Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection 9789401201704, 9401201706

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OBSERVATION, HYPOTHESIS, INTROSPECTION

POZNAŃ STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES VOLUME 87

EDITORS Jerzy Brzeziński Andrzej Klawiter Krzysztof Łastowski Leszek Nowak (editor-in-chief) Izabella Nowakowa Katarzyna Paprzycka (managing editor)

Marcin Paprzycki Piotr Przybysz (assistant editor) Mikołaj Sędek Michael J. Shaffer Piotr Ziemian

ADVISORY COMMITTEE Joseph Agassi (Tel-Aviv) Étienne Balibar (Paris) Wolfgang Balzer (München) Mario Bunge (Montreal) Nancy Cartwright (London) Robert S. Cohen (Boston) Francesco Coniglione (Catania) Andrzej Falkiewicz (Wrocław) Dagfinn Føllesdal (Oslo) Bert Hamminga (Tilburg) Jaakko Hintikka (Boston) Jacek J. Jadacki (Warszawa) Jerzy Kmita (Poznań)

Leon Koj (Lublin) Władysław Krajewski (Warszawa) Theo A.F. Kuipers (Groningen) Witold Marciszewski (Warszawa) Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki) Günter Patzig (Göttingen) Jerzy Perzanowski (Toruń) Marian Przełęcki (Warszawa) Jan Such (Poznań) Max Urchs (Konstanz) Jan Woleński (Kraków) Ryszard Wójcicki (Warszawa)

Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities is partly sponsored by SWPS and Adam Mickiewicz University

Address:

dr Katarzyna Paprzycka . Instytut Filozofii . SWPS . ul. Chodakowska 19/31 03-815 Warszawa . Poland . fax: ++48 22 517-9625 E-mail: [email protected] . Website: http://PoznanStudies.swps.edu.pl

POLISH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Volume V

Editors: Jacek Juliusz Jadacki (editor-in-chief) Leszek Nowak Jan Woleński Jerzy Perzanowski Ryszard Wójcicki

Adam Wiegner OBSERVATION, HYPOTHESIS, INTROSPECTION Translated by Katarzyna Paprzycka

Edited by Izabella Nowakowa

AMSTERDAM – NEW YORK, NY 2005

The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence". ISSN 0303-8157 ISBN: 90-420-1726-0 (Bound) ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2005 Printed in The Netherlands

CONTENTS Izabella Nowakowa, Introduction: Adam Wiegner’s Nonstandard Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Translator’s Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Selected Translational Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27 31

HOLISTIC EMPIRICISM

A Note on Holistic Empiricism (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy (1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The “Proton Pseudos” in Wundt’s Criticism of R. Avenarius’ Philosophy (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophical Significance of Gestalt Theory (1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . The Idea of a Logic of Knowledge (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35 37 91 95 99

OTHER EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Remarks on Indeterminism in Physics (1932) . . A Note on the Concept of Relative Truth (1964) On the so-called “Relative Truth” (1963) . . . . . On Abstraction and Concretization (1960). . . . .

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105 121 123 137

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

On the Nature of Mental Phenomena (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 On the Debate about Imaginative Ideas (1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 On the Subjective and Objective Clarity in Thought and Word (1959). . . 197 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Original Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Appendix: J. Kmita, Wiegner’s Conception of Holistic Empiricism . . 219

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Izabella Nowakowa INTRODUCTION: ADAM WIEGNER’S NONSTANDARD EMPIRICISM 1. Adam Wiegner’s philosophical work belongs to the Polish brand of analytical philosophy, the Lvov-Warsaw School — though to its rather peripheral branches. The mainstream of the Lvov-Warsaw School was parallel to the German neopositivism and to the British empiricism, all of which were under the spell of Hume’s epistemology. By contrast, Wiegner was inspired by the tradition of neokantianism and proposed a theory that in many ways precedes the views developed later by K.R. Popper. Some of his epistemological views remain original to this day. 2. Here are the main epistemological ideas that were the reference point for A. Wiegner: I. Analytic-synthetic dualism. All beliefs are based either on the analysis of its component concepts or on the association of experiential data. The former can be certain if the analysis is correct, the latter can be at best probable. The content of the former is limited to the content of the concepts involved (analytic beliefs), the content of the latter is enriched through experience (synthetic beliefs). II. A priori synthetic beliefs are impossible. The combination of the two characteristics of certainty and contentfulness is excluded. Contentful (synthetic) beliefs are uncertain, certain (analytic) beliefs have no content. Metaphysics aspires to discovering certain and contentful truths. Its allegedly synthetic a priori claims are only illusions. The only disciplines whose claims have an epistemic value are mathematics and logic, on the one hand, and empirical sciences, on the other.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 7-23. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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III. Experiential dualism. There are two kinds of experience: external (extraspection) and internal (introspection). The former is uncertain, at best probable. The latter is completely certain. IV. Atomistic nature of experience. All experience — whether extraspective or introspective — is based on sense-data, which are the atoms of the mind. Sense-data represent particular simple features of the world. They are combined (in association) to represent more complex features. Various mental procedures lead to the creation of ever more complex ideas. V. Atheoretical nature of experience. If sense-data constitute the ultimate basis for all our synthetic knowledge, they themselves cannot presuppose any knowledge of this kind. Sense-data are atheoretical and neither do they nor does our experience of them rely on any further presuppositions. To the contrary, any assumptions that may appear to be independent of experience can be ultimately reduced to configurations of sense-data. Theses I, II, IV and V are ultimately based on D. Hume’s epistemology. Thesis III captures the Cartesian epistemology of experience. Adam Wiegner calls into question this epistemological paradigm by revising, or at least reinterpreting, theses III-V. In other words, he questions Hume’s conception of extraspection and completely undermines the Cartesian conception of introspection. 3. Wiegner inherits the critique of Hume’s epistemology of extraspection from the Fries/Nelson version of neokantianism. Two arguments are of particular importance: Hume reduces the notion of a necessary connection to the recollection of a succession of impressions, i.e. to the association of one impression with another. As a result, the occurrence of one impression leads to the expectation that another impression will occur. But an expectation is something over and above a recollection. After the occurrence of one event we may expect another, which we did not have a chance to associate with the former — expectations go beyond an individual’s experience. Experiencing a relation is something else than a relation between experiences. There is a relation between the experience of high heat and the experience of pain, but it is dubious whether it is identical to the experience of a relation between these two impressions. The former is objective relation between experiential facts, the latter is part of the conscious experience just like the just mentioned facts. According to Wiegner, the critical tradition does not reach beyond Hume when the understanding of the basic structure of experience is concerned. It holds that sense-data (“impressions,” “sensations”) are the

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elements of experience, and the relations between them (succession, association, recollection, etc.) are not part of the experience, but rather something that organizes experience from the outside, as it were. But this is inadequate: Each even the simplest but concrete “content” of consciousness contains implicitly a “relation” of itself to other such contents. In other words, saying “an object is given to me directly” is the same as saying “I am aware of the relation of an object to certain other object.” For [a proper] empiricist, “relations” are just as directly given as individuals, among which they hold. (1925, p. 50, this volume: p. 77)

An impression is not a basic sense-datum but can be analyzed into components. It is always possible to distinguish in an impression, at least two objects x and y and a relation R between them. Moreover, not only the two objects but also the relation between them are directly experienced. More precisely, neither x nor y are the objects of our direct experience. Rather, what is directly experienced is a certain structure xRy. We experience x’s being R-related to y. This is the basic structure. Ordinarily, however, what we take for sense-data are structures of a higher order. Let ‘C’ stand for ‘x being R-related to y’ and ‘D’ stand for ‘u being S-related to w’. Among the sense-data there are structures of a second-order: we may experience structure Cϕ D: xRy is ϕ -related to uSw. And so on. x R

C

y

ϕ ............

u S

D

w J. Kmita emphasizes the priority of Wiegner’s version of empiricism to Popper’s hypotheticism. As he puts it: [Wiegner] rejected the view that experience is a passive perception of co-occurring but mutually independent elementary impressions, which we then associate one with another into relations of co-existence or into causal connections depending on whether their configurations repeatedly occur in space or in time. . . . The elements of such wholes and structures result from the process of abstraction. (Kmita 1967, p. 44; this volume: pp. 224-225)

So understood “empiricism turns out to be a ‘relativism’ in the sense that the terms ‘object’ and ‘relation’ are correlates of one another – one has no meaning without the other and each has a correlate in what is ‘directly given’” (Wiegner 1925, pp. 50-51, this volume: pp. 77-78). We experience

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not elementary data but complex structures. In particular, we do not experience only the individual components (of lowest order) of those structures, but also the component relations. The question arises whether all relations constituting such structures can be experienced by the senses. We encounter here the problem of the theoretical involvement of sensedata. Wiegner raises this problem and is convinced that theory (“mind”) does influence experience (“senses”): The concept of a “sense” belongs . . . to physiological psychology and refers to a peripheral “bodily organ,” whose stimulation is the condition of making statements about objects. It is quite consistent with empiricism to hold the view that each concrete experiential whole given directly depends equally on peripheral (“sense”) and central (“intellectual”) physiological changes. (Wiegner 1925, p. 51-52, this volume: p. 78; omitted italics)

The details of Wiegner’s position are, however, not quite clear. It is not clear what it means to say that we experience relations constitutive of structures given in experience. It is not clear how “thus conceived empiricism . . . unequivocally recognizes both ‘objects’ and ‘relations’ as given in direct experience” (1925, p. 52, this volume: p. 78)? Does this mean that we experience them in the same way as individuals? Or does it mean that our mind projects its image of the relations on the experienced individuals thereby organizing them into a structure? And does this concern all relations of the experiential structures or only some? And if some, then which ones? Extending Wiegner’s terminology, let us call the relation of the highest order in a given experiential structure the organizing relation for that structure. In our above example of the secondorder structure, ϕ is the organizing relation for that structure, while R and S are subordinate relations. It seems natural to distinguish such a relation in every experiential structure. If someone were to hold that only some relations are projected onto experience by the mind, he would most likely have at least the organizing relations in mind. Whenever one encounters an unclarity of this sort, it is best to begin with a whole spectrum of possibilities. There are three possible views: (1) when we experience a structure, we experience the component individuals in the same way as all component relations; (2) when we experience a structure, we experience only the component individuals, all the component relations derive from the presupposed theory; (3) when we experience a structure, we experience the component individuals in the same way as some component relations, in particular the subordinate relations, but the organizing relation for that structure derives from the presupposed theory.

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The question is which of these positions Wiegner holds. This is not entirely clear. It seems, however, that Position (1) can be excluded. Otherwise, what would the joining of “sensory” and “cognitive” elements in experience consist in? Everything would be derived from the senses: the elements (among which certain relations hold) and the relations themselves. Position (2) can also be eliminated. On that view, the role of the senses is reduced to registering the individual. What could it mean, however, to “sense-register” an individual without noting that it is somehow related to another? Here is how Wiegner describes the determination that two objects are identical: It consists in the fact that object x grasped by means of relation R (i.e. in relation to individual y) is identical with object u grasped by means of relation S (i.e. in relation to individual w.) (1925, p. 50, this volume: p. 77; symbols changed)

Individuals are identified by means of relations in the act of perception. If the latter were derived from reason, it would not only be impossible for the relations but also for the individuals to be objects of perception. The perceptual content of experience would be thereby reduced to zero. Wiegner, however, emphatically identifies himself as an empiricist. Position (3) is thus most likely to be Wiegner’s. It reconciles his empiricism with his view concerning the theoretical presuppositions of the perceptual act. This also seems to be the most adequate view. Some relations are undoubtedly observable (e.g. “is higher than”) but others are not (e.g. “dominates over”). Moreover, relations that organize experience are usually theoretically laden, while lower relations are observable. When one person says to another “Look, C clearly dominates D” referring to two people walking in front of them, he has in mind an unobservable relation between two persons. He says “look,” however, because that relation becomes apparent in observable relations, such as that D follows in C’s footsteps, while C walks in an uninterrupted rhythm without paying any particular attention to the attentive partner. In sum, on the standard view, the perceptual act consists in a simple discerning of some observable feature in the observed object. On Wiegner’s view, the perceptual act consists in the discerning of a structure of relations, the lower of which (themselves observable) hold among observed objects, while the higher involve more and more nonobservational relations and it is the latter that constitute the organizing relations. 4. Let the following be the structure of the perceptual act that p: (i) CϕD, which on the basis of the fact that C and D are objects of a higher (second, say) order and defined by means of relations R and S, respectively and

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(ii) theoretical assumptions T, leads to (iii) xRy and uSw, where (iv 1 ) relations R, S are (let us assume) observational, while (iv 2 ) ϕ is an nonobservational relation. Given this view, which as we saw was quite clearly expressed by Wiegner, it is clear that the stereotype of a one-sided control of theory by experience must be revised. According to the stereotype, if theoretical claim t leads to an observational consequence o, and observation demonstrates that not-o, then t must be rejected. However, it is the conjunction of (i) and (ii) that has as its consequence observation (iii). The failure of observations (iii) may thus be explained not by the falsity of (i) but of the theoretical assumptions (ii), so that the experiential datum is preserved. This is the first reason, why the falsification of prediction need not lead to the revision of the view concerning the occurrence of the observed fact. The second reason has to do with the construction of objects that constitute a given fact. They are defined by the observational relations, which, we are assuming, did not occur. It is possible that those objects have been construed in a faulty way. The failure of predictions need not speak against the experiential datum but rather against at least one of the assumed principles of object construction. In both cases, it would be necessary to add a few more requirements: for example, requiring the postulation of relations (i) with other perceptions but forbidding an ad hoc postulation of such relations (i.e. just to save perceptual structure (i) from falsification). I will not dwell on this point, however, since there is not a sufficient textual basis for it. Wiegner did not investigate the structure of observational control of scientific theories. And after all we are talking about writings from the 1920s and 1930s, when philosophy of science was silent about these issues. Nonetheless, he analyzed these problems deeply enough to have preceded Quine’s famous thesis, known today as the Duhem-Quine thesis. According to it, what is tested is not an isolated theoretical statement T but that statement together with a variety of assumptions Z. The observational statement s follows only from the conjunction (T and Z); its falsehood implies that the conjunction is false: not-(T and Z), i.e. it implies the disjunction (not-T or not-Z). When the observational consequence is falsified, it may be that the tested hypothesis is still true but one of the assumptions has been incorrect. This thought is clearly implied by Wiegner’s holistic conception of experiential data. 5. Here are some further consequences regarding the theory-laden nature of all experiential data. The main one is that all observational statements are only hypothetical. This is obvious: if all observations are accepted on the basis of some theoretical assumptions, which are always hypothetical,

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then statements about such observations can only be hypothetical as well. Not only theories but all observations can be called into question and rejected. All our empirical knowledge — both theoretical and observational — is hypothetical. What is observed are structures of relations, theoretical at the top, observational at the bottom, holding between observable objects. The following question arises. If it is indeed the case that some relations are observable, then are we not extending the concept of observation beyond what it is usually taken to cover in science? Wiegner writes at one point that “in some cases, we directly discover even causal relations in extraspection” (1935, p. 327). Why then are causal statements not accepted on the basis of observation in the empirical sciences? Why is it believed that reference to causal relations goes beyond observation entering the realm of the theoretical explanation of observed facts? According to Wiegner, the answer to these questions lies in the duality of the notion of experience. It is necessary to distinguish between the psychological and the methodological notion of experiential data. The former is much wider and encompasses all that we, as beings with a certain perceptual apparatus, could register by means of that apparatus. In Wiegner’s view, it is in this sense that we can experience even some causal relations. No empirical science, however, utilizes the full range of psychological (or more precisely, psychologically possible) experience. The set of methodologically permitted (in a given science, at a given time) data is always strictly included in the set of data in the psychological sense. Not everything that is psychologically possible is methodologically admissible in a given historical moment. And the observational registration of certain causal relations, though psychologically possible and notoriously used outside of the realm of science, is not methodologically legitimized within empirical sciences. So far — at any rate. The fact that the (methodological) notion of experience changes historically leads to the fact that the border between theory and experience is changeable: the distinction between the description of a pure datum and a theory which hypothetically complements it, becomes relative when scientific inquiry treads on a complex and epistemologically most significant terrain. (1933, p. 117, this volume: p. 162)

6. There are good reasons to suppose that Adam Wiegner proposed the holistic conception of experience, among the consequences of which are the views concerning the differences between theory and experience and the theoretical component of experience. Let us remember that we are

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talking about 1925, when the neopositivist position was beginning to take shape in the empiricist circles. According to it, sense-data were to constitute the foundation of all our knowledge — they were to be theoryindependent, to the contrary all theoretical knowledge was merely a short for potential impressions. This view was dominant also in the Polish literature at that time. The greatest Polish analytical philosopher, K. Ajdukiewicz claimed then (1934) that observational sentences constitute the “fundamental basis” of the sciences. The problem is that according to Ajdukiewicz, sentences that belong to a science are either “deduced from other sentences” or “not deduced from already accepted sentences” (1938a, p. 287). The latter constitute the fundamental basis of a given science. Observational sentences directly derived from experience constitute the fundamental basis of the sciences (1938a, p. 289). Those sentences do not presuppose any other ones, any theoretical knowledge — they are derived from experience alone. It is this view that Wiegner denies. Ajdukiewicz pictures the acceptance of an observational sentence thus: (A)

observation that o

acceptance of sentence ‘o’

According to Wiegner, mere observation is not sufficient for the acceptance of the corresponding observational sentences — it is necessary that certain nonobservational knowledge is accepted as well. Wiegner’s picture is more complete and closer to real perceptual acts: (W)

observation that o theoretical knowledge T

acceptance of sentence ‘o’

This difference stems from the different views on the nature of the perceptual act (among others). For Ajdukiewicz, perception consists in registering some observable feature of the observed object. For Wiegner, perception consists in registering a structure organized by a nonobservational relation with subordinate observational relations holding among observational objects. The organizing relation (and possibly other higherorder relations), which is (are) unobservable can be known only by means of the accepted theory. It is thus that the structuralist or holistic conception of the structure of experience leads to the thesis that experience is dependent on theory — an extraordinarily original thesis in Polish analytical philosophy if one considers the time and place, in which it was first proposed.

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7. The question of the legitimacy of empirical knowledge arises. Wiegner was rather skeptical as to the ability of philosophy to provide a legitimate conception of legitimacy. One example of it is the known paradox of inductive (lack of) justification of induction: (Ind) All beliefs about the world are justifiable either (a) by direct observation or (b) by induction from premises justified inductively by premises which are justified inductively on the basis of direct observation. The question about the status of principle (Ind) arises. According to Humean type assumptions, it must be either analytic, in which case it expresses the content of its concepts, or synthetic, in which case it is a claim about the world. The principle is not analytic, and no proof of it is possible, so it must be synthetic. But then, according to its content, it must be either (a) based directly on observation or (b) indirectly based on observation, i.e. inductively derivable from statements that are inductively derivable from statements, etc., based on direct observation. Option (a) is clearly false, only option (b) remains. But what statements are at stake? This problem can be generalized. Let us consider any legitimation criterion k: (K) all beliefs about the world are justifiable either (a) by direct observation or (b) by operation k on premises justified by operation k on premises based on direct observation. The question arises, On what basis do we accept (K)? The general problem of legitimizing a legitimation criterion is expressed in the question about the legitimation criterion for the legitimation criterion (K). If we accept (K) on a different ground than that expressed in (K), then (K) is not legitimate. If we accept it on the same ground, then it is necessary to show that by applying operation k to observational sentences, one will eventually obtain principle (K) itself. And there are well-known problems with doing this in the case of the principle of induction, for example. Wiegner’s solution is different. He rejects the very problem of legitimizing “knowledge in general” as a pseudoproblem. He writes: The question that does make sense is only whether some particular knowledge claim is objectively valid, i.e. true. But this question does not require a separate science. (1925, p. 64, this volume: p. 88)

It is answered only in a given epistemic situation. In general, The value of scientific principles does not depend on their relation to an “absolute.” Moreover, they are quite compatible with a relativistic conception of all knowledge in general . . . (1925, p. 56, this volume: p. 82)

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The point is that at the basis of the problem of the legitimacy of induction as well as the more general question of the legitimacy of all knowledge, there lies a tacit premise that legitimate knowledge can be thought of as something like an axiomatic system. Accordingly, all beliefs constituting our knowledge are to be linked by means of justification relations, which converge at a certain source-point. The question of the legitimation of the whole is reduced to the question of the legitimation of that source-point. The criterion of legitimate knowledge will enable us to recognize that point. Different epistemological conceptions point to different features (sense-data, eidetic intuition, clear and obvious rational principles, etc.), but all of them rely on the same epistemic structure: the source-point of obvious knowledge (epistemic absolute) which gives rise to further ideas imparting on them its own obviousness. But it is this structure that needs to be rejected. There are no epistemic absolutes: • All our assumptions can be called into question. They are only hypotheses which are evaluated not with regard to themselves but from the point of view of their ability to explain and systematize what we have already assumed. • Each of the hypotheses can be abandoned at any moment and replaced by another if we come to the conclusion that the latter systematizes our knowledge better. • And that knowledge itself is not in any way “given” — it may be subject to revision. Perceptual reports undergo various theoretical interpretations and may be changed not only with new perceptual reports but with changes in the interpretations, i.e. with the changes in the explanatory hypotheses. There is thus no epistemic absolute then which would be independent of other beliefs and which would satisfy some “external” legitimation criterion (intuitive, obvious, etc.) thereby becoming legitimate and imparting that legitimacy onto all other knowledge. The supposition that such an epistemic absolute exists is an illusion to which philosophers are prone as they rarely deal with the epistemic practice of the sciences. This practice teaches us that our knowledge is a web of hypothetical conjectures, which depend on one another at every point and in every direction (the web is not directed toward some special source-point). The legitimation of one element of the web depends on the legitimation of all others. Such a conception of knowledge, which admits only a conditional legitimation criterion (x is legitimate under condition y) suffices for the sciences. And for a philosopher, the fact that his criterion of legitimation coincides with that accepted in the sciences should be quite sufficient.

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8. I tried to show above that Wiegner’s epistemology revises theses IV-V of the epistemic standard of his times. Let us turn to thesis III. It has been accepted from the times of Descartes (and the view is practically accepted until this day) that introspection is more reliable than extraspection. For Descartes, introspection (or intuition, as he called it) is, aside from deduction, the only legitimate method of acquiring knowledge. All knowledge can be called into question — we can be wrong or misled by other people, it is impossible to exclude the existence of an evil genius who deceives all human kind. We cannot legitimately say about any state of affairs p that we know that p. But there is an exception: our thought that p. That we think that p is something we can be completely certain of. Even if p is false the belief “I think that p” is certainly true. Our knowledge can be based on an entirely certain basis — the contents of our mind are accessible through introspection. Introspection gives us infallible assumptions, deduction allows us to infallibly derive their consequences — this is the Cartesian model of knowledge. This view was also current in the Lvov-Warsaw school. It was anchored in a certain research paradigm of introspective psychology. Ajdukiewicz lists three characteristic features of mental phenomena, which determine the uniqueness of psychology as a discipline that studies such phenomena: (a) Unlike physical phenomena which must take place in space and time, mental phenomena do not take place in space but only in time. (1938b, p. 318) (b) While physical phenomena may be observed in principle by any number of observers, mental phenomena can be perceived by only one person who is the subject of such phenomena. Only I can perceive my own joy. Others can at best suspect it from my facial expression, from what I say and in general from my behavior. (1938b, p. 318) (c) Finally, mental phenomena are subjective — they can exist only as the content of someone’s consciousness, i.e. only insofar as someone is conscious of them. By contrast, physical phenomena are objective, i.e. they never are the content of a consciousness and they exist independently of anyone’s awareness of them. (1938b, p. 318) Such a conception of mental phenomena leads to a certain understanding of psychology. Ajdukiewicz writes: Some impressions are so vivid and clear that it is impossible to resist believing that the objects of such impressions are present. . . . Statements directly based on experience, which are thus guaranteed to be true, always pertain to my own mental impressions or states. (1938b, p. 289)

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Autopsychological statements, i.e. statements about the content of the epistemic subject’s mind, constitute the basic premises of psychology, its observational statements. Such a psychology is primarily descriptive. Its task is to give detailed descriptions of what is present to the subject’s consciousness, which would deviate from the actual contents as little as possible. This conception of psychology was among Wiegner’s chief (critical) targets. Although this conception of psychology is nowadays somewhat outdated, the conception of the epistemic priority of introspection over extraspection is accepted to this day. Several theses comprise this conception: Semantic irreducibility of introspection (SII). Introspective terms have a unique irreducible denotation. In other words, phenomena such as perceiving, thinking, deciding, etc. are not physical in nature, but rather they are phenomena sui generis. We distinguish them linguistically by assigning introspective terms to them. Infallibility of introspection (IfI). Introspective data are true, introspection is an infallible epistemic method. It is worth recalling that epistemic logics to this day distinguish introspective knowledge. The axiom postulating incorrigibility in general is rejected, of course (assertion does not imply truth): (1) It is not the case that (if as(X, p), then p), but an axiom postulating incorrigibility with respect to introspection is accepted (assertion of one’s own state of assertion does imply truth about that state): (2) if as(X, as(X, p)), then as(X, p). Empirical character of introspection (EI). Introspection is a form of direct experience. Just as we directly perceive certain objects, so we directly perceive our own thoughts. Introspection is a form of seeing — it is an “internal” seeing. Innate character of introspection (InI). The ability to introspect is innate, it cannot be learned. Indeed, how could I learn what I feel or experience, if not from myself? And so introspection must be innate. 9. Wiegner calls into question all these claims about the uniqueness of introspection:

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. . . contrary to popular opinion, I believe that apparently purely intellectual states such as impression, representation, idea and even decision are not as such given to me directly in introspection. Rather, they are accepted hypothetically to explain the occurrence of certain states given extraspectively, which are most likely observed first in others and only later in ourselves. (1959, p. 6, this volume: pp. 200-201)

The only senses that we have are sight, hearing, etc., i.e. so-called external senses. There is no internal sense directed toward my own psyche, which would give me some special data comparable to those given by the external senses. Some of those external data will pertain to the behavior of others. Commonsense has built a theory to explain such behaviors — the theory of intentional actions. The theory answers questions why a person acts in such and such a manner (which we register by our usual external senses) by appealing to his or her aim (intention). In reality, however, there is no intention: it is a non-existing state of affairs toward which the (extraspectively) observed subject strives. This is a distinct type of explanation quite different from a naturalistic (e.g. physiological) explanation of human action. Indeed, explaining a movement of the subject by appealing to his or her goal is completely different from explaining that movement by appealing to, for example, consecutive movements of such and such groups of muscles. Its distinctness is expressed in the fact that such explanation postulates a peculiar ontology: mentalism. Intention — the future state of affairs to be realized — is not a part of reality (if it were, it would be realized, but it is not). What is it then? Commonsense finds only one answer: it is a sui generis being located in the acting subject herself — in her mind or immaterial soul. Intentions are not the only beings of that kind. Within the framework of mentalist ontology, it is frequently postulated that intentions are dependent on the more basic mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires (values). Intention is to be construed as the value the subject appraises most highly, about the realization of which she is informed by her beliefs. The basic unit of mentalist ontology is constituted by impressions or images of objects, which themselves are objects sui generis equipped with certain mental properties. The whole mental world is to be non-spatial though located in time. This is how it differs from the physical world which is located in both space and time. In explaining the actions of others, we postulate the minds (psyche) of others. Only then do we seek to find analogical internal states in ourselves — i.e. we postulate our own minds (psyche). According to the commonsense canonized by philosophers, though we do not have access to the world of another’s psyche, we do have access to our own — through introspection.

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According to Wiegner, mental entities are purely theoretical constructs comparable not with the objects of the senses but with other theoretical constructs such as atoms or genes. He believes, however, that they should be rather compared with constructs such as phlogiston or ether since he believes that mental entities are empty constructs, to which nothing in reality corresponds. There is no introspection for the simple reason that there is nothing that it could register. There are only actions caused by physiological mechanisms that are still unknown to us. When they will be finally explained, the commonsense mentalistic ontology will become useless, just as the hypothetical construct of ether has become useless for mechanics. It is not the case then that the so-called introspective data are the result of experience. Wiegner rejects the thesis of the empirical character of introspection (EI). Introspective data are theoretical constructs, the results of a doubly theoretical endeavor: first, to explain the behavior of others, their mental states are postulated, then, one’s own mental world is postulated and modeled on the world we have hypothesized in others. (This is the thesis of the doubly theoretical nature of introspection.) It is further not the case that introspective data do not refer to some unique mental beings. Wiegner rejects the view that introspection is semantically irreducible (SII). He holds the view that autopsychological data (the contents of my thoughts, my intentions, etc.) are empty theoretical constructs (the thesis of the instrumental nature of introspective constructs). Their status is similar to the status of theoretical entities postulated by a false theory (phlogiston, ether, etc.) or the instrumentalist’s view on the status of mathematical constructs. They do not refer to anything but they can be used to systematize extraspective data explaining some such data in terms others: behavior → “mental entities” → behavior. Thus understood introspection is a doubly theoretical procedure, which clearly must be fallible. It is fallible in what kinds of mental entities it hypothesizes in the case of others, and it is also fallible in modeling one’s own mental entities (autopsychological constructs) on the basis of those postulated in others. Wiegner rejects thesis of the infallibility of introspection (IfI) as well as the thesis of its innate character (InI). 10. The conception of the (doubly) theoretical nature of introspection went against the views accepted in the Lvov-Warsaw school — especially against the view that introspection is a form of experience and the view that psychology is a description of introspective experience. Thanks to Wiegner’s understanding of introspection:

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. . . there is no need for the infamous theory of subjective “pictures,” which led to so many confusions and difficulties in psychology and epistemology. The place of “sensory contents representing an object playing the role of its appearance, appearing with a direct contention to being an object, etc.” (Blaustein 1931, section 19) is occupied by the physiological conditions of a statement and their epistemic value based on these conditions (1933, p. 148, this volume: p. 185)

The “infamous theory of subjective pictures” (which is the source of the cited phrases, as Wiegner explains in a footnote) refers to Leopold Blaustein’s theory, which was highly esteemed in the Lvov-Warsaw school. Similar views are also expounded by Ajdukiewicz, as we saw. Wiegner subjects the program of descriptive psychology mentioned above to a severe criticism. First and foremost, the very idea of a descriptive science is hard to accept: In every empirical science, the initial definition of terms and the initial classification of the subject-matter are only provisional, designed to provide direction for future inquiries. As such they have no pretension to carrying any real epistemic value. Such a value is exhibited only by those definitions and classifications that are developed to take into account the totality of acquired information . . . Any knowledge consists in going beyond what is directly given to genetic, causal or other relations. In science, the distinction between the description of a pure datum and a theory, which hypothetically complements it, becomes relative when scientific inquiry treads on a complex and epistemologically most significant terrain. (1933, p. 117, this volume: p. 162)

Psychology is quite similar in this respect: The so-called “inner” experience gives equally uncertain and fallible answers regarding issues of real epistemic value as “outer” experience characteristic of physical sciences. . . . In psychology too, pure description can only afford a provisional grasp of the material and initial semantic postulates but never knowledge in the strict sense of the term. . . . [Descriptive psychology] could only result in a general definition providing an initial grasp of the proper subject-matter of psychological inquiry [footnote omitted]. It would have more significance for a diagnostic classification of the sciences but it is insufficient to answer the question about the nature of mental phenomena. In order to reach an epistemically significant definition, i.e. a structural definition, one cannot limit oneself to description in the strict sense of the word – one has to include explanatory (e.g. functional, developmental, etc.) relations. In other words, one has to appeal to a theory and to hypotheses. (1933, pp. 118-119, this volume: p. 163)

It is no wonder that Wiegner’s anti-introspectionist ideas calling into question the program of descriptive psychology were not popular in the School, to put it mildly. It is a pity because they were really interesting and original, as we saw. Let us be fair, however. The fact that Wiegner’s ideas about introspection were ignored in the School had some rational basis. While Wiegner has developed his first idea that we experience structures into a non-

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Humean holistic empiricism, his second idea concerning introspection has been only mentioned. He indicated the general direction but he failed to follow it and to properly develop his conception. It is still not clear what is the literal sense of the notion of belief, for example. Wiegner voices the suggestion that such concepts will be replaced by others when psychology is properly developed. How one is to conceive of this is not quite clear. The idea remains only programmatic. It foreshadows an interesting program (the best evidence is that ideas akin to some of Wiegner’s have appeared only recently, e.g. Churchland 1979, Dennett 1971), which Wiegner himself did not develop properly. It is no wonder then that the anti-paradigmatic idea alone without support from a theory was received rather coldly. 11. One more point is worth emphasizing and it may have escaped notice in the above discussion. Wiegner’s analysis follows entirely “Twardowski’s style.” This is particularly clear in his main epistemic work, The Problem of Knowledge in L. Nelson’s Interpretation, which appeared in 1925. He distinguishes a variety of senses of the terms at stake (“knowledge,” “thinking,” “reasoning,” “proof,” “deduction,” “regression,” etc.) penetrating deeply into the sometimes exceedingly subtle shades of meaning. His analyses were rather valuable for the task of constructing a “philosophical dictionary” hoped for by the first generation of the LvovWarsaw School. Wiegner also undertakes a detailed reconstruction of Nelson’s reasoning, identifying and critically analyzing his reasoning patterns. This was exactly the work style of Twardowski — used in 1925, that is before the greatest philosophical works of the Lvov-Warsaw School appeared. But Wiegner’s style is different as well — and positively so. Aside from some minor innovations, which cannot be discussed here at length such as: • clear respect for the metaphysical tradition, • realism (anti-nominalism) in the understanding of definition, • raising the problem of correspondence in methodology, • putting forward the idea of “bridge rules,” enabling the discussion of the problem of reduction, • etc., Wiegner’s main contribution to epistemology is his rejection of the theory of knowledge I-V commonly accepted at the time of his writing. To put it very briefly, Wiegner undermined two of its component ideas: the thesis about the one-sided dependence of theory on experience and the thesis about the duality of experience. He replaced them with two new ideas:

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• introspection is the result of the interpretation of extraspection, • all experience is subject to theoretical interpretation. Indeed, Wiegner’s view is empiricist but non-Humean and non-Cartesian. Finally, two points are worth emphasizing. Popper has called the thesis about the independence of experience from theory into question a decade later than Wiegner (Kmita 1967); he still accepted the thesis about the duality of experience. Wiegner’s thesis that introspective data are interpreted extraspective data remains to this day an original way of going beyond the empiricist model of dual knowledge. Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza ul. Szamarzewskiego 89C 60-568 Poznań Poland REFERENCES Ajdukiewicz, K. (1934). Logiczne podstawy nauczania [Logical Foundations of Teaching]. Warszawa. Ajdukiewicz, K. (1938a). Metodologiczne typy nauk [Methodological Types of Sciences]. In: Ajdukiewicz (1960), pp. 287-313. Ajdukiewicz, K. (1938b). Postępowanie człowieka [Human Conduct]. In: Ajdukiewicz (1960), pp. 317-364. Ajdukiewicz, K. (1960). Język i poznanie [Language and Knowledge], vol. I. Warszawa: PWN. Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dennett, D. (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68, 87-106. Kmita, J. (1967). Koncepcja empiryzmu całościowego Adama Wiegnera [Adam Wiegner’s Conception of Holistic Empiricism]. Studia Filozoficzne 3, 41-51. Translation: this volume, pp. 221-232. Wiegner, A. (1925). Zagadnienie poznawcze w oświetleniu L. Nelsona [The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy]. Prace Komisji Filozoficznej PTPN, tom I, zeszyt 5. Poznań. Translation: this volume, pp. 37-90. Wiegner, A. (1933). O istocie zjawisk psychicznych [On the Nature of Mental Phenomena]. Prace Komisji Filozoficznej PTPN, tom IV, zeszyt 2. Poznań. Translation: this volume, pp. 147-189. Wiegner, A. (1935). Na marginesie Logicznych podstaw nauczania Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza [Some Comments on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Logical Foundations of Education]. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 13, 327-330. Wiegner, A. (1959). O subiektywnej i obiektywnej jasności myśli i słowa [On the Subjective and Objective Clarity of Thought and Word]. Zeszyty Naukowe UAM: Filozofia, Psychologia, Pedagogika 3, 3-15. Translation: this volume, pp. 297-210.

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Adam Wiegner

OBSERVATION, HYPOTHESIS, INTROSPECTION

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TRANSLATOR’S NOTE Adam Wiegner was perhaps one of the most original minds in twentieth century Polish philosophy but also one of the least perspicuous writers. His thoughts are usually hidden behind layers and layers of interpretative text. His ideas appear as if jotted on a piece of paper. They are rarely fully developed. His brilliant and novel ideas are put forward along side painstaking and nauseating detail. Since the texts are difficult themselves, the task of translating them was likewise not easy. In general, I have tried to be as close to the usual translational decisions as possible. 1. Since Wiegner discusses the work of Nelson, which has already been translated into English, I have tried to rely as closely as possible on Brown’s translation (Nelson 1949). One of the main problems in the translation was posed by the term ‘poznanie’ (which plays the very same function as the German ‘Erkenntnis’), which could be translated either as ‘knowledge’ or as ‘cognition’. Although I had only occasional access to the original quotations from the German text of Nelson’s, Brown’s translation choices appeared often to be quite arbitrary. I have therefore adhered to the following imperfect rules: • I have used ‘knowledge’ whenever speaking of the theory of knowledge or the problem of knowledge, in other words, when Wiegner talks about knowledge quite generally. This includes the term ‘poznanie w ogóle’, which I have consistently translated as ‘knowledge in general’ rather than ‘cognition in general’. • I have used ‘cognition’ whenever speaking of the processes leading to the acquiring of knowledge. • I have used ‘knowledge’ whenever Wiegner was concerned with the product of the cognitive processes rather than the processes themselves. This latter decision was complicated by the fact that occasionally Wiegner referred to only one such product. Since the English term ‘knowledge’ is not numerable, in such situations I have used the somewhat unfortunate term ‘a [claim to] knowledge’. It may have been perhaps more natural to use ‘a cognition’ in these situations, but I decided against doing so since it would be

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distracting from the clearly epistemological intentions of those passages. To complicate matters further, there is yet another term ‘wiedza’ (German ‘Wissen’), which has to be translated as ‘knowledge’. Fortunately, this term appears only in a few places. I have always marked its occurrences with the Polish word inserted in square brackets. I have followed Brown in rendering ‘ważność’ (German: ‘Gültigkeit’) as ‘epistemological validity’ or simply ‘validity’. It is a very different notion from that of logical validity. Unfortunately there is a place where Wiegner speaks of “the notion of ‘ważność’ we know from logic,” but he clearly does not mean the notion of logical validity (Polish: ‘prawidłowość’). I have marked this passage with a footnote to remind the reader that the unfortunate situation is due to my decision, not to Wiegner’s ignorance. There was a considerable problem with deciding how to translate the triple of terms, about which Wiegner himself makes an introductory point. The triple in question are the German terms: ‘Grund’, ‘Begründung’, ‘Grundsatz’, which — as Wiegner notes — are etymologically related. He decides to forgo any attempt to preserve the etymological connotations and translate them as: ‘podstawa’, ‘ugruntowanie’, ‘zasada’, respectively. In the English translation, one could try to revive the etymological connection between the first two terms and translate them as: ‘ground’ and ‘grounding’. However, I have decided not to follow this path and, instead, to preserve Wiegner’s rejection of the ambition to keep etymological connections altogether. I have translated the triple as: ‘basis’, ‘principle’, ‘grounding’. This was dictated by the fact that aside from the very technical usage of the term ‘podstawa’, Wiegner uses the term in less technical ways as well. Given the intricacies of the text, it would be wellnigh impossible to distinguish these uses. A considerable problem arises with the translation of the word ‘zdanie’. Literally translated it means the same as the English ‘sentence’. However, there is no single Polish term that corresponds to the term ‘proposition’, instead the phrase ‘zdanie w sensie logicznym’ (literally translated: ‘sentence in a logical sense’) is used. This raises the possibility that sometimes the more appropriate rendition of ‘zdanie’ might be ‘proposition’ rather than ‘sentence’. However, it would require too much of an interpretation to carry out the translation in any other but the most literal sense. The reader should bear in mind, however, that such an ambiguity might easily arise. Since Wiegner discusses a number of philosophers whose works are not presently well known, I have tried to remain within the terminological

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boundaries of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) under Paul Edwards’ editorship. 2. One of the virtues or vices (depending on perspective) of Wiegner’s writing is his custom (which seems to have developed into a mannerism later) of citing original sources. He justifies this style of writing in “Remarks on Indeterminism in Physics” (pp. 105-106). Perhaps the most significant is the comment that he wishes thereby to make the original formulation available to his readers where it might not have been available otherwise. As a rule, he cites the text also in the language of the original (German, English or Polish). I depart from Wiegner’s original in translating most of the in-text quotations into English. (The exceptions include technical texts, especially in “Remarks on Indeterminism in Physics”, as well as passages which are quoted to illustrate some points about German usage of certain terms.) The original text of the quotations has been moved to the footnotes. I have tried my best to find any already existing translations of these cited works and to include them. In such cases, the translated text is followed by a suitable reference in square brackets, e.g. ‘[Nelson 1965, pp. 113-114]’ refers to the English translation of Nelson’s text. Where such a reference is missing, the translation is mine either because there is no translation of the text into English or because I could not find it. I should note that I occasionally depart from Brown’s decisions on how to translate some terms. In such cases I have enclosed the terms in square brackets. For example, Brown chose to translate ‘Begründung’ as ‘verification’, which seems just incorrect; since I have translated this term as ‘grounding’, the quotations will have all occurrences of ‘verification’ replaced with ‘[grounding]’ (in square brackets to remind of the intervention). Brown translates ‘unmittelbare Erkenntnis’ as ‘immediate knowledge’, while I keep the term ‘direct knowledge’. Etc. 3. While I have not interfered with Wiegner’s use of quotation marks, I have changed his referencing system to author-date system and in some cases supplemented missing data (those that I could find). This has led to an inference with Wiegner’s footnoting, which however has already been disrupted by the inclusion of the original quotation texts in footnotes. Wiegner does not fully explain his quotation conventions. One frequently encounters references of the following form ‘II p. 461 (E. p. 49)’. I have recast such references as ‘Nelson (1915-E), p. 461, reprint: p. 49’. In other words, I have assumed that the first page reference is to “Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem,” which appeared in Abhandlungen der

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Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge 2, while the second page reference is either to a reprint of that work or to its independent page numbering. 4. I have marked my insertions into the text by square brackets. Occasionally I have inserted longer comments, in which case they are placed in footnotes at the bottom of the page using symbols ‘*’, ‘†’ to mark them apart from Wiegner’s footnotes. I would like to thank Andrzej Klawiter for his help in translating some of Husserl’s terms. Katarzyna Paprzycka SWPS Department of Philosophy ul. Chodakowska 19/31 03-815 Warszawa Poland [email protected] REFERENCES Nelson, L. (1949). Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays. Trans.: Thomas K. Brown. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Translator’s Note

LIST OF SELECTED TRANSLATIONAL DECISIONS

czucie czynności doznanie jednoznaczny odnalazek odwzorowywać pełnia naoczna pochodzenie podstawa* powiedzenie powtarzać poznanie* poznanie [numerable]* poznania, fakty poznawcze, akty prawomocność przedstawiać przedstawienie przedstawienie asertoryczne przedstawienie problematyczne przedstawieniowe, akty relacja rozsądek rozum stosunek stwierdzenie uczucie ugruntowanie* uzasadnienie wiedza* władza wrażenie wyobrażenie wyobrażenie imaginatywne wypowiadać wypowiedzieć z przekonaniem wyrażać wzruszenie wzruszeń, teoria zależność zdanie w sensie logicznym* zdanie* związek źródło

sensation activities sensation unique, unequivocal datum to reflect intuitional fullness origin basis* utterance to reiterate knowledge/cognition* knowledge claim* cognitive facts cognitive acts legitimation to present representation assertoric representation problematic representation representational acts relation understanding reason relation statement emotion grounding* justification knowledge [wiedza]* capacity [literally: power] impression idea imaginative idea to express to assert to express emotion theory of emotions dependency proposition* sentence* connection source

* Some comments about the translation are made above.

Ursprung Grund Erkenntnis eine Erkenntnis

Vorstellen Vorstellung

Verstand Vernunft

Begründung Wissen

Quelle

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HOLISTIC EMPIRICISM

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A NOTE ON HOLISTIC EMPIRICISM (1964) Empiricism has been traditionally defined as the view that experience is the “source” of knowledge. In modern philosophy, under the influence of the British empiricists, especially Hume, it became commonplace to treat experience as simply the so-called impressions. Through association, impressions form complexes, which are the proper content of knowledge. The immediate consequence of this position is idealism, according to which the proper object of knowledge is the mental world since it alone is given directly. The concept of what is “directly given” as an essential feature of experience became central and fundamental to all types of empiricism and the problem of the source of knowledge — a psychological problem. Already Kant seems to have been aware of the distinction between purely subjective perceptions and perceptions carrying real epistemic value (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, §17-20). However, he thought that the difference is due to the fact that reason is centrally involved in the latter. Unlike the associationists, he held that reason plays a distinct role. His suggestions were radically developed by his student J.F. Fries who argued that the notion of an objective connection cannot be derived from a connection among ideas. L. Nelson, who revived Fries’ school captured this critique in the following sentence: The law of association is only a law governing the connections among 1 representations, what is wanted, however, is the representation of a connection.

Fries’ critique had little impact, however, and the psychology of cognitive processes was thriving among associationists. In psychology, association came under attack only at the beginning of the 20th century. It was sparked by the question how we become conscious of relations and other experiential wholes. M. Wertheimer, a founder of Gestaltism, was 1

“Das Gesetz der Assoziation is nur ein Gesetz für die Verbindung der Vorstellungen, die Erwartung enthält aber die Vorstellung einer Verbindung” (1915c, p. 753, reprint: p. 341).

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 35-36. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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the first to reach the conclusion that “the given itself forms Gestalts in various degrees.” 2 This was the beginning of a new conception of what is immediately given. Much earlier in his Critique of Pure Experience (1888), R. Avenarius proposed such a new conception of empiricism based on an analysis of cognitive processes. On p. xv of the Introduction to Volume I, he lays down the main assumptions and points of departure for his analysis, the so-called “empiriocritical axioms.” According to the first of them, the socalled axiom of the content of cognition: Every human being initially assumes himself to be confronted with an environment and with other human beings who make assertions that are dependent on the environment. It is clearly indicated here that to the extent that “relations” are initially accepted they are “given directly”. This interpretation is confirmed by the so-called “natural notion of the world” where various “relations of dependence” are characterized as “found” (1891, §6 and §10).* This is clearly a new conception of empiricism, according to which relations and other “wholes” are “given directly.” This is why I call it holistic empiricism. It seems that only such a holistic empiricism is in agreement with scientific practice, in particular with the notion of “scientific observation.” Only the naïve can think of scientific observation as a single perceptual act or some set of impressions or other “elements.” A more sophisticated conception reveals it as a complex process, which ought to be conceptualized in terms of a system of perceptual procedures conducted according to rule derived from long-term laboratory and productive practices. The basic knowledge contained in them deserves to be called “direct knowledge,” which is the course and criterion of all deduced “indirect” knowledge. This view seems also to suggest an alternative conception of science not as a system of claims but as a set of operations, where also the problem of truth is replaced by the problem of what is taken as true.

2

“Das Gegebene ist an sich in verschiedenem Grade gestaltet” (cited in Koffka 1925, p. 528).

*

[I have not included in the main text the following sentence about the Polish translation of Avenarius’ work: “In the Polish translation of Avenarius’ ‘Remarks on the Notion of the Subject-Matter of Psychology’ (by S. Kobyliński and A. Zielenczyk, which appeared in 1907 in Warsaw under the title ‘O przedmiocie psychologii’), this content is given in §19. In §20, the term used is ‘odnalazek’.” (Nb. the term ‘odnalazek’ is a technical term and its connotation is “that which is found”. I have rendered it elsewhere in the text as ‘datum’.)”.]

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN LIGHT OF L. NELSON’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1925) Introduction Nelson’s views on the nature of the problem of knowledge and on the method of its solution have been the object of a live interest among many philosophers for a long time. The views are not entirely novel. Nelson himself clearly points out that he only develops the position of J. Fr. Fries giving it a clearer and sharper expression and that he does not deviate from it at any fundamental point. It is clear, however, that this is done superbly, that all the issues have been thoroughly thought through and that the author honestly holds the theses put forward. Nelson is not a common commentator but a congenial co-author of the thought of his master, whom he rescues from being undeservedly ignored and forgotten. Fries, a physicist and a mathematician, realized that without a closer contact with the sciences philosophy becomes an empty and pointless play. He was alone among Kant’s students in seriously trying to uphold such a contact. He rightly thought that the essence of science is constituted not by its results but rather by its method. Likewise, he believed that it is the method that holds the key to all philosophy. The great significance of Kant, in Fries’ view, lies in the discovery of the only possible method for philosophy. Fries believes this discovery not to have been used to the full by Kant himself. He takes himself to be the only of Kant’s students who sets out to clarify the idea of the method and to rid it of many errors and misunderstandings, some of which have already affected Kant’s system and which gave rise to the development of all post-Kantian philosophy. Fries’ modest and sober work lacking in speculative exaltation did not fit the spirit of his times. It did not get any response. Another deterrent was his peculiar and difficult psychological terminology, based on an original application of Leibniz’s thought to the critique of Kant. Similarly, Fries’ student E.Fr. Apelt was unable to bring the work of his master to philosophical attention in mid-19th century, as these were times of

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 37-90. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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contempt and disregard for all philosophy. It is only one hundred years after Fries, in 1904, that L. Nelson manages to renew the old Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule as the Neue Folge. He is supported by a number of collaborators, working in various disciplines but united in the conviction of the correctness of Fries’ philosophy. He publishes a number of excellent works — some polemical, some developing Fries’ work, some devoted to contemporary issues arising from the sciences but relevant to philosophy. Four volumes of the journal appeared — the last one appeared in 1918 and was delayed due to the war. All of Nelson’s works devoted to the problem of knowledge have been published in Abhandlungen, the first two listed are the most important:

• “Die kritische Methode und das Verhaltnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie” (1914-KM) appeared in volume 1;

• “Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem” (1915-E) appeared in

• •

5

•

volume 2. A summary of the non-polemical chapters of this work is the lecture “Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie” (1916-UE). It was given at the 4 th International Congress of Philosophers in Bologna in 1911, published in the Congress Proceedings and in the third volume of the mentioned Abhandlungen. One more systematic work by Nelson has a more general significance. It is “Inhalt und Gegenstand. Grund und Begründung” (1915-IG), which appeared in the second volume of Abhandlungen. The special problems of mathematical and scientific knowledge are the object of two papers: “Bemerkungen über die Nicht-Euklidische Geometrie und den Ursprung der mathematischen Gewissheit” (1914-NEG), which appeared in the first volume of Abhandlungen, and “Ist metaphysikfreie Naturwissenschaft möglich?” (1915-MN), which appeared in the second volume of Abhandlungen.

The fourth volume of Abhandlungen contains a major critical work by A. Kastil entitled “J. Fr. Fries’ Lehre von der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis.” It critically analyzes Fries’ views from the point of view of Brentano’s and Marty’s philosophy. However, Kastil’s analysis is so fastidious that the main line of thought and the important points are completely lost in the mass of details. I will only use Kastil’s name to refer to his paper. I will do the same for Nelson’s co-workers. In all these papers, the page numbers will refer to the volumes of Abhandlungen. Occasionally, the page number of an imprint will be added in parentheses. Aside from the just mentioned monograph, I have found W. Mechler’s paper “Die Erkenntnislehre bei Fries, aus ihren Grundbegriffen dargestellt und kritisch erörtert” (22 Ergänzungsheft zu Kantstudien, Berlin 1911)

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somewhat helpful. It is quite good in its descriptive part but its critical part is rather unclear and based on numerous misunderstandings. I will also refer to it by the author’s name. Both of these critical monographs share an emphasis on psychological analyses, i.e. the ascertainment of psychological facts which play a fundamental role in Fries’ and Nelson’s conceptions. I believe this not to be useful because of the imprecise and overly suggestive nature of psychological terminology as well as because of an inevitable lack of agreement among the results of such psychological analyses. I explain this point in detail later. Here I only want to note that analytic experimental psychology has reached a point where it is impossible to speak of an experimentum crucis just as it is impossible in physics. This leads to an inevitable disagreement in psychological analyses. For these reasons, I try to subject Nelson’s thought exclusively to a formal evaluation, investigating the validity of his reasoning and the coherence of assumptions but avoiding all appeal to “inner experience.” I believe that this increases the value of this essay. Moreover, I believe that if not in general then with particular reference to Nelson’s work, it is quite sufficient to adopt a formal point of view to form an opinion concerning the value of his propositions. My critical comments are supplemented with a few systematic comments complementing the former, which pretend not so much to solve the problems in question but to indicate some hitherto unexplored possibilities. There are some difficulties with the translation of the basic terms: “Grund,” “Grundsatz” and “Begründung.” I gave up any attempts to preserve the etymological relation among the three words (which has played some role in Nelson’s and Fries’ ideas). I translate them simply as “basis,” “principle” and “grounding.” Any other combinations of words lead to inevitable misunderstandings. *

*

[Omitted is a sentence about the Polish synonyms for ‘deduction’ and ‘demonstration’.]

