Strengthening the PRO Hypothesis 9781614510413, 9781614510420

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Lisa A. Reed Strengthening the PRO Hypothesis

Studies in Generative Grammar

Edited by Jan Koster Henk van Riemsdijk Harry van der Hulst

Volume 110

Lisa A. Reed

Strengthening the PRO Hypothesis

ISBN 978-1-61451-042-0 e-ISBN 978-1-61451-041-3 ISSN 0167-4331 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. 6 2014 Walter de Gruyter, Inc., Boston/Berlin Typesetting: RoyalStandard, Hong Kong Printing and binding: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

To Sarah

Acknowledgments I wish to recognize just a few of the many people who have contributed in various ways and degrees to the development of this book. First, I’d like to thank Marc Authier for many enjoyable hours of theoretical discussion, data testing, and proofreading. Your help, as always, has been immeasurable and is greatly appreciated. I would also like to express my gratitude to those who provided me with direct and, in many cases, detailed feedback on portions of this work: my (anonymous) reviewer, Lena Baunaz, Melvin Gonzales-Rivera, Sabine Iatridou, Idan Landau, Nurit Melnik, Ljiljana Progovac, Genoveva Puskas, Coppe van Urk, and the audiences at the Forty-First Meeting of the Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages (hosted by the University of Ottawa, May 5–7, 2011), the March 10, 2011 meeting of the Ling Lunch (held at MIT), and the Forty-Third Meeting of the Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages (hosted by the CUNY Graduate Center, April 17–19, 2013). Finally, my sincere thanks to the editors of the Studies in Generative Grammar series: Henk van Riemsdijk, Harry van der Hulst, and Jan Koster, as well as to the editorial staff at Walter de Gruyter – Emily Farrell, Wolfgang Konwitschny, Uri Tadmor, and Lara Wysong. Without you, this book might well have never seen the light of day.

Contents Acknowledgements 1

Overview

vii 1

6 On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar 7 Chomsky (1965) and Rosenbaum (1967): Lexical NP Deletion 7 2.1.2 Postal (1968a, 1970): The “Doom” pronoun 12 2.1.3 Chomsky & Lasnik (1977): R-indexing, “Rules of Control,” and opaque domains 23 2.1.4 Chomsky (1980): Constraints on anaphoric relations, the Case Filter, and elaborated rules of Control 31 2.2 Approaches to Control within the Government-Binding Theory 39 2.2.1 Chomsky (1981a, 1982): Theta Theory and Binding Theory 39 2.2.2 Manzini (1983): PRO is unambiguously an anaphor 54 2.2.3 Bouchard (1984): PRO is ambiguously an anaphor and a pronoun 62 2.2.4 Lasnik (1992): Evidence that PRO is licensed by a lack government and is identified by a separate Theory of Control 72 2.2.5 On Control into NP: Williams (1985) 77 2.3 On Minimalist approaches to Control 89 2.3.1 On the Minimalist rejection of a binding-theoretic approach to the distribution of PRO 90 2.3.2 Case-theoretic approaches to PRO 96 2.3.2.1 Null Case approaches to PRO 97 2.3.2.2 PRO as a Caseless NP 116 2.3.3 On structural case approaches to PRO 123 2.3.4 Summary 139 2 2.1 2.1.1

3 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2

144 Movement and implicit argument approaches to Control Movement theories of Control 144 Implicit argument approaches to Control 171 On some representative model-theoretic approaches to Control 173 On some representative argument and conceptual approaches to Control 190

x 3.2.2.1 3.2.2.2 3.3

Contents

Sag & Pollard (1991): An argument structure approach to Control 190 Jackendoff & Culicover (2003): A conceptual structure approach to Control 201 Summary 212 215

4

A critical look at some standard arguments in favor of PRO

5

Remotivating a PRO approach to Control

6

The syntax of Control

7 7.1

293 On the reference of PRO On the need to recognize syntactic influences on controller resolution 297 On the respective roles of syntax and semantics in controller resolution 303 Summary 322

7.2 7.3

240

256

8 8.1 8.2

325 On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO What are Facts, Eventualities, and Propositions? 332 Explaining the gap in simple Control (ECM/small clause) complementation 345

9

Conclusions

Bibliography Index 380

371

353

Chapter 1

Overview The goal of this book is to take a relatively in-depth look at the syntax and, to a lesser degree, the semantics of Control structures of the types in (1)–(3). (1)

a. I have started [to understand the issues more clearly now]. b. He refused [to even consider their offer]. c. She neglected [to tell me about it].

(2)

a. She directed the patient [to stay in bed for three days]. b. He always tells me [to try harder]. c. They encouraged him [to stay in school].

(3)

a. It is important/difficult/desirable [to try new things]. b. [To give up now] would just be too easy.

We will begin by considering these constructions from a historical perspective, the topics of Chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, Chapter 2 will show that what will be referred to here as “standard” generative accounts from Chomsky’s (1965: 21–24) Aspects model of transformational grammar to his more recent Minimalist model (Chomsky, 1995) have always assumed that in structures like (1)–(3) there is a syntactically projected embedded argument that bears one, and only one thematic role. In contrast, Chapter 3 will make it clear that it has long been assumed in syntactic frameworks such as Brame’s (1978) lexicalist syntax, Bach’s (1979) version of Montague syntax, Bresnan’s (1982) Lexical-Functional Grammar, Gazdar’s (1982) Phrase Structure Grammar, and Klein & Sag’s (1982) Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar, as well as in semantic circles (cf. e.g., Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1986), and Jackendoff (1990)) that such sentences contain embedded “subjectless” or “bare” VPs. These alternative approaches introduce the embedded subject in a variety ways, including semantic insertion rules, insertion rules at the level of functional structure, or, more commonly, via the assumption that there is simply an implicit Agent entailed by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. Finally, Chapter 3 will show that even within the generative tradition, a number of researchers have argued that PRO does not exist. According to these approaches, Obligatory Control structures like (1) and (2) reduce to either NP

2

Overview

or feature movement (cf. O’Neil (1995), Manzini & Roussou (1997, 2000), and Hornstein (1999)). It is, therefore, still very much a subject of debate whether or not the grammar of natural languages includes the type of nominal known as PRO. One of the primary goals of this book will be to answer this important question. In order to do so, some of the standard paradigms that have been previously offered in favor of the PRO Hypothesis will be examined in Chapter 4. Specifically, binding facts of the type in (4), agreement facts like (5), the case forms attested in Control complements in case rich languages such as Icelandic, as in (6), and basic argument/expletive contrasts of the type in (7) have traditionally been offered as “proof ” of the existence of PRO. I.e., since Postal (1968a, 1970) generativists have noted that PRO provides an antecedent for anaphors in examples like (4); it bears the appropriate phi-features needed to undergo agreement with the predicate nominal in (5); it can be used to explain how predicative elements in case rich languages come to surface in a non-default case in examples like (6); and its projection is necessary in Control structures if one wishes to use some version of the Theta Criterion in order to account for contrasts of the type in (7). (4) [PRO to think first of oneself ] is not always wise. (5) Mary and Bill want [PRO/*their son to become millionaires]. (6) a. Ólafur hafði gaman af [að PRO fara einn í veisluna]. Olaf.NOM had pleasure of to NOM go alone.NOM to party.the ‘Olaf found it pleasurable to go alone to the party.’ b. Ólafur hafði ekki gaman af [að PRO vanta einan í veisluna]. Olaf.NOM had not pleasure of to ACC lack alone.ACC in party.the c. Ólafur hafði ekki gaman af [að PRO leiðast einum í veislunni]. Olaf.NOM had not pleasure of to DAT be-bored alone.DAT in party.the Icelandic data drawn from Sigurðsson (2008: 412) (7)

I/*There saw him.

The reexamination of these arguments in Chapter 4 will establish that these particular paradigms can receive what are arguably equally plausible alternative accounts within both the Movement and the bare VP traditions. Given that the standard paradigms fail to resolve the issue of whether or not PRO exists, Chapter 5 will introduce five distinct types of evidence that will be

Overview

3

argued to presently be amenable to analysis only within that type of approach. This evidence will include the well-known placement of wh-elements in indirect questions of the type in (8), the contrasting acceptability of floating quantifiers in the (a) and (b) variants of sentences like (9)–(10), the contrasting grammaticality of the (a) and (b) variants of sentences like (11)–(12), and clitic climbing contrasts out of Control clauses in languages like French and Italian of the type in (13). (8) Larry told them [which outfit to buy for themselves]. Data from Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 439) and Chomsky (1980: 7) (9) a.

I urged my students [to all take that course].

b. *This point needs [all emphasizing]. (10)

a. *The students wanted [all to be ready to leave by 9]. b. I persuaded the students [all to be ready to leave by 9]. Contrasts in (10a,b) originally noted in Maling (1976)

(11)

a.

It is desirable [for it to become known that he is dishonest].

b. *It is desirable [to become known that he is dishonest]. (12) a.

Il doit [y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques]. it must there to-have of-the soap in every the toilets public

b. *Il faut [y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes it is-necessary there to-have of-the soap in every the toilets publiques]. public ‘It is necessary to have soap in all public restrooms.’ Data drawn from Authier & Reed (2009: 40) (13) a. *Je le veux voir. I it want to-see ‘I want to see it.’ b.

Lo volevo vedere subito. it want-PAST-1SG to-see immediately ‘I wanted to see it immediately.’ Example (13b) drawn from Cinque (2004)

4

Overview

Having remotivated a PRO approach to Control in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 will provide an in-depth examination of the form such an analysis should take, introducing key data that indicate that the standard null Case approach of Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) may warrant refinement in several surprising ways that include the assumed surface position of PRO at Spell-Out (presently assumed to be Spec of IP/TP), the categorial status of Control complements (often assumed to be CP, although, more recently, IP), and, finally, the Case and phi-feature make up of various NPs, including PRO. (PRO is generally assumed to be associated with null Case and the phi-features of an antecedent determined, when possible, by some version of the Minimal Distance Principle.) In Chapter 6, a very different view of PRO (and other types of NPs) will be put forth and defended, one that assumes with Bowers (2002) that it is best treated in the derivational component as a Caseless, inherently phi-featureless, non-expletive noun, but departs from him in arguing that it not only may remain within its original clausal domain at Spell-Out, but generally does not move even as high as the first NegP that dominates its original merge position. This approach will be shown in Chapter 6 to accommodate not only the standard paradigms discussed in Chapter 4 and the novel data introduced in Chapter 5, but also facts (some well-known, others previously unremarked) that involve apparent overlapping distribution of PRO and lexical NPs in English, French, and Greek sentences like (14)–(17), an overlap that is shown in Chapters 2 and 4 to be puzzling under previous theories of Control. (14)

a.

I believe [her/*PRO to be a person of integrity].

b. Je croyais [PRO t’avoir dit de ne pas toucher à mes affaires]. I believe to-you to-have told of Neg not to-touch at my things ‘I believe that I told you not to touch my things.’ Contrast originally observed in Italian and French by Rizzi and Vergnaud respectively (see Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37)). (15)

a.

I distinctly remember [PRO/myself/her sending that letter].

b. John deliberately got [PRO/himself hurt]. c. J’ai entendu [PRO/Médor aboyer]. I have heard Médor to-bark ‘I heard (Médor) barking.’

Overview

(16) a.

b.

5

o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ tora, o Yanis elpizi [na figi (o Giorgos)]. now the John hopes Particle leave-3-sing tomorrow ‘Now John hopes that he/George will leave.’ Greek data drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 154–155)

(17)

Les villageois/PRO/*Ils/*Eux étant pauvres, ils n’avaient pas the villagers they them being poor they Neg had not les moyens d’engager un expert. the means of to-hire an expert ‘The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert.’

While Chapter 6 is devoted to the syntactic mechanisms at work in Control structures, Chapters 7 and 8 will defend the view that a more complete theory of Control requires reference to minimally two types of semantic factors, namely, the lexical entailments associated with various lexemes in the sentence (a position that has been previously argued for in work by Bach (1979), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Sag & Pollard (1991), Culicover & Jackendoff (2001), and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), among many others) and, secondly, the type of semantic entity (e.g. Fact, Eventuality, or Proposition) denoted by a matrix verb’s clausal complement. The former hypothesis will be argued, on the basis of both familiar and previously unremarked data, to be necessary in order to determine the understood referent of PRO, analyzed in Chapter 6 as a syntactically phi-featureless NP. The latter hypothesis will be shown to explain why “overlap” is attested in structures like (14)–(17) above, but not with verbs like disclose or remark in simple infinitival contexts like (18) below. (18)

a.

I disclosed/remarked/explained [that I would bring some wine to tonight’s party].

b. *I disclosed/remarked/explained [to PRO bring some wine to tonight’s party]. With these purposes in mind, let us turn now to a consideration of how the syntax and semantics of Control configurations have been approached in the past, beginning in Chapter 2 with the type of approaches that either gave birth to, or explicitly recognized, the existence of PRO.

Chapter 2

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control As indicated in Chapter 1, there currently exist three fundamentally different types of approaches to analyzing the syntax of Control structures such as Julia loves to play the piano. and It is important to start learning a second language while one is still young. These are (a) PRO approaches to Control, as in, e.g., Martin (1992, 2001), Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002), Landau (2004, 2008), and Sigurðsson (2008), among many others (b) analyses reducing Control to NP or feature Movement, as in, e.g., O’Neil (1995), Manzini & Roussou (1997, 2000), and Hornstein (1999), and, finally, (c) bare VP (or implicit argument) approaches to the Control, as in work by Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Bach (1979), Bresnan (1982), Gazdar (1982), Klein & Sag (1982), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1986), and Jackendoff (1990), to name but a few. The goal of this chapter and the next one is to trace, for those linguists less familiar with the literature on this topic, a few of the key points in the historical development of each of these three currently competing theories of Control, beginning in this chapter with standard generative theory and turning in the next one to Movement and bare VP approaches to Control. This review will not be exhaustive and an apology in advance is in order for the oversights and omissions that undoubtedly exist. However, the discussion of previous work on this topic has been limited for two, hopefully legitimate, reasons. First, time and space constraints alone would preclude an undertaking as wide in scope as would be a comprehensive overview of previous theories of Control, a subject that could easily form a book topic (possibly several) in and of its own right. Second, the overarching goal of this book is not to provide a historical overview of every theory of Control that has ever been put forth, but rather to set the stage for (a) a critical evaluation of data currently (but, it will be argued, erroneously) asserted to favor current PRO approaches to Control over its two major competitors (the subject of Chapter 4) (b) the introduction of novel data that do appear to support such a theory (the topic of Chapter 5), and, finally, (c) the development of two novel PRO analyses of Control in Chapter 6. (The remaining chapters, the reader may recall, are devoted to two important semantic influences at work in Control.) In short, this chapter and the next one seek only to make it relatively clear how PRO, Movement, and bare VP approaches to Control have respectively been formulated over the years and, more importantly, why they have been constructed in such differing fashions.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

7

In terms of organization, the review of standard generative approaches to Control to be undertaken in this chapter opens in Section 2.1 with an overview of some of the key points in the development of transformational approaches to Control, these being the analyses of the phenomenon put forth in Chomsky (1965), Rosenbaum (1967), Postal (1970), Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), and Chomsky (1980). It moves on in Section 2.2 to that of theories couched in terms of the Government-Binding model (Chomsky (1981a, 1982), Manzini (1983), and Bouchard (1984)), and concludes in Section 2.3 with approaches employing Minimalist Theory (Martin (1992, 2001), Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002), Landau (2004, 2008), and Sigurðsson (2008)). While the reader already familiar with previous work on Control theory could easily set these two chapters aside and proceed directly to the novel subject matter of the remaining chapters, she or he may still wish to read over Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of this chapter well as Chapter 3 since certain novel empirical paradigms that are problematic for the current version of just one particular type of theory are introduced there. (Data that hold equal theoretical import for the current versions of all three types of theories will be delayed until Chapters 4 and 5.)

2.1 Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981) 2.1.1 Chomsky (1965) and Rosenbaum (1967): Lexical NP Deletion Since the earliest days of generative grammar, the syntactic structure of Control sentences has been a topic of great interest. In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chomsky (1965: 21–24) makes the novel observation that while the sentences like (1a,b) below may appear to be of the same structural form, upon closer inspection this cannot be the case since passivization of the embedded clause results in an output synonymous with the active voice counterpart only in the case of expect, as the examples in (2a,b) demonstrate. (1)

a. I expected a specialist to examine John. b. I persuaded a specialist to examine John.

(2)

a. I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (equivalent to (1a)) b. I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. (not equivalent to (1b))

8

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Chomsky suggested that this difference could easily be captured in terms of his Aspects model of grammar by postulating that expect in both (1a) and (2a) is associated with the same Deep Structure in (3), whereas persuade in (1b) is associated with the Deep Structure in (4a), while (2b) is associated with the Deep Structure in (4b). The two obviously differ with respect to which NP is assumed to be the thematic direct object of the verb persuade (a specialist or John), as well as which argument in the embedded clause is assumed to be non-overt at Surface Structure. (3)

I expected [ S a specialist will examine John].

(4) a. I persuaded a specialist [ S a specialist will examine John]. b. I persuaded John [ S a specialist will examine John]. Peter Rosenbaum, also working within the framework of Chomsky’s (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, appears to have taken up and greatly expanded on this suggestion in his doctoral dissertation, written at M.I.T. between 1964– 1965 and published in 1967. He also proposed that so-called Obligatory Control structures like Everyone preferred to remain silent. in (5a) and They tempted John to leave early. in (5b), involved the base-generation of an overt embedded thematic subject at Deep (a.k.a. underlying) Structure, as in (6a,b).1 That is, Rosenbaum (1967: 17, 20) proposed that Control verbs like prefer and tempt idiosyncratically (lexically) select for complements of the types in (6).

1 Rosenbaum (1967: 14) postulated that an NP serves as the complement of Subject Control verbs, while an S serves as a complement to Object Control verbs in order to provide the simplest account of the following contrasts, given the syntactic theory at the time: (i) a. Everyone preferred [to remain silent]. b. [To remain silent] was preferred by everyone. c. [What everyone preferred] was to remain silent. (ii) a. John tempted his little brother [to leave early]. b. *[To leave early] was tempted by John. c. *[What John tempted] was to leave early. Specifically, the transformational rules of Passivization and Pseudocleft formation had been previously formulated to target NP, not S (cf., e.g., Chomsky (1957: Chapter 7) in relation of passives). Therefore, a transformational account of the above contrasts would most straightforwardly follow if one assumes that Subject Control verbs c-select for NP, but Object Control verbs select for S.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(5)

9

a. Everyone preferred [to remain silent]. b. They tempted John [to leave early].

(6)

a.

b.

The attested Surface (a.k.a. superficial) Structure word orders in (5a,b) were then hypothesized, in a manner consistent with the Aspects model of grammar (i.e. the Standard Theory of Transformational Grammar) to result (among other mechanisms irrelevant to present purposes) from the obligatory application of a transformational rule that Rosenbaum dubbed Identity Erasure (soon to become known as Equivalent Noun Phrase Deletion, EQUI-NP Deletion, or simply EQUI), provided below in (7):2

2 The clause in (7b), involving erasure of an embedded subject by an NP that linearly follows it, was intended by Rosenbaum to capture examples like I absolutely require it of you to be here on time. in which the clause it to be here on time was assumed to linearly precede the PP of you at Deep Structure.

10 (7)

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Rosenbaum’s (1967: 6) Transformation of Identity Erasure (TIE ): W 1

(NP) 2

X 3

+D 4

NP 5

Y 6

(NP) 7

Z 8

(a) 5 is erased by 2 (b) 5 is erased by 7 In order for Identity Erasure to target appropriate NPs for deletion, Rosenbaum placed a number of conditions on its application. These are given below in (8a–c): (8) Conditions on the Identity Erasure Transformation: Rosenbaum (1967: 6) An NPj is erased by an identical NPi if and only if there is a Sα such that. . . (a) NPj is dominated by Sα (b) NPi neither dominates nor is dominated by Sα (c) for all NPk neither dominating nor dominated by Sα , the distance between NPj and NPk is greater than the distance between NPj and NPi where the distance between two nodes is defined in terms of the number of branches in the path connecting them. The explicitly stated intent of the preceding conditions was to ensure (a) that only the (subject) NP in a complement clause be targeted for “erasure” (not, say, a verb’s direct object in a sentence like Mary burned herself.) (b) that the “eraser” (in today’s terms, PRO’s antecedent) appear in the matrix clause and (c) that the closest possible “eraser”/antecedent be selected. This last condition, given above in (8c), was subsequently named the “Minimal Distance Principle,” or MDP, by Postal (1970: 468) and it proved to be quite influential in subsequent generative analyses of Control, as will soon be made clear. The basic observation that Rosenbaum was seeking to capture with his MDP was that it is the matrix object NP that serves as the antecedent for the understood subject of the embedded clauses in (9a–c), not the matrix subject: (9)

a. We should choose Mary [to serve as team captain this year]. b. You have got to start motivating him [to do his homework]. c.

My parents forced me [to clean my plate at every meal].

In order to accommodate cases in which the opposite appears to be the case, as in Rosenbaum’s (1967: 16–17, 68) examples in (10)–(12) below, two very different types solutions were suggested.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(10)

a.

11

I sold the boat [(in order) to save money].

b. She took the car [(in order) to buy bread]. (11)

I promised John [to bring the money].

(12)

a.

I demand of you [to be allowed to come].

b. I ask of you [to be allowed to come]. c.

I request of you [to be allowed to come].

First, in relation to in order-type (i.e. Rationale Clause) adjuncts like (10), Rosenbaum suggested that the MDP does correctly select the matrix subject as the antecedent of the Control clause because these phrases adjoin to S, as in his structure in (13) below. That is, in (13), the matrix subject (I) is clearly “closer” to the subject of the adjunct clause than is the matrix object as the former is dominated by a fewer number of branching nodes – just one (namely, S), as opposed to two (VP and S) in the case of the boat. (13)

Thus, one general approach to resolving apparent counterexamples to a configurational approach to antecedent resolution in Obligatory Control configurations emerged – the assumed point of attachment of the Control clause. As will be made clear below, this type of solution has been not infrequently employed since in other, strongly configurational, approaches to this particular aspect of Control theory, which Postal (1970: 468) later dubbed “the Control Problem.” In relation to promise-type examples like (11) (and, by extension sentences containing be allowed to in the Control clause, as in (12)), Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68) suggested: “The verb promise is peculiar in many respects; and there is every reason to . . . look more deeply into the analysis of this particular verb,

12

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

for we are likely to find that the problem lies not with the erasure principle but with our analysis of the constructions in which this particular verb appears.” In short, Rosenbaum was of the opinion that these sorts of sentences should also be treated as apparent counterexamples to his MDP, although he did not elaborate further on just how this second type of case might be accommodated, leaving entirely open the question of whether syntactic, semantic, or perhaps even non-linguistic (learned) factors might be at work. As we will see below, certain subsequent (generative) research on Control has again not infrequently adopted the same position, while semanticists and those working in alternative syntactic frameworks have used them to argue in favor of very different approaches to Control. In sum, with Rosenbaum’s seminal work we see the emergence of certain key features of a typical standard generative approach to the syntax of Control. First, there is assumed to be a level of representation at which a Control clause is associated with a syntactically projected thematic subject, although Rosenbaum offered no arguments in favor of this hypothesis and, clearly, the theory at the time did not entail it. Second, the embedded subject is assumed to be phonetically non-overt at some level(s), an obviously necessary assumption. Finally, configurational notions are argued to (in Rosenbaum’s case, exhaustively) determine which NP should be selected as the antecedent of the understood embedded subject of an Obligatory Control clause, a theoretical claim that was again not entailed by Standard Transformational theory, but one which, as we will see below, has proven to be highly influential in subsequent generative approaches to Control.

2.1.2 Postal (1968a, 1970): The “Doom” pronoun The basic premises of Rosenbaum’s (1967) analysis of Control seem to have remained largely intact, although reworked and refined with respect to such issues as its cyclical or non-cyclic nature, its ability to perhaps apply forwards and backwards, the point at which it is applied relative to other rules, etc., until the publication in 1970 of Paul Postal’s Linguistic Inquiry article entitled “On coreferential complement subject deletion,” an article that had been circulating in linguistic circles since at least 1968. It is in this article that one sees some significant shifts and refinements in the generative conceptualization of Control, as the following novel theoretical claims are either explicitly made or the groundwork for them is laid.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

13

(14) Innovations in standard generative Control Theory traceable to Postal (1968a, 1970) a.

For the first time, explicit arguments are given in favor of Rosenbaum’s (1967) hypothesis that there is a syntactically projected thematic subject in Control clauses. I.e., we see the emergence of some of the “standard” arguments in favor of PRO.

b. The novel claim is made that the thematic subject of a Control clause is a pronoun at some level(s) of syntactic representation. In other words, we in essence see the birth of PRO, which Postal refers to as the “Doom pronoun,” presumably because it is “doomed,” i.e. subject to obligatory deletion. c.

Postal makes the novel argument that the overt pronominal subject of a Control clause is not deleted until after the application of the majority of “core” syntactic rules (in the terms of the day, after the application of all cyclic rules). That is, we see what might be viewed as the precursor of the claim that the antecedent of PRO is determined by “late” rules operating over previously built syntactic representations.

d. The reference of the subject of a Control clause is, for the first time, argued to not be determined by purely configurational factors. I.e., we see the suggestion that, minimally, the antecedent of PRO cannot be solely determined by the MDP and, implicitly, that semantic factors play a key role in resolving “the Control Problem.” e.

Postal notes that not every pronominal subject of a Control clause is subject to coreference constraints. In other words, Arbitrary PRO is born.

Let us consider each of these contributions in turn. First, as indicated in (14a), Postal (1968a, 1970: 443–448) appears to have been the first to explicitly offer arguments in favor of Rosenbaum’s hypothesis that there is a syntactically projected thematic subject in Control clauses. He offers four such arguments to this effect, all of which warrant summary here as any theory of Control must accommodate them in one way or the other. (In Chapters 3 and 4, we’ll see just how other theories have attempted to do so.) Postal begins by noting that postulating that a Control clause has a syntactically projected subject, obligatorily coreferential with an argument of the matrix verb, accounts straightforwardly for selectional restrictions of the type in (15), a type of argument originally developed by Chomsky (1957: 42) in relation to passives.

14 (15)

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

a.

*Joan wants [to elapse].

b. *Joan wants [to occur nightly]. c.

*Joan wants [to disperse].

That is, under Rosenbaum’s analysis, the ungrammaticality of these examples would immediately fall out from the fact that the verbs elapse, occur, and disperse are semantically incompatible with an NP like Joan in subject position at the level of Deep Structure, as in (16). In other words, no additional theoretical assumptions need be added to the conceptualization of the grammar. (16)

a.

*Joan wants [Joan to elapse]. (cf. *Joan elapsed.)

b. *Joan wants [Joan to occur nightly]. (cf. *Joan occurred nightly.) c.

*Joan wants [Joan to disperse]. (cf. *Joan dispersed.)

Postal (1970: 445) also notes that Rosenbaum’s assumption that Control verbs c-select for full sentential clauses receives independent support from the existence of sentences like (17), in which the embedded subject is actually overt: (17)

Joan wants [Lucille to visit Betty].

That is, Rosenbaum’s analysis allows for a uniform sentential complementation frame for Control verbs, a result that, if empirically tenable, would certainly be superior to an approach that must resort to multiple c-selection frames to capture the same range of facts. Furthermore, even if the assumption of uniform c-selection were to ultimately prove to be unsustainable, examples like (17) provide independent support for the idea that Control verbs can c-select for some type of sentential complement. Thirdly, Postal shows that Rosenbaum’s approach straightforwardly accounts for what would otherwise be unexpected “gaps” in the distribution of phonetically overt embedded subjects in examples like (17) above. That is, one can explain why the NP Joan is acceptable in examples like (18a) below, but not in structurally identical examples like (18b): This follows from Rosenbaum’s proposal that Control verbs lexically specify for obligatory deletion of the subject of their complement clause only when that argument is co-referential with one of the matrix arguments. (18)

a.

Barbarai wants [Joan k to get married].

b. *Joan i wants [Joan i to get married].

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

15

Finally, a backwards Control application of the same analysis provides for an immediate account of the reflexive contrasts below in (19). That is, the presence of a Deep Structure subject coreferential with me in (19b,c) explains why himself becomes unacceptable in (19b), when it is perfectly licit in (19a). (19)

a.

[Bill’s shaving himself ] annoyed me.

b. *[Shaving himself ] annoyed me. c.

[Shaving myself ] annoyed me.

Turning next to the innovation in (14b), Postal (1968a, 1970: 457–482) also appears to have been the first to observe that the non-overt subject of a Control clause behaves in an impressive number of respects exactly like a pronoun, a fact not captured by Rosenbaum’s proposal. On page 458 of his 1970 article, Postal notes that this observation could be interpreted as indicating that Control clauses contain a phonetically null pronominal morpheme, Doom, subject to the rules already determining pronominal co-reference. Thus, instead of associating Control sentences with Rosenbaum’s Deep Structures in (6a,b) above, Postal suggests that they might be analyzed as in (20) below, in which the NP Doom is a pronominal NP, a position immediately judged by such authors as Jackendoff (1969: 108, 109–110) as the “. . .worst solution we might have to accept. . .” as it requires a special type of pronoun found nowhere else in the grammar that is never phonetically realized.3 (20) a.

3 Postal also notes that one could alternatively propose that the Deep Structure subject of a Control clause is as Rosenbaum suggests, but then is “turned into” a pronoun by the transformational rule known as Pronominalization. The bulk of his article is, in fact, formulated in these terms.

16

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

(20) b.

In support of this novel suggestion, Postal first notes that “Doom” is subject to the same constraint on backwards pronominalization that S.Y. Kuroda had observed earlier (in unpublished work) in relation to overt pronouns. Specifically, and as Postal’s (1970: 469–460) data in (21) and (22) make clear, backwards pronominalization with overt pronouns like he is blocked with semantically indefinite NPs like somebody: (21)

a. *The fact that he i lost amused somebodyi in the crowd. b. The fact that he i lost amused somebodyk in the crowd.

(22)

a. *The man who lost it i needs to find somethingi. b. The man who lost it i needs to find somethingk.

As his facts in (23) demonstrate, indefinites likewise block backwards application of Identity Erasure/EQUI, a parallel that would, of course, naturally follow from if one simply assumes that that the subject of a Control clause is a pronoun. (23)

a.

*[Doom i finding out Greta was a vampire] worried somebody i . (cf. [Bill’s finding out that Greta was a vampire] worried somebody.)

b. *[Doom i kissing] was fun for some kids i . (cf. [Tony and Betty’s kissing] was fun for some kids.) Similarly, Postal (1970: 465–468) notes that in those dialects of English that allow (24a), backwards pronominalization is blocked in contexts like (24b). Importantly, the same constraint is operative in Control contexts like (24c), indicating, once again, that the subject of a Control clause is a phonetically non-overt pronoun:

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(24)

a.

17

[His i finding that out] didn’t worry Bill i.

b. *[His i finding out that Bill i was going to be fired] didn’t worry him i. c. *[Doom i finding out that Bill i was going to be fired] didn’t worry him i. Postal (1970: 468–476) next observes that in many dialects of English, certain modal contexts constrain the co-referential possibilities of pronouns in exactly the same way that the antecedent of the understood subject of a Control clause is limited. For example, he observes with respect to the verb tell (and the verbs scream, yell, shout, moan, etc. when the latter set of verbs occur with overt objects) that while a pronoun in the embedded clause may refer to either the matrix subject or the object in (25a), the introduction of the modal ought or should limits the reference of the pronoun to the matrix verb’s object, namely, Max, as in (25b). (25)

a.

Harry i told Max k [that hei/k was sick].

b. Harry i told Max k [that he*i/k ought to visit Greta]. As (26) makes clear, the reference of the non-overt subject of a Control clause is similarly limited to the matrix object. Postal argues that this fact also straightforwardly follows if one assumes that the Control clauses selected by these verbs are associated with a Deep Structure containing the modal ought (a hypothesis allowed by the theory at the time) and that the subject of that clause is a pronoun. (26) Harry i told Max k [Doom*i/k to visit Greta]. Postal (1970: 476–478) next discusses the co-reference possibilities attested for overt pronouns in clauses containing semantically plural (i.e. coordinate) subject NPs, such as Harriet and Betty in (27) below. Specifically, and as (27b) makes clear, an overt possessive pronoun in an about-clause cannot refer singly to either Harriet or Betty, but must refer to either both of them jointly, as in (27a) or to a separate individual, say you, as in (27c): (27)

a.

Harriet i and Betty k spoke to you about theiri+k kissing Ralph.

b. *Harriet i and Betty k spoke to you about heri/k kissing Ralph. c.

Harriet i and Betty k spoke to you about your kissing Ralph.

18

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

The same, he notes, is true of the understood subject of a Control clause, as evidenced by (28b) below, a fact that would, of course, immediately follow if one simply assumes that the subject of a Control clause is a pronoun. (28) a.

Harriet i and Betty k spoke to you about [Doomi+k kissing Ralph].

b. *Harriet i and Betty k spoke to you about [Doomi/k kissing Ralph]. c.

Harriet i and Betty k spoke to youz about [Doomz kissing Ralph].

Finally, Postal (1970: 482–485) shows that the non-overt subject of a Control clause is sensitive to the very same “crossover” constraint that he had previously uncovered in relation to overt pronouns in Postal (1968b, 1971). Specifically, Postal (1968b, 1971) had noted that while examples like (29a), in which the Wh-phrase originates in subject position, are fully grammatical, those in (29b), in which it originates in object position, are not. This fact, he argued, can be captured by assuming that a Wh-expression coindexed with a pronoun cannot undergo movement that “crosses over” that pronoun: (29)

a.

Who i claimed Mary kissed him i?

b. *Who i did he i claim Mary kissed? As the example in (30) makes clear, the very same is true of the understood subject of a structurally parallel Control clause, indicating, once gain, that the non-overt subject of such a clause should be syntactically analyzed as a pronoun at some level(s) of representation: (30) *Who i did [Doom i punching Harry] annoy the most? Turning to the third innovation summarized above in (14c), Postal (1968a, 1970: 453–457) also appears to have been the first to provide what are now theory-internal pieces of evidence in favor of the view that antecedent resolution in Control structures occurs very late in the syntactic derivation, contra earlier claims by Rosenbaum and others. In the terms of the Standard Theory of Transformational Grammar employed at the time, Postal introduced evidence that Identity Erasure/EQUI/Doom Erasure must be treated as a noncyclical rule – a type of rule theorized to apply after the application of all cyclical ones. He did this by demonstrating that the rules determining pronominal co-reference (known as Pronominalization), to which Doom was just shown above to be subject, operate on the output of Wh-Movement, a rule itself argued by Postal (1970: 454–457) to be non-cyclic in nature. As these particular arguments are strongly

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

19

anchored to the Aspects-model of the grammar, they hold little import for present purposes, beyond the ultimate theoretical conclusion to which they led. For this reason, they have not been overviewed here, but the interested reader is invited to take a look at Postal (1970: 453–457). On the other hand, Postal’s data related to “the Control Problem” do warrant a closer look as they lend support for the innovation in (14d), namely, the novel (and equally influential) suggestion that purely configurational approaches to antecedent resolution in Control clauses may be insufficient. Specifically, Postal (1968a, 1970: 470) first observes that Rosenbaum’s MDP, given above in (8c), predicts that the understood subject of a Control clause will always be understood to refer unambiguously to a particular NP in the matrix clause (the “closest” one). Yet, he observes, examples like (31) below clearly show that this hypothesis cannot be maintained since Doom/PRO can be interpreted as referring to the matrix subject, the object, or even the two jointly: (31)

a.

Harry i talked to Bill k about [Doomi/k/i+k kissing Greta].

b. Harry i wrote to Bill k about [Doomi/k/i+k not voting for Humphrey]. In addition, Postal (1968a, 1970: 474) notes instances such as those in (32) in which the very same verb (ask) selects for different antecedents: In one of these cases, then, the “closer” potential target apparently is not selected. (32)

a.

Bill i asked Tom k [Doom*i/k to fire the cannon].

b. Bill i asked Tom k [when Doomi/*k to fire the cannon]. And, finally, he adds to Rosenbaum’s earlier problematic data involving the verb promise in (11) above, the semantically similar verbs in the examples in (33b,c) below, in which a more “distant” antecedent again appears to be selected as the understood referent of Doom (PRO): (33)

a.

Bill i promised Tom k [Doomi/*k to visit him in Sing Sing].

b. I i made an oath to Bill k [Doom i/*k to visit him in Sing Sing]. c.

I i vowed to Zeus k [Doom i/*k to find the thief ].

Postal’s (1968a, 1970: 470) solution to these problems is the generative semantic one already outlined above in relation to the Ought Modal Constraint that he suggests applies to verbs like tell, transitive scream, yell, shout, moan, and so on in (25)–(26) above. Specifically, Postal proposes that there is no grammatical principle such as the MDP – what appear to be MDP effects are actually

20

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

various, essentially semantic, constraints on pronominal coreference that can be shown to apply to overt pronouns as well. For example, in relation to the data involving ask in (32) above, Postal associates the example in (32a) with the Deep Structure in (34a), which may surface as either (32a) above or (34b) below. In both instances, he argues, there appears to be a constraint, which he calls the Will-Would Modal Constraint, that limits the coreference of overt and non-overt pronouns to the object NP. (34) a.

Bill asked Tom [if he/Doom would fire the cannon].

b. Bill i asked Tom k [if he*i/k would fire the cannon]. (on the relevant non-interrogative reading) In contrast, examples like (32b) are associated with the Deep Structure in (35a), which may surface as either (32b) or (35b). Again, the same (apparently semantic-based) constraint determines the reference of both overt pronouns and Doom/PRO. (35)

a.

Bill asked Tom [when he/Doom should fire the cannon.]

b. Bill i asked Tom k [when hei/*k should fire the cannon.] With respect to promise-type examples of the type in (33), Postal again develops what is essentially a semantic-based account, implemented, of course, in terms of the now discarded notion of a generative semantics-style Deep Structure. Specifically, Postal associates (33a) above with a Deep Structure semantically equivalent to (36a) below, which may surface in either the non-overt pronominal form as in (33a) above or the overt form, associated with the very same coreferential properties, in (36b).4 (36) a.

Bill promised Tom [that he/Doom intends to visit him in Sing Sing].

b. Bill i promised Tom k [that hei/*k intends to visit him in Sing Sing]. In short, despite its outdated technical implementation, Postal’s (1968a, 1970) work is the first to argue that the reference of the understood subject of a Control clause may not be determined by a configurational principle like the MDP, but rather, by semantic factors – ones that would similarly limit the distribution of overt pronouns in (semantically) equivalent contexts. 4 In an Appendix to his paper, Postal (1970: 493–500) attempts to unify the various modal constraints summarized in this chapter in terms of just two rules that determine the Deep Structure of a Control structure by making reference to its corresponding semantic content in direct discourse.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

21

Looking finally at the birth of Arbitrary PRO in (14e), Postal (1970: 480–482) notes, with Lees & Klima (1963: 21), the existence of sentences like (37)–(38), which have the singular property of allowing only the reflexive forms oneself and, more colloquially, generic yourself: (37)

a.

[Shaving oneself ] is no fun.

b. *[Shaving themselves] is no fun. (38) a.

[Criticizing oneself fairly] is difficult.

b. *[Criticizing herself fairly] is difficult. Such a restriction on Control structures involving reflexives is not, of course, attested in Postal’s earlier example in (19c) above, repeated below in (39), although, he notes, the restriction is attested with a large number of Control adjectives, including, among others, be clever/important /clear/obvious etc. (39) [Shaving myself ] annoyed me. Postal’s account of these facts is, unfortunately, theory-bound: He proposes that (37)–(38) must have a an overt generic pronoun one/you at Deep Structure, similar to the one attested at the Surface level in his (somewhat clumsy) examples in (40) below; in other words, (37) and (38) are associated with the Deep Structures in (41): (40) a.

[Going there] is fun for one.

b. [Kissing Betty] is difficult for one. (41)

a.

[Doom shaving one] is no fun for one.

b. [Doom criticizing one fairly] is difficult for one. To these Deep Structures, the usual rules of (backwards) Pronominalization and Reflexivization apply, as well as a new rule of one-deletion, generating the desired end results. While the account is technically outdated, the observation that the reference of the understood subject of certain Control clauses is limited to that of a generic pronoun equivalent to one or you remains significant. It marks, essentially, the birth of what would soon become known as Arbitrary PRO.

22

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Equally important was Postal’s (1970: 478–480) related observation that there are also instances in which the understood subject of what appears to be a Control clause is neither obligatorily generic, nor determined by an overt NP in the sentence. He provides the examples in (42) as illustrations: (42)

a.

[Kissing Betty] was condemned.

b. [Invading China] was proposed yesterday. In these examples, the understood subject of the gerundive clause is not determined by any explicit or implicit argument in the sentence. With respect to the latter, for example, postulating that the implicit Agent of the passivized matrix verb in (42a,b) functions as the controller would incorrectly derive readings in which the same person who does the condemning/proposing also does the kissing/invading. In fact, the referent of the understood subject of the gerund seems to be entirely open to contextual determination. For example, in (42a) it could be my kissing of Betty that was condemned, or yours, or anyone else’s. Of these examples Postal notes (p. 479) “. . .the deleted unspecified subjects . . .are a function of a rule of complement subject deletion which is not subject to coreference constraints” (emphasis his own). In other words, Postal hypothesizes that there must be a separate mechanism that determines the antecedent of the understood subject of these types of clauses, which, as we will soon see, ultimately came to be treated as further instances of Arbitrary Control. In sum, with Postal’s seminal work we see the emergence of additional key features of standard and alternative approaches to Control. With respect to the former, explicit arguments are given in favor of the view that Control clauses are associated with syntactically projected thematic subjects, these arguments repeatedly turn up in various forms in subsequent work on the topic, as will be demonstrated below. We also see, for the first time, recognition of a phonetically non-overt pronominal in Control clauses, soon thereafter referred to as PRO (see, e.g., Chomsky (1973, 1976)), presumably because of the parallels between this argument and overt pronouns that Postal (1968a, 1970) outlined. Thirdly, we see the emergence of the idea that certain aspects of the syntax of Control are determined relatively late, applying over previously built structures. Fourth, we see the recognition of Control clauses in which the antecedent of the nonovert subject appears to be determined in a fashion distinct from “Obligatory” Control contexts. Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, we also see the emergence of what would ultimately come to be viewed by some as a hallmark of an alternative, non-generative approach to Control. Namely, we see semantic factors “creeping into” the determination of PRO’s antecedent, although, given

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

23

the theory at the time, those semantic factors were actually “built into” syntactic Deep Structures, technically allowing for a purely syntax-driven theory of Control.

2.1.3 Chomsky & Lasnik (1977): R-indexing, “Rules of Control,” and opaque domains By the late 1970s, specifically, in Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) Linguistic Inquiry article entitled “Filters and Control,” one sees a third major shift in the standard generative approach to Control. This article, couched in terms of the so-called Revised Extended Standard Theory (REST) of Transformational Grammar, is more strongly focused than preceding models on achieving Chomsky’s (1965: 25–27) ultimate goal of achieving explanatory adequacy by restricting, to the highest degree possible, the options assumed to exist in natural language grammars. That is, generative syntacticians now viewed the rich descriptive work of the Standard Transformational Grammar and Extended Standard Transformational Grammar models as being overly permissive, assuming powerful theoretical devices (among them, rule ordering, non-structure preserving operations, diverse types of Phrase Structure Rules, etc.) without strong empirical motivation. In an attempt to constrain the range of possible natural language grammars, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 431) proposed that the transformational model be reconceived as in (43) below. That is, they assumed the basics of the EST model, but simplified certain aspects of it by postulating that surface filters applying at the syntax/phonology interface (in bold below) and interpretive rules applying at the syntax/semantics interface (also in bold) jointly conspire to impose wellformedness conditions on (now abstract) Surface Structures, thereby eliminating the need for rule ordering, non-structure preserving operations, and so on in the syntax. (43)

Base (= Lexicon + X0 Theory) ↓ Transformations (restricted, e.g., to structure-preserving, cyclic rules) Deletion ↓ Filters ↓ Phonology ↓ Stylistic rules

Construal (e.g. Rules of Control and rules of overt nominal co-/disjoint reference) = part of LF ↓ Quantifier Scope = part of LF

24

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

In short, with this model, standard generative theory moves to the view, originally defended in Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 2 & Ch. 3), that the types of syntactic operations previously assumed to generate Control structures, namely, transformations like Pronominalization and Identity Erasure/EQUI/Doom Erasure, should be rejected in favor of interpretive rules, of which Chomsky & Lasnik recognize two distinct types, the most important, for present purposes, being their “Rules of Control” in bold above. Looking specifically at the details of their analysis, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 432) first assume that Control structures, typified by the example in (44a) below, are associated with Deep Structures of the type in (44b): (44) a.

John persuaded Bill to leave.

b. John persuaded Bill [ S 0 [ S [ NP e][VP to leave]]]. Two comments about this structure are in order. First, as exemplified by (44b), Control verbs like persuade continue to be assumed to c-select uniformly for a full sentential complement. However, this complement is now assumed to take the form of S0 (today, CP or ForceP), rather than simply S (today’s IP or TP). Although Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) do not advance explicit argumentation in support of this assumption it is presumably adopted on the basis of “simplicity of the base”-type considerations similar to those put forth in Postal (1968a, 1970: 445) in relation to different examples.5 That is, Chomsky & Lasnik discuss at length the fact that Control verbs like promise in (45a) select for a full clausal complement headed by that; therefore, the null hypothesis would be that this is the only type of complement selected by this type of verb – even in Control structures like (45b) – unless empirical arguments can be advanced indicating the contrary. To do otherwise would amount to needlessly complicating the base by allowing multiple c-selection at no gain. 5 As the reader may recall from the discussion of example in (17) drawn from Postal (1970), he made this argument on the basis of the verb want, which Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) actually do not treat as a Control verb for reasons that will become clear as the discussion in the text proceeds. Specifically, it will soon be demonstrated that Chomsky & Lasnik’s system is devised in such a way that lexical NPs and PRO are in complementary distribution. Since want allows lexical NPs in infinitival contexts (cf. Postal’s example in (17)), it cannot be analyzed as a Control verb. Instead, Chomsky & Lasnik treat want as an EQUI NP Deletion verb. I.e., they assume that EQUI NP Deletion is distinct from Control. The same is true of other heads formerly treated as selecting Control; i.e., adjectives like (be) difficult/easy/fun etc. Given that this aspect of their analysis is soon abandoned (cf. Chomsky (1980: ft. 38) for a rejection of the assumption of complementary distribution, and especially Chomsky (1981a: 19–22) for a Control analysis of verbs like want), it is not discussed in detail in the text. The interested reader is referred to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 442).

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(45)

a.

25

Cherri promised Cindy [ S0 that [ S she would leave early]].

b. Cherri promised Cindy [ S0 [ S [N e][VP to leave early]]]. In a similar vein, Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) treat the case of indirect questions such as (46) below, in which the presence of a Wh-element in COMP (C) clearly indicates that Control verbs c-select S0 , at least in these types of examples, since Wh-movement was already well known to involve movement to COMP (cf., e.g., Chomsky (1977)). Assuming otherwise for Control structures not involving a [+WH] embedded COMP, would, once again, entail needless complications in the base along the lines already noted above. (46) It is unclear/obvious [ S0 what [ S to do]]. Of course, assuming that Control heads uniformly c-select for S0 rather than S does raise a separate issue. Namely, one must now explain why COMP appears to be absent in Control structures like (44b) and (45b) above, whereas it can obviously be present in tensed embedded contexts like (45a). To account for this fact, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 446) propose that the [-WH] COMP of Control infinitives is realized uniquely as the zero morpheme ɸ, whereas that of tensed clauses like (45a) is realized by that.6 The second aspect of Chomsky & Lasnik’s analysis of Control that warrants comment is their use in (44b) of what they call “an unexpanded NP” ([NP e]) in the embedded subject position of a Control clause, i.e., the position Postal (1968a, 1970) had earlier associated with his “Doom” pronoun. As mentioned in the previous section, researchers such as Jackendoff (1969: 108, 109–110) judged Postal’s use of a “Doom” pronoun to be the “. . .worst solution we might have to accept. . .” in analyzing the syntax of Control structures because Doom was unattested elsewhere in the grammar and it had to be stipulated to be phonetically covert. Jackendoff (1969: 110–112), at the suggestion of Chomsky, judged it better to formally analyze “Doom” as an unexpanded

6 The [-WH] complementizer associated with tensed clauses (that) was further assumed to be subject to the following rule of COMP Deletion: (i) Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977: 446) COMP Deletion Filter: In the domain COMP, delete [ α ɸ] where α is an arbitrary category and ɸ an arbitrary structure. The effect of this rule is to freely delete at the syntax/phonology interface any material in COMP that is either semantically vacuous or recoverable. For example, the COMP in (ii) below is assumed to be of the vacuous type, thus subject to the rule in (i): (ii) Cherri promised Cindy [ S 0 (that) [ S she would leave early]].

26

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

NP, which, under his approach, was an NP (phrase) that failed to project to a terminal node (N) in the base. I.e., such NPs would result from the theoretically possible non-application of a Phrase Structure Rule. While such unexpanded NPs would normally be blocked as uninterpretable, certain instances could be rescued by the application of semantic interpretation rules, specifically, his Complement Subject Coreference Rule, which simply said that the unexpanded NP in a Control structure had to be assigned the same referential index as an NP in the matrix clause, subject to certain lexically specified networks of (non)coreference. In short, Jackendoff (1969) made use of the Aspects notion of “unexpanded NP” to develop what is arguably the first implicit argument approach to the syntax of Control structures, as well as the first semantically-driven approach to antecedent resolution in such clauses. (A more in-depth discussion of such approaches to Control will be provided in Chapter 3.) While clearly influenced by Jackendoff’s work, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) implement each of these notions quite differently. Following earlier work in Chomsky (1976: 331), Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 432–433) assume that the [NP e] in Control structures like (44b) above is simply an NP associated neither with lexical material nor, they add, a referential index. Crucially, and in contrast to Jackendoff (1969), they assume that the very same type of unexpanded NP is found in the Deep Structure subject position of a passive sentence like (47a), which Chomsky & Lasnik associate with the Deep Structure in (47b): (47)

a.

Bill was hit.

b. [ S 0 [ S [NP e][VP was [ AP –en [VP hit Bill]]]]]. The additional assumption is made that “unexpanded NPs” correspond to free variables in the semantic component. Given this, such NPs are deemed uninterpretable at LF unless supplied with a referential index by the syntactic component. This association occurs by one of two means. First, movement of an NP inherently associated with a referential index into the unexpanded NP position has this effect. This is the case, for example, of a passive sentence like (47) above, in which Surface Structure movement of the NP Bill into the position marked [NP e] at Deep Structure associates that position with Bill’s referential index. Alternatively, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 439–444) suggest that an unexpanded NP can be assigned a referential index by an obligatory “Rule of Control.” That is, a Control verb, such as persuade in (48a), or a particular syntactic configuration, such as the [ S0 [COMP +WH] [ S ___to VP]] structure associated with indirect

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

27

questions in (48b), is lexically specified for a Rule of Control to be obligatorily applied at LF. (48) a.

John persuaded/promised Bill [ S 0 [ S [NP e][VP to leave early]]].

b. It is unclear [ S 0 [what +WH] [ S ___to do]]. In the case of Control verbs, Chomsky & Lasnik follow Jackendoff (1969) in assuming that it is the meaning of the verb itself that determines the referential index obligatorily assigned to the subject position of the Control clause. Thus, a verb like persuade lexically specifies that the NP in the subject position of an infinitival clause it selects be assigned the referential index of the matrix object in infinitival contexts, but a verb like promise assigns the subject of its infinitival complement clause the index of the matrix thematic subject. In the case of Control adjectives in indirect questions like (48b), an arbitrary index is lexically specified to be assigned. Interestingly, if a structure of the type [ S 0 [COMP +WH] [ S ___to VP]] is selected as the complement of a Control verb, as in (49), then the Rule of Control associated with the verb prevails. (49) I told Bill [ S 0 [what +WH] [ S ___to do]]. In order to notationally distinguish unexpanded NPs that have their referential indices supplied by Rules of Control from those that have them determined via movement, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 432–433) suggest that (44b) above can be alternatively represented as in (50) below, in which PRO replaces [NP e]. (50) John persuaded Bill [ S0 [ S [NP PRO][VP to leave]]]. It is important to note that the obligatory rules of Control are formulated not only to account for the presence of PRO in contexts such as the preceding, but also the absence of lexical NPs in the same configurations. That is, the ungrammaticality of (51a,b) below is attributed to the obligatory Rules of Control associated with these particular matrix verbs/indirect questions, which cannot assign the semantically appropriate referential index to the (inherently valued) lexical NPs in the embedded subject position of the infinitival complement clauses. (51)

a.

*John persuaded/promised Bill [ S0 [ S [NP Mary][VP to leave early]]].

b. *It is unclear [ S 0 [what +WH] [ S Sarah to do]].

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) point out that, as one would expect, non-Control verbs do accept lexical NPs in infinitival contexts, as in (52): (52)

a.

It is illegal [ S 0 for [ S Bill to take part]].

b. I believe [ S 0 ɸ [ S John to be incompetent]]. This is expected since these heads are not associated with an obligatory Rule of Control and, hence, accept embedded subject NPs already associated with a referential index. Of course, non-Control heads do not always accept embedded lexical subjects, as the facts in (53) make clear. For this reason, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 459) put forth the *[NP to VP] Filter given below in (54), which rules out structures of this type. (53)

a.

*It is illegal [ S 0 [ S Bill to take part]].

b. *We informed Bill [ S 0 ɸ [ S Harry to leave]]. (54) Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977: 459) *[NP to VP] Filter: *[ α NP to VP] unless α is adjacent to and in the domain of a verb or for. Being a filter, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 441) note, (54) applies only to NPs “visible” at the syntax/phonology interface (cf. the model in (43) above). In other words, (54) applies only to NPs endowed with a referential index at Surface Structure, which PRO is not. (The reader will recall that the obligatory Rules of Control are assumed to apply at LF.) Chomsky & Lasnik complete their system by incorporating into it two general conditions on Rules of Construal (the reader may recall from the model of the grammar in (43) that the Rules of Control are considered to be one type of Rule of Construal). The constraints in question are the Tensed S Condition (a.k.a. the Propositional Island Constraint or PIC) and the Specified Subject Condition (or SSC). Looking first at the Tensed S Condition, Chomsky (1977) had previously shown, on the basis of contrasts of the type existing between the (a) and (b) variants in (55) and (56) below, that syntactic rules (be they movement rules, as in the case of NP-Movement in (55), or rules of co-/disjoint reference, as in the reflexive examples in (56)) cannot anaphorically relate two categories across a tensed S. In other words, a tensed S was said to create a domain “opaque” to all types of anaphoric relations, including the coreferential relation existing between an NP and its trace and the one existing between a reflexive pronoun and its antecedent.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(55)

a.

29

John i seems [ S0 ɸ [ S t i to like cats]].

b. *John i seems [ S0 ɸ [ S t i likes cats]]. (56) a.

I i consider [ S 0 ɸ [ S myself i to be a decent human being]].

b. *I i consider [ S 0 ɸ [ S myself i is a decent human being]]. The Tensed S Condition in (57) formally captures this generalization: (57) Chomsky’s (1977: 85) Tensed S Condition: No rule can involve X and Y in structures of the type: . . .X. . .[ S0 . . .Y. . .]. . .X. . . where S 0 is tensed, and where Y is not in COMP. Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 440, ft. 30) note that this condition extends to the type of anaphoric relations established by their “Rules of Control,” as evidenced by the contrasts I have provided below in (58):7 (58) a.

Cherri persuaded Cindy i [ S0 ɸ [ S PRO i to consider her offer]].

b. *Cherri persuaded Cindy i [ S0 ɸ [ S PRO i will consider her offer]]. That is, the Rule of Control that normally associates PRO with the referential index of persuade’s thematic object is blocked from applying across the tensed S in (58b), preventing PRO from becoming associated with a referential index, leaving it a free variable, uninterpretable at LF. In short, with the addition of the Tensed S Condition, one can explain why PRO is limited to the subject position of infinitival contexts.8 In a similar vein, Chomsky (1977: 85) had earlier put forth the Specified Subject Condition (SSC) in (59) below in order to explain (among other things) why an NP in the subject position of an infinitival clause also creates a domain “opaque” to anaphoric relations, as illustrated by the NP-Movement examples in (60) and the reflexive data in (61):

7 Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: ft. 30) simply note this fact in passing and do not provide explicit examples. For more explicit discussion, see Chomsky (1980: 8–9). 8 The discovery of languages that allow Control in finite (specifically, subjunctive) clauses, such as Albania, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian had, of course, not yet been made so discussion of such data is delayed for the moment.

30

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

(59) Chomsky’s (1977: 85) Specified Subject Condition (SSC): No rule can involve X and Y in structures of the type: . . .X. . .[ α . . .Y. . .]. . .X. . . where α is an S 0 or NP with a specified subject, and where Y is not in COMP. (60) a.

Cherri i seems [ S 0 ɸ [ S t i to like cats]].

b. *Cats i seem [ S 0 ɸ [ S Cherri to like t i]]. (61)

a.

Cherri i considers [ S0 ɸ [ S herself i to have fooled Bill’s brother]].

b. *Cherri i considers [ S0 ɸ [ S Bill’s brother to have fooled herself i]]. As Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 440, ft. 30) note, the SSC, as expected, is also at work in Control configurations, as demonstrated by the parallel contrasts I’ve constructed below in (62). Thus, we arrive at an explanation for why PRO is limited to the subject position of infinitival clauses. (62)

a.

Cherri persuaded Cindy i [ S0 ɸ [ S PRO i to visit someone]].

b. *Cherri persuaded Cindy i [ S0 ɸ [ S PRO i to visit PROarb]]. Thus, we see that Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) capture many of the insights in Postal (1968a, 1970), summarized above in (14), in the radically different theoretical terms in (63). (63) Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) REST approach to Control a.

Postal’s (1968a, 1970) arguments for assuming that a thematic subject is syntactically projected in Control clauses are implicitly assumed.

b. As in Chomsky (1973, 1976), Postal’s “Doom pronoun” is renamed PRO. However, it is reanalyzed as an NP that is not lexically expanded in the base that has its reference determined by obligatory, lexically specified Rules of Control. Contra Postal (1970), no link is made between the rules of coreference applying to overt pronouns and those applying to PRO, beyond those imposed on all anaphoric relations by the SSC and the Tensed S Condition. c.

Postal’s insight that part of the syntax of Control takes place relatively “late” in the derivation is captured via the introduction of Rules of Control that apply at LF.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

(63)

31

d. Postal’s idea that the reference of the subject of a Control clause is not determined by purely configurational factors is captured by semantically-based, lexically specified Rules of Control, expanding also on Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3). e.

Recognition of an Arbitrary PRO, subject to distinct rules determining its reference is maintained, but recast as arbitrary assignment of a referential index in specific types of indirect questions.

2.1.4 Chomsky (1980): Constraints on anaphoric relations, the Case Filter, and elaborated rules of Control Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) ideas are further refined, expanded upon, and modified in the final transformational analysis of Control to be overviewed here – that of Chomsky’s (1980) Linguistic Inquiry article entitled “On binding.” Beginning with those ideas that are straightforwardly carried over from Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), first, the Deep Structure of Control clauses in Chomsky (1980) continues to be analyzed uniquely as S 0 , as in, e.g., (44b) above, although Chomsky (1980: 7, 9) now explicitly provides two simplicity of the base-type arguments in support of this view. That is, he first notes that since Control verbs like promise, persuade, and so on clearly select for S 0 complements in examples like Cindy promised them that she would consider their offer., then one should assume, until confronted with evidence to the contrary, that they do so in Control contexts like Cindy promised to consider their offer. as well. In addition, he points out that the existence of indirect questions of the type given below in (64a) entail the Phrase Structure Rule in (64b), in which S 0 clearly expands as an S, containing an overt embedded subject NP. Therefore, the simplest grammar would maintain that analysis in the case of examples like (65a), which one might otherwise be tempted to analyze instead in terms of the Phrase Structure Rule (PSR) in (65b). That is, Chomsky notes that one would not wish to analyze Control structures involving indirect questions as containing embedded “subjectless” VP as in (65a) since that analysis would not extend to cover cases like (64a) in which the embedded subject is overt. Doing so would entail needlessly complicating the base to allow multiple PSRs stipulated to apply only in particular contexts. E.g., the “bare VP” rule in (65b) would have to be limited to infinitival contexts. (64) a.

It is unclear [ S 0 [whox] [ S Bill visited tx]].

b. S 0 → COMP S

32

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

(65) a.

It is unclear [ S 0 [whox] [VP to visit tx]].

b. S 0 → COMP VP Chomsky (1980: 6) also follows Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) in assuming that Control clauses contain an unexpanded (index free) NP in the base, one that must be assigned a referential index during the course of the derivation in order for the structure to converge at LF. As before, when this type of NP is assigned an index via a Rule of Control (rather than movement), it may be notationally designated as PRO as in (50) above. Also as before, the Rules of Control are assumed to apply at LF; therefore, PRO is index free at the syntax-phonology interface and thus will be “invisible”/deleted there. (As will be made clear momentarily, this fact continues to hold an interesting consequence for the theory of Control.) In terms of modifications to the earlier system, Chomsky (1980: 21–25, 28) first assumes that Control clauses do not contain a zero morpheme ɸ, as in (58a) above, but, rather adopts the view that COMP is, in all contexts, only optionally expanded. However, in infinitival contexts, it is subject to obligatory deletion up to recoverability. (In finite contexts, COMP deletion is free (i.e. optional) up to recoverability.) A much more radical modification of Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) theory of Control relates to the place and form of both the Specified Subject Condition (SSC), given above in (59), and the Tensed S Condition/Propositional Island Constraint (PIC), provided earlier in (57). By respectively reformulating these as the Opacity Condition, below in (66), and the Nominative Island Constraint (NIC), in (67), we will see that Chomsky (1980: 8–18) is able to, among other things, (a) avoid stipulating, as in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), that the “Rules of Control” (at least in English-type languages) apply only to the subject position of infinitival contexts (b) avoid redundancies between the SSC and the PIC and (c) extend these conditions on rules of construal to cover parallels between the distribution of Arbitrary PRO and Obligatory Control PRO. (66) Chomsky’s (1980: 13 ) Opacity Condition (the former SSC): If an anaphor α is in the domain of the subject of β, β minimal, then α cannot be free in β. (67) Chomsky’s (1980: 13) Nominative Island Constraint or NIC (the former PIC): A nominative anaphor in S cannot be free in S 0 containing S. To explain, the NIC in (67) first accounts for the fact that PRO (an anaphor, along with reflexives, reciprocals, and NP trace) cannot appear in the subject

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

33

position of a tensed clause, as demonstrated by the example in (68) below. That is, the NIC states that no nominative anaphor can be free in its minimal S 0 , covering both PRO examples like (68) below and overt reflexive examples in matrix contexts like *Himself left. In contrast, as the reader may recall from the discussion of (58b) above, Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) theory had to resort to an obligatory Rule of Control in order to account for the facts in (68). That is, the PRO variant of this example was said to be ungrammatical because the Tensed S Condition/PIC blocks the obligatory application of a rule of Control associated with verbs like promise, depriving PRO of a referential index at LF. (68) John promised Bill [ S 0 that [ S Mary/*PRO would visit him]]. Likewise, the stipulation of an obligatory Rule of Control was necessary under Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) earlier theory in order to account for the fact that PRO is not licit in object position, as demonstrated below in (69). That is, the presence of the specified subject Mary in the embedded clause blocks the application of an obligatory Rule of Control, again depriving PRO of a referential index at LF. In contrast, Chomsky’s (1980) Opacity Condition in (66) covers the same facts without resort to an obligatory Rule of Control. I.e., the Rule of Control may now apply in (69), but the sentence is still ill-formed at LF because PRO is free within the domain of the embedded S. (69) John told Bill [ S 0 that [ S Mary likes him/*PRO]]. Chomsky (1980: 13) notes that his reformulations in (66) and (67) also eliminate redundancies in the former SSC and Tensed S Conditions. For example, a sentence like (70) below is redundantly ruled out by both of these earlier conditions, as the anaphoric relation between each other and they is blocked both by the specified subject I and the embedded tensed S 0 . However, it violates only the Opacity Condition under the new system, each other not being a Nominative anaphor subject to the NIC. (70) *They told me [ S 0 what I gave each other]. Finally, these reformulations allow for the conditions in (66) and (67) to extend straightforwardly to certain examples involving Arbitrary PRO, which was not the case for the former Tensed S/PIC and the SSC since these conditions were formulated in terms of an anaphoric relation between two elements X and Y, rather than as a condition on anaphors alone. Thus, for example, the contrasts in (71a,b) below straightforwardly follow: In (71a), PRO is neither in the domain of a subject, nor in a position of nominative Case, escaping both the

34

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Opacity Condition and the NIC. However, the Opacity Condition does apply in (71b), given the Wh-trace in subject position, ruling out a free occurrence of PRO in that configuration. Under the system of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), only indirect questions of the form [ S0 [COMP +WH] [ S [NP e] to VP]] (i.e. those with an unexpanded NP in subject position) were lexically specified for Control. Therefore, in an indirect question like (71b), in which the unexpanded NP is in object position, PRO would be left without a referential index at LF. Such an account, as Chomsky points out, misses the parallel between Arbitrary PRO examples like (71b) and Obligatory Controlled PRO above in (69). (71)

a.

It is unclear [ S 0 whox [ S PRO to visit tx]].

b. *It is unclear [ S 0 whox [ S tx to visit PRO]]. In terms of entirely novel hypotheses, first Chomsky (1980: 18–32), following an (unpublished) suggestion made by Jean-Roger Vergnaud, replaces the *[NP to VP] Filter of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), given above in (54), with the now wellknown Case Filter below in (72). According to (72), which, like all filters, applies at PF, any N visible at that level must be associated with an abstract Case feature. (As the reader will recall, PRO, being index-free, is not visible at that level and thus “escapes” the filter.) (72) Chomsky’s (1980: 25) Case Filter: *N, where N has no Case. The introduction of the Case Filter in (72), Chomsky (1980: 34) notes, completes the account of the respective distribution of PRO and lexical NPs without resort to obligatory Rules of Control. Specifically, since Ns are assumed to be assigned Case at Surface Structure by c-commanding Ps (resulting in oblique Case assignment to NP), Vs (resulting in objective Case), and Tensed Is (Nominative) under government (which is normally blocked by an intervening S 0 ), only PRO can appear in (most) infinitival sentential clauses because it is the only NP assumed not to require Case at Surface Structure.9 (Verbs like believe, which do not exhibit the “usual” distributional patterns below, will be discussed momentarily.) (73)

a.

We persuaded Bill [PRO to leave].

b. *We persuaded Bill [Harry to leave]. c.

We persuaded Bill [that Harry would leave.]

9 See Chomsky (1980: 25) for the formal definition of government employed at that time.

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

35

Turning to the “Rules of Control” in this theory, Chomsky (1980: 33) assumes that in the unmarked case, verbs selecting infinitival complement clauses are lexically associated with the feature [+Control], with Rosenbaum’s MDP now determining, for the most part, which NP will ultimately be selected as PRO’s antecedent. However, Chomsky (1980: 30) notes that there are certain “marked” cases, involving, e.g. the verb promise, in which the MDP is not respected. To accommodate these, he proposes that a verb selecting an infinitival complement may, in addition to the usual feature [+Control] feature, also be associated with the more specific feature [+SC], meaning such a verb is lexically specified as an obligatory Subject Control verb, regardless of whether or not a structurally “closer” potential antecedent is present. (The functioning of these mechanisms will be illustrated shortly with examples.) To this, Chomsky (1980: 28) adds one final lexical specification to complete the analysis. Namely, a [+F] feature is added to the lexical entries of verbs like English believe that contrast with all others verbs selecting infinitival complements in that only they can apparently exceptionally assign objective Case across S 0 , a node that normally serves as a boundary to government and, hence, Case assignment. The [+/-F] feature thus distinguishes the sentence in (74a) from the one in (74b) – the former being [+F] and the latter [-F]. (The [+F] feature also correlates with the feature [-Control].) (74)

a.

I believe [John/him to be a fool].

b. *I said [John/him to be a fool]. Importantly, Chomsky treats the [+/-F] feature as an idiosyncratic lexical specification since semantically equivalent verbs in other languages, like French, Italian, and German, apparently lack it, as demonstrated by the French data below, which Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37) attributes to Jean-Roger Vergnaud and Jean-Yves Pollock (personal communications). (Luigi Rizzi is credited there for identical facts in Italian.) (75)

a. *Je crois [Jean avoir vu cet homme]. I believe Jean to-have seen that man ‘I believe John to have seen that man.’ b. Je crois [PRO avoir vu cet homme]. I believe to-have seen that man ‘I believe that I’ve seen that man.’

36

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

With these novel mechanisms in place, Chomsky (1980: 33) is able to elaborate further on his Rules of Control in the manner indicated in (76)–(78): (76)

. . .V. . . [ S0 COMP . . . [NP e] . . .] where V = [-F] and V and S 0 c-command one another

(77) In (76), a.

if COMP is not null and V has no controller, then [NP e] is assigned arb;

b. otherwise, [NP e] is assigned the index of the nearest controller. (78) NP is a controller for V in (77) if a.

NP is an indexed NP properly (i.e. thematically) related to V;

b. if V = [+SC], then NP is the subject of V. The definition in (76) specifies contexts for indexing via the Rules of Control: The phenomenon is limited to sentential complements of non-ECM (i.e. [-F]) verbs like try, promise etc. that contain an unexpanded NP at Deep Structure. In other words, structures like (79) will be ruled out because the verb believe is [+F], [-Control], leaving PRO without an index at LF. (The corresponding verb in French is assumed to be [-F].) (79) *I believe [PRO to have seen that man]. The rules in (77a,b) apply in that order. In other words, the rule determining Arbitrary Control, (77a), is applied first, limiting it to contexts like (80) below in which COMP is not null and there is no controller. (80) It is unclear [who PRO to visit]. Chomsky (1980: 8, ft. 9) notes and sets aside for future research the case of Arbitrary Control examples like (81) below, in which both controlled and arbitrary readings are apparently available when only the former is predicted to be by (77a). (I.e., there is a controller, John, available to serve as the antecedent of PRO.) (81) John i knows [how PROi/arb to solve the problem].

Approaches to Control in Transformational Grammar (1957–1981)

37

Perhaps it bears mentioning that the rule in (77a) also faces problems with respect to the Postal data involving Arbitrary Control introduced above. Specifically, the facts in (82a,b) show that Arbitrary Control is not limited to contexts in which the Control clause serves as a complement to V. (82)

a.

[PRO shaving oneself ] is no fun.

b. [PRO invading China] was proposed in the legislature yesterday. Turning to the rule of Obligatory Control in (77b), we note that if COMP is null, then the antecedent of PRO will be determined by the MDP, but made sensitive by the introduction of the term “controller” to both thematic relations and the lexical semantic feature [+SC], as specified in (78). Consider first the simple case of examples like (83): (83)

a.

John i asked Bill k [PRO*i/k to shave himself ].

b. John i promised Bill k [PROi/*k to shave himself ]. As the COMP of the embedded clause is null, the rule for Obligatory Control in (77b) applies. This selects the closest “controller” as the antecedent. By (78), the structurally closest thematic argument of the verb will be the antecedent unless the verb is lexically marked [+SC]. Ask is not a [+SC] verb; therefore, Bill supplies its referential index to PRO in (83a). However, promise is marked [+SC], therefore, John is selected as the antecedent in (83b). The same mechanisms, Chomsky points out, account for the contrasts in (84): (84) a. *John was promised [PRO to leave]. b. John was persuaded [PRO to leave]. Specifically, (84a) is ungrammatical because promise is [+SC], but passivization has deprived the main clause of a thematic subject “controller,” leaving PRO without an index at LF. In contrast, persuade, a verb that is not marked [+SC], still has a “controller” available after NP Movement, thereby ruling in (84b). Chomsky (1980: 35, ft. 40) again notes and sets aside for future research the case of problematic be allowed to clauses of the type in (85), an example drawn from Hust & Brame (1976: 255). (85) John was promised [PRO to be allowed to leave].

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

The original Rosenbaum-type be allowed to examples given in (12) above are likewise problematic, given shifts in “controller” of the type in (86). That is, the verb ask, as noted above, is not a [+SC] verb, as evidenced by (86a), but apparently becomes one in be allowed to-type contexts like (86b). (86) a.

I i asked the teacher k [PRO*i/k to leave the room].

b. I i asked the teacher k [PROi/*k to be allowed to leave the room]. To summarize, by the end of the transformational era of generative grammar, a certain degree of consensus had been reached about the syntax and semantics of Control. According to the standard view, Control clauses were full sentential clauses (S 0 s); they contained a phonetically non-overt anaphoric NP (PRO); and the reference of that nominal was determined relatively late in the derivation (at LF) by a set representational syntactic rules supplemented with a semanticallybased feature ([+SC]) that would override the “usual” MDP pattern of antecedent determination. Finally, Case was thought to play a pivotal role in the licensing of PRO, as opposed to phonetically overt NPs, as the index-free nature of the former was thought to explain why it was not subject to the Case Filter and hence why it alone could be found in the subject position of most infinitival (i.e. Caseless) contexts, although it should be borne in mind that, at this time, PRO could be assigned Case, cf. e.g., the formulation of the NIC in (67) that was asserted to account for examples like (68).10 This then is the approach to Control that was widely accepted at the close of the transformational era. It is important to bear in mind, however, that not every syntactician working within the generative framework adopted this analysis. Alternative theories did exist. Koster (1978), for example, argued that PRO, NP trace, and Wh-trace should receive a uniform analysis as null anaphors. That is, while accepting Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1977) premise that PRO, NP trace, and Wh-trace are all instances of index-free NPs that must become associated with a referential index during the course of the syntactic derivation, Koster rejected the “standard” view that co-indexation was achieved in two distinct ways – either via the application of a transformational rule or via one of the Rules of Control. Instead, he proposed that the distributional characteristics of all three 10 As early as Andrews (1971), some generative syntacticians were aware of “case rich” languages like Ancient Greek, Czech, Icelandic, Latin, Russian, Slovenian, and Slovak in which various predicative elements in Control structures bear overt case markings, a fact that may point to the presence of C/case in all Control contexts, contra standard generative analyses of Control dating back to Chomsky (1980). A discussion of these data will be delayed until the point at which they enter the mainstream generative literature. I.e., they will be briefly mentioned in Section 2.2.3 and discussed in detail in Section 2.3.3 and Chapter 4.

Approaches to Control within the Government-Binding Theory (1981–1992)

39

empty categories could be explained in terms of the same two principles – his Bounding Condition and his Locality Principle. Williams (1980) developed an even more radically different approach to Control – one in which Obligatory Control reduces to predication. Having considered just a few of the key approaches to Control developed during the transformational era, let us turn now to a (similarly incomplete) summary of certain influential theories of Control formulated in terms of the Government-Binding framework.

2.2 Approaches to Control within the Government-Binding Theory (1981–1992) 2.2.1 Chomsky (1981a, 1982): Theta Theory and Binding Theory We will begin by considering what is perhaps the most well-known approach to Control formulated in terms of the Government-Binding (GB) model of grammar, namely, the one put forth in Chomsky’s (1981a: Chapters 2 & 3; 1981b) Lectures on Government and Binding (LGB), incorporating certain refinements to that approach that are developed in Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and Binding (Chomsky (1982: Chapter 5)).11 From his earlier transformational analyses (Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Chomsky (1980)), Chomsky (1981a: 66) first assumes that all Control clauses take the form of an S 0 (equivalent to CP) dominating a “normal” S (i.e. an S containing a syntactically projected thematic subject), as in (87) below.12 11 The theories of Control put forth in Chomsky (1981a) and Chomsky (1982) are for the most part equivalent except for (a) the status of pro – collapsed with PRO in Chomsky (1981a: Chapter 4), but accorded an independent status in Chomsky (1982: Chapter 5) (b) a characterization of empty categories in terms of intrinsic features (Chomsky, 1981a), as opposed to functional/ contextual factors (Chomsky, 1982) and (c) the status of Condition C, a principle of the Binding Theory adopted in Chomsky (1981a), but abandoned in Chomsky (1982). As concerns these differences, the case of pro will not be considered further here as it is not directly relevant to the topic at hand; the functional approach to empty categories advocated in Chomsky (1982) will be incorporated into the text; and the status of Condition C is discussed briefly below in footnote 15. 12 As in his previous transformational work on Control, Chomsky (1981a, 1982) assumes that all “full” clausal complements (i.e. those with an overt to in English) take the form of S 0 , as indicated by the examples below in (i). However, the possible existence of “small clauses,” as first proposed in Stowell (1983), is now recognized by Chomsky (1981a: 111) in the case of clausal complements lacking an overt I/T, as in, for example, the sentences in (ii). (i)

Cherri expected/wanted [ S 0 [ S him to stay]].

(ii) Cherri finds/considers [AP him [A attractive]].

40

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

(87) I persuaded Mary [ S0 [ S PRO to stay]]. Three arguments are advanced in support of this view. First, Chomsky (1981a: 24–25) reiterates the simplicity-of-the-base argument involving a “bare” or “subjectless” VP analysis of indirect questions overviewed in the previous section. (See the discussion of the examples in (64)–(65) above.) As further support for this view, Chomsky (1981a: 26) notes the existence of contrasts of the type in (88a,b) and (89a,b) – examples in which a pleonastic or expletive subject NP is required in an embedded infinitival clause. (88) a.

I believe [ S 0 [ S there to be good reason for his refusal]].

b. *I believe [VP to be good reason for his refusal]. (89) a.

I would prefer [ S 0 [ S there being a better reason for his refusal]].

b. *I would prefer [VP being a better reason for his refusal]. Specifically, he first notes that if one does adopt the PSR below in (90), which would allow an embedded S headed by a [-Tense] INFL to alternatively expand as a full clausal complement containing a thematic subject, like you in (91a), or as a “subjectless” VP, as in Control structures like (91b), then one has no explanation for the fact that a pleonastic/expletive subject NP is mandatory in non-Control contexts like those above in (88) and (89). In contrast, if one adopts the simpler PSR below in (92), with INFL being either [+] or [-] Tense, then the facts follow: An NP must be projected in the “normal” subject position in all cases and other principles of the grammar (as we will see momentarily) determine whether that NP is phonetically overt or covert. (90) S → (NP) to VP (91)

a.

