Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals) 331995959X, 9783319959597

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Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals Series Editor: Walter Leal Filho

Walter Leal Filho · Anabela Marisa Azul Luciana Brandli · Amanda Lange Salvia Pinar Gökçin Özuyar · Tony Wall  Editors

Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals Series Editor Walter Leal Filho

The problems related to the process of industrialization such as biodiversity depletion, climate change, and a worsening of health and living conditions, especially but not only in developing countries, intensify. Therefore, there is also an increasing need to search for integrated solutions to make development more sustainable. The current model of economic growth used by many countries is heavily based on the exploitation of natural resources, which is not viable. Evidence shows that a more careful, that is, a more sustainable, approach to the use of our limited resources is needed. The United Nations has acknowledged the problem, and among other measures, it produced a set of documents at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2012. In 2015, the UN General Assembly approved the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” On January 1, 2016, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the Agenda officially came into force. These goals cover the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. There are to date no comprehensive publications addressing the SDGs in an integrated way. Therefore, the Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is being published. It encompasses 17 volumes, each devoted to one of the 17 SDGs. More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/15893

Walter Leal Filho • Anabela Marisa Azul • Luciana Brandli • Amanda Lange Salvia • Pinar Go¨kc¸in O¨zuyar • Tony Wall Editors

Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions With 39 Figures and 28 Tables

Editors Walter Leal Filho European School of Sustainability Science and Research Hamburg University of Applied Sciences Hamburg, Germany

Anabela Marisa Azul Center for Neuroscience and Cell Biology Institute for Interdisciplinary Research University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

Luciana Brandli Faculty of Engineering and Architecture Passo Fundo University Passo Fundo, Brazil

Amanda Lange Salvia University of Passo Fundo Passo Fundo, Brazil

Pinar Gökçin Özuyar Istinye University Istanbul, Turkey

Tony Wall University of Chester Chester, UK

ISSN 2523-7403 ISSN 2523-7411 (electronic) ISBN 978-3-319-95959-7 ISBN 978-3-319-95960-3 (eBook) ISBN 978-3-319-95961-0 (print and electronic bundle) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Series Preface

The United Nations General Assembly agreed and approved in September 2015 the document “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, which contains a set of measures aiming to balance economic progress and protection of the environment, while at the same time remain aware of the need to address the many disparities still seen between industrialized and developing countries. The Agenda document consists of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These Goals build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals, while including new areas such as climate change, economic inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice, among other priorities. The goals are interconnected – often the key to success on one will involve tackling issues more commonly associated with another. The 17 SDGs are: SDG 1, placing an emphasis on ending all forms of extreme poverty SDG 2, which aims to end hunger and achieve food security with improved nutrition SDG 3, focusing on ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all SDG 4, touches on one of the most important areas, namely inclusive and quality education SDG 5, focusing on gender equality SDG 6, which emphasizes the need for clean water and sanitation SDG 7, advocates the need for affordable and clean energy SDG 8, sustaining inclusive and sustainable economic growth with productive and decent working conditions for all SDG 9, which intends to foster industry, innovation, and infrastructure SDG 10, being about reducing inequalities among countries SDG 11, an attempt to ensure that human settlements and cities are inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable SDG 12, with a focus on sustainable consumption and production patterns SDG 13, with an emphasis on the need for climate action SDG 14, raises the need to preserve life below water, especially rivers and oceans SDG 15, draws attention about the need for a greater care about life on land SDG 16, which advocates peace, justice, and strong institutions SDG 17, a cross-SDGs effort to foster the partnership for the goals and their delivery The SDGs and their specific objectives are very complex. The mandate of the Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is, therefore, to v

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clarify and explain a wide range of terms associated with each SDG. It does so by gathering and presenting inputs provided by experts from across all areas of knowledge and from round the world, who explain each term and their implications, drawing also from the latest literature. With 17 volumes and involving in excess of 1,500 authors and contributors, the Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is the largest editorial project on sustainable development ever undertaken. We hope that this publication will be helpful in fostering a broader understanding of the SDGs, and that this process may inspire and support a wide range of initiatives aimed at their implementation, thus realizing the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. Hamburg University of Applied Sciences Germany

Walter Leal Filho

Volume Preface

According to the United Nations, the fundamental aim of Goal 16 to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Some of the means via which it may be achieved are: a) By significantly reducing all forms of violence and violence-related mortality everywhere. b) By ending the abuse and exploitation of children, child trafficking, torture and all forms of violence against children. c) By promoting the rule of law at national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all. d) By significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows by 2030, strengthening the recovery and restitution of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime. e) By significantly reducing corruption and bribery in all its forms. f) By building effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. g) By ensuring that decision-making at all levels is needs-based, inclusive, participatory and representative. In addition, SDG16 advocates an expansion and strengthening of the participation of developing countries in global governance institutions. Also, there is an expectation that, by 2030, all people have a legal identity, in particular through birth registration. Moreover, SDG16 wants to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international legal agreements. One item which deserves a special emphasis in the context of SDG16 is corruption. This phenomena, especially in developing countries, prevents an effective fight against poverty. It deprives the countries concerned of funds that are then not available for development. It thus hinders the achievement of SDG16 and the other international development goals set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Moreover, state institutions lose legitimacy, which often leads to destabilization. With this volume, we attempt to emphasize and also showcase the advantages of implementing SDG16 and illustrate the many efforts being undertaken in respect of research or practical actions, in order to implement it. Operationally, SDG16 may be achieved by supporting relevant national institutions, in particular through international cooperation, in building vii

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capacity at all levels to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime, especially in developing countries. In addition, it encompasses the promotion and enforcement of non-discriminatory legislation and policies in favour of sustainable development. We hope that the contributions on this volume will provide a timely support towards the implementation of SDG 16, and will help to foster the on-going global efforts towards achieving it. May 2021

Walter Leal Filho Anabela Marisa Azul Luciana Brandli Amanda Lange Salvia Pinar Gökçin Özuyar Tony Wall

List of Topics

Section Editor: Alexandra Aragão Free and Fair Elections to Electoral Integrity: Trends, Challenges, and Populism Political Trust in International Relations Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies Section Editor: Amanda Lange Salvia Conflict Bargaining and Resolution Strategies Environmental Mediation: Definition and Design Impact of Good Governance on Disaster Risk Management Multilateral and Unilateral Sanctions: Compliance and Challenges Section Editors: Amanda Lange Salvia and Petra Schneider Political Participation: Inclusion of Citizens in Democratic Opinion-Forming and DecisionMaking Processes Section Editors: Amanda Lange Salvia and Pinar Gökçin Özuyar Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development Section Editor: Dênis Antônio da Cunha Local Leadership: Types and Functions Measuring Governance to Achieve Sustainable Development: Promises and Challenges

Non-aggression Pacts: Reducing the Risk of Armed Conflict and Improving Global Cooperation Open Government: Conceptual Underpinnings, Benefits, and Relationship with SDGs Strong Institutions for Territorial Justice Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding

Section Editor: Golda A. Edwin Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities Distributive Justice at the Global, National, and Temporal Scales New Technologies Impact on Conflicts Peace Corps and Its Contribution Towards the Sustainable Development Goals Plurals of Citizenship: Instruments for Inclusion Political Pluralism to Address the Sustainable Development Goals Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs ix

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Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen Social Ventures for Sustainability Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

Section Editor: Julinda Beqiraj “Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals Ensuring Child Rights for a Just Society Immanent Justice: Concept and Implications Relative Deprivation and the Sustainable Development Goals Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Metagovernance Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

List of Topics

Section Editor: Petra Schneider Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions: A Case Study on Guatemala for Decision-Makers Emotional Intelligence and the Sustainable Development Goals: Supporting Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals Illicit Trafficking of Antiquities and Its Consequences on the SDGs International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms Nations and Nationalism Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals Transparent Governments, Social Innovation, and Their Role in Achieving the SDGs

Section Editor: Pinar Gökçin Özuyar Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices

Section Editor: Paula Duarte Lopes Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development Economic Deprivation: Approaches, Causes, and Consequences for Violent Conflicts Freedom of Artistic Expression Through the Lens of the Sustainable Development Goals Housing Discrimination Linking New and Protracted Conflicts to SDG16: Patterns and Trends Local Governance Unsentenced Detainees: Socioeconomic Burdens of Pre-trial Detention

Section Editor: Renata Welinski da Silva Seabra Capacity Development and Sustainable Development Goals Environmental Justice: Emergence to Implementation and Its Relation with SDGs Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society Impact of Climate Justice and Climate Change Cost Distribution on SDGs Indigenous Peoples: Conflict, Peace, and Resolution International Human Rights Treaties and the Sustainable Development Goals

List of Topics

Legal Aid: Promoting Sustainable Development Through Greater Access to Justice Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16 Peace Journalism and Sustainable Development Political Unrest: Factors and Impact Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

Section Editor: Tehmina Khan Climate Justice Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry Democracy in the Developed Countries Ethnic Conflict and the UN Sustainable Development Goals Good Governance to Nexus Governance in Support of the Sustainable Development Goals Grassroots Political Movement to Achieve SDGs in Developing Countries Institutional Innovation for Sustainability Moving Toward an Informative and Transparent Justice System Political Inclusion and Sustainability Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace Prison Abolition: Justice and Sustainable Development Through Alternatives to the Carceral State Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice Resolving Belt and Road Initiative Disputes Through Mediation Secession: Reasons, Relevance, and Exemplified Conflicts Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

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Section Editor: Thomas Kaydor, Jr. Challenges of International Criminal Law for Sustainable Development Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16 Effects of Economic Crimes on Sustainable Development Electronic Government for Trust Building Environmental Democracy for a Just and Peaceful Society Game Theory: Towards an Understanding of the Logic of Justice, Peace, and Institutions Governance of Traditional Local Institutions and Achieving SDG16 Human Trafficking and the Sustainable Development Goals: Building on Solid Ground Informational Justice: Equity of Access, Implementation, and Interaction Insurgency and Its Impact on the Attainment of Sustainable Development Goals Mass Atrocities: Definition and Relationship with Development Peace Education: History, Features, and Effectiveness Post-development Alternatives: Enduring Debates in Development Paradigms Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Under Political Instability and Growth of Populism Systemic Oppression and Geographical Dispositions Transitional Justice and the Sustainable Development Goals: Towards a Complementary Approach Transnational Organized Crime and UN Sustainable Development Goals

About the Editors

Walter Leal Filho is Professor and Director of the European School of Sustainability Science and Research, whose Headquarters are at the Hamburg University of Applied Sciences in Germany. He also holds the Chair of Environment and Technology at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. He is founding editor of the International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education and heads the Inter-University Sustainable Development Research Programme (IUSDRP), the world´s largest network of universities engaged on sustainable development research. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the World Sustainable Development series with Springer. Prof. Walter Leal serves on the editorial board of various journals. He has in excess of 400 publications to his credit, among which are groundbreaking books such as Universities as Living Labs for Sustainable Development: Supporting the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, Social Responsibility and Sustainability, and Handbook of Sustainability Science and Research. He has nearly 30 years of field experience in project management and has a particular interest in the connections between sustainability, climate change adaptation, and human behavior.

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About the Editors

Anabela Marisa Azul is a Researcher at the Center for Neuroscience and Cell Biology (CNC) and Institute for Interdisciplinary Research of the University of Coimbra (UC, Portugal). She holds a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences, with specialization in Ecology (2002, UC), and pursued her investigation on biology and ecology of fungi to pinpoint the role of mycorrhizal symbiosis for sustainability of Mediterranean forests under different land use scenarios, at the Centre for Functional Ecology (CFE-UC), where she became an Associate Researcher (from 2009 to 2014). At CFE-UC, Marisa Azul developed a holistic approach that combined innovation in food production with sustainable development and public scientific awareness to multiple actors. At CNC, from 2014 onward, she focuses her investigation on basic research and participatory research dynamics to pinpoint links between fungimetabolism-health/disease-sustainability. She has coedited over 40 scientific publications and book chapters, coedited four books for children and two comics, and coproduced an animation. Luciana Brandli is an Associate Professor at the University of Passo Fundo, Brazil, working in the Ph.D. Program in Civil and Environmental Engineering. Her current research interests include sustainability in higher education and green campus, management of urban infrastructure and sustainable cities, and the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. She supervises a number of master’s and doctoral students on engineering, environment, and sustainability issues and has in excess of 300 publications, including books, book chapters, and papers in refereed journals.

About the Editors

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Amanda Lange Salvia has a degree in Environmental Engineering from the University of Passo Fundo, Brazil, and graduate studies focused on sustainable cities and universities. Her work focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals, the role of universities towards sustainability and the impacts of climate change. Amanda has experience with international studies assessing aspects related to the 2030 Agenda and sustainability in higher education. She is a reviewer for various journals and is also a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education.

Pinar Gökçin Özuyar is a member of Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey. She received her B.S. degree in Environmental Engineering from Istanbul Technical University in 1992 and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Bogazici University Institute of Environmental Sciences, Istanbul, Turkey. Her Ph.D. thesis was based on the “Thermodynamic Analysis of Treatment Plants for Producing Energy from Solid Waste,” which she conducted in Germany with a joint scholarship from Forschungszentrum Jülich and TUBITAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey). Defining herself as a pracademic, she has more than 25 years of experience not only in academia but also in private sector working on environment and sector-specific activities in Turkey and Dubai (UAE). She has extensive expertise specifically in environmental auditing according to World Bank standards, which is required for international financing especially during company M&As and greenfield projects. Working over the years in projects involving different stakeholder groups with different priorities, she has the proven capacity for establishing a dialogue between such stakeholder groups. Although coming from a technical background, her academic work focuses on involving sustainable development into the

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strategies of corporations including higher academic institutions. Currently, she teaches and leads funded research on sustainability/sustainable development especially focusing on industrial ecology and regional development. Tony Wall is Founder and Head of the International Centre for Thriving, a global-scale collaboration between business, arts, health, and education to deliver sustainable transformation for the common good. He is passionate about thriving and has published 200+ works, including articles in quartile 1 journals such as The International Journal of Human Resource Management and Vocations and Learning, as well as global policy reports for the European Mentoring & Coaching Council in Brussels. Overall, his leadership and international impact in these areas have attracted numerous accolades including the prestigious Advance-HE National Teaching Fellowship and three Santander International Research Excellence Awards.

About the Section Editors

Alexandra Aragão Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR) University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

Julinda Beqiraj British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law London, UK

Dênis Antônio da Cunha Rural Economy Universidade Federal de Viçosa - UFV Viçosa, Brazil

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About the Section Editors

Renata Welinski da Silva Seabra Independent author and international environment law researcher Sao Paulo, Brazil

Golda A. Edwin Research and Development Association for Promoting Sustainability in Campuses and Communities (APSCC) Puducherry, India

Thomas Kaydor IBB Graduate School of International Studies University of Liberia Monrovia, Liberia

Tehmina Khan School of Accounting RMIT University Melbourne, VIC, Australia

About the Section Editors

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Amanda Lange Salvia University of Passo Fundo Passo Fundo, Brazil

Paula Duarte Lopes International Relations, Peace Studies University of Coimbra Faculty of Economics Centre for Social Studies Coimbra, Portugal

Petra Schneider Department for Water, Environment Civil Engineering and Safety Magdeburg-Stendal University of Applied Sciences Magdeburg, Germany Pinar Gökçin Özuyar Istinye University Istanbul, Turkey

Contributors

Therese Adam Global governance and Diplomacy, ETHZ, Berne, Switzerland Umar Abdullahi Ahmed Department of Economics, Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria Meherun Ahmed Department of Economics, Asian University for Women, Chattogram, Bangladesh Most Asikha Aktar Department of Economics, Comilla University, Cumilla, Bangladesh Tamer Al Najjar Trujillo University Jaume I, Castellón, Spain Md. Mahmudul Alam School of Economics, Finance and Banking, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia Iftekhar Alam Department of Social Work, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India Nelson Amaro Institute of Sustainable Development, Galileo University (Universidad Galileo), Guatemala City, Guatemala Kumari Anjali SOS, IGNOU, New Delhi, India Alexandra Aragão Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Mohammed Asaduzzaman Department of Public Administration, Islamic University, Kushtia, Bangladesh Laura C. Atkins Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL, USA Subrato Banerjee School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology - Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia Jacqueline Behrend School of Politics and Government, Universidad Nacional de San Martín/National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina Pravinya Bhangle Department of Economics, University of Goa, Goa, India xxi

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Contributors

Hitesh Bhatia School of Business and Law, Navrachana University, Vadodara, Gujarat, India Florian Biermann Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK C. J. Binesh Department of Social Work, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India Isabel M. Borges Faculty of Law, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Saheli Bose Department of Political Science, Seth Anandram Jaipuria College, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India Swgwmsar Brahma Assam University, Silchar, India Lisa Brown Clinical Psychology, Palo Alto University, Palo Alto, CA, USA Melissa Martins Casagrande Universidade Positivo, Curitiba, Brazil Deborah Casalin Law and Development Research Group, University of Antwerp Faculty of Law, Antwerp, Belgium Department of Public Law, Nelson Mandela University Law Faculty, Port Elizabeth, South Africa Úrsula Caser Mediatedomain, Lda., Parede, Portugal Shreya Chakraborty South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies, Hyderabad, India Eleni Christodoulou Georg Eckert Leibniz Institute, Germany

Braunschweig,

Giacomo Ciambotti Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy Salvatore Coluccello Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Coventry University, Coventry, UK Bassel Daher Texas A&M Energy Institute, College Station, TX, USA Institute for Science Technology and Public Policy, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA Diego Davila Faculty of Researches, High School of Public Administration, Bogotá, Colombia Catherine de Souza Santos Universidade Católica de Santos, Santos, Brazil E. Devabalane Department of Tourism, Tagore Government Arts and Science College, Puducherry, India Siraj Ud Doullah Department of Public Administration, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh Alessandra Farné University Jaume I, Castellón, Spain

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Rosa Maria Fernandez Department of Social and Political Science, Economics Programmes, University of Chester, Chester, UK Renata Fragoso Department of Business School, Positivo University, Curitiba, Brazil Sabine Iva Franklin University of Westminster, London, UK Sabina Garahan Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, Colchester, UK Jean-Pierre Gauci British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, UK The People for Change Foundation, San Gwann, Malta Miriam Gomez School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Arda Güçler Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University, İstanbul, Turkey C. Silva Hamie Department of International Affairs Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA Ahsan Hanif School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia Charles Hawksley Politics and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia Richard Hazenberg Institute for Social Innovation and Impact, University of Northampton, Northampton, UK David Hulme Global Development Institute and Effective States and Inclusive Development Centre, University of Manchester, Manchester, Lancashire, UK Reina Ichii School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia Akramul Islam Bangladesh Judiciary, Dhaka, Bangladesh Mohammad Tarikul Islam Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh Lamia Islam Department of Political Science, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh Mine Islar LUCSUS-Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies, Lund, Sweden Daniel Jackson City Mission PNG, Madang, Madang Province, Papua New Guinea P. S. Janaki Krishna Centre for Sustainable Development, Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad, India Pantea Javidan Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

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Nadeshda Jayakody Melbourne, VIC, Australia Henning Jessen Maritime Law and Policy, World Maritime University (WMU), Malmö, Sweden David Tejs Joerring The University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Jithin Joseph Department of English Studies, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India Liliana Lyra Jubilut Universidade Católica de Santos, Santos, Brazil Nikhil Kant SOMS, IGNOU, New Delhi, India Anna Khalfaoui Open Society Justice Initiative, London, UK Jong Dae Kim College of Business Administration, Inha University, Incheon, South Korea Priyanka Kothari Jindal Global Business School, O P Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India South Asian University, New Delhi, India Shiv Nadar University, Noida, UP, India Amit Kumar Department of Political Science, Munshi Singh College, BR Ambedkar Bihar University, Motihari, India Rajeev Kumar Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur, West Bengal, India Nimkit Lepcha Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Management, Sikkim University, Gangtok, Sikkim, India Valesca Lima Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Rafael Gustavo Lima Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil Dulce Lopes Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Johannes M. Luetz School of Social Sciences, Christian Heritage College (CHC), Brisbane/Carindale, QLD, Australia School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, NSW, Australia School of Social Sciences, University of the Sunshine Coast (USC), Maroochydore, QLD, Australia Carla Luís Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Madhuri Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, Delhi, India

Contributors

Contributors

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Athir Mahmud Harvard University Extension School, Cambridge, MA, USA Debora V. Malito Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, People’s Republic of China Cátia Marques Cebola Polytechnic of Leiria, Leiria, Portugal Roberta Holanda Maschietto Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Kaye McBurnie School of Social Sciences, Christian Heritage College (CHC), Brisbane/Carindale, QLD, Australia Md. Abdul Kaium Masud Department of Sustainability Management, Inha University, Incheon, South Korea Department of Business Administration, Noakhali Science and Technology University, Noakhali, Bangladesh Carmen Amado Mendes School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Kristin Meyer International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Belgrade, Serbia R. K. Mishra Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad, India Md Nurul Momen Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Rajshahi, Bangladesh Vanesa Menéndez Montero Department of Public International Law and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Sara Moreno Pires GOVCOPP, Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal Mandana Mostofi Palo Alto University, Palo Alto, CA, USA Edwin Murillo Faculty of Law, Santiago of Cali’s University, Cali, Colombia Daniela Nascimento Faculty of Economics, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Syeda Nafisa Nawal Health Nutrition and Population Program, BRAC, BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh Department of Economics, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh Samara da Silva Neiva University of Southern of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil Yulia Nesterova The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, SAR, China Sylke Nissen Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany Eloísa Nos Aldás University Jaume I, Castellón, Spain

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Joao Alfredo Lopes Nyegray Positivo University, Curitiba, Brazil David Mathias Paaske Faculty of Humanities, Center for Applied Philosophy, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark Konstantinos Pappas Texas A&M Energy Institute, College Station, TX, USA Claire Paterson-Young Institute for Social Innovation and Impact, University of Northampton, Northampton, UK Salvin Paul Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Management, Sikkim University, Gangtok, Sikkim, India Pascoal Pereira Law Department, Universidade Portucalense – Oporto Global University, Porto, Portugal Chiara Pierobon Department of Sociology, Center for German and European Studies (CGES/ZDES), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany Alexandra Polido GOVCOPP, Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal Maheema Rai Gangtok, India Cláudia Toriz Ramos Universidade Fernando Pessoa, CEPESE (Centro de Estudos da População, Economia e Sociedade), Porto, Portugal Fernando Restoy Emotional Intelligence Coach and Educator, Madrid, Spain Francisco José Rufián Fernández Faculty of Law, Autonoma University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain Heritage for Peace, Madrid, Spain Isber Sabrine Milá I Fontanals Institution (Spanish National Research Council), Barcelona, Spain Polina Sadovskaya Free Expression Programs, PEN America, New York, NY, USA Krishna Kumar Saha Comilla University, Cumilla, Bangladesh Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium Sofia José Santos Faculty of Economics, Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal André Saramago Faculty of Economy, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal P. S. Sarathlal Department of Economics, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India Antonio Savoia Global Development Institute and Effective States and Inclusive Development Centre, University of Manchester, Manchester, Lancashire, UK

Contributors

Contributors

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Rajesh Sharma School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia Evan N. Shenkin Department of Sociology, Western Oregon University, Monmouth, OR, USA José Irivaldo Alves Oliveira Silva Department of Public Management, Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande, Brazil Nilay Ranjan Singh IGNOU, Govt. of India, New Delhi, India Navin Sinha School of Business and Law, Navrachana University, Vadodara, Gujarat, India Pavithra Siriwardhane School of Accounting, Information Systems and Supply Chain, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Diana Soeiro Instituto de Ciências Sociais – Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal Andrea Sottini Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy Jennifer Speed Department of Religious Studies, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA Alexander I. Stingl Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) and Center for Interdisciplinary Methodologies (CIM), University of Warwick (UK), Coventry, UK Global Legal Studies Network (GLSN), Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH), Paris, France Paris Institute for Critical Thinking (PICT), Paris, France A. Shahin Sultana Department of Social Work, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India Kamani Sylva Department of Engineering Management, Faculty of Engineering, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka Natalia Szablewska Law School, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand Hogr Tarkhani School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal Madhura Thombre School of Business and Law, Navrachana University, Vadodara, Gujarat, India Julie Trébault Artists at Risk Connection (ARC), PEN America, New York, NY, USA Nasir Uddin Department of Public Administration, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh

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Gaby Umbach Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy Lia Vasconcelos Faculty of Sciences and Technology, New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Petri Virtanen University of Vaasa (Social and Health Management), Vaasa, Finland Donato Vozza Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity, Coventry University, Coventry, UK Elyse Wakelin Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK Christine Wamsler Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies (LUCSUS), Lund, Sweden Washaya Washaya School of Business and Economics, Faculty of Diplomacy and Sustainable Development, Euclid University, Harare, Zimbabwe Pui-Hang Wong Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht, The Netherlands Marian Yankson-Mensah International Nuremberg Principles Academy, Nuremberg, Germany Sekander Zulker Nayeen Bangladesh Judiciary, Dhaka, Bangladesh SDG Lab, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Contributors

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Abolition Democracy

Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human ▶ Prison Abolition: Justice and Sustainable Right Development Through Alternatives to the Carceral State

Abolitionism ▶ Prison Abolition: Justice and Sustainable Development Through Alternatives to the Carceral State

Valesca Lima1,2 and Miriam Gomez2 1 Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland 2 School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Definition Access to justice is a basic principle of the rule of law. It is a fundamental right that allows individuals to use legal tools and mechanisms to protect their rights.

Aboriginal Population ▶ Indigenous Peoples: Conflict, Peace, and Resolution

Abuse of Power ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Introduction Access to justice is a fundamental right that must be guaranteed in democratic, participatory, and egalitarian societies. It is the right of all individuals to use the legal tools and mechanisms to protect their other rights. There is no access to justice when, for economic, social, or political reasons, people are discriminated against by law and justice systems.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right

In general, access to justice guarantees that people can go before the courts to demand their rights be protected, regardless of their economic, social, political, migratory, racial, or ethnic status or their religious affiliation, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Access, to be real, must be broad and free from discrimination. Proper access to justice allows individuals to protect themselves from violations of their rights, offering a remedy to the consequences of tort and holding executive power accountable. Access to justice is not easily defined. It is much more than improving an individual’s access to courts or guaranteeing legal representation, but it can be defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable (UNDP 2004). If the modern state has determined the prohibition of violence, there must exist the options of access to an impartial body to resolve the conflicts that people may have. The concept of access to justice has varied throughout history according to the prevailing ideas, determined by the era of development of social rights. Not only must access to the jurisdiction be postulated but access must be effective, that is, people must have a real chance of accessing justice (Lugaro 2003). As an important element of the rule of law, acess to justice is a vital part of civil, criminal, and administrative law. It is both a process and a goal, and it is crucial for individuals seeking to benefit from other procedural and substantive rights (FRA 2016). Turning now to the Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, this entry considers the access to justice as a basic principle of the rule of law. In this entry, we use human rights-based approach to access to justice from a human rights perspective. We describe the legal complexity and richness of the concept of access to justice, including formal and informal justice systems, as well as to the barriers and types of support to promote access to justice. The Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law and Access to Justice as a Human Right “Without access to justice, people cannot make their voices heard, exercise their rights, cope

with discrimination or hold decision-makers accountable,” states in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the 30 November 2012. The Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law emphasized the right to equal access to justice for all, including legal assistance to vulnerable groups. It reaffirmed the commitment of member states to take all necessary measures to provide fair, transparent, effective, nondiscriminatory, and accountable services that promote access to justice. The activities of the United Nations in support of the initiatives of member states ensure access to justice is a basic component of the work in the area of the rule of law (Elgebeily 2017). The administration of justice must be impartial and nondiscriminatory. In the Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, member states emphasized that the independence of the judicial system, together with its impartiality and integrity, is an essential prerequisite for supporting the rule of law and ensuring that justice is administered without discrimination (paragraph 13). Following the release of the declaration, in December 2012, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems Document (resolution 67/187), the first international instrument about the right to legal assistance in criminal justice systems providing a practical guidance on how to ensure access to effective legal aid services in criminal matters. Internationally, the UN Human Rights Committee has pioneered the treaty bodies of the United Nations in interpreting the concepts of access to justice. Access to justice is also protected in UN instruments such as the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006 and other convent, as, for example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly.

Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right

In European human rights law, the notion of access to justice is incorporated into Article 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which guarantee the right to a fair trial and to an effective remedy, respectively, in the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). These rights are also foreseen in international instruments such as, for example, in Article 2 paragraph 3 and Article 14 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in Article 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The main elements of these rights include the effective access to a dispute resolution body, the right to a fair trial and the timely resolution of disputes, the right to an adequate remedy, as well as the general application of the principles of efficiency and effectiveness of justice. More recently, the UN General Assembly, in resolution 67/1 on 24 September 2012, expressed its willingness to guarantee the right to equal access to justice for all, including to people belonging to vulnerable groups. While plenty has been done at the international and European levels, a lot still needs to be done in regards to effectiveness and awareness of access to justice. Daily challenges have hindered this access, especially for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

Access to Justice Perspectives The legal complexity and richness of the concept of access to justice lie in the fact that it is both a right and the means of restoring the exercise of rights that have been disregarded or violated. As an indispensable component of specific rights, such as the right to liberty and to personal safety, it is closely linked to the right to effective judicial protection (fair trial or due process), the right to an effective remedy, and the right to equality (Despouy 2008). There are three main mechanisms of justice: formal justice systems, informal justice systems, and transitional justice and restorative justice.

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• Formal Justice Systems: The structure and competence of formal mechanisms derive from laws, policies, and regulations developed by the government. They operate as part of the government and are financed by the state. Its function is to interpret and resolve conflicts over the laws, as well as to determine the responsibility for its violation. In federal systems, formal justice mechanisms can also derive from the power of a specific federal entity within the national state. The official courts are the center of the formal justice sector. The principal actors in the formal justice sector may include judges, prosecutors, attorneys, court support personnel, and those who provide services to survivors by court order. The formal justice sector can also include mechanisms outside the courts, such as arbitration, mediation, or restorative justice. Law enforcement officers, such as the police, also interact closely with both the formal and informal justice sectors (Silvers et al. 1998). • Informal Justice Systems: The power of informal justice mechanisms comes from social groups or community structures that are not part of the government. These social groups or structures may include specific ethnic or religious communities, rituals or traditions, indigenous governance systems, or local community organizations. In informal justice sector, leaders or local decision-makers are selected from within the community to implement justice through informal mechanisms. They preside over instances similar to courts of law, or they may act in a totally different environment (such as a community meeting or a private house). They can receive payment from the parties or from an external entity, or they can provide their services free of charge as part of their role in the community. The community and the public can also play an important role in informal procedures and in the implementation of decisions (UNDP 2017; Thomas et al. 2011). • Transitional Justice: It derives from accountability and reparation for victims, as they are recognized their dignity as citizens and as human beings. Some government and institutions opt for ignoring the massive abuses as a

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way to deal with this issue, but it destroys the values in which any worthy justice system must settle. Massive atrocities and systematic abuses destroy societies, and their legacy can produce fragility, weakness, instability, politicization, and scarcity of resources to political and judicial institutions such as Parliament, the courts, the police, prosecutors, etc. Violations of rights undermine citizens confidence in the ability of the state to safeguard their rights and security. It not uncommon for communities to be destroyed and social and political organizations weakened in this context. The need to respond with legitimacy to these violations of massive rights is what defines transitional justice (ICTJ 2009). The objectives of transitional justice will vary in each situation, although its features – the recognition of the dignity of individuals, the reparation and admission of violations of rights, and the objective of preventing their repetition – are constant. Among its complementary objectives are (ICTJ 2009): Create responsible institutions and regain confidence in them. – Enable access to justice for the most vulnerable social sectors after violations of rights. – Ensure that women and marginalized groups truly participate in the search for a just society. – Respect the rule of law. – Facilitate peace processes and promote durable resolutions for conflicts. – Laying the foundations to address the underlying causes of conflict and marginalization. – Promote reconciliation. The magnitude of the abuses and the social fragility mean that sometimes not all violations of rights are addressed as would be done under normal circumstances. Normally, four types of approaches are implemented (ICTJ 2009): – Criminal proceedings, at least against those most responsible for the most serious crimes.

– “Truth clarification” processes (or investigations) on violations of rights by non-judicial bodies. They are diverse initiatives, but they tend to focus not only on events, but also on their causes and consequences. – Reparations of various forms – individual, collective, material, and symbolic – in case of human rights violations. – Legal and institutional reforms that may affect the police, justice, military, and military information services. These approaches should not be considered mutually exclusive. For example, truth commissions do not replace judicial processes, because their objectives are different, as they offer a much greater degree of recognition and combat the culture of denial. Likewise, constitutional, legal, and institutional reforms do not exclude other measures but directly point to the recovery of trust and the prevention of new abuses.

Normative Framework The triad of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights forms the core of international human rights law. States ratifying the Covenants agree that they will abide by the rights enshrined in these treaties and work toward respecting, protecting, and fulfilling these obligations domestically through institutional mechanisms (Francioni 2007). According to the above international instruments, the fundamental right of Access to Justice has been enshrined in the: 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the cornerstone of international human rights law. The UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 217A (UN 1948). Article 7 and 8 provide for the right to equality before the law without discrimination,

Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right

equal protection of the law, and the right to an effective remedy by competent national tribunals. 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): It is one of the two treaties that give legal force to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights builds on the UDHR. Like Article 7 of the UDHR, Article 2.1 of the ICCPR provides for nondiscrimination, notably on the basis of social origin or status, meaning that ability to pay should not be a barrier to claiming rights. This is also reinforced in Article 26 which provides that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the law, without discrimination; the ICCPR also contains Article 14 which specifically addresses the administration of justice and equality before the courts and tribunals. The ICCPR reinforces the principles of equal (nondiscriminatory) access, which entails equality of arms between parties and an effective system of competent authorities for hearing disputes (Kovacs 2016). 3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR): The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contains no direct counterpart to Article 2 of the ICCPR, which obligates state parties to provide judicial remedy. However, the ICESCR notes in its preamble that “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights” which includes “appropriate means of redress, or remedies and appropriate means of ensuring governmental accountability” (UN CESCR 1998). Other instruments deserve to be mentioned, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Elimination of

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All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ICMW) and the members of their families. Once the access to justice problem has been broadly identified, it needs to be interpreted in terms of Human Rights. To do this, this entry compares the current situation to how it should ideally be according to international human rights conventions and treaties and the national legal framework (UNDP 2005). The relevance of access to justice within the human rights framework must be considered at least at three levels: as a fundamental human right recognized for all persons; in terms of its linkages with a range of human rights issues, especially in relation to human rights in the administration of justice; and the role of access to justice in the enforcement of human rights in general. The next section introduces the approach of human rights regarding to guidance on access to justice.

Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice Through ratification of international human rights treaties, governments committed to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty obligations and duties. Where domestic legal proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and procedures for individual complaints or communications are available at the regional and international levels to help ensure that international human rights standards are indeed respected, implemented, and enforced at the local level (Desai 2013). The sources of international law reflect access to justice as equivalent to access to courts and put strong focus on judicial remedies, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In its Article 8, it declares that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted by the constitution or by law. Other classic sources of international law offer similar concepts pointing in the same direction, such as the International Covenant on Civil and

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Political Rights which in its Article 2, which refers in a similar way to an effective remedy for all the rights in the convention and further guarantees the right to take proceedings before a court, or its Article 9 about the right to a fair and public hearing. At the international level, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has since its establishment led the way among the UN treaty bodies on interpreting concepts related to access to justice. However, more recently, better and broader concept in other international instruments are available. An example of attemps to broader concept of access to justice is the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. This is a Convention of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) focused on transparency and accountability which links human and environmental rights. The concept of access to justice is referred to in the title, the preamble and in Article 1, 3, 9, and 10. According to this concept, positive obligations are imposed upon the state parties. The most important feature of the Convention is that it establishes quite firm parameters and standards which must be satisfied in order to fulfill the states’ duties and grant adequate enjoyment of the right of access to justice for individuals and the general public (Pinedo 2011). This Convention defines access to justice as access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law. The public has the right to judicial or administrative recourse procedures in case a contracting party violates or fails to adhere to environmental law and the convention’s principles. In the second place, is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as the notion of effective access to justice is now defined in a broad manner in a United Nations treaty, calling for flexibility in procedural law and training. Article 13 of the Convention places an obligation upon states to ensure equal access to justice to persons with disabilities: “1. States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others,

including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages. 2. In order to help to ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those working in the field of administration of justice, including police and prison staff” (CRPD 2006). While in the European law, the notion of access to justice has been restricted to access to courts and the existence of a judicial remedy, it is now obvious that this is not so anymore in international law. For the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the concept extends to all different stages of a justice process, starting at the moment an individual recognizes a grievance and ends with the exercise of a concrete procedural remedy that respects fundamental rights (UNDP 2004). An important avenue for improving access to justice is the provision of legal services to the poor. The next section analyzes the empowerment of the poor via access to justice. Empowerment of the Poor Through Access to Justice In many developing countries, laws, institutions, and policies governing economic and social interactions do not afford equal opportunity and protection to a large segment of the population, who are mostly poor minorities, women, and other disadvantaged groups. Instead of fostering inclusive and equitable growth, some laws and institutions tend to impose barriers and biases against those groups. Even where there are laws that protect the rights of the poor, they are often too ambiguous and costly for them to access (UNGeneral Assembly 2010). Poverty is not simply the lack of material goods and opportunities such as employment and ownership of productive assets and savings. It is also the lack of intangible assets and social goods, such as legal identity, good health, physical integrity, freedom from fear and violence, organizational capacity, the ability to exert political influence, and the ability to claim rights and

Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right

live in respect and dignity. The poor are not a homogenous group; vulnerabilities and challenges faced vary among persons living in poverty. A human rights approach to development is fundamentally concerned with empowerment, believing that poverty results from disempowerment and multiple exclusions. Poverty can be seen as both the cause and consequence of the exclusion from the rule of law (UN and the Rule of Law 2009). Justice for the poor reflects an understanding of the need for demand-oriented, community-driven approach to justice and governance reform, which values the perspectives of the users, particularly the poor and marginalized as women, youth, and ethnic minorities (The World Bank 2006). The capacity of marginalized groups is influenced by their legal awareness (basic knowledge of the justice system), legal counsel (access to legal services availed by government and non-government institutions, availability of formal and informal mechanisms), and capacity to access justice services – judicial and quasi-judicial services (Maru 2010). The UNDP hosted the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor as an independent international organization. This Commission was established in 2005 as the “first global initiative to focus on the link between exclusion, poverty, and the law.” Drawing upon 3 years of research, the Commission proposed strategies for creating inclusive development initiatives that would empower those living in poverty through increased protections and rights. Its final 2008 report, “Making the Law Work for Everyone,” argued that as many as four billion people worldwide are “robbed of the chance to better their lives and climb out of poverty, because they are excluded from the rule of law” (UNDP 2008). To escape the poverty trap, the poor need a legal system that enables them to realize the full value of their physical and human capital. For the legal system to play a role in empowering the poor to lift themselves out of poverty, they need more than laws conferring the appropriate mix of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities; they also need a legal and judicial system that can make these legal entitlements practical and

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meaningful. Empowering the poor and disadvantaged to seek remedies for injustice requires efforts to develop and strengthen linkages between formal and informal structures and to counter biases inherent in both systems (UNDP 2008). Access to justice as a human right is essential to address the origin of poverty. Without access to justice, people living in poverty can neither claim nor exercise a wide range of human rights nor face the abuses or violations committed against them. People living in poverty face serious obstacles to accessing justice systems, which include physical, social, and financial barriers and perpetuate and exacerbate their disadvantages. The lack of information about their rights and illiteracy or language barriers, together with the entrenched stigma associated with poverty, also hinder the interaction of the poor with the justice system. In these circumstances, a person living in poverty cannot defend their rights or face justice (OACNUDH 2012). The legal system can play an important role in supporting poverty eradication by giving poor people access to the appropriate mix of rights and remedies. However, laws that discriminate against, or ignore, the rights and livelihoods of the poor can pose serious obstacles to the eradication of poverty. In a system that works against them, the poor survive by mixing customary practice with ingenuity, creating informal structures that can at times be more effective than their formal counterparts (UN and the Rule of Law 2009). Ensuring access to justice for the poor requires laws and judicial systems that work well and that not only reflect the interests of rich and more powerful groups, but also consider income and power inequalities. Reforms should be implemented with the effective and meaningful participation of people living in poverty. It is important to highlight that women living in poverty face particular difficulties in accessing justice, which is a major cause of their increased vulnerability to poverty, which means that efforts to address poverty must include the empowerment of women to that seek justice and ensure that the justice system does not discriminate against them (OACNUDH 2012).

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Despite some advances in expanding access to justice to vulnerable groups, there are barriers that stand between ordinary people with legal problems and their effective access to justice. These barriers are considered in the follow section.

Barriers to Access to Justice The access to justice is often hindered by economic, structural, and institutional factors. In many situations, the complexity and the cost of legal processes, as well as geographical and physical constraints, prevent poor and marginalized groups from accessing the justice system. Among other factors, costs and trust in the justice system determine whether someone will seek legal assistance or act to resolve their legal problems (Barakat 2018). According to UNDP (2004), the first step of the access to justice reform is the identification of barriers. These should be categorized and identified in order to promote better lawmaking and policies. As summarized by UNDP, there are barriers in access to justice from the user’s perspective, which is frequently weakened by: 1. Long delays; prohibitive costs of using the system; lack of available and affordable legal representation that is reliable and has integrity; abuse of authority and powers, resulting in unlawful searches, seizures, detention, and imprisonment; and weak enforcement of laws and implementation of orders and decrees 2. Severe limitations in existing remedies provided either by law or in practice. Most legal systems fail to provide remedies that are preventive, timely, nondiscriminatory, adequate, just, and deterrent 3. Gender bias and other barriers in the law and legal systems: inadequacies in existing laws effectively fail to protect women, children, poor, and other disadvantaged people, including those with disabilities and low levels of literacy 4. Lack of de facto protection, especially for women, children, and men in prisons or centers of detention

5. Lack of adequate information about what is supposed to exist under the law, what prevails in practice, and limited popular knowledge of rights 6. Lack of adequate legal aid systems 7. Limited public participation in reform programs 8. Excessive number of laws 9. Formalistic and expensive legal procedures (in criminal and civil litigation and in administrative board procedures) 10. Avoidance of the legal system due to economic reasons, fear, or a sense of futility of purpose Amid the main obstacles above, “legal awareness” that is the access to understandable rules is of chief importance. The lack of statistics available to the public and the lack of information offered to citizens about their own rights are an acute impediment for the realization of the access to justice. Ideally, citizens should have access to appropriate information on public authorities and the conditions in which the laws are drafted. It is also just as important for citizens to have information how judicial institutions work, so to become more understandable to stakeholders, especially to ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups (Carboni 2014). It is important to consider that despite the determination to remove barriers and the good intentions of regulators and supranational agencies, it is necessary to revisit the barriers now and then to evaluate whether new solutions may be available and how effective or successful any previous endeavor to remove barriers was. After identifying obstacles to access to justice, this entry now moves to an examination of the different types of support to promote access to justice and overcome barriers.

Types of Support to Promote Access to Justice By strengthening access to justice, the United Nations system collaborates with national partners to develop strategic plans and programs

Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right

for justice reform and service delivery. United Nations entities provide support to member states in strengthening justice in areas such as monitoring and evaluation; the empowerment of the poor and marginalized to seek resources and reparations in the face of injustice; the improvement of legal protection, legal awareness, and legal assistance; the supervision of civil and parliamentary society; the response to challenges in the justice sector such as police brutality, inhuman conditions of incarceration, prolonged periods of preventive detention, as well as the impunity of perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence and other serious crimes related to conflicts; and the strengthening of links between official and informal structures (UNDP 2017). Specific justice mechanism relates to supporting justice and related systems, with focus on formal mechanisms of justice, especially processes of adjudication through the judiciary. The most relevant are (UNDP 2004, 2005): – Legal protection: Provision of legal standing in formal or traditional law involves the development of capacities to ensure that the rights of disadvantaged people are recognized within the scope of justice systems, thus giving entitlement to remedies through either formal or traditional mechanisms such a ratification and implementation of treaties in local law or implementation of constitutional law. – Legal awareness: Lack of legal awareness is a serious impediment to accessing justice, in particular for the poor who are less likely to be familiar with their rights and less likely to use the formal system. Information needs vary significantly depending on local context. For instance, labor rights tend to be more important in urban areas, whereas land rights are the main concern in rural areas. Linking judges, prosecutors, and police with community groups can enhance community legal awareness, increase public trust in the state, and improve the capacity of the legal apparatus to respond to the needs of the poor. – Enforcement: For rights to be effective they have to be capable of being enforced. It is critical to support the capacities to enforce

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civil court decisions and to institute reasonable appeal procedures against arbitrary actions. The functioning of enforcement systems is key to minimizing disadvantaged people’s insecurity. It is a precondition for accountability and the elimination of impunity. Many crucial problems in justice systems, both formal and traditional, can often be traced back to deficient systems of enforcement. The performance of, for example, prosecution departments in government influences the effectiveness of the criminal justice system; the police also play a fundamental role in ensuring access to justice, particularly since it is the point of first contact in the criminal justice (UNDP 2004). – Public participation: The creation of civic oversight mechanisms can be a major entry point for larger reforms in the justice system, particularly in developing democracies. For instance, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) of South Africa ensures civilian participation in the process of handling citizens’ complaints against police personnel, and it may be a strategic entry point for a larger process of reform within the police. – Legal Aid: Development of the capacities that people need to enable them to initiate and pursue justice procedures. Legal aid and counsel can involve professional lawyers, paralegals, or both. Legal awareness can help disadvantaged people understand they have valuable rights, such as protection from forced evictions, forced labor without pay, or torture. Availability, affordability, and adequacy are the three major challenges faced by poor people and other disadvantaged groups when it comes to legal aid. Legal aid, like legal awareness, requires the intervention of both government and non-government actors. The direct and indirect effect of provisions to expand the access to justice have a strong impact on poverty. Public participation, for example, is closely linked with poverty reductions, since being poor and marginalized means to be deprived of choices and opportunities. It also has strong impact on crime and conflict reduction (Jodoin

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and Segger 2013). Reforms in the judiciary seeking to increase access to justice require an approach that involves building support from pre-existing strengths and protection of rights, specially the rights of the disadvantaged groups.

Conclusions Currently, access to justice is connected to international and national structures for the protection of human rights. It is a fundamental human right, as well as a key to defend other rights. The rise of access to justice suggests that there may be an opportunity to get this right effectively recognize as a fundamental right and prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all rights guaranteed by international, regional, and national norms. Yet, several challenges to legal and judicial access remains firmly in place, and access to justice is insignificant if not implemented equitably and uniformly in light of constitutional rights (Lam 2006). Individual access to international justice remains exceptional and based on specific treaty arrangements, rather than on general principles of international law, and also, even when such a right is guaranteed as a matter of treaty obligation, other norms or doctrines of international law may effectively impede its exercise, as in the case of sovereign immunity or non-reviewability of UN Security Council measures directly affecting individuals (Francioni 2007).

Cross-References ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Environmental Justice: Emergence to Implementation and Its Relation with SDGs ▶ Informational Justice: Equity of Access, Implementation, and Interaction ▶ International Human Rights Treaties and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

References Barakat S (2018) The cost of justice: exploratory assessment on women’s access to justice in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen. Policy and Practice. Oxfam report. https://doi.org/10.21201/2018.2593 ISBN 9781-78748-259-3 Carboni N (2014) From quality to access to justice: improving the functioning of European judicial systems. J Civil Legal Sci 3:1–9. OMICS International Desai M (2013) The paradigm of international social development: ideologies, development systems and policy approaches. Routledge, New York, USA Despouy L (2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (A/HRC/8/4). Human Rights Council, United Nations, Geneva Elgebeily S (2017) The rule of law in the United Nations Security Council decision-making process: turning the focus inwards. Routledge, New York FRA (2016) Manuale di diritto europeo in materia di accesso alla giustizia. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Wien Francioni F (2007) Access to justice as a human right. Oxford University Press, New York ICTJ (2009) What is Transitional Justice? The International Center for Transitional Justice, New York Jodoin S, Segger M-CC (2013) Sustainable development, international criminal justice, and treaty implementation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kovacs PR (2016) Access to justice and the international human rights framework. Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) Lam JH (2006) The rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: lessons on improving access to justice for women and religious minorities note. Geo Wash Int Law Rev 38:101–130 Lugaro JAM (2003) Un derecho humano esencial: el acceso a la justicia. Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico Maru V (2010) Access to justice and legal empowerment: a review of World Bank practice. Hague J Rule Law 2:259–281 OACNUDH (2012) Addressing poverty requires improving the access of the poor to justice. Statement from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Available at: https://www.unric.org/en/ latest-un-buzz/27928-tackling-poverty-requires-improvingaccess-to-justice-for-the-poor-un-expert-onextremepoverty Pinedo M (2011) Access to justice as hope in the darkin search for a new concept in european law. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. 1(19):9–19 Silvers A, Wasserman DT, Mahowald M, Mahowald MB (1998) Formal justice. In: Disability, difference, discrimination: perspectives on justice in bioethics and public policy. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham The World Bank (2006) Justice for the Poor (J4P). Justice for the poor and understanding processes of change in Local Governance-Sierra Leone: Concept note.

Armed Opposition Groups Thomas C, Young L, Ellingen M, Alarcon M, Askin DK, Dailey L, Bjallerstedt GR, Fitzgerald T, Frederick L, Koycheva A, Lee A, Campbell A, Lulo SA, MacIntosh P, Marques A, Pap E (2011) Working with the justice sector to end violence against women and girls, Justice Sector Module. UN Woman, New York UN (1948) The universal declaration of human rights, United Nations, Geneva UN (2006) Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (CRPD), United Nations, Geneva UN (2010) Guidance notes of the secretary-general – United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice UN and the Rule of Law (2009) Report of the SecretaryGeneral on Legal empowerment of the poor and eradication of poverty (Legal Empowerment No. A/64/ 133). UN, Office of Legal Affairs, New York UN CESCR (1998) General Comment No. 9: the domestic application of the Covenant (No. E/C.12/1998/24). UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) UNDP (2004) Access to justice practice note (Practice note), access to justice and rule of law. Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, New York UNDP (2005) Programming for justice: access for all – a practitioner’s guide to a human rights-based approach to access to justice. United Nations and The Rule of Law, New York UNDP (2008) Making the Law Work for everyone: report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (No. vol 1). The United Nations Development Programme, New York UNDP (2017) UNDP strategic plan, 2018–2021 – the United Nations entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women

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Agent Behavior ▶ Game Theory: Towards an Understanding of the Logic of Justice, Peace, and Institutions

Alternative Dispute Resolution ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

Alternatives to Development ▶ Post-development Alternatives: Debates in Development Paradigms

Enduring

Anti-development ▶ Post-development Alternatives: Debates in Development Paradigms

Enduring

Accountability ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

Armed Non-state Actors ▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16

Accountability and Transparency

Armed Opposition Groups

▶ Impact of Good Governance on Disaster Risk Management

▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16

A

B

“Blood Money”: From Compensation to ▶ Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Transformative Justice for Under Political Instability and Growth of Peace and Sustainability Back and Forth

Populism

Behavior Change ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices

Shreya Chakraborty1 and Subrato Banerjee2,3 1 South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies, Hyderabad, India 2 School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology - Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India 3 Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

Synonyms

Big Data

Compensation; Reparation; Restitution

▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts

Definition

Bisahi ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

A perpetrator: It is an agent that acts in a manner that leads to a deterioration of the general wellbeing of the agent acted upon. The said action, called perpetration, could be accompanied by individual intent, directed specifically at certain target agents, or it could simply be an unconscious

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

consequence of social constructs that do not account for the well-being of certain agents. The former includes many examples of genocides, and the latter includes examples of race discrimination, witch hunt, et cetera. An agent could be an individual, a group, or even a nation. Victim: Victim is an agent who is on the receiving end of the said perpetration. Examples of victims include aboriginals who have wrongfully been forced to evict their home-lands, women who have been physically abused in the name of witch hunt, nonwhite people who have been discriminated against on matters of social and economic importance (e.g., in the labor market), and so on. Typically, a victim therefore, is an agent that has experienced some form of a violation of human rights. Reparation: Reparation (interchangeably restitution or compensation) is an act directed toward a victim, with an associated objective to mitigate, nullify, or reverse the long-term and the shortterm ill-effects of all forms of perpetration that may have previously compromised the wellbeing of the victim.

Introduction Claiming and delivering justice for victims in the face of destruction, loss, and violence is not new to human society. Varied forms of justice mechanisms for victims have been practiced for centuries. In primitive societies, violence or harm was avenged personally by members of the family or clan through physical revenge and blood feuds (Laster 1970). One example is that of nomadic Arab tribes, where blood-feud was practiced as a form of personal or familial justice (Hardy 1963). This institution found its basis in a societal structure built around clans wherein members of a clan would engage in this feud of vengeance as a matter of honor. Additionally, there were local religious beliefs around death and soul, wherein it was believed that the soul of a person murdered could not rest until it was avenged. As society became more economically developed based on markets, property and economic status became equated with physical and mental

well-being. Justice, in the form of personal revenge over the offender, attained in monetary or property terms, could be equated to causing physical and mental injury. This led to a system of negotiation between the offender and the victim for a payment made against harm caused (Jacob 1970). This payment made by the offender, at their personal cost, to the victim to compensate for physical damage and harm is termed as bloodmoney (Baker 2001). In a more settled society under organized laws of the state, this system also played a role in maintaining social order overcoming unending violence that emanated from blood feuds. The moral and legal imperative of an offender to restore or compensate a victim for loss of life or property can be traced back to the ancient Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, and Germans (Jacob 1970), and references may be found in ancient Mosaic laws, the Bible, and The Illiad (Frank 1992), among others. Anglo-Saxon kings instituted mandated payments known as Wergild wherein the offender was required to pay a portion of the payment to the victim’s clan (called the Bot) and a portion as a fine to the king for breaking the “king’s peace” (called the Wit) (Frank 1992). These ancient systems of justice form the foundations for modern-day criminal and civil law. Domestic and international laws incorporate this monetary or property compensation to the victim in the practice of restitution – restitutio in integrum in Latin, translates to “make good the damages caused.” In this form, the concept of restitution is associated with restoration and repair of personal and social order and thereby seen as a form of reparation. Restitution and reparation are thus a form of justice focused on the victim. In legal terms, restitution and compensation are considered as separate forms of reparation. While restitution refers to the reinstatement of material and socioeconomic conditions that existed before the harm was caused, compensation refers to the payments made in lieu of physical, economic, and moral losses that cannot be reinstated (Buyse 2008). In many circumstances of permanent irretrievable damage to life and property, or if a long period of time has passed since the damage was caused, pure restitution may not be possible. As a

“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

result, compensation has assumed predominance as a more sought-after legal measure of reparation, echoing back to some of the basic tenets and traditions of blood-money. For situations where the state is responsible for wrongful conduct, human rights violations, or any other violation of international obligations, the International Court of Justice, and the International Law Commission, codified norms of remedy to be provided by the state under Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Buyse 2008). Rights to reparations have been developed and strengthened by human rights laws and under the jurisprudence of human rights courts (Moffett 2017b). The right to reparations as a human right was further adopted by the 2005 UN resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UNGA 2005). The resolution views reparations as a means of providing justice through redress as an obligation of states. This obligation subsumes the establishment of reparation programs and the enforcement of legal judgments for reparations. “Reparation,” here, refers to a larger and more comprehensive idea of redress which includes both material and symbolic measures. However, within the range of measures offered by the legal norms for reparations, material reparations relating to restitution or compensation tend to be placed higher within a hierarchy of measures (Buyse 2008). While the concepts of restitution, compensation, and reparations emerge from corrective justice concepts in private law in the contexts involving state and systemic injustice, these concepts have a bearing on larger political goals of conflict resolution, enabling democratization, and building social order. As a political project, reparations are counted as significant instruments for transforming political systems, addressing root causes of injustice, and enabling reconciliation, thus creating the foundations for stronger and more just institutions required for governance of sustainable futures. This entry will look at the moral and practical aspects of monetary and

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material restitution and compensation, its challenges and limitations, the need for a holistic approach to reparations, and its relevance for the sustainable development goals.

B Moral Values and Burdens of “Blood Money” Older traditions of blood money have been associated with a particular idea of justice which offered, simultaneously, compensation to victims and retribution for offenders, thereby providing a sense of rightful revenge and personal justice. However, the advent of the distinction, between the system of fines (levied by the state for crimes committed) and compensation to the victim, led to the separation of criminal and civil law (Laster 1970). While the former was focused on state-led punitive measures for the offender, the latter related to monetary compensations to victims in lieu of their losses. The disconnect between the victim and the offender, in modern legal practices, has played a role in reducing the recognition of the victim in punitive procedures for the offender. On the other hand, civil tort law has focused on insurance claims and looks down upon blood money (direct payments demanded from the offender) given the connotations of “revenge” associated with it (Baker 2001). Thus, while the overall outcome for the offender and the victim is the same, the sense of justice which emanated from the direct association between the victim and the offender is lost. This practice from individual judicial cases highlights that the source of the payment made to the victim, and whether it hurts the offender, holds a symbolic value of justice. One example to illustrate this is from international human rights violations of Japanese comfort women wherein women were forced into sex-slavery in the Japanese-occupied territories during the Second World War by coercive methods of the Japanese military (Hicks 1999). While the Japanese government relieved itself of liability and responsibility through various treaties with its prior colonies, it attempted some reparation by instituting a fund built on private donations. Payments of reparation

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“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

from such a fund were refused by many victims on the grounds that the cost of the payment was not shouldered by the government and therefore took the form of mere charity, not of atonement and assuming responsibility. Another moral association with the concept of direct payments made by the offender to the victim (criminal restitution) has to do with the fact that in many legal criminal proceedings, such payments may be mandated in return for probation or suspension of sentence for the offender (Jacob 1970). Even outside of formal legal methods, informal methods involve out-of-court monetary settlements made by the offender on a promise to not prosecute. The use of monetary payments to the victim thus carries a moral burden of being associated with payouts and hush-money – money paid to buy the silence of the victim (Moffett 2017a). In Argentina, Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) who initiated a movement between 1977 and 2006 demanding information and responsibility from the government for over 30,000 children who had “disappeared” during the previous military dictatorship. Monetary reparations were refused as they were considered to be payoffs to silence the victims in exchange for allowing the government to evade the truth recovery efforts and the consequent trials for the perpetrators (Moon 2013). A third moral conundrum around the concept of “blood-money” is the question about the meanings and value of money, and if at all the loss of life and cultural property can be valued monetarily. In this sense, accepting “blood-money” in return for atrocities faced by communities gets associated with feelings of shame, since morality and money are linked (Zelizer 1994). Monetary accounting for loss of a loved one, loss of home, violation of human rights, and the loss of cultural resources such as sacred lands and forests can amount to the commodification and objectification of personal suffering (Slyomovics 2014). Accusations directed at the Jewish for accepting German reparations also emanated from the distaste of equating money with suffering. The social value of money varies contextually through culture in terms of its sources, its communication,

and the recipients of the payment (Ng and He 2017). This is well illustrated through the case of the removal of Jewish-Israeli settlers from territories under Israeli occupation (Dromi 2014). In this case, while the victims of displacement accepted monetary payments, they outrightly, and through various means, denounced the representation of the payment as commensurate with their suffering. Victims utilized political and public spaces for directly engaging with the public about their suffering, engaged in collective meaningful interaction with the state to ensure that their unique identities and importance were invoked and acknowledged.

The Practice of Monetary Reparations In addition to the symbolic meanings, monetary reparations are faced with questions of practice and how they are to be operationalized (Moffett 2017b). Reparations may be offered through domestic and international courts, recommendations of truth commissions, and national reparation programs, among several other mechanisms. While courts are capable of mandating reparations on a case by case basis, truth commissions and larger reparation programs have the potential to cover a wider population. However, various challenges, including political will, recognition and responsibility for atrocities, and financial concerns, can determine which specific or combination of mechanisms are provided. One practical challenge is to identify who is eligible for reparation. Large-scale human rights violations or armed civil conflicts can have physical, economic, social, and cultural impact on millions. Most states, especially those emerging from such unstable political conditions that caused these violations in the first place, are financially ill-equipped to respond to demands for reparations for all victims. As a result, identifying and narrowing down the nature of victims is a significant challenge of monetary reparation mechanisms. Examples of such inclusion and exclusion processes may be found in the truth commission of Timor Leste and Sierra Leone wherein the most directly physically affected

“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

victims and socially vulnerable victims such as windows and orphans were prioritized (Suma and Correa 2009). The recommendations of the truth commission of South Africa focused the scope of reparations on those who testified. Purely monetary mechanisms of reparations thus have limited scope which may fall significantly short of the magnitude of a widespread impact of historical atrocities. Other challenges in relation to the practice of monetary reparations include defining the temporal scope of the atrocities and human rights violations. The example of reparations for African slavery in North and South America may be considered significant in this regard. Given the many generations over which the practice spanned and its remnants in the form of the continuing structural socioeconomic inequalities, it is clear that the impact of such atrocities is widespread in ways that may not be directly attributable to the direct physical harm caused (Westley 1998). Similarly, in relation to colonial atrocities and resource plunder carried out for centuries which are now manifested in various forms of economic backwardness of countries, a major challenge is to identify the direct victims of historical atrocities. Even the apportionment of monetary payments to descendants or the kin of victims would be challenging in these cases as many generations and individuals are often connected to a single victim. While reparations may be paid to victim states, whether this reparation payment then benefits the victims or not may be arguable. A significant challenge of monetary reparations emerges in identifying victims wherein contested narratives of political atrocities and complex victimhood compete for monetary payments (Druliolle and Brett 2018). Dominant political narratives about history, temporal delineation for defining violations, and strong political positions of elites and perpetrators can affect the narratives around a historical injustice and the attribution of responsibility – producing the clear distinction between the perpetrator and the victim. This may be seen in the Israel-Palestine conflict where offenders invoke their past victimization as a justification for violence (Moffett 2016). Complex victims, whose victimhood may be contested

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on the basis of their nonresistance to or allying with oppressive regimes, may become a point of dispute in reparation initiative. Complex victims carry the identities of both victim and perpetrators. Complex victims include members of military, ex-combatants, as well as members of armed resistance against regimes. Their inclusion in reparation programs as victims of oppressive regimes is controversial as it may be opposed by those who were victimized by them. All these challenges, notwithstanding monetary payments as reparation mechanisms in relation to the violation of human rights and historical injustice, are crucial for their economic and communicative role involving recognition of and economic rehabilitation for victims. However, monetary payments, as sole means of reparation without the recognition of victims’ sufferings, acknowledgement of responsibility, and initiatives for healing and closure, can often be seen as “blood money” with its associated negative moral connotations. Association of reparations with negative moral burdens can limit the efficacy of such initiatives in building peace and reconciliation.

Transitional Justice: A Holistic Approach to Reparations Given the various challenges and limitations associated with monetary reparations, there is a need to locate material reparations within larger goals of reparative justice. Reparations are seen as means of providing victim-centric justice and are required to help victims deal with past injustices. In juridical systems for individual criminal and civil cases, the goal of reparation is to offer individual resolution in terms of “adequate” compensation and retribution commensurate with the loss suffered by the victim. However, in contexts where states with a history of extensive atrocities under conflict-ridden and oppressive regimes aim to transition into democratic and social order, the goals of reparation are more political. Here, reparations may be considered as political projects with goals – recognition, building civic trust, and social solidarity – aimed at creating a new

B

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“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

political community (de Greiff 2006). Unlike juridical reparations where appropriate and adequate case-specific reparations can be determined, contexts of large scale reparations are faced with complex and a wider universe of victim identities. In addition, due to large number of victims and limited financial capacity of states, monetary reparations often tend to exclude a significant proportion of victims. Given the political goals of providing historical justice in transitional contexts, reparations need to be understood in a broader framework including both material and symbolic mechanisms to facilitate catharsis and healing (Hamber and Wilson 2002). Guided by the human rights laws, the 2005 UN resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation calls for “full and effective” reparations through several measures – restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. This broader conceptualization of reparation recognizes that for effective justice and redress, victims need to be provided with physical and mental care, as well as legal and social services in order to strengthen access to redress. These also constitute the rehabilitation measures for reparations. As previously discussed, monetary and material reparations that are not associated with a responsibility of the offender, or deny acknowledgment of a victim’s suffering, tend to be burdened by negative moral connotations. While there are several instances of denial of a victim’s suffering, one of the most recent examples concerns the Armenian genocide by the hands of the Turkish over a 100 years earlier. Facing potential international pressure to recognize the episode as “genocide,” a special condolence message was sent to Armenian communities around the globe by Turkey’s prime minister in 2015 – the year that marked the centenary of the Armenian genocide (Aharon 2019). Measures of material and monetary reparations must also be complemented by measures for creating symbolic healing and a sense of justice for victims. Investigations and disclosures of the truth of the atrocities, holding perpetrators responsible through legal/administrative sanctions and acknowledgment of their crimes, and commemoration and memorialization initiatives for victims, constitute measures of satisfaction.

Since, in transitional contexts, reparations are seen not only as backward-looking justice mechanisms but are also forward-looking political projects, ensuring nonrepetition of such atrocities and violations in the future becomes essential. For this, institutional reforms, ensuring protection of human rights, conflict resolution, and civilian control of military forces, form essential mechanisms. A holistic perspective of reparations recognizes victims not only as those directly affected physically or materially, but also those who have suffered emotional and cultural harm in their association with the injustice (UNGA 2005). This understanding allows for greater acknowledgment, and engagement with a wider range of victim experiences and varied impacts that are suffered by societies in the face of conflicts and human rights violations. Women’s experiences of conflicts and justice are often very different from men’s. Rampant incidence of sexual violence during and after conflicts, domestic violence, burdens of care for children and elderly family members in a violent environment, and lack of access to incomes and legal justice mechanisms are often trivialized or overlooked in the assessments of direct impact of conflicts and atrocities (O’Rourke 2013). Similarly in the case of displacements of indigenous tribal populations, property restitution or compensation often seeks to value land and resource but not the loss of socio-cultural relationships these communities associate with these resources (Vrdoljak 2008). In southern Brazil, for example, many Guarani people have committed suicide when forced to evict from their ancestral land where they had been living for many generations. Anthropologist and community leader Tonico Benites Guarani who has called it a “death sentence” estimates that many young, Guarani, have killed themselves in the last decade throughout the lands of Brazil (Vidal 2016). This figure, by far, exceeds the average Brazilian suicide rate and is likely to remain unsurpassed by other indigenous peoples in Latin American lands. The holistic framework of redress offered by transitional justice can allow for greater acknowledgment and inclusion of such often overlooked impacts and victims in reparation mechanisms.

“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

Transitional justice thus builds a complementary framework bridging material and symbolic reparation, backward-looking and forward-looking approaches, justice, and reconciliation. It focuses on institutional reforms aiming toward nonrepetition of conflicts and human rights violations in the future. In attempting to overcome some of the limitations invoked by the connotations and history of “blood money,” this framework aims to deal with the burdens of historical injustices for building future legal order and civic trust. This is essential to facilitate the building of a social and political foundation on which democratic systems and institutions can be established and strengthened. The transitional justice framework thus aligns with the goals of peace, justice, and strong institutions for sustainable development.

Transformative Justice and Sustainable Peace The holistic framework offered by transitional justice is increasingly accepted for its role in conflict resolution and a basis for democratization and state building. However, it is contended that the practice of this framework has tended to deal with the more immediate causes, and the immediate actors of conflict and injustice, but has not dwelled into deep structural causes that lie at the heart of creating and enabling conflicts. It addresses the symptoms of injustice, but not the root causes. Structural concerns around sustaining power asymmetries, class inequality, racial discrimination, gender injustice and patriarchy, and unequal access to development and resources form the roots of most political conflicts and weak institutions (Laplante 2008). Unless justice measures enlarge their scope of priorities from purely criminal justice to the larger social justice, such structural concerns will continue to prevail, jeopardizing efforts of postconflict reconstruction, institutions, and democracies. Continued structural inequalities and injustice in society, if not directly addressed, can facilitate continuity between past and present conditions producing fragile new states and institutions thus threatening a relapse into conflict situations. New cycles of

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violence can emerge destabilizing a state still in the process of emerging from widespread conflicts. Peru, South Africa, and Chile have been faced with such resurfacing violence and protests (Laplante 2008). The broad holistic framing of transitional justice measures allows for a normative linkage between institution building and reform to larger peace-building and social justice outcomes. However, in practice, it is contended that the focus of transitional justice mechanisms on legal and state-led measures can reduce the transformative capacity of the transitional justice framework. Its predominant focus on immediate actors of past conflicts and human rights violations – direct victims and political perpetrators – pushes the deeper sociopolitical roots of conflicts and social justice outcomes to the margins of practice of transitional justice mechanisms. Legal and state-led justice has neglected the potential for more participatory approaches in victim identification, determining appropriate reparation mechanisms, and political reconstruction. There is, therefore, an emerging call to enhance the scope and priorities of the holistic transitional justice approach toward more transformative justice. Gready and Robins (2014) define transformative justice as “transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level” (p. 342). Transformative justice seeks lasting peace by addressing underlying structural inequalities. However, the effective practice of such justice mechanisms is a work in progress. Transformative justice entails building justice mechanisms from top to down as well as from bottom to up in order to address the structural inequalities and sustainable peace. Gready and Robins (2014) suggest learning from “hybrid peace-building” methods which entail combining locally relevant discourses and methods with global discourses and measures. Participatory approaches to reparations and reconstruction that promote mutual accountability are also suggested. Truth commissions that have the mandate to enquire into the causes of

B

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“Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

conflict, and identify responsibility and impact of violence and conflicts, are also suggested as potent instruments to examine and present the root-structural factors in the preconflict society that led to the conflicts in the first place. They also provide effective recommendation to states to adopt policies that are focused on poverty alleviation, affirmative action (America 1998), providing human security (Laplante 2008), and building capabilities (Sen 2001).

Conclusion This entry has presented the phased evolution of victim-centric justice mechanisms from the narrower scope of ancient systems to the broad scope and goals of modern justice mechanisms. Victim-centric justice since ancient practices of blood feuds and blood-money has evolved from goals of personal justice and retribution to goals of reconciliation, state building, structural reform, and peace building. Yet, many tenets of ancient justice systems have continued to find an important place in modern justice frameworks. The importance of victim-centric justice systems in global sustainability goals is evident in its widening utility for creating political and social change through transitional justice and transformative justice concepts. In their aims to provide justice by ensuring nonrepetition of past injustices, and building sustainable peace, transitional and transformative justice concepts invoke linkages with other sustainability goals for alleviating socioeconomic inequalities, poverty, discrimination and promoting human security, life-satisfaction, and well-being. The concept of transitional justice has become a significant instrument for conflict resolution and peace building in postconflict societies as they look to transition to more sustainable peaceful futures with reduced violence (SDG16.1). The integrated approach brings together restorative justice for victims, punitive justice for perpetrators, as well as more fundamental institutional reforms to ensure nonrepetition of conflict and injustice in the future. By giving voice to the conflict-affected and oppressed sections of society, transitional justice initiatives also aim at creating a foundation for a more just and

democratic future – one that ensures equal access to justice for everyone (SDG16.3). Transformative justice concepts go deeper and target the very root causes of injustice and conflict in society. They aim at conflict-resolution from the foundations of socioeconomic and political inequalities at various levels. This requires the development of effective, accountable, and transparent institutions (SDG16.6) for a fairer society. Social mobilization and participatory decisionmaking (SDG16.7) are seen as important tools for transformative justice and long-term sustainable peace building. Socioeconomic inequalities deeprooted in communities lead to conflict situations and, if untreated, can also lead to unstable institutions in postconflict scenarios. Therefore, transitional and transformative justice concepts are essential for strengthening institutions (SDG16.A) from within by targeting sociopolitical inequalities among other forms of injustice.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact ▶ Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions: A Case Study on Guatemala for Decision-Makers ▶ Housing Discrimination ▶ Restorative Justice ▶ Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Meta-governance ▶ Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses ▶ Witch-Hunting

References Aharon EB (2019) Recognition of the Armenian genocide after its centenary: a comparative analysis of changing parliamentary positions. Isr J Foreign Aff 13(3):339– 352. https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2019.1737911 America RF (1998) Reparations and public policy. Rev Black Polit Econ 26(3):77–83. https://doi.org/10. 1007/s12114-999-1027-y

Build Baker T (2001) Blood money, new money, and the moral economy of tort law in action. Law Soc Rev 35(2):275– 319. https://doi.org/10.2307/3185404 Buyse AC (2008) Lost and regained? Restitution as a remedy for human rights violations in the context of international law. Heidelberg J Int Law 68:129–153 de Greiff P (2006) Justice and reparations. In: Greiff PD (ed) The handbook of reparations. Oxford University Press, Oxford Dromi SM (2014) Uneasy settlements: reparation politics and the meanings of money in the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Sociol Inq 84(2):294–315. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/soin.12028 Druliolle V, Brett R (2018) Introduction: understanding the construction of victimhood and the evolving role of victims in transitional justice and peacebuilding. In: The politics of victimhood in post-conflict societies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 1–22 Frank LF (1992) The collection of restitution: an often overlooked service to crime victims. J Civ Rights Econ Dev 8(1):6 Gready P, Robins S (2014) From transitional to transformative justice: a new agenda for practice. Int J Transit Justice 8(3):339–361. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/iju013 Hamber B, Wilson RA (2002) Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies. J Hum Rights 1(1):35–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14754830110111553 Hardy MJL (1963) Blood feuds and the payment of blood money in the Middle East. Brill, Leiden Hicks G (1999) The comfort women redress movement. In: Brooks RL (ed) When sorry isn’t enough: the controversy over apologies and reparations for human injustice. NYU Press, New York, pp 113–125 Jacob BR (1970) Reparation or restitution by the criminal offender to his victim: applicability of an ancient concept in the modern correctional process. J Crim Law Criminol Police Sci 61(2):152–167. https://doi.org/10. 2307/1142204 Laplante LJ (2008) Transitional justice and peace building: diagnosing and addressing the socioeconomic roots of violence through a human rights framework. Int J Transit Justice 2(3):331–355. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijn031 Laster R (1970) Criminal restitution: a survey of its past history and an analysis of its present usefulness. Univ Richmond Law Rev 5(1):71–98. https://scholarship. richmond.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss1/6 Moffett L (2016) Reparations for “guilty victims”: navigating complex identities of victim–perpetrators in reparation mechanisms. Int J Transit Justice 10(1):146– 167. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijv030 Moffett L (2017a) Reparations in transitional justice: justice or political compromise? Hum Rights Int Leg Discourse 17(1):2019–2007 Moffett L (2017b) Transitional justice and reparations: remedying the past? In: Research handbook on transitional justice. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham Moon C (2013) Money as the measure of man: values and value in the politics of reparation. In: Cowburn M, Duggan M, Robinson A, Senior P (eds) Values in

21 criminology and community justice. Policy Press, Bristol, pp 255–272. http://www.policypress.co.uk/ Ng KH, He X (2017) The institutional and cultural logics of legal commensuration: blood money and negotiated justice in China. Am J Sociol 122(4):1104–1143. https://doi.org/10.1086/689268 O’Rourke C (2013) Gender politics in transitional justice. Routledge, London Sen A (2001) Development as freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford Slyomovics S (2014) How to accept German reparations. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Suma M, Correa C (2009) Report and proposals for the implementation of reparations in Sierra Leone. International Center for Transitional Justice, New York UNGA (2005) Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Adopted and proclaimed by resolution, United Nations. General Assembly 60, 147 Vidal J (2016) Brazil’s Guarani Indians killing themselves over loss of ancestral land. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/18/brazils-gua rani-indians-killing-themselves-over-loss-of-ancestral-land Vrdoljak A (2008) Reparations for cultural loss. In: Reparations for indigenous peoples international & comparative perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 197–228 Westley R (1998) Many billions gone: is it time to reconsider the case for black reparations? Boston Coll Third World Law J 19(1):429 Zelizer VAR (1994) The social meaning of money. Basic Books, New York

Boycott and Embargo (related terms) ▶ Multilateral and Unilateral Sanctions: Compliance and Challenges

Bribery ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Build ▶ Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

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Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being A. Shahin Sultana Department of Social Work, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India

Synonyms Build; Capacities; Discuss; Identify; Inform; Mental health; Well-being; Youth

skills of the participants, technical and management skills, basic infrastructure for further improvization, and financial resources. It is an essential tool for empowerment and continuous up gradation which can foster higher outcomes influencing the growth of the individual or system. Its need is felt internally or at times externally; it is an existing, emerging, evolving, conscious, and time-consuming process aimed at better results from both the participant and the person toward whom services are being rendered to. It instills confidence and commitment towards the service being rendered to and also to pose off burn out.

Introduction Definition Capacity is the ability of people, institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives (UNDP 2002). It is the basic skill, knowledge, and criteria on which further development can be aimed or targeted for effective results. Capacity varies from individual to individual and differs across different spans of life. The ability and willingness to improve one’s own or a group or an organizational ability is considered as the prerequisite toward capacity building. It is the process whereby individuals, groups, and organizations enhance their abilities to mobilize and use resources in order to achieve their objectives on a sustainable basis. This process can comprise a combination of (i) human skills development; (ii) changes in organizations and networks; and (iii) changes in governance/ institutional context (ADB 2004). Capacity building simply means building capacities to develop/progress further. It is necessary to move/push/increase the momentum/raise awareness of individuals, groups, or any other system to gain positive outcomes. Every one requires at one phase of life a booster to revive/ rejuvenate/reset/refurnish goals from one phase to another. Capacity development (CD) emerged in the late 1980s, and it gained increased prominence throughout the 1990s (Lavergne and Saxby 2001). Capacity building seeks the following components as part of its process – basic knowledge and

One of the Goals of Sustainable Development is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies keeping in mind three dimensions: (a) economic growth, (b) social inclusion, and (c) environmental protection. Goal 3 also aims at ensuring healthy lives and promotes well-being for all at all ages. It believes in strengthening the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction, and management of national and global health risks. It aims further, by 2030, to reduce by one-third premature mortality from noncommunicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being (https://www.un.org/sustainablede velopment/sustainable-development-goals/. Accessed 3 Aug 2020). To attain all this, there is a need to build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. The focus could be on all age groups, but this can be precisely achieved only when there is a committed move toward building the capacities of children, adolescents, and youth. In order to build their capacities, it can happen at three levels – family, schools/colleges, and community. It directly means building individuals within institutions. It has been observed that the younger generation if mentored on these themes with knowledge and required skills can play a pivotal role in achieving the goals of Sustainable Development. This is an urgent and immediate need of the hour at the global level.

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Capacities have to be developed upon from phase to phase depending on the need and the assessment of the individual and the group. Unless there is a team involved who will identify, mobilize, and assess them and is given the charge of training the individuals, it cannot become a possible exercise. Capacity building is a skill, art, research, assessment, input, and outcome. It provides deliverable results and influences positivity into the individual or the group’s abilities. It aims at increasing their efficiencies, skills, and talents and an ability to induce the learnt and the training into the profession they practice to benefit the beneficiaries and the workplace. Capacity building simply means building capacities to develop/progress further. It can also be a process where the management or the organization and their governance have to be built on their capacities for effective outcomes. It is a kind of an intervention in the common and usual practice in any governance of the individual or a system. Capacity building can be aimed at: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Individuals Groups Institution Organization Any other system

Whichever sector one works in – schools, college, counseling, defense, army, corporate, management, police, law, music, dance, etc., the emerging need to build one’s capacities is always felt as a priority. The conviction that knowledge is supreme and gaining wisdom is a continuous process had made many feel the want of information and skill upgradation that after every major breakdown they have felt the need to update or rather build their capacities to show better outcomes. The capacity building measures should be a well-organized and planned change. Identification of the existing and required skills at times becomes a flawed process. It requires an assessment. It also has to focus on long-term, multilevel approaches, coaching, and feedback (Lammert et al. 2015). The most crucial point in the entire process is that the outcome of capacity building is not only rewarding the individual or the group, but it also

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benefits both the trainer and the trained. Huge amount of time, energy, and money goes into the capacity building initiatives. Such as a counselor who constantly meets people who always speak negatively about their life, experiences, environment, suicidal thoughts, depression, addiction, and violence and a police who witnesses crimes, murder, betrayal, theft, burglary, and desertion on routine basis are bound to have a burn out as they witness unpleasantness, negativity, insecurity, threat of life, hopelessness, despair, etc., and may feel inevitably a level of unhappiness and frustration as there is nothing positive they feel around them. It starts influencing them in their own personality or their living unconsciously, and it is highly recommended that they are made aware about their job role, risks, and benefits and also creates in them a resistance toward negativity and builds in positive thinking and victory amid all this. Now, this can be done through capacity building measures only at the workplace which could prevent the individual from moving toward burnout and impacting the client indirectly. Lammert (Lammert et al. 2015) has identified: 1. Four types of capacity in the field of education: (a) human, (b) organizational, (c) structural, and (d) material 2. Four levels of capacity: (a) information, (b) skills, (c) structures, and (d) processes Harsh and her colleagues (Harsh 2010) have identified four stages of capacity building: (a) exploration, (b) emerging implementation, (c) full implementation, and (d) sustainability. Existing literature and review are alone not sufficient to equip the process, but further literature on this theme has to be developed for further sustenance. Researchers who have been working on this theme have also to be collated for the benefit of the younger lot, has to be mobilized and disseminated, and laps have to be identified. This will promote further debate and deliberations on the same, and it might enthuse a many to get into the field of SDG and their participation in it – whether it is training, writing papers on them, researching on them, documenting evidences and best practices, and so on.

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Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

SDG Goals and Its Relevance to Social Well-Being The idea behind the implementation of SDG is to achieve the overall development plans, reduce the upcoming economic, environmental, and also the social costs, and in turn generate more livelihood opportunities, reduce poverty, and increase competition among the rising economies of the world. It also aims to enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacitybuilding in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through NorthSouth, South-South, and Triangular Cooperation (Harsh 2010). This has become an unavoidable necessity which is targeted to prevent the disastrous circumstances encountered in the near future if ignorance happens. The main focus in this entry is “Young people mental health and well-being.” While Goal 3 of SDG aims at “Ensuring healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages,” (https://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-developmentgoals/. Accessed 3 Aug 2020) the central theme of this entry would be to deliberate on the status, causes, and consequences of mental health problems among the young population and how their well-being matters to attain SGD goals. It would also deliberate on the necessity to build capacities of the young population for positive mental health and well-being through prevention, promotion, and rehabilitation measures. World Health Organization’s statement “there is no health without mental health” (Prince et al. 2007) is a global declaration to sign an accord on mental health based on human rights (Saxena et al. 2013), the enormous economic implications of mental illness (World Health Forum) (Bloom et al. 2012), and significant progress in science through clinical, epidemiological, and neuroscience-based investigations. The Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health (2016–2030) envisions a world in which every woman, child, and adolescent in every setting realizes their rights to physical and mental health and well-being, has social and economic opportunities, and is able to

participate fully in shaping prosperous and sustainable societies (https://www.who.int/lifecourse/partners/global-strategy/global-strategy2016-2030/en/. Accessed 14 Sept 2020). Youth, adolescents, and children are a resource, and if invested properly returns are guaranteed. A conscious purposeful decision has to be made as to how this empowerment should happen. The numbers are more and the potential is high. If investment is done meticulously, rewards can be intense. This population has to be mapped by the potential stakeholders within their vicinities. They have to be identified, mobilized, then sensitized, empowered with information, discussion, and dialogue, and then put into practice. The younger generation is very powerful in both receiving and delivery or action. In order to understand its significance, an attempt to discuss the key issues in youth mental health and well-being is presented below.

Key Issues: Youth Mental Health and Well-Being WHO (https://www.who.int/southeastasia/healthtopics/adolescent-health. Accessed on 14 Sept 2020) defines the terminology of a young person as the following: • Adolescent – age 10–19 years • Youth – age 15–24 years • Young people – age 10–24 years Mental health problems occur in the critical age between 12 and 25 years. Mental illness in young people is associated with significant physical, psychological, social, and developmental consequences which include obesity, substance use, delinquency, low educational achievements, and social disability (MHRG 2020). Adolescence is a time of physical and psychological maturation, changing social roles, and a move away from childhood toward greater independence and responsibility. In this age, they get exposed to risky behaviors such as sex, alcohol, drugs, and motor vehicles and also they begin worrying about their body image, relationships, peer pressure, and educational achievements (BPJ 2015).

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Young people in New Zealand have one of the highest rates of suicide in the developed world (BPJ 2015). Data published in 2012 shows that among 32 OECD countries, New Zealand had the highest rate of suicide for males aged 15–19 years and the third highest rate for males or females aged 20–24 years (Patton et al. 2012). A survey of 1,162 students in the Wellington region found that approximately 50% of the students reported having tried some form of suicidal self-harm at least once, suggesting that experimenting with self-harm could be regarded as characteristic of adolescent behavior. Ongoing self-harming behavior was also associated with other aspects of mental health, such as low selfesteem, depression, anxiety, or being bullied. (Garisch and Wilson 2015) Adolescence is another period wherein the children have a lot of zeal and energy. Their enthusiasm if used appropriately can work wonders to both themselves and the communities they live in. Youth is an extension of childhood and adolescence. It is just the next phase of life where maturity and early adulthood evolve. It is a very crucial phase where positive inputs can bring out positivity, and negative experiences can result in long-lasting impact thereby destroying their own and other lives. Hence, it is very important that a continuum is thought of in every possible way for these three stages of life. Youth Mental health and addictions run to the very core of the social and economic well-being of all societies (Trudeau 2017). The entry provides a perspective on the importance and value of youth mental health services for society and argued that the young mental health services have to be advanced and that should be the number one priority of health services in Canada (Ashok et al. 2018). Today’s generation is obsessed with information technology and media, rather their exposure on this is immensely high. They are also getting informed, but at the same time they are getting distracted. Their social responsibility is not thrown light upon, and they remain ignorant. They also tend to be under stress and confusion as their exposure levels are much more than what

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the earlier generations have had. Travel, leisure, recreation, relationships, peer groups, and associated concepts have undergone a sea change. Parent-child, teacher-child, and elder-child relationships have changed when compared to earlier times. Technology has propelled a radical generational shift when it comes to young peoples’ experiences compared to their predecessors (Hartas 2019). Children are very receptive about anything which is fed to them in the primitive phase, that is, why it is necessary to mold them very young. Research evidences have proved that the first 8 years which is known as The Early Childhood Care and Development phase is very productive and 80–90% of the brain development happens in this phase. Schools can play a proactive role in this phase as the first few years serve as the base for strengthening the upcoming years. It is witnessed in some schools that valuebased education imparted has some of the components such as – life skills, health and hygiene, personality development, time management, social service, and community development wherein there is a large scope to incorporate some of the most effective tips to achieve SDG Goals. The problem is – it is not uniform and universal. Once this is streamlined, then there is a large scope for improvement in achieving SGD goals. The purpose of the individual in relation to the environment is to be make them understood right from the beginning phase of their lives. Mental health problems negatively affect young people’s well-being and also the capacity to make sense of the world and their place in it. Both the constructs mental health and well-being are difficult to define and measure (Hartas 2019). Globally, concerns about young people’s mental health are on the rise (International NGO 2013; WHO (World Health Organisation) 2002). Our world is home to 1.8 billion young people of age 10–24 years contributing about one-fourth of the total world population. Around nine out of ten of them live in the less developed countries (Chadda 2018). Increasing violence in the young people is another important issue which deserves attention as

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Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

the youth are at risk of being not only victims but also perpetrators of violence (Christensen et al. 2017). It is estimated that about 20–25% of the young people suffer from Mental and Substance use disorders (MSUDs) worldwide (Christensen et al. 2017). Globally, MSUDs are recognized as the leading cause of all nonfatal burden of disease and also the years the youth lived with disability (Whiteford et al. 2013). Some of the common risk factors for MSUDs include poverty, malnutrition, child abuse, mental illness in parents, family, conflict, death of a family member, bullying, poor discipline in the family, academic failure, and also exposure to violence (Chadda 2018). The following are the observations made with respect to common mental disorders – (a) Depressive and anxiety disorders rise abruptly in childhood (1–10 years); it peaks in adolescence and early to middle age (10–29 years). (b) The burden which is associated with less common but chronic disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, although it is found higher in early adulthood (peaking between 25 and 50 years of age) also impacts the childhood to a larger extent. (c) The burden from illicit substance use is highest among young adults (ages 15–29 years), but for alcohol the largest burden is observed in the age of 25–50 years (Christensen et al. 2017; United Nations Population Fund 2014).

Future Directions In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an ever-changing fast pace in terms of faster modes of transport, ease of migration across countries, and the evolutionary developments in Information Technology (IT). This in fact has brought major challenges to the mental health professionals (Chadda 2018). Mental ill-health, sexual abuse, criminal behavior, and violence are serious concerns among the young population, and they are some of the greatest challenges faced by the mental health professionals as well as the society (Christensen et al. 2017).

A public health approach is what is required now that will be focused on both the controlling of the risk factors as well as enhancing the protective factors (Chadda 2018). Reassure young people that their health as an individual is important (BPJ 2015). Against a backdrop of high rates of mental health issues among young people in New Zealand compared to other OECD countries, it is important to ensure that opportunities to engage in primary care are maximized, and healthcare is provided which is accessible and appropriate to a young person’s needs (Thornicraft 2012). The young person has to be built into a transition period of consultations so that they are familiar with seeing a doctor on their own and they are able to initiate and attend appointment on their own (Thornicraft 2012). Building a solid youth mental health service will ensure not only a reduction in the suffering of the young people, but it will include also their families and a physically and mentally healthy future adult population, and with that it includes a healthy social and economic future for Canada (Ashok et al. 2018). One of the most important points to note is that the key to effective communication with the young people is listening to what they say and also make them feel that they feel heard and acknowledged. This skill is important, as with this it is easy to judge the stage of cognitive development of the young person as it does not always correlate with chronological age (BPJ 2015). If a young person has no concerns at that time, bringing up issues related to their emotional wellbeing can build trust and it can act as an invitation for them to discuss their problems in the future (BPJ 2015). The government’s commitment and intentions have also to be clearly made responsible toward this age group on these themes. When the government’s responsibility is made clear to all the stakeholders in the process, then the beneficiaries will also understand its seriousness. The blue print has to be prepared in consultation with the concerned individuals working on these issues, and then a

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

dialogue and a deliberation on its implementation has to be made. Continuous implementation with constant surveillance, support, and guidance can work wonders on the capacity building initiatives to a larger extent. The role of the NGOs, civil society, public health experts, development experts, and others who could be potential resource persons has to be integrated into the process to make it work successfully. It is also expected that the health workers have competencies to relate to young people to detect mental health problems early and to provide evidence-based treatment (Chadda 2018). Simultaneously, capacity-building measures for the journalists have also to be made. They need to understand the severity of the cause and cover up issues thereby motivating the younger lot to take up work on these issues and bring about a change in the years to come. The media has a larger role to play for this capacity building of the younger lot, and the existing people, who are interested but unable to present on that, require a module and training them which can in turn help them to report on these matters genuinely and the concerns associated with them. This can inform the public and the others the real fact and help them to take it further in their own discipline in whichever way they can. It is generally recommended that social skills, problem-solving skills, and self-confidence of the young population can help prevent mental health problems such as conduct disorders, anxiety, depression, eating disorders, and other risk behaviors such as sexual behavior, substance abuse, and violent behaviours (Chadda 2018). The problem-solving approach is yet another component which is very important. The beneficiaries are to be mentored on this component as the world requires now more problem solvers than problem creators. There are so many problems with respect to addressing the SDG Goals, but very few problem solvers. There are a number of people who are able to identify, recognize, and point out the problem but very few willing to volunteer to address them. The capacity-building program should address the task of problem solving which will build in them the confidence to attend to them, when at need, as this could solve

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most of the existing and emerging problems at every front. The sooner they learn to solve the problems and the more experience they gain would turn out to be an asset to the capacitybuilding program itself. Thus, all capacity-building programs cannot be the same; they will be developed according to the group members and the objectives. Every training schedule is prepared from program to program, and its implementation mode also varies from group to group. They will be designed with varied goals, and their vision shall be different from each other. The modality of training shall also be designed simultaneously to deliver the training program, and the assessment and outcomes will be spelt out. The disadvantages are not too many. The capacity-building process happens with a purpose. If it is not planned and implemented properly, it does not suit any purpose. The target group will lose the objective of attending the course intended for. They feel lost in the process if the resource persons do not meet their needs and furnish the objectives adequately. The target group becomes disoriented on the theme and loses track of their current status and will not feel socially inclined toward them. Their energies are wasted, and the anger surmounts them thereby deviating them from the goals. As the entire process is time-consuming, the timing and the breaks within the programs and also the entire one have to be meticulously planned. It is suggested that the integration of mental health in general medical, pediatric, and primary care can be an effective strategy since this facilitates contact with the target population (Chadda 2018). Team work is essentially a crucial element in the capacity-building process, and it helps imbibing resourceful interpretations from each other. The methodology of the capacity-building process is very important, and it makes wonders happen if the group is interested and oriented toward the goal incessantly with intervals between. Early identification and intervention for the mental health problem remain vital to the solution. (Chadda 2018)

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Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Schools and colleges offer a unique setting for mental health promotion in young people (Chadda 2018). Taking care of the mental health needs of the youth has a lot of barriers such as lack of services, lack of awareness, myths, misconceptions and stigma, and also the low priority which is attributed to mental health. (Christensen et al. 2017. Educational pressures, continuously reinforced by the family and the society, have been seen in the background of many suicides in young people in India (Aaron et al. 2004). There is a need to establish dedicated services so that the merging issues such as behavioral addictions among youth can be addressed (Balhara et al. 2017). It is found that health spending is the lowest in countries which have the highest youth population (United Nations Population Fund 2014). The 2017 Mission Australia Youth Survey which is an annual survey of young people aged 15–19 years found that mental health is the number one issue of national concern for young people in Australia, and it has been identified that mental health is the major barrier to achievement with around 13.2% stating that their goals for work or study once they finish school would be affected by mental health (Psychological Health Care 2020). Mental health problems can be eased and controlled by deep breathing, mindfulness meditation, progressive muscle relaxation, creative visualization, and yoga; all these are simple, and quick to learn (Psychological Health Care 2020). One of the most important concepts in wellbeing and positive mental health is to spend time with friends and family (Psychological Health Care 2020). There is evidence that alcohol increases the risk of developing mental illness, and it is more likely that it can aggravate self-harms and also result in suicide (Psychological Health Care 2020). The training methodology could be made from simple to complex. The target group should be made to come into the process with a well-planned ice-breaking session. The purpose and the objectives of the program can be well explained, thereby citing their future plans. The role they could play after the training could be spelt out in cooperation

with the target group. The methodology of the program should be discussion cum interactive mode where they feel they could clear off their queries. Audio visual methods, field visits, tours and mentored internships, role plays, presentations, group work, counseling, problem tree mode, rapport building, networking, best practice identification, pathways, recording, assessment and interventions, action research, and road map could all be part of the program. The target group should not feel disinterested to be part of the capacity-building process. The program plan should be made in such a manner that it interests them and it is worth attending to. It needs to be necessarily linked with resource persons who have had started from the primitive stage of understanding to the advanced way of working on the SDG themes. This instills a confidence in them and the desire to incubate, learn, and work toward it. A trained child psychologist can help young people work through their issues and also help them overcome challenging situations (Psychological Health Care 2020). Relaxing, having a warm bath, spending some time in nature outdoors, listening to music, reading a book, and having some tea can be soothing to minimize mental stress and tension (Psychological Health Care 2020). Besides this, developing a manual on the capacity building for the youth is also an urgent need. Though there are many materials available, specific manuals have to be prepared by the government keeping in mind the culture, area, and people specificity and provide at several institutions such as schools, colleges, religious institutions, urban and rural level bodies, public health institutions, etc., so that the seriousness is felt and it could be taken up by people who are interested to implement it. Training of trainers has to be done at varied levels to ensure appropriate delivery. The identification of the trainers demands a lot of clarity as it involves lot of process planning as who would serve the purpose and if they will be efficient enough to receive this training or not and about their long-term plan and whether they would be sustainable or not. In the Mission Australia survey study (84.4%), respondents shared that they would seek help

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

from their friends when they have to handle or face some challenges in their lives. Out of this, only four in ten mentioned that they would seek help from a doctor or teacher (Psychological Health Care 2020). In the last decade, there has been an increasing international recognition of the importance of addressing mental health on a global scale (Thornicraft 2012). Children and young people are considerably using the Internet on a variety of portable devices, and adult supervision on these cases might be more challenging (OECD 2018). Capacity building has its own advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are many. It is experienced before, during, and after the process. It also differs from phase to phase, from group to group, from time to time, and from place to place. A close look at the advantages the target group is going to receive is – the objectives are going to be set, they are going to be informed, the responsibilities are well discussed, the implementation part is dialogued upon, their own development happens, they are in relation with their environment, they become visionaries in themselves, it paves way for their own creativity and entrepreneurship, it guides them toward their own social responsibility, they start developing their own skills, make new bonds, networking takes place, and they become leaders on their own as they are quite abreast of knowledge on these domains. Digital technology has changed the way the children and the young people communicate with each other and how also how they express themselves and access valuable support networks. Even the parents and the young people are confronted with new challenges regarding how best they could use these technologies while minimizing the risks involved (OECD 2018). Schools should make it a point to deliver digital literacy, providing young people with digital skills to recognize the risks such as cyber-bullying and excessive use of social media as well as strengthening emotional resilience, empathy, and reaching out (OECD 2018). If children and young people show signs and symptoms of mental illness, it is necessary that they are intervened early at their levels. Child and

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adolescent mental health services treat the young population with the most severe disorders and the most acute needs (OECD 2018). The overall cost of mental illness on society is estimated to be around 3.5% of GDP (OECD 2015). Research suggests that the young people have a high acceptance rate when it comes to completing screening questions for psychosocial issues in a self-administered format (Bradford and Rickwood 2012). “Mental Illness” refers to any condition that meets the clinical diagnosis threshold criteria. This term “Mental Illness” is used interchangeably with “mental ill-health,” “mental disorders,” and “mental health problems”; it is important to note that the absence of mental well-being or poor mental well-being can affect all the individuals from time to time, and this may not necessarily meet the clinical criteria of a mental health disorder (OECD 2018). It is quite challenging to work with the young population at times, but it is truly satisfying and rewarding supporting them through the period they are passing as they mature, develop resilience, and also when they overcome their obstacles (BPJ 2015). The governments should also help and promote parental control for various devices as well as to encourage coviewing of content with children so that children understand what they are seeing and apply it to the world around them. For instance, in Germany education is provided to parents about the risks of online activities whereas in Japan the legislation has funded increased education on appropriate Internet use and promotes Internet filtering and monitoring to parents (King et al. 2018). Thus, to conclude, it is imperative to understand and acknowledge the fact that mental health problems among the young population are on the rise; it is a both a social and a global concern; if not attended earlier and in time, it can foresee disastrous results. An integrated approach of all stakeholders concerned in the well-being of the young population has to be mobilized to garner support and cooperate to work in a multidisciplinary team to take this serious problem

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forward. It is not specific to any one country or region, but it is a universal problem. The numbers being lost in this process are huge, heartbreaking, and shameful. Preventive, promotive, and rehabilitative efforts are the solution to this problem. There is a huge scope of the health care professionals in this initiative – general physicians, psychiatrists, rehabilitation professionals, social workers, psychologists, and so on. A combined approach from governments, educational institutions, parents, and communities can work together in identifying, researching, and resolving this issue. The governmental and the nongovernmental organizations, policy makers, health research bodies, and scientists have to work in coordination to prevent this problem from becoming a global public health disaster. “Health and Well-being” has to be integrated into the curriculum and not be something separate, and it has to be infused into the core components of learning along with physical education so that the young population do not learn it as a course but as something vital for their overall holistic well-being. Building their capacities is the crux of this deliberation, and it has to be done meticulously in all spaces be it the schools, home, higher educational institutions, communities, and public spaces so that it becomes integrated in their lives. Budgetary allocations have to be exclusively propagated, and the research outcomes in terms of investment over outcome have to be mapped regularly for understanding the significance of cost and returns. Early identification and intervention of the mental health problem among the young population is the urgent need of the hour followed by screening and offering instant support at the basic primary health care services where students can reach in no time. Building the capacities of the young population in understanding the problem and engaging them to trust in the counselling services and making them understand that preventing and treating is necessary can resolve the major part of the problem. SDG Goal 3 is about “Ensuring healthy lives and promote well-being of all ages can be achieved.” This deliberation is a move toward that goal with respect to the young population.

Cross-References ▶ Capacity Building ▶ Capacity Development ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities ▶ International Human Rights Treaties and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices ▶ Local Governance ▶ Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development ▶ Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability ▶ Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement ▶ Transitional Justice and the Sustainable Development Goals: Towards a Complementary Approach ▶ Transparent Governments, Social Innovation, and Their Role in Achieving the SDGs ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals ▶ United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges ▶ Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

References Aaron R, Joseph A, Abraham S, Muliyil J, George K, Prasad J et al (2004) Suicides in young people in rural southern India. Lancet 363:1117–1118 ADB (2004) DFID Working Paper Series: Capacity Building. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0 8b8ee5274a31e0000c0a/ResearchStrategyWorking Paperfinal_capacity_P1.pdf. Accessed 2 Aug 2020 Ashok M, Srividya I et al (2018) Youth mental health should be top priority for health care in Canada. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry. Sage Balhara YP, Bhargava R, Chadda R (2017) Service development for behavioural addictions: AIIMS experience. Ann Natl Acad Med Sci (India) 53:130–138 Bloom D, Cafiero E, Jane-Llopis E et al (2012) The global economic burden of noncommunicable diseases. Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Geneva

Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being BPJ (2015) Addressing mental health and wellbeing in young people. https://bpac.org.nz/BPJ/2015/October/ wellbeing.aspx. Accessed 16 Sept 2020 Bradford S, Rickwood D (2012) Psychosocial assessments for young people: as systematic review examining acceptability. Disclosure and engagement, and protective utility. Adolesc Health med Ther 3:111–125. https://doi.org/10.2147/AHMT.S38442 Chadda RK (2018) Youth and mental health: challenges ahead. Indian J Med Res 148(4):359–361 Christensen H, Reynolds CF 3rd, Cuijpers P (2017) Protecting youth mental health, protecting our future. World Psychiatry 16:32–38 Garisch JA, Wilson MS (2015) Prevalence, correlates and prospective predictors of non-suicidal self-injury among New Zealand adolescents: cross sectional and longitudinal survey data. Child Adolesc Psychiatry Ment Health 9:28. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13034015-0055-6 Harsh S (2010) Gaining perspective on a complex task: a multidimensional approach to capacity building. In: Harsh S, Bradley K, Good K, Ross J (eds) Capacity building technical assistance: change agent analyses. Charlestown, Edvantia, Appalachia Regional Comprehensive Center, pp 1–9 Hartas D (2019) The social context of adolescent mental health and wellbeing: parents, friends and social media. Res Pap Educ. Routledge Taylor Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.1080/02671522.2019.1697734 International NGO (2013) Council on violence against children. Violating Children’s rights: harmful practices based on tradition, culture, religion or superstition. Council on Violence against Children in Geneva, Geneva King D et al (2018) Policy and prevention approaches for disordered and hazardous gaming and internet use: an international perspective. Prev Sci:233–249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-017-0813-1 Lammert JD, Johnson L, Fiore TA (2015) Conceptualising capacity building. Rockville, Westat Lavergne R, Saxby J (2001) Capacity development: vision and implications. Capacity Development Occasional Series. CIDA Policy branch. No. 3 January. https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/242480268_Capac ity_Development_Vision_and_implications. Accessed 2 Aug 2020

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MHRG (2020) Youth mental health and wellbeing. The University of Nottingham, Nottingham OECD (2015) Fit mind, Fit job: From evidence to practice in mental health and work, Mental Health and Work, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ 9789264228283-en OECD (2018) Children and Young people’s mental health in the Digital age. Shaping the future Patton GC, Coffey C, Cappa C et al (2012) Health of the World’s adolescents: a synthesis of internationally comparable data. Lancet 39:1665–1665. https://doi. org/10.1016/S0140-636(12)60203-7 Prince M, Patel V, Saxena S et al (2007) No health without mental health. Lancet 370(9590):859–877 Psychological Health Care (2020). https://www.psycholo gicalhealthcare.com.au/blog/tips-improve-youthmental-health-2018/. Accessed 18 Sept 2020 Saxena S, Funk M, Chrisholm D (2013) World health assembly adopts comprehensive mental health action plan. 2013–2020. Lancet 381(9882):1970–1971 Thornicraft G (2012) Capacity building in global mental health research. England: Harvard Journal of Psychiatry Trudeau J. (2017) Statement by the prime minister of Canada on Mental Health week. http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ news/2017/05/01/statement-prime-minister-canadamental-health-week. Accessed 8 Jan 2017 UNDP (2002) Capacity development – UNDP. Available on https://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publica tion/en/publications/capacity-development/capacitydevelopment-a-undp-primer/CDG_PrimerReport_ final_web.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2020 United Nations Population Fund (2014) The power of 1.8 billion: adolescents, youth and the transformation of the future. United Nations Population Fund, New York Whiteford HA, Degenhardt L, Rehm J, Baxter AJ, Ferrari AJ, Erksine HE et al (2013) Global burden of disease attributable to mental and substance use disorders: findings from the global burden of disease study 2010. Lancet 382:155–186 WHO (World Health Organisation) (2002) Gender and Mental Health. Department of Gender and Women’s Health; Department of Mental Health and Substance Dependence, 1–4. WHO, Geneva

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Capacities ▶ Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Capacity Building ▶ Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals R. K. Mishra1 and P. S. Janaki Krishna2 1 Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad, India 2 Centre for Sustainable Development, Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad, India

Synonyms Capacity building; Capacity development; Training; Technical cooperation

Definitions The definition of “capacity building,” though evades consensus, has come to be seen as a core theme

within the development community. Sensibly, the debates centering on capacity began in the 1980s in the light of the publication of Berg Report (World Bank 1981) which referred to basically nonprofit organizations for fulfilling their missions and goals (McPhee and Bare 2001). Essentially, the definition of “capacity building” encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities (UNCED 1992) and traverses from the identification of ability of individuals (Morgan and Qualman 1996) by understanding and dealing with their development need in a sustainable manner (UNDP 1997) to a process by which individuals, groups, institutions, organizations, and societies enhance their abilities (CIDA 1996) to improve their knowledge, skills, and attitudes (ITC 2000). According to OECD/DAC (2012), “capacity building” is understood as the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. Krishnaveni and Aravamudhan (2013) opined that “capacity building” would help organizations focus on their priorities, foster coordination, reduce the scope for conflict, and ensure favorable outcomes. Gradually, “capacity building” evolved from simple technical assistance on request and technical cooperation between states, into a process of coordinating priority setting and implementation between various state and nonstate actors (Kaniaru 2010). Thus, “capacity building” was defined and understood in various ways depending on the context and the systems in which the organizations operate.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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“Capacity building” and “Technical Cooperation” for Achieving SDGs

Introduction “Capacity building” sometimes is also referred to as “capacity development.” Training and “capacity building” are also often wrongly treated as synonyms though the training is one form of “capacity building” besides other tools, such as seminars, twinning, workshops, and sponsorships. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), technical cooperation refers to both technical assistance and “capacity-building” (UNGA 2014). Over the years, “capacity building” has not only gained a lot of significance among nongovernmental organizations but also has become a strong policy instrument for development in government organizations too. Despite the definitional dilemma about the term “capacity building,” understandably, it made inroads into all sectors and domains to achieve sustainable development and its goals. “Capacity building” was initially observed as an issue of human resources development. Nevertheless, the scope of “capacity building” has been expanded to include various dimensions that go beyond the typical human resource issue. “Capacity building” has taken a new dimension and followed new approaches in “development assistance” as building capacities for sustainable development cannot be seen merely as developing technical expertise in various sectors. Lusthaus (1995) considered “capacity building” as an ongoing process by which people and systems, operating within dynamic contexts, enhance their abilities to develop and implement strategies in pursuit of their objectives for increased performance in a sustainable way. “Capacity building” was considered as one of the five pillars of the Habitat Agenda adopted at the Habitat II Conference in 1996. According to OECD (2006), capacity development is a fundamental component of development and is a key element in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005) and the Bogota Declaration on SouthSouth Cooperation and Capacity Development (OECD 2010) recognized “capacity building” as a distinct feature of South-South cooperation, strengthening South-South learning in all phases

of development through sharing of experiences, knowledge exchange, and technology transfer. The United Nations Development Summit adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 and set 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) not only for attaining peace and prosperity for all people living on earth but also for the good health of planet Earth. The 2030 Agenda also dealt with the means required for the implementation of the Goals and Targets, which include the mobilization of financial resources as well as “capacity building.” Against this backdrop of the evolving concept of “capacity building” and the utmost significance attached to “capacity building” in the context of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with specific reference to the development of peaceful, just, and inclusive societies (SDG 16), in this entry, the authors besides dovetailing on the various dimensions of “capacity building” explain the pervasive nature of “capacity building” into all aspects of sustainable development and specifically for SDG 16 and the linkages thereof with other SDGs and conclude with a way forward. For this entry, the keyword “capacity building” in respect of “sustainable development” and “SDG 16” was chosen, and significant papers, reports, and documents dealing with “capacity building” were reviewed and elicited. Given the bibliographic nature of the entry, enough care was taken to present the views and statements intact as presented in the papers and various reports that are cited in the references.

“Capacity Building” for Sustainable Development: The Genesis and Evolution “Capacity building” for achieving sustainable development and its Goals assumed a lot of significance since the adoption of UN Agenda 2030. Notably, the Brundtland Commission Report (UNCED 1987) entitled “Our Common Future” introduced “sustainable development” as an important connotation into the policy framework and defined it as the “development that meets the

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needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.” Subsequently, a comprehensive framework for “sustainable development” and “capacity building” was adopted in Agenda 21 highlighting the needs around which capacity is being developed systematically. Agenda 21 considered the fundamental goal of “capacity building” as “enhancing the ability to evaluate and address crucial questions related to policy choices and models of implementation among development options, based on an understanding of environmental potentials and limits and needs as perceived by the people of the country concerned” (UNCED 1992). Predominantly from 1992 onward, “capacity building” emerged strongly in policy, institutions, and treaties and featured in various provisions. The key aspect of “capacity building” undertaken by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and its partners was discussed in a series of Global Training Programmes held in alternate years, starting in 1993. States in the negotiation and adoption of international legal instruments on sustainable development considered “capacity building” as a vital area (Kaniaru and Kurukulasuriya 1994). Further, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was designated as the lead UN agency in organizing the UN system efforts toward “capacity building” at local, national, and regional levels. United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014, 2018), Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and a new instrument on the conservation and use of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) discussed issues such as equity, benefit-sharing, traditional knowledge, and “capacity building” for small-islanddeveloping states to benefit from ocean resources and to ensure their sustainability. In the outcome document of the Rio +20 Conference, “capacity building” is the subject of paragraphs 277–280 wherein the means of implementation were discussed. Further, the strategies for “capacity building” were also deliberated threadbare in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) in the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD 2002) and called for enhancing and

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accelerating human, institutional, and infrastructure “capacity building” initiatives and more importantly for assisting developing countries in building capacity to access a larger share of multilateral and global research and development programs. Paragraph 54 of Chapter VI of JPOI positions the need to enhance the capacity of health-care systems in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms and advises to be consistent with national laws and cultural and religious values. Para 58(a) of Chapter VIII highlights the importance of fast-tracking the national and regional programs with adequate financial resources, including through Global Environment Facility (GEF) focal areas transfer of environmentally sound technologies with assistance for capacity-building from the international community. Chap X identified among the means of implementation, the need to upkeep voluntary World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible marketbased initiatives for the creation and expansion of domestic and international markets for green products and services through “capacitybuilding” and technical assistance to developing countries. The draft International Covenant for Environment and Development of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 2010) embraces provisions on “capacity building” and financial mechanisms in Article 46 under education, training, and public awareness and Article 50 on scientific and technical cooperation and in Article 52 on international financial resources. However, in augmenting the “capacity building” endeavors beyond 2015, several issues that are being crucial in achieving all the sustainable development goals were reckoned. Member states emphasized the need for enhanced “capacity building” for sustainable development and the strengthening of technical and scientific cooperation, for the implementation of the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacitybuilding, adopted by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2005) and invited relevant agencies of the UN system and other international organizations to support developing countries, especially least developed countries in “capacity building” for developing resource-efficient and inclusive economies. Finance, technology

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transfer, and “capacity building” to developing countries have become part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s initiatives in the wake of the Paris Agreement (2016). The long-agreed Rio principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR 1992), concerning developed countries’ obligations to take action and to provide the necessary means of implementation, has been reaffirmed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (TWN Spotlight 2019). While referring to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 17 focuses on “capacity building” which affirms to “strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” and recognizes multistakeholder partnerships as important vehicles for mobilizing and sharing knowledge, expertise, technologies, and financial resources to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, particularly developing countries. Goal 17 further seeks to encourage and promote effective public, public-private, and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships (Spotlight Report 2019). The 2030 Agenda (United Nations 2015) prudently places the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), targets, and the means of implementation for all member states to comply with. In Paragraph 41 of the Agenda, the mobilization of financial resources and capacity-building and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favorable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed were succinctly presented. Through Samoa Pathway, member states also commit individually to strengthening the national institutions to augur “capacity building” and also for the inclusion of appropriate “capacity building” measures in institutions’ strengthening in all cooperation frameworks and partnerships. Of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, Target 17.9 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is dedicated to “capacity building” and aims to enhance international support to implement all the sustainable development goals for effecting targeted “capacity building” in

developing countries as part of national plans through North-South, South-South, and triangular cooperation. Within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, “capacity building” is also mentioned by target 17.8 in the context of ensuring full operationalization of the science, technology, and innovation “capacity building” mechanisms for least developed countries.

“Capacity Building” for Developing Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies (SDG 16) “Violence” – the very word shatters the peace, causes unrest, and brings disharmony in the society. For any nation, it is the biggest challenge to combat with, as globally the armed conflicts are raising causing fatalities, mass displacement within countries and across borders resulting in massive humanitarian crises thereby adversely impacting every aspect of developmental efforts. It is observed that the most affected are children and young people who are becoming victims of terrible homicides and human trafficking. Depriving people of their fundamental human rights due to institutional violence of unaccountable legal and judicial systems is acting as the root cause of violence. Keeping these anomalies in the background, Goal 16 of SDGs aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels for sustainable development. More specifically, Target 16A of SDG 16 positions to strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime. In the context of SDG 16, the history of “capacity building” and “technical assistance” traces back to the San Francisco Conference wherein building and maintaining peace and security were seeded as means for the promotion of economic, social, and humanitarian development, especially, of less developed countries, since there was a huge and even dangerous disparity in the level of

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development and standard of living between developed and less developed countries (Lazhari Bouzid 2019). Since 2011, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been organizing, in collaboration with the member states, an annual United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) thematic discussion on technical cooperation and “capacity building” in the field of human rights encompassing all sections of people who are deprived of their basic rights. Draft report of the study on technical assistance and “capacity building” in fostering mutually beneficial cooperation in promoting and protecting human rights details the nuances of technical assistance and “capacity building.” The report refers to the operative paragraph 17 of Resolution 68/268 of UN General Assembly (UNGA 2014), requesting the Secretary-General, through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to support states in building their capacity to implement their treaty obligations and provide in this regard advisory services, technical assistance, and “capacity building” in line with its mandate, in consultation with and with the consent of the states concerned. It also stated that under the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA 2015) request, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights created the Treaty Bodies’ “capacity building” program consisting of a group of staff at the Geneva Office and several “capacity building” officers in OHCHR’s regional presences. In the wake of UNGA (2015), Resolution on achieving Agenda 2030, UNDP (2016) Report dealing with SDG 16, paved the way for a new kind of development: one where people could influence the decisions that affect their lives and create communities that thrive. On 1 July 2016, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 32/16 entitled “Promoting the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health through enhancing capacity-building in public health.” In the resolution, the Human Rights Council decided to convene a panel discussion, at its 35th session, to exchange experiences and practices on promoting the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the

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highest attainable standard of physical and mental health by enhancing “capacity building” in public health and ensured that the discussion would be fully accessible to persons with disabilities. Thus, in the 35th session of the Human Rights Council (2017), Panelists recognized this is an important human right, which is also reflected as a key goal of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. HRC Resolution 37/23 of 23rd March 2018 on promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights-paragraph 5 of the said resolution requested the Committee to conduct a study on the role of technical assistance and “capacity building” in fostering mutually beneficial cooperation in promoting and protecting human rights. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Human Rights Council 2018) focused on technical cooperation and “capacity building,” with particular reference to human rights and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Council discussed the issues in pursuance of the Human Rights Council resolution 36/28 adopted on 29 September 2017 and informed by the OHCHR report entitled “Supporting effective and inclusive implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through effective, coherent and coordinated technical cooperation and capacity-building.” Human Rights Council in 2018 discussed the role of data: strengthening the capacity of national statistical offices (NSOs), data disaggregation, and partnership between national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and NSOs to ensure no one is left behind. It also discussed how such technical cooperation and “capacity building” can contribute notably in the areas of analysis and policy, data, and the implementation efforts in exploring and building on synergies between the implementation of the SDGs and the implementation of human rights obligations and recommendations stemming from human rights mechanisms. The Human Rights Council in 2019 reported that “technical cooperation” and “capacity building” play a critical role in enabling older persons to continue to contribute to society, and in fulfilling the promise of leaving no one behind in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and suggested to ensure their full and meaningful

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participation in the identification, design, and implementation of technical cooperation and “capacity building” activities in the field of the human rights of older persons, as rights-holders and active agents of change. Further, Human Rights Council in 2020 discussed the “capacity building” strategies and pointed how human rights, technical cooperation, and “capacity building” can contribute to achieving the 2030 Agenda and addressed the existing and envisaged roles of United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms, United Nations Country Teams, and other parts of the United Nations system, notably OHCHR, in contributing to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and identified innovative ways forward.

“Capacity Building” and the Linkages Thereof for Achieving SDG 16 For achieving SDG 16, “capacity building” is also linked with other SDGs. For example, Peride Blind (2019) while emphasizing the role of governance in financing for development and partnerships summarized four types of groups of connections between the targets of SDG17 and SDG16 (Table 1). DFID (2014) pointed out that capacity development goes well beyond the public sector and includes the private sector, civil society, and research organizations. Since the successful implementation of “capacity building” is linked to national budgets, Elisabeth Hege et al. (2019) highlighted the use of SDGs as tools in national budgets as it reflects a high level of political commitment. The (IDI) Development Initiative of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) launched a “capacity building” program on “Auditing Sustainable Development Goals” and in their SDG audits indicated that some SAIs refer to national budgets and financing frameworks (NAC 2019). For example, the Republic of Sudan established a national mechanism for overseeing the SDGs. However, the audit report on its preparedness to achieve SDGs indicated the mechanism’s shortfalls such as developing periodic national reports

and promoting “capacity building” at the subnational level and nonadherence to the clear program of action. The United Nations (United Nations 2019) in its Joint “capacity building” Workshop highlighted the efforts of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of China, and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)’s STI policies for the SDGs and also discussed on human “capacity building” and engaging women in STI in Asia and the Pacific. To mention, UN-DESA’s project for “Mobilizing Science, Technology, and Innovation in Developing Countries for the SDGs” was funded from the “2030 Agenda Sub-Fund of the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund” and supports the international community in achieving the SDGs. As part of institutional cooperation, UN DESA and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of China both signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and ESCAP is closely working with the member states in the Asia-Pacific region in developing STI policies for the SDGs that are inclusive and also worked on policy frameworks to advance STI policy for the SDGs and carried out “capacity building” activities to policymakers in the region. Based on the collaboration framework, the United Nations Division for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG), together with MOST and ESCAP, prepared the STI training course that is jointly funded by all three partners. Joachim Claudet et al. (2019) observed that promoting joint “capacity building” and technology transfer programs is a key issue for the uptake of appropriate science into policy and actions and stressed the need for data coproduction and sharing as important strategies to enhance science and cooperation. As part of these policy initiatives, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, and the Partnership for the Observation of the Global Ocean have a tradition of implementing capacity development programs. The Ocean Teacher Global Academy trained more than 2,500 people from 134 IOC member states in more than 180 courses, with more than

“Capacity building” and “Technical Cooperation” for Achieving SDGs Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Table 1 Interlinking AA indicators with SDG 16 and SDG 17 targets Action Area (AA) SDG17 targets AA1/SDG17.1 on domestic public resources

AA3/SDG17.2, 17.6, 17.9, 17.16, and 17.17 on international development cooperation

Action Area (AA) SDG16 targets SDGG16.a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime SDG16.8 – global governance SDG 16. a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime

AA6/SDG17.13, 17, 14, and 17.15 on systemic issues and coherence

SDG16.a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime

AA7/SDG17.6, 17.7, 17.8, 17.9, 17.18, and 17.19 on STI and “capacity building”

SDG 16.a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime

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Interlinking AA indicators terrorism (AA1.9), Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) (AA1.5), and stolen assets (AA1.6) SDG 16.a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime international cooperation (AA3.12) While not a verbatim overlap, the concept of global governance indicated in SDG16.8 presupposes international cooperation stated in AA3.12 17.15 on systemic issues and coherence SDG16.4 – IFFs, stolen assets, and organized crime SDG16.a – international cooperation, “capacity building” in developing countries, and preventing violence, terrorism, and crime SDG16.5 on corruption and bribery is also relevant although crime is not mentioned in its wording crime (AA6.6) and paragraph 112 of AAAA “Strengthening regional, national, subnational institutions to prevent violence, combat terrorism and crime, and end human trafficking and exploitation of persons, in particular women and children, following international human rights law. . . Strengthening national institutions to combat money-laundering, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. . . enhance international cooperation for capacitybuilding in these areas at all levels, in particular in developing countries” (United Nations 2015: 50) institutions (AA7.4), international institutions, and global governance including the United Nations system (AA7.5 and AA7.7), national policy frameworks for science, technology, and innovation (AA7.2)

Source: Authors’ extraction from DESA Working Paper No. 162 ST/ESA/2019/DWP/162 October 2019

4,200 registered users in the online platform. Further, it was reaffirmed that the root causes of barriers to achieving a healthy ocean also stem from insufficient progress in other aspects of sustainable human development such as ineffective

governance, poverty, low education levels, and gender or social inequity, and observed that the desire to meet people’s short-term needs often drives unsustainable activity and suggested for long-term human capital development, scientific

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exchange, cross-cultural dialog, inter-disciplinary engagement, and international cooperation as fundamental tools of “capacity building.” Niti Aayog, India, and the United Nations (2019) in the compendium of early lessons of localization of SDGs analyzed various aspects relating to SDGs implementation such as budgeting, “capacity building,” and advocacy. In India, inter-departmental mechanisms were arranged by Planning Department as part of the “whole-of-government” approach for effective implementation of SDGs which include the creation of specialized SDG Cells/Centers/ Teams, which organize regular “capacity building” programs, prepare knowledge products, and progress reports, provide inputs as required from time to time, and play a supportive role in interventions on SDGs. Allam Ahmed and Hanson (2011) probed many issues that are crucial for the attainment of sustainable development in Africa which include a responsive governance framework, conflict and related dynamics such as disarmament and demobilization, the role of donors in enhancing local development efforts, the demographic transition and youth bulge, “capacity building” in postconflict and fragile states, the need to understand the “softer-side” of capacity development, and above all the role of shrewd and tactical leadership. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has “capacity building,” education, and awareness integrated into many different Goals. Besides, Goal 17 calls for enhancing international support for implementing effective and targeted “capacity building” in developing countries. Goal 4 on ensuring “inclusive and equitable quality education” and promoting “lifelong learning opportunities for all” is also very relevant to “capacity building,” in particular, Goal 4.7 on ensuring that “all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development.” In preparation for the United Nations Highlevel Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) 2019, the Division for Sustainable Development Goals of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA/ DSDG) and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), in the Global Conference on SDG 16, addressed capacity needs and gaps toward SDG 16 implementation and follow-up

and realized that “capacity building” on SDG implementation also demands changing the culture and implementing institutional reforms in parallel and reflected on the most appropriate mechanisms for inclusion and participation, including criteria for ensuring meaningful stakeholder consultation processes and coordination with local governments. Global Civil Society Report on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs stressed that governments can pursue proactive tax policies to resource environmental and social policy goals and simultaneously fulfill their human rights obligations and squealed that governments should reduce military spending and reallocate the resource savings, inter alia, for civil conflict prevention and peace-building instead of engaging in a new arms race (Spotlight 2019). Regarding SDG 16, the works of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) are laudable. Remarkably, since August 2019, it has been working on linking up economic and other types of inequalities that impede enjoyment of human rights. As the official “custodian” OHCHR engages in monitoring and advocacy to empower excluded groups, widen participation, inclusion, and respect of fundamental freedoms including peaceful assembly (SDG 16), all essentially enable to mobilize and advocate toward equal access to rights such as water and sanitation (SDG 6), education (SDG 4), and housing (SDG 11). OHCHR is also one of the cofacilitators of Global Alliance for reporting on peaceful, just, and inclusive societies for SDG 16+ and develops methodologies for monitoring several indicators under SDG 16, especially on conflict-related deaths, violence against journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists, and human rights advocates, the existence of national human rights institutions and levels of discrimination. Report of the UN Secretary-General (United Nations 2020) indicated that in 2019, 40% of countries had national human rights institutions and successfully achieved compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. It is to be noted that still 78 countries, in particular in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, Latin America and

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the Caribbean, Oceania, and sub-Saharan Africa, do not have access to internationally recognized national human rights institutions

Conclusion and Way Forward “Capacity building” unceasingly acts as a fulcrum issue in aiming at sustainable development and achieving the sustainable development goals despite having the definitional consensus. The concept of “capacity building” evolves from mere focusing on human resource capability in development literature on civil society organizations and diffuses into national and international agendas thereby forming a focal theme for discussion in achieving development in all spheres and sectors and developing peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. “Capacity building” is looked upon as an important tool that can support the intense sharing of information about a specific policy to adopt and implement through technological, infrastructural, and financial support. “Capacity building” acts as a powerful instrument in empowering developing countries especially the emerging economies and helps in peer-to-peer learning process in many facets of development thereby contributing to the growth of strong and sustainable societies. Recognizing this instrumental and influential nature of “capacity building,” Agenda 2030, which focuses on achieving 17 specific goals and targets for the development of peace and prosperity for the people on the planet through partnerships, placed it on a high pedestal on the agenda items that strive for fighting injustice and inequalities in the societies. From the San Francisco conference of 1945 to the recent meeting of the High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on sustainable development held in July 2020, under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), “capacity building” occupied a pivotal place in developing peaceful, just, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Having gone through the various works and national and international efforts focusing on “capacity building,” the authors opine that a final consensus may arrive about the definition and usage of terminology on “capacity building” in consultation with all the stakeholders for documentation and reference

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purposes in the national and international agendas dealing with sustainable development and its goals. Emphasis should be given in all the national and international reports on sustainable development goals that are submitted as part of discussions in their agendas, to allow an item to discuss, review, and monitor the progress made on “capacity building” under each goal as it overarches all the SDGs. To the authors’ surprise, many of the strategic national and international reports on sustainable development though dealt extensively on sustainable development and its goals; “capacity building” “per se” under each Goal was silent. Since “capacity building” involves a considerable investment of financial, human, and infrastructural resources, such type of documentation and dissemination helps as a checkpoint for taking decisions on meeting the needs of “capacity building” in attaining every SDG in the prescribed period up to 2030. Concerning SDG 16 focusing on developing peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, the word “capacity building,” barring in a few independent authors’ works and reports, appeared only in the UN documents and reports with specific mention to OHCHR. Besides documenting in national and international agendas, independent researchers from academia and industry may be encouraged to study the individual Goal-specific aspects of “capacity building” from different stakeholders’ points of view and conduct impact studies to identify the gaps and provide further insights in terms of policymaking. Strengthening the capacity of national statistical offices (NSOs), documentation, data disaggregation, and partnership between national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and NSOs are the need of the hour. Appropriate mechanisms for meaningful stakeholder consultation processes and coordination with local governments may be developed to identify the gaps in “capacity building” at the national and international levels. Much more focus and coverage on the efforts made in the implementation of “capacity building” “per se” in attaining every goal are needed in all the national and international reports and research articles to exploit its fullest potential in developing peaceful, strong, just, inclusive, and sustainable societies by justifying the concept of “leaving no one behind” which is the bottom line of Agenda 2030.

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Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being ▶ Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Ensuring Child Rights for a Just Society ▶ Immanent Justice: Concept and Implications ▶ Relative Deprivation and the Sustainable Development Goals

References Ahmed A, Hanson KT (2011) Leadership, ‘Capacity Building’ and sustainable development in contemporary Africa. World J Entrepreneur Manag Sustain Develop 7(2/3/4) Blind PK (2019) How relevant is governance to financing for development and partnerships? Interlinking SDG16 and SDG17 at the target level. DESA working paper No. 162 ST/ESA/2019/DWP/162 October 2019 Bouzid L (2019) Draft of the study on technical assistance and capacity building in fostering mutually beneficial cooperation in promoting and protecting human rights CBDR (1992) The concept of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) – Principle 7 of the Rio declaration at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992. CIDA (1996) Capacity development: the concept and its implementation in the CIDA context, CIDA, Hull Claudet J, et al (2019) A roadmap for using the UN decade of ocean science for sustainable development in support of science, policy, and action DFID (2014) How to note capacity development. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224810/How-tonote-capacity-development.pdf Hege E, Brimont L, Pagnon F (2019) Sustainable development goals and indicators: can they be tools to make national budgets more sustainable? Pub Sect Econ 43(4):423–444 Human Rights Council (2017) Concept note under the theme: human rights and the sustainable development goals: enhancing human rights technical cooperation and capacity building to contribute to the effective and inclusive implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development Human Rights Council (2018) The Annual thematic panel discussion on technical cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights under the theme ‘Technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of the human rights of older persons’ IPCC (2014) AR5 synthesis report: climate change IPCC (2018) Global warming report

ITC (2000) Enchede, The Netherlands, 12–15 November 2000, Groot, Richard and Paul van der Molen, Eds Workshop on capacity building in land administration for developing countries – final report Kaniaru DW (2010) The internationalization of environmental law, paper presented at the Australasian Conference of Planning and Environmental Courts and Tribunals (ACPECT) conference, Sydney, Australia on September 1, 2010 Kaniaru DW, Kurukulasuriya L (1994) Capacity building in environmental law. In UNEP. UNEP’s new way forward: environmental law and sustainable development, 172 Krishnaveni R, Aravamudhan NR (2013) Capacity building: a new paradigm for development, effective. Executive XVI(2) Lusthaus C (1995) Institutional assessment: a framework for strengthening organizational capacity for IDRC’s research partners. IDRC, Ottawa McPhee P, Bare J (2001) Introduction. In: De Vita CJ, Fleming C (eds) Building capacity in nonprofit organizations. The Urban Institute Morgan P, Qualman A (1996) Applying results-based management to capacity development, Policy Branch, CIDA, Hull NAC (2019) National Audit Chamber, a report on the preparedness of the Republic of Sudan to implement the sustainable development goals 2015–2030. National Audit Chamber of Sudan, Karthum Niti Aayog and United Nations (2019) Localising sustainable development goals: Early lessons from India OECD (2005) The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness OECD (2006) The challenge of capacity development: working towards good practice. OECD (2010) The high-level event on South-South cooperation and capacity development. The Bogota statement: towards effective and inclusive development partnership OECD/DAC (2012) Supporting partners to develop their capacity: lessons from DAC peer reviews Spotlight Report (2019) Global civil society report on the 2030 agenda and the SDGs TWN Spotlight (2019) Third World Network (TWN) spotlights on the SDGs UNCED (1987), Our common future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UNCED (1992), Agenda 21, Chapter 37: National mechanisms and international cooperatione for ‘Capacity Building’ UNDP (1997) Capacity development, management development and governance division. UNDP, New York UNDP (2016) Annual report on the rule of law and human rights, Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) UNEP (2005) Bali strategic plan for technology support and capacity-building, adopted by the 23rd session of UNEP’s governing council in February 2005 UNGA (2010) The draft international convention on environment and development proposed in the 65th session of the UN General Assembly

Capacity Development and Sustainable Development Goals UNGA (2014) Draft of the study on technical assistance and capacity building UNGA (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development (UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015) [Transforming Our World] United Nations (2015) A/RES/70/1 transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development United Nations (2019) Joint ‘Capacity Building’ workshop on science, technology and innovation for sustainable development goals, UN DESA, MOST China and UNESCAP December 9–17, 2019, Guilin, Guangxi Province, China United Nations (2020) United Nations E/2020/57 “Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals” Report of the Secretary-General World Bank (1981) Accelerated development in SubSaharan Africa: a plan for action, by Elliot Berg WSSD (2002) Report of the World summit on sustainable development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002

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obtained after decades of work in different regions, countries, and realities. It involves a set of conceptual references and a methodological framework that consists of five steps that are integrated into a policy advisory analysis and programming process. These steps are: (1) engage stakeholders on capacity development; (2) assess capacity assets and needs; (3) formulate a capacity development response; (4) implement the response; and (5) evaluate capacity development (UNDP 2015). At each step, the UNDP has defined a set of policy recommendations and services offered by a network of partners such as United Nation agencies and national and regional research institutions, among others.

Introduction

Capacity Development ▶ Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Capacity Development and Sustainable Development Goals Diego Davila1 and Edwin Murillo2 1 Faculty of Researches, High School of Public Administration, Bogotá, Colombia 2 Faculty of Law, Santiago of Cali’s University, Cali, Colombia

Definition The capacity development approach is described by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the process by which individuals, organizations, countries, and societies foster and maintain the capabilities for addressing major restrictions to human progress, and achieve their development objectives over time (UNDP 2008). It is driven by the evidence, results, and lessons

The evolution of the UNDP’s capacity development approach has been marked by practices and results obtained during decades of work with developing and developed countries, international institutions, agencies, and donors, among others. It is considered the cornerstone for strengthening institutional capabilities and empower individuals, social leaders, politicians, governmental officers, and decision-makers for leading a transformation process to tackle all the disadvantages and inequalities that affect their societies (UNDP 2015). However, the current foundations of the capacity development approach are the outcome of several changes that occurred in the international context since the end of the Second World War. These changes are tightly related to the shift of paradigm in development economics, the major incidence of the human development approach by the end of 1990s, and the new development agendas that emerged in the core of international institutions such the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, Bretton Woods’s institutions and the USA have shaped most of the policies implemented for fostering development process in different regions in the world. Therefore, this contribution to the encyclopedia of the UN sustainable development goals

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seeks to present a general framework about the major transformations in development economics, the approaches implemented to address development issues in developing countries, and the current alternatives and goals endorsed by the international community to tackle persistent inequalities in the world.

The Planning Approach to Economic Development Reconstructing development theory and practices for the twenty-first century requires a deep understanding of the different ideological and theoretical perspectives that have dominated the international agenda. There is a consensus that the idea of development can be traced or directly linked to the changes occurred in Europe and the USA from the seventeenth century (Brett 2009). However, some authors disagree over the objectives of the social, economic, and political changes observed during this period, the normative implications of these changes, and the potential alternatives to manage it. However, the final purpose of this contribution is to provide a general understanding about the changes occurred in the international development agenda after the end of Second World War, in particular, the mainstream paradigms that have changed in the core of the international institutions and developed countries, who have had a great influence on the international policies implemented. Most development economists during the 1960s and 1970s stated that in most poor countries was necessary a sort of planning approach for promoting development, fighting poverty, and reducing inequality. According to this perspective, protectionist policies might be a mechanism for encouraging national growth and fostering the industrialization process required for bridging the gap with most developed countries (Edwards 2014). Thus, the economists who supported the planning approach stressed the importance that the states should own industries, banks, and trading companies in order to concentrate the authority and decisions in the government, and give it the power to determinate the course of the national economy.

The planning approach became influential in several regions, in particular Africa during the 1960s, after the beginning of the decolonization process. It was also prominent in India and Latin America during the 1970s, due to the international policies promoted by Kennedy’s administration for encouraging national planning at the core of the state reforms for Latin American countries (Edwards 2014). Indeed, the Alliance for Progress incorporated the institutionalism of well-functioning departments of planning at Latin American countries, as a precondition to be eligible of aid from the USA. The planning approach promoted a development’s perspective grounded on the accumulation of capital as the core and source of economic growth. Consequently, the accessibility of labor was not considered a major restriction to economic expansion, not even increases upon productivity were pondered in the equation for promoting national growth. Parallelly, most development economists argued that markets do not work well at promoting economic development; even these might harm the aggregate level of the economy. Thus, market failures were considered the outcome of the absence of competition, the lack of consumer’s knowledge, politicians-corrupted behavior, and incomplete information for making public decisions (Edwards 2014). Another core assumption of the planning approach was associated with depending on the exportation of commodities. Authors such as Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer estimated the implications for developing countries’ economies in comparison with industrialize ones, where exports of manufactured goods predominate. Thus, there are two (2) types of negative effects for primary producers in “terms of trade”: One effect occurs because of systematically different institutional features of product and factor markets, such as cost-plus pricing and the unionization of labor in industry. Another negative influence is that of technical progress, both from the asymmetric distribution of its fruits, but also from its asymmetric impact on future demand, favorable to that of industry while unfavorable to that of agriculture. (Toye and Toye 2003, p. 438)

In conjunction, relative prices of developing countries’ exports were destined to decline

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through time. Though the empirical evidence for the 1970s has produced mixed results, Arslan (2002) asserts that, in general, most have agreed that commodity prices are nonstationary. This variability draws on shocks in demand and supply conditions and by policy decisions designed and implemented at the national level. As a reaction to these implications, it was promoted an industrialization process guided by the state to minimize the inequalities within the international economic system (Edwards 2014). From Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives, these development issues were associated with a dependency model between developed and developing countries. According to the arguments stated by authors such as André Guther Frank and Samir Amin, developing countries occupy a secondary level within the international economic system, by allocating commodities to industrialize countries for manufacturing goods and services. These economic ties, in most cases, encourage new dependency relations with former colonial powers. As a reaction to the implications described, some dependency theorists encouraged the idea of “southsouth” trading policies, while others stayed from doctrinal Marxism, such Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in Latin America (Edwards 2014). Though their arguments discuss the relations of dependency within the international system, between the center and the periphery, they instead claimed for a rapid industrialization process to foster development and economic growth.

Markets and New Perspectives on Development The contrasting outcome between successful East Asian “Tigers” and the Latin American and African countries influenced the transformation of the mainstream paradigm in development economics (Edwards 2014). During the late 1970s, the planning approach started to be questioned. The experiences reported by several countries in Latin America, Africa, and some parts of Asia indicated to experts and policymakers that the “planning approach” did

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not solve most of the issues related to lasting economic growth and improving social conditions. Also, most academics agreed that Latin American countries became vulnerable to external shocks as consequence of protectionism policies (Edwards 2014). Even in Africa perspectives about development changed, in particular, due to the release of the report called “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Plan for Action,” written by Elliot Berg, and financed by the World Bank in 1981. Berg’s report advocated for designing another approach to allocate aid, increase foreign technical assistance, and promoting the engagement of the private sector for improving economic conditions in most African countries (World Bank 1981). In conjunction, it means a shift towards the policies of economic liberalization encouraged by the World Bank. Other factors had a great influence on the new development perspectives. Margaret Thatcher became prime minister of the UK in 1979, and Ronald Regan was elected president of the USA in 1981. Both supported the privatization of public enterprises, deregulation of the finance sector, and competitiveness in the public sector. These policy decisions were linked with new development thinking, established in the international agenda during the 1980s, which reinforced other means for encouraging lasting economic progress such as: “openness, competition, export growth, macroeconomic stability, and markets” (Edwards 2014, p.14). The new development agenda included several economic reforms that were rapidly disseminated in the developing world. These reforms had an origin in Latin America, and later, to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and India (Edwards 2014). Also, it influenced African countries, however, slower than other countries, mainly as a consequence of the opposition made it by politicians in several countries who have had benefits from the official assistance provided by multilateral agencies with a presence in the region. The market-oriented reform, commonly known as “Washington Consensus” in Latin America, was a decalogue of several policies

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suggested by John Williamson in 1990. Some of these policies were associated with deregulation, trade liberalization, tax reform, and fiscal discipline. The cornerstone of the reform was grounded on “the view of government interventionism as a fountainhead of distortions that represses creativity and causes resources to be misallocated” (Birdsall et al. 2010, p. 7). In contrast with protectionism policies and the planning approach, this new paradigm stated that economic development was not efficient in the hands of politicians, government planners, and bureaucrats. Therefore, development policies must focus on freeing and enabling markets to “get the prices right” (Birdsall et al. 2010). During the 1990s, different countries established internal policies based on the marketoriented reforms. Some of them, especially in Latin America, had quick results. Inflation rates decreased, exports enlarged, and real wages grew. However, in different nations, early accomplishments were followed by new setbacks. The privatization of public utilities coming from the water supply, sanitation, and telecommunications was implemented without proper regulation and competition policies. Also, state-owned ventures were replaced by private monopolies, and in many cases, these private organizations were surrounded by corruption cases getting involved politicians and government functionaries (Edwards 2014). Besides, most developing countries failed to transform its public institutions, intending to encourage the rule of law, protect property rights, and reduce the extent of corruption. In Latin America, for instance, the situation was accompanied by rigid exchange rates, developed by policymakers, seeking to control inflation rates. But, with time, its currencies became overvalued, generating several external imbalances such as that Africa had experienced decades before. The outcomes of these inflexible rates were a series of currency crisis in South America, Central America, and East Asia, including notorious cases such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea (Edwards 2014). During the second half of the 2000s, learnings and new public policy recommendations began to

be implemented in several countries. Some decided to take a pragmatic approach to the reforms and the modernization processes included in the “Washington consensus.” Thus, different national “versions” of the oriented market reform appeared in the international context, seeking to create a better approach for fostering development, within a free market dimension, but closer to the vast among of different local contexts. Therefore, several countries applied controls to capital mobility, maintain ownership over public enterprises, and implemented better methods to understand and manage macroeconomic imbalances. Also, factors such as China’s remarkable expansion and high commodity prices supported the recuperation and stabilization process of most affected countries (Edwards 2014).

Human Development Approach As the global political economy was moving towards the implementation of even greater reforms grounded on the market-based policies, a new paradigm on development emerged in the international agenda. The human development approach raised as a reaction to development agendas built on economic growth as the main source and goal of lasting development processes. Thus, human development grew out of the global discussions upon the links between economic growth and development during the second half of the twentieth century (UNDP 2020). During the 1960s there was an important movement of scholars advocating to include alternatives for measuring development processes in the world. By then, in many countries, the indicator gross national product (GNP) was used to explain most of the issues related to economic growth and national progress, even though GDP was never projected to be used as an indicator of well-being (UNDP 2020). Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, the international development debate had a turning point, by focusing on alternatives to measure development goals beyond the GDP, and incorporating important factors such as employment, redistribution with growth, and people’s basic needs.

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Probably the most prominent scholar by the end of the 1990s, who developed further these ideas and implications for human development, was the Nobel Prize for Economics Amartya Sen, and his work entitled Development as Freedom. Sen argued that development might be conceptualized as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people, communities, and countries enjoy (Sen 1999). However, focusing on human means of freedom diverges with narrower perspectives of development, such as labeling the development process with the growth of gross national product (GNP), rising the individual income of citizens, the industrialization process of developing countries, or with technological advance (Sen 1999). These determinants are means to expanding the freedoms perceived by all members of the society, but freedoms vary also on other factors such as social, economic, and political arrangements; political and civil rights; and freedom of speech, among others. Thus, Sen (1999) argues “viewing development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process” (p. 3). All the ideas and contributions made by Sen (1999) and other important scholars paved the way for the human development approach, which is grounded on expanding the richness of human life within two dimensions: enchaining human abilities and creating conditions for human development (UNDP 2020). Indeed, this approach had a great influence on the international development agendas that emerged during the first half of the twenty-first century, in particular, the goals, means, and targets included in the Millennium agenda and the new development agenda post-2015.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Aid Effectiveness In September 2000 the United Nations Assembly adopted the “Millennium Declaration,” stating that “only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common

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humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable” (UNGA 2000, p.2). Indeed, this declaration asserted upon the urgent necessity to develop policies and measures, at the global level, to correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition (UNGA 2000). Also, signing countries agreed to promote ownership at the local level, by formulating and implementing all possible measures in conjunction with governments in the developing world. The goals included in the Millennium agenda mainly were focused on: peace, security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting the environment, human rights, democracy, and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations (UNGA 2000). With respect of the specific goals the agenda set the following goals: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a global partnership for development. In 2002, at the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, the UN stressed the importance of increase international efforts for fulfilling the agreed development goals, and including those contained in the Millennium Declaration. It is considered a turning point on the approach to development cooperation at the international level, by gathering the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization as part of the efforts to promote coherent policies for financing development goals and targets throughout Official Development Assistance (ODA). Indeed, the Monterey’s declaration urged “developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries” (UN 2003,14). The Millennium Declaration and the leading actions included in the Monterrey consensus were subscribed by over 100 countries in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and

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later, reaffirmed in Accra in 2008 at ministeriallevel forums arranged by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Bissio 2013). This declaration did not emerge from any of United Nations bodies, but it gave plenty of support to the Millennium Declaration from major bilateral donors, the World Bank, and the OECD. The main concern of the Paris declaration was continuing to reform the mechanisms and ways of delivering aid. Indeed, it stated that “while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve [the millennium development goals], aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance” (Bissio 2013, p.236). Later, in 2008, ministers of developing and donor countries endorsed a statement called Agenda for Action, in Accra, Ghana, seeking to accelerate the implementation of the Paris declaration. This statement reinforced that aid and ODA were only one part of development efforts. Therefore, democracy, economic growth, social progress, and environmental conservation were considered are the main instruments for fostering development in all countries (OECD 2008). Thus, and intending to take steps forward, the agenda set three major actions or challenges to accelerate progress on the effectiveness of aid: foster country ownership of the policies and programs implemented; build more effective and inclusive partnerships with public institutions, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and foster the evaluation and monitoring of processes (OECD 2008). The Millennium agenda helped to lift more than one million people out of extreme poverty; by addressing hunger in the world, enabling actions for gender equality, and protecting the environment (UN 2015). However, and despite the efforts described, inequalities persisted all over the world. Women continued to die during pregnancy, disparities between rural and urban areas remained unattended, and inequalities by age, disability, or ethnicity persisted. Though several challenges remained, the Millennium agenda generated an unprecedented international

movement against inequalities, generated new and innovative partnerships for addressing development issues, encouraged the people to act, and showed the importance of setting ambitious goals (UN 2015). Thus, and to continue encouraging development and reducing inequalities, the Heads of State and high representatives, meeting at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York in 2015, decided to set a new global sustainable development goals (SDGs). This emerging post-2015 development agenda, built on the lessons and the gathered experience, seeks to “tackle root causes and do more to integrate the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development” (UN 2015, p. 3).

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Governance Instruments in the Capacity Development Approach The sustainable development agenda is a plan of action for people and the planet. It seeks to encourage the international community to commit to eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty. Also, it urges to shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path by integrating three dimensions: economic, social, and environmental, but in a balanced manner (UNGA 2015). This agenda has an unpreceded scope and impact. It is recognized by all countries and is relevant to different national realities and capacities, and to the current status of development policies and priorities stablished by national governments. The agenda integrates 17 goals and 169 targets, built on the millennium development goals, and seeks to address persistent disadvantages for human development. All the goals and targets were “the result of over two years of intensive public consultation and engagement with civil society and other stakeholders around the world, which paid particular attention to the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable” (UNGA 2015, p. 3). Also, it integrates the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; agreed during the Third International Conference on Financing

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for Development, the international commitment described in the Paris Agenda for fighting clime change, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Seeking to achieve the whole purpose of the agenda by 2030, there are several factors included in the sustainable development goals (SDGs) that represent the learning process of the international community during decades of changes on policies and strategies. Indeed, the transformations within the field of development economics and human development that occurred at the end of the twentieth century have shaped most of the current approaches and methodologies used by international institutions and governments for encouraging better development practices in several regions and developing countries. Also, the evaluation processes carried on by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF have contributed to discussions about how to promote better practices for engaging all the stakeholders within a framework of good governance. Governance practices are considered the cornerstone of the UNDP’s capacity development approach. As it was discussed before, the international community has developed different approaches and methodologies to promote better standards of living for all human beings. Indeed, after the Second World War, most of the issues in the development field were related to the necessity of fostering economic growth in developing countries. As a result, protectionism’s policies, grounded on the planning approach, were implemented in Latin America, Africa, and East Asia. However, this approach did not solve structural issues that limited the effectiveness of these policies, creating national economies vulnerable to external shocks and overvalued currencies. Parallelly, international institutions and donors initiated a debate upon the efficiency of aid for accomplishing development goals. Though in several conferences and assemblies was promoted greater economic support from developed countries to the ODA, the international community perceived that the basic factor for improving the impact of international agendas on development was not related to the amount of economic investment. Contrary, better results might be achieved

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by encouraging national governments to transform and modernize its public institutions, implementing better public policies, promoting a better understanding with the private sector, and setting the ground for enabling civil society to actively engage with their institutions. Thus, the required synergies for achieving better development outcomes, with the commitment of all stakeholders, correspond to principles and practices within a governance framework. Meuleman and Niestroy (2015) argue that governance is the set of interactions, in which governments, public institutions, the private sector, and the civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems. Also, it requires instruments, procedures, and a role division among the actors to address those social problems and disadvantages that affect human development (Bevir 2011). Thus, these principals are incorporated in the current UNDP capacity development approach as conceptual references for developing methods and services available for the international community. Indeed, as it was mentioned, UNDP’s capacity development approach has five steps that are integrated into a policy advisory analysis and programming process. The steps are: (1) engage stakeholders on capacity development; (2) assess capacity assets and needs; (3) formulate a capacity development response; (4) implement the response; and (5) evaluate capacity development (UNDP 2015). Engaging stakeholders on capacity development is probably the most important stage of the process. An effective development process is embedded in a political and social context that might be engaged or not with the required institutional transformations. In fact, an inclusive participatory approach to capacity development benefits all parties to set priorities, build trust, and engage politicians and decision-makers, within a steering process led by government structures. In conjunction, this what the UNDP has defined as “national ownership” of the programs implemented. Assessing capacity assets and needs provide a general framework for making decisions about what to prioritize, who is involved, and what would be the scope of the actions and results

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Capacity Development and Sustainable Development Goals

within a specific frame of time. The UNDP capacity assessment methodology is considered a systematic and objective approach for conducting a process, led by key local stakeholders, aiming to determine the best course of action in terms of capacity needs, potential responses, and recommended investments (UNDP 2015). The findings of the capacity assessment should be considered the starting point for formulating a capacity development response (UNDP 2015). This response or strategy for addressing the core issues detected in the assessment process are organized under four categories: (a) institutional arrangements, (b) leadership, (c) knowledge, and (d) accountability. Capacity assessments frequently reveal that organizations and institutions might be working inefficiently as a consequence of policies, procedures, and institutional structures that do not work properly. Also, the assessment process reveals weaknesses about the ability to anticipate and respond to the changes coming from inside of the institutions and organizations, or the outside context. Addressing these weaknesses require leadership training and educational opportunities for improving skills and knowledge. Also, a proper accountability process is essential for helping individuals, organizations, and systems to monitor, guide, and adjust their behavior and to learn and self-regulate (UNDP 2015). Therefore, the actions designed and implemented must meet all the core issues described, seeking to generate a comprehensive response. Implementing a capacity development response is a comprehensive set of activities and actions. It is not a parallel process without the commitment of all stakeholders. Instead, it requires the adequate management of the national institutions, truly political will, and engagement of the civil society for meeting the goals. Hence, the implementation process must deliver on time what was planned and have to continue after the end of the formal implementation period. This ensures that the improvements will be lasting and sustainable. Finally, every capacity development response needs to be assessed. Like the previous stage of assessing capacity assets and needs, this step is designed to promote accountability, performance management, and learning (UNDP 2015). The

evaluation process needs to integrate a set of indicators into an existing monitoring system in the country, rather than implement a separate one. Also, the measurement process should be based on clear evidence of the changes gathered on the core categories described: (a) institutional arrangements, (b) leadership, (c) knowledge, and (d) accountability. In sum, the UNDP capacity development approach is a comprehensive process designed to foster development responses and strategies. The whole structure and methods developed as policies recommendations and services offered by UN international partners are grounded on good governance practices. International institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF have changed over the years, seeking to develop better approaches to accomplish development goals in developing countries and other needed nations. Thus, the national ownership of the programs implemented with the support of donors, bilateral agreements with developed countries, and economic resources coming from the ODA is essential for guaranteeing the success and sustainability of the improvements, and is considered the best alternative for promoting a better quality of life for all.

Summary/Conclusions The changes that occurred over 70 years of cooperation for development have shaped the current strategies, public policies, and approaches implemented in different regions and countries. The transitions described in development economics have affected the perception of the international community and multilateral institutions about how to foster economic growth and improve the decision-making strategies in countries with different realities. Indeed, and after years of learning, there is not a unique formula for encouraging development processes in the world. The outcomes reported by countries in different regions such as Latin America, Africa, and East Asia offer a wide perspective of the challenges faced by countries that decided to transform its institutions and policies for improving the quality of life of the citizens.

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Also, the human development approach developed by the end of the twentieth century brought a whole new perspective about what would be the main issues that any strategy for improving social conditions should meet. Instead of just focus on economic growth, accumulation capital, and foster industrialization processes, this approach put the human being in the center of the discussion. Factors such as people’s needs and restrictions for human fulfillment became even more relevant in the international development agenda and had a great influence on the goals and targets described in the Millennium Declaration and the post-2015 agenda. The development agendas created in the core of the international institution since the beginning of the twenty-first century represent the international consensus upon the mechanism and strategies for fostering development in the world, mainly aiming to eradicate extreme poverty, hunger, and gender inequalities, among other restrictions for human fulfillment. Also, it represents the commitment of the international community, in particular developed and industrialized countries, at supporting strategies and programs with economic recourses, bilateral technical assistance, and technology transference. To summarize, the current capacity development approach is the result of years of learning and engagement with different international stakeholders. It is also an approach for encouraging development responses with the participation and leadership of all countries that have required the assistance of the UN and its bodies. It represents the cornerstone for achieving the development goals and targets agreed by the international community before 2030.

Cross-References ▶ Capacity Building ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Local Leadership: Types and Functions

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References Arslan A (2002) Commodity Price evelopments since the 1970s. Available via: http://www.fao.org/3/y4344e/y4344e0g.htm Bevir M (2011) Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma. The SAGE handbook of governance, London, pp 1–16 Birdsall N, Caicedo FV, De la Torre A (2010) The Washington consensus: assessing a damaged brand. https:// doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5316 Bissio R (2013) The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness. Available via https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economicand-social-development/realizing-the-right-to-develop ment_e121313e-en Brett EA (2009) Reconstructing development theory: international inequality, institutional reform and social emancipation. Macmillan International Higher Education, New York Edwards S (2014) Economic development and the effectiveness of foreign aid: a historical perspective. Kyklos 68(3):277–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12084 Meuleman L, Niestroy I (2015) Common but differentiated governance: a metagovernance approach to make the SDGs work. Available via: https://www.mdpi.com/ 2071-1050/7/9/12295 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008) Accra agenda for action. Available via https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ 45827311.pdf Sen A (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford Universty Press, Oxford Toye JF, Toye R (2003) The origins and interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer thesis. Hist Polit Econ 35(3):437– 467. Available via https://muse.jhu.edu/article/46958/ summary United Nations (UN) (2003) Monterrey conference on financing for development. Available via https://www. un.org/esa/ffd/overview/monterrey-conference.html. Accessed 10 May 2020 United Nations (UN) (2015) The millennium development goals report. Available via https://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG% 202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2008) Supporting capacity development: the UNDP approach. United Nations Development Programme. Available via https://www.undp.org/content/dam/ aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-develop ment/support-capacity-development-the-undpapproach/CDG_Brochure_2009.pdf United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2015) Capacity development: A UNDP Primer. Available via https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ librarypage/capacity-building/capacity-developmenta-undp-primer.html. Accessed 10 May 2020 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2020) Human development approach. Available via http:// hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-human-development. Accessed 5 Jun 2020

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United Nations General Asembly (UNGA) (2000). United Nations millennium declaration. United Nations General Assembly. Available via https://www.un.org/ en/development/devagenda/millennium.shtml United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Available via https://www.un.org/ en/development/desa/population/migration/ generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_ E.pdf World Bank (1981) Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a plan for action. Available via http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/702471468768312009/Accel erated-development-in-sub-Saharan-Africa-an-agendafor-action

Challenges of International Criminal Law for Sustainable Development Marian Yankson-Mensah International Nuremberg Principles Academy, Nuremberg, Germany

Definitions International criminal law comprises of principles and norms that create or are related to responsibility for crimes under international law (Werle and Jessberger 2014). Crimes under international law are proscribed actions or omissions that give rise to direct individual criminal responsibility under international law (Werle and Jessberger 2014).

Introduction At the end of the Second World War, the international community was greatly outraged by the heinous atrocities committed by the Nazis. This outrage set the stage for what later became known as the Nuremberg trial, one of the most significant milestones in international law which was dubbed, “the trial of the twentieth century” (Rancilio 2000–2001) (Wald 2005–2006). In the Joint Declaration by Members of the United

Nations issued on December 17, 1942, the Allied Powers reaffirmed “their solemn resolution to ensure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution” (Jewish Virtual Library). The Nuremberg trial was thus heightened by the need for retribution for the heinous crimes perpetrated in the course of the Second World War, coupled with the public demands for justice (Rosenbaum 2005–2006). On 8 August 1945, the governments of the four victorious nations of the Second World War, claiming to exercise their sovereign power, signed the London Agreement which brought forth the International Military Tribunal. The mandate of the International Military Tribunal was to prosecute and punish the major war criminals “whose offenses had no particular geographical location” (London Agreement of August 8, 1945). The Nuremberg Charter also set out the functions, subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity), and constitution of the International Military Tribunal. In pursuance of Article 14 of the Nuremberg Charter, 24 major war criminals were indicted on 18 October 1945 and charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In addition, the 24 accused persons were charged with “participating in the formulation of or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit all the said crimes” (International Military Tribunal 1946). The International Military Tribunal delivered its judgment on 30 September and 1 October 1946. Out of the 22 persons who were tried, 19 were convicted, with 12 of them being sentenced to death by hanging. Since the judgment of the International Military Tribunal in 1946, the principles enshrined under the Nuremberg Charter, have evolved significantly, serving as a catalyst for development of international human rights laws and international criminal law. Some key developments in international criminal law include the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) on 9 December, 1948, the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the 1950 formulation of the Nuremberg

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Principles (i.e., principles of international law recognized under the Nuremberg Charter) by the International Law Commission, the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court on 17 July 1998 through the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. While international criminal law has evolved over the years, the perpetration of mass atrocities continues to thrive in different parts of the world. Conflicts worldwide have increased in the twentyfirst century, with the highest increase having occurred since 2010 (World Bank 2020). Moreover, statistics show that there has been a reduction in global security and cooperation, as evinced by wars and humanitarian crises in different parts of the world. In 2019 for instance, a data project on Armed Conflict Location and Event recorded 20,578 cases of violence against civilians (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 2020). At the end of 2014, 59.5 million people had been forcibly displaced, including 19.5 million refugees (World Bank Group). These alarming rates of worldwide violence calls for the need to ensure accountability for mass atrocities perpetrated during these wars. Yet, different handicaps posed by the challenges of international criminal law, have hindered access to justice for the victims of mass atrocities at both national and international levels. Besides, the International Criminal Court (ICC), considered today as the major institutional player in the field of international criminal law, does not have jurisdiction in all instances to prosecute crimes committed in every atrocity situation. The absence of prosecutions where crimes under international law have been committed undermines Goal 16 of the sustainable development goals and in particular Target 16.3 which aims to “promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.” Provision of retributive justice for

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victims is also hampered by the low number of perpetrators who eventually get prosecuted for their heinous crimes (Mue 2015). Despite the relevant role that such prosecutions play in providing access to justice, little emphasis has been placed on studying how the solutions for some of the core challenges of international criminal law can also serve as two-edged swords for attainment of Target 16.3. This chapter maintains that the principles of international criminal law underly some key aspects of sustainable development, such as good governance. Hence, eliminating some of the core problems of international criminal justice will impact positively on the attainment of some targets of SDG 16. The chapter first looks at the relationship between sustainable development and international criminal law, before providing an overview of some of the core challenges of international law and the measures needed to address them. It also provides an overview of some existing initiatives that are aimed at improving the current system of international criminal law.

The Relationship Between International Criminal Law and Sustainable Development The relevant connection between international criminal law and sustainable development stems from four main reasons. Firstly, the relationship can be inferred from the recognition that is now given to the concept of sustainable development under international law. In the case of GabčíkovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), the International Court of Justice relied on the concept of sustainable development in its reasoning and observed that the “need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.” According to Sands, the court’s reliance on the concept of sustainable development implies that it has a “legal function” (Sands 1999). Indeed, in the same case, Judge Weeramantry explicitly stated in his separate opinion that the principle of sustainable

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development is “a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community” (International Court of Justice, case of GabčíkovoNagymaros Project[Hungary/Slovakia] 1997). The World Summit on sustainable development plan of Implementation has also acknowledged the relevance of international law for sustainable development under paragraph 142, where it states that “a firm commitment to the ideals of the United Nations and to the principles of international law and to strengthening the United Nations system and other multilateral institutions is essential” (United Nations 2002). Since international criminal law is regarded today as one of the key branches of international law, the recognition of sustainable development under international law arguably creates a connection between these two seemingly distinct subjects. Secondly, sustainable development depends largely on properly functioning laws. It has for instance been argued that the future enhancement of sustainable development depends partly on the “interaction of international treaty regimes” and “dialogue of international courts and tribunals” (Segger 2009). Law is thus considered as the “hidden architecture of sustainable development” (de Soto 2001). The United Nations has observed in this regard that “the rule of law, access to justice, non-discriminatory and accountable governments and public institutions help drive development and have their own intrinsic value” (United Nations 2013). Since one of the means of ensuring that laws function in any society is through retributive justice, which is one of the aims of international criminal justice, it cannot be alienated from sustainable development. Thirdly, the protection of human rights and the reduction of gross human rights violations are some of the underlying tenets of the right to development, which forms the basis of the concept of sustainable development (Qerimi 2014– 2015). The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development provides that “states have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.” In

this regard, states must take the necessary steps to eliminate gross human rights violations (the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, Articles 3, 5). Arguably, the implementation of international criminal law by states is a means of addressing and eliminating gross violations of human rights. Fourthly, good governance, which is recognized under different soft law documents as a principle of sustainable development, entails access to justice, which is one of the aims of prosecuting crimes under international law. In the International Law Association’s New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to sustainable development, the relevance of access to justice in sustainable development is reiterated under principle 5 in relation to public participation and access to information and justice. The declaration states that “the empowerment of people in the context of sustainable development requires access to effective judicial or administrative procedures in the state where the measure has been taken to challenge such measure and to claim compensation” (International Law Association 2002). Moreover, “where transboundary harm has been, or is likely to be caused,” states must ensure that “individuals and peoples affected have non-discriminatory access to the same judicial and administrative procedures as would individuals and peoples of the state from which the harm is caused if such harm occurred in that state” (International Law Association 2002). International criminal law can be considered as one of the key tools under international law today that can be used to achieve access to justice. In summation, although the status of the different principles of sustainable development may vary under international law, there is no doubt that the key tenets of international criminal law are generally related to the concept of sustainable development.

Addressing the Challenges of International Criminal Justice The need to address different challenges of international criminal law stems from the imperfection

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of the current system of international criminal law and the need for regular and significant reforms and changes to strengthen the worldwide fight against impunity. Many of the years following the Nuremberg trial and the subsequent adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations General Assembly were dominated by developing additional treaties and conventions, tribunals, and courts to develop international criminal justice, while little emphasis was placed on the basic needs of such tribunals and courts, such as training judges and ensuring enforcement (Donovan 2009). This has given rise to a low rate of convictions against perpetrators of crimes under international law. This chapter identifies four key measures that are needed to reform international criminal law positively, namely: the enforcement of international criminal law at the national level, the enhancement of the cooperation regime in international criminal law, addressing gaps in jurisdiction and definitional limitations, and resolving the question of immunity of heads of state under international criminal law. Enforcement of International Criminal Law at the National Level One of the fundamental reasons for the failure of international criminal justice to result in effective prosecutions is the lack of capacity in many cases to deal with perpetrators (Meron 2018). Mass atrocities are sometimes perpetrated by highlevel political figures who are difficult to arrest both nationally and internationally. Moreover, unlike municipal criminal law which relies on the services of national police and investigation services, international criminal courts do not have any police service to utilize in conducting investigations and effecting arrests of perpetrators. In essence, the ability to deal with large numbers of perpetrators depends on the capacity of national jurisdictions to handle as many of the cases as possible. As observed by a former UN secretarygeneral, “no ad hoc, temporary or external measures can ever replace a functioning national justice system” (United Nations Security Council 2004). However, post-conflict or post-dictatorship

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societies that are addressing mass atrocities usually lack the needed resources for investigations and prosecutions. The need for national jurisdictions to be well resourced can therefore not be underrated when bridging the impunity gap. It is believed that international criminal justice is likely to gain more acceptance and become more effective when it is decentralized to rely extensively on national judicial systems (Turner 2005). The aim of empowering national systems to investigate and prosecute core international crimes is to make international criminal tribunals a last resort rather than the first point of call to address mass atrocities. Some of the key steps needed to reform this trend is to enhance the ability of national judicial systems to undertake investigations and prosecutions of crimes under international law, such as through the establishment of special war crimes units in national courts. Moreover, the ICC can enhance its role in international criminal justice by providing financial support for national prosecution of international crimes (Donovan 2009). Another key to improving national systems for prosecution is through capacity building to give national judicial systems the requisite financial, infrastructural, and human resource boost to equip them for investigations and prosecutions. Capacity building is important because many post-conflict societies have ailing and weak justice mechanisms and may have lost trust in the eyes of the general public (Stromseth 2009). Capacity building can reignite judicial mechanisms and re-instill trust in them and provide them with the necessary coaching for investigating and prosecuting core crimes under international law. National capacities can be strengthened by advocating for and encouraging states to initiate investigations into crimes under international law. Civil society bodies should also be empowered and encouraged to advocate for investigations and prosecution of mass atrocities (Stromseth 2009). In addition, national laws must be reformed to incorporate the rules of international conventions that provide different norms of international criminal law. This will equip states with the

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jurisdiction to prosecute core crimes under international law. Some conventions and international instruments whose domestication must be promoted in this regard are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Enhancement of the Cooperation Regime in International Criminal Law In the fight against impunity, cooperation among states and cooperation of states with international criminal tribunals and other international bodies engaged in ensuring accountability for mass atrocities are key to ensuring that such international tribunals and organizations are able to carry out investigations and prosecutions. The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development provides that the realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, it provides that “all States should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, Articles 2, 6). In the field of international criminal law cooperation is most needed in executing arrest warrants, obtaining information during investigations, getting access to witnesses and useful documentary evidence during investigations, and carrying out sentences. State cooperation is therefore fundamental in the work of international criminal tribunals (Meron 2018). Although there are different bodies that exercise international criminal jurisdiction, as well as states involved in the system of international criminal justice, the ICC, as the world’s permanent international criminal court, is regarded as the “glue” that holds the system of international criminal justice together (Tladi 2014). To this end, the

Rome Statute of the ICC devotes many provisions to ensure that the court receives utmost cooperation. States parties to the Rome Statute are required to cooperate with the court in its investigations and prosecutions, while the court also has the power to issue a request for cooperation from a state party and can request for arrest and surrender of persons to the court (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 86, 87(1), 89). The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC has also created a cooperation regime for the court. At its tenth session for instance, the Assembly of States Parties adopted the Assembly Procedures Relating to Non Cooperation, which outlines steps to be followed in instances where a state does not cooperate with the ICC (Assembly of States Parties 2018). Nevertheless, the Assembly’s cooperation regime is generally believed to be ineffective (Tladi 2014). Besides, the Rome Statute’s ample provisions on cooperation evince a key gap due to their failure to create a framework that ensures cooperation among states parties of the Statute, as opposed to merely cooperation between the ICC and states parties (Tladi 2014). This however undermines national-level investigations and prosecutions, which also require cooperation from other states in many instances. In order to rectify this situation, there is the need for treaty law that provides for vibrant cooperation among states in the prosecution of core crimes under international law. Addressing Gaps in Jurisdiction and Definitional Limitations One of the questions that continually surfaces regarding the work of international criminal tribunals is the rationale for their failure to prosecute many crimes perpetrated during mass atrocities, such as the situations in Syria and Yemen. When mass atrocities are committed, victims look up to international criminal tribunals with high expectations to provide them with justice. Yet, many cases cannot be prosecuted because of lack of jurisdiction. In the case of the ICC for instance, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the court comprises of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression. Regarding its jurisdiction ratione temporis, the court has

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jurisdiction to prosecute only crimes which were committed after entry into force of the Rome Statute. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court applies to crimes which occur on the territory of or by a national of a state party. An exception is where the United Nations Security Council, exercising its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, refers a case to the prosecutor of the ICC, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the territory on which the crime was committed, in which case the court can exercise its jurisdiction (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 5, 11, 12, 13). Given the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, cases which do not fulfill these conditions cannot be prosecuted by the court. Hence, mass atrocities committed in Syria and Yemen cannot currently be prosecuted by the ICC since the above-mentioned jurisdictional requirements have not been fulfilled in these situations. The jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals can also be affected by the definition and elements of the crimes within their jurisdiction, as provided in their enabling statute or other applicable treaty law. Under the Genocide Convention for instance, the crime of genocide is limited to the specific acts mentioned in the convention “when they are committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II). A similar definition is provided in the Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 6). These definitions cover only four groups, namely racial, ethnic, national, and religious groups, thereby excluding killings that are based on political and other social groups. In addition, some definitional requirements under the Genocide Convention and under the Rome Statute, such as the requirement of a specific genocidal intent, prevent the inclusion of other acts such as ethnic cleansing under the ambit of the crime of genocide. Prospects of expanding the scope of the crime of genocide have also been frustrated by narrow interpretations of the convention by both scholars and international courts alike (Sadat 2009). There is therefore the need for amendment of the Genocide

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Convention to expand the definition of the crime of genocide to cover crimes like ethnic cleansing, which continue to be used to wreak untold havoc in different societies even in the twenty-first century. In addition, a factor that places limits on prosecuting mass atrocities is the absence of an international treaty relating to crimes against humanity. In 1945, crimes against humanity were first named in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Although the definition of the crime has subsequently been expanded under the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, effective enforcement of the laws on crimes against humanity lies in achieving true universal application of the rules on crimes against humanity. Unlike the crimes of genocide and war crimes which are backed by the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, respectively, there is no treaty law that exclusively addresses the subject of crimes against humanity (International Law Commission 2020). The existence of an international treaty on crimes against humanity will thus be the first step in ensuring that it attains extensive criminalization under national jurisdictions to ensure its widespread prosecution. In summation, relevant amendments to some international instruments and treaties, such as the Rome Statute, the Genocide Convention, and adoption of additional treaties will be necessary to address the current definitional and jurisdictional challenges of international criminal law. Resolving the Question of Immunity of Heads of States Another issue which continually poses challenges to international criminal tribunals is whether or not heads of states are immune from prosecution for crimes under international law. Under international law, certain state officials including heads of states enjoy immunity from all commercial and criminal acts, for as long as they remain in office. However, the question of whether or not their immunity extends to the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of

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aggression has not yet been resolved under any treaty law. In this regard, different arguments have been expressed on the issue by courts and scholars without successfully putting the matter to rest. A case in point which illustrates the difficulties posed by the lack of clarity on this issue is the ICC case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. On 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court issued two different warrants for the arrest for the then president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir. Despite the notification of all Rome Statute states parties of the existence of these arrest warrants, President Al-Bashir visited a number of states parties without being arrested or surrendered to the ICC. This gave rise to a number of Pre-Trial Chamber decisions about whether or not to refer the states in question to the Assembly of States Parties and the United Nations Security Council. In March 2017, following the failure of the Kingdom of Jordan to arrest Mr. Al-Bashir during his visit to the country, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC held that Jordan had breached its obligations under the Rome Statute. Upon appealing against the Pre-Trial Chamber decision, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC, on 6 May 2019, stated in its judgement that heads of states do not enjoy immunity from prosecution by international criminal courts (International Criminal Court, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir). This decision has however proved to be controversial, in light of the different schools of thought that continue to debate the question of whether or not the Appeals Chamber decision was flawed. Arguably, amending the Rome Statute and other relevant treaty laws to reflect the status of head of state immunities in relation to international criminal law will allay all existing doubts.

Existing Endeavors to Address Some Challenges of International Criminal Law In light of the above-mentioned challenges that hinder effective prosecution of crimes under international law, different initiatives and measures have been adopted towards promoting the worldwide fight against impunity. Notable among such initiatives are the establishment of different

international investigative mechanisms by the United Nations, the ICC’s Humanity against Crime Campaign, the International Law Commission’s Crimes against Humanity Project, and the Mutual Legal Assistance Initiative. International Commissions of Inquiry, FactFinding Missions, and Other Investigative Mechanisms In instances where mass atrocities are committed through sudden events or protracted armed conflicts and there have not yet been investigations or prosecutions by any international criminal tribunal, one practice that is usually resorted to by the United Nations is to establish United Nations mandated commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, and other investigative mechanisms to conduct investigations and collect evidence on these situations as a first step to providing accountability for the atrocities committed. Different entities of the United Nations have been involved in the establishment of these bodies, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for instance provides support to the work of these bodies by providing them with guidelines for their operation and advising them on their mandates. Examples of current commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions are the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2019), the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (2017), the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (2018), the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (2016), the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (2011), the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (2016), and the International Team of Experts on the Kasaï region, Democratic Republic of Congo (2018). Although the mandates of these commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions do not include the prosecution of perpetrators, their role in ensuring accountability for mass atrocities

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cannot be undermined, in light of the useful evidence that they gather from their work. In effect, their work can be considered as a preliminary step in the process of prosecuting crimes under international law. The Humanity Against Crimes Campaign On 9 May 2019, the ICC launched a campaign called “Humanity against Crimes” to support the work of the United Nations sustainable development goal 16. The humanity against crimes campaign is aimed at examining the crimes within the court’s jurisdiction, measures for promoting access to justice, and how the court can work with the United Nations to protect people from suffering and to help prevent mass crimes (International Criminal Court 2019). As part of the campaign, the ICC aims to enhance access to justice through “knowledge, physical access and legal access” (International Criminal Court 2020). Although this campaign has not yet resulted in concrete actions to support the attainment of SDG 16, it demonstrates the court’s commitment to using its work to promote access to justice, which is one of the underlying targets of SDG 16. The International Law Commission’s Crimes Against Humanity Project In 2014, the International Law Commission, during its 66th session, decided to embark on the topic of “crimes against humanity” as part of its work, pursuant to a recommendation by the Working Group on the Long-Term Program of Work. The aim of the project is to come up with recommendations for a new convention on crimes against humanity. In 2015, the commission received a first report from the Special Rapporteur on the topic, containing two draft articles on the prevention, punishment, and definition of crimes against humanity. In 2016, the commission received a second report that contained six draft articles on criminalization of crimes against humanity under national law, establishment of national jurisdiction, investigations and cooperation in relation to identifying perpetrators, and fair treatment of alleged perpetrators. As of 2019, the commission had considered a total of four reports in addition to comments from different governments and international organizations. Moreover,

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it has adopted an entire set of draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, including a preamble, 15 articles, and an annex (International Law Commission 2020). The Mutual Legal Assistance Initiative The Mutual Legal Assistance Initiative is led by the governments of Argentina, Belgium, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Senegal, and Slovenia, for the adoption of a Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. The birth of the initiative was propelled by a 2011 expert meeting by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slovenia in the Hague, during which it was identified that there was a gap in the existing international rules relating to mutual legal assistance and extradition with respect to the prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Currently, the initiative operates independently from the United Nations, although it has received the support of more than 70 states. At its initial stages, the initiative was focused on obtaining support from other states. In 2017, the initiative held its First Preparatory Conference during which participants from more than 40 supporting states discussed the substantive and procedural aspects of the desired treaty. The discussions at this conference have formed the basis for the Core Group’s work to produce the MLA Preliminary Draft Convention. In 2019, during a second conference, the draft was discussed and the comments that were received have been incorporated into a draft (MLA Initiative 2020).