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DESCRIPTIVE PART I. The General Problem of Knowledge

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1. Philosophy in the second half of the 19 th century was dominated by the interest in the so-called theory of knowledge, discipline devoted to the investigation of the objective importance of knowledge as such. This discipline, which was revived under the banner “Back to Kant,” was to offer the route of returning to Kantian Critique (which reached a dead end in the first half of the 19th century) as well as the only way out from the thought anarchy, the result of the speculative craze of the metaphysicians. But these hopes proved vain. The theory of knowledge has not produced any uncontestable theses despite its half a century’s reign. It has enjoyed a parasitic boom at the expense of the other areas of philosophy and became divided into an ever growing multitude of subdisciplines. The passionate but fruitless debates lost philosophy any remaining respect it had, frightened off those who have not yet lost common sense, and again led to a disruption of the ties between philosophy and science. This state of the discipline was in a stark contrast with the quiet but unswerving advancement of those sciences that the theoreticians of knowledge looked down upon and for which they wanted to draw the rules of conduct based on allegedly incorrigible analyses of the values of human knowledge. Any unprejudiced person would be struck by the amazing analogy between the shape of the theory of knowledge at the beginning of the 20th century and the shape of metaphysics in the middle of the 19th century. It is no wonder that the following question has occurred to the positive minds: Is there an error in the presuppositions of the problem investigated by the theory of knowledge, which leads to the futile and circular disputes? To the best of my knowledge, the first to offer a critique of the theory of knowledge was Fred Bon in an interesting book Die Dogmen der Erkenntnistheorie (Leipzig 1902), but the book has received little attention. The second was Leonard Nelson, who used some elements of Fries’ system to explain the puzzling phenomenon of the futility of the theory of knowledge. This became his chief objective (see 1915-E, Preface and Introduction). 2. The whole of Nelson’s critique of the theory of knowledge is summarized in his famous proof of its impossibility. Its simplicity and clarity and at the same time brevity and distinctiveness deserve a full citation:

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It is generally understood that the main task of the theory of knowledge is the investigation of the objective validity of knowledge in general. The very setting of this task requires that one doubts the objective validity of knowledge, i.e. that its availability is precisely a problem. I claim that a scientific solution of this problem is impossible. Let us assume that there exists a criterion which could solve the problem. This criterion itself would need to be classified as either knowledge or not. If the criterion in question is a part of knowledge, then it belongs precisely to the problematic domain whose validity should be first determined by the theory of knowledge. The criterion that will solve the problem cannot therefore be a part of knowledge. Consider the case when the criterion is not a part of knowledge. In order to solve the problem it must be known, i.e. it would have to be capable of becoming the object of knowledge. In order for the criterion to be at all useful it would have to be first decided whether the knowledge, of which the criterion is an object, is valid. But, under the present assumption, the criterion would have to be already used in making this decision. It is therefore impossible to find a grounding of the objective validity of 1 knowledge.

This proof can be briefly explained by reference to the following formal analysis of the task of the theory of knowledge. The attempt to consider the problem of knowledge necessarily involves the suspension of all synthetic beliefs. The answer to the question about the objective validity of knowledge is a synthetic judgment. So, the task of the theory of knowledge would consist in the deduction of a synthetic judgment from exclusively analytic premises, which is clearly impossible.2 This is why 1

“Die Erkenntnistheorie ist — nach allgemeinem Sprachgebrauch — die Wissenschaft, die die Untersuchung der objektiven Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis überhaupt zur Aufgabe hat. Die Stellung dieser Aufgabe setzt voraus, dass man an der objektiven Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis zweifelt, d. h. dass ihr Vorhandensein ein Problem bildet. Ich behaupte nun, dass eine wissenschaftliche Auflösung dieses Problems unmöglich ist. Angenommen nämlich, es gäbe ein Kriterium, das zur Auflösung des Problems dienen könnte. Dieses Kriterium würde entweder selbst eine Erkenntnis sein oder nicht. Nehmen wir an das fragliche Kriterium sei eine Erkenntnis. Dann gehörte es gerade dem Bereiche des Problematischen an, über dessen Gültigkeit erst durch die Erkenntnistheoriet etnscheiden werden soll. Das Kriterium, das zur Auflösung des Problems dienen soll, kann also keine Erkenntnis sein. Nehmen wir also an, das Kriterium sei nicht eine Erkenntnis. Es müsste dann, um zur Auflösung des Problems dienen zu können, bekannt sein; d.h. es müsste selbst Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden können. Ob aber diese Erkenntnis, deren Gegenstand das fragliche Kriterium ist, eine gültige ist, müsste entschieden werden, damit das Kriterium anwedbar ist. Zu dieser Entscheidung müsste aber das Kriterium schon angewendet werden. Eine Begründung der objektiven Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis ist also unmöglich.” (1915-E, section 3) 2 (1916-UE), p. 600f, reprint: p. 18f. For the proof that it is impossible to deduce a synthetic judgment from exclusively analytic premises, see (1915-E), section 9.

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the theory of knowledge either takes the form of a petitio principii or leads to an infinite regress. This explains its futility. This same theory of knowledge appears sometimes under the apparently innocent name of a psychological theory of the possibility of knowledge. In such form, it tries to reduce cognitive facts to more basic and primitive mental phenomena. It stems from the observation that a cognition * is a representation that has the force of an assertion. As such, cognition is a species of representation in general. The theory then tries to explain how assertive force attaches to the problematic representations, i.e. those without such a force, thereby creating what we call cognition. This effort is vain, however. Cognition is psychologically basic and primitive and so there can be no psychological theory of its possibility (1914-KM, section 12). Knowledge cannot be the object of any theory based on its problematization. That there is knowledge is a fact. And it must be accepted even by theories that call it into question. It must be stressed that the fact that a theory of knowledge is impossible does not yet imply that knowledge itself is impossible. Just as from the fact that it is impossible to prove a theorem it does not follow that the theorem is not valid. Even this reasoning presupposes a theory of knowledge. The negative solution of the problem of the objective validity of knowledge in general is also a solution, i.e. a form of a theory of knowledge, and so falls under the proof of its impossibility (1916-UE, p. 603, reprint: p. 21; 1915-E, section 4). The result of these analyses is that the theory of knowledge is a pseudo-science and the problem of the objective validity of knowledge in general is a pseudo-problem. 3. The history of thought shows, however, that pseudo-problems stem from important problems, which often lie hidden covered in deep layers of misunderstandings and false interpretations of abstract ideas. That is the case with the theory of knowledge. It developed against the background of the bankruptcy of metaphysical speculation, which was neither the first nor the last but a glaring symptom of human fallibility. Indeed, the very possibility of error lies at the base of the theory of knowledge and needs to be explained. The fundamentally important problem then is the question how to reconcile the possibility of error with the possibility of knowledge

*

[The term used here is ‘poznanie’ (German: Erkenntnis), which is the very same term elsewhere translated as ‘knowledge’.]

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(Grelling 1915, p. 183). The answer to this question is provided by the logical principle of sufficient reason. This principle demands that we accept only those judgments that are sufficiently justified. It denies that judgments have direct epistemic value, i.e. it affirms that judgments constitute indirect and so fallible knowledge. Indeed, judgment as a combination of concepts, i.e. problematic representations is not a direct product of human cognitive faculties but depends directly also on the faculties of the will (through attention and speech). It is thus directly governed by laws alien to the laws of the cognitive faculties. This is the reason why we can err, i.e. judge what is not the case. But in order to realize the error, what is really the case must be available to us in some form of knowledge, which cannot be subject to error. As such, it will be produced directly by our cognitive faculties and can be called direct knowledge. The explanation of the possibility of error depends on the distinction between judgment as a form of indirect knowledge from direct knowledge. The existence of direct knowledge is presupposed by all theories even those that want to call it into question (1914-KM, section 9; 1915-E, section 24 and 37). Let us call the powers of direct cognition reason and the powers of judgment — understanding. We can then say that a transcendental truth (a truth of the reason) is beyond any doubt since it alone is the criterion of any truth whatsoever, and so also for any doubt. An error can exist only for empirical truths (truths of the understanding). This distinction between direct and indirect knowledge makes it possible for us to find the main error which underlies the theory of knowledge. If we accept the claim that all knowledge comes in the form of judgments, the principle of sufficient reason will force us to call knowledge in general into doubt and to begin a fruitless and pointless search for a test of objective validity (1916-UE, p. 597; 1915-E, Chapter VII, sections 46-48). In other words, the theory of knowledge has grown out of an erroneous interpretation of the logical sense of the principle of sufficient reason. This explains at the same time the persistence with which it forces itself on human minds. If one rejects the identification of knowledge with judgment, one will be able to uphold the validity of the principle for judgments and at the same time to avoid the quagmire created by the pseudo problem of the objective validity of knowledge in general. We can thus put forward the following two methodological maxims: (1) basic trust toward reason (2) basic mistrust toward understanding (1915-E, sections 48 and 52; 1916-UE, p. 604f)

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In this way, we are on a path to the proper formulation of the general problem of knowledge.

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4. Scientific knowledge is based on grounded judgments, i.e. those based on a sufficient justification. One can thus ask the question what is the basis for such judgments. It may be another judgment from which the judgment in question is inferred. This kind of grounding, based on the logical relation of implication, is called a proof. It is clear that this cannot be the only kind of grounding. We cannot search for sufficient reasons indefinitely. We will finally reach judgments, which cannot be proven further since they are the most general premises — the first premises of the whole system of judgments. These most general premises fundamental to a system are called principles (axioms). Their existence gives rise to the following problem. Since axioms are judgments they fall under the principle of sufficient reason. However, since they are the most general and first judgments they cannot be proven. The question thus is: How are principles to be grounded? (1914-KM, sec. 8; 1915-E, sec. 46-47) This question constitutes an essential part of the content of the general problem of knowledge. It thus pertains not to knowledge in general but only to knowledge contained in judgments, i.e. indirect knowledge. It is clear nonetheless that this problem is of highest significance since it is concerned with the value of science in general as a system of judgments ordered by the logical relation of implication. 3 What then is the sufficient justification for principles? Since it is usual to think that the truth of a judgment is its agreement with its object, one is immediately drawn to the suggestion that the sufficient basis of principles lies in their objects and that their grounding consist in comparing them with their objects. However, this is clearly impossible. We would have to be able to reach beyond our knowledge, i.e. to do precisely what has proved the theory of knowledge futile. Some have pointed to acts of perception as allegedly showing that it is possible to compare knowledge with object. But they confuse perception with a perceptual judgment. One cannot compare perception with object but only perceptual judgment with 3

I have let myself diverge from Nelson’s text to the extent that I use the term “general problem of knowledge” while Nelson shuns it. I think he is overly afraid that the problem defined above will be confused with the pseudoproblem of the objective validity of knowledge in general. This fear must give way to the need to have a term for the problem regarding the basis of principles. I reserve the term “general problem of knowledge” to capture this issue since it gave rise to the pseudoproblem which was the object of the theory of knowledge.

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perception. After all it is perceptual judgments that constitute direct knowledge, and their truth is thus beyond doubt, they supply a test of the truth of judgments based on them. In this way, we have found a second and (clearly basic kind of grounding of judgments — by reference to direct knowledge as their basis (1914-KM, sec. 11; 1915-IG, p. 44). Every true judgment reflects the content of direct knowledge. The ultimate criterion of the truth of a judgment is its agreement with direct knowledge. Error, in turn, ultimately consists in a false expression of direct knowledge in a judgment. In our judgments, we do not create any knowledge, but only reiterate and explain direct knowledge. It is thus appropriate, following Fries, to call judgment an act of reflection.4 5. It is clear that the general problem of the grounding of principles can be solved only by finding such direct knowledge that could constitute a sufficient reason for them. The case of grounding a perceptual judgment in a perception explains the nature of such a grounding but at the same time reveals the main difficulty in the case of principles. Perception, as a sensory intuition, is knowledge of what is individual and accidental. By contrast, principles are general judgments, which capture necessary relations. They thus cannot be based on perceptions as their sufficient bases. To the extent that principles can at all be grounded, there must exist another form of direct knowledge beside perception. Obviously, the only way to find such alternate forms of direct knowledge is through inner experience, i.e. through a psychological analysis of cognitive facts. This is why psychology is fundamentally important for the problem of grounding principles. In order to proceed to grounding, one needs to find these principles. This can be done through regression, i.e. purely logical abstraction and analysis of concrete judgments used in everyday life or in scientific practice. In such cases, people do not differ in their judgments at all, even though they express them only on the basis of half-conscious but deep motives. Such judgments are, of course, the result of applying principles implicitly contained in them, so that by regressing from consequences to reasons, we can discover those principles. Regression is thus a logical

4

In (1915-E, sec. 181-184), Nelson emphasizes that one ought not therefore to think of judgment as self-observation, as Fries did somewhat recklessly. Fries thereby committed several psychologistic mistakes and made it very hard to understand the initial emptiness of understanding. See also Nelson (1915-IG), Chapter I.

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operation, which is the converse of a normal proof, which, in turn, is based on a progressive drawing out of consequences. 5 Concrete scientific work may, of course, not be concerned with principles and rely entirely on the provisional value of certain clear and obvious judgments, which appear to be sufficiently certain for the progressive construction of systems. It is clear, however, that a logically perfect science, an exact science in the strictest sense, must take care of its foundation, i.e. must strive toward the discovery of its principles and toward their grounding on the solid basis of direct knowledge. This is the path of the critical approach to science. The only alternative is that of a dogmatic approach to science (1914-KM, p. 7). The honor of discovering the essential content of the general problem of knowledge and of calling attention to the need for the critical approach in science belongs to Kant, who posed the famous question: “How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?”. II. Hume’s and Kant’s Problem

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1. From the general question about the basis of first principles emerges a particularly difficult problem concerning philosophy itself. Its roots lie in the fact that the basic principles of scientific knowledge are not homogeneous and can be divided into three very different groups. First, we can distinguish analytic judgments (where the predicate is contained in the subject) from the remaining synthetic judgments (1914-NEG, p. 377; 1915-E, sec. 6). It is clear that knowledge can only be contained in judgments of the second kind. The general problem of knowledge thus does not concern the most general analytic judgments, i.e. logical principles (1915-E, p. 172). Even the remaining set of synthetic principles is not homogeneous. Already Hume noted the fact that elementary mathematical judgments are 5

(1914-KM), sec. 2-3. Fries has mistakenly thought of regression as psychological selfobservation, which was a result of the above mentioned mistake of thinking of judgments as acts of self-observation. Nelson repairs this mistake and emphasizes the purely logical character of regression (see 1915-E, sec. 185). Everything seems to indicate that regression thus characterized is practically identical with the axiomatic method of mathematics. I am not sure, however, whether Nelson would concur. He never takes a clear stand on this point. Some passages (e.g., 1914-KM, p. 5; 1915-E, pp. 779f, reprint: pp. 367f; and footnote on p. 816, reprint: p. 404) would seem to support this line of interpretation. However, his acceptance of the fundamental role of Kant’s transcendental approach to categories (see the quote in Grelling 1915, footnote on p. 174) seems to support the contrary view. I will return to this point in the Critical Part of this monograph.

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extraordinarily obvious and clear in comparison to judgments about facts which are not obvious at all. For this reason, Hume has mistakenly classified mathematical judgments as analytic since he could not explain why they are so obvious. It was Kant who discovered the synthetic character of mathematical principles. He explained their obviousness by pointing to pure intuition as their sufficient basis (Nelson 1914-NEG, sec. 3 and 5). Since the grounding of a judgment by showing intuition to be its sufficient basis is called demonstration (Nelson 1914-KM, p. 21; 1915-IG, p. 45), we can say that Kant grounded mathematical judgments by demonstration. The purity of intuition, i.e. the non-sensory nature of this knowledge, allows space and time (necessary forms of sensory intuition) to be the objects of this knowledge (1914-NEG, pp. 404f). The intuitiveness of this knowledge points to its directness and direct awareness (1915-E, p. 461, reprint: p. 49). This last feature is particularly noteworthy in view of the wide-spread prejudice that every mental phenomenon is at the same time conscious. It is usual to recognize the existence of only such cognitive acts that are conscious. However, this opinion is completely unjustified. Moreover, it has disastrous consequences for philosophy as a whole and for metaphysics in particular. 2. Following Kant, we can say that metaphysics is a system of synthetic judgments a priori based on mere concepts (blosse Begriffen).* In contrast to logic, the judgments are synthetic. In contrast to empirical knowledge, the judgments are a priori. Finally, it contrasts with mathematics, which is a system of synthetic judgments based on a construction of concepts (in pure intuition). We can see that the principles of all the natural sciences including psychology belong to metaphysics. Since these principles are the most general premises for all empirical judgments, they cannot be derived from experience but must be a priori judgments. At the same time, since they are completely unobvious, they cannot be based on pure intuition. We will call those principles together with the first premises of ordinary commonsense judgments metaphysical principles. The question what is a sufficient basis for them is so difficult that in trying to solve this problem Kant confused the regressive discovery of these principles with their proof. To show that these principles constitute the condition of the possibility of experience is to transform them into analytic judgments that *

[The reference contained in the Wiegner’s footnote is incomplete. It only points to volume II of the Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge.]

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follow from the concept of experience. It is clear, however, that this does not solve the problem. At best, it merely postpones it. The so-called transcendental proof has only the significance of a regressive discovery of the totality of metaphysical principles (Nelson 1915-E, Chapters III and XIX). The discovery of this method, which allowed to generalize the question Hume posed regarding exclusively the principle of causality, is Kant’s great achievement, which was ignored by most of his contemporaries with the exception of Fries and his school. It has been recognized properly only recently when mathematicians have rediscovered and successfully applied this method in the study of the foundations of their discipline (Nelson 1915-E, p. 780, reprint: 368; see also footnote 5, above). Since the problem of basis of metaphysical principles is so difficult, we must proceed by carefully analyzing its presuppositions and by considering all possible solutions. Let us begin by considering the following four sentences: (a) all knowledge is either a judgment or an intuition but not both (complete separation of judgment and intuition)* (b) every judgment requires grounding (i.e. judgments constitute indirect knowledge) (c) intellectual intuition does not exist (i.e. intuition does not provide a sufficient basis for metaphysical principles) (d) metaphysical principles have a sufficient basis (i.e. they constitute knowledge). There are four combinations of positions with three of the above claims as premises, which generate the negation of the remaining claim. As is easily seen, these are all the possible presuppositions and solutions of the problem of justifying metaphysical principles. We can find a historical realization for each of them. (α) (a) (b) (c) ⊃ ~(d), or skeptical empiricism This is Hume’s view, who has not found any sufficient justification for the principle of causality and so rejected its claims to having any epistemic value. Kant accepted all of Hume’s assumptions but having rejected the *

[This claim seems to commit a category mistake to the extent that intuition and judgment are not on a par. And so for example, in Brown’s translation of Nelson’s KM, this claim is rendered as: “All knowledge is either intuition or reflection” (p. 146). However, there is a reading of ‘judgment’ (also in English) according to which what is meant is not so much the item that is the product of judging but rather the faculty of judgment. It is ‘sąd’ in this sense, I believe, that Wiegner aligns with intuition.]

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empiricist solution he found himself in a hopeless situation from which he escaped by committing the mistake mentioned above. (β) (a) (b) (d) ⊃ ~(c), or intuitionistic mysticism

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This position reached its full potential in Schelling’s work. It is accepted by all those who justify metaphysical principles by intellectual intuition. (γ) (a) (c) (d) ⊃ ~(b), or the so-called logical dogmatism It was clearly stated and systematized by Hegel. It is accepted by all rationalists who deny that understanding is initially empty and thus deny that the principle of sufficient reason applies absolutely to all judgments. (δ) (b) (c) (d) ⊃ ~(a), or critical philosophy proper This is Fries’ solution. Fries himself believed that he only developed Kant’s thought, which was subconsciously present and subdued by the alleged solution contained in the transcendental proof. It consists in recognizing that there exists knowledge, which is both direct (so it is not a judgment) and of which we are not directly aware (so it is not an intuition). It can be thus called non-intuitive direct knowledge or knowledge of pure reason. Fries views the disjunction between judgment and intuition as not exclusive and so rejects a prejudice which has lingered since Aristotle. We can see that this is clearly related to the rejection of the view that all mental phenomena are conscious. Moreover, on this view, psychology acquires a special significance for all philosophy (Nelson 1914-KM, sec. 3, 10, 31-34; 1915-E, Chapter XXIV; 1916-UE, pp. 607ff, reprint: p. 25ff; Hessenberg 1915, pp. 119f). 3. Since claims (a)-(d) state facts of inner experience, it must play the decisive role in the choice of the solution to the problem of the basis of metaphysical principles. The truth of (b) and (c) is one of those results of Hume’s and Kant’s analyses, which is accepted by scientific psychology and which constitutes a presupposition of the existence of the problem that bears their names. It is therefore obvious that (β) and (γ) are false and there is no need to devote any more attention to them. The discussion needs to focus on positions (α) and (δ), i.e. on the debate between empiricism and critical philosophy. It will be easily noticed that the critical issue in this discussion is how to explain the fact that metaphysical judgments exist. Since empiricism denies them any epistemic value (Nelson 1916-UE, p. 610, reprint: p. 28; 1915-E, pp. 745f, reprint: p. 333f; 1914-KM, sec. 35), it must explain how they arose in the first place. Indeed, if it were to turn out that empiricism cannot offer an adequate

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explanation, claim (a) would turn out to be false and the path toward critical philosophy would be cleared. Hume himself was tempted to explain why there are causal judgments. He thought that they expressed expectations based on custom that like effects will follow like causes. Ultimately, he thus reduced them to the association of representations. The fact that we believe in such judgments, i.e. that we recognize their claim to generality and necessity,6 consists in the fact that the ideas have become more intensely distinct,7 which is due to the frequent repetition of a succession of two phenomena. This explanation is inadequate, however. The expectation of like effects is at all possible only if one recognizes the objective connection between two phenomena. It thus cannot be based on association, which can only explain why when A happens we remember B, which has frequently succeeded A. But there is a huge and irreducible difference between remembering B and expecting that B will happen. A recollection of B is a problematic representation, whereas expecting that B will occur is based on an assertoric representation of the reality of the future B. One cannot reduce either of these representations to the other. The recognition of an objective relation between phenomena is always a necessary condition of expecting similar effects. Although it is usually only vague and subconscious, it differs from an abstract scientific judgment about a causal relation only by the degree of awareness and is an entirely sufficient basis for it (1915-MN, Chapters II and III; 1915-E, sections 161-162). The discovery of errors in Hume’s attempt to explain why causal judgments exist allows us to generalize this analysis of empiricism in such a way as to show that there can be no empirical explanation of metaphysical principles in general. The concept of a necessary connection between objects is common to all such principles. Empiricism has exactly two ways to explain how such a concept arises: senses and association. 6

Nelson rightly thinks that Kant was wrong in taking generality and necessity of judgment as a criterion of its a priori status (in the sense that this is a given feature, whose occurrence suffices for a judgment to be a priori). In fact, only the claim to generality and necessity of a judgment is given to us in inner experience. Only such a claim can be the basis of a psychological analysis of a priori knowledge. See (1915-E), sec. 160. 7 Nelson speaks of “Intensität der Deutlichkeit.” It would be better to speak of “Grad der Deutlichkeit” but even this expression does not seem to properly reflect Hume’s thought, who after all did not think of this in so simple terms. He finally reached the conclusion that the difference in the way of experiencing representations is not at all a matter of degree. Th. Lipps expresses Hume’s thought better using the terms “Energie” and “Lebhaftlichkeit.” See his translation of the Treatise, vol. I, pp. 129, 132, 364 (Leipzig 1912); original Treatise, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose V.I (London 1898), pp. 396, 398, 560.

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Hume himself has clearly shown that sensory data cannot do the work and so he pointed to association (Nelson 1915-MN, Chapter I). It is clear, however, that association can only give us a connection between representations but never a representation of a connection, which is at stake here. In this way, we have shown that empiricism cannot explain the fact that there are metaphysical principles. It must give way to critical philosophy for which this issue does not constitute any difficulty. 8 If we deny that the classification of judgment and intuition is complete, we will be able to recognize the existence of knowledge which can be the source of the concept of a necessary connection and which, in not being intuition, reach our consciousness only by means of reflection, i.e. judgment, viz. in the form of metaphysical principles (1914-KM, p. 18; 1915-E, p. 619, reprint: p. 207). Since this knowledge originally resides in pure reason and is direct it constitutes sufficient basis of these principles. 4. After showing that metaphysical knowledge is possible, critical philosophy must show how metaphysical principles are grounded. The task of grounding those principles — the famous question quid iuris — belongs to the special science which, following Kant, we call the critique of pure reason. The theory of such critique must indicate in what way one can determine the legitimacy of principles that are based on originally unclear knowledge (1914-KM, section 1; 1915-E, section 50). Already Fries has sketched an approach to this issue. He saw it as a development of Kant’s thought, which was contained somewhat unclearly in the subjective deduction but was overshadowed by the transcendental proof of principles and the objective deduction of categories (Nelson 1915-E, Chapters XX and XXI). Here is the gist of this approach. We consider the agreement of judgments with their basis as the criterion of their truth. In a proof and a demonstration, their basis is given to us. A proof contains the premises leading to the conclusion. A demonstration is based on intuition, i.e. on knowledge that is given directly by an inner sense. None of these methods can be used to ground 8

(1915-E), sections 161-162; (1916-UE), pp. 611f; reprint: p. 29f, (1914-KM), sections 35-36 and 39-40. I have omitted Nelson’s objection that empiricism is internally inconsistent because it takes its claim that all knowledge is based on observation to reach beyond what can be obtained through observation (1915-MN, Chapter IX). This argument fails in view of the theory of logical types. Nelson sees here one of the cases of what he calls “introizierter Widerspruch”; see (1915-E), section 5, footnotes on p. 470 (reprint: p. 58) and pp. 588ff (reprint: pp. 176ff). Likewise, I consider as not significant and have therefore omitted Nelson’s objection that in trying to explain why causal judgments can exist, Hume already assumes the validity of the principle of causality, which he previously claimed to have no epistemic value. See (1914-KM), p. 60.

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metaphysical principles. Their basis, i.e. this direct nonintuitive knowledge, is not given directly to our consciousness. It must be artificially brought out and its content discovered. This can only happen through an analysis of inner experience but not exclusively through selfobservation. What will be necessary here is a psychological theory of cognitive phenomena, which (based on careful induction) will give us knowledge of the organization of pure reason (which is identical in all people). It will thereby allow us to discover the content of knowledge falling within the province of pure reason and so to discover the basis of metaphysical principles. This third way of grounding judgments can be called deduction. It is clear that this is the only method of grounding metaphysical principles. It is based on the possibility of constructing psychological theories. Although this possibility is not commonly recognized, there is no reason why one ought to assume that it is excluded by the inner (as opposed to outer) experience. Indeed, we must accept this possibility if we do not want to forego a true knowledge of mental life which is provided neither by descriptive analysis nor by developmental genesis. Indeed, the subjectmatter is such that it allows only a severely restricted application of metaphysical principles to inner experience since it excludes the possibility of using mathematics. However, these restrictions do not make it impossible to construct psychological theories that are fundamentally similar to physical theories. To the contrary, there is even a bonus to such an enterprise since one cannot easily venture into dangerous abstraction and remove the theoretical construction too far from perceptual data.9 The critique thus grounds metaphysical principles by means of psychological deduction. It has been objected that the critique involves a vicious circle. However, this objection is based on a misunderstanding. The charge would be right on target if the critique proved metaphysical principles, i.e. contained their sufficient basis, as this is done in the theory of knowledge. However, the basis of metaphysical principles is not part of the content of the critique but rather constitutes its object. The content of the critique is the grounding of metaphysical principles. This grounding does not contain their basis — if it did then the deduction would become a proof. The direct nonintuitive knowledge, which is the basis of metaphysical principles has 9

Nelson (1914-KM), sections 3, 8, 13-19; (1915-IG), Chapter IV; (1915-E), sections 53 and 152-158. A contemporary attempt to construct a similar “theoretical” psychology with particular reference to cognitive phenomena (which Nelson, following Fries, calls “transcendental psychology” or “philosophical anthropology”) is given by Meyerhof (1916).

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laws as its object, so it is knowledge a priori. But as a [claim to] knowledge [a cognition], it is at the same time an individual fact. As such, it is the object of knowledge a posteriori viz. the object of psychological critique. In this way, the empirical character of the critique is completely compatible with the apodictic character of metaphysics, which would be impossible if the critique were part of metaphysics. 10

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5. We must firmly hold the above distinctions in mind. We must not confuse deduction with proof, the object of a critique with its content and the basis with the grounding of metaphysical principles. If we do not, we will necessarily dissipate the critique in metaphysics and fall back into the theory of knowledge. This error (first systematized after Kant by Reinhold) gave rise to two opposed camps: psychologism and transcendentalism. Since a judgment must have the same modality as its basis we can: either infer the a priori character of the critique from the apodictic character of metaphysics, which is the essence of transcendentalism, consciously systematized by Fichte, or infer the empirical character of metaphysics from the psychological character of the critique, which is the case of psychologism, systematized most prominently by Beneke. It is clear that the debate between these two positions, which has lasted for a century and which was being revived under ever new banners, is completely futile and cannot be satisfactorily resolved. It can be settled only by rejecting the common assumption that the content of a critique

10

Nelson (1914-KM), sections 22-23; (1915-IG), Chapter VI; (1915-E), sections 54-55; (1915-UE), p. 615f, reprint: p. 33f. Nelson points out that psychological deduction is necessary to ground only metaphysical principles. However, it can also be useful, though it is not necessary, in grounding mathematical and even logical principles (1914-KM, section 21). Nelson sketches such a deduction for the latter in (1915-E, sections 173-174). It is a pity that Nelson did not realize his program also for mathematical and metaphysical principles, which would show more concretely the form that such a deduction takes. In general, he indicates that such a deduction would follow Fries’ suggestion that such principles “derive” from the form of respective faculties. Mathematical principles “derive” from the forms of sensory perception (space and time) as the object of pure intuition. Metaphysical principles “derive” from the form of cognitive processes in general. Both “forms” refer to consciousness as such, i.e. they are based on an original spontaneity, a constant for the cognitive faculties in question. Since Nelson deduces analytic judgments from the “form” of judgments in general, and since he regards the most general analytic judgments as logical, so the concept of “form” is basic to deduction in general.

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must contain the basis of metaphysical principles, i.e. that a critique aims at a proof of these principles.11 Critical philosophy depends on the rejection of this assumption. Its essence is constituted not by ready results but by a certain view about the philosophical method. It is frequently confused with idealism on the ground that to claim that it is impossible to compare knowledge with object is to deny the real existence of objects. It is clear that these two claims are independent of one another since the latter expresses a philosophical position while the former only a methodological one (1914-KM, sections 5 and 20; 1915-IG, Chapters VII and XI). Based on a careful analysis of the presuppositions of the problem of grounding of metaphysical principles, critical philosophy regards its methodological program as the only possible and correct direction for philosophy. Its hope is that the adoption of this program will end unproductive debates and its realization will turn philosophy into an exact science (1914-KM, pp. 53 and 69).

11

Nelson (1914-KM), sections 24-26; (1915-E), sections 56-58 and Chapter XXVII. A clear schema of post-Kantian philosophy emerges from these purely systematic considerations. Nelson shows the logical continuity of its development and thereby allows one to make one’s way in this tangled web of systems. This is why I present it here: Kant

Reinhold

(Theory of knowledge)

Fichte

(Transcendentalism)

Schelling

(Mysticism)

Hegel

(Dogmatism)

Beneke

(Psychologism)

Fries

(Critical Philosophy)

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CRITICAL PART

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I. Basic Concepts and the Theory of Critical Method 1. Although Nelson is right that Fries’ critical philosophy is a program of philosophical method, it is easily noticed that it is based on numerous purely psychological assumptions which define or describe a variety of mental phenomena. The tendency toward a confrontation between those assumptions and “inner experience” is thus not surprising. It seems to me that there is little hope for success for two reasons, both of which have to do with the fact that psychology is still insufficiently developed. First, too little attention has been devoted to terminological matters in psychology. Second, the fact that the results of the analysis of even the simplest mental phenomena depend not only on the data but also on the person who analyzes them, has not been taken into account at all. This latter factor is decisive, in my opinion, in the analysis of such phenomena as “knowledge” or “judgment.” For this reason, it is best to adopt a purely formal stance and to evaluate Nelson’s claims as to their logical coherence and methodological usefulness. Nelson understands the importance of formula consideration and regards the lack of attention in these matters as one of them main reasons standing in the way of joint philosophical work (see “Schluss” in 1915-E). He thus proposes the following methodological rules: (1) To avoid ambiguity and consequently an inadvertent confusion of the meanings of terms, scientific terminology ought not to deviate from the commonly accepted usage; in coining new concepts, one ought to avoid words whose meaning is associated with a picture, unless this association has already disappeared as in the case of the term ‘basis” (1915-E, section 167). (2) One has to analyze the assumptions of deductions carefully in order to avoid conclusions based on insufficient premises and in order to direct discussion to the consideration of assumptions whose value depends on the value of conclusions, which follow from them (1915-E, section 168). The usefulness of these rules is beyond doubt. I will thus adopt them at the outset of my critical remarks. Point (2) is closely related to the issue of possible views on metaphysical principles and to the problem of the impossibility of the theory of knowledge. I will deal with these questions

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in the following chapter. At present, I will consider to what extent Nelson has incorporated requirement (1) and this will lead us to consider the theory of the critical method.

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2. It is not difficult to see that Nelson does not follow requirement (1) even for the concepts basic to his philosophy. The terms reflection, knowledge and the object of knowledge differ in meaning from common usage. Nelson is thus guilty of definitional “arbitrariness” in just the way in which he charges other psychologists to be. Since Locke, “reflection” has always been used to refer to inner observation or inner experience. Fries used this term in this sense, which is why he actually (and not only apparently, as Nelson claims) did fall into psychologism and self-contradiction. Nelson avoids this error by pointing out that he uses the term only to capture the explanatory character of judgment. However, he thereby introduces terminology that substantially deviates from the accepted usage. The term “reflection” seems to me the more dangerous that Nelson uses it ambiguously to refer to an “act” as well as to the “capacity” exercised in such an act,12 i.e. as a synonym for

12

On p. 524 (reprint: p. 112), Nelson (1915-E) writes: “Reflexions- oder Verstandeserkenntnis,” and on the following page: “Unterscheiduing von Reflexion und Vernunft,” which indicates that “reflection” has the same meaning as “understanding” and so refers to a “capacity.” On p. 755 (reprint: p. 343), we read: “dass die Reflexion nur in der willkürlichen Trennung und Wiederverbindung anderwiet gegenbener Vorstellung besteht” and similarly on p. 808 (reprint: p. 396): “die Reflexion . . . nur ein Mittel ist.” Here an act is at stake. The latter leads to yet another sense of the term, which is officially absent from Nelson’s psychology, viz. what we call the “product” of an act. For example, on p. 744 (reprint: p. 332), he says: “Anschauung und Reflexion die einzigen . . . Erkenntnisarten,” which points to reflection or judgment as knowledge, i.e. as a product. But Nelson is not familiar with the distinction between an act and a product. For him, every mental phenomenon is an act, so “Erkenntnis” is a synonym of “Erkennen,” “Anschauung” of “Anschauen,” etc. I must add that the term “Anschauung” is similarly ambiguous. In general, Nelson’s whole psychological terminology leaves much to be desired. Even the term “Assoziation” is ambiguous. On p. 745 (reprint: p. 333), we read “Die Reflexion darf aber hier nicht als ein selbständiges und von der Assoziation unabhängiges Erkenntnisvermögen betrachtet werden,” where even association has become a capacity. It seems to me that contemporary experimental psychology pays too little attention to such “details.” But they are the source of many misunderstandings especially between purely analytical psychology and applied psychology (educational, technical, etc.). The concepts of the latter focus almost exclusively on mental acts and capacities, which is a reflection of practical needs. For now, they differ greatly from the concepts of purely analytical psychology, for which the concepts of acts and capacities are alien. At present, it is urgent to build a bridge between these two areas of psychology by a careful analysis of these concepts and their origins. (It seems to me that the origin of these concepts lies in the

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“thinking” and as a synonym for “understanding.” Moreover, the existence of these synonyms renders Nelson’s term completely useless. (It may also be that the reason why Fries thought that judgment contains an act of reflection is due to this frequent confusion of the terms “Urteil” and “Beurteilung.”) The difference between Nelson’s understanding of the term “knowledge” and its commonsense as well as psychological meaning is easily brought out in his critique of Kant’s thesis that things in themselves cannot be known. According to Nelson (1915-E, section 79), who follows Jacobi on this point, this claim is incoherent since it is a claim about a thing-in-itself, i.e. an application of categories to the thing-in-itself. Nelson explains this rather unclear reasoning in the following way: What is incoherent is not the claim that things-in-themselves are unknowable a priori but only the claim that we know that things-in-themselves are unknowable a priori. If we had such knowledge, it would be precisely an instance of a priori knowledge of things-in-themselves, i.e. the knowledge that a priori knowledge of 13 things-in-themselves is impossible.

This last sentence confuses knowledge of things-in-themselves (respectively, cognition of them) with the knowledge of that knowledge (respectively, the cognition of it)14.* The latter knowledge is possible if one juxtaposes the notion of knowledge, on the one hand, and the notion of a thing-in-itself, on the other. By contrast, the former knowledge would have to consist in finding the properties of things-in-themselves. The error derives from the grammatical suggestion of the form of the sentence “things-in-themselves are unknowable,” which appears to suggest that

verb form though even ordinary language distinguishes “seeing” from “looking” and “hearing” from “listening,” etc.) 13 “Nicht dass Dinge an sich a priori unerkennbar seien, sondern nur, dass wir wissen, die Dinge an sich seien a priori unerkennbar, widerspricht sich. Denn: hätten wir ein solches Wissen, so besässen wir in ihm eine Erkenntnis a priori der Dinge an sich, nämlich die, dass eine Erkenntnis a priori der Dinge an sich unmöglich sei.” (1915E, p. 587 (reprint: p. 175) in footnote). Bon (1915) gives a similar argument. 14 Nelson sees in Kant’s claim an example of what he calls “introizierter Widerspruch.” However, distinction of the object of the two sentences, which I have explained above, shows that this view has to be rejected. *

[This is a rare occasion where Wiegner actually uses the term ‘wiedza’ (German: Wissen). However, he seems to think that the point applies both to what is captured by the term ‘wiedza’ and by the term ‘poznanie’. The sentence reads: “Ostatnie zdanie zdradza błąd pomieszania poznania rzeczy w sobie (względnie wiedzy o nich) z poznaniem tego poznania (wzgl. wiedzą o nim).”]

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things-in-themselves are the object of the judgment expressed in the sentence. More important than the above faulty reasoning are the views underlying it, with their source in the definition of knowledge. Nelson writes: Every representation is a representation of an object, and the essential quality that distinguishes knowledge from the merely problematic representation is its assertion 15 of the existence of that object.

29

According to this definition, Kant’s hypothesis that the thing-in-itself exists ought to be taken as knowledge that the thing-in-itself exists (and so as contradicting the thesis that it is unknowable). This is utterly unacceptable and contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word “knowledge.” When, in order to explain the perturbations in Uranus’ orbit, Leverrier put forward the hypothesis that a new and hitherto unknown planet must exist, nobody had been, or ever will be, tempted to say that Leverrier had a “knowledge of the hitherto unknown planet.” One cannot, therefore, claim that Kant’s hypothesis about the existence of the thing-initself is a knowledge of the thing-in-itself — not if one uses the terms “knowledge” in its ordinary sense. It is clear that Nelson’s notion of knowledge deviates from its ordinary counterpart. Consequently, also the concept of the object of knowledge is different, which is already evident in the above example. Nelson often calls direct nonintuitive knowledge the “object of inner experience,” since only “through” the latter do we know that the former exists.16 This again deviates from the ordinary sense of the “object of knowledge.” I do not think that any one would call atoms or electrons the “objects of outer experience” though it is only “through” outer experience that we know anything about them. Since those objects are to physics, what direct nonintuitive knowledge is to Nelson’s psychology, this example clearly 15

“Jede Vorstellung ist die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes und zwar ist der Anspruch auf Existenz des Gegenstandes das Wesentliche was die Erkenntnis von der nur problematischen Vorstellung unterscheidet” (1914-KM, p. 25). This is reminiscent of Brentano’s definition. 16 “Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis mag also sein welcher er wolle, äusserer oder innerer, so ist doch die Erkenntniss jederzeit eine innere Tätigkeit. Als solche ist sie aber selbst ein Gengenstand, nämlich Gegenstand der inneren Erfahrung” (1914-KM, p. 25). “ . . . wir müssen diese unmittelbare Erkenntnis (sc. der reinen Vernunft) erst künstlich zum Gegenstande einer Untersuchung machen . . . Wie ist eine solche Untersuchung möglich? Nicht anders als wie überhaupt eine Erkenntnis des faktischen Vorhandenseins von Erkenntnissen möglich ist, d.h. nicht anders als durch innere Erfahrung” (1915-E, p. 531, reprint: p. 119).

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exposes the difference between the ordinary and Nelson’s understanding of an object of knowledge. It is evident that the distinction here is between an object by means of which we come to know and an object of knowledge, i.e. the distinction between an “object sought” and a “directly given object.” 17 Only the latter sense is congenial with the ordinary meaning of the term “the object of knowledge,” which is incidentally also accepted by Nelson (e.g. 1915-E, p. 459, reprint: p. 47, and p. 462, reprint: p. 50). If the object of knowledge is that which we come to know, then, on the above definition of knowledge, the object of knowledge is the existence of the object of a representation. But how then should we understand the “content” of knowledge? I do not see a place for it in Nelson’s psychology. 18 I should mention here one more point about the notion of “grounding.” Nelson (1915-IG, p. 44) defines grounding as the tracing back of knowledge to its basis.19 Of course, grounding is here conceived of as an activity. It cannot be denied that one ordinarily uses this term (as a synonym of “justification”) in this sense. But one must point out that the picture underlying the “reduction” acquires a precise meaning only when it is based on an exact relation between a “basis” and what it grounds. I have not found anywhere in Nelson’s work even the slightest indication as to how he thinks of this relation. One cannot even speak that a judgment grounded by a basis is a “consequence” of the latter (using the model of logical relations among judgments). This interpretation of “grounding” as exclusively an activity is an unfortunate departure from the ordinary understanding of the term, where the psychological notion of grounding as an activity is based on the logical and objective relation between a basis and a consequence. This departure has resulted in the fact that this notion 17

Mechler [1911] claims that the confusion of these two meanings has led Fries to claim that direct nonintuitive knowledge is given not only “through” but directly “in” inner observation, which contradicts the nonintuitiveness of that knowledge. 18 The following passages demonstrate just how easy it is to fall into contradictions in the consideration of these matters. In (1914-NEG, p. 400), Nelson says: “Verwechslung der mathematishcen Begriffe mit den von diesen Begriffen geltenden Gesetzen. Der Satz von der Gleichheit aller Halbmesser eines Kreises gilt von allen Kreisen ohne Ausnahme.” It seems here that the term “circle” is a synonym of the term “the concept of a circle.” On p. 415, we read, however: “Aber was der Mathematiker eine Identität nennt ist keineswegs eine Identität im logischen Sinne. Denn das Gleichheitszeichen ist ein Zeichen für die Identität der Grösse zweier Gegenstände. Aber die Identität der Grösse zweier Gegenstände ist nicht die Identität zweier Begriffe.” It follows then that the mathematical laws hold not for concepts but for their objects. 19 “Die Zurückführung einer Erkenntnis auf ihren Grund heisst ihre Begründung.” (1915-IG, p. 44)

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has been left hanging in the air, as it were, which in turn is due to the picture-like quality of the expressions that Nelson uses to explain it. Let me now demonstrate that Nelson uses ambiguous suggestive pictures rather than precise definitions, contrary to his own declarations. 3. According to Nelson’s theory of judgment (fundamental to all critical philosophy), judgments are conceived of as “reiterating and expressing” the contents of direct knowledge.20 If these expressions were to be taken seriously, one would have to identify judgment with a proposition. Even if one could reconcile this view with critical philosophy, it contradicts Nelson’s explicit declarations (1915-E, section 7). We must therefore consider the above characterization as merely suggestive and so ambiguous and unclear. 21 This same relation between a judgment and direct knowledge is also characterized as an “explanation,” 22 which once again is merely suggestive and unclear. This expression is related to the most important definition of judgment as “indirect consciousness.” This characterization is most frequently used to explain the relation of metaphysical principles to direct nonintuitive knowledge, since it is to reach us only via a judgment not directly as in an intuition, for example. I have to admit that I do not understand this characterization at all. I understand “consciousness” as a kind of knowledge [wiedza]. In other words, what reaches my consciousness is an object of that knowledge [przedmiot tej wiedzy]. In the case of metaphysical principles, what reaches my consciousness is the knowledge of pure reason. However, I cannot regard this knowledge to be the object of those principles but only that, which constitutes the object of that knowledge.23 If, then, “to be an 20

This is most clearly put in (1915-E, p. 506, reprint: p. 94): “‘wahr urteilen’ für mich nichts anderes heissen kann als: so urteilen, dass das Urteil eine Erkenntnis ausspricht, d.h. also, dass es den Inhalt einer unmittelbaren Erkenntnis wiederholt.” 21 Kastil (1918) launches the same criticism against Fries. See pp. 310f. 22 (1914-KM), p. 18: “Die Reflexion ist sich nicht selbst genug, sie ist für sich leer und kann nur anderweitig gegebene Erkenntnis wiederholen und deutlich machen. Sie dient nicht zur Erweiterung sondern nur zur Aufklärung unserer Erkenntnis.” Similarly on p. 808 (reprint: p. 396) of (1915-E), we read: “ . . . dass alles Reflektieren keine Erkenntnis erzeugt, sondern nur eine anderweit gegebene verdeutlicht.” 23 “Die in der Vernunft zu Grunde liegende philosophische Erkenntnis ist als solche eine Erkenntnis a priori: ihr Gegenstand, d.h. das was durch sie erkannt wird, sind die allgemeinen Gesetze der objektiven synthetischen Einheit im Dasein der Dinge überhaupt. Das Urteil kann folglich, sofern es diese philosophische Erkenntnis wiederholt, nicht eine empirische Erkenntnis sein und sein Gegenstand kann kein anderer sein als der der unmittelbaren philosophischen Erkenntnis selbst, die ja ihrem Gehalte nach mit dem im Urteil ausgesagten identisch ist. Der ‘Gegenstand’, der durch das Urteil erkannt wird,

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object of knowledge” is not to stand for some transitive relation, one would have to understand the word “consciousness” in a way other than one usually does. But Nelson does not tell us how. One could, of course, speak of “indirect consciousness” in analogy to cases when we say that we have become conscious or aware of atoms only on the basis of a certain theory about physical and chemical phenomena. It is clear, however, that this “indirect” consciousness of atoms is contained in judgments whose object is constituted by those atoms, not in judgments whose subject is constituted by them. Similarly, the indirect consciousness of the direct nonintuitive knowledge would lie not in metaphysical principles, but in judgments about that knowledge. Once again, it is impossible to understand the claim: “metaphysical principles are the indirect consciousness of direct nonintuitive knowledge.” One other suggestive term plays an important role in Nelson’s consideration of these issue, viz. the expression “source” or “origin.” In his polemic with the empiricists, for example with Mach, Nelson constantly notes that they confuse the problem of a temporal development of a concept with the problem of its origin or its source.24 He stresses the difference between these two problems in the following passages: The question what the causes of the opportunity for development of our basic geometrical concepts were, is very different from the question of the origin of these 25 concepts. (1914-NEG, p. 403)

besteht also in gewissen allgemeinen Gesetzen, keineswegs aber in der unmittelbaren philosophischen Erkenntnis dieser Gesetze. Diese Erkenntnis ist nicht der Gegenstand, sondern der Inhalt des Urteils” (1915-E, p. 809, reprint: p. 397). 24 “Mach verfährt so, dass er dem Terminus der Apriorität, der nach Kants ausdrücklicher Definition nur den nichtempirischen Ursprung gewisser Urteile und Begriffe bezeichnen soll, den Begriff des Angeborneseins unterschiebt und dann aus der von niemanden bestrittenen Tatsache, dass es dergleichen angeborene Urteile oder Begriffe gar nicht gibt, auf den empirischen Ursprung der fraglichen Erkenntnisse schliesst. Eine Schlussweise, deren Unstatthaftigkeit in die Augen fält, so lange man noch die Frage, ob eine Erkenntnis hinsichtlich ihrer Quelle aus der Beobachtung geschöpft sei, von der anderen zu unterscheiden weiss, ob sie der Zeit nach, aller Beobachtung vorhergehe. Eine Unterschieudng dieser beiden Fragen ist bei Mach nirgends anzutreffen” (1915-MN, pp. 253f). Nelson comments further about the Mach”s theory of abstraction: “ . . . hier wieder das verschiedene Zeitverhältnis zur Erfahrung dem Unterschiede des empirischen und rationalen Ursprungs der Erkenntnis untergeschoben wird” (p. 269) and further “dass die Abstraktion nicht die Quelle, sondern nur die Methode der Aufsuchung der Prinzipien ist” (p. 269). 25 “Aber etwas anderes ist die Frage nach den Gelegenheitsursachen der Entwicklung unserer geometrischen Grundbegriffe, etwas anderes die Frage nach dem Ursprung dieser Begriffe.”

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Adam Wiegner The development of an insight through experience is something different from the 26 origin of this insight in experience. (1915-MN, pp. 269f)

It is clear that there is a difference here and that the question about the “source” is fundamentally important and constitutes the proper problem of a critique. It is hard, however, to see what is involved since Nelson does not provide us with a definition of the suggestive expressions “entspringen,” “shöpften” and the like. I believe that Nelson intended these expressions to capture the relation between the basis of a judgment and the judgment, i.e. ultimately the relation of direct knowledge and the judgment that “expresses” it. This is indicated by the following passage: . . . in dem seit Aristoteles traditionell gewordenem, von Kant bekämpften Dogma, das als Kriterien der Wahrheit nur die Logik und die Erfahrung kennt. Nach diesem Dogma sind alle notwendigen Wahrheiten logischen Ursprungs (1914-NEG, p. 391)

The indication here is that “Ursprung” is a synonym of “Kriterium” (see also 1915-E, section 87). Elsewhere, Nelson speaks as if “Kriterium” is synonymous with “Erkenntnisgrund” 27: . . . wenn man diese Erkenntnis als unmittelbare vom Urteil unterscheidet und als Kriterium oder Erkenntnisgrund der Gültigkeit der Urteile betrachtet (1915-E, p. 573, reprint: p. 161, in footnote). 34

Both passages imply that the terms “Quelle” and “Erkenntnisgrund” are synonymous. This is further confirmed by the following passage: Wie sollen wir den Ausdruck, die Phänomenologie “erschliesse” die “Quellen” aus denen die Prinzipien der reinen Logik “entspringen” verstehen, wenn nicht in dem Sinne, dass die Phänomenologie den Erkennitsgrund der logischen Prinzipien zum Gegenstande habe? (1915-E, p. 547, reprint: p. 135)

It is clear that the “source of knowledge” is the same as the “basis of knowledge.” In other words, the expression “to originate” indicates a relation between a judgment and direct knowledge. But there is no clear 26

“Aber etwas anderes is die Entwicklung einer Einsicht durch die Erfahrung etwas anderes der Ursprung dieser Einsicht aus der Erfahrung.” 27 This seems to be contradicted by the following passage: “Grund einer Erkenntnis heisst diejenige unmittelbare Erkenntnis mit der die erstere übereinstimmt, sofern wir in dieser Übereinstimmung das Kriterium ihrer Wahrheit suchen” (1915-IG, p. 44). Here, “Kriterium” is not synonymous with “Erkenntnisgrund” but simply with a definition of truth. In fact, Nelson charges Kant that he committed “Verwechslung jener Erklärung (Definition) mit einem Kriterium der Wahrheit” (1915-E, p. 598, reprint: p. 186). Likewise, Nelson points out that Beneke errs “in der Verwechslung des Kriteriums für ein Merkmal mit der Definition dieses Merkmals” (1915-E, p. 723, reprint: p. 311). But Nelson commits the very same error in the cited passage. Such details make the task of understanding the text often impossible.

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answer to the question what exactly this relation is. It is clear that “to originate” is not the same as “to repeat.” More is involved. So the logical aspect of the relation does not exhaust the meaning of the first expression. But what more is involved, we are not told. I gather that the psychological aspect of the relation between a judgment and its basis is also involved since the search for bases is a task for psychology. But how is the “origin” of knowledge different from its temporal development? How do “accidental causes” differ from the “source” of knowledge? Since we are not given clear answers, we are free to conjecture that what is at stake here is either a relation of a “capacity” (or “power”) to an “activity” or a “product” or a general characterization of the direct knowledge as a basis for a given category of judgments in abstraction from the concrete content of those judgments. The former option seems to be rather derivative and insignificant. On the latter option, on the other hand, the fundamental opposition between the question about the “source” and the question about the “accidental causes” together with the whole difference between “durch” and “aus” reduces to the difference between a universal and a particular.28 In any case, it is evident that the issue of the “source of knowledge” is quite unclear and that this is due to the suggestiveness of expressions and the lack of precise definitions. It should be also mentioned that this suggestiveness has also obscured the notion of a “basis.” It has made unclear to what this concept pertains, whether to the “content” of a judgment or to the “validity of a judgment. Nelson sometimes writes in one way, sometimes in the other. It is at any rate clear that the expression “Grund der Gültigkeit des Urteils” is not a simple synonym of “Grund des Urteils,” but exactly what the difference between them is we are not told.29 It is possible that the distinction would reduce to the previously considered difference between “aus” and 28

It may be that the very quest after a fundamental difference between the above two questions already contains an implicit assumption that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the “form” and the “content” of knowledge. Kant expresses the difference by the distinction between “mit der Erfahrung anfangen” and “aus der Erfahrung entspringen.” It will also not be beside the point to remind ourselves of Nelson’s view on the relation of mathematics to logic, i.e. of mathematical judgments to reflection as a “source”: “Die Mathematik entwickelt sich also, obschon in Begriffen und durch Begriffe, dennoch aus der Anschauung” (1914-NEG, p. 412). 29 In consequence, the term “Begründung” becomes similarly ambiguous, since we do not know whether the object of grounding is a judgment (as it seems to follow from the definition of a “basis” cited above) or its validity, which is indicated by the following passages: “so ist doch die Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis insofern einer Begründung fähig . . .” (1915-E, p. 633, reprint: p. 221) and “Die Aufgabe den Grund der Gewissheit dieser Sätze zu ermitteln” (p. 623, reprint: p. 211).