I’d like [ S 0 [ S you to stay]].

b. I’d like [ S 0 [ S to stay]]. (92) S → NP INFL VP In view of developing a third argument for uniform expansion of S 0 and S in Control contexts, Chomsky (1981a: 29–34) notes that if one assumes that natural language grammars contain two principles along the lines in (93a,b) below, then a redundancy previously existing between the PSRs and the lexicon is eliminated. That is, earlier generative models assumed, e.g., that the sentence in

Approaches to Control within the Government-Binding Theory (1981–1992)

41

(94) fails to conform both to the lexical entry associated with the verb persuade (which obligatorily c- and s-selects an object, and optionally also for a clausal (S 0 ) complement) and the PSR associated with the expansion of VPs headed by a transitive verb (which also requires the presence of an object). The Projection Principle and Theta Criterion in (93a,b) allow for this information to be specified just once, in the lexicon, as what is required there will be subsequently projected at every level of syntactic representation. (93)

a.

Chomsky’s (1981a: 29, 38) Projection Principle: Representations at each syntactic level (i.e., LF, D-Structure, and S-Structure) are projected from the lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorization properties of lexical items.

b. Chomsky’s (1981a: 36, 335) Theta Criterion: Each argument must bear one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role must be assigned to one and only one argument. (94) *I persuaded. As a consequence of this, of course, since a verb like stay lexically specifies for theta-role assignment to a subject NP in non-Control examples like (95a) below, then, by the Projection Principle in (93a) and the Theta Criterion in (93b), it will do so as well in Control contexts like (95b), thereby providing a third (theory internal) argument in favor of uniform selection for full clausal complementation in Control contexts. (95) a.

I persuaded Mary [ S0 that [ S she should stay]].

b. I persuaded Mary [ S0 [ S PRO to stay]]. Turning to the role of Case in this system, Chomsky (1981a, 1982) incorporates from Chomsky (1980) Jean-Roger Vergnaud’s Case Filter, formulated now as in (96). As before, this filter applies at PF, and only to NPs that are phonetically overt. In other words, PRO and trace “escape” its effects, although, also as before, nothing precludes PRO from being associated with Case if the appropriate set of circumstances should arise, a fact to which we will return at the end of this section. (96) Chomsky’s (1981a: 49) Case Filter *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case.

42

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

In a fashion similar to Chomsky (1980: 28), Chomsky (1981a: 66–69) also continues to maintain that certain verbs that subcategorize for S 0 have the “marked” property of exceptionally assigning Case to the embedded subject of the complement clause. In the GB version of his theory, however, the former [+F] feature is replaced with a marked rule of S 0 deletion. That is, verbs like believe and expect are assumed to be idiosyncratically associated with this rule, whereas verbs like want and prefer are not. This latter class of verbs are, like all verbs selecting full clausal complements, assumed to select for an S 0 , but one headed by the complementizer for, which is subject to a (dialectally influenced) rule of for-deletion (Chomsky (1981a: 19)). Also in line with his earlier work, Chomsky (1981a: 21) maintains that the empty category known as PRO is invisible at the phonology-syntax interface (now known as PF). However, in contrast to preceding proposals, Chomsky (1981a: 20, 34, 60) maintains that this is not because PRO is an unexpanded NP unassociated with a referential index at PF, but rather because it is the minimal pronominal element, inherently associated only with person, number, and gender features, features that are relevant to LF, but not PF, interpretation. In this way, Chomsky (1981a: 180–181) is able to extend earlier proposals put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 483) and Chomsky (1980: 6) to account for the facts in (97) in terms of a Control analysis for want-type verbs. (The reader may recall that Chomsky’s earlier theories treated want as an EQUI verb, EQUI being assumed to be a process distinct from Control.) Specifically, it is now assumed that the rule of wanna-contraction in (98) below is “blocked” by the presence of the Case-marked trace of who in subject position in (97b), but not by the Caseless occurrences of PRO and wh-trace in COMP in (97a). I.e., the complementizer for associated with clausal complements of want-type verbs assigns Case to both the trace of who in the embedded subject position in (97b) and to Bill in (97c), but not to PRO in (97a). (As mentioned above, for is subject to a rule of deletion, obligatory in certain contexts.) Thus, only NPs associated with a Case-feature at PF are assumed under this theory to be visible there, blocking phonological rules like wanna-contraction. (97) a.

Whox do they wanna [ S0 tx [ S PRO visit tx]]?

b. *Whox do they wanna [ S0 tx [ S tx visit Paris]]? c. *They wanna [ S 0 [ S Bill visit Paris]]. (98) Chomsky’s (1976: 328) version of Wanna-Contraction: want + to → wanna

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43

Again following the proposals in Chomsky (1980), which were themselves based on even earlier work in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), in turn inspired by insights in Postal (1968a, 1970) and Jackendoff (1969), Chomsky (1981a: 21, 74– 79) further assumes that Rules of Control are responsible for determining PRO’s antecedent. As before, these rules are in part guided by his version of Rosenbaum’s MDP, in part by other structural considerations (the null/overt status of COMP), as well as by a lexically-specified semantic feature ([+SC]). Specifically, the Rules of Control put forth in Chomsky (1980), given above in (76)–(78), are assumed in Chomsky (1981a, 1982) to “check” at LF that PRO was assigned an appropriate referential index at S-Structure. That is, Chomsky (1981a: 186, 192, 331; 1982) simplifies the more complex “dual” system of indexing proposed in Chomsky (1980: 38–44) by suggesting that PRO, like all nominals that appear in an argument (A-) position at S-Structure, is freely assigned a referential index at that level of representation. The Rules of Control then verify, at LF, that the appropriate assignment was made. Importantly, Chomsky assumes that the indices themselves do not have semantic import. I.e., an index does not directly encode the intended referent of the NP that bears it. It is simply a syntactic device (a random integer) that provides information needed by syntactic principles, such as the Rules of Control, in order to rule in or rule out certain types of co-/disjoint indexing. In other words, Chomsky leaves it to the semantic system to ultimately determine to what degree these indices do or do not determine the intended semantic reference associated with various NPs in a sentence.13 The Rules of Control adopted from the “On binding” system are, however, qualified as being only a “partial” theory of antecedent resolution, one warranting further investigation, as a number of important issues do remain unresolved. Specifically, Chomsky (1981a: 75) first notes that the Rules of Control formulated in “On binding” fail to account for differences in antecedent selection in indirect questions of the type I’ve constructed below in (99). (99) a.

John asked his mother [how to conduct oneself/himself/*herself at a royal wedding].

b. John told his mother [how to conduct oneself/*himself/herself at a royal wedding]. (100)

It isn’t obvious [how to conduct oneself/*himself/*herself at a royal wedding].

13 See Lasnik (1981) for criticism of this aspect of Chomsky’s (1981a,b, 1982) approach to indexing. See also Higginbotham (1983), Montalbetti (1984), and Sportiche (1985) for modifications of Chomsky’s system that address these criticisms.

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

That is, the “On binding” Rule of Control in (77a) above states that if the embedded COMP of a Control structure is not null and there is no argument available to serve as controller, then PRO is assigned the index arb, an assignment clearly attested in the case of examples of the type in (100) above. The “On binding” rule in (77) further specifies that if COMP is not null and there are thematic arguments in the matrix clause, as is the case in (99a,b), then the “closer” one is selected as controller unless the verb is idiosyncratically marked for Subject Control, which neither ask nor tell are assumed to be. Thus, in the case of Control verbs like ask and tell, one should find only Object Control readings. However, (99a,b) clearly show that this is not always the case. Both examples allow an unpredicted Arbitrary Control reading, although the tell example does favor the predicted Object Control one. Worse yet, the ask example disallows the predicted Object Control reading and favors an unexpected Subject Control one. Secondly, Chomsky (1981a: 76) notes, expanding on earlier observations in Rosenbaum (1967) and Chomsky (1980) (cf. the discussion of the examples in (12) and (85) above), that sentences like (101b,c) exhibit patterns of antecedent determination at odds with those predicted by the “On binding” system in (76)–(78). Namely, only the assignment in (101a) is predicted: The “On binding” rules prohibit both the ambiguous assignment of indices in (101b) and the obligatory Subject Control status of (101c). (101)

a.

The teacher i asked us k [PRO*i/k to leave early].

b. John i asked the teacher k [PROi/k to leave early]. c.

John i asked/begged/pleaded with the teacher k [PROi/*k to be allowed to leave early].

Further, he notes, only verbs like ask/beg/plead with and promise seem to be open to such “shifts” in controller, as evidenced by the contrast below between the examples in (102) and the one in (103). Chomsky argues that such facts point to the conclusion that the antecedent of PRO is determined by a complex interaction between syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors, yet to be unraveled. (102) a.

John i asked/begged/pleaded with the teacher k [PROi/*k to be allowed to leave early].

b. John i promised me k [PRO*i/k to be allowed to leave early]. (103)

John i persuaded the teacher k [PRO*?i/*k to be allowed to leave early].

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The same conclusion is argued to emerge from a consideration of Control into adjunct clauses, an aspect of the Control problem left untouched by the “On binding” system. Specifically, Chomsky (1981a: 77) notes that “purposive” adjuncts exhibit arbitrary Control in examples like (104a), but Subject Control in (104b) and Object Control in (104c).14 (104) a.

The books were sold [PROarb to help the refugees].

b. I i sold the book [PRO i to help the refugees]. c.

I i bought Bill k a book [PRO*i/k to give to Mary].

A further problem for the “On binding” system is noted in relation to examples like (105), in which there is no c-command relation between PRO and its

14 Chomsky (1981a) uses the term “purposive” to refer to both Rationale and Purpose Clauses. While examples like (i) below are ambiguous, allowing both readings, authors like Faraci (1974), Bach (1982: 35–37), and Jones (1991: 24–26), among others, have demonstrated that this is not always the case. For example, the addition of an in order (to) phrase serves to single out a Rationale Clause reading, as made clear by the example in (ii). Furthermore, these authors have argued that pre-posed infinitival adjuncts have only a Rationale Clause reading, as demonstrated by (iii); only they allow the tense of the main clause and the adjoined clause to be concurrent, as in (iva), but not the futurative (ivb); only they may adjoin to main clauses headed by an unrestricted number of verbs, as demonstrated by the contrast in (va,b); only they allow the “gap” to be filled, as in (vi); and only Purpose Clauses allow the “gap” to appear in subject or object position, as in (vii): (i)

John hired Mary [PRO to fire Bill]. Manzini (1983: 428) Rationale Clause reading: John fires Bill. Purpose Clause reading: Mary fires Bill.

(ii)

John hired Mary [in order to fire Bill]. Cannot mean: Mary fires Bill. (i.e. no Purpose Clause reading)

(iii)

To fire Bill, John hired Mary. Cannot mean: Mary fires Bill. (i.e. no Purpose Clause reading)

(iv) a. I bought it [in order to use up my money]. b. I brought it [to give to my sister]. Bach (1982: 36) (v) a. I read it [in order to review it]. b. *I read it [to review]. Bach (1982: 36) (vi)

a. She gave it to me [in order for my brother to review it]. b. *She gave it to me [for my brother to review it]. Bach (1982: 35–36)

(vii) a. I bought War and Peace [(*in order) to read to the children]. b. They hired him [(*in order) to go over the reports]. Bach (1982: 35) For further discussion of adjuncts, see especially Chapter 7.

46

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

understood antecedent, thereby making it impossible for an MDP-based rule like (77b) to select the “nearest” controller: (105) a.

[PRO to clear myself of all charges] is important to me.

b. [PRO finishing my work on time] is important to me. Finally, Chomsky (1981a: 78) notes that an MDP-type approach will face problems with respect to “long distance” Control in examples like (106): (106)

They i thought that I said [that [PRO i to feed each other] would be difficult].

Turning now to those aspects of the LGB/Concepts and Consequences approach to Control that differ most radically from Chomsky’s earlier transformational theories, let us next consider the role that the Binding Principles are asserted to play in this system. We begin by reiterating that Chomsky’s GB approach to PRO departs from his earlier transformational work in no longer assuming that PRO is simply a term used to refer to one of two types of “unexpanded” NP – specifically, an unexpanded NP that is inserted without a referential index, but acquires one at LF via a Rule of Control, as opposed to receiving one at S-Structure, via movement, as was assumed to be the case for NP trace. Instead, the term PRO is now used as a convenient way to refer to a nominal that is phonetically nonovert (associated in the lexicon with only person, number, and gender features) and appears in a particular configuration with respect to the principles and parameters of the theories of Case, Control, and Binding. Namely, we will soon see that PRO is simply one of many possible manifestations of the category N; i.e., it is a convenient mnemonic for an N unassociated with a phonetic matrix that, for very specific reasons, is associated the features [+pronominal, +anaphor], which has as a consequence that its (freely assigned) referential index is subject to possible limitation by the Rules of Control. In short, PRO is a derivative, not a primitive, notion. To explain more clearly just what is meant by this, let’s consider first the case of those manifestations of N that are phonetically overt. According to Chomsky (1981a: 101), these fall into three categories: R-expressions, like John and cat, pronouns like she and them, and anaphors, like each other. While Chomsky (1982: 83–84) assumes that all three types of overt nominals are inherently associated with person, number, and gender features (i.e. this information forms part of their lexical entries), he proposes that they differ fundamentally with respect

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to other aspects of their meaning. In fact, their meaning differs in such a way as to result in a contrast in their respective denotational properties, i.e. the manner in which they select an element or elements from the domain of entities. These differences are formally captured in terms of the features [+/-anaphor] and [+/-pronominal], which, we will soon see, make these items sensitive to distinct principles of the Binding Theory. More specifically, R-expressions such as John and (my) sister, are said to be inherently associated with person, number, and gender features, as well as lexical semantic features (presumably, the feature of being a rigid designator in the case of proper names, and features like [+/-female] etc. in the case of common nouns) that allow them to directly select or denote an element (or elements) in the domain of entities. For this reason R-expressions are claimed to be associated with the features [-anaphor, -pronominal]. I.e., the referential index of an R-expression is independently established by its meaning: R-expressions are directly interpretable; their (freely assigned) referential index prohibits either linguistically determined index “matching” principles that operate in a specific domain (e.g. Principles A and B of the Binding Theory) or co-indexation via by contextual factors.15

15 Chomsky (1982: 78) differs from Chomsky (1981a) in suggesting that there may be just two binding principles, Principles A and B, advocating Koopman & Sportiche’s (1982) alternative approach to strong crossover violations like (i) below: (i) *Whox [does hex think [Mary likes t x ]? Specifically, Wasow (1972) originally invoked Condition C to account for examples like (i): The foot trace in this example is a variable (an R-expression) that is bound by he. However, Koopman & Sportiche suggested that the notion “variable” be functionally defined as in (ii): (ii) A variable is any element that is locally A0-bound by an operator. Given this definition, the foot trace in (i) no longer fits the definition of variable and, in fact, fails to fit a functional definition of any other empty category, accounting for its ungrammatical status. Specifically, it is not a variable because its nearest binder is he, clearly not an operator in an A0-position. It cannot be PRO because, as will soon be demonstrated in the text, PRO cannot appear in a governed position due to the Binding Principles. That is, it will become clear in the discussion of the text that PRO would violate Condition A in the direct object position of an example like (i). It cannot be pro either since, for whatever reason (it depends on one’s theory), English is not a pro-drop language. Finally, this empty category cannot be an anaphor either since it isn’t bound in its governing category. While a simplification of the Binding Principles like that in Chomsky (1982) is desirable on theoretical grounds, it, unfortunately, offers no alternative account of other Condition C violations, such as the one in (iii). For this reason, the more complex Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981a) will be implicitly maintained in the text. (iii) *Hex thinks [Mary likes Johnx ].

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Turning to one of two types of overt nominal that differ from R-expressions in this respect, Chomsky (1982: 83) suggests that while overt anaphors, expressions like myself or each other, are also clearly associated with person, number, and gender features, they entirely lack further intrinsic semantic features that would allow them to denote directly. In other words, a lexical anaphor is interpreted as a variable assigned a value purely by virtue of its relation to its linguistically-determined antecedent. It is for these reasons that Chomsky (1982: 78) suggests that pure anaphors are associated with the features [+anaphor, -pronominal]. I.e., [+anaphor] is a feature that entails linguistic determination of a noun’s referential index (in the case of a pure anaphor, only one indexation out of an infinite range of possible free assignments is judged legitimate by Binding Theory); the feature [-pronominal] specifies that the NP is not subject to a looser, disjointness requirement on the referential index assigned to that NP. (In other words, many, although not all, assignments at S-Structure are judged legitimate for a “pure” [+pronominal] NP.) The exact principle of the grammar that determines legitimate indexation of a [+anaphoric] nominal expression is Principle A of the Binding Theory, given below in (107). This principle, assumed to apply at S-Structure and possibly LF, itself makes reference, directly or indirectly, to other formal definitions, provided in (108)–(114). (107)

Principle A of Chomsky’s (1981a: 188) Binding Theory An anaphor is bound in its governing category.

(108)

Bound versus Free: Chomsky (1981a: 184) α is bound by β if and only if α is co-indexed with β and β c-commands α; otherwise, it is free.

(109)

c-command: Chomsky (1981a: 164), due to Aoun & Sportiche (1983) α c-commands β if and only if the first maximal projection dominating α is also a projection dominating β; α does not dominate β; and β does not dominate α.

(110)

Governing Category: Chomsky (1981a: 211) β is a governing category for α if and only if β is the minimal category containing α, a governor of α, and a SUBJECT accessible to α.

(111)

Governors: Chomsky (1981a: 162–163) A lexical head (N, V, A or P) governs its complements in the phrase of which it is the head, and INFL governs its subject when it contains AGR (and, in the unmarked case, is tensed).

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(112)

SUBJECT: Chomsky (1981a: 209) The subject NP of either an infinitive, an NP, or a small clause, as well as AGR are SUBJECTs. (Intuitively, these are the most prominent nominal elements in a sentence.)

(113)

Accessible: Chomsky (1981a: 212) α is accessible to β if and only if β is in the c-command domain of α and assignment to β of the index of α would not violate (114) below.

(114)

The i-within i Condition: Chomsky (1981a: 212) *[γ. . .δ. . .], where γ and δ bear the same index.

Collectively, these formulations allow Chomsky (1981a: 188–190) to capture in a unified fashion, both Opacity Condition/SSC and Nominative Island Constraint/PIC/Tensed S Condition contrasts of the type discussed earlier, repeated below in (115)–(116). For example, the contrast in (115) below was shown above to be amenable to an account in terms of the Nominative Island Constraint/PIC/ Tensed S Condition, which bars anaphoric relations across a tensed clause. Now, however, it is attributed to Principle A of the Binding Theory. Specifically, in (115a), the anaphor myself is, as required by Principle A, bound in its governing category (the matrix S), but in the case of (115b), it is free in its governing category (the embedded S). That is, the presence of agreement in the embedded INFL makes the embedded S the governing category for myself in the latter example. In a similar vein, the contrast in (116), formerly attributed to the separate Opacity Condition/SSC, is now also due to Principle A: Herself in (116a) is, as required, bound in its governing category (the matrix clause), but is free in its governing category (the embedded S) in (116b). In short, the notion of “governing category” in (110) above allows Chomsky to provide a simpler (uniform) account of opaque domains, whereas the earlier “On binding” approach treated as accidental and unrelated the fact that opacity results in the presence of both AGR and the subject of an NP/clause. (115)

a.

I i consider [ S myself i to be a decent human being].

b. *I i consider [ S myself i is a decent human being]. (116)

a.

Cherri i considers [ S herself i to have fooled Bill’s brother].

b. *Cherri i considers [ S Bill’s brother to have fooled herself i ].

50

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Turning to overt pronouns like she and them, these too are clearly inherently associated with person, number, and gender features and, also like overt anaphors, such expressions are not associated with semantic features that allow them to directly denote. In other words, their freely assigned referential index will be subject to limitation by the Binding Theory. However, unlike overt anaphors, overt pronominals do allow a relatively free assignment of referential index: They are subject only to a disjointness (not a co-reference) requirement, namely, Principle B, given below in (117). More formally, pronouns are associated with the features [-anaphor, +pronominal]. (117)

Principle B of Chomsky’s (1981a: 188) Binding Theory A pronominal must be free in its governing category.

In a fashion parallel to Principle A, Principle B accounts, among other things, for contrasts like those in (118), which were formerly captured in terms of separate constraints on rules of construal. For example, in (118a), as required by Principle B, the embedded I is free in its governing category (the embedded S), but in (118b), the pronominal me violates that principle, being bound by I in its governing category, the matrix S. (118)

a.

I i promised Bill [ S 0 that [ S I i would visit him]].

b. *I i consider [ S me i to be a decent human being]. Now given that overt nominals appear to be classified in terms of the features [+/-anaphor], [+/-pronominal], Chomsky (1982: 78–89) argues that it is only logical to expect that non-overt NPs would be as well. He draws the parallels given below in (119) between phonetically overt and phonetically covert nominal expressions. (119)

a.

[+anaphor, -pronominal] Instantiations: overt anaphors like each other and non-overt anaphors like NP trace

b. [-anaphor, +pronominal] Instantiations: overt pronouns like she and non-overt pronouns, namely, pro c.

[+anaphor, +pronominal] Instantiation: Limited to non-overt PRO

d. [-anaphor, -pronominal] Instantiations: Overt R-expressions like Greta and non-overt R-expressions like Wh-trace (variables) For example, as indicated in (119a), NP trace is said to be the non-overt counterpart of overt anaphors like each other. I.e., it too is associated with a referential index that, though freely assigned at S-Structure, is linguistically

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determined or limited by Condition A (also assumed to apply at that level), as demonstrated by the parallel distributional facts involving overt and non-overt anaphors in (120)–(121) below. I.e., in the examples in (120) the anaphors (myself, t i) are, as required by Principle A, bound in their governing category (the matrix S), but in (121) they are free in that domain, which in these examples is the embedded S. Similar parallels are drawn by Chomsky with respect to overt and non-overt pronouns (they, pro), and between overt R-expressions and Wh-trace. (120) a.

I i consider [ S myself i to be a decent human being].

b. I i am considered [ S t i to be a decent human being]. (121)

a.

*I i consider [ S myself i is a decent human being].

b. *I i am considered [ S t i is a decent human being]. Of course, for present purposes the featural combination that is of greatest interest is the one in (119c), which is unattested with respect to overt NPs. According to (119c), PRO is an NP that exploits the options the grammar makes available to both pronominals and anaphors. I.e., it is analyzed as a nominal that is [+anaphor, +pronominal]. In other words, PRO is a phonetically non-overt nominal inherently associated only with person, number, and gender features, lacking semantic features that would allow it to directly denote. As a consequence, its indexing possibilities are subject to principles of the Binding Theory, specifically, both Principles A and B. In other words, PRO is an NP that must be both bound and free in its governing category. Of course, the only way these conflicting requirements can be satisfied, Chomsky notes, is for PRO to lack a governing category, thereby vacuously conforming to both principles. It is for this reason, then, that PRO can only appear in ungoverned positions of the type in (122) below. That is, the definition of governing category, given above in (110), specifies that a category β can only be a governing category for a nominal expression α if (among other things) it contains a governor of α, which is not the case in (122a–c) since the embedded INFL lacks agreement and the presence of S 0 prevents the matrix verb from serving as a governor of α. If a governor is present, as in (123a–c), then PRO is not licensed because now it must satisfy both Principles A and B of the Binding Theory, which is impossible. (122)

a.

I persuaded Mary [ S 0 [ S PRO to stay]].

b. I sold the book [ S 0 [ S PRO to help the refugees]]. c.

[ S0 [ S PRO to clear myself of all charges]] is important to me.

52 (123)

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

a.

*I persuaded Maryx [ S 0 that [ S John likes PROx]].

b. *PROarb helped the refugees. c.

*Whenever you’re in a jam, it’s important for you to speak to PROarb.

To complete the analysis, Chomsky notes that since vacuous satisfaction of the Binding Theory fails to appropriately limit the referential index freely assigned to PRO at S-Structure, Control Theory must do so at LF, explaining why the antecedent for PRO is determined in a fundamentally different fashion than is the case for overt anaphors and pronominals, although, perhaps, not a totally distinct fashion, since Chomsky (1981a: 192) suggests that the Rules of Control proposed in “On binding” might be slightly reinterpreted: Specifically, he notes that the rule in (77a) above – the one responsible for Arbitrary Control – might be interpreted as a case in which PRO maintains its freely assigned index, essentially being the “free” usage of a [+pronominal] NP, whereas the other Rules of Control in (77b) and (78) might be understood as obligatorily bound readings associated with a [+anaphoric] nominal. Furthermore, he notes that the preceding proposals explain why PRO lacks a true overt counterpart: Overt pronominals are subject to the Case Filter, and structural Case is assigned under government. Thus, any NP that is in a structural Case position will be associated with a governing category, and hence unable to satisfy both Principles A and B, although Chomsky (1982: ft. 40) does note that adjectival case agreement facts indicate that PRO apparently must be associated with Case when it appears in ungoverned positions in certain constructions found in languages other than English. (Unfortunately, he does not provide the exact data that he had in mind.) Crucially, he points out in the same footnote, PRO is barred in governed, but Caseless positions like those in (124), further supporting his Binding approach to Control: (124)

a.

*There was killed PROarb.

b. *It was persuaded PROarb that Mary shouldn’t be invited. And, finally, as was true of the other manifestations of N, Chomsky’s GB approach to PRO manages to achieve the empirical coverage of the Opacity Condition/SSC and the Nominative Island Constraint/PIC/Tensed S Condition in terms of the Binding Principles. For example, the Opacity Condition in (66) above, was said to account for the lexical NP, PRO, and reflexive facts below in (125) since it states that only anaphors (PRO and himself in this example) cannot be free in the domain of the embedded subject Mary. In other words, this condition is vacuously satisfied in the case of expressions like Ed and him. Now, of

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course, it is the Binding Theory that accounts for data like these: Ed and him respectively obey Conditions C and B; himself and PRO violate Condition A. (125)

Johnx told Billy [ S 0 that [ S Maryz likes Ed i/hima/x/y/*himselfx/y/*PROx/y]].

To summarize, in line with previous work on Control Theory in the generative tradition since the publication of Aspects in 1965, Chomsky (1981a, 1982) continues to assume that Control structures are full clauses (in the terms of the day, S 0 s) containing a syntactically projected thematic subject, non-overt at the surface level. (Two new arguments in favor of this view are advanced. These, the reader may recall, involve the obligatory projection of expletives in non-Control contexts and the need to eliminate certain redundancies between the lexicon and the PSRs.) In addition, and following the REST analysis of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), Chomsky (1981a, 1982) continues to assume that the understood subject of a Control clause is non-overt at every level of syntactic representation. Furthermore, combining insights in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), who treated PRO as a type of “anaphor” – a nominal (covering PRO, trace, and overt reflexives/ reciprocals) whose reference must be established by syntactic association with another NP, but may have that relation “blocked” by specific syntactic configurations, and Postal (1970), who treated PRO as a straightforward pronoun, like he and his, Chomsky now assumes that PRO is both anaphoric and pronominal in nature, an idea that is formalized in terms radically different from earlier approaches. Specifically, Chomsky (1981a, 1982) first proposes that the Opacity Condition/SSC and the Nominative Island Constraint/PIC/Tensed S Condition, be recast in terms of a set of Binding Principles, using the notions of governing category and SUBJECT to collapse the two distinct opaque domains separately delineated by earlier conditions on rules of construal. This innovation then allows for an analysis of the manifestation of NP known as PRO in terms of two principles of that Binding Theory, Principles A and B, from which Chomsky straightforwardly derives, first, the so-called PRO Theorem – the fact that PRO appears only in ungoverned positions (i.e., neither in the subject position of a tensed clause, nor as the object of a verb or preposition) and, secondly, the fact that PRO (a [+anaphoric] N) must, therefore, have its referential index (now freely assigned at S-Structure) syntactically limited at LF by a separate set of rules on possible indexation, namely, a very slightly modified version of the (syntactically-guided, semantically influenced) Rules of Control put forth in Chomsky (1980) (which were themselves inspired by the Rules of Control put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977)). These Rules of Control, Chomsky notes, require further refinement in a number of areas, among them, the determination

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

of the antecedent of PRO in the subject position of an adjunct clause and “shifts” in controller. To complete the analysis, Chomsky (1981a, 1982) follows Chomsky (1980) (who had earlier built off the *[NP to VP] Filter of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977)) in assuming that Case also determines, in large part, the respective licensing of PRO as opposed to lexical NPs. Specifically, the manifestation of NP known as PRO continues to “escape” Jean-Roger Vergnaud’s Case Filter by virtue of its phonetically non-overt nature. This difference between PRO and an overt NP accounts for the fact that the latter, but not the former, is excluded from Caseless positions, like the subject position of non-ECM infinitives, the subject of NP position, the subject position of a gerundive clause, and so on. (As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the combined effect of Principles A and B of the Binding Theory explains why PRO is generally, but not necessarily, excluded from positions in which overt NPs are licensed. I.e., Case is normally assigned under government, but PRO cannot appear in governed positions or it will become subject to the conflicting conditions expressed in Principles A and B. However, in positions in which Case is assigned without government, PRO and lexical NPs will both be licensed.)

2.2.2 Manzini (1983): PRO is unambiguously an anaphor (Extending Principle A) With this background in mind, let’s turn to a second well known theory of Control formulated in terms of the Government-Binding framework – the analysis Rita Manzini put forth in an article entitled “On control and control theory” published in 1983 in Linguistic Inquiry, but developed in a series of manuscripts dating back to 1980. From Chomsky (1981a, 1982), Manzini (1983) adopts two assumptions, without further argumentation: First, she assumes that Control structures are full clauses (S 0 s) containing a syntactically projected, phonetically non-overt thematic subject at all levels of representation; secondly, she adopts the view that the distribution of PRO is functionally determined by an interaction of the subtheories recognized in GB theory, particularly, in her analysis, Case and Binding Theory. Manzini (1983) differs significantly from Chomsky’s earlier GB approach to Control in three respects – first, in the specific referentially-based feature characterization of PRO that is assumed, secondly, in the exact formulations put forth for both Principle A of the Binding Theory and the Case Filter, and, finally, in the precise manner in which the antecedent of PRO is respectively determined by syntactic and semantic factors.

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With respect to the first difference, Manzini (1983: 439) departs radically from Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) analysis by assuming that PRO is not a pronominal anaphor. Instead, she simply treats it as an anaphor. In other words, Manzini (1983) analyzes the manifestation of N known as PRO uniquely as a [+anaphoric] empty category, like NP-trace. Because Manzini rejects Chomsky’s hypothesis that the distribution of PRO is largely due to the contradictory requirements inherent in its dual [+pronominal], [+anaphoric] status (namely, its being subject to both Principles A and B of the Binding Theory and thus appearing only in ungoverned (structurally Caseless) positions), Manzini then modifies the theories of Case and Binding to fill the gaps that would otherwise result. Specifically, with respect to Case Theory, she first hypothesizes that [+anaphoric] empty categories (trace and PRO) cannot be assigned Case, and, secondly, that every Case that is available for assignment must be assigned, as indicated below in (126) and (127). (126)

An empty category α is [+anaphoric] iff it lacks Case. Manzini (1983: 439)

(127)

Manzini’s (1983: 441) Case Filter: a. *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case. b. Every Case up for assignment must be assigned.

In this way, Manzini accounts for the ungrammaticality of examples of the type given below in (128), which Chomsky (1981a, 1982) formerly captured in terms of the contradictory requirements imposed on PRO by Principles A and B of the Binding Theory. Specifically, in these examples, PRO, a [+anaphoric] empty category, is either assigned a Case feature in violation of (126) or a Case feature that is available for assignment fails to be assigned, in violation of (127b): (128)

a.

*PRO won.

b. *John hit PRO. In order to explain certain distributional facts that cannot be attributed to Case considerations, as well as to account for a large portion of the interpretive properties associated with PRO, Manzini reformulates Principle A of the Binding Theory in such a way as to add to Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) original definition a specification of the co-indexing conventions that must hold of a [+anaphoric] N that lacks a governing category. Specifically, she makes the claim, given in bold

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

below in (129), that such expressions must be bound in their domain-governing category, defined formally as in (130), a definition that itself makes reference to the further technical definitions provided in (131)–(135). (Just how these definitions apply to specific data will be made clear in the explanatory paragraphs immediately following them.) (129)

Manzini’s (1983: 432) Principle A of the Binding Theory An anaphor is bound in its governing category and its domaingoverning category.

(130)

Manzini’s (1983: 433) Definition of Domain-Governing Category: γ is a domain-governing category for α if and only if a.

γ is the minimal category with a SUBJECT containing the c-domain of α and a governor for the c-domain of α, and

b. γ contains a SUBJECT accessible to α. (131)

c-domain: Due to Reinhart (1976, 1983) and Aoun & Sportiche (1983) γ is the c-domain of α if and only if γ is the minimal maximal category dominating α.

(132)

Manzini’s (1983: 432) Definition of Governing Category: γ is a governing category for α if and only if a.

γ is the minimal category with a SUBJECT containing α and a governor of α.

b. γ contains a SUBJECT accessible to α. (133)

SUBJECT: Chomsky (1981a: 209) The subject NP of either an infinitive, an NP, or a small clause, as well as AGR are SUBJECTs. (Intuitively, these are the most prominent nominal elements in a sentence.)

(134)

Accessible: Chomsky (1981a: 212) α is accessible to β if and only if β is in the c-command domain of α and assignment to β of the index of α would not violate (135) below.

(135)

The i-within i Condition: Chomsky (1981a: 212) *[γ . . .δ. . .], where γ and δ bear the same index.

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To clearly see the effects of Manzini’s version of Principle A, let’s consider first instances in which a [+anaphoric] empty category appears in the subject position of an infinitival complement clause, i.e., a classic Control context like (136): (136)

[ S We want [ S 0 ec (=PRO) to stay]].

We begin by asking what type of empty category can appear in this position. Obviously, it cannot be trace as a violation of the Theta Criterion would result – we would be associated with the external theta-roles of both stay and want. As English is not a pro-drop language (for whatever reason), we can set aside pro as well, and, for equally obvious reasons, this empty category cannot be a variable either. This leaves the manifestation of N known as PRO. According to Manzini’s version of Principle A given above in (129), if the empty category in (136) is indeed [+anaphoric], then it must be bound in its governing category (if it has one) as well as in its domain-governing category (again, if it has one). As Chomsky (1981a, 1982) discusses in detail and as Manzini’s definition of governing category in (132) above makes clear, the empty category in (136) lacks a governing category since it lacks a governor, the embedded S 0 being a barrier to government by want.16 PRO, therefore, vacuously satisfies the first requirement imposed by Principle A. However, this nominal does have a domain-governing category – the matrix S – and thus, by Principle A, must be bound in that domain. That is, the matrix S is the domain-governing category of the embedded subject (PRO) because it is the minimal category with an accessible SUBJECT (we or AGR) containing the c-domain of the embedded subject (assumed to be the embedded S 0 for reasons to be made clear momentarily) and a governor for the c-domain of the embedded subject (namely, want). Therefore, PRO must be co-indexed with an NP that c-commands it in the domain of the matrix S. In other words, PRO must be bound by the NP we. Thus we see one illustration of how Manzini’s theory derives the Obligatory Control readings associated with examples of this type: Obligatory Control now reduces to Principle A of the Binding Theory, thereby eliminating the need for a separate set of “Rules of Control” as in Chomsky (1981a, 1982). In other words, if PRO is simply an anaphor, as Manzini claims, then it is not subject to contradictory principles of the Binding Theory, and, therefore, antecedent resolution can

16 The definitions of governing category developed in Chomsky (1981a) and Manzini (1983), while not equivalent, make identical predictions with respect to the data discussed here. Where the two proposals differ is in their respective accounts of overt pronominals and reciprocals in pictures of contexts. For discussion, see Manzini (1983: 433–437).

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be made to fall out of already existing constraints on the free indexation of anaphors. To see just how well this objective is achieved, let’s consider further data related to the “Control Problem.” Specifically, let’s consider how this analysis accommodates the fact that certain verbs, namely those of the type in (137a), are obligatory Subject Control verbs, whereas others, of the type in (137b), are obligatory Object Control ones: (137)

a.

I made an oath/vowed to Bill [PRO to visit him in Sing Sing].

b. I have persuaded/entrusted Bill [PRO to take care of that problem]. With respect to this long-standing issue, Manzini (1983: 423) adopts the entirely novel position that the syntax (specifically, the constraints on indexing known as Principle A of the Binding Theory) requires only that PRO be bound in its governing and domain-governing categories, when such domains exist. The issue of which qualifying NP is ultimately interpreted as the intended referent of PRO, she leaves entirely to the semantic component. In other words, syntactically speaking, PRO in (137a,b) above can be co-indexed with either the matrix subject or the object. Separate semantic considerations, yet to be formulated, will determine which readings are ruled in or out. In short, we see that Manzini also departs radically from Chomsky (1981a, 1982) in entirely rejecting an MDP-based approach to the Subject versus Object Control verb distinction. Turning next to the phenomenon of Arbitrary Control, Manzini (1983) proposes that such readings arise whenever PRO lacks a domain-governing category. In other words, vacuous satisfaction of Principle A has as an effect that PRO is subject to no co-indexation requirements. Consider, for example, the case of sentences like (138), in which a Control clause appears in the subject position of a tensed sentence: (138)

[ S [ S0 PRO to behave oneself/himself in public] would greatly benefit Bill].

In this example, the c-domain of PRO is the category labeled S 0 – a maximal projection that is also the subject of the matrix clause and thus is co-indexed with the matrix AGR. Given this, PRO in this example lacks an accessible SUBJECT (one that would not violate the i-within-i Condition) and thus lacks a domain-governing category. It, therefore, vacuously satisfies both parts of Condition A and is, therefore, subject to no co-indexing requirement, deriving the arbitrary interpretation, as well as the reading in which free indexation happens to assign both Bill and PRO the same index. (Presumably, separate

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semantic considerations would account for the fact that PRO cannot refer to, say, a discourse-salient singular feminine entity or perhaps a plural one.) Consider next the case of indirect questions of the type in (139), configurations equally well known to exhibit arbitrary readings: (139)

John asked [ S 0 how [ S PRO to conduct oneself/himself at a royal wedding]].

Manzini (1983: 425–426) argues that PRO lacks a domain-governing category in these contexts as well and, for this reason, is not subject to any co-indexation requirements in a fashion parallel to the previous example. More specifically, she argues that the embedded S in (139) constitutes PRO’s c-domain (it is the minimal maximal category dominating PRO) and clearly there is no governor of that clause, the embedded S 0 being a barrier to government. At this point, two assumptions underlying Manzini’s approach may warrant further discussion. First, the reader may note that the account of indirect questions like (139) just given rests crucially on the assumption that the presence of how in the embedded COMP creates two distinct maximal projections dominating PRO, whereas in examples with a phonetically non-overt COMP (a COMP assumed at the time to be subject to deletion), such as the one in (136) above, the embedded S 0 and S are treated as a single maximal projection. The reader may recall that this assumption is necessary because when COMP is non-overt (and S 0 and S are treated as the same maximal projection) the c-domain of PRO is the embedded S 0 , establishing a domain-governing category in which PRO must be bound. On the other hand, when COMP is lexically filled, the embedded S will constitute PRO’s c-domain, depriving PRO of a domain-governing category, thereby deriving an arbitrary interpretation. In short, this analysis rests crucially on the assumption that COMP-deletion results in a single maximal projection – S 0 /S, a view that some may take issue with. Secondly, this analysis entails, as Manzini (1983: 426) herself points out, that Wh-Movement in examples like (140) must involve adjunction to S/S 0 , not movement through COMP, since, otherwise, the presence of a trace in COMP would create two distinct domains, in a fashion parallel to (139), and thus fail to predict the attested Obligatory Control reading. (140)

Whatx did John ask Bill [tx [PRO to do tx]]?

With these clarifications in mind, let’s consider next the account that Manzini (1983: 426–427) provides for the contrasting interpretive properties of PRO in extraposed, as opposed to passive, contexts of the type in (141) and (142).

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(141)

It would help Bill [ S 0 PRO to behave himself/oneself in public].

(142)

It was decided by Bill [ S 0 PRO to behave himself/*oneself in public].

As the grammaticality judgments given for these examples make clear, extraposed structures like (141) contrast with passive configurations like (142) in that only the former involve Arbitrary PRO. Why is this so? Manzini suggests that extraposition in examples like (141) involves obligatory co-indexation of both it and the matrix AGR with the extraposed S 0 . This co-indexation is said to deprive PRO of a domain-governing category since PRO now lacks an accessible SUBECT – a SUBJECT that does not violate the i-within-i Condition in (135). Thus, the Arbitrary Control reading is derived. In contrast, in a passive sentence like (142), the matrix it and AGR are not coindexed with the embedded S 0 . Thus, the matrix S constitutes PRO’s domain governing category and PRO must, by Principle A, be bound by an NP in that domain (namely, Bill), accounting for the Obligatory Control reading. Turning to further empirical consequences of this approach, Manzini (1983: 427–428) also briefly considers the interpretive properties of PRO in adjunct (specifically, in what she calls purpose) clauses.17 She notes, for example, that while sentences like (143a) exhibit Obligatory Control by either the matrix subject or object, sentences like (143b) allow Obligatory Control by the matrix subject alone, and passive examples like (143c) allow Control by the implicit Agent of the matrix verb fired: (143)

a.

[ S John i [VP [VP hired Mary k [PP [ S 0 PROi/k to fire Bill]]]]].

b. [ S John i [VP fired Mary k ] [PP [ S 0 PROi/*k to hire Bill]]]. c.

[ S Mary k was [VP fired t k ] [PP [ S 0 PROi/*k to hire Bill]]].

In all of these examples, the reader may verify, an application of the definitions in (130)–(135) selects the matrix S as the domain-governing category for PRO. Thus, by Principle A in (129), PRO must be bound in that domain, accounting for the fact that these are all Obligatory Control contexts. Manzini suggests that structural considerations (c-command relations) then determine which argument(s) in the main clause may serve as PRO’s antecedent. Specifically, she suggests that the purposive clause in (143a) adjoins to VP. Thus, both John and Mary c-command and potentially bind PRO in this example. In contrast, in

17 See footnote 14 above for alternative terminology.

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(143b), the purposive clause is assumed to adjoin to the matrix S. This breaks the c-command relation between Mary and PRO, making John the sole potential antecedent for PRO in this case. Finally, the implicit Agent of fired is analyzed as the antecedent in (143c), although no explicit discussion is given for just how this arises. In short, with respect to these purposive clauses Manzini employs a “difference of attachment site”-style approach to antecedent resolution, in a fashion entirely parallel to that Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68) had earlier employed in relation to examples parallel to (143b) (cf. our earlier discussion of his examples in (10)), rather than the semantic approach to antecedent resolution advocated earlier with respect to the Subject versus Object Control verb distinction, cf. the discussion of the examples in (137) above. Manzini (1983: 440) points out that her analysis also offers a straightforward account of the absence of PRO in Caseless, but governed positions, such as the one in (144), noted previously in Chomsky (1982: ft. 40). (144)

*[ S There was hit PRO].

Specifically, under this analysis, PRO violates the Theta Criterion: By Principle A, PRO must be bound by expletive there, the only NP that c-commands it in its governing and domain-governing category (S). This means that PRO is coreferential with an expletive NP. In other words, hit cannot discharge its object theta-role to PRO, in violation of the Theta Criterion given above in (93b). Finally, she notes (Manzini (1983: 423–424, 445)) that her theory certainly leaves one, and possibly two, important problems unresolved. Namely, it first incorrectly predicts that ECM and small clause contexts of the type in (145) should involve Obligatory Control: (145)

[ S The boys believe [ S [ S 0 PRO to behave (oneself ) in public] (to be) smart]].

Specifically, the definitions in (130)–(135) select the matrix S as the domaingoverning category of PRO in this example. By Principle A in (129), then, PRO should be obligatorily bound in that domain. Secondly, her theory predicts that one should not find Arbitrary Control in contexts like (146) since Principle A of the Binding Theory requires that PRO be bound by an NP in its domain governing category (the matrix S). (The reader will recall that Arbitrary Control readings are predicted to arise only when PRO lacks a domain-governing category.)

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

(146) a.

[ S John said [ S 0 PRO to behave (oneself )]].

b. [ S John recommends [ S0 PRO conducting oneself discreetly when traveling abroad]]. c.

[ S John signaled [ S0 PRO to remain still]].

Manzini suggests that examples like these may be only apparent counterexamples, proposing that PRO in these cases is bound by a phonologically null indirect object. To summarize, in line with previous work on Control Theory in the generative tradition since the publication of Aspects in 1965, Manzini (1983) continues to assume that Control structures are full clauses (in the terms of the day, S 0 s), containing a syntactically projected thematic subject that is non-overt at the surface level, and, in fact, at every other level of syntactic representation, following generative tradition dating back to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977). Where Manzini (1983) departs radically from the generative work on the topic that immediately preceded her own is in her elimination of a separate body of “Rules of Control.” That is, in a fashion parallel, in certain respects, to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Koster (1978), Manzini treats PRO as a phonetically non-overt manifestation of N that is uniquely [+anaphoric] in nature, parallel to NP-trace. (The two types of empty categories are, of course, assumed to differ in their thematic properties – only PRO bears a theta-role distinct from that of its antecedent.) Given its uniquely anaphoric status, and how generative theory had evolved since the framework in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), PRO is then uniquely subject to Principle A of the Binding Theory, which explains why it must be interpreted as co-referential with a nominal that c-commands it in a certain domain (its domain-governing category), but is “free” in configurations lacking such a domain. In both cases, the exact choice of antecedent is subject to further semantic determination, in a fashion yet to be made explicit. Finally, according to this theory, phonetically non-overt anaphors, PRO and NP trace, are licensed only in Caseless positions, more specifically, Caseless positions in which they can, of course, also satisfy Principle A.

2.2.3 Bouchard (1984): PRO is ambiguously an anaphor and a pronoun Two of Manzini’s (1983) key hypotheses – that the distribution of PRO is largely determined by Case Theory rather than the conflicting binding conditions that would be imposed on a pronominal anaphor and that the “Control Problem” is

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best resolved by making reference to already existing principles of binding coupled with semantic and pragmatic factors, not to a separate Theory of Control – are shared by a second well-known GB analysis put forth in Bouchard (1981, 1984: Chapters 2 and 5).18 While Bouchard’s (1984) work shares these characteristics with Manzini (1983), it is here that the similarities end since, as the following discussion will seek to make clear, Bouchard (1984) differs from both Chomsky (1981a, 1982) and Manzini (1983) in: (a) rejecting Principles A and B of the Binding Theory (b) deriving the “core” clause of the Case Filter from a separate morphological mechanism determining lexicalization at PF (c) adopting an approach to indexing that is level-specific (d) assuming that Obligatory Control configurations involve S 0 Deletion, and, finally, (e) assuming that PRO may function – non-vacuously and non-simultaneously – as either an anaphor or a pronoun. Let us take a look then at the details of this alternative approach to Control. Bouchard’s (1984) analysis opens with the adoption of his Principle of Denotability, given below in (147). This principle, which is assumed to apply post-LF (i.e. as a semantic constraint), requires of any NP in an argument position that it be associated with an R(eferential)-index (in the syntactic sense of Chomsky (1981a, 1982)) in order to be interpretable. This requirement appears to be a GB expansion of an idea dating back to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) since, as our earlier overview of that analysis made clear, Chomsky & Lasnik suggested that PRO was one type of “unexpanded” NP – an NP lacking lexical material and a referential index, and, as a consequence of this, had to obtain an index (via a Rule of Control) in order to be semantically interpretable. (147)

Bouchard’s (1984: 17, 42) Principle of Denotability An NP will denote an object in domain D only if NP has an R-index.

While a principle of the type in (147) is intuitively appealing, it raises the obvious question of just how various NPs come to be associated with an R-index and it is here that Bouchard begins to differ markedly from previous approaches. Specifically, he assumes that while overt names and quantificational NPs are assigned an R-index upon insertion at D-Structure, expressions like themselves and each other, NP trace, pro, and Obligatorily Controlled PRO (his class of functionally defined anaphors) are assigned an R-index at S-Structure by virtue of being bound. Finally, pronouns (for Bouchard, expressions like they and them, as well as Arbitrary PRO) are freely assigned an R-index at S-Structure by an Elsewhere Condition. For convenience, this set of conventions is summarized 18 These hypotheses were also developed in unpublished work by Sportiche (1982).

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

below in (148); Bouchard’s definition of the term “bound” is given in (149). (Just how these conventions function with respect to data will be illustrated once the mechanics of the analysis have been laid out.) (148)

Bouchard’s (1984: 17–38) Level-Specific Approach to R-Indexing a.

Overt names and quantificational NPs are assigned an R-index upon insertion at D-Structure.

b. Overt anaphors are assigned an R-index at S-Structure by virtue of being bound (see his definition of “bound” below in (149)). The same is true of non-overt anaphors (NP trace, pro, Obligatorily Controlled PRO). c.

(149)

Overt pronouns are freely assigned an R-index at S-Structure by an Elsewhere Condition. The same is true of non-overt pronouns (Arbitrary PRO).

Bouchard’s (1984: 34) Definition of Bound: α binds β if and only if α governs β and α assigns its R-index to β.

As the reader may have already surmised, Bouchard’s indexing procedures in (148) also seem to be drawing, at least in part, from earlier proposals, namely, those in Chomsky (1981a, 1982), according to which various types of NPs differ in their ability to select an element (or a set of elements) from the domain of entities and, as a consequence of this, also contrast in the manner in which their R-index is ultimately established. For example, we saw earlier that Chomsky suggests that R-expressions like Anne and bird are associated with distinct inherent semantic features that allow them to refer directly to an entity (or set of entities) in the domain of individuals. As a consequence, these nominals are argued by Chomsky to have their R-index freely assigned at S-Structure, which Bouchard appears to reinterpret as assignment of an R-index at D-Structure. On the other hand, Chomsky suggests that anaphors like herself and pronouns like he lack any type of inherent semantic content that would allow them to directly select an individual or set of individuals from the domain of entities. As a consequence, the R-index that is freely assigned to an anaphor is subject to a co-indexation requirement (Principle A), while that of a pronoun is subject to a disjointness condition (Principle B). These Bouchard respectively reinterprets as establishment of an index via binding and assignment of an index via an Elsewhere Condition. Continuing with our overview, Bouchard next makes a link between Rindexation and the person, number, and gender (in his terms, F-, today phi-)

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features that a nominal may bear. His Principle of Agreement, assumed to apply at LF, states that two NPs that have the same R-index must agree in person, number, and gender features, as in (150) below. (150)

Bouchard’s (1984: 17, 42) Principle of Agreement: α assigns (sometimes redundantly) its F-features (person, number, gender) to β if α and β have the same R-index.

To clarify slightly, the Principle of Agreement in (150) requires that the overt NP himself in (151a) below agree (redundantly) at LF in person, number, and gender with the NP that binds it. The same is true, although not redundantly, of the non-overt anaphor PRO in (151b). In other words, overt NPs are assumed to be associated in the lexicon with F-features that, by the Principle of Agreement in (150), must match those of an NP that binds them, whereas non-overt NPs are assumed to lack F-features in the lexicon, but to become associated with them, when bound, at LF. In short, overt NPs differ from non-overt ones in possessing F/phi-features at PF, a significant difference to which we will return shortly. (151)

a.

Andy should take better care of himself.

b. Andy refuses [PRO to take care of himself ]. It is important to note, however, that Bouchard does not assume that all non-overt NPs bear F-features at LF. If one should happen to bear an R-index that is distinct from every other NP in the sentence, as Bouchard (1984: 201– 202) assumes to be the case in (Arbitrary) PRO examples like (152) below, then it has no F-features at any level: The surface agreement morphology with the anaphor oneself is assumed to result from a language-specific “unmarked” Ffeature realization rule. (152)

[PRO to praise oneself ] is a bad habit.

Two final assumptions complete the analysis, both relating to Case Theory. First, Bouchard (1984: 169) assumes, with Manzini (1983), that assignment of an available Case feature is obligatory. Thus, he adopts something like clause (b) of her version of the Case Filter, repeated below in (153). (153)

Manzini’s (1983: 441) Case Filter: a. *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case. b. Every Case up for assignment must be assigned.

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

However, Bouchard (1984: 41) departs from Manzini in rejecting clause (a) of the Case Filter, adopting instead his own Principle of Lexicalization given below in (154).19 This principle actually makes two claims. First, it states that only nouns associated at PF with a full range of phi-features and a Case feature will be “interpretable” at that level; i.e., only this type of noun can (in fact, must) be phonetically overt. Secondly, it claims that if any subpart of these features is present, without the other, then it will not be possible to satisfy (154). In other words, phonetically non-overt NPs like PRO must lack both Case and F/phifeatures at PF. (154)

Bouchard’s (1984: 41) Principle of Lexicalization: A noun N will be lexicalized if and only if ψ-features are present in the entry of N at PF, where ψ = person, number, gender, Case.

While Bouchard’s (and, for that matter, Manzini’s) assumption that PRO must be Caseless at PF appears unproblematic if one looks only at English-type languages, Bouchard (1984: 189–193) notes that research on “rich agreement” languages like Ancient Greek (Andrews, 1971), Icelandic (Andrews, 1976) and Russian (Neidle, 1982) seems to point in the opposite direction. To provide just one example, Neidle (1982) notes that the Russian secondary predicates odin ‘alone’ and sam ‘oneself’ obligatorily agree in Case with the matrix subject of an Obligatory Subject Control verb like want, as illustrated below in (155): (155)

Vanja xočet prijti odin/*odnomu. Vanja-NOM wants to-come alone-NOM/*DAT ‘Vanja wants to come alone.’

Rather than adopt the view that PRO is independently Case-marked at SStructure by the embedded I in such configurations, Bouchard suggests that PRO is indeed Caseless at PF, but the Principle of Agreement is parameterized in these languages to require not only agreement in F-features at LF, but also agreement in Case. As for the Control constructions that Neidle and others have shown do not allow Case agreement, such as Obligatory Object Control structures of the type in (156), Bouchard suggests that binding (and thus Agreement) must be structurally blocked, and that the attested distinct Case form is, therefore, due to quirky Case-marking at LF, a type of solution precluded by Manzini’s 19 Bouchard (1984: 41) credits Jaeggli (1981) for a precursor of the Principle of Lexicalization. Specifically, he notes that Jaeggli (1981) proposes that a nominal element is pronounced only if it has Case and is governed structurally by an X0. Bouchard extends this to all manifestations of N and to all phonetically relevant features (i.e., he includes phi-features).

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analysis as she, the reader may recall, proposes that [+anaphoric] empty categories like PRO must be Caseless at all levels of representation (cf. (126) above). (156)

My poprosili Ivana pojti *odnogo/odnomu. we-NOM asked Ivan-ACC to-go alone-*ACC/DAT ‘We asked Ivan to go alone.’

With an outline of Bouchard’s analysis now in place, let us consider how it accommodates some of the core data involving Control, beginning with an Obligatory Control context of the type in (157). (157)

John hastened [PRO to leave].

As indicated in the indexing procedures provided above in (148), Bouchard (1984) assumes that PRO, like all referentially dependent nouns, lacks an Rindex at the level of D-Structure. In order to satisfy the Principle of Denotability in (147), therefore, it must obtain one at S-Structure by virtue of either being bound or by being assigned an index by an Elsewhere Condition. In the case an Obligatory Control verb like hasten in (157) above, the former option is assumed to be at work. Specifically, Bouchard (1984: 166–167) first suggests that Obligatory Control verbs be added to the class of S 0 Deleting verbs (like believe and consider). In other words, he argues that (157) above is associated with the “usual” S 0 complement in (158a) at D-Structure, but S 0 Deletion at SStructure results in the configuration in (158b): (158)

a.

John hastened [ S0 [ S PRO to leave]].

b. John hastened [ S PRO to leave]. Given the S-Structure in (158b), John now governs PRO and therefore by (149) binds and assigns it its own R-index. However, since the Principle of Agreement in (150) does not apply until LF, PRO will lack person, number, and gender features (as well as Case) at PF and thus, by the Principle of Lexicalization in (154), it will remain non-overt. A parallel derivation is, of course, assumed to be at work in the case of Obligatory Control verbs that select a nominal direct object, as in (159). In a fashion parallel to Manzini (1983), Bouchard (1984: 193–194) leaves the choice of controller to semantics and/or pragmatics. (159)

a.

John begged/promised Mary [ S0 PRO to leave]. = D-Structure

b. John begged/promised Mary [ S PRO to leave]. = S-Structure

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

As for some of the well-known empirical differences that exist between Control and ECM verbs, e.g. contrasts of the type in (160) below, Bouchard (1984: 172–182) adds to his analysis the assumption that ECM verbs like believe, but not Control verbs like try, have the marked property of allowing for a dissociation of Case and theta-role assignments. Thus, in (160a), an overt NP in the embedded subject position is disallowed because this would entail that try assign objective Case to an NP that it does not theta-mark – a marked dissociation not allowed by this verb. On the other hand, PRO is licit in (160a) because this is a Caseless position. I.e., PRO obtains only its theta-role from the embedded verb and F-features, at LF, from Agreement with John. Thus, by the Principle of Lexicalization in (154), it remains non-overt at PF. In contrast, the verb believe in (160b) is marked for Case/theta-role dissociation. It, therefore, licenses an overt NP in the embedded subject position. However, PRO is not licensed because it will now be associated with Case and thus, by (154), must lexicalize at PF, yet cannot because it lacks F-features at that level. (160) a.

John tried [ S PRO/*himself to leave].

b. John believes [ S *PRO/himself to be an honest man]. Turning to the phenomenon of Arbitrary Control, Bouchard assumes that such readings invariably (and only) arise in contexts in which PRO is not bound – by definition, when it occurs in ungoverned positions. Thus, Bouchard’s (1984: 182– 184) analysis accommodates the ungrammaticality of examples like (161) below in a fashion parallel to Manzini (1983): PRO is governed and, therefore, bound in such configurations by expletive it, which means that hit has failed to discharge a theta-role in violation of the Theta Criterion. (161)

*It was hit PRO.

Where Arbitrary PRO will be licensed is, naturally enough, in configurations in which, for various reasons, there can be no S 0 Deletion in the Control clause, leaving PRO ungoverned and unbound. Since PRO cannot obtain its needed Rindex via binding, it must do so by virtue of an Elsewhere Condition (a process of random R-index assignment), as is true of overt pronouns like they and them. Bouchard (1984: 195–202) enumerates five such configurations, which will be briefly examined in turn. These are indirect questions, nonbridge verbs, sentential subjects, purpose-type adjuncts, and “extraposed” clauses. Looking first at indirect questions like (162), the presence of a Wh-element in COMP obviously supports the view that S 0 Deletion has not taken place at S-Structure, the presence of the Wh-element presumably having “blocked” its application.

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(162)

69

David knows [ S 0 how [ S PRO to behave oneself/himself at a royal wedding]].

Given that PRO cannot obtain an R-index via binding in examples like (162), the Elsewhere indexing condition applies and randomly assigns PRO an Rindex. If that index does not happen to match that of any other NP in the sentence, PRO obviously will not undergo Agreement in F-features with an NP at LF. Under such circumstances, PRO remains F-featureless: Surface agreement with an anaphor like oneself is assumed to be due to an unmarked, languagespecific, F-feature realization rule. On the other hand, if PRO is “accidentally” assigned the same R-index as David in (162), then, by the Principle of Agreement in (150), PRO will be assigned David’s F-features at LF, accounting for the licitness of the anaphor himself. Parallel derivations are postulated in the context of nonbridge verbs like the one in (163) below: The lack of S 0 Deletion in these instances is, however, attributed to a semantic difference assumed to exist between bridge and nonbridge verbs. The latter are said to select sentential complements that are not “identified” by the verb; i.e., the “index” of the complement clause is not entered in the verb’s V-grid and deletion of S 0 is in some way contingent on this being the case. (163)

The teacher said/whispered [ S 0 PRO to always stay quiet when in the library].

The absence of indexing between the main clause verb and a Control clause is also invoked to explain the lack of S 0 Deletion in the case of sentential subjects, like (164), purposive adjuncts, such as (165), and “extraposed” clauses, exemplified by (166): (164)

I believe that [[ S 0 PRO feeding oneself/myself ] could become difficult].

(165)

The books were sold [ S 0 PRO to help the refugees].

(166)

It is important/impossible [ S 0 PRO to make a quick buck these days].

Structurally parallel examples like (167a,b) below, in which PRO appears (problematically) to be subject to Obligatory Control, are attributed to semantic and pragmatic factors: I.e., these are analyzed as Arbitrary Control configurations that semantically or pragmatically favor an “accidental” co-referential reading.

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

a.

The captain shouted to me [PRO to duck].

b. You only bought that book [PRO to annoy me]. To summarize, Bouchard (1984), like Manzini (1983), rejects Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) proposal that the distribution of PRO is to be largely accounted for in terms of conflicting requirements imposed by the Binding Theory, requirements that Chomsky uses to motivate the need for a separate Theory of Control in order for the reference of PRO to be established. Instead, Bouchard and Manzini propose that the distribution of the manifestation of NP known as PRO is determined principally by Case Theory and PRO’s reference in Obligatory Control contexts is determined by already existing principles of binding that apply to anaphors generally. Where Bouchard (1984) differs most radically from Manzini (1983) is in (a) the phi/F-features PRO is assumed to bear (Manzini implicitly adopts Chomsky’s “full” phi-feature analysis of PRO; Bouchard assumes PRO cannot have phifeatures at any level except, possibly, at LF.) (b) the precise fashion in which Case Theory determines the distribution of PRO (Both authors assume that every Case up for assignment must be discharged. However, Manzini precludes PRO from Case-marked positions by definition, while Bouchard suggests that the Principle of Lexicalization precludes the existence of a phi-/F-featureless, Casemarked NP at PF.) (c) the ambiguity or lack therefore of this empty category (Manzini assumes PRO is unambiguously an anaphor; Bouchard treats Obligatory Control PRO as an anaphor and Arbitrary Control PRO as a pronoun.) and (d) the structure of Obligatory Control clauses at S-Structure (Manzini uniformly analyzes them as S 0 ; Bouchard proposes that they take the form of S.). In short, we have established that standard GB approaches to Control (e.g. Chomsky (1981a, 1982), Manzini (1983) and Bouchard (1984)) all rest on the fundamental assumptions embodied in Chomsky’s (1981a) version of Theta Theory, repeated below in (168): (168) a.

Chomsky’s (1981a: 29, 38) Projection Principle Representations at each syntactic level (i.e., LF, D-Structure, and S-Structure) are projected from the lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorization properties of lexical items.

b. Chomsky’s (1981a: 36, 335) Theta Criterion Each argument must bear one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role must be assigned to one and only one argument.

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That is, the preceding principles jointly conspire to force the projection of a thematic subject in a Control clause at D-Structure since if a verb s-selects for an external argument in a non-Control configuration, like the verb see does in a sentence like I saw my adviser yesterday., then it must also do so in a Control context, such as I plan to see my adviser tomorrow., a hypothesis that also offers a straightforward account of selectional restrictions in Control contexts (e.g., the ungrammaticality of examples like *John wants to elapse.) in addition to a wide range of other empirical facts related to Control. Likewise, standard GB approaches to Control all assume, on the basis of facts involving simplicity of the base, Wh-movement, and the like, that Control clauses involve S 0 complementation at D-Structure. However, we have also seen that there is a fundamental split in the standard GB literature with respect to how PRO is licensed, as well as how it is identified: On the one hand, we have the government approach to the licensing of PRO suggested by Chomsky (1981a, 1982), with identification being achieved by a separate Theory of Control; on the other, we have the Case-based licensing accounts of Manzini (1983) and Bouchard (1984), in which identification of PRO in Obligatory Control reduces entirely to binding – i.e., to the very same mechanisms that determine the reference of an overt anaphor like ourselves. In the next section, we will take a look at a critique of the Manzini/Bouchard Case approach to the licensing of PRO published in Lasnik (1992) that proved influential in subsequent generative literature. In closing this one, however, we note that some important alternative GB theories of Control have not been overviewed here in interest of perspicuity. Koster (1984, 1987: Ch. 3), for example, independently developed an analysis of Control that involves a unique combination of mechanisms made available by the GB framework. He argues that PRO functions uniquely as an anaphor only when governed. More specifically, when a matrix verb (such as try) selects for a “reduced clause” (an embedded S 0 that can never be headed by an overt complementizer like for), then PRO is governed (contra Chomsky (1981a, 1982)) and must satisfy Principle A of the Binding Theory by virtue of being bound by an NP in the matrix clause (as suggested independently by Manzini and Bouchard). However, contra Manzini/Bouchard, Koster agrees with Chomsky (1981a, 1982) that PRO also must satisfy separate, lexically-specified, Rules of Control. This explains why only the matrix subject NP may bind PRO in a sentence like John contracted with Susan to take care of himself. while only the matrix object may do so in one like My mother reminded me to feed the cat. In short, a third possibility presents itself: PRO is a “special” type of anaphor – one whose reference is jointly determined by the theories of Binding and Control.

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2.2.4 Lasnik (1992): Evidence that PRO is licensed by a lack of government and is identified by a separate Theory of Control Lasnik (1992) presents two different types of arguments against a Manzini/ Bouchard-style approach to Control. The first involves contexts in which Case is apparently not assigned, yet PRO remains ungrammatical (due to government); the second involves a variety of marked differences that exist between the determination of the antecedent of PRO and the determination of the antecedent of a pure anaphor or pronoun (supporting the view that PRO’s reference is indeed established in a manner distinct from that of other referentially dependent nominals). Looking at the former type of problem, the reader may recall that Manzini (1983) and Bouchard (1984) both propose that PRO is unacceptable in ECM contexts like (169) below because PRO is associated with Accusative Case, in violation of either Manzini’s (126) characterization of anaphoric empty categories as being Caseless or Bouchard’s (154) Principle of obligatory Lexicalization of Case-marked expressions: (169)

John believes [ S himself/*PRO to be clever].

Lasnik (1992: 236) points out that in examples like (170a) below the ungrammaticality of the lexical NP variant seems to indicate that Accusative Case assignment is blocked (perhaps because of an adjacency requirement on Accusative Case assignment suggested in Chomsky (1981a)), yet PRO remains, inexplicably, unacceptable. The grammaticality of (170b), he notes, precludes an explanation of (170a) in terms of a principle of obligatory Case assignment; i.e. to the fact that believe must discharge an Accusative Case feature. (170)

a. *John believes sincerely [ S himself/PRO to be clever]. b. John believes sincerely [ S 0 that he is clever].

While the ungrammaticality of PRO in (169) and (170a) apparently cannot be attributed to the presence of Case, Lasnik emphasizes that it does fall out from Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) binding approach to PRO since PRO has a governing category in these structures, making these Principle B violations. Lasnik (1992: 237) provides a further illustration of the same problem via examples of the type in (171a) in which there is again no Case assignment,

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yet PRO remains illicit presumably because it is once again associated with a governing category.20 (171)

a. *Her belief [Harry/PRO to be intelligent] may be well-founded. b. Her belief [that Harry/she is intelligent] may be well-founded.

Turning to the second type of argument that he advances against a Manzini/ Bouchard approach to Control, Lasnik (1992: 238) begins by emphasizing the well-known fact that antecedent resolution in the case of “pure” anaphors is free. I.e., in contexts like (172a) below the overt anaphor may refer to either John or Mary, a variability that is well known not to be true of Obligatory Control PRO, cf. (172b). (172)

a.

John told Mary all about himself/herself.

b. John i told Mary k [PRO*i/k to stay]. In other words, the difference in antecedent determination exemplified above is only surprising under a treatment of Obligatory Control PRO as a straightforward anaphor – because of it, Manzini and Bouchard are forced to appeal to the existence of separate semantic and pragmatic constraints on just this sort of anaphoric expression. However, such a difference follows from Chomsky’s contention that antecedent resolution in Control configurations is determined by distinct mechanisms of the grammar (his Theory of Control). In a similar vein, Lasnik (1992: 239–242) notes that certain Control verbs impose thematic constraints on the PRO subject of their complement clauses, a phenomenon also unparalleled in the case of pure anaphors. As a first example, he cites Higgins (1973: 174) for the observation that verbs like serve, help, and suffice require that PRO be interpretable as an Instrument, as indicated by Lasnik’s data in (173a) and (173b) below. (The data in (173a) were first noted and discussed, in very different terms, in Kajita (1967: 103).) (173)

a.

The ice served [PRO to chill the beer].

b. *Edison served [PRO to invent the light bulb].

20 Lasnik (1992: 237) also offers examples like (i) as further illustrations of this problem. However, Manzini and Bouchard actually can account for such cases: In them, PRO appears in a configuration in which it must be bound by expletive it, resulting in a Theta Criterion violation as the external theta-role of solve remains unassigned. (i) *It is likely [ S PRO to solve the problem].

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Similarly, Lasnik notes that Berman (1970) and others have observed that a Control verb like try requires that the subject of its complement clause be an entity capable of deliberate or intentional action, as indicated by the contrast in (174). All of this is, of course, expected under Chomsky’s version of Control Theory, but not under an analysis of Obligatory Control PRO as a pure anaphor. (174)

a.

John tried [PRO to leave].

b. *John tried [PRO to resemble Bill]. Finally, Chomsky (1981a: 324) made the observation, illustrated below in (175a), that in Arbitrary Control contexts, PRO must refer to a [+human] entity, not, say, an inanimate one, such as a rock, and this despite the fact that both humans and rocks may roll, as made clear by the examples in (175b). (175)

a.

It is possible [PRO to roll down that hill]. (=It is possible for someone/*something to roll down that hill.)

b. The children/rocks rolled down the hill. This fact, Lasnik suggests, follows from the arb index assigned by the Theory of Control. In other words, arb is to be understood as the type of index associated with a pronoun like French on ‘we/they/one’, which is also marked [+human]. However, this aspect of the meaning of Arbitrary PRO does not immediately fall out of an approach to Control that assumes that the same mechanisms of antecedent resolution are at work in (175a) as would apply to an example containing a pure anaphor (Manzini) or an overt pronoun (Bouchard). In these cases, something more must be said. Bouchard (1984: 202) in particular accounts for them in terms of a proposal in Marantz (1981) to the effect that in English and many other languages, the unmarked or inherent role of the thematic subject position is that of Agent, where an Agent is generally assumed to be an active, animate, intentional being capable of manipulating or causing an event to take place. In short, he proposes that it is because of this tendency that PRO is assumed, by default (i.e. when not bound), to be [+animate]. This, of course, does not explain why the “default” interpretation does not arise in the case of overt pronouns, as illustrated below in (176): (176)

It’s possible that they will roll down the hill. (they = the children/the rocks)

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Finally, Lasnik (1992: 242–247) cites Safir (1985: 33–38) for the theoretical claim that PRO differs from overt and non-overt pronouns in being non-expletive, a fact that Lasnik argues can actually be made to follow under a modification of Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) analysis, but not, in certain cases, from those of his competitors. To explain, Chomsky (1981a: 324–328) had originally noted that PRO in Obligatory Control contexts “. . .normally takes on the referential properties of its antecedent.” That is, the fact that verbs like want and try are marked [+Control] in the lexicon means that, at LF, Control Theory will apply to verify that PRO has been assigned the same R-index as the matrix subject. This requirement is satisfied in the case of examples like (177a), but not, Lasnik argues, in contexts involving an embedded infinitival non-thematic verb, like the one (177b). (177)

a.

I wanted/tried [PRO to complete the assignment].

b. *I wanted [PRO to seem that Mary is crazy]. (intended meaning: I wanted for it to seem that Mary is crazy.) Specifically, the ungrammaticality of the latter type of example, Lasnik suggests, should be attributed to the fact that PRO is now functioning as an NP in a non-argument (expletive) position, a type of NP that should be defined as being unassociated with an R-index. Thus, contradictory requirements are imposed in (177b): PRO both must be assigned an R-index by the lexical entry for want and cannot be given the semantic nature of expletives as non-referential. This same modification can actually be carried over, unproblematically, to the Manzini-Bouchard approach to Obligatory Control as well. I.e., these authors make the claim that Obligatory Control PRO is a pure anaphor. Therefore, in contexts like those in (177) above, it must be bound by an antecedent and share its R-index. If one follows Lasnik in assuming that by definition expletives cannot bear an R-index, then the ungrammaticality of PRO in examples like (177b) again follows. Continuing to work towards those related data that are problematic for Bouchard and Manzini, it is important to bear in mind that Chomsky (1981a: 325), given the theory at the time, actually assumed that PRO could be expletive. That is, contexts like the one typified by the German example in (178) below, taken from Jaeggli & Safir (1989: 19), would have been treated by Chomsky (1981a) in terms of expletive PRO: (178) Er sagte, das PRO ihm scheint, dass Hans den Hund getötet hat. he said that to-him seemed that Hans the dog killed has ‘He said that it seemed to him that Hans killed the dog.’

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

The assumption that PRO could be expletive was soon challenged, however, by Safir (1985: 33–38) on the basis of facts uncovered in Rizzi (1982). Specifically, Rizzi had observed that while expletive PRO was unexpectedly illicit in French gerundive contexts like the one in (179a) below, thematic PRO was acceptable in structurally parallel ones like (179b). (The facts in English are the same.) (179)

a. *[PRO étant clair que Jean ne viendra plus], being clear that Jean Neg will-come no-more nous pouvons partir. we can to-leave ‘It being obvious that John won’t be returning, we can leave.’ b. [PRO ayant mangé], Marie est partie. having eaten Marie is left ‘Having eaten, Mary left.’

Rizzi (1982) accommodated these contrasts by proposing that gerunds are marked for an Obligatory rule of Control, not an Arbitrary one. In other words, (179a) was said to be ungrammatical because PRO lacked a controller, while (179b) was said to be acceptable because PRO was controlled by Marie. Safir (1985: 33–38) argued against this view on the basis of data such as (180a,b) below (for which he also provided French equivalents). Specifically, Safir noted that if gerunds are treated as Obligatory Control contexts, then it is not at all obvious why one finds (only) Arbitrary readings in the gerunds in (180). (180) a.

[Before PRO making a big decision], every option should be considered.

b. [Even without PRO testing], it’s obvious how things will turn out. On the other hand, Safir notes, the full range of facts follows straightforwardly if one simply accepts the alternative view that non-overt expletives do not involve PRO, but a separate manifestation of NP known as pro. Lasnik adopts this position and goes on to point out that Chomsky’s (modified) Theory of Control can now account for the lack of Arbitrary PRO in non-thematic contexts like (179a) in terms parallel to the account of the lack of Controlled PRO in (177b): Arbitrary PRO must be assigned an R-index (in this case, the index arb), but expletives, by definition, cannot bear one.

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A straightforward extension of Lasnik’s proposal to the Manzini/Bouchard approach is, however, not an option in this case since they assume that Arbitrary PRO is either subject to the same mechanism of R-indexation as are pure anaphors lacking a governing category (Manzini) or pure pronouns (Bouchard). In other words, if an overt expletive NP must remain unindexed, then so too must its non-overt counterpart. Consequently, a separate mechanism will have to be invoked in order to account for the thematic restriction exemplified by (179a,b). In summary, facts like the preceding led certain generativists working in the GB tradition to the conclusion that PRO was best analyzed in terms of a government-based approach to Control, rather than one based on Case (or rather, the lack of it at some level or levels). Nonetheless, the possibility that Case Theory might play a major role in the licensing of this empty category was by no means forgotten, as will be made clear in Section 2.3. Before turning, however, to the overview of certain key Minimalist accounts of Control to be provided in that section, one final issue warrants discussion as it was precisely during the Government-Binding era that it received a great deal of attention. This is the issue of Control (or the lack of it) in the subject of NP position. 2.2.5 On Control into NP: Williams (1985) Williams (1985: 306) cites Ross (1969a) for the suggestion that Event Nominals like realization in (181) below contain a non-overt thematic subject (PRO), a theoretical possibility that is later noted in Chomsky (1981a: 156) and is also discussed by Manzini (1983: 436), among others. That is, the fact that John in the following sentence cannot be the ‘realizer’ could plausibly be attributed to Principle C, which would require that John be disjoint in reference from PRO, which c-commands it. (181)

[The PRO i realization that he i /*John i was unpopular] upset him.

Similarly, Williams notes, this hypothesis would account for the fact that the teller of the stories, represented by PRO in (182) below, cannot have the same referent as them, an apparent Condition B effect: (182)

She heard [PROi/*j stories about themj ].

Thirdly, he observes that an Obligatory Control analysis could be extended to examples like (183) in order to explain why the leaves are obligatorily understood to undergo desiccation or dehydration, not, say, the referent of the pronoun you. (183)

Youi shouldn’t disturb the leavesk [during PRO*i/k desiccation/dehydration].

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Finally, the existence of a PRO subject of NP is predicted by the principles of GB theory. For example, under Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) approach to Control, PRO is an instantiation of NP that is attested when a nominal appears in a thematic, ungoverned position: Spec of NP in examples like (181) appears to fit this description perfectly. As appealing as this hypothesis initially appears, however, Williams (1985) argues against it on the basis of two separate types of considerations that will be reviewed here first because they establish that PRO cannot appear in Spec of NP (even when that position is ungoverned/Caseless) – raising the question of why – and secondly because his discussion reveals two generalizations concerning the determination of PRO’s antecedent that should be captured by any theory of Control. Williams’ first type of argument against Control into NPs involves unexpected respects in which this type of Control differs significantly from Control into verbal clauses, making a uniform PRO account of the two types of structures suspect. His second argument is two-fold. It involves first showing that the binding principles are sensitive not just to syntactically projected arguments, but to syntactically unprojected (i.e. implicit) ones as well. Given this, he then demonstrates that the analysis independently needed to accommodate binding facts clearly related to implicit arguments extends straightforwardly to the binding data involving Event Nominals just given above. We will begin by considering a few examples of the first type of argument – differences between Control into NPs and Control into sentential clauses. Williams (1985: 298) first notes that while, before, and after-type VP adjuncts differ from other types of adjuncts (such as purposive clauses) in that the former type of adjunct exhibits a strong restriction on the possible antecedent of its PRO subject: Namely, PRO in these cases can only refer to the surface subject of the main clause. That is, while example (184a) shows that there is no semantic restriction on objects binding into while-type adjuncts when the subject of the adjunct is overt, (184b,c) show that such is not the case when that argument is phonetically covert: (184) a.