Concluding Summary The recognition of the concept of sustainable development under international law, coupled with the requirements of SDG 16, create a strong imperative to link the promotion of international criminal law to attainment of some of the targets of the sustainable development goals. In particular, the promotion and development of international criminal law constitutes a major pillar for access to justice. Some of the measures needed to improve the system of international criminal law include

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empowering national adjudicatory systems to enforce international criminal law domestically, improving the cooperation regime under international criminal law, and addressing the gaps in jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals that are posed by lacunae in existing treaty law. Although there are already some initiatives working towards addressing the challenges of international criminal law, more efforts are needed for international criminal law to contribute substantively in providing access to justice worldwide.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16 ▶ Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace

References Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2020) Year in review:2019. https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wpcontent/uploads/dlm_uploads/2020/03/ACLED_ AnnualReport2019_WebVersion.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020. Assembly of States Parties (2018) Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties. Resolution ICC-ASP/17/Res.5. https:// asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP17/RES-5-ENG. pdf#page¼24. Accessed 12 May 2020 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) (9 De-cember 1948) No. 1021 De Soto H (2001) Making Sustainable development work: Governance, finance, and public-private cooperation. https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/6811.htm. Accessed 4 Apr 2020 Donovan N (2009) Introduction: Enforcement of international criminal law. In: The enforcement of international criminal law. https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 603D8E48589F6DD1C12577E70039FB54-Aegis_ Jan2009.pdf. Accessed 28 Apr 2020 International Court of Justice (1997) Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 1997, p 7 International Criminal Court (2019) ICC and UN call to mobilise humanity against crimes. https://www.icc-cpi. int/Pages/item.aspx?name¼pr1453. Accessed 23 Apr 2020

International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v Al-Bashir, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 6 May 2019. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/Jordan-Sum mary-Al-Bashir-Judgment.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 International Law Association (2002) New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development. https://www.ecolex.org/ details/literature/new-delhi-declaration-of-principlesof-international-law-relating-to-sustainable-develop ment-mon-070850/. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 International Law Commission (2020) Summaries of the work of the International Law Commission: Crimes against humanity. https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/ 7_7.shtml. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 International Military Tribunal (1946) Judgment of 1 October 1946. https://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_ Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 Jewish Virtual Library. Allied Declaration on the Persecution of the Jews, 17 December 1942. https://www. jewishvirtuallibrary.org/allied-declaration-on-persecu tion-of-the-jews. Accessed 28 Apr 2020 London Agreement of August 8 (1945). https://www.jura. uni-muenchen.de/fakultaet/lehrstuehle/satzger/ materialien/london1945e.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 Meron T (2018) Closing the accountability gap: concrete steps toward ending impunity for atrocity crimes. Am J Int Law 112(3):433–451 MLA Initiative (2020). https://www.gov.si/en/registries/ projects/mla-initiative/. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 Mue N (2015) Policy brief: enhancing the societal impact of international criminal tribunals. http://iccnow.org/ documents/Policy_Brief__Enhancing_the_Societal_ Impact_of_International_Criminal_Tribunals.pdf. Accessed 29 Apr 2020 Qerimi Q (2014) Sustainable development in international law: from origin to operation. City UHKL Rev 5:1–28 Rancilio PE (2000–2001) From Nuremberg to Rome: establishing an international criminal court and the need for U.S. participation. U Det Mercy Law Rev 78:299–339 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6 (17 July 1998) Rosenbaum T (2005–2006) The romance of Nuremberg and the tease of moral justice. Cardozo Law Rev 27 (4):1731–1738 Sadat L (2009) The crimes against humanity initiative. In: The enforcement of international criminal law. https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 603D8E48589F6DD1C12577E70039FB54-Aegis_ Jan2009.pdf. Accessed 28 Apr 2020 Sands P (1999) International courts and the application of the concept of sustainable development. Max Planck Yearb United Nations Law 3:389–406 Segger M (2009) Role of international forums in the advancement of sustainable development. Sustain Dev Law Policy 10(1):4–80 Stromseth J (2009) Justice on the ground: can international criminal courts strengthen domestic rule of law in postconflict societies? Hague J Rule Law 1(1):87–97 Tladi D (2014) Complementarity and cooperation in international criminal justice: assessing initiatives to fill the

Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries impunity gap. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185933/ Paper277.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 Turner J (2005) Nationalizing international criminal law. Stanford J Int Law 41(1):1–52 UN Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616 United Nations (2002) Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002, A/CONF.199/L.7. https://www.un.org/esa/ sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_ PlanImpl.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 United Nations (2013) A new global partnership: eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development. The report of the high-level panel of eminent persons on the post-2015 development agenda. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/docu ments/8932013-05%20-%20HLP%20Report%20-% 20A%20New%20Global%20Partnership.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2020 Wald PM (2005–2006) Running the Trial of the Century: the Nuremberg Legacy. Cardozo Law Rev 27(4):1559–1598 Werle, Jessberger (2014) Principles of international criminal law. Oxford University Press, Oxford World Bank Group (2020) Fragility, conflict and violence. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflict violence/overview. Accessed 30 Apr 2020 World Bank Group. Conflict and violence in the 21st century: current trends as observed in empirical research and statistics. https://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/ uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Conflict-and-violence-in-the21st-century-Current-trends-as-observed-in-empiricalresearch-and-statistics-Mr.-Alexandre-Marc-Chief-Spe cialist-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-World-BankGroup.pdf. Accessed 30 Apr 2020

Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries Jacqueline Behrend School of Politics and Government, Universidad Nacional de San Martín/National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina

Definitions Democracy is a political regime in which citizens have the right to vote and be elected to top government positions in free and fair elections and in which citizens enjoy a set of freedoms that enable these elections and participatory rights. Democratization, in turn, is a long-term and

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open-ended process of political construction that consists of progress toward a more rule-based, consensual, and participatory politics.

Introduction This chapter explores the diverse challenges that democracy faces in developing countries. Developing countries include the vast majority of political regimes in the world, many of which are countries that transitioned to democracy in the last four decades or so. They include all of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Eurasia, and most of Asia. Democracy varies within this large subset of countries, and developing countries face distinct challenges, as opposed to developed democracies in North America and Western Europe that include, namely, the heterogeneity of democratic practices, the uneven reach of the state and the rule of law, state capture by economic and private interests, and political violence. The three components of a democratic regime – free and fair elections, participatory rights of voting and being elected, and a set of surrounding freedoms that support the likelihood of these elections and citizens’ participatory rights (O’Donnell 2010) – presuppose the concept of citizenship, on the one hand, and the existence of the state, on the other. Citizenship rights and a consolidated state are often taken for granted in democracies in the developed world. But many of the tensions that democracies in developing countries face are often related to the uneven extension of citizenship rights and the incapacity of the state to enforce the rule of law homogeneously throughout its territory. Democracies in the developing world are often uneven democracies, where there is an economic center and a periphery, where not all citizens enjoy the same rights in practice, where parts of the state may be captured by private interests, and where the state’s monopoly of the use of force may be disputed by armed groups, among others. The challenges faced by democracies in developing countries are manifold and this is the focus of this chapter. The first section offers an introduction to the concept of democracy and introduces some of the main challenges faced by democracies in the

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developing world. The chapter then proceeds to the different types of challenges faced by contemporary democracies in the developing world. In the following sections, it develops each of these challenges in greater depth and analyzes their implications for the sustainability of democracy in the developing world. Finally, democracy in developing countries is discussed in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in particular to SDG 16, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Understanding the Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries According to O’Donnell (2010), at the heart of democracy is the notion of political citizenship and the rights and freedoms attached to this concept. Citizens – and not voters – are the central units of political regimes. The concept of citizen is broader than the concept of voter, because citizenship involves a series of rights and freedoms that are guaranteed and enforced by the state. Voting is only one of those rights. Many contemporary regimes have voters who participate in regular elections, but these elections are not necessarily democratic. Whitehead (2002) argues that we need a “floating but anchored” conception of democracy that includes a core meaning that is anchored in a few fundamental requisites but also a series of other dimensions that can be contested, challenged, and developed in light of collective deliberation. Implicit in this definition of democracy is the idea of process and social construction. It also highlights the notion that democracy is an essentially contested concept and its meaning may be disputed by different actors. In a similar vein, O’Donnell (2010) argues that outside the minimum definition of democracy, the inclusion or exclusion of a series of other freedoms is an undecidable matter that must be resolved through inductive judgment. As Whitehead (2002) argues, democracy has an open-ended character, and democratization should be understood as a longterm and open-ended process of political construction that consists of “progress toward a

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more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory form of politics” (Whitehead 2002: 27). This means that the boundaries of the freedoms that should be included in a democracy are a matter of continuous deliberation and contention (O’Donnell 2010). Democracies in developing countries are often uneven democracies that exhibit heterogeneous democratic practices. This means that different dimensions of democracy may not move in the same direction and one could readily find a country where elections are reasonably free and fair but where the extension of the rule of law is not the same in all areas of social and political life. Or perhaps we could find a country where the state upholds most of the principles of democracy outlined above but is unable to enforce them equally throughout its territory. This involves taking into account the territorial dimension of democratization (Gibson 2012). Another important aspect of democracy in developing countries is that developing countries have, in the course of their existence, undergone periods of democratic erosion, stagnation, or breakdown (Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 2015). And even in periods of stability, democracies in developing countries often exhibit important shortcomings that may not lead to democratic breakdown but nonetheless erode the quality of democracy. Some of these shortcomings, for example, not respecting some liberal rights, may lead to what O’Donnell described as “low-intensity citizenship” (O’Donnell 1993). The idea behind this concept is that within the set of countries that can be considered democracies, not all of them respect liberal rights and freedoms with the same intensity. The shortcomings faced by many contemporary democracies in the developing world have given rise to diminished subtypes of democracy or “democracies with adjectives,” as Collier and Levitsky (1997) depict them. What these subtypes reflect is the idea that the democracies to which these headings are applied somehow fail to meet the full criteria of a democracy. This is the conceptual framework in which democracies in developing countries are often studied. Some of these subtypes include the notions of “delegative

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democracy” (O’Donnell 1994), “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997), or “neopatrimonial democracy” (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Delegative democracy refers to a situation in which the legislative power delegates some of its functions and responsibilities to the executive, allowing presidents to concentrate more power than they normally would. This involves, for example, governing by decree instead of waiting for laws to be approved by the Congress. The delegation of power occurs through constitutional and legal means, but the argument is that the concentration of power in the executive erodes the checks and balances that are so central in a democracy. The notion of illiberal democracy refers to democracies where not all citizenship rights are safeguarded by the democratically elected governments. Neopatrimonial or patrimonial democracy, in turn, refers to a situation in which governments are elected democratically, but they exercise power in a discretionary way, through particularistic criteria, and where state resources are appropriated by the elected rulers. Mazzuca (2010) argues that when analyzing the quality of democracy, scholars need to distinguish between access to power, which he conceptualizes as the “regime,” and exercise of power, which he conceptualizes as the “administration.” In many democracies in developing countries, access to power is democratic, but the exercise of power can remain discretional, particularistic, or rentseeking. Flaws in the exercise of power are related to problems of bureaucratization and not democratization for Mazzuca (2010). Not all scholars agree that the exercise of power can be so neatly separated from the political regime, and in the definition offered above, a democratic regime includes both access and exercise of power. However, the distinction offered by Mazzuca is useful, because it focuses on the main problems that democracies in developing countries face – that although elections may be free and fair, elected leaders often govern in a discretionary way that erodes some of the fundamental principles of democracy. In short, the problems outlined above can be seen as problems of democratization and low democratic quality or as problems of insufficient

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bureaucratization (i.e., problems of the administration and not the regime). Yet, it is important to bear in mind that democratization does not proceed in a linear way and it involves advances, setbacks, and stagnation. These processes often lead to outcomes that are neither fully stable nor entirely predetermined (Whitehead 2002). In developing countries, where democratization occurred more recently than in many developed countries, setbacks can be observed in the periodic political crises that arise. Although political crises generate a sense of instability, they do not necessarily imply a crisis of the regime or that democracy is at risk. But low-intensity citizenship or diminished democracies, far from being part of a transition process, can achieve remarkable stability and persist over time. Democracy and Economic Development One of the important discussions regarding democracy in developing countries is the relationship between democracy and economic development. In the late 1950s, scholars like Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) argued that a direct relationship could be observed between economic development and democracy. Contrasting data from developed countries in Europe and North America with developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere, Lipset found a correlation that showed that countries with a developed economy were more likely to be democratic, while countries with developing economies were more likely to be authoritarian. Lipset understood economic development as an increase in a country’s income, and his argument was that an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) increased the likelihood of a democratic transition and the durability of democracy (Munck 2011). Lipset (1959) argued that industrialization and economic modernization led to the integration of urban centers and the countryside, the rise of labor movements, sociocultural modernization, and higher levels of education, all of which contributed to the legitimacy of the political system and led to democracy. Modernization theory, as this approach was called, sparked important criticism from scholars of Latin America, some of whom were based in the region and also in North American

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universities. Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) was the first to challenge Lipset’s modernization thesis. O’Donnell argued that in South America, the process of economic development had not occurred in the same way as in developed countries. Late and rapid industrialization processes had given rise to a series of distributive tensions that had been resolved in ways that eroded democracy in these countries and had instead led to coups and democratic breakdowns. O’Donnell argued that national indices gave the impression that economic growth was evenly distributed within countries, but, in developing countries, there was often a dynamic center and a less developed periphery, and economic development was often uneven. The democratic breakdowns observed in the most developed countries in South America gave credibility to O’Donnell’s critique of modernization theory. Adam Przeworski and his coauthors (1996) also tested modernization theory’s implications through a series of quantitative studies of countries in all world regions. What they found was that democracy was more likely to survive in countries with a higher level of economic development, but that economic development was not a prerequisite for a transition to democracy and that democracy could arise in different structural environments. Juan Linz (1978) also questioned modernization theory and the relationship between economic development and democracy but from a different perspective. Linz (1978) argued that democratic breakdown and survival could not be explained by economic causes but rather by the decisions that political actors took in specific situations and in a specific institutional context. Linz reached these conclusions on the basis of empirical work on the breakdown of democracy in Europe in the 1930s and in Latin America in the 1960s and the 1970s. More recently, Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán (2013) also challenge the hypothesized link between democracy and economic development. With a focus on Latin America, these authors argue that neither the level of development nor economic performance directly shapes the prospects for democratic survival. In contrast, they claim that democracies are more likely to survive when political actors have a

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strong normative preference for democracy and when they avoid radical policy decisions. Additionally, the regional environment is also important to understand the survival or breakdown of a democracy. The existence of more democracies in a region raises the likelihood of sanctions for authoritarian countries by their neighbors, international bodies, or supranational organizations. Likewise, the existence of successful dictatorships in a region can provide support for authoritarian leaders in neighboring countries. Many developing countries democratized in what was called the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). In the developing world, the third wave started in Latin America in the early 1980s and continued in Eastern Europe, Asia, and the former Soviet republics in the early 1990s and from the 1990s onward in sub-Saharan Africa. This wave of transitions to democracy occurred in an international environment that was more conducive to democracy than that of the 1960s or the 1970s, including in most cases international support from United Nations’ missions, as well as from other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individual foreign countries. Still, these new democracies in the developing world have since faced many challenges, which, in some cases, led to democratic backsliding, stagnation, hybrid regimes, or authoritarian regression. Uneven State-Building and Extension of the Rule of Law The differences between the homogeneity achieved in developed democracies and the persistent heterogeneity evidenced in developing countries point to one of the most important challenges to the achievement of high-quality democracies in the developing world: the uneven extension and application of the rule of law. This is a persistent problem in many developing democracies. There are two dimensions of unevenness that need to be highlighted: one is the uneven application of the rule of law to different sectors of the population; the other is the uneven application of the rule of law across the national territory. At the same time, in developing countries, state-building occurred in an uneven

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way, and the national state does not always have the capacity to reach into the more remote regions of its territory and ensure the application of the rule of law (O’Donnell 1993). All democracies, both in the developed and in the developing world, formally recognize and guarantee a series of rights to their citizens. These include political rights, such as the right to vote and be elected, but also civil rights, which include the protection of the physical integrity of all citizens. In many developing democracies across the world, there are violent groups that challenge the authority of the state and the application of the rule of law. In other developing democracies, the rule of law is applied unfairly and unevenly to different social groups. In many developing democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, for example, state institutions discriminate or fail to protect indigenous groups or minorities. A fair application of rights implies the administrative or judicial application of rules across equivalent cases without taking into consideration the class, status, or power of the persons involved (O’Donnell 1999). Equal treatment for all citizens in a democracy implies not only equal treatment before the law, access to the judiciary, and a fair process but also equal treatment by state bureaucracies. In many developing countries, where there is a large sector of the population that lives in poverty, there is an obvious inequality in the treatment poor people receive from bureaucracies when they apply for permits and retirement and go to the hospital or the police (O’Donnell 1999). This unequal treatment by the state also reflects the unevenness of developing democracies. At the same time, in many developing countries, the state does not have the capacity to enforce its rules across the national territory. This may happen, among other reasons, because bureaucracies are unevenly spread out across the territory, because regional elites resist central authority, or because there are illegal power holders who dispute the state’s authority, as often happens with drug cartels. The above discussion points to a disjuncture between a country’s formal rules and the real politics of how government agencies work (Boone 2003).

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For instance, many postcolonial African states had geographically uneven patterns of state-building. Boone (2003) shows that in West African countries, rulers adopted different strategies of state-building in different regions of a country, and these efforts were constrained by the negotiations between politicians at the center and rural elites, which differed across countries. Like in other parts of the developing world, the political authority of many African states is conditioned by local political economies of property relations, personal dependency, and social control (Boone 2003). The uneven reach of the state has been conceptualized in different ways. While O’Donnell (1993) sees this as a deficiency or failure of national states, Risse (2011) conceptualizes this situation as one of “limited statehood.” Limited statehood does not mean that national states are weak or failed states but that they are unable to enforce their monopoly of power in some regions of their territories. Risse (2011) argues that this is not a transitional problem but a situation that is remarkably enduring and must therefore be taken into account in the analysis of state governance. In Mexico and Colombia, for example, the state lost control of the monopoly of violence in some regions of its territory where drug cartels and illegal organizations exercise authority. Limited statehood can also be observed in many African states. At the same time, in developing countries, state-building and democratization occurred over a shorter period of time than in most developed countries, and this process led to rapid institutional change and often found itself in tension with existing social relations at the local level. These unresolved tensions are evidenced in the unevenness and territorial heterogeneity of democracy in developing countries. Subnational Variations of Democracy As the previous discussion shows, in many developing countries that are democratic at the national level, the degree to which citizens’ rights are respected varies markedly from one region to the other. If political democracy is about equal rights for all citizens, then the uneven distribution of

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such guarantees within countries matters as much as variation between countries (Behrend and Whitehead 2016). In federal or decentralized countries, democratic variation can be even more pronounced, as subnational units have autonomy to elect local governments; develop and implement public policies, including health and education; and control security forces, among other functions. Decentralization in many developing countries produced disappointing results. It was promoted in the 1990s as a policy that would bring democracy and government closer to the people. However, decentralization reforms often resulted in the transfer of power to local elites, who were thus able to govern with greater autonomy from national authorities. Aggregate classifications and measures of democracy often obscure the disparate processes that can take place at the subnational level, where democratic institutions and practices can coexist with other, illiberal, structures and practices. These structures and practices have effects on the equal exercise of rights but also on the quality of electoral contests, partisan competition, public debate, and social engagement in the periods between elections, which are just as important for democracy as elections themselves. In developing countries, subnational political systems can be understood as configurations of political practices, structures, and institutions that do not necessarily all move in the same direction. Some subnational units may fare better on some dimensions of democracy than others. For example, elections may be fair, but the judicial system may be captured. Or elections and the judiciary may work reasonably well, but there may be violence from illegal organizations. Not all institutions or political practices are equally democratic in many developing countries, and when this unevenness is territorially based, it creates pockets of less democratic politics within a country that is in general terms democratic. Less democratic enclaves can be found in most countries in the developing world, both federal and unitary. An important feature of local politics in many developing countries is the existence of political dynasties that actively participate in political parties and compete in elections for local and

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national office. Political dynasties are often rooted at the local level and can restrict competition and pluralism, as well as capture local government institutions. Subnational political dynasties are widespread in Latin American and Asian democracies. Between 45% and 60% of subnational units in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were governed by political dynasties after the transition to democracy. Dynasties are also frequent in India (Chandra 2016) and, most notably, in the Philippines (Cruz et al. 2017; Sidel 2014), among many other countries. Scholars have conceptualized subnational democratic variation in various ways. Gibson (2012) considers that the less democratic regions of nationally democratic countries constitute subnational authoritarian regimes. These subnational authoritarian regimes persist because they are able to isolate themselves from national politicians. Other authors prefer to conceptualize them as hybrid regimes, where a mixture of democracy and authoritarianism coexists (McMann 2006; Gervasoni 2010), or subnational undemocratic regimes (Giraudy 2015). Yet others argue that subnational units that evidence a lower quality of democracy are best understood through the concept of illiberal structures and practices (Behrend and Whitehead 2016). Subnational illiberal structures and practices coexist with other, liberal, structures and practices and should not be understood as autonomous regimes that are isolated from the national polity or conflated with the national authoritarian regimes that preceded democratization. In all democracies, the center intervenes regularly and substantively in subnational affairs through Supreme Court rulings, public policies, federal transfers, and security forces. Even in cases of extreme violation of rights, this occurs within the framework of national democratic politics that may have its faults but nonetheless guarantees a series of rights and institutions that can potentially be activated to ensure minimum standards of democracy. A subnational authoritarian regime requires a degree of autonomy and stability that is not present in most of the situations analyzed in the literature. Likewise, the notion of subnational undemocratic regimes fails to adequately take

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into account the fact the access to power in these subnational units is democratic: votes are counted fairly, there are no restrictions for opposition candidates, and elections are overseen by national authorities. For this reason, Behrend and Whitehead (2016) argue that these situations are best understood as illiberal structures and practices that are part of broader configurations that include both liberal and illiberal structures and practices, but that are not coherent wholes. As such, they can be democratized through control and conditionality by central authorities, contagion from other regions in the same country, or the activation of democratic institutions, which includes bottomup challenges and initiatives by civil society groups. Territorial unevenness can lead to important variations in democracy within a single country, and one of the challenges that democracies in the developing world face is how to achieve a territorially uniform democracy and citizenship. But in the context of a nationally democratic regime, the potential always exists to democratize these illiberal structures and practices through the multiple pathways outlined above. Democratic Backsliding in Developing Countries In the late 1980s and early 1990s, single-party and military dictatorships in Africa, Eurasia, Asia, and Latin America collapsed, and the formal institutions of democracy were disseminated across the world (Levitsky and Way 2010). However, as the early scholars of democratization had warned, transitions did not always lead to democracy. In many regions of the world, new regimes arose that combined democratic institutions with authoritarianism. These regimes hold multi-party competitive elections that are nonetheless undemocratic. In a democratic regime, elections are reasonably competitive, free, egalitarian, decisive, inclusive, and institutionalized (O’Donnell 2010). But many countries in the developing world hold elections that to do not meet all these criteria, and, as Levitsky and Way (2010) argue, electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, harassment, and violence skew the playing field in favor of incumbents. These countries were originally characterized as “in

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transition,” but it soon became evident that they were not in transition to democracy but rather remained stable in this not yet democratic but no longer fully authoritarian regime. The worldwide embrace of elections and democratic institutions was part of the international climate of the postCold War era. In many former Soviet and East European countries, international aid hinged on the establishment of democratic institutions. In this context, many countries adopted democratic institutions, which leaders who were not truly committed to democracy then proceeded to erode. Transitions from authoritarian rule therefore did not always lead to democracy in the developing world or even to flawed democracies. Instead, in many cases, new forms of authoritarianism arose that hide under a façade of democracy. At the same time, democracies in the developing world can be prone to backsliding and political instability, and authoritarian regression often occurs through the manipulation of democratic institutions. Many democracies in developing countries have to deal with the legacy of authoritarian rule. In some cases, former autocrats left office and retired from politics, either because they chose to do so or because they were banned or tried for crimes committed during their rule. But in other cases, former autocrats continued to participate in politics after the transition to democracy through authoritarian successor parties, as in Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, and several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Loxton 2018). Loxton defines authoritarian successor parties as political parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but continue to operate after the transition to democracy. The effects of these political parties on democracies in developing countries are varied. They can hinder democracy by impeding processes of transitional justice, supporting vestiges of authoritarianism, or triggering an authoritarian regression. But, as Loxton argues, they can also have positive effects on democracy by promoting party system institutionalization, incorporating doubtful democrats into the political system, and encouraging transitions to democracy in other countries. The transition to democracy in

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Mexico, for example, was led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional), which became an authoritarian successor party. However, in Chile, the two authoritarian successor parties blocked constitutional reform for years and delayed Chile’s full transition to democracy. In any case, dealing with the authoritarian past and with the potential instability that former autocrats can provoke in fledgling democracies is also one of the challenges that democracies in developing countries face. Another source of instability in democracies in developing countries originates in conflicts between the executive and the legislative that lead to the impeachment of the president. In Brazil, for example, President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016 in the midst of a political process that was more partisan in nature than rooted in a criminal offence. In Latin America in the 1990s, half a dozen presidents faced impeachment proceedings amid conflicts between the executive and the judiciary, as Pérez Liñán (2007) documents. However, democracies in developing countries are not the only ones that face political crises. Democracies in the developed world are also not exempted from democratic backsliding. But if democratization is understood as a process, then these advances and setbacks should be viewed in a long-term context. Free and fair elections are a necessary condition of democracy, but in and by themselves, they are not sufficient to guarantee a high-quality democracy. In the 1990s, many scholars believed that if the right institutions were crafted and put in place, democracy would have greater chances of survival. Yet the last four decades have shown that new democracies survive for reasons that are more linked to political and social actors’ commitment to democracy, to shared understandings of democratic governance, and to how conflicts are resolved within the polity. Democracy and the Sustainable Development Goals When member states developed the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), they included SDG 16, which aims to promote peace, justice,

Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries

and strong institutions. This goal includes two of the essential aspects of democracy discussed above: access to justice for all and effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Equal access to justice is related to the equal application and protection of citizenship rights, not only across countries but also within countries. This is a serious challenge in many democracies in the developing world, where access to the judiciary and equal treatment before the law are often conditioned by class, status, ethnicity, or the region of the country where an individual lives. Strong institutions that are effective, accountable, and inclusive are also a challenge for democracies in the developing world. Institutions do not exist in a vacuum but are mediated by the social relations and political practices that exist in each setting. The same institutions can function in diverse ways in different parts of a country, and this heterogeneity affects the quality of democracy and citizenship. Institutions and bureaucracies do not treat all citizens alike. The emphasis on peace also points to serious problems faced by countries where drug cartels or other illegal groups undertake violent actions that prevent local and national communities from living peacefully or where peaceful governance means of dispute resolution have not yet become embedded, due to disparate local understanding, the uneven reach of the state, and/or access to justice. These are serious concerns that affect the struggle for more inclusive, sustainable, and resilient democracies that are able to guarantee the same rights to all citizens in their territory. Democracy in developing countries evidences greater territorial unevenness in the enforcement of citizenship rights than democracies in developed countries. Uneven state-building and the uneven extension of the rule of law mean that not all citizens can benefit from access to state institutions or equal treatment before the law in the same way. Many democracies in developing countries have undergone periods of breakdown, stagnation, or political instability in the recent past, and transitions from authoritarian rule have not always led to high-quality democracies. However, if, as Whitehead (2002) argues, democratization is viewed as a long-term and

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open-ended process of social and political construction, then the potential always exists for further activation of mechanisms that can lead to a more rule-based, consensual, and participatory type of politics.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Democracy in the Developed Countries ▶ Free and Fair Elections to Electoral Integrity: Trends, Challenges, and Populism ▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16 ▶ Nepotism ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability ▶ Political Participation: Inclusion of Citizens in Democratic Opinion-Forming and DecisionMaking Processes ▶ Restorative Justice ▶ Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Meta-governance

References Behrend J, Whitehead L (eds) (2016) Illiberal practices. Territorial variance within large federal democracies. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Boone C (2003) Political topographies of the African state. Territorial authority and institutional choice. Cambridge University Press, New York Chandra K (2016) Democratic dynasties: state, party, and family in contemporary Indian politics. In: Chandra K (ed) Democratic dynasties: state, party, and family in contemporary Indian politics. Cambridge University Press, New York Collier D, Levitsky S (1997) Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research. World Polit 49:430–451 Cruz C, Labonne J, Querubin P (2017) Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: evidence from the Philippines. Am Econ Rev 107:3006–3037 Gervasoni C (2010) A rentier theory of subnational regimes: fiscal federalism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Argentine provinces. World Polit 62:302– 340 Gibson EL (2012) Boundary control. Subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies. Cambridge University Press, New York

69 Giraudy A (2015) Democrats and autocrats. Pathways of subnational undemocratic regime continuity within democratic countries. Oxford University Press, New York Huntington SP (1991) The third wave: democratization in the late 20th century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman Levitsky S, Way LA (2010) Competitive authoritarianism. Hybrid regimes after the cold war. Cambridge University Press, New York Linz J (1978) The breakdown of democratic regimes. Crisis, breakdown, and reequilibration. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Lipset SM (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. Am Polit Sci Rev 53:69–105 Loxton J (2018) Authoritarin successor parties worldwide. In Loxton J, Mainwaring S Life after dictatorship. Authoritarian successor parties worldwide. Cambridge University Press, New York Mainwaring S, Pérez Liñán A (2013) Democratic breakdown and survival. J Democr 24:123–137 Mainwaring S, Pérez Liñán A (2015) Cross-currents in Latin America. J Democr 26:114–127 Mazzuca SL (2010) Access to power versus exercise of power. Reconceptualizing the quality of democracy in Latin America. Stud Comp Int Dev 45:334–357 McMann K (2006) Economic autonomy and democracy. Hybrid regimes in Russia and Kyrgizstan. Cambridge University Press, New York Munck G (2011) The origins and durability of democracy. In: Kingstone P, Yashar DJ (eds) Routledge handbook of Latin American politics. Routledge Press, Abingdon O’Donnell G (1973) Modernization and bureaucraticauthoritarianism: studies in south American politics. Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley O’Donnell G (1993) On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries. World Development 21:1355–1369 O’Donnell G (1994) Delegative democracy. J Democr 5:55–69 O’Donnell G (1999) Polyarchies and the (un)rule of law in Latin America: a partial conclusion. In: Méndez JE, O’Donnell G, Pinheiro PS (eds) The (un)rule of law and the underprivileged in Latin America. Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame O’Donnell G (2010) Democracy, agency, and the state. Theory with comparative intent. Oxford University Press, Oxford Pérez Liñán A (2007) Presidential impeachment and the new political instability in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, New York Przeworski A, Allvarez M, Cheibub JA, Limongi F (1996) What makes democracies endure? J Democr 7:39–55 Risse T (2011) Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood. Columbia University Press, New York

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70 Sidel JT (2014) Economic foundations of subnational authoritarianism: insights and evidence from qualitative and quantitative research. Democratization 21:161–184 Whitehead L (2002) Democratization. Theory and experience. Oxford University Press, Oxford Zakaria F (1997) The rise of illiberal democracy. For Aff (Council on Foreign Relations) 76(6):22–45

Change Management ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices

Changing ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices

Change Management

Climate Justice Alexander I. Stingl Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) and Center for Interdisciplinary Methodologies (CIM), University of Warwick (UK), Coventry, UK Global Legal Studies Network (GLSN), Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH), Paris, France Paris Institute for Critical Thinking (PICT), Paris, France

Synonyms Climate change justice

Definitions

Chauvinism ▶ Nations and Nationalism

Child ▶ Ensuring Child Rights for a Just Society

Children’s Right ▶ Ensuring Child Rights for a Just Society

Civil ▶ Linking New and Protracted Conflicts to SDG16: Patterns and Trends

Climate Change Justice ▶ Climate Justice

Climate justice is at once (i) a particular field within environmental justice (Walker 2012; Sze 2018), (ii) a discourse on fair distribution of (interrelated and interdependent) benefits, responsibility, obligations, and harm, and finally (iii) a social movement. It can also be known as climate change justice (Moellendorf 2015), for the issue arises due to the consequences of climate change. Given the global impact of climate change, which is impacting if not threatening all regions of the planet generally, but with severe local differences in its effects, it can be argued that it is one of the most pressing issues in environmental justice but also one of the reasons why and how it differs from other issues of environmental justice. The two main strategies for dealing with climate change, adaptation (i.e., finding ways of coping with the no longer avoidable impact of climate change) or mitigation (the reduction of climate change-inducing emissions), are entangled with different scenarios for climate justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Moellendorf 2015). The struggle for taking seriously climate justice in general and/or any respective claims made by nations, regions, and groups unfairly affected is why climate justice is also social movement (Sze 2018). Climate justice includes, importantly, epistemic

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justice (Code 2014), referring to different cultures and ways of knowing the world and thus differences in experiencing climate change (Zellentin 2015; Jurt et al. 2015). Similar to other issues in environmental justice, climate justice takes into account that there are intra- and intergenerational dimensions, meaning that one aspect of the problem is that injustice affects people of the present differently (intragenerational), while some aspects of the problem require us to balance the interests of the presently living generation of people against future generations (intergenerational). Furthermore, it has been shown that there are significant inequities and injustice effects in terms of gender and race. One of the largest issues for resolving the problem of justice in climate change is its historicity, namely, that Global Northern, highly industrialized nations have in the past significantly contributed to climate change in the effort to build up their own wealth and welfare, often by using resources extracted from the Global South and, thus, creating significant global inequality (Boatcă 2016). In order to close this gap, nations in what is called the Global South, who are often also hardest hit by the effects of climate change, would have to increase industry and, subsequently, their contribution to climate change emissions. This complex dilemma, when viewed as a political, legal, and ethical issue, can be described as the general problem of climate (change) justice.

a social movement and a scholarly conceptualempirical discourse. Environmental justice asks questions, such as whether the positive and negative consequences (i.e., burdens and benefits) of human interactions and relations with the environment – which means primarily the human use of nature – are distributed fairly. The question of the climate has taken up a particularly important role in the discussions of environmental justice, as with the growing understanding that human activities have consequences of global proportions, by changing the climate of the planet, that effect variegated changes in local conditions: this suite of “human effects” is otherwise known as the Anthropocene, Capitalocene, or Plantationocene (Moore 2016), depending on whether the source of the problematic to catastrophic effects is located in humanity at large; in the history, ideology, and institutions of capitalism; or the specific colonial way of doing and thinking production. In distinguishing these three terms with reference to climate change, a core issue of climate justice is immediately apparent: human beings are not only subjected to the effects of climate change in unequal and unjust ways, but both historically and in the present, not all “humans” have equally contributed to climate change. Not all who are affected, subjected, and responsible are human but still might legally be considered as “persons.” Respectively, questions arise how responsibilities, obligations, and rights should be distributed today (Humphreys/Otomo 2016), when we are dealing with the present as well as future consequences of climate change.

Climate Justice

Climate Justice and SDGs The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), installed by the UN General Assembly in 2015, both directly address and relate to as well as indirectly are affected in climate justice. The most direct connection is, of course, with SDG 13 “Climate Action,” which addresses the fact of climate change along with options to combat climate change, e.g., through regulation of emissions and development of renewable energy sources. No less directly implicated are SDGs 14 and 15, which address “life below water” and “life on land,” for maritime and terrestrial ecosystems

Climate Justice as Environmental Justice? The term climate justice could, legitimately, be viewed as a special branch of environmental justice. Environmental justice, no less ambiguous than climate justice, should be seen in relation to concepts such as environmental equity and environmental racism, since it has its roots in social movements, including most prominently the civil rights discourse in the USA (Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Today, it describes (Walker 2012; Scott 2014), therefore, simultaneously

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are directly affected by climate change as well as present important climate actors, e.g., in the ability to absorb carbon and other emissions. Other SDGs are indirectly dependent on climate change and, thus, climate justice: with peace and conflict being addressed in SDG16 and poverty and hunger in SDG 1 and 2, it stands to reason that climate change affects conflicts over resources, including arable land and drinkable water. But climate justice also reveals inherent contradictions, which we have not yet fully resolved: regional economic development, which would help alleviate hunger, poverty, and health deficits (SDG3) of populations, is dependent on access to affordable energy (SDG7). Whether and in what timeframe such energy demands can be fulfilled without contributing negatively to climate change (as stated in SDG7 as “clean energy”) is, however, a problematic question. In short, between the SDGs there exist series of interdependencies and conflicts, which are just deeply and irrevocably tied to climate change and the issues and stakes of climate justice. Small/Big, Center/Margin, False, and Useful Binaries: Climate Justice as an “Urban” Issue? There is an issue that Western epistemologies have created, used, and proliferated categories that often, even though not always, are constituted in the form of binary distinctions that do not reflect realities that are complex and relational but instead oversimplify or even distort (see Michel-Rolph Trouillot and his critique of “North Atlantic Universals”) and, as a consequence, can contribute to injustice. At the same time, blanket dismissal of any or ignorance to the past historical effects of these binaries (and other categories) can prove just as disastrous. The point may just be, instead, to understand, in terms of what can be called provincialization as the explicit awareness that concepts and categories are bound to the geopolitical and historical of their creation, (a) how categories have operated in and how they have contributed to the situation today and (b) when and which binaries may be helpful and with regard to which inherent limitations and dangers in addressing a contemporary problem. Global social structures, which we have

Climate Justice

inherited from colonialism and imperialism, have mapped the world along, for example, the center-margin distinction, which has found its simultaneous expression in such highly problematic distinctions such as modern-traditional/ primitive, developed/industrial-underdeveloped/ developing, etc. In particular the issue of urbanrural normativity (Bakker 2015) in social thought and action is an instrumental aspect of climate justice, given the role that cities and the increase of urban areas have on the environment and Earth’s climate. The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group has taken this view into the economic-political arena, boasting representation of more than 90 megacities, 650 million people, and 1 quarter of global GDP (www.c40.org). Cities and city life account for the majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and urbanized areas lose absorption possibilities for these emissions. Cities are more dependent on longer transport routes, and city growth is contributing to food waste, etc. (UNFCCC 2017). Rural areas often provide resources for urban areas through agriculture. But the ongoing urbanization (Brenner 2014) of territory leaves less and less area for agricultural production to feed the planet’s growing human population on the hand while on the other, and simultaneously reducing through urbanization and agricultural (arable) land requirements, the amount of forests and green lands with high absorption qualities of carbon emissions. However, it is important to understand that the picture here is also not to be oversimplified: From this perspective, there is no such things as an unsustainable city in general, but rather there are a series of urban and environmental processes that negatively affect some social groups while benefitting others (. . .). A just urban socio-environmental perspective, therefore, always needs to consider the question of who gains and who pays and to ask serious questions about the power relations – the networked and scalar geometries of these relations – through which deeply unjust metabolic processes are produced and maintained. (Swyngedouw 2006: 115)

This is precisely why the question is not simply one of urban living versus rural living, nor simply one of addressing climate change, but in

Climate Justice

understanding the power relations involved, which is why climate is not just a techno-scientific issue or a policy matter, it is also clearly a matter of justice, i.e., climate justice. In addition, the matter of scale is important, as mentioned in the above quote. Many of the processes as well as the actors involved do have global influence, while many of the subsequent (and unjust) effects occur locally, and the first locations affected the most are small islands (Betzold 2015) who fear not only the eradication of their lands and livelihoods but also subsequent cultural loss (Zellentin 2015): climate adaptation, which in questions of local justice not only refers to individuals and/or populations but culture and history, thus has its limits. Similarly, perceptions and debates of climate change vary regionally and, as a consequence, do the understanding of climate justice, for concepts such as harm, loss, vulnerability, and risk are conceived differently in different places in general and with regard to climate in particular. This is nowhere as apparent as in the question of migration.

Climate Migration In 2015, the so-called European Refugee Crisis was largely associated with the situation in Syria, which sparked a sudden increase in the number of refugees migrating toward the European Union and other regions. However, the “crisis” further highlighted the situation of migratory movements in general, which have their roots not only in armed conflicts such as in Syria but also, among other reasons (which each also often contribute to armed conflicts), in climate change. Given that Global Northern/Western nations have historically contributed, and continue to contribute significantly, to climate change and environmental damage, they have, thus, contributed to the very reasons people are migrating northward or westward toward Europe (or the USA). This environmental or climate migration is, therefore, a serious matter for justice for climate refugees have suffered injustice for which “they are owed redress” (Saad 2017). The legal framework under which this can be discussed is the framework of human rights (see also further below: Law, Governance, and Climate Justice).

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Adaptation, Mitigation, and Types of (Climate) Justice The two main strategies for dealing with climate change are mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation refers primarily to the reduction of climate change-inducing gases or greenhouse gases (GHG), which are produced by industry, agriculture, traffic, etc. Adaptation refers to the possibilities and mechanisms of coping with effects that are now already irrevocable or that will impact in the future and can no longer be prevented. The strategies are not mutually exclusive, and they also create different problems in the discussion of climate justice, respectively. As can be seen in the case of small islands, adaptation may just not always be possible – if it is at all in the long run. The question of justice becomes here a different one than in the case of people dealing with “repair” costs for increasing damages by increasingly problematic and unpredictable weather patterns (induced by a changing climate) or in negotiating how much in emissions a growing and “developing” economy should be allowed. Therefore, in justice in general as well as in regard to climate justice, we can distinguish, at least, the following types of justice (see Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Moellendorf 2015; Saad 2017): • Criminal justice has a number of functions on the basis that it stands for the prosecutions (and punishment) of those who have committed harm. But besides punishment, criminal justice is one way how acceptable norms are communicated and also how deterrence is established. It is, of course, more difficult to hold nations or supranational entities, such as the European Union (EU), accountable in the sense of criminal justice than it would be to bring a corporation to justice that has broken climaterelevant regulations. But given the historic dimensions of climate change, the question is valid in what ways industrial nations should be held accountable. • Distributive justice refers to the question how resources, goods, and benefits, as well as burdens should be distributed (fairly). In light of any development goals, including the SDGs,

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the question of emissions looms large, since at the present and for the foreseeable future the ongoing level of technology and industrial/ economic development (necessitated by factors such as population growth) will not be possible without significant GHG emissions. This evokes questions such as the following: How are costs for mitigation and adaptation distributed? How can a fair allocation of emissions as well as a fair distribution of goods, resources, as well as a compensatory regime for emission-dependent damages (past, present, future) be established? • Corrective justice deals primarily with this latter aspect of damages, harms, wrongs committed, and their repair. • Procedural justice refers to the processes of decision-making; how these processes work; who is recognized as affected, concerned, and having a stake; who can actively participate in the process; how much weight is given to the participants; how accessible are the processes; etc. As in the case of small islands, one can see that their voice may not be easily heard in international circles and fall silent against nations that are significantly larger in population size, military, or economic power.

The Law, Governance, and Climate Justice In the creation of governance and legal questions, we encounter mostly discussions of distributive justice and embedded in them issues of procedural justice. The core dilemma of climate justice has often been expressed as an “energy” problem: the production of energy leads to emissions, and while the highly industrialized nations have already historically contributed to climate change inducing emissions, they still require a lot of energy to sustain their level of industry (any further growth notwithstanding), while the developing economies – in order to achieve at the very least a level of subsistence (which is defined as a human right) – have increasing energy needs. At the same time, economically poorer nations suffer more under the effects of climate change. Thus, poorer nations and developing economies

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can, in theory, not contribute (equally) to mitigation, and in order to even be in a position to manage adaptation, they will have to increase their level of emissions. Thus, emissions are often thought of in terms of a global budget, wherein regulatory and governance solutions for distributive justice are sought. Two principles can be identified as key to these discussions: the polluter pays principle and the beneficiary pays principle (Moellendorf 2015). The polluter pays principle describes the idea that those who have and/or do contribute to the problem the most, i.e., those who bear the greatest responsibility in the present and/or past, have to take over the greatest burden accordingly. However, the caveat lies in the temporal dimension between past and present and thus brings the intra- versus intergenerational aspect into focus: Why should a present generation be held accountable for the actions of (any) previous ones? The question of how burdens should work across time and generations is a serious and important question to be solved. In the other scenario, beneficiary pays, there is also a temporal question in play regarding causality. The beneficiary pays principle argues that those who have benefited or are benefitting from processes and events that have caused a problem are the ones who also should bear the resulting burdens, even if they haven’t caused the issue. These issues are tricky: present generations of highly industrialized countries, such as EU members, may wish to argue that as they are working toward a reduction or stabilization of their emissions, they should not unfairly be additionally burdened on the basis that previous generations of their country (knowingly or unknowingly) caused damage only so that other countries could increase their emissions or reduce them less than they possibly could, citing their “reduced” historical responsibility in comparison to European countries or the USA. But at the same time, current generations of highly industrialized countries do presently enjoy the welfare outcome of the past emission-intensive industrial development. However, they can make arguments that they did not choose this outcome themselves, that their choice to be born into that particular society was not theirs, and that they can do very

Climate Justice

little to change the present society they live in and can only make changes toward the future. Such discussions can be continued; many examples and arguments are introduced. As with many ethical and moral questions, there is no possibility for a simple solution that addresses all aspects and arguments comprehensively and satisfies all affected parties. This is precisely why pragmatic, transparent, and binding regulatory instruments and procedures are necessary. While in recent years there have been a few national court cases in the Netherlands, the USA, and the Philippines (Huntjens and Zhang 2016: 4f.), the question becomes much more difficult on the international stage. Generally, it is clear that as with the SDGs, climate change affects several human rights as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the later on enlarged International Bill of Human Rights (UN General Assembly Resolution 217 [III]) adopted by the UN General Assembly. However, the UDHR, even if by custom understood to be a basis for international law, is not generally and universally accepted by all nations as such. Like many international treaties, documents, declarations, regulations, and so on, it is dependent on the adoption, i.e., signing and ratification, by each nation individually. A nation that refuses to join a treaty in a binding way is consequently not per se subject to it in the form of it not being (easily) possible to hold such a nation accountable. In particular the USA, through a ruling by the US Supreme Court, has not fully accepted the human rights as a binding legal regime. Similarly, they have not joined the United Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992, from which obligations regarding climate change and justice would derive, nor is the subsequently added Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was signed during the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP10), therefore binding for the USA. Finally, even though the Obama administration had decided to join the Paris Agreement of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2015 during COP21, this did not hold up: the next administration under the television-personality

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Donald Trump, who was legally elected into office through the US system of the Electoral College but without the legitimacy of representing the will of the majority of US-American voters, issued a notice of withdrawal. In addition and to general effect, the Paris Agreement is lacking a genuine mechanism of making it binding in terms of enforcement. Thereby, the actual and consequential effects of the agreement, which is set to help regulate mitigation, adaptation, and finance questions of emissions, are currently in doubt. Regarding a number of legal issues, including environmental and climate justice, we are lacking effective mechanisms and institutions for transnational law, which supersede international law, as French lawyer and legal studies researcher Gilles Lhuilier argues (2016). Looking at environmentally destructive extractive industries, such as oil or mining, Lhuilier identifies that outside of international treaties that establish a volatile framework for international law, a transnational legal doctrine exists only but all the more effectively in the shared practices of lawyers who work on contracts and in adjudication between transnationally negotiating parties (multinational corporations, national governments, NGOs, indigenous people). For their practice is largely patterned by extractive industries, and especially the oil industry (lex petrolea), Lhuilier speaks of this as a doctrine of lex extractiva.

Seeing REDD(+) for the Future of Nature in “the Economy”: Circular Economy, Green Economy, Bioeconomy, Blue Carbon, Cap-and-Trade, and Other “Economy”-Based Solutions Many in the Global North and among the political, academic, and economic elites in the Global South believe in the possibility of market-based and/or economics-based solutions (Lemos and Agrawal 2006) for problems of distributive justice in general (Dennig et al. 2015; Fleurbaey and Manique 2011) and in particular for climate change (justice), especially in terms of adaptation but also for mitigation. One concept, of three related ones (D’Damato et al. 2017), that has gained much traction in policy circles is the idea of circular economy, the idea that

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processes of production (and, perhaps, even consumption) can be created as intertwined so that no “waste” is produced and that all excess in the economy in general or in particular economic production processes becomes generatively reintegrated into the value chain (Kristensen et al. 2016). Similarly, the second concept, i.e., the idea of green economy (Shmelev 2017), has been talked about widely and variously and was turned into a concrete orientation with the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, known as Rio+20. It aims at an economy that “results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (UNEP 2012: 76). Such an economy features reduced, i.e., low-carbon emissions, is efficient in its use of resources and promotes social equity and inclusion. Finally, “the bioeconomy” (Székács 2017; Lewandowski 2018) presents as a umbrella term that defines the general application of biotechnologies and the intensified use of ecosystem services for social progress and human flourishing while increasing simultaneously productivity, competitivity, and profitability, wherein “sustainability” is often added but rarely defined in terms of pragmatic criteria (Stingl 2015). By redefining all different forms of biological life as biomass and understanding ecosystems as delivering (measurable, quantifiable) services, which are both in principle “ownable” as property, these “green” and “bio” forms of economy introduce yet another version of the lex extractiva and neoliberal governmentality through the back door (Bigger et al. 2018): this is precisely the critique that has been launched against REDD/REDD+ and subsequent carbon markets (Brockhaus et al. 2013). The program for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD[+]), as first discussed by the UNFCCC COP 11, appears to be a mitigation effort. But it is an effort that an increasing number of activists and indigenous groups have opposed, for it resulted in the increasing commodification of forests, often lived in and with by indigenous peoples; these forests, once commodified, become part of a market for ecosystem services, which can be sold to the highest bidder, such as to corporations who can buy up carbon credits. To “properly” cultivate these forests, people who have ancestral connections to these lands are evicted, and

Climate Justice

the forests are set “under new management” (McAfee 1999), which means that the carbon-emitting practices of corporations and industry remain unchanged, even if for a prize. REDD(+) and its practices have therefore been called “carbon colonialism.” These practices on the expense of both indigenous peoples and humanity at large have recently extended to include the ocean as carbon market (Barbesgaard 2018): oceans, reconceived under the terms “blue economy” or “blue growth,” too, have various roles to play in regard to the climate and carbon absorption being one of these. However, at this stage, almost two thirds of maritime area do not fall under national jurisdiction, and actual laws – as originally demanded in the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – are still under development, which currently include discussions of how to measure and market carbon absorption, which also bears climate justice questions, such as in what way this can truly count as mitigation or merely a continuation of carbon-intensive practices and also to whom belong the profits of these carbon markets and at what cost? Finally, it must be said that focus on green economy and bioeconomy, for example, in the hope for development of biofuels qua advanced agricultural practices or biotechnological interventions (Timilsina and Zilberman 2014), is not only resting on may be an overstated techno-optimism, i. e., the (often near-religious) belief that future technologies will solve the most pressing ecological and/or social problems; but those technologies developed are themselves often not as sustainable as hoped, and much depends on how we even measure what can count as (promoting) sustainability, ecological well-being, or human well-being (Constanza et al. 2016). More precisely, not all bioeconomic and sustainable solutions are truly climate positive or enable climate justice. With the global and globalizing promotion of “the (universal) bioeconomy” (German Bioeconomy Council 2018), for example, in promoting molecular biotechnological transformations in agriculture over alternative agroecology or permaculture techniques (Coolsaet 2016), it is especially clear that Western and already highly industrialized nations’ privileges are maintained, for these countries have already built a techno-scientific infrastructure made to fit precisely this bioeconomic agenda.

Climate Justice

In terms of climate justice and the question of how economic and economics-based solutions contribute to justice, it can be argued that so far, approaches taken seem as of yet less convincing in establishing sustainable or just solutions (Klinsky et al. 2015). Instead, they seem primed to sustain largely the previous economic-industrial system and do not take global connections seriously that have produced and maintain global inequalities in the first place (Boatcă 2016), rather than make possible a fairer distribution of burdens and benefits and an equal recognition of all subjected, affected, and concerned groups and actors.

Global South, (De)Coloniality, and Climate Justice Rights of Nature, Gender, Race, and Climate Justice Equality not only in distribution (of benefits, obligations, and harms) but also in terms of recognition is important in the issue of climate justice – however, this does not only affect procedural justice. On the contrary, how recognition works (Trouillot 2002) can also be an important aspect in terms of, for example, epistemic (in)justice, i.e., justice about different ways, practices, and forms of knowledge, understanding and giving testimony (and bearing witness) about the world (Code 2014). A salient issue in both the Global North and South is the question of gender and climate justice (Davis et al. 2015; Agostino and Lizarde 2012), for women’s and men’s lives and livelihoods are affected differently by all environmental disasters and requiring often different responses as there are different needs, climate change being no exception. Climate change intensifies already existing gender inequalities and increases the burden on women, who in many cultures and societies fulfill complex roles and carry responsibilities for their families and their communities, beginning but not ending with care, welfare, and nutrition. As stated above, we can distinguish climate justice into the movement and the discourse, while both are being tied in their history to specifics of the USAmerican discourse on environmental justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014); and while that is a fact, it is also a fact that non-Western groups and

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actors have been concerned with environmental and climate issues before encountering US-American ideas and practices on the matter. And still today, non-Western, Global Southern, and indigenous practices of thinking and acting in an environmentally damaged and deteriorating world are often not recognized as (equally) meaningful (Fitz-Henry 2017). In the North American context, environmental justice, elite NGOs, and grassroots movements developed out of inequality, especially in terms of harms, that Black communities and First Nation and Aboriginal people experienced, such as the exposure to toxic waste. With any increase of incidence and intensity in – and decrease of predictability of – hurricanes and other harmful weather phenomena due to climate change, with Hurricane Katrina in 2005 serving as a particular watershed moment, climate justice became an integral part of US-American environmental justice, which at the time had already taken up traction in many countries, begging many interrelated questions, such as around food sovereignty and food justice through alternative ways of doing agriculture, as in the 1993-founded, worldwide La Via Campesina movement (McKeon 2015). One recent attempt to generate pragmatic and enforceable approaches to environmental and climate justice is to assign to nature “rights.” And while this move on “rights of nature” opens interesting avenues – for example, in seeming less anthropocentric and taking nonhuman agents seriously – this move also reintroduces and re-intensifies Western ways of thinking about “nature” in no less “colonial” ways (Rawson and Mansfield 2018). With climate change contributing to the ongoing destruction of ecosystems and loss of biodiversity, climate justice addresses the issue of how to deal with this kind of ecocide, for which largely the historical process of industrialization and the contemporary highly industrialized societies are to be held responsible, along with their underlying knowledge system (ways of knowing), which represents a form of “global coloniality.” Respectively, the epistemic dimension of climate justice requires, but also should itself be understood as rife with opportunities, an equal and open dialog between different cultures and ways of knowing and doing the world, for:

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Climate Justice indigenous communities have long experienced the ‘deaths of their worlds’ at the hands of the forces of ‘global coloniality’. They are, in a sense, ‘experts’ at how to navigate the ‘ends of the world’. (with reference to Viveiros de Castro and Danowski in Fitz-Henry 2017: 156)

Outlook Climate change is happening; it is here to stay. We can, at best, now, mitigate its intensity and scope of destroying livelihoods and adapt to the changes that we can no longer prevent and that we are all subjected to and affected by. This “we,” if thought of in terms of climate justice, is an inclusive “we”: it does include humans all over this planet but nonhumans and ecosystems also. How we deal with the different responsibilities, burdens, costs, risks, and harms (and also potential benefits) that not just climate change but also mitigation, and adaptation bestow, is the core issue of justice. It is a matter, primarily, of distributive, procedural, and epistemic justice. No goal for sustainable development can omit the effects of climate change nor, therefore, neglect the dimensions of climate justice. Addressing these various and complex issues of climate justice openly and comprehensively, however, will help us realize sustainable development in general.

Cross-References ▶ Impact of Climate Justice and Climate Change Cost Distribution on SDGs

References Agostino A, Lizarde R (2012) Gender and climate justice. In: Harcourt W (ed) Women reclaiming sustainable livelihoods. Palgrave Macmillan, London Bakker H (2015) The methodology of political economy: studying the global rural–urban matrix. Lexington/ Rowman, Lanham Barbesgaard M (2018) Blue growth: savior or ocean grabbing? J Peasant Stud 45(1):130–149 Betzold C (2015) Adapting to climate change in small island developing states. Climate Change 113 (3):481–489

Bigger P, Dempsey J et al (2018) Reflecting on neoliberal natures: an exchange. Environ Plann E Nat Space 1(1– 2):25–75 Boatcă M (2016) Global inequalities beyond occidentalism. Global connections. Routledge, London/New York Brenner N (ed) (2014) Implosions/explosions: towards a study of planetary urbanization. Jovis, Berlin Brockhaus M et al (2013) Governing the design of national REDD+: an analysis of the power of agency. Forest Policy Econ 49:23–33 Code L (2014) Ignorance, injustice and the politics of knowledge. Aust Fem Stud 29(80):148–160 Constanza R et al (2016) Modelling and measuring sustainable wellbeing in connection with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Ecol Econ 130:350– 355 Coolsaet B (2016) Towards an agroecology of knowledges: recognition, cognitive justice and farmers’ autonomy in France. J Rural Stud 47(Part A):165–117 Davis, A., et al (2015) Climate Justice and Women’s Rights: A Guide to Supporting Grassroots Women’s Action. Global Greengrants Fund, The International Network of Women’s Funds, and the Alliance of Funds. D’Damato D et al (2017) Green, circular, bio economy: a comparative analysis of sustainability avenues. J Clean Prod 168(1):716–734 Dennig F et al (2015) Inequality, climate impacts on the future poor, and carbon prices. PNAS 122(52):15827– 15832 Fitz-Henry E (2017) Grief and the inter-cultural public sphere: ‘rights of nature’ and the contestation of ‘global coloniality. Interface 9(2):143–161 Fleurbaey M, Manique F (2011) A theory of fairness and social welfare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK German Bioeconomy Council (2018) Global bioeconomy summit – conference report. Innovation in the global bioeconomy for dustainable and inclusive transformation and wellbeing, Office of the Bioeconomy Council, Berlin Godden L, Tehan M (2016) REDD+: climate justice and indigenous and local community rights in an era of climate disruption. J Energy Nat Res Law 34 (1):95–108 Humphreys S, Otomo Y (2016) 39: theorizing international environmental law. In: Orford A, Hoffman F, Clark M (eds) The Oxford handbook of the theory of international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Huntjens P, Zhang T (2016) Climate justice: equitable and inclusive governance of climate action, working paper 16, April 2016, The Hague Institute for Global Justice Jurt C et al (2015) Local perceptions in climate change debates: insights from case studies in the alps and the andes. Climate Change 133(3):511–523 Klinsky S et al (2015) Building climate equity: creating a new approach from the ground up. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC Kristensen DK et al (2016) Enabling sustainable agro-food futures: exploring fault lines and synergies between the

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integrated territorial paradigm, rural eco-economy and circular economy. J Agric Environ Ethics 29:749–765 Lemos MC, Agrawal A (2006) Environmental governmentality. Annu Rev Environ Resour 31:297– 325 Lewandowski I (ed) (2018) Bioeconomy – shaping the transition to a sustainable, biobased economy. Springer Open/University of Hohenheim, Cham/Hohenheim Lhuilier G (2016) Le droit transnational. Dalloz, Paris McAfee K (1999) Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green developmentalism. Environ Plann D Soc Space 17:133–154 McKeon N (2015) La Via Campesina: the ‘Peasants’ way’ to changing the system, not the climate. J World Syst Res 21(2):241–249 Moellendorf D (2015) Climate change justice. Philos Compass:173–186 Moore JW (ed) (2016) Anthropocene or capitalocene? Nature, history, and the crisis of capitalism. PM Press, Oakland Rawson A, Mansfield B (2018) Producing juridical knowledge: ‘Rights of Nature’ or the naturalization of rights? Environ Plan E Nat Space (OnlineFirst):1–21 Saad A (2017) Toward a Justice Framework for Understanding and Responding to Climate Migration and Displacement. In: Environmental Justice, Vol 10(4). http://doi.org/10.1089/env.2016.0033 Schlosberg D, Collins LB (2014) From environmental to climate justice: climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. WIREs Clim Change 5:359–374 Scott D (2014) Environmental justice. In: Brydon-Miller M, Coghlan D (eds) The SAGE encyclopedia of action research. Forthcoming; Osgoode Legal studies research paper no. 72/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn. com/abstract¼2513834. Last accessed 2 Oct 2018 Shmelev S (ed) (2017) Green economy reader. Lectures in ecological economics and sustainability. Springer, New York/Dordrecht/Heidelberg Stingl A (2015) The rural imaginary. In: Bakker JI (ed) The methodology of political economy: studying the global rural–urban matrix. Lanham, Lexington, pp 167–190 Swyngedouw E (2006) Circulations and metabolisms: (Hybrid) natures and (Cyborg) cities. Sci Cult 15 (2):105–121 Sze J (ed) (2018) Sustainability: approaches to environmental justice and social power. New York University Press, New York Székács A (2017) Environmental and ecological aspects in the overall assessment of bioeconomy. J Agric Environ Ethics 30:153–170 Timilsina GR, Zilberman D (eds) (2014) The impacts of biofuels on the economy, environment, and poverty. A global perspective. Springer, New York/Dordrecht/ Heidelberg Trouillot MP (2002) North Atlantic Universals: analytical fictions, 1492–1945. S Atl Q 101(4):839–858 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2012) UNEP annual report 2011, UNEP Division of Communications and Public Information

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2017) “Initiatives in the area of human settlements and adaptation”, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (Forty-sixth session Bonn, 8–18 May 2017), Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Walker G (2012) Environmental Justice: concepts, evidence and politics. Routledge, New York Zellentin A (2015) Climate justice, small island developing states & cultural loss. Clim Chang 133(3):491–498

Climate Responsibility ▶ Impact of Climate Justice and Climate Change Cost Distribution on SDGs

Coercion ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development Valesca Lima Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Synonyms Governance beyond the state; Interactive governance; Joined-up government; Network governance; Partnership paradigm

Definition Collaborative governance is a strategy implemented for the coproduction of public policies and services, involving various stakeholders in multi-institutional governance.

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Introduction

multiparty governance, which can include partnerships among stakeholders, in addition to joined-up government and hybrid arrangements (Agrawal and Lemos 2007). This chapter presents the configuration and evolution of collaborative governance within innovative frameworks and examines the role of collaborative governance promoted by the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs) and its global impact. The chapter begins by analyzing the rich literature on collaborative governance, derived from theoretical and empirical research. It then goes on to describe the drivers and conditions for collaborative governance. The next part analyzes the main elements of collaborative processes and examines the innovative governance tools promoted by UN SDGs. The chapter concludes with some reflections about the main challenges of collaborative governance.

Over the years it has become clear that traditional modes of government are not capable of dealing effectively with global challenges, such as extreme poverty, corruption, natural calamities, and security threats. Consequently, the confidence in the capacity of government to meet those demands are declining. To respond to the growing demands for governance to address problems of sustainable government, new forms of governance have emerged. These fit specific settings and develop effective policies without relying entirely on the government. The move towards a more collaborative style of governance has played an important role in nation’s progress towards achieving the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Appropriate approaches to policymaking and public management are required to the implementation of governance structures that brings public and private stakeholders together in collective forums of decision-making. Most studies define collaborative governance as strategy to coordinate and integrate the goals and interests of multiple stakeholders. In general, governance refers to complex decision-making processes in political, social, and economic matters. Broadly, it involves the processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management that include constructive partnerships among the state, the private sector, civil society, and ordinary citizens. It may engage all levels of government with the purpose of carrying out a public demand that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson et al. 2012). In a narrower sense, collaborative governance is a tool used to resolve conflict and facilitate cooperation among governmental agencies, interest groups, and communities. In its more ambitious sense, collaborative governance encompasses the reconstruction of democracy along the idea of giving voice to nonstate actors, an idea that comes close to the principles of deliberative democracy, in which citizen-centered governments implement governance systems with great levels of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy (Henton et al. 2005). This practice can also be applied to inform participatory governance and

Definition, Configuration, and Evolution of Collaborative Governance The definition of collaborative governance offers new perspectives on the state and how decision power is shared. It varies along different dimensions according to who collaborates and how this collaboration is organized. Theoretically, the concept of collaborative governance is outlined as a mode of governance that brings multiple stakeholders together in common spaces with diverse public agencies to advance consensus-oriented decision-making. Because this concept originated from many diverse local experiments, the literature in the area has had an untied character (Ansell and Gash 2008). More recent work has focused on evaluating and adapting collaborative practices in different areas, from IT governance in large corporations to sustainable development in lowincome countries. Although it has emerged as a reaction to the fiascoes of bad implementation at local levels and to the elevated cost and politicization of regulation, collaborative governance became an alternative to the adversarial and managerial governance. Collaborative governance, then, seeks to transform conflict situations into more cooperative ones (Ansell 2012).

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An important and critical term in collaborative governance is “governance.” In general, the term governance encompasses the act of govern. The literature in the area has highlighted interesting definitions that are workable but not fully broadly comprehensive. This is exemplified in the work undertaken by Lynn et al. (2001) which emphasizes that governance can be broadly understood as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services” (pp. 7–8). In their definition, Lynn et al. include the act of governing both in the public and/or private sector. On the other hand, Ostrom (1990, p. 136) considers governance a dimension of determined norms and rules designed to regulate individual and group behavior. This definition suggests that governance is also about group-making decisions, rendering governance as a concept that is not only applied at the individual level but also affecting groups of individuals. Stoker (1997) broadens this definition by adding that governance refers to a type of baseline agreement where the boundaries between the public and private sectors become blurred. Taking into account the various definitions of governance, it makes sense to summarize that collaborative governance can be understood broadly as a type of governance in which processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management engage people constructively across the public and private sector boundaries. In this work, the concept of collaborative governance refers to governmental arrangement where the state engages with nonstate stakeholders in collective decision-making processes that are formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets (Ansell and Gash 2008, p. 544). This definition is useful because it allows for the inclusion of five important criteria for collaborative approaches: it is a forum initiated by government agencies and institutions; nonstate actors participate in these forums; participants are not just consulted, they are engaged in decision-making processes; the forum is formally organized and make decisions

collectively; the focus of the forum and process is collaboration on public policymaking or public management of assets and goods. Despite its comprehensiveness, the broad use of the term collaborative governance makes theory building a challenge process, as pointed by Imperial (2005). Ansell and Gash’s definition assumes that public agencies are the typical initiators of collaborative governance. However, to be considered as “collaboration,” it requires the participation of nonstate actors. This representation means the inclusion of key interest groups and the representation of all the relevant interests in a specific policy area (Connick and Innes 2003). Stakeholder refers to both citizens participating in decision-making as individuals and the participation of citizens in organized groups (interests groups, social movements, and neighborhood associations, to cite a few). Collaboration implies a reciprocal communication and the capacity to influence policymaking. In other words, it implicates a working relationship between government and nongovernmental actors (Donahue 2004). The standard for collaboration must include the participation of nonstate stakeholders and guarantee the participation is not just consultative (Ansell and Gash 2008). In this sense, the process of participation should be collective, as public agencies and (nonstate) stakeholders meet to make decisions. Community consultation can be a useful tool of management, but it is not collaborative because it does not involve multilateral deliberation (Papadakis and Plimakis 2018; Booher 2004). The literature on collaborative governance draws from diverse realms of practice and research in public administration (Emerson et al. 2012). In most cases, it trends towards collaboration coming from the advance of knowledge and institutional capacity. As the distribution of specialized knowledge increases and institutional infrastructures become more complex and interdependent, the demand for a collaborative approach intensifies. The concept of collaborative governance – and other concepts closely relatedly to it, such as “interactive governance,” “governance beyond the state,” the “partnership paradigm,” “joined-up government,” “network

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governance,” or simply “governance” (Blanco 2015) – underlines the increasing significance of collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental social actors in the formulation and implementation of public policies. The variety of terms to refer to collaborative governance may cause confusion. Corporatism can be seen as a form of collaborative governance, as it emphasizes three-party bargaining between peak associations of labor and capital and the state, but they typically have the monopoly of representation in their sectors. In some cases, the term “associational governance” is used as a reference to generic forms of governing associations, and collaborative governance does not necessarily include formal associations. Collaborative governance and public–private partnership may in some cases refer to the same phenomenon. This partnership requires collaboration for a proper functioning; however, their main goal is to achieve coordination rather than to achieve collaborative decision-making. The term “policy network” embodies a multitude of modes of state-society cooperation and it can include both public agencies and stakeholder groups, implying a cooperative model of decision-making among actors within the network. For that reason, the terms policy network and collaborative governance may refer to similar phenomena. The difference is that while collaborative governance indicates explicit and formalized strategies of incorporating stakeholders (citizens) into “multilateral and consensus-oriented decision-making processes,” cooperation in policy networks is inherently informal and largely implicit (Ansell and Gash 2008). In summary, a variety of terms is used to refer to collaborative governance, yet, central to this definition, are the institutionalized forms of collective decision-making processes. Collaborative governance is not novel in the USA and its expansion to Europe has been significant because of the dominance of a state-centered policy approach, particularly in the context of building and consolidating welfare states (Blanco 2015). In Latin America and Africa, governance has had different meanings, some of them coming to light as a product of an uncritical incorporation of the international dissemination of the concept,

which came from multilateral organizations, mainly the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Both organizations promoted during the 1980s policies of structural adjustment in low-income countries, ignoring local contexts and political conditions, such as deep social inequality and elite political leaderships (Lima 2020). Themes such as corruption, institutional construction, consensus building, accountability, legitimacy, and sustainability entered the agenda of these institutions more strongly in the 1990s (Marques 2013).

Drivers and Conditions for Collaborative Governance The academic literature on collaborative processes has established the factors that contribute to the advancement or decline of collaborative governance. Much of the current literature focused on collaborative processes highlights factors that are associated with advancing collaborative governance. What follows is an account of those factors, consistent with the influential work of Ansell and Gash (2008), Emerson et al. (2012), and Thomson and Perry (2006), which understand the stages of the collaborative process as dynamic, cyclical, and iterative. The “starting conditions” set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital. They are the conditions that either facilitate or discourage cooperation between public agencies and stakeholders. Collaboration between stakeholders with different interests can be a challenge from the onset, as the parties involved need to resolve issues of distrust and antagonism. Ansell and Gash (2008) outline three complex conditions necessary to initiate and sustain collaboration: power imbalances, incentives to collaborate, and the historical record of conflict/cooperation among stakeholders. Power imbalance between stakeholders is a common problem often observed in collaborative governance (Purdy 2012; Choi and Robertson 2014; Fung and Wright 2003). When stakeholders do not have the capacity, resources, or

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organization to participate, it is expected that more powerful groups will be in advantage. In general, this imbalance generates distrust and resentment among participants. The issue of power inequality is particularly acute regarding key stakeholders which do not have access to a strong organization structure to be fairly represented in the collaborative process. As discussed by English (2000), the more diverse and diffuse the stakeholders, the more difficult it is to represent this group in the collaborative process. Lack of expertise and time constraints also add to difficulties of taking part in the time-consuming and intense collaborative process (Ansell and Gash 2008). However difficult, those issues are not unassailable. There are some mitigating strategies that can help to overcome barriers to collaborative innovation, such as providing stakeholders with additional skills and resources (Ansell 2012). In addition, as argued by Fung and Wright (2003), there are approaches to empower weaker stakeholders, such as “countervailing power,” a concept they developed to describe how powerful actors with privileged access to decision-making spaces may from time to time be challenged and even defeated by the weak and less organized (p. 260). The development of incentives to encourage stakeholder participation and the nature of those incentives that shape collaboration is essential to understand which incentives to participation are more effective. As seen in Gunton and Day (2003), power imbalances may affect the incentives of stakeholders participating in the collaborative process, and this imbalance may discourage weaker stakeholders to join collaborative venues, as they might consider the stakes are already against them. However, incentives are stronger when stakeholders’ goals are connected to the goals of other stakeholders. Incentives to engage are partially dependent on the stakeholders’ expectations of a meaningful outcome, especially when participatory aspects, such as time commitment, are inserted in the equation (Warner 2012). A crucial component of the collaborative process is the voluntary aspect. Consequently, incentives to participation are low when stakeholders can achieve success through other means, leading to

a weakened collaborative process. For example, stakeholders with easy access to politicians and courts may have the upper hand and manipulate the decision-making process. Those alternative venues will be particularly attractive to stakeholders in cases where they are able to achieve their goals unilaterally. Historic levels of conflict or cooperation among recognized interests and the resulting levels of trust have an impact on working relationships of collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008; Thomson and Perry 2006; Emerson et al. 2012). Those levels may facilitate or thwart collaboration. Nevertheless, where stakeholders are highly interdependent, conflict can create a powerful incentive for collaborative governance. When policy deadlocks take place and seem irresolute, it imposes serious costs on both sides of the dispute. Interestingly, conflict is not a barrier to collaboration per se, since the existence of conflict described in the literature mentions that eventually stakeholders often conclude that achievement will only be reached through engagement in the collaborative process. Groups of stakeholders with a history of conflict creates a vicious circle of distrust and antagonism; while a group with a history of successful past cooperation can lead to positive levels of trust which in turn leads to a constructive circle of cooperation.

Institutional Design and Leadership in Collaborative Processes In Ansell and Gash contingency model (2008), the starting conditions of collaborative governance influence the collaborative governance model (see Fig. 1). Unlike other previous models that did not articulated the relationships between management practices, collaboration processes, and outcomes, this one identifies institutional design and leadership from the main collaborative process, postulating that in addition to the set of initial conditions, these two dimensions set the stage for the collaboration process (Johnston et al. 2011). This influence is pervasive, related to the context, and not easy to identify as fully distinct variables. Nevertheless, this model enables

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Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development, Fig. 1 A model of collaborative governance. (Source: Ansell and Gash 2008: page number 550 ©)

for a consideration of the main drivers of the collaborative process, which are: institutional design, leadership, and management practices. Institutional design consists of the basic protocols and ground rules for collaboration, which are central for the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process (Ansell and Gash 2008, p. 555). The institutional design determines who is going to participate in the collaborative process and how this participation will take place. These decisions reflect the idea that inclusion mirrors group legitimacy. The way stakeholders are included in collaborative initiatives is a feature of institutional design, and as put by Chrislip and Larson (1994), the inclusiveness of participant selection is one of the first conditions of a successful collaboration. Clear ground rules and transparency of the process are fundamental features of the institutional design, since both are related to legitimacy and trust building (Gunton and Day 2003). In a

transparent process, stakeholders can be assured that their participation is meaningful, and the negotiations are real and not backroom deals. When considering the effectiveness of institutional design, Murdock et al. (2005) argue that collaborative processes are more effective when they have clear objectives and adequate technical support. Even then, the composition of the group is important, and minority and larger groups are sometimes more difficult to deal with, considering that consensus is harder to reach because of veto power, for example (Ansell 2012). Leadership is also understood as an essential feature of collaborative governance (Page 2010). Leadership provides indispensable mediation and facilitation for the collaborative decision-making process. Without strong countermeasures to represent less powerful groups and without “neutral” agency leadership, collaborative processes are skewed in favor of more powerful voices (Schuckman 2001). While some may consider

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this relationship uncomplicated and complementary, the concentration of power may reveal the power imbalances in collaborative spaces. Borraz and John (2004) argue that a strong leadership is essential for establishing collaborative models of governance. Considering the current context characterized by political and social fragmentation, strong leadership is helpful in providing a focus that offers some guidance and resolves disputes among the many stakeholders at play (Oliveras and Salazar 2016). In describing models of facilitative leadership that promote the engagement of weak stakeholders, Bergström et al. (2012) and Cruikshank and Susskind (1987) show that strong leadership is essential to enhance participants engagement, while at the same time highlighting the risks associated with this leadership style, such as the downplaying of ideological and political differences. Another associated risk is that individuals become more important than agencies or institutions (Bergström et al. 2012). Public agencies have a distinctive leadership role in collaborative governance. One of their clear roles is to set and maintain clear ground rules that facilitate dialogue and build trust among stakeholders (Ansell and Gash 2008). In fact, collaborative governance asks for a specific type of facilitative “effective leadership,” which is the adequate management of the collaborative process, maintaining “technical credibility,” and ensuring that the collaboration is empowered to make decisions that are acceptable to all parties involved (Ryan 2001). Another significant aspect of leadership in collaborative governance is the demand and necessity for multiple opportunities and roles of leadership (Page 2010). Leadership roles include sponsorship, facilitation, mediation, and representation, among others. In this context, leadership encompasses engagement and mobilization of participants with the view to build trust and collaborative capacity (Ansell and Gash 2008). Some leadership roles are more necessary in the onset of collaboration (Agranoff 2006), while others are more critical during the process of deliberation and conflict (Carlson 2007). While some scholars represent collaborative processes as a linear arrangement of stages that

occur over time from problem definition to direction setting and implementation (Daniels and Walker 2001; Gray 1989; Selin and Chavez 1995), others view the stages within collaborative processes as iterative interactions (Ansell and Gash 2008; Thomson and Perry 2006). As discussed above, collaboration often seems dependable on communication, trust, commitment, understanding, and outcomes (Imperial 2005). This cyclical process is important across all the stages of collaborative governance. The Collaborative Process Empirical research has shown that inclusive processes contribute to reduce dispute and antagonism among different stakeholders, and that those processes and structures help to foster effective cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al. 2015). An inclusive structure facilitates the management of collaboration and helps with the implementation of the agreements achieved (Quick and Feldman 2014). In collaborative governance, communication is indispensable for collaboration. In fact, collaboration creates communication, and much of it has to be face-to-face communication (Bryson et al. 2015; Koschmann et al. 2012). Face-to-face collaboration may reinforce some negative stereotypes, but it usually helps to break them and to build trust (Ansell and Gash 2008). However, since the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, changes have been seen in the way policy decisions are made, with the widespread use of remote work and online technologies that facilitates communication. So face-to-face communication does not mean to be physically in the same spaces with others anymore. It is likely that these changes can bring innovation to collaborative governance, such as new models of fast communication for decision-making, sharing of resources, and new partnerships. The literature is full of examples where trusting relationships are the core of collaboration (Lee et al. 2012). Trust building is an ongoing requirement for a prosperous collaboration, in which collaborative planning (objective, goals, steps, and responsibilities) are clearly understood and supported by a coherent institutional design. As argued by Imperial (2005) and Murdock et al. (2005), trust is based also on commitment, as

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collaboration partners learn to build trust by sharing information and demonstrating competency, good intentions, and follow-through (Chen 2010). Communication mechanisms and trust building facilitate the development of shared understandings of the problem and commitments to shared solutions (Bryson et al. 2015). In the context of collaborative processes and structures, legitimacy, both internal and external, is critical. Internal legitimacy relates to establishing commitment among members, including procedural legitimacy, as stakeholders feel they were heard in the decision-making process (Ansell and Gash 2008; Murdock et al. 2005). External legitimacy encompasses the necessity of continuing sponsorship from people who have formal authority and support less powerful stakeholders who largely only have access to informal authority to engage partners in mutual work. As demonstrated by Human and Provan (2000), horizontal structures and inclusive processes may not be seen as legitimate by stakeholders more habituated with traditional top-down decision-making processes. Therefore, it is essential that the involved see collaboration as legitimate. Otherwise, if a collaborative process is perceived as excluding relevant stakeholders, it may be considered illegitimate, a conclusion that may impede its political viability (Ansell and Gash 2008). In summary, it has been shown that collaborative processes focus on building trust, developing a shared understanding of the problem and resources, and also on building commitment to collective goals and actions. Moving on to the consideration of the UN role in collaborative governance, in the sections that follow, the way governance innovations can provide significant opportunities to transform public administration into an instrument of sustainable development through enhanced stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes is examined.

making, developed by structures of diffused networks of governance systems. The concept of governance innovation indicates new ideas, experiments, and practices that collaborate to better coordinate and more commonly share results in public administration (Bourgeois 2018). Currently, some of the most promising innovations in contemporary governance involve redesigning and improving public administration by ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels (SDG 16.7). The SDGs, predominantly through SDG 16, address some of the omissions of the previous millennium development goals (MDGs), around issues of governance, inclusion, participation rights, and security. SDG 16 aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” In consonance with the other goals, SDG 16 is an important goal-setting tool to deliver sustainable development in all countries. It has been considered by experts as a novel global governance strategy (Biermann et al. 2017).

UN Governance and Innovation: Accountable and Inclusive Institutions at All Levels As indicated previously, governance can take the form of a multilevel architecture of decision-

Box 1 Collaborative Governance in the SDGs

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

Bearing in mind the increased demands from citizens for meaningful participation in public affairs and calls for inclusiveness in decisionmaking processes, it is important to examine two governance innovations promoted by UN SDGs that allows people to actively take part in decisions that matter to them, to say, e-government and open data, and gender equality. E-Government and Open Data Initiatives New governance opportunities are emerging to support the management of public services and public goods delivery models. The global spread of the Internet and the application of information

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and communications technology (ICTs) in government is one of the main innovations in the area of collaborative governance. The greater investments in telecommunication infrastructure coupled with capacity-building in human capital can provide opportunities to transform public administration into an instrument of collaborative governance which directly supports sustainable development outcomes (UNDESA 2016). The UN 2016 e-government survey shows that several countries are increasingly embracing innovation and utilizing ICTs to deliver services and engage people in decision-making processes. One of the most important new trends is the advancement of people-driven services, with the opening of new venues of open government data, such as cities administration data and census data. Open data addresses the growing demand for more personalized services that reflect individual needs, as well as people’s aspiration to be more closely engaged in the design and delivery of public services. These new demands are transforming the way the public sector operates. E-government has remarkable potential to improve the way that governments deliver public services and enhance broad stakeholder involvement in public administration. Research on the topic has shown that open data is also enabling more effective collaborative governance. Better access to information about what governments are doing equips citizens to partake in public decision-making processes. This highlights the potential contribution of the internet to enhance the interactivity, transparency, and openness of public sector entities and to promote new forms of accountability. The search for new styles of governance which promote higher levels of transparency and the engagement of citizens is viewed as a way of improving citizen trust and participation in governments (Bonsón et al. 2012; Welp et al. 2007; Bertot et al. 2010). Publishing government data online can contribute to higher degrees of accountability and transparency not only of national governments, but also of parliaments and of the judiciary, which will play an important role in the achievement of the SDGs (see, for example, UNDESA 2016). In the context of public administration,

open data means that raw data, aggregated data, and multiple ICT-related channels are made accessible to citizens (Bartenberger and GrubmüllerRégent 2014). Apart from technological issues, a culture of transparency embedded within the governance system and technology capabilities and access to open data are critical success factors to transparent and collaborative e- government systems (Bertot et al. 2010). Governance and Gender Equality In the past years, transnational feminist activism has encouraged the UN and its affiliated agencies to play a more active role in advancing women’s rights agenda by increasing women participation in policymaking. Framing governance through gender equality means developing an understanding of the common assumption that governance is gender-neutral. To close this governance gap, it is necessary to assess actions to promote gender equality backed by adequate funds, and to systematically monitor progress in reducing gender discrimination. In principle, new forms of governance would offer women multiple channels for accessing policymaking. However, too often, public administrations overlook measures to ensure that public services respond to women’s needs and priorities, thus more access is not translated into more power or a greater voice. Feminist scholars have engaged in the investigation of the relationship between governance and feminism, by offering critiques of the gendered natures of governance. Research has documented the complex effects of governmentality on gender power dynamics in the modern world (Shin 2016). Thus, the creation of feminist networks was necessary because women’s issues have been and continue to be sorely neglected by governments and governance (Naurin and Naurin 2018). The impact of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1235 is remarkable and still underresearched and largely unrecognized in the scholarly literature on the UN and global governance (Paffenholz 2018; Hoewer 2014). Nevertheless, evidence from implementation shows that where an agreement is gender sensitive, women have greater access to representation in post-conflict

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governance (Domingo et al. 2015). The UN Women and the Commission on the Status of Women have highlighted the need for policy through gender-responsive governance and institutions, aiming to transform unequal gender relations and changing public systems that deny women equal rights and opportunities. This is an important strategy for ensuring that governance processes, policies, laws, and service delivery are gender responsive.

discover opportunities for mutual gains and creative problem-solving is open government data. Governments are currently struggling with issues of opening up their data and how to do that safely and effectively. The main challenges to open data include issues related to legal frameworks, policies, and principles; data management and protection; identity management and privacy; and cyber security. Nevertheless, numerous approaches can be used to expand access and usage of open government data, including facilitation of usage through campaigns, raising awareness of how open government data can assist in achieving SDGs and building effective and inclusive institutions.

Conclusion: Challenges for the Implementation of Collaborative Governance The concept of collaborative governance has attracted attention as a model to improve public administration and increase citizen trust in government. Theoretical and empirical research have investigated the intrinsic and complex mechanisms of governance, and the amounting evidence assures us that stakeholders can be brought together and work collaboratively to solve mutual problems. The literature shows that collaborative governance is often effective in replacing adversarial and managerial modes of policymaking and implementation. There is a growing body of literature that recognizes the variables that influence the outcomes of collaborative governance and whether they produce successful collaboration. Some of those factors include the initial (and ideal) conditions of collaboration and major components of the collaborative process, such as trust building and facilitative leadership. While many see collaborative governance as a strategy to revitalize trust in government by enhancing public administration and deliberation, it is important to temper expectations by considering the many challenges, as indicated previously, of achieving collaboration. Those challenges are usually related to whether collaborative governance can succeed and go beyond stakeholders’ differences and interests. To address the challenges of collaborative governance, careful consideration of opportunities and challenges are needed. An area where collaborative governance can help stakeholders

Cross-References ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Measuring Governance to Achieve Sustainable Development: Promises and Challenges ▶ Open Government: Conceptual Underpinnings, Benefits, and Relationship with SDGs ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Meta-governance

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Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact

characterized in terms of common interests between people, a common ecology and locality, and a common social system or structure in a given geographical area through communication platforms. Conflict refers to misunderstanding between communities and parties which leads to the loss of human and material resources. A relationship between two or more parties, who believe that they have incompatible goals, is imperative to the progressive situation. Sometimes conflict is viewed, briefed, and analyzed in several ways, but it is useful in the perspective of conflict management and resolving conflicts in simple and complex geometrical principles. Communal conflict is defined as a violent conflict between non-state groups that are organized along a shared communal identity, whereas the group identity is considered as socially and culturally constructed. Communal conflict represents a type of violence that can be separated spatially and analytically from organized to unorganized types of violence especially for land and livelihood. Communal conflict resolution is an act of finding an answer or a solution with various methods and process facilitating for the peaceful ending of a conflict. The communal conflict resolution encompasses the use of nonviolent measures like negotiation, arbitration, mediation, reconciliation, diplomacy, peacebuilding among the conflicted parties. The communal conflict resolution is also defined as a process by which two or more parties engaged in a dispute, debate, disagreement reach a peaceful agreement resolving it.

Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact Introduction E. Devabalane Department of Tourism, Tagore Government Arts and Science College, Puducherry, India

Definitions Community is broadly defined as a group of people small or large, whose identity as a group lies in their interactions and exchanges. Community is

According to the latest estimation by the World Bank, more than 192 million people are directly affected by conflicts and live in conflict-affected areas and fragile states. Conflict creates both short- and long-term damage to the civilians; it impairs the link between the states and the citizens and decimates the nation’s infrastructure. It also affects the normal course of life, mental wellbeing, and normal social functioning of people

Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact

who become more vulnerable as a result of communal conflict as progress and development both at the local and the global level becomes more elusive. The successful development of education, health, governance, and infrastructure are key attributes that make conflict and insecurity markedly less likely. Development has to be sustainable, not politicized for the short term, and rather it should concentrate more on governance, social security reforms, institutions, and the empowerment of civil society. These would be the keys to unlocking economic potential in developing countries. In effect, it has been frequently argued, that the right sort of sustainable development has been the highest priority for societies, and for whole regions, than security, since it created security in and of itself. The relationship between development and conflict has been effectively subordinated to the competition between the superpowers. Developed countries and the superpowers thus are assumed to have far too much to lose in any direct conflict. Their antagonisms were played out by proxy among other countries across the world. In such circumstances, development was highly politicized, skewed towards military and internal security spending, and frequently had the effect of creating and bolstering autocratic dictatorships of both capitalist and socialist persuasions. So the conflicts of the present era demonstrate some catastrophic departures from the historical norms, and it is important that international attempts be made to address these crises. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to significantly reduce all forms of violence and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights is the key to this process, as is reducing the flow of illicit arms and strengthening the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance. Unless we learn how to achieve the targets in conflict settings, the benefits of the SDGs will not reach many of the people who need them most. The list of 17 SDGs and 169 targets should be adapted by each country in a realistic manner that is simpler, and of a more modest approach, that relates to being associated with greater success. Conflict-affected countries

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both ongoing and post-conflict situations, namely, Congo, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Angola, Colombia, Gaza, Philippines, Kosovo, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Morocco, Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, Jordan, Uganda, etc., often have greater needs both in terms of capital costs to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and of recurring costs to operate in environments with transport and human security challenges. The present entry deals with communal conflicts in a world that is increasingly divided. Some regions enjoy sustained levels of peace, security, and prosperity, while others fall into seemingly endless cycles of conflict and violence, thus becoming an open sore in the process of development that is stalled due to lack of peace both local and international. The trend of communal violence while increasing is not only turning perilous to society but permeating into the deep roots of human civilization shaking its very foundation thereby causing a frightful phenomenon that has brought about a permanent curse upon the society and its peoples. Nevertheless, without justice, peace, tolerance, stability, human rights, and effective governance – based on the rule of law – one cannot hope for sustainable development. This dire situation must necessarily be addressed with great immediacy, on a war footing at every level by strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights, by reducing the flow of illicit arms and reinforcing the participation of developing countries in the institutions that are meant to promote global governance and peace. It becomes a debatable topic on 24/7 basis with the outbreak of riots, violence, and clashes among the communities irrespective of country, language, race, gender, class, and the ensuing polarization that is witnessed through all forms of media thereby leaving the trajectory of fear and hatred among the innocent peoples of the world. Civil society therefore is in peril. The constitutional principles on which nations and states have been built stand demolished. And yet as the history of human civilization has proved that hope has always been the saving grace of life, one can rest assured that there is light at the end of the tunnel because human evolution jump starts at every crisis for survival that has happened time and again. It is a

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clash of classes, races, ethnic communities, the ruling class, and the subalterns – in short of the powerful as against the powerless society – that the ambition of sustainable development has become a distant dream. The world fears for a total change in its lifestyle and living pattern and changing demographics and this has become inevitable in the new millennium. With the onset of globalization, distances among continents and countries have shrunk so as to create new spaces of multicultural societies where tolerance must be the keyword for sustenance, progress, and development. On the contrary, clashes of interests and the unequal distribution of powers have been the cause of strife as among communities purported as the two main concepts by conflict theorists. The conflict theorists see this order that exists as being the result of one group’s desire to control the other which has led to such communal conflicts. However, one has to understand the fact that over and above this issue lie the multistranded link between the environment, the natural resources, and the individual lives. It is not just a question of peoples or humans alone rather, and ultimately, it is the question of sharing the resources that form the basics of life and the entire ecosystem of which humans are only a part. Even the simple matters of water, food, and shelter, the fundamental amenities for survival, become more complex, and strategic behavior of the individuals will change if one party gets the resource while the other does not. All conflicts based on resources can be analyzed in such a way that the resources of that people are attempting to obtain, the availability of the resource, and the number of people who wants to share the resources. Thus, resources have become an explicit factor for the riots and communal conflict in real life situations as per the social science pathways vis a vis human behavior. Together with the determinants of individual and social behavior, an appropriate choice of institutions has a critically important place in the enterprise of enhancing justice. The institutions can contribute directly to the lives that people are able to lead in accordance with what they have reason to value. Institutions can also be important in facilitating the ability to scrutinize the values and priorities to be considered especially through

Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact

opportunities for public discussion which includes freedom of speech, right to information, civic sensibility, global democracy, global justice, that can plausibly influence and inspire practical actions across borders.

Communal Conflicts Communal conflict, as defined is also termed as violent conflict, refers to the fact that parties use lethal violence to gain control over some disputed and perceived indivisible resource, such as piece of land or local political power. For instance in local conflicts, where the dividing line is between the original inhabitants of an area and more recent settlers, this would be seen as a communal conflict since people very strongly identify themselves with the other group along these lines of demarcation which causes “son of the soil” conflicts where the indigenous perceive themselves as the rightful owners of the land. Communal identity includes ethnic or religious identity with common culture, common history, and common core values. Sometimes even livelihood conflicts may be fought along these lines no matter whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. The bottom line is that which constitutes the basis of communal identity and thus may differ across space and time may lead to communal conflicts. It is therefore viewed as a condition of social disharmony and unrest in the community like disagreement, antagonism, crimes, violence, and large-scale destruction of property and human lives. It also entails disorderliness, coercive, illegitimate communal force constituting threat to all fellow citizens. More scientific knowledge and in-depth research is required to understand communal conflict underlying the global scenario, the LPG syndrome, and changing world affairs. It should not be viewed as a mere law and order problem, disharmony, and social unrest. This unbridled lunatic communalism and religious fanaticism may lead to terrorism. In India or Pakistan, religion has become a weapon for separating the society and is the root cause in most of the communal and ethnic conflicts. Such conflicts tend to have more serious and global consequences like

Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact

state terrorism, cross-border terrorism, international terrorism that calls for awareness and vigilance on a transnational spectrum. Leo Tolstoy famously began his novel Anna Karenina, with the words: happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” In today’s globalized world, it is possible to paraphrase and stand that sentence on its head, to argue that unhappy societies are increasingly all alike, while happy ones are so largely because they follow a different trajectory. This may be why it is no longer remarkable that the past few decades, which have been marked at one level by such an onslaught and apparent victory of globalizing and centralizing economic forces, have also witnessed the emergence of great social divisions and more violence across the world. The indication is very clear that inequality in assets and incomes has increased in recent years significantly in the global economic boom that now appears to be tapering off and for obvious reason; inequality can be associated with conflicts in the communities. During conflict, especially violent and protracted conflict, development work is more arduous and dangerous than in non-conflict contexts, and it requires greater flexibility and adaptability (Kreimer et al. 1998). Communal violence has been at its height across continents like Africa, Australia, South Asia, and the Americas since the beginning of the twentieth century. Violence is perhaps the most significant and destructive challenge to the sustainable development of nations, the growth and well-being, and the very survival of countries around the world. Fatalities resulting from armed conflicts are rising in some parts of the world, causing mass displacement of people within countries and across borders, and resulting in massive humanitarian crises that adversely impact every aspect of the developmental efforts. Moreover, the other forms of violence, crime, and sexual and gender-based violence also remain a global challenge. The young people are especially the most vulnerable resulting in 43% of all homicides globally involve young people between 10 and 29 years of age, and 70% of all human trafficking victims in Sub-Saharan Africa countries are children. But violence can also take more insidious

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forms with abnormal and pathological complexities of particular situations which cannot be defined. Above all, the institutional violence of unaccountable legal and existing judicial systems and depriving people of their human rights and fundamental freedoms all constitute forms of violence and injustice. On the other hand, corruption, bribery, theft, and tax evasion cost in the developing countries around USD1.26 trillion per year with the international poverty threshold of USD 1.90 a day has been another form of violence stultifying general progress of society. The plethora of issues that arise out of such conflicts of violence, rioting and arson with the authorities in power failing to restore peace and normalcy, order and justice, in terms of favoring those rich and power wielding lot rather than those who really are in need of their attendance, tend to lose out on various legal disabilities living in the chamber of horrors. Hence the sense of security and fulfilment of the individual is always a challenge and the basic social values of equality and dignity of the individual human is not achieved. Of what use have been the fundamental rights to the black in America, to the Jews in Germany, and to the untouchables in India? Many communal riots and mass atrocities have indeed been precipitated by discord between state and central governments and between local and national administrators. In most of the cases, however, community conflict between leaders and government representatives have worked together to prevent or contain violence but in vain (Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli 1998). The problem of communal conflict and violence in the world encompasses religious, political scenario, socioeconomic issues, cultural, historical and intellectual spheres in different ratios, and extent with reference to different states and regions. It is not possible to analyze each communal conflict riot because of lack of accurate and systematic information but, by and large, it can be said that the religious issues ordinarily only provide the cover for the battling out of other social or economic matters. Even after the post-cultural world, the communal violence is well organized, planned, and executed by different stakes for deriving selfish gains. In most cases, it is

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politically motivated and the role of rumors in rousing communal passions is quite famous in the Indian subcontinent. There are several reasons for the communal conflict namely the struggle for identity, caste and class conflicts, communal conflicts and conflicts of interest, sociopolitical issues, socioeconomic factor, business rivalries, administrative redtapism, partisan attitude of police, rumors, lack of communication, insecurity and fear, religious causes, proselytization and forceful conversion, religious and communal organizations, religious processions and celebrations, religious rituals, religious fanaticism, revival of fundamentalism, religious fundamentalists, hurting religious sentiments, spending on religious activities, trivial causes has turned out to be an attempt to adversely affect the prosperity of each other as well as the development of the nation and the individual.

Conflict Theory and Sociocultural Impact Before understanding the conflict theory, the basic view and insight is that the human beings are social but conflict prone animal. Communal conflicts have become a curse for society and community. Conflicts, engineered by politically motivated men and the brutalities happening in these riots are a shame for the nation. According to the conflict model, struggles between contending forces in the society and the source of social change, sees society as being composed of group pitted against group. Clashes of interest abound and contending forces struggle either to maintain power or grasp it. From the struggle comes change which is not only inevitable but also meritable. A society in conflict must be dynamic and the struggle for power results in the redistribution of power better reflecting the interests of the society’s members. Hobbes, Machiavelli created a cynical realism about the human society and their behavior in the realm of law and religious ideologies struggling for power, which serves the interests of parties for conflict in the materialistic world by threat and violence. Machiavelli also argues for a constructive conflict which is good for the society to enjoy the basic

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liberty and status in a political system. The basic conflict according to Marx is the economic sphere in the industrial societies where conflict between owners and nonowners are inevitable and such conflict ends in the creation of a new social order. According to Karl Marx “theory of stratification,” the private ownership of production and the exploitation of the masses by the few powerful member of the bourgeois’ class is the product of capitalism which predisposes them to conflict and crime. The so-called theory books emanating from the West provided a formal distinction between caste and class, as relevant for the understanding of social stratification. The creation of a complex social existence and consciousness based on a mixed class-caste syndrome was historically inherited and carefully nurtured. The nurturing of the caste/class system within the context of class-based economic exploitation meant that the lower orders of the hierarchy started losing such mitigating aspects of feudal patronage clienteles relations as existed, without gaining optimally from the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The Marxian legacy says that certain class-based, sociocultural tensions within society will always be prone to violence and thus ultimately provides the mechanism by which the sociocultural movements evolve and history proceeds down its teleological path. The ethological legacy says that violence is part and parcel of human-animal nature that expresses itself in the sociocultural idiom of expression for the instinctual. It is a social construct rather than what it attempts to overcome. It is neither a natural nor a necessarily avoidable feature of human being; violence is treated as a contingent phenomenon, instrumental in achieving certain goals. Weber’s theory of property conflict, adding another sphere of control in their own right, through the theory of organization and multiple class divisions in the society to control the material existence emphasizing fear and violence. A parallel view was created by Freud, Nietzche, and Durkheim says that man is not only a social animal but also emotional strong with solidarity which is used as a weapon if conflict arises. According to Merton’s Anomie theory, which is based on the values and norms on the basis of the

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social order in the society, the crime and conflict consist of acts which can break or depart from the shared norms and values and legitimacy in achieving ones goal without any discrepancy, because difference breeds contradictions and ends in conflict followed by crime. The collective behavior theory proposed by Smelser (1963) deals with mob, crowd, riots, and social movements with the intention to change the situation in a deliberate way, by mobilizing the masses with a pertinent social action for a period of time. The collective communal conflict might vary according to the circumstances from mild disapproval to violence, crime, and killing. The ethnic relations have generated several theoretical frameworks mainly based on majority–minority theory, in multiethnic societies, enthnocentricism due to monopoly, attitude of political, economic, social, environmental, and technological advantages in the society will generate the communal contradictions in different forms. In some cases, the inside-outside religious groups, dominant versus host groups can cause communal conflict based on the contradictions and confrontation with the dominant groups. The German sociologist probably the leading exponent of conflict theory emphasizes the unequal distribution of power in society. The new conflict theory analyses the transformation of new issues in national and international agenda such as the antagonism between urban and rural space that face threat to the environment thereby emphasizing that sustainable development and ultimately development options become unsustainable in the form of liberalization, privatization, globalization, in the environmental century. Apart from the conflict theory, there is theory of development, theory of civilization, theory of peace, and theory of common property resources. The perspective of communal conflict differs according to the very understanding, in most of the cases, and it is proved that exploitation of the masses is principally the root cause of the conflict which invariably ends in crime. It can be deduced the more the exploitation, the more the conflict, the more the poverty, the more the crime, which eventually proves the theory of relativity. Hence from the above theories we may say that the unequal advantage given to a segment of the population

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over the other is the seed for conflict and criminality. With displacement/dislocation of peoples from their original homes and lands, for the sake of economic/political/religious or regional/communal/class conflicts, lack of access to education, unclear boundaries, climate change and environmental factors, natural calamities like drought, as refugees, contribute largely to such disparate situations. After the two World Wars that resulted in the flushing out of Jews to several parts of the world, a case in point is the Syrians, the Rohingyas, the Tamil Sinhalese, and Africans have remapped the trajectory of people’s lives in search of sustenance, peace, food, and employment and that inadvertently fetch newer and fresh problems of existence.

Logics of Human Rights In the past 50 years, human rights have become one of the most globalized political values of our times. Within the human rights arena the right to life, adequate food, shelter, health care and education, privacy, ownership of property, poverty, freedom from slavery and genocide, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, religion, and assembly needs to be regarded as problems for sustainability. The nation-state have demanded the rights to their own sovereignty and their own judicial and political equality as such the rights of the citizens are internal and it is out with the prerogative of members of other states to intervene. To enjoy individual human rights requires community rights, individual rights cannot be exercised in isolation from the community, individual rights to join the trade unions or to enjoy their culture, for instance, necessitates rights to groups to preserve their culture. Even in laissezfaire Western democracy, individual rights are not absolute or immutable; they are balanced by the rights of others and by the interests of the society so that the freedom of expression and association are subjected to the maintenance of national security, public order, morals, etc.; in short, man loses the essential humanity from the community. There are 10 million stateless people around the world who have been denied a nationality and related

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rights. The third world peoples express themselves in nationalistic terms, for instance, in their third generation rights like collective assertions of the right to self-determination, to protection from genocide, human trafficking, sovereignty over natural resources, denial of environmental democracy for the socioeconomic development and peace and security which goes out of senses of group solidarity of various third world populations. In particular, the United Nations universal declaration of human rights of 1948 was a charter of the European, post enlightenment, liberal humanist and idealist, political philosophy which came to be formulated in the wake of the Second World War and the holocaust. It attempts to provide rational foundations for universal norms of justice and it is understood as part and parcel of the rise of capitalism – a means for individual profiteering companies and business entities to proceed unencumbered by communitarian obligations, traditional customs, or localized morality. In its application, the Western interferences of moral issues internal to other cultures the universal declaration had been responsible for a particular normative blindness towards indigenous peoples and their collective narratives of land ownership, political determination, livelihood, and so on, creating a socialist bias environment towards sustainable approach. The human rights are manifestations of liberalism as a modern political philosophy is to wish to replace the political pluralism of individual rights with the politics of common good as an emphasis of collective life and the supreme value of the social movement’s and community. In short, it is important today to appreciate the right of the individual citizen to his or her own civil freedoms against the sociocultural prejudices and against the language embodied in their self-expressions. Hence human rights have a universal relevance and resonance and their advocating a universal responsibility, in an interdependent economy of the world human rights represents a discourse offering standards of human dignity with possible procedures and implications of global governance establishing the sustainable development goals for which it was constructed. Indeed, it is extremely important to understand the connection between human

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rights and the public reasoning, especially in relation to the demand of justice. The fact that monitoring of violations of human rights and the process of naming and shaming can be so effective, in putting the perpetuators, violators in some form of public discussion with critical scrutiny acquiring serious public standing.

Human Development and SDG16 SDG 16 is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all and building institutions with accountability at all levels. SDG 16 is explicitly designed to address the conflict-affected regions and to resolve the issue through mitigation in a given circumstances. The people are more vulnerable to conflicts and they are bypassed and ignored in the name of growth, development, and progress of nations affecting the physical and mental well-being and disturbed sociocultural functioning of the community. Establishing and implementing the SDGs is a tough, complex, long-term exercise in terms of identifying conflict areas in a global community which requires a strong political will and support and changing mind set of peoples in a sociocultural confluence. The national and global institutions are to be more transparent and effective, including the local governance and judicial systems which are critical to the guarantee of human rights, law and order, and security. Today, around half the world’s people living on less than US$1.25 a day are in fragile states. It has been suggested that this could rise to 80% by 2025 (Kharas and Rogerson 2012). In addition, there are disparities existing within country in terms of equality, inequalities between countries in relation to the SDGs are also important issues to be addressed while ensuring progress is vital to achieve. A whole range of country-specific factors, such as social or communal-based tensions, political strife, geographic isolation, and ongoing environmental damage, hold back attempts to prosper is a bottleneck. In particular, the extent of “fragility” in many countries today is impeding poverty reduction and development progress. The human development has often been shown by its composite index, which basically has three key components,

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namely, longevity, knowledge, and standard of living. The composite index of HDI reveals many aspects of human conditions. Besides poverty, the human development is also reflected by some critical indicators like life expectancy, mortality, and morbidity. One of the most readily evident among such generalizations is the variations in the level of economic development within its range encountered in many third world countries has discernible relationship with variations in the incidence of communal conflicts between groups spatially or temporally. Another is the impact of mass poverty in its diverse exemplifications found in all major situations of violent conflicts witnessed within the national units of the region during the past 50 years. Thirdly, it is equally clear that this impact has seldom taken the form of misery, despair, and desperation into collective violence. The minority community is perceived as fanatical and highly communal for stressing primordial identity, and the situation goes on getting more and more communalized threatening the unity and integrity of the nations. Thus, it is seen that ethnic or communal conflict is a politico-economic phenomenon at global level. It becomes aggravated by various organizations and movements whenever a structural shift takes place among one group or community. The community which loses emphasizes its identity in the society in order to mobilize the entire community to fight for justice and the community which has usurped all and most of the benefits tries to cling to them by mobilizing other members through stressing its identity, hence the ethnic or communal conflict spreads and gets sharpened and sometimes remain unresolved making conflict inevitable and violence appears to be unavoidable (Asghar Ali Engineer 1989). Most of the time, the conflict cannot be solved, it cannot be transformed to be constructive rather than destructive unless and until the three important factors are solved at the same time, namely, attitude, behavior, and contradictions.

Concluding Comments The first step to fulfilling any aspect of the global sustainable development agenda begin by restoring security and human rights to individuals

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whose very lives and basic freedoms are under threat either due to direct violence or through institutional restrictions to justice. If individual needs are taken care of, then the society at large is also taken care of and vice versa. SDG is truly people centric-approach with down-top involvement taking relevant stakeholders’ with active participation in the modern civil society. Without peace, there is no sustainable development and all nations should ensure good governance, social inclusion, and to condemn with authority elements of social and communal conflict. The civil societies must ensure that their governments are actively engaging the people in the action plan on SDG through designing, implementing through agency with adequate transparency and accountability at all levels and at every levels of implementation through equitable approach and inclusiveness so as to make sure that no individual is left behind, in an inclusive participatory mode to create a sustainable world. The very ambition of the agenda is to stimulate sustainable development with commitment and accountability of all nations. For example, the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) is the only international network of parliamentarians focused solely on combating corruption, is a whistle-blower which invokes joint anti-corruption advocacy. The members represent more than 50 countries in all regions of the world. They are current and former legislators who collaborate on a nonpartisan basis. GOPAC explicitly recognizes the value of civil society partnership, committing to achieve accountability and transparency through effective anti-corruption mechanisms and inclusive participation and cooperation between parliamentarians, government, and civil society. The GOPAC’s Participation of Society Global Task Force (GTF-PoS) highlights the importance of parliamentarians engaging with their constituents and working collaboratively with civil society to raise awareness of corruption issues and lobby for legislative and administrative changes aimed at combating corruption which was highly successful in Latin America, Argentina, and Canada. Development is invariably a form of change but not all forms of change can be termed as development. There are forms of

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change that may disadvantage communities and thus lead not to development, but to deprivation. The community goes not on to a higher level of well-being but to a lower level. This is the process of change that leads to deprivation where dispossession, for instance, ends up with the community conflicts or its members being at a lower level of well-being compared to their state before the process of change. In the language of social exclusion, this is a process of adverse inclusion, an inclusion that has largely negative results when compared to the state of exclusion. Communal hatred is further escalated due to partisan propaganda by political parties, the mass media, and various other organizations perpetuating violence. More research is required, because the neglect of agriculture and rural populations can thus become socially and politically perilous. Hence communal conflict is part of a struggle to capture control over resources of power economic, political, social, illiterate, and tradition bound masses are exploited by few individuals to gain dominance over resources. The emergence of political culture of corruption and criminalization of politics may also affect the credibility of democracy and its system. More studies are required whether policies favoring the minorities and the disadvantage and depressed groups have played the counter role of subverting secularism and promoting casteism and communalism and civil society organizations deserves prior attention. The following areas need careful empirical investigation like criminalization of politics, role of communication in crisis situation of caste clashes, politicization of caste affecting the functioning of democracy, the content analysis of election manifestos of various political parties, the impact of economic development, and rural power structure. There is an intricate relationship between urbanization and communalism and sustainable development among nations. It has to be understood that communal violence and the politics of communalism and the economic growth might be peculiar but it is manifested at every stage. There is communal violence in response to the reaction against the policies and break down of the system and the inability of the ruling group to control or to create one which can accommodate the aspirations of all

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the citizens. There is violence every day in the private sphere of the home or within the family and this is becoming a lasting phenomenon in the form of harassment by the self-styled leaders. Both men and women become the victims and violence against women is even more worse. All of them suffer from some sort of social myopia/ state hegemony at every level, which often leads us to recognize some manifestations of violence, but makes us indifferent to various other sociopolitical and economic actions that indirectly violate our democratic and fundamental rights. The units of the society not only functions properly but sometimes dysfunctions and disorganized as well thereby creating instability in the community. Nevertheless, one can see the logical interdependence of conflict and regional development. The successful development of education, health care, sustainable livelihood, law and order, good governance, infrastructure for all, and social security considered to be the important parameters to make the nations conflict-free.The development should be sustainable at every level through long-term plans empowering the civil society through gender equality with less challenges and abundant opportunities taking into account the social, economic, political, technological, environmental, and cultural factors for the overall human development of the nations. The entire globe is interconnected through various networks constituting societies and communities, hence the contradictions will occur at any moment incessantly and is considered to be illogical, illegal, crude, and aberrant to social harmony, and we have to admit the very fact that communal conflict is inevitable and we can make sure that not all conflicts can be managed and resolved instantly unless the government has a strong policy to tackle the issue at the right time.

Key Issues/Challenges Measuring the progress towards achieving the proposed SDG and targets is a problematic and challenging one but there is a wealth of governance related data produced both by multilateral organizations and NGOs. The data does not

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suggest positive long-term trends on individual areas within the goal, to promote and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development in most of the countries especially sub-Sahara, Latin-America, Asia-pacific nations. There are also a significant number of countries that remain a substantial distance away from achieving the overall goal, from institutional violence of unaccountable judicial and legal forms, depriving fundamental and human rights. The data and indicators for measuring effective, accountable, and transparent institutions reflect people’s actual perceptions and experiences will be critical to achieve the target. With global warming, the natural resources are fast depleting while on the other hand there is population explosion and human settlements colonizing, encroaching upon the living spaces of other life forms on the planet. These issues too inadvertently add to the problems of sustainable development on the whole. Only the human community can take pride in a conscious reasoning of matters with its capacity to think and act. Therefore, it is about time that this species puts its act together to take up challenges both manmade and natural towards the general sustenance of life on earth.

Future Directions The identified universal challenges of SDGs 16, and 2030 agenda as a whole require prioritization, scaled up efforts, or shifts in approaches include: (i) strengthening institutions and macro-stability; (ii) delivering services to foster social inclusion; (iii) promoting livelihoods, markets, and sustainable private sector development; (iv) mitigating the impact of climate change and supporting fair access to natural resources; and (v) promoting equity, socioeconomic inclusion, and access to justice. Furthermore, improving data, evidence, and monitoring is of paramount importance to effectively measure progress and design more tailored interventions. Hence by strengthening global governance, promoting human rights, effective local governance, law and order, social security, reducing corruption and bribes, decisionmaking at every level and at all levels with social

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inclusion, combating terrorism and crime against women and children, realistic budgets, transparent and inclusive institutions, timely judgements, providing legal identity at global level, reducing illicit flow of arms and finance, combating organized crime, avoiding political instability, poverty and insecurity, ensuring opportunity for all, protecting fundamental freedoms, access to justice can lead to sustainable development and put an end to violence and post-conflicts risks. The influence of the above thinking of communal conflict and SDG has been enormously widespread, commits to promoting over all development in a balanced way, economically, politically, socially, and environmentally, through institutions in all countries of the world, leaving no one behind.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16 ▶ Environmental Democracy for a Just and Peaceful Society ▶ Ethnic Conflict and the UN Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Human Trafficking ▶ Mass Atrocities: Definition and Relationship with Development ▶ Political Pluralism to Address the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Political Unrest: Factors and Impact ▶ Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace

References Basu A, Kohli A (1998) Community conflicts and the state in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp 3–7, 1989 Engineer AA (1989) Communalism, and communal violence in India. An analytical approach to Hindu-Muslim conflict. Ajanta Publications, New Delhi, pp 36–49 Kharas H, Rogerson A (2012) Horizon 2025: creative destruction in the aid industry. Overseas Development Institute, London

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100 Kreimer A, Eriksson J, Muskat R, Arnold M, Scott C (1998) The World Bank’s experience with conflict reconstruction. World Bank, Washington, DC Smelser N (1963) Theory of collective behaviour. The Free Press, New York

Communication for Development ▶ Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

Communication for Peace ▶ Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry Eloísa Nos Aldás, Alessandra Farné and Tamer Al Najjar Trujillo University Jaume I, Castellón, Spain

Synonyms Communication for development; Communication for peace; Communication for social change

Definitions Communication, peaceful social change, and global citizenry synthesize a communication model that combines individual and collective responsibilities that aim to denounce situations of direct, structural, and cultural violence. This model sets goals and criteria grounded in peace, social justice, equality, and human rights to transgress and transform all types of violence and promote social, political, and economic contexts of inclusive diversity that can

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develop into peace cultures. This approach to communication examines the cultural consequences, responsibilities and potential of narrative processes (the performativity of language) centered on cultural efficacy, and advocacy and accountability parameters to attain peaceful societies.

Introduction The adoption of the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) by the United Nations (UN) in 2015 represents a universal call to action involving multiple international actors for the purpose of eradicating poverty, improving living conditions and promoting peace. This entry provides a theoretical overview of the contributions of scholars and practitioners who highlight the importance of a transformative, educational, and emancipatory communication by different social actors to establish the main lines of action for the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. This communicative model involves the coordination of actors and strategies, both short and long term, cross-cutting actions, and discourses to build social, cultural, and political settings based on the criteria of peace, equality, social justice, and human rights. Specifically, this entails a contribution to the objectives set out in SDG 16, “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions,” given that the proposed theoretical framework is grounded in communication for peace and communication for social change, and includes a systematization of different strategies and experiences from a variety of social issuers, mainly institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or social movements, aimed at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. Specifically, communication for peaceful social change and global citizenry contributes to the achievement of specific SDG 16 objectives, particularly 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence; 16.6: Develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels; 16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels; 16.8: Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the

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institutions of global governance; 16.10: Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements, and 16.B: Promote and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development. This chapter is organized in four sections. First, “Culture and Communication for Peace” reviews the theoretical trajectory of peace research, with the definitions of different types of violence existing in societies and the role of communication in promoting peace. Particularly relevant are the cultural and symbolic aspects of peace because, as the preamble to UNESCO’s constitution states “Since wars begin in the minds of men and women, it is in the minds of men and women that the defenses of peace must be constructed” (UNESCO 1945). Second, “Communication for Development and Communication for Social Change” addresses the field of communication for development and its evolution in the past decades towards communication for social change. It reviews dominant approaches as well as alternative proposals and critical perspectives from the third sector, which is one of the leading actors in social dialogue and the implementation of actions aimed at improving people’s living conditions. Third, “Civil Society, Activism, and Communicative Action for Peace” stresses the role of communication in the actions and objectives of different actors in civil society to work for SDGs beyond projectbased logics. Fourth, “Transgressive Communication for Peaceful Social Change” reviews scholarly and practitioner proposals for new communicative criteria aimed at transgressing and transforming prejudicial discourse and producing alternative discourses to eradicate any type of violence. An approach based on cultural efficacy and transformation contributes to building imaginaries of new social, cultural, and political realities based on peace, social justice, solidarity, and intersectionality. The “conclusion” discusses the role of communication in contributing to the construction of alternatives that empower global citizenry towards a fair, peaceful, and sustainable future, in accordance with the 2030 Agenda.

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Culture and Communication for Peace Peace research consolidated as a discipline after World War II, and since then it has focused on the analysis of all situations that generate suffering to humans, and the study of proposals to eradicate violence (Wallensteen 2011; Young 2010). This approach is aligned to the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, which states that “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development” (United Nations 2015: 2). Theoretical contributions from peace research aim to understand peace, discuss the necessary conditions for building peaceful societies and training people in peace studies, and the necessary starting point is the study of all types of violence and its features in order to propose transformative actions towards peace. Johan Galtung, considered the founding father of peace research, fostered a thorough analysis on violence, concluding that to achieve peaceful societies it is also necessary to understand and tackle cultural and symbolic aspects (such as discourses) that legitimize and justify situations of direct violence (deprivation of life) and structural violence (poor living conditions such as deficient access to water or health care). Thus, these three types of violence are interrelated and conform a “triangle of violence,” in which “direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and down; cultural violence is an invariant, a permanence” (Galtung 1990: 294). This author also indicates that “the major causal direction for violence is from cultural via structural to direct violence” (Galtung 1996: 2). Recognizing the different types of violent situations is essential for determining possible peaceful alternatives, including the cultural sphere. The concept of peace has evolved over time, in line with historical and socio-political changes. Initially, peace was conceived as the mere absence of war (negative peace). The consolidation of peace research helped to dislodge this conception, with the understanding that the negation of direct violence must be accompanied by development and social justice to satisfy basic human needs (positive peace). Since the 1990s the concept of

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peace has undergone an epistemological reconstruction, addressing the issue of cultural violence and the need to transform it (peace culture). The study of the cultural aspects of peace, known as peace culture or culture of peace, enables discussion on the profound, long-term transformations that promote intercultural dialogue and nonviolence, stressing the role of cultivating human interactions to achieve societies free from violence (Martínez Guzmán 2006; Reardon 2001). Elise Boulding (2008), considered the mother of peace research, discarded a static approach to peace and conceived it as a process of ongoing changes and evolution comprising lifestyles, behaviors, and values that promote peaceful diversity, mutual care, equality, recognition of differences, and respect for the environment. These scholarly contributions impacted at the institutional and international level, such as in the UN Program of Action on a Culture of Peace, which emphasized the role of culture in eradicating all types of violence, inequality and injustice by protecting human rights, promoting equality between men and women, ensuring access to education, and guaranteeing freedom of expression, among others (United Nations 1999). All the peace culture contributions connect to, and reinforce, objectives set out in the 2030 Agenda, such as SDG 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence; 5.1: End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere, and, 1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty among all people everywhere. Peace culture is related to cultural and communication studies, given the significant role of symbolic and cultural aspects in configuring societies, and scholars dedicated to peace communication have focused on the role of communication in delegitimizing violence, and on those narrative features that best contribute to imagining and building alternatives based on peace and social justice (Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015). Different theoretical perspectives conceive communication as a social practice and a product influenced by different contexts (Fairclough 1989; Hall 1997). Therefore, the subject of communication necessarily involves reference to the configuration of individual, group, and

institutional relationships: “a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization take place” (Habermas 1987: 86). These communicative relations act as social and cultural mediators (van Dijk 2001), and the discursive aspects play an important role in configuring realities and interlocution among different social actors. Therefore, the analysis of discourses (Cobley 2008) addresses their sociocultural implications, their contextual effects, and the values, attitudes, and meaning that they convey. Language (and so, any discourse) is performative (Austin 1976), which means that communication is an action, and every communicative act has consequences. The way in which reality is expressed, represented, and framed affects how people think and conceive things, because frames are mental structures that shape our way of interpreting the world (Lakoff 2004). Some content may keep fostering cultural violence (for instance, stereotypes and prejudices), however, communication also entails dialogue, denouncing oppression, contextualizing events, and promoting transformation based on social justice criteria (Nos Aldás and Pinazo 2013) and nonviolence. In fact, following the principle and lesson of Peace by peaceful means (Galtung 1996), communication for peace must be grounded in, and promote, nonviolence (Nos Aldás 2013). In this regard, peace research highlights the role of the media as actors that can promote discourses oriented towards peace with different content, including peace journalism (Roberts 2012), which is a way of covering war or other conflict news by focusing on the possibility of peaceful transformation. For instance, concern about hate speech prompted the UN to stress the importance of elaborating narratives that promote “respect for human rights, nondiscrimination, tolerance and understanding of other cultures and religions, as well as gender equality” (United Nations 2019: 4), which could help to overcome a culture of fear (Chomsky 1996). Consequently, building a peace culture means confronting the cultural responsibility and commitment embedded in each communicative action, by promoting discursive strategies that foster equality and inclusive diversity.

Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

Communication for Development and Communication for Social Change Communication promotes discourses and, therefore, plays an essential role in society and its development. In the 1970s, several countries encouraged reflection on a New World Information and Communication Order, which was embraced by UNESCO and articulated in the report on the importance of communication and media for global development (MacBride 1980). Communication for Development (C4D) is an established field of study and practice, dedicated to exploring the role of communication in promoting development. It is a heterogeneous field closely linked to the evolution of different conceptions and approaches to development (Lancaster and Van de Walle 2018). The dominant paradigm of development emerged in the post– World War II era of the 1950s and 1960s, and consolidated around the goal of economic growth and the belief that this would bring “development” and modernization to “underdeveloped” countries. This economic growth approach is built on the principles of industrialization, capital-intensive technology, and quantification, particularly in measuring each country’s GDP (gross domestic product), which generated criticism, specially due to its ethnocentric (Western) view, its lack of attention to the causes of problems, and the macro, centralized focus that neglected local communities. Alternative paths for a new development drew attention to equality of distribution, concern for quality of life, integration of traditional and modern systems, more labor-intensive technology, self-reliance, popular participation and decentralization, and a focus on internal and external causes (Rogers 1976: 224). Despite these reflections, the traditional paradigm of development and its communication continued to be the dominant discourse throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. For instance, initial attempts to monitor international development by shifting away from a single measurement (income) to a more people-centered politics was only introduced by the United Nations Development Program (1990) in its first Human Development Report. In parallel, an increasing awareness

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of sustainability led the UN to consider the need for sustainable development, from its Conference on Environment and Development (United Nations 1992). Concurrent to the evolution of the concept of development, with proposals grounded in postcolonial, post-development, and gender perspectives (Klein and Morreo 2019; Parpart et al. 2000), was growing criticism of a dominant C4D, which focused on transmitting information from governments to the public in a top-down hierarchical way, with critics advocating the need to rethink the role of communication on development. Recent years have seen the consolidation of alternative proposals, which included the need to embrace regional perspectives from Africa and Asia (Servaes 2013), and particularly with the contribution from Latin America, with its cultural and participatory “communicology” (Martín Barbero 2008; Aguirre Alvis 2019). Contributions to the rethinking of C4D have also come from Education for Development (Skinner et al. 2013) and the third sector, in particular nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs). A reference point in this field is the Finding Frames (Darnton and Kirk 2011) report on the role of communicative frames in engaging people in social causes and the eradication of global poverty. This study demonstrates how the frames used in the dominant discourse on development not only convey the asymmetrical roles of a superior savior of a passive, incapable receiver, but also fail to engage the public in social causes by implying that poverty is inevitable. The study proposes positive frames that could be used in C4D to engage citizens for change based on more horizontal relationships and collaborations for justice (Table 1). Similarly, a joint network of Journalists and Communicators for Development from the North and South advanced a Vademecum for responsible international information (DevReporter 2016) that presents criteria and recommendations for communicative output on international cooperation and development. It addresses the need for media professionals to offer accurate, intelligible, and quality-driven international information, for which it provides some guidelines:

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Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry Current (negative) frame Charity Charities Aid Development Corruption, aid effectiveness Communications Campaigns

Alternative (positive) frames Justice, fairness Movements, NGOs Mutual support, partnership Well-being, freedom, responsibility Good/bad governance, fraud Conversations Engagements, dialogues

Source: Darnton and Kirk 2011: 94

• Enhance collaboration between journalists and NGO practitioners to garner information from the field, with a global perspective and emphasis on solidarity, common problems, and the commitment of citizens in all their diversity • Strike a balance between actors and voices from the North and South to understand all perspectives • Present the complexities of situations, explain the causes and context of problems, and follow up on events and situations to avoid the monopoly of emergencies and disasters • Make all possible solutions more visible, and emphasize the active role that people can play Another relevant third sector contribution to the renewal of C4D is the work of the Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations (Dóchas) through its code of conduct on images and messages; this group has produced an Illustrative Guide (Dóchas 2014) with examples of how to effectively communicate messages (not only in text, but also through the use of images) based on principles of respect, equality, solidarity and justice, and avoiding a subjugated, stereotyped view of people. These perspectives have boosted the shift away from traditional C4D, often criticized for its proximity to the dominant paradigm of development and its instrumental and project-based logic, towards more recent approaches on communication for social change (CSC) whose focus is on the potential of collaborative processes to overturn injustice and inequality (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006; Thomas and Van de Fliert 2015; Servaes 2019). The UN has acknowledged CSC as a relevant concept and a field of enquiry that

can enhance the efficacy of its own international actions to achieve sustainable long-term transformations, as CSC “is guided by principles of tolerance, self-determination, equity, social justice and active participation” (United Nations Development Programme 2011: 7). Hence, a first step towards a critical global citizenry committed to SDG dialogues between the evolving communicative tradition based on sustainable and eco-social criteria, including epistemologies from the South (de Sousa Santos 2016), and a global citizenship education that forms part of the last trends of development education (Bourn 2020; UNESCO 2017) aimed at understanding the deep, interconnected causes of inequalities and discriminatory processes. Overall, the critical perspectives of, and work carried out in, the field of C4D are focused on detecting successful transformative discourses that can imagine and build better realities (Rodríguez 2017; Tufte 2017). This transformative C4D approach intersects with communication for social change, which promotes a more cultural, participatory focus on social actors, structural changes and the role of media, and cultural production in order to engage people in the transformation of injustice.

Civil Society, Activism, and Communicative Action for Peace The role of communication in the reaching SDGs is, therefore, linked to the communicative tradition that emerges in NGDO research and in recent civil society activism and its creative, transformative, communication actions (Boyd and Mitchell 2012; Jenkins et al. 2020). At present, this reality

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relates closely to multilayer communication and the creative contributions of citizen’s technopolitical experiences (Toret and Calleja 2014) in hybrid and transmedia scenarios (Treré 2018). The design of communication scenarios for the 2030 Agenda requires an awareness of which actors work specifically towards SDGs and of their dependence on communicative processes; but it also needs to draw attention to how all the social actors are involved in the potential success of SDGs within a cross-cutting panorama. A global citizenry approach also encompasses companies that can be defined by their citizenry role, for instance, or commercial advertising that displays awareness of its promoter’s social and cultural responsibilities in its representations and stated commitments (the performativity of its discourse). Communication for peaceful social change and global citizenry seeks to strengthen a peaceful and sustainable society, which involves action by social, economic, and political structures, and engagement and capacity-building for social justice on the part of all social actors (governments, political parties, and voters; NGOs, trade unions, associations, and sponsors; companies and consumers; and international institutions and citizens). It also involves denouncing structural violence within these contexts, and calling out the root causes of the problems the world faces, pressing other actors to take just and coherent actions in line with SDGs, and applying SDG proposals and encouraging the necessary transformations associated to them. Therefore, organizational communication, strategic communication, and advocacy communication – in the broad sense, as presented in Fig. 1 (Cohen 2001: 178; Wilkins 2014) – are a central part of this chapter. In other words, communication that can effectively enhance SDGs needs to adopt an integrative, dialogic approach in which not only communicative actions themselves but also education, legislation, social economy, or direct political action and political decisions require strategic cooperation in order to achieve these goals. Communication is responsible for providing informal education, as people get as much education (information, knowledge, and

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wisdom) in their daily life contexts (the family, the media, entertainment, etc.) as they do in formal or nonformal educational contexts (Fig. 2). The most prominent collective, strategic communication goals and main lines of action undertaken by civil society actors working towards peace, social justice, and SDGs are: • Broadening the number of people and groups concerned about these issues, networking, and linking private interests to collective ones • Making these goals and issues interesting and relevant to those who decline to get involved in these causes, and to the broader public, by raising people’s ethical sensitivity (Pinazo and Nos Aldás 2016) • The importance of information and media literacy (Hobbs and Mihailidis 2019) developed from the fields of communication and education • “Re-imagining change” as the path for transformation through “social movement building” (Reinsborough and Canning 2017) using new frames and narrative power These communication scenarios involve all kinds of social actors with their individual idiosyncrasies that need to assume the SDGs in order to make them possible. Such actors include states, markets, third-sector organizations (structured civil society), nonstructured civil society actors, and social movements, all of whom can be defined as the main variables operating within the machinery of social relations and sustainable development. As extensions of these agents, two other actors to be considered are, first, international organizations such as the UN and UNESCO, or the International Court of Justice, as mechanisms devised by states for global action; the official offices created by such organizations work on social justice and peace cultures as mediators between governments and civil actors, but depend on the states. And, second, another piece in this puzzle are the media (mass and social) that respond to either a market actor, a state actor, a third-sector actor, or a civil society platform depending on their funding, structures, and goals (Guedes Bailey et al. 2008).

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Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry, Fig. 1 Actors and elements of SDG communication scenarios. (Source: Authors)

Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry, Fig. 2 Strategic and advocacy communication for SDGs. (Source: Authors)

Social movements and the third sector have provided the main case studies that define the paradigm of communication and sustainable development. These two sectors share goals but

not structures, with all their potential and limitations. Both originate in civil society with the aim of fulfilling collective goals. Social movements, described as “society in movement” (Alfaro

Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

Moreno 2006), are characterized by remaining spontaneous and flexible while the third sector consists of “voluntary, non-for-profit citizens’ groups organized at local, national or international level” to address issues in support of the public good, and which are independent of any government (UN 2004 cited in Powell and Steinberg 2006: 335). They are organizations with a fixed structure that need to be fed and maintained. A fundamental feature of their existence is to pressure the state and the market to accept their social responsibilities. Currently, many NGDOs are in the process of redefining themselves as global justice organizations to overcome the limitations of the traditional paradigm of development and, as discussed in the section above, they are largely seen as one of the most representative third-sector actors in promoting understanding of the problems of communicative efficacy in international cooperation. One of the main paradoxes and tensions within NGDO communication is maintaining coherence between fundraising and recruitment challenges and its advocacy and transformational and educational goals. As presented in section “Communication for Development and Communication for Social Change,” NGDO communication has traditionally relied on donor scenarios associated with charity frames, while recent studies indicate that protest scenarios and political and collective justice frames are a more suitable way to engage society to push for transformation (Pinazo and Nos Aldás 2016). This assessment relies on the communicative personality of these organizations (their reason for being, and their short- and long-term responsibilities, linked to a deep transformation of direct, structural, and cultural violence). The preponderance of their organizational structures and funding models has been indicated as enabling, or complicating, their ability to achieve their cultural and transformative goals. Internal communication is seen as key to achieving cross-cutting communication, which requires a more horizontal, cooperative relations with stakeholders and partners. Therefore, organizational and strategic communication requires specific working criteria in this sector to plan, produce, and assess the cultural efficacy of their communication (in terms of

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collective goals) and cultural efficiency (regarding the political and cultural consequences of their communicative actions even when their goals are private). This means that consistency is essential in every communicative decision taken that strives to political transformation (Nos Aldás 2013). One area cited as a resolution of these problems arising from the organizations’ own networks and coordinating committees is a social and solidarity economy, which now represents one of the most effective frameworks for fair and sustainable transformation. In fact, platforms, networks, and global actions implemented in collaboration with similar or dissimilar actors have to be included also as key actors in these communication scenarios, to acquire influence and resolve the complexity of collective goals and the limitations of private needs. In conclusion, the challenge of a nonviolent, transformative communication implies an understanding of communication that develops processes of awareness of interdependencies, agency, possibility, and engagement for a global citizenry from collective and culturally resonant action frames (Benford and Snow 2000). This communication aims not only to stage protests but also to achieve appropriate representation and recognition for all the different social and cultural groups, and to present proposals and strengthen economic, political, educational, and cultural structures for global social justice.

Transgressive Communication for Peaceful Social Change This theoretical overview allows us to understand the importance of communicative processes on a cultural, political, and educational level in order to transform situations of violence, inequality, or injustice. The field of critical studies in communication for social change has played an important role in incorporating a reflective view of different realities to propose transformative and constructive narrative criteria to establish new communicative paradigms that are more inclusive, pluralistic, and participatory. This involves understanding communicative processes as tools for

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transformation to eradicate all structures that generate violence. Social change requires new mental and action frames and, therefore, new language that enables us to rethink “the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions” (Lakoff 2004: 4). Therefore, CSC with peaceful goals aims to alter and transgress all dominant frames that legitimate an unjust social order and behavior that generate inequalities, hence, the concept of transgressive communication (hooks 1994) as a critical transformative communication based on a collective exercise of freedom and creativity with peaceful but subversive aims. Transgressive communication for social change explores which narrative criteria provide greater cultural consensus to achieve peaceful societies and strengthen civil society in the pursuit of social justice, presenting alternatives from local to global level. For instance, some studies (Mesa et al. 2013) indicate the need to incorporate values in narratives and discourses for peaceful change: inclusive (such as solidarity and care), universal (dialogue and diversity), and emancipatory (freedom, resistance, and hope) values. This approach requires the evaluation of the consequences of any discourse through a cultural efficacy approach (Bosch 2012), which takes into account the relevance of cultural variables in all communicative actions to anticipate and avoid any possible violence that hinders the transformation of cultural and symbolic elements counterproductive to peace. Therefore, cultural efficacy “can be seen as the goal for those discourses that arise from social and collective aims and have social education as their final and unique aim” (Nos Aldás 2013: 100). Referring back to peace research and communication for peace presented in section “Culture and Communication for Peace” a first step in the transgression and transformation of violent narratives lies in recognizing successful peace actions that emphasize the potential of nonviolent change carried out by a variety of actors, such as social movements and communities (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). The importance of making peace more visible from different media settings is also outlined in the measuring peace report that analyzed 164,000 international news items and

concluded “that stories related to violence do get the most coverage” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2011: 37). Recent studies on violent media content also suggest exploring transformative, communicative actions through the implementation of critical counter-narratives (Poole et al. 2019), particularly when discourses imbued with hatred and racism endanger principles of human rights. Chouliaraki (2013) argues that in media content it is necessary to continue to incorporate narratives and frames connected to human rights, social justice, cosmopolitanism, interculturality, and hospitality in order to address solidarity in a cross-cutting way. These discursive features are the basis of a transgressive communication for peaceful social change, and they engage with other concepts. On the one hand, ethical witnessing (Oliver 2004) addresses the discursive potential of witnessing: the content of testimonies, the relationship between testimony and witnessing, the narrative on vulnerability and resistance, and the connection of a specific claim to the broad context of structural inequality and collective action to transform it. This approach to the protagonist voices is “a guarantee of political positioning and of recognition of the processes of secondary victimization that are prompted in the frameworks of institutional action and, therefore, allow their reprocessing as transformative proposals” (Gámez Fuentes et al. 2016: 841). On the other hand, the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 2011) helps to envisage the different facets and overlapping of inequality and discrimination, addressing the intersections of different categories connected to the system of oppression and privilege (gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and origin, among others). Therefore, transgressive communication for peaceful social change requires an intersectional perspective to understand the structure of inequalities in a deep and comprehensive way in order to propose discourses aimed at transforming the situation. All these scholarly perspectives, along with the contributions mentioned in section “Communication for Development and Communication for Social Change” on the critical proposals from

Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

communication for social change, and in section “Civil Society, Activism and Communicative Action for Peace” on peaceful communicative actions from civil society, contribute to the construction of communicative frames and narratives that enhance the transgression and transformation of violence. Overall, transgressive communication for peaceful social change is underpinned by the following criteria: • To overcome discourse based on confrontation, aggression, or militarism, it is necessary to produce an alternative narrative based on peace culture to address social, political, or economic problems through principles of nonviolence, human rights, humanitarianism, and the ethics of care. • Confronting and transgressing discourses of fear can be achieved by communicative actions based on a culture of solidarity, making visible successful cases of hospitality and coexistence in diversity. For instance, online communicative initiatives such as #RefugeesWelcome or #WeAreMore advocate structural and political change based on solidarity, hospitality, and peaceful coexistence. • To transform frames that hinder peaceful social change, such as those related to cultural violence, it is necessary to promote narratives based on empathy and inclusive, universal, and emancipatory values, like dialogue, hope, creativity, and resilience.

Conclusions Every communicative action has the capacity to sustain or ignite situations of violence or injustice, but also the potential to facilitate peace and social change. The paradigm of transgressive communication for peaceful social change presented here reveals how symbolic elements can contribute to transforming violence from its cultural and symbolic basis, which is also effective on the structural and direct level. This chapter has reviewed a series of criteria to analyze and assess the cultural consequences of communicative actions. They point to the importance of discourses, their effects,

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and the representations and values they share on certain realities. The model suggests discourse and narratives that follow criteria of peace and social justice imbued with inclusive, universal, and emancipatory values, such as freedom, creativity, resilience, solidarity, hope, or nonviolence, which contribute to the transgression and transformation of cultural violence. In this way, communication acts as a tool, a space and a process of transformation with social and educational aims connected to the SDGs, to enable the construction of a more peaceful and inclusive world, and “significantly reduce all forms of violence” (SDG 16.1). The participation and interaction of multiple actors – such as institutions, NGOs, companies or the media – are key factors in the transformation of social problems from their roots, appealing to the social responsibility of all citizens. To implement communicative actions for a strong global citizenry committed to transforming injustice and inequality, it is necessary to determine which narrative criteria are more culturally efficient. Such criteria need to resonate culturally, that is, connecting with the shared values of a broader contemporary audience, and reducing levels of social tension and polarization to generate agreements among all actors in order to promote change towards peace and nonviolence. The peaceful transformation of all current violent situations, of inequality and injustice, requires transgressive communicative models that give greater visibility to potential and successful actions of social change, recovering the voices of those who have been silenced or marginalized, explaining the deep causes and complexities of the system of oppression and exclusion and, ultimately, educating in peace culture. The power of these transgressive narratives emphasizes the importance of setting goals and actions for sustainable development that are closely connected to peace: imagine and communicate other possible, nonviolent worlds in order to keep building peace in the minds of people. The pursuit of these transformative discourses has a direct impact on achieving the objectives set out in SDG 16: Promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies.

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Cross-References ▶ Emotional Intelligence and the Sustainable Development Goals: Supporting Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies ▶ Grassroots Political Movement to Achieve SDGs in Developing Countries ▶ Peace Education: History, Features, and Effectiveness ▶ Peace Journalism and Sustainable Development ▶ Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development Acknowledgments This work is supported by the R+D Project “Social digital education” (PGC2018-095123-BI00), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (2019-2021), and “Communication for Social Change and Media Education to stand up to hate speech on gender and immigration, through the analysis of public discourses in Spain between 2016-2019” (UJI-B2019-13), Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain.

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Communication for Social Change ▶ Communication for Peaceful Social Change and Global Citizenry

Community Circles ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

Community Conferencing ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

Community Leadership ▶ Local Leadership: Types and Functions

Communication for Social Change

Compensation ▶ “Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

Conflict Bargaining and Resolution Strategies Carmen Amado Mendes School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal

Definition of Conflict Bargaining and Conflict Resolution In order to understand the meaning behind conflict bargaining and conflict resolution it is vital to have a clear notion of what is conflict. Conflict can be defined as a clash of opposing forces that typically originates from contrasting ideas, interests, or needs. This means that conflict materializes in situations where there are incompatibilities between two or more parties (Lawler and Ford 1995). It is possible to identify five distinctive types of conflicts: conflicts resulting from relations between people; conflicts originating due to information problems; conflicts caused by interests; structural conflicts; and conflicts over values (Al-Rawashdeh and Al-Majali 2017). The concepts of conflict bargaining and conflict resolution are closely linked to each other, which might contribute to the notion that there is little distinction, or none at all, between the two. Although the two concepts can be used interchangeably, it is crucial to distinguish them since conflict bargaining is but one of the methods that conflict resolution encompasses. Conflict resolution encompasses all the methods, strategies, or processes that contribute to the end of a conflict through the increase of cooperation and the establishment of positive stances (Tulane University 2001). Typically, resolution strategies include bargaining, mediation, arbitration, and litigation. Conflict bargaining, also known as negotiation,

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can be described as the process of discussing the terms and conditions of an exchange in order to reach a decision accepted by all the parties involved in the conflict (Tulane University 2001).

Framework on Conflict Resolution Conflict has always been a main element of human life which means that, consequently, conflict and conflict resolution have always been the focus of research and investigation in a wide range of disciplines such as history, economics, law, political science, and international relations. Nevertheless, most researchers consider that the focus on conflict and conflict resolution as a specific study field emerged only in the 1950s due to the consequences of two world wars and the increased confrontation between the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Distinction Between Dispute Settlement, Conflict Management, and Conflict Resolution As a way of understanding clearly the concept of conflict resolution and in order to formulate efficient methods to solve ongoing conflicts, it is essential to distinguish between conflict resolution and two other concepts that are very closely linked to it: dispute settlement and conflict management. According to the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution (1997), conflict resolution can be defined as “a relatively stable resolution of a deeprooted conflict that is obtained by identifying sources of that conflict (usually fundamental human needs or value differences) and then instituting socioeconomic and/or political changes that allow the values or needs of all sides to be met simultaneously.” While conflict resolution tends to be directed towards long-standing conflicts with serious consequences, dispute settlement is generally applied on conflictual situations that derive from divergences of interests or values (Burgess and Burgess 1997). Lastly, and as stated by Burgess and Burgess (1997), the main purpose of conflict management is not the resolution of the conflict per se, but the supervision of the conflict with the objective of making it less damaging and more manageable.

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The Evolution of the Conflict Resolution Field of Study It should be taken into consideration that documents mentioning nonviolent methods to settle conflicts have been written since Classical Greece, as stated in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (2009). The decades that went from the American and French revolutions and the First World War were also relevant for this field of study because important figures like Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson made contributions to the area of conflict resolution (Bercovitch et al. 2009). According to these authors, it is possible to identify four main periods in the evolution of the contemporary conflict resolution field of study. From 1914 to 1945 research was mainly focused on the conduct of conflicts, arms races, revolutions, and peacemaking. The studies in the period from 1946 to 1969 centered around the prevention of a nuclear war between the two superpowers. From the 1970s until 1989, the concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) practices was considerably expanded mainly because there was a big increase in court congestion. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the topics of negotiation and mediation became highly popular which contributed to the publication of a wide number of studies and books. One example of this was the publication in 1981 of the book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Dimensions of Conflict In the opinion of Bernard Mayer (2000), conflict can be associated with three different dimensions: perception, feelings, and actions. Each of these dimensions has a major role in the comprehension of the origins of the conflict and, consequently, an even bigger part in the assessment of the best techniques and methods to guarantee an effective solution for the conflict. Firstly, in terms of perception, a conflict occurs when a person feels that his or her objectives are in opposition to another person’s objectives (Mayer 2000). This means that a conflict between the two parties will only cease when one or both of the parties involved in it sense that their objectives are no longer incompatible or reached a mutually accepted agreement (Mayer 2000). Mayer (2000) considers that there are two methods that might contribute to the

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resolution of perception-determined conflicts: “cognitive dissonance” and “successive reframing.” Cognitive dissonance is defined by Leon Festinger (1968) as the tension that befalls a person when he or she believes in an idea or a concept that clashes with newfound evidence. In certain cases, the new facts are understood as valid and this contributes to a change in the person’s mindset and, therefore, a reevaluation of the conflict. Successive reframing corresponds to the shift in a person’s view about a conflict, which may provide a smoother path to the resolution of the conflict. Secondly, Mayer (2000) also deems that every party present in a conflictual situation experiences one or a set of emotions, from hopelessness to sadness and/or anger. This emotional component of the conflict can be perceived not only from the way the parties view the conflict but also from the level of involvement they put into the situation (Mayer 2000). That being said, a conflict will only be solved when the parties feel what Mayer calls “emotional resolution,” that is, when the parties perceive that the divergence of ideas, needs, and values that caused the conflict has been addressed and solved. Thirdly, a conflict also covers the actions that are taken by the parties involved in the situation. Similar to the range of emotions that can be displayed during conflicts, Mayer (2000) believes that the actions encountered in a conflictual situation can also be quite broad in its spectrum, ranging from pacific to aggressive stances. Regarding the resolution of the behavioral aspect of a conflict, Mayer (2000) deems two different methods as very efficient: the first being the discontinuation of conflictive conducts, through the disappearance of the disagreement, and the second being the institutionalization of actions that promote the resolution of the conflict, which may occur through formal agreements, peace treaties, or contracts.

Conflict Resolution Strategies The 17 Principles of Conflict Resolution Dana Caspersen suggests in her book, published in 2015 and entitled Changing the Conversation: The 17 Principles of Conflict Resolution, that there are 17 principles that ought to be taken into

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consideration when dealing with conflicts. The principles are as follows: listen for what is behind the words; change the conversation from the inside; talk to the other person’s best self; differentiate needs, interests, and strategies; acknowledge emotions; differentiate between acknowledgment and agreement; when listening, avoid making suggestions; differentiate between evaluation and observation; test your assumptions; develop curiosity in difficult situations; assume useful dialogue is possible, even when it seems unlikely; if you are making things worse, stop; figure out what is happening, not whose fault it is; acknowledge conflict; seek solutions people willingly support; be explicit about agreements; and, finally, expect and plan for future conflict. According to the author, these principles can be extremely valuable when trying to end or, at least, minimize conflictual situations. The Five Conflict Resolution Styles Behavioral scientists Kenneth Thomas and Ralph Kilmann (1974) are responsible for creating a set of five conflict resolution styles: competing, avoiding, compromising, collaborating, and accommodating. Other authors, such as Christopher Moore and Peter Woodrow (2010), have also acknowledged the value and significance of these styles to the area of conflict resolution. The first style, labeled “competing” by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and “adhering strategy” by Moore and Woodrow (2010), is characterized by one of the parties involved in the conflict taking a firm stance and refusing to compromise. The competing style can be perceived as extremely assertive and in most cases is nothing more than an attempt to gain power over the other parties in order to obtain the most advantages possible. The second style, labeled as “avoiding” by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and “avoidingcontending strategy” by Moore and Woodrow (2010), stems from a necessity from one of the parties to temporarily postpone or completely evade the conflict. In this situation, the avoiding party will neither pursue their interests or objectives nor will the other parties involved be able to. The third style, labeled as “compromising” by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and “adapting strategy” by Moore and Woodrow (2010), aims to achieve a solution that may partially please all the parties

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involved in the conflict. This means that at least one of the parties will try to reach a middle ground. The fourth style, labeled as “accommodating” by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and “adopting strategy” by Moore and Woodrow (2010), can be perceived to be in total opposition to the “competing” or “adhering” styles. The “accommodating” style portrays the intention of one of the parties involved in the conflict to concede to the objectives, needs, or interests of the other party or parties. The fifth and last style, labeled as “collaborating” by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and “advancing strategy” by Moore and Woodrow (2010), derives from the resolution of one or both parties to achieve an agreement that accomplishes the interests and needs of all the parties involved in the conflict. The “collaborating” style can be associated with the concept of “winwin” negotiation, a concept that will be further developed in the next section.

Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Conflict Bargaining According to Edward Lawler and Rebecca Ford (1995), the occurrence of conflict bargaining presupposes two conditions: the existence of a conflict between two or more parties and the wish of all the parties involved to influence the others and achieve a profitable result. Charan Devereaux et al. (2006) expose a set of strategies in order to achieve a beneficial settlement: create the conditions necessary to influence the bargaining process; select an adequate forum where the negotiation process may take place; shape the agenda through the addition or removal of topics; build coalitions if necessary; manage the topics discussed in the bargaining process in order to obtain more advantages; create a favorable scenario that involves the concerning topics and also possible solutions; and, finally, guide the flow of the negotiation process. The process of negotiation is usually divided between track I and track II negotiation, where track I negotiation refers to formal negotiations between states or state representatives and track II negotiation is the one conducted by nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Two

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examples of track II negotiation are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue. Both initiatives were established in order to promote dialogue and allow for collective consultation on political, economic, and/or security-related issues (ASEAN Regional Forum n.d.; IISS n.d.). The study analysis of conflict bargaining should take into consideration the different strategies of negotiation since that is crucial to critically analyze the importance and impact of conflict bargaining in the resolution of conflicts. This means that it is imperative to distinguish between distributive/positional and integrative/interest-based bargaining, as well as between tacit and explicit bargaining. Distributive/Positional Bargaining Versus Integrative/Interest-Based Bargaining

According to the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution (Burgess and Burgess 1997), negotiations can be pursued through a distributive/positional or an integrative/interest-based perspective. Although all negotiations have aspects of both competitive and cooperative nature, in most cases one of these characteristics tends to overshadow the other at some point of the conflict (Mayer 2000). Distributive or positional bargaining is perceived as a type of negotiation where the parties immersed in the conflict seek to divide the outcome of the conflict between themselves (Hoffmann 2010). This means that the parties involved see each other as opponents, try to obtain victory over the others, and if they need to make concessions or compromise with one another, there is a high probability that the negotiators will yield reluctantly (Mayer 2000). The feature characteristic of a distributive/positional bargaining is the emphasis given to the strengthening and consolidation of the parties’ position since it will improve their chances of obtaining advantages and better results (Burgess and Burgess 1997; Mayer 2000). Moore and Woodrow (2010) consider that a distributive or positional negotiation tends to be favored in specific situations such as when: the negotiators need to absolutely win or must display a strong position; the resources are considerably limited; a

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specific asset can not be shared with the other parties; and instant benefits derived from the negotiation process are more important than a perceivable future relationship between the parties. According to Hoffmann (2010), it can be said that the relationship between the USA and India was characterized in some moments by a focus on a distributive/positional stance, especially in the period following the Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998. The five nuclear tests were done in the city of Pokhranand co-conducted by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization and the Atomic Energy Comission of India. The Indian nuclear tests and the a posteriori declaration from the Indian prime minister that India had become a full-fledged nuclear state led to a major international crisis and the imposition of international sanctions. As a major proponent of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the USA immediately demanded that India accepted a set of five conditions in order to cease the international sanctions and isolation, the most important being the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Integrative or interest-based bargaining is mainly focused on the needs and interests of all the parties entangled in the conflict (Burgess and Burgess 1997; Mayer 2000; Devereaux et al. 2006; Moore and Woodrow 2010). As stated in the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution (Burgess and Burgess 1997), integrative/interest-based bargaining is only effective when the interests, needs, or values of the parties are not totally divergent and there is room for the parties to agree and achieve a joint solution. Burgess and Burgess (1997) deem that the concept of “principled negotiation,” developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their book Getting to Yes, is no more than a type of interest-based bargaining. Principled negotiation, also known as “negotiation on the merits,” values the principle of winwin solution and emphasizes the creation and preservation of the relationship between the parties involved in the conflict (Fisher and Ury 1991). Furthermore, Fisher and Ury (1991) delineate four main points that negotiators should follow in order to increase their chances of success in a conflict: separating people from the problem;

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focusing on interests, not positions; formulating options for mutual gain; and, finally, insisting on using objective criteria. Integrative or interestbased bargaining is especially relevant if there is a high possibility that the relationship between the parties will carry on in the future. In addition, integrative/interest-based bargaining allows the negotiators to pursue what David Lax and Jim Sebenius (1986) call “value creating and value claiming,” that is, not only to fulfill their individual needs but also to achieve better results for all the parties involved in the conflict. A considerably famous example of an interest-based bargaining was the Camp David Accords, signed by the Egyptian president and the Israeli prime minister and mediated by the USA. The conflict between Egypt and Israel had long existed but was largely amplified with the Six-Day War, a conflict that occurred between June 5 and 10, 1967 and that culminated with the possession of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula by Israel. After the cessation of the Six-Day War, the Egyptian president requested that the peninsula be returned to Egypt while the Israeli prime minister considered the peninsula should remain in the control of Israel. According to Neil Katz and Kevin McNulty (1995), the USA was responsible for ensuring that both Egypt and Israel focused more on their interests rather than on the conflict per se. The diplomatic efforts carried on by the Carter administration culminated in the signature of the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978. Tacit Versus Explicit Bargaining

Thomas Schelling was responsible for introducing, in his book The Strategy of Conflict published in 1960, the distinction between the concepts of tacit bargaining and explicit bargaining. Tacit bargaining is a type of negotiation where the parties involved in a conflict favor nonverbal and distant-like communication instead of a more open and straightforward interaction, in most cases due to factors such as distrust of the communication channels or the situation’s background (Lawler and Ford 1995). Furthermore, the actions taken by the negotiators involved in a tacit bargaining are highly dependent of the nature they wish to input to the conflict, that is, whether

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they choose to be cooperative or competitive (Lawler and Ford 1995). On the contrary, Bacharach and Lawler (1980) distinguish explicit bargaining from tacit bargaining in three aspects. First, the parties involved in the conflict recognize the existence of the conflictual situation and, therefore, agree that they need to achieve a solution. Second, the communication tends to be straightforward, spoken, and characterized by offers, compromises, and sometimes concessions. Third, all the parties view the conflict as an event that can be solved or, at least, minimized. An example of a negotiation that contained both tacit and explicit elements was the negotiations between the British government and the Irish Republican Army (Dochartaigh 2015). Mediation Mediation is, along with arbitration, one of the ADR procedures (Burgess and Burgess 1997). Moore and Woodrow (2010) perceive mediation as “[. . .] a conflict resolution process that helps negotiators resolve serious differences, disputes, or conflicts in a voluntary and mutually acceptable manner.” Mediation is different from arbitration because the mediator does not have the authority to pronounce a decision. As a matter of fact, the mediator’s purpose is only to assist in the development of the negotiation process and promote a favorable environment necessary to achieve an agreement (Cloke 2001; Plantey 2007). Additionally, mediation is distinct from negotiation in the sense that the mediator is typically an impartial party that has no prior connection to any of the parties or prior involvement in the topic of the conflict. Nevertheless, there are cases where the mediator may be connected to one or both parties involved in the conflict. However, in these cases, the mediator will almost certainly be someone that is accepted by both parties. In the book Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Geoff Berridge (2015) distinguishes three main types of mediation tactics: track I mediation, track II mediation, and multipartidary mediation. Track I mediation is mainly carried by states who are still currently considered the key actors in international relations. Track II mediation is generally performed by individual or nongovernmental organizations

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whose role in international relations has increased considerably in the last decades. Although track II mediation tends to be a formal process, in some cases it can be more informal, with a third party acting more like a facilitator than a formal mediator of the conflict. Additionally, track II mediation can be further divided into public track II mediation and secret track II mediation. Secret track II mediation is typically employed when governments do not wish to acknowledge the other parties in the conflict as legitimate but still need to engage in dialogue with them. In his book entitled The Mediation Process, Moore (2014) identifies five categories of mediators: social network mediators; reputation-, status-, and position-based mediators; administrative/managerial mediators; vested interest mediators, and independent mediators. Social network mediators tend to be seen as trustworthy actors by the parties involved in the conflict even if they are not completely neutral to the situation. Reputation-, status-, and position-based mediators are usually highly recognized individuals that accept the responsibly to assist in the negotiation process. Administrative or managerial mediators are, in most cases, individuals that hold organizational positions and choose to act as mediators or, at least, as facilitators. The secretary-general of the United Nations can be seen as an administrative or managerial mediator since he assumes that role due to the prestige of his institutional position and trust worthiness. Vested interest mediators tend to possess a high-level interest in the topic of the conflict which means that, in the majority of conflict situations, they might be political leaders of neighboring states that have an interest in the resolution of the conflict. Finally, independent mediators are generally third parties who do not have, whatsoever, any interest or connection to the conflictual situation but still wish to help with its resolution. Arbitration As mentioned above, arbitration is another of the ADR’s methods. In an arbitration case, the parties involved in a conflict appeal their case to a third party, typically an arbitrator or anarbitral tribunal, who, after taking in consideration all sides of the case, produce a decision typically known as an

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“award” (Burgess and Burgess 1997). According to Neil Andrews (2016), the arbitration procedure is depicted as having six main advantages: neutrality, expertise, procedural flexibility, finality, superior cross-border enforcement, and confidentiality. As stated by Maud Piers and Christian Aschauer (2018), one of the main features of arbitration is that it is a fairly efficient and fast procedure, since it is not constrained by a predetermined code of behavior. Furthermore, the authors highlight, in their book, the role and influence that the technological advances in the digital world might have in the arbitration procedure. As a matter of fact, artificial intelligence and/or automated processes are already being operated by insurers to determine if a case should be dealt with by an arbitrator/arbitral tribunal or by a state court (Piers and Aschauer 2018). In opposition to mediation, where the final decision can be overruled if one of the parties does not agree with it, the final decision made by the arbitrator or committee of arbitrators is generally legally binding. If one or both parties do not wish for the decision to be legally binding, they will need to agree on the selection of a nonbinding arbitration method. Litigation Litigation is traditionally perceived as one of the ADR’s procedures and it occurs when a conflictual situation is taken to a court in order to achieve a final decision. According to Burgess and Burgess (1997), the litigation process is recognized as substantially more formal than any of the other ADR’s processes. Litigation is often underappreciated since it tends to be recognized as a procedure with many weaknesses, most notably its timeconsuming and highly priced characteristics. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand that this procedure also presents a deep connection to the concept of democracy in the sense that it imposes sanctions on offenders, stimulates transparent institutions, and allows for the political participation of citizens in democratic processes (Lahav 2017). In her book, the author stresses that reducing and restricting the number of lawsuits can produce negative consequences, such as constraining individual rights and giving wrongdoers the idea that they are above the law especially if they come from

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wealthy and/or influential backgrounds. As stated by Lahav (2017), the enforcement of the law is mainly carried through three different mechanisms: regulation by an agency, government lawsuits, or through private litigation. Regulation by an agency is a mechanism whereby an administrative agency, usually staffed with experts in one or a set of fields, is given the authority to enforce the law. Regulation by government lawsuits occur when government lawyers are endowed with the authority to enforce the law. The final mechanism, regulation by private litigation, is typically carried out by private individuals, organizations, or groups.

Culture-Based Influence on Conflict Resolution According to Rona Halualani (2019), culture can be labeled as “a socially constructed system of meaning among group members who collectively shape world views, perceptions, beliefs, values, attitudes, cultural practices, and identities that bind them together and toward one particular way of life.” This extensive definition of the concept of culture allows us to understand that it has a high-level impact not only in the origin of conflicts but also in the development of strategies to cease them. Shuang Liu et al.(2015), building on the work developed by Carley Dodd (1998), pinpoint three distinct sections that constitute the concept of culture: the “inner core” comprised of the history, identity, beliefs and values, and worldviews of a cultural group; the “intermediate layer” which consists of activities as manifestations of culture; and the “outer layer” that involves the kinship, educational, religious, health, political, and economic systems. Fay Patel et al. (2011) identify four particular traits that substantially influence intercultural communication: the views and principles of each person, the existence of language barriers, the role of the mass media in shaping our perception of the world, and the level of intercultural contact, that is, the degree to which two cultures are in contact with each other. There are two mistakes that people tend to make when engaging with different cultures: the first one is relying on stereotypes while the second one is interpreting someone’s actions, values, or beliefs

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through the lens of a different culture. Edward Hall and Mildred Hall (1990) are two anthropologists responsible for associating different cultures to a high- to low-context spectrum. According to them, the cultures originating from China, Japan, South Korea, and even some countries from the Middle East are considered high-context cultures. Firstly, these countries are characterized by upholding what the authors call highly stratified social structures. Secondly, the communication between people from these cultures is focused on preserving relationships and tends to be very implicit, since it is expected that people know how to interpret the information provided (Liu et al. 2015). These key traits concerning high-context cultures are very well explained by Guy Faure (2019) in a set of three cases where he shows in detail the Chinese preference for hidden agendas, subtlety, and ambiguity when dealing with bargaining situations. On the other end of the high to low spectrum, it is possible to find countries such as the USA, Canada, and Germany. Countries with low-context cultures are more task oriented and tend to favor explicit communication, with people from these cultures paying more attention to the words being spoken than to nonverbal language. Moreover, low-context cultures are usually linked to individualist cultures, where the development of the individual and his/her values are highly valorized. The significant difference between high- and low-context cultures means that negotiators need to be extremely aware and considerably intelligent in order to eliminate, or at least minimize, conflictual situations (Khan and Ebner 2019). Just like bargaining and other ADR procedures, the process of mediation is deeply shaped by culture and its distinctive elements. In one of his articles, Cheng Qian (2010) highlights the Chinese culture long-standing relation with the concept of mediation. To the author, the embrace of mediation by the Chinese is mainly due to the country emphasis on the preservation of harmony, peace, and cooperation at all times. Maintaining a close connection with Chinese values, Chinese mediators tend to be more flexible than Western mediators, focusing more on sustaining a peaceful environment rather than abiding by specific protocols (Qian 2010).

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Cross-References ▶ Multilateral and Unilateral Sanctions: Compliance and Challenges ▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts ▶ Political Participation: Inclusion of Citizens in Democratic Opinion-Forming and DecisionMaking Processes ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

References Al-Rawashdeh M, Al-Majali S (2017) The phenomenon of international conflict in international relations. Int J Soc Sci Human Invent 4(5):3488–3502. https://doi.org/10. 18535/ijsshi/v4i5.05 Andrews N (2016) Arbitration and contract law: common law perspectives. Springer International Publishing, Cham ASEAN Regional Forum (n.d.) ASEAN Regional Forum. http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/. Accessed 31 May 2019 Bacharach S, Lawler E (1980) Power and politics in organizations. Jossey Bass, San Francisco Bercovitch J, Kremenyuk V, Zartman I (eds) (2009) The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution. Sage, London Berridge G (2015) Diplomacy: theory and practice. Palgrave Macmillan, London Burgess H, Burgess G (1997) Encyclopedia of conflict resolution. ABC-CLIO, California Caspersen D (2015) Changing the conversation: the 17 principles of conflict resolution. Profile Books, London Cloke K (2001) Mediating dangerously: the Frontiers of conflict resolution. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco Devereaux C, Lawrence R, Watkins M (2006) Case studies in US trade negotiation. Vol. 1: making the rules. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC Dochartaigh N (2015) The longest negotiation: British policy, IRA strategy and the making of the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement. Polit Stud 63:202–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248-12091 Dodd C (1998) Dynamics of intercultural communication. McGraw-Hill, Boston Faure G (2019) Chinese business negotiations: closing the deal. In: Zartman I (ed) How negotiations end: negotiation behavior in the endgame. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Festinger L (1968) A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford Fisher R, Ury W, Patton B (1991) Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in. Century Business, Sydney

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120 Hall E, Hall M (1990) Understanding cultural differences. Intercultural Press Inc., Maine Halualani R (2019) Intercultural communication: a critical perspective. Cognella Academic Publishing, San Diego Hoffmann S (2010) Change in India-US diplomatic practices – an interim report. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi International Institute for Strategic Studies (n.d.) IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019. https://www.iiss.org/ events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019. Accessed 31 May 2019 Katz N, McNulty K (1995) Interest-based negotiations. https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/parcc/ cmc/Interested-Based%20Negotiation%20NK.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2019 Khan M, Ebner N (eds) (2019) The Palgrave handbook of cross-cultural business negotiation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham Lahav A (2017) In praise of litigation. Oxford University Press, New York Lawler E, Ford R (1995) Bargaining and influence in conflict situations. In: Cook K, Fine G, House J (eds) Sociological perspectives on social psychology. Allyn Y Bacon, Needham Heights, pp 236–256. https://core. ac.uk/download/pdf/144981913.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2019 Lax D, Sebenius J (1986) The manager as negotiator: bargaining for cooperation and competitive gain. Free Press, New York Liu S, Volčič Z, Gallois C (2015) Introducing intercultural communication: global cultures and contexts. SAGE, London Mayer B (2000) The dynamics of conflict resolution: a practitioner’s guide. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco Moore C (2014) The mediation process: practical strategies for resolving conflict. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Moore C, Woodrow P (2010) Handbook of global and multicultural negotiation. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Patel F, Li M, Sooknanan P (2011) Intercultural communication: building a global community. SAGE, New Delhi Piers M, Aschauer C (2018) Arbitration in the digital age: the brave new world of arbitration. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Plantey A (2007) International negotiation in the twentyfirst century. Routledge-Cavendish, Oxon Qian C (2010) The culture of China’s mediation in regional and international affairs. Conflict resolution quarterly, vol. 28, no. Inc, Wiley Periodicals, p 1 Thomas K, Kilmann R (1974) Thomas-Kilmann conflict mode instrument. Xicom, New York Tulane University (2001) A glossary on violent conflict: terms and concepts used in conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution in the context of disaster relief and sustainable development. Payson Center for International Development and Technology Transfer, Louisiana. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/6C8E6652532FE542C12575DD00444F2DUSAID_may01.pdf. Accessed 31 May 2019

Conflict Mediation

Conflict Mediation ▶ Governance of Traditional Local Institutions and Achieving SDG16

Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16 Saheli Bose1 and Amit Kumar2 1 Department of Political Science, Seth Anandram Jaipuria College, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India 2 Department of Political Science, Munshi Singh College, BR Ambedkar Bihar University, Motihari, India

Definition Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs) are those areas where conflict is dominant and has an adverse effect on human lives. CAA can be a region, an area within a country, or an area that spreads across the national boundary of two or more countries. However, there is no common definition of a CAA. Sometimes, CAAs are also identified as high-risk areas. CAAs can be identified by their widespread violence, prevalence of armed conflict, or insurrection that severely hampers the socio-economic and cultural growth of that area. Also, CAAs have two dimensions common everywhere: First it has a problem of ongoing conflict, and second it has a postconflict situation to tackle. The source of conflict can be over the control of territory, resources, ethnicity, sectarian politics, or the government policies. According to the United Nations, world conflict and violence are on the rise and conflicts are often becoming fragmented into several groups, creating complex polar disturbances. Under such situations, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which talk about tackling socio-economic and environmental challenges are severely jeopardized. The humanitarian argument in the SDGs is lost in the CAAs due to

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immense human suffering. In particular, SDG 16, which talks about peace, justice, and strong institutions, is most untowardly affected. However, SDG 16 has strong interface with SDG 1,2,3,4,5,6,8, and 10 which are also negatively affected.

Introduction Conflicts may be a usual part of human existence, and it can be preliminarily defined as a collision of two opposing interests (Cooper Tony 2003). However, when the conflict is unmanageable resulting in violence and large-scale suffering of humans, that conflict becomes significant. More so, unmanaged conflicts reflect that there is an institutional failure to manage or control the conflict. The holocaust of two World Wars led to considerable thinking of nurturing peace and resolutions to control armaments and war. Yet, over the years there has been constant and steady increase in the conflict and violence around the world so that nearly half of world’s population lives in CAAs and high-risk areas. According to UN, in the year 2019 alone the number of people fleeing war, persecution, and conflict exceeded 79.5 million which is the highest ever recorded in a year signifying that conflicts exists and its implication can be devastating (UNHCR 2020a). Though there remains a dearth of agreed definition of CAA, definitions of CAAs, as given by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European Union Mineral Regulation law, and Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights, are important and similar in-line. When looking at the definitions, it is not hard to find that CAAs are identified by presence of armed conflict, widespread human suffering, and existence of weak institution that failed to protect the people from such suffering. Therefore, CAAs present an extremely instable scenario where escalation in violence of any sort is possible which can have a catastrophic effect on the world peace at large. In 2015, all the members of United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030, which comprise of 17 Goals

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which would help address the urgent environmental, political, and social challenges across the world. SDG 16 talks about peace, justice, and strong institutions, implying that peace and just social, economic, and political systems should be promoted to help people feel safe irrespective of their religion, ethnicity, social status, or sex. SDG 16 is comprehensive in itself as it addresses a number of targets which are vital and do not stand in isolation, and it has a strong interface with other SDGs such as 1,2,3,4,5,6,8, and 10. SDG 16 is comprehensive and bedrock for meeting targets of other SDGs. Specifically, SDG 16.1 targets reducing “all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.”

Understanding Conflict The word “conflict” according to the Cambridge dictionary means an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles (Cambridge Online Dictionary 2020). Situations of conflict can be different over time and place, yet there remains a basic fact that conflict represents an “interaction” in a “competitive setting” (Oberschall 1978).The very nature of humans as units of society leads the way to conflict; this is because every individual, despite sharing a common social bond by being members of society, is different not only in their physiology but also in their cognition. Wright (1957) points out that sociologists have made a difference among the terms – conflict, competition, and rivalry. While conflict represents “opposition among the social entities directed against each other,” competition represents “opposition among social entities independently” for some resources which are scarce in supply to satisfy all. Rivalry presents a “halfway” situation between the two, and all of the three terms are species of opposition. In a physical sense, conflict can be a movement of two bodies against each other. For Coser (1957), conflict may be taken to mean “a struggle over values and claims to scare status, power and resources in which the aim of the opponents is to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.” Conflict, thus defined, refers to overt and coercive

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behavior initiated by one contending party against another. For Jeong (2010), conflict is “manifested through an adversarial social relation, between two or more actors involving differences which leads to intense hostilities”. According to Wright (1957), conflict has close relation to violence, as the Latin word confligere from which conflict is derived means to “strike together.” It is a process which can lead to open violence, may also be solved peacefully, or continue indefinitely. Ramsbotham (2005) outlines Eward E Azar’s proposition on protracted social conflicts (PSC). PSC blurs the distinction that conflict can only be restricted to just being internal or external or started by a particular actor or cause. There is also no definite starting or ending point. PSC lays “within and across” rather than “exclusively between states,” with four important preconditions for turning into high intensity level. First is the identity group which is a very important unit of analysis in PSC. The disjunction that exists between the state and society manifested through the relationship between different religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial, and cultural group existing within and across the state thus becomes problematic. Secondly, PSCs arise because of denial of basic human needs which is non-negotiable and when deprived there is bound to be intense and vicious conflict. Thirdly, the role of the state and governance is important to satisfy the needs of an individual or a group. Most PSCs continue due to a “parochial,” “incompetent,” “fragile,” and “authoritarian governments” that have failed to satisfy the needs of the individual or group within them. Lastly, the “international linkage” in terms of “political-economic” and “political-military” relationship between or among states is also an important factor in influencing the weak states. These are the reasons why most of the PSCs are concentrated in the developing countries where there is rapid growth of population with limited resources. For Galtung (2007), conflict equals to attitude plus behavior plus contradiction. Conflict should be seen as a triangle where contradiction, attitude, and behavior are at its vertices. Contradictions include the “incompatibility of goals” between the conflict parties. Attitude includes parties’

perceptions about each other which can be either positive or negative; in violent conflict, parties often develop negative perception about each other which gives rise to hatred. Behavior includes cooperation or coercion. In violent conflict, there is threat, and destructive attacks. As parties’ interest or the relationship between them becomes oppressive, development of conflict takes place, and this becomes the structure around which parties try to achieve their interest and develop hostile attitude and behavior. Conflict can be rooted into history, economic affairs, domestic policy or governance, or in the international relations of two or more countries. Also, conflicts can be located in ideological differences, security perception, or an attempt by any one group to impose its language, culture, religion, or social values over other groups. The nature and intensity of conflict have changed over the past decades, shifting from wars that were fought directly, fought between states that are inter-state war, to intrastate war that can be guerilla war, terrorism, protest, or issues related to sectarianism. To distinguish between the intraand inter-state conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2008) distinguished between international armed conflicts and noninternational armed conflicts. The term armed conflict may refer to anything ranging from “civil war, ethnic war to interstate war” fought at high or low intensities “as well as violence that falls short of war, such as militarized disputes, terrorism, and riots or strikes” (Szayna et al. 2017). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2020) defines that an armed conflict is a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year.” The Geneva Convention of 1949, dealing with the international humanitarian law, does not define armed conflict but has entrusted upon ICRC to develop understanding about the international humanitarian law in armed conflict, for (ICRC 2008) international-armed conflicts exist whenever there is recourse to armed forces between two or more states. Non-international

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armed conflicts are “protracted arm confrontation” which occurs between the armed forces of the Government with one or more armed groups or between such armed groups arising on the territory of the state. In this armed conflict, the parties must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved should show a minimum level of organization. The Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (2020) has categorized conflicts particularly the political conflict which it defines as “incompatibility of intentions” between individuals or groups. Incompatibility emerges because of certain “actors” who communicate among themselves with regard to certain “object.” The actions and communication among the actors form the “measures,” and the “object” forms the “issue” of differences. These “actors,” measures,” and “issues” are important constituents of conflict which further help in understanding the intensity of conflict, which is the “sum of conflict measures” in a particular conflict within a geographical space and time. In Table 1, which is adopted from Conflict Barometer, 2019, Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research, conflict intensity levels are categorized as dispute, nonviolent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war. Dispute and nonviolent crisis are categorized as nonviolent conflict under the level of violence, and their class intensity is low. The intensity level of violence in violent crisis, limited war, and war comes under the intensity class of medium and high.

Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs) and Their Sources Conflicts may be short-lived or longer depending on the nature and the parties involved. It is also seen that inability of effective governmental control and the inability of the Government to carry forward its basic functions provide the ground for the conflict. According to OECD (2011), CAAs and high-risk areas are “identified by the presence of armed conflict, widespread violence or other risks of harm to people. Armed conflict may take a variety of forms, such as a conflict of international

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or non-international character, which may involve two or more states, or may consist of wars of liberation, or insurgencies, civil wars, etc. Highrisk areas may include areas of political instability or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure and widespread violence. Such areas are often characterised by widespread human rights abuses and violations of national or international law.” The European Union Mineral Regulation Law, which is due to come into force in 2021 throughout the European Union, has defined Conclict Affected and High Risk Areas (CAHRA) as those states which are “either suffering from armed conflict such as a civil war, a state of fragile post conflict, or witnessing weak or non-exisiting governance and systematic violation of International law including human rights abuses” (European Commission 2020). According to Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights, CAA is identified if it has “the presence of an international or non-international armed conflict”; or an area where transition is taking place “from an armed conflict to peace” along with “widespread or serious human rights violations.” The CAA is dominated by “political and social instability or repression,” and is characterized by “institutional weakness or collapse of state infrastructure” (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights 2013). United Nations Global Compact (2020) defines CAAs and highrisk areas as those experiencing violent conflicts such as “civil war, armed insurrection, inter-state war or other organized violence.” CAAs include also those areas which are not or may not be facing “high level of armed violence,” but political and social stability is not there and triggers for breakout of violence are possible. Also, these areas face “abuses of human rights along with political and civil liberties.” These areas may also be on transition from violence to peace, yet the transition remains volatile “with the risk of falling back into violent conflict.” At the center of the conflicts that erupt around the world, three most important sources can be identified which assist in turning a region/country into CAAs.

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Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16, Table 1 Conflict intensity given by Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research Intensity level Dispute Nonviolent crisis

Level of violence Nonviolent conflict

Intensity class Low intensity

Violent crisis

Violent conflict

Medium intensity

Limited war War

High intensity

Light weapona 50 personnelb 20 casualtiesc 1000 IDPs and refugeesd 0 dimensione Light/heavy weapons >50  400 personnel >20  60 casualties >1000  20,000 IDPs and refugees 1–2 dimensions Heavy weapons >400 personnel >60 casualties >20,000 IDPs and refugees 3–4 dimensions

Source: Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (2020) Indicates the type of weapons used in the conflict situation b Personnel includes all persons who collectively represent conflict actor in a conflict c Deaths resulting from direct effect of the conflict excluding indirect effect d Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from conflict e Destruction on civil population measured taking into account four dimensions of infrastructure, accommodation, economy, and culture which are essential a

Territory: Among the primary sources of war, territory and territorial-boundary occupy central position. Although they do not immediately convert into conflict or war, however, they have acted as a source of conflict for the longest period of time and remain dormant until it is mixed with the security perception of one or the other party. In this sense, territory acts as the harbor ground for the conflict (Vasquez and Valeriano 2009). The examples of territorial conflict are: El Chamizal dispute between the USA and Mexico, South China Sea dispute between China and at least five of the ten member Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) littoral countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines), and East China Sea dispute between China and Japan. The South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes have become one of the new global flash points, risking safety and security of not just the region but the entire globe. At the heart of these disputes, lie unilateral declaration of the “ninedash line” claim and territorial expansionist policies of People’s Republic of China (China) that have threatened not only the regional security but also the global peace and tranquility. The two

oceans get their significance from their geo-strategic as well as geo-economic significance, thereby generating security threat perception among the rival contending parties. Security perception, along with the natural resources which lie within as well as underneath these seas, plays an important and integral role in worsening the situation in the sea. Another flash point related to territory is the Palestine-Israel conflict regarding the holy land for the Muslims and the Jews surrounding the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza strip and has killed many since the formation of Israel in 1948. The “Nakba” or the catastrophe day for the Palestinians which the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat inaugurated officially in 1998 to mark Israel’s 50th anniversary celebrations has seen violence since, resulting in killing of Palestinians who try to return home. In 2018, at least 100 died and 1000 were injured in the Gaza strip (The Newsweek 2018). The India-Pakistan conflict over Jammu and Kashmir continued since 1947, which has seen three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and a limited one in 1999. Continued militant activities in the form of terrorist attacks on civilians, and army bases, have been witnessed. There is also the

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India-China conflict based on territorial disputes, which saw war in 1962. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea annexation is another example. The territorial conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti for Dumeira Mountain and Dumeira Island, which are claimed by both Eritrea and Djibouti, has led to tensions between the two affecting many lives in the adjoining areas. Economic Resource: The rising population pressure and dwindling natural resource may create contest over the ownership of resources in a particular area or resource rich country. Such contest can undermine the peace and security of a region or an area. For Billon (2005) natural resources were thought to lift the country out of poverty and dejection yet it has been observed that resource rich countries faces high risk of civil war. However the qaulity of leadership and regime also palys significant role. The nature and character of these wars are summarily different from those of the previous ones, as these wars are centered on the economic activities and not the military targets. These actors are now running industries, regulating production, and providing services in order to survive in the changing world. All these changes have occurred in the backdrop of globalization and rising global prosperity that have resulted in dividing the world in two opposing groups, one that is wealthy and is getting prosperous and peaceful, the other that has become poorer. Conflict is a two-way process in poorer countries. While the high cost of conflict results in increased poverty, it also weakens the capacity of the state to deal with it and prevent further escalation and violence. Though poverty acts as a primary factor in the majority of conflicts in poorer countries, it alone does not provide sufficient explanation for the onset of the conflict. It is supported with other factors such as, demography, low level of education, an absence of middle class, and a weak institutional structure. Besides, the control over critical resources, such as water, petroleum, diamonds, timber, or fisheries, has also acted as the fodder for the onset of conflict. The water conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors over river Jordon is well-known; Ethiopia-Kenya water conflict over river Omo is another instance. The resource curse of the African countries such as Democratic Republic of

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Congo (DRC) which has led to violence and political instability still continues. DRC is rich in cobalt and copper which were used by the rebels to sustain their conflict. Sierra Leon’s diamond industry has been a reason for its civil war. It was alleged that the successive Governments in the country had used the diamond industry for their personal advantage selectively rewarding contacts to the people associated with the business. Thus, the deprived underclass joined the main rebel groups who used diamond mining areas as a means to sustain their rebellion (Koning 2008). On the other hand, economic crisis has led to huge migration from Venezuela to Colombia; it is estimated that in July 2016, more than 150,000 Venezuelans migrated to Colombia to find basic goods and medical care (Time 2017). Identity-Driven Ethno-religious Conflicts: The term “ethnicity” for Horowitz (1985) represents a sense of “collective belonging” which can be based on “common descent, language, history, culture, race or religion.” However, according to Varshney (2007), sometimes the term “ethnicity” is closely used in connection with nation and nationality. However, the terms “nation,” “nationality,” and “ethnicity” are not the same. If identified on a three-tiered classification, nation represents a group of people with “political and territorial home.” On the other hand, nationality refers to a group of people who have cultural, linguistic, and sometimes, religious rights; however, unlike the nation, they do not have “a political and territorial home.” Ethnicity is a small collectivity which is not large enough to be called a nationality. Examples of ethnic group include, Croats, Serbs, Chin, Kachin, Mon, Rohingyas, Hutus, and Tutsis. An ethnic conflict is broadly defined as a dispute between two or more ethnic groups over a range of socio, political, religious, economic, or territorial issues (individually or collectively) (Brown 1993). In other words, ethnic conflict emerges when one ethnic group tries to maximize or prioritize its collective interests at the cost of others’. These conflicts are not always a product of conflicting groups’ interests of two rival ethnic groups but also, when the government policies are aimed at “constructing homogeneous nationstate,” especially of ethno-national kind (Suan 2007). In ethnically diverse and divided societies,

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the homogeneous nation-states formations fail to accommodate the demands of fellow minority ethnic communities; as a result, ethnicity evolves as a site of conflict (Ibid.). There has been incidence of ethnic cleansing related to Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs in former Yugoslavia (Ibid.). The Rohingya exodus from Myanmar is the glaring example which reflects the conflict between the ethnic majority who are Buddhist and the Rohingyas who are the Muslims. The UNHCR has proclaimed that the Rohingyas are the most persecuted minority on this earth while their exodus has lent then the name “new fleeing boat people of Asia” (UNHCR 2020b; The Telegraph 2015) The Rohingya ethnic group of Myanmar has not been included as citizens in the country since the independence which made them stateless people till today. The ethnic community has seen exodus in the past year such as in 1989, 1995, 2015, and most recently in 2018 to escape atrocities inflicted by the majority. There are numerous instances of ethnic conflicts around the world, such as Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka which led to civil war, the Hutus and Tutsi ethnic group which led to genocide in Rwanda, the ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and the Boko Haram operating in Nigeria; the Sunni-Siah division within Islam has also been seen in countries such as Pakistan, and Iraq.

Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs) and Their Consequences When an area or region is conflict-affected, there are certain consequences which are to be faced by that particular country and its people. This can have not only direct effects such as the death and disabilities of civilians, and socio-economic effects, but also indirect effects such as mental health, and education of the people of that area. Some of the adverse consequences in CAAs are discussed below. (a) Loss of Human Lives and Human Right Abuses Violent conflicts lead to death due to weapons, strategies of violence such as mutilation,

antipersonnel landmines, and deliberate torching that is common in violent conflicts. Often in CAAs, it is very difficult to exactly identify the exact number of deaths. For example, in the Rwanda Genocide more than 8 lakh people were killed within 100 days of the war (BBC 2019). In Afghanistan, the war that has continued has claimed the lives of many. According to Human Rights Watch, the intensification of military operations between the Afghan government and the USA against Taliban has claimed more than 8000 lives by end of September 2019 (Human Rights Watch 2020a)). Thousand lives have been lost in the Arab-Israel conflict; according to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHR), from 2008 to mid-2020, around 2922 Palestinians have died in air-launched explosive weapons, 996 have died in live ammunitions, and 1441 have died in other fatalities (UNOCHR 2020). The Iraq Body Count which tracks the civilian deaths in Iraq attack since 2003, states that in 2007–2008 more than 55,000 civilians died. It estimates that around 185,296–208,295 civilians have died from violent attacks in Iraq since 2003 (Iraq Body Count 2020). Often the conflict-affected areas have seen violent human right abuses. The pictures of Abu Gharib to Camp Bucca, Guantánamo Bay, have created stir in the International arena regarding human rights abuse. For instance, in the IsraelPalestine conflict, Israel imposes sweeping restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip area. Only those with medical conditions are allowed to move out by obtaining a permit; however, it was noted that rejection or delay rate for permits of those injured in demonstrations along the fences separating Israel and Gaza was 82%. Similarly in the West Bank area, there is restriction on peoples’ movement so that they have to take a detour even to reach their agricultural land (Human Rights Watch 2020b). Forced disappearances, sexual violence, terrorism, and torture are some of the common human right abuses that are associated in the conflict-prone areas. Also, there is underreporting of these incidents that makes

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the matter worse. Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, and sub-Saharan countries have repeatedly made headlines due to sexual violence and abduction tortures. (b) Effect on Health and Education Health and education which remain two of the most basic and primary needs of the people around the world are seriously compromised in the CAAs. Fatalities and injuries are prevalent which lead to burden on the overall health structure of the affected area. More so, the increasing military expenditure sniffs in the expenditure which could have been implemented in enriching human lives. Especially for the developing countries, the precious and scarce resources need to be utilized very carefully. In terms of health, the public health system crumbles under conditions of hostilities. In the conflict-affected areas apart from disabilities created by the conflict-induced violence, there is also effect on mass immunization programmers. According to United Nations International Child Emergency Fund (UNICEF), in 2019 around “8.6 million unvaccinated and under-vaccinated” children lived in countries affected by conflict or unrest (UNICEF 2020a). Even HIV can be spread easily in the conflict-affected areas due to prostitution, inadequate medical attention, and also from pregnant women to their children. For the Syrian war, the UNOCHR reports that 3.1 million people live with disability, 41% of the population requires treatment from noncommunicable disease, 46% of the health care facilities are nonfunctional in the country, and around 50% of the sewerage system in the country is either destroyed or not functional exposing people to serious health hazards (UNOCHR 2019).The mental health related to trauma of war and violence can affect both children and adult. Food insecurity can also reduce the nutritional levels in children and women. Education in the conflict-affected areas is also severely affected. In Syria, 2.1 million children are out of school (Ibid.). In Iraq, in conflict-affected areas, such as Salah al-Din

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and Diyala, more than 90% of the children aged for school are left out. The situation of girls’ education is the worst (UNICEF 2020b). Rohingya children are also deprived from education as they had to flee to neighboring countries to save their lives. Also, some of the discriminatory policies taken by the Government of the country do not allow them to study in schools outside their camp or even from taking the national school examination. Also for all those Rohingyas who are staying in refugee camps in Bangladesh, it was decided that education for them will be informal that means their curriculum will not help to provide the Rohingya children any degree in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2019). (c) Economic Effect For those areas which are affected by war, instability can lead to economic losses. The unrest in a country can be led to low economic performances and in turn low GDP rates. According to International Monitory Fund (2019), conflicts can affect significantly the revenue and expenditure side of the Government of the conflict-affected country. IMF points with respect to Sub-Sahara Africa that GDP in the conflict areas is 2.5 times lower in comparison to that where there is no conflict, and those countries especially those who are nonoil commodity exporters have suffered greater effects of conflict on their economy. Similarly, countries such as Rwanda, Iraq, and Syria have suffered from lack of economic growth, and thus poverty is rampant affecting the overall growth of the country. (d) Forced Displacement Forced displacement happens when people of a particular area are forced to leave or migrate from their own place to avoid violence, war, or even economic hardship. According to UN (2020), unprecedented 70.8 million people around the world have been forced to flee from home by conflict and persecution by the end of 2018. Due to the Syrian war, 5.7 million refugees are there worldwide, whereas 5.3 millions have migrated to the neighboring countries. Forced displcement also results in internally displaced persons

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(IDPs), who are displaced from their original home but they have not crossed the borders of their own country. There are around 6.2 million people in Syria who are internally displaced including 2.5 million children making them the largest group of IDPs in the world. (UNHCR 2020c). According to Global Report on Internal Displacement (2019), there were 28 million new internally displaced persons associated with disasters and conflicts which were recorded in 2018 spread across 148 countries. When seen on a regional level, Sub-Sahara Africa accounts for 69% of the total displacement related to conflict. Other significant displacements related to conflict are from Pakistan especially related to Federally Administered Area (FATA) or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area and the Rohingya exodus from Myanmar. (e) Child Soldiers In conflict-affected areas, the children are abused, tortured, kidnapped, forced into prostitution, and also recruited as child soldiers. According to ICRC (2012), a child soldier is someone who is any person below the age of 18 who is associated with an armed group or armed conflict in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys, and girls who can be used as cooks, porters, fighters, spies, or for sexual purpose. It is not necessarily restricted to only those who take part directly in the hostilities. Often, such children are forced to commit or witness violence that leaves a grave psychological effect on them. In Cambodia, Mozambique, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, children are abducted and forced to commit atrocities.

CAAs and Effect on SDGs SDGs, which have been adopted since 2015, talk about tackling the socio-economic and environmental challenges that the world faces. SDG 16 which talks about peace, justice, and strong institutions does not stand in isolation; it has interface with other SDGs. Particularly, the first three goals under SDG 16 are very important as they are the bedrock for SDG 16 to be successful.

SDG 16.1 talks about “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere” (UNDP 2020); however, a substantial portion of the population lives in conflict-affected areas which see some form of violence or the other. In a way, if a substantial portion of the population of the world is resident of CAAs, it means that mitigation of conflicts through political and diplomatic means is to be stressed upon. SDG 16.2 talks about to “End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children” (Ibid.). Yet, the prevailing miseries as already pointed out leave a vacuum to be addressed. This is vital as there is a real need to provide people around the world with a safe, protective, and friendly environment to be able to express, live, and work. SDG 16.3 aims to “Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all” (Ibid.). Injustice anywhere in the world can be a potential cause of conflict; if economic, political, or social justice is not provided, it leaves enough room for violence; especially human right abuses need to stop by concrete steps and policies both by the national and international agencies. Along with SDG 16, SDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 are related to CAAs which face fatalities, and human right abuses; therefore ending poverty, providing food security, good heath, quality education, gender equality, basic sanitation, economic growth, and reduced inequalities can be difficult if conflict is not stopped.

Conclusion In the end, it goes without saying that CAAs need to be monitored carefully for the success of all the SDGs. It is important to understand why an area is conflict-affected. It can be due to dispute over territory, ethnicity, economic resources, or the interplay of all the factors. In most cases, there are some factors which escalate the probability of conflict or war such as the inability of the Government to provide basics to the people and also to protect its own people. Institutional failures of the Government can lead to failure to stop violence and conflict from erupting. These strong institutions are very essential for peace, and justice, around the world.

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Cross-References ▶ Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact ▶ Economic Deprivation: Approaches, Causes, and Consequences for Violent Conflicts ▶ Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs ▶ Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

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130 Szayna ST, O’Mahony A, Kavanagh J, Watts S, Frederick B, Norlen CT, Voorhies P (2017) Conflict trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections. Research report. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1063/RAND_ RR1063.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2020 The Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (2020) Conflict Barometer. https://hiik.de/wp-content/ uploads/2020/08/ConflictBarometer_2019_4.pdf. Accessed 4 Aug 2020 The Newsweek (2018) What Is Nakba Day? Israel Prepares to Face Thousands of Palestinian Protesters. https://www.newsweek.com/what-nakba-dayisraelprepares-face-thousands-palestinian-protesters926464#:~:text=Israel%20Prepares%20to%20Face% 20Thousands%20of%20Palestinian%20Protesters,-By %20David% 20Brennan& text=This%20year% 20marks%20the%2070th,was%20founded%20in% 20May%201948. Accessed 12th Aug 2020 The Telegraph (2015) Who are the Rohingya boat people? https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/ burmamyanmar/11620933/Who-are-theRohingyaboat-people.html. Accessed 31st Aug 2020 The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (2020) UCPD Definitions, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/. Accessed 2 Aug 2020 Time (2017) These 5 Border Disputes Are Still Causing Trouble. https://time.com/4858388/border-disputesiraq-syria-china-india/. Accessed 25th Aug 2020 United Nations (2020) Refugees. https://www.un.org/en/ sections/issues-depth/refugees/. Accessed 4 Sep 2020 United Nations Development Programme (2020). Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. https://www.un.org/sustaina bledevelopment/peace-justice/. Accessed 4 July 2020. United Nations Global Compact (2020) Do Business while advancing Peace. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ what-is-gc/our-work/governance/peace. Accessed 23 Aug 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020a) 1 per cent of humanity displaced: UNHCR Global Trends report. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/ 2020/6/5ee9db2e4/1-cent-humanity-displaced-unhcrglobal-trends-report.html. Accessed on 15th Aug 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020b) Rohingya Refugee Crisis. https://www.unrefugees.org/ emergencies/rohingya/. Accessed 30 Aug 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020c) Internally Displaced Person. https://www.unhcr.org/sy/ internally-displacedpeople#:~:text=As%20citizens% 2C%20they%20retain%20all,pace%20of%20displace ment%20remains%20relentless. Accessed 30 Aug 2020 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2020a) Immunization and Conflict. https://www. unicef.org/immunization/immunization-and-conflict. Accessed 3 Sep 2020 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2020b) Education, every child in school. https://www.

Conflict-Free Administration unicef.org/iraq/what-we-do/education. Accessed 3 Sep 2020 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2019) Humanitarian need overview, Syrian Arab republic. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf. Accessed 2 Sep 2020 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2020) Data on Casualties. https://www. ochaopt.org/data/casualties. Accessed 1 Sep 2020 UNICEF (2020) https://www.unicef.org/immunization/ immunization-and-conflict UNOCHR Syria (2020) https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf Varshney A (2007) Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict. In Carles Biox, & Susan C. Stokes (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politic. Oxford University Press, UK Vasquez AJ, Valeriano B (2009) Territory as a Source of Conflict and a Road to Peace. In Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I William Zartman (eds) The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Sage Publication, London Wright Q (1957) International conflict and the United Nations. World Polit 10:24–48. https://doi.org/10. 2307/2009223

Conflict-Free Administration ▶ Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice

Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities Washaya Washaya School of Business and Economics, Faculty of Diplomacy and Sustainable Development, Euclid University, Harare, Zimbabwe

Definitions Institutional autonomy means freedom in political, economic responsibilities. SDG refers to Sustainable Development Goals to be implemented by 2030.

Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction The Agenda 2030 advocates for inclusive as well accountable institutions for sustainable, inclusive development trajectory. Its thrust is to ensure inclusive, responsive, participatory, as well as representative decision-making processes at different levels. Fundamental freedoms and nondiscriminatory laws result in stable policies for SDGs implementation. The institution is a multifaceted term, including a plethora of structures, frameworks, entities, and norms that organize society. The global does not prescribe institutional models solely for the national level but also outlines parameters that institutions should endeavor to attain effectiveness, accountability, inclusiveness, responsive, participatory, as well as a representative decision-making criterion. Formal institutions encompass written laws, written constitutions, policies, regulations, and rights regulations enforced by respective official authorities (Gustafsson and And Scurrah 2019). Achieving SDGs will need an interlinkage of factors, including regulatory components, legal, multiple institutions interoperability, and broader societal changes. Individual institutions can contribute to inclusivity in different aspects. Among a plethora of institutions that must be critically examined in the context of fostering inclusivity, national councils for sustainable development (NCSDs) as well as parliaments are essential to achieve SDGs. The 2030 Agenda acknowledges the critical role of parliaments through legislative procedures, accountability, and budgetary processes.

Agenda 2030 and Inclusive Institutions Each government has a different point of departure as well as preferences for governance styles as a result of constitutional settings, political practice, culture, geography, and underlying environmental, economic, and social circumstances. The demands of participation in different international regimes cause policy coordination mechanisms across government a fundamental factor for determining effective governance. Paradoxically, power-holders can establish institutions for the

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benefit of all societal groups. Institutions not advocating for inclusivity potentially infringe and undermine rights and equal opportunities, and perpetuate economic pitfalls (Magnin 2018). Inclusive institutions avail equal rights as well as entitlements and facilitate equal opportunities and access to resources based on universality. Financial institutions dictate the rights, regulatory framework, as well as the corruption and degree of rent-seeking and corruption. Examples of formal institutions encompass labor laws and property rights. Many cross-country statistical studies find that more inclusive economic institutions improve. The quality of institutions, including property rights and the rule of law, are essential in the achievement of SDGs by 2030. In the context of political institutions, their level of genuine inclusiveness is critical for sustainability (Mauerhofer 2019). Deeper levels of political inclusion encompassing political competition, and competitive recruitment to these parties, issues-based political parties, have significant effects on SDGs attainment. Strengthening inclusive institutions entails, transforming power relations, incorporating marginalized groups, addressing political, social, and economic drivers in the context of private institutions.

Institutionalism Reinvented in the Context of SDGs Implementation In the context of a practical implementation of the global goals, the problem of developing institutions has to be reinvented. Developing effective, accountable institutions are pivotal for Agenda 2030. Formal in institutional capacities encompassing structures, processes, systems, legal parameters, networks, leadership, governance, and policy environment is essential for effective SDGs implementation. All SDGs oscillate around effectiveness, capability, inclusiveness, and accountability of formal institutions. Institutions are to undertake forecasting, implementation, planning, monitoring, and evaluation to attain SDGs by 2030. Sustainable development. Countries aspiring for the development of institutions for effective implementation of SDGs need to focus on the

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weakness and inadequacies of respective formal institutions. It also means recognizing areas of the 2030 Agenda implementation where institutions are too few is pivotal. Consideration of the symbiotic relationship among institutions, leadership, and the environment is fundamental. Leadership, the governance environment landscape, and people have a significant role in ensuring the dynamism of institutions frameworks. Institutions are effective, accountable, and inclusive as people as well as leaders who operate them. It is intricate to note that institutions are created and modified by people (Gök 2018). There is a symbiotic nexus between leadership and institutions where sustain institutions and on the contrary, institutions support implementation and guide of their vision. The commitment of respective leaders to the welfare of the people permeates throughout institutional edifice and affect effectiveness. Leadership and human resources need to possess the appropriate competencies, values, and mindsets for institutions to propel the sustainable development goals implementation.

Governments Political Will and the Right Leadership Lack accountable as well as transformational political leadership responsive to the aspirations of citizens is an indicator of poor good governance, which is against the attainment of global goals tenets. Responsible leadership foster good governance, build strong institutions, enhances transparency, profer stability, transparency, and sustained development. Countries under investigation have difficulties in facilitating policy coherence, and coordination pursues broader development objectives. There is unequivocally lack of commitment to sustainable development from the top at the country level and to subsequently focus on policies geared towards SDGs. The need for developing countries leadership that can understand the threats, opportunities, and challenges of globalization, good governance and democratization, preferred future vision, and commitment is crucial (Schmidt et al. 2017). Public policy formulation is subject to ideological and political pressures and also vulnerability to the

globalization exigencies. Success and failure contextually depend on the quality of leadership. Legislative leaders have limited capacity to fully understand the long-term effects of global and domestic changes and proffer sustainable solutions. Due to the lack of political will, they failed to form an environment to enable the continuous evolution of leaders with competence, vision, integrity, and commitment. Endemic problems revolve around inappropriate policies, bad governance, and corrupt, incompetent, and ineffective leaders. Political will for reforms implementation is necessary due to the need for sustainability reforms. The issue of sustainability is vital for institutional reforms, because such improvements have long gestation periods making SDGs achievement embedded in a vacuum. Credible and visible intents by political leaders to fight corruption at the systemic level is critical. Political will is the first critical first significant point of departure for sustainability attainment. Lack of political will is the root cause of limited transparency, lack of accountability, poor governance, and unsustainable leadership (Cao 2015). Governance incorporates integrity, transparency, and efficiency of government. Political will, watchdog agencies, the judiciary, public involvement, the private sector are crucial for the attainment of SDGs. Implementation of SDGs requires visionary leaders who recognize the significant setbacks mismanagement and corruption. The failure of respective case countries from previous reform strategies was predominantly as a result of limited political will and mismanagement. Good governance is an outcome of effective good leadership. Challenges faced by developing countries are a failure to see management as an enterprise that should focus predominantly on societal needs. Lack of political will to provide global leadership at national, regional, and international landscape impedes SDGs implementation.

Institutional Capacity and Autonomy Lack of institutional independence and ability is a disgrace to development trajectory. Attaining SDGs requires integration of legal, regulatory elements, multiple institutions interventions, and

Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

broader societal changes. Economic relations, political governance, as well as social norms among communities, are instrumental institutional parameters affecting development outcomes. These institutions affect social relationships inclusivity. Institutions that are not inclusive hurt political, economic decisionmaking processes resulting in vulnerability corruption and violence. Inclusive institutions avail equal entitlements, rights, opportunities, and access to services (Fidelman et al. 2017). Countries under study have weak economic and political institutions necessary for development goals implementation. Institutions shape the rights, regulatory framework, and also the degree of corruption, and market fundamentals. Strengthening institutions includes shifting power relations incentives, involving marginalized people, addressing drivers of exclusion in the context of institutions. Institutional reform is needed across countries for social cohesion, ideological legitimacy, transparency, and interoperability across countries to achieve partnership for SDGs Many countries under study suffer from overly ambitious technocratic institutional reforms resulting in little improvement in spite of changes structures. It is, therefore, essential to support drivers of institutional change. Achieving pragmatic institutional change is a formidable force due to policy paralysis and ideological confusion. The relative significance of institutions, integration, and geography is pivotal for development initiatives – differences in incomes between the world’s most developed countries and the poorest ones. Majority of institutions in selected countries increase security that the risk of incurring in an economic transaction is matched by the full appropriation of its eventual benefits. Property rights protection needs an expanded role of state authority. There are limited property rights adequate to steer economic growth – lack of sufficient balance limit the extractive state power capacity. Democratic institutions sharply accelerate to this process property rights for sustained, inclusive growth. Unequal institutions limit development by reducing the ability of respective individuals’ access to resources and increase their incomes. There are many societal outcomes linked to institutional arrangements historically. Institutions are

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essential in determining the economic development level of the respective countries. Institutions determine the horizon for oppression and resources expropriation by elites leading to unequal institutions allowing powerful, dominant elites over economic exchange thus limiting development. Institutions determine whether the environment is necessary for cooperation (Shakya 2010). Participatory and inclusive institutions improve the flow of information and reduce risk and necessitate sustainable wealth production. Institutions in many developing countries are rooted in greater inequality, imperfect political competition, and divergent cooperative norms against the tenets of SDGs development agenda.

Adherence to the Rule of Law and Property Rights Protection The practice of law that state powers and government can exercise legitimacy only in line with applicable regulations is vital. The rule of law is the major setback of development in countries with ideological instability. The legality of the state and institutions must be anchored on the rule of law. Case countries under study have a weak rule of law in the context of safeguarding against arbitrary as well as careless governance and power abuse (Mukum Mbaku 2018). This makes achieving SDGs by 2030 difficult in the reality that it is difficult for respective governments to reform themselves out of power. The hallmarks for the rule of law include separation of powers and the impartial judiciary which is limited in countries with ideological instability and also marred with the undercurrent counterglobalization wave. Specifically, many centrifugal forces eat away nation-states, especially agility, thus reversing political, social, as well as economic achievements is difficult. It is insane to anticipate about the achievement of the rule of law. The ripple effects of civil unrest and armed conflicts at the regional or country-level can create geopolitical and geo-economic spillover effects for neighbors. Endemic corruption is also a hindrance to the rule of law. Wanton disregarding of citizenry rights stem from poor implementation of

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the doctrine of separation of powers, epitomized by timid legislatures and judiciaries run mainly by the executive. This void in the rule of law implements the development goals vacuous and evasive across countries. The rule of law creates enough freedom to innovate and create. State capture encompasses the appropriation of state functions, institutions, and organs by groups or individuals. In the context of developing countries, individuals can influence the adoption and design of new laws, regulations, and rules, including the modification of current ones. There is limited institutional capacity due to state institutions, state ministries, the judiciary, and the legislature lack of independence to make sustainable political, economic decision-making processes (Touchton 2016). In this context, state capture is a catastrophic form of corruption, which is against the tenets of inclusive development. Countries under study have an arduous task to streamline development in line with local, regional, and international dictates due to the taking over of rule-making as well as rule-interpreting decisionmaking processes by the elite. Majority of governments could not shape the laws, regulations, and policies for system sustainable development process due to policy instability, ideological disorientation, weak property rights, and democratic processes and consequently, the state stops to operate in the best interest of the general populace. Through abandoning normal functions encompassing the provision of necessary public goods as well as services a significant uptick in government impunity, making the realization of SDGs by 2030 formidable phenomena.

Free-Market Environment Independent from Government Institutional Interference Governments’ market interventions in selected case countries impede the corrective capability of the market, thereby slowing sustainable political, economic recovery due to the weak rule of law and policy instability. Markets require stable laws and policies for the proper pricing of assets. Command economies reduce the systematic flow of services and goods between countries resulting

in a devastating global economic growth trajectory. Governments protect unfair privileges of politically connected special interests, which is against the tenets of sustainability. Lack of market independence is a hindrance towards the attainment of SDGs by 2030. Absence of simple, transparent, and clear policies for economic growth trajectory is also a force to reckon with. Corruption accelerates where financial regulatory procedures are very complex and government interference pervasive. A free-market system that advocates for openness, the flow of goods, services, and interconnectedness among nation-states is complicated due to lack of social cohesion, ideological legitimacy, porous global governance architecture, fragmentation of the international system, geo-economic, and geopolitical competition (Zagórski 2018). This implements the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development through partnerships evasive as well as unattainable. Asymmetric threats, energy transitions, state versus market dynamics, and antiglobalization narrative compound difficulties in the global direction towards SDGs implementation. Economic freedom is strongly correlated with economic growth. An environment characterized by financial freedom attract the ingredients necessary to spearhead economic growth. It is essential to comprehend that economic freedom is a critical ingredient in market performance. Financial freedom results in economic growth regardless of limited political freedom. Emerging democracies must pursue free markets, protection of property rights, provision of a stable currency, and reduces the government’s role in the economic realm. Economic freedom ultimately leads to political freedom. Financial freedom encompasses a plethora of components which must be put into consideration for an economy to grow. Selected countries under study strive to have a stable monetary system, security of private property rights, the impartial legal system, minimal government intervention, and reduced barriers for international exchange. From the preceding, it is prudent to note that governments’ interference in market activities is the greatest challenge of our time. Political and economic fragmentation cause frequent involvement by respective governments to indulge in the dictates of market operation (Hunt 2012). It is also essential to have market

Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

consolidation among developing countries. However, this requires a long-term strategy which is difficult due to ideological instability and market fragmentation implementing SDGs across developing countries an arduous task. Two wrongs may not make a right cementing the need for further investment in multilateral diplomacy for partnerships notwithstanding the anti-globalization backlash.

Migrating from Fragility to Resilience Fragility framework narrates ratios of high risk and low coping capacity in the context of political, economic, social, environmental, as well as security aspects. On the other hand, attempts to encourage resilience to help predatory regimes longevity in power intimidation and repression. Positive resilience predominately has some responsive to primary societal needs and widens state legitimacy. Positive resilience avails mean for self-reliance, focusing on coping capacities to promote inclusive development, legitimacy, and markets openness. It takes a long time to migrate from fragility to resilience, making SDGs implementation complex. Strengthening governance structures in fragile states for the promotion of structural reforms for societal resilience is an essential frontier in the supporting of fragile states (Hawker and Edmonds 2015). The challenge faced by countries under study, in general, is how to pragmatically transition from fragility to resilience considering inadequate governance mechanisms, low social cohesion, weak institutions, and economic vulnerabilities. Limited resources to facilitate the rule of law, more inclusive sustainable development, and justice for societal confidence is formidable. Limited holistic comprehension of how political economy aspects of risks undermine broader political governance, and settlements institutions are rife. Achieving coordination, cooperation, and commitment to navigate from fragility to resilience is difficult due to power asymmetries, ideological variations, clients, exclusion, and elite capture. A focus on governance structures that address inequalities and enhances accountability promote stability over time, making global goals existing in a

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vacuum. Generally, the magnitude of resilience in the context of the social contract should determine state-building strategic orientations (Olenski 2017). If the state leadership has a plausible strategy to foster social commitment, there a strong emphasize on forging an integrative multi-donor approach for providing support to the national budget directly. Likewise, where the source of disequilibrium is anchored on the state’s incapability to extend the rule of law and support long-term development programming of legitimate justice structures should be the thrust. Political collaboration with respective governments to generate necessary political, economic reforms and enhance service delivery for human development aspects is a complicated task. The focus should be on political processes for the state legitimation, the rule of law development framework, including respect to economic governance, and establishment of the security framework for stability. The challenge of state-building in line with authoritarian political systems is formidable. Governments should seek to locate opportunities for engagement with institutions for legitimacy. Likelihood of state collapse in scenarios of rapid political transformations is an arduous task implementing SDGs in the context of state fragility complex.

Institutional Economics in the Context of SDGs Implementation Recommendations and analysis of development economics concentrated on institutions. In this section, the navigation from market fundamentals to institutions in the context of theory and political aspects as the basis of methodological grounding in articulating SDGs implementation in under ideological confusion and post-globalization in developing countries is vital. The contribution made to institutional economics as a result of failures in economic paradigmatic transition experiments experienced in some states where development economic policies were in sync with the significant dictates of international organizations. These pitfalls have been at the point of departure of a change in policy orientations transitioning from privatization, liberalization,

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and stabilization to contemporary governance architecture reforms. The origin of the New Institutional Economics and the dissemination and revival of institutional economics is essential. Long-term economic growth under this theory is vital (Greenwood and Holt 2016). The emphasis on the significant role of institutions in the context of long-term growth and in sustainable economic development is an essential point of departure. Contemporary economic growth theories, for example, endogenous model economic growth theories show that economic growth predominantly depends on the abilities of many countries to avail technological innovations, in line with public utilities, infrastructure endowments, and workforce education. These aspects only delineate immediate, not fundamental, causal elements of economic growth. Beyond the said parameters, significant growth explanations trajectories and rhythms among countries anchored on the differences institutional architectures. Institutions contribute to the explanation of long-term divergences in global growth trajectories. Institutions produce security and the reduction of uncertainty linked to different economic transactions. Contextually, institutions have a pivotal role in enforcement rules and contracts. There is a correlation between geographical location and development. Econometric tests delineate that the predominance of the quality of institutions on income level. The variety of institutions, promotes the rule of law, policy stability, democracy, human rights, political-economic stability, which is critical for SDGs implementation. Institutions are essential in the context of a healthy market economy. Markets cannot be effectively operational in the absence of a set of institutions, including rules to augment economic activity and reforms without due considerations of their impact on the governance relations necessitated. The international organizations stressed the fact that the effectiveness of the organizations largely depends on institutional environmental parameters akin to economic growth. International organizations attributed difficulties in the transition to governance failures including labor market rigidities, educational system weaknesses, economic inefficiencies, systemic legal decay, and

corporate governance deficit as well as substantial corruption. To enhance this demise of governance loans granted to developing countries were conditioned to accountable governance, the efficient legal system, struggle against corruption, and political freedom. There was a shift from price and market theory to the legal, political, and social, environmental dichotomy of contracting. Furthermore, international organizations sometimes mix up effects and causes regarding the economy and institutions. The emergence of the New Institutional Economics is a result of seminal contribution to the domain of econometric analysis and dynamic global economic order. The nexus between political, financial, social institutions, and power matrix need an evaluation in sync with the 2030 Agenda. Institutions encompassing rules, customs, traditions, formal constraints, legal regulations, property rights, and enforcement devices are critical for SDGs implementation. The aspect of how institutional reform occurs in light of transition is poorly understood. Not only sufficient property rights is the hallmark of economic incentives but also mechanisms. In this context, institutions are mental models linked to the methodology people view the function of the financial system both normatively and positively. Institutions act as a social glue which producing cohesion and social dimension bringing predispositions and cognitive aptitudes necessary for championing SDGs. It is intricate to realize that besides atomistic views of mainstream and institutional approaches, New Institutional Economics is closer to socioeconomics, including interactions with the market economy (Kudłak 2008). Distinctions between relations-based and rule-based institutions are critical. Rule-based institutions focus on economic interactions mainly supported by legal regulations and laws; on the contrary, link-based institutions concerned with economic interactions. Alternative mechanisms of coordination including the market, the state, and the community organizations play different roles, conflicting and complementary, in the context of political, economic, and social development. The partnership is critical for the achievement of SDGs. To proclaim the superiority of one coordination mechanism as opposed to the other is futile, naïve, and ahistorical.

Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

Economic-Political Linkage in New Institutional Economics It is pivotal to note that growth transitional phases are political processes, and an institutional appraisal made by many international organizations are focused on political indicators. There is a nexus between economic institutions and political institutions. Political institutions include laws, rules, and other practices dictating methodologies on how people accede to various civic responsibilities. Some nondemocratic nations can grow faster sometimes than old democracies. It is unclear whether causality transient from justice to development or vice versa. Political, institutional mechanisms augmented by ideological, cultural orientations, and ultimately determine economic institutions. New Institutional Economics regard economic dynamism, which combines economic causality emanating from individuals economic power and organizations as well as institutional causality, which emerges from political influence. The direction of causality is from individual to political power. If economic power is the agent of change, political power avails the source of the selection of public purposes and rules, regulations of the commercial practices and processes. Deontic institutional properties do not constrain people only but also create new power linkages which independent from individual human desires. It is against this background the study focuses on SDGs implementation Washington Consensus in the concept that economic laws truths universally separate cultural and historical context was based. Neoclassical economics which advocated for those policies dominantly rooted on properties of equilibrium. Due to the advancement of time, Washington Consensus focused on reforms efficiency and poverty, and sensitivity to human distress. The New Institutional Economics developed a limited mechanical view of causality. Designing the functions to perform is not the same thing that creating the shape they should take. It delved on how to minimize costs of transaction in the context of the rule of law, human rights, corruption, and democracy yet in third world countries; institutions differ from those in older first world countries. In the context of the divergences that exist between

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institutional form and institutional, high-quality institutions achieve economic convergence. Market economies are an extensive system supported by linked institutions. Crucial institutions: the legal, political systems matter less as compared to the self-consistency of complementary institutions. Capitalist globalization prefers homogenization. Nevertheless, different types of national capitalism are still persistent (Pohoaţă and Socoliuc 2014). The intervention of nation-states due to nationalist policy agendas and the emergence of the post-globalization narrative is a cause for concern in the context of SDGs implementation.

Institutional Arrangements for Government Investment for Sustainable Development Goals While the SDGs presents an excellent opportunity to the private sector, they constitute a formidable challenge and obligation to the public sector. The sustainable development goals compel governments to reconsider their respective policies with regards to the public sector investment narratives and to rejuvenate the roles of global state enterprise as an institution for spearheading delivering and the provision of public services. There seems to be a swing back in the context of underscoring the duties of the public enterprise after an extended period of privatization. The trend of privatization in line with public services is prevailing worldwide. It is crucial to acknowledge that republication occurs, in various countries in the context of divergent political environments but supported by similar rationale interalia excessive prices, concerns about investment sustainability, environmental aspects, and quality of service. The need for the implementation of the global inclusively is likely to reignite the thrust very actively on responding to the general populace interest and to encourages a plethora of governments to engage in ownership or the operation of public parameters (Sukharev 2018). Governments, through a partnership with public and other private actors, need to ensure the effective implementation of SDGs as a result of equitable delivery of necessary public services. The public

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enterprise provides investment in some areas critical for inclusive development. For many countries globally, private sector as well as the civil society are still too weak to for development trajectory and consequently governments through formal institutional autonomy have to engage in investments to stimulate sustainable growth for the achievement of SDGs as well as national development aspects. There is a need to recontextualize the role of the public institutions in line with the implementation of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development.

promote and support the involvement and participation of the people and ensure equal access to services. The High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, set up by the United Nations Secretary-General in July 2012, reported, people the world over expect their governments to be accountable, honest, and responsive to their needs. Achieving commonality at the local, regional, and international level is wishful thinking.

Conclusions A Meta Governance Approach to Make SDGs Work The implementation of Sustainable Development Goals need differentiated governance frameworks as it falls short of using one governance style only – hierarchical, network, or market governance – or any one style combination that is believed to be fit-for-all-purposes (Pahl-Wostl 2019). There seems to be some convergence towards using this as a comprehensive approach to achieving appropriate governance frameworks. Policymakers must use meta governance, combined with crucial governance principles, as mechanisms to support design, analysis, and management of Sustainable Development Goals governance frameworks. A possible step-by-step methodology for SDGs implementation with meta governance is of paramount significance, as well as establishing governance support arrangements to help process design, review, monitoring, and evaluation, at local, regional, and international level. It is necessary to note that meta governance is not governance by its very nature: it is about combining governance styles into frameworks that produce results. There are two approaches to meta governance: a wider one which seems necessary for Sustainable Development Goals implementation at the national level, putting into consideration considering the massive variety of challenges, cultures, circumstances, traditions among different countries, and a narrower one. Most importantly, governance develops institutions, structures, systems, and practices that

The institutional development for effective implementation sustainable development goals must take into consideration institutions as practical organizational arrangements. Strengthening collaboration and collective effects of institutions in civil, public, and private society as well as strengthening underlying institutions must be an essential point of departure in the context of the Agenda 2030 implementation. Country-specific institutional arrangements must be put into cognizance since there is no one size fits all approach. For the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development to be effectively implemented, to be realized there is a necessity to revert the general public into public administration institutional arrangements not only through decentralized governance structures but also as well through participatory governance including decision-making processes for impact, accountability, and transparency. Improving formal institutions needs enhancing political leadership will and resource mobilization around sustainable development. It is pivotal to develop institutions, notably the public service, judiciary, and legislature. The effective rule of law and property rights are fundamental in the context of SDGs implementations. These formal institutional mechanisms instill policy consistency and predictability, which is pivotal for business competitiveness and foreign direct investment. Institutional autonomy is fundamental for long-term policy programming, which is vital for global goals achievement. The public institutional architecture needs to be reinvigorated in an endeavor to achieve the SDGs by 2030.

Crime

Cross-References ▶ Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Meta-governance

References Cao X (2015) Challenges and potential improvements in the policy and regulatory framework for sustainable tourism planning in China: the case of Shanxi Province. J Sustain Tour 23(3):455–476. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09669582.2014.957207 Fidelman P et al (2017) The institutions-adaptive capacity nexus: insights from coastal resources co-management in Cambodia and Vietnam. Environ Sci Policy 76:103–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.06.018 Gök A (2018) The role of first-best governance institutions on growth in the least developed countries. EN AZ GELİŞMIŞ ÜLKELERDE BİRİNCİ EN İYİ YÖNETİŞİM KURUMLARININ BÜYÜME ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ 40(2):208–229. https://doi.org/10. 14780/muiibd.511029 Greenwood DT, Holt RPF (2016) Sustainable development in affluent countries and the neo-institutionalist synthesis. J Econ Issues (Taylor & Francis Ltd) 50(3):647–666. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2016.1210363 Gustafsson M-T, And Scurrah M (2019) Strengthening subnational institutions for sustainable development in resource-rich states: decentralized land-use planning in Peru. World Dev 119:133–144. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.worlddev.2019.03.002 Hawker NW, Edmonds TN (2015) Avoiding the efficiency trap: resilience, sustainability, and antitrust. Antitrust Bull 60(3):208–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603 X15598096 Hunt SD (2012) Toward the institutionalization of macromarketing: sustainable enterprise, sustainable marketing, sustainable development, and the sustainable society. J Macromarket 32(4):404–411. https://doi. org/10.1177/0276146712453331 Kudłak R (2008) Adaptation of enterprises to the requirements of sustainable development in the light of new institutional economics. Manag Environ Qual Int J 19(2):213–221. https://doi.org/10.1108/14778308108 56591 Magnin E (2018) Varieties of capitalism and sustainable development: institutional complementarity dynamics or radical change in the hierarchy of institutions? J Econ Issues (Taylor & Francis Ltd) 52(4):1143–1158. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/00213624.2018.1536017 Mauerhofer V (2019) Legal institutions and ecological economics: their common contribution for achieving a sustainable development. Ecol Econ 156:350–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.09.023 Mukum Mbaku J (2018) Rule of law, state capture, and human development in Africa. Am Univ Int Law Rev 33(4):771–836

139 Olenski J (2017) Role of official statistics in fragile countries, regions, and sectors of the economy. Stat J IAOS 33(4):833–849. https://doi.org/10.3233/SJI170371 Pahl-Wostl C (2019) The role of governance modes and meta-governance in the transformation towards sustainable water governance. Environ Sci Policy 91:6–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.10.008 Pohoaţă I, Socoliuc O-R (2014) Franchise’s place within sustainable development matrix: an institutional economics approach. Theor Appl Econ 21(12):27–36 Schmidt S, Busse S, Nuriyev E (2017) Government and biodiversity governance in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: an institutional perspective. Environ, Dev Sustain 19(5):1953–1980. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668016-9838-z Shakya M (2010) Institutions and development: advances in new institutional analysis. Progr Dev Stud 10(4):384–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/14649934090 1000418 Sukharev OS (2018) Public administration: institutions, resource transfer, jobs. Государственное управление: институты, перелив ресурсов, рабочие места 9(5):11–25 Touchton M (2016) The benefits of balance: credibility, the rule of law, and investment in Latin America. Latin Am Res Rev 51(2):195–216. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar. 2016.0024 Zagórski K (2018) Etatism versus liberalism: economic attitudes in Poland after the world crisis. J Manag Bus Admin. Central Europe 26(1):149–170. https://doi.org/ 10.7206/jmba.ce.2450-7814.223

Cooperative Leaders ▶ Local Leadership: Types and Functions

Countermeasures/Restrictive Measures (Wide Understanding, Particularly in Relation to Economic and/or Financial Enforcement Measures) ▶ Multilateral and Unilateral Sanctions: Compliance and Challenges

Crime ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

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engineering, arts, or medicine, in order to contribute to the achievement of SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Effective Institutions.

Criminal Justice Reform ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

Introduction

Critical Development Studies ▶ Post-development Alternatives: Debates in Development Paradigms

Enduring

Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals Rafael Gustavo Lima1 and Samara da Silva Neiva2 1 Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil 2 University of Southern of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil

Synonyms International collaboration; Institutional partnership; Stakeholders involvement

Definitions Cross-institutional collaborations means partnerships that can support the SDGs between entities and institutions. Specific themes can be related and are not necessarily active in the same field of action between the different dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social dimensions), as is the case of the partnership between a hospital and a technology company, for example. Trans-institutional collaborations mean theoretical recommendations and practical actions that can support the SDGs by combining efforts within the same scope of action, even though the objects of analysis may be different. An example is partnerships between higher education institutions that come together to find solutions in different fields of knowledge, such as

The resources available on the planet for consumption, both financial and human as well as natural, are limited resources, that is, to ensure their maintenance it is necessary to optimize their use. For this, the fundamental core is collaborative partnerships, which bring together capacities and resources in ways that together can reach a higher level: greater impact, greater sustainability, and greater value for all. Based on this, collaboration between sectors of society has emerged as one of the defining concepts of international development in the twenty-first century. Initially, partly in response to the limitations of traditional top-down, state-led approaches to development, partnership networks have grown and become an essential paradigm in sustainable development (United Nations 2018a). The importance of the partnership was fully recognized by the United Nations (UN), businesses, and all leading institutions in international development. As a way of looking for new partners that would represent the importance of international collaboration, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also known as Agenda 2030 – the model for global development – represent a fundamental change in thinking and start to recognize the interconnection of prosperous businesses, a prosperous society, and a healthy environment. The SDGs name all sectors of society as key actors in development and demand an unprecedented level of cooperation and collaboration between civil society, business, government, NGOs, foundations, and others for their realization (Neiva et al. 2020; United Nations 2018a). Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (in 2015), countries have continually updated institutional arrangements to allow government institutions and other stakeholders to fulfill the objectives contained in the Agenda (United Nations 2018b). Goal 16 –

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Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions – states that threats of international homicide, violence against children, trafficking in persons, and sexual violence are important to be addressed in order to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development (United Nations 2020a). Based on the above, this entry has as main objective to present a literature review on cross- and trans-institutional collaboration, as well as its importance for the implantation of sustainable development.

Strong Institutions To achieve peace, justice, and inclusion, it is important that governments, civil society, and communities work together to implement lasting solutions to reduce violence, offer access to justice, fight corruption, and ensure inclusive participation at all times. The freedom to express points of view, in private and in public, must be guaranteed. People must be able to contribute to the decisions that affect their lives. Laws and policies must be applied without any form of discrimination. Disputes need to be resolved through the functioning of political and judicial systems. National and local institutions must be responsible and must be in place to provide basic services to families and communities in an equitable manner and without the need for bribery (United Nations 2020b). The SDGs pave the way for providing access to justice for all and building effective and accountable institutions at all levels. Although homicide and trafficking cases have made significant progress in the past decade, there are still thousands of people at greatest risk for intentional murder in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. Violations of children’s rights through sexual assault and violence continue to plague many countries around the world, especially as underreporting and lack of data exacerbate the problem. To face these challenges and build a more peaceful and inclusive society, more efficient and transparent standards are required in addition to comprehensive and realistic government budgets. One of the first steps toward the

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protection of individual rights is the achievement of registrations at birth and the creation of independent national human rights institutions worldwide (United Nations 2020a). One of the important points of promoting peace, justice, and inclusive societies, in all regions, is that crimes that threaten the foundation of peaceful societies, including homicides, trafficking, and other organized crimes, as well as discriminatory laws or practices, affect all countries. Even the world’s largest democracies face major challenges in dealing with corruption, crimes, and human rights violations for everyone at home (United Nations 2020b). Armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long-standing complaints among communities. Violence, in all its forms, has a widespread impact on societies. Violence affects children’s health, development and well-being, and their ability to thrive. It causes trauma and weakens social inclusion. The lack of access to justice means that conflicts remain unsolved and people cannot obtain protection and redress. Institutions that do not operate under legitimate laws are prone to arbitrariness and abuse of power and are less able to provide public services to everyone. Excluding and discriminating not only violates human rights, it also causes resentment and animosity and can lead to violence (United Nations 2020b). Men make up about 80% of homicide victims in general, but women make up 64% of victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide. 70% of the detected victims of human trafficking are women and girls, and most of them are trafficked for sexual exploitation. The UN recorded and verified 397 murders that were ordered by e-mails from journalists and human rights unionists in 41 countries (January to October 2018), and 91 journalists and bloggers were among the victims; in addition, it is important to note that only three quarters of children under the age of 5 in the world have a birth certificate, demonstrating how the number of stateless children in the world is still high (United Nations 2020c). Among the institutions most affected by corruption are the judiciary and the police.

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Corruption, bribery, theft, and evasion cost developing countries around $1.26 trillion a year; that amount of money could be used to raise those living on less than $1.25 a day above $1.25 for at least 5 years. Birth registration occurred in 73% of children under 5 years of age, but only 46% in Sub-Saharan Africa had their births registered. Approximately 28.5 million school children out of school live in conflict-affected areas. The rules of law and development have a significant interrelationship and are mutually reinforcing, making sustainable development essential at national and international level. The proportion of prisoners held in detention without sentence has remained almost constant over the past decade, at 31% of all prisoners (United Nations 2020a). Violence against children affects more than 1 billion children worldwide and costs societies up to $7 trillion a year. 50% of the world’s children suffer violence every year. Every 5 minutes, somewhere in the world, 1 child is killed by violence, and 1 in 10 children is sexually abused before the age of 18; 9 out of 10 children live in countries where corporal punishment is not completely prohibited, leaving 732 million children without legal protection. One in three Internet users worldwide is a child, and 800 million of them use social media. Any child can become a victim of online violence. Reports of child sexual abuse online for NCMEC increased from 1 million in 2014 to 45 million in 2018. Worldwide, 246 million children are affected by schoolrelated violence each year. One in three students has been bullied by their peers at school in the past month, and at least one in ten children has been cyberbullied (United Nations 2020a). The notion of an “international regime,” defined as “institutionalized patterns of cooperation,” provides a conceptual key to the relationship. Interdependence creates the demand for an international regime; otherwise, interdependence is responsible only for exacerbating the conflict and increasing the risk of “market failure,” creating a cross-collaboration between the actors. Unlike realistic models of international relations, forms of international cooperation are sometimes generated that transcend the narrow and immediate interests of those involved. This is more than

the “hegemonic stability” theory, which in contemporary Europe does not apply, as two potential hegemonic powers are caught up in a secret and sometimes open struggle for mastery in their respective parts of the continent, in general, and in the world, overlaid “abroad” in particular (Lima et al. 2016). However, these two putative powers are at the same time looking for a model of relationships that transcends the logic of competitive behavior in the Cold War. Keohane examines precisely the “demand” for international regimes, and this certainly provides a useful line of analysis to analyze the situation that Europe is currently facing. International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which the expectations of the actors converge in a certain area of activity. An “international regime” in Europe is in fact under construction, as the “variable intermediate” between full-scale integration, on the one hand, and entrenched competitive behavior, on the other (Lima et al. 2016).

Institutional Theory The importance of institutional theory lies in the fact that it is capable of building rules, norms, and belief systems that become capable of sustaining social, economic, and environmental systems (Geels et al. 2020). In this sense, to understand the partnership systems proposed by SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions in the dimensions of the triple bottom line (economic/ environmental/social) – it is necessary to consider the resistance of institutions, such as private entities or even national states in the face of crises of social well-being or even “survival” ultimately. Thus, the understanding of institutions as a repetitive and considerably “guaranteed” social behavior, whose support by normative systems and cognitive understandings gives meaning to social exchange, and makes the institutional theory allow the result of coordinating the self-reproduction of the social order, established under local, national, or even international regimes (Lima et al. 2016).

Cross- and Trans-Institutional Collaboration to Support SDGs

Institutional theory argues that stakeholders can put pressure on organizations through their ability to guarantee legitimacy. Organizational legitimacy refers to a process by which an organization justifies its right to exist to its peers or superordinate system. This implies that the corporation’s actions are desirable, appropriate, or appropriate in the socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. Organizations can seek legitimacy from their stakeholders for various reasons, such as continuity, credibility, and active and passive support for the organization’s current and future actions. A legitimate organization can be perceived by stakeholders as more dignified, meaningful, predictable, and reliable (Geels et al. 2020). The neoinstitutional theory is mainly associated with the idea that the institutional environment – normative, cognitive, and regulatory of an organization – influences the organizations inserted in it, so that the organizations become more similar than different, a state described as isomorphism. This view of institutional theory dominated his study until the early 2000s. Although institutional theory has evolved tremendously in the past four decades, the propositions presented in the two papers are still widely accepted (and rightly so) and remain the primary foundations of many institutional studies (Wondirad et al. 2020). Knowledge of institutional theory has progressed, but the fundamental principles have remained somewhat intact. Notably, entities are influenced by the networks, fields, and societies in which they are inserted; this is called institutional contexts. Some are more susceptible to various pressures from these institutional contexts than others, especially those who do not have high status in each scenario. It is believed that compliance with institutional pressures, through mimesis, coercion, or alignment with normative expectations, has an impact on the perception of legitimacy (Wondirad et al. 2020; Zhang 2020). Institutional theory focuses on the effects of cultural belief systems on the behavior of institutions. Institutional theory helps us to understand “how the institutional environment, composed of socially created beliefs and cognitions, widely

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maintained in society and reinforced by corporate actors, affects the organization.” Furthermore, institutional theory treats the institution, or formal structure, not only as a stable property, but also as a changing process. An important concept of institutional theory is institutionalization, which can be defined as “a central process in the creation and perpetuation of lasting social groups.” Tolbert and Zucker argued that organizational decision-making processes and behaviors should be treated as a “continuum” between two models: the rational actor model and the institutional model, where the first assumes that decision makers always calculate “costs and benefits of different actions,” while the latter assumes that decision makers generally “accept and follow social norms without question.” Therefore, institutionalization can explain “when rationality is likely to be more or less limited” and identified three phrases in the institutionalization process: habitualization (creation of new structures), objectification (diffusion of structures), and sedimentation (permanence of structures). Institutional isomorphism is another important concept in institutional theory, which allows this study to explore how and why certain decision-making practices have become formal standards or structures for academic libraries. The institutional isomorphism theory was developed to address the impact of political power, institutional legitimacy, and economic adequacy on organizational behaviors and further identified three different types of isomorphism, including coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism (Wondirad et al. 2020). Most transitions therefore involve changes in institutions, although the depth of the change may vary. Evolutionary economics recognizes the importance of institutions but focuses mainly on formal policies and treats them mainly as exogenous. The neoinstitutional theories of organizational sociology developed broader and more dynamic understandings. For example, they distinguish three different types of institutions (regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive) with different logics and mechanisms. Institutional theory emphasizes that organizations operate not

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only in economic environments, but also in institutional environments. “In institutional environments, organizations compete for social aptitude and not for economic efficiency.” The selection criterion for social adequacy is adequacy or legitimacy; it defines as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, appropriate or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” Legitimacy is not peripheral, but it can influence reputations, operating licenses, and access to capital and government support. In the beginning, organization-centered institutional theory emphasized unidirectional causality, with institutions exerting selection pressures and organizations conforming to them, leading to relative homogeneity and isomorphism (Geels et al. 2020). Reports of institutional pressures, particularly those arising from different logics, have been somewhat absent from the major escalation of commitment research. A notable exception to how institutional influences, particularly the coercive and normative pressures of stakeholders, impact organizational decisions to stay on course of action made a brief mention of institutional structures, suggesting that they may influence the escalation of the commitment. In sport management, we examine the topic of legitimacy in escalating commitment, which is a central tenet of institutional theory. Minimal attention to institutions in scaling up commitment research is problematic, considering that institutional theory has evolved into “the dominant approach to understanding organizations” and has been prominent in the sports management literature. As such, we affirm that the understanding of institutional elements, particularly the multiple logics by which actions are conferred, in sports contexts that exhibit the principles of escalation of commitment is appropriate and necessary. To understand how institutional and logical structures can change perceptions of escalating commitment, it is important to clarify and review the main concepts of institutional theory. The definition of an institution has evolved over the past 60 years. The classic definition of an institution is “an organization infused with value.”

However, scholars have recognized that structures, norms, and the meanings attributed to them exist across society and are not simply confined to organizational environments (Zhang 2020).

Cross-Institutional and TransInstitutional Collaborations for Sustainable Development Goals Since 2015, the SDGs have become the normative framework that drives the global development discourse, so that the international development community has taken comprehensive measures to mobilize resources in an attempt to operationalize these Goals (Kumi et al. 2019). SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Effective Institutions – suggests that, to strengthen institutions around the larger goals of peace and justice, it is necessary to establish collaborations between different areas of knowledge and human activity. Thus, in the light of the concept raised in the definitions of this research, interinstitutional collaborations can be understood as partnerships made in order to support the creation of partnerships between the SDGs, entities, and institutions that relate issues related to sustainability with different areas of action. According to Ye et al. (2012), an example of cross-institutional collaboration is that of academic research, which, in the last two decades, has shown a high degree of interaction not only at the institutional level, but also at the interinstitutional partnership, collaboration, and relationship involving one or more institutions that are identified by the possibility of developing projects, sharing problems, experiences and common objectives, and international collaboration between educational institutions belonging to different nationalities, and levels. The author also suggests that scientific collaboration benefits the productivity and impact of research, and that interinstitutional collaboration reveals the general picture of academic performance, especially in the case of research and related to hospitality and tourism. Thus, Ye et al. (2012) highlight as a relevant point for cross-institutional collaboration the necessary understanding of the interaction

Cross- and Trans-Institutional Collaboration to Support SDGs

between academic institutions with various entities from different market segments, bringing the academic area and business practice closer together. An evaluation of the researched institutions in hospitality and tourism identified influential institutions and revealed their contributions to research collaboration from an interinstitutional perspective of the network of coauthors (Ye et al. 2012). Another contribution to the understanding of cross-institutional collaboration with entities that do not necessarily operate in the same field of action between the different dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social dimensions) is the case of the partnership between a hospital and a technology company, for example, or an approximation of themes from different scopes of action such as economy and health. In this sense, Wondirad et al. 2020 suggests that changes in disease patterns and the economic climate have created challenges for contemporary health systems and, to meet the growing demands for care in a fiscally responsible manner, they began to require new collaborative approaches. To this end, the author indicates in his research that cross-institutional collaboration involves not only health professionals, but also managers, researchers, educators, and basic scientists. In addition, the challenges of contemporary times make the collaborative capacity for analysis urgent, since works involving Economy and Health need to actively involve consumers, policy makers, and doctors in the research process, so that the relevance, application, and acceptance of research results can be expanded and allow for more accurate conclusions (Ye et al. 2012). In addition to collaborative efforts involving specific areas of knowledge and scientific research, it is interesting to consider the trans-institutional collaborations that can be understood as theoretical recommendations and practical actions that can support the SDGs by combining efforts within the same scope of action, even though the objects of analysis may be different, such as partnerships between higher education institutions that come together to find solutions in different fields of knowledge, such as engineering, arts, or medicine,

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in order to contribute to the achievement of SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Effective Institutions (de Amorim et al. 2020; Garcia et al. 2017). An example of this is the ISCN – International Sustainable Campus Network, which currently brings together more than 90 educational institutions, including universities, institutes of science and technology, and polytechnic schools and colleges in general from over 30 countries on 6 continents (ISCN 2020). In this way, ISCN mission is to provide an international forum to support higher education institutions in exchanging information, ideas, and best practices to achieve sustainable campus operations and to integrate sustainability into research and teaching. In this way, ISCN offers two basic principles disseminated with the reflection related to the theme of sustainability on campus, institutional leadership, and network collaboration. For the latter, in particular, it is understood (1) the deepening and broadening of the collaboration that takes place between members of the network to accelerate collective action; and (2) ensuring that the network is significantly inspiring international dialogue and debate to contribute to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (ISCN 2020). Another possible example for trans-institutional collaboration stems from the private sector bias. According to Vazquez-Brust et al. (2020), collaborations between private sector entities for sustainable development, in reinforcing goals that make peace and justice possible, remain what the author calls the “black box of collaborative governance,” that is, the set of specific arrangements or types of collaboration used by various actors to come together and implement and oversee rules that align their efforts toward shared goals. In this sense, when entities from the same sector (in this example, the private sector of a specific market) collaborate with each other, as equals, to achieve higher levels of well-being, it can be said that trans-institutional collaboration occurs. In this sense, according to Vazquez-Brust et al. (2020), there are different types of collaboration as a governance mechanism for building Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions that are consistent with the Sustainable Development

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Goals as a whole, in an arrangement of alternative governance agreements that can be combined. Furthermore, the authors indicate in their research that the success of the collaboration depends not only on the specific dimensions of governance, but also on the type of SDGs to be pursued and the type of partners involved (Vazquez-Brust et al. 2020; Lima et al. 2020). Thus, the growing recognition that the private sector can strengthen corporate social responsibility initiatives and contribute to the achievement of several SDGs, through the cross- and trans-institutional collaboration paths, goes hand in hand with the challenges related to the lack of coordination among the players in the private sector and community (Kumi et al. 2019). Wondirad et al. (2020), when dealing with the interaction between stakeholders, suggest that providing solutions to challenges that restrict the impacts of ecotourism requires embracing collaboration before any competition and reconciling competing interests of several common actors. For the authors, collaboration is a process in which the actors come together to discuss issues of common interest with the intention of reaching common ground. In this sense, factors such as issues of power, trust, interdependence, reciprocity, transparency, commitment, genuine participation, and accommodation generally determine the outcome of stakeholder collaboration – essential factors for SDG 16 in building universal goals such as peace and justice, for example, institutions that can make them happen. The lack of institutional clarity, roles, and responsibilities among government agencies involved in the 2030 Agenda can challenge its implementation, and although the commitment and national political leadership are present, the implementation and effective implementation of SDG 16 is up to local institutions, which should count on an active network of collaborations at the most diverse levels of analysis – national, regional, or local (United Nations Development Program 2017). Ozdemir et al. (2019) assess this condition of collaboration in a context of new product development and suggest that cross- and trans-institutional collaborations can be formed with two or more partners to jointly acquire and

use knowledge related to the development and commercialization of new products. For the author, it is possible to see that transinstitutional collaborations, characterized by different objectives, interests, and expectations, can be seen as the difficulty and challenge of learning from these organizations, through the theory of interested parties, which offers a structure to manage relationships with a wide range of actors who are linked by their interests and expectations (Ozdemir et al. 2019; Wondirad et al. 2020). Stakeholders are “any group or individual that may affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” and include internal stakeholders, such as employees, and/or external parties, such as vertically and horizontally linked organizations in the value chain. All of these stakeholders interact together to create and commercialize value. In the context of new product development, stakeholders are recognized as important sources of innovation and cocreators of valuable offers, and thus, relationships and collaborations with stakeholders receive wide attention from different research streams, such as the field of open innovation, which focuses on new ways to capitalize on relationships with stakeholders for innovation, a relationship that is highlighted by the SDG16 when it relates the quality of institutions for the promotion of peace and social justice (Ozdemir et al. 2019).

Conclusions Working with the concepts of cross and trans-institutional collaborations allows to relate different areas of knowledge in the problems of differentiated and complex solutions found today that can enable the achievement of SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Effective Institutions. Thus, this work sought to understand the cross-institutional collaborations as the partnerships that can support the SDGs between entities and institutions that relate specific themes and not necessarily operating in the same field of action between the different dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social dimensions), that is, the necessary understanding

Cross- and Trans-Institutional Collaboration to Support SDGs

of the interaction between academic institutions with various entities from different market segments, for example, or the case of a partnership between a hospital and a technology company. Through trans-institutional collaborations, the present study observed the theoretical recommendations and practical actions that can support the SDGs by combining efforts within the same scope of action, even though the objects of analysis may be different, such as the partnerships between educational institutions superiors who work together to find solutions in different fields of knowledge, such as engineering, arts, or medicine. To understand this collaborative capacity (cross- and trans-institutional), the work sought the importance of institutional theory in its capacity to build rules, norms, and belief systems that become capable of sustaining social, economic, and environmental systems (Geels et al. 2020). In this sense, it was possible to understand the partnership systems proposed by SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions in the dimensions of the triple bottom line (economic/environmental/social) which increase the resistance of institutions, such as private entities or even national states, in the face of crises of social welfare or even “survival,” ultimately. Finally, it is necessary to establish solid institutional foundations through collaborative partnerships and networks of interested parties to promote and establish peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, fostering access to justice for all and building effective, responsible, and inclusive institutions in all countries, at all levels, in addition to strengthening relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for capacity building at all levels, particularly in developing countries, in preventing violence and combating terrorism and organized crime, as advocated SDG 16 – Peace, Justice, and Effective Institutions.

Cross-References ▶ Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

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148 for sustainable development. Retrieved from https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/ 22008UNPAN99132.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020 United Nations (2020a) Goal 16: promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies. Retrieved from https://www.un. org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/. Accessed 3 May 2020 United Nations (2020b) Peace, justice, and strong institutions: why they matter. Retrieved from https://www.un. org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/09/16.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020 United Nations (2020c) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Retrieved from https://www. un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/07/E_Infographic_16.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020 United Nations Development Program (2017) INSTITUTIONAL AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS: guidance note on facilitating integration and coherence for SDG implementation. Retrieved from https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/ 2478Institutional_Coordination_Mechanisms_ GuidanceNote.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020 Vazquez-Brust D, Piao RS, de Melo MF d S, Yaryd RT, de Carvalho MM (2020) The governance of collaboration for sustainable development: exploring the “black box.”. J Clean Prod 120260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jclepro.2020.120260 Wondirad A, Tolkach D, King B (2020) Stakeholder collaboration as a major factor for sustainable ecotourism

Cross-sectoral Governance development in developing countries. Tou Manag 78:104024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2019. 104024 Ye Q, Song H, Li T (2012) Cross-institutional collaboration networks in tourism and hospitality research. Tour Manag Perspect 2:55–64 Zhang M (2020) Rational actions or institutional actions: A study on the rationality in academic librarians’ decision-making processes when purchasing e-book products. Library & Information Science Research 101018

Cross-sectoral Governance ▶ Good Governance to Nexus Governance in Support of the Sustainable Development Goals

Crowdsourcing ▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts

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▶ Informational Justice: Equity of Access, Implementation, and Interaction

Cláudia Toriz Ramos Universidade Fernando Pessoa, CEPESE (Centro de Estudos da População, Economia e Sociedade), Porto, Portugal

Dayan pratha Definitions ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

De Facto Authorities ▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16

Decoloniality ▶ Post-development Alternatives: Debates in Development Paradigms

Enduring

Democracy, often defined as the government of the people, by the people, and for the people (Lincoln), is a political regime, the core tenets of which are the popular origin of political power and the common good of the political community and self-government, even if under different types of democracy. The threshold of democracy is often considered to be basic electoral democracy, where free and fair elections happen, but the concept can also encompass the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and inclusive citizenship. Beyond the threshold, the debate is focused on the quality of democracy and thus considers the quality of democratic inputs, the accountability of the institutions, the guarantees of freedom and equality for all, and the political outputs.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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Democracy has reached high standards (consolidated democracies, full democracies, liberal democracies, the designation may vary) especially in the parts of the world where a very high standard of human development (HDI) has also been attained. However, the connections between democracy and development are complex. This is where the debate on democracy meets the debate on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Set as a worldwide political agenda, the SDG cover a broad and integrated approach to the many aspects of human development, among which are some political goals, namely, under SDG 16, on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” (UN 2017). Democracy in the developed world faces some major challenges, many of them overlapping with core issues of the sustainable development agenda, within which those democracies still have improvements to make. The following text expands these ideas, with reference to democracy in the developed world.

What Is Democracy? Democracy has often been defined as the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, according to Lincoln’s well-known sentence in his Gettysburg Address. Heir to a long tradition in political thought and the result of several fairly diversified practices, democracy as an idea has become pervasive in today’s world. It is therefore worth discussing why one regime (among many) has become a flag of the modern and developed world, to the point that a whole ideology of democratization has emerged. Although not explicitly mentioned in the SDG, democracy’s underpinnings resonate all across that agenda, and the debates on both concepts share a substantial number of concerns, as further addressed below. As a political regime, democracy stems from some core tenets. The first of them is the origin of political power, which lies with the people. Second and associated with this is the idea of common good or common interest, that is, the fact that the purpose of government is to serve people’s common interest, which can itself be a contested

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issue, as further debated below. The third point, actually emerging from these two initial tenets, is the how question, that is, the debate on how to organize the exercise of political power in order to abide by the first two items. The immediate answer is direct democracy, i.e., that the people, who are sovereign, actually take governance into their own hands. However, practice has shown that this is often not feasible and that other mechanisms have to be designed, especially within modern “political communities,” which encompass large numbers of members. The concept of representation thus emerges and with it the debate on types of democracy (Catt 1999; Dahl 2000; Held 2006). The first tenet implies defining the limits of the political community. The idea of the people, the sovereign people, is not coincident with the whole of humanity. On the contrary, it divides human beings into reasonably stable groups, the “national” communities, as defined under the nation-state framework, which are still the key reference for the political communities of the present (Anderson 1983). However, and unlike in the nationalist past, these communities are now more permeable, given the circumstances of increased circulation of people across the globe, hence the emergence of discussion on a broader concept of “citizenship” – global citizenship – notably for the enhancement of human rights, as claimed in SDG 16. Furthermore, those national communities, where once political participation was restricted according to gender, income, ethnic, or other constraints, are now more level, under a universal suffrage rule that considers a wider condition of citizenship. This is not without difficulties though, since some identitarian clashes and loopholes in citizenship and nationality laws remain in some countries (de Wilde 2019). The provision of legal identity for all, including birth registration, as set in target 16.9 of the SDG, is a good example of steps to be taken in order to overcome such difficulties. Sovereignty understood as the exercise of popular will has gradually emerged all across the world, within the successive waves of democratization, and embodies present days’ debates on governance (Huntington 1991; Markoff 2016), notably

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the SDG claims on the accountability of political institutions (target 16.6 of the SDG). As for the second tenet, “common good” or “common interest” (sometimes also presented as “justice”) are not easy concepts to define. Within any human group, there will be some common grounds, but if addressed on a case-by-case basis, the individual will and the common will are often divergent. Democracies traditionally tackle this problem by resorting to majority rule, but in recent years, some pliability in addressing this issue has developed, leading to the protection of minorities’ rights both in representation and in decision-making procedures (Lijphart 2008). Balancing the individual with the community has always been a contested issue for democracies and is perhaps a never-to-be-solved problem (Nozick 1974). Nevertheless, present-day democracies, with their emphasis on the liberal and individualistic ideological underpinnings, tend to favor a broad space for individual freedom, provided that it does not hinder the community as a whole (Dahl 2000; Held 2006). The SDG agenda considers basic freedoms (cf. target 16.10 of the SDG), but it also places substantial emphasis on justice and equity (throughout), which also mean redistribution of resources and rationalization of their use – i.e., sustainability. In a highly asymmetric world, this is a major challenge, both inside and across national borders. The third tenet leads to the debate on the types of democracy. As already mentioned, the dominant type among extant democracies is representative democracy. However, and increasingly, other alternative and complementary types of democracy have emerged, in theory and practice, thus reinforcing both the democratic debate and action (Catt 1999; Held 2006). New forms of democracy have come to the fore. The virtues of direct democracy, as home to the idea of democracy itself in ancient Greece, are often put forward. It is for the people to discuss and give opinions and even to decide on crucial issues of their life. Referenda, for instance, are a practice often advanced as a virtuous procedure in democracies. However, direct democracy cannot replace representative democracy, owing to the vast number of members of the political communities, and

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to the quantity and complexity of political debates and decisions to be taken. It can nevertheless be a valuable complementary type of democracy, enabling people to debate and decide directly, on at least some of the core issues of collective life (Catt 1999; Held 2006). Participatory democracy has also been a key issue in the “how” debate, because it emphasizes peoples’ participation in discussions and decision-making. It has emerged from a certain amount of distrust of the mechanisms of representative democracy, seen as being elite biased. It calls for more genuine and more permanent processes of political participation than simply voting and puts a strong emphasis on the local dimension of political life, a principle of decentralization akin to democracy (Pateman 1970). In many cases, participatory processes are becoming a complementary, rather than alternative, practice within mainstream representative democracy (Catt 1999). Emphasis on participation and representation is also written down in target 16.7 of the SDG, accounting for another convergence with the democratic discourse. Theoretical debates on deliberative democracy have also reached the practices of democracy, and this means reinforcing the quality of argumentation in democratic debates, both at citizen level and among decision-makers (Fishkin 1991). These debates dovetail with another, on the quality of democracy, which is paramount to a presentation of the state of democracy in developed countries. From Threshold Democracies to Improving the Quality of Democracies For decades theorists and political scientists have debated the process of democratization, seeking to determine how the threshold of democracy is reached and how, subsequently, the regime becomes consolidated (Welzel 2018). The threshold is often conceptualized in terms of the attainment of a basic “electoral democracy,” i.e., one where free and fair elections happen (Schumpeter 1943). Dahl’s basic criteria for a democracy to emerge are more extensive, given the procedural but also contextual conditions required for the election. In his On Democracy, he mentions “elected officials”; “free, fair, and frequent

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elections”; “freedom of expression”; “alternative sources of information”; “associational autonomy”; and “inclusive citizenship” (Dahl 2000: 38). Rose (2018), in addressing the same topic, emphasizes the importance not only of free and fair elections but also of “the rule of law” (which is a core tenet of target 16.3 of the SDG), coupled with the free and fair election criterion. Understanding how a democracy emerges also entails considering a substantial set of preconditions, both of a socioeconomic and of a sociocultural nature: mass communication, widespread literacy, or levels of income are all connected with the viability of a democracy (Welzel 2018). Put another way, the debate on the preconditions of democracy is also a debate on human and sustainable development. After regime transition, consolidation is a long road and requires the principles of democracy to gain roots, not only in the legislation but also in the minds and habits of the citizens, a process that may take generations (International IDEA 2019). In the majority of the developed countries though, the debate on democracy is focused on the “quality of the democracy” they have achieved. As Diamond and Morlino (2005) explain in their model, quality goes well beyond the threshold and requires a threefold set of characteristics: procedural (“rule of law,” “participation,” “political competition,” “vertical and horizontal accountability”); content-oriented (“civil and political liberties,” “growing political equality”); and outcome-oriented (“political responsiveness”). Here again, parts of the model overlap with some of SDG 16 targets (e.g., 16.3, 16.6, 16.7, 16.10). When citizens in the developed world sometimes feel unsatisfied with the shortcomings of their democratic regimes, this is most often not about the regime itself but about policy outcomes, or procedures that can be improved, or errors to be avoided. This has led to the diversification of the practices of citizens’ participation and to improvements in the mechanisms of decision-making, as in deliberative democracy (Fishkin 1991). It is true, however, that in recent years, and because of some popular discontent, antidemocratic discourses have also echoed in some developed countries (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Przeworski 2019).

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The Developed World and Democracy There is no consensus on what it is exactly that characterizes the developed world, and therefore, under different theoretical perspectives, or in research led by different entities, the criteria vary, thus resulting in different categorization sets. For that reason, indexing countries as “developed” is no simple task. There is no convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries in the United Nations system, although there is a conventional list of “developed regions” for statistical purposes (UN 2019a). From organization to organization, criteria vary and can be more focused on economic indicators, as in the list of the World Bank’s “high-income economies” (World Bank 2019a), or the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) “advanced economies” (IMF 2019), or even the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) group of “donor countries” (DAC) (OECD 2019), or encompass other dimensions, as in the human development index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (UNDP 2019). Besides, the establishment of the SDG in 2015 set a broad new pattern, one that is future-oriented and very challenging, also for the “developed” world, given the core emphasis on sustainability, a requirement that so far no one has fully achieved (Blewitt 2017; UN 2019b; World Bank 2019b). Furthermore, goal 16 of the SDG adopts some of the core tenets of democracy itself, as mentioned above, notably peace promotion, the rule of law and justice, inclusion, political participation, and accountability of the institutions (UN 2019b). From this point of view, development now encompasses broad political goals that are akin to democracy (cf. Gastaldi 2019; World Bank 2019b). Identifying and counting democracies are also a tricky task, since different approaches, based on diverse patterns of democracy, will draw categories and index states in slightly different ways (Bernhagen 2018). Nevertheless, a major distinction between democratic and nondemocratic states is generally possible, although transitions and backlashes may blur the limits. The advantage of using international indices is that they go

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beyond the analysis of the constitutional framework of each state and provide information based on empirical research, in a comparative way. There are several indices of reference, well presented and compared by Bernhagen (2018). Freedom House, for instance, lists states according to their annual performance on “civil rights” and “political liberties” (Freedom House 2019a). It is therefore very much centered on the conditions for the threshold to be reached, since these are basic conditions for democracy (cf. Dahl’s above). Nevertheless, its longitudinal observation also provides relevant data on backlashes, even in countries where democracy would be expected to have stabilized. Another case, the Economist Intelligence Unit annual Democracy Index considers a more encompassing set of categories; it is based on the ratings for 60 indicators, grouped into five categories: “electoral process and pluralism”; “civil liberties”; “the functioning of government”; “political participation”; and “political culture” (EIU 2019: 48). While the first two categories conform to the threshold democracy conditions, the other three bear a major connection with the deep roots of a “quality democracy” and thus are useful for observing long-established democracies. The index classifies democracies as “full” or “flawed,” depending on their performance, with reference to those categories. The pattern for “full democracies” is quite high, so even long-established democracies of the developed world may at times exhibit flaws. The V-Dem project (V-Dem Institute 2019a) equally presents a long diachronic data series on a vast number of states, but its originality lies in the fact that it measures not only democracy but also where the countries stand, with reference to different types of democracy. The two fundamental types presented are “electoral” democracy, according to Dahl’s threshold definition (Teorell et al. 2016), and “liberal” democracy, taken as the predominant type of democracy in wellestablished democracies of the developed world. Information is also available on how states perform from the point of view of “egalitarian” and “deliberative” democracy, on exclusion, on gender discrimination, and on corruption (V-Dem Institute 2019a).

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Overview For their above-mentioned characteristics and for the purposes of the present article, the Human Development Index, 2017, the Democracy Index 2018, and the V-Dem Annual Democracy Report, 2019 (as of October 2019, these are the more recent issues) were chosen for presenting an overview on democracy in the developed world. The three combined provide the following panorama. For 2017, the HDI counts 59 territories, under the “very high development” category, and another 53, under the “high development” category (UNDP 2018: 22–23). The Democracy Index 2018 identifies 20 “full democracies” and 55 “flawed democracies” (EIU 2019: 36–38). The V-Dem 2019 report identifies 39 “liberal democracies” and 60 “electoral democracies” in 2018 (V-Dem Institute 2019b: 52). Not all very high human development states are democracies, although the large majority of the consolidated democracies are very high human development states. Many of the emerging democracies come under the “high development” category, which may, to a certain degree, mean that there is some connection between both processes of development and democratization; however, some highly developed states are hybrid or even autocratic regimes. The following analysis covers only democracies in countries of very high human development, where consolidated democracies tend to concentrate (cf. Table 1). In order to identify the main clusters of democracy in the world and their possible affinities, a regional approach is relevant. Democracies, especially “full democracies” (EIU 2019: 9) or “liberal democracies,” (V-Dem Institute 2019b: 52) are concentrated in North America and Western Europe. This is easily explainable, given that the predominant patterns of democracy originated in the so-called Western world and have long developed there. In North America, both Canada and the United States are well-established democracies, although their position in the rankings is slightly different. The EIU places Canada in the sixth position, as a “full democracy” but considers the United States as a “flawed democracy,” ranking it in the 25th position. In the V-Dem report, both countries are categorized as “liberal

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Democracy in the Developed Countries, Table 1 Political regimes in the “very high human development states” HDI 2017 “Very high human development”a 1-Norway 2-Switzerland 3-Australia 4-Ireland 5-Germany 6-Iceland 7-Hong Kong (China) 7-Sweden 9-Singapore 10-Netherlands 11-Denmark 12-Canada 13-United States 14-United Kingdom 15-Finland 16-New Zealand 17-Belgium 17-Liechtenstein 19-Japan 20-Austria 21-Luxembourg 22-Israel 22-Republic of Korea 24-France 25-Slovenia 26-Spain 27-Czechia 28-Italy 29-Malta 30-Estonia 31-Greece 32-Cyprus 33-Poland 34-United Arab Emirates 35-Andorra 36-Lithuania 37-Qatar 38-Slovakia 39-Brunei Darussalam 39-Saudi Arabia 41-Latvia 41-Portugal 43-Bahrain 44-Chile 45-Hungary 46-Croatia 47-Argentina

Democracy Index 2018b 1-full 10-full 9-full 6-full 13-full 2-full 73-flawed 3-full 66-flawed 11-full 5-full 6-full 25-flawed 14-full 8-full 4-full 31-flawed – 22-flawed 16-full 12-full 30-flawed 21-flawed 29-flawed 36-flawed 19-full 34-flawed 33-flawed 18-full 23-flawed 39-flawed 35-flawed 54-flawed 147-authoritarian – 36-flawed 133-authoritarian 44-flawed – 159-authoritarian 38-flawed 27-flawed 148-authoritarian 23-flawed 57-flawed 60-flawed 47-flawed

V-Dem 2018c LD LD LD LD LD LD CA LD EA LD LD LD LD LD LD LD LD – LD LD LD LD
ED+ LD
LD
LD LD
LD
ED+ LD ED LD ED CA – ED+ CA ED+ – CA LD
LD CA ED+ ED
ED ED (continued)

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Democracy in the Developed Countries, Table 1 (continued) HDI 2017 “Very high human development”a 48-Oman 49-Russian Federation 50-Montenegro 51-Bulgaria 52-Romania 53-Belarus 54-Bahamas 55-Uruguay 56-Kuwait 57-Malaysia 58-Barbados 58-Kazakhstan

Democracy Index 2018b 140-authoritarian 144-authoritarian 81-hybrid 46-flawed 66-flawed 137-authoritarian – 15-full 116-authoritarian 52-flawed – 144-authoritarian

V-Dem 2018c CA EA EA ED ED EA – LD
CA+ EA LD EA

LD ¼ liberal democracy, ED ¼ electoral democracy, EA ¼ electoral autocracy, CA ¼ closed autocracy Sources: a UNDP 2018: 22 b EIU 2019: 36–39 c V-Dem Institute 2019b: 52

democracies,” but a retreat in US democracy is also identified (V-Dem Institute 2019b: 11). The West European bloc of the European Union is equally home to some of the more developed democracies in the world. This is the case of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The list was deliberately kept in alphabetical order because, despite the fact that differences in scale occur and are visible in the rankings, they are not stable throughout time and depend on the methodology adopted for each index. As a general rule, the Nordic countries rank at the higher positions. The EIU identifies flaws in some of these democracies (in Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, and Italy, in 2018), yet some of those are ranked quite high in the “liberal democracy” category of the V-Dem analysis (Belgium and Portugal). Together with these Western EU member countries, and regularly ranking at the top of the list, Norway and Iceland, who are not EU members, are exemplary democracies. The Eastern European states that have become members of the European Union since 2004 have also joined the pattern of Western liberal democracies (it is a prerequisite for becoming a

member), but the maturing of their regimes is still an on-going process, and therefore some shortcomings are identified in international analyses and rankings – EIU classifies them all under the “flawed democracy” pattern; the V-Dem report labels some of them as “electoral democracies” only. The full list is Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. While Estonia and Slovenia normally rank closer to the West European states, some of the others are even undergoing political processes that indicate a degree of democratic retreat (such as Hungary or Poland), as further addressed below. In Asia and Australasia, Australia and New Zealand account for well-established democracies, ranking high in the world panorama, while Japan is also recognized as a democracy, and South Korea has transitioned into one more recently. Both Asian countries are good examples of the adjustment of the patterns of democracy to non-Western societies (Welzel 2018). In the Middle East and North Africa region, democracy is a true rarity, despite the fact that some of the Arab countries in the region rank very high in the human development index

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(e.g., the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia). On the contrary, the predominant political pattern in the region is sheer authoritarianism. By being a democracy, Israel stands as an exception, but the country is also clearly different from its neighbors, from the cultural and historical points of view. In sub-Saharan Africa, some transitional regimes have emerged, but they are still quite far away both from very high development and from stable democracy. Mauritius is the only state in the region counted as a “full democracy” and a “liberal democracy” (EIU 2019: 36; V-Dem Institute 2019b: 52), but it has not yet reached the pattern of “very high human development.” The same happens with Costa Rica (EIU 2019: 36; V-Dem Institute 2019b: 52), in Latin America, and the Caribbean, where a vast number of other states are either undergoing regime transition into democracy or consolidating it. The cases where very high development and substantial evidence of democratization are coupled are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, although flaws can be traced or, put another way, they are still closer to electoral democracies than to fully fledged liberal democracies (cf. Table 1). This regional analysis of democracy in the world points to the political-cultural background of the countries as at least partial explanation for its emergence – democracy is predominant in the so-called “Western” world and in countries directly influenced by “Western” colonization. Nevertheless, the successive waves of democratization (Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019) paved the way for broadening democracy into a worldwide dimension, and the ideology of democratization, associated with the role of international organizations and multilateralism, further reinforced this tendency. A certain regional effect can also be considered, which in turn will be closely tied to market and economic exchanges and cultural and historical proximity, if not to outright adhesion to major regional blocs, as is the case in the European Union, where democracy is constitutive. On the opposite side of the argument, the effects of geographic isolation and political exceptionalism account for the contingencies of the Israeli regime.

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On the relation between democracy and development, it can be argued that some of the characteristics of a developed country bear a connection to democracy, either as preconditions or as tools for its consolidation. Issues of internal equality, for instance, that pave the way for effectively inclusive universal suffrage, are a good example of this (cf. Lindberg 2019). However, both processes are intricate in nature and stem from a multiplicity of causes and conditions that cannot be subsumed to a simple one-to-one relation (Geddes 2011). As previously mentioned, some very highly developed countries in the Arab world are not democracies at all; and some full democracies have emerged (e.g., Mauritius and Costa Rica) in the developing economies. If, in the context of SDG’s implementation, the concept of development broadens so as to encompass indicators of democracy (e.g., accountability of the institutions), the ranking of the developed states will change. Conversely, if democracy indices are also to include categories connected with the sustainability debate, the panorama may also be different (Gastaldi 2019; UN 2019b). The diachronic consideration of the information provided in the indices also shows substantial consistency over the years. It is approximately the same group of states that rank at the top, even if some fluctuation in mutual positions occurs (the indices used provide comparative diachronic information). This is a trait consistent with the idea of a consolidated democracy, i.e., a regime that has reached maturity and thus can resist internal and external challenges. Conversely, states ranking at the bottom border of a category are more prone to moving either upwards or downwards, even if in a slow manner (cf. V-Dem column in Table 1). However, change and even sudden change may occur as further addressed below, in debating present days’ political trends in the democratic states of the developed world.

Democracy in the Developed World: Key Issues A substantial number of the states in the long list of democracies mentioned above consolidated the

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regime long ago. Others, which remain closer to the transition stage (e.g., Eastern European states), still require consolidation and quality improvements. In both cases, challenges and vulnerabilities exist. The debate on democracy continues to be open, pervasive, and intense, in the democratic world. Furthermore, the SDG, as a recent and very challenging agenda, has set the bar high, even for consolidated democracies. Some key issues for democracies in the developed world are therefore debated below. The Sustainable Development Goals Agenda While the SDG agenda is closely connected with the core values underpinning Western democratic regimes (human rights, peace, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, welfare, accountability, etc.), it nevertheless contains some challenges for the high quality democracies. SDG 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (health), and 4 (education) focus on either preconditions or outcomes of democracies (UN 2017). Poverty and major income differences do not account for stability in democracies, so they are normally low, under consolidated democratic regimes, although variation and setbacks may occur (V-Dem Institute 2019b: 44–49). High standards of education and health are also regularly associated with democracy, and an expected outcome of state policies, despite some variation between democratic countries, as expressed in the Inequalityadjusted Human Development Index (UNDP 2019). However, gender issues, as considered under SDG 5 (UN 2017), together with other problems related with inclusiveness (LGBT, migrants, refugees), still represent major challenges for extant democracies and may even tend to worsen, in the context of the massive population movements that have happened in recent years (V-Dem Institute 2019b: 44–49). The gender development index and the gender inequality index of UNDP (2019) provide evidence on this, but democracies rank high in these indices, if generally compared with nondemocratic states. Another set of SDG that truly challenges democratic industrialized countries is goals 7 (energy), 8 (sustainable economic growth), 9 (sustainable industrialization), 11 (cities), and 12 (sustainable

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consumption and production). In relation to these, major problems actually emerged from industrialization, which went hand in hand with modernization and urbanization, the three being part of the context in which many democracies emerged. People’s welfare was often connected with increased access to commodities and services, often at the expense of the waste of natural resources (UN 2017). Therefore, the pattern set by goals 13 (climate change), 14 (sustainable use of the oceans), and 15 (sustainable use of terrestrial resources) implies structural reforms to ways of living, the economy, and the society and also impacts upon democratic politics (UN 2019c). Goals 10 (inequality among countries), 16 (peace, justice and institutions), and 17 (global partnership) truly focus on political issues and set the political scenario beyond the boundaries of the national states, thus leaving no choice for isolationism, if the goals are to be met, as further addressed below (UN 2017). Multilevel Democracy and Multilateralism One challenge to democracy stems from globalization and the mutual glocalization movements. In political terms, this means that states are pushed upwards into the broader dimension of IGO and supranationalism but also pulled downwards into decentralization and devolution. Multilevel political governance calls for multilevel democracy, which entails the reinforcement of democratic representation and procedures (cf. targets 16.6 and 16.7 of the SDG) at all levels (Kaldor 2008; Piattoni 2010; UN 2017). Debates on how to democratize international organizations have emerged and become powerful campaign tools. The balance between developed and developing countries in these organizations is also an issue (cf. target 16.8 of the SDG). Wealth and demographic imbalances across the world, as much as climate issues, threaten democracies and require global governance tools. Besides, a transnational civil society appears to be in the making, which means that domestic state-society relations are no longer the exclusive mechanism for democratic representation (Krawczyk 2019). A global partnership for sustainable development

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(SDG 17) will have to involve all these actors and substantially reinforce international cooperation for development (UN 2017). Multilateralism thus seems to be the appropriate framework for this, despite the many setbacks it has undergone in recent years. With regard to the other aspect, debates on decentralization and devolution and on the rearrangement of regional autonomies are coterminous with democratic debates on grassroots political participation and the very nature of the “self-determined” community. In countries like Canada or the United States, discussions have emerged on the statute of indigenous people, while Europe, Spain, and the United Kingdom recently went through a referendum on independence (Scotland) and a unilateral declaration of independence (Catalonia). The constitutional balance in a democratic country can therefore be vulnerable, and mechanisms of direct democracy, or even direct action, may account for major turmoil (Hooghe and Marks 2016). There is some tension stemming from identitarian and neonationalist claims, which may threaten the internal peace of established democracies. Issues of Popular Participation and Political Culture A consolidated democracy needs a widespread democratic culture (cf. target 16.7 of the SDG), which fosters people’s awareness on politics and their abilities to participate in public debates and political processes. It also requires knowledge on political institutions and decision-making procedures, together with a clear notion on the rights and obligations inherent to citizenship. The role of the media and media freedom are fundamental too (cf. target 16.10 of the SDG). Voting is the most obvious expression of political involvement but not the only one. Turnouts, in developed democracies, are often lower than what might be expected, and not voting has sometimes become a sort of “protest” vote against the system itself. In many democracies of the developed countries some amount of skepticism vis-à-vis the mechanisms and the outcomes of representative democracy has gained ground (Mair 2013). Consequently, alternative modes of participation

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have become increasingly popular, and the “voice of the streets,” be it protest or simply grassroots participation, is now more audible than perhaps ever before. For 2018, the Democracy Index identifies a rise in political participation (EIU 2019: 2–6). Some countries have long nurtured a democratic tradition of citizens’ direct participation, as is the case of Switzerland, with its many referenda. Other states have developed new modes of participation, as a consequence of new democratic challenges: Icelanders’ reaction to the 2008 financial crisis had a major expression in the streets but then went as far as the participatory drafting of a new constitution (Bergmann 2014). Applications of deliberative democracy are also becoming more evident, even if with so far limited impacts (V-Dem Institute 2019a). Anger action has also been present in some democracies of the developed countries, as was recently the case in France, with the gilets jaunes movement. More recently, and with a clear transnational dimension, protest movements on climate change have emerged with a rapid and vast capacity of mobilization, especially among the young. As a whole, representative democracy is being complemented, if at times not completely shaken, by alternative modes of democratic practice that redraft the political debate, the agenda, and the procedures (Norris 2011). The risk is obviously the clash between both. Furthermore, group exclusion from citizenship and political participation (minorities, migrants, refugees) may put in jeopardy the internal balance and harm those people rights. Democracy and ICT: Between Freedom and Security A major challenge to democracy comes from technology, and this is paramount in postindustrial economies, where the quaternary sector has become a key to development. ICT as a set of highly sophisticated means of communication to foster the public sphere, which is changing rapidly, notably by incorporating nonconventional media and peer-to-peer communication. Democracy needs to adapt to this process, the risks coming from the quantity of information and from the lack of scrutiny of a substantial part of it. For

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deliberate disinformation purposes, or in unintended ways, fake news is circulating in the media more than ever and may bias the public debate. In the developed democracies, the critical citizen, one that will critically assess the information she receives, is more necessary than ever. Conversely, some states are tempted to introducing censorship practices (Freedom House 2019b). Furthermore, new issues of national and international security have emerged under cybersecurity concerns, notably foreign interference, which may challenge democratic tenets such as freedom (cf. target 16.10 of the SDG), upon which restrictions tend to be imposed when security is at risk (DSP 2019; V-Dem Institute 2019b). Organized crime, trafficking, and corruption all take advantage of these new tools and pose major challenges to the authorities in the democratic countries (cf. targets 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, and 16.5 of the SDG). However, new information and communication technologies also create opportunities for enhancing democracy. The rapid and allencompassing reach of their means of diffusion; the informal, peer-to-peer communication lines; the fostered conditions for increased participation, in a nutshell; and the “democratization” of information and communication all account for the many positive prospective views on the role of ICT in democracies, provided that they are not used for undermining democracies. From electronic voting to enhancing the virtual agora, there is a lot of potential in ICT to reinforce democracies, thus fostering the virtuous uses and countering the vicious is a new challenge (Ramos 2019). Democratic Retreats Although consolidated democracies are expected to be stable and long-lasting, they are not immune to the surrounding conditions that may change them. Furthermore, democracies resulting from recent transitions will be even more permeable to difficulties and backlash. In the current decade, processes of democratic stagnation, retreat, and even autocratization have been identified, to the point that the V-Dem report 2019 labels them as a “third wave of autocratization” (Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; V-Dem Institute 2019b). In

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democracies that have only recently transitioned from authoritarianism, this may be a culturalpolitical setback, inherent to the countries’ recent history and circumstances. In Hungary and Poland, for instance, a movement towards “illiberal” democracy has emerged, with an emphasis on nationalism, security, and state authority, to the point that citizens’ freedoms are being limited on national security grounds. External conditions perceived or presented as threats, as is the case of immigration in Hungary, may have partly driven this process, but the democratic retreat is there and finds space in the lack of a rooted democratic political culture (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Przeworski 2019). The “rule of law” (cf. target 16.3 of the SDG), a bedrock of democracy, may be at risk. The problem is, however, not only visible in the younger democracies. Populism has also seeded in the United States, Italy, France, and several other EU countries, where far-right discourses, walking on the edge of democratic values and constitutional freedoms, have gained central stage. New or revamped parties have emerged, which ground their appeal to the popular vote on basic populist tenets, among which, hatred towards the governing elites, nationalistic emotions, fabrication of scapegoats, and economic protectionism (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Freedom House also identifies a democratic retreat and particularly emphasizes the case of the United States (Freedom House 2019a: 17–24). Whether these are conjunctural variations or major structural challenges still remains to be seen, but, prospectively, democracy in the world may face some gloomy days ahead.

Conclusion: Developed Democracies and Sustainability Democracy is an enduring political regime in the developed world. It is often coincident with very high levels of human development, but there are states in which very high human development is coupled with authoritarianism or with a hybrid regime. Consolidated

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democracies are nearly inexistent among developing countries, but transitions into democracy do occur in tandem with development. The relation between democracy and development is nevertheless complex, and causal linkages between both are arguable. As a regime, democracy carries its threshold conditions, but its overarching structure is both extensive and profound, encompassing core values such as freedom and equality, popular sovereignty, selfgovernment, and common interest. It is inscribed in a long-lasting cultural matrix of a Western origin that spread across the globe under successive waves of democratization. At present, democracy in the developed world faces some major challenges: the challenge of a global agenda for sustainability; the challenges of globalization and glocalisation; the challenges of participation and accountability; the challenge of technology; and the challenge of defeat, whenever retreats and backlashes occur. What then can democracies do, in order to tackle all these challenges? First, postindustrial economies need to foster sustainable production and consumption while meeting the needs of their citizens in an inclusive and equitable manner. Second, international cooperation, multilateralism, and global governance must be accepted as political tools and used for fostering international peace, justice, and equity, since sustainability has shown that the world is inevitably an interdependent political stage. Third, democracy requires people-centered measures: from human rights to rule of law and political participation, individual rights and guarantees must be recognized at all times, for all individuals. Fourth, institutions must be both responsive and accountable, at all levels. Fifth, some democracies rank higher than others: sharing good practices and comparing and monitoring the progress of democracy and of sustainability in an interrelated way are a tool for advancement. As a conclusion, it can be stated that, through the lenses of the SDG, development is also about democracy and democracy about sustainability.

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Cross-References ▶ Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries ▶ Free and Fair Elections to Electoral Integrity: Trends, Challenges, and Populism ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Political Participation: Inclusion of Citizens in Democratic Opinion-Forming and DecisionMaking Processes

References Anderson B (1983) Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso, London Bergmann E (2014) Iceland and the international financial crisis. Boom, bust and recovery. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills Bernhagen P (2018) Measuring democracy and democratization. In: Welzel C, Inglehart RF, Haerpfer C, Bernhagen P (eds) Democratization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 52–66 Blewitt J (2017) Understanding sustainable development, 3rd edn. Routledge, London/New York Catt H (1999) Democracy in practice. Routledge, London/ New York Dahl R (2000) On democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven/London De Wilde P (ed) (2019) The struggle over borders. Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Diamond L, Morlino L (eds) (2005) Assessing the quality of democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington, DC DSP-Digital Society Project (2019) Digital Society Project. http://digitalsocietyproject.org. Accessed 25 Oct 2019 Eatwell R, Goodwin M (2018) National populism: the revolt against liberal democracy. Penguin Books, London EIU-The Economist Intelligence Unit (2019) Democracy index 2018: me too? Political participation, protest and democracy. A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit. http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. Accessed 04 Oct 2019 Fishkin J (1991) Democracy and deliberation: new directions for democratic reform. Yale University Press, New Haven Freedom House (2019a) Democracy in retreat. freedom in the world 2019. https://freedomhouse.org/report/free dom-world/freedom-world-2019. Accessed 4 Oct 2019 Freedom House (2019b) Freedom on the net. https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018. Accessed 24 Oct 2019

Democracy in the Developed Countries Gastaldi L (2019) Sustainable development goal 16: tracking progress with V-Dem data. In: V-Dem Institute (ed) Democracy facing global challenges. V-Dem annual democracy report 2019. V-Dem Institute, Gothenburg, pp 38–42 Geddes B (2011) What causes democratization. In: Goodin R (ed) The Oxford handbook of political science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 593–615 Held D (2006) Models of democracy, 3rd edn. Stanford University Press, Stanford Hooghe L, Marks G (2016) Measuring regional authority: a postfunctionalist theory of governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford Huntington S (1991) The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman IMF-International Monetary Fund (2019) World economic outlook reports. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/ weo. Accessed 13 Sept 2019 International IDEA-Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2019) State of democracy assessments. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/state-democracyassessments. Accessed 24 Oct 2019 Kaldor M (2008) Democracy and globalisation. Working paper series (WP 03/2008). Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London Krawczyk KA (2019) International NGOs, transnational civil society, and global public policy: opportunities and obstacles in the twenty-first century. In: Stone D, Moloney K (eds) The Oxford handbook of global policy and transnational administration. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lijphart A (2008) Thinking about democracy: power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. Routledge, New York Lindberg S (2019) Exclusion: a challenge to democracy. In: V-Dem Institute (ed) Democracy facing global challenges. V-Dem annual democracy report 2019. V-Dem Institute, Gothenburg, pp 44–49 Luhrmann A, Lindberg S (2019) A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? Democratization Mar 2019:1–19 Mair P (2013) Ruling the void. The hollowing of western democracy. Verso, London Markoff J (2016) Waves of democracy. Social movements and political change, 2nd edn. Routledge, New York Norris P (2011) Democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited. Cambridge University Press, New York Norris P, Inglehart R (2019) Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Blackwell, Oxford OECD-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2019) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistance-committee/#members. Accessed 13 Sept 2019

161 Pateman L (1970) Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Piattoni S (2010) The theory of multi-level governance: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford Przeworski A (2019) Crises of democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ramos C (2019) From the freedom of the press to the freedom of the internet: a new public sphere in the making? In: Visvizi A, Lytras MD (eds) Data driven decision making for politics in the post-truth era. Emerald, Bingley, pp 9–22 Rose R (2018) Democratic and undemocratic states. In: Welzel C, Inglehart RF, Haerpfer C, Bernhagen P (eds) Democratization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 40–51 Schumpeter JA (1943) Capitalism, socialism and democracy. George Allen and Urwin, London Teorell J, Coppedge M, Skaaning SE, Lindberg S (2016) Measuring electoral democracy with V-Dem data: introducing a new polyarchy index. V-Dem working papers. Series 2016:25. https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publi cations/working-papers/. Accessed 4 Oct 2019 UNDP-United Nations Development Programme (2018) Human development indices and indicators: 2018 statistical update. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ files/2018_human_development_statistical_update. pdf. Accessed 13 Sept 2019 UNDP-United Nations Development Programme (2019) Human development index (HDI). http://hdr.undp.org/ en/content/human-development-index-hdi. Accessed 13 Sept 2019 UN-United Nations (2017) 71/313. Work of the Statistical Commission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/71/313, 10 July 2017 UN-United Nations (2019a) Methodology. Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49). Developed regions. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ UN-United Nations (2019b) Sustainable development goals. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs. Accessed 13 Sept 2019 UN-United Nations (2019c) The sustainable development goals 2019. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/ The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2019.pdf. Accessed 3 Dec 2019 V-Dem Institute (2019a) V-Dem. Varieties of democracy. https://www.v-dem.net/en/. Accessed 4 Oct 2019 V-Dem Institute (2019b) Democracy facing global challenges. V-Dem annual democracy report 2019. V-Dem Institute, Gothenburg Welzel C (2018) Theories of democratization. In: Welzel C, Inglehart RF, Haerpfer C, Bernhagen P (eds) Democratization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 19–39 World Bank (2019a) Data. World Bank countries and lending groups. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/know ledgebase/articles/906519. Accessed 13 Sept 2019 World Bank (2019b) World Bank open data. https://data. worldbank.org/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019

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Deprived Children ▶ Ensuring Child Rights for a Just Society

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions: A Case Study on Guatemala for Decision-Makers Nelson Amaro Institute of Sustainable Development, Galileo University (Universidad Galileo), Guatemala City, Guatemala

Definition Development paradigms refer to basic postulates which provide groups of researchers and decisionmakers a common theoretical framework to pursue their activities and priorities. The word paradigm first identified by Thomas Kuhn (1996) also has inherent tensions that might intensify conflicts among certain groups who endorse different and frequently opposing points of view about the same reality which is the case of SDG 16 that addresses problems related to peace, justice, and solid institutions.

Introduction The aim of this entry is to try to clarify the uncertainty created by recent international national events and the 2030 Agenda. This situation, among other incidents, involves the withdrawal of the USA from the approved Paris Agreement after the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) and internal policies that aim to discourage measures taken in the past regarding environmental care, which in turn are linked to broader sustainable development problems. These tensions are magnified by massive migrations; decline in Official Development

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Assistance (ODA) and discouragement of development itself; religious and political polarization, particularly in Middle East countries; greater commercial protectionism tendencies; resurrection of nationalist movements; and the dangers surrounding the nuclear arms race. This new scenario deepens existing tensions of the past that are related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in late 2015. Currently this situation is trying to be solved by calling to a paramount effort, taking the year 2030 as the crucial moment in which the expected results are to be on track and many failings of present outcomes might be superseded. All this effort would accelerate global economic growth, facilitate the flow of goods, and help in effective resource management. Monetary stability and flexibility affecting particularly external debts, international cooperations, corruption scandals as well as migration disagreements together with international confrontations, and civil wars threaten the stability of political institutions and SDG 16 objectives at the world level, particularly in developing countries. According to this analysis, the dimensions that require greater effort by the year 2030 are those focused in the elimination of hunger, better health levels, availability and access to clean energy, industrial innovation along with the necessary infrastructure, reduction of inequalities, care on the extinction of submarine species, and overall a greater emphasis on the value of peace and justice around solid institutions. Extreme nationalism leading to economic protectionism and religious wars, among other tendencies, aggravates this situation. The proposal for Guatemala aims to reduce inequality, continue an industrial energy revolution mainly around water as energy generator, strengthen protected areas and forests, and achieve solid institutions through an effective social pact concerning corruption and institutions. The latter would strengthen steps to reach peace, justice, and solid institutions called by SDG 16. For these purposes this entry intends to answer four questions:

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions

(a) What was the global and Guatemalan situation in the year 2017 regarding the SDG relevant to the international crisis? (b) What is the nature of the international crisis at present and the near future? (c) What were the trends that fed international crisis and tensions that might affect SDG? (d) What can be done at present to overcome the current international and national (Guatemalan) situation on possible SDG compliance, particularly with SDG 16 that refer to peace, justice, and solid institutions? Methods For answering these questions, our point of departure was a set of characteristics describing sustainable development in Guatemala. Secondary data was gathered from available sources mainly through international organizations. The focus was the degree that SDG objectives were accomplished. This analysis provided a baseline data just after SDG targets derived from the 2030 Agenda were approved in the United Nations Assembly at the end of the year 2015. The identification for Guatemala of its most affected SDG will help to establish the relationship between these priorities and the one that was our focus of research which is SDG 16 (peace, justice, and solid institutions). National and international threats related to this particular SDG will also be highlighted and also their consequences for reaching what is intended in the 2030 Agenda. Finally, this reflection suggested a set of recommendations for decision-makers in charge of facing these threats.

Toward a Decision-Makers’ Vision of SDG 16 in the World in General and Guatemala Specifically Guatemala’s Profile Guatemala is located in the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America, close to Mexico at the North and El Salvador and Honduras in the South. Its population has reached 16,536.0 million inhabitants in mid-year 2017. Although it is the country with the highest number in

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Central America, it still is far off from countries such as Mexico that has 127,878.0 and Brazil that counts with 211,175.0 million inhabitants in the same date (CEPAL, the acronym for the UN Economic Comission for Latin America, ECLA 2018). For its degree of development and environmental performance, several indexes show its standing. According to classifications made by the World Bank, Guatemala is considered as a country of “low, median income” with a US $3,340 dollars of GNP in the last actualization made in 2018 (Tezanos 2018). Agricultural exports mainly represented by the so-called “non-traditional” ones (cardamom, vetches, etc.), followed by coffee and sugar, constitute the main crops. Manufactured goods are mainly oriented toward other Central American countries, taking advantage of integration treaties that dates back to the 1960s of the former century. Although difficult to measure, different figures place migrant Guatemalans living legally and illegally in the USA at around 13%, which represents more than one million inhabitants. Their remittances are an estimated important source for the economy, with almost two thirds of the total value of export goods in 2016: US$7.02 against US$11.6 billion (Economic Forecasts from the World’s Leading Economists 2017; Observatory of Economic Complexity, OEC 2017). On the other hand, the Human Development Index, a United Nations Development Program, UNDP, measure, denominates Guatemala as a country that ranks between 0.5 and 0.7 in a scale that goes from 0 to 1, that is considered in the “Middle.” (Tezanos 2018). Last year, these measures have gone from 0.391 in the year 2000 to 0.492 in 2014, reflecting some increase but not enough. The same happens with multidimensional poverty rates. During the same period, they have gone from 71.7 to only 66.7%. Nevertheless, this poverty indicator has had an increase of 2.5%, but between 2011 and 2014, the last period that a measure was made. In fact, it has deteriorated from 64.2 to 66.7% (PNUD 2016). According to the same source, the percentage of urban population is 56.0% in the year 2015, but it is significant that this long-term

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trend has grown from 34.1% in 1964 (Amaro 1970). The urban-rural differences are multiplied in each and every indicator by the presence in Guatemala of a significant proportion of indigenous population that in the year 2011, last time it was measured, had a 41% of the total population (MARN 2017). A summary index of performance in the environmental field is the one elaborated by the Universities of Yale and Columbia in the USA. It is called the Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Guatemala is ranked according to these data, in the position number 88 in the world with 69.64 over 100 points (MARN 2017, pp. 14–15). This rank gives Guatemala an increase of 20.51% in the last 20 years. Nevertheless, this advance is not acknowledged in the forest areas, due to significant losses in their coverage between 2001 and 2014. Particularly, the use of this raw material by a great percentage of the rural population as fossil fuels in their kitchen’s homes, not only because of their impact on forests but also in human health due to the suspension in the atmosphere of very small particles that might be breathed. A similar criticism receives the way fishing areas are overexploited, putting in danger the marine life and biodiversity in the seas of their coasts that face the Pacific as well as the Atlantic Oceans. The International Context: Its Nature, Trends, and Answers Needed The Global State of the SDGs in Latin America and Guatemala in that Context

A look at data for Latin America and specific information for Guatemala will help to highlight the problems that developing countries must face to comply with the 2030 Agenda. Figure 1 shows the relationship of SDG in each country, giving alerts through different colors of the extent that those objectives have been accomplished. The strengths and weaknesses of the achievements of Guatemala and the remaining 22 countries of Latin America are observed in Fig. 1, provided by SDSN (2017). The blue column that appears at the right of the former Table shows the number of red observations to the left

by objective that countries have obtained after the analysis, specifically (Ha (Haiti), Ho (Honduras), Gu (Guatemala), Bo (Bolivia), and RD (Dominican Republic)). They have obtained the worst records in Latin America. As can be seen Guatemala, our case study, is among the countries most deprived around 2016, and therefore, its performance looking at the year 2030 becomes more difficult. This information can serve as a basis for the agenda 2030 and periodic measurements regarding the degree of compliance of the SDG over time. As observed, Guatemala has only one green box, which focuses on SDG 13 for climate action. This evaluation considers that the only countries in Latin America that have a comprehensive law on climate change are Ecuador, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico; although when an analysis was made in April 2016, there were others with future law projects (Moraga and Meckievi 2016). For example, Peru has approved a law on the subject by 2018. Largely, the effort mentioned that gained a green observation for Guatemala was due to the hydroelectric potential it has because of its geological characteristics. Recently, the National Electric Energy Commission (CNEE by its initials in Spanish) announced that a national record was achieved covering 83% of the total demand for power using renewable energy sources, 80.5% of which was hydroelectric (Bolaños 2017a). There are plans in Guatemala that have specific targets for the period 2030–2032 (National Urban and Rural Development Council, CONADUR by its initials in Spanish and the General Planning Secretariat, SEGEPLAN by its initials in Spanish 2014), Guatemala must recognize the identified weaknesses and face them in order to make a significant difference. This orientation redirects the analysis to the dimensions marked in red shown in Fig. 1. In fact, these weaknesses are shared with many developing countries. The ones detected will be based on these observations. These data along with their ratings refer to the SDG (indicators that served for the qualification and which determined the countries’ ranking will be placed in the

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No Poverty

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Industry, Responsible Clean Decent Innovation Sustainable Consumption Affordable Work and Water and Climate and Clean Economic Reduced Cities and and and InfraSanitation Energy structure Inequality Communities Production Action Growth

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Number of Red emphasis 2 6 6 7 Bol 5 5 3 3 7 RD 5 6 8 Gu 5 13 Ha 9 Hon 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 5

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions: A Case Study on Guatemala for Decision-Makers, Fig. 1 Sustainable Development Goal Dashboard for Latin America and the Caribbean. (Source: Organización de Naciones Unidas. (2017). Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/es/objeti vos-de-desarrollo-sostenible/ and for the estimations of

Fig. 1, Sachs et al. (2017). According to this source, green shows achievements in the SDGs; red shows that there still are major challenges, while yellow and orange denote significant targets that should be accomplished ahead. The column at the extreme right only intends to highlight the worst situation (red) leaving the rest without further qualifications). The headings over the numbers refer to the SDGs

extreme right column, mainly by the number of red observations appearing in Fig. 1). Now, the most critical SDG for Guatemala will be analyzed in the following sections: SDG 2: End hunger and SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages (prevalence of undernourished population, prevalence of low height per age in children under 5 years of age, management of sustainable nitrogen, prevalence in maternal and neonatal mortality and diseases in general). The issue of malnutrition is highlighted in the possible targets to be accomplished in

order to achieve these two goals; while noting the existing crises in the Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS, by its initials in Spanish) and in the hospitals with the greatest affluence at present, which are in turn related to more institutional crises which have repercussions in health in general. This aspect will be discussed later when the need for solid institutions are analyzed. The latter is SDG 16, where health and well-being are associated with this important subject. The problem of malnutrition has especially occupied the Guatemalan government in recent

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years and might be a global indicator of the situation. Half of malnourished children throughout Central America are found in Guatemala; and prevalence of this condition in children under 5 years of age reaches 49.8%, which is one of the highest in the world and Latin America. In 2012, a Zero Hunger Pact which specified a Plan and Course of Action that set specific goals for 2016 was signed; one of these targets was a 10% reduction of infant mortality and the fight against seasonal hunger in critical months (Gobierno de Guatemala or Government of Guatemala in English 2017). Moreover, the maximum authority of the National Food and Security Secretariat in Guatemala (SESAN by its initials in Spanish) – leading authority on this matter – has stated to at least one media source that after various years of “Zero Hunger” implementation, these actions had reached only 33% of the population in need (Muñoz Palala 2016). Another evidence that SDG 16, the need for solid institutions, is forgotten and contribute very little or deteriorate the situation. SDG 7. Affordable and clean energy (access to non-fossil fuels and carbon emissions/electricity generated). Worldwide concern here revolves around access to electricity, percentage of the population that has use of alternative guaranteed fuel sources, and the CO2 emissions derived from electricity generation. Available data show that access to electricity is deficient and reaches 85.5% of the population toward the year 2015; when the population that still relies on fossil fuels is added to this, it is found that 36.7% of the population still depends on this energy source, and therefore CO2 emissions are relevant. These factors, when compared to the rest of countries worldwide, determine the red color in Fig. 1 (Sachs et al. 2017). It is necessary to add in this section an aspect which is relevant for Guatemala. It refers to the fact that having no other sources of energy, a significant percentage of the population relies on the use of firewood. This has an impact in existing forests because wood from these forests is the primary energy source of many families. When this happens, the trees are no longer able

to assimilate CO2 (carbon dioxide). According to a study done by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 93.6% of rural homes use firewood (Gálvez et al. 2012). SDG 9. Infrastructure and industrialization (urbanization, access to internet and broadband, number of scientific and technical articles, and expenditure in research). This is one of the main sources of corruption in Guatemala. Illegal contributions from corporations to political parties and their relevant figures during elections are the most publicized issues. On that basis, links that later result in favoring those mentioned illicit donors with government contracts are established. In turn, these exchanges result in money laundering in the financial worlds. In addition, a trail of overvalued and non-finished projects is left behind. This situation anticipates an uncertain future, which in turn influences the SDG, and again it belongs more to SDG 16 that asks for peace, justice, and solid institutions that will be analyzed later. The urbanization process which gives rise to high demands of infrastructure mainly concentrates in Guatemala City. It is estimated that the capital city’s metropolitan growth for the year 2020 will double the resident area that was enjoyed in 2006 (MARN 2017, p. 190). The municipalities surrounding this evolution are increasingly becoming territories where the population only comes and goes to sleep, and popularly, these urban agglomerations are called “dormitory cities.” It is estimated that the generation of solid residues or waste in urban areas reached 54% of the total in urban areas, where the territory occupied by Guatemala City and its surroundings concentrates 47.4% of this waste (MARN 2017, p. 190). On the other hand, access to water by home residents becomes critical. Interviews done at this level discovered that only 73% of the homes that were asked answered that they had water daily, while the rest only had this public service 11–15 days in a month and even there were homes that had, during the same period, only 1–5 days (MARN 2017, p. 201). The aforementioned situation related to corruption and lack of sound institutions, in turn,

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leads to discouragement in investment and delays in stimulating technological innovations in the new society that is envisioned with emphasis in knowledge. Add to this the lack of coordination of the private sector, government, civil society, and academia on these issues (Amaro 2018). Barely 27.1% of the population had access to internet, accompanied by a lower percentage of 10.1 out of 100 inhabitants subscribed to mobile broadband. Finally, the number of scientific articles from Guatemala that are published in relevant magazines and government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product in research and development did not reach 1% worldwide (Sachs et al. 2017). SDG 10. Reduced inequalities (poverty, hunger, health, gender, access to clean energy, industrialization). The comparative figure that earned Guatemala the red color observed in Fig. 1 was based on the Gini coefficient (a measure that varies from 0 to 100). The Environmental Report of the State of Guatemala (MARN 2017) acknowledges based on global scale statistics that Guatemala had a Gini coefficient of 0.5524, which ranks 14th among the most unequal countries in the world, a list which includes various African countries, Haiti, and Honduras. This has an impact on national and international migrations and social development in inequalities such as health and education, political instability, environmental neglect, and well-being of future generations. For Guatemala, this SDG is complicated by the existence of a multiethnic and female population, who suffers a double handicap in these dimensions. The most unequal results appear most prominently in populations of Maya origin (indigenous population) and women. The groups that inhabit the Guatemalan territory can be classified as follows: Maya, Garífuna, Xinka, and Ladino. The Maya population is in turn constituted by over 20 linguistic communities, among which the Kaquchikel, Mam, Q’eqchi, and Quiche communities constitute the great majority of those who often do not even speak Spanish, the Guatemala official language. The census of the year 2002 – the last made in Guatemala – reported that 51% of the population was

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female (whose inequality indicators also reflect deficits) and 39.5% of the total population was indigenous (National Urban and Rural Development Council, CONADUR, by its initials in Spanish and the General Planning Secretariat, SEGEPLAN, by its initials in Spanish, 2014). The double identity of women who are also indigenous is reflected in maternal mortality; 70% of these deaths are found in this population (MSPAS/INE/CDC 2009). SDG 14. Life below water (clean water, biodiversity and fisheries indicators) and SDG 15. Life on land (annual deforestation, impacts in species life). Regarding the marine issue, indicators developed expressly to measure this dimension point to Guatemala receiving a score of 94.2 in the Ocean Health Index (which varies from 0 to 100). The severity of the situation is being reflected in its proximity to the highest possible score. Regarding indexes in this dimension: clean water 33.1, presence of fishing 22.1 and percentage of the mentioned presence that is overexploited or collapsed 36.6. This analysis offered critical results. Guatemala, when compared to other countries, obtained a red color evaluation in this dimension. According to these data, concerns for the life of related species should be extended to terrestrial life in critical areas. An index that indicated a red color list of endangered species obtained 0.7 out of 1. The annual change in the area considered forest reached 12.9%, which is evaluated as highly significant (Sachs et al. 2017). These indicators achieved critical state in this dimension and also resulted in the red color for this category that is confirmed by the national Ministry in charge (MARN 2017). SDG 16. Peace, justice, and solid institutions (murder rate, percentage of the population that feels safe walking at night where they live, corruption perceptions index). The indicators mentioned in parenthesis determine the red alarm observed in the SDG as they are evaluated by the Report. The highest personalities that occupied the top posts of the past administration, which was elected at the end of 2011, are currently in preventive custody and subject to trial, most of them living in a military headquarter. After this event, another surprise came. Almost

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the whole cabinet of the administration that was elected before is also in the same situation, also charged with corruption practices. An agreement with the United Nations was signed in 2007 through an entity called the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG by its initials in Spanish). This entity directly collaborates with government entities and operates within the national laws. This signed mandate specifies the following (CICIG 2007): The CICIG was thus created as an independent international body, whose purpose is to support the Public Ministry, the National Civil Police and other State Institutions, in investigation of the crimes committed by members of illegal security bodies and clandestine security apparatuses, as well as in the general actions that lead to the dismantling of said groups. This, through support in investigation and criminal prosecution of a limited number of complex cases, as well as through other actions encompassed within its mandate, destined to strengthen Justice Sector institutions so that they can continue to pursue these illegal groups in the future. (CICIG Creation Agreement Section)

The result of these activities has extended over time, intensifying in recent years. Corruption networks that reach the highest level of the government have been detected, key institutions such as customs and the ministry and other institutions co-responsible for infrastructure have been involved, including the international and national private sector. The Odebrecht case, concerning a Brazilian corporation that has occupied media platforms and whose main executives are imprisoned in Brazil, has also been present in the country as well as in many other countries of Latin America. Insecurity and a ratio of 31.2 murders per every 100,000 inhabitants – one of the highest in the world – is added to what is mentioned above (Sachs et al. 2017). The lack of stability in institutions, exacerbated by the current crisis in Guatemala, has already resulted in a decline of the international rating published by Standard & Poor’s. This agency is a guide to financial institutions worldwide to assess the country’s economic stability, especially with regard to external support and aid. The country has been downgraded from a “BB” grade to a “BB-”. Marceo Barceinas, Director and Analyst of this organization, gave the

following responses to questions from a journalist (Bolaños 2017b): How much did the political crisis that Guatemala faces in the midst of the S&P evaluation influence the decision? It had significant influence. However, this new crisis is just a symptom of the institutional weakness of the country, which includes not only the Executive power, but also the Legislative and Judicial. . .What actions led to this political instability? The attempt to expel the head of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG – Ivan Velásquez-; the approved reforms to the Penal Code which were subsequently rejected by Congress, (Author’s note: he is referring to an attempt by a majority of Congress to invalidate the actions of the CICIG and the Public Ministry regarding the persons implicated in corruption processes identified, who are therefore subject to investigation and trial); the attempts to withdraw immunity of the President of the Republic, Jimmy Morales; the resignations from the State Cabinet; the lack of consensus within Congress on the approval of structural reforms; and the limited capacity of the government to accelerate their expenditure in investment, among others (page 7).

Strengthening its decision, S&P (2017) calculates that economic growth. . .: . . ..will continue to be insufficient to revert the current level of poverty and increase significantly the low GDP per capita, of US$4,200 in 2016. The growth of remittances was double digits in 2016 and 2017, which compensates for additional stress in the economy derived from low investment on behalf of the public and private sectors. However, the robust flow of remittances might be temporary since they depend on the immigration policy of the United States.

International Crisis Tendencies and Their Effects on the SDG, Guatemala, and Other Countries

Two tendencies that might be considered among the most visible ones present today and how they influence the SDG will be analyzed here. These tendencies might be defined this way: a) From the world of the cold war to a multipolar one. Bilateral tensions that could deviate programmed horizons can be detected. Concerns regarding the evolution of certain countries toward an adequate handling of nuclear weapons can be mentioned at this point. Iran and North Korea are some examples that have found a calling in limiting in one way or another these

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activities on behalf of relevant actors like the USA, China, and Russia. On the other hand, these limitations have been extended to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that has been declared “obsolete” due to their faults in financial responsibility by its European counterparts according to a USA public statement. Nevertheless, the organization has later continued its activities. In May 2017, however, according to the Agence France-Presse (2017a), explicit support for article 5 –which called for collective action from the signatories in defense of one of the partners – was avoided. This unilateral circumstances may not be permanent. Recent research shows that these one-sided policies may be constrained by public opinion (Reeves and Rogowski 2018). This uncertainty also contributes to unexpected events. Tensions and conflicts with significant military movements from former USSR countries, like Ukraine and modern-day Russia, are also noteworthy, causing the European Union and the USA to suspect attempts to recreate the geopolitical influence Russia had during the Cold War. There has been a series of unexpected trends, among which is the electoral victory in 2016 of the Unites States’ current administration. Some of the measures this administration has taken have affected cooperation and international trade and are subject of extraordinary attention by the media (Agence France Presse, Prensa Libre, October 30, 2017a, p. 20). On June 1, 2017, for example, the USA withdrew from the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21), on climate change which was celebrated in Paris in 2015, where it had achieved global consensus. This USA decision was accompanied with a withdrawal of a donation of US$4 billon that had been promised by President Obama, only a few months before. On the other hand, it is the only country that has not adhered to the consensus reached at COP21 at present. In addition the first measure of the new USA administration, in commercial matters was the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, almost a week after the new administration took office. Similar tensions brought disagreements around the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), although finally Mexico

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and Canada reached a consensus on this matter. Finally, at the end of 2019, a trilateral agreement was reached. In addition to the above, the Islamic “Jihad” represented by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which opposes peaceful Muslim tradition and the West must also be included. On the other hand, “socialism of the XXI century” in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has opened tensions with the rest of Latin America and the USA, in addition to the forced migration from Cuba during many years. Recently, the government of Ecuador changed this stance. Adding to the volatile situation, the Bolivian government, that used to pursue such policies, has dissapeared giving rise to a new situation in 2019 but new unexpected protests have erupted in Colombia and Chile. It must be taken into account that according to the Global Climate Risk Index, created by United Nations University and an alliance of organizations of civil society (2014), among 171 countries, Guatemala was ranked 4th. among the most vulnerable to natural disasters. Although this situation has changed, Guatemala continues to be ranked among several organizations, including the one mentioned, among the first ten countries most vulnerables in the world at present. It is therefore evident that this would allow a greater attraction of resources that would be limited by time and the uncertainty of these events. Anyhow, the Agenda 2030 would be compromised to some extent. b) The benefits of the growth experienced by developed countries in recent years has been unequal; in the USA, for example, entire portions of the population are out of growing welfare, giving way to political projections with emphasis on nationalist protectionism which is aggravated by migrations from less developed countries. Europe is not an exception to this trend. In the USA, 1% of the richest people owned 17% of the income in 1988. In the last survey done in 2015, this value increased to 24%. The investigation also highlights that significant differences regarding education and networks of informal groups that might be avenues to social ascent have accentuated (Robb 2017). “Between 1987 and 2013, the number of

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billionaires per every 100 million adults in the world went from 5 to 30 and their participation in global went from 0.4 to 1.5%” (Piketty 2014, p. 477). Jeffrey Sachs (2017) says: . . .in the United States in the last 30 years: the Gini Coefficient stands at 41.1, the second highest among the high-income economies, just behind Israel (42.8). There is general concern regarding the situation of the middle classes. This situation is clearly reflected in the political realm and in the decisions of the different states. (p. 13)

Recently, the World Economic Forum (WEF) published the Global Gender Gap Report 2017, which shed light on the aforementioned situation, pointing out that this dimension is far from diminishing in coming years. A comment on the report states that “. . .There is a notable absence of the major industrialized nations of the world, the so-called G20, within the top 10.” This situation suggests that economic power is not a necessary condition to reducing inequality. For example, the breach detected would close within 168 years in North America and 102 years in Africa, at the current rate (WEF 2017, p. viii). The data above offers only examples that have broader characteristics in sectors of the population that have been marginalized in recent years. It should not be forgotten that this population is the voter base for the new USA administration. It is also observed in several countries of Europe such as Germany and France new rightist political groupings opposed to migration from developing countries and showing an unknown electoral force at present. Due to the previous situation, the SDG can necessarily be threatened. There might be tensions surrounding external cooperation for the expenses that massive refugee populations – mainly from North Africa and Middle East countries, traveling to Europe on improvised boats – represent; they claim initial support coming from a situation of total poverty. The International Food Policy Research Institute based on the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO (2017, pp. 6 y 12 in Spanish), estimates that in 2015 there were 240 million international migrants in the world. On the other hand, 19 million people were displaced and 65 million people moved to other territories, either

as internally displaced people or as refugees both because of conflicts. This situation intensifies when the USA makes the decision (on December 2017) to reject signed agreements on migration, arguing that said policies must respond to the national administration. Prospects for the Future Based on the evaluation of current trends and the uncertainties that have arisen in recent times, it is risky to make a prediction about the expected and unexpected trends that might arise if the situations described above worsen. However, what can be done is an “educated guess” as to what the short, medium, and long term would hold. Our first claim is that the “paradigm” – using Thomas Kuhn’s (1996) preferred term – for the future will be the SDG and it would be affected by these trends. The reasons for this realization are the following: The current validity of sustainable development as a planetary policy after more than 50 years of different international and national approaches, is the culmination of a long practice of trial and error which has culminated at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Therefore, short term action, outside the mainstream currents, might not be lasting. The issue of “development” as such is institutionalized in the planet after the Second World War. The Marshall Plan, programmed by the USA and created to face Europe’s reconstruction after the war, contributed to this. The inauguration and continuity of the United Nations System became a factor, apart from the great division between countries of different income, quality of life, favorable environmental factors, and projections of continuity for future generations. To make this recount, the analysis should begin from the socalled “First Decade of Development” – what the 10 years between 1960 and 1970 were called – as it was nominated by almost all the countries gathered in New York at the headquarters of the highest international organism that was already in place. This evolution is described by many academics and is collected in many documents and international meetings (Amaro 2012; Göpel 2016).

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions

The meeting in Oslo of the Brundtland Commission in 1987 gathered these concerns. This elite group names and defines “sustainable” as an added last name for “development,” capturing the previous experience. This definition then calls for economic development but accompanied by a social or “human development” dimension and considering environmental factors, thinking of future generations in order to have an indefinite continuity and resilience over time. The argument expressed in this entry is that the awareness – which has been forged over so much time and that has confronted reality time and time again and that begun as an initial reflection during the 90s – has in itself a dynamics that tends to remain and even more to expand and disseminate to orient all research and actions in the future. Many programs of many countries (developed as well as underdeveloped ones) and subnational governments will follow their course in the following years. It might be noted that throughout time many countries have modified their positions, and it will take time for them to change courses after advances made in many sustainable fronts. A recurrent tension over the last 20 years was holding developed countries accountable for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Following the “polluter pays” principle, they were responsible for financing the process of climate change mitigation and adaptation in order to face adverse effects of this phenomenon. In general, developing countries expected disbursements amounting to US$100 billion mainly from developed countries, starting in 2020. This figure was based on a consensus reached in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2015 and follows the application of this principle in many European countries. For example, following COP meetings, a group of countries formed the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC by its initials in Spanish). Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru belong to this group. They have a combined commitment to reduce their GHG emissions by 20% to 45% by 2030. They also emphasize climate change mitigation and

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adaptation to its impacts. For example, Guatemala offered a reduction of approximately 11% as a goal, which would double if enough aid was received to support this goal. In addition, significant promises on behalf of Mexico and Brazil were made if there was sufficient consensus. These goals are being discussed at present. The argument here is that continuity persists, in spite of withdrawal from the USA and similar forces in Europe. AILAC countries, for example, held a meeting in Lima, Peru, previous to COP23 (which was held in Bonn, Germany) in order to unify criteria. In addition, to the aforementioned meeting in Bonn, around 20 countries have committed to abandoning the use of coal, the greatest polluting fossil fuel. Among them Canada, the UK, Angola, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Marshall Islands, Mexico, Holland, New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland can be found. These members have promised to rally at least 50 countries around these objectives (EFE 2017). The same thing happened in a meeting, held in Vietnam, of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – rejected by the USA as well – in which almost simultaneously, eleven countries strengthen their ties. The partnership (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) continues their alliances. It is significant that a total of 44% of US exports head to these countries (Office of the United States in the TransPacific Partnership 2018). There is the intention to attract the USA into the partnership once more, as was expressed during the last meeting. Routes regarding how to reach other agreements that are currently suspended have also been established (The Japan Times 2017a). This alliance represents 40% of the value of global trade, including the USA which singularly excluded China before its withdrawal. The group has also expressed its desire for China to participate in the alliance in the future, which in turn reinforces the perception that this void, like others present at this stage, will be filled by other actors that are not necessarily allied to those withdrawings. The possible inclusion of

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China in the TPP does not exclude a similar mechanism known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has been promoting China – along with the help of other countries present in the TPP – as a possible alternative that represents half of the world’s population, 30% of the gross world product (GWP), and close to a quarter of the world’s exports (The Japan Times 2017b). The problems that have arisen internally in US territory, regarding the degree of adherence of subnational governments, to a national policy of rejection and withdrawal from national and transnational environmental objectives, have been mentioned. These tensions involve gray areas that require competent courts, to which the parties can appeal and that may become a long process of delays, prohibitions, and qualifications of illegality in specific attributions exceeded by the executive power or vice-versa. A conservative guess would predict long battles that would allow greater flexibility. An argument cannot be ruled out that many of these mandates might lose their content and be validated by superior legal authorities. This situation that contributes to uncertainty, are the so-called Sanctuary Cities, which differ from the Executive’s policies regarding migration and tend to protect illegal aliens. This situation also applies to the COP21 Agreements, in which any withdrawal from them would be valid 4 years after the party expressed its desire to withdraw. This means that for the case of the USA, where elections are to be held just before this time period is over, decisions taken in a former administration may be revoked by new elected incumbents. All these measures, and the meaning and extent they take, will surely affect the SDG and the 2030 Agenda. A greater lack of consensus is taking place in Congresses and Parliaments (in USA and Europe) may delay partial decisions or impede measures that contribute to greater development of less developed countries. This is another uncertainty that hangs over the SDG. It concerns the growing nationalist wave, which often has historical origins but is also intensified due to

sudden migrations taking place both in the USA and Europe. In the first case, countries like Mexico and those located in Central America, constitute a central axis due to the volume of migrations and commercial aid relationships that have been established. There has been considerable controversy regarding the number of migrants and undocumented immigrants measured by official sources in the USA. These data are difficult to obtain; therefore it must have some degree of lack of accuracy. However, there is consensus, even among antiimmigration organizations, that the number of illegal immigrants is around 10 to 12 million depending on the year of measurement; in 2014, the last year recorded, the figure was 11.3 million. Then, what would be the amount of people per country? As expected, Mexico occupies the first place with five million 990,000, followed by El Salvador with 631,000 and Guatemala with 499,000. India appears in fourth place with 392,000 and Honduras in fifth place with 349,000. All of South America amounts to 637,000 (Warren 2016, pp. 9–10; De Bastos 2017). For Guatemala, the Institute of Migration Policy, based in Washington, DC, indicates that in 2015 the figure was 928,000 people (Lesser and Batalova 2017), which implies that 53.7% of this last figure is illegal. An example of what is mentioned above that can affect the SDG may be mentioned. Children that accompany migrants sometimes get detained at the border, which has already led to a decline in primary school enrollment in Guatemala; according to the Ministry of Education, there were 23,292 less students than the year before (Montepeque, November 17, 2017). As a consequence of the impact of these children, official aid under the “Plan for Prosperity” has been approved by US Congress. It benefits the less favored population of the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras). US Congress has donated US $209.4 million (National Competitiveness Program 2017) to Guatemala, which are also complemented with national funds; 51 municipalities are prioritized when addressing poverty. Threats of massive

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions

deportation therefore present a massive impact to the SDGs, and preparation to receive these deported populations should be anticipated. There is no doubt that a large part of the withdrawal of official development assistance (ODA) will suffer considerable decline. Withdrawal from the agreements reached during the COP21 meant mainly that the US$4,000 million pledged by the Obama administration to the corresponding fund shall not be incorporated. In the European case, limited centuries old nationalist tendencies react to recent migrations which are mostly from predominantly Muslim countries. However, the election of new governments in Holland, France, and Germany did not result in significant administration changes, which would alter previous commitments. Therefore the countries of the European Union continue supporting the Agreements reached during the COP21 and also are ratifying the SDG, at UN meetings. Giddens (2010, pp. 223–227) states that organizations of the European Union have faced environmental and development issues since 1998, and by 2008, there were already percentages of target reductions of GHG emissions. There is the commitment to reduce emissions by at least 10% by 2020 on behalf of all countries. It is expected that those values will continue to increase; the effort varies by country. European countries as a whole continue to adhere to these commitments, despite some breakdowns. For Guatemala, what is detailed above announces the worsening of a trend that is being observed. Public spending in health and education has diminished significantly in recent years. During 2010, 2.25% of the GDP was spent in healthcare, and in 2016 this figure decreased to 1.65%; in education this figure diminished from 3.19% to 3.03% during the same years; and only 2 months from ending the year 2017, the figure is currently at 2.37% (Contreras, November 27, 2017, p. 9). This also calls into question SDG compliance in these dimensions. Fears exist that other rival countries might fill voids in a multipolar world. This concern is present in many past alliances in which countries have held common positions

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in the Middle East, as is the case of Iran and North Korea, and the problems surrounding Crimea and Ukraine. The root of this fear lies in interpretations that Russia, after having broken the territorial pact of the Soviet Union, would like to revive its previous political influence. On the other hand, the rise of China in Asia, has left many countries behind that have not had sudden progress in recent years and that also have their base in a wide territory and population size, or that having reached a certain level of development in previous stages, have found it difficult to have long-term continuity in their achievements, like Japan. Latin America is not immune to these tensions. Chinese investments and exports to South America are already an important component of many countries. A recent report made by the Atlantic Council and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Avendaño et al. 2017) sheds light on a tendency for which there was little information. In the last 5 years before the report was drafted, the average annual investment of China in the area reached more than 10 billion dollars per year, mainly in countries with larger populations, like Brazil and Mexico. Likewise, there are talks to create infrastructure joining the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, across the whole Latin American continent with an important Chinese participation. This is repeated in Nicaragua, Central America, to create an infrastructure capable of competing with the Panama Canal. There is a significant Chinese investment in Honduras around a hydroelectric plant. Cuban, Chinese, and Russian presence were notable in Venezuela. Ecuador, and Bolivia. These possibilities complement the influence that these rival countries already had in Cuba since the 1960s although as it was mentioned Ecuador and Bolivia recently have followed a different path.

Conclusion This analysis provided grounds that might be extrapolated to the whole world. The conclusions of each one of these objectives will also show

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the relationship it has to the SDG and related targets that having these examples in mind could help developing as well as developed countries to face the uncertainties created by the international scenario in each country. First the SDG 2 and 3, related to hunger, health, and well-being, were analyzed. Nutritional levels of the Guatemalan population require a renowned effort on behalf of public policy, as well as medical attention and provision of hospitals and health centers, with priority areas marked by the presence of Mayan people and attention to women. From these first dimensions, priority on SDG 16, related to the solidity of institutions, can be highlighted. It is necessary to attribute a large part of the weaknesses observed to failures of public attention both from behalf of the State, involving its judicial, legislative, and executive powers, and the Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS), both currently indicted and questioned regarding their dubious management of public resources. SDG 7 is related to clean and accessible energy and constitutes a challenge for decision-makers because it is necessary to recognize that Guatemala, in terms of electricity generation from renewable sources, occupies a rather advanced position in the context of Latin America and the rest of the world. However, these challenges concern not only the public sector but also the private one. Still electricity is not universal in its access. On the other hand, there are serious obstacles for hydroelectric power expansion in the country and given the national potential in this field; the country may even export energy on a large scale to other Latin American countries, if these challenges are faced. These conflicts have reached the judicial powers, but their decisions have been characterized by delays and lack of understanding between the parties. There are also strictly public situations such as contamination of lakes, rivers, and water sources in general that have reached critical levels like the presence of excessive waste in the Motagua River, which has forced action because it impacts the territory of a neighboring country: Honduras. On the other hand, contamination of Lake Amatitlán, close to the capital city, has also attracted tensions regarding the problem of SDG 16, since a million-

dollar investment was made by a corporation whose offer was to clean the water pollutants. This in turn is being elucidated by the judicial organ and various officials accused of corruption, including the former Vice-President of the Republic, who is currently under preventive detention until a final judicial decision is reached. SDG 9 aims to strengthen society’s knowledge and education, mainly that which is capable of producing scientific and technical articles and could also make contributions in research and is strongly linked to aid cooperation and donations. This is absent in developing countries, and Guatemala is no exception. Primary and secondary education still suffer from significant deficits; and higher education has serious problems that are reflected in a greater emphasis in teaching and a notable absence of research (Amaro 2018). In the future it is not possible to visualize significant progress in this area. Advances in education, enter the list of problems derived from SDG 10, which refers to the reduction of inequality, which traverses almost all the goals. For example, SDG 1 and 2 refer to “zero hunger” and “elimination of poverty.” Nevertheless, the effects of pollution and climate change (where at least 5 environmental SDG are directly mentioned), precarious health, education deficit, low employment, etc. have a direct relationship to the SDG 2 that calls for the elimination of poverty. SDG 14 refers to strictly environmental goals that would seriously be affected by human activity and Guatemala is not free from it. The location where the Petén Department is located in the north of the country represents a third of Guatemalan territory with barely 3% of the population. Different groups, with different objectives, move to this territory. The first condition to prepare the land for crops is to remove the trees. Many families seek land due to the scarcity of it in areas with higher population density. The factors that affect inequality influence this migration. Finally, given the situation of Guatemala, which touches the dimension described in SDG 16, groups linked to human trafficking and drugs have established organized and territorial activities in Petén, taking advantage of its proximity to Mexico.

Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions

Suggestions for Decision-Makers The “educated guesses” advanced necessarily highlight temporary dimensions that are necessary toward the future in order to formulate actions that allow the advancement of goals that have practically global consensus. However, the insertion of Guatemala requires limitations that adjust to its specific characteristics as a developing country, answering to its position in Central America and its current political and institutional context. The strategies, which arise from the circumstances analyzed and the limitations pointed out, could be stated as follows:

(i) Closing ranks with those who have intensified their activities both in the USA and in the rest of the world in the short, medium, and long term. (ii) Regarding SDG 16, which appears as a priority in the Guatemalan reality, a call should be made to strengthening institutions and avoid violence and confrontations. Particularly corruption practices should be stopped. It is necessary to address the calls to different government sectors and civil society for a social pact. In these possible accords, which could materialize in the medium and long term, the weaknesses in sustainable development stated previously and the international crisis that looms over its achievements should be considered.

Cross-References ▶ Climate Justice ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-Stakeholder Mechanisms ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability ▶ Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation under Political Instability and Growth of Populism ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

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Acknowledgments First, the author would like to thank Dr. Eduardo Suger, Ph.D, founder and current Rector of Universidad Galileo, protagonist of strategic initiatives, in the fields of sustainable development, renewable energy, and climate change, for the benefit of the development of the country. Special thanks should be extended to Eng. Daniella Suger and Dani Alvarez who made the translation possible to English of the first draft made in Spanish delivered at the Forum on Sustainable Development and International Crises at the Galileo University in October 2017. The author would also like to thank the support received from other authorities of Universidad Galileo, like the Vice-Rector, Dra. Mayra Roldan, as well as the technical and administrative staff that helped, Ing. Robert Guzmán, who is in charge of academic and managerial responsibilities in the Master in Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development and the Doctorate in Sustainable Development and, finally, our Assistant, Sayra Gómez.

References Agence France Presse (30 October 2017a) Trump dismantles all great agreements of USA (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, p 20 Agence France Presse (13 December 2017b) Investors ward off from fossil energies. COP21 in Paris obtain commitments from corporations and investors to face global warming (in Spanish). Prensa Libre. Sección internacional, p 14 Amaro N (1970) The challenge of development in Guatemala (in Spanish). Impresos industriales/Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social para América Central, Guatemala Amaro N (2012) Renewable energies in the light of development experiences in fifty years, 1960–2010. In: Filho WL, Gottwald J (eds) Educational and technological approaches to renewable energy. Peter Lang GmbH, Frankfurt am main, pp 11–40 Amaro N (2018) Lessons learned for decision-makers during a 5-year research period on sustainability problems at the Galileo University in Guatemala. In: Filho WL (ed) Handbook of sustainability science and research. World sustainability series. Springer International Publishing AG, Cham, pp 3–23. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63007-6_1 Avendaño R, Melguizo A, Miner S (2017) China FDI in Latin America. New trends with global implications. Atlantic Council and OECD, Paris/Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://publications. atlanticcouncil.org/china-fdi-latin-america/ Bolaños RM (18 October 2017a) Energy. A country with a record in renewables. Electricity generation reached 83% from these sources last month (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, p 11 Bolaños RM (6 November 2017b) The crisis is a symptom of institutional weakness. The analyst from

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Estándar & Poor’s who evaluated Guatemala, justifies the low qualification (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, p 7 CEPAL, Comisión Económica para América Laina (2018) CEPAL, Annual Statistics of Latin America and Caribbean countries (in Spanish). Naciones Unidas, Santiago de Chile CICIG, Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (2007) Agreement on the Mandate creating CICIG (in Spanish). Retrieved on 21 Nov 2017 from http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page¼mandato CONADUR and SEGEPLAN, Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural and Secretaría General de Planificación (2014) National Development Plan K’atun: our Guatemala 2032 (in Spanish). Conadur/Segeplan/Serviprensa, Guatemala. Retrieved from http://www.infom.gob.gt/archivos/estrategia/2_ PND_Katun2032.pdf Contreras G (27 de noviembre de 2017) Public expenditures continue stagnant. Since the year 2010 in health, education, housing and security, the execution either has stopped or decrease and there are not any signal of improvement. (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, p 9 de Bastos J (19 January 2017) A lie. ¿How many migrants without papers are in USA? (in Spanish). Univisión. Retrieved from http://www.univision.com/ noticias/mentira/cuantos-indocumentados-hay-en-esta dos-unidos Economic Forecasts from the World’s Leading Economists (2017) Guatemala remittances 2017. Retrieved from https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/guatemal a/news/remittances/full-year-remittances-reach-all-tim e-high-in-2017-on-solid EFE (17 November 2017) Alliance promotes the end of carbón use (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, p 20 FAO, Oficina de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (2017) To change migration future investing in food safety and rural development (in Spanish). Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/ai7323s.pdf Gálvez J, López E, Sandoval C (2012) Environmental Profile of Guatemala 2010–2012. Local vulnerability and increasing risk construction (in Spanish), Sección 4.2.2. Instituto de Agricultura, Recursos Naturales y Ambiente (IARNA), Universidad Rafael Landívar (URL), Ciudad de Guatemala Giddens A (2010) The politics of the climate change (in Spanish). Alianza Editorial S. A, Madrid Gobierno de Guatemala (2017) The Plan for the Zero Hunger Pact (in Spanish). Retrieved from http://www. transparencia.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/INF -2012-002.pdf Göpel M (2016) The great Mindshift. How a new economic paradigm and sustainability transformations go hand in hand. Springer International-Wuppertal Institute, Berlin Kuhn T (1996) The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Lesser G, Batalova J (April 5, 2017) Central American inmigrants in the United States. Migration Policy

Institute, Washington DC. Retrieved from https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-im migrants-united-states MARN, Ministerio de Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, MARN (2017) Environmental Report of the Guatemalan State 2016 (in Spanish). MARN, Fondo de Adaptación (FA), PNUD, Ciudad Guatemala Montepeque F (17 November 2017) Children of Guatemala migrate to USA instead of going to school (in Spanish). El Periódico, p 4 Moraga P, Meckievi S (2016) Comparative analysis of Climate Change legistlation (in Spanish). Center for Climate and Resilience Research, Adapt Chile, Ministerio de Ambiente de Chile y Embajada Británica en Santiago, Santiago de Chile Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, MSPAS, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE y Center for Disease Control, EE. UU., CDC (2009) V survey on Maternal Child Health 2008/2009 (in Spanish). MSPAS, Guatemala Muñoz Palala G (29 de octubre de 2016) Community affairs. SESAN does not publish that chronic malnutrition increased in Guatemala (in Spanish). Prensa Libre. Retrieved from http://www.prensalibre. com/guatemala/comunitario/piden-que-se-evaluen-estr ategias-para-reducir-la-desnutricion-cronica Observatory of Economic complexity, OEC (2017) Countries. Guatemala. Retrieved from https://atlas. media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/gtm/ Office of the United States Representative. Executive Office of the President (2018) The Trans-Pacific Partnership Would Expand Market Access. Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/map/tpp/va Piketty T (2014) Capital in the XXI Century (in Spanish). FCE, México Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, PNUD (2016) Beyond any conflict, the welfare struggle (in Spanish). National Human Development Report 2015/ 2016. Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Guatemala Programa Nacional de Competitividad (2017) What is the Alliance Plan for prosperity? (in Spanish). Retrieved on 16 Nov 2017 from https://www. pronacom.gt/proyectos/plan_de_la_alianza_para_la_ pros peridad_deltriangulonorte Reeves A, Rogowski JC (2018) The public cost of unilateral action. Am J Polit Sci 62(2):424–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12340 Robb G (26 de septiembre de 2017) Gap between rich and poor continues to widen, latest Fed data show. Marketwatch. Retrieved from https://www. marketwatch.com/story/gap-between-rich-and-poor-co ntinues-to-widen-latest-fed-data-show-2017-09-26 Sachs J, Schmidt Traub G, Kroll C, Durand Delacre D, Teksoz K (2017) SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2017. Bertelsmann Siftung and Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), New York. Retrieved from http://www.sdgindex.org/assets/files/ 2017/2017-SDG-Index-and-Dashboards-Report%2D %2Dfull.pdf

Distributive Justice at the Global, National, and Temporal Scales Standard & Poor’s, S&P (19 de octubre de 2017) S&P Ratings. S&P Global Ratings gives a low qualification to ‘BB-’ from ‘BB’ to three Guatemalan banks after a similar move of a similar decision over the sovereign; BICRA revises and put Guatemala in a 7th. Group from 6th. Press reléase (in Spanish), Press release. Retrieved from http://www.standardandpoors.com/es_ LA/delegate/getPDF?articleId¼1936556&type¼NEW S&subType¼RATING_ACTION Tezanos S (2018) Development Geography of Latin America and the Caribbean: towards a new multidimensional taxonomy of the Sustainable Development Objectives (in Spanish). Revista de la CEPAL 125:7–28 The Japan Times (2017a) What policies the TPP 11 should pursue. The Japan Times, Editorials. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2017 from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/ 2017/11/13/editorials/policies-tpp-11-pursue/#.Wg yIhzdrzcs The Japan Times (2017b) Associated Press, Business. Pullout from Pacific Rim trade pact leaves U.S. on sidelines. The Japan Times. Retrieved on 17 Nov 2017 from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/ 11/10/business/pullout-pacific-rim-trade-pact-leavesu-s-sidelines/#.Wg8VUjdrzcs United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security, UNU-EHS, Alliance Development Works (2014) World risk report 2014. Retrieved from https://i.unu.edu/media/ehs.unu.edu/news/4070/ 11895.pdf World Economic Forum, WEF (2017) The global gender gap report 2017. Retrieved from https://www.weforum. org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017

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Dishonesty ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Disorientation ▶ Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Under Political Instability and Growth of Populism

Dissident Armed Forces ▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16

Distributive Justice ▶ Environmental Justice: Emergence to Implementation and Its Relation with SDGs

Digital Government

Distributive Justice at the Global, National, and ▶ Transparent Governments, Social Innovation, Temporal Scales and Their Role in Achieving the SDGs

Disaster Risk Management

Mine Islar LUCSUS-Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies, Lund, Sweden

▶ Impact of Good Governance on Disaster Risk Management

Definitions

Discuss

Distributive justice broadly concerns how benefits and burdens ought to be distributed among a set of groups or individuals as a matter of right and entitlement (Ip 2017). According to the distributive paradigm of justice (Miller 1999; Rawls 1999), the subject of justice is the very basic structure of the society, which defines how we

▶ Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

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distribute various rights, goods, and liberties, as well as how we regulate social and economic equality or inequality (Schlosberg 2007).

Introduction Justice is an underlying principle and an important lens in understanding sustainable development goals (SDG). There is a need for analysis and clarification on the underlying principles of justice embedded in the SDGs. Goals such as no poverty (goal 1), zero hunger (goal 2), health and wellbeing (goal 3), gender equality (goal 5), affordable energy (goal 7), reduced inequalities (goal 10) as well as climate action (goal 13) aim for a fair distribution of resources, risks, and benefits for all. There is one specific SDG goal which explicitly mentions “justice” and that is stated in goal 16 in the context of peace and ensuring access to justice for all in effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. In achieving these goals, distributive justice is a central element and can guide the political translation of SDG goals and targets in concrete strategies and policies (Oliveira 2018). According to the distributive paradigm of justice (Dobson 1998; Miller 1999; Rawls 1999), the subject of justice defines how rights, goods, and liberties are distributed (Schlosberg 2007). Distributive justice is also explained in the terms of fairness in the distribution of benefits and burdens in society (Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007). Political philosophers have assumed that principles of distributive justice are relevant only within the boundaries of a given political community (Ip 2017). However, this assumption is contested when the challenges like climate change require a global understanding of governance in the allocation of resources as well as risks for not only current generations but also for future generations. Similarly, regarding the implementation of the SDGs, the idea of distributive justice then needs a multiscalar understanding where consideration is given to where and when justice is assumed in relation to different spatial scales such as local, national, global as well as at temporal scales such as long term and short term.

This section provides a brief overview of philosophical definitions of distributive justice from a multiscalar perspective and later describes the uses of distributive justice in the context of energy access. Finally this entry concludes with the challenges of SDGs in ensuring intergenerational distributive justice and opportunities for future policy implementation.

Philosophical Origins According to Pelletier (2010), there are three approaches to distributive justice in the western tradition of normative political philosophy. These are shaped by the libertarian, socialist, and liberal theories (Sterba 2003; Okereke 2006). Within the libertarian tradition, individual liberty and private property rights are central concerns for a moral and political ideal (Sterba 2003). Distributive justice in the context of libertarianism is about providing freedom to individuals to pursue their respective material aspirations (Pelletier 2010). In this context, neoclassical economists such as Hayek (1976) and Friedman (1962) see free market as inherently just and any redistributive interventions by nonmarket forces as violations of the individual’s basic right to liberty (Hayek 1976). In contrast to liberty concerns, socialist tradition puts equality as the key for achieving distributive justice. The socialist conception of justice views equality rather than liberty as the moral imperative. Following Marx, private property and ownership of means of production are reasons for distributive injustice. In order to provide distributive justice the structures embedded in the relations of production need to be changed. Perhaps the most influential approach to distributive justice is rooted in the liberal democratic theory of justice as explained in John Rawls’ books “Theory of Justice” and “The Law of Peoples.” In Rawls’ (1971) concept of “a veil of ignorance,” people stay behind a hypothetical veil where they stripped off from their identities including their strength and weaknesses. According to this, when people do not know about their position in life they would come up with a fair notion of justice that everyone agrees

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with. They would want to choose to have the same political rights as everyone else, and the distribution of economic and social inequality in a society should benefit everyone, including the least welloff (Schlosberg 2004). Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971) is seen as a defense of liberal democracy and redistributive methods for justice. Although, Ip (2017) argues John Rawls’ theory is not meant to be applied at the global scale, his focus on people rather than individuals as the agents of justice has a collective nature. In his book “Law of Peoples,” the purpose is to emphasize the moral characters of societies as collective agents that are not solely motivated by prudence or rationality through the use of the term people (as distinct from states) (Rawls 1999). Another contribution of Rawls’ is his emphasis on collective agreement. Brian Barry’s (1999) notion of justice is similar: people should agree on the rules of distributive justice while being impartial to different notions of the good life individuals have (Schlosberg 2004). Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach can be seen as another attempt to broaden the scope of justice by emphasizing individuals’ abilities and opportunities to create functional and flourishing good lives (Sen 2001). Sen’s capabilities approach can also be articulated in the context of distributive justice as it aims to reconcile the competing demands of liberty and equality (Nelson 2008). According to Ballet et al. (2013), capabilities approach in the context of environmental justice and sustainability allows for an understanding that links individual vulnerabilities to the ability to access environmental goods and services. Sen’s concept of capabilities refers to the “conditions of enablement that make it possible for people to achieve goals, and the availability of opportunities to achieve outcomes people value” (Mustalahti 2018: 3182). Since human capabilities cannot be thought independent from natural environment, Holland (2008) argues that we should treat certain environmental entitlements as a matter of basic justice. From a distribtive justice perspective in multiple scales, there is also “the need to consider the level of protection of capabilities that a society can justify without impacting on ecological conditions in

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ways that undermine the capabilities of vulnerable people elsewhere” (Mustalahti 2018: 3183).

Multiscalar Approach in Understanding Justice Recent works on social transformation have recognized the importance of multiscalar approach in theorizing the interactions between different policy practices and actors at various spatial and temporal scales. The concept of scale has been introduced in social justice studies for reimagining the political space by going beyond the taken-for-granted frame of “national state” (Fraser 2008). According to Fraser, equality and justice lose its meaning unless we question and examine the spatial scale at which a question of justice is evaluated. Geographers coined the term “politics of scale” and explain that construction of a scale is always a result of a political project. Scale represents a set of political, economic, and social relations in a hierarchy (Harvey 1996; Herod and Wright 2002) and thus it can be dynamic and relational. While national scale was the hegemonic scale in the Fordist era, our present era represents the “de-hegemonizing” of the national scale due to reorganization of the world economy where production, finance, and information have been internationalized, and transnational communities are on the rise (Purcell 2002). Also, challenges like climate change transcend borders and require solutions in multiple scales. Changing power relations between different entities can reinforce processes of rescaling and negotiation of “scale” that they are defined in. For instance, local social movements can “jumpscale” from local to global in order to increase their influence or migrants can act as “scalemakers” and contribute to the global repositioning of cities – for example, through their participation in the labor force or in transnational associations (Williamson 2015; Çağlar 2007). By supporting measures at global, national, and local scales as well as promoting short- and long-term measures, sustainable development goals as a policy framework has a multiscalar vision. The size and breadth of the SDGs present

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new challenges not only for governments, policymakers, and public entities charged with implementing the SDGs, but also for researchers that seek to study the complex interactions and support a transition towards a more just, sustainable, and equitable world.

Distributive Justice at the Global Scale: Sustainable Development Goals This section addresses the linkages between some of the sustainable development goals and principles of distributive justice. Scholars argue that for achieving the SDGs policymakers, scientists, and practitioners have to interconnect and analyze 169 targets and their trade-offs and synergies (Oliveira 2018; Costanza et al. 2016; Waage et al. 2015; Biermann et al. 2017). Principles of distributive justice in this context can be understood as moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies (Lamont and Favor 2017). SDGs express statements which are embedded in the distributive justice paradigm emphasizing sharing benefits and burdens among citizens and the importance of fairness in the political processes. For instance, goal 1 – no poverty, explicitly targets distributional injustices by suggesting securing social protection systems in order to preventing reduce poverty and inequality at every stage of people’s lives. Targets of goal 2 – no hunger, focus on reducing malnutrition and hunger while also addressing the problems associated with the distortions in world agricultural markets. Emphasizing the distributive injustices at the global agricultural markets, goal 2 frames the “No Hunger” targets within the justice paradigm at multiple scales (UN 2017). Some of the goals such as goal 5 on gender equality moves beyond the distributional principles of justice and emphasizes the importance of recognition in the distributive paradigm. This goal includes targets like “recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies” as well as ensuring the “proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments

and local governments and proportion of women in managerial positions” in order to combat the underrepresentation of women in these positions. This links well to an important debate within distributive justice on recognition. This debate was stimulated by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth’s (2003) argument which suggests that recognition is a necessity to social justice and that recognition needs to be treated as a separate entity in the justice paradigm rather than a concept that is embedded in distributive justice (Ohlström et al. 2011; Fraser et al. 2003; Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007). According to this, distribution and recognition are equally fundamental components of distributive justice. Recognitionbased justice with explicit attributions to race, sex, ethnicity, and gender provides a ground for distribution. Scholars like David Schlosberg (2004) argues in a similar vein that the status of people distributed to (or not) must be addressed so the key is not to assume recognition, but to address it. Equal recognition between groups or people cannot be just assumed for distributive justice. In that sense, recognition is not only something that needs to be distributed but also a precondition of membership in the political community. SDG goal 6 “Clean Water and Sanitation” and goal 7 “Energy for All” emphasize the “equitable access” component of the distributive justice principles. Extending the access to resources such as clean water and clean energy for all reflects the egalitarian perspective on distributive justice. As Lamont and Favor (2017) point out egalitarianism is perhaps the first principle of distributive justice which demands for the allocation of equal material goods to all members of society. However, it is important to point out that distribution of opportunities is as important as the distribution of material goods and services. SDG’s target-oriented approach seems to be more in line of “equality of outcome” or strict egalitarianism rather than equality of opportunity. Nevertheless Barry (1988) argues that even with formal equality of opportunity, there will remain many factors over which people have no control but which will affect their lifetime economic prospects such as their family background, race, gender, and color (Lamont and Favor 2017). For a sustainable and

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just future, society needs to adopt more substantial equality of opportunity principle in areas like education and health care. Ensuring distributive justice at a global scale also requires a holistic and integrated approach between these goals, and their impacts on nature. Recent IPBES report (2019) on the global assessment on biodiversity shows that current formulation of SDG targets does not take into account the relationship between human activities and nature. This has implications on distributive justice. It is documented by the report that land or resource tenure insecurity as well as declines in nature have greater impacts on women and girls, who are most often negatively impacted. Some pathways chosen to achieve the goals related to energy, economic growth, industry and infrastructure, and sustainable consumption and production (sustainable development goals 7, 8, 9, and 12), as well as the targets related to poverty, food security, and cities (sustainable development goals 1, 2, and 11), could have substantial positive or negative impacts on nature, distribution on benefits and risks, and therefore on the achievement of the other sustainable development goals. According to the IPBES report, an essential step is to radically change and provide distribute justice at a global scale is to change the way in which our quality of life and social status are promoted on the basis of material consumption, and the way measures of national progress emphasize economic output at the expense of their distributive and long-term social and environmental implications. This involves dematerialization of consumption (less materials, less waste, less spillover, and more emphasis on nonmaterial benefits) and also, for some societies and sectors within societies, a reduction of the consumption perceived as necessary to achieve a fulfilled life. Below section will explain the distributive justice at the national scale by focusing on sustainable development goals 7 “access to affordable energy” as it serves as a good example highlighting the multiscalar dilemma between reduction of consumption for ensuring distributive justice at a global scale and providing more resources to those who consume less at a national scale.

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Distributive Justice at the National Scale: Case Studies of Renewable Energy Implementations Scholars like Jenkins et al. (2016), Sovacool, and Dworkin (2014) identify distributional justice principles for energy systems and frames this approach under the energy justice framework. In relation to sustainable development goal 7 “affordable and clean energy for all,” one can also use the emerging framework of energy justice. In the context of justice, they argue that the “energy challenge” is occurred as energy systems are encompassing several areas including energy policy (McCauley et al. 2013), energy production and systems (Heffron and McCauley 2014), energy consumption (Hall 2013; Jenkins et al. 2014), energy activism (Islar 2012; Islar and Busch 2016), energy security (Sovacool et al. 2013), and political economy of energy and climate change (Walker 2009). In the context of energy systems, distributive justice recognizes both the physical allocation of environmental benefits and harms as well as the uneven distribution of their associated responsibilities (Jenkins et al. 2016). Distributive justice in the context of energy emphasizes the ethical and social aspects of desired energy technologies and its infrastructure as they may have an effect on distribution of benefits and risks. Apart from the concerns on energy infrastructure, they identify access to energy services as a matter of distributional justice. Both physical access to heating and electricity (Islar et al. 2017) as well as affordability are matters of distribution. Studies conducted in energy transition at national scales demonstrate the distributive justice challenges regarding the implementation of the SDG goal 7 on access to clean and affordable energy (Herrington and Malakar 2016; Gippner et al. 2013; Gurung et al. 2011; Islar et al. 2017). In the case of Nepal where energy consumption per capita is one of the lowest in the world, the principle of affordability is mostly linked with affording the costs for establishing a secure energy access. Establishing a secure energy access presupposes an uninterrupted and adequate supply with a lower degree of dependency on

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foreign imports of fossil fuels. In this context, the availability of energy sources in Nepal is at a critical stage. Although developing, Nepal’s clean energy supply cannot meet the demands of all its population due to its geopolitical position. Its landlocked and mountainous geography create some challenges for ensuring a stable, self-sufficient, and decentralized energy system. Despite its developing renewable energy potential, Nepal is heavily dependent on both India and China for overland supplies ranging from medicine to petroleum products and nearly all fossil fuels imported to Nepal are imported and refined in India (Surendra et al. 2011). In countries with diverse population such as Nepal the access to and affordability of energy may not be all feasible for all community members such as to vulnerable members like women and Dalits. The poor institutional capacity, lack of coordination, and inadequate implementation of various energy projects might lead to different results such as the exclusion of the poor (Sovacool et al. 2011; Islar et al. 2017: 6). As a result of some energy access projects may lead to increasing poverty gap between poor and rich as subsidies often only reach to those who already have resources. Several studies have shown that ensuring intragenerational equity in a rural context requires special attention to variables such as caste and ethnicity (Jones and Boyd 2011). Off-grid renewable energy systems as well as small-scale renewable energy development offer solutions to this problem by increasing marginalized communities’ access to renewable energy. Gippner et al. (2013)’s detailed analysis of micro-hydro schemes in Nepal under the Rural Energy Development Program financed by UNDP and World Bank shows the positive impact of electrification and community-managed hydropower schemes on gender equity, income generation, and climate mitigation. However, case studies of community-based off-grid systems also show that the ability to derive benefits from these micro-hydro schemes depends on the economic status of the households as electricity can only be utilized when there are technological appliances. Clean and affordable energy facilities can make distributive injustices more visible

when households with mobile phones, TVs, and rice cookers afford and benefit from available electricity more than other households are able to do. Studies conducted in Turkey on private-sectorbased hydropower schemes demonstrate problems in relation to providing clean and safe energy from a distributive justice perspective. Among other renewable energy sources, hydropower is a highly contested issue in relation to water use rights and sustainability. Most attention has been given to large-scale hydropower systems where water is stored in dams that affect larger areas and lead to the degradation of the environment and displacement of millions of people. Islar (2012) highlights the (un)sustainability of run-of-river hydroelectricity plants, which are often portrayed as a promising alternative to the larger-scale hydropower system. In the context of Turkey and most of Europe, clean technology funds are distributed in order to facilitate small-scale hydropower projects to “help increase privately owned and operated energy production from indigenous renewable resources” (WB 2010) and draw on sustainability discourses but without giving adequate attention to an essential element in sustainability: justice. Clean technology fund is a low-interest loan program under the World Bank that is designed to finance the transformation of middle-income countries to low-carbon economies (WB 2010). Turkey is the first country which received a loan from this program. The Turkish case demonstrated that increased private sector involvement in renewable energy development in the form of hydropower led to a form of privatization that involves changes in regimes of entitlements that determine the conditions of access to the rivers previously used as commons by people living along these rivers. In this case, change in legal reforms in order to prioritize business-related use of hydroelectricity rather than other uses of electricity, water, and land raise questions about the link between property rights and distributive justice. Property rights are at the center of neoliberal reforms and they are presented in a way that subsumes all other rights, which are defined in the face of property (Ahlers 2010). This creates a special problem for water

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rights, which are derived from social relations and are often not formalized under a comprehensive property framework. According to Mansfield (2004: 314), the problem is not the property per se since resource systems are likely to be owned in common and individually but the particular perspective that designs property regimes specifically for the market. For instance, the legal reforms designed for the Turkish privatized hydropower development allow private sector to take control of or divert valuable water resources and watersheds for their own benefit and produce hydroelectricity. One consequence of this is that local communities are deprived of the water, even though their livelihoods often depend on these resources and ecosystems (Mehta et al. 2012). Islar (2012) argues that distributive injustice happens in two ways. First, redistribution of water user rights as well as land rights as a result of large-scale privatization led to unequal distribution of benefits among the users of these resources. Second, physical diversion of water from river beds in rural communities who have long used the water to diversion channels led to unequal distribution of risks and losses between companies and local communities. This process relies on a politics of exclusion in a number of ways: how the state frames the use of rivers by prioritizing hydroelectricity purposes, thereby neglecting other uses, and how environmental and rural communities’ rights are excluded from legal frameworks. The procedural injustice due to lack of inclusive participatory mechanisms in the decisionmaking process is the main source of conflicts and mistrust between actors. In the context of energy projects, the public participation concept has been contested and criticized. As Molle (2008) argues, the idea of public participation seems desirable and uncontroversial, yet its implementation is often problematic. The implementation of public participation relies on the essential roles of the state to empower public members and of the experts to provide information to avoid power asymmetries. In some cases of hydropower development, notification and consultation meetings organized by state institutions and companies are counted as participatory mechanisms even though opposing voices of rural

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communities are in fact excluded. In practice what we see is then “participatory exclusion” framed as procedural inclusion (Agarwal 2001). To avoid such exclusion, Fraser et al. (2003) and Schlosberg (2007) argue that recognition should be acknowledged as an inherent element of justice. First, reciprocal recognition ought to be a precondition for membership of political communities (Schlosberg 2004: 520). Secondly, recognition must be treated as a social norm and a relationship rather than something to be distributed (Ibid). For instance, the state’s historical relationships with certain groups or communities can itself be a source of injustice and lead to deficiencies in terms of recognizing alternative groups and communities. In the context of struggles over environmental justice, apart from the distributional issues, recognition of traditional values, identities, full participatory democratic rights, and resource rights, as is the case with water rights, are argued to be integral to demands for justice (Ibid.). Themes related to the lack of recognition of rights, both concerning citizenship and property, of people’s rural livelihoods and life styles and of nature and lack of recognition of different uses of resources are common in implementation of renewable energy projects. Nonetheless, the inequitable distribution of resource rights, the lack of recognition, and the limited participation all work to produce injustice (Schlosberg 2007).

Distributive Justice at the Temporal Scale: Intergenerational Justice Scholar like Oliveira (2018) argues that SDGs and their targets are insufficient when it comes to promising distributive justice in a longer life span. The lack of longer time scale in SDGs is also a point of contention in the context of intergenerational justice. One argument that critics bring up to demonstrate the weakness of SDGs is that environmental issues are so closely integrated with social and economic issues in the SDGs that there are no “hard” indicators for environmental targets. Known as intergenerational justice, a principle that argues that future generations have a right to enjoy sustainable life is not going to be achieved by

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15-year target horizon of the SDGs. Target-oriented, short-term perspective can jeopardize the establishment of long-term goals, which protect both present and future people (Oliveira 2018). The intergenerational aspect is central for distributive justice. Without focusing on the future, a fair distribution of the development benefits and burdens among present people does not necessarily guarantee the well-being of more distant generations (Ibid.). Oliveira (2018) analyzed the temporal scope of each of the 169 targets of SDGs. The results of the study shows that in the SDG targets “there is a strong and declared commitment to the improvement of the wellbeing of the present generation, especially with regard to the worst-off, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions” (p. 15). She concludes in her study that approximately 48% of the SDG targets have a maximum time horizon of less than a decade and a half (2020–2030) and considerable number of targets have no temporal dimension. The attention on intergenerational justice especially in the context of climate change is growing with the recent social mobilizations led by Greta Thunberg’s Fridays for Future and several indigenous movements for environment including activists like Autumn Peltier.

Conclusion This entry discusses the distributive justice in the context of sustainable development goals. Findings show that distributive justice is embedded in the formulation of most SDG targets. Most goals frame distributive justice as equality of outcome in relation to distribution of material goods and provide policy recommendations that are mostly designed for a national scale and in short-term time scale. However at a global scale, there is a critical need for a holistic and integrated approach to more explicitly account for aspects of nature and their relevance to human well-being in order to more effectively track the consequences of trends in nature as well as the consequences of implementation of some sustainable development goals on nature.

The example on the implementation of the SDG 7 “affordable and clean energy for all” at the national scale demonstrates the challenges in regards to distributive justice. Nepalese energy transition with the values promoted by the SDGs requires attention to geopolitical constraints in providing energy for all. Also, due to diverse character of societies in Nepal, principles of affordability and accessibility may not always go hand in hand with global ambitions on renewable energy transition and principles of sustainability. Some projects often only reach to those who already have resources and this can lead to intragenerational injustices. Turkish case of privatization of small-scale hydropower production raises issues directly linked to distributive justice in the context of property rights for land and water. Rapid implementation of renewable energy goals without inclusion of diverse values and social groups impacts the underlying principles of distributive justice in determining how and by whom risks and benefits are distributed. Another aspect that this entry emphasizes is the lack of long-time frame in the formulation of SDG targets. This has implications on distributive justice across generations. As several climate action activists point out, young people have contributed far less to emissions but during their lives they will be far more affected by climate change. Sustainable development goals, nevertheless, address global challenges with solutions that only concern livelihoods of the current generations. Target-oriented, short-term perspective can jeopardize the establishment of long-term goals, which can protect both present and future people.

Cross-References ▶ Climate Justice

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Ecological Justice ▶ Environmental Justice: Emergence to Implementation and Its Relation with SDGs

Economic Deprivation: Approaches, Causes, and Consequences for Violent Conflicts Pui-Hang Wong Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht, The Netherlands

Synonyms Poverty; Inequality; Underdevelopment

Definitions Economic deprivation is a condition in which individuals or households struggle to meet their basic needs. It can also be a state in which individuals perceive that what they need or are

entitled to is ignored or denied. When deprivation is defined by an absolute minimum, deprivation is said to be absolute. Deprivation can be relative and has no fixed standard. In economics, relative deprivation is also referred to as inequality. At the macrolevel, economically deprived countries are said to be poor, underdeveloped, or less developed.

Introduction In 2019, about 7.8 million people, or 10% of the world’s population, lived below the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day (Gapminder 2020). If poverty is a tragedy, to Stalin, 7.8 million is a statistic; to Takeshi Kitano, a tragedy repeated 7.8 million times. Poverty can cause environmental degradation, physical and mental health illnesses, armed conflicts, and other socioeconomic problems. Since other volumes of this encyclopedia have covered the topics of poverty and inequalities in length, this entry will focus on their relationships with institutions and conflicts, the subject matters of sustainable development goal (SDG) 16. The entry will first review how economic deprivation is conceptualized, measured, and perceived. It will then discuss different causes of poverty. Three categories of causes will be examined: structural, institutional, and individual. It will then examine the deprivation–conflict nexus from the economic, political, social, and psychological perspectives. Different conflict

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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onset mechanisms will also be explored. The relationship between economic deprivation and different targets under SDG 16 will be highlighted in the conclusion.

Understanding Economic Deprivation The term deprivation was used in the 1970s to connote “maldistribution of resources” and became a synonym for poverty in the 1980s (Misturelli and Heffernan 2012). The concept has a less specific meaning since the 2000s. Donors, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and researchers may refer deprivation to basic needs deprivation, capabilities deprivation, or a condition beyond material deprivation (Misturelli and Heffernan 2012). An intuitive approach to define whether an individual is economically deprived is to look at his or her income level. Since many economic decisions (e.g., expenditure on education) and policies (e.g., taxation) are made at the household level, a more common approach is to take the household instead of the individual as a unit of analysis. A household is considered poor when the disposable household income (per capita) is below a certain threshold, such as the national poverty line. In 2020, in the USA, the threshold for a single person was US$12,760 per annum. As living standards vary across countries, a relative poverty line can be used. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, sets the relative poverty line as 50% of the median disposable income in the respective country. Consumption is often a preferred measure, because it is less likely to be underreported and it captures long-run welfare of a household more accurately than income. The shift from income to consumption is also more humane as it does not focus on one’s earning ability but needs. The capability approach goes further and considers basic needs as a means that allows people to fulfill their aspirations (Robeyns 2005). Therefore, an income that barely covers basic needs is not sufficient; quality education and life (in terms of good health), for example, are also required to

enable human development. The approach brings forth the human development index (HDI). More recent development literature also adopts a direct approach and replaces income with a set of indicators of living standard. The resulting multidimensional poverty index (MPI) has become a popular measure of economic deprivation. The 2019 global MPI covers 101 developing countries. According to this approach, 1.3 billion people are multidimensionally poor, with twothirds of them living in middle-income countries. The number is about 70% higher than the estimate of 7.8 million people based on the international poverty line definition. The multidimensional approach to poverty faces at least three challenges. First, there is no consensus on what those dimensions should include. Most people agree that food, water, shelter, and clothing should be on the list, because they are fundamental for survival. Some may argue that to thrive in a modern world, one needs to receive basic education and health care, and hence they should be on the list. The MPI includes energy (e.g., fuels and electricity), sanitation and nutrition, floor (of a dwelling), television, and telephone, among others. But if the idea behind the capability approach is to enable people to thrive and to achieve what they desire, one may question whether the above list is exhaustive. Should a dimension such as civil rights not be included? Second, there is no consensus on the relative importance of various dimensions. Is a household that cannot afford to send their children to schools poorer than an otherwise identical household that cannot afford to send their children to clinics when they get ill? Currently, the MPI assigns an equal weight to each dimension (i.e., one-third, respectively, for health, education, and living standard) and subdimensions within each dimension (e.g., a half for years of schooling and another half for school attendance under education). While the weighting scheme acknowledges that the year of schooling is as important as school attendance, it also implies that school attendance is three times more important than having access to safe drinking water within a distance, an implication that is highly debatable. Finally, there is no consensus on where the cut-off point should be.

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Replacing the term “minimum standard” with “subsistence level” does not resolve the debate completely as deprivation can be subjective. For people who are barely surviving, although their material needs are satisfied, the fact that they live below a certain standard may make them feel impoverished. Recent human rights literature has influenced how scholars and practitioners define and understand poverty and development. It rejuvenates the concept of deprivation by pushing the boundary from survival or capability to rights. Similar to the capability approach, the rights-based approach refuses to define economic deprivation as an economic problem. It sees people as human, who has agency and dignity. The human rights–based approach defines economic deprivation as deprivation of economic rights. It acknowledges that every person is entitled to certain rights that go beyond their survival. Civil, political, social, and economic rights are interdependent and indivisible. While the capability approach may consider education as a means to escape poverty and to thrive, the rights-based approach sees education as an indispensable part of a dignified life and is an end in itself. Therefore, the rights-based approach suggests that development is not only about helping people to meet certain minimum standard or about liberalizing people to reach their full potential. It is more modest but radical. Free from deprivation is a fundamental right for all individuals. Development is not charity but a duty (Uvin 2007). As some scholars reflect, the term human rights is “nearly criterionless” (Griffin 2008, p. 14). Consequently, the rights-based approach might be overly idealistic (Nickel 2005). Some also doubt whether the approach would bring substantive difference in programming or significant impact on people’s lives (Uvin 2007). The shift to the rights-based perspective also begs the question: What constitute those rights? To justify that certain economic rights are fundamental human rights, Nickel (2005) adopts a norm-based approach and suggests that people have a claim against severely unfair treatment. Because it is unfair to exclude some parts of the population from access to basic education, therefore,

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according to this view, the right to education should be considered as a human right not entirely because it is necessary for one’s survival, ambitions, or it bestows people’s dignity. Rights to education should be protected because it is unjust to deprive some parts of the population of access to the public good when it is widely available to others. As such, the justice consideration encompasses the idea of relative deprivation. The above exposition suggests that the concept of economic deprivation covers several aspects: material well-being, aspirations, entitlement, and the norm of fairness. While the traditional economic understanding often highlights the material aspect of the concept, the second part of the term, deprivation, reminds us that economic deprivation is not only an objective state of inadequacy. It has a subjective side, often referring to one’s idea about rights, justice, and social expectations under a specific socioeconomic context. The following section explores people’s perceptions of poverty. Perception of Poverty Poverty is a widespread phenomenon in less developed countries. In a case study on poverty in rural Vietnam, Truong et al. (2014) report that rice farmers described poverty in terms of how much they produce per year. To the farmers, poverty means that they do not produce enough to feed their families. It is an inability and is a collective concept about security. Since some of them do not earn a salary, poverty is defined not based on employment and income but production or something purely material. They also find that only young people and more educated respondents related poverty to economic resources and income-generating assets such as land. In contrast, poor people in a fishing village in Ghana referred to poverty as a lack of income and alternative employment opportunities, given the competition with commercial or foreign fishing vessels and the decline of the fishing industry in the region (Holden et al. 2011). Nevertheless, similar to the case of Vietnam, the villagers also described their plight in terms of access to such basic needs as clean drinking water, sanitary facilities, and education.

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How do poor people in developed countries perceive poverty? Studies on first-person’s experience is scant and if they exist, they are about specific vulnerable groups (e.g., children and single mothers), focusing on their perception of poverty attributions and social stigma (e.g., Reutter et al. 2009). Otherwise, they take a third-person perspective and ask how media, social workers, and policymakers narrate poverty (e.g., Chauhan and Foster 2014). These studies emphasize the social aspect of poverty, drawing a line between materials and deprivation. According to Chauhan and Foster (2014), British media represents poverty in Britain as an issue limited to specific social groups such as children and pensioners. Poverty was also often understood and analyzed beyond material well-being and through a social lens (e.g., De Haan 1998). For instance, in a study on how single mothers perceive their welfare reliance, Nelson (2002) shows that single mothers in Vermont in the USA often demonstrated their desire to be self-sufficient. They reacted strongly when the interviewer used the word “rely” during the interviews. Poverty is seen as an individual problem and a failure to meet certain societal expectations about how an adult should behave. Consequently, poverty is often associated with the emotions of embarrassment, humiliation, and shame, which may not be elicited in the context of a developing country, where most people live in poverty. Children are another vulnerable group. When a group of 8-year-old children in the USA were asked what poor people are like, more than half of them spoke about their neediness (i.e., lack of something) (Chafel and Neitzel 2005). Children with lower socioeconomic status were more likely to talk about needs beyond basic necessities (e.g., social networks) than children with higher socioeconomic status, and only a few (13%) made social comparisons. To them, poverty is absolute. In a study in Finland, Hakovirta and Kallio (2016) find that children in their sample (aged 10–15, from middle affluence group) viewed poverty as a relative absence of nonessential goods. They report that Finnish children did not regard their peers from a poorer economic background as lacking daily necessities. Rather, poor children distinct themselves by their use of outdated

models, second-hand or broken goods. A crosscountry analysis on undergraduate students in eight countries finds that respondents from a wealthy country and with a better socioeconomic background are more likely to perceive poverty in a relativist stance (Corazzini et al. 2011). Overall, these studies suggest that, in affluent societies, as a person grows, poverty becomes relative and is increasingly defined in social terms.

