Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology [1 ed.] 9781003405610, 9781032520803, 9781032522180

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Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology

With contributors from different generations of the Chinese-speaking world, the book addresses the relevance of Paul Tillich’s thought in the Chinese cultural-political contexts. Appropriating and transforming different themes of Tillich’s thought in the Chinese context, the contributors reframe the dialogue with Buddhism and Confucianism, religion and science, and religion and politics under the ­interpretation of Tillich’s ideas. The thought-provoking essays examine the intellectual potentiality or further contribution of Paul Tillich’s ideas in ­Sino-Christian Theology. The book will be of interest to scholars and postgraduate students studying Paul Tillich’s thought, Chinese theology, and East-West religious dialogues. Keith Ka-fu Chan is currently a Professor at the Center for Judaic and ­Inter-religious Studies, Shandong University. His research interests include modern Christian theology, philosophy of religion, religion and environmental ethics, political theology, and Paul Tillich studies.

Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology

Edited by Keith Ka-fu Chan

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Keith Ka-fu Chan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Keith Ka-fu Chan to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-52080-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-52218-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-40561-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of tables List of contributors

Introduction

vii ix

1

K E I T H K A- F U C H A N

1 Being and Non-Being: Paul Tillich, Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, and Sino-Christian Theology

8

L A I PA N - C H I U

2 Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective

30

L AO J I AY I

3 Correlating Tillich’s Legacy with the PoliticalExistential Situation of Present-Day China

50

BE N SI U - PU N HO

4 Demonic and Frontier: Paul Tillich on Nationalism and Its Significance on National Identity Construction in Contemporary China

73

HONGL I N TA NG

5 St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage): With Special Reference to the Virtue of Vīrya in Buddhism

93

TAO A N T HON Y WA NG

6 T.C. Chao and Tillich: Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China J U NJ I E YA NG

140

vi Contents

7 The Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth in 1923: A Historical and Interpretative Reconstruction 152 T HOM A S X U T ONG QU (瞿旭彤)

8 Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue: An Emergentist Perspective

175

WA I - H A N , KU NG

9 An Examination of Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding: An Ecological Perspective 211 K E I T H K A- F U C H A N

Subject and Name Index

223

Tables

5.1 Meaning of “War” in Relation to St. Thomas’ Articulation of Fortitude According to Gregory M. Reichberg

103

Contributors

Keith Ka-fu Chan  (PhD in Religion and Theology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) is currently a Professor at the Center for Judaic and Inter-religious Studies, School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, China. He is interested in modern and contemporary Christian theology, Continental philosophy of religion, Religion and Environmental Ethics, political theology, and Paul Tillich studies. His publications include Life as Spirit: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Ecological Pneumatology (Tillich Research Series Volume 17) Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2018; co-edited, Paul Tillich and Asian Religions (Tillich Research Series Volume 11) Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017; Political Theology: A Reflection on Desacralizing Power (Taipei: Taiwan Chinese Christian Literature Council Publisher, 2022, in Chinese). Ben Siu-pun Ho (PhD in Religious Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) was a North American Paul Tillich Society Fellow in 2019 and was selected for the Fulbright Research Award 2020–2021. His research interests include systematic theology, political theology, cultural studies, social theories, Foucault and theology, and Hong Kong studies. Lao Jiayi (PhD in Religious Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) is currently a Post-doctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), Sun Yat-sen University, China. Her academic interests include Christian-Confucian Dialogue, contemporary Confucianism, and Paul Tillich studies. Wai-han, Kung’s (PhD in Religious Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) research interests include science-religion dialogue, interreligious dialogue, and philosophy of religion. Lai Pan-chiu (PhD, King’s College London) is currently a Professor of Religious Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is interested in modern Christian theology and Buddhist-Christian dialogue. His publications include Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Thought (1994); Mahayana Christian Theology (in Chinese,

x Contributors 2011); and Divergent Religious Paths to Convergent End? Perspectives of Religious Studies and Sino-Christian Theology (in Chinese, 2020). Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) (ThD, University of Heidelberg) is currently a tenured Associate Professor of Christian Studies and Continental Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. His research interests include Modern and Contemporary German Christian Theology (Barth, Bonhoeffer); Modern and Contemporary German Philosophy (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Luhmann); Ancient Greek Philosophy (Aristotle); and History of Chinese Christian Thoughts. His publications include Barth und Goethe. Die Goethe-Rezeption Karl Barths 1906–1921, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlagshaus (2014); Karl Barth and Sino-Christian Theology, Brill Yearbook of Chinese Theology (2019). Paul Honglin Tang (ThD, The Divinity School of Chung Chi College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) is a Lecturer at the Guangdong Union Theological Seminary, China. His major academic interests include Sinicization of Christianity, Christian counseling, and spiritual formation. His monograph Demonic and Frontier: Paul Tillich on Nationalism (Taiwan, 2023) is forthcoming. Tao Anthony Wang (PhD, The Chinese University of Hong Kong) is a Professor of Philosophy at the Holy Spirit Seminary College of Theology and Philosophy, Hong Kong, aggregated to the Pontifical Urban University (Urbaniana), Rome. He also serves as the part-time Research Fellow of the Center for Judaic and Inter-Religious Studies, Shandong University. His major academic interests relate to ethics, medieval philosophy, Catholic studies, interfaith integration, etc. He just published a new monograph A Study of Love in Catholicism: An Interpretation in Agape-Eros Paradigm (Hong Kong, 2021), and another monograph Supernaturalizing Nature: An Investigation of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Ethical Essentials (Taiwan, 2023) is forthcoming. Junjie Yang (DLitt, Renmin University of China) is currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Comparative Literature and World Literature, School of Chinese Language and Literature, Beijing Normal University. His research interests include Greek and German Literatures, German philosophy and theology, and Paul Tillich studies. His publications include “Paul Tillich und China: Ein noch zu erwartender Dialog,” Jesus of Nazareth and the New Being in History. International Yearbook for Tillich Research. Vol. 6 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), 221–235. For the Chinese version, see “Paul Tillich and China: A Dialogue Worth Awaiting,” Logos and Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology Vol. 38 (2013), 135–151 (in Chinese); An Examination on Walter Benjamin’s Theses on Philosophy of History (Beijing: China Social Science Publishing House, 2018) (in Chinese); Editor and Translator, The Works of Paul Tillich on Schelling (HK: Tao Fong Publication, 2011) (in Chinese).

Introduction Keith Ka-fu Chan

1 A General Description of Tillich-Reception in Chinese Academia The Chinese reception of Paul Tillich (1886–1965) has been started in the 20th century.1 Among the 20th-century Christian theologians, Tillich was commonly regarded as one of the theologians who was interested in non-­ Christian religions, especially his growing interests in Eastern Buddhism in his later years. It seems that his later theological-dialogical matrix would be one of the potential exemplars to develop religious dialogue and contextual theological thinking in the non-western contexts. Also, Tillich’s ontological style and form of thinking embodies the cross-­boundary visionary trace which attracts many non-western scholars to re-appropriate his thought in their local and contextual reflections. Liu Shu-hsien’s ground-breaking essay in 1989 showed the Chinese perspectives toward Tillich’s ontological understanding of God and Christology.2 Choi Du-yol’s doctoral dissertation in 2000 named as “Transcendence and Immanence in Paul Tillich’s Theology and Chu Hsi’s Neo-Confucian Philosophy” was perhaps the first academic output in correlating Confucianism and Tillich’s theology in which Choi compared both parties’ ideas of God and Heaven, and, finally, pointed out that Tillich’s being-itself and Li, Ch’I, and Tai-chi are the isomorphic complex though they function in different ways.3 AU Kin-ming’s Paul Tillich and Chu Hsi published in 2002 extends the discussion of Tillich’s anthropology and neo-Confucian understanding of human condition in a much deeper level. Au points out that Tillich and Chu Hsi share the ­essential-existential bio-polar structure in viewing the ontological structure of human being, and both proposed the similar strategies to resolve the existential tension within the human being through reunification of the divine reality and Heaven.4 Apart from Confucianism, David Chai’s pioneering essay demonstrated the similarity and difference between Tillich’s naturalist ontology and Zhuang Zi’s cosmological ontology.5 Chai mentions that Tillich’s dialectical employment of being and non-being would find the corresponding philosophical matrix in Daoist framework. Daoism also frames non-being

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-1

2  Keith Ka-fu Chan in positive terms in which Dao and nothingness coexist together and nourish all created beings in the world. Almost about ten years later, in 2015, an international conference entitled as “Ultimate Concern: Tillich, Buddhism, Confucianism” was held by the Center for Sino-Christian Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University in Hong Kong. The conference was intended to organize to memorize the 50th anniversary of Paul Tillich’s death. Nine conference papers were collected in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions published by de Gruyter.6 For the encounter of Tillich and Confucianism, Andrew Hung compared the religious nature, substantial content, and motivation of ethical reasoning of Tillich and classical Confucianism. Hung emphasized that, despite the differences between their understanding of God/Heaven, and love (agape/ren), the ontological structures of their religious ethics are similar in a sense that religion and morality are autonomous in nature. While Confucianism stresses the importance of self-cultivation, Tillich stresses that the real moral motivation comes from eros and theonomous morality. This difference would bring a challenge to Confucians’ optimistic perception of human nature.7 Lauren Pfister drew out attention to Tillich and Zhāng Zài (Chang Tsai, 1020– 1077) and compared Tillich’s essay “The Depth of Existence” and Zhang’s Zhèng Mēng 正蒙. Pfister asserts that both shared awareness of the need for humans to experience and understand transformation, second, for the themes of transformation and spirituality, both conceived of ways to attain peace and joy within a very changeable world.8 Following the theme of environmental ethics, Keith Chan pointed out the similarity between Tillich, Orthodox theology, and Confucianism through engaging the concept of holistic and dynamic cosmology and anthropology. Three parties asserted that the dualistic and hierarchical understanding of the reality is no longer acceptable; rather a multi-dimensional, unifying, and holistic view of the universe would be much benefit for reconstructing the environmental ethics ­ quinas’s through the tri-logical between them.9 In comparing with Thomas A idea of love, Wang Tao mentioned that Tillich has a much more dialectical understanding of agape-eros model which is so closed with Catholic traditions, and this Thomas-Tillich matrix of Christian love illuminates the path toward the integration with the Christian traditional idea of love in Confucianism.10 Also, the above collection includes four essays devoted to the area of Tillich and Buddhism Pan-chiu LAI’s essay, “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue,” explores the significance of Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern for the comparison or dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism. Based on an analysis of Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, including its reception and interpretation in the C ­ hinese-speaking world, this essay investigates if and how the concept is applicable to Buddhism through making reference to the concepts of Nirvana and Dharma in early Buddhism. Also, it further argues that if one takes Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern as a mediating concept, one may find it not only

Introduction  3 possible to explore the ultimate concern of Buddhism, but also meaningful (as well as fruitful) to make a comparison with Christianity. Based on this approach to Buddhist-Christian dialogue, this essay offers theological reflections on the Christian doctrine of God through dialogue with various schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, including the Middle-Path (Mādhyamika), the Hua-yen, and the Pure Land, representing three different approaches to the Buddhist ultimate concern.11 Kin-ming AU’s “Ultimate Reality: A Comparative Study of Kitaro Nishida’s concept of Nothingness and Paul Tillich’s concept of God” mentioned that both concepts of the ­Ultimate are profoundly transcendental insofar as the subject-object scheme is overcome. God’s being and Ultimate Nothingness are beyond human conceptualization. However, it seems that the negative relationship between the absolute and relative nothingness does not correspond with Tillich’s immanence apparatus of God and the world.12 This interest in the comparative study of the Buddhist idea of emptiness and Tillich’s concept of God as being-itself is shared by Ellen Y. ZHANG’s essay, “When the Ground of Being Encounters Emptiness: Tillich and Buddhism,” in which she explores the apophatic dimension of Tillich’s concept of God and its connection to his existentialist philosophy. The paper also examines Tillich’s ontological theology in light of the Buddhist view of ontological emptiness, showing that Tillich’s apophatic way of speaking about God is more “postmodern” or “post-­ontotheological” than some of Tillich’s critics have recognized. Finally, it also shows that Tillich’s quest for religiosity makes one to come to terms with the theological condition of thought in a contemporary context, therefore, inspiring one to go beyond theism (or atheism), especially after the “death of God” talk, to ask how the finite opens itself up to the infinite.13 Lastly, William Yau-nang NG’s essay, “Tillich, Lotus-birth and Asian Religions: A Comparative Study of Lotus-birth as a Religious Symbol,” attempts to use a comparative religious approach to study the meaning of “lotus-birth” (i.e. a birth related to the lotus flower) as a religious symbol. The lotus symbol is used across different Chinese religions. Tillich believes that ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically and that symbolic language alone is capable of expressing the ultimate. This paper, however, demonstrates that on top of expressing the ultimate, the lotus in Chinese Buddhist and Daoist narratives can also be used as a means of approaching the ultimate concern. These two Chinese traditions use the symbol of the lotus as an important means of enhancing the transformation toward the ultimate concern. Therefore, the symbol is not merely a means of expression but also a means of transformation.14

2  The Volume Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology brings together nine essays by Chinese scholars who have diverse social-political and intellectual backgrounds and share an interest in the role that the thought of Paul Tillich has played

4  Keith Ka-fu Chan in their local-academic contexts in the 21st century. The essays in this volume do not just only focus on what the intellectual potentiality or further contribution of Paul Tillich’s ideas in different areas of inter-religious dialogue with Confucianism and Buddhism, but also extends Tillich’s analysis of social-political insights into contemporary Chinese political situation, and draws our attention to the religion-science dialogue based on the correlation of Tillich and Confucianism. This book provides thought-provoking essays that cover different aspects of Tillich’s philosophy and theology and the comparison and dialogue with East Asian religions and philosophies. For the social-political-theological analysis of contemporary Chinese situation, Ben HO’s essay attempts to correlate the “theological-­political Tillich” with the situation of present-day China, shedding light on the understanding of the political reality and the resistance practice in the country. Taking into consideration the political landscape of China in the past decade, Ho studies three sets of ideas in Tillich’s thought and argues that they offer plausible “answers” to the political-existential “question” that the Chinese people are currently facing. The answers given here are comprehended in two senses. First, Tillich’s ideas provide illuminating perspectives to interpret or reinterpret the situation of China at the moment; second, they remind people of the power of the Christian symbol so as to strengthen their resisting mentality. The three sets of Tillich’s concepts to be examined are (1) faith, religion, and quasi-religion; (2) the demonic and the Cross of Jesus Christ, and (3) the Kingdom of God. Besides, Tang Honglin’s provoking analysis on Tillich and nationalism also brings implications of vital effects on Tillich’s relevance in contemporary China. Tang mentions Paul Tillich’s view of nationalism as demonic, which is both creative and destructive. It not only has the inherent characteristics of paganism or idolatry, but also has the good quality of spiritual presence. However, from Germany to America, especially in his later time, Tillich has still demonstrated a development from the ambiguous (demonic) to the negative (idolatry), and finally reverted to the positive (quasi-religion). Although it is quite reasonable to evaluate nationalism with the principle of theonomy, it is not enough, since nationalism is also closely associated with identity and meaning for modern people. Therefore, Tillich’s concept of boundary into understanding nationalism would be fruitful in a sense that the boundary not only integrates his principle of theonomy but also responds well to the issues of identity and meaning related to nationalism. It will not only shed light on identity building in contemporary China but also provide insights for the peace and interaction among nations. The correlation between Tillich and Confucianism is also one of the ­focuses of this collection. Lao Jiayi’s essay, based on her doctoral thesis, addresses the complicated issue of religious nature of Confucianism among different Chinese Confucian scholars in the Chinese context and aims to review the issue from the perspective of Tillich’s thought. Through making references to Tillich’s understandings of “ultimate concern”, “quasi-religion,”

Introduction  5 inter-religious encounter, and the dynamics of faith, this essay addresses not only the theoretical issues concerning whether and in what sense Confucianism can be characterized as religion but also the dynamics and prospect of development of Confucianism. Kung Wai-han’s article, based on her current doctoral thesis, demonstrates the significant role of the concept of “person” in the inter-disciplinary dialogue between religion and science and attempts to engage Tillich’s theology in the contemporary science-religion dialogue from the perspective of Sino-Christian theology. Contemporary advances in science, especially in biology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology, point to the concept of emergence and advocate a multidimensional understanding of person. In Christian Theology, such non-reductive, non-dualist, multi-layered, and relational approach to human person was articulated by Paul Tillich, particularly in Systematic Theology Vol.3. This understanding of person is also compatible with the articulations of contemporary Confucian scholars. A fruitful trilogue between Christianity, Confucianism, and science may be established by introducing the emergent-multidimensional understanding of person. This is a commitment to pursuing the dialogue between science and religion in a global, religiously pluralistic, and interfaith context of Sino-Christian theology. Keith Ka-fu Chan argues for the reciprocity between human being and the nature in Paul Tillich’s thought and Confucianism, and this “anthropocosmic” understanding of the whole universe and humanity in these two lenses would have profound ecological implications within our environmental crisis. Tillich’s concept of multi-­ dimensional unity of life tries to blur the boundary between different life dimensions, in order to establish the uniqueness but not the superiority of human being. Confucianism’s idea of ideal humanity links different moral orders into oneself and humanity is regarded as the mediator between heaven and earth. These two perspectives strongly emphasize the ontological continuity of the nature and human and assert the center of human being within the whole universe. For the encounter of Tillich and Buddhism, Lai Pan-chiu’s paper compares the receptions of Paul Tillich in the Buddhist-Christian Studies in the West and the Sino-Christian Studies in China represented, respectively, by Masao Abe (1915–2006) and He Guanghu. It argues that when arguing for the distinctiveness and superiority of the Eastern or Buddhist position, ­especially the notion of Absolute Nothingness advocated by the Kyoto School, Abe’s response to Tillich, especially his ontological discourse on Being and non-being, falls into the trap of reverse Orientalism. In contrast, when articulating a global philosophy of religion, He Guanghu makes extensive reference to Tillich’s ontology to illustrate the commonalities among the various religious traditions rather than to highlight their differences. Based on this comparative study, this article concludes with a critical reflection on how Sino-Christian theology may respond to western Christian theological discourses. Second, Anthony Wang tries to compare Tillich’s idea of courage and Buddhist’s concept of Vīrya through the lens

6  Keith Ka-fu Chan of Thomas’ ethical concept of fortitudo (fortitude or courage). Wang argues that St. Thomas Aquinas’ ethics, fortitudo (fortitude or courage) as a cardinal virtue is usually considered as a product of the Christianized ancient idea of fortitude represented by Aristotle. Therefore, a paradigm shift from an ancient “military paradigm” of fortitude to the “martyrdom paradigm” St. Thomas’ theory is highlighted by some modern scholars. The result is a tension between the two paradigms. Paul Tillich, with his theory of courage and the insight of the martyrological sacrifice, combined with St. Thomas’ viewpoint, helps us to re-examine the significance of fortitude in a contemporary context. Furthermore, it is possible other Asian traditional faiths could provide a counterpart to the virtue of fortitude. Such an example may be found in the Buddhist virtue of Vīrya. The last two essays contributed by two Mainland China scholars are significant in a sense that both mention and reflect the neglected details of Tillich-reception in the Chinese academia. Thomas Qu addresses the fundamental problem in establishing Sino-Christian theology based on the documentary analysis of Tillich-Barth controversy in 1923 and offers us a precious opportunity to understand the basic approaches and fundamental differences in their later theological development. Based on the related letters and texts from and around this controversy, this article reconstructs its genesis and history and analyzes its key points, in order to show the basic differences in their theological standpoints and approaches. These differences result not only from their different confessional backgrounds, their different metaphysical understanding, and their concrete methodologies and research approaches, but also, more importantly, from their different understanding and definition of Christian theological subject matter and especially Christology. Also, Yang Junjie’s article provides a substantial analysis on Chinese theologian T.C. Chao’s reception of Paul Tillich in his own theological journey. Yang’s analysis is vital in a sense that we should reexamine whether or in what sense Chao’s theology was influenced by Karl Barth, and re-consider the continuity between Chao’s theology and Tillich’s thought.

Notes 1 For the Chinese translation of Paul Tillich’s work, Junjie Yang’s article has a very comprehensive picture. For the German version, see Junjie Yang, “Paul Tillich und China: Ein noch zu erwartender Dialog,” in Jesus of Nazareth and the New Being in History. International Yearbook for Tillich Research. Vol.6 ­(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), 221–235. For the Chinese version, see Junjie Yang, “Paul Tillich and China: A Dialogue worth Awaiting,” Logos and Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology Vol.38 (2013), 135–151. 2 Shu-hsien Liu, “A Critique of Paul Tillich’s Doctrine of God and Christology from an Oriental Perspective,” in Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogue, eds. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 511–532.

Introduction  7 3 Du-yol, Choi, “Transcendence and Immanence in Paul Tillich’s Theology and Chu Hsi’s Neo-Confucian Philosophy,” Drew University, PhD dissertation, 2000. UMI. 4 Kin-ming, AU, Paul Tillich and Chu Hsi: A Comparison of Their Views of Human Condition (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). 5 David Chai, “Paul Tillich, Zhuangzi, and the creational role of Nonbeing,” Philosophy East and West, Vol.69 (No.2) (April 2019), 337–356. 6 Keith ka-fu Chan & William Ng Yau-nang. Eds. Paul Tillich and Asian Religions (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017). 7 Andrew Hung, “Paul Tillich and Classical Confucianism on Religious Ethics,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yaunang. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 175–197. 8 Lauren Pfister, “Paul Tillich and Zhāng Zài: Fellow Pilgrims Seeking New Peace in Trembling Worlds,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 199–220. 9 Keith Chan, “Pneumatological Sacramentality and Cosmic Humanity: Tillich, Orthodox Theology and Confucianism,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 221–238. 10 Anthony, Wang Tao, “A Comparative Study of St. Thomas Aquinas’ and Paul Tillich’s Idea of love: Integration with the Chinese Confucian Idea of love,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yaunang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 137–174. 11 Pan-chiu Lai, “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 47–68. 12 Kin-ming Au, “Ultimate Reality: A Comparative Study of Kitaro Nishida’s concept of Nothingness and Paul Tillich’s concept of God,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 69–86. 13 Ellen Zhang, “When the Ground of Being Encounters Emptiness: Tillich and Buddhism,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 87–108. 14 William Ng, “Tillich, Lotus-birth and Asian Religions: A Comparative Study of Lotus-birth as a Religious Symbol,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, eds. Keith ka-fu Chan and William Ng Yau-nang (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 109–136.

1 Being and Non-Being Paul Tillich, Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, and Sino-Christian Theology1 Lai Pan-chiu 1 Introduction The problem of religious diversity, particularly in the Buddhist-Christian encounter, is an important area for the study of Paul Tillich (1886–1965).2 As we are going to see, Tillich’s significance for the dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity is recognized by Masao Abe (阿部正雄, 1915–2006), who responded to Tillich’s view from time to time and made tremendous contributions to the development of Buddhist-Christian dialogue. This chapter explores the problem of being and non-being from the vantage point of Abe’s response to Tillich and introduces an alternative response to Tillich by drawing on the Sino-Christian theologian He Guanghu (何光滬). It then goes on to compare critically these two responses and to explore the implications of this comparative study for Sino-Christian theology. Strictly speaking, this chapter focuses not on Tillich’s thought as such, but on the responses to it.

2  Paul Tillich and Religious Diversity Western scholars generally prefer the theology of religions over inter-­ religious dialogue or comparative theology as their approach when studying Tillich’s view on religious diversity.3 Those who adopt the latter approach take Buddhism as their principal object of comparative study or dialogue partner, though they have also included other religions.4 Thus far, the study of Tillich’s influence on participants of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue is still in an elementary stage in the West, and Abe is seldom mentioned.5 In contrast, Chinese academia favors comparison and dialogue over specialized studies of Tillich’s theology of religions.6 For instance, Liu Shuhsien (劉述先) has compared Tillich and Confucianism long ago.7 Besides, Lai Pan-chiu (賴品超) has compared Tillich’s view of the Kingdom of Heaven and the Buddhist view of the Pure Land.8 He has also discussed the significance of Buddhism for the reflection of the Christian concept of God.9 Furthermore, Au Kin-ming (區建銘) has compared Tillich and Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200)10 and investigated the contribution of Tillich’s concept of

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-2

Being and Non-Being  9 11

ultimate concern to comparative theology. It is worth mentioning that in addition to these comparisons or dialogues between Christianity and Buddhism or Confucianism, Liu Xiaogan (劉笑敢) has roughly compared Tillich with Daoism, especially Laozi.12 In addition to these, a Korean scholar has cited Laozi and Wang Bi’s (王弼, 226–249) commentaries multiple times in his comparison of Tillich and Karl Barth (1886–1968) on nothingness.13 As for the comparison of Tillich and the Kyoto School, although Shin’ichi Hisamatsu’s (久松真一, 1889–1980) dialogue with Tillich has been translated into Chinese,14 there is no in-depth comparative study of the two from Chinese perspective. Interestingly, some Chinese scholars have compared Tillich with Zen Buddhism and even Kitarō Nishida (西田幾多郎, 1870–1945) or Abe of the Kyoto School, but their works were written in English.15 In sum, although there is no lack of treaties on the comparison between Tillich and the Kyoto School,16 the studies concerning the connection between Tillich and Abe remain rather few.17

3  Paul Tillich and Masao Abe A cursory glance at several English treatises by Masao Abe may reveal that Tillich is likely to be Abe’s most discussed Christian theologian. In his Zen and Western Thought, only three Western thinkers appear in the table of contents: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861– 1947), and Tillich. Among them, only Tillich was primarily a professional theologian, and Abe’s responses to Tillich are focused on his view on the encounter of world religions.18 In addition to deliberating over the content of some specific doctrines, Abe was basically in favor of Tillich’s overall approach to the encounter of religions, including its considering the encounter in a broader context of human civilization and covering various quasi-­ religions. What Abe dissented was his preference to the term “anti-religion” instead of “quasi-religion,” but he admitted that there were many overlaps between the two terms. He wanted to use the term “anti-religion” to underscore that although some of these “quasi-religions” or “isms” have certain religious characteristics, they are actually anti-religious—referring particularly to nihilism, scientism, and communism.19 In his discussion of the encounters between religions and these anti-religions, Abe quotes Tillich in multiple places. For instance, As Tillich points out, it is notable that “prophetic” religions such as ­Judaism, Christianity, and especially Islam, for the most part resisted and are resisting the invasion of Communism in the West while such Eastern “mystical” religions as Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism allow the invasion of Communism in a great part of the Orient without displaying sufficient resistance. The encounter of religion with Communism is unquestionably an important problem of today. The Communist infiltration of China and other parts of the East is no doubt partly due to the

10  Lai Pan-chiu corruption of the various Oriental religions, especially Buddhism with its “just because of” nature.20 It is apparent that Abe basically agrees with Tillich’s approach to inter-­ religious encounter or dialogue. Their disagreements are mainly on the fine details and some terminological issues. Abe not only affirmed Tillich’s contribution to inter-religious dialogue— especially the Buddhist-Christian dialogue but also often referred to Tillich’s position as a first resort in Abe’s discussion of Christian theology.21 A chapter in Zen and Comparative Studies that featured Tillich as the primary partner of comparison was an example.22 More importantly, in a chapter in Zen and Western Thought that focused on the concepts of non-being and Mu (無), Abe took the related discourse of Tillich as his vantage point.23 This question concerned not only Tillich’s fundamental theological position but also the core ideas of Abe and the Kyoto School. In fact, Tillich’s first lecture in Japan was about the philosophical underpinning of his theology, in which he began by addressing the question of being and non-being in ancient Greek philosophy.24 Abe’s Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue consists of three main parts. The second part of the book was titled “Buddhism in Dialogue with Tillich’s Theology,” demonstrating Tillich’s significance for Abe. Abe even directly expressed his admiration of Tillich in the book. Abe suggested that Tillich’s death was a great loss not only to Christianity but also to Buddhism, for Tillich was not only a great Christian thinker but also “an irreplaceable dialogist.”25 In the preface to the book, Abe stated that among the theologians he had got in touch, Tillich was one of the most challenging and influential figures. What Abe appreciated most was Tillich’s interpretation of God in terms of “being” with its counterpart “non-being.” However, Abe’s central criticism of Tillich also lay in his doctrine of God, namely, the double negation that contained an asymmetrical polarity. Tillich’s view was in square opposition to Abe’s idea of a symmetrical polarity, which was grounded on absolute Nothingness that went beyond the relative being and the relative non-being. Abe believed that only this double negation that was grounded on absolute Nothingness could represent the ultimate reality as emptiness. Abe even posed his challenge in these words: “I sincerely hope some theologian will respond to this remark on behalf of Paul Tillich.”26

4  Being, Non-Being, and Absolute Mu For Abe, Tillich’s basic position was that “being” took ontological precedence over “non-being,” just as the word “non-being” had presumed the concept of “being,” and “Being” embraces itself as well as “non-being.” This was not merely an ontology but was linked to the view of life and death, good, and evil. Life took precedence over death, and goodness took precedence over evil. In the same vein, “Being” with a capital “B”— the eternal

Being and Non-Being  11 life—transcended the opposition between “being” and “non-being.” This is the general tendency of Western thought or culture.27 As for Eastern thought, apart from Confucianism, which is closer to Western humanism, Buddhism and Daoism tend to take nothingness as the ultimate. For example, the Daoist “being born of non-being” (you sheng yuwu 有生於無) and the Buddhist “non-self” (anattā) are something not found in the Western intellectual tradition. Perhaps the most important notion is the Emptiness (Śūnyatā) of the Mādhyamaka tradition of Buddhism, which contains a dialectical or dynamic structure. It denies both the “eternalist” view and the “nihilistic” view and even negates negation. Therefore, this is not a relative negation, but an absolute one. However, this absolute negation is at the same time an absolute affirmation. Because of this dialectical structure, Emptiness is also Fullness.28 In other words, “true Emptiness is wondrous Being, absolute U (有).” This can also be called “the fullness and suchness of everything” (tathātā), which is the ultimate Reality that goes beyond being (u) and non-being (mu) and lets both of them “stand and work just as they are in their reciprocal relationship.” According to the Mādhyamaka tradition, “being” and “non-being” are equal, relative, complementary, and reciprocal. “Being” takes no precedence over “non-being.” That which is beyond “being” and “non-being” is not “Being” in a capital B but the “Emptiness,” that is, Mu in a capital M or absolute Mu.29 In Abe’s own words, “True Emptiness and wondrous Being are completely non-dualistic: absolute Mu and ultimate Reality are totally identical, although the realization of the former is indispensable for the realization of the latter.”30 He further clarifies, … the Buddhist idea of wonderous Being is clearly different from the idea of ‘Being’ understood as ultimate Reality in the West. In the West, ‘Being’ is neither non-dualistic (unlike absolute Nothingness) nor realized through the realization of Emptiness. It is not considered being beyond the antinomy of being and non-being but rather gains its ultimate status by virtue of its being ontologically prior to non-being.31 Abe argued that in Western thought, only the negative theology found in Christian mysticism and the non-Christian philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) were closer to the Buddhist understanding of ultimate Reality.32 It is rather well known that Abe had interpreted the Christian doctrine of God, particularly God’s kenosis and the Trinity, through the lens of the Emptiness of Mahayana Buddhism or Absolute Mu of the Kyoto School.33 However, as shown in the previous quotes, Abe had also employed expressions like “absolute U” when elaborating on his own view. Furthermore, when Hans Küng (1928–2021) inquired about the content of the ultimate Reality for Buddhism, Abe answered that for the Mādhyamaka tradition represented by Nāgārjuna (c.150–c.250), the ultimate Reality was Emptiness,

12  Lai Pan-chiu which was also perfection; as for Christianity, the ultimate Reality was the dynamic unity of kenosis and pleroma.34 When Abe pondered on how the kenotic God could overcome Nietzsche’s nihilism, he pointed out that the  kenotic God sacrificed God-self not for relative Nothingness but for ­absolute Nothingness, which is at the same time the absolute Being.35 A question that needs to be asked is whether Abe’s “absolute Nothingness” and “absolute Being” are simply two different terms for the same reference. If this is the case, why did Abe, in his critique of Tillich, claim that Tillich’s “Being” or “Being-Itself” (in a capital B) had to be asymmetrical and favor the side of being? Why, then, was Abe’s own “absolute Nothingness” symmetrical? Would this be a case of double standard that one may steal a horse while another may not look over the hedge? Langdon Gilkey (1919–2004) argued that Tillich had insisted on maintaining a dialectical polarity between being and non-being. This view affirmed neither absolute Being nor absolute Nothingness and was thus different from the Kyoto School, which favored absolute Nothingness.36 In response, Abe insisted that Tillich had affirmed the polarity between being and non-being but not their symmetry; instead, Tillich favored the side of being and was thus still different from the Emptiness of Mahayana Buddhism.37 In response to the question of the difference between God and Emptiness, Abe further mentioned that God was a third party beyond being and non-being in Tillich’s thought.38 Abe’s comment is highly problematic. If God is Being-Itself, which embraces both being and non-being, why then is God a third party beyond being and non-being? In fact, many Tillich scholars believe that Tillich’s treatise on Being-Itself goes beyond the binary opposition between being and non-being.39 Tillich’s case may support John Macquarrie’s (1919–2007) view that there is a long-standing dialectical view of God in Western thought, in which God can be thought of as both being and non-being.40 This dialectical view seems to assume that the realization of being should be indispensable for the realization of non-being and vice versa. Viewed in this perspective, Abe might have underestimated the Western theological and philosophical tradition of a symmetrical non-­dualistic view of God. Furthermore, Abe’s affirmation that the realization of the absolute Mu is indispensable for the realization of the absolute Being without the counter affirmation of the reverse may sound relatively asymmetrical and less dialectical or balanced. It is important to note that Tillich’s discussion concerning God as ­Being-Itself in the first volume of his Systematic Theology refers to God the Father only. Central to Tillich’s doctrine of God as a whole is his interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, which aims to describe the dynamic and dialectical process of the divine life. This process of “identity–­separation– union” achieved the perfection of the divine life through self-denial was, to a certain extent, a view inspired by F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854).41 In this sense, the true ultimate Reality is the one at the end of the dialectical process, not that in the beginning. Contrary to Abe’s critique of Christian

Being and Non-Being  13 theology, this ultimate Reality does not simply acquire its ultimacy through the ontological priority of being over non-being but through a dynamic ­union with finitude and even non-being. Furthermore, Tillich’s trinitarian understanding of God may raise a further question about whether the Triune God of Christianity can be reduced to the God of Being associated with the Western philosophical tradition. Perhaps the most important problem with Abe’s response to Tillich concerned more than Tillich’s thought as such. On the one hand, Abe’s discussion of being and non-being was complicated and ambiguous and was thus subjected to scrutiny to see whether his criticism of Tillich and Western thought was fair. On the other hand, it is more important to ask whether Abe had properly articulated the Buddhist position in his response to Tillich. Abe contended that “absolute Nothingness” was just another name for “Emptiness.”42 However, according to the Mādhyamaka (meaning literally Middle Path) tradition, there is an important distinction between “Emptiness” (空) and “Nothingness” (無). “Emptiness” should be identified with neither “being” nor “nothingness,” and yet it can be interpreted as “both being and nothingness” in a paradoxical or complementary way.43 To adhere to this middle path strictly, one should lean toward neither being nor nothingness. Furthermore, neither “absolute Being” alone nor “absolute Nothingness” alone should be regarded as adequate for the ultimate “Emptiness.” Regarding Abe’s assertion that “absolute Nothingness” transcends relative nothingness and relative being, one may query: why did Abe employ the concept of “absolute Nothingness” instead of “absolute Emptiness”? The latter concept may better accentuate the spirit of the Mādhyamaka, which should adhere to the middle path and lean toward neither sides or extremes—neither being nor nothingness—in relative or absolute sense.

5  He Guanghu’s Response to Paul Tillich Unlike Abe, He Guanghu, who is also from East Asia, exhibits a rather different approach to Tillich on the same issue. Besides editing and translating an anthology of Tillich’s writings with a preface,44 He Guanghu has also written many articles discussing Tillich’s thought.45 In these articles, He translated Tillich’s “ultimate concern” into Chinese as zhongjiguanqie (終極關切) rather than the more common term zhongjiguanhuai (終極關 懷). He also carefully explicated that Tillich’s “ultimate concern” covers both the subjective aspect (as a state of unconditional concern) and the objective aspect (as the object of unconditional concern). Viewed in this perspective, “care” (guanhuai) cannot properly cover the object aspect of “concern” (guanqie). He’s translation and explication not only evaded a purely subjective interpretation of the ultimate concern but also betrayed a criticism of the idolatry of non-ultimate things, especially nationality and ethnicity.46 Moreover, He attached great importance to Tillich’s concept of God as Being-Itself.47 These concepts are very important for He to

14  Lai Pan-chiu develop his own ideas. For example, in discussing the issue of religious pluralism, he quoted Tillich—especially his view of the ­Ultimate—­explicitly or implicitly.48 It is particularly worth mentioning that in addition to articulating his idea of God as Being-Itself, when proposing his rationale of Sino-Christian theology,49 He Guanghu clearly favored Tillich’s theological approach over Barth’s when considering the method of Sino-Christian theology.50 This forms an understanding of Sino-Christian theology that differs completely from Liu Xiaofeng’s Barthian approach and thus avoids reducing Sino-Christian theology to Liu’s or similar theological approaches.51 In his book All Rivers Return to the Ocean (BaichuanGuihai), especially the chapter titled “The Ontology of Global Philosophy of Religion,” He Guanghu displayed not only his inspiration from Tillich but also his completely different response from Abe. Immediately after giving a basic definition to ontology, He Guanghu proposes, It is generally believed that the ontology of the Western religions takes some kinds of reality as the source of the world. In contrast, that of the Eastern religions is regards emptiness as the source of the world. … However, if we look into the matter more comprehensively and deeply, we will find that this kind of statement is indeed an oversimplification.52 Later on, the article cited various religious classics and argued that “although the terms employed by the philosophy of world’s major religions are widely divergent, the source of the world in all their accounts possess the attributes of highest reality, existence, and certainty.”53 He Guanghu contended that besides employing the affirmative expressions of “reality-­beingaffirmation” (shiyoushi 實有是), many religions also make use of the negative expressions of “emptiness-nothingness-negation” (kongwufei 空無非) to talk about the source of the world.54 He referred to Tillich a number of times in this chapter.55 Particularly, He took Tillich as an example to illustrate that even in the Western or Christian tradition, there are those who believe that all that is in the world and the world itself contained certain aspects of “non-being” or nothingness. In other words, for He Guanghu, Tillich was a good example to illustrate that the Western religious tradition also affirmed some sorts of “emptiness-nothingness-negation.” Therefore, one could not simplistically generalize the Eastern and the Western philosophy of religion in terms of the duality between “emptiness-nothingness-negation” and “reality-being-affirmation.” He Guanghu did not mention Abe in his book, but they obviously had completely divergent positions. Perhaps the most decisive difference did not lie in their different interpretations of Tillich’s thought but in how they interpreted the Eastern religious and philosophical traditions. Apparently, unlike Abe’s favorite of Daoism and Buddhism over Confucianism, He Guanghu considered all three traditions more squarely and even incorporated the

Being and Non-Being  15 tradition commonly known as Hinduism. Regarding Daoism, He Guanghu did not emphasize its “nothingness” one-sidedly but followed Fang Litian’s (方立天, 1933–2014) interpretation, which was inspired by Wang Bi, suggesting that “nothingness” actually referred to “the immateriality and the absolute without any relative stipulations.” It was “not the ‘nothingness’ of being and nothing in an ordinary sense” but “was the ontological ‘Dao’ on which all that is subsists.”56 Therefore, even Daoism talked a lot about “being born of non-being”; and it did not one-sidedly favor “emptiness-nothingness-­ negation” over “reality-being-affirmation.” As for Buddhism, He Guanghu also suggested that although it talked about “emptiness-nothingness,” this so-called “emptiness” did not refer to nothingness in an absolute or ultimate sense. Furthermore, Buddhism talked more about “true suchness” (真 如), “real form” (實相), and “negating negation” (非非). He Guanghu further suggested that Huineng’s (惠能, 638–713) “pure Dharmakaya” in the Platform Sutra “was the source of the world or the basis for Buddhahood and thus not absolute nothingness.”57 The difference between He Guanghu and Abe in their interpretations of Buddhism is somehow reminiscent of the two different versions of Huineng’s verse in the Platform Sutra. One was the Fahai (法海) text, which said: Bodhi originally has no tree, The mirror also has no stand. Buddha nature is always clean and pure; Where is there room for dust? An alternative read: The mind is the Bodhi tree, The body is the mirror stand. The mirror is originally clean and pure; Where can it be stained by dust? The other version can be found in the Huixin (惠昕), the Qisong (契嵩), and the Zongbao (宗寶) texts, which said: Bodhi originally has no tree. The bright mirror also has no stand. Fundamentally there is not a single thing. Where could dust arise?58 Abe’s emphasis on absolute Nothingness was closer to the latter version, which accentuated “emptiness-nothingness.” In contrast, He Guanghu’s interpretation was closer to the former version, which could more accurately represent the doctrine of Buddha-nature emphasized by the Tathāgatagarbha school of Mahayana Buddhism. It is arguable that the latter can

16  Lai Pan-chiu better maintain a balance between “emptiness-nothingness-negation” and “reality-being-affirmation.” Both Abe and He Guanghu were indebted to Tillich, but they could be said to be two divergent responses to him. The most fundamental point of this divergence was that for He Guanghu, Tillich’s exposition of being and non-being coincided with He’s own global philosophy of religion that aims to seek common ground among religions. In his own words, “any return to the source of religious thought shad to aim to seek the commonalities.”59 On the other hand, Abe’s response to Tillich emphasized the divergence among the religious traditions. By responding to Tillich, Abe attempted to underscore the differences between Eastern and Western philosophies of religion and even to exalt the superiority of Kyoto School, Buddhism, and the Eastern religious philosophy. One may query, from a Tillichian perspective, He Guanghu’s assumption that a global philosophy of religion requires a universal ontology shared by different religions and it takes the articulation of such an ontology as its research purpose.60 Although He Guanghu’s global philosophy of religion was arguably an important achievement of Chinese academia, as we are going to see later, whether and in what sense it could be reckoned an adorable attempt of Sino-Christian theology remains debatable. As for Abe’s response to Tillich, while it was seemingly a Japanese Buddhist’s response to a Western theologian and had little to do with Sino-Christian theology, it involves some topics that are highly relevant to Sino-Christian theology.

6  Reverse Orientalism In his response to Tillich, Abe seemed to emphasize his divergence from Tillich and the superiority of the Eastern or the Buddhist points of view deliberately. This not only reinforced or even exaggerated the so-called differences between Eastern and Western ideas but also ignored their internal discrepancies. Even more seriously, it might sometimes distort certain Eastern ideas. For example, Abe argued that the problem of negativity was not only an ontological question but also an existential and soteriological question, for it concerned the understanding of human life. In this regard, he claimed that the difference between the East and the West was apparent. Inasmuch as the West assumed the priority of positivity over negativity, it led to an optimistic view of human life. In contrast, inasmuch as Buddhism attached equal importance to positivity and negativity, it brought about a seemingly pessimistic but substantially realistic understanding of human nature.61 Unfortunately, this macroscopic contrast between the Eastern and the Western thought can hardly convince Western theologians. The Chinese intellectuals, particularly the Confucians, may also find it unconvincing. Some contemporary New Confucians may even argue the other way round. For the New Confucians, whereas Christianity considers human nature to be evil and adopts a pessimistic view of human life, Confucianism regards

Being and Non-Being  17 human nature as good and echoes the Buddhist optimistic affirmation of human life that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and thus the potential for Buddhahood.62 In addition, when Abe highlighted the distinctions between Tillich and him, in many cases these distinctions seemed to be merely terminological and unnecessary. This sort of neologism coined with new definitions and meanings sometimes might look like a worthless sequel to a masterpiece. For example, Abe’s substitution of “anti-religion” for Tillich’s “quasi-­religion” in describing communism was not necessarily better than the original idea. In fact, the anti-religious tendency of communism was more than obvious. Hence, Abe’s description of it in terms of “anti-religion” was nothing more than stating the obvious. On the contrary, Tillich’s “quasi-religion” could perceptively unveil the “(quasi-)religious” nature of communism in the disguise of “anti-religion” and better explain the appropriateness of applying the model of the encounter of world religions in the encounter between Christianity and communism. In other words, Christianity and communism do not necessarily conflict with each other as implied by the term “anti-religion”; instead, what Tillich called a dialectical union of rejection and acceptance can take place not only in the Christian encounter with world religions as well as Communism.63 This relatively positive attitude toward communism is perhaps an important inspiration for Tillich’s theology to Sino-Christian theology.64 Christopher Ives, who has followed Abe in practicing Zen and devotes himself to studying and promoting the dialogue between Abe and Western theology, commented that Abe had great contribution to interreligious dialogue, including his discussion about negation in Tillich’s theology and the contrast between Tillich’s concept of non-being and the Buddhist concept of “emptiness.” However, Abe’s comparative statements sometimes succumbed to a reverse Orientalism, or he might have presented Christian or Jewish thought in an outdated approach.65 Perhaps it is necessary to explain the term “Orientalism” here. It originally referred to the academic study of the “East” or “Orient” prevailing in the modern West. However, it was not only a kind of research or learning but also an academic structure or institution with a certain kind of power relation and ideology. By interpreting some ancient texts, it reconstructed the image of the “East” and formed a simplified dichotomy with the image of the “West.” This might then highlight the superiority of the Western culture and eventually reinforced the colonial mentality and power of the West. The early study and discussion of Buddhism in Western academia was indeed full of this Orientalist tone, though there were later a few exceptions.66 Accordingly, reverse Orientalism can be understood as a reverse attempt to prove the superiority of Eastern civilization with similar strategies. As Bernard Faure has pointed out in his critical review and analysis, the Western interpretation of Zen Buddhism was obviously Orientalist. Later, the Kyoto School also adopted a similar approach in their representation of

18  Lai Pan-chiu Zen Buddhism and became a kind of reverse Orientalism. For example, aiming to exalt the superiority of the Eastern culture, D. T. Suzuki (鈴木 大拙, 1870–1966) had made extensive use of the conceptual categories of 19th-century Orientalism in his search for a pure and essential Zen or Buddhism. In a similar vein, Kitaro Nishida (西田幾多郎, 1870–1945) had also borrowed the Zen concept of “Mu.” Translating it as “nothingness” in English, he equated it with the Christian mystic concept of “Nichts” and further entangled the Zen concept of “U” (有) with the Western concept of “Being.” Then, by contrasting the Eastern concept of Mu with the Western concept of Being, Nishida randomly picked some Zen literature and some works of Christian mysticism to undertake a so-called East–West “dialogue.” Apart from falling prey to the fallacy of Orientalism, this had also betrayed Nishida’s nationalism hidden in his approach.67 Lai Shen-chon also contended that Nishida tended to put the Eastern and the Western cultures into a binary opposition, which identified the former with emptiness and the latter with being and criticized Western realism on this basis. This critique often overemphasized the “signless” (無相, animitta) aspect of Buddhism and neglected its positive aspect embodied in the doctrine of Buddha-nature, etc.68 From this perspective, although Abe’s reverse Orientalism is concretely reflected in his response to Tillich, it is not unique to Abe. Instead, it revealed a fundamental propensity deeply ingrained in the Kyoto School. Perhaps Sino-Christian theology also needs to beware of this propensity.

7  A Lesson for Sino-Christian Theology Ostensibly, although both He Guanghu and Abe are from East Asia; the former has a stronger Christian background and is primarily oriented to Chinese academia, whereas the latter mainly held a Buddhist standpoint and was oriented to the Western community of religious studies dominated by Christianity. Their personal religious backgrounds seemed to be the major factor leading to their divergent responses to Tillich. It is worth noting that under the inspiration of postcolonial ideas some Asian theologians have resisted the Orientalism associated with Western theology, but this kind of resistance has become a new Orientalism from time to time.69 This kind of reverse Orientalist interpretation of Western theology does not necessarily emerge from religious identity. National identity can also be a prominent cause. In fact, there was a similar reverse Orientalism in the Chinese theological circle. For example, Liang Yancheng (梁燕城, a.k.a. Thomas In-sing Leung) proposed a project of “de-Hellenization” 30 years ago, aiming to remove Christian theology’s Hellenistic coat or shell and then to integrate it into the Chinese culture. The outcome would be an indigenous theology that accords with the Chinese traditional culture.70 After years of repeated arguments, this kind of discourse resurfaced in a more recent postcolonial account. It argued that the concepts of “Being” and “Logos” had predominated Hellenistic philosophy. This was different from the Chinese culture,

Being and Non-Being  19 in which relationship was the predominant notion. Accordingly, Chinese theology should employ the strategy of “Hellenization” and adopt a Chinese relational ontology as the foundation for theological construction.71 In fact, Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930) had put forward the argument of “de-Hellenization” long ago, though his focus and purpose were different from Liang. It is noteworthy that Tillich had criticized Harnack for his spartiality and reductionism, particularly his elimination of all the whys and the wherefores of Hellenization and his disregard for its necessity.72 In addition, the historian of Christian doctrine Jaroslav Pelikan (1923–2006) had criticized Harnack for his disregard for the Orthodox tradition, which inherited the theological tradition of the Greek fathers. At the same time, Pelikan had also illustrated the positive meaning of Hellenization for the historical development of theology.73 As I have argued elsewhere, the theological tradition of the Orthodox Churches, which were greatly indebted to the thought of the Greek fathers, intersects with the Chinese culture in many places.74 In view of these positive assessments of Hellenization, one may find some of the positions associated with reverse Orientalism discussed above academically problematic, including the macroscopic dichotomy or hierarchical value judgment between “Chinese-Western” or “East-West” cultures; a total rejection of the entire Western theological tradition disregarding all kinds of differences and divergences within Christianity; and insisting on the irrelevance of Western theology to the construction of Chinese or ­Sino-Christian theology. Basically, the emergence of Sino-Christian theology was closely connected to the rise of “cultural fever” in China during the 20th century. Many intellectuals taking part in it had a fervent love or admiration for Western Christian theology. In fact, up to the present, many theological treatises published in Chinese were based on certain Western theological discourses. Some works were simply the translation, introduction, or annotation of some Western theological works. Given that Sino-Christian theology was in its initial stage, the heavy reliance on Western theology was understandable. However, it should not be the case for the long run. De-Hellenization seemed to be an easy way out of those terms or jargons of Western theology. Nonetheless, as a working hypothesis, this might probably reinforce the chasm between Chinese and Western theology and could not help Sino-Christian theology communicate and cooperate with other theologies in the context of globalization. On the contrary, if we assume that Sino-Christian theology can enter into an open and equal dialogue with theologies in other contexts and learn from mutual critique, it may be more beneficial to its long-term development.75 Taking the problem of “being” discussed in this essay as an example, the Kyoto School’s critique of the Western thought, especially its being dominated by the concept of “being,” was arguably an echo of Heidegger’s critique of the Western philosophical tradition.76 In his critique of Onto-theology, Heidegger argued that the Western way of thinking often

20  Lai Pan-chiu attempted to answer the question of “being” in terms of God. This involved an identification, or reduction, of God with “Being.” How to overcome this Onto-theology had then become a hot topic in contemporary Western theology.77 On the one hand, Jean-Luc Marion, who is from a Roman Catholic background, proposed a “God without Being” or an understanding of God without the concept of “being”;78 on the other hand, the Greek Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas proposed an ontology of personhood by re-­interpreting the writings of the Greek fathers. Apart from his assertion that “personhood” was more fundamental than “being,” Zizioulas’ proposal also affirmed the importance of relationships and communion to personhood.79 Some Protestant theologians have also proposed a Trinitarian theo-ontology, which placed great emphasis on the relationality of the persons.80 Basically, all these approaches attempt to bypass or replace “being” as a fundamental theological category. Comparatively, Tillich’s approach may be closer to the Mahayana Buddhist view of language, which is based on the doctrine of skillful means (upāya). In accordance with this doctrine, the practical use of the concept of “being” should be allowed in spite of its limitation, and the use of “being” does not exclude the use of the opposite concept of “non-being.” For Tillich, the Biblical religion is dominated by the “personalistic” expressions about God rather than the concept of “being,” but the concept of “person” does not exclude the concept of “being.” In this sense, the Biblical religion is simultaneously a negation and an affirmation of ontology.81 As for Sino-Christian theology, since the Chinese language, unlike the Indo-European languages, does not emphasize on the role of verb to be in its grammar and structure, and since the Chinese religious and philosophical traditions have rich resources of “emptiness-nothingness-­ negation,” Sino-Christian theology may consider making use of its cultural resources and entering into dialogue with Western theology on how to cope with the problem of Onto-theology.

Notes 1 This essay is translated from a Chinese article published in Daofeng 道風 [Logos & Pneuma] 43 (2015.07), 29–50. The author would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Bryan Mok, Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Religious Ethics and Chinese Culture, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, for preparing this English translation. The author added some minor modifications and should be responsible to the mistakes remain. 2 For example, the Tillich Research (Tillich-Forschung) in Germany has put it as the topic of their annual report. See Christian Danz, Werner Schlüssler, and Erdmann Sturm, eds., Internationales Jahrbuch für die Tillich-Forschung Band 5/2009: Religionstheologie und intereligiöser Dialog (Münster: LIT, 2010). 3 For example, Robison B. James, Tillich and the World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2003). This book, which mainly focuses on theology of religions, only mentions Buddhism briefly (pp. 133–135) in Chapter 8, “Is the Christian Message the Only Universal One?” (pp. 127–140). In Chapter 9, “Is Ultimate Reality Personal? Adding Buber to

Being and Non-Being  21 Tillich” (pp. 141–158), it has not even mentioned the fact that Tillich himself has also discussed the Buddhist challenge to the concept of “personal.” 4 For example, John J. Thatamanil, The Immanent Divine: God, Creation, and the Human Predicament (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006). This book mainly compares Tillich with Sankara (c. 788–820). 5 Related studies include Jeffrey Small, God as the Ground of Being: Tillich and Buddhism in Dialogue – The Impact of Paul Tillich’s Theology on a Christian-­ Buddhist Dialogue (Köln: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009). However, this book rarely discusses Masao Abe. In addition, there are articles that compare the views on the ultimate of Tillich, Barth, Abe, and Keiji Nishitani (1900–1990) with some discussion about being and non-being. See Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone, Dialogues of Paul Tillich (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002), 35–46. 6 Lai Pan-chiu 賴品超, Kaifangyuweishen: Tainlike de shenxueyuzongjiaoduihua 開放與委身：田立克的神學與宗教對話 [Openness and commitment: Paul Tillich’s theology and inter-religious dialogue] (Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 2000). It is actually a revised and expanded Chinese translation of Lai Pan-chiu, Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Thought (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1994). 7 Liu Shu-hsien, “A Critique of Paul Tillich’s Doctrine of God and Christology from an Oriental Perspective,” in Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 511–532. 8 Lai Pan-chiu 賴品超, DachengJidujiaoshenxue: Hanyushenxue de sixiangshiyan 大乘基督教神學：漢語神學的思想實驗 [Mahayana Christian theology: thought experiments of Sino-Christian theology] (Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2011), 223–252. A revised English version of this chapter is published as: Lai Pan-chiu, “Kingdom of God in Tillich and Pure Land in Mahayana Buddhism,” in: Internationales Jahrbuch für dieTillich- ForschungBand 5/2009, ed. Christian Danz, Werner Schlüssler and Erdmann Sturm (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010), 151–172. 9 Lai Pan-chiu 賴品超, “Cong FojiaofansiJiduzongjiaoShangdi guan: qudaoBaoluoDilixi de ‘zhongjiguanqi’” 從佛教反思基督宗教上帝觀：取道保羅．蒂利希 的「終極關切」 [A reflection on the Christian view of God from Buddhism: Paul Tillich’s “ultimate concern” as the path], Fu Jen Religious Studies 26 (Spring 2013): 91–119. A revised English version of this article is published as: Lai Panchiu, “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, ed. Ka-fu Keith Chan and Yau-nang William Ng (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017), 47–67. 10 Au Kin-ming, Paul Tillich and Chu Hsi: A Comparison of Their Views of Human Condition (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). 11 Au Kin-ming 區建銘, Dilixi de “zhongjiguanhuai” linan dui bijiaoshenxue de gongxian 蒂利希的「終極關懷」理念對比較神學的貢獻 [The contribution of Tillich’s concept of “ultimate concern” to comparative theology], in DilixiyuHanyushenxue 蒂利希與漢語神學 [Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian theology], ed. Keith Ka-fu Chan (Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2006), 373–386. 12 Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢, “Laozi zhi dao: chao yue bing jian rong zong jiao yu ke xue” 老子之道：超越並兼融宗教與科學 [The way of Laozi: transcending and incorporating religion and science], in Tianrenzhi ji yurenqinzhibian: bijiaoyudaoyuan de guandian 天人之際與人禽之辨：比較與多元的觀點[Transcendence and immanence: comparative and multi-dimensional perspectives], ed. Charles Wing-hoi Chan (Hong Kong: New Asia College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001), 17–36, esp. 26–30. 13 JeongSung Min, Nothingness in the Theology of Paul Tillich and Karl Barth (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 7, 8, 47, 51, 57, 122, 126, 128.

22  Lai Pan-chiu 14 Ng Yu-kwan 吳汝鈞, “Dongfang yu Xifang de dui hua: Bao luo Tian like yu Jiu song Zhenyi hui tan” 東方與西方的對話：保羅田立克與久松真一會談 [Dialogue between East and West: The colloquy between Paul Tillich’s and Shin’ichi Hisamatsu], in Jingdu Xuepai zhexue: Jiusong Zhenyi 京都學派哲學：久松真一 [The philosophy of the Kyoto School: Shin’ichi Hisamatsu] (Taipei: Wenchin, 1995), 207–257. 15 See James Chuck, “Zen Buddhism and Paul Tillich: A Comparison of their Views on Man’s Predicament and the Means of its Resolution” (ThD diss., ­Pacific School of Religion, 1962); Au Kin-ming, “Ultimate Reality: A Comparative Study of Kitarō Nishida’s Concept of Nothingness and Paul Tillich’s Concept of God,” Ching Feng 4, no. 2 (2003), 113–130; Lam Wing-keung, “Comparative study on Self-Transcendence: Paul Tillich and Masao Abe”(MPhil thesis, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 1997). 16 In addition to the existing publications, there are also unpublished studies. For example, Paul Sang-Wan Chun, “The Christian Concept of God and Zen ‘Nothingness’ as Embodied in the Works of Tillich and Nishida” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1981). 17 I performed a search in the ATLA Religion Database on 22 July 2014 with “Tillich” and “Zen” as the keywords and got only 6 results. Three of them are the dialogue between Tillich and Abe. There were 7 results in total after changing the keywords to “Tillich” and “Abe,” four of which are Abe’s discussions on Tillich. This demonstrates not only the importance of the connection between Tillich and Abe but also reveals that scholars have not paid enough attention to the implication of such a connection. 18 For details, See Masao Abe, “Tillich from a Buddhist Point of View,” in Zen and Western Thought, ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 171–185. 19 Ibid., 171–174. 20 Ibid., 184, 185. 21 Leslie D. Alldritt, “Masao Abe and Paul Tillich: A Dialogue toward Love,” in Masao Abe: A Zen Life of Dialogue, ed. Donald W. Mitchell (Boston, MA: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998), 232–241, esp. 232–233. 22 Masao Abe, “‘Life and Death’ and ‘Good and Evil’,” in Zen and Comparative Studies, ed. Steve Heine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 34–41. 23 Masao Abe, “Non-Being and Mu: The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West,” in Zen and Western Thought, 121–134. 24 Tomoaki Fukai, ed., Paul Tillich: Journal to Japan in 1960 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 51. 25 Masao Abe, “In Memory of Paul Tillich,” in Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue, ed. Steven Heine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 120–123. 26 Abe, Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue, xviii. 27 Abe, “Non-Being and Mu,” 121–124. 28 Ibid., 124–127. 29 Ibid., 127–129. 30 Ibid., 130. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 133. 33 See Christopher Ives, ed., Divine Emptiness and Historical Fullness: A Buddhist-­Jewish-Christian Conversation with Masao Abe (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995); John B. Cobb, Jr. and Christopher Ives, eds., The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990); Roger Corless and Paul F. Knitter, eds., Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1990).

Being and Non-Being  23 34 Masao Abe, “Beyond Buddhism and Christianity,” in Ives, Divine Emptiness and Historical Fullness, 236, 240–241. 35 Masao Abe, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata,” in Cobb and Ives, The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, 16. 36 Langdon Gilkey, “Tillich and the Kyoto School,” in Negation and Theology, ed. Robert P. Scharlemann (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 72–85, esp. 84–85. 37 Masao Abe, “Negation in Mahayana Buddhism and in Tillich,” in Negation and Theology, ed. Sharlemann, 86–99, esp. 92–93; See also Abe, “Replies,” in Negation and Theology, 142–148; for further revision and expanded discussion, See Abe, Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue, 89–119. 38 Masao Abe, “Double Negation as an Essential for Attaining the Ultimate Reality: Comparing Tillich with Buddhism,” in Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue, 106. 39 Jeong, Nothingness in the Theology of Paul Tillich and Karl Barth, 44–46. 40 For details, See John Macquarrie, In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism (London: SCM, 1984). 41 For details, See Lai, Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions, 147–69. 42 Abe, “Double Negation,” 106. 43 See further: Lai Pan-chiu, “Buddhist–Christian Complementarity in the Perspective of Quantum Physics,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 12, no. 2 (2002): 148–164. 44 He Guanghu 何光滬, Dilixixuanji 蒂里希選集 [Selected works of Paul Tillich], 2 vols (Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1999). 45 For example, He Guanghu 何光滬, “‘Ai zheyigecuo’: du DilixiCunzai de Yongqi” 「愛這一個錯」：讀蒂里希《存在的勇氣》 [Loving this mistake: a reading of Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be], in Sanshigongmingchenyutu 三十功名塵與土 [Thirty years of fame and honour as dust] (Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1999), 34–39. 46 He Guanghu 何光滬, “Jidujiao wenhua de daiyanren: Bao luo Dilixi” 基督教文 化的代言人：保羅．蒂里希[The spokesperson of Christian culture: Paul Tillich], in He Guanghu zixuanji 何光滬自選集 [A personal anthology of He Guanghu] ­(Guilin, China: Guangxi Normal University Press, 1999), 116–118. He Guanghu has paid special attention to the political implications of Tillich’s theology. See He Guanghu 何光滬, “Shen xue yu zhengzhi: Zheng zhi Qiwang Zhongyiben xu” 神學與政治： 《政治期望》中譯本序 [Theology and Politics: Preface to the Chinese Translation of Political Expectation], in Tian ren zhi ji 天人之際[Between heaven and humanity] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003), 243–247. 47 He, “Jidujiaowenhua de daiyanren,” 118, 119. 48 For an explicit example, see He Guanghu 何光滬, “‘Daozizui, doufuxin’: paitazhuyiwaiyixia de baorongzhuyi” 「刀子嘴、豆腐心」：排他主義外衣下的包 容主義 [Sharptongue, soft heart: inclusivism in the disguise of exclusivism], in Yueyingwanchuan, 485; for a more implicit example, see another article of the same book: He, “Zongjiaozhijian de duihuawenti” 宗教之間的對話問題[Issues in interreligious dialogue], in Yueyingwanchuan, 446. 49 He Guanghu 何光滬, “Hanyu shen xue de gen ju yu yiyi” 漢語神學的根據與意義 [The foundation and meaning of Sino-Christian theology], in He Guanghu zixuanji, 87. 50 Ibid., 98–110. 51 From the above survey, one can see that DilixiyuHanyushenxue [Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian theology]did not include He Guanghu’s articles. Its editor, Keith Ka-fu Chan, made no reference to He Guanghu in the editor’s preface either. This is a rather unfortunate omission. 52 He Guanghu, Baichuanguihai: zouxiangquanqiuzongjiaozhexue 百川歸海：走向 全球宗教哲學 [All rivers return to the ocean: towards a global religious philosophy] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2008), 87, 88; translation mine.

24  Lai Pan-chiu 53 Ibid., 92; translation mine. 54 Ibid., 100. 55 Ibid., 101, 102, 116, 118, 125, 129. 56 Ibid., 96, 97; translation mine. 57 Ibid., 51, 52, 94, 95; translation mine. 58 Guo Peng 郭朋, Tanjingduikan《〈壇經〉對勘》[Collation of the Platform Sutra] (Jinan: Shandong Qilu Press, 1981), 16–18. Scholars are more inclined to believe that the Fahai version on which the Dunhuang (or Tun-huang) manuscript is based is a relatively primitive version. For details, see Philip B. Yampolsky, trans., The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch: The Text of the Tun-huang Manuscripts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 89–110. Translation of the Fahai version of Huineng’s verse adopted from Yampolsky, Platform Sutra, 132; translation of the Huixin version, the Qisong version, and the Zongbao version of it adopted from John R. McRae, Seeing through Zen: Encounter, Transformation, and Genealogy in Chinese Chan Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 62. 59 He, Baichuanguihai, 24; translation mine. 60 For details, see Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 61 Abe, “Non-Being and Mu,” 131. 62 This kind of the contemporary New Confucian discourse basically has a certain degree of reverse Orientalism. For details, see Lai Pan-chiu, “Orientalism and Reverse Orientalism in the Interactions between Christianity and Confucianism: With Special Reference to the Problem of Immanence vis-à-vis Transcendence,” International Journal of Sino-Western Studies 21 (December 2021): 1–21. 63 Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 27–51, esp. 29. 64 Yang Junjie 楊俊杰, “Dilixi yu Zhongguo: yi chang reng xu qidai de duihua” 蒂利希與中國：一場仍需期待的對話 [Paul Tillich and China: a dialogue worth awaiting], Logos & Pneuma 38 (Spring 2013): 135–152, esp. 143–148. 65 Christopher Ives, “The Thought and Legacy of Masao Abe,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 28 (2008): 103–105. 66 Lai Pan-chiu, “Timothy Richard’s Buddhist-Christian Studies,” Buddhist-­ Christian Studies 29 (2009): 23–38. 67 Bernard Faure, Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 52–88. 68 Lai Shen-chon 賴賢宗, Haidege yu chandao de kuawenhua goutong 海德格與禪 道的跨文化溝通[Cross-cultural communication between Martin Heidegger and Zen] (Beijing: China Religious Culture Publisher, 2007), 76–82, 123, 134–136, 141. 69 NamsoonKang, “Who/What Is Asian? A Postcolonial Theological Reading of Orientalism and Neo-Orientalism,” in Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and ­E mpire, ed. Catherine Keller, Michael Nausner, and Mayra Rivera (St. Louis, MO: Chalice, 2004), 100–117. 70 See Tsai Jen-hou 蔡仁厚, Chow Lien-hwa 周聯華, and Thomas In-sing Leung 梁 燕城, Huitongyuzhuanhua 會通與轉化 [Intersection and transformation] (Taipei: Cosmic Light, 1985). 71 Thomas In-sing Leung 梁燕城, “JiangouZhonghuashenxue de tiaojian: houzhimindifanxingyufeixilahua” 建構中華神學的條件：後殖民地反省與非希臘化 [The conditions for constructing Chinese theology: postcolonial reflection anddehellenization], in Ren yan wo weishei hu? Lu Longguangyuanzhangrongxiujinianwenji 人言我為誰乎？盧龍光院長榮休紀念文集 [Festschrift in honor of Professor Lo Lung-kwong], ed. Ying Fuk-tsang 邢福增 et al. (Hong Kong: Chinese Christian Literature Council, 2014), 563–580.