David notified every studentx [before theirx taking the exam].

b. Every studentx was notified [before PROx taking the exam]. c. *David notified every studentx [before PROx taking the exam]. Interestingly, Williams notes, this restriction is unexpectedly lifted in the case of PRO in Spec of NP, as demonstrated by the grammaticality of (185a) below, the grammaticality of which contrasts sharply with the ungrammaticality of the otherwise structurally parallel verbal clause in (184c) above.

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(185)

a.

79

You should not treat the leaves [before desiccation/dehydration].

b. The leaves should not be treated [before desiccation/dehydration]. Secondly, Williams (1985: 306) observes, NP Control differs markedly from Control into verbal clauses in making reference to “multiple” instances of PRO in certain cases. That is, the same Condition C effect attested above in (181) seems to obtain below in (186) with respect to both the non-overt subject and the non-overt indirect object of promise. That is, John must be disjoint in reference not only from the understood Agent of the Event Nominal promise (the ‘promiser’), but from its Goal (the recipient of the promise) as well. (186)

*[The PRO i promise PRO i that John i would win] pleased him.

Thirdly, Williams’ (1985: 308–315) work establishes that while the PRO subject of a verbal clause may itself serve as the antecedent of a PRO subject of an adjunct clause (cf. (187a) below), the PRO subject of NP, unexpectedly, cannot (see (187b)). In this respect, again, the covert subject of a verbal clause behaves just like other syntactically projected, (although phonetically overt) NPs, such as you in (187c), whereas the understood subject of NP of an Event Nominal behaves unlike them. (187)

a.

[[PRO to sell those books now] [without even PRO looking them over first]] might be unwise.

b. *[[A sale of those books now] [without even PRO looking them over first]] might be unwise. c.

[[For you to sell those books now] [without even PRO looking them over first]] might be unwise.

Turning to a representative illustration of Williams’ second type of argument against Control into NP, namely, evidence that the binding principles make reference not only to syntactically projected arguments, but to implicit ones as well – opening up the possibility that the binding facts involving Event Nominals in (181)–(182) are actually of the latter type – Williams (1985: 306) introduces numerous examples of the sort exemplified by (188) below. In this particular sentence, he notes, Mary cannot have made her promise to the doctor – it must have been made to someone else – and this fact cannot be attributed to the presence of PRO since PRO would appear in the indirect object position of the verb promise, a position in which it would be governed (and assigned Case).

80 (188)

On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

Mary went to the doctor’s office, and she promised that the doctor would not see her again until she was really sick.

In order to account for such binding restrictions, Williams first proposes that the understood indirect object of promise is implicit in the sense of Roeper (1983) and Keyser & Roeper (1984). That is, it is part of the meaning of the verb promise that when one promises, one promises something to someone, an aspect of meaning that is to be formally captured in terms of a lexically specified list of arguments s-(emantically) selected by this particular verb, as indicated by the partial lexical entry below in (189a). Further illustrative entries are given in (189b,c). (189)

a.

promise

(Agent, Theme, Goal)

b. give

(Agent, Theme, Goal)

c.

(Agent, Event)

take

Importantly, it is not an a priori requirement that all of the arguments sselected by promise (or any other s-selecting lexeme) be projected into the syntactic structure. The verb promise, for example, only obligatorily projects its Agent; the verb give, on the other hand, normally obligatory projects all three of its s-selected arguments; Event Nominals, on the other hand, only optionally project their arguments. E.g., the noun promise is associated with the same argument structure as the verb promise, given above in (189a). However, in its nominal use these arguments only optionally project as indicated by (190b): (190) a.

Mary’s unwise promise of an expensive gift to John

b. a promise Williams goes on to suggest that various ‘associations’ may also be lexically specified to obtain between the arguments s-selected by a lexeme. For example, the verb take in the sense of snap a picture obligatorily links its Agent argument to the Maker role of the Event denoted by its nominal object, as indicated by the coindexation below in (191). (191)

take: (Agent i, Event) (Maker i, Subject)

This ‘linking’ has an end effect similar to Control, but is crucially different from it since the former makes reference to lexically specified argument structure, whereas the latter keys in on specific syntactic positions determined,

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e.g., in Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) theory, by the rules of Control. Thus, instead of capturing the fact that John in (192a) is the understood Agent of the Event Nominal picture because of the presence of an obligatorily controlled PRO, as in (192b), Williams captures this fact in terms of the associations between Agent and Maker lexically specified in (191) above: (192)

a.

John took a picture of Mary.

b. Johnx took [a PROx picture of Mary]. (on the relevant snap a picture reading) Finally, Williams (1985: 303, 311–312) proposes that implicit arguments actively participate in binding (and Control) relations in the manner specified in (193a,b) below. Specifically, (193a,b) state that the c-command domain of an implicit argument is determined by the c-command domain of the lexeme with which it is lexically associated, although only within X0 projections of that head. (193)

a.

An implicit argument c-commands X if the lexeme of which it is an implicit argument c-commands X. If an implicit argument is coindexed with X and c-commands X, then it binds X.

b. Implicit arguments are only ‘visible’ to rules that are applying strictly within the first projection of the head with which they are related. Thus, for example, the Condition C effect exhibited by (188) above is attributed to the fact that the verb promise, associated with an implicit indirect object, c-commands the R-expression the doctor within its immediately dominating V0. In an entirely parallel fashion, the fact that the ‘realizer’ must be distinct from John in (181) above, repeated below for convenience in (194), is due to the fact that realization, associated with an implicit Agent, c-commands John within its immediately dominating N0 . Thus, Condition C will bar coindexation of these two arguments. (194)

[The realization that he/John was unpopular] upset him.

Likewise, “multiple” binding relations are blocked between the implicit Agent and Goal of promise and John in (195): (195)

[The promise that John would win] pleased him.

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Similarly, the Condition B effect in (182), repeated below in (196), is due to the presence of an implicit Agent selected by stories. (196)

She heard [stories about them].

The contrasting adjunct data repeated below in (197a,b) is equally expected: Specifically, the antecedent of PRO in (197a) is configurationally determined in accordance with, e.g., Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) theory of Control. Thus, this system of rules would specify that PRO in a while-type adjunct clause must be assigned the referential index of the surface subject. In other words, these types of adjuncts, like the Control verb use of promise, would fall under the rule of Control given above in (78b) above. Implicit arguments, however, are not assumed to fall under the theory of Control: Being syntactically unprojected arguments, they are in no need of a referential index. (197)

a. *You shouldn’t disturb the leaves [while PRO desiccating/dehydrating]. b. You shouldn’t disturb the leaves [during desiccation/dehydration].

Finally, the contrasts repeated below in (198a,b) follow from Williams’ proposal in (193b) above to the effect that implicit arguments differ from explicit ones in that the former are not ‘visible’ outside of their domain of projection. In other words, either the phonetically overt explicit argument you or the phonetically covert explicit argument PRO in (198a) may serve as an antecedent for the PRO in the adjunct clause, but the implicit Agent of sale cannot serve as PRO’s antecedent because it is not visible outside its NP domain, although such implicit arguments can, of course, serve as antecedents for PRO within their domain, as the implicit Agent of attempt does in (198c): (198) a.

[[For you/PRO to sell those books now] [without even PRO looking them over first]] might be unwise.

b. *[[A sale of those books now] [without even PRO looking them over first]] might be unwise. c.

[Any attempt [PRO to leave]] will be thwarted.

Examples that initially appear problematic for the hypothesis that implicit arguments are “invisible” outside their argument domain, such as (199a,b) below (due to Roeper (1983)), are treated as instances of Control by the entire clause to which the adjunct is adjoined, parallel to (200a,b), taken from Williams (1985:

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310).21 In other words, it is the entire event denoted by the main clause that serves as the explicit antecedent of PRO in the adjunct clause, never an implicit Agent. I.e., the destruction of the city is what impresses the general in (199), not the implicit Agent of that destruction; the greenness of grass is what promotes photosynthesis in (200a); and the event of the ship sinking affects the queen in (200b). (199) a.

the destruction of the city [PRO to impress the general]

b. The city was destroyed [PRO to impress the general]. (200) a.

Grass is green [PRO to promote photosynthesis].

b. An exasperated playwright, when asked by the director to explain the mechanics of his script exclaims. . . ‘Why did the boat sink in Act 2?! It sank [PRO to impress the queen] and move her to murder her husband by the end of Act 3, of course!’ In sum, the ideas put forth in Williams (1985) are important for present purposes for at least three reasons. First, his work shows that Control theory (like binding theory) is sensitive to the presence of explicit and implicit arguments. That is, either type of argument may serve as the antecedent of Obligatory Control PRO, although the exact conditions under which they may do so differ. (Specifically, implicit arguments may only serve as an antecedent of a PRO that they c-command within their immediate X0 projection domain.) Secondly, Williams clearly shows that adjuncts differ with respect to the constraints they do or do not place on the understood antecedent of their PRO subject: Specifically, the PRO subject of a while-type adjunct must refer to the same individual as the surface subject of the clause to which it is adjoined, but purposive adjuncts, Chomsky (1981a: 77) had earlier shown, appear to vary with respect to which argument may serve as the antecedent of PRO, as a comparison of (184b,c) above with Chomsky’s data repeated below in (201a,b) makes clear: (201) a.

I i sold the book [PRO i to help the refugees].

b. I i bought Bill k a book [PRO*i/k to give to Mary]. Finally, Williams convincingly shows that PRO is barred from the Spec of NP position even when that position is ungoverned and/or Caseless. While Williams 21 Williams’ (1985) analysis of such examples is echoed in Lasnik (1988: 9–16).

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(1982, 1985) argues that this is because NPs cannot ever have subjects, being fundamentally different that verbs in this respect, Lasnik (1988) presents evidence that things may not be quite so simple. Specifically, and as we will now see, Lasnik (1988: 8) argues that Spec of NP can harbor a subject, but only under very specific conditions – ones that will be suggested here to preclude PRO. Lasnik’s evidence involves contrasts in possible/impossible co-occurrences of an Agent and Instrument argument in active sentences, passive sentences, and Event Nominals. He begins by noting that while sentences like those given below in (202) allow the syntactic projection of both an Agent ( John) and an Instrument (a skeleton key), those in (203) do not. The data in (204) establish that either an Agent or an Instrument may appear alone as the thematic subject of the verb open. (202) a.

John opened the door with a skeleton key. Agent Instrument

b. The door was opened with a skeleton key by John. Instrument Agent (203) a. *John opened the door by a skeleton key. Agent Instrument b. *The skeleton key opened the door by John. Instrument Agent (204) a.

John opened the door. Agent

b. A skeleton key would open this door. Instrument Lasnik then points out that certain proposals by Jaeggli (1986) and others initially appear to offer an account of these contrasts in terms of an interaction of Chomsky’s (1981a: 36, 335) Theta Criterion (given above in (93b)) with the following hypothesis: The passive affix is an obligatory subject theta-role absorber that may only transmit its theta-role to the object of a by-phrase. Given these assumptions, the examples in (202a,b) and (204) respect the Theta Criterion as each argument bears one and only one theta-role. However, those in (203) are Theta Criterion violations since there is no passive affix available to transmit a theta-role to the object of the by-phrase, depriving that argument of a theta-role.

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Lasnik goes on to argue that this account of the facts is actually incomplete since it cannot be extended to parallel contrasts involving Event Nominals, such as those in (205)–(206). That is, Event Nominals never have a passive affix to effect theta-role transmission, so the presence or absence of this morpheme cannot be invoked in any non-stipulative way to account for when Agent and Instrument roles may and may not co-occur. (205) a.

the army’s destruction of the city with a missile Agent Instrument

b. the city’s destruction by the army with a missile Agent Instrument (206) a. *the army’s destruction of the city by a missile Agent Instrument b. *the missile’s destruction of the city by the army Instrument Agent Lasnik (1988: 4–5) notes that one might be tempted to salvage a Jaeggli-style approach to these data by adopting the alternative view that by and ’s are potential Agent theta-role assigners, with the term ‘Agent’ now being understood to cover not only intentional Agents, like the army, but also unintentional ones, like a missile. Under this view, the examples in (206) become Theta Criterion violations since two distinct arguments are being assigned the same Agent theta-role. (With is assumed to assign a pure Instrument theta-role in the examples in (205).) That such a view of Agenthood is misguided, Lasnik (1988: 5–7) argues, is indicated by two distinct types of facts. First, there are the by-now familiar contrasts repeated below in (207), which, the reader will recall, were originally observed in Kajita (1967: 103) and were later analyzed in Higgins (1976: 107). In these examples, Lasnik notes, the skeleton key may serve as the thematic subject of serve, but John may not, a fact that remains mysterious if there is no theoretical distinction between Agents and Instruments. On the other hand, such contrasts are expected if we assume that Agent and Instrument are distinct subject thematic roles and that the verb serve, by virtue of its lexical semantics, s-selects only for a thematic subject of the Instrument type. (207) a.

The skeleton key served [PRO to open the door].

b. *John served [PRO to open the door].

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As a second argument in favor of this view of Theta Theory, Lasnik cites the case of data involving the verbs threaten and promise, facts that were originally discussed in Zubizaretta (1982) and later analyzed in different terms by Johnson (1985). Specifically, Johnson (1985) argues that threaten and promise exhibit both a Raising and a Control use. To illustrate, the Raising verb use of promise in (208a) means something like to give one hope of, whereas its well-known Control use in (208b) means roughly to give one’s word. (208) a.

Your solution promises [(your solution) to be a good one].

b. Do you promise [PRO to work harder from now on]? Lasnik notes that if there is no theoretical distinction between Agent and Instrument, then contrasts like those in (209), on the Raising verb reading, appear puzzling since promise places a requirement of non-Agenthood (but not non-Instrumenthood) on the subject of its complement phrase. (209) a.

This key promises [(this key) to open the door].

b. *Mary promises [(Mary) to open the door]. (on the relevant reading Mary appears likely to open the door.) For these reasons, Lasnik (1988: 2–3) advocates a different approach to the facts. He first proposes that the Theta Criterion be reformulated as in (210), a reworking that makes this principle sensitive not just to theta role labels, like Agent and Instrument, but also to specific grammatical functions, like thematic subject, where the latter term is understood to cover any type of subject, including, of course, Agents and Instruments. (210)

Lasnik’s (1988: 2–3, 8) Version of the Theta Criterion: Each argument bears one and only one thematic role (where thematic role refers to grammatical functions, as well as, perhaps, labels), and each theta-role is assigned to one and only one argument.

Secondly, Lasnik (1988: 2) adopts the view in (211) that by assigns only a subject theta-role to its complement. (211)

by assigns the theta-role of subject to its complement.

Finally, Lasnik (1988: 9) proposes that the genitive morpheme (’s in English), in addition to being a Case assigner, also either (a) assigns no theta-role, as is

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the case in “passive” nominals like (212), (b) independently assigns a possessor theta-role, as it does in (213), or (c) assigns a subject theta-role, as is the case in the examples in (214). (212)

the city’s destruction (city)

(213)

John’s hat

(214)

a.

the army’s destruction of the city

b. the missile’s destruction of the city Given these assumptions, the facts now follow in the fashion indicated below in (215)–(219). That is, in the grammatical examples, only one theta-role is assigned to each argument (in both the label and the grammatical function senses of the word), while in the ungrammatical ones, the subject theta-role is assigned twice – once by either the verb itself (218) or the genitive morpheme ’s (219) and once by by (in both (218) and (219)). (215)

a.

John opened the door with a skeleton key. Agent Instrument Subject

b. The door was opened with a skeleton key by John. Instrument Agent Subject (216)

a.

John opened the door. Agent Subject

b. A skeleton key would open this door. Instrument Subject (217)

a.

the army’s destruction of the city with a missile Agent Instrument Subject

b. the city’s destruction by the army with a missile Agent Instrument Subject

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a. *John opened the door by a skeleton key. Agent Instrument Subject Subject b. *The skeleton key opened the door by John. Instrument Agent Subject Subject

(219)

a. *the army’s destruction of the city by a missile Agent Instrument Subject Subject b. *the missile’s destruction of the city by the army Instrument Agent Subject Subject

What is important about this for present purposes is, of course, Lasnik’s conclusion that Spec of NP can harbor a thematic subject, contra Williams’ (1982, 1985) claim to the contrary. What Lasnik’s proposal leaves unexplained, however, is why PRO is not among the types of NP that can appear in that position. That is, given what has been said thus far, PRO could, theoretically, be projected in a sentence like (220) below: It would enter the derivation in the subject position of NP position, where it would receive investigation’s Agent theta-role. There it would remain ungoverned and Caseless (given the absence of the genitive morpheme). (220)

[An PRO investigation] is difficult under these circumstances.

In fact, the existence of this possibility seems to be entailed by Lasnik’s (1988: 9) adoption of Chomsky’s (1970), Kayne’s (1981a), and others’ proposals that passive nominal examples like (221) involve (object) theta-role assignment by destruction, with subsequent NP movement to Spec of NP for Case. (221)

the city’s destruction (city)

In short, we appear to have reached an impasse: Williams (1985) provides convincing arguments against the view that PRO can appear in the Spec of NP position, while Lasnik (1988) puts forth intriguing evidence that Spec of NP can harbor subjects and develops a system that allows PRO to be projected there. Fortunately, it appears that a minor change in one of Lasnik’s assumptions provides a solution. Namely, it seems legitimate to adopt Williams’ view that

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nominals cannot ever directly discharge the theta-roles they s-select: They require a theta-role “transmitter” – either a by-phrase or the genitive morpheme – to do so. Given this, the lack of PRO in examples like (220) would be due to the Theta Criterion – PRO fails to be assigned a theta-role – and its absence in contexts in which it is assigned a theta-role, as in (222) below, would be due (in GB terms) to either government or Case assignment by the theta-transmitting head. (222)

a.

*the PRO’s investigation

b. *the investigation by PRO

2.3 On Minimalist approaches to Control (1993-present) As discussed in detail in Section 2.2.1, a hallmark of Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) Government-Binding (GB) approach to Control is that the distribution of PRO, a [+anaphoric, +pronominal] instantiation of NP, is determined by Principles A and B of the Binding Theory. That is, the featural make-up of this type of NP is such that it is limited to ungoverned positions – those in which it lacks a governing category – since otherwise it would be unable to meet the contradictory requirements imposed on it by the binding principles. A further consequence of its [+anaphoric, +pronominal] nature, under this theory, is that the referential index of PRO cannot be regulated by the Binding Theory; therefore, a separate set of Rules of Control, provided above in (76)–(78), is needed in order to do so. In short, standard GB approaches to Control assume that Binding Theory, not, say, Case, is what primarily determines the distribution of PRO. As will be made clear in this section, this hypothesis is challenged by the original Minimalist approach to Control put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 116–120), to be overviewed in Section 2.3.2.1, as well as by the Minimalist analyses subsequently offered in Martin (1992, 2001), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002), Landau (2004, 2008), and Sigurðsson (2008), among many others, to be overviewed in part in the remaining subsections of this chapter. According to these analyses, it is feature checking that is primarily responsible for limiting PRO’s distribution, with authors divided into two camps according to which type(s) of features are primarily at work in determining PRO’s distribution, namely, those involving abstract Case (e.g. Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 116–120), Martin (1992, 2001), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), and Bowers (2002)), or those involving a specific combination of tense, agreement and phi-features (e.g. Landau (2004, 2008) and Sigurðsson (2008)).

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While the vast majority of Minimalist theories of Control will be shown to assume that PRO bears either abstract or morphological C/case, we will see that they differ radically from earlier Case-based accounts, such as those of Manzini (1983) and Bouchard (1984) (overviewed above in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively) in that PRO is now generally analyzed as bearing Case, not lacking it. (As we will see in Section 2.3.2.2, only one author – Bowers (2002: 206–209) – puts forth a Minimalist approach to PRO according to which it is C/caseless.) Before turning to an overview of the mechanics of some of the well-known feature based approaches to Control, however, we must first consider, in general terms, why they were developed. As the next section will show, the motivation is both empirical and theory-internal. Empirically, we will see that Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) have argued that the distribution of PRO at Spell-Out (in GB terms, at S-Structure) is determined by the Case properties of a sentence in which it appears, clearly not by its binding-theoretic ones. Likewise, we will see that certain innovations in Minimalist Theory (MT) that are motivated by facts not directly related to Control have led to the adoption of theoretical premises that also preclude a Binding-theoretic approach to limiting PRO’s distribution.

2.3.1 On the Minimalist rejection of a binding-theoretic approach to the distribution of PRO To begin then, why do Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), Martin (1992, 2001), Baltin (1995), and Bošković (1996, 2007), among many others, depart from earlier work in generative syntax by proposing that the distribution of PRO is primarily determined by the present theory of Case, not binding concerns? Two different types of arguments are put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 116–120). First, they provide empirical facts that conjunctively suggest that PRO behaves just like other arguments with respect to Case. Specifically, they enumerate data that appear to indicate that PRO, like other arguments, (a) cannot move from a Case-marked position – even to escape government and (b) must move from a non-Case position – presumably to check its own Case. Secondly, they point out that other phonetically non-overt categories clearly do have abstract Case; therefore, to assume otherwise with respect to PRO would require substantial empirical motivation, motivation that is, in fact, lacking. Let us begin by considering the former line of argumentation. Consider first the contrast between the grammatical examples in (223a,b) below and the ungrammatical ones in (224a,b), drawn from Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 118). The first set of examples demonstrates that strike and seem do not assign a thematic role to their subject position, as evidenced by the presence of the expletive NP it.

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The second set shows that movement of the object of these verbs ( John) to that non-thematic subject position is prohibited, despite the fact that it would not induce a Theta Criterion violation. (223)

a.

It is rare [for it to strike John [that the problems are insoluble]].

b. It is rare [for it to seem to John [that the problems are insoluble]]. (224)

a. *We want [John to strike (John) [that the problems are insoluble]]. b. *We want [John to seem to (John) [that the problems are insoluble]].

In Minimalist terms, the preceding contrast follows from Last Resort, given below in (225). Specifically, Last Resort prohibits movement of John from its initial merge position because, among other things, John is already in a position in which its Case feature can be checked. Thus, this movement is “superfluous”/ uneconomical. (225)

Last Resort: All steps in a derivation (e.g. movement) are made only if this is necessary for convergence.

Interestingly, Chomsky & Lasnik observe, the very same constraint appears to obtain with respect to PRO in such contexts, and this despite the fact that Move could now be construed as necessary for convergence. Specifically, under one version of Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) binding-theoretic approach to Control (one that does not attempt to derive the PRO Theorem from the binding principles), the movement illustrated below in (226a,b) is necessary in order for PRO to escape government: Once it has taken place, the examples should become acceptable. (The reader will recall that under Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) approach to Control, nothing precludes PRO from being associated with Case as long it satisfies its binding-theoretic requirements.) Yet these examples remain ungrammatical. Chomsky & Lasnik suggest that this is because PRO, like other arguments, is barred from moving from a Case position or, put differently, that it is Case, not Binding, that determines its distribution. (226)

a.

*[PRO to strike (PRO) [that the problems are insoluble]] is rare.

b. *[PRO to seem to (PRO) [that the problems are insoluble]] is rare. (Meaning It is rare for some arbitrary person to find the problems insoluble.)

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Before turning to further argumentation to this effect, it perhaps bears mentioning that if one does adopt an approach to Control in which the PRO Theorem reduces to the binding principles, then the implications these data hold for our understanding of Control change slightly. Specifically, the structures in (226) lack an accessible SUBJECT. Therefore, PRO vacuously satisfies both Principle A and Principle B in its initial merge position, making Move as unmotivated in (226) as it is in (224). If this is true, then, the data no longer establish that PRO is insensitive to the binding principles (they are satisfied). However, they continue to show that its distribution cannot be uniquely determined by binding considerations, as previously assumed. I.e., something else is clearly at work and that something, Chomsky & Lasnik suggest, is Case. Turning now to their contention that PRO is also like other arguments in that it must move from a non-Case position, Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 65–67, 116–117) begin by developing a Minimalist analysis of there-sentences like (227a) in terms of LF (covert) movement, as illustrated in (227b). They argue that this movement is necessary in order to satisfy the Principle of Full Interpretation, given in (228). I.e., the associate in a there-sentence must undergo LF movement in order for the uninterpretable expletive to be eliminated prior to semantic interpretation. (227)

a.

We never expected [there to be found a hitherto unknown play by Shakespeare].

b. [[there, a hitherto unknown play by Shakespeare] to be found (a hitherto unknown play by Shakespeare)] (228)

Principle of Full Interpretation: PF and LF can only contain information that the systems they interface with can recognize.

Chomsky & Lasnik introduce three distinct types of empirical facts in support of this analysis. They argue that it accounts for: (a) the otherwise puzzling rightward agreement between the verb and its associate, illustrated below in (229) (b) locality requirements that must obtain between there and its associate, exemplified by (230) (i.e., these are expected under the A-Movement analysis in (227b)) and (c) the contrast in grammaticality between examples like (231a,b) and (231c), which fall out from the Visibility Condition in (232). Namely, only in (231c) does the associate remain invisible for theta-marking since there in that example is not in a Case position. (229)

There are actually people living in that abandoned building.

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(230) *There seems that people are actually living in that abandoned building. (231)

a.

I believe [there is a man here].

b. I believe [there to be a man here]. c. *I tried [there to be a man here]. (232)

Visibility Condition: A chain is only visible for theta-marking if it contains a Case position.

Having developed and motivated an LF-movement approach to thereconstructions, Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 117) next point out an interesting contrast between phonetically overt associates in these constructions and PRO, illustrated below in (233): (233)

a.

We never expected [there to be found a hitherto unknown play by Shakespeare].

b. *We never expected [there to be found PROarb]. (Meaning We never expected some arbitrary person to be found.) While the preceding discussion has made it clear why (233a) is acceptable, one might wonder why (233b) is not: Arbitrary PRO would meet the indefiniteness requirement on there-sentences; PRO is in a theta-position that would be visible for theta-marking, given that there is in a Case position; and (non-arbitrary) PRO can appear in the position occupied by there in (233), as demonstrated by (234), so why is (233b) rejected? (234)

We i never expected [PRO i to be found (PRO i )].

Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 117) suggest that this is because PRO, for reasons that will be made clear in the next section, must always undergo overt movement from a non-Case position, whereas other arguments may undergo movement from such a position either pre- or post-Spell-Out. Finally, Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 115–116) note that their contention that PRO is sensitive to Case-theoretic properties is also indirectly supported by the fact that other phonetically non-overt NPs clearly do require Case. For example, the contrasts involving phonetically overt NPs given below in (235)–(236) are clearly replicated with respect to the potentially non-overt operators in (237)–(238).

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

a.

Who seems [(who) to be absent]?

b. *Who does it seem [(who) to be absent]? (236) a.

Who are you proud of (who)?

b. *Who are you proud (who)? (237)

a.

the man (who) seems to be absent

b. *the man (who) it seems to be absent (238) a.

the man (who) I’m very proud of

b. *the man (who) I’m very proud To propose that PRO is exceptional with respect to Case would, therefore, require strong theoretical motivation since it would, among other things, entail complicating the grammar by modifying the more general version of the Visibility Condition given earlier in (232) to the disjunctive variant given below in (239). (239)

Disjunctive Version of the Visibility Condition: A chain is visible for theta-marking if it contains a Case position or is headed by PRO.

While this exhausts the arguments Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) explicitly offer in favor of a Case-based approach to PRO, certain other features of Minimalist Theory will now be shown to likewise entail a rejection of the earlier GB account based on binding. These involve Chomsky’s adoption of a copy and PFdeletion approach to movement and his attempt to eliminate the role of government in the computational system. Looking at the first type of innovation, in MT Chomsky (1995: 202) adopts a suggestion that he notes had surfaced from time to time in the GB literature on reconstruction, a suggestion to the effect that the theoretical entity known as a trace, in GB theory standardly associated with the features [-anaphor, -pronominal] (i.e. those of an R-expression) in the case of Wh-trace and with the features [+anaphor, -pronominal] (i.e. anaphor) in the case of a trace of NP-movement, is actually, in all instances, a phonetically non-overt copy of the moved expression. In other words, on this alternative view, “traces” do not differ from their antecedents in terms of features. Instead, a “trace” is a complete copy of the moved element, one that fails to be spelled out in the PF component.

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Chomsky (1995: 202–210) discusses in some detail how this alternative view of traces may be implemented in such a way as to entirely eliminate the need for an independent operation of reconstruction. To provide just one simple illustration, consider the typical reconstruction effect illustrated below by the example in (240), a type of sentence discussed at length in work by Schachter (1973), Freidin (1986), Lebeaux (1988), and others. In (240), the anaphor himself may be interpreted as coreferential with either the matrix or the embedded subject. While the former reading is expected, given the structural position of the Whphrase at Spell-Out, the latter is not since, by definition, an NP (i.e. Bill in (240)) can only bind another NP (like himself ) if it c-commands it. For this reason, one might suppose that the anaphor optionally reconstructs at LF; i.e., returns to its initial merge position, in which it would be bound by Bill. (240)

John wondered [CP [which picture of himself ] [Bill saw t]].

Chomsky (1995: 202–210) notes that contrasts like these follow immediately under a copy and PF deletion theory of movement, without a separate process of reconstruction, since at LF the element represented by the trace in (240) is actually a complete copy of the moved constituent, as in (241). I.e., “deletion” of the copy takes place at PF, to which LF is “blind.” (241)

John wondered [CP [which picture of himself ] [Bill saw (which picture of himself )]].

What is important about this issue, for present purposes is, of course, that what MT is doing here with respect to traces clearly amounts to a rejection of the earlier approach to “instantiations” of overt and non-overt NPs based on the features [+/-anaphor, +/-pronominal]: An overt NP that undergoes movement and its copy are identical. This in turn entails that PRO must now be treated as a primitive – a distinct type of NP – one whose distributional properties no longer necessarily fall out of an established system of features. Put differently, the theoretical motivation for a treatment of PRO in terms of the conflicting binding requirements entailed by the features [+anaphor, +pronominal] is removed, further paving the way for an alternative treatment of its distributional properties in terms of Case or other features. This conclusion is further reinforced by Chomsky’s (1995: 172–211) minimalist attempts to entirely eliminate the notion of government from the grammar. Within the GB tradition, government formed the basis of objective Case assignment, played a crucial role in the formulation of the Empty Category Principle (ECP),

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and, of course, was key to Binding Theory, with its notion of Governing Category. All of this entailed the use of distinct levels of syntactic representation over which the representational definition of government could be applied. In MT, Chomsky seeks to dispense with multiple levels of syntactic representation (only S-Structure/Spell-Out remains) and to eliminate or reduce the grammatical devices needed to account for linguistic data. Government is one of the devices that are eliminated: Case “assignment” is recast as an instance of feature checking; the ECP is partially reformulated as the derivational Minimal Link Condition (MLC) or Shortest Move; and the notion of Governing Category is replaced with a simple requirement of c-command within a domain D at LF (the syntax/semantics interface) – with certain authors, such as Reinhart & Reuland (1993), even going so far as to suggest that Principles A and B be replaced by non-configurational principles governing the well-formedness and interpretation of reflexive predicates. From all of this, it is clear that Minimalist Theory rejects an account of the distribution of PRO in terms of a notion of Governing Category, although the possibility remains that its reference is still to be determined by a separate set of rules of Control applying at LF. Bearing these considerations in mind then, let us turn now to an overview of what has been suggested to replace the binding-theoretic account of PRO’s distribution, beginning with standard Case-theoretic accounts.

2.3.2 Case-theoretic approaches to PRO The goal of this section is to provide a relatively concise overview of the two basic Case-theoretic approaches to PRO that have been developed in recent Minimalist literature. Section 2.3.2.1 opens with the standard null Case approach to PRO originally put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 116–120) and modified in work by Martin (1992, 2001), Bošković (1996, 2007), and others. Section 2.3.2.2 then briefly considers Bowers’ (2002) alternative Case-theoretic account, according to which PRO possesses neither intrinsic phi-features nor Case. In contrast to previous sections, the discussion here will be critical. For the first time, I will introduce problems faced by a specific, current theory of Control, although, for reasons of economy, a discussion of data that are equally problematic for all current accounts will, for the most part, be delayed until subsequent chapters. With that said, let us begin by considering what are perhaps the most well known modern generative approaches to Control – those based on a notion of null abstract Case.

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2.3.2.1 Null Case approaches to PRO Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995: 116–121) well-known Minimalist approach to Control makes two novel assumptions: First, PRO is assumed to be associated not only with phi-features, but also with a null abstract Case feature; second, nonfinite I/T (of which English infinitival to and gerundive –ing are two examples) is assumed to check nouns only for null Case. The assumption that PRO is associated with phi-features is a familiar one – it follows generative tradition dating back to Postal (1970), as the discussion of Section 2.1.2 made clear. In support of this claim, however, Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 119) explicitly point to parallel contrasts of the type in (242) and (243) below. The contrast in grammaticality in (242a) and (242b) first shows that a predicative NP (here officers) must agree in phi-features (e.g., number) with its overt subject. The examples in (243a,b) then demonstrate that the same agreement relationship must obtain when a predicate nominal has a PRO subject, which may indicate that PRO is indeed associated with phi-features in the derivational component, although, as will be made clear in later chapters, the same facts can be made follow from both Raising and implicit argument approaches to Control, as well as from an analysis of Control in which PRO has no phi-features in the syntax. (242)

a.

I want [them to be officers].

b. *They want [me to be officers]. (243)

a.

They want [PRO to be officers].

b. *I want [PRO to be officers]. In any case, if PRO is like other nominals in possessing phi-features, Chomsky & Lasnik note, then it is not at all implausible to suggest that it might likewise be associated with a second nominal feature, namely, an abstract Case feature. More precisely, being the “minimal” nominal argument (one lacking independent phonetic, referential, and other properties), they hypothesize that PRO is the only noun bearing “null” Case. Furthermore, they suggest that null Case is checked only by correspondingly “minimal” inflectional elements (those lacking tense and agreement), such as English infinitival to and gerundive –ing. In this way, Chomsky & Lasnik’s analysis continues to account for the fact that PRO is attested in the subject position of nonfinite clauses like (244), but not in contexts of the types in (245). Specifically, PRO is able to check its null Case feature via Spec-head agreement with to and –ing in (244a,b), but is unable to check the Nominative, Accusative, or Dative Cases in (245a–c).

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(244) a.

Sarah neglected [PRO to tell me about the incident].

b. I highly recommend [PRO taking the exam today, not tomorrow]. (245)

a.

They certified [that she/*PRO is fit for duty].

b. He saw them/*PRO. c.

Patty sent some pictures to them/*PRO.

This novel approach to PRO raises two questions that were subsequently addressed by authors like Martin (1992, 2001), Watanabe (1993), and Bošković (1996, 2007). The first, originally pointed out by Watanabe (1993), but later explored in Martin (2001: 144–146) and Bošković (1996, 2007: 89–92), is this: If morphologically nonfinite I/T invariably checks null Case, then why are the examples in (246) ungrammatical and those in (247) grammatical? That is, the Raising verbs seem, appear, and happen, as well as the ECM verbs certify, expect, believe, and consider also select clausal complements headed by infinitival to, yet nonfinite I/T in these cases unexpectedly does not license PRO. Instead, phonetically overt NPs are licensed either via NP Movement to the matrix Spec IP/TP (247a) or by Accusative Case checking by the matrix AgrO/Tr head (247b). In other words, Chomsky & Lasnik’s theory, as it stands, cannot account for which nonfinite I/Ts check null Case and which do not.22

22 As Martin (2001: 144, ft. 10) acknowledges, it has been known since Rizzi (1978: 150), Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37), and Kayne (1981b: 352, ft. 7) that French and Italian sentences parallel to the English examples in (246a,b) in the text are fully grammatical: (i) Il me semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had solved that problem.’ (ii) Je certifie [PRO avoir lu les exceptions à cette garantie]. I certify to-have read the exceptions to this guarantee ‘I certify having read the exceptions to this guarantee.’ Furthermore, Sabine Iatridou (p.c.) has brought to my attention the existence of English examples like (iii) below, in which the I/T of the complement clause of seem actually licenses PRO, contrasting, in this respect, with (246a) in the text: (iii) [PRO to seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be correct]] is a common flaw. We will return to the issues raised by such data later in this section, as well as in Chapters 4, 6, and 7.

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*It seems to John [PRO to have solved the problem].

b. *They certified [PRO to be fit for duty]. (247)

a.

She seems to John [(she) to have solved the problem].

b. They certified [her to be fit for duty]. A second, not unrelated issue is discussed in depth by Bošković (1996, 2007). Namely, at no point in their development of a null Case approach to PRO do Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) explicitly take a position as to the exact form(s) a Control clausal complement may or must take. As the reader may recall, earlier generative theories had assumed that Control complements invariably take the form of a CP, first on grounds of simplicity, later on the basis of empirical facts involving, among other things, indirect questions, and, finally, on theoryinternal grounds (i.e., the fact the PRO must be ungoverned). Given the paradigm in (248) below, this hypothesis would appear to be being maintained in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995). That is, in (248a), the verb try must check the Accusative Case feature of its direct object. Therefore, a difference in c-selection (namely, selection for CP) is apparently required in order to block the same Accusative Case checking from obtaining in an ECM-style configuration like (248b). As we will see shortly, Bošković (1996, 2007) asks the logical question of whether this assumption is really necessary, arguing, in fact, that the mechanism of c-selection should be dispensed with entirely. (248) a.

You really should try something new once in awhile.

b. *Dorothy tried [her team to win]. So let us begin by considering the answer that Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007) provide to the question “Which types of nonfinite I/T check null Case?”. Both authors take as their point of departure an idea originally put forth (in GB terms) in Stowell (1982). Stowell (1982: 562–563, 565–568) argues that infinitival Control complement clauses consistently differ from both infinitival ECM and Raising structures in that only the former are associated with an independent semantic tense. In other words, Stowell makes the claim that, although all three types of embedded clauses are morphologically uninflected for tense, infinitival Control structures are unique in being covertly associated with one. The following examples, many of which were drawn directly from Stowell (1982), illustrate this claim.

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(249) a.

Jenny remembered [PRO to bring the wine].

b. Jim tried [PRO to lock the door]. c. (250) a.

You gotta have a lot of nerve [PRO to talk to someone like that]! Bill considers [himself to be the smartest].

b. I expected [John to win the race].

(251)

c.

I remember [John to be the smartest].

a.

Cindy appears/seems/happens [(Cindy) to like poker].

b. At least one surgeon needs [(at least one surgeon) to be on call tomorrow night]. In each of the infinitival Control structures in (249), the understood tense of the embedded clause is distinct from that of the matrix verb in exactly the same way; namely, the event denoted by the embedded clause is understood to be in an unrealized (quasi-futurative) tense vis-à-vis the time at which the matrix event is understood to hold. I.e., in (249a), Jenny has not yet brought the wine at the past time at which she remembers to do so; in (249b), Jim’s possibly locking the door is subsequent to his attempt to do so; and in (249c), the individual referred to by the pronoun you must first have a lot of nerve before s/he can talk to someone else in a bold fashion. In contrast, Stowell notes that in the ECM (250) and Raising (251) structures, the events denoted by the embedded clauses are realized at various times that are primarily determined by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb: In the examples in (250a) and (251a), the meaning of the verbs consider, appear, and so on is such that time of the matrix and embedded clauses are necessarily understood to be concurrent (in these particular examples, both are in the same present tense). In (250b), the meaning of expect is such that the time of the embedded clause is necessarily understood to be futurative with respect to the time of the matrix, while in (251b), the meaning of need is such that the same futurative ordering is allowed, and, in fact, entailed by the addition of the adverbial tomorrow night. Finally, in (250c), the meaning of remember is such that its complement clause is understood as past relative to the tense of the matrix, i.e. it temporally precedes the matrix event time (which is itself in the present). In all cases, however, the embedded clause is analyzed as lacking independent tense: this aspect of the meaning of the sentence is primarily determined by the meaning of the matrix verb.

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More formally, Stowell (1982: 563, 566–568) proposes that the independent “unrealized/quasi-future” tense that he argues is consistently associated with infinitival Control clauses is introduced by a temporal operator located in the embedded C. Since ECM and Raising structures are generally assumed in generative circles to involve IP (not CP) complementation, they are predicted to lack an independent temporal operator, which is why their understood tense is determined for the most part by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. In further support of this proposal, Stowell (1982: 562–563) argues that it explains why gerundive Control clauses differ from infinitival ones with respect to their temporal properties. That is, a gerund like (252b) below contrasts with its Control counterpart, given in (252a), in that the former clearly lacks a CP projection, as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of indirect questions such as (253b). (252)

a.

Honestly, I just didn’t remember [PRO to do it].

b. At the time, I honestly didn’t remember [PRO doing it]. (253)

a.

I didn’t remember [what PRO to do (what)].

b. *I didn’t remember [what PRO doing (what)]. Since gerundive Control structures, like ECM and Raising structures, lack a C to host a temporal operator, they are predicted to also lack the independent quasi-future tense, a prediction that is borne out by the contrasting temporal properties associated with (254a) and (254b) below, as well as the parallel one in (255a,b). That is, infinitival Control structures like (254a) and (255a) are understood to be in an “unrealized” or “quasi-future” tense with respect to the tense of the matrix verb; however, their gerundive counterparts clearly are not. In these latter cases, the understood tense of the embedded clause is determined by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. I.e., in (254b), both clauses are in the past and the event denoted by the embedded clause is understood to have temporally preceded the matrix one (because one can only remember something that has already happened). On the other hand, in (255b), the meaning of the matrix verbal expression have a lot of nerve is such that the two clauses can be understood to hold at the same (present) time. (254) a.

Jenny remembered [PRO to bring the wine].

b. Jenny remembered [PRO bringing the wine]. (255)

a.

You gotta have a lot of nerve [PRO to talk to me like that]!

b. You gotta have a lot of nerve [PRO talking to me like that]!

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Martin (1992, 2001: 146–152) and later Bošković (1996, 2007: 89–90) maintain Stowell’s proposal that infinitival Control clauses are semantically [+tense], but substantially modify other aspects of his analysis. First, they suggest that it is not C that encodes the tense of Control infinitives, but rather to and non-overt gerundive I/T. (The reader will recall that the mechanics of Stowell’s analysis were designed explicitly to treat gerundive Control clauses as being [-tense].) More specifically, Bošković and Martin propose that every I/T that is semantically [+tense] must check Case. However, only I/Ts that are both [+tense, +finite] (i.e. semantically tensed and morphologically inflected) check Nominative Case; those that are [+tense, -finite] (i.e. semantically tensed, but morphologically uninflected) check null Case. Finally, I/Ts that are both [-tense, -finite] (i.e. semantically untensed and morphologically uninflected) do not check Case at all. In this fashion, Bošković and Martin are able to explain why the I/Ts of complements to Raising and ECM verbs do not check null Case, while those of Control complement clauses do. However, Martin (2001: 148–150) and Bošković (2007: 91–92) note and attempt to address two empirically distinct problems that arise under this Minimalist reinterpretation of Stowell (1982), both of which relate to their key claim that Control clauses are consistently [+tense], while the complement clauses of ECM and Raising verbs are always [-tense]. The first, we will see, is due to a flaw in Stowell’s original database; the second follows from Bošković and Martin’s novel assumption that even gerundive Control clauses are [+tense]. Looking at the first issue, certain facts pointed out in Karttunen (1971), who himself cites Huddleston (1969) for similar data, clearly indicate that there are infinitival Control clauses that are not interpreted as being in an “unrealized/ quasi-futurative” tense with respect to the tense of the matrix verb as Stowell (1982) believed. Karttunen (1971) specifically discusses the case of implicative verbs, among them lexemes like dare and remember and phrases like take the time and see fit that have the semantic property of committing the speaker to the truth of their complement clause in the affirmative, but to its falsity in the negative, and to neither its truth nor its falsity in their interrogative and conditional forms.23 The Control complement clauses selected by certain implicative 23 In the text, I have elected to illustrate this problem only with affirmative implicative verbs – verbs like manage, dare, happen to, take time to, etc., which, as indicated in the text, entail the truth of the complement clause in the affirmative and its falsity when the matrix verb is negated. The same problem arises, however, with respect to the class of negative implicative verbs – verbs like forget, fail, and decline, which Karttunen (1971: 352–354) shows entail the falsity of the complement clause in the affirmative and its truth in the negative. (With both subclasses of implicatives, the truth value of the complement is indeterminate in interrogative and conditional sentences.)

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verbs, examples of which are given below in (256), clearly contrast in their temporal properties with the types of verbs Stowell (1982) discusses, some additional examples of which are given in (257). Namely, Karttunen (1971: 346, 349) notes that the matrix and embedded clauses in the case of the implicatives in (256) are both understood to hold at the same past time. In this respect, of course, these implicatives differ markedly from the verbs Stowell discusses, in which the embedded clause is in an unrealized/quasi-future with respect to the time of the matrix verb. (256) a.

Kate managed [PRO to solve the problem] just as the bell went off.

b. During the meeting, Megan had the sense [PRO to say nothing].

(257)

c.

Throughout the interrogation, Cindy was careful [PRO to reveal nothing].

a.

Before we arrived, we agreed [PRO to leave the party around 11:00].

b. We originally planned [PRO to leave the party at 11:00]. c.

We have decided [PRO to leave for the party in about two hours].

Martin (1992: 149) adds to these problematic data by making the novel observation that the exact same problem is posed by all factive Control verbs (verbs which Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970: 148, 150–151) and others have shown have the semantic property of presupposing the truth of their complement clauses; i.e. entailing it in their affirmative, negative, interrogative, and conditional forms). In the factive examples in (258) below, the understood tense of the matrix and embedded clauses is clearly concurrent; in no way is the embedded clause “unrealized” or “quasi-futurative” with respect to the tense of the matrix. Instead, the temporal properties of these Control structures actually appear parallel to those of certain Raising and ECM verbs, as made clear by a comparison of the factives in (258) with the ECM structures in (259) and the Raising examples in (260). (258) a.

I was glad/proud/lucky [PRO to see my parents].

b. It pleased/amused/bothered me [PRO to see my parents]. (259) a.

Bill considers [himself to be the smartest].

b. I find [him amusing].

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(260) a.

John appears [(John) to like poker].

b. Three people happen [(three people) to be here right now]. In short, it is clear that Stowell’s (1982) claim that infinitival Control clauses are systematically in a quasi-futurative tense vis-à-vis the tense of the matrix verb is incorrect. Therefore, one must either redefine the “tense” of Control I/T; i.e., determine just what that tense actually is, or reject the notion that the I/Ts of Control clauses are tensed, an equally plausible position given that the data have shown that certain ECM and Raising verbs appear to exhibit exactly the same temporal relations with respect to their complement clauses as do certain Control verbs. Bošković and Martin also attempt to address a second problem that is faced by their proposal that all Control clauses are [+tense], one that is of a similar nature, although it involves structurally distinct gerundive forms. Namely, as was noted above, Martin (2001: ft. 19) and Bošković (2007: ft. 8) must assume, contra Stowell (1982), that gerundive I/T is also [+tense] since otherwise their analysis offers no principled reason why only the I/T of Control clauses checks null Case. However, as we pointed out earlier, Stowell had noted that gerundive I/T is unlike infinitival I/T in its exact temporal properties since the infinitival Control clauses in (a) variants of (261)–(262) are distinct from those of their gerundive counterparts in the (b) examples. I.e., the infinitival Control clauses discussed by Stowell all involve embedded clauses in a quasi-future tense with respect to the tense of the matrix, while their gerundive counterparts clearly do not, again raising the question of just what the tense of null Case I/T might be. (261)

a.

Jenny remembered [PRO to bring the wine].

b. Jenny remembered [PRO bringing the wine]. (262)

a.

You gotta have a lot of nerve [PRO to talk to me like that]!

b. You gotta have a lot of nerve [PRO talking to me like that]! This type of problem can be further supplemented by considering the case of the implicative verb get, which Reed (2011) has argued is lexically ambiguous, possessing a small clause (ECM-type) entry, as in (263a), a Control entry (263b), and a Raising structure (263c):24

24 As early as Chomsky (1980: 28), verbs like believe, consider, find, and so on came to be known as “ECM” or Exceptional Case Marking verbs because they contrast with other verbs taking clausal complements containing an embedded to in requiring a phonetically overt

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(263)

a.

105

Our investigation has established that John deliberately got [himself hit by the truck].

b. Our investigation has established that John deliberately got [PRO hit by the truck]. c.

Some important documents got [(some important documents) lost in the move].

In all of the preceding examples, the understood time of the embedded verb is the same as that of the matrix verb get, in a fashion seemingly parallel to what one finds with respect to the small clause (ECM-type) use of the verb make and the Control verb force in (264): (264) a.

I made [him eat his vegetables].

b. I forced him [PRO to eat his vegetables]. Given this, it is difficult to see how the tense of the I/T of the clausal complement selected by Control get differs from that of the ECM or Raising use of the verb: It seems plausible to maintain that in all cases the embedded clause lacks tense; its understood tense is determined primarily by the meaning of the verb selecting it. The fact that make has an ECM use and force a Control one seems to reinforce this conclusion: The temporal relations between the matrix and embedded clauses are the same, but the complementation type differs. So how, then, does the former determine the latter? The very same problem appears to arise when one more closely examines the facts involving Raising verbs like seem. As noted above, Martin (2001: 144– 145) cites the example repeated below in (265) as problematic for Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995) analysis because their analysis cannot explain why the embedded I/T fails to license PRO. His (and Bošković’s) alternative account is claimed to resolve this issue: Raising verbs, by definition, s-select a complement clause that is [-tense] and only [+tense] to can check (null) Case. embedded subject NP in the complement, as exemplified by an example like (259a) in the text. In Stowell (1983: 297), the class of verbs associated with this property was extended to include small clause selecting verbs (which contrast with ECM verbs in lacking an embedded to), among them, find, make, and hear, as in (259b). For the purposes of this work, ECM and small clause selecting verbs are treated on a par since both have been argued in Chomsky (1998, 1999, 2001) to involve Case and phi-feature checking/valuation by the matrix AgrO/Tr head. I.e., these two types of verb classes are assumed here to be distinguished in respectively c-selecting IP/TP versus vP/predicative AP/PP, etc. complement clauses.

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*It seems to John [PRO to have solved the problem].

The grammaticality of examples like (266) below, however, raises obvious problems for this view: Here the I/T of the complement clause of seem now licenses PRO, yet the temporal relations between the matrix and embedded clauses are the same as in other examples in which PRO is not licensed. (266)

PRO to seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be in the right] is a common flaw.

Parallel examples attested in the Romance languages in Rizzi (1978: 150), Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37), and Kayne (1981b: 352, ft. 7) make the same point. (267)

Il me semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had solved that problem.’

In other words, contexts in which a verb meaning seem licenses PRO are by no means rare, which again makes it difficult to see how the I/T of a clausal complement selected by a Control verb differs in tense from that of a clausal complement selected by an ECM or Raising verb. It seems plausible to maintain that in all cases the embedded clause lacks tense; its understood tense is determined primarily by the meaning of the verb selecting it. Karttunen (1971: 346, 349, ft. 4), in fact, had earlier embraced just such a view with respect to the “tense” of implicatives in the infinitive. Specifically, he had proposed that the entire class of implicative verbs contrasts with that of non-implicatives in that in the former case the tense (and other semantic properties) of the matrix sentence are lexically specified to be shared by the complement clause. He notes that this explains why one finds contrasts between implicatives and non-implicatives like the ones in (268a,b) below, due originally to Huddleston (1969). That is, the lexical semantics of implicatives is such that the past tense of the matrix verb is “copied” onto the tense of the embedded clause, accounting for the ungrammaticality of a futurative adjectival like next week’s, while the meaning of non-implicatives like (268b) is such that different temporal relations are lexically specified to obtain, allowing futurative modifiers. (268) a. *Yesterday, three people remembered/managed/happened [PRO to attend next week’s meeting]. b. Yesterday, three people agreed/promised/were eager [PRO to attend next week’s meeting].

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As for the relative orderings that may exist within the shared time frame – i.e., the temporal relations that Stowell observed with respect to implicatives like remember, which distinguish them from other implicatives like manage – these are logically due to further subtle lexical specifications that exist across this class of lexical items. Rather than adopt this “tenseless” approach to infinitives, however, Martin (2001: 149) and Bošković (2007: 91) seek to maintain their account of the licensing of PRO by proposing that Control complement clauses do differ from Raising and ECM structures with respect to the feature [+tense]; however, that tense does not uniquely correspond to an unrealized futurative, as Stowell assumed. Instead, they suggest, in a fashion similar to Postal (1970), discussed in Section 2.1.2 above, that infinitival to should be analyzed as a type of modal whose meaning roughly corresponds to would in most instances, although it is best paraphrased by should in a few others. (The contrasting meaning of -ing is not discussed.) In other words, the “slippery” meaning of these covertly tensed infinitives is argued to be parallel to that of other modals whose precise semantics is as yet poorly understood. For example, Enç (1996), Martin (2001: 149) notes, has argued that English will can encode not only the future “tense,” as it does in (269a), but also a notion of epistemic necessity, as in (269b), and even one of dispositional necessity (269c). (269) a.

After the movie, we’ll have a snack.

b. Don’t call now – Pat will be sleeping. c.

Sue’s like that: she’ll just argue with you for no reason at all.

While such a position might be viewed as circular, given that the preceding discussion has made it clear that the very same logic could be extended to the varying “tense” of ECM and Raising verbs, Martin (2001) and Bošković (2007) argue that it is supported by a series of independent tests that are sensitive to the contrasting temporal properties of Control and ECM/Raising verbs. In particular, Martin (2001: 150–151) and Bošković (2007: 90) first suggest that Control verbs consistently differ from ECM and Raising ones in that only the former accept embedded eventive predicates in the simple infinitive, as illustrated by the contrasting grammaticality of (270) and (271). (270) a.

The BGs tried their best [PRO to win the banner].

b. The doctor asked Bill [PRO to take his medicine every day].

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a.

*Geno believed [Rebecca to win the game].

b. *The defendant seems to the DA [to steal the car]. To explain, Enç (1991) argues that eventive predicates like win the banner contrast with statives, such as be the winner, in that the former contain event variables that must be bound by a tense or modal/temporal operator. (The have and be of inflected infinitives are treated as examples of such operators.) Since Bošković and Martin treat Control I/T as being [+tense], Enç’s condition on eventive predicates is met in (270a,b), accounting for their well-formedness. As the to of ECM and Raising verbs is analyzed by these same authors as being [-tense], her condition is not satisfied in (271a,b). As appealing as this claim initially appears to be, it faces two sorts of empirical problems that bear pointing out. First, there are instances in which a “tenseless” small clause (ECM-type) structure does accept an embedded eventive predicate. Some examples have been given below in (272). If the embedded I/T of an ECM/small clause verb is indeed [-tense] and eventive predicates require tense to bind their event variables, then one would logically expect these examples to be as ungrammatical as the one in (271a). (272)

a.

They got [her to bring the wine].

b. They made/let [me bring the wine]. Second, if the I/T of inflected infinitives like (273) is [+tense], as Martin (2001) and Bošković (2007: ft. 9) must assume in order to account for the grammaticality of an eventive predicate in such examples, then why does that [+tense] I/T fail to check either Nominative or null Case, as indicated by the ungrammaticality of the examples in (274)? That is, their analysis crucially assumes that [+tense] I/T checks Case, yet this claim appears to be falsified by (274a,b). (273)

a.

John believed [Peter to have won the race].

b. John believed [Peter to be bringing the beer]. (274)

a.

*John believed [he to have won the race].

b. *John believed [PRO to be winning the race]. Martin (2001: 153–155) and Bošković’s (2007: 90) second independent test for the tense of Control I/T involves VP-Ellipsis. Following Lobeck (1990) and Saito

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& Murasugi (1990), they first assume that only functional heads that undergo some sort of overt or covert specifier-head agreement relationship license an empty complement, accounting (among other things) for the contrasting grammaticality of (275a,b) below:25 (275)

a.

Mary likes hot dogs and [Peter does e too].

b. *Mary believes Peter to like hot dogs, but Anne believes [John to e]. That is, the tensed I/T does in (275a) overtly agrees with (and checks the Nominative Case feature of ) the subject NP in its Spec, licensing VP-ellipsis. However, untensed I/T in the ECM structure in (275b) does not overtly or covertly undergo agreement with the subject in its Spec and ellipsis is therefore not permitted. As Martin (2001: 153–155) and Bošković (2007: 90) point out, their proposal that the I/T of Control complement clauses is [+tensed], and hence undergoes covert agreement and null Case checking with an argument in its Spec, makes the correct prediction that VP-Ellipsis is licit in Control structures like (276): (276)

a.

I’m not sure that I can ski, but I’ll try [PRO to e].

b. I love to swim, but my husband hates [PRO to e]. c.

I didn’t think Sarah would finish her project on time, but she managed [PRO to e].

Despite its initial appeal, this test too is not without problems. Specifically, authors like Lakoff (1971: 156), Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 553–554), and Reed (2011: 50) have noted that that English causative get is a Control verb, as indicated, among other things, by the licitness of agent-oriented manner adverbials like the one in (277): 25 The acceptability of VP-Ellipsis with the non-Control use of verbs of the want class initially appears problematic for Bošković and Martin’s claim that the I/T of infinitival non-Control verbs is [-tense] and hence fails to undergo an agreement (and Case checking) relation with an argument in its Spec: (i) I know that you’d like to climb Mt. Everest, but I don’t want [you to e]. As will be made clear later in this section, however, Bošković and Martin do put forth an account of the grammaticality of such examples. Namely, Bošković (2007: 96) follows Watanabe (1993) in assuming that that you in examples like the preceding undergoes a covert agreement (and Accusative Case checking) relation with a non-overt for in the embedded I/T that subsequently moves to C. (Martin (2001: 156–157) puts forth a similar proposal.)

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John deliberately got [PRO hit by a truck]. (Paraphrase of John deliberately got himself hit by a truck.)

Given that PRO is licensed by a non-overt [+tense] I/T in causative get constructions like (277), one would expect to find that VP-Ellipsis is licensed with this verb as well. That is, the [+tense] I/T of the embedded clause should agree with PRO, generating (278): (278) *John deliberately got hit by a truck and Peter deliberately got [PRO e too]. Martin (2001: 152–153) offers a third test for the tense of I/T in Control clauses based on verb raising in Icelandic. He begins by noting, following Thráinsson (1984) and Holmberg (1986), that Icelandic is a language, like French, in which finite main verbs and auxiliaries must overtly raise to I/T, as evidenced by the obligatory linear ordering V + Negation exemplified by the following examples: (279)

a.

. . . að Maria las ekki bókina. COMP Maria read not the-book

b. *. . . að Maria ekki las bókina. COMP Maria not read –the-book Martin then notes, following Thráinsson (1984), that Control infinitives in Icelandic also undergo obligatory verb raising pre-Spell-Out, as demonstrated by the word order in (280), while ECM (281) and Raising (282) infinitives, Holmberg (1986) has shown, do not: (280)

a. Maria lofaði [að lesa ekki bókina]. Maria promised COMP read not the-book ‘Maria promised not to read the book.’ b. *Maria lofaði [að ekki lesa bókina]. Maria promised COMP not read the-book ‘Maria promised not to read the book.’

(281) a.

Ég taldi [Mariu ekki lesa bókina]. I believed Maria not read the-book ‘I believed Maria not to have read the book.’

b. *Ég taldi [Mariu lesa ekki bókina]. I believed Maria read not the-book ‘I believed Maria not to have read the book.’

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a. Maria virtist [(Maria) ekki lesa bokina]. Maria seemed not read the-book ‘Maria seemed not to read the book.’ b. *Maria virtist [(Maria) lesa ekki bokina]. Maria seemed read not the-book ‘Maria seemed not to read the book.’

Martin (2001: 153) suggests that this contrast between Control and ECM/ Raising constructions follows straightforwardly from his proposal that only Control I/T is [+tense]. That is, Move is obligatory in (280a) because of the [+tense] feature of Control I/T. However, Last Resort blocks it in the case of the [-tense] feature of ECM and Raising I/T in (281) and (282). While agreeing with Martin that the structure of Control and Raising/ECM differs in some way, it is by no means obvious that this difference lies in a contrasting [+/-tense] feature. Such a proposal would, for example, leave unexplained the fact, noted by Pollock (1989: 374) and others, that Control clauses in other V-raising languages, like French, do not allow overt Verb Movement, as demonstrated by the contrast in word order in the Icelandic example in (277a) above with its French counterpart in (283a) below: (283) a. *Marie a promis de ne lire pas le livre. Marie has promised of Neg to-read not the book ‘Marie has promised not to read the book.’ b.

Marie a promis de ne pas lire le livre. Marie has promised of Neg not to-read the book ‘Marie has promised not to read the book.’

As a final independent test for the tense of Control infinitives, Bošković (2007: 91) suggests that Control verbs systematically s-select for “Irrealis” complement clauses, which are clauses whose truth is left unspecified at the time of the utterance, making it impossible to predicate truth or falsity of them, as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of (284a–c) below: (284) a.

*John tried to play football, which was false.

b. *John managed to bring the beer, which was false. c.

*John was pleased to see his parents, which was false.

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In this respect, Control verbs are claimed to differ from ECM (and, implicitly, Raising) verbs, which do not s-select Irrealis I/T, and hence allow truth or falsity to be predicated of them, as in (285): (285)

John believed/judged Peter to be a wise man, which was false.

The soundness of this diagnostic can likewise be called into question, first, by the grammaticality of Control sentences like (286), in which truth or falsity can be predicated of the complement clause, and, secondly, by the ungrammaticality of ECM/small clause structures like (287) in which truth or falsity cannot be predicated of the complement clause. Clearly, some factor other than [+/-tense] determines when truth or falsity can be predicated of a given complement clause. (286)

Donna claimed to speak Japanese, which was false.

(287) *Jenny made us go to bed early, which was false. To summarize the discussion thus far, Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007) offer a substantially modified version of Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995) original null Case approach to the licensing of PRO by suggesting that the I/T of Control clauses systematically differs from that of the complement clauses selected by both Raising and ECM/small clause verbs. The former types of clauses are said to be associated with an I/T that encodes its own specific, yetto-be-determined modality, while the latter are tenseless: Their understood tense is largely determined by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. In this way, there is no need to stipulate which I/Ts check null Case. Although this hypothesis covers a wide range of facts in an interesting new way, the fundamental claim that the I/T of Control clauses is [+tense] while that of the clauses selected by ECM/small clause and Raising verbs is [-tense] was argued here to lack force: There remains no definition of just what the tense of Control I/T is and there are no sound independent tests to detect it. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how future research could fill these gaps since identical temporal relations can be found across various Control, ECM/small clause, and Raising verbs, indicating that one could just as easily claim that all uninflected verbal clauses are [-tense] – the lexical semantics of the matrix verb contributes greatly to the tense ultimately understood to be associated with the embedded clause in each case. This problem was made particularly clear by the fact that even verbs that are usually treated as “Raising,” “ECM,” or “Control” may (sometimes under very limited conditions) select a distinct clausal complement type, as the English verb

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get does in (263a–c) above, as seem/sembler does in the examples in (266)–(267), and as the normally Control verb remember does in (288b). (288) a.

I distinctly remember [PRO doing that].

b. I distinctly remember [myself doing that]. In short, it seems clear that a simple [+/-tense] feature based on the meaning of a matrix verb will prove insufficient to predict when I/T checks null Case and when it does not. Having considered which types of I/T are standardly assumed to license PRO, let us turn to a second question: What type(s) of clausal complements do Control verbs select? As noted above, this issue is considered in detail in Bošković (1996, 2007), who seeks to demonstrate that under the revised null Case approach to PRO, there is no longer any need to arbitrarily specify the types of complement clauses selected by Control, Raising, and ECM/small clause verbs. In other words, Bošković argues that the notion of c-selection can be entirely eliminated from the grammar. To briefly explain just how he attempts to achieve this, consider first ECM structures of the type in (289): (289)

Will believes [XP her/*PRO to be a good person].

Under previous GB accounts, it was assumed that ECM verbs like believe arbitrarily c-select for an IP complement, licensing only lexical NPs, not PRO, given the assumption of Chomsky (1981) that PRO is subject to both Principles A and B of the Binding Theory; i.e., PRO must be ungoverned. Under the revised null Case approach to PRO, Bošković (1996, 2007: 92) points out, arbitrary c-selection is no longer needed to account for this paradigm. Lexical NPs will be licensed in ECM structures like (289) only if the category XP happens to take the form of IP/TP, not CP, since otherwise movement of the embedded subject to the matrix AgrOP, necessary for uninterpretable feature checking, will involve improper movement through the embedded Spec of CP. On the other hand, the ungrammaticality of the PRO variant in (289) will follow regardless of whether XP takes the form of IP/TP or CP since ECM verbs like believe fail to s-select for Irrealis ([+tense]) clausal complements. Hence, PRO’s null Case feature will remain unchecked. In short, independent mechanisms of the grammar related to Case feature checking account for the paradigm in (289) without the need to invoke arbitrary c-selection. The same is true, Bošković (2007: 92–93) argues, with respect to the standard distributional facts involving Raising verbs provided below in (290) if one makes

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the two following assumptions. First, Raising verbs are syntactically intransitive in the sense of Bowers (2002) (i.e., such verbs are not dominated by a TrP/AgrOP and so do not check Accusative Case). Secondly, like ECM/small clause verbs, Raising verbs not s-select Irrealis complement clauses. In other words, these types of verbs are also semantically incompatible with clausal complements containing an I/T capable of checking null Case. (290) a.

John appears [XP (John) to like Mary].

b. *It appears to John [XP PRO to like Mary]. Given these assumptions, the facts in (290a,b) follow without reference to the notion of c-selection. Specifically, in (290a), the NP John will only be able to check its (Nominative) Case feature if XP happens to take the form of IP/TP since CP would again involve improper movement through its Spec. The various derivations that could be associated with (290b) will all crash regardless of whether XP takes the form of CP or IP/TP since PRO’s null Case feature will remain unchecked by the [-tense] I/T associated with the types of clauses s-selected by Raising verbs. Turning next to some of the standard Control paradigms, Bošković (2007: 93–94) again argues that an appeal to c-selection is unnecessary in order to account for data like (291a–c), all of which involve Control verbs of what Bošković labels the try-class, a group of verbs that also includes factive and implicative Control verbs, but not emotives such as want. (The want-class will be discussed shortly.) (291)

a.

Tim tried/hates/managed [XP PRO to clean up the house].

b. *Tim was tried [XP (Tim) to clean up the house]. c. *Tim tried [XP her to clean up the house]. In (291a), XP can take the form of IP/TP or CP since Control verbs s-select clausal complements containing a [+tense] to which checks PRO’s null Case feature. The sentence in (291b) is ungrammatical for one of two possible reasons, depending on one’s assumptions with respect to Case checking. First, under Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995) version of Minimalist Case-checking, the derivation in (291b) crashes because the NP Tim becomes ineligible for movement once an (incompatible) Case-checking relationship has been established between it and the embedded I/T. This example is, therefore, a violation of Last Resort.

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Following earlier work by Watanabe (1993), Martin (2001: 145–146, ft. 11) provides an alternative view, one that is adopted by Bošković (2007: 93, ft. 6). They attribute the ungrammaticality of (291b) to Tim’s being unable to check off both the (incompatible) null Case feature of the embedded I/T and the Nominative Case feature of the matrix I/T. That is, these authors assume that not only must an NP check off its own Case feature, but each functional head associated with Case must also check that feature off. Under this view, (291b) would violate the Principle of Full Interpretation since to’s null Case feature remains unchecked. Identical considerations account for (291c): The NP her either cannot undergo movement to the matrix AgrO/Tr once it has entered a (non-matching) Case checking relationship with to or because her cannot check off the null Case feature of to. The case of want-type verbs is much less clear. The relevant data are in (292): (292)

Jennifer doesn’t want [XP PRO/him to clean up the house].

Under Bošković’s (2007: 94–97) account, PRO is licensed in (292) because the type of clause s-selected by want contains a to that is [+tense] and hence can check PRO’s null Case regardless of whether XP takes the form of IP or CP. The lexical NP variant of (292) raises some interesting problems for the analysis, however. Namely, if the [+tense] to of embedded clauses like (292) checks null Case, and if the Case feature of a functional head must be checked, then it isn’t immediately obvious how a lexical NP could ever be licensed there. Drawing inspiration from earlier proposals in Watanabe (1993) and Martin (2001: 155–159), Bošković attempts to resolve this problem by assuming that Control verbs that refer to emotions differ from Control verbs of the try-class in that only the former optionally select for a particular lexical item (in this case, an overt or covert for) that is generated in I/T, where it checks Accusative Case with an argument in its Spec, and then undergoes movement to C. Such an analysis lacks appeal on a number of grounds – its resort to a distinct notion of l-selection, an unmotivated movement of for from the embedded I/T to the embedded C, Accusative Case checking by an element ( for) entering the derivation in I/T etc. Equally importantly, it entails the abandonment of the hypothesis that Control verbs always s-select a complement clause that contains a [+tense] I/T that checks null Case in favor of the weaker view that, for some reason, only non-emotive Control verbs do. Finally, it raises the issue of which Cases must be checked and which can apparently remain unchecked. For example, we saw earlier that in relation to sentences like the ones repeated below in (293) that ungrammaticality results if a functional head (here the embedded I/T) fails to check its Case:

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(293)

a.

*Tim was tried [XP (Tim) to clean up the house].

b. *Tim tried [XP her to clean up the house]. Yet want and try – clearly Accusative Case checkers, given the grammaticality of (294a,b) – do not check that that Case in examples like (295a,b): (294) a.

I want your letter of resignation by tomorrow.

b. You really should try something new once in awhile. (295) a.

I want [you to write a letter of resignation by tomorrow].

b. Tim is trying [PRO to finish his work]. Similarly, get checks Accusative Case in (296a,b), but doesn’t in (296c,d). (296) a.

I got a book yesterday at the library.

b. I got [him to leave early]. c.

Anne deliberately got [PRO hurt] to collect Workingmen’s Comp.

d. Those documents got [(those documents) lost in the move]. In short, a second novel feature of many modern Minimalist approaches to Control is that Control clauses may take the form of categories other than CP, with the choice being determined not arbitrarily, by a notion of c-selection, but by independent mechanisms of the grammar (conditions on proper movement, feature checking, and so on). The hypothesis that c-selection can be dispensed with, we have seen, is not without problems. It too will be a focus of discussion in later chapters, especially Chapter 6.

2.3.2.2 PRO as a Caseless NP In this section, we will take a look at an alternative Minimalist account of Control with theoretical features that will come to figure prominently in an analysis to be developed in Chapter 6. This is an approach briefly suggested in Bowers’ (2002: 206–209), according to which PRO lacks Case, as well as intrinsic phifeatures. Like Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002: 206–207) opens his discussion with the observation that the null Case approach to Control

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put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) is unable to provide a non-stipulative account of the grammaticality of ECM structures of the type in (297): (297)

You know that I consider [you to be a really good friend of mine], don’t you?

Specifically, Bowers notes that if one adopts the null hypothesis, then the to of complements to ECM (and Raising) verbs should be just like the to of Control complement clauses. Namely, it should behave as a probe associated with a bundle of uninterpretable null phi-features that must be deleted by virtue of undergoing an Agreement relation with a goal associated with matching interpretable phi-features. This Agreement relationship should result in the goal’s having its own uninterpretable Case feature valued for null Case. Since PRO is the only NP that can enter such an Agreement relation with to, the derivation in (297) should crash since to’s uninterpretable phi-features remain unchecked, to being unable to Agree with you. In short, unless one departs from the null hypothesis by stipulating that only certain to’s are associated with uninterpretable null phi-features that result in a valuation of NPs for null Case, Chomsky & Lasnik’s analysis offers no account of some of the well known distributional facts involving PRO and phonetically overt NPs. As we saw in the previous section, Bošković and Martin attempt to correct this flaw by semantically distinguishing ECM/Raising to from Control to – only the latter is semantically [+tense] and so only it values NPs for (null) Case. Bowers makes the much more radical suggestion that to is never a probe at all – it has no uninterpretable phi-features to check, nor does it value NPs for Case. The only feature it does have, Bowers assumes, is an EPP feature that may be checked without prior agreement. As for PRO, it too is analyzed as a syntactically “inactive” head. Specifically, it is treated as a non-expletive noun that has no Case feature requiring valuation, although it is associated with a bundle of unvalued agreement features. These features, however, are assumed to not be valued by Agree, but by either some sort of anaphoric relation or by the assignment of a default feature arb, perhaps in a spirit akin to Chomsky’s earlier On binding and LGB approaches to the reference of PRO, minus the assumption that PRO is a pronominal anaphor. (The reader is referred to Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.1 above for an overview of these proposals.) Bowers shows that the core data now follow provided that one additional (fairly standard) assumption is made. Namely, verbs contrast with respect to the presence or absence of a dominating phrase (call it AgrOP or, as Bowers

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prefers, Transitivity Phrase/TrP) whose head must undergo Agreement to value its own uninterpretable phi-features and which, by virtue of that same relationship, values the goal NP for Accusative Case.26 In other words, verbs differ in syntactic transitivity. More specifically, only verbs like hit, love, and so on head a VP that is dominated by a TrP or AgrOP. Others, like smile, laugh, and die, are not. Verbs of this latter sort are syntactically intransitive; i.e., are not dominated by a phrase whose head can value NPs for Accusative Case. Given this, the facts given below in (298a) now follow: An indicated in (298b), an ECM verb like consider is dominated by a TrP/AgroP headed by the probe Tr/AgrO that is associated with uninterpretable phi-features. This head must enter an Agreement relation with an NP intrinsically associated with interpretable phi-features, which Tr/AgrO will value for Accusative Case. In the lexical NP variant of (298a), these conditions are met. However, in the PRO variant, they are not since PRO is neither associated with interpretable phi-features, nor is it compatible with Accusative Case. In short, Tr/AgrO’s uninterpretable phi-features remain unchecked in the PRO variant of an ECM structure like (298a). (298) a.

I consider you/*PRO to be a really good friend of mine.

b. I [ v 0/Pr 0 consider [ AgrO/TrP you (consider) [VP (consider) [ IP/TP (you) . . .]]]] Incidentally, the reader will note that Bowers’ approach, like Bošković’s discussed above, does not entail the former GB assumption that ECM verbs obligatorily c-select for IP/TP: This fact could simply fall out from constraints on proper movement (CP would block the overt movement of the embedded subject, which is triggered by the need to check AgrO/Tr’s EPP feature), although, as we will soon see, Bowers himself does not adopt Bošković’s proposal. Turning to Control contexts like (299a) below, one finds the opposite distribution of NP types. These are, naturally, due to the absence of a Tr/AgrO head in the matrix clause, as indicated in (299b). That is, phonetically overt NPs like your team are associated with an uninterpretable Case feature that must become valued by virtue of entering an agreement relation with a Case-associated head. In (299b), there is no Tr/AgrO that could value your team for Accusative Case and to cannot value NPs for Case at all. Thus, the phonetically overt NP is unacceptable. On the other hand, since neither PRO nor to are associated with

26 As discussed in detail in Bowers (2002), the properties assumed to be associated with Tr do differ from those standardly associated with AgrO in passive and middle constructions. As those differences hold no implications for the issues discussed in this work, the terms Tr and AgrO will be used interchangeably.

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phi- or Case features that would require checking/valuation under Agreement, that derivation converges. PRO simply moves to the Spec of to to check the latter’s EPP feature. (299) a.

b.

You should at least try [*your team/PRO to play well in tonight’s game]. . . . [ v0/Pr 0 try [VP (try) [*your team/PRO to play well in tonight’s game]]].

Again, the reader may note that there appears to be no need to specify for c-selection of CP or IP/TP. Either option would seem to result in a convergent derivation. Here, however, Bowers (2002: 190, ft. 10) does take an explicit position: He argues, on the basis of contrasts like (300a–c), that certain Control verbs (like prefer) arbitrarily c-select for CP, while others (like try and persuade) select IP/TP. (300) a.

It is to drive racing cars that John prefers.

b. *It is to drive racing cars that John seems. c. *It is to drive racing cars that John tries. That is, on the basis of the contrast in (300a,b), Rizzi (1982) argues that CPs are phonetically isolable, whereas IP/TPs are not. Given the ungrammaticality of (300c), Bowers concludes that one must specify which Control verbs c-select which complement type. Before moving on to Bowers’ approach to Raising contexts, it perhaps bears mentioning in relation to Control ones like (299a) above that his analysis precludes a Movement derivation of the sort in (301) below. Just as he did in the preceding GB framework, Chomsky (1995) continues to assume (and Bowers with him) that movement from one thematic position to another is barred by the Theta Criterion. (301)

*Your team should at least try [(your team) to play well in tonight’s game].

Turning now to the standard Raising facts below in (302), these also follow: PRO is unable to Agree with the tensed I/T in the matrix clause since tensed I/T shares with Tr/AgrO the property of being associated with uninterpretable phifeatures requiring valuation by an intrinsically phi-associated NP, which PRO is not. On the other hand, lexical NPs like Cindy are licit since they are intrinsically

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associated with such features and so are able to undergo Agreement with tensed I/T. (302)

Cindy/*PRO seems [IP/TP (Cindy)/(PRO) to really enjoy sappy old movies].

