Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and China's Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay 9789814377607

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modem Southeast· Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modemiza· tion, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University,· appointees fron'l the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and· administrative officer.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United J{ingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore." ,

''OVERSEAS CHINESE" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY An Interpretative Essay

by

I .co Survadinata

Research l\;otes and Discussions Paper No. I I Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1978

CONTENTS

Page Introduction

1

(I)

Overseas Chinese, China and Communist Movements

4

(II)

The Position of the Overseas Chinese in Peking's Foreign Policy

9

(III)

Overseas Chinese and the PRC Foreign Policy Priorities

15

(IV)

Peking's Policy towards the Overseas Chinese Before 1977

25

(V)

A New Policy?

28

Conclusion

34

Appendix 1:

Appendix 2:

Appendix 3:

Number and Percentage of ''Overseas Chinese" in the Populations of Southeast Asia ( 1974)

36

Official Translation ofthejin-minjih-pao (Rcnrnin Ribao) Editorial of 4 January 1978, published in Pl'king Review,. No.3 (20 January 1978), pp. 14-16

37

Excerpt of Hua Kuo-feng's speech on the Overseas Chinese. Taken from his "Report on the Work of the Government" delivered at the National People's Congress on 28 February 1978, published in Peking Review, No. l 0 (10 March 1978), pp. 35 and 37

41

Appendix 4A: Total Overseas Chinese Remittances to the PRC, 1950-64 B: Overseas Remittances from Southeast Asia to PRC via Hong Kong by origin, 1950-64

Appendix 5:

Chinese Characters Cited in the Essay

42

43 44

Introduction 1 W.It h t h c recent s·mo- v·Jctnan1csc con n·rct over t h c" Overseas ch·mesc" , th e problem of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia has once again attracted the attention of the world. Many began to raise questions whether Peking has introduced a new policy to act as the protector of the interests of the Overseas Chinese. This paper intends to examine very briefly the position of the Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) foreign policy and conventional notions of the linkages between China and the Overseas Chinese. lt is different from Stephen Fitzgerald's major study in several aspects. While Fitzgerald's book is a detailed study on Peking's policy towards the domestic Overseas Chinese and Chinese abroad, focusing on internal

rather than external developments up to around 1970,2 this essay is more general in scope and more recent in coverage. Although the focus is still on Peking's policy towards the ethnic Chinese, it is seen from the perspective of global politics. Moreover, the essay discusses the ethnic Chinese scene in Southeast Asia and ASEAN countries' reactions to recent political developments. No accurate census is available on the numbers of the Overseas Chinese m Southeast Asia due to several reasons: 1

first, it is difficult to define the terms

The term "Overseas Chinese" is ambiguous and often misleading. It has been used to refer to both Chinese nationals overseas and ethnic Chinese who arc local citizens. It also has the connotation that the Chinese are sojourners who will eventually "return" to China. The term is often regarded as the English equivalent of a Chinese term hua-ch 'iao (Chinese sojourners). For an interesting study of the term, sec Wang Gungwu, "A Note on the Origins of Huach'iao" in Lie Tek Tjeng and C.P.F. Luhulima, eds., Masalah·Masalah Intemasional Masakini (7) (Jakarta: Lembaga Research Kebudayaan Nasional- L.l.P.l., 1977), pp. 7-18. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used the term in various ways. According to Stephen Fitzgerald, it was first used to include all ethnic Chinese overseas but by the mid-1950s "it was narrowin.g to a category comprising mainly Chinese nationals but also including all those who still maintained some attachment to the Chinese homeland." (See his China and the Overseas Chines!': A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949-1970 ICambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 197 21, p. x). The Chinese speaking Chinese in Southeast Asia referred to themselves as either hua-jcn, hua-t:::u (both terms mean et hnie Chinese) or hua-i (person of f:hinese descent) and non-Chinese speaking Chinese used different terms to rdcr to themselves, depending on the country in which they lived. For instance, in Indonesia the local born and Indonesian speaking Chinese were called jN'ranakans or ketunma1!'· In this essay, l am using the term "Overseas Chinese" as well as "ethnic Chinese" to refer to people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia, regardless of their nationality and degree of acculturation for two reasons: first, the essay is dealing with the PRC policy towards the Chinese abroad: second, the term "Overseas Chinese" is still used by Peking to refer to the Chinese population abroad, although it is not clear if it is used to refer to all ethnic Chinese or those who are China's nationals as well as those "stateless". Because of its ambiguity, it is preferable to use the term "Overseas Chinese" in quotation marks but for aesthetic reasons, I have only used it in the title and when it first appears in the text.