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“durch.” 30 Unfortunately, we find absolutely no help on another point of fundamental importance, viz. the notion of “assertion,” which is what distinguishes “cognitive” from “merely problematic” representation. Of course, it itself is neither a “representation” nor a “judgment,” but what it is, we have no idea. We are left to make entirely arbitrary hypotheses both with respect to its nature as a mental phenomenon as well as with respect to its logical “content” or “object.” 31 It cannot be denied, for example, that “assertion” is closely related both to “Gültigkeit” and to “Anspruch auf Existenz,” and finally that it is related to “Überzeugung.” It is likewise entirely unclear why Nelson considers “recollections” (Erinnerungsvorstellungen) to be problematic representations since they are after all accompanied by the belief that the object of those representations exists albeit in the past (see Kastil 1918, p. 267). Moreover, the relation between assertion and “belief” is particular important in view of the fundamental difference between “thinking” and “knowledge.” According to Nelson, the former is always problematic. This is why, in his view, non-Euclidean geometries are possible. They are analytically (i.e. from a purely logical point of view) admissible, but synthetically (i.e. from an epistemic point of view) impossible in view of pure intuition (1914-NEG, section 11). This implies that the “issuing” of a judgment is independent of assertion. However, the following passage is clearly incompatible with this point: das Richtige . . . besteht in der Beobachtung, dass die Anerkennung des Wahrheitswertes des Urteils eine psychologische Bedingung für das wirkliche Zustandekommen des Urteils ist. (1915-E, p. 553, reprint: p. 141)

It suggests that assertion is a necessary condition of the issuance of a judgment. But how then is one to understand the existence of nonEuclidean geometries? Unless, assertion depends on the will so that we 30

The following passage, for example, could be interpreted in this way: “ . . . verwechselt die Ursache der Entstehung des Urteils mit dem Grunde seiner Gültigkeit” (1915-E, p. 556, reprint: p. 144). 31 Kastil (1918, §5 and §16) discusses this omission in Fries’ psychological system quite extensively. He shows that it is solely responsible for the theory of the irreducible psychological difference between direct knowledge and judgment. Indeed, consider the following passage: “Zum Urteil gehört ausser einer Verbindung von Vorstellungen noch eine zu dieser Vorstellungsverbindung hinzutretende Assertion. Diese Assertion ist es, die auf “Wahrheit” Anspruch erhebt und nur sofern dieser Anspruch zu Recht besteht, erkennen wir durch das Urteil” (Nelson 1915-E, p. 493, reprint: p. 81). If so then the following question forces itself: What exactly is the difference between “assertion” and “judgment” if both phenomena share the fundamental feature of aspiring to truth. Moreover, why should one insist that in the case of perception, “ . . . die Assertion, die sie (sc. die Wahrnehmung) einschliesst, ist aber kein Urteil” (1915-UE, p. 598, reprint: p. 16).

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can consciously “will the untruth.” In any case, it is clear that Nelson’s psychology has serious deficiencies that threaten the very program of the critical method, to the analysis of which I now turn. 4. As we have seen in the Descriptive Part of this monograph, the critical method consists of two operations: regression, which leads to the discovery of principles and deduction, which is used to ground them. In view of its importance and the difficulties with which it is associated, the later operation falls within the purview of the “critique of pure reason.” As such, it requires a special philosophical and psychological preparation. Regression, on the other hand, plays only a preparatory and supporting role.32 Here is how Nelson characterized the insufficiency of regression: . . . it is the principles that are in dispute; it is precisely with their justification that we are concerned . . . Now, we have already seen that there is no point in asking for proof of basic principles; we must first determine whether a proposition is really a principle before we are justified in renouncing proof of it. The regressive procedure, however, is not it itself sufficient for this demonstration; analysis does not set for itself its own limits. On the one hand, it is always doubtful, without some further criterion, whether the analysis could not be pursued further or whether it has really arrived at principles. On the other hand, even if the latter were possible, there would still remain the question whether we had really 33 exhausted the entire system of principles or whether it was not still incomplete. [Nelson 1965, pp. 113-114]

As this question indicates, Nelson considers the problem of the basis of principles to be identical with the issue of the ultimacy and completeness of the system of such principles.34 Let us set aside the question whether 32

“ . . . dass durch eine regressive Aufweisung die quaestio iuris der fraglichen Grundsätze nur mehr vorbereitet als beantwortet wird, dass also die Aufgabe, den grund der Gewissheit dieser Sätze zu ermittlen noch eine andere Methode erfordert” (1915-E, p. 623, reprint: p. 211). 33 “ . . . um die Prinzipien ist ja gerade der Streit, um ihre Berechtigung handelt es sich ja eben . . . Nun hatten wir ja allerdings gesehen, dass es keinen Sinn hat, für Grundsätze einen Beweis zu verlangen; aber ob ein Satz wirklich ein Grunsatz ist, dies muss doch erst feststehen, ehe wir mit Fug and Recht auf seinen Beweis verzichten können. Zu diesem Nachweis reicht aber das regressive Verfahren für sich nicht hin. Denn die Zergliederung selbst setzt sich keine Grenzen. Einerseits bleibt es ohne ein weiteres Kriterium immer fraglich, ob sich die Zergliederung nicht noch weiter fortsetzen lässt oder ob sie wirklich schon auf Grundsätze geführt hat. Wäre aber auch dies möglich, so bliebe andererseits immer noch die Frage, ob wir das System der Grundsätze schon erschöpft haben, oder ob es nicht noch unvollständig ist.” (1914-KM, section 11, p. 14) 34 However, Nelson (1915-E, p. 728, reprint: p. 316) seems to separate the issue of the uncertainty whether regressively reached judgments are indeed basic principles, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that it is impossible in this way to answer what is the basis of their validity.

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this is right. At present, I am only concerned with Nelson’s view according to which regression is insufficient because there is no criterion that could determine whether a system of principles reached regressively is indeed further unanalyzable and complete. In this respect, regression needs to be supplemented by another method which is not in a similar way disadvantaged. Deduction is to be such a method, so let us consider it in turn. Nelson [1965, pp. 119-120] writes: But how are we to [ground] the metaphysical principles? . . . We call the way of 35 [grounding] them deduction.

38

On p. 121, he says: “There are, then, three kinds of [grounding]: proof, demonstration, and deduction.”36 According to these remarks, deduction is a method or a kind of grounding. This point is elaborated: . . . critique proves the psychological proposition that the knowledge expressed by a particular metaphysical proposition is direct knowledge from pure reason. The proof of this psychological theorem is the deduction of that metaphysical 37 principle. (1914-KM, p. 30)

This explanation implies that the form of grounding called “deduction” is a proof of some psychological claim. If so, however, then the previous claim that deduction and proof are separate kinds of grounding is false. One could say at best that a deduction differs from a proof in such a way as each concrete proof of a claim differs from a proof in general, i.e. as a proof proper from its general “formula.” Already this analysis shows Nelson’s thought to be at least unclear. However, Nelson does not even let us hold on to this position. We read further: But how can the mere psychological ascertainment of the source of a metaphysical proposition become a [grounding] of it? Only through reference to the fact of the self-confidence of reason. On the reference to this fact rests, in the last analysis, the possibility of deduction as a validation of a priori principles on the grounds of their possibility. The [expression] of this fact is thus the highest principle of critique; it is nothing more or less than the expression of the fundamental fact of [knowledge] itself. 35

“Wie sollen wir aber die metaphysischen Grundsätze begründen? . . . Wir nennen ihre Begründungsweise Deduktion.” (1914-KM, p. 22) 36 “Es gibt also drei Arten der Begründung: Beweis, Demonstration und Deduktion.” (1914-KM, p. 23) 37 “Die Kritik beweist den psychologischen Satz, dass die Erkenntnis, die ein gewisser metaphysischer Satz ausspricht, eine unmittelbare Erkenntnis aus reiner Vernunft ist. Der Beweis dieses psychologischen Lehrsatzes ist die Deduktion jenes metaphysischen Grundsatzes.”

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The principle of the self-confidence of reason deserves to be called a critical (or transcendental) principle only in so far as we understand under the term a proposition that, without itself being metaphysical, provides us with a criterion of the legitimacy of metaphysical propositions. For it entails the legitimization of all propositions that can demonstrate their origin in pure reason and hence can establish themselves as metaphysical principles. It is not able, however, to adjudicate which propositions arise from pure reason; it serves therefore only as major premise in the logical structure of deduction. We must assure ourselves of 38 the minor premises in another way. This other way is the theory of reason. (p. 126)

These clarifications need to be further supplemented by the following quote: The critique of reason asks simply: What [direct] knowledge does our reason possess? Just to ask this question, reason must have self-confidence in the truth of its [direct] knowledge as the major premise of all deduction. Thus, although [critique] deduces metaphysical principles from a theory of reason which itself can be attainted though inner experience, i.e., only inductively, nevertheless the validity of the metaphysical principles is not grounded on experience or induction. For metaphysical principles are not proved by the theory of reason but are simply made manifest as such; and in this process the affirmation of their quid juris does not rest on the inductions of inner experience, which are used as the grounds of 39 deduction, but on the self-confidence of reason. (p. 125) 38

“Wie kann aber die nur psychologische Nachweisung des Ursprungs eines metaphysischen Satzes zu seiner Begründung werden? Nur durch Beziehung auf das Faktum des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft. Auf der Beziehung auf dieses Faktum beruht zuletzt die Möglichkeit der Deduktion als eines Rechtsnachweises von Prinzipien a priori aus den Gründen ihrer Möglichkeit. Der Ausspurch dieses Faktums bildet daher den obersten Grundsatz der Kritik, er ist nichts anderes, als der Ausspruch des fundamentalen Faktums des Erkennens selbst. “Der Grundsatz des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft verdient allein den Namen eines kritischen (oder transzendentalen) Prinzips, sofern darunter ein Satz verstanden wird, der ohne selbst metaphysisch zu sein, ein Kriterium der Legitimität metaphysischer Sätze an die Hand gibt. Denn er enthält die Legitimation aller Sätze, die ihren Ursprung in der reinen Vernunft und mithin sich selbst als metaphysische Grundsätze erweisen können. Welche Sätze aber aus reiner Venunft entspringen, darüber vermag er nichts auszusagen. Er figuriert also nur als Obersatz in der logischen Form der Deduktion. Ihrer Untersätze müssen wir uns auf anderem Wege versichern. Dieser Weg is die Theorie der Vernunft.” (1914-KM, p. 30f) 39 “Welche unmittelbare Erkenntnis besitzt unsere Vernunft? Wobei als Obersatz aller Deduktionen des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft auf die Wahrheit ihrer umittelbaren Erkenntnis überhaupt schon feststehen muss. Obwohl also die Kritik die metaphysischen Prinzipien aus einer Theorie der Vernunft deduziert, welche selbst durch innere Erfahrung, mithin nur induktorisch gewonnen werden kann, so werden doch die metaphysischen Prinzipien ihrer Gültigkeit nach nicht auf Erfahrung oder Induktion gegründet. Denn sie werden aus der Theorie der Vernunft nicht bewiesen, sondern nur also solche aufgewiesen; wobei die Schlusskraft in der Beantwortung ihres quid iuris nicht, auf den zu Grunde

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These passages clearly contain a new claim, which contradicts earlier claims made by Nelson. Here, Nelson holds that a deduction, understood as a proof of a claim that a given principle originates in pure reason, is not yet a grounding of that principle. A deduction is only a proof of a minor premise of the whole grounding process. It is only when it is combined with the major premise, viz. the principle of the self-confidence of reason that it “becomes” a grounding. It seems evident that Nelson’s view that deduction is a kind of grounding of principles cannot for this reason be upheld. These two operations lead to quite different conclusions. One could say, perhaps, that deduction is a means (i.e. a tool) of grounding. Indeed, I believe that Nelson’s mistake is due to the ambiguity of the preposition “durch” or the noun “Weise,” which he uses to capture both the species-kind relation as well as the means-end relation 40.* These passages further confirm the view mentioned earlier that the grounding of metaphysical principles consists in a proof after all. It is not a proof of the principles themselves but of their objectivity, i.e. their truth. We can thus capture the grounding of these principles in the following syllogism; I will call it syllogism (G): Knowledge from pure reason is objectively valid. (G) Principle A expresses knowledge from pure reason.

40

Principle A is objectively valid. The minor premise of this syllogism (sometimes also expressed as “Principle A originates in pure reason”) is a conclusion derived from a psychological theory of reason, which by laying out the organization of reason gives at the same time the content of knowledge based on that organization. The operation of deduction can be succinctly presented in the following syllogism (D):

gelegten Induktionen der inneren Erfahrung, sondern auf dem Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft ruht.” (1914-KM, p. 29) 40 Nelson speaks clearly of “die Begründung durch Beweis” (1914-KM, p. 23). In Polish, the same ambiguity occurs in the expression “sposób chodzenia” [Eng. a way of walking]. *

[This ambiguity is also present in English, e.g. in the expression “a way of thinking.” In the sentence “There are many ways of thinking about it,” the expression captures a specieskind relation. In the sentence “Here is a way to think about it . . . ” a means-end relation is involved.]

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[A] knowledge [claim] X originates in the organization of pure reason. (D) Principle A expresses knowledge claim X. Principle A expresses knowledge from pure reason. The minor premise here is tantamount to the claim that the content of principle A is the same as the content of knowledge claim X. Speaking about such a deduction, Nelson says: This psychological deduction is at the same time independent of the establishment of the system of principles by the logical-regressive analysis of the judgments of our conscious thinking; and we possess the advantage of being able to compare the two afterward and thus of being able to determine the “quid juris” of conscious 41 thinking by the “quid facti” of reason. (p. 122)

It is thus clear that Nelson views grounding by deduction as independent of regression. This is sufficient to explain the relation between the two critical methods. 5. We have devoted a substantial space to properly answer the question whether the grounding of metaphysical principles by deduction indeed answers the question of their validity. I give a negative answer to this question. In order to prove my thesis I will first establish that: (1) Deduction has the very same shortcoming as regression. (2) Deduction is not independent of regression. In order to prove claim (1), it is sufficient to recall that deduction is based entirely on a theory of pure reason. In other words, it is based on an inductively acquired empirical theory. Such a theory does not give any guarantee either that its theses are complete or that they are ultimate. This is why deduction likewise cannot overcome the shortcoming mentioned in the discussion of regression. Moreover, claim (1) follows from claim (2), which can be established as follows: All psychology can say about mental “capacities” is derivative, i.e. based on an analysis and description of directly given phenomena, which are to be explained by means of a conception of “capacity.” In order to know anything about the organization of pure reason, one has to first know 41

“Diese psychologische Deduktion ist zugleich unabhängig von der Grundlegung des Systems der Grundsätze durch die logisch-regressive Zergliederung der Urteile des Bewusstseins und wir haben den Vorteil, hinterher beides zu vergleichen und so das quid iuris des Bewusstseins durch das quid facti der Vernunft entscheiden zu können.” (1914-KM, p. 26)

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its “manifestations.” One must begin with cognitive phenomena given directly, viz. concrete cases of judgments issued in everyday life and in special sciences. It is clear, however, that Nelson does not think that “pure reason” can explain the totality of these concrete phenomena but only some of its so-called “formal” elements. In other words, in order to know anything about the organization of pure reason one has to find (through analysis) such formal elements of the concrete totality of cognitive phenomena and bring them out to light. One can easily see that these formal elements of a given set of judgments are none other than concepts and judgments basic to them — in our case, metaphysical categories and principles. In order to build a theory of pure reason, we must first know metaphysical categories and principles which (as “manifestation” are to be explained by the organization of the “capacity” of pure reason. We should recall, however, that categories and principles are discovered by means of regression. It is thus clear that deduction is ultimately based on regression. Regression is necessary for deduction since it supplies factual material for the inductive theory of reason. I have hereby proven that deduction is not independent of regression.42 The conclusion is simple: if regression does not suffice to ground metaphysical principles, then deduction cannot do this either. In other words, metaphysical principles cannot be grounded by deduction. The above consideration allows us to give a clear understanding of the futility of the whole process of grounding. In syllogism (D) the difference between the term “knowledge claim X” and the term “principle A” is only apparent since both refer to an “indirect awareness of direct nonintuitive knowledge” (to the extent that this expression has any sense). Deduction cannot give anything more or anything less than what is contained in its assumptions, i.e. a theory of reason. It is in fact circular.43 The appearance 42

This shows how misleading are Nelson’s claims. He says: “Thus, it will be possible, without dealing in abstracto with the philosophical principles themselves, to deduce them empirically — a procedure with which skepticism cannot take issue since we shall be dealing entirely with facts which everyone can observe for himself and shall not become involved in any metaphysical consideration or hypotheses” (CM, p. 122). “So wird es möglich sein, ohne mit den philosophischen Prinzipien selbst in abstracto zu operieren, sie auf empirischem Wege zu deduzieren. Ein Verfahren, dem gegenüber Skeptizismus gar nicht anzubringen ist, eben weil wir dabei ganz auf dem Boden der Tatsachen bleiben, die einem jeden zur Beobachtung offen liegen, ohne uns irgend auf metaphysische Erörterungen oder Hypothesen einzulassen.” (1914-KM, p. 25) 43 This point is made both by Mechler and by Kastil. Whereas Mechler makes this point rather vaguely — even though all too often (1911, pp. 58, 67, 80, 84f), Kastil treats this issue of fundamental importance to all critical philosophy rather superficially and casually (1918, p. 308).

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that it can give something new may derive from the ambiguity of an expression Nelson uses frequently, viz. “Faktum der Erkenntnis.” That expression can refer either to the cognitive act or to its content. Only in the latter sense can “cognitive facts” constitute the basis of an inductive theory of the “organization of cognitive power.” It is therefore not surprising that one can then infer from the theory what the content of knowledge, which is a manifestation of this power, is. This is a vicious circle. It differs from other vicious circles, however, in that it involves not only logical deductions 44 but both induction and deduction. This is revealed in the fact that the conclusion of grounding, i.e. of syllogism (G), reads: “Principle A is objectively valid.” In other words, the conclusion says that principle A is true. The whole grounding, as a proof of this conclusion, does not move us any further. It is tantamount to showing that “It is true that principle A is true,” which is logically equivalent to the proposition “Principle A is true.” The appearance that the grounding gives us new knowledge derives from the psychological interpretation of the processes of grounding. More precisely, it derives from our attempt to see it as a proof that our “belief that principle A is true is justified” since it derives from the very source of “consciousness in general.” This is, of course, a new judgment whose content differs from the judgment “Principle A is true.” Unfortunately, it already presupposes the latter since we can only know about “consciousness in general” from a psychological theory, which treats acts of “faith” in certain judgments as the basic factual data. Nelson quite rightly says: . . . that for every metaphysical proposition, there must be an equivalent psychological propositional , viz. a proposition about the basis of the possibility of the knowledge that is expressed in the metaphysical proposition. As far as its validity is concerned, this psychological proposition stands in the following relationship to its metaphysical equivalent: both propositions can have any claim to 45 truth only together, or they will have to be both discarded as prejudices. (1915-E, 46 p. 785, reprint: p. 373)

44

Deductions in the sense of formal logic, not in Nelson’s sense. “ . . . dass es zu jedem metaphysischen Sätze einen äquivalenten psychologischen Satz begen muss, nämlich einen Satz über die Gründe der Möglichkeit der in dem metaphysischen Sätze ausgesprochenen Erkenntnis. Dieser psychologische Satz steht hinsichtlich seiner Gültigkeit zu seinem metaphysischen Äquivalent in einem Wechselverhältnis von der Art, das beide Sätze nur miteinander Anspruch auf gegründete Wahrheit erheben können oder miteinader als Vorurteil verworfen werden müssen.” 46 I should mention that the above criticism can be easily generalized and applied to all “reasoning” whatsoever. After all, aside from Fries’ and Nelson’s purely psychological 45

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This does not show, however, that the psychological theory of the possibility of knowledge together with Nelson’s method of deduction could be used to ground principles. In order to explain cognitive facts, such a theory must already assume the content of what it calls knowledge. In our case: it is already based on the acceptance of certain judgments as true, i.e. as objectively valid. I am probably not mistaken in thinking that the source of the idea to use psychological “explanation” to logically “ground” judgments lies in the ambiguity of the words “Grund” and “gründen.” A psychological theory, which seeks to find the “source” of certain judgments in the basic functions of and laws governing “consciousness in general,” can lead one to suppose that such judgments are shared by all conscious beings. In other words, it can lead one to suppose that every conscious being takes certain “judgments” (with a precisely determined “content”) to constitute knowledge. But I do not (and cannot) see in this a “grounding” of such judgments. This is because the theory in question must first assume that such judgments are objectively valid. This is an empirical assumption of that theory. It must be made prior to the (allegedly) grounding conclusion. “deduction,” there exist other types based not on a “theory of reason” but on a “theory of knowledge.” (“Theory of knowledge” ought to be understood as a “science of knowledge” broadly conceived, not as the theory of knowledge that is disputed by critical philosophy.) Such a “deduction” based on a biologico-historical “theory of knowledge” was proposed, for example, by Bon [1915], who writes: “die einzig berechtigte und wertvolle Frage nach der Berechtigung und dem Wert des Erkennens die nach der Berechtigung und dem Wert der Voraussetzungen des Erkennens im Hinblick auf den durch das Erkennen zu erreichenden Zweck ist. Dieser Zweck is aber selbst wiederum nicht willkürlich aufzustellen, sonder er ist aus der Betrachtung der Menschenheitsgeschichte zu bestimmen. Denn nur diese kann uns lehren, welchem Zwecke das Erkennen tatsächlich dient.” (p. 348). Nelson objects that, in spite of his attacks on the theory of knowledge, Bon is proposing exactly such a theory (1915-E, p. 417, reprint: p. 5). But he must be misled by the terminology. In fact, Bon’s “Rechtfertigung” cannot be thought of as “Beweis” as is demonstrated unambiguously by the following passage: “Denn der gemeinsame Fehler, den beide (sc. Rationalismus und Empirismus), eben weil es Richtungen innerhalb der Erkenntnistheorie sind, begehen, ist der Glaube, dass ein Beweis für die obersten Grundsätze erstens notwendig und zweitens überhaupt möglich sei und dass es neben deren biologischer Berechtigung auch not eine logische gäbe, ein Glaube der sich durch das Festhalten an dem Descartes’schen Postulat dokumentiert, dass nichts als wahr angenommen werden dürfe, das nichts als wahr bewiesen, oder wie man sich auch ausdrückt ‘logisch notwendig’ sei. Ob dieser Beweis in der Erfahrung oder in der Intuition gesucht wird, das fällt dabei sehr wenig ins Gewicht gegenüber der Tatsache, dass ein solcher Beweis überhaupt gesucht wird” (Bon 1915, p. 304). It is quite clear that Bon’s “biologico-historical” justification of principles, which is not tantamount to their proof, is quite analogous to Nelson’s approach and in particular his “deduction.” Bon’s account can be thus regarded as a form of critical philosophy.

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Let us take the simplest principles there are as an example, logical principles. As the principles of “what can be at all thought,” they imply a psychological claim about the general necessity to think properly, i.e. about the “organization of reason.” No instance of “error” can prove otherwise since it can always be attributed not to the deviation from the “laws of thought” but to illusions concerning the subject-matter of thought, i.e. to the illusions of “inner sense.” In contrast to Nelson (1915-E, pp. 566f, reprint: p. 154f]), I claim, for example, that it is psychologically impossible to consciously think a self-contradictory thought. Cases where the principle of noncontradiction is disobeyed derive from a failure to notice a contradiction in the objective meanings of the terms. They are thus quite compatible with the suggestion that what is in fact thought is subjectively free from contradiction. it is inadmissible, however, to use this psychological fact to “deduce” the logical principle of noncontradiction. This is because the belief in the truth of this principle is prior to the psychological explanation of certain deviations from it.47 The 47

Nelson’s deduction of logical principles is entirely based on the concept of a “form” of judgment. He gives the following definition: “Der Inbegriff alles dessen, was erfordert wird, damit wir etwas dem Begriff des Urteils überhaupt unterordnen, d.h. das was die definierenden Merkmale des Urteils ausmacht, ist aber die blosse Form des Urteils” (1915-E, p. 792, reprint: p. 380). It would seem then that the “form” of a judgment is a synonym of a “concept” of judgment. Given that the concept of a judgment derives from psychological observation of cases of judging and so that this concept also includes features pertaining to he relation among judgments in general (i.e. the content of logical principles), it is not surprising that the latter “originate” in the “form” of judgment. The deduction of mathematical principles proceeds in a similar fashion. Nelson writes: “Form ist überhaupt dasjenige, was den Grund dafür bildet, dass Mannigfaltiges in gewissen Verhältnissen geordnet erscheint. So finden wir im Raum das Mannigfaltige der Sinnesanschaung in gewissen Ausdehnungs- und Massverhältnissen angeordnet. Der Raum ist also die Form der Sinnesanschauung” (1914-NEG, p. 404). It is clear that one cannot speak about a “Grund” of the order in a certain discipline without a prior acquaintance with it. In other words, all psychological deductions of principles that capture such an order must be circular. — Only the vagueness of concepts and expressions can give any appearance of some progress. Quite representative here is the confession of G. Hessenberg (a mathematician) who says the following about Apelt’s psychological deduction of the three-dimensionality of space: “ich habe den Sinn seiner skizzenhaften Ausführungen bisher nicht verstanden und habe auch unter philosophisch gebildeten Freunden niemanden gefunden, der es vermocht hätte. Da aber Apelt eine wissenschaftlich durchaus ernst zu nehmende Persönlichkeit war, so ist anzunehmen, dass diese Fussnote nur als vorläufiger Hinweis zu betrachten ist, und dass er durch seinen frühzeitigen Tod an einer ausführlichen Darstellung gehindert wurde” (1904, p. 25) I suspect that if Apelt carried out this attempt in more detail, he would have been no more successful. I will allow myself to call attention to one more striking consequence of the passage by Nelson cited above. I understand that the sensory totality given to us exhibits a certain order, i.e. that it is subject to certain laws. I understand also that the sensory content that is

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same is true, in my opinion, for metaphysical principles. They must be accepted prior to a psychology which explains their possibility. But the matters are more complicated here. For example, the rejection of the principle of causality by those who believe in miracles is frequently only apparent and derives from the ambiguity of the term “causality.” If this term means something like “regularity in general” then the concept of a “miracle” does not contradict it. To the contrary, a miracle is an instance of a special kind of regularity, which can be called “a regularity of the will.” Miracles, then, contradict the principles of causality only under a narrower interpretation. Only this more detailed concept of “causality” is metaphysically appropriate. The fact of its rejection will be explained differently by its proponents and differently by its opponents. But both explanations will be psychological though each different since based on a prior acceptance of a different metaphysical system. In other words, the accepted metaphysical system will determine at the outset even what I find as directly given. — These remarks lead straightforwardly to the criticism of Nelson’s theory of all possible positions on the issue of the grounding of metaphysical principles. II. The Possibility of Metaphysics and the Impossibility of the Theory of Knowledge 1. The analysis of the theory of deduction has demonstrated that this method, which is fundamental to critical philosophy, is in fact useless. It cannot serve to provide a non-circular grounding of metaphysical principles. Since Nelson himself has shown that regression likewise cannot be used for this purpose we must conclude that the critical method as such cannot be used to secure permanent bases for metaphysics or to provide an ultimate answer to the question quid juris for particular metaphysical principles. It does not follow, however, either that metaphysics itself is impossible or that Nelson’s critical philosophy (i.e. the view that the basis given to us is always spatial, i.e. in space. But I do not understand the expression, which follows from this passage that sensory intuition is given to us in space as “in the basis of the spatial order.” It is the ambiguity of the term “Grund” that allows Nelson to skip over the identification of the terms “space” and “spatial order.” The suggestiveness of the term “Form” gives the illusion of some kind of explanation. For mathematics, “space” is indeed synonymous with “spatial order.” But the so-called construction of concepts in pure intuition is not only spurious but senseless since it is either a construction of the so-called general object, which is incoherent (Leśniewski 1913, pp. 319f), or it cannot be understood since it has no definition.

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of metaphysical principles lies in direct nonintuitive knowledge) is impossible. Although we would not have an objective criterion sufficient to choose among the metaphysics, one of them would surely be possible since it would be necessary in general. It is unclear, however, whether it would be dogmatic, intuitionistic or critical. Critical metaphysics based on the method of regression, which is powerful though not without its limits, is distinguished from its competitors by the precision of its claims and by the caution toward experience. It would thus combine the virtues of dogmatism and mysticism without inheriting their vices — the vagueness and otherworldliness of concepts, on the one hand, and, on the other, an excessive number of inscrutable operations that would be required to clarify the connections among various judgments. It would be self-deceptive to think that these methodological features of critical metaphysics would have to be construed as its advantages by everyone. Followers of mysticism as well as dogmatism would both certainly take them to be disadvantages. I do not see how one of the sides could convince the other. I believe that any methodological stance one adopts already implicitly presupposes many metaphysical claims. How this is possible is explained by psychology, but not by one “scientific” psychology — rather by as many psychological theories as there are metaphysical positions. Each psychological theory explains it in its own way, congenial to the metaphysics it presupposes. This is why there is no agreement in these matters. Nor can there be any. A person who is blind from birth will never understand what the impression of light and color is; a person who is deaf from birth will never understand what sounds and voices are. Already the simplest ordinary concepts presuppose some metaphysical content. And a critical experiment (experimentum crucis) is as impossible in psychology as it is in physics (Chwistek 1921, p. 34). We know all too well from practice that there is no argument with “faith” (mysticism) or with “stubbornness” (dogmatism) unless one resorts to force. But even that works only to a limited extent. Metaphysics is decided by life, not by logic. It would be a merit of Nelson’s critical philosophy if it managed to convince skeptical empiricists that metaphysics is necessary in general and so that critical metaphysics is necessary since it alone could meet the methodological demands of an empiricist. Indeed, there is room for an agreement between these two views on a common methodological basis. In fact, Nelson tries to reach such an agreement though his extensive criticism of Hume’s views on the “source” of the principle of causality as well as his analysis of empiricism in general. The question thus arises, How adequate is Nelson’s reasoning in his polemic with empiricism?

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2. The discussion centers around the question whether empiricism can find the “source” of the concept of a “necessary connection.” It is clear that Nelson’s insufficiency proof directed at empiricism in general is logically independent of the criticism of Hume’s empiricism in particular. It is hard not to agree with Nelson that an expectation that a phenomenon will occur is not identical to a recollection of that phenomenon. It is hard not to agree that such an expectation contained implicitly (even if sometimes vaguely) the concept of a necessary connection between phenomena, which can be derived neither from “impressions” nor from the association of representations. It does not follow, however, that empiricism in general is identical with Hume’s claims. Although Nelson tries to find the same mistakes in Mach’s theories, his results depend on ambiguities. The assumptions of Mach’s psychology differ substantially from Hume’s. We thus arrive at the weak point in Nelson’s argument. It lies in the interpretation of the claim that empiricism can explain the “source” of the concept of a necessary connection only by appeal to sense or association. While Nelson understands the latter well, this cannot be said about the former. As far as association is concerned, one has to agree that the “representation of a connection” between phenomena cannot be derived from the connection between the representations of those phenomena since the latter presupposes the former. As far as senses are concerned, however, Nelson is quite mistaken in following Hume’s superseded view that “relations” are not given directly. In contemporary psychology, the distinction has led to a conception of the “nonsensory elements of consciousness,” which is hard to understand and illusive. This conception is akin to, though of course not identical with, Fries’ notion of “direct nonintuitive knowledge.” The difference between them lies primarily in the difference between a concrete “relation” and a “dependency.” The latter is, according to Nelson, the “object” of a priori knowledge, whereas the former is mentioned neither in Fries’ nor in Nelson’s psychology. This makes their polemic with empiricism considerably easier. The concept of a “necessary connection” is identical to the concept of a “dependency,” which differs from the concept of a concrete “relation” in that it holds between sets of individuals, whereas a concrete relation obtains between individuals. A “necessary connection” is thus an “abstract relation.” It is a relation between “abstracts.” When Mach writes that “dependencies” are given to us,48 this is imprecise since in such a case also “abstractions,” i.e. general objects, would have to be given to us. Indeed, it suffices to 48

See quotes from Mach in Nelson (1915-MN, Chapter 1). Other empiricists are also unclear. See, e.g., Avenarius (1891), sections 6 and 10 (the content of the “natural concept

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suppose that this “nonsensory mental element” is nonintuitive in Fries’ sense, i.e. that we can be only “indirectly aware” of it, and we obtain the concept of direct nonintuitive knowledge, which has “dependencies,” i.e. “necessary connections,” as its object. This is why the problem concerns the question whether the explanation of the fact that we are conscious of relations requires that one postulates the existence of a distinct “nonsensory” mental element. In my view, there is no reason why psychology would be forced to accept such a hypothesis and thereby cease to be purely empirical. It suffices that one accepts the view that each even the simplest but concrete “content” of consciousness contains implicitly a “relation” of itself to other such contents. In other words, saying “an object is given to me directly” is the same as saying “I am aware of the relation of an object to certain other object.” For an empiricist, “relations” are just as directly given as individuals, among which they hold. The distinction between them is in practice derivative. It consists in the fact that object C grasped by means of relation ϕ (i.e. in relation to individual D) is identical with object E grasped by means of relation ψ (i.e. in relation to individual F.) For practical reasons, we consider the former way of grasping an object to be “essential” (i.e. as defining the name of that object), while the latter as more or less “inessential” (i.e. as only contingently related to the object). It might sometimes seem as if there is no “relation” at all in the former case.49 In this way, empiricism turns out to be a “relativism” in the sense that the terms “object” and “relation” are correlates of one another — one of the world”); in Poland, W. Heinrich writes: “If we ignore all theories, set side our philosophical views and ask what the object of our investigations is, the answer will not be hard to find. It is whatever is directly given to us. This includes objects colored and spatial, inanimate and animate, which constitute a world of objects where we can also find ourselves as objects; further — sounds, touches, tastes, odors, pains, feelings, etc. and all in a variety of connections and interrelations.” (1902, p. 4) 49 Suppose that when I am looking at “a set of four points in a certain configuration” I see “the vertices of a certain quadrilateral.” If I say that I have conceived four “objects” as remaining in a certain relation one to another, I am speaking imprecisely. This is because the expression “a set of four points” already determines a certain relation. Expressions such as “I see four objects” or “I don’t see any object” are most likely to cause misunderstandings. They describe relation-rich complexes given directly but, for practical reasons, they do so in an abridged way. I suspect that the debate between “nativism” and “geneticism” (“empiricism”) in experimental psychology concerns in all cases the same issue — that of the “source of the consciousness of a relation.” In other words, it is only a version of the debate between empiricism in the most general sense (sensualism) and rationalism (intellectualism). Terminological difference ought not to detract our attention from the true identity of the issue in question.

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has no meaning without the other and each has a correlate in what is “directly given.”50 The main problem faced by the above “ontological relativism” is the confusion of the pure description of what is “directly given” with the explanation of the dependence of the content of our statements on physiological changes in an organism. The concept of a “sense” belongs in the first place to physiological psychology and refers to a peripheral “bodily organ,” whose stimulation is the condition of making statements about objects. It is quite consistent with empiricism to hold the view that each concrete experiential whole given directly depends equally on peripheral (“sense”) and central (“intellectual”) physiological changes. In this way, one could explain, for example, the difference between the “form” and the “matter” of statements and so also of knowledge. It is clear, however, that the distinction among conditioning processes has nothing to do with the distinction between what is “directly given” and “theory.” Only the latter distinction constitutes the content of the problem of the “source” or “bases” of our judgments. Thus conceived empiricism, which unequivocally recognizes both “objects” and “relations” as given in direct experience, can provide a sufficient explanation of the source of the concept of a “necessary connection.” It reduces this problem to the problem of the general concepts and thereby reduces the problem of the basis of metaphysical principles to the problem of the basis of induction. We have to conclude that Nelson’s principal objection against empiricism fails and that empiricism thus acquires the same status as Fries’ critical philosophy. The question thus arises whether empiricism is not more rational than critical philosophy. I will try to answer this question by means of a purely logical analysis of Nelson’s argument. 50

In fact, Nelson’s cognitive psychology implies sensualism, i.e. a sensual “consciousness of a relation.” After all, according to him, the truth of a judgment consists in an agreement between a judgment and direct knowledge. In the case of judgments based on intuition, we ascertain this agreement (i.e. a certain relation) directly — by means of an “inner sense,” of course. It is only because Nelson ignored this important point (i.e. only because there is a gap in his system) that he did not reach a contradiction. He would have found himself in a contradiction had he explicitly accepted the possibility of direct sensory knowledge of a “relation” while denying the empirical “source” of the concept of a “necessary connection.” I have to admit that my remarks about the relation between “relations” and “objects” are very cursory. Moreover, the grammatical form of sentences suggests that “relations” are objects of another kind — different from “objects” proper. I cannot develop my thoughts more precisely and extensively here since this would require writing another monograph. I thus rest content here with calling attention to the ambiguity of the claims and with stressing that empiricism is satisfied with only one kind of objects (viz. “real individuals”) and that it views “relations as individuals” as fictions created by language. See Kotarbiński (1920).

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3. The fact that empiricism can explain the “origin” of the concept of a “necessary connection” deprives Nelson of the most important argument for critical philosophy and against empiricism. It does not eliminate the possibility that critical philosophy has the same status as empiricism. Some of the things Nelson says suggest that the hypothesis that direct nonintuitive knowledge exists is either spurious or impossible (internally inconsistent). Such things are not hard to find. Metaphysical principles clearly differ in content from mathematical principles, but they both share the fact that they are synthetic a priori, i.e. they have “laws” as their “objects.” So, they share a common content: the general concept of a “relation.” According to Nelson, mathematical principles are based on pure intuition, i.e. on direct knowledge a priori, of which we are directly aware. It follows that we are directly aware of “mathematical relations.” We can thence derive the abstract concept of a “relation in general,” which if adapted to facts can give the concept of a “metaphysical relation.” Thus, nothing stands in the way of upholding metaphysical empiricism while holding to critical philosophy of mathematics. This position would have the considerable methodological advantage of not requiring a hypothesis which is extraordinary artificial and difficult to comprehend. If, however, in order to avoid this possibility, Nelson wanted to claim that we are never directly conscious of a “relation,” he would fall into a contradiction with his own hypothesis that pure intuition exists, and thereby invalidate his own position. If, on the other hand, he wanted to claim that mathematical principles are also based on direct nonintuitive knowledge, he would be in practice rejecting critical philosophy. Moreover, this would show the whole conception to be artificial.51 Well-known facts involving “subconscious mental phenomena,” only appear to support it. For they can be just as well explained by appeal to “peripheral consciousness,” which

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Cognitive psychology must recognize that mathematical principles are not at all obvious, contrary to what philosophers would have us believe. (This is clearly shown by studies of people highly competent in this area.) If “pure intuition” does indeed exist then how should we reconcile our alleged direct awareness with the fact that it was discovered (and only purely “theoretically” at that) only by Kant? If, however, one uses an illusion that a given knowledge is obvious to explain what only appears to be obvious, then an empiricist can likewise use the illusion that an item is directly given to explain its only apparent immediacy. Indeed, the concepts of what is “obvious” and what is “given directly,” although they characterize opposing camps of rationalism and empiricism, are not at all necessarily wedded to them. They are formal concepts, which play a certain formal role in each of the system. The reason why either one or the other is put at the fore of the system in question is that the systems emphasize one of two correlates: “relation” or “object.”

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has nothing to do with Nelson’s “indirect consciousness” and remains entirely within the bounds of empiricism. The above criticisms undermine critical philosophy completely. We can, however, go even further and ask whether the hypothesis of direct nonintuitive knowledge does indeed “explain” (in an ordinary sense of “explain”) the “source” of the concept of a “necessary connection.” In my view, this hypothesis is incapable of “explaining” anything at all. The whole value of such an explanation would have to consists in the clarity of the relation between such knowledge and metaphysical principles. However, when this relation is conceived as “indirect consciousness,” it appears to be completely unclear and vague, as I have already shown in the first part of these critical comments. As such, it cannot be a basis of any “explanation.” This is most evident in the following consequence. The existence of metaphysical principles as judgments presupposes the possession of certain concepts, among them the so-called categories, 52 i.e. basic metaphysical concepts. In Nelson’s view, such concepts are nothing but the concepts of the “form” of a judgment. We are aware of the content of categories in the forms of a judgment. This is why it is possible to use the so-called transcendental guideline of the system of fundamental metaphysical concepts. Since, according to Nelson, logical principles “arise” out of the form of a judgment, the question to ask is: What is the relation between logical principles and categories? If categories are indeed the concepts of a form of a judgment then logical principles would simply lay out the content of these categories, i.e. logical principles would be their definitions. However, this would imply that metaphysics is reducible to logic since metaphysical principles would be special applications of logical principles. As such, they would lose their synthetic character. As this would contradict the assumptions of Nelson’s system, one has to reject the view that logical principles are the definitions of categories and so the view that the content of categories is composed solely of the “form” of a judgment. If, however, the content of categories comprises more than the “form” of a judgment, where does this surplus of “content” come form? How does the relation of “indirect consciousness” help here? We are confronted by a puzzle. It would be reasonable to object that we are in fact dealing with a repostulation of the hypothesis of “innate concepts,” which are present to our consciousness at the very outset. The fact that subconscious correlates of conscious categories draw their “content” from actual subconscious cognitive processes, i.e. that they are 52

“Jedes Urteil setzt zu seiner Möglichkeit bereits Begriffe voraus” (1914-KM, p. 15). This is also clear in “Fries Kritiker,” p. 289.

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not innate, seems of little significance in view of the fact that all of this takes place without our knowledge and that our consciousness is presented with ready-made products whose “source” it cannot directly perceive and so is forced to accept the artificial theory of “nonintuitive” cognitive processes to explain it. One could reasonably claim that Fries’ and Nelson’s critical philosophy is an attempt to make the hypothesis of “innate concepts” psychologically plausible. It is clear that, from a methodological point of view, such an attempt is permissible only when all other more natural ways of salvaging given values have failed and these values must be salvaged at all costs. I believe that this last sentence captures the deepest tendency of Fries’ and Nelson’s critical philosophy. They seek to salvage not only “empirical science” but also the “thing-in-itself” and the “absolute,” which seemed impossible and unscientific after Kant. This explains the paradoxical theory of direct nonintuitive knowledge. By means of a skillful “deduction,” that theory allows one to demonstrate the “positive source” of the “negative form” of the concept of a “thing-in-itself.” In this way, it provides a way of salvaging metaphysics in the sense of absolute knowledge — “complete knowledge” as Nelson refers to it.53 The deduction allowed one to salvage only the limit concept of a “thing-initself” understood as the concept of “the object of the highest objectivity” (conceived by means of the negation of the constraints of our scientific knowledge; viz. the negation of space and time). But even this result is an important achievement in comparison to Kant, who could not find any theoretical basis for “ideas” and sought to ground them in morality by putting forward the principle of the “primacy of practical reason.” Since empiricism rejects any concept of a “thing-in-itself” as incoherent, it also denies the possibility of conceiving (in the limit) of a “completely determined” object. From the point of view of critical philosophy, it must therefore appear as an extreme skepticism, which cannot find sufficient 53

(1915-E), Chapter XXIII and sections 103, 164-165. This peculiar theory of the basis of “ideas” is the more puzzling that Fries (as a mathematician and a physicist) was fully aware of the relativism of scientific knowledge and has preceded in this respect many contemporary positivists. Kastil, for example, who accepted the inner contradiction of the concept of a “thing-in-itself” (1918, section 56), still claims that it is “absurd” to hold the view that “Sinnesqualitäten kämen zwar der Materie wahrhaft zu, seien aber nicht absolute Prädikate derselben, sondern Relationen” (p. 201). — When criticizing the concept of a “thing-in-itself,” Kastil considers only Fries’ formulations. For Nelson (1915-E, section 101), a “thing-in-itself” is an object of absolute knowledge, which determines its object completely, in contrast to the knowledge of special sciences, which only partially determine their object. Nelson views his notion of “complete knowledge” to be a limit concept. In my view, however, he confuses a limit concept with a negating concept.

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basis even for the first premises of the special sciences. But this view is erroneous. The value of scientific principles does not depend on their relation to an “absolute.” Moreover, they are quite compatible with a relativistic conception of all knowledge in general, not only “naturalistic” knowledge. If we ignore the nonintuitive character of the direct knowledge, which, according to Nelson, constitutes the sufficient basis of “synthetic and nonmathematical” principles, we will easily find that it has both intuitionistic and dogmatic features. “Laws” (and so ultimately “general objects”) constitute the object of such knowledge. This is quite consistent with the mystics’ “intuition,” which is exactly direct knowledge of general objects (Wesen, Wesenheit, Natur, etc.). On the other hand, the “content” of this direct knowledge is accessible to us only through “deduction,” which, however, yields only what has been previously put into the “theory of pure reason.” However, since there are no restrictions on what can constitute the material for the latter (provided it is not clearly incoherent), its starting point is in fact “arbitrary” and such arbitrariness is, according to Nelson, at the heart of dogmatism. Fries’ and Nelson’s critical philosophy thus combines elements of mysticism as well as dogmatism and so does not offer any significantly new position. There remains one feature, which could prove that the view is indeed substantially different from and indeed superior to the other two, viz. the method of regression. However, this method is not specific to critical philosophy. It can be very well accepted by empiricism. 4. The fact that we often put forward judgments without being clearly aware of all their presuppositions is known all too well. The function of the method of regression (called also “axiomatics”), which was fruitfully applied in mathematics and logic, is precisely to lay out the whole implied content of concrete judgments, which is often only vaguely given to consciousness. This has nothing to do with Fries’ and Nelson’s “nonintuitive” knowledge. The discovered and laid out content is one that we are in fact consciously thinking about. It is not an “indirect awareness” of some other content that is not directly accessible to us. It is also clear that regression is entirely sufficient to uncover the totality of necessary and sufficient presuppositions of a given system of claims as well as the totality of basic terms, which cannot be further defined in the usual manner. There is also no reason why regression would have to be limited to the discipline of mathematics. Technical difficulties are the only reason why it was so far (and will be for some time) impossible to apply it in the natural sciences. Contemporary physics seems to be undergoing an evolution which shapes it on the model of mathematics. A full application

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of axiomatics should thus be possible. Moreover, since it is the most general science, its most general “principles” will ipso facto become the most general premises of all natural sciences (including “explanatory” psychology, though indirectly — via physiology). It is methodologically misleading for an empiricist to use the term “metaphysics” to refer to the system of such “principles.” It is better to reserve that term for “absolute” systems such as rationalism or mysticism. According to empiricism, the “essence” of metaphysics lies not in the subject-matter, which is secondary, but in the claim that “absolute” knowledge is possible. This is manifested in the fact that “things-in-themselves” or “absolute properties” are considered to be the objects of knowledge. Empiricism stands in proper opposition to mysticism. The whole problem of the “sufficient basis” for principles of a system of scientific knowledge is simply the problem of the “source” of basic concepts. For the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments is completely useless for science. This is due to the fact that whatever direct knowledge we accept as a basis of a judgment, by distinguishing its “object” and its “content,” we re-invoke the distinction between the subject and the predicate of judgments “reiterating” it. In this way, either the whole problem of the “source of the synthesis” reappears or, if the direct knowledge were to be considered to be analytic, there would be no reason why the judgment reiterating it ought to be synthetic.54 In fact, we are turning around in circles, which is the best indicator of the fact that the whole problem has been badly posed from the very outset.55 Indeed, the only problem for an empiricist concerns the synthesis of the elements of a concept. In other words, each so-called synthetic principle is considered to be an implicit definition of elementary terms comprising it, i.e. an axiomatic definition. To say that principles are definitions is to say that the 54

Indeed, Kastil (1918, pp. 250f and 317) raises the question: In what sense (analytic or synthetic) is direct knowledge true? 55 I ignore here the question of the incompleteness of the classification of judgments into analytic and synthetic. It is unclear, for example, how to classify the judgment “Orange is similar to red.” If it were synthetic, it would have to be empirical. But it is true independently of whether we have ever “experienced” these colors. If it were a priori, it is not clear what kind of a priori knowledge it would be since it is neither mathematical nor metaphysical. For other examples, see Kastil (1918), pp. 239f. It should be also added that (contrary to Nelson’s view) “logical principles” are just as synthetic as mathematical or natural principles. Each of these principles, insofar it is independent of others, adds a new property (not determined by others) to the concept of the subject (or analogically to the concept of an object) of a judgment. Just as in the case of other principles here too, we can raise the question of the “basis” of syntheses contained in them.

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“elements” of a given domain of objects are completely bound in “elementary relations.” In other words, the basic concepts that constitute the content of such principles can (as concepts of “elements”) be captured only in judgments to the effect that certain “elementary relations” obtain. Since empiricism considers principles to be implicit definitions not cognitive judgments, it revives that ordinary meaning of the term “knowledge/cognition,” which it also has in psychology. This meaning could be briefly captures as a “recognition of a class,” i.e. the subsumption of a given object under a “concept.” (“Recognition” proper consists in the identification of a given individual with another (Schlick 1913). A concept is a tool of “understanding” and not its product. As such, it is identical with the “conceptual function” of a symbol. In this way, “knowledge” is practically the same as “understanding” but it is not a mere “awareness of an object” as Fries and Nelson claim confusing “knowledge” with “acquaintance” (“Erkennen” with “Kennenlernen”). For an empiricist, the “source” of concepts lies in the mere “awareness of what is directly given.” In other words, our symbols find the objects for their meaning function in it. — Every act of grasping of what is “directly given” is at the same time the source of the definition of some symbol. It is clear that according to empiricism the concept of a “general object” must be incoherent and so without any epistemic value. At the same time, the existence of “general objects” is the fundamental truth for mysticism, according to which they are grasped directly in acts of “intuition.” 56 Mysticism is thus committed to a realism about concepts while empiricism is committed to nominalism. As far as dogmatism is concerned, it is in part a misunderstanding to view it as based on the “arbitrariness” of certain assumptions. I trust that nobody will ever deny the usefulness of the critical method of regression, and that it will be ignored only by way of the so-called synthetic method of exposition not for philosophical reasons. No dogmatists appear to have denied the possibility of a psychological science of cognition, though none of them thought it imperative to ground their system by means of such a science. Since, as it has turned out, “deduction” cannot be a philosophical method, the distinction between dogmatism and critical theory loses its raison d’être. Nevertheless, the systems that Nelson calls dogmatic can indeed be differentiated from mysticism, with which they share the belief in the “absolute.” What is characteristic about “dogmatism” is a certain 56

A mystic responds to the proofs that the concept of a “general object” is incoherent by claiming that the contradiction lies in his formulations and not in the “intuition,” i.e. that he failed to capture the content of the latter. It may be that the possession of “intuition” is related to having a visual-reistic type of imagination and to eidetism.

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methodological vagueness and logical discontinuity. This contrasts sharply with relatively clear and distinct features of true mysticism. In my view, this characteristic of dogmatism indicates a distinct psychological type, though it is hard to deny that it is somewhat “mixed.” People of this type frequently search after the “obvious,” which, however, is understood equally unclearly as all its other concepts. This psychological type deserves to be called rationalist. Although Fries’ and Nelson’s critical philosophy also belongs to this type, it is one of the most moderate versions of rationalism. (The vagueness and unclarity of the concepts of rationalistic systems is relative to high demands put forward by empiricism. From the point of view of mysticism, this is far less objectionable.) Aside from these three camps, I would also distinguish skepticism, which Nelson quite wrongly identifies with empiricism. It is based on an entirely different frame of mind, though just like rationalism, it has a “mixed” character. The view that skepticism is incoherent is erroneous since the theory of logical types (whose place in logic is beyond any doubt nowadays) does not allow, in a given claim, to substitute that claim for a variable. It seems to me that the psychological source of skepticism lies in a certain organically-based spiritual impotence (a kind of aboulia), which may be manifested in various degrees and to a various extent. In this way, Nelson’s typology of four possible views on the problem of metaphysical principles can be used to construct a typology of philosophers. 57 For an empiricist, each of these positions is either logically impossible or internally inconsistent, or vague and unclear. The fact that they exist must be explained psychologically by appeal to “illusions” and “errors” based on them. Of course, this is also the view of the proponents of each of such systems on the others. This leads to the distinction between the general “form” and the particular “content” of knowledge. The distinction 57

It is easy to notice that that there is a correlation between the four positions I distinguished (empiricism, rationalism, mysticism and skepticism) and the four positions distinguished by P. Hofman (1921, section 5): realism, rationalistic idealism, intuitive idealism and phenomenalism. The distinction seems to be also similar to L. Chwistek’s four “kinds of reality”: reality of things, physical reality, reality of ideas and reality of impressions (1921, Chapter IV). The analogy is broken down only by the “physical reality” which cannot be considered to be rationalistic. However, it seems rather artificial and unjustified to distinguish it from the “reality of things.” (I do not see any reason why physical theories would exclude the equivalence of concepts “visible” and “visible under normal conditions.”) In addition, I should mention that proper empiricism is based on the “reality of things” not on the “reality of impressions” (as suggested by some idealistic views, which have arisen out of ambiguities of psychological concepts). The “reality of impressions” corresponds to skepticism.