In summary, Bowers (2002: 206–209) develops a radically different Minimalist approach to PRO, one that rejects Chomsky & Lasnik’s proposal that PRO is associated with (null) Case and a full set of phi-features. Instead, he shares with certain earlier researchers in the GB framework, namely Manzini (1983) and Bouchard (1984) (reviewed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 above), the opposing premise that PRO is Caseless and, with Bouchard, the idea that it lacks phifeatures in the computational component. In other words, it is the syntactic “inertness” of both PRO and infinitival/gerundive I/T that explains why these two types of elements are found together. Although Bowers’ (2002) analysis differs from standard null Case approaches in these important respects, it does share with Bošković’s (1996, 2007) analysis the assumption that there is no longer any need to assume that Control verbs uniquely c-select for CP. In some instances, Bowers (2002: ft. 10) argues, an arbitrary c-selection for IP/TP option is attested. Even here, however, Bowers departs from Bošković by rejecting the latter’s proposal that independent mechanisms involving proper movement and feature checking make the choice, not arbitrary c-selection. As one might anticipate, Bowers’ analysis is likewise not without problems. First, his proposal presently offers no account of the ungrammaticality of examples like (303) below: Here, PRO initially merges in a theta-position (not shown) and subsequently undergoes Move to check the EPP feature of a head (to) that is unassociated with any uninterpretable features that would require Agreement. (The insertion of expletive it should satisfy all of the checking requirements of the matrix tensed I/T, in a fashion parallel to the grammatical example in (304).) So just what makes the derivation in (303) crash? (303) *It seems to John [PRO to have solved the problem]. (304) It seems to John [that he had solved the problem]. Such unexpected restrictions on PRO are not limited to English examples like (303). They exist in other languages as well. For example, Bowers’ analysis offers no obvious account of the ungrammaticality of the French example in (305) on the expletive reading of il ‘it’:

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(305) *Il doit [PRO faire attention où on marche ici]. it must to-pay attention where one walks here ‘It’s necessary to watch one’s step when walking through here.’ Here too PRO initially merges in a theta-position and subsequently undergoes Move to check the EPP feature of an infinitival I/T that is unassociated with any uninterpretable features that would require Agreement. The insertion of expletive il ‘it’ should satisfy all of the checking requirement of the matrix tensed I/T, in a fashion parallel to the grammatical example in (306) below. So again just what makes a derivation like (305) crash? (306)

Il doit [y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques]. it must there to-have of-the soap in every the toilets public ‘By law, there must be soap in all public restrooms.’ Data drawn from Authier & Reed (2009: 40)

The fact that the French equivalent of seem (sembler) actually licenses PRO in a limited number of contexts, like the one in (307a), and that English seem in (307b) does so also, further complicates the issue: Here, Bowers’ analysis seems to make the correct predictions, but how can the grammatical examples in (307a,b) be reconciled with the ungrammatical ones in (303) and (305) above? (307)

a.

Il me semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had solved that problem.’

b.

PRO to seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be correct] is a common flaw.

Turning to a distinct type of empirical paradigm that is equally problematic for Bowers’ (and others’) analysis, consider the previously unnoticed fact that PRO and only certain phonetically overt NPs actually appear in the same syntactic environment, namely, gerundive contexts of the type in (308): (308) The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert. Bowers’ approach, like many others, is explicitly designed to (a) prevent any overlap in distribution between PRO and phonetically overt NPs and (b) treat all phonetically overt nouns on a syntactic par. The facts in (308) run counter to

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both assumptions, although the latter is much more problematic. Specifically, under Bowers’ analysis, all of the lexical NP variants in (308) should either be ungrammatical as a [-tense] I/T fails to value NPs for Case or they should all be grammatical because of valuation for “default” Case. Unfortunately, there is a split: non-pronominal NPs and PRO are licensed, but pronominal NPs are not.27 Why? Finally, Baltin (1995: 224), building on an observation originally made in Sportiche (1988: 444), notes that under both his predication approach to Q-float and a Sportiche-style stranding analysis, the contrast in grammaticality exemplified by Raising structures, such as (309a) below and Control sentences of the type in (309b) is problematic for the view, originally put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) and adopted by Bowers, that PRO checks an EPP feature in Spec of infinitival I/T. Specifically, under Baltin’s analysis of Q-Float, the ungrammaticality of (309b) indicates that infinitival to has no PRO subject; i.e., it is [-Predicative] and thus fails to meet the c-selection requirements of the preverb both. Alternatively, under a Sportiche-style “stranding” analysis, the ungrammaticality of (309b) would, again, only follow if movement of PRO to the Spec of infinitival to does not take place. To grammatically express the idea associated with (309b), the placement of the preverb must be post-to, as in (309c). (309) a.

They seemed [both (they) to have been betrayed (they) by their friends].

b. *[Both to be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous. c.

[To both be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous.

In short, under current accounts of Q-Float, the ungrammaticality of (309b) indicates that PRO does not move to Spec of infinitival I/T. This conclusion is further reinforced by separate Q-Float contrasts, specifically, those in (310a,b), which were originally observed in French by Sportiche (1988: 437–438). I.e., the ungrammaticality of (310b) seems to indicate that PRO does not even move to the embedded NegP position. (310) a.

They decided [to not all leave at the same time].

b. *They decided [to all not leave at the same time]. (*on the relevant sentential reading of the embedded not)

27 The fact that PRO and phonetically overt non-pronominal NPs exhibit an overlapping distribution in gerundive contexts has been previously noted, with respect to French and Italian, in Rizzi (1982: 163–164). However, to the best of my knowledge, the crucial fact that this overlap does not extend to pronominals (in French or English) has remained unnoticed until now.

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Of course, the reader may recall that separate facts involving binding, namely, grammatical examples of the type in (311), brought to my attention by Sabine Iatridou (p.c.), appear to indicate just the contrary: Here PRO certainly moves out of the embedded clause and into the matrix one since such a movement is necessary to provide the anaphor yourself with an antecedent, as required by Principle A. (311)

[PRO to seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be right]] is a common flaw.

Again, how can these apparently contradictory facts be reconciled? Chapters 5 and 6 will attempt to provide answers to these and other questions by developing a novel PRO analysis of Control that accepts Bowers’ hypotheses concerning syntactic in/transitivity, the featural make-up of PRO, and the need for arbitrary c-selection, while rejecting his assumptions regarding the featural make-up of non-pronominal NPs, the presence of an EPP feature in I/T, and the exact mechanisms involved in feature checking/valuation.

2.3.3 On structural case approaches to PRO Thus far, the discussion of this text has been limited to languages, such as English and French, in which Control seems to be limited to the surface subject position of an I/T that lacks full morphological inflection for tense, as demonstrated by the contrast between (312a,b) and (313): (312)

a.

I remembered [PRO to fix that error].

b. I remember [PRO fixing that error]. (313)

*I remember [that PRO fixed that error].

However, it has been well known since Iatridou (1993) that there are finite Control languages. That is, in languages like Albanian (Dobrovie-Sorin, 2001), Bulgarian (Krapova & Petkov, 1999), Greek (Iatridou, 1993; Varlokosta, 1993), and Hebrew (Landau, 2004), among others, the complement clause of a Control verb is fully inflected: the embedded I/T is in a subjunctive tense that is morphologically indistinguishable from either the present or the future (depending on the language) and it exhibits full person and number inflection, as illustrated by the Greek example in (314) below, drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 151):

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o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’

That the subject of such complement clauses is PRO, and not, say pro, has been argued by Varlokosta (1993), Landau (2004), and others, on the basis of parallels between the non-overt embedded subject of clauses of the type in (312) and their counterparts in ones like (314), respects in which these arguments do not pattern with overt or non-overt pronouns. For example, it has been well known since Rosenbaum (1967) that in English-type languages, one does not find PRO freely alternating with an overt non-pronominal NP, an alternation that is attested with overt pronouns, as demonstrated by the contrasts in (315): (315)

a.

John hopes [PRO/*George/*he to leave the party by 10:00].

b. John hopes [that *PRO/George/he will leave the party by 10:00]. Varlokosta (1993: 149–150) and others have shown that the same is true of the non-overt subject of the embedded clause selected by a Control verb in a finite Control language. Specifically, Varlokosta’s Modern Greek data in (316a,b) first show that the embedded subject of the complement clause of the verb meaning know (how to) must be non-overt, in a fashion parallel to the English infinitival clause in (315a). Her facts in (317a,b) then show that the equivalent of hope in this language does not exhibit this restriction, parallel to the English facts in (315b). These data offer strong support for the conclusion that indeed the subject of the embedded clause in (316a) is unambiguously PRO, whereas pro is licensed in (317a). (316) a.

o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’

b. *o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai o Giorgos]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing the George ‘John knows how George swims.’ (317)

a. o Yanis elpizi [na figi]. the John hopes Particle leaves-3-sing ‘John hopes that he will leave.’ b. o Yanis elpizi [na figi i Maria]. the John hopes Particle leaves-3-sing Mary-Nom ‘John hopes that Mary will leave.’

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Lebeaux (1985: 350), Varlokosta (1993: 149–150), and others have noted that overt pronominals also differ from Obligatory Control PRO in that only the latter requires a c-commanding antecedent, as made clear by the contrasts in (318): (318) a.

Jennifer i’s brother said [that shei/k still has a lot of work to do].

b. *John’s sister expects [PRO to shave himself ]. (cf. John expects to shave himself.) The same, Varlokosta (1993: 148–150) and others have shown, is true of the non-overt embedded subject of a complement clause to a Control verb in a finite Control language. Specifically, an example like (319a) below is acceptable only on the reading in which the matrix subject and the embedded subject are coreferential. However, a sentence like (319b), in which a pro embedded subject is licensed, allows a reading in which these two arguments are disjoint in reference. (319) a.

b.

o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ o Yanis elpizi [na figi]. the John hopes Particle leaves-3-sing ‘John i hopes that hei/j will leave.’

Thirdly, Lebeaux (1985: 351), Varlokosta (1993: 149–150), and others have noted that PRO differs from overt pronouns in that only the former does not allow a strict reading under VP-Ellipsis, as the examples in (320) make clear: (320) a.

John i hopes [that he i will leave early] and Bill does too. (The “strict” reading, in which Bill also hopes that John will leave early, is available.)

b. John hopes [PRO to leave early] and Bill does too. (The “strict” reading, in which Bill also hopes that John will leave early, is unavailable.) One again finds parallel facts in finite Control languages, as Varlokosta’s (1993: 148–150) data in (321a,b) below demonstrate with respect to Greek. Specifically, a pro subject is licensed in the complement clause of the Greek equivalent of hope, as made clear by the parallel ambiguities exhibited by (321a) below and

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(320a) above. However, the Greek equivalent of a clause containing the matrix verb know (how to) exhibits interpretive properties parallel to the Control structure in (320b): (321) a.

o Yanis elpizi [na figi], to idhio o Vasilis. the John hopes Particle leaves-3-sing so does the Bill ‘John hopes that he will leave early and Bill does too.’ (The “strict” reading, in which Bill also hopes that John will leave early, is available.)

b.

o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai], to idhio o Vasilis. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing so does the Bill ‘John knows how to swim and Bill does too.’ (Only the “sloppy” reading, in which Bill also knows how to swim, is available.)

Although this observation will be refined in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, Lebeaux (1985: 350) and others have made the additional observation that Obligatory Control PRO has the distinguishing property of not allowing split antecedents in contexts like (322b): (322)

a.

John hopes [that they will help each other].

b. *John hopes [PRO to help each other]. Again, one finds the same facts with respect to the non-overt subject of a finite complement clause selected by the Greek equivalent of know how to, as indicated by Varlokosta’s (1993: 148–150) data in (323b): (323)

a. o Yanis elpizi [na voithisoun o enas ton allo]. the John hopes Particle help-3-pl each other ‘John hopes that they will help each other.’ b. *o Yanis kseri [na voithisoun o enas ton allo]. the John knows-how-to Particle help-3-pl each other *‘John knows how to help each other.’

Finally, Higginbotham (1992) and others have observed that PRO differs from pronouns in only supporting a de se interpretation, as made clear by the facts in (324):

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The Unfortunate i hopes [that hei/k will leave early]. (The understood embedded subject can refer to either the Unfortunate (de se) or to someone else (non de se).)

b. The Unfortunate hopes [PRO to leave early]. (The understood embedded subject can only refer to the Unfortunate.) Varlokosta (1993: 148–150) observes the same restriction on the non-overt subject of the embedded clause in (325b), which contrasts with clauses licensing pro, as in (325a): (325)

a. o Atichis elpizi [na kerdhisi to metalio]. the Unfortunate hopes Particle wins-3-sing the medal ‘The Unfortunate i hopes that hei/k will win the medal.’ b. o Atichis kseri [na ektimisi to metalio] the Unfortunate knows Particle appreciates-3-sing the medal ‘The Unfortunate knows how to appreciate the medal.’ (The understood embedded subject can only refer to the Unfortunate.)

In short, there appears to be ample evidence in favor of the view that PRO can be licensed in finite (specifically, subjunctive) clauses in many languages. The fact that it appears to be licensed by an I/T that is morphologically indistinguishable from the one that is involved in the Case valuation of overt NPs raises obvious problems for current null Case approaches to Control, according to which only [+tense, -finite] I/T values nouns for null Case. In other words, how can [+finite] I/T license PRO? Furthermore, how can what is apparently the same I/T also license phonetically overt NPs? As the discussion of this section will make clear, the structural case approach to Control put forth by Landau (2004, 2008) seeks to provide an answer to this question. Before examining his alternative approach to Control, however, let us briefly consider a second, apparently related, problem faced by null Case approaches that is pointed out in Landau (2008), Sigurðsson (2008), and others. This issue arises from a consideration of infinitival Control languages with rich case systems, among them, Ancient Greek, Icelandic, Latin, Polish, and Russian. As was perhaps first noted in Andrews (1971) with respect to Ancient Greek, these languages possess lexical items, namely, past participles, floating quantifiers, secondary predicates, and/or semi-predicative phrases (again, the exact set differs from language to language), that must obligatorily agree in structural case with

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the overt subject or object of which they are predicated. To illustrate, the Russian Semi-Predicative phrase (SemP) odin ‘alone’ in (326a,b) below, drawn from Landau (2008: 882), must agree in structural case with the overt subject (nominative) or object (accusative) of which it is predicated: Russian’s default case, the Instrumental, is disallowed. (326)

a. Taras prišël odin /*odnim. Taras. NOM came alone. NOM/*INST ‘Taras came alone.’ b. Ja našel ego odnogo /*odnim. I. NOM found him. ACC alone. ACC/*INS T ‘I found him alone.’ (I.e., he was alone.)

Andrews and subsequent authors have made the interesting observation that in Control configurations, these predicative elements continue to exhibit non-default case, with the exact case form differing from language to language, and even within the same language, according to the particular type of Control configuration.28 For example, Landau (2008: 884, 886), refining earlier work by Comrie (1974) and others, notes that in Russian simple subject Control structures like (327a), SemPs must bear nominative case; whereas in object Control structures like (327b), all speakers accept SemPs in the dative case, and many speakers, in the accusative as well. (327) a. Kostja obeščal prijti odin. Kostja.NOM promised to.come alone. NOM ‘Kostja promised to come alone.’ b. Ona poprosila ego ne ezdit’ tuda odnogo/odnomu zavtra. she. NOM asked him.ACC not to.go there alone.ACC/DAT tomorrow ‘She asked him not to go there alone tomorrow.’ The problem that such facts pose for null Case approaches to Control is clear: If PRO is valued only for null Case, then how can these predicative elements, with which it must agree, come to surface in nominative, accusative or dative forms? 28 See Landau (2008) for a brief comparison of the case forms exhibited in each of the languages mentioned in the text, as well as an in-depth discussion of how the Russian facts vary according to the type of Control configuration. For a more in-depth discussion of the equivalent data in Icelandic, see Sigurðsson (2008).

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What Landau (2008), Sigurðsson (2008: 410), and others suggest is that the answer to this question, as well as the previous one, is that PRO is not valued for null Case. In fact, as will be made clear below, these authors follow Marantz (1992) in assuming that abstract Case does not exist at all. There is only morphological case and PRO is like any other NP in being open to valuation for any of a range of structural cases. In short, it is not Case that primarily determines PRO’s distribution, but other features. So with this background in mind, let us now consider just how a “structural case” approach to Control works. The system developed in Landau (2004, 2008) will be used here as representative, as it is the most completely developed analysis of this type to date. In terms of organization, the theoretical mechanisms assumed will first be overviewed, using English to illustrate their functioning. Then they will be applied to a typical finite Control language (Greek) and, finally, to a typical “rich case” language (Russian). To begin, Landau’s (2004) Calculus of Control rests on three features: [T], [Agr], and [R]. Each has positive and negative settings, and each may be either interpretable or uninterpretable. Uninterpretable features, of course, require checking via Agreement with an interpretable counterpart. In terms of the heads associated with these features, all three features may (under specific conditions) be associated with I/T and C; however, non-expletive nouns are only associated with the [R] feature. Let us consider each feature in turn, beginning with [T]. Landau proposes that, with the exception of small clauses, an embedded I/T is always associated with an interpretable [T] feature that may take either a [+] or [-] value, with the determination being semantically based on the temporal relations that do/do not exist between the matrix and embedded clauses.29 Specifically, if the embedded clause has its own independent tense; i.e., if its tense is not delimited by the lexical semantics of the matrix verb, as with the indicative example below in (328a), then the embedded I/T has an interpretable [+T] feature; if, on the other hand, the tense of the embedded clause must be interpreted as identical to that of the matrix I/T, then the embedded I/T has an interpretable [-T] feature, as in the factive Control verb example in (328b); finally, if the tense of the embedded clause is limited by (but not obligatorily identical to) that of the matrix, as in the example in (328c), then an interpretable [+T] feature is again associated with the embedded I/T. Landau respective refers to these three options as “free” tense, “anaphoric” tense, and “dependent” tense.

29 Small clauses are assumed to be “defective”; i.e., associated with a non-overt I/T unspecified for a [T] feature.

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(328) a.

Sarah said that she would take care of the cat for us.

b. During Spring Break, we managed to go skiing at Killington. c.

We agreed to visit Boston next time.

Landau further suggests that these feature settings can be teased out via “tense mismatch” tests parallel to those developed in work by Huddleston (1969) and Karttunen (1971), overviewed above in Section 2.3.2.1. Namely, only I/Ts that have an interpretable [-T] feature will preclude temporally “mismatched” adverbials in the matrix and embedded clauses, as indicated by the contrasts below in (329): (329) a.

Yesterday, Sarah said that she’d take care of the cat for us next week.

b. *Last week, we managed to go skiing at Killington next week. c.

Didn’t we all agree last night to go visit Boston the next time?

As mentioned above, [T] is also a feature that may be associated with an embedded C. In this case, however, the [T] feature is simply viewed a formal expression of the temporal (selectional) restrictions that the matrix verb imposes on the embedded clause. For this reason, it is an uninterpretable feature of C. Specifically, matrix verbs that select “free” tense complement clauses, like (329a) above, are associated with an embedded C that has no [T] feature; those involved in “anaphoric” tense relationships, like (329b), have an uninterpretable [-T] feature; and those selecting an embedded “dependent” tense like (329c) have an uninterpretable [+T] feature in C. Turning to the [Agr] feature, this too is a feature associated with certain I/Ts and Cs. Again, the interpretable variant is associated with I/T, and the uninterpretable one with C. In the case of I/T, the [Agr] feature always reflects the presence or absence of overt phi-feature morphology. Thus, an embedded clause in the infinitive, as in (330a) or a small clause, like (330b) involves an embedded I/T associated with an interpretable [-Agr] feature. An embedded I/T that is fully inflected, like the one in (330c), has an interpretable [+Agr] feature. The I/T of ECM verbs like believe is assumed to be defective, i.e. unspecified for this feature. (330) a.

We managed/agreed [to go to Boston].

b. She lets [me do whatever I want]. c.

Tim said [that he would stay].

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With respect to C, the [Agr] feature is uninterpretable. Its setting is determined by C’s own [T] specification in the manner stipulated in (331): (331)

If C is [+T], then C is either [+Agr] or it is unspecified for [Agr]; If C is [-T] or unspecified for [T], then it is unspecified for [Agr].

Turning finally to the [R] feature, this feature is hypothesized to be interpretable only for non-expletive nouns, and uninterpretable for I/T and C. Drawing inspiration from earlier work of the GB era, Landau proposes that lexical NPs and pro are associated with an interpretable [+R] feature, which is intended to reflect their “referential nature,” meaning that they are treated as being associated with inherent phi-features. PRO, on the other hand, is said to lack inherent phi-features, being dependent on the controller to acquire them (via Agree). For this reason, PRO is associated with an interpretable [-R] feature. As mentioned above the [R] feature on I/T and C is uninterpretable, and is determined by the combinations of [T] and [Agr] settings of the I/T or C in question. The [R] feature is thus viewed as a kind of “communication device” between non-expletive nouns and the functional heads that license them. The settings are determined as follows: (332)

a.

If INFL/COMP = [+T, +Agr], then INFL/COMP has an uninterpretable [+R] feature.

b. If INFL/COMP is any other combination of both [T] and [Agr], then it has an uninterpretable [-R] feature. c.

If INFL/COMP lacks either a [T] or an [Agr] feature, then it has no [R] feature.

Having laid out the mechanics of the system, let us briefly consider how it accounts for classic distributional facts of the type in (333a). The features associated with the C, I/T, and N heads in this sort of example are provided in (333b). (333) a.

John said [that he/*PRO would leave].

b. John said [CP that [ IP would [i +T, i+Agr, u+R]

[VP he/*PRO leave]]]. [i+R]/[i-R]

As indicated in (333b), Landau’s Calculus of Control assigns no features to the embedded C in structures of this type. This is so for the following reasons. First, non-Control verbs like say do not impose any selectional restrictions on

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the temporal relation that the complement clause must stand in vis-à-vis the matrix, as indicated by “mismatch” examples of the type in (329a) above. Therefore, C is not associated with a [T] feature. Given this, by the principle in (331), C does not have an [Agr] feature either and, given that, by (332c), it lacks an [R] feature as well. On the other hand, the system associates would in (333) with interpretable [+T] and [+Agr] features as well as an uninterpretable [+R] feature. The interpretable [+T] feature reflects the fact that the tense of the embedded clause is independent of that of the matrix. The [+Agr] feature is attributed to the presence of overt phi-feature morphology on would. Finally, the uninterpretable [+R] feature is assigned by (332a): It is due to the combination of [+T] and [+Agr] features of would. Looking now at the pronoun he, this type of noun is associated with inherent phi-features. For this reason, it has an interpretable [+R] feature. PRO, lacking inherent phi-features, is associated with an interpretable [-R] feature. Now given that the embedded I/T has an uninterpretable [+R] feature, the derivation will only converge if it Agrees with an NP with a matching interpretable feature: In other words, such clauses do not license PRO, which is [-R]. Consider, in contrast, a Control structure like (334a), associated by the system with the features in (334b): (334) a. b.

Mary managed [*she/PRO to finish up]. Mary managed [CP Ø [u-T]

[IP [ to [i -T, i-Agr, u-R]

[VP *she/PRO finish up]]]]. [i+R]/[i-R]

As indicated in (334b), Landau’s Calculus of Control assigns C a single uninterpretable [-T] feature. This is because factive Control verbs like manage are semantically compatible only with complement clauses associated with the same temporal index as is the matrix clause. Given that C has a [-T] feature, by the principle in (331), C does not have an [Agr] feature and, given this, by (332c), C lacks an [R] feature as well. On the other hand, to is associated with interpretable [-T] and [-Agr] features in addition to an uninterpretable [-R] feature. The interpretable [-T] feature reflects the fact that the tense of the embedded clause is anaphoric (identical) to that of the matrix. The [-Agr] feature is attributed to the absence of overt phifeature morphology on to. Finally, the uninterpretable [-R] feature is assigned by (332b): It is due to the combination of [-T] and [-Agr] features of to. As always, a lexical NP like she, because of its inherent phi-features, is associated with an interpretable [+R] feature and PRO, lacking inherent phifeatures, is associated with an interpretable [-R] feature.

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Given that the embedded I/T has an uninterpretable [-R] feature, the derivation will only converge if it Agrees with an NP with a matching interpretable feature: In other words, such clauses license only PRO, which is [i-R]. Finally, it bears mentioning that PRO, a non-expletive noun that lacks inherent phi-features, must come to be associated with such features via Agreement of the matrix T with both the matrix subject and the embedded one. Otherwise, PRO will remain uninterpretable to the semantic component. Specifically, Landau proposes that the matrix I/T is a probe that enters two Agreement relations – one with the controller and one with PRO. In this way PRO becomes associated with phi-features. (A parallel Agreement relationship is assumed to obtain with respect to the matrix v, the matrix object NP, and PRO in Object Control structures.) In sum, Landau’s system combines several aspects of earlier approaches in a novel way. It accords an equal role to the tense relationships that exist between matrix and embedded clauses, the referential nature of various NPs, and overt inflectional morphology. All are recast as features, the combinations of which determine the attested distribution of various types of NPs. Having demonstrated how the system applies to an infinitival Control language like English, let us consider next how it accommodates the phenomenon of finite Control, exemplified by Varlokosta’s (1993: 151) Greek example in (335a,b): (335)

a. o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ b. o Yanis kseri [CP na [u-T]

[IP kolimbai [i-T, i+Agr, u-R]

[VP PRO (kolimbai)]]]. [i-R]

The only featural difference between an infinitival Control structure like (334b) above and its finite Control counterpart in (335b) is, of course, the interpretable [+Agr] setting of the embedded I/T in the latter case, a difference that is due to the morphological inflection of the embedded I/T for phi-features. This contrast, however, has no effect on the types of NPs licensed by the embedded I/T in a finite Control language since, by (332), only the feature combination of [+T] and [+Agr] results in a specification of I/T for an uninterpretable [+R] feature, which would preclude PRO. Thus, one finds the same licensing of NP types across both types of languages, despite the surface difference in inflectional morphology, certainly a desired result. For completeness sake, let us consider the finite Control counterpart to an example like (333a) above, namely, a sentence like (336a,b) below, in which only pro (and lexical NPs) are licensed:

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On the historical development of PRO approaches to Control

a. o Yanis elpizi [na figi]. the John hopes Particle leaves-3-sing ‘John hopes that he will leave.’ b. o Yanis elpizi [CP na [u+T],

[IP

figi

[u+Agr], [u+R] [i +T, i+Agr, u+R]

[VP pro (figi)]]]. [i+R]

The two key differences to focus on in this example relate to the feature specifications of the embedded I/T, which is now associated not only with an interpretable [+Agr] feature (due, as before, to the overt inflection for phifeatures), but also with an interpretable [+T] and an uninterpretable [+R] feature. The former reflects the fact that the tense of the embedded clause is limited by (but not identical to) that of the matrix. The [+T] and [+Agr] features of figi result, by (332a), in the specification of the embedded I/T for an uninterpretable [+R] feature, which, as desired, licenses both lexical NPs and pro.30 Having considered how Landau’s analysis handles the phenomenon of finite Control, let us conclude with a brief illustration of how his approach seeks to accommodate “structurally case-marked” PRO in a rich case language, using Russian to illustrate. As was mentioned earlier, Landau (2008), Sigurðsson (2008: 410), and others take as their point of departure, Marantz’ (1992) hypothesis that abstract Case does not exist. These authors maintain that there is only morphological (formerly, surface) case, with the various forms being determined in the following manner: (a) inherent case (such as Icelandic quirky case) is lexically determined (b) structural cases (such as nominative and accusative) are determined by a onestep process, post-syntactically, via morphological rules that make reference to the Agreement relations previously established in the computational system (e.g., if tensed I/T undergoes Agreement with an NP in the syntactic component for feature checking purposes, it will value that NP post-syntactically for nominative case; in a like fashion, v/Tr will value NPs for accusative case, etc.) and

30 In the text, I have not focused on the fact that Landau (2004: 844–845) actually follows Terzi (1992, 1997) and departs from authors like Varlokosta (1993) in assuming that the class of verbs that includes the equivalent of hope (the so-called Free or F-subjunctives) are ambiguous between a derivation in which lexical NPs and pro are licensed (the derivation discussed in the text) and one in which PRO is. The later derivation, Landau proposes, is due to the features of the embedded C. Specifically, Landau suggests that the uninterpretable [+R] features on the embedded C and I/T in examples like (336b) may “check each other off,” which makes it possible for PRO (associated only with an interpretable [-R] feature) to be licensed. As there appears to be no external (i.e. non-theory internal) support to decide the “ambiguity” issue surrounding F-subjunctives, I will not be exploring it further, although I do make it clear in Chapters 6 and 8 that my proposals are compatible with either approach.

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(c) default case forms surface when the conditions for inherent and structural case fail to obtain. As alluded to above, such approaches next assume that PRO is just like any other NP in not being limited to valuation for a specific case: The case form it surfaces in post-syntactically is determined by which type of head(s) it has undergone Agreement with in the syntax. Thirdly, Landau (2008) in particular proposes that rich case languages parametrically differ with respect to whether or not infinitival I/T or C can value NPs for case and, if they can, with respect to which case they value those NPs for. Russian, for example, is assumed to optionally allow the embedded C (not I/T) of a Control clause to value NPs for dative case. On the other hand, Icelandic I/T (not C), is assumed to optionally value them for nominative. Finally, the I/T and C of languages like Czech is assumed to not value NPs for case at all. Given this, how then do the various case forms associated with PRO in a rich case language arise? Landau (2008) assumes that the matrix I/T and v/Tr in Control structures undergoes Agreement in phi-features with the controller subject or object NP in the usual way, respectively valuing those overt NPs for nominative and accusative case. However, the matrix I/T or v/Tr head in a Control configuration is assumed to still be a Probe, able to undergo a second Agreement relation with a [+T], [+Agr] embedded C, if C bears those features, or with PRO. In the former instance, PRO will then be valued for a case form distinct from that of the controller (i.e., it will be valued for the case form associated with the embedded C or I/T). In the latter instance, in which C is not [+T], [+Agr], PRO will be valued for the same case that normally results from agreement with the matrix I/T or v/Tr. Let us consider a couple of concrete examples to illustrate. In Russian simple subject Control structures like (337a) below, Landau notes that the surface case forms indicate that PRO can only have its case valued by the matrix I/T (for nominative), whereas in Russian object Control configurations like (337b), it apparently may have its case valued by either the matrix v/Tr (accusative) or by the embedded C (dative): (337)

a. Kostja obeščal [PRO prijti odin]. Kostja.NOM promised to.come alone. NOM ‘Kostja promised to come alone.’ b. Ona poprosila ego [PRO ne ezdit’ tuda odnogo/odnomu she. NOM asked him.ACC not to.go there alone.ACC/DAT zavtra]. tomorrow ‘She asked him not to go there alone tomorrow.’

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Why is this so? Looking first at simple Subject Control examples like (337a), Landau proposes that embedded C is unavailable for case valuation of PRO (for dative) because phonetically null C is a clitic whose only available host is the phi-complete matrix v/Tr, whose phi-completeness then makes C unavailable to serve as a Probe for PRO. Thus, in this type of configuration, C, for independent reasons, must enter the derivation without a case feature, and, therefore, PRO can only become valued for case via Agreement with the matrix I/T, resulting in its being obligatorily nominative. In contrast, in object control structures like (337b), C remains active to value PRO for dative case because the matrix verb is a double object construction with a phi-featureless Applicative head that serves as C’s host, which, being phiincomplete leaves C available to value PRO for dative case. Since, however, C may also enter the derivation without case, the matrix v/Tr head may alternatively agree with PRO, valuing it for accusative. While Landau’s system provides a means of accounting for both the phenomenon of finite Control and the existence of non-default case forms on predicative elements in Control clauses in case rich languages, it does suffer from a number of empirical problems, many of which have already been shown to be associated with Case-theoretic accounts. For example, how could Landau’s analysis accommodate the fact that PRO and non-pronominal NPs, but not pronominal ones, are licensed in the contexts in (338)? (338)

The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert.

Under his approach, the licitness of PRO in (338) entails that gerundive I/T either has an uninterpretable [-R] feature (which PRO checks off ) or entirely lacks an [R] feature (PRO’s [-R] feature is interpretable and so does not require checking.). If the former is true, then PRO should be licensed, but both nonpronominal and pronominal NPs (which have an interpretable [+R] feature) should be ruled out. If the latter is the case, then all three types of nominals should be licensed. But neither situation obtains. Thus, the mechanics of Landau’s system appear to preclude the attested distribution. Similarly, how would his analysis accommodate floating quantifier facts like those in (339), which appear to indicate that PRO never moves to Spec of IP/TP (339a,b), but does move from its initial merge position (339c)? Such facts cast doubt on his claim that it is simply the need to check the uninterpretable [-R] feature of I/T that primarily determines the distribution of PRO.

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(339) a. *[Both to be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous. b. *They decided [to all not leave at the same time]. (*on the relevant sentential reading of the embedded not) c.

[To both be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous.

Thirdly, how could this approach be modified to account for the seemingly contradictory facts in (340a) and (340b,c)? In these examples, PRO is first precluded and then licensed in what appear to be structurally parallel contexts. If temporal relations and overt phi-feature morphology on I/T (which combine to determine I/T’s [R] feature setting) make the determination, then it is not obvious how to proceed. (340) a. *It seemed to me [PRO to have solved the problem]. b. Il me semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had solved that problem.’ c.

PRO to seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be correct] is a common flaw.

Finally, Chapter 4 will show that, in addition to other facts, Landau’s analysis offers no account of the overlapping distribution of PRO and overt NPs in certain ECM and small clause contexts. To provide a brief preview of part of that discussion, consider first the case of well-known contrasts of the type in (341) and (342), noted in Landau (2004: 860): (341) a.

We saw/heard/felt [ourselves laughing].

b. We believe [Mary to be intelligent]. (342) a.

*We saw/heard/felt [PRO laughing].

b. *We believe [PRO to be intelligent]. Landau’s system associates the embedded (non-overt) I/T of small clause complements like (341a) with an interpretable [-Agr] feature since such I/T lack overt inflection for phi-features. This is the only feature associated with small clause I/T since Landau further assumes it to be “defective”; i.e. unspecified for the [T] feature and, therefore, by (332c), also unspecified for an [R] feature. Given

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this, such I/T are predicted to license both PRO and lexical NPs if no further mechanisms come into play. The same, he notes, is true of ECM configurations like (341b). Specifically, Landau’s Calculus of Control associates the I/T of ECM clauses with an interpretable [+T] feature since tense “mismatch” examples like Mary believes John to have fainted last night at 10. are grammatical. This is the only feature ECM to has because Landau assumes that it is “defective” – it lacks a specification for [Agr] – and thus, by (332c), lacks an [R] feature. Given the ungrammaticality of PRO in (342a,b), Landau (2004: 862) is led to rule it out by proposing that PRO is blocked from entering two checking relations with two distinct heads (the embedded I/T and matrix v/Tr) in the same phase. The problem, of course, is that PRO is, in fact, licensed in certain small clause/ECM configurations: English causative get in (343a) is one example; remember in (343b) is another; and French sentences like (343c) may provide yet a third instance. (343) a.

John deliberately got [PRO/himself injured] in order to collect Workingmen’s Comp.

b. I remember [PRO/myself/her sending that letter]. c.

J’ai entendu [PRO/Médor aboyer]. I have heard Médor to-bark ‘I heard (Médor) barking.’

It thus appears that the uniform determination of features for various clausal types assumed by this system is incorrect, an issue to which we will, of course, be returning in later chapters. While Landau’s analysis is not without empirical problems, and while it is equally true that certain aspects of his system are admittedly stipulative, the fact remains that some account must be given for the case forms exhibited by predicative elements in Control structures in rich case languages, as well as for the phenomenon of finite Control. In Chapter 4, a very different interpretation of the former type of data will be suggested, one in which they do not support a structural case approach to PRO, but rather point only to the need to spell out further just how surface morphological case forms arise on predicative elements when they fail to Agree with the argument of which they are predicated. The latter issue (finite Control) will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 8.

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2.3.4 Summary The stated goal of this chapter was to provide a relatively concise overview of some of the key points in the historical development of standard generative approaches to Control. The preceding discussion has shown that, virtually from its inception (cf. Chomsky’s (1965: 21–24) Aspects), standard generative theories have assumed that Control clauses contain a syntactically projected NP argument that receives its own, unique thematic role – one that is distinct from that of its controller in Obligatory Control configurations. In these respects, the discussion of the next chapter will show, these theories contrast with both non-standard generative approaches to Control (i.e. the Movement approaches advocated by O’Neil (1995), Hornstein (1999), and Manzini & Roussou (2000), among others), as well as the implicit argument analyses developed in alternative syntactic, as well as semantic, circles (cf., e.g., Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Bach (1979), Bresnan (1982), Gazdar (1982), Klein & Sag (1982), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1986), and Jackendoff (1990)). While standard generative theories agree on these two points, they have also been shown to differ radically in virtually every other respect. Most significantly, the phonetically non-overt status of the subject of a Control clause at the syntax-phonology interface has been shown to be open to analysis in very different terms, determined in large part by the evolution of the generative enterprise itself. Thus, in the early days of Transformational Grammar (Rosenbaum (1967)), the syntactic status of the subject of an Obligatory Control clause was literally treated in a fashion identical to that of any other phonetically overt NP at the level of “Deep Structure.” It was simply unlike other types of NPs in being subject to obligatory erasure at a subsequent level of syntactic representation because it referred to the same individual as the closest c-commanding argument in the matrix sentence. By the middle of the transformational era (Postal (1968a, 1970)), this argument was hypothesized to perhaps be a Deep Structure pronoun, although differing from other pronominals in being subject to obligatory deletion under (what were essentially semantically-based) structural conditions. By the end of the TG era (cf. Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Chomsky (1980)), this argument was commonly referred to as “PRO,” a technical term that, at that particular time, did not refer to its being a Deep Structure pronoun, as one might assume, but rather a “special” sort of NP – specifically, the type of “unexpanded”/index-free NP whose reference is not determined by movement and, therefore, must be established by a separate set of syntactico-semantic “Rules of Control” applying at the syntax-semantics interface. The Government-Binding era gave birth to entirely new analyses of PRO (cf. Chomsky (1981a, 1982), Manzini (1983), and Bouchard (1984)) – ones that rejected

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the TG notion that it is a type of “unexpanded”/lexically contentless NP, in favor of the novel view that it is, as Postal (1970) had earlier tentatively suggested, a type of non-overt pronominal, with authors varying widely on its exact properties as concerns binding, Case, and so on. Chomsky (1981a, 1982), for example, analyzed PRO as the minimal pronominal element, one inherently associated with only with person, number, and gender features. Its reference still had to be determined by “Control Theory,” but not because it was assumed to entirely lack lexical content (under this approach, it now had inherent phi-features), but instead because it was assumed to possess very specific binding-theoretic properties. Namely, PRO was treated as a “pronominal anaphor,” a theoretically expected instantiation of NP subject to conflicting principles of the binding theory (Principles A and B). This conflict had, as an end effect, the limitation of PRO to ungoverned positions, which meant that it could not become associated with any Case assigned under government. This was by no means the only approach to Control developed during the GB era, however. Manzini’s (1983) treatment of PRO as a phonetically non-overt anaphor was also considered above. We saw that she put forth significantly revised versions of Chomsky’s (1981a, 1982) theories of Case and Binding in order to account for PRO’s distributional and interpretive properties in terms of just (her version of ) Principle A (assumed to be supplemented by semantic and pragmatic considerations). These modifications were such that PRO, by definition, had to be treated as a Caseless NP. Bouchard (1984) offered yet a third GB approach to these types of structures. He argued that PRO is actually a non-overt NP that is not inherently associated with phi-features and that functions as either an anaphor (Obligatory Control PRO) or a pronoun (Arbitrary PRO). In other words, PRO was treated as being lexically ambiguous. Bouchard’s radical reworking of the theories of binding and Case entailed that PRO be analyzed as Caseless and phi-featureless at PF, although Controlled PRO did become associated with phi-features at LF and even, in languages like Russian, with Case at that level. The move from GB to Minimalist theory in the ’90s led to yet another wave of theories of Control, several well-known Minimalist approaches to Control being the subject of discussion in the final section of this chapter. In that overview, the binding-theoretic notions central to earlier GB approaches to Control were shown to be replaced with feature-based systems, with authors differing with respect to whether it is primarily Case-feature valuation that is at work in determining PRO’s distribution (as in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 116–120), Martin (1992, 2001), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), and Bowers (2002), among others) or some other combination of tense, agreement, and referential features, as in, e.g., Landau (2004, 2008).

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The move from binding to feature-based accounts was shown to be motivated on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirically, authors like Chomsky & Lasnik (1995) introduced facts that appear to indicate that PRO, like other arguments, (a) cannot move from a Case-marked position – even to escape government and (b) must move from a non-Case position – presumably to check its own Case. In terms of theoretical motivation, it had long been noted in the GB literature that the assumption that PRO was the only potentially Caseless argument was “odd”: Other non-overt NPs (e.g., Wh-trace) could clearly be shown to require Case; assuming PRO to be Caseless led to complications in the formulation of the Visibility Condition, and so forth. Furthermore, certain key features of Minimalist Theory itself, these motivated by empirical facts unrelated to Control, seriously undermined a binding approach to the phenomenon. For example, the treatment of traces as copies, identical in features to their antecedents, meant that one could no longer treat PRO as an expected [+anaphoric, +pronominal] instantiation of NP. In addition, the representational notions embodied by Government Theory, key to a binding approach to Control (e.g. the notion of Governing Category), were rejected in favor of a purely derivational approach to syntax. Having motivated a feature-based approach to Control, several well-known analyses of this type were then considered, the first being the influential null Case approach to Control put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995). This analysis assumes that PRO is a phonetically non-overt, non-expletive NP associated with both phi- and null Case features, null Case being a feature that can only be checked (in later terms, valued), by the similarly minimal inflectional elements infinitival and gerundive I/T. As this analysis raises the obvious question of just which morphologically incomplete I/T check null Case, the analyses of Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007) were then introduced. These authors suggest that only semantically [+tense], morphologically [-finite] I/T check/value for null Case, a proposal that was shown to not be without problems given that a clear characterization of this tense is lacking, no independent tests consistently detect it, and an alternative [-tense] approach to infinitival and gerundive I/T seems equally plausible. Given the empirical problems faced by the null Case hypothesis, we next considered whether the Caseless, inherently phi-featureless approach to PRO briefly developed in Bowers (2002) might fare better. According to this analysis, both PRO and the infinitival/gerundive I/T of Control clauses are syntactically “inactive” heads, heads lacking any features that require syntactic valuation via Agree. It is for this reason that they are generally compatible with one another. When they are not, as in the infinitival complements to ECM and Raising verbs, this is viewed as not being due to the features of PRO or the embedded I/T (which

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have no such features), but rather to the presence of a matrix I/T or Tr (a.k.a. AgrO or v) that has phi-features requiring valuation via Agreement with a featureassociated NP in the embedded clause, which PRO is not. That Agreement relation also results in valuation of the NP for structural Case, which PRO cannot bear as, we have just seen, it cannot undergo prior Agreement in phi-features. This analysis, too, was shown to suffer from some significant empirical problems: As PRO is assumed to have no features requiring valuation via Agreement, it is overgenerated in a number of contexts in which PRO, as required, receives a thematic role, and an expletive is theoretically available to check any features of the matrix I/T, as in, for example, a sentence like *It seems to John to have solved the problem. Furthermore, this analysis is presently formulated in terms that preclude the attested distribution of NP types in gerundive contexts like The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial means needed to hire an expert. That is, Bowers’ approach, like many others, predicts that non-pronominal and pronominal NPs should pattern together. Finally, the approach was shown to fail to account for the fact that PRO cannot move to Spec of infinitival IP/TP, given the ungrammaticality of *Both to be betrayed by their friends would be a disaster., yet apparently must do so given the grammaticality of examples like PRO to seem to yourself to always be right is a common flaw. Having considered several approaches to Control that advocate the view that the distribution of PRO is primarily determined by abstract Case (be it PRO’s need to check null Case or its inability to undergo phi-feature Agreement and thus be valued for Accusative or Nominative Case), the chapter concluded with discussion of an analysis that is representative of the alternative view that its distribution is actually determined by other features, namely, various combinations of tense, agreement, and referential features, as in, for example, Landau (2004, 2008). The appeal of this type of approach was shown to lie in its attempt to accommodate both the phenomenon of finite Control in languages like Greek and the existence of structurally case-marked predicative elements in Control clauses in case rich languages such as Icelandic. Specifically, the fact that PRO is licensed by a morphologically finite (subjunctive) I/T in many languages – and that I/Ts with the very same inflection appear to license lexical NPs in other contexts – poses obvious problems for approaches to Control that assume that PRO can only be licensed by [+tense, -finite] I/T (e.g. Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007)), as well as for ones that assume that PRO is unique in being incompatible with heads that value for Case (as in Bowers (2002)). Similarly, if PRO can be valued only for null Case or cannot be valued for Case

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at all, then how could agreeing predicative elements in case rich languages come to apparently Agree with PRO in a structural (not default) case? Under Landau’s assumptions, both phenomena are argued to follow from feature checking/valuation unrelated to Case, the notion of abstract Case being entirely rejected. With respect to finite Control, Landau argues that the only time that PRO is not licensed is if the embedded I/T is both [+T] and [+Agr]. (Only this type of I/T is associated with an uninterpretable [+R] feature that must be checked by a NP with the interpretable [+R] counterpart, which PRO is not.) In infinitival Control languages, the I/T of a Control clause is always [-Agr], licensing PRO. In a finite Control language, it is always [+Agr], but either [-T] (C-subjunctives), straightforwardly licensing PRO, or has its [+R] feature “cancelled” by a [+R] feature in the embedded C (F-subjunctives), again licensing PRO (and other types of NPs). As for the overt structural case forms on predicative elements in Control clauses in rich case languages, these are attributed to Agreement of the predicative element with structurally case-marked PRO, an NP like any other with respect to case, that, in these types of languages, may have its case valued (post-syntactically) by either an I/T or C in the Control clause or by an I/T or v/Tr head in the matrix one, with specific structural conditions determining the choice in different configurations. While non-Case approaches like Landau’s provide a much-needed account of these cross-linguistically attested facts, it was shown to suffer from several significant shortcomings, many of which are likewise associated with Casebased theories of Control. For example, this analysis, principally formulated in terms of I/T’s [R] feature (or lack of one), was shown to preclude the attested distribution of NPs in gerundive contexts like The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial means needed to hire an expert. since gerundive I/T either must have an uninterpretable [-R] feature, and so license only PRO, or lack an [R feature] feature, and so license all three NP types equally. In addition, PRO is also predicted by this analysis to move to the Spec IP/TP of a Control clause (to check I/T’s uninterpretable [-R] feature), generating what are actually ungrammatical examples like *Both to be betrayed by their friends would be a disaster. In sum, adopting the view that Control clauses contain a syntactically projected argument that bears one, and only one, thematic role has led to the development of a fascinating array of proposals and counter proposals, accommodating the empirical facts to varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, we turn to a consideration of analyses of Control that reject either one or both of these hypotheses in order to see, in general terms, how they approach the complex, well-studied problems associated with Control.

Chapter 3

Movement and implicit argument approaches to Control This chapter examines representative theories of Control that reject the standard view (examined in detail in Chapter 2) that sentences of the type in (1a) contain a syntactically projected argument that receives one and only one thematic role, an argument commonly referred to as PRO, indicated in bold in (1b). (1)

a. The crew plans to finish up by 9:00. b. The crew plans [PRO to finish up by 9:00].

As the discussion will show, approaches to Control that reject the PRO hypothesis can be classified into one of two basic types: Movement Theories of Control, which do not adopt the Minimalist assumption that an argument can bear only one theta-role (the one discharged upon initial Merge), and implicit argument analyses, which reject the Principle of Full Interpretation by proposing that there is no syntactically projected argument in the subject position of a verbal clause like (1b). We will begin with an examination of a typical Movement Theory of Control in Section 3.1 and conclude with a consideration of some of the key features of implicit argument analyses in Section 3.2. As in Chapter 2, this overview will, of necessity, not be exhaustive. (The author apologizes in advance for any oversights or omissions.) The purpose here is only to arrive at an understanding of the basic positions that have been taken in the literature with respect to key issues to be explored in the subsequent chapters.

3.1 Movement theories of Control There are currently at least three very different Movement Theories of Control (MTC) in the existing literature, put forth respectively in O’Neil (1995), Hornstein (1999) and Manzini & Roussou (2000).1 Although they differ in virtually every other respect, all three share the hypothesis that the argument formerly known as the “controller” in an Obligatory Control configuration bears not only a thematic role associated with the matrix verb, but also one associated with the embedded verb. In other words, all three MTC reject the Minimalist form of

1 For a Transformational Grammar analysis along these lines, see Bowers (1981).

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Chomsky’s (1981a: 36, 335) Theta Criterion, according to which theta-assignment takes place only within initial merge positions. The fashion in which multiple theta-role assignment/association is implemented does, however, differ from author to author. O’Neil (1995: 366), for example, suggests that in a sentence like (1a) above, the surface matrix subject (the crew) initially merges in the subject position of the embedded verb, undergoing movement in the computational system in the manner indicated below in (2) purely for feature-checking (e.g. Case and [D/EPP]) purposes. When the resulting structure is fed into the semantic component at LF, then, and only then, thematic roles are assigned provided that the argument has previously checked its Case (O’Neil’s version of Chomsky’s (1981a: 336) Visibility Condition). Thus, in (2) the crew, which has been previously valued for Nominative Case in the computational system, receives the external thematic roles of both finish up and plans at LF. (2)

The crew plans [IP (the crew) to (the crew) finish up by 9:00].

While Hornstein (1999: 79) assumes the very same derivational steps for an example like (1a) as does O’Neil, namely, those above in (2), the mechanisms assumed to generate this structure are quite different. Under Hornstein’s approach, theta-roles are morphological features on verbs and thus must be checked, via Merge and Move, as the derivation proceeds. So the crew in (2) again receives the external theta-roles of both verbs; however, this assignment takes the form of feature checking in the syntax. A third, radically different view is defended in Manzini & Roussou (2000: 422). Under this theory, the matrix subject in (1a) initially merges directly in the matrix Spec of IP/TP to check tensed I/T’s [D/EPP] feature, as indicated below in (3). From there, the crew attracts any theta-features in its scope; in other words, the crew attracts the external thematic features of both finish up and plans. (3)

The crew plans [IP to finish up by 9:00].

It is obvious from even this cursory discussion that the various Movement Theories of Control are not theoretical equivalents. In the interest of brevity, and also because it has been the subject of much subsequent discussion in the literature, the focus in this section will be on the MTC developed in Hornstein (1999), although an in-depth examination of other theories of this type would reveal that many of the criticisms that will later be leveled against Hornstein’s theory apply equally well to the other two variants. With that said, let us begin by considering some of the strengths of Hornstein’s particular movement analysis of Control. What is most appealing about

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his theory is clearly its simplicity: A significant degree of empirical coverage is retained while reducing the complexity of the grammar. Specifically, and as will be demonstrated shortly, Hornstein shows that many of the basic interpretive and distributional properties of Control clauses can be captured under a theory that has no need for the primitive PRO, nor for a notion of null Case, nor for a theory of Control to determine PRO’s referent, nor, for that matter, for a principle like the Theta Criterion. All of these complications, he argues, arise from a failure to recognize that Control clauses actually involve A-Movement, parallel to that attested in Raising constructions. Only the number of thematic features checked differs, a fact that is used in Hornstein’s subsequent co-authored work (e.g. Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes, 2010) to account for some of those areas in which the syntax of Control and Raising clauses diverges.2 Let us consider some of the key points of his analysis in more detail. As noted in our earlier discussion of C-Subjunctives in the languages of the Balkans in Section 2.3.3, previous work on Control has established that the non-overt subject of an Obligatory Control clause has a number of characteristic distributional and interpretational properties. First, the argument standardly known as PRO does not freely alternate with phonetically overt NPs, as made clear by contrasts of the type in (4a,b): (4) a. Katie is hoping [PRO to do well on the exam]. b. *Katie is hoping [she/Dan to do well on the exam]. As Hornstein (1999: 82, 2010: 126–128) points out, if “PRO” is actually a copy (the NP trace of GB theory), as indicated below in (5a), then these facts fall out from whatever mechanism covers the parallel Raising facts in (6). One might, for example, assume, in line with Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 483) and Jaeggli (1980), that Case is required for phonetic “visibility.” Thus, the ungrammaticality of (5b) and (6b) would (in minimalist terms) be attributed to the fact that the embedded overt subjects in these examples do not undergo Agree with a functional category that values them for Case and so cannot be visible/Spelled Out at PF.

2 The idea that configurations of Obligatory Control structures pattern with Raising structures had actually been argued for at length much earlier in Koster (1978, 1984, 1987), although Koster’s analyses do not involve multiple theta-marking and thus do not reduce Obligatory Control to NP-Movement. Instead, the primary claim that is made is that the same basic dependency relations (the need for a c-commanding antecedent within a given domain) must obtain with respect to all of the empty categories attested in configurations of NP-Movement, Control, and Wh-Movement.

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a. Katie is hoping [ IP (Katie) to (Katie) do well on the exam]. b. *Katie is hoping [ IP she/Dan to do well on the exam].

(6)

a. Katie seems [ IP (Katie) to (Katie) do well on exams]. b. *Katie seems [ IP she/Dan to do well on exams].

As was also discussed in Section 2.3.3, Lebeaux (1985: 350–351) and others have made the additional observation that Obligatory Control PRO requires a c-commanding antecedent, as made clear by the contrasts in (7a,b): (7)

a. Matt expects [ IP (Matt) to (Matt) do well on the exam]. b. *Matt’s sister expects [ IP (Matt) to (Matt) do well on the exam].

This characteristic also appears to be true of the copy of A-Movement found in Raising contexts, as made clear by the facts in (8a,b). Both sets of facts would, therefore, follow from the same general constraints on A-chains that are captured by conditions like the Minimal Link Condition (MLC). (8) a. Matt seems [ IP (Matt) to (Matt) do well on exams]. b. *Matt’s sister seems [ IP (Matt) to (Matt) do well on exams]. Likewise, we saw earlier that Lebeaux (1985: 351) and others have observed that Obligatory PRO allows only a “sloppy” reading under VP-Ellipsis, as demonstrated by (9): (9) John hopes [ IP (John) to leave early] and Bill does too. (The “strict” reading, in which Bill also hopes that John will leave early, is unavailable.) As Hornstein observes, the same restriction is attested with respect to Raising verbs, as made clear by the example in (10). Thus, whatever accounts for this restriction with respect to Raising Verbs will extend straightforwardly to Control contexts. (10) Vera seems [ IP (Vera) to be happy] and Carey does too. (This sentence can only mean that both Vera and Carey seem to be happy.)

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Although this claim will be critically examined later in this section, Lebeaux (1985: 350) and others have also asserted that Obligatory Control PRO cannot have a “split” antecedent, as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of (11a), a fact that, if true, would be paralleled in Raising constructions, as made clear by (11b). This too would obviously follow from a MTC: Only one of the two arguments appearing in the matrix clause at Spell-Out could have initially merged in the embedded one. (11)

a.

*John told Mary [ IP to help each other].

b. *John seems to Mary [ IP to help each other]. In addition, it was noted above, following Higginbotham (1992) and others, that Obligatory PRO supports only a de se interpretation, as made clear by (12). This fact is likewise said to straightforwardly follow from Hornstein’s MTC, according to which the Unfortunate initially merges in the subject position of the embedded clause. (12)

The Unfortunate hopes [ IP (the Unfortunate) to (the Unfortunate) leave early]. (The Unfortunate can only have this hope with respect to himself.)

Finally, Hornstein (1999: 75–76) observes that his Movement approach to Control correctly predicts the well-known fact that Raising and Control verbs pattern alike with respect to the phenomenon of wanna-contraction. That is, as discussed above in Section 2.2.1, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 483) suggested that Chomsky’s (1976: 328) phonological rule of wanna-Contraction, given below in (13), applies to Control contexts like (14) because PRO is Caseless. I.e., only NPs associated with Case at PF were assumed, at that time, to be visible at that level of representation, and thus block phonological rules like (13).3 3 As it is sufficient for the point being made, the text provides a simplistic view of the phenomenon of wanna-contraction, a topic that has been the subject of much discussion in the linguistic literature over the years. The version of the rule given in (13), for example, leaves unexplained the contrast below in (i): (i) a. I wanna [leave early]. b. *I wanna [not leave early]. For arguments to the effect that wanna-contraction is, in fact, not strictly based on linear ordering, see Chomsky (1982: 77) and Postal & Pullum (1982) (among others). For a brief overview of some of the other issues surrounding this phenomenon, see Bouchard (1984: 47–51) and Sag & Fodor (1994), among many others.

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(13) Chomsky’s (1976: 328) version of Wanna-Contraction: want + to → wanna (14)

a.

They want [PRO to leave early].

b. They wanna [leave early]. Lightfoot (1976) observed that NP trace (cf. the example below in (15b)) also does not block wanna-contraction, a fact that one would expect, Jaeggli (1980) pointed out, since it too is Caseless. (15)

a.

I’m going [ IP (I) to (I) leave early].

b. I’m gonna [leave early]. Hornstein’s MTC treats the examples in (14) and (15) in the syntactically parallel fashion indicated below in (16). (Only the number of theta-roles assigned to the surface subject differs.) He, therefore, straightforwardly captures the parallel behavior. He correctly points out the current null Case approaches to PRO discussed in the last chapter incorrectly predict that wanna-contraction should be blocked in Control, but not Raising contexts, as PRO under those theories bears Case. (16)

a.

They want [ IP (they) to (they) leave early].

b. I’m going [ IP (I) to (I) leave early]. Having considered some of the positive aspects of this approach, let us turn to some of the difficulties it faces, beginning with those noted in part by Hornstein himself. One aspect of his analysis that Hornstein views as a benefit, but that researchers like Culicover & Jackendoff (2001) and Landau (2003) (and the present author) see as a significant problem, concerns its treatment of Minimal Distance Principle (MDP) violations, which, as will be soon demonstrated, Hornstein analyzes in terms of the Minimal Link Condition (MLC). As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, standard generative treatments have long been divided with respect to the validity of Rosenbaum’s (1967: 6) original claim that the NP “closest” to an (Obligatory) Control clause must be the one that functions as the controller. That is, authors like Rosenbaum (1967: 6), Chomsky (1980: 33), (to a much lesser degree) Chomsky (1981a: 75), and now Hornstein (1999: 76, 83–87), adopt the view that the computational system, by

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default, selects the NP in bold in the examples below as the controller because it is the nominal dominated by the fewest number of branching nodes.4 (17)

a.

This motivated Larry [to look for a new job].

b. I instructed them [to exit in an orderly fashion]. c.

My mother reminded me [to feed the cat].

Specifically, Hornstein (1991: 87) notes that the interpretive facts in (17) are actually entailed by his A-Movement approach to Control. For example, the pronoun me, in (17c) must initially merge in the subject position of the embedded clause, not the DP my mother, because if the reverse were true, a violation of the Minimal Link Condition would result at the point of the derivation in which my mother moves from the embedded clause to the matrix thematic subject position, crossing over the object me, which is dominated by a fewer number of nodes. In short, an A-Movement approach to Control (correctly) disallows readings of the type in (18): (18)

a.

*You must motivate Larry [ IP (you) to (you) look for a new job].

b. *They instructed us [ IP (they) to (they) exit in an orderly fashion]. c.

*My mother reminded me [ IP (my mother) to (my mother) feed the cat].

The problem, of course, is that it has been equally well-known since Rosenbaum (1969: 16–17, 68) (cf., e.g. Postal (1968a, 1970: 474), Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3), Hust & Brame (1976: 255), Chomsky (1981a: 76), or, more recently, Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 505), to name but a few) that in a comparatively fewer number of cases, the more “distant” NP actually must function as the controller, as demonstrated by the data given below in (19)–(21): (19)

a.

I promised John [to bring the money].

b. I demand/ask/request of you [to be allowed to come]. Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68)

4 As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Chomsky (1981a: 75) describes his strongly MDP-based approach in Chomsky (1980) as “. . .on the right track, though . . . too restricted,” apparently now favoring an analysis of the Control problem that is still primarily MDP-based, but supplemented by further (at the time, poorly understood) semantic and pragmatic factors.

Movement theories of Control

(20) a.

151

Bill asked Tom [when to fire the cannon].

b. I made an oath/vowed to Zeus [to find the thief ]. Postal (1968a, 1970: 474). (21)

a.

John agreed/contracted with Susan [to take care of himself ].

b. John is obligated to Susan [to take care of himself ]. Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 505) Such counterexamples to the MDP/MLC are treated by Rosenbaum (1967: 16– 17, 68), Chomsky (1980: 30), and now Hornstein (1999: 76, 83–87), as “marked” exceptions to core grammar. Research results on L1 acquisition by Carol Chomsky (1969) are often cited in support of this interpretation of the facts since her research has demonstrated that certain MDP/MLC violations of the type in (19)– (21) above emerge relatively late in the acquisition process. However, as was also discussed in the previous chapter, other authors, among them Postal (1968a, 1970: 470–474), Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3), Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 439–444), Manzini (1983: 423), and Bouchard (1984: 193–194) (and, more recently, Sag & Pollard (1991), Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 498– 499), Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), and Landau (2003: 480–481), to name but a few) interpret these facts quite differently. Under this alternative view, it is not a syntactic condition like the MDP or the MLC that primarily determines the controller in Obligatory Control configurations, but rather, it is the lexical semantics of the matrix verb that does so. Although a more in-depth discussion of semantic approaches to antecedent resolution in Control configurations will be the topic of Section 3.2 and Chapter 7, it seems useful at this point to provide a brief illustration of one such analysis for purposes of comparison with Hornstein’s alternative Movement approach. That of Sag & Pollard (1991) has been selected here mainly because it is the first to discuss in detail the “shifts” of controller exemplified by sentences of the type in (19b). Sag & Pollard (1991: 65–72) argue that Subject Control verbs express a state of affairs in which the matrix subject either commits to perform (or not to perform) the action denoted by the embedded predicate (as in, e.g., decide, refuse), or is oriented (e.g. want, hate) to do so (or not to do so). On the other hand, Object Control verbs express states of affairs in which the matrix object is influenced by the matrix subject to perform (or not perform) the action denoted by the embedded verb (as in, e.g., force, forbid). Thus, in those instances in which the MDP/MLC is respected, namely, sentences of the type in (17), one

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finds that the matrix verbs motivate, instruct, and remind do indeed express situations of the influence-type. On the other hand, in the “exceptional” examples in (19a), (20b), and (21a,b), the matrix verbs (promise, make an oath, vow, agree/ contract with X to, and be obligated to) all refer to commitments on the part of the matrix subject.5 As for the Rosenbaum be allowed-type of example in (19b), also discussed by Hust & Brame (1976) and many others, these are likewise analyzed in semantic terms. Namely, Sag & Pollard (1991: 81–87) argue that the meaning of be allowed to is such that it is semantically incompatible with the normal notion of influence encoded by Object Control verbs like demand, ask, and request (and similarly with respect to the notion of commitment associated with Subject Control verbs like promise when they select be allowed to complements). That is, one can demand/ask/request of someone that he or she do something (as in, e.g., I asked you to be quiet.), since the decision to act is within the requestee’s control. However, one cannot normally demand/ask/request of someone that he or she be allowed to do something, as being allowed to do something is generally not under that person’s control. (Permission from a third party is required.) For this reason, Control structures selecting be allowed to complements are argued by Sag & Pollard to be rescued via “coercion”: They are “coerced” into hidden causatives. Namely, the matrix subject in (19b) demands/asks/requests of the matrix object to cause someone to be allowed to perform the action denoted by the embedded verb. Thus, these verbs remain Object Control verbs: The matrix subject asks the matrix object to cause someone to do something. As, again, one cannot generally cause oneself to be allowed to do something, the

5 As will be discussed in Section 3.2, certain Obligatory Control verbs do not fit into the commitment, orientation, or influence categories envisaged by Sag & Pollard (1991). Three illustrative examples have been given below. In (i) and (ii), the French equivalents of the verbs confess and believe are Obligatory Subject Control verbs, yet neither seems to involve the matrix subject making a commitment to perform (or not to perform) the action denoted by the embedded verb. The same is true of the English verb strike in (iii). (i) J’ai avoué à ma mère [avoir oublié de donner à manger au chat]. I have admitted to my mother to-have forgotten of to-give to to-eat to-the cat ‘I admitted to my mother that I had forgotten to feed the cat.’ (ii) Je crois [avoir vu cet homme]. I believe to-have seen that man ‘I believe that I’ve seen that man.’ Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37) attributes (ii) to Jean-Roger Vergnaud and Jean-Yves Pollock (personal communications). (iii) Judy strikes Harry [as being much younger]. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 551)

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matrix subject (not the object) is understood to be the one being caused by the referent of the NP in object position to be allowed to do something. In short, so-called “shifts” in controller are argued by Sag & Pollard to not be actual shifts in controller at all: There is an implicit verb that is associated with an argument that is controlled by the argument of the matrix verb in the usual fashion. Although the “shifts” of controller revealed by Postal (1970: 474) examples of the type in (20a) – exemplified by his pair Bill asked Tom to fire the cannon. and Bill asked Tom when to fire the cannon. – are not discussed by Sag & Pollard (1991), it is possible to envisage how they might proceed. First, it seems plausible, and has, in fact, been suggested by Chomsky (1981a: 76), Farkas (1988: 32), and others, to recognize that the Obligatory Control verb ask not only has the wellknown “request someone to act/polite order” (influence) meaning (discussed by Sag & Pollard), favored in (22a), but also a less common (possibly dialectically restricted) “request for permission to act” (orientation) reading favored in (22b). (22)

a.

My mother asked me [to do the dishes].

b. If you want to go on the fieldtrip, you’ll need to ask your teacher (for permission) [to leave early]. That is, the “request someone to act” meaning in (22a) can be paraphrased as in (23a), whereas the “request for permission to act” reading can be rendered by (23b): Both uses of Obligatory Control ask involve the semantic notion (modality) of possibility, rendered by if in the paraphrases. (23)

a.

My mother asked me [if I would do the dishes].

b. You’ll need to ask your teacher [if you can leave early]. As Sag & Pollard suggest, the “request someone to act” meaning of ask in (22a) is an Object Control verb since it involves the notion of influence. As predicted by their theory, the “request for permission to act” reading in (22b) involves Subject Control as it involves orientation – a desire or hope on the part of the matrix subject to do something, on a par with a Subject Control verb like want. Interestingly, when the Control clause complement of ask takes the form of an indirect question, as in the Postal-inspired examples below in (24), neither the “request for permission to act” meaning nor the “request someone to act” reading is attested: ask can now only be understood literally – as “to inquire.”

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The notion of if is now absent. In other words, examples like (24) initially appear to be paraphrasable in the fashion in (25); i.e., they appear to be Obligatory Subject Control structures, as has, in fact, been argued in Landau (2003: 482, 483): (24)

a.

My mother asked me [when to do the dishes].

b. Students should ask the teacher [when to leave]. (25)

a.

My mother asked me [when she should do the dishes].

b. Students should ask the teacher [when they should leave]. The paraphrases in (25a,b), may, however, not be entirely accurate. Despite the apparent straightforward Obligatory Subject Control readings strongly favored by the infinitival indirect questions in (24), there appears to be good reason to recognize, with Chomsky (1980: 30, 8 (ft. 9)), Chomsky (1981a: 75), and others, that infinitival indirect questions are actually paraphrasable as either (26b), which Chomsky suggests is the Arbitrary reading of (26a), or as (26c), which he suggests is an Obligatory Control reading. (Landau (2003: 482–483, 493–494), in contrast, suggests that both readings are one and the same: Infinitival indirect questions involve a type of Obligatory Control that he calls Partial Control, a situation in which the reference of PRO must always include an argument in the matrix clause, although it may include others as well.) (26)

a.

At that point in the lecture, a clueless student asked the professor [when to project PRO and when not to].

b. At that point in the lecture, a clueless student asked the professor [when one should project PRO and when one should not]. c.

At that point in the lecture, a clueless student asked the professor [when he should project PRO and when he should not].

That such structures actually do, minimally, allow an Arbitrary Control reading (contra Landau (2003)) is supported by facts like those in (27a–c), in which clearly the reference of the understood subject of the when clause is not an argument in the matrix one: (27)

a.

In this joint, it’s clearly the waiter who decides [when to order], not the customer.

b. A good therapist should make it clear [when to give up and when to push on].

Movement theories of Control

(27)

c.

155

An elderly, infirm gentleman asks his gardener: I’ve always wondered [when (it is best) to trim trees] – before or after they bud?

In other words, the view being adopted at this point (more on this issue will be added in Section 3.2.2.1) is that infinitival indirect questions are contexts that minimally allow Arbitrary Control: Such constructions can express either what anyone should do, generally including the referents of the arguments in the matrix clause, or what some arbitrary, contextually determined individual or set of individuals should do. In short, Arbitrary PRO is semantically parallel in these respects to the French indefinite pronoun on, as made clear by on’s varying referents in the examples in (28a–c): (28)

a. Il faut faire attention où on marche ici. it is-necessary to-pay attention where one walks here ‘It is necessary to watch one’s step when walking through here.’ b. On dit que Patrick sort avec une fille qui s’appelle Cécile. one says that Patrick is-going-out with a girl who self calls Cecile ‘They say that Patrick is now going out with a girl named Cecile.’ c. An officer, seeing a soldier walking around town when he’s supposed to be on base says: Alors, comme ça, on se promène en ville? so like that one self walks in town ‘Well now, so you’re walking around town, are you?’

The question remains, of course, whether the apparent Obligatory Control readings in (24) above are due to the fact that indirect questions are ambiguous, as claimed in Chomsky (1981a: 75), or whether indirect questions involve only Arbitrary Control, with apparent “controlled” readings arising from pragmatic factors, in a fashion entirely parallel to French on. Under the latter view, for example, the readings indicated in (24) would be attributed to the fact that, in general, one asks when to do something it is because one intends to do it oneself. This question will be left unanswered for the moment, as it more properly figures into the discussion of Section 3.2.2.1 and Chapter 7. At any rate, regardless of which approach to infinitival indirect questions one favors, it is clear that these constructions are incompatible with the Obligatory Control use of the verb, the one in which ask expresses a request for either someone else to act or for oneself to be given permission to do so. The question

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then is why this should be so. A plausible hypothesis would be that in the former case, ask semantically selects a clause associated a modality of possibility (involving existential quantification over a set of accessible possible worlds), whereas infinitival indirect questions are clauses associated with a modality of necessity (involving universal quantification over a set of accessible worlds). Put informally, when one asks when to do the dishes, one is not asking if the dishes should be done. One is presupposing that they must or should be done and is asking when that task is to be undertaken. In short, it seems plausible to suggest that the Obligatory Control uses of ask (the request uses) select a clause type (modality of possibility) at odds with the modality associated with infinitival indirect questions (necessity). For this reason, when ask selects an infinitival indirect question as its object, the verb only retains its literal “to inquire” meaning, which is compatible with a presupposition of necessity. (One can inquire when something must/should be done.) If this is true, then we can conclude that the Postal-type “shifts of controller” exemplified by pairs like Bill asked Tom to fire the cannon. and Bill asked Tom when to fire the cannon. are likewise not shifts in controller at all. The two ask’s in his examples are not one and the same. The verb ask can mean “request” or “inquire” and only the latter is compatible, in terms of modality, with infinitival when clauses.6 Although brief, this discussion shows, at least in general terms, just how a semantic approach to antecedent resolution in Control contexts provides a plausible approach to accounting for examples that run counter to the MDP or MLC. More importantly for present purposes, however, it is also now obvious why authors like Culicover & Jackendoff (2001) and Landau (2003) have taken issue with Hornstein’s MTC on the basis of such data: As explained above, his theory must treat all of the examples in (19)–(21), (22b), and (24) as “marked,” i.e. learned, structures that fall outside core grammar, a move that some have judged to be illegitimate in light of the fact that (a) such “oddities” appear open to a natural explanation in semantic terms and (b) the very same “exceptions” exist in literally every known human language, a universal remarked upon by such authors as Radford (1981: 381), Comrie (1984), and Sag & Pollard (1991: 65).

6 This analysis, however, leaves unanswered the logical question of why the literal “inquire” reading is absent in non-interrogative Control structures. For example, why can’t Bill asked Tom to fire the cannon. mean Bill asked Tom if someone would fire the cannon.? In other words, why does a verb like ask have an Arbitrary Control reading only when its Obligatory Control readings result in semantic deviance? We will return to this, and other issues involving antecedent resolution in Control structures in Section 3.2.2.1 and Chapter 7.

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A second related, although not identical, problem is posed by the issue of antecedent resolution in the Obligatory Control use of adjunct clauses. Hornstein (1999: 76–77, 88–90) focuses his attention on the Obligatory Control use of verbal adjuncts of the after, before, without, and while-type. As discussed earlier in Section 2.2.5, Williams (1985: 298, 308–313) made the interesting observation that on their Obligatory Control use, these types of adjuncts (unlike others to be discussed shortly) uniquely involve Subject Control, as demonstrated by the facts below in (29).7 That is, the example in (29a) first establishes that there is no restriction on objects binding into these types of adjuncts. Sentence (29b) then shows that a thematic object in surface subject position can function as the controller for the understood subject of these adjuncts. Finally, (29c) demonstrates that a syntactic object cannot do so. Two additional examples illustrating 7 As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 7, Williams (1992) has observed that when a syntactic controller is not available, as in the examples below in (i)–(iii), verbal while-type adjuncts may, under appropriate pragmatic conditions, license Arbitrary Control readings. (Equivalent French data have been added to demonstrate that the licensing of an Arbitrary reading is not in some way contingent upon there being an –ing-type, as opposed to an infinitival, adjunct.) (i) It rained [while/before crossing the Rockies]. (ii) Several different options were explored [before finally giving up]. (iii) Plusieurs solutions ont été envisagées [avant d’abandonner, faute de fonds]. several solutions have been envisaged before of to-abandon fault of funds ‘Several different options were explored before finally giving up, due to a lack of funds.’ The same is true of certain purposive adjuncts in both English and French, as the examples in (iv)–(v) make clear: (iv) a. A citation was issued [for leaving the scene of the crime]. b. Atonement has now been made [for having committed a venial sin]. (v) Un procès verbal sera rédigé [pour avoir fuit les lieux de l’accident]. a trial verbal will-be written for to-have fled the scene of the accident ‘A citation will be issued for having fled the scene of the accident.’ In this respect, these types of adjuncts contrast with Rationale Clauses, as a comparison of the facts above in (i)–(v) with those in (vi) below makes clear: (vi) a. *Mary was arrested [to indict Bill]. b. *The ship was sunk [to become a hero]. c.

Williams (1985: 309) Lasnik (1988: 12)

*The court was petitioned [to receive a fairer sentence].

d. *Thirty Hail Marys were recited [to be forgiven]. That is, it was noted earlier in Section 2.2.5, that sentences like (vii) below, which authors like Chomsky (1981a: 77) erroneously characterized as involving Arbitrary Control, were later convincingly argued by both Williams (1985: 308–313) and Lasnik (1988: 9–16) to involve Obligatory Event Control. I.e., the understood subject of the adjunct clause in such cases is argued by both Lasnik and Williams to be controlled by the entire event denoted by that clause. In

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the Subject Control restriction on the Obligatory Control use of while-type adjuncts, drawn from Hornstein (1999: 88), are provided in (30). (29)

a.

David notified every studentx [before theirx taking the exam].

b. Every student was notified [before taking the exam]. c. *David notified every student [before taking the exam]. (30) John heard Mary leave [without/after entering the room]. Hornstein (1999: 88–90) shows that his MTC correctly captures this fact. To see how, consider the derivation that his system associates with a sentence like (31a), namely, the one in (31b): (31)

a.

David should notify every student [before leaving for Spring Break].

b. David should [VP/VP [VP (David) notify every student] [before [ IP (David) ing [VP (David) leaving for Spring Break]]]]. Hornstein argues that only the derivation of (31a) given in (31b) converges because only it allows for every NP to check its Case feature. To explain, in (31b), David first merges and checks the external theta-role of leave; then it other words, it is the event of the books being sold that “helps” the refugees, in a fashion parallel to Williams’ well-known example of Event Control in (viii). (vii) The books were sold [to help the refugees].

Chomsky (1981a: 77)

(viii) Grass is green [to promote photosynthesis].

Williams (1985: 310)

One final clarification, Chomsky (1982: 46) observes that the addition of a modal frequently results in a fully grammatical Rationale Clause adjunct with what appears to be an Arbitrary reading, as in the examples below in (ix). If this were indeed the case, such data would counterexemplify the claim above to the effect that infinitival Rationale Clauses are not associated with Arbitrary readings. (ix) a. The court should be petitioned [to receive a fairer sentence]. b. Thirty Hail Marys must be recited [to obtain forgiveness]. However, Williams (1985: 312–313) suggests that, in these cases, the modal verb s-selects both an implicit thematic subject and a complement clause, namely, the “adjunct,” which is functioning here as an argument. Put differently, modals express what an implicit argument should/must do in order to do Y. Thus, examples like those in (ix) actually involve Obligatory (implicit) argument Control into a complement clause, on a par with examples of the type below in (x), which were discussed in Section 2.2.5. (x) [Any attempt [PRO to leave]] will be thwarted.

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159

moves to Spec of –ing to check –ing’s D-features. Importantly, every student cannot merge in the Spec of –ing instead of David because David would then be blocked by the Minimal Link Condition from ever moving over the “closer” DP every student to check its Case. Next, David raises from the Spec of IP of the adjunct to check the external theta-role of notify, a movement that does not violate the MLC because every student, previously merged in the complement position of notify, and David, in the Spec of IP of the adjunct, do not c-command one another, nor does the target of movement c-command them both. Thus, David and every student are not in the type of “proximity” relation that is relevant for the MLC. On the other hand, if every student were to move up to check the external theta-role of notify, then again David would be barred by the MLC from ever checking its Case: Both the Nominative and Accusative Case positions c-command every student and David and, thus, the MLC blocks movement of David over the “closer” target every student in both instances. In short, Hornstein’s system correctly predicts that the Obligatory Control use of while-type adjuncts involves Subject Control: Given the MLC and the need for both NPs to check Case, the only convergent derivation for a VP-adjunct is one in which the surface subject of the main clause is not also the thematic object of that clause. The problem with this account, noted in part by Hornstein (1999: 76, ft. 10), is that it has been well known since Chomsky (1981a: 77) that purposive adjuncts do not exhibit this restriction. More specifically, our discussion in the previous chapter showed that while in certain instances these types of adjuncts do appear to exhibit the obligatory Subject Control reading expected under Hornstein’s MTC (see, e.g., the sentences below (32)), in other cases, they instead seem to involve Obligatory Object Control (cf. the examples in (33)) and, in still others, either Subject or Object Control is possible (as in (34)): (32)

a.

I sold the boat [(in order) to save money].

Rosenbaum (1967)

b. The prisoner petitioned the judge [for having received an unfair sentence]. c.

They recited thirty Hail Marys [for having committed a venial sin].

d. I’ll bathe the kids for a whole week [for having stuck you with it for the last month]. e.

J’ai taquiné Paul [pour faire chier sa soeur]. I have teased Paul for to-make to-shit his sister ‘I teased Paul [in order to piss off his sister].’

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Movement and implicit argument approaches to Control

(32)

f. Paul nourrit les pauvres [pour aller au paradis]. Paul feeds the poor for to-go to-the paradise ‘Paul feeds the poor to get into paradise.’