Causes of Economic Deprivation Numerous studies across disciplines have tried to identify the causes of poverty. While it is impossible to review each individual account, the identified causes cluster into three interrelated categories: structural, institutional, and individual. Structural causes are system-level factors that are beyond the control of any actor such as an individual or a government alone. Examples include climate change (environmental), baby boom (demographic), globalization (economic), and Industry 4.0 (technological). These factors tend to persist and take a long time to turn. According to this view, people live in destitution because of their adverse positions in a structure. For instance, free trade provides economic opportunities to firms and individuals. However, endowment of resources confers comparative advantage to different economies and economic agents. Goods and services under a high demand will benefit their producers and factory owners. Depending on the production technology, shift in demand often affects the income of workers and capital owners unevenly. Accordingly, the endowment of an economy, consumer preference, production technology, and the prevailing global economic order jointly determine who are the winners and losers in a global economic game, with the latter structurally pressed in the base of the income pyramid. As another example, innovation changes production technology and induces a higher demand for skilled workers. This skill-biased technological change accelerates the divide between skilled and unskilled workers and traps the latter in the bottom of the economic

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hierarchy. As communication and transportation costs decline, global-level division of labor arises. Under this new economic norm, developed economies relocate their production and export low-skilled jobs to developing countries. Production outsourcing intensifies the effect of skillbiased technological change, making the skill premium higher in both the headquarter economies and the factory economies, leading to job polarization, a lower-wage bill, and possibly inwork poverty in both developed and developing countries (Baldwin 2016). Unfortunately, although production chains have become increasingly globalized and inclusive, the pattern and dependency tend to reproduce themselves and are highly stable. Institutional causes are state-related factors, sometimes caused and perpetuated by inactions or deliberate state policies. Examples are corruption, state discrimination, and poor welfare and labor market policies. A person can fall in poverty because of favoritism, a malicious act, or the inability of a state to react to such structural problems as climate change. For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) find that ethnic diversity is a crucial factor behind Africa’s growth tragedy. After decolonization, political institutions entered an unstable period where power vacuum was awaited to be filled. Different groups struggled to assert their political and economic status in these new countries. To mobilize support and prompt loyalty, elites often politicized ethnicity and identity politics became a norm. When competition is intense, identity politics may give rise to violence. In a famous experiment, Tajfel (1981) divided a group of school boys into two groups based on their trivial preferences over a set of abstract paintings. When the boys were asked to anonymously allocate points to other boys for a reward for their participation in the study, they quickly displayed discriminative behaviors by maximizing the gain for their own group. Ethnicity is a convenient and sometimes visible label to classify people. When resource competition is intense, the group label can trigger in-group and out-group dynamics and set off antisocial behaviors, harming or eliminating other people to ease the competition (Prediger et al. 2014). Ethnic

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diversity sometimes results in clientelism, social division, and impediments in public goods investment (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Inequalities between social groups and poor development outcomes can also be a result of distributive politics. Distributive politics seems to be a common feature in many ethnically diverse societies. To cultivate political loyalty and consolidate their own power, political leaders may practise ethnic favoritism by distributing more and better public goods to people who share an ethnic background similar to theirs. In a study, which covers 18 African countries, using data over the span of 30 to 40 years, Franck and Rainer (2012) show that the factor of ethnicity can account for variations in primary school attendance, completion, literacy rate, and infant mortality between ethnic groups. While the lower development outcomes may be a result of bargaining failures in a multiparty setting instead of discrimination, Lee (2018) shows that problems in ethnic cooperation cannot fully explain lower development outcomes in Northern India. He suggests that poor provision of public services could be due to the absence of coethnic links to the central government or ethnic discrimination. Finally, poverty can be explained by individual- or household-level factors. People remain poor due to cognitive and behavioral biases, wrong choices, or misfortune. Duflo and Banerjee (2011), for example, discuss how misconception about the returns to education makes parents decide to send their children to farmland instead of schools in many developing countries. Although the actual returns to education are positive and high, because many parents in poor households perceived them to be low not until their children get into university, many of them choose not to let their children go to schools when they have only limited financial resources. This form of behavioral bias explains why poverty transmits across generations in many developing countries. Moreover, poor people are also less likely to take risk, and they discount the future more heavily by choosing smaller and earlier rewards than people earning a higher income (Tanaka et al. 2010). They save less, invest less, and exert less personal control, which add up to

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lower returns and income (Pepper and Nettle 2017). Poverty also affects people’s affective states and mindset, creating a feedback loop and begetting poverty (Haushofer and Fehr 2014).

Deprivation and Political Violence As many cross-country analyses show, GDP per capita, a commonly used indicator of economic deprivation in macrolevel analysis, is one of the most robust determinants of civil war onset. Although the causal relationship between economic deprivation and civil conflicts, terrorism, and violent extremism is multifaceted and less deterministic than it appears, conflict prevention has become a key element in the rhetoric of poverty reduction in many developing countries. This section examines the roles of economic deprivation on civil war onset in a number of influential theories in political science and economics literature. Indirect Effects One of the most influential theories of war in the international relations literature is Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model. The model has been used to explain the onset of wars (Fearon 1995), the recurrence of identity-based conflicts such as secession wars, the difficulty of reaching an agreement between warring parties, the precariousness of negotiated settlement, and the role of United Nations peacekeeping operations in conflict resolution (Walter 2009). It has also been used to inform the design of peace agreements and postconflict political institutions (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). In brief, the model suggests that there are usually solutions to disputes, which are less costly than war and hence acceptable to all disputed parties. The solutions will depend on the bargaining power of the involved parties and the cost of fighting, which are private and unknown to the other side of the dispute. This kind of information asymmetry incentivises both sides to misrepresent their true strength, leading to bargaining failures and violent conflicts. Even when both parties manage to arrive at an agreed solution, because the situation is constantly

changing and the stakes are high, both sides usually find it difficult to commit to the agreement when the environment tilts toward their sides. This commitment problem, similarly, will give rise to bargaining failures. Therefore, asymmetric information and commitment problems are two major reasons why countries and groups wage war against each other. As such, according to the bargaining model, economic deprivation does not play a critical role in conflict onset. As solutions usually exist, the problems of asymmetric information and commitment are more crucial to the onset of a conflict. Deprivation only serves as an issue under dispute that may result in an armed struggle against the state that fails to tackle the problem. The model also fails to explain why civil wars occur predominantly in the underdeveloped world, as poverty is not the only issue that leads to bargaining failures. Additionally, the lack of financial resources, and hence lower contest capability, also implies that the weaker side is less likely to win, thus easing the problem of information asymmetry and reducing the likelihood of war. The theory of development clusters (Besley and Persson 2014) proposes that economic development, state capacity, and peace are intertwined. Factors such as political cleavages (e.g., due to ethnic politics) of the ruling coalition and economic endowments (e.g., natural resources) jointly determine the levels of income and state capabilities, which comprise fiscal capacity, legal capacity, military capacity, and so on. These capacities in turn influence the choice of ruling strategy between redistribution, co-optation, and repression. While a healthy economy supports strong institutions and public goods provision and sustains peace and prosperity, an impecunious country reproduces weak institutions and falls into conflict and poverty traps. Accordingly, poverty and violence are concomitant outcomes. They reinforce each other and share a common root: bad governance. Motivation Economic deprivation plays a more direct and stronger role in the famous “greed and grievance” theory by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). In the

Economic Deprivation: Approaches, Causes, and Consequences for Violent Conflicts

theory, greed refers rebellion as a business venture or a profitable opportunity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The greed account states that people living under poverty would join a civil war because of a material gain. In contrast, the grievance explanation acknowledges that economic deprivation can be a major source of grievances, which motivate people to take up arms to fight against a government. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) refer grievances mainly to inequality or relative deprivation, not poverty. In their empirical analysis, income is a proxy for the foregone income by joining a war. Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is a proxy for grievance. And because most of the grievance indicators do not have statistically significant effects on civil war in their regression analysis, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that greed offers a better explanation of conflict incidence. Greed can play different roles in a conflict and it is often associated with natural resources. For example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, diamonds were exchanged for supplies of arms and help to sustain the conflicts (Silberfein 2004). In Chechnya, the pipeline network that connects oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan at one end and the markets in Europe and the USA at the other partially explains why Russia did not tolerate Chechnya’s struggle to gain independence from Russia in the First Chechen Civil War (Ashour 2004). In this case, resource rent is a prize to be captured by the winning party. In Sudan, the division of oil revenue is central to the dispute between the intractable North–South civil war. Although the country was divided into two in 2011, the same issue led the two countries to reignite the fire of war in 2013. However, the factors of greed and grievances may not be easily separated when a war is about natural resources. For instance, grievances also play a role in the Second Sudanese Civil War starting from 1983, as the ethnic minorities, who resided in the oil region but politically underrepresented, felt that they were dispossessed of the resources. While the Sudanese government started the drills in 1999, the southern government had not earned their share until 2005 (Le Billon and Savage 2016). The unfair distribution of revenues and destitution

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due to long period of war generated widespread discontents among people in the south and caused the war. The finding, or nonfinding, in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) has sparked a series of debates over the role of grievances in conflict onset. One is illustrated by the Sudanese example discussed above that primary commodities can be a source of grievances rather than greed. A survey by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) also reveals that many ex-combatants of the Sierra Leone conflict joined the rebellion because they were scared of what would happen to them if they had chosen not to join. Contrary to what is proposed by the greed explanation, only a few ( d1 > a1 > c1 and c 2 > d 2 > a 2 > b 2. The term Public Goods Game (from here on abbreviated as PGG) describes a situation with n > 1 players which is a generalization of the PD (which will be shown in section “Theory”). Each Player i has the same budget B and must decide how much thereof to contribute to a

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 1 Generic payoff matrix

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common project. The amount jointly contributed by the players will be multiplied by a factor c, which is greater than 1 but smaller than n, and then the multiplied contributions are returned to the players in equal shares (i.e., not reflecting the individual payments of the players). If the players 1,. . .,n contribute the amounts d1,. . .,dn to the project, then the payoff of Player i is B  d i þ cðd1 þ . . . þ dn Þ=n: Many of the challenges arising within the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have characteristics resembling those of PD or PGG. References to such situations will be made throughout this entry. Besides highlighting theoretical and empirical aspects of the two games, this survey stresses the linkages between game theory and sustainable development practice.

Narratives The original story motivating the PD is about two delinquents who have transgressed the law in a joint crime and were caught by the police. The prosecutor cannot make a strong case against them due to lack of evidence, and a confession by at least one of the suspects is required for a conviction. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor interrogates them in two separate rooms and makes the following identical offer to each of them: “If you confess your crime and your companion does not, you will go free, and your companion will go to jail for 10 years. Yet, if you deny and your companion talks, you will go to jail for 10 years and your companion will go free. If you both confess, you will both go to jail for 5 years.” Both prisoners know that if they both deny the crime, the prosecutor has not enough evidence to convict either, and they will be charged with some minor transgression and imprisoned for 1 year each. The payoff matrix corresponding to the situation is given in Fig. 2. Prisoner 1 can choose to confess or deny the deed, and these options are represented by the

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 2 The prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs according to the standard narrative

rows of the matrix. Prisoner 2 can also confess or deny, and her options are represented by the columns of the matrix. The numbers in the cells represent the payoffs resulting from the combinations of actions taken by the two players, the first entry being the payoff of the first prisoner, the second entry the payoff of the second. The payoffs are unwanted years in prison and therefore negative numbers. As can be seen, the game of Fig. 2 meets the definition of a PD given in section “Definition” because the conditions b1 > d1 > a1 > c1 and c2 > d2 > a2 > b2 are fulfilled. The PGG does not have an iconic narrative, and its story can be told in different ways. For example, global efforts for climate change mitigation yield an illustrative narrative (Paavola 2019).

Background Since its invention in the middle of the twentieth century, the PD has become the “work horse of introductory game theory” (Robinson and Goforth 2004). The game was first described in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, working at the RAND Corporation, and its narrative and name were contributed by Albert W. Tucker (Flood 1958, and Poundstone 1993, p. 8). In the Cold War era, the RAND Corporation was involved in game-theoretic analyses of nuclear war scenarios (Hart 2005), resulting in infamous

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doctrines such as mutually assured destruction (MAD) and studies such as Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War (Kahn 1960). In this spirit, the choice between “preemptive strike” and “waiting” between two adversary nuclear powers can be framed as a PD (Schelling 1960; Snyder 1971). To this end, one has to assume that the best outcome for each power is the own survival and the destruction of the enemy (and the worst outcome the own destruction and the survival of the enemy), while the outcome of mutual destruction is worse than the outcome of coexistence. Choosing payoff values reflecting these preferences, the situation can be described by the matrix in Fig. 3, which represents a PD according to the definition. In real-world settings related to development and sustainability, the PD appears most commonly in its generalization as PGG. The PGG in its general form is commonly attributed to Samuelson (1954), who points out that Lindahl’s (1919) suggestion for the provision of public goods ignores the incentives to free-ride. Once these are taken into account, the situation becomes a PGG according to our definition. The game is central to Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) analysis of the management and usage of common pool resources (from here on abbreviated as CPR), which are economic goods jointly extracted by multiple appropriators. The classical example are so-called “commons,” pieces of land in medieval European villages that were jointly used by all villagers (Hardin 1968), but also the global climate can be considered to be a CPR (Paavola 2019). In the context of developing countries, agricultural resources often have common pool characteristics (Mvula and Haller 2009), and even the Sahelian famine of 1970 was attributed to a failure to solve CPR problems (Picardi and Seifert 1977). Likewise, overfishing and other overexploitations of maritime resources typically result from failure to overcome the Public Goods problems of maritime CPRs (Rickels et al. 2016). In a very different domain but conceptually similar, the provision of free information on the Internet through websites such as Wikipedia as well as open source software is often referred to as “digital commons,” a concept that can be further generalized into “knowledge commons,” many of which are relevant to scientific and economic development (Madison et al. 2019).

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According to Brewer and Kramer (1986), the PGG appears twice in the context of CPRs, namely on the stage of providing and maintaining the resource, e.g., an irrigation system has to be built and repaired, and on the stage of appropriating the resource, e.g., when the farmers extract water from the system.

Theory The Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma How should one play the PD? We will answer this question referring to the original narrative of the two prisoners (the game represented by the matrix in Fig. 2). Prisoner 1 may ask what is her best response under the assumption that Prisoner 2 will deny the crime. In that case, Prisoner 1 faces the choice between going free (if she confesses) or going to prison for 1 year (if she denies). It follows that Prisoner 1 should confess. Next, she may ask what is the best response under the assumption that Prisoner 2 will confess. Then Prisoner 1 faces the choice between 5 years in prison (if she also confesses) and 10 years in prison (if she denies). Also in this case, she achieves the best result for herself if she confesses. Consequently, it is best for Player 1 to confess regardless of the action taken by Player 2. Analogous reasoning applies to Player 2 so that we expect both players to confess, and this is indeed the game theoretic prediction of what will happen in the PD. Technically speaking, the outcome in which both players will confess is a Nash equilibrium of the game, which is defined as a combination of actions where no player can improve her payoff by choosing a different action if the other players stick to their respective actions. Unlike in many other games, the Nash equilibrium of the PD is unique, i. e., defection by both players is the only combination of actions that has said property. Moreover, the unique Nash equilibrium of the PD is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. A strategy is dominant if it yields the highest payoff to a player regardless of what the other players do. This is the case in the equilibrium of the PD as we have just demonstrated: Confessing yields the best payoff for each player independent of whether the other player confesses or denies the crime.

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Understanding game theory as a positive theory, a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies comes close to being the strongest prediction game theory ever makes. Likewise, if one considers game theory to be normative, the recommendation to play a dominant strategy is as assertive as it can get. To illustrate the persuasiveness of the PD Nash equilibrium, consider the nuclear standoff PD shown in Fig. 3. In 1945, when the United States had already developed the atomic bomb, but the Soviet Union did not have it yet, Bertrand Russell, otherwise known to be a staunch pacifist, wrote: “Russia is sure to learn how to make it [the atomic bomb]. . . There is one thing and one only which could save the world, and that is a thing which I should not dream of advocating. It is, that America should make war on Russia during the next 2 years, and establish a world empire by means of the atomic bomb” (Poundstone 1993, p. 70). The pioneer of game theory, John von Neumann, emphatically agreed: “If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o’clock, I say why not one o’clock?” (Poundstone 1993, p. 4). Target 1 of SDG 16 aims at “significantly reducing all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere,” and Indicator 16.1.2 specifically considers the number of “conflict-related deaths” (SDG documents of the United Nations A/RES/70/1 and A/71/L.75). The fact that many violent conflicts have characteristics of a prisoner’s dilemma may explain their protractedness and lack of progress in conflict resolution. Realizing this may point at ways to promote peace, often along lines discussed in section “Breaking the Dilemma” of this entry (e.g., through external Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 3 Nuclear standoff PD

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development

enforcement). This has been frequently demonstrated, for example, for the conflicts between Egypt and Israel (Dekmejian and Doron 1980) and between Namibia and South Africa (Levy 1985). The Nash Equilibrium of the Public Goods Game If the PGG is played between two persons, and each of them has only two choices, namely the first player can contribute a fixed amount of either x1 or y1 with x1 > y1, and the second player can contribute a fixed amount of either x2 or y2 with x2 > y2, then one obtains the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 4 (the other parameters are explained in the definition of the PGG in section “Definition”). It is easily verified that the matrix in Fig. 4 represents a PD according to our definition. Mathematically, this means that the Public Goods Game is an n-player generalization of the PD, i.e., every PD is a PGG but not necessarily vice versa. Despite this fact, it is often the case that PGGs with more than two players are referred to as PDs (e.g., in the context of CPRs, see Ostrom 1990, pp. 29, 46, 48), while the mathematically correct reverse is not as common. The incentive to “unconditionally defect” carries over from the PD to the general PGG, where defecting means to free-ride on the other players’ efforts. Consider generic Player i in the general form of the PGG. If the contributions of the other players are d1,. . .,di  1,di + 1,. . ., dn, it is easily shown that di ¼ 0 maximizes i’s payoffs independent of the values chosen by the other players. Nevertheless, everyone finds this

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Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 4 Payoff matrix of a PGG with two players and discrete contributions

outcome worse than the alternative outcome where d1,. . .,dn ¼ B. For CPRs, this means that in the unregulated equilibrium state, the CPR is not maintained, maybe not even provided, and suffers from overuse. Every potential appropriator wants to free ride on the provision and maintenance efforts of the others, and all of them want to use the resource as much as possible, disregarding the negative effects this will have on the other appropriators and maybe even on the preservation of the resource itself. These effects are known as the Tragedy of the Commons, a term coined by Hardin (1968). Countless challenges that emerge within the context of SDGs have characteristics of PGGs, and many resources essential for sustainable development are CPRs. For example, Targets 1 and 3 of SDG 4 call for the availability of secondary and tertiary education for everyone. Potentially, this could be achieved through so-called Massive Open Online Courses (e.g., Baggaley 2013) as implied by Indicator 4.A.1, measuring the availability of computers and Internet in schools. Yet, the Tragedy of the Commons portends the failure of private investors to invest in “digital commons” and “knowledge commons”, and governments may have to step in. Likewise, maintaining biodiversity and utilizing its benefits for developing countries is an important objective of the sustainable development agenda, featured in Targets 5 and 6 of SDG 15 and in Target 5 of SDG 2. It has been pointed out that biodiversity has features of a common good (see the discussion

in Larrère 2013) so that it is at risk not to be preserved if exploited in a decentralized way. Also agricultural resources are frequently CPRs (as will be illustrated by examples discussed in section “Breaking the Dilemma” of this entry), and the efficient management of these CPRs will be essential for the improvement of agricultural productivity as outlined in Targets 3 and 4 of SDG 2, feeding into any developing strategy in line with SDG 8. Direct effects of the overuse of CPRs are land degradation, highlighted in Target 3 of SDG 15, and overfishing, addressed in Target 4 of SDG 14. It was already mentioned that global climate can be considered a common resource (Paavola 2019), and its CPR resemblance may explain why it is so difficult to make progress in SDG 13. Repeated Play If the PD is played multiple times between the same players, the equilibrium in each round of play is not necessarily the same as the equilibrium of the one-shot game. A player may reward other players for cooperation through future cooperation (or punish them for defection through future defection), and one can think of complex reward/ punishment-schemes that span over multiple rounds. It has been shown in the so-called Folk Theorems that, if the game is played between two players infinitely many times and players aim at maximizing the discounted value of their payoffs, any sequence of actions can be supported by an equilibrium (Sigmund 2010, p. 76). Intuitively, the Folk Theorem holds true because it allows

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Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 5 The PD with conditional denial

players to choose contingent strategies. Consider the one-shot PD with the original narrative, but assume that both Prisoners had an additional strategy of conditional denial in their strategy sets, which is “deny the crime if the other player also (conditionally) denies, otherwise confess.” The matrix of this game is shown in Fig. 5. In this game, the situation where both prisoners confess is not the only Nash equilibrium anymore. There is now a second equilibrium where both prisoners conditionally deny. While the original equilibrium yields the payoffs of 5 years in prison for each of them, the new equilibrium yields just 1 year in prison, and it seems natural that if this game was actually played, the players would coordinate on the better of the two equilibria. While in the repeated PD, the players cannot make their current action conditional on what the other player does in the current round, they can make their future actions conditional on what the other player did in the current and earlier rounds. Conditionality of cooperation in repeated settings (“I will contribute to the public good as long as the others do”) is acknowledged by Elinor Ostrom as being conducive to the perpetuation of cooperation in real-world CPR problems (e.g., Ostrom 1990, pp. 95–97). While it seems unrealistic that a game is repeated infinitely many times, it was shown that the Folk Theorem carries over to the case where the game terminates with a certain nonzero probability in each round, if this probability is sufficiently small (Sigmund 2010). It may be argued that situations where it is clear that a repeated interaction will come to an end at some point,

but nobody knows when exactly that will be, are very common in reality. They can also be artificially created in economic experiments, as in Axelrod (1980b). If the PD is repeated finitely many times and it is known to the players when the final round will take place, the results of the Folk Theorem do not apply. In the last round of the repeated interaction, the players will surely defect as there is no option for players to punish or reward each other in subsequent rounds. Knowing that in the last round, all players will defect no matter what, they will already defect in the penultimate round. Knowing that in the last two rounds both players will defect, they will already defect one round before the penultimate round, and this reasoning can be rolled back to the first round. Consequently, the only equilibrium in this case is defection by all players in all rounds, a phenomenon sometimes informally referred to as “backward breakdown.”

Experiments and Simulations When the PD is played in classroom experiments, it often surprises classically trained game theorists that a considerable share of people, on average about 60% of the participants, do not play the Nash equilibrium strategy even if the game is not repeated (Dhami 2016, pp. 24, 62, 977–978). This was already the outcome in the very first PD experiment conducted by Flood and Dresher in January 1950, when the two experimental subjects, Armen Alchian and John D. Williams,

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development

played the Nash equilibrium only 14 out of 100 times, while mutual cooperation occurred 60 times (Flood 1958). In the following almost 70 years, it has not been possible to conclusively clarify why the experimental results deviate from the theoretical predictions. As Dhami (2016) writes: “In the light of the evidence, the explanation of cooperative behavior in prisoner’s dilemma games is an open problem in economics and social science. This cannot be dismissed as just a minor annoyance; the prisoner’s dilemma game is the most widely used game in the social sciences. . . as a metaphor for why cooperation may break down” (p. 978). The more an experimental population was exposed to game theory training, the less cooperation can be observed, leading to the paradoxical result that knowledge of game theory may reduce the average payoff of players (Frank et al. 1993). In the finitely repeated case, people typically do not follow the game-theoretic recommendation to defect in all rounds but play cooperatively for several rounds and switch to defection close to the end of the sequence (Embrey et al. 2018). It is widely believed that commonalities between the players foster cooperation in the PD (cf. the discussion in Buchan et al. 2011). Kollock (1998) asks students to rank outcomes of the PD (without actually playing the game) and finds that they report stronger preferences for the cooperative outcome when they are told that the game is played among members of their own college fraternity. Goette et al. (2006) show that officers of the Swiss Army play more cooperatively when matched with members of their own platoon. Interestingly, and surprising to many (see Charness and Rustichini 2011), there is no unequivocal evidence for gender differences in the propensities to cooperate in the PD (Ledyard 1995). Looking at some studies in detail, the picture is rather blurry. In Chen et al. (2014), students of Asian and Caucasian backgrounds are matched in pairs to play the PD against each other. Through the requirement to fill out a questionnaire before the experiment, the students are “primed”: Some are reminded of a common characteristic, namely that they all went to the same school, and others

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are reminded of a “fragmenting” characteristic, namely their different ethnic backgrounds. The latter priming is achieved by revealing the Asian or non-Asian surname of the other player in the match. It turns out that Caucasians play the cooperative strategy significantly more often when matched with other Caucasians. Asians choose significantly more often the cooperative strategy when they are primed for common school attendance. In a similar vein, Burns et al. (2015) show that South African students randomly assigned to dormitories more often cooperate in the PD if they share an apartment. Yet, unlike what one might expect and what may have been a motivation for the experiment, this effect is not influenced by the students’ races. Similar experimental evidence on the impact of identities and group affiliations has been accumulated for the PGG, e.g., Clist and Verschoor (2017) find that in a bilingual Ugandan sample population, contributions to the public good are up to 74% higher when groups are addressed in the national language (Luganda) than when addressed in the language of the Gisu people (Lugisu). The authors believe that this is due to out-group favoritism among the Gisu people, documented in anthropological literature, causing them to contribute less when addressed in their own language. A famous simulation experiment of the repeated PD is the so-called Axelrod Tournament (Axelrod 1980a, b), where strategies are randomly matched to play a sequence of 200 repetitions of the PD against each other. A strategy specifies whether to defect or cooperate in each round based on the observed history of play. Axelrod asked game theorists and other people concerned with the PD to propose strategies, and to the surprise of many experts, a very simple strategy named Tit-for-Tat consistently outperformed all other submitted strategies in this setting. Tit-for-Tat starts with cooperation in the first round and then takes the same action as the opponent chose in the previous round. The foremost insight of Axelrod’s experiments is that cooperation can emerge and be profitable in a competitive environment if individuals encounter

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repeatedly, and this is not only true under the strong assumptions of the Folk Theorem (see section “Theory”). Axelrod’s random matching within a population of unknown competitors mimics evolutionary and other environments in the real world.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Mechanism From the point of view of the prisoners, the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the PD are highly dissatisfactory. By the standards of classical utilitarianism, which aims at maximizing the sum of utilities (Shapiro 2003, Chapter 2), the outcome where both players deny is always preferred to the outcome where both players confess because the sum of years in prison of both players is higher in the latter than in the former. According to the concept of Pareto improvement, historically proposed to remedy various shortcomings of classical utilitarianism (Shapiro 2003, Chapter 3) and arguably the most widely applied welfare criterion in economics, the outcome where both players cooperate is superior to the one where both defect. Yet, the equilibrium outcome of the PD may be favorable when the well-being of the prisoners is no concern or not the main concern. Under such circumstances, the PD can turn into a mechanism to achieve desirable outcomes. The original story yields a straightforward application as high payoffs for criminals are socially undesirable, but the incentives of the PD can be utilized in other settings too. Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) devise a mechanism which fosters the integrity of a team of two government officials who could be, for example, tax inspectors. These inspectors can report the true income of their inspectees to their superiors or lie and incur a bribe, but the latter only works if both of them lie as otherwise the true report of one inspector will reveal that the other has lied. It is easy to see how one can set incentives like in the PD for the inspectors to tell the truth, namely by paying a high reward to the truthful inspector in case the other one lies. This idea is applied, for example, in “pre-shipment inspection programs” which are common in many developing countries for collecting tariff revenues (Dequiedt et al.

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development

2012). Ideas such as these can be instrumental in building strong institutions and fostering integrity (SDG 16, specifically Target 5). The mechanics of the PD also make the (socially detrimental) collusion between companies more difficult. Such collusion can create particularly severe problems in developing countries due to a lack of antitrust legislation and enforcement (Cook 2004; Ivaldi et al. 2014). Assume that two companies are the sole suppliers of a commodity in a market, and they agree on an overblown price to increase their profits. After the agreement was made, each company faces the choice of either keeping to the agreement or deviating from it. If they comply, they both make collusive profits, but unilateral deviation from the agreement yields even higher profits at the expense of the other firm: The defecting firm will marginally undercut the price of the competitor (which is the inflated collusive price) and increase its market share at a price that is still above the competitive price. Assigning numerical values to the different scenarios, the situation can be described by the payoff matrix in Fig. 6. This is a PD where in equilibrium both firms will undercut the agreed price, undermining the collusion. While this argument is about internal instability, incentives resembling the PD can also be created externally through antitrust legislation which rewards whistleblowing, as discussed in Leslie (2006). Circumstances in reality may be messy and include factors preventing PD incentives from working as expected. Beaman et al. (2014) discuss different potential explanations why small shops and firms in Kenya often do not have sufficient change money. Because of this, a considerable number of deals do not materialize, reducing profits by an estimated 5–8% for firms without change money, and causing great losses of time when customers have to wait until change is organized (Based on a sample of 508 firms, they estimate the average waiting time to amount to 2 h/week/firm). One of the explanations offered in their paper is that the firms engage in implicit collusion: As the total amount of sales is not or only marginally affected through the lack of change (if one firm loses a deal because it cannot

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Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 6 The incentives of firms that form a cartel can be modeled as a PD

give change, its competitor will get it), and as holding change is costly, the firms are collectively better off by not having change available. From the firms’ perspectives, a situation where all firms hold change is inferior to one where none of them does. At the same time, a firm could attract additional customers if it would consistently have change available (i.e., break up the collusion), increasing its profits by 5–8%. Yet, for reasons unknown, this does not happen.

Breaking the Dilemma External Enforcement When the equilibrium of the PD is undesirable, a common suggestion to overcome bilateral defection is external enforcement of the cooperative outcome. The idea can be illustrated within the original PD’s narrative if one assumes that the two prisoners are members of a mafia organization which punishes cooperation with the police. This changes their incentives because confessing loses attractiveness, independent of what the other prisoner is doing. Under the arbitrary assumption that the disutility from the punishment by the mafia is equivalent to 50 years in prison, the new payoff matrix looks like the one in Fig. 7. In this game, the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is the outcome where both players deny the crime. In the real world, the incentives created by the PD are both known to the police and the mafia, and, not surprisingly, the police really puts suspects into PD situations (e.g., in the infamous “Central Park jogger case,” Norris

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 7 The PD payoff matrix where confessing is punished by the mafia

P and Redlich 2013). The mafia, on the other hand, does indeed punish collaboration with the police, which is the central aspect of the mafia honor code of “Omertà” (Paoli 2003). The equilibrium outcome with external enforcement is better for both prisoners so that they might join the mafia for the very reason that cooperation with the police is punished (Jennings 1984). In the pursuit of SDG 16, one should put an emphasis on witness protection programs to diminish the value of this “service” and in this way weaken organized crime. Like in the prisoner’s dilemma, external enforcement is a very straightforward way to tackle real-world CPR problems. However, Elinor Ostrom questions its effectiveness: “The problem of gaining compliance to the rules. . . often is assumed away by analysts positing all-knowing

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and all-powerful external authorities who enforce agreements.” Yet, she argues, whenever a CPR was to be regulated, “no external authority has had sufficient presence to play any role in the day-to-day enforcement of the rules in use” (Ostrom 1990, p. 93). She underpins her opinion by a game-theoretic analysis that demonstrates how a lack of information on part of the external enforcer can lead to outcomes that are worse than the unregulated PGG (Ostrom 1990, p. 11). In addition, Ostrom emphasizes that external enforcement is in developing countries often impaired by malevolence and inefficiency of the government (which typically assumes the role of the external enforcer), referring to issues which are at the core of SDG 15: “In countries where small villages had owned and regulated their local communal forests for generations, nationalization meant expropriation. . . National agencies issued elaborate regulations concerning the use of forests, but were unable to employ sufficient numbers of foresters to enforce those regulations” (Ostrom 1990, p. 23). In the context of water management in California, Ostrom argues that the external intervention by courts, even if initiated by the appropriators themselves, can impair the establishment of efficient management systems for the CPR (Ostrom 1990, p. 113). These observations call for a cautious and restrained approach when building institutions and creating legal frameworks for the regulation of CPRs in the context of SDG 16. Privatization of Common Pool Resources Another way to overcome the public goods problem of CPRs is to get rid of the nonexcludability of the common resource by assigning private property rights. For a long time, this was the preferred way to deal with the problem among economists (see the literature provided in Ostrom 1990, p. 12). Practically, this means that the common resource will be privatized, e.g., the common grazing land in medieval villages will be turned into private land and then parceled among the villagers. Elinor Ostrom, however, is also skeptical of this solution. She argues that CPRs often have characteristics that call for common ownership. First, common ownership may come with a primitive form of

Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development

insurance: If one part of the common land is affected by a negative event, say, a landslide or a lack of water, but other parts of the land are not affected, then the villagers can all herd in the unaffected land. This is not possible anymore when the land is partitioned into private parcels. Second, when the resource is mobile, such as fish moving around or flowing irrigation water, privatization is physically impossible (Ostrom 1990, p. 13). Self-Regulation Elinor Ostrom endorses self-regulation by the appropriators as the optimal way of tackling CPR problems, tapping their mutual monitoring as well as their knowledge about the most effective use, maintenance, and replenishment of the resource, and utilizing their strong incentives to get the most out of their resource. She describes self-imposed systems from Turkey (common fishing grounds), Switzerland (common forests), Japan (common agricultural land), Spain (irrigation water), and (in an institutional setting that is based on modern law rather than century-old traditions) the decentralized but cooperative management of water resources in California (Ostrom 1990). Many of these systems evolved over centuries and are therefore intertwined with and embodied in local traditions, and some of them ingeniously anticipate ideas which were reinvented in modern economic literature. For example, the “scrip” system used over centuries for the assignment of irrigation water in Spain resembles modern systems of emissions trading that were initiated in the 2000s to reduce CO2emissions (Ellerman et al. 2016). Ostrom claims that her approach lives up to the standards of sustainable development: “The most notable similarity of all. . . is the sheer perseverance manifested in these resource systems and institutions. The resource systems clearly meet the criterion of sustainability” (Ostrom 1990, p. 89).

Outlook According to Bardhan (1993), many situations are erroneously framed as PDs. He gives the example of an irrigation ditch that is used by two farmers

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▶ Effects of Economic Crimes on Sustainable Development ▶ Game Theory: Towards an Understanding of the Logic of Justice, Peace, and Institutions Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Robert Axelrod, Rafael Castro, Thorsten Chmura, Sanjit Dhami, and Nikolai Jarre for useful discussions and comments.

References Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations in Sustainable Development, Fig. 8 When the outcome of mutual defection is very unattractive, the PD turns into a so-called Chicken Game

and needs repair, and each of them would prefer to free-ride on the repair efforts of the other. In this case, he argues, the lack of water may cause such great distress that any outcome where the repair is done dominates any outcome where it is not done. As the author points out, the game then turns into a so-called Chicken Game of which a payoff matrix is depicted in Fig. 8. The game has two equilibria, namely the two outcomes where one farmer repairs while the other remains inactive. While these outcomes may not be fair, the irrigation will be reinstated, and, as one can see, these outcomes are not Pareto-dominated or otherwise inefficient. Minding this example, the reader interested in sustainable development should not end his or her excursion into game theory when the PD is mastered. When analyzing problems in sustainability, development, and environmental protection, it may be rewarding to also have a look at other items in the rich toolbox of game theory.

Cross-References ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Conflict Bargaining and Resolution Strategies

Axelrod R (1980a) Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. J Confl Resolut 24(1):3–25 Axelrod R (1980b) More effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. J Confl Resolut 24(3):379–403 Baggaley J (2013) MOOC rampant. Dist Educ 34(3):368–378 Bardhan P (1993) Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development. World Dev 21 (4):633–639 Beaman L, Magruder J, Robinson J (2014) Minding small change among small firms in Kenya. J Dev Econ 108:69–86 Brewer M, Kramer R (1986) Choice behavior in social dilemmas: effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. J Pers Soc Psychol 50(3):543–549 Buchan NR, Brewer MB, Gianluca G, Wilson RK, Fatas E, Foddy M (2011) Global social identity and global cooperation. Psychol Sci 22(6):821–828 Burns J, Corno L, La Ferrara E (2015) Interaction, prejudice and performance: evidence from South Africa. Working paper (Version: February 2015) Charness G, Rustichini A (2011) Gender differences in cooperation with group membership. Games Econ Behav 72:77–85 Chen Y, Li SX, Liu XT, Shih M (2014) Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation. Games Econ Behav 84:58–86 Clist P, Verschoor A (2017) Multilingualism and public goods provision: an experiment in two languages in Uganda. J Dev Econ 129:47–57 Cook P (2004) Competition policy, market power and collusion in developing countries. In: Cook P, Kirkpatrick C, Minogue M, Parker D (eds) Leading issues in competition, regulation and development. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp 39–57 Dekmejian RH, Doron G (1980) Changing patterns of equilibria in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Confl Manag Peace Sci 5(1):41–54 Dequiedt V, Geourjon A-M, Rota-Graziosi G (2012) Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs. J Dev Econ 99:282–291 Dhami S (2016) The foundations of behavioral economic analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford Ellerman AD, Marcantonini C, Zaklan A (2016) The European Union Emissions Trading System: ten years and counting. Rev Environ Econ Policy 10(1):89–107

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740 Embrey M, Fréchette GR, Yuksel S (2018) Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Q J Econ 133 (1):509–551 Flood MM (1958) Some experimental games. Manag Sci 5 (1):5–26 Frank RH, Gilovich T, Regan DT (1993) Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? J Econ Perspect 7 (2):159–171 Goette L, Huffman D, Meier S (2006) The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment to real social groups. Am Econ Rev 96(2):212–216 Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (3859):1243–1248 Hart S (2005) An interview with Robert Aumann. Macroecon Dyn 9:683–740 Ivaldi M, Khimich A, Jenny F (2014) Measuring the economic effects of cartels in developing countries. Report for CEPR/PEDL/UNCTAD Jennings WP (1984) A note on the economics of organized crime. East Econ J 10(3):315–321 Kahn H (1960) On thermonuclear war. Princeton University Press, Princeton Kofman F, Lawarrée J (1996) A prisoner’s dilemma model of collusion deterrence. J Public Econ 59:117–136 Kollock P (1998) Transforming social dilemmas: group identity and co-operation. In: Danielson PA (ed) Modeling rationality, morality, and evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 185–209 Larrère C (2013) Biodiversity: common good or common world? Int Soc Sci J 64(211–212):125–133 Ledyard JO (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton Leslie CR (2006) Antitrust amnesty, game theory, and cartel stability. J Corp Law 31:453–488 Levy MA (1985) Mediation of prisoners’ dilemma conflicts and the importance of the cooperation threshold: the case of Namibia. J Confl Resolut 29(4):581–603 Lindahl E (1919) Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung. Hakan Ohlssons Buchdruckerei, Lund Madison MJ, Frischmann BM, Strandburg KJ (2019) Knowledge commons. In: Hudson B, Rosenbloom J, Cole D (eds) Routledge handbook of the study of the commons. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 76–90 Mvula PM, Haller T (2009) Common pool resource management in Lake Chilwa, Malawi: a wetland under pressure. Dev South Afr 26(4):539–553 Norris RJ, Redlich AD (2013) Seeking justice, compromising truth? Criminal admissions and the prisoner’s dilemma. Albany Law Rev 77(3):1005–1038 Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Paavola J (2019) Climate as a commons. In: Hudson B, Rosenbloom J, Cole D (eds) Routledge handbook of the study of the commons. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 188–197 Paoli L (2003) Mafia brotherhoods: organized crime, Italian style. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Privacy Picardi AC, Seifert WW (1977) A tragedy of the commons in the Sahel. Ekistics 43(258):297–304 Poundstone W (1993) Prisoner’s dilemma. Anchor Books, New York Rickels W, Dovern J, Quaas M (2016) Beyond fisheries: common-pool resource problems in oceanic resources and services. Glob Environ Chang 40:37–49 Robinson D, Goforth D (2004) The topology of the 2x2 games. Routledge, Oxford/New York Samuelson PA (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev Econ Stat 36(4):387–389 Schelling T (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Boston Shapiro I (2003) The moral foundations of politics. Yale University Press, New Haven/London Sigmund K (2010) The calculus of selfishness. Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford Snyder GH (1971) “Prisoner’s dilemma” and “chicken” models in international politics. Int Stud Q 15(1):66–103

Privacy ▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts

Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs Melissa Martins Casagrande Universidade Positivo, Curitiba, Brazil

Synonyms Protection of the Civilian Population

Definitions Civilians are persons who are not actively involved as combatants in the context of an armed conflict or are persons who are not actively taking part in the hostilities during an insurgency, an international armed conflict, or a non-international armed conflict. The international community has a responsibility to protect civilians during insurgencies, international and non-international armed conflicts, and often exercises this protection using the

Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

norms and tools provided by International Humanitarian Law.

Protection of Civilians in Context Human dignity is the core human rights principle presupposed in any policy or protective measure not only in times of peace, but also in times of war. International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict, is a field within International Law which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict by “protecting persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities” (ICRC 2004). Furthermore, IHL seeks to restrict the means of warfare, in particular weapons, and the methods of warfare, such as military tactics. There are international treaties as well as international customary rules that outline the practical rules agreed upon by States that seek to strike a careful balance between humanitarian concerns and the military requirements of parties which take part in armed conflicts (ICRC 2004). The development of IHL accompanies the development of methods and tactics of warfare. Consequently, IHL’s goal, which is the protection of persons who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities, requires constant shifts in approaches and tools. IHL was originally conceived to be upheld by parties in armed conflict between countries, but the understanding that it now applies to international and non-international armed conflicts alike is well sedimented in international practice. One of the main compliance obstacles, however, is the sheer number of active armed conflicts and protracted humanitarian crises in the world today as well as the widespread participation of groups not linked to a country’s government that often operate outside of the public authorities’ outreach in such conflicts and crises. It could be argued that even though the protection of the civilian population has been at the core of the limitations to warfare imposed by International Law, there are challenges that the current scenario poses, such as the purposeful targeting of civilians, of medical personnel, of field clinics, and of hospitals and the targeting of crucial

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urban infrastructure affecting sanitation, distribution of water and food. Such challenges require renewed approaches as well as subsidiary tools to effectively protect civilians not involved in hostilities. Compacts negotiated and endorsed by the international community such as the 2030 Agenda and the Agenda for Humanity have an important role to play in this regard. Moreover, unlike norms that protect civilians during armed conflicts, initiatives such as the 2030 Agenda can also be instrumental to prevent wars, rebuild communities in the aftermath of armed conflict as well as to establish protection strategies during protracted humanitarian crises.

Prevention of Armed Conflict: Reduction of Risk and Vulnerability Armed conflict can be identified as one of the greatest inhibitors of economic development, sometimes being referred to as development in reverse. Sustained economic growth, on the other hand, is “closely associated with significantly higher chances of peace.” Where the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were achieved, “this helped exert significant downward pressure on armed conflict.” The opposite trend is evidenced by the fact that the lowest performing countries in reporting progress and achieving the MDGs and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are States or regions affected by conflict or those experiencing endemic social violence (Bellamy 2016). The prevention of armed conflict can, therefore, be easily pinpointed as an effective form of civilian protection. The prevention of armed conflict requires State and civil society-led action as well as partnerships between government agents, International Organizations, and communities. Action by all stakeholders to achieve SDG 16, to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions” (UN 2015) is key to prevent armed conflict. Two indicators can be identified as being particularly relevant to conflict prevention: (1) the significant reduction of illicit financial

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and arms flows and countering all forms of organized crime, and (2) strengthening of national institutions, including through international cooperation, toward capacity-building at all levels, especially in developing countries, to prevent violence, terrorism, and crime (UN 2015). Reduction of all forms of violence to meet SDG 16 requires consensus on how to measure violence and understand risk factors linked to the progression of crises into armed conflicts coupled with clear State-reporting on patterns of violence and risk as part of their SDG compliance thresholds (Bellamy 2016). Moreover, this approach could benefit from linking local political resolution strategies to national policies, thus, engaging a wider range of actors and strengthening local, regional, and national institutions (IPI 2018). The Agenda for Humanity, an outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit, highlights the need for a genuine change in the way we deliver assistance and reduce risk and vulnerability, drawing attention to the need to act early analyzing risks and monitoring deteriorating situations and to make success visible by capturing, consolidating, and sharing good practices and lessons learned on conflict prevention (UN 2016a). International Organizations can play a pivotal role in strengthening operational and structural capacities by triggering early warning systems (Bellamy 2016) and supporting the State and local actors’ capacity building to protect civilians by preventing the eruption of armed conflicts. Despite efforts to prevent armed conflict, they do happen, and they present those not taking part in the hostilities with an undue burden. When armed conflicts irrupt, civilians are faced with challenges presented by the progressive loss of their livelihoods and the need to seek protection for their lives, physical integrity, and safety. The protection of civilians is “an essential and significant challenge for all parties to conflict,” and significant challenges are posed by “the high density of civilians populations; the possibility of the sudden and unexpected presence of civilians among combatants; the commingling of combatants and military objectives with civilian and civilian objects which may at times be deliberate.” Moreover, the vulnerability to damage and the

interdependence of basic service infrastructure, for example, water and electricity systems, should be considered, as well as “the likelihood of large outflows of civilians in need of immediate protection and assistance,” including access to trauma and medical care (UN 2018c). To understand the challenges for the protection of civilians during armed conflict, it is necessary, first of all, to understand the core rules of International Humanitarian Law. They are norms formed by long-standing practice considered by States as legally binding. IHL rules state that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants” as well as “between civilian objects and military objectives.” In other words, attacks may only be directed at combatants, not civilians. Moreover, the rules also prohibit acts or threats of violence if their primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. IHL also determines, specifically, that civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces and that “civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take direct part in the hostilities.” Insofar “as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action” and their partial or total destruction, capture, or neutralization offer a definite military advantage (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005). IHL prohibits indiscriminate attacks, the launching of an attack “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005). Moreover, it is also an IHL rule that constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population and objects as much as “all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Parties in a conflict are also obliged to “give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population” (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005).

Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

Those who protect and care for civilians are also covered under IHL rules. Medical personnel, units, and transport exclusively assigned to medical duties must be respected and protected in all circumstances. The same is true for humanitarian relief personnel and objects, and for religious personnel. Attacks directed against them are prohibited (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005). However, despite the monitoring and enforcement of IHL across the globe in a collective effort by the international community and organizations such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to uphold IHL rules, a Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations’ Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict highlights a different reality: “civilians are routinely killed or maimed, and civilian objects are damaged or destroyed, in targeted or indiscriminate attacks that frequently involve the widespread use of explosive weapons” (UN 2018c).

Humanitarian Action and Civilian Protection Partnerships High levels of forced displacement of the civilian population, constraints on humanitarian access, attacks against humanitarian workers and assets, and attacks and other interference with medical missions as well as a lack of accountability for violations of IHL have been recently highlighted as the biggest obstacles to the protection of civilians in ongoing conflicts and protracted humanitarian crises (UN 2018c). The rise in civilian targeting as a method of warfare in itself has been an issue of great concern to the international community, strengthened in last decades. This has prompted the UN Security Council, for example, to authorize the use of force to defend local people rather than exclusively to defend peacekeepers or specific locations (IPI 2018). Nevertheless, it is a “well-worn truism that missions cannot protect everyone is their areas of operation,” therefore, local, national, and international actors must deliver such protection through the use of unarmed strategies (IPI 2018). The first strategy is to enable those responsible for

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protection to negotiate the protection of civilians within the local, regional, and national political spheres. In the short term, protection of civilians can be established as a priority. In the long term, it could develop a political vision to address the conflict itself. Naturally, in any case, this approach requires high-level engagement of all stakeholders, and protection should focus on interacting with the wider civilian population rather than exclusively reaching out to political elites in order to protect civilians. Protection should also be framed in apolitical terms, “as a humanitarian or categorical necessity rather than a strategic decision” (IPI 2018). Engagement of all stakeholders with the community being protected is crucial for the success of any protection initiative. For instance, in “contexts where the [S]tate in unable or unwilling to fully implement its responsibility to protect, including situations where [S]tate actors are actively perpetrating the abuses” (Gorur and Carstensen 2016), the engagement of international organizations acting in loco with a protection mandate is very important. However, rather than taking a top-bottom approach and implementing a “one size fits all solution” to any conflict, all stakeholders, namely International Organizations, must support local communities affected by armed conflict with their existing self-protection strategies. It should be noted that although community efforts with the support of other stakeholders are instrumental to the protection of civilians, “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” Such responsibility “entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement” and “the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility” (UN 2005). The main challenges to external stakeholders in fostering community self-protection strategies can be outlined as the “different motivations of affected communities and of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other external actors” and “different concepts of what being protected means in practice” (Gorur and Carstensen 2016). Community approaches to self-protection will naturally be

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“shaped by their cultural and socio-economic environments,” as highlighted by Gorur and Carstensen (2016), “international legal categories of persons, such as ‘civilian’, ‘refugee’, or ‘internally displaced person’, are important for specific regimes and actors working to implement them, but are not always helpful for protection in practice.” Gorur and Carstensen (2016) also draw an important conclusion that is crucial to the effective collaboration between external stakeholders and communities toward the protection of civilians. While humanitarian protection literature and guidelines often distinguish between “protection needs” and “pressing needs,” communities affected by ongoing armed conflict and/or protracted humanitarian crises do not make these distinctions. Communities often do not distinguish between pressing threats to survival, protection, and attempts to recover. Effective protection, therefore, should bridge the gap between short-term and long-term efforts. In other words, it is needed to increase the connection and correlation between humanitarian assistance during an armed conflict and the development approaches required in the post-conflict phase. As conflict becomes “increasingly urbanized, the impact on civilians reaches new lows, with bombs and rockets destroying schools, hospitals, markets and places of worship” (UN 2017a). This reality is compounded by a growing sense of fatigue and resignation, among the international community, in addressing the suffering of civilians in conflict (UN 2017a). Renewed approaches seeking greater coherence between humanitarian and development actors are paramount to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience.

Building Resilience Through the Agenda 2030 Upholding the 2030 Agenda goals while negotiating and providing humanitarian assistance to civilians during armed conflict is likely to have a direct effect in building resilience for lasting economic, social, and environmental sustainability in

each community affected by armed conflict. Postconflict scenarios require investment on stability through the lens of the 2030 Agenda. All parties in an armed conflict have the primary responsibility for meeting the basic needs of civilians under their effective control and fewer civilians would, in fact, flee if parties to conflict spared them from the effects of hostilities, notably by complying with the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution (UN 2017a). Nevertheless, the inobservance of these principles and the purposeful targeting of civilians as a warfare tactic such as the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas has “dire long-term consequences for civilians, including the destruction of housing, schools, hospitals, electricity grids and water and sanitation systems, the displacement of civilians and the loss of education and livelihood opportunities” (UN 2017a). The UN Secretary-General argues that “this pattern is largely predictable, and its immense scale is undermining efforts to protect civilians, building lasting peace and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals” (UN 2017a). The 2030 Agenda states that countries in situation of conflict and post-conflict countries deserve special attention. Furthermore, it states that “sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.” Factors which “give rise to violence, insecurity and injustice, such as inequality, corruption, poor governance, and illicit financial and arms flows” are addressed in the Agenda (UN 2015). Each and every goal of the agenda can be related to either conflict prevention and/or to the upholding of human rights and basic needs throughout armed conflict as well as in the recovery and reconstruction phases in post-conflict countries. Examples of the interrelation between the SDGs and the protection of civilians during armed conflict are outlined below. A need for “holistic policies or strategies on the protection of civilians and civilian harm mitigation,” including training and the development of capacities to “track and analyze civilian harm in military

Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

operations,” has been suggested by the UN Secretary-General (UN 2017a). On the same path, the UN Secretary General has also suggested human rights monitoring and reporting, casualty tracking, and gender analyses, encouraging, furthermore, the “development and improvement of mechanisms to systematically collect information relating to the protection of civilians, including data disaggregated by sex and age, and to ensure that it feeds into conflict analysis, prevention and response” (UN 2017a). It could be argued that the correlation between the 2030 Agenda and the spectrum of civilian protection within the above-mentioned policies, strategies, and mechanisms is undeniable. Naturally, the list is nonexhaustive, and there is plenty of room for contextualization and innovation. Below, matters relating to the protection of civilians are analyzed in detail in relation to issues such as: (1) food security and availability of water and sanitation; (2) health and well-being; (3) access to education; (4) inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable human settlements and cities; and, (5) gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. Last, the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies within the context of armed conflict, but mostly within post-conflict scenarios, is presented. Food Security and Availability of Water and Sanitation Focus on achieving food security is paramount as conflict-driven food insecurity and the use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare are reported by the United Nations to be on the rise (see UN 2018c). Such practices are reinforced by widespread and persistent constraints on humanitarian access that jeopardize the ability of affected populations to meet their basic needs during and after armed conflicts. Moreover, access to humanitarian assistance has been deeply and increasingly affected by bureaucratic impediments to the entry of humanitarian assistance in areas heavily populated by civilians as well as attacks on humanitarian personnel. Hunger is on the rise globally “after declining for more than two decades, with conflict cited as the main reason for that reversal” with a

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high percentage of major food crises being conflict-driven (UN 2018c). The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has long-term effects, including “the extensive destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, workplaces and essential infrastructure, with reverberating effects on water and electricity systems,” thus increasing the risk and spread of disease as well as food insecurity (UN 2018c). Health and Well-Being In an intersection with SDG 3 and against all IHL norms concerning health and well-being of civilians and other persons not taking direct part in the hostilities, there is growing concern over the increase of “attacks against medical workers, patients and medical facilities, equipment and transport, and interference with the provision of impartial medical care” with reports of non-State armed groups occupying medical facilities and preventing ambulances from transporting the sick and wounded as well as assaults and abduction of medical personnel (UN 2018c). There are reports of looting of medical equipment and of use of medical facilities for military purposes for extended periods, exposing facilities and patients to an increased risk of attack (UN 2017a). In 2016, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2286 reinforcing all IHL norms and previous UN Resolutions concerning the protection of medical personnel as well as humanitarian personnel engaged in medical duties. The Resolution states that medical personnel or those engaged in medical duties “in an armed conflict situation, continue to be under a duty to provide competent medical service in full professional and moral independence, with compassion and respect for human dignity” (UN 2016b). Attacks targeting the civilian population or against military objectives in areas heavily populated by civilians can cause injuries that without timely treatment can cause lifelong disabilities. Furthermore, “attacks on medical care also have catastrophic long-term consequences as facilities close and workers flee, depriving entire communities of access to medical services” (UN 2017a). The protection of civilians and those who provide medical care to the civilian population is crucial

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both to their survival during conflict as well as to their access to health services and the guarantee of their well-being after the conflict. Access to Education Armed conflict heavily hinders access to education as does the forced displacement that armed conflicts cause. Lack of access and interruption of primary and secondary formal education as well as technical, vocational, and tertiary education are one of the biggest undue burdens that the civilian population in an area affected by heavy fighting endures. It is also one of the hardest issues to address in postconflict scenarios to bridge the gaps of capacity building of the local population in order for them to undertake any provision of service or activity to foster the country’s recovery and development. Children are disproportionally affected by armed conflict. Effects of hostilities include extensive destruction or occupation for military use of schools and universities, reducing spaces traditionally perceived as safe for children and young people. Children out of the formal education environment become more vulnerable to exploitation, rape, and other forms of violence including their recruitment for use in support roles or as combatants during conflict (UN 2017b). The UN Security Council has reiterated its grave concern over the abduction of children in situations of armed conflict, the majority of which are perpetrated by non-State armed groups, in a variety of settings, including schools. It also recognizes that “abduction often precedes or follows other abuses and violations of applicable international law against children, including those involving recruitment and use, killing and maiming, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence, which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity” (UN 2017b). The international community has proposed two non-legally binding documents to address the detrimental impact of conflict on education: The Safe Schools Declaration and The Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (2015). These instruments represent an important commitment; however, unfortunately, they do not suffice to minimize the disruptions and negative impact of conflict in formal education.

SDG target 4.a provides relevant guidance for both conflict and postconflict scenarios proposing the building and upgrading of education facilities that are child, disability, and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive, and effective learning environments for all (UN 2015). In the case of former child soldiers, the provision of “community-based psychosocial, educational and vocational reintegration programs has been an important factor in overcoming stigmatization, avoiding re-recruitment and breaking the cycles of violence” (UN 2018c). Furthermore, the Agenda for Humanity reinforces the need of provision of “sufficient domestic and international funding to enable all children and adolescents to receive education and vocational training opportunities, including in crisis settings” (UN 2016a). The Agenda for Humanity also aligns with SDG 4, ensuring inclusive and equitable education, with the needs and constraints of persons displaced by conflict. It proposes that the international community commits to “ensuring safe, quality and inclusive access to primary and secondary education and vocational opportunities during and after crises including for children and young people with disabilities.” Moreover, it proposes the provision of “primary, secondary and vocational education and certification for those living in displacement, in line with national qualifications and standards” in addition to the development of programs that “successfully integrate refugee youth into communities, providing education, vocational training and employment opportunities and platforms to address grievances” (UN 2016a). Inclusive and equitable education empowers young people, and the civilian population in general, promoting their active participation in local and international humanitarian and development programs and processes, namely in conflict prevention and resolution, in the response to crises and in the recovery of communities (UN 2016a). Inclusive, Safe, Resilient, and Sustainable Human Settlements and Cities Making human settlements and cities safe, as outlined in SDG 11, is a particular challenge within a context of armed conflict. The growing militarization of camps for internally displaced

Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

persons underlines “the need to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of camps and settlements” (UN 2018c), so as “to ensure that residents are not subject to forced recruitment and do not become military targets” (UN 2017a), thus ensuring the obligation of all parties in the conflict to uphold IHL norms concerning the protection of civilians. Resilience and sustainability of settlements, temporary or permanent, and cities, must be at the core of post-conflict reconstruction and further development. The Agenda for Humanity prescribes the reinforcement of national and local systems and not their mere replacement by systems created and run by the international community. The Agenda suggests a shift in tasks and leadership from international to local actors “as part of a planned and systematic approach from the outset of a crisis” by putting people at the center, enabling them to be the drivers in building their resilience and being accountable to them, ensuring consistent community engagement and involvement in decision-making (UN 2016a). Furthermore, the Agenda for Humanity connects the notion of community resilience with building on “positive local coping strategies and capacities in preparedness, response and recovery, and ensure relevant, demand-led support that reduces reliance on international assistance” (UN 2016a). Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women and Girls The empowerment of women and girls as well as the furtherance of gender equality is a must in preventing armed conflict, in the protection of civilians during armed conflict and in recovery and building of resilience in post-conflict situations. The targeting of women and girls through the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war, terrorism, torture, and repression is widespread in conflicts around the globe (UN 2018b). The UN Secretary General has reported on widespread accounts of rapes by parties to conflict, “mostly in conjunction with other crimes such as killing, looting, abduction, forced displacement, arbitrary detention and trafficking in persons,” in addition to that “in many cases, the strategic nature of the violence was evident in the selective targeting of victims from opposing

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ethnic, religious or political groups” with patterns of sexual violence also seen “in the context of urban warfare, during house searches and operations in residential areas” (UN 2017a). Such violence has been reported to result in forcible displacement and dispersal of the targeted community, with severe effects on social cohesion (UN 2018c). Conflict-related sexual violence is so widespread and of such concern to the international community when it comes to the protection of the civilian population and those not directly involved in the hostilities that by 2018, the UN Secretary General had published nine reports specifically addressing the issue (UN 2018b). The reports are based on information verified by the United Nations and cover any manifestation of conflictrelated sexual violence understood as “rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to conflict” (UN 2018b). While the 2018 Report on conflict-related sexual violence states that “all peacekeeping missions with mandates that include the protection of civilians have established the monitoring arrangements and incorporated early warning indicators of conflict-related sexual violence into their broader protection structures,” national authorities and civil society should also prevent and address conflict-related sexual violence (UN 2018b). Some of the efforts suggested to achieve this goal are legal reforms, legal assistance programs, community security programs, awarenessraising campaigns, and rehabilitation programs (UN 2018b). Within the specific context of a postconflict scenario, the socioeconomic reintegration of sexual violence survivors, who “often suffer lifelong stigma and exclusion” (UN 2018c) should also be foreseen. The conflict-related sexual violence disproportionally affects women and girls; therefore, the correlation between meeting the goal and targets of SDG 5 is very clear. Violence against women and girls is often based on discrimination regarding their gender and often other overlapping factors such as their sexual orientation

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Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

and/or actual or perceived ethnic, religious, political, or social affiliations. Ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls, as prescribed in target 5.1, is crucial to address the issue at its core. Meeting target 5.2 is also pivotal to addressing and ending conflict-related sexual violence. The elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private spheres fully applies within the contexts of prevention and post-conflict as well as during armed struggle. Addressing the nexus between armed conflict and trafficking in persons, namely of women and girls, is also extremely relevant. Strategies to end trafficking as well as sexual and other types of exploitation have been addressed by the UN Security Council, for instance, in Resolutions 2331 (2016) and 2388 (2017). Both resolutions call for the application, within the context armed conflict, of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children. The Resolutions recognize that trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict and in post-conflict situations can be for the purpose of various forms of exploitation, including prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor, servitude, slavery, or practices similar to it (UN 2016c). Building partnerships with the private sector and civil society, including local women organizations, can be effective to provide information helping to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and bring to justice individuals and networks involved in trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict, including by training relevant officials, for example: law enforcement personnel, border control officers, and peacekeepers, to be able to identify indicators of trafficking in persons in supply chains in areas affected by armed conflict (UN 2016c). Strengthening national and international investigative and judicial mechanisms can also help ensure accountability (UN 2017a). Compliance with international law by State and non-State actors is paramount in any aspect of civilian protection. Referrals to investigative and judicial mechanisms at all levels, for example, the

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, of situations in which sexual violence has been committed, commanded, or condoned through the failure to prevent or punish such acts (UN 2018b) can be an effective way to address conflict-related sexual violence which disproportionally affects women and girls.

The Promotion of Peaceful and Inclusive Societies Contemporary high-intensity armed conflicts cause large numbers of civilian casualties going against the tide of slowly declining homicide rates around the world. Despite the lack of harmonized data, fatalities and injuries relating to armed conflict seem to be increasing in some countries (UN 2018a). Prevention, protection of civilians during armed conflict, and the fostering of sustainable peace processes are paramount to the achievement of SDG target 16.1 which calls for the significant reduction of all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere. Within this context, a key indicator is the significant reduction of illicit financial and arms flows, strengthening the recovery and return of stolen assets combating all forms of organized crime as well as the use of international standards and legal instruments, usually established in IHL norms, to increase the proportion of seized small arms and light weapons. Public access to information, foreseen in SDG target 16.10.1, is also key to the protection of civilians during and post-conflict, ensuring access to justice and accountability, and consequently, increasing long-lasting stability. Reporting and public access on information about verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, and human rights advocates can provide avenues to redress and the exercise of the rights to truth, memory, and justice of communities affected by armed conflict. SDG targets 16.a and 16.b are crucial in the context of the cycle of rebuilding resilient societies post-armed conflict while simultaneously preventing armed conflict. Strengthening national institutions for capacity building in order to combat violence, terrorism, and crime goes hand in

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hand with the promotion and enforcement of nondiscriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development. Urging the international community to prevent and resolve conflicts and build sustainable peace, as suggested by the UN Secretary General (UN 2018c), requires a shift from perpetual reaction to early action, including the ability to identify and act upon signs of impending or potential conflict and threats to civilians.

References Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law (2004) International committee of the red cross. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ ihl.pdf. Accessed 16 Sept 2018 Bellamy AJ (2016) The 2030 agenda reducing all forms of violence. In: UN Chronicle. https://unchronicle.un.org/ article/2030-agenda-reducing-all-forms-violence. Accessed 15 Sept 2018 Gorur A, Carstensen N (2016) Community self-protection. In: Willmot H et al (eds) Protection of civilians. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 409–427 Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (2015). http:// protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ guidelines_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Sept 2018 Henckaerts JM, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary international humanitarian law, vol 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Protection of Civilians and Political Strategies (2018) International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/ 2018/05/protection-of-civilians-and-political-strate gies. Accessed 15 Sept 2018 Safe Schools Declaration (2015). https://www.regjeringen. no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/utvikling/ safe_schools_declaration.pdf. Accessed 29 Sept 2018 United Nations (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. A/59/ 2005 United Nations (2015) Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/70/1. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015. Accessed 8 Sept 2018 United Nations (2016a) Agenda for humanity: annex to the report of the secretary-general for the World Humanitarian Summit. A/70/79. https://www.agendafor humanity.org/sites/default/files/AgendaforHumanity. pdf. Accessed 8 Sept 2018 United Nations (2016b) Security council resolution n. 2286. S/RES/2286. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/ 2286. Accessed 22 Sept 2018 United Nations (2016c) Security council resolution n. 2331. S/RES/2331. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2331. Accessed 22 Sept 2018

749 United Nations (2017a) Report of the secretary-general on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. S/2017/ 414. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-secre tary-general-protection-civilians-armed-conflicts2017414-enar. Accessed 16 Sept 2018 United Nations (2017b) Security Council Resolution n. 2388. S/RES/2388. http://unscr.com/files/2017/02388. pdf. Accessed 30 Sept 2018 United Nations (2018a) Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ sdgs. Accessed 16 Sept 2018 United Nations (2018b) Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence. S/2018/250. https:// reliefweb.int/report/world/report-secretary-general-con flict-related-sexual-violence-s2018250-enar. Accessed 29 Sept 2018 United Nations (2018c) Protection of civilians in armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General. S/2018/462. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-secretary-gen eral-protection-civilians-armed-conflict-s2018462enarru. Accessed 22 Sept 2018

Protection of the Civilian Population ▶ Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs

Protests ▶ Political Unrest: Factors and Impact

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development José Irivaldo Alves Oliveira Silva Department of Public Management, Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande, Brazil

Definition Public access to information is the unrestricted concession to any information necessary for decision-making by citizens, groups, or communities, which mainly relates to it or to issues related to the

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conduct of state agents or actions originated by the state. In this way, we will discuss public transparency, types of public transparency, the importance of access to qualified information, the impact of information on the responsibility of state agents and on the formation of full citizenship, the levels of this information, and the relevance of accessible information for intelligent public management and for the formation of smart cities to materialize the sustainable development in what concerns to health security, to the environment, to poverty eradication, and to anti-corruption within the scope of the sixteenth goal from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).

Introduction Information has never been more important than it is today in a technology context with two basic pillars: access and speed. This entry explores the most sensitive aspects in relation to public access to information, as it is fundamental for the formation of citizenship and decision-making in different spheres of society, in both public and private spaces. It is possible to state that the ways of accessing information are diverse and within reach of many people, notably through equipment such as cell phones, tablets, and computers. The way of accessing information has changed rapidly, and thousands of applications are available to help citizens gain access to data about themselves and their most private interests or the ones which they have a more collective relationship. However, it is necessary to think about public access to information in a context of great urbanization and the search for a new model of cities, which main characteristic is the interconnections between citizens, the thousands of data that are moved, and a resilient and healthy environment (James et al. 2020). It is important to highlight that the application of innovative technologies, especially in the field of information and communication technologies, is also essential for a model of a smart, inclusive city with an intelligent society. The latter is characterized by a high level of integration (Wiesmeth et al. 2018). In addition, the concept of public

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access to information is based on its conception as a fundamental and human right, being the basis of modern democracies, with provision in the constitutions of countries that are considered to be under the rule of law (Jeffrey and Staeheli 2016). Khan and Peter-Anders (2018) also understand that this model of smart cities is based on an increase in the volume of information and the movement of that information which is exchanged in billions of data and has an improved governance and participatory processes to develop adequate public services, transport and energy infrastructures that can guarantee sustainable socioeconomic development, healthy environment, improved quality of life, and intelligent management of environmental and natural resources. In addition to all this, the way in which public access to information is given can be added as an element of this improved governance. Cities are large collectors of increasingly massive and heterogeneous amounts of data (text, video, audio), some of them are static, but increasingly larger parts are in real time. This context potentiates an increasingly common reality of big data, being strategic especially when thinking about public access to this information, considering the volume, speed (generation in real time), variety (extremely heterogeneous), veracity, and value (very useful for business apps and research) (Cesario 2019). Thus, the intention is to update this entry with these new elements of contemporary society in which billions of information travel through the Internet and there is an increasing need to increase access while protecting information from cyberattack and other innovations that threaten this extraordinary set of information. Throughout the text, a current analysis of the meanings of public access to information will be sought, with an emphasis on the role of technology and the state, notably public administration, and the role of the citizen, highlighting its protagonism in this process. However, we cannot forget that access to information is fundamental and works as a facilitator to freedoms protection, health promotion,

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

environmental protection, poverty, and corruption eradication, which are essential dimensions to sustainable development in the sphere of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), notably the sixteenth, which advocates the security of public access to information and the protection of fundamental freedoms, in conformity with the national legislation and international agreements. Technology is a mean, not an end by itself, to the realization of these fundamental rights.

Public Access to Information as Right and Privacy Access to information, transparency, and accountability are the pillars of the modern democracy – a concept named right to information is formed, reinforcing the sixteenth Sustainable Development Goal for the construction of environments of peace and justice, according to the principles of sustainable development. Currently, several countries have laws that deal with information that should be made available to the public, information that should be stored in a transparent way and made available in a way that is accessible to the population. It is important to understand that, in public management, information needs to be as transparent as possible. However, there is private information that is not available and can be protected due to people’s privacy. In the case of companies, this information may relate to industrial secrets that are legally protected. Public authorities also have information of strategic nature that is generally classified as national security, and not everyone has access to it. The European Union, for example, is implementing a directive for the entire bloc of associated countries to be applied mainly to operators of essential services and providers of digital services that are fundamental to the functioning of society. Essential services may be linked to health, water, sanitation, banks, transport, and the energy sector, to name a few examples, which justify a greater protection of their data in the face of the possibility of cyberattacks, and their duty to issue report and general data that needs to be disclosed (Markopoulou et al. 2019). Information under

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the state custody must always be public, considering there is always going to be exceptions according to the level of national security and the country’s strategy. The Brazilian case is paradigmatic, as it defines the confidentiality of information as an exception, being a type of general publicity followed by the entire public sector and access to information of fundamental right of the citizen. Article 23 of law no. 12.527/2011 establishes that information may be confidential because it is essential to the security of society or the state, if they endanger national defense and sovereignty or the integrity of the national territory; harm or jeopardize the conduct of negotiations or the country’s international relations, or those that have been provided in secret by other states and international organizations; endanger the life, safety, or health of the population; offer a high risk to the country’s financial, economic, or monetary stability; harm or cause risk to the Armed Forces’ strategic plans or operations; harm or cause risk to scientific or technological research and development projects, as well as to systems, goods, and installations or areas of national strategic interest; endanger the security of institutions or senior national or foreign authorities and their families; or compromise intelligence activities, as well as ongoing investigations or inspections, related to the prevention or repression of infractions (Brasil 2011). In this model, the responsibility for the information basically rests with the public authority, which must provide the protection of confidential information and disclose information that is not. The private sector is responsible for responding to requests from individuals about the information in their custody. It can be said that this access is not full or absolute. It is not just about access to information from the public administration, but also from other state powers or sectors such as the judiciary and the legislative, but with the same rule that restricts access to some sensitive information, such as privacy and the rights of third parties. However, access to this information related to state decisions helps society to be able to carry out critical control of public activities and services, real accountability, so that governments

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are responsive and ready to be accountable for their activities (de Santana and Pamplona 2019). In this way, the information needs to be accessible, which means employing facilities so that the citizen does not find it difficult to locate and get the information they want. Thus, what will define whether a piece of information is public or not will be its purpose and content. Once again, the Brazilian case can be cited in view of the need to think of information as data that is currently stored in a virtual way and that need greater legal protection. Thus, the Brazilian parliament approved the General Law on Protection of Personal Data n 13.708/2018. This law is based on the following items: respect for privacy; informative self-determination; freedom of expression, information, communication, and opinion; the inviolability of intimacy, honor, and image; economic and technological development and innovation; free enterprise, free competition, and consumer protection; and human rights, the free development of personality, dignity, and the exercise of citizenship by natural persons. Therefore, in the Brazilian case, information can be in a private and a public sphere, and both of them have the right to protection and respect for its content, and in the case of personal information, it is in the sphere of intimacy, which establishes limits and possibilities of punishment for those who exceed these limits, submitted to international treaties and the International Declaration of Human Rights (Rodriguez-Garcia et al. 2019). The information is in a sphere that allows everyone access; however, it must be protected from cyber invasions and possible changes in its content by anyone without proper control from its source. This is very important in the current context in which there are social networks in an environment of democracy and freedom of expression and information is dispersed in several channels, making it even more essential to check the source of the information and its veracity. In this case, the law made by parliaments will indicate what information will be public and who will be able to classify the information as secret, or of restricted access, in short, information that will not be public, but of restricted access. In Bulgaria, the law gives ample scope to the concept of

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classifying authority, allowing any signatory of the document to classify it. Also, in that country, few documents referring to the old security service are available in the National Archives. The Czech Republic passed a legislation that allows citizens to obtain personal files prepared by the Communist secret police. In the United States, the Information Security Oversight Office (a division of the National Archives) oversees the classification system. In a survey carried out in 2004, it was found that 51% of the documents examined were erroneously classified. In Germany, the Stasi Records Act (1991) authorized access to secret police files from the former Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR). Material was made available that was produced between 1949 and 1990, consisting of approximately 28.400 audios, 3.000 films, and 1.6 million photographs (Schneider and Xavier 2018).

Access to Information Laws in Countries Some indicators are used to analyze the level of access to information, such as the outstanding Global Right to Information Rating. It was created by the Centre for Law and Democracy, a Canadian nonprofit organization, which aims at promoting, protecting, and developing human rights that are grounding for democracy, such as freedom of expression, government participation, and access to information. It has 61 indicators which are applied on the analysis of legal texts about access to information, in terms of seven macrostructural aspects: right of access; scope; procedures for information request; exceptions; appeals; sanctions; and promotion measures. Figure 1 demonstrates the current panorama of access to information around the world, considering a methodology that took 61 indicators into consideration, resulting in an interval between 0 and 150, in which the higher the score, the higher the level of access to information in these countries. According to Eirão and Leite (2018), the worldwide panorama demonstrates that there are diverse situations according to the continent. The European continent has 41 access to information laws; the American has 23 laws; Asia has 21 laws;

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Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development, Fig. 1 Access to information laws around the world. (Source: Global Right to information Rating (2020))

Africa has 14 laws; and Oceania has 3 laws. This indicator does not demonstrate the degree of implementation of these instruments yet, which is crucial to evaluate access to information as a booster of not only a formal but a real democratic system. Figure 1 demonstrates exactly countries that have laws, but that information is not as available as the other indicators.

Privacy Laws Across Countries and Big Data The right to information is a human right and part of the Sustainable Development Goals; therefore, it will be fundamental to think about data security and about ensuring privacy, which is also a fundamental right (Cancelier 2017). A society cannot be effectively free without access to information and assurance of privacy of personal information, mainly in a context of great flow of information exchanged between people, institutions, and other organizations, through the worldwide web or

other means. Both public access to information and privacy are groundings of a democratic state. On the previous items, it was possible to verify the example of the legal framework of information management on the Internet, as well as the laws that ensure access to information, including permissions and limitations. In a context of great flow of information from diverse origins, it is essential that citizens and corporations trust the data protection system. In this way, countries need legal framework that can provide the proper protection of its public and private data. Public and private information gains importance, especially its protection, at a time when the volume is growing in an environment dominated by big data. Laney (2001) defined big data as: “high volume, high speed and high variety information that require innovative and economical ways of processing information for an improved vision and decision making.” Bayer and Laney (2012) updated this definition by stating that big data is “information of high volume, high speed and/or high variety that requires new

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forms of processing to allow improved decisionmaking, discovery of insights and optimization of processes.” Perhaps isolated information is meaningless, but this processed information gains value and becomes great assets for companies, public authorities, and certain people with varied interests (Ramírez-Gallego et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2020). This processed information does not lose the quality of being public or private, and the relevant authorizations are necessary for the one who manages and processes the information to be able to do so. It is important to consider that big data helps in several areas of knowledge, mainly in the production of knowledge from this huge volume of information, requiring new parameters to deal with them in the field of sciences, for example (Maass et al. 2017). For Maass et al. (2017), the influence of this voluminous set of information occurs mainly in scientific development considering the following: (1) using larger and more complete data sets (e.g., physics, biology and medicine); (2) increased computational capabilities (e.g.,,

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

astronomy); (3) mining heterogeneous data sets for predictive analysis, text mining, and sentiment (e.g., business applications); (4) adopting new machine learning techniques (e.g., computer vision); and (5) generating new and innovative questions. The universe of possibilities is huge and affects the security of data, or information, both as a private data and as public data. However, it can be glimpsed that the most delicate point may be in data aggregation, which refers to the process by which raw data is collected, reformatted, and presented in a summary form for subsequent data sharing and further analysis. In general, raw data can be aggregated in a variety of ways, such as by time (e.g., monthly and quarterly), by location (e.g., city), or by data source (Wen 2020). Isolated data alone may not have a meaning, but aggregate data may have significance. It is possible to verify in Fig. 2 that there is still a long way to go in the context of data or information protection. Most countries do not have an effective system, only laws, or laws and the regulatory authority, without a full implementation.

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development, Fig. 2 Worldwide data protection. (Source: Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) 2019)

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

Of course, having laws is an important step, but the implementation steps are fundamental, and it is a responsibility of the public power.

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mainly in areas as health, environment, poverty eradication, and anti-corruption.

Combat and Prevent Corruption Why Is Public Information Access Important for the SDG 16? Information, what is done about it and who has power over it are fundamental issues for civilizing design. This makes a difference in the relationship between power and people, both giving greater control of the governors in relation to the governed and giving greater autonomy and greater citizenship to the governed and enabling greater control over governors. The quality of access to information can define a government as being more or less democratic (Twizeyimana and Andersson 2019). Therefore, controlling information is power. The more information you have, and depending on the purpose you want, the more power you can accumulate. This will define the level of freedom of the citizens, considering that it is difficult to talk about fundamental freedom where there is no democracy nor rule of law. In addition, one can think about information from the point of view of its applications. The lack of information generates some negative effects for the construction of active citizenship as well as the structuring of more responsive governments and a more transparent environment. The first effect of the lack of access to information is the low transparency of governments. This transparency, according to Harrison et al. (2012), means the availability and flow of timely, comprehensive, relevant, high-quality and reliable information about government activities for citizens. Therefore, simple access is not enough, but a relationship of trust between government and the governed is established based on the quality of information. This relationship of trust will only be possible with the availability of the correct information, whether positive or negative in relation to the government, as citizens need to have subsidies to build their opinion and also protect themselves from risky situations. Access to information is important and works as a facilitator for the concretization of the sustainable development,

The application of access to information as a fundamental element for a transparent government is a contemporary demand for full citizenship. For Twizeyimana and Anderson (2019), this directly impacts the daily perception of public power, the efficiency of public services, and the administrative improvement of the government, and it promotes an open and transparent government that has ethical care and cultivates professionalism and improves trust in government, improving social value and well-being. Without information it becomes difficult to fight corruption, for example, through the action of citizens individually and collectively. Faulkner et al. (2019), after researching several models of electronic governments, perceived that user satisfaction is linked to clarity of information and access. The digitization of access to information has been an irreversible reality, since, in the last 10 years, many countries have made databases and information available on the network, becoming real repositories of accessible and useful public information for the population, mainly motivated for values such as greater government transparency, collaboration, and citizen participation and encouraging innovation (Gascó-Hernández et al. 2018). The digital government which has its information available on the Internet can assist and strengthen the fight against corruption through the inspection of citizens, state and private organizations, and even organizations formed by the collective effort of ordinary citizens (Nam 2018). Zhao and Fan (2018) testifies from his research that a successful government will inevitably depend on the quality of access to information or on the level of transparency it has toward the population and other actors and partners. It is clear that access to information is central to the quality and level of democracy of a country or even to the level of transparency of private organizations, establishing a positive and trusting

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relationship, whether between citizens and even service users, as well as consumers. In fact, the importance of information is so great that it can be called new oil, being a high-value asset, so its protection is essential.

Environmental Protection and Health Care as Related Dimensions Currently, the quality of governments and companies performance vis-à-vis the environment is fundamental data for a good part of the population, because in times of pandemic or diseases that affect the whole world and that originates from the interference of human beings in nature, many of them want to know if this action is harmful for the future of the planet (WHO 2019, 2020). Access to environmental information should not be restricted, for example, in relation to pollution, deforestation, forest fires, biodiversity, water quality, and sewage treatment quality, among other data that may interest citizen monitoring. This data can also alert possible levels of preservation that are not adequate and that cause damage to humans and ecosystems. The availability of information with goals linked to sustainable development is increasingly an essential requirement in the public access model (Janowski et al. 2018). The case of electronic waste is an example of this, and it is a global problem; it is necessary to monitor the circulation of these objects and what is their final destination, so as not to pollute the environment (Kumar and Rawat 2018). This kind of Information can assist in the implementation of environmental policies through the pressure exerted by the population and public and private environmental organizations. The lack of information leads to a society that is unaware of the level of preservation of the environment. Data about the environment is essential to know the moment and the need to act, in order to pressure governments and private entities to protect environmental factors, which are necessary for the survival of ecosystems and human life on the planet (Rantala et al. 2020). Knowing the degree of sustainable development of countries must be considered essential information to prevent societies from becoming ill from pollution and from contamination of rivers and of the air; to prepare

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societies in the face of the emergence of new diseases, such as SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19); and to make the level of compliance with the Sustainable Development Goals (2030 agenda) known by the population (Soma et al. 2016). Giving up this information means not prioritizing environmental protection on the public agenda, which promotes greater vulnerability on the planet. Such information must be public, and its availability must be a mandatory guideline. The lack of information causes the government and the governed to feel that they are not guided to follow the paths necessary for sustainable development; it is as if they were on an airplane whose navigation equipment for some reason appeared to be disconnected, causing disorientation during the flight. It is not knowing where to go. It is important to highlight that this transparency in information and its consequent availability is crucial for increasing the credibility of companies and for them to be classified in the community as sustainable corporations, including clearly presenting the level of risk of what is produced or of its intervention in the environment, degrees of pollution, and other indicators (Jacoby et al. 2018; Tseng et al. 2020). The participation of the population is essential in the design of water and sanitation policies, as well as in its implementation, and without it the public policy performance, which is the essential to life, will be compromised; and there cannot be participation without information (Mukhtarov et al. 2018). In such cases, open and easily accessible information and data on Internet portals is basic to this process of participation in public policies. Colombo and Femminis (2014) attest that when the capacity of policymakers to overshadow information is restricted, increasing the accuracy of public information can improve well-being. In the nineteenth century, Sir Jean Snow, an English scientist who dedicated his life to the study of infectious diseases, used monitoring through the mapping of the cholera infection, which affected the English people at that time, to map the disease in London. This draws attention to the importance of these tools for preventing outbreaks of certain diseases as well as the mapping of their evolution, through a simple survey of city sewage and the water that is provided. It is an epidemiological control tool of paramount

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

importance, mainly highlighted in times of pandemic, such as the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19), that is being monitored in several places around the world; the ones responsible for the sanitation of cities and scientists are analyzing sewage clues in relation to the behavior of the virus in these environments, being able to establish the viral load according to the mapped geographic location or space (Morawska and Cao 2020; Sims and Kasprzyk-Hordern 2020). Zoller et al. (2020) point out the importance of monitoring the urine of people exposed to glyphosate, for example, a carcinogenic substance, which would serve as a biomarker to indicate the health of people, which reinforces the relevance that cities have sewage collection networks and that this information is available to both the population and the decision-makers in general. Another effect of the lack of access to information is the lack of knowledge about the real health diagnosis of the country’s population. Research shows that access to information has a double positive effect: it helps in decision-making, and it helps in reducing the vulnerability of patients (Fiocruz 2019). Access to technology that provides information, especially mobile phones, is essential in this moment of social isolation. Hiding information is not effective; on the contrary, it leads to a higher risk of an increase in COVID-19 cases. As Negri et al. (2020) point out, in times of pandemic, qualified public information is essential not only for citizens but also for the production of knowledge in order to mitigate and combat the virus and seek an effective vaccine. The absence of accessible and quality public information can be harmful in a public health policy that aims to reduce obesity in the population. In this field, studies indicate that this information is scarce, confusing, and insufficient to guide the consumer’s decision, which can even put their lives at risk (Díez et al. 2017).

Poverty Eradication It is not possible to talk about sustainable development without poverty eradication. And access to information is also fundamental for this. Access to information can provide possibilities to freedom, and the way out of poverty may be one of

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them. The lack of information may generate a cycle which imprisons people who are in situation of financial vulnerability, who have no access to basic services, such as water, energy, and sewage and no access to basic daily food. The lack of information prevents people from organizing themselves, because they do not have knowledge about the instruments and the ways they can be used to claim their rights. Poverty eradication is fundamental in the process of implementation of the SDG, since it is not possible to have a sustainable, peaceful, and fair society in a context of growing poverty. Improving access to information must go hand in hand with the increasing of income for the poorest people, in order to promote the sustainable eradication of poverty (Randel 2013). According to Randel (2013), on a randomized control study in Uganda, clinic users had access to data and qualitative information about the local financing of health care. The result was a great improvement on the health services: the waiting time and the absenteeism of the health team decreased, the clinics got cleaner, fewer drugs were stolen, and there was a reduction of 33% of infant mortality, saving 550 lives in a region with only 55.000 families. Information and transparency create grounding for the development of other policies, which may be somehow related to poverty eradication. It is necessary to have information and, simultaneously, a broad process of education so that people know what do to with it. Igwe (2019) points out that no civilization was successful in any field without access to information. Zhang et al. (2019) contributed in research that access to information had a positive impact in the decrease in poverty in Chinese communities, especially in rural communities. At the same time, the big data technology may be used to dynamically track the situations of demand from poor families and the allocation of resources to relieve poverty, as well as to improve justice and transparency of the work for relieving poverty.

Information Governance Is Necessary The so-called information age influences not only social relations, economy, and science but also

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governance (Soma et al. 2016), which is the decision-making process and by which decisions are implemented. It can be used in various contexts, such as corporate governance, institutional governance, national governance, and local governance (Islam 2018). The aspect of the arrangement and interaction of information and how it will be organized is fundamental for their security and for the correct and lawful access by citizens. This new world of big data needs rules of legal frameworks that allow the assumptions and fundamentals of public access to information to occur (Samoilenko and Shilina 2017). Governance presupposes in itself a set of structures that interact under rules and principles that govern the flow of information and how this will occur. However, this governance in times of big data is part of a broader information governance program that manages policies related to data optimization, privacy, and monetization (Samoilenko and Shilina 2017). In order to have good governance, it is necessary to have information management installed in the sectors that will work with this data, besides capturing, processing, and presenting it as accessible or not, according to what is determined by the country’s legislation and international conventions and treaties. However, according to what Samoilenko and Shilina (2017) state, to minimize the potential risks related to data misuse or privacy breach, strong information management should include a comprehensive data model that supports a company’s business applications, appropriate data management tools, and methodology, in addition to competent data specialists. Therefore, the governance process refers to creating a profile of the data, understanding what it will be used for, and determining the necessary level of management and protection of this data (Samoilenko and Shilina 2017). According to Islam (2018), good governance needs to establish the regulation paradigm and rules for the development of public management within parameters. This governance is tested to the extreme, mainly in times of pandemic isolation, when most people need to stay at home and are working and maintaining levels of sociability because of the Internet, clearly increasing the flow of public and private data. In this

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

universe, it is possible to have information on personal data, acquisitions, financial transactions, lawsuits, criminological data, genetic data, health data, and other possibilities not even imagined yet, which are stored on servers or in the cloud. Currently, as the most effective way in the aspect of governance of private data in relation to financial transactions, blockchain technology is being used as the most secure, and it also can certainly be used for other business modalities (Gupta and Sadoghi 2019). It should also be borne in mind that for a new post-pandemic normal, information governance will have increased its level of relevance in view of the urgency of having more intelligent urban spaces, which are those that insert technology, economics, and governance under ubiquitous computing and that are driven by innovation (Pettit et al. 2018). This is just a bias, but within the perspective of public information governance in smart, connected, technological and innovative urban spaces, environmental management, sanitation, disasters, management of land use, and occupation, among others that produce public information, can also be inserted in so many cases. Thus, smart governance is essential to articulate all these needs, with digital communication being an ally to be used for this purpose (da Silva and Fernandes 2020). This smart governance is composed of the following factors (da Silva and Fernandes 2020, 2): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Collaboration Participation Transparency Effectiveness Efficiency Guiding consensus Responsiveness Strategic vision Equity Inclusion Rule of law Coherence

All of these principles for smart governance that should make up the universe of smart cities must have a synergy with communication and

Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development

information technologies. This will be essential if effective public access to information is to take place. Geoinformation plays a fundamental role for decision-makers who need to know their territory as much detailed as possible and that this information is also clear for citizens who act as public administration inspectors as well and can collaborate in management (da Silva and Fernandes 2020). And for this governance to be meaningful, the information must be considered relevant, in the sense of being salient and with a high signal/noise ratio, and individuals must have the power and incentives to act accordingly (Kosec and Wantchekon 2020). So far, there has been talk of the urban environment in which access to information is facilitated. Information governance and its public access should also include the most remote regions, as rural areas that public services and concentrate great poverty worldwide (Kosec and Wantchekon 2020).

Conclusion The priority is to transform public access to information into a state policy and not a government policy, transforming it into a consolidated public policy. Free and quality access to the Internet has become essential for the purpose of making public access to information a public policy. As it became easier, because today you can have access to a large amount of information through the cell phone, for example, it has also become a great challenge, because it is necessary to universalize access to the Internet in order to be able to also universalize public access to information. This first point should be the grounding for public access to information as a public policy. This would make the transition from private, nonpublic information to a level of public communication effectively, with the goal of improving citizenship (Bottrel 2018). A second point is to consider the need to provide the country with the minimum infrastructure necessary to enable this access. It can be said that the creation of this infrastructure would eliminate a classic dysfunction in the state bureaucracy, which is unrestricted access to information. The

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wide access to the Internet in countries that intend to make access to information as a public policy is a mandatory guideline, especially considering the process of transforming conventional governments into electronic governments guided by a certain level of information systems that provide access to information and increase transparency. This implies the involvement of multiple actors and with a perspective that encompasses the production, storage, and dissemination of information, constituting a public information policy. Another dimension based on public access to information is citizen participation. It is hoped that the universalization of information systems and possibilities for virtual access will also improve the participation of citizens in decisions, formulation, and implementation of public policies. Studies point out that the decentralization of participation through information systems is a viable alternative and that provokes greater legitimacy and acceptance of public policies defended by the government, pointing to few mistakes and even correction of directions. Ruijer et al. (2017) conclude in their research that a context-sensitive open data design facilitates the transformation of raw data into meaningful information collectively constructed by public administrators and citizens. This means that it is better to have interaction since the construction of data. It is not enough to have open data; they also need to have meaning for administrators and citizens, adapting to each model of society. The mere availability of information without prior treatment, which does not mean manipulation, can cause several distortions. The virtual availability of public information cannot be used as an excuse to eliminate citizen participation, but to strengthen this process. We are experiencing a context of great volume of information that requires the institutionalization of a public data infrastructure that promotes their access and security. Therefore, the task is difficult, but necessary; information is the great asset of the coming centuries, with which it is possible to produce knowledge; formulate, implement, and evaluate public policies; and improve citizenship by increasing the possibilities of information; and bad information can establish chaos in life in society. There is no full democracy

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without quality public information available. The absence of this causes the curtailment of human rights, such as the right to information and communication just to begin. It will be through access to information that public services can be improved; besides that, the fight against corruption will have space on the public agenda. Public access to information is essential for maintaining the democratic rule of law while also improving environmental defense and protection as a global need. It is necessary to take care from the definition of what is or is not public information until its publication on the worldwide web or in another communication vehicle.

Cross-References ▶ Good Governance

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Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development Janowski T, Estevez E, Baguma R (2018) Platform governance for sustainable development: reshaping citizenadministration relationships in the digital age. Gov Inf Q 35(4):S1–S16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2018. 09.002 Jeffrey A, Staeheli LA (2016) Learning citizenship: civility, civil society, and the possibilities of citizenship. In: Kallio KP et al (eds) Politics, citizenship and rights, geographies of children and young people, vol 7. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-9814585-57-6_29 Khan Z, Peter-Anders J (2018) Big data in smart cities. In: Sakr S, Zomaya A (eds) Encyclopedia of big data technologies. Springer, Champions. https://doi.org/10. 1007/978-3-319-63962-8_33-1 Kosec K, Wantchekon L (2020) Can information improve rural governance and service delivery? World Dev 125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.07.017 Kumar S, Rawat S (2018) Future e-waste: standardisation for reliable assessment. Gov Inf Q 35(4):S33–S42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.11.006 Laney D (2001) 3D data management: controlling data volume, velocity, and variety [online]. Available at: https://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Vol ume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2020 Liu J et al (2020) Urban big data fusion based on deep learning: an overview. Inf Fusion 53(February 2019):123–133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2019. 06.016 Maass W, Parsons J, Purao S, Rosales A, Storey VC, Woo CC (2017) Big data and theory. In: Schintler L, McNeely C (eds) Encyclopedia of big data. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32001-4_ 505-1 Markopoulou D, Papakonstantinou V, de Hert P (2019) The new EU cybersecurity framework: the NIS directive, ENISA’s role and the general data protection regulation. Comput Law Secur Rev 35(6):1–11. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2019.06.007 Morawska L, Cao J (2020) Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: the world should face the reality. Environ Int 139(April):2003–2005. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.envint.2020.105730 Mukhtarov F, Dieperink C, Driessen P (2018) The influence of information and communication technologies on public participation in urban water governance: a review of place-based research. Environ Sci Policy 89 (April):430–438. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci. 2018.08.015 Nam T (2018) Examining the anti-corruption effect of egovernment and the moderating effect of national culture: a cross-country study. Gov Inf Q 35(2):273–282. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2018.01.005 Negri Fd, Zucoloto G, Miranda P, Koeller P (2020) Ciência e Tecnologia frente à pandemia. Centro de Pesquisa em Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade, 27 March [online]. Available at: https://www.ipea.gov.br/cts/pt/central-deconteudo/artigos/artigos/182-corona. Accessed 17 Apr 2020

761 Pettit C et al (2018) Planning support systems for smart cities. City Cult Soc 12(August):13–24. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.ccs.2017.10.002 Ramírez-Gallego S et al (2018) Big data: tutorial and guidelines on information and process fusion for analytics algorithms with MapReduce. Inf Fusion 42(September):51–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus. 2017.10.001 Randel J (2013) Why access to information needs to be central to the debate on poverty. The Guardian, 18 Jan [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development-professionals-network/2013/jan/ 18/mdgs-poverty-eradication-information-access. Accessed 18 Apr 2020 Rantala S et al (2020) Governance of forests and governance of forest information: interlinkages in the age of open and digital data. Forest Policy Econ 113 (December 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol. 2020.102123 Rodriguez-Garcia M, Batet M, Sánchez D (2019) Utilitypreserving privacy protection of nominal data sets via semantic rank swapping. Inf Fusion 45(July 2017): 282–295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2018.02.008 Ruijer E, Grimmelikhuijsen S, Meijer A (2017) Open data for democracy: developing a theoretical framework for open data use. Gov Inf Q 34(1):45–52. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.giq.2017.01.001 Samoilenko SA, Shilina M (2017) Governance. In: Schintler L, McNeely C (eds) Encyclopedia of big data. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-32001-4_107-1 Schneider LG, Xavier VCS (2018) Acesso à informação. E-book library [online]. Available at: https:// repositorio.enap.gov.br/bitstream/1/3144/1/Módulo% 203%20-%20Classificação%20de%20Informações% 20e%20Dados%20Abertos%20%281%29.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2020 Sims N, Kasprzyk-Hordern B (2020) Future perspectives of wastewater-based epidemiology: monitoring infectious disease spread and resistance to the community level. Environ Int 139(March). https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.envint.2020.105689 Soma K, Termeer CJAM, Opdam P (2016) Informational governance – a systematic literature review of governance for sustainability in the information age. Environ Sci Policy 56(1):89–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. envsci.2015.11.006 Tseng ML, Chang CH, Remen Lin CW, Ha Nguyen TT, Lim MK (2020) Environmental responsibility drives board structure and financial and governance performance: a cause and effect model with qualitative information. J Clean Prod. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro. 2020.120668 Twizeyimana JD, Andersson A (2019) The public value of e-government – a literature review. Gov Inf Q 36(2): 167–178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2019.01.001 Wen T (2020) Data aggregation. In: Encyclopedia of big data. pp 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31932001-4_296-1 WHO – World Health Organization (2019) Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease

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Public Access to Information for Sustainable Development Zhang J, Zhang Y, Cheng M, Yu N, Wel X, Zhang Z (2019) Impact of information access on poverty alleviation effectiveness: evidence from China. IEEE Access Journal, October, 24 [online]. Available at: https:// ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp? arnumber¼8864977. Accessed 26 Apr 2020 Zhao Y, Fan B (2018) Exploring open government data capacity of government agency: based on the resourcebased theory. Gov Inf Q 35(1):1–12. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.giq.2018.01.002 Zoller O et al (2020) Urine glyphosate level as a quantitative biomarker of oral exposure. Int J Hyg Environ Health 228(November 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.ijheh.2020.113526

R

Rebel Groups

Populism contextually means appealing to ordinary people for regime transformation.

▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16

Introduction

Recognition ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability

Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Under Political Instability and Growth of Populism Washaya Washaya School of Business and Economics, Faculty of Diplomacy and Sustainable Development, Euclid University, Harare, Zimbabwe

Synonyms Back and forth; Disorientation; Instability

Definitions Political instability means incidences of political upheaval and government propensity for change.

Populism is imperative in the context of sustainable development goals (SDGs) policy perspectives. This entry avails a rigorous exploration in line with the rise of populism in this contemporary world. Understanding the phenomenon of populism and global headway is paramount (Litan et al. 2019). Both populism and nationalism have a vital sustainable economic dimension. The rise of nationalism and populism has caused a rift in economics, issues concerning income, environmental parameters, and governments globally. Ideological instability between nationalism in the realm that nations would benefit more by working independently as compared to international dictates is a hindrance towards the implementation of SDGs. Populism is a philosophy directed to the needs of ordinary people and advocating a more equitable distribution of wealth and power. These two ideological groundings are detrimental and beneficial to the overall wellbeing of the general populace and nation-states. Furthermore, an uptick in nationalist and populist bandwagon globally has severe ramifications on development trajectory. Populism has negative stability consequences and contributes to the weakening of democratic representation.

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Sustainable Development Goals Implementation and Populism Nexus Populism on a different side of the political spectrum is gathering momentum globally, including in some big economies and standing democracies. Political instability in the context of populism is a complicated phenomenon which can be comprehended through ideological, discourse, and strategic analytical lenses. This is vital to position the practicality of SDGs in line with policy instability and political cycles emanating from populist tendencies at local, regional, and international aura. Populism is an antipluralist and antielitist with many populist political parties claiming ordinary people representation. Consequently, a societal vision is divided into pure people and the corrupt elites; internal homogeneity of the two groups; the opposition between the two groups; and the genuine people as the legitimate source of the general will. From the preceding, overall, populism more broadly involves antiestablishment, nativism, and authoritarianism (Hirvonen and Pennanen 2019). This ideological instability is against SDGs effective implementation. The emergence of populist policies is a counter-reaction reaction to conventional politics and globalism discontent. Predominantly, accelerated populism emanates from economic recessions, the upsurge of levels of inflation, austerity, unemployment, inequality, immigration, trade discrepancies, financial turbulence, and geopolitical as well as geo-economic considerations. Populism and political instability is not only caused by economic factors, but also the psychological state and identity of a specific group of people. Partnership for development is critical for the implementation of SDGs. However, due to the growth of nationalistsocialist policies globally, achieving policy stability in the long haul, which is essential for business competitiveness and investment, is amorphous. Political will at the global level to chart the development trajectory of sustainability is on a downtrend due to ideological polarization and the antiglobalization backlash. Although populism is perceived to encompass strong advocacy for nationalist tendencies, justified in the context of

exclusion and rhetoric of the people and the demonization of perceived threat and support for authoritarian leaders, it is a hiccup to sustainable policy making in line with the Agenda 2030. This could be discontent for governments and politicians and multinational corporations. Populism portrays themselves the voice of the ordinary people while advocating for mono-culturalism at the expense of multiculturalism, national self-interest as opposed to international cooperation, and traditionalism over liberal values (Urbinati 2019). In this domain of thought, populism, which is related to fears of globalization and the demise of contemporary mainstream parties to solve social problems, is opportunistic in responding to the growing discontent and fear of citizens by availing simple answers to very convoluted scenarios.

Sustainable Policy-Making Challenges in the Context of Political Instability Populism is a distinct contextually, and there are divergences between right-wing and left-wing populism, as well as the undergirding factors. In developed countries, for example, populism is primarily right-wing and has a secure link to skepticism and anti-immigration. In developing countries, it is more linked to left-wing ideological grounding railing against government incompetence, the inadequate rule of law, limited transparency, and stability aspects. In this domain of thought, populism is a challenging force against complacency and governments’ marginalization of minorities. Effectively implementing SDGs by 2030, bearing in mind this form of ideological instability is extremely difficult. Sustainability requires several cogs to work together, including predictable policies, pragmatic policies, and social harmony. On a lighter note, populism is a form of democratic expression involving mobilization and opposition against contemporary neoliberal policies and political systems failing to deliver promises. Populism may have the potential to initiate political dialogue and overcome a sense of alienation (Prout 2019). However, populism often leads to nativism and identifying external threats as opposed to durable

Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Under Political Instability

alternatives which are equivalent to sustainable policy-making. Investors want to see stability in the extended horizon Populism and can pose a threat to democratic, values, and liberal norms and values. The danger comes, in other words, from within the democratic world – the political actors posing a danger speak the language of democratic values. Populism act as a reaction as a to a flawed political, economic system and this can provide a grounding for the reaction, adaptation, as well as a change of governance mechanisms, and policies by counter movements and mainstream political parties. Populist movements in common have a spontaneous rejection of neoliberal hegemonic tendencies and the articulation of perceiving real alternatives. The form of discontent epitomized in populism act as a wakeup call for mainstream parties and oppositional political movements not to budge to populist rhetoric, but instead propose alternatives that a cater for the underlying factors of ideologically induced populism. Lack of ideological direction universally creates a vacuum against the systematic implementation of the global goals. Limited institutional capacity, low social cohesion, poor governance, and low level of legitimacy in governments create antiestablishment which reverse the gains of globalization. When policy unpredictability is high, there is reduced sustainable, inclusive economic growth (Blühdorn and Butzlaff 2019). One key informant highlighted that policy uncertainty hampers investment and sustainability in countries with ideological disorientation. Delayed in governments availing clear policies and legislative procedures diminishes competitiveness. Many states have to undergo legal and regulatory shifts to achieve SDGs. This is impractical considering lack of political will and the implementation timeframe left. Governments delay in providing predictable policy direction hampers the ability of investors to comply with the rules and invest in the long haul. Case countries under study face a raft of policy as well as regulatory challenges. They have limited capability to translate various policy objectives to effective organizational procedures for effective implementation.

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Lack of pragmatic policy alignment among government agencies results in contradiction and duplication with existing laws – however, this increases in policy uncertainty. Governments do not provide a consistent definition of policies and regulatory procedures. This leaves the purpose, motivation, applicability, scope, as well as the practicality of legal provisions subject to interpretation dispute. Lack of legitimacy leads to a consensus that governments’ power to make effective decisions in the context of policies is justified. Inconsistent, rapidly changing policies hamper the implementation of SDGs by 2030. There is an accelerating realization in many aspects of society that the contemporary architecture of the countries under investigation that political economy is on an unsustainable trajectory. This form of unsustainability is predominantly attributable to the transition from autocratic to democratic societies settings (Bonner 2018). Challenges of decisive, effective action to facilitate paradigmatic economic transformation and democratic consolidation to improve the quality of life and promote nation-building through social cohesion are inherent. An intricate element for sustained financial political and social growth framework is the balanced and coherent economic policies. The governments have instituted, different contradictory economic policy documents against the tenets of inclusive development. Interventionist policy processes are against the expectations of modern state development axioms. There is limited market-friendly policy framework due to adherence to ideological preferences (Jessen 2019). In corroborating qualitative thematic results, DeGroot postulated that availing both thorough coverage and cohesive narratives encourages the interlinkages between macroeconomic and microeconomic policy aspects and realities relevant for the development of expected human capital to sustain functioning society. The different outlook of the policy landscape is a detriment to the realization of the global goals by 2030. Achieving policy coherence across countries under study is wishful thinking due to limited, accountable governance, policy paralysis, low legitimacy, and little social cohesion.

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Patterns of Ideological Instability and Postglobalization Wave The undercurrent postglobalization narrative is a formidable force because nationalist countries blame hostile foreign forces for political, economic demise perceived or real (Ha and Cain 2017). Some developing countries are advocating take back control for growth trajectory restorative measures. This nationalist-socialist-globalist instability causes failure in development trajectory unless respective countries under study fix the global institutions through which they rail. In this domain of thought, achieving SDGs by 2030 is an arduous task. The new bandwagon of nationalism and the populist wave took governments predominantly by surprise. Post hoc strategic explanations have mainly been on the secular uptick of inequality, the persistence of racism, moral public sphere decay, authoritarianism resilience, and the decline in governments trust. The ever-shrinking ability to effectively manage globalization trends is significant. The postwar global order benefited much from a virtuous circle in which accelerating globalization needed universal cooperation which facilitated more interdependence. This system worked systematically since there was a political direction. The consensus became harder as more countries join the global polity. As global challenges became more complex and penetrated profoundly into domestic social settings, interdependence advocates for adjustments. Governments and institutions are at a crossroads as well as stagnated due to fragmented gridlocked global governance making Agenda 2030 attainment through cooperation wishful thinking. If governments fail, the cycle of porous global governance, as well as nationalist backlash, will continuously spiral against the tenets of sustainability (Djelic and And Quack 2018). The global economy today faces fundamental challenges due to the backlash against the dictates globalization. The real problem of globalization is substantive and is on an uptrend. The international monetary system is fragmented. Additionally, the trading system has been in doldrums due to geo-economic and geopolitical

dynamics. The emergence of new multilateral negotiations poses serious nature to the existing architecture. The ultimate paradox of contemporary backlash is so severe regardless of improved economic development across some developing countries. All this unfolds after a market-oriented philosophy Washington consensus seemed to gain near-global approval as a guiding ideology and intellectual agreement for the global economy. Lack of global ideological direction makes the achievement of SDGs by 2030 difficult. Pereira argued that the antiglobalization forces are in the ascendancy on the policy front. It is therefore essential for individual countries to take the threat seriously and to devise a multipronged program against the anti-globalism criticism. However, due to hegemony, territory, and fragmentation of the international system, this is a formidable task. Individual nation-states need to put themselves on the postglobalization wave axis to remain relevant (Dorn and Schinke 2018). Considering the 2030 time-frame for global development goals attainment, achieving global growth trajectory, is inadvertently wiped away by the dictates of nationalist tendencies. Evasive implementation of development goals is a force to reckon with due to differences in priorities across countries and lack of trust for global partnerships.

Ideological Instability, Populism, and Environmental Sustainability Populism is driven predominantly by discontent with the contemporary political systems. In this domain of thought, a worsening natural environment may contribute to further exacerbation of this discontent. Populist parties are against the tenets of climate protection measures predominantly because agreements are multilateral and require cooperation across borders and such political parties are of the fear that such form of agreements may impact the domestic economy negatively (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). Notwithstanding that, the increase of right-wing populism seems to feed climate change denials. The increase of climate change denial

Re-contextualizing SDG Implementation Under Political Instability

contributed to the growth of right-wing nationalists since there are some overlapping features. More practically and broadly, environmentalism is part of a liberal, internationalist agenda that is concentrating on building international treaties and forging inclusive synergies, which is incompatible with the antipluralist and nativist ideals of populism. There are a few links that can be drawn between populism and sustainable development goals. The likelihood of antagonism towards the SDGs implementation is straightforward. Populism focus on domestic concerns may be contra to the collaborative form of international governance structures linked with the SDGs. Furthermore, the reoccurring theme of populist rhetoric of simple solutions to complex problems blaming a specific group for being the root cause of societal issues is counter-productive. As there is no quick-fix to sustainable development or the 2030 Agenda implementation, this is a formidable societal challenge that populism strategically shun. Although populism may be less inclined compared to their mainstream political parties to implement global agreements, the sustainable development goals can also be a way for governments accountability to citizens (Schulz et al. 2018). SDGs are a crucial tool in holding governments accountable for their inclusive development progress. Although the social, economic, and political concerns, and discontent of the public, which aggravates populism, are legitimate, populism tendencies, on both sides of the political divide, become problematic when inclining to racial rhetoric and the demonization of perceived threat in a scapegoat manner. Fragmentation of the international system due to nationalist populist policies is an arduous task against the dictates of SDGs implementation. There is increasingly growing xenophobic discourse and rhetorical underpinnings by populist parties, which is becoming more normalized globally. This development is against the tenets, ensuring equal opportunities for all and eradication of discrimination. Populism vies for national interests and priorities at the expense of cosmopolitanism and also the provision for the ordinary populace at the expense of those perceived as threats. The Agenda 2030 paradoxically

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advocates for an inclusive process including states, civil society organizations, as well as the general public. What is intricate is that populism does not oppose milestones to tackle sustainable development aspects per se, but instead favors national interests over internationalism. This form of ideological disorientation of switching back between Marxist, socialist, nationalist, and capitalist pollard positions does not bode well with the sustainable development trajectory. A handful of populist parties support renewable energy in their party programs with an emphasis on localism. Although the implementation of the global goals is predominantly done on a national level advocating for inward-looking, populist political parties are skeptical of international agreements, as that means supranational governance dictates and cooperation against nationalism (Stavrakakis and Jäger 2018). This institutes a significant challenge to the global governance architecture and globalism that optimizes the SDGs. These inclusive partnerships built upon values, principles, shared goals, and vision that place people and the planet at the center stage are needed at national, regional, continental, and global aura. Given that the populist rhetoric advocates for less international collaboration and more nativism, this would appear to be in direct conflict with the partnership for development. SDGs implementation is deceptive due to ideological disorientation and market fragmentation. Nevertheless, populist parties do not manage to rally substantially enough votes for governance, but their rhetorical standpoints manage to leave a strong imprint on the political landscape, sway public opinion and tend to normalize antiestablishment discourse mechanisms.

The Stable Political Environment Which Fosters Sustainable Growth Unstable political environment hampers sustainable growth, yet durable political systems are catalysts for long-term growth trajectory. Political instability slows economic growth. Political instability lowers productivity and retards growth.

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Measures of political unrest, including coups, political assassinations, and revolutions, negatively affect the achievement of genuine wealth (Haltinner 2018). These affect property rights, thus reducing investment and growth. Stability of political regimes lacks in many countries due to political cycles and ideological instability. The undercurrent postglobalization narrative also retards the long-term growth trajectory. Many developing countries have longevity in terms of political leadership in an undemocratic manner making SDGs implementation blurred. The problem with democracy is voting for what appears to be useful in the short condition while it is not sustainable, for example, of what happened in Greece. It takes longer to realize the evidence of democracy, making the 2030 Agenda unattainable. Greater freedom hinder growth by upping the pressure mainly for immediate consumption, and this reduces investment. Some respondents argued that dictatorship has the advantage of transferring resources from consumption purposes to investment. Countries under study broadly have political instability including political assassinations, coups, violent deaths, revolutions, political riots, indices of executive adjustments, revolts, constitutional changes, and government, and separatist movements making stability for SDGs attainment difficult. Political instability is a severe malaise to sustainable economic performance. Instability shortens policymakers’ capabilities leading to short term macroeconomic policies. There are also possibilities of the frequent switch of policies, causing volatility and negatively impacting macroeconomic performance. The widespread political instability in several developing countries and its harmful results on their economic performance is a difficult task. Socio-political instability creates an uncertain politico-economic environment, reducing investment, and raising risks, and higher inflation. Political instability narrows the framework of governments and disrupts long term economic policies necessary for positive financial performance. The uncertainty linked with an unsteadfast political landscape reduces investment and

accelerates economic development. Weak financial performance results in government downfall and political instability (Dorin-Madalin 2015). In this contemporary world, political instability is endemic, irrespective of the level of development or political regime. Fragile ridden countries lose their ability to make constructive societal relationships and often suffer from weak ability to perform governance functions as Okafor notes that these countries are vulnerable to external and internal shocks and subsequently face instability. The instability of governments, poor political culture, as well as inefficient political parties systems are a setback to the achievement of SDGs by 2030. Achieving stability due to contemporary ideological variations and antiglobalization is a huge task due to divergences in priorities.

Quality of Accountable Governance and Transparency How democratic governance is practiced in the overall administration of respective case countries under study is a hindrance sustainable development in the long trajectory according to one of the interviewed subjects with international development exposure variances. The capacity and capability of the institutional landscape are vital for sustainability. Improving governance and sound sustainable development strategies is an intricate concern for many governments. The concept of good governance delves primarily on the inputs for effective management. Good governance is needed to ensure that policies have their respective desired impact (Oladapo et al. 2019). However, the main features that are significant in respect of highly performing economies are policy directions stability, market signals flexibility, and discipline in adhering to measures crucial for meeting long-term strategic development objectives; all are hallmarks of good, accountable governance. Governments in countries under study have difficulties in maintaining macroeconomic stability, developing infrastructure, providing public goods, preventing market failures, as well as promoting equity, which is vital for the achievement of SDGs. Without transparent

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governance systems and macroeconomic stability, investment risks resulting in weak competitiveness. An effective governance mechanism must be effected as a foundation for the proper implementation of sustainable development policy (Davis 2017). In this context, accountable leadership accountable is a necessity. For SDGs objectives to be achieved yet, on the other hand, avoiding devastating trade-offs, policies must be effectively integrated into contemporary governance structures. Good governance plays an essential role in the enhancement of human development, leading to poverty reduction and inclusive development – poverty reduction. Accountable governments, sound policies, and bureaucratic quality are critical ingredients in sustaining growth paradigm in developing countries. Poor people in developing countries seek to attain their needs beyond the political system and using personal relationships – developing countries under study lack efficient institutions that foster development. Support of human rights to promote the rule of law, as well as participatory development, is absent. There are inadequate rules in the conduct of public affairs due to ideological instability and postglobalization narrative. Good governance is pertinent to the prevention of corruption, enforcement of active policies, and interoperability with the citizenry (Swapan and Khan 2018). In cementing this standpoint, many developing countries endeavor to achieve good democratic governance have been marred with various problematic elements due to lack of political will to sanctions corrupt behavior, limited institutional capacity, and economic mismanagement. The trajectory of governance changes has been ununiform due to the weak persistence governance and government effectiveness. Many developing countries need financial and technical support to augment sustainable human development. Neo-patrimonial politics and confusing ideological confusion hamper continuity of development assistance. Leveraging development assistance across geographies to achieve sustained growth requires a long term strategy which may not be accessible due to ideological polarization and geopolitical dynamics.

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Mindset Renewal and Behavioral Change People may have a positive attitude for the concept of sustainability, but attitudinal intensity could be different. Transforming behavior and attitudes take a considerable period making SDGs implementation vacuous in terms of practicality. Views are closely associated with beliefs and values. Similarly, some people who experienced abject poverty may feel wrong about the scenario, yet others might have a neutral standpoint towards poverty (Wedchayanon and Chorkaew 2014). People might know the effects of pollution biodiversity and human health, but they might not feel bad concerning people’s choices, causing pollution. People transform their attitudinal tendencies under different influences. The personality of some global leaders has sustainability ramifications. Changing beliefs and values in the context of political economy to achieve policy stability in the context of SDGs implementation is difficult due to short term electoral cycles and lack of long-term policy framework across domains. Attitudinal change unfolding through compliance is rooted in one’s values. Unlike compliance as well as identification, attitudinal change as a result of internalization is in-line with personal values. Sustainable development cannot happen without a significant shift in the nation and people’s attitudes towards sustainable development trajectory. Attitudes act as predictors of people’s behaviors and their respective association with the world around. For people to have a positive attitude towards sustainability, it may need a substantial period due to variations in development initiative across regions and continents.

Geo-economics and Geopolitical Vulnerability Differences Geopolitical and geo-economic competition is consistently reshaping universal economic trends and global governance power architecture. As systematic tensions between global superpowers rage, businesses that were once masters have now

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also relegated to pawns in a strategic game; they have limited control. Financing for SDGs requires partnerships across countries, regions, continents (Punyaratabandhu and Swaspitchayaskun 2018). However, due to geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics, this is a formidable task to achieve by 2030. How to leverage development assistance requires a long-term strategy which may not be feasible due to policy instability and lack of ideological legitimacy. In every part of the world, restive populations and new powers are rising, and increasingly introverted global powers are recalibrating their global governance role in a scattershot manner, leaving allies guessing. Leadership personality, protectionist policies, geopolitical dynamics, global financial system weakness reduce the prospect of meeting the global goals by 2030. The challenge of geoeconomics to governments, companies, and campaign group is unavoidable. Influential trends are reshaping the world in the context of the pursuit of power, economic warfare obliterating integration, regimes becoming regional as opposed to global. In this new geo-economic and geopolitical world order, institutions developed in the context of win-win cooperation are in disarray. The absence of global leadership, the decay of global norms as well as standards, and the shift towards a multipolar, regional power dynamic are also apparent (Buzan and Lawson 2014). This places pressure on leaders globally challenging their legitimacy and effectiveness in line with the Agenda 2030. The world has traversed into an unsettling geopolitical paradigm that is multipolar as well as multiconceptual. This creates uncertainties and risks, including rising military tensions, economic disruptions, economic volatility, and destabilizing loops between changing global polity and domestic countries political, climatic conditions. Assessing as well as mitigating risks across potential conflict areas will require careful scanning of nonstate and state actors. Increasingly geo-economic aspects and the upsurge of pressures encountered by small states impede SDGs implementation. During the period of geopolitical flux, re-calibrating the state as locus of power and legitimacy offers governments

a strategic anchor (Malakhova 2015). The intensification of nationalist and strong-state narratives causes risks domestically and internationally. The increase of strong-state politics has disruptive potential among the world’s major powers. As a result, there is a general breakdown in trust and an erosion of global norms designed to govern peaceful global interactions. Shifting relations between regional and global powers are making increased uncertainty for smaller states, which is a source of geopolitical risk. These developing countries are vulnerable to the weakening of alliances as well as to overt or subtle pressures to adapt strategy or policy to conform to a significant power or regional hegemon orientations. Geopolitical tensions impede the achievement of global goals making 2030 timeframe unattainable.

Policy, Practical, and Theoretical Implications of Populism on SDGs Implementation Illuminating possible trajectories of how sustainability and environmental policies can better exist in the context of rising populism rhetoric is of great importance. Sustainable development is a complex phenomenon requiring complex solutions. It is pivotal to provide pathways for moving SDGs and sustainability policy forward, notwithstanding the undercurrent political populist agendas. It is ideal to comprehend drivers and triggers the rise of populism. The significant drivers of populist movements include economic factors encompassing low growth, unemployment, and inequality. Populism is also attributable to the uptick in migration, which threatens cultural traditions and societal, an economic burden. It targets societal changes and pitfalls and even advocates for short-term economic outcomes and cultural homogeneity as via able solutions. Why populism has gained such a strong foothold in global politics is an essential point of departure. Anchored in a discourse of fear, populism rallies around perceived threats and other enemies, for example, corrupt elites, and external threat to national cultural traditions. Populism rhetoric, making use of scapegoat tactics by offering

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legitimization for the support of nativism as well as exclusion is a fundamental challenge for SDGs implementation. SDGs are global, and the acceleration of political instability as a result of the populist quagmire is retrogressive. Comprehending the discontent can provide momentum structuring sustainable counter alternatives to the populist bandwagon. The tendency to be temporal in governments, failure to deliver sustainable economic plans, and strategies executions is the demise of populism. Considering that the 2030 Agenda is a 15-year time frame, this form of ideological instability scares away Foreign Direct Investment, which is vital for SDGs financing. Reversing populist policies may take a little while making SDGs attainment vacuous. Populist political parties pursue short-term solutions, which is a detriment to SDGs long term policy framework. Policymakers should offer long-term visions for intergenerational equity. The rise of populism is a reaction to the lack of accomplishments by respective governments in addressing complex issues and availing sustainable alternatives for communities. In populist rhetoric, sustainable development and environmental policy are perceived as an elite discourse as well as the establishment, showing a postmaterialist, urban project requiring technocratic and sophisticated implementation contra with the homogenous, materialistic, and traditional narrative. The SDGs are an easy target for populist parties since they are anchored on complex science. In this domain of thought, there is a need for sustainable development to evolve and adopt into a more practical, inclusive, efficient instrument while being able to address political, social, and economic trade-offs and averting inequalities. Alleviating underlying drivers of populist movements and the SDG critique is paramount for politicians as well as policy-makers. There is a need for governments to focus on political counter-measures to address existing challenges so that Agenda 2030 becomes a reality. Sustainability should be more practical, concrete, and local. Time keep integrating new research and lessons learned and not succumb to populist rhetoric in oversimplifying sustainability issues. Sustainable development should not be socially

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unfair, and there is a need to integrate and social aspects interalia environmental policies and alleviate inequalities. Furthermore, a part of the debate regarded the questioning of accountability and credibility of SD and climate policies. Public administration should strive for citizens inclusive participation in the policy-making processes by fostering ownership for a more sustainable society. The need for a positive re-contextualization of sustainable development that includes an optimistic vision and develops alternative narratives on how the world would look like the 2030 Agenda is successfully met. These positive aspects should be epitomized by a balance between modernization and preservation, with attention for socioeconomic parameters of SDGs. Addressing the underlying societal factors leading to discontent, yet paradoxically developing sustainability narratives addressing the critique of being overly complex to foster ownership, participation, inclusivity, and proactive policies are fundamental. Both populism and nationalism have a strong economic dimension. They also both exploit the same political cleavages. It is the citizens who accept the populist discourse more. Populism could maintain predominantly in societies standing at the edge of modernization. This is in tandem with modernization theory suggesting that the rapid socio-economic change postcommunism, postindustrialization, postglobalization makes individuals and groups hostile and aggressive. These societal changes negatively impact SDGs implementation. On the other hand, the rational choice theory points to the aspect of scapegoating as well as group interest conflicts, delineating that prejudice, outright conflict, and discrimination is a direct result of competition on limited resources.

Conclusions Citizen’s support for nationalism and far-right ideology encompasses negative attitudes towards minorities, welfare chauvinism, xenophobia, and exclusionism in the context of migrants. Ethnic nationalism, economic insecurity, and financial problems result in a high prevalence of antimigrant

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sentiments. This is against the tenets of globalization which fosters inclusivity. Populists usually offer a dichotomous societal vision and socioeconomic relations. Populism grows very fast in the context of the fertile ground of political discontent. The rise of populism and nationalism recently has resulted in a rift in economics, environmental parameters, and governments globally. Patriotism is the belief that nations would benefit from being more independently than being collective, emphasizing local rather than international goals. Populism has historically amalgamated different governments and initiated revolutions because of perceived unifying tendencies. Additional, populism as a philosophy is directed to the needs of the familiar people and equitable distribution power and wealth. These two ideological positions have proven to be both detrimental and beneficial to respective nations; however, history diminishes citizens trust in their respective governments and contributes to the demise of representative democracy. It is challenging to achieve SDGs by 2030 under current political instability globally and the growth of populism.

References Blühdorn I, Butzlaff F (2019) Rethinking populism: peak democracy, liquid identity and the performance of sovereignty. Eur J Soc Theory 22(2):191–211. https://doi. org/10.1177/1368431017754057 Bonner MD (2018) Media and punitive populism in Argentina and Chile. Bull Lat Am Res 37(3):275–290. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12744 Buzan B, Lawson G (2014) Capitalism and the emergent world order. Int Aff 90(1):71–91. https://doi.org/10. 1111/1468-2346.12096 Davis TJ (2017) Good governance as a foundation for sustainable human development in sub-Saharan Africa. Third World Q 38(3):636–654. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01436597.2016.1191340 Djelic M-L, And Quack S (2018) Globalization and business regulation. Annu Rev Sociol 44:123–143. https:// doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053532 Dorin-Madalin D (2015) Public policy, quality of institution and economic growth in Central and Eastern European countries. Ann ‘Constantin Brancusi’ Univ Targu-Jiu Econ Ser 2:239–245 Dorn F, Schinke C (2018) Top income shares in OECD countries: the role of government ideology and globalization. World Econ 41(9):2491–2527. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/twec.12638 Elchardus M, Spruyt B (2016) Populism, persistent republicanism and declinism: an empirical analysis of

Regulation populism as a thin ideology. Gov Oppos 51(1):111–133. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.27 Ha E, Cain NL (2017) Who governs or how they govern: testing the impact of democracy, ideology, and globalization on the well-being of the poor. Soc Sci J 54(3):271–286. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.soscij.2017.01.010 Haltinner K (2018) Right-wing ideologies and ideological diversity in the tea party. Sociol Q 59(3):449–470. https://doi.org/10.1080/00380253.2018.1479196 Hirvonen O, Pennanen J (2019) Populism as a pathological form of politics of recognition. Eur J Soc Theory 22(1):27–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1368431018766271 Jessen N (2019) Populism and conspiracy: a historical synthesis of American countersubversive narratives. Am J Econ Sociol 78(3):675–715. https://doi.org/10. 1111/ajes.12275 Litan RE et al (2019) Why is populism on the rise and what do the populists want? Int Econ 33(1):11–35 Malakhova TS (2015) Causes and consequences of the bipolar system collapse: a geo-economic aspect. Natl Interests Prior Secur 29:45–53 Oladapo IA et al (2019) Assessing good governance practices and development Nexus: an application of structural invariance analysis. Manag Account Rev 18(1):77–99 Prout J (2019) Populism and the populists: the incoherent coherence of Coxey’s March. Am J Econ Sociol 78(3):593–619. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12279 Punyaratabandhu P, Swaspitchayaskun J (2018) The political economy of China-Thailand development under the one belt one road initiative: challenges and opportunities. Chin Econ 51(4):333–341. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10971475.2018.1457326 Schulz A et al (2018) Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions. Int J Public Opin Res 30(2):316–326. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edw037 Stavrakakis Y, Jäger A (2018) Accomplishments and limitations of the “new” mainstream in contemporary populism studies. Eur J Soc Theory 21(4):547–565. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1368431017723337 Swapan MSH, Khan S (2018) From authoritarian transplantation to prescriptive imposition of good governance: tracing the diffusion of western planning concepts in Bangladesh. Int Plan Stud 23(4):340–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563475.2018.1489786 Urbinati N (2019) Political theory of populism. Annual Rev Polit Sci 22(1):111–127. https://doi.org/10.1146/ annurev-polisci-050317-070753 Wedchayanon N, Chorkaew S (2014) The sufficiency economy and people-centered development. Eur J Train Dev 38(9):822–844. https://doi.org/10.1108/ EJTD-10-2013-0118

Regulation ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Regulatory Agencies ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals Md Nurul Momen Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Rajshahi, Bangladesh

Synonyms Regulation; Regulatory agencies

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challenges require a good regulation to promote very diverse developments and to steer the economy sustainably and to control society for desired changes. The global financial crisis of 2008 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 emphasized the importance of regulation that is reinforced for recovering the crisis of the economy. Regulations can take in many forms, such as social, economic, and political domains. Put it differently, regulations may also create obstacles for the competition, alongside creating an environment for competition; furthermore, regulation might serve to both the public and private interests. Therefore, Schauer (1992, p. 1) rightly argued that “our life plans are so often impeded by rules, large and small, that the very idea of a life plan independent of rules is scarcely imaginable.” However, having reviewed the existing literature, the objective of the entry is to examine different facets of regulatory governance to have a clear understanding of the different perspectives of the concept.

Definition Governance refers to the rules of the political system that determine how decision-making is made and how governments share powers and exercise responsibilities in a state (Momen and Begum 2019). Regulation is the authoritative set of rules by which governments intervene in economy and society (Momen 2019).

Introduction Broader transformations of society and economy are taking place in the contemporary world. There are underlying reasons for this transformation that relates to socioeconomic development, the consequences of the societal crisis, financial crisis or economic depression, technological innovation, environmental disaster, as well as the new form of conflicts in the changing political contexts (Poul and Antje 2018). Listorti et al. (2019) stressed for adopting a systemic approach to properly address these contemporary challenges and difficulties. However, these difficulties and

Defining Regulation and Theoretical Approaches Regulation has become increasingly important in the debates and discussion of public administration (Momen 2019). Regulation is a contested term due to different theoretical and analytical approaches, therefore making it impossible to reach a consensus among the scholars of this field (Parker and Braithwaite 2003). Levi-Faur (2010) illustrates that for the far-right group, regulation is understood as an instrument of authoritarian regimes via the various rules that constrain human liberties. From the views of the Old Left, the term refers to the relationships between people staying in lower strata based on the social stratification and the interests of the ruling class in society. From the perspectives of Progressive Democrats, the concept is regarded as a custodian of public interest and measures to control profitdriven capitalism and to reduce the current social and environmental risks. On the other hand, political analysts’ highlights regulation as a matter of the state affairs for introducing new rules or mechanisms for enforcement that is done exclusively

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by the government. It is also observed that regulation supports professionals who provide services and monitor other actors, including the functions of governments (Levi-Faur 2010). Elaborately, Gilardi (2008) pointed out that regulation refers to the scope of governance, regulatory bodies, and the craft of governance. Ogus (1994) forwarded the question regarding the regulation of whether the term is solely carried out by state authorities. A question becomes one of the important debates in regulatory governance whether self-regulation by private actors is considered under regulation (Koop and Lodge 2015). Ogus (1994) illustrates regulation as “a politicoeconomic concept [which] can best be understood by reference to different systems of economic organization and the legal forms which maintain them” (1994, p. 1). Guidi et al. (2020) argue that regulation presents as the legal tools through which deficiencies in the market system are controlled and solved, by introducing a set of rules, along with the monitoring and enforcement of these rules across the variety of actors which are backed by the statecentered public law. Baldwin and his colleagues (1998, p. 4) highlight “all mechanisms of social control,” which covers the scope of self-regulation. Many academic discussions relate regulation only with public actors and highlight that regulation is an important instrument by which governments steer the economy and control society (Noll 1980). Further, Selznick (1985) argues that regulation is designed and enforced by state actors. Mitnick (1980) mainly studies on regulation relating to the public sector, but he opines that private actors may also be involved to regulate their own business. From the recent experiences, governmentled regulation has been failed to bring desired outcomes around the world, for instance, weak regulatory monitoring and enforcement resulted in artificial disasters, such as the collapse of the garment factory building in 2013 in Bangladesh and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 in the USA. These incidences often led for calls to strengthen the government’s role in regulation (van der Heijden 2020). No doubt, power as a

tool of control or influence by the states is now declining due to the adoption of liberalization policy of the national economy and the incapacity of the state in itself (Momen and Begum 2019). Black (2002) echoes the findings of the Mitnick’s (1980) work who emphasizes that self-regulation by industry and other forms of non-state regulation would be considered as regulation. Now the question is why regulation is rapidly increasing in many areas or issues in the states; replying to it, Levi-Faur (2010) indicated the advance of neoliberalism and the adoption of the welfare state policy. The author added that the rise of regulation occurs due to a neo-mercantilist approach for the expansion of the market, and the term is also considered as a tool for high modernist state and large-scale social engineering (Levi-Faur 2010). If we look back to the history of European regulation in the twentieth century, the concept, in general, was in the form of government intervention in economic affairs. It was also found that the efforts of the European states through regulatory measures were necessary to control society for desired behavior (Levi-Faur 2010). Hood et al. (2001) explore the concept from two different perspectives, for instance, one school of thought discusses the term focusing on the set of rule-making, but others illustrate it to the monitoring and execution of the rules. More specifically, Levi-Faur (2010) pointed out that some academics and professionals note that regulations are about the rules and responsibilities of the public agencies after delegating power to them. For some others, regulation is known as every kind of rule for administrative bodies, even including social and professional norms (LeviFaur 2010). As a way to examine the disciplinary differences, Braithwaite (2002) highlights that for legal discipline, regulation is seen as the use of legislative and judicial instruments, while for social scientists, it is the form of social control, which is considered as a necessity for maintaining social order and restorative justices. However, the entry mainly provides different facets of statecentric regulatory governance framework from an interdisciplinary subject.

Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Conceptualizing Regulatory Governance: Variations in Public Discussions and Academic Disciplines Regulatory governance refers to the application of binding rules by which governments can effectively regulate society and economy (Poul and Antje 2018), which becomes the essential building blocks of governance. In the developed economies, countries are continuously working to develop process and enforcement of regulation which are associated with the potential of regulatory governance. The European Commission (2010) encourages that policy-makers and regulatory agencies should always try to develop policy tools and guidelines, for instance, “smart regulation” is a concept that solves policy-related issues in an ever-more complex world. Jordana et al. (2015) note that regulatory governance has recently appeared in policy-related debates and academic discussions. In the academic field, there have been specialized programs in many universities in the western world, where regulation and governance are intensively studied; further, the rise of the number of research institutes and centers and the contribution of peer-reviewed journals publishing scholarly papers contributed in this domain of research and the wide range of publication of books, with a particular focus on regulatory governance (Koop and Lodge 2015). As a global financial institution, the World Bank (WB) has an ongoing project on global indicators for regulatory governance, which evaluates how governments interact with their citizens when introducing and implementing regulation. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2017) has also published a report on the requirements for good regulatory governance. It is noteworthy that the WB emphasizes transparency in activities and accountability in government rule-making, while the OECD report is more concerned with the basics of the regulatory process, such as their design and implementation (Poul and Antje 2018). Both the organizations, in the same tune, illustrate the building

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of institutional capacity and contexts in which rule-making is designed and executed, the nature of the regulatory bodies, and contribution of the appropriate stakeholders to the process (Poul and Antje 2018) that would safeguard the regulatory process against any attempts of undue political intervention (Correa et al. 2019). Regulation and governance, both the terms, are operationalized separately, because of the apparent differences in their approach continued through debates and discussion in many policies and scholarly papers (Amsonova-Taddei and Turley 2019). Governance highlights the institutions and the procedures involved to get things done and the political authority to design and enforce prescriptive rules in order to shape the regulatory regimes (Poul and Antje 2018). Most of the literature regarding regulatory governance is illustrated by highlighting the relationship between structural aspects of governance (Kjaer and Vetterlein 2018) and how they support or hinder actions or the environment in which regulations are designed and enforced, and, if necessary, regulation may be produced, reproduced, contested, and changed over time (Poul and Antje 2018). The rise of regulation has moved on considerably over the last decades. Stigler (1971) commented that since the 1970s, the world observed the emergence of the different models of “economic theories of regulation,” and the growth of regulation was also found in case of consumer rights, financial crisis, the safety of food and medicine, environmental protection (Majone 1996), network industries, credit consumer data protection (Guidi et al. 2020), and the recent developments like banking regulation (Kudrna 2019). In the 1980s and 1990s, regulation has further developed worldwide in the field of practice and policy research (Koop and Lodge 2015). It is noteworthy that sustainable development requires stimulating response to many areas, such as environment, health, safety, and economy (Ashford and Hall 2011). For empirical evidence, Brazil attempted to restore its economy from the consequences of

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global financial and economic recession coupled with substantial internal political dissidents that resulted in a fall of more than 7% of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2015 and 2016; given the context, Brazil highlighted sound regulatory governance to attract more domestic entrepreneurs and inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of restoring national economy (Correa et al. 2019). While the twin peaks model in South Africa introduces two sets of independent bodies, one body is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of providing safety and maintaining the soundness of the diverse financial system, and the other bodies are charged with preventing or mitigating against the manipulation of market and protecting the rights of consumers (Schmulow 2017). However, the language and subject of regulation might be different depending on the context; therefore, the term has become highly debated in the public domain and academic research; further the effectiveness of regulation depends on the modes and tools how to shape behavior in society (Koop and Lodge 2015). There are differences of opinion in case of exploring the term. Despite the point of differences, three main perspectives of regulation are commonly found, for instance, firstly, the term is the promulgation of the authoritative set of legal materials, along with some measures for monitoring compliance with these rules; secondly, the concept is used by the state authorities to pursue an economic policy; and, thirdly, the field is an effort of social control to shape behavior (Koop and Lodge 2015). The variation in defining regulation is also found in academic disciplines, for instance, legal practitioners, political scientists, and economists relate to their disciplinary discourse mainly on the first two perspectives, but socio-legal academics and practitioners focus on the third views (Koop and Lodge 2015). Some scholars adopt the cross-disciplinary approach in viewing the term, while many scholarly research papers borrow the Selznick’s idea of conception about regulation as sustained and focused control exercised by an administrative agency over many areas or issues that are valued by the community (Koop and Lodge 2015). To be

a more precise definition about regulation, it is an objective to shape the people’s behavior, based on the predefined standards, tools, and measures, to bring desired behavior or outcomes in economy and society (Lodge and Wegrich 2012). It is found conflicting answers among the regulation researchers regarding the intentionality of regulation. Koop and Lodge (2015) found that some regulation experts analyzed the rise of the regulatory state with the whole realm of legislation, governance, and social control in the context of Europe. The broader use of the concept led to an object of research and coextensive with the legal and social science disciplines, including law, economics, political science, business, and sociology (Koop and Lodge 2015; Guidi et al. 2020). Hall et al. (1999) argue that broader uses of regulation are also influenced by cultural practices, while Miller and Rose (2008) highlight that regulation remains the crucial building block of “governmentality.” Miller and Rose (2008) further argued that the term includes all kinds of power relations which require individuals to shape behavior of themselves due to the dominant logic of social control. As stated, there are many types of illustration found in viewing regulation, which is regarded as both the direct and indirect forms of intervention of the states to steer the economy and society (Baldwin et al. 1998). Baldwin and his colleagues (1998, p. 3) adopted a broader approach, who highlighted that “a variety of tools are considered as possible alternatives to traditional ‘command and control’ type regulation [. . .] so that where rulemaking seems to be inappropriate as a means for achieving policy objectives, other tools may be used.” A broad definition is also provided by Breyer (1982, Chap. 8), who distinguishes the term between “classical form of regulation,” which focuses on a command-and-control form of governance, while “alternatives to classical regulation” includes comparatively flexible or less restrictive measures, for instance, revenue collection policy, financial disclosure statement, etc. Both Stigler (1971) and Mitnick (1980) also developed the term. Stigler (1971) uses regulation to indicate some policy instruments, which are

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mainly used to shape the behavior by adopting new business strategies and introducing forms of taxation policy. Mitnick (1980) highlighted the term as administrative rules for private activities for the sake of common interest, but also examines the differences between directive and incentive means of regulation, for example, guidelines for standard operating procedures versus effluent taxes or subsidies. Noll (1980) criticized the earlier research that those failed to provide the true objective of the regulation and stressed the importance of conceptual familiarity for a better understanding of the concept. Noll (1985) refers the term as a tool of control through which governments intervene against the certain activities of the private sector. Noll (1980) also explores by pointing out that regulation is not simply what regulatory bodies’ do, but also how do they perform their activities. Scholarly academic works are also found with respect to regulation in the form of a distinct mode of governance. Guidi et al. (2020) highlight that regulatory policy process involves relationships between three interlinked necessary steps, firstly, inputs (the structural process and the bodies influencing the process of regulatory decisionmaking); secondly, outputs (the regulatory policies which are adopted by the regimes); and, finally, outcomes (the results of regulation). Lowi (1985, pp. 73–75) indicates that regulation presents a specific type of policy instruments which vary on two main areas, such as “the form of the intended impact – that is, whether policies work through individual conduct or the environment of conduct, and the form of expressed intention- whether policies impose obligations or positions (primary rules) or confer powers or privileges (secondary rules).”

Standard-Setting of Good Regulatory Governance Good regulatory governance (GRG) is characterized by effective enforcement of tools, the resilience of institutions, and the process that governments ensure that the activities of regulatory bodies are effective in enforcement, transparent in

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actions, inclusive, and sustained (World Bank Group 2019); thus GRG increases trust in society and strengthens social integrity. OECD (2002) defines the scope of regulatory governance that includes both the design and implementation of the authoritative set of rules and the principles of governance, such as transparency about activities, accountability for acts and behavior, professional effectiveness, true adaptability, and sense of coherence. Public debates and academic discussions point out that sound regulatory governance promotes business activities, which eliminate bad practices in the market system to sufficiently limit moral hazard. These practices improve financial risk management capabilities in a state. Regulatory agencies are mainly responsible for the execution of enforcement and inspection for complying rules and requirements (Momen 2019). Therefore, operational independence and accountability of regulatory bodies are regarded as a pillar for good regulatory governance. Barth et al. (2006) also developed a relationship between the degree of operational independence and accountability and the performance of regulatory bodies. However, governments often experience a trade-off situation between the independence of the regulatory bodies and control over their activities (Correa et al. 2019). Regulatory bodies are responsible to monitor the “players of the game”; therefore, it raises fundamental issues regarding the accountability of their actions (Marques and Pinto 2018). Mohr and Wagner (2013) emphasized the degree to which regulatory authorities require to financial institutions be held liable for disclosing accuracy of the information and monitoring of financial institutions. The authors added that external audits performed by the private sectors determine fairly for an independent assessment (Mohr and Wagner 2013). Authoritarian governments perceive that autonomy of regulatory bodies may not serve their partisan interests. This trade-off is particularly evident when there are any changes of government with the new political philosophy along with different policy preferences. However, an empirical study was conducted to Brazilian regulatory agencies in 2016 which highlighted strong

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resilience of regulatory agencies by introducing broader institutional endowment to encounter against any attempts of powerful political intervention (Correa et al. 2019). Rules and processes of regulatory governance often become too complex. It is commonly perceived that overprotective or excessive prescriptive rules unduly intervene with personal freedom and hamper for doing a business which creates “red tape” stifling innovation (van der Heijden 2020). For instance, excessive prescriptive rules may create regulatory burdens in society and business, thus creating an ample of opportunities for corruption by elected officials and public employees which encourage the rise of the informal economy (Momen 2019), which is neither imposed taxes nor monitored by any government agencies. For good regulatory governance, Quintyn and Taylor (2003) emphasized transparency with respect to the designing and enforcing of rules and the opportunities for a participative dialogue with appropriate stakeholders that can limit “regulatory capture and self-interests of regulators.” Summing up, it can be emphasized two important variables for good regulatory governance, such as a high degree of operational independence and greater accountability and external audit with high quality (Masciandaro et al. 2008). The authoritative set of rules by the states concerning regulation has been changing over time. In the earlier studies and practices, it mainly focused on the interventionist government approach, but it has now been replaced by the minimal and limited role of the state. As a consequence, a state withdrew from the idea of the regulatory state; however, in the current context, the emphasis has shifted to “better regulation” accepting the principles of “good governance” (Thomas and Zhang n.d.). However, there are many underlying reasons for sound regulatory governance for steering the economy and sustainable development that has now been widely acknowledged. There has also been plenty of empirical works and the research outputs by institutions highlighting that regulatory governance is a significant issue for sustainable development applicable to all countries around the world. On the other hand, excessive regulation has opposite effects on economic activities of countries for

its private investment, international trade, and growth (Thomas and Zhang n.d.). For regulatory failures, it needs to bring reform to avoid complexities (van der Heijden 2020). OECD (2002) pointed out that there are three characteristics of regulatory governance, such as regulatory policies, measures, and institutions. However, sound regulatory governance agenda is a very dynamic concept that stresses on the continuous adoption of new tools, policies, and institutions which must be maintained and improved over time (Thomas and Zhang n.d.). The successful design and implementation of regulatory reform needs to be connected with the notion of the three mutually supportive elements of governance values, such as transparency, consistency, and accountability (Thomas and Zhang n.d.). Regulatory policy is, in general, designed and formulated at the top political level and delegated to regulatory bodies. Implementation of regulatory policy in wide-ranging areas refers to how governments use their powers to steer the economy and society; therefore, it is emphasized on improving design and enhancing the capacity of regulation, bringing new changes in the current regulatory practices.

Evaluating the Challenges of Regulatory Reform Different perspectives and interpretations are observed regarding the challenges and difficulties of regulation. The World Bank Group (2019) emphasizes on good regulatory practices by improving the regulatory environment that boosts sustainable growth and development. The findings are evidenced through an empirical work conducted by the World Bank Group based on their Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, which collected primary data from 750 investors in developing and transitional economies. The report found that “political stability and security” is a very significant issue for good regulatory practices, along with the “legal and regulatory environment” in case of doing business and/or for making investment decisions (World Bank Group 2019). Further, for evaluating good

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regulatory practices, government may apply different kinds of indicators, such as public consultation, ex ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA), ex post review of the current regulatory process, administrative procedures, access to laws and regulations, the efforts of regulatory reform, and the extent of accountability and transparency in actions (World Bank Group 2019). Fischer (2007) highlighted that regulation is often regarded as a risky business, as there is likely to be of higher costs that outweigh the benefits. Levi-Faur (2010) found that there have been many public debates and academic discussion of regulation that focuses on the governance of regulation, (that means regulating regulation) rather than governance through regulation. The rise of regulations, in many countries around the world, may present difficulties with respect to its effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. About the first hurdles that highlight “effectiveness,” however, there is found the alleged weakness of the process regarding its command-and-control nature of the regulated entities that just explains what and how to do (Levi-Faur 2010). The rules of the regulatory bodies are highly particularistic and rigid and specify the necessary actions and the standards to be maintained over time, which must be supported by the state’s mechanisms (LeviFaur 2010). Regarding the second challenge “democratic legitimacy,” regulation needs to have a clear definition of authority, sanction measures, and identification of responsibility and thus accountability for actions and behavior of the regulating entities (Levi-Faur 2010). Some challenges are related to the weak institutional environment that acts as a barrier to the credibility of the regulatory bodies. These difficulties create a spread of unsound practices, thus destroying the financial stability in a state (Das et al. 2004). Sound regulation strengthens financial stability and boosts economic growth and development (Sikarwar and Sharma 2020). Quintyn (2007) points out that weak regulatory governance, in general, develops the failure of governance in the financial sector, which jeopardizes the functioning of the financial system and economy, reducing the level of economic development. Considering the significance of good regulatory governance, the Basel Committee on

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Banking Supervision (2006) has emphasized operational independence and accountability for actions and behavior of regulatory bodies for the desired outcome in the financial sector and economy. Claessens et al. (2010) observed that many regulatory bodies don’t have a clear mandate of operation, adequate resources, and operational independence to effectively contain the crisis. Many regulation experts connect to the failures of policies or actions of the governments for regulating entities that act as one of the important factors in the past and even in the recent financial crisis (Mohr and Wagner 2013; Levine 2010), while Mian et al. (2010) highlighted that vested interest groups put pressure on the agenda-setting and formulation of the financial policy of the USA government after the financial crisis occurred in 2008. Levi-Faur (2010) observed that strict authoritarian regimes, unreasonable rules, and its arbitrary enforcement led to regulatory formalism, and these impose unnecessary administrative expenses and generate adversarial ethics of business between regulators and regulatees. Levi-Faur (2010) also identified six major challenges, such as (a) expensive and ineffective strategies of regulatory bodies; (b) increasingly inflexible and adversarial regulation that led to poor enforcement; (c) legal barriers on the objectives, process, and discretionary power of regulatory bodies; (d) the grievances of regulatees which generate to noncompliance of rules; (e) rigid rule-based nature of regulation which often acts as a barrier to innovation; and finally (f) the subjects of regulation which often present a least common denominator for regulatees to comply rather than providing subsidies or incentives for better performance. Countries in transitional economies attempt to borrow and adopt good regulatory governance model practiced in developed countries, but certain challenges lie with transferring of the regulation model because of the varying nature of economic, social, and political settings. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the ideas of the so-called best practice of regulation in developed countries and the actual socio-legal context, administrative procedures,

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and political and economic contexts of the developing countries; therefore, once Hood (1998, p. 208) highlighted that a “one-size-fits-all” approach does not bring positive outcomes in every society. Further, regulatory reform requires a wide range of objectives beyond just enhancing the efficiency in the market system; rather regulatory policy in transitional economies or developing countries should maintain “pro-poor” approach (van der Heijden 2020).

Conclusion Regulatory governance is a significant issue for achieving sustainable development goals, especially in the developing countries. It is also worth to note that excessive regulation may create regulatory burdens that has opposite effects on economic activities and social control. A state should systematically apply of its regulatory policy in terms of tools, institutions, and process by which governments can make sure that the activities of regulatory bodies are effective and sustained. Regulatory reform in developing countries always experiences more and bigger difficulties in introducing new regulatory policy and its implementation. Further, countries with poor regulatory environment are likely to fail to encounter the contemporary challenges and difficulties, especially determining strategies which regulate public services such as health, education, and social schemes. However, difficulties lie on the ground that low- and middle-income countries lack institutional settings because of the absence of adequate resources and lack of relevant expertise that is required for successful monitoring and enforcement of rules. Last but not least, major academic works related to regulatory governance focused on OECD countries, but very little scholarly publications are found in the context of developing countries.

Cross-References ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice

References Amsonova-Taddei A, Turley WS (2019) Accountability in an independent regulatory setting: the use of impact assessment in the regulation of financial reporting in the UK. J Bus Ethics 155:1053–1076. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10551-017-3527 Ashford NA, Hall RP (2011) Technology, globalization, and sustainable development: transforming the industrial state. Yale University Press, New Haven Baldwin R, Colin S, Christopher H (1998) Introduction. In: Baldwin R, Scott C, Hood C (eds) A reader on regulation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–55 Barth JR, Caprio G, Levine R (2006) Rethinking bank regulation-till angels govern. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) Core principles for effective banking supervision (Revision). Bank for International Settlements, Basel Black J (2002) Critical reflections on regulation. Aust J Leg Philos 27:1–35 Braithwaite J (2002) Restorative justice and responsive regulation. Oxford University Press, Oxford Breyer S (1982) Regulation and its reform. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Claessens S, Dell’Ariccia G, Igan D, Laeven L (2010) Lessons and policy implications from the global financial crisis. International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper, WP/10/44, Washington, D.C., U.S Correa P, Melo M, Mueller B, Pereira C (2019) Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil. Regul Gov 13(4):540–560. https://doi.org/10.1111/ rego.12274 Das US, Quintyn M, Chenard K (2004) Does regulatory governance matter for financial system stability? An empirical analysis. IMF working paper, WP/04/89. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC European Commission (2010) Smart regulation in the European Union (COM/2010/0543 final) Fischer E (2007) Risk regulation and administrative constitutionalism. Hart Publishing, Oxford Gilardi F (2008) Delegation in the regulatory state: independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Guidi M, Guardiancich I, Levi-Faur D (2020) Modes of regulatory governance: a political economy perspective. Governance 33(1):5–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12479 Hall C, Colin S, Christopher H (1999) Telecommunications regulation: culture, chaos and interdependence inside the regulatory process. Routledge, London Hood C (1998) The art of the state: culture. Rhetoric and public management. Clarendon Press, Oxford Hood C, Rothstein H, Baldwin R (2001) The government of risk: understanding risk regulation regime. Oxford University Press, Oxford Jordana J, Bianculli A, Fernández-i-Marín X (2015) When accountability meets regulation. In: Bianculli AC, Fernández-i-Marín X, Jordana J (eds) Accountability

Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals and regulatory governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp 1–18 Kjaer PF, Vetterlein A (2018) Regulatory governance: rules, resistance, and responsibility. Contemp Polit 24(5):497– 506. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2018.1452527 Koop C, Lodge M (2015) What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis. Regul Gov 11:95–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12094 Kudrna Z (2019) Varieties of banking regulation in the EU: an empirical analysis. Governance 33(1):79–92 Levi-Faur D (2010) Jerusalem papers in regulation & governance. Jerusalem papers in regulation & governance working papers series, working paper no. 1. pp 1–47, Jerusalem Levine R (2010) An autopsy of the U.S. financial system. NBER working paper no. 15956. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA Listorti G, Basyte Ferrari E, Acs S, Munda G, Rosenbaum E, Paruolo P, Smiths P (2019) The debate on the EU better regulation agenda: a literature review. European Commission, Brussels Lodge M, Wegrich K (2012) Managing regulation: regulatory analysis. Politics and policy. Palgrave, Basingstoke Lowi TJ (1985) The state in politics: the relation between policy and administration. In: Noll RG (ed) Regulatory policy and the social sciences. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 67–105 Majone G (1996) Regulating Europe. Routledge, London Marques RC, Pinto FS (2018) How to watch the watchmen? The role and measurement of regulatory governance. Util Policy 51:73–81. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.jup.2018.02.002 Masciandaro D, Quintyn M, Taylor M (2008) Financial supervisory independence and accountability-exploring the determinants. International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper, WP/08/147, Washington, D.C., U.S Mian A, Sufi A, Trebbi F (2010) The political economy of the US mortgage default crisis. Am Econ Rev 100 (5):1967–1998 Miller P, Rose NS (2008) Governing the present: administering economic, social and personal life. Polity, Cambridge Mitnick BM (1980) The political economy of regulation: creating, designing and removing regulatory forms. Columbia University Press, New York Mohr B, Wagner H (2013) A structural approach to financial stability: on the beneficial role of regulatory governance. J Gov Regul 2(1):7–26. https://doi.org/10. 22495/jgr_v2_i1_p1 Momen MN (2019) Governance and regulations. In: Farazmand A (ed) Global encyclopedia of public administration, public policy, and governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31931816-5_1783-1 Momen MN, Begum MM (2019) Sustainability and governance. In: Farazmand A (ed) Global encyclopedia of public administration, public policy, and governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-319-31816-5_1979-1

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Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice Kamani Sylva Department of Engineering Management, Faculty of Engineering, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

Synonyms Conflict-free administration; Fundamental shift in patterns of regulation

Definitions Conflict-free, secure, strong institutions and fair access to justice are among the main targets of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. The aim is to have effective, accountable, and transparent institutions for social peace at each possible level. Social peace, social life exclusive of internal conflict, is an objective of social politics, which is offering peaceful solutions to the disputes and conflicts among national and international sectors of society (Kaynak 2014). Justice is related to the quality of being just, impartial, or fair in administration: unbiassed amendment of conflicting claims and allocation of merited rewards or punishments (Merriam-Webster 2018). A set of simple interconnected principles representing a “weak paradigm” based on the survival of all are focused on nonviolent and nondestructive means to resolve conflicts (Sun 2005) backed by strong institutions to serve the communities.

Introduction Peace, stability, human rights and effective governance have been identified as essential for sustainable development (SDG, Knowledge Platform), which leads to social sustainability.

To accord for social sustainability, it is necessary to address the discord of the same. A regulatory paradigm to build concord, therefore, should focus on the root cause of the dispute. Dissonance

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occurs in social systems which do not distribute resources equally among its members. Ideological, technological, economic, or any other realm could provide factors that lead groups and individuals to question the legitimacy of a system of distribution of rewards (Coser 1957). Disturbances raised in the equilibrium of any system lead to the wiling contribution of groups or individual to both what they have to do and what they are not supposed to do, breeding strain and conflict in that society (Coser 1957). “Yet conflict finally led to a breakdown of all feudal relations and hence to the rise of a new social system governed by different patterns of social relations” (Coser 1957, 200). Detrimental effects of conflict encourage regulation. A regulatory paradigm “must not only be well designed but also effectively implemented and enforced” (Gunningham 2011, 170) to reduce friction. It is worth to inquire regulation, introduced to minimize crisis and institutional instability as a result of neo-classical economists’ obsession on the market-driven tendency towards the general equilibrium (Jessop 1995), for its conceptual performance. A regulatory framework is the “interrelated principles, hypotheses or ideologies” (Sun 2005, 110) or is the normalization (Jessop 1995). The frame or paradigm should be robust and designed, considering aspects leading to or any force that could damage social harmony, to have clear guidelines for implementing and enforcing for sustainability. Or, should a weak paradigm, one that supports the less defined, be introduced instead for peace and harmony? A “strong paradigm, which advocates for the survival of the fittest, could easily become biased and result in injustice, hatred and violence” (Sun 2005, 123). The poor will have to work harder for their survival in such a system (Pansera and Martinez 2013). A robust paradigm would expect outcomes that will measure the deprived equally with the privileged, although there is no equal opportunity. A new paradigm is thus needed for the survival of all, including the fittest of the human race. But the need for the replacement of, or at least for the complement to, the strong paradigm goes beyond the negative implication that the fittest might be the

Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice meanest or that they might destroy themselves before they destroy others. (Sun 2005, 122)

A weaker regulatory paradigm should be for the survival of all: the deprived and the privileged. “Weak” is the term used referring to the simplicity with less sophisticated measuring scales: a selfexplanatory paradigm. The framework should be within the control of each individual who could think and act, outlined with mutual practices related to a belief. What is expected for social peace and justice is a slogan of all humankind to have faith in their conviction and not hurt one another with their acts. But can a weak paradigm be supported by weak institutions to achieve the expected outcome? The introduction is followed by what weak institutions are and how such institutions could affect social peace and justice. Stabilizing strong institutions backed by rigid paradigms once again has adverse effects on social harmony and justice. Failure of the contemporary approaches brings about the discussion of the need for a paradigm shift to mix the strong and the weak in an effective method. The system to have strong public institutions with adequacy in wealth to protect the community is encouraged through the chapter. In contrast, non-state sector institutions more flexible in the accumulation of wealth, willing to share profits with their stakeholders, encouraged for social peace and justice. Sharing of resources could reduce the inequality in society and the tendency for conflict. The public sector should be able to communicate through simple networks such as social media to educate people of ethical conduct. In contrast, the private or non-state sector should follow a robust ethical Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) framework for its governance. Their contribution to society should be twofold: contributing to the public sector through tax payments for the provision of services such as common infrastructure and providing income generation opportunities for the community. A transparent, robust framework with clear indicators of the distribution of wealth to maintain social standards is encouraged. Indirectly, they would be contributing to social peace and justice by enhancing the social rules as a whole by supporting the development of infrastructure for equal

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opportunity and egalitarianism. Accumulation of wealth among a few individuals that enriches a few and impoverishes most (Otusanya 2011) is discouraged by a fair sharing of resources and distribution of wealth. The discussion of this chapter is limited to simple means of understanding regulation, and it does not extend up to a debate on regulation theory and its ideologies.

Weak Institutions and Weak Paradigms Many economic structures in the world were influenced by European capitalism establishing structural weaknesses that cannot be rectified even with successive democratic governments (Köhler 2018). As Köhler (2018) points out, Spain depends on imports of foreign capital, know-how, and technology and lacks domestic industrial capital. It also depends on oil imports and has unsustainable energy-consuming equipment (Köhler 2018, 728). This phenomenon is familiar to many European-influenced systems. They have become structurally weak; they are left with authoritarian development regimes with only partially modernized economic structures and dysfunctional political regulation leading to conflicts (Köhler 2018). According to Kumssa and Mbeche (2004), institutions in Africa have played a weaker role “because of poor enforcement of the rule of law, corruption, mismanagement, the absence of strong civil society and political interference” (Mbeche 2004, 840). “State weakness is a critical factor constraining development in all poorly performing developing countries and is particularly evident in Africa” (Khan and Gray 2006). Weak institutions with weak modes of regulation are responsible for the poor performance of developing countries. As Khan and Gray (2006) point out, although successful developers could provide “rent” for the development of capital and technology in these countries, they also had the institutional and political capacity to withdraw rent when performance was poor. This intervention, therefore, could be positive for developers with strong state capabilities. But, states with weaker skills would suffer from indirect corruption and other forms of rent

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initiated through the intervention (Khan and Gray 2006). As stated by He and Cui (2012), “Institutionweak countries are characterised by poorer governance quality compared with countries with strong institutions” (He and Cui 2012, 358). The institution-weak countries will not be able to provide stable domestic markets due to poor governance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). Market-driven economies influenced explicitly by the non-state sector would be less effective in such instances since the affluent can control deprived societies. The Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank designed to represent institutional quality consists of six elements: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption (Masron 2017). Masron (2017) has identified that institutional quality affects foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to institutionweak countries. As Ross (1988) presents, developing countries are inferior in their bargaining power for unskilled labour exemplified by weaker trade unions or lack of social security systems with comparatively smaller industrial establishments. Developing countries, with a vulnerable public sector, are unable to meet challenges that are powerful, organized, and corporate-driven in integrating into the global economy (Haque and Azmat 2015). The evidence presented by Otusanya (2011) supports the presence of weak institutions in developing countries: “large sums of government revenue have been undermined by the corrupt practices of the political and economic elite (both local and international), which have enriched a few, but impoverished most” (Otusanya 2011, 387). He states that “socio-political and economic development, politics, power, history and globalisation have continued to reproduce and transform the institutional structures and actors which have facilitated corrupt practices in developing countries” (Otusanya 2011, 387). Corruption is initiated with the activities of “politicians, presidents, dictators, bureaucrats and public officials” (Otusanya 2011, 387). Malpractices result in the “loss of taxes, public revenues, economic devastation, lack of investment in public goods, the emergence of gangs and private armies,

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a loss of faith in law and institutions, poor quality of life and even a decline in average life expectancy . . . [and] destroys the social fabric” (Otusanya 2011, 388), leading to conflict. According to Otusanya (2011), “successive governments in developing countries have done little to bring culprits to justice, due to poor regulation and ineffective sanctions” (Otusanya 2011, 387). Weak institutions are not in a position to cater to social peace and justice expected by SDG 16.

Strong Institutions and Strong Paradigms The regulation approach and the theorization of capitalist restructuring have been emerging to stabilize institutions from the paradox of capitalism: subjected to the crisis, change, and instability (Jessop 1990, 1995; Tickell and Peck 1992). According to Tickell and Peck (1992), the regulation theory gained widespread support for the restructuring of contemporary capitalism as a system of post-Fordist “faith.” Jessop (1990) identifies regulation theory as a “continuing research programme rather than an already established monolithic theoretical system” (Jessop 1990, 154) which initiated with the work of French political economists around the 1970s. Regimes of accumulation, introduced as a concept with the dissatisfaction of several dominant approaches, such as Fordism and post-Fordism (Jessop 1995), are one aspect of the regulation approach. The other two concepts supporting regulation are modes of growth and modes of regulation. The systems of production were encouraged on mass production, aiming at stability in profitability with plants running at full capacity and full employment (Lipietz 1987). The regime of accumulation, mode of growth, and mode of regulation “are located not only in a movement from abstract to concrete but also in an orthogonal movement from simple to complex” (Jessop 1990, 156). The modes of regulation laid the written and unwritten laws of society which controls the regime of accumulation to its shape while controlling both economic and non-economic activities (Jessop 1990). According to the

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regulation theory, every regime of accumulation will reach a crisis point at which the mode of regulation will no longer support it. The mode of regulation is the institutional support: a set of institutional laws, norms, and forms of state, policy paradigms, and other practices that provide the context for the operation of the regime of accumulation. The mode of the regulation provides the supportive and conducive environment for the regime of accumulation to operate through institutions which should be strong to maintain industrial relations (IR). Weak institutions, disturbed with turbulence, will fail to support the regimes of accumulation. “Actors and institutions of current IR in Spain emerged during the second period of dictatorship and the transition to democracy. The turbulent history of Spain left little space for historical experiences with democratic and autonomous IR and collective bargaining” (Köhler 2018, 726). Similar nature of developments in many countries provoked new regimes of accumulation, which will eventually reach a crisis point and transition from a conventional to an emerging paradigm. . . .if the states are to successfully navigate the turbulent transition from the conventional to the emerging economic paradigm, they will not only need sound economic theory and effective economic strategy. They will also need an institutional change strategy, that more like a compass than a road map, points them in the direction of the emerging paradigm, and moves them forward at a pace and with a surefootedness appropriate to the uncharted territory they are attempting to traverse. (Fosler 1992, 13)

Fosler (1992) points out the need for top-down, long-term strategic vision and the need for a range of agencies to handle diverse state responsibilities. Effective performance quality assessment and accountability in a bottom-up, market-driven, performance-oriented actions with a new generation of organizational intelligence and new mechanisms of organizational agency coordination with strong institutions to support the mode of regulation are necessary (Fosler 1992). Any paradigm, conventional or contemporary, will testify for different approaches with their parallel moves. Jessop (1995) discusses the parallelism between regulation and governance. As he presents, the

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crisis of Atlantic Fordism and the emergence of the regulation theory are closely related; the crisis gave rise to the regularization of economic models. The search for this new social model of economic regulation has led to theories of governance founded on institutional economics, work on statecraft and diplomacy, research on corporatism and policy communities, and interest in welfare with the expectation of social justice. Jessop (1995) questions whether the serious difficulties of each paradigm “would be alleviated, left unchanged or magnified in the attempt to combine them into a more general account of contemporary economic and political change” (Jessop 1995, page 308). The economic and political change could affect regulation or governance up to some extent. As Todeva (2010) points out, most of the regulation and governance theorizing is based on political ideologies or empirical observations and universal goodwill. As Todeva (2010) states “both governance and regulation theories still do not offer a wider platform for comparisons across different socio-economic systems” (Todeva 2010, 797). Despite in-depth comparisons, universal peace is challenging to be testified. As pointed out by Sun (2005), any scientific study with satisfactory answers to questions would not enquire after the validity of a paradigm, and this applies to the robust standards in focus too. However, the solutions often tend to be one-sided. As he exemplifies, “on the economic assumption of perfect competition, consumers are automatically believed to have their welfare increased with a higher degree of market competition”. . . “however, market competition does not necessarily increase consumer welfare” (Sun 2005, 110). The belief of a strong paradigm to get a perfect solution depends on many other factors such as institutional support, institutional context, and the survival of the fittest through strong regulation (Sun 2005). The impacts of globalization and low-cost competition either wiped out pre-existing strengths or had adverse effects on regions specializing in traditional manufacturing activities (Agne 2013). Multinational corporations (MNCs), as the institutional support, could uplift the standard of living of people in developing regions by driving economic growth, creating jobs with employment standards

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and technology transfer (Ferdausy and Md. Sahidur 2009). In contrast, MNCs could have severe negative impacts relating to social peace and justice as their operations create gaps in society (Ferdausy and Md. Sahidur 2009). MNCs can be guilty of pollution or human rights abuse and low wages, as there are few or no trade unions to protect the rights of employees or negotiate with the MNCs, giving rise to a theoretical dispute over the effects of MNCs in developing countries (Ferdausy and Md. Sahidur 2009). Assumptions of perfect competition with robust standards could fail. In contrast to the strong paradigm, a weaker paradigm linked to a belief could be more consistent and would be predicated on the principle and the practice of the survival of all (Sun 2005). But the sustainability of a weak paradigm with weak institutions is questionable in meeting social peace and justice.

Compromising of the Strong and the Weak As Sun (2005) points out, the systems should focus on the original element of neutral universal force: the balance between the strong and the weak. As he states, “This original force created two equal but different forces, the Yin and the Yang. The interaction and constant change of these two forces determine and explain the multifarious events and things on earth” (Sun 2005, 11). This principle applied to strong or weak economies; institutions or paradigms could counterbalance the detrimental effects on social peace and justice. As Sun (2005) explains, when these two forces go to the extreme without balancing each other out, there could be problems in any system. The stronger Yin and the weaker Yang under one condition and the weaker Yin and the stronger Yang in another condition should bond for social peace and justice. The reach of social peace and justice is only possible by connecting the two ends: strong public sectors and the weak private sector in terms of the accumulation of wealth. A move on the public sector with soft paradigms to protect all and healthy standards in the private sector in their conduct on ethical behavior relating to CSR

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policies could support peace and justice. The models of the public sector should not measure its society on hard and fast rules such as the poverty line but help all people to sustain by the provision of shared facilities. A state should be prosperous. A counterbalancing with influential paradigms of the private sector through CSR policies to accommodate the requirements of the public sector and society at large in their contribution through tax, employment opportunities, and profit-sharing strategies would support the system. Transparent measuring indicators for both public and private are needed, especially in developing nations, to maintain social peace and justice. “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” (SDG 16: SDG Knowledge Platform). Connection of the strong and the weak could be extended further to build support for sustainability. As stated by Zhang (2014), “Yang is solid, continuous; yin is broken, discontinuous.” As Kaynak (2014) expresses: modern political and social accumulation has come to the beginning point of producing new living experiences in our global world by taking the religious understandings and differences as a reference point to itself in terms of religious cultural multiplism and social peace notions. . . at that point, we see that the religious cultural multiplism and social peace studies processes the religion comes to the scene as an actor on the world policies. (Kaynak 2014, 364)

As Churchman (1968) states, “the planners are often far too optimistic about their success so that when failures occur, they are in no position whatsoever to take necessary steps because they have never thought about them before” (Churchman 1968, 8). They should have their alternatives ready and not postpone thinking, “when you postpone thinking too long, then it may not be possible to think about it adequately at all” (Churchman 1968, 8). The solution should be to have a weak and robust balance thinking together. Strong governing institutions should focus on what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to with a contextual backing. The supporting institutions are expected to produce with the understanding of strong ethical principles contributing to the needs of the governing institutions in production. The private sector could act as partnerships supporting

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the public sector. They could provide employment opportunities for the society, distribute their profit equitably, adhere to environmental ethics and regulations on the effective use of raw material, assign due respect to all factors of production, and follow sustainable practices for ecological sustainability (Kaynak 2014). Social peace is a reality in the existence of humanity. . . secular paradigms set out in the secular world of Western-Centric, despite all the sophistication longed at the point of social peace, has not reached the expected level. . .while the steps through rule of law, strengthening democracy and democratic social life create positive results in certain regions of the world, on the other hand, unemployment, disease, exploitation and hunger continue to tyrannies a large part of the world. (Kaynak 2014, 363)

A paradigm shift is necessary to secure social peace and justice of the entire “global village.”

Strong Institutions and Weak Paradigms With the rupture of market-driven economies, for the resolution of accumulation crises (Köhler 2018; Jessop 1990), there was an increasing concern on “self-organisation and self-reproduction of complex systems in turbulent environments building up social mode of economic regulation” (Jessop 1995, 314). The need to coordinate actions of interdependent but autonomous organizations and the need to control essential resources are necessary “to produce a joint outcome which is deemed mutually beneficial” (Jessop 1995, 324). Churchman (1968), in his systems approach, introduces the management subsystems as structures that have standards to reach the overall objectives of the total system but are autonomous and interdependent. According to him, the subsystem will think for the whole system and will not postpone thinking until a crisis. In systems theory, “there are obviously strong constructivist elements in discourse-analytic accounts of how organisations and other social forces besides individuals come to develop distinctive identities, interests and strategies” (Jessop 1995, 314) in support of the total system. As Ross (1988) points out, the policy models for microeconomic stabilization of developing

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countries should focus on targets and instruments but also pose questions such as: How many separate targets can be achieved? Which can or should be left to achieve themselves without deliberate intervention? Which instruments and combinations of instruments are available, necessary, sufficient, to achieve the targets? If particular instruments are to be “assigned” to particular targets, which should be assigned to which? (Ross 1988, 4)

To answer these questions, the backing of strong state sector institutions is essential. These institutions should be able to build their answers and not necessarily adopt the explicitly or implicitly produced variety of solutions to these questions (Ross 1988), mainly by the industrialized countries. “Instead of copying other countries” on particular policies or practices, “each country should build conditions that enable improvisation within its own society or government” (Ang 2018). Strong institutions which are capable of getting the world together in providing the basic needs and basic rules are needed. Churchman (1968) presents: Suppose we have made up our mind that the first problem to be solved is that of adequately feeding, sheltering and clothing every inhabitant of the world. How should we begin to solve this problem? The technological capability is there. We can produce the food necessary to do the job and housing materials that will provide shelter and the textiles that will clothe each person. Then why don’t we do so? The answer is that we are not organised to do so. (Churchman 1968, 4)

The system should organize to reach SGD 16 by forming strong public institutions to protect their society from external forces that have detrimental effects on social peace and justice. “An effective state administration with responsible institutions. . . including anti-corruption measures (Government Offices of Sweden 2015) can be considered as secure in their conduct.” With the development of healthy organizations, a weaker paradigm should collaborate, a model that could be adopted by any institution or individual. Simultaneously, a simple regulatory paradigm based on the cooperative principle of the survival of all and based on ethics, awareness, and sensitivity and one that does not believe in violent and destructive

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means to resolve conflicts and differences among people (Sun 2005, 12) is needed. Unless solutions haven’t been produced for the theological, cultural, economic and political based fundamental problems . . . terror will dominate in spite of social peace. The terror is the most effective political element that threats the social peace . . . all the religions, invite their followers to act the manners which are basically known as universal and humane values such as not killing, being just, not harming others, honesty, mercy, making favours without profit expectations, helping, respecting others, saturation the needed, thinking others alongside with oneself, not acting others in a manner as one doesn’t want oneself to be acted, kindness against kindness, kindness against malignity. (Kaynak 2014, 367)

Social strain (Merton 1938), once flexibility is allowed with weak paradigms, leads to new patterns of behavior “by choosing what they consider appropriate means for the maximization of rewards” (Coser 1957, 204). This may happen in two ways: if the social system is flexible enough to adjust to conflict situations, we will deal with change within the system. . .on the other hand, the social system is not able to readjust itself and allows the accumulation of conflict, the ‘aggressive’ groups, imbued with a new system of values which threatens to split the general consensus of the society and imbued with an ideology which ‘objectifies’ their claims, may become powerful enough to overcome the resistance of vested interests and bring about the breakdown of the system and the emergence of a new distribution of social values. (Coser 1957, 204)

The former is less harmful to the system. “If feelings of dissatisfaction, instead of being suppressed or diverted are allowed the platform for expression against ‘vested interests,’ and subsequently to lead to the formation of new groupings within the society, the emergence of genuine trans valuations is likely to occur” (Coser 1957, 205). Strong institutions where the expression is allowed through a less rigid paradigm will be able to protect the query of injustice and rectify the system with fair resolutions. The strong institution should be equipped with wealth to protect all.

Weak Institutions and Strong Paradigms The robust supporting institutions, mainly the non-state sector, should become weaker in the

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accumulation of wealth to accept lesser profit for the sake of fair distribution of profit through CSR to the society at large for both home and host country environments. They should build influential paradigms on the CSR in their contribution to the achievement of the goals of sustainability, especially in social peace and justice. They should not enrich a few and impoverish most (Otusanya 2011) to create gaps in society. Reduction of poverty and inequality with a fair distribution of resources leading to social peace and justice to reach the aim of SDG 16 is to be expected. In an industrialized context where there is a firm domestic policy on sustainability, its MNCs should standardize these principles in extending to the international market, although a worldwide uniformity, of product, process, advertising or marketing strategy, is severely constrained (Walters 1986). Standardization of all is urged in all aspects; however “it would be naive to believe that unique recipes for success with universal validity have been, or are waiting to be, discovered” (Walters 1986, 56). Petras and Cavaluzzi (1994) argue that it is not competitiveness that underlies the internationalization of organizations but profits and rates of profit. They are of the view that MNCs are responsible for the globalization of capitalism. “Overseas profits are today the principal source of profits for a growing number of firms” (Petras and Cavaluzzi 1994, 91). Profit has become the main driving force for the “capital flight” with a relative decline of the domestic economy and higher rates of overseas returns. The tendency of this movement of MNCs is “for the simple reason that developed nations could find with ease cheap factors of production and they could easily impose themselves by means of illusory promises” (Haller 2016, 9). Despite positives, MNCs undermine democracy, affect national societies, and outline a new form of capitalism making “individuals lose control over their own lives, becoming slaves of these exploiting companies whose only preoccupation is profit” (Haller 2016, 10), affecting sustainability. Although much of the institutional activity of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been directed to developing countries, and microeconomic stabilization (Ross 1988), poverty and

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inequality of these countries are continuing to grow at very high rates. In addition to these negatives, many other ill effects of globalization have been observed by authors. Haque and Azmat (2015) studied CSR and economic globalization in the context of developing countries, and they pointed out that “CSR requires organizations to not only have economic and legal obligations to society but also ethical and discretionary responsibilities” (Haque and Azmat 2015, 168). Strong public institutions in the host country should verify standardized CSR paradigms fulfilling these obligations of the MNCs before they are allowed to penetrate the host country environment. Any existing weakness of the host country context should not be misused by MNCs or the political elite of either party. The target should be to upgrade the public institutions by the contribution of appropriate taxes and tariffs to support the host country or even the home environment of the industry. CSR should prevail in sharing profit, and attaining higher margins by unethical practices should be prevented by the standardization. A change is expected in the economic and financial interests of MNCs: . . .the economic and political elite and the professionals remain a strong impediment to the development of developing states. Corrupt practices and their underlying dynamics subvert structured competitive participation and institutions because public officials and the political elite enjoy wide monopolistic powers and discretion. The exercise of such control of economic resources often prevents honest decision making and favours cronyism . . . the colonization of the state and its institutions subvert transparent and accountable procedures which make the rules of fair play and access to decision-makers a marketable commodity. The activities of the political and economic elite are rarely challenged because the countervailing institutions are weak, and information about government practices is kept secret and out of the public domain. (Otusanya 2011, 406)

Although CSR exists in various forms in developing countries especially in businesses conducted with multinational industries, the lack of good governance and irresponsible business practices have been recorded affecting the safety of workers and negatively affecting the image of the host country (Haque and Azmat 2015). Many developing countries have opened their markets

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for the MNCs to compete in industries such as apparel, leather and footwear, agri-business, pharmaceuticals, and shrimp farming. Still, the completion is allowed based on “cheap labor” (Haque and Azmat 2015, 168). Although they have been responding to the growing demands for compliance with CSR, some industries are facing problems related to noncompliance of CSR. These reflect the ill effects of weak institutions in the host country of the multinational operations. “Investments of the MNCs have led to major disturbances in the local communities, loss of innocent lives and many people evicted from their homes, ending up as refugees in foreign countries” (Nikolov and Westergren 2017, 5). According to Nikolov and Westergren (2017), MNCs expanded to grow their revenues to be more than the gross domestic product of many developing countries in which they operate, making MNCs more powerful than their host country governments. As they have pointed out, although companies have been praised for corporate responsibility with positive rankings, the cost of globalization which increases global inequality has become higher than ever giving power to the plutocrats, the influential owners of MNCs. As pointed out by Otusanya (2011) “much corruption occurs at the interface between the private and public sectors, with government officials and companies seeking competitive opportunities to earn excessive profit” (Otusanya 2011, 389). To reduce this “inherently unethical behaviour” (Otusanya 2011, 389), a more robust CSR paradigm for the nonpublic sector is essential. They should compensate the public sector for the provision of infrastructure for their business activities through strong taxation policies. This contribution would enable the public sector to fairly reward their officials not to be influenced by excess profit as corrupted commissions for uplifting their living standards which indirectly encourage social peace and harmony with reduction of inequality in society.