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is made difficult by the ambiguity of such terms as “cause,” for example. From a purely formal point of view, the concept of a cause is identical with the logical concept of a condition necessary and sufficient for a certain change to take place. So, the “source” of such a concept of cause lies in the concept of “lawlike regularity” and thus in formal logic broadly understood. Causality so conceived belongs to the “essence” of the world since the definition of the latter includes the property of “knowability” or “proper ordering.” The principle of causality in this sense is not “knowledge” as Kant (and Fries and Nelson after him) claim. (Their mistake can be ultimately understood as taking a “form of knowledge” to be “knowledge.”) but this purely formal understanding of the principle of causality is not sufficient for “knowledge.” The general “regularity” would have to be filled by particular “content.” This can be done only through a further principle that determines the “regularity,” for example, whether it is mechanistic or teleological. This is the point at which the various psychological types come to the fore. This can be seen, for example, in the decisive prevalence of all kinds of atomism and determinism in the empirical positive science, on the one hand, and of all kinds of indeterminism (vitalism, occultism, spiritualism, etc.) in the intuitionistic metaphysics, on the other. I consider it to be a common task of logic and psychology to discover and to explain the relation between various kinds of more or less “scientific” views and a basic epistemic stance, expressed in principles defining “knowledge” with respect to “content.” 5. I should finally turn to the discussion of Nelson’s proof that theory of knowledge is impossible. I know of only two objections against Nelson’s argument, which is incidentally extremely similar to the arguments of the Ancient skeptics (for example, Sextus Empiricus’ argument that “it is impossible to decide whether a criterion of truth exists”). The first objection is put forward by M. Schlick (1918, p. 75), who observes that in order to “know” something [znać], we do not first need to “get to know” it [poznać]. In other words, the use of a certain criterion does not always presuppose that one must first “get to know” it. The objection is in effect that Nelson’s concept of knowledge is “inappropriate.” According to Schlick, “Kenntnisnehmen” of an object is not “Erkennen” of it, which is always identical to “Begreifen.” Although Schlick is quite right on this point, he is wrong in thinking that it destroys Nelson’s argument. For Nelson can claim that never mind what terminology we use, the point is whether it is possible to solve the problem of the objective validity of this “Kenntnisnehmen.” A different objection is raised by L. Chwistek. He tries to use the theory of types to show that theory of knowledge is possible. The point is that we should understand it as a progressive proof

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of validity of the used criterion in ever “higher” reality.58 I doubt, however, that we can gain anything in this way. The progress thus generated is in fact an infinite regress. In order to “automatically” raise the type (order) of knowledge, the criterion used would have to be the same. But what guarantees its logical identity? The theory of types destroys Hegel’s objection that in attempting to know knowledge we already presuppose it. But the point of Nelson’s argument is not that in trying to prove the truth of knowledge in general we presuppose the truth of the very operation of proving, but rather that the proof of the truth of knowledge presupposes the truth of the premises of such a proof. So, the theory of types notwithstanding, there is a regress and it is not at all “apparent.” Chwistek raises an important point, however. It could be summarized thus: The proof of the objective validity of knowledge in general is impossible since it does not make sense to speak of knowledge in general. What is possible is a proof of the objective validity of a particular knowledge claim. This is indeed possible but one does not need a “theory of knowledge” for this purpose. “Reflection on knowledge” is knowledge of an individual cognitive act. It functions as a “control” that checks the relation between the presuppositions and the content of that knowledge claim. However, such a reflection cannot be the content of a science. At best, it constitutes material for cognitive psychology. As can be seen, the “invincibility” of Nelson’ proof lies in the ambiguity of formulation. This can be shown even more clearly as follows: Nelson’s proof in effect shows that no concrete criterion of truth other than knowledge itself is possible since if it were possible we could go beyond knowledge. (It is clear here that the term “knowledge” is understood so generally that it has become synonymous with the term “awareness of an object.”) It can be shown, however, that in such a case we fall into either a contradiction or an infinite regress. It is a consequence of this proof that in order to use knowledge as a testing criterion in a concrete case, it must first come to be known. And so ad infinitum unless we use a certain knowledge claim without our first coming to know it. The proof of the impossibility of the theory of knowledge implies “introjected contradiction” (“introizierter Wider58

“The force of this reasoning breaks down as soon as we notice that the act of knowledge, which lays down a certain epistemic criterion, belongs to a reality different from the one, to which this criterion is to apply. This criterion may be in turn the object of investigations of a higher order. Just as in formal logic, the apparent infinite regress is quite benign since knowledge of a higher order does not require that the analysis begin anew but is automatically generated from knowledge of a lower order due to the systematic ambiguity of the concepts involved.” (Chwistek 1921, p. 39)

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spruch”). It can be shown most clearly by paying attention to the fact that “the tracing of a judgment to direct knowledge as its basis,” which is the object of grounding, involves a comparison of two “objects” (in the broadest sense of the term). However, such a case is not possible in Nelson’s view since those objects would have to come to be known first. And so on and so forth. One can see thus that Nelson’s proof that the theory of knowledge is impossible is not worth any more than the “theory of knowledge” he is combating. Nevertheless, there is a healthy thought in it, which can be put thus: It does not make sense to ask about the objective validity (or about the existence) of “knowledge in general” since such an expression presupposed that “knowledge in general” is an object. From an empiricist point of view, this is clearly false since the concept of a “general object” is incoherent. The question that does make sense is only whether some particular knowledge claim is objectively valid, i.e. true. But this question does not require a separate science. The impossibility of a “theory of knowledge” consists not so much in the fact that it is impossible to solve the problem of the objective validity of knowledge in general as in the fact that the question is senseless. If psychology uses the term “knowledge in general” then only in the sense in which biology uses the term “human being (in general),” i.e. to capture “a class of objects with certain properties.” If one were to understand the question about the truth of knowledge in general in this sense, then one would be asking about the existence of certain phenomena with such and such properties and there can be only one answer to this question. If one does not find such a phenomenon in one’s mental life then no proof is going to be of any help. Analogously, nobody can prove the existence of something we call light to a person who has been born blind. But how is one to explain the fact that there exists “error” or “falsehood”? This is closely related to the ambiguity of the term “knowledge.” If one does not understand this term as generally as Nelson does, one must distinguish “direct” awareness of an object from “indirect” awareness, i.e. from “knowledge” in the strict sense of the term. The former is simply the “awareness of an object,” i.e. it is based on the fact that there exists a mental life. It would be more or less insane to uphold skepticism on this point. The latter is the subordination of an object under a “concept.” It is only in such an act that there is a possibility of “error” — either because an inappropriate “concept” is used or because “the content of the concept used” is not sufficiently precise. The latter possibility is known in methodology as a hasty generalization. It consists in the fact that certain facts are unnoticed at the time when one comes to know the object directly and, consequently, they not taken into account in

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the definition. Here lies the main source of “falsehood” that forces us to exert great care when using concepts. The fact that error is possible in concrete acts of forming concepts does not touch the issue whether we have the right to form concepts, i.e. to generalize. This right is based on the definition of “an object of consciousness” and is expanded in the logical principle of identity (for similar view, see Stamm 1911). The acquiring of concepts is also called “knowledge” because it leads ipso facto to “understanding.” In addition, the “acquiring of concepts” is frequently done by “acquainting oneself” with a word or a sentence (this is the only way to understand Nelson’s claim that “laws are the objects of knowledge”). In this derivative sense of the word “knowledge” lies an important source of the question about the objective validity of knowledge in general. From this point of view, the question has as much sense as the question whether we can at all talk about an “object.” The capacity to form concepts, i.e. the possibility of induction (or the “knowability of the world”) — all constitute definitional presuppositions. Someone who does not accept them utters words that carry no meaning and falls prey to the illusion that they express some thought. A “theory of knowledge” whose task would consist in demonstrating such a law simply could not be understood. The term “theory of knowledge” ought to be reserved for cognitive psychology, where it would refer to a theory “explaining” cognitive facts, i.e. where it would stand next to the theory of sensations, emotions, etc. If Nelson thinks that such a psychological theory is impossible then he must understand the word “explain” in a way that deviates from the one customarily accepted in science. If “to explain” is “to give necessary and sufficient conditions” then there is no reason why physiological psychology should not explain psychological facts. The only constraint there is, is that pure psychology without physiology could not “explain” at all. 59 Moreover, it is clear that “explanations” of cognitive facts cannot be used to “deduce” (in Nelson’s sense) any principles. Aside from the “explanatory” psychology of cognition (though not independently of it), a “differential” cognitive psychology must develop which would provide a cognitive typology. Furthermore, the contemporary “logic of thought” must be supplemented with a “logic of knowledge,” whose axioms would define the “form” of knowledge, i.e. the concept of knowledge in general.

59

It may be that the concept of a “mental phenomenon” is identical to the concept of the “dependence of the content of experience on system C”; see Avenarius, O przedmiocie psychologii (trans.: S. Kobyliński and A. Zieleńczyk) and Kotarbiński (1922).

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An auxiliary role would be played here by an axiomatic analysis of philosophical systems known from the history of philosophy. 60 The postulated “logic of knowledge” would in part realize Nelson’s prospect of the critical method but would also be fundamentally distinct from any “critique” in not sharing any aspirations to “solving” “metaphysical” problems. It is clear that “logic of knowledge” so conceived would completely replace the contemporary “theory of knowledge,” which has been rightly called “one of the most interesting misunderstandings in the history of science.” Moreover, the only method to obtain “principles” is the axiomatic method (i.e. regression), which arrives at basic assumptions and principles through abstraction and analysis of concrete cognitive facts. Incidentally, this method was instinctively used in the creation of both the traditional logic (Socrates and Aristotle) as well as metaphysics (Eleates and Plato). Although some of Nelson’s claims and arguments proved to be wrong, it remains to his undeniable merit that he called philosophical attention to the real value of regression as well as the deceptive nature of the central problem of the theory of knowledge. And even if we were to admit that neither Nelson nor Fries are original on those two points, since both are already contained in Kant’s Critique, it remains true that none of the Kantian scholars could adequately develop and appreciate those points. It is to Fries’ particular merit that he alone was seriously concerned with keeping a close connection between philosophy and science.

60

This is how I interpret the historiosophical program developed by W. Heinrich; see (1909), p. 4.

THE “PROTON PSEUDOS” 1 IN WUNDT’S CRITICISM OF R. AVENARIUS’ PHILOSOPHY (1963) Neither Richard Avenarius’ doctoral dissertation nor his Habilitation were particularly distinguished from the philosophical works at that time except for the fact that he took a greater care about the clarity and precision of language. However, the Critique of Pure Experience (volume I of which appeared in 1888, volume II in 1890) as well as The Human Concept of the World (1891) were so original and so distinct methodologically that they were treated as bizarre and perplexing. A long time was needed to get used to those positions and to undertake attempts to understand them. I am also not surprised by the fact that Avenarius’ life’s work was not only not understood but also misunderstood. As Avenarius died early, his students tried to make the thoughts of their master more accessible and to straighten out the misinterpretations. Their efforts were not successful, however. It is no wonder that the paper gained a lot of attention when Wilhelm Wundt (1897), the famous cofounder and distinguished representative of contemporary experimental psychology, included an extensive discussion of “empiriocriticism,” as Avenarius’ philosophy was already then called, in the second part of his paper “Über naiven und kritischen Realismus” (On a naive and critical realism) published in volume 13 of Philosophische Studien. The name of the author of the paper as well as the virtues of the language in which it was written exerted such an enormous impact on the critics that practically none of the later students of Avenarius’ philosophy managed to go beyond Wundt’s interpretation and criticism. And yet Wundt’s paper is an exceptional example of a superficial and condescending reading, perhaps even of ill will or perhaps only of an inability to adopt so different (for an idealist) a way of thinking and so original (at this time in philosophy) epistemic attitude. — This can only be 1

~ τον ψε~υ δος ’ — main and fundamental error. ‘ Πρω

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 91-94. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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decided by the historians of philosophy. Many fundamental misunderstandings were already clarified by Carstanjen in three articles entitled “Der Empiriokritizismus” published in the 22nd volume of Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. It has been my impression that he grasped the views of his master most adequately. However, even Carstanjen does not note Wundt’s fundamental objection repeated by all later interpreters, which is at the same time the most serious since it misinterprets Avenarius’ fundamental attitude. I have in mind here the interpretation of the concept “principal empiriocritical coordination,” which alleges that there is an intimate ontological relation between the “self” (as a central term) and the “environment” (as an opposite term).* It is clear that such an interpretation justifies the objection that Avenarius subscribed to epistemological idealism, which was a position that was quite foreign to the mature Avenarius. The fact that none of Avenarius’ students considered this objection (which, incidentally, is blended into Wundt’s text in such a way that it appears self-evident) gives rise to the suspicion that they could not rectify it. This was due to the general misunderstandings that arose as a result of Avenarius’ claim that the “objective” method of his Critique is a psychological analysis and his failure to distinguish its semantic and psychological “aspect.” In fact, Avenarius’ investigations of people’s statements in their relation to the object world had a semantic character. Indeed, he can be rightly held to be a precursor of this so popular nowadays method of philosophizing. For Wundt, an idealist, this distinction was inconceivable. He was also unable to take note of another innovation of great importance to psychology. Avenarius put forward the idea of a “variational” system of psychology. According to it, one begins with a certain “whole” of a mental process and operates with its “modifications.” He quite explicitly contrasted his style with an atomistic style of system construction, which is widely rejected nowadays.2 Avenarius’ extraordinary pioneering discoveries made the task of understanding his philosophy very difficult even for his students. The more so that their master entangled himself in psychologism, and in consequence confused some philosophical positions. I also cannot deny that one of the causes of the misunderstandings lies probably in Avenarius’ language. Its literary beauty is beyond doubt *

[To the best of my knowledge, Avenarius’ works have not been published in English. I follow here Albert E. Blumberg’s translation of Franz Austeda’s entry on Avenarius’ philosophy for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967).] 2

The most precise and the most interesting school of this general approach is “Gestalt psychology.” But it has not managed to put forward this simple idea.

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(Avenarius was also a poet and a literary writer). While it is evident that he is concerned with clarity and precision, the alluring flow of his writing creates the illusion that it is easy to understand and makes it easy to overlook important details. As a result, I am not surprised that the interpreters have failed to notice that Avenarius places his “empiriocritical principal coordination” in the act of cognitive experience and not in the object world. It suffices to take a look at section 148 of The Human Concept of the World (1891): The belonging and indivisibility of the experience of one’s own I (Ich-Erfahrung) and the experience of one’s environment (Umgebungserfahrung) in every experience which is actualized; this fundamental interdependence and equality (Gleichwertigkeit) of both experiential values — since both (beides) I and the environment belong to every experience in the same sense; in other words, this coordination unique to all experience, in which that which is signified by “I” constitutes one (relatively stable) term, whereas the environment (for example, that which is signified by “tree” or “others”) constitutes a (relatively variable) term, is * what I mean by the empiriocritical principal coordination.

It seems to me that this excessively strong emphasis of the connection between the terms of the empiriocritical principal coordination has turned the attention of the critics away from the word “coordination.” This primary meaning of this word is not “connection” but rather “bringing about equal order” or “bringing about equality.”† It has only later come to be understood as an “interconnection.” It seems that Avenarius used the word “coordination” to emphasize that both terms of such an interconnection are given “in an equal sense,” that none is more basic or more directly given than the other. His point was then fundamentally opposed to epistemological idealism, which reigned supreme in philosophy at that time and whose main claim was that “only the contents of consciousness are given directly.” This constitutes an answer to the question posed in the Preface to The Human Concept of the World (1891): Must the theory of knowledge be based on the above assumption, despite *

[The quotation is followed by Wiegner’s comment, which I have not included in the main text because of its parenthetical character. It reads: “It is in the spirit of this quote that we should interpret the somewhat unclear contents of the footnote on p. 109 of the Polish translation (by S. Kobyliński and A. Zieleńczyk) of Avenarius’ monograph Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie. It is devoted to a question that has always confused the critics: how to understand the natural knowledge of objects that existed at a time when there were no human beings.”] † [One of the entries for ‘coordination’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1989) reads: “The action of arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree; the condition of being so placed; the relation between things so placed; co-ordinate condition or relation: opposed to subordination.”]

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the fact that its futility was clearly proven by the centuries of philosophy’s development? I am always amazed at the fact that the critics fail to notice this passage, which is decisive in the interpretation of Avenarius’ texts. I should finally note one more circumstance that probably contributes to the misunderstandings. In German, such terms as ‘Empfindung’ [impression], ‘Wahrnehmung’ [perception] and ‘Erfahrung’ [experience] can signify both the cognitive processes as well as their objects. * I believe that the time has come to give Avenarius what is due him and to clear the fundamental misunderstanding in the interpretation of his texts.

*

[Omitted from the main text is a note on similar ambiguities in Polish. English seems to be quite close to German in this respect. It reads: “In Polish, mainly the term ‘wrażenie’ [impression] is ambiguous in this way. For example, the phrase ‘klasyfikacja wrażeń wzrokowych’ [classification of visual impressions] refers to the objects of those impressions, i.e. to colors, not to the impressions themselves.”]

PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GESTALT THEORY (1948) I have in mind here the Gestalt theory in psychology, of course. Following L. Grünhut, it can be summarized in the following three claims: (1) The most important and most frequent processes and states are something over and above their elements since they have the property of transferability. This is the descriptive thesis. (2) Mental processes and states constitute distinctive wholes, i.e. they possess properties that cannot be explained in terms of the properties of their parts. In other words, the laws governing these wholes cannot be reduced to the laws governing their parts. This is the dynamic thesis. (3) Mental Gestalts in consciousness have physical counterparts in the nervous system. This is the psychophysical thesis. Associationist critics of these claims have quite rightly pointed out that the purely descriptive concept of a Gestalt (i.e. delimited exclusively by thesis (1)) is not sufficient for distinguishing the concept of a Gestalt as a new ontological category. This is because thesis (1) holds also for all interactive relationships (Wirkungszusammenhänge). Only thesis (2) can establish such a status for the concept of a Gestalt. Indeed, this has been done by pointing to such properties as “sensibility,” “inner uniformity,” “dynamical laws of nature” and others deriving from the terminology of teleological systems. Grünhut, as well as other psychological “atomists” believe, however, that such conceptions of the “primacy of the whole over the parts” may possess even deep significance in practice and in art, but they have no epistemic or explanatory power. From the point of view of science, they are thus useless and even harmful since they give rise to illusions about some “higher” explanations and “deeper” understanding by “gaining access” to some “inner sense” of being. At this point, it seems to me, this criticism is based on misunderstandings. In particular, it rests on a failure to understand the Gestalt conception of the nature of mental phenomena as well as the nature of scientific understanding thereof.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 95-97. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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If the “atomists” claim that the rejection of the “elements” of associationist psychology makes psychological description in general impossible, then this is clearly an overstatement. Moreover, it contradicts facts. For “Gestaltists” not only describe experiences but even, to my mind, do it far better precisely because they do not use the concept of a psychological “element.” It has to be admitted, however, that they are forced to develop alternative methods of psychological description. After all, they must not combine description with causal explanation, as “atomists” do following the lead of the natural sciences, where it is impossible to separate “pure” description from description based on theoretical constructions. This simply means that the purely psychological description is purely qualitative in its nature. It thus stands in sharp contrast to the descriptions of the natural sciences, where the “element” is strictly related to the quantitative constructions of phenomena. In fact, Gestalt theory never really offers causal “explanations” of experiences, although it seems that not all of its representatives realize that. This situation is the methodological counterpart of the ontological dependence of mental life, i.e. of the epiphenomenal character of experiences. It is this feature that stands in the way of seeing mental processes as epistemologically equal to physical processes. In other words, it is this feature that robs the principle of psychophysical parallelism of its dominant position in psychology. Gestalt theorists have not clearly realized that their view is committed to this philosophical assumption. In accordance with the principle of parallelism, they have thus sought after physical Gestalts — the counterparts of mental Gestalts. In consequence, they had to confuse “Gestalts” with “interactive relationships” and, at all costs (even at the cost of being subject to the objection that they subscribe to the explanatorily mute Aristotelianism), they had to seek explanations where there cannot be any. Their opponents are right to point out that scientific explanation can only be “mechanistic.” What they fail to see is that the “Gestaltist” conceptions contain rudiments (unfortunately still undeveloped) of an alternative (though compatible with mechanistic explanations) understanding of Gestalts as equilibrium systems, i.e. systems remaining in an equilibrium, which have the property of remaining in that equilibrium (within certain limits) even in adverse circumstances. In this respect, R. Avenarius ought to be considered as the precursor of Gestalt theory. In the first place, he discovered two ways of doing psychology. What he called mosaic psychology corresponds to contemporary “atomistic” psychology, while variational psychology corresponds to “Gestalt” psychology. More importantly, he actually developed the latter both descriptively (by means of the concept of

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“modification”) and explicatively (by relating mental processes to properties of equilibrium systems; he considered both the organism in general and the nervous system in particular as equilibrium systems). While Avenarius’ work is not without errors (he confuses psychological with logical and epistemological problems, and is thus guilty of psychologism), it is very interesting from a scientific point of view. He uses the so-called “objective method,” i.e. “external” description of the behavior of human beings in given situations. He was thus also a precursor of behaviorism. Admittedly, “Gestaltists” have not scrutinized the task and the essence of psychology as deeply, but their descriptions can be without great problems incorporated within the behaviorist framework. This is due in part to the epistemological realism, which is deeply rooted in them. This makes them even more akin to Avenarius.

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THE IDEA OF A LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE (1934) 1. According to T. Kotarbiński (1929, Part V, §16), philosophical reflection played the role of a prescientific analysis of certain problems and it gave rise to new scientific disciplines as its methods were perfected. If so then we should expect that a similar fate awaits the so-called theory of knowledge — to this day recognized as one of the most important areas of philosophy. We know today that it abounds in pseudoproblems which have flourished on the ground of confused concepts and imprecise formulations of traditional philosophy. But one may presume that after it overcomes its present state of hopeless chaos, it will develop into a new science, the logic of knowledge. The logic of knowledge will be for empirical sciences what contemporary logic is for formal sciences. It will also replace traditional metaphysics, at which the theory of knowledge proved to be unsuccessful despite many attempts. It has been shown that the main problem of the theory of knowledge, the so-called problem of the objective validity or truth of knowledge in general, is only apparent. On the one hand, it reduces to the methodological question, How to avoid mistakes and errors in epistemic practice? On the other hand, it covers the real though so far almost untouched problem of the essence of knowledge, i.e. the definition of the term “knowledge.” (See my 1925, Critical Part, II, section 5.) The two remaining problems of traditional epistemology, i.e. the problem of the source (or origin) of knowledge as well as the problem of the limits (or object) of knowledge, must undergo a similar analysis and appropriate transformation. The analysis of the first of the two problems will precisely point to the logic of knowledge as the goal of further development of this area of philosophy. 2. The central concern of the theory of knowledge has been the debate about the interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy between psychological empiricism (according to which knowledge “derives” from experience) and rationalistic transcendentalism (according to which the

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 99-102. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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proper “source” of knowledge is only reason or understanding). This debate has been a witness not so much to two different answers to one question but rather to two different but entirely compatible problems linked together by the ambiguity of the term “poznanie” [English: knowledge, cognition, German: Erkenntnis] (— two faces, as it were, of the general problem of knowledge). If one associates the meaning of the term with a mental experience, one will look primarily at all kinds of conditions of the origination and development of such processes. In addition one will try to supplement the psychological pure description with a theoretical construction that answers the question quid facti. Although it is true that epistemology contains a lot of material of this kind (through which it has contributed to the origination of scientific psychology), it also comprises considerations of a different kind (sometimes present even in the work of psychologists). They can be, following Kant, characterized as attempts to answer the question quid juris. Of particular concerns is the problem of the “source” of knowledge, which is put forward by transcendentalists as a properly philosophical and nonpsychological problem. It is clear that this “origin” of knowledge should not be identical with the psychological origin of cognitive experiences. But the transcendentalists do not tell us very much about its character. For to say that it is to be “philosophical” is not to say very much. If one inspects their reasoning a little closer, one realizes that they have in mind primarily the relations among claims with respect to their content. In other words, what is at stake are purely formal matters. However, because of a somewhat bizarre terminology that appears to be psychological, they are confused with purely psychological issues. To say that rationalists see the proper “source” of knowledge in the “reason” or “intellect” is not to say that psychological dispositions are necessary conditions of some epistemic achievements or that the so-called obvious or “undeniable” judgments are certain mental experiences. Rather, it is to say that certain claims constitute a logical “ground” or simply a reason for concrete epistemic claims. We should understand the empiricist’s claim that knowledge “derives” from experience in a similar way. This is also clearly indicated by Avenarius (1888, §§ 940 and 957), where he points out that the meaning of the above claim is identical with a characterization of certain statements as determined by perception. This in turn (according to section 535) is to be understood as pointing toward certain things that are “directly given” to the subject in this perception and which thus constitute part of the meaning of these statements. To “ground” knowledge in experience is again not to build a psychological theory of “sensibility.” Rather, it is to determine what claims are sufficient to justify concrete scientific knowledge by

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means of a logical analysis of the most general content of perceptions, i.e. the so-called datum. Evidently, both traditional views take “knowledge” to mean not mental phenomena as such but rather statements with a determinate content (though it is not exactly clear what it is), which are present first of all in the so-called science. The problem of the “source” or “origin” of knowledge turns out to be identical with the question of their sufficient ground. The situation is quite analogous in logic. It does not investigate the psychological conditions of thinking but rather the truth relations [związki prawdziwości] among statements. It does not tell us, for example, when we believe something but rather what are the formal conditions of the truth of statements. What emerges from the poetic and suggestive metaphor of a “source” and from the biological but unclear term “origin” is the purely logical problem of the set of axioms for a system of epistemic propositions of empirical sciences. At the same time, it is clear that this problem does not obliterate psychological questions concerning cognitive experiences. If, in keeping with psychological and philosophical tradition one reserves the term “theory of knowledge” for latter set of problems, then one must assign the former problem to a new and non-philosophical logic of knowledge. One can obtain the same result if one considers the third epistemological conception, viz. intuitionism. (I have not mentioned it so far since this is a relatively new movement which has been strongly represented by Husserl’s school only in recent years.) According to intuitionism, knowledge is “based” on the so-called intellectual intuition, or the insight into the essence of things. This term emphasizes the methodological problem of knowledge (a third face of the general problem, as it were) mentioned at the beginning. It is again accompanied by the psychological problem of experiences of a special kind. However, the analysis of the research practice of the intuitionists shows that they discover the essence of things in every case only after a discussion of claims, i.e. after the determination of reasons and consequences of their statements. This means, however, that this intuition is simply definitionally determined by the content of certain statements, which can constitute the sufficient ground for scientific knowledge in general. 3. This purely logical understanding of the problem of the source or origin of knowledge agrees very well with K. Dürr’s (“Wesen und Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie,” §§90-93) explication of the problem the limits of knowledge. He understands it in terms of the question whether all scientific questions can be solved or decided, i.e. whether it is possible to find a positive or negative answer to them. A position on this issue will

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depend on whether the “source” of knowledge reaches all, some or no objects. This, in turn, is tantamount to asking whether the totality of objects to be known is logically present in the axioms of the general system of knowledge, which thereby constitute a contextual definition of the term “object of knowledge.” It is at this point that the epistemological problems meet the ontological problems of metaphysics, which traditional theory of knowledge tried to include within the scope of its investigations without success. It can be presumed that they will be handled by the new science, equipped with the precise axiomatic method and independent of philosophy: the logic of knowledge. This is also suggested by the movement stirred by R. Carnap under the banner of the “unified science” (Einheitswissenschaft) proposed in his (1928) but predicted already by Avenarius (1888-1890, §§ 926-928) in his thesis that the content of knowledge synthetically evens out (Ausgleichung).

OTHER EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

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REMARKS ON INDETERMINISM IN PHYSICS (1932)

I. Introduction: The Goal and Content of the Work In the last quarter of a century, physicists have come to deal with problems that appeared to be the indisputable property of philosophers. Much more frequently, one also encounters traditionally philosophical terms and theses in purely physical work. It is quite predictable that the great differences in the starting point and in the method will affect the form and the results of the discussion. It is thus quite imperative that philosophers who want to use physicists’ claims proceed with great caution. A. Einstein’s theory, for example, deprives metaphysical speculations on space and time of all scientific value, which many natural philosophers have unfortunately not yet realized (viewing it instead as a “confirmation” of their views). M. Planck’s quantum theory leads to indeterminism — a thesis that is so paradoxical that, at first sight, it appears to undermine the very possibility of scientific knowledge. The content of my paper is devoted to a semantic analysis of the main claims of this physical indeterminism. My aim is to determine what the relation between physical and metaphysical indeterminism is. This inquiry is the more urgent that there are already attempts to use the former to aid the latter.1 It is also not insignificant that this topic leads not only to the explanation of some epistemological concepts and the elimination of some equivocations, but also to the construction of certain theoretical possibilities that have not been explored or considered so far. At the same time, I do not want to engage in a discussion of the subject-matter since I believe this to be a task exclusively for the physicists themselves. The role of an 1

I have in mind in particular the papers by Jakubisiak (1929) and Gawecki (1931). The former is a good example of the traditional irresponsible and careless method of “philosophizing,” whereas the latter calls to be augmented by an analytic investigation of the sort I attempt here.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 105-119. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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epistemologist is that of a comparing observer or an analyzing translator rather than a dogmatic legislator or a pretentious judge. The content and aim of the paper should justify the nauseating multiplicity of quotations, which are necessary, however, to forestall the objection that my analysis is arbitrary and unfounded. They will also allow a glimpse into the source literature or perhaps even will make it available in case it is not.2 II. Indeterminism in Physics 1. What do the Physicists Claim? The point of departure for an analysis of physical indeterminism must be the following excerpt from a famous paper by W. Heisenberg (1927a), which is fundamental for both a philosophical and a physical interpretation: Aber an der scharfen Formulierung des Kausalgesetzes: “Wenn wir die Gegenwart genau kennen, können wir die Zukunft berechnen,” ist nicht der Nachsatz sondern die Voraussetzung falsch. Wir können die Gegenwart in allen Bestimmungsstücken prinzipiell nicht kennenlernen. Deshalb ist alles Wahrnehmen eine Auswahl aus einer Fülle von Möglichkeiten und eine Beschränkung des zukünftig Möglichen. Da nun der statistische Charakter der Quantentheorie so eng an die Ungenauigkeit aller Wahrnehmung geknüpft ist, könnte man zu der Vermutung verleitet werden, dass sich hinter der wahrgenommenen statistischen Welt noch eine “wirkliche” Welt verberge, in der das Kausalgesetz gilt. Aber solche Spekulationen scheinen uns, das betonen wir ausdrücklich, unfruchtbar und sinnlos. Die Physik soll nur den Zusammenhang der Wahrnehmung formal beschreiben. Vielmehr kann man den wahren Sachverhalt viel besser so charackterisieren: Weil alle Experimente den Gesetzen der Quantenmechanik . . . unterworfen sind, so wird durch die Quantenmechanik die Ungültigkeit des Kausalgesetzes definitiv festgestellt. (Heisenberg 1927a, p. 197)

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This paper was finished last year in May [1931 – IN]. Its publication was delayed for reasons independent of me. I realize that in deciding to let it appear now in that form, I risk being subject to the objection that it is not up to date with the state of the discussion on indeterminism in world physics, in view of the fact that it does not take into account the most recent literature on the subject. As far as I know, however, in Poland, no one has yet put forward the views I defend or has carried out a semantic analysis of the sort I elaborate. I believe therefore that this voice in the discussion has not lost all of its value. The reader who is interested in the further development of the problem should consult the second volume of Erkenntnis which contains important work by W. Heisenberg and H. Reichenbach. (Footnote added while the text was in print.)

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According to this physical indeterminism, the principle of causality is invalid. Correlatively, according to the physical determinism, the principle of causality is valid. If one understands the terms “[epistemological] validity”* and “[epistemological] invalidity” as they are understood in logic, i.e. as synonyms of “truth” and “falsehood,” one would have to conclude that Heisenberg claims that the principle of causality is false according to physical indeterminism (and true according to physical determinism). On such an interpretation, however, Heisenberg’s reasoning would be fallacious, since he would be concluding that a conditional is false because its antecedent is false. The only situation when a conditional can be false is, of course, when the consequent is false while the antecedent is true, which is not the case here. So, to say that the principle of causality is “invalid” must mean something else than that it is false. One may suppose that Heisenberg means simply that it is groundless or that it has no sense in physics, i.e. that it is inapplicable in physical research. This interpretation is confirmed in the work of other physicists. Consider P. Jordan, who says: Die heutige Quantenmechanik enthält eine ausdrückliche Absage an das Kausalitätsprizip in seiner Klassischen Form. (Jordan 1928, p. 770)

and explains it further: Die Quantenmechanik . . . die logische Entbehrlichkeit der Kausalität im System der theoretischen Physik erweist. (Jordan 1928, p. 770)

Von Mises says quite distinctly: Die deterministischen Ansätze der klassischen Physik lassen sich rein formal oder besser gesagt, der Idee nach, im ganzen Bereich unmittelbar beobachtbarer Erscheinungen aufrechterhalten, aber sie werden in vielen Fällen . . . leerlaufend, sie verlieren den Charakter einer kausalen Erklärung, sie bringen zur Erkenntnis, zur Beschreibung, zur Voraussage des Erscheinungsablaufes nichts mehr bei. (von Mises 1930, p. 147, reprint: p. 194)

and further: Niemals ist von einem Widerspruch zwischen einer Beobachtungsreihe und der klassischen Theorie die Rede, niemals sind wir gezwungen zu sagen, bei irgendeinem Einzelvorgang würde ein Satz der deterministischen Physik verletzt . . . Die systematische Theorie . . . hat, obwohl sie dem Indeterminismus weitesten *

[This is one of the contexts where the translation of the Polish term ‘ważność’ (which corresponds to the German term ‘Gültigkeit’) as ‘validity’ breaks down. In this context, it might be better captured by ‘acceptability’. It should be made clear, however, that the Polish term for logical validity is very different (‘prawidłowość’). Wiegner is not confusing validity and truth here.]

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Adam Wiegner Raum gewährt, nie eine andere Form des Versagens der deterministischen Physik gekannt als die, dass sie in gewissen Fällen leerlaufend, also unzureichend zur Lösung der Aufgaben wird. (von Mises 1930, p. 152, reprint: p. 207)

In other words, physicists are quite aware of the fact that the “invalidity” of the principle of causality means simply that it is spurious and inadequate since it is inapplicable. In order to claim that it is false, one needs something more. Von Mises is quite aware of this: 6

Die philosophische Beurteilung dieses Ergebnisses wird verschieden ausfallen, je nachdem, welche Stellung man zu den Grundbegriffen der theoretischen Physik einnimmt. Wer in den poderomotorischen Kräften, Dichten, Dielektrizitätskonstanten Dinge sieht, denen eine von der Aufgabe der Naturbeschreibung unabhängige Existenz zukommt, wird den Determinismus als grundsätzlich bewahrt und nur praktisch ausgeschaltet ansehen. Für denjenigen aber, der diese Begriffsbildungen nur als Hilfsmittel auffasst, die durch die Differentialgleichungsansätze eingeführt werden und mit diesen dazu dienen, eine Orientierung in der Erscheinungswelt zu ermöglichen, für den fallen die Grenzen der Anwendbarkeit und die Grenzen des Determinismus selbst zusammen. (von Mises 1930, p. 147, reprint: p. 194)

Indeed, since, according to the empiricist idealism, “to exist” is the same as “to be experienced,” the “inapplicability” of a principle is its “falsehood.” Since this epistemological standpoint is widely accepted by physicists, it is easy to understand why Heisenberg’s reasoning has reverberated among them. In my view, however, Heisenberg’s intention is not so much concerned with showing the invalidity of the whole conditional as rather the falsehood of the consequent. In other words, his argument is to prove that it is impossible to calculate the future. He would then be following the direction of a modus ponens, but where from the truth of the conditional and falsehood of the antecedent the falsehood of the antecedent is inferred. Clearly, such a reasoning is fallacious: if the conditional is valid, one can only infer that the antecedent is false if the consequent is false, not the other way around. Perhaps then the conditional is simply an imprecise statement of the thought that we can calculate the future if and only if we know the present accurately. On this interpretation, when both terms are equivalent, the proof of the falsehood of the consequent is possible. But in such a case, physical indeterminism is not a claim about the rejection of the principle of causality, but rather a claim about the acceptance of the fact that future events are incomputable. Physicists inadvertently confuse the two claims, probably because of the ambiguity of “to determine.” This is probably also the source of the rather unusual (from a philosophical standpoint) formulation of Heisenberg’s principle of causality. Kotarbiński, for one, explains the concept of indeterminism in the following way:

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indeterminists claim that not every event is determined by another event in the past according to natural laws. (Kotarbiński 1929, p. 438)

This formulation of the principle of causality is completely different from the one given by Heisenberg (1927b, p. 239). Not all physicists use Heisenberg’s terminology. Here are some excerpts from other theorists of the microphenomena. M. Born says: In der klassischen Dynamik gilt unumschränkt der Satz, dass die Kenntnis des Zustandes (nämlich der Lagen und Geschwindigkeiten aller Materieteilchen) in einem Augenblick den Ablauf eines abgeschlossenen Systems für alle Zukunft determiniert; das ist die Fassung, die das Kausalgesetz in der Physik annimmt. (Born 1929b, p. 117)

and Wenn man nur die Lage und Geschwindigkeit aller Teilchen eines abgeschlossenen Systems in einem Augenblick wüsste, so müsste der weitere Ablauf vollständig determiniert sein und durch blosse Rechnung vorhergesagt werden können. (Born 1929a, p. 9)

The agreement with Heisenberg is only partial. Although, on the one hand, Born speaks about “knowledge determining the course of events” but, on the other hand, he does make a distinction between the “determination of a course of events” and its “numerical prediction.” When E. Schrödinger writes about the postulate “dass ein jeder Naturvorgang absolut und quantitativ determiniert ist mindestens durch die Gesamtheit der Umstände oder physischen Bedingungen bei seinem Eintreten,” * he notes that “it is a postulate which is also described as the principle of causality.” This indicates that he agrees in terminology not with Heisenberg but with the epistemologists who also speak only about the determination of events by their conditions, i.e. other events. It is clear that, even among physicists, there are two different formulations of the principle of causality. The first ontological thesis is identical with the traditional philosophical principle of causality. The second epistemological thesis is of special interest to the physicists and is apparently, in their view, so closely related to the first that practically indistinguishable from it. Clearly, however, a proper analysis must carefully distinguish these formulations and determine the relations between them. It is also clear that physical indeterminism is not simply identical with metaphysical indeterminism, as might have appeared at first sight. 3 * 3

[There is no page reference to Schrödinger’s paper probably due to a typesetting error.]

As is well known, metaphysical indeterminism has its roots in the psychological indeterminism, i.e. in the view that human will is “free,” where this freedom is understood

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2. An Attempt at an Explication, Discussion and Interpretation In order to carry out a detailed discussion of the relation between the two kinds of indeterminism, one must choose some formulations and render them more precise. This must take place within a general framework without any pretension to prejudge the results of a detailed analysis of the nature of causality but with accurate rendition of the intentions of the scientists in question. I take the following theses to be best suited for this purpose:

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(1) For every empirical (given in experience) phenomenon Z, there exists another phenomenon Z′ such that: If Z′ occurs at moment t n then Z will occur at the directly following moment t n+1 . (2) For every empirical (given in experience) phenomenon Z, it is possible to find in experience (and, in particular, to measure physically) another phenomenon Z′ such that: If Z′ occurs at moment t n then Z will occur at the directly following moment t n+1 . (3) Every empirical (given in experience) phenomenon Z can be predicted (or, in particular, determined numerically) if another phenomenon Z′ is given and if we know the dependence between Z and Z′. Only the first of these theses, which is distinctly ontological, deserves to be called the principle of causality. Accordingly, metaphysical determinism consists in accepting the principle of causality, while metaphysical indeterminism rejects it. This coincides with philosophical terminology. The second thesis is distinctly epistemological. It states the necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of predicting events based on the knowledge of a causal relationship, i.e. of predicting by appeal to thesis (3). Thesis (2) is thus equivalent to the claim that that every empirical phenomenon can be predicted causally. These two claims are the proper object of discussion among physicists, since both are denied by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, also known as the indeterminacy principle. According to this law, the simultaneous measurements of the position and the momentum (or the time and the energy) of electrons are so intricately linked within the limits of Planck’s universal constant that the precision of measurement of one of these magnitudes (of each pair) is inverse to the precision of measurement of the other. It follows that it is impossible to find the cause of a given microphenomenon, and so it is as the lack of determination by causes. The fundamental difference between this indeterminism and physical indeterminism has been already noted by Zawirski (1930, pp. 300f).

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impossible to predict and calculate the future state of a given system unequivocally. Since this is how physical determinism and indeterminism are defined, I will call thesis (2) (which is equivalent to the claim just made) the principle of causal prediction. Physical determinism is a view that accepts thesis (2), physical indeterminism — rejects thesis (2). Finally, thesis (3) deserves to be called the schema of scientific prediction in general,4 since it gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the scientific predictability of phenomena in general and it is a generalization and an explication of Heisenberg’s “principle of causality.” Since it is a formal methodological thesis, its acceptance or rejection does not define any epistemological position. I will thus not subject it to a detailed analysis. In what follows, I will restrict myself to the consideration of the relation between the first two theses, i.e. to the relation between the two kinds of indeterminism. First of all, it is clear that from the point of view of empiricist idealism, theses (1) and (2) are synonymous because the expressions “exists” and “can be found in experience” are synonymous. We have to conclude that within this epistemological perspective, physical indeterminism leads to metaphysical indeterminism and vice versa. The mentioned popularity of this epistemological position among physicists explains the ease with which the above inferences were drawn without clear awareness of their presuppositions. It seems to me, however, that the idealism of the 4

The name and the content of thesis (3) come from Metallmann (1928). This thesis is synonymous with what he calls component R, which is common to three definite epistemological principles: the principle of causality, the statistical principle and the morphological principle. Aside from the general schema of scientific prediction, Metallmann distinguishes other independent ontological components of these principles: component P is derived from the causality principle (it is equivalent to thesis (1) given above), component T is derived from the statistical principle, component S is derived from the morphological principle (see especially pp. 4ff and 29ff). These components make more detailed the dependence in terms of which we predict one phenomenon on the basis of another. Metallmann distinguishes three independent forms of determinism in science: causal, statistical and morphological. They are defined by the mentioned ontological claims. As is evident from this brief sketch, Metallmann’s view differs both from the traditional philosophical as well as from the physical position. On the one hand, what philosophers call the principle of causality is for him only a component of a thesis that bears this name. On the other hand, physical indeterminism is for him a version of statistical determinism, which again is only a species of determinism in general. This conception is thus important for the logic of knowledge. It is an attempt to generalize causal determinism. In particular, it is not indifferent to the problem of the so-called irrationalism, which I mention below. — Implicit in theses (1) and (2) is the denial of the continuity of time order. In my view, this is a consequence (albeit physically not yet quite clear) of the quantum theory. But this thesis is not essential to my main point so it can be abstracted from without influencing any important results.

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physicists is rather superficial and that it is rather due to the erroneous belief that it is a necessary component or perhaps even the essence of empiricism, which they consider to be the only position that is compatible with the concrete nature of positive research. This is also confirmed by the fact that the rather vague and confused postulate of “anti-metaphysicism” continues to be so popular. It has to be admitted, however, that much of the blame lies with the philosophers themselves since the methods they have employed in epistemology are still not scientific enough. We should also recall the fact that the fundamental claim of empiricist idealism that all theoretical constructions are only heuristics, has suffered a major blow with the victory of the atomic theory. In consequence, it is no longer possible nowadays to disregard epistemological realism and to stigmatize it as “unscientific metaphysics.” What about the objection that an idealistic attitude is more easily and more naturally combined with the critical sense indispensable for a scientist than a realistic attitude, which inadvertently leads to a hardened dogmatism? First of all, this “fact” cannot constitute any argument in a systematic discussion. Moreover, it is hardly a “fact” since there is no shortage of idealistic fanatics. Consequently, we must also take into account the position of epistemological realism. If one assumes that both theses are not synonymous, it seems most natural to view thesis (1) as an inferential consequence of thesis (2). In other words, it seems most natural to view physical determinism as an inferential reason for metaphysical determinism and so (by contraposition) to view metaphysical indeterminism as an argument for physical indeterminism. However, in view of the inner coherence of epistemological skepticism, this view is not necessary. — I, for one, am inclined to consider the principle of causality as independent from the principle of causal prediction. It is clear, though, that this point in the discussion does not have any fundamental significance for the purpose of these remarks and so I will not dwell on it any longer. As far as the relation between thesis (2) and thesis (1) is concerned, it seems to be beyond doubt that thesis (2) does not depend on thesis (1). It is after all possible for the principle of causality to be true even as the principle of causal prediction is false. This leads to the conclusion that according to epistemological realism, physical indeterminism dose not lead to metaphysical indeterminism, even though it dooms metaphysical determinism to be emptily satisfied, i.e. without physical sense. This result stands in complete agreement with the preceding analysis of the statements made by physicists. Let me confirm it with M. Born’s words: Die Unmöglichkeit alle Daten eines Zustandes exakt zu messen, verhindert die Vorherbestimmung des weiteren Ablaufs. Dadurch verliert das Kausalitätsprinzip in

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seiner üblichen Fassung jeden Sinn. Denn wenn es prinzipiel unmöglich ist, alle Bedingungen (Ursachen) eines Vorganges zu kennen, ist es leeres Gerede zu sagen, jedes Ereignis habe eine Ursache. (Born 1929b, p. 117)

The question that arises is how an epistemological realist should interpret physical indeterminism. Some physicists suggest that Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle reveals the existence of some “indeterminate” being, hence the term. However, the expression “indeterminate being,” as long as it is not synonymous with “indeterminable being,” is unintelligible unless we understand such “indeterminacy” as the “lack of individual properties.” Such a conception, which is probably equivalent to conceptual realism and probably incompatible with reism, seems to be theoretically interesting. This is especially true in view of the fact that it is possible to tie it with manyvalued logic and with the probability calculus. However, it is still too enigmatic and impenetrable to be properly discussed. To a philosopher, the term “indeterminability” suggests a different conception, viz. irrationalism, as long as what one means is the thesis that it is impossible to know the world by means of reason, and as long as one takes the possibility of predicting the future to be a test of knowledge. This also seems to be the way in which M. Bohr himself understands the matter in terms of Kant’s phenomenalism: Die Entdeckung des Wirkungsquantums zeigt uns nämlich nicht nur die natürliche Begrenzung der klassischen Physik, sondern sie bringt die Naturwissenschaft in eine ganz neue Lage, indem die alte philosophische Frage nach der objektiven Existenz der Erscheinungen unabhängig von unseren Beobachtungen, in neue Beleuchtung gestellt wird: Wie wir gesehen haben, fordert jede Beobachtung einen Eingriff in den Verlauf der Erscheinungen, der seinem Wesen nach der kausalen Beschreibungsweise die Grundlage entzieht. Die Grenze der Möglichkeit von selbstständingen Erscheinungen zu reden, die uns die Natur selber in dieser Weise gesetzt hat, findet allem Anscheine nach eben diesen Ausdruck in der Formulierung der Quantenmechanik. (Bohr 1930, p. 77)

The result of this view, from the physicist’s point of view, is that the two (particle and wave) conceptions and explanations of light cease to be contradictory. They are both equally necessary even though individually one-sided and subjective pictures of unified objective reality of “things-inthemselves,” which is inaccessible to us, which we cannot know. Die prinzipielle Unbestimmtheit . . . ist . . . ein direkter Ausdruck für die absolute Begrenzung der Anwendbarkeit unserer anschaulichen Vorstellungen bei der Beschreibung der Atomerscheinungen, die in dem scheinbaren Dilemma, dem wir

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Adam Wiegner bei der Frage nach der Natur des Lichtes und der Materie gegenübergestellt werden, 5 hervortritt.” (Bohr 1930, p. 77)

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The epistemological weakness of this view, which has been demonstrated many times, is not outweighed by the advantages it has from the physicist’s point of view. It is advisable therefore to seek a different solution for this epistemologically difficult situation. First of all, it seems to me that there is no need to seek an irrationalist interpretation since there is another explanation, which is more compatible with the spirit of positive science, even though it appears to be more paradoxical. I believe that instead of speaking about the limits of knowledge, we should speak about the “inner” limits of the world, which is an interpretation of the hypothesis that phenomena are not continuous. Let me use the following analogy between logic and physics. In a deductive system, the chain of proofs is not infinite. Some statements, the so-called axioms, have to be accepted without proof. This does not undermine the principle of sufficient reason but only deprives it of methodological sense in these cases. By analogy, one ought to take the chain of causal relations to be finite by accepting that some events, which can be called elementary in the strict sense of the term, as taking place without a cause. However, this does not contradict the principle of causality but merely deprives it of epistemological sense in these cases. Since Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle has its source in the interaction between those phenomena by means of which physicists carry out the observations and those phenomena that are the object of their investigation, this seems to indicate that all those phenomena are elementary in the above sense. I must restrict myself to this very general and enigmatic characterization of this possibility. I return to the consideration of arguments against the view that indeterminism is a form of irrationalism. First, one must note the fact that both the principle of causality as well as the principle of causal prediction do not, in scientific practice, appear in such a schematic and abstract formulation as is given to them by epistemologists and in which they figure in our discussion. Rather, their content specifies the details of the conditions and factors that are necessary for the principles to apply to experience in accordance with the decidability postulate. In particular, the physical principle of causality takes into account only those magnitudes that can be experimentally 5

This is also Białobrzeski’s interpretation of Bohr’s position as being about “two faces of the uniform nature of matter and radiation inaccessible to us (lecture “Rysy charakterystyczne współczesnej teorii kwantów” given to the 5 th Congress of Polish Physicists in Poznań, Synopsis, p. 17).

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measured, in accordance with the nature of physics as a science about that and only about that which can be experimentally measured.6 M. Planck expresses this in the following way: Ein physikalisches Gesetz ist ein jeder Satz, welcher einen festen, unverbrüchlich gültigen Zusammenhang zwischen messbaren physikalischen Grössen ausspricht, einen Zusammenhang, welcher es gestattet, eine dieser Grössen zu berechnen, wenn die übrigen durch Messung bekannt sind. (Planck 1926, p. 249)

P. Jordan applies this to the principle of causality thus: Die Kausalität definieren heisst für den Physiker nichts anderes als angeben, wie man ihr Vorhandensein oder Nichtvorhandensein experimentell feststellen kann. (Jordan 1927, p. 105)

In general, physical formulations of the principle of causality appeal to mechanical concepts such as the position of a particle at a given time or the velocity and direction of its movement, as is evident from the passages cited above. This was made possible by the fact that almost all physical phenomena have been reinterpreted in terms of atomistic concepts. The fact that it is impossible to uniquely determine those magnitudes, has resulted in the fact that the principle of causality has lost its physical sense. However, it is impossible to exclude the theoretical possibility that, in the future, physicists will find some other ways of determining which states and factors are measurable that will not conform to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and thereby make the application of the principle of causality in physics once again possible. Though this possibility is improbable, it is explicitly considered by Ph. Frank: Wir wissen heute, dass man mit Hilfe von Lagen und Geschwindigkeiten keine kausalen Gesetze für die einzelnen Elektronen aufstellen kann. Daraus folgt aber 6

So, M. Schlick (1925, p. 269) defines upfront: “reality is called ‘physical’ insofar as it is described in terms of the quantitative spatiotemporal conceptual framework” (“‘physisch’ heisst die Wirklichkeit sofern sie durch das räumlich- zeitlich- quantitative Begriffssystem der naturwissenschaften bezeichnet ist”). As far as I know, the first philosopher to understand physics in this fashion was W. Heinrich who states quite clearly in his Psychology of Emotions that: “if we ask what are the manifestations of what is given * directly in experience , we will always obtain the answer that these manifestations always consist in the changes in three fundamental magnitudes: mass, length and time. This is a fundamental fact, quite independent of whether one operates with a mechanical, thermodynamical or electromagnetical point of view” (1907, p. 18). *

[The beginning of the quotation could also be read as “if we ask what are the direct manifestations of what is given in experience,” which is what the text of the passage as it appears in Wiegner’s text says. The difference of interpretation is due to but one letter which is probably the result of a typographical error.]

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Adam Wiegner nicht, dass man nicht vieleicht einmal Zustandsgrössen finden wird mit Hilfe deren man das Verhalten dieser Teilchen mehr ins einzelne gehend wird verfolgen können 7 als mit Hilfe der Wellenfunktion, der Häufigkeiten. (Frank 1929, p. 993, reprint: p. 155).

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In short, as long as it has not been proven that the current formulation of the principle of causality in physics is the only possible one, so long one may question the irrational character of physical indeterminism. Aside from the negative side, which is indicated by its name and which I have used to define it, physical indeterminism has also a positive side. It is manifested in the fact that the fall of the principle of causality has not resulted in the fall of microphysics. To the contrary, it develops very well. Moreover, the use of statistical methods has allowed it to predict future though, of course, the predictions are different from causal ones, i.e. they do not allow to predict the occurrence of a phenomenon exactly. It is at this point that it is very easy to fall into error. Probability theory, from which such statistical methods derive, is based on such concepts as “chance,” “arbitrariness,” “irregularity.” At first sight, these concepts appear to be contrary to any possibility of predicting the future at all, and so also to any knowledge. However, the very fact that it was possible to construct a precise calculus by means of these concepts is a proof, in my view, that their meaning is not purely negative as in metaphysics, but that they contain certain positive aspects, which, unfortunately, have not yet been made logically precise but which clearly constrain the negative ones. Indeed, the logical foundations of the probability calculus are still unclear. To this day, we do not know whether they require the construction of some logic that is more general than two-valued logic — as is suggested by H. Reichenbach (1930) and which would probably lead to the claim that causal regularities are versions of statistical regularities at the macrolevel8; or whether they can be contained within two-valued logic — as 7

This possibility is also noted by Zawirski (lecture “Refleksje nad indeterminizmem w fizyce” given to the 5 th Congress of Polish Physicists in Poznań, Synopsis, p. 17). 8 This view, which is accepted by the majority of contemporary physicists, is put forward in great detail by R. von Mises, who comes to the following conclusion: “Der strenge Determinismus, den man gewöhnlich der klassischen Differentialgleichungsphysik zuschreibt, ist nur ein Scheinbarer; er hält nicht stand wenn man eine Theorie grundsätzlich nur im Zusammenhang mit den zu ihrer Überprüfung dienenden Experimenten gelten lässt, sich also auf das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare oder ‘prinzipiell’ Beobachtbare beschränkt. Im Makroskopischen steckt das Indeterministische teils in den Beobachtungsgegenständen, teils kommt es durch die Messvorgänge hinein; jede Mikrophysik aber führt das statistische Element mit sich, da dies allein den Übergang zur Massenerscheinung vermittelt und jede Messung schon eine solche ist” (1930, p. 153, reprint: pp. 209f).