(33)

a.

I bought Bill a book [to give to Mary].

b. They punished John [for driving drunk]. c.

Chomsky (1981a: 77) Hornstein (1999:76, ft.10)

They cited Chomsky [for having made that observation in the 80s].

d. I thanked them [for doing that]. (34) John hired Mary [to fire Bill].

Manzini (1983: 428)

The problem that purpose and rationale adjuncts pose for Hornstein’s MTC is this: If only structural factors determine the understood controller of adjunct clauses, as he argues in relation to while-type adjuncts like the one in (31) above, then how can the same factors result in Obligatory Subject control in adjoined structures like (32), Obligatory Object Control in ones like (33), and allow both Subject and Object Control in instances like (34)? The only option available, which Hornstein (1999: 76 (ft. 10)) adopts, following the tradition of Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68) and Manzini (1983: 427–428), is that purposive adjuncts contrast with while-type adjuncts in that only the former may adjoin to different positions. I.e., Obligatory Subject Control structures are (as before) attributed to VP-adjunction and Obligatory Object Control ones to adjunction to a lower (unspecified) phrase. Apparently, ambiguous structures allow either attachment site. While not implausible, this account still leaves unexplained why the same type of adjunct (e.g. a for-clause) must adjoin to VP in the case of (32b–d), but must adjoin lower in the examples in (33b–d), while other types of purposive adjuncts allow either option, as in (34). Clearly something more must be said and, as was true of the earlier facts involving the choice of Obligatory Subject versus Object versus Arbitrary Control in complement position, a semantic solution comes to mind in certain instances. Consider, for example, the contrasting selection of controller in the two examples repeated below in (35): (35)

a.

They punished John [for driving drunk].

Hornstein (1999:76, ft.10)

b. They recited thirty Hail Marys [for having committed a venial sin].

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The Subject/Object Control difference in the preceding sentences seems to straightforwardly follow from a difference in meaning between the verbs punish and recite: Specifically, for-clauses provide the reason why an Event is taking place. Therefore, it is logical in the case of a verb like punish that the punishing event is taking place because of something the matrix object – the person being punished – has done, not because of something the punisher has done. However, in the case of recite, it is logical that it is subject – the person doing the reciting – that is doing so because of something he or she has done, not, obviously, because of something a Hail Mary has “done.” In other words, the facts involving purposive adjuncts again point to the conclusion that lexical semantic factors can play a pivotal role in antecedent resolution in control structures: a purely structural condition like the MDP or the MLC cannot be the only factor at work in making these determinations, an issue to which we will return later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 7. A third aspect of Hornstein’s MTC that researchers like Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 495–498, 500) and Landau (2003: 481–484) have taken issue with is its approach to Arbitrary (a.k.a. Non-Obligatory, Free/Nearly Free) Control. In his article, Hornstein (1999: 72–75, 78, 90–93) defends the view that sentences of the type in (36), drawn from his article, involve not PRO (which he has entirely eliminated from the grammar), but pro, a phonetically non-overt, Caseless pronoun that, in English, encodes either a definite (e.g. (36a)) or an indefinite ((36b,c)) reading. (36) a.

John thinks that it is believed [that [pro shaving himself ] is important].

b. It is impossible [pro to win at roulette]. c.

John told Sam [how pro to hold oneself erect at a royal ball].

The appearance of pro (in English) is limited to configurations in which the movement derivation, deriving Obligatory Control, is barred. That is, insertion of pro in this language is costly: It is done only as a Last Resort, in a fashion parallel to do-support. Thus, one finds insertion of pro in a structure like (36a) because the sentential subject, of which pro is the external argument, constitutes an island (as does the embedded tensed clause); one again finds pro in contexts like (36b,c) because both an indirect question clause and the clause c-selected by adjectives like impossible take the form of CP – again, a well-known barrier to movement. As Hornstein (1999: 72–75) points out, this pro approach to Arbitrary Control straightforwardly accounts for many of the areas in which Arbitrary Control is

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well known to differ from Obligatory Control. Namely, a comparison of the examples below in (37a,b) with their Obligatory Control counterparts above in (7a,b) reveals that only in the latter context does one find a c-command requirement on the antecedent of the Control clause: (37)

a.

It was believed [that [pro shaving] is important].

b. The mayor’s campaign manager thinks [that [pro keeping his sex life under control] would increase his chances of winning the election]. Specifically, the contrast between (7a,b) and (37a,b) naturally follows from Hornstein’s proposals since Obligatory Control now reduces to movement (hence, conditions on chains account for the necessity of a c-commanding antecedent), while Arbitrary Control arises from the Last Resort insertion of pro – a non-overt pronominal that, like the overt pronouns in (38), may establish its referent through discourse: (38) a.

It was believed [that it was important for one to shave every day].

b. The mayor’s campaign manager thinks [that [for him to keep his sex life under control] is essential during this election year]. Furthermore, Obligatory and Arbitrary Control structures are well-known to contrast in that only the latter allow a strict reading under VP-Ellipsis, as a comparison of (9) above with (39) below reveals: (39) John thinks [that [pro getting his résumé in order] is essential] and Bill does too. (The strict reading, in which Bill thinks that John should get his résumé in order, is available.) This difference, Hornstein argues, also follows from a Movement versus pro derivation: Raising constructions were shown above in (10) to pattern with Obligatory Control configurations in disallowing strict readings; overt pronominals, such as the one below in (40), behave like pro in (39) in licensing them: (40) John thinks [that [for him to get his résumé in order] is essential] and Bill does too. (The strict reading, in which Bill thinks that John should get his résumé in order, is available.)

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In a similar fashion, Hornstein’s proposals predict (in his view, correctly) that Arbitrary Control configurations differ from Obligatory Control structures in that only the former ever allow “split” antecedents (cf. (11a) above and (41a) below), and only they allow non-de se interpretations (cf. (12) and (41b)). (We will return to validity of the former claim below.) (41)

a.

John told Mary [that [pro washing each other/themselves] would be fun].

b. The Unfortunate thinks [that [pro getting a medal] would be boring]. (The understood subject can refer to someone other than the Unfortunate.) As one would expect under Hornstein’s approach, overt pronouns again pattern with Arbitrary Control structures in these two respects, as revealed by the sentences in (42): (42)

a.

John told Mary [that [for them to wash each other] would be fun].

b. The Unfortunate thinks [that [for him to get a medal now] would be boring]. (The understood subject can refer to someone other than the Unfortunate.) While these positive results are appealing, a number of important technical questions arise in relation to this pro approach to Arbitrary Control, a fact that Hornstein (1999: 91–92, ft.s 38 & 41) acknowledges, at least in part. For example, one wonders why pro in English is only licensed in the subject position of untensed clauses (unlike the pro of Romance languages, such as Italian and Spanish); why pro cannot be expletive in just this language, etc. Even assuming that these issues could be resolved, separate empirical problems arise. To provide a novel illustration of one such problem (others can be found in Chapter 5, as well as in Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 495–498, 500) and Landau (2003: 481–484)), consider first the contrast in grammaticality in (43), originally observed in Williams (1985: 308–309): (43)

a.

The game was played [PRO nude].

b. *The game was played [PRO mad at Bill].

Roeper (1983) Williams (1985: 309)

As mentioned earlier, Williams (1985) argues that interpretive considerations indicate that the preceding structures involve Obligatory Event Control. Namely,

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nude and mad at Bill do not denote properties of the game – the game itself is not nude or mad at Bill – instead, nude and mad at Bill describe properties of events of game-playing: This is a game typically played nude or drunk (it’s a “nude game” or a “drinking game”), etc. For this reason, (43b) is unacceptable: There are no games typically played mad at a specific individual known as Bill (i.e., there are no “mad at Bill games”). Given these interpretive facts, Hornstein (1999) would be led to analyze predication structures like these not in terms of movement of the game out of the embedded clause (that would, e.g., incorrectly predict that the game is nude in (43a)), but via insertion of pro, bound by the event denoted by the main clause, as in (44) below. In other words, predication structures would be treated in a fashion parallel to examples like (45): (44) a.

The game was played [pro nude].

b. *The game was played [pro mad at Bill]. (45) John told Mary [that [pro bathing (themselves/oneself )] is important]]. The problem now is that Hornstein has proposed that in English, pro is limited to contexts of Arbitrary Control (i.e. those in which movement is barred): Namely, insertion of pro is a costly operation employed only as a Last Resort. Because of the syntactic configurations in which it is licensed, pro in this language may establish its reference in a variety of ways, like other pronouns. It may, for example, do so via a generic operator, as in (46a), via syntactic binding, as in (46b), or via discourse, as in (46c): (46) a.

It was believed [that [pro shaving] is important].

b. John thinks that it was believed [that [pro shaving himself ] is important]. c.

Mary was baffled. [[Even after pro revealing her innermost feelings], John remained untouched]. Landau (2003: 482)

Problematically, however, pro in predication structures like (44) is subject to Obligatory Control by the Event denoted by the matrix clause; otherwise, one is left without an explanation for the contrast in (44a) and (44b). In short, the appealing distinction that Hornstein was originally able to draw between contexts of Obligatory Control (involving licit movement) and Non-Obligatory Control (barred movement) is now lost. The facts in (44) show that there are

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instances of Obligatory Control that must involve pro. Given that, anyone adopting this approach must now undertake the difficult task of clearly defining just when Obligatory Control involves movement and when it involves pro. Such an account would need to make it clear, among other things, why only certain nonovert pronouns (those in predication structures like (44)) must be syntactically bound, a very odd result for a pronoun, a type of nominal normally assumed to only be subject to a disjointness requirement (Principle B). In addition to these problems, Hornstein (1999: 90, ft. 35) also mentions some further issues faced by the present form of his analysis. Specifically, he notes that treating Obligatory Control as a type Raising (albeit with multiple theta-marking) appears to leave unexplained a number of differences in syntactic behavior well known to exist between configurations of Control and A-Movement. For example, he thanks Tim Stowell (p.c.) for bringing to his attention facts observed in Chomsky (1970) showing that noun-complement constructions permit Control, but not Raising – contrasts that are unexpected if the two phenomena are one and the same: (47)

a.

Mary’s desire [PRO to win]

b. *Mary’s appearance [t to win] Apparently equally problematic, he notes, are certain si-reflexivization data in Italian, discussed by Burzio (1986: Ch. 1), among others, to which Landau (2003: 488–493) adds established differences in each-association in English, discussed in Burzio (1981), contrasts in en-cliticization in Raising and Control configurations, uncovered in Ruwet (1972), and the case concord data in “case rich” languages like Icelandic, discussed briefly above in Section 2.3.3. Since, as Hornstein himself points out, an account of such differences may, theoretically, lie in a more articulated theory of his MTC, we will leave these particular issues aside and instead conclude our overview of his approach by mentioning just three other areas (in addition to those to be introduced at various points in Chapters 4–6) that appear particularly intractable to an analysis of Obligatory Control in terms movement.8 First, as has been mentioned at various points in this work, it has been widely assumed since Williams (1980) and Lebeaux (1985) that Obligatory Control configurations do not license “split antecedents,” as indicated by interpretive facts of the type in (48):

8 See, e.g., Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes (2010) for a Movement account of case concord data in Raising and Control configurations in Icelandic.

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(48) a.

*John told Mary [to wash each other/themselves].

b. *John urged Mary [to wash each other/themselves]. As indicated above, Hornstein (1999: 73, 80) also makes this assumption and, in fact, shows that it is entailed by his analysis: That is, two non-conjoined NPs, like those in (48a,b), cannot both have moved from the same position. A serious problem for this view, however, is the well-known existence of data of the type in (49), in which one does find the understood subject of the Control clause referring to two distinct arguments of the matrix one: (49) a.

John proposed to Mary [to help each other]. Koster & May (1982: 138)

b. I promised my children [to all go to Disneyland together next year]. c.

Tim suggested to Masahiro [to introduce themselves to Bill]. (49b,c) are based on similar sentences in Madigan (2008: 494)

Arguments in favor of the view that the preceding examples do involve Obligatory, not Arbitrary, Control can be found in Madigan (2008: 494–496). First, Madigan notes that the understood referent of the Control clause in these cases cannot ever refer to some arbitrary individual: it must refer to one or both of the arguments of the matrix verb, as made clear by the contrast in grammaticality between (50a) and the Arbitrary configuration in (50b): (50) a. *John proposed to Mary [to help oneself ]. b. John said to Mary [that [to help only oneself ] is unwise]. Furthermore, Madigan notes that, in contrast to configurations of Arbitrary Control, split antecedent examples of the type in (49) also disallow long-distance control, as evidenced by the data in (51a,b), in which the boldface indicates which NPs are intended to serve as controllers: (51)

a. *Bill thought that Jim proposed to Mary [to hug each other]. b. Bill thought that Jim told Mary [that [hugging each other] was wrong].

In addition, he shows that split antecedent contexts of the type in (49) contrast with contexts of Arbitrary Control in disallowing strict readings under VPEllipsis, as evidenced by his example in (52a), which is to be compared, in this respect, with an example involving Arbitrary Control, such as the one repeated below in (52b), due to Hornstein (1999):

Movement theories of Control

(52)

a.

167

Jim proposed to Mary [to leave themselves open to criticism] and Bill did too. (Disallows the strict reading in which Bill also proposed to Mary that Jim and Mary should leave themselves open to criticism.)

b. John thinks [that [pro getting his résumé in order] is essential] and Bill does too. (The strict reading, in which Bill also thinks that John should get his résumé in order, is available.) Finally, Madigan shows that examples of Obligatory Control involving split antecedents also differ from contexts involving Arbitrary Control in that the former disallow de re readings, as made clear by his data in (53a), which contrasts with the earlier Hornstein example repeated in (53b): (53)

a.

A man with amnesia, Bill, is watching television with his friend Mary. They are watching a program where they are shown in an ongoing courtroom case. Furthermore, it seems as if both of them may go to jail. Suddenly, Bill has the thought that Mary and the man on TV, who he does not know is himself, should lie in order to not go to jail. So. . . *Bill proposed to Mary [to perjure themselves]. (Bill cannot be suggesting to Mary that she and the man on TV, who he does not believe is himself, perjure themselves.)

b. The Unfortunate thinks [that [pro getting a medal] would be boring]. (The understood subject can refer to someone other than the Unfortunate.) In short, there appears to be strong support for the view that Obligatory Control is involved in contexts of the type in (49), a fact that is at odds with Hornstein’s Movement approach to deriving Obligatory Control readings as it rules out such a possibility. An additional type of attested empirical fact that is incorrectly prohibited by Hornstein’s (1999) movement approach to Obligatory Control is noted in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 508), who observe, on the basis of data drawn from Perlmutter (1971), that verbs like say, shout, yell, scream, and signal all have the distinguishing property of being Obligatory Object Control verbs even when the object is syntactically unexpressed (i.e. implicit), as evidenced by their data in (54):

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(54) a.

Johni shouted (to Sallyk) [to take care of *herk /herselfk/himi / *himself i ].

b. Johni yelled (to Sallyk ) [to take care of *herk /herselfk /himi /*himself i ]. If Obligatory Object Control reduces to Movement, as Hornstein claims, it is not at all obvious how to derive the attested Obligatory Object Control readings in these cases since the controller is implicit, i.e. cannot have undergone syntactic movement out of the embedded clause. Finally, we conclude by observing, in a fashion akin to Landau (2003: 488– 489), that, in many languages (among them, French, Italian, Dutch, Swedish, Icelandic, and Hebrew), there exist Obligatory Control, but never Raising, constructions, in which the embedded infinitival clause is introduced by an overt element in the C system, as made clear by the following French examples: (55)

a. Il est payé [à PRO ne rien faire]. he is paid to Neg nothing to-do ‘He’s paid to do nothing.’ b. Marie a promis [de PRO ne rien faire]. Marie has promised of Neg nothing to-do ‘Marie promised not to do anything.’

Extending argumentation based on Italian facts in Rizzi (2001: 288), it will be assumed here that in the examples in (55), French à ‘to’ and de ‘of’ appear in the head of FinP, itself ultimately dominated by TopP, given the relative ordering of left dislocated topic phrases like ce toit ‘this roof’ and à ‘to’/de ‘of’ in an example like (56): (56)

Il avait promis [TopP ce toit [FinP de [ IP le réparer]]]. he had promised this roof of it-ACC to-repair ‘He promised that this roof, he would fix.’

The preceding facts may be problematic for Hornstein’s analysis as his approach requires IP complementation in order for an Obligatory Control reading (derived via movement) to result. Given this, one must either assume that, for some reason or other, the controller in these examples can move out of TopP, a potentially problematic move, or, alternatively, that these structures involve insertion of a pro that must, for some reason or other, be bound, an undesirable result as well.

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In summary, Hornstein’s novel Movement Theory of Control (MTC) is appealing because it “down-sizes” the theoretical mechanisms needed to account for a surprising range of empirical facts involving Control. His theory, we have seen, has no need for PRO, for null Case, for a theory of Control, or even for the Minimalist version of the Theta Criterion. While this allows Hornstein to capture some of the basic distributional and interpretive properties of Control structures, it has also been shown to repeatedly face serious, perhaps intractable, problems in one very specific area – that of antecedent resolution. (Distinct types of structurally based problems associated with this approach will be introduced in Chapter 5.) Specifically, the preceding discussion has shown that Hornstein’s analysis makes the following, very strong, claim: Due in part to the MLC, Obligatory Control readings always reduce to movement of the syntactically “closest” NP appearing in the matrix clause at Spell-Out; Arbitrary Control readings arise elsewhere via insertion of pro. Five distinct areas were shown to counterexemplify this claim. First, we discussed the non-negligible number of universally attested grammatical sentences involving Control into complement clauses in which the more “distant” NP actually must serve as the controller. These were, of course, the well-known examples exemplified by (19)–(21) above, originally noted, but dismissed, in Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68), and later discussed in detail by such authors as Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3), Culicover & Jackendoff (2001) and Landau (2003), among many others. The latter researchers have argued, convincingly, in this author’s view, that this aspect of antecedent resolution is open to analysis in semantic terms. However, under Hornstein’s approach, they must be treated as “exceptional,” i.e. “outside core grammar.” Second, we noted that Hornstein’s analysis, as it stands, cannot offer an explanation for the “shifting” Obligatory Subject vs. Obligatory Object vs. Obligatory Subject or Object Control nature of purposive adjuncts, first noted, in part, in Chomsky (1981a). That is, in its present form, Hornstein’s MTC predicts that the adjunct clauses in examples like (32)–(34) must theoretically adjoin to either VP (generating an Obligatory Subject Control reading) or to a lower position (resulting in an Object Control reading). However, it cannot predict, for a given example, which adjunction site may or, in some cases, must be selected. Here, too, we noted that a semantic solution to the problem in many cases appears promising, a topic to which we will be returning in the next section. The equally problematic interpretive facts associated with predication structures of the type in (43) were considered next. Williams (1985) has shown that these sentences involve Obligatory (Event) Control. The novel observation was made that, under Hornstein’s approach, this means that they cannot be analyzed in terms of movement, as there is no candidate NP in the main clause that is

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associated with the property denoted by the predication structure (that property is predicated of the entire Event denoted by the main clause). Thus, such structures must involve insertion of pro, but then they should, by definition, be configurations of Arbitrary, not Obligatory, Control. In short, these data establish that Obligatory Control under this system no longer reduces to movement, raising the thorny questions of just when pro can be inserted to derive Obligatory Control readings and when it cannot, as well as why just this type of pro must be bound in some way by that matrix clause, when, normally, pronouns are not subject to such a requirement. Fourth, we noted with Hornstein (1999) that his analysis predicts that there should never be instances of Obligatory Control in which two non-conjoined NPs in the matrix sentence jointly serve as controllers since, logically, only one of those arguments could have undergone movement from the embedded clause. In short, his analysis precludes the existence of “split antecedents” in configurations of Obligatory Control, a prediction that is problematic since authors like Madigan (2008) have argued, convincingly in this author’s view, that such examples do exist (cf. the examples above in (49)). Fifth, we noted, with Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), that this analysis likewise cannot accommodate the existence of Obligatory Control by an implicit antecedent. Namely, contrasts of the type As I was getting on the train, my parents shouted to take good care of myself/*oneself. are wrongly predicted to be non-existent as the understood controller is not syntactically present, hence, precluding a Movement analysis. Finally, we observed that this approach, in its present form, wrongly predicts that certain Obligatory Control structures in the Romance languages should be configurations of Arbitrary Control. That is, the obligatory presence of an overt element in the C system in the complement clause to the French equivalent of a verb like promise indicates that such clauses take the form of TopP, a category that may well block movement of an NP out of that clause, thereby precluding an Obligatory Control reading under Hornstein’s theory. While Hornstein’s analysis clearly faces serious empirical problems with respect to antecedent resolution, in all fairness, it should be noted that competing PRO approaches to the phenomenon, in both their previous and current forms, were shown in the previous chapter to fare quite poorly in this respect as well. For example, we saw in Section 2.3.2.1 that the current null Case approach to PRO has literally nothing to say in this area, apparently relying on the sort of Theory of Control provided in Chomsky (1980, 1981a), minus his (1981a) assumptions relating to the [+pronominal], [+anaphoric] status of this empty category. That is, the current standard PRO approaches to Control appear to implicitly adopt the rules given in (76)–(78) of Chapter 2, yet Chomsky (1980, 1981a), we

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saw in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.1, has shown these rules to form an incomplete system at best. Left entirely unanalyzed, for example, are various phenomena involving Arbitrary and Obligatory Control in non-complement clauses, “shifts” in controller, and split antecedents. Furthermore, a lexical stipulation (the [+SC] feature) is needed in order to account for instances in which a “more distant” NP must function as controller. Given this, it hardly seems justified to reject Hornstein’s theory simply because it makes the wrong predictions in these very same areas. Having considered some of the positive and negative aspects of a typical Movement theory of Control, let us turn now to a brief overview of the third, currently existing type of theory of Control, namely, approaches in which the understood thematic argument of a Control clause remains syntactically unprojected

3.2 Implicit argument approaches to Control Although differing markedly from one another in virtually every other respect, the approaches to Control advocated by Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Brame (1978), Bach (1979), Bresnan (1982), Gazdar (1982), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Jackendoff (1990), and Sag & Pollard (1991), among others, do collectively share the hypothesis that in sentences like (57), there is no syntactically projected embedded thematic subject. (57)

a.

Emma tried [to play a very difficult piece on the piano].

b. Ellen persuaded Emma [to take LING 100]. In other words, these researchers adopt the view that in Control clauses, one finds neither a non-overt pronominal argument (PRO), as argued, e.g., in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), nor the non-overt copy of a moved nominal element, as suggested, e.g., in Hornstein (1999). Control structures are instead syntactically treated as “bare VPs,” which, in generative terminology, currently means that Control verbs and adjectives c-select for a VP clause that is not dominated by a vP (or, in the terms of Bowers (2002), a thematic PrP). In short, these theoreticians adopt the view that Control clauses are not dominated by a phrase headed by an external theta-role assigner, as indicated below in (58). (58) a.

Emma tried [VP to play a very difficult piece on the piano].

b. Ellen persuaded Emma [VP to take LING 100].

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This means, in turn, that these authors also assume that the understood thematic subject of a Control clause is an implicit argument: It is, e.g., simply part of the meaning of verbs like play and take that someone must do the playing of the piano in (58a) and do the taking of the course in (58b) and the lexical semantics of the matrix verbs determines in each case that the referent of Emma must be that person. This semantic fact, we will soon see, can be captured in a variety ways, among them, via an interaction of the argument/conceptual structure of the matrix verbs (or meaning postulates associated with them) with (their versions of ) the type of lexical entries examined earlier in Section 2.2.5 in relation to the discussion of Williams (1985), given below in (59). (59) a.

play: (Agent, Theme)

b. take: (Agent, Theme) Thus, these theories adopt the view that there is no a priori requirement like the Theta Criterion or the Principle of Full Interpretation that ensures that all of the arguments s-selected by a verb be projected into the syntactic structure. Separate considerations, which vary from framework to framework, make these determinations. In short, these authors assume that the control relationships involved in the syntactically distinct clausal types below in (60a–c) are all to be analyzed in parallel semantic terms, as originally suggested in Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3): It is the argument (a.k.a. conceptual) structure, or, alternatively, the lexical entailments associated with a given lexeme (and its derived forms) that determine(s) which argument is understood to be the controller. Given the meaning of the verb agree, for example, it must be the matrix subject in (60a) – the referent of the French – that controls the implicit subject of the embedded verb respect. For the same reason, it is the referents of the morphologically derived adjective modifying the nominal agreement – those of Anglo-French – that must serve as the controllers of the implicit Agent of the verb respect in (60b); and, finally, it is the meaning of the derived nominal agreement in (60c) that entails that its implicit Agent be controlled jointly by the matrix subject NP the French and the object NP (the British). (60) a.

The French have agreed [to respect our territorial claims].

b. The media have uncovered [a secret Anglo-French agreement [to respect each other’s territorial claims]]. Modification of an example in Postal (1969) c.

The French promised the British some sort of agreement before the end of this round of negotiations.

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The goal of this section is to take a closer look at these alternative theories of Control. The discussion will open in Section 3.2.1 with a concise overview of some representative analyses within the model-theoretic tradition. The proposal originally developed in Montague (1974: Ch. 8) will first be explored, followed by a discussion of the elaborations of that proposal put forth in Bach (1979) and Dowty (1985). More specifically, in that section, the mechanics of these modeltheoretic treatments of Control structures will first be clearly laid out. Then some key arguments that have been advanced in favor of them will be introduced and evaluated in critical terms. Section 3.2.2 will then provide a similar overview of a representative argument structure analysis of Control, namely, that of Sag & Pollard (1991), in addition to one based on conceptual structure, specifically, that of Jackendoff & Culicover (2003).

3.2.1 On some representative model-theoretic approaches to Control To begin, Montague (1974: Ch. 8) appears to have been the first to explicitly suggest that a Control clause takes the form of a “bare VP” that is idiosyncratically c-selected by a set of lexemes that would include verbs like try and persuade.9 Specifically, he put forth a set of categorial syntactic rules (which, in the interest of brevity, will not be overviewed here) that associate a sentence like Mary tried to win. with a syntactic structure equivalent to (61a) below. This configuration was then compositionally translated into Intensional Logic (IL) by a separate set of translation rules (which will also not be summarized in this work), with the category S (corresponding to Mary tried to win.) ultimately surfacing as the formula in (61b).10 The formula in (61b) embodies the claim that Control verbs like try take a property (that denoted, e.g., by win) as their internal argument and an NP-meaning (e.g. that associated with Mary) as their external one. In other words, in such an example, the individual known as Mary stands in a tryrelation to the property win, just as she would to the property denoted by happy in an example like Mary is happy.

9 As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, one could make a case for the claim that Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3) was actually the first to put forth an “implicit argument” approach to Control since he formulated an analysis in which the head noun corresponding to the thematic subject of a Control clause is not syntactically projected and is rendered interpretable by thematically-based semantic rules of (non)co-reference. 10 See Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981) or L.T.F. Gamut (1991) for a step-by-step introduction to the syntactic and semantic theories of Richard Montague.

174 (61)

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a.

b. try'(win')(Mary') In contrast, Montague’s analysis of verbs like believe and assert makes the claim that these verbs idiosyncratically c-select for full sentential complements, as indicated below in (62a). The matrix S, in this case, translates into Intensional Logic as in (62b), which analyzes verbs like believe as taking a proposition as their internal argument (that expressed, e.g., by Mary won.) and an NP-meaning (e.g. that associated with John) as their external one. In other words, in such an example, the individual known as John stands in the believe relation to the proposition denoted by Mary won. (62)

a.

b. believe'([win'(Mary')](John')) From this, it becomes clear that generativists as earlier as Chomsky (1965) and Rosenbaum (1967) diverge from semanticists like Montague (1974), Bach (1979), Dowty (1985), and others, in treating Control verbs in a fashion similar to verbs like believe; i.e., generativists assume a derivation similar (at least with respect to the issue of the syntactic projection of an embedded subject) to (62a, b) with respect to both classes of verbs. Turning now to how such authors approach the “Control problem,” let us begin by comparing the translation Montague and others have developed for a sentence containing a Subject Control verb, like try in (63a,b) below, with the one put forth for a sentence containing an Object Control one, such as persuade in (64a,b). (Those readers who are interested in the details of a categorial syntactic analysis of Object Control verbs are referred to Bach (1979).) (63)

a.

Mary tried to win.

b. try'(win')(Mary')

Implicit argument approaches to Control

(64) a.

175

Mary persuaded John to win.

b. persuade'(win')(John')(Mary') As indicated above, in the former case, the individual known as Mary stands in a try-relation to the property win. In the latter one, we now see, the individual known as Mary is analyzed as standing in the persuade to win relation to the individual known as John. Put differently, Mary is the external argument of a complex predicate persuade to win, while John is treated as the internal argument of that predicate. One question that now arises is this: To what degree does this semantic analysis capture the well-known fact that native speakers understand that Mary is the implicit thematic subject of the verb win in (63a) – not, say, some other discourse-relevant individual – and, similarly, how do they know that John (not, say, Mary) is the implicit Agent of the winning in (64a)? One possible answer to this question, the one that may have been implicitly being advanced in Montague (1974: Ch. 8), is that these aspects of lexical meaning should be left unanalyzed by the formal (logic-based) semantic system. That is, the only claim that Montague (1974) explicitly makes is that try is a function that takes as arguments a property (e.g. win) and an NP-meaning (e.g. that of Mary) and maps them onto a truth value in a given model. In no way does his system specify how native speakers decide, for a given world and time, if the sentence Mary tried to win. should be assigned a semantic value of truth or falsity. In other words, the semantic analysis he formulated does not capture the fact that native speakers judge Mary tried to win. to be true only if Mary (not someone else) is the one who wins in those possible situations in which Mary succeeds in her attempts (and likewise with respect to John in Mary persuaded John to win.). Leaving a given aspect of lexical meaning unspecified in this way is, in fact, not uncommon in model-theoretic semantics. For example, Montague likewise did not attempt to analyze more precisely the meaning of verbs like walk and run beyond saying that they are both functions from entities to truth values. I.e., John is walking/running. is assigned a semantic value of 1 (truth) if, and only if, the interpretation of John is a member of the set picked out by walking/ running at the index (world and time) under consideration. His semantic system again does not spell out certain properties that every native speaker knows are associated with both walking and running (e.g. movement), nor does it spell out what they are aware distinguishes them (e.g. speed). These aspects of lexical meaning, which do determine the truth value a given speaker will assign to an utterance on a particular occasion, remain unanalyzed, and there are at least three reasons for legitimately adopting such an approach.

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First, there are a myriad of meaning distinctions that undoubtedly exist, but that hold little import for the linguistic system at large. There is, consequently, little to be gained by analyzing them. For example, the similarities and differences in meaning between walk and run that were just mentioned above would fall into this class. In contrast, we will see below, the similarities and differences in meaning associated with determiners like every and some are generally viewed as worthy of analysis and so are spelled out, in various notationally distinct, but semantically equivalent, forms. In this author’s view, it seems unlikely that this would have been the motivation behind Montague’s apparent decision not to formally analyze the Control problem, as it seems to be an aspect of meaning well worth analysis, at least to the degree that such analysis proves possible. Secondly, it has long been acknowledged (see, e.g., Putnam (1975)) that certain aspects of meaning associated with lexemes are not so “logical” as to be entirely open to formal semantic treatment. E.g., with respect to the pair walk and run, it is impossible to formally specify just what degree of speed decisively distinguishes walking from running. Speakers will, in fact, sometimes make differing decisions on the matter. In relation to the Control problem, this possibility also seems unlikely to have been a decisive factor since native speakers, with the exception of certain examples involving split antecedents, agree on the issue of antecedent resolution. On the other hand, a third, more serious motivation that may underlie such a decision might be that it would entail incorporating into the formal semantic system entire theories of human actions, beliefs, knowledge, and so on. One good illustration of this sort of problem arises in connection to theta-roles like Agent, Patient, Theme, and Instrument. In many linguistic traditions, it is common to analyze the stone and the children in sentences like (65a,b) below as bearing distinct thematic roles: the stone is said to bear a Theme theta role (it is the entity that is understood to undergo the action denoted by roll), whereas the DP the children, in most situations at least, is analyzed as bearing an Agent theta-role (i.e., the children usually initiate the action denoted by roll). Generativists, for example, frequently claim that the verb roll may s-select for either an Agent or a Theme theta-role, accounting for the contrasting acceptability of Agent-Oriented Adverbs like intentionally in such examples. While researchers in other frameworks often propose that these thematic roles actually derive from other primitives of semantic theory (see, e.g., Jackendoff (1983, 1987)), the end effect in both cases is the same. (65) a.

The children (intentionally) rolled down the hill.

b. The stone (#intentionally) rolled down the hill.

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Model-theoretic semanticists often view such matters differently, however. (See, e.g., Cresswell (1978: 4).) According to this approach, the examples in (65a,b) above should receive entirely parallel semantic treatments: There is only one verb roll that s-selects for an external argument. Native speakers will associate a sentence like (65a) with a positive truth value in situations in which the children intentionally initiate the rolling, but would not do so with respect to sentences like (65b) only because of what they know about how the world works. Children intentionally do things, but stones do not. These distinctions, in short, do not have to be spelled out by the semantic system, but, rather, should be addressed in a separate, complementary theory of human understanding of the world, causation, and so on. Under this view, then an example like Mary tried to win. would only be assigned a semantic value of truth if Mary (not someone else) is understood to be the implicit thematic subject of the verb win only because native speakers know that only she can attempt some action (like winning) for herself to possibly achieve; she cannot literally attempt it for someone else to possibly realize. Likewise, if Mary persuades John to win, she cannot persuade him for herself (or someone else) to win. She can only convince him, the object of her persuasion, to himself attempt to win. In short, one possible “answer” to the Control problem is that this knowledge forms part of our understanding of how the world works and so is best left outside the formal semantic system (which does not mean, of course, that it is not worthy of analysis by researchers in other fields, such as natural language metaphysics or discourse structure). While Montague (1974: Ch. 8) may have been of this view (whether he was or was not is unclear), other model-theoretic semanticists, such as Bach (1979) and Dowty (1985), certainly are not. If one is of this latter view, then, in a system like Montague’s, the Control problem (like any lexical semantic distinction) can be formally analyzed in one of three ways, all of which give exactly the same results. One may either (i) fix the meaning of an expression (like try) by providing it directly with an Intensional Logic translation that specifies the relevant aspect(s) of meaning; alternatively, (ii) one may simply translate the lexical item into a constant of Intensional Logic of the same form (e.g., try would translate as try' in IL) and then restrict its meaning by associating it with a Meaning Postulate – a theoretical mechanism that narrows down the interpretation of the item by specifying as legitimate (or admissible) only those models in which the postulate is true, or, finally, (iii) one may provide no “special” IL translation, but give the lexical item a meta-language definition. All three of these options have, in fact, been employed in model-theoretic treatments of every and some, determiners that differ from one another in their lexical semantics in linguistically interesting ways. Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981),

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for example, employ the first option: They associate every with the IL translation below in (66), which specifies that every makes an assertion about two properties, P and Q (say, the properties denoted by student and walk) and for every individual x, if x has the first property P, then x must have the second property, Q, as well. In other words, a sentence like Every student walks. will be assigned a truth value of 1 (truth) only if it is the case that for every x such that x is a student, x also walks. (66) every translates into: λPλQox[P(x) → Q(x)] A determiner like some, on the other hand, is associated with the IL translation below in (67) which requires that only one individual x that has the property P must also have the property Q, capturing this well-known semantic difference between Every student is walking. and Some student is walking. (67) some translates into: λPλQpx[P(x) → Q(x)] Thomason (1976) captures the same facts in terms of the second option: He translates every as the IL constant every' and then associates it with the MP below in (68). This postulate specifies as admissible models, only those in which the postulate is true. In other words, the only models in which two properties can stand in the relation associated with every is those in which for every x, if x has the first property, x also has the second one. The MP associated with some would differ from that of every, as before, in being associated not with universal, but with existential quantification. (68) oPoQ□[every'(P)(Q) ↔ ox[P(x) → Q(x)]] And, finally, Cooper (1983) makes use of the third approach, proposing the meta-language definition in (69), a close reading of which reveals its equivalence to the two preceding options. (69) 7every8M,W,t,g is that function that applies to a property P and then to a property Q that yields the value true if and only if the extension of P is a subset of the extension of Q. In the model-theoretic literature that this author is familiar with, only the second option (the use of Meaning Postulates) is attested with respect to the Control problem. Both Bach (1979) and Dowty (1985), for example, take this route, although, as we will see shortly, their MPs are not entirely equivalent.

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Looking first at those briefly suggested in Bach (1979: ft. 7), the MP below in (70a) is offered for a typical Obligatory Subject Control verb (namely, promise), and the one in (70b) for an Object Control one (one e.g., like force): (70) a. aM b x b y b γ [promise' (x,y,γ) iff M(x,y,γ(x))] where M is an appropriate variable type. b. aR b x b y b γ [force' (x,y,γ) iff R(x,y,γ(y))] where R is an appropriate variable type. The MPs in (70a,b) narrow down the class of admissible models to those in which both postulates hold. Thus, (70a) requires that for each world in which the proposition expressed by Mary promised Bill to stay. is assigned a truth value of 1, the proposition Mary stayed. is also true. (The portion of the MP that ensures this is γ(x), where γ takes as its reference the property denoted by the Control clause and x is assigned the same reference as the subject of promise.) On the other hand, the MP in (70b) specifies that for each world in which the proposition expressed by Mary forced Bill to stay. is assigned a truth value of 1, the proposition Bill stayed. must be as well. (The portion of the MP that ensures this is γ(y), where γ, again, takes as its reference the property denoted by the Control clause, but y takes as its reference the object NP.) Turning now to Dowty’s (1985: 299–300) alternative, and slightly more restrictive, MPs, first, those below in (71a,b) are put forth in relation to Obligatory Subject Control verbs like manage or try. In these postulates, x is a variable ranging over the set of individuals; P is a variable over properties (namely, those denoted by the verb in the Control clause, e.g. the property denoted by win in Mary tried to win.); ∂ takes the value of any intransitive Control verb (e.g., try, manage, want, etc.); α is a property of NP-meanings – specifically, one entailment of α(x*) is assumed to be “x acts intentionally.”; and, finally, β is a relation between NP-meanings and propositions. Specifically, an instance of β([P(x*)]) (x*) would be “x intends that x’s actions will bring about P(x*).” (71)

a.

oxoP□[∂(P)(x*) → α(x*)]

b. oxoP□[∂(P)(x*) → β([P(x*)])(x*)] Thus, the MP in (71a) requires that for each world in which the proposition expressed by Mary tried to win. is assigned a truth value of 1, the proposition expressed by Mary acts intentionally. is also true. (This MP is intended to capture non-expletive and [+human] restrictions on the implicit subject of Control clauses.) The MP in (71b), on the other hand, imposes the further restriction that for each world in which the proposition expressed by Mary tried to win.

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is assigned a truth value of 1, the proposition expressed by Mary intends that her actions will bring about Mary winning. is also true. This MP is intended, of course, to determine the understood referent of the Control clause in configurations of Obligatory Subject Control. A comparison of Dowty’s proposals with those of Bach reveals that the two differ in that only Dowty imposes a requirement of intentionality on the understood subject of a Control clause (see Dowty’s MP in (71a)), allowing his system to capture both the unacceptability of sentences like *There tried to be a unicorn in the garden. and the oddness of examples like ?The proposition tried to be true. (Certain problems faced by this aspect of his proposal will be introduced later in this section, with additional discussion in Chapter 5.) In addition to these proposals, Dowty observes that Subject Control verbs like manage differ from those like try in that only the former would be associated with an additional MP (which he does not formalize) that would entail the realization of P(x*) – e.g., the truth of the proposition Mary wins. – in the real world. Verbs like try, he points out, would only be associated with such an entailment in worlds in which the matrix subject is successful in his or her attempts. As the reader may have anticipated, the postulates Dowty (1985: 300) puts forth in relation to Object Control verbs have parallel entailments, although, of course, another participant is now involved, namely, an object NP (y). These MPs have been provided below in (72a,b): (72)

a.

oxoyoP□[∂(P)(y*)(x*) → γ(y*)]

b. oxoyoP□[∂(P)(y*)(x*) → Ω([P(y*)])(x*)] The MP in (72a) has the same intended effect as (71a): With respect to a sentence like Mary forced John to leave., for example, it would require that for each world and time in which the proposition expressed by Mary forced John to leave. is assigned a truth value of 1, the proposition expressed by John is an Agent capable of forming intentions to act. is also true. Similarly, the MP in (72b) is intended to resolve the (Object) Control problem: In relation to Mary forced John to leave., for example, an instance of Ω([P(y*)])(x*) would be “As a result of x’s (i.e., the matrix subject’s) actions, y (the matrix object) comes to intend to act so as to bring about P(y*) – i.e. the matrix object’s leaving.11 11 As the reader may have noticed, Dowty’s (1985) system further differs from Bach’s (1979) proposal in that the former does not recognize that certain syntactically transitive verbs (like promise) are Subject, not Object, Control verbs. This problem could easily be rectified by associating such verbs with the following MP: (i) oxoyoP □[∂(P)(y*)(x*) → Ω([P(x*)])(x*)]

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As was true of Subject Control verbs, Dowty notes that Object Control verbs also differ with respect to whether or not they are also associated with an additional MP to the effect that the embedded proposition obtain in the real world (as would be the case for force) or in some set of possible worlds (as with persuade, for example). In sum, we have seen that those model-theoretic semanticists who adopt the view that it is desirable to formally analyze the Control problem do so in terms of Meaning Postulates that simply specify (among other things) the understood antecedent of a syntactically “subjectless” VP c-selected by a given Control head. While critics may be of the opinion that what these MPs do is stipulate the referent of the controller, advocates of such analyses point out that such “stipulations” are, in any event, already acknowledged to be necessary in order to account for control relations in Event Nominals like realization and agreement, as our discussion of Section 2.2.5 revealed. That is, even generativists currently assume that there is no PRO or NP copy referring to the thematic subject of agreement in examples like the ones repeated below in (73a,b), and even they assume, following Williams (1985), that the relevant control relations are lexically determined. Advocates of the “bare VP” approach note that the Event Nominals in (73a,b) do differ from verbal complement clauses like (73c) in terms of the syntactic category type of the head associated with the implicit Agent (a noun in (73a,b) versus a verb in (73c)). However, they argue that this is no reason to assume that an entirely distinct type of rules determines the understood controller in the latter type of structure, especially since it appears that the very same (lexical semantic) considerations are operative in both cases. (As before, some problems that arise in relation to this contention will be introduced momentarily, with additional discussion of related issues to be developed in Chapter 5.) (73)

a.

The media have uncovered [a secret Anglo-French agreement [to respect each other’s territorial claims]]. Modification of an example in Postal (1969)

b. The French promised the British some sort of agreement before the end of the end of this round of negotiations. c.

The French have agreed [to respect our territorial claims].

Having outlined the mechanics of three representative model-theoretic analyses of Control, let us now consider, in critical terms, a few of the key arguments that have been advanced in favor of them.

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First, as has been indicated above, it has been frequently suggested that simplicity considerations clearly support an implicit argument analysis of Control over both Movement and PRO approaches. For example, Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 501–502) emphasize the fact that the same lexically-based semantic considerations appear to be determining controller relations in both nominal and verbal clauses, so why complicate the grammar by assuming that distinct mechanisms are at work in the two cases? Furthermore, adopting a uniform “bare VP” approach to Control clauses allows one to entirely dispense with the abstract entity known as PRO, as well as the “Rules of Control” assumed to determine its reference, clearly an additional advantage. A partial rejoinder to this argument has, in fact, been revealed by our discussion of Williams (1985) in Section 2.2.5 above. There, we noted, with Williams, that Control into NPs differs significantly from Control into verbal clauses in at least three respects, all of which make a uniform syntactic analysis of the two clausal types suspect. To briefly reiterate that discussion, Williams (1985: 298) first notes that verbal while, before, and after-type verbal adjuncts differ from other types of adjuncts headed by a verbal element (specifically, Purpose Clauses) in that the former exhibit a strong restriction on the possible antecedent of its understood subject in non-Arbitrary contexts: Namely, the understood subject of a while-type verbal adjunct can only refer to the surface subject of the main clause. That is, while example (74a) shows that there is no semantic restriction on objects binding into these adjuncts when the subject of the adjunct is overt, (74b,c) show that such is not the case when it is non-overt. In the latter case, the understood subject of the verbal adjunct must refer to the surface subject of the main clause, never to its syntactic object. (74)

a.

David notified every studentx [before theirx taking the exam].

b. Every student was notified [before taking the exam]. c.

David notified every student [before taking the exam]. (The understood subject of the before clause must refer to David.)

Interestingly, Williams observes, this restriction is lifted when while-type adjuncts are headed not by a verb, but by an Event Nominal. That is, unlike the verbal adjuncts above in (74b,c), the Event Nominals below in (75) allow not only the expected reading in which the implicit thematic subject is controlled by the argument in subject position in the main clause (cf. (75a)), but also one in which that argument is controlled by the main clause object (75b):

Implicit argument approaches to Control

(75)

a.

183

The leaves should not be treated [before desiccation/dehydration].

b. You should not treat the leaves [before desiccation/dehydration]. If advocates of a bare VP approach to Control are correct in their contentions that verbal and nominal while-type adjuncts are equivalent with respect to both the syntactic status of their understood subjects (it is implicit) and the manner in which the controller is established (via lexical semantics), then it is not at all obvious why such a difference should exist. If, on the other hand, one assumes that the two constructions differ fundamentally in their syntactic and, consequently, relevant semantic properties (namely, controller determination), then such contrasts are to be expected. Williams (1985: 306) next observes that NP Control differs markedly from Control into verbal clauses in being able to make reference to “multiple” instances of an implicit argument in certain cases. That is, in (76) below, a Condition C effect obtains with respect to both the non-overt subject (the promiser) and the non-overt indirect object of promise (the recipient of the promise); i.e., John must be disjoint in reference not only from the understood Agent of the Event Nominal promise, but also from its Goal. Nothing remotely similar to this is ever attested in verbal contexts, in which specific a syntactic position (the surface subject of the Control clause) is uniquely and consistently targeted. (76) [The promise that John would win] pleased him. Thirdly, Williams’ (1985: 308–315) work establishes that while the understood subject of a verbal clause may itself serve as the antecedent of the understood subject of a separate verbal adjunct clause (cf. (77a) below), the understood subject of NP, unexpectedly, cannot (see (77b)). In this respect, again, the covert subject of a verbal clause behaves like other syntactically projected, (although phonetically overt) NPs, such as you in (77c), whereas the understood subject of NP of an Event Nominal behaves unlike them. (77)

a.

[[To sell those books now] [without even looking them over first]] might be unwise.

b. *[[A sale of those books now] [without even looking them over first]] might be unwise. c.

[[For you to sell those books now] [without even looking them over first]] might be unwise.

The conclusion that emerges from these data (as well as separate facts to be introduced in Chapter 5) is that the syntax of nominal and verbal clauses is not

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the same with respect to the obligatory projection of s-selected external arguments. As a consequence of this, the reference of that argument in the two types of clauses, for some reason, cannot be determined in exactly the same manner, although, clearly, lexical semantic factors can play a role in both cases. Turning now to a second argument that has been advanced in support of a “bare VP” approach to Control, Chierchia (1984a) and later Dowty (1985: 319– 321) note that under Montague’s (1974) analysis of Control, the following intuitively valid argument is immediately captured: (78) a.

Premise 1:

Whatever Mary likes, John likes.

b.

Premise 2:

Mary likes to jog.

c.

Conclusion:

John likes to jog.

To explain, the Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD) structure above in (78a) could plausibly receive the IL translation below in (79a). By Montague’s analysis of Subject Control (see (61) above), (78b) will then receives the IL translation in (79b). Given these two premises, the validity of the conclusion in (79c) immediately follows: (79) a.

ox[like'(x)(Mary') → like'(x)(John')]

b. like' ( jog')(Mary') c.

8 like'( jog')(John')

In contrast, Chierchia and Dowty argue, the validity of (79c) as a conclusion of (79a,b) appears to be a mystery under any analysis that assumes, as do the standard generative approaches discussed in Chapter 2, that a Control clause contains a syntactically projected external argument subject to Obligatory Control by the closest c-commanding NP in the matrix clause. That is, while the example in (78a) above could continue to receive the same IL translation under the generative approach (cf. the repetition of (79a) below in (80a)), the Control structure in (78b) would now translate as in (80b). From these two premises, unfortunately, the conclusion in (80c) no longer follows: One would erroneously expect John to like the fact that Mary jogs, not the fact that he himself does. (80) a.

ox[like'(x)(Mary') → like'(x)(John')]

b. like'([jog'(Mary')])(Mary') c.

8 like'([jog'(John')])(John')

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Before accepting this argument, however, it is important to more closely examine the IL translations that are assumed to be associated with ACD structures. In view of doing so, we first note that the very same problem appears to arise in relation to VP-Ellipsis. That is, as the reader may recall from the discussion of Hornstein’s (1999) analysis in Section 3.1 above, it was been well known since Lebeaux (1985: 351) that Obligatory Control configurations only allow a “sloppy” reading under VP-Ellipsis: (81) John hopes [to leave early] and Bill does too. The “strict” reading, in which Bill also hopes that John will leave early, is unavailable. One might argue, in a fashion akin to the argumentation above involving ACD structures, that the lack of a strict reading for (81) is problematic for standard generative approaches to Control since the proposition expressed by the Control clause, where PRO is obligatorily controlled by the referent of John, forms part of the ellipsis. (82) Johnk hopes [PROk to leave early] and Billi does [hope [PROk to leave early]] too. This reasoning would, however, be flawed: What actually forms the ellipsis is the proposition that includes the Control verb hope and the PRO subject of that verb’s complement clause is, of course, subject to Obligatory Control by Bill, as indicated below in (83): (83) Johnk hopes [PROk to leave early] and Billi does [hope [PROi to leave early]] too. In short, the standard generative approach would actually lead one to expect these facts. In a similar vein, then, one might suggest that the ACD Deletion structure above in (78a) does not translate into IL as the initially plausible formula in (79a) above, but rather as (84): (84) ox[like'([x'(Mary')])(Mary') → like'([x'(John')])(John')] Here, the claim that is being made is that Whatever Mary likes, John likes. is more accurately paraphrased as Whatever Mary likes to do, John likes to do as well. If this is the case, then the validity of the inferences in (85a–c) is expected:

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(85) a.

ox[like'([x'(Mary')])(Mary') → like'([x'(John')])(John')

b. like'([jog'(Mary')])(Mary') c.

8 like'([jog'(John')])(John')

In short, this argument, like the one that preceded it, is initially appealing, but ultimately proves inconclusive with respect to determining the syntactic status of the understood subject of a Control clause. Montague (1969: ft. 9), Chierchia (1984b), and Dowty (1985: 321–323) formulate a third argument in support of a “bare VP” approach to Control, this one based on the interpretation of infinitival clauses functioning as arguments of be, as in the following two examples, respectively due to Montague and Chierchia: (86) a.

To love is to exult.

b. To know him is to love him. These authors note that the “bare VP” approach to Control associates the preceding examples with the IL translations below in (87a,b). Namely, the verb be equates the two properties respectively denoted by love and exult in (87a) and by know and love in (87b). Such an analysis makes the intuitively correct claim that (86b), for example, can be paraphrased as Whoever knows some guy, loves that guy. (87) a.

ˆλx[love'(x)] = ˆλx[exult'(x)]

b. ˆλyˆλx[know'(y)(x)] = ˆλyˆλx[love'(y)(x)] What is important about these translations for present purposes, of course, is that they immediately capture the attested controller-controllee relations. That is, in both examples, any understood subject or object of the initial infinitival clause is necessarily understood to be co-referential with the subject or object of the second one: That is, whoever is doing the loving in (87a) must also be doing the exulting, and likewise in (87b) with respect to the person who is doing the knowing and the loving. In a parallel fashion, the implicit objects of the knowing and the loving in (87b) must also be one and the same individual. In contrast, under a generative approach to Control, something more would need to be said. That is, both PRO and Movement analyses associate the infinitival clauses in (86a,b) with a syntactically projected subject whose reference must be restricted by means of additional “machinery.” Specifically, it was shown in

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Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 that examples like (86a,b) are treated as Arbitrary Control configurations – structures in which the reference of PRO (in standard generative terms) or pro (under Hornstein’s (1999) analysis) is determined in a fashion distinct from that associated with the phonetically non-overt argument attested in contexts of Obligatory Control. Namely, it was noted in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.4 that advocates of the PRO approach assume that whenever there is no syntactically available “controller,” a default referential index (arb) is assigned, an index that is assumed to correspond to that associated with an overt pronoun like one or French on, which is obligatorily [+human]. As the PRO subjects of the infinitival clauses flanking be in (86) fit this syntactic description, both would be assigned the same arb index, explaining not only their co-reference, but also the [+human] restriction placed upon them. Alternatively, Hornstein (1999), we noted above in Section 3.1, adopts the view that it is actually pro that is inserted as a “Last Resort” in such contexts (a Movement derivation not being an option – there being no overt NP to move). This phonetically non-overt pronoun (pro) is further assumed to encode either a definite or an indefinite reading, again, much like the French pronoun on, which has been shown in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 to variously translate into English as we, you, they, and one. In short, generative approaches to Control do provide a means of capturing the facts related to (86). However, authors like Chierchia and Dowty are correct in observing these analyses entail additional complications in the grammar. The question, therefore, is whether or not they are justified. That is, while the modeltheoretic approach straightforwardly captures the attested controller-controllee relations in equative sentences like (86) above, does it so easily capture separate, but related, facts? In view of answering this question, let us first reintroduce the sentences below in (88), due Chomsky (1981a: 324), who noticed in relation to them that the understood subject of Arbitrary Control contexts is necessarily [+human]: (88) a.

The children/rocks rolled down the hill.

b. It is possible [to roll down that hill]. (=It is possible for someone/*something to roll down that hill.) The preceding facts are now to be contrasted with the sentences given below in (89), originally observed in Kajita (1967: 103). As Lasnik (1992: 239– 242) points out in relation to examples like these, there is no general [+human] restriction on the understood subject of an Obligatory Control clause: Certain Obligatory Control verbs impose a thematic requirement of [-human] (more specifically, [+Instrument]) on the subject of their complement clause.

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(89) a.

A little ice should serve [to chill the beer].

b. Einstein’s work has helped [to establish that there is a link between time and space]. c.

The preceding examples should suffice [to show that Obligatory PRO can be [-human]].

As noted above, generative approaches to Control account for the fact that the non-overt subject of an Arbitrary Control clause is necessarily [+human], while that of an Obligatory Control one is not via separate mechanisms of referential index determination. “Bare VP” approaches, however, reject this assumption and, as a consequence, currently offer no account of this fact. Dowty’s (1985) MPs in (71a) and (72a) above, for example, wrongly predict that verbs like serve and suffice do not exist. Bach’s system incorrectly predicts that Arbitrary PRO in (88b) could be [-human]. While certainly nothing precludes developing a model-theoretic account of this fact, doing so would appear to entail the very sorts of “complications” for which semanticists have faulted generative approaches. And if this is so, then this argument in favor of an implicit argument approach to Control also loses its force. Certain facts involving the verb ask that were introduced in the previous section further support this contention. There, we noted, with Chomsky (1980: 30, 8 (ft. 9)) and others, that the verb ask, like other verbs, allows an Arbitrary Control reading when the complement clause takes the form of an indirect question, as evidenced by the following sentences:12 (90) a.

At that point in the lecture, a clueless student asked the professor [when to project PRO and when not to].

b. In this joint, it’s clearly the waiter who decides [when to order], not the customer. c.

A good therapist should make it clear [when to give up and when to push on].

d. An elderly, infirm gentleman asks his gardener: I’ve always wondered [when (it is best) to trim trees] – before or after they bud?

12 The syntactic problems that indirect questions pose for “bare VP” (and Movement) approaches to Control will be discussed in Chapter 5.

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There, it was also observed that the Arbitrary reading associated with ask in (90a) is clearly lacking when its complement clause is non-interrogative, as in (91) below. That is, (91a) cannot mean My mother asked me if someone would do the dishes., nor can (91b) be paraphrased as If you want to go on the fieldtrip, you’ll need to ask your teacher (for permission) for someone to leave early. (91)

a.

My mother asked me [to do the dishes].

b. If you want to go on the fieldtrip, you’ll need to ask your teacher (for permission) [to leave early]. According to “bare VP” approaches to Control, the infinitival clauses in all of the preceding cases denote a property. Furthermore, Arbitrary Control is assumed to be distinguished from Obligatory Control in that only the latter type of clause is selected by a head that is associated with a MP or set of postulates that specify the controller. Given this set of assumptions, how can a verb like ask be obligatorily associated with MPs encoding Subject and Object Control (in order to account for the lack of Arbitrary readings for (91a,b)), yet not be associated with them in order to account for the uniquely Arbitrary reading associated with (90a)? Clearly, something more must be added to the system. While nothing precludes doing this, if one does, then the argument that “bare VP” approaches straightforwardly capture controller relations that generative approaches do not becomes one that loses its force. We thus conclude that there are, currently, no conclusive arguments in favor of an implicit argument approach to Control over competing explicit argument accounts. To summarize, this section has been shown that model-theoretic approaches to Control share the assumption that Control heads c-select for a “bare VP’ (syntactically subjectless) complement clause denoting a property, with various researchers being divided with respect to the separate question of whether or not antecedent resolution in such structures is amenable to formal logical analysis. Those who are of the opinion that it is were further shown to do so in terms of Meaning Postulates that simply specify (among other things) the understood antecedent of the implicit argument of the Control clause. The discussion concluded with a critical examination of three arguments that have been suggested to support this type of implicit argument approach to Control over explicit argument analyses. Upon closer inspection, these arguments proved to be inconclusive. Having considered some representative illustrations of implicit argument approaches to Control formulated in model-theoretic terms, let us turn next to how this complex phenomenon can be alternatively analyzed by making reference to argument or conceptual structure.

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3.2.2 On representative argument and conceptual structure approaches to Control Although it is true that argument and conceptual structure approaches to Control accept the model-theoretic premise that Control clauses lack a syntactically projected external argument, thus adopting a syntactic analysis along the lines of (61a) above, such analyses do differ markedly from model-theoretic approaches in accepting the generative hypothesis that the semantic representation of a Control clause contains a full array of s-selected arguments. In other words, in one fashion or another, argument and conceptual approaches to Control come to associate the sentence below in (92a) with a “generative-style” semantic representation along the lines of (92b) – in which the Control clause has a semantically specified external argument – rather than the model-theoretic representation in (92c), in which the external argument of win is not semantically represented, but simply entailed, in some unspecified manner, by the matrix verb’s meaning. (92)

a.

Mary tried [to win].

b. try'([win'(Mary')])(Mary') c.

try'(win')(Mary')

This divergence within the implicit argument tradition is due to a difference in goals: Unlike model-theoretic analyses, conceptual and argument structure approaches primarily seek to explain why a given head selects a complement clause that is subject to Object Control, Subject Control, or Arbitrary Control. That is, the MPs of model-theoretic semanticists provided above in (70)–(72) were shown to simply stipulate that a given verb entails a given Control relation – no attempt is made to further decompose just which aspect(s) of the meaning of the Control head accounts for that fact. As will be made clear in the next two subsections, argument and conceptual structure approaches attempt to fill this gap.

3.2.2.1 Sag & Pollard (1991): An argument structure approach to Control As briefly noted above in Section 3.1, and as has been summarized below in (93)–(94), Sag & Pollard (1991: 65–72) develop a semantically-based theory of controller assignment that rests on their claim that Obligatory Object Control verbs in all languages express states of affairs in which the matrix object is

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influenced by the matrix subject to perform (or not perform) the action denoted by the embedded verb, whereas Obligatory Subject Control verbs universally express either a state of affairs in which the matrix subject commits to perform (or not to perform) the action denoted by the embedded predicate or one in which s/he is oriented to do so (or not to do so). (93) Object Control Verbs: The lexical semantics of such verbs expresses states of affairs in which the thematic subject of the control head influences the object NP to act or not to act, e.g., by giving orders or permission. Examples: order, persuade, bid, charge, command, direct, enjoin, instruct, advise, authorize, mandate, convince, impel, induce, influence, inspire, motivate, move, pressure, prompt, sway, stir, talk (into), compel, press, propel, push, spur, encourage, exhort, goad, incite, prod, urge, bring, lead, signal, ask, empower, appeal (to), dare, defy, beg, prevent (from), forbid, allow, permit, enable, cause, force (94) a.

Subject Control Verbs: The lexical semantics of such verbs expresses states of affairs in which the thematic subject of the verb commits to act or not to act. Examples: promise, swear, agree, contract, pledge, vow, try, intend, refuse, choose, decline, demand, endeavor, attempt, threaten, undertake, propose, offer, aim

b. Subject Control Verbs: The lexical semantics of such verbs expresses states of affairs in which the thematic subject of the verb is oriented to act or not to act. Examples: want, desire, fancy, wish, ache, hanker, itch, long, need, hope, thirst, yearn, hate, aspire, expect Thus, for example, Sag & Pollard attribute the fact that in a sentence like They persuaded me to leave. the object NP (me) is understood to be the controller of the syntactically implicit Agent of the verb leave because persuade expresses a state of affairs (soa) in which the matrix subject influences the object to act. On the other hand, in They promised us to leave., the matrix subject (they) is the controller of the implicit Agent of leave because promise involves a state of affairs in which the subject commits to perform an action. Following work dating back to Jackendoff (1972), Sag & Pollard (1991: 67) further propose that the very same lexical semantic factors are at work in determining the controller

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of the implicit argument in a Control complement to an Event Nominal construction, such the one in the sentence Mary’s promise to endorse this candidate indicates that she is in need of an ally. In order to formally implement their ideas, Sag & Pollard construct lexical entries that interact with their version of a semantically based Control Theory embedded within their version of a head-driven phrase structure (HPSG) grammar. (For the sake of brevity, discussion of the mechanics of HPSG syntax will be kept here to a minimum and little explicit mention will be made of exactly how Sag & Pollard’s Control Theory technically interacts with their version of Binding Theory and their Principle of External Argument Reflexivity (PEAR).) Specifically, Sag & Pollard (1991: 77–92) first propose that the lexical entries of Control heads like promise and persuade must include specifications that link a given syntactically selected argument of the verb to a particular semantic relation, namely, that of being influenced, orientated, or committed. That is, the Control problem is in part resolved via a lexical linking of a Control head’s syntactically selected arguments to specific semantic roles determined by that verb’s meaning. To see just how this is achieved, consider first the syntactic portion of the lexical entry that is associated with the typical Object Control verb persuade, given below in (95). (95) persuade: [SUBCAT ] The preceding (for the moment, partial) entry includes a list of the number and type of arguments for which persuade subcategorizes. Namely, it makes the claim that this verb subcategorizes for three arguments: an NP subject (associated with the index [1]), an NP object (associated with the index [2]), and a “bare VP” infinitival complement clause (index [3]). Although this fact is not made clear by (95), Sag & Pollard’s HPSG system also associates the verb persuade with an index of its own, the index [4]. Furthermore, once persuade undergoes syntactic merger into a structure similar to (61a) above, projecting the matrix VP and, ultimately S, those two phrases will share the index of the verb (namely, [4]). One final note in relation to the entry in (95), a Subject Control verb like promise is assumed to include exactly the same types of subcategorization (i.e. syntactic) information as does an Object Control verb like persuade. Turning now to those areas in which Subject and Object Control heads do differ, let us add to the partial entry for persuade the specific type of semantic content (the type of relation or state of affairs) it encodes. We noted earlier that persuade, like all of the Object Control verbs in (93), encodes a relation of

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influence, a fact that is captured by the portion of this verb’s lexical entry given below in (96): 2

(96) persuade:

RELATION 6 INFLUENCE CONTENT 6 4 INFLUENCED SOA  ARG

3 persuade ½1 7 7 ½2 5 ½3

This portion of the entry for persuade in (96) specifically links the “influencer” role to this verb’s thematic subject, that of ‘influenced” to its direct object, and that of “state of affairs argument” (i.e. soa-arg) to its VP complement clause. As the reader may have surmised, an Object Control verb like persuade differs crucially from a Subject Control one like promise with respect to (semantic) content. Namely, promise encodes a situation of commitment (not influence) and its subject is linked to the role of “committer,” while its object is linked to that of “commissee,” as indicated below in (97): 2

3 RELATION promise 6 COMMITTOR ½1 7 7 (97) promise: CONTENT 6 4 COMMISSEE ½2 5 SOA  ARG ½3 Finally, for purposes of comparison and also because it will become relevant momentarily, a non-Control verb like leave is associated with its own lexically specified content, namely, the verb leave is associated with the semantic content in (98):   RELATION leave (98) leave: CONTENT LEAVER ½1 Returning to the case of the verb persuade, we noted above that this verb selects a state of affairs denoting bare VP as its complement. Because of this, the lexical entry associated with the verb that heads that complement clause, e.g., that of leave, becomes, in a sense, incorporated into persuade’s entry, as in (99): 2

(99) persuade:

RELATION 6 INFLUENCE 6 CONTENT 6 6 INFLUENCED 4 SOA  ARG

persuade ½1 ½2 RELATION ½3 LEAVER

3 7 7 7 7 leave 5 ½5

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At this point, we still have no explanation for the fact that the leaver in They persuaded Mary to leave. must be the same individual as Mary. We do not because, at this point in the discussion, the indices of Mary ([2]) and the implicit subject argument of leave ([5]) are not yet linked. It is separate rules of Control Theory, their initial, simplified version of which is provided below in (100), that achieve this coindexation. (The reader will recall from the preceding discussion that the index [4] mentioned below in (100) is the one associated with the Control verb. Additionally, it bears reiteration that Sag & Pollard’s (1991: 90) final analysis revises (100) to allow for part of the work done by these principles to actually be the result of an interaction of Control Theory with their version of the Binding Principles and their Principle of External Argument Reflexivity.) (100)

HPSG Control Theory: Sag & Pollard (1991: 78) Given a phrase X[SUBCAT ]:[3],   RELN R and a state of affairs (soa) [4] , SOA  ARG ½3 a.

if R is of the sort influence, then [4] [INFLUENCED [INDEX [6]]]

b. if R is of the sort commitment, then [4] [COMMITTOR [INDEX [6]]] c.

if R is of the sort orientation, then [4] [EXPERIENCER [INDEX [6]]]

The rules of Control Theory in (100) specify which argument of a given Control head is to be understood as coreferential with an (implicit) argument of the bare VP. In the case of an influence-type Control verb like persuade, for example, it is the influenced argument that becomes co-indexed (via the index [6]) to the implicit Agent of the Control clause, and similarly for the committer for verbs like promise, and the experiencer for a verb like want. The resulting final entry for persuade is provided below in (101): The relevant change is, of course, the addition of the shared index ([6]) borne by both the leaver and the influenced argument in an example like They persuaded Mary to leave. (101)

persuade: 3 2 SUBCAT < NP : ½1; NP : ½2; VP½inf  : ½3 2 3 RELATION persuade 7 6 7 6 ½1 6 INFLUENCE 77 6 6 77 6 77 6 CONTENT6 INFLUENCED ½2 ½index ½6 6 7 6  7 4 55 4 RELATION leave SOA  ARG ½3 LEAVER ½5 ½index ½6

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Having briefly overviewed the basic mechanics of the system, let us now consider some of its relative advantages and disadvantages. As the preceding simplified discussion has hopefully made clear, an important advantage that Sag & Pollard’s analysis has over the competing approaches that have been examined thus far is that only their proposal provides any explanation for why a given head is associated with Obligatory Subject, Obligatory Object, or Arbitrary Control readings: Namely, verbs expressing a situation of influence, orientation, or commitment semantically require that the implicit external argument of their bare VP complement clause be coindexed with a specific argument in the matrix one; if a head selecting a bare VP complement does not involve one of these three semantic relations, then coindexation is not required, i.e., the implicit argument of the Control clause is free to pick out its referent from discourse. We have seen above that competing approaches either simply stipulate this information or seek to make it fall out of general syntactic constraints on movement (or both). In addition, Sag & Pollard (1991: 79) note that an interaction of their system with (their version of) Binding Theory can, among other things, explain agreement facts of the type below in (102). Namely, the shared index in an entry like (101) above will entail an agreement in person, number, and gender features in a sentence like (102) below. (We will see in Chapter 4 that facts like these can be captured by other approaches as well.) (102) They persuaded Mary [to behave herself/*himself/*oneself ]. Finally, as was noted above in Section 3.1, Sag & Pollard’s analysis is the first to provide a formal means of accounting for “shifts in controller” of the type in (103b) below. (103) a.

Sarah promised me [to leave early].

b. Sarah promised me [to be allowed to leave early]. Namely, we noted above that the Obligatory Subject Control verb promise in (103a) is treated by Sag & Pollard as only apparently becoming an Object Control verb on the favored (“shifted”) reading of (103b). Specifically, the lexical semantics of promise entails, via an interaction of its lexical entry with Control Theory in (100), that the matrix subject NP commit to being allowed to leave early, a commitment that is normally impossible to make since one generally cannot decide for oneself what one will or will not be allowed to do. The semantic deviance of the derivation is, therefore, rescued by “coercing” the sentence into

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a hidden (interpolated) causative. I.e., the verb allowed in (103b) undergoes a lexical rule of coercion, meaning that Sarah promised me to be allowed to leave early. is actually an elliptical form of Sarah promised me to cause either me or herself to be allowed to leave early. In compliance with the normal lexical semantics of promise, then, the matrix subject Sarah is the understood controller of the implicit subject of cause. (She commits to cause either me or herself to be allowed to leave early – the limitation to me or herself is a feature of the lexical rule of coercion.) As cause itself is an Object Control verb (it is a verb of influence, as indicated above in (93)), the implicit subject of cause (which is Sarah) is understood to cause me or herself to be allowed to leave early. Since, again, one cannot normally cause oneself to be allowed to leave early, the understood controller for be allowed to leave is usually not the matrix subject (Sarah), but, rather, the object (me). While aspects of the analysis like the preceding are certainly appealing, the approach is not without problems. First, from a purely empirical standpoint, there are many Obligatory Control verbs that do not fit into any of the three categories envisaged by Sag & Pollard. Namely, their system in (93)–(94) above presently only recognizes that verbs expressing states of affairs involving influence, commitment, or orientation entail Obligatory Control. Any verb selecting a bare VP that does not express one of these three relations does not require any coindexation between its arguments and those of its complement clause, resulting in an Arbitrary reading. Yet, as Sag & Pollard acknowledge, there must be relations beyond these that entail coindexation (i.e. Obligatory Control). For example, we have seen above that verbs like serve, help, and suffice take Obligatory Control complement clauses, as in, e.g., A little ice should serve to chill the beer. What sort of semantic notion is responsible for this fact? Likewise, what semantic properties determine that heads like learn, manage, forget, deny, start, wait, (be) able/happy/willing, and strike (to name but a few) all involve Obligatory Control? Finally, what semantic consideration accounts for the fact, originally noted above in Section 2.1.4, as well as in footnote 5 of the present chapter, that in the Romance languages verbs of belief (e.g. French croire) and verbs equivalent to admit (avouer) select Obligatory Control complement clauses? Clearly, a larger number of relations must be recognized and care taken to explicate, as precisely as possible, just what each relation is so as to avoid overlap and a lack of predictivity. (E.g., Sag & Pollard place the verbs expect and intend into two different classes – expect is analyzed as involving orientation and intend as expressing commitment. The reason behind the choice is not obvious in this case and calls to mind the perhaps parallel difficulty attested in the literature of defining thematic roles.)

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Additional empirical problems also remain unresolved, some syntactic in nature, others, semantic. For example, one wonders whether some semantic or syntactic property accounts for the fact that only certain adjectival heads, such as (be) important/difficult/worthwhile/easy/impossible select bare VP complements involving Arbitrary Control. In other words, what explains why, e.g., (be) likely, does not accept a bare VP complement? What explains why (be) surprised/ happy/sad involves Obligatory Control? Furthermore, why are the implicit subjects of complements to heads of the type (be) important/impossible etc. necessarily [+human], whereas the implicit arguments involved in Obligatory Control can be of either type, depending on the verb (e.g. try versus suffice)? Further issues arise in relation to the verb ask, discussed above in Section 3.1. Sag & Pollard analyze this verb as uniquely involving Object Control, which they attribute to its being a verb of influence, as it certainly is in (104a) below. However, they mention in passing that fact that, in some dialects of English (including this author’s), ask also allows Subject Control, as illustrated below in (104b). This reading, Sag & Pollard might suggest, is due to an orientation use of the verb in just these dialects. Finally, ask also has an Arbitrary Control use that Sag & Pollard do not mention, given below in (104c). This reading, Sag & Pollard might argue, is due to ask’s literally meaning inquire – i.e., here ask is not a verb of influence, commitment, or orientation and so does not entail any coindexation between matrix and implicit embedded arguments. The problem left unresolved by this approach, however, is this: Why does ask only have an Arbitrary reading in indirect questions? That is, why can’t (104a) be paraphrased as both I asked/influenced you to be quiet. or I inquired of you if some contextually determined person would be quiet. Put differently, if the verb ask can mean inquire, which it certainly can, then why is that meaning blocked in syntactic contexts of the type in (104a,b)? (104) a.

I asked you [to be quiet].

b. If you want to go with us on the fieldtrip, you’ll need to ask your teacher (for permission) [to leave early]. c.

The elderly gentleman asked his gardener [when (it’s best) to trim trees].

A consideration of the Control problem as it is manifested in adjuncts raises some additional problems that also may point to the need to accord to syntax a somewhat larger role in antecedent resolution than currently envisaged by Sag & Pollard.

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We will begin by examining a type of adjunct that initially appears to support the type of semantic solution to the Control problem that Sag & Pollard suggest, but which, when considered in conjunction with a second type adjunct, actually points to the need to refine the analysis. Expanding on some observations in Chomsky (1981a: 77), reviewed above in Section 2.2.1, Bach (1982: 41–42, 47–55) notes that the readings associated with (object-gap) Purpose Clauses like (105a,b) below initially lead one to the view that these adjuncts involve Obligatory Subject Control. This fact could, plausibly, be attributed to their meaning. Namely, these adjuncts refer to purposeful activities in which the controller (the Agent of the main clause verb) uses an instrument at their disposal (the main clause object) to achieve some end (expressed by the Purpose Clause). (105) a.

I bought War and Peace [to read to the children].

b. I bought War and Peace from Bill [to read to the children]. However, such a conclusion would be incorrect, he notes, given the existence of data of the type in (106) below, observed in Chomsky (1981a: 77), in which the controller, for some reason, appears to now obligatorily be the main clause object NP, no longer the subject: (106)

I bought Bill War and Peace [to read to the children].

In fact, Bach concludes, these types of adjuncts are actually uniquely configurations of Arbitrary Control since more careful consideration of the preceding data reveals that any of these examples may be uttered in a context in which neither the referent of the subject NP, nor that of the object does the actual reading. For example, a blind woman might utter the sentences in (105) to her blind spouse, with the intention that the caregiver of the children does the actual reading (assuming the book is not written in Braille). Similar types of contexts can be constructed for an example like (106). Bach’s data in (107), also observed in part by Chomsky (1981a: 77), as well as the example added in (108) make the same point even more clearly. (107) a.

War and Peace was bought [to read to the children].

b. Here’s Bambi [to read to the children]. (108)

A elderly man says to his equally infirm older brother: I bought you some shingles [to put on that leaky roof of yours].

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In the end, Bach concludes controller resolution in object-gap Purpose Clauses is determined by complex reasoning as to who, finally, ends up owning or having a given instrument available to achieve some purpose. One clearly cannot “pin down” a single lexeme, the lexical semantics of which will consistently single out a controller, as Sag & Pollard are able to do with respect to certain verbal complement clauses that are associated uniquely with Obligatory Control. Bach’s conclusions are completely in line with Sag & Pollard’s analysis: As there is no lexeme expressing a relation of influence, commitment, or orientation, there is no obligatory coindexation between an overt argument in the matrix clause and an implicit one in the adjunct. Thus, antecedent resolution proceeds through discourse. As we will now see, however, the issue that arises is why this is not the case with respect to adjuncts generally, as another type of adjunct can be shown to also lack a specific lexeme encoding a semantic relation or influence, commitment, or orientation, yet still involves Obligatory Control. I am referring here to the by now familiar case of verbal while-type adjuncts. Namely, as has been noted at various points in the preceding pages, Williams (1985) establishes that verbal while-type adjuncts are uniquely configurations of Subject Control, as evidenced by the data below: (109) a.

Glen must notify every doctor [before they/he operate(s)].

b. Glen must notify every doctor [before operating]. (Glen must control the understood subject of operating; every doctor cannot.) (110)

a.

I unwrapped the device [while it was still spewing forth sparks].

b. *I unwrapped the device [while still spewing forth sparks]. c.

The device arrived [while still spewing forth sparks].

Given the readings associated with the (a) variants of (109)–(110), it is clear that there is nothing about the meaning of before, after, while, during etc. that precludes a co-referential reading between the object NP of the main clause and the subject of the adjunct. Yet, in contrast to the purpose adjuncts examined above, for which meaning also provided no means of resolving the antecedent, these adjuncts (and, incidentally, in order to-type Rationale Clause adjuncts), do restrict the controller to the surface subject of the main clause. They are configurations of Obligatory Control that cannot be attributed to meaning. Clearly, then, syntactic considerations do play some role in resolving the Control problem after all.

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Let us conclude this discussion with two final notes. First, as was true of model-theoretic approaches, Sag & Pollard’s version of the implicit argument hypothesis faces a second problem in relation to while-type adjuncts. Namely, we have noted at several points that William’s (1985) work establishes that only verbal (not nominal) while-type adjuncts are Obligatory Subject Control constructions, as indicated by the contrasting readings available for the verbal example in (111a) and its Event Nominal counterpart in (111b). (111)

a.

Glen must notify every doctor [before operating]. (Glen must control the understood subject of operating.)

b. Glen must notify every doctor [before the operation]. (Glen or every doctor may control the understood subject of operation.) If the same semantic factors determine the controller in nominal and verbal contexts, as implicit argument analyses assume, then why does this contrast exist at all? In the same vein, why can only the understood subject of a verbal clause serve as the controller for while-type verbal adjuncts, as illustrated below in (112)? (112)

a.