Being and Non-Being  25 72 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 515–519. 73 Lai Pan-chiu 賴品超, Guangchangshang de Hanyushenxue: congshenxuedaoJiduzongjiaoyanjiu 廣場上的漢語神學：從神學到基督宗教研究 [Sino-Christian theology in the public square: from theology to Christian studies] (Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2014), 117–143. 74 Lai Pan-chiu, “Chinese Explorations of Orthodox Theology: A Critical Review.” International Journal for the Study of Christian Church 18, no. 4 (December 2018): 315–331. 75 Lai Pan-chiu, “Reconsidering Theological Exchange between China and the West,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 19, no. 2–3 (September 2019): 103–109. 76 For the relationship between Heidegger and Kyoto School, see Lai, Haidegeyuchandao, 71–119. 77 For the related discussion in Chinese academia, see Li Bingquan 李丙權, Maliweng, Jizhoulasi he kefubenti–shenxue 馬里翁、濟宙拉斯和克服本體─神學 [Marion, Zizioulas and the Overcoming of Onto-theology] (Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2015). 78 See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 79 See John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985). 80 For example, see Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-Ontology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005); for a more recent example, see Najib George Awad, Persons in Relation: An Essay on the Trinity and Ontology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014). 81 See Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (London: James Nisbet, 1955), 81–85.

Bibliography Abe, Masao. “Tillich from a Buddhist Point of View.” In Zen and Western Thought, edited by William R. LaFleur, 171–185. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Abe, Masao. “Beyond Buddhism and Christianity.” In Divine Emptiness and Historical Fullness, edited by Christopher Ives, 224–243. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995. Abe, Masao. Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue. Edited by Steven Heine. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. Abe, Masao. “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata.” In The Emptying God, edited by John B. Cobb and Christopher Ives, 3–68. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990. Abe, Masao. “‘Life and Death’ and ‘Good and Evil’.” In Zen and Comparative Studies, edited by Steve Heine, 34–41. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Abe, Masao. “Negation in Mahayana Buddhism and in Tillich.” In Scharlemann, Negation and Theology, 86–99. Abe, Masao. “Non-Being and Mu: The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West.” In Zen and Western Thought, edited by William R. LaFleur, 121–134. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Abe, Masao. “Replies.” In Negation and Theology, edited by Robert P. Scharlemann, 142–148. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992.

26  Lai Pan-chiu Alldritt, Leslie D. “Masao Abe and Paul Tillich: A Dialogue toward Love.” In Masao Abe: A Zen Life of Dialogue, edited by Donald W. Mitchell, 232–241. ­Boston, MA: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998. Au, Kin-ming 區建銘. Dilixi de “zhongjiguanhuai” linan dui bijiaoshenxue de gongxian 蒂利希的「終極關懷」理念對比較神學的貢獻 [The contribution of Tillich’s concept of “ultimate concern” to comparative theology]. In DilixiyuHanyushenxue 蒂 利希與漢語神學 [Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian theology], edited by Keith Ka-fu Chan, 373–386. Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2006. Au, Kin-ming. Paul Tillich and Chu Hsi: A Comparison of Their Views of Human Condition. New York: Peter Lang, 2002. Au, Kin-ming. “Ultimate Reality: A Comparative Study of Kitarō Nishida’s Concept of Nothingness and Paul Tillich’s Concept of God.” Ching Feng 4, no. 2 (2003): 113–130. Awad, Najib George. Persons in Relation: An Essay on the Trinity and Ontology. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014. Chuck, James. “Zen Buddhism and Paul Tillich: A Comparison of their Views on Man’s Predicament and the Means of its Resolution.” ThD diss., Pacific School of Religion, 1962. Chun, Paul Sang-Wan. “The Christian Concept of God and Zen ‘Nothingness’ as Embodied in the Works of Tillich and Nishida.” PhD diss., Temple University, 1981. Cobb, John B. Jr., and Christopher Ives, eds. The Emptying God: A Buddhist-­JewishChristian Conversation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990. Corless, Roger, and Paul F. Knitter, eds. Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity. New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1990. Danz, Christian, Werner Schlüssler, and Erdmann Sturm, eds. Internationales Jahrbuch für die Tillich-Forschung Band 5/2009: Religionstheologie und intereligiöser Dialog. Münster: LIT, 2010. Faure, Bernard. Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Fukai, Tomoaki, ed. Paul Tillich: Journal to Japan in 1960. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014. Gilkey, Langdon. “Tillich and the Kyoto School.” In Negation and Theology, edited by Robert P. Scharlemann, 72–85. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992. Grenz, Stanley J. The Named God and the Question of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-­ Ontology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005. Guo, Peng 郭朋. Tanjingduikan《〈壇經〉對勘》[Collation of the Platform Sutra]. Jinan: Shandong Qilu Press, 1981. He, Guanghu 何光滬. “‘Ai zheyigecuo’: du DilixiCunzai de Yongqi”「愛這一個錯」 ：讀蒂里希《存在的勇氣》 [Loving this mistake: a reading of Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be]. In Sanshigongmingchenyutu 三十功名塵與土 [Thirty years of fame and honour as dust], 34–39. Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1999. He, Guanghu 何光滬. Dilixixuanji 蒂里希選集 [Selected works of Paul Tillich]. 2 vols. Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1999. He, Guanghu 何光滬. He Guanghu zixuanji 何光滬自選集 [A personal anthology of He Guanghu]. Guilin, China: Guangxi Normal University Press, 1999. He, Guanghu 何光滬. “Shenxueyuzhengzhi: ZhengzhiQiwangZhongyiben xu” 神 學與政治： 《政治期望》中譯本序 [Theology and Politics: Preface to the Chinese

Being and Non-Being  27 Translation of Political Expectation]. In Tian ren zhi ji 天人之際 [Between heaven and humanity], 243–247. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003. He, Guanghu 何光滬. Yueyingwanchuan: zongjiao, shehuiyurensheng 月映萬川：宗 教、社會與人生 [Moonlight shining on a myriad of rivers: religion, society, and life]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003. He, Guanghu. Baichuanguihai: zouxiangquanqiuzongjiaozhexue 百川歸海：走向全球 宗教哲學 [All rivers return to the ocean: towards a global religious philosophy]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2008. Ives, Christopher, ed. Divine Emptiness and Historical Fullness: A Buddhist-­JewishChristian Conversation with Masao Abe. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995. Ives, Christopher. “The Thought and Legacy of Masao Abe.” Buddhist-Christian Studies 28 (2008): 103–105. James, Robison B. Tillich and the World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2003. Jeong, Sung Min. Nothingness in the Theology of Paul Tillich and Karl Barth. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003. Kang, Namsoon. “Who/What Is Asian? A Postcolonial Theological Reading of Orientalism and Neo-Orientalism.” In Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and ­E mpire, edited by Catherine Keller, Michael Nausner, and Mayra Rivera, 100–117. St. Louis, MO: Chalice, 2004. LaFleur, William R., ed. Zen and Western Thought. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Lai, Pan-chiu. Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Thought. Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1994. Lai, Pan-chiu 賴品超. Kaifangyuweishen: Tainlike de shenxueyuzongjiaoduihua 開 放與委身：田立克的神學與宗教對話 [Openness and commitment: Paul Tillich’s theology and inter-religious dialogue]. Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 2000. Lai, Pan-chiu. “Buddhist–Christian Complementarity in the Perspective of Quantum Physics.” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 12, no. 2 (2002): 148–164. Lai, Pan-chiu. “Timothy Richard’s Buddhist-Christian Studies.” Buddhist-­Christian Studies 29 (2009): 23–38. Lai, Pan-chiu 賴品超. DachengJidujiaoshenxue: Hanyushenxue de sixiangshiyan 大乘基督教神學：漢語神學的思想實驗 [Mahayana Christian theology: thought experiments of Sino-Christian theology]. Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2011. Lai, Pan-chiu 賴品超, “Cong FojiaofansiJiduzongjiaoShangdi guan: qudaoBaoluoDilixi de ‘zhongjiguanqi’” 從佛教反思基督宗教上帝觀：取道保羅．蒂利希 的「終極關切」 [A reflection on the Christian view of God from Buddhism: Paul Tillich’s “ultimate concern” as the path]. Fu Jen Religious Studies 26 (Spring 2013): 91–119. Lai, Pan-chiu 賴品超. Guangchangshang de Hanyushenxue: congshenxuedaoJiduzongjiaoyanjiu 廣場上的漢語神學：從神學到基督宗教研究 [Sino-Christian theology in the public square: from theology to Christian studies]. Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2014. Lai, Pan-chiu. “Chinese Explorations of Orthodox Theology: A Critical Review.” International Journal for the Study of Christian Church 18, no. 4 (December 2018): 315–331.

28  Lai Pan-chiu Lai, Pan-chiu. “Reconsidering Theological Exchange between China and the West.” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 19, nos. 2–3 (September 2019): 103–109. Lai, Pan-chiu. “Orientalism and Reverse Orientalism in the Interactions between Christianity and Confucianism: With Special Reference to the Problem of Immanence vis-à-vis Transcendence.” International Journal of Sino-Western Studies 21 (December 2021): 1–21. Lai, Shen-chon 賴賢宗. Haidegeyuchandao de kuawenhuagoutong 海德格與禪道的 跨文化溝通[Cross-cultural communication between Martin Heidegger and Zen]. Beijing: China Religious Culture Publisher, 2007. Lam, Wing-keung. “Comparative study on Self-Transcendence: Paul Tillich and Masao Abe.” MPhil thesis, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 1997. Leung, Thomas In-sing 梁燕城. “JiangouZhonghuashenxue de tiaojian: houzhimindifanxingyufeixilahua” 建構中華神學的條件：後殖民地反省與非希臘化 [The conditions for constructing Chinese theology: postcolonial reflection anddehellenization]. In Ren yan wo weishei hu? Lu Longguangyuanzhangrongxiujinianwenji 人言我為誰乎？盧龍光院長榮休紀念文集 [Festschrift in honor of Professor Lo Lung-kwong], edited by Ying Fuk-tsang 邢福增 et al., 563–580. Hong Kong: Chinese Christian Literature Council, 2014. Li, Bingquan 李丙權. Maliweng, Jizhoulasi he kefubenti–shenxue 馬里翁、濟宙拉斯 和克服本體─神學 [Marion, Zizioulas and the Overcoming of Onto-theology]. Hong Kong: Logos & Pneuma, 2015. Liu, Shu-hsien. “A Critique of Paul Tillich’s Doctrine of God and Christology from an Oriental Perspective.” In Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogue, edited by Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler, 511–532. New York: Greenwood, 1989. Liu, Xiaogan 劉笑敢. “Laozi zhidao: chaoyuebingjianrongzongjiaoyukexue” 老子 之道：超越並兼融宗教與科學 [The way of Laozi: transcending and incorporating religion and science]. In Tianrenzhi ji yurenqinzhibian: bijiaoyudaoyuan de guandian 天人之際與人禽之辨：比較與多元的觀點 [Transcendence and immanence: comparative and multi-dimensional perspectives], edited by Charles Wing-hoi Chan, 17–36. Hong Kong: New Asia College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. Macquarrie, John. In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism. London: SCM, 1984. Marion, Jean-Luc. God without Being. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. McRae, John R. Seeing through Zen: Encounter, Transformation, and Genealogy in Chinese Chan Buddhism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Ng, Yu-kwan 吳汝鈞. “DongfangyuXifang de duihua: BaoluoTianlikeyuJiusongZhenyihuitan” 東方與西方的對話：保羅田立克與久松真一會談 [Dialogue between East and West: the colloquy between Paul Tillich’s and Shin’ichiHisamatsu]. In JingduXuepaizhexue: JiusongZhenyi 京都學派哲學：久松真一 [The philosophy of the Kyoto School: Shin’ichiHisamatsu], 207–257. Taipei: Wenchin, 1995. Scharlemann, Robert P., ed. Negation and Theology. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992.

Being and Non-Being  29 Small, Jeffrey. God as the Ground of Being: Tillich and Buddhism in Dialogue – The Impact of Paul Tillich’s Theology on a Christian-Buddhist Dialogue. Köln: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009. Stenger, Mary Ann, and Ronald H. Stone. Dialogues of Paul Tillich. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002. Thatamanil, John J. The Immanent Divine: God, Creation, and the Human Predicament. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006. Tillich, Paul. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. London: James Nisbet, 1955. Tillich, Paul. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. New York: ­Columbia University Press, 1964. Tillich, Paul. The Future of Religions. Edited by Jerald C. Brauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Tillich, Paul. A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism. Edited by Carl E. Braaten. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. Tsai, Jen-hou 蔡仁厚, Chow Lien-hwa 周聯華, and Thomas In-sing Leung 梁燕城. Huitongyuzhuanhua 會通與轉化 [Intersection and transformation]. Taipei: Cosmic Light, 1985. Yampolsky, Philip B., trans. The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch: The Text of the Tun-huang Manuscripts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Yang, Junjie 楊俊杰. “DilixiyuZhongguo: yichangreng xu qidai de duihua” 蒂利希 與中國：一場仍需期待的對話 [Paul Tillich and China: a dialogue worth awaiting]. Logos & Pneuma 38 (Spring 2013): 135–152. Zizioulas, John. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985.

2 Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective Lao Jiayi

This essay aims to review the issue from the perspective of Tillich’s thought. Through making references to Tillich’s understandings of “ultimate concern,” “quasi-religion,” inter-religious encounter, and the dynamics of faith, this essay addresses not only the theoretical issues concerning whether and in what sense Confucianism can be characterized as religion, but also the dynamics and prospect of development of Confucianism.

1 Introduction The question of whether and in what sense Confucianism is a religion has been debated for a long time. It concerns not only what Confucianism was and/or is, but also its prospect of development in the contemporary world. Some scholars have contributed their respective ideas. Jiang Qing 蔣慶 attempts to establish Confucianism as a “state religion,” a religion that combines with political power and takes its own doctrine as a national ideology.1 Some scholars, such as Chen Ming 陳明, advocate developing Confucianism as a “civil religion,” in which Confucianism could provide its own religious values.2 Other scholars such as Tseng Chao-hsu 曾昭旭 and Peng Guoxiang 彭國翔 prefer to identify Confucianism as a “humanistic” religion which is basically a matter of personal/private “religious faith.”3 For those who accept that Confucianism has its religious “character” (Mou Tsung-san 牟 宗三, Tang Chun-i 唐君毅, etc.),4 “function” (Lao Sze-kuang 勞思光),5 or ­“dimension” (Rodney Taylor),6 Confucianism is not an “institutional” religion in the conventional “western” sense of “religion.” Some scholars, such as Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, make use of Tillich’s “ultimate concern” to argue that Confucianism has its “ultimate concern” and thus religious character.7 However, this may over-simplify Tillich’s rather complicated understanding of “ultimate concern” and overlook the other aspects of Tillich’s thought which are also relevant to the question about whether and in what sense Confucianism is a religion, as well as the question concerning the dynamics and prospect of development of Confucianism. This essay aims to address the above questions by studying not only Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, but also other aspects of Tillich’s

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-3

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  31 thought, including his overall understanding of religion, his profound analysis of quasi-religions, his brief discussion on Confucianism, and his view concerning religion and nation.8 This essay will start with an analysis of Tillich’s concepts of religion and quasi-religion. It will then evaluate whether Confucianism is a religion or quasi-religion. Finally, it will discuss the existing condition of Confucianism and its future in China. This study aims to cast new light on the question of Confucian religiousness, explore some neglected spiritual connotations of Confucianism, enrich the Tillich scholarship, and contribute to the Christian-Confucian dialogue.

2  Religion as Ultimate Concern in Tillichian Perspective Tillich defines religion as the ultimate concern. He says “Religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life.”9 In Dynamics of Faith, he describes the state of ultimate concern as “If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name.”10 The ultimate concern is actually the abstract translation of the great commandment: “The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength” (Mark 12:29).11 This concern is ultimate, unconditional, total (which means “on part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it”), and infinite.12 The state of this concern is faith (or religion). Tillich analyzes faith in two sides, the subjective side and the objective side. The concept of ultimate concern should be understood on these two sides as well. The subjective side of faith means “fides qua creditur (the faith through which one believes)”; the objective side means “fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed).”13 The former understands faith as a central act of the human mind, which means people believe in something with the unity of their cognitive, emotional functions, and their wills, but not with a separate part of them. The latter understands faith on the side of the object of faith. As a Protestant theologian, Tillich claims that the real object of ultimate concern, namely, ultimate reality, is God, who is also identified with ­“being-itself,” “the ground of being,” “the power of being,” and “the abyss.” In Tillich’s theology, God is the ultimate reality, having the characters of infinitude and ultimacy. It is the ultimacy of God that makes Him transcend the finite beings and transcend the subjective-objective structure. It means there is no subject-object separation in ultimate reality, which is a character of the existential world. In Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate ­Reality, Tillich wrote, In every true prayer God is both he to whom we pray and he who prays through us. For it is the divine Spirit who creates the right prayer. At

32  Lao Jiayi this point the ontological structure which makes God an object of us as subjects is infinitely transcended. God stands in the divine-human reciprocity, but only as he who transcends it and comprises both sides of the reciprocity. He reacts, but he reacts to that which is his own act working through our finite freedom. He never can become a mere object. This is the limit of the symbols of reciprocity. This makes the ontological question necessary.14 That means God transcends us and is also immanent in us. Through Holy Spirit, He is with us and leads us. This character is an important one among the characters of God, which makes God different from finite beings. With God’s ultimate and infinite character, the only possible way is to talk about God as a symbol. Any finite, concrete things, events and persons, etc. cannot be equivalent to God, but they can become tools to refer to God. Tillich’s theory of symbol can be expressed in this way: God presents Himself through symbols; people know and interact with God through different concrete symbols. Tillich asserts that “God is the symbol of God.”15 This means the notion of God points to God Himself.16 In Tillich’s words, there are two elements in the notion of God—“the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God.”17 God is the fundamental symbol of faith. Besides the fundamental symbol in faith, there is another group of symbols that can express the divine—things and events, persons and communities, and words and documents that can be the manifestations of the divine.18 In Tillich’s understanding, these concrete things are not holy in themselves, but they point beyond themselves to the source of all holiness. As the ultimate can only be expressed in symbolic language, ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically as well. Unlike the theistic concept of God, Tillich’s concept of “ultimate concern” seems to be applicable to the study of other religions or religious phenomena anthropologically. Jonathan Z. Smith, one of the leading scholars of Religious Studies, points out that Tillich’s most important contribution to the development of Religious Studies in North America lies in his concept of ultimate concern.19 Lai Pan-chiu further elaborates that Tillich’s foremost contribution lies probably in his concept of ultimate concern, which provided the support to the study of religions from an anthropological rather than theological perspective and thus the justification for the academic study of religion (s) in public universities in North America.20 In the Chinese-speaking world, some scholars have made use of this concept to study religious phenomena, or interpret Confucianism and Buddhism.

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  33 Au Kin-ming 區建銘reinterprets ultimate concern as a “religious mark,” so that it can be used to study religious phenomena in general or different religions.21 Fu Wei-hsun Charles (傅偉勳 1933–1996) employs this concept to interpret Mahayana Buddhism.22 Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 (a.k.a. Liu Shuxian, 1934–2016) applies this concept to argue for the religiousness of Confucianism.23 These are some typical examples. However, when applying Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern to study respective religious themes, some scholars omit the ultimacy of the objective side of the concept. Quoting Jonathan Z. Smith and He Guanghu, Lai Pan-chiu pointed out that actually no matter in the academia of North America or China, the situation of ignoring the objective side of the concept is common, which means scholars usually grasp the anthropological meaning of this concept, but ignore the theological meaning.24 This may misuse the concept and may dilute the richness of the concept. Liu Shu-hsien’s use of the concept has this problem, which has caused some criticism. As we will see later, Liu Shu-hsien’ s use of the concept was criticized on this account. In terms of the objective side of the concept of ultimate concern, it refers to a question: whether the “object” one ultimately concerns is ultimate or not. In Lai Pan-chiu’s words, “apart from affirming that both Christians and non-Christians may have their respective ultimate concern, one has to examine whether the object of one’s ‘ultimate’ concern is really ‘ultimate’ or not.”25 As not every “object” of ultimate concern has the character of ultimacy, not every so-called ultimate concern is a real ultimate concern. According to Tillich, taking finite beings as the object of ultimate concern can lead to idolatry. Money, honor, social status, nationality, country, etc. could be objects that people consider the ultimate concern. In these cases, these finite things, events, or communities would be raised to the height of ultimacy and ascribed the character of the divine. People worship them and long for what they expect. However, these finite beings have neither the ultimate nor divine character, and they cannot satisfy people with fulfillment. Disappointment and danger are hidden in these kinds of “ultimate concerns.” Tillich calls these “ultimate concerns” pseudo religions or quasi-­ religions. Quasi-religion is analyzed profoundly by Tillich, which will be elaborated on in the next part.

3  Quasi-religion and Its Representatives in the 20th Century Quasi-religion is not pseudo-religion but has religious characters. Tillich describes quasi-religion in the following way: Sometimes what I call quasi-religions are called pseudo-religions, but this is as imprecise as it is unfair. ‘Pseudo’ indicates an intended but deceptive similarity; ‘quasi’ indicates a genuine similarity, not intended, but based on points of identity, and this, certainly, is the situation in

34  Lao Jiayi cases like Fascism and Communism, the most extreme examples of ­quasi-religions today.26 Religion is the state where people are concerned with the ultimate being wholeheartedly, but quasi-religion is the state where people are concerned with a finite being and pursue it as the ultimate being wholeheartedly. There are two important representatives of quasi-religions in the 20th century: Fascism and Communism, which are the radicalization of nationalism and socialism. In these two quasi-religions, nation and society are elevated to the highest, which become people’s goals in life. Tillich says, “In Fascism and Communism the national and social concerns are elevated to unlimited ultimacy. In themselves both the national and social concerns are humanly great and worthy of a commitment even unto death, but neither is a matter of unconditional concern.”27 Elevating an object which is without ultimacy to ultimacy leads to emptiness and destruction. In Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, what people are concerned ultimately with has the character of ultimacy, which is infinite and absolute. Tillich says, “The predominant religious name for the content of such concern is God—a god or gods.”28 The ultimate, infinite being brings people fulfillment because of its ultimate character, whereas a concrete, finite being cannot bring people fulfillment because of its finite character. When people elevate a finite being to infinite and expect they can receive the meaning of life and other fulfillment from it, their expectations usually will fail. Tillich analyzes two examples of quasi-religions: Fascism and Communism. Fascism and Communism take the state and social type as their ultimate concern. However, this is where the problem lies. Tillich points out that “Nations and social orders as such are transitory and ambiguous in their mixture of creativity and destructiveness. If they are taken as ultimate in meaning and being, their finitude must be denied.”29 Hitler and the Soviets did take this action: Hitler used the eschatological symbol “thousand-year period” as the vision of his empire; Russia made the classless society (Communist society) their ultimate goal by adopting Marx’s eschatological thinking—“This has been done, e.g., in Germany by the use of the old eschatological symbol of a ‘thousand-year period’ for the future of Hitler’s Reich, a symbol which originally signified the aim of all human history. The same thing has been done in Russia in terms of the Marxian type of eschatological thinking (classless society).”30 The result was tragic: In both cases it was necessary to deny the ambiguities of life and the distortions of existence within these systems, and to accept unambiguously and unconditionally their evil elements, e.g., by glorifying the suppression of individual criticism and by justifying and systematizing lie and wholesale murder—as happened in Italy and Germany and in Russia under Stalin.31

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  35 Undoubtedly, these events should be criticized and avoided happening in future history. Tillich analyzes how nationalism happened in modern society: Nationalism in the modern sense of the word can appear only when secular criticisms have dissolved the identity of religious consecration and group self-affirmation, and the consecrating religion is pushed aside and the empty space filled by the national idea as a matter of ultimate concern.32 When secularism invades the sphere of religion and other traditional spiritual spheres, the space in people’s minds which used to belong to ultimate concern, namely, faith, becomes blank, and at this time nationalism serving as something like faith takes the place. Tillich analyzes how Militaristic Fascism arose in modern Japan: Japan has gratefully received democracy from the hands of its conqueror, but democracy needs spiritual roots as well as sociologically favorable conditions. And they are lacking. Neither Shintoism nor ­Buddhism—and most Japanese are adherents of both religions at the same time—has symbols or ideas which can become productive and protective for democracy. Thus it was possible for a demonically radicalized militaristic Fascism to come into power.33 This logic is equally effective in the rise of Communism. Tillich’s analysis of nationalism undoubtedly has implications for the situation of China today.

4  The Identity of Confucianism in Tillichian Perspective Where does Confucianism stand in the picture of contemporary world religions in Tillich’s perspective? Tillich does not discuss Confucianism ­ directly, but he says, “In Confucianism, Communism encountered a system which, in spite of its cosmic-religious background, had first of all a social and ethical character, but which had lost this power with the disintegration of the hierarchy of governing officials and, at the same time, of the great-­familytype of social coherence.”34 According to Tillich’s division of religion (faith) and quasi-religion, is Confucianism a religion (or faith), a quasi-­religion or a kind of culture? According to Tillich’s approach to inter-religious dialogue, the dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity should be conducted when this question is answered. Only after that, the question of how Confucianism should face quasi-religions can be explored clearly, and even the future of Confucianism in contemporary China can be imagined. According to Tillich’s definition of religion, as an ultimate concern, religion should have a subjective side and an objective side. Quasi-religion refers to the seeming “ultimate concern” whose content of the objective side is a

36  Lao Jiayi finite being. A simple method to judge whether Confucianism is a religion (faith) or quasi-religion is to examine both the subjective and objective sides of the ultimate concern of Confucianism. If Confucianism has both sides, and there is infinitude in the objective side, Confucianism is a true ultimate concern; but if the content of its objective side is a finite being, Confucianism is a quasi-religion. The impact of the Confucian tradition on Chinese people is huge and profound. Confucianism affects Chinese society in many aspects such as the political system, social norms, and ethical order. It is the spiritual and living guidance for most Chinese people to live in the world. Yu Ying-shih 余英時 (1930–2021)35 describes the importance of Confucianism to Chinese society as follows, Confucianism is not just a simple philosophy or religion, but a set of ideological systems that comprehensively arrange the order of the ­human world. From the entire process of a person’s birth to death, to the composition of the family, the country and the world, it is within the scope of Confucianism.36 Yu Ying-shih asserts that Confucianism prevailed in almost all spectrums of traditional Chinese society by relying on its institutionalization, which “provided a relatively stable political and social order” for Chinese society and provided an ethical order and lifestyle for Chinese people for a long time.37 With strong commitment to Confucianism, some Confucian scholars take Confucianism as their own ultimate concern, such as New-­Confucian scholars. They have faith in Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, and make great efforts to keep Confucianism alive and developing. “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook”38 is an embodiment of their efforts. This can be considered as the subjective side of taking Confucianism as an ultimate concern. As we will see soon, in their efforts to reinterpret Confucian doctrines, the ultimacy of the objective side of Confucianism as an ultimate concern presents itself. Concerning the objective side of ultimate concern, which means ultimate being, some New-Confucian scholars (Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, Mou Tsungsan 牟宗三, Tang Chun-i 唐君毅, and Tu Wei-ming 杜維明) and Li Zehou 李泽厚’s efforts of asserting the ultimate character of Confucianism helps to prove that there is an ultimate dimension of Confucianism, which is an essential element of the objective side of real ultimate concern.39 New-Confucian scholar Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 argues that there is “immanent transcendence” (內在超越) in Confucianism, which he uses to argue that Confucianism has the character of religiousness by applying Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern.40 There is a criterion to distinguish religion and quasi-religion in Tillich’s theory—whether an ultimate concern is a religion or a quasi-religion depends on if there is ultimacy in its objective side.

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  37 Borrowing the concept of ultimate concern and this criterion from Tillich, Liu says, “Tillich thought that only Christianity can serve as true ultimate concern or religion (faith), but we do not have to accept this opinion. What we need to do urgently is to find out the boundary line between religion and pseudo-religion. I think the most important criterion here is the faith and expectation of ‘Transcendence’.”41 Chen Jianhong 陳建洪 points out that Liu modified Tillich’s criterion of “ultimacy” into “transcendence” so that it can be used to discuss the question of religiosity of Confucianism.42 It is Liu’s opinion that religion or faith is about an expectation of “transcendence” and Confucianism is a type of “immanent transcendence.” According to him, every religion or faith relates to three important parts: the divine, human, and the world—the divine belongs to the transcendent level, whereas humans and the world belong to the immanent level. Transcendence and immanence are important parts of religion. The way the immanent level connects to the transcendent level produces two types of religion—the type of external transcendence (外在超越) and the type of immanent transcendence. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam which are monotheism religions belong to the type of external transcendence; mysticism in the Middle Ages and the pantheism of Spinoza in the Modern age belong to the type of immanent transcendence. Hinduism, Taoism and Confucianism which have the notion of the unity of Heaven and humanity (tian ren he yi 天人合一) belong to the type of immanent transcendence. The type of external transcendence is characterized by the beliefs that God creates the world and stays beyond the world and that humans connect to God through revelation. Pantheism which belongs to the type of immanent transcendence believes that everything in the world reflects God’s brightness and God is in the world. Liu expresses the immanent transcendence of Confucianism in this way: From outside, there are principles in the universe and there is power working in it, giving value to every being. Absorbing the most precious elements, human beings become the most intelligent (ling 靈) in the universe, and they have the ability to participate in the process of creation. From inside, how people can transcend their own instincts to correspond a new spiritual life, grasping the true sense of stillness is one way that cannot be doubted in personal experience. Therefore, Chinese humanism presents a special type. The relation between heaven and human is neither unity nor duality ( fei yi fei er, 非一非二). The heaven and the earth come into being unintentionally, but the sages and the kings have the sense of preparing for the unexpected (憂患意 識). Thus, this is not an entire unity. However, when humanity is actualized to its full extent, what Mencius calls ‘embodied shape’ ( jian xing, 践形), human and heaven and the earth interact fully with each other. Thus, Heaven and humanity are not dualistic. From this, we can see that the structure of the doctrine of Confucianism presents a dialectical

38  Lao Jiayi relationship of ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’. Without ‘transcendence’, ‘immanence’ cannot be experienced; without ‘immanence’, ‘transcendence’ cannot be experienced.43 According to Liu Shuxian, Confucianism believes that the way of Tian (Tian Dao, 天道) influences every being, making it vital. As human hearts interact with Tian (天), infinitude can be experienced within a finite human being. The dialectical experience of transcendence and immanence is a special religious experience of Confucianism. Liu’s explanation of the immanent transcendence of Confucianism was queried by some scholars. Chen Jianhong 陳建洪 points out that Liu’s use of “transcendence” and “immanence” is self-defined, which is different from that in the context of Christianity. In Christianity, “Transcendence” refers to God; the terms “transcendence” and “immanence” refer to the relationship of God (the creator) and creatures, which means “these two terms refer to the intimacy of God’s relationship with the world and humans, rather than referring to two separated worlds.”44 Fun Yiu Ming 馮耀明 argues that in western culture “transcendence” is usually understood as having a character of the “external.” The transcendent cannot be external and immanent at the same time. Roger T. Ames’ opinion is that the basic presupposition of Confucius’ thought is “internality” (內在性) rather than “transcendence.” It is incompatible to form Confucius’ thought with the western dualism of “external transcendence.” David L. Hall holds a similar opinion.45 But for Liu at least, this character of transcendence of Confucianism presents the ultimate dimension of Confucianism, which can be seen as the objective side of an ultimate concern. This ultimate dimension proves that the object of the Confucian ultimate concern is not a finite being, but has the character of infinite. In this sense, Confucianism is a religion or faith with real ultimate concern. Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三 (a.k.a. Mou Zongsan, 1909–1995) is another modern New-Confucian scholar who insists there is immanent transcendence of Confucianism. He attempts to prove it with the concept of the infinite mind (wu xian zhi xin, 無限智心): Separately speaking, it is of absolute universality. It transcends everyone and everything, but it cannot be reached by perceptual experience. Thus, it is called transcendent. However, it is the substance of everyone and everything. Thus, it is called immanent.46 Mou argues that the infinite mind in Confucianism can make virtue consistent with happiness; and thus, Confucianism is a “perfect teaching” (yuan jiao 圓教). In contrast, there is no infinite mind in Christianity that cannot lead the finite human being to infinitude; thus, Christianity is a “distinctive teaching” (li jiao 離教). Tang Chun-i 唐君毅 (a.k.a. Tang Junyi, 1909–1979) argues for the religious character of Confucianism as well. His opinion is that Confucianism knows heaven, earth, ghosts and gods (rujia tong tian

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  39 di gui shen 儒家通天地鬼神), and human minds connect with the heart of Heaven. He claims that the religious character of Confucianism is presented in the three worships (san ji, 三祭)—the worship of heaven, the worship of ancestors, and the worship of heroes and saints.47 Tu Wei-ming 杜維明(born 1940) identifies the religious character of Confucianism with the aspects of learning to be human (zuo ren, 做人) and self-cultivation (xiu shen, 修身). It is Tu Wei-ming’s opinion that learning to be human is a central concern of Confucianism and the practice of self-cultivation is essential. He says, Ontologically a person’s selfhood embodies the highest transcendence within its own reality; no external help is needed for the self to be fully realized. The realization of the self, in the ultimate sense, is tantamount to the realization of the complete unity between humanity and Heaven. The way to attain this, however, is never perceived as the establishment of a relationship between an isolated individual and God. The self as a center of relationships in the human community must recognize that it is an integral part of a holistic presence and, accordingly, work its way through what is near at hand.48 Tu shows what the meaning of Confucianism as a faith is. That is “a faith in the living person’s authentic possibility for self-transcendence.”49 When a self-transformation of a person becomes one part of the “ultimate self-transformation as a communal act,”50 the ethical-religious meaning of Confucianism appears. Tu says, “Salvation means the full realization of the anthropocosmic reality inherent in our human nature.”51 LiZehou 李泽厚 (1930–2021) criticizes Modern New Confucian scholars’ view that Confucianism is a religion.52 It is his view that it “precisely does not suit the spirit of Confucianism and the Chinese tradition.”53 However, he affirms that there are religious characters in Confucianism. He says, “Confucianism is not without features of faith. What it believes and worships is ‘heaven, earth, country (king), parents and teachers’ which is centered on ancestors… It also has rituals, including worshiping heaven and earth, enshrining tablets of ancestors, sweeping tombs on Tomb Sweeping Day, worshiping ancestors in Chungyuan Festival (中元節), etc., but all of them are ‘li’ (禮) in daily life, not holding densely, nor having independent institutes and miracle teachings to coordinate.”54 Li Zehou does not think that Confucianism discusses afterlife. However, it means “not deny, and not confirm,” but transforms the “immortal” or “eternal” into achieving “virtue, honor and precious words” (li de, li gong, li yan, 立德、立功、立言) in this life. It transforms the pursuit of the eternal into the actualization of concrete events of life—“Confucianism sets the individual’s life value, life ideal and life meaning in the arduous struggle for life order in this real world.”55 Not only New-Confucian scholars argue that Confucianism has the character of immanent transcendence or a dimension of faith, Li Zehou emphasizes the feature of faith in Confucianism and holds a point of view that

40  Lao Jiayi Confucianism turns the pursuit of the immortal and the eternal into  the actualization of concrete daily life. From these scholars’ efforts to argue there is transcendence or ultimacy in Confucianism, the ultimate dimension of Confucianism can be seen. From this, it can be said that there is an ultimate dimension of Confucianism. To summarize, Confucian’s practice and pursuit of the value, ethical order, and social norms of Confucianism can be seen as the subjective side of Confucianism as an ultimate concern; the ultimate character of Confucianism pursuit can be seen as the objective side of Confucianism as an ultimate concern. According to Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, Confucianism can be seen as ultimate concern, or a religion or faith. For the Confucians, Confucianism is not a quasi-religion.

5  The Type of Faith of Confucianism in Tillichian Perspective It is Tillich’s view that “Our ultimate concern represents what we essentially are and—therefore—ought to be. It stands as the law of our being, against us and for us. Holiness cannot be experienced without its power to command what we should be.”56 According to the two aspects of experiencing the divine—“the holiness of being” and “the holiness of what ought to be,” Tillich divides the types of faith into the ontological type and the moral type. There are three kinds of ontological types of faith: the sacramental type of faith, mystical faith, and humanism/humanist faith. The sacramental type of faith and mystical faith are usually called “religious,” while humanist faith is usually called “secular.” The difference is that “the sacramental and mystical types transcend the limits of humanity and try to reach the ultimate itself beyond man and his world, while the humanist remains within these limits.”57 The moral types of faith focus on moral laws. Tillich says that in the moral types of faith, “God is the God who has given the law as a gift and as a command. He can be approached only by those who obey the law.”58 The moral types of faith can be distinguished concretely as three kinds: the conventional type, the juristic type, and the ethical type. The juristic type is strongly developed in Talmudic Judaism and in Islam, the ethical type is represented by the Jewish prophets and the conventional type is prominent in Confucianist China.59 In Tillich’s view, Confucianism is a moral type of faith. More exactly, Confucianism belongs to the conventional type which is one of the moral types of faith. The following is what Tillich describes on Confucianism: This is also true of a system of conventional rules as collected and formulated by Confucius. This system has often been called unreligious and a complete lack of faith has been attributed to the Chinese way of life, in so far as it is determined by Confucius. There is faith in Confucianism, not only in the worship of the ancestors (which is a sacramental element) but also in the unconditional character of the commands. And in the background is the vision of the law of the universe, of which

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  41 the laws of state and society are a manifestation. Yet in spite of these religious elements in Confucianism, its basic character is secular. This accounts for two world historical facts. It is the negative condition for the influence of the sacramental and mystical religions of Buddhism and Taoism in China in their popular as well as their sophisticated forms. And it is the positive condition for the easy victory of the secular faith of communism which also belongs to the moral types of humanist faith.60 Tillich’s opinion is that Confucianism has features of religion, but the basic outlook is secular. This made it unbeneficial for the development of the sacramental and mystical religions of Buddhism and Taoism, but beneficial for the development of secular humanist communism.

6 The Experience of Confucianism in Modern Times and its Future Possibilities Confucianism played an important role in ancient China. However, Confucianism has encountered unprecedented attacks in modern times. The attacks were from Confucianism itself and western culture. According to Yu Ying-shih 余英時, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, Confucianism took a turn—shifting from serving the imperial court to developing a living space for the folk. Quoting Yu Ying-shih’s words, the Confucian scholars who had ambitions to contribute to the world had given up the upward route of ‘realizing the Confucius goals with the help of the king’ (de jun xing dao, 得君行道), but adopted a downward route which was ‘changing the existing habits and customs’ (yi feng yi su, 移風易俗).61 What it means is the Confucian scholars at that time did not lobby the king and participate in politics, but transfer and spread the Confucian teachings to the folk. This can be seen in Wang Yang Ming 王陽明 (1472–1529)’ s shifting the focus from the learning of the mind and nature (xin xing zhi xue, 心性之學), to the learning of world-managing ( jing shi zhi xue, 經世之 學). One important reason for the shifting of Confucianism is that the autocratic monarchy was unprecedentedly strong in Ming and Qing dynasties. The highly autocratic monarchy suppressed the participation of Confucian scholars in politics. Yu Ying-shih believes that the autocratic monarchy is the core reason for Confucianism to transfer its attention to the folk.62 As the Confucian scholars could not participate in politics, they turned to the folk to develop a living space for Confucianism. This situation develops the study of the mind in Ming Dynasty and the textual research (考證學) in the Qing dynasty. The Confucian scholars in the Ming dynasty discussed much on the study of the mind and had weak practical effects on the society. This limitation was criticized by Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) and

42  Lao Jiayi Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692) in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties. Yu Ying-shih views that these criticisms come internally from Confucianism. These internal criticisms laid the foundation for the input of ideas and values of western culture later in the Late Qing and the Republican period. At the end of the 19th century, China was crashed strongly by the west, failing from the level of the instrument to the political system. Confucianism was radically criticized at that time. The May fourth movement was a peak of the anti-Confucianism movement. Slogans like “flatten the Confucian school” (da dao kong jia dian, 打到孔家店) were heard loudly. Yu Ying-shih’s view is that it is the political system that made Confucianism the mainstream culture of China. Along with the breakdown of the political system in ancient China, Confucianism collapsed as well. Yu Ying-shih says, Confucian principles are embedded in all establishments from top to bottom (in ancient China). The whole Confucian establishments had collapsed soon since Xinhai Revolution (the 1911 Revolution) broke out. Since the establishments were gone, Confucianism lost its shelter to exist, becoming ‘a wandering soul’ (遊魂)… In the past, the study and spread of Confucianism mainly relied on public and private schools, which were closely integrated with the imperial examinations. The collapse of the establishments began with the abolition of the imperial examinations (1905), when monarchy was still existing.63 Yu opines that modern Confucianism became “a wandering soul.” The meaning of “a wandering soul” is that along with the collapse of the establishments, Confucianism lost its shelter, existing like “a wandering soul.” Yu’s word “soul” means a kind of “spirit,”64 which means Confucianism being as “a wandering soul” is not entirely dead, but remains alive, without any formal institutional embodiment. Yu Ying-shih has the idea that “After being free from the traditional establishment, the spirit of Confucianism may gain a new life in freedom. ‘A wandering soul’ may be the fate of Confucianism in modern age.”65 About what the fate is, Yu Ying-shih does not give an answer in his book. He believes that this answer can be explored by later scholars who are interested in the reconstruction of Confucianism. Tillich believes that “A nation is determined by two elements, its natural self-affirmation as a living and growing power-structure, and, at the same time, the consciousness of having a vocation, namely, to represent and spread and defend a principle of ultimate significance”66 (It is the unity of these two elements that makes the quasi-religious character of nationalism possible). Vocational consciousness is such a consciousness: a history-­bearing group realizes that in history there is an aim they should strive and there is a destiny they should try to fulfill.67 Tillich describes the vocational consciousness as “History runs in a horizontal direction, and the groups which give it this direction are determined by an aim toward which they strive and a destiny they try to fulfill. One could call this the ‘vocational consciousness’ of a

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  43 history bearing group. It differs from group to group not only in character but also in the degree of consciousness and of motivating power. But vocational feeling has been present since the earliest times of historical mankind. Its most conspicuous expression is perhaps the call to Abraham in which the vocational consciousness of Israel finds its symbolic expression; and we find analogous forms in China, in Egypt, and in Babylon.”68 It is Tillich’s point that “The basic problem is the tension between the power and the vocational elements in national life…Yet there are cases, though not very frequent, in which the vocational element is minimized by the power element. Examples are Bismarck’s Germany and Tojo’s Japan. Hitler felt this lack and invented the salvation-myth of the Nordic race. ­Present-day Japan is looking for a vocational symbol. The future of all Asiatic and African nationalism is dependent upon the character of their vocational consciousness and its relation to their will to power.”69 Obviously, when China moved from ancient society to modern society, the living-growing power structure was attacked severely, like what Yu Ying-shih says—along with the collapse of the establishments, Confucianism lost its shelter, becoming “a wandering soul.” However, one may query if the vocational consciousness of Confucianism is preserved. This vocational consciousness may reflect the ultimacy of Confucianism which is emphasized by the New-Confucian scholars.70 But how can we make use of the vocational consciousness of Confucianism? It is well-known that communism is dominant in China nowadays. According to Tillich, communism is a ­quasi-religion, which means the objective side of this ultimate concern is finite, but not ultimate. It also means that this ultimate concern cannot be a true faith for people. In this blank, Confucianism may offer help—it can offer a vocational consciousness for Chinese people. Over the past 2,000 years, Confucianism sitting in this position stably shows that it has this spiritual resource. How this vocational consciousness can express itself and work, still needs the efforts of contemporary Confucian scholars to explore. This may be what Yu Ying-shih says—“After being free from the traditional establishment, the spirit of Confucianism may be reborn in freedom.”71 Concerning the vocational consciousness, Tillich claims “If the national consciousness is humanized and becomes aware both of its own finite validity and the infinite significance of that which it represents (though ambiguously), a nation can become a representative of the supranational unity of mankind—in religious languages, of the Kingdom of God.”72 The above discussion seems to confirm that Confucianism has the capacity of being humanized and represent the ultimate dimension, but it lacks the awareness of its own finitude, which is what Tillich says “What happens in the Kairos should be absolute, and yet not absolute, but under judgment of the absolute.”73 This is an awareness that is conscious of its own finitude and thus accepts criticism of oneself. If Confucianism can incorporate this awareness into itself, Confucianism can become a better and more sustaining doctrine that provides a vocational consciousness for Chinese people. Of course, this will certainly enrich Chinese people’s spiritual resources today.

44  Lao Jiayi

7  Concluding Remark Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern differentiates what true religion is and what quasi-religion is. He analyzed and judged major political events in the world in the 20th century by this concept as well. It is concluded that Confucianism is a kind of ultimate concern by analyzing Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, which proves that Confucianism has a dimension of faith. Moreover, according to the division of the types of faith by Tillich, Confucianism belongs to the moral type of faith. The dimension of faith of Confucianism at the same time shows that it has a vocational consciousness, which is one of the two essential elements in the development of a nation. In the context of communism as an ideology in contemporary China, it is valuable that Confucianism can serve as a real and long-term spiritual resource, which has the capacity to meet the needs of the times. This may cast light on the issues concerning the prospect of Confucianism, especially whether it should or will become a state religion or civil religion in China. Based on Tillich’s understanding of ultimate concern as well as Confucianism, Confucianism has its ultimate concern and can be a personal faith. With its vocational consciousness, Confucianism has the potential to become a civil religion or one of the religious/spiritual factors contributing to the development of civil society. However, if Confucianism were established as the “state religion” and elevated above other religions by political power, it might become demonic and dangerous. Judging from the above studies, Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern, the point of view of quasi-religion, the idea of elements constituting a nation and the understanding of Confucianism can enrich and deepen the dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism. These are the contributions to be made by Tillich’s theology to Christian-Confucian dialogue.

Notes 1 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan 政 治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展 (Political Confucianism: The Turn, Characteristics and Development of Contemporary Confucianism) (Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2014). 2 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Sungmoon Kim ed., Confucianism, A Habit of the Heart: Bellah, Civil Religion, and East Asia (New York: State University of New York Press, 2016); and Chen Ming 陳明, “Rujiao zhi gongming zongjiao shuo 儒教之 公民宗教說” (A Doctrine of Confucianism as A Civil Religion), in Rujiao xinlun 儒教新論 (A New Theory on Confucianism as A Religion), ed. Chen Ming (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2009), 284–295. 3 Peng Guoxiang 彭國翔, Rujia chuantong: zongjiao yu renwu zhuyi zhijian 儒家 傳統：宗教與人文主義之間 (The Confucian Tradition: between Religion and Humanism) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007); and Tseng Chao-hsu 曾 昭旭, Liangxin jiao yu renwen jiao - lun ruxue de zongjiao mianxian 良心教與 人文教——論儒學的宗教面相 (The Religion of Conscience and the Religion of ­Humanism - On the Religious Face of Confucianism) (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshu guan, 2003). 4 Mou Tsung-san and Tang Chun-i’s argumentation of Confucian religiousness will be elaborated in part 3 of this essay.

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  45 5 Lao Sizguang has a point of view that Confucianism “has a religious function but is not itself a religion.” See Lao Sizguang, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中國文化 要義 (The Main Meaning of Chinese Culture) (Hong Kong: Zhongguo renwen yanjiu xuehui, 1987), 108. 6 Rodney L. Taylor, The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990). 7 Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, “Rujia zongjiao zhexue de xiandai yiyi 儒家宗教哲學的現 代意義” (The Modern Significance of Confucian Religious Philosophy), in Rujia sixiang yu xiandaihua – Liu Shuxian xinrujia lunzhu jiyao 儒家思想與現代化—— 劉述先新儒學論著輯要 (Confucian Thought and Modernization – ­Collections of Liu Shu-hsien’s Essays on New Confucianism), ed. Jing Haifeng 景海鋒 (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992); and Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, “Lun zongjiao de chaoyue yu neizai 論宗教的超越與內在” (Discussion on Transcendence and Immanence of Religion), Twenty-First Century (December 1998): 99–109. 8 About religions proper, quasi-religions and their encounter with each other, Tillich discusses it in detail in Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 9 Ibid, 4. 10 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Publisher, 1957), 1–2. 11 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 11. 12 Ibid, 11–12. 13 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 11. 14 Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), 81. 15 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 53. 16 About the notion of God (a symbol), Tillich points out that “It points beyond itself while participating in that to which it points.” See Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 51. 17 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 53. 18 Ibid, 55. 19 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Tillich’s Remains,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (2010): 1139–1170. 20 Lai Pan-chiu, “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue,” in Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, ed. Keith Ka-fu Chan and Yaunang William Ng (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, August 2017), 48. 21 Au Kin-ming 區建銘, “Dilixi de ‘zhongji guanhuai’ linian dui bijiao shenxue de gongxian 蒂利希的“終極關懷”理念對比較神學的貢獻” (The Contributions of Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern to Comparative Theology), in Dilixi yu hanyu shenxue 蒂利希與漢語神學 (Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology), ed. Keith Ka-fu Chan (Hong Kong: Logos and Pneuma Press, 2006), 373–386. 22 Fu Wei-hsun Charles 傅偉勛, “Cong zhongji guanhuai dao zhongji chengnuo – dacheng fojiao de zhendi xintan 從終極關懷到終極承諾——大乘佛教的真諦新 探” (From Ultimate Concern to Ultimate Commitment – A New Exploration of the True Meaning of Mahayana Buddhism), in Cong chuangzao de quanshi xue dao dasheng foxue 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (From Creative Hermeneutics to Mahayana Buddhism) (Taipei: Dongda tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1999), 189–208. 23 Liu, “Lun zongjiao de chaoyue yu neizai 論宗教的超越與內在” (Discussion on Transcendence and Immanence of Religion): 99–109. 24 Lai, “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue,” 48–51. 25 Ibid, 50. 26 Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, 5–6. 27 Ibid, 6.

46  Lao Jiayi 28 Ibid, 5. 29 Ibid, 6. 30 Ibid, 6, 7. 31 Ibid, 7. 32 Ibid, 15. 33 Ibid, 25. 34 Ibid, 19. 35 The quoted Yu Ying-shih’s words in this essay are translated in English by the author. 36 Yu Ying-shih 余英時, “Xiandai ruxue de kunjing 現代儒學的困境” (The Difficulties of Modern Confucianism), in Xiandai Ruxue lun 現代儒學論 (Essays on Modern Confucianism) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988), 230. 37 The term “institutionalization” used by Yu Ying-shih refers to the range “from the etiquette and regulations of the imperial court, the organization and laws of the state, social etiquette, to clan rules, family laws, and personal codes of conduct.” See Yu Ying-shih, “Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang 現代儒學的回顧 與展望” (Retrospect and Prospect of Modern Confucianism), in Xiandai ruxue lun 現代儒學論 (Essays on Modern Confucianism) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998), 37. 38 Carson Chang 張君勱, Hsu Foo-kwan 徐復觀, Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三 and Tang Chun-i 唐君毅, “wei zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan—women dui zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中國文化敬吿世界人士宣言——我們對中國學術研究及中國 文化與世界文化前途之共同認識” (A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook), 1958. https://6744278.s21d.faiusrd.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAgjKz3tgUoxMbrigQ.pdf 39 The quoted words of these scholars in this essay are translated in English by the author. 40 Liu, “Lun zongjiao de chaoyue yu neizai 論宗教的超越與內在” (Discussion on Transcendence and Immanence of Religion), 99–109. 41 Ibid, 100. 42 Chen Jianhong 陳建洪, “Zhongji guanqie yu rujia zongjiaoxing: yu Liu Shuxian shangque 終極關切與儒家宗教性：與劉述先商榷” (Ultimate Concern and Confucian Religiosity: A Discussion with Liu Shu-hsien), Twenty-First Century (April 2000): 89. 43 Liu, “Rujia zongjiao zhexue de xiandai yiyi 儒家宗教哲學的現代意義” (The Modern Significance of Confucian Religious Philosophy), 58. 44 Chen Jianhong 陳建洪, “Zhongji guanqie yu rujia zongjiaoxing: yu Liu Shuxian shangque 終極關切與儒家宗教性：與劉述先商榷” (Ultimate Concern and Confucian Religiosity: A Discussion with Liu Shu-hsien), Twenty-First Century no. 58 (April 2000): 87–93. 45 Yao Caigang 姚才剛, Zhongji Xinyang yu duoyuan jiazhi de rongtong – Liu Shuxian ruxue sixiang yanjiu 終極信仰與多元價值的融通——劉述先儒學思想研究 (Intigration of Ultimate beliefs and Pluralistic Values – A Study of Liu Shuhsien’s Thought) (Chengdu: Bashu sheshe, 2003), 172–175. 46 Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三, Yuan shan lun 圓善論 (On the Perfect Good) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1985), 340. 47 Tang Chun-i 唐君毅, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshenjiazhi 中國文化之精神價值 (The Spirit and Value of Chinese Culture), in Tang Junyi quanji, vol. 4唐君毅全 集 卷四 (The Complete Works of Tang Chun-i, vol. 4) (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), 401. 48 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (New York: State University of New York Press, 1985), 60, 61.

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  47 49 50 51 52

Ibid, 64. Ibid. Ibid. Li Zehou 李澤厚 disagrees Modern New Confucian scholars “proving the religiousness of Confucianism by adopting western abstract thinking.” He disagrees the contemporary mainland Confucian scholars building Confucianism as a religion in a social-practical level too. In Li’s words, “they generally follow the example of western religions, which require the establishment of Confucian teachings, institutions and rituals that could be comparable to Christianity and Islam. They even call for the sages, the saviors and the Charisma who can reach heaven, earth, God and people.” Li argues that “it precisely inconsistent with the spirit of Confucianism and Chinese tradition.” Li Zehou 李澤厚, You wu dao li, Shi li gui ren 由巫到禮 釋禮歸仁 (The Origins of Chinese Thought: From Shamanism to Ritual Regulations and Humaneness) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2015), 63, 64. 53 Li, You wu dao li, Shi li gui ren 由巫到禮 釋禮歸仁 (The Origins of Chinese Thought: From Shamanism to Ritual Regulations and Humaneness), 64. 54 Ibid, 64, 65. 55 Ibid, 64. 56 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 64–65. 57 Ibid, 72. 58 Ibid, 74. 59 Ibid, 75. 60 Ibid, 76, 77. 61 Yu, “Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang 現代儒學的回顧與展望” (Retrospect and Prospect of Modern Confucianism), 31. 62 Ibid, 35. 63 Ibid, 37. 64 Ibid, 42. 65 Ibid, 46. 66 Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, 15, 16. 67 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 310. 68 Ibid, 310. 69 Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, 16, 17. 70 It is the author’s opinion that the character of “immanent transcendence” argued by New Confucianism refers to the character of ultimate. 71 Yu, “Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang 現代儒學的回顧與展望” (Retrospect and Prospect of Modern Confucianism), 42. 72 Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, 17. 73 Paul Tillich, “Kairos,” The Protestant Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 42.

References References on Paul Tillich Au, Kin-ming 區建銘. “Dilixi de ‘zhongji guanhuai’ linian dui bijiao shenxue de gongxian 蒂利希的“終極關懷”理念對比較神學的貢獻” (The Contributions of Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern to Comparative Theology). In Dilixi yu hanyu shenxue 蒂利希與漢語神學 (Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology), edited by Keith Ka-fu Chan, 373–386. Hong Kong: Logos and Pneuma Press, 2006.

48  Lao Jiayi Fu, Wei-hsun Charles 傅偉勛. “Cong zhongji guanhuai dao zhongji chengnuo – dacheng fojiao de zhendi xintan 從終極關懷到終極承諾——大乘佛教的真諦新 探” (From Ultimate Concern to Ultimate Commitment – A New Exploration of the True Meaning of Mahayana Buddhism). In Cong chuangzao de quanshi xue dao dasheng foxue 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (From Creative Hermeneutics to Mahayana Buddhism), 189–208. Taipei: Dongda tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1999. Lai, Pan-chiu. “Tillich’s Concept of Ultimate Concern and Buddhist-Christian ­Dialogue.” In Paul Tillich and Asian Religions, edited by Keith Ka-fu Chan and Yau-nang William Ng, 47–67. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017. Smith, Jonathan Z. “Tillich’s Remains.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (2010): 1139–1170. Tillich, Paul. “Kairos.” The Protestant Era. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948. ———. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955. ———. Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper Publisher, 1957. ———. Systematic Theology, vol. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. (Repr., London: SCM, 1978.) ———. Systematic Theology, vol. 3. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. (Repr., London: SCM, 1978.) ———. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

References on Confucianism Chang, Carson 張君勱, Hsu Foo-kwan 徐復觀, Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三 and Tang Chun-i 唐君毅. “wei zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan – women dui zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中國文化敬吿世界人士宣言——我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世 界文化前途之共同認識” (A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook), 1958. https://6744278.s21d.faiusrd.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAgjKz3tgUox MbrigQ.pdf Chen, Jianhong 陳建洪. “Zhongji guanqie yu rujia zongjiaoxing: yu Liu Shuxian shangque 終極關切與儒家宗教性：與劉述先商榷” (Ultimate Concern and Confucian Religiosity: A Discussion with Liu Shu-hsien). Twenty-First Century, no. 58 (April 2000): 87–93. Chen, Ming 陳明. “Rujiao zhi gongming zongjiao shuo 儒教之公民宗教說” (A Doctrine of Confucianism as A Civil Religion). In Rujiao xinlun 儒教新論 (A New Theory on Confucianism as A Religion), edited by Chen Ming, 284–295. Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2009. Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Kim, Sungmoon, ed., Confucianism, A Habit of the Heart: Bellah, Civil Religion, and East Asia. New York: State University of New York Press, 2016. Jiang, Qing 蔣慶. Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan 政治 儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展 (Political Confucianism: The Turn, Characteristics and Development of Contemporary Confucianism). Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2014.

Confucianism as Religion in Tillichian Perspective  49 Lao, Sizguang 勞思光. Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中國文化要義 (The Main Meaning of Chinese Culture). Hong Kong: Zhongguo renwen yanjiu xuehui, 1987. Li, Zehou 李澤厚. You wu dao li, Shi li gui ren 由巫到禮 釋禮歸仁 (The Origins of Chinese Thought: From Shamanism to Ritual Regulations and Humaneness). Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2015. Liu, Shu-hsien 劉述先. Rujia sixiang yu xiandaihua - Liu Shuxian xinrujia lunzhu jiyao 儒家思想與現代化——劉述先新儒學論著輯要 (Confucian Thought and Modernization – Collections of Liu Shu-hsien’s Essays on New Confucianism), edited by Jing Haifeng 景海鋒. Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992. ———. “Lun zongjiao de chaoyue yu neizai 論宗教的超越與內在” (Discussion on Transcendence and Immanence of Religion). Twenty-First Century, no. 50 (December 1998): 99–109. Mou, Tsung-san 牟宗三. Yuan shan lun 圓善論 (On the Perfect Good). Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1985. Peng, Guoxiang 彭國翔. Rujia chuantong: zongjiao yu renwu zhuyi zhijian 儒家傳統： 宗教與人文主義之間 (The Confucian Tradition: between Religion and Humanism. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007. Tang, Chun-i 唐君毅. Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshenjiazhi 中國文化之精神價值 (The Spirit and Value of Chinese Culture). In Tang Junyi quanji, vol. 4 唐君毅全集 卷四 (The Complete Works of Tang Junyi, vol. 4). Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991. Taylor, Rodney L. The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990. Tseng, Chao-hsu曾昭旭. Liangxin jiao yu renwen jiao – lun ruxue de zongjiao mianxian 良心教與人文教——論儒學的宗教面相 (The Religion of Conscience and the Religion of Humanism - On the Religious Face of Confucianism. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshu guan, 2003. Tu, Wei-ming 杜維明. Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation. New York: State University of New York Press, 1985. Yao, Caigang 姚才剛. Zhongji Xinyang yu duoyuan jiazhi de rongtong – Liu Shuxian ruxue sixiang yanjiu 終極信仰與多元價值的融通——劉述先儒學思想研究 (Intigration of Ultimate beliefs and Pluralistic Values – A Study of Liu Shuxian’s Thought). Chengdu: Bashu sheshe, 2003. Yu, Ying-shih 余英時. “Xiandai ruxue de kunjing 現代儒學的困境” (The Difficulties of Modern Confucianism). In Xiandai Ruxue lun 現代儒學論 (Essays on Modern Confucianism), 229–235. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988. ———. “Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang 現代儒學的回顧與展望” (Retrospect and Prospect of Modern Confucianism). In Xiandai ruxue lun 現代儒學論 (Essays on Modern Confucianism), 1–57. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998.

3 Correlating Tillich’s Legacy with the Political-Existential Situation of Present-Day China Ben Siu-pun Ho 1 Introduction The extant discussion of Sino-Christian theologyand Tillich’s thoughtis mainly on the theological, religious studies, inter-religious dialogue, cultural, and philosophical levels. Many scholars have explored these aspects of Tillich and attempted to relate them to their Chinese contexts.1 However, mosthave not written much about the “political-theological Tillich” and its implication for politics in the Chinese context. A few of them did try to do so. For example, Lai Pan Chiu studied Tillich’s interpretation of the Kingdom of God, and he used it to lightly touchon the problem of collectivism in Chinese society.2 Another Hong Kong scholar, Li Chun Hong, has explained Tillich’s notion of religious socialism and attempted to address its significance for the “Chinese-styled” socialism.3 Li thussuggestedan appropriate way of making the policy towardreligions in China. Taiwanese scholar Zhuang Xin-De presentedTillich’s thinking about the nationand explicated how Tillich’s ontological-ethical conceptscritique the demonic nature of nationalism.4 Zhuang further reflected on Tillich’s analysis of utopianism and correlated it with the Sunflower Student Movement that happened in Taiwan in 2015.5 The articles of these scholars may have been stimulating at the time they were published. However, first, they spent most of their words elucidating Tillich’s ideas and only briefly mentioned their implications for Chinese society, making the correlation with China look insufficient and even weak. Second, and more importantly, most of their analyses were given a long time ago. With the enormous change in China’s political landscapeand the vigorous dynamics of global politicsin the past decade, it is doubtful whether their analyses are still valid for comprehending the politics ofChina nowadays. To reflecton it more thoroughly, whether and how Tillich’s legacy can be correlated with todayChina’s politics requires examination and compelling explanation. Forthesereasons, this essay looks into Tillich’s political-theological thought andattempts to explore its meaning in view ofthe current politics of China.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-4

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  51

2  What has Tillich to do withSino-Christian Theology? The primary query, however, is why Tillich’s legacy—and not those of other theologians, such as Karl Barth’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s—draws our attention. After all, manyWestern theologians have given their insightful responses to the political catastrophe that occurred in Europe in the last century, and thesecan be good references for reflecting on the Chinese context. Tillich’s thought intrigues the Sino-Christian theologians, partly becausehe is, as scholar Christoph Schwöbelwrites, “from the beginning intent on relating theological thought to non-theological reflection and seemingly non-religious spheres of culture.”6 This characteristic of Tillich’s theology induces Sino-Christian theologians to believe that Tillich’s legacy has much potential for dialoguing with the non-Christianity-rooted Chinese culture. Moreover, many Sino-Christian theologians are tackling the issue of modernity,7 which, by and large, is also the main issue in which Tillich engaged. Sino-Christian theologians can find resonance with some of Tillich’s concepts. As shown in the following sections, I will show that some of Tillich’s political-theological ideas even have roomfor conversing withtoday’sseemingly atheistical-political environment of China. The second reason Tillichis the focus of this study is because ofhis theological method. Scholars have observed that there are two sets of models of his theological method; the first set refers to a “question and answer” pair and the second is the “form and content.”8 This paper is going to focus on the first set. By “question and answer,” Tillich means that his method “makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions.”9 As illustrated next, the current political climate of China is fervid and prevalent, to a degree that it almost reaches a life-and-death situation—the existential level of some Chinese people.10 Some incidents cited in the following paragraphs indicate that politics is not merely one of the spheres of people’s daily life, but it has become the determinant oftheir whole living styles or even their destinies. How they live, what they speak, and what stance they show could threaten, undermine, destroy, preserve, and transcend their very existence. For this reason, I attempt to explore in what sense could Tillich’s theological ideas and interpretation of Christian symbols “answer” the Chinese people’s political-­ existential “question.” While Tillich tends to talk more about the universal dimension of the human existential condition, I will delineateconcretely the situation that the Chinese peoplearenow generally facing. I believe that this canattain a universality-particularity balance when mentioning the existence of the people of one specificcountry, and this is indeed in line with Tillich’s ontological bipolar interpretation of the structure of life.11 As a result, the readers may find that what I am carrying out is “making good use of” Tillich’s legacy. While Tillich uses the “question-answer” method

52  Ben Siu-pun Ho to build up his theological system, I appropriate it for my reflection on the politics of China. My approach is close to what Grimshawdescribes as“neo-Tillichian,” which is an “attempt to express Tillich anew in and for today [China].”12 The other feature of this essay is that, unlike the previous Sino-Christian theological writings that first explain Tillich’s ideas and then slightly employ them to reflect onthe Chinese context, this article puts the existing political situation of China on the front stage. The following parts will first depict the current political-existential condition of the Chinese people; it will subsequently explore how Tillich’s legacycould provide “answers” to the “question” described. I regard this as a Tillichian structuring; as Tillich says, “man cannot receive answers to questions he never has asked.”13 The theological response becomes meaningful only when the political-existentialsituation is properly articulated.