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Waismann (1930) tries to show and which suggests the reverse possibility of deriving statistical regularities from causal ones and is probably a more commonsense view. In any case, it needs to be said that physical indeterminism uses statistical prediction of the future most successfully and that its results are not worse than those generated by causal prediction. This is clearly stated by N. Bohr (1930, p. 76): “Ebenso wie die klassische Mechanik beansprucht die Quantenmechanik eine erschöpfende Beschreibung aller Erscheinungen zu geben, welche innerhalt ihres Anwendungsgebietes liegen.” Since it is clearly seen that there is fullblooded knowledge obtained through “reason” in microphysics, so to consider physical indeterminism to be a form of irrationalism is an error, which derives from the failure to distinguish the positive physical indeterminism from the purely negative (since absolute) metaphysical indeterminism. (Hence, perhaps its unfortunate name.) One might think that to the extent that physicists use philosophical terminology, they would do better to use in accordance with their philosophical meaning. Who knows, however, perhaps their somewhat carefree use of traditional philosophical terminology reveals a healthy instinct of a positive researcher and a trained intuition of a concrete thinker. For metaphysicians, who are used to dealing with the highest abstractions by means of so imperfect a tool as scholastic logic and traditional methodology, have lost touch with the current state of scientific methods. As a result, there is no guarantee that their theories are not only coherent but even that their constructions make sense. In my view, the essential feature of historical metaphysics that distinguishes it fundamentally from scientific constructions is its use of the “absolute” in all its forms and flavors. Since implicit in this concept is always pure negation of the restrictedness given in experience, I may justifiably doubt whether metaphysical constructions can at all satisfy the postulate of decidability, i.e. one of the most important conditions of positive research. For these reasons, the future truly scientific epistemology will probably be neither rationalist, nor empiricist, nor realist, nor idealist, nor dogmatic, nor skeptical, nor identical with any other traditional epistemological view since they are all based on confused and non-methodical metaphysics. This is one of the reasons why philosophizing scientists instinctively reject the historical terminology of philosophers as too unclear and enigmatic, too impenetrable and overly abstract. This is also why they transform it into a more detailed and more concrete terminology in their language. I do not mean this to sound as a settled and irreversible verdict. But I would like to warn against drawing too hasty a conclusion that the carelessness of the

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scientists is the only source of terminological confusion errors in epistemology.9 III. Conclusion: Indeterminism in Psychology Finally, let me call attention to an interesting application of the basic thesis of physical indeterminism to psychology, due to M. Planck. He summarizes the idea as follows: 16

Das Kausalgesetz verlangt, dass sowohl die Handlungen als auch die seelischen Vorgänge, insbesondere auch die Willlensmotive eines jeden Menschen, in irgend einem Augenblick vollständig bestimmt sind durch den Zustand seiner gesammten Innenwelt im vorhergehenden Augenblick und die hinzutretenden Einflüsse der Umwelt. Wir haben keinerlei Grund an die Richtigkeit dieses Satzes irgendwie zu zweifeln. Denn bei der Frage der Willensfreiheit handelt es sich gar nicht darum, ob es einen derartigen bestimmten Zusammenhang gibt, sondern es handelt sich darum, ob dieser Zusammenhang dem Betreffenden selber erkennbar ist. Einzig und allein dieser Punkt ist es, an welchem die Entscheidung darüber haftet, ob der Mensch sich frei fühlen kann oder nicht. Nur wenn jemand imstande wäre, allein auf Grund des Kausalgesetzes seine eigene Zukunft vorauszusehen, müsste man ihm das Bewusstsein der Willensfreiheit absprechen. Ein solcher Fall ist aber deshalb unmöglich, weil er einen logischen Widerspruch enthält. Denn jedes vollständige Erkennen setzt voraus, dass das zu erkennende Objekt durch innere Vorgänge im erkennenden Subjekt nicht verändert wird, und diese Voraussetzung ist hinfällig, wenn Objekt und Subjekt identisch werden. Oder konkreter gesprochen: da die Erkenntnis irgend eines Willensmotives im eigenen Innern ein Erlebnis ist, aus welchem ein neues Willensmotiv entspringen kann, so vermehrt sich durch sie die Zahl der möglichen Willensmotive. Diese Feststellung bringt eine neue Erkenntis, die abermals ein neues Willensmotiv zeitigen kann, und so geht die Kette der Schlussfolgerungen weiter, ohne dass man jemals zur Feststellung des für eine zukünftige eigene Handlung endgültig ausschlaggebenden Motivs gelangen kann, d.h. zu einer Erkenntnis, die nicht abermals ihrerseits ein neues Willensmotiv auslöst. (Planck 1926, p. 256)

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M. Schlick’s work (1931) is an attempt at a new understanding of epistemological theses by means of an analysis of the sense of physical statements. In my view, the attempt is not successful because of the too idealistic understanding of the thesis “Das Wort ‘determiniert’ bedeutet also schlechterdings genau dasselbe, wie ‘voraussagbar’ oder ‘vorausberechenbar’” (p. 158). One must admit that it is very difficult to grasp the real sense of scientific constructions and to avoid their confused and superficial interpretation in idealistic or psychologistic terms. At the same time, I believe this to be the most urgent issue in contemporary epistemology. — To avoid any misunderstandings, I should add that, at the time that I was writing this paper, I did not know Schlick’s paper or the papers by H. Reichenbach, Th. Vogel and H. Bergmann he cites. (Footnote added while the text was in print)

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We can see clearly how, on the one hand, the place of a strictly metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will is taken by the properly psychological problem of the perception of freedom in the decision process, and how, on the other hand, the latter problem is made more precise by the fact that this perception is considered to be dependent on the causal prediction of future decision. While one may question such an intellectualization, one must nonetheless admire the originality of reasoning and the positive nature of the change in questions. In any case, this serious idea of positive psychological indeterminism, which strictly corresponds to physical indeterminism, has to be fundamentally distinguished from traditional purely negative metaphysical and psychological indeterminism, which, as is well known, is also the “source” of all indeterministic theories in general.10

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N. Bohr (1930) makes some interesting comments on indeterminism in biology. S. Szuman (1930) tries to apply indeterminism to the psychology of human development.

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A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVE TRUTH (1964) 1. I believe that the discussion of the concept of relative truth so far has neglected the notion of truth. This is unfortunate since this concept seems to be the source of all the problems with the concept of relative truth. According to philosophical tradition, we should conceptualize “truth” as “correspondence” and so as a one-to-one relation. On such an interpretation of traditional view, one must conceptualize all “approximation” as a one-to-many relation. And to take the latter to be a version of “correspondence” would be conceivable only if one considered, for example, dialectical contradiction to be a version of logical contradiction, which does not seem possible. Although one type of a oneto-many relation has been accepted in scientific practice, it has been called “probability”* not “truth” — evidently to underscore the fundamental difference between them. One can define the notion of “relativized truth” using Tarski’s method, where the one-to-one correspondence is built into the basic definitions connecting the meta-language with the object language in a very elegant and witty way. But this method strictly presupposes the initial formalization of the object language. This means that the method cannot be simply applied to the languages of empirical sciences and philosophy since they use ordinary language whose formalization is impossible without complex transformations. One might try to use Tarski’s method in epistemology if one could formalize ontology as the object language and think of the language of the theory of knowledge as the meta-language. Unfortunately, in view of the fact that every ontology reflects differences in worldviews of its proponents, there is no hope that such a formalization would be useful even for some ontologies. In fact, it could lead to ever greater confusion resulting from the different “correct” conceptions of truth. *

[The Polish term ‘prawdopodobieństwo’ (Eng.: probability) is etymologically linked to ‘prawda’ (Eng.: truth) and ‘podobieństwo’ (Eng.: similarity).]

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 121-122. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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In this situation, we ought not to be seriously concerned with the concept of truth in the methodology of the empirical sciences. (That concept is, after all, strictly tied to the notion of “science” as a system of claims.) Rather, we ought to conceptualize “science” in terms of a set of methodological procedures, where the notion of “justification” is central and that of “taking to be true” is operational. Moreover, all facts used to support the notion of “relative” truth seem to be well explained by the notion of “taking to be true.” As far as the very concept of relative truth is concerned, I think that the only way to understand it is to follow, for example, R. Suszko’s method in limiting the model of reference. The traditional concept of “absolute truth” could be included in this “relativized truth” if a universal model existed, which is contradicted by contemporary science. 2. One can object that the interpretation of “correspondence” as a one-toone relation is inadequate on the grounds that scientists themselves frequently speak about the “disparity” between scientific statements and their objects. At the root of such claims lies a misunderstanding about the concept of “experience,” and thus a misunderstanding that falls on philosophers’ conscience. In epistemology, it is still thought that the only possible form of empiricism is the one which has been proposed by the British empiricists, and which could be called “atomistic.” Experience, on this view, is conceived of as a set of impressions, feelings, etc. It is not surprising that scientific statements remain in a “disparity” with such a “source.” Similarly, a layperson who does not know much about methodology erroneously thinks that “observation” is just like what happens when she sees things during a walk, for example. What she does not realize is that it is a very complex process, regulated by methodological principles based on a long tradition and practice both theoretical and technical. The sense of the mentioned methodological rules is ultimately based, of course, on what is directly given in experience, i.e. on the so-called “direct knowledge,” which is the source and ultimate criterion of all theoretically deduced “direct knowledge.” (I use the terminology introduced by the Fries-Nelson school, though without a further detailed interpretation of it.) This “direct knowledge” is beyond any doubt in a given linguistic and epistemic situation at a given time. Any attempts to undermine its [epistemological] validity would lead either to a vicious circle or to an infinite regress. But it would be a gross mistake to try to find here an argument for universal skepticism, i.e. the claim that knowledge is impossible.

ON THE SO-CALLED “RELATIVE TRUTH” (1963) R. Suszko’s (1957ab) paper (“Formal Logic and Some Problems of the Theory of Knowledge”) is devoted mainly to the problem of the so-called “relative truth” and is a very important contribution to the discussion of this topic. The author is concerned to upgrade a Marxist theory of truth to the level of contemporary methodological requirements by an appropriate explication of concepts and a creative development. Although A. Schaff (1961, chapter IV) offers an extensive discussion of the traditional form of this theory, he does not convincingly explain the relation of the relativity of that concept with the objectivity of the classical concept of truth and with Twardowski’s conceptualization of the above mentioned features (which, incidentally, accords with the philosophical tradition). Twardowski writes (he understands “truth” to mean “true judgment”): Absolute truths are those judgments that are unconditionally true, without any restrictions or reservations, with view to no further circumstances; they are true always and everywhere. Relative truths, on the other hand, are those judgments that are true only under certain conditions, with certain restrictions, thanks to certain further circumstances; such judgments are not true always or everywhere. (1927b, p. 64)

On the basis of this understanding, Twardowski shows that the examples given to support the claim about the relativity of truth fall into two categories. Some examples are based on the failure to distinguish between judgment and its utterance. The utterance of a judgment usually involves some shorthand. It does not contain all the elements of the contents of the judgment since they may be evident. As a result, a true judgment may be expressed by means of a false sentence. Other examples rely on the ambiguities of the terms used. Consequently, the apparent identity of a sentence conceals different judgments with different truth values. Schaff has not shown that this analysis is faulty. By unexpectedly switching from “judgment” to “knowledge” and by thinking of the latter as a process, he made his argumentation inadmissibly easier thereby weakening his whole case.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 123-136. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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Suszko’s attempt thus comes at a very appropriate moment. Since it is very meticulous, it merits our highest attention. I am surprised that it has not yet been subjected to a detailed analysis. He uses the semantic notion of a “model,” which plays a very important and fruitful role in contemporary mathematics. The way in which Suszko develops his conception is so beautiful that it would deserve a detailed presentation and an attempt to make it even more accessible. I must, however, restrict my discussion to the most important points which best characterize the author’s way of thinking. I will therefore also avoid the use even of the simple and elementary symbols. Suszko’s idea is to introduce the second relativization of “truth” or the “true sentence.” 1 The first relativization is due to A. Tarski who, in his famous study The Concept of Truth in the Language of Deductive Sciences (1933), relativizes the term ‘truth’ to the language in which it is expressed. This step is so obvious that one has to wonder about the fact that it was only because of the paradoxes due to a careless use of this term that this step could be taken. This is not the first time in an exact science when it turns out that the most obvious steps are also the most difficult! Suszko introduces yet another relativization – this time to a “model.” A “model” in a theory of language is simply “every object such that the language can be used to talk about it in some sense” (1957a, p. 33). This is thus to be a generalization of the epistemologically basic relation between “knowledge” and the “world” (or “reality”), or, in other words, the relation between “thought” and “object” (or “being”). The property of “being true” thus becomes a general relation between the “sentence of language J” and an associated model M. It is a generalization of the traditional notion of the “agreement of sentences with their objects.” The basic idea of the double relativization of “truth” is expressed in the phrase “the truth of a sentence of language J in model M.” Suszko emphasizes the basic agreement of this notion with the classical concept of truth, which was the basis for the dialectical theory of “reflection.” This allows him to tie the “relativity” of the notion of truth with the development of knowledge. He does so in a very interesting and elegant way. He points out quite rightly that: although the results achieved in formal logic are very valuable for epistemology, they throw little light on the development of knowledge. To my knowledge, there was no systematic study in formal logic which would take into account the developmental aspect of knowledge. If one applies to formal logic the terminology that de Saussure introduced in linguistics, one can say, first, that the formal 1 I will say why we speak about “sentences” and “terms” rather than about “judgments” and “concepts” at the end of the paper.

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research carried out so far is a part of synchronic formal logic, and, second, that no systematic studies were undertaken within the framework of a diachronic formal logic, whose task is to determine the formal logical properties of the evolution of knowledge. (Suszko 1957a, p. 45)

At the same time, he warns that: One may presume that diachronic formal logic cannot be developed in such a way that it would constitute a subdiscipline of formal logic on a par with the synchronic formal logic. Diachronic formal logic is simply an application of the methods of formal logic to the problem of the development of knowledge. As such, it makes an essential use of the tools and results of synchronic formal logic. (p. 45)

Among various models that can be assigned to a language, Suszko distinguishes the sensible model of language, which plays a communicative function among the members of a given social group. Among the various languages, he distinguishes a language that provides the conceptual apparatus for the so-called proper model that is assigned to it, i.e. to the model that is delimited by the sense of the language. Finally, in order to mark the changes among the theorems of the sensible language, he introduces the phrase ‘language J is sensible in circumstances t’. Since he understands circumstances broadly, in particular they include also moments of time, he is thus able to consider the developmental epochs of scientific language and knowledge (1957a, pp. 47-49; 1957b, pp. 34ff). Languages themselves are conceived of in purely syntactical terms, i.e. exclusively in terms of the form of expressions and relations between them. The mention of a model constitutes already a transition to semantic functions of linguistic expressions by appeal to a certain interpretation of these expressions: It turns out quite clearly that the fundamental problems for formal logic are semantic. Of course, the problems of the logical syntax (broadly understood) are closely related to them but as secondary in a sense.

The readers are thus not surprised when they later read: The unique epistemological problems center around the relations between thinking and the object of thinking. From the point of view of formal logic, these relations are manifested as the semantic relations between languages and models. Formal logic is thus an abstract and very specialized (and thus undeniably one-sided) area of the theory of knowledge.” (1957b, pp. 62-63)

Suszko assumes further that “the set of epochs is ordered, i.e. that the relations among its elements are analogical to the relations of ‘smallerthan’ among numbers” (p. 34). He claims that the historical development of science exhibits a certain regularity of linguistic changes, viz. that “the language of a later epoch contains (preserving syntactic category) all the expressions of the language of an earlier epoch” (p. 36). As a result a simi-

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lar regularity governs the changes of models: “Science does not narrow its field of vision during its development; the domains of simple, constant expressions can grow but they do not get smaller” (p. 37). Finally, he distinguishes two kinds of changes. First, there are changes designed to eliminate “mistakes” arising in the epistemic process. They do not have a fundamental creative impact on the distinction of epochs (1957a, p. 50; 1957b, p. 51). Second, there are changes that result from the changes in the “universa” (i.e. those parts of the models which correspond to “objects” or “the world”). They play a decisive role in the rise of new developmental epochs of scientific knowledge since they effect nontrivial changes in the second part of the model, the so-called “characteristic” (which corresponds to “thought” or “knowledge”). This important detail of Suszko’s presentation should be explained in his own words:

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What we talk about in science, i.e. the proper model of the conceptual apparatus of science, constitutes a whole with a determinate ontological structure, which can be determined in terms of the syntactic structure of the conceptual apparatus of science. We must note that a universal model does not exist. In such a model, the universum would be the set of everything and the characteristic would comprise all properties, relations, relations among properties, etc. We know from set theory, that such universal sets do not exist. On the other hand, the syntactical structure of the language is closely related to the structure of the characteristics of its models. . . . It follows that the characteristics of models are not arbitrary sets (of properties, relations, relations among properties, etc.) but depend strictly on the syntactic structure of the appropriate conceptual apparatus. The set of possible syntactic structures of a language is not arbitrarily unlimited, however. These structures fall under a general schema we have previously called “standard formalization,” which precludes the characteristics of models from being too rich. One can say that it is impossible to build a conceptual apparatus for a “model” whose characteristic comprises too many properties, relations, relations among properties, etc.; such a “model” would not be a model.” (p. 38)

We have thus arrived at an abstract but accurate understanding of scientific change. We thus cannot be surprised by the fact that there are cases where a sentence that is true in one model becomes false in another. As a rule, this happens in the cases of nontrivial changes in the universa, i.e. in the case of epoch-making changes. However, since such sentences (false in new models) can be rather easily transformed by relativization (i.e. by the logical conjunction of the antecedents of the claims, i.e. by restricting their scope) into sentences that are true also in the new models, one can say in such cases that these false sentences are partially true in the old models (p. 48). In these terms, one can define eternal truths, i.e. ones that are true in a given epoch and in every later one, as well as enduring sentences, i.e. such sentences that if they are true in a given model then they are also true in every later model. One can further define the “picture

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of the world” as the set of claims accepted by a science in a given epoch, the “perspective of the world” as the deductive system of these claims and, finally, the “actual” knowledge about the world as the true picture of the world in a given epoch whereas the “potential” knowledge about the world as the true perspective of the world in that epoch (p. 42). Tautologies are sentences that are true in every model (1957a, p. 41). Analytic sentences are the sentences generated by the deductive systems based on those sentences that are accepted when the conceptual apparatus of the language of a new epoch is constructed. These are the most important theses of the dialectical theory of truth. They are compatible with the objectivity as well as the relativity of truth, and they have been derived in accordance with the methodological postulates of contemporary science. Before I turn to the detailed analysis of Suszko’s results, it will be useful to add some details that are very important for the analysis. First, consider what Suszko says about universa and models: . . . in science, we never talk about the absolutely whole world. The world in toto is in a sense too big and too complex. It is not a model – it does not constitute a whole which one could talk about in a certain conceptual apparatus (language). Let us introduce some terminology for models M t that occur in the abstract schema of the development of science. Model M t is that layer of the world, which science has reached in epoch t. The world in toto is an objective reality independent of and prior to the cognizing consciousness. The process of cognizing the world involves, first, discerning the layers of the world, which (like the world itself) exist as things in themselves, and, second, transforming them into things for us (Engels) by constructing conceptual apparati appropriate for these layers and by using these conceptual apparati to examine the layers. The layers of the world are quite literally fragments of the world. They are objectively real and independent of as well as prior to consciousness. However, they become the correlates of consciousness in the process of cognizing the world, as they are transformed from things in themselves to things for us. We can infer from our previous discussion that not every fragment of the world (not to mention the absolutely whole world) can become a correlate of consciousness in this fashion. This does not mean, of course, that there exist objects (individual objects, properties, relations, etc.) in the world, which are not part of any layer of the world and which are inaccessible to human knowledge. However, only that only such fragments of the world can become correlates of consciousness (in the sense of the proper model of science), whose structure is not too complex and does not exceed the structural capacities of the conceptual apparati that consciousness is capable of building. The view that there exists a general but strictly determined schema of the syntactic structure of languages is a hypothesis derived from the properties of those formalized languages that are known in formal logic. This hypothesis is confirmed also for the natural language despite the fact its structure is very murky, which is due to secondary (from the point of view of formal logic) factors. (1957b, p. 38f)

Suszko believes special attention is due to the epoch when human beings develop a properly human consciousness linked to the development of

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speech, which has continued to have a great impact on our evolution. In this process of the transformation of an animal into a human being: the fundamental factor that contributed to the development of syntactical framework of language was a certain layer of the world, which one could call the surface of the world. This fragment of the world is the outer environment of the evolutionarily more advanced species. These animals and primitive humans reacted only to that which lay on the surface of the world. The surface of the world is the objective correlate of consciousness of highly organized animals and primitive humans. The ontological structure of this objective correlate is the structure of a model . . . A primitive conceptual apparatus was constructed to fit this model. The syntactic structure of this apparatus is the ontological reflection of the structure of the world surface. (1957b, p. 40)

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I have cited these rather long passages for two reasons. First, they are very interesting. Second, it will be better to have the original statements fresh in our minds in order to avoid misunderstandings. The second issue that requires some clarification concerns the status of the absolute concept of truth in Suszko’s conception. He writes: The absolute concept of truth can be introduced separately relative to every epoch t. In particular, it can be introduced . . . for t = t 0 , i.e. the absolute concept of truth relativized to language J t 0 from the actual epoch t 0 . (1957b, p. 54)

He explains this term thus: Let us note that we can talk about the so-called actual scientific epoch without special and complicated analyses. This is that epoch in the development of science, during which the logician or theoretician of knowledge undertakes her investigation. (p. 53)

Since the way in which Suszko introduces the term ‘absolute truth’ is somewhat convoluted and hard to grasp, I will let myself stray from the line of his presentation and depict the issue in a simplified manner, which nevertheless coincides with the essential points of his discussion.* We sometimes use the so-called “absolute” concepts as shorthand for “relative concepts” some of whose elements are left out but easy to fill in, i.e. these “absolute” concepts are easily replaced by their appropriate relative counterparts. Consider the following illustration from ordinary language. We frequently “absolutize” the terms of a relation. Instead of always speaking properly about the “father of somebody” (where the noun phrase following ‘of’ completes the sense of the term), we often say only “father” as if the term were “absolute” and not “relative.” We are not interested, *

[For purposes of brevity, I have omitted here Wiegner’s adjoinder “bo zgodny z ogólnie przyjętą i, zdaje się, jedynie możliwą w ścisłej nauce metodą”, which translates: “since it follows the generally accepted and, it seems, the only possible method in science.”]

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I think, in emphasizing their relational (i.e. “relative”) character in part because it is obvious and in part because we may not be interested in the missing term. This can be expressed by the following synonymy claim: “the father” is the same as “the father of somebody.” One can suggest similar synonymy claims for some of Suszko’s phrases. The “truth of language J” is the same as “the truth of language J in model M.” Since every model must be relativized to an epoch, it will be most convenient to consider the actual epoch, i.e. the one when the epistemological reflection takes place and whose language contains the language that is the object of this reflection. In Suszko’s words, The language we use when investigating science in epoch t contains the conceptual apparatus J t . This means that all the expressions we use are part of J t and that we use these expressions in accordance with the semantic function those expressions play relative to model M t . I understand this to mean that the semantic function of the expressions of language J t relative to model M t is a narrowing of the (absolute) semantic function those expressions have in our considerations. (1957b, p. 56)

Accordingly, the relation between thus conceived concepts of absolute and relative “truth” can be expressed thus: The absolute concept of truth, which pertains to sentences of language J t , overlaps with the relative concept of truth, which pertains to the sentence of language J t but is relativized to the proper model of language J 0 . Language J 0 is that language in which the semantic study of language J t is conducted and which uses this absolute concept of truth. The relative concept of truth is a relational concept. It represents a certain relation between the sentences of a language and what one talks about in that language. For an epistemologist who uses a relative concept of truth, the language, its sentences as well as its model (i.e. what one talks about in that language) are the objects of consideration. Such an epistemologist is explicitly concerned to study the language as well as the model. He “perceives” the language and its expressions, on the one hand, and the model, on the other, as a certain whole, as it were. He can thus clearly formulate the relations between language and what one talks about in that language. The absolute concept of truth is not a relational concept. It represents a certain property of the sentences of a given language. It is true that the absolute concept of truth is a semantic notion and so pertains in a way to the relation between sentences and what those sentences say. However, if one evaluates the logical value of the sentences of a given language by means of the absolute concept of truth, what the sentences say figures into the evaluation in a different way than in the case of the relative concept of truth. The epistemologist who applies the absolute concept of truth to the sentences of a given language, uses that very language and “sees” the proper model of that language through that very language and – and this is crucial – only through that language. As a result, the epistemologist “sees” the details of the model but he does not “see” it as a whole. This “visibility” is sufficient to evaluate the logical value of sentences of the language in question relative to the model in question on the basis of its “visible” details. This “visibility” is too weak, however, for the relativity to be grasped and explicitly expressed in the concept of truth. This difference between the relative and the absolute concept of truth is responsible for the fact that the

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This last statement by Suszko ends my presentation of his very interesting theory, which brings the Marxist theory of truth to the methodological level of contemporary scientific theories. Let me, however, ask this question. Does this theory correspond to the intentions of the founders of the dialectic? Since these intentions grew out of traditional philosophical concepts, the above question reduces to the question whether Suszko’s theory corresponds to the assumptions and intentions behind the classical theory of “truth” (which is the inspiration for the theory of “reflection”) as well as whether it is epistemologically accurate. As I mentioned, there is no question as to the formal adequacy of Suszko’s theory. The only questions there can be concern its philosophical adequacy. It may be best to begin with the analysis of the relation between these two concepts of truth. As far as the proper philosophical intuitions related to the classical notion of truth are concerned, the superiority of Suszko’s relative concept of truth over the absolute concept of truth speaks against this notion. While one has to agree that some very important claims about the development of science could not be made using his absolute concept of truth, this seems to indicate only that his absolute concept of truth does not correspond to the concept which has been traditionally associated with this term and which is well defined by Twardowski. At the same time, it seems to me that Suszko’s relative concept of truth does not correspond to the dialectical concept of “relative” truth. According to Twardowski’s definition, this latter “relativity” consists in the fact that the logical value of a sentence is considered to be dependent also (and perhaps mainly) on facts that bear no direct relation to the relation of “correspondence” or “reflection” of the object (the correlate of the sentence) which contains knowledge. The logical value of a sentence can thus change when these facts change while the object of knowledge remains constant (and so does the meaning). In Suszko’s theory, however, the relation to the world is the only relevant factor of any epistemic value. The nature of the changes to the logical value of a sentence is thus different in his theory. It has to do with the changes of object (the correlate of a sentence), i.e. with the transition from one layer of the world to the next. The correlation itself within an epoch is, strictly speaking, “absolute” in the traditional sense of the term. Similarly, Suszko’s “absolute” concept of truth is only apparently absolute, i.e. it differs substantially from the traditional notion. The “absolute” concept of truth is after all but shorthand for a default

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relativization to the most convenient model (or world layer). It is not absolute in the sense of excluding the extra-epistemic facts as irrelevant to the logical value of a sentence. I therefore think that it is only appropriate not to use traditional terminology for Suszko’s concepts. Accordingly, I will speak of the “relativized” and “nonrelativized” concept of truth. In this situation, Suszko’s attempt to explicate the dialectical concept of truth can not be considered to be successful. It does not solve the mentioned difficulties, which are due to Hegel’s terminology accepted by Marx and Engels. It seems to me, moreover, that the classical definition of “truth” formulated traditionally as correspondence to reality, contains further intuitions about certain important epistemological distinctions. In this formula, “reality” or “being” is contrasted with “appearances” (in the sense of what is merely apparent) or “illusions” (in the sense of what does not “really” exist). Both these concepts of reality and of appearance are thus rather derivative and “relative” to the extent that they pertain to changeable elements of the world. If my suspicion is right then the “absolute” nature of truth is categorially assumed at the outset. It is related to this fundamental form of being, which one calls “essence.” Suszko’s conception does not take these intuitions into account at all. This is not to say, though, that it could be developed in this way especially since the progress of epochs is related to the transition between “things in themselves” and “things for us.” However, such a development might give rise to further difficulties especially if one asks to what extent the relativized concept of truth is a generalization of the classical concept of truth (which is Suszko’s view). Let me not elaborate on this point, whose consequences are too far-reaching, and rest content with the following remark. Although it is true that “science never talks about the absolutely whole world,” this fact does not have the significance that Suszko takes it to have. It is simply due to the fact that science almost employs sentences that are so concrete that the invocation of the “world in toto” is irrelevant to their relativized truth. On the general epistemological question, one has to say, contrary to Hegel’s remarks, that the definition of “truth” has always been formulated in a decisive way that removed any doubts. While perhaps not “absolutely” the whole world was concerned but something very similar, viz. this “reality” or “being” (which is a high “abstraction”). In other words, traditional conceptions of truth exclude the possibility of “closing” the object of knowledge, as it were, in such a way that it could be compared as a ready-made product (the result of the scientific achievements to date) with knowledge itself, for example, to ascertain the accuracy of the “reflection” of that object. It is thus also impossible to

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speak about “partial truth” in the Marxist sense. I touch here on a fundamental issue that appears to have escaped the attention of epistemologists. It thus seems that the concept of “relativized truth” cannot take the place of the traditional dialectical “relative truth”; Suszko’s attempt fails. This does not imply that this conception has no value for scientific methodology. A good indication of that is the substitution of the following for Suszko’s formula: “a sentence of language J verified [sprawdzone] in model M in epoch t,” i.e. in “the world layer known in epoch t.” This formulation sounds better than the one where ‘true’ is used. As far as the actual epoch and the notion of “absolute” truth, which is related to it, are concerned, it suffices to consider the present time and use ‘has been verified’ to obtain an entirely understandable and sensible text. These formulations must be made even more precise by the consideration of the following fact. I have in mind here the fact that the result of verification of sentences in empirical sciences is not their truth but their justification, which is sometimes expressed in terms of their being “accepted as true.” One can speak about truth only in case where one proves it. And this is possible only in the formal sciences, which use a formalized language that supports syntactic or semantic proofs. It is obvious that this is not the case in the empirical sciences. Suszko appears not to take note of this fact and somewhat hastily (perhaps inadvertently) unifies the two types of sciences.2 This is also indicated by the fact that he considers even formal logic to be an area of theory of knowledge even though he realizes that it is possible to study only the formal relations among the sentences irrespective of their epistemic value, i.e. as a kind of “make-belief,” as it were. For it is hard to believe that he would consider strictly inferential relations (which themselves are sometimes the object of study) as something similar to the layers of the world. I have to admit that this view just does not make any sense to me. Suszko himself distinguishes two methodological phrases: “accepting a sentence” as legitimate and “accepting a sentence” as true, which need not accompany the former, as he notes several times, e.g. when he ascertains that the set of all claims about a model of a given epoch evolves in the direction of the set of all true claims in this model (Suszko 1957a, p. 51). The cause of this disparity, it seems to me, lies in the fact that methodologists notoriously use the term ‘accept’ without specifying further whether only the so-called scientific legitimacy is concerned or whether also the epistemic value is at stake. This shows 2 On this interpretation, W. Biegański (1910) is Suszko’s predecessor. He defines “truth” as agreement with principles, which form the ground for its expression (p. 211). On the other hand, Suszko’s influence is clearly marked in W. Mejbaum’s (1960, p. 350) definition of “being true” as an approximate reflection of a certain fragment of reality.

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that the problem of “relative truth” under discussion is closely tied to general problems of knowledge and science. Suszko’s account is still under a strong influence of the traditional conception of science as a set of sentences that are accepted or true. However, while this view is very well suited for the deductive method of the formal sciences (the so-called meta-linguistic system theory), it is fruitless in the methodology of the empirical sciences. And so, in his discussion, Suszko was forced to retreat from this narrow platform of study and consider the so-called pragmatic problems of science. In undertaking these problems, he treated science as totality of creative research operations and activities that lead to the formulation of claims or truths. It seems to me that, in the methodology of the empirical sciences, precisely this pragmatic position is fruitful and called for. Suszko’s work provides a lot of such pragmatic material, albeit not always intentionally. According to Marxist epistemology, the world is the objective correlate of our subjective cognitive processes: of judgments and concepts as the highest forms, and of impressions and ideas as the lowest forms. Since this correlate is usually identified as the “object” of knowledge, I should call attention to the fact that such a use of this term, though popular among philosophers, is in fact incompatible with the usual traditional understanding of the term, which is based on an ordinary understanding of the term ‘sentence’ or ‘judgment’. On this ordinary understanding, the object of knowledge (e.g. the object of an explanation) is what corresponds to the subject of a sentence (or judgment), which expresses the knowledge (explanation). For example, the discovery of Neptune by Leverrier is not considered to be a contribution to our knowledge of this planet, but a supplementary contribution to our knowledge of the planetary system, as I have already indicated in (1925, p. 29). As a result of this distribution speaking about knowing laws or regularities becomes ambiguous. It can mean either the “reflection” of the regularities or the inclusion to a broader regularity (or the subsumption under more general laws). It is clear that these two meanings cannot be confused since they lead to different consequences. For example, on the second interpretation, one cannot speak about knowing as a “reflection” of regularities – not in the sense in which this term is used in Marxist epistemology, and so also in Suszko’s theory, unless of course one suitably changes the meaning of the term in question. Suszko never explicates the concept of “knowledge/cognition”* but one can conjecture that he understands it semanti*

The English reader should bear in mind that the term ‘poznanie’ in Polish, which is the exact equivalent to the German ‘Erkenntnis’ has just such a dual meaning – it can stand for cognition or the processes of acquiring knowledge (which is what Wiegner calls the

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cally as “a set of sentences reflecting the object world” and pragmatically as “a set of processes leading to the above result.” It is in any case his intention, I believe, to connect the term ‘knowledge’ with the term ‘sentence’ since he has adopted the latter as fundamental for his theory. Let us turn now to the question why logicians and epistemologists nowadays tend not to use the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘concept’, and instead use the terms ‘sentence’ and ‘name’. One of the reasons for this terminological change was the need to avoid the error of so-called psychologism, i.e. a mistaken psychological approach to the subjectmatter. For the allow minds, this changed involved the threat of the error of grammaticalism, but the possibility of this error is small because of clear enough differences in the subject-matter, on the one hand, and because of the fact that such errors are not as dangerous to the epistemologist as the errors of psychologism. Another reason for this change was due to the fact that sentences and names are directly and easily graspable, whereas judgments and concepts, which have been alleged to be introspectively given, have been shown by the history of psychology to be very difficult to grasp and as such subject to multifarious interpretations. These rather technical reasons can be supplemented with a more fundamental argument. I consider the view that the so-called judgments and concepts (which are the bases of thinking and cognitive processes) are given directly in introspection to be one of the strongest illusions, which has been the source of a multitude of errors. I believe that theses processes are hypothetical constructions designed to explain the directly given facts of human behavior, in particular of human language communication. I then consider these alleged mental processes to be precisely inaccessible through introspective observation. This is the primary reason why traditional psychology has not brought anything new to what was previously known in traditional logic. It is clear, however, that the relation of these and other processes (such as e.g. decisions, or motive choices) with human behavior is not simple or easy to grasp formally, especially in view of the impact of the social determination of human speech and of the customs of social groups. I consider such an approach to these problems very fruitful and extremely liberating. After all one of the upshots of this approach is that the division between the soul and matter finally dissipates because what disappears is the barrier in the form of some “ideal” more or less Platonic objects, which has divided theses domains for centuries. This view does not stand in the way of the dialectical theory of “reflection” or “pragmatic” interpretation) as well as for the product of such processes (which is what Wiegner calls the “semantic” interpretation).

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“mirroring.” To the contrary, it actually helps since it serves to explain what the so-called “ideal side” of thinking and cognitive processes is, which despite declarations to the contrary could not be understood. As far as the danger of grammaticalism is concerned, which is alleged to bring with it the threat of naive and ominous nominalism, I consider the danger to be first of all exaggerated. Second, it results from a historical misunderstanding – from taking the word of its enemies naively at face value. I am surprised that contemporary philosophers have seriously considered the objection that nominalism is necessarily committed to the infamous view that the essence of general terms is flatus vocis. For only someone who is mentally blind would not recognize the fact that such terms do have meaning. One can only understand what happened by appeal to the fact that the destruction of many textual sources has deprived the sympathizers of nominalism of the ultimate weapon and has allowed its enemies to misrepresent the proper sense of the nominalistic theses. This issue is not trivial, in my view, for the following reason. While the ontological relation between the world and language (ratio essendi) is not simple or easy to decipher, it suffices to allow for the reverse inference from the structure and properties of language to the structure and properties of the world (ratio cognoscendi). Although some Marxist epistemologists do not want to accept this view (see Schaff 1960, Part II, Chapter VI, esp. sections 2 and 3), I do not see any convincing arguments against it. As can be seen from the quotes I have cited, Suszko too accepts such an attitude as admissible and employs it for his purposes very well. It seems to me that the opposite view of some Marxists consists simply in the failure to distinguish the two relations mentioned above as the grounds for inference. As far as Suszko’s theory is concerned, still other details can be developed and used in the construction of pragmatic epistemology especially when taking into account the developmental aspect of science. Consider the following detail as an example. Traditional empiricism uses the concept of the “directly given” as the foundation of scientific knowledge, i.e. as the source of both the first problems as well as the first statements necessary for the construction of the rest of the system. If we free this conception from the burden of the idealistic tradition and use, for example, Suszko’s notion of a “world layer” interpreting it as a “model of an epoch,” we will be able to relativize this empiricist notion to an epoch. In this way, we will be able to take advantage of its undeniable epistemological virtues as well as to explain the fact that the content of this notion constantly changes, which is incompatible with the absolutist understanding of this notion. A stark example of such a change is the mentioned difference of my view on judgments and concepts as not

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directly given in introspection contrary to what is usually alleged. This understanding of the concept of the given becomes useful even in the dialectical theory of knowledge as it contributes to its development. It is possible that further details of Suszko’s theory could be developed in a similar way.

ON ABSTRACTION AND CONCRETIZATION (1960) That abstraction belongs to the fundamental and most important cognitive operations a human is capable of is not denied by the great majority of methodologists. Only vulgar empiricists do not want to recognize its incredible role in human knowledge. On the other hand, however, one hears many voices warning against its excessive use and even voices directly indicating the error of “abstraction” in the name of the concrete character of truth. It seems therefore worthwhile to subject the issue to a closer analysis. The term ‘abstraction’ sometimes refers to a certain cognitive operation and other times to its product. It might be thought that it is fitting to call such a product “an abstract” were it not for the fact that this term has been quite commonly used to speak about the ontological hypostasis of this product, i.e. as a name for a certain kind of “abstracted” objects. I will therefore avoid using this term when thinking about the product of abstraction as such, i.e. about something that may correspond to certain objects but is not identical with them. One also needs to consider the question of “generalization,” which is associated with “abstraction.” This is especially important since this is where the analysis of cognitive operations is closely tied with logic, which is often forgotten about while the pride of place is given to psychology. W. Witwicki (Psychologia, vol. I, Chapter XII, section 2) describes how, by comparing objects and ascertaining similarities between them, we distinguish their common properties and carry out an “analysis” of these objects into their thought components. We then “think” about such components “in separation” and contrast them to the perceived wholes. He calls this whole process “abstraction.” One can consider this to be a typical and accurate psychological explanation but it falls short of what a logician expects, viz. the explanation of the logical side of this operation. The whole issue consists in trying to understand what exactly is meant by “to think about the common properties of the objects in separation.” Does it mean to say that I am thinking them as ontologically separate real things

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 137-143. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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popularly called “abstracts”? Or does it merely mean that only those common properties “are taken into account” or considered in further investigation? The latter position does not prejudge whether they exist separately and independently of object wholes that really exist in experience. It is quite compatible with the contrary view. According to common sense, we should adopt the second position since the first leads directly to idealism of a Platonic or Aristotelian type, i.e. to the realist conception of universals (conceptual realism). This conception relies on the confusion of the expression “I only have this in mind” with “I think about this as existing in separation from the rest,” or, alternatively, on the confusion of the expression “I think only that something is such and such” with the expression “I think that something is such and such and nothing else.” The semantic difference between these two expressions is rather clear and does not require further explication. When it is obscured, however, the process of abstraction is wrongly interpreted and the consequences are far-reaching. The above explanation of the process of abstraction as an operation that restricts the contents of thought from a psychological side only and does not lead to an ontological interpretation of this restriction (indeed is quite compatible with its rejection), coincides very well with the linguistic reflection of the process of abstraction. It usually consists in a simple deletion of certain descriptions and not in an addition of claims, which would have to be the case under an ontological interpretation of abstraction. At the same time, the remaining thought wholes are generalized; this is what the positive side of “abstraction” (breaking apart) consists in. If I generalize the term ‘white human being’, for example, to the term ‘human being’, I abstract from (break apart) the property of skin color, which is not significant for me at this time and which, consequently, ought not to be considered. As a result, also the scope of my thoughts changes, of course. I do not want, however, to deal with a “handicapped” human being, a being without skin or its color, as those who believe in the existence of universals would have us believe. Similarly, if I do not take into account temporal properties of things, for example, the fact that things change, this does not mean that I will deal with some atemporal or unchangeable objects but only that I restrict myself to the analysis of the general relation of an object having a property where the time variable plays no role. Just this abstraction takes place in formal logic but this does not mean it thereby becomes a static theory of the universe. I am inclined to consider the law of addition, for example in the form “every S is S or P,” as the symbol for thus conceived abstraction, where the disjunction reflects the fact that the object of thought is ontologically boundless, unharmed by the processes of abstraction.

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I will use the term “idealization” for the erroneous ontological understanding of abstraction. I will thus contrast idealization with abstraction proper, where not taking into account some properties does not imply the annihilation of those properties in objects. One could object that even if it were true that idealization is neither abstraction proper nor is it correct (since it gives rise to idealism), still the fact that science uses it, for example, in the construction of the concepts of geometry or of some concepts of physics (e.g. the concept of a mathematical pendulum), indicates that this operation is indispensable or at least useful in certain cases. In my view, this is a misunderstanding. One cannot deny that formulations such as “there is one and only one straight line through any two points on a plane” or “two straight lines on a plane either do not have any points in common or have exactly one point in common” suggest thoughts about some spatial objects possessing only one or only two dimensions or even none. One cannot deny that these geometrical theorems appear obvious under such an idealization of spatial objects. However, nothing stands in the way of taking this interpretation to be unnecessary and undesirable if there are other reasons (for example, the question of logical adequacy and consistency with other claims), which suggest that the content of the claims is more complex and problematic. Moreover, it is possible to interpret the relevant terms in such a way that the idealization becomes spurious and unacceptable. Thus, for example, we can understand a “point” to be every object, whose actual spatial dimensions we disregard, paying attention solely to the fact that it can possess them; we can understand a “straight line” to be every object, where we only pay attention to its possession of one dimension and to its property of containing “points”; we can understand a “plane” to be every object, where we only pay attention to its two spatial dimensions and to its property of containing such objects as “points” or “straight lines.” The resultant formulation will be admittedly complex and didactically useless. However, such vices are irrelevant when we are concerned with fundamental questions which can only be decided with view to formal adequacy. From a materialist standpoint, only such an interpretation of abstraction is admissible which distinguishes it from idealization. Only so understood abstraction can have the epistemological significance ascribed to it by some methodologies. K. Twardowski (1924) tries to rescue idealization as an operation that is essential in the formation of concepts by appeal to the distinction between “judgments thought” and judgments actually issued. According to this theory, we do not really deny objects their spatial properties, for example, when forming geometrical concepts. Rather, we deny objects those properties “only in thought” by means of “thought judgments.” I do

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not believe, however, that this distinction will help us to understand the issue. If these “thought judgments” really are just “thoughts of judgments” then it is impossible to understand how they can play a constructive role in the formation of concepts. If, on the other hand, they do play such a constructive role, nothing will save us from the idealistic hypotheses deftly masked by such distinctions. Twardowski’s attempt to rescue idealization is thus ineffective. It is necessary to consider idealization to be forbidden for general formal and foundational reasons. This is not to suggest that one may not use expressions suggesting it for didactic and psychological reasons as long as one is conscious of their character as merely shorthand. Analogously, it is admissible to use metaphorical expressions as long as one is conscious of their character as metaphors. What contributes to idealization, i.e. to the ontological absolutization of abstracts, is the fact that our language has separate terms (the so-called abstract names) that suggest the separate existence of such objects as whiteness, heaviness, similarity, fatherhood, etc. These names differ fundamentally from the concrete common names since, in an elementary sentential function, they cannot be substituted for the predicate variable but only for the subject variable. In this way, they resemble proper names, which possess neither content nor scope in the usual sense. It is their functioning in the role of the subject of a sentence that suggests the function of naming or referring to real objects, viz. the alleged abstracts. It must be admitted that nobody has so far been able to describe the semantic role of these names of properties and relations in a sufficiently clear and precise way. Nevertheless, one instinctively feels that the idealizational understanding of the designata of such names is inadmissible and that they stand for high-order abstractions from certain objective sensible wholes encountered in experience and ordinary life. It is my impression that such abstractions are similar to the sorts of abstractions that numbers involve. Since “concretization” is the converse of “abstraction,” it would have to consist in the transition from the more general to the more particular names. However, I will not consider such an operation since one cannot associate it with the postulate of the “concreteness of truth.” “Abstraction” in the above sense cannot lead to error and is always admissible as long as one remembers that the conclusions based on it do not exhaust reality. When one speaks about an erroneous “separation” (“breaking-apart”) on the grounds that truth is always concrete, one must have in mind not the simple disregarding of certain properties, but rather a disregarding where to ignore the properties is to falsify reality, as we saw in idealization. This happens always in cases when the ignored terms constitute an essential part of the reflection of reality — in particular in the cases of ignoring the terms of a relation, for example. I have in mind cases where a term of a

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relation is absolutized by separating it from other terms and treating it as an independent element of reality. An example here is the construction of the concept “father as such,” i.e. such a father who is nobody’s father. The intermediate term is the concept “somebody’s father,” where ‘somebody’s’ plays the role of the name variable and is later forgotten. The result is that the property of “fatherhood” is absolutized and understood as the property of “whiteness,” for example. In the case of a lot of the so-called relative terms, we are no longer aware of their relational origin. Consider, for example, the term ‘weight’. Originally, ‘heavy’ meant the same as ‘more heavy than usual’ (‘of greater weight than usual’). Since physics accepted weight to be a general property of matter, nothing stood in the way of considering it to be an absolute property. [ . . . ]* In any event, it seems right to me to think that that terms such as “teacher” are shorthand for complex terms such as, for example, “Peter’s teacher,” where ‘Peter’s’ is first replaced by ‘somebody’s’ which is then separated off entirely giving rise to the absolutization of the first term of the relation. It should be noted here that the similarity of this linguistic operation to what we do in real abstraction magnifies the illusion of its correctness. Corrections are not difficult in concrete ordinary cases; they are more difficult when philosophical concepts are concerned. Here one takes, for example, the “reflection” of reality to be the essence of “knowledge.” However one uses the term ‘reflection’ both as a synonym for the relation of “reflecting” and as a synonym for the second term of this relation, viz. “knowledge.” In the latter case, knowledge is easily absolutized, when we transfer onto it the properties of the relation, e.g. its invariability. In the former case, on the other hand, we approach epistemological relativism, when we transfer the variability of the reflected “copy” onto the very relation of reflection. In such cases, it is quite in order to hear the admonition that we must return to concrete reality (where the term of a relation can never be separated off from the relation) and that only those sentences are true that do not rely on such “abstraction.” It is only in such cases that the postulate of “concretization,” which forbids similarly incorrect “separations,” is appropriate. Such inadmissible “abstraction” is particularly dangerous in the social sciences since it leads to the fetishization of concepts. How often the term ‘development’, in relation to a particular element of culture, comes to mean an almost automatic course of changes *

[Omitted from the main text is the following sentence, which makes a linguistic point about some Polish words that does not transfer to English: “Similarly, we seem to have lost the awareness of the relativity of such terms as ‘góra’ [Eng.: hill] and ‘dolina’ [Eng.: valley], which seem to derive from ‘górować’ [Eng.: to be greater than] and ‘dołować’ [Eng.: to be smaller than].”]

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that take place independently of human participation, in fact almost as if beside it. One encounters this view even in relation to the logical transformation of concepts — as if it were not human beings who construct concepts to aid their work. The so-called “economism” in sociology appears to consist in just such an absolutization of economic concepts. In economics, it is especially easy to forget that, for example, [the concept of] a “commodity” makes sense only in terms of highly complex relations and actions of humans. The laws pertaining to commodities are first and foremost laws pertaining to such relations and actions. The “concretization” slogan rightly reminds us that such separations are inadmissible and that they need to be corrected. In practice, the “concretization” postulate is used also in other cases that are only indirectly related to abstraction. If someone goes beyond his abstractions, he should not be surprised that he finds discrepancies when he returns to reality. What is at fault here is not abstraction but the failure to keep to its terms. This is related to the following type of “forgetting” or “disregarding.” When a given phenomenon depends on a number of conditions, some of which usually undergo only very small changes, it is often the case that one disregards them and treats such a phenomenon as depending exclusively on those conditions that undergo striking changes. For example, one frequently forgets about such a constant factor as geographical position and does not take into account its impact on cultural processes. One should also remember that phrases such as “the price of a commodity depends on its supply” do not provide all sufficient conditions for a given phenomenon. In other words, the above phrase does not mean “the price of a commodity depends solely on its supply.” But such phrases are frequently misunderstood in just this fashion, which leads to erroneous methodological inferences. Hegel’s doctrine of “changeable truth” has its source in just such a “forgetting” or faulty “abstraction.” To justify it, it is frequently pointed out that there are examples of sentences, which have been considered to be truths at a certain period of time and have, in the course of events, been “outdistanced” and turned out to be false. The most frequent examples here are generalities or programmatic theses that are not relative to time or place but provide only “abstract” prescriptions and claims of the “truth must win” kind. Upon registering the sentence, shallow minds do not supplement it with the vast content implicit in this sentence, without which it is merely a set of sounds devoid of any sense. Similarly, the sentence “it rains” does not have any sense unless one considers the situation in which it was uttered. Whoever takes such a naive sentence as a full-blooded statement may indeed fall prey to the illusion that “this same” sentence changes its truth-value if the circumstances change, i.e. that this is a case of “variable truth.” In fact, however, we

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have here not “this same” sentence but different claims which do not contradict one another since their sense is fundamentally different. However, this is evident not in what is explicitly said but in what is implicitly assumed. One must not, of course, treat such linguistic omissions as abstractions in the proper sense of the term and treat such shorthand utterances as sensible and methodologically acceptable statements. These cases merit special attention due to the hundred years long debate about the “variability” of truth. It has to be pointed out that the proponents of this theory have never conducted proper semantic analyses or have never cared about precision — as if the sense of expressions in a living language was unchangeable and determined for all times. In fact, a peculiar semantic formalism is revealed by the view about the full meaning of the above mentioned shorthand utterances. According to it, the concrete situation of the speaker (especially the time and the place) is not an integral part of ordinary expressions. Ordinary sentences can be already considered to be statements without the consultation of external factors, which cannot be the determinants of the sense of sentences, on this view. Again, speaking about “abstraction” here is misleading and can only lead to errors. The only treatment is to remember that “truth is always concrete.” It is worth noting in the end that sometimes the phrase “truth is always concrete” speaks not so much about “truth” in the proper sense of the word but simply about reality. In such cases, we should remember that “reality is always concrete.” 1

1

Professor Kokoszyńska has kindly noted that I should also explain the so-called concrete abstraction, which plays an important role in Marxist methodology. If I understand the relevant remarks of dialectical materialists, their theory is concerned primarily with the epistemic role of this phenomenon, which falls beyond the scope of this paper. From a formal point of view, I do not see any difference between the instances of this method and ones that are not so called but are part of the scientific practice. In my view, these cases occur in the complex situation when we are dealing with the terms of many relations, where some are more and others less epistemically important. In such cases, there is a tendency to absolutize the latter, i.e. to (impermissibly) separate them off from the remaining terms. This is particularly clear in the social sciences, in particular economics, with respect to such concepts as, for example, commodity, value, class, etc. This concrete abstraction is simply “the grasping (or distinguishing) of the concrete,” i.e. taking into account the totality of relations. Incidentally, contemporary methodology calls this the “relativization” of concepts. Of course, abstraction in our normal sense also takes place here: certain relative properties are “disregarded” as insignificant for a given consideration. As far as the mentioned absolutization of the complex concepts is concerned, it constitutes the logical basis for the phenomenon of so-called “alienation.”

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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

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ON THE NATURE OF MENTAL PHENOMENA (1933)

I. The Essence of Something 1. Conceptual Analysis [ . . . ]* Expressions such as ‘the essence of something’ are popular and typical of traditional metaphysics. One should therefore look for their clarification in the textbooks of traditional, in particular scholastic, logic and methodology. Unfortunately, the only clear formulation one can find can be expressed thus: the essence of something is constituted by all features that are essential to it and by only such features. If dissatisfied with this obvious tautology we try to look further for clear and precise criteria of the essentiality of features and for a clear and precise understanding of the relation between the division into essential and inessential features, on the one hand, and the distinctions between necessary and accidental features, general and individual features, basic *

[The Polish term ‘istota’, as the German ‘Wesen’, has two meanings. It can signify either a being (especially a human being or a person) or the essence (or nature) of something. The first paragraph clarifies the relation between these two senses. It has not been included in the main text because that relation is not apparent in English:] “The term ‘istota’ is frequently used to signify living organisms, especially those who possess a soul, i.e. human beings. The term will not appear in this semantically independent role in this monograph, however. I will only concern myself with the nature (‘istota’) of something, i.e. with something relative whose expression requires another name in its complement. It may be that there is a connection between these two senses of the term. (Footnote: This possibility is clear in particular in Kant, who uses the term ‘Wesen’ almost exclusively in the absolute sense, see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, e.g. pp. 480ff, 614 and 620 of the first edition.) It could be understood in the following way: A being (signified by the term ‘istota’ in the absolute sense) is something that has such and such an essence (signified by the term ‘istota’ in the relative sense). I will not belabor this point any further since it is of no significance for the task at hand and will venture into a conceptual analysis of the expression ‘the essence of something’.”