[[To operate now] [without even notifying the next of kin]] might be unwise.

b. *[[An operation now] [without even notifying the next of kin]] might be unwise. Finally, any analysis of control into while-type adjuncts must ultimately account for the fact that they are associated with Arbitrary readings in contexts in which no controller is available, as in (113), as well, Williams (1992: 301–302) has established, as in preposed positions, like (114)–(115): (113)

It always rains [while crossing the Rockies].

(114)

a.

[After traveling all day], the hotel was a vision indeed.

b. *The hotel was a vision indeed [after traveling all day]. (115)

a.

[While pulling into the station], a clock in the bell tower chimed.

b. *A clock in the bellower chimed [while pulling into the station].

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In conclusion, although additional work may serve to extend Sag & Pollard’s proposals to cover the residual issues enumerated above, until it has actually been done, a strong case for the analysis has not yet been made. In fact, as it stands one is, unfortunately, still left wondering whether future research might actually establish that this type of approach does involve building into the linguistic system entire theories of world knowledge and human belief, as suggested, to one degree or another, by certain model-theoreticians. That said, let us turn now to a third, and final, illustration of an implicit argument approach to Control, this one formulated in terms of conceptual semantics. 3.2.2.2 Jackendoff & Culicover (2003): A conceptual structure approach to Control Although technically neutral with respect to the syntactic status of the understood subject of a Control clause, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: ft. 1) make it clear that they are “generally more sympathetic” to the syntactically subjectless approaches to Control put forth in Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Bach (1979), Bresnan (1982), Gazdar (1982), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), and Sag & Pollard (1991), among others. Simplicity concerns are a primary factor underlying their position (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 502) and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 519)). Namely, Culicover & Jackendoff observe that the same lexical semantic factors play a key role in controller resolution across verbal and nominal constructions; therefore, they see no need to complicate the grammar by introducing syntactically based Rules of Control that operate only within the verbal system. (Of course, some important reasons for doing so were provided in Sections 2.2.5, 3.2.1, and 3.2.2, and additional ones will be developed in Chapter 5.) As will soon be made clear, Culicover & Jackendoff follow earlier work in Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3), Bach (1979), Dowty (1985), and Sag & Pollard (1991) in attempting to derive as much of the Control problem as possible from lexical semantic factors. Before demonstrating just how they do so, however, let us begin by considering the minimal role their theory accords to the syntactic component of the grammar. First, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 520–521) adopt the view that arbitrary c-selection accounts for the fact that certain Control heads tolerate only a bare VP as their complement, whereas others also accept a full clausal complement with an overt subject NP. In other words, syntactic factors are said to be responsible for contrasts like those below in (116), drawn from their paper: (116)

a.

Sally beseeched Bill [(*for his kids) to leave].

b. Sally begged Bill [(for his kids) to leave].

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As Jackendoff & Culicover observe, the verbs beg and beseech are close paraphrases. Consequently, no semantic consideration could be responsible for the fact that only beg accepts a clausal complement with a phonetically overt thematic subject. Secondly, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 551), referring to their earlier work in Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 502–503), observe with Williams (1985) that the determination of the controller in certain adjunct clauses “. . .indubitably has a syntactic dimension.” The types of adjuncts that they have in mind are precisely those that have been discussed at numerous points in the preceding pages, namely, verbal while‑type and Rationale Clause adjuncts, which exhibit the strong subject-as-controller restriction exemplified by Culicover & Jackendoff’s (2001: 503) examples below in (117), as well as the one drawn from Hornstein (1999: 88) in (118): (117)

a.

Helen examined Bernie [in order to/so as to vindicate herself/ *himself/*oneself/*themselves].

b. Helen liked/pleased Bernie [without/after compromising herself// *himself/*oneself/*themselves]. (118)

John heard Mary [without/before/after entering the room]. (Only John can serve as the controller.)

Although clearly acknowledging the existence of this syntactic constraint on verbal while-type and Rationale Clause adjuncts, Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 503–504) nonetheless seem to minimize the implications that it holds for an understanding of Control in verbal versus nominal contexts (see Section 2.2.5 above for a discussion of such implications) by introducing the examples given below in (119a,b). In (119a), they suggest that an implicit argument (the subject of interrogation) necessarily functions as controller of the subject of the verbal while-type adjunct, whereas in (119b), an entirely discourse-determined antecedent does so. (119)

a.

[Such a brutal interrogation of the suspect without considering the legal repercussions] could lead to disaster.

b. This story will appear on the back page [in order not to embarrass the president]. As noted above (see, most recently, footnote 7), Williams (1985, 1992) interprets these facts differently. Specifically, Williams (1992) suggests that verbal

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while-type adjuncts do have an Arbitrary (in his terms, logophoric) reading, but, importantly, only when no syntactic controller is available, which is, of course, the case in (119a). In other words, under Williams’ view, the implicit Agent of interrogation does not necessarily serve as the controller of the adjunct, as Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 503) suggest. It is only the pragmatically favored one. Williams’ view appears to be correct as it is possible to imagine a context in which the implicit subject of interrogation in an example like (119a) is not the person who must also consider the legal repercussions of such an interrogation, as in (120) below: (120)

Speaker A: Our national security is at risk here. We should turn this suspect over to the CIA. They’ll extract the information from him by whatever means necessary. Speaker B: No. I think we should talk to someone over in the Department of Justice first. [Such a brutal interrogation without first considering the legal repercussions] could prove disastrous.

In short, the existence of while-type examples like (119a) above in no way points to a semantic mitigation of the role played by syntax in controller determination in these configurations: If a syntactic controller is available in the surface subject position of the main clause, it must serve as the antecedent of the understood argument of the verbal while-type adjunct. In other words, Arbitrary readings only arise as a “default” in the absence of a syntactic controller, an important observation that any theory of controller resolution must eventually accommodate. In relation to a Rationale Clause example like the one in (119b) above, we noted earlier in Section 2.2.5 that Williams (1985) argues that in such cases, it is actually the matrix clause that serves as the Obligatory (Event) controller of the understood subject of the Rationale Clause, an analysis that explains why the examples below in (121), which are otherwise parallel to (119b) above, are unacceptable. I.e., an event of a story appearing on the back page of the newspaper as in (119b) may not embarrass someone, but an event of being arrested, as in (121a), cannot indict someone. Such contrasts remain unexplained if Rationale Clauses allow discourse determination of the controller, as Culicover & Jackendoff suggest. (121)

a. *Mary was arrested [to indict Bill]. b. *The ship was sunk [to become a hero].

Williams (1985: 309) Lasnik (1988: 12)

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c. *The court was petitioned [to receive a fairer sentence]. d. *Thirty Hail Marys were recited [to be forgiven].

In short, we again conclude that when a controller is available in both verbal while-type and Rationale adjuncts, as in (117)–(118) above, then the controller, without exception, is the surface subject NP, an important fact that should ultimately be incorporated into any theory of Control. Having considered the minimal role that syntactic considerations are assumed to play within Jackendoff & Culicover’s analysis, let us turn now to that accorded to lexical semantic concerns. In their paper, Jackendoff & Culicover limit their discussion to two types of contexts, although they suggest that future work within the framework should allow for a much greater range of empirical coverage. The first type of context that is considered involves Obligatory (in their terms, Unique) Control attributed to a head uniquely selecting for a bare VP complement of the semantic type Action. This class of heads, we will see momentarily, includes such lexemes as persuade, order, promise, (be) able, teach, remind, forget, ask, and (be) rude, among others. The second type of context that is considered involves Arbitrary (in their terms, Free and Nearly Free) Control, which is attributed to a head selecting a complement that is not uniquely of the semantic type Action. This class of heads, we will soon see, includes talk/speak to X about, mention/discuss, (be) possible/difficult/important, and sentential subjects. More specifically, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 524) defend the hypothesis in (122), inspired, in part, by ideas in Lasnik & Fiengo (1974): (122)

A semantic characterization of Obligatory (Unique) Control Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 524) Infinitival and gerundive complements that are selected by their head to be of the semantic type Action have unique control. The unique controller is the character to which the head assigns the role of Actor for that action – whatever its syntactic position.

The hypothesis in (122) does two things. First, it defines which heads are involved in Obligatory Control and, by default, which are involved in Arbitrary Control. Specifically, only those heads that uniquely select a bare VP complement that refers to an Action are said to be associated with Obligatory Control: Any bare VP selecting head accepting Nonactions as a complement involves Arbitrary (Free or Nearly Free) Control.

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Secondly, the hypothesis in (122) defines which of an Obligatory Control head’s explicit or implicit arguments must function as the controller: The controller is the argument that is assigned the role of Actor, a notion that will be made clear momentarily. To see just how this proposal functions, then, we must first have some means of determining which complement clauses express Actions and which express Nonactions. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 524) put forth three means of doing so. Specifically, they first suggest that only Actions can complete the clause What X did was. . . , as illustrated by the contrasts below in (123)–(124), drawn from their paper. (123)

Actions What Roberta did was dance with Jeff/read a book/think about physics.

(124)

Nonactions What Roberta did was ?grow taller/*strike Simmy as smart/*realize it was raining.

On the basis of this test, we see that clauses like dance with Jeff and think about physics express Actions, whereas ones like grow taller and realize it was raining express Nonactions. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 524–525) go on to suggest that only voluntary Actions are acceptable in the imperative voice and only they are compatible with Agent-Oriented Manner Adverbials like voluntarily and on purpose, as exemplified by the contrasts below in (125)–(126): (125)

a.

Dance with Jeff!

b. I voluntarily danced with Jeff. (126)

a.

*Grow taller!

b. *I voluntarily grew taller. The facts in (125)–(126) thus confirm that that a clause like dance with Jeff expresses a (voluntary) Action, whereas one like grow taller expresses a Nonaction. As one would expect, given the hypothesis in (122) above, an Obligatory Control verb like urge or promise accepts only Actions as its complements, as confirmed by the examples below in (127a). On the other hand, an Arbitrary Control verb like talk to X about accepts both Actions and Nonactions as complements, cf. (127b):

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a.

They urged/promised me [to dance with Jeff/*grow taller].

b. They talked to me about [dancing with Jeff/growing taller]. Furthermore, on an intuitive level (the notion will be formalized in terms of Conceptual Structure in a moment), we understand that an Obligatory Control verb like urge associates the object NP with the Actor role, whereas a verb like promise associates that role with the subject, observations that are also consistent with Jackendoff & Culicover’s hypothesis in (122). Before explaining how these ideas are captured in conceptual terms, it bears mentioning at this point that Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 551) are well aware that there are Obligatory Control verbs that behave in a manner inconsistent with their hypothesis in (122). They specifically mention, for example, the case of hope and wish. (Some additional empirical facts that fall outside the current form of this analysis will be mentioned in the final paragraphs of this overview.) As made clear by the data below in (128), verbs like hope and wish accept Nonactions as bare VP complements (cf. the (a) examples), yet they are not associated with Arbitrary Control (cf. the (b) sentences): (128)

a.

Henry hopes/wishes [to grow taller/strike Sammy as smart].

b. Henry hopes/wishes [to redeem himself/*oneself ]. As one would expect, semantically similar verbs, such as want, need, expect, hate, etc. are similarly problematic. As alluded to above, Jackendoff & Culicover are of the view that future research on the Control problem will uncover additional principles of the type in (122) to cover such data. In other words, yet-to-bediscovered semantic factors beyond unique selection for a bare VP complement expressing an Action are clearly involved in Obligatory Control. Having presented an intuitive overview of this analysis, let us turn now to its formal implementation in conceptual semantic terms. In conceptual semantics, a number of primitive psychologically based concepts are posited in order to break down or analyze the meaning of lexemes. We have already mentioned one such concept – ACT (standing for Action), shared by verbs like run (a race), dance (with Jeff ), and think (about physics). Let us partially formalize Jackendoff & Culicover’s primary hypothesis above in (122) to incorporate this concept: (129)

A semantic characterization of Obligatory (Unique) Control If a head uniquely selects for bare VPs of the semantic type [α ACT], that head involves Obligatory Control. The unique controller is the character to which the head assigns the role of Actor for that action – whatever its syntactic position.

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The first clause of the hypothesis in (129) makes the claim that Obligatory Control verbs, nouns, and adjectives uniquely select bare VPs that are unsaturated predicates of the type Action. The second half of the hypothesis, the portion that determines the actual controller or reference of the implicit subject α, has not yet been formalized. In other words, we must now identify a set of conceptual primitives associated with Obligatory Control heads whose meaning is such that either the thematic subject or the thematic object of the Control head must serve as the understood referent of α in the unsaturated predicate [α ACT]. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 536–541) enumerate six such primitives, these being the concepts INTEND, OBLIGATED, ABLE, SHOULDroot, CS, and REQUEST. We will begin with some discussion of the notion INTEND. INTEND is a conceptual primitive assumed to be shared by such Obligatory Control verbs as intend, decide, and persuade. I.e., with each of these verbs, someone (either the thematic subject or the object) forms an intention to act. Naturally enough, given the way things work in the world, only the individual forming that intention can actually execute it. Thus, if I intend to go to Spain. is true, then only I can do the actual going. Similarly, if I persuaded Sarah to go to Spain. is true, then I caused Sarah to form an intention for she, herself, to go to Spain. In formal Conceptual Semantic terms, these observations are captured by the formula in (130a), which has been added to the formal version of Jackendoff & Culicover’s theory of Control: (130)

A semantic characterization of Obligatory (Unique) Control If a head uniquely selects for bare VPs of the semantic type [α ACT], that head involves Obligatory Control. The reference of α is determined as follows: a. Xα INTEND [α ACT] e.g., intend, decide, persuade

The second conceptual semantic primitive responsible for controller determination in this system is OBLIGATED, a notion shared by such verbs as order, promise, pledge, and guarantee. In these cases, an individual X is obligated to another individual Y to perform some action. Naturally enough, only the person who is obligated can fulfill that obligation, as is clear from the meaning of such examples as I promised you to do the dishes., in which the matrix subject NP bears the obligation, and I hired him to take care of the problem., in which the object NP is. The basic semantic structure of obligation is provided in (131), which would be added as (b) in the system in (130) above. (131)

Xα OBLIGATED [α ACT] TO Y e.g., order, promise, pledge, guarantee

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The third conceptual notion at work in controller determination is ABLE – the ability to perform some action. As one cannot have an ability with respect to someone else’s performance of an action, only the person with the ability can function as controller, a fact made clear by such examples as John is able to speak French. and Sarah learned how to speak French. These observations are formally captured by (132): (132)

Xα ABLE [α ACT] e.g., be able, learn (how to), teach

Normativity, represented by SHOULDroot, is the fourth concept said to be involved in inherent control equations in this system. The SHOULDroot concept refers to the type of modality underlying such heads as forget (as in, I forgot to do what I should have done.), remind (I reminded someone to do what he was supposed to do.), and remember. In line with the concepts previously introduced, given the way things work in the world, a given individual cannot enable another one to comply with a norm by performing an action for him or her. In other words, the person on whom the norm is imposed must be the one who performs the action, observations captured by the formula below in (133): (133)

Xα SHOULDroot [α ACT] e.g., remind, learn (what one should do), forget

The fifth conceptual semantic notion proposed to underlie Control relations is represented CS, roughly, cause. CS is a notion that underlies any situation in which one character is involved in influencing the execution of an action by another character. It is intended to form part of the lexical meaning of such diverse verbs as force, help, enable, prevent, encourage, permit, signal, and shout. In these cases, it is the individual being influenced who must serve as controller, as indicated below in (134): (134)

X CS Yα [α ACT] e.g., forced, help, permit, shout, signal

Requesting is the final conceptual notion for which Jackendoff & Culicover provide a formal equation. The verb ask is provided as representative of this class. Similar to verbs involving the CS notion, REQUEST-type verbs involve influencing another individual to act. However, the crucial difference between CS and REQUEST is that in the latter case, the individual making the request benefits from its accomplishment, as indicated below in (135):  (135)

Xα REQUEST Yβ

 ½ β ACT  γ e.g. ask γ BENEF α

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We complete this portion of the system by noting with Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 540) that adjectives involving Obligatory Control of the (be) rude/nice/ clever-type have the semantic characteristic of ascribing the same property to the actor as to his or her actions. I.e., spitting in public is rude, so John was rude to spit in public. ascribes the property denoted by rude to both John and spitting in public. Since one cannot have such a property on the basis of someone else’s actions, it is necessarily the argument of which the property is predicated that must function as the controller, observations that Jackendoff & Culicover stop short of capturing in terms of a formal control equation. For convenience, Jackendoff & Culicover’s (2003) conceptual semantic approach to Obligatory Control has been summarized below in (136): (136)

A semantic characterization of Obligatory (Unique) Control If a head uniquely selects for bare VPs of the semantic type [α ACT], that head involves Obligatory Control. The reference of α is determined as follows: a.

Xα INTEND [α ACT] e.g., intend, decide, persuade

b. Xα OBLIGATED [α ACT] TO Y e.g., order, promise, pledge, guarantee c.

Xα ABLE [α ACT] e.g., be able, learn (how to), teach

d. Xα SHOULDroot [α ACT] e.g., remind, learn (what should do), forget e. f. g.

X CS Yα [α ACT] e.g., forced, help, permit, prevent, shout, signal   ½ β ACT  γ Xα REQUEST Yβ e.g. ask γ BENEF α An informal characterization of controller resolution for such adjectives as be rude/smart/kind etc. is also given: One cannot have a property on the basis of someone else’s actions.

Their default characterization of Arbitrary Control is provided in (137): (137)

A semantic characterization of Arbitrary (Free and Nearly Free) Control If a head selects for bare VPs of the semantic type [α NONACT], that head involves Arbitrary Control. The reference of α is determined by a complex array of pragmatic and semantic factors. See Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 521–524, 540) for some discussion and additional references.

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To summarize, like the other implicit argument approaches to Control examined in the two previous sections, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003) favor an approach to Control clauses in which there is no syntactically projected argument in the Control clause, although, they note, there is nothing inherent in their analysis that entails that this be the case. Rather, it is simply their view that the most economical approach to Control is one in which the understood argument of the Control clause remains syntactically implicit, allowing for the same mechanisms to cover Control relations in nominal and verbal contexts. With respect to the separate, although related, issue of antecedent resolution in Control structures, Jackendoff & Culicover also agree with previous implicit argument approaches that the answer to the question of which argument must function as a controller in a context of Obligatory (Unique) Control lies in the meanings of the predicates that select such clauses. Furthermore, they are also clearly the strongest advocates of the view, contra, perhaps, Montague (1974: Ch. 8), that antecedent resolution warrants formal semantic analysis. In fact, their analysis is the most in-depth treatment of its type to date. Specifically, the preceding discussion revealed that Jackendoff & Culicover propose that Obligatory Control verbs semantically select only for bare VP complements of particular semantic types. They uncover one such type, those expressing Actions, but note the need for others. In relation to the type of Obligatory Control they discuss, namely verbs like persuade and promise, these authors further suggest that the meanings of these verbs break down into subclasses (they provide six) the conceptual semantics of which entails inherent control equations between arguments of the main clause and (an) implicit one(s) in the Control clause. If, for example, the meaning of a verb involves someone forming an intention to act, as is the case for the object NP with a verb like persuade, then only the person having that intention can execute it. Thus, persuade is an Obligatory Object Control verb. Similarly, if one incurs an obligation, as is the case for the thematic subject of a verb like promise, then only the obligated person can fulfill it. What distinguishes Jackendoff & Culicover’s purely conceptual approach to the Control problem from the HPSG analysis overviewed in the previous section is that the former authors assume that the same basic conceptual notions of INTENT, OBLIGATED, etc. unify large classes of verbs that involve identical Control relationships despite mapping the person with the intent, obligation, etc. in varying syntactic positions. I.e., Sag & Pollard (1991), the reader may recall, link a given conceptual-type role to a specific syntactic position. This is why the classifications of Sag & Pollard (1991) differ from those in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003). Intend and persuade, for example, are in two different classes in Sag & Pollard (1991) – the commitment and influence classes, but they are in the same (INTEND) class in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003).

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Although we have noted that Jackendoff & Culicover acknowledge their system to be incomplete in its present form, in guise of a conclusion, let us consider a few of those areas in which it is in need of refinement. As many of these issues have figured prominently in previous sections, the critical discussion here will be brief. We will, of course, be returning to these facts in more detail in Chapter 7. First, as noted above, Jackendoff & Culicover’s system does not cover the full range of empirical facts. They themselves point out that their system lacks the lexical semantic factors needed to account for the Obligatory Control status of verbs like hope and wish (to which were added, by logical extension, want, need, expect, hate, etc.). Similarly, the present author notes that there is currently no account of the fact, originally noted in Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37), that French verbs like croire ‘believe’ and, as we added, verbs like avouer ‘admit,’ involve Obligatory Control. Also lacking is an explanation for the Obligatory Control use of verbs like serve and suffice, first discussed in Kajita (1967: 103), and equally unexplained is Chomsky’s (1981a: 324) observation, noted above, that verbs like roll, which normally allow [-human] subjects, not do accept them in configurations of Arbitrary Control. In addition, this approach offers no account of antecedent resolution in adjunct structures. In other words, the very facts that proved problematic for the model-theoretic approaches and the HPSG analysis discussed in the two previous sections remain equally problematic under this proposal. In a similar vein, the semantic nature of ask raises issues for this proposal that are very similar to those attested earlier with respect to Sag & Pollard’s analysis. Namely, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 544–547) also propose that ask is semantically unambiguous: Clause (136f) makes the claim that ask is uniquely a verb of the REQUEST-type, for which control of the implicit argument is obligatorily associated with the (explicit or implicit) recipient of the request (the thematic direct object of the verb ask). This nicely covers cases like I asked you to do the dishes. However, it leaves examples like John asked to take care of himself. (drawn from Jackendoff & Culicover) without an immediate account. In order to accommodate them, Jackendoff & Culicover follow Sag & Pollard in making use of coercion, a treatment that is not formalized in terms of a lexical rule involving a Cause-type conceptual notion, but rather, the conceptual primitive ENABLE. That is, Jackendoff & Culicover suggest that John asked to take care of himself. is roughly paraphrasable as John asked someone to enable him to take care of himself. in which ask remains, as desired, an Object Control verb. As with Sag & Pollard’s approach, this analysis leaves unexplained not only why John asked to go. cannot mean John asked someone to go., but also why ask in indirect questions involves Arbitrary Control, as in, e.g. I asked when to excuse oneself from a formal gathering.

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3.3 Summary This chapter has examined some theories of Control that reject the PRO Hypothesis in favor of theoretical “downsizing” of two distinct types: Control as NP Movement and Control as an implicit argument. First, Hornstein’s (1999) version of a Movement Theory of Control was overviewed. His analysis was shown to reject the Minimalist assumption, dating back to the Theta Criterion of the GB era, that thematic roles are discharged only at the moment an NP enters the derivation and must be discharged in a sentence in the active voice in order to avoid a violation of the Principle of Full Interpretation at LF. Instead, Hornstein accepts the view that a thematic verb in the active voice must discharge its external theta-role, but rejects the claim that such assignment takes place only at initial merge. Control structures are claimed to instantiate just such a situation as the matrix subject NP of a sentence like They didn’t even try to understand my position. is analyzed as entering the derivation in the subject position of the embedded clause, where it checks a thematic feature, then undergoing movement through the subject position of the matrix one, checking an additional one. While Section 3.1 showed that Hornstein’s proposal offers surprisingly extensive empirical coverage, it also proved to suffer from a number of significant shortcomings, particularly in the area of antecedent resolution. In this area, the theory makes very strong, but incorrect, predictions, disallowing Obligatory Subject Control in examples like John promised me to leave early., failing to offer an account of when an adjunct clause does not require Obligatory Surface Subject Control, precluding “split antecedents” attested in examples like John proposed Mary to help each other., and so on. In Section 3.2 we examined a second type of theoretical “downsizing”: Analyses of Control that assume that the understood subject of a Control clause is implicit. These approaches also reject the Minimalist assumption that verbs in the active voice must discharge their thematic roles and can do so only at initial merge. The syntactic system instead allows for a head to c-select a “subjectless” VP, with authors varying with respect to whether or not that the s-selected implicit subject of a Control clause appears in the semantic representation. Model-theoretic semanticists were first shown in Section 3.2.1 to be of the opinion that it is not. The fact that native speakers understand that Control clauses have a subject and even know which argument in the matrix clause must serve as its reference in certain cases, can be formally captured in semantic terms, if one believes it should be, by Meaning Postulates lexically associated with specific verbs. Crucially, no attempt is made to decompose the meaning of a head selecting a bare VP complement to explain why this is the case. In other words, no attempt is made to analyze in formal semantic terms, just why the understood

Summary

213

subject of a Control clause is subject to Obligatory Subject Control, Object Control, or Arbitrary Control. This is implicitly assumed to be a non-linguistic matter, relating to how humans understand the world and its workings. In terms of problematic areas, model-theoretic analyses were shown to fail to offer an account of important differences that exist between Control by an implicit argument, as in Event Nominal constructions, and Control into clauses headed by a verbal element. That is, these authors assume that the understood subject of the noun desiccation and the verb desiccate is implicit in both cases, failing to account for Williams (1985) contrasts of the type You should not treat the leaves before desiccation. and *You should not treat the leaves before desiccating. Furthermore, such approaches cannot explain, among other things, why only Arbitrary PRO has a [+human] restriction, why certain verbs, like ask, appear to “lose” their Meaning Postulate of Obligatory Control in indirect questions, etc. This examination of alternative approaches to Control concluded with an overview of two analyses that do attempt to explain why certain heads entail Obligatory Subject or Object Control, whereas others entail Arbitrary Control. These were, of course, the argument and conceptual approaches to Control just examined above in Section 3.2.2. In contrast to model-theoretic approaches, the analyses of Sag & Pollard (1991) and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003) assume that a particular argument is specified as the subject in the semantic representation of a Control clause. Furthermore, formalizing ideas in the seminal work in Jackendoff (1969: Ch. 3), it is the lexical semantics of the selecting head that makes this determination in either argument or conceptual structure, with the two analyses varying with respect to whether or not a link should be made to particular syntactic positions, as well as which exact semantic factors are at work in making the determination (notions of influence, commitment, or orientation, as in Sag & Pollard, or factors like intent, obligation, ability, etc., as in Jackendoff & Culicover). These types of implicit argument approaches were shown to suffer not only from the empirical problems associated with model-theoretic analyses (namely, the differences in behavior noted above with respect to nominals like desiccation and verbs like desiccate; the [+human] restriction in configurations of Arbitrary Control; the “shifting” nature of ask; the determination of Control relations in adjuncts, etc.), but they also offer no account, at least in their present form, of a large number of Control verbs that do not “fit” into one of the presently recognized classes. We are referring here to verbs like croire ‘believe’ in French, hope/want/wish, and others. The existence of such data leaves unresolved, for the moment, the important question of whether it will, ultimately, be possible to provide a clear, predictive list of the semantic notions underlying controller

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resolution or whether this aspect of the Control problem will finally be judged to form the subject matter of theories of human reasoning and understanding, as many have claimed in relation to specific theta-role labels like Agent, Theme, etc. In conclusion, the two preceding chapters have sought to make clear some of the fundamental issues that arise in relation to Control structures, as well as how previous researchers have gone about resolving them. Three basic “schools of thought” have emerged concerning the syntax of Control: (a) Control clauses involve the projection of a non-overt NP, PRO (b) Obligatory Control clauses involve NP Movement; Arbitrary Control is due to the Last Resort insertion of pro and (c) Control clauses contain a syntactically implicit argument. The two preceding chapters have also shown that three basic positions have been taken with respect to the Control problem. One may adopt the view that (a) antecedent resolution reduces to an interaction of purely syntactic factors, such as the Minimal Link Condition and Last Resort (b) controller determination, to the degree that it is amenable to formal analysis, should be approached in primarily semantic (Obligatory Control) and pragmatic (Arbitrary Control) terms, and (c) antecedent determination is due to a complex interaction of syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and, even, possibly, non-linguistic factors. With this background in place, let us turn now to the first question to be addressed in the pages that follow: Does PRO really exist?

Chapter 4

A critical look at some standard arguments in favor of PRO The purpose of this chapter is to critically re-examine evidence commonly put forth in favor of a PRO approach to Control structures like (1) and (2) below. (1)

a. You forgot to fill up the tank again. b. I actually managed to send in an abstract before the deadline. c.

(2)

She loves to swim.

a. They persuaded Bill to go with them. b. He always advises his students to take LING 100. c.

They dared her to do it.

Specifically, the goal here will be to determine whether or not the PRO hypothesis advocated in Martin (1992, 2001), Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), Baltin (1995), Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002), Landau (2004, 2008), and Sigurðsson (2008), among many others, is superior in its account of Controlrelated data to the alternative proposals put forth by its competitors, the bare VP approach, developed in distinct ways by Montague (1974: Ch. 8), Bresnan (1982), Gazdar (1982), Klein & Sag (1982), Chierchia (1985), Dowty (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1986), and Jackendoff (1990), among others, and the NP or feature movement approaches put forth in, among others, O’Neil (1995), Manzini & Roussou (1997, 2000), and Hornstein (1999). What will be argued in this chapter is that these particular empirical facts can actually be captured in equally plausible terms by both Movement and bare VP approaches to Control. This will pave the way, in the Chapter 5, to seek out distinct evidence either for or against a PRO approach to Control. To begin, then, four arguments that continue to be frequently advanced in favor of positing PRO in the subject position of embedded sentences like (1) and (2) above concern the need to predictably encode argument structure, the desire to capture certain binding and agreement facts, and the manifestation of non-default case on agreeing predicative elements in such languages as Ancient Greek, Czech, Icelandic, Latin, Polish, Russian, Slovak, and Slovenian. (For an enumeration of the first three arguments, see, e.g. Radford (2004: 108–111); for

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the last, Landau (2008), Sigurðsson (2008: 421), and the many references cited therein.) Each of these will be examined in turn, beginning with the need to predictably encode argument structure. As was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3, in examples like (1) and (2) above, standard generative accounts currently merge a PRO in the Spec of the head responsible for external theta-role assignment (embedded v in the terms of Chomsky (1995: Ch. 3); a thematic Pr head if one adopts, as will be largely done here, the clausal structure defended in Bowers (2001, 2002)) in order to satisfy the argument requirements of the verb embedded in a Control structure, thereby offering a straightforward account of argument versus expletive contrasts that include the following: (3)

a. I always fill up the tank. b. *It/There filled up the tank. (on the relevant expletive reading of it/there) c.

You sometimes forget [PRO to fill up the tank].

Specifically, the grammaticality of (3a) and (3c) is assumed to be due, in part, to the satisfaction of the argument requirements of the verb fill. That is, fill expresses an action that must be performed by a thematic subject (an Agent), which, in current generative terms, means that this verb projects a VP that is selected by a causative light verb/thematic Pr. This v/Pr must discharge an Agent theta-role to an argument entering the derivation in its Spec position in order for the derivation to converge at LF. The overt NP I satisfies this requirement in (3a) and the non-overt NP PRO does so in (3c). However, the expletive nature of the subjects in (3b) precludes them from fulfilling this semantic function, which means that in such examples, the syntactic system fails to present sufficient information to the semantic component, violating the Principle of Full Interpretation. Alternative approaches offer equally plausible accounts of these and related contrasts. For example, Hornstein’s (1999: 79, 82–83) Movement approach to Obligatory Control, overviewed in Chapter 3.1, shares with standard accounts the hypothesis that examples like (3b) violate the Principle of Full Interpretation, although the violation is of a different nature. Specifically, the reader will recall that theta-roles in Hornstein’s system are treated as morphological features of a predicate that must be overtly checked off by an argument of the appropriate type before the derivation interfaces with the semantic system (i.e. by LF). Thus, the external thematic feature of fill remains unchecked in examples

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like (3b), but is checked off by I is (3a) and by you in (3c). (In (3c), you then moves up to check off a second external thematic feature, the one associated with the matrix light v/Pr.) Under this approach then, the syntactic system in examples like (3b) actually presents “too much” information to the semantic component, namely, an unchecked external thematic feature, again violating the Principle of Full Interpretation. “Subjectless VP” approaches, overviewed in Chapter 3.2, offer still other accounts of these facts. To provide one illustrative example, Dowty (1985: 315– 319) postulates that expletive NPs are associated with a feature [+there], as are verbs like seem, be, and appear that do not impose selectional restrictions on their subjects. Verbs like fill that do impose selectional restrictions are assumed to lack the expletive feature. The grammaticality of (3a) and (3c) is then due to proper feature agreement and the ungrammaticality of (3b) to a clash in agreement features. While competing approaches to Control arguably offer equally plausible accounts of the data introduced thus far, I would now like to argue that they each fail to provide a compelling account of separate facts relating to argument projection. Specifically, there are a significant number of verbs, a small sample is given below in (4), that, to the best of my knowledge, never select Control complements in any language.1 In contrast, those in (5) seem to universally accept Control complements, be they infinitival (as in English) or tensed (as in the languages of the Balkans).2 Finally, there is an extremely limited class of

1 I have identified 37 verbs of this type in English and verified the results with the equivalent verbs (where they exist) with native speakers of French (Marc Authier), Greek (Sabine Iatridou), Hebrew (Idan Landau), and Serbian (Ljiljana Progovac). These verbs are: answer, ascertain, bet, charge (on the meaning ‘to assert as an accusation’), comment, confide, conjecture, contend (on the meaning ‘to maintain that’), deduce, disclose, emphasize, explain, gamble, gather (on the meaning ‘to surmise that), guarantee (on the meaning ‘to swear to the fact that’), guess, hint (on the meaning ‘to indicate that’), hypothesize, indicate (on the meaning ‘to point to the fact that’), mention, mutter, preach (on the meaning ‘to advocate that’), pronounce (on the meaning ‘to announce that’), remark, reply, report, say (on the meaning ‘to mention’), show, specify, stipulate, submit (on the meaning ‘to argue that’), suppose (on the meaning ‘to conjecture that’), surmise, theorize, understand, wager (on the meaning ‘to speculate that’), and write (on the meaning ‘to indicate in writing’). An examination of the data provided in the papers listed in the bibliography revealed that none of these verbs is listed as a Control verb in other languages. The reader is referred to Chapter 8 for an in-depth discussion of these verbs and their failure to select simple Control complements. 2 As discussed in detail in Landau (2004) and the references cited therein, languages like Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian have (with the exception of a few idioms) lost infinitival verb forms. The embedded verb in a Control complement is tensed (in the subjunctive, which is in some cases morphologically identical to the indicative, as in Greek,

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verbs that allow Control structures in one language, but not in another, cf. the English and French examples in (6)–(7).3,4 (4) a. I disclosed/remarked/explained that I would retire in 2028. b. *I disclosed/remarked/explained to retire in 2028. (5)

a. *I will manage/try/be unable/hasten that I retire in 2028. b. I will manage/try/be unable/hasten to retire in 2028.

(6)

a. *I believed to have told you not to touch my stuff. b. Je croyais t’avoir dit de ne pas toucher à mes affaires. I believe you to-have told of Neg not to-touch at my things ‘I thought that I told you not to touch my things.’

and, in others, to the future, as in Hebrew), exhibiting full person and number inflection. The embedded verb’s understood subject (PRO in standard generative terms) nonetheless exhibits the interpretative properties commonly associated with Control, e.g., it must be null; it must be co-referential with a c-commanding antecedent; it only permits a sloppy reading under ellipsis; and it supports a de se but not a de re interpretation. (See Varlokosta (1993) for a particularly clear discussion of these characteristics as they apply to Greek.) As pointed out in Landau (2004) and Melnik (2007), Modern Hebrew is a language that exhibits both finite and infinitival Control, although finite Control is restricted to the third person, future tense of certain verbs. I.e., certain Control verbs in Modern Hebrew (e.g. nisa ‘try’) allow only infinitival Control complements; others (e.g. hitshir ‘declare’) accept only finite Control (limited to the third person, future); and still others (e.g. hivtiax ‘promise’) accept both complement types (with the finite option being, again, restricted to third person, future). 3 Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 3) credits Luigi Rizzi and Jean-Roger Vergnaud for the original observation that the Italian and French counterparts to believe-type verbs allow Control complements where their English counterparts do not – facts that Bošković (2007: ft. 26) notes obtain in other Romance languages, and which have also been argued by Terzi (1992, 1997) and Landau (2004) to obtain in the languages of the Balkans. (But see, e.g., Varlokosta (1993), for an alternative non-Control (uniquely pro) approach to these so-called ‘Free Subjunctives’ in the languages of the Balkans.) Estimer ‘judge’ ( J’estime être le meilleur. ‘I judge myself to be the best.’) is another verb that I have found that contrasts in this manner. Bošković (1996: 286) cites constater ‘to notice’ as an additional example (Pierre a constaté avoir convaincu son auditoire. ‘Pierre noticed that he had convinced his audience.’), but these examples strike my informant as ungrammatical, though processable, a view supported by their lack of productivity (cf. *?J’ai constaté avoir trop mangé. ‘I noticed that I had eaten too much.’ and J’ai constaté que j’avais trop mangé.). 4 If authors like Varlokosta (1993) are correct in analyzing Balkan Free (a.k.a. F-) Subjunctives as unambiguously non-Control structures, then the class of verbs that differ cross-linguistically with respect to Control/non-Control distinction is greater than indicated in the text since verbs

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(7)

219

a. *I think to have passed the exam. b. Je pense avoir réussi à l’examen. I think to-have passed at the exam ‘I think I passed the exam.’

As Martin (2001: 144–146) points out in relation to data parallel to (5b), the question that arises with respect to the standard PRO approach to Control is this: What mechanisms determine when to project PRO and when to project a lexical NP? Analyses like Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995) and Baltin’s (1995) implicitly rely on lexical stipulations to do so. That is, non-Control verbs like the ones in (4) are apparently assumed to idiosyncratically c-select only for tensed clauses; i.e., they do not c-select for clauses containing infinitival to or clausal gerundive -ing, the only heads capable of checking off the null Case feature associated with PRO. Control verbs, like those in (5), do have an untensed clause c-selection frame, thereby ruling in PRO. Finally, those in (6) and (7) select different options in various languages. The validity of this approach is cast into doubt, however, by the fact that so little cross-linguistic variation seems to exist in this area. That is, an idiosyncratic lexical specification for complement type provides no explanation for why the class of verbs in (4) disallows simple Control complements cross-linguistically; why those in (5) always allow them; and why variability is limited to the relatively small class of verbs exemplified by (6) and (7). Aware of this issue, as well as separate facts involving ECM and Raising verbs that were discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3.2.1, Martin (1992, 2001) and Bošković (1996, 2007) modify Chomsky & Lasnik’s proposal by developing a like want, hope, persuade and many others can select Control complements in languages like English and French, but their counterparts must select non-Control structures in the languages of the Balkans, as the following Greek examples drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 154–155) demonstrate. (i)

tora, o Yanis elpizi [na pro figi avrio]. now the John hopes PRT leave-3-sing tomorrow ‘Now John hopes that he’ll leave tomorrow.’

(ii) tora, o Yanis elpizi [na figi o Giorgos]. now the John hopes PRT leave-3-sing the George ‘Now John hopes that George will leave.’ However, the reader is referred to Terzi (1992, 1997) and Landau (2004) for an alternative account of F-Subjunctives like (i), according to which they are as syntactically ambiguous as their English counterparts, i.e., associated with Control and non-Control configurations parallel to those in (iii)–(iv). (iii) John hopes [PRO to be selected]. (iv) John hopes that [he/George will be selected].

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semantic criterion that they argue defines the class of verbs selecting for Control. Extending and substantially modifying ideas in Stowell (1982), Pesetsky (1992), and others, they propose that Control verbs s-select for embedded propositions whose Tense is independent from that of the matrix verb. In other words, these authors suggest that the to and clausal gerundive -ing associated with null Case are morphologically uninflected; nonetheless, they semantically encode a tense distinct from that of the matrix. This distinctness may take one of two (presumably not unrelated) forms: Either the truth of the complement clause is unrealized at the time denoted by the matrix verb (Martin 2001: 146–150)/the time of utterance (Bošković 2007: 91) or its truth is presupposed or entailed at that time. In each of the Control complements in (5b), for example, the event expressed by the embedded clause (the retirement) is unrealized at the time of the actual trying, wanting, being unable and hastening, as well as at the time of utterance; in the case of factive verbs like be surprised in John was surprised to win the championship last year. and implicative verbs like happen to in Crosby happened to score in every game. the truth of the proposition denoted by the embedded clause is respectively presupposed and entailed. In this respect, these Control complements stand in stark contrast to the complements of ECM and Raising verbs like believe and seem since in She believes him to be crazy. and He seems to be crazy. the properties denoted by the matrix and embedded predicates necessarily hold in the world(s) under consideration at exactly the same moment(s) in time. Martin (2001: 150–152, 153–155) and Bošković (2007: 90–91) go on to suggest that this semantic difference offers an immediate account of contrasts like the following: (8) a. *John tried/hated/managed to play football, which was false. b. John believed Peter to have played football, which was false. (9) a.

John wasn’t sure that he could leave, but he tried/managed to.

b. *John believed Mary to know French and Peter believed Jane to. (10)

a.

John tried [PRO to bring the beer].

b. *John believed [Peter to bring the beer]. Specifically, it is argued in relation to (8a,b) that the truth of Control complements, unlike that of ECM/Raising verbs, is semantically unspecified in the senses outlined above; therefore, it is impossible to predicate truth or falsity

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of it. Turning to (9a,b), VP-ellipsis is argued to be licit in Control but not ECM/ Raising contexts because, following Lobeck (1990) and Saito & Murasugi (1990), ellipsis is only licensed by a functional head when that head Agrees with an argument in its Spec. Since only the to of Control infinitivals is semantically [+tense], only it undergoes such an agreement relationship (with PRO). Finally, in relation to (10), the eventive predicate to bring the beer is said to only be licit in the Control infinitival because only it contains the [+tense] operator that Enç (1991) has argued is needed to bind the event variable associated with these types of predicates. As appealing as these proposals may initially appear, a closer inspection of the data reveals them to be unable to provide a non-circular definition of the semantic property that distinguishes Control verbs, leading ultimately to the same sorts of projection problems noted earlier with respect to Chomsky & Lasnik’s original analysis. Consider first sentences like I disclosed/remarked/explained that I would retire in 2028.; i.e. those in (4), which appear to universally disallow simple Control. The events denoted by the embedded predicates s-selected by these matrix verbs are equally “unrealized” or “unspecified” with respect to the time of the matrix/utterance in a manner parallel to (5b), yet in the former case, PRO is always unacceptable. Why? In addition, as was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3.2.1, there exist verbs that are structurally ambiguous, possessing Control, ECM, and Raising complementation frames, and in which, problematically, identical temporal relations obtain between the matrix and embedded clauses. For example, Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 553–554) and Huang (1999: 41) have argued that causative get involves a Control configuration since the Agent-Oriented Manner Adverb deliberately modifies John’s actions in (11a) below, a claim that is further supported by the fact that John serves as the controller of the PRO in both the Rationale Clause in (11b) and the embedded passive infinitival in (11c).5 (11)

a.

John deliberately got [PRO hurt.]

b. John deliberately got hurt [PRO to collect Workingmen’s Comp]. c.

John deliberately got hurt [PRO to be awarded monetary compensation].

Interestingly, the sentences in (11) have small clause paraphrases, given in (12):

5 Lakoff (1971: 156) appears to have been the first to note the existence of examples like (11a,b).

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a.

John deliberately got [ Small

Clause

himself hurt].

b. John deliberately got himself hurt [PRO to collect Workingmen’s Comp]. c.

John deliberately got himself hurt [PRO to be awarded monetary compensation].

And, finally, Haegeman (1985) and Fox & Grodzinsky (1998) have noted that get may also function as a non-thematic, Raising verb, c-selecting an embedded passive clause: either verbal (Haegeman) or adjectival (Fox & Grodzinsky) in nature:6 (13)

a.

The book got [ VP

Small Clause

b. The book got [AdjP

(the book) torn (the book)].

Small Clause

(the book) torn].

Importantly for present purposes, in all three cases, the same temporal relations obtain between the matrix and embedded clauses ( get in all three cases is an implicative verb like happen to). But if such temporal relationships exhaustively determine membership in the class of Control versus ECM/Raising verbs, as Bošković and Martin suggest, then how can this be the case? Pairs like (14) and (15) below make the same point: It is difficult to see how the temporal properties of the (a) and (b) variants could be said to differ, yet the PRO/lexical NP projection patterns clearly do.7 (14)

a.

I forced him [PRO to bring the wine].

b. I made [him bring the wine].

6 See Reed (2011) for an in-depth discussion of the two proposals and an alternative account. 7 Martin (2001: 155–159) and Bošković (2007: 94–97) both discuss the case of want, citing evidence involving NPI licensing and binding drawn from Lasnik & Saito (1991) that they argue indicates that want contrasts with prove, believe, make, get, etc. in not possessing an ECM/small clause configuration. Martin argues that apparent instances of ECM with want involve a lexical NP having its Case feature valued null by to and its phi-features valued at LF by a null for in C; Bošković suggests that want is associated with a T possessing either a null Case feature or no Case feature. In the latter instance a null for, generated in T, values the lexical NP’s Case. In either case, the criticism leveled in the text remains valid: These authors are arguing that temporal relations between the matrix and embedded clauses determine when an embedded T checks null Case. The same temporal relations obtain in (15a,b), so why are the Case-checking properties different?

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(15)

a.

223

Mary wants [PRO to win]

b. Mary wants [her team to win]. Finally, it seems plausible to argue, in opposition to Bošković (2007: 101– 102), that the same conclusion emerges from a consideration of the contrasts in (6)–(7) above in which verbs of belief exhibit opposite projection patterns in English and the Romance languages.8 That is, the temporal properties in (16a, b) below are clearly identical, so why is PRO licensed in the former case, but not the latter (cf. (16c))? Bošković’s (2007: 102) conclusion that French propositional infinitivals contrast with their English counterparts in being specified [+tense] appears to be a stipulation in this case, i.e., not based on a consistent semantic property. (16) a.

Pierre croyait [PRO embrasser Marie]. Pierre believed to-kiss Marie

b. Peter believed that he was kissing Marie. c. *Peter believed [PRO to kiss/be kissing Marie]. If the class of Control verbs were instead decisively delimited by the constructions in (8)–(10) above, then one might be justified in supposing that the semantic criterion at work need only be refined in some yet-to-be-determined fashion. Unfortunately, as was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3.2.1, it is possible to find counterexamples to each of these claims as well. For example, there are small clause selecting and Raising verbs that, in fact, disallow predication with truth/falsity clauses, as the parallel between (17a,b) below and (8a) above makes clear, and there is at least one Control verb that allows such predication, as in (17c). Furthermore, there are Control verbs that disallow VP-Ellipsis (contrast (17d) below with (9a)), as well as small clause selecting verbs that allow embedded infinitival eventive predicates (compare (17e) with (10b)): (17)

a. *Mary made him bring the wine, which was false. b. *The book got torn in the move, which was false. c.

John claimed to know her, which was false.

d. *John deliberately got hurt and Peter deliberately got too. e.

I made/saw/let [John bring the beer].

8 The so-called Free (F-) Subjunctives of the languages of the Balkans may present another type of problematic class of example of this type, cf. the discussion in footnote 4.

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In short, these alternative means of identifying the class of Control verbs also fail, leaving these more recent versions of the null Case approach to Control with no way to predict the respective licensing of PRO and lexical NPs. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3.3, Landau (2004, 2008) offers a complex feature-based alternative approach to the projection problem that is flawed in a similar manner since, as will be demonstrated below, he too assumes that it is primarily the nature of the temporal relationship existing between the matrix and embedded propositions that licenses PRO. The key licensing feature in his system, however, is the [R] or “referential” feature that is assumed to be associated with all non-expletive nouns and certain INFLs and COMPs. Specifically, Landau proposes that since non-expletive Ns, such as they, he, etc., inherently encode person, number, and gender (i.e. phi-) features, they are associated with an interpretable [+R] feature; however PRO, having no inherent phi-features (acquiring them instead via an Agreement relation with the controller), is associated with an interpretable [-R] feature. In contrast, INFL and COMP, under specific conditions to be spelled out shortly, have an uninterpretable [+] or [-] [R] feature, which, being uninterpretable, must be checked off by an N with the matching interpretable counterpart prior to Spell-Out. Given their respective features, this means that PRO can only check off an INFL or COMP with a [-R] uninterpretable feature setting, while lexical NPs and pro may only check off an INFL or COMP associated with an uninterpretable [+R] setting. The exact setting of INFL’s and COMP’s [R] feature is determined largely by the temporal properties that exist between the matrix and embedded clauses, specifically, by a combination of their [T] (representing various tense relationships between the matrix and embedded INFLs, mediated by C, to be briefly summarized shortly) and [Agr] (for overt phi-feature morphology) feature settings, as indicated in (18). (18)

a.

If INFL/COMP = [+T, +Agr], then INFL/COMP has an uninterpretable [+R] feature.

b. If INFL/COMP is any other combination of both [T] and [Agr], then it has an uninterpretable [-R] feature. c.

If INFL/COMP lacks either a [T] or an [Agr] feature, then it has no [R] feature.

The definitions in (18) make crucial reference to INFL/C’s [T] and [Agr] feature settings. Thus, (19)–(21) are needed to complete the system. As is obvious, it is the clauses in (19), which specify INFL/C’s [T] feature, that once again bring tense relationships between the matrix and embedded propositions into the equation.

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a.

225

If an embedded I encodes a tense distinct from the matrix (as in indicatives), then I has an interpretable [+T] feature and C lacks a [T] feature.

b. If an embedded I encodes a tense dependent on that of the matrix (as with non-factive Control verbs like prefer), then I has an interpretable [+T] feature and C has a matching uninterpretable [+T] feature. c.

If the tense of the embedded I is identical to that of the matrix (as with factive Control verbs like manage), then I has an interpretable [-T] feature and C a matching uninterpretable [-T] one.

d. Small clauses are “defective,” i.e., they are unspecified for [T]. (20) a.

An INFL exhibiting overt phi-feature morphology is associated with an interpretable [+Agr] feature.

b. Non-ECM infinitival and small clause I are associated with an interpretable [-Agr] feature.9 c. (21)

ECM infinitival I is “defective”; i.e., lacks an [Agr] feature.

If C is [+T], then C either lacks an [Agr] feature or it is associated with an uninterpretable [+Agr] feature; otherwise, C lacks an [Agr] feature.

When one applies this feature calculus to the preceding data, the same sorts of problems emerge as were attested with the standard approaches. Namely, one finds that a predictive account of the class of verbs in (4) – those that disallow Control – is lacking. To explain, Landau (2004: 836) notes that the embedded I of a complement to a verb like prefer, want, or try exhibits a tense that is dependent on (not identical with, nor completely distinct from) that of the matrix, as evidenced by the grammaticality of “tense mismatch” examples like (22): (22)

Yesterday, John preferred to gather today in the main conference room.

Given this tense dependence, by (19b), the embedded to of a verb like prefer has an interpretable [+T] feature. Since to exhibits no overt phi-feature morphology, by (20b), it also has an interpretable [-Agr] feature, which combines 9 As indicated in (19d) and (20b), Landau (2004: 861–862) departs from the standard view that small clauses are defective, i.e., fail to project both I and C. Instead, he assumes that small clauses do indeed lack C, but they possess a null I, unspecified for a [T] feature (as evidenced by their failure to project auxiliary verbs) and specified [-Agr] (intended to capture the abstract Agreement at work in small clause subject-predicate agreement).

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A critical look at some standard arguments in favor of PRO

with to’s [+T] feature in (18b) to yield an uninterpretable [-R] feature, forcing the projection of PRO and blocking a lexical NP in the embedded subject position. The problem is that verbs like disclose, remark, etc. in (4) exhibit seemingly identical “tense mismatches,” as evidenced by the parallel between (22) above and (23) below, yet these verbs disallow Control. (23) Yesterday, John announced/bet that we would gather in the main conference room today. That is, the grammaticality of (23) indicates that the embedded I of this class of verbs is also associated with an interpretable [+T] feature. Why then does such a verb block the projection of PRO? The answer is purely by stipulation. I.e., these verbs always happen to exhibit agreement morphology; therefore, they are associated with a [+Agr] setting, which combines with [+T] to license only lexical NPs. While the system describes the facts, it, like the others, leads one to expect to see some cross-dialectal or cross-linguistic variation in these projection patterns, yet there is no evidence that such is the case. Instances of “overlap” in Control and ECM/small clauses pose additional problems. Consider first the case of well-known contrasts of the type in (24) and (25), noted in Landau (2004: 860): (24)

a.

We saw/heard/felt [ourselves laughing].

b. We believe [Mary to be intelligent]. (25)

a.

*We saw/heard/felt [PRO laughing].

b. *We believe [PRO to be intelligent]. According to definitions (19d) and (20b), the I associated with small clause complements like (24a) is [-Agr] and unspecified for [T]. By (18c), then, such Is lack an [R] feature and will, therefore, license both PRO and lexical NPs if no further mechanisms come into play. The same is true of ECM configurations like (24b) since the I of ECM clauses is [+T] (given the licitness of tense “mismatches” like Mary believes John to have fainted last night at 10.) and lacking [Agr], combining to deprive these Is of an [R] feature as well. Given the ungrammaticality of PRO in (25a,b), Landau (2004: 862) is led to rule it out by proposing that PRO is blocked from entering two checking relations with two distinct heads (the embedded I and matrix v) in the same phase. The problem, of course, is that PRO is, in fact, licensed in certain small clause/

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227

ECM configurations: English causative get in (11a) is one example; remember in (26a) is another; and French sentences like (26b) may provide a third instance. (26)

a.

I remember [PRO/myself/her sending that letter].

b. J’ai entendu [PRO/ Médor aboyer]. I have heard Médor to-bark ‘I heard (Médor) barking.’ The contrasting projection patterns attested with verbs of belief in Romance and English pose yet another problem, though of a semantic nature. As noted above, Romance verbs of belief accept Control complements. Since they also allow “tense mismatch,” as indicated by the grammaticality of (27), this means that the embedded I and C heads in these cases are associated with the features in (28), which are identical to those associated with verbs like prefer, that also allow tense mismatch, cf. (22). (27)

Je crois avoir laissé ce dossier dans mon bureau hier. I believe to-have left that file in my office yesterday ‘I think that I left that file in my office yesterday.’

(28) I:

Interpretable [+T] [-Agr]; Uninterpretable [-R].

C: Uninterpretable [+T], [+Agr], and [+R] or Uninterpretable [+T] only. As with prefer above in (22), I’s uninterpretable [-R] feature has the desirable effect of licensing PRO and disallowing lexical NPs. The problem lies in C’s features. Landau (2004: 833) notes, on the basis of examples like (22) above, that verbs like prefer contrast with verbs like manage in allowing what he calls “Partial Control” (PC), not exclusively “Exhaustive Control” (EC) readings. That is, he points out that verbs like prefer allow a reading in which the controller and PRO are not identical in semantic number; e.g., in (29) below, John, the controller of PRO, is singular, but PRO refers to a group of individuals that includes him; i.e., PRO is semantically plural. Such PC readings are strictly disallowed by factive Control verbs like manage, as evidenced by (30): (29) John prefers [PRO to meet in the small conference room today]. (30) *John managed [PRO to meet in the small conference room today].

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A critical look at some standard arguments in favor of PRO

Landau (2004: 848–849) captures this semantic difference in his Calculus of Control via C’s features, specifically, via the hypothesis that only the Cs associated with verbs like prefer are [+T] (where [+T], the reader may recall, is intended to capture the tense dependency that exists between the matrix and embedded clauses – a type of semantic selection mediated by C). Since only these types of C are [+T], only they can ever combine with a [+Agr] feature to yield an uninterpretable [+R] feature, which will serve to break a direct Control relationship between the controller and PRO, allowing the two to potentially differ in semantic number. The problem, of course, is that Romance verbs of belief, which the system associates with identical features, strictly disallow Partial Control readings, as indicated by the gloss in (31): (31) Le directeur du comité croyait avoir déjà discuté the chair of-the committee believed to-have already discussed de ce dossier. of that file ‘The chair of the committee thought that he/*we/*they had already discussed that file.’ Furthermore, French equivalents of verbs like prefer (e.g. préférer) actually disallow PC readings as well, as made clear by (32c): (32)

a. [PRO se rencontrer devant la mairie] serait idéal. oneself to-meet in-front-of the city-hall would-be ideal ‘Meeting in front of city hall would be ideal.’ b. Cédric préfère [qu’on se rencontre devant la mairie]. Cédric prefers that we ourselves meet in-front-of the city-hall c. *Cédric préfère [PRO se rencontrer devant la mairie]. Cédric prefers oneself to-meet in-front-of the city-hall ‘Cédric prefers to meet in front of city hall.’

In short, this approach too fails to offer a predictive account of PRO licensing, at least in its present form. Hornstein’s (1999: ft. 21, 94) Movement approach to Control can be shown to suffer from similar shortcomings. According to Hornstein, Obligatory Control (for him, A-Movement) verbs like manage in (5b), croire ‘believe’ in (6b), and penser ‘think’ in (7b) lexically specify for optional Accusative Case feature “suppression.” This suppression allows the surface subject NP to raise from the embedded

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to the matrix subject position to check off the matrix verb’s Nominative Case since, were Accusative Case not suppressed, a Case feature would remain unchecked. On the other hand, non-Control verbs like those in (4b) idiosyncratically disallow suppression of their Accusative Case feature, which means that either the Nominative Case feature of the matrix I/T or the Accusative Case of AgrO/Tr remains unchecked in examples like the following: (33) *I disclosed [(I) to (I) retire]. Clearly, then, the Movement approach, like the standard Chomsky & Lasnik analysis, relies on random lexical specification to limit the projection of Control/ Raising structures. As such, it immediately leads one to expect much more cross-linguistic/dialectal variation in this area than is actually attested. These very same issues arise with respect to “bare VP” approaches to Control. Particularly problematic for these analyses are the areas in which one finds two structurally distinct sentences that are, by all appearances, perfect paraphrases. This is, of course, the case with small clause/Control causative get, as well as English versus French verbs of belief. Specifically, these analyses rest on the assumption that it is the meaning of verbs that determines whether or not a “bare VP” is projected. If so, equivalent meaning logically entails equivalent syntactic projection; otherwise, one would again need to resort to arbitrary lexical specification to make final decisions regarding argument projection, leading one to once again expect a wider range of cross-linguistic variation than is actually attested. To summarize, thus far it has been shown that (a) PRO, Raising, and bare VP approaches to Control offer equally plausible accounts of mapping contrasts involving expletive and thematic subjects, as in (3), and (b) all three types of approaches fail to offer a predictive account of a more complete data set, one that includes not only Control verbs like those in (5), but also non-Control verbs (4) and verbs of belief in Romance (6)–(7), an issue that we will return to in Chapters 6 and 8, where a syntactic account is offered for a portion of this data, and a semantic one for the remaining facts. Continuing now with a critical examination of arguments standardly advanced in favor of the existence of PRO, let us next consider binding contrasts, like those in (34) and (35) below, as well as agreement facts, such as those in (36).10 Authors like Martin (1992, 2001), Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), Baltin (1995),

10 As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the use of such data to argue for the existence of PRO (at the time, “Doom”) dates back to Postal (1968a, 1970).

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Bošković (1996), Bowers (2002), and Landau (2004, 2008), among others, treat the (a) examples in (34) and (35) as Condition A violations and the (b) variants as involving satisfaction of this Principle via the local antecedent PRO. In a similar vein, a predicate nominal, like millionaires in (36), requires a local subject with which it agrees in person, number, and gender – a requirement that is not met by the singular NP their son in (36a), but is, by PRO, controlled by they, in (36b). (34) a. *They want [John to help themselves]. b. They want [PRO to help themselves]. (35)

a. *[For John to help oneself ] would be nice. b. [PRO to help oneself ] is not always wise.

(36) a. *They want [their son to become millionaires]. b. They want [PRO to become millionaires]. Here too alternative proposals exist. Hornstein’s (1999) Movement approach, for example, offers an immediate account of the contrasts in (34a,b). In (34a), the singular NP John enters the derivation as the subject of the embedded verb, failing to serve as an appropriate antecedent for the plural anaphor. In (34b), on the other hand, the plural surface matrix subject they enters the derivation in that position, thereby serving as an appropriate antecedent for themselves. The same line of reasoning extends to the agreement facts in (36). To account for the grammaticality of (35b), however, Hornstein (1999: 90–93) must make use of pro, an element that he suggests can only be inserted as a Last Resort to check I’s EPP feature, but which, in so doing, provides an appropriate antecedent for oneself as well. Since John is already available to check I’s EPP feature in (35a), pro cannot be inserted, leaving the anaphor without an antecedent, in violation of Condition A. Bach (1979: 520–521) appears to have been the first in the “bare VP” tradition to explicitly use Meaning Postulates to accommodate these sorts of facts. To illustrate this type of approach, I will instead make use of Dowty’s (1985: 299) Meaning Postulate for Obligatory Subject Control verbs, adapted specifically to want in (37) below, simply because Dowty’s version of the postulates is more explicit. (The reader is referred to Chapter 3.2 for a more detailed overview of both analyses.)

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(37) ox oP□[WANT(P) (x*) → INTENDS ([P(x*)](x*))] The preceding postulate embodies the claim that it is part of the meaning of Subject Control verbs that for every individual x and every property P (e.g. the property WIN), if x WANTS P (i.e. x wants to win.), then x intends that x’s actions will bring about P(x) (i.e., x intends for x to win). Object Control verbs like persuade are associated with a similar postulate, except, of course, that the matrix subject’s actions have, as a result, that another individual (y) comes to intend to act so as to bring about P(y). In short, these postulates associate Control verbs with implicit embedded subjects and the reference of those implicit subjects is determined by the meaning of the verb; specifically, whether the verb denotes an action that logically can be performed by the matrix verb’s syntactically projected subject or its object.11 As a result of the postulate in (37), sentences like (34b) and (36b) will be ruled in; i.e. judged to be conventionally compatible with the meaning of the verb, since the verb want associates its syntactically projected subject (they) with the implicit subject of the embedded verb. This identity would entail a matching in person, number, and gender features between the two (co-referential) arguments. On the other hand, the variants in (34a) and (36a) will be ruled out because an alternate c-selection frame of want was selected and there is a failure in agreement between the post-verbal nominals and the overt subjects. Contrasts involving Arbitrary Control, such as the ones in (35) have, to the best of my knowledge, never been explicitly discussed in the model-theoretic literature. But perhaps they could receive a treatment along the following lines: The meaning of thematic verbs like help is such that they lexically entail the existence of an Agent who performs the action denoted by the verb. This argument will only be explicitly projected when independent syntactic considerations (e.g., in generative terms, unchecked EPP or unvalued agreement features) force it to be. In the case of (35b), one would need to assume (contra standard generative assumptions) that there are no such features, which is why the thematic subject of help remains implicit. This argument is, nonetheless, semantically available, via Agent verbal entailments, to serve as the antecedent of oneself. On the other hand, in (35a), there presumably are some sort of syntactic mechanisms that force the projection of the embedded subject, but the one inserted fails to agree with the anaphor in person, number, and gender as required by Principle A. 11 As discussed in detail in Chapter 3.2.2, similar lexical semantic accounts of Control have more recently been developed within, e.g., the Conceptual Semantic framework in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003).

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Such an account rests, of course, on the assumption that implicit and explicit arguments may both participate in binding relations, a view that Williams (1985) has defended at length on the basis of facts that include (38a,b), taken from Williams (1985: 306). (The reader is referred to Chapter 2.2.5 for a detailed overview of Williams’ proposals.) (38) a.

Mary went to the doctor’s office, and she promised that the doctor would not see her again until she was really sick.

b. Mary went to the doctor’s office, and she promised that he would not see her again until she was really sick. As Williams notes, examples (38a) and (38b) contrast in that only (38b) permits a reading in which the implicit Goal of the verb promise is co-referential with the subject of the embedded verb see. That is, (38a) cannot mean that Mary promised the doctor that she would not come to see him (the doctor) again until she was really sick, a reading available in (38b). A straightforward account of this (and other facts) follows from Williams’ proposal that implicit arguments are active in the computation of the Binding Principles. Specifically, the lack of the co-referential reading in (a) is due to a Condition C violation (the R-expression the doctor is c-commanded by promise, the element lexically associated with the co-referential implicit Goal); the pronoun he, subject to Condition B, allows such binding. The grammaticality of examples like (39) may indicate that implicit arguments are equally active in computing Principle A since oneself here is bound by the implicit Agent of the passive verb given: (39) Damaging testimony is often given against oneself at such trials. It thus appears that oft-cited binding and agreement facts are equally inconclusive with respect to the syntactic status of the embedded subject in Control contexts. A final argument for the existence of PRO involves the manifestation of nondefault morphological case on various types of agreeing predicative elements in languages that include Ancient Greek (see e.g., Andrews, 1971), Czech (Comrie, 1974), Icelandic (Sigurðsson, 2008), Latin (Cecchetto & Oniga, 2004), Polish (Comrie, 1974), Russian (Landau, 2008), Slovak (Comrie, 1974), and Slovenian (Franks, 1998). As was perhaps first noted in Andrews (1971) with respect to Ancient Greek, these languages possess a class of elements known as SemiPredicative phrases (SemPs) that obligatorily agree in structural case with the

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overt subject or object of which they are predicated, a fact illustrated by the Russian examples in (40a,b), drawn from Landau (2008: 882).12 (40)

a. Taras prišël odin /*odnim. Taras.NOM came alone.NOM/*INST ‘Taras came alone.’ b. Ja našel ego odnogo /*odnim. I.NOM found him.ACC alone.ACC/*INST ‘I found him alone.’ (I.e., he was alone.)

As these examples make clear, the SemP odin ‘alone’ must bear the same structural (i.e. syntactically valued) case as the clausemate subject (40a) or object (40b) of which it is predicated: Russian’s default case, Instrumental, is disallowed. Andrews and subsequent authors have noted that in Control configurations, predicative elements continue to exhibit non-default case, with the exact form differing from language to language, and even within the same language, according to the particular type of Control configuration.13 For example, Landau (2008: 884, 886), refining earlier work by Comrie (1974) and others, notes that in Russian simple subject Control structures like (41a), SemPs must bear nominative case; whereas in object Control structures like (41b), all speakers accept SemPs in the dative case, and many speakers, in the accusative as well. (41) a. Kostja obeščal prijti odin. Kostja.NOM promised to.come alone.NOM ‘Kostja promised to come alone.’ b. Ona poprosila ego ne ezdit’ tuda odnogo/odnomu zavtra. she.NOM asked him.ACC not to.go there alone.ACC/DAT tomorrow ‘She asked him not to go there alone tomorrow.’ Following Comrie (1974), Sigurðsson (2008: 421) and others have argued that “. . .it is evident that PRO neither reduces to nothingness nor to movement only. 12 As discussed in the literature cited in the text, in many of these rich case agreement languages, there are other types of predicative elements that have also been used to argue for the existence of a structurally case valued PRO. For example, Icelandic past participles, floating quantifiers, and secondary predicates all exhibit obligatory case agreement properties parallel to those attested with SemPs. In interest of space, the discussion here is limited to SemPs since the data are sufficient to make clear the strengths and weaknesses of this particular argument. 13 See Landau (2008) for a brief comparison of the case forms exhibited in each of the languages mentioned in the text, as well as an in-depth discussion of how the Russian facts vary according to the type of Control configuration. For a more in-depth discussion of the equivalent data in Icelandic, see Sigurðsson (2008).

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What the . . . facts demonstrate, beyond doubt, is that something is there. . .” In other words, projecting a PRO in the embedded clauses in (41a,b) provides a means of explaining how these predicative elements come to be associated with a non-default case: As with lexical NPs, they are simply predicated of and hence agree in structural (syntactically valued) case with PRO. Exactly how PRO comes to be associated with a particular case form varies from author to author. Landau (2008), for example, takes as his point of departure Marantz’ (1992) hypothesis that abstract Case does not exist. That is, he assumes with Marantz that structural case forms, in contrast to both inherent case forms (which are lexically determined) and default case forms (which surface when the conditions for inherent and structural case fail to obtain), are determined by a onestep process, post-syntactically, via morphological rules that make reference to the c-command relations previously established in the computational system. Thus, PRO, under Landau’s version of this approach, enters a syntactic derivation like any other NP – with an unvalued case feature that may become syntactically valued by distinct c-commanding heads, depending on the exact structural configuration in which it appears. For instance, in Russian simple subject Control structures like (41a), Landau argues that PRO has its case feature valued by the matrix T (spelled out subsequently in the morphological component as nominative), but in Russian object Control configurations like (41b), it may have its case feature valued by either the matrix v (accusative) or the embedded C (dative). I.e., the embedded C is said to be unavailable for case valuation in the former instance because null C is a clitic whose only available host is the phi-complete matrix v, whose phi-completeness makes C unavailable to serve as a Probe for PRO. C remains active to value PRO’s case in object control structures like (41b) because the matrix verb is a double object construction with a phi-featureless Applicative head that serves as C’s host, which, being phi-incomplete leaves C available to value PRO’s case as dative. Sigurðsson (2008: 410) takes a slightly different tack. While agreeing with Landau that abstract Case does not exist, he adopts the view that PRO has its case feature valued in the post-syntactic morphology in exactly the same manner as do lexical NPs in finite clauses, which explains why, in the Icelandic structural equivalents of (41a), the case form of the SemP is determined by the case associated with the embedded verb, as illustrated by his examples in (42) (Sigurðsson, 2008: 412):14 14 Landau (2008: 914–917) accounts for the Icelandic facts by assuming that in Icelandic it is the embedded T that values case (not C, as in Russian) and that the case of T is nominative, (not dative). Thus, in (42a) the embedded T values PRO for nominative, but in (42b,c) quirky case is maintained because PRO has already had its feature lexically valued by the quirky verb, before T entered the derivation. Sigurðsson (2008: ft. 45) argues that this approach to Icelandic makes some incorrect predictions with respect to case transmission in that language.

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(42) a.

Ólafur hafði gaman af [að PRO fara einn í veisluna]. Olaf.NOM had pleasure of to NOM go alone.NOM to party.the ‘Olaf found it pleasurable to go alone to the party.’

b.

Ólafur hafði ekki gaman af [að PRO vanta einan í veisluna]. Olaf.NOM had not pleasure of to ACC lack alone.ACC in party.the

c.

Ólafur hafði ekki gaman af [að PRO leiðast einum Olaf.NOM had not pleasure of to DAT be-bored alone.DAT í veislunni]. in party.the

Regardless of which approach one favors, it is clear that two hallmarks of both are an adoption of Marantz’ (1992) proposal that abstract Case does not exist and a rejection of Chomsky & Lasnik’s (1993, 1995) hypothesis that PRO can only be valued for null Case (in their terms, case). It is these assumptions that render the argument inconclusive, in two very different respects, as will be now shown. First, as originally acknowledged by Marantz (1992: 243–244), any theory that rejects the notion of abstract Case must introduce something else in order to determine the respective licensing of PRO and phonetically overt NPs. I.e., one still must account for classic contrasts of the type in (43), drawn from Marantz – contrasts that exist even in rich case agreement languages like Icelandic and Russian. (43)

a.

Elmer preferred [PRO to be given (PRO) the bigger porcupine].

b. *Hortense tried [Elmer to be given (Elmer) a porcupine]. That is, if one assumes that contrasts like (43a,b) are not due to the fact that infinitival to values NPs for null Case (or case) and only PRO is compatible with that feature, then something else must be invoked in order to account for them. If a compelling alternative existed, this would be entirely satisfactory. However, the only proposal currently available is Landau’s (2004) [R] feature approach discussed above (or Sigurðsson’s (2008: 438–446) variant of it), and it was shown that that particular account of contrasts of the type in (24) and (25) is stipulative with respect to the membership of the class of non-Control verbs and, furthermore, makes incorrect predictions with respect to the existence of a dual small clause/Control verb like English causative get and an Exhaustive Control verb like French croire/penser ‘believe/think’ (cf. the discussion of the

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examples in (26) versus (11) and (29) versus (31)).15 In short, it is this author’s view that until analyses of Control rejecting the null Case hypothesis are able to adequately address the licensing issue, agreement facts cannot be said to offer conclusive evidence for PRO’s existence. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is a substantial body of data that is apparently amenable to analysis only in terms of some notion of abstract Case. Legate (2008), for example, argues at length that only a theory recognizing this notion can offer a non-stipulative account of numerous syntactic similarities and differences attested in Absolutive as Default languages (like Djapu, Hindi, Niuean, and Warlpiri) and Absolutive as Nominative languages (e.g. Georgian). To provide one example, Legate (2008: 77) notes that in Djapu, all elements of a DP must be overtly marked for case and, when possible, match in case, as illustrated in (44), in which all five elements of the DP are obligatorily marked dative: (44) nganapurru-nggalangu-w djamarrkurli-w’ yumurrku-w dhiya-ku Djapu-w 1PL.EXCL-OBL.S-DAT children-DAT small.PL-DAT this-DAT Djapu-DAT ‘for these our small Djapu children’ Morphy (1983: 123) When, however, a lexical item is inserted for which the abstract Case has no overt morphological correlate, as is true of demonstratives, then that lexeme systematically surfaces in the default absolutive case, as illustrated in (45). (45) Dhuwa nhe yurru lili dha:parng rongiyi-rr. this.ABS you.NOM FUT HITHER unsuccessful return-UNM ‘YOU will return empty handed [but not I].’ Morphy (1983: 84) As Legate (2008: 89) argues, the “single-step” approach to case proposed in Marantz (1992) cannot account for such “case mismatches,” which apparently entail an abstract two-level process in either the computational or morphological components in order to explain how a lexeme can apparently satisfy rules of agreement (at the level of abstract Case), yet surface in a non-agreeing (surface) form. 15 Sigurðsson (2008: 438–446) essentially offers a variant of Landau’s [R] feature approach since he follows Landau in assuming (a) that the licensing of PRO as opposed to a lexical NP follows from the former’s lack of inherent person features and (b) that this anaphoric property of PRO relates to the “close” tense relationships that obtain between the matrix and embedded clauses in Control configurations. While the two authors do differ in some interesting details (e.g., Sigurðsson assumes that PRO is a person variable, while Landau assumes that PRO has an unvalued person feature; Sigurðsson proposes that the “silence” of PRO is part of a larger, as yet poorly understood left edge silence phenomenon in PRO infinitives, while Landau does not), the criticisms leveled in the text apply to both.

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Importantly for present purposes, “case mismatches” are not limited to the surface use of a default case form. For example, Citko (2008: 639) notes that German nominal appositions also normally must surface in the same case as the appositive head, as in (46): (46)

Du kennst doch den Jan, meinen Cousin? you know yet the.ACC Jan my.ACC cousin ‘You know Jan, my cousin, don’t you?’ De Vries (2006: 240)

If, however, the nominal apposition is a date modifying a dative head, then it may surface in either dative or accusative case – not in the default (nominative) case of this language, as illustrated in (47). (47)

am Montag, den/dem 16 Juni on.DAT Monday the.ACC/DAT 16 June ‘on Monday, the 16th of June’ Potts (2005: 107)

Halle (1990) provides further examples of structural case mismatch in Latin and Russian that also apparently entail the recognition of either a syntactic or morphological notion of abstract Case. For instance, Halle (1990: 163–173) notes that Russian is a(nother) language in which all elements of a DP must be marked for case and, when possible, surface in “matching” case, as illustrated in (48), in which all three elements of the DP bear dative morphology: (48)

pjat-i star-ym rabot-am five.DAT old.DAT works.DAT

However, in subject case position, surface “mismatches” emerge: In (49), for example, the numeral pjat' ‘five’ surfaces in the expected nominative case form, but the adjective and head noun unexpectedly surface in the (non-default) genitive. (49)

pjat' star-yx rabot-U five.NOM old.GEN works.GEN

Furthermore, it is possible to challenge these authors’ underlying assumption that a surface non-default case form is a sound indicator of a process of structural case valuation. The default case of French, for example, is generally assumed to be that of the tonic or stressed nominal forms, overtly realized on the pronominals in Left-Dislocation structures like (50):

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Moi, j’adore les chats! me I adore the cats ‘As for me, I love cats!’

However, accusative case, normally assumed to be structural, is the form uniquely attested with pronominalized predicative adjectives, like (51b), and dative case (also non-default) is the form attested in affected datives (52a) and ethical datives (52b): (51)

a.

Marie est intelligente. ‘Marie is intelligent.’

b. Marie l’est. Marie it.ACC is ‘Marie is just that (i.e. intelligent).’ (52)

a. Jean lui a chanté sous ses fenêtres. Jean him.DAT has sung under his windows ‘Jean went and sang under his windows on him.’ b. Je vais te tondre cette pelouse en vingt minutes! I am-going you.DAT to-mow this lawn in twenty minutes ‘I’m gonna mow you this lawn in just twenty minutes.’

Clearly, predicative adjectives do not participate in normal structural case valuation processes and the same is generally assumed to be true of affected and ethical datives, given the well known lack of non-pronominal counterparts to the dative clitics in (52a,b), yet all three surface in a non-default morphological case. An account of this fact and the others enumerated above not only seems to entail the recognition of abstract Case, but it also leads one to question the validity of Landau, Sigurðsson, and others’ assumption that the surface form of predicative elements like Russian odin ‘alone’ in (41a,b) can be used to argue for a structurally case valued PRO. That is, if even phonetically overt agreeing elements can at times “mismatch” in structural case, then what conclusions is one able to draw about the syntax of Control based on the surface case forms of predicative elements? In other words, how do we know that these too are not instances of mismatch, i.e. mismatch between the predicative element and a structurally case valued PRO (if one follows Landau et al) or between the predicative element and a null Case valued PRO (if one follows Chomsky & Lasnik) or, (following Hornstein) between the predicate and the Raised NP, or, finally,

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for that matter, between the matrix subject and the predicative head (assuming a “bare” VP approach). In short, the suggestion that the case forms of predicative elements in Control complements in rich agreement languages provide evidence for the existence of PRO is intriguing, but remains inconclusive until it can be embedded in a more elaborated theory of surface morphological case. To summarize, this chapter has reviewed four arguments that have frequently been put forth in favor of projecting a syntactically overt, phonetically covert, PRO subject in Control structures. Each argument was shown here to either receive an alternative account without resort to this empty category or to rest on assumptions in need of independent justification. In the next chapter, five distinct types of data will be introduced that will be argued to support the PRO hypothesis over its competitors.