The Paradigm Shift Nyerere (1967) encourages implementing a policy of socialism and self-reliance. Fair distribution

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of profit through taxation could reduce the gap of income of workers in the private and public sector (Nyerere 1967). A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does not have two classes of people, a lower class composed of people who work for their living, and an upper class of people who live on the work of others. In a real socialist country, no person exploits another; everyone who is physically able to work does so; every worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from different types of work are not grossly divergent. In a socialist country the only people who live on the work of others, and who have the right to be dependent upon their fellows, are small children, people who are too old to support themselves, the crippled, and those whom the state at any one time cannot provide with an opportunity to work for their living. (Nyerere 1967, 36)

The class separation or the poor distribution of resources leading to conflict (Coser 1957) may then be controlled by making the government leader, either a peasant or a worker. This leader would emphasize actions to raise the standard of living of the peasants and the rural community and not allow them to associate with the practices of capitalism or feudalism (Nyerere 1967). “Judged by first-world norms, mobilising all civil servants to recruit investors using personal

relations would be considered weak, backward or wrong” (Ang 2018). “Yet this unorthodox arrangement harnessed existing resources and fitted the needs of early development. In that sense, it was functionally strong” (Ang 2018). In developing contexts, where poverty or the unequal sharing of resources leads to conflict with different paradigms (Coser 1957), “institutions that look weak or wrong by first-world standards may function effectively” (Ang 2018). “Achieving good governance in firstworld forms is part of the problem of being poor, not its solution” (Ang 2018). Understanding this would enable achieving SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. A shift to strong public sector institutions to support the community by providing equal opportunities and security with simple paradigms should collaborate with a weaker private sector in accumulation of wealth, which could contribute for a stable public sector with strong CSR practices. Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the balance of the strong and the weak. Social peace and justice are to prevail by the reduction of inequality through resource sharing. A leading to egalitarianism is expected.

/ Public Sector: Strong in wealth and capacity to provide equal opportunities and security to all people. Weak paradigm to accommodate all human beings, those who could and cannot contribute to the production process Sharing of Tax and resources: tariff as infrastructure, main public utility revenue networks, markets, generation and all other services

Private Sector: Weak in accumulation of wealth. Strong CSR policy for sustainability – profit sharing, contribution to public sector by fair taxation policies, providing employment opportunities, contributing to economic development through business, while adhering to environmental regulations

Achievement of SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions Reduction of conflicts through sharing of resources and equal opportunities. Egalitarian societies.

Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice, Fig. 1 Sustainable collaborative institutional framework for social peace and justice

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Conclusion

Cross-References

The question posed in this chapter was whether a regulatory paradigm should be strong or weak for the social peace and justice urged in SDG 16. In the occurrence of weak public institutions, if a robust model for regulation with hard and fast rules is adopted, it would measure the deprived equally on the same scale as the privileged. Such measurement would expect the deprived to contribute equally or more for production, compared to the privileged who would enjoy the benefits than contribute, without providing equal opportunities to all or protection from external exploitation. This unfair contribution would trigger conflict. Instead, a weaker paradigm to measure the social standards backed by strong public institutions in wealth, to provide equal opportunities and protect the community, would reduce disputes over resource sharing. Concurrently, this paradigm could be supported and collaborated with non-state sector institutions to produce wealth for the regime while providing opportunities for the communities to contribute. Non-state sector partners should be weaker in the accumulation of wealth and more reliable in their CSR paradigm to help by profit-sharing for the common benefit. They would support the system through fair taxation policies for the usage of public infrastructure, provide employment opportunities to the community, and share profit among stakeholders for equity while adhering to environmental regulations as a part of their responsibility. They would not trigger conflict by creating inequality. Good governance should create an egalitarian society, through appropriate paradigms, to reach the SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. Both public and private sector institutions should collaborate, respectively, with weak regulations to cater for all and strong regulations for the responsibility towards society. Regulations ‘weak’, will not measure the privileged and the deprived equally and will provide equal facilities to all. A partnership of strong, wealthy, public sector institutions with flexible paradigms to serve all and weak, less affluent, private sector with strong CSR paradigms could reach egalitarianism for peace and justice.

▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Development Paradigms Related to Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions: A Case Study on Guatemala for Decision-Makers ▶ Environmental Justice: Emergence to Implementation and Its Relation with SDGs ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Grassroots Political Movement to Achieve SDGs in Developing Countries ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms ▶ Local Governance ▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts ▶ Peace Education: History, Features, and Effectiveness ▶ Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

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Relative Deprivation and the Sustainable Development Goals Lamia Islam Department of Political Science, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Definition(s) Relative deprivation is feeling or perceiving grievance, dissatisfaction, and resentment of individuals or groups for not receiving resources that they perceive to have which the dominant groups of the society already belong. It measures social, political, and economic deprivation in society by allowing objective comparison. An individual can feel deprivation personally compared to others in his/her own group, or s/he can feel deprivation relatively to other groups, though he is personally satisfied. It originates from the presence of poverty, inequality, inequity, injustice, and weak institutions in society. In general, lack of access to social services, below the standard of redistribution of society, and repression by the state often result in relative deprivation.

Relative Deprivation and the Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction Relative deprivation, being a significant term in academia, explains the feelings or the measures of social, economic, and political deprivation by demonstrating an objective comparison. Focusing on these aspects, the entry introduces the term by contextualizing it through historical perspectives. In doing so, the ideas of basic theorists, including Samuel Stouffer and Colleagues (1949), Merton and Kitt (1950), Davis (1959), Pettigrew (1967), Runciman (1966), Townsend (1979, 1987), and Gurr (1968, 1970), are incorporated to understand the construction and development of the term. Afterward, a comprehensive overview of different forms of relative deprivation is discussed in the following section which explains egoistic (or personal), fraternalistic (or group), and double deprivation standpoints with ample examples (Runciman 1966). This section also discusses Townsend’s (1987) forms of relative deprivation to understand the relativity of people’s needs and wants to explain the social conjecture nature of it. In the next section, considering a list of indicators of standard of living, it is aimed to highlight the relative and the absolute deprivations demonstrating the material and social aspects (Townsend 1979). It further integrates the patterns and dimensions to understand the concept comprehensively (Gurr 1968, 1970; Runciman 1966; Townsend 1979). Later, this entry explores the root causes and consequences of relative deprivation studying the focuses and links between them. Finally, it also exhibits frustration and dissatisfaction-driven tensions and then highlights the association between conflict and relative deprivation. However, the connections of extremism, migration, and unconventional movement with relative deprivation are precisely explained in this contribution. Thus, this study illustrates the relationship between sustainable development goals (SDG-16) and deprivation to understand the impediments for establishing a peaceful, inclusive, and just society. In addition, the critiques of relative deprivation are delineated to discern it beyond the term.

Understanding Relative Deprivation Relative deprivation, being a major social-psychological approach, explains its

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preconditions, emotional concomitant, and behavioral consequences. In this definition, the “preconditions of relative deprivation” refer to not having or deserving something as an antecedent condition of feeling unjust deprivation, “emotional concomitant” includes resentment, anger, and dissatisfaction, and the feeling of unjust deprivation leads to “behavioral consequences” (Adams 1965; Homans 1961; Runciman 1966, p. 10; Walster et al. 1973 cited in Crosby and Gonzalez-Intal 1984, p. 141). However, socialpsychological relative deprivation research has placed emphasis on “intergroup and interpersonal (upward and contrasting) social comparisons, political science relative deprivation research focuses on people’s comparisons of their present situation with either their past, future, desired or desired selves” (Gurr 1970; Smith et al. 2012, p. 204). The term “relative deprivation” was first used in the book titled “The American Soldier” published in 1949. The study is mainly focused on the factors that had an impact on the motivation and morale of the US troops. The concept was introduced in the book to analyze the dissatisfaction of the American army by assessing their attitudes on different aspects including racial integration, soldiers’ performance, and so on (Stouffer et al. 1949; Fahey 2011, pp. 6–7). Later, in the 1950s, Merton and Kitt (1950) used the idea of relative deprivation in mainstream sociology. They developed “reference group theory” to explain people’s comparative frames to assess their condition in their groups as well as to other groups (Merton and Kitt 1950; Fahey 2011, p. 7). Besides, Davis’s (1959) model of deprivation is the first formal theoretical model that distinguishes between in-group members and out-group members as well as between haves and have-nots. He stated that if a “have-not” person compares himself with a “have” person in his group, the “have-not” person would experience relative deprivation. Again, if he (have-not) compares himself with a better-off person from other groups, it would create or reinforce social distance. Davis’s (1959) model of deprivation also mathematically explains the probability of relative deprivation as a curvilinear function that represents the proportion of haves and have-nots with

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the likelihood of feeling deprivation. In this regard, the probability is being the greatest when the “haves” and “have-nots” are divided evenly in their group (Davis 1959; Crosby 1979, p. 105). Runciman (1966) applied the term to understand the relation between the deprivation of people and feelings of resentment or dissatisfaction in the British context. However, he added the idea of social justice in the American Approach (Fahey 2011, p. 7) and mentioned four conditions for feeling relative deprivation. He stated, “We can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons (possibly including himself at some previous or future time) as having X (whether or not that is or will be the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X” (Runciman 1966, p. 10). Crosby (1976), while defining relative deprivation, took the works of Davis (1959) and Runciman (1966) into consideration and explained five facets of relative deprivation that an individual feels. For instance, if the person does not possess X, to feel relatively deprived he would need to (i) see someone else possessing X; (ii) want X; (iii) feel entitled to X; (IV) think it feasible to obtain X; and (V) lacks a sense of personal responsibility for not having X. Crosby explained these five facets as the preconditions of relative deprivation, and the presence of all five is needed to feel relatively deprived. Later, he (1982) revised his model during his study on working women mentioning about three preconditions that include, (i) does not possess X; (ii) wants X, and (iii) feels entitled to X. In his revised model, the social comparison and future expectations are not considered, although Crosby (1982) mentioned that in some cases, these can be relevant (Crosby 1976; Crosby 1982 cited in Brown 2014, pp. 381–383). Townsend also emphasized the objective definition of relative deprivation to research and study poverty. Deprivation, as he suggested, can be relative in terms of people’s needs and wants. It also has a social contingent nature (Townsend 1979, 1987). Townsend (1987, p. 125) explained deprivation is the “[. . .] state of observable and demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local

community or the wider society or nation to which an individual, family or group belongs.” He also pointed out that people, who meet material conditions with proper diet, clothing, housing, and household facilities, can be considered deprived if they have no access to the political system as citizens, or if they are not recognized as part of that society. Thus, they feel deprived in terms of social conditions (Santos 2018, pp. 129– 130). Gurr (1968, 1970), a basic theorist of relative deprivation, asserted that relative deprivation occurs when a discrepancy exists between the value expectations and the value capabilities of individuals. He defined value expectations as goods and life-conditions that are possessed by the individuals, whereas value capabilities are those goods and life-conditions that individuals can attain. The imbalance between value expectations and value capabilities causes relative deprivation that leads to violence and conflicts in society. To illustrate this, he mentioned about three categories of values that include welfare values (physical and psychological well-being of individuals), economic values (goods and pleasures), and self-actualization values (mental and physical abilities) (Džuverovic 2013, pp. 120– 122; Gurr 1968, 1970). In contrast, Pettigrew (2016) criticized Gurr’s (1970) Why Men Rebel arguing that relative deprivation focuses on individuals, not society. And microlevel phenomena cannot be analyzed by macrolevel findings. He explained the central proposition of relative deprivation as individual responses that are different from the macrolevel perspective. For instance, protest participation may occur for the high unemployment rate in society, while the unemployed individuals may be less likely to get involved in protests (Pettigrew 2016). He also commented that the concept ultimately challenges the conventional wisdom about the impact of absolute deprivation. Some academics argue that relative deprivation became important in social sciences because social justice is based on both absolute standards and relative comparisons (Pettigrew 2016; Smith et al. 2012; Smith and Pettigrew 2015 cited in Grasso et al. 2017, p. 4). Others opine that the

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concept of relative deprivation refers to both comparisons across people as well as comparisons across time, because people not only compare themselves with others in society but also compare their past status and their future expectations. At present, people’s happiness, or life satisfaction, depends on whether they perceive progress in their status, or see the prospects for the future (Verme 2013, p. 3). In addition, absolute deprivation should be considered as the understanding of the perception of relative deprivation, at least, in the self-comparison system. For instance, GDP growth is the indicator of the betterment of society because it indicates that everyone is equally benefitting in terms of welfare and income. This may not affect an individual’s position in society as everyone improves by the same degree. Though the relative position remains unchanged, it has an impact on the present status of an individual compared to past status, because s/he feels better knowing that s/he is improving (Verme 2013, p. 3).

Relative Deprivation: Forms, Patterns, and Dimensions After the introduction by Stouffer et al. (1949) and the expansion by Merton and Kitt (1950), many theorists have contributed to explaining different attributes of relative deprivation. Runciman (1966) is one of the pioneers who broadened the construction of the concept by distinguishing different forms (Smith et al. 2012, p. 204), by mentioning egoistical, fraternal, and double deprivation in his theory of relative deprivation. An individual experiences egoistical deprivation when he feels deprived personally compared to others in his own group, whereas in the case of fraternal deprivation, individuals of a group feel deprivation relative to other groups, even though they are satisfied personally. Double deprivation occurs when individuals experience both egoistical and fraternal deprivation at the same time. Besides, people can also feel status deprivation, power deprivation, and economic grievance (Crosby 1979, p. 105; Runciman 1966). Another distinctive case is perceiving relative deprivation

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rather than feeling it emotionally. For instance, individuals can perceive relative deprivation with or without being emotionally affected. An individual’s perception of feeling associated with emotions of anger, resentment, or both may get worse than others. Particularly, “specific patterns of cognitive appraisal of a situation determine which specific emotion individuals are likely to experience” (Smith et al. 2012; Van Zomeren et al. 2008 cited in Van Zomeren 2017, p. 2). Townsend (1987), in his article Journal of Social Policy, also discussed about different forms of relative deprivation. The first one is the lack of food, cloth, and other customary facilities approved in society, the second one is falling beneath the socially accepted standard of living, and the final one is falling below the majority standard to give a better redistribution of society. The first two forms of relative deprivation are regarding the access to both public and private social services that impact on people’s standard of living. It focuses on socially expected services and means, whereas the latter form describes an attempt to impose relative standards which is not a part of the current custom but highly utilized by developing countries (Alcock 1997, p. 86; Townsend 1987). Moreover, Gurr asserted three patterns of deprivations named decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation, and progressive deprivation. Decremental deprivation occurs when value expectations are constant for a long time, whereas value capabilities decrease within a group, while on the contrary value capabilities do not change while value expectations increased in the case of aspirational deprivation. On the other hand, Progressive deprivation appears when both value expectations and value capabilities evenly increased due to constant progress during a prolonged period (Crosby 1979, p. 107; Džuverovic 2013, pp. 120–122; Gurr 1968, 1970). There are two dimensions of relative deprivation – subjective and objective. Runciman (1966) explored the subjective deprivation by examining different perceptions of deprivation. The findings of his research explain that many people do not feel relative deprivation. They perceive that no one is better-off than themselves. Even those

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who feel relative deprivation compare themselves to those people who are not much better-off, such as people with no children, people on shift work, university researchers, etc. He observed that an unequal society existed in 1960s Britain where people’s sense of social justice was limited rather than wide (Alcock 1997, pp. 86–87; Runciman 1966, p. 227, 229). Townsend (1979), after exploring the subjective perceptions of poverty, found a strong correlation between subjective perceptions and objective poverty. He (1979, p. 31) affirmed that “Individuals, families, and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.” He also mentioned that the condition of life should be distinguished from the distribution of resources and deprivation. Townsend (1979) explained the absolute and relative dimensions of the phenomenon by differentiating the material and social deprivation. He outlined a list of 60 indicators to determine and measure levels of deprivation. For instance, diet, clothing, fuel and light, housing and housing facilities, home circumstances, recreation, family support, working conditions, family activity, community integration, and social participation are some of the indicators. In this regard, different people or group scores differently as their deprivation in these indicators are different. Subsequently, deprivation is the result of insufficient income and resources that ultimately refer to the existence of poverty (Alcock 1997, p. 87; Townsend 1979).

Root Causes and Consequences of Relative Deprivation “Relative deprivation involves the perception that oneself or one’s group does not receive valued resources, goals, ways, or standards of living

which others possess and one feels rightfully entitled to” (Power 2018 cited in Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 55). An unfair exchange and injustice, in most cases, also recast relative deprivation (Pettigrew 1967, p. 266). The discrepancies between the actual and expected situations cause frustration that leads to aggression, and finally induces tension. It requires some conditions as well (Dollard et al. 1939; Džuverovic 2013, pp. 117–118). Gurr (1970) suggests that both political and economic relative deprivations induce conflict (Džuverovic 2013, p. 118; Gurr 1970). In this perspective, the theoretical framework of relative deprivation applies to understand the relationship between economic inequality and conflict (Džuverovic 2013, p. 117). Sensing relative deprivation mingled with violent conflict can trigger unconventional participation including demonstrations, social movements, and so on (Grasso et al. 2017, p. 3). Deprivation also causes the revitalization movement, mainly an organized attempt to create a satisfying culture, which is a blend of the new culture and the previous mode of living. Early Methodism in England and the United States, the Shaker movement in the United States, the Boxer movement in China, and the Mau Mau movement in Kenya are some of the examples of revitalization movements. Social scientists claim these movements as a social response to excessive stress. Later, many theorists have explained, and then accepted the generation of revitalization movement as an approach related to relative deprivation. The relative deprivation approach mentions that revitalization movements may occur when the status and economic circumstances of significant people in society are trailed by the rest of society. It often happens when the dissatisfied group has a relatively high standard of living, as stated in independent economic measures or compared to its past standard of living (Pauls 2010). At present, many societies are witnessing challenges due to the engagement of individuals and groups in terrorism and different violent activities worldwide. Some theorists assert that the experience of relative deprivation due to the surge of social inequalities and intra- and internationally corresponding power asymmetries triggered to be

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involved in violent extremism in the twenty-first century (Moghaddam 2005; Van den Bos 2020 cited in Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 55). Contemporary forms of violent extremism, including lowpower groups’ violent attempts to challenge the unequal status quo, high-power groups’ violent defense of their privileged position and people’s violent attempts to help out-groups in need, can be explained by the experience of relative deprivation (Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 55). It is seen that there lies a causal relationship between extremism and objective deprivation which involves poverty, low educational attainment, lack of political influence, etc. This deprivation leads to many low-power groups to fight against perceived deprivation (Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 56). Although some highly educated people, higher earners, and individuals born in the west are more likely to involve in violent activities, low-power groups’ participation in different domestic riots including extremist violent movement Jihadism, Arab spring, etc., is strongly explained by relative deprivation (Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 56). Similarly, high-power groups are also involved in violent extremism against out-groups to defend their dominant status; it occurs when intergroup inequality is high (Kunst et al. 2017; Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 56; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). For instance, Dutch youth support right-wing violent activism due to their experiences of personal and group deprivation (Doosje et al. 2012). Again, people’s violent attempts to help out-groups are also concerned with relative deprivation as the people take normative collective action on behalf of the outgroup by perceiving their injustice under certain conditions (Kunst and Obaidi 2020, p. 57). Relative deprivation also induces ethnic conflict. An ethnic group may identify itself as marginalized, oppressed, and weakened by the dominant group in power. The group may perceive that they are not getting the same degree of benefit, while the dominant group enjoys the benefit of development. Consequently, they find themselves deprived in many facets of life including economic, socio-cultural, political, and ideological. That marginalization and oppression motivate the ethnic group to respond against

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dominant power to maximize their share of wealth distribution, whereas the dominant group refuses to give them their share, and in doing so, the conflict between the groups starts. Besides, the sense of deprivation also intensifies due to socioeconomic modernization as modernization brings a quality of education and a level of social awareness. In this case, the nonbenefitted ethnic group may involve in conflict to get more access to resources. Moreover, dramatic political structural change, unequal access to political institutions, and a power struggle between the political elites to maintain power may increase grievance among people that may also induce ethnic conflict (Džuverovic 2013, p. 116; Gurr 1970; Haynes 1996, p. 102; Saleh 2013, p. 172). However, the effect of relative deprivation encompasses all types of crime. When individuals relate their situations to the affluent ones, they feel deprived and engage themselves in crime. Finding no decent opportunity (e.g., paid employment) to increase affluence for themselves, they join an easily accessible illegitimate channel and get involved in crime (Brown 2014, p. 1). Those societies possess a higher crime rate where greater degrees of inequality exist. Here, inequality refers to the gap between the material assets of solvent and insolvent people (Merton 1968 cited in Kawachi et al. 1999, p. 720). There is also a correlation between state-level homicide rates and the extent of income inequality. It is found that the state’s level homicide rate is higher where income inequality is greater (Kennedy et al. 1998 cited in Kawachi et al. 1999, p. 720). Relative deprivation, focusing on the feelings raised by intragroup inequalities, often leads to migration. The households make decisions to send migrants to the labor market for expected income gains from migration as they perceive deprivation relatively within the reference group. Thus, relative deprivation also influences the decisions of international migration. After considering a household’s initial absolute income and its expected net income from migration, it is concluded that migration more likely occurs in more relatively deprived families rather than less relatively deprived households (Stark and Taylor 1989, p. 2, 4).

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Critique of Relative Deprivation The difference between the concept of absolute deprivation and comparative deprivation lies in the definition of poverty. Basically, the relative concept of poverty has evolved from the criticism of the absolute concept of poverty (Santos 2018, p. 127). The pioneers of the absolute concept, Rowntree and colleagues, define poverty based on the notion of subsistence. According to them, the people living beneath the subsistence level have a scarcity of resources to survive. In contrast, the relative concept defines poverty based on subsistence and conditions to participate in activities in society. Thus, the relative concept focuses on deprivation (ALCOCK 2006; LISTER 2004; Townsend 1979, p. 31 cited in Santos 2018, pp. 127–128). The theorists of absolute poverty argue that the researchers of the concept of relative poverty are broadening the concept illegitimately by explaining the redistribution of wealth. But it is evident that many aspects of the concept of absolute poverty depend on the relative concept of deprivation to explain. Even theorist Rowntree considered relative measures in his studies about poverty in Britain (Alcock 2006; VEIT-WILSON 1987 cited in Santos 2018, pp. 129–130). Alcock (2006, p. 68) asserts that both absolute and relative concepts of poverty have advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, it is not worth going with just one of them. Sen (1983) also explains that both relative and absolute approaches to measuring poverty are important, and it is not possible to understand the true meaning of poverty by referring to only one of them. He further admits the drawback of the relative concept and asserts that the concept has added several aspects to the study of poverty, but it fails to address the absoluteness of needs and the difference between achieving relatively less than others and achieving less because of falling behind others. Later, he (1983) also argues on the relation between poverty and inequality, which contributes to the argument of a relative concept of poverty. Sen (1983) mentions that poverty and inequality are relevant but poverty is not merely a matter of inequality. As the complete elimination of poverty is impossible, it is difficult to distinguish between poverty with

respect to the discussion of inequality. Sen (1983) also states that the absolute core of poverty is related to facts such as starvation, malnutrition, and avoidable diseases. On the other hand, an individual’s absolute satisfaction also depends on their relative position in front of others. In this perspective, Sen’s (1983) concept of poverty is focused on functionings and capability. Here, the capability is the freedom that permits people to choose any kind of function or to have any kind of lifestyle. If a person fails to achieve a certain minimum of capabilities, they would certainly experience poverty (Sen 1981, 1983, 1992, 2000 cited in Santos 2018, pp. 133–135, 137). Some critics also argue that the indicators of Townsend’s (1979) relative deprivation approach are arbitrary in determining the indicators of the deprivation as the methodology of the approach was unable to allow for difference and choice in how people live. In this way, a new model named “consensual method” has evolved to explain deprivation to measure poverty (Mack 2016). The consensual model is also known as the “Perceived Deprivation approach” where deprivation is determined by the public opinion and with an enforced lack of “necessities” that are considered to address deprivation. This is a direct measure to admit deprivation by examining the extent of it among the groups in society (Mack 2011).

Final Concluding Considerations on Relative Deprivation and the SDGs Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a plan of action set for people, planet, and prosperity. In 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations incorporated 17 goals and 169 targets in its agenda adopting this universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure peace and prosperity by 2030. “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all.” Each major and crucial global challenge that is interconnected in nature, such as poverty, inequality, climate change, environmental degradation, peace, and justice, is addressed by SDGs (United Nations 2017, 2018).

Relative Deprivation and the Sustainable Development Goals

However, relative deprivation is deeply connected to poverty and inequality (Alcock 2006; Townsend 1987). Townsend (1987), a leading pioneer in this field, considers the concept of deprivation as an aspect to measure poverty. He suggests that people are likely to feel deprived when they get limited access to some material conditions (e.g., diet, clothing) as well as lack of access to social conditions (e.g., access to political systems, social recognition). Moreover, relative deprivation portrays the problem of inequality in society concerning the standard of living (Alcock 2006; Townsend 1987; cited in Santos 2018, p. 29). Theory of inequity is also an integration of the concept of relative deprivation and justice to understand the perception of justice and injustice (Adams 1965, p. 268 cited in Crosby and GONZALEZ-INTAL 1984). Similarly, Pettigrew (1967, p. 266) asserts that unfair exchange and injustice recast relative deprivation. So, it is evident that the aspects of relative deprivation are well-connected with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The goals which are most relevant with relative deprivation are as follows: Goal 1: “No Poverty – End poverty in all its forms everywhere”

Goal 2: “Zero Hunger – End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture” Goal 3: “Good Health and Well-Being – Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”

Goal 4: “Quality Education – Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” Goal 5: “Gender Equality – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”

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Goal 8: “Decent Work and Economic Growth – Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all” Goal 10: “Reduced Inequalities – Reduce inequality within and among countries”

Goal 11: “Sustainable Cities and Communities – Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” Goal 16: “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions – Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (United Nations 2017, 2018)

The termination of relative deprivation is directly connected with “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels,” goal-16 of Agenda 30 (United Nations 2017, 2018). In this case, global challenges including poverty, inequality, violence, extremism, climate change, and environmental degradation are needed to combat for establishing peace. Although the Sustainable Development Goals Report 2020 (The Sustainable Goals Report 2020, n.d.) shows that countries all over the world are improving in different sectors such as maternal and child health, access to electricity, women’s representation in government, and eliminating extreme poverty, the world is encountering an economic recession and income inequality. It is seen that the COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the 2030 Agenda to a great extent. It has become a threat to increase feeling or perceiving deprivation among people as frustration and resentment are accelerating in societies where people encounter limited access to social services, discrimination, inequalities, limited job opportunities, week institutions, and scare resources. This

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may increase the risks to take collective action by people, for instance, participating in conventional movements including social movements, strikes and protests, violence, ethnic conflicts, etc. As an example, the United States has already witnessed a historical protest due to the killing of George Floyd by a police officer. Besides, American citizens are getting frustrated by the weak Covid-19 pandemic response by the government and by unemployment that is continuously increasing. Moreover, the economic fallout is likely to trigger existing grievances in developing countries including Nigeria, Iran, Bangladesh, Algeria, and Ethiopia. Subsequently, 37 countries in Africa and Latin America could face street protests in upcoming days (McVeigh 2020). These incidences are the result of grievances, frustration, and resentment of people for the existing crisis which is a threat to ensure peace and justice. In this perspective, global fraternity and inclusiveness of state institutions are needed to strengthen to combat the challenges. From the above discussion, it is clearly understood that the relative deprivation is highly connected to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It may differ from person to person and society to society. However, the individual perspective and society’s perspective on relative deprivation may not get along. But, as relative deprivation often results in conventional movements including social movements, strikes, protests, etc., and violent conflicts, ethnic conflicts, crime, extremism, migration, and so on, researchers and policymakers should conduct more in-depth research on the concept of relative deprivation. In doing so, it will bring new perspectives and reduce feeling or perceiving deprivation proportionately to establish a peaceful and just society.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Insurgency and Its Impact on the Attainment of Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability ▶ Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

References Adams JS (1965) Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2 ). New York: Academic Press Alcock P (1997) Deprivation and social exclusion. In: Campling J (ed) Understanding poverty. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25666-2_6 Alcock P (2006) Understanding poverty, 3rd edn. Palgrave McMillan, London Brown FH (2014) Relative deprivation, opportunity and crime: a study of young men’s motivations for committing Burglary. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirement of London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Stoke-on-Trent: London School of Economics and Political Science. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2421/1/ U615370.pdf. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Crosby F (1976) a model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychological Review 83(2):85–113. Crosby F (1979) Relative deprivation: a response to millar, bolce and halligan. The American Political Science Review 73(1):103–112. Crosby F (1982) Relative deprivation and working women. Oxford: Oxford University Press Crosby F, Gonzalez-Intal AM (1984) Relative deprivation and equity theories. In: Folger R (ed) The sense of injustice. Critical issues in social justice. Springer, Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2683-0_5 Davis JA (1959) A formal interpretation of the theory of relative deprivation. Sociometry 22(4):280–296 Dollard J et al (1939) Frustration and aggression. Yale University Press, New Haven Doosje B et al (2012) My In-group is superior!: susceptibility for radical right-wing attitudes and behaviors in Dutch Youth. Negot Confl Manag Res 5:253–268. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2012.00099.x. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Džuverovic N (2013) Does more (or less) lead to violence? Application of the relative deprivation hypothesis on economic inequality-induced conflicts. CIRR XIX(68):115–132 Fahey T (2011) Poverty and the two concepts of relative deprivation: implications for EU poverty measurement. Seminar presentation, CASE social exclusion seminar series, London School of Economics. http://sticerd.lse. ac.uk/seminarpapers/ses02112011.pdf. Accessed 12 Aug 2020 Grasso MT et al (2017) Relative deprivation and inequalities in social and political activism. Acta Polit 54:398– 429. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-017-0072-y. Accessed 12 Aug 2020 Gurr RT (1968) A causal model of civil strife: a comparative analysis using new in-dices. Am Polit Sci Rev 62:1104–1124 Gurr RT (1970) Why men rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton Haynes J (1996) Third world politics. In: A concise introduction. Blackwell, Oxford Homans GC (1961) Social behavior: its elementary forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World

Representation Kawachi I, Kennedy BP, Wilkinson RG (1999) Crime: social disorganization and relative deprivation. Soc Sci Med 48(6):719–731. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0277-9536(98)00400-6. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Kennedy BP, Kawachi I, Prothrow-Stith D, Gibbs B, Lochner K (1998) Social capital, income inequality and firearm violent crime. Soc Sci Med 47:7–17 Kunst JR, Obaidi M (2020) Understanding violent extremism in the 21st century: the (reemerging) role of relative deprivation. Curr Opin Psychol 35:55–59. https:// www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235225 0X20300397. Accessed 12 Aug 2020 Kunst JR, Fischer R, Sidanius J, Tomsen L (2017) Preferences for group dominance track and mediate the effects of macro-level social inequality and violence across societies. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 114:5407–5412 Lister R (2004) Poverty. Polity Press, Cambridge Mack J (2011) Consensual method. https://www.poverty.ac. uk/definitions-poverty/consensual-method. Accessed 5 Aug 2020 Mack J (2016) Deprivation and poverty. https://www. poverty.ac.uk/definitions-poverty/deprivation-and-pov erty. Accessed 5 Aug 2020 McVeigh K (2020) Protests predicted to surge globally as Covid-19 drives unrest. The Guardian. [online] 17 Jul. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 2020/jul/17/protests-predicted-to-surge-globally-ascovid-19-drives-unrest. Accessed 16 Aug. 2020 Merton RK, Kitt AS (1950) Contributions to the theory of reference group behavior. In: Merton RK, Lazersfeld PF (eds) Continuities in social research. Studies in the scope and method of “The American Soldier”. Free Press, New York Moghaddam FM (2005) The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration. American Psychologist 60:161–169 Pauls EP (ed) (2010) Revitalization movement. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/ revitalization-movement. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Pettigrew TF (1967) Social evaluation theory. In: Levine D (ed) Nebraska symposium on motivation. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, pp 241–311 Pettigrew TF (2016) In pursuit of three theories: authoritarianism, relative deprivation, and intergroup contact. Annu Rev Psychol 67:1–21 Runciman WG (1966) Relative deprivation and social justice. Routledge Kegan Paul, London Saleh A (2013) Relative deprivation theory, nationalism, ethnicity and identity conflicts. Geopolit Q 8 (4):156–174 Santos TMD (2018) Poverty as lack of capabilities: an analysis of the definition of poverty of Amartya Sen. 9:125–148. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327381829_ POVERTY_AS_LACK_OF_CAPABILITIES_AN_ ANALYSIS_OF_THE_DEFINITION_OF_POVERTY_ OF_AMARTYA_SEN. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Sen A (1983) Poor, relatively speaking. Oxf Econ Pap 35 (2):183–169 Sidanius J, Pratto F (1999) Social dominance: an intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge University Press, New York

801 Smith HJ et al (2012) Relative deprivation: a theoretical and meta-analytic review. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 16 (3):203–232. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10. 1177/1088868311430825. Accessed 12 Aug 2020 Stark O, Taylor JE (1989) Relative deprivation and international migration. Demography 26(1):1–14. https:// www.jstor.org/stable/2061490?seq¼1#metadata_info_ tab_contents. Accessed 12 Aug 2020 Stouffer SA, Suchman EA, DeVinney LC, Star SA, Williams RM Jr (1949) The American soldier: adjustment during army life, 1. Princeton University Press, Princeton The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2020 (n.d.) [online]. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/The-Sus tainable-Development-Goals-Report-2020.pdf. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Townsend P (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom. Allen Lane and Penguin Books, London Townsend P (1987) Deprivation. J Soc Policy 16(2):125– 146 United Nations (2017) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. [online] https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/trans formingourworld. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 United Nations (2018) About the sustainable development goals – United Nations Sustainable Development. [online] United Nations Sustainable Development. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustain able-development-goals/. Accessed 6 Aug 2020 Van Zomeren M (2017) Relative deprivation theory. In: Moghaddem FM (ed) The Sage encyclopedia of political behaviour. Sage, Thousand Oaks Veit-Wilson JH (1987) Consensual approaches to poverty lines and social security. J Soc Policy 16(2):183–211 Verme P (2013) Relative deprivation, discontent and revolutions. [Online] 23rd December, 2013. blogs. worldbank.org https://blogs.worldbank.org/ developmenttalk/relative-deprivation-discontent-andrevolutions. Accessed 10 Aug 2020 Walster E, Berscheid E, Walster GW (1973) New directions in equity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25:151–176

Reparation ▶ “Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

Representation ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability

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Resolving Belt and Road Initiative Disputes Through Mediation Rajesh Sharma, Reina Ichii and Ahsan Hanif School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia

Definition Mediation means a process, whether referred to by the expression mediation, conciliation, or an expression of similar import, whereby parties request a third person or persons (the “mediator”) to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute arising out of or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship. The mediator does not have any authority to impose upon the parties a solution to the dispute.

Introduction Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) involves infrastructure development in the countries along the belt and road. Some of those projects may involve more than one country along the belt and road. BRI comprises of two major components, i.e., twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road (CMSR) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Firstly, the sea-based route of CMSR connects the South China Sea with the South Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. Secondly, the SREB is a land-based route that connect China to Europe through intensive networking of roads, rails, fiber, and other supply channels (Jones and Zeng 2019). BRI invests in more than 70 countries of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East with an estimated investment ranging from USD 1 trillion to USD 6 trillion (Zhai 2018). The investment is used for energy, construction, industrial, other infrastructure, and communication projects. BRI includes six economic corridors to connect countries under the flagship of BRI. These include (1) China–Mongolia–Russia economic corridor, (2) New Eurasia Land Bridge (Second Eurasia

land bridge) economic corridor, (3) China– Central Asia–West Asia economic corridor, (4) China–Indochina peninsula economic corridor, (5) Bangladesh, China India, and Myanmar economic corridor, and (6) China–Pakistan economic corridor (Aoyama 2016). It is expected that timely completion of roads, bridges, railway lines, and power projects will bring benefits to the people down in line immediately after completion of the work. This might be ultimately accepted by the people benefiting at large. To some extent the BRI is realizing the goals of the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4th December 1986 (UN 1986). It is also true that BRI projects may also lead to dispute among private parties, private parties with governments, and between governments too. It is also possible that one action or decision may give rise to disputes based on contract, treaty, or other instruments, which may involve private parties and governments. In some situation even general people may have concerns related to BRI projects (Hanif et al. 2020). It is also important that while dispute is being resolved the project must go on so that it can be completed on time (Sharma 2020). For example, a payment dispute for a section of a road project should not hinder the completion of the full road. Most of the countries along the belt and road are supporters of amicable solution of any dispute. Therefore, a dispute resolution process which gives emphasis on consultation, negotiation, and mediation as the main method of resolving disputes may be acceptable to countries at large (Wang et al. 2020).

Dispute Settlement Mechanism for the Belt and Road: The Proposal Having a good dispute resolution mechanism is as important as the Belt and Road projects including water supply, power plants, road, and train construction projects. Otherwise, benefits of these projects will not reach to the people at large (Sharma 2020). With this view in mind, a group

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of experts from the International Academy of the Belt and Road has drafted the rules for the dispute settlement mechanism for the Belt and Road Rules (B&R rules) which is effective, efficient, and practical (Wang et al. 2020). The key mantra of the B&R rules is that while the dispute is being resolved the project must not stop. The first port of call for dispute resolution is the use of national grievance/good offices. It is generally seen that at the time of dispute governments ignore the demands of the private parties. The national grievance/good offices will help bring private and government together to resolve dispute before it escalates further. If a dispute is still not resolved, then parties are required to use mediation. Mediation is a mandatory step before commencing arbitration. Mediation may be conducted privately or with the assistance of any institution such as the proposed Belt and Road Dispute Resolution Center. Mediation is the part of the culture of majority of the Belt and Road countries, so use of mediation is highly emphasized in the B&R dispute resolution rules (Wang et al. 2020). Now with the enactment of the Singapore Convention for the enforcement of the settlement agreement, any settlement reached through mediation may also be enforced by using the Singapore Convention. If a dispute is not settled through mediation then parties may use arbitration for final determination which is also subject to appeal system in investment disputes and state-to-state disputes. The B&R rules allow the unique use of mediation to reach any compromise between the disputing parties after arbitration. It is possible that parties, after arbitration, understand more about each others’ economic and other conditions and in the spirit of friendship and long-term relationship agree to reduce damages, or give extra time or use different ways to execute the final award. The mediation rules proposed for the BRI disputes cover commercial disputes, investment disputes, and disputes arising between state-to-state in relation to BRI projects. The process of mediation is made flexible so that parties can initiate mediation even if a formal dispute resolution process, e.g., court or arbitration proceeding, has commenced. It is a simple process to commence

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mediation under these rules. A party may initiate mediation by sending a written request to mediate to the other party or parties. The request of mediation should contain: (a) a summary of the differences or disputes sufficient to identify the matter giving rise to the request; (b) an identification of any treaty, contract, or other legal instruments to which the differences or disputes relate; (c) the names and contact details of the requesting party and its representative(s); and (d) either a reference to the agreement to mediate or an invitation to the other party or parties to mediate under these rules. A copy of the mediation request should also be sent to the secretariat of the Belt and Road Dispute Resolution Center (hereinafter “BNRDRC”). In order to centralize the operation or record of disputes arising out of BRI, the establishment of an institution has been envisaged with a suggested name of “Belt and Road Dispute Resolution Centre.” The mediation is considered as commenced when the secretariat of the BNRDRC receives the request for mediation. The mediation rules require the parties not to initiate, during the mediation proceedings, any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of a dispute that is the subject of the mediation proceedings, except that a party may initiate arbitral or judicial proceedings where, in his opinion, such proceedings are necessary for preserving the rights such as preservation of evidence. In order to keep costs of mediation low, the rule encourages parties to appoint one mediator. However, if parties agree they may choose to have three mediators. This flexibility is there because it is possible that a dispute may be complex or include multiparties, so a panel of three mediators may be appropriate. It is expected that parties will cooperate in selecting a sole mediator or the third mediator otherwise; BNRDC has the default power to appoint the sole mediator or the third mediator as the case may be. The mediator may be any person which parties consider suitable to assist them in resolving their dispute or differences. It is important that the mediator must be impartial and independent. Prior to accepting an appointment as a mediator, any person under consideration is required to provide a signed and

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dated “statement of independence and availability” to the secretary of the BNRDRC. In the statement of independence and availability, the person under consideration to act as a mediator should: (a) disclose any facts or circumstances that might call into question the mediator’s independence or impartiality in the eyes of the parties and (b) state the mediator’s availability and willingness to conduct the mediation expeditiously and efficiently within the time limit agreed by the parties or, in the absence of such an agreement, within a reasonable time limit following the mediator’s appointment. In order to maintain independence and impartiality, the mediation rules emphasize that a mediator must not be a national of parties involved in a dispute. However, recognizing the importance of parties’ autonomy the mediation rules allow a mediator to be the national of one or either parties if parties so agree. The obligation of independence and impartiality is a continuous one so even during the proceeding of mediation. Therefore, if during the course of the mediation, a mediator becomes aware of any facts or circumstances that might call into question the mediator’s independence or impartiality in the eyes of the parties, the mediator is duty-bound to disclose those facts or circumstances to the parties in writing without any delay. If, during the course of the mediation, a party objects for any reason to a mediator continuing to act, then that party must notify the mediator, the other party, and the secretariat of the BNRDRC. The notification should preferably state the reasons for the objection. If a mediator resigns or is incapacitated or otherwise becomes unable to perform the mediator’s functions, a new mediator will be appointed according to these rules. The role of mediator(s), in the BRI dispute resolution process, is to assist the parties independently and impartially in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute. In this regard, the mediator will be guided by principles of objectivity, fairness, and justice, giving consideration to, among other things, the rights and obligations of the parties, the usage of the concerned trade, and the circumstances surrounding the dispute, including any previous business practices between the parties. The mediator is

allowed to conduct the proceedings in such a manner as he considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the wishes of the parties, including any request by a party that the mediator hears oral statements, and the need for a speedy settlement of the dispute. The mediator should assist the parties to reach an agreement on a settlement of their dispute on a voluntary basis in which the parties make free, informed, and self-determined choices as to the process and the outcome. With the agreement of the parties, the mediator may consult one or more experts. In order to make mediation an effective and efficient method of dispute resolution, the parties to a dispute are required to cooperate with the mediator and each other in good faith. It is mandatory under the mediation rules that the mediation must be held out at least one time in (one) month(s) from the date of the appointment of the mediator(s). In the mediation, each party may be represented or assisted by agents, counsel, or advocates whose names must be notified by that party to the mediator before the mediation session. In the Belt and Road countries, different languages are spoken so the mediation rules provide English as a default language of mediation. Otherwise, parties are free to choose any languages for their mediation. As mediation, in the BRI dispute resolution process, is a party-driven dispute resolution process, therefore, the mediation rules encourage that the mediation should run following the parties’ wishes and with the assistance of the mediator. During the process of mediation, the mediator may communicate with the parties orally or in writing, either jointly or individually, at any point during the mediation. The mediator is also allowed to conduct meetings with one party only which is a normal process in mediation, and it is not considered as ex parte communication. In this situation, the mediator should also give opportunity to the other party to meet in private. As a matter of rule, no information provided orally by a party to the mediator during a separate meeting may be disclosed to any other party by the mediator, unless the party explicitly so authorizes the mediator. However, in a co-mediation, each co-mediator is required to share with the other co-mediator all written or oral communications

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received from a party or parties. The co-mediators should coordinate their efforts and jointly conduct the mediation. During the proceedings, the mediator may suggest or request that a party provide such additional information or materials as the mediator sees to fit. Each party may, on his (her) own initiative or at the invitation of the mediator, submit to the mediator suggestions for the settlement of the dispute. When it appears to the mediator that there exist elements of a settlement which would be acceptable to the parties, he or she should formulate the terms of a possible settlement and submits them to the parties for their comments. After receiving the comments of the parties, the mediator may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement in the light of such comments. However, the mediator must not impose on the parties any partial or complete settlement of the differences or disputes. If the parties reach an agreement on a settlement of the dispute, they draw up and sign a written settlement agreement. If requested by the parties, the mediator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up the settlement agreement. The parties by signing the settlement agreement put an end to the dispute and are legally bound by the agreement. The signing of a settlement agreement marks the termination of the mediation process. Thus, a BRI dispute can be resolved through mediation. Under these mediation rules, the mediation is confidential and hence the mediator and the parties must keep confidential all matters relating to the mediation proceedings. The obligation of confidentiality also extends to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement. Following the principle of confidentiality and giving effect to the mediation process the mediation rules require the parties to undertake not to rely on or to introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the mediation proceedings: (a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute; (b) admissions made by the other party in the

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course of the mediation proceedings; (c) proposals made by the mediator; and (d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the mediator. The mediaton rules require a mediator to give undertaking that he/she will not act as an arbitrator or as a representative or counsel of a party in any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of the same dispute. The mediation rules allow a party to take the dispute to arbitration if mediation fails. Therefore, such restrictions on a mediator is in line with principle of confidentiality, independence, and impartiality of the mediator. The parties also undertake that they will not present the mediator as a witness in any such proceedings. This undertaking of parties mainly protects mediator from being part of other proceedings and keeps mediator’s mind at rest while assisting parties are reaching to their settlement. The mediation rules have strived to keep the cost of mediation as low as possible. In this regard, before the commencement of the mediation proceedings, the secretariat of the BNRDC gives the parties with the information about the proposed costs. The “costs” of mediation includes only: (a) the fee of the mediator which must be reasonable in amount and the travel and other expenses of the mediator; (b) the administrative expenses of the BNRDRC; (c) the travel and other expenses of witnesses requested by the mediator with the consent of the parties; and (d) the cost of any expert advice requested by the mediator with the consent of the parties. Upon termination of the mediation proceedings, the secretariat fixes the costs of the mediation and gives written notice thereof to the parties. As a general rule costs are borne equally by the parties unless the settlement agreement provides for a different apportionment. All other expenses incurred by a party are borne by that party. The secretary-general of BNRDRC may request each party to deposit an equal amount as an advance for the costs and expenses. In comparison to litigation and arbitration costs, the cost of mediation is relatively low. In mediation settlement is not reached based on law, therefore to a large extent there is no need to involve any lawyer and thus the legal cost can be

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saved easily. There is no fee table available for mediation, however, reference can be drawn from the arbitration fee table available for the Belt and Road dispute resolution mechanism. There a nonrefundable filing fee is charged USD 2,000. The administration fee is dependent on the amount in a claim. For example, a claim of up to USD 50,000 will attract administrative fee of USD 3,800. The maximum amount of the administrative fee is capped at USD 95,000 for any claim above USD 100 million. Arbitrator’s fee is also linked to the amount of the claim. For example, any claims up to USD 50,000 will attract USD 6,500 as arbitrator’s fee. For a claim ranging from USD 100 million to USD 500 million, arbitrator’s fee will be USD 344,900 + 0.065% excess over USD 100 million. Even arbitrator’s fee is capped to a maximum of USD 2 million. It is to note that these figures do not include a lawyer’s cost. Therefore, the cost of dispute resolution is linked to the amount claimed. The BRI projects are multibillion dollar projects and, in that comparison, capping of administration fee and arbitrator’s cost is seen as respite for parties. Conciliation (similar to mediation) of investment disputes under the auspices of the World Bank ICSID (International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes) Convention costs USD 92,000 per party. It is well known that claims in investment arbitration are in tune of billions of dollars. BRI countries which are parties to the ICSID Convention may take their dispute to ICSID forum and use conciliation to resolve their disputes. Some experts consider that BRI disputes will fall under the category of investorstate dispute (Shi and Dong 2018). The ICSID is now in the process of revising its rules and hoping that parties will opt more for conciliation which was initially envisaged by the ICSID members. The drafting history of ICSID Convention indicates that in a meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963, Mr. Aron Broches said that “it might well be found when the Convention came into operation, that conciliation activities under the auspices of the Centre proved more important than arbitral proceedings.” Unfortunately, more disputes went for arbitration than conciliation. So now with the revision of conciliation rules under ICSID, it is

again hoped that parties will choose conciliation over the arbitration. Considering the rising cost of arbitration and the economic condition of a private party, the ICSID conciliation rules have allowed for the “third-party funding” for conciliation. The third-party funding is now acceptable in the field of arbitration so it is also introduced in conciliation. “Third-party funding” is the provision of funds or other material support to a party in a conciliation, by a natural or juridical person that is not a party to the dispute (“third-party funder”), an affiliate of that party, or a law firm representing that party. Such funds or material support may be provided: (a) through a donation or grant, or (b) in return for a premium or in exchange for remuneration or reimbursement wholly or partially dependent on the outcome of the proceeding. It is hoped that a party who does not have any financial capacity to initiate a claim against a government then such funding will help them to protect their rights and to get justice. For nonsignatories of the ICSID Convention, ICSID has also formulated “the (Additional Facility) Mediation Rules (AFMR).” Those member countries of BRI that are not signatories to ICSID Convention may be able to use AFMR. The AFMR is different from the ICSID conciliation rules and such differences are seen in (i) the institution of the proceeding; (ii) the appointment of the mediator; (iii) the role of the mediator; (iv) the conduct of the proceeding; and (v) the fact that mediation under the proposed (AF)MR is an entirely voluntary process, allowing a party to withdraw at any time. Under AFMR, mediation can be initiated in two ways. If there is a prior agreement to mediate then mediation can be initiated by giving written notice to the party. If there is no prior agreement to mediate then a party wishing initiate mediation may give an offer of mediation to the other party through the secretary-general. If the other party accepts the offer then the case will be registered and mediation will commence. However, if the other party does not accept the offer of mediation then it is considered as “manifestly outside the scope” of mediation. Under AFMR, parties may appoint one mediator and if they agree to have two mediators then both mediators are

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appointed by agreement. If there is no agreement on the appointment of mediator then the secretarygeneral appoints “sole mediator” after consulting with parties. In addition to the general qualification of independence and impartiality, under AFMR rules party may agree to set a particular qualification, knowledge, or experience for a mediator relevant for the subject matter of dispute. The first meeting of mediation is important under AFMR. To facilitate the initial discussion between the mediator and the parties, the parties will each provide the mediator with a brief initial statement describing the issues in dispute and their positions or views on these issues before the first session. The mediator will then conduct the mediation based on the protocol for the mediation as determined at the first session. While conducting the mediation the mediator is required to take into account the views of the parties and the circumstances of the dispute. The mediator must conduct the mediation expeditiously and cost-effectively. If requested by the parties, the mediator may make oral or written recommendations for the resolution of all or part of the dispute. However, for the parties to make the final call on any agreement, a mediator cannot impose a solution on the parties. However, the mediator may obtain expert advice with the agreement of the parties during the conduct of the mediation. In BRI disputes, which may involve complex matters, use of an expert is a sensible approach strategy for the peaceful resolution of disputes among parties.

Enforcement of Settlement Agreement Resulting from Mediation The problem of enforceability of settlement agreement resulting from mediation was considered as the great deficiency of mediation which was a big hurdle in making mediation popular among international businesses. In various surveys it was revealed that international business would use mediation if there is a legal mechanism to enforce mediated settlement similar to how arbitral awards are directly enforced through the

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New York Convention. This factor was emphasized in the US Proposal at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [hereinafter UNCITRAL] and it was noted that “one obstacle to greater use of conciliation, however, it is the settlement agreements reached through conciliation that may be more difficult to enforce than arbitral awards, if a party that agrees to a settlement agreement later fails to comply” (UN 2014). Therefore, the UNCITRAL took up this issue and worked for 3 years to produce a legal instrument, i.e., the United Nation Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, also known as the Singapore Convention (the Singapore Convention), which is akin to the New York Convention (UN 2018). The Singapore Convention is “uniform and efficient framework for the enforcement of international settlement agreements resulting from mediation and for allowing parties to invoke such agreements” (Knieper and Corinne 2018). It is expected that the Singapore Convention will “become an essential instrument in the facilitation of international trade and the promotion of mediation as an alternative and effective method of resolving trade disputes” because it “ensures that a settlement agreement reached by parties becomes binding and enforceable following a simplified and streamlined procedure” (UN 2018). At a higher level is it expected the “the establishment of a framework for international settlement agreements resulting from mediation that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic systems would contribute to the development of harmonious international economic relations” (UN 2018). There is no doubt that the Singapore Convention will help BRI disputes to be resolved through mediation. The Singapore Convention provides a mechanism for the direct enforcement of the settlement agreement resulting from an “international” “commercial” mediation. For the Singapore Convention, the condition of “international” must be satisfied at the time of the conclusion of the settlement agreement and not before or after. The Singapore Convention specifically says that only those settlement agreements which are, “at the time of

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conclusion” of the agreement, international can be covered by the Singapore Convention (Sharma 2019). Even in situations where the disputing parties are from the same state but the substantial part of the settlement agreement is performed in a different state or the subject matter of the settlement agreement is closely connected with a different state then the condition of “international” will be met to apply the Singapore Convention. Thus the definition of “international” is most suitable in the context of BRI because projects of BRI are passing through different countries. The Singapore Convention facilitates the enforcement of commercial settlements resulting from mediation. This means the subject matter of the settlement must result from commercial disputes. The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; and carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road. The definition of commercial is wide enough to include investment-related disputes if parties want to settle their disputes through mediation and therefore can use the Singapore Convention for the enforcement of the settlement agreements arising from mediation. During the drafting of the Singapore Convention, there was a consensus that settlement agreements involving government entities should be within the ambit of the Singapore Convention because some government entities may like to use mediation to resolve their commercial disputes (Verbist 2018). However, if a state wishes to exclude government entities outside the scope of the Singapore Convention then it may make such declarations. It is noted that by way of declarations a state may not exempt state-owned enterprises (hereinafter “SOEs”) from the coverage of the Convention because SOEs by nature conduct commercial activities.

To apply to the Singapore Convention, the international commercial settlement must result from mediation. For this purpose, a party invoking the Singapore Convention will provide any of the following evidence: (a) the mediator’s signature on the settlement agreement or (b) a document signed (separately) by the mediator indicating that the mediation was carried out, or (c) an attestation by the institution that administered the mediation. Anyone of these will be sufficient for the court to conclude that there was mediation which resulted in an international settlement agreement presented before the court. For some reason, if the above one of the three documents could not be furnished then a party may present “any other evidence acceptable” to the court. The settlement agreements may be used for the two purposes under the Singapore Convention: 1. for enforcement and 2. for use as a defense if the same issue or case is raised again in a court or before the arbitral tribunal. The functional approach of the “recognition” allows a party to use an international settlement as evidence before a court to prove that the alleged issue before a court in litigation or arbitration has already been mediated and a final and binding settlement has been reached between the parties (Schnabel 2019). Therefore, once a party invokes the Singapore Convention with regards to an international settlement a court needs to ascertain as per the request of that party whether it is made for enforcement or only for use as an evidence to prove that the matter is already resolved. This will help parties to BNR disputes if a party tries to relitigate or arbitrate a dispute which has already been resolved through mediation. When an international settlement agreement is used to request relief by a party to the settlement agreement before a court, then that court is under a positive duty to enforce that settlement agreement and that court is also obligated to decide on the matter expeditiously. Only on the very limited ground, courts can refuse the grant of relief concerning that international settlement agreement. Those grounds for refusing the grant of relief are exhaustive: 1. A party to the settlement agreement was under some incapacity.

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2. Settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed under the law to which parties have validly subjected it or failing any indication thereon, under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority. 3. Is not binding, or is not final according to its terms. 4. Has been subsequently modified. 5. Obligations in the settlement agreement have been performed. 6. Obligations are not clear and comprehensible. 7. Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement. 8. There was serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable to the mediator or the mediation without which breach that party would not have entered into the settlement agreement. 9. There was failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose had a material impact or undue influence on a party without which failure that party would not have entered into the settlement agreement. 10. Granting of relief would be contrary to the public policy. 11. The subject matter of dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law of that state. The grounds for refusal of relief in the Singapore Convention have been designed in the context of mediation. For example, a serious breach of mediator’s standards and conflict of interest as a direct ground to refuse the grant of relief which is an important aspect of the mediation process. The court may also refuse the grant of relief if the settlement agreement is not clear or incomprehensible. This situation may happen if the settlement agreement is not drafted or the clarity of terms becomes lost in translation. The relief a court could grant that must be clear to courts. The ground of public policy is similar to the New York Convention and thus courts of Belt and Road countries would be able to apply their public policy. The Singapore Convention has also introduced the

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idea of “mediability” because if the subject matter of a dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law of the country where relief is sought then the court may refuse grant of relief. The Singapore Convention does not include reciprocity reservation and it is not tied to any “seat,” therefore a party from a country which is not a signatory to the Convention can use the Singapore Convention to seek a grant of relief in a country which is a signatory of the Singapore Convention as there are many Belt and Road countries that have not signed the Singapore Convention.

Conclusion Considering the Asian culture, it is believed that the mediation is the best way to resolve such disputes. In this regards the proposed mediation rules provide efficient, effective, and practical sets of rules of mediation to resolve any or all disputes between commercial parties, investorstate, state to state, and economy to economy. These rules have taken into account the culture, regional, and various levels of economic and legal developments among the Belt and Road countries. The biggest defect of mediation as a dispute resolution process for cross-border enforcement of the settlement agreements resulting from mediation has now been cured by the Singapore Convention. This Convention has made mediation a self-sufficient process and there is no need to convert a settlement agreement into an award or a judgement to make the cross-border enforcement possible. Now the settlement agreements can be enforced directly with the help of the Singapore Convention. The Singapore Convention provides for very limited and exhaustive grounds for refusing the grant of relief though some grounds of refusal are specifically designed for mediation. It is hoped that with the help of the Singapore Convention, belt and road countries and businesses involved will choose mediation even more to resolve their disputes. Thus both the mediation rules and the Singapore Convention will help create peace, justice, and strong institution within the Belt and Road countries.

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References

Restorative Justice Aoyama R (2016) One belt, one road: China’s new global strategy. J Contemp East Asia Stud 5(2):3–22 Hanif A, Sharma R, Ichii R (2020) Resolving CPEC Issues in Balochistan Through Local Government. Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Partnerships for the Goals. Pakistan. Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/2F978-3-319-71067-9_97-1 Jones L, Zeng J (2019) Understanding China’s belt and road initiative: beyond grand strategy to a state transformation analysis. Third World Q 40(8):1415–1439 Knieper J, Corinne M (2018) UNCITRAL and a new international legislative framework on mediation. Special TMD Dutch-Belgian Mediation Q 22(4):23. https://doi.org/10.5553/tmd/138638782018022004002 Schnabel T (2019) The Singapore convention on mediation: a framework for the cross-border recognition and enforcement of mediated settlements. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution J 19:1–60 Sharma R (2019) The Singapore Convention – a drone’s view. Contemp Asia Arbitr J 12(2):265–277 Sharma R (2020) Framework of dispute settlement for the belt and road. In: Wang G et al (eds) Dispute resolution mechanism for the belt and road (Red Book). Zhejiang University Press, pp 483–573 Shi J, Dong N (2018) The construction of investor-state dispute settlement mechanism under “The Belt and Road” initiative. Wuhan Univ Int Law Rev 3(2):1 UN (1986) Declaration on the right to development, adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ pages/righttodevelopment.aspx. Accessed 17 Apr 2020 UN (2014) Commission on International Trade Law, Planned and Possible Future Work – Part III: proposal by the Government of the United States of America: future work for working group II. https://uncitral.un. org/en/commission. Accessed 5 Apr 2020 UN (2018) Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law of Its Fifty-first Session. https://www. uncitral.org/pdf/english/commissionsessions/51stsession/Final_Edited_version_in_English_28-8-2018. pdf. Accessed 8 Apr 2020 Verbist H (2018) UNCITRAL instruments on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements resulting from mediation. Special TMD Dutch-Belgian Mediation Q 22(4):6 Wang G, Lee YK, Leung MF (2020) Dispute resolution mechanism for the belt and road initiative (Red Book). Springer, Singapore Zhai F (2018) China’s belt and road initiative: a preliminary quantitative assessment. J Asian Econ 55:84–92

▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Indigenous Peoples: Conflict, Peace, and Resolution

Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques Jennifer Speed Department of Religious Studies, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA

Synonyms Alternative dispute resolution; Community circles; Community conferencing; Criminal justice reform; Mediation; Peacebuilding; Social justice; Victim offender dialogue

Definition Restorative justice encompasses both a set of contemporary practices for, and a philosophical approach to, repairing the harm caused by interpersonal conflict, especially violent crime. It can exist completely apart from, or in concert with, institutionalized criminal justice systems. At a minimum, restorative justice involves the participation of a victim, offender, and facilitator and can also include other stakeholders, such as family members, who have a vested interest in promoting not only the personal well-being of the victim and offender but also the peace and harmony of the community to which they belong. Stakeholders jointly engage issues of harm, responsibility, and desired outcomes, typically in a series of meetings or conferences.

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Overview

▶ “Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability

This entry offers an introduction to the sociocultural-political background that has served as an

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impetus for the emergence and establishment of restorative justice around the world and provides a survey of practical and philosophical approaches to restorative justice. It offers examples of restorative practices and efforts to institutionalize those practices, as well as some critiques of restorative justice. Finally, the entry provides an explanation of the key strains of disagreement that can be found within the field broadly known as restorative justice. Restorative justice is recognized by policymakers, practitioners, and scholars as having a vital role in criminal justice reforms and around the world, reforms that are vital for making progress toward many of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Restorative justice is an umbrella term that refers to wide range of approaches intended to ameliorate the harm and suffering caused by interpersonal conflict, conflict that typically is serious enough to involve the criminal or juvenile justice system. Restorative justice approaches use a variety of practices that can take place in conjunction with formal judicial processes, or they can take place at some point after those judicial processes are complete. In some locales, restorative justice takes the place of institutionalized judicial processes. Restorative justice is also an approach used to address large-scale harm that a particular criminal justice system may not be equipped to handle. The term restorative justice can refer to the intended outcomes of restorative practices, which may concern the well-being of a particular victim, or the term can refer to the remedying of an entire set of sociocultural conditions that give rise to conflict and harm in the first place. Such undesirable conditions can exist in a community as small as a family or tribe or neighborhood or in a community as large as a country that has experienced endemic violence. Some restorative justice efforts are well aligned with formal (state) structures, whereas others seek complete separation and distance from institutionalized practices due to differing philosophical understandings of the very meaning of justice and the needs of the human person. Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers approach restorative justice from a diverse set of perspectives; thus their aims, criteria for success, and emphases can differ considerably. There is even disagreement about the true origins of the

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restorative justice movement (Hudson 2012). Given the broad, and contested, use of the term of restorative justice, this entry seeks to reflect a wide range of perspectives, approaches, practices, values, and intended outcomes that pertain to it.

Emergence of Restorative Justice [Background] Restorative justice, as a contemporary approach to crime, punishment, and healing (individual and collective), originated in the last third of the twentieth century as a response to widely perceived failings of so-called Western-style criminal justice systems. These systems originated in Europe and were spread via colonization to much of the world beginning in the early modern era and continuing through the end of the nineteenth century. Elsewhere, such as in Japan and Russia, Western-style legal systems were adopted in efforts to modernize, regularize, and centralize governance. Such imported legal systems, based upon either the ius commune (a combination of ancient Roman civil law and canon law) or English common law, typically displaced pre-modern, indigenous traditions of community justice and conflict resolution. In some places around the world, there remains an uneasy tension between Western and indigenous approaches to justice. Despite their many variations, imported or imposed Western legal systems share four features that have been challenged as part of the restorative justice movement: (a) the state’s role as the victim of interpersonal crime; (b) the harmful, and often unintended, effects of state-imposed retribution; (c) the limitations of criminal justice systems in dealing with certain kinds of crime and conflict; and (d) tensions between the state and the community that emerge when the state or other public entity assumes responsibility for social cohesion and well-being. These features serve as the backdrop to nearly all restorative justice approaches, practices, and intended outcomes; thus they are important for understanding the breadth of the field. They are also important for appreciating the deeply entrenched nature of the sociocultural and legal dynamics that proponents of restorative justice seek to change. Below, each is explored more fully.

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The State as Victim In nearly all criminal justice systems worldwide, interpersonal crime is treated as a crime against the state because it presumes to violate the public peace for which the state claims responsibility. This idea has its origins in later Roman law and its conception of the public good, but it also owes something to sociopolitical changes that took place in Europe during the High Middle Ages. From the eleventh century onward, royal authorities and their successors gradually assumed a monopoly on dispute resolution and violence. The waging of war, the meting out of corporal and capital punishment, and the settling of disputes were limited to public authorities in the place of private citizens. This centralizing tendency was accompanied by the development of bureaucratic institutions that regularized judicial procedures and shaped notions of rights (van Caenegem 1995). Also, owing to the adoption of new inquisitorial procedures in the early thirteenth century, recognized civil or religious authorities could initiate inquiries about crimes without individuals having to initiate complaints on their own behalf. There is much to appreciate about these changes, for they gradually made criminal justice more transparent, more evenly applied, and dependent upon standards of evidence. Perhaps most importantly, public mechanisms of justice took away from victims and their supporters the responsibility for exacting their own vengeance (Vallerani 2012). However, there is a considerable downside to these developments, for when the state treats interpersonal conflict as a violation against itself and the public order, the real victim of a crime is often excluded from any remedies that the state might seek (Achilles and Zehr 2001). In fact, the real victim typically has no legal standing in criminal proceedings. His or her experience is entirely incidental to most contemporary criminal and judicial proceedings, except those situations in which the victim’s first-person testimony might be used as evidence in a case in which the harm that a victim suffers is relevant for determining an offender’s degree of punishment (i.e., greater harm leads to more severe punishment). The growth of victims’ rights movements that emerged in the 1970s is often held up, uncritically,

as fundamental to the emergence of restorative justice (Zehr 1990), and it coincided with the emergence of victim-offender reconciliation programs that emphasized “the emotional exchange between the victim and offender” (Boyes-Watson 2018). Albert Eglash coined the term restorative justice in 1977 when he distinguished three types of criminal justice: retributive, distributive, and restorative. He claimed that the first two, which predominated worldwide, were limited because they focus on the criminal act, deny victim participation in the justice process, and require merely passive participation by offenders (Gavrielides 2008). As to the problem noted above of “denying victim participation in the justice process,” feminist activists raised the key issues relating to victims that would become vital to the restorative justice movement. These include: “the psychological trauma of crime, the critical importance of empowering victims, the extent to which victims are not treated with respect and dignity by the criminal justice system, and the healing journey that involves partnerships between the system and community” (Boyes-Watson 2018). Even though Eglash called out the exclusion of victims in the criminal justice system, and given that victim’s needs serve as a pillar of central claims of restorative justice, critics note that in practice, victims’ needs and participation are often overshadowed by a focus on offenders (Richards 2009). Nevertheless, the well-being and restoration of victims remains an aspiration of restorative justice. In addition to neglecting the needs of actual victims, the paradigm in which the state itself is the victim of crime creates other negative consequences that are the target of restorative justice approaches (Sullivan and Tifft 2005). Criminal legal systems are almost entirely backward looking in that they are expected to respond to that which has already happened. They focus on legal transgressions (i.e., crime and lawbreaking) and the protecting of the rights of the accused in prosecuting and adjudicating crimes, often with an inherent belief that punishment will bring about an offender’s moral reform and rehabilitation. The state’s status as victim ends when the criminal justice system renders judgment against an offender and retribution or punishment is

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meted out and satisfied. The state wins (is deemed the victim) and the offender loses (is convicted of victimizing the state and fulfills the conditions of a penalty). The state does not require that an offender accept responsibility, nor does the state typically try to remedy the factors that led to a particular crime in the first place. On the contrary, restorative justice is forward looking and sees beyond the state’s needs as the victim of a crime. A tenet of restorative justice is that “crime is a violation of relationships and as such creates obligation and responsibilities” (Achilles and Stutzman-Amstutz 2006). Most criminal activity causes direct harm to individuals and communities, not abstract entities like “the state.” When relationships are violated, efforts to repair them demand the involvement of multiple parties, including the offender and actual victim of a crime. Also implicated in the violation and repair of relationships are parties unconnected to the crime itself but who may have connections to the offender, victim, and their broader social context. Retribution Imposed and Delivered by the State In contemporary criminal justice systems, punishment for serious interpersonal conflict or crime is usually some kind of retribution visited upon the offender, by the state, in the form of intentional suffering. “Retributivists” argue that a penalty for crime must be compelling and inescapable (van Stokkom 2005). Censure can range from fines, to loss of liberty (imprisonment), to loss of certain rights, and to harsh physical punishments and can even mean death. Restorative justice perspectives, on the other hand, regard retribution that is imposed by many legal systems as often causing even more harm to offenders, victims, and communities instead of promoting rehabilitation or healing. Retribution is a typical feature of criminal justice because there is nearly universal acceptance that offenders should suffer penalties as a consequence of violating the law. Even as criminal justice reforms swept Europe during the Enlightenment, the philosopher Immanuel Kant posited that a person who commits a wrongful act has inflicted suffering on another and therefore

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deserves to have a proportional kind of suffering inflicted on herself/himself (Kant 1972). Kant treated this as a matter of balancing the scale of justice, but in practice this balancing of justice often takes the form of retaliation. Howard Zehr, an early promoter of restorative justice, put restorative and retributive justice in opposition to one another (Zehr 1990). However, the literature that has emerged in subsequent decades suggests that there is more nuance to be found in their differences (Daly 2003). Assumptions that undergird wide acceptance of punishment as retribution and retaliation include the beliefs that without harsh punishment, a victim will not truly receive justice, an offender will not understand the consequences of her or his action, and an offender will fail to undergo a moral transformation that would prevent criminal behavior from happening again. To support lesser punishments for criminals in Western legal systems is regarded politically as “soft on crime” (Drago et al. 2017). To treat offenders as moral agents who are community members with their own need for healing is typically even less tenable in public discourse, but restorative justice is trying to change this. As noted above, when the state prosecutes a crime, the state itself is the victim. The punishment is a transaction between the state and the offender, and the actual victim who suffered harm is usually left out of the equation entirely. Restorative justice acknowledges that this crimepunishment transaction does little to ameliorate the suffering of the true victim. Restorative justice also acknowledges that punishments meted out to offenders can extend to non-offenders, such as family members who suffer financial consequences of trials or children who are separated from a parent due to incarceration (Butler and Misinde 2018). Finally, restorative justice recognizes that a penalty can amplify harm to an offender and thereby pervert justice. For example, a prison sentence may impose loss of liberty as a punishment for crime, but horrific prison conditions can have devastating consequences for an offender’s mental and physical health. Or, an offender may spend so long in jail that she or he loses the capacity for self-sufficiency and gainful employment that is necessary for

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post-incarceration life. Thus, there is additional, unjust retribution that is a by-product of the state’s punishment (Bernard 2016). As to the two other assumptions that serve to support retribution (namely, that an offender will fail to understand the consequences of her/his action, and that the offender will fail to undergo a moral transformation, or reform, that would prevent criminal behavior from happening again), pointed critiques are offered by scholars, practitioners, and policymakers who work out of a restorative justice perspective. They note that the suffering inflicted as state-sanctioned punishment has little or no connection with an offender’s inner transformation because it does not require that the offender accept responsibility, nor does punishment require that the offender acknowledge the suffering of those who were harmed by a criminal act. Such a punishment only requires outward, measurable compliance with a state order. Moreover, there is no evidence that hard punishment imposed by the state has any relationship to moral transformation (van Stokkom 2005). Therefore, if retribution and punishment are dealt to offenders to bring about personal change, but do not accomplish these ends, then there is something fundamentally wrong with the criminal justice system. Restorative justice, then, seeks approaches and practices that are designed to actually bring about personal transformation that can address true harm and prevent it from happening again. Limitations of Criminal Justice Systems Around the world, criminal justice systems are ill suited to two, very different kinds of disorder and criminal activity: first, juvenile crime, and, second, harm that is perpetuated (or sanctioned) by the state, such as widespread human rights violations. Also, in some situations, war and its aftermath can prevent normal institutions of civil society, including those related to justice, from functioning. The term peacebuilding encompasses democratic transition as well as “conflict transformation in the wake of mass violence, genocide, state violence, and civil war,” and it seeks to remedy the effects of the breakdown of equitable public institutions and trust thereof

(Boyes-Watson 2018). There can be a tension between achieving peace and delivering justice. In all of these cases, restorative approaches and practices have the potential to address the limitations of criminal justice systems, including those in transition. As to the first kind of disorder, juvenile crime is a thorny problem, even in locales that have wellfunctioning courts and social service systems for youth. Responses to juvenile crime, such as property destruction or theft as well as personal violence, must take into account the seriousness of the crime, the age of the offender, and the potential for any sanction to cause permanent harm to a child’s emerging sense of self and moral responsibility. Even as justice systems for adults are widely accepted as being inappropriate for the needs of youth, truly effective systems are elusive. A worrying trend internationally is “the lowering of the minimum age of criminal responsibility” or even ad hoc decisions to treat juvenile offenders as adults given the serious nature of certain crimes (Penal Reform International 2017). A recent UN report notes that girls are particularly vulnerable within criminal justice systems (United Nations 2015). A particular focus of juvenile justice is preventing recidivism and breaking patterns of violence within families. Unlike in criminal justice systems for adults, though, juvenile systems typically do take into account the broader social environments in which children live. A movement that began in New Zealand in the 1980s attempted to develop better strategies for “disciplining, morally educating, and rehabilitating delinquent youth” with intended outcomes of personal development and accountability. The movement’s methods and approaches, which only later came to be regarded as restorative justice, were subsequently adapted in juvenile justice systems in Australia, the United States, and England (Bouffard et al. 2017). The second kind of disorder, state-sanctioned or state-perpetuated harm that may or not take place in the midst of war, is fundamentally destructive to public order because it reflects a breakdown of civil institutions, the absence of political normalcy, and the erosion of public

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trust. Harder to measure and repair, but perhaps more important for understanding the depth of social fractures, is suffering on the part of individuals and identity groups (Jantzi 2004). The term “transitional justice” is often used to describe efforts to reverse widespread disorder and suffering and restore political stability, efforts that must contend with “two powerful yet often contradictory moral intuitions: that in order to establish a legitimate, functioning civil society one must do justice for the crimes of the past and that to secure quiet, stability and a functioning government it is sometimes necessary and morally acceptable to leave past crimes and past criminals alone” (Eisikovits 2017). Truth and reconciliation schemes try to manage these competing moral intuitions and are considered by many practitioners and scholars to be an example of largescale restorative justice processes, such as those that have taken place in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Relationship building that takes place as part of restorative justice, which includes acknowledging harm and affirming human dignity, is a fundamental part of transitional justice, because restorative justice seeks to involve all parties who have been touched by conflict and harm and jointly involve them in planning for a peaceful and just society (Villa-Vicencio 2006). A United Nations draft resolution from 2018 affirms that “restorative justice is one of the guiding paradigms of transitional justice” (United Nations 2018). Notably, this involvement of all parties typically does not take place within the bounds of most criminal justice systems. State Responsibility Versus Community Responsibility for Well-Being As noted above, contemporary criminal justice and juvenile systems treat crime as a violation of public order, and a violation of a public order is undeniably a threat to well-being and social cohesion. State actors assume responsibility for policing, prosecuting, and judging crimes, as well as for determining and enforcing punishments. They provide the security that is a fundamental for human flourishing. In terms of political theory, this is a social contract whereby the state only acts on behalf of, and in the interest of, its citizenry

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who “agree to obey laws in return for protection of their vital interests” (Ashworth 2002). Arguably, though, in practice, the actions and needs of the state can be contrary to the vital needs of the community, with “community” broadly understood. Particularly in Anglo-American parts of the world, the emphasis on community can take the tone of “insurgency” that challenges the power of the state (Walgrave 2008). There is compelling evidence worldwide that persons who are poor or have minority status within their context (e.g., because of ethnicity, religion, gender, social class, etc.) are not equitably served by the criminal justice system; thus the system can be understood to be working against the true needs of the community (Barbaret 2014). In some countries, the outsourcing of aspects of the criminal justice system by the state to private entities not only poses a threat to civil liberties but also undermines the notion of public justice because corporate and private interests are understood to influence the security role claimed by the state (Weiss 2018). In other cases, the state is unable to assume control over security due to financial reasons or limited capacity for oversight, and it either allows or fails to prevent private policing and judicial activity. Such policing has unpredictable implications for citizens’ involvement with the criminal justice system (Diphoorn and Kyed 2016). Whereas the state would be presumed to act in the best interests of all persons under the state’s jurisdiction, private entities have loyalties to their own leadership and to the particular organs that contract their services; they do not have an impartial obligation to serve the needs of communities in which they operate. Put a different way, such systems are neither fair nor legitimate, even if they operate under the auspices of the state. Restorative justice approaches seek to reclaim for communities an authentic connection with justice that is administered in the name of, or on behalf of, the community. This has a particular significance for minority or indigenous populations who are neither well served by, nor well represented within, predominant power structures (Galanter 1984). There are widespread efforts on the part of practitioners to reframe the

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conversation around the meaning of justice to go beyond a crime-judgment-punishment transaction controlled by the state and move toward justice as a true public good that is owned by the community. Broadly speaking, their goal is to see the state devolve to communities a greater role for determining well-being. This ultimately calls for more stakeholder engagement, to include victims and offenders, in all aspects of the criminal justice system. This has particular importance for social well-being given that offenders who served prison time will need to be re-integrated into the fabric of the community. A failure to prepare the victim, offender, and other stakeholders for this reintegration can lead to revictimization for victims and recidivism for offenders.

Restorative Justice Processes and Practices At the center of restorative justice approaches and practices is the dignity of the human person and the fundamental need for human beings to exist and thrive within a supportive web of social relationships. Various restorative practices and approaches have different emphases for victims, offenders, and other stakeholders. Regardless of any particular approach, a restorative process depends on free and voluntary participation of all parties. For the victim, the emphasis is on the need for personal restoration and healing following crime or harm. This includes validation on the part of the community that its norms were violated and that suffering has taken place – suffering that may be ongoing. Trained mediators provide a supportive environment within which the victim articulate his or her suffering and response to the harm, which could range from physical injuries, to emotional trauma, to loss of property or other resources, and to a diminished sense of personal security. For the offender, the emphasis is on treating him or her as a moral agent who chooses to accept responsibility for the harm done to the victim and encouraging reparations that are within the offender’s capabilities. This often includes an acknowledgment on the part of the offender of the harm that she or he has caused to the victim

(directly) or other parties (indirectly), which may or may not take the form of an apology. It can also include the offender’s explanation of why she or he chose to commit a crime and targeted a specific victim. “Families” of Restorative Justice Practices Addressed below are “families” of restorative justice practices. This section below closely follows the Handbook on Restorative justice programmes issued by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (United Nations 2006), and no additional citations to that text are provided here in Part III. Citations to other sources are noted as usual. Advocates of restorative justice recognize that there is a set of “critical ingredients for a fully restorative process.” These include voluntary participation by an identifiable victim, which could include those who have been harmed indirectly, such as children of a parent who was killed, and voluntary participation by an offender who accepts responsibility for harmful (usually criminal) behavior. The intent is “to create a nonadversarial, non-threatening environment in which” in the needs of all parties can be met. As to outcomes, the expectation is that victims will achieve some kind of satisfaction that is personally meaningful, and “offenders [will] understand how their action has affected the victim” and other community members. Although there is an expectation that the offender “will assume responsibility for the consequences of their action and commit to making reparation,” all aspects of the process must be designed so as not to jeopardize any legal rights that the offender may have within the criminal justice system, e.g., the right not to self-incriminate. It is anticipated that the parties will agree upon “flexible measures” to repair harm and address the circumstances that led to the crime or offense. A network of stakeholders will make every effort to hold offenders accountable for making amends or reparations within their capabilities. The key outcome of the process is for all stakeholders to “understand the dynamic that led to the specific incident and gain a sense of closure,” which allows for the offender’s reintegration into the community.

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The UN Handbook on Restorative justice programmes categorizes restorative justice processes into “families” that differ by the type of participants, the number of participants, the reach of issues addressed, and level of formality/informality. Nearly all center on face-to-face dialogue and thus are sometimes called “restorative dialogues” (Roberts 2004). Within the literature on restorative justice, there is a wide range of terms used to describe differing styles and practices; thus every effort is made here to offer clarifying details. There are, or course, areas of overlap and degrees of difference within these families of processes. Victim offender mediation is the most common type of restorative justice practice, but it can look very different depending on the setting and people involved. There is typically no limit on the number of encounters that may take place as part of a restorative process, nor is there a fixed time period over which they might unfold. The process could involve a single meeting, or a series of encounters over a period of years. Some common features include the role of a neutral facilitator or mediator (hereafter, facilitator) who draws up any agreements that the victim and offender have reached. There are differences in the scholarly literature on the meanings of “facilitator” and “mediator” to describe such a role in formal and informal dispute resolution processes. However, for simplicity, the term facilitator is used here to describe the person whose role is to guide proceedings, to “strive to deliver on expectations,” and to follow the process that is agreed upon during the preconference phase. The proceedings may or may not be confidential, depending upon the needs of the parties involved. However, expectations regarding confidentially must be agreed upon at the outset of the process. All dialogues should be inclusive and appropriate to the age and cultural norms of all of the people involved. A discrete outcome, such as reparations or subsequent obligations, is desirable, but not a requirement, given that proponents of restorative justice hold that the process itself is inherently restorative (Bowen et al. 2003). Facilitated Indirect Dialogue (Victim and Offender)

Victim offender mediation (VOM) is the most common kind of restorative justice practice, and

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it can either be indirect or direct. It involves the smallest number of people – at the very least, the victim and offender, along with a trained facilitator who may be a volunteer or a professional. In cases involving serious (usually violent) crime or relationships in which there is a significant power imbalance, such as within a family, the victim(s) may not wish to meet face to face with the offender. In those cases, a facilitator serves to ferry messages between the two parties until the process has reached a satisfactory conclusion. Indirect VOM can be managed by a state official (formal) or a community member (informal), such as an employee of a not-for-profit organization or member of a church congregation with a restorative justice ministry. An indirect VOM process is typically initiated by a non-state actor at the request of the victim or offender. Facilitated Direct Dialogue (Victim and Offender)

In direct VOM, the offender and victim meet in person. The facilitator prepares the two parties for their meeting(s) and ensures a safe, non-confrontational setting. The facilitator acts in the interests of the two parties and not any other entity, such as the state or community. At the conclusion of the process, the facilitator draws up any agreements that the two parties may have reached. Much as in indirect VOM, the process is typically initiated by a non-state actor at the request of the victim or offender. Facilitated Group Dialogue

A restorative conference or circle involves dialogue that extends beyond the victim and offender, involving their supporters, community members, and/or and officials from a criminal justice system. Some focus on families, whereas others are more community focused. The process itself is sometimes called conferencing or circling. Issues that the conference may touch upon include underlying problems and attitudes that led to harm and crime; community dynamics; family dynamics; or other circumstances that are relevant to harm and healing. This type of dialogue is especially appropriate for juvenile crime. The facilitator takes care to ensure that all parties are heard and that power dynamics do not allow one

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viewpoint to dominate. The facilitator also takes care to ensure that the offender is neither shamed nor unduly pressured to accept an agreement. In these restorative conferences or circles, a state actor such as a police officer or judicial official is there to provide context and background information but not to shape the process or outcome. Facilitated group dialogue is a feature of some indigenous traditions that approach justice from the perspective of community well-being and social harmony. Truth and reconciliation practices can fall in this category, given that matters of amnesty or guilt may have already been decided and the focus is on acknowledgement of harm and healing as a step toward civil peace. Directed or Arbitrated Group Dialogue

Directed or arbitrated group dialogue, much like restorative conferences and circles, not only involves a wider group of people beyond the victim-offender-facilitator triad but also has a greater emphasis on formal mediation and settlement. The facilitator offers greater direction during the dialogue(s) and may make the decision about a final settlement. State officials are more likely to be involved in this practice, not because the process itself is devalued but because parties involved expect some kind of binding settlement at its conclusion. Such a settlement can involve reparations or restitution, or something less tangible like a formal acknowledgment of harm. Although all restorative processes focus on free and un-coerced participation, in this directed or arbitrated dialogue, there is a greater expectation for an offender to assent to an agreement that goes beyond the criminal penalty associated with the crime. Great care must be taken neither to violate the legal rights of the offender within such mediation or arbitration, nor to impose elusive or imagined notions of community standards (Brown 2017). Intended Outcomes The anticipated outcomes of restorative practices and processes vary considerably. Outcomes are shaped by the type of crime and degree of harm and whether or not the process is formal or informal, in addition to many other factors.

Nevertheless, whether or not those outcomes are understood to be met has less to do with specific practices and more to do with the expectations of individual stakeholders as they engage with restorative justice approaches and practices. Here are considered three perspectives: victim, offender, and community. Outcomes for Victims

As noted above, restoration and healing of victims remains the aspiration of restorative justice programs, even if this does not always come to pass. Perhaps the greatest limitation of restorative justice for serving the needs of victims lies in the fact that the process ultimately depends on the offender. This is because “the process is limited to those cases with an offender who admits culpability and wants to participate and the remedies are limited to that the offender, and secondarily, the community can provide” (Herman 2004). As yet, there is not well-defined set of practices for serving victims in cases in which the offender refuses to meet with the victim or in which the offender is unknown. Nevertheless, when victims are able to participate in restorative practices, there are usually three key outcomes that are positive. First, victims are able to articulate the personal harm that they have suffered and to have that harm recognized by one or more people, including the offender. Although victim impact statements can play this role in a trial, the adversarial setting of a trial does not allow for victim-offender dialogue. Simply being heard in restorative justice settings can have meaningful benefits for victims. This has been demonstrated amply in truth and reconciliation processes. Second, if the offender accepts responsibility for the criminal act and apologizes for the harm that she or he has caused, the victim is given the freedom to offer mercy or forgiveness. A significant critique of restorative justice is that it can focus on the value of forgiveness for the offender, thereby diminishing the impact on the victim. That is not the emphasis here. On the contrary, the intent is to stress that the offering of mercy or forgiveness can allow a victim to release destructive feelings of anger and revenge, thereby promoting the victim’s restoration and healing (Conway 2010). And third,

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restorative processes can offer a sense of closure for a victim. In general, restitution or reparations have less of an impact on victims than their ability to take part in a restorative process which gives them agency and affirmation. Outcomes for Offenders

Outcomes for offenders very much depend on whether or not restorative justice practices take place after all state judicial processes have concluded, are completely separate from state processes, or are offered as an alternative to formal criminal or juvenile processes. In jurisdictions that offer restorative practices as a voluntary alternative or diversion, an offender’s participation and adherence to agreements can affect jail time, fines, and other kinds of punishment. The UN recommends that “the results of agreements arising out of restorative justice programs should, where appropriate, be judicially supervised or incorporated into judicial decisions of judgements” (United Nations 2006). In this way, restorative processes have a more obvious benefit to offenders who may endure lesser punishments in exchange for participation. There is limited, but positive evidence that an offender’s participation in restorative processes does indeed reduce recidivism for some kinds of non-violent crime, especially among juveniles (Rodriguez 2007). For proponents of restorative justice who focus less on formal state interests and more on the person of the offender, their concern lies with personal moral or spiritual transformation. The intent is to treat the offender as a moral agent who is encouraged to take responsibility for his or her actions and, moreover, to treat the offender – regardless of the seriousness of the crime – as a person who needs care, deserves concern, and has his or her own healing to do (Zehr 1990). By engaging in restorative processes, the offender can reach a point of taking ownership of broken relationships and considering options for restitution – real and symbolic. This offers an avenue for rehabilitation that state-imposed punishment promises but does not typically deliver. Outcomes for the Community

Community outcomes as a result of restorative justice processes are diverse and hard to measure

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because they are largely intangible, such as perceptions of community engagement and personal satisfaction. It can even be hard to determine the boundaries of the community that is invoked. Nevertheless, widespread involvement in restorative justice programs on the part of non-state actors speaks to an unmistakable willingness for people of all backgrounds to be more involved in supporting victims and offenders whose needs are unmet by current criminal justice system. This, in and of itself, speaks to an important community outcome because it moves criminal justice concerns beyond the narrow realm of the state and into the wider domain of citizenship (Walgrave 2008). Proponents of restorative justice may engage with it as an extension of their religious commitments to peace and justice (e.g., the Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles and Mennonite Central Committee United States), or they may be affiliated with national or transnational NGOs that carry out restorative justice programming (e.g., Prison Fellowship International and Korea Peacebuilding Institute). Within indigenous communities that have adopted or reclaimed restorative justice practices, members can feel a stronger sense of agency in state contexts that have long marginalized their participation (e.g., Navajo in the United States and Maori in New Zealand). As noted elsewhere, there is not a universal embrace of community perspectives in restorative justice because values and priorities can vary from community to community, but equitable treatment of offenders should not (Ashworth 2002). Nevertheless, community engagement of one kind or another features prominently in restorative justice approaches worldwide.

Institutionalization of Restorative Justice In the year 2000, the UN encouraged the “development of restorative justice policies, procedures and programmes that are respectful of the rights, needs and interest of victims, offenders, and communities and other parties” (United Nations

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2000). The UN subsequently encouraged “Member States to recognize the importance of further developing restorative justice policies, procedures and programmes that include alternatives to prosecution” (United Nations 2005). Significantly, the UN suggested that “restorative justice programmes can be used to reduce the burden on the criminal justice system, to divert cases out of the system and to provide the system with a range of constructive sanctions” (United Nations 2006). Viewed in this way, restorative justice is closely aligned with public criminal justice systems, has as its starting point the needs of the state, and operates at the direction of the state. This development is not compatible with the viewpoint of practitioners and scholars who argue that the state should not co-opt the language of restorative justice (Sullivan and Tifft 2005). Viewed from another perspective, restorative justice actually poses risks for the integrity of criminal justice systems, for it promises to introduce elements of impartiality, vengeance, and vague notions of community that can affect the outcome of trials (Ashworth 2002). Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that public bodies (e.g., states, regional governments, municipalities, public school systems) have embraced restorative justice approaches and thus have either adopted, or advanced, the United Nations’ transnational efforts to promote it. Restorative justice programs have been implemented in contexts as diverse as within culturally cohesive communities (e.g., Rwanda, Canada), within juvenile justice systems in Australia, North America, and Europe and within adult prison settings around the world. However, it is very difficult to apprehend the extent to which public entities invest in restorative justice, given that funding for restorative justice falls under multiple guises, such as offender reentry programs, supervised community service, state block grants for education, and even philanthropic and funding used for public purposes. There is important work yet to be done to understand the extent of funding for restorative justice initiatives and the effectiveness of those expenditures. A better understanding of funding can offer insights into the ways in which restorative justices have been institutionalized.

Critiques of Restorative Justice An enduring critique of restorative justice is that the term has been applied to so many different practices and approaches as to be meaningless. Restorative justice has emerged out of – and continues to evolve within – distinctive perspectives. As noted above (see section “Emergence of Restorative Justice”), proponents of restorative justice embrace it as a way of addressing particular sociopolitical concerns or deficiencies. Thus, if restorative justice has so many meanings and encompasses so many different approaches, it is impossible to evaluate whether or not restorative justice practices are truly effective. However, the viewpoint of participants and proponents matters. Some scholars have proposed to narrow the definition of what constitutes restorative justice, but there could certainly be no broad support of a definition that excludes scholars and practitioners who see themselves doing the very work of restorative justice. A related critique is that, in part because restorative justice encompassed too many ideals, restorative justice practices have failed to live up to their promise: “advocates have made astonishing promises for what restorative justice can achieve and what it can do for victims, offenders, their family members, and communities” (Daly 2006). Additionally, a significant critique of restorative justice is that even as it promises to focus on the needs of victims, the needs of offenders still predominate. Finally, although an aspiration of restorative justice is to alter the larger social conditions that give rise to harm and crime in the first place, restorative justice still remains reactive and not proactive (Gil 2006). It has yet to affect root causes of crime in any measurable way.

Conclusions Part of the appeal of restorative justice is that it resonates with deeply held cultural ideas about the value of human relationships, as well as its promise to repair aspects of criminal justice systems that are widely regarded as failures. Nevertheless, its embrace by scholars, practitioners, and

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policymakers speaks to its global value and appeal for addressing criminal justice reform in diverse sociocultural-political settings. Its broad base offers multiple avenues for engaging criminal justice reforms and, in turn, the broader UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact ▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Retributive Justice ▶ Transitional Justice

References Achilles M, Stutzman-Amstutz L (2006) Responding to the needs of victims: what was promised, what has been delivered. In: Sullivan D, Tifft L (eds) Handbook of restorative justice. Taylor and Francis, Abington, pp 211–220 Achilles M, Zehr H (2001) Restorative justice for crime victims: the promise, the challenge. In: Bazemore G, Schiff M (eds) Restorative and community justice: cultivating common ground for victims, communities and offenders. Anderson, Cincinnati, pp 87–100 Ashworth A (2002) Responsibilities, rights and restorative justice. Br J Criminol 42(3):578–595 Barbaret R (2014) Women, crime and criminal justice. Routledge, London Bernard V (2016) Out of sight, out of mind? Exposing the human cost of detention. Int Rev Red Cross 98(3):725– 735 Bouffard J, Cooper M, Bergseth K (2017) The effectiveness of various restorative justice interventions on recidivism outcomes among juvenile offenders. Youth Violence Juvenile Justice 15(4):465–480 Bowen H, Boyack J, Marshall C (2003) How does restorative justice ensure good practice? A values-based approach. In: Zehr H, Toews B (eds) Critical issues in restorative justice. Criminal Justice Press, Palisades, pp 265–276 Boyes-Watson C (2018) Looking at the past of restorative justice: normative reflections on its future. In: Gavrielides T (ed) Routledge international handbook of restorative justice. Routledge, Abington, pp 35–48 Brown JG (2017) The use of mediation to resolve criminal cases: a procedural critique. In: Gavrielides T

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(ed) Restorative justice. Ideals and realities. Routledge, Abington, pp 197–259 Butler M, Misinde C (2018) Primary caregiver imprisonment in Uganda: its impact on child poverty, health and education. Report from Queen’s University Belfast and Makerere University Conway T (2010) Forgiveness. In: Conway T, Matzko McCarthy D, Schieber V (eds) Redemption and restoration. A Catholic perspective on restorative justice. Liturgical Press, Collegeville, pp 161–176 Daly K (2003) Restorative justice: the real story. In: Gavrielides T (ed) Restorative justice. Ideals and realities. Routledge, Abington, pp 85–109 Daly K (2006) The limits of restorative justice. In: Sullivan D, Tifft L (eds) Handbook of restorative justice: a global perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 134–145 Diphoorn T, Kyed HM (2016) Entanglements of private security and community policing in South Africa and Swaziland. Afr Aff 115(461):710–732 Drago F, Galbiati R, Sobbrio F (2017) The political cost of being soft on crime: evidence from a natural experiment. SSRN CERD discussion paper no. DP12097 Eisikovits N (2017) Transitional justice. In: Zalta E (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2017 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/ entries/justice-transitional/ Galanter M (1984) Law and the backward classes in India. University of California Press, Los Angeles Gavrielides T (2008) Restorative justice – the perplexing concept: conceptual fault-lines and power battles within the restorative justice movement. Criminol Crim Just 8(2):165–183 Gil D (2006) Toward a “radical” paradigm of restorative justice. In: Sullivan D, Tifft L (eds) Handbook of restorative justice: a global perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 499–511 Herman S (2004) Is restorative justice possible without a parallel system for victims? In: Zehr H, Toews B (eds) Critical issues in restorative justice. Criminal Justice Press, Palisades, pp 75–83 Hudson J (2012) Contemporary origins of restorative justice programming: the Minnesota Restitution Center. Fed Probat 76:49–55 Jantzi V (2004) What is the role of the state in restorative justice. In: Zehr H, Toews B (eds) Critical issues in restorative justice. Criminal Justice Press, Palisades, pp 189–201 Kant I (1972) Justice and punishment. In: Ezorsky G (ed) Philosophical perspectives on punishment. State University of New York Press, Albany, pp 102–106 Penal Reform International (2017) Global prison trends 2017. Report from Thailand Institute of Justice and Penal Reform International Richards K (2009) Taking victims seriously? The role of victims’ rights movements in the emergence of restorative justice. Curr Issues Crim Just 21:302–309 Roberts AW (2004) Is restorative justice tied to specific models of practice? In: Zehr H, Toews B (eds) Critical issues in restorative justice. Criminal Justice Press, Palisades, pp 241–251

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822 Rodriguez N (2007) Restorative justice at work: examining the impact of restorative justice resolutions on juvenile recidivism. Crime Delinq 53:355–379 Sullivan D, Tifft L (2005) Restorative justice. Healing the foundations of our everyday lives. Willow Tree Press, Monsey United Nations (2000) Vienna declaration on crime and justice: meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. In: 10th United Nations congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, Vienna, 10–17 April United Nations (2005) Bangkok declaration – synergies and responses: strategic alliances in crime prevention and criminal justice. 11th United Nations congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, Bangkok, 18–25 April United Nations (2006) Handbook on restorative justice programmes. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York United Nations (2015) Safeguarding the rights of girls in the criminal justice system. Preventing violence, stigmatization and deprivation of liberty. Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Violence against Children, New York United Nations (2018) Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, E/CN.15/2018/L.5, Vienna, 14–18 May Vallerani M (2012) Medieval public justice (trans: Blanshe SR). Catholic University of America Press, Washington, DC van Caenegem RC (1995) An historical introduction to western constitutional law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge van Stokkom BAM (2005) Does punishment need hard treatment? A reply to Duff. In: Claes E, Foqué R, Peters T (eds) Punishment, restorative justice and the morality of law. Intersentia, Cambridge, pp 165–177 Villa-Vicencio C (2006) Transitional justice, restoration, and prosecution. In: Sullivan D, Tifft L (eds) Handbook of restorative justice: a global perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 387–400 Walgrave L (2008) Restorative justice, self-interest and responsible citizenship. Willan, Portland Weiss RP (2018) Vanishing boundaries of control: implications for security and sovereignty of the changing nature and global expansion of neoliberal criminal justice provision. In: Hucklesby A, Lister S (eds) The private sector and criminal justice. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 23–63 Zehr H (1990) Changing lenses: a new focus for crime and justice. Herald Press, Scottsdale

Retributive Justice ▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals

Retributive Justice

Right to Information ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

Rivalry ▶ Linking New and Protracted Conflicts to SDG16: Patterns and Trends

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals Elyse Wakelin Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK

Definition Effective rule of law reduces corruption, combats poverty and disease, and protects people from injustices large and small. It is the foundation for communities of equity, opportunity, and peace – underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights (WJP 2016). To fully understand how the rule of law supports the SDGs, it is necessary to define the rule of law. It will be considered whether SDG 16 protects the rule of law by analyzing eight key sub-elements to the concept of the rule of law.

Introduction The rule of law is not a new concept; it can be traced back to the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero who all hinted at the modern-day understanding of the concept that no person or body is above the law. The rule of law has often been viewed as the domain of lawyers and judges; however, this concept covers everyday issues of

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

safety, rights, justice, and governance and so has a direct impact upon all individuals and not just those involved in the application of the law. As a result, the rule of law is fundamental to all national, political, and legal systems. Modern-day commitments to the concept were first evidence in the work of League of Nations, where it was central to the advisory opinion given by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Danzig legislative decrees case. Moreover, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of the founding documents of the UN, captures this concept, stating “it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” The UN has maintained this commitment to upholding the rule of law; paragraph nine of the UN Millennium Declaration established a commitment “to strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs.” This was confirmed in 2004 by Kofi Annan, who stated that the rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the (United Nations) mission (UN 2004, para. 6). The link between the rule of law and sustainability was first identified at the World Summit, which took place September 2005, when more than 170 Heads of State and Government acknowledged that good governance and the rule of law at international and national levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development, and the eradication of poverty and hunger. Paragraph 119 provided that “we recommit ourselves to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (UN 2005, para. 119). This recommitment was further elaborated in paragraph 134, which provides that: recognizing the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the Rule of Law at both the national and international levels, we reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to an international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States. (UN 2005, para. 134)

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Moreover, in 2012, the UN recognized that the rule of law applies to all States equally, to international organizations, including the UN and its principles organs, and that respect for and the promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy in their actions (UN 2012, para. 2). The most significant commitment of the UN to the rule of law was in 2015, when the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted. SDG 16 sets out the UN, and its members are dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels. Moreover, SDG 16.3 sets out the goal to promote the rule of law at national and international levels and ensures equal access to justice for all. In order to understand the link between sustainability and the rule of law, it is necessary to understand the rule of law. The rule of law is very difficult to define and even more difficult to quantify compliance of. According to the English judge, Lord Bingham, the meaning of this constitutional principle may have been thought to be too clear and well-understood to call for statutory definition, and he acknowledges that the rule of law has been routinely invoked by judges in their judgments (Bingham 2007, p. 67). Raz suggested that there has developed a tendency to use the rule of law as a shorthand description of the positive aspects of any given political system (Raz 1979, p. 210). Finnis argued that the rule of law is simply “the name commonly given to the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape” (Finnis 1980, p. 270). Whereas, Shklar claims that the rule of law may have become just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that gave the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians (Shklar 1987, p. 1). All of these academics suggest that the failure to create a definitive definition of the concept of the rule of law has resulted in the term to be used to describe any positive political or legal system, especially in Western societies. While it is undeniable that the upholding the

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rule of law is indicative of strong and stable legal and political systems, it goes beyond the mere existence of these systems. Although there is no set definition of the rule of law at either national or international level, the rule of law is the same at these different levels. In both situations, at its most basic level, the rule of law means that the law should be respected. This has been developed into a core principle of the concept: The rule of law . . .refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure of supremacy adherence to the principles of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (UN 2004, para. 6)

From this core principle, it is possible to identify several elements or sub-rules to the concept of the rule of law which are commonly identified require further elaboration. The sub-rules identified in this article are not identified in a single resource but are a summary of the key elements of the rule of law as identified in the work of other organizations and academics including the work of the World Justice Project, working to advance the rule of law and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and Tom Bingham in his book on the rule of law. These sub-rules will each be considered in turn, in order to establish a clear understanding of the concept of the rule of law. 1. Sub-rule one: the law must be accessible to all and be as intelligible clear and predictable as possible. An essential element to the rule of law is that the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear, and predictable. In essence, there must be a body of fundamental laws in a legal system, which defines the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the State (Janse

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2012). Moreover, laws and constitutions must be stable over time. They must not be amended or changed too often as this will result in a lack of legal security. The rule of law therefore requires States to have a constitution, be it codified or uncodified, which clearly sets out how a country is organized and how power is divided, as well as provide a clear mechanism for the development and amendment of laws which avoids arbitrary changes. A further requirement is that laws must therefore be made public. The exact way in which this requirement must be fulfilled is not important, but it has been established that simply providing a formal announcement or providing access to legislation or legal changes on an official database, which most countries now provide though the Internet, is not sufficient; for laws to be public or promulgated, those affected by the legal changes must be actively informed. This was confirmed in the European Court of Human Rights Case, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979), where it was held that the law must be adequately accessible. For laws to be public, citizens must have adequate knowledge of the laws which apply to them and the ability to adapt their behavior accordingly with this knowledge. The judgment also highlights that this does not require that all citizens understand all legislation, and it is acceptable that citizens seek advice from the legal profession to clarify the law. However, this does detract from the requirement that laws must be sufficiently clear, since people cannot obey laws if they do not understand them. Any layperson who has attempted to read any form of legislation will have been faced with a document which is often drafted in general, vague, and unclear terms, which appears open to interpretation. This is particular evident in international law; for example, Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a State which has signed or ratified a treaty has the obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty prior to its entry into force. The vagueness of this section in terms of its meaning and requirements has been identified as one the major shortcomings of the Convention itself (Palchetti 2011).

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

However, the precise wording of legislation is not the only concern with regard to clarity. If significant changes are to be made to the law, they must be clearly communicated in advance. Moreover, the sheer volume of legislation which applies at both domestic and international levels has serious implications to the clarity of the law. It can be difficult to identity the relevant legislation and ensure that the legislation identified is in fact the most current legislation. This is contradiction to SDG target 16.10 which seeks to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements (UNDP 2015). If citizens are unable to identify the relevant laws due to the sheer volume and complexity of law, then it is difficult to say that there is public access to information. The problems of clarity in the law cannot all be placed on the legislators alone; the judiciary, at times, does not provide clarity in the law when one considers the length and complexity of modern common law judgments. This has been highlighted on a number of occasions, across different jurisdictions including by Lord Brightman in the UK case of R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] which concerned the fox-hunting ban in England and Wales and confirmed through the Hunting Act 2004 and by Chief Justice Roberts of the USA in an address to the American College of Trial Lawyers (Bingham 2007, p. 70). Therefore, the judiciary has a role in ensuring clarity in the law. Judges at both a national and international level must actively seek to provide a judgment with a clear majority ratio, which can be explained easily to a jury, unqualified clerk, or to a bench of lay justices (Bingham 2015, p. 71). Moreover, Justice Heydon of the High Court of Australia stated that judicial activism, where judges create new offenses by changing the perimeters of existing offenses, taken to extremes can spell the death of the rule of law (Heydon 2003). The rule of law requires that the judiciary takes conscious steps to avoid changing the law and act within the perimeters of their role to apply the law in the court system. Thus, to ensure clarity in the law and to avoid judicial activism, judges must not develop the law to create new offenses and leave this to the legislators.

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The final element to this sub-rule is the need for stability and predictability in the law. As a general rule, laws regulate matters that require careful planning and should not be constantly amended and changed. One element of stability or predictability in the law which is non-negotiable is the requirement that laws apply prospectively, and not retroactively. This principle of the non-retroactive application of the laws is especially important in criminal law. This is supported in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, paragraph 2, which states “No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed” (UN 1948, para. 2). The requirement of stability means that laws which apply retrospectively or are applied to events which have already occurred before the time at which the law was introduced are not compatible with the rule of law. 2. Sub-rule two: legal issues should be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion. There are advantages to the use of a discretionconferring approach to applying the law; every rule of law has a few corners which do not quite fit. It follows that perfect justice can only be achieved if the courts are unconstrained by such imperfect generalizations. However, the key concern with a discretion-based approach to legal decisions is that it provides the decision-maker with a greater scope for subjectivity and arbitrariness, which is the antithesis of the rule of law. The SDG target 16.6 provides for the development of effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels (UNDP 2015). Therefore, although some discretion is inevitable, as the law cannot provide for every eventuality, discretion should be narrowly defined and its exercise be capable of reasoned justification (Bingham 2007, p. 72). The judiciary cannot be seen to be making decisions on the exercise of discretion alone and must be transparent and accountable in its application of the law to resolve disputes. A narrow application of discretion in the law means that it must never be used to determine the

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facts of the case – this can only ever be established through evidence presented to the decision-maker. Discretion can only apply to the way in which the law is applied to the set of facts presented to the decision-maker. This can be seen in the English legal provision for Police Powers. S.78 (1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. (PACE)

This legislation provides discretion to the courts by the inclusion of the words “may refuse.” However, it is clearly not unlimited discretion as the legislation provides examples of when it is reasonable to exercise this discretion, in relation to the fairness of a hearing. It does not allow the courts to simply find that any evidence that it choses is inadmissible in the court. The courts have traditionally taken a dim view of this discretionary power and will only find evidence admissible in extreme cases, highlighting the limited use of this discretion. Therefore, as far as possible, decisions should be made by the permitted decision-maker on the application of the law to the facts of the case and not by the exercise of discretion. This goes some way in ensuring stability in the law as required by sub-rule one. 3. Sub-rule three: laws should apply equally to all, except when it is justifiable to differentiate. The sub-rule that the law should apply equally to all is at the very core of the concept of the rule of law. It presupposes that no one is above the law, be it an individual or a State, and that anyone who infringes the law will be punished. Moreover, it ensures that all persons should be protected equally by the law. However, it must be noted there exist circumstances when differentiation in the application of the law is necessary for the fair application of law. According to Bingham, differentiation should be made for some categories

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

of people, such as children and the mentally ill, based on peculiar characteristics (2007, p. 73). These characteristics are protected characteristics that are afforded additional anti-discrimination protections in many legal systems, such as through the European Convention on Human Rights. The difficulties in establishing when it is necessary or appropriate to differentiate can be seen in the example of the issues raised in Western Samoa and the Cook Islands surrounding the requirement of universal suffrage, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite this requirement, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands introduced an electoral law, based on long established Samoan custom, that only the Matai, the chiefs, could vote and be candidates in parliamentary elections, in conflict with the principle of universal suffrage (Keith 2015, p.411). This scenario raised the question as to whether this differentiation, for cultural and historical purposes, should be permitted or should the law on universal suffrage apply to all. SDG 16.3 aims to ensure equal access to all (UNDP 2015) which suggests that any differentiation should not be permitted. However, it is not always clear-cut when differentiation in the application of the law is permitted and arguably necessary under the rule of law. An area where differentiation and the rule of law have been subject to debate is the different treatment of nonnationals, as compared to citizens. It is no secret that most legal systems in the world allow for different treatment of nonationals. According to David Cole, Virtually every significant government security initiative implicating civil liberties- including penalizing speech, ethnic profiling, guilt by association the use of administrative measure to avoid the safeguards if the criminal process and preventative detention had originated in a measure targeted at non-citizens. (Cole 2003, p. 85)

This claim is seen in the terrorism legislation hastily introduced in England and Wales, following the 9/11 attacks which provided for indefinite detention of foreign national suspected of terrorist activities. This legislation was heavily criticized and subsequently repealed on the extreme differential treatment provided for nonnationals and

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

citizens. States would be wise to heed the advice of Justice Jackson in the Supreme Court of the USA in 1949 who stated that “States and the federal government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice.” (Railway Express Agency Inc v. New York (1949)) 4. Sub-rule four: the Law must provide for the protection of human rights. The SDS target 16.10 seeks to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements (UNDP 2015). Moreover, SDG 16.3 promotes the rule of law and the equal access to all. These targets are aligned with the protection of human rights. However, this sub-rule has received mixed support. At an international level, the need to uphold and support human rights is seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the main focus on being on compliance with the right to life, due process, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of belief and religion, freedom of assembly and association, fundamental labor rights, and elimination of discrimination. Moreover, the preamble of the UDHR provides that it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. At a regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights draws inspiration from the rule of law. Human rights protections are fundamental to the rule of law as: A state which savagely repressed or persecuted sections of its people could not in my view be regarded as observing the rule of law, even if the transport of the persecuted minority to the concentration camp or the compulsory exposure of female children on the mountainside were the subject of detailed laws duly enacted and scrupulously observed. (Bingham 2007, p. 76)

If we accept this point of view, human rights protections are a foundation of the rule of law.

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However, there is no reference at all to human rights in a number of theorists work on the rule of law. Despite there being a number of international human rights regimes, there is not a standard of human rights that is universally agreed among all States. All human rights protections are subject to reservations by States and subject to each States voluntarily surrendering its sovereignty in the ratification of an international treaty. States are not always willing to do this, as evidenced by the failure of the USA to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child, 1989, which is seen as fundamental by many other States. This highlights the difficulties in requiring compliance with human rights as part of the rule of law at an international level. However, at a national level, there will be an agreed standard of human rights which must be complied with as part of the rule of law. 5. Sub-rule five: courts must be accessible and affordable, providing means for resolving civil disputes. It is widely recognized that the rule of law requires access to the courts, as SDG 16.3 requires equal access to justice for all (UNDP 2015). People must not refrain from taking their case to court because this is excessively expensive, troublesome, or complicated. Access to justice is an important element in a society which supports the rule of law. Moreover, any restrictions must serve a purpose and be justifiable. Most criminal justice systems are widely accessible, with legal aid and access to free legal advice, but the same is not to be said for civil justice systems across the international arena. The civil justice system resolves disputes between individuals on issues such as contact disputes or nuisance claims, making it central to legal system and the day-to-day lives of individuals. In most jurisdictions, there are concerns on the prohibitive costs of bringing a civil claim, along with the excessive delays in getting to court. These issues prevent individuals from pursing civil disputes. In a system which fully supports the rule of law, court costs must be moderate, and there must be subsidies for people who cannot afford court

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costs or legal fees. It is common practice that if you are successful in your legal claim and judgment is made in your favor, the other side will be liable for your costs, including court and legal fees. However, in many cases, it is necessary to pay fee’s upfront meaning that this practice does not help the issue of individuals being able to bring a claim and paying these fees in advance of the court hearing. The most common way in which the issue of prohibitive legal fees is dealt with is through legal aid programs. The way these systems work varies from State to State, but an individual’s eligibility is usually assessed on a means basis. In the case of Airey v. Ireland (1979), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a State, under particular circumstances, also has an obligation to provide legal aid in civil cases. Despite this ruling, the cost of bringing a civil claim often prevents individuals from being able to resolve their disputes. The drastic cuts in the legal aid budget in England, leaving most ineligible for legal aid funding on civil cases, are representatives of the situation in most States. In addition to the need for courts to be accessible and not involving prohibitive costs, it is also widely accepted that court cases should not be delayed and that disputes should be resolved in a reasonable time frame. Most people have heard of the saying “justice delayed is justice denied.” However, delays in cases are widespread. In the 2016 annual report of the European Court of Human Rights, 22.9% of all hearing heard in the court were based on article 6, the right to fair trial (ECHR 2016), with delays being the most common reason for this right to be cited. It is apparent that in order to meet the target of access to justice for all, there is a universal need to improve on this element of the rule of law. 6. Sub-rule six: there must be a clear system of separation of powers which ensures that governments and those holding public office exercise the powers conferred on them, in good faith and for the correct purpose. The rule of law requires a clear separation of powers in the legal and political systems of the State. A system based on the separation of powers

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

will have three organs of power, namely, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, each independent from each other in both function and personal. This is reflected in the SDG 16.6 which requires effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels (UNDP 2015). This separation not only means that these powers are exercised by different institutions (for instance, the government, the parliament, and the judiciary), but also that individuals cannot be member of more than one of these institutions (for instance, the UK prime minister cannot also be a judge). Under this system, the executive usually consists of ministers and public officials, tasked with the everyday running of the country using powers conferred to them by statute. The legislature is the law-making body. This is usually found in a bicameral system of government of two houses that are involved in the law-making process. This is seen in the House of Commons and House of Lords in the UK and the House of Representatives and the Senate in the USA. Finally, the judiciary consists of the court system and all those involved in the application of the law, whose role is to settle disputes, be they civil or criminal matters. A clear separation of powers is necessary to prevent any one organ of power having too much power and ensure that all power is regulated through a system of checks and balances A clear separation of powers should act as a check and balance of power, ensuring that one institution is not acting beyond the power conferred upon it. Thus, a proper system of checks and balances is of utmost importance to the rule of law. According to Bingham, beyond the traditional application of the law and resolving legal disputes, the historic role of the courts in England has been to check excesses of executive power. This role has greatly expanded in recent years due to the increased complexity of government and the greater willingness of the public to challenge governmental decisions, through legal processes, such as judicial review. Although it is inevitable that governments will often exercise their powers, to the very limits of what they are legally entitled to do, especially during perceived threats to national security, it is essential that the courts

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

and the legislature be willing to hold governments to account when they act beyond their power, even if this excessive exercise of power was done in good faith. The key function of the rule of law, limiting the exercise of power, would not be realized if executive and legislative powers were exercised by the same institution or individual. 7. Sub-rule seven: the legal system provided by the State to settle disputes must be open, fair, and impartial. According to the Chief Justice of Australia, the rule of law does not mean rules by lawyers (Gleeson 2001). Legal disputes should not be decided by the legal professions opinions. Rather, it requires that decisions be made by a court of law. The decision-maker in the legal process, be they a judge, adjudicator, or mediator, must be independent. This is reflected in the SDG 16.6 which seeks accountable and transparent courts (UNDP 2015). This requires decision-makers to be free to make their decisions on the merit of a case and free from any undue influence and pressure from the government. The rule of law requires that this independence must be promoted and ensured by laws. Moreover, the judge must be impartial and ensure that there is no bias toward either parties involved in a case for any reasons, including but not excluded to personal interest or allegiance. If there is any risk of bias, the judge should excuse themselves and the case be relocated to another judge. To ensure that the legal system is seen to be open, fair, and impartial also requires legal disputes to be decided by a direct application of the law and by no other means but the application of the law, following an open hearing whereby both sides have had the opportunity to present their submissions or arguments. 8. Sub-rule eight: the rule of law requires compliance with international obligations. The emergence of globalization and the increased link between States have resulted in compliance in international law obligations to form part of the rule of law. This is evidenced in

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SDGS 16.3 which highlights the need to ensure international rule of law is prompted and SDGS 16.10 which requires that international obligations on fundamental freedoms are protected (UNDP 2015). In 1990, President Bush stated that “a new world was emerging, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle” (New York Times 1990, p. 20), which was echoed in 2002 by President George W. Bush junior. At an international level, the rule of law requires that international law obligations are complied with by those bound by it. Most international law obligations are found in treaties by organizations such as the UN, who develop treaties on various legal matters. These international treaties are often drafted in vague terms, which may be open to interpretation, as highlighted in section one with the Vienna Convention. This is problematic, as the rule of law requires that laws are sufficiently clear. The vague nature of international treaties has resulted in a number of monitoring bodies adopting general comments on the interpretation of the convention for which this particular body has been established, in order to try and provide clarification on the international obligations that States have committed themselves to. For example, the Human Rights Commission General Comment No.23 provides guidance on the application of article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides an impressive body of rules of interpretation of treaties but has itself been subject to criticism about the vague terms it adopts. Thus, the combination of the general comments produced to clarify the treaties and the interpretation guidance in the Vienna Convention suggests that the challenge of the vagueness of international law is successfully overcome, and the requirement of clarity of the law is met.

Conclusion: Does SDG 16 Help Uphold the Rule of Law? The eight sub-rules identified in the definition of the rule of law all have clear links to SDG 16 at a domestic level. This has been demonstrated using

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a variety of examples of how States attempt to uphold these elements, despite some being upheld better than others. However, the key remaining challenge to SDG 16 is compliance with international law and the rule of law at an international level and not just at a State level. While several institutions and organizations take responsibility for overseeing their own treaties, such as the UN, there is no central legislator which is responsible for the accessibility, clarity, and certainty of international law. Rather, this tends to fall in the hands of the States which conclude treaties and form customary law. Moreover, there are about 15 international and regional courts, including the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. The most prominent challenge for the courts at the international level is the nature of their jurisdiction. There is general acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute. However, not all these courts have the same compulsory jurisdiction, creating a challenge in the realization of the rule of law at an international level. Europe could serve as a model in this respect: States cannot participate in the European Union and the Council of Europe if they do not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, respectively. Despite these challenges, compliance to international law is generally regarded as a key element to the rule of law. Although violations of international law do occur, it should be noted that they are the exception. Most observers and practitioners accept international law voluntarily and thus actively work to ensure that it is generally observed.

Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

Cross-References ▶ International Human Rights Treaties and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

References Bingham T (2007) The rule of law. Camb Law J 66(1):67– 85 Cole D (2003) Enemy aliens. The New Press, New York Finnis J (1980) Natural law and natural rights. Clarendon law series. Clarendon Press, Oxford Gleeson M (2001) Courts and the Rule of Law. http://www. hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/formerjusti ces/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm. Accessed 30 Jan 2018 Heydon JD (2003) Judicial activism and the death of the rule of law. Quadrant XLVII, 1–2 Janse R (2012) Rule of Law – a guide for politicians. http:// www.hiil.org/publication/rule-of-law-for-politicians. Accessed 14 Jan 2018 Keith K (2015) The international rule of law. Leiden J Int Law 28:403–417 New York Times (1990) President’s Address to Joint Session of Congress. http://ce399.typepad.com/web log/files/NWOspeech91190.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan 2018 Palchetti P (2011) Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: a vague and ineffective obligation or a useful means for strengthening legal cooperation? In: Cannizzaro E (ed) The law of treaties beyond the Vienna Convention. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 25–36 Raz J (1979) The rule of law and its virtue. In: Raz J (ed) The authority of law: essays on law and morality. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 210–233 Shklar J (1987) Political theory and the rule of law. In: Hutchinson A, Monahan P (eds) The rule of law: ideal or ideology. Carswell, Toronto United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2015) The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/trans formingourworld. Accessed 19 Nov 2019 World Justice Project (WJP) (2016) Rule of Law Index. https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-lawindex/wjp-rule-law-index-2016. Accessed 8 Dec 2017

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Further Reading Airey v Ireland 32 Eur Ct HR Ser A (1979): [1979] 2 E.H. R.R. 305 Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, PCIJ Advisory Opinion of 4 December 1935, Series A/B No. 65 ECHR (2016) Annual report. https://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/Annual_report_2016_ENG.pdf. Accessed 21 Jan 2018 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 Railway Express Agency Inc v. New York 336 US 106, 112–113 (1949) Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 271, 149

831 UN (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN (2000) Millennium Declaration. http://www.un.org/ millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. Accessed 21 Jan 2018 UN (2004) Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. UN Doc. S/2004/616 UN General Assembly (2005) World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1 UN General Assembly (2012) Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, UN Doc. A/RES/67/1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)

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Secession: Reasons, Relevance, and Exemplified Conflicts

such, both terms resist the strict limits of any legal categorization.

Henning Jessen Maritime Law and Policy, World Maritime University (WMU), Malmö, Sweden

The Reasons for Secessionist Conflict and General Problems of Secession

Definition A secessionist conflict may result from an initial liberation or separation movement of a people (which often represents a geographically separated ethnic minority) within a State. However, separation or agreed/negotiated withdrawal from a territorial sovereign would go along with consent of that sovereign. In contrast, secession is characterized by the fact that it is persistently nonconsensual, thus generating complicated political and social conflicts and potentially violent hostilities. Secession can be defined as a unilateral severance from a constituent part of a State, which includes its territory and population, resulting in a perpetual split within the former territorial sovereign. Thus, secessionist conflict is any kind of conflict which ultimately aims at achieving a territorial split within a country. However, no authoritative definition of the notion of secession exists. Rather, secession and a preceding secessionist conflict represent a factual phenomenon. As

The potential for a secessionist conflict is inextricably linked with the principle of selfdetermination of peoples as embodied in Article 1, para. 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (Tomuschat 2006; Moore 1998). At the most basic level, self-determination is a principle concerned with the right to be a State (Crawford 2010). Selfdetermination, however, should not be too easily equated with the quest for independent statehood via secession (Oeter 2015) because there are many possible arrangements to sensibly acknowledge the right to self-determination of a people within a State. For example, the territorial sovereign may accept a high level of regional self-governance, up to the level of granting far-reaching autonomy rights to a region (Dinstein 1981). In the twentyfirst century, Goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) has introduced – as a de minimis policy expectation – “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels” (see target 16.7 and its indicators). This could also be interpreted as including elements of efficient self-governance of population groups within a State.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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Secessionist conflict and the desire to form a newly independent State might be fuelled if a people experience a significant denial or limitation of elements of self-determination. Generally, a narrow understanding of the concept of selfdetermination of peoples within a State (internal self-determination) limits the legality aspects of potential secessionist intentions. In contrast, a wide general understanding of self-determination creates some potential for a lawful secession of a people from the “parent” State (exercising external self-determination). In any case, external self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of States must be reasonably and sensibly balanced. Secession per se is neither prohibited under public international law nor does the law support any process aiming at secession (Thürer and Burri 2009). Ultimately, secession is not a matter of law but rather a matter of fact (Musgrave 2000). A secessionist conflict will always be deeply embedded in a specific domestic or regional context (Buchanan 1997). Systematic oppression of a part of the society of a State can be a common reason for the build-up of secessionist ideas and secessionist conflict. Oppression may range from the denial of participatory rights, to serious and systematic discrimination and other violations of human rights of the members of one part of the population (Thürer and Burri 2009). This might often coincide with ethnic differences and ethnic conflict within the sovereign State. It goes without saying that any public measures (regardless whether directed or generating indirect consequences) which could fall under the elements of oppressive activity stand in direct contradiction to UNSDG 16 and its targets and indicators. There could also be a high degree of geographic separation of the seceding ethnic group from other parts of the territory. In historic contrast, however, the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865 might serve as one counterexample of a secessionist conflict that built up as a result of protracted internal political conflict but without any clear ethnic separation between the parties to the conflict. Consequently, it is very difficult to generalize the motivation for secessionist conflict. Nevertheless, a perceived

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long-standing oppression will often be one of the root causes of a secessionist conflict. “Liberation movements” which may build up in tension over time to result in separatism and secessionist conflict are first and foremost issues of internal political processes in a given society. However, they do not automatically constitute a question of international relations (Orakhelashvili 2008; Oeter 2015). A central follow-up question of any secessionist conflict, ultimately resulting in secession or separation or withdrawal or complete State dissolution, is the question of recognition of a seceding entity by third States (Dugard and Raić 2006). Although recognition is merely declaratory, the international community has traditionally been very reserved in recognizing secessionist entities because any kind of premature recognition is perceived to be illicit and to constitute intervention in internal affairs, in particular, if the former territorial sovereign continues to actively apply countermeasures against the secession (Orakhelashvili 2008; Oeter 2015). The United Nations has taken a similar approach, up to the point of completely rejecting any unilateral right of secession whatsoever. For example, in 1970, UN Secretary-General U Thant stated that “as an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State” (Press Conference held in Dakar, Senegal, 4 January 1970, cited by Thürer and Burri 2009). This restrictive attitude towards secession is also confirmed by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Declaration, UNGA Res 2625 [XXV] [24 October 1970] Principle V). The Friendly Relations Declaration emphasized that “nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as

Secession: Reasons, Relevance, and Exemplified Conflicts

described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.” The Friendly Relations Declaration thus also highlights that the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of States is a legal obligation among States. In contrast, there is no legal obligation for an internal secessionist movement to adhere to the principle of territorial integrity. A notable recent exception to the cautious spirit of Principle V of the Friendly Relations Declaration was, however, the (premature) recognition of an independent Kosovo by a number of States. This is one of the very few examples of a patronized secession and it has ultimately led to a deep split within the international community (Oeter 2015). What has been perceived as a selective attitude towards secessionist conflict has caused significant political and legal uncertainty in international relations since 2008, in particular in relation to preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine against foreign influence after 2014.

The “Traditional” Approach to Secessionist Conflict Although there are many examples of internal separation movements and secessionist conflict, ultimate secession is an extremely rare occurrence because the legal understanding of the term “secession” includes the notion of a unilateral severance to which the “parent” State persistently objects even after the territorial split has occurred. In most cases, the former territorial sovereign will first try to prevent a secessionist movement from advancing its claims. In case of a secessionist conflict, the territorial sovereign will either try to prevent international coverage by the press and/or it will argue that the secessionist activities are illegal, for example, by highlighting the existence of internal accommodating measures that are in accordance with the right to (internal) selfdetermination. In some cases, the territorial sovereign might even apply a bipolar mixture of oppression and granting beneficial rights to the seceding entity.

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If all restrictive efforts against a secessionist movement are unsuccessful, however, State practice evidences that the former territorial sovereign will sooner or later give consent to the “birth” of a new State, which ultimately becomes a new member of the international community (Crawford 2010). This also indicates that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to identify the exact point in time when secession actually occurs or when a “liberation movement” turns into a secessionist activity. Rather, secessionist conflict will often be a long-term, progressively hardening development, potentially extending over many decades. In addition, any conflict of that kind may not necessarily result in a declaration of independence of the secessionist movement, while the existence of such a declaration will not mean that secession has ultimately been finalized.

The Relevance of a Territoriality in a Secessionist Conflict There might be secessionist conflicts around the world which center on the concept of “a people” and their common language, religion, and culture, possibly even spanning over wider regions (e.g., relevant for the Kurds who settle in adjacent parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-western Iran, northern Iraq and northern Syria). However, one element is indispensable for the objectives of a secessionist movement: There must be a territorial element to successfully construct and implement the concept of external self-determination. In other words: Never has there been significant international sympathy (not to speak of any degree of diplomatic support) for a claim of external self-determination via statehood – raised by an ethnic group – without any firm territorial basis in a preexisting political entity (Oeter 2015). A certain defined territory (and the claim to exercise unlimited sovereignty over it) is the most important foundation for a collective identity of a people and will serve as a driving force to justify secessionist intentions. What is more, no secessionist referendum or related plebiscite can be reasonably implemented without an exact delimitation of its territorial applicability.

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The Relevance of a Secessionist Referendum The secessionist intention of a people might materialize by the results of a plebiscite or a referendum, thus, indicating that a more formalized political process, aiming at ultimate secession has been initiated. Historically, the “Aaland Islands dispute” was one of the first legal proceedings in which the progressive elements of secession have been analyzed by an International Tribunal (The Aaland Islands Question, Report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, 16 April 1921). This early secessionist conflict resulted in the territorial sovereign (Finland) maintaining its territorial integrity while it had to grant extensive cultural and political autonomy rights to the predominantly Swedish-populated Aaland Islands. As evidenced by this example, extensive voter participation and the outcome of a plebiscite or referendum on secession might add to the persuasiveness of the objectives of a secessionist movement, both from a domestic view and from an international perspective, while it will not serve as a singular reason for secession. A number of secessionist conflicts – whether accompanied by domestic violence or nonviolent political debate – have highlighted the existence and outcome of a referendum of a people of a geographically defined region as a milestone of potential secession. For example, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Federal State of Canada and its constituent entities, based on the constitution, would be obliged to negotiate secession in good faith (bona fide) if the population of Quebec, having been asked the unequivocal question, expressed its wish to secede by a clear majority (Bayefsk 2000, Thürer and Burri 2009, Reference re Secession of Quebec Supreme Court of Canada, 20 August 1998). One might ask, however, whether the term “secession” – given its unilateral flavor – is rightly placed here or whether the respective negotiations would rather amount to a potential agreement on withdrawal from a Federation of States. The same could be said for the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014, had it indicated a clear majority

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of the Scottish population in favor of leaving the United Kingdom. There might also be cases where the territorial sovereign persistently denies the constitutional legality of an independence referendum (as Spain does in the case of Catalonia) or where the international community suspects a secession referendum to be massively influenced by an external power (as in the case of Crimea, Ukraine, in relation to the Russian Federation). On the other hand, the 2011 independence referendum of South Sudan (which was an agreed consequence of a 2005 peace agreement after a long-standing civil war) resulted objectively in a 99% approval of all voters in favor of secession. As such, the referendum definitely marked the final milestone for South Sudanese independence from Sudan after decades of secessionist conflict.

“Remedial Secession” as an Ultima Ratio? State practice provides a number of examples of secessionist conflict and the resulting problems have been discussed extensively in academic literature (Crawford 2010). Historically, the Aaland Islands case of 1921 represents the oldest adjudicated dispute and it still holds authority until today. This is particularly true when it comes to evaluating any potential right for an ultima ratio (“remedial”) secession. Generally, a lack of appropriate representation of a people within a State – violating the right to internal selfdetermination – could be a catalyst for an internal secessionist conflict and could legitimize the objective of secession (Thürer and Burri 2009). The territorial sovereign must “enact and apply just and effective guarantees” to de-legitimize the secessionist objective (The Aaland Islands Question, Commission of Rapporteurs, 1921). This may be translated as a legal right to introduce a certain degree of autonomy to the benefit of an affected (secessionist) region. The most basic understanding of (internal) selfdetermination will demand from the territorial sovereign a guarantee to uphold human rights for everyone on a nondiscriminatory basis. If there is a lacking will or incapability to enact

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and to apply just and effective guarantees, this will add to the legitimacy of any political objectives for a secessionist movement. Some scholars argue that a “remedial secession” might be legally justified – notably as an ultima ratio reaction – to counteract against continuous and severe violations of human rights by a territorial sovereign. Such a concept shall serve the function of an emergency right. Cases of alien “subjugation, domination or exploitation” and the persistent violation or denial of fundamental human rights (in other words: extreme oppression) may thus both trigger secessionist conflict and ultimately result in a legitimate secession – again: as an ultima ratio – but never as an early political option.

Some Historic Examples in Relation to Secessionist Conflict (State Practice) The postdecolonization phase provides for a number of younger secessionist conflicts (from the 1960s onwards), especially on the African continent. A precondition for a secessionist conflict is, however, the existence of a territorial sovereign from which a secessionist movement seeks to secede. This was not the case, for example, in the case of the Western Sahara where no State (neither Spain, nor Morocco nor Mauretania) had unlimited territorial sovereign rights at the time of colonization though certain legal links may have been established. Thus, the Western Sahara conflict is rather situated in the area of (unlawful) occupation and includes elements of a potential (externally imposed) denial of the right to self-determination of a people which has never been part of another territorial sovereign (International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1975, Rep. 12, Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, para. 162). Examples of ultimately unsuccessful secession attempts are the regions of Katanga (trying to secede from the Republic of Congo in 1963) and Biafra where the Ibo population attempted to secede from Nigeria and had declared its independence on 30 May 1967 (Cronje 1972). As indicated above, the international community was generally reluctant to inflict any potentially negative effects on the territorial integrity of States. In these cases,

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the Republic of Congo and Nigeria were the beneficiaries of that restrictive attitude of other States. Moreover, already in 1964, several African heads of State had confirmed their commitment to respect existing borders as achieved after independence from former colonial powers (Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, “Border Disputes Among African States” [17–21 July 1964] AHG/Res 16(I), Art. 2). Eritrea/Ethiopia Other examples of secessionist conflict are more difficult to differentiate from the long-term process and effects of de-colonization. For example, it could be argued that Eritrea, an independent State since 1993 (UNGA Res 47/230, 28 May 1993), was formerly part of the State of Ethiopia. Both entities had first been jointly under colonial domination, followed by the creation of a federation under UN administration since 1952 (UNGA Res 390 (V), 2 December 1950). However, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea 10 years later, which resulted in a long-term internal armed conflict between Ethiopian dominance and Eritrean counter-activity. If the annexation by Ethiopia was unlawful, however, Eritrea had only factually become a part of Ethiopia but was never subject to a legitimate territorial sovereign. Rather, one could argue that this internal secessionist conflict was the long-term fallout from earlier colonization and a complicated process of de-colonization in which it took four decades for Eritrea to finally achieve independence. Anyone categorizing Eritrean independence as a result of unilateral secession from Ethiopia will have to highlight two aspects: First, the existence of an UN-sponsored plebiscite in which almost 100% of the Eritrean voters expressed their desire not to form a part of Ethiopia anymore. Second, Ethiopia initially objecting to the ultimate loss of this formerly controlled, but always unruly, part of its territory. Later however, the Ethiopian objection turned into a fact-driven acceptance. Bangladesh/Pakistan As indicated above, in those cases where a secessionist conflict arose and the secessionist movement was, in fact, able to establish a high degree

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of effective control over a defined territory, possibly even attracting recognition from foreign governments, the former territorial sovereign sooner or later yielded to the consequences of this situation. This is also true for (West) Pakistan which lost the territory of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan (Chowdhury 1972). However, one could argue that foreign influence (if not active sponsorship) played a large role in this specific secession because India heavily supported the desire of Bangladesh for independent statehood with its military forces and Pakistan was significantly weakened by Indian intervention in 1970–1971. Three years after the proclamation of independence by Bangladesh (April 1971), the former territorial sovereign Pakistan accepted the situation and recognized the independent statehood of Bangladesh, as several other States had done before. State practice evidences that other States regard the recognition by the preexisting State as paramount. It was only then that the United Nations did admit Bangladesh as a new member as well (UNGA Res 3203, 17 September 1974, GAOR 29th Session Supp. 31 vol. 1, 2). Quebec/Canada The late 1990s case of Quebec has already been mentioned above because of its significant contribution to clarifying the legal requirements for a possible nonviolent secession without any foreign intervention (Bayefsk 2000). The lines between an orderly secession and a formalized withdrawal from a federation of States, however, will still remain blurry. Nevertheless, the 1998 Canadian Supreme Court decision could now serve as a “legal template” to peacefully resolve an internal secessionist conflict. In particular, it has resulted in establishing a threshold and a possible orderly sequence for resolving a secessionist (political) conflict, without establishing any tendency in favor of or against the possibility for secession. Under Canadian constitutional law, if the population of Quebec had expressed its will to secede by a clear majority, this would entail an obligation to negotiate in good faith the change of the Canadian Constitution necessary for a withdrawal of Quebec, without any outcome of these negotiations being predetermined by Canadian constitutional

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law (see para. 102 of the decision; Thürer and Burri 2009). Furthermore, it was held that international law does not grant Quebec the right to secede unilaterally from Canada (para. 138 of the decision; Thürer and Burri 2009). Such right may, however, arise in principle and under specific circumstances, in particular, in cases of “alien subjugation, domination or exploitation” (para. 133), and “when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination internally” (para. 134). Since the Canadian Supreme Court gave its opinion in 1998, the population of Quebec has not expressed any “clear wish” to secede, which, according to the opinion, would be required under Canadian constitutional law (Thürer and Burri 2009). The same could be argued in the case of Catalonia, taking into account that a significant (though undefined) portion of the Catalonian population does not unambiguously support the secessionist intentions. This situation precludes a “clear majority,” while there might be a general majority in favor of such a move. Admittedly, no numerical threshold for a “clear wish” to secede can be given. However, the so-called “Clarity Act” (as passed under Canadian Law) and the fact that relevant independence plebiscites in Eritrea and South Sudan have generated almost 100% approval rates in the past could serve as a strong indication that a simple majority of voters is – by far – not enough to establish any “clear wish” for secession. Kosovo/Serbia The dissolutions of the former Soviet Union and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia do not fall under the category of secession(s). Rather, these developments amounted to factual “rearrangements” of statehood because the newly independent States all emerged from the turmoil of a process of State dismemberment while none of them has bilaterally fought for independence against a persistently objecting “parent State” (not even Russia would fall into this category). However, with regard to secession, the fallout from the break-up of Yugoslavia has generated a very delicate subsequent problem: This is the case of the former Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo.

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Since 2008, the Kosovo case represents a stark political difference to the traditional approach of States, even differing significantly from the early 1970s case of Bangladesh, which would represent one of the rare case study examples of a (nonconsensual) secession in the first place. In the Kosovo case, however, not only one “sponsor State” but a larger number of States actively promoted unilateral secession despite the fact that the territorial sovereign expressly opposed the separation. Later, this was negatively labeled as “manipulating the legal framework on secession and recognition” (Oeter 2015). Quite obviously, in relation to Kosovo, a number of States – whether expressly or implied – had positively identified the requirement of “alien subjugation, domination or exploitation” and had taken the view that a people was being “blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination internally” (the legal threshold proposed generally by the Canadian Supreme Court, though admittedly, in another context). After years of severe internal secessionist conflict within Serbia, evidence mounted that Serbia would apply methods of “ethnic cleansing” (a dubious euphemism for organized deportation and systematic crimes against humanity). When diplomatic efforts seemed to be exhausted, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Member States intervened in Kosovo in the late 1990s, despite the fact that the UN Security Council had not authorized the action. After the surrender of Serbia, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 established an international civil and military presence in Kosovo – UNMIK and KFOR – while ignoring both the legality of the prior use of force, as well as the “final status” of Kosovo (UNSC Res 1244 [1999] [10 June 1999] SCOR 54th Year 32; Thürer and Burri 2009). As a result of a protracted stalemate between 1999 and 2008, resulting in a political inability of Kosovo and Serbia to resolve the “final status,” Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. In 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed – via an Advisory Opinion – the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovo. The reasoning was predominantly based on formal grounds and

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highlighted, above all, that the Assembly of Kosovo had acted in a capacity of representing the people of Kosovo – outside the framework of any interim administration and not legally bound by any constitutional framework as externally created by the United Nations between 1999 and 2008. Nevertheless, one of the aspects differentiating the Kosovo case from the previously discussed examples of State practice is the fact that the territorial sovereign, Serbia, has persistently objected to any unilateral severance of part of its territory while a number of other States (including the United States and some EU Members) did not hesitate to quickly recognize Kosovo soon after the declaration of independence. As a consequence, the former strong bias against secession in State practice was severely weakened and the longstanding policy of nonrecognition was terminated. Highlighting the “uniqueness” of the Kosovo situation did not change this verdict and has, unfortunately, created a complicated precedent for the future.

Conclusions While public international law remains neutral on the issue of secession and neither prohibits nor permits it, some legal guidance for settling a secessionist conflict in an amicable way does exist: First, even in the event of a long-term secessionist conflict, the threshold for any legitimate secession should remain extremely high. It must not be forgotten that the territorial sovereign may have a number of valid counterarguments against any secessionist intentions. In fact, it has to be taken into account that a lenient approach to secession would entail a slippery slope for the territorial integrity of States anywhere in the world. From a legal point of view, it is far easier for any “parent” State to delegitimize the objectives of secession than it is for a secessionist movement to prove the necessity for ultimate secession from the territorial sovereign. This is also where Goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals becomes particularly relevant: A good record on implementing the targets

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and indicators of that goal, in particular, in relation to target 16.7 (“Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”) will invalidate both the political and legal persuasiveness of any secessionist intentions of a group of the population (which are frequently based on a perceived denial of inclusive, participatory and representative rights within a State). Second, the right to preserve the territorial integrity of States is not without limitations. In particular, in the most extreme cases of severe and continuous human rights violations, a potential “remedial” secession might be an issue, potentially justified by the unambiguous outcome of a related plebiscite, which would mark a final milestone in the path for statehood. In any case, an internal secessionist movement is not legally obliged to preserve the territorial integrity of the sovereign. Externally, however, this legal obligation definitely falls on other States. In almost all historic cases that could fall under the general understanding of secession, States did not want to create any opportunities for secessionist precedents whatsoever. This solid approach, however, has crumbled with the externally sponsored unilateral secession of Kosovo (inducing more than 100 foreign recognitions) after 2008. The Kosovo case may have given rise to motivate other, seemingly oppressed, populations to voice their grievances and their claims to statehood (Thürer and Burri 2009). One of the legal repercussions and consequences seems to be that the unilateral severance of Crimea from Ukraine was made easier to achieve in 2014. However, the lines between secession and a foreign annexation are blurry in this regard. Finally, the ongoing cases of Catalonia (or Somaliland) are good examples for the fact that secessionist conflict can only be resolved politically. In more basic terms, changed facts and power structures in relation to which entity exercises effective governmental control over a clearly defined territory can ultimately “tip the bar” into the direction of successful or unsuccessful secession. In contrast, a legalistic approach (in the absence of foreign recognitions) will rather perpetuate existing stalemates, potentially

Social Entrepreneurship

resulting in a transformation of a secessionist conflict into a long-term “frozen” conflict.

Cross-References ▶ Ethnic Conflict and the UN Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

References Bayefsk AF (2000) Self-determination in international law: Quebec and lessons learned. Kluwer, The Hague Buchanan A (1997) Theories of secession. Philos Public Aff 26:31–61 Chowdhury SR (1972) The genesis of Bangladesh: a study in international legal norms and permissive conscience. Asia Publishing House, New York Crawford J (2010) The creation of states in international law. Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press, Oxford Cronje S (1972) The world and Nigeria: the diplomatic history of the Biafran war 1967–1970. Sidgwick and Jackson, London Dinstein Y (ed) (1981) Models of autonomy. Transaction Books, New Brunswick Dugard J, Raić D (2006) The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession. In: Kohen MG (ed) Secession: international law perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 94–136 Moore M (ed) (1998) National self-determination and secession. Oxford University Press, Oxford Musgrave TD (2000) Self-determination and national minorities. Oxford University Press, Oxford Oeter S (2015) The Kosovo case – an unfortunate precedent. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 75:51–74 Orakhelashvili A (2008) Statehood, recognition and the United Nations system: a unilateral declaration of Independence in Kosovo. Max Planck UNYB 12:1–44 Thürer D, Burri T (2009) Secession, Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law (MPEPIL). Oxford University Press, Heidelberg/Oxford Tomuschat C (2006) Secession and self-determination. In: Kohen MG (ed) Secession: international law perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 23–45

Social Entrepreneurship ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding

841 “We have to bring the world together. . .we have to live as one. . . This is the answer for the people who lost their loved ones from war” Song: United, by Playing for Change and United Nations Population Fund

Andrea Sottini and Giacomo Ciambotti Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

Introduction Definitions Vulnerable individuals are considered those communities that live under the threshold of poverty, belong to minority ethnic groups, and are excluded from access to economic, political, and social life (Zoogah et al. 2015). Such conditions push them toward subsistence objectives (Webb et al. 2020). A growing body of literature widely recognized the role of social enterprises to tackle social exclusion and poverty. Social enterprises are for profit organizations that pursue a social and/or environmental missions while generating incomes through commercial operations in order to sustain and scale the social demand (Doherty et al. 2014). They are characterized by innovative processes to use and combine resources to pursue social change (Mair and Marti 2006). Poverty-war trap is a condition where vulnerable groups try to balance societal inequalities through violent actions, which – in turn – generate direct negative consequences on economic and societal level, decreasing better livelihood opportunities. This phenomenon is built on the poverty trap concept which define a socioeconomic condition where communities are too poor to achieve an economic development (Sachs et al. 2004). A mechanism to breakdown the poverty-war trap is the sustainable peacebuilding. This is a process composed by two aspects: economic and social value creations. The economic value promotes economic empowerment, contributing to poverty reduction (Mair et al. 2012). The creation of social value raises trust between individuals, favoring social reconciliation (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011; Hockerts 2015). These two aspects mutually reinforce each other, by moving the society away from the poverty-war trap.

For as long as humanity existed, peace has been threatened across geographies and Nations, and the effort toward conflict resolutions has been immense. Given the widespread occurrence of violent conflicts mainly in Africa, Latin America, Middle East, and South Asia, and the rising concern about fragile economies and their repercussions for global development, initiatives toward prevention and resolutions became crucial and leaded the development Agenda of the World (e. g., United Nations Global Compact 2020, see Kimoon 2010; Sustainable Development Goals 2030, see Rasche, 2020). In fact, recently, research on violent conflicts resolutions has grown significantly with several publications in leading scientific journals (e.g., Journal of Conflict Resolution) and mainstream conferences (e.g., Young Academic Conference 2020 “Planning as a Conflict Resolution” www.aesop-youngacademics.net). In this vein, authors pinpoint the weaknesses in the numerous peacekeeping missions of recent decades and highlight the need to have a more comprehensive actions directed to eradication of roots of war, accommodating the economic and social purposes of war-countries (Gerson and Colletta 2001). The efforts toward war resolutions involved the participation of many actors like Public and International Policy, and International Affairs. Moreover, private initiatives have also played a crucial role in alleviation of violent conflicts. In this vein, sharing-based organization also played a crucial role in unlocking underutilized resources and create a social connection between different global sides of the World (Muñoz and Cohen 2018). The sharing economy has received attention from scholars as a potential solution to reduce income inequality (Acquier et al. 2017) and social inclusion between vulnerable groups and rest of

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the society (Malik and Wahaj 2019). The sharing economy includes a wide spectrum of organizations from non-for-profit, profit initiatives, to social entrepreneurship (Laukkanen and Tura 2020; Parente et al. 2018). For instance, several nongovernmental-organizations (NGO) developed sharing-based platforms to promote microcredit actions in underprivileged countries (including conflict-countries) as Palestine, Lebanon, Congo (DRC), and Kosovo through fundraising via internet. Among private initiatives, for-profit organizations have grown their relevance and number of activities in such contexts (Prahalad and Hart 2002). In 2010, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged business organizations to join the Global Compact – an international initiative that would bring companies together with UN agencies to advance ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anticorruption (Ki-moon 2010), thereby fostering the exploration of ways through which businesses can achieve peace and prosperity. In this vein, business and peace literatures have distinguished social enterprises, which include peacebuilding in their social mission (Kolk and Lenfant 2016; Brück et al. 2013), corporate foreign policy (Prahalad and Hart 2002), and ethical firms that promote conflict prevention and peaceful environment (Fort and Schipani 2004). Among such organizations, social enterprises are growing and attracting interest globally for their specific capacity to address the needs of people where markets and governments are failing like in many developing and constrained contexts (Ciambotti and Pedrini 2019). With the attempt to address such needs, social enterprises pursue a social mission while running commercial operation in order to generate revenues to sustain and scale that social mission (Yunus et al. 2010). Thus, they are characterized by the aim of achieving and growing the dual mission: they have to create social value, while assuring a financial sustainability (Doherty et al. 2014). Such combination of multiple missions makes them a unique and powerful force of change and development, being able to operate in extreme contexts (Littlewood and Holt 2018; Ciambotti

and Pedrini 2019), such as slums (Shepherd et al. 2020), refugee camps (Harima and Freudenberg 2020), and conflict-zones (Brück et al. 2013). This has generated a growing visibility and presence of social enterprises across the world in the last decades and central in the focus of corporate leaders in the twenty-first century (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015). Heeding this, the entry which follows intends to deeply present, comment, and understand a category of social enterprise, labelled Peace Social Enterprise, which has the social mission of providing solutions to raise peace in violent conflict areas, thereby transforming and developing such contexts. Thus, this entry provides an analysis of extant literature to explain the characteristics and the role played by social entrepreneurship to address peace and development-related issues such as reconciliation among opposite parties and economic growth in conflicts countries. In doing this, the entry also highlights the contribution of Peace Social Enterprise to achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nation. In fact, Peace Social Enterprise performs an inclusive economic development contributing to achieving the SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), while enabling vulnerable groups to address their basic unmet needs, addressing the SDG 1 (No Poverty). Taking together such two goals, Peace Social Enterprise addresses its principal social mission that is the promotion of a peaceful society in war-conflict contexts, thereby contributing to the SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).

Violent Conflict: Economic and Social Antecedents Why do people begin a war? The antecedents of violent conflicts have been often associated with the high level of poverty (Prahalad and Hammond 2002; Prahalad and Hart 2002). Prof. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, declared at the acceptance of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, that “poverty is a threat to peace.”

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding

This suggests that alleviating poverty may contribute thereby to a peaceful society where resources a more equally distributed. However, poverty is still a mass problem and comprises more than half the world’s population. Between 4 and 4.5 billion people globally live in what is called Base-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) market, on incomes below US$ 3,000 per annum, or less than US $8 per day (Hammond et al. 2007; Ciambotti et al. 2020). In such conditions, people struggle to address their basic needs such as food, education, and health (Littlewood and Holt 2014; Khoury and Prasad 2016; Sottini et al. 2020). Moreover, the institutional system often deficit in providing essential institutional structure, such as basic systems of governance, infrastructure (e.g., communication, utilities, or transportation), property rights protection, regulatory agencies, rule of law, regulation of capital and labor markets, thereby leaving formal institutional voids (Webb et al. 2020). When formal institutional voids occur, transactional and operational costs increase, creating an obstacle in the economic growth and market functioning (North 1990). Therefore, such voids obstacle the chance of equal economic and social development, leading to the favoring of one population over another (Webb et al. 2020). The difficult life conditions of poor people in such conditions raise inevitably frustrations in the society (Staub 1998). As a consequence, people try to balance socioeconomic inequalities (Collier and Duponchel 2013), doing whatever is necessary to survive including clashing against authorities. For example, the experience of Gandhi made a strong case that poverty contributes to social clashes and civil unrest (Nanda 1996). Furthermore, together with economic poverty, divergence identities based on ethnic belonging has been considered as one of the greatest cause of violent conflicts (Littlewood and Holt 2014). Such divergences raise from establishing of norms and belief that certain group of people (i. e., outgroup members of a clan) are different and subordinate, or even dangerous compared to others. As a result, some parts of the society marginalize some other groups based on their ethnicity, geographic, and demographic attributes

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(Littlewood and Holt 2014; Khoury and Prasad 2016). Sociologist and psychologists documented such phenomenon, agreeing that people derive their personality from their social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Such process affects the perception of others, raising – in some cases – distrust and prejudice toward outgroups members (Alexander et al. 1999). An example, the apartheid (separation) system in South Africa raised social norms according to which certain groups had strict working and social restrictions (e.g., Bantustan) becoming victims of racial discrimination. From such beliefs and norms derive the so-called informal institutional voids, conceptualize as the fails of traditions, norms, values, beliefs to establish socially acceptable ways of interactions between societal members (Mair et al. 2012; Khoury and Prasad 2016; Webb et al. 2020). Informal institutions include tacit rules in society through “codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions” (North 1990, p. 36). Accordingly, such institutions’ incentive- and constrainspecific behavior according to what is acceptable by large groups of society, creating expectations and predictability in social exchanges (North 1990). The informal institutional voids can bring the exclusion of certain groups, based on their ethnicity or other demographic attributes, from society exchanges system, economic transaction participation, and resources network (Khoury and Prasad 2016). Outgroup prejudices are considered as predictors of violence (Alexander et al. 1999), because increase social distance among different groups which suddenly become antagonistic and place them into severe market disadvantages due to lack of resource and market access (Webb et al. 2020). For example, in Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi clans shared their lives peacefully for centuries. The raising of norms and beliefs that Tutsi belonged to a distinct and dangerous social group convinced and justified Hutu population to see Tutsi as enemy to be eliminated (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). Such ethnic tensions derived from poor economic conditions of the country. Indeed, the collapsed price of coffee – mostly belong to Hutu farmers – in 1980s pushed the government – Hutu-leaded – to use ethnic

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ideology against the Tutsis to increase its legitimacy among the majority of the population Hutu (Verwimp 2003). The result: a genocide. In conclusion, literature and examples suggest that war countries are affected by formal and informal institutional voids which leave the population vulnerable without any form of institutional support and exposed to economic and social clashes. In such contexts, vulnerable groups of the society try to balance resources and societal status inequalities, overcoming their poor living conditions and marginalization (Tobias et al. 2013). Such tentative may find obstacles from other groups raising social tensions, flowing into a violent conflict (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). Violent conflicts – in turn – have direct negative consequences on economic development of the country (e.g., destroying infrastructure, missing of foreign investment), thereby increasing the vulnerability of the population. Therefore, poverty and armed conflict are interrelated. And they reinforce each other in a poverty-war trap: the poverty is the cause of war and war becomes the cause of poverty. As a consequence, the resolution of armed conflict requires a complex peacebuilding process, combining both economic and social aspects in order to restore harmony and peace in society. But how can such combination be realized?

Social Entrepreneurship: Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding Scholars suggest that approach toward poverty eradication may lead to the elimination of armed conflicts (Prahalad and Hammond 2002; Prahalad and Hart 2002). Prahalad and Hammond (2002) in the book named “Serving the World’s Poor, Profitably” argued that entrepreneurship should pursue business opportunities addressing basic needs of poor people (e.g., drinkable water, sanitization, electricity access), taking “The fortune at the Base of the Pyramid” (Prahalad and Hart 2002). Such approach has double benefits: poverty reduction and profit generation for ventures (Shepherd et al. 2020). Following this, many businesses moved toward

this fertile opportunity, including multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Ahmed 2013), as well as B Corporations (Rodrigues et al. 2015). More recently, also social enterprises played a crucial role in such context toward poverty reduction (Ciambotti et al. 2020). In fact, social enterprises have a unique opportunity to successfully combine social and financial missions and processes, thus ensuring a financial sustainable impact initiative (Battilana et al. 2015). The most widely accepted conceptualization of social business is proposed by Yunus et al. (2010, p. 311), who defined social business as a “no-loss, no-dividend, self-sustaining company that sells goods or services and repays investments to its owners, but whose primary purpose is to serve society and improve the lot of the poor.” Social enterprises are present is various sectors: including education (Sydow et al. 2018), health (Sottini et al. 2020), microfinance, energy, and recycling (Ciambotti et al. 2019b). Approaches to social entrepreneurship can be categorized in three groups (Alvord et al. 2004). The first category regards the capacity-building approach, which regards the increasing on capacity and skills that local actors already have, in order to solve their problems. Such category includes technical training and business training of marginalized communities in rural villages. The second approach doesn’t rely on capacities of local actors while focuses to provide innovative solutions in form of product and service to vulnerable people. The third involves “building a movement that mobilizes grassroots alliances to challenge abusive elites or institutions” (Alvord et al. 2004, p. 270). These three main approaches described in literature also comprises different typologies of social enterprises. The first type of social enterprises is called Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISE), whose mission is to create employment opportunities for those vulnerable people at risk of permanent exclusion for the labor market (Battilana et al. 2015). Such activities enable those individuals to gain an income and so being economically independent. For example, beneficiaries of such organizations might be homeless and displaced people.

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding

A second type is called Base-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) social enterprises which intends to address the basic unmet needs of poor people, belonging to the so-called BoP market (Prahalad and Hart 2002; Yunus et al. 2010; Ciambotti et al. 2020). In such context, social enterprises create products and services that answer to four main characteristics: affordability, availability, accessibility, and awareness (Anderson and Billou 2007). For example, in such context, scholars documented social enterprises which distribute drinkable water in both urban and rural areas, building a delivery door-to-door system. Likewise, social enterprises that provide solar panels through a pay-as-you-go platforms. A third type is called Fair Trade Social Enterprises whose mission is to raise incomes of poor and marginalized producers, often localized in the south of the world (Doherty et al. 2014; Rivera-Santos et al. 2015). They do that, charging an extra price for customers who are willing to pay a premium price because conscious about their contributions to the positive impact of the social enterprise. Examples in this field might be the cooperatives of tea leaves, coffee, or cocoa that sell the processed raw materials across the world, ensuring a proper profit for the growers (Ciambotti et al. 2019a). A fourth category that will be explored in this entry is related to Peace Social Enterprises, which has the specific mission to improve the welfare of people affected by armed conflicts events (Brück et al. 2013), playing an important role in the process of building peace (Fort and Schipani 2004). In this vein, social entrepreneurs are as “heroes” able to “address, mostly with extra ordinary success, seemingly unsolvable social problems” (Praszkier and Nowak 2011, p. 503). For example, there are Peace Social Enterprises that deploy community health workers (CHWs) to low-income neighborhoods and camps for people displaced by national conflict. In the attempt to achieve such goal, Peace Social Enterprises create business opportunities for vulnerable groups that allow them to address their basic needs and so improve the quality of their life (Kolk and Lenfant 2016). Likewise, they contribute to restoring those social ties among

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opposite groups that have been lacerated by the war, thereby contributing to strength equalities and justice within groups (Tobias et al. 2013).

Economic Value Creation for Vulnerable Literature provided evidences that countries experiencing growing of entrepreneurial activities benefit of lower levels of conflicts (Kolk and Lenfant 2016). Evidences of studies conducted in Rwanda suggest that entrepreneurial activities contributed to poverty reduction and peacebuilding especially between very different ethnic groups (Tobias et al. 2013). As the common sense would suggest, with employment or selfemployment opportunities, people tend less to join terrorist groups or be engaged into violent behavior. Thus, it becomes clearly the cruciality to combat the marginalization of the poor (Prahalad and Hart 2002), providing means to become economically independent as part of the process of peacebuilding (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). In this view, vulnerable people are transformed as whom able to general economic value in the society, contributing to poverty reduction (Kolk and Lenfant 2016; Tobias et al. 2013). According to the literature, one of the best ways toward economic independence of vulnerable people in poor countries is through produceroriented interventions (Brück et al. 2013). Such approach aims to enhance the income-generating skills of poor people, securing a better standard of living. Accordingly, the purposes of this intervention are to make poor people producers of product and services in order to be economically independent; in other words: entrepreneurs. Relevance of the role of entrepreneurship in such context has been documented in Afghanistan by Ciarli et al. (2010), suggesting that once marginalized groups have access to self-employment, entrepreneurship seems to be indestructible. However, armed conflicts create various obstacles and challenges for starting entrepreneurial activities. Authors suggested that people lose skills due to long time exposed to armed conflicts and in working environment. Such effect of conflicts on entrepreneurial activities has been

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labelled as “forgetting by not doing” – recalling the analogy of Arrow’s famous theory of “learning by doing” (Arrow 1962). Moreover, a conflict context raises challenges for producers to access affordable and quality resources, like raw material, financial, and equipment, increasing uncertainty and risk of starting a business (Brück et al. 2013). Furthermore, due to the reduction in demand for products and services, producers struggle to access the marketplace and obtain secure and consistent transactions (London et al. 2010). In addition to that, they face also physically barriers to reach customers because of poor or destroyed infrastructures (e.g., transportation facilities and access to points of sale) together with a lack of awareness of customer requirements trends (Collier and Duponchel 2013; London et al. 2010; Sottini et al. 2020; Ciambotti et al. 2020). In this context, social enterprises play a crucial role to support vulnerable groups to start entrepreneurial activities overcoming such challenges (Ciambotti and Pedrini 2019; Littlewood and Holt 2018). In this vein, social enterprises create partnerships with the poors, exploring opportunities to utilize and improve local and existing resources and capabilities in order to exploit new business opportunities. Therefore, social enterprises act as a bridge among local vulnerable people with resources providers, by creating resource channels (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015). In Fig. 1 are summarized the discussed evidences.

Such channels ensure access to scarce resources, such as production materials, business competencies, and market knowledge (e.g., Doherty et al. 2014; Ciambotti and Pedrini 2019), supporting production and delivery of good and services (London 2008). In this way, social enterprises enable vulnerable communities to overcome their production and distribution challenges (London et al. 2010; Littlewood and Holt 2014). Moreover, social enterprises interventions also regard capacity building of vulnerable people, such as technical and entrepreneurial skills. In this vein, the effort of social enterprises is to train vulnerable people with technical skills in order to increase the quality of their products and services, reach safety standards, and get access to certification opportunities, addressing market requirements (Markelova and Mwangi 2010). Over that, social enterprises offer training aimed at build business and entrepreneurial skills and knowledge of local entrepreneurs, in order to enable them to manage the start-up and growth scale of their activities (see Fig. 1). For instance, there are social enterprises that deliver free of charge online courses in different fields, like program web application and mobile apps, for example, in Syria, with the mission to equip vulnerable youth with the right skills to be integrated into the workforce. Beside interventions related to capacity building and resources providing, social enterprises need also to create market opportunities for

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding, Fig. 1 Sustainable peacebuilding model. (Source: Developed by Authors)

Social Entrepreneurship Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding

vulnerable producers. In fact, marginalized groups have significant obstacles in selling their products and services in the market. From one side, in armed conflict environments, infrastructure are destroyed creating barriers in reaching customers (Anderson and Billou 2007; Ciambotti and Pedrini 2019). On the other side, vulnerable communities don’t know market trends and they expect that part of society neglect their tentative to sell their product and services as part of marginalization process (London et al. 2010). Heeding this, scholars highlight the need to create an inclusive market accessible across race, religions, and ethnic belongs (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). In this way, social enterprises create opportunities where marginalized groups can be part of the market and thus doing their transactions (Khoury and Prasad 2016). Therefore, social enterprises act as intermediaries redefining market architecture: including and legitimizing new actors, specifically, marginalized groups. Such activities include a sort of legitimization of marginalized groups in the market, such as through social narratives (Mair et al. 2012). An example is rapresented by those social enterprises with the mission to rehabilitate displaced people after the civil wars, supporting them to produce goods (e.g., textiles) to be sold in local and foreign markets. In this activity, social enterprises play a role as connector among the local vulnerable producers with international market creating a channel of sales. To conclude, it is possible to confirm that social enterprises fill formal institutional voids removing those obstacles for vulnerable groups to start-up and grow their businesses (Mair et al. 2012; Shepherd et al. 2020). Doing that, social enterprises replace formal institutions creating resource channels and market access for vulnerable communities. In other words, they act as an intermediator between vulnerable communities from one side and resources providers and customers on the other side. Creating, from one side, source for acquiring key resources and on the other side channels of market to sell products, they contribute to restore an environment that facilitate entrepreneurial activities development, thereby contributing to poverty reduction.

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Social Value Creation The participation of vulnerable people into entrepreneurial activities raises in them the feeling to be useful for the community. For example, social entrepreneurship in Uganda played as positive drivers especially in social effects in post-conflict era (Sserwanga et al. 2014). In fact, through entrepreneurship, ex-violent groups may achieve economic independence, providing services and goods to the community (Hockerts 2015). Doing that, they raise a new status within the society, find themselves as part of the economic and societal development. Moreover, the chance to be engaged in entrepreneurial activities encourage disengagement from ideologies that brought them into violent conflicts initiatives (Horgan et al. 2017), thereby contributing to create a peaceful environment in the community (Chandra 2017). For example, commercial motorcycle-taxi driving in postcivil war in Sierra Leone has been recognized as a successful case of reintegration of ex-rebels’ groups in the society (Menzel 2011). Training and equipping such groups with commercial motorcycle raised a new form of social capital between exrebels and other groups of the society. In fact, community recognized a new social status of exrebels’ groups, thereby removing their ex-combatant mark (ibid.). Then, such reintegration promoted a peaceful development environment where excombatants and victims shared the same living places and established peaceful relationships as part of the same community. A second relevant aspect to take in consideration in the creation of intergroup relationship promoted through entrepreneurial cooperatives between opposite group parties (Figure n.1). Scholars documented that social interactions between antagonist parties change attitudes toward members of the “other” group, playing a crucial role in creation of a peaceful environment (Allport 1954). Establishing intergroup relationships between such groups contribute to reduce prejudices and develop trust in people with different ethnicities. In fact, such relationships developed norms and beliefs based on social trust – a person’s general perception that others are trustworthy – generating a harmonious and peaceful

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climate within communities (Tobias et al. 2013). Such interactions allowed opposite groups to become aware that the enemy doesn’t exist and that they are part of the same community, thereby overcoming prejudices at the base of hostility (Dovidio et al. 2003). Thus, it offers opportunities for human interactions that can be the seed of unity and reconciliation (Fort 2007). For example, an interesting result of social cohesion has been achieved by cooperatives of coffee in Rwanda (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). After the civil war in 1994, local companies opted to create cooperatives with both Hutu and Tutsi ethnize working together. Working relationships created space for contacts among the two parties. Such interactions increase an understanding from both of the sides that they part of the same community. This restores a peaceful environment between Hutu and Tutsi and eliminates the social inequalities (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). In sum, social enterprises contribute to fill informal institutional voids, creating opportunities to raise new norms and beliefs in the community (Webb et al. 2020). Such norms reduced divergences in the society and thus social inequalities through the creation of space for interactions among antagonist groups (Tobias et al. 2013). Such relationships allowed to restore those norms and beliefs that all members of the society are part of the same community, eradicating subordination, and marginalization of vulnerable groups. It is part of a co-reintegration process where opposite parties, victims – from one side – and combatants – one other side – got close and knew each other again, breaking down those prejudices at the base of hostility. Such process contributes, finally, to develop a new common identity in the society, based on trust and harmony.

Toward a Sustainable Peacebuilding Processes of creation of economic and social value generate an environment where antagonistic groups benefit of equal status in society, access to same resources and life chances (Mair et al. 2012). Such new context reduces economic and social disparity and thus the probability of renewed mass

intergroup conflicts (Addison and Brück 2009). For example, the end of apartheid allowed blackAfrican people to have same access of trade and resources opportunities compared to white community. Such social and economic equality reduced the ethnic tensions and clashes that characterized the entire twentieth century. These two components – social and economic values – effectively contribute to a sustainable peacebuilding, because both poverty and social tensions are solved through respectively economic empowerment and social reconciliation as displayed in Fig. 1. Gathering the discussion above, from one side the creation of economic value promoted economic empowerment, contributing to poverty reduction and society wellness (Mair et al. 2012). On the other side, the creation of social value raised trust between individuals, favoring social reconciliation (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011; Hockerts 2015). These two aspects of Peace Social Enterprises’ approach mutually reinforce each other, by moving the society away from the poverty-war trap. In fact, livelihood advancement increases satisfaction of life, reducing temptation of some vulnerable groups to balance socioeconomic inequalities through violent actions (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). Such aspect reduces social tensions favoring the creation of norms and beliefs that enhances cohesiveness and solidarity between opposed groups (Tobias et al. 2013). These norms – in turn – promote economic development through business collaborations and equal chances to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. In sum, economic and social value creation processes play an interrelated role, where one “feed” the other one and vice versa. For this reason, both processes should be prosecuted and promoted together in order to favorable condition for a durable peace in the community in the respect of dual mission achievement and the hybrid nature of such businesses (Doherty et al. 2014; Rivera-Santos et al. 2015).

Conclusions Violent conflicts affect several countries and initiatives of peacebuilding have, in some cases,

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generated poor results (Gerson and Colletta 2001). Scholars suggested that there are two main antecedents of begging of a war: poverty and divergence identities based on demographic factors (e.g., ethnicity) (Prahalad and Hammond 2002; Prahalad and Hart 2002; Littlewood and Holt 2014). Such two causes of war may derive to a failure of formal institutions and informal institutions (Webb et al. 2020). As a result, people are in a poverty-war trap, where they try to overcome poverty conditions beginning a war which negatively effect – in turn – economic situation in the country. In such context, social enterprises are particular suitable organizations able to address the needs of people where markets and governments are failing. Social enterprise that operates in conflict areas are called in literature Peace Social Enterprises, as they effectively contribute to a sustainable peacebuilding process. Literature, then, shows that this happen through creation of economic and social value for vulnerable groups, to raise them as protagonist of the economical and societal development. Intervention of economic value creation includes two aspects: (1) bringing economic empowerment to vulnerable people (2) as well as including them in market transaction. Through such two actions, Peace Social Enterprises provide to vulnerable communities the means to address their basic needs, hence overcoming an economic poor status (SDG 1), while participating to the local economic development, thus contributing to the economic growth (SDG 8). The achievement of such two Sustainable Development Goals, in turn, promotes a reduction of tensions derived by the temptation of vulnerable groups to use violent initiatives and rebalance socioeconomic inequalities (Collier and Duponchel 2007). Accordingly, Peace Social Enterprises contribute to create social value restoring those beliefs and norms that favor the raising of a common identity within opposite parties, thereby enhancing a social reconciliation (Tobias and Boudreaux 2011). Consequently, such approach allows to create opportunities for building a society based on peace and harmony among communities, contributing to the third and most significant goal for Peace Social Enterprises, the SDG 16.

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Then, such two processes of economic and social creation are not divergent in a Peace Social Enterprises but interact and reinforce each other within the same organizational body. Such combination breaks down the poverty-war trap. As a consequence, it creates the pillars for a new stabilization and reconstruction, providing formal and informal institutional support to accommodate economic and social development of the nations. This entry intended to grow awareness and understanding about the role of social enterprises to create inclusive and equal conditions in the society, thereby contributing to conflict resolutions with the “hope that we will come together as united people [. . .] in the World” as recalled by Steve Wonder at his speech at Concert for Peace and Justice in 2018. Therefore, the entry also lays the basis for further research and developments by scholars to concretely understand dynamics, challenges, and opportunities offered by such ventures, to finally exploit the potential of social entrepreneurship toward peacebuilding.

Cross-References ▶ Institutional Innovation for Sustainability ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

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Social Justice ▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen Renata Fragoso Department of Business School, Positivo University, Curitiba, Brazil

Definitions According to Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), social media is defined as a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content. Web 2.0 is a platform that represents a different way to utilize the World Wide Web, whereby end users are able to create various forms of media content (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Besides, those contents created can be continuously modified by all end users in a participatory and collaborative way. It is believed that social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, had an important role in Arab Spring (Beaumont 2011; Lotan et al. 2011; Salem and Mourtada 2011a, b; Dewey et al. 2012; Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012; Kassim 2012; UK Essays 2017). The Arab Spring is not a season or a single event but a civil response to oppressive regimes and to a low standard of living that broke out in the Arab countries in Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2012; Tahir 2018; The Guardian 2017).

Introduction Conflicts arise from incompatible opinions, views, plans, goals, and interests between two or more groups. Divergent views may be appreciated

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as worthy of consideration and legitimate or else as disrespectful and offense (Montada 2015). When considered in the later form, the risk of conflict is eminent, and many of them involve some violence. In this sense, many regions of the world suffer untold horrors as a result of armed conflict or other forms of violence that occur within societies, among political parties, between government and population, and at the domestic level. Some of these conflicts have never been on news or have been barely noticed. However, other conflicts called the attention of the world because people used social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs, to transmit in real time what was happening on their countries that would otherwise never make it to mainstream news media. Since December 2010 the world has watched as demonstrations and protests spread across countries in North Africa and the Middle East. These pro-democracy movements revolted against the dictatorial regimes and corrupt leaders that had ruled for decades in some cases (Cornell University Library 2018a); these movements were called “Arab Spring.” The efforts of ordinary people in the Arab “street” to move away from compliance with and toleration of authoritarian regimes also allowed them, once the opportunity arose, to use and invest on the social media in order to chance politics (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). Through social media, protesters hold online discussions and organized and staged popular uprisings which, in turn, led to the resignation of two unpopular leaders – Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as well as their rapid spread across Arab countries, and transnationalization to the wider world (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). The specificity of these Arab revolutions is that they have been popular uprisings, leaderless, and uncompromising in demand total chance (Cornell University Library 2018a). In this sense, it is possible to say that social media acted as a powerful accelerant (Chebib and Sohail 2011; Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012) facilitating the events in ways that were crucial, given their nature which allows for connections to be made in the very fast

and widely distributed manner, through their power of real-time networked communication (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). Despite the large usage of social media in these events, not all Middle East and North Africa countries experienced the same popularity, which influenced both on the closure of the uprising and on the following years. While some countries, like Egypt, enjoyed great repercussions in the world press, others, like Yemen, were almost forgotten.

Social Media Social media is the most relevant form of media in the contemporary society (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; Pallas et al. 2014), and its concept relies at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s with efforts to create online groups to discuss ordinary themes. The tremendous expansion of the Internet during the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, as well as the development and spread of sophisticated mobile phone technology, has enabled and promoted the growth of social media, generally considered to be any web-based or mobile communications technology that allows the creation and exchange of user-generated content (Dewey et al. 2012). Scholars classified social media in five different types: (i) collaborative projects; (ii) blogs; (iii) content communities; (iv) social networking sites; and (v) virtual worlds. Collaborative projects enable the joint and simultaneous creation of content by many end users and are, in this sense, probably the most democratic manifestation of UCG (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). An example of collaborative project is the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. Blogs can be compared to personal web pages and are usually displayed date-stamped entries in reverse chronological order (e.g., Twitter) (OECD 2007; Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Content communities’ main objective is the sharing of media content between user, including photos (e.g., Flickr) and videos (e.g., YouTube). Social networking sites are applications that enable users to connect by creating

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personal information profiles and inviting friends and colleagues to have access to those profiles (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010), such as Orkut, Facebook, and MySpace. Virtual worlds are platforms that replicate a three-dimensional environment as a game (e.g., World of Warcraft) or as a social world (e.g., Second Life). What makes a media so-called social media is to be based on Internet (Hjarvard 2008) and provides the dialogical discourse, contributing to the emergence of prosumers, i.e., end users who simultaneously produce and consume generated content. This new kind of interaction and communication was particularly important for the uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa countries – called Arab Spring – because it allowed users to share ideas, activities, events, and interests within their individual networks, in addition to a wider scope of applications with increasing global impact on society and government (Salem and Mourtada 2011a).