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 147-189. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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and derivative features, etc., on the other, we will search in vain. We will find only ambiguous and vague answers of which one cannot make the least bit of sense even with the best will. One can, however, focus on the following popular and probably the clearest formula: The essential features of a thing are those and only those features without which the thing in question would not be what it is. The formula could be made more precise as follows: Feature c of an object P is an essential feature of that object if and only if from the fact that an object X does not possess feature c, it follows that X is not P. The implication contained in the antecedent of this conditional is equivalent to the following implication: if X is P then X has c. In other words, that an object X possesses feature c is a necessary condition of X’s being P. One is thus led to the thought that the so-called necessary features of an object P are simply those features, the possession of which by an object X is a necessary condition of X’s being P. Similarly, one could think that the socalled essential features of an object P are simply its necessary features. I believe, however, that this equation of the concept of necessary features with the concept of essential features does not fit the conceptual intentions of those who use the term ‘the essence of something’. They certainly also think that the essential features of an object X include also those features the possession of which is sufficient for X’s being P. Such features could be called basic features of object P.* One could thus propose the following analytic definition: the essential features of an object are all and only basic and necessary features of that object. Since those and only those features of an object denoted by a general name 1 are present in the definition of that name, essential features of an object are simply those features that define the [general] name of that object. Further support and development of this result is supplied by the analysis of equivalences by T. Kotarbiński (1929). On pp. 36f, he lists five cases of acceptable (in positive science) use of expressions containing the word ‘essence’ or ‘essential’: 1. ‘The essence of X’ means the same as ‘the meaning of the term “X”’. 2. ‘Features essential to an issue’ means the same as ‘features significant to an issue’, or 3. ‘features of special significance to an issue’. *

[This appears to be a suggested explication of one side of the distinction between basic and derivative features Wiegner alludes to earlier.]

1

A general name is a name that has content and an extension in contrast to proper names.

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4. ‘Features essential for the elements of a domain’ means the same as ‘features, on the basis of which one can discover the greatest number of important and characteristic truths for the domain in question’. 5. ‘Features essential to the extension of a name’ means the same as ‘features connoted by that name’, i.e. ‘features constituting its connotation’. Equivalence (5) is identical with equivalence (1). First, it is clear that ‘X’ mentioned in (1) must be a name and that ‘extension of name N’ means the same as ‘all and only Ns’. Second, according to the most accepted view in logic ‘connotation of a name’ is the same as ‘its meaning’. Since the meaning of a name is given in its definition, the equivalence (1), respectively (5), leads to the thought laid out above that ‘essential features of an object’ are simply ‘features defining the name of that object’. At first sight, it may appear that there is no connection between the meaning of the term ‘essential’ in (1) or (4), on the one hand, and (2) or (3), on the other. This is because the latter appear to have a distinctive teleological character absent from the former. But this is a mistake. Defining, like any conscious human activity, must also fulfill a certain purpose. That purpose determines which features are included in the definition of names and, likewise, the character of the definition. Equivalence (1) exemplifies a definition which plays a communicational role determined by particular circumstances. Such definitions are useful when, for example, two people conversing with one another settle on the meaning of the names used in the conversation exclusively to enable mutual understanding and to prevent misunderstandings. It is clear, however, that such definitions can only be a provisional starting point in scientific endeavors and that, for this reason, they are not involved in determining the nature or essence of something. Here also one can speak of a certain significance of features taken into account in such definitions, so equivalence (2) holds as well. But this significance does not pertain to the subject-matter at hand and so, practically speaking, it does not concern a scientist. Hence the appearance that such definitions are not teleological in character. At the same time, however, it becomes evident that one ought to look for the analytically proper sense of the expression ‘the essence of something’ and ‘the essential feature of something’ precisely in equivalence (3), and even better in (4), which could be understood in terms of listing the significance of features relative to special goals of scientific enterprise.

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2. Definition and Theory

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Further clarifications are necessary. According to equivalence (4), the criterion of essential features of an object lies in the possibility of discerning on its basis further features that are important and characteristic of the extension of name of that object. It is clear that the character of this process of discerning will be different depending on how one understands this importance and uniqueness of discerned features, even though its formal character will always be the same, viz. deductive. I will distinguish recognitive (diagnostic) discerning based on so-called diagnostic definitions from cognitive discerning based on theoretical definitions. In the first case, from the fact that an object possesses evident features easily accessible to perception, one infers that the object possesses certain hidden features not as easily accessible to perception. The relation between these two types of features need not be necessary, so the inference has a pragmatic character and is admissible only relative to certain practical needs. In the second case, one begins not with features immediately given but with features constituting the so-called “inner” structure of an object. One then infers what immediately given (and so “external”) features an object has. The relation here is necessary and so the inference is admissible without restrictions in the whole domain of objects. It is easily seen that the distinction between diagnostic and theoretical definitions given above corresponds to, for example, the distinction between artificial and natural classification.2 This suffices to explain why the analytically proper sense of the words ‘essential feature of something’ must be found in cognitive discerning, so that the meaning of ‘the essence of a thing’ will only be given by a theoretical definition of the name of that thing. I have said that definitions of names that capture the essence of something are theoretical definitions. This claim is too broad, however, since not all theories can be the basis of cognitive discerning as I have characterized it above. In the formal sciences, for example, there is no distinction between those features that are immediately given and those that are not. So, in those sciences, there is no cognitive discerning in the above sense, although these sciences are, of course, creative.3 The same is true in the case of sciences of a purely phenomenological nature, such as e.g. pure thermodynamics, which does not employ the hypothesis about the molecular structure of matter or the definition that ‘heat’ is the same as 2

The epistemic significance of natural classifications is also emphasized by Metallmann (1928). 3 The creative character of definitions in formal sciences is discussed extensively by L. Chwistek (1923), esp. pp. 179ff.

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‘kinetic energy of molecules’. Here too there is no distinction between features that are immediately given and those that are not, though there is systematization. It is only where a theory depends on hypotheses concerning the “inner” structure of objects, i.e. on so-called explanations, that cognitive discerning is possible. It is only there that the essence of something can be captured in a definition.4 Although positivists held that to admit such hypotheses in science is to pollute its purely empirical character with nonempirical (metaphysical) claims that carry little or indeed no scientific value, I believe that D. Sztejnbarg has convincingly shown that this position (which is incidentally rather unclear and full of misunderstandings) is groundless and that it is precisely the positivist postulate to eliminate such hypotheses from science that deserves to be so eliminated from the methodology of the sciences.5 Moreover, it seems to me that the distinction of purely phenomenological theories which only systematize phenomena from explanatory theories is not fundamental enough from an epistemological point of view. It concerns only a particular stage of the development of a science. After all, comparative history of science indicates clearly that the former are characteristic of initial stages of science and are preparatory for the latter, and that only methodical difficulties cause a longer detainment of a science in this first phase.6 Furthermore, there exist theories, such as, for example, Einstein’s theory of relativity or the paradoxical quantum theory, where it is impossible to distinguish description from explanation. And yet, those theories allowed physics to cross its traditional cognitive boundaries and to incorporate issues and problems that have until then been widely regarded as the proper concern of philosophy — because of its concern with general ontological issues as well as its formal methodological character. In these sciences at the boundaries of scientific knowledge, the distinction between the two kinds of theories becomes 4

I have first explored the role of explanations in constructing theoretical definitions in (1930), see footnote on p. 13, reprint: p. 281. 5 Sztejnbarg (1929), p. 92. Although the author is concerned only with natural sciences, I do not see any obstacles to generalizing the conclusions of her analysis to science in general. The author distinguishes the “explanation of phenomena” from the “explanation of laws.” I confess that I have not encountered such terminology. It seems more natural to me to speak about the difference between a recognitive and cognitive explanation depending on whether it pertains to an individual fact or to the phenomenon as a whole. I should also mention that those explanations in which dispositional concepts pertaining only to the “external behavior” of things are replaced by concepts pertaining to the actual properties of their “inner structure” are of special importance from an epistemological point of view. (Such replacements are discussed in R. Carnap 1932b, p. 331.) 6 This view coincides with K. Lewin’s (1926) position; see in particular p. 83.

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senseless. I believe therefore that the identification of definitions that express the essence of something with theoretical definitions is not as misleading as it might appear at first sight. It might be worthwhile to use the term ‘structural definitions’ as a reminder of the special character of these definitions. 3. Structural Definitions and Science

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It is worthwhile to consider the significance of these definitions for science from a formal point of view. They enable not only the systematization of certain specialized research areas, but also a formal reduction of whole scientific divisions and even of whole sciences to other divisions or sciences. The explanatory hypotheses of one theory are revealed as special cases of more general laws, which become thereby inferential reasons for the main laws of that theory. For example, the definition that ‘light’ is the same as ‘periodic perturbations (so-called waves) of the electromagnetic field with such and such specific properties’ reduces optics to the more general theoretical division, i.e. electromagnetism. Structural definitions of the quantum theory and general relativity theory lead toward subsuming the whole domain of physical phenomena under the laws of electromagnetism. Similarly, there is a trend toward showing, by means of appropriate structural definitions, that the laws of chemistry are special cases of certain general laws of physics. Physiologists and biologists in their turn try to formally reduce life to physico-chemical phenomena. There is a clear and indisputable connection here between these tendencies and the so-called monistic needs of the human mind even if the latter remain not properly explained from an epistemological point of view. Scientists strive toward the creation of one general science unifying the multitude of sciences that arose from a purely practical need for division of labor. The use of structural definitions makes possible one systematically uniform theory encompassing the whole universe of phenomena accessible to rational categories.7 7

This idea is taken up in the so-called constitutive system of concepts by R. Carnap in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). A number of fundamental details as well as the general way of carrying out the idea raise doubts. On many important issues, I prefer O. Neurath’s program of Einheitswissenschaft and its Einheitssprache which has ties with the behaviorist position. (See his 1931/32, esp. the first two sections.) Carnap changed his views under Neurath’s influence, which is clear in (1932a) and (1932b). See also the whole interesting discussion on this “Einheitswissenschaft” in volumes 2 and 3 of Erkenntnis. It shows clearly the direction for the new epistemology but, at the same time, it indicates the difficulties in attempts to understand this development by specialized research scientists brought up in traditional philosophical terminology and the usual language of their

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Perhaps the intuitive grasp of the enormous epistemic significance of structural definitions was at the basis of the well-known but unclear distinction between nominal and real definitions in scholastic logic. After all, the latter were considered to be tightly related to attempts to understand the essence of things. But other motives were involved as well. One of such motives was a confusion of the concept of the essence of something with the concept of the essential meaning of the name of something, i.e. a confusion between a structural and an analytic definition. An analytic definition states that a term is used in a given domain of everyday life (primarily) with a meaning captured by the definition. The meaning is called essential (though it would be more fitting to call it “proper”) with reference to the domain of everyday life in question. It is research. This is indeed one of the reasons for my writing this monograph. It aims to give psychologists a quick and easy orientation in the whole problem using the traditional language of this science. I will refrain from giving any fundamental epistemological explanations, which will have to wait for future papers, and will rest content with some general remarks on analogies used. Incidentally, Chapter IV shows that a proper understanding of the assumptions of the new epistemology requires the solution of a number of problems related to the nature of mental phenomena. I should also mention that the basic ideas of a “Gesamtwissenschaft” are contained in a largely underestimated and ignored epistemology of R. Avenarius, presented in his Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (esp. in vol. II, Chapters 5-8). He holds that, under normal conditions, science develops in such a way as to reach a heterotetic minimum. In any case, it seems true to say that theoretical constructions of such “Gesamtwissenschaft” are beyond any differences between metaphysics and epistemology; since traditional concepts are not supported by such a science, they become senseless. Accordingly, the status of an epistemological interpretation of structural definitions is unclear. One would have to construct a new logic of knowledge using a more precise method than the traditional theory of knowledge. This is, however, beyond the scope of this work. Here I must rest content with the remark that while the idea to use the etymological connection between ‘essence’ and ‘reality’ naturally comes to mind, one must reject the popular way of interpreting it as the ‘real’ existence of what is mentioned in the definiens in contrast to the ‘subjectively illusory’ existence of what is mentioned in the definiendum. This is particularly clear when one changes the formula in structural definitions from ones expressed in the specialized language of science to ones expressed in reistic language. For example, the formula: For every X, X is light if and only if X is a periodic disturbance of the electromagnetic field with such and such further properties would be changed to: For every X, X is a luminescent object if and only if X is an object, which is periodically and in such and such a way disturbed from the state of an electromagnetic equilibrium. This position seems to coincide with W. Heinrich’s views in the last chapter (esp. sec. 271) of his (1902) and in the first lecture (esp. pp. 19f) of his (1907). See also footnotes 17, 43, 45, 53, below.

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clear that analytic definitions do not have any theoretical value though they might be very useful for applied sciences and even helpful in the task of systematization. In any case, it would be erroneous to use them to understand the concept of the essence of something. In conclusion, I will use the term ‘the essence of an object’ to mean the totality of features structurally defining the name of that object. I consider this to be an analytic definition in view of the actual use of that concept in science.8 II. Theory in Psychology

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Since, as I have shown in Chapter I, the answer to the question about the nature (essence) of mental phenomena has a theoretical character, it is appropriate to devote some attention to theories of contemporary empirical and nonspeculative psychology and to their relation to the main issue of this monograph, which has traditionally been considered to be the concern of the so-called metaphysics or philosophy of nature. Scientific psychology is still divided into experimental and descriptive psychology. I will therefore cosider each of these areas or divisions in turn. 1. Experimental Psychology Experimental psychology is divided into two areas. Psychophysics studies the connection between experiences and physical stimuli corresponding to them. Physiological psychology tries to understand the relation between experiences and physiological processes.9 Whereas the former is 8

The above proposal to understand the answer to the question about the essence of an object as an answer to the question about a structural definition of the name of that object has another advantage. It offers an interesting way to harmonize the work of the scholastics or contemporary philosophers on essence (e.g. E. Husserl and A. Meinong) with the work on the substance of things and phenomena, provided that one ignores all hypostasis, which leads to a more or less clearly irrational absolutization of the objects of thought. (This is most evident in Spinoza’s use of the concepts just mentioned in his Ethics.) I believe in fact that the distinction itself corresponds to Schopenhauer’s distinction between “Grund des Seins” and “Grund des Werdens” and also to Aristotle’s not well understood distinction between ουσια and υποχειµενον. 9 This characterization differs from the definitions of psychophysics and psychophysiology given by their founders G. Th. Fechner and W. Wundt, according to which there would be no difference between psychophysics and psychophysiology. However, the above characterization does fit the psychological practice and is widely accepted by psychologists.

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descriptive, the latter undertakes explanatory tasks. It is easy to see that the latter constitutes the proper theoretical area of experimental psychology. And that it has always been considered as such is already evident in its achievements which include: the theory of visual impressions, the theory of memory, etc. Indeed, psychologists have always been faced with the need to found intrinsically psychological laws on physiological ones. This was not so much due to the fact that pathological cases as well as ordinary facts indicated the existence of some relationship between the “soul” and the “body,” but mainly to the fact that this was the only way to systemize the descriptive laws of psychophysics. Moreover, purely psychological explanations of psychological facts have never fully satisfied scientists and have consequently always required further explanations that would avoid fruitless speculation. For example, the psychophysical law concerning the perception of such and such a color given such and such stimuli was first theoretically tied to certain changes in the sense organ and later with processes occurring in the central nervous system. Likewise, after reducing all laws describing the processes of idea formation (which explain the facts of reproduction* ) to the general law of association, the scientists searched for some physiological basis for the latter in the laws governing the changes in the central nervous system. It is clear then that precisely such psycho-physiological theories constitute an excellent ground for hypotheses that could support a structural definition of mental phenomena. It is only fitting to analyze them more closely. Even a cursory look suffices for the realization that most psychophysiological theories so far lack a mathematical formulation, even though it is a common practice in psychology to consider the phenomena under investigation quantitatively and even though researchers occasionally try to use deductions more extensively. 11 The reason for this state of affairs lies, of course, in the enormous complexity of both mental as well as physiological phenomena in comparison with physical or chemical phenomena. As a result, psychology as well as physiology will have to rest content with a qualitative grasp of the subject-matter for a long time. This *

[Wiegner uses just the term ‘fakty reprodukcji’, without much explanation. The term probably refers to facts about the reproduction of ideas.] 11

Interesting attempts of this kind can be found in recent work especially in applied psychology, which uses statistical methods. The most noteworthy among them is perhaps C. Spearman’s theory of the relations among abilities discussed by Kowalski (1931). There is a puzzling agreement between such attempts and the interpretation of psychophysical measurements, according to which what is measured is not so much the experiences themselves as the ability to experience them.

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is in any case a symptom of their methodological inferiority vis à vis physics and chemistry. This does not imply, however, as some have claimed, that psychometrics is impossible. According to them, only qualitative features of what is immediately given are the subject-matter of psychology, whereas quantitative features of what is immediately given belong to the domain of physics in the widest sense (see e.g. Heinrich 1902, pp. 302f ). However, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative features is already theoretical since it is based on the so-called physical measurability of phenomena of the physical world. Hence, it does not apply to what is given immediately. Surely, there is no harm in thinking that psychological measurements will be somewhat different from physical measurements. But it is hard not to see that mental phenomena are (or have) quantities. For this to be the case it is only necessary and sufficient that they form a certain order based on a comparison that is proper to them. One can guess that the question of the unit of measurement would be most effectively solved by an appropriate structural definition which would relate it to physiological processes and that this would turn psychology into an exact quantitative science. It is clear, however, that for this to be possible physiology too would have to reach an appropriate stage of development. The characteristic feature of psychophysiological explanations is the fact that they were not intended (by their founders) to be causal in nature. This feature was to distinguish them sharply from the explanations of other sciences, in particular natural sciences. This is evident in E. Th. Fechner’s and W. Wundt’s initial proclamation of the so-called psychophysical parallelism as the main principle for all explanations of mental phenomena in terms of physiological phenomena. Ignoring strong metaphysical currents which influenced the introduction of this principle (whose name is as suggestive as it is misleading), we should remember that the main scientific motive was a reaction against the flourishing but fruitless interactionist speculation characteristic of the old-fashioned prescientific psychology. The thesis about the “parallelism” of these two kinds of phenomena is the height of sobering reason when faced with the interactionist “metaphysics.” Nonetheless, the principle of parallelism is a conjunction of several different positive claims about the relation between mental and physiological phenomena. They can be expressed thus: (a) Mental phenomena, on the one hand, and physical phenomena in general as well as physiological phenomena in particular, on the other, are essentially different, i.e. they cannot be reduced to one another. This is the thesis of fundamental dualism between the “soul” and the “body.”

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(b) This dualism is such that it precludes any interaction between the “soul” and the “body.” This thesis is the negation of interactionism. (c) There is a temporal isomorphism between the two sets of phenomena (as a whole or in part); i.e., when each of the sets (in whole or in part) is ordered with respect to time, the resulting sequences remain in a one-to-one correspondence preserving the order of the sequences. This is the thesis of isomorphism. 12 These claims are not mere descriptions of facts but clearly supply an interpretation thereof. In other words, they constitute a theoretical metaphysical construction. 2. Psychophysical Parallelism It is clear that the totality of epistemic value of parallelism is contained in thesis (c). It is the only possible positive research hypothesis that remains after one accepts the negations contained in the first two theses. Its function is not only to serve as a schema for understanding the relation between the “soul” and the “body” but also to give a heuristic direction to the search for fundamental explanations in psychology. It is beyond doubt that mental phenomena as such are not in general accessible to us (as long as one excludes “facts” of a rather dubious nature such as telepathy, clairvoyance, etc.). Even for the purposes of experiment and experimental control, they can be elicited indirectly — through the mediation of physical or physiological processes. Mediation is the more necessary when others’ mental states are concerned. If the thesis of isomorphism were false, it would be impossible not only to exert any social influence on people but even to acquire an experimental knowledge of experiences. In other words, psychology as an exact science would be impossible. Here too lies the main strength of parallelism. But its concrete epistemic value depends on the particulars of its content, i.e. on the range of sets considered to be isomorphic to each other. In this respect, however, parallelism does not offer a uniform picture. In the first place, it is clear that as far as the physical sequence is concerned, it is necessary and sufficient for the positive purposes of science to narrow the sequence only to physiological processes. One ought to speak of psychophysiological rather than psychophysical parallelism. In 12

When formulating the principle of parallelism, psychologists frequently omit theses (a) and (b) and rest content with thesis (c) (see, e.g., Müller 1896). This should not lead one to think, however, that the first two theses are not part of the content of psychophysical parallelism. To the contrary, the principle of isomorphism is without any sense unless it is understood in the context of the negations contained in the first two theses.

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view of physiological knowledge acquired thus far, one should even restrict the physiological processes to those that occur in the nervous system and perhaps even further to those that occur in the central nervous system, though there is some uncertainty about the latter proposal. However, far more important is the question of how to apply thesis (c) to the psychological side. There is no shortage of psychologists who claim that the thesis has a limited scope of application in particular when the socalled higher mental functions are concerned. But one would be hard pressed to find positive arguments of a purely psychological nature. Those that they do offer derive from metaphysical hypotheses or from ethical considerations or are based on some other a priori philosophical reasons. It is no wonder then that these views have found little recognition among most researchers. The fact that thus far researchers have not managed to find “parallel” physiological phenomena corresponding to certain experiences cannot qualify as an argument that they do not exist. The more so that according to a generally accepted methodological directive, a scientist cannot reject the generality of a principle unless and until he finds facts that either directly contradict it or make it highly improbable. There is yet another view, which might invalidate the principle of isomorphism from the psychological side, viz. the view that mental phenomena as such are not causally related to one another. Indeed, according to a position that is dominant among psychologists, there is no mental causality at all. Hence, it is impossible to determine the elements of the psychological sequence unequivocally. However, from the point of view of a psychologist, this is practically equivalent to saying that mental phenomena cannot be known. In practice, this would mean that the domain liberated from thesis (c) is unknowable. The weakest aspect of this reasoning is the accepted equivalence between the knowability of phenomena and their susceptibility to unequivocal determination. After all contemporary microphysics is an example of a valuable but statistical and so not unequivocal knowledge (see my 1932b, Zawirski 1931, Sztejnbarg 1932). In practice, however, this objection is of little significance since it seems improbable that general psychology will be built on statistical foundations, and since, if that were so, it would lack the kind of practical impact that is required of it. Let us, however turn to the more important question concerning the claim that mental processes do not fall under the principle of causality.

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This claim seems to reflect the phenomenal state of affairs accurately.13 The cost for those who reject it is the incredible extension of the domain of psychophysical parallelism to panpsychism (a vague position beyond all criteria of scientific verifiability), which would further lead to an uncritical acceptance of the notion of unconscious mental processes. One can easily see this if one tries to give a purely psychological causal explanation of some impression, or if one tries to give a purely psychological account of what happens to some idea when it is not actually reproduced, or if one tries to connect (in purely psychological terms) a sequence of experiences that has been constantly interrupted by physical or physiological factors. It is interesting to note that the rejection of mental causality actually contradicts the principle of parallelism. After all, claim (c) forces one to recognize that for all relations (including causal ones) on the physical side there are corresponding relations on the psychological side. One can, however, avoid this consequence by accepting a highly likely hypothesis that the subset of physical processes that isomorphically correspond to mental processes does not constitute a causally closed sequence. This would allow to uphold the claim that mental phenomena do not fall under the principle of causality. We are thus led to another consequence of parallelism, which is of enormous importance to the understanding of mental phenomena.

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3. Monism According to a widely accepted view in positive science, the physical sequence is causally closed. It is thus quite sufficient for the unequivocal determination of the mental sequence on the basis of the principle of isomorphism. In such a case, however, the ontological status of the latter is called into question. For it appears most reasonable to think of them as epistemically useless epiphenomena. One might try to avoid this consequence by denying that the world of physical phenomena is exceptionlessly governed by the principle of causality. One could point to physical indeterminism, for example. This strategy fails for two reasons, however. First, physical indeterminism does not hold in the macroscopic world, which is the sole concern of experimental psychology. Second, and 13

One must remember that most of the representatives of experimental psychology represent at the same time the so-called phenomenal psychology, according to which “sensory qualities” are mental phenomena. (I discuss this view in the next chapter.) It is only given this assumption that the claim considered in the text becomes intelligible. See also Heinrich (1907), p. 61, and chapter “Die psychische Kauzalität” in his (1895), as well as in sections 4 and 5 of Chapter I of Volume I of Petzoldt (1900).

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more important, from the point of view of epistemological realism (which practically dominates physics as well as common sense), physical indeterminism is fundamentally different from and independent of metaphysical indeterminism (see my 1932b, p. 10, this volume: p. 112f ). Psychophysical parallelism cannot thus escape the consequence drawn above. This is perhaps the reason for the criticism and for the desire to revive its first two theses. Some scientists led by a number of metaphysical reasons to uphold the fundamental dualism expressed in claim (a), weaken this position by rejecting claim (b). They thus return to interactionism, stressing its current harmlessness for experimental psychology and the relatively high agreement with the facts. What they fail to see is that the very application of the concept of a causal relation presupposes the position of monism, and so the rejection of principle (a). Others approach the issue more radically. They question the necessity of and the need for any fundamental dualism between the “soul” and the “body.” They reject claim (a). Among the latter, R. Avenarius’ position is the most original and radical since his critique leads to the proposal of an “objective” experimental method in psychology. He is thus a precursor of contemporary developments of more or less clearly materialistic objective psychology,14 which I will discuss in the next chapter. Such a monism (provided that this term will retain its sense in the scientific language based on the new epistemology) is not the only way to remove the fundamental difference between physical and mental phenomena. But such a way of accomplishing this task derives from purely positive and concrete needs of the scientist. This distinguishes it from other attempts of this kind whether it be the metaphysical position of pseudomonistic spiritualism15 or the metaphysical identity theory. The latter does not in fact remove the parallelism but reduces it to playing a purely external and superficial role by representing the two sequences as epistemologically equal “sides” or as “appearances” of essentially one and the same substance, which cannot be described independently of those attributes. The very existence of such views, which are clearly unverifiable and fall beyond any concrete needs of experimental psychology, indicates already that parallelism is epistemically insufficient and requires some

14

See Avenarius (1891), section 32 and (1894), section 147. In Poland, this position is represented by W. Heinrich, who, in my opinion, has (of all philosophers) the deepest grasp of Avenarius’ work and who has most successfully used it. 15 T. Kotarbiński (1929, p. 396) calls attention to the de facto dualistic character of spiritualism.

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kind of completion or explanation, which, of course, speaks against it.16 In view of the monistic needs of the mind, which are probably intimately related to the rationalizing powers of cognitive capacities, parallelism cannot pretend to be an ultimate metaphysical position. In experimental psychology too, the purely temporary and transitional role it has played appears to have come to an end. Its theses about the relation between the physical and the mental and so indirectly about the problem of the nature of mental phenomena, have ceased to satisfy even experimenters. At the same time, they have become more convinced that this problem considered so far to be exclusively metaphysical, is integral to psychology itself and closely linked to any theoretical endeavors in this discipline. After all, it concerns the logical foundation of scientific psychology and shapes its general methodological framework. Although the matter has not matured enough to convince all psychologists of the close ties between an abstract problem about the nature of mental phenomena with the concrete research practice of experimental psychologists, I believe that this will happen in not so distant a future. If one may rely on the analogy from physics, which has at present adopted the problem of space and time regarded until recently as the exclusive domain of metaphysics, then there is no doubt that a similar fate awaits also the problem of the nature of mental phenomena. When it is understood in special and concretely psychological terms, it will be solved exclusively in view of the needs of psychology and exclusively in view of purely scientific goals. The same conclusion can be reached from an analysis of descriptive psychology, to which I now turn. 4. Descriptive Psychology It may seem paradoxical to speak about a constructive theory in a science, which intends to be a pure description, i.e. exclusively phenomenological. As I will try to demonstrate, this is not a paradox. First of all, one should clear a number of misconceptions about descriptive psychology. Descriptive psychologists do not claim that some mental phenomena cannot be the objects of experiments. Nor are they trying to claim that an experiment carried out in a laboratory and so in a necessarily “artificial” setting will never replace systematic observation of mental processes in their “natural” setting of everyday life. Nor even do they claim that that phenomenology ought to provide a preliminary terminological and clarificatory foundation for any future research. Rather, the main thought of descriptive psychology is that the so-called inner experience (which is 16

This is perhaps what A. Dryjski has in mind when he writes about the need to solve the puzzle of “unchangeable connectedness” of the two sequences. See his (1931), p. 152n.

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the basis of all psychological knowledge) may, given an appropriate training, provide obvious and apodictically certain knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is by far more valuable than experimental knowledge. This view appears to be obvious — especially if one accepts the fundamental dualism between the soul and the body as well as scholastic speculations on the identity of the subject and the object of knowledge in acts of psychological reflection. However, just like other obvious thoughts, known well from the history of science, so this one is in fact false. In every empirical science, the initial definition of terms and the initial classification of the subject-matter are only provisional, designed to provide direction for future inquiries. As such they have no pretension to carrying any real epistemic value. Such a value is exhibited only by those definitions and classifications that are developed to take into account the totality of acquired information and that form a system of knowledge. The best illustration is provided by morphological biological sciences. Until very recently, their purely descriptive methods could only allow for “artificial” classifications and merely diagnostic definitions. It was only after the methods for determining genetic relations or “inner” kinship relations were developed that it has become possible to construct definitions and “natural” classifications of real epistemic value. Any knowledge consists in going beyond what is directly given to genetic, causal or other relations. In science, the distinction between the description of a pure datum and a theory, which hypothetically complements it, becomes relative when scientific inquiry treads on a complex and epistemologically most significant terrain.17 Psychology is no exception here. The so-called “inner” experience gives equally uncertain and fallible answers regarding issues of real epistemic value as “outer” experience characteristic of physical sciences.18 The prestige of introspective states will not be saved by examples of apparently synthetic 17

In a discussion note (1932c), I have rendered the problem of the relation between description and construction in science in terms of the question whether the distinction between a pure description of a directly given phenomenon and its rendition in a theoretical construction is itself given directly or theoretically constructed (see pp. 133f). In accordance with the above reasoning, one can answer that the distinction must be given directly for a range of phenomena (otherwise, it would not have reached our consciousness). However, it is given directly only for the most simple and initial problems and ceases to be given directly for more complex problems encountered in the course of scientific development where only systematic considerations decide what is to be understood as given directly and what is to be understood as constructed. See also Neurath (1931/32), p. 403; Metallmann (1925), Part II, section 1, especially pp. 43f. 18 Even E. Husserl realized that it is impossible to uphold the claim that inner experience is obvious. See (1900/01), vol. II, Part 2, Appendix, section 4.

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a priori judgments such as that orange is more similar to red than to blue. For these are either simple descriptive definitions implicit in necessary and sufficient conditions satisfied by certain objects, * or their immediate consequences (in the logic of relations). In either case, from an epistemological point of view, they are tautologies. In psychology, too, pure description can only afford a provisional grasp of the material and initial semantic postulates but never knowledge in the strict sense of the term. The problem of the nature of mental phenomena, one of the traditional problems of descriptive psychology, cannot be solved by means of description alone. The latter could only result in a general definition providing an initial grasp of the proper subject-matter of psychological inquiry.19 It would have more significance for a diagnostic classification of the sciences but it is insufficient to answer the question about the nature of mental phenomena. In order to reach an epistemically significant definition, i.e. a structural definition, one cannot limit oneself to description in the strict sense of the word — one has to include explanatory (e.g. functional, developmental, etc.) relations. In other words, one has to appeal to a theory and to hypotheses. It is no wonder that descriptive psychologists have never in practice managed to remain within the bounds of description. Whenever epistemically significant problems were concerned, they crossed those boundaries and considered also non-descriptive (in particular, genetic) elements.20 One can also appeal to the influence of theory to explain the divergence of the results of the alleged pure description involved in introspection. This divergence stands in sharp contrast to the claimed obviousness of non-experimental introspection, though it is not surprising *

[The original term is ‘przedmioty nieoznaczone’; literally translated: ‘unmarked objects’.]

19

Structural definitions are not suitable for this purpose. One can see this using T. Kotarbiński’s definition of physics as a “science that investigates the laws of motion of all bodies and laws of motion of inanimate bodies” (1929, p. 390). Someone who does not yet know physics would not infer that it also deals with light, voice and heat (in reistic language: with luminous, loud and warm bodies). It is also pointless to present theoretical concepts in ordinary scientific definitions as the objects of investigation. This is done, for example, by W. Witwicki (1930, vol. I, p. 7, second edition: p. 11), who includes mental dispositions among the objects of psychology. In such a case, physicists would have to consider forces and energy to be the object of physics. 20 M. Kreutz’s (1931) attempt to conceptualize the phenomenally given similarity of elementary impressions as a sharing of their secondary features, i.e. those that are based on genetic relations, temporary relations, relations of manifestation, etc., is a beautiful example of an intentional crossing of the boundaries of pure description and entering the grounds of theory. It seems to me, however, that the author has confused the problem of similarity with the problem of awareness of similarity.

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to anyone who knows the difficulties of experimental introspection. Indeed, even in the latter case, the description of experiences inevitably presupposes those theories that are implicit in the very language of the psychological school that shaped the scientist’s elementary terminology. This provides an excellent explanation of the surprising differences in the protocol descriptions carried out by people undeniably well-trained in psychological observation. How much greater, then, must be the influence of theories on observation of experiences in ordinary circumstances, even in the face of the strongest resolve to be “objective.” Moreover, the applicability of such a non-experimental analysis is limited to “higher” mental functions — as far as real achievements are concerned, i.e. ones that go beyond what can be discovered by pre-scientific speculative psychology. A good experiment, which demonstrates, for example, the existence of special centers of pain, will convince everyone about the experimental character of pain more quickly and decisively than long and tedious comparisons and analyses of descriptive psychologists. Finally, it is worth noting that their method bears clear marks of the so-called thought experiment. After all, those assemblies of situationally different cases of one’s own and others’ experiences and utterances are nothing other than attempts to find the “only” difference or agreement, or even attempts to find coinciding changes. Precisely this methodological weakness of descriptive psychology vis a vis the multitude of particular and only apparently descriptive problems concerning lower mental processes, constitutes its strength when dealing with traditional philosophical problems concerned with “higher” mental processes, especially thought and cognition. The representatives of this psychology had intended this purely phenomenological description to provide a final elucidation and explanation of basic concepts and truths of mainly traditional logic and epistemology, and to decide, among others, the burning issue of psychologism in logic and logicism in psychology. Although those efforts were not successful, they have contributed a lot of valuable material, which must be taken into account by any serious attempt to systemize psychology. The philosophical character of this work confirms the view that what is at stake here is not some special purely descriptive part of psychology but quite general and theoretical problems, and that they have not become part of the interests of experimental psychologists only because the collected experimental data were insufficient to present them in a clear light. The theoretical nature of this psychology is implicit in its descriptiveness. I believe that all these problems will be, with time, incorporated by theoretical psychology, which will develop as a result of a division of labor similar to the one which has for a long time shaped research in physics. That this division of

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labor is necessary is already evident to applied psychologists in view of the notion of a disposition or mental ability which is one of the most important connecting points between their endeavors and theoretical constructs of psychophysiologists.21 Thus, it turns out that one can and one must speak of theories even in descriptive psychology. One can presume that attempts to determine the nature of mental phenomena in purely descriptive terms are among such theories. The material used in such attempts may provide important clues where to find anchor-points for the structural definition of experiences and may also constitute the departure point for the construction of this definition.

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5. Gestalt Theory These considerations would be incomplete if one did not take into account a new psychological theory of great importance for all the sciences dealing with mental phenomena. The Gestalt theory, or structural psychology, provides an excellent confirmation of the views advanced above about the inseparability of description and explanation. On the one hand, the theory is anti-synthetic in its psychological conception of experience. It rejects the view that experience is merely a “sum” or a “mosaic” of “atoms” or “elements,” which can exist on its own and without the whole of which they are part. This is in line with the principle of constancy, which determines their connection with stimuli and which had been accepted so far. On the other hand, it postulates the primacy of Gestalt or structure over its elements with regard to laws governing the world of experiences, i.e. with regard to genetic, functional and even psychophysiological relations.22 Despite a great unclarity of many concepts and claims, the 21

As far as I know, J. Lindworsky (1922) was the first to propose theoretical psychology thus understood. The need to systematize psychological knowledge obtained thus far is felt also by specialists who have not conducted a lot of experiments. A noteworthy exception here is W. Baade (1928, esp. chapters 10 and 11). W. Peters (1929, pp. 389f and 403) provides a valuable discussion of the attitude of psychologists, concerned only with the special problem of their discipline, toward philosophical problems contained in unclear conceptual foundations and imprecise theoretical assumptions of psychology. 22 See B. Petermann (1929), the first main part (especially §§5, 6, 12 and 13). F. Krueger and E. Spranger also consider themselves as representatives of structuralism, though they differ from physicalistically oriented “Gestaltists.” The former represents a biological, the latter — a humanistic orientation. In Poland, the precursors of structural psychology include W. Heinrich (as I already indicated in Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 1, in a footnote on p. 428), B. Bandrowski (1907, p. 526), and A Stögbauer (1909, pp. 485 and 498f), who was led to reject the principle of constancy four years before Köhler. It should be stressed that Anglo-Saxon and French psychologists use the term ‘structural psychology’ in a very different way; see Claparède (1927), p. 87. It is notorious that in the United States of North

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researchers have managed to experimentally demonstrate the usefulness and rationality of their approach, so that the victory of at least the antisynthetic orientation is beyond doubt. Although many details of their theories will undergo changes or will even be given up altogether, no theory of the nature of mental phenomena can ignore their achievements. It should be stressed, however, that the significance of the issues brought up by this new psychological approach extends beyond psychology. After all, the problems dealt with by Gestalt theory are but special cases of general morphological problems important in particular for biological sciences but also for sciences about organized wholes, even sciences about inanimate matter such as chemistry. General psychology has a far more complex epistemological structure than any other science. In other sciences, it is usually the case that only one ontological category plays a central epistemic role, e.g. the category of a process or phenomenon in physics and physiology, and the category of structure in general chemistry and biology. In psychology, by contrast, both these categories play a central role. It is not surprising then that the problem of the relation between these categories and the problem of their relation to the essence of knowledge have been particularly sharp and pertinent in psychology. The solution of these problems in this area may even decide the epistemological relation among those sciences. Unfortunately, this solution has not been reached. And to this day it is unclear, for example, how to reconcile the possibility of psychological analysis, which is a necessary precondition for any description of experiences, with the rejection of the principle of constancy. I would not be surprised if someone demonstrated that the problem of psychological Gestalt and its knowability is related even to the problem of noncontradiction of mathematical concepts of infinity and continuum. In other words, it may even reach the very foundation of logic and knowledge. I must, however, rest content with the above general remarks on this very pressing problem. The discussion of the role and meaning of theories in psychology suggests the following directions for future work. First of all, one should find a descriptive definition of mental processes. It should, on the one hand, delineate the subject-matter of psychology, which would make it useful for the classification of sciences, and on the other hand, it should incorporate the anti-synthetic point of view, which would provide a suitable anchor-point for the construction of a proper structural definition of mental phenomena and which would satisfy the monistic needs of the America, there exists a multitude of (usually subordinate) psychological movements that bear the same names as European movements though represent very different approaches (see Murchison 1930).

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rational scientific mind. I will add another methodological principle which has been very useful for theory-building in physics: New general theories ought to be constructed in such a way as to encompass previous views as their special cases (see Reichenbach 1920, p. 29 and Zawirski 1924, pp. 45f ). III. Mental Phenomena in General

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When one wants to discover the meaning of a term already in use, it is usual to begin by assembling as many and as diverse cases of its use as possible. Moreover, the cases assembled must clearly and unquestionably fall under the term. By comparing and analyzing them one can then determine which features are common to all of them and which are basic, thereby determining the analytic definition of the term unequivocally. This definition can then be the starting point for further theoretical work and for the construction of a structural definition. However, this way of proceeding is closed in determining the subject-matter of psychology since there is no agreement among psychologists as to what exactly falls within the domain of psychological investigation. Some include only such processes as, for example, perception, imagination, thinking, emotion, deciding, etc.; others include only such facts as, for example, perceptions, ideas, thoughts, emotions, decisions, etc.; still others (the most numerous group) recognize both kinds of phenomena as the proper subject-matter for psychology. Moreover, if one takes a clear look at the terms used to capture mental phenomena, one will notice that they have become ambiguous — sometimes the relation to consciousness, on the one hand, and introspection, on the other, is part of their content, and sometimes it is not. This initial disparity makes it impossible to find some common ground that would be sufficiently suitable for further analysis. We are thus forced to proceed in an unusual way. First, we need to analyze those theories that have found some ground in this disparity of views on the subject-matter of psychology. We can, then, proceed to the construction of the concept of mental phenomena with reference to the results of the analysis. 1. Phenomenal Psychology Experimental psychology has for a long time either not felt the need for the distinction between perceiving and perception, thinking and thought, etc., or has even clearly rejected such a distinction as an inheritance of metaphysical speculation. According to epistemological idealism,

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dominant at the beginning of the experimental method of introspection, the so-called sensory qualities were thought to have some content (Inhalt),* or phenomena in Kant’s sense. Such “impressions” were taken to be the basic elements of mental life. Some have considered pleasure and displeasure as elements of a second kind. They were thought to be different from the former but analogical to them nonetheless from an ontological point of view. According to this position (abstracting from certain exceptions especially among the consequences), association was to be the only way of combining these elements into more or less tight complexes. At the same time, association was to regulate the development of these complex constructs in time. Moreover, it was to provide the foundation of the socalled unity of consciousness from the totality of the contents of consciousness (Bewusstseinsinhalte) given in introspection, i.e. in “inner” perception or experience. This perception or experience was differently conceived, though the most common view was consistent with epistemological idealism and treated introspective experience as “direct.” By contrast, “indirect” experience provides a foundation for physical sciences and consists in abstracting from the dependence of the contents of consciousness from the experiencing subject (Wundt 1896, §1, sect. 1). This tendency toward “atomization” of mental life has been developed by E. Mach, for whom the directly given world is a world of elements that remain in a variety of more or less constant relations to one another. A privileged place is occupied by a complex of elements called “own body,” since every element which enters into a relation to it reveals itself as an impression, i.e. a fundamental element of the world of mental phenomena. When considered in abstraction from this complex and in relation to other elements, it reveals itself as an element of the physical world. Mach writes: A color is a physical object, as soon as we consider, for example, its dependence from the source of light that illuminates it (from other colors, heat, space, etc.). If we consider its dependence on “own body,” it reveals itself as a psychological 23 object, an impression. *

[The literal translation of the original “upatrywano w t. zw. jakościach zmysłowych jakąś zawartość (Inhalt) przeżywającego podmiotu” would read: “the so-called sensory qualities were thought to have some content (Inhalt) of the experiencing subject.”]

23

“Eine Farbe is ein physikalisches Objekt, sobald wir z. B. auf ihre Abhängigkeit von der beleuchtended Lichtquelle (andern Farben, Wärmen, Räumen u.s.w.) achten. Achten wir aber auf ihre Abhängigkeit von der Netzhaut, so ist sie ein psychologisches Objekt, eine Empfindung.” (Mach 1903, Chapter I, sec. 9.) Mach’s views were turned into an epistemological and ontological system by Th. Ziehen and accepted by K. Pearson and B. Russell (at a later stage of his life).

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However, the attempt to overcome psychological dualism (unsuccessful, as it turns out) has as its cost an incredible substantialization of sensory qualities, which stands in too stark a contrast with their obvious dependent character. It is not surprising that Mach’s construction has never found a ground among deeper minds that accept an anti-synthetic viewpoint in psychology and exhibit realistic attitudes in epistemology. Moreover, R. Avenarius has shown that the same result can be obtained without committing Mach’s mistakes and without accepting his one-sidedness. He writes: The object of psychology is every experience insofar as it is conceived by the corresponding sense as dependent on the individual with respect to whom it is an 24 experience.

Since the dependence on the experiencing subject reduces to direct dependence on the instructions from the central nervous system, his final formulation is: The object of psychology is an experience in general insofar as it is dependent on 25 System C.”

Avenarius reached this conclusion as a result of “objective” observation of the conditions of human utterances. As such it goes beyond the assumptions of pure psychology of the contents of consciousness or phenomenal psychology, and is independent from it. Although it coincides with many facts of intellectual experiences, it can be applied to feelings and manifestations of the will only with the greatest difficulty and stark artificiality.26 More importantly, the view in question does not take notice of the fact that the mental world understood as the world of what is dependent on the subject, is not and cannot be given as directly as the representatives of this position claim. One has to learn that experience depends on the individual experiencing it, or rather on his central nervous system. He discovers this only relatively late by means of the method of difference, when the difference encountered in experience (illusions and errors) cannot be

24

“Gegenstand der empirischen Psychologie ist jede Erfahrung, sofern sie in dem Sinne, in dem sie eine Erfahrung ist, als abhängig von dem Individuum, in bezug auf welches sie in diesem Sinne eine Erfahrung ist, aufgefasst wird” (Mach 1903, sec. 111). 25 “Gegenstand der Psychologie is die Erfahrung überhaupt als Abhängige des Systems C” (Mach 1903, sec. 113). “Impure” phenomenalists include W. James, O. Külpe and H. Cornelius. 26 Elsenhans (1912) and Zawirski (1921) believe that it is impossible.

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explained otherwise than by this hypothesis.27 This very important fact has not escaped the notice of H. Münsterberg, who puts it thus: The mental is in a sense a remainder, what is left over when one works out and subtracts that which is identifiable and causally interrelated in a variety of 28 experiences. 128

Indeed, one can safely risk the hypothesis that human beings have become psychologists only when they discovered that they fall prey to illusions and commit errors. It is doubtful, however, that this was the only source of their knowledge of themselves as experiencing subjects. Münsterberg has also a different kind of knowledge concerned with the subject, viz. his direct knowledge of himself as an acting subject. Remarkably, he does not recognize it as adequate scientific knowledge. According to him, scientific knowledge must transform what is given directly by sensualizing it in psychological analysis and by objectivizing it in epistemic categories: For the purposes of the communication, scientific psychology must accept as its ideal to conceive the whole contents of consciousness as a combination of elements [or experiences — AW], which have noetic relations to the physical world in 29 perceptual representations and thereby can be entirely determined.

27

This is also confirmed by T. Witwicki’s treatise (1931), in which he claims that “appearance becomes the content of a representation of an object when it is erroneously recognized as that object” (p. 403, or p. 10 of the reprint). However, if he means that “only the appearance of a table is given us directly and our judgments originally refer to it” (p. 397, or p. 4 of the reprint) then he contradicts himself in view of what ‘directly given’ usually means in epistemology. Since ‘directly given’ means ‘directly accessible to consciousness’ and we can interpret ‘a judgment refers to something’ as synonymous with ‘something is an object of the judgment’, the distinction between the appearance of an object itself becomes equivalent to the distinction between the representation of the object (i.e. its content) and the object itself. W. Heinrich seems to occupy the same position, see his (1902), sec. 4. 28 “Das Psychische ist also gewissermassen der Rest, der übrig bleibt, wenn das in verschiedenen Erfahrungen identifizierbare und somit das kausal Zusammenhängende, herausgearbeitet und abgezogen ist” (1918, p. 88). This is manifested in the fact that the best introduction to the basic study of impressions and perceptions is, from a didactic point of view, the analysis of illusions, e.g. geometrical optical illusions. This is because after one ascertains that physical stimuli cannot be the causes of the changes in the appearance of objects, one is led to the inevitable conclusion that the only possible explanation lies in the conditions of the subject’s knowledge of these objects, i.e. in seeing and looking. See also a beautiful description of such gradual and ever more deep realization of the existence of intellectual functions in Chwistek (1921), pp. 48ff. 29 “Die wissenschaftliche Psychologie muss daher, soweit die Zwecke der Mitteilung in Betracht kommen, es als ihr Ideal betrachten, den gesamten Bewusstseinsinhalt als Kombination von Elementen [or: Empfindungen — AW] aufzufassen, welche in Wahrneh-

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This unique psychological irrationalism clearly results from the “mosaic” method of understanding experiences and it is therefore rightly rejected, together with the assumptions of pure “phenomenality,” by functional psychology. 2. Functional Psychology All versions of functional psychology accept that mental functions or mental activities (in K. Twardowski’s generalized sense) and acts are directly accessible in introspection and irreducible to any sensory qualities. C. Stumpf contrasts such qualities (together with the relations they stand in to one another), as “phenomena,” with functions (hence too the names of both approaches). He gives the following examples of functions: “noticing appearances and the relations in which they stand to one another, forming complexes from appearances, forming concepts, conceiving and judging, desiring and willing.”30 According to this position, there are two types of experiences. Experiences of the first type are more basic and constitute the material on which experiences of the second type operate. Unfortunately, neither Stumpf himself nor his experimental followers have managed to demonstrate any theoretical advantages for concrete and particular research that could follow from this view. Nor have they managed to integrate functional notions in the concrete scientific knowledge and to thereby completely explain them. It is hard not overcome the impression that it is not good to treat the terms ‘act’ and ‘function’ as synonyms, for example. It would be desirable to distinguish “point” acts (as periodic elements of functions) from functions themselves extending in time and composed of these acts. It is also hard to deny that functionalism based on the notion of a mental activity as an operation on some mental material, exhibits a rather primitive “anthropomorphism.” It is also, of course, incompatible with the antisynthetic point of view in psychology. It is therefore unable to justify the need to consider sensory qualities and acts as one category of mental phenomena. However, it seems right to me to think that mental activities can be given directly in introspection. The more so that the origin of the notion of causality would become a puzzle since, according to mungsvorstellungen noetisch Beziehungen zur physischen Welt haben und dadurch vollkommen fixiert werden können” (1918, p. 309). 30 “Bemerken von Erscheinungen in ihren Verhältnissen, Zusammenfassen von Erscheinungen zu Komplexen, die Begriffsbildung, das Auffassen und Urteilen, das Begehren und Wollen” (1906, pp. 4f). More or less similar forms of functionalism are propounded by A. Meinong, S. Witasek, Th. Lipps and even J. Rehmke.

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epistemological empiricism, it derives from the experience of activity as a source. I believe, however, that mental functions belong to the same category as the movements of a subject. There is thus no need to provide them with some sort of material to operate on.31 In these respects, the radical version of psychological functionalism is more satisfactory. Such a view, which could be called intentionalism, has been developed by F. Brentano, who was the first to revive functional psychology in general, and who has also created descriptive psychology discussed in the previous chapter. Very early on, Brentano has called attention to the fact that it is a mistake to identify sensory qualities and impressions. Such a mistake can be tolerated (as a linguistic simplification) in everyday life, but it is theoretically inadmissible since it is the source of confusions. According to him, sensory qualities are features of the objects of experiences and of experiences themselves. The definitional and directly (by introspection) identifiable feature of the latter is intention, i.e. direction of consciousness upon an object, in other words, a certain relation between consciousness and object. He thus follows the scholastic and the Aristotelian tradition in holding also that the object of experience need not actually exist. 32 Intentional acts combine in such a way that some become the foundation or basis for others superimposed on them. At the same time, however, as long as the unity of intention is preserved, so is the unity of complex acts. Representational acts are the basic elements of all mental life. In other words, by definition, every mental phenomenon is either a representation or an act based on some representation. It is evident that these concepts allow Brentano to build psychology on the basis of the natural position of epistemological realism, which is in fact presupposed by all physical sciences. Moreover, it is clear that such intentional psychology is consistent with the anti-synthetic standpoint of contemporary Gestalt theory. Brentano’s intentionalism (especially under a reistic interpretation) gives also a far stronger and clearer expression (in comparison to phenomenal psychology) to the subjectivity of mental phenomena, which 31

This coincides with the comments of many psychologists on the enormously important, though underestimated in psychology, role of motor factors. See, for example, Błachowski (1924), pp. 41-57. These remarks are also confirmed by Szuman (1932). 32 (1874), Book II, Chapter 1. It is impossible to deny that psychological functionalist constructions are highly prone to the dangers of hypostasis of various linguistic forms. At the same time, however, there must be some deeper psychological reasons why some but not other forms of linguistic expression are used. So, one may use them, within certain limits, to draw conclusions about features of psychological processes, but with caution and under constant control of linguistic intuition by means of data obtained from other sources.

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is given directly and which is considered unanimously to be the basic feature of mental phenomena. This suggests the thought that behind this “direction” of subject upon object, which is irreducible in this psychology and equivalent only to the distinction of the objects of acts and the acts themselves, there are directly introspectible attitudes or other states of the organism, which could be characterized behaviorally. This thought is important to the extent that it opens a way to escape the tight space of “subjectivity.” There are also many dark and difficult to understand aspects of Brentano’s intentionalism. In the first place, it is difficult to grasp how it is possible for there to be a relation of consciousness to an object in cases where the object does not actually exist. It is also difficult to agree with the need to eliminate from psychology the fruits of the research on sensory contents, which, as nonintentional phenomena, lose their mental character. I am not surprised therefore that E. Husserl, a student of Brentano who developed his teachers’ views on the intentional nature of mental states in a deep and excellent way, gave up precisely this consequence. Every act has, in his view, two (not self-sufficient) elements: quality (i.e. that which distinguishes representation, judgment, desire, joy, etc., one from another) and matter (i.e. that which causes intention to be directed upon such and such an object and with reference to such and such features of that object). In addition, every concrete act includes impressions, or sensory qualities as the contents which represent an object and thus constitute an intuitional fullness of an act, though they do not belong to the intentional essence of the latter. Impressions thus constitute the second nonintentional type of experiences on this theory. They are the material for intentional experiences and thus form a psychological basis for the latter. And the fundamental role of representations in mental life is explained simply by the fact that they provide the matter for other mental acts (Husserl (1900/01), vol. II, chapters 5 and 6). One must admit that this development of Brentano’s thought seems right in many details, but one cannot also deny that it leaves many more problems unsolved. In the first place, since Husserl’s intentionalism is very close to Stumpf’s function psychology, it is prone to the same objections. Moreover, Husserl does not offer any argument why it is necessary to accept a separate class of nonintentional experiences. He also does not sufficiently explain the relation of the representational contents to the matter of those acts for which they constitute intuitional fullness.33 In general, it is difficult to make sense of 33

See Blaustein (1928), §29 and §30. On p. 72 (in a footnote), he also notes the relation between psychological schools and epistemological approaches.