3  The Political-Existential Reality of Recent China Xi Jinping, the person who possesses the paramountpolitical power in today’s China, has been the general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2012. His assumption of role of the president of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) in 2013 further made him the head of the political triad system of the country. Xi carried out a series of anti-corruption campaign after seizing power in 2012. More than a million officials have been disciplined, and it seems thatXi’s far-reaching move has received appreciation and support froma considerable number ofChinese people.14 However, critics believe that this is Xi’s “excuse” to legitimize his “great purge” of his political enemies.15 Xi managed to eliminate his opposition in the nextfew years, and by 2018, there was no obstacle for anaudaciouspolitical change: The National People’s Congress, the party-controlled legislature, voted almost unanimously in March to approve an amendment to the constitution to remove the two-term limit on the presidency of the PRC, allowing Xi to remain in this position for life. Xi continues to be the general secretary of CPC after its 20th National Congress held in October 2022, getting the historic third term leadership. With the principle of “the Party controls the gun,” this means that Xi’s “trinitarian” power is secured in the future. Xi has been using an iron hand to rule over the people in the past few years. The Hong Kong Anti-extradition Bill Movement that happenedin 2019 raised international concern about the freedom of Hong Kong society, and it embarrassed Xi, especially when protestserupted during the 14th G20 Summit. Although eventually “the bill is dead,” as expressed by the former Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, the Chinese government tightened its control overthe city by establishing the Hong Kong national security law in 2020.16 More than 10,000 people were arrested because of the social movement and the law,17 and a large number of local civic associations and news media, including the pro-democrat newspaper Apple Daily, were closed

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  53 down because of the direct intervention of and the chilling effect produced by the government. However, perhaps it is not Hong Kong but the Xinjiang region thatcauses more worries about the totalitarian gesture of Xi. In the past few years, the British Broadcast Company (BBC) and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists have collected a lot of documents, pictures, interviews of sufferers, and other solid evidence to show that the Uyghurs are being persecuted, detained, and brainwashed.18 While critics have suggested that the Chinese government is running a “concentration camp” to detain the Uyghurs, the Chinese governmenthas defendeditself by sayingthat it is an “education and training center”; while people have accused it of performing Sinicization and genocide, it has responded that what it isdoing is to prevent “terrorism.” The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Office was highly concerned with the Xinjiang issue, and it dispatched investigators to Xinjiang and released a report on August 31, 2022. The report concluded that “serious human rights violations have been committed in XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) in the context of the Government’s application of counter-terrorism and counter-‘extremism’ strategies,” and “allegations of patterns of torture or ill-treatment, including forced medical treatment and adverse conditions of detention, are credible, as are allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.”19 The Chinese governmentdenied the UN’s assessment, as it did to earlier accusations against it, but many Western countries have already considered the Chinese government as one of the major threats to democracy, human dignity, and universal values. Xi rules not only coercivelyand psychologicallyby fear but also ideologically and cognitively by propaganda. Besides the mass media that are controlled by the state, there are two groups of people who are actively embellishing the Chinese government and defending it against the negative news about it. “Little Pink” is a group of “diehard fans” of China. Their fervid patriotic minds make them support every word and policy the Chinese government utters. They are very sensitive to the negative portrayals of their country, and they fire off vigorously against the unfavorable voices appearingonthe internet. Chinese state media praise the “Little Pink,” and a tacit “cooperation” has thusbeen formed.20 “Little Pink” has influential power in the entertainment industry in China, and many performers do not want to lose the big Chinese market. Consequently, this “breeds” a nationalistic fever: singers, for example, please their fans by singing songs with lyrics adoring the Chinese culture. Actors and actresses become more popular if they are cast in movies that portray a good image of today’s China. As a result, an “internal circulation” is occurring, and the measure of beauty is probablybeing replaced by the criterion of loyalty to the country. The other group is the “50 cent army” (the name derives from the amount of money each commentator supposedly earns per post on social media). Unlike “Little Pink,” which is a group of “volunteers,” “50 cent army” is paid to post

54  Ben Siu-pun Ho comments to praise the government and fight against negative views about China. In a sense, “50 cent army” is more active than “Little Pink,” because the former endeavors to set the agenda and steer the direction of the discussion. Most political fake news are created by the “50 cent army,” and it is reported that the group writes around 450 million threads of comments on the social media platform every year.21 “Little Pink” and “50 cent army” together are the frontline troops implementing the “telling China stories well” strategy uttered by Xi in 2013. Xi perceives religion as a threat to his sovereignty. Christianity is particularly dangerous, for it is a “Western” culture and “foreign power,” which, in Xi’s andmany preceding leaders’ eyes, is always intending to subvert China. However, it is quite shocking that since 2014, Xi’s government has been ­removing crosses from many church buildings, especially those in the Zhejiang province. Thisdestruction has been outraging an enormous number of Chinese Christians, and conflicts have been taking place between them and the officials. Xi’s control of religion is far-reaching, and it seems that he wants to change local Christianity not only physically but also ideologically. Instead of contextualizing or indigenizing Christianity, several news reports suggest that the government intends to transform and domesticizeChristianity in China. CPC is reportedly carrying out a project of making the official state translations of the Bible, Quran, and other religious texts.22 For example, in order to conform the Bible to CPC’s ideology, the government intends to change the story of the woman caught for adultery, who is presented to Jesus by the crowd in Chapter 8 of John’s Gospel. While the Bible writes that Jesus challenges the crowd and says that whoever has never sinned should throw the first stoneand consequently the people slip away one by one, the official state version changes it in this way: “When the crowd disappeared, Jesus stoned the sinner to death saying, I, too, am a sinner. But if the law could only be executed by men without blemish, the law would be dead.” Religion has the power toawaken people’s consciences and to mobilize people, and this is the reason CPC is very cautious of religions and tries every way to suppress their flourishing and to shape them to be merely a “tool” serving its ideology and governance. Leaders of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Bishops’ Conference of Catholic Church in China have been “urged” recently to “firmly uphold the leadership of the CPC and to help the religion better adapt itself to socialist society … to unswervingly adhere to the principle of independence and self-­governance, resist infiltration by foreign forces and resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.”23 However, it seems that the government wants people’s allegiance not only to the Party but also to a person. Xi’s portrait and the national flag have been posted on the walls of some official Three-Self churches, and the congregation has to face them during worship.24 According to Bitter Winter, a magazine on China’s religious liberty and human rights, posters of the Ten Commandment inside some churches have been replaced by Xi’s quotes, and any church that does

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  55 not do so is shut down or blacklisted. In some believers’ families, Xi’s picture has been found to be put upon the Christian “altar.”25 As early as 2014, scholars hadobserved and detailed how the Party activates a propaganda machine to build a cult of personality around Xi.26

4 Tillich’s Understandings of Faith, Religion, and Quasi-Religion After sketching the current politics of China with some illustrative incidents, I now move on to ask whether and which aspects of Tillich’s legacy can be appropriated to answer it. The “answer” in the following can be understood in two senses. First, I attempt to explore if and in what sense can Tillich’s concepts articulate or explain the situation of today’s China. The “answer” in this sense means providing a renewed framework for people to comprehend or reinterpret the meaning of the existing reality delineated earlier. The “answer” in the second sense denotes an attempt to help thepeople to encounter the challenge. This line enquires about what ideas of Tillich could empower the people to change, survive, or sustain in their difficult political-­ existential situation. The first set of concepts of Tillich looked at are his notions of faith, religion, and quasi-religion. Tillich’s understanding of faith is not confined to, for instance, confession to certain religious credos or doctrines. Faith, for him, is “the state of being ultimately concerned … If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name.”27 Faith, as an ultimate concern, is therefore an unconditional demand in which one is “grasped.” In Tillich’s mind, this comprehension does not imply that human freedom is entirely denied;28 it only means that faith demands “a decision of our whole personality. Yet it is not produced by our own intellect or will.”29 For Tillich, faith grasps people in three ways: promise, demand, and threat. God’s covenant with the Israelite in the ­Hebrew Bible is an example that includes all the three elements: God gives the Decalogue, demands the Israelite to obey, and threatens them that they cannot enter the Promised Land if they break the covenant.30 Tillich’s understanding of religion is in line with his faith: “Religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life.” A person with such religion shows “a willingness to sacrifice any finite concern which is in conflict with it.”31 This definition of religion provides an angle for Tillich and people after him to interpret various seemingly nonreligious issues and ideologies.32 In the area of political philosophy, for instance, Fascism and Communism are regarded by him as “quasi-religion,” which “indicates a genuine similarity, not intended, but based on points of identity” of religion, because “in Fascism and Communism the national and social concerns are elevated to

56  Ben Siu-pun Ho unlimited ultimacy.” Tillich says that every person being ultimately concerned does not mean that every ultimate concern is worthy—the “content” of ultimate concern must be distinguished from the “concept” of ultimate concern.33 According to him, Nazism is an example of quasi-religion with misplaced and unworthy ultimate concern, because it “invests something preliminary, finite, and conditioned with the dignity of the ultimate, infinite, and unconditional.”34 For example, it absolutizes the Germanic nation, and the consequence is “instead of trying to communicate with them (all other ­nations), it tries to destroy them, because it makes itself absolute.”35 Tillich’s notion of faith corresponds to or is supportedby other areas of study. For instance, historian Tal suggests that “PolitischerGlaube” (political faith) appears when extreme ideology is present in a society, and Nazism is an example.36 He writes: The fundamental principal of “faith” is to be understood not in terms of “belief that” but rather “belief in,” such as “belief in the Führer,” or “having confidence in him.” Only by means of this faith may one acquire a reaffirmation of one’s confidence in the fatherland, in the Reich, and even in oneself. Once again, words that have a religious structure yet a secular meaning stand out.37 Tal further argues that power can work through the “sacralization of politics” and the “secularization of religion.”38 The boundary between the conventional understandings of politics and religion can blur in some circumstances, and this observation echoes Tillich’s identification of the ­quasi-religious characteristics of some forms of politics. Tillich’s comprehensions of faith, religion, and quasi-religion offer a stimulating perspective for us to reconceive the nature of what CPC or Xi Jinping is currently carrying out. The Chinese government’sintention isto get the total submission of the people—not only of the Chinese people but also of the people of other countries, and this is evident in its “wolf warrior diplomacy.” It is astonishing that Xi mentioned the words “faith,” “faithfully,” “belief,” “commit,” and “conviction” for almost 40 times in his report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC—an alleged atheistic political party. He expresseshis concern lucidlyin the report: Inside the Party, there were many issues with respect to upholding the Party’s leadership, including a lack of clear understanding and effective action as well as a slide toward weak, hollow, and watered-down Party leadership in practice. Some Party members and officials were wavering in their political conviction.39 “No one can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other” (Matt. 6:24, NRSV). The destruction of the crossesat church buildingsand the posting of

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  57 the portraits of Xi on the walls of churcheslively demonstrate the exclusive and aggressive quasi-religious nature of the CPC. CPC “grasps” people, and it does not allow them to “slip into” the hands of other religions. It demands faithfulness and the total submission and surrender of its target.

5  The Conception of the Demonic As mentioned above, Tillich believes that there is ultimate concern for everyone; however, what matters is how worthy the “content” of ultimate concern is. Tillich regards an idolatrous ultimate concern as demonic, and it should be constantly avoided and combated against. The conception of the demonic is innovative and significant in Tillich’s theology.40 This partfocusesontwo of Tillich’s essays to explain the idea, and they are “The Demonic: A Study in the Interpretation of History” (Das Dämonische: EinBeitragzurSinndeutung der Geschichte) in 192641 and the speech of the third lecture of the Thorp Lectures that Tillich delivered in Cornell University in 1962, titled “The Divine and the Demonic.”42 The characteristics of the demonic can be summarized into four aspects. The first is its ambiguity in which constructive/creative and destructive elements are mixed.43 For Tillich, the demonic is different from the satanic. The satanic is the negative principle of the demonic; nevertheless, the demonic contains both positive and negative elements that are described by Tillich as having a “dialectical depth.”44 Mere negativity is immediately recognized, and so it is incapable of explaining the fascinating power of the demonic. The demonic must exhibit certain “tempting” attractions—some seemingly or superficially constructive features.45 Furthermore, the demonic needs to acquire a form to exist. In other words, it must obtain a constructive form, for instance, the form of a creature before conducting any destruction. This, however, implies that its negativity is unable to substantiate itself without the positivity outside of itself. It is interesting to see how Tillich exemplifies this feature through a biblical narrative: “In the Biblical story of Jesus, who expelled demons throughout his work, the demons ask him, ‘Can we go into the swine?’ When they are permitted, they go in and drive the animal to destruction.”46 Demons require the form of swine to exist. The drowning of the swine in the Gerasene shows that the demonic aims at ruining form by obtaining form, and the consequence is its existential self-­ destruction. However, “it may break through a given form in order to attain a higher one, but it does not shatter form simply for the sake of shattering it.”47 The telos of the demonic form-destruction is to elevate the demonic to infinity, like “the serpent provokes immense potentialities, he tempts Adam to actualize himself in knowledge and power.”48 This desire for infinity is the second characteristic of the demonic. It is a desire of “the drive to burst through its own particular limits of form and to realize the abyss within itself.”49 The mark of self-elevation to the absoluteness is partly assisted by the ambiguous constructive characteristic of the demonic: “It is the elevation of something

58  Ben Siu-pun Ho relative and ambiguous (something in which the negative and the positive are united) to absoluteness. The ambiguous, in which positive and negative, creative and destructive elements are mingled, is considered sacred in itself, is deified.”50 Certain ideologies, for instance, nationalism, exhibit this demonic feature: “The symbols of the nation become the sacrosanct and inviolable elements of the cult. This is where the demonic begins to emerge.”51 The demonic is a “structural” evil, and this is its third characteristic. “Man’s (sic.) life knows no completely isolated event. Everything that happens in man is connected with everything—that is the definition of structure.”52 The power of the demonic should not be understood simply as “moralistic concept of sin,” because the demonic works in the “superpersonal dimensions of community”53 as well as the personal dimension. This is why Tillich explains the demonic in social and historical levels and discusses “social demons” and “salvation history” (Heilsgeschichite).54 It is because the demonic wields such structural encompassing power it cannot be confronted with individual endeavor but “structure of grace.”55 The fourth feature of the demonic is its possessing power. For Tillich, this power attacks personality: “personal freedom and autonomy are grounded in the unity of the personality and in the synthetic character of consciousness. Possession assails the unity and freedom that lie at the center of the personality. The divided mind has always been taken as a sign of demonic possession.”56 While one’s center of self and rationality are attacked, possession “exalts the very elements of the unconscious.”57 Paradoxically, it is exactly this unconsciousness that gives creativity—the first characteristic of the demonic—to the possessed one. Again, Tillich employs a biblical story to illustrate his claim: The demon recognized Jesus as the Christ before the average man, even the average disciple, was [not] able to recognize him, and this means that the other element of the split consciousness is sensitive to things to which the united center was shut off. This is why one often speaks of possession as inspiration, confusing the two. The enemies of Jesus attribute demonic possession to him when he exercises the power of inspiration. ‘By Beelzebub he casts out demons.’58 How does Tillich’s conception of the demonic “answers” the political reality of today’s China? First, it explains why Xi’s power can continue for over ten years. We should not neglect that Xi’ s governance receivesa certain degree of public support in his country. His strike at corruption getsmany people’s appreciation, as corruption has long been anineradicable social problem in China. While it may be Xi’s “excuse” to purge his political rivals, and corruption is eventually not completely solved, some people are delighted when they come to know that officials who are taking away their wealthare heavily punished or dismissed. In addition, although Xi’s control disregards others’ voices, in some people’s eyes, he ensures many government policiesare

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  59 implemented more quickly, albeit not always effectively. As the democratic systems of the Western countries—in whatever forms—have started showing up some internal problems recently, Xi’s totalitarianism is increasingly beingconsidered by some Chinese people to be superior thana more open and market-oriented governance. In fact, Xi says in the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC that China’s reform that took place by the end of the 1970s in the last century has caused: some people [to] lack confidence in the socialist political system with Chinese characteristics, and, all too often, we saw laws being ignored or not being strictly enforced. Misguided patterns of thinking such as money worship, hedonism, egocentricity, and historical nihilism were common, and online discourse was rife with disorder. All this had a grave impact on people’s thinking and the public opinion environment.59 Xi then declares that his work is “to ensure the people’s well-being.” Thus, we find that Xi’s governance exhibits the feature of ambiguity of the demonic power: it stresses on its “constructive” elements, such as the result of the anti-corruption campaign, intending to “cover up” its satanic autocratic side and to “grasp” people’s appreciation and allegiance. The demonic “possesses” a leader, evidenced in the sacralization of him and the self-elevation to infinity. Xi demands the people to be faithful to him, and the replacement of the Ten Commandments with his quotes is highly symbolic in this regard, for the first Commandment says, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” However, this is not only a personal matter but also a structural and historical issue. Xi often emphasizes the “humiliation” of China in history— how China’s territories weredivided, occupied, and colonized by the Western countries in the last century, but that Chinanow has “stood up, grown rich, and become strong.” The history and the social development of China help to structure and breednationalist sentiment among the Chinese people. Those Chinese nationalistsseem to bepossessed by the demonic as well, and they desire a Leviathan, not because civil war is going on among them and so they long for a strong government to end the chaos, but because they want to revenge foreign powers and to rejuvenate their state. The presence of a tyrant meets their needs, and Xi acts as a figure of their aspirations. Tillich rightly says, “The manipulation of men is not, of course, a one-way road. It is successful only if the reaction of the manipulated is not negative.”60 Xi and thenationalists are what we see on the stage, but what we may be unable to see is the demonic power that controls and operates backstage.

6  The Contextual Meaningfulness of the Cross of Jesus Christ Tillich’s interpretation of the Cross of Jesus Christ thus becomes illuminating when we pair it with his idea of the demonic. Tillich said in the 1963 Earl Lectures that the relevance of Christianity to the modern age falls upon

60  Ben Siu-pun Ho the image of the Cross, which “is the end of every religious as well as every political absolutism.”61 In his last lecture in 1965, “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian,” he asserts that “there is an old symbol for the Christ, Christus Victor. …It points to the victory on the cross as a negation of any demonic claim. … The criterion for us as Christians is the event of the cross.”62 He identifies Jesus’s crucifixion as “the finality of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ,” possessing “the power of negating itself without losing itself.” By crucifying himself, Jesus’s selfnot only preserved but also becomes what Tillich calls “theonomous”: “He becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals.”63 Scholar Amos Yong rightly articulates this mystery: Thus Jesus is the Christ who defeats the powers of the demonic precisely because he avoided the self-grasping and self-elevating characteristic of the seductions of the demonic, and relied instead upon the power of the Spirit. In this way, Christ as the New Being exposes all of history’s false/ demonic absolutes, and points forward toward the transcendental and eschatological absolute of divine justice.64 For this reason, removing the crossesby the Chinese government can be symbolically regarded as an act of “negating the negation of self-elevation.” The destructive move reveals the self-sacralization feature of the demonic. Some Christians in the Zhejiang province reportedly made small redpainted wooden crosses and wore cross-printed T-shirts to protest against the anti-cross campaign.65 One user of Weibo, a popular social media platform, says, “Let the cross take root in everyone’s heart.”66 The reaction of these Christians is noticeable, because it shows that while the material cross is being destroyed, the symbolic power of the cross still remains and even seems to amplify. Some Church leaders “called on churches in other parts of the country to join the relay in the safe and legal non-violent disobedience movement.”67 The symbol of the cross seems to unite people to resist, and its “indefeasibility” appears to be the scandal of the sovereignty in China. It attempts to eradicate the reminder of negation of self-elevation, but it fails; its self-elevating attempt is negated by the people who bear the power of the Cross of Jesus Christ. The symbol of the Cross is upheld and emphasized; it crucifies the triumph of the demonic.

7 The Implications of the Kingdom of God in the “Kingdom” of China Toward the end of the last century, theologian Carl Braaten wrote that “Paul Tillich made the greatest contribution to the interpretation of the Kingdom of God among the theological leaders of the last generation.”68 In 1938, Tillich had already employed the symbol in his article, “The Kingdom of God and History,” for reflecting on the struggle with the demonic Nazism.69

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  61 He later systematically conceptualized and more vigorously explained this symbol in volume three of his Systematic Theology in the United States. Why is the Kingdom of God used by Tillich to confront the demonic? What are the implications of this symbol? First, the “Kingdom” of “God” contains strong social and political denotations and instructions. Tillich writes that the symbol in the Christian Bible is “in his own right for the highest and most consecrated center of political control.” In Judaism and in the New Testament, the Kingdom of God designates “a transformed heaven and earth, a new reality in a new period of history. It results from a rebirth of the old in a new creation in which God is everything in everything.”70 If the demonic elevates itself to infinity and to the absolute, the Kingdom of God “expresses the majesty, controlling power, and distance of the unconditioned meaning of existence with respect to the realm of conditioned meanings.”71 In other words, the Kingdom of God declares God’s sovereignty, “relativizes” any absolutization claim, and dissolves all utopian promises—“Paul (the Apostle) expresses this in the symbols ‘God being all in all’ and ‘the Christ surrendering the rule over history to God.’”72 Furthermore, the Kingdom of God “fulfills the utopian expectation of a realm of peace and justice while liberating them from their utopian character by the addition of ‘of God,’ for with this addition the i­ mpossibility of an earthly fulfillment is implicitly acknowledged.”73 Any romanticized historical view and national myth pronounced are shattered—in Tillich’s time, they were Hitler’s emphasis of “blood and soil” and the promise of the “Third Reich.” In the present context of China, they are probably the desire of building a “community with a shared future for mankind”74 and the “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” declared by Xi.75 At all events, in Tillich’s mind, one ought to differentiate the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world and be crystal clear about the natures of these two kingdoms. Preliminary sovereignty and ultimate supremacy should never be confused. In addition, we should be cautious of political promise, as Pope Benedict XVI rightly says, “Wherever politics tries to be redemptive, it is promising too much. Where it wishes to do the work of God, it becomes not divine, but demonic.”76 However, one question arises: Could one absolutize herself/himself when upholding the concept of the Kingdom of God? Indeed, human history informs us that many fanatical and inhumane social movements appeared in the name of building or participating in the Kingdom of God. This consideration is especially meaningful in the Chinese context, because in the history of China the rebellion of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom that occurred in the 19th century caused a huge number of deaths, and since then, it has been worsening many Chinese people’s impression of Christianity. However, Tillich insists that the manifestation of the Kingdom of God in this world is incomplete, preliminary, or “fragmentary”77—an adjective that is often used by Tillich to describe his idea of “theonomy.” The Kingdom of God is always “at hand” and “becoming,” 78 and its consummation

62  Ben Siu-pun Ho only occurs beyond history.79 The demonic power may “penetrate into the church itself, both in its doctrine and institutions.”80 The incompleteness of the Kingdom of God in this world remindsthe Christian community of human finitude and imperfection, as well as God’s grace and ultimate fulfillment. The Kingdom of God should beviewed as a convictionor a resistance foothold, rather than a political emblem or slogan for initiating or running a social movement. The Kingdom of God is unambiguous, albeit incomplete in Tillich’s mind. Analogically, this is like a segment of an art piece entirely made up of pure gold—fragmentary but genuine. There are marks of the Kingdom of God that can be “anticipated,” and they are values that incentivize people to struggle with manipulative force. Justice is one of the marks;81 the others are valuing personality—“the fulfillment of humanity in every human individual,” and universality—“a kingdom not only of men; it involves the fulfillment of life under all dimensions.”82 These values can be regarded as “identifiers” of the Kingdom of God, and they are not values exclusively possessed by the Church that can be found outside the Christian community. This leads to two implications: first, the Church intermittently fails to give testimony of the divine as seen in history. The word “Kingdom,” however, denotes that God works in a broader scope than in the Church. This means that the failure of the Church does not necessitate the failure of God’s work in this world. Thus, on the one hand, the Church is reminded to not view itself as an exclusive agent of God, while on the other hand, the hope of defeating the demonic is still present if the Church is temporarily demonized. The second and related implication is that because the values of the Kingdom of God can be found in non-Christian communities, Tillich names themthe “latent” church, in order to distinguish them from the “manifest” church. Communities are said to be latent churches if they have not encountered Jesus as the Christ, or they are in a preparatory state for the acceptance of it albeit showing values of the Kingdom of God. In Tillich’s words, the latent church is “the state of being partly actual, partly potential.”83 However, the latent church has the Spirit of God in it. Tillich’s ecclesiology humbles the institutionalchurch, and his interpretation of the Kingdom of God addresses that there are a common “enemy” and values that both the latent and the manifest churchesare encountering and cherishing. This probably helps to unite Christian believers and nonbelievers in China and to point a fresh and timely missionary direction and strategy for the development of Chinese Christianity at the moment. This perspective also illuminates the Church a proper understanding and attitude to the large-scale social protests that happened in the end of November 2022. How to contribute to some public concerns and the realization of some universal values from a Christian theological point of view may become one direction for the development of the Sino-Christian theology in the future, and Tillich’s legacy is definitely one of the appealing resources.

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  63

8 Conclusion This essay first raises and then explains the problems regarding the Sino-Christian theological engagement with Tillich. It states that Sino-­ ­ Christian theologians have not considered or given a robust correlation between Tillich and the current political situation of China. This article attempts to constructor enhance this linkby employing a neo-Tillichian correlation model of question and answer. It first outlines the picture of the politics of China in the past decade by addressing several significant relevant incidents. The delineation indicates that the Chinese government today is on the way to totalitarian governance, andthis becomes a pressing political-­existential challenge formany Chinese people. Then, how a part of Tillich’s legacy is c­ apable of answering their political-existential “question” is explored. Three sets of Tillich’s ideas are picked up and examined, and they are (1) faith, religion, and quasi-religion; (2) the demonic and the Cross of Jesus Christ; and (3) the Kingdom of God. This study shows that they provideanswersto the question in two senses. First, they offer an illuminating theological perspective to rethink the politics of China. For example, Tillich’s interpretations of quasi-religion and the demonic accurately capture the nature of what the CPC and President Xi are carrying out. The conflict between the Chinese government and many local churches signifies the former’s exclusive ­ quasi-religious character. Tillich’s political-theological notions contain a strong explanatory power for us to comprehend the politics of today’s China. However, Tillich’s “answer” is prescriptive as well as interpretative. His interpretation of the Cross of Jesus Christ suggests that bearing this symbol in mind could strengthen Christians’conviction in resisting a demonic regime. This is testified by the reactions of some Chinese Christians when the crosses of their churches are torn down by the government. This essay finally examines Tillich’s notion of the Kingdom of God, proposing that this symbol, on the one hand, like the Cross of Jesus Christ, negates the ultimate sovereignty and the absolute control of any earthly kingdom, while, on the other hand, the values that the Kingdom of God stresses could unite the people to resist. The symbol could deliver the “gospel” to non-Christians, for it states that withstanding is never lonely and that the communal resisting power would augmentwhen people put their faith in the Kingdom of God and are willing and are ready to be empowered by it.

Notes 1 For a summary of the engagement of Sino-Christian theology with Tillich’s thought before 2006, refer to 陳家富， 「編者前言：近年西方與漢語學界的蒂利 希研究」，載陳家富編， 《蒂利希與漢語神學》（香港：道風書社，2006），頁11–36 。[Keith K.F. Chan, “Editor’s Preface: A Review on the Recent Western and Chinese Scholarships on Tillich Studies,” in Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology, ed. Keith K.F. Chan (Hong Kong: Logos and Pneuma Press, 2006), 11–36.] The Sino-Christian theological engagement with Tillich continues to flourish after

64  Ben Siu-pun Ho 2006. A Chinese academic journal Logos and Pneuma published a special issue for the fiftieth anniversary of Paul Tillichʼs death in 2015. See 楊俊杰、賴品超， 「 中心作邊緣：紀念蒂利希辭世五十周年——神學論題引介」， 《道風：基督教文化評 論》，43期，2015：頁19–28。[Yang Junjie, Lai Pan Chiu, “The Centre as Boundary: Essays for the Fiftieth Anniversary of Paul Tillichʼs Death: An Introduction,” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 43 (Autumn 2015): 19–28.] 2 賴品超， 「田立克對上帝國的詮釋與漢語基督教終未論」， 《道風 : 漢語神學學刊》, 8期，1998：頁43–73。[Lai Pan Chiu, “Tillich’s Interpretation of the Kingdom of God and the Sino-Christian Eschatology,” in Logos&Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no.8 (Autumn 1998): 43–73.] 3 李駿康， 「蒂利希的宗教社會主義及其對當代中國的意義」，載《蒂利希與漢語神 學》，頁313–350 [Li Chun Hong, “Tillich’s Idea of Religious Socialism and Its Significance to Contemporary China,” in Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology, 313–350.] 4 莊信德， 「蒂利希本體論範式的『國家』概念對『民族國家』魔魅本質的批判」，載《 蒂利希與漢語神學》，頁351–371. [Zhuang Xin-De, “Tillich’s Ontological Idea of the State and Critique of the Demonic Nature of National State,” in Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology, 351–371.] 「烏托邦辯證視域下的太陽花學運台灣」， 《道風：基督教文化評論》，43 5 莊信德， 期，2015：頁51–76。[Chuang HsinTe, “Examining Sunflower Student Movement under the Utopian Visions of Paul Tillich,” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 43 (Autumn 2015): 51–76.] 6 Christoph Schwöbel, “Tillich, Paul (1883–1965),” in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought, ed. Alister E. McGrath (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 638–642. 7 For a brief review of the development and the “trend” of Sino-Christian theology, refer to 林子淳， 「科際整合：漢語神學的終結？——對當前漢語神學發展 軌跡的反思」， 《道風：基督教文化評論》，38期，2013：頁33–64. [Jason T. S. Lam, “Interdisciplinary Studies: The End of Sino-Christian ‘Theology’? A Reflection on the Development of Sino-Christian Theology,” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 38 (spring 2013): 33–64. 8 John Powell Clayton, The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology (Berlin: Watler de Gruyter, 1980), 155–249. 9 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 62. 10 Tillich’s understanding of “existential” is different from “existentialism.” See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1973, 1:62. 11 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1973, 1:174–186. 12 Mike Grimshaw, “The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Radical, Impure Tillich,” in Retrieving the Radical Tillich: His Legacy and Contemporary Importance, ed. Russell Re Manning (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 116. 13 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1973, 1:65. 14 Rahul Karan Reddy, “China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: Tigers, Flies, and Everything in Between,” The Diplomat, May 12, 2022, https://thediplomat. com/2022/05/chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-tigers-flies-and-everything-inbetween/. Accessed November 28, 2022. 15 Charting China’s ‘great Purge’ under Xi,” BBC News, October 23, 2017, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162. Accessed on November 28, 2022. 16 For a review of the events of the 2019 protest, see Ben Siu-pun Ho, “A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests,” in The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology, ed. Pui-lan Kwok and Francis Ching-Wah Yip (Lanham, MD: Rowman& Littlefield Publishing Group, 2021), 15–38.

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  65 17 Statistics on Criminal Cases,” The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Press Releases, April 27, 2021, https://www.info.gov.hk/ gia/general/202204/27/P2022042700446.htm. 18 For BBC’s follow up, seeJohn Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” BBC News, May 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/­ 85qihtvw6e/the-faces-from-chinas-uyghur-detention-camps. Accessed on November 28, 2022. For the investigation conducted by International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, read ScillaAlecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang” (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022), https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiang-­ police-filesuyghur-mugshots-detention/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIpp-f6bjk-gIVVlZgCh2CQWaEAAYASAAEgKDUPD_BwE. Accessed November 28, 2022. 19 OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China” (The Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 31, 2022), 43, https:// www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022–08–31/22–08–31final-­assesment.pdf. Accessed November 28, 2022. 20 Lotus Ruan, “The New Face of Chinese Nationalism,” Foreign Policy, August 25, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/25/the-new-face-of-chinese-­nationalism/. Accessed December 5, 2022. 21 Henry Farrell, “The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year. This Is Why,” The Washington Post, May 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/thechinese-­government-fakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-yearthis-is-why/. Accessed December 5, 2022. 22 Matthew Taylor King, “The Gospel According to Xi,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-gospel-according-to-xi-11591310956. Accessed December 5, 2022. 23 Jianli Yang, “Xi Jinping Blocks Christianity, Invents Communist Version in China,” The Washington Times, June 1, 2021, https://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2021/jun/1/xi-jinping-blocks-christianity-invents-communist-v/. Accessed December 5, 2022. 24 The Chinese Communist Party’s War on Churches,” Global Prayer for China, accessed December 5, 2022, https://globalprayerforchina.org/thechina-communist-partys-war-on-churches/. 25 Zhe Tang, “Xi Jinping Portraits Replace Catholic Symbols in Churches,” November 25, 2019, https://bitterwinter.org/xi-jinping-portraits-replace-­ catholic-symbols/. Accessed December 5, 2022. 26 Luwei Rose Luqiu, “The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China,” East Asia 33, no. 4 (December 2016): 289–307, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140016-9262-x. 27 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 1. 28 Brown D. Mackenzie, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 17, 18. 29 Ibid., 10. 30 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 2–4. More on Tillich’s understanding of the concept of faith in the Hebrew Bible, read Paul Tillich, The Ground of Being: Neglected Essays of Paul Tillich, ed. Robert M Price (Mindvendor Publications, 2016), 123–126. 31 Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 4, 5. 32 For example, Tillich’s concept of ultimate concept was employed by the Supreme Court of the United States as a criterion by which beliefs may be judged religious.

66  Ben Siu-pun Ho See James McBride, “Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich’s ‘Ultimate Concern’ as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation,” Journal of Church and State 30, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 245–272. The controversy surrounds whether conscientious objectors were permitted not to serve in the army if they do not have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. With reference to Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern, the Supreme Court was convinced and ruled in a case that “the individuals in question need not profess conceived notion of a ‘Supreme Being’ in order to qualify for conscientious objector status.” A person may have the status of being a conscientious objector “based on a belief that has a similar position in that person’s life to the belief in God.” See “United States v. Seeger,” Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1964/50. Accessed December 5, 2022. Tillich’s understanding of faith echoes one of the Frankfurt School thinkers, Erich Fromm’s view: “It is difficult to think of faith not primarily as faith in something, but of faith as an inner attitude the specific object of which is of secondary importance. It may be helpful to remember that the term ‘faith’ as it is used in the Old Testament—‘Emunah’—means ‘firmness’ and thereby denotes a certain quality of human experience, a character trait, rather than the content of a belief in something.” See Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), 199. Italics in the origin. 33 D. Mackenzie, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, 21, 22. 34 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 130. 35 D. Mackenzie, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, 25. 36 Uriel Tal, Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Third Reich: Selected Essays (London: Routledge, 2004), 16–47. 37 Ibid., 18. 38 Ibid., 18. 39 For the full text of the report, read “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 25, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908.html. Accessed December 5, 2022. 40 According to Tillich scholar Werner Schüßler, Tillich once expressed to his colleague that even his all other writings need to be burnt away, those which are concerned with his idea of the demonic must be preserved. See Werner Schüßler, “Der Begriff Des Dämonischen,” in An Den Rändern: Theologische Lernprozesse Mit Yorick Spiegel, ed. Ilona Nord and Fritz Rüdiger Volz (Münster: LIT, 2005), 179. The publication of a book few years ago, Christian Danz and Werner Schüßler, eds., Das Dämonische (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018) attempts to show that this concept is relevant to the contemporary world. There are several works discussing the metaphysical problem regarding the potential demonic present in God, for example, Vernon Mallow, The Demonic: A Selected Theological Study: An Examination into the Theology of Edwin Lewis, Karl Barth, and Paul Tillich (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 101–150.; H. Frederick Reisz Jr., “The Demonic as a Principle in Tillich’s Doctrine of God,” in Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 135–156; However, the focus of this section is not the metaphysical problem of God, but Tillich’s understanding of the political behavior exhibited by the demonic. 41 The German version can be found in Paul Tillich, Main Works 5: Writings on ­Religion, ed. Scharlemann Robert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), 99–123. There are two English versions of this essay: “The Demonic” in Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), and “The Demonic: A Study in the Interpretation of

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  67 History” inJacquelyn Ann K. Kegley and Paul Tillich, Paul Tillich on Creativity (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 63–91. I agree with several Tillich scholars, for example, Ronald Stone that the former suffers poor translation. Therefore, I use the latter version for my analysis. See Ronald H. Stone, Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary in New York (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2012), 73 and 447 f.n. 5. 42 This series of lectures was conducted on April 12, 13, and 15, 1962. The text scrutinized is the typescript of the speech of the third lecture, which is found in the archive of Tillich of Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School. See “The Problem of Evil, Three Lectures” (Lecture I: “Man, Nature and Evil”; Lecture II: “The Struggle Between Good and Evil as the Ambiguity of Life”; Lecture III: “The Divine and the Demonic”), handwritten and typescript, n.d. Tillich, Paul, 1886–1965. Papers, 1894–1974., bMS 649, bMS 649/41 (14), Box: 41, Folder: 14. Harvard Divinity School Library, Harvard University. I express my gratitude to Maureen Jennings for helping me to access the material. I hereafter use “Lecture III” to refer to the typescript of the third lecture, “The Divine and the Demonic.” 43 Kegley and Tillich, Paul Tillich on Creativity, 65. 44 Paul Tillich, Advanced Problem of Systematic Theology: Courses at Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1936–1938, ed. Erdmann Sturm (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 253. 45 Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. and Paul Tillich, 73, and “Lecture III”, 9, 10. 46 “Lecture III,” 9. 47 Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. and Paul Tillich, 73. 48 “Lecture III,” 10. 49 Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. and Paul Tillich, 68. 50 Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, ed. Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), 132, 133. 51 Kegley and Tillich, Paul Tillich on Creativity, 89. 52 “Lecture III,” 13. 53 Kegley and Tillich, Paul Tillich on Creativity, 74. 54 Ibid., 72–76. Tillich understands Heilsgeschichite in this way: “It is only when history is approached as sacred history (Heilsgeschichite) that it can have an unconditional meaning. This sacred character lies hidden, to be sure, in the depths of history; it cannot serve as a model for representing historical events… It must remain in the background in the depths. Genuinely historical thinking deals with verifiable phenomena that can be illuminated by the depths: the battle of the divine against the demonic, the in-breaking of ‘salvation’ (‘Heil’),” cf. Cullmann’s idea of Heilsgeschichite, Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History, trans. Floyd V. Filson, 3rd edition (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2018). 55 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, from Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 246. 56 Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. and Paul Tillich, 69. 57 Ibid., 70, 71. 58 “Lecture III,” 11. 59 Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” 60 Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, ed. J. Mark Thomas (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1988), 147. 61 Paul Tillich, The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Christian Message, ed. Durwood Foster (Eugene, OR.:Wipf& Stock Publishers, 2007), 53, 54.

68  Ben Siu-pun Ho 62 Paul Tillich “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian,” in Paul Tillich, Main Works 6: Theological Writings, ed. Carl Heinz Ratschow (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 437, 438. 63 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1973, 1:133. 64 Amos Yong, In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2010), 138. 65 Vivienne Zeng, “Chinese Christians Make Crosses at Home as Church Crosses Are Removed by Gov’t,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 27, 2015, https://hongkongfp. com/2015/07/27/zhejiang-christians-make-crosses-at-home-as-church-crossesare-removed-by-govt/. Accessed December 5, 2022, and Dan Southerland, “Zhejiang’s Christians Are Resisting a Campaign Against Church Crosses,” Radio Free Asia, August 11, 2015, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asiabeat/china-churches-08112015122240.html. Accessed December 5, 2022. 66 Zeng, “Chinese Christians Make Crosses at Home as Church Crosses Are ­Removed by Gov’t.” Accessed December 5, 2022. 67 Ibid. 68 Carl E. Braaten, “The Kingdom of God and Life Everlasting,” in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 291. 69 Paul Tillich, Theology of Peace, ed. Ronald H. Stone (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 25–56. 70 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 3:358. Italic mine. 71 Paul Tillich, Theology of Peace, 33. 72 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 3:359. 73 Ibid., 358. 74 Xi Urges BRICS Countries to Advance Building of Community with Shared Future for Mankind,” XinhuaNet, September 9, 2021, http://www.news.cn/­ english/2021–09/09/c_1310178476.htm. Accessed December 5, 2022. 75 The Chinese Dream,” The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, July 13, 2022, http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/­ chinakeywords/2022–07/13/content_78321910.htm. Accessed December 5, 2022. 76 Joseph Pearson, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2004), 116. 77 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 3:381. 78 Tillich, Theology of Peace, 35, 36. 79 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 3:394–423. 80 Tillich, Theology of Peace, 35. 81 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1976, 3:358. 82 Ibid., 358, 359. 83 Ibid., 152–154.

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Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  69 Clayton, John Powell. The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,1980. Cullmann, Oscar. Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History. Translated by Floyd V. Filson. 3rd edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf& Stock Publishers,2018. D. Mackenzie, Brown. Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue. New York: Harper & Row,1965. Danz, Christian, and Werner Schüßler, eds. Das Dämonische. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Fromm, Erich. Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. Abingdon: Routledge,2002. Grimshaw, Mike. “The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Radical, Impure Tillich.” In Retrieving the Radical Tillich: His Legacy and Contemporary Importance, edited by Russell Re Manning,113–131. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2015. Ho, Ben Siu-pun. “A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests.” In The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology, edited by Pui-lan Kwok and Francis Ching-Wah Yip,15–38. Lanham, MD: Rowman& Littlefield Publishing Group,2021. Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K., and Paul Tillich. Paul Tillich on Creativity. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,1989. King, Matthew Taylor. “The Gospel According to Xi.” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-gospel-according-to-xi-11591310956. Lai, Pan Chiu. “Tillich’s Interpretation of the Kingdom of God and the Sino-­ Christian Eschatology.” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no.8 (Autumn 1998): 43–73. [賴品超， 「田立克對上帝國的詮釋與漢語基督教終未論」。 《道 風 : 漢語神學學刊》，8期，1998：頁43–73。] Lam, Jason T.S. “Interdisciplinary Studies: The End of Sino-Christian ‘Theology’? A Reflection on the Development of Sino-Christian Theology.” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 38 (Spring 2013):33–64. [林子淳， 「科際整合：漢 語神學的終結？——對當前漢語神學發展軌跡的反思」。 《道風：基督教文化評論》 ，38期，2013：頁33–64.] Li, Chun Hong. “Tillich’s Idea of Religious Socialism and Its Significance to Contemporary China.” InPaul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology, edited by Keith K.F. Chan,313–350. Hong Kong: Logos and Pneuma Press,2006. [李駿康， 「蒂利 希的宗教社會主義及其對當代中國的意義」，載陳家富編， 《蒂利希與漢語神學》，頁 313–350。香港：道風書社，2006。] Luqiu, Luwei Rose. “The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China.” East Asia 33, no. 4 (December 2016): 289–307. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-0169262-x. Mallow, Vernon. The Demonic: A Selected Theological Study: An Examination into the Theology of Edwin Lewis, Karl Barth, and Paul Tillich. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,1983. McBride, James. “Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich’s ‘Ultimate Concern’ as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation.” Journal of Church and State 30, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 245–272. Pearson, Joseph. Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions. Translated by Henry Taylor. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press,2004. Reisz Jr., H. Frederick. “The Demonic as a Principle in Tillich’s Doctrine of God.” In Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, edited by John J. Carey,135–156. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,1984.

70  Ben Siu-pun Ho Schüßler, Werner. “Der Begriff Des Dämonischen.” In An Den Rändern: TheologischeLernprozesseMitYorick Spiegel, edited by Ilona Nord and Fritz RüdigerVolz,179–191. Münster: LIT,2005. Schwöbel, Christoph. “Tillich, Paul(1883–1965).” In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought, edited by Alister E. McGrath,638–642. Oxford: Blackwell,1993. Stone, Ronald H. Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary in New York. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,2012. Tal, Uriel. Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Third Reich: Selected Essays. London: Routledge,2004. Tillich, Paul. The Interpretation of History. Translated by N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936. ———. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. ———. My Search for Absolutes. Edited by Ruth N. Anshen. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967. ———. A History of Christian Thought, from Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism. Edited by Carl E. Braaten. New York: Simon and Schuster,1968. ———. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. ———. Systematic Theology. Vol. 3. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. ———. Main Works 5: Writings on Religion. Edited by Scharlemann Robert. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988. ———. The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society. Edited by J. Mark Thomas. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1988. ———. Theology of Peace. Edited by Ronald H. Stone. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990. ———. Main Works 6: Theological Writings. Edited by Carl Heinz Ratschow. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992. ———. The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Christian Message. Edited by Durwood Foster. Eugene, OR: Wipf& Stock Publishers, 2007. ———. Dynamics of Faith. New York: HarperOne, 2009. ———. Advanced Problem of Systematic Theology: Courses at Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1936–1938. Edited by Erdmann Sturm. Berlin: De Gruyter,2016. ———. The Ground of Being: Neglected Essays of Paul Tillich. Edited by Robert M Price. Mindvendor Publications,2016. ———. “The Problem of Evil, Three Lectures” (Lecture I: “Man, Nature and Evil”; Lecture II: “The Struggle Between Good and Evil as the Ambiguity of Life”; Lecture III: “The Divine and the Demonic”). Papers, 1894–1974., bMS 649, bMS 649/41 (14), Box: 41, Folder: 14. Harvard Divinity School Library, Harvard University. Yang, Junjie, and Lai, Pan Chiu. “The Centre as Boundary: Essays for the Fiftieth Anniversary of Paul Tillichʼs Death: An Introduction.” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 43 (Autumn 2015): 19–28. [楊俊杰、賴品超， 「中心作 邊緣：紀念蒂利希辭世五十周年——神學論題引介」， 《道風：基督教文化評論》，43 期，2015：頁19–28。] Yong, Amos. In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co.,2010.

Correlating Tillich’s Legacy  71 Zhuang, Xin-De (Chuang, HsinTe). “Examining Sunflower Student Movement under the Utopian Visions of Paul Tillich.” Logos &Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, no. 43 (autumn 2015): 51–76. [莊信德， 「烏托邦辯證視域下的太陽花學運 台灣」， 《道風：基督教文化評論》，43期，2015：頁51–76。] ———.“Tillich’s Ontological Idea of the State and Critique of the Demonic Nature of National State.” In Paul Tillich and Sino-Christian Theology, edited by Keith K.F. Chan,351–371. Hong Kong: Logos and Pneuma Press,2006. [莊信德， 「蒂利 希本體論範式的『國家』概念對『民族國家』魔魅本質的批判」，載陳家富編， 《蒂利 希與漢語神學》，頁351–371。香港：道風書社，2006。]

News Sites BBC News. “Charting China’s ‘great Purge’ under Xi,” October 23, 2017. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162. Farrell, Henry. “The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year. This Is Why.” The Washington Post, May 19, 2016. https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-­governmentfakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-year-this-is-why/. Reddy, Rahul Karan. “China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: Tigers, Flies, and Everything in Between.” The Diplomat, May 12, 2022. https://thediplomat. com/2022/05/chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-tigers-flies-and-everything-inbetween/. Ruan, Lotus. “The New Face of Chinese Nationalism.” Foreign Policy, August 25, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/25/the-new-face-of-chinese-nationalism/. Southerland, Dan. “Zhejiang’s Christians Are Resisting a Campaign Against Church Crosses.” Radio Free Asia, August 11, 2015. https://www.rfa.org/english/ commentaries/east-asia-beat/china-churches-08112015122240.html. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Press Releases. “Statistics on Criminal Cases,” April 27, 2021. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/­ general/202204/27/P2022042700446.htm. Sudworth, John. “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps.” BBC News, May 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/85qihtvw6e/the-faces-fromchinas-uyghur-detention-camps. XinhuaNet. “Xi Urges BRICS Countries to Advance Building of Community with Shared Future for Mankind,” September 9, 2021. http://www.news.cn/­ english/2021-09/09/c_1310178476.htm. Yang, Jianli. “Xi Jinping Blocks Christianity, Invents Communist Version in China.” The Washington Times, June 1, 2021. https://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2021/jun/1/xi-jinping-blocks-christianity-invents-communist-v/. Zeng, Vivienne. “Chinese Christians Make Crosses at Home as Church Crosses Are Removed by Gov’t.” Hong Kong Free Press, July 27, 2015. https://hongkongfp. com/2015/07/27/zhejiang-christians-make-crosses-at-home-as-church-crossesare-removed-by-govt/.

Other Websites Alecci, Scilla. “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang.” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022. https://www. icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiang-police-files-uyghur-­m ugshots-

72  Ben Siu-pun Ho detention/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIpp -f6bjk-gIVVlZgCh2C-QWaEAAYA SAAEgKDUPD_BwE. Global Prayer for China. “The Chinese Communist Party’s War on Churches.” Accessed December 5, 2022. https://globalprayerforchina.org/the-china-communist-partyswar-on-churches/. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” October 25, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908. html. “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.” The Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 31, 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/ default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf. Oyez. “United States v. Seeger.” Accessed October 1, 2021. https://www.oyez.org/ cases/1964/50. Tang, Zhe. “Xi Jinping Portraits Replace Catholic Symbols in Churches,” November 25, 2019. https://bitterwinter.org/xi-jinping-portraits-replace-catholic-symbols/. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. “The Chinese Dream,” July 13, 2022. http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/­chinakeywords/ 2022-07/13/content_78321910.htm.

4 Demonic and Frontier Paul Tillich on Nationalism and Its Significance on National Identity Construction in Contemporary China Honglin Tang 1 Introduction “Nationalism is the most important social and political phenomenon of our time. It is the cultural framework of modernity and, as such, it defines all of the specifically modern experience, be it social, political, economic, personal, that is, it defines the ways we, modern men and women, live our lives.”1 That’s partly why it has emotional power2 and requires understanding nationalism to understand the world,3 as Greenfeld puts it “that nationalism lies at the basis of this world.”4 Paul Tillich is a theologian who concerned the situations and problems of his time through a methodological approach based on the method of correlation. How does he respond to the phenomenon of nationalism? Moreover, he was forced into exile in the United States because of his opposition to Nazi Germany, had his views on nationalism changed during the different period? Unfortunately, although there are many studies on Tillich’s political thoughts,5 there are few articles on Tillich’s nationalism, such as Gregory Baum’s book Nationalism, religion, and ethics, and Matthew Lon Weaver’s book Religious Internationalism: The Ethics of War and Warfare. Moreover, their studies mainly focus on Tillich’s early critique of Nazism, or based on his early book The Socialist Decision,6 not dealing much with his later works. This paper is an attempt to expound Tillich’s view on nationalism, and the changes in his lifetime. It also argues that Tillich’s concept of boundary can better respond to the modern phenomenon of nationalism than his principle of theonomy.

2  Tillich’s View of Nationalism 2.1  Nationalism as Demonic Demonic is not only the main concept of Tillich’s view on nationalism, it is also his most important critique of nationalism in the German period. He regards nationalism as ambiguous in its mixture of creativity and destructiveness. In other words, he held a positive view of nationalism during this

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-5

74  Honglin Tang period, such as resistance against the objectification and dehumanization of bourgeois society.7 In addition, the national impulses of the bourgeois era were the only ones which had, and to a great extent still have, the strength to offer resistance to pure rationality, thereby creating a vital, immediate consciousness. Furthermore, it preserves the consciousness from complete meaninglessness by filling it with concrete symbols.8 Of course, Tillich was very wary of the misuse of nationalism or its tendency to be demonized and insisted on using the principle of divine justice ortheonomy to criticize the narrow-minded nationalism, hoping to transform it. Tillich’s ambiguous and dialectical yes-no attitude toward nationalism is not only related to his romantic and positive view of the nation under the influence of German Romanticism, but also to his expectation of Kairos or divine intervention in German history after the First World War. For, just as Hirsch, he expected Germany to regain its former glory, and the nationalism emerged at that time could be an instrument of God or the medium of the manifestation of theonomy. This led him develop a little anticipation of Nazi nationalism in his early days. But as history evolves, his hopes were shattered, and he came to regard nationalism more as a form of idolatry. 2.2  Nationalism as Idolatry In the early days of the United States, Tillich critiqued nationalism primarily as idolatry, as in his Systematic Theology, where he considered nationalism to be the best example of contemporary idolatry. For him, “idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy. Something essentially conditioned is taken as unconditional, something essentially partial is boosted into universality, and something essentially finite is given infinite significance.”9 Therefore, it is the most dangerous enemy of “Ultimate Concern.” Regarding nationalism as idolatry is not actually contradictory to his previous demonic. Because at this time, Tillich had no expectations of Kairos as he was in Germany; moreover, in his early immigration to the United States, he also experienced the second death of his life and experienced the sacred void. Therefore, he focuses more on the negative and destructive features of nationalism, more on the destructive power of the demonic, and rarely mentions the positive side of nationalism. In addition, Tillich also regarded nationalism as a form of secular faith.10 And the church needs to perform its prophetic-critical function here, against its untrue and unjust claims. However, contemporary churches are often either subordinated to the nation-state, silenced by national fanaticism, or are used to accomplish the rituals of sanctifying the nation; or misled by the separation of church and state, thus kept its place in secular life. In both cases, the Church has lost its proper role as a counterpoint to secular trends.11 It can be seen here that Tillich contrasts the church with nationalism, arguing that nationalism is a secular faith that antagonistic to the Church and plays a greater role in the world than the church does. This view

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  75 of nationalism as a faith will be discussed further in the following discussion of quasi-religions. 2.3  Nationalism as Quasi-religion Regarding nationalism as a quasi-religion is not only related to his greater participation in religious dialogue in his later years, especially after his trip to Japan,12 but is also a logical result of his ideological development.13 First of all, on the grounds of the universality of revelation, Tillich breaks the intrinsic distinction between Christianity and other religions, placing Christianity alongside other religions and within the same category of religion. In addition, Tillich upholds the spirit of Protestantism, which is to insist on the presence and renewal of the Holy Spirit in the secular world, thus breaking the Catholic Church’s dichotomy of the “sacred-secular” worldview.14 When defining religion as the ultimate concern,15 Tillich extended religion even more clearly beyond the traditional religious sphere. To distinguish it from traditional religions, Tillich refers to nationalism as quasi-religion.16 Consequently, the nation, as a community, can have the presence of the Holy Spirit and the inner essence of a spiritual community, just as the Church does. In other words, nation can also be directed toward God (or ultimate concern), or to be the medium of human meaning and power. Perceiving nationalism as a kind of quasi-religion is not only to recognize the religious substance inside it but is also consistent with Tillich’s former view which regards it as idolatry or secular faith. Nonetheless, Tillich’s late proposal for the concept of quasi-religion was not to criticize the idolatrous nature of nationalism but to compare it with other religions or Christianity.17 The positive undertone of the notion quasi-religion far outweighs its negative connotations, and he has used it to analyze major political, social, and ideological systems in the world.18 In his later years, Tillich no longer had the expectation of theonomy as in Germany, or the disappointment of Kairos in the early days of the United States. Instead, he focuses more on the positive effect of things or expects to renew and transform the world with divine presence. Therefore, he elevates secularism to the status of quasi-religion, and at the same time pulls traditional religions such as Christianity down from the altar and ranks them with quasi-religion. All things are equal before God and are subject to God’s law (theonomy). 2.4 Summary Tillich’s view of nationalism as demonic, idolatry, and quasi-religion does not mean three separate aspects. Their essential nature is the same, that is, the demonic, which is the manifestation and distortion of the divine presence or creation. It is actually also Tillich’s consistent view of being, that is, the essential nature of any being is both an essential existence and an

76  Honglin Tang estrangement from it. These three statements are just different aspects of the nationalism that Tillich emphasizes in different contexts or periods. In post-World War I Germany, Tillich had a strong sense of kairos, believing that Germany was facing a transformation and that Nazi nationalism might be God’s kairos, capable of transforming Germany into a new “national commonwealth.” As a result, Tillich’s ambiguous attitude toward nationalism led him to emphasize the demonic nature of nationalism, which is a mixture of creativity and destruction. When he was forced into exile in the United States, due to the full manifestation of the Nazi nature, the outbreak of World War II, and the subsequent formation of the Cold War, he believed that the sacred Kairos had passed and it was in a sacred void. Against this backdrop, Tillich was more critical of nationalism, seeing its self-absolute nature of idolatry and the destructive nature of its subjugation of people. In his later years, due to the rise of secular humanism, which was even more attractive than Christianity, Tillich saw more of the divine presence and positive elements behind the secular movement. Thus, he proposed the concept of quasi-religion and defined nationalism as quasi-religion. It is to emphasize that nationalism also has positive elements of divine presence, if treated well, it can even become the medium for the realization of the kingdom of heaven. In fact, Tillich’s views on nationalism have not changed fundamentally, as some scholars have argued, “that his thought did not really develop over time but simply involved the application of a few key formulae to ever-new subject matter.”19 He does regard nationalism differently or his views do undergo some changes through early ambiguous demonic to the negative idolatry, and to the more positive quasi-religion in the later years.

3  Tillich’s Critique of Nationalism 3.1  Theonomous Critique of Nationalism The essence of nationalism is demonic (both creative and destructive). It has not only the presence of the Divine Spirit but also a distortion (or estrangement) from it. Therefore, it is appropriate for Tillich to use the principle of theonomy to criticize nationalism. Theonomy is to renew or to transform nationalism with the divine presence and justice. Whether it is demonic, idolatry, or quasi-religion, they all need to be renewed by God to dissolve their destructiveness, relativize their absoluteness, and show their true ultimate direction. But nationalism is a wide-ranging and complex political, historical, and cultural phenomenon with different meanings, paradigms,20 and interpretations.21 Is it sufficient to respond only with the theonomy? As Delanty and Kumar maintain, there is a need to adopt new approaches in the study of nationalism.22 Likewise, in addition to the theonomy, do we have new or more appropriate ways to deal with nationalism nowadays? After all,

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  77 nationalism is not just a form of idolatry; it also gives identity, belonging, and meaning to people. Especially in today’s context, national identity is not only a part of modernity but also one of the most important expressions of today’s political groups; moreover, meaning and identity are also important features of the contemporary era.23 Does Tillich’s theology also address the issues of meaning and identity involved in nationality? Or are there other resources in Tillich’s theology other than theonomy that are applicable to the analysis of nationalism today? The following is an attempt to explore this question. 3.2  Tillich’s Concept of Boundary Tillich is known as a theologian of the boundaries.24 He agrees in his autobiography that “I thought that the concept of the boundary might be the fitting symbol for the whole of my personal and intellectual development.”25 So, we might wonder what is the meaning of the boundary for Tillich? First of all, for Tillich, the boundary defines the nature of being or what makes it what it is. After all, “all beings in the world are territorialized through different grenze which leads to the distinctiveness of beings.”26 As Tillich points out, “Boundary is a dimension of form, and form makes everything what it is.”27 And boundaries are not fixed and rigid but are often blurred, because different realms, or beings, overlap, intertwine, interrelate, or confront each other. Just like the boundaries of land and water, they are separated but also connected, “meet each other and feed each other and change each other.”28 As Ka-fu Chan points out, “the grenze does not primarily function to separate and divide reality into different spheres which are totally independent, isolated, and with no contact point or overlapping realms.… reality is with the center and being open to each other. The existence of the grenze is to define the boundary and the possibility of a being; it establishes the form for them and to make them what they are. Simultaneously, this center must not be closed in on itself; it should be open for the one beyond itself. For Tillich, center-orientated and beyond-orientated coincide.”29 Thus, the boundary is not to demarcate a closed field for beings, but to create different possibilities of beings, both correlated and in conflict or confrontation with each other, with overlapping or intertwining among them. For example, there is no absolute line of separation between religion and culture, but rather religion is the substance of culture and culture is the form of religion.30 And “it is the dialectical character of existence, that each of its possibilities drives on its own accord to its border line and to the limitation power beyond the boundary.”31 Thus, the primary role of boundaries for Tillich is not to define nor to limit the scope of different beings, but to encounter and be adjacent to the other. In the early period, the dynamic nature that this encounter with others means for Tillich “to experience in many forms the unrest, insecurity, and inner limitation of existence, and to know the inability of

78  Honglin Tang attaining serenity, security, and perfection.”32 But later on, he realized that the boundary also invites people to cross. When one does cross bravely, a more comprehensive dimension emerges, where there is no longer turmoil, no longer feeling conditioned, but rather a kind of peace, a oneness in the comprehensive dimension. As he said later in his speech in New Frontiers, “Existence on the frontier, in the boundary situation, is full of tension and movement. It is in truth not standing still, but rather a crossing and return, a repetition of return and crossing, a back-and-forth—the aim of which is to create a third area beyond the bounded territories, an area where one can stand for a time without being enclosed in something tightly bounded.… For peace is to stand in the Comprehensive (Übergreifenden) which is sought in crossing and recrossing the frontiers. Only he who participates on both sides of a boundary line can serve the Comprehensive and thereby peace—not the one who feels secure in the voluntary calm of something tightly bounded.”33 Tillich’s later emphasis on the idea that boundaries need to be crossed was, in a way, his answer to the boundary question raised in his autobiography, namely, that serenity, security, and perfection are not entirely unattainable, when one dares to cross the boundary, a kind of peace emerges. Therefore, the boundary should not give people a sense of being enclosed or being limited, but rather inspire a spirit of exploration of the unknown, enlightening us to cross the border bravely and adventurously into the new and uncharted land, thus making peace for the world. As Ka-fu Chan points out, “Therefore, the boundary/frontier will be a challenge or an invitation to let someone to leave the security and become open to the unknown Other.”34 It might be the case why Tillich used the term frontier instead of boundary in his later years.35 Because the word frontier, as a border, means to be at the forefront, to encounter or extremity conterminous with that of another36; it emphasizes the new and unexplored territory beyond the boundary, thus inspires people to cross over, and to explore the unknown. The word boundary mainly serves to indicate the bounds or limits of anything37; it gives a sense of being bound or enclosed, thus emphasizing that different realms have their own scope. Therefore, boundaries should not be static, fixed, rigid, and unchanging. Indeed, it is mixed because of the intertwined, antagonistic, or correlated existence of beings. The concept of boundaries is somewhat similar to the notion of “multidimensional unity of life” mentioned by Tillich in his Systematic Theology Volume 3.38 It means that different dimensions of life do not interfere with each other, they cross without disturbing each other, and there is no conflict between dimensions. Even if there are conflicts, they are not intrinsic, but consequences of the ambiguity of all life processes and are therefore conquerable without the destruction of one level by another, nor affecting the unity of the multiple dimensions of life.39 The ideas that boundaries are both defined and mixed, and that the intertwining, interconnectedness, and even confrontation between different beings do not destroy

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  79 the unity of the whole, are indeed great insights into reality based on Tillich. The real world is neither a black-and-white dichotomy nor a monolithic unity, but has its own ambiguity and unity.40 In his later years, Tillich also put forward another pair of important concepts about boundaries, namely, essential limits and factual limits. As the name implies, what an essential or authentic being exhibits is the essential limits; and what a factual, or non-authentic being exhibits, is the actual limits. “The essential limit and the factual limit do not coincide. The essential limit stands demanding, judging, giving goals beyond the factual limit.”41 As Tillich pointed out in Volume 1 of his Systematic Theology that essence is the basis of value judgment, the norm by which a thing must be judged, and the logical ideal (or divine goal) to be reached.42 Therefore, the essential limits give beings the purpose of life, so that they are not trapped in the present, but have a direction to move forward. It is also the guidance of the limits, or new frontiers, that enable beings to continuously cross the boundary, thereby realizing their own essential limits. Tillich’s concept of the essential limits is undoubtedly another expression of his theonomy, and in his later period, Tillich also integrated the theonomy into his boundary concept.43 Added with his late attempts to use the concept of boundary to express his thoughts on essence and estrangement from Systematic Theology, and his early American autobiography titled On the Boundary, it can be seen that the symbol or concept of boundary has always been of concern to him, and the idea of boundary thus has a very important place in his thought. All these make him worthy the name: theologian on the boundary. 3.3  Analysis of Nationalism with the Concept of Boundary It is mentioned in the previous discussion that the theonomy is inappropriate for dealing with the issue of national identity and the resulting national conflicts.44 How can Tillich’s boundary concept provide a more appropriate explanation and a direction for solution? In the following part, we will elaborate on the relevance of Tillich’s concept of boundary to nationalism. 3.3.1  Boundary and National Vocation According to Tillich, every nation has a particular vocation, which means to be called, to have a historic destiny, and to give meaning to the nation.45 But not every nation lives up to its calling. For Tillich, only those which manifest their essential limit can be regarded as true callings. For example, different nation-states such as Greece, Rome, Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Russia, and China had their own great callings.46 However, with regard to Nazi Germany, Tillich believes that it lacks a true calling because its goal is centered on the superiority of the Nordic race, contrary to the standards of God’s righteousness. In addition, Tillich would judge its true

80  Honglin Tang calling by whether it is humanized.47 Humanized goal represents values that transcend national boundary, and can thus be used to unite the nations, to fulfill the unity of humanity, or the kingdom of God to some extent. And this is in line with the essential limit of nation, or God’s creation. Therefore, when each nation is driven by its true calling of realizing its own essential limit, it will become more humanized in nature, and thus become closer to each other, hence achieving peace among the nations. Moreover, if nationalism can be transformed into the realization of national calling, its demonic nature will be dissolved. As Reisz points out, one of the main types of demonic is the unity of life-power and dead meanings.48 If power can be combined with true meaning, it naturally dissolves the demonic. And according to Tillich, this is the source of the German lacking peace in the 20th century. That is, Germany did not have a true calling, and its power did not being put at the service of the calling, so that Germany lived in its factual limit and did not awaken to its essential limit.49 3.3.2  Boundary and National Expansion When each nation pursuing its calling and realizing the essential limit, will peace be achieved naturally? Isn’t Tillich also opposed to the inflexible of the frontiers?50 Isn’t it often the case internationally that when a nation is strong enough, it will often annex neighboring nation-states? Undoubtedly, the annexation of weak nations by strong nations is common in history, but it is obviously an abnormal phenomenon caused by demonic forces without a true calling. A nation which achieves its vocation will pursue justice and respect the rights and interests of other nations, rather than invading them. What we really need to deal with here is whether or not nations will die out when they have fulfilled their essential limit and been humanized? After all, the growth of a nation, or the fulfillment of its essential limit, is not a matter of holding fast to its frontiers, but of a constant back-and-forth movement of crossing and returning to the boundaries. Will this eventually lead to the disappearance of the border, resulting in unity, communion, and thus toward conformity? In principle, this seems to be a possible outcome, as Tillich affirms the existence of a comprehensive boundaries, “For the essential limits of all human groups are contained in the essential frontiers of humanity. The identity of every single group is a manifestation of the identity of humanity and of the nature of human existence.”51 Thus, when each nation intersects and back-forth crossing the boundaries, will they eventually dissolve into the totally comprehensive boundaries, or common human nature? According to Tillich, the essential limits should not disappear or merge as result of this. First of all, if the essential limits disappear or merge, the unique identity of individuals or groups will disappear, and the uniqueness of each nation will be lost, thus there will be no such thing as different nationalities. In that case, there will be no worship of nations in the Kingdom of Heaven,

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  81 but just human race worship. Second, nations and states can be different. Tillich does not seem to oppose or deny the possibility of unification of states in the future. The political boundaries of different nation-states may disappear, but the intrinsic boundaries of each group, or nation, do not. Although it is true that some national groups have died out in history due to the unification of politics, languages, and cultures, it is not the result of those with a true calling, but rather the result of those without calling. A nation will commit to the ultimate justice and love, rather than the selfish interests of the group if it has a true calling. In such a case, instead of the suppression or annexation of weak groups, nations will respect each other, intertwine with each other, and exist in fairness and harmony; this is also what the theonomy emphasizes. True justice is the recognition that others share the same dignity as you do, which, in Buber’s words, means to appreciate others as “you” rather than “it.”52 That is, other people cannot be objectified, their freedom must be respected, and they must not be restricted, so that they can become who they are. The encounter in this situation and the back-forth crossing on the boundary will not automatically lead to the demise of the other, but fulfillment. In addition, the boundary crossing caused by the dynamic interaction between the two parties does not limit to the geographical border but could be involved with political, economic, and cultural spheres. It is like the multiple dimensions of life, intertwining and crossing each other without causing interference or conflict. Even if there are conflicts, it will not lead to the destruction of one dimension (or boundary), or the loss of unity of whole.53 Likewise, the boundary crossing does not in itself abolish the boundary but is the acknowledgment of them. Rather, it is the act of denying the border, ignoring or denying the other, which leads to the expansion of the nation or elimination of the other, just like Hitler-period in Germany. It was driven by the power of hatred to fulfill itself, its frontiers were closed—so that a whole nation was unable to see beyond itself. It thus became extremely conceited, eliminating the frontiers by conquering or destroying all that lay on the other side of the boundary— whether they were other races or neighboring people, opposing political systems, or even new artistic styles. That is the demonic urge to wipe out one’s frontier in order to be the whole thing by one’s self.54 Therefore, it is true that the boundary can be fluid, but this does not mean that when one side is strong, it will weaken or narrow the frontier of the other side, but rather that the stronger side is more aware of its essential limit, its identity, and potential, as well as the direction of development. Although it will not be trapped within the boundaries, it will not break it, so as to bully others. Instead, it will respect the boundary, and even make the other aware of its essential limit, understand itself, and develop together. Hence, the repeated back-forth crossing of the boundaries between nations will only increase mutual understanding and respect, so as to achieve harmonious coexistence in a more comprehensive dimension, rather than eliminating each other, or causing the disappearance of boundaries. This is in

82  Honglin Tang line with the goal of socialism, which is not to achieve globalism: leading to national and cultural uniformity, but to achieve internationalism: free and equal interaction among all peoples in the social, economic, and cultural spheres, with mutual influence, cooperation, and enrichment, rather than isolation. It is also consistent with early Tillich’s affirmation of the nation in his book The Socialist Decision.55 To sum up, the essence of the conflict between nations is that the nation does not understand or observe its own essential limit. It does not know its calling and mission and does not know where its boundaries end. This leads to the loss or fragility of the identity, which can easily lead to conflict. In addition, it is precisely because of lacking the awareness of one’s essential limit and the boundary that make it easy to inflate oneself to the point of wanting to wipe out what is strange in order to eliminate boundaries; or to regard oneself as the whole who has a comprehensive boundary and ignore others existence, which leads to the encroachment of others. Peace between nations comes from respecting each other’s boundaries, knowing their callings, and realizing their essential limits, which are inseparable from crossing the boundaries repeatedly. The back-forth crossing of boundaries not only increases mutual understanding but also creates a more comprehensive dimension. Both are indispensable to peace building. Besides that, boundary crossing brings the encounter with strangers, which is valuable or helpful for the individual or nation to recognize their calling and essential limit. And the above analysis has suggested that it is indeed more specific and appropriate to use the boundary concept to deal with inter-national relations than the principle of theonomy.