Arab Spring Arab Spring is not a season or a single event but a response to oppressive regimes and to a low standard of living that broke out in the Arab countries in Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2012; Tahir 2018; The Guardian 2017). The uprisings saw a frustrated generation vent their anger on their leaders, on the brutality of the security apparatus, unemployment, rising prices, and corruption that followed the privatization of state assets in some countries (Lotan et al. 2011; Tahir 2018). It is widely accepted that the events of the Arab Spring began in December 19, 2010, when a Tunisian named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire (Cornell University Library 2018b; Lotan et al. 2011; Tahir 2018) in hopelessness and to protest his treatment at the hands of the authorities (Cornell University Library 2018b). The unemployed 26-year-old had reached the end of his tether after being banned from selling fruit to earn a living in the town of Sidi Bouzid, in the center of the country (Tahir 2018). Demonstrations broke out in his rural hometown

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followed by protests in other areas of the country. A brutal security crackdown followed, reported in chocking details by online social media (Cornell University Library 2018b). When protests reached the capital, Tunis, the government responded with even more brutality, arresting demonstrators, activists, and shutting down the Internet (Cornell University Library 2018b). Around 300 people were killed during the subsequent unrest (Tahir 2018). Protesters just wanted the regime to fall and its president stripped of any power. On January 14, 2011, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to resign, after 23 years in power, and he and his family fled the country taking refuge in Saudi Arabia (Cornell University Library 2018b; Tahir 2018). In the following months, other Arab countries, one by one, joined the Tunisian uprising, such as Argelia, Jordan, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Palestine. The region is shown in Fig. 1. Among all these Arab countries, this paper calls attentions to two of them – Egypt and Yemen – whose trajectories unfolded in different ways. The Case of Egypt Following the success of the Tunisians protesters, activists in Egypt called up for an uprising in Cairo for January 25, 2011 – National Police Day – to protest against poverty, unemployment, government corruption, and the 30-year-old regime of President Hosni Mubarak (Al Jazeera 2011a; Lotan et al. 2011; Cornell University Library 2018c). Protest organizers heavily relied on social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, with #Jan25 becoming the common Twitter hashtag used to mark messages relevant to the Egyptian Revolution (Al Jazeera 2011a; Lotan et al. 2011). On January 25, thousands marched in downtown Cairo, heading toward the offices of the ruling National Democratic Party. After a few hours of relative tranquility, police and demonstrators clashed; police fired tear gas and used water cannons against demonstrators in Cairo’s

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Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen

Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen, Fig. 1 Middle East and North Africa countries. (Source: UNICEF 2010)

main Tahrir Square (Al Jazeera 2011b; Cornell University Library 2018c). Street demonstrations quickly grew into a national revolutionary movement (Cornell University Library 2018c), and protests broke out in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria, the Nile Delta cities of Mansura and Tanta, and in the southern cities of Aswan and Assiut (Al Jazeera 2011a). As the uprising continued, the government, on January 27, shut the Internet down, and mobile service providers complied with the government requests to suspend their services (Cornell University Library 2018c); Twitter, Facebook, and Blackberry Messenger were disrupted (Al Jazeera 2011a). On the next day, Internet and mobile phone text message users in Egypt reported major disruption to services as the country prepared for a new wave of protests after Friday prayers (Al Jazeera 2011a). Meanwhile, Al Jazeera, a state-funded broadcaster in Doha, Qatar, announced that on January 31, its broadcast signal across the Arab region faced interference on a scale it has not experienced before. It was just on February 2 that Internet services were at least partially restored in Cairo, after a 5-day

blackout aimed at stymieing protests (Al Jazeera 2011a). Also on this day, Google improved its speak2tweet technology for the people in Egypt. At the same time, the military refused to fire upon the protesters, most notably in Tahrir Square, where protesters camped out in civil resistance (Cornell University Library 2018c; Lotan et al. 2011) and the international community called for free and fair elections in Egypt (Al Jazeera 2011a). Despite the concessions made – appointing intelligence Omar Suleiman as vice president, installing a new cabinet, and conceding that he wouldn’t run again for president nor would his son Gamal after he finished his term in September 2011 – Mubarak failed to appease the Egyptian people’s demands. On February 11, after tens of thousands of people take to the streets across Egypt in angry protests, a day of massive “Friday of Departure” demonstrations, Hosni Mubarak resigned as president and handed over power to the army (Al Jazeera 2011a; Al Jazeera and Agencies 2011; Cornell University Library 2018c). Once in power, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by Mohamed Hussein

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Tantawi, later dissolved the legislature and suspended the constitution (Cornell University Library 2018c). In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi was elected Egypt’s president. However, a decree issued on November 2012 by the Egyptian President granting sweeping constitutional powers – including immunity for the president from judicial review and protecting a controversial constitutional assembly dominated by the group he is affiliated with, the Muslim Brotherhood – gathered thousands of people to protest against him (Hussein 2012; BBC 2013a). The following months protests both in favor of and against Morsi’s removal were happening across the country. At the end of May 2013, Morsi was issued an ultimatum by the military to either step down or face a military coup. He was overthrown on June 3, 2013 and placed under house arrest, where he was held incommunicado (Al Jazeera 2016). The Case of Yemen Popular discontentment, fuelled by widespread unemployment and government corruption, soared in late 2010 after the ruling party proposed to amend electoral laws and the constitution so that Ali Abdullah Saleh could stand for reelection when his seventh term expires in 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2012). Inspired by popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, thousands of Yemenis took place on January 27, 2011, in Sanaa’s Change Square, at Yemen’s capital, calling for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, president for more than 30 years (Al Jazeera 2011b; Human Rights Watch 2012; BBC 2013b; Cornell University Library 2018d). Despite the vow made by President Saleh, on February 2, to not to run for reelection on 2013 (Al Jazeera 2011b; BBC 2013b; Cornell University Library 2018d), the protests spread across the country. On the next day, more than 20,000 anti-government protesters gathered in Sanaa for a “Day of Rage” demanding president Saleh’s resignation (Al Jazeera 2011b; Cornell University Library 2018d), despite the presidential announcement. Two other movements protesting the Saleh regime, including a powerful tribal confederation and the weaker

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formal opposition parties, joined the protests shortly after (Dewey et al. 2012). Security forces responded to the largely peaceful demonstrations with excessive force, often firing live ammunition directly at unarmed protesters (Human Rights Watch 2012), that eventually left more than 2,000 people dead (Al Jazeera 2011b; BBC 2013b). This situation forced President Saleh to announce a state of emergency (Al Jazeera 2011b). In the following months, the violence against Yemenis protestors increased. In Sanaa, Aden, and Taizz, security forces blocked wounded protesters’ access to medical care; in June, Republican Guard forces began occupying alThawrah Hospital in Taizz and using it as a base to shell opposition neighborhoods; in September, Central Security Forces attacked opposition forces from Sanaa’s Jumhuri hospital; in November, a government shell struck al-Rawdha Hospital, killing at least one patient (Human Rights Watch 2012). Furthermore, government forces and armed gangs attacked, harassed, and threatened scores of Yemeni journalists and human rights activists, many for reporting on or denouncing attacks on protesters (Human Rights Watch 2012). Two journalists were killed covering protests in Sanaa: Jamal al-Sharabi, a photojournalist for the independent weekly al-Masdar and Hassan al-Wadhaf of the Arabic Media Agency (Human Rights Watch 2012). All these situations led President Selah to sign an agreement on November 23, 2011, which immediately transferred power to his vice president, bowing to unrelenting street protests and raising hopes for an end to a political crisis that brought this impoverished nation to the brink of collapse (Agencies 2011; Al Jazeera 2011c; Fahim and Kasinof 2011). Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh was the fourth Arab leader to be forced from power by popular uprisings that have shaken the Middle East and North Africa (Al Jazeera 2011c; Fahim and Kasinof 2011; BBC 2013b). Contrary to expectations, the situation in Yemen has worsened over the years, and by 2015 the country had plunged into civil war and

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a grave humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by the presence of the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State jihadist groups (BBC 2018).

Social Media Impact on Egypt and Yemen Uprisings The growth of social media in the Arab region and the shift in usage trends from social into political nature have played a critical role in mobilizating, communicating, coordinating, empowering, shaping opinion, and influencing change (Salem and Mourtada 2011b; Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). This growth is widely associated with the popularization of social media among young people. Most of the population of the Arab world under the age of 30 are technology-savvy and active social media users (Salem and Mourtada 2011b; Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). By April 2011, the youth represented 75% of Facebook users in Egypt and 79% of Facebook users in Yemen (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). Also, they are adept at using new forms of communication to bypass state controls and mobilize others around common issues or grievances (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). This mobilization created the roots to the following uprisings in Middle East and North Africa. Between January 5 and April 5, 2011, Arab region has acquired over 3.6 million new Facebook users, with over 1.9 million in Egypt and over 161,000 in Yemen. In relation to Twitter, between January 1 and March 30, 2011, the average number of active users in Egypt was 131,204 and in Yemen was 29,422 (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). These new social media users intensified the range and the depth of manifestations on social media, especially in Egypt, once a far more mature and extensive social media environment played a crucial role in organizing the uprising against Mubarak (Beaumont 2011). The Facebook page “We are all Khaled Saeed” – a 28-year-old Egyptian who was brutally beaten to death by police after circulating a video showing Egyptian police divvying the remains of a drug

bust – had attracted more than 400,000 members by 2011 (Dewey et al. 2012); the videos posted both on Facebook and YouTube calling Egyptians to protest against government in Tahrir Square mobilized thousands (Dewey et al. 2012); and in the first quarter of 2011, top trends on Twitter were #egypt and #Jan25 with 1,400,000 and 1,200,000 mentions, respectively (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). The week before President Mubarak’s resignation, the total rate of tweets about political change ballooned from 2,300 a day to 230,000 a day (O’Donnell 2011). Yet on Egypt, details of demonstrations were circulated both on Facebook and Twitter activists’, and a 12page guide to confronting the regime was distributed by e-mail (Beaumont 2011). Al Jazeera covered the Egyptian Revolution with streaming video starting in the “Friday of Anger” on January 28, 2011, while journalists from Western media organizations started reporting from Egypt at a later stage. The Egyptian government’s reaction to the Internet’s role as a key network information infrastructure was to order the shutdown of Internet, denying citizens its access for 5 days – from January 28 to February 2 (Al Jazeera 2011a; Salem and Mourtada 2011b). For almost 60% of Facebook users, however, the main impact of blocking the Internet was positive, for the social movements, spurring people to be more active, decisive, and to find ways to be more creative about communicating and organizing (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). Social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, has functioned in the way the media should – as a source of information (Beaumont 2011). But the importance and impact of social media on the uprisings rest on four main factors: first, the accelerated spread of information; second, the emergence of a key source for real-time mobilization; third, the creation of a sense of belonging; and fourth, the ability to spread information across international borders. By uploading images, texts, and videos on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, activists were able to use social media as a key source for realtime logistical coordination, information, political communication, mobilization, and discussion among people, both within the Middle East and

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North Africa and across the globe (Lotan et al. 2011; Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012; UK Essays 2017). The accelerated speed with which information can travel and the communication capabilities of social media have significantly reduced the constrains of national borders in their ability to contain information by providing means for an individual in one country to communicate with another in a different country on a virtual platform (Dewey et al. 2012; UK Essays 2017). The stories of simmering discontent toward the repressive regime and inspiring success in overthrowing it have reached directly to individual readers across the region to play an important role in encouraging neighbors to follow on and participate in political action. This shared discontentment and the desire of a country with better living conditions engaged people on protests and made them feel part of something, giving them a sense of belonging and solidarity. For some, it also meant the “permission” to go further (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012; Kassim 2012). Social media, then, enabled a sense of identity during the Arab Spring, especially after cyber protesters spread videos and reports of government abuse (Blas 2018). From an international perspective, social media has facilitated the spread of information from those on the ground in areas of social unrest to international media outlets, such as Al Jazeera (Beaumont 2011). Few minutes later, newspapers, TV stations, and many international media outlets were quick to seize upon the potential of social media. They have utilized videos, photos, and other primary source information highlighted in social networks in order to obtain information for their own media coverage. In Yemen, activists also used social media to mobilize and engage people to protests. However, the country is the poorest in the Middle East (UNHR 2011) and has the lowest levels of Internet penetration in the entire region, at 1.8% of the population (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). The number of social media users is still low (Metcalf 2011). Facebook pages set up to advertise protests in early February were largely composed of university students – that is why it is said that Yemen revolution was driven by the youth (UNHR 2011) – numbered only in the few

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hundreds (Metcalf 2011). Protest numbers have remained relatively high in part because Friday prayers functioned as a convenient rallying point for anti-Saleh protesters to organize (BBC 2011). The government reacted with brutal violence and used the military to suppress the demonstrations (Al Jazeera 2011d). Videos of this repression appeared on YouTube and Facebook, increasing national outrage and bringing international condemnation (Dewey et al. 2012). The mobilization of the youth movement in Yemen, which has made some use of social media, has reignited a broader struggle in the country, among tribal forces, opposition parties, and sectarian Houthis (a Yemeni religious-political-armed group) demanding changes in the ruling regime (Dewey et al. 2012). These tribal and opposition groups have very dense, solid networks of constituents who are primarily organized by traditional means and not only by social media. The major role of such tribal and organizational affiliations in the ongoing Yemeni protests demonstrated the importance of pre-existing organizational, or in this case, tribal, membership (Dewey et al. 2012). However, due to the low level of Internet penetration, Yemeni activists had little to show on social media when compared to activists of other Middle East and North Africa countries. The low participation in online events was insufficient and did not allow the development of significant group connections, identity, and loyalties, as it did in Egypt, and consequently not accurately reflected activity on the ground (Dewey et al. 2012; Blas 2018). The information, then, barely made the mainstream media and consequently did not call the attention of the citizens and institutions around the world (Beaumont 2011; UK Essays 2017). The country was basically forgotten.

Future Directions Social media was critical at a time when everything else was censored (Beaumont 2011). The large, decentralized, and often leaderless networks facilitated by the new communication technologies operated a form of politics that is based

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on the participation and direct engagement of all citizens, rather than the hierarchical model of institutionalized bureaucratic authoritarian politics. Social media was, and still is, about building relationships and forging solidarity rather than simply providing information. This became more important in the societies of the Arab world. The growth of social media in the region – particularly driven by the youth – and the shift in usage trends have played a critical role in mobilizating, empowering, shaping of opinions, and influencing change (Salem and Mourtada 2011b). The social media served as an important “free space” to express deep-seated discontentment with the political status quo (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012) and with unjust acts committed by the government (Kassim 2012). Such actions gained power to bypass government restrictions (Kassim 2012) and escaped the confinement of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, seizing the space of information and deliberation provided by the Internet and the social media. They served as alternative sources of information and proposals that originated outside authoritarian official discourse, not only enabling cyber-activism and civic engagement through mobilization and organization of protests but also providing a platform for ordinary citizens to express themselves and document their own versions of reality. Most significantly, the Internet, with its networked, interactive, and polycentric form, also accommodated radically different types of political actors from different places at different times, to engage with common interests (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos 2012). In countries like Egypt and Yemen, rising action plans such as protests made up of thousands have been organized through social media (Kassim 2012). As these events unfolded, social media served both as a common way for professional journalism and citizen journalism and as a site of global information flow. People from all around the world tuned in to Twitter feeds to learn about the revolutions and share what they learned (Lotan et al. 2011). Social media provided a window into the broader world of digital conversations, many of which probably involved cell phones to send text, pictures, or voice messages (O’Donnell 2011).

Also, social media enabled discussions and demands about human rights (UNHR 2011), since the Arab Spring issued from a profoundly human inclination to procure natural and inalienable rights for each individual (Kempner 2016). However, by 2011, the pace of progress was considered for many Egyptians as not quick enough, and some would argued that new measures introduced by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) have curbed some aspects of human rights (Bakrania 2011). Egyptians, then, continued to report human rights abuses on social medias, such as the use of excessive violence against protestors, the clamp down of free expression, the imprisoning of many journalists (Jackson 2015), and criticism of the military government, accompanied by increased rhetoric and restrictions on NGOs and human rights organizations, and the counting use of military trials (Bakrania 2011). In Yemen, the human rights situation has deteriorated rapidly in the same year. Protests calling for reform have met with brutal repression, and the pro-democracy movement has been hijacked by three elite factions (Bakrania 2011). The situation for children and women is particularly worst; while child soldiers recruited by the Yemeni army are now being used by anti-government militias, women generally have a low social status in the country, and those involved in protests are particularly vulnerable to attacks by security forces (Bakrania 2011). This scenario, alongside government control on all types of media – including social media – brought increased risk of civil war with little hope for improving the human rights situation for civilians and kept Yemen crisis away from mainstream media. By 2018, Yemen is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (UN 2019) with millions lacking access to safe water and sanitation and to adequate healthcare (UN 2019). It would be interesting, then, to study the role and influence of social media on events that followed the uprisings in Middle East and North Africa countries in a longitudinal perspective. This may enable to understand the language patterns used to engage people to protest both in and between Arab countries, such as hashtags, slang words, language structure, discourse, and

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rhetoric. It may also enable to understand the process of diffusion of information to the international world, such as which kind of texts reached mainstream news and why, and why some revolutions made mainstream media, including international media, and others not. And finally, to understant the role of social media on the development of the human rights in the Arab countries.

Cross-References ▶ “Blood Money”: From Compensation to Transformative Justice for Peace and Sustainability ▶ Conflict-Affected Areas and Sustainable Development Goal 16 ▶ Democracy in the Developed Countries ▶ Legal Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups and Sustainable Development Goal 16 ▶ Peace Journalism and Sustainable Development ▶ United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

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Social Value social-media-during-the-arab-spring.php. Accessed 9 Dec 2018 UN (2019) Humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world, warns UN. https://news.un.org/en/ story/2019/02/1032811. Accessed 24 Apr 2019 UNHR (2011) The youth of Yemen in the Arab Spring. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ TheYouthOfYemenInTheArabSpring.aspx. Accessed 17 Dec 2018 UNICEF (2010) MENA map. https://www.unicef.org/ har2010/images/HAR10_Map_MENA.jpg. Accessed 18 Dec 2018 Bakrania S. (2011). The Arab Spring and its impacts on human rights in the MENA regions. Helpdesk Research Report. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

Social Value ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

Social Venture ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

Social Ventures for Sustainability Iftekhar Alam Department of Social Work, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India

Synonyms Economic value; Environmental value; Social entrepreneurship; Social value; Social venture; Sustainability

Definition Social ventures also known as social business or social enterprise adopt innovative business techniques to reach solution for social problems which markets fail to accomplish. Social ventures are mission-centric business organizations which seek to engage disadvantaged groups of people

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in livelihood activities by providing fair wages or salaries or start creative businesses with deeper understanding of felt needs (Townsend and Hart 2008) among low-purchasing power communities (Seelos and Mair 2005). Social venture along with the objective of achieving social change has to compete with conventional business organizations in producing similar goods and services. It is considered unique as it combines the social and economic mission in a sustainable manner.

Introduction In economic perspective, an entrepreneur is a creative person with exceptional innovative ideas and deep sense of identification of opportunities, motivated to start a new enterprise or organization or to renovate an organization which is already established. Even though profit and market shares have been considered as the prime motive of entrepreneurship in the economic world, there were entrepreneurs who have broken this established concept. This fact has been corroborated by the number of academic literature on exploring and redefining the concept of the motivation behind entrepreneurship in wider sociopolitical and ecological context (Downing 2005; Chell 2007; Nicholls 2008). In order to create a new venture, the entrepreneur has to successfully mobilize resources in response to perceived opportunities (Aldrich 1995). Social venturing an advanced form of social entrepreneurship has adopted commercial business practices (Moizer and Tracey 2010) to sustain in the business sector (Brinckerhoff 2000; Paton 2003). It appears like business organization while creating economic value (Schuler and Cording 2006) and nonprofit organization when it essentially aims at creating social value (Moss et al. 2010). Earlier, social ventures relied upon charity and public funds to sustain the operation; however diminishing financial avenues forced them to run their own businesses and generate revenues. Social venture adopts conventional business practices with innovative methods to deal with crisis and market competition to further the social and environmental goals. As social ventures work on nonprofit motive, they are often considered similar to other nonprofit organizations such as charities, foundations, and trusts. However in matters of financial resources

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and management, there lies a distinction between them; while charities, foundations, trusts, etc. are supported by donations, grants, and government funding, social venture creates their own avenue of revenue generation by producing goods and services of rationalized economic value (Brinckerhoff 2000). Despite being different from other nonprofit organizations in their approach to creating economic value and income generation, social venture shares similar legal structure and common objective to accomplish social purpose mission. Social venture addresses social needs through social capital and social innovation to convert economic value to social value. The task of social venture when pursuing the dual mission of economic viability and social change becomes more challenging as it may disrupt the nonprofit organizations’ ability to operate a viable social venture, especially when it competes with conventional business organizations (Dees 1998). Undoubtedly, social enterprise fills market gaps between public sector undertakings and private enterprise, numerous research studies indicate global increase in such business ventures (Thompson and Doherty 2006), and even policymakers increasingly consider it as catalyst in regenerating people, planet, and profit. These ventures have a potential to make the communities self-reliant, generate social capital, rejuvenate vulnerable and needy persons to meet their needs by linking with the resources available locally and in doing so enable stakeholders to take greater responsibility of their destiny. Social value and Environmetal value

Economic value

Innovation & Technology

Resource acquisition

Social Skills/Social Capital

The development of social venture is a cyclical process starting from arrangement of requisite

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resources to creation of social value and consequently environmental value. As the social ventures grow from start-up to maturity, they are faced by conflicting demands of resource availability and management. Through social capital such as trust building and network relationship, social entrepreneurs harness tangible and intangible resources. Social innovation has potential to convert social issues and challenges into opportunities, while need-based innovation and remedial technology generate economic value and social value. The creation of social value and rationalized economic value is the prioritized objective of social venture (Schuler and Cording 2006). Many researchers opine that creation of social value in social venture is linked to addressing issues prevailing in communities (Peredo and Chrisman 2006).

motivation of social entrepreneurs. The social network facilitates entrepreneurs to address problems they face at the early stage of project. The success of venture depends on diverse and sprawling network. These social contacts not only provide valuable information on market trend but also provide link of financial investors willing to support on the early stage idea, as in developing economies financial constraints are main causes of social business failure (Peterson and Shulman 1987). Gaining trust, confidence, and reliability among the network is the biggest challenge for entrepreneurs in order to procure their valuable time, skills, and efforts as well as financial support. In a bid to pursue these challenges, social entrepreneur can devise a strategy of reputational bonding (Siegel 2005). It’s an effort to develop bonding relationship in dense social network by reducing one’s own incentives for the good of stakeholders.

Dimension of Social Venture

Economic Mission In social venture, economic mission is the conduit for attaining social mission; here economic mission does not refer to private gain, rather it’s a gainful activity for all stakeholders. In social enterprise the rationality of economic value creation lies in the innovative nature of ensuring the profitability of unexplored opportunities to be passed on the vulnerable sections of society. The success of social venture lies in producing needbased goods and services of economic value benefiting millions of people living in abject poverty. This can be accomplished through innovation and social business at “Bottom or Base of Pyramid” (BOP), referring to around four billions of poorest socioeconomic group in developing world sustaining at income of less than $2000 annually (Hall et al. 2012). Prahalad and Hart (2002) claim huge opportunity for business and innovation at BOP. Economic mission at BOP has potential to capitalize on billions of newly joined customers in untapped market and unexplored areas of economic activities.

Social venture or enterprise is associated with voluntary or not-for-profit organizations that strive to achieve social goals (Nicholls 2006; Morris et al. 2011). It proposes alternative model that incorporates social, economic, and environmental goals (Thompson and Doherty 2006). Social entrepreneurship is considered as a collective and creative work where ideas are generated, propagated, and operationalized by organizations, networks, and groups. Although social entrepreneurship gives priority to the process and the purpose of social change, the term social entrepreneurship always is being connected with the entrepreneurs who create or revitalize socially entrepreneurial organizations (Nicholls 2008). Social Dimensions Research on social dimensions of entrepreneurship has increased (Shapero and Sokol 1982). Social entrepreneurs are “good social actors who actively embed themselves in a social context” (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). Social entrepreneurship with primary aim to address social needs has increased in recent decades (Peredo and Chrisman 2006). Social institutions such as customs, traditions, culture norms, etc. influence the role and

Environmental Mission Social entrepreneurship or not-for-profit organizations have demonstrated its creativity in responding to environmental issues. The national

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and regional policies of many countries have greatly emphasized the role of social entrepreneurship to address social inclusion and environmental improvement. The entrepreneurships which are motivated by environmental values are variously called as environmental or green entrepreneurship, ecopreneurship, sustainable entrepreneurship, or sustainopreneurship (Dixon and Clifford 2007). The triple bottom line accounting framework incorporates (ecological) environmental aspects in designing assessment tools for social ventures growth and development. Plethora of studies suggests environmental concerns as important sources of entrepreneurs’ motivation and experimentation. Community-based enterprises with exclusive local engagement strive to enhance ecological resources and strengthen proenvironmental practices to achieve sustainable society.

Types of Social Venture Social ventures take varied legal forms as registered organizations in sharing common objective to achieve socioeconomic empowerment. It can be generally classified as follows: Not-for-profit/nonprofit ventures are voluntary organizations or community-based organizations that provide services or product to uplift the socioeconomically and politically weaker section of community. A nonprofit venture is referred to those ventures which restrict the profit maximization and distribution to its owners or promoters; rather the revenue or surplus gained is reinvested to the community or target vulnerable population. Wherein, the entrepreneur as any other member in the organization discharges its duty while earning its salary or consultation fee. The restriction is only on surplus revenue distribution to its members. Even the founder of the social venture cannot be entitled to profit as the owner of the organization; however she/he can utilize portion of surplus revenue only to meet the maintenance cost or contingency of the organization. Examples could be The Rockefeller Foundation, the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, Azim Premji Foundation, etc.

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Charity organizations are a kind of foundation or institution that comes under the category of nonprofit organization. Based on educational, socioeconomic, religious, or cultural activities, it can be managed by public agencies as well as private agencies. All charities are nonprofit organizations, but not all nonprofit organizations have the status of charities. The key feature is organizations with charitable status in their country, that can provide tax relief benefits to the donors. It also enjoys privilege over peoples’ perception and shared trust of registered charities. Examples could be Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Rotary Foundation, Oxfam, etc. Cooperative ventures also known as coops are defined as group of active members coming together in pursuit of social, economic, and sustainable goals. These are based on democratic principles of giving ownership to all stakeholders comprising of employees, customers, or members of the organization, who enjoy equal status and representation in organizational decisions. Such features make cooperatives applicable in wide variety of settings such as housing cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, worker cooperatives, and credit unions including various nonprofit agencies. Trust is a mechanism when a person (“the settlor”) transfers a property (“the trust fund”) ownership and control to another person (“the trustee”) for the benefit of others (“the beneficiaries”). It is mostly owned and run by local community members to attain socioeconomic, educational, cultural, and environmental needs of a community. Examples are J. P. Morgan Trust Company, Allianz Technology Trust, Jamnalal Kaniram Bajaj Trust, etc. Microfinance ventures are credit unions, revolving loan funds, cooperative banks, etc. that provide small loans or microcredit to individuals, organization, and associations involved in income generation, livelihood promotion, and selfemployment ventures. In recent times microcredit organizations have flourished in many developing countries empowering the marginalized sections of population through the provision of small loans and other financial services. The Self-Help Groups (SHGs) or individuals are enabled by

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these institutions in meeting their financial needs. Examples are Grameen Bank, Self Employed Women’s Association Bank etc. Community-centered and indigenous enterprises generate profit at limited scale and operate to address the felt needs of communities. These are community led, owned, and controlled social enterprises that reinvest or distribute the profit for community benefits. It has emerged as a distinct form of social enterprises that devises strategies to create social as well as economic value for its community (Peredo and Chrisman 2006). These grassroots organizations have potentials in identifying the community needs, prioritizing these needs, and linking these needs to local resources, while enhancing the ecosystem, and strengthening the sustainable socio-cultural practices of the community. First three stages give opportunity to shapereshape the social venture, but the flying high

stage provides indication of success or failure of the social venture. Generally at this stage, most of the social venture falls under strain prompting social entrepreneurs to relook at the strategies for social mission. At this juncture, a wise yet firm decision is made to adhere to ecosystem and human system in order to sustain social venture’s intrinsic characteristics to accomplish social mission. Building sustainable society is similar to the process of preparing yogurt. Consider milk as an ecosystem and small quantity of yogurt (which is product of milk itself) as a human system. A perfect fermentation of milk is possible only when milk and small quantity of yogurt are in good or compatible state and as a result makes perfect and yummy yogurt. Thus, sustainable social venture juxtaposes ecosystem and human system in a compatible fashion. These ventures strive to bind all these together by adopting core values of procuring human, social, and natural

Social Ventures for Sustainability, Table 1 Stages of social venture S. No. 1. 2.

Stages Parameters Level Main activity

3.

Essentials

Creative ability and monitoring

4.

Resources (tangible, human, financial, and social)/ (intangible, knowledge, expertise, and capability) Expected outcome

5.

New initiative Early stage Shaping of venture and strategy

Start-up Groundwork Formulating social change mission and profit orientation Ambitious entrepreneurial effort

Takeoff Strategic Setting out strategic objective and technology

Flying high Uncertain Resolving challenges/ problems to opportunities

Differentiation Flourish/perish Requisite innovation to avoid risks

Tackle the administrative challenges

Innovative product and services to address the felt needs

Optimal utilization of resources by acquisition and management

Rationalization of resources and economic value

Induction of new set of social skills

Measuring the potential outcomes of social venture Realization of social innovations

Creating social value to improve wellbeing of individuals, communities, and regions

Marketing and creating economic value are major achievement

Transition from person or team leadership to communitybased leadership/ social ventures

Innovative ways to sustain the social venture are established

Sustainability and growth of venture or decline

Interorganizational relationship and social engagement networks

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capital for the well-being of the people at the bottom of development pyramid. Social venture addresses social needs and keeps abreast of local and national market trends and sensibly responds to the needs of the target community by delivering better and relevant product and services.

Social Venture, Social Inclusion, and Social Justice Social entrepreneurship and social justice are complementary to each other; the characteristics of an entrepreneur, i.e., being altruistic, innovative, risktaking, and socially conscious, make a sublime combination with the features of social justice, viz., equal rights and dignity, equal distribution of resources and benefits, and responsibilities in addressing the social evils of marginalization, victimization, and insecurity of individuals and communities. Treading the path of social justice through social inclusion of downtrodden communities by creating social and economic value is not mutually contradictory rather reciprocally interdependent. Social entrepreneurship with justice will ensure accomplishment of social mission and create conducive environment for securing social justice by attending to the felt needs of the vulnerable, as well as empowering and uplifting the marginalized. Though the needy are safeguarded and entitled to justice through legislations and other social control mechanisms in a welfare state, but to promote economic rehabilitation, social integration with dignity, and psychological well-being, they ought to be engaged in livelihood activities. However, there are many instances when these victims themselves become right-based entrepreneurs to achieve sustainable social justice for them and other victims. The hyperconcentration of capital among countable affluent people across the world creates disparity in the distribution of resources between rich and poor, challenging the restoration of social justice (Henry 2015). Without social justice, political stability cannot be attained; without political stability, economic security is impossible; and without economic security, community development cannot be realized. The welfare state ensures social justice

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through social inclusion and democratic participation of stakeholders and relevant government agencies. However such government agencies, labor market partners, and social enterprises such as community-based organizations and cooperatives are currently losing its capacity to restore social justice. Nevertheless, social enterprise has enormous potential in empowering the vulnerable, attaining social mission, promoting the local and national economy, checking migration, and achieving environmental sustainability (Kreiner 2013). The social entrepreneurial activities are entrenched in the community needs through deeper engagement in need-based design and delivery of goods and services. The exceptionally innovative entrepreneur with proven social impact on some of the burning global issues is recognized through awards, fellowships, and investments by leading worldwide foundations having network of professionals and associations sprawling across the world such as Skoll Foundations, Ashoka Foundations, Schwab Foundation, etc.

Social Venture and Sustainability The term sustainable development refers to the development allowing “to meet the needs of present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meets its needs,” and it is the guiding principle of the UN, governments, institutions, and organizations. The term became popular in 1987, with the UN report on Environment and Development. The terms sustainable/ sustainability and durable/durability are often used interchangeably. Sustainability was a matter of discussion during the 1970s and 1980s in the context of different social matters like limits of growth, the rising prices, etc. As a result of Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992, the International Court of Justice has connoted sustainable development as a public international law. Currently this area regained popularity owing to rampant unemployment, poverty, and social inequality (Wüstenhagen et al. 2008). The number of research conducted on social economy in recent years has revolved around the sustainability of social enterprises. In

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an organizational context, the creation of financial resources takes precedence, whereas in sustainable development, more importance has been given to achieve social well-being along with limited financial aspects. Social venture addresses the social needs, creates and promotes livelihood, and attains holistic and sustainable impact on the community. Social needs are “the goal of achieving sustainable development” (Seelos and Mair 2005). Social enterprises often do the smart work by harnessing the economic approach in accomplishing the socio ecological needs of the consumers. Many times social enterprises have surpassed state employment policies in playing its role of social economy in integrating people from marginalized groups in the labor market (Spear 2008). Dean and McMullan (2007) mainly give their attention to the functioning of the market and generating profit from environmental entrepreneurship. They state environmental degradation as the result of improper functioning of the markets by explaining environmental and welfare economics and consider those failures as opportunities for entrepreneurs to extend new ideas to solve such malfunctioning of markets and generate profits with the assistance of government. However, other researchers focus more on the different motivational factors and values of entrepreneurs involved in environmental entrepreneurship. Moreover, sustainable or environmental entrepreneurship draws attention of many researchers as it is closely linked with corporate social responsibility (CSR), business and management ethics, values, and belief owned by the entrepreneur, business owners, managers, etc. Sustainability also includes components like financial security, referring to adequate financial resources for investment, transferability and integration of social and natural resources and availability of suitable infrastructure, as well as use of remedial technology in the organization. Crisis related to financial sustainability will have impact on other inter-related elements. Defourny (2010) discourages excessive dependency of social enterprises on their donors. The role ambiguity of organizations engaged in local development, the absence of proper regulatory institutions for nongovernmental organizations and cooperatives, and the inability to mobilize resources are the major problems faced by the organizations in developing economies. When the supporting

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organization is unable to continue their services to the beneficiaries owing to financial constraints, the responsibilities lie with the public institutions working in tandem with the local authorities. Futurity: Avoid exploitations of nonrenewable resources. The judicious and sustainable use of renewable and nonrenewable resources will ensure healthy ecosystem. Community entrepreneurship ensures ownership of local resources and accountability and endeavors to replenish and enrich the existing resources. (A) Equity: All the available resources must be shared for future generation and same as for all human beings irrespective of a particular group, gender, race, and creed. Social enterprise should aim to provide welfare and achieve well-being in a given community. (B) Quality of life: A venture strives to realize the vision for positive impact on socio-economic aspects; access to health, goods, and services; reduced vulnerability, increased self-esteem and well-being; and social inclusion. Furthermore, suitable business strategies should be formulated to sustain a social venture. These are as follows: Viable Mission Social venture must have purposeful mission to address community’s needs and demands of all stakeholders and funding agencies. The goods produced and services rendered by the venture should be more a solution than a business for the community. Though in the beginning it might appear formidable and unattainable, having it as a long-term mission will propel the venture to achieve the impossible. Chalking out plan: In order to accomplish the mission and match satisfactorily with performance measure, organization must have a business plan with wellexplained minute details. These business plans must consist of the following aspects: (a) Products and services offered (b) Summary of market size in view of local competitors

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(c) Purchasing power of expected customers (d) Measures of revenue, cash flow, surplus, etc. (e) Action plan Stakeholders’ Centric Parameters The level of mission so far attained should be measured in terms of impact brought to the targeted disadvantaged group. The parameters may include human, natural, financial, social, and physical capital or assets formulated by the Department for International Development (DFID). It can be assessed in terms of costs and benefits analysis and outcome evaluation. Innovative/Standing Out Innovation plays a crucial role in sustaining the feasibility and viability of social venture. It is one of the important pillars of entrepreneurial activities that seek to explore opportunities in social problems. Creativity and ability to risk for good serve as a catalyst and make one become well determined. Everyone has entrepreneurial ability and capability to create social ventures. The only requirement is to come out of fear of risks, and that can be overcome by foreseeing social problems, arranging financial capital, and bringing about desired changes in disadvantaged population. Exploring the Untapped Market An ambitious social entrepreneur will explore the unexplored areas and opportunities, mostly locating in areas where contenders deliberately choose to ignore. C. K. Prahalad attracted attention through his article in 2002, and later his bestseller The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid in 2004 (Prahalad 2004) indicated that around four billion at BOP, with an income of less than $1 per day, are the most sought-after destinations for social venture. Stakeholder Relationship In pursuit of maintaining productive balance between two obverse dimensions, viz., charity and business, the social entrepreneurs rely profusely on the trust and perseverance of diverse stakeholders. The purposeful relationship among them and with social entrepreneur fosters the social venture to take off toward the journey of stabilization and growth.

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Financially Viable Financial insight is equally important as outlining business plan, and board members should be capable to take decision according to market strategy and control the venture’s financial account efficiently. Social ventures sometimes face difficulty in achieving self-sufficiency, it may incur financial losses in fulfilling core objectives to keep target population away from going back to the same condition or even more vulnerable situations. At such situation, seeking financial assistance (even in the form of charity) is advisable to make social venture survive. Look Before You Leap Looking back to review the entire social venture plan precisely before its launch is a wise man’s way to get ready for sudden unforeseen situations particularly pointing out the pulling factors which may bring social venture to downfall. Operating risks should be noted, and various strategies should be kept in mind to tackle the situation even if a social venture forcibly has to enter into business. Bringing back the social venture from business to social venture again is easier and far better than pushing stakeholders in stranded conditions. Devising suitable strategies and induction of new set of skills or even changes in administrative setup to tackle administrative challenges are good practices in order to make social venture more viable. Risk management strategies are quite essential and must be planned well before the launch of social venture. Ethical Consideration Social Ventures, comprises of economic (profit), social (people), and environmental (planet) dimensions, as Elkington (1998) enunciates that serving people without harming the planet warrants high ethical standard and moral orientation as key to successful socially responsible business. While attending to the felt needs, social entrepreneurs as ethical leaders go beyond conventional disposition in attending stakeholders to attain social mission. They also strive to maintain equilibrium between two extremes namely economic goals and social goals in sustainable manner. Consequently, profound responsibility and integrity prevail with organizations with not-for-profit

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status as they maintain high level of ethical standards in matters pertaining to mobilization of funds, accountability, transparency, financial management, etc. as well as in rationalizing economic value.

Future Directions Economic dynamics and optimal technology marinated with social mission involving resource management, social capital or skills, innovation, etc. resulting in economic value, social value, and environmental value are integral to successful social venture anchored on the political will of the respective nation-state. Heuristically, the determinants of successful social venture are analytically designated as internal and external factors. Foreign policies, foreign exchange, foreign trade, commerce and market, international cooperation, international institutions, etc. constitute the external factors, while resource creation, acquisition, management, innovation, technology, human skills, network, etc. are internal factors. In the light of contradiction posed by natural resource crunch, depleting water resources, diminishing forest cover, degradation of fertile land, etc., exacerbated by population explosion, the development of social venture could greatly rely upon appropriate management strategies with greater skills and eco-friendly orientations. The future of social venture has to be tuned with global demands and international directives accommodated to the local and contextual requisites.

References Aldrich H (1995) Entrepreneurial strategies in new organizational populations. In: Bull I, Thomas H, Willard G (eds) Entrepreneurship perspectives on theory building. Pergamon, Oxford, pp 91–108 Aldrich HE, Zimmer C (1986) Entrepreneurship through social networks. In: Sexton D, Smiler R (eds) The art and science of entrepreneurship. Ballinger, New York Brinckerhoff PC (2000) Social entrepreneurship: the art of mission-based venture development. Wiley, New York Chell E (2007) Social enterprise and entrepreneurship – towards a convergent theory of the entrepreneurial process. Int Small Bus J 25(1):5–26

Social Ventures for Sustainability Dean TJ, McMullan JS (2007) Towards a theory of sustainable entrepreneurship: reducing environmental degradation through entrepreneurial action. J Bus Ventur 22:50–76 Dees GJ (1998) Enterprising nonprofits. Harv Bus Rev 76 (1):54–61 Defourny J (2010) Concept and realities of social enterprise: a European perspective. In: Fayolle A, Matlay H (eds) Handbook of research on social entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 57–87 Dixon SE, Clifford A (2007) Ecopreneurship – a new approach to managing the triple bottom line. J Organ Chang Manag 20(3):326. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct¼true&db¼edsbl&AN¼RN209162773&site¼edslive. Accessed 7 May 2019 Downing S (2005) The social construction of entrepreneurship: narrative and dramatic processes in the co-production of organisations and identities. Enterp Theory Pract 29(2):185–204 Elkington J (1998) Partnerships from cannibals with forks: the triple bottom line of 21st-century business. Environ Qual Manag 8(1):37. http://search.ebscohost.com/login. aspx?direct¼true&db¼edsbl&AN¼RN054347728& site¼eds-live. Accessed 7 May 2019 Hall J, Matos S, Sheehan L, Silvestre B (2012) Entrepreneurship and innovation at the base of the pyramid: a recipe for inclusive growth or social exclusion? J Manag Stud 49(4):785–812 Henry H (2015) Social justice through enterprises: the end of the 1972/1973 conjuncture? A legal perspective. Int J Soc Qual 5(2):81. http://search.ebscohost.com/login. a s p x ? d i r e c t ¼t r u e & d b ¼e d s g l r & A N ¼e d s g c l . 459423560&site¼eds-live. Accessed 18 Nov 2018 https://unltd.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Youthled-social-enterprise-report-formatted.pdf. Accessed 27 Apr 2018 Kreiner T (2013) Social entrepreneurship as practical social justice. J Manag Glob Sustain 1(2):1–5. https:// journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/index.php/jmgs/article/view/ JM2013.01201/1689. Accessed 20 Nov 2018 Moizer J, Tracey P (2010) Strategy making in social enterprise: the role of resource allocation and its effects on organizational sustainability. Syst Res Behav Sci 27 (3):252–266 Morris MH, Webb JW, Franklin RJ (2011) Understanding the manifestation of entrepreneurial orientation in the non-profit context. Entrep Theory Pract 35:947–971 Moss TW, Short JC, Payne GT, Lumpkin GT (2010) Dual identities in social ventures: an exploratory study. Entrep Theory Pract 35(4):805–830 Nicholls A (2006) Playing the field: a new approach to the meaning of social entrepreneurship. Soc Enterp J 2:1–5 Nicholls A (2008) Social entrepreneurship: new models of sustainable social change. Oxford University Press, Oxford Paton R (2003) Managing and measuring social enterprises. SAGE, Thousand Oaks Peredo AM, Chrisman JJ (2006) Toward a theory of community-based enterprise. Acad Manag Rev 31(2):309–328 Peterson R, Shulman J (1987) Entrepreneurs and bank lending in Canada. J Small Bus Entrep 5:41–45

Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies Prahalad CK (2004) The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: eradicating poverty with profits. Wharton Business Publishing, Philadelphia Prahalad CK, Hart S (2002) The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. Strategy Bus 48:1–23 Schuler DA, Cording M (2006) A corporate social performance–corporate financial performance behavioral model for consumers. Acad Manag Rev 31(3):540–558 Seelos C, Mair J (2005) Social entrepreneurship: creating new business models to serve the poor. Bus Horiz 48 (3):241–246 Shapero A, Sokol L (1982) The social dimensions of entrepreneurship. In: Kent C, Sexton D, Vesper KH (eds) The encyclopedia of entrepreneurship. PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, pp 72–90 Siegel JI (2005) Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws? J Financ Econ 73:319–359 Spear R (2008) The social economy from the perspective of active inclusion: employment opportunities for people far from the labour market. Peer review in social protection and social inclusion 2008. Belgium 12– 13.06.2008. Synthesis report Thompson J, Doherty B (2006) The diverse world of social enterprise: a collection of social enterprise stories. Int J Soc Econ 33(5/6):361–375. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 03068290610660643 Townsend DM, Hart TA (2008) Perceived institutional ambiguity and the choice of organizational form in social entrepreneurial ventures. Entrep Theory Pract 32(4):685–700 Wüstenhagen R, Sharma S, Starik M, Wuebker R (2008) Sustainability, innovation and entrepreneurship: introduction to the volume. In: Wüstenhagen R, Hamschmidt J, Sharma S, Starik M (eds) Sustainable innovation and entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 1–23

Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies Pascoal Pereira Law Department, Universidade Portucalense – Oporto Global University, Porto, Portugal

Definition Spatial segregation is the visible result of deliberate policies aimed at insulating groups of people away from the rest of society in neighborhoods or whole regions. Literature includes different terms

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for spatial segregation, such as ghetto, ethnic enclave, gated community, suburb, exurb, inner city, or edge city (Brown and Chung 2006) across a wide range of specific situations. Louf and Barthelemy (2016) would add that “segregation” equates to any spatial distribution of population that deviates from a random distribution. This kind of segregation can persist even after these policies are revoked, with long-lasting effects, while specific dynamics linked to different demographic, social, and economic phenomena may lead to different kinds of spatial segregation. This may not be the result of explicit, deliberate, and coercive public policies, but rather the result of such dynamics within the public space. This more structural segregation logic will be addressed in more detail in a subsequent section. The importance of studying spatial segregation is palpable: a secluded society may be an obstacle for the equal participation and effective inclusion of all its members and might also be a powerful contributing element to persistent exclusion and poverty. Balakrishnan and Hou (1999) state that residential segregation can evince how well (or not) a group is integrated. However, Arbaci (2008) warns that spatial concentration does not automatically imply social exclusion and that dispersed settlements do not entail integration. Addressing spatial segregation as a social problem is a matter of justice since an inclusive and just society cannot be conceived with such forms of exclusion. But at the same time, it is also a matter of peace-building, if one assumes peace to be more than the absence of direct violence. Therefore, spatial segregation might be apprehended as a form of structural violence over groups of people and an obstacle to a positive and comprehensive understanding of peace.

What Spatial Segregation Is and Is Not The aforementioned deliberate policies are put into practice by public institutions within their national jurisdictions and depend on a discursive and empirical distinction between a “self” and a defined “other.” This distinction generates a legal hierarchy between them, and this definitional power is usually held by a privileged “self.”

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Although this might not be at all the purpose intended, controlling the defined “other” is a key idea behind enforced spatial segregation since, by its very definition, the presence of this “other” might endanger the survival of the defined “self.” The first step for constructing spatial segregation is the definition of the aforementioned “other” according to specified but variable characteristics, which can be based on nationality, religion, ethnicity, race, or socioeconomic criteria. In the following section, some historical examples of such forced segregation will be explored. Strong institutions may have a key role in overcoming this kind of social exclusion. Although strong institutions are required for enforcing segregation whenever they are implemented in order to be effective, they are also required when it comes to removing more structural forms of segregation. Therefore strong institutions with an effective presence in society have a key role in overcoming and in implementing comprehensive policies against spatial segregation. How can we make sense of this spatial segregation and avoid including other similar situations? Firstly, although it could be defined as a deliberate form of segregation, international borders will not be considered an example of spatial segregation, since our interest lies within national societies and not between them. Secondly, no-go areas or walls/buffer zones created to avoid or complicate any kind of crossing do not fit as a tool of segregation for specific groups of people. Thirdly, the idea of spatial segregation is conceived as a long-standing form of social and political organization, not so much a provisional situation of segregated groups for a theoretically defined amount of time, such as concentration/ labor camps, gulags, or refugee camps. Fourthly, the domestic distinction between public and private spheres will not be considered either, since we are looking for policies or structures within the public space. Fifthly, although compulsory confinement (prisons, psychiatric institutions) is the result of public legislation and may aggregate hundreds of individuals in the same place, this is a more individual form of segregation (based on specific individual behaviors) implemented on a

case-by-case basis; we are looking for collective forms of segregation in which an individual may end up living in one place or neighborhood as he/ she possesses the collective features of a given group. In the following section, we will discuss some historical examples of enforced spatial segregation, such as the ghettos in European cities in the Middle and Modern Ages, the Jim Crow system in the United States until the 1960s, and the apartheid in South Africa until 1994. Structural segregation will be addressed in the third section. Analyzing former segregated societies will not be our sole focus but also an analysis of the factors and dynamics stemming from or leading to different forms of spatial segregation. This section is divided in three subsections: socioeconomic factors and mobility; (de)industrialization, migration, and urban changes; and awareness of spatial segregation and its impact on public policies.

Enforced Segregation A historical example of the spatial segregation of a particular group of people could be the concentration of the Jewish population in specific neighborhoods in many cities throughout Europe since the Middle Ages up until the nineteenth century. Present on the European continent since the Roman Age, Jews did not always live in separate areas. In fact, according to Wirth (1956), at its inception, the segregation of Jews would have started as voluntary and not necessarily a formal, compulsory creation of the local authorities. Although they may have started as a mechanism for preserving customs and practices, such neighborhoods soon became a necessity for these communities’ self-preservation, as Jews were often blamed as scapegoats for the eruption of diseases or for the dissemination of heresy (Wirth 1956). Keeping the Jewish population in specific neighborhoods gradually turned into an instrument of control, and by the fourteenth century, Jews lived in concentrated areas within many European cities. The name ghetto associated with these neighborhoods originates from Venice, when the local

Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies

government decided at the beginning of the sixteenth century that Jews in the city had to live in a specific neighborhood (Haynes and Hutchinson 2008). Rome adopted a similar law soon after, and segregated life in ghettos became compulsory for Jews throughout Christian Europe: walled neighborhoods with one or more gates that were locked at night (Wirth 1956) and increasingly restrictive rules (Duneier 2016). Those ghettos gradually disappeared during the nineteenth century, but the word “ghetto” (and its meaning) was revived by Nazi Germany in the 1930s when the Jews of the occupied territories in Central Europe were confined to segregated neighborhoods (Duneier 2016). One other major historical example of a particular population’s enforced segregation is the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948–1994). Built on earlier race-related segregationist policies, political domination by the white population meant that only the white minority was entitled to participate in the republic’s affairs. At the same time, spatial segregation was also a cornerstone of this political regime. On the one hand, apartheid promoted residential and educational segregation according to institutionalized racial belonging (Worden 1995). On the other hand, self-ruled “homeland states” based on former “native reserves” were gradually unilaterally created by the government (Worden 1995). However, these territories were deeply fragmented, and the proportion of territory assigned to the homeland states did not correspond to the different population sizes, rendering them unviable (Thompson and Prior 1982). Outside their homeland state, the black African population could not own land; they had to register for residence and work and were confined to specific zones (Thompson and Prior 1982). Even after the end of apartheid in 1994, the long-term effects of segregationist policies are still present in society (Breetzke 2018). A final historical example of institutional segregation is the Jim Crow period put into place in the former Confederate States in the United States. After the end of the American Civil War in 1865, slavery was constitutionally abolished, citizenship granted to all former slaves, and equal protection attributed to all US citizens (Brown and

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Stentiford 2008). This Reconstruction Era did not last long and was followed by a period of legislative setbacks which not only hindered the political rights of the African-American population but also consistently institutionalized racial segregation based on white supremacy. Although some form of racial segregation already existed in the North (Higginbotham 2013), such an articulate and comprehensive system emerged in the South (Alexander 2010). One by one, these states enacted a set of laws ranging from segregation in public spaces (schools, hospitals, churches, restrooms, restaurants, transport, employment) and housing – following the principle of “separate but equal” – to limitations of the right to vote for black men (literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, residency, and property restrictions) (Higginbotham 2013). Vagrancy laws were also enforced (Higginbotham 2013) which, along with systematic arbitrary arrests and court costs and fines, led these prisoners to be sold as forced laborers in order to pay off their debts (Alexander 2010). Although some civil rights movements soon took shape within the black community, their reach was rather limited, and their activities were met with hostility during the first half of the twentieth century. However, after 1945, legal campaigns led by associations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and some legal decisions by federal courts (Klarman 2004) eventually challenged the Jim Crow laws, with their reversion in the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965) (Alexander 2010).

S Structural Segregation Segregation is not only present in societies where a legal framework separates people according to a set of criteria (racial or ethnic) (Colini and Czischke 2015). Some scholars claim segregation may persist over time in some societies (Boustan 2013; Breetzke 2018; Popescu et al. 2018) even if they take new forms (Berenguer 2014; Lichter et al. 2015). Balakrishnan and Hou (1999) refer to two major negative consequences segregation may have for minorities: becoming a structural

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basis for institutional and organizational segregation and increasing the visibility of racial differences. On the other hand, other phenomena may create situations of some sort of structural segregation based on socioeconomic features. Class differentiation and poverty, industrialization processes, migration, urban planning, and privatization of public space, among other factors, can also be determining factors. Socioeconomic Factors and Mobility Race and ethnicity may be interconnected with socioeconomic features in different ways. Economic segregation, for example, can be found alongside racial segregation in the United States (Glasmeier and Farrigan 2007). However, in their study on the evolution of urban segregation in colonial and postcolonial Indonesia, Colombijn and Barwegen (2009) found that the “from-raceto-class-segregation” (class divisions replacing ethnic differences) dynamic might not be accurate and that class has had a more critical impact on spatial segregation than racial categories, on a “class-segregation-throughout-decolonization” basis. Spatial segregation is not only a geographical phenomenon; it is also the result of economic ties and social interactions (Mossay and Picard 2013). Inequality in income/resources and uneven development may have an impact on segregation patterns (Glasmeier and Farrigan 2007; Greenstein et al. 2000). Van Ham et al. (2016) stress that higherincome individuals have some freedom in selecting neighborhoods, whereas low-income households have fewer options. Segregation can therefore be involuntary and can be reproduced over time between generations (Van Ham et al. 2016). However, Berenguer (2014) states that, in Brazil, segregation can be co-opted by nonwhite people either by kinship or in order to avoid potentially racist contact with white people. Residing in areas of greater ethnic diversity as a reaction to perceived prejudice is also pointed out as one factor by studies on segregation in the United States (Kwon et al. 2018). On the other hand, self-segregated, thus voluntary, neighborhoods have also taken shape as gated

communities, in which their high- and middleincome inhabitants choose to live in those very selective, highly securitized areas (Greenstein et al. 2000). Different levels of income within a specific group or the same level of income in different groups must also be taken into account for understanding patterns of segregation. According to Berenguer (2014), in Brazil, for example, segregation increases with higher income: nonwhite middle class is more likely segregated from white middle class and low-income white more likely to live close to low-income nonwhite. Racial homogeneity in low-income neighborhoods may also be a consequence of the mobility of white households to other neighborhoods as soon as they are able (Boustan 2013). In the same vein, Malheiros, quoted in Arbaci’s study on Southern Europe (Arbaci 2008), suggests there might be a mismatch between the spatial distribution of foreigners and local population with similar socioeconomic profiles. Status changes brought about by better incomes may lead to the displacement of former members of traditionally segregated areas, aiming to match social status and neighborhood status (Bailey 2012), especially among young adults (Arbaci 2008). However, in Southern Europe, for example, the role of family in welfare and access to/provision of housing in some societies may be a key element in rather low residential mobility, along with the presence of a dualist formal/informal labor market (Arbaci 2008). On the other hand, this mobility seems to occur mainly between neighborhoods of a similar status or may even be geographically limited: residential immobility can persist over time among long-term residents in working-class areas, obstructing new residents’ access to these neighborhoods (Arbaci 2008). Some scholars argue that spatial segregation alone may not be enough to understand the persistence of inequality and social immobility. In some contexts, such as in Canada, studies show that occupational segregation has declined, while residential segregation remains constant (Balakrishnan and Hou 1999). Van Eijk (2010), on the other hand, challenges the focus on spatial

Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies

segregation by stating that this phenomenon might not be relevant to understanding poverty and exclusion, emphasizing the perhaps more relevant possibility of unequal and interpersonal networks, with people living in other places that provide access to opportunities and resources (information, jobs, and education opportunities). (De)Industrialization, Migration, and Urban Changes The industrialization (and later deindustrialization) of societies has also been crucial for understanding patterns of concentration and segregation. In his analysis The Age of Revolution, Hobsbawm (1996) refers to a process of class segregation already present in the nineteenth century, caused by mass movement to industrial cities in which the new laboring poor lived in misery far from where decisions were made. More recent industrialization processes have had similar if not greater consequences. Beserra and Teixeira (2016) point to governmental industrial plans for import replacement as one leading factor of spatial segregation in Brazil during the twentieth century. The drastic rural-urban flow of those attracted by job opportunities in new industrial sites was not matched by the state’s ability to accommodate this sudden urbanization process appropriately. An unplanned internal migration of this scale pushed these populations into precarious housing with poor sanitary conditions, lacking basic urban infrastructures and public services, close to factories and far from the city center. If we consider that immigrants are disproportionately concentrated within cities (Accetturo et al. 2014), urban spatial segregation may also be connected to migration (either domestic or international). The abolition of slavery, for example, brought many freed slaves from Northern and Northeastern Brazil to the city in search of work, who settled in newly established informal settlements (favelas) in the hills close to the city center (Berenguer 2014); spatial poverty would therefore go hand in hand with the racialization of urban space. Research has revealed significant segregation between immigrants and French natives in France, for example, and that segregation might be even higher with non-European immigrants

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(McAvay 2018). Immigrants often settle in conational neighborhoods since their networks can be helpful for finding a house and work upon arrival. These immigrants’ (or their descendants’) later mobility to other neighborhoods may then be blocked by discrimination in the rental market, which perpetuates their residential segregation, as demonstrated in Spain (Bosch et al. 2015). Depending on specific national contexts and historical backgrounds, spatial segregation is visible in some city centers and in peripheral or even suburban areas. Different social, economic, and urban dynamics in each country may have an influence on the location of such segregated areas. Greenstein et al. (2000) show that, in North America, minorities tend to be segregated in inner-city areas, whereas middle classes are more widely dispersed across smaller neighborhoods or suburbs; in Latin America, this trend is reversed. Arbaci (2008) refers to the peripheralization of low-income groups in Southern Europe, since the central areas have not been depopulated consistently over the years as a long-term result of rent-control legislation, among other factors. Boustan (2013) argues that emphasis on neighborhood interactions may not be relevant in this day and age, since data suggest that residential segregation takes place between cities and suburbs, and Lichter et al. (2007) point to a changing pattern of racial neighborhood segregation within cities in the United States, now being reproduced on a different scale in suburbs and small towns. More recent phenomena have altered the configuration of cities and thereby population distribution within them. The displacement of factories out of city centers, the deindustrialization and tertiarization of the economy, and the restructuring of the labor market as a consequence of globalization (Colini and Czischke 2015) brought about an extreme polarization between very high-income and very low-income workers (Sassen 2005). Some of these cities lost their polarized demographic shape and took on a more fragmented form (Martinez 2018). More vulnerable sections of the population had no choice but to move to less attractive areas

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(Glasmeier and Farrigan 2007) as plans for rehabilitation and urban renewal of old city centers pushed them out of these newly gentrified and more expensive neighborhoods (Arbaci 2008). The proliferation of gated communities (Greenstein et al. 2000), the privatization of public places and services in South Africa (Mini 2012), the creation of “Special Economic Zones” in India (Rajagopal 2010) and Africa (Van Noorloos and Kloosterboer 2018), and a progressive dispossession of common goods in Europe, linked to an increasing rolling back of state intervention in welfare and housing policies (Colini and Czischke 2015), are also considered contemporary dynamics one could correlate with the neoliberalization of urban spaces, which have a huge impact on housing options. Knowledge on Spatial Segregation and Its Impact on Public Policy Policies to accommodate traditionally segregated groups within a larger society may vary greatly from one country to another. Therefore, organizing and categorizing knowledge on policies to overcome exclusionary dynamics linked to spatial segregation may be complex. At the same time, there might be significant lacunae on how to make sense of segregation. Some authors would even claim that segregation issues are recurrently underestimated, de-problematized, and underresearched both in academia and in the political arena and that ethnic residential marginalization is considered either unintentional or a temporary phase that mechanisms such as markets will accommodate (Arbaci 2008). Other scholars put forward different sets of dimensions they deem critical in analyzing segregation. Lamanna et al. (2018) state that spatial segregation dynamics stemming from immigration may differ from one country to another according to a combination of factors, such as the culture of origin, the culture of the hosting country, and said country’s specific policies. This means that particular policies aimed at tackling spatial segregation may also differ greatly from one country to another and depend on a complex set of factors. Sabatini (2003) stresses three central dimensions in segregation studies:

the degree of spatial concentration, the social homogeneity of the area, and the neighborhood’s prestige or social stature (degree of stigmatization). Finally, Massey (apud Brown and Chung 2006) introduces five dimensions upon which segregation can be assessed: evenness (the distribution of a specific group over a defined area), exposure (the isolation of a group according to the degree to which it shares a neighborhood with others), clustering (related to persons living close to others of the same group and how they form a contiguous enclave), concentration (a group’s density in a certain area), and centrality (proximity to the urban core). When it comes to the specific spatial mobility of immigrants, three theoretical perspectives are usually considered in literature on segregation: spatial assimilation theory, place stratification, and residential preferences (Kwon et al. 2018). The first argues that acculturation processes (active participation in social institutions, language proficiency, understanding social norms) play a key role in expanding individual choices about where to reside. The second perspective, however, suggests that discrimination, racism, and prejudice may be significant obstacles to acculturation processes and these processes may therefore have a mitigated impact when it comes to choices within the housing market. Finally, the third perspective stresses the cultural preferences of the newcomers: residential options may also depend on individual preferences, above and beyond limited resources. In political and practical terms, the integration of immigrants could be conceived according to two broad strategies: assimilationist and multiculturalist strategies. While an assimilationist approach would, by its own definition, seek to avoid the concentration of incoming population as an integrative tool, multiculturalist strategies have been promoted in some countries as a way of incorporating immigrants. Kwon et al. (2018) have mapped critical literature on this multiculturalist approach, which could amplify residential segregation along three lines of reasoning: these policies might be an impediment to acculturation, they would reify boundaries between immigrants and the native population, and they might amplify hostility toward immigrants.

Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies

As to particular policies addressing spatial segregation, Boustan (2013) lists the different policies states have implemented. First is place-based policies, in which governments and local authorities seek to improve these specific neighborhoods’ facilities in order to make them more heterogeneous by attracting new inhabitants. Second is people-based policies, aimed directly at individuals through fair housing regulations or vouchers or improved access to mortgages. Third is indirect solutions, policies targeting the symptoms rather than the root causes, such as improving public transport to reduce isolation.

Scope of Further Research on Spatial Segregation Deliberate public policies leading to the spatial segregation of groups of people used to be common in some countries, but a more comprehensive understanding and practice of human rights have inhibited states from sustaining or implementing such policies. Although many of the former segregationist policies are long gone, their consequences are still present in society. Therefore, these structural, nondeliberate forms of human segregation can persist in the present even after such policies have been revoked. Nevertheless, one can trace other human experiences linked to the increasing geographical confinement of certain groups in twenty-first-century societies that can be equated to spatial segregation and therefore require further research. Other forms of geographical confinement might be related to different patterns of mobility within the framework of immaterial and de-territorialized globalization. Zygmunt Bauman (1998) makes the distinction between “tourists,” voluntary, cosmopolitan travellers for whom borders and space (either real or virtual) are not a constraint and travelling is a matter of choice, and “vagabonds,” uprooted people for whom geographical mobility is a painful, dangerous, and often illegal option. Qualifying the consequences of unwanted mobility as “segregation” would be inaccurate, but some of its more extreme cases could easily be included within the scope of

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spatial segregation. One example of an increasingly permanent form of segregation through confinement might be the experience that a growing number of individuals have to endure in refugee camps. These are intended as structures for providing provisional shelter (Montclos and Kagwanja 2000) to refugees and asylum seekers in between two worlds: the violent reality these individuals are escaping from and a safe, peaceful new life (either back in the country of origin or in the incoming country). However, in too many situations, such a provisional solution becomes a lifelong experience (Agier 2002) over several generations, often because the root causes behind these forced migrations also persist (Moehler and Backer 2012). At the same time, these settlements may be equated to urban slums in their inequity, violence, and informal economic structures (Oka 2011). With no legal status allowing a regular life in the incoming country nor a realistic chance of returning back home, these groups are forced to live in overcrowded camps as second-rate human beings (Diken 2004) with no agency (Turner 2015) and no possibility of participating in the decision-making processes concerning their own individual and collective lives (Hanafi and Long 2010). Considering such confinement as spatial segregation illustrates how debatable and difficult it is to circumscribe what does indeed fit within its very definition. No definition will ever be fully comprehensive or definite, as it can change over time, with new important defining elements, while other features become obsolete. Deliberate public policies at the root of spatial segregation can no longer be at the core of its definition. Nevertheless, that does not negate the social and political effects that such policies implemented in the past still have in the present. That said, informal, nondeliberate structures may lead to real situations of spatial segregation that can be as harmful as those stemming from deliberate policies.

Cross-References ▶ Housing Discrimination ▶ Local Governance

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and contingent residential locations. Econ Geogr 83 (3):221–229 Greenstein R, Sabatini F, Smolka M (2000) Urban spatial segregation: forces, consequences, and policy responses. Land Lines, November, 7–9 Hanafi S, Long T (2010) Governance, Governmentalities, and the state of exception in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon. J Refug Stud 23(2):134–159. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq014 Haynes B, Hutchinson R (2008) Symposium on the ghetto – the ghetto: origins, history, discourse. City Community 7(4):347–398. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406040.2008.00271_1.x Higginbotham FM (2013) Ghosts of Jim Crow – ending racism in post-racial America. New York University Press, New York Hobsbawm E (1996) The age of revolution. Vintage House, New York Klarman MJ (2004) From Jim Crow to civil rights: the supreme court and the struggle for racial equality. Oxford University Press, New York Kwon R, Flores B, Yonamine H (2018) Spatial segregation and the impact of linguistic multicultural policies within the USA. J Int Migr Integr 19:213–232. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0547-3 Lamanna F, Lenormand M, Salas-Olmedo MH, Romanillos G, Gonçalves B, Ramasco JJ (2018) Immigrant community integration in world cities. PLoS One 13(3):1–19. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone. 0191612 Lichter D, Parisi D, Grice SM, Taquino MC (2007) National estimates of racial segregation in rural and small-town America. Demography 44(3):563–581. https://doi.org/10.1353/dem.2007.0030 Lichter D, Parisi D, Taquino MC (2015) Spatial segregation. Pathways: A magazine on poverty, inequality and social policy (special issue) – State of the states: the poverty and inequality report: 30–36. https://inequality. stanford.edu/sites/default/files/SOTU_2015.pdf Louf R, Barthelemy M (2016) Patterns of residential segregation. PLoS One 11(6):1–20. https://doi.org/10. 1371/journal.pone.0157476 Martinez AL (2018) Segregación socioespacial bajo el nuevo modelo de ciudad en América Latina. Características, perspectivas e implicaciones. Hallazgos 30:99–124. https://doi.org/10.15332/17943841.2018.0030.04 McAvay H (2018) Immigrants’ spatial incorporation in housing and neighbourhoods: evidence from France. Population-E 73(2):333–362. https://doi.org/10.3917/ pope.1802.0333 Mini S (2012) Spatialisation of post-Apartheid urban inequalities: a new type of spatial-social inequalities in South African cities. Sci Ann “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Univ Iasi 58(2):147–170. https://doi.org/10. 15551/scigeo.v58i2.167 Moehler DC, Backer D (2012) The puzzling persistence of semi-permanent refugee camps: analyzing humanitarian crises using bargaining models. Available at: http:// citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼10.1.1. 120.9421&rep¼rep1&type¼pdf

Strong Institutions for Territorial Justice Montclos MAP, Kagwanja PM (2000) Refugee camps or cities? The socio-economic dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma camps in northern Kenya. J Refug Stud 13(2):205–222. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.2.205 Mossay P, Picard P (2013) Spatial segregation and urban structure. RIETI discussion paper series, 13-E-56, pp 1–39 Oka R (2011) Unlikely cities in the desert: the informal economy as causal agent for permanent “urban” sustainability in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya. Urban Anthropol Stud Cult Syst World Econ Dev 40(3– 4):223–262 Popescu I, Duffy E, Mendelsohn J, Escarce JJ (2018) Racial residential segregation, socioeconomic disparities, and the white-black survival gap. PLoS One 13(2):1–15. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193222 Rajagopal A (2010) Special political zone: urban planning, spatial segregation and the infrastructure of violence in Ahmedabad. South Asian Hist Cult 1(4):529–556. https://doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2010.507024 Sabatini F (2003) The social spatial segregation in the cities of Latin America. Report of the Inter-American Development Bank – Sustainable Development Department, Social Programs Division Sassen S (2005) The global city: introducing a concept. Brown J World Aff 11(2):27–43 Thompson L, Prior A (1982) South African politics. Yale University Press, New Haven Turner S (2015) What is a refugee camp? Explorations of the limits and effects of the camp. J Refug Stud 29 (2):139–148. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fev024 Van Eijk G (2010) Unequal networks – spatial segregation, relationships and inequality in the city. IOS Press BV, Amsterdam Van Ham M, Tammaru T, Vuijst E, Zwiers M (2016) Spatial segregation and socio-economic mobility in European cities. IZA discussion paper, 10277, pp 1–21 Van Noorloos F, Kloosterboer M (2018) Africa’s new cities: the contested future of urbanisation. Urban Stud 55(6):1223–1241. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0042098017700574 Wirth L (1956) The Ghetto. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Worden N (1995) The making of modern South Africa, 2nd edn. Blackwell, Oxford

Stakeholders Involvement ▶ Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals

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Strategic Interaction ▶ Game Theory: Towards an Understanding of the Logic of Justice, Peace, and Institutions

Strong Institutions ▶ Impact of Good Governance on Disaster Risk Management

Strong Institutions for Territorial Justice Alexandra Aragão Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal

Definition Territorial justice is the result of strategies, policies, and measures to avoid the geographical coincidence of social injustice and environmental injustice. Social injustice is an unequal distribution pattern for wealth and uneven access to essential public services. This leaves behind disadvantaged persons, weak communities, and vulnerable social groups, such as low-income and less-educated persons, the disabled, the elderly, young infants, racial and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, sexual minorities, refugees, etc. Environmental injustice is the uneven exposure to human-made environmental pollution and overexposure to anthropogenic environmental hazards which impairs more directly those who live or work near the source of pollution. Consequently, territorial injustice is the inequitable overlap, in the same country, region, or place, of vulnerable populations and environmentally harmful activities.

State-Building

Introduction

▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals

The first section on “Uneven Spatial Distribution of Environmental Burdens” highlights the

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inequalities behind territorial injustice and the reasons explaining the territorial overlap between social injustice and environmental injustice impacting vulnerable social groups living near sources of pollution and hazards. The second section explains the “The Sustainable Development Paradox” or the dilemmas associated with finding compromise solutions preventing territorial injustice. The next two sections describe “The Role of the Courts” in the protection of victims of territorial injustice, showing that “Insufficient Judicial Protection” is the rule rather than the exception, and that more effective solutions are needed. Section five presents examples of “International and Supranational Legal Instruments to Prevent Territorial Injustice.” Section six, on “Geospatial Knowledge for Territorial Justice,” introduces the use of new information and communication technologies to develop decision support tools for visualization of territorial injustice. The last section before the conclusion sheds some light on the possible outcomes of using legal instruments and technology-based tools to strengthen the institutions and deliver social, environmental, and territorial justice. The line of reasoning adopted is a two-step approach: firstly, demonstrating that the conventional solutions presented to those claiming for territorial justice are frankly insufficient (Section on “Insufficient Judicial Protection”). The courts have not been capable of pacifying the victims in cases of blatant territorial injustice. Secondly, showing how existing legal instruments and geospatial technologies can and must be merged and used together by strong institutions to foresee and preventively avoid any case of territorial injustice (Sections on “International and Supranational Legal Instruments to Prevent Territorial Injustice” and “Geospatial Knowledge for Territorial Justice”).

Uneven Spatial Distribution of Environmental Burdens Living in safe environments is a condition of utmost importance for human health and wellbeing (CSDH 2008). The right to live in a healthy

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environment is recognized in many constitutions throughout the world (UN SRHRE 2020). Yet, the prevalence of vulnerable social groups living in deteriorated environments is growing (Eurostat 2019). The World Health Organization has gathered evidence of frequent overlap between multiple inequalities: • Housing-related inequalities (lack of a flush toilet, lack of a bath or shower, overcrowding, housing dampness, and thermal discomfort) • Basic service inequalities (reduced access to drinking water services, no access to basic sanitation services, and energy poverty) • Work-related and transport inequalities (workrelated injuries and mortality, risks in working environments, and fatal road traffic/transport injuries) • Environmental inequalities (exposure to air pollution, noise annoyance, chemical exposure, contaminated sites, and lack of access to recreational or green areas) (WHO 2019) In addition, the same populations are also more vulnerable to natural risks such as earthquakes, heat waves, or hurricanes (Driesen et al. 2005). Territorial injustice (Boyne and Powell 1991; Rauhut 2017)—also called spatial justice (Pirie 1983)—is the result of several of these inequities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) occurring in the same country, region, or place. Furthermore, territorial injustice can as well occur between countries (EEA 2018) revealing that territorial injustice is a crosscutting problem with international incidence. The overlap between social injustice (ILO 2008) and environmental injustice arises because it is common for vulnerable social groups to live near sources of pollution and hazards (UN HRC 2018a) and consequently, to be more exposed to unhealthy environments than the average population (EEA 2018). The most debated case of territorial injustice is environmental racism, in other words, the frequent exposure of racial minorities to nuisance from waste treatments facilities (Bullard 2000; Westra and Lawson 2001). Territorial injustice is explained by the first “law” of geography: “all things are related to

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everything else, but close things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970). In fact, most pollutant emissions—air pollution, water pollution, soil pollution, noise, and radiation—are more severe near the source, and fade out gradually when moving away from it. Consequently, those living in the vicinity of sources of pollution and hazards are the most vulnerable populations (Taylor 2000). Why? Several reasons can be identified: • Economic reasons (cheaper housing in contaminated areas becomes the only affordable option for low-income households) • Educational reasons (low-educated groups ignore their rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice) • Cultural reasons (some cultures do not encourage complaining but rather cultivate resignation and acceptance of inequities) • Institutional reasons (governmental transparency, public consultation practices, and wide access to justice are not universally granted) • Political reasons (minorities have less lobbying power to influence decision-making) (Davy 1997) More shockingly, the most vulnerable individuals or groups are also less resilient and unable to take self-protection measures (Cutter 2006). One of the ways to react to locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) (Vanderheiden 2016), such as sources of pollution and major hazard facilities that generate externality costs (like health risks and loss of property value), is by voting with the feet (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008). But abandoning the contaminated area and departing elsewhere is only possible when the environmental victims have the economic capacity to resettle. If they do not have enough economic capacity and still decide to abandon the polluted area, they will be submitted to the fragile condition of displaced people (HCR 2001). Consequently, the more economically disadvantaged victims are forced to stay and endure the slow violence (Nixon 2011) of living in an unhealthy environment, exposed to structural pollution (Cole and Farrell 2006).

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The Sustainable Development Paradox Cases of territorial injustice are not difficult to recognize, but simple binary explanations based on labels as “good or evil” are not valid approaches to territorial injustice. There may be a few cases where it is easy to pinpoint precisely the “evil” activity that is responsible for the environmental disturbance. For instance, when excess pollution is so evident that cannot be denied; when an activity is functioning illegally; or when the operator is accused of corruption. In such cases, hard measures must be taken, and the operator should be charged for criminal misconduct. But in many other circumstances it is not obvious that polluting activities can be labeled as being “evil,” harmful for society, or illegal. In cases of legal pollution, or slow cumulative chronic pollution, finding an acceptable solution is not so easy. Therefore, it is not pacific that these activities should be outlawed. There are several possible reasons why it is difficult to identify who is responsible and blame a person or a company for the deterioration of the environment and the loss of health and quality of life incurred by the neighboring population. Here are some usual allegations: (a) It is an indisputable social need. Invoking the character of necessity goods that are provided by the environmental disturbing activities is an argument strong enough to dissuade legal disputes. One example is the case of building a dam in a river as a reservoir for urban water supply or to produce clean, renewable energy. But dams often displace or at least jeopardize the subsistence of fishing communities living along the river, due to the gradual disappearance of migratory fish, unable to spawn upriver (WCD 2010). Another example is managing a sewage treatment plant to treat municipal wastewater and ensure urban sanitation despite the nuisances —odours, noise, vibration, insects, rodents, and other parasites—suffered by the neighbours of the installation.

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(b) It is for the common good. The imperative reasons of overriding public interest that justify certain activities are also powerful arguments, difficult to be contradicted. It is the case of major hub international airports, large-sized maritime ports, or important railroads. Despite their considerable impacts on the quality of life of the population living nearby, their function in contributing to the development of the country, supporting international businesses and tourism is undeniable and is hard to contest. (c) It is a drop in the ocean. Many pollution cases are not originated from point source pollution. In those cases, the scattered nature of the environmentally harmful activities leads to diffuse pollution and to the dilution of responsibility. Roads with intense traffic or river eutrophication caused by agricultural fertilizers are the perfect illustrative examples. Hundreds or thousands of anonymous individuals carry out activities which do not require previous authorization, public licencing, or register. While the environmental damage (noise, air, water, or soil pollution) generated by each individual is irrelevant, the aggregate emissions can amount to an intense cumulative pollution. (d) Force majeure. Extraordinary events or unusual circumstances beyond the control of the operator can originate accidents with strong impacts in the surroundings of the activity. The external events can range from extreme weather conditions (heat waves, hurricanes, or hail) to seismic events, floods, or terrorist attacks. When the extreme events involve classified installations (industrial plants requiring an integrated environmental authorization or establishments where dangerous chemicals are used or stored), the result can be a pollution hotspot triggering a major domino effector cascading accident (Pescaroli 2018). In normal circumstances, the facility’s emissions would be below the legal thresholds. Yet, by virtue of the force majeure they can cause a disaster. Each of these examples illustrates the sustainable development paradox: the environmental

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nuisance is caused by activities that promote labor, because they create jobs; activities that benefit the consumers, because they place on the market useful products and services; activities that are advantageous for the region and the country, because they attract investment; and activities that are good for the economy, because they boost economic development. Whoever claims for territorial justice in such cases risks being accused of acting selfishly, in an environmental fundamentalist manner or simply reflecting nimbyism (Hager and Haddad 2015). Victims of territorial injustice are often misunderstood while challenging activities that are considered useful for development of the country or region, advantageous for the economy, beneficial for society, (supposedly) favorable to the wellbeing of citizens, and therefore unquestionable. One possible solution is neighborhood dialogue, a structured and long-term communication process involving face-to-face meetings between companies, neighbors, and the competent authorities. The network for the implementation and enforcement of environmental law (IMPEL), in the European Union, developed a neighborhood dialogue toolkit (IMPEL 2007) to resolve environmental conflicts, improve the environmental performance of industrial sites, build trust with local residents, and improve relations with the authorities.

The Role of the Courts The cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the protection of the right to enjoy one’s home without environmental interference are clear enough to show that in situations of long-lasting territorial injustice tolerated or unpunished by the public authorities, the courts are the last resort to guarantee the citizen’s rights. In fact, the right to live in a safe environment is more effectively protected using the right to a home as an argument than through the right to property or other human right contained in the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In the words of the court, “naturally, severe environmental pollution

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may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health” (case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain 1994). Therefore, sanctioning unlawful “interferences” with the right to enjoy one’s home, caused by extreme pollution, seems to be effective tool for the prevention of territorial injustice. In the interpretation of the ECHR, the public authorities’ unlawful interference can happen in two ways. One, when the detrimental environmental effects are the result of activities (such as public works) executed directly by the state or when the polluting or hazardous facility (an industrial plant or a dam) is publicly owned. Two, when the environmental damage or hazard is caused by private activities, carried out by individuals or companies in privately owned installations, but the public authorities are nevertheless responsible for regulating, supervising, and sanctioning such activities. In the first case, the State has the duty to refrain from activities likely to cause environmental damage (pollution or deterioration) to the citizens, or in other words, to stop environmental interference.In the second case, the state has the duty to actively control, inspect, and punish polluting or hazardous private activities that impose excessive burdens on the surrounding population. If the state does not control and punish, that is passive interference. This is the reason why strong institutions, as required by sustainable development goal No. 16, are so important to ensure territorial justice. Yet, judicial protection often comes too late and is insufficient to ensure effective human rights’ protection.

Insufficient Judicial Protection Almost 30 year have passed by since the first case where the European Court of Human Rights declared the violation of the right to have one’s home protected against illegal interference, the case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain, in 1994. Hundreds of complaints before the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg show that in many

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cases neither the timing nor the scope of the court decisions are enough to grant an effective, timely, and full judicial protection to all the victims of territorial injustice. Before going to the ECHR, obtaining a final judicial decision by a national supreme court on cases of territorial injustice requires going through all the judicial instances of the national courts. This can take decades. The numbers behind the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights recognizing violations of the right to enjoy one’s home are impressive. Regarding industrial activities and particularly steel industry, in the case of Fadeyeva versus Russia, the industry had been working since the 1960s and the decision of the European Court was adopted in 2005. In the case of Băcilă versus Romania, also on steel industry, the court delivered the judgement in 2010 but the plant had been in operation since the 1930s. In the case of Cordella versus Italy, the steel industry was active since 1965, and the court deliberated in 2019. Other cases concerning different sources of long-lasting pollution were also judged by the European Court of Human Rights: in the case of Moreno Gomez versus Spain, on noise pollution from night clubs and other night-time leisure activities, the court decided in 2004 but the first bars and clubs had obtained their licenses in 1974. In the case of Giacomelli versus Italy, the noxious activity was irregular waste management which was going on since 1950 and the court decided in 2006. In the case of Di Sarno versus Italy, Naples region declared a state of emergency due to waste management difficulties which lasted for 15 years, between 1994 and 2009. The European Court issued the final decision in 2012. Also, the subjective scope of the judicial decisions is not as ambitious as it would be desirable. In other words, the victims benefiting from the condemnation of the state by the ECHR are limited to the applicants. This is also very insufficient as the following numbers demonstrate. In case of Kolyadenko versus Russia, decided in 2012, there were 6 applicants and more than 5000 residents in Vladivostok whose homes were in danger when the state-owned enterprise decided to suddenly open the gates of a water reservoir, after a period of exceptionally heavy rains, causing sudden

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flooding and endangering thousands of homes. In the case of Fadeyeva versus Russia, mentioned before, there was one single applicant while 60,000 workers had their residence within the factory’s “health protection zone,” the over contaminated surrounding area. In the case of Cordella versus Italy, already mentioned, there were 180 applicants and 200,000 inhabitants living in an area classified by the public authorities as “exposed to high environmental risk.” These examples serve to demonstrate the need for faster and more powerful legal mechanisms to guarantee the adequate protection of the human rights of the victims by preventing at least all foreseeable damages and predictable risks.

International and Supranational Legal Instruments to Prevent Territorial Injustice Several environmental and planning law instruments can be used to prevent territorial injustice. The objective is to adopt anticipatory strategies and approaches (Rechtschaffen 2010), imposing procedural and substantial obligations based on fundamental environmental principles (Aragão 2018) such as the prevention principle (Sadeleer 2002), and the correction at the source principle (Krämer 2018) to achieve the desired level of protection (Squintani 2019). Taking international environmental conventions and European Union law as an illustration, here are eight examples: • Environmental impact assessment, or EIA, is internationally regulated by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the 1991 Espoo Convention. In the European Union it is the 2011 Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. The EIA is used to prevent, reduce, or offset the likely significant adverse effects on the environment caused by different projects such as construction works or any interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape. These projects range from agriculture, silviculture and aquaculture, extraction of

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mineral resources, manufacturing industry (energy, metal, chemical, food, textile, leather, wood, paper, or rubber), infrastructure projects (urban development, railways, airfields, roads, harbors, dams, dykes, pipelines, and aqueducts), tourism and leisure (ski runs, marinas, hotel complexes, and theme parks), solid waste management projects, waste water treatment plants, or sludge deposition sites. • Strategic environmental assessment, or SEA, is managed internationally by the 2003 Kyiv Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Espoo Convention. In the EU it corresponds to the 2001 Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programs on the environment. EIA and SEA have similar aims but different objectives: SEA aims at preventing, reducing, or offsetting the likely significant adverse effects on the environment of plans and programs, and where appropriate policies and legislation. The plans and programs requiring strategic assessment are those adopted for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, waste management, water management, telecommunications, tourism, town and country planning or land use, and which set the framework for future development consent of projects. SEA comes before EIA because the projects are more concrete then the policies, plans, or programs which serve as framework for projects. • The international legal context of the authorization of industrial establishments using dangerous substances is the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. In the EU it is regulated by the 2012 Directive on the control of majoraccident hazards. The industrial pollution regime has rules for the prevention, mitigation, and restoration of accidents involving hazardous chemicals, with a view to limiting of consequences for human health and the environment, thus ensuring a high level of protection. Prevention measures start with land use planning policies to maintain appropriate safety distances between industrial establishments and residential areas and between the industrial establishments

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themselves, in order to prevent domino effects and goes on with operational rules on the role and responsibility of management. • Integrated environmental permitting corresponds to the 1979 Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution. In the EU it is regulated by the 2010 Directive on industrial emissions. This regime imposes the use of best available techniques, and whenever necessary additional measures, to respect the desirable environmental quality standards. The objective of environmental permitting is to prevent or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions into air, water, and land and prevent the generation of waste, in order to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole. As in the two previous instruments, transparency and public participation in the decision-making processes are the rule to ensure that the general public is involved, preventing social conflicts, strengthening the credibility of private companies, and increasing trust in public policies. • The environmental management and auditing scheme is governed by the 2018 EMAS regulation, in the EU. It is used to promote continuous improvements in the environmental performance of organizations by the establishment and implementation of environmental management systems and the provision of information on environmental performance. Being a voluntary management instrument, only the organizations that are confident enough accept to undergo a systematic, documented, periodic, and objective evaluation of the organization’s management system and environmental performance conducted by an auditor. Yet, the business benefits (European Commission 2011) of obtaining an EMAS certification can outweigh the effort. First, there are internal gains, such as resource efficiency, cost savings, enhanced employee motivation, and greater team building capacity. Secondly, there are external advantages associated with the fact that EMAS label can be used as a marketing tool and increase business opportunities in markets that prioritize green production processes. Additionally, it can provide

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access to public incentives and public contracts, improve the relations with the customers, the local community, and regulators, reducing the risk of fines related to breaches of environmental legislation. • The environmental liability regime created in 2004 by the European Directive on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage establishes a legal framework based on the prevention and polluter-pays principle (Sadeleer 2002) to prevent and remedy environmental damage. Where environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat of such damage occurring, the operator must, without delay, take the necessary preventive measures. Where environmental damage has already occurred, the operator shall take, without delay, all practicable steps to immediately control, contain, remove, or manage the damage factors in order to limit or to prevent further environmental damage and consequent adverse effects on human health. The costs for the preventive and remedial actions shall be borne by the operator, directly or through insurance or other financial security. • Corporate social responsibility launched in the EU by the 2014 EU Directive on disclosure of nonfinancial information corresponds to the G l o b a l C o m p a c t ( h t t p s : / / w w w. unglobalcompact.org/) at the UN level. Large companies and groups associated with this regime have the obligation to prepare every year nonfinancial statements relating to environmental, social, and employee matters, as well as respect for human rights. The annual statement shall include a description of the environmental, social, and labor policies pursued by the undertaking, including the outcome of those policies, the principal risks related to those matters, and relevant key performance indicators. The expected result of the statement is to promote sustainable development through accountable, transparent, and responsible business behavior by undertakings in all sectors. • The three pillars of environmental democracy, also called procedural environmental rights (Jendrośka and Bar 2017), have been

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crystallized internationally by the 1998 Aarhus Convention and the 2018 Escazu Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. In the EU it is the 2003 Directives on public access to environmental information and on public participation and in the 2017 Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (EC – European Commission 2017). Environmental information covers information in any form, on the state of the environment, on factors, measures, or activities affecting or likely to affect the environment or designed to protect it, on cost–benefit and economic analyses used within the framework of such measures or activities and also information on the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, conditions of human life, cultural sites, and built structures in as much as they are, or may be, affected by any of those matters. The essential assumption is that increased public access to environmental information contributes to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, and more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making. On the other hand, improved public participation in decision-making and access to justice enhances the quality and the implementation of decisions, and, eventually, contributes to a better environment. But besides effective legal instruments, technological innovation—such as geospatial intelligence and data visualization tools—is also important to prevent the undesired geographic coexistence between social and environmental inequities.

Geospatial Knowledge for Territorial Justice The global use of new technologies for sustainable development was expressly recognized in 2018, when the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution declaring that the economic and social council should focus on “future trends and scenarios related to the (. . .) contribution of

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new technologies, in the economic, social and environmental areas on the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals” (UN HRC 2018b). In 2013, the UN secretary-general appointed a high-level panel of experts to advise on the post-2015 agenda. In the view of the panel: “better data and statistics will help governments track progress and make sure their decisions are evidence-based; they can also strengthen accountability (. . .). A true data revolution would draw on existing and new sources of data to fully integrate statistics into decision making, promote open access to, and use of, data and ensure increased support for statistical system (. . .) data gathered will need to be disaggregated by gender, geography, income, disability, and other categories, to make sure that no group is being left behind” (HLP 2013). The agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean Region (Escazu 2018) proclaims that “each Party shall guarantee that environmental information systems are duly organized, accessible to all persons and made progressively available through information technology and georeferenced media, where appropriate” (article 6 No.3). The UN Human Rights Council calls upon states “to collect disaggregated data on the effects of environmental harm, including the loss of biodiversity and the decline of ecosystem services, on persons in vulnerable situations” (UN HRC 2017). When social and environmental data are georeferenced, processed, interpreted, and presented in maps, they can help identify information gaps and visualize (Carter and Herold 2019) sustainable development indicators (Moreno-Pires 2014) and territorial injustice much more clearly than using graphics or tables. Mapping tools that display layers of georeferenced statistical information (Jankowska and Pawełczyk 2014) on

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social and environmental datasets help visualize (Krieger et al. 2012) and understand territorial injustice. Advanced technologies, such as satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence, are already being used in the context of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations to support decision-making and to promote multidisciplinary approaches to sustainable development (FAO 2006). There are concrete examples of such tools being developed for visualization of territorial injustice. In the European Union, the Directive establishing an infrastructure for spatial information launched in 2007 the construction of a European wide network of interoperable spatialized data, held by the member states, on subjects of major importance for citizens and for decision-makers. The spatial data themes correspond to different layers of information that, when put together, show a clear picture of territorial justice. The Inspire geoportal (https://inspiregeoportal.ec.europa.eu/) will disclose large amounts of information such as the availability of essential services (sewage, waste management, energy and water supply, civil protection sites, schools, and hospitals), the quality of the environment (air pollution, chemicals, depletion of the ozone layer, and noise), zones prone to natural hazards (floods, landslides and subsidence, avalanches, forest fires, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions), and finally on the geographical distribution of pathologies like allergies, cancers, respiratory diseases, decline of fertility or epidemics, fatigue, or stress. In the USA, another good example is the Environmental Justice Screening and Mapping Tool (https://ejscreen.epa.gov/mapper/). Developed by the Environmental Protection Agency, the EJSCREEN is available online since 2015 and provides environmental and demographic indicators. Some of the environmental indicators are: lifetime cancer risk from inhalation of air toxics, air toxics respiratory hazard, particulate matter in air, ozone concentration, traffic proximity and volume, percent of housing units built pre-1960 (indicator of potential lead paint exposure),

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potential chemical accident facilities within 5 km, hazardous waste facilities within 5 km, and wastewater discharge (considering stream proximity and toxic concentration). The demographic indicators are: the percent of population where the household income is less than or equal to twice the federal “poverty level,” the percent of individuals who list their racial status as a race other than white alone and/or list their ethnicity as Hispanic or Latino, percent of people age 25 or older in a block group whose education is short of a high school diploma, percent of people living in linguistically isolated households (speak a non-English language and also speak English less than “very well”), and percent of people under the age of 5 and over the age of 64. Lastly, another example is the Washington Environmental Health Disparities Map (https:// deohs.washington.edu/washingtonenvironmental-health-disparities-map-project) which is the result of a community–academic– government partnership in the State of Washington, USA (Min et al. 2019) and went public in December of 2018. The map shows the same environmental indicators as EJSCREEN and demographic indicators of sensitive populations (death from cardiovascular disease and low birth weight), and low socioeconomic status (limited English, no high school diploma, poverty, race/people of color, transportation expense, unaffordable housing, and unemployed). The examples provided show that territorial justice is much more than a philosophical concept. It is an operational concept (Soja 2010) which can be implemented using decision support tools for evidence-based public policies.

Strong Institutions for Territorial Justice The activities that cause environmental deterioration turn neighbors into victims, whose living conditions are lost, whose physical and psychological health is impaired, whose quality of life fades, and whose dignity rights are denied (McCrudden 2014).

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Yet, according to the Aarhus Convention “Every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.” Thus, a new socio-environmental paradigm, which comes with new legal requirements for territorial justice, must prevail. Just like the slaves of the colonial period and the working class during the industrial revolution, the new victims of development are the vulnerable population overexposed to unhealthy environmental conditions. Territorial justice depends on strong institutions, capable of using legal instruments and advanced technologies to deliver territorial justice through transformative public policies. Territorial injustice is associated with various forms of unfairness: • It is unfair to tolerate territorial injustice when it could have been foreseen and preventively avoided. • It is unfair to leave avoidable environmental harm unpunished. • It is unfair to endure environmental damage when ecological restoration of ecosystems is possible, restoring social peace as well. • It is unfair to allow negotiations between the offender and the highly vulnerable victims that lead to nonequitable outcomes. • It is unfair to take decisions without hearing the victim’s voices and considering their opinions. To counteract territorial injustice, institutions are required to act, predicting risks, punishing infringements, reconciling parties, mediating, or arbitrating disputes, redistributing wealth, dialoguing with stakeholders. Strong institutions must use legal instruments to effectively apply preventive justice avoiding, from the beginning, the territorial overlap of vulnerable populations and dangerous or environmental unhealthy installations. Strong institutions impose retributive justice towards those who are responsible for the malfunctioning of activities that were supposed to function properly.

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Strong institutions guarantee restorative justice for the ecosystems, and for humans, when environmental damage eventually occurs, with or without fault of the economic operator. Strong institutions ensure commutative justice, supervising direct negotiations between the operator and the victims of territorial injustice. Strong institutions provide distributive justice, using public money and wider access to public services to compensate the victims of territorial injustice. Strong institutions deliver procedural justice by instituting the necessary conditions for public participation to happen, to be considered in public decision-making and to influence public policies. In an ideal society, there should be no serious social inequalities. In an ideal economy, there should be no severe environmental pollution nor hazardous facilities. In the real world, while there is no paradigm shift, territorial injustice should at least be prevented.

Conclusion Striving for territorial justice requires strong institutions, awareness of territorial inequities, and capable of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, as advocated by sustainable development Goal 16: “the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.” Yet, working for territorial justice will contribute to the progress towards the first indicator for SDG 16: “significantly reduce all forms of violence everywhere.” Why? Because territorial injustice is a form of slow violence. Besides, preventing territorial injustice is fighting social exclusion and mitigating social conflicts while respecting the rule of law.

Cross-References ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Local Governance ▶ Restorative Justice

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Strong Institutions for Territorial Justice ILO - International Labour organization (2008) Declaration on social justice for a fair globalization, ninety-seventh session, Geneva, 10 June. https://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-dgreports/%2D% 2D-cabinet/documents/genericdocument/wcms_ 371208.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2020 IMPEL - The European Union Network for the implementation and enforcement of environmental law (2007) Establishing neighbourhood dialogue. Toolkit. Brussels. https://www.impel.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/08/2007-01-neighbourhood-dialogueTOOLKIT.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2020 Jankowska M, Pawełczyk M (eds.) (2014) Geoinformation law and practice, PolskaFundacjaPrawaKonkurencji Warsaw. http://iip.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ Geoinformation.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2020 Jendrośka J, Bar M (2017) Procedural environmental rights: principle X in theory and practice. European Environmental Law Forum Series, Intersentia (4) Krämer L (2018) The principle of fighting environmental harm at source. In: Principles of environmental law, Elgar encyclopaedia of environmental law series. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 186–194 Krieger N, Dorling D, McCartney G (2012) Mapping injustice, visualizing equity: why theory, metaphors and images matter in tackling inequalities. Public Health 126(3):256–258. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. puhe.2012.01.028. Accessed 29 July 2020 Kyiv Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Espoo Convention (2003). https://www.unece.org/ fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/pro tocolenglish.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2020 McCrudden C (ed) (2014) Understanding human dignity. Oxford University Press, Oxford Min E, Gruen D, Banerjee D, Echeverria T, Freelander L, Schmeltz M, Saganić E, Piazza M, Galaviz VE, Yost M, Seto EYW (2019) The Washington state environmental health disparities map: development of a community-responsive cumulative impacts assessment tool. Int J Environ Res Public Health 16(22):4470. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16224470 Moreno-Pires S (2014) Sustainability indicators. Encyclopedia of quality of life and well-being research. Springer, Dordrecht Nixon R (2011) Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor. Harvard University Press. https:// southwarknotes.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/slowviolence-and-the-environmentalism-of-the-poor.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2020 Pescaroli G (2018) Perceptions of cascading risk and interconnected failures in emergency planning: implications for operational resilience and policy making. Int J Disaster Risk Reduct 30(B):269–280. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.01.019. Accessed 29 July 2020 Pirie G (1983) On spatial justice. Environ Plan A Econ Space 15:465–473. https://doi.org/10.1068/a150465. Accessed 29 July 2020 Rauhut D (2017) A note on territorial justice. In: 57th conference of the European Regional Science

Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Meta-governance Association, Groningen, the Netherlands, 29th August, 1st September. https://www.researchgate.net/publica tion/319443258_A_Note_on_Territorial_Justice. Accessed 29 July 2020 Rechtschaffen C (2010) Strategies for implementing the environmental justice vision. Golden Gate Univ Environ Law J 1(2) August Pacific Region Edition https:// digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article¼1015&context¼gguelj. Accessed 29 July 2020 Regulation on environmental management and auditing scheme - Regulation (EU) 2018/2026 of 19 December 2018. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri¼CELEX:32018R2026&from¼EN. Accessed 29 July 2020 Sadeleer N d (2002) Environmental principles: from political slogans to legal rules. Oxford University Press, Oxford Soja EW (2010) Seeking spatial justice. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Squintani L (2019) Beyond minimum harmonisation: gold-plating and green-plating of European environmental law. Cambridge University Press, New York Taylor DE (2000) The rise of the environmental justice paradigm. Injustice framing and the social construction of environmental discourses. Am Behav Scientist 43(4):508–580 Tobler W (1970) A computer movie simulating urban growth in the detroit region. Economic geography supplement: proceedings. International Geographical Union. Commission on Quantitative Methods (46):234–240 UN HRC - United Nations Human Rights Council (2017) Resolution 34/20 on Human rights and the environment, adopted on 24 March. https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/085/99/PDF/ G1708599.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 29 July 2020 UN HRC - United Nations Human Rights Council (2018a) Resolution 37/8 on Human rights and the environment, adopted on 22 March. https://documents-dds-ny.un. org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/099/17/PDF/G1809917. pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 29 July 2020 UN HRC - United Nations Human Rights Council (2018b) Resolution 72/305 on the strengthening of the Economic and Social Council, adopted on 23 July https:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/1636799. Accessed 29 July 2020 UN SRHRE- United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Environment (2020) A/HRC/45/53 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, 24 February to 20 March. https://undocs.org/en/A/ HRC/43/53. Accessed 29 July 2020 Vanderheiden S (ed.) (2016) Environmental justice, the library of essays on justice, second series. Routledge, Abingdon WCD – World Commission on Dams (2010) Dams and development. A new framework for decision-making. The report of the world commission on dams. Earthscan Publications, London

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Strong, Transparent Public Institutions and Metagovernance Mohammed Asaduzzaman1 and Petri Virtanen2 1 Department of Public Administration, Islamic University, Kushtia, Bangladesh 2 University of Vaasa (Social and Health Management), Vaasa, Finland

Definition Institutions have a huge impetus to build strong and capable public policies and public organizations to fuel the notion of sustainable development. Accountable and inclusive institutions enable people to work together effectively and peacefully. Transparent institutions ensure equal rights for people and a chance to improve their lives as well as providing access to justice when they are wronged. Strong and transparent public institutions provide an important in measuring successful and unsuccessful states and societies. The development practitioners argue that good governance and the sustainable development of developing countries depends on their ability and willingness to strengthen the quality of their public institutions. Public institutions are thus vital platforms and strong vehicles for sustainable development. The quest for sustainable development will remain an elusive and merely theoretical notion unless priority is given to building institutional capacity and transparency. This entry intends to discuss the significance of strong public institutions in sustainable development in the light of meta-governance. For capable and strong

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public institutions and sustainable development, meta-governance has to be viewed as a vital theoretical platform. “Meta-governance” has been introduced in the discourses of development and governance since the late 1990s with the aim at promoting and enhancing governance network to achieve sustainable development. It is perceived as an answer to governance failures through enhancing accountability and transparency in governance networks, limiting the fragmentation of global sustainability governance, or successful governance of natural resource regions, among other things. Broadly, meta-governance can be defined as the governance of governance or to adopt the transition from “the logic of structures” to “the logic of flows” and refers to the need to steer how governing takes place. Considering its merits, we propose that “meta-governance” might have enormous consequence in building strong and transparent public institutions and thus promoting the notion of sustainable development.

Introduction We live in a time of leadership populism in public institutions. The meritocratic belief that “few are right and the rest are wrong” still pervades administrative elites even as “experts” are routinely undone by the “wickedness” of the problems facing them. This has led to a populist backlash in many countries, as the narrative of “common sense solutions” is deployed to replace expertise. Numerous examples can be used to illustrate this development – the UK Brexit referendum, the electoral victories of self-styled anti-establishment (and quite often antidemocratic) leaders throughout Europe and the World (e.g., Sanders 2019). The rise of populism is stress-testing public institutions globally. It is then reasonable to ask – as Ansell et al. (2017) have done – how do governments in general and public institutions in particular tackle enduring ambiguity and uncertainty in their systems and environments? Under this backdrop, the UN 2030 agenda emphasizes on peace, justice, and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions as the core of ensuring good governance and

sustainable development in developing countries. This entry is linked to the Sustainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16: peace, justice, and strong institutions) and we argue that meta-governance type of governance framework might be an alternative in order to overcome the present governance challenges and promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. In recent decades, there has been a massive paradigm shift both in the theory and practice of public administration and public institutions across the globe. The driving forces and factors of this paradigm shift are due to globalization, the diverging models of public service delivery, the development and innovation of information and communication technology, the increasing role of nongovernmental sector organizations in poverty alleviation and in ensuring the well-being and safety of citizens, the massive political and administrative corruption in postcolonial countries, and the failure of the centrally planned economy model. Reflecting on the developments in institutional economics, new institutionalism, and public sector management doctrines, this entry builds upon Hartley’s (2018: 212–213) notions of public leadership and the management of public institutions as a complex, contested, and physically grounded practice which is about mobilizing a wide variety of people, publics, and divergent interests. The context for public leadership and public institutions is complex and fast-changing and in order to understand it, sensitive antennae are needed to interpret the context for and among others. This is the point of departure for sensemaking – and in particular that kind of sensemaking which takes place through meta-governance and collective “making sense of things” among top civil servants and the leaders of public institutions. As a result, the theoretical focus of public administration has gradually shifted from traditional public administration to new public administration, new public management, new public governance, partnership administration, network governance, and meta-governance (Bourgon 2017; Greve 2015; Gjaltema et al. 2019; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Klijn and Edelenbos 2007).

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The central role of public administration is to provide effective and efficient public services to its citizen through strengthening the capacity of both central and local public institutions. For a better functioning society and safer planet, a friendly, inclusive, service-oriented, and contextual public administration is essential. Malfunctioning administrations or public institutions have enormous consequential impacts on governance ranging from corruption to poverty and terrorism. Weak and nontransparent public institutions can jeopardize the process of development and growth. The World Bank (2020) notes that strong institutions matter for reducing poverty and promoting environmental sustainability. Development policies are not implemented across the developing countries, partly due to the weak and incapable nature of public institutions. Institutions have a huge impetus to build strong and capable public policies and public organizations to fuel the notion of sustainable development. Effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions enable people to work together effectively and peacefully. Transparent institutions ensure equal rights for people and a chance to improve their lives as well as providing access to justice when they are wronged. Strong and transparent public institutions provide an important in measuring successful and unsuccessful states and societies. The policy makers, development practitioners, and international development agencies argue that good governance and the sustainable development of developing countries depends on their ability and willingness to strengthen the quality of their public institutions. Public institutions are thus vital platforms and strong vehicles to promote democracy, ensure good governance, and sustainable development in any society. The quest for sustainable development will remain an elusive and merely theoretical notion unless priority is given to building institutional capacity and transparency. Keeping the above contexts in mind, this contribution intends to discuss the significance of strong public institutions in sustainable development in the light of meta-governance. In the broader perspective, meta-governance has to be viewed as a vital theoretical platform for

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effective, efficient, capable, and strong public institutions. The entry is divided into five sections. After the introduction, the second section provides some theoretical background to the key concepts of public institutions, governance, and meta-governance. The third section concerns meta-governance and addresses the notion that meta-governance can be viewed as a mechanism to better govern public institutions. The fourth section discusses the nature of institutional change and the deployment of meta-governance dynamics in the evolution of public institutions. Conclusions and policy recommendations are discussed in the fifth and final section.

Public Institutions, Transparency, Governance, and Meta-governance This section presents the theoretical background to the key concepts related to the governance of public institutions. Depending on how public institutions are conceived from systems thinking perspective, the governance model can relate to governance (closed systems perspective) or metagovernance (open systems perspective). This contribution approaches public institutions from a broad perspective. Public institutions operate in the public sphere and domain. This point of departure introduces the need for transparency and public accountability. Overall, public institutions consist of democratic institutions (e.g., the parliament, the presidency, the judiciary, the comptroller, and national audit office), various public organizations (the police, government agencies, civil service, regional and local government authorities), economic institutions (e.g., national banks, finance commissions), and transnational organizations and donors (e.g., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the International Labour Organization). Noteworthy here is that major public organizations take on the qualities and characteristics of an institution as they become vessels for societal ambition, combining reliable performance with high levels of legitimacy and good service quality. Public institutions also embody the idea of impartiality which relates to a series of criticisms stemming from the fields

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of public administration, public choice, multiculturalism, and feminism. Overall, public institutions build upon the practices of democracy, the rule of law, and the effectiveness of public organizations (e.g., Boin and Christensen 2008; Goodin 1996). Public institutions are important for sustainable development for a number of reasons. For example, Uphoff (1992) lists the various benefits as follows: • For sustainable development, institutions, especially at local levels, are important for mobilizing resources and regulating their use with a view to maintaining a long-term base for productive activity. • Available resources can be put to their most efficient and sustainable use with location-specific knowledge, which is best generated and interpreted locally. • Monitoring changes in resources’ status can be quicker and less costly where local people are involved; making adaptive changes in resource use is speeded up where local decision-making has become institutionalized. • While local institutions are not always able to resolve resource management conflicts, if they are absent, all conflicts must be dealt with at higher levels, yielding slower and often less appropriate outcomes. • People’s behavior is conditioned by community norms and consensus, so preserving or instituting practices that are environmentally sound requires more than just individual incentives and persuasion. • Institutions encourage people to take a longerterm view by creating common expectations and a basis for cooperation that goes beyond individual interests. To the extent institutions are regarded as legitimate, people comply without (or with fewer) inducements and sanctions. Transparency is one of the central pillars of strong public institutions. It is seen as a prerequisite for and the underpinning of public trust and as a keystone of quality governance. Building citizen trust through transparent processes is vital for sustainable

development. Transparency refers to unfettered and easy access by the public to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance metrics in the public sector. Rational and trustworthy public services and collective decision-making lead public trust and create a level playing field for businesses, thus contributing to well-functioning markets and economic growth (Armstrong 2005). As a founding principle transparency has consequential impacts, for example, it encourages trust, trust promotes empowerment, empowerment supports participation, participation leads to inclusiveness, inclusiveness buttresses equality, peace, and justice, all of which are necessary for sustainable development. Joseph Stiglitz, recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001, has written about the possibilities and limitations of government: according to Stiglitz (1998), public institutions are part of the policy-process and policy-making is a dynamic process, with today’s decisions shaping options and coalitions in the future. Stiglitz (ibid.) makes a substantial point that secrecy – in contrast to transparency – makes explicit government failure from two perspectives. First, it makes it harder to establish credible commitments among decisions-makers and stakeholders. Those excluded by secrecy from the process feel fully justified in trying to change the outcomes of public policy or the performance of public institutions. Second, secrecy aggravates the problem of positional goods and destructive competition. This will lead to outcomes that promote further divergence between winners and losers. Making government processes more open, transparent, and democratic, with more participation and more effort to find consensus is likely to result not only in a process that is fairer but one with outcomes that are more likely to be in accord with the general interest and thus are for the benefit of society as a whole. Before conceptualizing governance, it is apposite to note that the terms “government” and “governance” are not same, although both share goal-oriented objectives. Simply, government occurs when those with legally and formally derived authority and policing power execute and implement activities. On the other hand, governance refers to the creation, execution, and

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implementation of activities backed by the shared goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have formal authority or policy-making power. Richards and Smith (2002) very clearly differentiated between the terms. To them, government is bureaucracy, legislation, financial control, regulation, and force, governance, on the other hand, refers more to a growing use of nonregulatory policy instruments. For Richard and Smith (ibid.), governance focuses attention towards proposed, designed, and implemented cooperation by non-state actors working together with state actors. More broadly, the concept of governance also relates to neoliberalism and the New Public Governance (NPG) and was designed to reflect the shift from hierarchical, vertical authority structures to diffuse, often horizontal or networked decision-making structures where hierarchy and authority were either absent or opaque. Overall, governance is a lucrative, growing, and dynamic idea. Its meaning is changing and moving fast around the discourse of public administration and development. According to Jessop (2002), governance is a polyvalent and poly-contextual concept and its meaning varies by context and it is being deployed for often quite contrary, though not plainly contradictory, purposes. Central to this theoretical debate is the question whether the governance notion can really provide a compelling theoretical entry point for the analysis of contemporary social transformation and transformative development or a compelling practical entry point for dealing with complexity. In addition, keeping alive all of its inherited dominant features (for example, bureaucratic and political elitisms and the politicization of public bureaucracy, weak electoral systems, weak taxation policy, massive corruption, environmental degradation, winner takes all, etc.), it should be asked whether governance is – as a concept – able to promote sustainable development, ensure peace and justice, and promote a better functioning society for future generations. Indeed, is it even deployable in understanding the operations and functions of public institutions in a complex world? These questions give rise to the need for a discussion on the concept of meta-governance in the discourse of governance as it relates to public institutions. Adopting a meta-governance approach

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seems to be one possible way (in response to governance failure) to fill the theoretical and practical gaps in the governance concept making it more constructive, effective, efficient, collaborative, and service-oriented, as understood from the perspective of public institutions. Meta-governance was introduced to describe a kind of counter tendency to the shift from government to governance, namely the shift from government to meta-governance, i.e., the “organisation of the conditions of self-organisation.” By definition, meta-governance refers to the management of global governance complexity and plurality linking a range of networks, partnerships, public and private actors, and the emergence of new models of economic, social, and political governance (Albareda and Waddock 2016). In addition, meta-governance is defined as “the governance of governance” (Peters 2010, see also Frasen 2015: 295–297). There is already plenty of support in the research literature for the meta-governance concept, suggesting that a broader view of governance is required. This is essential, firstly, because governance, in practice, fails in terms of numerous, often basic, governing tasks related to the issues outlined above on, for example, the lack of coordination, oversimplifying the problems to be governed, erratic inference about the contexts of the problems, and a misfit between the scale of the governance apparatus and the scale of the problems faced (Jessop 2011). Secondly, metagovernance is viewed as a response to the more specific challenges of nonhierarchical modes of governance (Peters 2009). According to Jessop (2011: 142) one of the leading proponents of the concept, “meta-governance involves a process of reflexive self-organisation of independent actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal interdependences,. . .based on continuing dialogue and resource sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations.” He (2011: 113–116) further identifies four modes of meta-governance such as: • Redesigning of markets so that incentives are better aligned and improve outcomes

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• Constitutional design innovations that adjust the mandate and scope for action of relevant parties • Redesigning of network relations so that interactions among relevant governing parties may become more efficient and effective • Interventions designed to promote trust, loyalty, and commitment among governing parties thus smoothing governance processes

Meta-governance and the Governance of Public Institutions Traditional public management paradigms – those of the New Public Management (NPM) and the New Public Governance (NPG) – do not “fit” easily into a discussion on the role of management and leadership in public institutions. The theory of meta-governance – or governance of governance – however focuses on how values, norms, and principles underpin governance systems and governing approaches as well as on how to deliberatively guide governance process in networks (e.g., Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Klijn and Edelenbos 2007). As noted previously, meta-governance is not a new phenomenon. It appeared for the first time in the public administration and political science literatures in the mid-1990s and has proliferated extensively during the last couple of decades. The early 1990s accounts of meta-governance were rather abstract and theoretical and lacked empirical grounding. In their seminal work on meta-governance, Gjaltema et al. (2019) contended that metagovernance should be perceived as an umbrella concept in the governance literature since metagovernance is often referred to in very general terms such as the governance of governance or the organization of self-organization. Gjaltema et al. (ibid.) define meta-governance as a practice, by (mainly) public authorities, that entails the coordination of one or more governance modes by using different instruments, methods, and strategies to overcome governance failures. The value of this definition is that it goes beyond the unproductive dichotomy in the “from government to governance” debate by introducing four different but somewhat overlapping types of meta-

governance: network meta-governance, multilevel meta-governance, meta-governance of multiplicity, and meta-governance of modes. All of these are relevant from the perspective of public institutions. These aforementioned meta-governance variants do “fit” with public institutions from the perspective of governing, managing, and leading and what is perhaps even interesting, they also go together with the various governing layers of public institutions (transnational, national, regional, and local). These four types of meta-governance are briefly discussed below (based on the theoretical and conceptual typology put forward by Gjaltema et al. 2019: 12–14; Jessop 2011): (I) First-order meta-governance models (which refers to governance within the public sphere): • TYPE 1: Network of meta-governance (governance network that comprises actors from multiple domains) – Example from the transnational level meta-governance of public institutions: United Nations’ donors working with regional and local authorities and communities to provide well-being and the conditions for reasonable living. – Example from the local-level meta-governance of public institutions: locallevel programs/projects/communities providing service delivery, aiming at contributing to enhanced well-being for local-level communities. • TYPE 2: Multilevel meta-governance (includes multiple active meta-governors from different levels of governance) – Example from the transnational level meta-governance of public institutions: the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). – Example from the national level metagovernance of public institutions: national level state administration authorities (e.g., ministries) deploying performance management and fiscal control for local communities and municipalities. – Example from the local-level metagovernance of public institutions:

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local-level authorities and decisionmakers organizing public service delivery for service users. • TYPE 3: Meta-governance of multiplicity (meta-governance aims to control and manage the networks of networks) – Example from the national/regional/ local-level meta-governance of public institutions: national state administration organizations (e.g., line ministries at the level of central administration) mobilizing, coordinating and controlling different actors at lower levels of governance in – for instance – implementing social policy programs. (II) Second-order meta-governance models (which refers to governing actors from all possible societal sectors, based on multiple interactions and market building): • TYPE 4: Meta-governance of modes (by the public meta-governor seeking to balance hierarchical, market and network governance). – Example from the transitional level meta-governance of public institutions: the European Union (EU) and its key stakeholders (members of trade unions, lobby organizations) as the harmonizer of EU Member States prosperous development in balancing social and economic development dimensions for collective good). – Example from the national/regional/ local-level meta-governance of public institutions: State administration organizations affecting market building in putting together through policy instruments (juridical, information-based, and resource-based) policy ecosystems of various kinds for regional- and local-level development purposes.

Moreover, the aforementioned definition by Gjaltema et al. (ibid.) is important in the sense that it makes visible the distinctions between public institutions and institutions that are self-assembled or as networks outside the domain of the public sector.

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Also noteworthy here is the fact that the meta-governance dimension introduces human agency to institutions as well as the aspect of cooperation and collective sensemaking – i.e., how institutions evolve through leadership and management, concepts that are embedded in the governing structures of institutions (see, e.g., Jessop 2002; Roe 2020). Finally, there are, nevertheless, some important limitations in terms of the meta-governance concept when leadership skills in institutions and leadership development tools are considered as the key mechanisms to maintain and further develop the capabilities of human agency in institutions. The usefulness of the concept of metagovernance in making explicit the evolution of institutions and especially, generic leadership skills (meta-skills) comes close to Jessop (2002), who approaches the idea of governance structures and asks whether governance can provide a compelling theoretical entry point for analyzing contemporary social transformation and leadership in institutions (see also Tammeaid et al. 2020).

Dynamic Meta-governance Mechanisms Contribute to Institutional Change Meta-governance is a relevant approach from the perspective of public institutions because public institutions evolve over time. Meta-governance is a dynamic mechanism that contributes to institutional change. Douglass C North, co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, has also addressed this dynamic mechanism issue on the changing role of institutions. North (1991: 97) writes: “Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange (. . .) [The Institutions] evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story” (see also North 1993, 2005). According to Bush (1987: 1075), institutional economics is evolutionary by nature because it has the capacity to explain the

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phenomenon of institutional change and because it incorporates the principles of that explanation in both theoretical and practical inquiry. North looks at institutional change from the perspective of institutional economics. Classical institutional economics (starting from the first part of the twentieth century, understands the economy as a result of the complex interaction of various institutions, e.g., individuals, companies, civil society, state authorities) and new institutionalism (during the latter half of the twentieth century stressing the role of behavioral science as a sensemaking kaleidoscope in understanding the logic of institutions) conceive of the evolution of institutions in a way that once created, they (public institutions) change over time. According to institutional economics and its scientific variants, no institution can be untouched by change regardless of how we interpret the functional logic of institutions. Institutions can be operable as closed systems and if so, then change occurs because of indigenous factors and through the process of organizational learning. Understood from the perspective of open systems, institutions evolve through the process of adaptation to not only indigenous but also, to a great extent, to exogenous factors also which link institutions to a web of systems in which they function and constantly create and re-create their position towards other societal agencies. According to Kingston and Caballero (2009), different institutional change models conceive institutional evolution from different perspectives: Some of the theories emphasize the deliberate creation of institutions through the political process while others emphasize the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary processes. According to Streeck and Thelen (2005), there are four (ideal) types of institutional change (see also, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15–29): • Displacement (the removal of existing rules and codes of action and the introduction of new ones) • Layering (the introduction of new rules and codes of action on top of or alongside existing ones) • Drift (the changed impact of existing rules and codes of action due to shifts in the institutional environment)

• Conversion (the changed enactment of existing rules and codes of action to their strategic redeployment) Public institutions and public administration promote societal stability which is an important factor in this age of turmoil and shocks. Sondermann (2016), for instance, found that there is evidence that sound labor and product markets, framework conditions, and political institutions increase societal resilience in terms of adverse shocks and reduce the incidence of economic crisis more generally. In the presence of a common shock, a country with weaker economic structures can, on average, suffer up to twice the output loss in a given year compared to those countries with more stable and resilient institutions. A relevant issue here is in fact the framework for explaining why institutional changes occur: according to Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 14–15), these decisive factors include characteristics of political context (as exogenous drivers) and characteristics of institutions per se (as indigenous drivers) (see also Greif and Laitin 2004). Regardless of the manifested institutional stability, change is, however, an immanent aspect in the life courses of institutions. It is also important to understand that institutional change derives its origins from institutional analysis, since the leading approaches to institutional analysis – sociological institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism – emphasize the role of different indigenous and exogenous factors in addressing the nature of institutional change. Regardless of the approach to institutional analysis, the presence of change is, however, manifested in the evolution of institutions. Conceptually, changes can be incremental or radical. The difference between these types of change relates to the timespan of changes (slow vs. quick) and the level of pervasiveness (piecemeal vs. total) of the changes. • Incremental changes are by nature slow and piecemeal and they can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior and shaping substantive political outcomes. The theory of gradual institutional change aspires to develop causal propositions that pinpoint the sources

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and origins of institutional change and asks what properties of institutions permit change to take place and what kind of change strategies are deployed in implementing change activities (e.g., Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 2– 4, 7–8). The value of gradual institutional change theory is that it conveys the idea that institutional change and the stability of institutions are inextricably linked. This is because there is seldomly anything automatic, self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements and processes. According to Mahoney and Thelen (ibid.), gradual institutional change theory addresses the fact that a dynamic component is always present in institutions. This is because institutional coalition dynamics are based on human behavior, cognitive biases, institutional contradictions, human praxis, and collective sensemaking, which bring about shifts and changes – i.e., instability (see also Seo and Douglas Creed 2002). • Radical changes take place over a short period of time and, by definition, are pervasive in nature. Radical institutional change can take place due to indigenous or exogenous factors within the institution or within the system comprised of various institutions. Radical change theory in respect of institutions derives its origins to a great extent from models of business process reengineering which became popular during the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Hammer and Champy 1993). The aforementioned approaches to understanding institutional change and theories about change are based on organizational theory – i.e., seeing institutions as organizations. A complementary approach is provided Roland (2004) who writes about culture as a “slow-moving” institution and political institutions as “fast-moving” institutions. Culture – manifested in values, beliefs, and social norms – changes reasonably slowly, whereas political institutions – and political systems (e.g., the decline of communism during late 1980s) – can change relatively quickly, sometimes almost overnight. In an organizational context, institutional change does not take place by itself nor does it

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occur in a vacuum. Institutional change is implemented through change management methods and can be conceived of through change management theories. The main approaches to change management theory can be found in the seminal works of Kurt Lewin, Edgar Schein, Chris Argyris, and Peter Senge (see, e.g., Cooke 1999; Mento et al. 2002). In recent decades, the complex nature of society and operating environments as well as the existence of complex and socalled “wicked” problems have brought about new approaches and conceptual tools highlighting the role of collective learning and sensemaking in tackling these problems thus contributing to more intense cooperation between institutions (e.g., Styhre 2002; Cilliers 1998; Virtanen and Tammeaid 2020).

Conclusions Overall, meta-governance is not a panacea, nor it is a magical silver bullet that overcomes the problems of market and state failure as well as the dysfunctionalities of public institutions without creating its own problems. Instead, each form of coordination of complex reciprocal interdependence has a distinctive primary form of failure together with typical secondary forms of failure. Meta-governance can be seen as a reflexive and responsive process through which a range of legitimate and resourceful actors aim to combine, facilitate, shape, and direct particular forms of governance in accordance with specific rules, procedures, and standards (e.g., Sörensen and Torfing 2009). At its best, meta-governance helps public institutions discursively and politically frame their operations and agendas, to design and redesign public institutions to facilitate change and engage different stakeholders, to facilitate networks to take action at different levels of government (transnational, national, regional, and local), and to take overall action in network constellations to influence goal attainment and coordinating actions. Although meta-governance can be conceived as a response to governance failure and to alleviating the dysfunctionalities of public institutions, this notion has not gone unchallenged. Each mode

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of meta-governance, outlined above, displays both threats and weaknesses. To take an example, market reform might not be possible due to the scarcity of resources in developing countries or – alternatively – weakly regulated and poorly implemented taxation policy plus massive corruption may lead to market failure. Power sharing is also a big issue in semi-feudalistic societies or in postcolonial countries and thus it is difficult to establish effective networks among the various stakeholders thus jeopardizing the process of trust building. Compared to the traditional mode of administration and governance, however, meta-governance has more scope (and scholarship backing) to make governance responsive, effective, accountable, transparent, and trustworthy. Each of these factors in turn leads us towards the destination of sustainable development and good governance – even though that it is somewhat unclear still whether “good governance” is an empirical category or is it a political or politicized theory. Due to the various situational contexts and governance challenges, each of the 17 SDGs requires differentiated governance contexts at all levels. In addition, it is not enough to use just one governance theory, only hierarchical, network, or market governance; there is a need to an apply adequate combination of theories. All 17 SDGs are interconnected and, by design “indivisible” and while some of the connected governance challenges are common, they have their own typical challenges. Their complexity and the difference in governance contexts in the countries in which the SDGs are to be implemented cannot be addressed without a broad governance concept and the use of the full meta-governance toolbox in general. The emergence of successful governance depends on managing plurality with the aim of inducing more coherence, while remaining sensitive to different social values, administrative cultures, traditions, and norms in a society. Thus the application of meta-governance enables much faster progress, primarily because it takes into consideration national, subnational, and local specificities (e.g., Meuleman 2020). In particular, meta-governance will promote to achieve SDG-16 through the establishment of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels in developing countries. Building strong and just institutions are important for reducing corruption

and promoting participatory decision-making at all levels in support of peaceful and inclusive societies around the world by 2030. However, it depends on the degree of open-mindedness, awareness of the current problems, reflexive thinking, adequate flexibility, and willingness to innovate of the state and public sector organizations. Finally, this entry sets out a number of possibilities for future research in understanding the coordination mechanisms of meta-governance in running and orchestrating public institutions. These include, first, the more detailed empirical scrutiny of the use and role of leadership incorporated into the dynamics of meta-governance. Secondly, reciprocal dialogue between various levels of meta-governance merits more empirical research. Third, the accountability aspects of meta-governance in understanding the levels and dimensions of accountability in a framework of multiple actors and polyphonic agency remain obscure (e.g., Koppell 2005).

Cross-References ▶ Capacity Building ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Cross- and Trans-institutional Collaboration to Support Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability ▶ Political Pluralism to Address the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Transparent Governments, Social Innovation, and Their Role in Achieving the SDGs

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Sustainability ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

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three kinds of oppressive strategies: the spatial displacement, the spatial exclusion, and spatial confinement. The spatial displacement due to oppression is defined by UNHCR as “displacement resulting from persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violation” (UNHCR 2014). It can either be the internal displacement within the national border or the external migration of refugees across the borders. In line with this definition, geographical perspective addresses the systemic and institutionalized nature of oppression in displacements which mostly results from failure of strong political, cultural, social, and legal institutions. The United Nations HCR defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR 1967). Refugees who have the right to seek for legally defined protection from a host country differ from an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) who is displaced within the national boundaries (UNHCR 1967).

▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices

Introduction

Systemic Oppression and Geographical Dispositions Jithin Joseph1, C. J. Binesh2 and P. S. Sarathlal3 1 Department of English Studies, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India 2 Department of Social Work, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India 3 Department of Economics, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, India

Definitions The geography of oppression is a critical perspective which explores the dynamic spatial/geographical context of various forms of oppression. The geography of oppression mainly deals with

United Nations development Program highlights the SDG 16, promotes peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provides access to justice for all, and builds effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels (UNSG 2015), as one of the major strategies to address and tackle the various forms of oppression in the society. After the completion of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2015, SDG specifically the “Goal 16” was constituted with the view that in the context of a decline in Global Peace Index and 70 million refugees around world, a strong intervention is required on changing and surging forms and structures of oppression in the contemporary society. The UN also reiterated that “the rule of law and development have a significant interrelation and are mutually reinforcing, making it essential for sustainable development” (UNSG 2015). In line with the SDG goals, “leave

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no one behind,” UN places all sorts of conflicts which result in various forms of displacements in a frame of oppression that challenges the fulfillment of SDGs by 2030. Oppression as a generic term in the discourse of social sciences has been defined and explored in diverse ways. But, a spatial perspective of oppression has evolved only in the twentieth century, with a “spatial turn” which Michael Foucault identified as the beginning of an “epoch of space” (Foucault 1984). Edward Soja, the most prominent spatial theorist of the twenty-first century and renowned geographer, also argued that the reassertion of space, especially, outside the disciplinary confinements of geography, urbanism, and architecture, will help to understand oppression on various levels as either related to a systemic operation causing geographical displacements or addressing issues of “spatial Justice” (Soja et al. 2010). According to Soja’s critical social theory, spatial justice appeared more politically practical and inclusive, a basis for creating a new and more cohesive coalition among highly diverse groups and social movements . . .over gender issues, sexual preferences, racial issues, and environment (Soja et al. 2010). Spatial justice and a spatial perspective of oppression becomes much relevant when major crises such as wars and pandemics initiate a large-scale unprecedented displacement of people which induces poverty, violence, exploitation, trafficking, and death all over the world. When considering the large-scale geographical dispositions, internal displacements, and external migration of refugees, which have caused the displacement of 68.5 million people and made 10 million people stateless around world, it is found inevitable for the nations and governments to access the spatial perspective of oppression to implement and respond to the United Nations’ call for SDGs. SDG 16 with an inherent spatial perspective specifically addresses the larger context of violence created by spatial displacement. Insofar as the SDG 16 is concerned about the geographical displacements on various levels, a spatial analysis will unveil the inherent connection between an oppressive system and its spatiality or geography which results in spatial

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exclusion, spatial eradication, or spatial confinement of people. Spatial observation on oppressions such as “Holocaust” and Vietnam War or the political insurgencies in Middle East has already derived much proof on this interconnectedness between space and oppression, and the socio-psychological impact it creates. Lewi Stone, in his article titled Quantifying the Holocaust, studied the spatial perspective of Holocaust and argued that the correlation between the Nazi’s people transmission system of Jews and the locations of Concentrations camps had a proactive influence on the increasing killing rate of Jews during the Second World War (Stone 2019). Stone’s correlative analysis between locations of massacre and spatial transmission system proves that the systemic oppression of Nazis had a spatial aspect which immensely amplified the effect of oppression. However, oppression has turned out to be quite dynamic in the present world. According to Edward Soja, nearly four decades of economic restructuring and neoliberal globalization have generated enormous inequalities and injustices which require spatial strategies to analyze (Soja et al. 2010). In analyzing oppressive systems and oppression of this sort, Soja suggests the theory of “Production of Space” by Henry Lefebvre which for a first explained the spatiality of oppression and’ spatial production of social spaces’ in the urbanity (Lefebvre 1991). With his theory, Lefebvre mainly raised four propositions on the spatiality of human life (1) spatial practice as movements “involving the segregation of certain kinds of constructed spaces and their linkages through human movement” (1991). Lefebvre converts the geography into categories through naming and customizing with imagination. (2) The process of creating a personalized environment consists of all sorts of social and cultural spaces including secret and personal spaces, and home. (3) The spatial practices of an individual are also deeply interlinked with his/her domestic culture, religion, and various socializing agencies. (4) Every system and person is needed to produce its own social spaces to survive in this world (1991). At large, Lefebvre’s propositions are found to be much similar to the eight dimensions

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of SDGs proposed by the United Nations to ensure holistic well-being by 2030. However, when it comes to oppression, Lefebvre’s argument raised the logic that the oppressive system primarily takes control of the spatial practice of the people through spatial exclusion or spatial confinement to restrict the process of spatial production. At present, this type of systemic operation is widely observable in global and regional levels as spatial displacement of refugees in the Middle East and South East Asian regions surges. In the light of these events, the SDG’s call for international rule of law, rights of refugees, international peace and prosperity, and protection from violence against children has a spatial disposition to consider. The theoretical insights discussed so far have derived new directions to identify and analyze the spatial implications of systemic oppressions happening in the world today. Accordingly, the most dominant spatial movements resulting from systemic oppression are the movement of refugees and internally displaced people in the middle-east and other politically unstable regions.

Refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP): An Enduring Concern for the UN Sustainable Development Goals War as a Systemic Oppression Moving toward the SDG with 17 goals and 169 targets, the world today considers the crisis of the displaced people as the most alarming and surging problem to deal with. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) in its recent report pointed out that 70.8 million refugees are accommodated worldwide as the flow continues to rise in the coming years (UN 2020). There are numerous accounts of problems related to refugees and their spatial displacement in the history around the world. In general, Jews, who faced a massive displacement of about 3.8 million people in the twentieth century alone, top this list (Tolts 2010). Slave trade was another significant and enduring spatial displacement in the history in which the transatlantic slave trade alone convoyed 12.5 million Africans to the United States (Eltis

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2018). The current form of displacement began at large scale in the first half of the twentieth century with the rise of civil wars and political crisis in the decolonized states resulting in a massive number of spatial displacements around the world. In response to that, on December 14, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly established The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee with a 3-year mandate which later continued to work on the issues of refugees. UNHCR, in order to understand the various dimensions of oppression faced by a refugee, attempted to form a comprehensive definition of a refugee which identified a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR 1967). This definition highlights two specific aspects of displacement: the cause of oppression and forceful geographical displacement. The cause, as it is quite evident and specifically mentioned by the UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette in Ottava 1998, is violence instigated by wars of different sorts (UN 1998). The studies of UNESCO also reiterate that the most common factor for the refugee flows in Asia, Latin America, and Africa is armed conflict which can be either in the form of a war or a civil war (UNESCO 2019). Confirming this fact, the recent report of UNHCR reveals that 57% of refugees are mainly from three war-hit nations: Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan (UN 2020). These data strongly substantiate the correlative between spatial displacement and armed conflicts which, until recent times, was not studied as a systemic oppression. But, recent studies under SDG and their challenges on growing war-led insurgencies and political instabilities in Middle Eastern countries and Africa have helped to bring static attention to the systemic operation of war and its resultant spatial displacements. As the world witnesses a steep rise in armed conflicts and terrorist interventions which, as mentioned above, quite often accompany wars, the UN has intentionally constituted the SDG 16 which stands to instigate universal peace and justice within a targeted period of 15 years. The SDG 16 attempts

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to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UNSG 2015). However, the first phase of the project has had to face a number of setbacks as the Global Peace Index reported decline in the 6th consecutive year with a 0.34% decrease in the year 2020 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2020). It also reported a sharp hike in the civil unrest in major countries with a heightened atmosphere of polarization among people. Taking the extent of the problems, SDG, apart from the MDG, has been dealing with the root causes of conflicts and poverty with the help of various national and international partners. Pertaining to SDG 16’s emphasis on the major drivers of conflict, and the Middle East being the hotspot of insurgencies, Prof. Yannis A. Stivachtis in his study, Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East, describes the systematic operations behind the wars in the Middle East as driven by two domineering political influences. The first one is the political structures in the Middle East which he names as “political structures of anarchy” that wage the devastating civil wars in the Middle East (Stivachtis 2018). He explains that these political structures have an inner state inter- relation which, according to the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) of Barry Buzan, is “as complex as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Wæver et al. 1997). This peculiar nature of political structures in the Middle East explains the rationale behind similarities in the systemic nature of civil war and oppression in the region. The second political influence named by Yannis is the external influences of foreign countries which have a long, but, quite intimidating history since the postwar period. Until the disintegration of the USSR, both the United States and USSR along with their allies controlled the course of the Middle East politically, economically, and to a certain extent culturally (the Russian influence in Afghan and the American influence in Iran during the Shah rule) (Stivachtis 2018). But After the 1990s, the military strength of the United States

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has dominated the gulf which monitored wellstructured wars in Afghan and Iraq and at present fights against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with NATO. The Washington Post reported that the United States had deployed 170,300 soldiers in different military bases in Iraq alone in 2007 during the Iraq war (Berger 2020). The assumption is that when the issues of refugees are addressed on a common ground, both political influences remain affecting the flow of refugees and the oppression it engendered. Moreover, the international influence in the war also suggests the inevitability of implementing SDG 16 by all countries as the prerequisite of all other SDGs. With the increase in the number of internal conflicts and wars, the United Nations has channelized its operations through various bodies. Currently, the UN runs 13 peacekeeping operations with 110,000 volunteers around the world (UN Peacekeeping 2020). Even though SDG 16 places significant reduction of all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere as its first target, the issues of refugees and its operation forces raise a great threat. Major Refugee Flows After the Second World War The second Congo war, also called the first world war of Africa, is considered as the significant forerunner of the deadliest wars of the twentyfirst century. When the war began in 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo was hosting over 527,000 refugees with women and children 50% of them from the neighboring civil-war-affected countries (UNHCR 2020b). Ruanda’s 1994 genocide alone had brought 1.2 million refugees to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both of these early displacements which remain unsettled for decades are considered to be budding violence and uncertainties in the Mid-African regions today. In a positive note, in the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 2019, Congo’s Voluntary national review suggested that the government in office has adopted six of the SDGs including SDG 16 with higher priority to implement as a part of national plan (HLPF 2019). The Syrian Civil war, which came with the waves of the Arab Spring, began as a response

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against the rule of President Bashar al-Assad, and it turned out to be amplifying the momentum of political insurgencies in the neighboring states and laid ground for the militant regimes such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and ISIS. The latest UN figures show that the population in Syria has shriveled to just 16.6 million, down from a prewar level of around 22 million (The Economist 2015). With 5.6 million refugees abroad, at least 6.6 million are internally displaced people, approximately half the country’s population (UNHCR 2020c). The Syrian Civil war which began in full swing in 2011 was a major blow to the MDG that strived to alleviate global poverty. Moreover, this war was also a strong factor to constitute SDG with a comprehensive emphasis on dealing with conflicts and its impulses. The war against Saddam’s regime in Iraq led by the United States was another stimulator of refugees’ flow which, as per the data by United Nation, created 3 million refugees and 360,000 internally displaced people (UNHCR 2020d). UNHCR also reported that in 2018, 6.5m people including vulnerable sections such as women required protection and rehabilitation in Iraq (UNHCR 2020e). According to Amnesty International, The Afghan war was second in position after Syria to contribute approximately 2.1 million refugees and 2 million displaced people (Amnesty International 2019). In the South-East Asian region, in Myanmar, the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State of Myanmar faced a stinging communal violence in mid-2017 and fled to Bangladesh and other neighboring countries such as India and Nepal. According to UNHCR, the latest exodus which began on 25th August 2017 has carried a population of 742,000 people out of the state to Bangladesh (UNHCR 2020f). The Kutupalong refugee settlement in the Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh is the largest of this kind with approximately 600,000 people accommodated in the area of 13 square kilometers (UNHCR 2020f). The UNHCR’s data on consolidated statistics of refugees in the world states that 60 million people around the world are either refugees in various countries or internally displaced within

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the Arab region (Yahya and Muasher 2018). The spatial displacement which most often leads to poverty, denial of freedom and safety, sexual and physical abuses, traumas, vulnerability to health conditions, dismissal of nationality, and such innumerable issues poses huge challenges for the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 at large. Thus, the effective implementation of SDG demands a thorough understanding of the nuances of spatial displacement in various contexts. In such an understanding, the life of a refugee seems to pass through three different stages. The first stage begins with a conflict which leads to forceful eviction of people toward the shelter country. In the second stage, refugees are settled in the host country for an uncertain period of time. The third one can be either the forceful return of the refugee to homeland or rehabilitation after subsiding the cause of displacement. These conditions apply to the internal displacement also. The oppression faced by refugees in these referred stages not only gives a better picture on the spatiality of oppressions but also puts light upon how the developed, developing, and underdeveloped nations approach this crisis in the context of SDGs. The First Stage of Spatial Displacement: The Origin of Conflict and the Relevance of SDG 16 As mentioned above, in the first stage, the forceful exclusion of people from homeland is mainly triggered by conflicts (civil war, war, or communal violence) operated generally in the level of the political system. The world Economic Forum identifies the continuous failure of political institutions in the Middle East as a major threat to the peace and prosperity of the region (WEF 2015). It argues that the lack of stable and willful governance in the Middle East has discouraged the UN from implementing the significant UN Security Council resolution 242 and SDG which included major suggestions to recuperate peace through diplomacy. Considering the demographic nature of oppression in the Middle East, statistics shows the minorities are the most-affected subjects in this chaos. According to Albert Hourani, the minorities in the middle east are mainly those communities that differ from Sunni Arab majority

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that include the sections of people such as Copts and orthodox Christians in Egypt, heterodox Islamic sects such as Shias, Alawis, and ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Druze, Yazidis, etc. From Southeast Asia, the Rohingya in Myanmar also fits in this list (Hourani 1947). The United Nations with the consensus of its partnering nations called on this global scenario of violence against the minorities and constituted the Minority Declaration in 1992 which drew international standards and guidelines for refugees concerns (OHCHR 2020). Considering the displaced minorities in the twenty-first century, specifically in the context of the Middle East, reports state that the Yazidis in Syria and Iraq have witnessed the epoch’s worst exploitation and displacement. According to The Guardian, Yazidis, one of the smallest ethnically Kurdish groups inhabiting mainly in Iraq (500,000) and Syria (12,000–15,000), have faced more than 72 genocides in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alone (Jalabi 2014). The most recent attack on Yazidis was in Iraq by ISIS which captured the Yazidi-populated city of Sinjar on 3 August 2014. The abduction of Sinjar by ISIS Caliphate triggered a rapid flood of around 50,000 people, mostly Yazidis, to the nearest Sinjar Mountains. Under the political system of ISIS, Yazidi women faced heinous oppression of sexual slavery and forceful conversion. According to the Yazidi Endowment in Kurdistan, out of 6,000 people disappeared or kidnaped by ISIL, only a few have returned (Higel 2016). OHRC/UNAMI reported that, by the end of August, ISIS has abducted around 2,500 Yazidis, mostly women and children (OHCHR and UNAMI 2014). Minority Rights Organization also reported that vulnerable sections such as women and children were subjected to adverse exploitations under the ISIS system, that women were either enslaved or forced into marriages, and that children were recruited for combats (Higel 2016). Stating the UN statistics, The Telegraph reported in August 2014 that “ISIL had detained 5,000 to 7,000 Yazidi women as slaves or forced brides in northern Iraq in August 2014” (Spencer 2014). Forceful conversion was another oppressive practice conducted by ISIS on the abducted Yazidis.

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According to Washington Post, about “70,000 Yazidis had been forced to convert to the Islamic State group’s harsh interpretation of Islam” (Washington Post 2014). After facing excruciating oppression from all sorts of institutions, one of the Yazidi public officials in Baghdad stated that the Yazidi community has lost all trust in politics, whether Iraqi or Kurdish. This statement fairly confirms the horrifying nature of the systemic and institutionalized oppression faced by Yazidis in the Middle East. The despondency of the minorities on political institutions is also suggestive of a greater demand to implement a global framework like SDG 16 which promises “peace, justice and strong institutions” for a better world by 2030. The United Nations through its various institutions such as WHO, OHCHR, and UNAMI has been prudently observing the situations in the Middle East and called for international interventions on matters concerning these disastrous displacements. In line with the SDG goals, the UN under the Human Rights Council constituted an Independent International Commission to investigate the violations of international law in the Syrian conflict since 2011. The commission also invited the attention of the International Court of Justice into the issues of Yazidies which has conducted discussions on the possibilities in bringing the Syrian war crimes into the International Court of Justice (UN News 2017). The UN also played a role in the London Quartet meeting, 2019, on Syria which was hosted by Germany and included France, Britain, and Turkey to gain support on forming a Syrian constitutional committee. The Istanbul Quartet also suggested a promising union of various international political systems to make constructive solutions on various problems in the Middle East. Rohingya Muslims as mentioned earlier had already been facing political and geographical exclusion for centuries. Rohingya displacement caught the world’s attention in two ways. First of all, Rohingya are minorities in a Buddhist state of Myanmar, and oppression against them is overtly understood as the systemic oppression against minorities. Second, in Myanmar, most of the Rohingya do not have citizenship or legal identity. UNICEF assumes that the displacement would

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potentially make them a lost generation without a nation to return to (UNICEF 2020). The Human Rights Council’s Report of The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar states that they have found evidence of institutionalized oppression including “extrajudicial killings; gang rapes; arson of Rohingya villages, businesses, and schools; and infanticides” (Human Rights Council 2018). The statistics confirm that the beginning of the Refugees movement in Myanmar is mainly amplified by state-sponsored violence in which the military and state machineries extensively took part. This tyranny is globally considered as a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. The United Nations identified Rohingya issues as one of the major humanitarian crises in South-East Asia in the twenty-first century that challenges the drive toward SDG 2030. As an immediate reaction, the UN and its allies formed a Joint Response Plan and raised funds to meet the urgent requirements of the refugees. The UN along with other cohosts, the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom, conducted a Rohingya Conference in 2020 “to gather international attention on the Rohingya Crisis and to shift from short-term interventions to sustained and stable support” (UN News 2020). The UN also coordinated its institutions and allies, UNICEF, IMO, UNHCR, and WFP, which are committed to work on various aspects of SDGs to deal with the crisis effectively. By providing monetary support and human resources, the UN served to strengthen and prepare Bangladesh to cater to the needs of refugees who came in large numbers to their land. Parallel to this, the United Nations also brought in Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in December 2018. GCR conceptualized a global holistic framework in par with the challenges of host countries toward SDG 2030 to address a range of problems created by refugees in pursuit of host countries. The report explained how far the GCR-adopted states (181), including Bangladesh, have informed the response to the Rohingya Crisis. GCR as a systematic multinational collaboration constituted a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework which eased Bangladesh’s pressure on dealing with refugees

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by providing monetary and strategic aids. Despite being backlogged by the crisis, GCR has largely helped Bangladesh to keep track of its SDG commitments. The UN also claims that it has persuaded Bangladesh to implement GCR on Rohingya as it is in compliance with SDG at large (Hargrave et al. 2020). Besides these accounts of physical violence, the refugees flow in general is also initiated by massive demolitions of build environments which ISIS has widely used as a war strategy. According to The National Geographic, ISIS has destroyed five monumental places in Syria alone. It includes the UNESCO world heritage site Temple of Baalshamin in Palmyra, Mar Elian Monastery, the roman era trading city Apamea, and Mari. In Iraq, they have destroyed the famous Mosul Museum and Libraries (Curry 2015). According to historian Christopher Jones, these spatial destructions by ISIS are part of their vision to “recapitulating the early history of Islam” (Gates of Nineveh 2018). The spatial destruction of constructed spaces by ISIS strongly poses the idea of spatiality of oppression which explains that, apart from spatial exclusion, displaced people are also subjected to spatial erosion of memories through demolition of built structures such as historical monuments, cities, and lived environments. Upholding the global demand for revival of destroyed cultural heritages and monuments, UNSCO’s World Heritage Centre organized a meeting to address the issue of postconflict reconstruction in the Middle East in 2015. The discourse explored the possibilities of reconstructing major sites of heritage such as the ancient city of Aleppo. It also emphasized on the urgency of reconstructing the build structures which for the returning refugees are inevitable to recover their cultural and social connections to the past (UNSCO 2015). The forceful evacuation prompted by demolition and violence was preceded with greater want to have a safer place of refuge. In the case of Syrian refugees during the ISIS attack or Iraqi refugees in US/Iran war and the following ISIS invasion, to find a safe host nation became problematically critical and quite unsolvable as the accessible geographies in which people found

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refuge were continually prone to unparalleled violence. For instance, according to UNHCR statistics, the US/Iraq war and the following developments took 1,200,000 people from Iraq to Syria, the then safe neighboring county, by 2007 (UNHCR 2007). But to the dismay of Iraqi refugees, in the subsequent civil war Syria fell into the hands of ISIS. It triggered the decade’s worst refugee movement of 13.5 million people which included the Iraqi refugees who had come to Syria earlier (UNHCR 2020c). Among the Syrian refugees, a vast majority again fled to Iraq which, following the war, was already undergoing massive political confusions and violence. The situation in Iraq again worsened in 2014 with the presence of ISIS, and the world witnessed yet another refugee movement from Iraq to already devastated Syria (UNHCR 2020e). These frequent jumbling of refugees between two countries continued for a long tenure. Consequently, the demand for stability and safety in host countries prompted a major trend in migration toward the much safer European states. Despite the restrictive immigration policies implemented by European states, the amplified interest of refugees for safety developed at large and called for a collective obligation of the world to uphold the spirit of Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 15 to prevail justice and “not let anyone behind.” In the wake of this crisis, the European Union as a major institution and collective of developed states stepped in with adherence to the SDG target and put the migration policy as its top priority in the 2015 convention. In line with SDG target 2030, European Migration Agenda was adopted in 2015 which outlined the priorities in migration, asylum, and border policies for the coming years. It was for a first that the EU compiled a unified migration policy engaging with internal and external policies of all the member nations. The agenda proposed six policy actions which included a temporary and emergency relocation mechanism, tripling of capacities and budgets to agencies involved in refugee matters, strengthening Europol’s joint maritime information to control trafficking (Carrera et al. 2015). European Migration agenda also proposed to contitute three key level action plans which included a strategic border management to check

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on human traffic, a new asylum policy, and a new policy on legal migration. The European commission’s Vice-President, Federica Mogherini, played a decisive role in initiating “UN-brokered peace deal to form a government in Libya, and to widen the ‘E3+3’ format with Iran in an effort to reboot discussions on how to bring about an end to the violence in Syria” (Carrera et al. 2015). Under the Temporary Relocation System, the EU put in place a new refugee distribution policy in which asylum seekers were allocated to member states on the basis of their GDP, population, and unemployment rate. In 2015, the commission’s initiative carried out reallocation of 120,000 refugees from Greece and Italy which were the hotspots of refugees (Carrera et al. 2015). This model incorporated other agencies such as Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and Europol to screen and prepare for irregular migrants. The EU also worked constantly with Turkey, the biggest host and bordering country of Middle East refugees to set up a joint action plan to bring order into the migration flow. The European Union played a decisive role upholding the purpose of SDG 16 by systematically accommodating the refugees in par with their legal and political rights and strengthening the host countries to deal with the crisis. Turkey as part of showing its commitment to SDG 16 stated in its SDG Voluntary National Review that it has constituted various programs for refugees worth 37 billion USD to provide health support to children, better living exposure, short-term employment, and safe return to homeland (The Global Goals 2019). In the SDG Voluntary National Review, nations such as Cameroon and Rwanda reported to have formed refugees’ response framework to keep on track with the SDG goals amid the refugees flow (The Global Goals 2019). In the Middle East, displacement has also triggered people smuggling during the Syrian refugees’ crisis from 2014 to 2016 (Mandic 2017). The Balkan route, as the main channel of transportation of the transit countries Turkey, Greece, and Serbia, became the epicenter of people smuggling during this time. The counter product of this was considerably more miserable which resulted in the death of around 34,361 people on the sea; it

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includes the famous drowning of 3,078 refugees in the Mediterranean by July 2016 (Mandic 2017). In line with SDG 16.2 which condemns all forms of modern slavery and human trafficking, the European Union established a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the Mediterranean (COM(2015) 285) and initiated ‘Operation Sophia’ to curb trafficker’s network and provide justice to those who fall prey to smugglers (Carrera et al. 2015). The International Organization for Migration IOM with the UN introduced Emergency Response Induction Training for coordination of activities against trafficking in the Mediterranean route connecting North Africa to Europe (The Freedom Fund 2016). Similar cases are also reported in Myanmar where the Rohingya have taken risk chances to cross the bay of Bangladesh to reach out to much safer Southeast-Asian countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on migrant smuggling in Asia and the Pacific shows that “Approximately 87,000 Rohingya from Myanmar and Bangladesh were smuggled through sea and land methods to Malaysia and/or Thailand between January 2014 and April 2015” (UNODC 2018). Responding to this, UNHCR strongly requested the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to uphold SDG 16.2 and make effective intervention which somehow reflected in the ASEAN Version 2020 (UNSW 2020). The increasing trend in people smuggling in the Middle East and South Asia toward the developed nations suggests the sheer anxiety of refugees about security and stability as they do not find much future in their settlements. This, in fact, poses serious appeal to the life of refugees in their settlements in host land which is the second stage in spatial displacement. The Second Stage in Spatial Displacement: SDGs and Global Interventions In the second stage of spatial displacement, refugees find a host land where they will be exposed to a hybrid context of social, cultural, political, and linguistic experiences. On a broad level, the host countries which are subjected to its differences on socio-economic status mainly fall into two

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categories: the developed countries (the European nations) and the underdeveloped or developing nations (Middle East countries or South Asian/ Southeast Asian countries). The differences between these categories of nations are crucial signposts in analyzing the problems of refugees and their effects on SDGs on a global level. Reuters, referring to the UN statistics, reported that the third world nations together host 70.8 million people, almost 80% of all the refugees in the world (Nebehay 2019). Even though the high intake of refugees by third world nations has been widely appreciated, its bearing on both the refugees and the host nations is far-reaching. The UN International Rescue Committee (IRC) report, “SDG progress: Fragility, crisis and leaving no one behind,” estimated that 12 out of 15 major hosting countries, which being low and middleincome countries and accommodate 152 million people, are considered fragile (IRC 2019). The report with regard to SDG 1 also stated that the third world host countries have 18–60% higher levels of poverty than other countries (IRC 2019). Third world nations with the highest rate of population increase and density along with low per-capita income and innumerable systemic troubles will have to make hard choices between the needs of refugees and its own citizens. In most of the third world countries, the unexpected concentration of huge throngs of people across the border has created a space panic. However, the governments have opened up temporary camps to accommodate the refugees. In most of the cases, the refugee camps have turned into vulnerable geographies. For instance, in Bangladesh, the Kutupalong refugee settlement in the Cox’s Bazar district is the largest of this kind with approximately 600,000 people accommodated in the area of 13 square kilometers (UNHCR 2020f). UNICEF reported rising anxiety among the Rohingya that the life in the temporary settlements has warded off their chances of education for children that, in turn, will make them a lost generation (UNHCR 2020g). Moreover, temporary settlements also increase the chance for sexual abuse, human trafficking, and gender-based violence such as early marriage. The UN foresaw the persisting challenges of refugees in host lands

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and took initiatives to constitute the GCR – the Global Compact on Refugees in 2017. GCR responses were framed in close reference with SDGs, especially SDG 16, as a major goal and sought maximum support from member nations. “GCR provided a basis for predictable and equitable burden – and responsibility – sharing among all UN members and other stakeholders to respond to large-scale displacements” (Hargrave et al. 2020). In the context of the Rohingya crisis, Bangladesh adopted GCR in 2018 and worked effectively with the UN to implement its credentials. According to the Humanitarian Policy Group, the GCR implementation had three major outputs: (1) easing the pressure of Bangladesh as a host country, (2) enhancing refugee self-reliance through receiving policy inputs from multiple international organizations and monetary help, and 3. effective guidance on framing supporting conditions for safe return for refugees (Hargrave et al. 2020). GCR provided a window for a “multistake holder approach” in which UN agencies and INGOs could find ease of working together harmoniously to carry on quality research on framing refugees policies and implementing them. It also envisaged a diplomatic channel for Bangladesh to engage with Myanmar for repatriation of the Rohingya people. At large, implementation of GCR in Bangladesh conceded a better way toward fulfilling SDGs to strengthen and enable a nation’s regional and national governments to deal with issues of refugees. The refugee settlements in third world countries are also reported to have frequently been affected by the health risks such as the outbreak of Ebola and recently COVID-19. According to UNHCR, the 2018 Ebola outbreak in Africa raised a severe threat on the lives of refugees and the Internally Displaced People (IDP), as it had claimed 2,200 lives and infected a lot more. In Congo, Ebola mainly affected Ituri and North Kivu provinces which were also the epicenters of civil war (UNHCR 2020a). Recently, the outbreak of the Pandemic COVID 19 has put the SDG 2030 target on an unprecedented dilemma, and WHO along with OHCHR, IOM, and UNHCR in a joint press release called for rapid and timely interventions to safeguard the refugees

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in temporary settlements to mitigate the extent of disaster (WHO 2020b). Addressing the higher vulnerability of refugees on host nations, especially in third world countries, the UN formed a response plan for the COVID 19 crisis in which WHO, OCHA, and UNHCR were assigned to work on ground with the host nations. UNHCR mainly associated with ministers of health and government entities as WHO assessed the preparedness for COVID response in local and regional level (WHO 2020a). In line with SDG targets, The Global Refugees Forum chose GCR as the larger and most inclusive platform with which most of the host countries could be mediated into international channels of aid. GCR turned out to be a more adaptable framework within which the participatory nations were enhanced to be self-reliant and strengthened. GCR helped the governments in their inclusion efforts which became paramount as the pandemic bolstered xenophobia and economic strains. According to Global Refugee Forum, “GCR in host nation deepened the engagement of refugees themselves, civil society, development actors, the private sector, INGOs, NNGOs, community-led organizations, and faith-based groups in the crisis which helped to mitigate risks and localize the response in all sectors across the humanitariandevelopment-peace nexus” (UNHCR 2020a). GCR also enabled the nations and various institutions to have developmental partnership with international agencies such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the EU. Along with it, GRF’s pledge for health, social protection, education, and livelihood through IGAD, MIRPS, and SSAR envisaged social safety nets, livelihood for refugees during lockdown, and inclusive health system. Health emergencies of this sort have spawned a new synergy with which the world has become more resilient to pursue SDGs. Apart from this, refugees in developed nations are also subjected to various covert forms of systemic oppression such as racism, linguistic and religious abuses, and islamophobia. Prof. Gill Valentine, in his article titled Rethinking Geographies of Oppression, interestingly discusses his survey on prejudices over minorities conducted

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by MORI in London. The survey infers that out of the whole population according to samples collected from the so-called progressive and liberal countries such as Britain, Denmark, and Australia, 16% of people hold less positive feelings toward four groups of minorities which include asylum seekers and refugees (Valentine 2010). The recent upsurge in refugees flow from Middle East and other Muslim-populated countries toward the European states has stimulated the already existent islamophobia among the Europeans. Europe has responded to this issue in diverse ways. For instance, “The Council of Europe Contribution to the United Nations 2030 agenda for sustainable development goals” has extensively brought the issues of racial and religious abuses, islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and hate speech under its action plan for SDG 16 and has constituted various institutions to deal with it. The Council of Europe responding to the raising trend of xenophobic populism and hate speech due to the large influx of refugees highlighted the SDG 16’s target for antidiscrimination and established the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) (Council of the EU 2019a). ECRI functions as an independent human rights monitoring body that prepares reports on the basis of country visits and provides recommendations to nations. It largely helps the nations to overcome all forms of discrimination through effective antidiscrimination legislations. Another significant body is The No Hate Speech and Cooperation Unit which cooperates with CoE members in combating racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, intolerance, and islamophobia with a special focus on tackling hate speech off-line and online (Council of the EU 2019a). In line with SDG 16, “No Hate Speech and Cooperation Unit” conducted campaigns and mobilized civil and national authorities in around 45 countries to raise awareness on this issue. CoE committee on equality and nondiscrimination made a number of resolutions to inform and strengthen nations and institutions to fight for SDG 16 targets.

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The Third Stage in the Spatial Displacement: Dilemmas in Repatriation This stage is specifically related to the return of refugees to their homeland. The most recurring issues pertaining to this stage at present is the forceful return of refugees from the host lands. The Amnesty International states that the constant increase in the number of refugees returning between 2015 and 2016 is giving a suspicious thought of forceful return by the European countries (Amnesty International 2019). This reluctance of the EU is also reflected in their refugee policies which simultaneously brought down the recognition of asylum seekers application from 68% in 2015 to 33% in 2016 (Amnesty International 2017). Situations in Asian host countries are also somewhat similar that, as the Human Rights Watch’s report reveals, in 2016 alone roughly 365,000 Syrian refugees were forcefully deported from Pakistan (Human Rights Watch 2017). The forceful deportation of refugees from the host country is considered to be a breach of the International Law of Voluntary Repatriation adopted in 1951 refugee’s convention, which, according to UN Human Rights Commissions, guarantees the refugee a “stay at his host land until the case of the displacement settles up” (UNHCR 1967). The reasons behind the forceful return of refugees are various as refugees have greatly impacted on the economic, political, and social structures of the host country. Responding to this, Sustainable Development Goals 2030 for a first reiterated the impact of migration on SDG as its 10 out of 17 goals are relevant to migration and mobility. UNCHR and International Organization for Migration as the major players in this issue highlighted the SDG 16 and called for a responsible approach from the world community. In the context of the Middle East crisis, UNHCR constituted The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) as primary humanitarian planning and response framework to enable the Syrian government to deal with the returnees (UNHCR 2019). Along with it, IOM has been working with host nations on refugee’s early-recovery and resilience programs from 2011. IOM’s “Whole-of-Syria” approach, in place since 2014, lifesaving,

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resilience, and recovery support have assisted 650000 people in Syria and host country citizens in 2018 (UNHCR 2019). In line with SDGs, the declaration on the Third Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, 2019, was a significant action from the EU and UN, and it largely helped to strengthen the host and returning countries’ governments through providing guidance on all of the 17 SDG goals (Council of the EU 2019b). The Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) (2018) – of Danish Refugee Council (DRC) – is another example of how Denmark effectively intervenes in repatriation by offering quality data and research through MMC’s collaboration with Seefar, an international social enterprise (Mixed Migration Centre 2019). They provide suggestions on how to deal with the repatriation effectively. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has extended its support toward SDGs and has published a report on their interventions in line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Sida was associated with the UNDP and contributed to the SDG 16 plans of Guatemala from 2017 to 2020 (The Global Goals 2019). These trends show how collectively the world moves toward the SDGs amid unprecedented challenges such as COVID-19 and increasing conflicts.

Conclusion However, all these precarious conditions of refugees and IDPs caused by the spatial displacement are considered to be largely due to the failure of strong political, economic, and social institutions on national and regional levels. Thus, the connection between oppression and spatial displacement entangles its institutionalized nature which takes form from either the failure of an institution or the monopoly of the same. In other words, the spatial perspective exposes that there is always a systemic intervention behind every context of oppression, be it war/civil war or forceful displacement/spatial confinements. SDGs in general and SDG 16 in particular have a perennial role in addressing these issues, institutional mismanagement and failures, and recuperating it in

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the global context. SDGs thus call for a global collective of nations to resist the weaker and strengthen the failing institutions to attain its goals by 2030. With the huge surge in spatial displacements, a spatial resistance brewing out of inclusive cooperation is the demand of the time.

Cross-References ▶ Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact ▶ Nations and Nationalism ▶ Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace ▶ Spatial Segregation: The Persistent and Structural Features of Exclusionary Policies

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Systemic Oppression and Geographical Dispositions governance-the-root-of-the-middle-easts-woes. Accessed 12 July 2020 Tolts M (2010) Population and migration: migration since World War I. YIVO encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe. https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Popu lation_and_Migration/Migration_since_World_War_I. Accessed 21 Mar 2020 UN News (2017) ISIL’s ‘genocide’ against Yazidis is ongoing, UN rights panel says, calling for international action. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/08/562772isils-genocide-against-yazidis-ongoing-un-rightspanel-says-calling. Accessed 4 Mar 2020 UN News (2020) Rohingya conference pledges to ‘remain steadfast’ in finding solutions to crisis. https://news.un. org/en/story/2020/10/1075992. Accessed 15 July 2020 UNESCO (2019) Migration and inclusive societies. https:// en.unesco.org/themes/fostering-rights-inclusion/migra tion. Accessed 5 Apr 2020 United Nations (1998) Solutions to refugee flows lies in attacking causes- oppression, conflict, says deputy secretary-general in Ottawa address. https://www.un.org/ press/en/1998/19981014.dsgsm22.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2020 United Nations (2020) Global issues: refugees. https://www. un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/. Accessed 3 Apr 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1967) Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/en-in/3b66c2aa10. Accessed 17 Mar 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2007) Statistics on displaced Iraqis around the world. https:// www.unhcr.org/461f7cb92.pdf. Accessed 12 Mar 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) UNHCR Global Trends 2014. https://www.unhcr.org/ 556725e69.html. Accessed 25 Feb 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019) Regional operational framework for refugee return to Syria. https://www.unhcr.org. Accessed 7 July 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020a) The role of the global compact on refugees in the international response to the COVID-19 pandemic. https://globalcompactrefugees.org/sites/default/files/ 2020-06/2020.06.04.The%20role%20of%20the% 20GCR%20in%20the%20international%20response% 20to%20the%20COVID-19%20pandemic_3.pdf. Accessed 14 July 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020b) Democratic Republic of the Congo refugee crisis explained. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/demo cratic-republic-of-the-congo-refugee-crisis-explained/. Accessed 2 Apr 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020c) Syria refugee crisis, USA. https://www.unrefugees.org/ emergencies/syria/. Accessed 30 Mar 2020

913 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020d) Iraq refugee crisis, USA. https://www.unrefugees.org/ emergencies/iraq/. Accessed 1Apr 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020e) Iraq emergency, India. https://www.unhcr.org/iraqemergency.html. Accessed 2 Apr 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020f) Rohingya emergency, India. https://www.unhcr.org/ rohingya-emergency.html. Accessed 28 Feb 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020g) Refugee response in Bangladesh. https://data2.unhcr. org/en/situations. Accessed 18 Mar 2020 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2020) Rohingya crisis. https://www.unicef.org/emer gencies/rohingya-crisis. Accessed 28 Feb 2020 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2018) Migrant smuggling in Asia and the Pacific: current trends and challenges. Thailand. https://www.unodc.org/docu ments/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/20182019/SOM_in_Asia_and_the_Pacific_II_July_2018. pdf. Accessed 18 Mar 2020 United Nations Peace Keeping (2020) Peace keeping missions. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en. Accessed 25 June 2020 United Nations Sustainability Goals (2015) Goal 16: promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peacejustice/. Accessed 15 Aug 2020 UNSCO (2015) Post-conflict reconstruction in the Middle East context. https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1286/ Accessed 24 July 2020 UNSW (2020) Trafficking in Rohingya women: the ASEAN perspective. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw. edu.au/publication/trafficking-rohingya-womenasean-perspective. Accessed 15 Sept 2020 Valentine G (2010) Prejudice: rethinking geographies of oppression. Soc Cult Geogr 11(6):519–537. https://doi. org/10.1080/14649365.2010.497849 Wæver O, Buzan B, Wilde J (1997) Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder World Health Organization (2020a) Housing related health risks. https://www.who.int/sustainable-development/ cities/health-risks/slums/en/. Accessed 5 Apr 2020 World Health Organization (2020b) OHCHR, IOM, UNHCR and WHO joint press release: the rights and health of refugees, migrants and stateless must be protected in COVID-19 response. https://www.who.int/ news-room/detail/31-03-2020-ohchr-iom-unhcr-andwho-joint-press-release-the-rights-and-health-of-refu gees-migrants-and-stateless-must-be-protected-incovid-19-response. Accessed 22 Mar 2020 Yahya M, Muasher M (2018) Refugee crises in the Arab world. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/18/refugee-cri ses-in-arab-world-pub-77522. Accessed 29 Mar 2020

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Technical Cooperation ▶ Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Toni ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities Nikhil Kant1 and Kumari Anjali2 1 SOMS, IGNOU, New Delhi, India 2 SOS, IGNOU, New Delhi, India

Synonyms Indigenous ecological knowledge, Local ecological Knowledge, Traditional environmental knowledge.

Definitions The term traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) denotes a subset of the broader term – traditional

knowledge – encompassing comprehensively tribal/indigenous practical time-tested ecological knowledge accrued, preserved, and transmitted to succeeding generations with the self-sustaining ability generated from the interactions of tribal/ indigenous peoples with their directly associated natural climate and surroundings over multiple years through practices and sociocultural heritage where these tribal communities as institutions owning TEK, specific and unique to their areas, perform by virtue of being its repositories and primary beneficiaries of sustainable survival and development.

Introduction The arguments of Khan (2016), encouraging to look forward to the most important research agendas for promoting higher accountability along with national and international changes for making our planet better, also remind that the natural resources on this planet are limited, and that sustainable survival of the humans is dependent on the planet’s health. Further, Kant and Anjali (2020) inform that the processes of industrialization, in recent times, have intensified challenges more particularly in developing countries urging thereby all the parties for augmented efforts to explore integrated solutions for ensuring sustainable development. These challenges have continuously been acknowledged by

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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the United Nations which brought out the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” with effect from January 2016 with a set of 17 SDGs (sustainable development goals) encompassing economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection as the three dimensions of sustainable development (UN SDG Knowledge Platform, n.d.). Despite the inadequate utilization of TEK, recognition of its values and successful exploitation as a strategy more particularly in developing countries in overcoming local, national, and global challenges, gradual shift has been visible in recent times in the trends of recognizing its significance in view of its varied perceived potential in ensuring sustainable development. Considering TEK, which is a tacit knowledge, as a significant intangible strategic resource might demonstrate huge potential not only for empowering tribal communities in their natural ecosystem and surroundings but also for bringing about sustainable development for them more particularly in developing countries at a time of intense climate crisis being faced. This entry aims to discuss the issue of considering TEK as a resource of sustainable development for tribal communities harnessing its huge untapped potential in this knowledge-based economy era. This entry follows the structure as such that the next, i.e., second section illustrates common understanding of the concepts of tribal communities, TEK, and resources of sustainable development for the purpose of providing enhanced conceptual understanding, followed by the third section elaborating the interconnections of tribal communities, TEK, and SDG 16. Fourth section discusses the potentials and possibilities of considering TEK as the resource of sustainable development for tribal communities owning TEK before culminating into the fifth section with conclusion. Scholarly value of this entry lies in underscoring the significance of TEK as a strategic resource which can empower tribal communities as a TEK-owning institution in order to help them attain and sustain competitiveness in the changing dynamics of the entire world in general and developing countries in particular amidst the uncertainty arising from climate crisis and

consequences. The underlying intent behind such empowerment of tribal communities demonstrates the efforts to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, to provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all level as envisaged by SDG 16.

Common Understanding Tribal Communities ILO (2018) informs that global tribal population exceeding 370 million in more than 70 countries have been accorded a common denominator of indigenous and tribal peoples – as this population lacks any universal definition despite possessions of their own customs, cultures, languages, and institutions capable of differentiating them from numerous different societies. However, ILO (International Labor Organization) adopting a practical approach vide its Convention 169 put forth objective and subjective criteria for identifying them which have a variety of names demonstrating high diversity, e.g., native peoples, aboriginal peoples, first nations, hunter gatherers, janjati, adivasi, and hill tribes, honoring which the convention attempted to assign an inclusive term for them – indigenous and tribal peoples – which served the purpose of ensuring common set of rights to all of them (ILO 2018). Although tribal communities have been victimized by the social and institutional discriminations (Salick and Byg 2007) in the entire era of rapid globalization witnessed in previous decades by the world where their engagements and roles in development discourse have remained diminished, their coevolving with the natural ecosystem and persistent capability of conserving ecosystem and its services are noteworthy which remind us to consider them as the agents of environmental conservation instead of the victims of the consequences of climate change impacts, as they are generally considered (Etchart 2017). Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) Despite lacking any universal definition and lack of clarity as regards the exact origin of TEK, it is

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

commonly understood to have been emerged as an extension of the tribal knowledge and practices commonly referred to as a broader term – traditional knowledge – with the clarifications provided by Dudgeon and Berkes (2003), denoting it as a part of traditional/indigenous knowledge with the stress laid not on all indigenous knowledge but only on ecological knowledge which helps it to be understood as a subset of the traditional/indigenous knowledge (Snively and Corsiglia 2001). Drew (2005) defines TEK as a comprehensive knowledge of species – environments, and their interactions accumulated and transmitted to subsequent various generations, often in the form of stories, folklore, taboos, rituals, ceremony, and cultural traditions (McMillen et al. 2014), making the resilience of socioecological systems underpinned by traditional learning and transmission methods. Dudgeon and Berkes (2003) further add that it represents the knowledge retrieved from the interactions of tribal communities founded on their direct association with natural environment over multiple years. In recent times, significant recognition of TEK, along with the social, cultural, and environmental aspects, has been accorded globally considering it to be an intellectual activity and sociocultural heritage which is not only preserved by but transmitted also through succeeding generations in the forms of practices and innovations in tribal communities utilizing the customary laws interrelations, as informed by studies such as Cocks (2006) and Pieroni, Giusti, and Quave (2011). While Chambers and Gillespie (2000) urge to consider it a “situated knowledge,” Menzies and Butler (2006) argue that TEK is flexible over time because it evolves with an often uncontrollable and unpredictable environment. Charles and Capistrano (2010) argue that tribal communities as institutions owning TEK should be considered to be the repositories of plethora of observations by multiple generations because of their mammoth potentials with respect to enhancing survival and sustainability of resources in addition to their cultures. The arguments of Kovach (2005) favoring emergence of TEK as a purposeful/practical knowledge from the need to feed, clothe, and transmit values, idiosyncratic to

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the land and locality of tribal communities, also find further underpinnings from the arguments provided by Zent (2008) informing TEK, on the ethno-scientific basis, as the emerging time-tested knowledge of tribal communities which have evolved over thousands of years through their direct contacts with environment, the significance of which can be gauzed by their self-sustaining ability. It is notable that in spite of its existence among various tribal communities for numerous years, the development of TEK as a conceptual framework occurred in the decade of 1980s only by tribal elders for promoting enhanced understanding of the natural climate interdependence (Finn et al. 2017). Resource of Sustainable Development through Competitiveness Enhancement Porter (1980) posits that strategy denoting capability to demonstrate appropriate directions for sustainable growth – using mechanisms of goal setting and policy determination – harnessing the association of organizations with external environment is also considered to be a formula to compete, attain goals and finally attain competitiveness. Strategy therefore denotes human efforts of meeting desired results despite scarce resources in the real world to create a better shaped future (McKeown 2012) where, as Amit and Schoemaker (1993) posit, resources perform as productive assets to achieve organizational objectives. While traditionally economic resources are found within the three major tangible factors of production, i.e., land, capital, labor, the developments in the discipline of management including popularization of the resource approach has witnessed the extension of these factors with the addition of other intangible factors – such as information – as important resource (Weiland 2017) underscoring the proportional significant growth of intangible resources to the transformation process into the knowledge-based economy of this modern era. As against the emphasis on dividing economic resources on the basis of tangible and intangible assets, studies have also attempted to stress on the significance of intangible knowledge in attaining competitiveness based on the way they are used as

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Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

functioning strategically to create the weight for translating them into competitiveness also enhancing competing ability. While the arguments of Porter (1980) list three generic strategies – cost leadership, differentiation, and focus (based on the competitive position attained in a segment market using either of the cost leadership or differentiation strategy) – to attain competitiveness, and of Cater and Pucko (2005) clarifying that simultaneous engagement of these strategies can strategically help in attaining competitiveness more successfully, the arguments of Barney (1991) in defining resources through their “VRIN” attributes influencing competitiveness are also notable who underscores that the strategically useful resources which are valuable, rare, inimitable, nonsubstitutable (VRIN) can help sustain competitiveness. RBV (resource-based view) defines resources as stocks of available factors including knowledge also in addition to physical assets – human capital – and other tangible/intangible items under organizational ownership or control to be further converted into consequent products/services (Amit and Schoemaker 1993), and the knowledge-based view further offers the basis to the claim of knowledge to be considered as an influential resource in the quest of competitiveness (Grant 1996) which researchers have considered as an intangible resource (Milgrom and Roberts 1982). Further, the clarification provided by Polanyi (2009) that every knowledge, be it tacit or otherwise, is ultimately embedded in tacit knowledge not only helps in considering TEK, which is a tacit knowledge, such as an intangible resource, but also showcases the availability of the unarticulated elements in knowledge helping to understand it in entirety.

Knowing the Connections Tribal Communities and TEK Tribal communities represent around 15% of the poor population around the world with its population constituting approximately 5% of total population, of which approximately 80% of the global 370 million tribal population are inhabitants of the

Asia-Pacific region which is known to be highly vulnerable to the effect of climate change and fear worsening future emphasizing thereby the urgent need to harness the potential of TEK owned by them considering them powerful change-agents for the purpose of climate mitigation – adaptation efforts, and sustainable and healthy natural climate (ILO 2017). Harisha, Padmavathy, and Nagaraja (2016) inform that attempts have been made in the past to separate tribal communities in different countries, which also include Africa and southeast Asian countries, from their surrounding ecosystems with the misuse of umpteen policies and regulations enforced disguised as sincere efforts to conserve and manage natural resource, to be amended appropriately only in recent times by making them more inclusive and participatory, integrating TEK in resource management which increased involvement and awareness of these communities by facilitating their livelihoods. Despite the arguments of Salick and Byg (2007) that tribal communities and TEK have not been considered adequately in the public, academic, and policy in an era inflicted with the negative consequences of climate change, Negi, Maikhuri, Pharswan, Thakur, and Dhyani (2017) suggest that its integration with western scientific knowledge could be significantly useful in the pathways for the construction of the climate change adaptation. Karlsson (n.d.) informs that countries including India, which are inhabited by majority of this population, cast their votes to favor the UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples which is considered to be a significant nonbinding instrument. He further informs that the specific rights excluding rights over land – livelihoods, and culture are enjoyed universally by them, which include bigger groups with agricultural activities and smaller groups of hunter-gatherers/ pastoralists, with the international supports protecting them from any outside violation threats. ILO (2017), summarizing the arguments provided by several studies emphasizing natural resources as the primary sources of income of tribal communities, highlights their efforts of attaching more value to their surroundings and ecosystems than

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

the economic benefits to ensure maintenance of complex cultural association with them. It also underscores the significance of their selfgoverned and sustainable economic model which ensures conservation of natural resources across the globe despite substantial differences and idiosyncrasies with respect to their habitat and lifestyle. Nonetheless, in a recent study Harisha et al. (2016) have attempted to identify major drivers of transforming TEK and found five such drivers viz. modernization comprising developmental activities; changes in food habits and lifestyle; policies and social welfare programs intervention; invasive and forest degradations; and migration and changes in occupations. These five major drivers underscore the effect on TEK of developmental activities encompassing infrastructural and technological developments facilitating exposure to other parts of the world which cause their reduced interactions with their ecosystem as well as elders resulting into creation of knowledge gaps between generations. Tribal Communities, TEK, and SDG 16 The decade of 2010–2020 and more particularly the year of 2015 are considered significant for the pathways to sustainable development as the set of 17 SDGs (sustainable development goals) was brought out by the United Nations in September, followed by the guidelines on a Just Transition Towards Environmentally Sustainable Economics and Societies for All by ILO in October, and finally the NDCs (Nationally Determined Commitments) under Paris Climate Agreement by UNFCCC in December of 2015 (ILO 2018). The 2030 Agenda for sustainable development of the UN was adopted by the countries to ensure social, environmental, and economic development in such a sustainable manner that human welfare is enhanced and earth – resources – inhabitants longevity is ensured more particularly in developing countries nurturing the ambition to achieve the 17 SDGs by 2030 along with their 169 targets and 230 indicators by planning for suitable actions replacing the erstwhile MDGs (millennium development goals) and imbibing the valuable learning gained from their deficiencies. While different SDG targets indicators indirectly relate to the

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tribal communities along with TEK possessed by them seeking their engagements recognizing the significance of their clear and critical roles in this era of knowledge-based economy and climate crisis, SDG 16 too relates by aiming to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels” also describing different terms for an enhanced and clear understanding and knowledge (UN SDG Knowledge Platform n.d.). Here, this is notable that the efforts to conserve and promote TEK to harness its immense potentials in developing countries are not commendable for the purpose of economic analysis with respect to natural resources, though TEK has been globally recognized as a significant contributor towards sustainable development (Harisha et al. 2016). The potential of TEK has been focused upon in the past not only in terms of sustainable development by the World Commission on Environment and Development in its seminal report “Our Common Future” emphasizing the various lessons in the resources management that tribal lifestyles can provide to modern societies in complex forest – mountain – dry land ecosystems (WCED 1987), but also in terms of climate change responses (Pearce et al. 2015). Conservation management (Gadamus et al. 2015) and sustainable agriculture (Cannarella and Piccioni 2011) attaching greater significance to TEK for its association with relationships of human and their natural climate. The critical role of TEK, in addition to handling health, food security, climate, biodiversity, and conservation-related problems (Gadgil et al. 2000), has explicitly been recognized by Paris Climate Agreement in climate actions (ILO 2017) which underscores the urgency of realizing that tribal communities, despite not being the part of the problem of climate change, present themselves as an inevitable part of the solution and can help enormously with the help of collaborations for a sustainable planet keeping in view the substantial capacity of TEK to handle, e.g., flood, drought, and pest-related problems due to the fact that TEK – natural resources – ecosystems interactions are not only unique and sufficiently

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relevant but have high value for adaptation and facilitation of green growth in addition to poverty alleviation through consultations and decisionmaking engagements of tribal communities in the bid to search social solutions to climatic threats (AIPP 2015; ILO 2017). Meanwhile, ILO (2017) informs that climate change has had substantial impact on the ecosystem-based tribal livelihoods posing serious threats to their livelihoods, lifestyle, and culture not only resulting into forced migration but also exposing them to higher exploitation, discrimination, and other climate related hazards which might aggravate the occurrence of losing their traditional knowledge which assumes significance for successful climate action. Different ways of protecting and promoting TEK, along with increased global recognition of its role in sustainable development by international intergovernmental efforts such as SDGs, CBD (convention on biological diversity), and MEAs (multilateral environmental agreements) in recent times, find support from the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) which emphasized the significance of TEK as a vital resource for adaptation to climate change which hitherto largely remained ignored while formulating policies and conducting research, highlighting the urgency and immediacy of its recognition and integration with scientific knowledge (IPCC 2014). While the UN in its sustainable development agenda 2030, brought out in 2015, also emphasizes on handling different serious challenges with the help of secured and equal access to knowledge to all, and urgent action against climate change, the UNFCCC in the seventh article of Paris Climate Agreement underscores governmental acknowledgments towards climate change adaptation guided by TEK integrating it with scientific knowledge while formulating socioeconomic and environmental policies; and also the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction effective from 2015 urges governments to engage with tribal communities while designing and implementing policies, plans, and standards optimally utilizing TEK with the complementary support of scientific knowledge underscoring the immense contributions of TEK possessed by them (ILO 2017).

The major drivers identified by Harisha et al. (2016) responsible for transforming TEK amply highlight the effects of developmental activities, but explicit recognition of its critical role in climate action by Paris Climate Agreement presses for according urgency to realize its greater significance in seeking social solution to the climate change problems through collaborations with the tribal communities engaging in consultations and decision-making for sustainable development (AIPP 2015; ILO 2017). It is notable that determination of their incomes based on the value derived from nature of this global population of around 370 million puts them in a commanding position with respect to the modern economic model based on a sustainable green economy principle (ILO 2017).