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the various elements of an act in the case of experiences that lack objects. Husserl’s discussion leads to a paradoxical hypothesis (which though paradoxical is partly supported by developmental psychology) that the dependence of the matter of those non-representational acts is a simple consequence of the fact that representation itself is already a theoretical and explanatory construct and not something that is directly given in introspection. Furthermore, I could find no support for Husserl’s view (shared by all functionalists) that the very existence of an act is accompanied by a direct and non-sensory knowledge of it. Such nonsensory knowledge presupposes not a descriptive but explicatory concept of sense — since it appears to refer to the peripheral physiological conditions of an experience. I can find no fundamental difference in descriptive terms between e.g. optic content, on one hand, and pleasure, anger or desire, on the other, as long as one takes into account the Gestalt character of feelings, of course. 34 However, two issues appear to be confused here. First of all, S. Błachowski seems to be right in thinking that some acts or mental functions are not given directly in introspection.35 I take it to refer to acts that have objects, i.e. representations and judgments. This is also supported by the fact that the so-called introspective descriptions of these experiences turn out to be pure descriptions of the objects of those experiences (if one rejects any kinesthetic elements). For example, what is described are not the experiences of colors but colors (respectively, colorful objects) themselves. One must also recognize that there is no reason to think that some kind of knowledge (or awareness) of an act must be a necessary condition of its existence. This issue leads us directly to the problem of the concept of consciousness in psychology. 3. Psychology of the Unconscious For both phenomenal and functional psychology, the mental was so closely related to the conscious that the concept of a mental phenomenon was not only equivalent to but synonymous with the concept of a conscious mental phenomenon. No psychologist has in fact managed to systemically reduce all psychological concepts to the concept of consciousness. This would require the construction of universal definitions where the term ‘consciousness’ would always be fundamental. One will 34

This though also appears in T. Kotarbiński (1922) as the claim that psychological description is sensory in nature. 35 He points out that perceiving is an example of a function that is hypothetically constructed, in contrast to the so-called sensations, which are directly accessible. See (1917), pp. 18ff.

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easily notice that this would be impossible for emotions or manifestations of the will. Nevertheless, the tendency to treat the concept of consciousness as fundamental is very clearly present in phenomenalism and functionalism despite the growing number of voices demanding the rejection of this traditional view. S. Igel (1919) has greatly clarified this issue by pointing out that, strictly speaking, what is usually called pleasure, anger, desire, etc., are objects, not functions of consciousness. They are the objects of emotions, feelings, experiences of the will, not emotions, feelings, experiences of the will themselves (if the later terms are reserved exclusively for forms of consciousness). 36 Indeed, overwhelming pleasure or violent anger are not at all overwhelming or violent states of consciousness. Just as blinding light or piercing shriek are not blinding or piercing states of consciousness. It also does not make sense to speak about strong or true states of consciousness though one does speak about strong convictions and true judgments. At the same time, it is clear that such distinctions are only possible on the basis of functional psychology and would be impossible in terms of phenomenal psychology. We must conclude that the concept of an unconscious mental phenomenon is strictly speaking impossible in the system of the psychology of “contents of consciousness.” By contrast, it can be included in the system of psychology of acts and functions. The latter system turns out to be more general and has, from a methodological point of view, a definite advantage over the former. Although the concept of unconscious mental phenomena is still the subject of theoretical debates, the fact that there exist various automatisms as well as psychopathological data from mental disorders force psychologists to treat this notion as a serious theoretical construct. The popularity of this concept is mainly due to the work of S. Freud, the famous founder of psychoanalytic therapy. His psychotherapy is theoretically grounded in the system of psychoanalysis (which, in the narrower sense also encompasses C.G. Jung’s system) as well as A. Adler’s system somewhat misleadingly called individual psychology. The main vices of the approach are the striking excesses in the application of the method and the fabrications in the interpretation of facts, which 36

I take this opportunity to call attention to the fact that reism (which was also held by Brentano himself, though only toward the end of his life) does not permit one to speak about sensory qualities (changes) as the objects of acts but only about things that bear those qualities (changes). As a result, that which causes mental acts (i.e. phenomena occurring on things) cannot be identical with the intentional objects of those acts. Similarly, reism leads to a correction (apparently also accepted by Husserl) that it is not the act itself but rather the psychological subject that is directed upon an object.

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result from the lack of any positive decisive criteria.37 Despite these shortcomings, one cannot ignore the movement that has been stirred by these approaches. To the contrary, one must reconsider the problem of the concept of an unconscious experience, which, in my opinion, derives from the ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’. Almost all representatives of phenomenal psychology and many adherents of functional psychology treat the term ‘consciousness’ as synonymous with the term ‘mental subject’. However, the original meaning of ‘consciousness’ is closer to the concept of being alert [przytomność], i.e. it refers to a certain feature of a subject. This sense of the term ought to be involved in understanding the concept of an unconscious mental phenomenon. On the other hand, many identify consciousness with knowledge in general. This is both an imprecise and unnecessarily wide rendition of this concept. In my view, consciousness understood as the product of “coming to be conscious [of something]” is a kind of state of knowledge, which is knowledge of oneself. It becomes clear that neither this state of knowledge nor even the knowledge of one’s own states and activities is a necessary condition of the latter. As a result, the concept of an unconscious but still mental phenomenon is not at all self-contradictory, as it would have to be given the previous sense of the term ‘consciousness’. One should also note that it is common (esp. among “phenomenalists”) to use the term ‘consciousness’ synonymously with the term ‘conscious’. This use is, of course, derivative and despite its popularity it cannot stand in the way of recognizing the possibility of unconscious experiences.38 In conclusion, I believe that there are good reasons to recognize the possibility of unconscious mental phenomena. This concept itself is both useful and necessary for psychology as a science about introspectively given states and activities, the subject’s acts and attitudes and other inner functions of the subject constructed on the basis of what is introspectively given. The transition from this result to a structural definition of mental phenomena is

37

Among the representatives of these movements (which could be called depth psychology, together with certain trends in humanistic psychology and practical characterology), there is a growing awareness of these problems and a perceived need to solve them. See, for example, Roffenstein (1923) and Bernfeld (1932). 38 A. Dryjski (1931, p. 149) claims that “from a formal and logical point of view, the notion of an unconscious mental life does not contain any contradictions.” But his claim will remain groundless until conceptual analysis removes all confusions deriving from the ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’. Incidentally, this ambiguity has certainly contributed to the popularization of epistemological idealism about phenomenal psychology.

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not difficult now. It can be obtained by means of an analysis of the socalled objective psychology. 4. Objective Psychology The term ‘objective psychology’ encompasses two approaches: I.B. Pavlov’s and W.M. Bechterev’s reflexology and the so-called behaviorism which originated in America. They both reject introspection as a “subjective” method because it is incapable of solving many problems that arise as a result of its application and because the traditional psychological concepts it gives rise to are fundamentally unclear. They both proclaim the need to replace introspection with the “objective” method of extraspection, i.e. observation of the external behavior of an organism, as the only scientific method that is precise and fruitful. The representatives of the two approaches differ as to how to interpret the positive part of their program. In rejecting introspection, some reject the whole of traditional psychology and feel no need to reform or improve it. They think of themselves as creating a completely new science (which bears different names) about the movements and behavior of higher organisms in general and of human beings in particular. Others, provided they recognize that there are some processes that constitute the unique object of “inner” experience, claim only that the method of introspection is not scientific. This is the reason why they demand to replace current psychology with the new psychology, which would use exclusively the method of extraspection,39 i.e. the very method which has been used in the study of the psychology of animals and small children. Another difference between reflexology and behaviorism has been nicely put by Petermann 39

Here is a characteristic passage from J.B. Watson’s classic behaviorist work Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist: “Psychology limited its subject matter to the socalled, states of consciousness — their analysis and synthesis. ‘States of consciousness’ like the so-called phenomena of spiritualism, are not objectively verifiable and for that reason can never become data for science” (p. 1) — “Psychology as a science of ‘consciousness’, has no such community of data. It cannot share them, nor can other sciences use them. no only can psychologist A not share his data with physicist A, but also he cannot share them with his brother psychologist B. Even if they existed, they would exist as isolated, unusable ‘mental’ curiosities.” (In a footnote:) “The behaviorist finds no evidence for ‘mental existences’ or ‘mental processes’ of any kind” (p. 2). — Bechterev has originally held the same view as indicated by his old work in German translation “Objektive Psychologie oder Psychoreflexologie” (1913). Later, he joins the former camp mentioned in the text and ceased to refer to his work as psychology at all. There are also so-called nominal behaviorists (Baley 1929, p. 51), who are content with a more or less slick supplementation of the subject-matter of traditional introspective psychology with the concept of behavior.

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(1928). Whereas the focus of the former is primarily atomistically physiological, the latter is holistically biological. A reflexologist tries to capture the wealth of human movements in terms of the schema “stimulus — reflex.” The special task of psychology is the study of the so-called conditioned reflexes (Pavlov) or associative reflexes (Bechterev). A behaviorist, on the other hand, gives the pride of place to the schema “stimulus-response” and takes learned behavior as well as the processes of learning to be of central interest for psychology. The concept of the conditioned reflex or learned behavior is meant to encompass also human utterances. However, “objectivists” only begin to turn their attention in this direction. They are completely unaware of the fact that this has been done a long time ago by R. Avenarius, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Despite the naive excesses in criticism, multiple terminological confusions and the often primitive argumentation of Russian and American representatives of “objective” psychology, their objections to the achievements of “subjective” psychology are by and large quite right. On the other hand, however, the results obtained by means of the new method do not live up to the expectations and do not justify the total rejection of the traditional method. This is not at all surprising since their results are related most closely to the developments in physiology and biology. Until those disciplines progress, the new psychological method will not afford any better results than the old one. One cannot, however, turn this surely only temporary state of affairs to an objection against the new method, as does B. Petermann (1928, pp. 378ff), who argues that reflexology is not verifiable. It is also not surprising to a neutral observer that the results of the new extraspective method do not actually contain anything that either has not been already or that could be obtained by means of “inner” perception (see P. Ranschburg 1932ab). Moreover, Petermann’s objection against behaviorism seems basically right. A holistic understanding of the behavior of an organism requires that one knows its “meaning.” We learn the meaning of a behavior fundamentally through introspection.40 An excellent example is provided by James’ and Lange’s theory of emotions suitably corrected in Gestalt terms, of course. This is due to the fact that behaviorism is very literal in understanding the external behavior of an organism as the movements of external organs. However, nothing stands in the way of extending holistic extraspection to the domain characteristic of reflexology by letting it cover literally inner behavior of an organism, i.e. 40

Petermann (1928), pp. 392ff. The same objection appears to be contained in Claparède (1927, p. 286).

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a behavior that consists in processes occurring inside the body. It would be permissible to focus exclusively on the external movements as the subjectmatter for objective psychology only if there were a strict isomorphism between such movements and their introspectively accessible meaning. But behaviorists have produced no support for this claim. It must be admitted, though, that a limited isomorphism of this sort is rather probable, or perhaps even necessary, if applied psychology in general and practical psychology (characterology, physiognomics and graphology) in particular is to be possible at all. 41 Supplementing objective psychology with the notion of a literally inner behavior of an organism gets rid of the paradoxical air of some fundamentally new science of mental phenomena. What is revealed is simply a theoretical construction of the nature of these phenomena (in the sense laid out in Chapter 1, i.e. analogical to physical theories of sound, light, electricity, etc.). At the same time, the traditional psychophysical parallelism based on fundamentally dualistic premises is removed, but the purely psychological advantages of the thesis of isomorphism are not lost. It is also easy to see that this conception is quite compatible with intentional psychology. After all, one can interpret acts and activities as well as attitudes and mental states as forms of inner behavior of the subject directly accessible to her consciousness through an “inner” (i.e. directed toward inner processes) sense.42 Mental phenomena (understood as the functions of a subject given directly in introspection) turn out to be the same as what is given in “external” experience as the inner behavior of an organism or certain movements of organic matter. 43 Unfortunately, the 41

This point is made by P. Guillaume (1932), pp. 707ff. Indeed, D.B. Klein (1931, pp. 295f) attempts to offer a behaviorist interpretation of intentionalism. 43 This “philosophical” construction of the nature of mental processes seems to me to capture the more or less unclear and mostly “subconscious” views of the majority of physiologists, biologists and psychopathologists. It is also congenial with the tendencies of applied psychology which is essentially neutral with respect to the mind-body problem (as indicated e.g. by W. Stern’s personalism). Similar trends toward this position develop even on the grounds of general introspectionist psychology. This is most evident in O. Selz’s understanding of the phenomena of thinking as a system of specific reactions [System spezifischer Reaktionen], i.e. reflex orderings [reflexoidaler Zuordnungen] (see 1924, pp. 9f). It is also indicated by the capacity interpretation of psychophysical measurements mentioned in footnote 11, above. It is also possible that the difficulties facing the Gestalt theory (Chapter II, section 3) would disappear on the grounds of the position on the nature of mental processes laid out above. It seems, moreover, that an internal development of behaviorism (under the influence of the deep thought of its European (in particular French) sympathizers leads directly to a position essentially congenial with the one proposed above (see in particular, Guillaume 1932, especially Chapter III). I also believe that the structural 42

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detailed task of assigning the particular phenomena one to another must be left to future developments of physiology or biology. The direct “subjective” knowledge about the inner behavior of a subject has, of course, always been the departure point for psychological research. However, the concept of a mental phenomenon cannot be limited only to those forms of behavior of an organism that are directly accessible to consciousness. It must also cover those forms of behavior whose existence the subject can ascertain only indirectly on the basis of a close relation to the former. Consciousness is unnecessary for many types of reactions of a subject, hence the various manifestation of the “unconscious” (more precisely: behavior of which one is at present unaware even though one is usually aware of it). Nevertheless, the biological significance of this direct knowledge of oneself seems to be enormous since it is necessary for the development of “higher” forms of social conduct based on direct prediction of one’s future behavior. 5. Naive Materialism

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This conception of mental phenomena is clearly materialistic (if, that is, this term will preserve its sense in the new epistemology). It is especially close to the version of materialism, which T. Kotarbiński has called psychological kinetism. However, the claim “‘to experience’ is the same as ‘to move’” must be understood as a structural definition. Otherwise, it is clearly false.44 From a reistic point of view, this position is simply a psychological somatism, i.e. the claim that a “soul” (i.e. a subject) is a “body” (or organism). (See Kotarbiński 1932, pp. 21f.) Both versions of materialism are species of what Kotarbiński calls equative materialism [materializm ekwatywny] (if one understands the expression “in fact” as a synonym for the expression “essentially”), which is opposed to causative mate-

definition of mental phenomena given above provides a proper elucidation and sufficient justification of the empiriocritical substitution of a subject with system C, which is mentioned by R. Avenarius (see 1891, section 112). Finally, one could regard the above conception as a development of T. Kotarbiński’s (1922, p. 186) claim that “each of many different types of the descriptive part (sc. of psychological description) could be understood according to the schema: such an such a process occurs in Jan’s nervous system.” See also my comments in footnote 7, above and footnotes 45, 53, below. 44 Kotarbiński (1932), pp. 25f. If one treats this claim not as stating synonymy but as a structural definition, then one can reject the claim that “no psychological sentence has the same meaning as a non-psychological (including also physiological) sentence” (Kotarbiński 1929, p. 413).

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rialism [materializm kauzatywny].45 However, in view of the fact that this view is so natural, it might be best to call it naive materialism, by analogy to naive realism. One of the main reasons why this naive materialism encounters theoretical resistance is the fact that it implies that mental phenomena have spatial features and must be localized in an organism, which is allegedly starkly incompatible with what is given introspectively. First of all, as Kotarbiński points out, one needs to take into account the ambiguity of the concept of localization of mental phenomena. Moreover, only speculative localization (what Avenarius calls introjection) leads to the unwelcome epistemological idealism. But there is no harm in thinking that mental phenomena possess “real localization,” i.e. that every person experiences his mental process where his body is located (Kotarbiński 1929, pp. 405f and 392). The possible further objection against materialism that “physiological processes will possess the same properties as mental processes, e.g. the ability to perceive, to distinguish or to reason, etc.”,46 is based on a confusion. It is not the mental processes but it is the subject who possesses the ability to perceive, distinguish, reason, etc. And I see no reason to think that the subject could not be thought of as the organism. Those of us who have been brought up in traditional dualistic metaphysics may find it strange and even hard to understand the claims that an organism possesses self-knowledge in the form of an “inner” sense or that it obtains self45

Kotarbiński (1927), p. 421. Causative materialism is inferior for three reasons. First, it degrades mental phenomena to the role of epiphenomena since the causal relation is onedirectional. Second, it cannot provide a sufficient explanation of this asymmetry, which would be necessary if one was to prevent a relapse to dualistic interactionism. Finally, one would have to first introduce monism before the concept of a causal relation, as it is understood in physical sciences, would be applied. One could object to the proposed view as follows. One could claim that the structural definition does not remove the dualism after all. It is only transformed into the dualism between the definiens and the definiendum. The objection can be disarmed if on remembers that this latter duality does not exclude the reducibility of the phenomena in question to one another (which is what would have to be the case if there really was a substantive dualism at stake). This issue requires much more discussion in view of the questions mentioned in in footnote 7, above. My construction of the nature of mental phenomena seems to be equivalent to Carnap’s conception of the psychophysical parallelism as “Parallelverauf der Bestandteile” (1928, §16), if one were to take into account the epistemologically unequal status of the two parallel elements. The presented view is indeed very close to Neurath’s physicalism (1931/32) and Carnap’s “methodological materialism” (1932b). See also Avenarius’ discussion of psychophysical parallelism in sections 147-149 of his (1894) as well as footnotes 43 (above) and 53 (below). 46 This is an adaptation of A. Dryjski’s objection against the physiological interpretation of unconscious phenomena. See (1931), p. 229.

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knowledge through theoretical construction. If one takes into account the fact that self-knowledge is no more mysterious than knowledge in general, then — as long as ‘to understand’ means the same as ‘to include in a logical system of knowledge’ — the above claims will become easy to understand. Moreover, the fact that an organism has such knowledge will become relatively easy to grasp precisely in terms of the naive materialism which formally reduces psychology to physiology, which reflects the monistic tendencies of the rational mind. This issue touches on the problem of explaining the concepts of judgments and representations in terms of the above conception of mental phenomena. The more so that this problem presupposes the problem of drawing the distinction between the object, the content and the act of a mental phenomenon as well as the problem of distinguishing between the logic and epistemology, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other.

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IV. Selected Problems 1. Basic Distinctions I see no fundamental difference between introspection and extraspection. Both involve sensory qualities. The only difference is that they supply information about the subject in the former case and directly about the things existing outside of the subject and only indirectly about the subject, in the latter case. Accordingly, we must change the concept of a sensory stimulus so as to let it coincide with the meaning accepted by physiologists. In other words, this term ought to be restricted only to nonneural processes that stimulate the nervous system, so that one would literally speak about external and internal stimuli. Sensory qualities constituting consciousness include the so-called kinesthetic and organic contents as well as others similar to them or even unknown so far. According to Gestalt psychology, they are the foundation of the direct awareness of one’s functions. It will be useful, I believe, to distinguish activities in the usual sense of the term and states, i.e. passive experiences that have the character of “products” or dispositions. I have in mind the distinction between paying attention, convincing someone, believing, seeing, inquiring, being angry, moving about, etc., on the one hand, and attention, conviction, belief, perception, knowledge, anger, movement, etc., on the other. This distinction seems similar to the one between emotions and moods. In view of my interpretation of mental phenomena as the inner behavior of an organism, it will be in keeping with the conclusion of the previous chapter to introduce the concept of an attitude

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to characterize particular processes in a cross-section, as it were, and in agreement with intentional psychology. In these terms, an act is simply a transition between two attitudes. It is especially important to distinguish between a function of which the subject is directly aware (the function will be said to be directly accessible), and an indirectly accessible one of which the subject becomes aware indirectly through its directly accessible effects. Such indirectly accessible mental processes include, first and foremost, purely intellectual functions such as representing and judging and also some “acts of will” such as deciding and choosing (if indeed they are a distinct kind of experiences). This distinction is best brought out by comparing seeing, hearing, feeling (a smell or a touch) with looking, listening, smelling or touching. If only illusions and hallucinations have made us aware of the fact that aside from things and phenomena, there exist also seeing, hearing, feeling, then the early awareness of looking, listening, smelling or touching should be explained in terms of the clear presence of motions that accompany those experiences. It must be pointed out, however, that this direct sensory awareness of one’s functions (in abstraction from any corrections introduced by external senses) is completely vague and indeterminate. Each actual introspection even of a mere arm movement (and even the very characterization of it as an arm movement) is already very complex and involves materials from all senses. Only thus can we make sense of the numerous observations by thinkers and artists that the proper creative process is “subconscious” and consciousness plays the role of a care-taker and advisor. I take beliefs, i.e. convictions, to be states directly accessible to the “inner” perception, just like emotional experiences and other feelings as well as actions or motivated movements. The relation of a judgment to judging and of a representation [przedstawienie, Vorstellung] to appearing [przedstawianie, Vorstellen] seems to me to be similar to the relation between motion and moving. It is thus more analogous to the relation of a part (or an instantaneous phase) to a whole (or something extended in time) rather than to the relation of a product to the process or activity that produces it (see Twardowski 1927a). The genetic relation between these two acts or processes has also been erroneously conceived in my opinion. It has been thought that representation is more basic than judgment. This view is best expressed by L. Blaustein (1928), who claims that the distinction between the act/content/object of a mental phenomenon was first drawn for representations and “it has been only later applied to other classes of mental facts” (p. 3). I think to the contrary that this distinction was first made on elementary individual judgments, i.e. judgments whose subject is a referent of a proper name, and that it was then applied to other mental

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phenomena, in particular representations. It derives from the distinction of elements in a declarative sentence or utterance. It corresponds to the distinction between the subject, the predicate and the very fact of a judgment. Accordingly, • the object of a judgment is that which one judges to be such and such, • the content of a judgment is what one judges something to be, • the act of a judgment is the fact that one judges something to be such and such something else. 2. Judgments and Representations

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The noted correspondence between the elements of a judgment and the elements of its symbolic “expression” should not be surprising if one considers the fact that [the concept of] a judgment is a theoretical construction based on the fact that one asserts such and such to be the case. One can thus define a judgment as an act that brings about the state of the belief, which has been asserted [stan przekonania wypowiedzianego] (not necessarily using the language of sounds). In other words, a judgment is an attitude of a special sort, related to stating and leading the subject to a state of knowledge, i.e. ability to assert declarative sentences. From a biological point of view, this state can be characterized as a state of mobilized defenses as a result of a “fuller” orientation. Judgments are those statements that are accompanied by the element of conviction or belief; they would be mere suppositions otherwise. In my opinion, suppositions are the representations of sentences and so like all representations they do not involve the capacity to affirm a sentence, i.e. to issue a judgment that a given judgment is true. The close relation between a judgment and a statement at the same time indicates that in order to find the structure of representations one needs to search for linguistic “expressions” that correspond to them one-to-one. It is clear, however, that, from the point of view of intentional psychology, it is impossible to understand mere names as that, which corresponds to representations symbolically. We thus need to change the widely accepted view in this regard. I believe that the logical theory of elementary sentential functions may be a reliable guide here. This is to say that statements with ‘something’ as a subject correspond to representations, where the semantic role of ‘something’ is meant to be construed so broadly as to refer also to people. However, one has to distinguish the above use of such statements from another commonly occurring abbreviation where such statements express existential judgments, i.e. judgments that the sentential function is satis-

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fied by certain substitutions of the variable. It is not difficult to see that the role of representations in psychology is analogous to the role of sentential functions in logic. In psychology, the role of representations is to make the subject-matter present, as it were, as a necessary condition for judgments and assessments. As far as particular and general judgments of traditional logic are concerned, the role of sentential functions with respect to universal and particular sentences in the logical theory of apparent variable [logiczna teoria zmiennej pozornej] is clearly analogous. This makes plausible the thought that we can use this result even where the analogy is not so clear, i.e. in perceptions, recollections and expectations, which contain individual judgments, i.e. where a name must be substituted for the variable in the sentential function. Consequently, there is no need for the infamous theory of subjective “pictures,” which led to so many confusions and difficulties in psychology and epistemology. The place of “sensory contents representing an object playing the role of its appearance, appearing with a direct contention to being an object, etc.” (Blaustein 1931, section 19) is occupied by the physiological conditions of a statement and their epistemic value based on these conditions.47 W. Heinrich (1895, p. 65) puts it succinctly:

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The point is not how the world is reflected in us. The point is to understand our 48 relation and attitude toward the world in general.

After imposing the distinction between an act, content and object of an experience onto representations, 49 it is evident that different representations are different to the extent that they have different contents. Ultimately, what is responsible for these differences is the predicate of an elementary sentential function. This explains why phenomenal psychology could (without major harm) ignore the concept of an act as well as the concept of an object of a representation, thereby becoming a special case of the more general intentional psychology. Moreover, one has to accept that the psychological subject is concerned with the object of a representation only to the extent that the latter possesses properties assigned to it 47

It is clear that after a proper translation of the language of the theory of “pictures” to the language of objective conditions, it would be possible to make all traditional and new distinctions of genera and species of representations (perceptual, imitative, creative, imaginative, symbolic, schematic, signitive). As far as Twardowski’s recent theory of concepts is concerned, it is compatible with the view presented above provided that one replaces the term ‘judgment’ by the term ‘sentence’. 48 “Es kann sich aber nicht darum handeln, wie sich die Welt im Menschen abbildet, sondern es handelt sich um das Verständnis des menschlichen Verhaltens der Welt gegenüber überhaupt.” (Heinrich 1895, p. 65) 49 There is a connection here with T. Czeżowski’s theory of concepts; see his (1932).

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by the content of the representation. This does not imply, of course that the object does not or cannot have other properties as well. Consequently, the difference between a particular and a general representation is not a difference of their objects but rather of their contents, which determine how many substitutions satisfy a sentential function. This means essentially that the object of a general idea can be a particular, which is presented in a general way. It need not be construed as some kind of universal, which lacks the properties of particulars that fall under the general representation. K. Twardowski (1894, p. 105) argues otherwise: If one has two representations whose objects do not support the same judgments then the objects are different from one another. We can see that this relation holds also for a universal and a particular representation when we realize that the object of a general representation is different from the object of an arbitrary particular 50 representation that falls under the general one.

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However, the first premise seems to me false. It is not true that judgments supported by the objects of particular representations are not supported by the objects of a (corresponding) general representation. I cannot judge that the object of the general representation “triangle” is equilateral, for example, or that its area is 2 cm2 . But this is not to say that these judgments are false or that they are not supported by that object. Since an unjustified claim is certainly not false just in virtue of being unjustified, so Twardowski’s argument cannot demonstrate the existence of objects of general representations that are fundamentally different from the objects of particular representations. Finally, we can explain how it is possible for every representation to have an object even though this object need not actually exist. Such an “empty” representation simply corresponds to a sentential function that does not form a true sentence for any substitution. The problem of understanding judgments (in the strict sense of the term) in terms of some more elementary perceptual processes is better left to logic. This is necessary in view of the problem of the meaning of predicate names [nazwy orzecznikowe]. Psychology, in turn, is interested in the experiences that correspond to the sentences to the effect that another sentence is true or false, i.e. the problem of judgments about judgments. In my opinion, these experiences occur initially rarely. They occur only after a judgment has been called into question, i.e. usually after 50

“Hat man zwei Vorstellungen, . . . von deren Gegenständen nicht dieselben Urteile gelten, so sind diese Gegenstände voneinander verschieden. Da dies letztere Verhältnis bei der Allgemeinvorstellung im Vergleich zur Einzelvorstellung stattfindet, so müssen wir den Gegenstand der Allgemeinvorstellung für verschieden vom Gegenstand einer beliebigen ihr untergeordneten Einzelvorstellung erklären.” (Twardowski 1894, p. 105)

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a clearly conscious state of doubt. In this respect, these judgments are strikingly similar to the so-called intentions, which initially at least appear only after a clearly conscious battle of motives, i.e. after the state of hesitation. This analogy between judgments about judgments and intentions is so striking that I will present it in some more detail. Just as hesitation probably consists in halting some motor impulse, so doubt consists in some sort of halting in the “hatching” of a statement. Just as intention consists in unhalting an action (or “putting it in motion” anew) thus leading to a state of a positive or a negative activity, so a judgment about a judgment consists in an unhalting leading to a state of a positive or negative certainty associated with a statement, i.e. to the state of a fortified conviction. Just as directly accessible states of hesitation and action cause the illusion that we are thus conscious of intentions, so directly accessible states of doubt and certainty cause the illusion that we are thus conscious of judgments about judgments. Finally, just as the awareness of the existence of such intentions has led to the hypothesis that intentions exist even when there is no conflict of motives, i.e. even in the case where actions are singly motivated, so also the awareness of the existence of such judgments about judgments has led to the hypothesis that judgments exist even in the cases of normal statements not preceded by doubt. This hypothesis is justified further by the fact that, in later stages of development, we frequently carry out such a doubt in the form of a brief thought experiment before we utter a sentence. (In formal logic, this corresponds to the equivalence between a judgment and a judgment, which asserts its truth.) 51 3. Nominalism The task of logic and epistemology (which I have also called the logic of knowledge 52) is to consider judgments exclusively with view to their truth or falsehood. Since what is required to ascertain the truth or falsehood of a judgment is not the mere act of judgment but only its content, so for pure logic and epistemology the term ‘judgment’ (i.e.: truth or falsehood) is practically synonymous with the term ‘the content of a judgment’. This is 51

The analogy between intentions and judgments has been brought to my attention by the reading of W. Witwicki’s theory of intentions. I have published some comments on it (1932a), to which Witwicki (1932) replied. I hope that this monograph will help to clear misunderstandings that arose in this discussion. 52 See my (1925), pp. 66f and (1928), pp. 134ff. This idea of a “logic of knowledge” overlaps to a large extent with R. Carnap’s “applied logic” (“angewandte Logik” or “Grundlagenforschung”) developed in (1932c), see pp. 219f and 237f.

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the reason why pure nominalism (provided that term will retain its sense in the language of the new epistemology) is permissible in these sciences. In other words, it is sufficient for the purposes of these sciences to see the linguistic expressions themselves, i.e. sentences, as the bearers of a truthvalue. These sciences are thus distinguished from pure psychology. As a result, one cannot understand “judgment” thus construed as a product of the act of judging, as is proposed by K. Twardowski. One cannot accordingly distinguish psychology from logic on the ground that the former studies particular mental products in their particularity, while the latter studies only the abstracts of such products, which constitute the “meaning” of such psychophysical products, through which in turn mental products are “expressed” (see Twardowski 1927a, §39 and §45). Even if one ignores the fact that the distinction between an act so understood and its product is not useful in the case of judgments, it should be noticed that such an abstract will also, of course, possess the property of being mental since it possesses all features that are shared by the particular mental products, and the property of being mental is among those shared properties. As such, it will remain an object of psychological studies. If one wanted to abstract from this feature, one would have to extend the process of abstraction beyond the shared properties. One would have to appeal to the content of an experience, i.e. one would have to appeal to exactly that, which was supposed to have been the result of such an abstraction. This nominalistic position does not quite protect those sciences from the dangers of psychologism. It is very easy to confuse the meaning or sense of linguistic expressions, which are the proper bearers of truthvalue, with the act of utterance and its conditions, which is studied by linguistics in general and the psychology of language in particular. Such a confusion again leads to psychology. R. Avenarius seems to have committed just such a mistake in his analytical works by confusing the “objective” method of psychological investigations with the nominalism of logical and epistemological considerations, i.e. by confusing the conditions of an utterance with its sense.53 An analogous mistake is also present in K. Ajdukiewicz’s interesting semantic behaviorism, if the “motivational relations” among experiences, on which his theory of meaning is based, are interpreted as relations among psychophysical acts 53

I have in mind here the superb Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (1888-1890). It tells us a lot about the states and processes of the system C, on which human utterances depend directly. But it tells us too little, in fact nothing, about what these statements mean. Yet it is clear that the author must have first answered the second question before he began the construction of his physiological schemata. See also footnotes 7, 43, 45, above.

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(see 1931, pp. 56f and 67f, or pp. 26f and 37f of the reprint). Just as the socalled logical laws of thought govern the truth and not the process of thought, so also these motivational relations must obtain between the contents of claims rather than between acts of claiming (if they are to be the basis of formal logical constructions). In other words, what is at stake is the truth or falsehood of expressions, not the acts of taking them to be true or false.

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ON THE DEBATE ABOUT IMAGINATIVE IDEAS (1932) In young sciences, it is usually the case that the failure to solve principal problems lingers heavily on attempts to solve detailed problems. This is only to be expected since the solution of the former problems requires a broader and more detailed understanding of their impact on the latter. This point can be easily confirmed by a study of the history of the sciences. Until the material is gathered that would throw light on the relation between various views on the principal issues (i.e. ones that pertain to the basic concepts and claims of a given science), on the one hand, and various answers to more detailed questions in science, on the other, until then it is hard to put forward any certain fundamental criteria, which would be capable of deciding even the more detailed issues. Until then it is also extremely important for the further progress of science that one engage in discussion, whose main aim is to discern and analyze the principal elements contained in the concrete scientific results. The aim of my remarks is to address this issue in the ongoing discussion on imaginative ideas1 and to contribute to the further development of our understanding of this issue by indicating those differences in the general principles that have been revealed as particularly pertinent in the debate on this particular psychological question. That the question is of broader significance is quite rightly brought out by Ms. Filozofówna, who claims that it concerns first and foremost the problem of the “essence” of ideas. What she fails to notice is the fact that the debate on this issue is but a special case of the general opposition between functional psychology (or: the psychology of “acts”) and phenomenal psychology (or: the psychology of the “contents of consciousness”). It is clear that functional psychology became a clear and developed theory only when mental acts were understood as intentions (which was Husserl’s final view), when it became clear that a simple use of the term ‘mental activity’ is insufficient to build functional psychology. On the 1

Przegląd Filozoficzny 34 (1931), pp. 60-65 and 180-191.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 191-195. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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other hand, it is insufficient, as Mr. Blaustein claims, to abstract from the notion of the matter of an act in order to uphold the results of his analyses. Rather, one must adopt the notion of an intentional act and an intentional object, i.e. concepts essential for functional psychology. The debate about imaginative ideas is thus another episode of the rivalry between the two psychological schools. I also believe that the conflict has been sharpened by the fact that no compromises have been allowed. Indeed, there is no bridge between Ms. Filozofówna’s claim that “presentations merely make something present” and Mr. Blaustein’s claim that “presentations make something present as this and this and as such and such,” even though the verb form appears to suggest that there exists some common functional platform. However this “merely making present” is to be ultimately understood (which Ms. Filozofówna tries to explain by claiming that “presentations do not grasp their objects but pertain to them”), there is no doubt that she does not have an intentional experience in mind. According to a consistent and uniform functional psychology, intentionality is essential for experiences in general. What W. Witwicki and many others call “ideas” are, for her, merely structures of sensory contents, which, as such, are not mental though they remain in a close (even if as yet unexplained) relation to the mental. The on-going discussion is thus clearly a discussion about the nature of the subject-matter of psychology. This complicates matters substantially. In the first place, we are confronted by the fact that most of the serious experimental results were obtained in the framework of the psychology of the “contents of consciousness” and that not even the experimental functionalists were able to use the accepted theoretical concepts and to integrate them in research. On the other hand, however, it is evident to everyone that the results of phenomenal psychology are extremely slim relative to what is needed, and that it was precisely the psychology of “acts” that was presented as a necessity whenever “higher” mental processes (and cultural produced based on them) were concerned. Indeed, the “philosophical” value of functional psychology is much higher than that of phenomenal psychology. This is most manifest in the fact that the latter is akin to the unclear and risky epistemological idealism while the former can be splendidly developed on the “natural” epistemological realism. It is easy to infer from this that general philosophical issues play a significant and perhaps even a decisive role in the debate between these two psychological movements. If introspection is called on to the role of an arbiter, it will always give a judgment, which follows just those subjective and theoretical factors, and which depends on perspective from which one approaches the problem of the essence of experiences – whether from the concrete experimental or the abstract philosophical point of view. It is

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obvious then that the criterion of the simplicity and clarity as far as the existence of imaginative ideas is concerned is not as straightforward as Ms. Filozofówna believes. For me, at any rate, Mr. Blaustein’s descriptions, for example, are clearer and simpler. To support his position, let me call attention to the following fact of considerable significance. For many, it was no secret that the psychology of the “contents” does provide a sufficient logical foundation for the study of the so-called ideational types [typy wyobrażeniowe] in the form of a proper theory of ideas. No description and no “phenomenal” construction gives a clear and precise understanding of these special ideas in which we “think about objects with the help of words” (Witwicki 1930, pp. 253f in the 2 nd edition, p. 223 in the 1 st edition) and whose existence is to define the so-called word types (whether in view of the frequency, the degree of vividness, or the importance of the role). At the same time, the facts of such ideas are completely intelligible (in the sense of a descriptive grasp, not in the sense of a causal explanation) in terms of the constructions and descriptions of the psychology of the “acts,” by means of the concepts of an intentional object and act. This can be seen in the case of Mr. Blaustein’s theory of the so-called signitive ideas [wyobrażenia sygnitywne], developed on the same foundations as his theory of imaginative ideas.2 I take this result to be a significant achievement of functional psychology, which moves the scale of the debate about the “essence” of experiences significantly away from phenomenal psychology. The two views are distinguished by one more point, which pertains to the issue of the construction of mental processes. It is clear that the intentionalistic understanding of such processes is compatible with the postulate to take into account the fundamental unity and consistency of experiences, which is put forward by “structuralists” in general and “Gestaltists” in particular. But this means that functional psychology is easily built in terms of the so-called “anti-synthetic point of view.” The clear victory of this orientation is nowadays hard to deny. Even selfprofessed “atomists” defend themselves not by trying to combat it but by pointing out that their constructions from “elements” are not “additive” in character. This point speaks for Mr. Blaustein’s, and against Ms. Filozofówna’s, remarks. Indeed, according to her view (following Witwicki and others), all presentations which are not ideas themselves are complexes formed from ideas and judgments. Their mental elements are 2 Blaustein develops his theory of signitive ideas more extensively in his new work (1931). Chapter V contains a detailed criticism of the competing views. It will be certainly contribute to the clarification of the misunderstandings and to the explanation of many debated points in the on-going discussion.

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thus independent (each can be connected with other such elements without any threat to its identity) and the number of such elements can be at any point in time unlimited because of the “indistinct consciousness.” Take, for example, her claim about the “identity” of ideas subject to different interpretations in the case of illusions and perceptions, or in the case of the changing attitude of theatrical audience toward the actor and the hero (this is a generalization of the so-called principle of constancy). Or take her statement that “there simultaneously exist a number of more or less distinct judgments in consciousness” and that “it is impossible to determine how many presentations or judgments are present in one’s experiences at a given moment” (the inapplicability of the decidability postulate). In other words, the debate about the nature of ideas can be seen as an episode from the unfinished conflict between structuralists and atomists. And this, of course, complicates matters even further. In addition, I have to admit that functional psychology need not be built antisynthetically and that even Mr. Blaustein’s descriptions contain clearly “synthetic” elements. I have in mind here primarily his claims about the “identity” of the presentational contents in various kinds of presentations. I consider this to be a deviation from his basic methodological outlook. But the issue is indeed difficult and concerns facts that Gestalt psychology has not yet explained sufficiently well. Incidentally, this issue calls for an experimental investigation of the extent to which an ideational intention [intencja wyobrażeniowa] depends on the objective (stimuli) and subjective (personality) factors. The last comment, which this debate has provoked, concerns the epistemological problem of the difference between the strictly descriptive grasp of a directly given phenomenon and its hypothetical completion in a theoretical construction. In view of the divergence in introspective results, the question that forces itself is whether this difference itself is given directly (empiricist or intuitionist thesis) or rather theoretically constructed (rationalistic or skeptical thesis). It may be that this question, just like many questions in traditional epistemology, makes sense only in terms of the fundamental distinction between the “directly given data” and “constructional theory” (or the “pure experience” and “pure thought”) as two “absolutes.” But if one denies the assumption, the question loses its footing. At any rate, the development of the sciences has not produced clear answers to this question. At the same time, it is hard to deny that the methodologically absolute status of this difference is hard to reconcile with the relativism implicit in the fact that it is realized in concrete scientific practice. I suspect that this difference is a manifestation of deep “philosophical” attitudes (the so-called fundamental values) that are so general that they decide even the question whether a given method is

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“scientific.” Moreover, they correspond to basic (and so far unexplained) definitional assumptions of various “systems of knowledge,” i.e. they distinguish “scientific knowledge” from other kinds of knowledge such as “metaphysical,” “religious,” etc. The resolution of these issues belongs to the future logic of knowledge. At present, I want to merely point out the difference in the pictures concerning the relation between “description” and theory” that is suggested by the development of physics, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other. One may risk the claim that, in physics, every fundamental step forward consisted in the discovery and elimination of purely theoretical elements from the material considered as directly given. As a result, the development of this science could be conceptualized as a progressive convergence to the “pure” distinction between description and theory. For that reason, physicists consciously appeal to the important postulate of gradual generalization, according to which each fundamentally novel construction must contain the old one as a special case. This is also the source of the amazing developmental continuity of this most perfect of material sciences. By contrast, there is not a trace of such a developmental continuity in psychology. The fundamental differences between theories look like the differences between statements and their direct negations, i.e. they look like ineliminable contradictions. This may be due to the fact that physical theories are by nature explicative whereas theories of pure (i.e. nonphysiological) psychology are by nature descriptive. This would point to a certain fundamental methodological difference between these two sciences, which is not irrelevant to the problem of the nature of their subject-matter. In any case, since the debate about imaginative ideas is an episode of precisely those fundamental differences embodied in psychological views, there is little hope that there can be agreement on and an “objective” resolution of this issue. Unless, that is, it turns out that aside from the thesis of functional psychology or the thesis of structural psychology and the antithesis of phenomenal psychology or the antithesis of atomistic psychology, there is room for some more general synthesis (as, for example, was the case with the “contradiction” between the wave and the particle theory of light). Or, unless it turns out that one of the sides of the debate contains elements capable of developing it into a theory that is more general than the other, indeed one that could contain the other as a special case (as is illustrated, for example, by the relation between Einstein’s and Newton’s physics). It is clear, however, that such a resolution of the debate about imaginative ideas can only take place on a methodologically and “philosophically” homogeneous ground, i.e. on the ground of “scientific” knowledge.

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ON THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE CLARITY IN THOUGHT AND WORD (1959) 1. For a long time, we have heard and read in methodological discussions and papers about clarity as a feature of thought and speech. Descartes, as we know, raised it to the distinction of one of the criteria of truth. I have noticed, however, that beyond an apparent agreement as to its significance and value, there are substantial disagreements about how to understand it and factual disparities in the extent to which the clarity postulate is realized. My aim in these reflections and analyses is to provide a groundwork for further methodological considerations. The need for such a work is particularly evident in philosophical discussions, whose highly abstract character makes them especially prone to misunderstandings and which, as a result, lead all too often to our forgetting about the living human. 2. In the methodology of the sciences, the meaning of the postulate of clear thinking and speaking is, of course, metaphorical, founded on an analogy from the world of physical processes. [. . . We speak first and foremost about air being clear or fogged and about water being clear or clouded.] * This gave rise to our speaking about seeing things clearly. Finally, these characteristics were transferred onto consciousness, thinking and its elements, as well as onto speech. [ . . . ]† We stumble on a *

[Omitted here is a passage about the roots of the metaphor, which do not transfer to English (see below). What follows within the brackets is what I take to be the equivalent point in English. The original reads: “We speak first and foremost about it being light or dark, and later (in a somewhat different sense) about light or dark colors.” In Polish, the word ‘jasny’ (clear) means also ‘light’ (as opposed to dark) as in ‘it is light’ or ‘this is a light color’. There is no evident etymological connection between ‘jasny’ (clear, light) and ‘światło’ (light as in ‘light waves’).] † [Once again the text does not translate well because of the breakdown of the light metaphor mentioned in note *, above. Here is the remainder of the paragraph without the omissions (marked by ‘[ . . . ]’) made in the text: “Light colors are not the same as colors in

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 197-210. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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fundamental difference between absolute internal properties of objects and relative properties of objects that depend on their relations to other objects. [ . . . ] The function that [ . . . ] confers the subjective clarity on processes and objects is usually attention. It is commonly conceived as “increased” or “heightened” awareness or consciousness. We should therefore pause to consider the meaning of the term ‘consciousness’. 4

3. This term has played a particularly important role in the first phase of the development of modern psychology — in the so-called psychology of the “contents of consciousness” (Bewusstseinsihalte). Consciousness here was most frequently understood simply as the same as the subject, i.e. as an indeterminate basis for mental processes and as a “substrate” [ośrodek odniesienia poznawczego] for mental properties (or a “mental thing,” as it were). However, the term has already then had another meaning, which is more congenial to the ordinary sense of the term and more appropriate in my view, viz. in the sense of knowledge [wiedza], in general, and knowledge about one self (or self-consciousness), in particular. This sense leads directly to thinking and thoughts as general terms for proper intellectual functions and states, which can have the property of being clear or unclear and confused. I must, however, stress that I do not conceive of the relation between mental functions and states as the relation between processes and their products, as K. Twardowski does. This construction is too fruitless and unnatural (one could even say — anthropomorphic). In my view, states are to be considered as componentstages of processes. For example, thoughts are components of thinking, which is a temporally extended sequence of thoughts. Consequently, clear thinking is, first and foremost, thinking that contains clear thoughts. This ought not to be understood as precluding other properties (in particular those that pertain to the Gestalts of mental processes) from contributing to the clarity of thinking. In any case, the clarity of thinking and thought is, in my view, strictly related to knowledge. Hence, its relation to judgment, a strong light. Here the feature of being light is not something relative, which derives from the outside as in the case of objects that are light due to their being strongly lit. We stumble on a fundamental difference between absolute internal properties of objects and relative properties of objects that depend on their relations to other objects. In the case of the property of being light, this difference is tantamount to the difference between being objectively and subjectively light, i.e. to the difference between the property of being light independently of the perceiving and thinking subject and the property of being light depending on the relation to the subject and his or her functions. The function that (by analogy to light) confers the subjective light on processes and objects is usually attention. It is commonly conceived as ‘increased’ or ‘heightened’ awareness. We should therefore pause to consider the meaning of the term ‘awareness’.”]

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which is considered to be the typical or proper object of clarity. Thus conceived clarity is an objective property since it is related to the objectivity of knowledge. Before I focus on this point, I should like to mention that there is also a clarity related to knowledge, whose nature is quite subjective. I have in mind here the clarity that accompanies the unique states and experiences of the mystics as well as the pathological (or perhaps only abnormal) states and experiences of normal and healthy individuals, which do not seem to differ that much from the former. Many describe this state as “dwelling in light,” which is reminiscent of the analogy to light.* It suggests that the resulting clarity is distinctly subjective. It is not usually associated with any more clear and distinct content of the knowledge or with any practically and theoretically important object of knowledge. 4. It will be worthwhile to consider the extraordinary ambiguity of the expression ‘to think’, which has not been properly taken into account in the analyses of such important expressions as, for example, “the laws of thought.” Let me focus only on the most important meanings. ‘To think’ is the same as: (a) to move from one thought to another accompanied by a feeling of “activity” (this is a general operational sense of ‘thinking’ I mentioned above); (b) to claim that this or that is such and such, i.e. to issue judgment in the sense of traditional logic; (c) to “merely think” or to represent something to oneself or to entertain an idea without assertion (in direct contrast to (b)); (d) to become aware of some relation at all (i.e. not only the relation mentioned in (b)); (e) to ascertain that something is true, i.e. to claim truth; (f) to have true and concrete thoughts about something concrete; (g) to have true thoughts in general, i.e. to think something about an arbitrary object or about being in general. It is clear first of all that meaning (c) is the basis for the construction of such concepts as representation, idea, impression, etc., whose role in traditional epistemology has been important though, in my view, misunderstood. I believe that these concepts are derivative from the concept of a judgment. In other words, we have come to be aware of the existence of what those concepts denote as a result of our coming to be *

[See note * on page 197.]

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aware of the existence of what has been called “judgment.” At the same time, this is not to contradict the fact that the existence of judgment depends on the existence of those processes. I will throw some light on this issue below. At present, let me briefly discuss the meanings of the term ‘to think’ I listed. In contrast to the proper logical sense (b), sense (e) is metalogical, important for logical semantics. (This distinction is also important for the reflections that follow.) Sense (g) (as well as (f), which differs only in the degree of abstraction) clearly takes into account the content and the object, which I believe to be important for thought, and which seems to have escaped the attention of those logicians, who viewed “form” as something fundamentally different from (or even as contradictory to) “content.” After all, this has led to Aristotelian idealism, i.e. to the conception of “pure” form, i.e. form without content. We know nowadays, however, that abstraction is not the same as annihilation. Consequently, the so-called “laws of thought” must be conceived as the laws of “what has been thought,” i.e. they must be conceived objectively and ontologically as independent of the act of thinking, and so also as beyond [social] class.* This issue is strictly relevant to the question of the relation between thinking and speech, to which I now turn.

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5. According to the popular view, thinking is “expressed” in speech. A judgment is expressed in a sentence. A concept (as a form of a representation) is expressed in a term. On the other hand, it is commonly accepted that thinking is directly given in introspection, and accordingly that we can directly control the accuracy of this relation of expression by means of simple juxtaposition of thought and language. This second point seems to be but a prejudice deriving from the habit, inculcated in us by idealistic upbringing, to think that introspection is a fundamentally different source of knowledge than extraspection. By contrast, I claim that although one can say that what is given in introspection are such mental states as hesitation, doubt, belief, conviction, certainty, etc., one must be careful not to understand introspection all too naively as literally an “inner sense” that informs us about our own organic states (via being affected by stimuli occurring within the organism). One must also remember that such data are indeterminate. The determinate content contained in the terms cited above ought to be considered the result of the influence of data deriving from extraspection. Furthermore, contrary to popular opinion, I believe that apparently purely intellectual states such as impression, *

[This is an allusion to the Marxist trend to view thought as dependent on social processes, especially social-class processes.]

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representation, idea and even decision are not as such given to me directly in introspection. Rather, they are accepted hypothetically to explain the occurrence of certain states given extraspectively, which are most likely observed first in others and only later in ourselves. For example, ‘consciousness’ at first means a feature of the behavior of others — something like their “alertness.” Only after perceiving this feature in our own behavior, does it acquire the “mental” significance and eventually comes to be “idealized” to what we find in bourgeois psychology as the simple negation of all materiality. This is particularly evident in the case of “judgment,” the central object of traditional logic. Let us note that everything we know about judgment derives not from psychology but from logic. The real psychological science about thinking arises only at the beginning of the twentieth century and it contains no trace of any information about this classical state of mind. It is thus not surprising that the psychology of judgment looks just like a logic chapter (or the other way around) — to the dismay of all those who liberated themselves from psychologism in logic but who remain faithful to the thought that this strange phenomenon is given directly. The same is true about “thoughts” and “representations,” about which we hear and read the same things in psychology and in logic. Becoming aware of these facts is revelatory and liberating for fundamental philosophical concepts. It removes a lot of difficulties with which idealists are constantly confronted, and it gives a concrete meaning to ideas such as that mentality is the “subjective side” of material processes, for example. In particular, within this framework, one could define all psychological concepts by means of biological and specifically physiological concepts. However, such a “reduction” of psychology to “physiobiology” does not determine the question how the laws of these sciences relate to one another. For a reduction of the terms does not automatically lead to the reduction of the laws, as is clearly demonstrated by the relation between mathematics and logic. The mere reduction of the terms of one science to the terms of another, though methodologically important for knowledge, does not deserve to be called the “reduction” of one science to the other. We cannot thus speak about the reduction of psychology to physiobiology, not in the above terms at least. I should call attention to one more possible objection, which relies on some remarks by K. Twardowski (1898). He claims that the majority of words that refer to mental objects derive from words that refer to physical objects. He claims also that “not all words referring to the mental world derive from words referring to the phenomena of the sensual world” (p. 22), giving as an example words ‘myśl’ [Eng.: thought] and ‘uczucie’ [Eng.: emotion]. The second example is horrible since the word ‘uczucie’ [Eng.: emotion] derives from the word

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‘czucie’ [Eng.: sensation]. In any case, it is related to extraspection. According to A. Brückner (1927), the word ‘uczucie’ [Eng.: emotion] is also etymologically related to the word ‘czuwanie’ [Eng.: staying alert], which refers to a behavioral state. As far as the first example is concerned, it is semantically related to ‘zwlekanie’ [Eng.: delaying], which again refers to a certain behavioral attitude (Brückner 1927, p. 81). It is, of course, difficult to give and substantiate the etymological genesis of all psychological terms. This will be a nice task for future linguistics. However, the hypothesis I put forward is no less justified than was the hypothesis of evolution of biological species prior to its experimental demonstration.