Chapter 5

Remotivating a PRO approach to Control* The previous chapter examined four well-known arguments that are frequently advanced in favor of the existence of PRO, these being the need to predictably encode argument structure, the desire to capture certain binding and agreement facts, and, finally, the manifestation of non-default morphological case on agreeing predicative elements in such languages as Ancient Greek, Icelandic, and Russian. As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, each of these facts can receive what is arguably an equally compelling account without recourse to this empty category, making the PRO approach less appealing than its competitors as it requires additional “machinery” in order to account for the grammar of natural languages. In this chapter, the need for PRO will be remotivated. Here, it will be shown that only this type of approach presently: (a) accounts straightforwardly for the attested placement of wh-items in indirect questions (b) accommodates potential contrasts in floating quantifier placement in the pre-infinitival to position in Subject versus Object Control, as well as in Control, as opposed to implicit subject constructions, such as English Retroactive Gerunds, French Tough-Movement sentences, and English Event nominals (c) explains why the presence of expletives is “forced” in infinitival, non-thematic complements to Control heads (d) leads one to expect potential expletive contrasts involving verbs like French falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must’ and (e) accounts for potential differences in clitic pronoun placement in Control structures across the Romance languages. In addition, of course, the PRO hypothesis does provide a straightforward account of the standard expletive, binding, and agreement facts discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will, therefore, set the stage for a thorough examination of the syntax of Control in Chapter 6 and two semantic influences at work in such configurations in Chapters 7 and 8. In terms of motivating the existence of PRO, then, I would like to begin by pointing out, in line with literature dating back to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), that only a standard generative approach to Control presently offers an immediate account of the placement of wh-items in indirect questions like (1) below. (That the example in (1) is indeed an indirect question, not, say, a free relative clause,

* For comments and suggestions, I wish to thank Marc Authier, Sabine Iatridou, Coppe van Urk, and the audience at the March 10, 2011 meeting of the Ling Lunch, held at MIT.

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is established by the use of an embedded infinitival clause and the wh-element which outfit.1) (1)

Larry told them [ CP which outfit [ IP PRO to buy (which outfit) for themselves]].

Specifically, it was observed in Chapter 2 that standard generative accounts have long assumed that Control verbs minimally may c-select a CP complement, which would provide the usual landing site (Spec, CP) for an interrogative phrase in examples like the preceding one.2 As authors like Henry (1995: 107) have noted, the word order attested in indirect questions in Belfast English further supports this approach to indirect questions. That is, the placement of the wh‑expression in a position preceding the overt complementizer that in (2) below offers further proof that such structures do involve the usual movement of the [+Question] phrase to [Spec, CP]. (2)

They didn’t know [which model that [we had discussed]].

If, on the other hand, Control involves the embedded bare VP structure below in (3a), as is generally assumed by researchers in semantic and alternative syntactic frameworks, overviewed in part in Chapter 3.2, then it is unclear what the surface syntactic position of the wh-elements in (1)–(2) above might be. One cannot simply assume that wh-elements adjoin to VP since this would overgenerate in non-Control structures, as made clear by the ungrammaticality of (3b) in all dialects of English: 1 See Baker (1989: 163–181) for a discussion of the syntactic and semantic properties that distinguish indirect questions (IQs) and free relative clauses (FRCs), among them, the fact that only FRCs are restricted to finite clauses, cf. (i) and (ii), and only FRCs disallow wh-elements like who, how many, and which NP, as evidenced by the contrasts in (iii) and (iv): (i) a. John always knows [what to wear]. b. John always knows [what he should wear]. (ii) a. *John always wears [what to wear]. b. John always wears [what he should wear]. (iii) John knows [which outfit/what to wear]. (iv) a. *John bought [which outfit Sally wanted to sell him]. b. John bought [what Sally wanted to sell him]. 2 The current standard generative account of PRO put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995: 111–120) continues to posit a CP complementation frame for Control verbs in order to block sentences like *They tried her to win. That is, CP is assumed to block Accusative Case checking of her in such examples.

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(3) a.

Larry told them [VP to buy that outfit for themselves].

b. *Larry told them [CP [ IP they should [VP which outfits [VP buy (which outfits)]]]]. A further potential problem for the bare VP approach is posed by the word order attested in negative indirect questions like the following, in which the Control verb told appears to select minimally for an IP complement, given the placement of to relative to NegP: (4) My adviser told me [which stocks to not buy]. Turning to the issues such structures raise for Movement approaches to Control, namely, the variant of these analyses developed in Hornstein (1999), which was overviewed in Chapter 3.1, we begin by noting with Hornstein (1999: 92) that his theory of Control entails that indirect questions be analyzed as configurations of Arbitrary (in his terms, Non-Obligatory) Control. Namely, Hornstein must associate an indirect question like (1) with the structure below in (5) since otherwise there would indeed be no landing site available for the wh-expression. (5)

Larry told them [CP which outfit [ IP pro to buy (which outfit) for themselves]].

I.e., the ungrammaticality of (6) below in Belfast English clearly establishes that an adjunction to IP analysis of wh-movement is as undesirable as an adjunction to VP approach, leading again to the conclusion that the correct structure, in Hornstein’s terms, is as in (5) above. (6) *Larry told them [CP that [ IP which outfits [ IP they should buy (which outfits)]]]. In short, and as was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.1, Hornstein’s (1999) analysis entails that any structure associated with an Obligatory Control reading must involve NP-Movement out of an embedded IP, while any configuration associated with an Arbitrary reading involves CP complementation, with insertion of pro as a Last Resort. While our earlier discussion of examples like (7) below in Section 3.1 clearly supports Hornstein’s claim that indirect questions are configurations of Arbitrary Control, we also noted there his pro approach to Arbitrary Control faces a number

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of problems not faced by the standard generative account. Many of these are acknowledged by Hornstein (1999: 91–92, fts. 38 & 41) himself. For example, he notes that we have no explanation for why pro in English is only licensed in the subject position of untensed clauses (unlike the pro of Romance languages, such as Italian and Spanish); we would add that we have no explanation as well for why pro cannot be expletive in this language, etc. (7) a.

In this joint, it’s clearly the waiter who decides [when to order], not the customer.

b.

A good therapist should make it clear [when to give up and when to push on].

c.

An elderly, infirm gentleman asks his gardener: I’ve always wondered [when (it is best) to trim trees] – before or after they bud?

Even assuming that these issues could be resolved, we noted in Section 3.1 that separate empirical problems arise. To reiterate one such problem (others can be found in Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 495–498, 500) and Landau (2003: 481–484)), consider first the contrast in grammaticality in (8a,b), originally observed in Williams (1985: 308–309): (8) a.

The game was played [PRO nude].

b. *The game was played [PRO mad at Bill].

Roeper (1983) Williams (1985: 309)

As mentioned in Section 2.2.5, Williams (1985) argues that interpretive considerations indicate that the preceding structures involve Obligatory Event Control. Namely, nude and mad at Bill do not denote properties of the game – the game itself is not nude or mad at Bill – instead, nude and mad at Bill describe properties of events of game-playing: This is a game typically played nude or drunk (it’s a “nude game” or a “drinking game”), etc. For this reason, (8b) is unacceptable: There are no games typically played mad at a specific individual known as Bill (i.e., there are no “mad at Bill games”). Given these interpretive facts, Hornstein (1999) would be led to analyze predication structures like these not in terms of movement of the game out of the embedded clause (that would, e.g., incorrectly predict that the game is nude in (8a)), but via insertion of pro, controlled by the event denoted by the

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main clause, as in (9) below. In other words, predication structures would be treated in a fashion parallel to examples like (10): (9) a.

The game was played [pro nude].

b. *The game was played [pro mad at Bill]. (10) John told Mary [that [pro bathing (themselves/oneself)] is important]]. The problem now is that Hornstein has proposed that in English, pro is limited to contexts of Arbitrary Control (i.e. those in which movement is barred): Namely, insertion of pro is a costly operation employed only as a Last Resort. Because of the syntactic configurations in which it is licensed, pro in this language may establish its reference in a variety of ways, like other pronouns. It may, for example, do so via a generic operator, as in (11a), via syntactic binding, as in (11b), or via discourse, as in (11c): (11)

a.

It was believed [that [pro shaving] is important].

b. John thinks that it was believed [that [pro shaving himself ] is important]. c.

Mary was baffled. [[Even after pro revealing her innermost feelings], John remained untouched]. Landau (2003: 482)

Problematically, however, pro in predication structures like (9) is subject to Obligatory Control by the Event denoted by the matrix clause; otherwise, one is left without an explanation for the contrast in (9a) and (9b). In short, the appealing distinction that Hornstein is originally able to draw between contexts of Obligatory Control (involving licit movement) and NonObligatory Control (barred movement) is now lost. The facts in (9) show that there are instances of Obligatory Control that must involve pro. Given that, anyone adopting this approach must now undertake the difficult task of clearly defining just when Obligatory Control involves movement and when it involves pro. Such an account would need to make it clear, among other things, why only certain non-overt pronouns (those in predication structures like (9)) must be syntactically bound, a very odd result for a pronoun, the type of nominal normally assumed to only be subject to a disjointness requirement (Principle B). In other words, adopting the superficially “simpler” approach to Control advocated in Hornstein (1999) actually involves needless complications in the grammar, ones unattested under the standard PRO approach.

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My second argument involves a novel extension of contrasts in floating quantifier placement previously noted in the literature on Control and Raising. Maling (1976) was the first to notice that Subject and Object Control sentences contrast in that only Subject Control sentences clearly disallow a floated quantifier in the embedded Spec of IP, cf. (12a,b) below. (12)

a. *The students wanted [all to be ready by 8:00]. b. I persuaded the students [all to be ready by 8:00].

While many native speakers find the contrast to be subtle (e.g., Sportiche (1988: 444), for example, describes (12b) as “marginal”; I would characterize it as simply strongly disfavored in certain dialects of English, including my own), Sportiche notes that Raising verbs pattern with Object Control verbs in this respect, cf. (12) above with (13) below. (13) The students seemed [all to be ready at 8:00]. Baltin (1995: 246) has pointed out that semantic approaches to Control treat Subject and Object Control identically with respect to the syntactic status of the understood subject (it is an implicit argument in both cases); therefore, such analyses would incorrectly predict floating quantifiers to be either equally licit or equally illicit in both cases. In further support of his conclusion, it is interesting to note that the distribution of floating quantifiers in the post infinitival to position is also quite different when one compares Subject and Object Control verbs like (14a,b), on the one hand, to implicit argument constructions such as English Retroactive Gerunds (15a), Event Nominals (15b), and French Tough-Movement constructions (15c), on the other. (14)

a.

The students want [PRO to [all (PRO) take the course]].

b. I urged my students [PRO to [all (PRO) take the course]]. (15)

a. *This point needs all emphasizing. (Contrast with: This point needs emphasizing by all linguists.) b. *This all operation was a success. (cf. This operation by all the interns was a success.) c. *Ce saut est difficile à tous exécuter. ‘This leap is difficult for all to execute.’

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It is argued in Huddleston (1971), Williams (1985), and Authier & Reed (2009), respectively, that the three constructions in (15a,c) all contain implicit (i.e. syntactically unprojected) thematic subjects.3 If Control Verbs share this property, as assumed by bare VP approaches to Control, then they should all presumably behave in a parallel fashion with respect to the (un)acceptability of floating quantifiers. If, on the other hand, one adopts a PRO approach to Control, and if one further assumes that floating quantifiers can only enter derivations when associated with a syntactically projected argument – be it phonetically overt or covert – then the contrasts in (14) and (15) follow. Turning to the implications these floating quantifier facts hold for Hornstein’s Movement approach to Control, it is important to note that his analysis accounts nicely for the contrasts in (14) and (15) since the former examples involve an explicit argument moving through the position indicated with PRO in (14), while those in (15) would presumably still be treated as implicit arguments. However, it is not obvious how this approach could account for Maling’s original contrasts in (12) and (13) since Subject Control, NP Raising, and Object Control are all analyzed in a parallel fashion. That is, the uniform syntactic treatment (only the number of thematic features checked differs) would seem to entail that floated quantifiers in all three cases should be licit in Spec of the embedded IP. In contrast, PRO approaches to Control do not necessarily assume that Subject and Object Control are structural equivalents, opening up a potential means of accounting for the contrasting behavior. Baltin (1995: 212, 217, 224–226), for

3 To provide just one of the arguments that have been advanced in the literature in favor of the view that these three constructions contain implicit subjects, consider the contrast between (ia), which contains the explicit subject Lauren, and (ib)–(id): (i) a. Lauren performed that operation [while training as an intern]. b. *That operation was performed [while training as an intern]. c. *This is a job worth doing [while revising notes]. d. *Ces pull-overs sont difficiles à tricoter [en lisant]. ‘These sweaters are difficult to knit while reading.’ Only the example with an explicit subject licenses the while-clause. In terms of standard generative theory, only in the former case is the PRO in the adjunct provided with the explicit antecedent it requires. The implicit Agents in (ib)–(id) fail to fulfill this function. (See Chapter 7 for a modified version of this account under which the point just made still goes through.) It is interesting to note that Control structures pattern in this respect with lexical NPs like (ia), not with the implicit arguments in (ib)–(id), a further problem for bare VP approaches to Control. (ii) To be frequently absent [while taking a course for credit] is not wise.

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example, argues that the Maling facts in (12) and (13) follow from structural differences between the three sentence types.4 Specifically, he first proposes that floating quantifiers are members of the class of preverbs – quantifiers and adverbs like all and ever that obligatorily c-select only for [+Predicative] X's, where the term “predicative” is to be understood in the purely syntactic sense first suggested (in slightly different terms) in Williams (1980). Specifically, an X' is [+Predicative] if it stands in a mutual c-command relationship with an NP (or its trace), which serves as its syntactic subject. Secondly, Baltin adopts the view, contra Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) and others, that PRO checks its null Case VP-internally (in today’s terms vP- or Pr-internally), not in Spec of infinitival IP. This hypothesis, he argues, is supported (among other empirical facts to be discussed shortly) by the fact that gerunds, small clauses, etc. participate in Control, yet apparently lack an I projection. Finally, Baltin adopts the view, again contra Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) and others, that I does not possess a strong D (a.k.a. EPP) feature, which means, given Economy considerations like Procrastinate and Last Resort, that NP-movement to Spec IP, when it occurs, is triggered by other considerations.5 Given these assumptions, the licitness of the preverb all in

4 There are, of course, alternative accounts of Floating Quantifier placement. Sportiche’s (1988) “stranding” approach to the phenomenon is one that is particularly well known that straightforwardly accounts for the key contrasts introduced in (14) and (15) by positing the existence of PRO in (14), but not in (15). (See Bošković (2004) for a more recent “stranding” analysis that addresses a number of the criticisms Baltin (1995: 227–232) levels against Sportiche’s original proposal.) Baltin’s (1995) predication approach has been adopted here simply because it also captures the Maling’s (1976) facts in (12), which Sportiche (and implicitly, Bošković) do not recognize as legitimate. I.e., the stranding analyses treat (12a,b) as both being ungrammatical, a view not adopted here since certain speakers do report that they accept the type of examples in (12b). 5 Baltin’s two departures from the standard approach to Control have been independently proposed by other researchers. E.g., Sportiche (1988: 437–438) also assumes that PRO remains VP(vP/PrP-)internal in order to account for the contrasts in (i) and Bošković (2007: 201) has proposed that I does not possess a D/EPP feature in order to account, among other things, for the facts in (ii), which are due to Postal (1993). (i)

a. Ils ont décidé de ne pas tous partir à la même heure. they have decided of Neg not all to-leave at the same hour ‘They decided to not all leave at the same time.’ b. *Ils ont décidé de tous ne pas partir à la même heure. they have decided of all Neg not to-leave at the same hour ‘They decided to all not leave at the same time.’

(ii) a. He alleged there to be stolen documents in the drawer. b. *He alleged stolen documents to be in the drawer. Specifically, the fact that floated quantifiers are illicit in the pre-Neg position in infinitival clauses like (ib) indicates that PRO cannot have moved to the embedded Spec of IP. The

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Raising configurations like (13) follows from the fact that the embedded I' satisfies all’s c-selection requirements; namely, I' is predicative because it stands in a mutual c-command relationship with the trace of the DP the students in its Spec. (Movement through the embedded Spec of IP is forced by Minimality considerations.) Object Control configurations like (12b) are likewise grammatical because the controller of PRO – the students – c-commands the embedded sentence under Baltin’s approach, making it predicative, again meeting the c-selection frame of all. In contrast, Subject Control sentences like (12a) fail to meet all’s c-selection frame because the controller (the students) obviously does not stand in a mutual c-command relationship with the embedded clause and, under Baltin’s (nonstandard) approach, PRO does not either because it remains vP-internal at Spell-Out. In short, the postulation of PRO offers a means of accounting for the contrasts in (12) and (13), as well as the ones introduced in (14)–(15): It is unclear how Movement and bare VP approaches, which syntactically unify all three sentence types, could be amended to accommodate such data. A third area of sentence grammar that offers support for a PRO approach to Control concerns the obligatory selection of a non-Control, expletive structure as the complement of a head that would normally also allow a Control complement, i.e. contrasts of the type in (16) and (17).6 (16)

a.

It is desirable for it to become known that he is dishonest.

b. Will actually expects for it to seem that he is smart. (17)

a.

*It is desirable PRO to become known that he is dishonest.

b. *Will expects PRO to seem that he is the best candidate. The standard generative account of such contrasts is as follows. First, I/T consistently enters derivations with a strong [D] (a.k.a. EPP) feature, one that

contrasts in (ii) follow from Bošković’s hypotheses that verbs like allege c-select an additional VP-shell and I lacks an EPP/D feature. I.e., the additional VP-shell in (iib) blocks movement of lexical NPs like stolen documents from the embedded clause to the matrix AgrOP/TrP, the site of Accusative Case feature-checking, but the there variant in (iia) is licit because there is inserted directly in the Case-checking position (AgrOP /TrP). Since the purpose of the present section is only to demonstrate that a PRO approach to Control offers a potential means of accounting for facts that remain unexplained under uniform bare VP or Movement approaches to the phenomenon, a detailed discussion of the exact syntax of Control that I will be advocating is delayed until Chapter 6. 6 Example (17b) is a slightly modified variant of Hornstein’s (1999: 86, ft. 29) *John expects to seem that he is smart., which Hornstein attributes it to Juan Carlos Castillo (p.c.) and Martin (1996: 26).

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must be checked off by some expression pre-Spell-Out in order to satisfy the Principle of Full Interpretation. Second, PRO is analyzed as the phonetically non-overt counterpart of [-expletive] pronouns like he, she, they, and so on in English. More specifically, it appears to be a fairly close non-overt counterpart to French on, which, like PRO, can be interpreted as referential or quantificational, singular or plural, but never expletive, as evidenced by the data in (118). (18)

a.

On est allé à la plage. ‘We went to the beach.’

b. On m’a volé ma moto. ‘Someone stole my motorcycle.’ c. *On semble que Jean est fatigué. ‘It seems that John is tired.’ Given that PRO must be associated with a theta-role, it cannot serve to check off I/T’s [D/EPP] feature in (17) since this would entail initial merger of PRO in the subject position of a non-thematic verb. In (16), on the other hand, expletive it can be inserted as a Last Resort to check off to’s [D/EPP] feature.7 As is clear from this discussion, the standard generative account rests crucially on the assumption that there is a syntactically projected non-expletive NP (PRO) in Control structures. If one rejects this hypothesis by adopting a bare VP approach to Control, it becomes unclear how to account for these contrasts. To explain, the grammaticality of (19a,b) below clearly indicates that Arbitrary Control adjectives like desirable must share with Raising Verbs like become and seem the property of selecting what Dowty (1985: 315–319) calls [+there] (in generative terms [+expletive]) subjects. (19)

a.

It is desirable [VP to leave].

b. It became/seems desirable [VP to leave]. It also seems clear that Control adjectives are associated with a Meaning Postulate (MP) parallel in function (although not in form) to the one below in (20), which Dowty (1985: 299) puts forth for Obligatory Subject Control Verbs. 7 As mentioned in footnote 5, Bošković (2007) has argued at length against Chomsky’s (1995, 2000) EPP/D feature hypothesis, a view predated by Martin (1999) and others. How the contrasts in (16) and (17) would be treated under this alternative account will be addressed in the next chapter.

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This must be so since in these instances of both Arbitrary and Obligatory Control, the implicit Agent of the embedded verb must be a quasi-rational being capable of intentional actions (cf. *It is desirable to function smoothly. with an intended reading equivalent to It is desirable for everything to function smoothly.). The presence versus absence of this type of MP would then be what semantically distinguishes Control adjectives and verbs from Raising Verbs (cf. Everything seems to function smoothly when she’s around.). (20) ox oP□[ WANT(P) (x*) → ACTS INTENTIONALLY (x*)] Given these two assumptions, there now seems to be no means of blocking an example like (17a) if it is associated with a bare VP structure as in (21): (21)

*It is desirable [VP to become known that he is dishonest].

That is, in (21), the [+there] feature is shared by both desirable and become, just as it was in (19b), and the implicit Agent of known would apparently satisfy the MP of intentionality. One cannot rule out such examples by making use of some sort of [D/EPP] feature, as is done in the standard generative analysis, since under the bare VP approach, that feature would remain unchecked in sentences like It would be desirable to leave. Turning now to Hornstein’s (1999) Movement analysis, we begin by noting, with Hornstein (1999: 86, ft. 29), that under his approach to theta roles there is no a priori reason why NP-Movement should be blocked in an example like (17b) above, which is associated with the structure in (22a) below. And, I would point out, this is equally true of examples like (17a), which would have the structure in (22b). (22)

a.

*Will expects [ IP (Will) to seem that he is the best candidate].

b. *It is desirable [ IP (it) to become known that he is dishonest]. Hornstein outlines two alternative accounts of these contrasts which, it will now be argued, are both theoretically inferior to the standard approach. The first makes use of Martin’s (1996) suggestion that verbal heads of the expect type (for Martin, Control verbs and adjectives) differ from heads of the seem type in that only the former select infinitival clauses whose [+T] feature must, by stipulation, be checked by a theta-marked NP. This proposal would cover (22a), as well as the contrast between it and (23): (23) Will seems [ IP (Will) to (Will) expect [that he will be elected]].

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Examples of the type in (22b), under this approach, would be associated with the two possible structures in (24a,b), both of which would be ruled out via the same thematic restriction; i.e., in neither case is the [+T] to associated with a “Control” selecting verbal head checked by a theta-marked NP. (24)

a.

*It is desirable [ IP (it) to become (it) known that he is dishonest].

b. *It is desirable [CP pro to become (pro) known that he is dishonest]. Alternatively, Hornstein suggests that Raising predicates like seem must, by stipulation, have expletive subjects when they c-select a finite complement. While this too describes facts like (22a), it fails to extend to examples like (24), as well as the one in (25), drawn from Hornstein (1999: 87, ft. 29). It fails to do so in both cases because these examples contain the embedded thematic verbs know and believe. (25) *It was hoped [(it) to be (it) believed [that John is smart]]. While the restriction could perhaps be reformulated to refer to any verb that fails to check off a subject thematic feature, it is important to note that in any event both approaches are simply stipulations, whereas the standard approach accounts for these data via the straightforward assumption that PRO is simply a member of the class of non-expletive pronouns. The fourth argument in favor of the PRO hypothesis to be offered here involves a novel extension of expletive contrasts involving the French verbs falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must,’ first noted in Authier & Reed (2009: 40), who were examining these data in relation to various competing theories of Restructuring in Romance. The relevant contrasts are given in (26)–(27). (26)

a. Il faut faire attention où on marche ici. it is-necessary to-pay attention where one walks here ‘It is necessary to watch one’s step when walking through here.’ b. *Il doit faire attention où on marche ici. it must to-pay attention where one walks here *‘It/There must to watch one’s step when walking through here.’

(27)

a. De par la loi, il doit y avoir du savon dans as per the law there must there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public ‘By law, there must be soap in all public restrooms.’

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b. *De par la loi, il faut y avoir du savon dans as per the law it is-necessary there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public *‘By law, it is necessary to be soap in all public restrooms.’

The standard generative approach to Control offers the following account of these initially puzzling facts. Let us first assume that devoir ‘must’ and falloir ‘to be necessary’ are both Raising verbs that encode deontic modality, but possess distinct c-selection frames. In other words, assume that neither verb s-selects for a thematic subject; that both make statements about how something ought to be; and that each c-selects for a clausal complement that happens to be categorically realized as CP in the case of falloir ‘to be necessary,’ but as a defective TP – a phrase headed by a T that lacks a null Case feature – in the case of devoir ‘must.’ Given these assumptions, the derivation in (26a) is convergent since PRO checks off both the null Case and [D/EPP] features of the embedded infinitival I/T and it is associated with the external theta-role of the verb meaning pay attention; the expletive il ‘it’ is inserted in the matrix as a Last Resort to check off of the [D/EPP] and [NOM] features of faut ‘is necessary.’ (PRO cannot perform these functions for two reasons. First, CP would block movement of PRO into the matrix clause; secondly, PRO is only associated with null, not Nominative, Case.) Example (27b) crashes for one of two reasons, depending on the exact form of the derivation. If the expletive initially merges in the embedded clause, then (27b) is ungrammatical because CP will block subsequent movement of it into the matrix clause; furthermore, this derivation leaves the null Case feature of the embedded I unchecked. If, on the other hand, PRO merges in the embedded clause, then (27b) will fail to converge because PRO fails to be associated with a theta-role. Turning to (26b), this derivation fails to converge because the external theta-role of faire attention ‘to pay attention’ fails to be discharged or is inappropriately assigned to an expletive NP. On the other hand, (27a) converges because the expletive NP can initially merge in Spec of embedded I/T and check off I/T’s [D/EPP] feature and IP/TP allows subsequent raising to check off the same feature of devoir ‘must.’ In short, all of these facts follow because this approach assumes that semantic properties do not determine c-selection. This assumption is, of course, not shared by current semantic theories of Control, which hold as a basic premise that it is the meaning of the Control head that determines its c-selection of a bare VP as a complement. Thus, these analyses would seem to entail that there be no contrasts of the type in (26) and (27).

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In the interest of brevity, it will be left to the interested reader to verify that Hornstein’s pro approach to Arbitrary Control can accommodate the data in (26) and (27a). However, I would point out that this approach presently offers no account of (27b), which would be associated with the (translated) structure in (28): (28) *By law, it is necessary [ CP pro to be soap in all public restrooms]. Specifically, this example is incorrectly predicted to be grammatical since pro can be inserted as a Last Resort to check off the infinitival I/T’s features, just as Hornstein (1999: 92) assumes is the case in examples like his own It is impossible to win at roulette. That is, Arbitrary Control adjectives like impossible and verbs like falloir ‘to be necessary’ are analyzed by Hornstein as c-selecting CPs that block the “less costly” Movement derivation normally associated with Control. The reader will note that the thematic constraint discussed earlier in relation to examples like (22a) will not suffice to block this type of example since pro, as is well known, can be expletive, as is the case in sentence (29): (29) pro parece que a Juan le gusta la música. ‘It seems that John likes music.’ The final argument to be advanced here in favor of PRO involves contrasts in clitic placement with Control Restructuring verbs in languages like French and northern dialects of Italian, on the one hand, versus Spanish and southern and central dialects of Italian on the other. As is well known, all of the aforementioned languages allow the clitic placement exhibited by the French example in (30a), but only a subset, e.g. Spanish and southern and central dialects of Italian, also permit the “clitic climbing” variant in (30b). (30)

a.

Je veux le faire. I want it to-do

b. *Je le veux faire. I it want to-do ‘I want to do it.’ Cinque (2001) and Cardinaletti & Shlonsky (2004) attribute this variation to idiosyncratic categorial and c-selection differences for the Romance Restructuring verb meaning want.8 Specifically, in French-type languages the verb meaning want is assumed to be a lexical verb that c-selects uniquely for CP, which 8 See Authier & Reed (2009) for arguments against Cinque’s (2004) alternative approach to these contrasts, as well as the earlier Kayne (1989) and Roberts (1997) analyses.

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blocks the clitic from climbing out of the embedded clause, as in (30b). On the other hand, in languages like Spanish and the relevant dialects of Italian, this lexeme has an alternative functional categorial status, in which case it c-selects for vP/PrP. The latter, of course, allows movement in sentences equivalent to (30b). In short, nothing new need be added to the theoretical apparatus in order to account for these data under a PRO approach.9 Such is not the case, however, for current semantic approaches to Control, which would associate both of the examples in (30a,b) with the same bare VP structure. That is, these analyses assume that the meaning of a Control verb dictates projection of a bare VP structure. Since the Romance equivalents of want apparently mean the same thing across this language family, a bare VP would be projected in all cases, incorrectly predicting clitic climbing to be licit in all cases as well, if nothing more is said. Turning to Hornstein’s Movement approach, this analysis currently assumes that all Obligatory Control structures crucially involve IP/TP, not CP, complementation. (This is necessary in order to allow movement of the surface subject out of the embedded clause.) In its current form, then, the contrasts in clitic climbing across Romance are left unaccounted for. In order to accommodate them, one could adopt the view that French-type languages uniquely c-select for IP/TP, which, for some yet-to-be-determined reason, blocks clitic movement, but allows NP movement, while in Spanish-type languages, vP/PrP complementation is also be an option, and with it, clitic climbing. This modification of Hornstein’s proposal could receive support from the fact that it correctly predicts clitic climbing in French to be illicit with both Raising and Control verbs, as illustrated by the parallel between (30b) above and (31b) below. (31) a.

Elle semble l’aimer. she seems him-ACC to-love

b. *Elle le semble aimer. she him-ACC seems to-love ‘She seems to love him.’ Likewise, one would expect clitic climbing with Raising and Control verbs to be equally licit in the relevant dialects of Italian (and Spanish), and the facts in (32), drawn from Cinque (2004: 141, 132) indicate this is the case. 9 Cinque’s (2001) and Cardinaletti & Shlonsky’s (2004) proposals do entail an acceptance of Baltin’s (1995) claim that PRO does not check null Case feature in Spec IP, as put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995). As noted earlier, the details of the syntax of Control to be advocated here is the topic of the next chapter.

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(32)

255

a. Gianni non lo sembra apprezzare abbastanza. Gianni not it seems-3SG appreciate enough ‘Gianni does not seem to appreciate it enough.’ b. Lo volevo vedere subito. it want-PAST-1SG see immediately ‘I wanted to see it immediately.’

This particular argument is, therefore, inconclusive with respect to Movement versus PRO approaches to Control since both currently lack an articulated means of allowing NP, but not clitic, movement in TP structures like (31). To summarize, this chapter offered five arguments in favor of recognizing the existence of PRO. That is, while the well-known involving expletive, binding, agreement, and case facts discussed in Chapter 4 can receive equally plausible treatments in terms of a Movement or a bare VP approach to Control, such is not the case for separate data involving the placement of wh-items in indirect questions, varying floating quantifier placement in Control, Raising, and implicit argument constructions, the obligatory presence of expletives with non-thematic complements to Control heads, various expletive contrasts involves deontic verbs in French, and differences in the placement of clitic pronouns in Romance. At this point in time, these all follow only from a PRO approach to Control. The goal of the next chapter will be to explore the exact form this approach to Control should take.

Chapter 6

The syntax of Control* In the last two chapters, we took a critical look at the hypothesis that there is a phonetically non-overt, non-expletive subject projected in the Spec v/Pr of the complement clause of a Control verb. Chapter 4 examined four well-known arguments commonly advanced in favor of a PRO approach to Control, but found what are, arguably, equally compelling alternative accounts of those facts that do not rely on the existence of this empty category. Chapter 5 then advanced five distinct arguments in favor of PRO’s existence. Specifically, it was shown that only a PRO approach presently leads one to immediately expect: (a) the well-known placement of wh-items that is attested in indirect questions in English and many other languages (b) potential contrasts in floating quantifier placement in the pre-infinitival to position in Subject versus Object Control, as well as in Control, as opposed to implicit subject constructions, such as English Retroactive Gerunds, French Tough-Movement sentences, and English Event nominals (c) the presence of expletives to be “forced” in infinitival, non-thematic complements to Control heads (d) potential expletive contrasts involving modal verbs like French falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must’ and (e) potential differences in clitic pronoun placement in Control structures across the Romance languages. In addition, of course, the PRO hypothesis does provide a straightforward account of the expletive, binding, and agreement facts given in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we will explore in detail the picture of Control that seems to emerge from a collective consideration of these and other data. The goals here are (a) to arrive at a clearer understanding of the current conception of the syntax of Control; i.e., to determine the form that the current standard analysis should take and (b) to see if the empirical coverage of this approach to Control can be improved upon by more radically modifying certain key aspects of it. The point of departure will, naturally enough, be the standard generative approach to PRO originally put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995), according to which PRO differs from other non-expletive pronouns in being uniquely associated with an uninterpretable null Case feature checked in the Spec of infinitival I/T. As will soon be demonstrated below, certain data introduced in Chapter 5 suggest that

* For comments and suggestions, I wish to thank Marc Authier, Sabine Iatridou, Coppe van Urk, and the audiences at the March 10, 2011 meeting of the Ling Lunch (held at MIT) and the Forty-Third Meeting of the Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages (hosted by the CUNY Graduate Center, April 17–19, 2013).

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minimally two aspects of this analysis warrant reconsideration: (a) the hypothesis that PRO must check (or have valued) its own null Case feature, in addition to an [EPP/D] feature associated with infinitival I/T and (b) the hypothesis that Control verbs c-select uniquely for CP (or, to use more recent terminology developed in Rizzi (1997, 2001), ForceP) complements. In short, a revised standard PRO account will first be developed, one that optimally covers the data already introduced in the previous chapter. With this in place, a novel empirical fact will be added, one that indicates that a more radical revision may be justified. This revised analysis will entail that (a) PRO be analyzed as a non-expletive element entirely lacking both Case and phi-features (b) non-pronominal NPs like the students be similarly analyzed as Caseless (c) the featural make-up of a number of functional heads, specifically, infinitival and gerundive I/T, is more impoverished than generally assumed and (d) feature valuation mechanisms should be formulated in such a way as to require that all Case and phi-features undergo agreement at some point in the derivation. Let us begin, then, by considering why the standard approach to PRO appears to require modification in the two respects indicated above. Looking first at the position of PRO at Spell-Out, Baltin (1995) notes that under both his predication approach to Q-float and a Sportiche-style stranding analysis, the ungrammaticality of sentences like (1b) below is problematic for the standard view that PRO either checks its Case in Spec of infinitival I/T (as in Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993, 1995) or checks an [EPP/D] feature there. Specifically, under Baltin’s approach to Q-Float, the ungrammaticality of (1b) indicates that infinitival to has no PRO subject; i.e., I' is [-Predicative] and thus fails to meet the c-selection requirements of the preverb both. Alternatively, under a Sportiche-style “stranding” analysis, as in Bošković (2004), the ungrammaticality of (1b) would, again, only follow if movement of PRO to the Spec of infinitival to does not take place in these examples. (1)

a. [To both be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous. b. *[Both to be betrayed by their friends] would be disastrous.

In short, under current accounts of Q-Float, the ungrammaticality of (1b) indicates that PRO does not move to Spec of infinitival I/T in contexts like these. The reader may recall from Chapter 5 that this conclusion is further reinforced by separate Q-Float contrasts, specifically, those below in (2a,b), which were originally observed in French in Sportiche (1988: 437–438). I.e., the ungrammaticality of (2b) also indicates that in PRO, in this type of example at least, does not even move as far as the embedded NegP position.

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a. They decided [to not all leave at the same time]. b. *They decided [to all not leave at the same time]. (*on the relevant sentential reading of the embedded not)

The ungrammaticality of embedded Q-float in English causative get examples of the type introduced in Chapter 4 may provide still further evidence in favor of this conclusion:1 (3)

The workers deliberately got [VP (*all) hurt PRO].

Specifically, if one assumes, as seems plausible given the lack of intermediate projections in the embedded clause, that causative get c-selects uniquely for a category smaller than ForceP, say, a VP small clause as in (3), then there is no position to which PRO could undergo movement. From this, the ungrammaticality of (3) follows under Baltin’s approach since the VP small clause has no explicit subject and V' therefore is [-Predicative]. Under Bošković’s (2004) version of Sportiche’s “stranding” analysis, it follows from the fact that floating quantifiers are inserted acyclically, once an argument moves from its initial Merge position. In either case, it is clear that the ungrammaticality of such examples follows only if one assumes that PRO does not obligatorily undergo movement to the Spec of an infinitival I/T to either check its own null Case feature or to check an [EPP/D] feature of infinitival to. Finally, the discussion in Chapter 5 showed that this assumption dovetails nicely with the Cinque (2001)/Cardinaletti & Shlonsky (2004) approach to Restructuring contrasts in Romance. Specifically, in order to allow clitic climbing in Italian (and the Spanish equivalents of ) examples like (4) below, Control complements must be allowed to take the form of a projection much smaller than ForceP, specifically, vP (a.k.a. PrP). This entails, of course, that PRO cannot be required to check/value its Case features via Agree with infinitival I/T since I/T is not even present in these particular contexts. (4) Lo volevo [vP/PrP PRO vedere subito]. it want-PAST-1SG to-see immediately ‘I wanted to see it immediately.’ While current accounts of Q-Float and Romance clitic climbing data indicate that Control complements may take the form of phrases smaller than ForceP, it is

1 See Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 553–554), Huang (1999: 41), and Reed (2011) for arguments in favor of a Control approach to examples like (3).

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important to note that these facts in no way entail that this always be the case. In other words, these data do not preclude ForceP complementation in other instances. In fact, the discussion of the previous chapter also revealed that certain Control verbs must select ForceP complements. Specifically, the existence of wh-movement to the embedded Spec of ForceP in Control structures like (5) was shown to clearly support this view. (Recall that the fact that (5) is an indirect question, not a free relative clause, was established in Chapter 5 by the use of an embedded infinitival clause and the use of the wh-element which outfit.) (5)

Larry told them [ForceP which outfit [IP/TP to PRO buy (which outfit) for themselves]].

The same was argued to be true of French falloir ‘to be necessary’ examples like (6), in which an embedded ForceP is needed in order to account for the fact that movement of the expletive out of the embedded clause is blocked. I.e., such examples are ungrammatical because an expletive cannot initially merge in the embedded clause in order to check I/T’s [EPP/D] feature and then “move up” into the embedded clause in order to meet its own (and the matrix I/T’s) feature checking requirements. (6) *De par la loi, il faut [ForceP y avoir du savon dans as per the law it is-necessary there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques]. all the toilets public *‘By law, it is necessary to be soap in all public restrooms.’ Finally, this assumption was needed in order to account for the ungrammaticality of clitic climbing in French and northern dialects of Italian, i.e. examples like the French sentence in (7). (7) *Je le veux [ForceP faire (le)]. I it want to-do (it) ‘I want to do it.’ In short, a collective consideration of the data indicates that Control verbs idiosyncratically select for such diverse complements as ForceP (formerly, CP), vP/PrP, and small clauses. Given this, it is logical to consider whether an IP/TP complementation frame might also an option. That it is has been argued in Bošković (2007: 97–101) on the basis of a number of facts involving the distribution of empty complementizers in English, as well as scrambling out of

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Control infinitives in Serbo-Croatian. To provide one example, Bošković notes that assuming that Control structures may involve IP/TP, not CP complements, accounts for the contrast in (8a,b) below. That is, Stowell (1981) accounts for the ungrammaticality of sentences like (8a) via the assumption that empty complementizers are subject to the ECP (i.e., they must be properly governed), a condition not met in this example. The fact that (8b) is acceptable, Bošković notes, indicates that Control complements do not always take the form of a ForceP headed by a null equivalent to that, but rather may take the form of IP/TP. (8) a. *[CP C [IP He would buy a car]] was believed at that time. b. [ IP To PRO buy a car] was desirable at that time. It thus appears that (a) we cannot assume that PRO consistently moves to Spec of infinitival IP/TP, or even, for that matter, as far as NegP (b) PRO can, in fact, sometimes remain in its initial merge position and (c) Control verbs seemingly arbitrarily c-select a variety of complement types, ranging from ForceP to small clauses. From this, we conclude, contra the original Chomsky & Lasnik approach, that (a) infinitival I/T is not associated with an [EPP/D] feature that must be checked via movement of PRO to the embedded Spec of IP/TP and (b) infinitival I/T does not value PRO for null Case. If PRO is associated with Case, an issue to which we will be returning shortly, then Baltin (1995) must be correct in assuming that this is done in the initial merge position (vP/PrP-internally). Before continuing, it is important to emphasize the fact that none of what has been said thus far precludes PRO from ever undergoing Move: The data examined thus far simply indicate that null Case and/or [EPP/D] feature checking in Spec of infinitival I/T does not take place. This conclusion leaves open the possibility that other features/grammatical mechanisms may trigger instances of movement of PRO. And indeed, Radford (2004: 310) has uncovered Q-float data of the type in (9) below that indicate that PRO does undergo movement (to a position lower than NegP) in certain infinitival clauses. (The reader will note that here, as elsewhere, certain irrelevant intermediate copies have been omitted to improve readability.) (9) [To both PRO be betrayed (PRO) by their friends] would be disastrous. As Radford points out, the acceptability of (9) casts doubt on Baltin’s (1995) claim that PRO always remains vP/PrP-internal since, if it did, a mutual c-command relationship would not obtain between both and a predicative phrase. While

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Radford concludes from this that Chomsky & Lasnik were correct in assuming that PRO consistently undergoes movement to Spec of infinitival to, the data considered above in (1)–(7) indicate that this conclusion is too strong. Instead, PRO in (9) seems to simply be undergoing movement to a position higher than vP/PrP, yet lower than both Spec of IP/TP and NegP – perhaps to Spec of AuxP. Presumably, some feature draws it there. For lack of a better term, I will simply refer to it as an EPP feature, although I am, of course, departing from the standard view that such a features is possessed by the infinitival I/T of Control complement clauses.2 The grammaticality of the sentence below in (10a), brought to my attention by Sabine Iatridou (p.c.), further supports the conclusion that PRO can undergo Move when this is necessary for convergence, although the ungrammaticality of (10b) makes it clear that it does not move as far as the Spec position of the matrix IP/TP, further reinforcing the conclusion that PRO does not check Case or [EPP/D] features there. (As before, certain irrelevant intermediate copies have been omitted to improve readability.) (10)

a.

To PRO seem to yourself [(PRO) to always be in the right] is a common flaw.

b. *Both to PRO seem to yourselves [(PRO) to have been betrayed (PRO) by your friends] would be disastrous. That is, in (10a) we see that the need to satisfy Principle A apparently triggers movement of PRO from the embedded clause into the matrix one, again to a position lower that Spec IP/TP, cf. the ungrammaticality of (10b). Interestingly, the grammaticality of the floating quantifier in a pre-to position in (11) indicates that in examples like (10a), PRO does, in fact, move through the embedded Spec of IP position: (11)

To PRO seem to yourselves [both (PRO) to have been betrayed (PRO) by your friends] would be disastrous.

2 Interestingly, the conclusion that there is a position intermediate to I/T and v/Pr available for NP movement was previously reached, for independent reasons, by Bošković (2004: 693). As the reader may recall, under Bošković’s (2004) version of the stranding approach to Q-float, floated quantifiers are added acyclically after an argument moves away from the position in which it is theta-marked (an assumption needed in order to block examples like *The people were seen all (the people).). Thus, the intermediate position for PRO that we have suggested is needed to account for (9) is needed under his approach in order to generate examples like The girls have [all (the girls)] [ vP (the girls) scored a goal].

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It is, therefore, being concluded here that the standard PRO approach to Control achieves better empirical coverage if the following two changes are made to its formulation: (a) PRO does not check a null Case or [EPP/D] feature in Spec of infinitival I/T. If PRO is associated with Case (an issue to which we will turn shortly), then it does so in its initial merge position. (b) Control heads arbitrarily c-select for a variety of phrasal complement types. These two modifications, it is important to note, in no way impact negatively on the ability of the standard PRO approach to accommodate the remainder of the data introduced in Chapter 5. Consider first the expletive contrasts originally discussed there, repeated below in (12) and (13). (12)

a.

It is desirable for it to become known that he is dishonest.

b. Will actually expects for it to seem that he is smart. (13)

a.

*It is desirable PRO to become known that he is dishonest.

b. *Will expects PRO to seem that he is the best candidate. Under the revised standard account proposed in this chapter, these facts now follow from the following two assumptions: (a) PRO is non-expletive and (b) Control adjectives like desirable and Control verbs like expect may c-select a ForceP headed by a complementizer (phonetically overt or covert for) associated with a non-null Case feature. Since PRO cannot be initially merged as the subject of a non-thematic verb (PRO is non-expletive), nor can it check a non-null Case feature, a PRO derivation of (12) and those in (13) crash. Since expletive it satisfies both requirements, the derivations in (12) converge. Turning to the falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must’ contrasts discussed in Chapter 5, repeated below in (14) and (15), let us continue to assume that these two verbs differ in that falloir ‘to be necessary’ selects for ForceP, while devoir ‘must’ selects a “defective” TP, with “defectiveness” now being construed as a TP headed by a T that selects a vP whose head cannot value NPs for null Case. (14)

a. Il faut faire attention où on marche ici. it is-necessary to-pay attention where one walks here ‘It is necessary to watch one’s step when walking through here.’ b. *Il doit faire attention où on marche ici. it must to-pay attention where one walks here *‘It/There must to watch one’s step when walking through here.’

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a. De par la loi, il doit y avoir du savon dans as per the law there must there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public ‘By law, there must be soap in all public restrooms.’ b. *De par la loi, il faut y avoir du savon dans as per the law it is-necessary there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public *‘By law, it is necessary to be soap in all public restrooms.’

Given these assumptions, (14a) is grammatical since PRO merges in the subject position of the embedded verb where it receives a theta-role and is valued for null Case by v. On the other hand, (14b) is ungrammatical on the relevant expletive reading of il ‘it’ either because PRO is merged in a “defective” vP/PrP that cannot value it for null Case or because expletive il is inappropriately initially merged Spec vP/PrP, a thematic position. In a similar vein, (15a) converges because the embedded predicate has no subject theta role to discharge, which means that expletive il may merge directly in the matrix I/T, having its Nominative Case feature valued by devoir ‘must.’ In (15b), on the other hand, insertion of PRO in Spec of the embedded vP/PrP means that PRO fails to be associated with a theta-role, which it requires. In sum, a modified version of the standard approach to Control continues to offer an account of empirical facts not currently covered by its competitors. The contrasts in the following sentence, however, do remain unexplained. Specifically, the current account would not lead one to expect, as is the case in (16), that PRO and non-pronominal lexical NPs can appear in an environment in which pronominal NPs cannot.3 (16) Les villageois/PRO/*Ils/*Eux étant pauvres, ils n’avaient pas the villagers they them being poor they Neg had not les moyens d’engager un expert. the means of to-hire an expert ‘The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert.’ 3 The fact that PRO and phonetically overt non-pronominal NPs exhibit an overlapping distribution in gerundive contexts has been previously noted, with respect to French and Italian, in Rizzi (1982: 163–164). However, to the best of my knowledge, the crucial fact that this overlap does not extend to pronominals (in French or English) has remained unnoticed until now.

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To explain, under the standard account, the acceptability of PRO in (16) indicates that the gerundive clause is associated with null Case. The licitness of the non-pronominal NP indicates that this association must be optional in gerundive contexts. I.e., it appears to be the case that such gerunds can also either lack the ability to value NPs for Case (in which case a lexical NP is acceptable because it is associated with default Case) or that they involve a structural (Nominative) Case. But if this is so, then why are pronominal NPs not also licit? That is, if the non-pronominal variant happens to instantiate an entirely Caseless structure, then a default Case pronoun like eux ‘them’ should be acceptable; if, alternatively, a structural Case position is available, then the structurally Case-marked pronoun ils ‘they’ should be. But all pronominal forms are rejected. The question, then, is why and, unfortunately, it is left unanswered by the present (as well as the original) standard version of the PRO analysis. In order to resolve this issue, while maintaining the empirical coverage previously gained, a tentative alternative proposal will now be considered, one that is not novel in the basic grammatical mechanisms that are employed (these can be found in Chomsky (1998, 1999, 2001)), but rather in the exact manner in which they are configured. In terms of organization, the basic tenets of the approach will first be given. The resulting account of the facts will then be discussed. Let us begin by clarifying the feature-checking/valuation mechanisms to be adopted here, focusing specifically on Case and phi- (person, number, and in some languages, gender) features. It will be assumed, as is standard, that certain lexemes enter derivations with (among other features) Case and phi-features. The non-standard assumption made here will be that every time a lexeme does enter a derivation with Case or phi-features, they must be checked, via Agreement, in order for the derivation to converge. In other words, all phi- and Case features, even the so-called “interpretable” (semantically relevant) phi-features associated with non-expletive nouns like cats, must, at some point in the derivation, enter into an agreement relationship with a compatible item in order for the structure to converge. As for feature valuation, as is standard, this will be assumed to occur when a head that is inherently valued for a feature stands in the closest c-commanding relation to a head unvalued for the same feature, within the same phase. For example, non-expletive Ns will be assumed to be inherently valued for phifeatures, an inherent valuation that takes the form of a bundle of actual person, number, and in some languages, gender features. In contrast, in English and French-type languages, tensed I/T and AgrO/Tr will be assumed to be inherently valued for Case, but this inherent valuation does not take the form of a Case “feature,” but rather is simply an inherent feature-valuation property of these

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particular functional heads.4 In short, the semantically relevant phi-features of lexical heads involve actual feature bundles, but the Case properties of functional categories are by-products of their categorial status. Two further, in part fairly standard, assumptions will be made with respect to Case features: (a) certain (but not all) nouns enter derivations with an unvalued Case feature and (b) a noun’s Case feature can only be valued by a phifeature complete functional head. For example, in the sentence He likes them., it will be assumed, as is standard, that both of the nouns enter the derivation with an unvalued Case feature. The subject nominal has its Case feature valued by tensed I/T, a phi-complete functional head that is inherently valued for Nominative Case and that c-commands the subject noun from its own initial merge position. This valuation/agreement relationship is reflected in the surface form of the pronoun that subsequently emerges from the post-syntactic morphological component, i.e., pronouns that have their Case features syntactically valued by tensed I/T in English morphologically surface in the nominative form, here, he. Similar relations obtain with respect to the object noun and the phi-feature complete functional head AgrO/Tr, although, of course, a different case form (accusative) results from valuation by AgrO/Tr, which is inherently valued for Accusative Case. While much of the preceding is familiar, an area in which this approach differs markedly from others is in the exact membership of the set of nouns assumed to be associated with a Case feature. It will be assumed, for reasons that will become clear, that the presence of an abstract Case feature on a noun is directly recoverable from its overt morphological inflection. For example, in English and French-type languages, only pronominal NPs are overtly marked for case (cf., e.g., the nominative/objective case distinction signaled by they versus them, as opposed to the case invariant forms Mary, linguists, and PRO). Therefore, only phonetically overt pronouns, in these languages, will enter derivations with an unvalued abstract Case feature that requires valuation by a phicomplete functional head. In other words, PRO and non-pronominal NPs in these languages will be assumed to lack Case features. Looking more closely at the role played by various functional heads in Casevaluation, it will be assumed, as is standard, that certain functional heads are phi-incomplete and so, ultimately, cannot value a noun for Case. Three wellknown examples are the embedded I/Ts of ECM and small clause complements,

4 As will be made clear in the discussion of the data to follow shortly, every morphologically inflected I/T in English and French-type languages is assumed to be phi-complete, i.e. to be inherently valued for Nominative Case. However, the same is not true cross-linguistically as there are well known to exist inflected verbal forms, the subjunctives of finite Control languages like Greek and Hebrew, that are not always capable of Case valuation.

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as well as gerunds. In other words, in sentences like He believes himself to be quite the ladies’ man. and I heard her singing The Marseillaise. the embedded I/T, being phi-incomplete, cannot value the embedded subject pronouns for Case. (The phi-complete matrix AgrO/Tr does so.) Where this approach differs from the standard approach is in the following further assumption: The infinitival to/I/T of Control complements is asserted to also be phi-incomplete and hence unable to value nouns for Case. Turning now to phi-features, it was already noted above that it is being assumed here that when any head (nominal or functional) enters a derivation with phi-features, be they interpretable, as is the case for certain (non-expletive) nouns, or uninterpretable, as is the case for functional categories, then those phi-features (like Case features) must undergo agreement via a closest c-command relation by an inherently valued head within the same phase (ForceP and vP constituting phases). As was assumed above for Case features, the phi-feature settings of nouns are assumed to be recoverable from overt morphological signals: In English/French-type languages, both pronouns and lexical NPs are inflected for phi-features (e.g., he is inherently valued for third person, singular; cats, for third person plural), but PRO is not. The latter is assumed here to entirely lack phi-features in the syntactic component, being associated in that component of the grammar with only an N categorial and a [-expletive] semantic feature. (How PRO is assumed to come to be understood to be associated with phi-features under this approach will be discussed in the next chapter.) With respect to the phi-feature settings of functional categories, it will be assumed, as is standard, that AgrO/Tr and overtly inflected I/T enter derivations with unvalued phi-features. However, in contrast with the standard approach it will be assumed that these are the only functional heads associated with such features; i.e., infinitival and gerundive I/T (e.g. to, being) will be assumed to entirely lack phi-features. (This difference may be attributable to the fact that only AgrO/Tr and inflected I/T ever exhibit overt syntactic effects of agreement in these languages). While infinitival I/T and gerundive I/T are assumed to be similar in their lack phi-features, they will be assumed to differ in one respect: Gerunds, being overtly inflected for tense (i.e. overtly associated with a [+tense] feature) will be assumed to be able to enter an agreement relationship with a phi-associated noun. So, for example, in our earlier sentence He likes them., it will be assumed that the two nouns, tensed I/T, and AgrO/Tr are all associated with phi-features – interpretable (inherently valued) in the case of the Ns and uninterpretable (unvalued) in the case of the functional heads. However, in all instances these phi-features must undergo Agree in the usual manner (via a closest c-command

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relation in the same phase between the inherently valued lexeme and its unvalued counterpart). This is achieved via overt movement of the inherently valued subject NP to Spec of tensed I/T (in order to establish c-command); and movement of the object NP to Spec of AgrO/Tr (for the same reason). Having laid out the new system, let us consider how it accounts for the empirical facts, looking first at the type of example that was problematic for the revised and the original null Case approach, namely, (16) above, repeated below in (17): (17)

Les villageois/PRO/*Ils/*Eux étant pauvres, ils n’avaient pas the villagers they them being poor they Neg had not les moyens d’engager un expert. the means of to-hire an expert ‘The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert.’

Only PRO and non-pronominal NPs are licit in these contexts because only their feature values are compatible with those of gerundive I/T. Specifically, PRO enters the derivation with the features [N, -expletive]; les villageois ‘the villagers’ with the features [N, φ], the pronouns with the features [N, φ, Case-unvalued], and étant ‘being’ with the features [I/T, +tense]. PRO and étant ‘being’ have no Case, phi-, or, for that matter, other features that require valuation; therefore, the derivation with those lexemes converges. The derivation with the nonpronominal lexical NP is also convergent since [+tense] I/T is assumed to be able to enter an agreement relationship with inherently phi-valued NPs. In contrast, the derivations with the pronominal forms crash because gerundive I/T is phi-incomplete and hence unable to value NPs for Case. (Apparently, even default Case requires prior Case valuation by a phi-complete functional head of some sort.) Turning to small clause contexts, it is well known that PRO is prohibited in structures like (18a), but, we have seen, is licit in the superficially similar (18b,c): (18)

a.

I made/let [vP *PRO/John/him eat the whole pie].

b. The workers deliberately got [VP/vP hurt PRO]. c.

Lo volevo [vP PRO vedere subito]. it want-PAST-1SG to-see immediately ‘I wanted to see it immediately.’

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Following Bowers (2002: 206–209), these contrasts are attributed to the presence in (18a) versus the absence in (18b,c) of a matrix AgrO/Tr head associated with unvalued phi-features, i.e., to an idiosyncratic difference in syntactic transitivity.5 Specifically, a matrix AgrO/Tr is assumed to be associated with a bundle of unvalued phi-features that require valuation by an inherently phi-feature valued NP, which must itself enter an agreement relationship. Under this approach, only lexical Ns, not PRO, are so valued, which explains why only these types of NPs are acceptable in (18a), as well as in equivalent ECM examples like He believes himself/Bill/*PRO to be quite the ladies’ man. In contrast, in (18b,c), there is no matrix AgrO/Tr head, which means that the phi-features inherently associated with any type of phonetically overt N will fail to undergo agreement during the course of the derivation. Further, in the case of pronominal NPs, the failure to undergo Agree also leaves their Case feature unvalued. In short, all of these derivations converge only with phi- and Case-featureless PRO. We thus have a relatively straightforward account of the previously problematic differences in Control versus ECM/small clause complementation pointed out in earlier chapters. Specifically, it has been noted at numerous points in this work that the same verb may select for a Control complement in one language, but an ECM complement in another: The case of French croire and its English counterpart believe is one well known case, as the examples below make clear.6 (19)

a. *I believe [to have told you not to touch my stuff ]. b.

Je croyais [PRO t’avoir dit de ne pas toucher à I believe to-you to-have told of Neg not to-touch at mes affaires]. my things ‘I believe that I told you not to touch my things.’

5 I differ here from Bowers (2002) in proposing that not just PRO, but also non-pronominal NPs in English and French-type languages lack a Case feature. Bowers assumes this to be true only of PRO, leaving unexplained the contrasts in (16). 6 As indicated in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, Luigi Rizzi and Jean-Roger Vergnaud are credited by Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37) for the original observation that French and Italian counterparts to verbs like believe allow Control complements where their English counterparts do not – facts that Bošković (2007: ft. 26) notes obtain in other Romance languages, and which have also been argued by Terzi (1992, 1997) and Landau (2004) to obtain in the languages of the Balkans. (But see, e.g., Varlokosta (1993), for an alternative non-Control (uniquely pro) approach to these so-called ‘Free Subjunctives’ in the languages of the Balkans.) As was also noted there, estimer ‘judge’ ( J’estime être le meilleur. ‘I judge myself to be the best.’) is another verb that I have found that contrasts in this manner. Bošković (1996: 286) cites constater ‘to notice’ as an additional example (Pierre a constaté avoir convaincu son auditoire. ‘Pierre noticed that he had convinced his audience.’), but these examples strike my informant as ungrammatical, though processable, a view supported by their lack of productivity (cf. *?J’ai constaté avoir trop mangé. ‘I noticed that I had eaten too much.’ and J’ai constaté que j’avais trop mangé.).

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Similarly, it was noted that the same verb in the same language may make use of either complementation option: English remember and causative get, as well as French entendre ‘to hear’ were given as illustrative examples: (20) a.

I distinctly remember [PRO/myself/her sending that letter].

b. John deliberately got [PRO/himself hurt.] c.

J’ai entendu [PRO/Médor aboyer]. I have heard Médor to-bark ‘I heard (Médor) barking.’

While these facts were shown in Chapter 4 to pose interesting problems for current theories of Control, they are expected under the present analysis: they are the result of a simple difference in syntactic transitivity (i.e. the projection of an AgrO/Tr head in the matrix clause) already attested in examples like (18). In other words, these verbs are simply structurally ambiguous, possessing both syntactically transitive and intransitive forms. Turning now to English and French-type (i.e. infinitival) Control clauses, one finds the distributional facts below in (21) for exactly the same reasons. Namely, following Bowers (2002), Subject Control verbs are also assumed to be syntactically intransitive/lack an AgrO/Tr head that could value NPs for Case and/or phi-features. As infinitival to is also phi-incomplete, it too is unavailable to perform this function. Thus, PRO, the sole N lacking either type of feature, is the only means available to give rise to a convergent output. (It bears mentioning that although Object Control verbs are associated with an AgrO/Tr head, that head checks off the features of the “closer” matrix object NP, again ruling out overt embedded subjects.) (21)

Mary forgot [*she/*the students to PRO send in an abstract].

Turning to tensed embedded complement clauses like (22), the distributional facts are the polar opposite of Control structures like (21): (22)

Mary forgot [that *PRO/she/the students had sent in an abstract].

This follows from the feature settings of tensed I/T in these types of languages. Specifically, tensed I/T contrasts with infinitival I/T in being a phicomplete functional head capable of valuing Ns for (Nominative) Case, as well as in being itself associated with a bundle of unvalued for phi-features that require valuation. PRO, entirely lacking phi-features in the syntax, is unable

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to value I/T’s phi-features, resulting in a derivational crash. However, nonpronominal NPs like the students are licit since they can value I/T for phifeatures and, at the same time, have their own phi-features undergo Agree. Pronominal Ns are likewise acceptable since I/T and the pronominal N may undergo agreement in phi-features and, by doing so, tensed I/T can value the pronoun for Case. Having considered the derivations associated with infinitival Control languages, let us turn now to those that employ finite Control.7 As indicated in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, authors like Iatridou (1993), Varlokosta (1993), Landau (2004), and many others have noted that in languages like Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian, the embedded verb in a Control complement is always tensed, specifically, in the subjunctive, which is morphologically identical to the indicative. Importantly, this verb exhibits full person and number inflection, as illustrated in (23a,b), drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 154–155):8 (23)

a. o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ b. tora, o Yanis elpizi [na figi avrio]. now the John hopes Particle leave-3-sing tomorrow ‘Now John hopes to leave tomorrow.’

While most authors now agree, on the basis of the interpretive properties of the understood embedded subject, that the class of verbs that includes the equivalents of know how to, manage, start, try, and fear uniquely instantiate Control structures in these languages (and so refer to examples like (23a) as C-Subjunctives), 7 For the reasons enumerated in Chapter 4, it is being assumed here that the basic syntax of infinitival Control structures provided for English and French are shared by rich agreement languages like Icelandic and Russian. That is, the well-known manifestation of non-default morphological case on various agreeing predicative elements in these languages is viewed as a post-syntactic morphological phenomenon. 8 As mentioned in Chapter 4 and as Landau (2004) and Melnik (2007) discuss in detail, Modern Hebrew is a language that exhibits both finite and infinitival Control, although finite Control is restricted to the third person, future tense of certain verbs. I.e., certain Control verbs in Modern Hebrew (e.g. nisa ‘try’) allow only infinitival Control complements; others (e.g. hitshir ‘declare’) accept only finite Control (limited to the third person, future); and still others (e.g. hivtiax ‘promise’) accept both complement types (with finite option being, again, restricted to third person, future). The discussion of finite Control in the languages of the Balkans applies equally to finite Control structures in this language.

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there is some debate as to the syntactic status of the class of verbs that includes the equivalents of hope, want, decide, and expect.9 Many researchers, like Varlokosta (1988), have argued that this class of verbs does not select Control complements (and so refer to examples like (23b) as F(ree)-Subjunctives). According to this view, the phonetically non-overt embedded subject in (23b) is pro, not PRO. Terzi (1992, 1997) and Landau (2004: 846), however, have suggested that these clauses are actually ambiguous, allowing both a Control and a non-Control configuration. Regardless of which view one favors, finite Control structures raise an interesting point for all theories of Control, including the present one. Specifically, the discussion until now has focused on the case of phi-complete inflected I/T. I.e., in English and French-type languages morphologically inflected I/T is always associated with a bundle of phi-features that require valuation, via agreement, with an inherently phi-valued NP that it can, in turn, value for Nominative Case. PRO, being a non-expletive noun lacking both phi- and Case features, is incompatible with phi-complete, inflected I/T. Given facts of the type in (23a) and possibly (23b), it is obvious that this is not true cross-linguistically. Specifically, the morphologically inflected I/T of C-Subjunctives such as (23a) must be treated under the current analysis as phi-incomplete, licensing only PRO in a fashion entirely parallel to English examples like (21) above, while the I/T of F-Subjunctives must be assumed to either be unambiguously phi-complete (under a Varlokosta-style approach) or ambiguous between a phi-complete use and a phi-incomplete one (under the alternative Terzi-style approach to FSubjunctives). Under the former approach, the unambiguously phi-complete I/T will license only pro and lexical NPs in a fashion parallel to English examples like (22) above. Under the latter view, the phi-complete use of I/T will again license pro and lexical NPs, akin to (22), while the phi-incomplete use will license PRO in a fashion similar to (21). In short, this approach can accommodate the basic empirical facts associated with finite Control, but, of course, it leaves unanswered the important question of just why these morphologically inflected I/T are phi-incomplete whereas others are not. A semantic answer to this question will be offered in Chapter 8. Turning now to expletive contrasts like (24a,b), these obviously continue to follow under the present analysis since the standard assumption that PRO is

9 These interpretive properties are discussed in detail, e.g., in Varlokosta (1993), who notes that the understood embedded subject in clauses of the type in (23a) must be null; it must be co-referential with a c-commanding antecedent; it only permits a sloppy reading under ellipsis; and it supports a de se but not a de re interpretation – all classic properties of PRO. Clauses of the type in (23b) exhibit the opposite characteristics.

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[-expletive], originally due to Safir (1985: 33–38), is being maintained. I.e., the examples in (24) crash on the PRO derivations because PRO is initially merged in a non-thematic position. The obligatory projection of an expletive can be accounted for by assuming that an adjective like desirable may also select for a ForceP complement that is headed by an overt or covert for that is associated with a bundle of unvalued phi-features. (24)

a.

It is desirable (for) it/*PRO to become known that he is dishonest.

b. Will actually expects (for) it/*PRO to seem that he is smart. Where something quite different needs to be said under this analysis, however, is in how it accounts for the falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must’ contrasts repeated below in (25)–(26). As the reader may recall from the earlier discussion of these examples in (14)–(15), the revised standard account of these facts assumes that PRO is a non-expletive NP that must be valued for null Case by a “non-defective” v/Pr – a proposal that has been since rejected. Specifically, the contrasts in (25)–(26) were argued to follow if PRO is non-expletive and the v/Pr of the ForceP complement of falloir ‘to be necessary’ values NPs for null Case, but the “defective” v/Pr in the TP complement selected by devoir ‘must’ does not. (25)

a. Il faut faire attention où on marche ici. it is-necessary to-pay attention where one walks here ‘It is necessary to watch one’s step when walking through here.’ b. *Il doit faire attention où on marche ici. it must to-pay attention where one walks here *‘It/There must to watch one’s step when walking through here.’

(26)

a. De par la loi, il doit y avoir du savon dans as per the law there must there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public ‘By law, there must be soap in all public restrooms.’ b. *De par la loi, il faut y avoir du savon dans as per the law it is-necessary there to-have some soap in toutes les toilettes publiques. all the toilets public *‘By law, it is necessary to be soap in all public restrooms.’

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Given what has been said thus far, only a portion of these contrasts continues to follow under the present approach. Specifically, a straightforward account of (25a) is maintained since PRO is the only NP that can receive the thematic role of the embedded verb in the context of a phi-incomplete infinitival I/T – PRO being the only non-expletive NP not possessing any phi- or Case features that require agreement/valuation. Similarly, the grammaticality of (26a) is still expected: In this sentence, there is no PRO (its non-expletive nature bars it from initially merging in the subject position of the non-thematic embedded clause); thus, expletive il ‘it’ initially merges in the matrix clause, where it directly undergoes agreement with the phi-complete tensed I/T, allowing for valuation of the features of both I/T and il ‘it.’ While these facts continue to follow, those in (25b) and (26b) initially appear mysterious. Why isn’t (25b) grammatical under a derivation parallel to (25a), in which PRO merges in the embedded clause, where it receives a theta-role, and expletive il ‘it’ merges in the matrix? Similarly, why isn’t (26b) grammatical on a derivation parallel to (26a) in which there is no PRO in the non-thematic embedded clause and the expletive again merges in the matrix? The hypothesis to be explored here is that these facts follow from an interaction of the syntax and semantics of Control with the lexical entries of the verbs devoir ‘must’ and falloir ‘to be necessary.’ To see how, let’s begin by considering some of the syntactic and semantic properties associated with these two modal verbs. As noted in the previous chapter, it is well known within traditional and theoretical circles that devoir ‘must’ and falloir ‘to be necessary’ are semantically similar in that both productively express deontic (a.k.a. root) modality. (See, e.g., Dubois (1969: 119), Kayne (1969, 1975: 259), Ruwet (1972: Chapter 2), Huot (1974: 171–172), Zubizarreta (1983), Rooryck (1989: 193), among others.) That is, either verb can be used to make a statement about how something must be given a certain set of norms, desires, expectations, or other factors, as the relative equivalence of (27a) and (27b) makes clear: (27)

a. Tu dois travailler plus dur si tu veux te rattraper. you must to-work more hard if you want yourself to-catch-up ‘You must work harder if you want to catch up.’ b. Il faut travailler plus dur si tu veux te rattraper. it is-necessary to-work more hard if you want yourself to-catch-up ‘It’s necessary to work harder if you want to catch up.’

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As is equally well known, devoir ‘must’ differs from falloir ‘to be necessary’ in that the former may also be used to express, among other things, epistemic modality; i.e., devoir ‘must’ can also be used to make statements about how something must be based on inference or knowledge, as the contrast in (28a,b) demonstrates.10 (28)

a. Speaker 1:

Speaker 2:

b. Speaker 1:

Speaker 2:

On dit que Patrick sort avec une fille qui s’appelle Cécile. ‘They say that Patrick is going out now with a girl named Cecile.’ Comme je le connais, elle doit être blonde aux yeux bleus. ‘Knowing him, elle must be blonde-haired and blueeyed.’ On dit que Patrick sort avec une fille qui s’appelle Cécile. ‘They say that Patrick is going out now with a girl named Cecile.’ *Comme je le connais, il faut qu’elle soit blonde aux yeux bleus. *‘Knowing him, it is necessarily the case that she be blonde-haired and blue-eyed.’

While either deontic devoir or falloir can be used in examples like (27) above (native speakers indicate that the falloir example is “stronger”), the two are not completely interchangeable as there are contexts in which one or the other is disallowed. The by-now-familiar sentence in (29a), as well as the novel ones in 10 The generalization that falloir ‘to be necessary’ cannot encode epistemic modality may require qualification as there do exist certain quasi-idiomatic uses of the verb that could, arguably, involve epistemic readings, as in the following: (i) On me dit que Marie joue du violon douze heures par jour. Douze heures par jour! Tu te rends compte! Il faut qu’elle aime la musique, celle-là! ‘They tell me that Mary plays the violin twelve hours a day. Twelve hours a day! Just imagine! That girl has really got to like music!’ The status of such examples is unclear, however, given the general absence of epistemic readings with falloir, as well the fact that even sentences like the preceding could be construed as deontic. E.g., with respect to (i), one could say that anyone who plays twelve hours of violin a day must, of necessity, be a person who likes music.

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(29b,c) demonstrate, for example, that only devoir ‘must’ is licit when the complement clause contains an infinitival verb that does not s-select for a thematic subject.11 (29)

a. De par la loi, il doit/*faut y avoir as per the law there must/is-necessary there to-have du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. some soap in all the toilets public ‘By law, there must/*is necessary (to) be soap in all public restrooms.’ b. Il devra/*faudra sembler y avoir un problème. it must/will-be-necessary to-seem there to-have a problem ‘There must/*will be necessary (to) appear to be a problem.’ c. Il devra/*faudra s’ensuivre une controverse. it must/will-be-necessary itself to-ensue a controversy ‘There must/*will be necessary (to) ensue a controversy.’ (said, e.g., by two politicians planning a strategy for the upcoming meeting of the House)

Interestingly, this thematic restriction on the complement clause of falloir ‘to be necessary’ is not maintained when it selects for a tensed (subjunctive) complement clause instead of an infinitival one, as a comparison of the falloir variants above in (29) with those below in (30) makes clear: (30)

a.

De par la loi, il faut qu’il y ait as per the law there is-necessary that it there have du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. of-the soap in all the toilets public ‘By law, it is necessary that there be soap in all public restrooms.’

b.

Il faudrait qu’il semble y avoir un problème. it would-be-necessary that it seem there to-have a problem ‘It would be necessary for there to appear to be a problem.’

c.

Il faut qu’il s’ensuive une controverse. it is-necessary that it itself to-ensue a controversy ‘It is necessary that there ensue a controversy.’

11 The licitness of expletives with devoir has been previously noted in, e.g., Zubizarreta (1983: 213), although their limitation to contexts in which devoir selects a non-thematic complement clause (i.e., the ungrammaticality of expletives in examples like (25b)) remained unnoticed.

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The preceding is taken here to indicate that not only is falloir + infinitive not a perfect synonym of devoir ‘must’, but it is not even perfectly synonymous with falloir + subjunctive. This claim is not all that surprising, however, since a similar lack of equivalence has been previously observed with respect to tensed versus small clause pairs involving verbs like see, make, and find, as revealed by pairs like I saw John play tennis./I saw that John played tennis.; You should make your kids learn French./You should make it so that your kids learn French.; I found Julius Caesar to be boring./I found that Julius Caesar was boring.12 Having considered some contexts that accept only devoir ‘must,’ let us next consider those that only accept falloir ‘to be necessary.’ Specifically, let us consider sentences involving inanimate embedded subjects like those in (31)– (33), which are licit only with falloir + subjunctive. (This restriction can only be observed with respect to falloir + infinitive in (31b) for syntactic, i.e., NP Case and phi-feature valuation, reasons.) (31) a.

Pour attraper des truites dans cette rivière, il faut for to-catch some trout in this river it is-necessary qu’il pleuve. that it rain ‘In order to be able to catch trout in this river, it is necessary for it torain.

b. *Pour attraper des truites dans cette rivière, il faut pleuvoir. for to-catch some trout in this river it is-necessary to-rain *‘In order to be able to catch trout in this river, it is necessary to rain.’ c. *Pour attraper des truites dans cette rivière, il doit pleuvoir. for to-catch some trout in this river it must to-rain *‘In order to be able to catch trout in this river, it (the weather) must rain.’ (32)

a. Pour crever ce genre de pneu, il faut qu’un for to-flatten this type of tire it is-necessary that a clou le pénètre. nail it penetrate ‘In order for this tire to get a flat, a nail must puncture it.’ b. *Pour crever ce genre de pneu, un clou doit le pénétrer. for to-flatten this type of tire a nail must it penetrate *‘In order for this tire to get a flat, a nail is obliged to puncture it.’

12 See, e.g., Kirsner & Thompson (1976) and Postal (1974: 357–363).

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(33)

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a. Pour pouvoir sortir de cette grotte, il faut que for to-be-able to-escape from this cave it is-necessary that la marée monte. the tide rise ‘In order to get out of this cave, the tide must rise.’ b. *Pour pouvoir sortir de cette grotte, la marée for to-be-able to-escape from this cave the tide doit monter. must to-rise *‘In order to get out of this cave, the tide is obliged to rise.’

The fact that inanimate embedded subjects like these are licit only with falloir + subjunctive lends additional support for the view being advanced here that this construction is semantically distinct in some way from sentences involving both falloir + infinitive and devoir ‘must.’ An additional piece of evidence in favor of this conclusion comes from the fact that only falloir + subjunctive tolerates the following idioms: (34) a.

Quand je leur dis qu’ils ne valent rien when I them-DAT tell that they Neg are-worth nothing en tant qu’équipe, il faut que les plumes volent. in terms that team it is-necessary that the feathers fly ‘When I tell them that they’re a nowhere team, the fur has got to fly.’

b. *Quand je leur dis qu’ils ne valent rien when I them-DAT tell that they Neg are-worth nothing en tant qu’équipe, les plumes doivent voler. in terms that team the feathers must to-fly *‘When I tell them that they’re a nowhere team, the fur is obliged to fly.’ (35)

a. Pour qu’on puisse les amener devant un juge, for that one be-able them-ACC to-bring before a judge il faut que les carottes soient cuites. it is-necessary that the carrots be cooked ‘In order to bring them in front of a judge, their goose has got to be cooked.’

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b. *Pour qu’on puisse les amener devant un juge, for that one be-able them-ACC to-bring before a judge les carottes doivent être cuites. the carrots must be cooked *‘In order to bring them in front of a judge, their goose is obliged to be cooked.’

In order to account for this array of facts, the following hypotheses will be made. First, let us make the relatively uncontroversial assumptions that falloir ‘to be necessary’ unambiguously encodes deontic modality and never s-selects for a thematic subject.13 In addition, let us adopt the novel hypothesis that falloir + infinitive differs from falloir + subjunctive in that the former expresses the idea It is deontically required of NP that p., whereas the latter expresses the idea It deontically must be the case that p. In other words, let us assume that both constructions semantically select for an embedded proposition, but only falloir + infinitive also obligatorily s-selects, but optionally c-selects, for an indirect object on whom a deontic obligation is imposed with respect to the realization of the state of affairs denoted by the embedded clause. This difference in selection is revealed by contrasts like the following, in which we see that only falloir + infinitive accepts a pronominal indirect object. (36)

a. Il (lui) faut travailler plus dur. il (to-her) is-necessary to-work more hard ‘It is necessary (for her) to work harder.’ b. *Il (lui) faut que son fils/qu’elle travaille plus dur. il (to-her) is-necessary that her son she work more hard ‘It is necessary (for her) that her son/that she work harder.’

Despite the fact that the indirect object in a falloir + infinitive construction is obviously subject to optional syntactic realization (cf. (36a)), it is, nonetheless, clear that this argument obligatorily forms part of the argument structure of this verb since even in an example like Il faut travailler plus dur. ‘It’s necessary to work harder.’ the implicit indirect object obligatorily serves as the antecedent of PRO. That is, authors like Grinder (1970), Kimball (1971), Epstein (1984), and Landau (2000) have observed with respect to similar English Control heads like to be fun that in a sentence like It’s fun to play baseball., the person who is 13 But see footnote 10 for a type of example indicating that perhaps falloir ‘to be necessary,’ in certain quasi-idiomatic contexts, can encode epistemic modality.