4  It’s Significance on Chinese National Identity Construction Notably, national identity is a complex modern phenomenon.56 It is almost impossible to discuss the full range of the topic. For the purpose of this article, the focus is on important while relevant issues of Tillich’s boundary concept in Chinese national identity formation. All identities are multifaceted, particularly in an increasingly globalized world. National identity is no exception. Many factors, state experiences, political, institutional, media, and everyday social practices, are contributing to the formation of national identity.57 In China, “Chinese” is often treated as a generic concept and is used as an ethno-cultural and genealogical “pan-Chinese nation” (Zhonghuaminzu). This fiction of blood kinship, or what Rey Chow calls the “myth of consanguinity,”58 is narrated in the metaphor of “nation (guo) as family (jia)” and ambivalent notions such as “tongbao” (literally siblings by birth) and “blood is thicker than water.” That’s why the main nationalizing methods used by the official discourse are to incorporate deliberately the mythology and symbolism of a community of historical, ethnic, and cultural lineage in the people.59 As Shuqin Xu has indicated, China nowadays has put a lot of efforts in preserving

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  83 and constructing national identity through an educational program on traditional culture. In fact, constructing national identity with collective memory based on traditional culture has long been a policy and research concern.60 However, the identity formation could not be based on the traditional culture alone. Tillich once argued that to better understand ourselves, we need to cross the frontier to encounter with others. It is also consistent with the social theory that social actors cannot know their identities a priori, and it is only through social interaction that a sense of the “Self” is formed.61 Actually, the fact that “Chineseness” has been constructed through its Other is a well-documented phenomenon. Which particular identity will come to the fore depends very much on which “Other” the actor interacts with at a particular given moment. For the time being, under the patriotic education campaign, modern China’s national identity has been characterized by an acute sense of “victimhood” arising from its turbulent interactions with International Society.62 It is true that the cognitive notion of “us” and “them” has often been created through discrimination of members of the other group, which resulted in an antagonistic relationship between a positive self and a negative other.63 However, ingroup identification does not necessarily produce outgroup hostility and conflict.64 Besides that, national identity construction through others, is not just for identifying the differences,65 but rather for recognizing our essential limits, or our callings according to Tillich. Because only through repeated frontier crossing, or interacting with others, could the nation know their true identity, thus has the possibility of realizing its nature. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the others, its perceptions of it, and its sense of the “Self” have not necessary been static. In other words, identity is not static, or we should not hold fast to certain memories, although memories of the “century of humiliation” no doubt continue to be important, reliance on this particular memory alone obviously is not suitable for identity formation since identity construction is a process rather than fixed. However, there are also some merits that can be reflected from the Chinese national identity formation, which will shed light on how should our future be like. As existing research indicated that the level of national identity in China was extremely high among the Hans, as well as among minorities (90 out of 100). And there was virtually no difference among the minority groups.66 In addition, there is also strong ethnic identity among China’s religious ethnic minorities by examining ethnic-language identity, religious identity, and interethnic marriage.67 It seems that people can have two identities (ethic and national) at the same time while not conflicting with each other. In other words, although nation is the central identity for Chinese citizens,68 their unique ethnic identities will not be eclipsed either. These studies have shown that there can be a super ordinate identity, under which each group or nation can be included. Besides that, such common super ordinate identity does not necessarily require each group or nation to forsake its

84  Honglin Tang subgroup identity.69 In other words, each group or nation could maintain its original or unique identity while at the same time, sharing with other group or nation a common or in group identity. What’s more, under such common super ordinate identity, peace can be better achieved. Just as Yida Zhai’s research indicates that when the Chinese and the Japanese recognize their common super ordinate identity under the Asian or cosmopolitan identity, they will treat each other more favorably, while only national identity in both countries will not facilitate positive attitudes toward the other. Asian identity and cosmopolitan identity do not replace national identity. Their relationships are cross-cutting, rather than mutually exclusive. Chinese and Japanese people can maintain their distinctiveness while working toward cooperative goals.70 This is in line with Tillich’s boundary concept that each nation will not lost their unique identity after repeated boundary crossing. On the contrary, a more comprehensive dimension will appear which will contribute to the peace building among nations. People can be united as one while maintaining their distinct identity. This is what the Heaven Kingdom will look like: all are united as one in the Holy Spirit but not losing their nationalities. Consequently, Chinese national identity formation might be valuable for the world peace building in some way. Despite that, it does not mean that each ethnic group in China has blended in harmony. There is a tendency in China that political factors are becoming more and more important than ethnic and cultural dimensions in the national identity formation.71 In the present patriotic campaign under the authoritarian regime where ideology remains an important factor in national identity formation,72 the uniqueness of each Chinese ethnic group might fade out in future. And in contemporary great uncertainty and reinforced nationalism and strengthened states under COVID-19,73 how to maintain the same nationalities or ethnic distinctness while still interacting with each other is a posing question for each nation, given national identity itself is an ongoing production under diverse strands at play.74 Furthermore, Tillich’s insights of boundary concept including venturing to cross the frontier and dealing with each other under the principle of theonomy are valuable references for contemporary China and the world.

5 Conclusion Although Tillich has different views on nationalism such as demonic, idolatry, and quasi-religion, they are essentially the same. They are all manifestations and distortions of the divine presence. According to Tillich, the three terms represent different characteristics of nationalism in different contexts or periods. Since nationalism has a distortion of the divine, it is appropriate for Tillich to criticize nationalism with the principle of theonomy. However, the theonomy itself cannot effectively respond to the issues related to the national identity and meanings. Therefore, the author has compiled Tillich’s concept of boundary, which not only has integrated the principle

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  85 of theonomy, but also is more appropriate in addressing such issues, thus making a good complement to the shortcomings of theonomy. The boundary not only gives identity and meaning to the nation, but also points to the existence of the other, and encourages people to cross the frontier, to meet and get acquainted with the other. It will not cause a nation to lose its identity and meaning, but rather make it more aware of its essential limit, respect the boundaries, and the existence of the other. Besides that, repeated back-forth frontier crossing will not only actualize the nature of beings, but also foster peace between them. For the peace among nations or peoples comes from crossing the frontier repeatedly, rather than sticking to it. Just as Tillich opposes pacifistic legalism, arguing that their mistake lies in holding fast to frontiers unconditionally, daring neither to loosen nor move them, forgetting the dynamics of world history and the creative and correcting effect of the essential frontier.75 Furthermore, if each nation aims to realize its essential limit, which is also another expression of the theonomy, the world will not only be more peaceful, but will be more diverse and richer. For the Chinese national identity construction, as well as other nations, repeated frontier crossing is not only helpful for them to know their essential limit, and to live out their true calling, but also valuable for building up their national identity. It is also indispensable for peace building among nations.

Notes 1 LiahGreenfeld, Advanced Introduction to Nationalism, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 1. 2 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 3. 3 John Agnew, “Nationalism”, in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography, edited by NualaC. Johnson, Richard H. Schein, and Jamie Winders, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 141. 4 LiahGreenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 3. 5 Ronald H. Stone, Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary in New York, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2012); A. James Reimer, The Emanuel Hirsch and Paul Tillich Debate: A Study in the Political Ramifications of Theology (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989); John Jesse Carey, Paulus, Then and Now: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Theological World and the Continuing Relevance of His Work, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002); Ronald H. Stone, Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought, (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1980); Alan J. Richard, “Dreaming Innocence in America: Paul Tillich’s Radical Theology of Liberation,” Journal for Culture and Religious Theory, 2018, 17(1): 126–157; Daniel Weidner, “Prophetic Criticism and the Rhetoric of Temporality: Paul Tillich’s Kairos Texts and Weimar Intellectual Politics,” Political Theology, 2020, 21(3): 71–88; Gregory A. Walter, “Critique and Promise on Paul Tillich’s Political Theology: Engaging Giorgio Agamben on Sovereignty and Possibility,” The Journal of Religion, 2010, 90(4): 453–474. 6 Paul Tillich, The Socialist Decision, translated by Franklin Sherman, (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012). 7 For the alienation of man in the capitalist society, ref. Eric Fromm, TheSane Society, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 5: Man in Capitalistic Society.

86  Honglin Tang 8 Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, translated by Nicholas A. Rasetzki and Elas L. Talmey, (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1936), 120, 121. 9 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology v.1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951–1963), 13. In his sermon, Tillich also said that in modern society, the concerns about our work, another human being, pleasure, science, money, have become our god; and the concern about the nation the most important god of all. Paul Tillich, The New Being, (London: SCM Press, 1956), 158. 10 Tillich, Systematic Theology v.3, 6. Some scholars also argue that nationalism can be seen as a secular religion. Ref. Paul Zawadzki, “Nationalism, Democracy and Religion,” in Revisiting Nationalism: Theories and Processes, edited by Alain Dieckhoff and Christophe Jaffrelot, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 175–183. 11 Ibid., 216. 12 Ref. Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 13 However, Thomas argues that it should not exaggerate the role of the trip to Japan (Ref. MirceaEliade, “Paul Tillich and the History of Religions,” in Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, edited by Jerald C. Brauer, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 31–36.), in actuality, the trip to Japan was only one of the peaks of his late ideological change; his dialogue with other religions had already taken place in earlier years. (Terence Thomas, “On Another Boundary: Tillich’s Encounter with World Religions,” in Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, edited by John J. Carey, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 194–197.) Moreover, the concept of quasi-­ religion was not put forward by Tillich in his late period, he had already proposed the concept of quasi-religion as early as the 1950s, he just did not discuss it in detail at that time. (Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, translated by James Luther Adams, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 57, 58, 176, 248.) 14 Ambruster summarizes three of Tillich’s principles of sacred-secular relations, namely, Consecration, Convergence, and Essential Union. Carl J. Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 104, 105. 15 Tillich has two concepts of religion. Ultimate concern is his large or universal concept of religion, and the smaller concept refers to traditional religion, which supposes an organized group with its clergy, scriptures, and dogma, etc. D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, (London: SCM Press, 1965), 4–6. 16 Note that Tillich is using quasi-religions, not pseudo-religions. For Tillich, to use “pseudo” is imprecise and unfair, because “pseudo” indicates an intended but deceptive similarity. But actuality, quasi-religions have a structural similarity and points of identity with religions. So Tillich uses “quasi”, since “‘quasi’ indicates a genuine similarity, not intended, but based on points of identity, and this, certainly, is the situation in cases like Fascism and Communism, the most extreme examples of quasi-religions today.” (Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, 5, 6; Paul Tillich, The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions, edited by Terence Thomas, (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 61.) The purpose of the term is “to indicate that man’s ultimate concern can express itself in secular terms.” Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, 94. 17 For, when Tillich sees nationalism as quasi-religion, he does not stop using the word idolatry, but at this time, idolatry is usually not associated with nationalism, but refers to the essential act of the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy. Of course nationalism can be idolatrous, but when Tillich sees nationalism as quasi-religion, he is saying that it is in fact the same as Christianity, and that its idolatrous character is only its distorted form, not its essence, just

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  87 as there is idolatry in Christian religion as well. Ref. Brown, Ultimate Concern, 1–34. 18 Francis Ching-Wah Yip, Capitalism as Religion?: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Modernity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Divinity School, 2010), 54. 19 George Pattison, Paul Tillich’s Philosophical Theology: A Fifty-Year Reappraisal, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3. 20 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 5–9, 47–65. Also ref. Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1983), Part Two: Varieties of Nationalism. 21 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, Part One: Theories of Nationalism; Christophe Jaffrelot, “For a Theory of Nationalism,” in Revisiting Nationalism, 10–61. 22 Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar, “Introduction,” in The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, 1–3. 23 Ibid., 2. Modern people have common identity crisis. Ref. Alain de Botton, Status Anxiety, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2004). 24 Mark Kline Taylor, Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries, (London: Collins, 1987). 25 Paul Tillich, On the Boundary, (Eugene, OR: Wipf& Stock, 2011), 13. Tillich’s autobiography On the Boundary was first published in 1936 and included in the book The Interpretation of History. It was later revised and published in 1966 in a book form. There is no substantial change in these two versions apart from some slightly revised translation. 26 Keith Ka-fu Chan, Life as Spirit: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Ecological Pneumatology, (Berlin; Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2018), 95. 27 Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 57. 28 Matthew Lon Weaver, “Peacemaking on the Boundary,” in Retrieving the Radical Tillich: His Legacy and Contemporary Importance, edited by Russell Re Manning, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 108. 29 Chan, Life as Spirit, 95. 30 Tillich, “On the Boundary,” in The Interpretation of History, 50. 31 Tillich, “On the Boundary,” in The Interpretation of History, 72. 32 Tillich, “On the Boundary,” in The Interpretation of History, 72. 33 Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions,53. 34 Chan, Life as Spirit, 95. 35 Unfortunately, when the same article was later edited and included in Theology of Peace, the editor replaced all frontiers with boundaries, thus losing the original and more insightful meaning of Tillich. Ref. Paul Tillich, “Boundaries,” in Paul Tillich, Theology of Peace, edited by Ronald H. Stone, (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 162–173. 36 Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74931?rskey= DFqpJ5&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid, accessed on June 18, 2020. 37 Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/22048?redirected From=boundary#eid, accessed on June 18, 2020. 38 Chan, Life as Spirit, 95. 39 Tillich, Systematic Theology v.3, 15. The idea of multiple dimensions of life is also similar to the recent emphasis on relational existence in psychology. Ref. Kenneth J. Gergen, Relational Being Beyond Self and Community, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 40 Ambiguity is a core concept of Tillich’s analysis of life. Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich, 65. In addition, Cruz has a good discussion of Tillich’s concept of ambiguity, ref. Eduardo R. Cruz, A Theological Study Informed by the Thought of Paul Tillich and the Latin American Experience: The Ambivalence of Science, (Lewiston, NY: Mellen University Press, 1996), 106–148.

88  Honglin Tang 41 Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 58. 42 Tillich, Systematic Theology v.1, 202, 203. 43 Due to the space limit, please refer to author’s D. Th thesis, Paul Tillich on Nationalism, (Hong Kong: Divinity School of Chung Chi College, 2020) for details. 44 National conflicts are inherently rooted in the nature of identity. Because of the fragility of national identity, people of different national groups are prone to violent conflicts in defense of their national identity. Ref. Joshua Searle-White, The Psychology of Nationalism, (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 45 Brown, Ultimate Concern, 81, 82. 46 Varied callings such as: the Hellenic people were conscious of representing culture as against the barbarians; Rome represented the Law; the Jews the divine covenant with man; and medieval Germany the corpus Christianum, religiously and politically. The Italians were the nation of the rebirth (Rinascimento); the British represented a Christian humanism for all nations; France represented the highest contemporary culture; and Russia the saving power of the East against the West; China was the land of the “center,” which all lesser nations encircled. And America is the land of the new beginning and the defender of freedom. Ref. Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 59; Tillich, Systematic Theology v.3, 310; Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, 16. 47 Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, 17. 48 Reisz, Jr., “The Demonic as a Principle in Tillich’s Doctrine of God,” in Theonomy and Autonomy, 155. 49 Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 60. 50 Ibid., 60. 51 Ibid., 61. Tillich pointed out that the formation of the Cold War between East and West at that time, which included both will to power and consciousness of calling, indeed, which on both sides has the character of exclusiveness and therefore, given the circumstances of contemporary technology, threatens humanity with self-destruction. 52 Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1959). Regarding the differences between Tillich and Buber on the “I-Thou” relationship, please ref. Robison B. James, “Revising Tillich’s Model of Reality by Adding Buber’s I-Thou,” in Being Versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?, edited by Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 237–248. 53 As Tillich argues, when the Church was attacked by Nazism, it drew back on the tradition and defended their identity at the cost of narrowing the boundary of their life. But their task today is to return to the frontier, to cross over it and wrestle for the Beyond in the to-and-fro between church and culture. Otherwise, they will be irrelevant for unnumbered persons who, essentially, belong to them. Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 55. 54 Ibid., 56. In addition, Tillich also cites the example of church and culture, where if the church dare not risk this crossing of the frontier, wrestle for the Beyond in the to-and-fro between church and culture, the thorn of having failed can produce a fanatical self-approval, which tries to incorporate culture into itself and remove the boundary against it. 55 Tillich, The Socialist Decision, 150–152. 56 David McCrone and Frank Bechhofer, Understanding National Identity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 57 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, ed., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, (London: SAGE, 2009). 58 Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 24.

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  89 59 Thomas Kwan-choiTse, “Constructing Chinese Identity in Post-colonial Hong Kong: A Discursive Analysis of the Official Nation-Building Project,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2014, 14(1): 194. 60 ShuqinXu, “Cultivating National Identity with Traditional Culture: China’s Experiences and Paradoxes,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 2018, 39(4): 615–628. 61 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 13. 62 Shogo Suzuki, “The Importance of ‘Othering’ in China’s National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,” The Pacific Review, 2007, 20(1): 23–47; Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” International Studies Quarterly, 2008, (52): 783–806. 63 Yifan Yang and Xuechen Chen, “Globalism or Nationalism? The Paradox of Chinese Official Discourse in the Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2021, (26): 89–113. 64 Marilynn B. Brewer, “Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict: When Does Ingroup Love Become Outgroup Hate?,” in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, edited by Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim and David Wilder, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17–41. 65 ArashAbizadeh, “Does collective identity presuppose an Other? On the alleged incoherence of global solidarity,” American Political Science Review, 2005, 99(1): 45–60; Thomas Diez, “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2004, 17(2): 319–335. 66 Also refers to: Wenfang Tang and Benjamin Darr, “Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origins,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2012, 21(77): 819. 67 Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He, “Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China,” Policy Studies, 2010 (56): 1. 68 William A. Callahan, “History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies, 2006, 38(2): 203. 69 S. Gaertner, J. Dovidio, and B. Bachman, “Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Induction of a Common Ingroup Identity,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 1996, (20): 274. 70 YidaZhai, “Identity, Contact, and The reduction of Mutual Distrust: A Survey of Chinese and Japanese Youth,” The Pacific Review, 2017, 30(1): 93–113. 71 Jin Woong Kang, “The Dual National Identity of the Korean Minority in China: The Politics of Nation and Race and the Imagination of Ethnicity,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2008, 8(1): 101–119. 72 Gilbert Rozman, “Chinese National Identity and Its Implications for International Relations in East Asia,” Asia-Pacific Review, 2011, 18(1): 88. 73 Guangyi Pan and Alexander Korolev, “The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID19,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2021, (26):115–138. 74 Allen Carlson, “A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent Within the Study of Chinese Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, 2009, 15(1): 29. 75 Tillich, “Frontiers,” in The Future of Religions, 60.

Bibliography Abizadeh, Arash. “Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity.” American Political Science Review. 2005, 99(1): 45–60.

90  Honglin Tang Armbruster, Carl J. The Vision of Paul Tillich. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967. Ashmore, Richard D., Lee Jussim and David Wilder. eds. Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Botton, Alain de. Status Anxiety. London: Hamish Hamilton, 2004. Brown, D. Mackenzie. Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue. London: SCM Press, 1965. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1959. Calhoun, Craig. Nationalism. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997. Callahan, William A. “History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China.” Critical Asian Studies. 2006, 38(2): 179–208. Carey, John Jesse. Paulus, Then and Now: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Theological World and the Continuing Relevance of His Work. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002. ———. Ed. Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984. Carlson, Allen. “A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent Within the Study of Chinese Nationalism.” Nations and Nationalism. 2009, 15(1): 20–35. Chan, Keith Ka-fu. Life as Spirit: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Ecological Pneumatology. Berlin; Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2018. Chow, Rey. Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Cruz, Eduardo R. A Theological Study Informed by the Thought of Paul Tillich and the Latin American Experience: The Ambivalence of Science. Lewiston, NY: Mellen University Press, 1996. Dieckhoff, Alain and Christophe Jaffrelot. Eds. Revisiting Nationalism: Theories and Processes, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Diez, Thomas. “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 2004, 17(2): 319–335. Dovidio, S. Gaertner, J. and B. Bachman. “Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Induction of a Common Ingroup Identity.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations. 1996, (20): 274. Fromm, Eric. The Sane Society. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2002. Gergen, Kenneth J. Relational Being Beyond Self and Community. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. ———. Advanced Introduction to Nationalism. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. Hummel, Gert and Doris Lax. Eds. Being Versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology? Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. Johnson, Nuala C., Richard H. Schein and Jamie Winders. Eds. The Wiley-­Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Kang, Jin Woong. “The Dual National Identity of the Korean Minority in China: The Politics of Nation and Race and the Imagination of Ethnicity.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism. 2008, 8(1): 101–119. Manning, Russell Re. Ed. Retrieving the Radical Tillich: His Legacy and Contemporary Importance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Paul Tillich on Nationalism  91 McCrone, David and Frank Bechhofer. Understanding National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Neumann, Iver B. Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74931?rskey=­DFqpJ5 &result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid, Accessed on June 18, 2020. Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/22048?redirected From=boundary#eid, Accessed on June 18, 2020. Pan, Guangyi and Alexander Korolev. “The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID19.” Journal of Chinese Political Science. 2021, (26):115–138. Pattison, George. Paul Tillich’s Philosophical Theology: A Fifty-Year Reappraisal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Reimer, A. James. The Emanuel Hirsch and Paul Tillich Debate: A Study in the Political Ramifications of Theology. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989. Richard, Alan J. “Dreaming Innocence in America: Paul Tillich’s Radical Theology of Liberation.” Journal for Culture and Religious Theory. 2018, 17(1): 126–157. Rozman, Gilbert. “Chinese National Identity and Its Implications for International Relations in East Asia.” Asia-Pacific Review. 2011, 18(1): 84–97. Searle-White, Joshua. The Psychology of Nationalism. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Smith, Anthony D. Theories of Nationalism. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1983. ———. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. Stone, Ronald H. Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought. Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1980. ———. Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary in New York. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2012. Suzuki, Shogo. “The Importance of ‘Othering’ in China’s National Identity: ­Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts.” The Pacific Review. 2007, 20(1): 23–47. Tang, Wenfang and Benjamin Darr. “Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origins.” Journal of Contemporary China. 2012, 21(77): 811–826. Tang, Wenfang and Gaochao He. “Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China.” Policy Studies, 2010, (56): 1. Taylor, Mark Kline. Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries. London: Collins, 1987. Tillich, Paul. The Interpretation of History. Translated by Nicholas A. Rasetzki and Elas L. Talmey. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1936. ———. The Protestant Era. Translated by James Luther Adams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. ———. Systematic Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951–1963. ———. The New Being. London: SCM Press, 1956. ———. Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. ———. The Future of Religions. Edited by Jerald C. Brauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. ———. The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions. Edited by Terence Thomas. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

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5 St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage) With Special Reference to the Virtue of Vīrya in Buddhism1 Tao Anthony Wang 1  Fortitudo as a Cardinal Virtue: St. Thomas’ Idea of Fortitude In the virtue theory of the great medieval thinker St. Thomas Aquinas, fortitude or courage ( fortitudo) is one of the four cardinal virtues (virtutes cardinales) which are the proper foundation of the natural human moral virtues (virtutes morales naturales). St. Thomas defines a cardinal virtue as what “is good as defined by reason”. These cardinal virtues are: i Prudence (prudentia) existing in the very act of reason. ii Justice (iustitia) as the reason putting its order into operations. iii Temperance (temperantia) as reason putting order into passions by curbing unreasoning passions. iv Fortitude ( fortitudo) as reason putting order into passions by strengthening unreasoning passion toward an end in face of danger, fear, or toil.2 Fortitude overcomes fear of dangers of death so that it moderates the passions so that person is diverted away from the good known by reason. It ranks third among the four cardinal virtues, that is, after prudence and justice whose subjects are both the pure powers of soul, namely respectively, intellect and will, before temperance whose subject is also sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) as the power of body-soul composite.3 Furthermore, fortitude perfects the irascible appetite (appetitus irascibilis), which has the distinctive bodily feature pertaining to passion (passio). Since temperance perfects the concupiscible appetite (appetitus concupiscibilis), both called affective virtues. Unlike prudence and justice, these “twin auxiliary virtues” can never be “completely spontaneous” as the true second nature to the agent but need “contrary inclination” as “a constitutive feature” of their actions.4 Thus both fortitude and temperance could be classified as second-order cardinal virtues since they proceed from second-order motivations. According to St. Thomas, the concupiscible appetite, through which “the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable according to the senses

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-6

94  Tao Anthony Wang and to fly from what is hurtful”, is distinct from the irascible power, which resists “these attacks that hinder what is suitable and inflict harm” or “the onslaught of the unsuitable” and makes suitable things useful for self-­ defense in order to finally obtain good.5 In the course of acquiring good or avoiding evil, the object of irascible appetite is “difficult to obtain or avoid” for its “arduous or difficult nature”.6 St. Thomas, therefore, suggests that fortitude as a virtue is to make a person good “by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs”. In other words, a person’s will can be “in so far as it conforms man to reason”, as he says, the human will is hindered from following the rectitude of reason “through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself”. The obstacle is removed by a fortitude of the mind, whereby to resist a difficulty becomes a fortitude of body overcoming bodily obstacles.7 Fortitude, consequently, “remove(s) any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason”.8 With regard to specific passions, fortitude primarily pertains to two kinds of irascible appetite: fear and daring. Fortitude, in effect, “curbs” fear and “moderates” daring because it is “chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason”, with which person needs firmly to “bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear” and “dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future” by the strength of daring.9 It is worthwhile noting that the optimization of fortitude upon the irascible passions, according to St. Thomas, moderates rather than enhances. This is a similar approach to Aristotle’s location of fortitude (courage) as the mean between cowardliness and rashness. The major difference to Aristotle is that St. Thomas proposes martyrdom as the exemplar of fortitude. In doing so he abandons daring or audacity in the face of violent attack. St. Thomas, in addition, believes that fear serves as the “completion and end” of all the other irascible passions in the movement of the appetite toward evil. The movement of the appetite “begins in hatred (odium), goes on to aversion ( fuga), and ends in fear”. As such fear is the general and principal passion by which we can “understand the appetite’s common tendency to desire or shun something”. Daring, consequently, cannot be the primary passion because it implies accidental movement toward evil.10 That is to say, the passion of daring and an attacking act motivated by it are not the constitutive elements in the irascible faculty to overcome the difficulties in acquiring good. Put differently, the passion of daring even in its “moderate” manner in an attacking act against an obstacle of the good cannot be counted as an essential feature of fortitude. Consequently, fear is the basic characteristic of the irascible appetite so that the overcoming of fear, for St. Thomas, becomes the fundamental character of fortitude. For St. Thomas, the cardinal virtues are treated first in general as being “the common formal principles” of all the other virtues since they are “general conditions of the human mind [and thus] found in all the virtues”.11 Hence fortitude as a “firmness of mind” ( firmitas animi) is a common

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  95 condition of every virtue because “it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably”. Moreover, if we signify virtue’s general definition as “the extreme limit of a power” by virtue’s power of resisting corruptions, that is a “firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers”, fortitude is reckoned a special virtue with a specific matter.12 As a special virtue fortitude is distinctive in matter to the extent that it is “the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death”.13 The most critical danger is undoubtedly death because it is “the most fearful of all bodily evils”, which “does away all bodily goods” none of which “is equivalent to the good of the reason”.14 Put differently, given that the proper situation of fortitude is a being’s immediately coming face-to-face with the threat from nonbeing, fortitude bears the ontological significance of the only cardinal virtue which unfolds its essence in this critical state of being. St. Thomas’ basic definition of fortitude is to acquire the good by overcoming fear with a firmness of mind when facing the nonbeing of death. However, it is death in battle that primarily and properly exemplifies human non-avoidance of the danger of death in the pursuit of good. This then can include martyrdom as the death in a personal or individual battle since “[the person] is defending the common good by a just fight”.15 In St. Thomas’ theory, martyrdom then becomes the perfect moral exemplar of fortitude: It belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest (certamine particulari) with his persecutors. …Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude.16 Martyrdom as the exemplar of fortitude demonstrates the essential difference between St. Thomas’ theory and the classical tradition of virtue theory represented by Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle places fortitude at the start of the discussion of individual virtues and highlights its meaning in terms of the circumstance of “death in battle” giving it the meaning of “showing prowess” or “noble death”.17 In short, Aristotle’s fortitude, namely andreia (ἀνδρεία), emphasizes the military battlefield as the apex of fortitude, whilst St. Thomas’ fortitudο emphasizes martyrdom. St. Thomas maintains that virtue as “the extreme limit of a power” leads a person to excellence to the extent that it endows reason control over passions appropriately by performing a perfect operation consistently or stably, readily, and pleasurably.18 It is interesting to note that this account may seem contradictory. For example, the one who displays fortitude in martyrdom does so by sacrificing bodily life consistently and readily but it will

96  Tao Anthony Wang not be pleasurable in doing so. For this to make sense requires there to be a supernatural end that is beyond this life and for St. Thomas, this is his Christian belief in the martyrs’ continued life with the Blessed in Heaven and their ultimate joy (gaudium) of the vision of God.19 St. Thomas admits that the martyr suffers bodily pain and spiritual sorrow or despair over the loss of life on the one hand, but feels the spiritual joy on the other. That is “the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a person prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto”.20 St. Thomas further explains that “the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God’s grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it”.21 Thus St. Thomas clarifies that for the martyr exhibiting fortitude in the midst of bodily pain but spiritual joy “it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad”.22 Fortitude proper to human nature cannot reach this height in the face of death unless it overcomes nonbeing and firmly pursues the ultimate good with the assistance of God’s supernatural grace according to St. Thomas. The infused supernatural virtues, namely theological virtues (virtutes theologicae), therefore, with special emphasis on charity (caritas) as “the mother of virtues”, elevates and transforms natural fortitude in essence into the Christian virtue of fortitude as the exemplar of martyrdom.23 As such fortitude manifests itself as a kind of charity, as St. Augustine writes in De moribus ecclesiae catholicae: “fortitude is love bearing everything readily for the sake of God”.24 Conquering fear and enduring death are the instinctual normal of self-preservation when faced with death. Thus, fortitude in suffering death presents itself as an acquired cardinal virtue (virtus cardinalis acquisita) proper to human nature in the circumstance of acquiring a higher good than the self-preservation. Due to the irascible appetite pertaining to the specific good rather than the principle of good (universal good), fortitude, which guides the irascible faculty as its subject toward its excellence under the dictate of reason, cannot acquire the good beyond the specific and proximate such as enduring death and even recklessly fighting back the enemy for the sake of a fake good promised by an illusory or even evil secular ideology. This is the moral risk that the natural fortitude, that is civil fortitude ( fortitudo civilis) brings about. According to St. Thomas, it is only by the elevation and transformation by the supernaturally infused virtues that the ambiguities and moral risks surrounding natural fortitude can be removed in pursuit of the universal and supreme good of God. Charity, therefore, is nothing but the infused fortitude exemplified by martyrdom. As noted earlier, the essence of fortitude is the firmness of mind toward the good such that persists to the end. Through “the firmness of mind” a person “does not yield to the contraries that hinder him/her from achieving that good”. Furthermore, because “gratuitous fortitude strengthens man’s soul in the

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  97 good of Divine justice, which is ‘through faith in Christ Jesus’”, martyrdom is elicited by fortitude and thus “related to faith as the end”.25 Importantly, martyrdom is grounded in and driven by charity as St. Thomas writes: …On this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better. A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life. …Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man’s love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment. …And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity.26 It is charity as God’s grace from without, in which the distinctiveness of Christian faith lies, that endows infused natural fortitude with an unambiguous motive and purpose, and consequently with ultimate value. Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause (primum et principale motivum), being the virtue commanding (imperantis) it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause (motivum proprium), being the virtue that elicits (elicientis) it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity.27 It is noteworthy that fortitude is given another description in Summa Theologiae as the fifth Gift of the Holy Spirit (dona)—the Gift of fortitude (donum fortitudinis).28 St. Thomas emphasizes that the firmness of mind supported by the virtue of fortitude proper to human nature when undergoing hardship or critical suffering, “perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever”, but it cannot “go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers”.29 Therefore the assistance of the Gift of the Holy Spirit is necessary: Yet furthermore man’s mind is moved by the Holy Spirit, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils

98  Tao Anthony Wang may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man’s power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Spirit works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Spirit who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a Gift of the Holy Spirit. For it has been stated…that the Gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Spirit.30 Consequently, fortitude becomes the only one among the Sevenfold Gifts of the Holy Spirit that directly corresponds to a cardinal virtue proper to human nature. In other words, fortitude is the only naturally acquired cardinal virtue that is “seamlessly” connected to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit that is required for the living out of Christian life. Although fortitude as a Gift of Holy Spirit or cardinal virtue “perfects man in relation to well-doing”, they are fundamentally different from each other to the extent that the cardinal virtue is promoted by human reason from within while the Gift moved by God’s divine inspiration (inspiratio) from without.31 Thus, St. Thomas says, “sometimes these Gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God”.32 In addition, the Gifts are distinguished from the virtue. For example, the virtue of temperance is not a Gift and the Gift of the fear of the Lord is not a virtue.33 Moreover, St. Thomas indicates there is difference between the Gifts and supernaturally infused virtue (virtus infusa) such that “…the Gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God”.34 That is to say, the fundamental difference between the Gifts and the virtue, especially the infused virtues, lies in the fact that the Gifts originate from God from without, while the virtues are a human second nature from within for the purpose of a good life through the operation of human reason. Put differently, the subject of the Gifts is God himself by divine inspiration of the Holy Spirit while the subject of the infused virtues is the human being. The Gifts are critically necessary to the elevation of the virtues because “…not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues (virtutes heroicas vel divinas). But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receives in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Spirit”.35 St. Thomas discusses further the relationship between the three theological virtues with the Gifts of Holy Spirit. He maintains that the theological virtues serve as the foundation of the Gifts, that

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  99 is, given the virtue of faith, hope, and charity presupposed in the possible union of person with God, the mind of person can be united to and thus moved by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Gifts are derived from the theological virtues and correspond to them.36 St. Thomas, consequently, makes an analogy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues (the cardinal virtues), to that of the theological virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, for St. Thomas, just as the intellectual virtues perfect the reason, which is “the moving principle of the moral virtues (which ‘perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason’)”, so too the theological virtues uniting a person to God, God are the moving principle of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence St. Thomas concludes that “the theological virtues are those whereby man’s mind is united to God, …the Gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. …So the theological virtues are more excellent than the Gifts of the Holy Spirit and regulate them.”37 The Gift of fortitude, therefore, perfects naturally acquired cardinal virtue of fortitude and achieves the infused fortitude ( fortitudo infusa) to the point of action in the supernatural dimension under the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

2 From Military Paradigm to Martyrdom Paradigm of Fortitude It seems that the research works do not focus very much on St. Thomas’ idea of fortitude. Rather the focus is on martyrdom as perfectly exemplifying fortitude, thus comparing it to Aristotle’s classical military paradigm which considers both the soldier’s fearless mind and his ruthless aggression facing death in battlefield. Through the transformation of the classical understanding of fortitude in the paradigm of military heroism to that of the paradigm of martyrdom, the profundity of St. Thomas’ theory of fortitude in the context of Christian faith is unfolded, whereby the martyr’s fortitude is centered upon “internally-oriented intellectual excellence” thus differing from the military fortitude which is centered upon externally oriented performative excellence.38 Moreover, the martyr’s fortitude is a disposition toward supernatural good beyond human nature in St. Thomas’ theory. Nicholas E. Lombardo suggests that St. Thomas defines fortitude in two distinctive but complementary ways as “[c]onsidered according to its formal principle, fortitude is the virtue that puts the rule of reason into passion that otherwise might ‘draw away from what reason dictates through fear of dangers or hardships’” and “considered according to the power of the soul that it perfects, fortitude is the virtue located in the irascible passions. From this perspective, fortitude is about ordering the irascible passions to correspond with our telos”.39 Lombardo continue to point out that the former way overcomes obstacles to what reason dictates and “places the moderation of sadness under fortitude under the virtue of patience”, while the latter, as the material principle of fortitude “places the restraint

100  Tao Anthony Wang of immoderate anger under temperance, under the virtue of gentleness” and avoids recklessness as well.40 The double implications of fortitude in St. Thomas, according to Lombardo, suggest an importance that “fortitude is more about the restraint of fear than the moderation of daring”.41 For him, St. Thomas’ idea of fortitude is more about Christian “transformation” than “tacking” on Aristotle’s classical understanding in the following. That is, on the one hand, for Aristotle, “the virtue of fortitude is a matter of strength and aggressive valor, and conquering internal and external obstacles”, while for St. Thomas, “fortitude might include these elements, but it is more concerned with ‘the strength of the soul in enduring or resisting evil’”. On the other hand, Aristotle focuses on fortitude’s “aggressively seeking to accomplish some objective” as “the province of the strong and powerful”, while St.  Thomas emphasizes “the internal ordering of the irascible passions”, which is “compatible with some amount of sorrow, so that they do not interfere with the decision to lay down one’s life for the truth”. In short, St. Thomas transforms the meaning of fortitude from that concerning external conduct to the focus on the internal ordering of the passions.42 Accordingly, fortitude, along with its possible ambiguities of recklessness and violence, has been transformed into the unambiguous exemplified by martyrdom, namely the giving up of the bodily life for the truth and the fulfillment of the spiritual life through the ordering of internal reason. Therefore, fortitude will obtain a richer implication, including an aesthetical feeling, in moral action, and a more elegant gentlemanship thus characterizing the essence of Christian faith or the power of agape. Rebecca K. De Young provides a similar viewpoint. For her, St. Thomas’ choice “to give the act of martyrdom precedence over the paradigm of military heroism as the exemplar act of courage reflects his commitment to taking Christ—especially in his act of sacrificial love on the cross—as the model of virtue, thereby departing radically from alternative ideals of courage found in both ancient Greek and contemporary culture”. Hence, she believes that St. Thomas’ Christian commitments do not merely “add theological frosting to an Aristotelian philosophical cake” but is rather more like “changing water into wine”.43 Compared with the fearless sacrificial and bloody killing act of military heroism at war, “martyrdom faces the worst harm (death) and, as a result, the greatest degree of hindering passion (fear). It can do so because it cleaves to nothing less than the greatest good (the Truth that is Christ). Therefore, martyrdom is the act that chiefly exemplifies courage and captures its essential nature”.44 According to De Young, the reason why St. Thomas chooses martyrdom as more important over the military paradigm of fortitude, which inclines toward the act of aggression, is that the martyrdom paradigm focuses on the act of endurance, which is much more difficult than aggression because “it involves a threat perceived as stronger than oneself (rather than weaker), as present (rather than future), and as usually requiring a longer period of resistance and overcoming of fear (rather than a short and sudden action)”.45 De Young says, “Military

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  101 courage thus has physical and psychological resources to draw upon which the martyr lacks in her act of enduring fear and evil. So, while military courage’s aggressive act can still say ‘My strength can overpower you,’ the martyr’s says only, ‘The truth will stand even when I fall’”.46 In martyrdom, no bodily strength could be relied on; even at the critical point of life and death only complete vulnerability remains and all control over one’s life is lost. Therefore, suffering and helplessness could only be overcome by the power of the soul, namely the endurance of mind as the essence of fortitude, which remains the only possibility of resistance such that in extreme peril fortitude primarily and ultimately proves its genuine character.47 De Young concludes that St. Thomas’ paradigm of martyrdom, in contrast to classical paradigm of military, instead of narrowing the scope of fortitude widens its application, To make martyrdom the model to follow allows anyone who is able to suffer to echo this supreme example of courage in their own lives, and leaves physical power, with its attendant gender and age limitations, out of the picture. …Courage’s essential character is to trust Christ… In conclusion, rather than narrowing the virtue, Aquinas’s version of courage actually opens up the range of possible practitioners, in a way that breaks from both Aristotelian and contemporary ideals, and in a way that is consistent with his own pedagogical purposes in the S.T.48 Furthermore, since the paradigm of martyrdom gives fortitude a precise and unambiguous meaning fortitude should also be a higher virtue in the ordering of Christian faith, This new kind of power is made perfect in weakness, for both the martyr’s act of remaining steadfast in her end and doing it well—with facility and delight—are a gift from another. Again, the fit of this last theological virtue with the exemplar act of courage reinforces the theme that the courage of the martyr is not about human power or achievement, but about proper dependence on God as a source of strength and the end to which we direct and dedicate our lives. Aquinas’s account brings us to the conclusion that courage’s highest expression is fidelity to truth, empowered by charity, and graced with the delight that only God can give. …Martyrdom, as the exemplar act of courage, is best suited to illustrate the features of this virtue so as to counter any mistaken conceptions of courage—those relying solely on human power and control—that ancient and modern ideals alike might tempt us to hold.49 Gregory M. Reichberg disagrees with De Young’s interpretation. He maintains that the thinking behind St. Thomas’ elaboration of Question 123 in the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologiae is “to substitute the ancient

102  Tao Anthony Wang Greco-Roman admiration for military heroism with a Christian focus on martyrdom” is misleading. Reichberg writes, Despite Aquinas’s obvious interest in highlighting martyrdom as the highest instantiation of fortitude, he does not discredit the value of battlefield courage within the Christian life of virtue. On the contrary, he elaborates a two-stage theory in which military heroism is put forward as the exemplar of acquired fortitude, while martyrdom is praised as the paradigm of infused fortitude. Having embraced the principle ‘grace perfects nature,’ Aquinas is attentive to the various relations that can exist between these two modalities-acquired and infused-of fortitude. On the one hand, the heroism of soldiers provides him with a natural basis for understanding the supernatural fortitude of holy martyrs. On the other hand, he recognizes how infused fortitude can find expression in military deeds, such that death on the battlefield will sometimes count as martyrdom.50 Clearly, Reichberg confirms the connection and consistency between St. Thomas’ and Aristotle’s theories through Christian “infused fortitude”.51 The war context in the military paradigm is practically extended by expanding the connotation of the concept of war in St. Thomas’ paradigm of martyrdom. Therefore, St. Thomas extends fortitude to martyrdom “not by modifying the essentials of this virtue as they are presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, an account he adheres to closely, but rather by finding a foundation in Scripture that enables him to widen the ordinary meaning of bellum”.52 Bellum, in the medieval context, enjoys “a range of application considerably broader than obtains for ‘war’ or its equivalents today”.53 Reichberg lists the multiple meanings of “war” in relation to St. Thomas’ articulation of fortitude as shown in Table 5.1.54 Table 5.1  Meaning of “War” in Relation to St. Thomas’ Articulation of Fortitude According to Gregory M. Reichberg Analogate

Senses of War

Primary analogate Secondary analogate

Public war (bellum One army confronting another on a generale) battlefield One individual Signified actively: Particular interacting resorting to force war (bellum violently defensively or for other particulare) with motives or private Signified passively: another war (bellum suffering violent attack privatum) with firm endurance; self-sacrifice, for God (martyrdom) or one’s country Spiritual fighting Resisting concupiscence (spiritualiter certare)

Metaphorical analogate

Description

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  103 As can be seen, the general meaning of bloody confrontation in public war is somewhat extended to the private sphere and highlighted as a particular war or private war.55 Reichberg concludes that under the medieval notion of “private war”, “there could be an easy transition from the causative meaning of bellum to the receptive connotation of someone suffering violence yet firmly by strength of soul”. For Reichberg, this more passive designation of bellum represents, on St. Thomas’ part, an innovation from causing violence to receiving violence. In this way, he replaces a resorting to violence in aggression to an endurance of violence with fortitude and proposes a “spiritual fighting (spiritualiter certare)” against a person’s own wayward desire to gain eternal life in contrast to physical fighting ( pugnare corporaliter) in a metaphorical sense, which precisely justifies the classical spirit of fortitude in Aristotelian sense presented in martyrdom.56 Reichberg further suggests that although public war is the chief arena for the exercise of acquired fortitude, according to St. Thomas, fortitude also is exhibited in the way that “violence is undergone not applied” by those who bear witness to God in the face of persecution; their martyrdom can be defined as the practice of the infused virtue of fortitude. For Reichberg, St. Thomas recognizes that when individuals risk their natural lives for the sake of the common good (bonum commune), even though there is also a fortitude of civic sacrifice ( fortitudo civilis), it is still an acquired fortitude different from the infused and divine one presented in martyrdom.57 St. Thomas integrates the fourfold virtue theory proposed by the Neo-­Platonic philosopher Plotinus, namely an order of social virtues (virtutes politicae), perfecting virtues (virtutes purgatoriae), perfect virtues (virtutes purgati animi), and exemplar virtues (virtutes exemplares) into his doctrine of cardinal virtues. It is by reason of social virtues that “man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs”, hence they are the acquired virtues proper to human nature. However, “since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, …we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine”. St. Thomas continues, “[n]ow these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called ‘perfecting’ virtues”. He maintains that they correspond to the four cardinal virtues, for instance, “fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things”.58 Essentially, perfecting virtues are equivalent to abovementioned “Christian virtues”, that is the infused cardinal virtues through the infusion (Gifts) of God’s grace in the course of sanctification/justification, while the comparatively static “perfect virtues” are the genuine fulfillment and consummation of the ultimate moral achievement of the idealized Christian virtues, namely the final perfection of the perfecting. The achievement to distinguish the social virtues, namely the practice of the acquired virtues (including the sacrifice of a citizen for the sake of common good in the critical situation), from the infused virtues

104  Tao Anthony Wang presented in martyrdom, is not to destroy the consistency of fortitude in two sorts of scenarios but to legitimate the substantial coherence between them. The reason for making a distinction between the two paradigms is to clarify the tension and boundary between different scenarios of “war” in either secular matters or divine providence on the one hand, and to avoid the risks in confusing the two on the other. Therefore, Reichberg emphasizes that there is no such thing as sacrifice in a public war labeled “military martyrdom” for St. Thomas because “the martyr’s courage, consisting as it does solely in endurance, excludes a stance of attack”. Accordingly, the very notion of a “military martyrdom” would seem to be an oxymoron unless it could be applied “only to soldiers who die in a purely defensive posture, such as those who are captured and executed, or who are otherwise unable to mount a forcible resistance”.59 On the one hand, the aspect of attack or aggression that military fortitude highlights does not characterize the core spirit of fortitude; on the other hand, the boundary between the scenario of a secular public war and that of the divine private “war” is clear enough that any religious indoctrination (infusion?) to the public war in order to make it a private matter or a matter of martyrdom is not allowed.60 Other scholars delve into the theological meaning, especially the Christological dimension, of St. Thomas’ exposition of fortitude in relation to Aristotle’s theory. Patrick Clark, for example, notes the difference between St. Thomas’ and Aristotle’s idea of fortitude in the theological meaning of death. Clark understands that St. Thomas’ theological anthropology, informed by Genesis, considers death as “the greatest and most fearful danger to human life in a radically different way than Aristotle” such that death is “an unmitigated evil because it represents humanity’s severed relationship with God”, thereby acts of greatness are possible in light of death and in spite of death. Thus St. Thomas “views the exercise of courage in its deepest sense as an expression of hope for the restoration of the form of existence in which the justice and mercy of God preserves us from all harm”.61 Compared with Aristotle’s understanding of death in general, St. Thomas’ Christological doctrine of death suggests, “The evil of death no longer represents ultimate loss but rather an opportunity to be conformed to the person of Christ. In our endurance of suffering and death, we grow in virtue by imitating the passion of Christ, which for Aquinas is simultaneously the exemplum of moral perfection and the source of grace by which the supernatural life grows in us”.62 Clark continues: …The martyr undergoes the extreme evil of death not so much as a punishment for sin or even as a consequence of the ‘natural’ vulnerability of her bodily functions to acts of misfortune and violence. Rather, death is an opportunity to imitate Christ’s ‘example of patience’. Just as Christ patiently endured corruption and death in order to redeem to the human race from its sin, the martyr imitates the patience of Christ by refusing to avoid or deny the evil of what she suffers.63

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  105 Clark endorses the viewpoint that St. Thomas’ “prioritization of endurance over aggression decisively alters Aristotle’s account of courage by characterizing it principally as a matter of restraining the passions and remaining steadfast in the good of reason rather than actively pursuing any proximate objective”.64 Fortitude, by its power of endurance, leads the irascible faculty of the sensitive appetite directly toward the highest good (summum bonum). Clark, therefore, highlights St. Thomas’ description of fortitude as “a virtue essential to the attainment of the difficult good (bonum arduum)” against all kinds of corruption and misfortune,65 and he insists that all these corruption and misfortune “is a direct effect of humanity’s historical sinfulness”.66 In other words, what makes the acts of fortitude virtuous is not “what they do to harmonize the relationship between reason and the passions”, but rather “depends primarily upon the goodness of the end for which an agent resists and endures the threats to its attainment”.67 This goodness of the end possesses the strong Christological meaning manifested in the perfection of Jesus Christ’s charity in His sacrifices on the Cross at Calvary for the sake of human redemption thereby becoming the ideal of martyrdom. However, for Aquinas the communicative significance of martyrdom runs deeper than simply confirming reason’s preeminence. By means of her explicit confession, the martyr provides witness to the specifically divine nature—and as I hope to show, the irreducibly Christological nature—of the ultimate good for which she is willing to sacrifice all else. It is for this reason that Aquinas will say that the act of martyrdom ‘belongs to perfection in its highest degree,’ for it manifests the perfection of charity, the supreme love of God manifested most fully in Christ’s willing sacrifice on the cross.68 Clark, consequently, suggests, “Aquinas actually clarifies and improves upon Aristotle’s theory of courage by insisting with greater consistency on courage’s auxiliary role with respect to the larger human good”.69 Jennifer A. Herdt agrees that St. Thomas’ fortitude-cum-martyrdom theory exactly develops Aristotle’s theory. Herdt explains that “when Aquinas’s account of courage is held up against the broader theological tradition, what is most striking is not the departures from Aristotle as such, but the way in which Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle in affirming the exemplarity of martyr courage in a way that builds on, rather than repudiating, Aristotle’s analysis of battlefield courage.”70 For Herdt, we must choose “a fine death”, “the death that is noble and beautiful (to kalon)” to define fortitude. That is the reason Aristotle chooses death in war as the exemplar of fortitude since it occurs “in the greatest and finest danger” “one faced for the sake of defending some important good”.71 Likewise, Christian thinkers, such as St. Thomas, readily regard the generous martyrdom of Jesus Christ for human redemption on the Cross as the exemplar of fortitude under the circumstance of a “fine and noble death” for Christians to imitate as the

106  Tao Anthony Wang criterion of morality. Likewise with De Young’s analysis, Herdt also indicates that the martyr’s fortitude is more valuable as it is more difficult action given it possesses an achievement in a physically powerless person holding fast to the good with great endurance in strength of soul over a stronger evil power than when a physically strong person relies on his/her bodily strength in order to attack an evil. In short, “one’s steadfast adherence to the good is most fully and powerfully displayed in physical weakness”, St. Thomas, therefore, “seeks at this stage (martyrdom) to make a more general point about enduring evils”.72 St. Thomas differs from Aristotle in his exposition of fortitude in that he highlights endurance and downplays aggression regarding the double meaning of fortitude. Concerning this point, Herdt investigates the revival of the classical idea of fortitude by the medieval tradition represented in the Patristic thought.73 In the Christian tradition, Jesus’ “heroic” act of fortitude is not his possible “heroic (military) deed” of a descent from the Cross and then an aggressive attack against Pontius Pilate, but instead is his ready endurance of death throughout the savage torture of the Cross and eventual victorious resurrection from death. More importantly, as an indispensable part of fortitude, patience is not an unambiguous virtue. Alasdair MacIntyre once criticized Aristotle’s virtue ethics for its lack of a vision of a whole human life without an overriding conception of the telos. As a result, it seems ambiguous in regards to why and to what to be patient with, thus any substantive application of an Aristotelian concept like patience “requires an understanding of goods and of the good that goes beyond the multiplicity of goods which inform practices”.74 That is to say, an ultimate and divine good as the final cause is required to plan and establish a whole human life so that the ambiguous acquired fortitude can be transformed into the unambiguous infused fortitude. Herdt holds the similar opinion and insists that the reason why martyrdom-cum-fortitude is more praiseworthy than military fortitude is that those who die in defense of their country, is “not just because endurance is more proper to courage than attacking, but also because the Divine good to which martyrs cling exceeds not only the good of the individual but also the civic good: both its form and its end are greater” and this good is “the Divine good which cannot be grasped by natural reason”. Therefore, for Herdt, the martyr’s fortitude presents itself as a “gratuitous (infused) fortitude” different from a “civic (acquired) fortitude”.75 Herdt concludes by highlighting the coherence between the two kinds of fortitude, “[c]ourage on Aquinas’s own account is most perfectly realized in the endurance of martyrdom, which clings to the Divine good by grace. Courage fully articulated is thus dramatically different from courage as understood by Aristotle. At the same time, Aquinas’s purpose is not to subvert Aristotle, but rather to show how his partial truth points towards more complete truth.”76

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  107

3 The Courage to Be: Paul Tillich on Courage and Martyrdom The modern Christian Theologian Paul Tillich, from the Protestant tradition, once gave a series of lectures entitled The Courage to Be at Yale University from which one of his most famous monographs was produced under the same title. The core concept “courage”, in this book, is properly the general notion of fortitude ( fortitudo) as one of the four cardinal virtues found in classical ethics.77 Tillich reviews and reflects upon the ideas of fortitude/courage in some of the major ancient and medieval thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas. He inclines to underline the difference between the ancient theories of Plato and Aristotle, and those of fortitude in the modern ages as that of the domination of intellectualism. He insists that St. Thomas’ idea of fortitude serves more as a connecting link to the preceding thinkers by following the history of ideas of fortitude as possessing ancient gentlemanship and intellectualism but being joined to the spirit of Christian faith. Tillich uses a similar method in analyzing the concept “love” in such works as Love, Power and Justice, Morality and Beyond and Systematic Theology;78 he articulates the virtue of courage through the dual perspective of ontology and ethics: Courage is an ethical reality, but it is rooted in the whole breadth of human existence and ultimately in the structure of being itself. It must be considered ontologically in order to be understood ethically… The ethical question of the nature of courage leads inescapably to the ontological question of the nature of being. And the procedure can be reversed. The ontological question of the nature of being can be asked as the ethical question of the nature of courage.79 Put more precisely, courage “as a human act, as a matter of valuation, is an ethical concept. Courage as the universal and essential self-affirmation of one’s being is an ontological concept”.80 The idea of courage as the self-­ assertion of being will be investigated later. For now, it is right to be begin with Tillich showing that in Plato’s classical structure of the soul, passion or spirit (thymós) courage (andreía) is located in the central position between reason (logos), corresponding to the virtue of prudence, and appetite (epithymia) pertaining to temperance, which is “the unreflective striving towards what is noble” and can at least “bridge the cleavage between reason and desire”.81 Nevertheless, the metaphysical dualism of Platonism emphasizes the conflict between the reasonable and the sensual, which deprives courage of its pivotal use as a bridge.

108  Tao Anthony Wang This deprivation can be seen in later philosophy with Descartes’ division of being into thought and extension, along with Kant’s moral rigor, eliminates courage’s central position in person’s being as an ontological and ethical consequence.82 In addition, Plato considers courage as the essential function of person’s being with an ethical value and sociological quality, which manifests the noble and graceful sociological qualities of the guardians (phylakes) of the Greek City-State manifested in the aristocracy. The aristocratic element of courage is “preserved as well as restricted by Aristotle” to the extent that, whether or not one is courageous, to endure pain and death becomes the criterion of the morally beautiful and noble or ugly (aischros). Tillich continues, “Courage is the affirmation of one’s essential nature, one’s inner aim or entelechy, but it is an affirmation which has in itself the character of ‘in spite of’.”83 The “affirmation” of courage presents itself as “in spite of” (sacrifice oneself against) that which “would prevent us from reaching our actual our fulfilment” including even those elements which “belong to one’s being”. Thus “most essential part of our being prevails against the less essential”. For Aristotle, however, the soldier who “is required by his profession to be always ready for this sacrifice” becomes “the outstanding example of courage”. Hence, either the Greek concept andreía characterizing manliness (aretē) or the Latin word fortitudo underlining power (virtus) indicates the military connotation of courage. Tillich advances that once “the aristocratic tradition disintegrated and courage could be defined as the universal knowledge of what is good and evil, wisdom and courage converged and true courage became distinguished from the soldier’s courage”. For example, for Tillich, the courage of Socrates under the sentence of death is “rational-democratic, [and] not heroic-aristocratic”.84 Tillich maintains that while courage has an acute military connotation in classical philosophy, there was a revival of its nobility through gentlemanship in the Middle Ages, and this was especially manifested in the knight spirit called hohe Mut, which means “the high, noble, and courageous spirit”. In short, the ideal medieval knight would be both a brave soldier and a noble gentleman.85 Tillich delves further into the context of the German language and indicates two adjectives signifying courage, namely tapfer meaning the power that comes from occupying a place in the upper strata of feudal society, and mutig derived from Mut signifying the movement of the soul correlating to the English word “mood”. The noun form of tapfer, namely Tapferkeit expresses more and more the special virtue of the soldier who ceases to be identical with the knight and the nobleman, while Mut as the stem of mutig indicates the heart within a person, just as the English word “courage” is derived from the French “coeur” (heart). Therefore, Tillich says, “It is obvious that the term Mut and courage directly introduce the ontological question, while Tapferkeit and fortitude in their present meanings are without such connotations”.86 For this reason, he makes the title of his series of lectures The Courage to Be (Der Mut zum Sein) instead of The Fortitude to Be (Die Tapfterkeit zum Sein). Tillich concludes that “[t]hese linguistic remarks

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  109 reveal the medieval situation with respect to the concept of courage, and with it the tension between the heroic-aristocratic ethics of the early Middle Ages on the one hand and on the other the rational-democratic ethics which are a heritage of the Christian-humanistic tradition and again came to the fore at the end of the Middle Ages.”87 As can be seen, Tillich incisively indicates the deviation of the modern idea of courage from the ancient one represented by Plato and Aristotle by emphasizing that the modern understanding of courage is deficient in its ontological and ethical implications which posits courage as the pivot center of being to the extent that it replaces the pursuit of the moral kalos with rational speculation. Consequently, the rational consideration of goods exceeds the endurance of mind upon the ultimate Good. Likewise, regarding this tension between modern and traditional ideas of courage, Titus maintains that the modern and postmodern discussions of courage “challenge the basic characteristics that typify the ancient worldview and Aquinas’ Christian synthesis” in that “modern philosophical approaches more often than not sever or weaken the bond between fortitude and the good”.88 Obviously, Titus is ascribing to St. Thomas the ancient traditional theory of courage. Tillich sees St. Thomas as the pivotal thinker who serves as a connecting link between the ancient and modern world. For Tillich, the intellectualism of St. Thomas makes courage subordinate to prudence in his four cardinal virtues. Under the dominance of wisdom (prudence), courage is essentially the strength of mind under the dictate of reason or revelation; while the alternative is St. Thomas’ emphasis on the priority of will which “would point to a greater, though not a total, independent of courage in its relation to wisdom”. Tillich suggests that the difference between the two lines of thought, namely “the approach of wisdom (reason)” and “the approach of will”, is “decisive for the valuation of ‘venturing courage’ (in religious terms, the ‘risk of faith’)”. It seems to Tillich that the danger of the former, for St. Thomas, is an “uncreative stagnation” that he believes is found in a good deal of Catholic and some rationalistic thought. On the other hand, the danger of the latter approach is “undirected willfulness” presented in some Protestant and much Existentialist thinking.89 Although the power of heart or affectivity is highlighted in St. Thomas’ thought, so that there is a degree of complementarity between the intellectualism characterized by “mind” and the voluntarism characterized by “heart” where “heart” is nourished by Christian faith, St. Thomas’ whole system is still dominated by reason (rationality), which can be seen by the single fact that the will (voluntas), in his ethics, is defined as “rational” appetite (appetitus rationalis).90 With regards to comparing the modern and ancient ideas of courage, Tillich admits that one of the unfortunate consequences of the intellectualization of person’s spiritual life is that the word “spirit” is lost and replaced by “mind” or “intellect”. This leads to the element of vitality presented in spirit to be “separated and interpreted as an independent biological force”, with the human person, consequently, “divided into a bloodless intellect and

110  Tao Anthony Wang a meaningless vitality”. The spiritual soul is dropped so that it is easy for “a reductive naturalism to derive self-affirmation and courage from a merely biological vitality”. Tillich continues to indicate that in person “nothing is merely biological as nothing is merely spiritual”. The abovementioned “the unity of the strength and value”, namely the unity of “the power of being and the fulfillment of meaning” is presupposed in the Greek word aretē (virtue) only if the moralistic connotations of “virtue” is removed. Therefore, the Greek concept of courage signifies both the intentionality of reason (away from barbarism) and vitality (away from moral elegancy). This understanding is rich in the psychosomatic character of the ideal personality which in ancient Greece is the virtue of nobility (kalos kagathos) or the (manly) beautiful noble who is thus good-virtuous. Either the Greek aretē or medieval virtus, Tillich says, “designate[s] the quality of those who unite masculine strength (virtus) with moral nobility”.91 Moreover, Tillich suggests that the abovementioned biological argument of courage falls short of the classical meaning and in separating the vital from the intentional (rational) “necessarily re-establishes the barbarian as the ideal of courage”. For Tillich, the implication in the social-political sphere, if used by demagogues, will “produce the barbaric ideal of courage as it appeared in fascism and Nazism”.92 In emphasizing the mean between cowardice and recklessness as the definition of courage, Aristotle shows his preference for aggression in courage and highlights the aristocratic beauty/nobility of virtue by courageous and vital masculinity. Aristotle believes that virtue of courage will be obtained when no rash advance is impulsively adopted, and the passions are properly controlled by reason in using physical strength, so that an opponent can be defeated physically. According to Tillich, St. Thomas is the connecting link between the ancient and modern ideas of courage with his exemplar of courage, namely martyrdom, which underscores endurance, is the spiritual power of the will guided by reason and revelation “in spite of” the threat of a block to obtain the good when physical strength is unavailable. This understanding of courage integrates vitality completely into spirituality and embodies the total obedience and commitment of body to spirit (Holy Spirit). Tillich, accordingly, defines St. Thomas’ idea of courage as combining “the aristocratic structure of medieval society (vitality) with the universalist elements of Christianity (Holy Spirit) and humanism (reason)”.93 For St. Thomas, perfect courage is the Gift of the Holy Spirit such that “through the Spirit natural strength of mind is elevated to its supernatural perfection” so that “the ontological side of courage is taken into faith (including hope), while the ethical side of courage is taken into love or the principle of ethics”.94 The fruit of “the supernatural perfection” is the infused cardinal virtues in St. Thomas’ theory of virtue, while the perfection or sanctification of courage is a constant idea throughout the Christian tradition. Courage received into faith and especially hope, is considered as a “loftier virtue than the rest” by the Church Fathers, such as St. Ambrose, and the architype of

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  111 this virtue are Christian martyrs of the Church making courage, for Tillich, “the strength of the soul to win victory in ultimate danger”.95 The opposite of being is nonbeing or nothingness. Tillich maintains that in the Greek language, there are two approaches in nonbeing—a nondialectical concept of nonbeing and the dialectical concept. Ouk on means absolute nothingness which “has no relation at all to being”; while me on is the meaning of nothing which “has a dialectical relation to being”.96 The dialectical nonbeing threatens being in an inescapable way, and it dialectically unites being within being as a whole so that person’s finitude or creatureliness is intelligible in four categories of time, space, causality, and substance.97 Tillich categorizes three types of threats to being by nonbeing. First, nonbeing threatens person’s ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate and absolutely in terms of death. Second, nonbeing threatens person’s spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness and absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. Third, nonbeing threatens person’s moral self-­ affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt and absolutely in terms of condemnation.98 Therefore, courage becomes the ontological power that accepts and overcomes the ontological anxiety caused by nonbeing or finitude; and it is “self-affirmation ‘in-spite-of’, that is in spite of that which tends to prevent the self from affirming itself”.99 It can be called “courage to be” and is the affirmation of being itself either as part of an embracing whole or in its individual selfhood.100 If courage has the self-affirming power to conquer the anxieties incurred by Tillich’s threefold categorization of nonbeing then it “must be rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and the power of one’s world”. For Tillich, the consequence of this means that “every ‘courage to be’ has an open or hidden religious root, for religion is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself”.101 In Tillich’s theological system, therefore, courage has necessarily an ultimate orientation since “finite being includes courage, but it cannot maintain courage against the ultimate threat of nonbeing. It needs a basis for ultimate courage”.102 This “ultimate courage is based upon participation in the ultimate power of being” which, for Tillich, is “Almighty God”. Consequently, Tillich asserts “when the invocation ‘Almighty God’ is seriously pronounced, a victory over the threat of nonbeing is experienced, and an ultimate, courageous affirmation of existence is expressed. Neither finitude nor anxiety disappears but they are taken into infinity and courage”.103 This “self-affirmation” with ultimate concern may be seen as the higher end of being in contrast with natural self-preservation. Martyrdom, on this interpretation, highlights a substantial difference to self-­preservation to the extent that martyrdom sacrifices the present natural being for the sake of ultimate concern and affirms the person at the end by acknowledging their finitude. Courage’s victory over nonbeing is also accomplished in joy. It is joy (gaudium) rather than delight (delectatio) that presents the ontological feature of courage which accompanies the self-affirmation of a person’s essential

112  Tao Anthony Wang being in spite of negation incurred by a person’s accident being. St. Thomas expresses a similar idea when he describes the extreme joy experienced by the Christian martyrs during their bodily sufferings in the face of death. For example, remarks on the martyr St. Tiburtius’ miracle of walking barefoot on burning coal while feeling like he was walking on roses: “yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain, and the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow”.104 Tillich agrees with St. Thomas that, “[j]oy is the emotional expression of the courageous ‘Yes’ to one’s own true being. This combination of courage and joy shows the ontological character of courage most clearly. If courage is interpreted in ethical terms alone, its relation to the joy of self-fulfillment remains hidden. In the ontological act of the self-affirmation of one’s essential being courage and joy coincide”.105 In addition to martyrdom, Tillich has discussed self-sacrifice. He has written that, “[t]he courage to surrender one’s own goodness to God is the central element in the courage of faith”.106 In martyrdom, the entirety of natural life is given to God and embodies courage in its most perfect sense. Thus as far as martyrdom is concerned, it can always be equated with self-sacrifice. In effect, self-sacrifice is always part of martyrdom. It does not follow, of course, that all types of self-sacrifice form part of martyrdom. Martyrdom can be defined as a sacrifice at the cost of the good of natural life, including being itself and being’s this-worldly welfare, for the sake of the Logos, God’s doctrina sacra, or other transcendent ultimate concerns. In Catholic dogmatic and fundamental Theology, martyrdom precisely means “the freely endured (not actively fighting, like a soldier) acceptance of death for the sake of faith”.107 According to St. Thomas’ classification of the relation with divine happiness or beatitude, the love of one’s body as the participation of happiness by way of overflow is inferior to the love of God as the principle of happiness and the love of neighbor as the fellowship in the full participation of happiness.108 By this classification, the sacrifice of natural, bodily, life for the sake of loving God and loving neighbor is justified. Nevertheless, if the divine happiness is pursued for the sake of one’s own soul, then the love of one’s soul, as the direct participation of the Divine good, namely a unity (unitas) with Him, is a more potent reason than the love of neighbor or the soul’s union (unio) with neighbor in the Divine good. Accordingly, St. Thomas concludes that one ought to make self-sacrifice that is bodily for the sake of one’s neighbor because “precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind” while “on spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin”.109 For St. Thomas, the love of God and the love of neighbor, as the love of oneself, is the double commandment of love in the Christian faith. Therefore, one can sacrifice one’s own bodily life for the eternal happiness of one’s own soul and neighbor since they lead to the ultimate good and are thereby also for the sake of God. Christian

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  113 self-sacrifice is nothing other than martyrdom. Differing from St. Thomas, however, Tillich discusses the phenomenon of self-sacrifice in the ontological perspective. Tillich suggests that the centered unity which I dynamically need increases new content of the centered unity by going out and preserve itself by returning to the centered unity. During this process, I may encounter innumerable possibilities which can carry the risk to destroy the self-­alteration of my present reality, “For the sake of my present reality, I must keep many possibilities outside of my centered self, or I must give up something of what I now am for the sake of something possible which may enlarge and strengthen my centered self. So my life process oscillates between the possible and the real and requires the surrender of the one for the other—the sacrificial character of all life”.110 For Tillich, self-sacrifice unfolds “the struggle of values in a personal center”, namely “the conflict of essences within an existing self” in ontological terms, which creates an ambiguity of self-integration. Therefore, according to Tillich, every self-sacrifice is a moral risk with hidden motives so that it is not something unambiguously good at all.111 He explains the risk of self-sacrifice as, in the first instance, as being presented in the decision whether to sacrifice the real for the possible or the possible for the real. In the second instance, self-sacrifice asks the question “what is to be sacrificed?” since “[s]elf-sacrifice may be worthless if there is no self worthy of being sacrificed”. In the final instance, in the cause of sacrifice, the victim may receive nothing from the sacrifice itself, including the moral self-integration, that is a moral achievement. “[The victim] may merely gain the power which weakness gives over the strong one for whom the sacrifice is made”. Even if the self-sacrifice of the victim is worthy, the question arises whether that for which it is sacrificed is worthy to receive it, “the cause which receives it may be evil, or the person for whom it is offered may use it for selfish exploitation”.112 Facing these multiple ambiguities in self-sacrifice, Tillich believes that the only unambiguous sacrifice a human being can make is the sacrifice within the transcendent unity in the communion of the Holy Spirit: The Spirit takes the personal center into the universal center, the transcendent unity which makes faith and love possible. When taken into the transcendent unity, the personal center is superior to encounters with reality on the temporal plane, because the transcendent unity embraces the content of all possible encounters. It embraces them beyond potentiality and actuality, because the transcendent unity is the unity of the divine life. In the ‘communion of the Holy Spirit,’ the essential being of the person is liberated from the contingencies of freedom and destiny under the conditions of existence. The acceptance of this liberation is the all-inclusive sacrifice which, at the same time, is the all-inclusive fulfilment. This is the only unambiguous sacrifice a human being can make.113

114  Tao Anthony Wang Undoubtedly, the sacrifice in the communion of the Holy Spirit relates to martyrdom. Tillich explains, again ontologically, that a person’s moral self-integration contains two poles, namely self-identity and self-alteration: “The Spiritual Presence maintains the identity of the self without impoverishing the self, and it drives towards the alteration of the self without disrupting it” such that “[w]here there is Spirit, the actual manifests the potential and the potential determines the actual. In the Spiritual Presence, man’s essential being appears under the conditions of existence, conquering the distortions of existence in the reality of the New Being”.114 Human potential cannot be completely actualized because of the finitude or creatureliness of both human individual and species. Potentiality as possibility must be sacrificed such that the method to overcome the ambiguity of self-sacrifice is to acknowledge human finitude through ultimate courage endowed by the presence of the Holy Spirit within the tension of actuality and possibility. Tillich writes, Not all the creative possibilities of a person, or all the creative possibilities of the human race, have been or will be actualized. The Spiritual Presence does not change that situation—for although the finite can participate in the infinite, it cannot become infinite—but the Spirit can create an acceptance of man’s and mankind’s finitude, and in so doing can give a new meaning to the sacrifice of potentialities. It can remove the ambiguous and tragic character of the sacrifice of life possibilities and restore the genuine meaning of sacrifice, namely, the acknowledgement of one’s finitude. In every religious sacrifice, finite man deprives himself of a power of being which seems to be his but which is not his in an absolute sense, as he acknowledges by the sacrifice; it is his only because it is given to him and, therefore, not ultimately his, and the acknowledgment of this situation is the sacrifice. Such an understanding of the sacrifice excludes the humanistic ideal of the all-round personality in which every human potentiality is actualized. It is a Godman idea, which is quite different from the God-man image created by the divine Spirit as the essence of the man Jesus of Nazareth. This image shows the sacrifice of all human potentialities for the sake of the one which man himself cannot actualize, the uninterrupted unity with God. But the image also shows that this sacrifice is indirectly creative in all directions of truth, expressiveness, humanity, justice—in the picture of the Christ as well as in the life of the churches. In contrast to the humanist idea of man which actualizes what man can be directly and without sacrifice, the Spirit-determined fulfilment of man sacrifices all human potentialities, to the extent that they lie on the horizontal plane, to the vertical direction and receives them back into the limits of man’s finitude from the vertical direction, the direction of the ultimate. This is the contrast between autonomous and Theonomous personal fulfilment.115

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  115 Christian self-sacrifice or martyrdom in “recognizing man’s finitude” is for Tillich, in sharp contrast to other forms of religious-like suicide that can be characterized “in terms of the emptying of life of all finite contents so that the entrance into the ultimate identity is possible”.116 Interestingly, this kind of religious-like suicide, such as the Kamikaze at the end of the Second World War, which is the syncretism of Japanese Shinto with the secular ideology of militarism, presents courage in the aspect of aggression to “attack” rather than the aspect of endurance (Shinobu, Samurai’s virtue of courage) found in Japanese tradition of Bushido. Tillich rarely discusses martyrdom directly in his theological works since he preferred to articulate the ontological profundity of martyrdom over the moral meaning of courage in martyrdom. As a Christian Protestant theologian in discussing Catholic saints who were often martyrs, along with the veneration of saints, Tillich emphasizes the reason why the saints are different from the other ordinary believers, is not that “the saint represented moral superiority over the others; his saintliness was his transparency to the divine. This transparency expressed itself not only in his words and his personal excellence but also—and decisively so—in his power over nature and man. …Saintliness is transmoral in essence”.117

4  Virtue of Fortitude in Buddhism: Vīrya The counterpart of fortitude could be found in the traditional wisdom of Asian religions. In Buddhism, vīrya (Pali: viriya) is one of the Five Perfection or Salvific Methods (Five Pāramitās)118 as the fourth cardinal virtue to the perfection of liberation/salvation and has the similar meaning to fortitude. It is generally translated as Jingjin 精進 (or Qin 勤/diligence) in the Chinese version of the Buddhist scriptures, which means to “continuously advance towards the real and the pure by one bright essence”.119 Meanwhile, vīrya is also categorized into the Seven Factors of Awakening (Sapta bodhyaṅga) and the Noble Eightfold Path (Ārya aṣṭāṅga mārgaḥ) as one of the core approaches of Buddhist religious practice.120 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Commentary on the Sheath of Abhidharma), the scripture of the All-Exist School (Sarvāstivāda) of the Buddhist Sect of the Elders (Sthavira nikāya), categorizes vīrya into one of the Ten Good Caittas or mental qualities within the Seventy-Five Dharma (Phenomena).121 Vīrya “disposes the mind towards goodness with fortitude”,122 as a state of mind to goodness which the virtue is. It is likely the Mere-Consciousness School of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Vijñānavāda) also ascribes the virtue of vīrya to so-called Eleven Good Caittas of the One Hundred Darmas to illustrate the phenomena as this-worldly and otherworldly.123 In short, in the extremely complicated terminology of Buddhism, vīrya can be clearly distinguished as one of the virtues bringing ultimate goodness in the liberation/salvation of Buddhist faith.