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6. Everything that we know about judgment comes from logic. However, the first logicians, who were also the first grammarians, as well as the whole logical study of judgment is simply a repetition of a chapter in the study of language, which is also indicated by even the traditional logical symbols. After all, it was only with the rise of mathematical logic, which has successfully used mathematical symbols, that the enchanted verbal circle was broken. However, one has to be an idealist in mathematics to see this progress as a transcending of language in general; one has to see the operation of abstraction as an ontological process and as liberation from the ties to any linguistic symbols, not to recognize the important role of linguistic expressions in contemporary mathematical-logical constructions. Our knowledge about the “form” of judgment (or thought, more generally) would not be at all possible if it were not based on linguistic material and if appropriate formal abstractions were not carried out on it. It follows that everything that is essentially related to those features must be applied to the linguistic side of thought processes. This is particular true with respect to the relation of being true understood as an accurate reflection of reality. Although the truth of a sentence depends on the truth of the thought expressed by the sentence, it is not the latter but the former relation that is given directly to us and over which we have control. We find out whether a thought is true fundamentally after we check that there is a correspondence between the sentence and reality. Of course, the latter correspondence does not constitute the former, as idealists claim, but it constitutes the basis for its determination. The former constitutes Seinsgrund [existential ground], as Germans say, of the latter, while the latter is an Erkenntnisgrund [epistemic ground] for the former. (The relation between the temperature and the height of the Mercury column in a thermometer provides a good analogy.) I thus believe that it is not against epistemological materialism (realism) to associate “reflection” primarily with language as well as to rest content with the

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“materialization” of judgment and thought in a sentence, and of concept in a term. Likewise, it is quite congenial with epistemological realism not to use those terms in logic and epistemology at all since they are misleading, or at any rate to supply them with different meanings so as to preclude the confusion of logic and theory of knowledge with psychology. The position explained above seems to constitute both an explanation of the fruitful “grammatical” turn in modern logic, which is almost complete now, as well as a sufficient justification of that turn. It seems also that this position, which I expressed already twenty years ago (see 1933, Chapter IV, this volume: pp. 182-189), corresponds to K. Marx’s view that the “immediate reality of thought is language.” 7. The same can be said about the clarity of thought and thinking. This feature (as far as its epistemological value is concerned) pertains, first and foremost, to language and to speech. In contrast to subjective clarity, which is the object of the methodology of the sciences, the clarity in question is an objective property. This means that it pertains to something objective, viz. the material-social side of thought processes, i.e. to linguistic behavior. According to this view, who speaks clearly thinks clearly, and a person speaks clearly as long as she is simply understood. In other words, being understood is a sufficient condition of clarity. Moreover, we recognize the clarity of someone’s thoughts by recognizing the clarity of her language. Of course, it is necessary to relativize clarity to the “subject” of speech or to its object since the degree of clarity depends on it: “easy” understanding (the highest degree of clarity) is not possible everywhere. On this view, the social character of cognitive functions (related in particular with the linguistic communication among people) is also taken into account. This requires a detailed analysis, however. After K. Bühler, we must distinguish three functions of a language: an expressive function (expression of experiences), suggestive function (instigation of certain mental and behavioral reactions constitutive of social interactions among humans) and finally the proper communicative function (communication among people by conveying information about the world). 1 Although in every concrete act of linguistic interaction all 1

The terminology is somewhat different from Bühler’s, see Milewski (1947), p. 129. Prof. Kokoszyńska has rightly pointed out to me that the distinction provided in the text differs from Bühler’s not only terminologically but substantially. The communicative function I distinguish does not overlap with Bühler’s representational function (Darstellungsfunktion). Indeed, the latter is psychologically individualistic and need not be associated with the social role of linguistic interaction, which is the point of my distinction. A similar distinction of other psychologically individualistic functions of language (even if they were

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three functions are realized, depending on the situation, this happens in different configurations and usually one function dominates the others. Only the third of the functions listed above stands in a direct and strictest relation to thought processes in the proper sense of the term (i.e. as far as their epistemic role is concerned). Scientific knowledge would not be possible were it for the fact that information is communicated through language. The role of the other functions is only auxiliary and secondary. The development of science shows also that the language of science evolves in such a way as to help realize that very function, i.e. in such a way as to foster the proper communication or “exchange of thoughts.” This is also the reason why artificial languages are invented where the whole emotional richness of linguistic interactions is removed and what remains is exclusively a dry and naked vehicle of conveying information. In this light we can understand the role and sense of the methodological postulate of clarity of speech and language, where clarity is understood as an objective property that makes it possible for people to understand one another and to minimize misunderstandings.

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8. Before I proceed to the general discussion of the conditions of clarity of language and speech thus understood, I have to mention a factor that is hardest to grasp and to determine: the author’s or the speaker’s style. As far as the written language is concerned, it is well known that the authors of scientific monographs and textbooks have through centuries developed a certain stylistic scheme, which is dry and plain but considered to be most helpful for the communication of information. Of course, individual deviations from this scheme cannot be avoided even in this area of linguistic interaction since here too human individuality leaves its mark. These deviations cannot be major, however, as I had an opportunity to find out, for example, in the case of W. Witwicki’s style. The students who used his well-known textbook to prepare for an examination in psychology complained that they find it impossible to use it for studying. It appears not to be difficult but somehow they cannot retain any of its contents and some things are hard to understand. Evidently, the unique style, an expression of the author’s distinguished individuality, stood even in the way of their comprehending his work and required longer to get used to. It appears even that the scientific languages of different nations differ in this respect a great deal despite the fact that they realize the same social function. It suffices to mention here the well-known “lightness” of the considered to be necessary conditions of the social role of language) is contrary to my purpose.

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French or the “heaviness” of the Germans. In these cases, one can also observe a correlation between the “lightness” (respectively, “heaviness”) of language and “shallowness” (respectively, “depth”) of the content. It is clear, however, that it is difficult to say anything more precise as long as we consider natural languages and ordinary speech. This is due to the fact that the expressive and suggestive functions are still too prominent and interfere with the free realization of the communicative function. The style of scientific prose develops at any rate in the direction of simplicity and calmness even at the cost of being colorless and cold. All kinds of aesthetic embellishments are rejected as interfering with the communication among researchers. It is also worth pointing out that as far as research is concerned, written language has a natural advantage over spoken language. Since the latter is closely associated with gesticulation and voice modulation, it is highly dependent on undesirable (from an epistemic point of view) emotional experiences and makes it difficult for the communicative function to dominate. This has not remained without an impact on the development of scientific methods, as will become clear below. 9. If we understand clarity as comprehensibility, the postulate of the clarity of language can be understood as the postulate of exactness (more precisely, the postulate of isomorphism, i.e. one-to-one correspondence preserving all relations between linguistic expressions and their meanings). However, practice teaches us that synonyms (i.e. different expressions with the same meaning) are not as dangerous for mutual understanding as are homonyms or ambiguous expressions (i.e. expressions that have various meanings). For a long time, science has tried to safeguard against homonyms by means of the postulate to offer possibly complete definitions of its terms, i.e. by means of the demand to use only such terms, whose content has been defined precisely and thus settled in a given domain. In the first phase of their development, sciences usually try to take account of the ordinary meanings of the terms in question since such meanings derive from the accumulated ordinary human experiences. As science accumulates experiences that are inaccessible to ordinary practice and that require special scientific skills, there comes a phase when science liberates itself from this restriction. Epistemic goals thus tend to foster a steady departure from ordinary meanings. Since oftentimes this leads directly to an increase in the ambiguities, so the researchers seek a different method of constructing an entirely new terminology, which does not have undesirable associations. This is especially true in view of the fact that there is an ever greater need to take into account new and thus far unknown objects and phenomena. This is coupled with the creation and

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development of artificial written languages that have this advantage over natural spoken languages that, for easily understood psychological reasons, the expressive and suggestive functions can be much more easily tamed, giving pride of place to the communicative function. How perfect the process of creating unique and artificial terminology in a given discipline is, depends mainly on the wealth of accumulated experiences and on the level of formal-logical operations. Although it cannot be denied that here and there other factors surface, such as snobbish or pretentious attitudes or even the class interests of scientists, still they are not the principal factors in play in this process, which is nowadays carried out with the full consciousness of its purpose and necessity. It is worth reminding ourselves that this very need to make the terminology exact is manifested in the fact that technicians usually appeal to figure drawing as the most perfect expressions of what they want to communicate.

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10. The process of making the terminology exact reaches its peak with the so-called axiomatic method. This method was discovered by mathematicians as a means to bring order to the acquired research results by creating an enormous deductive chain in accordance with accepted inference rules. Likewise, the definitions were naturally ordered into a sequence starting with the definitions of the simplest terms to the more complex ones. In this way, every term of a given discipline has its own exactly determined place and so also meaning. Although such a place must also be relativized to a given system (since it is possible to construct different sequences), this does not stand in the way of perfect communication among scientists by means of such an artificial written language. The limits of this perfection are constituted, of course, by the primitive terms, i.e. terms that are not defined in a given discipline. This is why scientists try to minimize the number of such terms and why they consider the question of the possible definitional reduction of the primitive terms of one science to the terms of another science. For it has turned out in mathematics that it is indeed possible to reduce all mathematical terms to logical terms in just this fashion. Since then the attempts are made (not altogether unsuccessful) to accomplish something similar in other sciences. The postulate of such unification of all scientific terminology, which is simply a reflection of the fundamental unity of the world, has great chances of being realized though, of course, we are still far from its complete realization. If the postulate were realized, the scientific language would reach the height of clarity since it would minimize the chances of misunderstandings, which would be relegated only to the primitive terms of logic. Another important fact is that, in this process, the component of the written scientific language, which corresponds to the syntax of the

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spoken natural language and which could be rightly called the logical syntax of the scientific language, is made progressively more uniform. As a result, the “style,” which is so hard to grasp in natural languages, also becomes more uniform. One can thus speak not only about the terminology but indeed about the whole language of science becoming uniform. This does not mean, however, that the sciences will be thereby reduced, giving rise to some super-science of everything. There remains the question of scientific laws. The case of mathematics shows precisely that the reduction of vocabulary does not yet lead to the reduction of laws. It is thus quite possible that the sciences are systematically independent because of the irreducibility of their laws. This fact indicates that it is not possible to speak (even theoretically) about some unified science of everything even if the slogan is methodologically appealing. 11. In section 5, I have considered the possibility of reducing psychological vocabulary to physiobiological vocabulary. I have noted that the main difficulty for the opponents of materialism is the epistemic character of purely intellectual states and experiences. Another fundamental difficulty for them is the question of the relation of social and economic sciences to psychology. This is due to the fact that when socialscientific vocabulary is reduced to psychological vocabulary, the objectivity of the laws of the former science seems threatened. I think that this is a misunderstanding, which is due to the failure to distinguish the subjectivity of mental processes and states from the objectivity of the course of the development of these states and processes in the life of individuals and social groups. The reduction of the terminology of the social sciences to the terminology of psychology could threaten the objectivity of the laws of the former only if the laws of psychology were not objective, i.e. only if objective psychology were impossible. However, it seems clear that nowadays we must consider such a view as a manifestation of hopeless agnosticism alien to commonsense and to the creative attitude of scientists. There is no need to fear the reduction of vocabulary if one is careful in making the mentioned conceptual distinctions and if one resists the suggestiveness of ordinary terms. I do not mean to imply that such reduction has already been accomplished. To the contrary, it still needs to be carried out and a lot of effort will have to be put in to overcome the obstacles set by the suggestiveness of phrases scientists use. For what exactly is the meaning of such expressions as ‘the aspect of a problem’, ‘one side of the issue’, ‘the problem breaks down’, ‘the rise of a view’, ‘the form of being’, and so on and so forth? Is this ambiguous suggestiveness of philosophical language not to blame for the fact that nobody so far has been able to explain clearly the distinction

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between the epistemological problem of the “source of knowledge” and the psychological problem of the “origin of knowledge,” and that philosophers still confuse these two issues all too easily? Of course, it will not be possible to remove this feature of language altogether since even the terms of formal logic are not free from it (conclusions are “derived,” there are sufficient “grounds,” etc.). But the only radical cure for the infinite discussions and everlasting misunderstandings is (assuming good will and exclusively cognitive attitude) to minimize this suggestiveness of language and to strive for the definition of philosophical terms by reduction to purely logical ones.

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12. I want to call attention to the incredible misunderstanding, which was caused by the logical term ‘abstraction’ or ‘separation’. If one looks at the discussion between dialecticians and metaphysicians, one cannot escape the impression that neither side is aware of what this operation consists in or even when it is admissible and indicated and when it leads to errors. How otherwise can one explain the objection the “doors are being opened” where it is only permissible “not to close the doors”? Or can one understand differently the imputation that an author who studies the consequences of a certain conceptual construction assumes that the construction is not empty? Or the confusion of “truth” with “taking as true” or “reflection” as a relation with “reflection” as a secondary term of that relation? This is also where I see the cause of the failure to note that the same term referring to a philosophical view can be used to denote only one thesis or a conjunction of many different theses. What lingers here is the idealistic heritage contained in Hegelian language. After all, Hegel was well known for an atrophy of the understanding of the formal side of thinking and its relation to speech. It is not difficult to notice, for example, that the expression ‘the development of concepts’ is frequently used as if one spoke about something as completely independent of humans as organisms, not about something that is a social product of human beings. The legacy of Hegelian language is, in my view, the main reason why it took so long for the Soviet dialecticians to realize the idealistic nature of Marr’s linguistic views. It is also the nourishment for all parasitic deviations from materialism. Only a systematic inebriation of dialectics with the language of formal logic can radically thwart idealism in science and [theory of] knowledge since this is the only way of achieving clarity and mutual understanding. Logic as well as mathematics is “rooted” in human work associated with the “exchange of thoughts.” Everyday practice teaches constantly about the reliability of this epistemic tool, a mortal enemy of irrationalistic fog and pseudoscientific “knowledge.” But one has to be able to use this tool, so one must study it thoroughly.

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13. Let me take the opportunity to consider one more possible objection against the above view about the possibility of reducing psychological to physiobiological vocabulary. For psychology, this is a meta-systematic thesis (i.e. formulated in the meta-language). For every such thesis, there is an equivalent systematic thesis (formulated in the object language), which, in this case, is the statement about the materialist nature of mental processes, e.g.: every mental process is a physiological process. One can object against this view (as has been done, of course) that, according to W. Lenin (p. 279 [231]),2 to say that a thought is material is to take an erroneous step toward confusing materialism and idealism. However, on the next page we read: “the difference between matter and spirit is relative, it is not excessive,” and still further we read: that this juxtaposition ought not to be “excessive,” exaggerated, metaphysical is beyond doubt . . . The limits of the absolute necessity and absolute truth of this relative juxtaposition are just those limits that set the direction for epistemological study. Beyond these limits, it would be a grave error to use the contrast between matter and spirit, between the physical and the mental, as an absolute contrast.

In order to fully understand these sentences, one must consider the following passage: Obviously, also the contrast between matter and consciousness is absolute only within very narrow limits. In the case given — only within the limits of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be taken as epistemologically primary and what as secondary. Outside of this problem, the relativity of this contrast is beyond doubt. (p. 166 [134-135])

Lenin is not concerned with the confusion of epistemological and ontological problems. Only in epistemology, must one not substitute the “ideality” of thought with its materiality since this would lead to the identification of thought with its object, i.e. to the dissolution of the difference between the thought about a table and the table itself, for example. In epistemology, the materiality of thought means simply the fact that it has an object, and its “ideality” — the fact that it is epistemologically secondary. It is clear that this is not the sense in which thought and matter are contrasted in ontology, where what corresponds to being secondary is simply the logical relation of the subject being ascribed to a predicate. In conclusion, I do not think that Lenin’s words contradict the systematic thesis of ontological materialism. 2

Materializm a empiriokrytycyzm. Polish edition. (Page references in brackets are to the Russian edition: Soczinienija, vol. 14, Moscow.)

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14. Let ‘clarification’ stand for all the operations we use to understand the meaning or sense of some linguistic expression. The question that arises is, What is the relation between the so-called explanation (which provides a cause) and clarity?* In my view, we can think about the origin of this term in the following way. What someone says is clear to me if I can understand what is being said, i.e. if I know the sense of what is being said or if I know “what to think.” To provide a cause of a given phenomenon or event is to do something important in the practice of everyday life. It is to supplement the experienced situation perceptually or “only intellectually.” Indeed, in the sciences where causality is the principal explanatory category, the relation between cause and effect constitutes so important a component of knowledge that it determines the meaning of terms and the sense of sentences — it shapes the very way in which language is understood and thus leads to its clarity. In general, it can be observed that all cases of a causal explanation involve the “removal of an unclarity” due to the lack of knowledge about the cause of an event or phenomenon. Such a lack of knowledge usually elicits puzzlement, curiosity, fear or even fright. When the cause is found the unclarity dissipates. We project our states on the objective situation. We say at first that it is unintelligible and then that is intelligible. This is but a metaphor, however. I do believe, though, that this metaphor throws some light (and clarifies) also the problem of the nature, the sense and the meaning of linguistic expressions. It indicates that the meanings are also composed of certain relations.

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[In Polish, there is an evident etymological connection between all three terms: ‘jasność’ (Eng.: clarity), ‘objaśnienie’ (Eng.: clarification), ‘wyjaśnienie’ (Eng.: explanation).]

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Elsenhaus, Th. (1912). Lehrbuch der Psychologie. Tübingen. Frank, Ph. (1929). Was bedeuten die gegenwärtigen physikalischen Theorien für die allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Naturwissenschaften 17 (51). Reprinted in Erkenntnis 1 (1930). Gawecki, B. (1931). Konsekwencje filozoficzne indeterminizmu w fizyce współczesnej. Przegląd Filozoficzny 34 (1). Grelling (1915). [No title]. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 2. Guillaume, P. (1932). L’objectivité en psychologie. Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 29. Heinrich, W. (1895). Zur Prinzipienfrage der Psychologie. Zürich. Heinrich, W. (1902). Teorie i wyniki badań psychologicznych. Warszawa. Heinrich, W. (1907). Psychologia uczuć. Kraków. Heinrich, W. (1909). Johannes Scotus Eriugena i Spinoza. Kraków. Heisenberg, W. (1927a). Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quanten-theoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik. Zeitschrift für Physik 43. Heisenberg, W. (1927b). [No title]. Die Naturwissenschaften 15 (10). Hessenberg, G. (1904). Über kritische Mathematik. Sitzungsberichte der Berliner mathematischen Gesellschaft 3. Hessenberg, G. (1915). [No title]. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 2. Hofmann, P. (1921). Antinomie im Problem der Gültigkeit. Berlin u. Lpz. Husserl, E. (1900/01). Logische Untersuchungen. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Igel, S. (1919). Stosunek uczuć do przedstawień ze względu na klasyfikację faktów psychicznych. Przegląd Filozoficzny 22. Jakubisiak, X.A. (1929). Kryzys determinizmu. Przegląd Filozoficzny 32 (4). Jordan, P. (1927). Kausalität und Statistik in der modernen Physik. Naturwissenschaften 15 (5). Jordan, P. (1928). Der Charakter der Quantenphysik. Naturwissenschaften 16 (41). Kastil, A. (1918). J. Fr. Fries’ Lehre von der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 4. Klein, D.B. (1931). Der Lernprozess: eine theoretische Erörterung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 123. Koffka, K. (1925). Psychologie. In: M. Dessoira (ed.), Lehrbuch der Philosophie: Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten,. Berlin. Kołakowski, L. (1966). Filozofia pozytywistyczna (Od Hume'a do Koła Wiedeńskiego). Warszawa. Kotarbiński, T. (1920). Sprawa istnienia przedmiotów idealnych. Przegląd Filozoficzny 23. Kotarbiński, T. (1922). O istocie doświadczenia wewnętrznego. Przegląd Filozoficzny 25. Kotarbiński, T. (1927). W sprawie klasyfikacji poglądów na wzajemny stosunek duszy i ciała. Reprinted in: Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne. Lwów. Kotarbiński, T. (1929). Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk [Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and the Methodology of the Sciences]. Lwów. Kotarbiński, T. (1932). O różnych znaczeniach słowa ‘materializm’. Księga pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. Lwów. Kowalski, W. (1931). Jak można podnieść diagnostyczność badań psychotechnicznych. Psychotechnika 5. Kreutz, M. (1931). O podobieństwie wrażeń. Księga pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. Lwów. Leśniewski, S. (1913). Krytyka logicznej zasady wyłączonego środka. Przegląd Filozoficzny 16, 315-352. Lewin, K. (1926). Idee und Aufgabe der vergleichenden Wissenschaftslehre. Symposion 1. Reprinted as: Sonderdrucke des Symposions, vol 2, Erlangen.

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Lindworsky, J. (1922). Umrissskizze einer theoretischen Psychologie. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 89. Mach, E. (1903). Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältniss des Physischen zum Psychischen. 4th edition. Jena: G. Fischer. Mechler, W. (1911). Die Erkenntnislehre bei Fries, aus ihren Grundbegriffen dargestellt und kritisch erörtert. Ergänzungsheft zu Kantstudien 22. Berlin. Mejbaum, W. (1960). Posłowie. In: Reichenbach (1960). Metallmann, J. (1925). Filozofia przyrody i teoria poznania A.N. Whiteheada. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 3. Metallmann, J. (1928). Elementy determinizmu przyczynowego [Elements of causal determinism]. Reprint from: Przegląd współczesny 70/71. Kraków. Meyerhof, O. (1916). [No title]. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 3. Milewski, T. (1947). Zarys językoznawstwa ogólnego. Part I. Lublin-Kraków. Müller, G.E. (1896). Zur Psychophysik der Gesichtsempfindungen. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 10. Münsterberg, H. (1918). Grundzüge der Psychologie. Leipzig. Murchison, C., ed. (1930). Psychology of 1930. Worcester, Mass. Nelson, L. (1914). Fries Kritiker. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge 1. Nelson, L. (1914-NEG). Bemerkungen über die Nicht-Euklidische Geometrie und den Ursprung der mathematischen Gewissheit. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 1. Nelson, L. (1914-KM). Die kritische Methode und das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge 1. Nelson, L. (1915-IG). Inhalt und Gegenstand. Grund und Begründung. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 2. Nelson, L. (1915-MN). Ist metaphysikfreie Naturwissenschaft möglich. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 2. Nelson, L. (1915-E). Über das so-genannte Erkenntnisproblem. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge 2. Nelson, L. (1916-UE). Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie. Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge 3. Nelson, L. (1965). The Critical Method and the Relation of Psychology to Philosophy. In: Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays, trans.: Thomas K. Brown, pp. 105-157. New York: Dover (reprint of the Yale University Press edition of 1949). Neurath, O. (1931/32). Soziologie im Physikalismus. Erkenntnis 2. Petermann, B. (1928). Über die Idee einer objektiven Psychologie. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 108. Petermann, B. (1929). Die Wertheimer-Koffka-Köhlersche Gestalttheorie. Leipzig. Peters, W. (1929). Sprangers Lebensformen und die Psychologie des konkreten Menschen. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 112. Petzoldt, J. (1900). Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung. Vol. 1. Leipzig. Petzoldt, J. (1904). Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung. Vol. 2. Leipzig. Planck, M. (1926). Physikalische Gesetzlichkeit im Lichte neuerer Forschung. Naturwissenschaften 14 (13). Ranschburg, P. (1932a). Behaviorismus und Psychologie. Archiv für die gesellschaftliche Psychologie 86. Ranschburg, P. (1932b). Reflexologie und Psychologie. Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 3. Reichenbach, H. (1920). Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori. Berlin. Reichenbach, H. (1960). Powstanie filozofii naukowej [The Rise of Scientific Philosophy]. Trans.: H. Krahelska. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza. Roffenstein, C. (1923). Das Problem des Unbewussten. Stuttgart.

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Schaff, A. (1960). Wstęp do semantyki. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Schaff, A. (1961). Z zagadnień marksistowskiej teorii prawdy. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza. Schlick, M. (1913). Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis? Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie 36. Schlick, M. (1918). Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Berlin. Schlick, M. (1925). Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. 2nd Edition. Berlin. Schlick, M. (1931). Die Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik. Naturwissenschaften 19 (7). Schrödinger, E. (1929). Was ist ein Naturgesetz? Naturwissenschaften 17 (1). Selz, O. (1924). Die Gesetze der produktiven und reproduktiven Geistestätigkeit. Bonn. Stamm, E. (1911). Stanowisko zasady tożsamości w logice. Przegląd Filozoficzny 14. Stögbauer, A. (1909). Teoria funkcji psychicznych a psychiczna analiza. Przegląd Filozoficzny 12. Stumpf, C. (1906). Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen. Philosophische und historische Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften aus dem Jahre 1906. Suszko, R. (1957a). Logika formalna a niektóre zagadnienia teorii poznania I. Myśl Filozoficzna 2 (28). Suszko, R. (1957b). Logika formalna a niektóre zagadnienia teorii poznania II. Myśl Filozoficzna 3 (29). Sztejnbarg, D. (1929). Zagadnienie wyjaśniania zjawisk i praw przyrodniczych w nowszej literaturze metodologicznej. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 7. Sztejnbarg, D. (1932). Zagadnienie indeterminizmu na terenie fizyki współczesnej. Przegląd Filozoficzny 35. Szuman, S. (1930). O historycznym charakterze rozwoju osobowości w przeciwieństwie do prawidłowej ewolucji psychicznej człowieka. Polskie Archiwum Psychologii 3 (1). Szuman, S. (1932). Geneza przedmiotu. Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 3. Tarski, A. (1933). Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TNW. Twardowski, K. (1894). Zum Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Wien. Twardowski, K. (1898). Wyobrażenia i pojęcia. Lwów. Twardowski, K. (1924). O istocie pojęć. Lwów. Twardowski, K. (1927a). O czynnościach i wytworach. Reprinted in: Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne. Lwów. Twardowski, K. (1927b). O tak zwanych prawdach względnych. In: Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne. Lwów. von Mises, R. (1930). Über kausale und statistische Gesetzmässigkeit in der Physik. Naturwissenschaften 18 (7). Reprinted in: Erkenntnis 1 (2/4). Watson, J.B. (1924). Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Second edition. Philadelphia & London. Wiegner, A. (1925). Zagadnienie poznania w oświetleniu L. Nelsona. Poznań. Translated in this volume as “The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy,” pp. 37-90. Wiegner, A. (1928). O tzw. teorii poznania. Przegląd Filozoficzny 31. Wiegner, A. (1930). W sprawie odwrotności między treścią i zakresem pojęć. In: Prace Komisji Filozoficznej Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, vol. 3. Poznań. Wiegner, A. (1932a). Na marginesie “Psychologii” W. Witwickiego. Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 3. Wiegner, A. (1932b). Uwagi nad indeterminizmem w fizyce. Poznań. Translated in this volume as “Remarks on Indeterminism in Physics,” pp. 105-119.

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Wiegner, A. (1932c). W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych. Przegląd Filozoficzny 35. Wiegner, A. (1933). Rudolf Carnap: “Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie.” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 13, 327-328. Wiegner, A. (1934). O istocie zjawisk psychicznych. In Prace Komisji Filozoficznej Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, vol. 4 (2). Poznań. Translated in this volume as: “On the Nature of Mental Phenomena,” pp. 147-189. Wiegner, A. (1935). Na marginesie Logicznych podstaw nauczania Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 13, 327-330. Wiegner, A. (1959). O subiektywnej i obiektywnej jasności w myśli i słowie. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu im A. Mickiewicza. Filozofia, Psychologia, Pedagogika 3, 3-15. Translated in this volume as: “On the Subjective and Objective Clarity in Thought and Word,” pp. 197-210. Wiegner, A. (1963). W sprawie tak zwanej “prawdy względnej.” Studia Filozoficzne 1. Translated in this volume as: “On the so-called ‘Relative Truth’,” pp. 123-136. Wiegner, A. (1964). O empiryzmie całościowym. Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 72, 200-201. Translated in this volume as: “A Note on Holistic Empiricism,” pp. 35-36. Witwicki, T. (1931). O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawień. Księga pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. Lwów. Witwicki, T. (1932). Odpowiedź Wiegnerowi. Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 3. Witwicki, W. (1930). Psychologia: dla użytku słuchaczów wyższych zakładów naukowych. Vol. 1. Second edition. Lwów: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich. Wundt, W. (1897). Über naiven und kritischen Realismus. Philosophische Studien 13, 232-433. Wundt, W. (1896). Grundriss der Psychologie. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann. Zawirski, Z. (1921). Relatywizm filozoficzny a fizykalna teoria względności. Lwów. Zawirski, Z. (1924). Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 2. Zawirski, Z. (1930). Teoria kwantów a zasada przyczynowości. Przegląd Filozoficzny 33 (4) Zawirski, Z. (1931). W sprawie indeterminizmu fizyki kwantowej. Księga Pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie, pp. 456-483. Lwów.

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ORIGINAL SOURCES “A Note on Holistic Empiricism” appeared as: “Empiryzm całościowy”, Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 2, 1964, 199-201. “The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy” appeared as a monograph: Zagadnienie poznawcze w oświetleniu L. Nelsona, Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk 1 (5), pp. 3-67. Poznań: 1925. “The ‘Proton Pseudos’ in Wundt’s Criticism of R. Avenarius’ Philosophy” appeared as: “Proton Pseudos Wundtowskiej krytyki filozofii R. Avenariusa,” Studia Filozoficzne 3-4, 1963, 207-210. “Philosophical Significance of Gestalt Theory” appeared as: “Filozoficzne znaczenie teorii postaci,” Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, I i II kwartał, 1948, 26-28. “The Idea of a Logic of Knowledge” appeared as: “Idea logiki poznania,” Życie Literackie 4, 1934, 4-5. “Remarks on Indeterminism in Physics” appeared as a monograph: Uwagi nad indeterminizmem w fizyce. Poznań: 1932. “A Note on the Concept of Relative Truth” appeared as: “W sprawie pojęcia prawdy względnej,” Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 2, 1964, 198-199. “On the so-called ‘Relative Truth’” appeared as: “W sprawie tzw. ‘prawdy względnej’,” Studia Filozoficzne 1 (32), 1963, 113-127. “On Abstraction and Concretization” appeared as: “O abstrakcji i konkretyzacji,” Studia Filozoficzne 1 (16), 1960, 201-209. “On the Nature of Mental Phenomena” appeared as a monograph: O istocie zjawisk psychicznych. Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1933.

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Original Sources

“On the Debate about Imaginative Ideas” appeared as: “W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych,” Przegląd Filozoficzny 35, 1932, 1-4. “On the Subjective and Objective Clarity in Thought and Word” appeared as: “O subiektywnej i obiektywnej jasności w myśli i słowie”, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. A. Mickiewicza: Filozofia, Psychologia, Pedagogika, zeszyt 3, 1959, pp. 3-15.

APPENDIX

Jerzy Kmita ADAM WIEGNER’S CONCEPTION OF HOLISTIC EMPIRICISM * 1 The fundamental act that gives rise to positivism, viz. the denial that synthetic judgments a priori are possible, could be identified with reduction of all knowledge to biological reactions. Induction becomes a certain form of conditioned reflex. The question when induction is legitimate becomes a question when the development of a certain reflex is biologically advantageous. (Kołakowski 1966, p. 232)

I begin with a quote from Kołakowski’s monograph on positivism since its thesis stands in a close relation to an epistemological conception developed by Adam Wiegner, a professor of Adam Mickiewicz University, who died in September 1967. Wiegner’s theory in fact falsifies Kołakowski’s claim at two points. Before I turn to develop this thought further, I should say that the main goal of this paper is to honor the memory of a philosopher whose work has unfortunately never been an object of due attention. The is the more unfortunate that, as I will demonstrate, Wiegner’s philosophical reflection continues to be of philosophical interest as is evidenced by its pertinence to currently discussed topics. There are a couple of extraordinarily interesting lines of thought in Wiegner’s works. They concern issues of permanent interest and Wiegner’s solutions have been completely original in the context of Polish *

The text appeared as: Jerzy Kmita, “Koncepcja empiryzmu całościowego Adama Wiegnera,” Studia Filozoficzne 3-4 (1967), 41-51.

In: Adam Wiegner, Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection, edited by Izabella Nowakowa (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 87), pp. 219-230. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005.

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philosophy between the two world wars. My present remarks will focus on one of these lines of thought. Let us return to Kołakowski’s claim. The two points mentioned above that can be called into question on the basis of holistic empiricism can be formulated thus: (1) An epistemic criterion that eliminates synthetic propositions a priori from science is positivist. (2) Whoever accepts such a criterion cannot justify this acceptance with reasons. In other words, he cannot appeal to any claim that would imply that the application of such a criterion will ensure that one obtains epistemically better results than ones that would be obtained by means of any other criteria. In practice, there exists only one way of justifying the rationality (purposefulness) of such a choice. — One must appeal to the biological, and more precisely, adaptational, value of the cognitive behavior that coincides with this criterion. An epistemic criterion that excludes the possibility of synthetic claims a priori is in fact empiricist. After one questions all forms of a priori knowledge, the only “legal” source of knowledge about the world that remains is experience. (I should clarify that I use the term ‘experience’ in such a way as to exclude nonintellectual intuition. I repeat, Wiegner’s holistic empiricism, if it is true (about which there is little doubt), constitutes a counterexample to (1) as well as (2). I should remark that both claims could have been appended by a restriction that would prevent their falsification by such a conception as Wiegner’s, but Kołakowski does not consider any such restrictions. Let me turn to the presentation of holistic empiricism. 2 Wiegner sketches his theory of holistic empiricism in the monograph The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy published in 1925. The point of departure is the analysis of the epistemological position developed by L. Nelson, who in turn develops J.F. Fries’ views proposed a hundred years earlier. This position can be roughly captured in the two following points: 1. A theory of knowledge that seeks to formulate a general legitimation criterion for all synthetic knowledge is impossible. Such a criterion would have to be synthetic itself. As such, it would have to be based on synthetic premises — analytic premises do not yield synthetic conclusions.

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2. In view of this, it is quite easy to understand why such a theory of knowledge so intensively practiced in the second half of the 19th century brought no results. The reflection on knowledge should follow a different path. It should first and foremost recognize two types of knowledge: direct and indirect. Critical reflection can concern only indirect knowledge; direct knowledge is beyond all doubt. The principle of sufficient reason, which demands that one accept only such claims to knowledge which have been sufficiently justified, pertains only to indirect knowledge. Direct knowledge, on the other hand, constitutes an unquestionable (unquestionable also for a critical reflection about knowledge) point of departure which makes the application of the principle of sufficient reason possible. There are three types of direct knowledge: (a) perception, (b) intuitive mathematical knowledge, (c) nonintuitive metaphysical knowledge. The main task of critical epistemological reflection is the discovery of metaphysical principles, i.e. those claims that are directly based on metaphysical knowledge. Those principles, with the principle of causality at the forefront, constitute the foundation of empirical sciences. The reason why this is a task for critical reflection is that metaphysical knowledge is nonintuitive. Unlike claims directly based on intuitive mathematical knowledge, metaphysical principles are not captivatingly obvious. Wiegner develops his exhaustive and very meticulous criticism of L. Nelson’s views in two directions. First, he shows that Nelson’s critical reflection about knowledge is in no better position than the 19th century theory of knowledge Nelson criticizes. Second, Wiegner sketches an empiricist position that avoids Nelson’s objections and, at the same time, allows to explain those elements in empirical sciences for which Nelson sought explanation in metaphysical knowledge. Let us consider the first point. If we assume that though metaphysical knowledge is infallible it requires critical identification in view of the fact that it cannot be intuited, we are led to the thought that our very grasp of metaphysical knowledge [rozpoznanie poznania metafizycznego] (and so of metaphysical principles) is not direct knowledge. The analysis of scientific practice in empirical sciences (what Nelson calls “the method of regression”) can at best lead to the determination that those sciences make certain synthetic assumptions. What we cannot show, however, is that these assumptions are metaphysical principles based directly on some form of metaphysical knowledge — no matter what form of indirect knowledge we employ. It follows that Nelson’s critical reflection about knowledge is likewise impossible despite the fact that it does not start from “point zero” (as did the theory of knowledge he criticizes) but already assumes that all direct knowledge is legitimate.

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Let us note here that L. Kołakowski states clearly that if one rejects the conception of a priori synthetic statements, it will be impossible to formulate a legitimation criterion that would be capable of imparting epistemic not merely practical justification. The implicit assumption here is that if one accepts the conception of a priori synthetic statements, the path to an epistemic justification of thus formulated criterion of legitimate knowledge opens automatically. (If Kołakowski did not think so, his interpretation of positivist philosophy could be just as well applied to other philosophical orientations.) But Kołakowski’s implicit assumption is not true. Nelson, for one, accepts a priori knowledge. However, he cannot justify the presence of a priori synthetic statements in the empirical sciences (which is permitted according to his criterion) other than by means of an arbitrary assumption that they are metaphysical principles. I will return to the problem of the epistemic justification of the legitimation criteria, when I turn to developing the claim that A. Wiegner’s theory of holistic empiricism contradicts L. Kołakowski’s view that there is no epistemic justification for an empiricist position. This problem can be in fact considered to be identical with the problem of the extent to which Nelson’s criticism of the theory of knowledge is valid. At present, I will show that Wiegner’s rejection of the possibility of a priori synthetic statements (within the framework of the empiricist view he proposed) did not constitute a “fundamental act that gives rise to positivism.” 3 As I said earlier, when developing his conception of empiricism, which he only much later called “holistic empiricism,” A. Wiegner had two fundamental goals in mind: (1) to explain those elements in empirical sciences that L. Nelson derived from metaphysical knowledge, (2) to avoid L. Nelson’s objection against the 19th century theory of knowledge. It is due to his endeavoring to meet those two goals that the holistic empiricism he proposed differs so radically from positivistic empiricism. It should be first of all pointed out that Wiegner shared Nelson’s (actually Fries’) negative opinion about Hume’s conception of experience. In particular, he accepted Fries’ cryptic formula that the relation of ideas cannot lead to the idea of a relation. He also thought that Hume’s theory of the psychological origin of the concept of a causal connection was wrong from a psychological point of view. In general, he rejected the view that experience is a passive perception of co-occurring but mutually independent elementary impressions, which we then associate one with another into

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relations of co-existence or into causal connections, depending on whether their configurations repeatedly occur in space or in time. Wiegner held quite the contrary view: certain wholes, structures, sometimes even causal connections are given to us directly. The elements of such wholes and structures result from the process of abstraction. The reason why what is directly given to us in experience are organized structures, not loose impressions, is that experience does not consist in a passive perception. It is an active process, which depends equally on the physical character of the stimulus as well as on the “subjective factors,” i.e. on the stable structure of processes in the central nervous system: each concrete experiential whole given directly depends equally on peripheral (“sense”) and central (“intellectual”) physiological changes. (Wiegner 1925, p. 52, this volume: p. 78)

Everything that Nelson calls the “form” of empirical judgments, whose source was to be metaphysical knowledge, can be derived from experience. The “form” of empirical statements is determined by the “subjective factors” of experience: In this way, one could explain . . . the difference between the “form” and the “matter” of statements and so also of knowledge. (p. 52, this volume: p. 78)

As a result, thus conceived empiricism, which unequivocally recognizes both “objects” and “relations” as given in direct experience, can provide a sufficient explanation of the source of the concept of a “necessary connection.” (p. 52, this volume: p. 78)

Somewhat later, Wiegner realized that his conception of experience is closely related to the Gestalt movement in psychology, on the one hand, and to R. Avenarius’ theory of knowledge, on the other. This is why he devoted so much attention to Gestaltism and propagated it not only among philosophers but also among psychologists.1 He ascribed the authorship of his own conception to R. Avenarius, even though he developed it independently of Avenarius’ views. It is also likely that he would not have discovered that, contrary to popular opinion, R. Avenarius’ philosophy has little to do with E. Mach’s positivism,2 if he did not first formulate a theory whose elements he later noticed in Avenarius. The fact that A.

1

A. Wiegner was in fact a faculty member of the Institute of Psychology of Adam Mickiewicz University in the period of 1928-1934. 2 See Wiegner (1963). Wiegner’s translation of R. Avenarius’ Der menschliche Weltbegriff is forthcoming.

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Wiegner completely renounced the authorship of holistic empiricism3 was undoubtedly an act of excessive modesty. This feature of his character substantially explains why he worked and died as a practically unknown philosopher. 4 One may ask the following question. If at least “in some cases of external experience, we can directly ascertain even causal connections” (Wiegner 1935, p. 327), then why is there no empirical science where claims about causal relations are based directly on observation? This is because the methodological concept of the directly given has a narrower scope than the psychological concept of the directly given. The former concept is always relativized to a given discipline, more precisely to its current stage of development. Consequently, no empirical science exhausts all (psychologically) possible data of experience. Whether a given type of direct data (in a psychological sense) constitutes empirical evidence for a given science is decided by a variety of factors, but first and foremost by the possibility of their theoretical explanation. It is thus clear that the repertoire of direct data of a given empirical discipline changes in time — it depends on the stage of its development. One of the consequences of this changeability is the fact that it is difficult to determine some precise boundary between more or less theoretical elements of a given science: Any knowledge consists in going beyond what is directly given to genetic, causal or other relations. In science, the distinction between the description of a pure datum and a theory, which hypothetically complements it, becomes relative when 3

Here is a fragment of Wiegner’s talk given in 1964: “Empiricism has been traditionally defined as the view that experience is the ‘source’ of knowledge. In modern philosophy, under the influence of British empiricists, especially Hume, it became commonplace to treat experience as simply the so-called impressions. Through association, impressions form complexes which are the proper content of knowledge. . . . Already Kant seems to have been aware of the distinction between purely subjective perceptions and perceptions carrying real epistemic value . . . His suggestions were radically developed by his student J.F. Fries who argued that the notion of an objective connection cannot be derived from a connection among ideas. . . . [I]n 1888, R. Avenarius proposed such a new conception of empiricism, based on an analysis of cognitive processes, in his Critique of Pure Experience. . . . [A]ccording to [it], relations and other ‘whole’ are ‘given directly’. This is why I call it holistic empiricism. It seems that only such a holistic empiricism is in agreement with scientific practice, in particular with the notion of ‘scientific observation’. Only the naive can think of scientific observation as a single perceptual act or some set of impressions or other ‘elements’.” (Wiegner 1964a, pp. 200-201)

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scientific inquiry treads on a complex and epistemologically most significant terrain. (Wiegner 1933a, p. 117, this volume: p. 162)

In any case, only direct (in a psychological sense) data can constitute observational evidence. These do not include, however, alleged introspective data concerning our judgments and concepts, which are relentlessly considered as given directly to inner experience. Wiegner addressed this question in his monograph On the Nature of Mental Phenomena (1933a), in the review (1935) I cited above, in the paper “On the so-called ‘Relative Truth’” (1963) as well as, perhaps most clearly and convincingly, in the paper “On the Subjective and Objective Clarity in Thought and Word” (1959): . . . contrary to popular opinion, I believe that apparently purely intellectual states such as impression, representation, idea and even decision are not as such given to me directly in introspection. Rather, they are accepted hypothetically to explain the occurrence of certain states given extraspectively, which are most likely observed 4 first in others and only later in ourselves. (Wiegner 1959, p. 6, this volume: pp. 200-201)

This explains why the research on judgments and concepts conducted by introspective psychologists (especially intensively at the beginning of the 20th century) “. . . looks just like a logic chapter . . . — to the dismay of all those who liberated themselves from psychologism in logic but who remain faithful to the thought that this strange phenomenon [i.e. judgment in a psychological sense — JK] is given directly” (Wiegner 1959, p. 6, this volume: p. 201). Only the symptoms of certain physiological states of the organism are given in introspection. Let us return for a moment to the issue of the directly given in a methodological sense. Our claims based directly on it are not strictly observational because the directly given in a methodological sense is such a directly given in a psychological sense, which we understand as a symptom of certain theoretical facts. Such claims will always contain some non-observational “content.” (This is also why they can constitute any knowledge at all.) Moreover, if we bear in mind the relative nature of the directly given in a methodological sense, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that knowledge directly based on experience cannot constitute direct knowledge in L. Nelson’s sense. At any rate, it cannot be beyond any doubt. 4

This claim is confirmed by some research reports in psychology. It has been shown, for example, that there are no introspective correlates of the concepts (in a logical sense) we use properly, see M. Rytel (1948). I have also in mind here the conclusions reached by G.A. Miller (1951) about the way in which introspective terms are learned — only on the basis of extraspective concepts a child has already learned.

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This is the reason why A. Wiegner denies that it is possible to find a general legitimation criterion. The question whether such a criterion is possible has no sense. “The question that does make sense is only whether some particular knowledge claim is objectively valid” (Wiegner 1925, p. 64, this volume: p. 88). The task of answering such questions belongs to a given scientific discipline and is always relative to a “given linguistic and epistemic situation at a given time” (1964b, p. 199). This is also why such answers are never definitive or absolute. They are an expression of the choice of the best hypothesis (relative to a given stage of scientific development). However, The value of scientific principles does not depend on their relation to an “absolute.” . . . They are quite compatible with a relativistic conception of all knowledge in general. (1925, p. 56, this volume: p. 82)

Is A. Wiegner’s holistic empiricism a positivistic empiricism? A positive answer would be possibly only if we assumed that positivism is compatible with the thoughts that: (1) statements based directly on experience are only hypotheses that always have some non-observational “content”; (2) the acceptance of such statements always involves (in view of point (1)) the acceptance of certain theoretical hypotheses; (3) the “essence” of scientific knowledge consists in reaching beyond the horizon of what is directly given in experience; (4) statements directly based on experience (together with all potential statements of this type) constitute but a fragment of all our knowledge about reality. If we accept L. Kołakowski’s quite correct characterization of positivism (1966, pp. 11-17), in particular if we accept phenomenalism as the most characteristic feature of positivism, then we cannot by any means consider holistic empiricism to be a part of positivism. Wiegner himself fully realized the anti-positivist character of his theory. This is clear in his polemic (Wiegner 1933b) with the neopositivist doctrine of verificationism, according to which the entire so-called “theoretical content” of knowledge is contained already in what is directly given. It is also clear when he emphasizes “that it is precisely the positivist postulate to eliminate [theoretical — JK] hypotheses from science that deserves to be so eliminated from the methodology of the sciences” (1933a, p. 102, this volume: p. 151). Bearing in mind A. Wiegner’s conception of holistic empiricism, one can demonstrate that “the denial that synthetic judgments a priori are possible” is not at all, contrary to L. Kołakowski’s view, “the fundamental act that gives rise to positivism.”

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I believe that at the roots of Kołakowski’s position lies a certain erroneous view, which is also presupposed by the next point I cited from Kołakowski. The view in question is that if we deny that a priori synthetic statements are possible, we will not be able to justify the epistemic criterion we propose otherwise than by appeal to the practical (more precisely, adaptational) consequences of its application. I will formulate this view shortly. Before I do so, I will show that A. Wiegner’s conception constitutes a counterexample also with respect to the second point of Kołakowski’s thesis. 5 Let us note first of all that the epistemic criterion in A. Wiegner’s conception of holistic empiricism (1) does not depend on direct knowledge in L. Nelson’s sense, and thus (2) does not fall under the principle of sufficient reason. In other words, this epistemic criterion is not a legitimating criterion. It does not answer the question “What epistemic facts constitute legitimate knowledge?”. This is why it is not subject to L. Nelson’s objection against the criteria formulated in the nineteenth-century theory of knowledge. The objection pertains only to those epistemic criteria that are justificatory and, more generally, only to an epistemological reflection that tries to formulate such criteria. It is also time to note that no justificatory criterion can be justified as an epistemic criterion. This is true even when one distinguishes between indirect and direct knowledge. This was also A. Wiegner’s position in (1925). Obviously, he did not consider practical justifications since to appeal to them is already to give up epistemic justification. What can be said about the epistemic criterion in A. Wiegner’s conception of holistic empiricism? It has to be said that, strictly speaking, Wiegner did not clearly formulate such a criterion. For my present purposes, it is sufficient to note that (in view of the assumptions of holistic empiricism) it would have to satisfy the following condition: it would have to determine how to choose the best hypothesis (relative to a given state of knowledge) from among the available ones. Such a choice would not mean, however, that the accepted hypothesis would acquire a positive justification that would guarantee it a permanent place within “legitimate knowledge.” Such a choice would thus not appeal to the principle of sufficient reason. Rather, it would be the effect of the recognition that the remaining competing hypotheses (about which one hypothetically assumes that they, together with the accepted

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hypothesis, complement one another factually, i.e. extra-logically) have turned out to be unacceptable. Such an epistemic criterion, or more precisely a normative proposition (in the sense of T. Kotarbiński) that prescribes the use of that criterion, may in turn be treated as a meta-scientific hypothesis. Such a hypothesis is subject to a choice (at a higher meta-scientific level of the language) on the very same basis as (object-)scientific hypotheses are chosen. Such a criterion may thus be justified (in the sense of that criterion) in a purely epistemic fashion — as a hypothesis that determines a method of scientific conduct, which makes it possible to obtain epistemically valuable results. The evidence for such a hypothesis consists of facts from the history of science, on the assumption that there exist concrete research results whose epistemic value5 can be negatively decided. If the above reasoning is correct then Kołakowski’s view that the denial of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments implies the impossibility of an epistemic justification of an epistemic criterion, is contradicted by A. Wiegner’s conception of holistic empiricism. Wiegner’s conception denies that a priori synthetic judgments are possible and yet it sketches an epistemic criterion that could be justified in a purely epistemic fashion. 6 In conclusion, I would like to make a stronger claim: Only such a criterion as the one implicit in holistic empiricism can be justified epistemically; no legitimizing criterion could be justified epistemically. I have mentioned the second part of this claim already in the previous paragraph where I have said that it expresses A. Wiegner’s position (1925). At present, I will discuss the first and the second component of this claim in more detail. It only appears that if one assumes that a priori synthetic judgments are possible, one gains an epistemic justification for a proposed legitimation criterion. In fact, however, a phenomenologist, say, as well as a positivist are in the same situation (at least in this respect). When one asks whether their criteria of legitimate knowledge are legitimate, they both have two choices: (1) to admit that one cannot legitimize the proposed criterion, that it can be at least justified from practical points of view; (2) to claim that it 5

As we already know, A. Wiegner assumes that we can (within a scientific discipline) ask about the epistemic value of a particular research result. It is clear that if the proposed epistemic criterion has justificatory character, such an assumption cannot be accepted.

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requires no justification (e.g. because it is obvious in view of some or other miraculous cognitive powers). Positivists employ strategy (1) as frequently as strategy (2). (The employment of the latter in their case is tantamount to the declaration that they will not consider “metaphysical” questions.) Phenomenologists, on the other hand, always resort to strategy (2) and appeal to a special cognitive power. A positivist can be either a dogmatic (at least with respect to the proposed criterion) or a skeptic. A phenomenologist is always a dogmatic. Both the dogmatic and the skeptic (or a frustrated dogmatic, as one says in Popper’s school) are equally helpless in the situation they drive themselves into by attempting to formulate a legitimizing criterion. The source of both claims contained in the quote from Kołakowski (both of which are contradicted by Wiegner’s holistic empiricism) is the erroneous belief that an epistemic criterion can only be legitimizing in nature. If that were so, then the only possible positions would be skepticism and dogmatism (where aprioristic dogmatism acquires the privilege of epistemic justification of the proposed epistemic criterion). In particular, Kołakowski believes that to deny that a priori synthetic judgments are possible is already to embrace positivism since an empiricism that aims to formulate a legitimation criterion is indeed a positivism. But Kołakowski does to notice any other form of empiricism. both claims are in fact quite correct but only on the assumption that they pertain to epistemological theories that formulate criteria of legitimate knowledge. The other form of empiricism, and so the third (next to dogmatism and skepticism) epistemological conception can be called critical epistemology or hypotheticism. As is well known, this position is associated with K.R. Popper. In a paper, which has inspired many of the above remarks, W.W. Bartley (1964), one of Popper’s students, says: Since antiquity, irrationalists have embraced as fact — indeed as one of the few facts established in philosophy — the philosophical contention that rationality is logically limited; that at least insofar as his standards are concerned, every man must make some irrational commitment. They have often used this contention to excuse on rational grounds their own particular irrational commitments, however bizarre in character. (p. 31)

However, it is possible: . . . to refute the philosophical theory about the limits of rationality by turning the tables, by showing how we can shift the emphasis in rational discussion from justification to nonjustificational criticism. . . . [In this way — JK], the irrationalists lose the most formidable weapon in their intellectual armory, their rational excuse for irrational commitment. (p. 31)

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It is worthwhile to add that Adam Wiegner’s Zagadnienie poznania w oświetleniu L. Nelsona appeared almost ten years before Logik der Forschung. Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza ul. Szamarzewskiego 89C 60-568 Poznań Poland REFERENCES Ajdukiewicz, K. (1938). Metodologiczne typy nauk [The Methodological Types of Sciences]. Reprinted in: Język i poznanie [Language and Knowledge], vol. 1, pp. 287-313. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1960. Bartley, W.W. (1964). Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality. In: Mario Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy: In Honor of Karl R. Popper, pp. 3-31. London: The Free Press of Glencoe. Rytel, M. (1948). Psychologiczne odpowiedniki pojęć [Psychological Correlates of Concepts]. Lublin. Wiegner, A. (1925). Zagadnienie poznania w oświetleniu L. Nelsona [The Problem of Knowledge in light of L. Nelson’s Critical Philosophy]. Poznań. Translation: this volume, pp. 37-90. Wiegner, A. (1933a). O istocie zjawisk psychicznych [On the Nature of Mental Phenomena]. Prace Komisji Filozoficznej Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, vol. 4 (2). Poznań. Translation: this volume, pp. 147-189. Wiegner, A. (1933b). Rudolf Carnap: “Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie.” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 13, 327-328. Wiegner, A. (1935). Na marginesie Logicznych podstaw nauczania Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza [Some Comments on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Logical Foundations of Education]. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 13, 327-330. Wiegner, A. (1959). O subiektywnej i obiektywnej jasności myśli i słowa [On the Subjective and Objective Clarity of Thought and Word]. Zeszyty Naukowe UAM: Filozofia, Psychologia, Pedagogika 3, 3-15. Translation: this volume, pp. 297-210. Wiegner, A. (1963). W sprawie tak zwanej “prawdy względnej” [On the so-called “Relative Truth”]. Studia Filozoficzne 1 (32), 113-127. Translation: this volume, pp. 123-136. Wiegner, A. (1964a). Empiryzm całościowy [A Note on Holistic Empiricism]. Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 2, 199-201. Translation: this volume, pp. 35-36. Wiegner, A. (1964b). W sprawie pojęcia prawdy względnej [A Note on the Concept of Relative Truth]. Sprawozdania Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 2, 198-199. Translation: this volume, pp. 121-122.