2

Fitzgerald, op.cit.

In fact, thC' study concentrates more on the pre-1960 period.

')

"(hcrscas Chinese" or "ethnic Chinese" since a few countries do not categorize their l'itizens of Chinese descent as "Chinese" any more, at least in their census statistics;3 secondlv, in some countries it is politically sensitive to differentiate the ethnic backgrounds of the population.4 Therefore, what there is now is only an estimate. In 1965, there were approximately 12.5 million Overseas Chinese in the region, and m 1974, the number was about 14.5 million. 5 In terms of absolute numbers, Malaysia has the largest ethnic Chinese population, 3,552,413; Thaihmd is second with 3,500,000; and Indonesia is third with 3,250,000. But in terms of percentage of ethnic Chinese to the total population, Singapore ranks first (75.5%.), Malaysia second (34%), Brunei third (24%) and Thailand fourth (8.9%). The importance of the 14.5 million Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has been recognized, largely because of the following factors: China has increasingly been active in international politics and the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have played significant roles which have affected both the political and economic stability of the region. The linkage between China and the Overseas Chinese has been assumed to be essential and hence affects foreign relations between China and Southeast Asian countries. James Rosenau, a leading U.S. political scientist who is recognized as the promoter of "linkage politics", argues the relationship between China and the Overseas Chinese as follows: For various reasons the Chinese in Southeast Asia have become leading merchants of these countries and, in tum, are subject to oppressive taxation and discrimination in many ways. They naturally turn to China for protection, whether to Taipei or Peking. Hence this minority group becomes involved in the eyes of the dominant majority in these countries, a potential fifth column, to which is added the problem of whether or not the Communist Party will succeed in organizing these Chinese minorities. 6

3

According to my Thai informants, a Chinese born in Thailand is classified as Thai by ''race''.

4

In the two Indonesian population censuses conducted in 1961 and 1971, there is no breakdown by ethnic origin.

5

For the estimate, see Appendix 1.

6

James Rosenau, Of Boundaries and Bridges: .t1 Report on the Interdependencies of National and International Political Systems, Princeton University, Center for International Studies, January 1967, pp. 42-43.

3

The assumption made by Rosenau here is that the Chinese minority is largely a homogeneous group which sees both Taipei and Peking as their protectors. He also assumes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will, under all circumstances, organize the "Overseas Chinese" to promote its interests, although he is not certain whether or not it will succeed in this venture. It should also be noted that indigenous Southeast Asians consider the Overseas Chinese as a "fifth column". More explicit in his assertion on Peking and the Overseas Chint~se links is Harold Hinton, a Chinese specialist who has published numerous works on PRC's foreign relations. He once argued that From the CCP's standpoint, the Overseas Chinese represent a number of important assets. They can be used to provide bargaining leverage in dealing with Southeast Asian governments, by conveying the impression that fair treatment of the overseas Chinese is a prerequisite for good relations with the CPR [People's Republic of China]. The Overseas Chinese can help the Chinese Communist Party to maintain contact with, finance, and influence local Communist parties. 7 While Rosenau asserts that the Overseas Chinese are Taipei and Peking oriented and seek actively the protection of the Chinese Governments, Hinton seems to emphasize that China is the protector of the Overseas Chinese. He even argues that Sino-Southeast Asian state relations depend in large part on the treatment of the total local Chinese by governments in Southeast Asia. The better a government in Southeast Asia treats the local Chinese, the better its relations with the PRC. The other way round must also be true. Hinton also stresses a point that the CCP can use the Overseas Chinese to finance and influence local communist parties. How correct are their propositions? These are examined in the following sections within the context of the Chinese in Southeast Asia as well as within the context of Chinese foreign policy.