116  Tao Anthony Wang In the long history of Indian thought, it is possible to find multiple usages of vīrya. For example, in Rig Veda, the first volume of Vedas, the sacred canonical texts of Aryan Brahmanism, vīrya is given the meanings “manliness”, “valour”, “strength”, “power”, “energy”, etc. In the ancient Sanskrit epic Mahābhārata, from which the major Hindu scripture Bhagavad Gītā originates, vīrya is given a connotation similar to “heroism”, “heroic deed”, “manly vigour”, “virility”, “semen virile”, etc. in addition, there is a corresponding word of vīrya in Pali, namely viriya which signifies the “state of a strong man”, “vigour”, “energy”, “effort”, “exertion”, etc.124 William E. Soothill, the famous British sinologist and a missionary of the United Methodist Free Church, and Lewis Hodous, an American sinologist and a missionary of ABCFM (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions), translated the Sanskrit term vīrya as “energy”, “zeal”, “fortitude”, “virility” in their co-edited A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms: With Sanskrit and English Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index.125 In summary, it can be seen, in the Indian tradition of ideas, the meaning of vīrya is a heroic quality with the power of endurance coinciding with strong masculine characteristics. From this perspective, vīrya shares a similar meaning with the virtue of fortitude proposed in the Occidental tradition of virtues, as represented by both St. Thomas and Tillich. In the context of Sinicized Buddhism, the translation of the Buddhist term vīrya is always emphasized to mean fortitude as a virtue. Chinese Buddhist scholar Ding Fubao defines vīrya as “the fortitude that cultivates all good and overcomes all evil”;126 it “is also translated as diligence (Qin 勤)…, which is a state of mind to cultivate good order and abandon evil order with courage”.127 Vīrya, as a Buddhist cardinal virtue, often emerges along with a modifier such as a fortitude or courage in the Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures. Such as translation of vīrya cannot be made into a literal meaning of the Chinese word “Jingjin 精進”, to continuously advance toward the real and the pure by one bright essence, or “Qin 勤” or diligence. There are many expressions of vīrya in Buddhist scriptures. For example, the famous text of the Sect of the Elders Commentary on the Sheath of Abhidharma says, “vīrya is endurance of the mind”,128 as its substantial character. The Longer Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra, that is The Infinite Life Sutra, the foundational scripture of the Mahāyāna Buddhist School of Pure Land, mentions that “Courageous and diligent, strong-willed and untiring, he (Bhikṣu Dharmakāra) devoted himself solely to the pursuit of the pure Dharma, thereby benefiting a multitude of beings”.129 The canonical scripture of the Middle Way School (Madhyamakā) of Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa) believed to be composed by Nāgārjuna bodhisattva himself, further illustrates the meaning of vīrya from the perspective of body and spirit, he writes: “Vīrya is a virtue by which dharma is pursued without indolence. For example, to give alms by legal wealth is bodily vīrya; to abandon and reject the evil such as cupidity is spiritual vīrya”.130 A more elaborate

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  117 exegesis could be found in The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness (Vijñāptimātratā-siddhi-śāstra), whose translation and compilation is based on the systematic teaching of Vasubandhu, the founder of the Mahāyāna school of Mere-Consciousness. It says: The word ch’in (diligence) in the Stanze refers to tsing-tsin, zeal (Vīrya). This Caitta has as its essential nature courage and tenacity of purpose in the cultivation of good and the abandonment of evil. Its special activity consists in counteracting indolence and completing all good spiritual practices. The term ‘courage’ indicates undeflected progress (advance from moment to moment); hence it has nothing to do with the practice of defiled dharmas. The expression ‘tenacity of purpose’ indicates ‘absolute purity’; hence it has nothing to do with the practice of non-defiled-non-defined dharmas. This signifies that zeal is exclusively good.131 For the ultimate purpose of spiritual liberation and salvation, vīrya characterizes its courage and tenacity in the course of spirituality by cultivating good and abandoning evil, namely the courgae in the undeflected progress with unflagging spirit, and the tenacity of purpose toward the absolute purity with perseverance. It suggests a five-phase procedure based on the quality of vīrya to practice good dharmas as follows, first, “the arraying of oneself in armour” to embrace a strong desire; second, “strenuous exercise” to the zealous energetic self-cultivation; third, “non-depression or non-self-debasement” by neither underrating oneself nor dreading the dharma of liberation/salvation truth; fourth, “non-retrgression” by forging ahead despite adverse circumstances; lastly, “non-self-satisfaction” for the boundless aspiration toward supreme enlightenment. As the Sutra says, “Having the inclination, the diligence, the courage, the indomitable will to advance, and the firm determination not to put aside the good yoke”.132 The above illustration of vīrya distinctively analyzes its connotation as a virtue practicing nothing other than good dharmas. Furthermore, it is possible to find a deeper understanding of vīrya by its correlative terms. In The Good, Caittas, apramāda, is similar to vīrya and usually signifies a more passive meaning like “vigilance” or “conscientiousness”. It is noteworthy that in the English translation of The Commentary on the Sheath of Abhidharma by the famous American Buddhist scholar Leo M. Pruden, apramāda is translated as “diligence”, while vīrya is also translated as “energy”. It is a reminder to be attentive to the subtle difference between two terms. The Commentary on the Sheath of Abhidharma writes: Apramāda or diligence is bhāvanā (cultivation), that is, the taking possession of, and the cultivation of good dharmas. The taking possession of and the cultivation of good dharmas is none other than the good dharmas being grasped and cultivated. How can you make a partial

118  Tao Anthony Wang mental dharma of diligence? Diligence is application to good dharmas. One says, by metaphor, that it is bhāvanā. By that fact, it is the cause of bhāvanā. According to another school, diligence is the guarding of the mind.133 Pruden adds a footnote to explain that there is “another school” in the Sect of the Great Congregation (Mahāsāṃghika) of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which claims that apramāda is that virtue that “holds the mind safe from the dharmas of defilement (Sāṃkleśika)”.134 Pruden’s translation of apramāda not only raises doubts about the common translation of vīrya into diligence, especially as manifested in the Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures as Qin 勤, the counterpart of diligence; but also emphasizes the distinct meaning of vīrya apart from apramāda, which is the more active connotation of “cultivating good with courage and zeal” rather than “guarding and possessing the good or vigilance over good against evil dharmas with diligence”. The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness articulates apramāda in the following manner: “Vigilance (Apramāda) is zeal plus the ‘three roots of excellence’, non-covetousness, non-anger, and non-delusion. It is the nature of this Caitta to guard against dharmas that should be abandoned (i.e., all the defiled dharmas) and cultivate those that should be cultivate. Its special activity consists in counteracting idleness and realizing and achieving all good dharmas, mundane and supramundane”.135 Apramāda cultivates good and guards against evil by vīrya and the three roots of excellence altogether in order to fulfill the good orders both naturally and supernaturally. Essentially, apramāda works as a resultant force of the four dharmas already noted. The question that results then is “what is the difference between apramāda and vīrya?” The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness suggests that apramāda “has no nature of its own apart from these four dharmas, because it possesses no characteristics different from those of the four, and because, apart from the power of the four, it has no activity proper in the prevention of evil dharmas and the cultivation of good ones”.136 That is to say, apramāda has neither nature nor characteristics nor activity on its own in prevention-cultivation so that it must rely on the four dharmas, namely vīrya, alobha (non-covetousness), adveṣa (non-anger), and amoha (non-­delusion). Nevertheless, although other Good Caittas may possess the same potentiality (virtus) of prevention/cultivation, “their activity is slight and commonplace in comprison with the four” due to the fact that “they are not roots of excellence like the three above-mentioned Caittas” on the one hand, and “they do not stimulate good dharmas universally as vīrya does” on the other. Hence these four dharmas completely embody the substance under the general name apramāda.137 It is possible to say that apramāda is a virtue which merges the power of vīrya and the three roots of excellence to achieve “the prevention of evil dharmas and the cultivation of good ones”. In this power, vīrya contributes the universal motivation to obtain good with fortitude by its own nature.

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  119 As Abhidharmakośabhāṣya writes that “kauśīdya is the opposite of vīrya”, it is possible to say that kauśīdya (indolence) is the vice (vitium) contrary to the virtue of vīrya.138 The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness also points out that vīrya overcomes kauśīdya in Buddhist spiritual practice, that is bhāvanā, by saying: “What is kauśīdya? It is by nature laziness in the cultivation of good dharmas and the abandonment of bad dharmas. Its special activity is to counteract zeal (vīrya) and multiply defiled dharmas. In fact, lazy persons usually multiply and nourish impure dharmas”.139 As the opposite of vīrya, kauśīdya acts as a stumbling block to it for the sake of multiplying defiled dharmas or breeding vices. The essence of kauśīdya is laziness, however, it is not “non-diligence” in the sense of a passive act of omission. Instead, a diligent activity could be made by defiled dharmas (kleśa) or non-defined things (avyākṛta). For the defiled dharmas in particular, an activity with vīrya is substantially an act of kauśīdya which “causes a retrogression of good dharmas”.140 Therefore, The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness considers whether multiplying defiled dharmas is the criterion of kauśīdya thus underlining kauśīdya’s nature as “a retrogression of good dharmas”, namely a failure to cultivate the good or cultivate the opposite of the good. In short, what characterizes kauśīdya is not a non-diligent state of mind but the subjective non-good telos of mind, namely refusing to cultivate the good or busily cultivating a fake good. Likely, pramāda, one of the six universal vexing or defiled mental states (kleśamahābhūmikās), is the opposite of the virtue of apramāda and is generally defined as “non-taking possession of and the non-cultivation of good dharmas”.141 This emphasizes the objective state of non-possession of the good. Pramāda “[by its nature] is self-indulgence and self-abandonment which renders one incapable of stopping the bad and cultivating the good. Its special activity is to counteract diligence and self-discipline, to increase the bad, and to ruin the good”.142 Self-indulgence or self-abandonment, which violates or refuses to cultivate the good in the appearance of doing evil, is similar to the vice of intemperantia in Western classical ethics. A person of pramāda in contrast to a person of kauśīdya acts analogously to Aristotle’s comparison of the intemperate and incontinent where “a city uses the wicked laws” in contrast to “a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws but makes no use of them”.143 The person of kauśīdya either is too slothful to fulfill the law or fulfills it rigidly and resolutely in the wrong city. In general terms, kauśīdya can be said to correspond to acedia, one of the Seven Capital Sins (capitalia peccata) of the Catholic Church. Acedia is a vice of spiritual hindrance in Christian life, which is interpreted as sorrow and displeasure over the spiritual or divine good and is then usually translated into sloth or spiritual apathy in English. The great Catholic thinker St. Thomas Aquinas uses the deadly sin of sloth directly from Greek word acedia in his opus magnum Summa Theologiae. In another treatise Quaestiones disputatae de malo, he also concurs with Church fathers, such as St. John Damascene and St. Gregory the Great, who translate acedia into tristitia

120  Tao Anthony Wang in Latin which is the interior oppressive sadness of mind.144 As a capital sin, acedia signifies not only a literal non-diligence in bodily action or a torpid, dispirited or unenterprising mind, but essentially refers to a “sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good”, and shows itself as “an oppressive sorrow (tristitia)” for “spiritual good” and “oppresses man [so] as to draw him away entirely from good deeds”.145 Thus acedia is not only a human depravity for bodily comfort and spiritually complacence, but also the opposition to the theological virtues (virtutes theologicae) of Christian faith, especially the virtue of charity (caritas). It “signifies a sadness arising out of the repugnance of human desires for divine spiritual good, since such repugnance is obviously contrary to charity, which belongs to a divine good and rejoices in possession of that good”.146 St. Thomas asserts, Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that spiritual joy (gaudium spirituale) whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. On like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called acedia.147 Furthermore, St. Thomas indicates that all the sins which are due to ignorance can be reduced to the capital sin of acedia “to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor”.148 That is to say, acedia is not merely the non-diligence of the cultivation of the ultimate good by charity (with fortitude) but also adopts the negative attitude of apathy, disdain, disgust, even vexation, and fear toward that good, similar to the abovementioned “underrating oneself and dreading the dharma of liberation/salvation truth”. In the sense, in comparison to “sloth”, the translation of acedia into “spiritual apathy” more precisely reveals the spiritual aspect.149 It seems that the Buddhist concept kauśīdya as contrary to vīrya is substantially the spiritual attitude of being negligent in or even against the highest good of liberation/salvation in moral and spiritual practice. It is not a renouncement of cultivating good like pramāda by self-indulgence or self-abandonment, but signifies being weary of and dreading the good, even wrongly making a diligent act toward all kinds of defiled dharmas, and breeding the vices and ultimately turning the person away from good. Buddhist vīrya, characterizing courage and tenacity as its spiritual nature, is zealously diligent in moral and spiritual practice—bhāvanā of preventing evil and cultivating good against the vice of kauśīdya through spiritual endurance for the sake of the great good dharma of ultimate liberation/

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  121 salvation. The Sect of the Elders, however, which proclaims the self-liberation/ salvation of practitioner himself, or Mahāyāna Buddhism which concerns the universal liberation/salvation of all the sentient beings, regards the virtue of vīrya as the spiritual ascent-drive toward the ultimate truth of the “good yoke” and liberation from saṃsāra, the eternal suffering of circle of life-death-rebirth, by vīrya’s power of zealous efforts over hardship and danger without retrogression. In the Catholic tradition, found in St. Thomas’ classical theory of virtue, the cardinal virtue of fortitude conquers fear with endurance of mind and pursues the divine ultimate good despite the nothingness that death threatens. The Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich, on the other hand, attempts to restore the ontological meaning intrinsic to the ancient idea of fortitude, that is the power of confirming the mind toward the ultimate good, a self-assertion with ultimate concern “in spite of” nonbeing (me on). Meanwhile, the agent of vīrya, the sentient being who is trapped in defilement and undefined things, tries to liberate itself from the state of nonbeing, namely eternal suffering (duḥkha) and the vicious circle of saṃsāra, to reach authentic being and ultimate joy and freedom, namely nirvāṇa. Vīrya, by itself, seems to be something “in spite of” “the defiled dharmas”, which aligns itself toward good dharmas and salvation with zeal and perseverance. The Cardinal virtue of fortitude in St. Thomas’ exposition of Catholic moral action, through a shift from Aristotle’s military paradigm to a martyrdom paradigm, is presented in the context of a spiritual “personal war” by removing the ambiguities of bodily acts considered as aggressive valiance. It highlights the non-violent way of self-sacrificial martyrdom to radically pursue the ultimate logos, that is summum bonum by enduring and suffering “in spite of” all hardship and danger. In this way, the virtue of fortitude presents itself as the mean between cowardice and recklessness, and the ancient spirit of heroism. St. Thomas regards the fortitudinous martyrs who love God and pursue virtue as the true spiritual exemplar of fortitude. He suggests that martyrdom is “the greatest proof of the perfection of charity of all virtuous acts” so that it is “the sign of the greatest charity”.150 The Catholic martyrs are the genuine fortitudinous sacrifices for the salvation truth, who enjoy the delight of virtue by overcoming bodily pain and spiritual sorrow.151 The virtue of vīrya operates in a similar manner to prevent kauśīdya from removing good dharmas and moderating diligence in defiled dharma. Although the enterprising and aggressive Buddhist vīrya is positive and active, it pertains exclusively to the spiritual and implies nothing bodily as may be found in a military context. The above-mentioned bodily vīrya signifies nothing but a charitable enterprise concerning bodily life. It is well-known that Buddhism vigorously advocates the fundamental principle of non-violence exemplified by ahimsā (harmlessness) in the Ten Good Caittas. The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness describes it as following: Harmlessness, which means ‘not causing any injury and anguish to sentient beings’, has non-anger as its essential nature. Its special activity

122  Tao Anthony Wang consists in counteracting harmfulness and producing compassion. That is to say, non-anger or non-hatred, inasmuch as it does not cause injury and torment to sentient beings, is conventionally termed harmlessness. Non-anger or non-hatred is opposed to anger or hatred which cuts off the life of beings; hermlessness is opposed to harmfulness which causes injury and anguish to beings. Non-anger gives pleasure (it is benevolence); harmelessness relieves suffering (it is compassion). In this lies the defference between their apparent characters. In fact, non-anger is a dharma which possesses a nature of its own, while harmlessness is merely a name established on the basis of a part of non-anger (that part which relieves suffering). These two dharmas are distinguished to indicate the distinct characteristics of benevolence and compassion, because these two virtues are essential elements of the well-being of sentient beings.152 Benevolence and compassion as the work of charity can neutralize and prevail over the harmfulness incurred by violence in anger or hatred. It can then be asked “can vīrya be practiced by self-sacrificial martyrdom?” Although vīrya has no military meaning, to sacrifice of bodily life by an individual practitioner for their own spiritual achievement or even for the benefit of all sentient beings is a legitimate approach to fulfill liberation/ salvation in the Buddhist faith. The Lotus Sutra of Wondrous Dharma (Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra) records the following words to justify vīrya: While the gods discoursed celestial music this Buddha, who seems to represent the Light, preached the Law-Flower Sutra to a Bodhisattva called Beautiful. So full of rapture did Beautiful become, that he resolved to express his gratitude by the immolation of his beautiful body. Before so doing, he partook of all the fragrance of all the flowers for twelve hundred years. Then he anointed his body with costly unguents, wrapped himself in a celestial robe, bathed in perfumed oil, and by his transcendent will set fire to his body. The brightness illuminated all worlds, the Buddhas in which acclaimed his deed as ‘true zeal (vīrya)’; ‘the True Law Homage to the Tathāgata’; ‘the supreme gift’. His body continued to burn and illuminate the worlds for twelve hundred years, after which it came to an end. …Sakyamuni is now made to say, that Beautiful has become the present Bodhisattava, the King of Healing. Such has been his example of self-immolation that, ‘if any one with mind set on attaining Perfect Enlightenment is able to burn a finger of his own hand, or even a toe of his foot, in homage to a Buddha’s stupa, he surpasses any other who pays homage with domain, cities, wives, and children’.153 It seems that this offering by bodily life in the way of burning fingers or even the body is acclaimed as not only the manifestation of true vīrya,

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  123 but also the supreme gift to the Tathāgata, the omnipresent incarnation of Buddha himself. In 1963, the Vietnamese monk Thích Quảng Đức immolates himself at a crossroads in Saigon to protest the persecution of Buddhists by President Ngô Đình Diệm’s regime in South Vietnam. This famous historical act of sitting in the Lotus Pose (padmāsana) and sacrificing himself with a peaceful look while devoured by a raging blaze shook the whole world. The spiritual charisma and its transcendent value presented in this act seem indistinguishable from that of the martyrs in the Catholic Church throughout history. Nevertheless, the Buddhist attitude toward actions like burning fingers or immolation sacrifice for Buddha is circumspect to the extent that imitating such actions is not yet advocated as a right path to liberation/salvation. As The Question of Maitreya (Maitreyaparipṛcchā) writes: (The Blessed One said to the venerable Ānanda): ‘Ānanda, when the bodhisattva mahāsattva Maitreya was formerly engaged in the conduct of a bodhisattva he did not let go of his arms, legs, or marrow. He did not renounce and let go of his spouse, or his child, village, town, city, royal palace, or retinue. But, Ānanda, when the bodhisattva mahāsattva Maitreya was formerly engaged in the conduct of a bodhisattva, because he fully embraced skillful means, through the easy vehicle, the easy entry, and the easy path he accomplished supreme, perfect enlightenment’.154 A famous stone tablet can be found at the Temple of Avalokiteśvara on Putuo Mountain in China today, erected during the reign of the Jiajing Emperor (1522–1566) in the Ming Dynasty, on which a precept reads “No Self-Sacrifice nor Burning Fingers”. It reminds Buddhist believers that such acts are not regarded as a convenient path to liberation/salvation.155 This perspective toward martyrdom in vīrya is substantially similar to Tillich’s theory on self-sacrifice (martyrdom). Jonathan C. Gold considers vīrya as a sort of moral strength to realize good and right action by overcoming the weakness of will.156 He says, Once one has cultivated sufficient moral strength (vīrya), there might well be no chance one will do the wrong thing. The goal of the path from the perspective of effort is complete mental control. This suggests that to whatever degree you need to exert effort, you are morally compromised in the sense of having at least the potential to succumb to weakness of will. …the perfection of effort, then, is freedom from negative acts. Perfect willpower means never failing to do the right thing. In a Buddhist worldview, not only is the capacity for moral choice not a necessary precondition of moral significance or responsibility, it gets in the way. The desire to exercise individual ‘free will’ is, in this view, part of what keeps us mired in saṃsāra.157

124  Tao Anthony Wang The weakness of will is regarded as fundamental reason of human sinfulness, namely the ontological privation or nonbeing intrinsic to human nature in the sense of Tillich’s me on. It is also an expenditure for the human freedom of the will. That means, if the fortitude of will (vīrya) completely conquers the ontological privation or nonbeing, the will would form a unity with the ultimate good through charity, which is properly what can be called ultimate liberation/salvation. In Buddhism, it will become the right path toward the fulfillment of total liberation from the suffering of saṃsāra; while in Christian faith, it is rightly the beatitude of eternal salvation by beatific vision.

5 Conclusion The shift from the military paradigm in Aristotle’s traditional idea of fortitude to St. Thomas’ martyrdom paradigm consists of a basic understanding of the meaning of fortitude among contemporary scholars and uncovers the deficiency of the spiritual connotation in the modern idea of fortitude which is severely criticized by Tillich who compared it to Nazism. Those two paradigms and the tension between provide a deeper understanding of fortitude. Patrick Clark comments in the following way: All of these recent studies recognize to one degree or another the curiously prominent role and undeniable salience Aquinas accords to the human agent’s supernatural end within his main treatise on courage in the Secunda Secundae, particularly with respect to Aquinas’s turn from a paradigm of aggression to one of endurance. Yet these studies also suggest that Aquinas’s account reflects a new emphasis upon the interior dimensions of courage, an emphasis that extends the scope of the necessity and practicability of courage to all rational agents—and not just male soldiers—acting within a world of chance and misfortune. With regard to the identification and exercise of courage, Aquinas thereby shifts the focus from the recognized attainment of excellence (which takes priority in the Homeric model) to the state of one’s pursuit of excellence: the orientation of one’s intellect and will to the good rather than one’s settled enjoyment of it. According to this interpretative trend, Aquinas conceives of courage primarily as a virtue that regulates one’s internal perspective on the world in the midst of contingency, danger, and misfortune.158 The phrases “the state of one’s pursuit of excellence”, “the orientation of one’s intellect and will to the good”, and the acquiring and infusing from the external moral orientation of conduct to the “internal perspective” correspond to Tillich’s suggestion of adjusting the fortitude/courage analysis from an ethical to ontological setting. The subject of fortitude should not be limited to males fighting on battlefield. Accordingly, the scene for

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  125 fortitude is not simply unfolded in a traditional sense of public war which happens between hostile groups in the way of violent defense or revenge and articulates a grand narrative of history by forming a dialectical cycle with peace. Fortitude can also be presented with a richer meaning in a more complicated scenario of private confrontation, as Reichberg has mentioned above, an individual “war” scenario of endurance rather than aggression for the sake of the ultimate good beyond any natural benefit. The private war could be either bodily, outward, violently confrontational, oriented to the survival of natural life, or spiritual, inward, non-violent enduring, oriented to eternal life after the demise of bodily life with the sustaining and elevating power of religious faith with its “noble death”. In short, martyrdom actualizes ultimate concern by replacing the natural value with the supernatural one. It is this fundamental attitude of Christian faith toward death in martyrdom that differentiates between St. Thomas’ and Aristotle’s ideas of fortitude. As Clark says: On this particular reading of Aquinas’s metaphysically informed anthropology, death appears to us as the greatest threat to our perfection not merely because it dissolves the bodily functions that sustain all our other activities, but more significantly because it seems to contradict the human desire to know the world as an intelligible order of goods converging in the good as such. According to the Aristotelian tradition Aquinas inherits, even the most wise encounter death as an interruption of contemplation. Likewise for the Christian tradition Aquinas inherits, the martyr views death as a weapon of coercion employed against her in the hopes of driving a wedge between the goods associated with her social and bodily flourishing and the goods associated with her intellectual attempt to understand the world and its creator. The martyr suffers the loss of bodily goods order to defend the goods of truth (virtue’s proper object) and justice (virtue’s proper effect), which together establish the proper relation of the human person to the natural world and its first cause. The martyr clings to the hope that what perfects her as an individual human being is not, despite all appearances, ultimately separable from the final unified good in which the natural world as a whole participates.159 Martyrdom as a kind of unambiguous self-sacrifice must benefit from communion of a person infused by the Holy Spirit with God. This is exactly what Tillich maintains as the communion and unity between the finitude of human creature and the infinity of God the Creator fulfilled by human self-sacrifice—the self-affirmation of being in the true sense of the word. One of the most important achievements of the division between the two paradigms of fortitude is the emphasis on the virtue of endurance within fortitude. All the above-mentioned scholars insist on the presence of the dual meaning contained in fortitude—endurance and aggression.

126  Tao Anthony Wang St. Thomas’ Aristotelian way of “overcoming fear one the one hand, moderating daring on the other hand”, considers martyrdom, which renounces the valor of violent aggression as the exemplar of fortitude, as essentially involving endurance. His understanding of fortitude, along with Lombardo’s suggestion that fortitude “places the restraint of immoderate anger under temperance, under the virtue of gentleness, and avoids recklessness as well”, underscores the modification of the ancient idea of fortitude by the idea of non-violence. It has been noted that Tillich, who has an abhorrence to Nazi fascism, is cautious to the possible ambiguity of self-sacrifice. St. Thomas, immersed in Christian faith, is preoccupied with the imitation of Jesus Christ’s martyrdom in His Passion on the Cross. Nevertheless, both thinkers have the insight that fortitude runs the risk of violence. Regardless of their ontological priorities or their ethical perspectives, both Christian theologians believe in the principles of non-violence and non-vengeance and justify self-sacrifice (martyrdom) as being maintained by fortitude’s meaning of endurance (“in spite of”) rather than aggression in the context of Christian faith in order that fortitude could not be coerced and abused by another ideological power. By martyrdom, fortitude fulfills the radical pursuit to the ultimate Logos, namely the Highest Good “in spite of” any cost. As Clark says, martyrdom displays its unconditional adherence to that good without any possible ambiguity by accepting the greatest evil for the sake of the greatest good, “Martyrdom thus reveals the summum bonum governing one’s pursuit of every other end insofar as the capacity to will one’s death for the sake of the good expresses the human ability to adhere unconditionally to the good of reason in the face of the most powerful opposing movements of sense appetite”.160 St. Thomas confines fortitude to the framework of both reason and revelation by way of praising the martyrdom paradigm and thus removes the possible risk of “heroism” in the context of aggression (attack) when discussing the ancient theory of fortitude. If fortitude was under the dominant power of will, its “directionless arbitrariness” would most likely bear risk for human conflict and finally cause humanitarian disaster. Aggression without the dictate of reason and revelation, and without the regulation of the virtue of justice, and the counterbalance of the virtue of temperance, is apt to fall into ruthless and cruel vengeance. The evil consequence of this can be found not only in the scenario of the public war, as described by the ancient thinkers but also in the “private war” of a person’s internal life. The custom of “the duel” once prevailed in the Middle Ages and is often considered as an example of a fake “virtue of fortitude” overwhelming the virtue of justice. It eventually became an illegal act by the end of 19th century. Today’s such fake “virtue of fortitude” can be found in trends such as “dating for dueling” and “settling in private (by fighting)”. They are outside the legal way to settle disputes according to the principle of justice within the judicial system. They too can be considered as overstating the aggressive, bodily, and vainglorious (for private fame and benefit) aspect of fortitude without reference

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  127 to its enduring, spiritual, and divine (for the common good) aspect. Such trends easily fall into hatred and enmity, where a seeking of revenge for the smallest grievance exemplifying the motto of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth”. Fortitude is easily turned into the opposite of charity which is the “mother of all virtues”. The consequence caused by this wrong understanding of fortitude can easily harm all human civilization if it has been mingled with extreme ideologies like religious fundamentalism. This criticism of the so-called “military martyrdom” of “emptying of life of all finite contents to enter into the ultimate identity” is found in Nazism and Fascism was raised by Reichberg and Tillich. Fortitude, as one of the four moral cardinal virtues proper to human nature, fulfills itself appropriately in spiritual profundity, whilst presenting itself in the ancient ideal of the Mild, Gentle, Sincere, and Broad-minded (Wenrou-Dunhou 温柔敦厚) gentleman by achieving the mean with moral kalos (both moral nobility and moral sense of beauty), through obeying the dictate of reason and revelation to endure the hardship in mind until death for the sake of ultimate concern. Fortitude regulates the irascible faculty from deviation from the mean caused by various ambiguities; by the infusion of the Holy Spirit, it disposes and unites the ultimate good replacing the present incomplete good obtained by bodily aggression. The idea of fortitude in essence, explicitly or implicitly proposes the following moral principles like “valiance without violence”, “brave without ruthlessness”, the inward spiritual power of “delicate” soul stronger than outward bodily power of “robust” body, “truth always bigger than fist”, etc. It is neither difference nor opposition but simply overcoming intolerance and violence that breeds resentment and enmity. Fortitude or courage does not foster revenge, fighting, and bloodshed but reconciliation, peace, and truth. In the Christian faith, fortitude always unites charity whilst never colluding with hatred. It refuses the vicious circle proposed by violence and revenge and advocates a pursuit of true good, justice, and eternal happiness with endurance and peacefulness of mind, which is nothing but the manifestation of Christ’s Logos—“the power of the powerless”.

Notes 1 This article has been proofread by Rev. David P. Doran. Please let me express my wholehearted gratitude to his generous and professional efforts. 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 61, a. 2. 3 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 12. 4 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death: The Christological Dimension of Courage in Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), p. 169. 5 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, q. 81, a. 2 & ad. 1–2. The concupiscible appetite concerns the problem of concupiscentia in the context of Christian faith. For a correlative discussion, please see: Wang Tao Anthony, “The Conception of Concupiscentia: In the Perspectives of St. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Rahner,” Theology Annual, Vol. 38 (2017), pp. 29–69; Natural and Supernatural: The

128  Tao Anthony Wang Ethical Inquiry into St. Thomas Aquinas (New Taipei City: Taiwan Christian Literature Council, 2018), p. 25–61; From Nature to Grace: An Ethical Study of St. Thomas Aquinas (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2019), pp. 27–66. 6 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 23, a. 1. 7 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 1. 8 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 3. 9 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 3. St. Thomas categorizes the irascible passions into five kinds in three groups as following: hope (spes) and despair (desperatio) in respect of good not yet obtained; fear (timor) and daring (audacia) in respect of evil not yet present; anger (ira) in respect of evil already present. But there is no irascible passion in respect of good obtained, “because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous”, as St. Thomas suggests. See: St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 23, a. 4. 10 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 25, a. 4 & ad. 3. 11 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 61, a. 3; I-II, q. 61, a. 4. 12 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 2 & ad. 1. 13 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 61, a. 3. 14 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 4. 15 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 5. 16 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 124, a. 2. 17 Aristotle, EN, III-6, 1115a26-b4. 18 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 1. 19 According to St. Thomas, joy differs from bodily delight (delectatio) in that it is correlative to desire (desiderium) and happens in will or the rational appetite, accompanying no bodily variety as a rational and spiritual delight; while bodily delight is correlative to concupiscence (concupiscientia) and happens in sensuality (sensualitas) or the sensible appetite, accompanying bodily variety. See: St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 31, a. 3–4. Clark also points out, “by definition, then, courage is an odd virtue. Rather than being chiefly identified by the pleasure it effects, it distinguished itself by the presence of pain, discomfort, and anxiety.” Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 166. 20 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 8. 21 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 8. 22 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 8. 23 For the discussion of the infused cardinal virtues, please see: Wang Tao Anthony, “Reflection on Pagan Virtues: A Philosophical Study on St. Thomas Aquinas’ Virtue Theory”), Sino-Christian Studies, Vol. 19 (2015), pp. 105–140; Natural and Supernatural: The Ethical Inquiry into St. Thomas Aquinas (New Taipei City: Taiwan Christian Literature Council, 2018), pp. 63–120; From Nature to Grace: An Ethical Study of St. Thomas Aquinas (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2019), pp. 67–129; “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Theory of Pagan Virtues: A Pilgrimage towards the Infused Cardinal Virtues”, Jaarboek 2014–2015 Thomas Instituut te Utrecht Jaargang, Vol. 34, pp. 27–65. 24 St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, I-xv. 25 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ad. 1. 26 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 124, a. 3. 27 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ad. 2. 28 The Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit consist of wisdom (sapientia), knowledge (scientia), understanding (intellectus), counsel (consilium), fortitude ( fortitudo), piety (pietas), fear of the Lord (timor). 29 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 139, a. 1, ad. 1. 30 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 139, a. 1. 31 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  129 32 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad. 1. 33 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1 & ad. 3. 34 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad. 3. 35 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 2. The “heroic or divine virtues” is the term St. Augustine used to signify the virtue of early church martyrs. 36 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad. 3. 37 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 8. 38 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 214. 39 Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), p. 178. 40 Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), p. 179. St. Thomas enumerates the different parts of fortitude, or the secondary virtues, that constitute the necessary elements of fortitudinous acts. Those required for the act of aggression are magnanimity (magnanimitas) or confidence ( fiducia) regarding the preparation of the mind ready for the act of aggression, and magnificence (magnificentia) or the “accomplishment of great and lofty undertakings with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose”. Those required for the act of endurance, are patience (patientia) or “the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit”, and perseverance (perseverantia) or “the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose”. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 128, a. 1. Within this enumeration we find Lombardo’s “virtue of patience” but not “the virtue of gentleness”. 41 Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire, p. 180. 42 Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire, pp. 181, 182. Lombardo also notes St. Thomas’ transformation of Aristotle’s theory in relation to one of the secondary virtues of fortitude, namely magnanimity or confidence. For St. Thomas, magnanimity banishes the passion of despair and is characterized by confidence which implies a certain firmness of hope. Lombardo writes that “[t]his approach to the virtue of magnanimity, with its focus on the passion of hope, represents a radical transformation of Aristotle’s account. Aristotle gives a character sketch of the behavior and general manner of the magnanimous man. He does not attempt to single out a thematic perfection that integrates the magnanimous man’s personality beyond that of self-conscious greatness. Aquinas, however, roots magnanimity in the passions of hope and despair, something completely foreign to Aristotle’s approach, even while reiterating much of Aristotle’s description of the magnanimous man. In doing so, Aquinas again manifests his interest in connecting the moral virtues to the elemental passions of the sense appetite that he painstakingly identified in the Prima Secundae.” Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire, pp. 182, 183. It is also noteworthy that “greatness of soul” is common translation of the Greek word magalopsukhia (μεγαλοψυχία) which in turn is often used as a correlative alternative to magnanimitas. 43 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness: Aquinas’s Transformation of the Virtue of Courage,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 11 (2003), p. 150. 44 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” p. 159. 45 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” p. 160. 46 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” p. 164. 47 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” pp. 164, 165. 48 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” pp. 170, 171. 49 Rebecca K. De Young, “Power Made Perfect in Weakness,” p. 179.

130  Tao Anthony Wang 50 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” The Thomist, Vol. 74 (2010), pp. 337, 338. 51 John Inglis also understands the martyrdom paradigm of fortitude by the theory of the infused cardinal virtue; however, he draws an opposite conclusion. He admits that St. Thomas breaks with Aristotle “by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level, a level that both parallels and extends the work of the acquired virtues”. John Inglis, “Aquinas’s Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas,” Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999), p. 4. The so-called “replication” is neither the elevation and transformation based on the latter, nor the overturn and reconstruction. Given a proper teleology, that is the highest good, the infused virtue can govern even the lowest human actions. For example, fortitude can rightly lead the lower personal appetite to the highest good so that the infused virtue is “not just icing on the cake of acquired virtue”, it does not “concern actions that ought to stand apart from the acquired virtues” but orders all human actions towards moral perfection at a higher level. John Inglis, “Aquinas’s Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues,” p. 15. Therefore, for Inglis, what St. Thomas’ maintains is that only by the infusion in a Christian life of virtue a person come to possess the true cardinal virtues; that is, true fortitude should be infused, namely fortitude in martyrdom. John Inglis, “Aquinas’s Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues,” p. 18. The substantial difference between the acquired fortitude and the infused one simply lies in the different ends, “acquired virtues direct action to a political end while the infused virtues direct action to the highest good”. John Inglis, “Aquinas’s Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues,” p. 20. Obviously, Inglis doubts the continuity between the acquired and the infused virtue, by considering them as two independent parallel virtues with their respective ends, he weakens St. Thomas’ claim that the acquired virtue serves as the preparation (through the Gifts of the Holy Spirit) of the infused one. He suggests that besides the final cause, the material cause (acquired cardinal virtues), the formal cause (Gifts of the Holy Spirit) and the efficient cause (theological virtues), etc. altogether determine the nature of virtue. 52 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” pp. 340, 341. 53 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” p. 342. 54 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” p. 343. 55 See: St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 5; II-II, q. 41, a. 1. 56 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” pp. 342, 343. Reichberg points out that St. Thomas has not increased Aristotle’s preference for the meaning of daring and aggression in his military paradigm of fortitude, instead, St. Thomas believes that military fortitude “results from the appropriate balancing of both passions (not only daring but also endurance)”, while the fortitude of martyrdom “consists in endurance alone”. Reichberg insists that De Young “misidentifies Aquinas’ position when she defines military courage (fortitude) by reference solely to daring (aggression), under the assumption that endurance is proper to the courage (fortitude) of martyrs”. This misidentification undoubtedly overemphasizes the difference between the two paradigms and automatically polarizes St. Thomas’ and Aristotle’s ideas of fortitude. See: Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” p. 350, endnote 51. 57 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” p. 344. 58 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 61, a. 5 59 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Battlefield Courage,” p. 363. 60 Ryan R. Gorman evidently understands St. Thomas’ fortitude also as a military/battlefield fortitude sacrificing individual goods (including his own bodily life) for the common good, which “is most clearly displayed when a person

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  131 bravely goes into battle in defense of justice and the common good” and “makes use of and tempers a person’s irascible passions, especially fear and daring, so that they are amenable to reason and duly ordered to good and noble ends”. Ryan R. Gorman, “War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought,” Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2010), p. 254. Gorman also reminds us that St. Thomas has mentioned waging war with unbelievers for the defense of Christian faith in the Summa Theologiae: “It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ”. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8. However, it’s definitely a narrative of historical fact rather than a declaration of war against unbelievers, and by no means an attempt to associate this kind of war with the virtue of fortitude. 61 Patrick Clark, “Is Martyrdom Virtuous? An Occasion for Rethinking the Relation of Christ and Virtue in Aquinas,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2010), p. 151. 62 Patrick Clark, “Is Martyrdom Virtuous?” p. 153. 63 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 232. 64 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 146. 65 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 147, 150. 66 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 151. 67 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 170. 68 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 180. 69 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, pp. 182, 183. 70 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” in Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (eds.), Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 110, 111. 71 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” p. 112. 72 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” p. 124. 73 For the revival of Aristotle’s theory of fortitude by the Christian tradition, please see: Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” pp. 110–128. In this article, Herdt not only analyses various interpretations of Aristotle’s fortitude, but also investigates some classical Christian expansions of the works of Cicero, Albert the Great and St. Thomas. Herdt especially mentions Ciceronian twofold definition of fortitude of undertaking dangers and enduring hardships, as providing the crucial foundation for the theories of fortitude for the Christian scholars like Albert the Great and St. Thomas, etc. Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” p. 115. 74 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 202. 75 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” p. 125. 76 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Aquinas Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage,” p. 128. 77 According to Tillich, there are some subtle differences lies between the two ideas of “courage” and “fortitude”. Lombardo also suggests that fortitudo can be translated as courage. Fortitude, however, has more of a connotation of endurance while courage has the connotation of attack. Both connotations present the double meanings of fortitude as a virtue in the Aristotelian tradition. Lombardo prefers fortitude to courage because St. Thomas confirms the central meaning of fortitude as endurance. Nicholas E. Lombardo O.P., The Logic of Desire, p. 178, endnote 163. 78 For the comparative study of Tillich’s and St. Thomas’ ideas of love, please See: Wang Tao Anthony, “A Comparative Study of St. Thomas’s and Paul Tillich’s

132  Tao Anthony Wang Ideas of Love: In the Perspective of Agape-Eros and Philia,” Logos & Pneuma Chinese Journal of Theology, Vol. 43 (Autumn/2015), pp. 117–150; A Study of Love in Catholicism: An Interpretation in Agape-Eros Paradigm (Hong Kong: Yuan Dao Publishing Company Limited, 2021), pp. 209–252; Natural and Supernatural, pp. 153–186; From Nature to Grace, pp. 166–201; “A Comparative Study of St. Thomas Aquinas’s and Paul Tillich’s Ideas of Love: Integration with the Chinese Confucian Idea of Love,” in Ka-fu Keith Chan & Yau-nang William Ng (eds.), Paul Tillich and Asian Religions (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), pp. 137–174. 79 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 1, 2. 80 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 3. 81 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 3. 82 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 3. 83 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 3, 4. 84 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 4, 5. The death of Socrates is regarded as exceptional in the ancient tradition of fortitude. It “brought a profound change in the traditional meaning of courage”. Tillich maintains that, “In Socrates the heroic courage of the past was made rational and universal. A democratic idea of courage was created as against the aristocratic idea of courage of it. Soldierly fortitude was transcended by the courage of wisdom.” Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 11. In the history of ideas it is sometimes said that the death of Socrates is an exemplar of a humanistic martyrdom in comparison to the death of Jesus Christ. 85 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 5, 6. For the knight spirit, Sr. Mary Paul Goetz, O.S.B. insists that the spirit of medieval knighthood, whose origin is exclusively military, is founded on “The Germanic ideal of nobility, modified by Christian teaching through which the idea of reward for faithful service was made the center of medieval ethics”, and “military valor was consecrated to the service of the Church, and courage, faithfulness, and loyalty were outstanding in the code of knightly virtues”. Mary Paul Goetz, O.S.B., The Concept of Nobility in German Didactic Literature of the Thirteenth Century (New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 35. She continues to point out that the knightly virtues praised by medieval writers should still be considered primarily Aristotelian. Besides the traditional cardinal virtues as justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, other virtues are added including “the Christian virtues of faith, hope, charity, and humility” because the didactic writers in 13th century Germany follow attempt of early ecclesiastical writers by trying to “effect a reconciliation between pagan and Christian virtues”. Please see: Mary Paul Goetz, O.S.B., The Concept of Nobility in German Didactic Literature of the Thirteenth Century, p. 82. Goetz affirms, “Fortitude or, better, courage was the virtue par excellence of the medieval knight. Romances of chivalry picture him courting danger for danger’s sake, rejoicing in suffering and gladly meeting death, if, by doing so, he could procure renown, a most coveted reward.” Mary Paul Goetz, O.S.B., The Concept of Nobility in German Didactic Literature of the Thirteenth Century, p. 86. For Goetz, hôher muot (the medieval spelling of hohe Mut) is the synonym of magnanimity, which signifies “a form of sublimated courage, [and] a virtue exclusively belonging to the nobleman. It is related to the megalopsychia (μεγαλοψυχία) of Aristotle”. Please refer to: Mary Paul Goetz, O.S.B., The Concept of Nobility in German Didactic Literature of the Thirteenth Century, p. 86. As discussed earlier, magnanimitas is merely a part of or secondary to fortitude in St. Thomas’ system of virtues as “…it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  133 firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.” St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 129, a. 5. This point also highlights the substantial difference between the fortitude of medieval knight and that of a Catholic martyr in moral achievement. 86 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 6. 87 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 6. According to Craig Steven Titus’ etymological investigation, courage as the general expression of fortitudo could find its origin in the Latin cor and old French cuer (heart); and fortitude could find its roots in the Latin fortis which means strong or vigorous. See: Craig Steven Titus, Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude: Aquinas in Dialogue with the Psychosocial Sciences (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), p. 145. 88 Craig Steven Titus, Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude, p. 144, endnote 2. 89 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 7. 90 For the affective elements in St. Thomas’ intellectualism, please See: Wang Tao Anthony, “St. Thomas Aquinas on Connaturality: With Special Reference to Synderesis,” Universitas, No. 512 (2017/1), pp. 123–140; Natural and Supernatural, pp. 121–152; From Nature to Grace, pp. 130–165. 91 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 82, 83. The Latin word virtus itself has the meaning of “power”. 92 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 84. 93 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 8. 94 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 8. 95 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 8. 96 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 187, 188. 97 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 189, 192–198. 98 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 41. 99 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 32. 100 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 155. 101 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 155, 156. 102 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 209. 103 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 273. 104 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 123, a. 8. 105 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 14, 15. 106 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 226. 107 Karl Rahner, “Dimensions of Martyrdom,” Theological Investigations, Vol. XXIII (New York: Crossroad, 1992), p. 109. Rahner challenges the traditional definition of martyrdom by pointing out that “the Church currently excludes from the concept of martyrdom a death suffered in active combat” for the following reasons: first, the “passive undergone” death of Jesus is the consequence of his “active” fight against the religious and political authorities of his time, in the perspective of what he has done in his life as a whole. In addition, victims who die in active combat “for the demands of their Christian conviction also ‘endure’ their death” such that the death of these martyrs also includes an active element because “through their active witness and life, they too brought about the situation in which they could have escaped death only by denying their faith.” Karl Rahner, “Dimensions of Martyrdom,” pp. 109, 110. Rahner continues, “[t]he difference between a death in active combat for the sake of faith and death passively endured for the sake of faith is too subtle and too difficult to determine to make it worthwhile to separate them conceptually or verbally. Ultimately, both express the same resolute acceptance of death prompted by the same Christian motivation; in both cases death means acceptance of the

134  Tao Anthony Wang death of Christ, which, as the highest act of love and courage, puts humanity unreservedly at God’s disposal. It is a radical unity of active love and endurance of the painful being-snatched-away-from-oneself, while facing the incomprehensible but powerful no of men and women to the love of God revealing itself. In both cases, death appears as the complete and public manifestation of the true nature of Christian death. Where death is suffered in a struggle for Christian conviction, it also bears witness to an unshakable faith that, inspired by God’s grace, is ready to go all the way up to and including death, and all this is patiently endured in an experience of the deepest inner and outer powerlessness. That applies also to death in combat, because, like the martyr who suffers in the traditional sense, the combatant experiences in his apparent failure the power of evil and his own impotence.” Karl Rahner, “Dimensions of Martyrdom,” p. 111. Moreover, Rahner adds support to his viewpoint by quoting St. Thomas’ definition of martyrdom in a “broad” sense in The Commentary on the Sentences. Please refer to Karl Rahner, “Dimensions of Martyrdom,” pp. 111, 112. This argument warrants further investigation since it seems that St. Thomas has a more precise definition of martyrdom in The Summa Theologiae: “The chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience.” St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ad. 3. St. Thomas’ viewpoint underscores more the passive endurance of death than the active aggression in martyrdom, in which differs from Aristotle’s ancient understanding of fortitude. Nevertheless, the acceptance of martyrdom in a way of active aggression is possibly a disguised promotion of violence, essentially similar to “the military martyrdom” rejected by Reichberg, which would be incompatible with the Christian moral principle of non-violence. 108 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 26, a. 5. 109 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 26, a. 4 & ad. 2. 110 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 42. 111 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 43. 112 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 43, 44. 113 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 269. 114 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 269. 115 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 271. 116 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 76. 117 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 237. 118 Including almsgiving (dāna), commandment-keeping (śīla), patience under provocation (kṣānti), diligence with zeal (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna), along with a sixth virtue wisdom (prajñā) in another interpretation of the Six Pāramitās. 119 “This absolute perfection in its purity causes the essential (wisdom) to turn all vicious habits contracted since the time without beginning into one bright essence which continues to advance towards the real and the pure. This is called the stage of zealous progress (vīrya).” See: The Śūraṅgama Sūtra, Vol. VIII. 120 The Seven Factors of Awakening are the categories of practice and correlative feelings to fulfill Buddhist enlightenment. Besides vīrya, there are mindfulness (smṛti), investigation (dharmavicayaḥ), joy (prīti), tranquility (praśrabdhiḥ), concentration (samādhi) and equanimity (upekṣā).The Noble Eightfold Path also called the Eight Rafts which refers to the eightfold method of religious practice to a supreme state of mind, namely nirvāṇa, the liberation from saṃsāra the endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. Apart from right effort (sammā-vāyāma), the Noble Eightfold Path includes right view (sammā-diṭṭhi), right

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  135 thought ­(sammā-saṅkappa), right speech (sammā-vāc), right conduct (sammā-­ kammanta), right livelihood (sammā-ājīva), right mindfulness (sammā-sati) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi). 121 The Seventy-Five Phenomena are classified into five categories as material objects (rūpa), mind (citta), mental states (caittas) or dharma associated with mind (cittasaṁprayuktasaṁskārāḥ), dharma not associated with mind (cittaviprayuktas or aṁskāras), unconditioned dharmas (asaṁskṛtas). Among them, dharma associated with mind (cittasaṁprayuktasaṁskārāḥ) pertaining to mental states (caittas) can be divided into those that accompany all minds (mahābhūmikās), those that accompany all good minds (kuśalamahābhūmikas), those that accompany all defiled minds (kleśamahābhūmikās), those that accompany all bad minds (akuśalamahābhūmikas), those that have small defilements (parīttakleśabhūmikā) and those that accompany indeterminate minds (aniyatabhūmikās). The Ten Good Caittas are the mental qualities accompanying all good minds (kuśalamahābhūmikas), in other words, good states of mind, namely the virtues. In addition to vīrya, there is belief (śraddhā), equanimity (upekṣā), sense of shame (hrī), sense of integrity (apatrāpya), non-covetousness (alobha), non-anger (adveṣa), harmlessnesss (ahimsā), composure of mind (praśrabdhi), vigilance (apramāda). See: Ding Fubao (ed.), “kuśalamahābhūmikas,” The Great Dictionary of Buddhism (Beijing: Cathay Bookshop Publishing House, 2011), p. 420. The Commentary on the Sheath of Abhidharma lists six universal vexing or defiled mental states (kleśamahābhūmikās) as the counterparts of kuśalamahābhūmikas, including error (avidyā), non-diligence (pramāda), idleness (kausīdya), disbelief (āśraddhya), torpor (styāna), dissipation (auddhatya). Among them is kausīdya as the opposite of vīrya. 122 Ding Fubao (ed.), “Seventy-Five Dharmas,” The Great Dictionary of Buddhism (Beijing: Cathay Bookshop Publishing House, 2011), p. 97. 123 “Non-delusion (amoha)” is added on the Ten Good Caittas in the theory of the Sect of the Elders. 124 Thomas William Rhys Davids, & William Stede (eds.), The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary (Chipstead: Pali Text Society, 1921–1925), p. 634. 125 Lewis Hodous and William E. Soothill, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms: With Sanskrit and English Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 396. 126 Ding Fubao (ed.), “Five Pāramitās,” “Six Pāramitās,” The Great Dictionary of Buddhism (Beijing: Cathay Bookshop Publishing House, 2011), p. 1574. 127 Ding Fubao (ed.), “Vīrya,” The Great Dictionary of Buddhism (Beijing: Cathay Bookshop Publishing House, 2011), p. 2511. 128 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vol. I, translated into English by Leo M. Pruden (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), p. 193. 129 The Longer Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra or Infinite Life Sutra, translated from the Sanskrit by F. Max Mueller, edited by Richard St. Clair. Electronic resource: http://buddhasutra.blogspot.com/2013/05/infinate-life-sutra.html, access in October, 2021. 130 Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, Vol. 80. 131 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 399. 132 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 399. 133 See: Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, translated into English by Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), Vol. I, p. 191.

136  Tao Anthony Wang 134 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, translated into English by Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), Vol. I, p. 336, endnote 123. 135 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 401. 136 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 401. 137 See: Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 401. 138 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, translated into English by Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), Vol. I, p. 193. 139 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 447. 140 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 447. 141 See: Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, translated into English by Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), Vol. I, p. 191, 193. In this English translation, Pruden translates pramāda into non-diligence, while he translates kauśīdya, the correlative vice of vīrya into idleness. 142 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), p. 447. 143 Aristotle, EN, VII-10, 1152a19–24. 144 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 11, a. 1. 145 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 35, a. 1. 146 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 11, a. 3. 147 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 35, a. 2. 148 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 84, a. 4, ad. 5. 149 See: Wang Tao, “St. Thomas Aquinas on Evil: The Fundamental Structure of the Theory of Sins,” Theology Annual, Vol. 42 (2021), p. 47. 150 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 124, a. 3. 151 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 123, a. 8. 152 Hsüan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, translated by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), pp. 403–405. 153 The Lotus of the Wonderful Law or The Lotus Gospel, translated by W. E. Soothill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 236–238. 154 The Question of Maitreya, translated by Karen Liljenberg, F.104.b.1.65. https:// read.84000.co/translation/toh85.html. Access in Oct., 2021. 155 It is interesting to note that those who set up the tablet were not from within Buddhism but outside secular government officers. 156 On St. Thomas’ discussion of the weakness of will (akrasia), please See: Wang Tao Anthony, “St. Thomas Aquinas on Akrasia/Incontinentia in the Philosophy of the Will,” Universitas, No. 508 (2016/9), pp. 121–138; Natural and Supernatural: The Ethical Inquiry into St. Thomas Aquinas (New Taipei City: Taiwan Christian Literature Council, 2018), p. 3–23; From Nature to Grace: An Ethical Study of St. Thomas Aquinas (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2019), pp. 3–26. 157 Jonathan C. Gold, “Freedom through Cumulative Moral Cultivation: Heroic Willpower (Vīrya),” Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 25 (2018), p. 764.

St. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich on Fortitudo (Courage)  137 158 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 211. 159 Patrick Clark, Perfection in Death, p. 220. 160 Patrick Clark, “Is Martyrdom Virtuous?” pp. 147, 148.

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6 T.C. Chao and Tillich Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China1 Junjie Yang

1  “Philosophy and Fate” in T.C. Chao and Tillich The Protestant Era, a volume of essays compiled and translated by Professor James Luther Adams, was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1948. The response to this book was pretty good, and taking this opportunity Tillich ushered in a “harvest period” in the New World.2 As a consideration for the publication of The Protestant Era, he was required to deliver the planned manuscript of Systematic Theology to the publishing house as well. When he was exhausted by the writing of the first volume of Systematic Theology, he probably did not expect T.C. Chao in distant Beijing, a theologian who had the dream of “Chinese theology”, to be full of praise for The Protestant Era. The first chapter “Philosophy and Fate” of The Protestant Era was even translated into Chinese by Chao as “Philosophy and Fortune”.3 When talking about Tillich, most Chinese scholars have not noticed the existence of this piece of translation.4 That Chao translated Tillich’s name as “Tie Lihe” is also a bit uncommon indeed. The chapter thus entitled “Philosophy and Fate” was originally Tillich’s inaugural report (akademische Antrittsvorlesung) “Philosophie und Schicksal” for the post of professor of “philosophy” at the University of Frankfurt (Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main) in Germany in June 1929.5 The German or English version of the report would be termed as “Philosophy and Fate” in the following text. For Tillich, his appointment to the University of Frankfurt was to take over the chair in “philosophy” which Professor Max Scheler left unoccupied.6 In the inaugural report, only the name of Scheler (translated by Chao as “邁克司西勒” [Pinyin: Maikesi Xile]) was mentioned among the contemporary German philosophers, which is undoubtedly a tribute to Scheler. Meanwhile, Tillich also made an implicit criticism of Scheler’s idea – “the correlation between philosophy and fate that is external to both sides”, pointing out that fate is not concerned with the periphery of philosophy without touching the sacred inner courtyard of philosophy (Vol. IV, p. 400). Tillich’s expression of respect as well as of disapproval, however, did not contradict with his image as Scheler’s “successor” that he was willing to show to the public.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-7

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  141 The Protestant Era includes 18 essays, ten of which were written in English by Tillich. The other eight essays, including “Philosophy and Fate”, were translated from German into English by the compiler and translator Adams. It is worth noting that they are not quite pure translations. Tillich also worked on the translations, revising them with some paragraphs completely rewritten. Tillich and Adams explained the revision, respectively, in their “Introduction” and the “Translator’s Note”. As far as the essay “Philosophy and Fate” is concerned, the fourth section “Truth and Fate” (Chao’s translation as “Truth and Fortune”) was largely rewritten by Tillich. The German expression “eine vermittelnde Losung versucht Max Scheler” (Scheler is trying a conciliatory solution), became “Max Scheler, a representative of vitalism, a man of great intuitive power, tried to give a solution in a different way” in Adams’ English translation. Therefore, Chao translated it as “Maikesi Xile, a representative of vitalism, a figure with great intellectual intuition, sought the solution of problem with a different method” (Vol. IV, p. 400). Praises like “man of great intuitive power” is most probably the rewriting by Tillich.7 Chao’s translation “Philosophy and Fortune” is generally corresponding to Professor Adams’ English translation. If the English translation is wrong in itself, the Chinese translation would not be spared. Taking the first sentence in the 1929 German version of “Philosophy and Fate” as the example, there are some mistakes in Adams’ translation. The referred sentence is “sich philosophisch in sein Schicksal finden” (one philosophically follows his fate), but Adams translated it as “to have a philosophical understanding of one’s fate”, which is probably “using philosophy to understand one’s fortune” in Chao’s translation (Vol. IV, p. 391). “One philosophically follows his fate”, does not mean to leave oneself totally under the control of fate, but means that although the fate is good at controlling, one can face it through philosophy (therefore Tillich proceeded to write “to defy fate with philosophy” [mit Philosophie dem Schicksal trotzen]). In this regard, Adams’ understanding is not entirely wrong. However, the connotation of facing fate through philosophy is far more than “using philosophy to understand one’s fortune”. The original meaning of Tillich’s expression was not perceived by Chao thanks to Adams’ translation.

2  Chao’s Reception of Tillich The time that Chao read The Protestant Era was at the end of 1949. To be more precisely, on 13 December 1949, Chao received this book from Bishop Ronald Owen Hall (1895–1975) of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui Church, “finished the first reading with daily free time in eighteen days”, and then spent a week doing the translation. On 8 January 1950, the translation of the first chapter “Philosophy and Fate” whose content is not without difficulty was completed (Vol. IV, pp. 402, 403). Chao praised The Protestant Era as a “book which makes an epoch”, “a book that Chinese Christians and

142  Junjie Yang Chinese thinkers should read”, and hoped “to complete the translation of The Protestant Era”. “I will make detailed notes and ask the readers to give advice and criticism after I finish the translation” (Vol. IV, p. 403). In the course of reading The Protestant Era, Chao “wrote the notes in the book, almost filling the margins of the pages” (Vol. IV, p. 402). He loved this book so much for the reason that “the author said what I wanted to and yet was not strong enough to say, which made me feel convinced with delight and see the tendency of the pursue and direction in my thoughts” (Vol. IV, p. 402). In other words, Tillich’s The Protestant Era was highly appreciated because it not only implied but also indicated the direction to which Chao was going forward. Tillich had never been to China, the only trip that brought him nearest to China being a visit to Japan from May to July 1960.8 If the “spiritual” encounter between Tillich and Chao is taken as Tillich’s journey in China, it may be termed as the “spiritual journey”. In a letter to Bishop He Minghua dated 12 January 1950, Chao expressed with full gratitude that “I have read it carefully and have the strong feeling that it is an epoch-making book, at least for a Chinese Christian like me who is under challenging circumstances” (Vol. V, p. 597). It is not difficult to see that Chao appreciated Tillich, and that his discussion about the guiding significance of Tillich’s thought and his agreement with Tillich on thought, must be related to his reflection over the current situation in China and his thinking on how the Chinese Christianity should react to the situation at the juncture. Chao also mentioned that “the translation of the first chapter ‘Philosophy and Fate’ has been completed and would hand it over to ‘Truth and Life’, and the translation of the last chapter is in progress” (Vol. V, p. 597). The final chapter of The Protestant Era, namely the eighteenth chapter, is “Spiritual Problems of Postwar Reconstruction”. It is unknown whether Chao completed the translation by that time, or whether there was a manuscript left, but it can be sure that it has not been published. Being able to be translated so quickly indicated that Chao had a quite strong interest in the content of the last chapter. Chao’s strong interest in The Protestant Era manifests not only in his translation but also permeates in his writings. His article “I Was Caught (The New Theory of God)” was inspired by Tillich. In his letter written on 23 February 1950 to Alaric Pearson Rose, the senior pastor of St. John’s Cathedral in Hong Kong, Chao said, “I have recently read Tillich’s The Protestant Era, which made a substantial improvement in my theoretical life. I hope to translate this book into Chinese, though I have no idea how to spare the time to do this. The illumination I got from the book made me write a long essay ‘I Was Caught’, which can be taken as my witness to the existence of God” (Vol. V, p. 599).9 The article “I Was Caught (The New Theory of God)” also talks explicitly and exactly about Tillich. The author points out that the “border circumstance” mentioned in “Tie Lihe’s The Protestant Era” refers to the entry of

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  143 the “end of the world” or the “extinction of mountains and rivers” in the course of seeking faith (Vol. IV, p. 121). The term “border circumstance” quoted by Chao should have been “boundary situation”. “The Protestant Message and the Man of Today”, the chapter thirteen of The Protestant Era, has a detailed explanation of it. This chapter was originally translated from “The Protestant Proclamation and the Man of the Present” (Die protestantische Verkündigung und der Mensch der Gegenwart), the first volume of Tillich’s treatises Religious Realization (Religiöse Verwirklichung) published in 1939. The “boundary situation” mentioned above is Grenzsituation.10 If Tillich’s “Situation” is interpreted as “circumstance”, then “border circumstance” is “boundary situation”.11 The impact of Tillich’s The Protestant Era on Chao is obviously multi-­ dimensional and multi-level. At a local level, there are Tillich’s ideas about philosophy and faith that Chao resonated with. Besides, Chao also admitted that he is in accord with and benefits from Tillich, which is of a deeper level. Due to limited space, it is difficult to cover the whole points. The main interest here is to be invested in the latter.12

3  Chao’s Situation in China Chao’s ideological direction at the juncture was to envisage a possible compatibility between Christianity and Communism in China. At the end of January 1949, not long after Peking became “Red Peiping”, Chao imagined in a long English letter (namely “Days of Rejoicing in China”) “the peaceful and harmonious coexistence of Christianity and Communism”, supposing that “Communism, willingly or unwillingly, would find that Christianity is the only force capable of providing China with a permanent moral and spiritual foundation in the year coming down the road” (Vol. V, p. 539). In another article written in early February (i.e. “Christian Churches in Communist China”), he repeatedly called on China’s Christian churches not to be too conservative, but to take the successive victories of Communism as an opportunity for Christianity in China. If “Christianity and Communism can coexist in China”, it means that both sides “can also coexist worldwidely” (Vol. V, p. 546). However, Christians abroad were quite criticized toward Chao’s idea. In his article “Red Peiping After Six Months” published in September 1949, Chao mentioned that since the publication of “Days of Rejoicing in China”, many people have found the statement within the article “a little too enthusiastic” (Vol. V, p. 547). It is reasonable to infer that in their mind, Chao held too optimistic vision about the relation of Christianity and Communism in China. In addition, in a letter written by Chao to the leaders of the PPU in April 1950, he thanked his PPU colleagues for “defending me against wild attacks” (Vol. V, p. 600). Professor Winfried Glüer pointed out that the “wild attacks” referred to someone who thought Chao had been already a member of the Communist Party of China.13 It must be Chao’s “optimistic” idea

144  Junjie Yang which provoked those “wild” attacks. With regard to Christians in China, there were not without their suspicions of Chao’s thoughts, either. The article “Christian Church in the Communist Party of China” by Chao was translated as early as in 1949. But the statement quoted above was deleted when the article was published.14 That Chao had positive expectations for Communism did not occur only after the city of Peiping was relocated nor after the outskirt of Peiping (where Yenching University was located) had been taken over by the end of 1948. Early in 1948, Chao had clearly realized that the Chinese Communist Party would win the civil war, that China would soon be a Communist China, and that this would be a fact that the Christian Church should be confronting directly rather than evading.15 Compared with his earlier attitude toward Communism, it is not difficult to find that Chao has indeed changed and was no longer “anti-Communist”. However, we must also realize that this only means that Chao’s attitude toward Communism and the relationship between Christianity and Communism have undergone strategic changes, and it does not directly mean that he has also undergone changes in thought. Early in the 1920s, especially from 1927 to 1928, when the National Revolution led by the Kuomintang won successive victories, Christian churches had already felt the tremendous pressure brought by political movements to Christianity. Facing this menacing and politically oriented “non-­Christian” movement, Chao’s proposition is to affirm the positive significance of the revolutionary movement and the reasonable connotations within the criticism of Christian church by “non-Christian” movement and to demand that the Christian church not only keep the faith unshakable, but also get rid of the conservative attitude in order to get involved in the revolutionary movement. This sort of active intervention, in his perspective, is surely risky and yet unavoidable. The Christian church in China should actively seek to survive in the political tides of China. He even stated explicitly, that “I and other believers should never seek to adapt to the environment, just to cater to and avoid danger”, that “religion is the product of danger, and it is also the guarantee of danger”, and that “the towering cross is not only dangerous, but also the artifact of conquering danger” (“The Church of Christ Rising in the Tide”; Vol. III, p. 241). Twenty years later, when confronting the prospect of Communist China, Chao was not different from himself regarding his view of it. Regarding the “non-Christian” movement during the National Revolution, Chao emphasized that Christian church should follow the doctrine of “love”. The Christian church lives a life of love with religious faith. He said, that “Christian religionists have really failed, however, their religion and love, will never fail”, that “we believe the cross will never fail, and the world will progress”, and that “to advance progress of the world, men must have God moving in the crowd, and must use love as the motive and the method” (“Christianity That Never Fails”; Vol. III, p. 256). As for the pressure brought about by Communist China, he clearly insisted that the

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  145 Christian church must abide by “love” – “building fellowship with love is the master key to reform the church” (“Building Fellowship with Love”; Vol. IV, p. 163). In his view, the characteristics of Communism are the emphasis on struggle and “hate”. The reason that Chao valued the power of the “love” in the Christian church was probably to overcome hatred with love. It can be seen from the above that Chao’s change in attitude and his imagination of the harmonious coexistence of Christianity and Communism in China was fundamentally based on his firm belief in the “fellowship” relation between Christianity and the possible constructor of a better China (even though it is merely a revolutionary at present) on the one side, and his full confidence in Christianity’s ability to lay a solid moral and spiritual foundation for Chinese society on the other. After the upsurge of the National Revolution, Christianity continued to develop steadily in China. With regard to this, he did have every reason to expect that Christianity would also develop steadily in the situation of a Communist China, even though it may encounter some unpredictable events.