TEK: A Resource of Sustainable Development for Tribal Communities This entry aims to examine the possibility of TEK as a resource of sustainable development for tribal communities within the broader framework of the UN SDG 16 (encompassing 12 targets and 23 indicators). The world without adequate scientific research on TEK needs to focus on integrating traditional and modern knowledge systems (ILO 2017) at a time when the UN through its SDG 16 aims to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making by facilitating proportions of positions by population groups in public institutions vis-à-vis national distributions which are critical for the success of all SDGs to ensure a sustainable future on the entire planet with the developed countries fulfilling development assistance commitments to developing countries (UN SDG Knowledge Platform n.d.). Given that tribal communities are engaged in protecting not only 22% of the surface but also 80% of the earth’s biodiversity despite the fact that they constitute 5% of the population on the planet depending primarily on renewable natural resources for their economic – social – cultural practices, they have huge potential to facilitate management and conservation of sustainable natural resource in the battle against

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

climate change (ILO 2017). Kant (2020a) highlights that climate risks seek an urgent remedy as are being considered increasingly as the biggest market failure across the globe requiring all the major parties including developing countries to display proactivity in the pathways to sustainable development. While pessimism prevails about possibility of climate change outpacing the ability of TEK as regards adaptation (Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2013), market economies’ assimilation causing them leave traditional practices (GómezBaggethun and Reyes-García 2013), social structures changes such as adopting nontribal lifestyles and languages causing loss of TEK (McCarter et al. 2014) and disruptions to the intergenerational transfer of TEK (Hanazaki et al. 2013), and migration forcing these communities to abandon the social–ecological contexts embedding their knowledge systems (Lasisi and Ekpenyong 2011), the optimism also makes its presence felt through the discourses on potentials of TEK based on the enhanced wider recognition of dynamism embedded in TEK (FernándezLlamazares et al. 2013; Furusawa 2016). Despite the lack of clear direct linkages of the SDG 16, the critical roles of TEK, along with tribal communities possessing it, in contributing to the achievement of different SDGs are highlighted if interpreted in the light of the Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities, Fig. 1 SECI matrix {source: Nonaka et al. (2000, p.12)}

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suggestions of the “UNGC’s The Ten Principles” to apply innovation, good practices, collaboration, and minimization of harms for the purpose of providing solutions to societal challenges without compromising the organizational survival and growth (UN Global Compact n.d.). Tribal communities as institutions owning TEK should be considered to be the repositories of plethora of observations by multiple generations because of their mammoth potentials with respect to enhancing survival and sustainability of resources in addition to cultures (Charles and Capistrano 2010). Here, knowledge management can be of immense help in changing tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge in order to spread it among stakeholders (Woelk and Agarwal 2002), an enhanced understanding of which can be achieved with the help of the SECI matrix (Nonaka et al. 2000) as demonstrated in Fig. 1. While explicit knowledge denotes formal – written down – documented knowledge which is codified/asynchronously shareable, tacit knowledge denotes informal knowledge existing in the minds as experiences – know-how – mental models which cannot be codified easily for being available in the form of perception, experience, and learning by doing, having been accumulated over enormously long periods (Bratianu and Orzea 2010; Grover and Froese 2016; Polanyi 2009). Having been embodied in such individuals

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Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

as are not able to express readily despite retaining it within their own minds – behaviors – perceptions, the tacit knowledge represents skills, experience, expertise, intuition, insight, and judgment which are shareable and transferrable with the use of discussions, stories, analogies, and interactions and are therefore not easily captured or explicitly represented which further facilitate it for remaining uncapped despite continual addition and constantly changing behavior and perceptions of individuals (Ketcha et al. 2015; Küpers 2005). Haldin-Herrgard (2000) and Selamat and Choudrie (2004) further argue that with the improvement in productivity, competitiveness can be brought about by tacit knowledge which performs as a significant asset for the purpose of improving quality of work, decision-making, learning, accuracy, consumption of time, and service. Here, it is notable that TEK truly represents one such tacit knowledge and an intangible resource which, as studies in the discipline of strategic management profusely underscore, is strategically more significant than tangible knowledge for attaining competitiveness and ensuring sustainable development. ILO (2017) underscores the efforts of World Conference on Indigenous Peoples held in 2014 in recognizing the significance of tribal communities in sustainable social, environmental, and economic development due to their possession of TEK and associated sustainable practices related to financial services, markets, supply systems, health care, education, training, affordable irrigation, water harvesting, storage technologies, etc. in the meantime, and the need to equip them with multifarious fluency by making arrangements to prepare them ensuring simultaneous active connectedness to own communities and facilitating them to possess dominant knowledge and home cultures’ knowledge (Brayboy and Castagno 2008) encapsulated in their traditional practices including but not restricted to testing of water quality, rainwater harvesting, supplementary irrigation, watersheds protection, improved building technologies, diversifications in crops and livelihoods, and community-based disaster risk reduction, which are considered vital for sustainable development (Macchi 2008).

Harisha, Padmavathy, and Nagaraja (2016) argue that TEK playing an important role in the pathways of sustainable development is born from the long-term interactions among society and nature and extends help to validate scientific hypothesis for developing a research agenda by integrating TEK and scientific knowledge in order to improve environment and well-being. TEK transferred through oral traditions, cultural expressions, and traditional food cultivation/collection/preparation suffers the threats of extinction along with the fast disappearance of languages of the tribal communities (Montag et al. 2014) which keeping in view the significance of tribal communities as change agents to facilitate sustainable and green growth due to the uniqueness associated with wealth creation of these communities using sustainable green economy principles enshrined in TEK can empower them through enhanced skills upgradation and trainings improving income generation capabilities and supporting economic activities, thereby alleviating poverty and facilitating green growth (ILO 2017). In this regard, McKinley (2007) posits that education too should be restructured while making efforts to overcome the challenge associated with integrating TEK in curricula and system to recognize and protect TEK and enhance scientific knowledge simultaneously. IGNOU, for example, through its Centre for Traditional Knowledge Systems (CTKS) has, in India, demonstrated strategic approach of utilizing TEK having evolved and survived over thousands of years despite being informal, rooted in their cultures and traditions enshrining multitude of arts, crafts, textiles, agriculture, veterinary practices, natural resource, environmental management, housing, etc. which had remained hitherto unrecognized in formal education, by ensuring access – analyzing – documenting it through identification and outlining the curricula for the purpose of imparting skills/trainings and applying for accreditation and certification of prior learning, and by setting up centers for vocational education and training for reaching out to them for the socioeconomical empowerment of the remotely placed population using ODL (Open and Distance Learning) system (IGNOU 2013).

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

In recent times, TEK has assumed significance in recruitments as highlighted by the arguments of Ketcha, Jokull, and Bocij (2015) that acquisition and assessment of practical knowledge including but not limited to know-how and experiential knowledge popularize tacit knowledge acquisition for career progression keeping in view its inherent value not only for tribal communities residing in remote areas with their significant voice but for the need to reconcile diverse interests and policy coherence providing sufficient interventions for sustainable economic growth (ILO 2017). Galloway McLean et al. (2012) consider TEK as the underpinning of tribal resilience to build capacity against the negative effects of climate change because, as added by Chisanga, Mvula, and Habibu (2017), TEK is the knowledge generated by tribal community over thousands of years rendering their empowerment through learning from their interactions with their own natural environments, and as added by Lejano, Tavares-Reager, and Berkes (2013), the traditional ways of observing – understanding – making sense of changes in their environment. Further, Nyong, Adesina, and Osman Elasha (2007) add that TEK could be valuable for ensuring sustainable development because of its significance in sustainable mitigation and adaptation strategies which could place tribal communities in a position to use their capability to sense negative effects in advance for ensuring essential preventive actions or taking advantage of possible opportunities (IPCC 2007). UNFCCC (2007), therefore, reports that climate change adaptation which has become a priority more particularly in developing countries can be in advantageous position due to availability of sufficient information and knowledge in the form of TEK to plan and strategize by making efforts to integrate it with modern science approaches which empower tribal communities (Egeru 2012) and bring competitiveness to them by proving to be valuable enough to bring scientists and these communities together for collaboration and exchange of knowledge (Williams and Hardison 2013), and to provide efficient – suitable – time-tested mechanisms to respond to issues related to natural climate and climate change (Pandey et al. 2018) such as

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weather monitoring system for predicting extreme climate events in a sub-Saharan African City of Accra (Codjoe et al. 2013); sustainable utilization of the existing bioresources by introducing rice– fish culture farming system like Asra in Indian state of Assam (Bhattacharjee and Das 2018); resource preserving commitment of Iroquois for seven future generations (Story and Lickers 1997), etc. While transfer of tacit knowledge such as TEK in this ICT-driven era can be cost-effective with the use of feasible suitable tools which can reinforce interactions of humans – collaborations – transfers of tacit knowledge (Panahi et al. 2012), the potential danger that next generations might be devoid of TEK despite the acquisition of explicit knowledge can be handled with the apt use of ICT for facilitating its transfer (Özdemir 2008) and creating new knowledge with the support of SECI model (Fig. 1) engaging them in the best way for using TEK, uniquely local and tribally driven, harnessing their cultural and geographical interactions attributes with environment (Finn et al. 2017) to understand key components of changes in environment and impacts on outcomes (Freeman 1992) given its significance for collaboration and scientific research for meaningful outcomes (Finn et al. 2017). Finn, Herne, and Castille (2017) argue that TEK has potential to improve scientific ecosystem models which can significantly help not only policymakers and decision-makers but tribal communities also in building appropriate sustainability models, as further argued by Rahimli (2014) favoring knowledge as a vital resource of competitiveness dependent upon the way it is created – distributed – utilized by the organization considering it an important asset. Additionally, TEK offers itself with tremendous potential as a significant intangible resource of sustainable development for the tribal communities possessing it through attaining and sustaining competitiveness with the underpinnings provided by the arguments of Hitt, Ireland, Camp, and Sexton (2001) who posit that the contributions of intangible resources are greater than tangible resources for organizations for the purpose of creation of

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Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

competitiveness, and by Barney (1991) who posits that internal and intangible resources are more important than external and tangible ones for attaining and sustaining competitiveness by helping substantially in exploiting opportunities and negating threats, because of meeting the four conditions of “VRIN.” Further, in order to be considered as a source of competitiveness, a resource needs to be applied to an industry or used in a market (Kotter and Heskett 1992) with the involvement of the processes such as identification, development, protection, and deployment of organizational resource base (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Summing up, in addition to possessing the attributes such as cost-effectiveness and differentiation – locally focused, TEK appears to be meeting the characteristics of a strategic resource for being inimitable (as everyone in the community contributes knowledge on the basis of personal experience), rare (as TEK is the sum total of the individuals’ know-how/what/why), valuable (as community knowledge has potential to contribute in improving products, processes, technologies, and services in a competitive and cost-effective manner), and nonsubstitutable (as the synergy of the specific tribal communities are not easy to be replicated), making the tribal communities as TEK-owning institutions create idiosyncratic competence arising from TEK as an intangible resource helping them achieve sustainable development through attaining and sustaining competitiveness. Here, Fig. 2 provides

more clarity as regards the idiosyncrasies of TEK in order to be eligible as a strategic resource. It is notable here that diminishing interests of tribal communities in managing and conserving TEK due to dwindling dependency on wild plants have encouraged new generations to fall in the luring traps of external market forces causing thereby their migration resulting from increased unemployment in their environment which are causing plethora of changes in tribal communities (Harisha and Padmavathy 2013) as new generations demonstrate increasing willingness for learning modern knowledge in order to exploit new livelihood opportunities which expose them to newer challenges arising from modern life style, migration, and occupational changes with huge effect on environment and wellbeing due to their higher interrelations (Harisha et al. 2016). Nonetheless, tribal communities possessing TEK are aware of the competitiveness and their fear to lose it making them display hesitation in exchanging it with outsiders on account of absence of trust and time (Ayub et al. 2018) needs to be eliminated in this modern era primarily governed by knowledgebased economy affecting lives and types of instruction, trainings, employment, and recruitment processes substantially given the higher significant recognition of knowledge and technology which also highlight the tremendous help provided by intangible resources in attaining competitiveness (Jashapara 2011) to harness comprehensively the potentials of TEK. A basic framework presented in Fig. 3 gives an overview of this entry in entirety.

Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities, Fig. 2 TEK as a resource of sustainable development through attaining

and sustaining competitiveness. (Source: Adapted from Barney (1991); Cater and Pucko (2005); and Porter (1980))

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Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities, Fig. 3 Basic framework

Concluding Comments Tribal communities, found to be sharing complex cultural relations with their environment and natural surroundings in their economic activities, depend substantially on the natural resources without letting it depreciate, though they use the natural capital as core asset for production. Their value determines the incomes of these communities and attaches commanding position with their huge populations across the globe in the knowledge-based and sustainable economy principle-based modern economic model. Although the uncertainty as regards origin of TEK prevails, TEK refers to the traditional knowledge enshrining only ecological knowledge informing that TEK is a subset of traditional/indigenous knowledge and has similarly evolved over thousands of years which is possessed by tribal communities in the form of purposeful and practical knowledge having assumed significance in recent times globally more particularly in the pathways of sustainable development through SDGs making it hog limelight which usually remained hitherto ignored in policy formulation. With the enhanced significance of the role played by tribal communities as change agents for sustainable growth, TEK cannot only enhance

their income generation capacities but can also prove to be resource of sustained competitiveness for these communities, given that TEK is a tacit knowledge which is known to be a vital intangible strategic resource of attaining and sustaining competitiveness. It is notable that by managing, preserving, promoting, and transferring TEK, the negative impacts of ignoring it must be eliminated in this modern era of knowledge-based economy. Given the dismal performance of developing countries as against the increased global recognition and uses of TEK in the pathways to sustainable development, its strategic utilization, to empower tribal communities, needs to be harnessed properly in the battle against acute climate change consequences, also. TEK, a purposeful, practical, and time-tested tacit knowledge offers itself to be considered a significant intangible resource to help tribal communities attain and sustain competitiveness in this era of knowledgebased economy if it is used strategically for their empowerment in their own natural surroundings and ecosystem in remote areas considering them as change-agents for sustainable development, given their dependency on renewable natural resources for economic, social, and cultural activities more particularly in developing countries facing the maximum consequences of climate change.

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Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

While the emergence of TEK has been dependent on the need to feed, clothe, and transmit idiosyncratic values through multiple generations over innumerable years, it might play leading roles for climate mitigation and adaptation actions in addition to meeting the educational goals as per SDGs using greater flexibility and interactivity of ODL system and support of developments in ICT in developing countries to eliminate access constraints and enhance capacity building (Kant 2019, 2020b) in the knowledge-based economy when its significance is increasingly being recognized by intergovernmental agencies and governments for collaborations with tribal communities as its rights owners. The significance of TEK as an intangible resource of sustainable development for tribal communities through competitiveness enhancement has potential to continuously increase as a consequence of technical advancements. Though creation of competitiveness is influenced by intangible and tangible resources both, the significance of intangible resources appears to be growing continuously. The technological advancements aligned with scientific progresses might become driving force to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the intangible resources giving unimaginable possibilities for attaining competitiveness and sustainable development not only for tribal communities but for the entire planet. While TEK as a strategic intangible resource is related to creation and enhancement of sustained competitiveness for tribal communities, tribal communities wishing to be competitive need to be helped in developing mechanisms to capture relevant TEK and disseminate it timely, accurately, consistently, and concisely as pursuing implementation of an effective and efficient knowledge management system is critical for a successful strategy in addition to focusing on intellectual asset management, on learning, research, development, and innovation, on TEK transfer strategy emphasizing on systemic approaches, and on efficient governance structure incentivizing for sharing it. This entry therefore sums up with the concluding comments that TEK itself and along with integration with modern scientific knowledge cannot only build competitiveness for tribal communities possessing it in view of the increasing significance of TEK as a

strategic intangible resource in contemporary modern era driven by knowledge-based economy, but also bring about success in the pathways of sustainable development. However, further relevant research for gaining more insights into TEK as a significant strategic resource is invariably suggested.

Cross-References ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

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Panahi S, Watson J, Partridge H (2012) Social media and tacit knowledge sharing: developing a conceptual model. Int Sch Sci Res Innov 6:648–655 Pandey R, Kumar P, Archie KM et al (2018) Climate change adaptation in the Western-Himalayas: household level perspectives on impacts and barriers. Ecol Indic 84:27–37 Pearce T, Ford J, Willox AC, Smit B (2015) Inuit traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), subsistence hunting and adaptation to climate change in the Canadian Arctic. Arctic 68:233–245 Pieroni A, Giusti ME, Quave CL (2011) Cross-cultural ethnobiology in the Western Balkans: medical ethnobotany and ethnozoology among Albanians and Serbs in the Pešter plateau, Sandžak, South-Western Serbia. Hum Ecol 39:333–349 Polanyi M (2009) The tacit dimension. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Porter ME (1980) Competitive strategy. Free Press, New York Rahimli A (2014) Knowledge management and competitive advantage. Inf Knowl Manag 2:37–43. https://doi. org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4679-7 Salick J, Byg A (2007) Indigenous peoples and climate change. Tyndall Centre Publication, Oxford, UK Selamat MH, Choudrie J (2004) The diffusion of tacit knowledge and its implications on information systems: the role of meta-abilities. J Knowl Manag 8:128–139 Snively G, Corsiglia J (2001) Discovering indigenous science: implications for science education. Sci Educ 85:6–34 Story PA, Lickers FH (1997) Partnership building for sustainable development: a first nations perspective from Ontario. In: Bouman OT, Brand DG (eds) Sustainable forests: global challenges and local solutions. The Haworth Press, Binghamton, pp 149–162 UN Global Compact All companies can play a role. https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/sdgs/about. Accessed 19 May 2019 UN SDG Knowledge Platform Sustainable development goals. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs. Accessed 19 May 2019 UNFCCC (2007) Climate change impact, vulnarabilities and adaptation in developing countries WCED (1987) Our common future. World Commission on Environment and Development Weiland D (2017) The role of information in e-commerce. Transp Econ Logist 68:103–115 Williams T, Hardison P (2013) Culture, law, risk and governance: contexts of traditional knowledge in climate change adaptation. Clim Chang 120:531–544 Woelk D, Agarwal S (2002) Integration of e-learning and knowledge management. In: World conference on E-learning in corporate, government, healthcare, and higher education, pp 1035–1042 Zent S& E (2008) Methodology for developing a vitality index of traditional environmental knowledge (VITEK) for the project “global indicators of the status and trends of linguistic diversity and traditional knowledge. Technical report to the Christensen fund. Salt Spring Island, British Columbia: Terralingua

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Traditional Environmental Knowledge ▶ Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK): A Strategic Resource for Tribal Communities

Traditional Leaders ▶ Governance of Traditional Local Institutions and Achieving SDG16

Trafficking in Human Beings ▶ Human Trafficking and the Sustainable Development Goals: Building on Solid Ground

Trafficking in Persons ▶ Human Trafficking and the Sustainable Development Goals: Building on Solid Ground

Training ▶ Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement Claire Paterson-Young and Richard Hazenberg Institute for Social Innovation and Impact, University of Northampton, Northampton, UK

Definitions Transformative outcomes hinge on the development of effective services that address social issues on the micro (individual), meso

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(organizational), and macro (societal) levels. Popular discourse on the development of effective services refers to notions of evaluation and impact measurement. Social impact measurement is a vague concept with a plethora of definitions and methodologies, resulting in poor understanding of its true meaning (Sairinen and Kumpulainen 2006; Paterson-Young et al. 2019). A commonly cited definition for social impact measurement, developed by the European Commission’s “Groupe d’Experts de la Commission sur l’Entrepreneuriat Social” (GECES) sub-committee, described social impact measurement as the scope of the program (outputs of the program); the positive and negative outcomes experienced by beneficiaries (outcomes for the beneficiary group); the changes for beneficiaries and society over time (impacts on society); the role of different stakeholders/partners in this change (alternative attribution); and the changes that would have occurred regardless of the programs delivery (deadweight/control group) (Clifford et al. 2014). Social impact measurement promotes efficient and transparent regulation of organizations by identifying the short-, medium-, and long-term benefit of services, transforming outcomes, and driving organizational change (Nicholls 2009; Clifford et al. 2013). Furthermore, it outlines the role of different stakeholder groups and how they interact with each other, both strategically (from a power perspective) and operationally (in delivering the program and measuring the impact).

Introduction The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outline targets and indicators to address systemic barriers to sustainable development (Costanza et al. 2016). The SDGs provide a blueprint for the development of a sustainable, peaceful, and prosperous planet, with all United Nations Member States encouraged to adopt the agenda (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020). Adopting the SDG agenda creates pressure on Member States to develop and/or fund services that address the systemic barriers to sustainable development and, more specifically, transform outcomes. This creates an opportunity for

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organizations to maximize funding by introducing a measurement approach that not only captures the organizations success in transforming outcomes but aligns organizational activities with the SDGs. Social impact measurement enables organizations to highlight the benefit of activities, aligned to the SDGs, by identifying short-, medium-, and longterm outcomes and impact (Nicholls 2009; Clifford et al. 2013). It requires an understanding of the scope of the program (outputs of the program); the positive and negative outcomes experienced by beneficiaries (outcomes for the beneficiary group); the changes for beneficiaries and society over time (impacts on society); the role of different stakeholders/partners in this change (alternative attribution); and the changes that would have occurred regardless of the programs delivery (deadweight/ control group). Understanding developments in social impact measurement, the approaches to measurement and the areas for measurement are therefore essential in establishing an appropriate framework. Furthermore, understanding the role of multi-stakeholder approaches to program design, delivery, and evaluation is critical in social impact measurement (Hazenberg et al. 2015), especially in developing a holistic social impact measurement framework to promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies. From this perspective therefore, social impact measurement approaches can provide a mechanism for better understanding the strategic delivery of the SDGs while also quantifying the roles (and impact delivered) of the various stakeholder groups involved at the operational level in achieving the SDG indicators.

Developments in Social Impact Measurement In recent years, the emphasis on developing effective and sustainable services that transform outcomes has resulted in the amplification of social value and social impact measurement within academia and practice (Jain 2018; Jain et al. 2019). Increased scrutiny on public spending and the emergence of policy frameworks (e.g., the Public Services “Social Value” Act 2012) and practice guidance [e.g., the “Groupe d’Experts de la

Commission sur l’Entrepreneuriat Social” (GECES)] create expectations on organizations to transform outcomes by evaluating the impact of organizational activities. In the United Kingdom, the Charity Act (2006) placed legislative requirements on funded services to deliver social value, and, then, the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 placed legislative requirements on procuring authorities to identify the economic, social, and environmental benefits of services. The Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 encourages commissioners to fund services that deliver fiscal and social benefits by engaging with new and innovative services. In Europe, policy and legislation operates in a constantly evolving environment, resulting in recommendation for the development of a methodological approach for measuring the social and economic impact of social enterprises (The Single Market Act II). This resulted in the creation of GECES, an expert sub-group, that was designed to develop a universal European social methodology of social impact measurement (Clifford et al. 2014). Developing a universal methodology for social impact measurement enables accountability and transparency in spending, informed engagement, and consistency in impact reporting (Clifford et al. 2014). The emergence of policy frameworks and practice guidance extends beyond the United Kingdom and Europe, having relevance for academics, policy-makers, and practitioners around the world in developing best-practice approaches to social impact measurement that can be used to support the SDG’s aims. The SDGs, although not specifically aimed at measuring the social impact of services, places pressure on Member States to address systemic barriers to sustainability (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020) through developing and/or funding services that transform outcomes in this area. Outlining targets and indicators, the SDGs introduce new expectations on Member States, and organizations operating within Member States, to capture the social impact of activities that align with the SDGs. The introduction of policy and practice guidance has resulted in expectations on organizations, from funders and commissioners, to outline the social impact of activities, not only for improving services

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but for securing future funding (Stevenson et al. 2010; Chapman et al. 2010). Essentially, with the commissioning and funding landscape evolving, the expectations on organizations to evidence impact have grown substantially (Clifford et al. 2014). This is particularly true for organizations receiving government funding, who are expected to demonstrate the social impact of activities offered as a result of funding (Ellis and Gregory 2008). Although perceived pressure from the funding bodies can influence social impact measurement within organizations, there are other reasons to measure impact. Research (Stevenson et al. 2010; Chapman et al. 2010) has shown that organizations engage in social impact measurement, not only to satisfy funder requirements but to effectively target activities and resources. Targeting activities and resources allow organizations to ensure effective and sustainable provisions that improve outcomes for services users (Paterson-Young et al. 2019) while outlining investment opportunities, establishing performance objectives, and assessing achievements (Maas 2014). Furthermore, measuring impact allows organizations to improve credibility and staff morale, encourage improvement of services, demonstrate the effectiveness of services to beneficiaries and stakeholders, and establish positive publicity (Lyon and Arvidson 2011; Ogain et al. 2012). Consequently, organizations are able to refine their program/service designs based upon evidence-led approaches, which consider the role and impact of the multitude of stakeholder groups involved (Hazenberg et al. 2015). Expectations that organizations measure impact (e.g., financial pressures, legislative implementation, and internal motivation) have led to an increase in social impact measurement approaches, especially driven by the public and third sectors (Paterson-Young et al. 2019).

How to Measure: Building a Social Impact Measurement Approach Social impact measurement has received growing attention over the past decade, with expectations through public/third sector funders and legislation that organizations measure impact (PatersonYoung et al. 2019). Understanding the

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development of social impact measurement provides a starting point for developing a universal social impact measurement approach, suitable for measuring the impact of organizational activities aligned with the SDGs. Outcome measurement was influenced by early research conducted by Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton in seventeenth-century Europe (Betz 2011), which led to empirically grounded theory with: 1. A scientific model that could be verified by observation (Copernicus) 2. Precise instrumental observations to verify the model (Brahe) 3. Theoretical analysis of experimental data (Kepler) 4. Scientific laws generalized from experiment (Galileo) 5. Mathematics to quantitatively express theoretical ideas (Descartes and Newton) 6. Theoretical derivation of an experimentally verifiable model (Newton) This provided the foundation for modern scientific inquiry, leading to developments in social impact measurement in the 1970s (Hornsby 2012), with the work of the US Agency for International Development’s logic framework in 1971 and Claude Bennett’s hierarchy of program effectiveness in 1976 (Knowlton and Phillips 2012). The development of logic models was pushed by the United Way of America publication in 1996 and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation in 2001 (Knowlton and Phillips 2012). These publications sparked interested in the development of logic models, with Knowlton and Phillips (2012), stating that logic models: 1. Develop common language among stakeholders 2. Offer highly participatory learning opportunities 3. Document and emphasize explicit outcomes 4. Clarify knowledge about effective approaches and why 5. Identify important variables to measure and enable effective use of evaluation resources

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6. Provide a credible reporting framework 7. Lead to improved design, planning and management A coherent logic model with strong and reasonable associations in the chain is essential for establishing the overall direction of measurement. Theory of change models illustrate the changes that occur, iteratively, with multiple interactions of features (Knowlton and Phillips 2012). Establishing a logic model (or theory of change) allows for the creation of impact chains that outlines the relationships and/or associations between inputs (resources deployed to address specific activities), activities (actions or tasks completed in order to meet specific objectives), outputs (tangible services and practices as a result of specific activities), outcomes (positive and/or negative changes that enhance beneficiaries’ lives), and impact (intended and unintended social changes, both positive and negative, of activities) (Vanclay 2003; McLoughlin et al. 2009; PatersonYoung et al. 2019). Research found that organizations commonly report outputs (e.g., the number of beneficiaries) and outcomes (e.g., self-reported well-being), with impact data rarely reported (Ogain et al. 2012). Reporting output and outcome information is beneficial for outlining the benefit of activities in the short- or medium-term; however, it generally only captures quantitative information (Stevenson et al. 2010). Impact reporting moves beyond the collection of quantitative information, relying on a robust measurement approach that combines quantitative and qualitative information (Stevenson et al. 2010). Integrating quantitative and qualitative information within an impact chain allows for the collection of in-depth information that indicates not only the success of activities on individuals but also the success of activities on the wider community. Research exploring impact measurement approaches found variance in the scope of measurement and stakeholder engagement (Hehenberger et al. 2013), highlighting the challenge with implementing an effective and robust impact measurement approach. While approaches to measuring impact vary, there are common elements that allow for

the creation of a “common-sense” approach (Hazenberg and Clifford 2016; Paterson-Young 2018). Discerning the best approach to measuring impact for specific programs (in this case programs that promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies) relies on identifying a simple social impact measurement approach that balances the scope of measurement and stakeholder engagement. Paterson-Young (2018) conducted a review of social impact measurement approaches based on the scope of the measurement tool (comprehensive to limited) and the level of stakeholder engagement (high to low). This led to the separation of social impact measurement tools, with the most effective tools providing a balance between the scope of the measurement tool and stakeholder engagement. Based on this approach, the social impact measurement for local economies (SIMPLE) approach (McLoughlin et al. 2009) provides an effective framework for social impact measurement. This approach allows for the measurement of outputs, defined as the tangible and immediate results of activities (i.e., the number of people completing an intervention) (ibid.); outcomes, defined as the positive and/or negative changes that enhance beneficiaries’ lives (e.g., improvements in psychological well-being) (ibid.); and impact, defined as the intended and unintended social changes, both positive and negative, of activities (ibid.). Research outlines the overreliance of output measurement in evaluation reports (Ogain et al. 2012), and, although this method of evaluation is beneficial in tracking the success of activities, if employed in isolation, it neglects the long-term participant benefits (i.e., outcomes) and social change (i.e., impact) resulting from activities (Paterson-Young et al. 2019). Adopting the SIMPLE approach (McLoughlin et al. 2009) allows for the development of a robust approach that, when coupled with clear guidance, can be beneficial in illustrating transformative outcomes. The European Commission’s GECES framework (Clifford et al. 2014) developed useful guidance on how to deliver social impact measurement strategically and operationally. Furthermore, the framework highlights additional impact areas including the importance of capturing data in

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relation to deadweight, the changes that would have occurred regardless of the activities or intervention; alternative attribution, the impact resulting from other activities or interventions; and drop-off, the decreasing effect of activities or interventions over time (Fig. 1). This framework offers a starting point for measuring activities that align with the SDGs; however, the diverse nature of organizations operating across sectors means that caution should be exercised in implementing this framework without considering the organization’s objectives, mission, and stakeholders (Hornsby 2012). Implementing frameworks requires an understanding of the pathway toward measurement, specifically understanding the purpose of social impact measurement, identifying key stakeholders, identifying appropriate measurement tools for the specific activities, and reporting and/or disseminating findings to external and internal stakeholders (Clifford et al. 2014: 7): 1. Identify objectives: What are the objectives of the impact measurement (i.e., organizations and partners)? 2. Identify stakeholders: Who are the beneficiaries and who provide resources? 3. Relevant measurement: Understand the theory of change, and then utilize relevant indicators to capture this. 4. Measure, validate, and value: Assess whether outcomes are achieved and whether they are recognized by the various stakeholders. 5. Report, learn, and improve: Ensure the dissemination of and meaningful use of the data gathered and findings produced to internal and external stakeholders/audiences.

What to Measure: Identifying MeasurementIndicators Developing indicators specific to organizations requires an understanding of the notions (mission, objectives, principles, and assumptions) underpinning the organization and the services delivered (Hornsby 2012; Clifford et al. 2014). Understanding the organization’s mission,

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objectives, principles, and assumptions in delivering specific services allows for the development of suitable indicators for measuring impact. Aligning organizational activities with specific SDGs enables the identification of specific impact areas (Social Sector Network 2020), comparability of impacts (Initiative of the Sustainable Finance Platform 2017), and consolidation of data requirements and reporting (Initiative of the Sustainable Finance Platform 2017). The SDG Impact: Measurement and Reporting Toolkit highlighted essential questions to help organizations in measuring SDG impact (Social Sector Network 2020: 1), specifically: • How do the SDGs align with your organization’s objectives and operations? • What specific SDGs does your organization support? • What metrics and methods does your organization use to measure SDG impact? • How does your organization set SDG impact objectives? • Does your organization’s mission, vision, and leadership communication include the SDGs? Adopting this approach empowers organizations to establish a process for aligning organizational activities with SDGs and measuring impact. The SDG16, promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies, emphasizes the need for access to justice for all and the building of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Within this, SDG16 highlights several individual target indicators (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020: 1): (16.1) Significantly reducing all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere; (16.2) End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children; (16.3) Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all; (16.4) Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stole assets and combat all forms of organised crime;

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Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement, Fig. 1 Social impact measurement framework

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(16.5) Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms; (16.6) Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; (16.7) Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; (16.8) Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance; (16.9) Provide legal identity for all, including birth registrations; and (16.10) Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements. Identifying specific indicators for the SDGs is complex, with activities and/or interventions offered by organizations operating across diverse sectors. For example, victim support services focusing to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children (16.2) are not focused on substantially reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms (16.5). Indicators associated with specific SDG targets help to identify manageable areas for impact measurement, with the indicators associated with 16.1 identified as 16.1.1 number of victims of international homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age; 16.1.2 conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population by sex, age and cause; 16.1.3 proportion of population subjected to physical, psychological or sexual violence in the previous 12 months; and 16.1.4 proportion of the population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020). The direct indicators for identifying SDG targets provide a starting point for impact measurement; however, identifying specific areas of impact measurement is essential for understanding the impact of services. Attempts have been made to identify specific areas for measuring impact on the human, social, and environmental levels. The Big Capital Society (2013) Outcome Matrix allows for the identification of indicators across specific outcome and impact areas such as employment, training, and

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education; housing and local facilities; income and financial inclusion; physical health; mental health and well-being; family, friends, and relationships; and citizenship and community. The matrix identifies a broad array of outcomes and impacts (outlined above) allowing for the identification of individual and community benefits. The example below (Table 1) outlines a basic impact chain for measuring the indicator 16.2 (End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children). This example breaks down the indicator, exploring the potential impact for organizations providing trauma-informed services that aim to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence by supporting children. Traumainformed services are beneficial in supporting victims of child sexual abuse and/or exploitation (Eaton and Paterson-Young 2018). Organizations providing trauma-informed services to victims empower victims to understand their behaviors/ thoughts and feelings, which helps improve feelings of safety which, in turn, improves wellbeing, self-esteem, and self-efficacy (Eaton and Paterson-Young 2018). Organizations utilizing this approach are required to consider the effects achieved by others (alternative attribution), effects that would have happened anyway (deadweight), negative consequences (displacement), and effects declining over time (drop-off) (Clifford et al. 2014).

Multi-stakeholder Approach A multi-stakeholder approach to the design, delivery, and evaluation of programs is critical to social impact measurement (Hazenberg et al. 2015), especially in developing a measurement approach that promotes just, peaceful, and inclusive societies. The need to adopt multi-stakeholder approaches to social impact measurement is related to both the design of effective program evaluations and hence the delivery of more effective services moving forwards (Hazenberg et al. 2015), as well as to ensure that powerful stakeholder groups cannot use social impact measurement to drive their own political agendas (Costa

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and Pesci 2016). Indeed, the issue of power and the role that this plays in impact measurement, specifically in the way that dominant stakeholders can use it to reinforce dominant paradigms, is one that has been explored in prior research (Voltan and Hervieux 2017). Ormiston et al. (2020) identified these types of conflicts when exploring stakeholder expectations in social impact bonds (SIBs), showing that often the investors in SIBs are privileged as the holders of funding at the expense of social innovators and policy-makers. The use of multistakeholder approaches within genuine partnership frameworks is therefore a crucial element in ensuring that social impact measurement frameworks are utilized for the correct motives and are not misused. This is also true for those individuals delivering programs or services, for whom there is the incentive to exaggerate positive social impact or obscure negative social impact. Indeed, research by Ormiston and Seymour (2011) demonstrated that social entrepreneurs in Latin America were not measuring their social impact in a way that truly aligned with their social mission, with “managerialist” approaches causing deviation from measurements that truly reflected the impact of the work being delivered. This relates back to the earlier arguments made within this chapter, in which social impact measurement was argued to be an efficient way of regulating the performance of sustainability focused organizations (Nicholls 2009; Clifford et al. 2013); however, this regulation is only effective if the efficacy of the evaluative measures and the trust in the outcomes and impacts reported is high. This is critically important in relation to the measurement of social impact within the SDGs, especially when specific indicators of impact are being selected. Returning to the example provided above in Table 1, different stakeholders will have differing agendas in the measurement and reporting of impact in relation to SDG16. Law enforcement authorities may seek to demonstrate their performance efficacy by obscuring the real numbers of violent/sexual crimes against the person; while health officials may seek to downplay the real impact of well-being in society on health outcomes, for fear that this would mean reductions in their fiscal budgets so that the money can be

spent on early intervention programs to improve public safety and hence well-being. In such scenarios there is a danger that unilateral attempts at impact measurement do not accurately capture the truth of impact on the frontline, meaning that real performance in meeting the SDG indicators can be blurred. Multi-stakeholder approaches help to limit this likelihood by ensuring that a broad focus of agendas and views is incorporated into the design of impact/program evaluations (Hazenberg et al. 2015), therefore mitigating the dangers outlined above. Such approaches also allow for multiple nodes of expertise to be brought into the evaluation process, enabling the social impact measurement to be transdisciplinary in nature (Ormiston 2019). Nevertheless, this is a key challenge when seeking to deliver (and measure) transformative outcomes in relation to the SDGs and one that it is crucial to meet as part of the wider SDG focus on partnership working to achieve the SDG goals (SDG17: Partnership for the Goals) (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020).

Monitoring and Reporting The design and measurement of social impact is critical for establishing the delivery of transformative outcomes and the achievement of the SDG agenda; however, dissemination of the results is equally critical. This allows those measuring impact to illustrate how the program impacts on beneficiaries and stakeholders and how the program aligns with the SDG agenda. Reporting the results from social impact measurement is challenging, with Hehenberger et al. (2013) recommending the integration of impact measurement approaches within an organization’s performance management process. Integrating impact measurement approaches within organizational performance management allows organizations to ensure reporting is “appropriate to the audience, and needs to be presented in such a way as both to be transparent and useful, and to encourage future behaviours most useful to making the service effective in delivering desired outcomes” (Clifford et al. 2014: 23). This includes considering:

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Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement, Table 1 SDG16 – Social impact measurement example Target indicator 16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children

Activities Trauma informed support services providing victims of sexual violence (Eaton and Paterson-Young 2018)

Output Number of service users self-reporting that they feel safe walking alone around the area they live and/ or victimization surveys

1. How can the results be reported? 2. What has been learned from the results? 3. What are the differences in the program over time? 4. How does the data compare to other programs? Addressing the questions and establishing effective reporting standards are central to embedding social impact measurement fully within organizations. This ensures that they can raise awareness of why change is required, foster desire in stakeholders to support and participate in the change, illustrate how to program can change, highlight recommendation for improving the program, and undertake reinforcement to sustain change. It is essential that the data produced in social impact reports is utilized by the organization to drive internal change and improve the delivery of services (Hazenberg et al. 2015); in fact, this is more important than external marketing of impact to stakeholders. Aligning your social impact measurement with the SDG framework does, however, allow an organization to both use data to drive internal change, but also measure performance against a global standard and disseminate this message in a medium that people understand. Furthermore, the use of global frameworks such as the SDGs allows the reporting to be transdisciplinary (Ormiston 2019) and to gain buy-in from stakeholders (Clifford et al. 2014). In an increasingly

Outcome Improved emotional wellbeing (e.g., measurement tool WarwickEdinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale) Improved selfesteem and/or selfefficacy (General Self Efficacy)

Impact Improved emotional and physical wellbeing resulting in reduction in public services costs (e.g., law enforcement and healthcare) Improved self-esteem and/or self-efficacy increases productivity resulting in educational attainment and/or employment (Brown et al. 2000)

globalized world focused on sustainable development and social value creation, this form of integrated, holistic reporting aligned with global frameworks should become the gold standard for social impact reporting. As noted above, the reporting of measurement requires buy-in from stakeholders (Clifford et al. 2014: 29), and: • Principle of relevance: The report should include the information necessary for stakeholders to make decisions, specifically information on the effectiveness (outputs, outcomes, and impact achieved), efficiency (resources used to achieve the outputs, outcomes, and impact), and capacity (sustainability of impact in the future). • Principle of reliability: Information presented in the report should be accurate and objective, with only verified information contained in the report. Therefore, data sources and assumptions should be clearly presented in the report to ensure transparency. • Comparability: Information on the social impact reported by organizations should use an agreed structure for consistency. This ensures the organizations activities and measurement processes are comparable. • Comply or explain: Acknowledging the challenges in the collection information should be reported to ensure comparability, reliability, and

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relevance. In the event organizations are unable to collect information (e.g., specific SDG indicators), the reasons should be explained. The presentation of social impact information falls into three broad categories, including research reports (literature review, methodology, results, discussion, and conclusion), tailored diagrammatic reports (designed for specific organizations), and/or accounting reports (summary of information with financial table) (Clifford et al. 2014). The report style selected is dependent on the organization type and the social impact reported. Indeed, new technologies are opening up new avenues for the dissemination of social impact data, with social media, online publishing, blogs, and podcasts all being used by social innovators to disseminate their impact. Following this process allow organizations to produce quality reports that highlight transformative outcomes and the achievement of the SDG agenda.

Summary The SDGs outline targets and indicators to address systemic barriers to sustainable development (Costanza et al. 2016). The SDGs provide a blueprint for the development of a sustainable, peaceful, and prosperous planet, with all United Nations Member States encouraged to adopt the agenda (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020). Adopting the SDG agenda creates pressure on Member States to develop and/or fund services that address the systemic barriers to sustainable development and, more specifically, transform outcomes. This creates an opportunity for organizations to maximize funding by introducing a measurement approach that not only captures the organizations success in transforming outcomes but aligns organizational activities with the SDGs to frame their impacts in a wider global perspective. Transforming outcomes requires an understanding of the positive and/or negative outcomes (and more broadly the impact) of activities or interventions. In recent years, the focus on transforming outcomes has resulted in the amplification of social value and

social impact measurement (Jain 2018; Jain et al. 2019; Paterson-Young et al. 2019). Increased scrutiny on public spending and the emergence of policy frameworks (e.g., the Public Services “Social Value” Act 2012 in the United Kingdom) and practice guidance (e.g., the GECES) mean organizations are expected to evaluate impact to improve performance. The emphasis on social impact measurement has resulted in expectations from funders that social impact measurement is essential, not only for improving services but for securing future funding (Stevenson et al. 2010; Chapman et al. 2010). Social impact measurement enables organizations to highlight the benefit of activities, aligned to the SDGs, by identifying short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes and impact (Nicholls 2009; Clifford et al. 2013). It requires an understanding of the scope of the program (outputs of the program), the positive and negative outcomes experienced by beneficiaries (outcomes for the beneficiary group), the changes for beneficiaries and society over time (impacts on society), the role of different stakeholders/partners in this change (alternative attribution), and the changes that would have occurred regardless of the programs delivery (deadweight/control group). Further, a multistakeholder approach to the design, delivery, measurement, and dissemination of social impact evaluations remains critical to the robustness, validity, and trust in the delivery of transformative outcomes and the achievement of the SDG agenda. This allows those measuring impact against the SDGs to also ensure that they align with the SDG focus on partnership to deliver the SDG agenda (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2020). The benefits of social impact measurement in transforming outcomes are evident; however, “social impact measurement” is complex and, in reality, should be considered a predictor of sustainability. This is why effective reporting of social impact measurement, through outputs that are relevant, reliable, comparable, and explanative (Clifford et al. 2014) and that are aligned with the United Nations’ SDGs, remains critical in allowing us to better understand globally the impact of programs and interventions in alleviating societal problems.

Transformative Outcomes: The Use of Social Impact Measurement

Cross-References ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Leadership and Sustainable Development: Perspectives, Principles, and Practices ▶ Regulatory Paradigm Shift for Social Peace and Justice ▶ Social Ventures for Sustainability

References Betz F (2011) Managing science: methodology and organization research. Innovation, technology and knowledge management. Springer, New York Big Capital Society (2013) The outcome matrix. http://www. goodfinance.org.uk/impact-matrix. Accessed 15 Mar 2016 Brown C, Reedy D, Fountain J, Johnson A, Dichiser T (2000) Battered women’s career decision-making selfefficacy: further insights and contributing factors. J Career Assess 8(3):251–265. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 106907270000800304 Chapman T, Robinson F, Brown J, Crow R, Bell V, Bailey E (2010) What makes third sector organisations tick? Interactions of foresight, enterprise, capability and impact. Northern Rock Foundation, Newcastle Clifford J, Markey K, Malpani N (2013) Measuring social impact in social enterprise: the state of thought and practice in the UK. E3M, London. http://ec.europa.eu/ internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/ social_impact/presentation-e3m_en.pdf Clifford J, Hehenberger L, Fantini M (2014) Proposed approaches to social impact measurement in European Commission legislation and in practice relating to: EuSEFs and the EaSI. European Commission report 140605 (June 2014). http://ec.europa.eu/internal_mar ket/social_business/docs/expert-group/social_impact/ 140605-sub-group-report_en.pdf and http://ec.europa. e u / s o c i a l / m a i n . j s p ? c a t I d ¼7 3 8 & l a n g I d ¼e n & pubId¼7735&type¼2&furtherPubs¼yes Costa E, Pesci C (2016) Social impact measurement: why do stakeholders matter? Sustain Account Manag Policy J 7(1):99–124 Costanza R, Daly L, Fioramonti L, Giovannini E, Kubiszewski I, Mortensen LF, Pickett LE, Vala Ragnarsdottir K, De Vogli R, Wilkinson R (2016) Modelling and measuring sustainable wellbeing in connection with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Ecol Econ 130:350–355. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.07.009 Eaton J, Paterson-Young C (2018) The Little Orange Book: learning about abuse from the voice of the child. Victim Focus, Staffordshire Ellis J, Gregory T (2008) Developing monitoring and evaluation in the third sector: research report. Charities Evaluation Service (CES), London Hazenberg R, Clifford J (2016) GECES and the valid measurement of social impact in the VCSE sector.

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In: Gunn R, Durkin C (eds) Social entrepreneurship: a skills approach, 2nd edn. Policy Press, Bristol Hazenberg R, Seddon F, Denny S (2015) Programme recruitment & evaluation: the effect of an employability enhancement programme on the general self-efficacy levels of unemployed graduates. J Educ Work 28(3):273–300 Hehenberger L, Harling A-M, Scholten P (2013) A practical guide to measuring and managing impact. European Venture Philanthropy Association, Brussels, p 124. http://evpa.eu.com/publication/guide-measuring-andmanaging-impact-2015/ Hornsby A (2012) The good analyst: impact measurement and analysis in the social-purpose universe. Investing for Good CIC, London Initiative of the Sustainable Finance Platform (2017) SDG impact indicators: a guide for investors and companies. Dutch Central Bank. https://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/ SDG%20Impact%20Measurement%20FINAL% 20DRAFT_tcm47-363128.PDF?2017091813 Jain P (2018) Conceptualising social value: perspectives of the public, private and third sectors in the UK. PhD thesis, University of Northampton Jain P, Hazenberg R, Seddon F, Denny S (2019) Social value as a mechanism for linking public administrators with society: identifying the meaning, forms and process of social value creation. J Public Adm. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1660992 Knowlton LW, Phillips CC (2012) The logic model guidebook: better strategies for great results, 2nd edn. Sage, London Lyon F, Arvidson M (2011) Social impact measurement as an entrepreneurial process. Third Sector Research Centre, Birmingham Maas K (2014) Classifying social impact frameworks [Online]. https://www.conference-board.org/ retrievefile.cfm?filename¼TCB_GT-V1N2-141.pdf& type¼subsite. Accessed 9 Sept 2015 McLoughlin J, Kaminski J, Sodagar B, Khan S, Harris R, Arnaudo G, McBrearty S (2009) A strategic approach to social impact measurement of social enterprises: the SIMPLE methodology. Soc Enterp J 5(2):154–178 Nicholls A (2009) We do good things don’t we? Blended value accounting in social entrepreneurship. Acc Organ Soc 34(6–7):755–769 Ogain EN, Lumley T, Pritchard D (2012) Making an impact. NPC, London Ormiston J (2019) Blending practice worlds: impact assessment as a transdisciplinary practice. Bus Ethics Eur Rev 28(4):423–440 Ormiston J, Seymour R (2011) Understanding value creation in social entrepreneurship: the importance of aligning mission, strategy and impact measurement. J Soc Entrep 2(2):125–150 Ormiston J, Moran M, Castellas E, Tomkinson E (2020) Everybody wins? A discourse analysis of competing stakeholder expectations in social impact bonds. Public Money Manag 40(3):237–246 Paterson-Young C (2018) ‘Inspiring futures’ – how social impact measurement as a form of organisational performance management can enhance outcomes for children and young people in custody. PhD thesis, University of Northampton

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940 Paterson-Young C, Bajwa-Patel M, Hazenberg R (2019) The social impact of custody on young people in the criminal justice system. Palgrave, Cham Sairinen R, Kumpulainen S (2006) Assessing the social impact in urban waterfront regeneration. Environ Impact Assess Rev 26:120–135 Social Sector Network (2020) SDG impact: measurement and reporting toolkit. https://socialsectornetwork.com/ sdg-impact-measurement-and-reporting/. Accessed 12 Feb 2020 Stevenson N, Taylor M, Lyon F, Rigby M (2010) Social impact measurement (SIM) experiencing and future directions for the third sector organisations in the east of England. Working paper. Social Enterprise East of England, Bradford UN Sustainable Development Goals (2020) Goal 16: promote justice, peaceful and inclusive societies. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-jus tice/. Accessed 5 Feb 2020 Vanclay F (2003) International principles for social impact assessment. Impact Assess Proj Appraisal 21(1):5–12 Voltan A, Hervieux C (2017) Social impact assessment of a community engagement initiative. Paper presented at the 9th International Social Innovation Research Conference, 12th–14th December 2017, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne

Transitional Justice ▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals

Transitional Justice and the Sustainable Development Goals: Towards a Complementary Approach Nadeshda Jayakody Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Definition Transitional justice is a comprehensive set of measures that seek to address gross human rights and/or international humanitarian law violations NOTE: All views are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of any organisation that I am affiliated with.

Transitional Justice

commonly perpetrated during armed conflict and/or authoritarian rule. Addressing violations means discovering the truth about what really occurred, holding perpetrators criminally or otherwise accountable for their actions, providing reparations to victims, and ensuring that violations do not occur again through the enactment of institutional and structural changes and the strengthening of the rule of law. The measures taken are judicial and non-judicial in nature and typically consist of four main elements: truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence.

Introduction Transitional justice is a set of judicial and nonjudicial measures that seek to address gross human rights and international humanitarian law violations that have typically occurred during a period of armed conflict and/or authoritarian rule. Transitional justice is closely linked with sustainable development goal (SDG) 16, as it inherently seeks to promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies through the implementation of measures that aim to transition countries away from their violent pasts towards peaceful futures encompassing inclusive communities, economies, and governance institutions (Sancho 2014). This entry examines how transitional justice as a set of measures focusing on truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence contributes to the advancement of SDG 16. In doing so, section “Origins and Aims of Transitional Justice” details the origins and aims of transitional justice; section “The Four Elements of Transitional Justice” examines the four core elements of transitional justice and how they relate to SDG 16; section “Transitional Justice and Sustainable Development: Making Connections” specifically assesses the relationship between transitional justice and SDG 16, as well as the challenges that arise when these concepts do (or do not) interact; section “Challenges That May Arise when Development and Transitional Justice Are Not Pursued in a Mutually Reinforcing Manner: The South African Example” examines how one country, South Africa, grappled with transitional

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justice and sustainable development as interrelated fields; and section “Conclusion and Ways Forward” concludes.

Origins and Aims of Transitional Justice While aspects of transitional justice can be traced back to the prosecution of Nazis at the Nuremberg trials (Bass 2000), or even further back to trials more than 2000 years ago in Ancient Greece (Elster 2004), the literature suggests that transitional justice developed as a full-fledged concept and field throughout the 1980s and 1990s to address issues faced in South Africa and by countries in Latin America that were transitioning from dictatorships to democracies (Arthur 2009). The Aspen Institute Conference in 1988 was a particularly important event for the development of transitional justice, as it was the first set of meetings that sought to elucidate and solidify the field’s conceptual, practical, and institutional frameworks. While elements of transitional justice were present decades or even centuries before, this event provided a novel intellectual framework for human rights activists, political scientists, lawyers, and philosophers to discuss what sets of measures could be used by societies with a legacy of human rights violations to adequately address the past and move forward as more just, inclusive, and peaceful societies. Thus, transitional justice has its roots in human rights and was “invented as a device to signal a new sort of human rights activity” (Arthur 2009, p. 326) catered towards transitional contexts. Notably, the term “transitional justice” was not authored at the conference, and in fact it is not clear who first invented it. Arthur postulates that the term can be traced to several authors including philosopher Milton Fisk in 1989 and Argentinian sociologist Juan E. Corradi in 1992 (2009). Irrespective of who invented the term, its understanding and acceptance was most significantly aided by Neil Kritz who published a four-volume compendium entitled Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes in 1995 (Arthur 2009).

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Since then, transitional justice has evolved as a distinct field and has been adapted to suit different contexts. For example, justice could mean court trials in one context or modes of accountability reflective of traditional customs, such as the local community Gacaca courts in Rwanda, in another. Despite variances, transitional justice at its core is victim-centric and focused on ending impunity and re-establishing respect for human rights and the rule of law in the short and long term. It is underpinned by rights and obligations found in international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law and encompasses the right to truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence. The last element is predominantly focused on improving state institutions such as judiciaries so that they are accountable, effective and earn people’s trust. These objectives are directly linked with SDG 16 which aims to promote “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.”

The Four Elements of Transitional Justice The literature recognizes four universal components of transitional justice: truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence (South Asian Centre for Legal Studies 2015; Arthur 2009; Sikkink 2011). These components are not mutually exclusive and must be addressed holistically by transitioning societies, though how these components are integrated and addressed within a transitional justice setting is context dependent. Truth Truth seeking and truth telling are an important part of the transitional justice process where societies attempt to uncover and understand what actually occurred during a period of repression and/or conflict and reckon with the past. It allows victims and the broader society to understand the pattern, extent, and nature of human rights

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violations. Truth seeking and telling are often done within the context of a truth commission, which is a temporary, non-judicial body set up to unearth how and what occurred and who was involved. Such commissions also generally examine the factors that may have led to the occurrence of violations so that societies can avoid similar situations in the future. Truth commissions must have an adequate mandate, independent commissioners, be accessible to victims, and be adequately resourced. Once commissioners have conducted investigations, they should release a report detailing their findings and recommendations. Before a truth commission is set up, victims should be consulted on what they want from such a commission to ensure that their needs are met. Often, but not always, truth commissions have paved the way for prosecutions and reparations (Sikkink 2011). Aside from truth commissions, forms of memorialization, such as museums and memorials, also seek to provide an accurate record of abuses. For example, the Auschwitz concentration camp has been transformed into a memorial site to educate people on the atrocities of the Holocaust. Justice The justice component of transitional justice primarily concerns securing accountability for victims of abuses through criminal prosecutions of perpetrators. Prosecutions not only hold perpetrators to account and tackle impunity but set normative standards on the kinds of behavior deemed acceptable by national and international communities (Sikkink 2011; Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2018). Trials for international humanitarian law and grave human rights law violations may be conducted by domestic, hybrid, or international courts or tribunals. Courts that have tried or continue to try grave violations include the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. Prosecutions should seek to target those most responsible for grave violations at the first instance, including heads of state and military leaders. Trials should be held according to fair processes.

Reparations Reparations seek to deliver redress to victims of violations and place the victim back in the position they would have been in had the violation (s) not occurred. Reparations typically come in the form of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. Compensation seeks to compensate victims for damages caused by violations; restitution measures are those that seek to place the victim in the position they were in before the violation, for example, by returning a victim’s land from which they were displaced; rehabilitation is the provision of, inter alia, medical or legal services; and satisfaction refers to symbolic measures such as apologies by wrongdoers. Reparations can be related to development activities. For example, the introduction of health and education programs to victim communities could form part of a reparations package for human rights violations but also serve to advance development goals. However, it is also important that the two goals are differentiated. Where human rights abuses have occurred at the hands of the state, reparations serve as a way for the state to explicitly acknowledge the harm it has caused the victim and take responsibility for any wrongdoing (South Asian Centre for Legal Studies 2015; Sancho 2014). Thus, reparations should be clearly communicated as such and should not be phrased as exclusively forming part of development activities. Guarantees of Non-recurrence Guarantees of non-recurrence refer to reforms that are undertaken by the state to ensure that past abuses do not occur again in the future. Typically, laws and state institutions that enabled abuses to occur are reformed. For instance, constitutional reform may occur to strengthen fundamental rights protection, equality, democratic participation, and the rule of law. For example, excessive executive powers may be wound back to protect the separation of powers. Further, laws that impeded human rights may be amended or repealed, while laws to protect fundamental rights are enacted. The state might also accede to international human rights treaties and implement them into domestic law.

Transitional Justice and the Sustainable Development Goals

In addition, state institutions most responsible for abuses, such as the police or military, may be reformed and restructured through the imposition of strict rules of conduct to change the organizational culture that likely led to abuses. Personnel who committed violations may be vetted out of these bodies. Institutional reform is done with a view to ensuring that these bodies respect human rights and are accountable to and trusted by the public. One way to ensure civilian oversight over government institutions and build trust within the public is to enact freedom of information laws that enable citizens to access information on how state institutions and processes function. Connections with SDG 16 The four key elements of transitional justice, truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of nonrecurrence, contribute to accountability, ending impunity, increasing access to justice, strengthening the rule of law and democratic processes, and improving state-citizen relations through enhanced public trust in state institutions. These objectives are interrelated with and help advance the specific targets contained within SDG 16. For example, institutional reform endeavors to ensure that powerful state agents, such as the police and military, do not abuse their power, thereby aiming to reduce violence, an aim stipulated in target 16.1. In addition, adopting a victim-centered approach to transitional justice and working towards accountability for human rights abuses, especially of those who may have been above the law previously, promote the rule of law and access to justice (target 16.3). The institutional reform aspect of transitional justice furthermore advances SDG target 16.6, that is, developing effective, transparent, and accountable institutions at all levels. Also, by seeking to establish the truth of what occurred during a period of grave violations through the publication of independent and accessible truth commission reports, and allowing civilian oversight over public institutions, transitional justice measures promote target 16.10, which focuses on ensuring public access to information. There are other connections that can be drawn, and these will be explored below.

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Transitional Justice and Sustainable Development: Making Connections While the aims of transitional justice and sustainable development are clearly linked, few had initially thought to make connections conceptually and in practice. However, in recent years academics, policymakers, and international bodies have recognized the need for integrated theoretical and practical frameworks to ensure that the objectives of transitional justice and sustainable developments are realized in a mutually reinforcing way. This also helps to make certain that governments that avoid transitional justice efforts by arguing that they only have the resources to promote development have no excuse. The discourse has shifted from the notion that transitional justice and development cannot be achieved in tandem due to scarce resources to the realization that these fields have many interconnected concerns (Duthie 2009), inform one another, and therefore can and should be worked on concurrently. While maximizing synergies between the two fields, it is also important to note that transitional justice and development are two distinct fields, and as such, relevant actors must not blur the boundaries of the two unnecessarily. Rather, both transitional justice and development actors should focus on concrete shared goals and explore how to achieve these in the most sustainable and resource-efficient way (Lenzen 2009). This means espousing integrated conceptual and practical frameworks. How are these fields connected in theory, and what can be done to create synergies in practice? Integrated Conceptual Framework Greater connections between the transitional justice and development fields can be made when the definition for the latter is broad in scope. If development is viewed through a rights-based lens and as a way to achieve human dignity (UNDP 1990) and advance human capabilities (Sen 1999) rather than merely as a path towards increased economic outcomes (particularly rises in GDP), the “greater the conceptual overlap” with transitional justice (de Greiff 2009, p. 50). Amartya Sen’s conception

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of development centers around creating a set of factors that enable people to have choices and opportunities to live dignified lives (Sen 1999). In addition, Uvin posits that development should espouse a rights-based approach as the field should assist people to realize and claim their rights, rather than being seen as a form of charity (Uvin 2004). If one prescribes to these conceptions of development, then transitional justice helps to attain the sustainable development goals, including goal 16 which comprises giving individuals greater access to justice. Transitional justice aims to give victims of human rights abuses a sense of justice and the tools to exercise their rights and gain redress for violations of these rights. In fact, measures to advance development that do not take account of justice and rights considerations “fail to achieve sustainable human development” (de Greiff 2013, p. 19). This is exemplified by the Tunisian context where the country’s strong progress on the Millennium Development Goals did not prevent an uprising that largely occurred due to citizens being dissatisfied with their lack of access to justice and minimal good governance. Another important component of development is fostering citizens’ trust in state institutions (Clark 2011). This cannot happen in transitional societies if state institutions that may have been directly implicated in violations or were tacit supporters of them are not reformed as transitional justice strives to do. Hence justice and development are not independent aims where one can be pursued at the expense of the other. While transitional justice can help achieve development, the opposite is also true. Development, specifically sustainable development, can arguably also go towards achieving transitional justice, particularly its most transformative aspect, guarantees of non-recurrence. By striving for better and fairer socioeconomic outcomes for all individuals in a country, development actors may be addressing some of the root causes of conflict or other contexts where rights violations were able to take place, including discrimination and unequal access to resources. For example, Mani argues that in South Africa, justice will remain elusive to some citizens who suffered under the Apartheid era until

socioeconomic inequalities are addressed (2002). In essence, development action may address root causes of violations so that transitional societies can avoid similar situations in the future; guarantees of non-recurrence. Now that the commonalities between transitional justice and development have been highlighted, it is important to ask why this matters in practice? The answer is simple. Development and transitional justice actors have been striving towards broadly similar goals (that is societies where individuals can exercise their rights and freedoms and benefit from choice and opportunity). If these actors are working towards similar objectives, it is important that there is greater collaboration to increase the sharing of knowhow and best practice as well as to reduce the waste of resources and any overlap. The next section examines how actors working in both fields can be better coordinated to garner effective results on the ground. Integrated Practical Framework There are broadly four actors working in the development and transitional justice spaces: (1) donors, (2) international bodies such as the UN and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), (3) the recipient state, and (4) local NGOs and civil society. All of these actors can better integrate transitional justice and development work in five main ways. Changing Status Quo Thinking

In order for development and transitional justice programs to be more efficient and have less overlap, actors working in both fields should focus on detecting common goals (Clark 2011). The former Special Rapporteur on Transitional Justice, Pablo de Greiff, highlights that development actors in particular should “reflect in their practice theoretical advancements in development thought, thereby firmly anchoring justice and right-related concerns in the new development agenda” (de Greiff 2013, p. 21). While the new development framework has already moved in this direction, with SDG 16 acknowledging that states cannot experience holistic development without peaceful and inclusive societies where access to

Transitional Justice and the Sustainable Development Goals

justice is available for all, more work needs to be done to shift the discourse. For instance, certain authors argue that some development actors have at times overlooked rights violations committed by states or other groups to obtain access to vulnerable areas, continue with their development work and maintain working relationships with development partners, specifically the host state (Lenzen 2009). In this way, “justice” has been foregone to maintain “peace.” At times stability is seen as a priority to deliver development outcomes, and justice is viewed as a hindrance to that stability (Orentlicher 2001). However, transitional justice actors have consistently rejected the peace versus justice dichotomy. It is important that development actors also espouse this mode of thinking. Transitional settings are complex and nuanced; however, the rejection of impunity and the need to provide justice to victims of violations are well accepted. In fact de Greiff notes that justice, security, and development are strongly interlinked such that “in the absence of justice, neither security nor development can be fully realized” (2013, p. 21). Integrated Funding and Programming/Increased Collaboration and Knowledge-Sharing

There must be increased coordination between transitional justice and sustainable development workers, donors, and programs if the integrated theoretical framework is to be realized in practice. Given that transitional justice and development actors are working towards some of the same goals, development cooperation, such as funding and technical assistance, could be increasingly directed towards transitional justice initiatives where possible and relevant, particularly in relation to justice institutions’ reform and reparations (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky 2009). While some development work, such as security sector reform, indirectly benefits transitional justice, the direct transfer of development resources to transitional justice processes that also advance development is an important way to capitalize resources. This has previously occurred to some extent. For example, between 1995 and 2005, 5% of development aid to Guatemala and Rwanda was used for transitional justice measures (Petersen et al. 2009).

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Aside from the strategic allocation of aid by donors, programming can also be better coordinated to maximize reinforcement and decrease overlap and tension between transitional justice and development work. Development projects can stipulate what is being done to advance transitional justice where applicable. UNDP has already adopted this modus operandi to a certain extent. According to Clark, the former head of UNDP, the agency has engaged with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Kenya to assist the body to deliver its mandate (Clark 2011). Further in Guatemala, UNDP’s development work on justice and security created a space for local justice and security actors, victims, and other relevant stakeholders to discuss ideas on how to move transitional justice initiatives forward (Clark 2011). Another way to integrate programming is for the UNDP and other development agencies to hold joint strategic planning sessions with the transitional justice community to ensure that “programmes are developed to advance justice, security, and development simultaneously” (Clark 2011). In addition to funding and programming, the transitional justice and development community can better communicate and share knowledge. Lenzen argues that development actors have for many years been well versed in consulting local communities and espousing participatory methods when carrying out their work (Lenzen 2009). As such, development workers can share with their transitional justice colleagues best practices regarding consultations. In return, the transitional justice community can share know-how on legal frameworks and human rights mechanisms. Other areas where both actors can share knowledge, according to Ndulo and Duthie (2009), are in relation to maximizing resources and capacity when conducting work; political and cultural dynamics in transitional settings to ensure that both actors’ work is culturally sensitive and adapted to the local context; processes (how to best go about one’s work and ensure that local actors participate and are partners); and how to maintain the bigger picture and guarantee that projects contribute to broader reforms concerning the rule of law and peacebuilding. Moreover, both

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communities can share know-how on ways to increase gender sensitivity in programming and guarantee that women’s and girls’ empowerment is a central facet of work being done. Finally, transitional justice and development workers can collaborate to address root causes of violations. For instance, recommendations provided by a truth commission on, for example, the root causes of a conflict could help shape development programming, especially in order to increase access to land, health, education, and other resources in a nondiscriminatory manner. Ultimately, with more integrated funding, programming, collaboration and sharing of ideas on best practice and how to overcome challenges, development and transitional justice actors can work together to achieve better outcomes in both fields. Understanding Boundaries and Context

While collaboration as the previous section highlights is crucial, it is also important that both sets of actors understand any boundaries between the two fields. This is especially pertinent in relation to reparations provided to victims as part of the transitional justice agenda. For example, if a government provides educational or health facilities to a village as a form of reparation for rights violations, this should be clearly enunciated as such. These measures should not be framed as development programs since reparations require the state to acknowledge that it is providing these services in order to compensate victims, take responsibility, and atone for its mistakes. Another example where the aims of transitional justice and development may become confused is in relation to land rights. One aim of development is to work on systematic land tenure security. Although transitional justice actors should also examine this question, especially in relation to root causes of conflict and rights violations, this should not get in the way of these actors working towards redress for specific land rights violations against specific named victims. Individuals in transitional settings should not get lost in the broader debates that development actors tend to focus on. Having said that, transitional justice in its most transformative sense should focus on structural issues, with individual

cases and structural changes being worked on in tandem. For instance, while the structural causes and consequences relating to land rights violations and the unequal access or ownership of land may not be adequately addressed through a reparations program, these concerns can still be addressed through truth commissions. This is because truth commissions are set up to examine the bigger picture, including the extent of harm done and the root causes of violations. Truth commissions can also provide broad policy recommendations on how to avoid violations in the future, thereby focusing on structural concerns (Huggins 2009). Further, development actors should clearly understand the legacies of human rights violations and their impact on the local population when working on the ground. For example, there have been cases where development agencies have hired local staff from one ethnicity, creating strains between ethnicities that may have already experienced ethnic violence and tensions (Lenzen 2009). Increased Participation of Those Affected

A sound way to understand what communities want from transitional justice and development programs is to adequately consult them. It is important for both sets of actors to hold consultations in order to understand common goals and how they can be achieved in a way that is resource efficient, sustainable, and attune to local needs and customs. Clark argues that development actors, including UNDP, have increasingly engaged with civil society groups and communities to provide a space for them to voice their needs and ensure that these groups are viewed as development partners and not simply as aid recipients (2011). It is important that transitional justice actors also engage in this way, and while there has been engagement, greater consultations are needed. This is demonstrated by the fact that in some transitioning societies, foreign actors have sought to shape what justice looks like without understanding that local elements of justice should also form a part of accountability measures (Higonnet 2006). Here transitional justice actors can learn from the “development philosophy that local involvement is critical to sustainable longterm development” (Higonnet 2006, p. 360).

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Importantly, certain transitional justice outcomes, such as increased trust in public institutions and empowered individuals who are able to realize their rights, help to solidify the norms that inspire participatory citizenship (de Greiff 2009). And participatory citizenship is an element that must be present if development work is to succeed. If citizens do not trust institutions or feel they can participate in decision-making, then development can be undermined. Therefore Greiff argues that perhaps the most important contribution that transitional justice can make to advance development is strengthened participatory citizenship (2009). Measuring Impact of Work

Finally, transitional justice and development actors working on concurrent projects must measure their success/impact against particular indicators. Measuring impact is complicated as certain outcomes, such as reconciliation, can at times be intangible. For example, how can we measure if two different ethnic groups who conducted armed hostilities are now fully reconciled? Nevertheless, one set of indicators that could be used to measure impact are the ones stipulated in SDG 16. For instance, transitional justice actors could measure whether SDG 16 is being fulfilled according to, inter alia, the following indicators: the proportion of victims of grave human rights abuses who reported their victimization to competent authorities and/or transitional justice mechanisms; the proportion of a population in a transitioning society that is satisfied with their last experience of a public service, including a transitional justice mechanism; the proportion of underrepresented or marginalized groups such as women and ethnic minorities in public institutions, including transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission or a special court; the number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists, and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months; and whether the transitioning society has adopted and implemented constitutional, statutory, and/or policy guarantees for public access to information.

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Challenges That May Arise when Development and Transitional Justice Are Not Pursued in a Mutually Reinforcing Manner: The South African Example South Africa is an example of a country that arguably did not effectively integrate development and transitional justice programs during a period of transition and is now witnessing negative impacts. In South Africa, some of the land that was taken from the black population during Apartheid was retransferred as part of the transitional justice restitution process in the post-Apartheid era. However, Huggins points out that the government provided leasing agreements to affected parties where the land would continue to be used for large-scale commercial production without adequate consultation with the black population (2009). This was problematic according to Huggins (2009, p. 352) as the government’s commitment to agrarian policy: [H]as meant that those black farmers who have claimed land and have attempted to start smallholder farm enterprises are struggling to succeed within a wider economic system geared for large-scale production. While the state has provided some support, its “developmental” interventions tend to benefit commercial farmers rather than the smallholder majority. In short, while the multifaceted land reform program was intended to “restore identity and promote reconciliation, whilst redistributing wealth and strengthening the rural economy,” some observers have argued that these are competing and possibly irreconcilable objectives.

Thus, where transitional justice efforts are not consultative and do not address socioeconomic inequalities, justice will remain elusive to some (Mani 2002). Furthermore, while these efforts of providing land for commercial production may be viewed as a strong push towards development by some, the policy has arguably in fact undermined one key aspect of development. Specifically, black South Africans were afforded land without being afforded the right to choose what to do with it, hampering Sen’s vision of development where people have freedom and choice to empower themselves.

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Ultimately, both transitional justice and development efforts were hindered in South Africa due to, inter alia, a lack of integration and, most importantly, consultation.

Conclusion and Ways Forward In sum, the key components in the transitional justice field, that is, truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence, go towards achieving development goals, including goal 16 which concerns promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions. While transitional justice measures help realize development, the opposite is also true. Without development outcomes, such as the fair distribution of resources, the root causes of rights violations and transitional justice’s aim to guarantee non-recurrence cannot be fulfilled. Recognizing conceptual connections is important for how development and transitional justice actors work in practice in and on transitioning societies. In particular, there should be greater integrated funding, programming, knowledgesharing, and collaboration. Having said that, transitional justice and development actors should also understand any limits between integrating the two fields, in particular where reparations for human rights violations are concerned.

Cross-References ▶ Rule of Law and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

References Arthur P (2009) How “transitions” reshaped human rights: a conceptual history of transitional justice. Hum Rights Q 31:321–367 Bass GJ (2000) Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton University Press, Princeton Clark H (2011) A role for development in transitional justice: the Arab spring and beyond. UNDP. http://

www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/ s p e e c h e s/ 2 0 11 / 11 / 1 4 /h e l en - c la r k -a -r o l e- f o rdevelopment-in-transitional-justice-the-arab-springand-beyond.html. Accessed 25 May 2018 Dancy G, Wiebelhaus-Brahm E (2018) The impact of criminal prosecutions during intrastate conflict. J Peace Res 55(1):47–61 De Greiff P (2009) Articulating the links between transitional justice and development: justice and social integration. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 28–75 De Greiff P (2013) Report of the special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. UNOHCHR website. http://undocs. org/A/68/345. Accessed 1 July 2018 De Greiff P, Duthie R (2009) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York Duthie R (2009) Introduction. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 17–27 Elster J (2004) Closing the books: transitional justice in historical perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Higonnet ER (2006) Restructuring hybrid courts: local empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform. Ariz J Int Comp Law 23(2):347–435 Huggins C (2009) Linking broad constellations of ideas: transitional justice, land tenure reform, and development. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 332–374 Lenzen M (2009) Roads less traveled? Conceptual pathways (and stumbling blocks) for development and transitional justice. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 76–109 Mani R (2002) Beyond retribution: seeking justice in the shadows of war. Polity/Blackwell, Cambridge Ndulo MB, Duthie R (2009) The role of judicial reform in development and transitional justice. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 250–281 Orentlicher D (2001) Settling accounts: the duty to prosecute human rights violations of a prior regime. Yale Law J 100:2537–2615 Petersen S, Samset I, Wang V (2009) Foreign aid to transitional justice: the cases of Rwanda and Guatemala, 1995–2005. In: Ambos K, Large J, Wierda M (eds) Building a future on peace and justice: studies on transitional justice, peace and development. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 439–467 Roht-Arriaza N, Orlovsky K (2009) A complementary relationship: reparations and development. In: De Greiff P, Duthie R (eds) Transitional justice and development: making connections. Social Science Research Council, New York, pp 170–213

Transnational Organized Crime and UN Sustainable Development Goals Sancho H (2014) Using transitional justice to promote development: development trends. SIDA archive. https://www.sida.se/contentassets/3e28b323f8374010 a577bdad7cb47593/15410.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018 Sen A (1999) Development as freedom. Knopf, New York Sikkink K (2011) The justice cascade: how human rights prosecutions are changing world politics. W.W. Norton, New York/London South Asian Centre for Legal Studies (SACLS) (2015) Handbook on transitional justice. SACLS website. http://sacls.org/images/training-material/ HANDBOOK_ON_TRANSITIONAL_JUSTICE_-_ ENGLISH.pdf. Accessed 13 April 2018 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1990) Human development report. UNDP, New York Uvin P (2004) Human rights and development. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield

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The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, defines the concepts of “organized criminal group” (OCG), “serious offence,” and the “transnational nature” of an offence (Schloenhardt 2014, pp. 414–418; Boister 2016b, pp. 130–136; UNODC 2020d, p. 3; Coluccello 2017). In light of the interpretation of the UNTOC, “transnational organized crime” can be explained as “any serious transnational offence undertaken by three or more people with the aim of material gain” (UNODC 2010, p. 1).

Introduction

Transnational Organized Crime and UN Sustainable Development Goals Donato Vozza1 and Salvatore Coluccello2 1 Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity, Coventry University, Coventry, UK 2 Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

Definitions Several difficulties arise in identifying a generally accepted definition of organized crime (OC) due to the wide range of variables inherent in this phenomenon (Coluccello 2017). Klaus von Lampe has collected so far more than 200 different definitions of organized crime elaborated by scholars from different backgrounds (von Lampe 2020), and the subject is still being strongly debated (von Lampe 2008; Allum and Gilmour 2012; Albanese 2014, pp. 1–24; Levi 2014; Paoli and Vander Beken 2014; Varese 2017). Within this context, the notion of transnational organized crime (TOC), one of the most relevant manifestations of organized crime (Williams and Savona 1996, p. 1), described as the dark side of the globalization (Williams 2001, p. 66), is subject to a similar ambivalence (Williams 2001; Mitsilegas 2003; Sheptycki 2003).

The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the UNTOC, adopted in Palermo on 15 November 2000. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has published a report (UNODC 2020d), developed new initiatives against transnational organized crime, and launched a hashtag campaign (#UNTOC20) to celebrate this event (UNODC 2020c). The recent developments at international level aimed at nurturing the implementation of the UNTOC provide a chance to take stock of the achievements and challenges in the battle against organized crime groups (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2020b) and explore transnational organized crime as a multiform, dynamic, and complex criminal phenomenon hindering the accomplishment of the United Nations sustainable development goals (UN SDGs). This entry first analyzes the multiple factors influencing the growth of transnational organized crime, the evolution of the structures and activities of organized crime groups, as well as the economic dimension of the phenomenon. Hereafter, the UNTOC, as one of the main international legal tools for countering cross-border crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups, is critically discussed. Specific attention is devoted to the strengths and weaknesses of this convention and the recent steps towards the establishment of the review mechanism for its implementation. This entry then turns its focus to the impact of transnational organized

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crime on the achievement of the SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions as well as other SDGs and targets set in the UN agenda. In particular, it explores the relationship between sustainable development and organized crime. Additionally, a section examines the new opportunities for organized crime groups generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which could further negatively affect the accomplishment of several SDGs. The last section will take into consideration recent developments at international level to counter transnational organized crime in order to achieve the SDG 16 and face the challenges posed by the spread of COVID-19 pandemic.

Understanding Transnational Organized Crime “I am gonna make him an offer he can’t refuse.” This is the best-known line from The Godfather (1972), one of the most iconic movies ever made based on a novel by Mario Puzo (1969), which chronicles a decade (1945–1955) in the life of a Mafia family in the USA, the Corleones. For many, the mention of organized crime brings to mind the mafia, long conceptualized as a “mystique” phenomenon (Coluccello 2016), and The Godfather, a glorifying portrayal of a hierarchically structured mafia family with codes of honor (omertà). Nevertheless, movies like The Godfather often simplify the reality and perpetuate stereotypes (Albanese 2014, p. 1). These stereotypes might represent a fragment of organized crime as its manifestations and meanings have changed significantly and recurrently over time and space (Varese 2017). Organized crime has diversified over the years and become increasingly global. Criminal groups operate across countries, and transnational organized crime is considered one of the main threats to society, security (Williams 1994), democracy, and the rule of law (UNODC 2010). The question of transnational organized crime is not new; from the pirates of Barbary who terrorized the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century to white slave traders, and the ItalianAmerican mafia globe-trotters who traded drugs

from different corners of the world in the first half of the twentieth century, criminals have often transcended national borders in carrying out their illicit activities. Woodiwiss argues that the origins of transnational organized crime go back far in time, as evidenced by phenomena such as piracy and international brigandage (Woodiwiss 2003, p. 13). Nonetheless, in recent decades, transnational organized crime underwent profound changes from its promptness and magnitude, to the range and the diversity of activities and actors involved. Despite the differences, transnational organized crime is a widespread criminal phenomenon on a global scale (van Dijk and Spapens 2014). The factors influencing the growth of transnational organized crime and trafficking in recent years have been manifold. The rapid expansion of these illicit phenomena is the result of the combination of the process of globalization which occurred at the end of the Cold War (UNODC 2010, pp. 29–31), the evolution of the international economic environment, the growth of gaps in public governance (UNODC 2010, pp. 29–31), the changes of social conditions (UNODC 2010, pp. 32–33), and the spread of civil wars (UNODC 2010, pp. 34). In particular, the process of globalization has accelerated the movement of criminals – including organized criminal groups – beyond national borders (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004, p. 3; Massari 2003, pp. 59–60). In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the development of a new international order, transnational organized crime became a significant security threat (Edwards and Gill 2002; Sheptycki 2003, p. 42). Since then organized criminal groups have become more sophisticated and movable in a context where cross-border activities thrive, where “criminogenic asymmetries” (Passas 1998) between wealthy and poverty-stricken states have become more harmful. Furthermore, globalization and new technologies have created vast opportunities for legitimate businesses, likewise for organized crime. Organized crime has branched out, gone worldwide, and reached huge magnitudes: illegal goods are often produced in one continent, smuggled across another, and

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traded in a third – confirming the dark side of globalization (Williams 2001, p. 66). From a phenomenological perspective, organized criminal groups have been defined in various ways over time (Obokata 2010, pp. 13–15; Williams 2001, pp. 72–78; Varese 2017, p. 53). Based on the study carried out by Donald Cressey (1969), organized criminal groups first may have had the structure of the pyramid-based mafias, in which each participant in the association had welldefined roles. Examples of this bureaucratic model (Edwards and Gill 2002, p. 254; Coluccello 2017, p. 191) are, among others, the Italian Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza (Obokata and Payne 2016, p. 43; Coluccello 2017, p. 191). The criminal groups have also been explained in terms of “illegal enterprise” (Reuter 1983, 1985; Haller 1990). Other scholars describe organized criminal groups as dynamic networks that are efficient and effective and cooperate (Williams 2001, pp. 73– 78). It has been argued that the network model appears to be predominant (Obokata, 2010, p. 17). Unlike the hierarchical model, the network model is more flexible and more complex to counteract. Moreover, networks dismantled by law enforcement agencies are quicker to reorganize (Morselli 2009; Obokata 2010, p. 17). Further studies would also suggest that criminal groups operate in a disorganized way. The disorganized model may be identified, for instance, with reference to cybercrime (Wall 2015), whereby organized crime structures and activities have liquid forms. Although there is an open debate on the predominant model regarding organized criminal groups’ structure, each of these prototypes finds concrete manifestation in reality, and it is difficult to identify a one-size-fits-all definition for all criminal groups. This also highlights the need for policymakers and law enforcement agencies to develop differentiated strategies. The criminal activities carried out by organized criminal groups on a transnational scale are many and varied. UNODC distinguishes between typical and new forms of transnational organized crimes. Drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, smuggling of migrants, and human trafficking are considered “typical forms” of transnational organized crime (UNODC 2020d, p. 3). Organ

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trafficking, trafficking in cultural goods, trafficking in precious metals, and cybercrimes are identified among the “emerging forms” of organized crime (UNODC 2020d, p. 5). A close relationship between organized crime and other offences has also been underlined in existing literature. First, scholars have stressed the existence of interconnections between international terrorism and transnational organized crime (Shelley and Picarelli 2005), which should be addressed through specific policies and tools (UNODC 2020d, p. 5). Scholars have also highlighted the interconnections between the criminal activities of organized criminal groups on a global scale and white-collar crimes perpetrated within the public and private sectors as, for example, corruption and money laundering (Beare 2003; Ruggiero 2012, pp. 12–14). In order to disrupt, prevent, and counter organized crime on a transnational scale, the strategies developed at international level need to promote a public–private partnership and a proactive role of the private sector. The impact of organized crime is almost impossible to evaluate as it is multidimensional and shared across a state’s political, economic, and social structures and activities. Nevertheless, in a comprehensive study on the illicit financial flows from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime published in 2011, the UNODC estimated that the proceeds of crime could amount to around US$650 billion per year in the first decennium of the 21st century (UNODC 2011, p. 7). Based on this study, criminal activities related to illicit drugs represent the primary income of transnational organized crime activities, which has been estimated to be 17–25% of all crime proceeds (UNODC 2011, p. 7). A large amount of criminal proceeds generated by transnational organized crime has a significant effect on the commission of other profit-motivated crime, including bribery and corruption, and on the legal economy (UNODC 2011, p. 9). In 2017, Global Financial Integrity estimated that the revenues generated by 11 transnational criminal markets – including counterfeiting, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organ trafficking, illegal wildlife trade, trafficking in cultural property, illegal

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mining, small arms and light weapons trafficking, illegal logging, crude oil theft, and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing – ranged between US$1.6 and $2.2 trillion per year (Global Financial Integrity 2017, p. xi). In assessing the impact of organized crime on the private sector, the Global Initiative against TOC estimated that it ranged between $3.6 and $4.8 trillion in 2015/2016 (7% of global GDP) (Global Initiative against Organized Crime 2017, p. 10). The correct analysis of the size of the damages caused by criminal groups influences the development of policies and strategies at national and transnational level. Therefore, the methodologies used to estimate the illegal activities of organized crime should be progressively improved and studies should be regularly revised to have a comprehensive and updated picture of the data.

Countering Transnational Organized Crime The realization that individual countries are powerless in successfully combating transnational organized crime has led several actors to elaborate multiple strategies and develop various tools to counter cross-border crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups (Obokata and Payne 2016, p. 37). Many international institutions and organizations are proactively engaging in the battle against transnational organized crime. These include – among others – the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The fact that multiple institutions simultaneously develop policies and measures against transnational organized crime has also begged the question about the need to coordinate all these efforts. In this regard, the White Paper on transnational organized crime published by the Council of Europe in 2014 constitutes an interesting international instrument aimed at promoting coordinated actions in this field (Council of

Europe 2014, p. 39). Moreover, worthy of attention are the activities carried out by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, a network of experts aiming to promote discussion and develop innovative responses to transnational organized crime. The tools and measures adopted at international and regional levels to counter transnational organized crime are various. From a legal perspective, one of the primary efforts was made by the United Nations, which adopted the UNTOC (UNODC 2020d) and further international treaties against different forms of crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups at a transnational level. Relevant legal developments in the fight against transnational organized crime can also be seen at EU level. Unlike other regions, the EU has adopted several instruments aimed at countering organized crime (in particular, Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organized crime) and enhancing judicial cooperation in criminal matters between member states (Obokata and Payne 2016, pp. 35–53). The UNTOC is the most important legally binding tool adopted at international level for countering transnational organized crime (Albrecht and Fijnaut 2002; Boister 2016b, pp. 126–149; Obokata 2010, pp. 25–80; Schloenhardt 2014; McClean 2007; Calderoni 2012). According to this convention, an organized crime group is “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (Article 2(a)). The offence “is transnational if it is committed” in at least two states or “it is committed in one state” but “a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another state,” “involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state” or “has substantial effects in another state” (Article 3(2)). Moreover, the convention applies to “serious crime,” “where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized

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criminal group” (Article 3(1)(a)). A “serious crime” is defined as “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty” (Article 2(a)). This convention can be applied both to hierarchical and nonhierarchical organized criminal groups (Obokata and Payne 2016, pp. 43–44). Indeed, an organized criminal group “does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure” (Article 2(c)). The broad definitions of “organized criminal group,” “transnational” offence, and “serious crime” represent, at the same time, the strengths and weaknesses of the UNTOC (Boister 2016b, p. 149). On the one side, this convention can be used to counter several types of criminal groups and forms of organized crime (Calderoni 2012, p. 431). On the other side, state parties maintain wide discretion in its implementation (Boister 2016b, p. 149). A multitude of provisions of the UNTOC is designed to prevent, investigate, and prosecute a variety of offences, including the participation in an organized crime group (Article 5) (Obokata and Payne 2016, pp. 46–49), laundering of the proceeds of crime (Article 6), corruption (Article 8), obstruction of justice (Article 23), and serious crime, “where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group” (Article 3(1)(b)). In particular, states parties are obliged to criminalize the offences of participation in an organized crime group (Boister 2016b, pp. 138–146), money laundering (Boister 2016b, pp. 146–143), corruption (Boister 2016b, pp. 143–144), and obstruction of justice (Boister 2016b, p. 144). Since the liability of legal entities represents an important tool to counter organized crime infiltrated within the legal economy, the UNTOC imposes legal person liability for the above-mentioned offences and serious offences committed by organized criminal groups (Article 10) (Boister 2016b, p. 144–145). State parties are also required to adopt measures to prosecute and punish these offences (Article 11). Moreover, given that the main aim of the organized criminal groups is to obtain financial benefits from the perpetuation of their offences, the UNTOC also

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comprises a set of provisions on the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime (Article 12– 14) (Boister 2016b, pp. 145–146). The UNTOC also includes several legal provisions aimed at fostering judicial cooperation in criminal matters, mutual legal assistance, joint investigations, law enforcement cooperation, and exchange of information. Despite the existence of a wide range of tools, it has been argued that there is no significant evidence of the implementation of these provisions (Boister 2016a, p. 39). Besides, it has been argued that the UNTOC is weak on the protection of the fundamental rights of the perpetrators, victims, and witnesses of transnational organized crime, whereby these provisions and their enforcement must be read in light of the international legal provisions ensuring the protection of these rights at international and regional level (Obokata and Payne 2016, pp. 61–68). Additional protocols to the UNTOC aimed at countering specific manifestations of organized crime were enacted. These include: the Protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000; the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea, and air adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000; and the Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts, and components and ammunition adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001. Further international treaties prohibit other forms of organized crime (Obokata and Payne 2016, p. 48), including trafficking of drugs, trafficking of cultural property, illegal trade in endangered species, cybercrime, and child pornography. Although 190 countries have adopted the UNTOC, UNODC has recently underlined that this convention “continues to be an underutilized instrument, as its implementation remains a challenge for many States Parties” (UNODC 2020d, p. 711). The lack of a review mechanism has impacted the effectiveness of the implementation of the UNTOC (Boister 2016a, p. 39). In order to

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address this issue, the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC adopted in 2018 a resolution on the “Establishment of the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto” (UNODC 2020e; Rose 2020). In October 2020, the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC adopted a further resolution on the “Launch of the review process of the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto.” This process is extraordinarily important to take new steps towards a common and effective fight against transnational organized crime.

UN Sustainable Development Goals and Transnational Organized Crime On 25 September 2015, member states of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs), encompassing 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) and 169 targets (UN General Assembly 2015). Although all targets have close links with organized crime, Goal 16 (“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels”) is of paramount importance in the fight against this criminal phenomenon. In this regard, the Doha Declaration, adopted on the 70th anniversary of the UN, was a cornerstone in defining a “transformative post-2015 development agenda” aimed at stressing the importance of the battle against crimes, including transnational organized crime, and the protection of the rule of law, with the support and participation of the public and civil society (UNODC 2015, p. iii). Target 16.4 requires the global community, by 2030, to “significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime.” Consequently, countering organized crime is one of the significant objectives for achieving sustainable development on a global

and local scale (Schultze-Kraft 2016, p. 11). Even though the fight against organized crime falls primarily under Target 16.4, there are no specific indicators to evaluate the progress made in this field. Indeed, the existing indicators concern the value of illicit financial flows (16.4.1) and the proportion of seized arms (16.4.2) (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2019, pp. 3–4). The relationship between development and organized crime is, thus, a key topic in the debate surrounding the SDGs. This link has been described as paradoxical (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2019, p. 3) since organized criminal groups often provide essential resources to weak and poor social groups. However, sustainable development and illegal economy are opposite concepts. A study undertaken in 2016 has clarified that organized crime can affect sustainable development from different perspectives (Schultze-Kraft 2016, p. 18). From a political and governmental standpoint, organized crime has been portrayed as a “nondevelopment” phenomenon, since the governance rules used by these illegal actors are alternatives to those of the public institutions (Schultze-Kraft 2016, p. 15). From a social and cultural viewpoint, organized crime creates inter-social conflicts undermining social cohesion and harmfully affects the public health through, for instance, the illicit traffic of drugs which impact on the spread of HIV (Schultze-Kraft 2016, p. 16). From a human security perspective, it has been argued that organized crime can affect the stability of countries and the fundamental rights of people (Schultze-Kraft 2016, p. 18). Finally, organized crime produces negative effects on economic development, as previously highlighted. Target 16.4 is also closely interconnected with the other targets of Goal 16. Firstly, organized crime groups’ activities strongly affect the achievement of targets focused on crime prevention. For instance, Target 16.1 (“Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”) depends heavily on the international and national organizations’ efforts to counter all forms of organized crime. As clarified by UNODC in its Global Study on Homicide

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published in 2019, this target might not be reached by 2030 due to the current number of killings caused by organized crime groups, which constitute approximately one-fifth of homicides worldwide (UNODC 2019, p. 35). Consequently, more attention should be devoted to counter organized criminal groups in order to achieve Target 16.1 (UNODC 2019, p. 35). The achievement of Target 16.2 (“End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence and torture against children”) is also strictly interconnected with the capacity of international, regional, and local institutions to dismantle organized crime groups. As evidenced by UNODC in 2018, around one-third of the world’s human trafficking involves children (UNODC 2018) and the traffic is mainly organized by criminal networks and organized crime groups. In October 2018, a EUROPOL study highlighted the critical role played by criminal networks (e.g., Nigerian networks) and organized crime groups (e.g., Vietnamese OCGs) in child human trafficking – also for sexual exploitation – from non-EU countries to and within the EU (EUROPOL 2018). The accomplishment of Target 16.5 (“Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”) is also partially determined by the strategies adopted to counter organized crime. The existence of a close interconnection between corruption and organized crime represents a relevant challenge for international and local institutions (Ruggiero 2012). Furthermore, democracy, global justice, strong institutions, and transparency are negatively impacted by organized criminal groups and networks, and thus, all other general targets set within Goal 16 – such as Targets 16.3 (“Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels”) and 16.6 (“Develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels”) – are impacted by organized crime. Target 16.4 is also intricately linked with other targets of other SDGs. In 2015, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime published a report focusing on the impact of organized crime on other SDGs and distinguished, more specifically, between different goals, targets, and development impacts at risk (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp.

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7–8). According to this report, organized crime can first hinder the achievement of four “goals.” More precisely, good health and well-being (Goal 3) are strongly affected by the increasing use of narcotic drugs, illicit cigarettes, or altered pharmaceutical substances trafficked (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 12–15). The protection of aquatic fauna (Goal 14) is jeopardized by illegal fishing, which is closely connected to organized crime (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 16–18). Environmental crimes committed by organized crime groups harm the terrestrial ecosystem (Goal 15) (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 19–21). The presence in different countries of organized crime groups is linked to unusual spikes in violence, which – as already explored – has a considerable impact on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies (Goal 16) (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 22–28). Secondly, sex trafficking, water trafficking, toxic waste dumping, exploitation of migrants, and illicit financial flows are examples of organized crime activities that impact on the targets of the SDGs (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 29–48). Thirdly, there are also further “development impacts” at risk due to organized criminal groups (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015, pp. 50–59). The main risk associated with the development of policies and measures to achieve SDG 16 is the strengthening of coercive powers, which can impact on the rule of law (Blaustein et al. 2018, p. 776) and the protection of human rights. That risk can rise when it comes to countering organized criminal groups at national and transnational level.

The Spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic and New Forms of Transnational Organized Crime The sustainable development goals report published in 2020 assessed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the achievement of

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the SDGs. According to this report, “before the COVID-19 pandemic, progress remained uneven and we were not on track to meet the Goals by 2030. [. . .] Now, due to COVID-19, an unprecedented health, economic and social crisis is threatening lives and livelihoods, making the achievement of Goals even more challenging” (United Nations 2020, p. 2). Even though this report did not explicitly assess the progress of Target 16.4, it can be reasonably argued that the battle against organized crime will be more complicated after the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, which could negatively influence the accomplishment of relevant SDGs. On 13 July 2020, research published by the UNODC showed that the pandemic has had a twofold effect on organized crime. Lockdown measures have only temporarily reduced the illicit trafficking in arms, drugs, and migrants. The crisis caused by the spread of the pandemic will further stimulate migrant smuggling and human trafficking (INTERPOL 2020a). Simultaneously, new opportunities are emerging for organized crime groups (UNODC 2020a, pp. 1 and 9). The above-mentioned research of the UNODC has indicated a significant risk of organized crime’s infiltration into struggling economic sectors due to the spread of COVID-19, including tourism and hospitality, arts, transportation, and retail (UNODC 2020a, p. 15). Moreover, organized crime has penetrated sectors that offer significant opportunities for economic gains, such as medical and pharmaceutical trade, funeral services, waste management, and food retail trade (UNODC 2020a, p. 16). The involvement of organized crime groups in the trafficking of medical products has increased as a result of the pandemic (UNODC 2020a, pp. 16–17, b, p. 7). Worthy of attention is the PANGEA XIII operation coordinated by INTERPOL in 2020 which resulted in the seizure of dangerous pharmaceutical products worth about US $14 million, the arrest of 121 people worldwide, and the closure of 2500 websites, as well as the dismantling of 37 organized criminal groups (INTERPOL 2020c). In October 2020, States Parties to the 10th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC also adopted a resolution aimed at “Preventing and combatting the

manufacturing of and trafficking in falsified medical products, as a transnational organized crime” (Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC 2020b). INTERPOL and EUROPOL also coordinated an operation (Opson IX) during the spread of COVID-19, in which US $40 million of potentially dangerous fake food and drinks were seized, 19 organized crime groups were dismantled, and 407 individuals worldwide were arrested. As highlighted by INTERPOL, the pandemic has impacted the distribution market and the seizure of expired food products is increasing (INTERPOL 2020b). Organized crime groups are also infiltrating legal economies by exploiting the crises that emerged in the transport, tourism, hospitality, arts, entertainment, and retail sectors (UNODC 2020a, p. 15). At the same time, organized criminal groups may misappropriate public funds made available by governments to tackle the economic crisis and unemployment (UNODC 2020a, p. 19). Additionally, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime has highlighted how organized crime has played a role as a substitute for the government in maintaining order (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2020a, p. 14). Regional agencies have also confirmed this trend. On 30 April 2020, EUROPOL published a report showing that organized crime groups are increasing cyberattacks, child sexual exploitation online, and illicit trade of counterfeit pharmaceutical products (EUROPOL 2020, pp. 6–7). Moreover, there is a risk that ordinary people may be involved in these groups due to the negative impact of the pandemic on economy and society (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2020c, p. 3). During the crisis caused by the spread of the pandemic, the “tentacles” of organized crime seem to have become more widespread, making it even more complex to achieve the sustainable development goals. In this perspective, new integrated policies should be developed by international and national authorities in order to avoid witnessing a rise in organized crime. At the same time, the achievement of other UN SDGs is crucial to reduce the impact that organized crime has with its illegal activities on institutions, society, economy, and environment. These objectives

Transnational Organized Crime and UN Sustainable Development Goals

need to be developed in close synergy with each other so that security policies do not frustrate development.

Conclusions Concluding on a positive note, the Conference of the States Parties to the UNTOC adopted in October 2020 seven resolutions to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of UNTOC. It launched the review mechanism of this convention and intensified the battle against different forms of transnational organized crime (trafficking in firearms, persons, and cultural property; falsified medical products; and environmental crimes) (UNODC 2020f). The resolution celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the UNTOC constitutes an important step (Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC 2020a). Indeed, this resolution highlights the close interconnection between the fight against organized crime and the achievement of the SDGs. To this end, it recognizes that countering transnational organized crime means to implement the protection of fundamental rights and promote inclusive societies and strong institutions. Nevertheless, it is also important to emphasize that this process of securitization under SDG 16 must be read with great caution (Lazarus 2020). Moreover, states parties have been invited “to address, including through multilateral cooperation and partnership, the increasing risks, challenges and impediments in the fight against transnational organized crime, in particular those stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications on, inter alia, the socioeconomic conditions of States” (Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC 2020a). This tool is extremely important as it emphasizes the role of institutions, society, and victims in the battle against transnational organized crime. In particular, it commemorates all victims of organized crime such as Judge Giovanni Falcone, the Italian magistrate murdered by the mafia in 1992, “whose work and sacrifice paved the way for the adoption of the Convention” (Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC 2020a). The “follow the money” method developed by Falcone represents an essential key to

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combat all forms of organized crime, and the seizure of illicit assets is a crucial target to achieve in the next years. At the same time, in order to counter this phenomenon, the Conference of the Parties stressed the “important roles of civil society, non-governmental and community-based organizations, the private sector and academia” (Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC 2020a). To paraphrase a famous quote from Judge Falcone, the “mafia” – or TOC in this case – “is not invincible.” It is indeed “a phenomenon deadly serious and that can be won not claiming heroism of unarmed citizens, but engaging in this battle all the best forces of the institutions” (UNICRI 2018).

Cross-References ▶ Effects of Economic Crimes on Sustainable Development ▶ Human Trafficking and the Sustainable Development Goals: Building on Solid Ground ▶ Illicit Trafficking of Antiquities and Its Consequences on the SDGs

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Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2019) Organized crime, SDG 16 and the high-level political forum. Policy note. https://globalinitiative.net/ wp-content/uploads/2019/03/summer_sdg_web.pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2020a) Crime and contagion. The impact of a pandemic on organized crime. https://globalinitiative.net/ wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CovidPB1rev.04.04.v1. pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2020b) The promise of Palermo. A political history of the UN Convention against transnational organized crime. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/10/The-promise-of-Palermo-GI-TOC-Tennant. pdf. Accessed 25 Oct 2020 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2020c) A parallel contagion. Is mafia entrepreneurship exploiting the pandemic? https://globalinitiative.net/ wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Italian-Connection-v7. pdf. Accessed 20 Oct 2020 Haller M (1990) Illegal enterprise: a theoretical and historical interpretation. Criminol 28(2):207–236 INTERPOL (2020a) COVID-19 impact on migrant smuggling and human trafficking. https://www.interpol.int/en/ News-and-Events/News/2020/COVID-19-impact-onmigrant-smuggling-and-human-trafficking. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 INTERPOL (2020b) Food fraud in times of COVID-19. https:// www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/Foodfraud-in-times-of-COVID-19. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 INTERPOL (2020c) Global operation sees a rise in fake medical products related to COVID-19. https://www. interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/Globaloperation-sees-a-rise-in-fake-medical-productsrelated-to-COVID-19. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 Lazarus L (2020) Securitizing sustainable development? The coercive sting in SDG 16. In: Kaltenborn M, Krajewski M, Kuhn H (eds) Sustainable development goals and human rights. Interdisciplinary studies in human rights. Springer, Cham Levi M (2014) Thinking about organised crime. RUSI J 159(1):6–14 Massari M (2003) Transnational organized crime between myth and reality. In: Allum F, Siebert R (eds) Organized crime and the challenge to democracy. Routledge/ECPR studies in European political science, London, pp 50–62 McClean D (2007) Transnational organized crime. A commentary on the United Nations convention and its protocols. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mitsilegas V (2003) From national to global, from empirical to legal. The ambivalent concept of transnational organized crime. In: Beare M (ed) Critical reflections on transnational organized crime, money laundering and corruption. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp 55–87 Morselli C (2009) Inside criminal networks. Springer, New York Obokata T (2010) Transnational organised crime in international law. Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland

Transnational Organized Crime and UN Sustainable Development Goals Obokata T, Payne B (2016) Transnational organised crime: a comparative analysis. Routledge, London/New York Paoli L, Vander Beken T (2014) Organized crime: a contested concept. In: Paoli L (ed) The Oxford handbook of organized crime. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 13–31 Passas N (1998) Structural analysis of corruption: the role of criminogenic asymmetries. Trans Org Crime 4 (1):41–54 Reuter P (1983) Disorganized crime: the economics of the visible hand. MIT Press, Cambridge Reuter P (1985) The organization of illegal markets: an economic analysis. United States National Institute of Justice, New York Rose C (2020) The creation of a review mechanism for the UN convention against transnational organized crime and its protocols. AJIL 114(1):51–67 Ruggiero V (2012) Introduction. The organisation of crime. In: Gounev P, Ruggiero V (eds) Corruption and organized crime in Europe: illegal partnerships. Routledge, Abingdon/New York, pp 3–14 Schloenhardt A (2014) Transnational organised crime. In: Boister N, Currie RJ (eds) The Routledge handbook of transnational criminal law. Routledge, London, pp 409–433 Schultze-Kraft M (2016) Organised crime, violence and development: topic guide. GSDRC, University of Birmingham, Birmingham. http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/08/Org_crime_violence_dev.pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 Shelley LI, Picarelli JT (2005) Methods and motives: exploring links between transnational organized crime and international terrorism. Trends Organ Crim 9 (2):52–67 Sheptycki J (2003) Global law enforcement protection racket: some sceptical notes on transnational organised crime as an object of global governance. In: Edwards A, Gill P (eds) Transnational organised crime: perspectives on global security. Routledge, London/New York, pp 42–58 UN General Assembly (2015) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 A/RES/70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol¼A/RES/70/1&Lang¼E. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 UNICRI (2018) Maria Falcone, Advocate for UNICRI. Shaping a culture that strongly opposes crime and corruption. http://unicri.it/in_focus/on/Maria_Falcone. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 United Nations (2020) The sustainable development goals report 2020. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/ The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2020. pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 UNODC (2010) The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime threat assessment. www.unodc.org/ documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_ 2010_low_res.pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2020 UNODC (2011) Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes. Research report. www.unodc.org/documents/

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Transparency ▶ Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

Transparency

“Transparency is beyond sharing of information and also includes the perceived quality of the information shared” (Albu and Flyverbom 2016). It masters the art of knowing why, how, what, and how much. In terms of business/organizations/institutions and individual or in the context of government, transparency means adopting policy of integrity, honesty, and openness. Transparency is closer to accountability but not identical (Stirton and Lodge 2001). Institutions for human beings are means to create order and reduce uncertainty (North 1991). Institution is an organization or body founded for various purposes like religious, educational, professional, and social and can be formal or informal. Transparent institution thus means the organization or body which lays its foundation on sound principle of honesty, integrity, openness, accountability, and governance leading to impartiality in approach and evolving trust under public scrutiny.

Introduction

Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals Nilay Ranjan Singh IGNOU, Govt. of India, New Delhi, India

Synonyms Accountability; Governance; Institutions; Right to information; Sustainability; Transparency

Definition Transparency is one word which is used generously in various connotations by the people but, in reality, is less understood. “An agreed upon definition of the concept of transparency is lacking” (Relly and Sabharwal 2009; Florini 2002). Transparency is about clarity and compliance of rules, plans, processes, and actions.

Transparent Institutions Pave the Way for the Just Society “Without strong watchdog institutions, impunity becomes the very foundation upon which systems of corruption are built. And if impunity is not demolished, all efforts to bring an end to corruption are in vain.” – Rigoberta Menchú, Nobel Prize laureate (Global Corruption Report 2001). When the world is reeling under the pressure of conscience to deliver a just society and provide freedom and equality to all across the globe, the focus has shifted to the institutions and governments which are supposed to work for humanity in an honest and transparent manner. Communication is an important factor for business management, public relations, and democratic governments. It is important for organizational transparency (Santos et al. 2013). Observation and practice of transparency instill confidence in the government and organizations as well as work as a means of increasing reliability (Fairbanks et al. 2007). According to Transparency International, transparency incorporates accountability which brings in its purview public officials, civil

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servants, higher officials, business people, etc. Monitoring and reporting their activities improve trust upon individual and institutions as well as act as watchdog against corruption. Institutions not only are the embodiment of collective wisdom and knowledge related to their purpose of establishment but also reflect the trust of its stakeholders. An institution is a formation with set of rules governing human interaction. Transparency for the institutions is of utmost importance particularly due to reliance of people on it. Transparency is one of the essential elements of stakeholders’ trust in organizations (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 2014). Institutions formed upon solid foundation of human development and societal norms are building block of society and governance. Through different forms and functions, it ultimately serves the society and is intended to help the humanity whatever way it can, especially, based upon its objectives and philosophy. According to Rosendorff and Kongjoo (2011), institutions are important for development and economic performance. Proper functioning of these institutions with transparency is important. However, assimilation of transparency in polity and the economy is sometimes difficult. Good economic governance is based upon institutional transparency, and it is one of the important steps in improving accountability and fighting corruption (Sumanjeet 2015). Strength of institutions (public) can make or break a nation (Kumar 2005). Institutions can be categorized as “regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities” which provide stability and meaning to social behavior (Scott 1995). Institutions have a high degree of legitimacy, and it is one measure of institutionalization (Brinkerhoff 2005). A common grouping of institutions can be understood by the acronym PESTLE. P – Political E – Economic S – Social T – Technological L – Legal E – Environmental Overall institutions can be classified based upon the foundation of their establishments and

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stakeholders they serve. These can further be grouped into public/government Institutions (institutions which are promoted by governments for the various purposes related to the public) and nonpublic or private institutions. What Brings Transparency in Institutions? The reform of institutions are considered the second generation of reforms after the first generation of economic reforms. (Kumar 2005)

Transparency is both a mean and outcome. Transparency got prominence among national governments, international institutions, and civil society groups from the early 1990s of the twentieth century (Oberoi 2013). Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2003) opined, “. . .transparency is the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information.” According to them, it should be accessible to all relevant stakeholders, and it must encompass the attributes of access, comprehensiveness, relevance, quality, and reliability. The information provided by institutions should be relevant for their evaluation, and then only it would lead to transparency. Willingness of the organizations to let citizen monitor their performance as well as their participation depends upon how transparent organizations are (Curtin and Meijer 2006). According to Oberoi (2013), “. . .important factors of transparency are: a) Event transparency (information about inputs, outputs and outcomes), b) process transparency (information about interaction and transformation related to inputs, outputs, and outcomes), Transparency can be 1. Real-time transparency (information released immediately), or 2. Retrospective transparency (information available only after time elapses).” All agree that transparency is important, but there is lack of unanimity on what brings transparency – especially in institutions. Many

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researchers have focused on information and its quality but in the process overlooked the dynamics of organizational transparency (Albu and Flyverbom 2016). Some researchers have tried to assess the causes or factors responsible for transparency and good governance with varying analysis (Johnston 2002). Though the list is not exhaustive, few contributing factors to transparency and transparent institutions are as follows. i. Dissemination Information

of

Information:

Right

to

Passing legislations and effectively executing the Right to Information Act or free access to information play a major role in establishing transparent institutions, particularly institutions in public domain. Good governance works on the foundation of information which is a contributing factor for increasing efficiency. It not only empowers people but also enables a more equitable redistribution of the benefits of overall growth. This also ensures that benefits are not captured by elites and influential people only (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005). Dissemination of information through the internet brings great potential of facilitating spread of information to the public considering its cost-effectiveness. Information and communication technologies have edge over conventional methods in terms of efficiency, cost, time, and space (Curtin and Meijer 2006). Fung (2013) emphasizes upon a state of information utopia – Infotopia – which considers access to a broad set of information related to organizations or institutions and to its citizens based upon the principles of democratic transparency.

people’s trust in political and economic systems, institutions, and leaders. Action against corruption plays a critical role in establishing transparency and accountability. Removing corruption improves governance as well as socio-politico-economic scenario. Empowering People and Good Governance

Political power has the tendency to provide temptations to succumb to it, and the persons exposed to such temptations must resist it with vigor. Most compelling reason for doing so can be the superintendence of the public (Bentham 1999, 29). “Government for the people” and accountable public administration which incorporates open and responsive communicative practices empower their citizens. This facilitates good governance and institutionalization of accountability and transparency (Fig. 1). iii. Education and Awareness Transparency can never be sustainable, if people are not aware of their rights and do not enforce the government and its institutions to be accountable and transparent. Sustainability is a dynamic concept, and increased awareness/knowledge

Transparency

Social Justice and responsible citizenship

Accountability

ii. Action Against Corruption “Freedom from corruption is a basic human right. We support the pro-accountability voices within the countries who want to build governments that work transparently to guarantee this right.” - Huguette Labelle, Chair of Transparency International. Corruption is the abuse of power and misuse of authority for personal benefit, and it destroys

People Empowerment

Good Governance

Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals, Fig. 1 Transparency cycle. Source: Self-conceptualized

Transparency in Institutions

necessitates the need of transparent accountability mechanisms (Rotheroe and Richards 2007). Increase of awareness and improved literacy help the institutions and all stakeholders. Still, stakeholders, if not directly connected, are not much aware of the role, responsibilities, and functioning of institutions including government institutions. It’s duty of the people to participate and take a genuine interest in action and working of their government. “Public opinion matters and ignoring it can be ominous for any government or its institutions. It is essential to have persistent and sustained efforts to educate the public and make them aware about changes, cost involved in better governance and the result yielded” (Johnston 2002). Public access to government information is a strategy to achieve transparency. Communication

Information to the public are either proactive (government making public aware of its activities) or demand driven (institutional commitment to respond to citizens’ requests for information (Fox 2007). “Communication is the ability of the government and institutions to interact with public and provide information about its activities. For a government, the difference between success and failure is often determined by communication” (Fairbanks et al. 2007). “Independent press, advertisements and political ‘marketing campaigns’ also form part of communications but propaganda or selective information generate distrust amongst public. Success of a democratic government is in its ability to encourage communication and providing clear and relevant information” (Santos et al. 2013). The Barack Obama administration instituted principles of “open government” with three main objectives: collaboration, citizen participation, and transparency. Transparency is the main driving force behind the concept of open government (Matheus and Janssen 2020).

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established upon foundation of transparency and accountability. Accountability is not only to carry out a task efficiently and correctly but also to be answerable for non-execution in the manner expected. Accountability is a two-dimensional concept entailing ‘answerability’ meaning monitoring and justification of the power as well as ‘enforcement’ or the threat for abuses of the exercise of power. (Schedler et al. 1999. Some scholars argue that while transparency is an important constituent for securing accountability, the link between the two is neither unassailable nor automatic. Transparency can be either ‘clear’ (information-access policies which are reliable) or ‘opaque’ (institutions disseminating information with intention to not divulge relevant and reliable information), while accountability can be either ‘soft’ (answerability) or ‘hard’ (answerability plus the possibility of sanctions). (Fox 2007)

Accountability is even more important because it works as checks and balances. Accountability ensures that one doesn’t go overboard and at the same time fulfils its duties. It is responsibility combined with legitimacy and trustworthiness. v. Willingness of Political Leadership The role of political leadership is very critical in developing transparency. Unless leadership acts and encourages, it is difficult to have the good governance and commitment toward transparency and institutions. Serious commitment of political leadership and political institutions is important for improvement in governance and to uphold the rights and life of people. Commitment of High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on sustainable development to accelerate the efforts for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an apt example. Political leadership on various global platforms and multilateral organizations/institutions have pledged support for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

iv. Accountability

vi. Value System and Code of Ethics of Institutions

One important ingredient of good governance is credible and trustworthy institutions which are

Without the value system, an organization/ institution is like a body without a soul. It is the

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value system and code of ethics of the institutions that inspire all the stakeholders to be transparent in their interactions and dealings. The value system of all the institutions must encompass four factors mainly sustainability, ethics, social uplift, and transparency. Every institution must strive to work for the people and society while maintaining transparency and complying with ethics/code of conduct of the institution, attaining sustainability (Fig. 2). Transparency: Responsiveness and Empowerment Some definitions of transparency include “responsiveness” (improved access and quality of services). Transparency can lead to accountability which will incorporate responsiveness as a possible and desirable outcome of accountable statesociety relation. Empowerment is a much-debated term with wide-ranging conceptualization. Transparencyinduced accountability ultimately works for empowerment of people. However, it is a very broad concept. Defining empowerment is not easy so is its measurement. Empowerment is enhancing an individual’s or group’s capacity to make purposive choices. It aims to uplift the status of the oppressed or the common people and the

Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals, Fig. 2 Value system of a public institution. Source: Self-conceptualized

social structure within the limitations and possibilities. Government/public institutions with answerability and accountability work toward empowerment of people. Transparency in Institutions Across the Spectrum of Life The primary purpose of every institution is to serve the people; however, various institutions in different walks of life are being marred by nepotism and corruption. Let us see first how institutions are perceived by people across the globe? (Fig. 3). Corruption is corrosion in the values and results in less than fairly expected performance. Important is not only the purpose but also the purity of means to achieve it. Scientific/research institutions or educational institutions are also not unaffected with the disease of corruption and nepotism. Today when negativity is entering into the world and people are fighting against diseases, poverty, and partisan, the role of scientific institutions and research organizations/ institutions is very important. For this role, transparency is required in all endeavors be it process, funding, or end result. Education works for empowerment, and the transparent delivery of this duty would encourage a better and justified society.

Sustainability

Social Uplift

Value System of a Public Institution

Transparency

Ethics/Code of Ethics /governance

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CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 18

Religious Leaders 30

Judges and magistrates 32

Tax officials

Institutions

32

Prime Minister / President Local government

33 34

Business executives 35 Government officials 36 Elected representatives 36 Police 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Percentage Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals, Fig. 3 Corruption in institutions and groups in society –

global average. Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2017, Transparency International

Medicine/health/healthcare institutions or military/defense institutions have their respective role in the life of people. From taking lives to saving lives, these institutions cover two extremes. Transparency is very important in the funding and financial dealings of these institutions owing to the power they wield. Defense/military deals are often seen with connotation of corruption, and the role of institutions involved is shrouded with suspense. Healthcare/medical aid and medical institutions are also used as arsenal of politics at various instances in many countries or in International relationship, thus asking for more transparency in the institutions involved. Social institutions – advocacy groups/political parties/think tanks/press – need to preach and practice transparency. Transparency (information about institutions relevant for their evaluation) is a major concern for the contemporary social sciences. In the international relations, transparency is acknowledged as tool of regime effectiveness. Think tank and advocacy groups/institutions are often accused of having polarized view due to financial aid or funding and thus assume additional responsibilities of not only being

transparent but also appearing so. Press has a very important role to play in upkeeping the rights and values of citizens and people. Equally important is their independence and transparency in their advertisements, financial support, and state/ regulatory monitoring. The role of political parties and political institutions in promoting accountability and transparency is most desired factor. Transparency must be an important element in Industry/Businesses institutions or Financial/Economic Institutions. Dealing with money and having power to affect the well-being as well as livelihood of people, these institutions touch life of people directly. Monetary transparency have a positive effect on economic outcomes. (Stasavage 2003)

Financial/economic institutions as architecture of growth are more susceptible to corruption. Multilateral economic and financial institutions have focused now on improving accountability and fighting corruption. “Many researchers have identified the role of institutions in economic growth and particularly how the lack of transparency hampers economic growth” (Relly and Sabharwal 2009; Sumanjeet 2015; Mira and Hammadache 2017). Multilateral financial

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institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, Asian Development Bank, and African Development Bank are considered to be platform used by large and powerful nations for their advantage. Demand for transparency in these institutions and combating corruption has been acknowledged by these institutions too, and they have taken steps to improve transparency. “Globalisation and competition in the global economy has also provided a strong incentive for governments to show transparency and openness” (Relly and Sabharwal 2009). The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program was initiated in 2001 by seven international development partners: the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, France, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to harmonize assessment of public financial management across the partner organizations and bring transparency (PEFA.Org). While corruption reduces the trust (in the government), it also impedes investment which in turn affects growth and jobs. Combating corruption gives edge to countries using their human and financial resources more efficiently, attracts more investment, and makes countries grow more rapidly. Civil Society/NGOs/Religious/Charitable Institutions

“An open civil society helps to set governments to account and plays an important role in building back trust because it represents the views of all people, including minorities and the marginalized, to their leaders.”– Huguette Labelle. The emphasis should be on NGOs and civil society as active partners in all phases of the transparency and human rights efforts. Their goal should be to bring improvement in governance and link them with human rights. Religious and charitable institutions having a vast follower base have more power and capability to enact this. (Johnston 2002)

Independent judiciary and administration are pillars of good governance. The governance of a country and welfare measures, peace and justice, development, and international cooperation all

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depend upon administration and institutions of administrations. Judiciary not only works as watchdog and monitoring as well as correction center but also works as savior of last resort. No one can deny the importance of transparency in their functioning. Access to justice is important for not only conflict resolution but also redressing grievances. Institutions should function as per laws in order to do justice to public services and to keep check on abuse of power. Capability of public institutions to administer good governance depends upon effective, equitable, honest policies and implementation and access to information within and around. A strong and sustainable institution needs an independent and effective judiciary, a free and competitive press, and a strong civil society. (Johnston 2002)

Transparency and Accountability in Government Institutions: State Actors and Role of Principal-Agent Transparency is multifaceted, and this poses difficulties for its measurement and theory-building. Transparency and accountability entail a broad range of processes, actors, and power relations (Fox 2007). For transparency and accountability of public/ government institutions, many social scientists have debated the concept of “principal-agent” (Schedler et al. 1999; Florini 2002). In the principal-agent concept, people, groups, and institutions (principals) are able to hold government and other power holders (agents) responsible for their actions and accountable for their decisions as well as actions. According to Florini (2002), governments can’t act as independent actors working for their own interests, but as agent, they must act on behalf of their “principals” – the citizens. Schedler et al. (1999) argued accountability and transparency as horizontal (state actors having formal authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on another) or vertical (citizens or principal holding state or agent “the powerful” to account). However, diagonal (answerability and transparency accounted by interrelationship of state actors and citizens) is also evident.

Transparency in Institutions

Transparency channels information both ways – upward and downward. While “Right to know” reforms promote “downward transparency” (from the state to society), state monitoring and surveillance are a form of “upward transparency” (Fox 2007).

Supreme Audit Institution: Enforcing Accountability and Transparency in Government Institutions Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) perform a central function within government accountability systems. (Supreme audit institutions generally aim at improving and promoting transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the public sector and government institutions. Role and responsibilities of the supreme audit institutions has also changed with time. While compliance and financial auditing was prime focus initially, later these institutions were also entrusted with the job of assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending and government performance. (Monteroa and Blancb 2019)

For SAI, independence is equally important along with capability, in order to evaluate the strengths and limitations of government institutions, processes, and policies. In many countries, supreme audit institutions are also auditing the preparedness of their governments to implement the SDGs and the level of implementation. These efforts have further been facilitated by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and its coordinated effort through the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI). SAIs have been benefitted by their previous experience of auditing national implementation of international development programs, like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), national development plans and similar instruments. But these efforts have not been very systematic. (Monteroa and Blancb 2019)

Role of Some International and Multilateral Institutions for Cooperation: A Transverse Approach United Nations (UN): Established in 1945, it is an international organization (193 countries)

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formed with intention of international development and cooperation and acts as a representative of nations across the globe. It has various specialized agencies associated with it. Its institutions have global reach, approach, and influence. The UN acts as the voice of nations and takes the role of promoting sustainable development, upholding international laws, and protecting human rights through its various agencies or organizations. In last few years, the action and function of UN and its agencies have come under criticism, and there has been demand of more accountability and transparency in the actions of its agencies. Its role through financial agencies like the World Bank, IMF, and World Health Organization (WHO) as well as development through UNDP, UNESCO, and UNICEF is commendable. Thus, bringing transparency in all the works and actions of agencies and bodies of the United Nations would inspire other international institutions as well as national institutions to imbibe transparency as a culture. European Union (EU): A blend of economic and political union between 27 EU countries (Europe), the EU is the most influential body in Europe. Started as the European Economic Community (EEC) of six countries in 1958 (the European Union – 1993), it provides a huge single market. With the European Commission and the European Central Bank (commercial and political congregation of institutions), it makes and regulates policy areas from climate, environment, and health to external relations and security, justice, and migration. International Monetary Fund (IMF): The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (189 countries) works for economic growth, employment, and global monetary cooperation. Its primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system. However, it is also involved in working on macroeconomic and financial sector issues that have bearing on global stability. Considering its influence and ability to affect the global economy, it is of utmost importance that the IMF works as a transparent institution. It has recognized the need for same and taken several measures in this regard. World Bank: With 189 countries as members and offices in 130 countries, it focuses on poverty

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reduction and the improvement of living standards worldwide through its five institutions which work for sustainable solutions for reducing poverty and help in creating sustainable capabilities in developing countries. With regard to corruption, various institutions of the World Bank have zero-tolerance policy. The World Bank group works at the country, regional, and global levels to help its clients build capable, transparent, and accountable institutions. World Health Organization (WHO): The WHO, one of the important arms of the United Nations, works and coordinates for establishment and upkeep of international health. It directs and advises countries and agencies dealing in international health and collaborates between them. Besides working to promote systematic health system and development of better health infrastructure, it also works for awareness and keeping the world safe from pandemics. It promotes research and data collection and dissemination related to health system and diseases and encourages organizations and institutions to find cures for diseases. In the recent few epidemics, the work and role of the WHO have come under intense scrutiny. Demand for transparency and scrutiny of its work is being raised by member countries. It has incorporated transparency as a core value, but it is the need of the time to clear the cloud on its working, operation, and processes. This necessitates the importance of transparency even more in international institutions/organizations of this stature. World Trade Organization (WTO): The WTO is a global organization dealing in trade as well as trade-related systems, rules, and policies of trade between nations. Its agreements are generally negotiated and signed by the majority of the world’s trading nations. It works to ensure free and smooth multinational/international trade and settles trade disputes between its member nations. It has very influential role in world trade and needs not only to be transparent but also to keep the checks and balances so that the influential countries do not use its forum to tilt the balance of power toward them. Sometimes it is accused of bias and is considered favoring developed nations.

Transparency in Institutions

Transparency is a principle in the WTO, and it is ensured through two ways: a) governments informing the WTO and fellow members of specific measures, policies, or laws through regular “notifications” and b) the WTO conducting regular reviews of individual countries’ trade policies as part of the Uruguay Round agreement. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): It is an international organization (established: 1960) which interacts with governments, policymakers, and citizens to build better policies for prosperity, equality, opportunity, and well-being of all. With 37 nation membership across all continents, it is one of the important institutions/organizations working to better lives and prepare the world of tomorrow. The OECD has partnered with various global and regional institutions to combat corruption and foster transparency. Transparency International (TI): “The TI is a Berlin-based international non-governmental organization, working in over 100 countries, promotes transparency as a key component of anticorruption reforms. It has brought the issues of transparency and accountability at the centre in public services reforms debates” (Stirton and Lodge 2001). It is working to expose the systems and networks which support corruption. It promotes transparency, accountability, and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. Its Global Corruption Barometer (worldwide public opinion survey on corruption) since 2003 is one mirror the world needs to see in order to curb corruption and promote transparency. Its Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a composite index (a combination of 13 surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of reputable institutions), is still one of the most used measurement of corruption. The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on corruption perception of experts and business executives of a country’s public sector. European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): The OLAF is a body which detects, investigates, and stops fraud of EU funds, corruption, and serious misconduct within the European institutions and develops anti-fraud policy for the European Commission. It acts as a watchdog to ensure that EU

Transparency in Institutions

taxpayers’ money reaches projects that can create jobs and growth in Europe and are spent on intended purposes. It contributes in strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU institutions and plays an active role in the development of EU antifraud policies as well as in protection of the EU’s financial interests against fraud and corruption.

Right to Information and Keeping Check on Corruption: Critical Contributor Two important aspects which would be critical for achievement of sustainable development goals promulgated by the United Nations are right to information and combating corruption. These also contribute to the establishment of transparent institutions. Various countries have enacted their own versions of rights of information with varying degree of sincerity and success. Information is important for citizen not only to exercise their right but also to ensure accountability in the government and public institutions. It is very important to not only enact a strong act with relation to information dissemination but also encourage the people to exercise their rights without any fear. All the governments must act to remove the roadblocks and deterrents in this regard. In 1766, Sweden first incorporated the ideal of public access to information as a law, thus effecting practices and promotion of transparency. More than 100 countries have so far enacted laws of information. The key constituent in promoting transparency is free and fair access to effective information. Information is effective if it is timely, relevant, accurate, and complete. However, actual implementation of transparency and its related laws and environment is still not fully evolved despite being clearly stated in United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a half-century ago (Oberoi 2013). Corruption impedes the effectiveness of state and hampers economic growth as well as impacts the quality of people’s lives. For macroeconomic performance and economic development, corruption needs to be effectively tackled. It restores

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trust in institutions. Combating corruption requires a comprehensive approach and the coordinated efforts of several institutions. “One reason of different level of corruption in different countries or institutions is balancing the expected cost of a corrupt act against the expected benefit. One of the most obvious cost is risk of getting caught and punished which depends upon the effectiveness of the country’s legal system” (Treisman 2000). Hence, checking corruption system needs to be effective. In another form of principal-agent framework, the principal (the government or citizens) tries to motivate the agent (public agency) to be honest and keep check on corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978). Greater fiscal transparency and increased public access to information lead to better social outcomes. Many international financial institutions (IFIs) and governments have taken measures to enhance fiscal transparency across their member countries and institutions. IMF/World Banksupported programs frequently include measures to address institutional weaknesses, reduce opportunities for corruption, and promote good governance. Involvement of these institutions is aimed at increasing the transparency of government activities. Many countries have set up bodies and organizations to monitor fraud and malpractices and combat corruption which collaborate with global organizations/multilateral institutions and improve transparency and accountability of the system.

Good Governance and Upholding of Human Rights: Key Outcomes of Transparency in Institutions Legitimate, accountable, and effective ways of obtaining and using public power and resources in the pursuit of widely-accepted social goals is good governance. (Johnston 2002) Good governance at an institutional level implies provision of public services effectively to meet the needs of the citizens. (Kumar 2005) Principal-agent theory holds well for not only transparency and accountability but also in combating corruption and ensuring good governance. Many sociologists agree on transparency and accountability being key to all manner of ‘good governance’. (Fox 2007)

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“Transparency is often conflated with ‘good governance’” (Grigorescu 2003). Heald (2006) identifies three different points of determining the level of transparency by government: a) transparency of decision-making processes, b) transparency of policy content, and c) transparency of policy outcomes or effects. There is information asymmetry between the government and the public. Transparency aims at overcoming this discrepancy in information and enabling the public to view what is happening within the government. This is often viewed in the context of the principle-agent theory. In the digital government, or e-governance information has become cost effective and less opaque. Transparency portals have created a window to view government functioning. In general e-government satisfaction is positively associated with citizen trust in government. (Welch et al. 2005.

Mira and Hammadache (2017) has considered “. . .six indicators for good governance after analyzing the composite indicators of the World Bank- 1) Voice and accountability- measuring tendencies of political process, civil liberties, political rights and independence of the media; 2) Political instability and violence- measuring Transparency in Institutions: Critical Factor for Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals, Fig. 4 Elements of good governance. Source: Selfconceptualized

perception of possible destabilization of the political regime through elections or violence; 3) Government effectiveness- measuring perception of the quality of public service/public administration; 4) Rule of Law- measuring perception of citizens regarding rules and the degree of compliance of these rules; 5) Quality controlmeasuring perceptions which are favorable or unfavorable to a market economy such as price controls, imports and exports, and the banking system; 6) Control of corruption- measuring perceptions of the use of public power for private gain.” (Fig. 4). The European Union model for good governance considers five elements: openness, participation, responsibility, efficiency, and coherence (Livioara 2009). In the EU level, new types of governance adopted change through persuasion, monitoring, and mutual learning, rather than hierarchy. The EU facilitates reforms of public administration based on “principles of excellence,” which takes into account “social responsibility,” “result orientation,” “citizen customer focus,” “partnership development,” “leadership and constancy of purpose,” “continuous innovation and improvement,” “people development and

Transparent Particpatory and Inclusive

Accountable

Responsive People Empowerment

Citizen at the core of policy and decision

Instittunoilised ethics and Rule of Law

Effective and efficient

Transparency in Institutions

involvement,” and “management of processes and facts.” The European Commission believes that legal uncertainty and weak administrative/judicial capacity are bottlenecks in economic development. Good governance and public administration are very important for a country’s growth and development. Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states about the right to information; however, its establishment and execution in different countries took a long time, and still, the battle is half won. The right to information is increasingly recognized as a fundamental democratic right. Another very critical aspect is the restoration of belief in humanity through recognition of human rights and setting up institutions to preserve them. Many governments have enacted laws to safeguard human rights. This restores the trust of people in the government and public institutions as well as creates bonding of love among people (Johnston 2002). Human rights should be an important goal and a continuing theme across policymaking and implementation. The focus should be to broaden the consultation on human rights and issues related to it. Governments and the NGO both play a very important role in strengthening the system for implementation of human rights and the right to information. A National Human Rights Plan, a strategy coordinating all the stakeholders, particularly government and other institutions along with the awareness as well as education of people, will go a long mile in serving the human rights and bringing transparency in the institutions.

Conclusion Roadblocks “Integrity, transparency and the fight against corruption have to be part of the culture. They have to be taught as fundamental values.”– Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General. Despite the commitment, declarations, and efforts toward establishment of transparent institutions, various parts of the world are still marred

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by conflicts and instability, violence, poverty, malnutrition, diseases, struggle, illiteracy, corruption, and political instability causing untold human suffering and undermining the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals. Report of the Secretary-General, Special edition: progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: A world eye view The report (2019) says “. . .despite all the efforts and the commitment expressed by various nations the sustainability development targets are still not achieved. Progress in ending violence, promoting the rule of law, strengthening institutions and increasing access to justice are uneven and millions are still deprived”: •

• •

. . .Intentional homicides per 100,000 people increased from 6.0 in 2015 to 6.1 in 2017. Killings of human rights defenders, journalists and trade unionists are increasing. Birth registration (an effective tool for ensuring individual rights and access to justice), is still just 73%. Laws and policies related to access to information have been adopted by only 125 countries. In 2018, only 39% countries had human rights institutions fully compliant with the Paris Principles. There is need of accelerating this process otherwise only 54% countries will have compliant national human rights institutions by 2030.

The World Bank (2017) estimated that globally, individuals and businesses pay around $1.5 trillion per year in bribes. The United Nations estimates developing countries lose each year around $1.26 trillion to corruption, bribery, theft, and tax evasion. Bribery or corruption is one of the important concerns in public institutions. However, efforts of governments and public institutions/multilateral institutions have brought positivity also as global extreme poverty has decreased in the past two decades. Population living below the extreme poverty line of $1.90 per day has come down to 10.0% in 2015 (35.6% in 1990). COVID-19 is also a cause of concern, and as per report of the World Bank, this pandemic would affect global poverty, sending around 60–94 million people into extreme poverty in 2020, depending upon the development and growth forecast. In the present scenario, it is even more important that government institutions

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carry out their duties diligently and transparently. Transparency and good governance will be key steps of the government and multilateral institutions to reach the people who need it most. Though in many countries policies might appear to be in place, implementation and delivery are ineffective caused by rampant corruption, absenteeism, indifference, incompetence, inefficiencies, or outright failures. A critical factor for these failures is lack of accountability. There has not been a systemic effort to instill the sense of accountability. Political system and administration have also aided to that. Poverty and lack of basic amenities have given rise to corruption, and significant divergences have been seen across regions and among countries. Lack of education and awareness has hampered the effect of equitable distribution of resources and blunted the demand for information and transparency. Unless the sustained efforts are made to address these issues, the achievement of sustainable goals or just societies are very difficult. Transparent institutions are means to overcome the roadblocks. The commitment of multilateral and international organizations and institutions is also being questioned these days as the efforts lack coherence which puts pressure on multilateral cooperation. Economic scenario is also a culprit which has hampered the institutionalization of many forward-looking changes required for achievement of SDGs and particularly establishment of system for transparency in institutions. The cost consideration and lack of direct tangible benefit make task even daunting as political leadership doesn’t see much value in working toward this. Way Forward “It is important that governments, civil society and communities work together to implement lasting solutions to reduce violence, deliver justice, combat corruption and ensure inclusive participation at all times” (UN Sustainable Development Goals). The only way forward for the systematic and holistic achievement of goal of development of transparent institutions is to bring all the

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stakeholders together with utmost sincerity and integrity. It would not be possible if government, public institutions, civil societies, NGOs, etc. do not come forward without any fear or restraint. But the most critical role is of the public which is the ultimate user and the most important stakeholder. By promoting education and awareness, political leadership and administration can play a vital role. Dissemination of information through enactment of stronger laws and creating conducing environment to encourage the people as well as making institutions and administration accountable are important. This will ensure that power or resources are not concentrated in the hands of few but reach to all and ultimately improve the living conditions of the people. For developing transparent institutions, institutions require to be made accountable and answerable for their responsibilities and outcomes. Not only there should be appropriate responses for the functions entrusted to these institutions but also establishment of mechanism to redress grievances in this regard. In order to be effective, accountable, and transparent, institutions must be responsive to the needs of the people such as healthcare, education, water and sanitation, administration, governance, police, and judicial system. Public institutions must promote inclusion in order to deliver basic services to families and communities equitably, without any greed, fear, or malice respecting the people and their rights of livelihood and dignity. Strong and transparent institutions can be instrumental in securing the rights of the people and creating an inclusive society, eradicating poverty, and ensuring peace. Whether it is national or international institutions and government or nongovernment institutions, if they act responsibly and are transparent in their transaction, it would improve trust of the public in them and go a long way in ensuring the objectives of the UN. Unless institutions and their working are made transparent, it is very difficult to achieve sustainable development of the world with equal distribution of resources. Transparency not only brings responsibility and accountability but also involves development with sincere and honest efforts, improving trust among and within.

Transparency in Institutions

Cross-References ▶ Contemporary Institutional Autonomy and SDG Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities ▶ Effects of Economic Crimes on Sustainable Development ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society

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Schedler A, Diamond L, Plattner MF (eds) (1999) The selfrestraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Rienner L, Boulder Schnackenberg AK, Tomlinson EC (2014) Organizational transparency: a new perspective on managing trust in organization-stakeholder relationships. J Manag 4 2 ( 7 ) : 1 7 8 4 – 1 8 1 0 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o rg / 1 0 . 11 7 7 / 0149206314525202 Scott WR (1995) Institutions and organizations. Ideas, interests and identities, Sage. 17(2):136–140. ISBN: 978-142242224. https://doi.org/10.3917/mana.172.0136 Stasavage D (2003) Transparency, democratic accountability, and the economic consequences of Monetary Institutions, London School of Economics. Am J Polit Sci 47(3):389–402. ISSN 0092-5853 Stirton L, Lodge M (2001) Transparency mechanisms: building publicness into public services. J Law Soc 28(4):471–489. ISSN: 0263-323X Sumanjeet (2015) Institutions, transparency, and economic growth. Emerg Econ Stud 1(2):188–210. https://doi. org/10.1177/2394901515599272 Trapnesll S, Jenkins M, Chêne M (2017) Monitoring Corruption and Anti-Corruption in the Sustainable Development Goals: A resource Guide, Transparency international, ISBN: 978-3-96076-056-6; www.trans parency.org Treisman D (2000) The causes of corruption: a crossnational study. J Public Econ 76:399–457 Vishwanath T, Kaufmann D (2003) Towards transparency in finance and governance. SSRN Electron J. https:// doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.258978 Welch EW, Charles CH, Moon JM (2005) Linking citizen satisfaction with e-government and trust in government. J Public Adm Res Theory 15(3):371–391. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui021

Transparent Governments, Social Innovation, and Their Role in Achieving the SDGs Diana Soeiro Instituto de Ciências Sociais – Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

Synonyms Digital government; Institution Participation and accountability

building;

and governance and then present a definition of transparency. Government: When a government is elected, an administration is selected to run the day-to-day affairs of government. Government refers to the institution and administration to the processes that sustain the institution. In this sense, the boundaries of government and administration coincide (UN 2020). Governance: Over time, the conception of government has evolved, and what now defines an institution goes beyond its processes (its administration). Each institution perceives itself as one among many other institutions, creating a system. This ecosystem of different institutions shares a decision-making process and is referred to as a governance system. Transparent government: Themes currently identified in the UN’s website (UN 2020) that define a transparent “public administration” coincide with those that define a “transparent government.” Its foundation lays on the assumption that the government is an institution that is part of a more comprehensive system and not an institution that is exclusively defined by its internal processes. This impacts the boundaries of the definition of “public administration” that now stretch beyond its processes. Processes are impacted by the notion of ecosystem where there is an increasing role of technologies. In the context of Agenda 2030, government transparency prioritizes the following themes: participation and accountability, digital government, institution building, public service innovation, and transformation (UN 2020). Transparency: The United Nations defines “transparency” as decisions enforced according to laws and regulations that are freely available and directly accessible. Information that is provided also needs to be enough and should be easily understandable in any form or media used (UNESCAP 2009).

Introduction Definitions In order to define a transparent government, we first make a brief distinction between government

In the late 1990s, research on transparency, accountability, and corruption in the context of public sector emerged. This research was

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motivated by heavy criticism concerning the presuppositions of the New Public Management (NPM) and traditional theories of public administration (Pedersen et al. 2010) and offered a new perspective. According to this new paradigm, interactive collaboration between state, market, and society was vital. Consequently, the importance of accountability, transparency, open government, and the democratic rule of law should be reinforced (Lyrio et al. 2018). The concept of transparency itself is an old concept. It started being discussed back in the French Revolution, and it was built from an idea of representative democracy, culminating in an idea of participatory democracy. What was emphasized was the importance of the relationship between the government and society (Meijer 2015). There is no consensual definition of transparency, but, for example, Meijer (2013) has defined it as “the availability of information about an actor who allows other actors to monitor his work and performance in an institutional relation of exchange of information.” For a state-of-the-art literature review on “transparency,” see Lyrio, Lunkes, and Taliani (2018). According to Matheus and Janssen (2019), public administration literature tends to be focused on factors such as participation and trust (see Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013). In contrast, information systems literature focuses on factors such as user interface, user experience, and data quality (see Buie and Murray 2012). Digital government literature attempts to bridge these elements. This is becoming increasingly relevant as the role of technology, open access, and privacy and security become pressing issues in the context of public administration. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are an integral part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in September 2015 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA 2015). The SDGs aim to update the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), established during UN’s Millennium Summit (2000), with the adoption of United Nations Millennium Declaration that expired in 2015 (Ki-moon 2013).

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Two main differences exist between the Millennium Development Goals and SDGs. The first is that SDGs broaden MDGs’ scope of action covering a significantly higher number of areas. The second is that the 2030 Agenda is the first UN agenda that envisions accomplishing its goals not only in the Global South but also in the Global North. The global ambition of this agenda is confirmed not only thematically but also geographically. A sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social) implies an integrated global effort. How does such a broad perspective of global governance, based on goal-setting, translate into implementation? How to go from a global strategy to local action? Many remain skeptic about the possibility of accomplishing such a broad scope and question the Agenda’s utility and effectiveness (see Kanie et al. 2017). However, this Agenda is aware of its ambition, and the focus on the mobilization of resources is unprecedented. Political support is crucial, but it is not sufficient to assure the successful accomplishment of SDGs. Conscious of the importance of societies’ many other actors, the mobilization encompasses all: civil society, financial, and business actors (Young 2017). This broad involvement of society is particularly relevant when it comes to indicators. To each SDG, the UN has associated several indicators that allow to measure and account for a successful accomplishment of the goal. Nevertheless, each country is given the possibility to adapt the indicators and create a set of indicators that is relevant to assess the goal according to the country’s needs. Recognizing the importance of local circumstances, nongovernmental organizations, regional governments, and municipalities can also develop additional indicators. This possibility values bottom-up approaches, validating them as key to improve both data collection and monitoring of global development objectives (Pintér et al. 2017, p. 112). The transition from global governance normative principles issued by the UN to rules and norms adopted by countries is not linear. Nevertheless, the 2030 Agenda is a powerful strategic document that confirms its signatories’

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agreement on the importance of working toward those goals, together. Governments have an essential role as mediators in this transition from global principles to national rules, also, in supporting (bottom-up) and promoting (top-down) local actions that actively contribute to SDGs. As a mediator, the more transparent a government is, the more actively it contributes to a successful accomplishment of SDGs. Its dynamics permeate any other organization and the society at large, and therefore it should strive to embody transparency, accountability, and compliance. Aligned with SDG 16, a “transparent government” aims at the implementation of mechanisms that promote peace, justice, and strong institutions. This not also contributes to a successful accomplishment of the goal’s corresponding targets being also relevant to all other goals. Two general features characterize a “transparent government”: 1. A shared and collaborative decision-making process involving the government, relevant actors, and citizens, at all three policy-making levels: design, monitoring and evaluation; 2. Access to information by all parties and society at large in order to facilitate and legitimize the decision-making process. In short, in a “transparent government,” information is the keyword, and rules must be made known to all, accessible at any time, by anyone, at every stage of a process. Also, rules are defined, implemented, monitored and assessed involving relevant actors and citizens, in a continuous process of information exchange. In government transparency, the role of technology and open data becomes increasingly important as a way of promoting accountability and facilitating compliance. However, matters of data privacy and security must be accounted for. The subsequent sections will distinguish between the concepts of government and governance; identify Actors: Participation and Accountability; investigate mechanisms that promote Facilitation: Digital Government; define

Values: Institution Building; recognize the importance of Partnerships: Public Service Innovation Transformation; and assess the role of cities to SDGs, From Global to National to Regional to Local: The Growing Relevance of Cities and Urban.

Government and Governance The distinction between government and governance is useful to demonstrate the dynamics between institutions and the processes involved related to those same institutions. Since the emergence of the concept of nation-state (eighteenth century), government and governance have been perceived as synonyms (Hobsbawm 2012). Government was identified with an institution: the state. Governance was exclusively about the processes involved in making the state work. The main reason for this overlap is rooted in an idea of democracy conceptualized in terms of elections and voting (Pierre and Peters 2020, p. 3). Citizens’ involvement and participation starts and ends at the voting booth and between elections; the government is free to act as the sole decisionmaker. This is a decision-making process that privileges a top-down approach. Gradually, the concept of democracy itself started changing, and questions about the representativity started growing: Were those elected by voters genuinely representing the interests of citizens who had elected them? Government and governance started drifting apart, leading to an ever-growing discussion, which continues up until today, about the boundaries of each concept. The ambition is to be able to determine where does the government end and governance starts. Both concepts became so distant that some argue the radical perspective that governments are now obsolete institutions and that governance should replace governments (Bell 2017). This is the most extreme form of a bottom-up approach in decision-making where citizens and a network of institutions are perceived as equally powerful, collaborating in order to decide X, and where institutions are perceived as obsolete.

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How did we get here, and what has contributed to the slow parting of government and governance? Two main reasons can be pointed out. The first is the context created by the establishment of supranational institutions (like the UN) and globalization. The state went from being hierarchically the institution that held the ultimate power and had the last word to becoming an institution that needs to make decisions about its future in a collaborative manner and close dialogue with other countries and institutions, taking them as partners. The second main reason for government and governance drifting apart is the growing role of participatory mechanisms that have been successfully permeating the founding concept of democracy itself. If governments want to govern successfully, they need to accommodate continuous forms of participation of several other society’s actors (citizens, nongovernmental organizations, universities, etc.). The UN clearly states: “Government is one of the actors in governance” (UNESCAP 2009). This means that the decision-making process needs to incorporate other perspectives and not exclusively that of the government. The United Nations defines good governance as “the structures and processes whereby a social organization - from a family to corporate business to international institution - steers itself, ranging from centralized control to self-regulation” (UN 2016a, p. iv). The United Nations has also attributed eight major characteristics to good governance: “participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized; the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making” (UNESCAP 2009). What is at stake in the dynamics between government and governance is how to find a balance between both, one where the government is perceived as the institution that supplies the needed direction to the society, but it is not the only one making decisions. The European Commission defines good governance as “the manner in which power is

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exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (EC 2014, p. 8) considering it the basis and ultimate objective of institutional capacity building. It also affirms good governance as key to build trust and social capital, confirming that states with a high level of social capital tend to perform better economically. A relevant distinction is also between outputs and outcomes. Output is the result of a process produced by the activities developed by a given institution. An outcome has a broader scope and extends toward the future, being the level of achievement and impact that occurs because of the activity of the aforesaid institution. A transparent government needs to make sure that it acts as a role model in both its outputs (its processes) and its outcomes (where government perceives itself as one among other actors, as part of an ecosystem). Governments should therefore be aware of their leadership role, perceiving itself as the driving force of positive change based on principles of equity, justice, and inclusiveness, promoted with transparency. We now describe each of the four themes related to “public administration” mentioned above that are key to promote and should be held accountable for a transparent government.

Actors: Participation and Accountability Auditing the Sustainable Development Goals In order to strengthen national control mechanisms, supreme audit institutions (SAIs) were established in a country-based order to follow up and review SDGs. UN’s General Assembly acknowledged the role of SAIs in promoting an efficient and accountable public administration conducive to the implementation of development priorities and the SDGs (see UN-General Assembly 2011, 2014a, b). It has also strongly suggested that Member State and relevant United Nations institutions should continue their cooperation with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).

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INTOSAI has a special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It provides an institutionalized framework for SAIs to promote knowledge development and transfer, improve government auditing worldwide, and enhance professional capacities, standing, and influence of member SAIs in their countries. To follow up and review SDGs is among INTOSAI’s goals, and in 2016 it has launched the Auditing the Sustainable Development Goals program (INTOSAI 2020). The program provides guidance on how to audit SDGs preparedness, and over 70 SAIs and 1 subnational audit institution, from all regions, participate. UN/INTOSAI seminars have been organized regularly, promoting a close connection between the General Secretariat and the UN. Combating Corruption Corruption is one of the key themes within SDGs 16 that is taken very seriously in the 2030 Agenda. The current understanding of corruption and a discussion of factors affecting the risk of corruption was recently addressed by Liu (2019). From the latest research, it can be stated that scholars began to tend to use the real raw data rather than the perception of data to study the corruption of a particular country or region when they use empirical analysis method. For this tendency to continue, the corruption index measurement and the international comparability of the macro data need to continue to be studied and perfected. Corruption has been identified as one of the significant components hindering sustainable development affecting the public and private sector (Frolova et al. 2019; Sartor and Beamish 2019), peace, and security (Basabose 2019). It negatively impacts trust in government and contributes to social inequality and poverty. It is also a problem that has severe costs: $1,000 billion are paid in bribes per year; corruption can cost a country up to 17% of its GDP, and US$ 1.8 trillion is the volume of illicit financial flows from Africa between 1970 and 2008 (UNDP 2020). According to the UN, corruption is “the abuse or misuse of public power for private benefit can take many forms – bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud or embezzlement” (UN 2020). The main document providing guidelines to combating corruption is the United Nations

Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, A/RES/58/4). It is an exceptional document in the sense that it is the only legally binding international anti-corruption multilateral treaty, signed by 140 countries. It was adopted in October 2003 and entered into force in December 2005 (UNCAC 2020). Four articles specifically address corruption in the public sector: Article 7, Public sector; Article 8, Codes of conduct for public officials; Article 9, Public procurement and management of public finances; and Article 10, Public reporting. These have contributed to advocacy and research on national and regional codes of conducts of the public service, constitutional rights concerning citizen engagement in public affairs, open government data, national e-procurement development, the role of supreme audit institutions, as well as institutional arrangement and mechanisms in promoting open, transparent, and inclusive participation and decision-making in development. In broader terms, the Doha Declaration Global Programme (DDGP) is also worth mentioning, having been adopted in 2015, in the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice held in Qatar. It calls for the integration of crime prevention and criminal justice across all themes and programs promoted by the UN, acknowledging the importance of the rule of law to sustainable development. The Doha Declaration encompasses four specific components: strengthening judicial integrity and the prevention of corruption; fostering prisoner rehabilitation and social integration; preventing youth crime through sports; and encouraging a culture of the rule of law in schools and universities through the initiative Education for Justice (DDGP 2020). In order to combat corruption, UN Office of Drugs and Crime works closely with United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Tiri, GTZ, the Basel Institute on Governance, the Huairou Commission, and the Institute of Governance Studies of Bangladesh. The European Union has high standard legislation that either specifically addresses corruption or incorporates anti-corruption elements in other sectoral legislation. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has an unrestricted

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right to act in the field of anti-corruption policies. Article 83 recognizes corruption as a “eurocrime,” and, therefore, the EU holds legislating powers to regulate this area. In 2010, the Stockholm Programme was adopted, and the EC was given a political mandate to measure efforts in the fight against corruption and to develop a comprehensive EU anti-corruption policy, in close cooperation with the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). The EU Anti-Corruption Report, published in 2014, was crucial to assess how corruption affects countries differently, therefore requiring different anti-corruption policies. The following year, all EU countries designated a national contact point to facilitate information exchange on anticorruption policy to encourage and better implement laws and policies against corruption. For more information on the EU’s anti-corruption past and present framework, see EC (2020). Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption (TI 2020), is an independent, nongovernmental, not-for-profit also relevant to the anti-corruption theme. It is a global movement working in over 100 countries to end the injustice of corruption, promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. It features 60 Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres (ALACs) that provide free and confidential legal advice and allow people to report corruption safely, access public information, and demand transparent, responsive, accountable government institutions. Since its foundation in 1995, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is Transparency International’s flagship research product, becoming the leading global indicator of public sector corruption. In 2012, Transparency International revised the methodology, and now it allows for a comparison of scores from 1 year to the next. On 9 December, the world marks International Anti-Corruption Day.

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the UN created the E-Participation Index (EPI), the first to evaluate participation initiatives worldwide (UN 2016b, pp. 49–77, 141). There have been critics claiming that the EPI assesses e-participation initiatives on the government side only and neglects the society side, which includes all kinds of civil e-participation initiatives. Some argue that political rights and civil liberties should be viewed as the most important criteria with which to evaluate e-participation initiatives (Pirannejad et al. 2019). For a discussion on eparticipation, see Zimmermann (2016). However, in 2013, the United Nations’ Public Institutions and Digital Government Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) created the METEP Toolkit (Measurement and Evaluation Tool for Citizen Engagement and eParticipation Toolkit) and then developed a selfassessment questionnaire in response to an emerging need for more robust and deeper participation in citizen engagement by all stakeholders. This instrument was created identifying as its assumptions that engaging citizens is beneficial to governments throughout the public policy process: (i) at the early stages to enhance public problem definition and to identify acceptable policy options; (ii) through the implementation stages by facilitating dialogue to support policy inclusiveness; and (iii) to receive feedback while monitoring and evaluating public policy programs and their outcomes, which is key to continuous improvements in the delivery of public goods and services (UN 2020). An evaluation of the success of METEP was performed in 2016 by the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). Among its conclusions, it addresses the importance of Internet access to accomplish 2030 Agenda’s goals, particularly in the least developed countries (UN 2016b, pp. 76–78).

Facilitation: Digital Government E-Participation and Citizen Engagement E-Participation uses information and communications technologies (ICTs) to encourage citizen participation, strengthening collaboration between government and citizens. Since 2003, in order to assess citizen engagement,

E-Government The public value of e-government is understood as citizens’ expectations form e-government. Recently, Twizeyimana and Anderssona (2019) have identified six main dimensions

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concerning the public value of e-government, having associated each of them with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): (1) improved public services; (2) improved administrative efficiency; (3) open government (OG) capabilities; (4) improved ethical behavior and professionalism; (5) improved trust and confidence in government; and (6) improved social value and well-being. The 17 SDGs are closely intertwined, aiming to highlight that in order to achieve sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social), it is necessary to implement an integrated policy-making approach. This implies to connect sectors and sub-sectors through polices that uses as its guidelines SDGs. This whole-of-government (WoG) policy strategy aims to answer more effectively to concrete and local problems. In order to contribute to this strategy, e-government and online service delivery are perceived as vital to bridge the gap between institutions (UN 2016b, p. 5). In 2003, only 18 countries declared to have an online presence. Since 2014, all 193 Member States of the UN have delivered some form of an online presence. However, just like there is a digital availability of ICT divide, there is an egovernment divide. That is why it is essential to assure access and make institutions more accountable and responsive to people’s needs (UN 2016b, p. 6). METER (2020; Measurement and Evaluation Tool for E-Government Readiness) is an online, interactive tool to assist governments and decision-makers at any level throughout the world in developing, monitoring, refining, and improving the context within which information and communication technologies are used to transform government. In a sense, it creates the context for e-government. It was created by the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and Division for Public Administration and Development Management, in 2010. For evaluation and vision of what e-governance should become, see UN (2020, pp. 4–6). To consult the UN’s past e-government surveys, since 2001, go to visit (UN 2020: Themes, Digital Government, E-Government).

Open Government Data and Services The Division for Public Institutions and Digital Government (DPIDG) is a division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). It focuses on analyzing and supporting efforts to make institutions inclusive, effective, accountable, and well equipped to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as reflected in SDG 16 (DPIDG 2020). DPIDG has been conducting research on open government data (OGD) since 2010, allowing citizens to monitor data streams, thereby improving the accountability and transparency of government. Online government services (e-government) lead to more participation from citizens in the decision-making process to address policy issues (e-participation). In 2013, it created an evolving tool, the Guidelines on Open Government Data for Citizen Engagement, a practical and easy-to-understand guideline for policy-makers and technologists that can be used to understand, design, implement, and sustain open government data initiatives. Initiatives of the project OGD can be followed here (UN OGD 2020). World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Hosting the WSIS confirms UN’s conviction that ICTs are a determinant factor to accomplish the 2030 Agenda’s SDGs. It first took place in Geneva in 2003; then, a second one was conducted in 2005. Both addressed a shared commitment to building a people-centric, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society where everyone can create and share information. In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly reviewed the progress over the past 10 years and considered the future of the WSIS (a process also called WSIS +10 Review). In 2019, the DPIDG organized facilitation meeting, in Geneva, titled “Digital Government for Empowering People and Ensuring Inclusiveness and Equality.” The United Nations e-government survey methodology was discussed, and participants presented the latest trends and developments on the promotion of ICTs for development as well as on international and regional cooperation (WSIS 2019).

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Values: Institution Building To promote the values of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions is among the characteristics that define a transparent government. Why are these values significant? We go back to good governance and briefly dwell on the strong causality that was established between good governance and economic growth (Holmberg et al. 2009; Raza et al. 2019). There are two ways in which good governance has been defined. Liberal economists consider good governance as market-enhancing and trust that governance can reduce transaction costs and enable markets to work more effectively. Heterodox economists have stressed the role of growth-enhancing governance “which focuses on governance capacities to overcome entrenched market failures in allocating assets, acquiring productivity-enhancing technologies and maintaining political stability in contexts of rapid social transformation” (Khan 2007). The liberal approach has received more attention than the heterodox, but whichever way, it is bad governance that undermines economic growth. In order to assess governance worldwide, the World Bank has developed a group of indicators and created a database, available online: Worldwide Governance Indicators. It reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2018, and it has identified six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption (World Bank 2020a). This is important to determine that governance, transparent institutions, and a transparent government, are not a secondary matter. It is not a given that economic growth leads to good governance, but, conversely, it has been demonstrated that good governance leads the way to economic growth. Values can, therefore, be the foundation for growth.

Partnerships: Public Service Innovation Transformation The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for transformation through enhanced

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creativity and innovation in the public service at all levels of governance and public administration. In the words of Secretary-General António Guterres, “Public service is a critical component for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [. . .] we need to pioneer new approaches, work differently, take risks and innovate” (UN 2020). This encompasses to design activities that empower public sector leaders, human resource managers, and public servants through advice, research, and capacity development in the public service promoting creativity and innovation. To promote this, the United Nations Public Service Awards program was created, the most prestigious international recognition of excellence in public service. The UN Public Service Day is celebrated since 2003 with an Awards Ceremony, receiving an increasing number of submissions from all around the world. Kattel et al. (2014) have worked on an extensive literature review in order to assess different definitions of innovation in the context of the public sector, also discussing different ways to measure social innovation (initiatives that intersect private and public sector, p. 33). It stresses that if evaluation and measurement of social innovation are performed “from a purely quantitative perspective, disregarding qualitative properties, then it is likely that a range of factors facilitating social innovation (e.g. social networks and trust existing in local communities) will not be accounted for” (p. 33). The 2020 United Nations Public Service Awards (UNPSA) is now open for nominations under the following categories: (1) delivering inclusive and equitable services for all; (2) promoting integrated mechanisms for sustainable development; (3) developing transparent and accountable public institutions; (4) promoting digital transformation in the public sector, and (5) promoting gender-responsive public services to achieve the SDGs. Public service innovation transformation is closely connected to SDG 17, Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. Innovation creates more resilient public institutions,

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permeable and connected with other institutions. This brings institution-centered governments closer to a network-governance government, where people are at the center.

From Global to National to Regional to Local: The Growing Relevance of Cities and Urban Development One of the critical components of an integrative and WoG public policy approach is “smart cities.” Simply put, the “term generally refers to the management of urban environments through ICT” (UN 2016, p. 11). The smart city concept promotes the active participation of citizens through ICTs. Active participation can be defined as a relationship based on partnership with government in which citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policy-making (OECD 2001). While this can bring several social, environmental, and economic benefits in the way we manage energy, water, transport systems, etc., increasingly better regulatory frameworks that promote transparency, privacy, and security are needed (OECD 2016; Zuboff 2019). The implementation of smart cities is particularly relevant because, in 2018, 55.3% of the world population lives in cities and by 2030, the number is expected to increase to 60.4%. More importantly, not only the general population is becoming more urban but also the density of urban centers is changing. In 2018 there were 33 megacities (cities with over ten million inhabitants), and 27 of them were located in the less developed regions or the “Global South.” China alone was home to six megacities in 2018, while India had five. Nine of the ten cities projected to become megacities between 2018 and 2030 are located in developing countries (UN 2018, p. 3, 5). It is expected that ICTs will be able to contribute to managing such large agglomerations, furthermore, that it will assure a constant flow of communication bridging national, regional, and local scales in such a way that cultural traditions and identities are respected and preserved.

Megacities and the “smart city” model will be increasingly crucial elements that will encourage the design, implementation, and monitoring of new governance systems having the potential to stimulate social innovation and government transparency. Information and open data tend to permeate our urban surrounding environments, encouraging a constant exchange between citizens and government. The use of ICT impacts not only infrastructures but also the creation of an enabling environment, with a focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building (UN 2016b, p. 96). Public data and their reuse are vital resources for social innovation and economic growth. Open data provides new opportunities for governments to collaborate with citizens and evaluate public services by giving citizens access to data about those services (World Bank 2020b). Governments have a crucial role in all this making sure that access to information and its use is readily available and secure, being processed according to transparent dynamics.

Concluding Summary Just like the concept of democracy itself, the definition of government and transparency is ever-evolving. However, the principles that support these concepts growingly raise the bar on values like equity, equality, and justice, encompassing more actors and citizens around the world. In this process, it is crucial that the government assumes a leadership role encouraging the participation of relevant actors and the society at large. This will allow for more robust institutions and the promotion of peace. The combat to corruption is a critical theme in SDGs and a central topic to a successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda having been established a causal link between lower levels of corruption and a more sustainable development. The circulation of information at different hierarchical scales, among different actors and between different sectors through technology use, and open data systems contribute to promote

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the distribution of power and decision-making. A constant and renewed approach to finding mechanisms that promote E-participation and E-government is encouraged. However, actions need to be taken to decrease the digital gap, promoting more generalized access worldwide to technologies and the Internet. Also, transparency and open data access bring the added risk of raising security and privacy issues that should be accounted for. SDG 16 is one of the most challenging goals when it comes to developing indicators. Therefore, existing indicators like EPI and WGI are essential to evaluate progress. New indicators should be developed by each country concerning SDG in order to monitor and implement a concrete measure that leads to stronger institutions and promote peace. Initiatives like UN Public Service Day value the role of people within public institutions. Their values and work ethics express the institution’s values. The quality and values of public institutions should be strengthened through partnerships with other actors contributing to constant learning and upgrading workers skills. As urban population raises worldwide and urban development evolves toward higher densities, the use of ICTs is expected to become more relevant propelling the “smart city” model. These impact infrastructures and government and governance systems, having the ability to positively impact economic growth and promote innovation. However, security and privacy issues should be accounted for.

Cross-References ▶ Access to Justice: Promoting the Legal System as a Human Right ▶ Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries ▶ Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development ▶ Democracy in the Developed Countries ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society ▶ Grassroots Political Movement to Achieve SDGs in Developing Countries

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▶ Local Governance ▶ Open Government: Conceptual Underpinnings, Benefits, and Relationship with SDGs ▶ Regulatory Governance and Its Significance in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals Acknowledgments The research was supported by Project ROCK – Regeneration and Optimisation of Cultural Heritage in creative and Knowledge cities – funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 730280.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010378159. Accessed 15 May 2020 Pierre J, Peters B (2020) Governance, politics and the state. Red Globe Press/Springer Nature, London Pintér L, Kok M, Almassy D (2017) Measuring progress in achieving the sustainable development goals. In: Kanie N, Biermann F (eds) Governing through goals: sustainable development goals as governance innovation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 99–134 Pirannejad A, Janssen M, Rezaei J (2019) Towards a balanced E-Participation index: integrating government and society perspectives. Gov Inf Q 36(4). https://doi. org/10.1016/j.giq.2019.101404 Raza SA, Shah N, Arif I (2019) Relationship between FDI and economic growth in the presence of good governance system: evidence from OECD countries. Glob Bus Rev. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150919833484. Accessed 15 May 2020 Sartor MA, Beamish PW (2019) Private sector corruption, public sector corruption and the organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries. J Bus Ethics. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10551-019-04148-1 TI (2020) Transparency international. https://www.trans parency.org/. Accessed 15 May 2020 Twizeyimana JD, Anderssona A (2019) The public value of E-Government – a literature review. Gov Inf Q 36 (2):167–178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2019.01. 001. Accessed 15 May 2020 UN (2016a) Security sector reform: integrated technical guidance notes – transnational organized crime and security sector reform. www.unodc.org /organizedcrime/SSR_TOC_ITGN_2016_WEB. Accessed 15 May 2020 UN (2016b) E-Government Survey 2016. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/ 2016-e-government-survey.html. Accessed 15 May 2020 UN (2018) The World’s cities in 2018 – the United Nations. www.un.org/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_ in_2018_data_booklet. Accessed 15 May 2020 UN (2020) Participation and accountability. https://publicad ministration.un.org/en/developmentmgt. Accessed 15 May 2020 UN OGD (2020) OGD project initiatives. https:// publicadministration.un.org/en/Themes/ICT-for-Devel opment/Open-Government-Data-and-Services/OGDProjects. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNCAC (2020) United Nations convention against corruption in United Nations office on drugs and crime. https:// www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNDP (2020) Anti-corruption in United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/ en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-andpeacebuilding/responsive-and-accountable-institutions/ anti-corruption/. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNESCAP (2009) United Nations economic and social commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unescap.

Truth and Reconciliation org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNGA (2011) Promoting the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration by strengthening supreme audit institutions. Resolution A/66/209. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol¼%20A/RES/66/209. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNGA (2014a) Promoting and fostering the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration by strengthening supreme audit institutions – Resolution A/69/228. https://www.un.org/en/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/69/228. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNGA (2014b) Building capacity for the evaluation of development activities at the country level – Resolution A/69/237. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol¼A/RES/69/237. Accessed 15 May 2020 UNGA (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Draft resolution referred to the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda by the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session. UN Doc. A/70/L.1. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/sum mit. Accessed 15 May 2020 World Bank (2020a) Starting an open data initiative. World Bank. http://opendatatoolkit.worldbank.org/en/starting. html. Accessed 15 May 2020 World Bank (2020b) Worldwide governance indicators. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/. Accessed 15 May 2020 WSIS (2019) World Summit on the information society. https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/forum/2019/Agenda/ ViewSession/135#intro. Accessed 15 May 2020 Young OR (2017) Conceptualisation: goal setting as a strategy for earth system governance. In: Kanie N, Biermann F (eds) Governing through goals: sustainable development goals as governance innovation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 31–52 Zimmermann H-D (2016) Evaluation of an eParticipation project against eParticipation. In: Chugunov A, Misnikov Y, Roshchin E, Trutnev D et al (eds) Proc. 5th Int. Conf. Electronic, governance and open society: challenges in Eurasia. Springer, New York, NY, pp 295–307 Zuboff S (2019) The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. PublicAffairs, New York

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Treaties of Non-belligerency ▶ Non-aggression Pacts: Reducing the Risk of Armed Conflict and Improving Global Cooperation

Tribal Peoples ▶ Indigenous Peoples: Conflict, Peace, and Resolution

Trust ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Trust and e-Government ▶ Electronic Government for Trust Building

Truth and Reconciliation ▶ Global Approaches to Punishment and the Sustainable Development Goals

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Underdevelopment ▶ Economic Deprivation: Approaches, Causes, and Consequences for Violent Conflicts

Unethical Behavior ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges Joao Alfredo Lopes Nyegray Positivo University, Curitiba, Brazil

Definitions International organizations are a rather recent phenomenon. Such organizations can be understood as subjects of international law constituted of own legal personality, distinct from its founding members. This organizations are a treaty established association of states to pursue a common goal, with their own legal personality.

Although international organizations have emerged before the founding of the United Nations, the UN is by far the most important. The United Nations Organization was founded by 51 countries in 1945 with the aim of preserving and maintaining peace and security, as well as maintaining and creating a sense of neighborhood and friendship among countries. Its universal character and scope encompass more than 190 countries, and its specific agencies address issues of collective concern through a technical approach, such as the World Health Organization or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its main office is in the city of New York, in the USA. There are also other headquarters in Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi. UN’s official languages are English, French, Chinese, Russian, Arabic, and Spanish. The United Nations also has treaty-making power, and to function well and to fulfill its objectives, international organizations, and in particular the United Nations, need some freedom and security. For the United Nations, the most important document is the “Charter of the United Nations,” commonly referred to only as “Charter.” International organizations and their staff are therefore granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. International organizations are governed by their founding treaty, charter, or charter of principles, which will impose rules on the admission of new

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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members, internal decision-making, sanctions, and withdrawal of member states. Traditionally, international organizations are funded by member states.

From the Shadow of War to the Dawn of New Times: From the League of Nations to the United Nations The concept of nation-state refers to the Peace of Westphalia, although it is possible to find even earlier digressions regarding the idea of nation and the idea of state. International organizations, on the other hand, are a much more recent phenomenon. As Rezek (2005) pointed out, it is in the twentieth century that this phenomenon emerges strongly. It is not possible to speak of international organizations without mentioning international law or without addressing the idea of cooperation. As Brownlie (2008, p. 675) asserts, “In the nineteenth century states advanced from the bilateral treaty and reliance on diplomatic contact to other forms of co-operation. The Congress of Vienna heralded an era of international conferences and multilateral treaties, and later there appeared administrative unions such as the European Danube Commission, and the International Telegraph Union. After 1920 the League of Nations and the United Nations provided the more developed notion of universal peace-keeping institutions, and there appeared and ever-increasing number of specialized institutions concerned with technical, economic, and social co-operation.”

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations rise from the ashes of World Wars. As it is widely known, World War I began in 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. From that moment on, a complicated alliance policy generated dozens of declarations of war. As Hobsbawm (2005, p. 26) observed, “the First World War involved all the great powers, and indeed all European states, except Spain, the Netherlands, the three countries of Scandinavia and Switzerland were often first sent to fight and operate outside their regions.” The emergence of this movement is not easy to explain. The nineteenth century was also rich in crisis and conflicts, from imperialist and colonial movements that can be regarded as one of the

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seeds of the catastrophe between 1914 and 1918. As Perry (2005, p. 509) states, “before 1914, the predominant state of mind in Europe was of pride for the achievements of Western civilization and of confidence in its future progress.” The industrial revolution, which at all times presented novelties and innovations, certainly contributed to this sentiment. The result is the explosion of a melting pot of pressures and turbulence. In this regard, Perry (2005, p. 509) points out that “By 1914, national states, responding to no superior power, were fed by an explosive nationalism and grouped together in alliances that defied one another with ever-increasing hostility. Nationalist passions, overheated by the popular press and by expansionist societies, poisoned international relations. Nationalist thinkers propagated pseudo-scientific racial doctrines and social Darwinists, who glorified the conflict and justified the subjugation of other peoples. Committed to the rise of national power, statesmen lost sight of Europe as a community of nations sharing a civilization. Caution and restraint gave way to belligerence in foreign relations.”

At first, the war was seen by nationalists and extremists as a purifying, honorable, and necessary experience. Nevertheless, the 4 years that follow to 1914 prove just the opposite. World War I left at least nine million dead and countless others wounded and disabled. Although the war ended in 1918, peace has its terms outlined only in 1919. The 1919 peace conference had the US President Woodrow Wilson as a central person, and as Perry (2005, p. 530) pointed out, “the warweary crowds turned to Wilson as if he were a prophet who would make the world swap his swords for plowshares.” According to Casella (2007, p. 12), “Much of the building done after the First World War was criticized, and all good and all evil were attributed to it for what followed. But the content and scope of the Versailles treaty should be considered as a framework and as a significant moment in the history of international law.” In all, at least five peace agreements were signed, not only with Germany, but also with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Casella (2007, p. 12) points out that the Treaty of Versailles represents a relevant stage

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“towards the institutionalization of the international system, in the wake of what was at the time the forerunners of this system, as milestones in the evolution of international law.” At about this time, in a speech to the US Congress, President Woodrow Wilson points out 14 points necessary for the peace of that time to become enduring. One of these points suggested the creation of a League of Nations “for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” According to Grenville (2007, p. 124), “the real purpose of the League of Nations was to find a better way of solving disputes that could lead to war than by the kind of devastating conflict through which the world had just passed. In the League great states and small states were to find security with justice.” Seitenfus (2005, p. 103) points out that the League of Nations was “an intergovernmental association of a permanent nature, of general scope and with a universal vocation, based on the principles of collective security and equality among sovereign states.” It is important to note that the League of Nations was the first attempt to create an international organization that could bring countries together to discuss solutions to mutual problems. It is also Seitenfus (2005, p. 103) who notes that “With the League of Nations there is for the first time a truly international organization with the specific objective of maintaining peace through legal mechanisms, which is only possible because of the hecatomb represented by the war.” Neither peace nor the league, however, was enduring. Grenville (2007, p. 124) states that “The weakness of the League was that each member could in effect decide whether or not to comply with a Council request to apply sanctions. Furthermore, the Council, consisting of permanent great-power members together with some smaller states, could act only unanimously, so that any one of its members could block all action. The League was not a world government, lacked armed force of its own and remained dependent on the free cooperation of its members to behave according to its principles and to join with others in punishing those states that did not.”

Hobsbawm (2005, p. 34) points out that neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the League of Nations

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could give the world a lasting peace: “the Versailles could not be the basis of a stable peace. It was doomed from the start, and so another war was almost certain. As we have already noted, the US almost immediately retired, and in a world no longer Eurocentric and Eurodetermined, no agreement not endorsed by what was now a great world power could sustain itself.” Soon after that the world plunges again into another crisis. First, an economic crisis in 1929. Then a military, humanitarian, political, and social crisis in 1939. This is the scourge of war, seen twice in the space of a brief human life. The World War II, however, was even more ferocious, deadlier, and more reprehensible than the first. As put by Hobsbawm (2005, p. 41), “The Second World War extended the massive war to total war. Its losses are literally incalculable, and even rough estimates are shown impossible, as war (unlike World War I) killed so readily civilians and people in uniform, and much of the worst killing occurred in regions, or moments when no one was ready to count or to care.” While World War I had at least nine million casualties, the Second was far beyond that. There were those who defend a death toll at least 10 times higher, and other estimates stand at 60 million, namely: genocide, torture, absolute disregard for life and dignity; forced deportations, relocations, and mass killings; bombing, destruction, theft, and rape; and hopelessness. Words are missing to describe the genuflection, the horror between the years 1939 and 1945. While all these tragedies were taking place, on the other side allies were working since 1942 to create a new international organization. In this respect, Vaïsse (2013, p. 12) points out that “It was a question of creating a body building on the experience of the League of Nations (LoN), which had failed in its mission throughout the inter-war period. In the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941), US President FD Roosevelt, on January 1, 1942, about twenty leaders, including Churchill and Roosevelt, adopted a declaration in the terms of which the United Nations would undertake to establish, as soon as the war (1930 of 1943), the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, China and the USSR proclaim the need to establish, as soon as possible, ‘a general organization based on the principle of equal sovereignty of all peaceful states.’ At

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The United Nations then emerges from the rubble of the most serious conflict in the history of mankind to protect future generations, to build a peaceful international order, and to ensure equality and dialogue among large and small nations. Peace is its main goal, and its greatest challenge.

The Foundation of a New Era: The United Nations and the Multipolar Perspective Even before the official end of World War II, representatives of 51 countries approved the Charter of the United Nations on June 25, 1945, in the city of San Francisco. According to Seitenfus (2005, p. 125), “the victory against the Axis was imminent and it became imperative to institutionalize international relations.” As noted before, the preparations for the founding of the United Nations started not in 1945, but with the Charter of the Atlantic in 1941. Grenville (2007, p. 9) noted that “The United Nations began with a burst of renewed hope after the Second World War.” This new hope can be felt by reading the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations which states: “WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to

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maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS. Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.”

The Charter of the United Nations, which is often called the Charter of San Francisco, is the main document of the organization. The charter states that all “peace-loving” states that accept the obligations contained therein may be admitted to the UN. The charter creates, in addition to the UN itself, its six special organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, which will be described ahead. It is important to highlight the statement by Seitenfus (2005, p. 129), which states that the adoption of the UN Charter and the subsequent Universal Declaration of Human Rights transform the legal order of the world: “Sovereignty, both in its external and internal aspects, ceases to be an absolute and savage principle and will henceforth be subordinated to the imperatives of peace and human rights. It represents the conclusion of an unprecedented pact or social contract of universal scope, capable of creating a true legal order beyond and above the States in the fundamental area of security and fundamental rights.”

One of the great goals of the United Nations is to thrive where the League of Nations failed in preserving peace. As Rezek (2005, p. 264) points out, its “primary goal – frustrated for the League of Nations with the outbreak of the Second World War – is to preserve peace among nations by fostering the peaceful resolution of conflicts and providing appropriate means of collective

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security.” To meet its audacious goal, the United Nations has six leading organs, which are tackled further.

From the General Assembly to the ECOSOC As set out in Article 1 of the Charter, the United Nations’ purpose is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. These are audacious and challenging objectives for which the organization has its main bodies, which will be addressed shortly. General Assembly Composed of all members of the United Nations, the General Assembly is its most comprehensive body. Its description begins in Article 9 of the charter, which states: “the General Assembly shall consist of all Members of the United Nations” and “each Member shall have more than five representatives in the General Assembly.” Once the organization has as its basic principles the equality and the sovereignty of its members, in order to discuss and vote for actions of global and collective interest, each country has the right to one vote, and each vote has equal weight, value, and importance. The tenth article of the charter indicates the functions and powers of the General Assembly: “The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter.” The same article also puts that the General Assembly “may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or both on any such questions or matters.” The contents of the discussions of the General Assembly are addressed by Article 11 of the charter, which states that “The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a

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Member of the United Nations.” Regarding these discussions, Casella (2008, p. 398) points out that the General Assembly “shall meet in ordinary sessions once a year and in extraordinary sessions, when circumstances so require. The special sessions shall be convened by the Secretary General, at the request of the Security Council or a majority of Member States.” Following the charter commandments, the General Assembly can also initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in several fields, such as political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and health, always considering its goals for the maintenance of peace and human rights. Among its other responsibilities, Casella (2008, p. 399) states that it is the responsibility of the General Assembly to “consider and approve the budget of the organization, the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council and members of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council; admission of new members to the organization, suspension and expulsion of them, appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (. . .) election of judges of the International Court of Justice.”