7

Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 401. It ~ho!"'ld be ~oted th~t in ~is later book enti~led China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of Chtn~ s Foretgn Relattons Stnce 1949 (Bloonungton: Indiana University Press, 1972), Hinton modified his argument. He maintained that "in the last analysis, the Overseas Chinese art: not so much instruments in the hands of Peking as hostages for ita good behaviour as well u the hands of the host countrie-:" (p. 199). None the leu, since Hint~n'a previous their own, argu~e?t still has many subsaibers in the West as well as in the region, it ia therefore W()rttJ exammmg.

i?

4

(I) Overseas Chinese, China and Communist Movements As noted previously, one of the assumptions about the Overseas Chinese is that they constitute a homogeneous group: they are traders, Chinese speaking and China oriented. They have close links with both Chinese and local communist parties. In fact, many Western and Chinese writers in the past had believed that the Overseas Chinese were unassimilable. Once a person was born a Chinese, he remained Chinese. He continued to speak Chinese, oriented himself towards China and paid allegiance only to China and not to the local government. These Overseas Chinese were not and are not interested in local politics. The most well-known writers holding this view were probably the late Victor Purcell and C.P. Fitzgerald.8 Since the late 1950s, some Western writers such as G. William Skinner, Donald Willmott, Mary F. Somers and Charles Coppel -- to name just a few -- have seriously studied Chinese communities and discovered that the Overseas Chinese are far from being a homogeneous group and thus this does not warrant a sweeping generalization. 9 The present author's study on the Indonesian Chinese also confirms the heterogeneous nature of the Overseas Chinese society.10 The Chinese in Indonesia, for instance, can culturally be divided into Indonesian speaking peranakans and Chinese speaking totoks; legally, they can be classified as Indonesian citizens and aliens cutting across the abovementioned cultural divisions. Among the aliens, they can be further divided into PRC nationals, Taiwan's nationals and those with ambiguous national status; politically, they are split into pro-Jakarta, pro-Peking and pro-Taipei groups and others who are not sure of their orientation. The majority, however, remain politically passive. Economically, the Chinese are heavily (but not solely) engaged in trading and industrial activities and are still far from controlling the Indonesian economy in the way the Dutch did prior to 1957.

8

Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 1952); C.P. Fitzgerald, The Third China: The Chinese Communities in South-East Asia (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1965).

9

G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957); G. William Skinner, Leadership in the Chinese Community in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); G.W. Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), pp. 97-117; Donald Willmott, The Chinese of Semarang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960); Mary Somers Heidhues, Chinese in Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Longma11s, 1974) and Charles Cappel, "The Indonesian Chinese in the Sixties: A Study of an Ethnic Minority in a Period of Turbulent Political Change," Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1975.

10

Leo Suryadinata, The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers (Singapore: Chapmen, 1978); Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, The Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1978).

The Chinese community in Malaysia is also quite complex. Politically, according to the analysis of Wang Gungwu, the Chinese in Malaysia can be divided into A, B and C groups. 11 Group A Chinese identify themselves with China, both politically and culturally; Group B (which constitutes the majority) is concerned with "low-profile and indirect politics of trade and associations''; Group C is committed to "some sort of Malayan loyalty". Legally speaking, Malaysi:!

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INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE

RESEARCH NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS PAPERS SERIES M. !\tainguy, Economic Problems Related to Oil and Gas Exploration, 1976. 39pp. S$6.00 2

R. William Liddle, Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia, 1977. 21pp. S$4.00

.'3

Raja Scgaran Arumugam, Stale and Oil in Burma, 1977. 3Gpp. S$5.00

-1:

I Iilman Adil, .1 ustralia 's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962-66, 1977. 90pp. S$8.00

5

Albert D. Moscotti, Burma's Constitution and Elections of 1974: A Source Book, 1977. 184pp. S$13.00

G

Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand rmd tht· .fapanesc Prt'.ll'IIU', 19-/-1- J:J, 1977. 142pp. S$13.00

7

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