4  Tillich’s Theological and Existential Contexts When Tillich talks about the “the Protestant era”, what he really concerns about is the “end” of the era of Protestantism. This topic is discussed in detail in “The End of the Protestant Era?”, the fifteenth chapter of The Protestant Era. It was renamed from a 1937 article “Protestantism in the Present World-Situation”, which was originally a speech by Tillich in Chicago on 27 February 1936 and slightly revised.16 Moreover, the content of “Protestantism in the Present World-Situation” overlaps to a large extent with the article “The End of the Protestant Era” published in 1937.17 The German printscript “The End of the Protestant Times” (“Das Ende des protestantischen Zeitalters”) kept in Harvard “Tillich Archives” is the original German version of “The End of the Protestant Era”. With regard to “The End of the Protestant Era?” (1948), “The End of the Protestant Era” (1937), and “Protestantism in the Present World-Situation” (1937), the core idea of these articles is that the new era situation (or the world situation) requires that the pure Protestantism no longer adopts as before a “protest” stance which rejects the social and political function of the church, but makes timely adjustments to integrate the “protest” attitude with the “formation” function. As a Protestant theologian, Tillich is well aware that Protestantism often sees the function of “formation” as incompatible with the “protest” attitude. He believes that both “protest” and “formation” are the basic principles of Protestantism. Based on these two principles, especially in relation to the principle of “formation”, he moves on to discourse about the “end” or “transformation” of the era of Protestantism. It is interesting to see from the articles above that from 1937 to 1948, a subtle shift also happened in Tillich’s view on the topic of the “end” of the Protestant era. “The End of the Protestant Era” (1937) might be a bit too

146  Junjie Yang radical, claiming that the “era” of Protestantism had been to an “end”, and that it must enter the “post-Protestant era” in order to have a continuous effective influence in the new era. The first sentence of the article directly pointed out, that “the end of the Protestant era does not mean the end of Protestantism. It just means that the mass-based church as the substantial form of Protestantism has come to an end. A culture which is infiltrated by Protestantism and as the substantial form of Protestantism has ended. However, Protestantism is not in just such a kind of actual form. Perhaps it is not an actual form that fits Protestantism at all”.18 “The End of the Protestant Era?” (1948) is moderated in its wording, and if Protestantism cannot be changed in a timely and appropriate manner, the Protestant era will “end”. Obviously, this is to correct the previous formulation. What Tillich prefers to advocate here is that the “era” of Protestantism should be “transformed”, or there should be a “profound structural change”: “Only when such a movement emerges, it is possible that the end of an era would not occur to Protestantism”.19 Considering both “protest” and “formation” as the fundamental principles of Protestantism was what clearly stated by Tillich before he arrived in the United States and was by no means a new idea that appeared around 1936. In 1929, Tillich edited the second volume of Kairos, which included one of his articles “Protestantism as Critical and Formative Principle” (Der Protestantismus als kritisches und gestaltendes Prinzip). The title of the second volume of Kairos, “Protestantism as criticism and formation” (Der Protestantimus als Kritik und Gestaltung), is obviously also the embodiment of Tillich’s will. The above-mentioned Protestantism as critical principle refers to “protest” (or “prophetic criticism” as Tillich likes to use) as the root of Protestantism, sc. to adopt a critical stance on the whole secular or sacred things in this world with a view of the world beyond. Protestantism as formative principle means that “formation” should also become the foundation of Protestantism. To make things of the soul and social levels become formative, is “an urgent cause for Protestantism in formation”.20 Confronting the topic of the “end” of Protestant era, Tillich outlines three solutions for Protestantism in “The End of the Protestant Era?” (1948). The first is to stick to the traditional approach, but Tillich believes that this would mean that Protestantism has completely lost its vitality in the present era (Tillich even said that this will be the end of Protestantism). The second solution is probably the “Catholicism of Protestantism” that Tillich referred before, but he did not mention this concept again here, instead only said that Protestantism could borrow elements of the sacraments from the Catholic Church. He is well aware that there have already been many Protestant churches trying to do this, and there are indeed not a few merits, but he is not optimistic about this solution. This is because, in his perspective, this practice is in conflict with the traditional protestant doctrine, and it may be difficult to fully implement it in Protestantism.21 Tillich prefers the third solution. He hopes that Protestantism goes out of the church, engages with

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  147 society in a more secular way, and effectively contends with various forms of “formative” forces of the people, sc. to struggle not only against the “formative” force of the catholic church, but also against the secular nature such as the Nazis. “If this kind of movement develops, the Protestant era will not end”.22 Tillich’s idea of taking protest and formation as the two indispensable fundamental principles of Protestantism would undoubtedly touch Chao’s nerves of thought. Chao is convinced that the Christian church and China’s revolutionary force (the future construction force) can only be a “companion” relationship, which means to ground on the “critical” spirit of the Christian church. He is convinced that the Christian church can provide a solid moral and spiritual foundation for Chinese society, which seems to be commensurate with Tillich’s “formation”. This means that the key idea of Tillich’s The Protestant Era is indeed consistent with the direction of Chao’s thought. As far as the systematic and profound nature of Tillich’s formulation is concerned, it might not entirely be Chao’s humble words that Tillich has expounded what he could not and guided his progress. Later (in the fall of 1961), Tillich gave “Bampton Lectures” at Columbia University in New York on the theme of “The Encounters of Christianity and Various World Religions”, referring to the rise of Communism as well as the Communism of China. Tillich pointed out that by the beginning of the 20th century, China’s traditional value systems were either a rigid one, for example the “two sacramental mystic religions of Taoism and Buddhism”, or on the verge of disintegration, for instance the Confucian social ethics system. That is to say, Taoism and Buddhism, as two important religious forms in traditional Chinese society, lacked the ability to intervene in society like the Russian Orthodox church. In respect of Confucianism, it originally developed the characteristics of social ethics under the “cosmic and religious background”, but unfortunately lost the driving force to integrate the social situation at this juncture, thanks to the collapse of the political hierarchy and family structure system of the whole society. As a result, the spirit of utopia was also pinned on the belief of Communism, which ignited the enthusiasm of the whole China.23

5  Concluding Remark Although Tillich’s formulations may not be entirely accurate, there are reasons to think that at least two of them deserve serious consideration. First, Tillich believes that the rise of Communism in China has its own justification. Second, he observes that the rise of Communism is related to the dislocation of China’s traditional values system. These two points of view are probably exactly what Chao had in mind when Communist China was taking shape. He firmly believed that Christianity has the power to lay a moral and spiritual foundation for Communist China and was willing to pursue the bright prospect of the harmonious coexistence of Christianity

148  Junjie Yang and Communism, which means that, in his view, Christianity does have the opportunity to exert its power in communist China. Things did not turn out as Chao expected. His imagination of the fusion of Christianity and Communism in China did not become reality. The plan to translate Tillich’s whole book of The Protestant Era was in the end postponed. But it cannot be simply said that what he left behind was nothing but a joke. Today, China still faces a good number of problems. Chao’s vision and his “spiritual” encounter with Tillich along with the vision are not without something to reminisce about.

Notes 1 Thanks for Ms. Chen Lilin’s translation from Chinese to English. Funded by Beijing Youth Talent Fund (Project No. 108201). Thanks to Hong Kong Tao Fong Foundation for funding, I was honored to visit ISCS (Institute of Sino-Christian Studies in Hong Kong) from January to March 2014 to collect various materials necessary for writing this article. 2 Wilhelm & Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich: His Life & Thought, Vol. 1: Life, New York: Harper & Row 1976, pp. 218–221. 3 Tie Lihe, T.C. Chao trans., “Philosophy and Fortune”, originally published in Truth and Life, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1950), here is quoted from The Collected Writings of Tsu Chen Chao, Vol. 4, pp. 391–402. Regarding the writings of T.C. Chao that are cited in this article of mine, as long as they are from the five volumes of The Collected Writings of Tsu Chen Chao (edited by Yenching Institute, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2009 [Note: the fourth volume was published in 2010, later than the fifth volume]), the volume and page number would be marked directly in the article. Kindly noted that my article follows Chao’s translation, i.e. translating “The Protestant Era” as “The Era of Protestantism” in Chinese. 4 Only Professor Xu Yihua keenly noticed that what Chao translated was the article by Tillich. See Xu Yihua, “Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York and the Christian Church in China”, in Liu Jiafeng ed., Brokenness and Reconciliation: Chinese Christians and the Rise of Indigenous Church (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2005), p. 48, Note 4. 5 Paul Tillich, “Philosophie und Schicksal”, Kant-Studien, Vol. 34, (1929), pp. 300– 311. Thanks to Qu Xutong (School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University) for his kindness. 6 The reality was not as what Tillich introduced. Goethe University Frankfurt was newly established in 1914, and there was in the beginning only one professorship of philosophy, namely of “Philosophy and Pedagogy”. It was until November 1937 when Scheler was hired to preside over the professorship of “Pedagogy” that the two separate professorships were formed and the professorship of “philosophy” was occupied by Hans Comelius. Professor Cornelius retired in April 1928 and Professor Scheler died in May 1928, leaving both professorships vacant. After several deliberations, it was decided that Tillich succeeded Cornelius as the professor of “philosophy” and took charge of the professorship of “pedagogy”. That meant Tillich was actually Cornelius’ successor. For more details, see the foreword by Prof. Eduard Sturm for volume 15 of the German edition of Supplements to Collected Works of Tillich: Paul Tillich, Vorlesungen über Geschichtsphilosophie und Sozialpädagogik (Frankfurt 1929/30) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2007), pp. XXX–XL.

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  149 7 The rewritten version of “Philosophy and Fate” was also the text that Tillich himself recognized. Although “Philosophy and Fate”, recorded in Tillich’s volume of essays TheProtestantism: Principle and Reality that published in Germany in 1950, was based on the German version in 1929, it also incorporated the rewriting in the English “Philosophy and Fate”. See Paul Tillich, “Philosophie und Schicksal”, in Der Protestantismus. Prinzip und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1950), pp. 35–48. “Philosophy and Fate” in the fourth volume of Collected Works of Tillich which is edited by German academics came from the 1950 German version. See Paul Tillich, “Philosophie und Schicksal”, in Gesammelte Werke IV. Philosophie und Schicksal. Schriften zur Erkenntnislehre und Existenzphilosophie (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1961), pp. 23–35. With regard to the textual differences between “Philosophy and Fate” in The Protestant Era and the 1929 German “Philosophy and Fate”, for details See Pau1 Tillich, “Philosophie und Schicksal”, in Ausgewählte Texte (eds. Christian Danz, Wemer Schüßler & Erdmann Sturm; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 223–235. 8 Paul Tillich, The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990); Tomoaki Fukai (ed.), Paul Tillich – Journey to Japan 1960 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014). Also see Paul Tillich, “On the Boundary Line”, The Christian Century. An Undenominational Weekly, Vol. 77, (1960), pp. 1435–1437 (also collected in F. Forrester Church (ed.), The Essential Tillich: An Anthology of the Writings of Paul Tillich [Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1987, 1999], pp. 209–213). 9 Alaric Pearson Rose, whose year of birth and death is unknown. He came to Hong Kong in 1938, served as the senior pastor of St. John’s Cathedral, Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui from 1941 to 1952, and taught at the University of Hong Kong since 1952. He is one of Bishop He Minghua’s best assistants. He then returned to England and became the Principal of Sutton Coldfield Secondary School in Birmingham. See David M. Paton, R.O., The Life and Times of Bishop Ronald Hall of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Diocese of Hong Kong & Macao; The Hong Kong Diocesan Association, 1985), pp. 105, 200. 10 See Paul Tillich, “Die protestantische Verkündigung und der Mensch der Gegenwart”, in Religiöse Verwirklichung (Berlin: Furche, 1929), pp. 25–42. 11 Grenzsituation initially became an important philosophical concept in Jaspers, usually translated as “limit situation”. The academics is currently inclined to consider that Tillich’s Grenzsituation, i.e. the concept of “boundary situation”, was taken from Jaspers. See Schüßler, Yang Junjie trans., Paul Tillich ­Interpreter of Life (Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2011), p. 206. 12 For the relation between the article “I was caught” and Tillich’s thought, kindly see my essay “ ‘I was Caught’: From Tillich to T. C. Chao”, which would be presented at the Academic Commemoration Conference of 50th Anniversary of Tillich’s Death at Hong Kong Baptist University (June 2015). 13 Glüer, Deng Zhaoming trans., T. C. Chao’s Theological Thought (Taipei: Taiwan Christian Literature and Art, 1998), p. 270. 14 T.C. Chao, Ma Jingquan trans., “The Church in China under the Rule of the CCP”, in TheHope Monthly, Vol. 21, No. 9, 1949, pp. 10–13, particularly p. 13. 15 Ying Fuk-tsang, In Search of the Uniqueness of Christianity: Anthology of T. C. Chao’s Theology (Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary, 2003), pp. 102, 103. 16 Paul Tillich, “Protestantism in the Present World-Situation”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Sep. 1937), pp. 236–248. 17 Paul Tillich, “The End of the Protestant Era”, Student World (Genf), Vol. 30, No. 1 (1937), pp. 49–57. 18 Paul Tillich, “Ende der protestantischen Ära? I”, in Gesammelte Werke VII. Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung. Schriflen zur Theologie I (Stuttgart:

150  Junjie Yang Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1962), p. 151. The German version of “The End of the Protestant Era? I” in the seventh volume of Collected Works of Paul Tillich is actually a German translation of “The End of the Protestant Era” (1937). 19 Paul Tillich, “The End of the Protestant Era?”, in The Protestant Era, translated and with a concluding essay by Jarnes Luther Adarns (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 233. This is the last sentence of the article (if there were such a movement, the end of the Protestant era would not yet have arrived), which is missing from “Protestantism in the Present World Situation” (1937). 20 Paul Tillich, “Der Protestautismus als kritisches und gestaltendes Prinzip”, in Paul Tillich (ed.), Der Protestantimus als Kritik und Gestaltung. Zweites Buch Kairos-Kreises, (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl, 1929), pp. 3–37. 21 With regard to Protestant theologian Tillich’s attitude toward Catholicism, kindly see my essay “Tillich and the Second Vatican Council”, in Journal of Comparative Scripture, Vol. 5, (2015). 22 Tillich, “The End of the Protestant Era?”, pp. 232–233. 23 Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York & London Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 18, 19.

References David M. Paton: R.O.: The Life and Times of Bishop Ronald Hall of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: The Diocese of Hong Kong and Macao; The Hong Kong Diocesan Association 1985. Paul Tillich: Die protestantische Verkündigung und der Mensch der Gegenwart, in: ders., Religiöse Verwirklichung, Berlin: Furche 1929. Paul Tillich: Der Protestantismus als kritisches und gestaltendes Prinzip, in: ders. (hrsg.): Der Protestantimus als Kritik und Gestaltung. Zweites Buch des ­Kairos-Kreises, Darmstadt: Otto Reichl 1929. Paul Tillich: Philosophie und Schicksal, in: Kant-Studien 34 (1929). Paul Tillich: Protestantism in the Present World-Situation, in: American Journal of Sociology 43 (1937). Paul Tillich: The End of the Protestant Era, in: Student World (Genf) 30 (1937). Paul Tillich: The End of the Protestant Era?, in: ders.: The Protestant Era, translated and with a concluding essay by James Luther Adams, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1948. Paul Tillich: Philosophie und Schicksal, in: ders., Der Protestantismus. Prinzip und Wirklichkeit, Stuttgart: Steingrüben 1950. Paul Tillich: On the Boundary Line, in: The Christian Century. An Undenominational Weekly 77 (1960). Paul Tillich: Philosophie und Schicksal, in: ders., Gesammelte Werke IV. Philosophie und Schicksal. Schriften zur Erkenntnislehre und Existenzphilosophie, Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk 1961. Paul Tillich: Ende der protestantischen Ära? I, in: ders.: Gesammelte Werke VII. Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung. Schriften zur Theologie I, Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk 1962. Paul Tillich: Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, New York and London: Columbia University Press 1963. Paul Tillich: On the Boundary Line, in: F. Forrester Church (ed.): The Essential Tillich: An Anthology of the Writings of Paul Tillich, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1987c, 1999.

Paul Tillich’s Spiritual Journey in China  151 Paul Tillich: The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions, Toronto: Toronto University Press 1990. Paul Tillich: Collected Works of Paul Tillich, ed. He Guanghu, Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishers 1999 [in Chinese]. Paul Tillich: Vorlesungen über Geschichtsphilosophie und Sozialpädagogik (Frankfurt 1929/30), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2007. Paul Tillich: Philosophie und Schicksal, in: ders., Ausgewählte Texte, hrsg. Christian Danz, Werner Schüßler und Erdmann Sturm, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2008. T. C. Chao: The Church in China under the Rule of the CCP, trans. Ma Jingquan, in: The Hope Monthly 21 (1949) [in Chinese]. T. C. Chao: The Collected Writings of Tsu Chen Chao, ed. Yenching Institute, Beijing: The Commercial Press 2003–2010 [in Chinese]. Tie Lihe: Philosophy and Fortune, trans. T. C. Chao, in: Truth and Life 15 (1950) [in Chinese]. Tomoaki Fukai (ed.): Paul Tillich - Journey to Japan in 1960, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2014. Wilhelm & Marion Pauck: Paul Tillich: His Life & Thought. vol. 1. Life, New York: Harper & Row 1976. Winfried Glüer: T. C. Chao’s Theological Thought, trans. Deng Zhaoming, Taipei: Taiwan Christian Literature and Art 1998 [in Chinese]. Werner Schüßler: Paul Tillich - Interpreter of Life, trans. Yang Junjie, Kaifeng: Henan University Press 2011 [in Chinese]. Ying Fuk-tsang: In Search of the Uniqueness of Christianity: Anthology of T. C. Chao’s Theology, Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary 2003 [in Chinese]. Xu Yihua: Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York and the Christian Church in China, in: Liu Jiafeng (ed.), Brokenness and Reconciliation: Chinese Christians and the Rise of Indigenous Church, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House 2005 [in Chinese]. Yang Junjie: Tillich and the Second Vatican Council, in: Journal of Comparative Scripture 5 (2015) [in Chinese].

7 The Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth in 1923 A Historical and Interpretative Reconstruction1 Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) 1 Introduction 1923 was a significant year, not only for Karl Barth himself, but also for the dialectical theology movement in the 20th century and the history of Christian theological thought thereafter. In January of that year, Between the Times (“Zwischen den Zeiten”), the official journal of the dialectical theology movement, was launched. In the same month, Adolf von Harnack, one of the greatest contemporary theologians at Barth’s time, published an article in The Christian World(“Die Christliche Welt”), the official journal of liberal theology, criticizing the burgeoning dialectical theology movement. Barth gave a prompt response and argued against Harnack.2 This controversy marked not only the independent development of Barth’s theology and the dialectical theology movement, but also indicated their public breakup from liberal theology. But what is more significant for the future development of theology, and also of the religious socialist and the dialectical theology movements,3 was not this controversy between Barth and Harnack,4 but that between Barth and Paul Tillich at the end of that same year.5 Both Barth and Tillich belong to the most eminent Christian theologians in the 20th century.6 This controversy in their early years provides us with an invaluable opportunity to understand the basic approaches and fundamental differences in their later theological development. The first part of this paper describes the genesis and history of the controversy. This paper then reconstructs, chronologically and textual-analytically, the basic ideas and main contents of this controversy and its related texts: in the second part, Tillich’s praise and criticisms; in the third part, Barth’s “counter-critique”; in the fourth part, Tillich’s response; in the fifth part, what followed from it.And the concluding sixth part summarizes the essential differences in theological positions and approaches between these two theologians.

2  The Genesis and History of the Controversy In 1923, Karl Ludwig Schmidt, the chief editor of Theological Papers (“TheologischeBlätter”), invited Tillich to write a polemic against Barth and his

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-8

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  153 friends. The invitation, however, was not made on a whim, but because Tillich had promised to write such an article “since long ago” (349).7 Although Tillich praised Barth (and especially his second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans),8 he had disagreed with Barth “since long ago”,9 and that was why he told Schmidt that he had intended to debate with Barth.10 According to the latest available document, Tillich’s “since long ago” could date back to his two long conversations with Barth in Göttingen in early 1922. According to Barth’s letter to Eduard Thurneysen on 2 April 1922,11 the meeting was arranged by Emanuel Hirsch,12 who belonged to the same student association as Tillich.13 Although Hirsch was younger than Barth and Tillich, he had become a chair professor at the University of Göttingen one year earlier.14 In that meeting, Barth had a private conversation with Tillich. Both were frank and sincere, “willing to think and expect the best from each other”, and exchanged ideas very warmly.15 What was most impressive to Barth was Tillich’s “‘anti-orthodox resentment’ and his historical mythology”.16 In addition, Tillich spoke much of “conditional and unconditional”, and also “unconditional (‘theonomous’) periods in history”.17 Barth’s impression was confirmed and supplemented by Tillich himself. On 2 April 1922, Tillich wrote to his friend Alfred Fritz about his trip to Göttingen. The trip was “a refresher of top-level, a trip out of the theological ‘province’: from Berlin into the theological centrals”.18 In their first conversation, Tillich agreed with Hirsch’s sharp critique of Barth: Barth’s system about Christ, resurrection, and eschatology is an incoherent one, and his thought is derived from Johann Christoph Blumhardt’s thought, which may be termed as “supernaturalism”.19 Meanwhile, Hirsch argued that, compared with Barth, Tillich’s thought is “pagan” and much more consistent. Moreover, Barth’s theology unduly denies the historical-­critical method, which might dissolve “scientifical seriousness”, and was thus more dangerous than Tillich’s “sincere paganism”.20 In the private dialogue between Tillich and Barth,21 the main topic was the philosophy of history. The dialogue clearly showed the opposing ideas of the two sides: Barth was a “supernatural eschatologist” and had no interest in history, while Tillich focused on “the ‘theonomous’ era” and was rather more interested in history. Last, but not least, the two sides reached an agreement that Barth should “rationalize his supernatural formulas”, while Tillich should “counter-­ balance his rational [formulas] by the supernatural”. Barth wanted to act as a biblical theologian, so that he could preach the essence of the unconditional, whereas Tillich wanted to preach it as a cultural theologian.22 This Göttingen meeting should be regarded as an important chapter in the history of modern theological thought. The mutual understanding and criticism between Barth and Tillich, the two theological giants, can be largely traced back to their different positions, orientations, and approaches taken in this meeting. As Werner Schüßler pointed out, Hirsch had seen, as far as back 1922, the divergent approaches in the development of Barth’s and

154  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) Tillich’s respective theological thought, and attributed to them two opposing types: Barth’s theology was “supernatural” and therefore “unscientific”, while Tillich’s was “pagan” and therefore “non-Christian”. This was also the fundamental reason why Barth advocated biblical theology and Tillich cultural theology.23 Not long after this meeting, Thurneysen’s letter to Barth on 24 April 1922 suggested that Tillich wanted to know little from Barth, though he shared a number of points of consensus with Barth “in basic principles”. The reason was that Tillich believed there was “something inactive and easygoing” in Barth’s attitude, and his theology would end in “supernaturalism and pietism”. As a result, Thurneysen reminded Barth to have reservations about Tillich.24

3 Tillich’s Praise and Critique: From the Critical Paradox to the Positive Paradox In a public critical article (“Kritisches und positives Paradox: Eine Auseinandersetzungmit Karl Barth und Friedrich Gogarten”, 351–358) in 1923, Tillich articulated at the outset that he is “reluctant” to engage in “attempts at confrontation” with the thoughts of Barth and his friends (351).25 He did so because he appreciated the critical negation which they had made, and felt that it should be carried forward within and outside of the Church. However, precisely for the purpose of promoting such critique, Tillich maintained the need to prevent their opponents from taking advantage of their “weakness” to damage the critical negation. Therefore, Tillich “dared” to make an attempt to confront himself with them. While he tried to appreciate their critical negation, he also pointed out that critical negation is possible due to the position, which is the ground that makes the negation possible. Starting from this ground, Tillich held the view that the relation between the unconditional and the conditional must be grasped dialectically. The reason why he appreciated the critical negation of Barth and his friends is that it helped to clarify the relation between the two sides: “a relation with the unconditional, which is immediate, non-paradoxical, without the persistent radical negation, is not the relation with the unconditional, but with the conditional, and the conditional as such claiming itself as unconditional and becoming therefore an idol” (351).26 Those things and words that are supposed to express paradoxes, such as religion and the Bible, Christ, and God, are in constant danger of becoming idolatrous and non-paradoxical. Meanwhile, Tillich maintained that one should go beyond the negative critique. The negative dialectic and the crisis theology stressed by Barth and his friends must presuppose a sort of position, which is no longer dialectical in itself. Otherwise, the self-sublation of the dialectic would fall into infinity, which never ends. This real sublation of the dialectical position, which is not intrinsically dialectical, must be found from the unconditional. For this reason, Tillich put forward his main ideas and also his serious reminder

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  155 to Barth: to return to the positive paradox from the critical paradox. For Tillich, everything is a factor in the dialectical position and is under the unity of judgment and grace. Positive grace is the premise of negative judgment, and “without the unity with grace, judgment would be [a] natural process” (353). Tillich then proceeded to elaborate his basic ideas from the following three viewpoints: the relation between God and nature, between God and spirit, and between God and history. As far as the relation between God and nature is concerned, Tillich argued that one should not, like Barth and his friends, refuse to talk about the order of creation,27 or completely deny the human possibility of knowing God from nature. Tillich had three reasons. First, from a dialectical perspective, as soon as one speaks of judgment, irrationality, or death manifested in the world, nature, or life, those corresponding affirmations of the world, nature, and life are all presupposed premises. Second, what manifests in the irrationality of nature is not only the desperate situation of the world, but also the infinite majesty of God who is worthy of worship. Lastly, with the sight of birds in the sky and flowers in the field, one sees not only judgment, but also the grace that creates life. Nevertheless, Tillich also conceded that judgment and grace are paradoxically united, and this unity manifests only to the eye of faith. That one sees only grace and never sees judgment is “deifying idealism”, i.e., an attempt to grasp immediately and paradoxically the unity between the unconditional and the conditional in nature.28 It would be “demonic realism” to see the annihilation of the conditional in nature as a natural process, taking no regard of the paradoxical unity with grace (353–354). In Tillich’s perspective, neither “deifying idealism” nor “demonic realism” are proper, and both are far away from revelation. To illustrate these points, Tillich emphasizes his understanding of divine Trinity. The outward work of the divine Trinity is inseparable, since the work always comes from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit concurrently. This also means that the order of creation and the order of salvation belong to each other, that the acts of grace manifested in creation and salvation are inseparably the same act, and that “creation is ordered towards salvation, and salvation is installed (‘angelegt’) in creation” (354).29 Regarding the relation between God and spirit, Tillich considered the human spirit as belonging to creation. Different from the dialectical negation, the dialectical position is neither under judgment (but under the unity of judgment and grace) nor a human expression in his or her predicament, but truth. However, the human spirit is capable of proclaiming this truth and is therefore one place of revelation. The human spiritual life is also carried by the unity between grace and judgment. In human autonomy, there is always revelation and concealing, as well as the divine and the demonic. The conflict between the divine and the demonic, the Holy Spirit and the unholy spirit, and the principle of creation and the principle of annihilation are the most profound and hidden content of spiritual history (355).

156  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) For Tillich, the greatest contribution of Barth’s crisis theology is to fight with the most energy against the religious non-paradoxical claim of absoluteness. He even argued that every relevant word written by Barth in his second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans was destroying idolatry (355). Nevertheless, Tillich pointed out that dialectical self-sublation cannot sublate the ground of this negation, i.e., “the religious position”. “In all religious and profane cultures, there are phenomena that make the origin, […] the revelation of grace and judgment to be seen in the eye of faith” (355). For Tillich, this is “the deep meaning” of culture and religion. This deep meaning cannot be seen objectively and immediately, but dialectically and faithfully in the unity between position and negation (355–356).30 In terms of the relation between God and history, history is also conditional and therefore cannot be set as unconditional. Like nature and spirit, history is the place of the Godlikeness of humanity which is in predicament and under God’s wrath. However, such a judgment of the crisis is possible only on the ground of a position that is itself not under this judgment. For Tillich, it is in history that the positive ground of the negative paradox is most obviously manifested; because the proclamation of the crisis is history, and the content is historical. “Wherever this message is proclaimed, it is one place of revelation in the history. […] The revelation, which realizes itself in the history and carries this history, is non-intuitive” (357). Rejecting this idea, Barth and his friends did not see the positive ground of crisis theology and were forced to search for a kind of position in history, on which the proclamation of crisis lays. “The place of this revelation is Christ. In Christology, the opposition between positive paradox and negative paradox is resolved decisively” (357). Barth and his friends delineated in history “a one-time historical event (‘Ereignis’)”, in which history is sublated and an absolute new is set. What happened in Christ happened completely beyond humanity, but in the historical human Jesus of Nazareth. This event is a “purely objective historical fact”, which happens only once, but once and for all (357).31 According to Tillich, these ideas of Barth indicate that, in search of a ground for its critique, the theology of critical paradox becomes a theology of positive absurdity, and thereby abandons its own premise. In his view, Barth and his friends must admit that “this empirical fact points to an indication of the unconditional revealed non-objectively in this fact”. “Faith is not the work of affirming the absurd, but develops on the ground of the non-intuitive revelational history that runs through the history hiddenly and finds its full expression in Christ” (358). After criticizing the theology of Barth and his friends from the above three perspectives, Tillich finally concluded that there is something right in Barth’s crisis theology, that is, “the fighting against those non-paradoxical, immediate and objective grasps of the unconditional” (358). However, Barth failed to notice that the premise of crisis theology is “no longer crisis, but creation and grace” (358). This premise can be expressed paradoxically only through the crisis and must be expressed when it is implemented in nature

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  157 and spirit, as well as culture and religion. Corresponding to the above Trinitarian theological framework, Tillich argued that the premise can be formulated in the following three ways. First, from the perspective of creation, the premise is the eternal origin, ground, and abyss (“Abgrund”), revealed to faith in a non-intuitive and non-given way through all of reality in position and negation. Second, from the perspective of salvation, the premise is eternal salvation, which is revealed only to faith, as salvation history. This salvation history is hidden in Christand manifests itself by full symbolic power, while going through history and various creations in a non-intuitive and non-given way. Third, from the perspective of completion, the premise, which is non-intuitive, is the eternal completion; in this non-intuitive promise, the original ambiguity, and the conflict between the divine and the demonic, will be sublated in the eternal unity in God. Therefore, the theology of the critical paradox is not only dialectically, but also genuinely, placing itself under paradox, and thus becomes the theology of the positive paradox (358).

4 Barth’s “Counter-Critique”:32 Christ is the Positive Paradox Prior to Barth’s response, Thurneysen wrote to Barth on 22 November 1923 that Tillich, who wrote the above article, was like a lion trying to announce his imminent presence in the theological arena. From Thurneysen’s perspective, Tillich’s theology exhibits a “great city vibe (‘Großstadtgewächs’)” is uncommonly artificial, deficient in biblical foundation, and with an attempt to escape revelation. He therefore had a strong expectation of Barth’s response, looking forward to a quick reaction from Barth which would make Tillich the lion become quiet.33 Later, on 26 November 1923, Barth wrote to Friederich Gogarten, expressing that, “I have surely rejected all of Tillich’s suggestions for improvement without exception”.34 In his public response (“Von der Paradoxie des ‘positiven Paradoxes’: Antworten und Fragenan Paul Tillich”, 358–375), like Tillich’s opening remarks, Barth also expressed from the beginning that he was “not that willing” to have public conversation with Tillich. One reason was that he and Tillich, notwithstanding their differences, were fairly close to each other.35 Consequently, Barth was reluctant to express his differences with Tillich in front of unrelated people.36Now that Tillich had published his article, he could not keep silent but had to respond.37 First, Barth expressed his understanding of Tillich’s purpose (namely, that the critical negation should be grounded on a certain position) and recognized Tillich’s right to make criticism and correction. Barth then proceeded to articulate that Tillich started with a wrong point: he believed that Barth and his friends failed to see the positive ground of crisis theology, which made one feel that they had to wait for his enlightenment. Tillich supposed that what he said is something new that Barth had not heard of, but in fact Barth was not ignorant of it at all.

158  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) Subsequently, Barth tried to understand why Tillich thought he had found a “loophole”. In Barth’s view, Tillich asked his questions not from a theological perspective, but a cultural-theological one.38 Barth argued that, if Tillich would recognize an “external” and “typically non-theological” premise,39 Tillich would have every reason to refuse Barth’s opposition to that premise (361). Despite the difference in their approaches and standpoints, Barth attempted to understand Tillich’s article better than Tillich himself did40 and to examine and improve Tillich’s understanding and definition of the positive paradox (361–362). According to Tillich, Barth and his friends had absolutized the critical negation. In Barth’s view, Tillich made this accusation simply out of his occasional reading of their works and his private meetings with them,41 which were followed by his suspicion of their stubborn belief in negation, and Tillich has subsequently claimed that he had found the “fatal vulnerability (‘Krebsschaden’)” of crisis theology (362).42 Contrary to Tillich’s view, Barth pointed out that “the dialectical sublation of the dialectic (as position) must be and would always be dialectical”, instead of being no longer dialectical (363). In this sense, the “crisis”, as Barth perceived, is not the “persistent radical negation” (351) or “prohibition” as Tillich understood, but the “warning” or “reminder” (364–365), namely, the reminder that the crisis should not be forgotten. In specific cases, “crisis” may also mean position and commandment. Therefore, Barth asked Tillich why the dialectical sublation of the dialectic must be a “position” as understood by Tillich, and “why it cannot be an indication at all, not to mention the indication which points not to some sort of other, but to that other, to the ‘real sublation’” (364).43 Barth argued that, if Tillich cannot prove this “must” and this “cannot”, then he could not see why he needs to accept Tillich’s instruction, as Tillich misses the key point of the question. Therefore, Barth turned to discussing the key point of the question, i.e., the indicated to which the indicator tries to indicate, or Tillich’s fundamental argument, namely, the “positive paradox”. Barth observed that Tillich fails to make clear what “the real sublation from the unconditional” is, and made a series of queries about Tillich’s mistake. In Barth’s view, to imagine escaping from human predicament without relying on external force is most probably a “philosophical presumptuous self-lying (‘Münchenhauseniade’)”. Barth also questioned Tillich about his concept of the unconditional.44 If one could understand the term “God” solely with the recognition of the unconditional as the premise of the positive paradox, then why did Tillich forbid theologians from applying the concept of the unconditional to the term “God”?45 However, what was “unfamiliar and “incomprehensible” to Barth was that, in Tillich’s method, philosophy or metaphysics is more than theology in proportion and that Tillich’s positive paradox was nothing more than an X.46 Even though Barth may have agreed with Tillich on specific points, he disagreed with Tillich’s thoughts in terms of fundamental method and approach, considering it “untrustworthy” as theology (367).

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  159 As a result, Barth began to criticize Tillich’s discussion of the relation between God and nature, spirit, and history based on the concept of God and put forward three specific objections. First, Barth considered Tillich’s article to be full of indicative sentences which point to a good number of non-paradoxical definitions of the relation between God and the world and man. However, what the positive paradox emphasizes in the first place is the paradox rather than the unity between God and the world or man. Second, Tillich’s claims about judgment, grace, and revelation express “the desolation of Christian thought and speech”, in exactly the same way as the idolatrous use of the term “God” which he rejected. The positive paradox does not emphasize the logical possibility, so that judgment and grace cannot be spoken of casually in a confident way which Tillich takes for granted. Third, Barth objected to Tillich’s generalization of the relation between God and the world and man, taking it as a “broad and universal cliché of faith and revelation”. The God in discussion as such is not “the God of Luther and Kierkegaard”, but something like “the God of Schleiermacher and Hegel” (369). Barth pointed out that, as a theologian, one should avoid Tillich’s “directness”, “easy-goingness”, and “generosity” while discussing the positive paradox, i.e., the paradox of God. The reason was that the paradox of God is not only related with the “non-intuitive”, but also with God’s own free will. Unlike Tillich, the revelation perceived by Barth is “not some sort of relation that is universal, defined in indicative, and only waiting to be disclosed, not some hidden state of being given, but a kind of happening that is particular, only revealed by God and for us to recognize (after we are recognized by God), a kind of event from person to person” (369). It is due to the above understanding of the positive paradox that Barth and Tillich parted ways. Barth argued that it is the fundamental reason why Tillich found the so-called “loophole” in Barth’s thought. In Barth’s idea, the positive paradox is not the object of theological science, but the subject that is not dominated by human thought and knowledge.47 The difference and opposition in their approaches and standpoints are clearly indicated in Christology and the related understanding of revelation.48 For Barth, “Christ is the ‘positive paradox’”, and “Christ is the history of salvation, the salvation history itself”. Meanwhile, for Tillich, “Christ is the representation of the history of salvation that happens more or less always and everywhere by full symbolic power” (370). In Barth’s perspective, Tillich’s definition of the positive paradox is incomplete and ignores divine freedom and love; although Tillich correctly opposed the “man-God”, i.e., the idolatry from man to God, there is the risk of falling into the most severe opposition to the “God-man” (i.e., the specific and special revelation of God in Jesus Christ). In Barth’s view, it is for “baptized Christians” and “Christian theologians” rather than for the world, religion, culture, and man in general, that the revelation can be expressed in indicative sentences. That is to say, “according to the biblical witness and ecclesiastical confession, there is a history that is qualified as the

160  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) place of the salvation history”. And this is the unique positive paradox, which is “not only non-intuitive, but first and foremost God’s special, personal, and real (understood as one-time and contingent!) act of freedom and love” (371). Therefore, the positive paradox or revelation itself is also paradoxical and dialectical. On the one side, due to God’s sovereignty and his one-time and contingent revelation, the revelation happened in history and was closely related to empirical facts, but it was non-intuitive and non-objectifiable, and cannot be found through the intuitive relation to history, nor can it be obtained through abstraction. On the other hand, this revelation is a revelation of God’s majesty in his past, concrete, and special humbleness. In this context, Barth explicitly referred to the Reformed Christological tradition (and the Christological tradition of the Council of Chalcedon) in order to make clear the different Christological traditions that he and Tillich have followed. The tradition followed by Barth indicates that Jesus is Christ and Christ is Jesus, and that the two are distinguishable, but inseparable. The tradition followed by Tillich seeks not only to distinguish between Jesus and Christ, but also to separate them by means of a symbol theory, “denying by revelation the singular qualification of the history of Incarnation”, i.e., the uniqueness and singularity of history, and proceeding from “claiming the qualifications of all history by revelation” (373), that is to say, emphasizing that all history can be a revelation of God. In the concluding part of his response, Barth tries to understand Tillich’s “enigmatic” critique as a theologian. He guessed that, on the one hand, Tillich may have always been inspired by modern attacks on the grand inquisitor (374), with a strong apologetic motive and less emphasis on mission; on the other hand, Tillich’s “anti-orthodox resentment” made it difficult for him to properly understand the (specific) positive paradox, i.e., God’s special revelation in Jesus Christ, as witnessed by the Bible and confessed by the Church. Surely, Barth also conceded that Tillich’s article as a whole is amicably written and full of appreciation. Barth hoped that his response would also be the same. Nevertheless, Tillich’s attempt to correct the “loophole” in crisis theology attacked precisely the decisive elements that are crucial to crisis theology. For Barth, theology is not without premises, and these premises are not universal “theonomy”. “Not only God, not only Christianity, but also the Church, ‘not only the Holy Universal Church, but also the particular Church to which we belong’, are the premise of theology” (375). Barth therefore drew the conclusion that his conflict with Tillich was due to his “indication of the indissoluble correlation between the theological conception of truth and the concepts of the Church, the canon, and the Holy Spirit” (375).

5  Tillich’s Response: Reflections on the Spiritual Situation After reading Barth’s “counter-critique”, Tillich wanted to respond “quickly and briefly”. Meanwhile, he also noted that the purpose of his conversation with Barth is “totally being with each other rather than separating from each other” (376).

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  161 Tillich’s response focused on discussing the spiritual situation of his philosophical-­theological work. He first agreed with Barth’s efforts to understand his thought from the spiritual situation, and clearly pointed out that his philosophical-theological work, including his positive and negative critique of Barth and his friends, is precisely a revolt against the grand inquisitor and his entourage.49 Based on the above response, Tillich argued that, from the perspective of the universal, Barth’s theology is correct in being premised upon the concepts of truth, the canon, the Church, and the Holy Spirit. But he went on to point out the question of what such a universal perspective actually means for “our spiritual situation”. In the current situation, it is impossible for us to directly speak of God according to the words of the Bible and the Church, and it is also impossible to directly express their essential meaning. We must speak indirectly of the unconditional. Moreover, we cannot directly and immediately speak of (the concrete and specific) Jesus Christ as the positive paradox. The name of Jesus Christ could be abused. If the Spirit of Christ would be identified with the name of Jesus Christ, the blasphemy of the name of Jesus Christ would be cursed, and the grand inquisitor would be right. In contrast with the Reformed Christological tradition (and the Christological tradition of the Council of Chalcedon) followed by Barth, which emphasizes thespecial revelation in Jesus Christ, Tillich advocated that theology should be done from the Logos and the Spirit of Christ, which emphasizes the universal revelation.50 The reason is that the (universal) Spirit of Christ is the positive paradox and does not end in the particular empirical phenomenon of Jesus Christ as such. Moreover, theology never asserts that the positive paradox has absolute contingency. Theology concerns itself more with the Logos,51 so that theology should follow the way of the Logos,52 and try to be clear about the Logos’ existence in like manner in the creation and in the crisis of culture and religion. Therefore, to preach the positive paradox, and to try to show the traces of God in the creation and in the ruins of cultures and religions, are not false idolatry. Tillich thought that such a theological approach can be termed “cultural philosophy”, as the indication directed toward the ultimate is not limited to the words of the Bible and the expressions of the Church. “In this way, our situation drives us as theologians not to be theologians, but cultural philosophers” (377). As to the specific understanding of pneumatology, the universal Spirit of Christ in Tillich’s understanding is not necessarily limited to the Bible and the Church, but can be in its inner development strongly directed to us through specific natural things, cultural works, or religious activities, even though the related words, narratives, and images may bear the imprint of the grand inquisitor. As a result, in his view, Barth’s spirit, which is bound in the concrete sense to the biblical canon and the Church, is distinct from the spirit of truth and love and may seriously block the way to the complete intuition of the paradox in Christ. Barth’s pneumatological understanding, which is such a direct proclamation of concrete paradox against the various forms of culture and religion, is “the disloyalty to our situation” (378).

162  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) Therefore, Tillich expressed especially to Barth two specific concerns. First, the dialectical approach exercised by Barth and his friends may lead to “a very positive, very non-dialectical supernaturalism”, in which the Yes and No of the relation between God and the world may become a kind of simple No against the world, and may probably become even “a more positive, non-dialectical Yes” (378). Second, the Reformed theology that Barth referred to strictly distinguishes the profane sphere from the sacred sphere, not only secularizing and evacuating cultural life, but also making religious life appear primitive, which has got completely away from the intention of the Reformation and against its own situation. Different from Barth, Tillich also articulated that the tradition, to which he belongs, is the German-­ Lutheran tradition which emphasizes the constant attempts at overcoming the profane autonomy through a filled theonomy. For Tillich, Schleiermacher and Hegel, whom Barth mentions, are also in this tradition. Barth did not respond further to Tillich’s above-mentioned response.53 According to Thurneysen’s letter to Barth on 7 December 1923, the statements by Tillich can be understood, at best, as “comment and warning contribution”. As far as the facts are concerned, nothing would change.54

6  The Subsequence of the Controversy On 20 January 1926, Tillich published an article in the Berlin local newspaper Vossical Newspaper (“Vossische Zeitung”),55 to continue his critique of Barth. Marked by this short piece of writing, Barth and Tillich parted ways completely and embarked on their own way of theological development.56 As he did in the previous polemical articles, Tillich first praised the theological movement represented by Barth as the most important movement in contemporary German Protestant theology, and his second commentary on The Epistle to Romans is “a milestone in the development of Protestant theology”.57 In the first part concerning historical background, Tillich argued that, in addition to the Reformation, Johann Blumhardt and his son are also an important source for Barth’s theological thought.58 These two prophetic figures stress the work of God himself, arguing that God’s relation with the world need not be mediated by the Church and religious piety.59 Influenced by them, Barth claimed that no human movement, ecclesiastical or non-­ ecclesiastical, pious or profane, and Christian or socialist, has any holiness before God. Everything is under the judgment which is from eternity and befalls temporal things. As we see in his article in 1923, Tillich applauds the critique initiated by Barth, arguing that the dialectical theology movement “has always been the most powerful and for the near future the most important factor to Protestant theology” (188). Slightly different from his emphasis on Christological understanding in Barth’s theology in 1923, Tillich focused first in the second part on Barth’s conception of God and his ensuing critical understanding of human autonomy,

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  163 culture, and religion, and then proceeded to expound Barth’s view of revelation and his ensuing critical understanding of piety and faith. In Tillich’s view, Barth is deeply influenced by the Calvinist concept of God, emphasizing God’s full power and the glory beyond the world, and strongly opposed to human possibility of direct intuition of God in nature and history. The world is under sin, judgment, and crisis, and it is time and all the temporal things, especially human autonomy, culture, and religion, that would be judged. Autonomy is understood by Barth as human self-glorifying and his efforts to live in his own form and to try to become something before God. All cultures are also in crisis, and the highest contribution of culture is to define its own boundaries. Religion is only a human possibility, a human effort trying to approach God. Fundamentally speaking, religion belongs to human autonomy and is a form of human self-glorifying, and Christianity as a religion is no exception. Corresponding to the above conception of God, Barth argued that revelation is a ground that neither requires any apologetic effort nor can it be refuted by any argument. It is one-time, contingent and special, and cannot be grasped from the viewpoint of universality. Revelation breaks autonomy and replaces human possibility with divine possibility, which is human “impossible possibility” (188). Due to this view of revelation, Barth argued that piety is faith and that faith is the impossible possibility from God rather than from man, and full of leaps and adventures on human side. In the third part concerning specific criticism, Tillich first stated that the significance and strength of dialectical theology come from its adherence to the Protestant principle, namely, “justification by faith alone”. Tillich’s critical point is similar to that in 1923, i.e., “it is impossible to preach and hear only the No of God without preaching and hearing the Yes of God” (191). By examining the concepts of faith, religion, and revelation, Tillich developed his critique of Barth. First, since believers or nonbelievers are specific individuals, the opposition between faith and unfaith does not exist in transcendence, but in human reality. Second, human religion cannot be simply understood from the negative perspective as Barth did, as religion is not only human possibility, but also can become human faithful answer to God’s possibility and his revelation. Third, revelation cannot be understood in a fractured manner as Barth did, otherwise revelation will become “settled segments of time, and fragments of history” (192). In Tillich’s view, these shortcomings or “false developments” (192) in Barth’s theology may be used by the orthodox ones to support their rigid doctrines. In 1935, Tillich, who had to live in exile in the United States, visited Chicago and talked with local theologians on a number of occasions, trying his best to show that he is not a Barthian theologian.60 In order to express himself publicly, Tillich published the article “What is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?” in English, openly expressing his critique of Barth’s theology in the English-speaking world. The basic point of this article is that Barth’s dialectical theology is not dialectical, but paradoxical and supernatural.61

164  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) In 1940, Tillich pointed out in a review of Barth’s new book62 that, whether Barth himself admitted it or not, the book presents in Barth’s thought a turning point which demonstrates that Barth had begun to confront and protest to the national socialism as a political reality. In Tillich’s perspective, Barth’s theology was under constant attacks thanks to its “transcendentalism”, i.e., a radical distinction between God and the world, religion and ethics, and God’s kingdom and history.63 However, in this book, especially in the fourth part, Barth took a new position, arguing that the national socialism is both a political experiment and a religious salvation institution, and that “the Church cannot under any circumstance be neutral to the contemporary political questions” (325). Besides, Tillich also mentioned in brief the profound impact that this turn may have on Barth’s theological thinking, namely, the distinction between Barth’s theology and the religious socialist movement being no longer theological but only political (326).64

7 Concluding Summary of Theological Differences between Tillich and Barth Following the historical interpretative reconstruction of the 1922 conversations, 1923 controversy, 1936 book review, etc.,65 this article will in its concluding part summarize the mutual understanding between Barth and Tillich, as well as the essential differences in their theological positions and approaches. First, in terms of the interactive relation between the two sides, Tillich and Barth are not personal friends, but theological dialogue partners who maintain a distance from and respect for each other. Both concern themselves with each other in their parallel theological development processes. This is even more evident on Barth’s part, who reads intensively the first volume of Tillich’s Systematic Theology in his declining years.66 However, Tillich’s understanding and critique of Barth is comparatively one-sided, since he particularly emphasizes the influence of the religious socialist movement on Barth’s theology (especially his understanding of God), and especially stresses that Barth’s theology is non-dialectical but obsessed with negative “supernaturalism” or “transcendentalism”. This indicates that Tillich’s understanding of Barth is somehow limited to Barth’s dialectical theological and religious socialist period (especially Barth’s second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans). Second, as Barth articulated and Tillich affirmed in the 1923 controversy, the differences between their respective theologies are highly confessional. While Barth follows the Reformed tradition through Luther and Kierkegaard, Tillich continues the German-Lutheran tradition, which is close to Schleiermacher’s theological tradition and Hegel’s philosophical tradition.67 Third, Tillich’s affinity with Schleiermacher and Hegel is closely related to his metaphysical stance that emphasizes creation (followed then by salvation and completion), as well as the positive original unity between God

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  165 and man (or the unconditional and the conditional). From this standpoint, Tillich states that the negative difference, namely, the separation of the unconditional from the conditional, must be treated dialectically.68 The metaphysical premise in Barth’s theology is very different from that of Tillich’s theology. In a nutshell, the metaphysical position of Barth’s theology is somehow a postmodern one; that is to say, that the original unity has been completely lost. From this standpoint, Barth’s theology emphasizes the absolute difference between God and man. Fourth, concerning a concrete understanding of dialectic, Tillich’s dialectic stresses that, although there is negation, the original position is prior to and the premise of negation. Barth’s dialectic emphasizes that the original position is no longer to return to. The return is impossible either by the human nature created in God’s creation or by the human nature restored in Jesus Christ’s salvation, like many Catholic or similar theologians such as Tillich would advocate. Meanwhile, for Barth, the negation can only be overcome continuously thanks to the position that God himself constantly re-establishes in salvation. The overcoming of negation is not universal, but only contingent. Correspondently, Christian believers can only keep walking in-between on the narrow way from the revelation which has happened to the revelation which is promised. In relation of Barth’s idea, Tillich’s dialectic emphasizes the universal method and principle, while Barth’s stresses the particular dialectic of the theological subject matter.69 Although both Barth’s and Tillich’s respective theologies adopt a Trinitarian framework (i.e., creation, salvation, and completion), due to their different understanding of the theological subject matter, one emphasizes universal revelation and the other special revelation, which results in radically divergent understandings of dialectic. Fifth, the differences between Barth’s and Tillich’s theologies come not only from different confessional backgrounds, different philosophical and metaphysical backgrounds, or different methodologies and research approaches, but also from different understandings of the theological subject matter.70 Christology is the main battleground. Tillich emphasizes the Logos and the Spirit of Christ, the symbolic power of Christ, and the universality of revelation in history and culture. Barth emphasizes that Jesus is Christ and Christ is Jesus, that Jesus Christ is God’s special revelation, and that the revelation is specific, one-time and contingent in a concrete historical and cultural situation.71 Sixth, in line with the above-mentioned Christological differences, Barth emphasizes the biblical and ecclesiastical nature of theology, because God’s special revelation in Jesus Christ is what the Bible witnesses and the Church preaches. Tillich, on the contrary, emphasizes the cultural and religious nature of theology, as it is possible for God to reveal himself through phenomena by symbolic power in culture and religion. Correspondingly, Barth’s dogmatics and hermeneutics take an approach from the special to

166  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) the universal, while Tillich’s systematic theology, or philosophy of religion, adopts an approach from the universal to the special. Seventh, thanks to their fundamentally different theological standpoints and approaches, Barth and Tillich have very different attitudes toward the religious socialist movement. For Tillich, the religious socialist movement is a decision in principle. For Barth, the religious socialist movement is no more than “a kind of political decision in practice”. The reason is that, in Barth’s perspective, his confession in Christian faith is exclusive, while his affiliation with the German Social Democratic Party does not imply his “confession of the socialist ideal and world view”.72This again shows that Tillich’s account, namely, thatthe religious socialist movement isa or the decisive source of Barth’s theological thought, is a misunderstanding. Eighth, as with Tillich’s (mis-)critique of Friedrich Schelling, his (mis-) critique of Barth reflects precisely his own theological character and power. It is out of such philosophical and theological (mis-)reading that Tillich’s theology embarked on its own unique and open way of development, while he was gradually growing into one of the greatest theologians and philosophers of religion in the 20th century, by building a remarkable theological bridge between history and revelation, religion and culture, that cannot be ignored.

Notes 1 This article is revised based on the English translation of Chen Lilin from the original Chinese version (Universality and Specialty: Theological Differences between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth based on Their Controversy in 1923, in: Logos & Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology, No. 43, Autumn 2015, pp. 151– 176). This translation and revision are supported by Tsinghua University Humanities Foundation Development Program and Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program (Project No.:2022THZWJC04).] 2 Eberhard Busch, Karl Barths Lebenslauf nach seiner Briefen und autobiographischen Texten (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1986), pp. 160, 161. Forrelatedstudies, See Hans-Anton Drewes, “Die Auseinandersetzung mit Adolf von Harnack”, in: Karl Barth in Deutschland (1921–1935): Aufbruch – Klärung – Widerstand (Michael Beintker, Christian Link, und Michael Trowitzsch [Hgg.], Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2005), pp. 189–204; Peter Henke, “Erwählung und Entwicklung: Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Adolf von Harnack und Karl Barth”, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 18 (1976), pp. 194–208; George Hunsinger, “The Harnack/Barth Correspondence: A Paraphase with Comments”, in: George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in theTheologyof Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 319–337; H. Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology: An Analysis ofthe Barth-Harnack Correspondenceof 1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 3 Forinstance, forHarnack’scriticismSee Karl Barth & Eduard Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2: 1921–1930 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag), p. 135; John Clayton, “Dialektik und Apologetik in der theologischen Entwicklung Tillichs”, in: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 75 (1978), p. 215; and from Karl Holl, in Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 196. Many years later, Tillich was often classified as a “Neo-Orthodox” or “Barthian” in the United States. See

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  167 Paul Tillich, “Auf der Grenze”, in: Begegnungen: Paul Tillich über sich selbst und andere (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1971), p. 33; Walter Horton, “Tillich’sRole in Contemporary Theology”, in: Charles Kegley et al (eds.), The Theologyof Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 27. In an early article in 1922, Tillich stated that he was in a “spiritual community” with Barth and Friedrich Gogarten. See Paul Tillich, “Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffes in der Religionsphilosophie”, in: Kant-Studien XXVII (1922), p. 447; Tillich, “Auf der Grenze”, p. 32; Clayton, “Dialektik und Apologetik in der theologischen Entwicklung Tillichs”, p. 215; John Clayton, “Paul Tillich: Ein ‘verjüngter Troeltsch’ oder noch ‘ein Apfel vom Baume Kierkegaards’ ”, in: Umstrittene Moderne: Die Zukunft der Neuzeit im Urteil der Epoche Ernst Troeltschs (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1987), pp. 261–263. By that time, Tillich and Barth may not have met each other. Barth also agreed with Tillich’s view, believing that they were in a kind of “underground working community” (Barth, Vorträge und kleinereArbeiten 1922–1925, pp. 359, 379). Barth not only read and appreciated the speech, but intended to help Tillich to publish a related book. See Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 65. 4 In the same year, Barth also had a debate with Friedrich Foerster. See Karl Barth & Martin Rade, Ein Briefwechsel (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1981), pp. 193, 194. The relatedtextiscollected in Karl Barth, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1990), pp. 180–201. 5 Relevant textswerethencollectedinto a varietyofdocumentsformanytimes, such as Paul Tillich, Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung: Schriften zur Theologie I (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1962), pp. 216–246；Jürgen Moltmann (ed.), Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie, Teil I (München: Kaiser, 1966), pp. 165–197；Karl Barth, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925, pp. 349–380. Forrelatedscholarship, See Kaith Chan, Tillich: Theology on the Edge (Hong Kong: Logos Book House, 2008), pp. 23–44; Yang Junjie, “Kairos and ‘Bewusstsein um Kairos’ in Paul Tillich: On theCritiqueof Karl Barth by Paul Tillich”, in: Logos and Pneuma: Chinese Journal ofTheology, 37 (2012), pp.141–157; Hermann Fischer, “Theologie des positive und kritischen Paradoxes: Paul Tillich und Karl Barth im Streit um die Wirklichkeit”, in: Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 01 (1989), pp. 195–212；Friedrich Hertel, “Karl Barth oder Paul Tillich: das ist die Frage!”, in Deutsches Pfarrerblatt 87 (1987), pp. 95–99; Robert P. Scharlemann, “The Noto Nothing and the Nothing toKnow: Barth and Tillich and thePossibilityofTheological Science”, in: Journal ofthe American Academy of Religion LV/1, pp. 57–72；Werner Schüßler, “Paul Tillich und Karl Barth. Ihre erste Begegnung in den zwanziger Jahren”, in: Werner Schüßler, “Was uns unbedingt angeht”, Studien zur Theologie und Philosophie Paul Tillichs (Münster: LIT, 1999), pp. 119–130. 6 Besides Rudolf Bultmann and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Tillich should have been the third contemporary theologian whom Barth appreciated the most. See Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann: Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen/ Christus und Adam nach Röm 5: Zwei theologische Studien (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1964), p. 6; Karl Barth & Rudolf Bultmann, Briefwechsel 1922–1966 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1971), p. 206; Karl Barth, “HowMyMindHasChanged”, in Karl Barth, Der Götze wakelt: Zeitkritische Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe von 1930 bis 1960 (Waltrop: Spenner, 1993), p. 208. As Eberhard Busch (Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth: Tagebuch 1965–1968, [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht, 2011], p. 20) has correctly pointed out, Tillich is the theologian who has proposed a program against Barth, rather than Bultmann and Bonhoeffer, as one might think. 7 This page number and other page numbers in the main text and footnotes, which are not explicitly attributed, are from Karl Barth, Vorträge und kleinereArbeiten 1922–1925, pp. 349–380.

168  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) 8 Werner Schüßler (“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, pp. 119, 120) excerpted the full text of Tillich’s short review of Barth’s second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans. This excerpt was published in the Berlin local newspaper Vossische Zeitung on 29 October 1922. Tillich observed that Barth’s work is “the most original and religiously most significant contribution” in the field of New Testament exegesis for a long time, and interpreted Barth’s theology as “a theology of absolute paradox”. This theology emphasizes “the impossible possibility” and “the complete paradox”, and therefore deserves the “most urgent” recommendation to every pastor. The religious socialist movement is the source of ideas for Barth’s theology. As a result of this movement, Barth is inwardly liberated from the “idol” of “religion” and realized “the greatness of God”. Barth mentioned this review on 2 April 1922. See Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 65. For Tillich’s similar comments, See Paul Tillich, Die religiöse Deutung der Gegenwart: Schriften zur Zeitkritik (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1968), p. 92. 9 Busch, Karl Barths Lebenslauf, p. 150. 10 According to the memory of Harald Poelchau, one of Tillich’s students in Marburg in 1924, Tillich also criticized Barth for the specific reason that many students at the University of Marburg were attracted to Barth, besides Barth’s “biblicism” and the “non-dialectic of his dialectic”. See Paul Tillich, Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszüge, Berichte (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1980), p. 168. However, Poelchau’s statement is subject to doubt, since Tillich only taught briefly at Marburg in 1924, which was after the controversy. 11 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, pp. 64–67. 12 This is the first time that Barth mentioned the name of Tillich in his existing letters. According to Tillich’s letter to Alfred Fritz quoted below, this meeting was very likely the first time they saw each other. See Paul Tillich, Briefwechsel und Streitschriften: Theologische, philosophische und politische Stellungnahmen und Gespräche (Frankfurt: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1983), p. 81. Due to their similar experience of the religious socialist movement, and the small circle of German (systematic) theology, Barth and Tillich must have heard of each other before, but this did not mean that the two men had met. Eduard Thurneysen already mentioned Tillich in his letter on 12 July 1920: Karl Barth & Eduard Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 1: 1913–1921 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag), p.  415. Besides, Martin Rade mentioned Tillich’s name in one of his previous letters to Barth: Barth &Rade, Ein Briefwechsel, pp. 159, 160. However, according to Clayton (“Dialektik und Apologetik in der theologischen Entwicklung Tillichs”, p. 214), this was not the first time the two had met. 13 Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 354; Clayton, “Dialektik und Apologetik in der theologischen Entwicklung Tillichs”, p. 214. 14 In the meantime, Barth was an honorary professor without his own chair in Göttingen since 1921, and Tillich was still waiting for a chair as a Privatdozent in Berlin. Clayton, “Dialektik und Apologetik in der theologischen Entwicklung Tillichs”, p. 214; Tillich, Briefwechsel und Streitschriften, p. 81. 15 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 64. 16 Ibid. The term “anti-orthodox resentment” is probably not Barth’s original terminology, but from Hirsch or Tillich. Later on, Barth referred to this expression of resentment by Tillich at least twice and attributed it to Tillich’s father complex: Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 651; Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 222. 17 Here, Tillich maintained that Barth’s second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans is an “important symptom” of the beginning of the theonomous period. See Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 64；Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (trans. James Adams; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 38 & 61.

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  169 18 Tillich, Briefwechsel und Streitschriften, p. 80. 19 Ibid. This was the first talk that took place in the presence of Hirsch, and the first time that the criticism of Barth’s so-called “supernaturalism” was explicitly mentioned. Whether the term came from Hirsch or Tillich needs further investigation. 20 Ibid. 21 Hirsch was not present in this conversation. Two of Barth’s students were there for a short while and asked Tillich, with whom they were unacquainted, some questions. According to Schüßler (“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, p. 120), Barth took Tillich as a “stranger”, and made further discussion about it. 22 Tillich, Briefwechsel und Streitschriften, pp. 81, 82. In the first volume of his Systematic Theology, Tillich continued the line of thought in this talk, arguing that his theology is “apologetic theology”, while Barth’s theology is “kerygmatic theology”, which are close to fundamentalism and orthodoxy. See Paul Tillich, Systematische Theologie I/II (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987), pp. 11–15. See also Lai Pan-chiu, “Types and Development Directions of Chinese Theology”, in: Daniel Yeung (ed.), Preliminary Studies on Chinese Theology (Hong Kong: Institute of Chinese Christian Culture, 2000), pp. 3–21, especially pp. 7–8, 11. 23 Schüßler, “Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, p. 122. 24 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 68. 25 Barth not only agreed with but stressed Tillich’s expression of “confrontation” (Auseinandersetzung, 359). “Auseinandersetzung” is an ambiguous term. To emphasize the importance of the controversy for understanding their theologies, this paper translates the term as “confrontation”. Besides, this translation can also convey the impression both of the participants and observers of the confrontation. For example, Barth called it a “bullets exchange” (359), while Tillich put forward that Barth had “passion for fighting”, and Thurneysen described it as a “battle”: Friedrich GogartensBriefwechselmit Karl Barth, Eduard Thurneysen und Emil Brunner (Tübingen: Siebeck, 2009), p. 332. 26 Cf. Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 207. 27 The “order of creation” is a fundamental concept in Lutheran theological discussion about creation and related issues such as natural order. 28 This may be one of the most fundamental critiques by Tillich as a theologian against the tradition of German classical philosophy (especially the philosophy of identity of F. W. J. von Schelling, on whom Tillich mainly relied), and presumably one of the essential presuppositions for understanding Tillich’s Schelling-reception. 29 This should have been one of the essential statements for understanding the approach and development of Tillich’s theological thinking. Tillich emphasizes the continuity of creation and salvation, while recognizing also the discontinuity between both sides. For Barth, it has to be considered primarily the rupture and difference between God and the world, as well as salvation and creation; that is to say, salvation is more than creation, and the eschatological completion is more than salvation; and only then can one talk about the dialectical unity brought by God as the sovereign one. 30 What is stated here is the premise of Tillich’s cultural theology or philosophy of religion. 31 Tillich cites here an article by Friederich Gogarten. In terms of the points cited, Tillich’s citation is also a precise grasp and understanding of Barth’s theological standpoint. Barth, in a letter to Thurneysen on 12 November 1923, also argues that his response to Tillich revolves primarily around Christological questions. See Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 198. In addition, in his later life, Barth still talks about his fundamental differences with Tillich on Christology and revelation (See endnote 71 in this paper).