This list of attributions goes on among other duties. About the membership of the UN, Grenville (2007, p. 409) points out that a “country’s membership of the UN requires a two-thirds approval by the General Assembly on a Security Council recommendation, with a power of veto exercisable by any of the five permanent members.” And what are the challenges of the General Assembly for the future? At a time when the world is witnessing the rise of nationalism and movements in which important nations abandon multilateralism to adopt unilateral positions, the assembly seems to need a greater active voice in the important international debates of our time. Migrations, forced displacement, and environmental issues are in urgent need of attention. The future challenge seems to be to aligning all members around the same solutions for these problems. Nationalism and unilateralism seem to be the challenge that we will hear about in the years to come.

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Security Council The name of this body already allows inferences about its main activities. Recalling that the United Nations emerges after two world conflicts of unimaginable proportions, it has been necessary since its inception to establish an organ and a body of rules to deal with issues related to threats to international peace and security. The charter addresses the Security Council on its fifth chapter, from Article 23 on. The Security Council is composed of 15 members, 5 of whom are permanent and 10 are temporary, with a two-year term. The five permanent members are, not by chance, the winners of World War II as stated on the Charter’s article 23: The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

Initially this composition was another: five permanent members and six temporary members, which was reformulated in 1963. The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. As with the General Assembly, the decisions of the Security Council are also taken by voting, but with a different peculiarity: the veto power of the permanent members. Basically, the veto power of the permanent members of the council block decisions on a topic. According to Casella (2008, p. 400), the

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“abusive use of the right of veto paralyzed the Council for many years.” Seitenfus (2005, p. 144) goes on to say that “in the face of the impossibility of consensus among the powers of diverse ideological nuances, the rule of unanimity among the permanent members was responsible for the paralysis that prevailed in this instance during the Cold War.” The UN (2008, p. 8) stresses that “All five permanent members have exercised the right of veto at one time or another. If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast its veto, it may choose to abstain — thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine votes in favor. Under Article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which member states are obligated under the Charter to implement.”

Casella (2008, p. 400) points out that it was through Article 24 of the Charter that UN members “gave the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and agreed that in fulfilling the duties imposed by that responsibility, the Council shall act on their behalf.” In order to fulfill the objectives of the United Nations, its members have abdicated the use of violence and aggression, with the so-called prohibition of the use of armed force. This interdiction, however, has certain exceptions. The Security Council, as put by Seitenfus (2005, p. 142), “may define and enforce military sanctions against States in cases of threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. The Council applies such sanctions by means of armed forces placed on its territory. Member States according to special agreements signed for this purpose.” Articles 39 to 51 of the charter address actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Of particular importance is Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council

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has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defenses shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

power, whose political use has deepened humanitarian and human crises, is also positive.

As Browlie (2008) pointed out, in 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution defining the meaning of an act of aggression. The UN (2008, p.9) itself asserts that “When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation.”

In this way one can see how the Security Council has at hand various means for the maintenance of international peace and security, thus editing resolutions, using embargoes or blocking or establishing peacekeeping missions. According to the UN (2017), between 1948 and 2017 71 UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed. In addition, the UN (2017, p. 110) also states that “As at 31 May 2017, there were 95,301 uniformed personnel (troops, police, and military observers and staff officers) along with 1587 UN Volunteers and, as at 31 December 2016, 15,319 international and local civilian personnel serving in peacekeeping operations.” The main criticisms of the Security Council today relate to its political use, as well as to the political use of the veto power of permanent members. Another point worthy of consideration is the need for reform of the council to include other countries as permanent members. Today’s international scenario is diametrically different from that of 1945. Thus, permanent seats need to better reflect the reality of the twenty-first century. Economically important nations and regional powers would be a positive addition to the Security Council. Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, and South Africa could bring different perspectives to the traditional disputes that are waging the council nowadays. The discussion on the end of veto

General Secretariat The secretariat of the United Nations, which is governed by the charter between Articles 97 and 101, is its administrative organ. Article 97 stipulates that “The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Since its foundation until 2018, the UN has had nine secretaries-general of different nationalities. The UN (2008, p. 13) points out that “The Secretariat — consisting of international staff working in duty stations around the world — carries out the diverse day-to-day work of the Organization. It services the other principal organs of the United Nations and administers the programs and policies laid down by them. At its head is the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. The duties carried out by the Secretariat are as varied as the problems dealt with by the United Nations. These range from administering peacekeeping operations to mediating international disputes, from surveying economic and social trends to preparing studies on human rights and sustainable development.”

In addition, the secretary-general shall attend the meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Among its powers is the presentation of an annual report to the General Assembly on the organization, as well as submitting to the Security Council any matter worthy of its appreciation. Nowadays the UN General Secretariat is permanently overwhelmed with challenges around the world. Its main challenge for the future is to be present in multiple locations at the same time. Several crises occur at the same time and, therefore, the representation of local subadvisers could be useful. A greater interface between the General Secretariat and UN’s specialized agencies could provide faster responses to crises that cannot wait. International Court of Justice Disciplined between Articles 92 and 96 of the charter, the International Court of Justice predates the founding of the United Nations in 1945.

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As Brownlie (2008, p. 707) points out, “the permanent Court began to function in 1922 but as a new standing tribunal it grew out of previous experience.” This means that the League of Nations also had an International Court of Justice, at the time the Permanent Court of International Justice. After the UN creation in 1945, the Court gained new considerations and a new statute, to be more linked to the UN than it was to the League of Nations. Even its headquarters are in the same place, in the city of the Hague in Holland. As the charter points out in article 92, “The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.” As put by Casella (2008, p. 401), the International Court of Justice “is the result of decades of sedimentation of the idea of a judicial body capable of ensuring the settlement of disputes among states.” The UN (2008, p. 12) pointed out that the Court “settles legal disputes between states and gives advisory opinions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Its Statute is an integral part of the United Nations Charter. The Court is open to all states that are parties to its Statute, which include all members of the United Nations. Only states may be parties in contentious cases before the Court and submit disputes to it. (. . .) The General Assembly and the Security Council can ask the Court for an advisory opinion on any legal question. Other organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, when authorized by the Assembly, can ask for advisory opinions on legal questions within the scope of their activities.”

In order to do so, the statute of the Court, with 70 articles, is an integral part of the UN Charter, so that, according to Casella (2008, p. 402), “the state that becomes a member of the United Nations will fully accept the ICJ’s statute.” The court, as stated on its second article “shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.”

United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

The judges are elected for nine-year terms, with the possibility of reelection. If there is a need to consider a case that involves the country of nationality of a judge, he/she should abstain from taking part in the case. The jurisdiction of the court is either consultative or contentious, and only states can apply. In its advisory jurisdiction, the court may be called upon to interpret treaties or to pronounce understandings on matters of treaties or international law. In its contentious jurisdiction, the court may consider suits between states based on treaties, conventions, or the UN charter itself. With the end of the Cold War, the peoples of the United Nations gained a new ally in the quest for international justice, this time for the criminal prosecution of individuals. In 1998, as Bassiouni (2003, p. 448) points out, “the General Assembly called for the convening of a diplomatic conference in Rome, June 15-July 17, 1998, to adopt a Convention on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.” The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court came into force in 2002 with great international support. Bassiouni (2003, p. 496) points out that it was very important “rising influence of international civil society, which was no longer willing to tolerate that perpetrators of major international crimes went unpunished. It was believed that a permanent international criminal court would help put an end to impunity for international crimes and serious violation of fundamental human rights.”

Thus, although the International Court of Justice is the principal legal arm of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court becomes its ally for the protection of individuals under the charter. The International Court of Justice is a very traditional institution, which does not mean that it does not face challenges. It seems that environmental matters should perhaps fall within the jurisdiction of the court. In terms of international justice, the International Criminal Court has been an ally, albeit with a different jurisdiction. Increasingly, voices are being added for the criminalization of environmental misdeeds, and this may be one of the toughest challenges to face.

United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

Economic and Social Council The Chapter X of the charter pays special attention to the establishment of an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to the UN (2008, p.10), ECOSOC is “the principal organ to coordinate the economic, social and related work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and institutions — known as the United Nations family of organizations.” The council is composed of 54 members, elected by the General Assembly, and each one has the right to a single vote. According to Article 62 of the charter, ECOSOC is responsible for “making or initiating studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.” The Covid-19 pandemic showed that certain phenomena do not recognize borders. The economic, social, and health problems that the pandemic opened will not end anytime soon. Since the term of ECOSOC members is 3 years, their challenge is to continue the actions proposed and recommended there. To overcome the economic slowdown and unemployment that arise as a result of the pandemic, the continuity and effectiveness of the ECOSOC recommendations is a huge obstacle. Trusteeship Council Created in 1945 with the UN, the Trusteeship Council oversaw the administration and supervision of territories. According to the UN (2008, p. 12), the Trusteeship Council was to “provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories placed under the administration of 7-member states and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government or independence.” In 1994 the last territory that acquired independence was the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Palau), which later became the 185th member of the UN. The Trusteeship Council ended its operations in 1994, once its mission was accomplished. In the eventual reform of the United Nations, the council would possibly be suppressed.

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The United Nations System The complexity of the world and of the international relations forces the United Nations to deal with new challenges every day. However comprehensive their six main organs may be, not all contemporary challenges can be resolved by them. It became necessary to establish other international organizations of a technical and administrative nature that became known as the United Nations family of organizations or the United Nations system. It is a series of specialized organizations that linked to the UN and created through international and intergovernmental agreements. The UN (2008, p. 22) points that this family of organizations “consists of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations funds and programs (such as UNICEF and UNDP), the specialized agencies (such as UNESCO and WHO) and related organizations. The funds and programs are subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly. The specialized agencies are linked to the United Nations through special agreements and report to the Economic and Social Council and/or the General Assembly. The related organizations — including IAEA and the World Trade Organization — address specialized areas and have their own legislative bodies and budgets. Together, the organizations of the UN system address all areas of economic and social endeavor.”

There are currently about 28 specific organizations such as FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, World Bank, and WTO among several others. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, some nations criticized WHO and announced their departure from the organization, like the USA. In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, these organizations need to work together with the administration of the countries where their efforts are most needed.

Final Words Bobbio (2002, p. 51) wrote that “war has always been one of the obligatory and beloved themes of every philosophy of history, by the characteristics of terribility or fatality, which

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It is exactly this problem that the creation of the United Nations tried to address. It is also Bobbio (2002) who sees in the war and in the conflict a blocked route, a road without exit, that forces humanity to a setback. Lafer (2006, p. 95) reminds us that it was the horrors of “World War II and its scourges, the evil of the prepotent exercise of power by totalitarian regimes and the passive misery of the suffering of its innumerable victims that instigated the search and rekindled hope in the possibility of if we build a peaceful humanity.” Although it may be the subject of much criticism, the United Nations was the light of this hope. Lafer (2006, p. 95) also notes that the UN Charter “responded to these aspirations. It proposed guidelines along these lines in establishing a quest for the peaceful settlement of disputes as an obligation of behavior, and in indicating the path of international cooperation to solve global economic problems and social development for the purpose of creating conditions of well-being and respect for the human rights necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.”

On another occasion, Bobbio (2012, p. 21) states that “there will be stable peace, a peace that does not have war as an alternative, only when there are citizens no longer just this or that state, but the world.” This task of becoming children of the same homeland, the homeland of humanity, has been carried out by the United Nations for at least seven decades. There is a long walk ahead. As Castells (2012) has shown, nationalism, terrorism, environmental problems, the killing, and the sexual exploitation of children are future challenges whose confrontation is not only for the UN but for all humanity, of the peoples of the United Nations. These are not, however, the only challenges the future holds. While the United Nations is an essential forum for multilateral discussions, isolationist nationalism became a concern in recent years. The tendency of some world leaders to abandon global treaties and agreements puts the future of all of us in jeopardy on key issues. The environment, for

United Nations: Past, Present, and Future Challenges

example, the target of global debates since the 1970s is one of those threatened by the abandonment of negotiated solutions to a common problem. Dealing with this challenge is a part of what the future holds for the UN. In addition to greater acceptance and inclusiveness of the Rome Statute, effective ways of fighting terrorism are also on the agenda. It is not enough to persecute, fight, and find guiltiness to extremism. It is necessary to understand what causes people to see in radical acts the way out of their problems or the only way to draw attention to a given cause. Of course, there is no simple definition or easy understanding of this phenomenon, but somehow the UN needs to deal with it and its humanitarian aspect. In the humanitarian field, migration waves deserve great attention as well for families who leave their countries, fleeing desperate from a present of pain to an uncertain future. How to support the discouraged, which embark on potentially tragic journeys through the seas, lands, and frontiers? Why do some children have rights and the children of immigrants do not? None of these questions can be easily answered, but it is not the answers but the questions that will move us into the future.

Cross-References ▶ Informational Justice: Equity of Access, Implementation, and Interaction ▶ International Human Rights Treaties and the Sustainable Development Goals ▶ Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace

References Bassiouni M (2003) Introduction to international criminal law. Transnational Publishers, New York Bobbio N (2002) The problem of war and the ways of peace. Unesp, São Paulo Bobbio N (2012) Age of rights. Elsevier, São Paulo Brownlie I (2008) Principles of public international law. Oxford, Oxford Casella P (2007) Treaty of Versailles in the history of international law. Quartier Latin, São Paulo Casella P (2008) International public law handbook. Saraiva, São Paulo

Unsentenced Detainees: Socioeconomic Burdens of Pre-trial Detention Castells M (2012) The information age: economy, society and culture - end of millennium. Paz e Terra, São Paulo Grenville JA (2007) A history of the world from the 20th to the 21st century. Routledge, New York Hobsbawm E (2005) The age of extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914–1991. Companhia das Letras, São Paulo Lafer C (2006) Trade, disarmament, human rights. Reflections on a diplomatic experience. Paz e Terra, São Paulo Perry M (2005) Western civilization, a brief history. Cengage, Boston Rezek F (2005) International public law. Saraiva, São Paulo Seitenfus R (2005) Handbook on international organizations. Livraria do Advogado, Porto Alegre United Nations (2008) The United Nations today. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ar/geninfo/pdf/UN. today.pdf United Nations (2017) United Nations handbook 2017– 2018. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/ Peace-and-Security/United_Nations_Handbook_ 2017_18.pdf Vaïsse M (2013) International relations after 1945. Martins Fontes, São Paulo

Unscrupulousness ▶ International Resistance Networks for Anticorruption: Multi-stakeholder Mechanisms

Unsentenced Detainees: Socioeconomic Burdens of Pre-trial Detention Sabina Garahan Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Synonyms Pre-trial detainees

Definition The term unsentenced detainees refers to individuals held in places of detention who are awaiting trial or decisions relating to their possible

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conviction or sentencing, whether at first instance or on appeal. Some definitions view the pre-trial period as beginning at the moment of arrest and ending with the first appearance before a judge, while more expansive conceptions regard the pretrial period as starting from the moment of arrest and encompassing the trial period up until the point at which all possibility of appeal is extinguished (Domingo and Denney 2013).

Introduction Indicator 16.3.2 denotes the total number of persons in detention who have not yet been sentenced as a percentage of the total number of persons held in detention on a particular date (UNSD 2016). The indicator defers to the principle that persons awaiting trial should not be unnecessarily deprived of their liberty if the presumption of innocence is to be respected (UNSD 2016). In justice systems governed by the rule of law, unsentenced detainees are legally presumed innocent (Schönteich 2013). International standards allow the use of pre-trial detention only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has been involved in the commission of the alleged offence and there is a demonstrable risk that they will abscond, interfere with the course of justice, or commit a serious offence (Schönteich 2013). From the viewpoint of the SDGs, the disproportionate imposition of periods of pre-trial detention when not required for these set reasons wastes crucial criminal justice system resources and imposes socioeconomic burdens on the individual as well as their family (UNSD 2016). International law also requires that pre-trial detention be imposed only for the shortest time possible, with suspects being entitled to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial (Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). There are more than two and a half million remand prisoners in the world (Walmsley 2017) with pre-trial detainees constituting over half of the prison population in 40 countries (Penal Reform International 2016). The detrimental socioeconomic impacts faced by unsentenced

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detainees thus extend beyond their individual situations and those of their families, creating wider effects in society and on criminal justice in particular. Over the course of a year, almost 15 million people experience pre-trial detention (Open Society Foundations 2014), leaving a vast number of individuals and their families to deal with the consequences of imprisonment. The issue is a global one, affecting both developed and developing countries. In Africa, 41.5% of the prison population were awaiting trial in 2016, with 36.3% in the Americas, 25.8% in Asia, and 20.1% in Europe (Walmsley 2017). The time spent in pre-trial detention often exceeds the maximum possible sentence for the offence in respect of which individuals are awaiting trial – for instance, in England and Wales, more than half of all pre-trial detainees are eventually acquitted or, in the case of conviction, receive a noncustodial sentence (Schönteich 2014). The overuse of pre-trial detention has been described as “perhaps the most overlooked human rights crisis of our time” (Schönteich 2014). As well as presenting a higher risk of suicide and self-harm (Open Society Foundations 2014), evidence shows that pre-trial detainees are at higher risk of torture and other ill-treatment than sentenced prisoners (Méndez 2013). Manfred Nowak, former UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, noted that pre-trial detainees are “[o]ne of the most vulnerable groups” imprisoned “often for many years and usually under much worse conditions than convicted prisoners” (Nowak 2010). The crux of the issue, as identified by former UN Special Rapporteur Juan E. Méndez, is that “[i]n far too many countries, pre-trial detention is no longer a precautionary measure . . . but in reality serves as a type of preliminary punishment” (emphasis added) (Méndez 2013). At the UN level, one of the aims of Goal 16 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is to “provide access to justice for all” (UN Economic and Social Council 2017). An indicator to measure progress against the Goal is that of the percentage of “[u]nsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population” (UN

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division 2017), signaling global awareness that pre-trial detention rates directly reflect the state of criminal justice systems. The indicator is an important one, as the relative extent to which pre-trial detention is used can provide the necessary evidence to help states lower its resulting burdens and work towards its proportionate use (UNSD 2016).

Poverty as a Cause of Pre-trial Detention Pre-trial detention disproportionately affects people living in poverty since they are less likely to be in a position to pay the bail or bribes necessary for their release but more likely to come into conflict with the criminal justice system and to be detained awaiting trial (Schönteich 2013). Most pre-trial detainees are both economically and politically marginalized (Open Society Foundations 2014). This is the case in both high- and low-income economies, with pre-trial detainees experiencing comparably poor health and educational outcomes, as well as little formal employment (Open Society Foundations 2010). Consequently, unaffordable bail and the inability to provide a surety as a bail condition disproportionately impact those living in poverty. For instance, in James Fort prison in Ghana, at least 60% of pre-trial detainees had been granted bail but were not released because they were unable to pay the required surety (Penal Reform International 2005). In Mexico, 5 out of every 100 people charged with “minor crimes” – matters in which they have the right to be released on bail – remain in pre-trial detention because they cannot afford to pay the required amounts (Open Society Justice Initiative 2005). A 2014 study found that in South Africa, roughly 10,000 prisoners awaiting trial qualified for bail but could not meet the bail sums; in half of these cases, the amount was less than 1,000 rand (around USD $60) (Herrmannsen 2014). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has emphasized the potentially discriminatory nature of making pre-trial release conditional on the payment of financial sureties and has urged states to ensure “that the

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requirement to deposit a guarantee or financial security in order to obtain release pending trial is applied in a manner appropriate to the situation of persons belonging to . . . [racial or ethnic] groups, who are often in straitened economic circumstances, so as to prevent this requirement from leading to discrimination against such persons” (CERD 2005). The significance of access to legal representation, including to enable the use of noncustodial measures, was marked by the adoption of the UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems by the UN General Assembly in December 2012. The Principles require states to develop systems for the provision of legal advice for individuals who cannot afford legal assistance. Legal advice, whether delivered by public defenders, private lawyers, or through paralegal schemes, improves access to justice and case management during the pre-trial phase (Penal Reform International 2016). However, all over the world, a lack of funding results in a failure to provide individuals detained on remand with an adequate defense (International Centre for Prison Studies 2004). In developing countries, this issue is aggravated by a deficit of trained lawyers (Penal Reform International 2018). This is especially concerning since a lack of legal assistance significantly reduces the likelihood of a fair trial while placing further pressure on individuals living through the uncertainty of pre-trial detention to plead guilty (Penal Reform International 2018). Corruption also diminishes the possibility of fair pre-trial outcomes for the poor, since they are unable to pay the bribes that may be sought to guarantee pre-trial release. Post-release, they face the disproportionate negative impacts on education, employment, and livelihood set out elsewhere in this chapter. Corruption is highly prevalent at the pretrial stage, with their vulnerability and fear of the uncertainty of their situation making unsentenced detainees frequent targets for demands for bribes (UNODC 2017). The risk of corruption is also increased since pre-trial detention attracts less scrutiny and, at the same time, more discretion than other, later, stages of the criminal justice process, often involving the most junior and low-paid criminal justice actors (Schönteich 2013).

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Poverty as an Effect of Pre-trial Detention The poorer an individual, the harder it is to recover from the adverse impacts of pre-trial detention. Even temporary unemployment can have far-reaching consequences; in states that have social security or retirement programs, the income lost through pre-trial detention has a lasting impact extending through later life as a result of reduced contributions to the retirement plan (Open Society Foundations 2010). Pre-trial detention decreases not only formal sector employment but also the amount of employment and taxrelated government benefits received (Dobbie et al. 2016). Detention on remand translates into lost income and reduced employment opportunities for the individuals detained and plunges their families into financial struggle (Schönteich 2013). When a key source of income is cut off as a result of a person being held in pre-trial detention, their family must not only cope with the sudden loss of that income – a heightened challenge where the detainee is the breadwinner – but also with the financial costs of supporting that individual during their detention, including travel costs incurred when visiting them, the provision of food and personal items in detention, payment of legal fees, and, frequently, bribes to guards (Schönteich 2013). This economic hardship, while generally felt immediately, may also have enduring consequences from which a household may struggle to recover, especially where detention continues indefinitely (Muntingh and Redpath 2018). A household’s ability to cope financially will depend on the levels of available existing resources or the ability to access other financial avenues (Muntingh and Redpath 2018). Research conducted in Sierra Leone revealed that for every four pre-trial detainees, there were five family members who could no longer rely on the support of a main breadwinner, with most detainees (men at the peak of their working lives) having on average four dependants (Timap for Justice and Prison Watch Sierra Leone 2013). The negative economic impacts of pre-trial detention can also lead to loss of the home (King 1973),

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with grave consequences both for the individual on release and for the family. This can have further repercussions, leading to the breakup of the family and thereby ultimately hampering the detainee’s reintegration into the community after release. In both high- and low-income economies, pre-trial detainees are more likely to come from already fragile family backgrounds (Open Society Foundations 2010), making this a particularly devastating consequence of pre-trial detention. It is worth noting that pre-trial detention also leads to adverse criminal justice outcomes for remand prisoners. Being detained before trial significantly heightens the likelihood of a conviction (Dobbie et al. 2016), more so the longer an individual is detained (Open Society Justice Initiative 2009). This could be a result of the increased risk faced by remand prisoners of a confession or statement being coerced through torture or other ill treatment and of their weakened defense rights while in custody (APT/ Penal Reform International 2013). The possible loss of employment and accommodation, as well as family and community ties, hampers an individual’s ability to persuade a court to hand down a noncustodial sentence (Morgan 1994), such as a fine, probation, or a suspended sentence (King 1973). Importantly, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) encourage states to incorporate within their criminal justice systems a wide range of noncustodial measures, thereby avoiding unnecessary recourse to imprisonment and alleviating the detrimental socioeconomic impacts experienced by unsentenced detainees. The UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Noncustodial Measures for Women Offenders (The Bangkok Rules) provide guidance on the particular application of these rules to women in detention. Periods of detention have a “clear and measureable” socioeconomic impact on individuals and their dependants (Muntingh and Redpath 2018). The following sections review the negative health, gender equality, employment, and universal education outcomes for all persons affected by the disproportionate use of pre-trial detention.

Health (Goal 3, in Particular Target 3.3) Goal 3 requires states to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.” Target 3.3 requires states to “end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases.” Places of detention are high-risk environments for the transmission of disease because of inadequate healthcare and overcrowding. Overcrowding has been shown to aggravate the spread of disease, including TB, in places of detention (Reyes 2007). When prisons are overcrowded and under-resourced, prison administrations struggle to provide detainees even with sufficient food, clean water, and a bed to sleep on (Coyle 2002). Places of pre-trial detention are frequently more overcrowded than prisons (Schönteich 2008). Prison administrations may also intentionally deprive detainees of their basic needs – for instance, in Kenya, pre-trial detainees were given only half the food ration of sentenced prisoners because they did not work (Rodley 2000). In Zimbabwe, pre-trial detainees denied access to basic sanitation were said to be dying from cholera and other infectious diseases at a rate comparable to a humanitarian emergency, with detainees reported to be sleeping next to dead bodies that had not yet been removed (Alexander 2009). Against this background, pre-trial detainees will sometimes incriminate themselves in order to be transferred to a detention facility for convicted prisoners where they believe their living conditions will improve; alarmingly, many authorities support the inferior treatment of pre-trial detainees since this can result in their self-incrimination and, ultimately, conviction (Schönteich 2013). Pre-trial detainees should be housed separately from convicted prisoners, and juveniles in pretrial detention should be separated from adults (Article 10(2) of the ICCPR). Pre-trial detention centers may not offer the same health services as prisons since they are regarded as short-term detention facilities (Tomasini-Joshi et al. 1990), although untried prisoners have the right to access all services accorded to all prisoners (Rule 24 of the Nelson Mandela Rules). Indeed, individuals in state custody have the right to “the health services

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available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation” (Basic Principles 1990, Principle 9). Health services are however frequently even more lacking in pre-trial detention than in prisons generally, since they are not a priority for governments and may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the health ministry (WHO 2007). Individuals detained on remand may not have access to prison services because they are not at that stage under the legal jurisdiction of the prison (Tomasini-Joshi et al. 1990). Authorities are often unwilling to commence a course of treatment for pre-trial detainees that will need to continue over a sustained period of time (Schönteich 2013; Reyes 2007), since they are considered to be a transitory prison group by most prison authorities (Open Society Foundations 2010). Pre-trial detention therefore often presents a “missed opportunity” to prevent illness and even death, particularly in cases of HIV, TB, hepatitis, and some mental health problems requiring sustained treatment, in respect of which early detection and treatment are critical (Tomasini-Joshi et al. 1990). A deficit of medical professionals conducting intake screenings (Reyes 2007) hampers the chance of early detection, despite international standards requiring every detainee to be examined by a medical officer as soon as possible after admission (Rule 30 of the Nelson Mandela Rules). Worryingly, ministries responsible for pre-trial detention do not always report cases of TB or of sexually transmitted infections, making it hard to assess the contribution of infections in these settings to regional and national epidemics (Csete 2010). These concerns have come to the fore in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a joint statement, the UNODC, WHO, UNAIDS, and OHCHR highlighted the health risks faced by prisoners and urged that deprivation of liberty, including pre-trial detention, be employed only as a measure of last resort, noting that overcrowding imposes an “insurmountable obstacle” to any adequate response to COVID-19 (WHO 2020). Pre-trial detainees have however been largely excluded from any initiatives to release prisoners in response to the pandemic; where release has been authorized, requirements to post

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bail in order to secure release have again disproportionately affected unsentenced detainees without adequate financial means, leaving them exposed to serious health risks in detention (Human Rights Watch 2020). Gender Equality (Goal 5, in Particular Targets 16.3 and 16.B) Proportionately more women than men are remanded in custody; a UK study showed that two-thirds of women in prison were detained on remand with more than half ultimately not receiving custodial sentences, with one in five being acquitted (Corston 2007). One of the reasons for this is that women are often unable to afford bail or to offer a surety as a bail condition. This creates particular difficulties in countries where women cannot legally own property, since women are forced to rely on a male family member to act as a surety (AdvocAid 2012). Women’s lower economic status also means that they are more likely to be viewed as being at greater risk of absconding, since courts rely on factors such as stable employment or accommodation in order to be persuaded that an individual will appear for trial (Townhead 2007). The failure of the state to provide alternatives that do not require financial guarantees therefore has a disproportionate impact on women (Townhead 2007). Moreover, noncustodial alternatives to detention are generally tailored to men and often not accessible to women on an equal basis (Penal Reform International 2017). Since accommodation and facilities for women prisoners are more limited than for men, women detained on remand are more likely to be housed with sentenced prisoners (Bastick and Townhead 2008), contrary to Article 10(2) (a) of the ICCPR. As research from Australia has shown, a lack of accommodation also means they are more likely to be housed in a high-security regime regardless of their low-security classification (Armstrong et al. 2005). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has emphasized that “the mere fact of belonging to a racial or ethnic group . . . is not a sufficient reason, de jure or de facto, to place a person in pretrial detention” (CERD 2005).

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Despite this, black and minority ethnic women are more likely to be remanded in custody than white women (Corston 2007). In recognition of the fact that women from minority groups may face multiple discrimination within the justice system, the Committee has emphasized the need to pay “particular attention to [their] situation” (CERD 2005). Women in prison tend to be young, poor, and not formally employed, with low levels of education (Muñoz 2009). The former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Vernor Muñoz, has emphasized that women’s educational needs differ from those of men (Muñoz 2009). The training and work opportunities offered to women in prison should correspond to market demand, thereby increasing women’s employment chances post-release (Atabay 2008). Nonetheless, women detained pre-trial are often excluded from education and vocational programs (Bastick and Townhead 2008). Where such programs are made available, they are more limited in scope and worse in quality than those provided for men, and often reflect stereotyped roles for women such as kitchen tasks and sewing (Muñoz 2009). In addition, women are usually offered vocational training for low-paying jobs (Human Rights Watch 1996). A significant number of women in prison are mothers and are the sole or primary caregivers in their household (Ackermann 2015). Their detention imposes adverse health, social, emotional, and financial impacts on them and their families; the effect on children is especially severe (Muntingh and Redpath 2018), both for children who are imprisoned with their mothers and those who remain without them on the outside (Ackermann 2015). In addition, a lack of childcare facilities creates additional hurdles to accessing educational and work programs for women whose children are in prison with them, owing to the difficulties of balancing both commitments, or because such programs do not permit children to be present (Prison Services Working Group 1999). In addition to these detrimental socioeconomic impacts on families, women in prison are affected by specific gender-related issues, including those

relating to reproductive health needs, mental health disorders connected to prior experiences of violence and substance misuse, and heightened vulnerability to sexual abuse and harassment in places of detention (Ackermann 2015). In the state of New South Wales in Australia, pre-trial detainees are automatically classified as highrisk prisoners, entailing restrictions on personal property and visit entitlements (Bastick and Townhead 2008). While high-security classification of individuals who have not been convicted of a crime is unacceptable in all cases, it has a particularly harmful impact on female detainees who find the effects of placement in high-security conditions, including restrictions on family visits, especially distressing (UNODC 2014). Employment (Goal 8) Goal 8 requires states “to promote . . . full and productive employment and decent work for all.” As previously outlined, pre-trial detainees may lose their jobs during or following even a short period of pre-trial detention. Future employment prospects may be irrevocably damaged, even after acquittal, and in the long-term. The stigma of having been detained together with lost educational or training opportunities impacts negatively on the employment and lifetime incomes of pre-trial detainees far beyond the remand period (Open Society Foundations 2010). During her mandate, the former UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona highlighted that “[d]etention and incarceration can lead to loss of income and employment and often temporary or permanent withdrawal of social benefits” (Sepúlveda Carmona 2012). Compounding this issue is the authorities’ view of pre-trial detainees as a temporary population not requiring vocational training services (Open Society Foundations 2010). In England and Wales, half of men and two-thirds of women employed at the time they were arrested lost their jobs after being detained, and only 18% of men and 11% of women are expected to return to employment after their release (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2000).

Unsentenced Detainees: Socioeconomic Burdens of Pre-trial Detention

The stigma of detention, combined with lost educational and training opportunities, severely limits the incomes of those who have been detained in remand over the course of their lifetimes – since most pre-trial detainees are aged between 20 and 40, namely, their “wage-earning peak”, income lost at this point almost certainly cannot be regained later in life (Open Society Foundations 2010). The time spent in detention also causes the loss of social networks that would otherwise tend to improve employment prospects (Bucknor and Barber 2016). Universal Education for All (Goal 4) Goal 4 requires states to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.” Pre-trial detention has adverse impacts on the education of detainees both by interfering with any educational processes they may have already been engaged in and by failing to provide meaningful educational opportunities in detention. Since many pre-trial detainees are young adults, some will be forced to interrupt or abandon their education (Open Society Foundations 2010). Pre-trial detainees are also offered fewer educational opportunities than sentenced prisoners (Schönteich 2008) because most prison authorities regard them as a transitory prison group not requiring access to education or other services (Open Society Foundations 2010). Families of unsentenced detainees also experience reduced educational outcomes (Schönteich 2013). Children of those who are detained face disruption to their education – changes to who their main carer is and to their home may require them to move schools (Beresford 2018). A UK report showed that only 5% of female prisoners’ children stayed in their home once their mother had been sentenced to custody (Corston 2007). This sort of disruption results in “heightened rates of school failure and eventual criminal activity” (Myers et al. 1999). In developing countries, children also commonly face the additional struggle of being forced out of education and into work in order to make up for the lost income of the detainee (Open Society Foundations 2010). Older children are especially vulnerable to being

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taken out of school in order to fulfill the duties formerly carried out by the detained parent (Muntingh and Redpath 2018). These forfeited educational opportunities create a multigenerational effect, also reducing the lifetime income of prisoners’ children, the socioeconomic costs of which are ultimately absorbed by the state (Open Society Foundations 2010).

Efficiency of the Justice System The excessive use of pre-trial detention wastes resources that could be effectively expended in other spheres, thereby increasing costs, lowering revenue, and limiting resources for social service programs (Schönteich 2013). Ineffective criminal justice policies, including excessive use of pretrial detention, fail to reduce reoffending, with increased crime levels leading to higher costs (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2014). International standards mandate the widest possible use of alternatives to pre-trial detention. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9 and Article 14) (1966), the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1988), and the UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems (2012). As well as helping to protect individual rights, alternatives to detention are a more cost-effective option for the state (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2014). Courts around the world have become overcrowded through the drastic overuse of custodial measures at the pre-trial stage. The slow functioning of justice systems increases both the number of people in pre-trial detention and the length of time for which they are detained (Townhead 2007), resulting in resources being spent on the construction and operation of places of detention rather than being meaningfully deployed elsewhere (Open Society Justice Initiative 2008). The period of time for which people are held in pre-trial detention depends on factors including the speed of the police or prosecutor’s investigation; the capacity of the system to transport defendants from prison to court; the workload of the

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courts and the resources available to conduct trials; and the availability of legal advice and public defenders for unsentenced detainees (International Centre for Prison Studies 2004). Overcrowding caused by excessive use of pretrial detention causes prison administrations to struggle to maintain a safe and healthy prison environment while also weakening the efficiency of the justice system. Congested pre-trial detention centers are “often chaotic, abusive, and unruly places where few inmates are given the supervision they require” (Open Society Justice Initiative 2008). To tackle poor conditions in such centers, the UN Human Rights Committee has recommended the allocation of additional resources to the judiciary in order to ease the backlogs of cases that contribute to overcrowding (Human Rights Committee 2004).

Conclusion Unsentenced detainees face a plethora of issues impacting detrimentally on their own education, employment, and healthcare outcomes and those of their families. Female detainees face the additional burden of gender discrimination aggravating these detrimental outcomes, especially so in the case of women from ethnic minority backgrounds. Pre-trial justice therefore has a key role to play in contributing to the success of the sustainable development program. In order to reduce the devastating and longlasting impacts on pre-trial detainees and their families, individuals who are primary caregivers of young children should only be detained on remand following the review of a probation report on the likely impact on their children (Corston 2007). Custodial sentences for women should only be imposed on serious and violent offenders who are considered to pose a public threat; women who are unlikely to receive a custodial sentence should not be detained pre-trial (Corston 2007). Laws and policies should consider and seek to mitigate the impact on children of a primary carer’s contact with the criminal justice system (Beresford 2018). Reform interventions have included undertaking measures to address issues of access to justice and legal aid to fill existing gaps. The Paralegal

Advisory Service Institute in Malawi is believed to have played a key role in reducing the number of pre-trial detainees in the country by heightening coordination between the prisons, courts, and police, improving prisoners’ understanding of the law and offering legal advice and support (UNODC 2014). The key role of health professionals, including professional societies and international organizations such as the World Health Organization, in improving pre-trial detention practices has been emphasized through their participation in research and building research capacity as well as through providing technical support to remand service providers and to the prison health profession, among others (Open Society Foundations 2011). Prison settings should be included in national HIV, TB, and drug dependence treatment programming (UNODC/ILO/UNDP/WHO/ UNAIDS 2013). Programs providing safe alternatives to pre-trial detention for persons accused of low-level crimes should also be implemented (Csete 2010; Schönteich 2008; UNODC/ILO/ UNDP/WHO/UNAIDS 2013). The exposure of prisoners to COVID-19 has reiterated the need to treat pre-trial detention as a measure of last resort (WHO 2020).

Cross-References ▶ Legal Aid: Promoting Sustainable Development Through Greater Access to Justice

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Unsentenced Detainees: Socioeconomic Burdens of Pre-trial Detention the Anti Discrimination Commissioner for an inquiry into the discrimination experienced by women prisoners within the criminal justice system in New South Wales. Available via Justice Action. https://www. justiceaction.org.au/prisons/prison-issues/94-women/ 597-beyond-bars-inquiry-into-treatment-of-women. Accessed 14 September 2020 Atabay T (2008) Handbook for prison managers and policymakers on women and imprisonment. http:// www.unodc.org/documents/justiceand-prison-reform/ women-and-imprisonment.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Bastick M, Townhead L (2008) Women in prison: a commentary on the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Available via Quaker United Nations Office. https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/ default/files/HR_Prisoners_QUNO_2008_0.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Beresford S (2018) “What about me?” The impact on children when mothers are involved in the criminal justice system. Available via Prison Reform Trust. http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/portals/0/docu ments/what%20about%20me.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Bucknor C, Barber A (2016) The price we pay: economic costs of barriers to employment for former prisoners and people convicted of felonies. Available via Center for Economic and Policy Research. http://cepr.net/ images/stories/reports/employment-prisoners-felonies2016-06.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 CERD (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) (2005) General comment 31 on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system. Adopted on 17 August 2005 Corston J (2007) The Corston report: a report by Baroness Jean Corston of a review of women with particular vulnerabilities in the criminal justice system. https:// w e b a r c h i v e . n a t i o n a l a r c h i v e s . g o v. u k / 20180207155341; http://www.justice.gov.uk/publica tions/docs/corston-report-march-2007.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Coyle A (2002) Managing prisons in a time of change. Available via International Centre for Prison Studies. http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/ resources/downloads/managing_prisons_0.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Csete J (2010) Consequences of injustice: pre-trial detention and health. Int J Prison Health 6(1):3–14 Dobbie W, Goldin J, Yang C (2016) The effects of pre-trial detention on conviction, future crime, and employment: evidence from randomly assigned judges. NBER working paper no. w22511. http://scholar. harvard.edu/files/cyang/files/dgy_bail_july2016.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Domingo P, Denny L (2013) The political economy of pretrial detention. Available via ODI. https://www.odi.org/ sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/8257.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Herrmannsen K (2014) Unaffordable bail sums in the spotlight. Available via Wits Justice Project. https:// witsjusticeproject.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/

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unaffordable-bail-sums-in-the-spotlight/. Accessed 14 September 2020 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2000) Unjust deserts: a thematic review by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons of the treatment and conditions for unsentenced prisoners in England and Wales. Home Office, London Human Rights Committee (2004) Concluding observations on Suriname (CCPR/CO/80/SUR) Human Rights Watch (1996) All too familiar: sexual abuse of women in U.S. State Prisons. Available via Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Us1. htm. Accessed 14 September 2020 Human Rights Watch (2020) Covid-19 prisoner releases too few, too slow. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/ 27/covid-19-prisoner-releases-too-few-too-slow. Accessed 27 May 2020 International Centre for Prison Studies (2004) Guidance note 5: pre-trial detention. http://www.prisonstudies. org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/gn5_8_0. pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 King M (1973) Bail or custody. Cobden Trust, London Morgan R (1994) England/Wales. In: Dünkel F, Vagg J (eds) Waiting for trial: international perspectives on the use of pretrial detention and the rights and living conditions of prisoners waiting for trial. Max Planck Institute, Freiburg Muntingh L, Redpath J (2018) The socio-economic impact of pre-trial detention in Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 10(1):139–164 Myers BJ et al (1999) Children of incarcerated mothers. J Child Fam Stud 8(1):11–25 Open Society Foundations (2010) The socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention. http://www.undp.org/ content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Gover nance/a2j-%20Socioeconomic%20impact%20of% 20PTD%20OSI%20UNDP.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Open Society Foundations (2011) Pretrial detention and health: unintended consequences, deadly results. https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/5e9f14f1249f-4427-84d8-ac6b30228a45/ptd-health-20111103. pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Open Society Foundations (2014) Access to pretrial justice. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/ pretrial-justice. Accessed 2 July 2018 Open Society Justice Initiative (2005) Myths of Pretrial Detention in Mexico. https://www.justiceinitiative.org/ uploads/40d9a55d-3cee-490a-9651-ecbc8394e949/ myths-pretrial-detention-mexico-20100825-en_0.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2020 Open Society Justice Initiative (2008) Pretrial detention. https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/2f65cc09c4da-4a48-9929-c8bff4110f53/Justice_Initiati.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 Open Society Justice Initiative (2009) Why we need a global campaign for pretrial justice. Available via Open Society Foundations. https://www.opensociety foundations.org/fact-sheets/why-we-need-global-cam paign-pretrial-justice. Accessed 2 July 2018 Penal Reform International (2005) Reducing pre-trial detention: an index on good practices developed in Africa and elsewhere. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-

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UN Economic and Social Council (2017) Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. E/2017/66, 11 May 2017. h t t p : / / w w w. u n . o rg / g a / s e a r c h / v i e w _ d o c . a s p ? symbol¼E/2017/66&Lang¼E. Accessed 2 July 2018 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (2000) Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, Submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/32, Addendum, Visit of the Special Rapporteur to Kenya. UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 2000/9/Add.4, 9 March 2000. https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/115/09/PDF/ G0011509.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 2 July 2018 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2009) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Vernor Muñoz. The Right to Education of Persons in Detention. A/HRC/11/8, 2 April 2009. http://www2. ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A. HRC.11.8_en.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2010) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak: Addendum: Study on the phenomena of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the world, including an assessment of conditions of detention. UN Doc. A/HRC/13/39/ Add.5, 5 February 2010. http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A.HRC.13. 39.Add.5_en.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2012) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona. UN Doc. A/HRC/20/25, 5 April 2012. https://www.ohchr. org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-25_en.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2013) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez. UN Doc. A/56/156, 1 February 2013. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_ English.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes] (2014) Handbook on women and imprisonment. 2nd edn. With reference to the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (The Bangkok Rules). Available via UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/docu ments/justice-and-prison-reform/women_and_imprison ment_-_2nd_edition.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018 UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes] (2017) Handbook on anti-corruption measures in prisons. https://www.unodc.org/documents/justiceand-prison-reform/17-06140_HB_anti-corr_prisons_ eBook.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2018

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Victim Offender Dialogue

Introduction

▶ Restorative Justice: Emergence, Institutionalization, and Critiques

This entry explores the highly sensitive and politicized concept of violent extremism. As an essentially contested topic, it has attracted significant attention and debate in the academic literature. The entry first offers an introduction to the term by way of contextualizing it, historically and etymologically, as well as introducing some of the terminological difficulties, their implications, and potential explanations for these. It then proceeds to a detailed overview of the different types of violent extremism and its devastating implications on humans, heritage, and the environment. The next section engages with so-called “push” and “pull” factors that drive people to support or commit acts of violent extremism. After this, various recruitment strategies adopted by such organizations, with a particular focus on right-wing, leftwing, and Islamist organizations, are discussed. In the context of the “War on Terror” and “the globalization of countering violent extremism policies” (Kundnani and Hayes 2018), it becomes pertinent to go beyond the term itself and offer an overview of the responses to countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE and PVE) by various stakeholders, be it international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or states. Within the context of responses by the international community, violent extremism is discussed in relation to sustainable development goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 on

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses Eleni Christodoulou1 and Yulia Nesterova2 1 Georg Eckert Leibniz Institute, Braunschweig, Germany 2 The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, SAR, China

Definition(s) Violent extremism (VE) refers to the use, support, or legitimization of violence to achieve social, political, or religious goals. The degree to which these goals are ideologically driven varies, but the cognitive aspect is always present. What differentiates VE from other violent acts is that it is usually done within a broader context of violent extremists’ current and future visions of the world – in other words a worldview mostly rejected by mainstream society that encompasses what is wrong with the world, what needs to change, and how the world should look like in the future.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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peaceful, inclusive, and just societies. Finally, the entry presents some criticism and concerns regarding approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism.

Understanding Violent Extremism Violent extremism (VE) is a relatively new term that gained potency since the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11 and the “War on Terror” that followed them. Violent extremism, however, existed prior to that in various manifestations. Some past examples include Nazism in Europe (1933–1945), Apartheid in South Africa (1948–1994), the West German far-left militant Red Army Faction (1970–1998), the paramilitary Irish Republican Army in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and numerous ethno-religious movements, including Chechen Muslim separatism from Russia since 1990s and the militant organization of Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka since 1976. However, it was only after the early 2000s that the term reached prominence in both academic and public discourse. Neither scholars nor states or international organizations have a universally agreed definition of VE, and there are often vested political and ideological interests involved that further complicate the situation. This definitional issue is then transferred to actions aiming to prevent or counter violent extremism; the practices are infused with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and paradoxes. Part of the difficulty lies in the highly sensitive and political nature of the term “violent extremism,” in its changing and varied manifestations, and the different contexts in which it occurs. Another reason for the definitional issue is lack of empirical evidence that could help scholars and policy-makers reach a more clear-cut understanding not only of what this term entails but also how it relates to other terms like radicalization and terrorism that are often used interchangeably, creating further confusion. The term “violent extremism” incorporates two words: one is a noun that refers to being extreme as a characteristic or state in the sense of having or advocating views or measures that fall outside the accepted mainstream views of society.

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

In today’s world these mainstream views have inadvertently strong links to the values of democracy (and rule by the majority), peace, and nonviolence, all within an ordered judicial system. Therefore, the term immediately differentiates between those who hold “moderate” and those who hold “extreme” views, with the latter having negative connotations that constitute a threat to democracy and its institutions. The second word of the term is “violent.” “Violent” is an adjective that refers to the use of violent methods and tactics in order to pursue those extremist views or agendas, which are usually religious, ethnic, or political in nature. One can be violent without being extremist in their views (e.g., meaningless or criminal violence), and one can be extremist without being violent, so it is pertinent to recognize the dynamics of this phrase when these two words are put together. At the same time, it is important to keep the “extremism” aspect of the term narrow enough so that violent extremism does not become an empty concept that encompasses all forms of violence but rather is seen as a sub-concept of violence, i.e., a particular genre or type of violence. International and regional organizations like the UN, the European Union, or the African Union do not have a consistent official definition. Organizations like USAID, on the other hand, define VE as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives” (2011, p. 2). UNESCO does not have an official definition either but uses certain definitions depending on its publications (whereas the UN intentionally refrained from offering a definition arguing that is the responsibility of the Member States; see UN 2015b). For example, in its 2017 Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: Guide for Policymakers, it adopts the Australian Government’s definition, arguing it is the most commonly used one: violent extremism “refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals” (UNESCO 2017a, p. 19). Policy-makers have been criticized for inconsistent definitions of VE, for leaving them

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intentionally vague so as to avoid tackling sensitive issues head on or for keeping them so broad that they could well encompass large parts of the population as being violent extremists (yet in practice the definitions are sometimes applied selectively stigmatizing particular populations). For example, the 2011 US White House strategy on PVE which defines violent extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologicallymotivated violence to further political goals” is strongly criticized by Kundnani and Hayes (2018). They argue that if we apply this broad definition, then “the millions who support US military violence carried out for political purposes, such as regime change or humanitarian intervention, and who do so as a result of an ideology, such as American exceptionalism, are violent extremists. Yet no CVE programme exists to prevent teenagers from being indoctrinated into American exceptionalism” (p. 10). Definitions are crucial as they are adopted to justify or legitimize strategies that are used to prevent or counter violent extremism. So the broader the definition, the more potentially encompassing the security measures utilized to tackle violent extremism can be, allowing security government agencies to evade accountability and justification of their actions. Some academics argue that more attention should be given to the cognitive aspects of violent extremism, including an individual’s “quest for personal significance” (Kruglanski et al. 2018, p. 3). There are also those who argue VE only refers to the ideology and not to the act of violence itself (Striegher 2015). However, others argue that these approaches are problematic. For example, in the analyses of Islamist extremism, it has been claimed that the emphasis has been placed on “religio-cultural ideology” at the expense of understanding the “political conflict over western foreign policy” and that violent extremists’ engagement with ideology often remains at a very superficial level (Kundnani 2009, p. 40). To add to the terminological complexity, as there are no commonly accepted definitions of either violent extremism, terrorism, or radicalization, the terms are often used interchangeably. Despite connections between them, clear

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distinctions are critical to the development of effective strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism. Terrorism can be seen as one form or tactic of VE whose main aim is to spread fear, panic, anxiety, and chaos at random time-spaces by using “violence or force, or the threat directed upon innocents, civilians, or noncombatants, in order to achieve political objectives” (Kapitan and Schulte 2002, p. 173). The effects of terrorism go beyond physical damage and have “long-term psychological repercussions” that “cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands” (Croissant 2005, p. 5). While terrorism is an act of extreme violence, radicalization is typically referred to as the specific path or process by which individuals are drawn to adopt “radical” ideas that condone and actively pursue the use of violence to pursue ideological goals (Striegher 2015, p. 75) to effect “far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose direct threat to, the existing order” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 798). Warnes and Hannah (2008, p. 403) suggest that even though radicalization may not lead to violence, “the growth of a large number of radicalized individuals” is a security concern as these “alienated and ‘excluded’ individuals may provide a ‘stepping stone’ for individual recruitment.” Another difficulty with defining the term violent extremism is related to its evolving and varied manifestations and the different contexts within which it occurs. It is therefore useful to have a more nuanced understanding by looking in more detail at the different types of violent extremism.

Types of Violent Extremism Islamist VE refers to groups that guided by extremist interpretations of Islam, utilize harsh militant measures to dramatically change society by creating a caliphate for themselves. Some of these groups pledge allegiance to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that positions itself as the one true state ruled by sharia

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law that all Muslims should live under (Prinsloo 2018). They include Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and Abu Sayyaf. The measures used by ISIS and other Islamist VE groups include beheadings, mass executions, abductions, crucifixions, bombings, and other violent attacks and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law (Prinsloo 2018). Most vulnerable to Islamist VE continue to be Muslim populations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018). Christian violent extremism includes actions represented by extremist interpretations of Christianity. One example of this type of VE is Eric Rudolph in the United States who was a follower of a racist, anti-Semitic, white supremacist religious group. He conducted bombings at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics and in 1998 at an abortion clinic, quoting the Bible in his defense during court proceedings. Attacks on abortion clinics by Christians referring to their acts as the “work of God” have been conducted over years in Australia, Spain, Canada, and many cities across the United States. Another example is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that originated in Uganda and was led by Joseph Kony who proclaimed himself the messenger of Christian God and based the Army’s constitution on the Ten Commandments. During 1986–2006 the LRA committed atrocious acts of violence against people in Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The years 2013–2014 saw the rise of another Christian army in the Central African Republic that waged a violent war against the country’s Muslim population. Buddhist violent extremism has occurred in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. They are both two primarily Buddhist countries with religious minority populations. For decades the Myanmar government refused to recognize the Muslim minority Rohingya group. As a result, a conflict between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas started in 1982 with the government declaring all Rohingyas illegal immigrants. The conflict reemerged in 2012 with hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people being displaced and cases

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of rape and torture being reported (Amnesty International 2018). In Sri Lanka, the 1983–2009 civil war between Buddhists and Tamils (mainly Hindu) began as a result of the government’s moves to embrace religious (Buddhist) nationalism through, for example, giving the Buddhist citizens “the foremost place” in the constitution (Johansson 2018). In 2012, the Buddhist VE group, Bodu Bala Sena, that has connections with Myanmar’s VE “969 movement” (whose leader is the self-dubbed “Burmese bin Laden”), entered politics using Buddhist nationalist ideology and agenda against the country’s Muslim population for “taking over the country” and funding international terrorism (Johansson 2018). Hindu extremism started developing as a religious-nationalist ideology in the 1920s as a reaction to European colonialism, rejecting secularism and partly influenced by fascist ideas (Marshall 2004). These include cultural and religious chauvinism and racism and attempt to eradicate or drive out Indian citizens and foreigners of other religions based on the belief that Indians should practice only Hinduism. Hindu extremists have committed violence against Muslims and Christians resulting in thousands of deaths, tens of thousands of displaced people, forced conversion, sexual assaults on nuns, and destruction of Christian cemeteries and other religious property (Human Rights Watch 1999; Marshall 2004). Ethno-nationalist VE emerges as a response to a real or perceived oppression of an ethnic group by another powerful actor such as a state or another ethnic group and leads to a fight for selfdetermination and autonomy. Rwandan and Cambodian genocides are two examples of ethno-nationalist VE. In Rwanda, the former Belgian colonial authorities expressed favoritism toward the Tutsi ethnic group, and after granting independence, they left control over state affairs, administration, and resources to representatives of that group. Tensions between the Tutsis and another ethnic group, the Hutus, culminated in the 1994 genocide committed by the Hutus. The Hutus used indoctrination and incitement of their people to exterminate the Tutsis, killing an estimated 937, 000 people. In Cambodia, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge committed mass genocide against

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1.7 million people representing ethnic and religious minorities, including the Vietnamese, Chinese, Thai Muslims, and Buddhists. Right-wing VE groups are divided into extremist right, ethnocentric right, populist right, or religious-fundamentalist right and include, among others, neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, Christian Identity adherents, and white supremacist prison gangs. They advocate for taking action against nonwhites, Muslims, Jews, migrants, and LGBTQ who are believed to control and manipulate white people and drive them and their civilization to extinction. The movement has seen a dramatic resurgence since 2000 and has led to a significant increase in violence in North America and continental Europe as a response to “the refugee crisis and religiously inspired extremism” (Capano and van de Donk 2017). It culminated in Guillaume Faye’s 2011 European white supremacist manifesto Why We Fight: Manifesto of European Resistance aimed to unite white people, the right-wing terrorist Anders Breivik’s 2011 attacks in Norway that murdered over 70 people, the rise of right-wing parties across Europe, and other violent incidents. In certain European countries, such as Italy, Germany, and Greece, far-right parties whose members have been accused of violent extremism have gained seats in their respective parliaments. In the United States, among domestic extremist movements, far-right represents the most violent group with 83% of all extremist-related murders between 2005 and 2015 (ADL 2015). Left-wing VE groups use violence to overthrow capitalist systems which are perceived as exploiting the poor and weak members of society to establish a Marxist-Leninist, anarchist, antiglobalist, and anti-fascist society. A prominent example is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (1964–2017) that recruited, sometimes through force, men, women, and children to their ranks and funded itself through illegal mining, drug trade, and kidnappings to carry out terrorist attacks (e.g., using gas cylinder bombs) and traditional warfare against the Colombian government and civilians (Human Rights Watch 2005). A number of small left-wing organizations were active across European cities in

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1970s and 1980s although the German far-left Red Army Faction was active until 1998, while the Spanish Maoist group First of October Antifascist Resistance Groups re-emerged in 2006 by killing 86 people through bombings and shootings. Currently, left-wing radicalization and violence are on the rise partly as a response to the rise of right-wing VE and ethnic movements (Lenos and Wouterse 2018). The perpetrators of violent extremism can also be state actors. State VE refers to violent extremism perpetrated by a state that violates the rights and liberties of and commits ideologically driven atrocities against its own or other states’ citizens, for example, Nazi Germany and Stalinist USSR. States may also support non-state violent extremist actors by providing them with financial and technical resources, weapons, training, safe havens, and diplomatic support.

Effects of Violent Extremism VE has a detrimental effect on all sectors and, as such, undermines sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, security, and peace (UN 2015b). VE groups target, abduct, torture, and murder members of religious communities, political and human rights activists, members of LGBTQ communities, women, and children and commit other atrocities including genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Such atrocities have immense detrimental impacts on mental and physical well-being of those who experience torture, rape, injury, physical and sexual abuse, shooting, or witness killings. In occupied territories, for example, where ISIS ruled by instilling fear through torture, executions, gang rapes, killings, and sale of women (Torok 2015), survivors were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder (Hoffman et al. 2018). VE has a damaging impact on economic activity and growth due to the costs inflicted by deaths, injuries, property destruction (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018), the loss of revenues when tourism, investment, consumption, and trade decrease (Frey et al. 2004) and disruption of

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modern education that can provide young people with better opportunities (UN 2015b). Some VE groups are also involved in kidnapping, human trafficking, slave trade, trafficking in antiquities, and other illicit and illegal trade to increase their revenues (UN 2015b). To deal with organized movement of arms, drugs, money, and people, governments need to divert already limited economic resources from basic services to state security which may cause alienation of the population and contribute to increase of violence (Australian Government 2017). As the basic structure and work of state, nongovernmental, and development actors are disrupted, the ability of people to enjoy and exercise their human rights, such as the right to life, liberty, as well as freedom of expression, association, thought, and religion, is diminished. Humanitarian assistance to civilians living in areas controlled by VE groups is interfered with or seized by violent extremists, while humanitarian aid workers are killed, injured, and kidnapped (UN 2015b). Environment and wildlife experience an adverse long-lasting impact (Mannion 2003). Environmental impacts include defoliation and ecosystem destruction, deforestation, air and water pollution, and impairment of soil and vegetation from training grounds, camps, weapons testing, bombs and blasts that develop craters and collapse buildings, and abandonment of agricultural land. Loss of wildlife is another feature as animals are hunted for meat in places and for income ensured by selling ivory and animal skins in conflict zones where food and economic opportunities are scarce. Systematic and deliberate destruction of invaluable tangible heritage is another effect (but also tactic) of violent extremists who destroy archaeological treasures, museums, religious, and historic buildings. These include, among others, the destruction of shrines in Timbuktu in Mali by Al-Qaeda affiliates and of historic monuments in Raqqa, Palmyra, and Aleppo in Syria as well as Hatra, Mosul, Nimrud, and Nineveh in Iraq in recent years by ISIS. Brosché et al. (2017) outline four reasons for targeting cultural heritage. They include attacks on sites that represent a religious belief or cultural identity contested in the conflict; that are perceived to have military

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

importance; that can signal their strength and commitment; and that can be exploited to finance warfare. In other words, the rationale (and its effects) is not simply physical destruction. Instead, heritage destruction by VE groups can be viewed as part of a wider ideological struggle and an attempt to psychologically and emotionally hurt others.

Root Causes of Violent Extremism There is no one trajectory toward VE, but rather it is a combination of push and pull factors that increases an individual’s vulnerability or attraction toward VE. Hassan (2012, p. 18) identifies push factors as “negative social, cultural, and political features” in one’s context that “push vulnerable individuals into the path of VE,” while pull factors are appealing characteristics and benefits provided by VE organizations to lure or “pull” them to join. These factors and their combination change depending on contexts in which people live and their biographical backgrounds. The most widespread notion suggests that people are pushed to engage with VE ideologies, activities, and groups when they have nothing or little to lose. Weak and fragile states, therefore, are believed to present a fertile ground for the emergence and spread of VE. Croissant’s (2005) work shows a high correlation between violence and absence of democracy, low degree of trust in political authorities, low accountability, state weakness, and shallow political representation. Vergani et al. (2018) add state repressions to this list. Krueger and Maleckova (2003, p. 119) conclude that unfavorable political conditions create “feelings of indignity and frustration [perceived or real].” Additionally, Goodhand (2003) suggests violent conflicts are fueled “from below” by people who do not have access to quality social services and live in poverty. Unfavorable economic conditions, socioeconomic injustices, and lack of decent or any employment have shown to push individuals in different contexts to join VE that offer escape from poverty. For example, many women joined Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to attain financial stability as FARC offered them a high salary (Graham

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

2008). Hassan (2012) reported on Somali youth in a poverty-stricken country joining al-Shabaab for “employment” with a decent pay. However, poverty is not always a factor: background studies of 9/11 hijackers (Krueger and Maleckova 2003) and interviews with nearly 250 terrorists and associates (Hassan 2001) show that they come from educated middle-class backgrounds. As such, they also dispute the belief that absence of quality education, which would equip people with skills and critical thinking to fight ignorance and hate, is a critical factor as is emphasized in policies, rhetoric, and research (see Hanley 2001). In this, Krueger and Maleckova and Hassan are supported by Berrebi (2007) who discovered that people with higher education levels and higher living standards are more likely to participate in VE activities. The situation may, of course, differ in conflict and post-conflict zones where access to and quality of education might be disrupted and lack of education pushes people toward VE. However, as UNESCO MGIEP (2017) reports, a bigger concern is lack of context-relevant, culturally sensitive, and critical education that represents the diversity and complexity of contexts, histories, and views. Some scholars explain the phenomenon from the ideological perspective arguing for the primacy of religious factors. Aly and Striegher (2012, p. 849), however, found that religious beliefs play “a far lesser role” in pulling people toward VE than some experts suggest, while Zhirkov et al. (2014) discovered that the more religious individuals are and the more knowledge of Islam they have, the less chance of radicalization to VE there is. Nevertheless, there are problematic issues within religions as religious messages may be misused by different groups (Tarlow 2017) and/or radically interpreted (Venkatraman 2007). For example, Islam is misused by VE groups in cases when they need to convince youth of their religious duty to fight Islam’s “enemies” and/or to die as a martyr to obtain paradise (Hassan 2012). Atran (2010) provides an example of young Muslim women and men who, being increasingly more marginalized economically, socially, and politically, become more vulnerable to Islamist VE that abuses Islam for its own purposes. This

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can be the case for Muslim youth living in western countries who experience an identity crisis, a heightened sense of non-belonging to either their parents’ home or host countries, discrimination, and disadvantage (see Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Sageman 2004). Their search for identity and community can bring them to Islamist VE groups that provide a fixed system of values, belonging to a community, and a sense of understanding of their experiences with racism and discrimination in non-Muslim countries (NasserEddine et al. 2011). Another example is the Islamist al-Shabaab group that attracts members of Somali ethnicity and Muslim faith who have historically been marginalized in the neighboring Kenya (Hassan 2012). This suggests that it is not religion per se but other factors that may lead individuals to VE. Marginalization and discrimination or the “aggressive policies of Western states in Muslim majority countries” have been cited as factors (Vergani et al. 2018, p. 8). The study of Vergani et al. (2018) further divided it into the Global War on Terror, the War in Afghanistan, Western attacks against the Ummah, and the perception of Western dominance in world politics. Attaining reputation and power in the community or a sense of belonging can be regarded as pull factors. In Hassan’s study (2012), young people who joined violent extremists became viewed as “defenders of country and religion” which gave them authority and respect in the context where due to traditional structures that value age, they tend to have none. Atran (2010) shows that for many individuals, moral causes play a more critical role than economic incentives, and young people tend to take on causes that build upon and/or represent their core values even though resources are provided by VE groups. Other pull factors may include the desire of adventure and excitement offered by violence (Vergani et al. 2018).

Recruitment While injustices, inequalities, racism, and various forms of marginalization and vulnerability exist, the majority of people that experience push factors and are exposed to radical ideas do not become violent extremists (Nasser-Eddine et al.

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2011). This suggests that importance should be given to personal biographical factors but also to the various recruitment strategies of VE. As engagement with VE requires strong relationships with like-minded people and a sense of identity and belonging, key recruiters are usually representatives of a close social network and include family members, peers, and religious leaders (Hassan 2012; Vergani et al. 2018). Boko Haram, for example, recruits primarily through friends and at religious meetings although madrassas (Islamic religious schools) play a significant role in introducing youth to the organization (Botha et al. 2017). Atran (2010) points out, however, that most people become engaged by their peers who form small groups in their neighborhoods or social network or through online communities on the Internet. Unlike Boko Haram and other VE organizations that primarily use social networks for recruitment, ISIS mostly relies on direct engagement with people through its sophisticated online recruitment system that also spreads VE propaganda and undermines rivals (Alfifi et al. 2018). Such propaganda promotes a black and white worldview and “us” versus “them” rhetoric to motivate people to join ISIS. Extremist propaganda follows a general pattern that consists of a diagnosis of a problem (Islam is under attack), prognosis of what should be done (fight and create the Caliphate), and a rationale of who should do it and why (help however you can) with a carefully crafted, clear-cut, and relevant narrative and message for each target group of potential followers (Ritzmann 2017). Successful recruitment strategies have shown to include propaganda that presents ISIS as a utopian land with effective governance, flourishing economic and social systems and religious order (Winter 2015) through audiovisual material, images, and hashtags promoted on social media website (e.g., Twitter, YouTube, Facebook) (Awan 2017). ISIS also uses individual targeting through its “headhunters” who approach “vulnerable” youth as young as 12 on social media and instant messaging (Shalal 2017). Similarly, right-wing groups use online platforms for initial recruitment. Video games’ chats

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

are avenues to recruit young people by providing them with a sense of structure, identity, and belonging to a group that cares for them and supports their interest (Kamenetz 2018). Offline avenues for recruitment may include mixed martial arts clubs (Zidan 2018), football fan clubs (Parkin 2018), and spreading information on flyers and posters on college campuses (Shugerman 2018). Miller-Idriss (2018), in her study on German far-right youth subculture, demonstrates how the commercialization of fashion products and clothes covered with extremist right-wing political (e.g., anti-Semitic and racist) symbols plays an instrumental role in attracting and recruiting young people to extremism. In terms of left-wing VE, less research has been conducted, but there are some indications that personal contacts such as family and friends may play a more critical role in recruitment than the online space (Lenos and Wouterse 2018, p. 7).

Responses to Violent Extremism Countering (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) have been key approaches adopted to address the ideologies and activities (e.g., recruitment, radicalization, mobilization, attacks) of violent extremist groups and individuals that associate or may associate with them. Although often used interchangeably, CVE and PVE are two distinct approaches. CVE combines “soft” and “hard” strategies, while PVE relies primarily on “soft” approaches. “Hard” strategies are “a means to achieve desired outcomes through the ostensible use of force” (Coronado 2005, p. 322) and include military intervention, coercive diplomacy, policing, legislation, and defensive measures such as intelligence, infrastructure protection, and border security. In contrast, the “soft” approach aims not to coerce people but to co-opt them through “intangible assets” such as “political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (Nye Jr 2008, p. 95). The “soft” strategies rely on formal and informal education, counter-ideological interpretations and counter-narratives to VE ideologies and interpretations, censorship

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

and monitoring of media and social media, conflict resolution through state building and peace talks, provision of alternative pathways, and work with civil society, among others. CVE and PVE “soft” approaches also differ as PVE’s objective is to “prevent the violent actor from emerging in the first place,” while CVE is a responsive strategy to “respond to specific threats, violent actors or organizations, and known quantities” (UNESCO MGIEP 2017, pp. 45–46). Thus, as PVE’s work revolves around addressing broad social issues and risks by designing an environment (in, e.g., schools, communities, media) that redresses injustices, strengthens identities, builds cohesion between groups, and develops a strong sense of belonging, CVE, on the other hand, employs strategies to help de-radicalize and/or counter-recruit individuals through targeted counter and alternative narratives, community-based programs, youth engagement, and other methods. Nonetheless, both rely on the same spectrum of stakeholders to design and implement their strategies. These stakeholders include formal and informal education institutions, media and social media, families and guardians, peers and friends, community, and religious leaders, among others. International and regional organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, and the European Union, several countries, and a variety of NGOs and think tanks have responded by creating or becoming members in networks that specialize on PVE/CVE and often collaborate with each other on various multiagency projects (e.g., Radicalisation Awareness Network; European Forum on Urban Security; Violence Prevention Network; African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism). Impetus to the creation of these structures at local, national, and international levels was arguably given by former Secretary-General, Ban Kimoon’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, presented to the General Assembly on 15 January 2016, which despite its weaknesses “it represented a fundamental step in institutionalising and internationalising PVE. It embedded PVE both within UN discourses and practices, its principal organs and specialised agencies (such as UNESCO) and its member states, as well as outside

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of the UN, among donors, policy-makers, researchers and practitioners” (Christodoulou and Szakács 2018, p. 25). Violent Extremism and the SDGs When developing the SDGs of Agenda 2030, Member States gave particular attention to violent extremism which they argued threatened “to reverse much of the development progress made in recent decades” (UN 2015b, p. 5). As a result, several of the goals are directly or indirectly related to promoting sustainable development by preventing violence and promoting peace. According to the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, national development policies should be aligned with the SDGs to target and address the drivers of violent extremism. The Plan makes specific reference to seven SDGs: • Goal 1: “ending poverty in all its forms everywhere” • Goal 4: “ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all” • Goal 5: “achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls” • Goal 8: “promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all” • Goal 10: “reducing inequality within and among countries” • Goal 11: “making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” • Goal 16: “promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN 2015b, p. 12) Arguably, the SDG 16 is most directly related with tackling VE as it aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN 2015a). There is on the one hand an emphasis on peace which would entail the cessation of violence caused by extremism and on the other hand an acknowledgement of the

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importance of addressing push factors of VE such as ineffective, unaccountable, discriminatory, and inequitable societies and institutions. Support for various extremist ideologies increases particularly after people lose faith in the democratic institutions and decide to take “power in their hands” or are agitated with the prevalent economic system and its exploitation of humans and the environment. Therefore, the rationale is that a world free of hate speech and religious discrimination and one where there would be effective and accountable institutions including access to justice means that people would be less likely to be driven to extremist ideologies. However, interestingly enough, despite the aforementioned UN discourse on PVE, in the targets and indicators for SDG 16, there is no explicit mention of the term at all. There is a single and very general reference to the need to “combat terrorism” as a target (16.A) though even here the indicator seems largely limited to the need to develop independent institutions for the protection of human rights under the Paris Principles. Another noteworthy point is that in the SDG Reports which review progress of implementation of Agenda 2030, there is, so far, no mention at all of the progress made in combating terrorism or violent extremism.

Problematic Practices and Effects of CVE/PVE Some P/CVE approaches employed over years have caused criticism for contributing to the spread of VE ideology. One concern is the approach taken by some national security agencies that prioritize security measures over observance of human rights and democratic principles of pluralism (Ngari and Reva 2017). Response to VE extremism with violence, abuse, and military intervention is argued to have fueled the spread of VE among Muslim populations. Inhumane treatment and torture of prisoners charged with terrorism at US-run prisons “Guantanamo Bay” and “Abu Ghraib” have been used by Al-Qaeda as propaganda to recruit followers by exposing the West’s treatment of human rights (Postel 2013) and have also been linked to radicalization of prisoners who later created ISIS (Chulov 2014).

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

Studies have also shown that targeting of Boko Haram’s leaders and networks with excessive use of force by military and special forces increases the likelihood of follow-up attacks by violent extremists (Botha et al. 2017). Another concern is the focus on Islamist violent extremism overlooking other manifestations of VE such as, for example, ethno-nationalist and rightwing. Apart from failing to address these other types of VE, their strategies identify whole communities of Arab and Muslim populations as being at risk of radicalization to Islamist VE (Shirazi 2017). Stereotyping and stigmatization of whole groups lead to Islamophobia, racism (Jones 2018), discrimination against Muslims, and unequal treatment before the law which damages and alienates Muslim communities (Ragazzi 2016). One example that is highly criticized is the UK’s multiagency CVE program Prevent that aims to identify individuals at risk of radicalization and refer them to experts to address their vulnerabilities and build resilience. It has been argued that the strategy had a negative impact on Muslim communities and wider democratic principles as it has created a strong association between Islam and extremism, terrorism, and jihadism and a fear in Muslim female students to voice their opinions or participate in activism (Ngari and Reva 2017). Despite the widespread awareness of problems related to CVE terminology, concepts, damage inflicted on Muslim youth and communities, and other aspects of CVE programs, many researchers and experts still seek CVE-focused funding thus “feeding problematic government narratives” (Jones 2018). Problematic narratives and approaches include the use of Muslim communities as “subject of scrutiny,” lack of “relevance in reallife settings” (Jones 2018), and absence of empirical data on CVE/PVE that would help design, implement, and evaluate evidence-based and context-specific programming (Abu-Nimer 2018). Policies and practices are based on untested information and culturally and religiously insensitive interventions not on communities’ more pressing and realistic needs that could be determined if governments and researchers built trusted partnerships and in-depth engagement with them (Jones 2018). As CVE/PVE work is increasingly becoming a key international funding and policy priority,

Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

organizations that are more adept to the language of funding institutions can take advantage of the availability of funds to end up conducting ineffective and unimpactful projects as their work is not evidence-driven or empowering to local actors and communities (Harling et al. 2018). Scholars have also criticized the education responses to PVE, arguing that neoliberal and simplistic assumptions are dominant in such policy discourses and that they are leading to the instrumentalization of youth which “has moral and political implications as well as the danger of a ‘PVE-E fatigue’ on account of youth feeling ‘bombarded’ with these discourses by various actors of both formal and nonformal education” (Christodoulou and Szakács 2018, p. 43; Sukarieh and Tannock 2018). Concerns have also been voiced regarding the role of responsible journalism that acknowledges the sensitive nature of VE and avoids sensationalism that can exacerbate an already difficult situation causing further panic but also reproducing stereotypes and fostering hatred of certain groups. UNESCO and the OSCE have been particularly active in this area organizing media training workshops, conferences, as well as producing a handbook for journalists with the goal of improving media reporting on violent extremism (UNESCO 2017b).

Conclusion Lack of conclusive empirical evidence and the methodological difficulties associated with researching violent extremists suggest that the definitional issues are not likely to go away anytime soon. Nevertheless, given the rise and constant evolution of far-right, far-left, and religious violence associated with extremist ideas, policy-makers and researchers alike have an onerous yet urgent task ahead.

Cross-References ▶ Communal Conflict: Theory and Sociocultural Impact ▶ Ethnic Conflict and the UN Sustainable Development Goals

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▶ New Technologies Impact on Conflicts ▶ Postconflict Risk: The Path from Violence to Sustaining Peace ▶ Protection of Civilians: Reducing Risk and Building Resilience through SDGs ▶ Social Media Impact on Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt and Yemen

References Abu-Nimer M (2018) Alternative approaches to transforming violent extremism: the case of Islamic peace and interreligious peacebuilding. In: Austin B, Giessmann HJ (eds) Transformative approaches to violent extremism. Berghof Foundation, Berlin, pp 1–20 ADL (2015) With hate in their hearts: the state of white supremacy in the United States. In: ADL: fighting hate for good. https://www.adl.org/education/resources/ reports/state-of-white-supremacy. Accessed from 12 Nov 2018 Alfifi M, Kaghazgara P, Caverlee J, Morstatter F (2018) Measuring the impact of ISIS social media strategy. MIS2: misinformation and misbehavior mining on the web. https://www.voxpol.eu/wpfb-file/mis2_paper_ 23-pdf/. Accessed from 4 Nov 2018 Aly A, Striegher JL (2012) Examining the role of religion in radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. Stud Conflict Terrorism 35(12):849–862. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2012.720243 Amnesty International (2018) Myanmar: military top brass must face justice for crimes against humanity targeting Rohingya. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/ 2018/06/myanmar-military-top-brass-must-face-jus tice-for-crimes-against-humanity-targeting-rohingya/. Accessed 12 Nov 2018 Atran (2010) Pathways to and from violent extremism: the case for science-based field research. Statement before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. http://www.edge.org/3rd_ culture/atran10/atran10_index.html. Accessed 4 Nov 2018 Australian Government (2017) Development approaches to countering violent extremism. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publica tions/Documents/development-approaches-counteringviolent-extremism.pdf. Accessed 13 Jan 2019 Awan I (2017) Cyber-extremism: Isis and the power of social media. Soc Sci Public Policy 54:138–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0114-0 Berrebi C (2007) Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians. Peace Econ Peace Sci Public Policy 13(1):1–38 Botha A, Eqi M, Salifu U, Abdile M (2017) Understanding Nigerian citizens’ perspectives on Boko Haram. Inst Secur Stud Monogr 2017(196):1 Brosché J, Legnér M, Kreutz J, Ijla A (2017) Heritage under attack: motives for targeting cultural property

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Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses Human Rights Watch (1999) Anti-Christian violence on the rise in India. https://web.archive.org/web/ 20090211152613/https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/ docs/1999/09/30/india1626.htm. Accessed 10 Nov 2018 Human Rights Watch (2005) Colombia: more FARC killings with gas cylinder bombs. https://www.hrw. org/news/2005/04/15/colombia-more-farc-killingsgas-cylinder-bombs. Accessed 12 Nov 2018 Institute for Economics and Peace (2018) Global peace index 2018: measuring peace in a complex world. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/ Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2018 Johansson A (2018) Violent Buddhist extremists are targeting Muslims in Sri Lanka. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/violent-buddhist-extrem ists-are-targeting-muslims-in-sri-lanka-92951. Accessed 10 Nov 2018 Jones C (2018) Is Australia fooling itself on countering violent extremism? Ethnographic research shows why current CVE programs are unlikely to work. Asia & the Pacific Policy Society. https://www.policyforum.net/ australia-fooling-countering-violent-extremism/. Accessed 1 Jan 2019 Kamenetz A (2018) Hate groups are recruiting video gamers. NPR: National Public Radio. https://www.npr.org/2018/ 11/05/660642531/right-wing-hate-groups-are-recruitingvideo-gamers. Accessed 11 Nov 2018 Kapitan T, Schulte E (2002) The rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ and its consequences. J Polit Mil Sociol 30(1) Krueger AB, Maleckova J (2003) Education, poverty, and terrorism: is there a causal connection? J Econ Perspect 17(4):119–144 Kruglanski AW, Fernandez JR, Factor AR, Szumowska E (2018) Cognitive mechanisms in violent extremism. Cognition 188:116–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.11.008 Kundnani A (2009) Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism. Institute of Race Relations, London Kundnani A, Hayes B (2018) The globalisation of countering violent extremism policies: undermining human rights, instrumentalising civil society. The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam Lenos S, Wouterse L (2018) Police prevention and countering of far-right and far-left extremism. Ex Post paper, Radicalisation Awareness Network. https://ec.europa. eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/net works/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/ docs/ran_pol_police_prevention_and_countering_of_ far-right_and_far-left_extremism_rome_12-13_april_ 2018_en.pdf. Accessed 3 Jan 2019 Mannion AM (2003) The environmental impact of war and terrorism. Geographical paper no 169. https://www. reading.ac.uk/web/files/geographyandenvironmen talscience/GP169.pdf. Accessed 2 Dec 2018 Marshall P (2004) Hinduism and terror. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/research/4575-hinduism-andterror. Accessed 12 Nov 2018 Miller-Idriss C (2018) The extreme gone mainstream: commercialization and far right youth culture in Germany. Princeton University Press, Princeton

Vocalization Nasser-Eddine M, Graham B, Agostino K, Caluya G (2011) Countering violent extremism (CVE) literature review. Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, The Australian Government, Edinburgh, South Australia Ngari A, Reva D (2017) How ethnic and religious discrimination drive violent extremism. Institute for Security Studies: Africa in the World Report 4 Nye JS Jr (2008) Public diplomacy and soft power. Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 616(1):94–109 Parkin S (2018) The rise of Russia’s neo-nazi football hooligans. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/news/2018/apr/24/russia-neo-nazi-football-hooli gans-world-cup. Accessed 11 Nov 2018 Postel T (2013) How Guantanamo Bay’s existence helps AlQaeda recruit more terrorists. The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/howguantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruitmore-terrorists/274956/. Accessed 10 Nov 2018 Prinsloo BL (2018) The etymology of “Islamic extremism”: a misunderstood term? Cogent Soc Sci 4. https:// doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1463815 Ragazzi F (2016) Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism as ‘policed multiculturalism’. J Ethn Migr Stud 42(5):724–741. https://doi. org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1121807 Ritzmann A (2017) The role of propaganda in violent extremism and how to counter it. The European Institute of the Mediterranean: The 8th Euromed Survey, Barcelona Sageman M (2004) Understanding terror networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Shalal A (2017) Islamic State using online ‘headhunters’ to recruit young Germans. Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKBN1531ZM. Accessed 11 Nov 2018 Shirazi R (2017) When schooling becomes a tactic of security: educating to counter “extremism”. Diaspora Indig Minor Educ 11(1):2–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15595692.2016.1253555 Shugerman E (2018) White supremacist recruitment on college campuses increased more than 200% in 2017. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/americas/white-supremacy-college-cam pus-recruitment-anti-defamation-league-identityevropa-a8190301.html. Accessed 11 Nov 2018 Striegher JL (2015) Violent-extremism: an examination of a definitional dilemma. Paper presented at the 8th Australian security and intelligence conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia, 30 November-2 December 2015. https://doi.org/10.4225/ 75/57a945ddd3352 Sukarieh M, Tannock S (2018) The global securitisation of youth. Third World Q 39(5):854–870 Tarlow P (2017) The interaction of religion and terrorism. Int J Saf Secur Tour Hosp. https://www.palermo.edu/ Archivos_content/2017/Economicas/journal-tourism/ edicion16/PAPER-2.pdf. Accessed 1 Nov 2018 Torok R (2015) ISIS and the institution of online terrorist recruitment. Middle East Institute. http://www.mei.

1021 edu/publications/isis-and-institution-online-terroristrecruitment. Accessed 11 Nov 2018 UNESCO (2017a) Preventing violent extremism through education: guide for policy-makers. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO (2017b) Terrorism and the media: a handbook for journalists. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO MGIEP (2017) #YouthWagingPeace – youth led guide on prevention of violent extremism through education. UNESCO MGIEP and the Australian Government, New Delhi United Nations (UN) (2015a) Sustainable development goal 16. Sustainable Development Goals. https://sustainable development.un.org/sdg16. Accessed 11 Jan 2019 United Nations (UN) (2015b) Plan of action to prevent violent extremism. Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly. http://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/70/674. Accessed 9 Jan 2019 USAID (2011) The development response to violent extremism and insurgency. In: USAID policy. USAID, Washington, DC. https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final. pdf. Accessed 5 Jan 2019 Venkatraman A (2007) Religious basis for Islamic terrorism: the Quran and its interpretations. Stud Conflict Terrorism 30(3):229–248. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100600781612 Vergani M, Iqbal M, Ilbahar E, Barton G (2018) The three Ps of radicalization: push, pull and personal. A systematic scoping review of the scientific evidence about radicalization into violent extremism. Stud Conflict Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018. 1505686 Warnes R, Hannah G (2008) Meeting the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners: the experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain. Policing 2(4):402–411. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pan063 White House (2011) Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States. In: The White House, Washington DC. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners. pdf. Accessed 9 Jan 2019 Winter C (2015) Documenting the virtual ‘caliphate’. Quilliam, London Zhirkov K, Verkuyten M, Weesie J (2014) Perceptions of world politics and support for terrorism among Muslims: evidence from Muslim countries and Western Europe. Confl Manag Peace Sci 31(5):481–501 Zidan K (2018) Fascist fight clubs: how white nationalists use MMA as a recruiting tool. The Guardian. https:// www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/sep/11/far-rightfight-clubs-mma-white-nationalists. Accessed 11 Nov 2018

Vocalization ▶ Political Inclusion and Sustainability

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Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions Konstantinos Pappas1, C. Silva Hamie2 and Bassel Daher1,3 1 Texas A&M Energy Institute, College Station, TX, USA 2 Department of International Affairs Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA 3 Institute for Science Technology and Public Policy, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Synonyms Informal concepts; Informal institutional capital; Informal institutional qualities; Informal rules

Definitions The FAO (2018) defines the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus as a conceptual approach to explain and understand the complex and interconnected nature of the global resource systems, thoroughly analyze the interactions between the natural environment and human activities, and work toward a

more coordinated management and use of natural resources across sectors. A migration crisis concerns complex and often large-scale migration flows and mobility patterns caused by a crisis, which typically involves significant vulnerabilities for individuals and affected communities. Such crises generate acute and longer-term migration management challenges (IOM, 2019). A migration crisis may be sudden or slow in onset; it can have natural or man-made causes and can take place internally or across borders while undoubtedly affecting the way human life and society are organized. The term “institution” refers to integrated systems of structures, entities, frameworks, and norms that organize human life and society (UNDESA 2016). As a standard definition, institutions are rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior. The term commonly applies to both informal institutions such as personal networks, clientelism, corruption, rules and organizations within civil society, unwritten social norms, customs, or cultural traditions that shape thought, attitudes, and behavior and formal institutions created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official. Institutional capacity is generally understood as “the capability of an institution to set and implement development objectives on a sustainable basis” (Land 2000, pp. 2). Capacity can refer

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3

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to an individual’s skills and abilities; an organization’s structure, training, and resources; or the “macro level systems as a whole,” which includes the individual and organizational levels in addition to informal institutional elements, such as culture and laws (Pritchard 2014, pp. 18; Land 2000).

Introduction Water, energy, and food are vital resources for human well-being, poverty reduction, and sustainable development. Demand for these resources is projected to increase due to population growth and will be affected by economic development, international trade, urbanization, diversifying diets, cultural and technological changes, climate variability, and migration trends. These current societal megatrends, coupled with environmental, technological, economic, and demographic changes, continue to pressure already scarce or depleted natural resources: threatening their sustainability and undermining community resilience. Human migration in its various forms (internal or international, regular and unregulated, forced, displaced, survival or “distress”) has taken place at all times and for various reasons. It is triggered by economic, political, and security causes and natural or anthropogenic disasters, which are likely to destabilize both sustainability and human development factors such as water, energy, and food security. Migration could be triggered by the lack of access to water, energy, food, and basic resources at the home country. These migration flows exert potential stresses on the resource systems of the host countries. The availability and accessibility challenges to water, food, and energy are multifaceted (Daher et al., 2019), while the impact of migration on resources security seems evident at the place of origin, transit, and destination, especially in forced migration cases. Since human beings live in such an uncertain world, they try to develop formally or informally determined structures to control their environment, shape behaviors, and govern rules. Water and energy distribution, food security, and

different types of migratory movements and their interconnections with the nexus are to a large extent regulated by official legislation, rules, and norms at some form of formal institution at the national, regional, or local level. Informal institutions play a key role in decentralized resource governance which could catalyze cooperation by empowering local and incentive-based governance mechanisms (Forsyth and Johnson 2014). Their impact can lead to different outcomes, which depend on their interactions with formal institutions and their relative context and strength. Moreover, the level of their impact is not easily quantifiable, as informal institutions are difficult to identify, measure, quantify, and relate to dimensions of a society’s culture. To understand informal institutional capacity in the context of managing WEF resources under migratory pressures, the following discussion focuses on the existing coordination gap among cross-sectoral formal institutions, which highlights the key role that informal institutions can play. This will be discussed in the context of different cases from developing and developed countries while highlighting the importance of informal institutions in resource management under strong migratory pressures.

“Formal” and “Informal” Institutions Dipole on the Development Process Formal and informal institutions play a role in nearly every aspect of society. The two also rely on each other. According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), formal institutions “mirror the culture and history of the national context from which they emerge and in which they are meant to work” (pp. 64). Informal institutions play a role in shaping social norms, which are then reflected in the charters, policies, or constitutions of formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Often, formal and informal institutions interact. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) created a framework examining these interactions based on formal institutional efficacy and outcomes. For example, when formal institutions are effective, and outcomes are convergent, informal

Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

institutions complement the formal institutions, reinforcing existing norms that often promote desired social change. When outcomes are divergent, informal institutions accommodate the formal institutions – they “contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of the formal rules” (pp. 729), challenging existing norms that obstruct desired social change. On the other hand, when formal institutions are ineffective, and outcomes are divergent, informal institutions compete with the formal, creating new norms to facilitate social change. Finally, when formal institutions are ineffective, but outcomes are still convergent, informal institutions substitute for the formal, invoking alternative norms to create new policy opportunities. As stated by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), in this instance, “substitutive informal institutions achieve what formal institutions were designed but failed to achieve” (pp. 729). The formal and informal institutions’ interactions and political forces result in sustainable development outcomes such as poverty eradication, sustainable growth, increases in health and living standards, etc. A particular “institutional arrangement” could have different effects in different environments, depending on the wider context. While institutions help shape development outcomes, eventually development will in turn also influence institutions. Informal Institutional Capacity in the Context of Managing WEF Resources Under Migration Crises People in both rich and poor countries rely on informal institutions to varying degrees to facilitate relations, but informal institutions are relatively more important in poor countries and small, traditional communities where formal institutions are less developed and the reach of formal law and state power are relatively weak (Bardhan 2001). Three out of four of the world’s poor populations live in rural areas and rely heavily on agricultural production, with food insecurity, water contamination, and drought forcing people from their homes – especially the young. There are cases in which novel conditions of water stress affect livelihood expectations, destroy assets, and

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alter rates at which people change residences on a temporary, seasonal, cyclical, or permanent basis. Other studies have shown that institutions and responsive policies have tremendous influence on the likelihood of migration (Fussell et al. 2014, Marchildon et al. 2008). Taking into account the impacts of informal institutions on economic development can considerably reduce the costs associated with inefficient formal institutions. This makes reform more effective as communities can go a long way toward resolving information and enforcement problems without using their formal public legal systems (World Bank 2002). Recent Migration Trends

According to the UN DESA (2013), there are nearly 763 million internal migrants worldwide. In addition, the number of international migrants globally has reached an estimated 272 million (UNDESA 2019). Threatening factors in the home countries, such as conflict, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations, can force migratory movements. A surge in armed conflict since 2010 has led to increased levels of refugee flows. The UNHCR (2018) has estimated that two-thirds of world refugees are from only five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. It is characteristic that, out of the top ten bilateral migration corridors experiencing the largest annual increases, four corridors are located in Syria or Jordan: Syria to Jordan, Syria to Lebanon, Syria to Turkey, and Palestine to Jordan (WEF 2017). The openness of these corridors is related to economic, social, and regional interests. Moreover, the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters, or other environmental factors can drive migration, even though they are usually only one of many drivers that influence migration. According to Hoffmann et al. (2020), given the expected consequences of climate change in many regions of the world, environmental migration may become more prevalent in the future for certain countries. However, in both low- and high-income countries, environmental impacts on migration are weaker, because either vulnerable subgroups in the population may not

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be able to afford to migrate and therefore become trapped, or in wealthy countries, they have enough financial means to absorb the consequences. It is mainly in middle-income regions and those with a dependency on agriculture that strong effects are observed. Migrants, whether “pulled” toward a nation with robust water, energy, and food resources or “pushed” by a lack of such resources in their home country, increase demand and place strains on these industries in host countries. Developing countries, especially, can become overwhelmed and subsequently experience negative, cascading effects (Rogers 2017). Water Stresses and Migration

Water management and water governance are highly complex processes and involve economic, political, social, and environmental state and nonstate actors. The effective, or ineffective, implementation of rules (which are formal institutions) and the way decision-making procedures are handled by various actors often make informal institutions a decisive factor of water governance. According to DiMaggio (1998), “informal institutions operate at a deeper level than formal ones, and the development of formal institutions may reinforce or constrain the effects of informal ones.” This means that the latter becomes predominant when the former fails (Helmke and Levitsky 2004), which also depends on the cultural characteristics of the country itself. The example that Haider (2016) describes about the situation in Delhi, India, is characteristic. Delhi, which is known as a city of migrants, suffers from nonuniform water distribution that results in a non-adequate supply of water on a regular basis for a significant percentage of the population. Pressures on water governance are increasing due to the burdens created by an increasing population and the increasing demand for water in industry and agriculture. The poor have been hit the hardest by this situation. The water distribution system of Delhi is characterized by a high degree of inequality and informal institutions, interpreted as the 3Cs (i.e., caste system, class, and corruption), which influence water governance in different ways. The

caste system, although outlawed, is de facto still in practice in India and, in addition to other religious and cultural values, is a major obstacle to good water governance. These informal institutions play a strong role in the country and are linked to one of its biggest problems: corruption. Corruption is linked to social networks and greatly influences the social dimension of water governance, where water is nonuniformly distributed to those who can pay bribes and have strong social connections. Water represents one of many factors contributing to migration that could be addressed in a systematic manner. The interlinkages between water challenges and climate change are push factor multipliers, not primary causes, of largescale population migration. Social, economic, and political factors also affect the vulnerability or resilience of communities. In some regions, while the ability to cope with climate change and water scarcity declines, the likelihood of migration increases. This could be the result of poverty, low levels of education, lack of skills, weak institutions, limited infrastructure, lack of technology and information, limited access to healthcare, poor access to resources, the overexploitation of resources, and other factors. On the other hand, hope for a better life and employment are strong pull factors for migration. In a recent work on how the fight for water drives migration in Central America, Oxfam concluded that the mismanagement of water, energy, and food systems leads to many drivers of migration, such as water stress and food insecurity (Oxfam 2018). In Central America, where fishing and agriculture are critical to the livelihood of its populations, human displacement crises are fueled by water scarcity and food and energy crises. In El Salvador, more than 90 percent of surface water sources are contaminated, and more than half a million rural households lack access to clean drinking water. Development challenges such as accessibility to water and food or ecological degradation clearly influence these human mobility patterns. For instance, the Honduran mass migration that recently stirred the North American border is also driven by poverty, inequality, and the impacts of unsustainable

Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

mining alongside political instability and economic and financial turbulences in the state. However, mass migration impacts water supplies. The Syrian war and consequent refugee crisis provide an example of a sudden, large-scale migration flow with several serious implications for the country itself but also for the neighboring countries. In the Middle East, countries have hosted 4.8 million Syrian refugees since 2011 (UNHCR n.d.). Lebanon and Jordan are highwater-stress countries; Lebanon saw an increase of its population by 25% between 1992 and 2012 (Jägerskog and Swain, 2016) due to the inflow of Syrian and Palestinian refugees, currently amounting to one and two million, respectively (UNHCR 2018, Selby and Hoffmann 2012), giving Lebanon the highest per capita proportion of refugees in the world (UNHCR 2020). Jordan is the country in the world with the third-highest water insecurity, after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A large influx of refugees from Syria after civil war broke out there in 2011 led to tensions with host communities, especially in cities, and has contributed to putting pressure on the water resources that are already exploited or not efficiently managed. Jordan hosts about 750,000 Syrians, the vast majority in urban areas, according to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR 2018b). However, contrary to public discourse, their presence is not the main cause of the country’s water shortages. The Disi Aquifer was supposed to cover Jordan’s water needs until 2022; however, mismanagement of water resources, leaks, illegal wells, and intensive farming made up the majority of water losses in parched Jordan. From leaks alone an estimated 76 billion liters per year are lost – an amount that is enough to satisfy the needs of 2.6 million people (Mercy Corps 2014). Initially, Jordanians and Lebanese allotted resources into hosting the bulging Syrian population, but like all countries faced with long-term displaced people, tension and antagonism began to rise over the sharing of resources, such as education, health services, and jobs (Miletto et al. 2017). Unemployment has been on the rise in the Middle East due to decreasing agricultural productivity and depletion of groundwater resources,

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which has caused rural-to-urban migration and brought about social unrest (WWAP 2016). In turn, to respond to the crisis, these countries resorted to unsustainable water and land use practices, i.e., increases in groundwater mining and in untreated sewage discharge (Jägerskog and Swain 2016). As its use accelerates, 40% of all groundwater is expected to be depleted by 2030. While the pressure on resources is understandable in a shortrange, emergency phase, at the same moment, it should not be ignored that most refugees are in a condition of displacement for 5 years or more (World Bank 2011). Though the government of Lebanon had developed a national water sector strategy plan in 2010 that included an investment plan and strategic roadmap outlining improved management of the sector, the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis forced the formal institutions in Lebanon to switch focus to addressing the immediate needs of displaced persons. The refugee crisis therefore exacerbated the lack of resources and capacity that precluded adequate funding and planning for sector reform (Government of Lebanon 2019). In response to the pollution created by Syrian refugees, Lebanese authorities have resorted to forcibly evicting refugees and their dwellings from certain sites along the Litani River. This in turn has prompted quick responses from UNHCR to provide WASH services for refugees to help reduce their negative environmental impact (UNHCR 2019). In instances where environmental displacement and/or conflict-induced displacement causes migrants (or refugees) to live in informal settlements, those involved can be locked into future water stress. This is specifically the case where the informal settlement requires forms of land use that are water-intensive or destructive to local water cycles (FAO et al. 2018). Therefore, the literature identifies three mechanisms: First, migrants can decide or be forced to settle on marginal or fragile lands in a manner that can increase the risk of water stress. Second, land tenure systems that incentivize water conservation may be disrupted. Third, the construction of new settlements or the expansion of existing ones may damage local water flows as land uses change and land degradation occurs.

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It should be noted that independent of the linkages between migration and environmental challenges, the same informal institution might lead to different institutional and development outcomes depending on the context. For example, risk-sharing rules in rural communities can protect community members against shocks, but they also can act as a “tax on success” for the more affluent members of the society. Energy and Migration

Energy is not only central to a modern economy, but it is also part of the “basic structure of society.” Although the social value of energy is accepted and legally recognized, tensions nevertheless persist, and the quest for balance in the governance of energy systems inevitably remains an ongoing battle, especially since the current transition toward sustainable energy systems does not only involve changes in technologies but is also shaped by the restructuring in the rules and regulations (i.e., the institutions) that oversee the development of the energy sector. Institutional change can be influenced by changes in core values and normative principles such as affordability, security of supply, and sustainability. A great example where the transformation of the institutions due to the energy transition can be highlighted is the Russian energy industry. The institutional environment inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union is changing extremely slowly and still has a significant impact on the current development of the Russian energy industry. In addition, Russian energy companies have to operate within a bureaucratic environment created from governmental legislative reforms. A transformation of the institutional environment implies changes in both formal and informal institutions. According to Loktionov (2020), changes in formal institutions lead to fundamental changes in the energy sector. These changes may include the development of distributed generation, development of renewable energy sources, improvement of infrastructure for development, and implementation of new energy-saving technologies. These interventions can stimulate the emergence of new informal institutions and changes in existing ones that are favorable to the

sustainability transition, especially with realizing the principles for responsible management education at Russian universities. Many parts of the world are facing a lack of or uneven access to energy, which is part of the root cause of migration. Despite the acknowledgment of energy as a basic human need in Sustainable Development Goal 7, 1.1 billion people still do not have access to electricity (Stephan et al. 2018): energy and migration are correlated. Nevertheless, the link between energy and migration is complex and very often intertwined with many aspects of the humanitarian and development agendas. It is very common that the existing networks of formal and informal institutions that operate in the energy sector of many developing countries are responsible only for fragmented activities and programs that are not adequately coordinated at any level. Access to and use of energy services is an integral dimension of people’s socioeconomic circumstance and well-being but is rarely explicitly recognized as a factor in migration decisions (Castán Broto 2017). Access to energy services – or the lack of access – may be considered what van Hear et al. (2012) call a “predisposing factor” that can lead to migration. Although it is difficult to discern a causal relationship between energy and migration, they are correlated. Before migration occurs, the role of energy as a facilitator for environmentally sustainable economic development may represent ways of halting the economic and environmental drivers of migration in the long term. Particularly in ruralurban migration patterns, sustainable energy access in rural and peri-urban areas offers increased employment opportunities through economic diversification and upgrading value chains. Additionally, more efficient systems of food production and processing, as well as water management, can allow for better coping mechanisms and increased capacity to respond to crises (relief systems). After migration occurs, migrants that arrived in host countries reported that they may seek means of onward travel because they do not have opportunities to develop their own means of living in reception countries, and energy is a central factor in facilitating them to do so.

Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

Energy is acknowledged as an enabler of economic activity and improved livelihoods. It is therefore assumed that some of the structural causes of migration could be prevented through improved access to sustainable energy. Addressing access to energy as an indirect driver of migration could help mitigate the more immediate effects of economic drivers such as (rural) poverty, food insecurity, insufficient economic opportunity, unemployment, deficient healthcare, and poor education services, as well as environmental drivers of migration (including environmental degradation caused by the inadequate management of natural resources, poorly planned urban development, and climate variation). Natural disasters, on the other hand, result in the sudden exacerbation of these vulnerabilities and migration patterns. Regarding the humanitarian context, it must be noted that energy practices in refugee camps are often inefficient, polluting, unsafe, and environmentally damaging. Worldwide, 89% of refugees do not have access to adequate lighting and rely on firewood for cooking and heating, causing premature death and deforestation. Additionally, humanitarian and development actors often take conflicting approaches in humanitarian contexts. Humanitarian interventions focus on meeting acute needs as fast as possible, whereas development interventions engage in transitional assistance on a medium- to long-term basis (Morales 2017). Furthermore, governments of host countries may see the provision of sustainable energy access as an indicator of a settlement becoming formalized. They may interpret efforts to provide access to sustainable energy as a threat to their ability to provide economic opportunities and public services to displaced populations, which could cause social tensions with host communities. Lebanon’s energy sector was already in disrepair even before the Syrian crisis. Though Lebanon had already been facing blackouts before the crisis, the influx of displaced Syrians added an additional demand of 486 megawatts of power supply, which consequently led to even more frequent power cuts and greater reliance on

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pollutive diesel generators (Government of Lebanon 2019). Households that are connected to the national electricity grid typically have a nonmetered power connection and subscribe to private generators, indicating a heavy reliance on alternative sources for energy. Schools and hospitals have had to resort to generators to supply needed power. Since “private generators are more expensive than grid electricity, these variations are disproportionally affecting the already-fragile economic situation of vulnerable Lebanese, displaced Syrians and public institutions by forcing them to spend more electricity costs” (Government of Lebanon 2019). The greater national demands on energy are a result of having more housing/shelter units attached to the grid, increased residential loads in host households or rentals, and longer working hours requiring more energy particularly to run water pumps (Government of Lebanon 2019). Once again similar to the water sector, the Government of Lebanon endorsed a policy paper in 2010 aimed at increasing the level and quality of the electricity supply. Though Lebanon did upgrade its existing plants and built new power plants that resulted in gains of 2100 megawatts of energy, it still only covers roughly 60% of total demand total in Lebanon (Farajalla et al. 2016, Government of Lebanon 2019). Food Security and Migration

According to the UN, institutions must be equitable and inclusive in order to reach several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outlined in the 2030 agenda. By 2015, the proportion of people suffering from hunger was reduced to half, relative to base year 1990, partially meeting one of the Millennium Development Goals. The SDGs currently aim to end all forms of malnutrition by 2030 (FAO et al. 2018). New advances in food science, technological innovation, and increasing international trade to move food from one place (or nation) to another contributed largely to this great achievement. Nevertheless, this target remains fragile, especially at a time of global shocks, such as mass migration. The relationship between migration and food security is extremely interrelated. Food shortage

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and population security are root causes of migration: There is a direct link between hunger levels and migration. A recent World Food Programme study (WFP 2017) found that countries with the highest levels of food insecurity (combined with the presence of armed conflict) also had the highest outward migration of refugees. The report determined that every 1% rise in hunger means an extra 200 (out of 10,000) people will leave their country. For each additional year of conflict, an additional 40 (out of 10,000) people will flee. A large share of migrants come from rural areas, where more than 75% of the world’s poor and food insecure depend on agricultural and natural resource-based livelihoods. Thus, the institutional underpinnings on who controls food production and how food is distributed become critical, and food insecurity increases because people just lose their right to food, rather than due to a lack of food production. From this perspective, Messer and Cohen (2006) observed that empowering people and promoting democracy may be one avenue toward food security. New formal institutional arrangements may undermine informal practices that formerly preserved food security. As Maclean (2010) illustrates in her example, public policies favoring the production of tomatoes (a labor-intensive production) in Ghana had important, unintended consequences for food security compared to those promoting the less labor-intensive production of cocoa in Cote D’Ivoire. This policy shift in Ghana threatened informal household practices, but by shifting more household labor into tomato production, they improved food security for the most vulnerable members of the household. Many actually believe more decentralized, community-based control of the processes of production and allocation of food is a promising strategy for increasing food security, what Cohen and Messer (2012) presented as “food sovereignty,” or the right of people “to define their own food and agriculture.” According to Ostrom (2012), some informal institutions can be harmful to society, such as when existing norms governing access to food give an advantage to certain racial, ethnic, or

gender groups, thereby increasing food insecurity. Weakening those norms may improve access to food, making it more equitable and reducing the number of hungry people. In addition, temporary problems for food security that were created due to changes in informal institutions may be the basis for more inclusive norms of food distribution in the future. For example, the shifting to tomato production in Ghana described above created new social groups that were more homogeneous in terms of age, which resulted in relationships that weakened traditional intergenerational bonds causing food security problems. However, following Ostrom’s approach, these new social groupings may strengthen the institutions of democratic citizenship, and access to basic needs like food and safety could be guaranteed by the state. In that regard, formal policies’ alterations may happen through changes in prevailing informal norms. Development, nongovernmental, and human rights organizations such as Oxfam International (based in the UK) and Global Exchange (based in the USA) work to improve the capacity of food-insecure people and nations to negotiate with private sector and government actors to improve their potential to feed themselves. These organizations educate and influence national governments and international organizations regarding government policies on food security and also promote “fair trade” and sustainable agriculture initiatives that help empower producers, marketers, and consumers all along the “alternative trade” food chain. When these efforts to transform both formal state institutions and the more informal understandings and practices that govern businesses, communities, and families merge, more progress is likely to be made. Moreover, human rights from a moral point of view but also in terms of formal declarations and international legal principles may establish or expand recognition of the right to food and even condemn the manipulation of food scarcity as a weapon. However, the human right to food is not considered a legal right in several parts of the world and even by developed countries. The efforts to promote food as a human right rather than as an enforceable law can make a difference

Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

because being seen as being responsible for mismanaging food supplies or production to the point that people cannot feed themselves can trigger unwanted reactions (from outrage to uprisings and even regime change) pushing to change the behavior of key governments and corporations. Overdevelopment in the first world is linked to food insecurity in the developing world. Holland (2008) suggested moving from a “capability thresholds” to a “capabilities ceiling” by suggesting a new norm that those who are above such a ceiling are the ones who should mainly tolerate the costs of adjustments necessary for safeguarding food for all. Thus, “overdevelopment” in the first world is linked to food insecurity in the developing world. Global Exchange, Oxfam International, and other NGOs try to change how people think about their own use of food and the sometimes-unjust systems that produce that food. Similarly, anti-slavery and human rights organizations work to make sure that the coffee and chocolate that are important components of our daily food consumption are produced in ethically responsible and environmentally sustainable ways. In Lebanon, the 2018 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) shows that 90% of displaced households use some form of coping strategy to meet immediate food needs, including reducing the number of meals and reducing food rations (Government of Lebanon 2019). The protracted nature of the crisis also affects the capacity of displaced household from obtaining a sustainable income to support the needs of their families and consequently have often turned to sending their children to work, beg, and engage in high-risk activities. The Syrian crisis has also left negative impacts on food security for Lebanon at large including the degradation of natural resources, such as land, due to settlements, the need for alternative sources of fuel and water, and soil contamination from pollution and waste (Government of Lebanon 2019). For a country that is a net food-importing country with 80% of its food coming from abroad, these stressors could be particularly impactful (Farajalla et al. 2016). This is especially concerning given

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that the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget is reportedly less than 1% of the government’s total budget and is inadequate to support the needs of the agricultural infrastructure and market (Government of Lebanon 2019).

The Interface Between Formal and Informal Institutions Institutions are a critical variable to consider when examining the WEF nexus and subsequent pressures placed on it by migration. And while it is certainly useful to analyze the efficacy of policies implemented by WEF institutions, it is also important to understand that these institutions are bound by capacity. Especially as new mass migration scenarios (e.g., forced displacement crises, droughts and natural resource degradation-related crises) are the result of a network of complex and overlapping dimensions, which need to be examined at the local level and in their specific context and aggregated at national, regional, and local scale. One of the most important roles the water, energy, and food access has in the migration debate is to facilitate environmentally sustainable socioeconomic opportunities for poor rural populations or displaced persons that arrive in informal urban settlements or humanitarian settings. This is an important area where the humanitarian and development agendas intersect. Especially regarding forced displacements, a surge in violent conflict since 2010 has led to historically high levels of people who have fled their homes to escape violence, conflict, and persecution. This humanitarian crisis is a development challenge as well, since the host communities (often in developing countries that are struggling to meet their own development goals) need support, too, to accommodate the sudden arrival of masses of newcomers. Around 78% refugees are displaced for more than 5 years, and 95% of the world’s refugees and internally displaced people live in developing countries, underscoring the need for a more sustainable and efficient way to support both the displaced and their hosts with a

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longer-term perspective. Informal institutions can offer several important new perspectives on these complex systems interconnections’ explanatory framework. An innovative, flexible, unregulated network of informal resource provision and distribution exists beneath the formal system. These informal institutions are able to turn an infrastructure deficiency into an opportunity. When the resources are not provided by formal institutions, refugees attempt to obtain them through alternative means like informal institutions (Roger and Ruaudel 2016). The access to resources is substantially influenced by institutional arrangements and any new economic arrangements, or formal institutional changes should be scrutinized to avoid unintended negative consequences on the way informal institutions maintain the use of resources. Thus, governments can have a major impact on informal institutions based on the capacity and willingness of a government to enforce its will. But there are also strong limitations to the role that the government can play in changing informal institutions. The change in norms governing resources may offer new opportunities for reform of formal institutions to better provide these resources. It should be noted, however, that changing a country’s informal institutional system is a delicate process that needs to be done with caution and sometimes against common reform dogma. Policies that work in one country may fail and are rarely optimal elsewhere. Moreover, it has been observed that some countries open their borders and attempt to set up adequate facilities, whereas other countries close their borders, in an attempt to redirect refugees. It is clear that the area of impact exceeds single countries and that a solution implemented by one country could result in major difficulties for another. Indeed, the challenge of understanding the movements of refugees and their impact on the use of available natural resources is huge and global, and as a society we are confronted with it on a daily basis. Better anticipation and understanding of the potentially negative effects of changes in policy on informal institutions is therefore important.

The human right to resources could be addressed by new norms created or promoted by civil society groups, making part of the solution the citizens of developed countries. Civil society groups have been instrumental in changing particular types of regularized behavior. Activists across borders, such as Amnesty International, were central to developing and spreading the norms of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Key personalities are another type of agent that can increase awareness and promote change. All these facets suggest the diverse ways that a focus on informal institutions and norms may advance policy discussions regarding these global challenges. In this direction, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom 2009) can provide useful insights regarding the role of informal institutions in the water-energy-food resource challenges of migration. Since its first publication, the use of the IAD framework has been extended to a large and diverse number of empirical settings, including problems related to the waterenergy-food nexus (e.g., Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2015). This framework can contribute to understanding the role and power of informal institutions in addressing water-energy-food resource challenges under migration trends for a number of reasons: (i) The framework was originally designed to study commons pool resources and their governance by communities without state intervention. Her work offered a vision of cooperation between potentially competing actors that did not rely upon reverting to a centralized state. This is particularly relevant given how peer production enabled by open networks and practices is challenging existing practices and institutions and creating new and dynamic commons pool resources that are often “informal” before becoming “institutionalized” or formalized. (ii) The IAD framework can contribute to better understanding the effect of informal institutions within and across water, food, and energy production processes, as it can

Water, Energy, Food Resource Challenges in Migration: Role of Informal Institutions

demonstrate the importance of establishing linkages across water, energy, and foodrelated situations and the ways in which informal institutions limit or facilitate synergies along the value chains. (iii) One interesting challenge will be developing methods for studying the evolution of action situations over time. These methods could build on the IAD framework and on existing migration and WEF nexus tools and models in order to better evaluate the impact of migration flows on the interconnected resource systems and thus develop a better understanding of the role that formal and informal institutions could play in addressing those pressures.

Cross-References ▶ Democracy in the Developed Countries ▶ Global Governance, Multi-actor Cooperation, and Civil Society

References Bardhan P (2001) Understanding underdevelopment: challenges for institutional economics from the poor country perspective. In: Kochendörfer-Lucius G, Pleskovic B (eds) Institutional foundations of a market economy. German Foundation for International Development (DSE), Berlin Castán Broto V (2017) Urban governance and the politics of climate change. World Dev 93:1–15. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12.031 Cohen MJ, Messer E (2012) Food security as an “intractable problem”. In: Policy brief in the informal institutions and intractable global problems: food security and informal institutions. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN Daher B, Mohtar R, Pistikopoulos E et al (2019) Developing Socio-Technical-Economic-Political (STEP) solutions for addressing resource nexus hotspots. Sustainability 10(512):1–14. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/su10020512 DiMaggio P (1998) The new institutionalisms: avenues of collaboration. J Inst Theor Econ 154:696–705 Farajalla N, Haydamous P, Hajj RE (2016) Water, energy, food nexus: an outlook on public institutions in Lebanon. Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut. https://scholarworks.aub.edu.lb/bitstream/handle/ 109 38/21136/20 1608 28_nexu s_lebanon.p df? sequence¼1. Accessed 13 July 2020

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Organization for Migration, the World Food Programme (2018) The linkages between migration, agriculture, food security and rural development. http://www.fao.org/3/CA0922EN/CA0922EN.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 Forsyth T, Johnson C (2014) Elinor Ostrom’s legacy: governing the commons and the rational choice controversy. Dev Change 45(5):1093–1110. https:// doi.org/10.1111/dech.12110 Fussell E, Hunter LM, Gray CL (2014) Measuring the environmental dimensions of human migration: the demographer’s toolkit. Glob Environ Change 28 (1):182–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha. 2014.07.001 Government of Lebanon, United Nations (2019) Lebanon crisis response plan 2017–2020 (2019 update). https:// www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2019/ 04/LCRP-EN-2019.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 Haider A (2016) Role of informal institutions in explaining water governance performance: a case of inequality and corruption in mega city Delhi, India. Dissertation, Freien Universität Berlin Helmke G, Levitsky S (2004) Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda. Perspect Polit 2(4):725–740 Hoffmann R, Dimitrova A, Muttarak R et al (2020) A meta-analysis of country-level studies on environmental change and migration. Natl Clim Change 10:904– 912. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0898-6 Holland B (2008) Ecology and the limits of justice: establishing ‘capability ceilings’ in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. J Hum Dev Capabilities 9 (3):399–423 International Organization for Migration (2019) Glossary on migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/ pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf. Accessed 13 Jul 2020 Jägerskog A, Swain A (2016) Water, migration and how they are interlinked. https://www.siwi.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/07/2016-Water-Report-Chapter-1FINAL-Web.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 Keck M, Sikkink K (1998) Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh13f Land T (2000) Implementing institutional and capacity development: conceptual and operational issues. The European Centre for Development Policy Management. https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ DP-14-Implementing-Institutional-Capacity-Develop ment-Operational-Issues.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 Loktionov V (2020) Energy consumption, GHG emissions and quality of life: the case of Russia’s institutional transition to sustainability. Geopolitics Energy 42 (3):2–6 Maclean L (2010) Informal institutions and citizenship in rural Africa: risk and reciprocity in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Cambridge University Press, New York

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Marchildon GP, Kulshreshtha S, Wheaton E, Sauchyn D (2008) Drought and institutional adaptation in the Great Plains of Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1914–1939. Nat Hazards 45:391–411. https://link.springer.com/article/ 10.1007%2Fs11069-007-9175-5 Mercy Corps (2014) Tapped out: Water scarcity and refugee pressures in Jordan. Portland, Oregon, USA, Mercy Corps. www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/ MercyCorps_TappedOut_JordanWaterReport_ March204.pdf Messer E, Cohen MJ (2006) Conflict, food insecurity, and globalization. International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper 0206. www.ifpri.org/sites/default/ files/pubs/divs/fcnd/dp/papers/fcndp206.pdf Miletto M, Caretta MA, Burchi FM et al (2017) Migration and its interdependencies with water scarcity, gender and youth employment. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://unesdoc.unesco. org/ark:/48223/pf0000258968. Accessed 13 July 2020 Morales HC (2017) The role of sustainable energy access in the migration debate. European Union Energy Initiative. http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/ field_publication_file/the_role_of_sustainable_ energy_access_in_the_migration_debate_euei_pdf_ 2017.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 Ostrom E (2009) Institutional rational choice: an assessment of the institutional analysis and development framework. In: Sabatier P (ed) Theories of the policy process, 2nd edn. Westview Press, Boulder, pp 21–64 Ostrom E (2012) Opportunities that result from changing informal institutions. In: Policy brief in the informal institutions and intractable global problems: food security and informal institutions. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games and common pool resources. Michigan University Press, Michigan Oxfam (2018) What does the fight for water have to do with migration in Central America? https://www. oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/whats-driving-migra tion-from-central-america-the-fight-for-water/ Pritchard M (2014) A field practitioner’s guide: Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening. International Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/documents/ 38714170/39144386/A+field+practitioner's+guide++Institutional+and+organizational+analysis+and +capacity+strengthening.pdf/48466eeb-244e-4f3ba67d-f587ebf75038. Accessed 13 July 2020 Roger Z, Ruaudel H (2016) Refugees’ right to work and access to labor markets – an assessment. KNOMAD, working paper Rogers P (2017) The triangle: energy, water & food nexus for sustainable security in the Arab Middle East. In: Badran A, Murad S, Daghir N (eds) Water, energy, and food sustainability in the Middle East: The sustainability triangle. Springer, Cham. http://doi-org-443. webvpn.fjmu.edu.cn/10.1007/978-3-319-48920-9_2 Selby J, Hoffman C (2012) Water scarcity, conflict, and migration: a comparative analysis and reappraisal.

Environ Plan C Govern Policy 2012(30):997–1014. https://doi.org/10.1068/c11335j Stephan RM, Mohtar RH, Daher B, Irujo AE, Hillers A, Ganter JC, . . . Sarni W (2018) Water–energy–food nexus: a platform for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. Water Int 43(3):472–479. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2018.1446581 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2016) Global sustainable development report. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/docu ments/2328Global%20Sustainable%20development% 20report%202016%20(final).pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013) Cross-national comparisons of internal migration: an update on global patterns and trends. Technical Paper No. 2013/1 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019) International migration 2019: report (ST/ESA/SER.A/438) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018a) Global trends: forced displacement in 2017. https://www. unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/. Accessed 13 July 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018b) Syria emergency. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr. org/en-us/syria-emergency.html United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019) Operational update: Lebanon. https://www.unhcr.org/ l b/ w p - c on t e nt / u p l o a d s/ s i t e s/ 1 6 / 2 0 2 0 / 0 1 / Q 1 UNHCR-Lebanon-operational-update.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). UNHCR Lebanon at a Glance. https://www.unhcr.org/ lb/at-a-glance. Accessed 20 Oct 2020 Van Hear N, Bakewell O et al (2012) Drivers of migration. Migrating out of poverty research programme consortium, working paper. University of Sussex, Falmer Villamayor-Tomas S, Grundmann P, Epstein G, Evans T, Kimmich C (2015) The water-energy-food security nexus through the lenses of the value chain and the institutional analysis and development frameworks. Water Alternatives 8(1):735–755 World Bank (2002) World development report 2002: building institutions for markets. Oxford University Press, New York. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han dle/10986/5984. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO World Bank (2011) World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development. World Bank. https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO World Economic Forum (2017) Migration and its impact on cities. REF 061017 World Food Programme (2017) At the root of exodus: food security, conflict, and international migration. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 5 8 / d o w n l o a d / ? _ g a ¼2 . 1 7 3 6 1 7 7 . 1375417791.1519116698-683025040.1519116698. Accessed 13 July 2020 WWAP (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme) (2016) The united nations world water development report 2016: water and jobs. UNESCO, Paris

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Well-Being ▶ Building Capacities of Youth for Positive Mental Health and Well-Being

Witchcraft ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Witchery ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Witch-Hunting ▶ Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women Rajeev Kumar1 and Madhuri2 1 Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur, West Bengal, India 2 Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, Delhi, India

Synonymous Bisahi; Dayan pratha; Toni; Witchcraft; Witchery; Witch-hunting

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traditions (International-Labor-Organization 1996; Sanders 1999). Witch-hunting is widely prevalent in the indigenous communities across the world. According to local perception and belief systems, the mishappenings and disasters are attributed to some targeted women and people of weaker sections (elderly men, old aged women, and children). In most of the cases, women are targeted for witch-hunting-related crimes. Those women are labeled as a witch and ostracized from the community and victimized in several ways – this socio-cultural phenomenon is observed as witch-hunting (Goswami 2016).

Introduction Indigenous Communities in the World The word indigenous is originated from the Latin word “Indigena” – it means native and original inhabitant (UNHCHR 2016). Indigenous communities carry their distinct culture, and they solely survive on natural resources. Around the globe, the population of indigenous people varies from 370 million to 500 million spread across more than 90 countries of the world, and they share 5% of the total population of the world (World-Bank 2019). According to the report of IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), the share of the indigenous population in various countries is as follows: Greenland – 89.6%, French Polynesia – 80%, Bolvia – 48%, Guatemala – 45%, Nepal – 36%, Algeria – 33%, and Myanmar – 32% (IWGIA 2019). China is having the largest number of indigenous people in the world, whereas the indigenous population constitutes only 8.5% of the total population. Comparing with developed nations, there are 2.5 million indigenous people living in the United States, which constitute only 0.8–1.8% of the total population, whereas in Canada, the population of indigenous people is 1.7 million – which shares 4.9% of the total population.

Definitions Indigenous people are original inhabitants of the locality, and are not settled, colonized, and occupied the land; they have their distinct culture and

The Magnitude of Indigenous Communities in India

The count of the indigenous population in India is 104 million, which is 8.6% of the total population.

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However, India shares a 20–30% indigenous population of the world (IWGIA 2019). In Indian states, the high concentration of indigenous population is found in nine states: Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal (Government of India 2011). Around 12% of the indigenous population is settled in the North-eastern region, 5% indigenous population in the southern region, and 3% in the northern region of India (Government of India 2011).

Position of Women in Indigenous Communities Due to gender inequality and gender discrimination, women of all spheres face several kinds of crimes, which not only inflict injury on the physical body but also shatter their psyche and soul. Those crimes are female feticide, child marriage, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, rape, dowry, acid attack, and workplace harassment. Regarding positions of indigenous women, some exceptions are in matriarchal indigenous societies in Nepal, certain tribes of India, Thailand, and Cambodia, where women hold high or equal social positions, gender equality, equal property share, and economic autonomy. In northeast hilly regions of India, those matriarchal societal structures are seen in Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia tribes; however, that high social status, which reflects at family and society level, is not seen at the broader political scenario (UNPFII 2010). The report of the United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) highlighted the conditions of indigenous women. They suffer multiple discriminations based on their gender, race, ethnicity, language, and culture. These discriminations are inadequate access to health and education, deprivation from the ancestral property, domestic violence, sexual abuse, trafficking, forced marriage, polygamy, prostitution, workplace harassment, various sorts of exploitation in armed conflict zones, and witch-hunting (UNPFII 2010).

Witch-Hunting Witch-hunting or witchery or witchcraft is one of the gruesome atrocities against indigenous women, and those are observed around the world. Witch-hunters exclusively target indigenous women. In the village – when any calamity occurs, an outbreak of any disease, loss of crops, death of cattle, or fatalities of people, or some mishaps arise – then a particular woman or group of women are held responsible for that. These group of women or woman is labeled as Dayan or witch (Foxcroft 2009). This process is also called witch-declaration. After such a declaration, community members cease to maintain social interaction with those marked women. And finally, the community members ostracize that labeled woman from society. In several reported cases, it was observed that a woman accused of a witch is subjected to several heart-wrenching cruelties. She is stripped publicly and paraded naked in front of the whole village, sharp objects are inserted in her genitals, body parts are chopped off, her head is shaved off, she is made to eat human excreta, and finally she is killed brutally (Goswami 2016). Witch-declaration is the psychological, social, emotional, and spiritual devaluation of any woman. Witchery is a severe violation of the human rights of indigenous women all around the world (Foxcroft 2009). The Practice of Witchery Around the Globe The incidences of witchery are observed in different segments of the world, which are tribal population-dominated. American Countries

In the Dutch Caribbean – there is Afro-Caribbean religiously oriented healing in practice, whose purpose is to restore health and well-being as well as perform devilish acts and bring misfortune. This practice is locally known as Bruja – believed as sorcery; however, no particular gender is branded for this practice; the black-magic practitioner can be of either gender (Blom et al. 2015). Witchcraft was an essential part of socio-cultural life in colonial Mexico. Spanish

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

inquisitors viewed witchcraft as a social problem, originated from acculturation with indigenous African culture. Consequently, several women of minority sections were persecuted in the name witch-hunting (Lewis 2003). Historical records reveal that in British North America during 1692–1693, around 300 men and women faced death execution in accusation of witchcraft practice (Shi and Tindall 2016). European Countries

Medieval Europe, around 1500–1750, witnessed the social culture blend of sorcery and heresy. Sorcery is all about bringing adverse magical outcomes through a conventional way, while heresy is based on early Christian belief about a person equipped with demonic powers (Kamerick 2013). In Europe, witchcraft was very much in practice – it was the manifestation of male domination against the rebellious women – especially the women who protested against the rules of churches were targeted to atrocities of witchcraft (Russell 1972, 1986). Not only women, but children were also subjected to witchcraft-related atrocities. In the United Kingdom, witchery has been a devilish mode of child abuse and maltreatment. Children faced witch-craft accusation and further persecution, which includes physical abuse and painful exorcism. Those victimized children belong to the minority communities: African migrants, step-children, unwanted children, and children with disabilities (Coram-Children’s-Legal-Centre 2017). Women in Italy were more likely to fall prey to witch-branding compared to their male counterparts; there was an unusual belief propagated – women procure demonic powers from menstrual blood (Black 2001). The scenario of witchcraft in Italy was astonishing and distinct from the rest of the world. In the sixteenth century, a vast number of young men preferred to stay single and marry later in life. As a result, women remained unmarried and supportless, which made them an easy target for witch-branding and persecution (Kiekhefer 2001). Amid the high magnitude of witch-trials, a new term was emerged named love magic. Trial records of the sixteenth century

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from the courts of Italy presented predominant beliefs against professional prostitutes. These prostitute women allegedly had extraordinary supernatural power of casting love and magic on wealthy men. However, those alleged prostitute women were hailed from minority religions, migrants, outsiders of Rome, and lower socioeconomic status (Cohen and Cohen 1993). According to medieval world historians, Franciscan monks infused demonic beliefs into the indigenous community of new Spain in 1524; even human sacrifice was excluded from the list of evil activities, and witchcraft rituals attained the natural way of religious manifestation (Van Young et al. 1996). Witchery is deeply rooted in the medieval cultural history of Spain and other European countries. Based on mythological stories, Galicia – an autonomous community of Spain – is known as a land of witches; and similarly Zalla, which is a Town located in Spain – is named as town of witches (Mcelroy 2017). African Countries

The practice of witchcraft is widely prevalent in South African countries: Cameroon, Central Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and South Africa (Okeja 2011). Especially old-aged women with poor socioeconomic status and poor social support are often subjected to violence by their community members in the name of witchery. After the accusation of a witch, these women are hanged, stoned to death, and banished, and community members capture her property; witchery is more common among vulnerable populations of rural regions of South Africa (Ivey and Myers 2008). In Kenya, especially old and supportless women are susceptible to the trap of witchery (Luongo 2011). The women of Tanzania, especially those who are poor and illiterate, are more likely to become the prey of witchery; however, in Tanzania, the practice of witchcraft is a punishable offense, even the possession, sale, and supply of witchcraft equipment are criminalized (Mesaki 2009). Likewise, data from the Democratic Republic of Congo showed dominant religious institutes branded 25,000–50,000 children as a witch, threw them out of their home, and subjected

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them to harsh treatment leading to fatalities (The-Gaurdian 2006). Very frequently, women in Ghana are labeled as a witch, but whosoever in Ghana is accused as a witch can come to witch-camp to avoid violence; those witch camps are erected to provide those women safety from perpetrators (Whitaker 2012). In 2002, several women encountered moblynching on account of being accused of a witch; they were blamed for causing malfunctions in the genitals of men (Whitaker 2012). Asian Countries

In Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq, men and women, who are found practicing witchcraft and sorcery, are subjected to death execution; however, for witchcraft accusation, a particular group is not targeted (Miethe and Lu 2005). Women in Northern Thailand are declared pipa (evil spirit) – they are ostracized from the mainstream society of the village. In essence, shunned women make their habitation in a secluded place on the outskirts of the town (Ganjanapan 1984). Similar practices of witchcraft were observed in the Sino-Thai language group of Thai Yunnan in southwest China and Du (evil spirit) in Tibeto-Burman group of China (Nathan et al. 1998). More or less, the characteristics of witch-hunting are uniform around the world. Witchcraft in the Indigenous Community of India These are Indian states, where the tribal population is dominant: North-eastern states, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, and Odisha. In these Indian states, few communities practice shamanism, occult healing through witchcraft, and witchcraft. According to their belief system – health, fatality, or any sort of misfortune is attributed to paranormal power, and some people or group of people may possess the exclusive ability to control the lives of people of the community – these belief systems are inherited from ancestral tradition (Chakraborty 2014). Data obtained from Census (2011) and the National Crime Record Bureau are presented in Table 1. The 20 years of data from 1991 to 2010

procured from the National Crime Record Bureau revealed that there were more than 1700 women charred to death on the accusation of witch or Dayan Bisahi (National-Crime-Record-Bureau 2012). This estimation of witchcraft-related killings could be higher because many cases of witchcraft killings are not reported. There is a 46% reduction of witchcraft-related killings in India in 2017 compared to 2016. The majority of witchcraft-related murders are reported in the states: Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Telangana. All these states have a sizeable population of scheduled tribes or indigenous communities. Except for Gujarat – where there is 78.03% literacy, which is above the national literacy level – the rest of the states have lower literacy levels than the national average literacy level. Incidences of witchcraft-related killings are associated with the low education level of the community. There are other states of India that are located in the north-eastern region of India and where the indigenous population is dominant. Those states are: Mizoram (Tribal Population ¼ 94.4%; Literacy rate ¼ 91.33%), Tripura (Tribal Population ¼ 31.8%, Literacy rate ¼ 87.22%), Meghalaya (Tribal population ¼ 86.1%, literacy rate ¼ 74.43%), Manipur (Tribal Population ¼ 35.1%, Literacy rate ¼ 76.94%), Nagaland (Tribal population ¼ 86.5%, Literacy rate ¼ 79.55%), and Sikkim (Tribal population ¼ 33.8%, literacy rate ¼ 81.42%); except Assam (tribal population ¼ 12.5%, literacy rate ¼ 67.02%) and Arunachal Pradesh (Tribal population ¼ 68.8%, literacy rate ¼ 65.38%), all the states located in north-eastern region have literacy level above the national level (Government of India 2011). Except from Assam, where there is a report of three witchcraft-related killings in 2017 and a single case of witchcraft murder in 2016, there is no report of any fatalities related to witch-hunting from any states of the north-eastern region of India (National-Crime-Record-Bureau 2016, 2017). Cultural Roots of Witchcraft Practice Our culture shapes our understanding of health, illness, preventive measure, causation factors of

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Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women, Table 1 Regional variation of witchcraft-related killings in India

States Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Chhattisgarh Gujarat Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Odisha Rajasthan Telangana Uttar Pradesh West Bengal All India

Tribal population (%)a 7

Literacy level (%)a 67.02

Reported cases of killings with the motive of witchcraft (2016)b 0

Reported cases of killings with the motive of witchcraft (2017)c 02

12.5 1.3 30.6 14.8 26.2 21.1

72.19 61.80 70.28 78.03 66.41 69.32

01 0 17 14 27 19

03 01 06 06 19 13

9.4 22.8 13.5 9.08 0.6

82.34 72.87 61.11 66.46 67.68

0 24 01 11 03

05 09 02 03 01

5.8 10.45

76.26 74.04

03 134

0 73

Sources: Government of India (2011) b National-Crime-Record-Bureau (2016) c National-Crime-Record-Bureau (2017) a

diseases, preventive mechanisms, and health-seeking behavior (Gopalkrishnan 2014). The witchcrafts are often practiced in cultures, where beliefs regarding paranormal powers, occultism, magical powers, supernatural forces, and black magical powers are deeply ingrained (Russell 1972). It is traced back to the fifteenth century – in a village which is located in the Latur district of Maharashtra – it was believed that one woman converted herself into a witch using black magic, gradually a secret group of witches was formed – it is believed that these witches were bringing misfortune to the village, were killing young men, and were spreading diseases – one day this secret group of women was caught and burnt alive (Fane 1975). It is believed that those witches still live in abandoned places, cemeteries, and cross-roads of the village, and they destroy everything in the town (Buckland 2009). The records reveal that since the British colonization period, the witchcraft practice was in

tradition – as it was seen in the Bastar region, which lies in central India; in the Santhal indigenous community – the women who were labeled as a witch are called Toni or Pagnahin (Sundar 2001). Witchcraft and Its Relation with Female Gender In Jharkhand, indigenous communities are Munda, Ho, Kharia, Birhor, etc., and they have an Austro-Asiatic origin. In these indigenous communities – women are not included in some collective worship, because it is believed that the spirit gets a transfer from father to son, and women should not know this; married sisters and married daughters are not allowed to enter the inner shrine of indigenous faith (Mullick 2000). Women hold inferior positions in these indigenous communities; the labeled witches or Dayan are solely women – according to the community norms only women can be Dayan or witch and men will be witch-identifiers; because as per the

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centuries-old beliefs, women had possessed the art of controlling men, and in return men got the black magic tricks to counter women (Archer 1984). These cultural norms clearly show the power conflict between genders lies deep in their belief systems. The practice of witchcraft is closely related to indigenous women. The link of female gender with witchery is deeply rooted in the excluded social position of women in the indigenous community. In the kharia tribes of India – it is believed that menstrual blood of women attracts the devil spirit – thereby, community members don’t include women in religious ceremonies (Sinha 2006). The Santhal community made witchcraft a great tool to oppress the rights of indigenous women, and this power of declaring witch to any women lies in the hands of men only. The gender rights of indigenous women: religious rights, choice of marriage, property inheritance, economic rights, control over sexuality, or reproductive choices are severely violated in the name of witch-hunting (Archer and Archer 1974). Gender and Inheritance Laws in Tribal Communities in India Among the Indian indigenous society, women have limited inheritance right on the ancestral property. Unmarried daughters may claim a smaller section of land or crop, in which they extended help of their family members. Whereas married women have no direct right on their land, and it is only through the mediation of their husbands (Archer 1984). CNT (Chhota Nagpur Tenancy) act-1908 adopts discriminatory approach regarding inheritance rights of women – especially sections7, 8, and 76 are violative of gender equality. According to CNT Act-1908, after the death of their husband, a wife can inherit the property of her husband but cannot transfer it to her daughter. It can only be transferred to her son alone, and if a woman has no male child, then the property goes to the male relatives of her late husband (CNT-act 1908; Xaxa 2004). It has been seen that most of the witchery victims are old-aged women. They are unprotected from their relatives (Sinha 2006) because gender discrimination in property in

customary tribal laws reinforces the ill-motives of male relatives to control the land or other properties of the woman (Chophy 2019). Some reformations in inheritance rights of tribal women were attempted but did not yield a satisfactory outcome. In 1991, the Tribal Advisory Board considered equal property rights to tribal women. But it was felt as a threat of alienation of tribal lands to nontribal people; there are several instances when nontribal men with mala fide intentions married tribal women just to purchase the tribal lands (Sharan 2005). If a nontribal person gets the property right of purchasing tribal land, then it increases the enormous tendency of occupancy of tribal land by outsiders or nontribal individuals. Consequently, tribals or indigenous people will be abandoned from their land. In 2018, Jharkhand state Government prohibited tribal women (who are in marital bond with nontribal men) from buying tribal-land. Also, those women are mandated to mention the name of their husband on their caste certificate to avail of further privileges (Jharkhand-Tribal Advisory-Council 2018). On the further development, The Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh directed that tribal women of Himachal Pradesh can avail the equal right in the ancestral property as per Hindu Succession act-1956 (Bahadur-vs-Bratiya-And-Others 2015).

The Phenomenology of Witch-Hunting Practice Since the crowd does the witchcraft killings and other sorts of victimization, it is an act of mob-lynching. Jharkhand is a hub of Naxalism, mob-lynching, and witch-hunting (Focus-Magazine 2019). But surprisingly, the practice of witchhunting kills more women than Naxal-violence (National-Crime-Record-Bureau 2016). The Social Process of Labeling Witch The phenomenon of witch-hunting can be segmented into several stages. At the first stage, when any mishappening arises, such as illness, deaths, thefts, loss of property, or any natural calamity, these mishappenings are blamed on a particular woman or group of women. In the initial

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

phase, the name of the branded person is not revealed; this revelation is left on the person who has suffered the loss or faced such mishap or still facing. In most of the cases, villagers already know the woman who will be declared a witch. It is done with the predecided motives as whom to drive out of this village (Nathan et al. 1998). After witch-identification, the target woman is either fined or warned. If the diseases or any mishappenings continue, then Ojha (village priest) can accuse any woman as a witch. This accusation is made with the mutual consent of all witch-finders males. In the second stage, after witch-accusation, either the targeted woman is driven out of the village or mercilessly killed (Nathan et al. 1998). This system of witch-labeling and witch-categorization is entirely governed by the male members of the village community. This similar phenomenon of witch-categorization is observed among the indigenous communities in western India, where the primary role of bhagat (village priest) is to declare the witch (Dalmia 1988). In the Santhal community, the social process of victimizing women in witchery is so horrendous that during the time of natural calamity or any time of crisis, every woman of the village remains fearful of being accused of witchcraft or labeled as a witch (Nathan et al. 1998). In some cases, if the natural calamity or epidemic continues, then all the women of the village are beaten and made to eat human excreta because, in the community, it is believed that any contact with human excreta, will release the Bonga (evil) from the body of women (Archer and Archer 1974). Labeling Theory

Labeling theory is one of the most relevant in describing the phenomenon of witchcraft violence. According to this theory, influential individuals in the community label some behavior as inappropriate and deviant, and whosoever is indulged in such conduct are assigned those labels; this is called primary deviance. In the next phase – a member of society begins to treat the labeled person in a discriminatory way if the targeted person accepts those labels and

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internalizes those marked traits and begins to behave in their prejudiced way; this is called secondary deviance (Becker 1963). The phenomenon of secondary deviance is similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1936). To brand a woman as a witch is similar to labeling; however, the secondary deviance component may not apply to witch branding because none of the women can accept herself as a witch. Nonetheless, the daily routine of targeted women is conceived as witchery act, and they are blamed for everything. Since many cases of witch-branding are predetermined, a theory of somewhat self-fulfilling prophecy is applied here. After witch-branding, the next stage is the victimization of targeted women. Perpetrators victimize the selective women collectively, which is similar to mob-lynching. Apart from labeling theories, some other sociological and psychological theories can shed light upon them. Sociological Theory of Mob-Lynching The dominant group in the society believes that power and resources belong to them by the natural order – it goes unquestioned, and gradually, it becomes social norms. Collective violence is the by-product of the social identity construction process, when two or more communities or individuals conflict to prove their identity or loyalty to the community at large (Tripathi and Singh 2016). The Process of Othering

In this process of proving identity or loyalty – the component of othering is essential. A dominant and majority of the community label a particular as “other.” This labeled “other” section is different from the more extensive part of society or community. These differences may be gender, culture, language, ideological, regional, faith, and social-economic status (Spivak 1985). The process of othering resembles labeling theory, but rather than making them deviant, it is the process of marginalizing a marginal and weaker section. However, in the homogenous group, the process of “othering” can take place; because of the ulterior motives of some dominant subgroups or individuals, and consequently, an invisible boundary is created within the groups. After the

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formation of new subgroups within a homogenous group, either subgroup has unequal power and resource, or they are equivalent to their counterpart. In the situation of comparable strength and resources between two demarcated groups – a perpetual conflict continues to prove their identity. If the divided groups have unequal power, quantum, and support, then a powerful group or individuals attempt to suppress the inferior group or individual; when this suppression is opposed, the dominant group inflicts victimization to the minority group. This group conflict phenomenon of othering is directly implied to the practice of witchery against indigenous women; because of their disempowered position in the community – shreds of evidence reveal that social marginality increases the risk of lynch-victimization (Bailey et al. 2011). Characteristics of the Crowd from the Lens of Sociologists Despite a multitude, a mob acts like a single being; likewise, other group dynamics: the mob also has a leader but for scapegoating only; the mob puts all the blame on the leader only Sighele (2018). Describing the characteristics of the mob, further, De-Tarde (1903) added that the members of the crowd resemble each other in terms of intolerance, irresponsibilities, and ideological pride, which are deeply seeded in the sense of powerfulness. LeBon (1895) called it primitive communism – a normed state of the human being before modern civilization. During mob-lynching, within a crowd, there are wild instincts created, and whosoever are associated with the masses are likely to acquire the traits of the massive group; furthermore, the irresistible power of the mob does not tolerate the delayed gratification or no satisfaction in the fulfilling of the collective desire – because the rationality of crowd is inferior to the individual – this is why an individual may be more pacific than the masses (LeBon 1895). The roots of crimes against women lie deep in the patriarchy, which is primitive communism. During witchcraft-related victimizations, the collective primitive patriarchy becomes active within male perpetrators.

The Psychological Theory Explaining Mob Violence When an individual becomes a part of the crowd, then they lose their identity, and their collective mentality is formed, and the mob act like a blind animal (Jung 1959). Even in this togetherness – there is a need for one leader to guide the group. This leader attains a God-like status – and eventually, the crowd begins to worship him or her (LeBon 1895). According to Allport (1924), even in crowds people maintain their individuality, and a group of like-minded people commit mob-lynching. Lynching is one of the most brutal violence causing deaths or fatal injuries to the victims, and it may range from shooting, burning, hanging, stoning, or other forms of cruelty (Mullen 1986). Mob-lynching is the execution carried out by a mob; though it is on moral-judgment, it is an illegal and immoral act (Corzine et al. 1996). Mob – though a multitude, but merged into a single being – is called deindividuation (Leader et al. 2007). In the deindividuation, social norms are easily broken. In essence, new barbaric norms are established, and the severity of lynching is increased when members of the crowd are attentive to self, but with the merged person, in this psychological state, mobs lose their self-control, and outbreaks of violence grow (LeBon 1895; Festinger et al. 1952; Diener 1980). Here, the mass of several men converts into a single identity of male – and notions of patriarchy instinctively motivate them to victimize women in the name of witch-branding. Witchery: From the Eyes of Psychiatry Sometimes, the symptoms of undetected psychiatric morbidities are similar to shamanic practice, possession of supernatural power, and something of demonic nature – which are identified as witchcraft practice – because of deeply seeded cultural beliefs about witchery and poor awareness about symptoms of psychiatric illness (Sahu 2018). In Schizophrenia, auditory and visual hallucinations are commonly present – the manifestation of hallucinatory behavior is seen as a person muttering to self or unknown, invisible things. Moreover, aimless wandering, untidy appearance, maintaining

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

odd posture for a long time, aggressive behavior, pervasive suspiciousness, hypervigilance, and persistent fearfulness are the symptoms of Schizophrenia (World-Health-Organization 1992), which can be misunderstood of practicing black magic or something ominous as per cultural belief. The person who develops mania symptoms – often exhibits increased psychomotor activities and exalted mood in the form of wandering tendencies, increased familiarization with people, decreased need of sleep, aggressive-assaultive behavior, making tall claims of possession of tremendous resource or power, or being celebrities or some supernatural identities; very frequently, the manic episodes are marked with increased religiosity and hypersexuality (World-HealthOrganization 1992). Besides, symptoms manifestation of trans and possession disorder, delusional disorder, schizotypal personality disorder, schizoid, and paranoid personality disorders closely resemble the cultural belief of occult practice (World-Health-Organization 1992). Though theoretically, there is a high possibility of mistaken witch-branding of persons suffering from psychiatric illness, but practically there are low chances of such occurrence. First, because the prevalence of psychiatric morbidities is higher among males than females except for anxiety and depression (Sadock et al. 2017), whereas, in most of the cases, only females are victimized for witchbranding, very rarely men are persecuted in witch-hunting. Second, community people deliberately target the particular woman, as it is predecided ─ these women are deprived of power, support, and resources. Since these women are subjugated for their property, sexual exploitation, and overpowering, there is less chance of mistaking with psychiatric symptoms. The Motives Behind Witchery The atrocities of witchery against indigenous women involve several secondary motives such as their sexual exploitation and subjugation of their property; if the victim tries to raise her voice, they are branded as a witch and publicly killed, and ironically such mob violence is socially accepted (Roy 1998).

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Who Are Vulnerable to Be Labeled a Witch or Dayan? Generally, older women with poor support and poor socioeconomic status are subjected to witchcraft victimization (Nathan et al. 1998). People or communities who maintain longer social distance with dominant communities have a higher propensity to face mob-lynching and witchcraft-related crimes. This longer social distance encompasses different cultures, infrequent social mingling with the larger society, and unequal social status (Senechal-de-la-Roche 1996). Moreover, the minority communities whose quantum are highly disproportionate to other populations are susceptible to such crowd-violence of witch-hunting (Blalock 1989). Legislation Against Witch-Hunting in India In India, there is no specific national-level legislation formed, which particularly penalizes the perpetrators of witch-hunting. In the absence of national-level law, certain sections of Indian Penal Code such as under section 302 for murder, under section 323 to hurt, under section 354 for outraging the modesty of women, under section 307 for an attempt to murder, and under section 376 for rape are applied during court trial for the incidence of witch-hunting. Some Indian states, where witchcraft-related crimes are reported, have formulated legislation preventing witchcraft-related crimes, such as Bihar prevention of witch practice act-1999, Anti-witchcraft act-2001 introduced in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh Toni Pratha Bill-2005, and Rajasthan Women (prevention and protection) from atrocity act-2006. At the international level, the Indian Government has an obligation to protect women from discrimination and atrocity, because India is a signatory of the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) 1948, which protects women against discrimination. The Indian Government has signed the international convention on civil and political rights (ICCPR)-1979 and convention of elimination of discrimination against women (CEDAW)-1993; those conventions explicitly promote the equality between men and women as well as the prohibition of cruelty, inhuman treatment, and derogatory behavior against

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women. Section 5(a) of CEDAW mandates signatory countries to take measures to modify social and cultural patterns of men and women; specifically, the practice of witch-hunting is the output of socio-cultural pattern of gender behavior. Perpetuating Factors Behind Witch-Hunting As mentioned earlier, the absence of uniform national level law against witch-hunting and poor implementation of existing law discourage the deterrence against witchery practice. Lack of societal action and mute approval to witchcraft are perpetuating factors that contribute to the incidences of witchcraft-related crimes in India, as it was observed in the case of Tula Devi and others versus the state of Jharkhand, where the victim failed to prove the atrocity against her and culprits were scot-freed (Tula-Devi-andothers-versus-state-of-Jharkhand 2014). In an another case, which is similar to the Tula Devi vs Jharkhand, the accused could not be convicted due to the remote location of the incident, and inconsistency in the accounts of witness (Madhu-Munda-And-Ors-vs-State-Of-Bihar 2003). After the witchcraft-related crime, people hesitate to report and fear to raise voice against the established social norms. Usually, perpetrators belong to the influential section of society, so the rest of the community members do not dare to speak against them. The theory of planned behavior propounded by Ajzen (1991) explains the hesitation of people and low reporting of witchcraft-related crimes. According to the theory of planned behavior, the intention is the immediate precursor of behavior; attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavior govern the intention of people. Thus, societal and cultural norms are one of the factors to govern the behavior of human beings (Ajzen 1991). The primary and secondary motives of perpetrators receive the unwritten societal nod to commit witchcraft-related crimes. The other community members who witness the witch-hunting scene also hesitate to report crime and to stand against the witchery practice. Because they think witch practice is right and a part of their culture, they can also victimize women in the name of witchcraft, and reporting the matter to law enforcement agencies will be against community norms.

Witch-Hunting Practice and Its Relevance with Sustainable Development Goal-16 The prevalence of violence, insecurity, and injustice in society hampers the inevitable development process. To achieve the objectives of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), it is crucial to address these issues and highlight an inclusive society’s role, promoting justice and accountable institutions. The inclusive and participatory approach of development can counteract the marginalization and exclusion of different sections of our community. Therefore, Sustainable Development Goal-16 is aimed to highlight the importance of peace, stability, and effective governance. According to the United-Nations (2015), “peace, justice, and strong institutions” is the stimulus of the whole SDG framework. SDG’s goal cannot be accomplished unless there is a violation of human rights based on discrimination and exclusion. The SDG objective is the holistic development of society by integrating society barred due to violence and human rights violations. The occurrence of violence in society imposes a severe threat to human rights, justice, and a challenge for development. This societal violence occurs in wide ranges: gender genocide, war crimes, discrimination, and violence based on race, caste, ethnicity, and class. The violence against women and persecution based on discrimination by labeling them as a witch is underrepresented. According to Viegas (2018), witch-labeling is a powerful tool of social stigmatization against women of weaker section. Witchcraft practices violate human rights and hamper the development of societies (Di-Falco and Bulte 2011). There is also a lack of monitoring mechanisms for record and response to such human rights violations (Witchcraft-and-Human-Rights-InformationNetwork-WHIRN 2014). Consequently, witchhunting related to violence is increasing (Jorgensen 2014). Therefore, the gross violation of human rights and abuses by branding women as witches and witchcraft-related violence are eventually becoming a serious concern for international human rights and aid organizations (Action-Aid 2012).

Witch-Hunting: A Mute Atrocity Against Indigenous Women

Summary and Conclusion Indigenous women suffer multiple atrocities; witch-hunting is one of them. Around the world, incidences of witchcraft victimization are reported. In most cases, victims are women, whereas in a few cases, men, women, and children are tortured in the name of witch-hunting. India shares a 20–30% indigenous population of the world. Therefore the description of witch-hunting in the Indian context can generalize the rest of the world. Though the fact cannot be denied that the phenomenology of witchcraft is distinctive in various regions, nonetheless, the core feature of witch-hunting is uniform throughout the world. Witchcraft practice has been prominent in places where the indigenous population is highly concentrated. In European countries, sufferers were not indigenous people but from the downtrodden section of society. In India, witchcraft is still being practiced in the tribal-dominated regions. Gender discrimination and deprivation of inheritance of ancestral property to tribal women are the signs of gender disempowerment. In essence, this disempowered position of tribal women added fuel to the fire of witchcraft-related crimes. Witchcraft victimization occurs in the form of mob-lynching, which starts from witch-labeling of poor, marginalized, and supportless women. Social legislation failed to curb the menace of witch-hunting, because the issue of witchcraft victimization is not mainstreamed itself.

Cross-References ▶ Mass Atrocities: Definition and Relationship with Development ▶ Violent Extremism: Types, Implications, and Responses

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Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding Pavithra Siriwardhane School of Accounting, Information Systems and Supply Chain, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Definition Sustainable developments of a nation may not be able to achieve without equal participation of both

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women and men in the decision-making positions in the economy, society, and political spheres. Many jurisdictions are advocating to develop and implement policy and legal reforms to accelerate equal participation of women in decisionmaking in the household, community, corporate governance, and in peacemaking processes. Nevertheless, holding a decision-making position does not mean women are allowed to make influential decisions until the society believes in women’s capabilities which are often clouded with patriarchal ideologies.

Introduction Every human being has the right to participate in decisions that define her or his life. This right is the foundation of the ideal of equal participation in decision-making among women and men. It is argued that since women know their situation best, they should participate equally with men to have their perspective effectively incorporated at all levels of decision-making, from the private to the public spheres of their lives, from the local to the global (Miranda 2005). Thus, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon says that it “enables women’s groups to mobilize and makes it easier for women to realize their political, civil, economic and social rights” (UN Women 2014). Inequality between men and women in decision-making was brought into the limelight at the fourth world conference on women, held in Beijing in 1995. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action recognize women’s unequal share of power and decision-making as one of the twelve critical areas of concern (UN Women 2014). It outlines concrete actions to ensure women’s equal access to, and full participation in, power structures (Strategic Objective G.1), and to increase women’s capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership (Strategic Objective G.2) (DESA 2005). Both objectives are proposed to be initiated and implemented by governments, national bodies, the private sector, political parties, trade unions, employers’ organizations, research and academic institutions, subregional and regional bodies, and nongovernmental and international organizations

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Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership. . .

(Miranda 2005). Even after 23 years, the Platform for Action remains as one of the most powerful sources of guidance and inspiration. In September 2000, world leaders came together at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The Declaration committed nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and set out a series of eight targets with a deadline of 2015, that have become known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDGs presented a much narrower focus than the Beijing platform for action (Odera and Mulusa 2020). MDG 3, which called for the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women had one target: elimination of gender disparities in primary, secondary, and tertiary education by 2015. The indicators for this target were somewhat broader, and the relationship between these indicators and the target itself was quite unclear (Sen 2013). Many of these critiques have been considered in the process to develop their indirect successors, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Positions of Women in Decision-Making and SDGs The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted in 2015 by world leaders. These soft laws incorporate a roadmap for progress that is sustainable and leaves no one behind in the journey of achieving peace and prosperity for people and the planet. The 17 SDGs are comprised of 169 targets covering a broad range of sustainable development issues with 231 unique indicators. The issue of decision-making is addressed directly by some of these SDGs. Mainly target 16.7 addresses the inclusive, responsive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels by sex, age, disability, and population group. However, SDG16.7 is gender-neutral and does not explicitly state the term “women.” Nevertheless, SDG 5.5 explicitly states to ensure women’s full and effective participation and

equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic, and public life. On the other hand, the issue of women in decision-making is addressed indirectly by some of the SDGs either by way of empowering the capacity of women to actively participate in the decision-making process or by eliminating the barriers to participate in the decision-making process. For example, equal access to economic resources (SDG 1.4 and 5.A), equal access to land (SDG 2.3 and 5.A), free and equitable education (SDG 4.1), the achievement of literacy and numeracy (SDG 4.6), enhance the use of enabling technology (SDG 5.B), strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality (SDG 5.C), and equal pay for work of equal value (SDG 8.5) empower the capacity of women to participate in decision-making process actively. The SDGs that attempt to eradicate the barriers of women to participate in the decision-making process includes: eliminate gender disparities in education (SDG 4.5) and end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere (SDG 5.1). See Table 1 for the SDGs that address the issue of women in decision-making. The following discussion presents a review of the positions of women in decision-making, in political, business, peacebuilding, and land ownership.

Women in Political Decision-Making Status Quo Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right of every person to take part in the government of his or her country. Equality in political decision-making is pivotal for a palpable integration of the equality dimension in government policymaking. This does influence not only the advancement of women but also a significant factor for the attainment of justice, democracy, and peace (UN Women 2014). In this respect, through various discussions and networking at local, regional, national, and international level in developing and developed countries have come to an accord that politics must be transformed, and the transformation needs the active involvement of

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership. . .

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Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding, Table 1 Sustainable Development Goals that address the positions of women in decision-making SDGs that directly address (women) decision-making SDG5: Gender equality 5.5 ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decisionmaking in political, economic, and public life. SDG16: Peace and justice strong institutions 16.7 ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels (gender neutral) SDGs that address uplifting of empowerment of women in decision-making SDG1: No poverty 1.4 all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance. SDG2: Zero hunger 2.3 double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment. SDG4: Quality education 4.1 ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant effective learning outcomes. 4.6 ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy. SDG5: Gender equality 5.A undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws. 5.B enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women. 5.C adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels. SDG8: Decent work and economic growth 8.5 achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value. SDGs that address to eradicate the barriers of women to participate in the decision-making SDG4: Quality education 4.5 eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations. SDG5: Gender equality 5.1 end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.

women. Hence, to make the transformation, women who believe in serving the public trust and those who can commit to public accountability should enter politics (Miranda 2005). Thus, these women will be responsible to the electorate, the taxpayers, and the general public. Despite the ubiquitous shift towards democratization, women are still underrepresented, especially in ministerial and other executive bodies at different spheres of governments in most of the countries. All most all the country members of United Nations have attained the women’s right

to vote, and nearly half of the electorate is comprised of women nevertheless the gravity of underrepresentation of women in public decisionmaking is astounding (UN Women 2014). The Economic and Social Council endorsed a target to increase the proportion of women in leadership positions to at least 30%, considered a level of critical mass for women to have an impact. However, in 1995, approximately only 10% of members of national assemblies across the world were women (UN Women 2014), and even fewer women held positions in the government.

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Currently, women’s participation in decisionmaking in the parliament is below this target except in the regions of the Americas and Europe. The following Table 2 shows the world and regional averages of women in decision-making in parliaments in 1995 and 2020. Table 3 presents the top 10 countries of women representation in parliaments in 1995 and 2020. Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding, Table 2 World and regional averages of women in parliaments, 1995 and 2020 Situation in July 1995 and May 2020, both houses combined. Regional ranking in the order of the percentage point change Region 1995 2020 World average 11.3 25.0 Americas 12.7 31.8 Europe 13.2 29.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 9.8 24.6 Arab states 4.3 16.6 Pacific 6.3 19.6 Asia 13.2 20.3 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union: Women in parliament (2020)

Barriers for Participation of Women in Political Decision-Making Positions As per the online discussion report on women and political decision-making, prepared by the EIGE ( 2013), there are supply-side barriers and demand-side barriers that hinder women entering political decision. When women decide that a political career is not feasible because of specific barriers, these are called supply-side barriers, and they are predominantly cultural. Stereotypes of women, the gendered understanding of roles for women and the pressures that arise from these issues negatively shape decision-making by women concerning their participation in politics (Sadie 2005). These cultural barriers, in turn, contribute to further practical barriers to making such a decision (Izelmaden 2016). There is a lack of support for the reconciliation of work and family life. It can be difficult for women, who bear an unequal share of caring responsibilities, to find time to launch a political career. Women do not have access to economic resources and the networks that are required to engage in politics. Women can also face barriers of low self-confidence and low self-esteem in deciding whether to enter politics

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding, Table 3 Topranking countries of women representation in single and lower houses of parliament, 1995 versus 2020 1995

2020

Country 1.Sweden 2. Norway 3. Denmark

Region Nordic/Europe Nordic/Europe Nordic/Europe

% of women 40.4 39.4 33.5

4. Finland

Nordic/Europe

33.5

5. Netherlands 6. Seychelles

Europe

32.7

4.United Arab Emirates 5.Mexico

Africa

27.3

6.Nicaragua

7. Austria 8. Germany 9. Iceland 10. Argentina

Europe Europe Nordic/Europe Latin America and the Caribbean

26.8 26.3 25.4 25.3

7.Sweden 8.Grenada 9.South Africa 10.Andorra

Source: Adopted from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020)

Country 1. Rwanda 2.Cuba 3.Bolivia

Region Africa Americas Latin America and the Caribbean Arab Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean Nordic/Europe Americas Africa Europe

% of women 61.2 53.2 53.0 50 48.2 47.2 46.9 46.6 46.5 46.4

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership. . .

(Izelmaden 2016). How these supply-side barriers of females entering into a political career can be mitigated may be associated with SDG 4.5. The Goal attempts to eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations. Demand-side barriers occur when women who have decided to participate in political decisionmaking face barriers while pursuing a political career. These are barriers mainly presented by political parties in relation to the processes for candidate selection and the position of women on their electoral lists (Izelmaden 2016). Certain demand-side barriers arise within democratic institutions which fail to take account of and respond to the needs of female members with caring responsibilities. Lack of childcare provision and arrangements to reconcile work and family life are some of these barriers. Mitigating these demand-side barriers can be related to SDG5.1, which attempts to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere. The Way Forward SDG 5.5 directly addresses this situation and emphasizes to ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making, including in political domain. SDG 5.5.1 explicitly states the proportion of seats need to be held by women in national and local governments. Successful quota systems for women representation in leadership and decision-making can achieve change as they compensate for the barriers women face. They can compel action to seek out active and competent women candidates and accelerate the slow pace of change. However, quotas can be controversial and have been challenged as disregarding merit and as being discriminatory and undemocratic (European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE 2013). Further, rules and procedures of political parties need to be a focus for change, in relation to candidate selection. Initiation of SDG 5.C may possibly focus this change, which says adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable

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legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels. Change in society is needed through broader social, economic, and political transformations that gradually erode patriarchal values and offer greater opportunities for women to accept different roles and open the way in political decisionmaking (IPU 2018).

Women in Business Decision-Making Status Quo In many regions, the participation of women in remunerated work in the formal and nonformal labor market has increased significantly and has changed over the decades. However, in the private sector, including transnational and national organizations, women are mostly absent from management and policy levels, denoting discriminatory hiring and promotion policies and practices (Feintzig and Lublin 2016). Glass and Cook (2016) assert that women are severely underrepresented in business leadership positions and many women are still battling to become part of the decision-making processes. Business and Sustainable Development Commission (BSDC) report ( 2018) claims that gender balance is relatively equal at the lowest levels of the global workforce, where women represent about half of all employees. Still, women are often absent from decision-making roles such as chief executive officer (CEO), board member, president, and dean. Although the Fortune 500 list has been released annually for the last 65 years, it was not until 1998 it began noting executives’ gender. Since then, the magazine pointed out that the percentage of female CEOs has generally increased. And as men make up most of the Fortune 500 CEOs, women still get left out of boardroom decisions. As of May 2020, 37 of the companies on this year’s Fortune 500 are led by female CEOs. Yet the big picture is less encouraging: even with a record of 37 female CEOs, women run just 7.4% of the 500 businesses on the ranking. Only in the past 4 years has the

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growth of women in these roles accelerated past 30 – a general upwards trend, though there have been dips along the way. As per the report “Women in the Boardroom, A Global Perspective” published by Deloitte (2019), women are still largely underrepresented on corporate boards globally, and progress to change this trend continues to be slow towards board diversity (see Table 4).

Barriers for Participation of Women in Business Decision-Making Positions Many reasons have been identified as barriers that impede women in pursuing leadership roles which involve decision-making, namely: conscious and unconscious biases; gender stereotype; lack of mentality to pursue leadership; lack of mentors, role-models, and sponsors; lack of policies that support work-life balance; work-life integration

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding, Table 4 Percentage of board seats held by women by region and country

Region Africa Asia

Australasia Europe

Latin America and the Caribbean

Middle East

North America

Country South Africa Nigeria India

% of women on board 26.4 20.0 13.8

China Japan New Zealand Australia Norway

10.6 5.2 31 25 41.0

Germany

26.0

United Kingdom Brazil

22.7

a

8.6

a

Mexico Bermuda Israel

6.5 15.6 21

a

United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Canada United States of America

3.8

a

0.7 21.4 17.6

a

Quotas a a

Listed companies and large public limited companies are required to appoint one or more women to their boards under the companies act of 2013. a In mainland China a a a

In 2005, Norway became the first country in the world to enact gender quota legislation for public limited companies, requiring a 40% representation of both sexes on the board. German gender quota legislation which was passed in 2015 targets 50% women on supervisory boards.

a

Under the 16th amendment to the companies law, boards consisting of only one gender must add members of the other gender in any new nonexecutive director appointments.

b b

There are some state measures to help increase women’s representation on boards.

Source: Deliotte ( 2019) There are no quotas in place for women serving on boards b There are no national quotas in place for women serving on boards a

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challenges; lean-out phenomenon; and the culture of the organization that lack internal and external networks, recognition, opportunities, or resources (Chisholm-Burns et al. 2017). Mainly, the culture of gendered organizations is consciously or unconsciously developed predominantly by men for men, embedding patriarchal norms (Rai et al. 2019). Albeit, SDG5.1 attempts to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere, with the indicator particularizing on whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce, and monitor equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. Glass and Cook (2016) claim that while the challenges women face is well-documented, less understood are the factors that shape the experience and success of women who, against significant barriers. They further state, scholarship on women and leadership positions on decision-making by analyzing the conditions under which women are promoted to top leadership positions and exploring the challenges they face post-promotion. The data of all women that currently serve or have ever served as CEO of a Fortune 500 company were selected for the study. The study reveals that if women are promoted to high-risk positions and lack the support or authority to accomplish their leadership goals, then they are likely increasingly vulnerable to scrutiny and performance pressures. As a result, female leaders may experience shorter tenures compared to their male peers either due to a higher risk of being fired or replaced or due to self-selection out of leadership positions. The study undertaken by Ng and Sears (2017) in Canadian organizations reveals that the presence of a female chief executive officer and an organization’s active recruitment of women is positively associated with a firm’s percentage of women in positions of decision-making in the management. However, while firm internationalization and firm foreign ownership are negatively related to the representation of women in management, overall, these findings suggest that although firms exercise discretion for hiring and promoting women, they are also constrained by the external environment and organizational characteristics.

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For example, organizations with higher levels of steady internationalization and that are foreignowned may limit their efforts and investment in the advancement of women into positions of decision-making in the management. The Way Forward Although empirical research claims that having women in positions of decision-making would improve the productivity (Luanglath et al. 2019), SDG 8 (which addresses the promotion of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment, and decent work for all) is not comprised of any targets that address on positions of women’s decision-making at the workplace. Further, no target in SDG 8 had discussed the issue of gender inequality, including the discrimination (Rai et al. 2019) concerning equal decision-making at all levels in the workplace. Hence, the successful delivery of SDG 8 is doubtful. Thus, failure to address women’s participation at decision-making in the workplace will hinder achieving SDG 5.5 (which ensures women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic, and public life). The study undertaken by APS ( 2016) finds that countries with specific targets, quotas, and penalties for not meeting regulations, including Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, had nearly double the average percentage of women on boards (about 34%) than countries without those measures which are around about 18%. Adoption of SDG 5.C would further enhance these positive measures through sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels. Moreover, the future will be optimistic if nations adopt and promote SDG 5.1, which leads to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere. The workplaces can partner in this promotion by implementing SDG 5.5.2 which emphasize on women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making, measuring through the proportion of women in managerial positions.

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Women in Land Ownership and Decision-Making Status Quo The land is key to a life with dignity and a basis for entitlements which can ensure an adequate standard of living and economic independence and, therefore, personal empowerment (UN Women 2014). Land itself can be understood to include farmland, wetland, pasture, rangeland, fishery, forest, as well as harvesting and hunting territories. The principal means of acquiring land ownership is through the family via inheritance, the community either through inheritance or via land re-allocation, the state through land distribution programs or the titling of national land, and market purchases (Deere and León 2003). However, land ownership patterns are significantly gendered in the world (Behrman 2017), and women are severely disadvantaged in accessing land due to various reasons. Hence, as a result, women are marginalized and do not have a voice or not in a position of decision-making in land rights and ownership. Research finds that landlessness among women in low-income households is associated with reduced decision-making power in the household (Garikipati 2008) and a lower status for women (Hare et al. 2007). As per the World Economic Forum (2017), women own less than 20% of the world’s land. International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW) (2013) claims that only 1% of the women in the world, in fact, own land. This scarcity hampers the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies to reduce gender gaps in land ownership (Kieran et al. 2015). Table 5 presents the distribution of agricultural landowners by women in different years in different countries. As per Behrman (2017), the comparatively high rates of female land ownership in Malawi can be partially attributed to the prevalence of cultural traditions. That is, the land is passed through the female side of the family, and husbands reside with their wives’ natal families. Barriers for Participation of Women in Land Ownership and Decision-Making Positions Women are incredibly underprivileged in limited decision-making power and control over how to

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership, and Peacebuilding, Table 5 Distribution of agricultural landowners by women Region and country South Asia Bangladesh (2011/12) Vietnam (2004) Africa Malawi (2013) Ghana (2013) Nigeria (2013) Latin America Ecuador (2010) Mexico (2002) Nicaragua (2005) Middle East Iraq (2013)

Percentage 22.6 37.3 57.3 38 15.8 51 32.2 19.9 26.2

Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2020)

use land predominantly due to existing patriarchal social norms and gendered inheritance laws (Agarwal 2018). In some societies, gender inequalities regarding land and other productive resources occur due to the assumptions that men, as heads of households, are more capable of controlling and managing land. This implicitly replicates that women are incapable of effectively managing productive resources, hence restrictive participation in decision-making opportunities (Agarwal 2018). Certain societies have the perception that productive resources given to women are disappeared to another family in the event of marriage (Okpara 2018). Further, women are often vulnerable to loss of land when their household structure changes, particularly if their husband dies or leaves; in such cases, the community or husband’s family may take over the land (Doss et al. 2018). Many inequalities are prevailing in some societies for land ownership law as well as in government land distribution schemes (Agarwal 2018). For instance, in Bangladesh, while the country’s statutory regulations give men and women equal right to purchase and own land, in practice, this is limited by inheritance rules that are governed by Shariah Law, which place women and girls at a

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership. . .

considerable disadvantage. In Vietnam, the amount of acreage allocated to a household by the government would depend on the ages of household members, with individuals of working age receiving the most significant allocations. Since female-headed households inclined to have fewer working-age adults, received less land than male-headed households. Further, the legal retirement age for women is 5 years earlier than of men (age 55 for women compared to 60 for men) resulting, the amount of land allocated to women ages 55–59 half that has been allocated to men of the same age (Menon et al. 2014). The most significant legal barrier for women to own land in some of the Latin American countries is the gendered agrarian reform laws that stipulated agriculturalists as beneficiaries which were referred to in the masculine version. Regardless of the amount of labor that rural women devote to agriculture, it has been perceived as a male livelihood resulting in women’s work in agriculture undistinguishable (Doss et al. 2018). Although many countries have developed gender-equitable land reforms, in practice, these regulations were not well enforced due to lack of administrative capacity, racial, and ethnic discrimination. The inequality in the practice of land management and relevant decision-making does not suggest that women and men are unequal humans but rather that their roles, responsibilities, and opportunities are dependent on whether they are born female or male as per the beliefs of the society (FAO 2020). Notwithstanding, SDG 5.1 efforts to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere, with the indicator specifying on whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce, and monitor equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, it is anticipated by 2030 either to eradicate or to mitigate the issue of gendered land ownership and women acquiring equal rights as men to purchase and own land in practice. The Way Forward A broad consensus has emerged among both policymakers and researchers to strengthen women’s land rights which is crucial for achieving equitable growth (Kieran et al. 2015) and

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decision-making (Okpara et al. 2019). According to Doss et al. (2018), women’s rights to land requires work in two dimensions. First, both land law and family law must protect women’s rights (Doss et al. 2018). Thus, SDG 5.A emphasizes to undertake reforms to give women equal rights to access to ownership and control over land particularly SDG 5.A.1 emphasizing (a) proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by sex; and (b) share of women among owners. Similarly, SDG 2.3 states by 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, through secure and equal access to land. Evidence suggests that Rwanda’s recent land regularization program improved land access for legally married women and increased investment in soil conservation measures, especially among female-headed households (Ali et al. 2017). Currently, in the contexts of legal pluralism, where both statutory and customary law are both recognized, it is more challenging to ensure that women’s land rights are enforced (Doss et al. 2018). Initiation of SDG 5.A.2 can mitigate this challenge by the proportion of countries where the legal framework (including customary law) guarantees women’s equal rights to land ownership and/or control. A lesson from the Vietnam land reform is that rights need to be guaranteed in such a way that women can exchange, lease, bequeath, sell, or mortgage their land in an enforceable manner (Menon et al. 2014). As per Doss et al. (2018), the second dimension of women’s rights to land involves, women to be aware of their rights, have the ability to enforce them, and be able to challenge social norms that limit women’s rights to land. With this regard, SDG 1.4 claims that by 2030, to ensure that all men and women, the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land. Okpara et al. (2019) says increasing women’s presence in high-level communitybased committees, including raising the number of women contributing to important land use plans and decisions will play a fundamental role in land ownership (Okpara et al. 2019) and decision-

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making. Further, enhanced awareness of legal literacy programs may be achieved through programs such as mobilizing community workers as paralegals (Doss et al. 2018). Teaming up with different SDGs and collectively implementing them has substantial potential for an era of equitable access and decision-making in women’s land rights.

Women in Peacebuilding DecisionMaking Status Quo The civil-society campaign on women in peacebuilding led to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a landmark legal and political framework which was unanimously adopted in 2000 (UN Women 2012). It acknowledges the importance of the participation of women and the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping operations, post-conflict peacebuilding, and governance (UN Women 2018). Grave violations of the human rights of occurring, particularly in times of armed conflict, and these civilian victims, mostly women and children, often outnumber casualties among combatants (Jabang 2016). Women often become caregivers for injured combatants and find themselves, as a result of conflict, unexpectedly cast as sole manager of household, sole parent, and caretaker of elderly relatives (Karim and Beardsley 2017).The equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security (Jabang 2016). Although women have begun to play an important role in conflict resolution, peace-keeping, and defense and foreign affairs mechanisms, they are still underrepresented in decision-making positions. As per UN Women (2018), three key areas of intervention in recovery and peacebuilding are: post-conflict planning, economic recovery, and restoring governance. Thus, if women are to play equally in securing and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically and economically and represented

adequately at all levels of decision-making in the peacebuilding process (UN Women 2010). Barriers for Participation of Women in Peacebuilding Decision-Making Positions A study undertaken by UN Women (2012) found that in 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, only 4% of signatories, 2.4% of chief mediators, 3.7% of witnesses, and 9% of negotiators were women. Although the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes has gained momentum in policy discussions over the years, the number of women in decision-making positions remains relatively small. O’Reilly et al. (2015) argue that a leading barrier to women’s participation is that the goal is often merely to end violence, in which women play only a trivial part. However, if the focus was instead on building peace, women would play a more prominent role. Khodary (2016) state that post-conflict peacebuilding can provide women with the opportunity to mobilize, be heard, and become more politically active due to the opening of a democratic space. However, at the same time, this is not always the case since these spaces can also end up being dominated by men and omit gender equality in the agenda. Further, Khodary (2016) argues that women should not be given roles based on stereotypes; men should not be viewed as dominant and violent, and women as subordinate and peaceful. Rather, identities overlap, and experiences are contextual based. This is precisely what SDG 5.5 is addressing of, women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life. Although, not explicitly stated the word “women’ the gender-neutral SDG 16.7, addresses to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels. Participation of Women in Peacebuilding Decision-Making Positions Long-term conflict prevention requires investment in cultures of peace along with formal and informal institutions for nonviolent conflict resolution. Women’s participation can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the causes of and

Women in Decision-Making Positions in Politics, Business, Land Ownership. . .

alternative solutions to conflict, and bolster actions, addressing varying needs and sustaining peace over time (UN Women 2018). Case of Zimbabwe

Rukuni et al. (2016) explore ways of enhancing women participation in peacebuilding and decision-making processes in Zimbabwean rural communities. The results revealed that women in rural Zimbabwean communities play crucial roles in peacebuilding processes such as psychological healing, mediation, conflict resolution, child care, and advocacy. However, women’s participation is minimal, mainly due to challenges such as the patriarchal nature of the society, lack of support from the government and the local community. The authors claim that although women play important roles in peacebuilding they are not recognized or strengthened. If strengthened, more lasting peace is possible, otherwise, many peacebuilding efforts are superficial and don’t last long, especially if women’s contributions are ignored. Through education and training the attitudes of the local community towards full participation of women in peacebuilding processes can be altered. As stated in SDG 5.C, the government needs to develop and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels which may support women’s rights and build capacity for women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding. Case of Iraq

Iraq is the first country in the Middle East to launch a program to implement Resolution 1325 and it is a step in the right direction towards furthering women’s interests in the country (O’Driscoll 2017), Iraqi National Action Plan (INAP). However, INAP significantly ignores some of the key areas of Resolution 1325, namely: women’s participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation; prevention of violence against women; and women’s specific relief needs in conflict and post-conflict. Seven Iraqi women civil society organizations played a major role in the development of INAP over a 2-year period although some important pillars were later removed without the consent of these civil

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societies (Khodary 2016). In July 2017, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, in collaboration with UN Women and the Government of Iraq National Reconciliation Committee, Office of the Prime Minister’s Women and Gender Affairs Department met the leading Iraqi women to discuss women’s participation in Iraq’s National Reconciliation process O’Driscoll (2017). The women participants requested for a smooth transitional justice system following the defeat of the Islamic State and for accountability for those who committed crimes against women during the conflict. Notably, they demanded for the political parties law to be amended to ensure representation of women in the parties’ leadership. However, women are still underrepresented in decision-making positions and in national peacebuilding forum in Iraq (O’Driscoll 2017). The SDG 16.7 stresses the responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels, which implies representation of women. Case of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka suffered a brutal ethnic-conflict for nearly three decades from 1983 to 2009. Sri Lanka was one of the first Asian countries to be granted the universal adult suffrage for both men and women in 1931. The country prides in having produced the first female Prime minister in the world (1960–1965) and later her daughter being the first female President (1994–2005) in the nation. The females from different ethnic groups in the country experienced the civil-conflict in an utterly different manner (Porter 2003). Nearly 89,000 of the female population in the country was widowed during this time and left them in a female-headed household consequently. Moreover, the women had been actively participating in the actual conflict as soldiers in the battlefield representing the government forces and the rebellions (Abeysekera 1999). In addition to being directly involved in the conflict, Sri Lankan women have also been active in lobbying and campaigning for an end to the war and for respect of the rights of all communities and for a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict (Abeysekera 1999). Women in North and women in South of the country formed separate

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alliances termed as Mothers’ Fronts and they challenged the authorities demanding justice for the disappearances of their family members (Aryasinha 2015). Although Sri Lanka has been enhancing the contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts, adequate representation of women at the peacebuilding decision-making process is not very clear (Perera 2018). Considering enhancing the participation of women in the post-war peacebuilding process, the government of Sri Lanka should initiate necessary steps in adopting SDG 5.5 which elevates women’s full and active participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making.

Conclusion The right to participate in decision-making is a fundamental right of a human being that defines his or her life. Without the full participation of women in decision-making processes, and debates about policy priorities and options, issues of great importance to women will either be abandoned or misjudged. Despite the universal transfer towards democratization, women are largely underrepresented, especially in ministerial and other executive bodies at different spheres of governments in most of the countries. In the private sector, women are severely underrepresented in business leadership positions, and many women are still battling to become part of the decisionmaking processes. Women are marginalized and do not have a voice or not in a position of decision-making in land rights and ownership which hinders the decision-making power in the household resulting in a lower status too. Although women have begun to play an essential role in conflict resolution, peace-keeping, defense, and foreign affairs mechanisms, they are still underrepresented in decision-making positions. Successful quota systems or equal representation in legislation for women in leadership and decision-making can achieve change as they compensate for the barriers women face. However, quotas and legislations tell us little about women’s leadership or decision-making in practice. That is, merely holding a position of leadership does not mean she can make influential decisions until

society believes in her capabilities which are often clouded with societal ideologies. Hence, change in social norms is essential through broader social, economic, and political transformations that gradually erode patriarchal ideologies and offer more significant opportunities for women to accept different roles and open the way for decision-making. Education and awareness campaigns on women in decision-making are an essential means, and all forms of media can contribute immensely to this regard. Moreover, SDGs should be embraced as devices for the change in patriarchal ideologies in the journey of achieving peace and prosperity for people and the planet.

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This encyclopedia includes no entry for Z. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95960-3