170  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) 32 Barth, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925, p. 375. 33 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 201. 34 Friedrich Gogartens Briefwechsel, pp. 220 & 222. 35 This also reflects Barth’s consistent attitude toward Tillich: very different in theology and yet close in personal relationship. See, for example, Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 222. 36 Another important reason is that Tillich’s thinking is too “technical”, which makes Barth feel “strange” to his world of thinking (359, 361). 37 It is now unknown whether this response came from Barth’s own initiative or an invitation from the editorial office. See Barth, Vorträge und kleinereArbeiten 1922–1925, p. 349. 38 Schüßler (“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, p. 124) argued that this difference in approach is more fundamental than the difference in understanding of the crisis. In a 1926 article, Barth stated that the Church should be defined theologically, and opposed explicitly Tillich’s historical-sociological understanding of the church. See Karl Barth, “Die Kirche und die Kultur”, in Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1925–1930 (Züricher: Theologischer Verlag, 1994), pp. 11 & 19; Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 409. 39 Nonetheless, Barth regarded Tillich as a theologian at this juncture (cf. 359, 374), instead of taking Tillich as a philosopher or philosopher of religion, as he did later. 40 Probably due to the above or similar opinions, Hirsch has criticized Barth in person for taking a “prophetic stance” in his response to Tillich. See Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 213. However, Barth does not do this out of pride or animosity, but due to the fundamental demand of his (biblical) hermeneutics: when interpreting a text, it is necessary to interpret not only the words of the text, but also the inner “word in words”, namely, the subject matter or Jesus Christ which the text points to. This is also the fundamental reason why he would discuss Christology subsequently. For Barth’s related hermeneutics, See Thomas Xutong Qu, Barth und Goethe. Die Goethe-Rezeption Karl Barths (Neukirchen-­V luyn: NeukirchenerVerlagshaus, 2014), pp. 195 & 241; Thomas Xutong Qu, “Specialty and Universality: A Preliminary Investigation into Karl Barth’s Hermeneutic Decisions in the Forewords to the First Three Versions of His Commentary on Romans”, in: Logos and Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology 42 (2015), pp. 69–83, especially pp. 76–80; Barth, Vorträge und kleinereArbeiten 1922–1925, pp. 77 & 362. 41 Barth viewed Tillich’s reading and understanding of him in this way until his later life. 42 Barth does not persist in the negative Trinitarian paradox. See his 1919 lecture “The Christian in Society (‘Der Christ in der Gesellschaft’)”. This classic masterpiece of the dialectical theology movement is not only in the transition stage between Barth’s first and second commentary on The Epistle to Romans, but also lays the dialectical and Trinitarian framework of Barth’s theological thinking and writing in the future. Fordetails, See Thomas Xutong Qu, “Karl Barths Tambacher Vortrag aus dem Blickwinkel seiner Goethe-rezeption”, in: Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 30 (2014), pp. 153–172. 43 Here is the key to understanding Barth’s thought. Like Tillich, Barth expresses firm opposition against the confusion between God and the world and man, and against idolatry, but Tillich emphasizes the unity between the two sides, and the phenomena with symbolic power that come from the unity, and the universality of the indicated. Barth stresses the difference between the two sides and the particularity of the indicated.

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  171 44 In Barth’s perspective, the concept of the “unconditional” is a “chilling monster” (365). According to Schüßler (“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, p. 126), Barth, the country pastor, could not understand Tillich’s “highly abstract” and “highly theoretical” philosophical thoughts. In 1962, Barth commented on Tillich’s efforts when talking about the solitude of theological existence and responded to Schüßler’s criticism which actually occurred later or may occur again. See Karl Barth, Einführung in die evangelischeTheologie (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 2021), pp. 181–183, esp. 183: that “the cheap, i.e., relatively easy actualized syntheses in some people of intellectual talent and desire” must be abandoned. 45 James Adams (“Tillich’s Concepts of The Protestant Era”, in Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 301) argues that Tillich’s concept of the unconditional is “a negative philosophical symbol” and not an attempt to replace the concept of God. According to Tillich, God is unconditional, but the unconditional is not God. 46 Here, Barth has not yet addressed his Christological understanding that the positive paradox is not some universal X with specific content to be filled, but God’s special revelation in concrete history: Jesus Christ. 47 For Barth’s critique of modern Cartesian-Kantian epistemological tradition, See Thomas Qu, “Much More Liberal Than Liberal Theology: An Investigation into Differences between Karl Barth’s Theology and Liberal Theology Concerning His Exploration of Theological Saclichkeit and Wissenschaftlichkeit, in: Journal of Comparative Scripture 7 (2016), pp.139–158. 48 Busch, Karl Barths Lebenslauf, p. 165. 49 In one of his autobiographical reflections, Tillich mentioned that Barth rightly saw the “determining factor in his theological thought” by fighting against the grand inquisitor. Meanwhile, he also thought that Barth must realize that this fight will never become unnecessary. Paul Tillich, “Autobiographical Reflections of Paul Tillich”, in: Kegley et al. (eds.) The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 8; Tillich, “Auf der Grenze”, p. 28; Horton, “Tillich’s Role in Contemporary Theology”, p. 28. 50 Because of his insistence upon Logos-Christology, Tillich maintains that it is “not the historical Jesus, but the biblical Christ-image, that lays the ground for Christian faith”. Tillich makes it clear that it is precisely because of Logos Christology as such that he appreciated Barth’s paradox and yet disagreed with Barth’s supernaturalism. See Tillich, “Auf der Grenze”, p. 33. 51 See A. Mollegen, “Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich”, in: Kegley et al. (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 241 & 244. 52 In about 1935, Tillich stated that “philosophical theology is and must be logos-­ theology”, and pointed out that Barth’s exclusive kerygmatic theology denies logos-doctrine. See Tillich, “Philosophy and Theology”, in: The Protestant Era, pp. 91 & 84. 53 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, pp. 209, 210; Barth, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925, p. 350. 54 Barth & Thurneysen, Briefwechsel, Band 2, p. 203. 55 Tillich, “Karl Barth”, in Begegnungen, 187–193. 56 Clayton, “Paul Tillich”, p. 271; Schüßler, “Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, in: Paul Tillich und Karl Barth, pp. 127–129. 57 Tillich, “Karl Barth”, p. 187. 58 As early as 1922, Tillich expressed his appreciation of Hirsch’s related ideas. See the first part of this paper. 59 In an article published in 1935 (“What is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?”, in: The Journal of Religion 15:2 [1935], pp. 127–145), Tillich clearly stated again that Barth is deeply influenced by the religious socialist movement, especially its idea of God’s sovereignty, that God is above the church and the world (pp.

172  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) 128–129, 135). However, Tillich’s statement is not accurate. The reverence and emphasis on God’s divinity and sovereignty is the concern in Barth’s theological thinking throughout his life, not a short-term result of the influence of the religious socialist movement. To put it more exactly, the religious socialist movement reinforces and promotes this reverence and emphasis in Barth. In fact, as early as 1910, Barth had emphasized the divinity of God. See Qu, Barth und Goethe, pp. 87,241, &242. 60 In early 1935, Tillich made it clear in an open letter that he had persuaded liberal theologians in Chicago that he belongs to “neither Orthodox nor Barth”: Tillich, Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten, p. 227. 61 Tillich, “What is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?”, p.127. Since this and the related arguments have been expressed in the 1922 conversations, the 1923 controversy, and the 1926 book review, they will not be repeated here. It is worth mentioning that Tillich seemingly unknowingly followed Barth’s previous statement twice, pointing out that his relevant critique came from the previous members of the “underground” working community, not from the original group in opposition (ibid., p. 136; for Barth’s related statement, See p. 359). In addition, in 1948, Tillich articulated in the author’s introduction to The Protestant Era that his method of correlation is genuinely dialectical, and that it is aimed at “the supernaturalism of later Barthianism as well as any other type of orthodoxy and fundamentalism” (Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. XXII & XXIV). 62 Paul Tillich, “Ein Wendepunkt in Karl Barths Denken: Zu seinem Buch “Die Kirche und die politische Frage von heute” (Zollikon: Evangelische Buchhandlung, 2. Aufl., 1938) (1940)”, in: Begegnungen: Paul Tillich über sich selbst und andere, pp. 324–326. 63 It is interesting that Tillich’s term for critique this time is no longer “supernaturalism”. It is probable that Tillich had noticed the Kantian origin in Barth’s thought at this juncture. 64 Tillich’s understanding and interpretation as such will not only meet opposition from Barth himself, but also encounter objection from other researchers. When talking about religious socialism, Barth once said that Tillich is more attached to the ideas pursued by religious socialism, while he is more interested in practical questions, for instance, the question of how workers could protect themselves (Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 539). 65 Due to the limitations of an article’s length, it is impossible for us to reconstruct and analyze more relevant literature. However, the following summary of this article will not be affected unduly. 66 In order to understand Tillich’s method of correlation, Barth held a seminar in the winter semester of 1958–1959 to study the first volume of Tillich’s Systematic Theology with his students. See Karl Barth, Gespräche 1959–1962 (Eberhard Busch [Hg.], Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1995), p. 325; Busch, Karl Barths Lebenslauf, p. 454. 67 Schüßler (“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth”, pp. 129, 130) argues that the distinction between the types of Tillich’s and Barth’s respective systems of thought is not due to the former’s emphasis on philosophy and the latter’s stress on theology. The distinction between them is the difference within theology. Barth follows the Reformed tradition, emphasizing God’s transcendence over the world, and even emphasizing that God is “the wholly other” (in correspondence with the Extra Calvinisticum in the doctrine of Eucharist), while Tillich is following the Lutheran tradition, stressing that God is both transcendent and immanent, that God is on the one side “the wholly other” in the sense of the unconditional, and on the other is also “totally in himself” which concerns me unconditionally (in comparison with the Intra Lutheranum in the Eucharist). Schüßler may have been inspired by Tillich (“Auf der Grenze”, pp. 45, 46) who maintains that, as

Theological Controversy between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth  173 a branch of the religious socialist movement, Barth’s theological thought has a Calvinistic element, to simply grasp God’s Kingdom from beyond, but the Lutheran element is actually decisive to Barth’s theology. 68 Tillich’s metaphysical standpoint as such, which emphasizes the original unity, is probably the reason why many theologians with a certain Catholic tendency, such as Christian Danz and Schüßler, admire Tillich and feel distance from Barth. In addition, Tillich’s metaphysical stance is related to his early reception and interpretation of Schelling. However, the essential difference between Tillich’s theology and Schelling’s philosophy is that God and man, along with their fundamental difference, are indeed in an original unity, but not in an absolute identification. 69 Qu, Barth und Goethe, pp. 189–194, 246. 70 Theodor Siegfried (“The Significance of Paul Tillich’s Theology from the German Situation”, in Kegley et al (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 68–87, 73) argues that Barth and Tillich parting ways is not due to their philosophical education, but their fundamental religious decision. That is to say, Barth’s theology puts the whole of reality into the bracket of position and negation, understanding and accepting the world with a distance from God. Tillich’s theology is a sort of “realism of faith” that emphasizes the transcendental meaning of all cultural forms. 71 In December 1963, Barth and Tillich met for the last time in Basel. At this meeting, Barth admonished Tillich for “converting properly”, but it is apparent that Tillich cared little for the admonition. See Busch, Karl BarthsLebenslauf, pp. 487 & 494. Tillich died in Chicago on 22 October 1965. According to the related recollection of Busch (Mein Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 222), Barth used to explain his difference from Tillich by taking this meeting as an example: Tillich told Barth that he used to visit a house in Nazareth, Palestine. This house is taken as the place where the “reception of the Holy Spirit” event took place, and therefore a monument was erected: “Here the Word became flesh”. Tillich told Barth that this is not good, as it is an idolization of God. Barth responded: Here? For sure, whether or not the event happened here it can surely be understood in a humorous way. However, as to the theological subject matter, “here” is not a problem. Barth then explained to Busch his concern for Tillich who had been trying to replace “here” with “always and everywhere”, which is the fundamental mistake that Tillich has made. 72 See thecorrespondencebetween Tillich and Barth in 1933: Tillich, Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten, pp. 192–195; Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth, p. 539.

References Barth, Karl & Rade, Martin, Ein Briefwechsel (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn,1981). Barth, Karl, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag,1990). Barth, Karl & Thurneysen, Eduard, Briefwechsel, Band 1: 1913–1921 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag). Barth, Karl, Gespräche 1959–1962 (Eberhard Busch [Hg.], Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1995). Barth, Karl, Einführung in die evangelische Theologie (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag,2021). Busch, Eberhard, Karl Barths Lebenslauf nach seinen Briefen und autobiographischen Texten (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1986). Drewes, Hans-Anton “Die Auseinandersetzung mit Adolf von Harnack”, in: Karl Barth in Deutschland (1921–1935): Aufbruch – Klärung – Widerstand (Michael

174  Thomas Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) Beintker, Christian Linkund Michael Trowitzsch [Hgg.], Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2005), pp. 189–204. Friedrich, Hertel,“Karl Barth oder Paul Tillich: das ist die Frage!”, in Deutsches Pfarrerblatt 87 (1987), pp. 95–99. Henke, Peter, “Erwählung und Entwicklung: Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Adolf von Harnack und Karl Barth”, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 18 (1976), pp. 194–208. Hermann, Fischer,“Theologie des positive und kritischen Paradoxes: Paul Tillich und Karl Barth im Streit um die Wirklichkeit”, in: Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 01 (1989), pp. 195–212. Hunsinger, George, “The Harnack/Barth Correspondence: A Paraphrase with Comments”, in: George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans,2000), pp. 319–337. Moltmann, Jürgen (ed.), Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie, Teil I (München: Kaiser,1966). Qu, ThomasXutong, Barth und Goethe. Die Goethe-Rezeption Karl Barths (Neukirchen-­V luyn: Neukirchener Verlagshaus,2014). Qu, ThomasXutong, “Karl Barths Tambacher Vortrag aus dem Blickwinkel seiner Goethe-rezeption”, in: Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 30 (2014), pp. 153–172. Robert, P. Scharlemann, “The No to Nothing and the Nothing to Know: Barth and Tillich and the Possibility of Theological Science”, in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion LV/1, pp. 57–72. Rumscheidt, H. Martin, Revelation and Theology: An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack Correspondence of 1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1972). Tillich, Paul, The Protestant Era (trans. James Adams; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948). Tillich, Paul, Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung: Schriften zur Theologie I (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk,1962). Tillich, Paul, Die religiöse Deutung der Gegenwart: Schriften zur Zeitkritik (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk,1968). Tillich, Paul, Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszüge, Berichte (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk,1980). Tillich, Paul, “Ein Wendepunkt in Karl Barths Denken. Zu seinem Buch, Die Kirche und die politische Frage von heute” (Zollikon: Evangelische Buchhandlung, 2. Aufl., 1938) (1940)”, in: Begegnungen: Paul Tillich über sich selbst und andere, pp. 324–326. Tillich, Paul, Systematische Theologie I/II (Berlin: de Gruyter,1987). Werner, Schüßler,“Paul Tillich und Karl Barth. Ihre erste Begegnung in den zwanziger Jahren”, in Werner Schüßler, “Was uns unbedingt angeht”, in: Studien zur Theologie und Philosophie Paul Tillichs (Münster: LIT,1999), pp. 119–130.

8 Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue An Emergentist Perspective Wai-han, Kung 1 Introduction The concept of “person” plays a significant role in the inter-disciplinary dialogue between religion and science. Under the religiously diverse Asian context as well as the global phenomenon of religious pluralism, the dialogue between religion and science also involves interreligious exchanges.1 The present study is a preliminary attempt to engage Tillich’s theology in the contemporary science-religion dialogue from the perspective of Sino-Christian theology. According to Philip Clayton, a renowned scholar in science-religion dialogue, contemporary advances in science, especially in biology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology, point to the concept of emergence and advocate a multidimensional understanding of person. As Clayton puts: “we need multiple layers of explanatory accounts because human person is a physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality, and because these aspects of its reality, though interdependent, are not mutually reducible.”2 In Christian theology, such non-reductive, non-dualist, multi-layered, and relational approach to human person was articulated by Paul Tillich, particularly in Systematic Theology Vol.3 such an approach to human personhood that emphasizes the importance of context and relationships. This approach differs from reductive or dualist approaches that reduce human beings to mere physical or spiritual entities. This understanding of person is also compatible with the articulations of contemporary Confucian scholars. Confucianism emphasizes relationships as fundamental to human flourishing, which aligns with Tillich’s relational approach. However, Confucianism also emphasizes social roles and duties as essential components of personhood. The emergentist perspective is introduced as a way to reconcile these different perspectives on personhood. Emergence advocates for a multidimensional understanding of person that recognizes both individuality and relationality. A fruitful trilogue between Christianity, Confucianism, and science may be established by introducing the emergent-multidimensional understanding of person.3 This approach contextualizes Christian theology and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-9

176  Wai-han, Kung Confucianism in the contemporary understanding of evolution and personhood. This perspective has implications not only for comparative studies between Christianity and Confucianism but also for the humanities in general. This study will first introduce the basic concept of emergence and the emergentist-relational understanding of person. Then, it will explore the relevance of Tillich’s theology of life to the concept of emergence by focusing on the concept of multidimensional unity and his view on person as relational-embodied spirit. In the third part, Confucian understanding of person will be presented. Based on these explorations, it will sketch a multidimensional understanding of person with special references to the significance of relationality to human morality. This is a commitment to pursuing the dialogue between science and religion in a global, religiously pluralistic, and interfaith context of Sino-Christian theology.

2  Theory of Emergence Theory: The Basics Theory of Emergence is a metaphysical principle inspired by sciences about the integrative levels and the complex systems of the natural world. It raises discussions in various scientific disciplines, such as molecular biology, evolution biology, neuroscience, etc. since the 19th century. The idea of “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” is commonly shared by different undertakings of emergentist theory. Concerning the ontology of life, some prefer a physicalist position: all things that exist are physical entities that can be explained in terms of the laws, particles, and energies of physics. For instance, Francis Crick, one of the founders of molecular biology, suggests that the ultimate goal of the contemporary biology is to explain all of biology in terms of physics and chemistry by claiming chemistry is “nothing-but” physics, the biochemistry of cells is “nothing-but” chemistry, the biology of organisms is “nothing-but” biochemistry of cells, and so on.4 Others prefer a dualist position: living beings consist both of physical components and of a non-physical soul, a spirit, or a life force, etc. For instance, Henri Bergson, a French philosopher, suggests that there is an animating energy called élan vital (vital force/ impulse) shared by all living things and driven the orthogenesis in Darwin’s theory of evolution.5 Emergentism offers a third way to overcome the ­physicalism-dualism. On the one hand, emergentism is a form of physicalism which agree all concrete entities, including humans, are constituted only of fundamental physical entities of matter/energy. On the other hand, emergentism rejects the reductionist flamework of physicalism and maintains a holistic approach to account for the novel and unpredictable occurrences in nature without any additional non-physical entities. The term “emergence” came from the Latin word emergere, which means “bring to light.” The first technical use of this term can be traced back to the

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   177 G. H. Lewes’s Problems of Life and Mind (1875). Lewes uses the term “emergents” in contrast to the idea of “resultants.” According to Lewes, “resultants” is either the sum or the difference of the co-operant forces, but “emergents” are co-operation of things of unlike kinds for it is incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.6 For example, the novel properties of water are emergents of a special arrangement of two hydrogen molecules and one oxygen molecule. Lewes’s understanding on emergent orientates some basic characteristics, such as irreducibility and novelty of the emergents that are definitive in the later development of the concept.7 According to Clayton, the precursors to the concept of emergence can be traced back to Aristotle. In Aristotelian metaphysics, the distinction between dynamis (potentiality) and energeia (actuality) reveals the principle of entelechy, an internal principle of growth/perfection within organisms. Entelechy refers to the “final causes” that direct that organism toward the final telos or “perfection.” Meanwhile, it is also the “formal causes” that operate internally to the organism that accountable for the qualities or forms that would later emerge. As Clayton notes, “the one natural world exhibits different kinds of properties at different levels, and different kinds of causation are at work at these various levels.”8 Through an overview on different forms of theory of emergence, emergentism is recognized as a family of resemblance. With reference to the works of Arthur Peacocke (1924–2006) and Philip Clayton, four general characters are summarized for this family, they are: (1) Hierarchical complexity; (2) Irreducibility; (3) Novelty; and (4) Whole-part Influence.9 1 Hierarchical complexity According to Peacocke, science gives us a picture of the world as consisting of a complex hierarchies—“a series of levels of organization and matter in which each successive member of the series is a whole constituted of parts preceding it in the series.”10 The sequence starting from atom, molecule, macromolecule, subcellular organelle, cell, multicellular functioning organ, whole living organism, population of organisms, and ecosystem represents an increase in the levels of complexity found in the living world. The whole constituted of parts which themselves are, at the lowest level, made up of the basic units of the physical world.11 Peacocke states that this series can be understood as a succession of a “whole” constituted of “parts” preceding it, for example, “molecule” is a “whole” that constituted of “atom” as its “part.”12 The wholes are constituted by parts, and they are dynamically and spatially interrelated. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen calls this understanding of reality as “multidimensional monism,” because it affirms that natural realities, although are basically physical, new properties and realities with distinctive internal interrelationships between their components, can emerge from the physical reality.13

178  Wai-han, Kung 2 Irreducibility Emergent properties as higher-level phenomena are irreducible to the lower-level phenomena in the sense that the predicates, concepts, and laws of the theories applied to the higher level cannot be explained in terms of the lower levels. That means the methods and explanations used to investigate each level in the hierarchy of complexity are specific to and distinctive of those various levels.14 Non-reducibility in Peacocke’s emergence theory is an epistemological claim rather than an ontological claim. In short, ontologically, the higher-level phenomena are still constituted by physical entities. Yet, epistemologically, laws and the properties operated in the new emerged entities are not reducible to physical explanation. 3 Novelty Novelty refers to the idea that our nature is opened to the possibility of the emergence of new properties, causalities, and relations. Nature is in the process of continuously becoming. The idea of hierarchical complexity implies a temporal ontology. The process of hierarchical structuring takes place over time, i.e., cosmic, and biological evolution move from the simple to the more complex, and new structures and entities emerge through the process.15 “Novel” emergent novelty depicts the “self-transcending” property of emergence, as new emerged properties, structures, and organizational patterns are genuinely distinctive to the lower levels, in other words, transcend their substrate roots. 4 Whole-Part Influence The concepts of “causality” and “causation” must be reformulated as causality cannot be depicted simply by regular chain of events in time in an irreducible hierarchical complex system. Since higher-order emergent phenomena/properties/patterns are dependent on lower-order ones, thus their probability of formation is substantially lower.16 Peacocke states that the general movement of a whole system caused by its constituent units is described as “bottom-up” causation. Meanwhile, the influence of the system-as-a-whole can act as a constraint on the behaviour of its constituent units. Other than the linear chains of causality from lower-to-higher-level, a kind of whole–part, higher-to-lower-level relationship is needed in the complex systems. Such a whole-part relationship is better to be regarded as “determinative influences” rather than “causation.”17 Hence Peacocke inclines to use the term “whole– part influence” to denote the net effect a system-as-a-whole acts as a determining factor on what happens to its constituent parts. According to Peacocke, the concept of emergence can be summarized as follow: “the interpretation to of naturally occurring, hierarchical, complex systems constituted of parts which themselves are, at the lowest level, made up of the basic units of the physical world.”18 New features and properties at higher levels emerge from the level of organization of the matter which

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   179 constitutes it and they are not fully explicable in terms of and out of which it has evolved.19 Also, these newly emerged levels are regarded as having determinative efficacy in terms of whole–part influence.20

3  Emergentist-relational Understanding of Person Human brain/mind is the product of biological evolution; On one hand, the physical and chemical properties of the neuro-physiological contents of humans are continuous with other animals. On the other hand, the interconnectedness of human societal processes is discontinuous with those of the social behaviour of animals. Instead of addressing the debates over the mind-body problem concerning emergentism, this section will discuss how the concept of person is articulated under the emergentist framework. The idea of whole-part influence adequately captures the multiple forms of relationality that are essential for the becoming of organisms in the evolutionary process. The emergence of an organism is a continuous process comprised of multiple internal and external relations and the changes in these relations. Russell and Suchocki further argue that this is not a oneway process in which organisms emerge from multiplicity to form unity. Rather, multiplicity and unity are continuously negotiated realities within the complex relationality of the self.21 According to Stuart Kauffman, from an evolutionary point of view, each organism is “out to make a living” in its environment.22 The niche of an organism is the range of conditions in which it can live and reproduce, it is the sum of the selection pressures on a population.23 An environment is a multidimensional condition including both the surroundings abiotic and biotic resources required by a species. The ecological niche and the environment of an organism mutually co-define one another. For example, in environment A, feature X is not of selective significance, but in an environment B, X becomes significant for selection. The different shapes of bird beaks are textbook examples of how genetics and the environmental factors intertwined to result in certain kind of ecological adaptation.24 The emergence of person is regarded as a novel development in the evolutionary process. As with other organisms, human persons are emergent realities that are constituted by their body parts and their relationships with their environment. From a reductionist point of view, mental properties are merely epiphenomenal of an individual’s neuro-activities, “just a bundle of neurones” as Francis Crick suggested.25 In the same vein, social and economic phenomena are the results of collective individual psychology. However, these interlocking relationships in hierarchical complexity of natural system make it more difficult for the reductionists to formulate explanations across multiple levels. For instance, it is hard to map a person’s intentions with any specific brain states. Clayton suggests person-as-a-whole is an integrated state of the affective, intellectual, and social dimensions established by one’s relations with the physical body,

180  Wai-han, Kung other persons, and his/her overall environmental, social, cultural, historical, and religious context.26 Similarly, Peacocke describes “person” as “human-brain-in-the-human-body-in-social-relations.”27 Embodiedness of consciousness is an indispensable precondition for qualities of person such as perception, action, moral agency, community, and freedom.28 Such “ecosystemic relationship” in emergentism is an articulation of ontological interconnectedness.

4  Tillich’s Theology of Life and Emergentism This section examines Tillich’s theology of life regarding the idea of gestalt and the multidimensional unity of life and how they relate to the idea of emergence in the contemporary science-religion dialogue. For Tillich, the dialogue between science and theology concerning life is not only about the theory of evolution and human uniqueness, but also about the transition from the inorganic to the organic, i.e., the question of “what is the difference between living organisms and non-living objects?” Tillich’s response to this question can be found in his early articulation of biology as a gestalt science in The System of Sciences (1923) and the idea of “multidimensional unity of life” in Systematic Theology Vol. 3 (1963). 4.1  Tillich’s Understanding on Gestalt The idea of gestalt in Tillich’s understanding of biology and psychology came from the movement of gestalt psychology. Gestalt movement from 1910s to 1920s was a new approach against reductionist approaches to psychology, such as structuralism and behaviourism. The closest English translations for the German term Gestalt are “configuration” and “pattern.”29 Gestaltism is a form of psychological holism which claims that humans’ psychology should be perceived as irreducible wholes, a gestalt. Structuralism and behaviourism focus on disintegrating mental thoughts and processes into small parts, whereas Gestalt psychology focuses on mental processes and thoughts-as-a-whole. Tillich and Max Wertheimer, one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, were close acquaintances at the University of Frankfurt in early 1920s, they often stayed up very late discussing philosophy and psychology.30 It is very possible that Tillich was well informed by Wertheimer, particularly on biology and psychology. The concept of gestalt is indispensable in the discussion of Tillich’s theology of life. Yet, many scholars ignored or disregarded this concept as it is mainly mentioned in The System of Sciences, which was considered as “old and outdated” according to Paul Wiebe.31 Only Keith Ka-fu Chan notices the contribution of the concept of gestalt to Tillich’s understanding of the theology of life.32 Tillich argues that while it is possible to grasp the inorganic aspect of life by objectifying the quantitative elements of the organic, it is impossible to grasp the essence of life, i.e., how to distinguish a stone from

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   181 a plant. For Tillich, the conflict between dualism/vitalism and mechanism/ physicalism in philosophy of life is the conflict between the reductionist and the gestalt method. Scientists who employ methodological and epistemological reductionist concepts in their research may carry that reductionist attitude into a metaphysical disposition. Tillich argues that the organic cannot be comprehended merely in terms of its quantifiable inorganic components, he suggests, “as far as the biological problem is concerned, one simply cannot make ‘life,’ in the biological sense, a pure object of external perception, as one can in physical things.”33 The attitude of reducing all beings to the physical level is scientifically obsolete. In The Religious Situation (1932), Tillich mentions Bergson when articulating the idea of vitalism. He appreciates Bergson for restoring the idea of life as a primal presupposition of physical and chemical processes. However, Tillich still finds the physical and chemical analysis important, as the vital principle is not useful for the explanation of details.34 Mechanists use the quantitative-causal method, and vitalists appeal to the teleological relation of all organs and functions to the unity of life. Tillich contends that vitalism is justified only on the basis that it rejects the expression of existential life as merely mechanistic laws and sequences (reductionism), yet it introduces a new, mystical principle of causality (dualism).35 The debate between vitalism and mechanism, for Tillich, was caused by a misunderstood dichotomy of teleology and causality. Almost all biological propositions express a teleological relation of all organisms and functions to the unity of life, whether direct or indirect.36 Tillich believes that the gestalt method provides a new perspective to investigate living organisms other than the predominance of the mathematical natural sciences and the physical method of laws.37 4.2  Tillich’s Understanding on the Multidimensional Unity of Life In 1963, Tillich had a meeting with Michael Polanyi on Christian faith and the relation of science and religion in Berkeley. Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) is a physical chemist and philosopher who makes a profound contribution to both philosophy of science and social science. After the meeting, Polanyi and Tillich continued their discussion in letters. In one of the letters, Tillich wrote: The fundamental vision of a hierarchy of detachment and involvement came to me when I wrote in beginning of the 20s my “System of Sciences”. Lately I have carried it through rather fully, in the not yet published manuscript of the third volume of my Systematic Theology. One year ago, when I first read Teilhard de Chardin, I was happily surprised by the discovery how near my own philosophy of life is to his. You are right that I had to solve first of all the problem of mutual interferences of theology and science.38

182  Wai-han, Kung It clearly shows that the philosophy of life is a problem that Tillich had been thinking of from his early work, The System of Sciences (1923) and carries through his Systematic Theology Vol. 3 (1963). Tillich does not restrict the use of the word “life” to the realm of living beings, rather, he regards life as the “actuality of being.”39 Life is understood as the actualization of the potentiality of a particular being in time and space. The concept of life is applied to humans, birds, trees, or even rocks and stars, as long as it is subjected to the structures of existence, such as growth, distortion, and death, it is included in such ontological concept of life.40 Tillich’s concept of life marks out a distinctive ontological standpoint in which the inorganic realm is conceived as an ontologically primary dimension of life and constitutive for organic, spirit, and history dimensions. Both emergentists and Tillich borrow Aristotle’s “dynamis-energeia” distinction to articulate the actualization of potentialities of nature.41 Tillich suggests that all dimensions are potentially present in all life forms, even the inorganic entities, but some dimensions were actualized, and some are latent.42 Tillich clearly states that different dimensions are actualized in sequential order, from inorganic to organic, to spirit, and history dimension. This expresses the concept of embodiment of mind because without the inorganic and organic dimensions, the dimension of spirit would remain potential; its actual appearance was dependent on the conditions described by biology and biochemistry.43 Tillich notices that both his own theology and biology press in the direction of a monistic understanding regarding the mind-body problem. Such monistic understating of inorganic-organic relation, mind-body relation, and the interconnectedness of all dimensions signifies the multi-dimensional unity of life.44 Through analysing the idea of gestalt and the concept of multidimensional unity of life, it is reasonable to suggest that Tillich’s theology of life shares similar characteristics of emergentism. Both of them are non-reductionist, non-dualist, and monistic approach to nature and both agree that nature undergoes a continuous self-actualization process that new properties or dimensions will emerge from the foundational constituents. However, the difference between the use of the term “hierarchy of levels” in emergentism and “dimensions” in Tillich’s theology of life needs to be addressed. Tillich clearly expresses the inadequacy of “hierarchy of levels” as the metaphor for the “uniting principles” for the diversity of beings and must be excluded from any description of life processes.45 According to Tillich, a “hierarchy of levels/layers/stratum” is the most frequently used metaphor for the “uniting principles” for the diversity of beings.46 In a hierarchy of levels, different beings are classified and placed in different levels like a pyramid, based on their ontological qualities, such as higher degree of universality, richer development of potentiality, the power of being, grade of value, etc. It is a metaphor that emphasizes a complete separation between levels. Separation between inorganic and organic levels brings to the problem of whether biological processes can be completely reduced to

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   183 and explained by physics and mathematics (i.e., mechanism/physicalism) or a teleological principle must be used to explain the inner-directedness of organic growth (i.e., vitalism).47 There is no positive inter-relation between levels, they can only remain “interference, either by control or revolt”48 which will cause conflict, dominance, and destruction.49 As mentioned previously, the development of emergentism was exactly in the midst of the debate between mechanical-reductionism and dualistic-­ vitalism. It is “a third way” to the ontology of life that avoids reductionism and dualism at the same time. “Non-reducibility” is one of the definite characters that share among all emergentists—emergentism and reductionism are, by definition, exclusive. The metaphor of “level” is used to describe difference in sequence within the whole system regarding their complexity. In view of this kind of whole-part relation, there is no implication conflict, dominance, and disturbance between different levels within the complex hierarchical system.50 Since the qualified use of “levels” in the emergent theory does not imply reductionism and dualism. Thus, the difference in the use of metaphors between “level” and “dimensions” does not bring any essential conflict to the discussion. Also, Tillich emphasizes that there is no interference between dimensions, however, emergentism emphasizes on the interaction between levels, and stresses on the idea of whole-part constraint or downward causation. The reason for Tillich to reject interference between dimensions is that interference must bring conflict, dominance, and destruction.51 However, this understanding is only applicable to a reductionist framework, and not applicable to emergentism. The interactions between different dimensions are inevitable as they are interdependent under the emergentist framework; yet each dimension still possesses their own power of being. 4.3  Tillich on Evolution Tillich’s reception of the evolutionary view of life is still an inconclusive debate. There has been a significant shift in Tillich’s perspective on the theory of evolution. In The System of Sciences, 1923, Tillich totally rejected the Darwinian evolutionary theory. Tillich regards theory of evolution is a myth that cannot be proved or disproved using scientific methods.52 Forty years later, in Systematic Theology Vol. 3, Tillich is convinced by Teilhard de Chardin’s formulation of evolutionary processes in nature, which is remarkably similar to his own theology of life.53 In The System of Sciences, Tillich believes that the idea of evolution is about the origin of life from the inorganic to the evolution of species by pure mechanical forces, which is unwarranted under the gestalt concept.54 In Systematic Theology Vol. 3, the process of self-integration of life rejects biological models that subject to quantitative-calculating methods and stimulus-response discourse.55 I would contend that Tillich did not reject evolutionary ideas per such, but rather the disintegrating interpretation of Darwinian theory under the

184  Wai-han, Kung influence of reductionist-mechanistic scientism (in Tillich’s words: the hidden theology of scientists).56 Referring to Tillich’s own words, religion belongs to the dimension of ultimate concern about the meaning of existence, whereas science is the dimension of methodological cognition of finite reality.57 The creative partnership and collaboration between religion and science is only possible if such confusion is cleared out. The scientific theory of evolution and the metaphysical interpretations of scientific research are two different sorts of explanations that should be assessed separately. Tillich’s own theology of life, as Keith Chan correctly points out, captures a holistic view in biology and necessitates a self-originating, self-creative, and self-transcending understanding of nature.58 Thus, the question is not whether Tillich’s theology is compatible with or adequate to the theory of evolution, but rather which metaphysical interpretation of evolution can provide insights for meaningful cooperation between Tillich’s theology and science. I contend that “emergent evolution,” a philosophical interpretation of evolution from an emergentist viewpoint satisfies this criterion. The term “emergent evolution” was first articulated by C. Lloyd Morgan(1852–1936) in 1922s Gifford Lectures.59 Emergent evolution combines three separate but related claims: (1) evolution is a universal process of change, one that is productive of qualitative novelties; (2) qualitative novelty is the emergence in a system of a property not possessed by any of its parts; and (3) reality can be analysed into levels, each consisting of systems characterized by significant emergent properties.60 Emergent evolution emphasizes the “process” of life from inorganic to organic, and at the same time allows multiple directions of actualization in different dimensions of life. However, emergent evolution does not suggest a progressive, linear, oneway process that points to the actualization of homo sapiens as the final product or the ultimate fulfilment of evolution. First, there is a trend in evolution toward increasing complexity, but this does not imply that humans or any other specific sort of existence emerged with a purpose. Second, complexity increase does not necessarily indicate advancement; throughout the course of evolution, traits and attributes might be lost.61 For instance, birds evolved the ability to fly; penguins, as birds subsequently lost such a feature. Evolution is not about an increase in complexity, but about the adaptation through natural selection that increases the chance of successful reproduction within a population in a particular environment. For penguins, being able to fly was not advantageous; instead, being fat was. Novelty rather than progression is the key to understand that idea of increased complexity. Progressionism is not essentially presumed by the concept of evolutionary change. Tillich rightly points out, “evolutionary process is more adequate to the symbol of creation then causal interferences of a highest being in the process of life. The view of man [sic] as creature and as that creature that is aware of its creatureliness was not changed out but deepened by the theory of evolution.”62 An emergentist-evolutionary understanding of life rejects

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   185 the progressive and anthropocentric implications of evolution that Tillich opposes. According to Paul H. Carr, Tillich’s concept of the dialectic of being and nonbeing is consonant with the fact that new existences and explosive deaths are inevitable in the course of evolutionary.63 The ambiguity of creation and destruction is fundamental in all life processes. The growth of living beings can be regarded as the suppression or consumption of other lives. Coincidentally, Tillich uses the phrase “life-and-death struggle” to describe the tendencies toward disintegration in the process of life.64 It is particularly Darwinian because On the Origin of Species (1859) contains the phrase “struggle for life” over 40 times. Tillich contends that there are mixture of slow transformations and sudden leaps in the evolutionary processes. If evolution proceeded only by leaps, one could identify the result of each leap. If evolution proceeded only by slow transformation, no radical change could be noticed at all. If evolution processes combine both the leap and the slow change, and therefore, although the results are distinguished, it cannot be localized as a distinct point in time or space.65 There are two major models to explain rates of speciation, namely, the gradual speciation model and the punctuated equilibrium model, both are depicted in Tillich’s understanding of the process of life. In the gradual speciation model, species diverge gradually over time in small steps. In the punctuated equilibrium model, a new species undergoes rapid change, followed by long periods with little evolutionary change. These two models are not mutually exclusive in the sense that they both occur during the long period of environmental change in the history of evolution.66 In addition, Tillich rejects the notion of “special creation in theistic evolution” in the contemporary discussion of religion and science.67 In general, the idea of special creation refers to the teleological direct interference of God in the process of evolution, for the special creation of life, the soul, or even homo sapiens at a precise moment within the process of evolution. The continuity of the process of actualization of dimensions rejects the doctrine that, at a precise moment of the evolutionary process, God especially adds an “immoral soul” to a human body.68 Not only is there no “immoral soul,” but there is also no “first cell” that requires a unique supernatural intervention to be understood.69 For Tillich, that is not only because this view is rejected by biological reason, but also because it is rejected by theological reason, as it attributes finite causality to the Ground of Being.70

5  Tillich’s Views on Human Person Human persons can never be understood exclusively in biological-­evolutionary terms or in social-relational terms. Inter-disciplinary study is crucial to any endeavour of understanding human person. The concept of emergence further elaborates Tillich’s multi-dimensional unity of life and established the relevance of Tillich’s theology to the contemporary science-religion

186  Wai-han, Kung dialogue. Since the concept of multidimensional unity of life refers to the interconnectedness of all the dimensions of life as a unified whole, any reductionistic view of human beings through any particular lens of biology, psychology, sociology, and so on is rejected. 5.1  Person as Embodied Spirit “Life and the spirit” is the main theme in Tillich Systematic Theology Vol. 3. Tillich defines “life,” as an ontological concept of the “actuality of being,” which is not exclusively attributed to “living beings.”71 Tillich reserved the term “spirit” (with a small “s”) to denote a constitutive, relative, and finite spirit, in comparison to the “Spirit” (capital “S”) of God as an absolute and infinite Spirit.72 Thus, Tillich’s philosophy of life is interchangeable with Tillich’s pneumatology—the spirit dimension of life. As Pannenberg comments, Tillich develops a conception of spirit within the broad horizon of an overall interpretation of life rather than identifying spirit exclusively with the subjective mind.73 The multidimensional understanding of life primary aim to expressing a non-reductionist and non-dualist approach to life. Spirit is a dimension of life, and beings in which this dimension is actualized can be called “beings with spirit” or “the bearers of spirit.” Such dimension of spirit only actualized in human. Tillich’s view of the human person as “spirit” in the world does not advocate for an abstract, disembodied view of the person. The substantial dualist view on mind-body problem that regards spirit as some kind of immaterial “add-on” to the physical body must be abandoned. Under Tillich’s interpretation of life, disrupting the multidimensional unity of life, especially the unity of the psychological and the spirit, thus making the dynamics of the human personality completely incomprehensible.74 Under this holistic and monistic interpretation of humans, the spiritual dimension is present in every cell of the body, and in every spiritual action of humans, the function of every cell is noticeable. The spiritual and the physical are one and the same reality.75 Tillich’s articulation of spirit as a dimension of life is in tune with discussions of pneumatology and emergence in the interaction between science and theology. Charles Raven (1885–1964) embraced an emergentist perspective on evolution early in Creator Spirit (1927), and he suggested that “spirit” is the highest form of complexity in the emergent hierarchy. According to Raven, the process of emergent evolution may be broken down into seven stages: (1) atoms; (2) molecules; (3) solids; (4) life; (5) mind; (6) reason; and (7) spirit. Raven asserts that the level of “spirit” is emerged from rational, aesthetic, and ethical values, and it is regarded as the essence of personality.76 Following Peacocke’s theory of emergent evolution, Clayton goes on to claim that in humans, “spirit” developed as a result of a highly complex network of connections including the body, the brain, and relationships with the environment. Emergence in this context must be understood from an ontological perspective: the presence of spirit represented new properties

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   187 and activities. Spirit is an emergent phenomenon insofar as it’s not reducible to the physical system (such as neural structures, biochemistry, and quantum physical events) that gives rise to it; hence, persons are best understood in terms of “strong emergence”77 that is a new emergent level of reality, that has causal efficacy and agency.78 Following Clayton, Amos Yong, a Pentecostal theologian, adopts an emergentist perspective on spirit, saying that: “spirit is a gift of the divine breath at a certain level of complexity—i.e., dependent upon but irreducible to brain and body function.” He also asserts that the Spirit is inherent in every level of emergent complexity and participates in the creative process. The presence of God’s Spirit interconnects all layers of the biosphere, and all living things—including humans—are not isolated individuals but rather “en-spirited” entities that may relate to and engage with one another as well as the social and natural environments.79 Tillich does not advocate any form of “fine tuning” or anthropic principle to demonstrate the explanatory need for a God who “fine tunes” a universe that is amenable to the emergence of homo sapiens. Notably, although the dimension of the spirit is only actualized in human beings, Tillich does not regard humans as the pinnacle of creation, or somehow perfect.80 Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, suggests that according to Darwin’s pronouncement, it is inappropriate to use the terms “higher” or “lower” to descript any species. Because of this, Darwin refers to “descent with modification” rather than “evolution,” since evolutionary science provides no absolute scale of value to support such value judgment. Similarly, Tillich is aware that there are different degrees and criteria for “high” and “low.” The gradation of value in Systematic Theology Vol. 3 refers to the power of being to include “the number of potentialities in one living being.”81 Humans are the “highest” beings only because humans are the actualizations of all dimensions, the most complex, but not the most perfect. 5.2  Person as Relational Being With regard to the current issue of personhood in science-theology dialogue, Tillich’s theology of life offers an ontological and theological framework for the notion of person as a relational self. In terms of the spiritual dimension, morality or the formation of the individual self are references to the self-­ integration of existence.82 The actualization of the dimension of the spirit reveals that “spirit” is not a supernatural entity that is only subjected to itself nor a material entity that is completely subjected to physical-biological influences.83 Instead of being separated and reduced, a person is a being-inthe-world that is profoundly interconnected and interdependent with all the dimensions of life. Person is defined in terms of relationships. This points to an embodied personhood as well as a wider and deeper understanding of relationality. Tillich defines the fundamental basic structure between persons and nature as a dialectic-polar “self-world” structure. This refers to the interrelation

188  Wai-han, Kung and interpenetration between the human self and the natural environment. In Systematic Theology Vol. 1, Tillich discusses the basic ontological structure of “self-world,” stating that the environment of a being refers to the totality of things with which it has active interrelationships. Any theory that tries to explain the behaviour of a being in terms of the environment alone is problematic, because a being not only belongs to its environment but also has such an environment. In other words, a being interacts with its environment; self and environment determine each other: “The self without a world is empty; the world without a self is dead.”84 These “self-world” polarities are also an ontological framework that applies to all dimensions, including people, living things, and even inorganic entities. Thought comparing Tillich’s understanding of subjectivity and relationality with a number of feminist theologies, Mary Ann Stenger contends that Tillich created a relational theology because the multidimensional unity of life’s ontology allowed him to create a theology that takes seriously both the relationship to the ultimate and the relationship to the material world, including the human body.85 Similarly, Philip Hefner refers to Tillich when he articulates the idea of person-formation in a network of relationships under the evolutionary-emergent assumption.86 Hefner contends that the emergence of human person is a bio-cultural process, as every person actualizes themselves concretely in their world. As a result, being a person involves both a moral process of responding to the world and a cognitive process of perceiving and comprehending oneself in connection to it. The process of a person developing has irreducible relational complexity (the dimension of spirit) and material content (the organic and inorganic dimensions).87 For Tillich, the continuous process of actualizing potential beings in every dimension is rooted in the ontological structure of self-world correlation.88 This structure of life leads to the function of self-integration in life process. Self-integration refers to the circular movement of life from a centre and back to the centre, a process of going out to its environment and returning to the centred self (i.e., circular direction). The process of self-integration also implies the function of self-creation, the principle of growth. Growth refers to the creation of new centres beyond the circle of self-integration (i.e., horizontal direction).89 The research was done by Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, and Evan Thompson on the lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience echo Tillich’s understanding of the “circular movement of life” of self-integration. From a cognitive-­emergentist perspective, humans live in an “enacted” environment to a greater degree than any other creature. The classical understanding of adaptation in evolutionary theories implies a dualistic understanding between environment and organism, which suggests the environment as pre-given and the organism as representing or adapting to it.90 On the other hand, the environments that we perceive, adopt, and enact are socially shared and culturally transmitted. Because the world is not independent and extrinsic to

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   189 human cognitive systems, the relationship between the human cognitive system and the world functions as an operational relationship rather than as an input-output relationship. The definition of operational refers to processes that feed back into themselves to form autonomous networks.91 Organism and environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the fundamental circularity that is life itself.92 One may ask why the dimension of spirit is actualized in humans but not in other animals? The term “mind” in Tillich’s terminology is not interchangeable with “spirit.” A being’s consciousness in relation to its environment is expressed by its mind. This consciousness includes awareness, perception, and intention, all of which are potentially existent in all dimensions but are only actually realized in the dimension of animals. As Deane-Drummond suggests, if one explores the human/animal boundary set in an evolutionary context, characteristics that have traditionally been identified with human distinctiveness, such as reason, freedom, and morality, become matters of degree, rather than absolute difference.93 In other words, some animals also have “mind” or “psychological self.”94 Yet, “rationality,” “intelligent,” or “self-awareness are not parameters for the emergence of the dimension of spirit, thus the dimension of the spirit does not actualize in some high animals.95 Tillich asserts that in addition to their surroundings, humans also have a world. The world is the structural unity of all conceivable content but not the totality of beings.96 All aspects of self-consciousness, both physical and psychological, are contained in the structure of being, and only humans are united with and able to access all levels and dimensions of being, making them the only beings who are instantly aware of their participation in the structure of being.97 Human persons emerge from the unity of all dimensions of life, which actualized interconnectedness with the unity of relational experiences, including personal relations, group relations, and the ultimate relation. In contrast to other animals, humans are able to form an infinite number of relationships with loved ones, friends, fellow humans, other living things, environment, the cosmos, and even the Divine. Early in Systematic Theology Vol. 1, Tillich already mentioned that a “person” participates in all levels of life only if he/she has communion with other persons. Communion is participation in another completely centred and completely individual self; such participation is necessary for the actualization of personal beings.98 Tillich further suggests that if there is a living being with the psychosomatic structure of a human but lives completely outside any human community, such a being could not actualize its potential spirit. It is because personal life only emerges in the encounter of one person with another in a community.99 As the experience of cooperative and mutually enhancing encounters with others and community are the fundamental conditions for the emergence of the spiritual dimension but not a specific type of mental capacity, it is very clear that the distinctiveness between the dimension of the spirit and the organic/psychological (animals in particular) dimension is understood in terms of relationality.

190  Wai-han, Kung According to Tillich, the fundamental expression of a person transcending their environment and becoming a being-in-the-world is language. Since it liberates a being from the constraints of the “here and now” to experience the universals of a world with boundless potential. The power of language presupposes the idea of universals. Further, with language, humans can grasp their encountered reality, and the interdependence of self-world encounter is established, in Tillich’s words: “man [sic] has language because he has a world, and he has a world because he has language.”100 When it comes to the self-creativity of life in the realm of spirit, language is essential for the emergence of culture. A question at the nexus of philosophy, linguistics, and biology is the origin of language in human evolution. There are no formal similarities between human language and animal communication, despite the fact that some higher species, such as dolphins, great apes, and birds, express some forms of verbal communication. One way to look at the subject of how language evolved from a genetic perspective is to consider what mental abilities are required for language to develop. Before language (and languages) started to evolve at the level of communities, early people had to attain a particular level of general or language-specific cognitive ability. However, from a cultural standpoint, language is a communication tool that has been created over time. Mutual understanding and collaboration between the speakers and listeners within a community environment are necessary for effective informational exchange among individuals. Some scientists believe that language is a combination of biological-­ cognitive and cultural factors, and that language evolution should be understood in terms of the co-evolution of biological-cognitive capacities and culture over time. For example, Daniel Dor and Eva Jablonka argue that cognitive and behavioural plasticity are the foundation for the evolution of new behaviours in general, language in particular, especially in “phenotype-first” scenarios.101 Neural plasticity refers to the ability to form novel neural associations and connections, whereas behavioural plasticity refers to the ability to form novel behaviours that have previously been manifested by members of the lineage. New behavioural patterns emerging from certain individuals can change the behavioural patterns of a particular community or culture, because the behaviour and neural plasticity allow individuals to learn. Those new behavioural patterns were consistently socially and culturally selected and drove a process of genetic accommodation of both general and language-specific aspects of cognition. Language evolution can be explained as the result of an integrated gene-culture co-evolutionary framework and the co-evolutionary dynamics that resulted in the emergence of languages and language-compatible minds.102 Tillich’s understanding on the relationship between person, language, and world can be elaborated by the above interlocking and interdependent relationship between neural capacity, behaviour, and culture under the emergent evolution framework.103

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   191

6  Confucian Views on Human Person After engaging the concept of emergence and idea embodied relational person with Tillich’s theology, this section turns to explore Confucian theories of human personhood and its relevance to emergentism. I would argue that the relational understanding of human personhood advanced by some contemporary scholars of Confucianism is comparable to the embodied relational anthropology advocated by contemporary understanding of emergence and Tillich’s theology of life. 6.1  Neo-Confucianism and Emergentism: Qi and Li Contemporary research on the dialogue between science and religion mainly focuses on Christianity and occasionally on Buddhism, but seldom on Confucianism. There is an impression that Confucian philosophers are often portrayed as humanists in the sense that they are more interested in the discussion of morality and society than in the investigation of nature. However, some contemporary scholars find that traditional discussions in Confucianism need to be reconceptualized and adjusted in light of contemporary understandings of nature and human, so meaningful dialogues can take place. The majority of Confucianism’s interactions with science are concerned with human nature and morality. For instance, Donald J. Munro claims that research in evolutionary biology and psychology corresponds with Confucianism. According to Munro, Confucian ethics has its biological basis that echoes three hypotheses of altruism in evolutionary biology, namely, the ideas of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and group selection.104 Lai Pan-chiu and Wang Tao attempt to engage Christianity, Confucianism, and evolutionary biology in a fruitful trilogue by making references to the biological explanations of altruism, particularly the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism.105 Edward Slingerland argues from the fields of cognitive science that affection, embodiment, and metaphorical extension play crucial roles in moral judgements and decision making. The virtue-ethical model of self-cultivation more accurately represents human moral reasoning. corresponds.106 Different from the above scholars, Michael C. Kalton starts the dialogue in terms of cosmology and the evolutionary process of nature.107 Neo-Confucian cosmology, according to Kalton, is interpreted in terms of Qi (vapour/breath) and Li (pattern). These two ideas refer to a conceptual framework that presupposes a continual process of change and transformation. Kalton argues that the concept of Qi offers a way that rejects a materialistic reduction of life without advancing the dichotomy of spirit/ matter. Kalton suggests that Qi is the “stuff” of the universe, it is conceived as a vitalistic energy rather than a mechanistic force; it is a matter of course that life emerges naturally from an energetic universe. Similar to emergentists, Kalton points out the ambiguities and continuities of the emergence of

192  Wai-han, Kung life: no one can precisely differentiate between the living and the non-living. Everything, including non-living beings, can be interpreted along a spectrum of Qi’s manifestations, according to Kalton’s conception of Qi as the transformative force of all the universe’s activities that circulate inside and between all that exists. Then the question of the ambiguity of life should be posed in reverse: is there such a thing as “non-living”?108 This understanding is consistent with Tillich’s understanding of the concept of life as the “actuality of being” and with the notion that “life” also applies to inorganic entities.109 In a similar vein, Tu Weiming asserts that the continuity of being, self-­ generating wholeness, and dynamism are fundamental concepts in Chinese cosmology. The continuity of being is understood in terms of the universal presence of Qi as a “the all-enfolding harmony of impersonal cosmic function.” Thus, all dimensions of life are connected organically by the continual presence of Qi and flow together as a unified internal process.110 The idea of wholeness derives directly from the idea of continuity. To assert that the universe is a continuum and that all entities are interconnected is comparable to asserting that there is an organistic, holistic unity that incorporates all levels of complexity.111 The third motif, dynamisms, is closely tied to the concepts of being continuity and completeness. The holistic wholeness of nature is not a closed, static system; the dynamically self-generating life process is not only interdependent and interrelated but also possesses infinite potential for development.112 Kalton remarks that the idea of Qi does not imply any supernatural or non-material entity, Qi is not the Greek or Latin equivalent of pneuma or spiritus, nor is it the animus energy of vitalism. In his words: “[Qi] in effect, much of what went into ‘spirit’ in the West went into the physical in the East Asia.”113 Nicholas S. Brasovan proposes that the concept of Qi must be reinterpreted in light of a new understanding of “materialism.” “Materialism” in this context means: on the one hand, persons, experience, and nature are constituted by Qi; on the other hand, it does not imply that consciousness, life, and spirit are reducible to material substance. Qi is not simply matter as opposed to consciousness or spirit; Qi is both matter and spirit; and Qi has an irreducible, non-dualistic, holistic, and complex nature.114 According to Clayton, the emergence thesis expresses the anti-dualistic ontology, yet it only expresses the thesis of ontological monism instead of ontological physicalism. It is more accurate to understand monism as: reality is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff. However, the “stuff” is not necessarily physical, hence emergentists should be monists but not physicalists.115 The monist theory of Qi as a new “materialism” is consistent with the emergentist thesis. It is difficult to find an unify counterpart of Qi in contemporary sciences. As Qi is perceived differently across disciplines, for instance, Eastern philosophers may view Qi as a metaphysical function of life, physicists may see it as “matter-energy,” and cognitive physiologists may see it as “information” of neurotransmission.116 I would further argue that such

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   193 matching is not only unnecessary but also creates confusion. As Qi (as well as Li 理)is a metaphysical concept but not a scientific one in Confucianism, it is not the subject of contemporary scientific investigation. According to Tu Weiming, Qi is not a scientific notion but rather a metaphorical framework that aims to address the multidimensional nature of reality and a unified cosmological theory.117 Referring back to Tillich’s theology of life, metaphysical interpretations and scientific investigation are two distinct types of explanations that should be evaluated independently.118 Typically, Li (理) is translated as “pattern” or “principle” of the natural process. Kalton reinterprets the concept of Li by referencing complexity theory and system theory in evolutionary biology. According to Kalton, there is a new nonreductionist systems theory that integrates physics, biology, social, economic, and political systems. He states, “Energy becomes complex in atoms and molecules, and more so in organic, living systems; these organic units in turn associate and develop in complex ecosystems, and finally human societies emerge as the most complex of all.”119 All life exists in a web of responsive relationships in a living, complex system. Such patterned interdependence includes the evolution of life forms and the artificial ecosystem called “culture” or “society.” According to this interpretation, Li is the “patterning” at all levels as well as the patterned interdependent relationships among various levels. Particularly, the Neo-Confucian idea of “Li (理) is one but manifested diversity,” 理一分殊 (li i fen shu) articulated by Cheng Yi 程頤 can be reinterpreted in the evolutionary context. The concept of 理一分殊 (li i fen shu) is elaborated by Neo-Confucian Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619– 1692) as “Myriad patterns systemically unite in one pattern; one pattern contains myriad patterns; they are interconnected and inter-contained” (則萬理統於一理，一 理含夫萬理，相統相含。).120 The idea of 理一分殊 (li i fen shu) indicates that one never has a unity apart from the diverse facts that constitute it, and one never has a plurality of facts that do not constitute a unity. In complex systems theory, the “one” and “many” or “whole” and “parts” are mutually implicated in this context.121 Kalton argues that Li is compatible to the evolutionary context as the interdependent systemic process of evolving life insures both differentiation and that each thing develops its own distinctive specialization precisely in terms of everything else: one ever-changing and developing pattern encompasses all, and each has its own particular pattern in terms of the whole.122 The relationship of Qi (氣) and Li (理) is described by Wang Fuzhi as follows: “Filling the space between the heavens and earth, inside and outside of the human body, there is nothing that is not Qi, thus there is nothing that is not Li” (而盈天地間，人身以內人身以外，無非氣者，故亦無非理者。). Li and Qi are non-dualistic and inseparable in Neo-Confucianism: Qi is the active vital energy driving the continuous transformation according to the self-­ organized and patterned (Li). According to Brasovan, Wang Fuzhi expresses a continuity of Qi ontology and a novel perspective on the inseparability of Li

194  Wai-han, Kung and Qi. Wang Fuzhi’s understanding of Li is not a principle that governs the movements of Qi from the top-down. Li emerges from and as the interactive pattern generated in the internal dynamics of Qi itself. Li, in other words, is the spontaneous and complex organization of Qi. Li is not a static principle, rather, it is emergent within the world of flux, it is perhaps better translated as “patterning” rather than “pattern.”123 Wang Fuzhi’s cosmology points to the relationship between Qi and Li: complex pattern of energy 氣之理 Qi zhi li.124 Anything and everything in the world, including the world itself, is completely the result of the intertwining dynamics of Qi and Li.125 Similarly, Tu Weiming suggests, nature is perceived as the spontaneously self-generating life process in Chinese philosophy. The self-organization power of Qi operating in pattern (Li) is perceived as a way of conceptualizing the fundamental structure and function of the cosmos. Qi zhi li 氣之理 is accountable for the actualization of all dimensions of beings. Human life is part of the continuity, thus human beings are organically connected with rocks, trees, and animals.126 In an evolutionary universe, dynamics and self-creative processes occur in a “non-linear” system with the emergence of unpredictable novel entities. This ontological characteristic is also applicable to the concepts of Qi and Li. In Neo-Confucian understanding, each novel entity is a configuration of the cosmic Qi that interconnects all things in a continuous energy field. Each particular draws all of the energetic relationships that it has with every other particular into itself, organizes these relationships into a unique pattern, and expresses these relationships in its own way. Li is a complex hierarchical pattern of cosmic patterns. It is a pattern of Qi transformations or a holistic system of all particular events, but this pattern/structure never has an objective status that can be apprehended apart from a particular perspective.127 Even though Kalton and Brasovan do not directly address the concept of emergence, the terminology they employ resonates with emergentism. Putting the conjoined concepts of Qi and Li as Qi zhi li 氣之理 qizhili in the contemporary understanding of emergence, the emergence and evolution of life is an energetic (Qi) 氣 thrust towards systemic complexity (Li) 理. The complex pattern of organism and ecosystem is emergent rather than pre-existing. The process starts with self-organizing systems at a relatively simple level and transforms as adaptive strategies within the system lead to continually increasing levels of complexity. In a sense, Li is self-­c reative emergent pattern leading to novel patterns.128 Again, I do not attempt to match the concept of Qi and Li with any concrete subject of scientific investigation; rather, the underlying metaphysics of the concept of Qi and Li in Neo-Confucianism, particularly the works of Wang Fuzhi, shows remarkable relevance to the contemporary concept of emergence: an non-reductive, non-dualistic, holistic ontology operated with the idea of the continuous self-organizing evolutionary process that actualizes novel entities in nature.

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   195 6.2  Human Person as Social-Relational Being Confucian’s concept of 人性 (ren xing) is always translated as “human nature.” For instance, A. C. Graham (1919–1991) interprets Mencius’ conception of 人性 (ren xing) in terms of “human nature” and suggests Mencius speaks of the goodness of human and human beings have spontaneous impulses toward the good.129 The Confucian mainstream, there is a commitment to the idea of an essential-universal human nature. This approach to human nature discussions around human nature put a lot of emphasis on differentiating humans and non-human beings 人禽之辨 (ren qin zhi bian) or whether human nature is intrinsically good 性善 (xing shan) or bad 性 惡 (xing e). However, such normative inquiry of human nature is being frequently questioned among contemporary philosophers. For instance, Roger T. Ames disagrees with Graham’s translation as he points out that “human nature” has essentialist connotations emphasizing something pre-set and given. Ames thinks that the primary concern of Confucianism is not elaborating the presence of static common essence shared among human beings, but rather the becoming of human in relational and dynamic terms, i.e., in what way does a person become consummately human.130 Also, Richard Kim suggests that this approach to human nature is problematic because such inquiry of human nature assumed nature is static which is incompatible with evolutionary biology.131 Regarding this dispute, Shun Kwong-loi defines the concept of human nature as follows: “Certain characteristic features of human beings that are particularly conspicuous, pervasive, and difficult to alter, without necessarily having the connotation of what is essential as opposed to accidental.” Shun is hesitated to follow the translation of “xing” as “essence,” since the connotation of Aristotelian essence is not clearly proclaimed by Confucians.132 By referring to Mencius, Shun suggests that the idea of xing as common essence of humanity and (e.g. in Mencius 2A and 6A) and a view of xing as a cultural accomplishment and development of human capacity achieved by high moral achievers (e.g. in Mencius 7A and 7B) can both be found in Mencian idea. Shun’s definition makes sense to see Mencius’ view of human nature as both a common humanity and the achievement of human self-cultivation. By referring to Xunzi, Chong, Kim-chong also suggests that there are essential as well as constitutive perspectives on human person. An essentialist approach to human nature is unavoidable when Confucians talk about an innate moral sense and capacities of human. However, the ability to constitute the general structure of society and social relations is a “constitutive” ability.133 The argument on xing brings up the long debate on a priori nature 先天 (xiantian) versus a posteriori nature 後天 (houtian) or the idea of “innate versus acquired,” or “nature versus nurture.” According to Wang Fuzhi, a priori nature is the fundamental principle of Qi and Li, that gives persons

196  Wai-han, Kung their concrete biological existence, body, and requisite disposition for developing higher cognitive and moral faculties. A posteriori nature, on the other hand, is the culmination of persons-in-the-world as an undertaking, a historical event unfolding of humanizing nature. Wang Fuzhi defines the totality of xing as the emerging, developing state of human existence given by Qi and Li.134 In this regard, Wang Fuzhi’s understanding of xing cancelled out the dichotomy of “nature versus nurture.” Irene Bloom also argues that the dichotomy of “innate” versus “acquired” suggests a disjuncture between a biological given and a cultural achievement—a disjuncture that is never actually signified in the Mencius text, and this may overlook the human person as a whole and the dynamic development personhood under the idea of evolution.135 Confucian’s understanding of xing is also supported by the evolutionary psychological approach to morality. In evolutionary studies on biological fitness and effective adaptation to ecological niches, there has been a paradigm shift: from early notions of evolution as “red in tooth and claw” to the importance of prosocial behaviour in terms of cooperation. There is continuity and discontinuity between the prosocial behaviours of humans and animals, from an emergentist perspective (especially primates). Many contemporary researchers attempt to argue morality as a natural outcome embodied in the biological history of social animals.136 The evolutionary psychological approach to emotion origins in Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals ([1872] 1965). Darwin suggests that emotional expressions of human and animals can be given evolutionary explanations. Paul E. Griffiths rejects the dichotomy of “innate” and “acquired” from evolutionary psychological perspective. He suggests that a trait can be given an evolutionary explanation does not necessarily imply this trait is innate that independent of any extrinsic factors.137 In the section on the concept of relationality in emergent evolution, we discussed the interdependent relationship between genetics and the ecosystem in terms of whole-part influence. It is possible for a genetic trait to manifest different behavioural phenotypes in response to environmental variation. Griffiths cites the example of the European barn owl, which exhibits a completely distinct behavioural phenotype in South-East Asia. Under the concept of emergent evolution, innate genetic traits and acquired behaviours are not only compatible but also complimentary in addressing the interdependence of organisms and their environment. According to Frans de Waal, primates exhibit similar moral emotions and sentiments as humans. The link between prosociality, collaboration, and morality is exemplified by the primacy of moral feelings and sentiments, which foster prosocial attitudes and lead to the development of collaborative behaviour patterns. In the beginning, there was empathy. The capability to feel as others do, particularly, the capability to understand their sorrows, discomforts, and vital needs, would incline individuals to help, console, and actively try to relieve the sufferings of their fellows.138

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   197 According to this view, the emergence of morality in humans is predicated on the biological manifestation of empathy observed in primates. Understanding the underlying characteristics of empathic behaviour and its relationship to pro-sociality and collaboration may be the key to understanding how morality-related activities are carried out. Although Confucians had no concept of evolutionary psychology, their remarkable emphasis on embodied-relational morality did recognize the significance of the biological bases of morality. For instance, in early Confucian thought, the human person is described in terms of body 體 (ti), desire 欲 (yu), emotion 情 (qing), will 志 (zhi), and heart/mind 心 (xin).139 According to Ames Roger, the Chinese word xin 心 is typically translated as heart/mind, mind/ heart, or heart/mind, reflecting the Confucian view that “the activity of mind cannot be divorced from the feelings of the heart; the cognitive is inseparable from the affective. There are no rational thoughts devoid of feeling, nor any raw feelings lacking cognitive content.”140 Mencius argues virtue requires proper emotions and feelings, which suggest that our capacity to feel compassion and empathy provides us with the basic moral foundation. As Bloom states concisely, “There would be no morality if we didn’t care for others.”141 Munro finds in the new evolutionary biology and psychology an affirmation of the Confucian belief in a human nature. From the essentialist points of view, there are inherited trait and objectionable features of the status quo as inevitable expressions of supposed human nature. On the other hand, members of a species can change their own environments to such an extent that they can influence their own evolution and manifestations of a purported human nature. On the other hand, members of a species can influence their own development by altering their circumstances to such an extent. This may be especially true of humans, who are capable of radically altering their circumstances, both physically and in terms of cultural, social, and political arrangements.142 Unlike behaviourist schools in psychology, Confucians do not regard human beings as merely another animal. Humanity has a moral disposition. Mencius employs numerous vegetative analogies to describe ethical evolution: the ethical development of human beings is analogous to the growing of seeds into plants. As sprouts are predisposed to growth, the human heart and mind are predisposed to moral ideal. This suggests that all humans possess the capacity to be moral. Humans are capable of reflexive learning; they construct cultures that foster the development of their innate ability to distinguish between right and wrong.143 However, Munro argues that, when discussing the evolution of morality, the concept of relationality and the crucial role of society and culture are more important than identifying inherent traits in which moral norms are embedded. It is now widely believed that the capacity of humans to cooperate based on culturally established standards emerged at the same time as our biological constitution. This co-evolution may have led to intrinsic tendencies such as following the majority or mimicking the most successful members of a

198  Wai-han, Kung group. In this regard, there may be an intriguing overlap between this type of morality explanation and the Xunzian, rather than Mencian.144 We will not elaborate the divergent trends of self-cultivation methods in the Confucianism. The presupposition of self-cultivation derives from the notion that human person is never static but rather dynamic and creative becoming processes. Human person is able to achieve perfection in terms of humanity through the transformative power of learning and self-­cultivation. Through the transformational power of learning and self-­ cultivation, human beings can attain perfection in terms of humanity. One of the most basic Confucian precepts is that learning to be human is to learn to become fully a person. Becoming a person entails a dynamic process of transformation. A distinctive feature of being human is that despite seeming inevitability of development, we become persons through learning as self-cultivation. We learn to acquaint ourselves with our bodies; each act of eating, sitting, walking, speaking, or sleeping requires constant learning. Strictly speaking, we do not own our bodies. Even though Mencius and Xunzi’s articulations on human nature appear to be in conflict, there are numerous points of agreement about the role of education and self-cultivation. According to Tu Weiming, the primary distinction between humans and other animals is the primacy of self-­ awareness, which is conceptualized as the recognition of one’s specific relationships with others.145 Contrary to utilitarianism and deontology, Confucian morality is not a universe-wide rule for determining good and evil; rather, morality is other-regarding cognition and conduct. This view is supported by Thomas Scanlon, who argues that the core of morality is “what we owe to each other”; in other words, right and wrong are derived from the value of being related to others in the process of reciprocal justification and criticism.146 By acknowledging our debts, for instance, we learn the value of reciprocity. As we mature, we become increasingly aware of the amount of other-focused thought and activity we should have nurtured to demonstrate our gratitude.147

7  Conclusion: Towards the Self-transcendence of Life In the pluri-religious Asian context, the dialogue between religion and science involves multiple interreligious exchanges; that is to say, a trilogue among Christian theologies, Asian religions, and the natural sciences is inevitable. Kim Heup Young describes this approach as “fusion of hermeneutical horizons” and the goal of such trilogue is not so much located within an abstract metaphysics, a methodology of parallelism, or an epistemology of knowledge, but in a hermeneutics of the human person, the ortho-praxis of humanization—that is to say: how to actualize the full potential of humanity.148 The concept of emergence not only reveals the embodiedness and relationality in nature, but more importantly, the possible of self-transcendence

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   199 in nature. According to Clayton, under the concept of emergent evolution, the natural world exhibits a continuous process of the emergence of different kinds of properties at different levels out of the massively complex system, then it is hard to avoid asking, could there be one or more further levels of emergence as well? This question points to whether there could be levels beyond the level of mind, a level of spirit. As an ontology of pervasive becoming, Clayton believes that the idea of emergence helps to make sense of the predicates of spirit in nature. The notion of the emergence of spirit is understood in terms of the emergence of a novel type of level or property that diverges significantly from any existing emergent properties within (or of) the natural world.149 Clayton holds a position called emergentist pluralism, as he finds ­physics-based monism cannot be the last word, since there are more and more complex levels of organization in the reality. Attempting to do justice to the radically new structures and phenomena that arise in universal history, Clayton inclines to use the term emergentist pluralism, which expresses an ontology of continual becoming. The emergence of human person is a particular psychosomatic unity, an organism that can do things both mentally and physically. From this, Clayton aims to construct a theology of emergence concerning the “emergence of the spirit.” It does make sense to speak of the emergent levels of consciousness—intentionality, self-awareness, rational reflection, and artistic creativity as “the emergence of spirit,” the spiritual dimension of humanity. Human person is a physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality, and because these aspects of its reality, though interdependent, are not mutually reducible. Clayton introduces “spirit” as a new type of entity, it diverges significantly from the way we were compelled to introduce mental causation, namely, as an emergent property of a complicated biological system. His inquiry to this point would suggest that “spirit” would have to be an emergent level or property within the natural world.150 Tillich addresses this question directly via his understanding of the multidimensional unity of life by suggesting the actualization of the dimension of the spirit in human person in community. Recalling the idea of self-transcendence within the process of actualization of the potential, ­self-transcendence is the function of life in which life drives beyond itself as finite life, i.e., “driving toward sublime.” It is self-transcendence because life is not transcended by something that is not life, such transcendence actualized is both in itself and above itself. The dimension of the spirit is a self-transcendence of life actualized in the personal–communal realm of self-awareness.151 Confucian’s idea of Sagehood also indicates the potential of self-­ transcendence of human. The idea of Sagehood is developed upon key doctrines about human nature, learning, and self-cultivation in Confucianism. Confucians believe that human beings have the potential to transform toward perfection (Sagehood), and the embedded presumption is the belief

200  Wai-han, Kung in the oneness of Heaven and human nature: “the person of ren forming one body with the ten thousand things of heaven and earth” (仁者與天地 萬物成為一體). The relationality of human person is also reflected in the relationship between humanity and Heaven 天 (tian), which is the ultimate reality in Confucianism. This idea does not merely mean that the same vital energy Qi (氣) penetrates the whole universe and thus all things are manifested according to the cosmic patterning Li (理); but the idea that human person is endowed with a greater purity or fineness of Qi participate responsively in the fullness of the Li which patterns all things. Hence, human being is “empathetically” or “analogically” feeling commiseration with all living beings as part of his/her own body. Heaven’s character of benevolence 仁(ren) is not only manifested in the production of life or creativity in the universe, but also immanent in human heart/mind. In other words, for Confucianism, both divine and human persons share the same character of ren.152 Such Heaven-person relationship is the foundation for the universal possibility to human perfection. Self-cultivation in this regard is to strengthen the humanizing potential for personal and cultural development and such cultivation of benevolence 仁 (ren) a lifelong mission for Confucianists. As Michael Welker suggests, a multidimensional approach is needed for theologians, philosophers, and scientists to do justice to the “complexity of human personhood.”153 The question of human person from the standpoint of biological evolution, especially the standpoint of emergentist interpretation, helps us to understand the profound embodiment of human person and signification of relationality in the actualization of personhood: personin-the-world. There are deep connections between emergentism, Tillich’s theology, and Confucianism—all emphasize on embodiment and relationality in person-making process. Such holistic ontology of nature in general and person in particular points to the actualization of creative potentiality and self-transcendence. Identifying the overlap set between contemporary emergence theory, Tillich’s theology, and Confucianism reveals the possibility of constructive dialogue among the three. From a scientific point of view, the best that contemporary emergentists can offer, according to Colin McGinn, is the miracle of emergence—getting the wine of consciousness from the water of the brain.154 Since scientists can descript the occurrence and feathers of the “miracle,” but they cannot provide any explanation of why and how it occurred. In this regard, Christian theology and Confucianism may offer answers to this mystery. For Tillich, the answer is the universal Spiritual Present that lures the actualization of the potentialities of different dimensions of life. For Neo-Confucianism, the answer is the creative power from the intertwining of Qi and Li. Most of the ideas in this paper are not particularly “theological” and “Confucian”; they more general conceptual schemes borrowed from the concept of emergence. On the one hand, this approach contextualized Christian theology and Confucianism in the contemporary understanding of evolution and personhood which may revels new kind of coherence and relevance.

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   201 On the other hand, it attempts to be intelligible to different religious and non-religious points of view. This vision has implications not merely for the study of comparative studies of Christianity and Confucianism, but also for the humanities in general, which can be enriched by a serious engagement with relevant findings from natural sciences.

Notes 1 Number of scholars work on the intersection of science-religion and inter-­ religious dialogue, such as Amos Yong, The Cosmic Breath: Spirit and Nature in the Christianity-Buddhism-Science Trialogue (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Lai Panchiu, and Wang Tao, “Altruism in Christian, Confucian, and Evolutionary Perspectives,” Sino-Christian Studies 15, no. 15 (2013): 183–214. 2 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 148. 3 There are some scholars work on the dialogue of Tillich’s theology and Confucianism. For instances, Chan, Ka-fu, Keith, “Environmental Ethics in Dialogue: Tillich, Orthodox Theology and Confucianism,” in Life as Spirit: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Ecological Pneumatology (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 191–206; Kim Kyoung-Jae. “A Conception of an Ecological Theology of Spirit and Ch’i.” In Asian Contextual Theology for the Third Millennium (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2010), 285–302. 4 Francis Crick, Of Molecules and Man (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). 5 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911). 6 G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life, and Mind (London: Trübner, 1875), 142. 7 G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 412, 413. 8 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 156. 9 Wai Han, Kung, “Arthur Peacocke’s Theory on Divine Action (MPhil dissertation, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014). 10 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” The Re-Emergence of Emergence, Philip Clayton, and Paul Davies eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 257. 11 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 261. 12 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 267. 13 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “Multidimensional Monism: A constructive Theological Proposal for the Nature of Human Nature,” in Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 201–227. 14 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 258. 15 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, 60. 16 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 264. 17 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 264. 18 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 261.

202  Wai-han, Kung 19 Arthur Peacocke, God and the New Biology, 100. 20 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 261. 21 Helene Tallon Russell and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, “The Multiple Self” in J. Wentzel van Huyssteen and Erik P. Wiebe (eds.), In Search of Self. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Personhood (Grand Rapids, MI; William B. Eerdmans, 2011), 183. 22 Stuart Kauffman and Philip Clayton, “On Emergence, Agency, and Organization,” Biology & philosophy 21, no. 4 (2006): 514. 23 J. M. Chase and M. A. Leibold, Ecological Niches: Linking Classical and Contemporary Approaches (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 24 Peter J. Richardson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 25 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 3. 26 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 197. 27 Arthur Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to Human Mind-Brain-Body,” 273. 28 Clayton, God and Contemporary Science, 205. 29 “Gestalt psychology,” in Britannica Concise Encyclopedia (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006). 30 King, D. Brett, and Michael Wertheimer, Max Wertheimer and Gestalt Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005), 187. 31 Paul Wiebe, “Introduction,” in Tillich, The System of Sciences. 32 Keith, Ka-fu Chan, Life as Spirit: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Ecological Pneumatology (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 127–133. 33 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 83. 34 Tillich, The Religion Situation, 58, 59. 35 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 86. 36 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 85, 86. 37 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 87. 38 “Tillich’s letter to Polanyi, May 21, 1963”, in Richard Gelwick, “The Polanyi– Tillich Dialogue of 1963: Polanyi’s Search for a Post-Critical Logic in Science and in Theology”, Tradition and Discovery 22, no. 1 (1995): 17. 39 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 11. 40 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 11, 12. 41 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 12, 20. 42 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 16. 43 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 16, 20. 44 Tillich, “Thing and Self,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 116. 45 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 15. 46 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 13. 47 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 14. 48 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 13. 49 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 15, 16. 50 Peacocke,  Theology for a Scientific Age  (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 36–43. 51 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 15, 16. 52 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 87. 53 Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man (Harper Perennia, 1959 [1976]). However, Tillich is not convinced by Teilhard de Chardin’s progressive interpretation of evolution since it is overly “optimistic”. Tillich’s critique on progressivism

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   203 can be found in Tillich, “The Decline and the Validity of the Idea of Progress,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 83–95. 54 Tillich, The System of Sciences, 87. 55 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 35. 56 Tillich, “Religion, Science, and the Confusion of Dimensions,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society,175–176. 57 Tillich, “Evolution and the Distinction Between Religion and Science, in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 80–82. 58 Chan, Life as Spirit, 128–131. Chan argues that Tillich is not compatible with the idea of evolution, or at least cannot commit to it unconditionally. He counter proposes the idea of gestalt might be affiliated to Jakob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944)’s understanding of the process of life. Uexküll advocates the idea of umwelt, “environment” or “surrounding”, that all organisms have an inaccessible “inner-world” and it autonomously interact with the environment. Uexküll is regarded as the Darwin-rejecting Neo-Vitalists that I would argue this is unlikely for Tillich to agree with Uexküll in this regard. Uexküll’s the idea of umwelt may well capture the idea of “life as a gestalt”, but the vitalist implications of it is not comparable with Tillich’s flamework. A total rejection of the scientific theory of evolution is not necessary, but a critical analysis on different metaphysical implications of evolutionism is needed. 59 C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923). 60 David Blitz, Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Reality (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1992), 1. 61 Some called these phenomena as “devolution” or “backward evolution”. However, these terminologies assume evolution has a predetermined direction or purpose, which is problematic. 62 Tillich, “How Has Science in the Last Century Changed Man’s View of Himself,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 81. 63 Paul H. Carr, “A theology for evolution: Haught, Teilhard, and Tillich,” Zygon 40, no. 3 (2005): 734, 735. 64 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 51–53. 65 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 307. 66 Eldon D. Enger, Frederick C. Ross, and David B. Bailey, Concepts in Biology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 292, 293. 67 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1, 267. 68 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 26. 69 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 20. 70 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 20; Tillich rejects the term “teleology,” as it is misused to imply causality, which must be rejected by both science and philosophy. Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 164. 71 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 11, 21. 72 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 21. 73 Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Nature, 128. 74 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 26. 75 Tillich, “Thing and Self,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 114, 115. 76 Charles Raven and Joseph Needham, The Creator Spirit: A Survey of Christian Doctrine in the Light of Biology, Psychology and Mysticism (Edinburgh: Kessinger Publishing, 1927), 80. 77 In “strong” emergence, in contrast to weak emergence, distinct forms of causation and new agents are introduced. For “weak” emergence, human mental properties manifest no causal efficacy. For more details, see Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 2004.

204  Wai-han, Kung 78 Clayton, “Philosophical Resources for the Doctrine of the Spirit,” Advents of the Spirit, 191. 79 Amos Yong, Pneumatology and the Christian-Buddhist Dialogue (Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), 49–51. 80 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 36. 81 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 17. 82 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 38. 83 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 38. 84 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1, 171. 85 Mary Ann Stenger, “Being and Word in Tillich’s Doctrine of Spiritual Presence: Issues of Subjectivity and Relationality,” Hummel, Gert, and Doris. Lax. Being Versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?: Proceedings of the VII. International-­ Paul-Tillich-Symposium Held in Frankfurt/Main 1998 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1999), 290–297. 86 Philip Hefner, “Imago Dei: The Possibility and Necessity of the Human Person,” in Human Person in Science and Theology, edited by Niels Henrik Gregersen, et al., (Bloomsbury: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003), 83, 84. 87 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 32–50. 88 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 32. 89 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 30–35. 90 Varela, Francisco J., Evan. Thompson, and Eleanor. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 202. 91 Varela, Francisco J., Evan. Thompson, and Eleanor. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, 140. 92 Varela, Francisco J., Evan. Thompson, and Eleanor. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, 217. 93 Celia Deane-Drummond, The Wisdom of the Liminal: Evolution and Other Animals in Human Becoming (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 52. 94 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 24. 95 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 20–24, 36, 37. 96 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 36. 97 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1, 171. 98 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1, 176. 99 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 40. 100 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 58, 61. 101 Phenotype-first hypothesis is against the neo-Darwinian assumption that genetic factors are the principal source of variation upon which natural selection operates. Phenotype-first hypothesis suggests that environmentally induced phenotypic change (including behaviours) may be an important mode of evolutionary innovation. See Andreas Wagner, “Phenotypic plasticity and innovation,” The Origins of Evolutionary Innovations: A Theory of Transformative Change in Living Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 172–185. 102 Daniel Dor and Eva Jablonka, “Why We Need to Move from Gene-Culture Co-Evolution to Culturally Driven Co-Evolution,” in The Social Origins of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14–30. 103 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 58, 61. 104 Donald J. Munro, “Reciprocal Altruism and the Biological Basis of Ethics in Neo-Confucianism,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1, no. 2 (2002): 133–138. 105 Lai Pan-chiu and Wang Tao, “Altruism in Christian, Confucian, and Evolutionary Perspectives,” Sino-Christian Studies 15, no. 15 (2013): 183–214.

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   205 106 Edward G. Slingerland, “Of What Use Are the Odes? Cognitive Science, Virtue Ethics, and Early Confucian Ethics,” Philosophy East & West 61, no. 1 (2011): 80–109. 107 Michael C. Kalton, “Extending the Neo-Confucian Tradition: Questions and Reconceptualization for the Twenty-First Century,” in Mary Evelyn Tucker and John H. Berthrong, eds. Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 1998), 77–101. 108 Michael C. Kalton, “Extending the Neo-Confucian Tradition,” 89. 109 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 11. 110 Tu Weiming, “The Continuity of Being, in Confucianism and Ecology,” 108. 111 Tu Weiming, The Continuity of Being, in Confucianism and Ecology, 109. 112 Tu Weiming, The Continuity of Being, in Confucianism and Ecology, 109. 113 Michael C. Kalton, “Extending the Neo-Confucian Tradition,” 88, 89. 114 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism: An Interpretive Engagement with Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 65. 115 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 4. 116 Tsuyoshi Ohnishi, and Tomoko Ohnishi, “Philosophy, Psychology, Physics and Practice of Ki,” Evidence-based Complementary and Alternative Medicine 6, no. 2 (2009): 175. 117 Tu Weiming, “The Continuity of Being, in Confucianism and Ecology,” 107, 108. 118 Tillich, “Evolution and the Distinction Between Religion and Science,” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 80–82. 119 Kalton, “Extending the Neo-Confucian Tradition,” 80. 120 Fuzhi Wang 王夫之, “Reading the Compendium of Discourses on the Four Books 讀四書大全說 ,” in Complete Works of Chuanshan 船山全書 (Changsha 長沙市: Yuelu shu Publishers 嶽麓書社出版, 1991), 1110. 121 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism: An Interpretive Engagement with Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 56. 122 Michael C. Kalton, “Extending the Neo-Confucian Tradition,” 85. 123 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism, 56. 124 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism: An Interpretive Engagement with Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 1, 2. 125 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism, 22. 126 Tu Weiming, “The Continuity of Being,” in Tucker, Mary Evelyn, and John H. Berthrong, eds. Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 1998), 112, 113. 127 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism, 56. 128 Nicholas S. Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism, 89. 129 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 13. 130 Roger T. Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren Xing: Does It Mean ‘Human Nature’?” in Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed. Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts-­E ssays Dedicated to Angus C Graham .(La Salle, PA: Open Court, 1991), 143–175. 131 Richard Kim “The Role of Human Nature in Moral Inquiry: MacIntyre, Mencius, and Xunzi,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2015): 313–333.

206  Wai-han, Kung 132 Shun Kwong-loi, “Mencius on Jen Hsing,” Philosophy East and West 47, no. 1 (1997): 7. 133 Chong, Kim-chong, “Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking on Human Nature,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35 (2008): 63–78. 134 Brasovan, Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism, 125. 135 Irene Bloom, “Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature.” In Mencius (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2017), 91–102. 136 Daniele Bertini, “The Evolutionary Approach to Ethics: From Animal Prosociality to Human Morality,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, no. 3 (2020), 3–22. 137 Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 59, 60. 138 Jessica Pierce, “Mice in the Sink: On the Expression of Empathy in Animals”, Environmental Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2008). 139 Shun, Kwong-loi, “Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought.” in Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wang, eds. Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 184–86. 140 Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011), 127. 141 Paul Bloom, Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil (New York: Crown Publishers, 2013), 47. 142 Donald J. Munro, A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch’ien Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on Science and Confucian Ethics (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005). 143 James H. Liu, “Neo-Confucian Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy: Practical Postulates for Actioning Psychology as a Human Science,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 20, no. 2 (2017): 137–149. 144 Donald J. Munro, A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch’ien Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on Science and Confucian Ethics. 145 Tu Weiming, “Spiritual Humanism: Self, Community, Earth, and Heaven,” Wang Yangming Lecture at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy and Spiritual Humanism (2018), 4. https://fh.pku.edu.cn/docs/2021–05/20210513105139108119. pdf. 146 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 147 Tu Weiming, “Spiritual Humanism: Self, Community, Earth, and Heaven,” Wang Yangming Lecture at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy and Spiritual Humanism (2018), 4. https://fh.pku.edu.cn/docs/2021–05/20210513105139108119. pdf. 148 Kim Heup Young, “Toward a Trilogue of Humility: Sciences, Theologies, and Asian Religions,” Why the Science and Religion Dialogue Matters Voices from the International Society for Science and Religion (Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2006), 127. 149 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 156, 157. 150 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 210. 151 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, 31. 152 Lai Pan-chiu, “Reconsidering Confucian Understanding of Human Person and its Implications for Whole Person Education, 19, 20. 153 Michael Welker, “introduction,” in Michael Welker, ed. The Depth of the Human Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 1.

Tillich’s and Confucian Understanding of Person in Dialogue   207 154 Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?’, in Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka, eds. The Mind–Body Problem—A Guide to the Current Debate (Blackwell, 1994), 99. McGinn is committed to the position called “New Mysterianism” concerning mind/body problem.

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9 An Examination of Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding An Ecological Perspective Keith Ka-fu Chan 1 Introduction Both Judeo-Christian traditions and western philosophical traditions are commonly criticized for anthropocentrism and dualism, which are regarded as a problem central to the global environmental crisis. Western philosophical and religious dualistic conceptuality, with its demarcation between transcendence and immanence, and a hierarchical mode of thinking, are being challenged by those radical ecological movements. From these perspectives, the emergence of secularization results in the divine absence from the world and promotes a scientific-technological mindset which consolidates human rationality and subjectivity, and which deepens the western ecological crisis. Recently, attempts to explore the ecological implications in different religious traditions have brought balance to the above highly generalized picture. These studies insist that religion and some Asian humanist thought should not be regarded as bankrupt in dealing with the environmental crisis, but rather that it provides fruitful and promising resources for us to rethink the ecological question from a different angle. In this context, the east-west religious-ecological dialogue establishes a platform in which different religious traditions try to articulate the inter- and intra-textual readings of the other (as well as their own) in order to explore numerous potentialities and possibilities for ecological thinking. In this chapter, Christian and Confucian understanding of the human being and the whole universe would be articulated as the inter-relational companion. Confucianism and Paul Tillich’s work share a similar ontological and cosmic vision which is relational, dynamic, and universal in nature. Also, both emphasize the uniqueness but not superiority of the human being in the universe without committing to anthropocentrism. Further, it will demonstrate that a human being can be regarded as the “center” but not the “master” of the world. Tillich and Confucian tradition find no difficulty in the assertion that a human being can be “being in-the-world” and “beingabove-the-world” at the same time. Third, re-enchantment of the world seems to provide an opportunity for the renewal of human spirituality in which instrumental rationality about the world should be reconsidered in order to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003405610-10

212  Keith Ka-fu Chan perceive the world as a sacrament, a gift, and a living organism instead of a huge mechanical machine. Also, adherents of both uphold an anthropocosmic vision which emphasizes the interrelationship between human beings and nature, communication between self and community, and the mutuality between humans and God (Heaven). I will first argue that Tillich’s notion of multidimensional anthropology is ontological-­ universal in character, and that this concept expresses the nature of the multi-­dimensionality in the universe which is based on his pneumatology in which Tillich proposed an universal and immanent idea of divine spiritual presence in the world. In Confucian cosmogony, transcendence and immanence are interrelated within a dynamic and holistic whole in which the underlying principle of the universe is wholly embodied within the structure of the world. Second, I will argue that the notion of “ideal humanity” in the Confucian tradition is also similar with Tillich’s idea of “microcosmos”. In Confucianism, the essential part of the human being is connected with transcendent Heaven, and the human being is mandated with the duty of the creative transformation of the world by the Heaven. Finally, in concluding the paper, the ecological implication of both will be explored.

2  Tillich’s Multi-Dimensional Anthropology In his Systematic Theology Volume three, Tillich proposed a ground-­ breaking concept in which all beings in the world are reframed into a world of unified multi-dimensionality. This idea strongly rejects any ideas of dualist and hierarchical conceptuality. For Tillich, the metaphor we use to describe the ontological structure is a reflection on our experiential encounter between human beings and reality. He mentioned “dimension” as The difference of the realms of being in such a way that there cannot be mutual interference; depth does not interfere with breadth, since all dimensions meet in the same point. They cross without disturbing each other; there is no conflict between dimensions. Therefore, the replacement of the metaphor “level” by the metaphor “dimension” represents an encounter with reality in which the unity of life is seen above its conflicts. These conflicts are not denied, but they are not derived from the hierarchy of levels; they are consequences of the ambiguity of all life process and are therefore conquerable without the destruction of one level by another.1 Based on the non- and anti-hierarchical understanding of human beings, Tillich’s anthropology is highly and profoundly multi-dimensional which means that he rejected, ontologically speaking, the power and value of all beings are leveled, and anthropologically speaking, mind, psychic, and body within a human being are also leveled. Second, it is so difficult, if not impossible, to perceive any essential and stable elements to identify what

Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding  213 human being is. All different dimensions, inorganic, organic, psychic, and spiritual dimensions, are dynamically presented within human being. It is clear that Tillich basically described the holistic and cosmic views of reality in which different “dimensions” encounter each other with no conflicts caused by the structure itself. It denotes the harmonious character of the universe and human being with tensions. Also, any atomic and self-­ contained conceptuality is not possible; they fully and profoundly engage with each other in maintaining their own spheres. Therefore, different “dimensions” have their own unique and distinctive realms in which no interference is possible; different dimensions are interrelated and interpenetrated; the unity of different dimensions has the ontological priority over their tensions; and the conflict and tension generated by different dimensions are not created by the hierarchical model of beings but occur in the mixture between essential and existential conditions which Tillich called “ambiguity”. Therefore, all essential and vital elements in the cosmos are combined into the ontological structure of human being, and at the same time, human being is like a “mirror” to represent the whole universe. This cosmo-­anthropological understanding of human being is clearly mentioned by Tillich’s idea of “microcosm”. Tillich redefined the idea of Imago Dei of human as “the ontological elements are complete and are united on a creature basis, on one hand, and, on the other hand, are united with God as the creative ground”.2 For him, human being plays the role of mediator between divinity and all other beings in which all dimensions are present and actualized in the human being.3 Also, the ontological structure of the human being is analogous to the divine Logos in which the telos of a human being is grounded. Therefore, the fulfillment of the created purposiveness of the whole universe is determined by the actualization of the potentiality of human being. Ontological speaking, the whole universe and human being are correlated within each other. The interpenetration and fusion within poly- and trans-dimensionality constitute an interactive, dynamic, and vitalist vision of the realities and human beings. Even though all dimensions are real but not always in actual status (some are present in a potential forms), the interplay of potentiality and actuality insists that there is not any metaphysical and transcendental core in any realms or dimensions. This non-­essentialist approach of Tillich’s idea allows the ontological blurring of spirituality, humanity, animality, and materiality. Functional speaking, human being is unique in a sense that all dimensions are actually present in a human being. Therefore, for Tillich, human being, even though he/she shares the essential structures of all dimensionality with other beings in the world, human being is not only part of the world, but also the focus of the world. Therefore, it is important for us not to talk about the superiority of human being in the world and try our very best to escape the commitment to an anthropocentric error. At the same time, the uniqueness of human being should be

214  Keith Ka-fu Chan maintained and understood within the realm of the whole multi-­dimensionality of the world.

3  Tillich’s Pneumatological Sacramentality As the previous paragraph show, Tillich located his anthropology in a unified and holistic framework of the universe which is called “multi-­dimensional unity of life”. This concept is prepared to anticipate his correlational idea of pneumatology in which the spiritual presence is closely linked with the whole realm of life, human, and non-human beings. Pneumatology, for Tillich, first, plays a decisive role in reconceiving the entire theological project. The interplay between Christology and pneumatology constitutes the theological methodological consideration for integrating universality and particularity in the divine revelation and redemption. Thus, the being of God and the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ are well grounded in the Spiritual Presence as the unity of power and meaning. Second, Tillich is distinctive in correlating life universal, and human life in particular, with the divine Spirit. Spiritual Presence brings the self-transcendence of life into the multi-dimensional unity. The Spirit, for Tillich, is not only regarded as the life-power and vitality of the different life forms, but she also dwells in the historical dimension of the multi-faceted levels of beings and reveals the fulfillment of the telos of all beings. In this sense, the term sacramentality denotes the presence of the infinite in the finite, and finite symbols point to the infinite. Tillich’s idea of sacramentality is wholly and definitely pneumatological. In volume three of his Systematic Theology, Tillich expressed a dynamic and unifying perspective toward a multi-dimensional understanding of life. For him, the concept of “life” embraces different “dimensions” in which the interplay between potentiality and actuality is intertwined. Therefore, nothing should be reduced to “thing” only. As he emphasized, “no thing in nature is merely a thing”.4 Nature is viewed neither as the scientific-­technological object nor the magical substance, but is to be perceived theologically as “the finite expression of the infinite ground of all things”.5 On one hand, Tillich strongly rejected sacralization of nature when he describes a realist interpretation of the real structure of nature. Under the multi-dimensional unity of life, the infinite divine and the finite creatures are clearly distinguished but not separated. On the other hand, the innermost structure of nature as the form of the divine substance of the Spirit constitutes the theonomous attitude toward the universe in which the divine and nature are interpenetrated. Tillich’s “infra Lutheranum” background allowed him to adopt the mutual indwelling of the two natures of Jesus Christ in whom the presence of infinite in everything finite is theologically possible; in addition, Schelling’s idealist philosophy of nature provided him with the philosophical identity between God, human beings, and nature. Based on his understanding of the

Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding  215 ontological-universal structure of being-itself, God is the ground and the power of beings. Every being is grounded in the innermost part of the God’s being. Therefore, all objects or events become a medium, functioning as a sacramentality in which the transcendent is perceived to be present.6 Although Tillich emphasized that the character or quality of nature itself is closely related with the sacred power it symbolizes, those qualities are only to be considered as the bearer of a sacred power. Nature is the object of Christian redemption. Therefore, the quality of the natural object is a necessary but not sufficient condition for becoming a sacrament. For Tillich, revelation and salvation are interchangeable. In volume one of his Systematic Theology, based on the universal-ontological understanding of being-itself, Tillich insisted that nothing is excluded from participation in the ultimate ground of beings, and nothing is qualified and worthy in itself to represent ultimate concern. In order to be the medium of divine revelation, it should also be the object of divine redemption. This is the reason why the whole reality has become a medium of revelation but has never been identified with the divine.7 The power and meaning of nature are disclosed through, but not in, objective physical structure. Tillich emphasized that the subjective and objective approach toward the understanding of nature is not sufficient. In this context, Tillich tended to accept nature as embodying a kind of symbolic character in revealing something ultimate. For Tillich, the whole theology of sacramentality relies on a theology of symbol in which the sacramental material is not only a sign, but also stands for a symbol that participates in what it signifies, and is intrinsically related to what it expresses.8 The theology of symbol is closely related to his notion of self-transcending realism (glaubiger Realismus). As Tillich noted, “self-transcending realism is a universal attitude toward reality. It is neither a merely theoretical view of the world, nor a practical discipline for life … it is a basic attitude in every realm of life, expressing itself in the shaping of every realm”.9 This type of realism confirms the concrete form of nature as the embodiment of spiritual power and meaning. Following Tillich’s “form-Inhalt-Gehalt” framework of theology of culture, the spiritual Gehalt reveals its power and meaning through natural forms and structures. Tillich insisted, “the new realism was not interested in the natural forms of things for their own sake, but for their power of expressing the profounder levels and the universal significances of things”.10 Through the given natural forms, this realism functions as symbolic embodiment and “tries to point to the spiritual meaning of the real by using its given form”.11 For this reason, Tillich rejected both the Catholic idea of transubstantiation, which transforms a symbol into a thing to be handled, and the reformed tradition of the sign character of the sacramental symbol.12 Considering the Catholic side, nature as a symbol representing spiritual power is not functioning as “opus operatum” in order to receive objective grace from the divine power; considering the reformed side, it is also not a sign for the faith community to remember the divine saving event. In sum, nature as symbol participates

216  Keith Ka-fu Chan in the power of what it symbolizes, and therefore, it can be a medium of the Spirit.13 In Tillich’s early demonstration of sacramental thinking, Christology and soteriology are linked with the power of a sacramental bearer. In order to attack magical and mythological usage, the Protestant tradition needs to bring nature into the context of the history of salvation, so that the demonic quality of nature is conquered in the New Being in Jesus Christ.14 “Any sacramental reality within the framework of Christology and of Protestantism must be related to the New Being in Christ”.15 For Tillich, the New Being created by Jesus as the Christ is the new creation universe. Moreover, in his Christology, the essential Godmanhood, manifesting within the existential and historical conditions, is interpreted not merely as a religious personality, but as a basic divine sacramental reality.16 Cosmic Christ as the New Being also represents the paradoxical character of the divine symbol in which “the absolute side of the final revelation, that in it which is unconditional and un-changeable, involves the complete transparency and the complete self-sacrifice of the medium in which it appears”.17 However, the above Christological orientation shifted into a pneumatological perspective in volume three of Systematic Theology. In that work, Tillich tried to develop the doctrine of pneumatology in order to answer numerous criticisms on one hand, and to re-articulate his theological perspectives in the light of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit on the other. Though Tillich emphasized that the divine spirit is essentially correlated with the human spirit, it does not exclude the Spiritual Presence indwelling in the whole multi-dimensional unity of life. Given the rejection of dualistic and supernaturalist reduction, spiritual power and meaning manifests as the “dimension of the ultimate” or “the dimension of depth”.18 Likewise, the universality of the Spiritual Presence is the expression of the radical effective embodiment of personal and historical events. Therefore, for Tillich, we have no reason to adopt the narrow sense of the concept of “sacramental” in which some particular objects and acts are qualified as the medium for the experience of divine spirit in a faith community but, rather, Tillich enlarged the sense to cover everything in which the Spiritual Presence has been experienced.19 The spiritual community “is free to appropriate all symbols which are adequate and which possess symbolic power”.20

4  The Confucian Cosmogony Generally speaking, western dualistic conceptuality is not found in the Chinese holistic and organic world view; instead, the poles of transcendence and immanence integrate within each other to construct a more dynamic and developmental cosmic whole. The genuine Chinese cosmogony is that of an organismic process, meaning that all of the parts of the entire cosmos

Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding  217 belong to one organic whole and that they all interact as participants in one spontaneously self-generating life process.21 According to TU Weiming, continuity, wholeness, and dynamism are the three characters of the Chinese vision of the cosmos. The reality is regarded as a huge continuum in which nothing is outside of it. In rejecting dualistic thinking, nature is perceived under holistic thinking, and the whole reality is not static in a sense that vitality and dynamism always perform in a process-oriented way. In Neo-Confucianism, the dynamic ordering pattern (li) and the vital energies (qi) emanate from the ultimate Great (taiji) which performs as the basic structure and function of the cosmos and it penetrates into the vital energy. Therefore, the ultimate principle of the universe is the ultimate One and it differentiates itself into the diverse structures and patterns in order to form different beings. In this context, the transcendent principle and the immanent forms are not dualistic but functions as a polar interaction. This philosophy of qi becomes the focus of Zhang Zai’s philosophy. Qi functions as the cosmic force to unite everything in the universe, and it is embodied into the human mind to embrace the pluralist and diverse conditions in everything in an integral whole.22 Nature is a relational whole in which human life and the rhythms of nature that sustain life in both its biological needs and socio-cultural expressions operate together. Everything in nature is interdependent, interrelated, dynamic, and transformational. Nature, therefore, is inherently valuable and morally good. Value lies in the ongoing transformation and productivity of nature. TU Weiming asserted that Confucian ontology is regarded as the continuity of being in which all modalities of being are organically connected.23 Spiritual and material realms are co-related under the vital force. All beings, whether living or non-living, consist of this vital force. Without the concept of a creator God and the Christian idea of creation out of nothing, Confucian thought emphasizes a spontaneously self-generating life process within which all beings, human and non-human, are integral parts of an organic continuum.24 Under this way of thinking, humans, and nature share the same cosmic creative force, so that a kind of kinship relationship develops between them. Although nature has inherent value and embodies the normative standard for all things, it is not judged from an anthropocentric perspective. In Confucianism, value is embodied within nature and lies in the ongoing transformation and productivity of nature. In this context, Confucians do not view hierarchy as leading inevitably to domination. Rather, they see that value rests in each thing, but not equally in each thing in an individual way. A Confucian vision of reality asserts that everything has its appropriate role and location. The use of nature for human ends must recognize the intrinsic value of each element of nature, but also its value in relation to the larger context of the environment. Each entity is considered not simply equal to every other; rather, each interrelated part of nature has a particular value

218  Keith Ka-fu Chan according to its nature and function.25 Hierarchy, for Confucianism, is seen as a necessary way for each being to fulfill its function. Thus, no individual has an exclusive privileged status. The processes of nature and its ongoing logic of transformation are the standard form that takes priority.

5  Confucian Ideal Human Human actualization in cultural and ethical transformation is always embodied in the transformation process within the dynamic of nature. The great triad of Confucianism – heaven, earth, and humans – signifies this understanding that only humans can attain their full humanity in relationship to both heaven and earth. This becomes an ontological-ethical foundation for a cosmological ethical system of relationality applicable to spheres of family, society, politics, and nature. Nature functions in this world view as great parents to humans, providing sustenance, nurturing, intelligibility, and guidance. In return, nature requires human respect and care. Human realization is achieved by fulfilling this role of filial children to beneficent parents who have sustained life for humans. Humans participate in the vast processes of nature by cultivating themselves in relation to nature’s seasons and transformations. Human beings are not treated as the masters of the universe in Confucianism, because all beings in the world are included within the cosmic moral order. As Chang Tsai (Zhang Zai, 1020–1077)’s Western Inscription noted,26 this cosmic moral order constitutes the basic ontological structural relationship between humans and other beings. Using the metaphor of kinship order, all beings in the world are arranged in an orderly relational structure. Humans are the sons/daughters of Heaven and Earth, and other non-human beings are regarded as our companions. It seems that, in Confucianism, “human beings are organically connected with rocks, trees and animals”.27 In this sense, we can state that it is no problem for Confucianism to agree with the anti-anthropocentric approach of environmental ethics, that human and non-human beings should each have intrinsic value, because they are equal in the sense that all are subject to the transformative influence of Heaven and Earth. However, Confucianism rejects certain kinds of eco-egalitarianism, which assume that an equal moral status is shared by human beings and other nonhuman beings. In the Doctrine of the Mean, Heaven decrees human nature on the assumption that humankind receives, at least in potential, this mandate of Heaven in its highest excellence. Therefore, among the creatures in the cosmos, human beings are assumed to be the most sentient being, and the mandate that comes from Heaven establishes the ideal moral process and ideal personality as grounded in sincerity (Cheng, 誠).28 In the Doctrine of the Mean, the word “sincerity” is not only regarded as a human moral quality, being trustworthy to other people and oneself, but is also

Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding  219 treated as an ethical ontological substance of Heaven and Earth. “Sincerity is a way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the way of man”.29 To be sincere is identical with developing and cultivating the potentiality of others. The Confucian ideal moral person is a person who can fully actualize the inner goodness mandated by Heaven, and then also cultivate others’ inner goodness in order to fulfill the ultimate self-cultivating ends in union with Heaven and Earth. Based on the unity of human beings and non-human beings, Confucianism finds no difficulty in asserting the intrinsic value of all beings. However, under the above analysis, “Heaven-Human-Earth” consists of the organic and holistic worldview in which human beings should play a unique role: transformation of the moral potentiality of other beings in the world. In this sense, the Confucian tradition insists that the centrality of the human being in the cosmos is by virtue of cultivating and transforming the other. The unity of “Heaven-Human-Earth” is best illustrated in Wang Yangming (1472–1529)’s Inquiry on the Great Learning.30 In the text, Wang emphasized that the Confucian “Great Man” does not mean super-human, but a person who transforms and cultivates her/himself to be an authentic person who, ontologically united with transcendent Heaven and immanent Earth on the one hand, and constituting a unifying body with other species on the other, is full of passion and compassion toward other beings that are also regarded as the creation of the Heaven and Earth. The concept of unity with other beings in a body upholds the intrinsic value of other beings; however, this does not mean that Confucianism will agree with eco-egalitarianism, which insists that all beings have equal value with others. The idea of the “degree of love” will insist that, in Confucianism, though non-human beings are the objects of moral compassion, the human social order has ontological and moral priority over the animal world and the natural world. In a certain sense, the concept of human as microcosm is found in Confucianism. This is expressed most succinctly in the metaphor of humans as forming a triad with Heaven and earth. This is not intended simply to describe a vague mystical unity with the “all”. Rather, the Confucians situate humans within concentric circles of embeddedness. The individual is never viewed in isolation but is seen as part of these interlocking circles, which touch each other. The family is at the center and the circles move outward toward friends and the larger human community; they connect to the political order, and inevitably unite with the cosmos itself. This is exactly the Confucian anthropocosmic world view.

6  Concluding Remark: An Ecological Perspective From the above discussion, anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches are not the “either-or” problem for Tillich and the Confucian thought in the environmental reflection. Both assert that the transcendental and immanent side of the whole universe is not separated and dualistic but

220  Keith Ka-fu Chan interpretational and inter-related. The role of human being is regarded as the “central” but not the master of the universe, it means that human being is perfectly located himself/herself into the whole ecological-biological system of the world, and embodies the most perfect dimensions from the whole universe into oneself. Tillich’s idea of the presence of Holy Spirit is embodied universally within the multi-dimensional unity of life; the pan-sacramentality provides the room for Tillich to embrace the idea of the dynamic and holistic view of the reality of Confucian traditions. Also, in Confucianism, the dynamic and unifying vision of the universe constitutes the principle of “unity in difference” in which all the diverse realities share the “one fundamental principle”. Confucian ethics encourages us to expand our human heart to love the other beings in the world. Concerning anthropology, both regard the human being as the mediator between God and the world. Comparing the stewardship of human beings with environmental thinking, Tillich highlighted the human being as the “highest” being in the ontological sense, though this does not imply that s/he is the perfect one. Based on the universal fall of humanity and nature, the ambiguous character of all beings results in suffering with an alienated existential condition. For Tillich, the human as microcosm represents the ethical and religious tasks that human should fulfill. For Tillich, under the impact of Spiritual Presence, the divine love, agape, is manifested. The agape manifests its power through the ontological structure of all beings, to bind all beings into a unified whole. Because the ontological structure of love is the reunion of the separated, the Spiritual agape transforms the human eros to embrace the universe. Compared with the Confucianism, the love-quality of human beings is also manifested in the role of humans as the companions of other beings in the world. Human beings and other beings are fragile and share the suffering of the world.

Notes 1 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 15. 2 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 259. 3 Ibid., 260. 4 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 34. 5 Tillich, “Autobiographical Reflection,” The Theology of Paul Tillich. Ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New York: MacMillian Co., 1956), 4. 6 Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” The Protestant Era. Ed. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 108. 7 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 118. 8 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.3, 123. 9 Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” 67.

Tillich’s and Confucian Anthropocosmic Understanding  221 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.3, 123. 13 Ibid. 14 Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” 102, 103. 15 Ibid., 109. 16 Tillich, “Author’s Introduction,” The Protestant Era. Ed. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), xxiii. 17 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 151. 18 Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol.3, 113. 19 Ibid., 121. 20 Ibid., 123. 21 Weiming Tu, “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Ed. J. Baird Callicott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). 22 Jung-Yeup Kim, Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Qi: A Practical Understanding (Lexington Books, 2015). 23 Weiming Tu, “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” 70. 24 Ibid. 25 Mary Evelyn Tucker, “Confucianism and Deep Ecology,” Deep Ecology and World Religions. Eds. David Landis Barnhill & Roger S. Gottlieb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 131. 26 “Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I find an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.” Wing-tsit Chan. Trans. and ed. 1963. Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 497. 27 Weiming Tu, “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” 113. 28 Only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can fully develop their nature, they can then fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully develop the nature of others, they can then fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature of things, they can then assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth” Wing-tsit Chan. Trans. and ed. 1963. Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 108. 29 Wing-tsit Chan. Trans. and ed. 1963. Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 7. 30 “The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. He regards the world as one family and the country as one person … That the great man can regarded Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the humane nature of his mind that he do so. Forming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is not only true of the great man. Even the mind of the small man is no different. Only he himself makes it small. Therefore when he sees a child about to fall into a well, he cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows that his humanity (jen) forms one body with the child. It may be objected that the child belongs to the same species. Again, when he observes the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, he cannot help feeling an “inability to bear” their suffering. This shows that his humanity forms one body with birds and animals. It may be objected that birds and animals are sentient beings as he is. But when he sees plants broken and destroyed, he cannot help … feeling … pity. This shows that

222  Keith Ka-fu Chan his humanity forms one body with plants. It may be said that plants are living things as he is. Yet, even when he sees tiles and stones shattered and crushed, he cannot help … feeling … regret. This means that even the mind of the small man necessarily has the humanity that forms one body with all. Such a mind is rooted in his Heaven-endowed nature, and is naturally intelligent, clear and not beclouded. For this reason it is called ‘clear character’” Wing-tsit Chan. Trans. and ed. 1963. Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 659, 660.

References Chan, Wing-tsit. Trans. and ed. 1963. Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Kim, Jung-Yeup. Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Qi: A Practical Understanding (Lexington Books, 2015). Tillich, Paul. “Nature and Sacrament,” The Protestant Era. Ed. James Luther Adams （Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 94–114. ———. “Author’s Introduction,” The Protestant Era. Ed. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), ix–xxix. ———. Systematic Theology Vol.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). ———. “Autobiographical Reflection,” The Theology of Paul Tillich. Ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New York: MacMillan Co., 1956), 3–21. ———. Systematic Theology Vol.3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). Tu, Weiming. “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Ed. J. Baird Callicott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 67–78. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. “Confucianism and Deep Ecology,” Deep Ecology and World Religions. Eds. David Landis Barnhill & Roger S. Gottlieb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 127–152.

Subject and Name Index

Abe, Masao 5, 8, 9, 21–25, 28 absoluteness, absolutism 57, 58, 60, 76 actual limit 79 Alaric Pearson Rose 142, 149 ambiguity (ambiguous) 4, 13, 57–59, 62, 67, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 87, 100, 101, 106, 113, 114, 125, 126, 157, 169, 185, 192, 212, 213, 220 animals 179, 189, 194, 196, 198, 206, 208, 209, 218, 221 anthropocosmic 5, 39, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221 Aristotle 6, 94, 95, 99, 100, 102, 104–110, 119, 121, 124, 125, 128–132, 134, 136, 137, 177, 182 Barth, Karl 9, 21, 152, 154, 166–168, 174 Baum, Gregory 73 being 1–3, 5–8, 10–21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31–35, 38, 40, 42, 43, 53, 55, 56, 59–62, 65, 66, 70, 75, 77–80, 83, 85–88, 90, 91, 94–98, 103, 107–114, 116, 117, 120–122, 125, 126, 128, 134, 142, 158–161, 164, 175, 176, 181–190, 192, 194, 195, 197–200, 204, 205, 210–222; being-itself 1, 3, 12–14, 31, 111, 215; non-being 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11–17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 95, 96, 111, 121, 124, 185 (see also emptiness); nothingness 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10–16, 18, 20–23, 26, 27, 111, 121 Bergson, Henri 176, 181, 201, 207 biology 5, 175, 176, 180, 182, 184, 186, 190, 191, 193, 195, 197, 202, 203, 206–209 Bishop He Minghua 142, 149 Bishop Ronald Owen Hall 141 boundary 1, 4, 5, 37, 56, 64, 70, 73, 77–82, 84–88, 91, 92, 104, 149, 150, 189

boundary situation 78, 143, 149 Buddhahood 15, 17 Buddha-nature 15, 17, 18 Buddhism 1–5, 7–12, 14–18, 20, 21–29, 32, 35, 41, 93, 115, 121, 124, 135–137, 147, 191, 201, 210; Buddhist–Christian dialogue 23, 27; Mādhyamaka 11, 13, 116; Mahayana 21, 27, 117; Zen 9, 10, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26–28; Mahāyāna Buddhism 3, 11, 12, 15, 21, 23, 25, 33, 45, 48, 115, 116, 118, 121; MereConsciousness School 115; Sinicized Buddhism 116 calling 79–83, 85, 88 capital sins 119; acedia 119, 120 Catholicism 132, 139, 146, 150; Christianity 2, 3, 5, 8–10, 12, 13, 16–19, 23–25, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 61, 62, 65, 70, 71, 75, 76, 86, 88, 91, 110, 142–145, 147–151, 160, 163, 175, 176, 191, 201, 210; Protestantism 75, 145–150, 167, 174, 216 century of humiliation 83 Chang Tsai 2, 218 Chen, Ka-fu 1, 2, 5, 7, 21, 23, 26, 45, 47, 48, 77, 78, 87, 90, 132, 138, 180, 201, 202, 207, 211 Chi see Qi Chinese Communist Party 65, 72, 144 Chineseness 93 Chow, Rey 82, 88, 90 Christ: Christology 1, 6, 21, 28, 156, 159, 165, 169, 170, 171, 214, 216 Christianity 2, 3, 5, 8–10, 12, 13, 16–19, 23–25, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 61, 62, 65, 70, 71, 75, 76, 86, 88, 91, 110, 142–145, 147–151, 160, 163, 175, 176, 191, 201, 210

224  Subject and Name Index Clayton, Philip 175, 177, 201, 202, 209 Communism 9, 17, 34, 35, 41, 43, 44, 55, 86, 143–145, 147, 148 Communist Party of China 52, 66, 67, 72, 143, 144; CPC 52, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63 completion 94, 157, 164, 165, 169 conditional and unconditional 153 Confucian 3, 5, 7, 16, 31, 36, 38, 40–48, 132, 138, 147, 175, 176, 191, 195–201, 204–212, 216, 217, 219, 220 Confucianism 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 11, 14, 16, 24, 28, 30, 31–33, 35–49, 147, 175, 176, 191, 193, 195, 198–201, 205, 208, 210, 211, 212, 217–222; NeoConfucianism 191, 193, 194, 200, 204, 209, 217; New Confucian 16, 24, 39, 45, 47, 49 cosmogony 212, 216 creation 21, 29, 37, 61, 75, 155–157, 161, 164, 165, 169, 184, 185, 187, 188, 216, 217, 219 crisis 5, 87, 154, 156–158, 160, 161, 163, 170, 211 Cross of Jesus Christ 4, 59, 60, 63; the Cross 60, 100, 105, 106, 126, 144; crucifixion 60 culture 11, 17–21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 66, 69, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 88–92, 100, 138, 146, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 169, 190, 193, 197, 202, 204, 206–209, 215 Daoism 1, 9, 11, 14, 15, 37, 41, 147 Demonic 4, 35, 44, 50, 57–64, 66, 67, 69–71, 73–76, 80, 81, 84, 88, 155, 157, 216 dialectic 154, 158, 163, 165, 168, 171, 172, 185, 187; dialectical 1, 2, 11, 12, 17, 23, 28, 37, 38, 47, 74, 77, 111, 125, 152, 154–158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 172 dimensions 5, 45, 49, 58, 62, 78, 81, 84, 87, 124, 133, 134, 138, 179, 182–189, 192, 194, 200, 203, 212–214, 220; see also multi-dimensional Doctrine of the Mean 218 embodiedness 180, 198 emergence 5, 19, 175–180, 184–192, 194, 197–203, 205–207, 209, 211; emergentism 176, 177, 179, 180, 182,

183, 191, 194, 200; theory of 176, 177; emergent evolution 184, 186, 190, 196, 199, 203, 207, 209 empathy 196, 197, 206, 209 emptiness 3, 7, 10–18, 20, 22, 23, 25–27, 34, 111; negativity 16, 22, 25, 57; nothingness 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10–16, 18, 20–23, 26, 27, 111, 121; the problem of 16; see also being essential limit 79–83, 85 establishments 42, 43 ethnic identity 83 event (Ereignis) 156 evolution 176, 178–180, 183–187, 190, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209; evolutionary psychology 5, 175 existence (existential, politicalexistential) 1–4, 14, 16, 31, 34, 50–52, 55, 57, 61, 63, 64, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 85, 87, 104, 107, 111, 112, 114, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 161, 171, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 196, 213, 216, 220 external transcendence 37, 38 faith 4–6, 10, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 30–32, 35–41, 43–45, 47, 48, 55–57, 59, 63, 65–67, 70, 74, 75, 85, 91, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 120, 122, 124–127, 131–134, 143, 144, 155–157, 159, 163, 166, 171, 173, 176, 181, 209, 215, 216 Fascism 34, 35, 55, 86, 110, 126, 127 finite 3, 31–34, 36, 38, 43, 55, 56, 62, 74, 114, 115, 127, 184–186, 199, 214 frontier 73, 78–81, 83–85, 87–89 gestalt 180–183, 202, 203, 207; gestaltism 180; gestalt science 180 Gifts (of the Holy Spirit) 98, 99, 128, 130 Gilkey, Langdon 12, 23, 26 God 1–4, 6–14, 20–23, 25–29, 31, 32, 34, 37–40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 55, 59, 60–64, 66, 68, 69, 74–76, 79, 80, 86, 88, 96–99, 101–105, 111, 112, 114, 121, 122, 125, 134, 142, 144, 154–165, 168– 173, 185–187, 202, 207, 209, 212–217, 220; doctrine of 3, 6, 10–12, 21, 28, 66, 69, 88; trinitarian understanding of 13 Gogarten, Friedrich 154, 157, 167, 169, 170

Subject and Name Index  225 grace 58, 62, 97, 101–104, 106, 128, 132–134, 136, 139, 155, 156, 159, 166, 174, 215 Great Man 219, 221 Harnack, Adolf von 19, 152, 166, 173, 174 He, Guanghu 26, 27 Heidegger, Martin 11, 19, 24, 25, 28 Hellenization 19; de-Hellenization 18, 19, 24, 28 hierarchical complexity 177, 178, 179 Hirsch, Emanuel 74, 85, 91, 153, 168–171 history 6, 25, 29, 34, 35, 42, 43, 57–62, 66–70, 74, 80, 81, 85–87, 89–92, 107, 116, 123, 125, 132, 152, 153, 155–157, 159, 160, 163–166, 171, 182, 185, 196, 199, 205, 206, 208, 209, 216 Hong Kong 2, 20, 21, 22, 24–28, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 88, 89, 92, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 148–151, 167, 169, 201, 206–209 Huineng 15, 24 human nature 2, 16, 17, 39, 80, 96–99, 103, 124, 127, 165, 191, 195, 197–201, 205–208, 218; Mencian concept of 205, 207 humanism 11, 37, 40, 44, 49, 76, 88, 110, 205–107, 210 humanistic 30, 109, 114, 132

Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti 177, 201, 208 Kauffman, Stuart 179, 202, 207 Kingdom of God 4, 21, 43, 50, 60–64, 68, 69, 80 Kyoto School 5, 9–12, 16–19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28 language 3, 20, 32, 43, 81, 83, 108, 111, 190, 204, 208 latent church 62 Li 191, 193–195, 196, 200, 201 life 5, 10–12, 16, 17, 22, 25–27, 31, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 51, 52, 55, 58, 62, 66–68, 70, 73, 74, 78–81, 87, 88, 90, 95–98, 100–104, 106, 109, 112–116, 119, 121, 122, 125–127, 130, 133, 135, 142, 144, 148–151, 155, 162, 169, 170, 172, 176, 177, 180, 181–194, 198, 199–203, 207, 208, 212, 214–218, 220; dimensions of 78, 81, 87, 184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 200; evolution of (see also evolution); function of 192, 199; multidimensional unity of 78, 180, 181, 182, 186, 188 Little Pink 53, 54 Liu Shu-hsien劉述先 1, 21, 30, 33, 36, 45, 46, 48, 49 Logos 6, 18, 20, 21, 24–29, 45, 47, 63, 64, 68–71, 107, 112, 121, 126, 127, 132, 138, 161, 165–167, 170, 171, 213

judgment 19, 43, 79, 155, 156, 159, 162, 163, 187 justice 60–62, 74, 76, 80, 81, 93, 95, 97, 104, 107, 114, 125–127, 131, 132, 199, 200

Mādhyamaka see Buddhism Mahayana see Buddhism manifest church 62 martyrdom 6, 94–97, 99–107, 110–115, 121–127, 130–134, 137, 138; burning fingers (Buddhist) 122, 123; martyr (Catholic) 121, 133; self-immolation (Buddhist) 122; self-sacrifice 102, 112, 113–115, 123, 125, 126, 216 Max Scheler 140, 141 method of correlation 73, 172 microcosmos 212 mind-body problem 179, 182, 186, 209 morality 2, 106, 107, 176, 187, 189, 191, 196–198, 206, 207; Confucian 198 Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三 30, 36, 38, 44, 46 multi-dimensional 2, 5, 21, 28, 182, 185, 212, 214, 216, 220

Kairos 43, 47, 48, 74–76, 85, 92, 146, 150, 167 Kamikaze, Shinto, Bushido, virtue of Shinobu 115

national identity 18, 73, 77, 79, 82–85, 88–92 nationalism 4, 18, 34, 35, 42, 43, 50, 58, 65, 71, 73–77, 79, 80, 84–92

idealism 155 ideology 17, 30, 44, 54, 56, 66, 70, 84, 87, 91, 96, 115 idolatry (idolatrous) 4, 13, 33, 57, 74–77, 86, 154, 156, 159, 161, 170 immanent transcendence 36–39, 47 infinite 3, 31, 32, 34, 38, 43, 56, 74, 114, 116, 135, 155, 186, 189, 192, 214 infinitude 31, 36, 38 infinity 57, 59, 61, 111, 125, 154 Inquiry on the Great Learning 219 irreducibility 177, 178

226  Subject and Name Index nature 2, 4, 5, 10, 15–18, 22, 25, 39, 41, 50, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64, 67, 70, 71, 75–77, 80, 83, 85, 88, 93, 94, 96–100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 115, 117–122, 124, 127, 128, 130, 132–134, 136, 139, 147, 155, 156, 159, 163, 165, 176, 178, 182–184, 187, 191–201, 203, 205–212, 214–218, 220–222 nature versus nurture 195, 196; houtian 195; xiantian 195 Nazi 73, 74, 76, 79, 126, 147; Fascism 34, 35, 55, 86, 110, 126, 127; Nazism 56, 60, 73, 88, 110, 124, 127 Nazism 56, 60, 73, 88, 110, 124, 127 negation 10, 11, 14–17, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28, 60, 112, 154–158, 165, 173 negativity 16, 22, 25, 57; the problem of 16 neuroscience 5, 175, 176, 201, 208 New Confucian scholars 39, 47 Nishida, Kitarō 3, 7, 9, 18, 22, 26 non-being 1, 5, 8, 10–17, 20–22, 24, 25 non-reductive 5, 175, 194 non-violence 121, 126, 134 nothingness 2, 3, 7, 9–16, 18, 20–23, 26, 27, 111, 121; absolute nothingness 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 111; see also being; emptiness; negativity, the problem of novelty 177, 178, 184, 203, 207 object 3, 8, 13, 31–34, 38, 66, 94, 125, 135, 159, 180, 181, 210, 214–216, 219 objective 13, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 100, 105, 119, 156, 194, 215 Onto-theology 19, 20, 25, 28 Orientalism 17, 18, 24, 27, 28; reverse Orientalism 5, 16–19, 24, 28 Orthodox 2, 7, 19, 20, 25, 27, 147, 153, 160, 163, 166, 168, 172, 201 paradox 89, 92, 171, 174; critical paradox 154–157; negative paradox 156; positive paradox 154–161, 171 patriotic education 83, 89, 92 Paul Tillich 1–10, 12–14, 16–37, 39–45, 47, 48, 50–52, 55–71, 73–93, 107–116, 121, 123–127, 131–134, 138, 140–143, 145–176, 180–193, 199–216, 219–222 Peacocke, Arthur 177, 178, 180, 186, 201, 202, 208, 209 Pelikan, Jaroslav 19 People’ Republic of China 52, 65, 66, 68, 72; PRC 52

person: Confucian understanding 175, 176; emergence of 179; human 5, 109, 125, 175, 179, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 195–201, 206, 208–210; relational understanding of 176, 179; theory of, Tillich’s understanding of 183 personality 55, 58, 62, 65, 69, 110, 114, 129, 186, 216, 218; humanity 5, 7, 23, 27, 37, 39, 40, 62, 80, 88, 104, 105, 114, 134, 156, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 212, 213, 218, 220–222 personhood 20, 25, 29, 175, 187, 191, 196, 200, 202, 209 Platform Sutra 15, 24, 26, 29 Pneumatology 87, 90, 161, 186, 201, 202, 204, 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216 position 5, 10, 13, 14, 19, 43, 52, 66, 107, 108, 130, 153–158, 164, 165, 173, 176, 199, 207 possession (possessing) 58, 117, 119, 120 possibility 39, 64, 69, 77, 81, 83, 85, 92, 101, 114, 155, 159, 163, 167, 168, 174, 178, 200, 204, 208 Protestantism 75, 145–150, 216 Qi 23, 24, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 200, 217, 221, 222 quasi-religion (quasi-religious) 4, 9, 17, 30–36, 40, 43–45, 55, 56, 57, 63, 75, 76, 84, 86, 91, 149, 151 question and answer 51, 63 realism 18, 155, 173, 215 reduction 20, 89, 92, 191, 216; reductionism 19, 181, 183 reduction of life 191; self-creativityof 190; self-transcendenceof 198, 199, 214; theologyof 8, 20, 21, 23, 27, 66, 68, 70, 85, 87, 91, 92, 156, 157, 168, 171, 173, 174, 176, 180, 182, 183, 184, 187, 191, 199, 201, 203, 208, 209, 215, 220, 222; see also reduction relationality 20, 175, 176, 179, 187–189, 196–198, 200, 204, 210, 218 religion 1–5, 7–10, 14, 16, 17, 20–41, 43–50, 54–57, 60, 63, 65, 66, 68–70, 73, 75–77, 84–89, 91, 92, 111, 115, 132, 138, 144, 147, 149–151, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163–171, 174–176, 180, 181, 184, 185, 191, 198, 201–203, 205–208, 211, 221, 222 religious character 30, 33, 38, 39, 42, 56, 63

Subject and Name Index  227 revelation 37, 60, 75, 109, 110, 126, 127, 155–157, 159, 160, 163, 165, 166, 169, 174, 214, 215, 216; special revelation 159–161, 165, 171; universal revelation 161, 165 sacramentality 7, 214, 215, 220 salvation 39, 43, 58, 67, 115, 117, 120–124, 155, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 169, 215, 216 Schmidt, Karl Ludwig 152, 153 Schüßler, Werner 66, 69, 70, 149, 151, 153, 167–174 science and religion 5, 176, 181, 191, 206, 208 self-affirmation 35, 42, 107, 110–112, 125 self-cultivation 2, 39, 117, 191, 195, 198, 199, 200 self-world 187, 188, 190 Shun, Kwong-loi 94, 195, 206, 210 spirit 13, 31, 39, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 60, 62, 75–78, 87, 90, 103, 104, 107–110, 114, 116, 117, 121, 132, 147, 155–157, 159, 161, 165, 176, 182, 186–192, 199, 201–204, 206– 209, 214, 216; dimension of 3, 36, 38–40, 44, 51, 77, 127, 137, 182, 184, 186–189, 199, 214, 216; embodied 18, 22, 26, 37, 176, 186, 187, 191, 196, 197, 204, 212, 217, 218, 220; the Holy Spirit 75, 84, 97–110, 113, 114, 125, 127, 128, 130, 155, 160, 161, 173, 216 spiritual 4, 31, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 67, 70, 75, 96, 100, 102, 103, 109–112, 114, 116, 117, 119–125, 127, 128, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 155, 160, 161, 167, 175, 186–189, 199, 200, 202–206, 210, 212–217, 220 St. Thomas Aquinas 6, 7, 93, 101, 102, 104–106, 109, 119, 124, 125, 127, 128–134, 136, 138, 139 subject matter (Sache) 6, 76, 165, 170, 173 subjective 13, 31, 35, 36, 40, 119, 186, 215 sublation 154, 156, 158 super ordinate identity 83, 84 supernaturalism 153, 154, 162, 164, 169, 171, 172 symbol 3, 4, 7, 32, 35, 43, 45, 51, 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, 72, 74, 77, 79, 160, 171, 184, 214, 215, 216

T. C. Chao 149, 151 Tang Chun-i唐君毅30, 36, 38, 44, 46, 48 Taoism see Daoism the Epistle to Romans 162, 170 theonomy 4, 61, 66, 69, 73–77, 79, 81, 82, 84–86, 88, 90, 160, 162 theonomy (theonomous) 2, 60, 76, 114, 153, 168, 214 Thurneysen, Eduard 153, 154, 157, 162, 166–171, 173 Tillich, Paul 1–10, 12–14, 16–37, 39–45, 47, 48, 50–52, 55–71, 73–93, 107–116, 121, 123–127, 131–134, 138, 140–143, 145–176, 180–193, 199–216, 219–222 transcendence 1, 7, 21, 22, 24, 28, 36–40, 45–47, 49, 163, 172, 198–200, 211, 212, 214, 216 transcendentalism 164 Trinity 11, 12, 22, 25, 26, 27, 155, 221 Tu, Weiming 192–194, 198, 205, 206, 210, 217, 221, 222 ultimacy 13, 31–34, 36, 37, 40, 43, 55, 56, 74, 86 ultimate 3, 11–15, 21, 31–34, 36–40, 42, 43, 47–49, 56, 61–63, 76, 81, 96, 97, 103–106, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 120, 121, 124–127, 161, 176, 184, 188, 189, 215, 216, 217, 219; concern 2–4, 7, 9, 13, 21, 26, 30–38, 40, 43–48, 55–57, 65, 66, 69, 74, 75, 86–88, 90, 111, 112, 121, 125, 127, 184, 215; reality 3, 7, 10, 11–13, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 45, 48, 200 ultimate concern 2–4, 7, 9, 13, 21, 26, 30–38, 40, 43–48, 55–57, 65, 66, 69, 74, 75, 86–88, 90, 111, 112, 121, 125, 127, 184, 215 ultimate dimension 36, 38, 40, 43 Uyghurs 53 virtue, cardinal virtue 6, 93, 94–96, 98, 99, 103, 107, 109, 110, 115, 116, 121, 127, 128, 130, 132, 138; courage 5, 6, 23, 26, 93, 100–102, 104–112, 114– 118, 120, 124, 127–134, 137, 138; infused (cardinal) virtue of fortitude 99, 103, 121; theological virtues 96, 98, 99, 120, 130; virtue of charity (caritas) 96, 120; virtue of fortitude (fortitudo) 6, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103,

228  Subject and Name Index 107, 108, 112, 115, 116, 121, 126, 128, 131, 133, 138; virtue of vīrya 6, 93, 115, 119, 121 vitalism 141, 181, 183, 192 vocation 42, 79, 80 vocational consciousness 42–44 Wang, Fuzhi 42, 193–196, 205, 207, 208 Wang, Yangming 206, 219 war (medieval) 59, 65, 72–74, 76, 88, 100, 102, 104, 105, 115, 121, 125, 131, 137, 144; duel 126; public war 102–104, 125, 126; private war 102, 103, 125, 126; spiritual fighting 102, 103 Weaver, Matthew Lon 73, 87

whole-part influence 177–179, 196 Winfried Glüer 143, 151 Xi Jinping 52, 56, 65, 71, 72 Xing: ren xing 195, 205, 207 Xinjiang 53, 65, 71, 72 Xu, Shuqin 82, 89, 92 Xunzi 195, 198, 205–208 Yu Ying-shih 余英時36, 41–43, 46 Zen see Buddhism Zhai, Yida 84, 89, 92 Zhang Zai 217, 218, 221, 222; see also Chang Tsai Zizioulas, John 20, 25, 28, 29