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having fun must also be the person who is playing baseball. I could not, for example, utter this sentence while sitting in the stands, observing a baseball game, with the intent that it mean It’s fun for me when they play baseball. In a parallel fashion, with respect to Il faut travailler plus dur. ‘It’s necessary to work harder.’, the person who bears the deontic obligation must be the one who actually realizes the action denoted by the embedded predicate. In other words, the sentence cannot mean It’s necessary for me that someone else work harder. In short, the view being adopted here is that heads of the be fun/ difficult/necessary variety involve Obligatory Control. Furthermore, this is being interpreted as meaning that such heads obligatorily s-select for an internal argument that may remain syntactically implicit, but that must, for reasons to be made clear in Chapter 7, serve as the antecedent for the PRO in the complement clause. Looking more closely now at the syntax of these constructions, examples like those in (36a,b) above also make clear the well-known fact that falloir + subjunctive differs from falloir + infinitive in that only the former allows for (in fact, requires) an overt head (que ‘that’) to surface in the embedded ForceP. Given work on the structure of the left periphery, i.e. Rizzi (1997, 2001), this fact is accounted for here by simply assuming that the falloir in a falloir + subjunctive construction c-selects for ForceP, whereas falloir in a falloir + infinitive construction c-selects for something smaller, say, FinP, as made clear by the structures below in (37a,b). (37)

a. Il faut [ FinP PRO travailler plus dur]. il is-necessary to work more harder ‘It is necessary to work harder.’ b. Il faut [ ForceP que tu travailles plus dur]. il is-necessary that you work more hard ‘It is necessary for you to work harder.’

Turning now to devoir ‘must,’ let us first adopt the uncontroversial view that this verb is semantically ambiguous in that it may productively express either epistemic or deontic modality. In model-theoretic terms, this translates into universal quantification over distinct sets of accessible worlds. Namely, the truth of sentences containing deontic devoir (and falloir) are evaluated with respect to sets of worlds that accord with certain norms, desires, expectations, and so forth, while ones containing epistemic devoir are evaluated with respect to every world consistent with some individual’s beliefs or knowledge.

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Let us next adopt the standard view defended in previous literature (cf., e.g., Dubois (1969: 119), Kayne (1969, 1975: 259), Ruwet (1972: Chapter 2), Huot (1974: 171–172), and Zubizarreta (1983: 214–215)) that epistemic devoir is a Raising verb; i.e., it does not s-select for a thematic subject. More specifically, and in line with recent work on the left periphery, let us assume it c-selects for an IP/TP complement, as in (38) below. This will explain not only why an overt que is never attested with this verb, but also why NP-Movement into the matrix clause is acceptable. (38) Marie doit [IP/TP [vp/PrP (Marie) lire beaucoup]]. Marie must to-read a-lot ‘Mary (epistemically) must do a lot of reading.’ I.e., she probably does a lot of reading. Turning now to some more controversial assumptions, let us next adopt the view, contra Ruwet (1972: Chapter 2) and Zubizarreta (1983: 214–215) and following Dubois (1969: 119), Kayne (1969, 1975: 259), and Huot (1974: 171–172), that deontic devoir has a lexical entry in which it assigns a theta-role to its subject position. On this reading, devoir expresses the idea X deontically must p. Syntactically speaking, and in line with work on the left periphery, we will assume that devoir c-selects for a FinP complement clause in order (among other things to be discussed in the next chapter) to account for the lack of overt complementizers with this modal. The result, then, is the structure in (39): (39)

Marie doit [FinP [vP/PrP PRO lire beaucoup]]. Marie must to-read a-lot ‘Marie (deontically) must read a lot.’ I.e., she is obliged to do a lot of reading.’

Turning to a final, entirely novel proposal, it will be further assumed, for reasons that will be made clear when we return to the data, that deontic devoir has a second lexical entry, one in which it expresses the idea It deontically must be the case that p. On this entry, devoir does not assign a subject theta-role and it selects for a clausal complement headed by a predicate of exactly the same type. In other words, it selects for a non-thematic vP/PrP, in the fashion indicated in (40):

The syntax of Control

(40)

Il doit [non-thematic there must

vP/PrP

281

y avoir du savon there to-have of-the soap

dans toutes les toilettes publiques]. in all the toilets public ‘There must (by law) be soap in all public restrooms.’ For convenience, the lexical entries that have been put forth in the preceding paragraphs are summarized below in (41)–(42): (41)

a.

falloir1 = falloir + subjunctive c-selection: ______ForceP s-selection: Meaning: It deontically must be the case that p. Illustrative example: Il faut [ForceP qu’elle travaille]. it is-necessary that she work ‘She must work.’

b. falloir2 = falloir + infinitive c-selection: _____(Indirect Object), ______FinP s-selection: Meaning: It is deontically required of NP that p. (or NP is obliged to p.) Illustrative example: Il (lui) faut [FinP PRO travailler]. it her-DAT is-necessary to-work ‘She must work.’ (lui variant)/‘One must work.’ (42)

a.

devoir1 = epistemic devoir c-selection: ______TP s-selection: Meaning: It epistemically must be the case that p. Illustrative example: Ton pneu est dégonflé. Un clou doit [TP (un clou) l’avoir your tire is flat a nail must (a nail) it-to-have (un clou) pénétré]. (a nail) punctured ‘Your tire’s flat. A nail must have punctured it.’

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b. devoir2 = Non-external-theta-role assigning deontic devoir c-selection: ______Non-Thematic vP s-selection: Meaning: It deontically must be the case that p. Illustrative example: Il doit [Non-Thematic it must

vP

y avoir du savon dans toutes les there to-have of-the soap in all the

toilettes publiques]. restrooms public ‘(By law) There must be soap in all public restrooms.’ c.

devoir3 = External-theta-role assigning (Control) deontic devoir c-selection: ______FinP s-selection: Meaning: NP deontically must p. Illustrative example: Marie, tu dois [FinP PRO travailler plus dur]. Marie you must to-work more hard ‘Marie, you must work harder.’

Having laid out the proposals, let us return now to the facts that motivated them. As concerns the original falloir/devoir expletive contrasts in (25)–(26), it was previously noted that the non-expletive nature of PRO accounts for its presence in the embedded clause in (25a) and its absence in (26a). (As explained earlier, syntactic considerations – a need to value phi- and, in some instances, Case features – explain why overt lexical embedded subjects are never an option in the embedded clause in any of these examples.) The proposed difference in the lexical semantics of devoir and falloir + infinitive explains the remaining facts in (25b) and (26b), as well as the additional ones added in (29b–c). Specifically, (25b) is semantically deviant: When the complement clause of deontic devoir contains a thematic vP/PrP, as is the case here, devoir must itself assign a subject theta-role of requirement, a thematic role that is, of course, incompatible with expletive il ‘it.’ On the other hand, the devoir examples in (29a–c) are all licit because devoir is now selecting a clause containing a non-thematic vP/PrP complement and, hence, itself assigns no theta-role of requirement to its subject position. Turning to the falloir examples, sentence (26b) is also semantically deviant: falloir + infinitive expresses the idea It is deontically required of X that p. Thus, the sentence *Il faut y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. makes the absurd assertion that the implicit argument (any arbitrary individual)

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is required to have soap in every public restroom. The same is true of the additional falloir + infinitive data in (29b–c). The lack of this restriction in falloir + subjunctive in (30) is due to a lexical semantic difference between the two polysemes: falloir + subjunctive simply expresses the idea It is necessary that p., where p = any proposition. I.e., falloir + subjunctive does not entail that some individual is deontically obligated to ensure the realization of the embedded clause, but only that that state of affairs must obtain. The rough semantic equivalence of (27a,b) also follows simply from the deontic meaning standardly associated with both devoir3 and falloir2 : The devoir ‘must’ example in (27a) is associated with a subject Control structure parallel to (39) in which a thematic role of requirement is assigned to Marie/tu and the falloir example in (27b) is realized as the Obligatory Control structure in (37a). The latter is perceived as being “stronger” by native speakers because it makes that claim that anyone must work harder to catch up, as opposed to simply making the weaker claim that you or Marie must do so. The contrast in (28) follows from the hypothesis that only devoir ‘must’ productively encodes epistemic modality. In other words, the unacceptability of falloir in (28b) is due to the fact that it is difficult to imagine a situation in which some set of norms, desires, expectations or other factors could essentially require of a girl that she have blonde hair and blue eyes. (A very peculiar, fascist-style dating system could render a deontic reading of this sentence licit.) On the other hand, it is easy to imagine a situation in which one is logically led to deduce that it must be true that she does; e.g., if we know that this is the only type of girl Patrick has been attracted to in the past, then we might deduce this to be the case for his new girlfriend, whom we have not yet met. The unacceptability of devoir and falloir + infinitive in examples involving inanimate embedded subjects in (31)–(33) is also an expected consequence of the lexical semantics of these two verbs. Falloir + infinitive is disallowed in (31b) because falloir expresses the idea It is deontically required of NP that p. and it is absurd to deontically require of any arbitrary individual that s/he “rain.” The examples (31c), (32b), and (33b) all involve devoir3 , as is clear from the type of embedded predicates involved. That is, each of these verbs s-selects for a subject theta-role. Therefore, all of these examples are semantically deviant because deontic devoir assigns a requirement theta-role to an inanimate NP. In other words, these examples are all associated with a Control structure parallel to (39) and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the matrix subject, being inanimate, can be an entity “required” to perform the action denoted by the embedded predicate. I.e., it is difficult to see how it could be required of the weather that it rain, of a nail, that it puncture a tire, or of the tide, that it rise. The idiom contrasts in (34)–(35) are parallel: The (b) variants are also associated

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with the Control structure exemplified by (39). Therefore, the matrix subject initially merges as the thematic subject of devoir, giving rise to peculiar readings in which it is required of things like feathers to fly and of carrots to be cooked. In addition to accounting for all of the preceding data, this proposal has the added advantage of accommodating some additional facts. First, as one would expect, idioms involving devoir are entirely licit on epistemic readings. That is, while deontic devoir examples of this type were shown to be unacceptable (cf. (34b) and (35b) above), their epistemic counterparts are fully grammatical: (43) a.

Quand ils ne sont pas d’accord sur quelque chose, when they Neg are not of agreement on some thing les plumes doivent voler. the feathers must to-fly ‘When they don’t agree on something, the fur (epistemically) must really fly.’

b.

Les carottes doivent être cuites qu’ils ne cherchent the carrots must to-be cooked that they Neg look même pas à se défendre. even not to themselves to-defend ‘Their goose must (epistemically) really be cooked since they’re not even trying to defend themselves.’

The existence of such examples is expected given that epistemic devoir is associated with the Raising structure in (38), in which the surface subject initially merges as an argument the idiom chunk, raising to the non-thematic matrix subject position for Case and phi-feature valuation purposes. As one would also expect, when the surface subject is an inanimate NP, epistemic readings are again attested. Compare, in this respect, the earlier deontic devoir facts in (31c), (32b) and (33b) with the following: (44) a. Regarde ces gros nuages noirs sur le pic là-bas. look-at those big clouds black on the peak over-there Il doit y pleuvoir. it must there to-rain ‘Look at the big black clouds hanging over the mountaintop over there. It must (epistemically) be raining.’

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b. Ton pneu est dégonflé. Un clou doit l’avoir pénétré. your tire is flat a nail must it-to-have punctured ‘Your tire’s flat. A nail (epistemically) must have punctured it.’ c.

Regarde-moi ce courant! La marée doit être en train de monter. look-at-for-me that current the tide must to-be in process of to-rise ‘Look at that strong current! The tide (epistemically) must be coming in.’

While the lack of a deontic reading in the very similar examples in (31c), (32b), and (33b) follows from their Control structures, exemplified by (39), the presence of an epistemic reading in the examples in (44) is expected, given the Raising configuration associated with epistemic devoir provided in (38). I.e., a thematic role of requirement is assigned to the surface matrix subject by thematic deontic devoir, but not by non-thematic epistemic devoir. Some particularly interesting examples involving inanimate NPs and deontic thematic devoir ‘must’ in (45) demonstrate the subtlety of the interaction being proposed here to exist between the syntactic and semantic components. (45)

a.

De par la loi, un litre de lait doit [FinP PRO contenir as per the law a liter of milk must to-contain au moins 5% de crème]. at-the least 5% of cream ‘By law, a liter of milk (deontically) must contain at least 5% cream.’

b.

Pour être exportable, un vin doit [FinP PRO faire for to-be exportable a wine must to-make au moins 11 degrés]. at-the least 11 percent ‘Wines produced for export (deontically) must contain at least 11% alcohol.’

c.

Un saucisson digne de ce nom ne doit [FinP PRO contenir a sausage worthy of this name Neg must to-contain aucun agent conservateur]. no agent preservative ‘Any sausage worthy of the name must (deontically) not contain any preservatives.’

As noted above in relation to examples (31c), (32b), and (33b), inanimate matrix subjects are normally illicit with devoir3 because a role of “requirement”

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is assigned to the matrix subject position: Inanimate entities, like the weather, nails, and the tide cannot be required to do things like rain, puncture a tire, or rise. However, as examples like (45a–c) make clear, this is not always the case: It can be legally required of milk that it contain a minimum of 5% cream, of wine for export that it contain a given amount of alcohol, and of high quality sausage that it contain no preservatives. Parallel “exceptions” to the restriction on idioms noted above in (34)–(35) can also be found, given (relatively rare) appropriate conditions. For instance, it was previously noted that idioms, such as the French equivalents of This situation is intolerable – the fur has got to fly! and In order to get them in front of a judge, their goose has got to be cooked! cannot be expressed with devoir3, again because this verb assigns a requirement theta-role to its subject position. I.e., It cannot be required of feathers that they fly nor of geese that they be cooked. In view of this, examples of the type in (46), noted, e.g., in Ruwet (1972: 72), Kayne (1975: 256), and Zubizarreta (1983: 213), are intriguing since here we do find acceptable idiom chunks with deontic thematic devoir: (46)

a.

Justice doit être rendue. justice must to-be rendered ‘Justice (deontically) must be served.’

b.

Assistance doit être portée aux personnes en danger. assistance must to-be given to-the people in danger ‘Assistance (deontically) must be given to people in danger.’

c.

Hommage/Honneur doit être rendu à ceux qui sont homage/honor must to-be given to those who are morts pour la liberté. died for the liberty ‘Homage/Honor (deontically) must be given to those who have died for liberty.’

However, the existence of such examples is actually expected under the present proposals since, in these examples, deontic devoir is associated with both a Raising and a Control configuration, as indicated below in (47a,b): (47)

a.

Justice doit [non-thematic vP/PrP être rendue ( justice)]. ‘Justice must be rendered.’

b. Justice doit [FinP [vP/PrP PRO être rendue]]. ‘It is required of justice that it be served.’

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That is, in (47a), we find devoir2 – a Raising verb that selects for a nonthematic (passivized) vP/PrP as its complement and assigns no theta-role to its own subject position. The NP justice, therefore, merges in the object position of rendre ‘to render’ and subsequently raises, for feature valuation purposes, to the matrix I/T. The sentence means It must be the case that some implicit Agent render justice. In (47b), on the other hand, we have deontic devoir3 , which selects for a FinP complement that contains an adjectival passive headed by the predicative head être ‘to be.’ Justice, in this instance, merges as the thematic subject of devoir – it is required of justice that the property denoted by the embedded predicate obtain of it. In other words, it is required by the very nature of justice itself that it be rendered. Further, more obvious, examples of this type of Control by an inanimate NP like justice, assistance, and hommage/honor have been given below in (48). (48)

a. Si on part du principe que la justice veut if one starts from-the premise that the justice wants [être rendue], on fait preuve d’une certaine naïveté. to-be served one makes proof of a certain naïveté ‘By departing from the premise that justice wants to be served, one demonstrates a certain degree of naïveté.’ b. La justice demande [à être rendue]. the justice demands to to-be served ‘Justice demands to be served.’

We can round out our discussion of devoir and falloir by considering an interesting aspect of the by-now-familiar example repeated below in (49). Specifically, in light of what has just been said, the reader may now well be wondering why a Raising derivation parallel to (47a) is not available for this particular idiom. I.e., why can’t the NP les carottes ‘the carrots’ merge in the object position of cuites ‘cooked’ and subsequently raise, for feature valuation purposes, to the matrix I/T, generating a sentence meaning It must be the case that some implicit Agent cook their goose.? Why is only the Control option available? (49) *Pour qu’on puisse les amener devant un juge, for that one be-able them-ACC to-bring before a judge les carottes doivent être cuites. the carrots must be cooked *‘In order to bring them in front of a judge, their goose is obliged to be cooked.’

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The answer is that the French equivalent of to cook someone’s goose actually lacks a verbal passive structure; i.e., the NP of the idiom chunk cannot ever merge in object position, as evidenced by the contrasts below: (50)

a. On doit toujours rendre justice. one must always to-render justice ‘We must always render justice.’ b. *On a cuit les carottes. we have cooked the carrots *‘We cooked their goose.’ (OK on the irrelevant, non-idiomatic reading We (literally) cooked the carrots.)

In other words, this passivized idiom is unambiguously adjectival, not verbal. Thus, examples like (49) unambiguously involve a thematic vP/PrP in the complement clause, and, hence, instantiate only the Control configuration in (47b), which is semantically deviant as it cannot be required of carrots that they be cooked. As one might expect, the converse is also true: Certain contexts license only a Raising structure, as in the following. (51)

a. Une décision doit être prise au plus tard demain. a decision must to-be taken at-the most late tomorrow ‘A decision must be made by tomorrow at the latest.’ b. Les coupables doivent être punis. the guilty must to-be punished ‘The guilty parties must be punished.’

Here, a Control configuration is syntactically available, but is semantically deviant, as it cannot be required of decisions that they be made, or required of the guilty that they be punished. To summarize, it was noted in Chapter 5, following Authier & Reed (2009: 44–45), that the standard null Case approach to Control originally developed in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) is able to accommodate devoir/falloir contrasts of the type in (25)–(26), which competing approaches to Control are not. In this chapter, distinct empirical facts involving Q-Float, clitic pronoun placement in the Romance languages, and the distribution of NP types in gerunds pointed to the need to reject the very features of the standard approach that

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provided this explanation. To accommodate the Q-Float, clitic pronoun, and gerund data, a more radical approach to PRO was developed – one in which it is both Case and phi-featureless. While this approach initially appeared to offer no explanation for the devoir/falloir contrasts in (25)–(26), an account was argued to emerge once one considers just how the lexical entries of these particular verbs interact with the mechanisms of Control. More specifically, falloir ‘to be necessary’ was argued to be two-way ambiguous. On both readings, it is a non-thematic verb encoding deontic modality. However, on one reading, it c-selects either a “full” ForceP complement ( falloir1) and on the other, an optional indirect object and a FinP complement ( falloir2 ). In the former instance, falloir expresses the idea Given certain norms/desires/expectations, it must be the case that p.; in the latter, Given certain norms/desires/ expectations, it is required of NP that p. It is this latter entry that is attested in the Authier & Reed data in (25)–(26). Namely, sentences like *De par la loi, il faut y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. *‘By law, it is necessary to be soap in all public restrooms.’ are judged ungrammatical because it is absurd to assert that any arbitrary individual is deontically obligated to ensure that soap be in every public restroom. In contrast, devoir ‘must’ has been analyzed above as being three-way ambiguous. Semantically, it may productively express either deontic or epistemic modality. Syntactically, epistemic devoir (devoir1 ) is a Raising verb, c-selecting a TP complement clause, and expressing the idea Given what is known/believed, it must be the case that p. Deontic devoir, on the other hand, is treated as being syntactically ambiguous between a Raising (devoir2 ) and a Control (devoir3 ) configuration. The Control configuration involves selection for a FinP complement clause and assignment of a requirement theta-role to its subject position. It expresses the idea Given certain norms/desires/expectations, NP must p. The Raising configuration involves selection for a non-thematic vP complement clause and means, roughly, Given certain norms/desires/expectations, it must be the case that p. It is devoir3 that is attested in the Authier & Reed data in (25)– (26). Thus, sentences like *De par la loi, il doit faire attention où on marche ici. *‘It must watch one’s step when walking through here.’ are judged ungrammatical because expletive il ‘it’ cannot be assigned a theta-role of deontic obligation. In addition to offering an account of the Authier & Reed contrasts in terms compatible with the novel approach to Control developed in this chapter, this analysis of devoir and falloir is able to accommodate a range of seemingly contradictory facts that other, syntactically unambiguous, analyses cannot. For example, Dubois (1969: 119), Kayne (1969, 1975: 259), Huot (1974: 171–172), and others have suggested that epistemic devoir is a Raising verb, while deontic devoir is a Control one, an approach also found in the literature on English

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must by Ross (1969b), Perlmutter (1970: 115), and others. However, as noted, e.g., by Zubizarreta (1983: 213), facts involving expletives with deontic devoir, as in (29a–c) above, well as idioms, as in (46a–c), pose problems for this view. I.e., the how can this analysis accommodate an expletive in the thematic matrix subject position? Likewise, how can it account for the fact that the examples in (46a–c) favor a reading in which a thematic role of obligation is not assigned to the NP in subject position? Finally, why are the examples in (51a,b) acceptable at all since, in these cases, it is clear that no subject theta-role is assigned to the matrix subject position? On the other hand, Ruwet (1972: Chapter 2), Zubizarreta (1983: 214–215), and others have proposed that devoir is simply semantically ambiguous – syntactically, it is always a Raising verb, an approach that can also be found (in different terms) in the literature on English must, cf., e.g., Wurmbrand (1999). The apparent syntactic ambiguity, on Zubizarreta’s version of this approach, is due to the optional assignment of an adjunct theta-role of requirement to the animate subject of deontic devoir. This analysis is also not without problems. For example, one cannot explain why the sentences in (31c), (32b), and (33b) are all ungrammatical: If assignment of a requirement theta-role is optional, as must be assumed in order to generate (29a–c) and (46a–c), and, furthermore, if it is dependent on the animacy of the surface matrix subject, then an adjunct theta-role should not be assigned in (31c), (32b), and (33b) and these examples should all be grammatical. The same sort of problem arises in accounting for the expletive contrasts in (25b) and (26a): If we assume, as Zubizarreta does to account for examples like (29a–c), that deontic devoir does not assign a requirement theta-role in sentences containing matrix inanimate or expletive subjects, then the ungrammaticality of (25b) is again unexpected. In short, it appears that the complexity of the data justifies the analysis defended here, which assumes both syntactic and semantic ambiguity in the case of devoir.14 14 Of course, this is certainly not to say that everything has been said here that needs to be said about devoir. Obvious questions remain. For example, the analysis offered in the text has nothing to say about other well-known restrictions on epistemic devoir ‘must,’ such as, e.g., the fact noted in Sueur (1979) that an epistemic reading of this verb is not attested in interrogative (as well as other types of) sentences, a restriction associated as well with English must: (i) Doit-il venir? ‘Must he be coming?” (#Is it likely that he is coming?) It seems plausible to assume that such restrictions follow from other factors irrelevant for present purposes. For example, in relation to the non-existence of epistemic readings in interrogatives, it is instructive to note that the same restriction is at work with examples not involving devoir or must, such as (ii): (ii) #Is it probably the case that he is coming?

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In conclusion, the primary goal of this chapter was to make explicit the syntactic mechanisms needed to accommodate the full range of facts enumerated in the two preceding chapters, as well as some novel data introduced in this one. The discussion led us to conclude that (a) PRO does not move to Spec of the infinitival IP/TP to check a Case or an [EPP/D] feature. (b) there are examples in which PRO does not undergo Move at all and others in which it does undergo Move, but only if this is necessary for convergence. (c) Control verbs seemingly arbitrarily c-select a variety of complement types, ranging from CP/ForceP to small clauses. From this, we concluded, contra the original Chomsky & Lasnik approach, that PRO does not check an [EPP/D] feature in the embedded Spec of infinitival I/T and, furthermore, there is evidence indicating that it does not even check phi- or null Case features. This led to the postulation of a novel approach to PRO, according to which this lexeme is associated only with an [N] categorial feature and a [-expletive] semantic one. This analysis entailed a novel re-working of the features associated with other nouns, as well as the mechanics of feature-valuation. Notably, with respect to the former, non-pronominal nouns in English and French-type languages are necessarily assumed to also lack a Case feature. Having demonstrated how this new approach to PRO can accommodate the range of data introduced in this and previous chapters, let us turn next to two distinct issues, the first of which was raised in Chapter 4. Specifically, why does the class of verbs exemplified by those in (52) disallow Control in English, French, and quite possibly other languages, while those in (53) allow it?15

Given the parallel between (i) and (ii), a semantic restriction may well be at work. Specifically, epistemic readings arise from conclusions/inferences drawn on the basis of known facts; i.e., epistemic must presupposes the knowledge of the truth of such facts. Interrogative sentences, on the other hand, question the very existence of these facts, making the semantics of epistemic must and interrogatives incompatible. 15 As indicated in Chapter 4, I have identified 37 verbs of this type in English and verified the results with the equivalent verbs (where they exist) with native speakers of French (Marc Authier), Greek (Sabine Iatridou), Hebrew (Idan landau), and Serbian (Ljiljana Progovac) These verbs are: answer, ascertain, bet, charge (on the meaning ‘to assert as an accusation’), comment, confide, conjecture, contend (on the meaning ‘to maintain that’), deduce, disclose, emphasize, explain, gamble, gather (on the meaning ‘to surmise that’), guarantee (on the meaning ‘to swear to the fact that’), guess, hint (on the meaning ‘to indicate that’), hypothesize, indicate (on the meaning ‘to point to the fact that’), mention, mutter, preach (on the meaning ‘to advocate that’), pronounce (on the meaning ‘to announce that’), remark, reply, report, say (on the meaning ‘to mention’), show, specify, stipulate, submit (on the meaning ‘to argue that’), suppose (on the meaning ‘to conjecture that’), surmise, theorize, understand, wager (on the meaning ‘to speculate that’), and write (on the meaning ‘to indicate in writing’). An examination of the data provided in the papers on Control listed in the bibliography revealed that none of these verbs is listed as a Control verb in other languages either.

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a.

I disclosed/remarked/explained that I would retire in 2028.

b. *I disclosed/remarked/explained to retire in 2028. (53)

a. *I will manage/try/be unable/hasten that I retire in 2028. b. I will manage/try/be unable/hasten to retire in 2028. c. Je croyais [t’avoir PRO dit de ne pas toucher à mes affaires]. I believe to-you-to-have told of Neg not to-touch at my things ‘I believe that I told you not to touch my things.’

In Chapter 4, we saw that previous approaches to Control fail to offer an account of this restriction. Unfortunately, at this point, the present analysis does not appear to provide any explanation for it either. Specifically, PRO has been analyzed here as a nominal associated only with a categorial and a nonexpletive semantic feature. Given this, one might expect it to appear in some language/dialect in a clause of the type in (52b) since neither PRO nor the infinitival I/T are associated with any features that require valuation. In short, what would rule out a derivation for (52b) parallel to what is found in Control structures like (21) above? Secondly, given the analysis defended in this chapter, one may well be wondering just how the reference of PRO is established. That is, it has been proposed here that PRO entirely lacks Case and phi-features in the syntactic component, contra standard and many alternative approaches to Control. Yet, clearly, PRO ultimately does come to be associated with the phi-features of its antecedent in the semantic component. Just how does this come about? These two questions form the topics of Chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 7

On the reference of PRO Thus far, the focus of this work has principally been on the syntax of Control, although semantic influences on controller resolution did form an important part of the literature review in Section 3.2 and some appeal to semantics also proved necessary at the end of Chapter 6 in order to account for certain contrasts involving the French verbs devoir ‘must’ and falloir ‘to be necessary.’ This chapter looks more closely at the issue of antecedent resolution in Control clauses. Specifically, if one assumes the existence of PRO, as is done here for the reasons enumerated in Chapter 5, then the logical question arises as to just how its reference is determined. That is, it was argued in Chapter 6 that PRO enters and exits the syntactic component as a non-expletive nominal associated with neither Case nor phi-features. How then does it come to be understood to have the same phi-features as those of the matrix subject in sentences like (1), those identical to the matrix object in examples like (2), and, finally, to have arbitrary phi-features in sentences like (3)? (1)

a.

We have only just begun [to PRO understand these issues].

b.

He refused [to PRO even consider their offer].

c.

She neglected [to PRO tell me about it].

(2) a.

She directed the patient [to PRO stay in bed for three days].

b.

He always tells me [to PRO try harder].

c.

They encouraged him [to PRO stay in school].

(3) a.

[To PRO be, or not to PRO be], that is the question. William Shakespeare, Hamlet

b.

Amy told Tom [that [PRO undressing oneself in public] is strictly forbidden in this country].

c.

It always rains [while PRO crossing the Rockies].

Chapters 2 and 3 provided an overview of some of the extensive work that has already been done on this topic. We saw in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 that generative approaches to Control have assumed since Rosenbaum (1967) that syntax plays a key role in resolving the Control problem, with authors differing

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with respect to just how significant that role is. Namely, we noted that Rosenbaum (1967: 6) was the first to develop a syntactically centered approach to antecedent resolution in Obligatory Control contexts. He proposed that the controller is obligatorily the NP separated from the subject of a Control clause by the fewest number of branching nodes, a condition built into his Identity Erasure Transformation, later dubbed the “Minimal Distance Principle” or MDP in Postal (1968a, 1970: 468). Hornstein’s (1999) Movement Theory of (Obligatory) Control, discussed in Section 3.1, was shown to be a modern version of this type of syntax-based approach to antecedent resolution. Under his theory, the Minimal Link Condition (MLC) interacts with other syntactic constraints on movement to produce effects roughly parallel to the MDP. Under both analyses, the reader may recall, sentences of the type in (4) are said to accord with Universal Grammar, but those in (5)–(7) are deemed “exceptional,” i.e. learned, a view that may be supported by research results in L1 acquisition in Carol Chomsky (1969). (4) a.

This motivated Larry [to PRO look for a new job].

b.

I instructed them [to PRO exit in an orderly fashion].

c.

My mother reminded me [to PRO feed the cat].

(5) a. b.

(6) a. b.

(7) a. b.

I promised John [to PRO bring in the money by Friday]. I demand/ask/request of you [to PRO be allowed to come]. Rosenbaum (1967: 16–17, 68) Bill asked Tom [when to PRO fire the cannon]. I made an oath/vowed to Zeus [to PRO find the thief]. Postal (1970: 474) John agreed/contracted with Susan [to PRO take care of himself]. John is obligated to Susan [to PRO take care of himself]. Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 505)

Our discussion of Chapter 2 also made it clear that not all generativists adopt an exclusively syntax-based approach to the Control problem. For example, we observed that Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 439–444) proposed that the understood subject of a Control clause has its referential index determined at the syntax-semantics interface by “Rules of Control” that are both syntactic and

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semantic in nature. Specifically, the [+WH] COMP associated with indirect questions, such as the one in It was unclear what to do., is assumed in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) to be associated with a Rule of Control that assigns an arb index to the subject of a Control clause, an apparent syntactic effect. However, the semantics of verbs like told are explicitly asserted to determine the antecedent of what is today known as PRO in sentences like I told them to stay. Interestingly, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) assumed that semantics could “override” syntax in cases like I told Bill what to do., a type of indirect question analyzed by those authors as involving Obligatory Object Control.1 Chapter 2 also provided an overview of the revised version of Chomsky & Lasnik’s Rules of Control developed in Chomsky (1980: 33) (cf. Chomsky’s Rules of Control in (76)–(78) of Chapter 2). We saw that this system is explicitly limited to Control clauses serving as verbal complements. I.e., it makes no claims with respect to antecedent determination of PRO in adjuncts, in the subject position of a sentential subject clause, etc. As before, the arb index is hypothesized to be assigned when the embedded COMP is overt and the matrix verb has no appropriate thematically related NPs (i.e. “controllers”). If COMP is null or the matrix V does have a controller, then PRO is assigned the referential index of the closest one unless the verb is idiosyncratically marked [+SC]. The result is a more syntax-based account than that of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), as an MDP-style principle is now clearly being adopted, with strong semantic influences being replaced by an arbitrary [+Subject Control] lexical feature for “exceptional” verbs like promise. In Chapter 2, we saw that this approach was incorporated into Chomsky (1981a: 75), although explicit mention is made of various problems it faces and there is recognition of the fact that it should eventually be refined to take into account semantic and pragmatic influences on controller determination. This is the position that appears to be implicitly assumed in modern PRO approaches to Control, such as those of Martin (1992, 2001), Baltin (1995), Chomsky & Lasnik (1995: 116–120), Bošković (1996, 2007), Bowers (2002), and others, although the issue is never explicitly addressed. Section 3.2 made it clear that a very different view is adopted in nongenerative treatments of Control, such as the HPSG analysis put forth in Sag & Pollard (1991) and the model-theoretic and conceptual proposals developed in Bach (1979), Dowty (1985), and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), among others. Within this tradition, semantic factors are argued to be the primary forces at work in antecedent resolution. Specifically, certain heads are assumed to select 1 But see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for the suggestion that indirect questions are, in fact, unambiguously contexts of Arbitrary Control, a view that will be defended later in this chapter.

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for a syntactically “subjectless” VP complement, the understood (i.e. implicit) external argument of which is established by the meaning of the selecting head. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), for example, propose that John is the obligatory controller of the implicit subject of stay in Mary persuaded John to stay. because the meaning of persuade is such that it is the thematic object of that verb that forms an intent to act, not its thematic subject. In contrast, a verb like decide associates intent to act with the thematic subject and is, therefore, an Obligatory Subject Control verb. Having laid out some of the basic approaches to the Control problem that have been put forth in the past, what then is the position being taken in this book? In this author’s view, the research results overviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 make it clear that antecedent resolution in Control structures can neither be purely syntactic, nor uniquely semantic in nature. That is, a purely syntax-centered MDP/MLC-type approach to the Control problem was shown at the end of Section 3.2 to face significant problems that cast doubt on its tenability. For example, an analysis like that of Hornstein (1999) deems ungrammatical universally attested examples of Obligatory Subject Control of the type I promised John to bring in the money by Friday. Such an approach also fails to predict when an adjunct clause does not require Obligatory Surface Subject Control and when it does. In addition, it precludes the existence of “split antecedents” that are attested in sentences like John proposed to Mary to help each other., among other issues. Similarly, current implicit argument theories of Control, which deny any significant role for syntax in the area of antecedent resolution, were shown in Chapters 3 and 6 to fail to offer an account of important differences that exist between Control involving an implicit argument (as in Event Nominal constructions) and Control involving an explicit argument (PRO) in clauses headed by a verbal element. Such theories, for example, fail to capture Williams (1985)-type contrasts like You should not treat the leaves before desiccation. and *You should not treat the leaves before desiccating. Furthermore, a purely semantic approach to the Control problem cannot explain, among other things, why only the understood subject in a context of Arbitrary Control is subject to a [+human] restriction; why certain verbs, like ask, appear to “lose” their Meaning Postulate/ conceptual specification of Obligatory Control in indirect questions; and why certain adjuncts have a strong subject-as-controller restriction, whereas others do not. For these reasons, the view being adopted in this work is a moderate one, akin in spirit to that of Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Chomsky (1980, 1981a), but revised in light of subsequent work in the semantic literature of the type in Sag & Pollard (1991) and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003). Namely, the view to be defended here is that the reference of PRO is equally determined by syntactic

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and semantic factors. In this chapter, I seek to provide the basic outlines of such an approach, one that leaves many important issues unresolved, but which will hopefully serve as springboard for future research in this fascinating area of linguistic theory.

7.1 On the need to recognize syntactic influences on controller resolution As the discussion of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.1 made clear, generativists have frequently claimed that the notions of c-command and domain play a pivotal role in antecedent resolution in Control clauses. For example, it has been claimed, on the basis of well-known contrasts of the type in (8a,b), that an NP must c-command PRO in order to serve as its antecedent. (Boldface in the examples below indicates intended co-reference.) (8) a.

Matt expects [to PRO do well on the exam].

b. *Matt’s sister expects [to PRO do well on the exam]. Furthermore, a comparison of (8a) above with (9) below appears to indicate that the antecedent must also appear within a particular domain relative to PRO. Namely, the antecedent must appear in the sentence headed by the verb selecting for the Control clause; it cannot appear “two clauses up.” (9) *Matt thought that Emma expected [PRO to do well on the exam]. While the notions of c-command and domain appear to offer an appealing account of these facts, we noted above in Chapter 3.2 that research in Sag & Pollard (1991), Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), and others establishes that semantic considerations actually offer an equally plausible account of these particular data. Jackendoff & Culicover, for example, argue that the contrast in (8) is due to the fact that expect is a verb whose lexical semantics involves intent. Specifically, it is the thematic subject of expect that forms the intent to act (i.e. to do well on the exam), so only that argument can serve as controller. The same considerations account for the ungrammaticality of (9) on the indicated reading. If this is true, then the syntactic notions of c-command and domain are actually superfluous in accounting for the Control problem. Are there, then, any separate facts that more clearly support this view? The position to be defended in this section is that there are. Three will be briefly considered in this section, in general terms. Others will be introduced in the next section, once the analysis has been presented.

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On the reference of PRO

To bein, we noted in Chapters 2 and 3 with Williams (1985: 298) that verbal while-type adjuncts are unique in that they are the only type of adjunct that exhibits an inviolable subject-as-controller restriction in the type of example represented by (10)–(13): (10)

a.

The leaves should not be disturbed [while PRO desiccating].

b. *You should not disturb the leaves [while PRO desiccating]. Data due to Williams (1985: 298) (11)

a.

Every student/David was notified [before PRO taking the exam].

b. *I notified every student/David [before PRO taking the exam]. (12)

a.

Sarah talked to Veronica [while PRO doing her homework].

b. *Sarah talked to Veronica [while PRO doing her homework]. (13)

a.

John heard Mary [without/before/after PRO entering the room].

b. *John heard Mary [without/before/after PRO entering the room]. Data in (13) due to Hornstein (1999: 88) In Chapters 2 and 3, we noted that this fact cannot be attributed to some sort of general semantic restriction on a thematic object serving as the antecedent for the subject of these types of adjunct clauses since, if the subject of the adjunct is an overt pronoun, the result is grammatical, as made clear by (14a–d) below: (14)

a.

You should not disturb the leaves [while they are desiccating].

b. I notified every student/David [before they/he took the exam]. c.

Sarah talked to Veronica [while she was doing her homework].

d. John heard Mary [without her even entering the room]. While no semantic approach to controller determination in these types of adjuncts appears possible, a syntactic solution in terms of c-command clearly suggests itself. Namely, if verbal while-type clauses adjoin in a relatively “high” position, say, IP/TP, then a “lower” surface object NP will consistently fail to c-command PRO and, hence, also fail to serve as its antecedent. Before this type of syntactic approach to the problem can be adopted, however, a number of issues must be resolved. Most importantly, we require some

On the reference of PRO

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explanation for the lack of a surface subject-as-controller constraint in verbal while-adjuncts of the types in (15) and, especially, (16). (15)

a.

[Just before PRO arriving in town], my sense of impending doom grew even stronger.

b. [After PRO crossing the Rockies], it rained. (16)

a.

My sense of impending doom grew even stronger [just before PRO arriving in town].

b. It always rains [while PRO crossing the Rockies]. Data inspired by parallel facts in Williams (1992) An answer to this question will be provided below. For the moment, however, what is of interest is simply that the subject-as-controller restriction is inviolable in examples of the type in (10)–(13) above and this can only be for syntactic, not semantic, reasons. A second type of empirical fact that seems to point strongly in the same direction relates to examples of the type in (17), first noted in Gross (1968: 91) and later discussed by Rizzi (1978: 150) and others: (17)

Il me semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had already solved that problem.’

For present purposes, there are two important points to bear in mind in relation to such sentences. First, (17) is a context of Obligatory Control: The indirect object me ‘to me’ must function as PRO’s antecedent. This sentence cannot mean It seemed to me that someone had already solved this problem. Second, sembler ‘to seem’ only accepts Control complement clauses when its indirect object is syntactically projected, as a comparison of (17) above with (18) below makes clear. (18) *Il semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it seemed to-have solved that problem ‘That problem seems to have already been solved.’ Since the lexical semantics of sembler ‘to seem’ is identical in (17)–(18), it is unclear why such a contrast exists. However, the notion of c-command offers a plausible account of it. Namely, these facts would fall out from the standard

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On the reference of PRO

generative assumption that Obligatory Control PRO requires a c-commanding antecedent, one available in (17), but not in (18). Further evidence for this interpretation of the data is offered by the grammaticality contrast that exists between the French sentence above in (17) and English examples like (19a): (19)

a. *It seemed (to John i /me i ) [PRO i/arb to have solved the problem]. b. It seems (to John/me)[that he/I already solved that problem].

As observed in Rizzi (1978: 150), English seem never tolerates a Control complement clause. Since the meaning of sembler and seem is the same in both languages, there is once again no obvious semantic reason for the fact that (17) is grammatical, but (19a) is not. However, a syntactic solution does come to mind. Namely, the ungrammaticality of (19a) may be attributed to the fact that the NPs John and me do not c-command PRO because they appear in a “low” PP adjunct clause. The grammaticality of the French counterparts in (17) would then follow from the fact that pronouns are clitics in this language. I.e., the object clitic in (17) appears on the verb, in a “higher” position from which it c-commands PRO. In the same vein, it is interesting to note that native speakers of French also accept Control clauses with sembler ‘to seem’ when the object NP is nonpronominal, although they do judge such examples to be somewhat unnatural: (20)

?Il semble à Jean [PRO y être déjà allé]. it seems to Jean there to-be already gone ‘It seems to John that he’s been there before.’ Very slight modification of an example in Gross (1968: 91)

Why would this be the case, given what has just been said about the English equivalents in (19a)? A plausible syntactic answer is that French à is unlike its English counterpart to in that à is not a preposition, but rather a simple morphological realization of Dative Case, as has been argued for in Vergnaud (1974), Kayne (1975), and Zaring (1992), among others. If so, then à ‘to’ in (20) does not head an adjunct PP that breaks the c-command relation between Jean and PRO and, consequently, Jean can (and, for reasons to be made clear below, must) serve as PRO’s antecedent. As to why examples like (20) are judged “unnatural,” this plausibly follows from the fact that there is a general preference in French for clitic pronouns over their non-pronominal counterparts. In other words, the unnaturalness of (20)

On the reference of PRO

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does not relate to the process of antecedent determination in Control clauses since native speakers provide parallel judgments for sentences that do not involve Control, like those below in (21): (21) a.

Il lui semblait [qu’il avait oublié de fermer la fenêtre]. it him-DAT seemed that he had forgotten of to-close the window ‘It seemed to him that he had forgotten to close the window.’

b.

?Il semblait à Jean [qu’il avait oublié de fermer la fenêtre]. it seemed to John that he had forgotten of to-close the window ‘It seemed to John that he had forgotten to close the window.’

Having briefly considered two types of constructions that support the view, to be developed further in this chapter, that c-command is crucial in resolving the Control problem, let us now consider an area that supports recognition of some notion of domain. It has been observed in Evers (1975) and Koster (1987: 119–136) that Dutch has the interesting property of allowing passivization of Subject Control verbs like try – a type of sentence strictly disallowed in English, as a comparison of (22a) and (22b) makes clear. (22)

a. *It was tried [PRO to see Bill]. (Intended meaning: Someone tried to see Bill.) b. Er werd geprobeerd [(om) PRO Bill te bezoeken]. there was tried (for) Bill to visit ‘Someone tried to visit Bill.’ Data due to Koster (1987: 119)

As these authors also note, Dutch passives equivalent to (22a) are restricted in a very specific way: They are only licit when the complement clause takes the form of a “full” ForceP. In other words, passivization of the equivalent of a verb like try is only grammatical if the complement also allows an overt complementizer equivalent to for, as in (22b) above. If the complement takes the form of a “smaller” phrase – one that strictly disallows an overt C and requires Verb Raising into the matrix clause – then ungrammaticality results, as in (23): (23) *Er werd [PRO Bill (te bezoeken)] geprobeerd te bezoeken. there was Bill (to visit) tried to visit ‘Someone tried to visit Bill.’ Data due to Koster (1987: 120) As argued in Koster (1987), the contrast between (22b) and (23) offers support for the view that domains play a role in antecedent determination in Control

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On the reference of PRO

clauses. More specifically, an embedded ForceP clause like the one in (22b) blocks Obligatory Control of PRO by an NP in the matrix clause, licensing (for reasons to be developed below) a reading of Arbitrary Control. However, when a Control verb selects a complement clause “smaller than” ForceP, as in (23), then PRO must (again for reasons to be made clear) take as its antecedent, an NP in the matrix clause. Unfortunately, in the case of a passivized verb of the try-type, the only candidate is an expletive NP, which cannot be interpreted as co-referential with inherently [-expletive] PRO. As will be discussed later in this chapter, English indirect questions offer further support for this interpretation of the Dutch data. Namely, a verb like ask is also a configuration of Obligatory Control when there is no ForceP complement, as in I asked Bill to leave., but it becomes a context of Arbitrary Control when a full ForceP is selected, as in I just love this restaurant because the headwaiter always knows what to order (from him). In sum, then, it is for reasons like these that it is being assumed in this work that syntax does play a key role in resolving the Control problem. More specifically, I would like to suggest that the phi-features that come to be associated with PRO in the semantic component are due to the LF application of the Bare Output Condition (BOC) below in (24), a BOC that makes equal reference to syntactic and semantic factors. (24) Control Theory By default, PRO must take as its antecedent a c-commanding implicit or explicit argument within the superordinate clausal domain that immediately dominates the clause in which it appears, with lexical specifications ruling out potential antecedents and ForceP constituting a phase that “closes off” the search space. If there are no c-commanding potential antecedents or the search space is closed off by ForceP, PRO is assigned the index arb and its phi-feature specifications are logophorically determined. According to (24), in order for PRO to be interpretable to the semantic component, it must come to be associated at LF with a bundle of phi-features. There are assumed to be two distinct means of achieving this end, with the second being a type of “elsewhere” condition. Namely, by default, PRO must bear the phi-features of any c-commanding NP within the domain of the superordinate clause, provided that a ForceP phase does not “shut off” the search space. Although any c-commanding NP is syntactically licensed to serve as PRO’s antecedent under the default option, lexical semantic specifications can rule out certain readings. On the other hand, if the structural conditions for the default option are not met, then a distinct strategy is employed: PRO is assigned the index arb, subject to logophoric determination.

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In the next section, the functioning of this version of Control Theory will be illustrated with specific examples, beginning with the basic Obligatory Subject versus Object Control verb distinction.

7.2 On the respective roles of syntax and semantics in controller resolution The sentences below in (25a,b) exemplify the core Obligatory Subject versus Object Control verb distinction. With respect to these structures, the reader will recall that it is being assumed here, extending work in Rizzi (1997, 2001), that a consistent lack of overt complementizers, such as that in English, correlates with unique c-selection for a phase “smaller than” ForceP (formerly CP). In (25a,b), FinP has been selected first because certain contexts of Obligatory Control in French allow the overt lexeme de ‘of,’ assumed to head FinP and, second, because FinP differs from “smaller” XPs, like VP, in blocking clitic climbing, a desired result for French Control structures. (25)

a.

This motivated Larry [FinP to PRO look for a new job].

b. Mary promised John [FinP to PRO bring in the money by Friday]. At any rate, the BOC above in (24) syntactically requires PRO to select any one of the c-commanding NPs in the matrix clause as its antecedent. For example, in relation to (25a), this condition syntactically requires that either this or Larry serve as the antecedent of PRO. Let us next assume, following authors like Sag & Pollard (1991), Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), and others, that a verb like motivate is associated with a lexical semantic specification of the type in either (26a) or (26b) below. (26) Lexically specified controller relations of motivate a. Sag & Pollard (1991: 65–78) 3 2 SUBCAT < NP : ½1; NP : ½2; CP½inf  : ½3 2 RELATION 37 6 motivate 7 6 6 6 INFLUENCE 77 6 ½1 6 77 6 77 6 CONTENT6 INFLUENCED ½2 ½index ½6 6 77 6 6 77 6
 4 57 5 4 RELATION look . . . SOA  ARG ½3 LOOKER ½5 ½index ½6 b. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 538) X CS Yα [α ACT]

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On the reference of PRO

As a result of the lexical specifications in (26), a selection of this as the antecedent for PRO in (25a) above creates a semantic anomaly since motivate is a verb that entails that its thematic object be the individual who is either influenced to act (in Sag & Pollard’s terms) or is caused to do so (under Jackendoff & Culicover’s analysis). Thus, only one reading of (25a) will be both syntactically and semantically well formed – the one in which Larry serves as the controller of PRO. In relation to (25b), the BOC in (24) above again syntactically requires PRO to select any one of the two c-commanding NPs in the matrix clause as its antecedent, allowing either Mary or John to serve as the antecedent of PRO. However, since authors like Sag & Pollard (1991) and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003) have shown that a verb like promise is also associated with a lexical semantic specification of the type in either (27a) or (27b) below, then if John is selected as PRO’s antecedent, semantic anomaly will result. I.e., promise is a verb that entails that its thematic subject be the individual who is either committed to act (in Sag & Pollard’s terms) or is obligated to (in Jackendoff & Culicover’s). Thus, only the reading in which Mary serves as the controller of PRO in (25b) is both syntactically and semantically well formed. (27) Lexically specified controller relations of promise a. Sag & Pollard (1991: 65–78) 3 2 SUBCAT < NP : ½1; NP : ½2; CP½inf  : ½3 2 RELATION 37 6 promise 7 6 6 6 COMMITTOR ½1 ½index ½6 77 6 6 77 6 77 6 CONTENT6 6 COMMISSEE ½2 77 6 6 77 6
 4 57 5 4 RELATION bring . . . SOA  ARG ½3 BRINGER ½5 ½index ½6 b. Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 537) Xα OBLIGATED [α ACT] TO Y Having considered the functioning of the analysis with respect to the most basic Obligatory Subject vs. Object Control contexts, let us turn next to the very closely related class of examples below in (28), a type of Obligatory Control construction first observed in Perlmutter (1971). (For additional examples of this type, the reader is referred to the discussion of French falloir + infinitive and English predicates like be fun at the end of Chapter 6.) (28) As little Sally was getting on the train, her worried father said/shouted/ yelled/screamed/signaled (to her) [FinP to PRO watch out for herself/ *himself/*oneself during the trip]. Slight modification of an example in Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 508)

On the reference of PRO

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According to the BOC in (24), PRO, by default, must select a c-commanding explicit or implicit argument within a particular domain as its antecedent, subject to further semantic and syntactic mitigation. In other words, the BOC in (24) integrates Williams’ (1985: 303) hypothesis that syntactically unprojected (i.e. implicit) arguments play a role in Control Theory. Specifically, it is being assumed here that implicit arguments c-command any of the arguments c-commanded by the explicit head that s-selects them, a view formally expressed below in (29). (The reader is referred to Chapter 2.2.5 for a discussion of further data that led Williams (1985) to this conclusion.) (29) The c-command domain of implicit arguments An implicit argument c-commands X if the lexeme of which it is an implicit argument c-commands X. Williams (1985: 303) In short, since a verb like signal obligatorily s-selects for an object that is only optionally syntactically projected, regardless of whether that object is implicit or explicit, it will c-command PRO in contexts like (28). It will do so by virtue of the fact that the verb signal c-commands PRO there. Thus, in (28), the BOC in (24) selects both John and the implicit/explicit object of a verb like signal to syntactically serve as the antecedent of PRO. In terms of semantics, authors like Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 538) have argued that verbs like signal share with verbs like motivate the lexical semantic specification below in (30). This Conceptual Structure, the reader may recall from Chapter 3.2, makes the claim that signal is a verb that expresses a situation in which one individual X (the thematic subject in the case of a verb like signal) influences another individual Y (signal’s object) to act in a particular fashion. (30) X CS Yα [α ACT] Given (30), the c-commanding NP John in (28) is now semantically ruled out as a potential antecedent for PRO since that argument is the influencer, not the influencee. For this reason, only the implicit or explicit object NP in (28) can (and, by default, must) ultimately serve as the antecedent of PRO. Let us turn now to the related question of how the proposal in (24) accounts for Visser’s Generalization, exemplified by the well-known contrasts below in (31)–(32). Namely, how does this analysis accommodate the fact that, in Englishtype languages, only Obligatory Subject Control verbs resist passivization?

306 (31)

On the reference of PRO

a.

This motivated Larry [FinP to PRO look for a new job].

b. Larry was motivated [FinP to PRO look for a new job]. (32)

a.

Sue promised John [FinP to PRO bring the money].

b. *John was promised (by Sue) [FinP to PRO bring the money]. The example in (31a), which involves the Obligatory Object Control verb motivate in the active voice, has already been shown above to straightforwardly follow from an interaction of the BOC in (24) with the lexical semantics of motivate in (26). We note now that the grammaticality of the passivized form of this sentence in (31b) is also expected. Namely, the BOC in (24) syntactically requires either the explicit argument Larry or the implicit Agent of motivated to serve as controller for PRO; however, the lexical semantics of motivate rules out the second option. In the preceding paragraphs, we also analyzed the active voice variant of the Subject Control verb promise in (32a), so let us focus now on the ungrammatical passive variant of that sentence in (32b). We begin by noting that the lexical meaning of promise, given above in (27), rules out a reading in which the c-commanding NP John serves as the controller: It does so because John is not associated with the committer/obligation role. Why then doesn’t the c-commanding implicit subject of promise serve as the controller, especially since signal-type examples like the one in (28) above have made it clear that implicit arguments can function as controllers and the BOC in (24) says that, by default, if there is a syntactically available controller, then it must be selected? The answer to be advanced here is that this is exactly what does occur, but the result is semantically anomalous for a distinct, as yet poorly understood reason involving co-reference between a pronoun and the type of implicit argument associated with passivization. In view of this, consider first the fact, originally observed in Authier (1988: 24–25) in relation to “donkey anaphora” sentences of the type below in (33), that the type of existential implicit argument associated with the passive morpheme fails to license a bound reading of a pronominal. I.e., the overt NP meaning someone below in (33a) can be interpreted as co-referential with the overt pronoun meaning him, but the equivalent of him cannot be interpreted as co-referential with the implicit argument associated with the passive morpheme in (33b).

On the reference of PRO

(33)

307

a. Quand une femme est humiliée par quelqu’un, when a woman is humiliated by someone elle le gifle. she him-ACC slaps ‘When a woman is humiliated by someone, she slaps him.’ b. *Quand une femme est humiliée, elle le gifle. when a woman is humiliated she him-ACC slaps ‘When a woman is humiliated, she slaps him.’

It is important to note that the constraint exhibited above in (33) is not limited to contexts of donkey anaphora, as made clear by the parallel data constructed below in (34). Namely, in verbal complement clauses as well, we find that a pronoun cannot be interpreted as co-referential with the type of existential implicit argument found in passives, although, as with the French data above, they can (with varying degrees of success) be interpreted as coreferential with a non-c-commanding explicit argument in, e.g., a by-phrase. (34) a.

John promised Mary [that he would pay her by Friday].

b. *Mary was promised [that he would pay her by Friday]. c. ??Mary was promised by John [that he would pay her by Friday]. In short, the ungrammaticality of (32b) above, as well as its nominal counterpart below in (35b), is due to an interaction of the BOC in (24) with a separate constraint on pronominal co-reference in passive contexts: In both cases, Control Theory (i.e. the BOC in (24)) mandates a reading that is anomalous on separate grounds. (35)

a.

[Mary’s insincere promise [to PRO complete all future assignments on time]] was met with great skepticism.

b. *[The insincere promise [to PRO complete all future assignments on time]] was met with great skepticism. For completeness sake, the example below in (36) has been added as it establishes that, parallel to the facts above in (33a), (34c), and (35a), a non-ccommanding explicit argument may be interpreted as co-referential with PRO in a verbal complement clause to passive promise:

308 (36)

On the reference of PRO

Si seulement vous saviez combien de fois il m’a été if only you knew how-many of times it to-me has been promis par un chevalier de votre âge [de PRO me promised by a knight of your age of to-me ramener le graal]. to-bring-back the Holy-Grail ‘If only you knew how many times it has been promised to me by a knight of your age [to PRO bring back the Holy Grail].’

In light of this discussion, it is interesting to now reconsider the Dutch facts introduced earlier in (22b) and (23), repeated below in (37a,b): (37)

a. Er werd geprobeerd [(om) PRO Bill te bezoeken]. there was tried (for) Bill to visit ‘Someone tried to visit Bill.’ b. *Er werd [FinP PRO Bill (te bezoeken)] geprobeerd te bezoeken. there was Bill (to visit) tried to visit ‘Someone tried to visit Bill.’ Koster (1987: 119–120)

Considering first the ungrammatical example in (37b), the reader will observe that the embedded clause takes the form of an XP “smaller than” ForceP, assumed here to be FinP. As a consequence, PRO must take as its antecedent one of the NPs that c-commands it in the matrix clause. The implicit external argument associated with the passive verb is ruled out as a candidate by the same constraint already noted in relation to English examples like *John was promised (by Sue) to bring the money in by Friday. This leaves only the expletive NP, which does c-command PRO, but clashes with it in semantic features since PRO is inherently [-expletive]. The derivation is semantically deviant. The sentence in (37a), on the other hand, is fully grammatical because the complement clause clearly takes the form of ForceP, an XP that constitutes a phase that “shuts off” the search space for PRO’s antecedent. Given this, the non-default option of antecedent determination must be employed and PRO receives an arbitrary interpretation. Let us conclude our discussion of Control in complement clauses by considering two additional cases of Arbitrary Control attested there. The first involves examples of the type in (38), which contain embedded sentential subjects. (38) The police told me [ForceP that [FinP PRO undressing oneself in public] is strictly forbidden in this country].

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309

The arbitrary reading associated with PRO in examples of this type is expected under the analysis in (24) for two reasons. First, in (38), the default option fails to assign an index to PRO because there are no c-commanding arguments within the superordinate clausal domain immediately dominating PRO (the embedded IP/TP). Thus, the non-default assignment of an arb index is employed for this reason. Second, the presence of that in (38) indicates that the complement clause takes the form of ForceP, a phase that “closes off” the search space for PRO’s antecedent. For this reason as well, an arb index is assigned. As indicated in (24), the phi-features that come to be associated with Arbitrary PRO are then pragmatically determined. More specifically, following Williams (1992), PRO functions in such contexts as a logophoric pronoun and, following Sells (1987), it, like any logophoric pronoun, necessarily refers to the person whose thoughts and feelings the sentence is about. Thus, we have an immediate explanation for why Arbitrary PRO is subject to a [+human] restriction, originally noted in Chomsky (1981a: 324), that is unattested with respect Obligatory Control PRO, cf. the contrast repeated in part below, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. (39) a.

[To PRO catch a fish] would be nice. Lasnik (1992: 243) (Equivalent to For someone to catch a fish would be nice.; cannot mean For something to catch a fish would be nice.)

b. The ice served [to PRO chill the beer].

Kajita (1967: 103)

The logophoric nature of Arbitrary PRO also accounts for the well-known fact that, in certain contexts, Arbitrary PRO is associated with a “truly arbitrary” referent, corresponding to the pronoun one, as in (38) above. However, in other contexts, a reading is favored in which PRO is associated with the phi-features of a more specific referent, such as himself or themselves, as in the following: (40) Cindy told Tim [ForceP that [FinP PRO undressing herself/himself/ themselves/myself in public] was a very bad idea]. A second well-known instance of Arbitrary Control in verbal complement clauses involves the case of indirect questions, exemplified by such examples as (41a–b). That indirect questions truly are contexts of Arbitrary Control, contra, e.g., Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Landau (2000: 39), is established by the grammaticality of (41a,b). Namely, if PRO were, in fact, obligatorily controlled by the matrix subject, then a Condition B violation would result on a reading in which the pronoun him is interpreted as co-referential with the matrix subject, but this is not the case.

310 (41)

On the reference of PRO

a.

I just love this restaurant. The headwaiter always knows [ForceP what to PRO order (from him)].

b. You know, as a parent, sometimes you just have to take charge. For example, your baby doesn’t know [ForceP what/when to PRO feed him]. You do! As made clear by the structures in (41), it is being assumed here, following work dating back to Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), that indirect questions take the form of an embedded ForceP (formerly, S0 /CP), as this immediately provides the usual landing site for wh-elements. Further evidence in favor of this assumption, the reader may recall from earlier discussions, is provided by the respective order of overt complementizers and wh-elements in Belfast English, illustrated below in (42): (42) They didn’t know [ForceP which model that [we had discussed (which model)]]. Henry (1995: 107) The BOC in (24) specifies that the presence of ForceP “shuts off” the search space for PRO’s referent, providing an immediate account for the assignment of the arb index in these constructions. A few final comments of clarification may be in order with respect to indirect questions. Namely, at various points in earlier chapters (see especially Chapter 3), it was pointed out that researchers dating back to Postal (1968a, 1970: 474) have often assumed that verbs like ask can undergo “shifts in controller” when selecting an indirect question, as indicated by the readings Postal associates with the examples in (43a,b) below: (43)

a.

Bill asked Tom [FinP to PRO fire the cannon].

b. Bill asked Tom [ForceP when to PRO fire the cannon]. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, some doubt was cast on this view since the meaning of ask is not the same as in the two cases. In (43a), ask clearly means “influence someone to act” whereas, in (43b), it literally means “to inquire.”2 2 As noted in Chapter 3, many speakers of English (e.g., Chomsky (1981a: 76), Farkas (1988: 32), and the present author), have a third reading for ask, roughly equivalent to request permission to act, as in (i) below: (i) If you want to go on the fieldtrip, you’ll need to ask your teacher (for permission) [FinP to PRO leave early tomorrow].

On the reference of PRO

311

Under the analysis being developed here, ask in (43a) c-selects for a FinP complement clause and, by the BOC in (24), one of the c-commanding arguments in the matrix clause must serve as PRO’s controller. Since the lexical semantics of ask on its “influence someone to act” reading entails that the matrix object NP develop an intention to act, the syntactically available reading in which the matrix subject NP serves as PRO’s antecedent is ruled out. In contrast, ask in (43b) c-selects for a ForceP complement, a structure that precludes Obligatory Control. Any influence/Control reading of ask is now barred, licensing only a literal inquire reading of the verb. The antecedent of PRO in (43b) is, therefore, open to pragmatic determination. The contexts that come to mind in relation to (43b) favor a reading in which Bill is the antecedent. I.e., Bill is probably asking Tom when the cannon should be fired because he himself intends to do it. In other examples, however, antecedents other than the matrix subject can be selected, including truly arbitrary ones, as in (44) below. (44) The elderly gentleman asked his equally infirm wife [ForceP when (it’s best) to PRO trim trees], before or after the new leaves have come out. In short, indirect questions, as suggested informally in Chapter 3, actually do not involve shifts of controller at all. The verb ask is syntactically and semantically ambiguous. As further support for the suggestion that examples like (43a,b) involve distinct syntactic structures – one licensing only Arbitrary PRO and the other only Obligatory Control PRO – consider the fact that even verbs that normally disallow Control come to allow it if the complement clause takes the form of an indirect question:3 (45)

a. *I explained [to PRO trim the trees]. b. I explained [how to PRO trim the trees].

(46) a. *In this DVD, I will reveal [to PRO make a million dollars]. b. In this DVD, I will reveal [how to PRO make a million dollars].

As indicated by the boldface, this is a context of Obligatory Subject Control, a fact that is also expected under the analysis being developed here. Namely, selection for FinP in (i) and the BOC in (24) entail that one of the arguments in the matrix clause serves as the antecedent of PRO. The lexical semantics of ask on its request permission reading precludes selection of the object NP since the thematic subject is the one who is oriented to act. 3 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of why verbs like explain, disclose, specify, etc. normally disallow Control.

312

On the reference of PRO

Having considered how the BOC in (24) interacts with lexical semantic factors to determine the referent of PRO in complement clauses, let us turn next to how it might serve to address the Control problem in various types of adjunct clauses, beginning with the case of while-type adjuncts. The reader will recall that it has been known since Williams (1985) that verbal while-type adjuncts exhibit a surface subject-as-controller restriction in pairs of examples like the following, a restriction that is mysteriously “lifted” in pairs like (48) and (49): (47)

a.

John heard Mary [without/before/after PRO entering the room].

b. *John heard Mary [without/before/after PRO entering the room]. Data due to Hornstein (1999: 88). (48) a.

[Just before PRO arriving in town], my sense of impending doom grew even stronger.

b. [After PRO crossing the Rockies], it rained. (49) a.

My sense of impending doom grew even stronger [just before PRO arriving in town].

b. It always rains [while PRO crossing the Rockies]. Data in (48) and (49) inspired by parallel facts in Williams (1992). In order to account for these facts, I will first adopt a Rosenbaum (1967: 16– 17, 68)/Hornstein (1999: 76, ft. 10, 88)-style approach to adjuncts by assuming that while-type clauses may adjoin to two different types of phrasal categories, those specified in (50): (50) Verbal while-type adjuncts may either adjoin to the right of IP/TP or higher, i.e., to the left or the right of ForceP. As (50) makes clear, it is being assumed here that verbal while-type clauses always adjoin to a relatively “high” position. One immediate desirable consequence of this, given the BOC in (24), is that “lower” surface object NPs will fail to c-command and, hence, consistently fail to serve as obligatory controllers for PRO in these types of adjuncts. Thus, we now have an account for ungrammatical sentences of the type in (47b). It is also claimed in (50) that verbal while-type clauses may either adjoin to the right of IP/TP – in which case an NP in surface subject position will ccommand PRO in the adjunct (and hence obligatorily serve as its controller) –

On the reference of PRO

313

or they may adjoin even higher, to the right or the left of the matrix ForceP. In this latter situation, the BOC in (24) specifies that the arb option must be employed to determine PRO’s antecedent, as there are no c-commanding arguments available in the main clause. This provides an account of the arbitrary readings in (48) and (49). As evidence for the claim that the “pre-posed” adjuncts in (48) actually do initially merge in their surface position, we note the contrasts below in (51a,b), which show that pre-posed while-adjuncts contrast with their non-preposed counterparts in not being in the scope of metalinguistic negation: (51)

a.

Riley didn’t break her arm [while PRO skating]; she broke it [while PRO hiking].

b. #[While PRO skating], Riley didn’t break her arm; she broke it [while PRO hiking]. Given that the arbitrary readings in (49) are being accommodated here via ForceP adjunction to the right, let us now address the important issue of why there is a contrast in grammaticality between examples of the type in (52a) and those in (52b): (52)

a.

My sense of impending doom grew even stronger [just before PROarb arriving in town].

b. *John heard Mary [without/before/after PROarb entering the room]. Specifically, one might logically expect both of these examples to be grammatical on a derivation in which a strategy of ForceP adjunction to the right is employed. Why then is only (52a) grammatical? The answer to be developed here, extending ideas in Williams (1992: 301– 302), is that there are pragmatic constraints on logophoric PRO that we have not yet taken into consideration. Namely, a logophoric derivation of PRO is contingent on the non-existence of a convergent, pragmatically felicitous, nonlogophoric (i.e. Obligatory Control) one. Further, a derivation that is syntactically and semantically convergent, but pragmatically infelicitous will be assumed to produce intermediate judgments. In other words, the existence of a fully acceptable non-logophoric derivation for (52b) “blocks” its logophoric one. Since an Obligatory Control derivation of (52a) is semantically anomalous (a sense of doom cannot arrive in town), the logophoric derivation is allowed.

314

On the reference of PRO

As further evidence for these claims, consider next the contrasts in (53), also observed in Williams (1992): (53)

a.

[On PROarb first arriving in town], it was clear that the sheriff was asleep.

b. ??It was clear that the sheriff was asleep [on PROarb first arriving in town]. In (53a), a logophoric determination of PRO’s antecedent is fully grammatical. It is because the while-type clause initially merges in its surface position, adjoined to ForceP, and, there are, as a consequence, no NPs that c-command PRO. In short, no “competing” Obligatory Control derivation of (53a) is possible, allowing for the logophoric one. In contrast, in (53b), there is a competing syntactically and semantically convergent, Obligatory Control derivation, but it is pragmatically odd. I.e., if the while-type clause adjoins to IP/TP, then the sheriff will c-command and serve as the obligatory antecedent of PRO. However, on this derivation, one understands that the sheriff was asleep while he was in motion – a situation difficult to imagine. The presence of this competing convergent, but pragmatically odd, Obligatory Control derivation renders the logophoric one possible, but dispreferred. It should be avoided in favor of the unambiguously, syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically perfect logophoric derivation in (53a). The grammaticality of the examples below in (54)–(55) also follows from these considerations. Namely, the logophoric derivations are possible (and employed) because there are no fully convergent non-logophoric derivations. There are not because inanimate NPs, like those in the surface subject position in these examples, cannot do things like “give up” or “leave the scene of a crime” and pronouns (including PRO) cannot be interpreted as co-referential with the type of existential implicit argument found in passives. (54) Several different options were explored [before finally PROarb giving up]. (55)

Plusieurs solutions ont été envisagées [avant several solutions have been envisaged before d’abandonner, faute de fonds]. of to-abandon lack of funds ‘Several different options were explored before finally giving up, due to a lack of funds.’

On the reference of PRO

315

Having considered in some detail the case of while-type adjuncts, let us (re) turn now to seem/sembler. As noted earlier in this chapter, French is a language in which sembler ‘to seem’ licenses Obligatory Control, but only when a Dativemarked object appears in the matrix clause, as in (56a–b). This option is not available in languages like English, cf. (56c). (56)

a. Il *(me i ) semblait [FinP PRO i/*arb avoir résolu ce problème]. it to-me seemed to-have solved that problem ‘It seemed to me that I had already solved that problem.’ b. ?Il semble à Jean i [FinP PRO i/*arb y être déjà allé]. it seems to Jean there to-be already gone ‘It seems to John that he’s been there before.’ Very slight modification of an example in Gross (1968: 91) c. *It seemed to John i /me i [FinP PRO i/arb to have solved the problem].

To demonstrate how these facts follow from the version of Control Theory in (24), recall first that PRO, by default, must take as its antecedent any one of the arguments that c-commands it within the relevant domain. Under the assumption that à is simply a marker of Dative Case, as argued in Vergnaud (1974), Kayne (1975), and Zaring (1992), it follows that il ‘it,’ me ‘to me’ and Jean in (56a,b) are all syntactically selected as potential controllers for PRO. However, given its inherently [-expletive] nature, expletive il ‘it’ is semantically precluded. The contrasting English facts in (56c) follow as well since it is being assumed here that to in English does head a PP adjunct that breaks the c-command relation between John/me. This leaves PRO with only expletive it as its controller, resulting in semantic anomaly. Consider finally the grammaticality contrast in (57a,b): (57)

a. *Il semblait [PRO avoir résolu ce problème]. it seemed to-have solved that problem ‘That problem seems to have already been solved.’ b. It is fun [to PRO play baseball].

As noted above in relation to the example in (28), sentences of the type in (57b) are grammatical because PRO (obligatorily) takes as its antecedent the implicit or explicit object of be fun. I.e., predicates like be fun/signal etc. obligatorily s-select for an internal argument. Therefore, any Control clause c-commanded by these predicates will be subject to Obligatory Control by that argument.

316

On the reference of PRO

The example in (57a) makes it clear that such is not the case for sembler ‘to seem.’ This difference, however, follows from the assumed adjunct status of the à NP. That is, it has been claimed here that the verb sembler does not s-select the à NP; it is an adjunct semantically similar to à mon point de vue ‘in my opinion.’ Given this, there is no implicit argument associated with sembler that is available to serve as the controller of PRO in (57a), leaving only expletive il ‘it.’ Since it is not immediately obvious that the à NP/to NP of sembler/seem is an adjunct, not an argument, let us consider some additional evidence in favor of this assumption. First, the to NP attested with seem can be shown to behave unlike the for NP associated with predicates like be fun with respect to whextraction, as made clear by the contrast in (58a,b): (58) a.

For whom is it fun to play baseball?

b. *To who(m) did it seem that someone had already solved the problem? Second, movement of an argument NP over sembler/seem’s à NP/to NP results in the same kind of oddness as does movement of that argument over an adjunct like hier ‘yesterday,’ as made clear in (59)–(60): (59)

a. Il semblait à Jean [que Marie avait du talent]. it seemed to John that Marie had of-the talent ‘It seemed to John that Mary had talent.’ b. ?Marie semblait à Jean [(Marie) avoir du talent]. Marie seemed to John (Marie) to-have of-the talent ?‘Marie seemed to John to have talent.’

(60)

a.

Il semblait hier [que Jean avait le dessus.] it seemed yesterday that John had the above ‘It seemed yesterday like John had the upper hand.’

b. ?Jean semblait hier [(Jean) avoir le dessus.] John seemed yesterday (John) to-have the above ?‘John seemed yesterday to have the upper hand.’ Having considered the case of adjuncts associated with sembler/seem, let us turn next to for-adjuncts, exemplified by (61)–(63) below. We observed in earlier chapters, especially Chapter 3.1, that these adjuncts exhibit Obligatory Control in contexts of the type in (61) and (62), with the global meaning of the sentence

On the reference of PRO

317

determining whether the matrix subject or the object is favored as controller, but they are associated with Arbitrary Control in configurations of the type in (63). (61)

a.

The prisoner petitioned the judge [for having PRO received an unfair sentence].

b. The prisoner petitioned the judge [for having PRO treated him unfairly]. (62)

a.

I thanked them [for having PRO done that].

b. The students thanked their professor [for having PRO learned so much about Control Theory in class this year]. (63)

a.

A citation was issued [for PROarb leaving the scene of the crime].

b. Atonement has now been made [for having PROarb committed a venial sin]. c.

Un procès verbal sera rédigé [pour avoir PROarb fuit a trial verbal will-be written for to-have fled les lieux de l’accident]. the scene of the accident ‘A citation will be issued for having fled the scene of the accident.’

Under the present analysis, these facts follow if one assumes that purposive clauses adjoin in the fashion indicated in (64) and one continues to assume that the existence of a convergent Obligatory Control derivation for a given sentence will “block” an Arbitrary one. (64) Purposive (i.e. for-) clauses may either adjoin “low” to VP or “high” (to the left or right) of ForceP. Given the assumptions in (64), all of the examples in (61)–(63) are syntactically ambiguous, associated with either a “low” VP-adjunction derivation (associated with Obligatory Control) or a “high” ForceP adjunction to the right derivation (correlating with Arbitrary Control). Since the existence of a convergent Obligatory Control derivation will “block” an Arbitrary one, let us consider that option first, beginning with the examples in (61) and (62). Under the “low” option, both the subject of the main clause in Spec of IP/TP and its object in Spec of AgrOP/TrP c-command PRO in the for-adjunct. Thus, the

318

On the reference of PRO

BOC in (24), in such cases, syntactically selects both of these arguments as potential controllers. The meaning of for (which corresponds roughly to because) then interacts with the global meaning of the sentence to favor one of those arguments as the antecedent. In (61a), for example, the adjunct provides the reason why the event denoted by the main clause is taking place. I.e., it provides the reason why a prisoner is petitioning a judge. Is it more likely that a prisoner would file such a petition because he himself received an unfair sentence or because the judge did? Clearly, the context favors the former. Therefore, we have subject control in (61a). In (61b), however, we have a situation in which the prisoner is petitioning the judge because one of them treated the other unfairly. Who is more likely to have mistreated the other, in the prisoner’s view? Most likely, that would now be the judge, resulting in object control. We have now established that Obligatory derivations for (61) and (62) are fully convergent. This explains why there are no arbitrary readings for these examples: They are blocked. In contrast, the sentences in (63) fail to converge on the “low” adjunction/ Obligatory Control derivation; therefore, the “high” option is employed, resulting in logophoric determination of PRO’s antecedent. The Obligatory Control derivations fail to converge because (a) the inanimate surface subjects cannot be understood to have such properties as leaving the scene of a crime/accident or committing a venial sin and (b) the type of existential implicit argument associated with passivization consistently fails to license a bound reading of any type of pronoun, including PRO. Turning now to Rationale Clauses, we noted in earlier chapters that these adjuncts involve overt lexemes, such as in order to and so as, as well as nonovert counterparts to those lexemes. Furthermore, such adjuncts were shown to initially appear to be identical to while-type adjuncts in being associated with a strict subject-as-controller restriction, as demonstrated by the following examples: (65) a.

Helen examined Bernie [(in order/so as) to PRO vindicate herself/ *himself/*oneself/*themselves]. Data from Culicover & Jackendoff (2001: 503)

b. I sent John out [(in order to/so as) PRO have myself/*himself a peaceful evening]. As was shown above to also be true of while-adjuncts, the subject-ascontroller restriction cannot be attributed to some sort of general semantic constraint on a thematic object serving as the antecedent for the subject of a

On the reference of PRO

319

Rationale Clause since, if the subject of the adjunct is an overt pronoun, the result is a grammatical output, as in (66a,b) below: (66) a.

Helen examined Bernie [in order for him to vindicate himself ].

b. I sent John out [in order for him have a peaceful evening]. That Rationale and while-adjuncts are not parallel, however, has been established by Jones (1991: 47), who observes that Rationale Clauses are actually associated with a thematic (not a surface) subject-as-controller constraint, as made clear by the data below in (67), which contrast with the while‑facts in (68): (67) a. *Bernie was examined [in order/so as to PRO vindicate himself ]. b. *John was sent out [in order to PRO have a peaceful evening]. (68) a.

The leaves should not be disturbed [while PRO desiccating].

b. Every student/David was notified [before PRO taking the exam]. Data in (68a) due to Williams (1985: 298) In short, antecedent resolution in Rationale Clause adjuncts appears to be determined in large part by lexical semantics, i.e. the meaning of the heads involved, in a fashion akin to what happens in verbal complement clauses of the promise type. That is, in order (to), so as, etc. are like promise in imposing a thematic subject restriction on Control clauses they head. While this restriction with respect to promise is due to the thematic subject’s taking on an obligation or committing to act, the restriction associated with in order to etc. is due to the fact that these lexemes create a causal link between the event denoted by the main clause and the one denoted by the adjunct. Specifically, in order (to) etc. provide the reason why the main clause event took place: It was so that the event denoted by the adjunct would as well. Importantly, only Agents (thematic subjects) can deliberately cause one event in order to trigger another. Given this, the Rationale Clause facts provided above can be treated by assuming that they are associated with the same adjunction options as are while-clauses, as indicated below in (69), but are, in addition, lexically specified for thematic subject Control. Finally, the pragmatic constraints on logophoric readings discussed earlier in relation to the while- and for-data will be assumed to be operative in these contexts as well.

320

On the reference of PRO

(69) Rationale Clause (i.e. in order (to)/so as) adjuncts adjoin to the right of IP/ TP or higher, to left or the right of ForceP. Let us briefly illustrate with a few examples. Considering first the facts in (65), we begin by noting that these sentences are structurally ambiguous: Given the assumption in (69), the adjunct may theoretically adjoin to the right of ForceP (a configuration associated with logophoric/Arbitrary PRO) or to the right of IP/TP (a configuration of Obligatory Control). If the latter is entirely convergent, the former is “blocked.” So let us consider the Obligatory Control derivation. The BOC in (24) syntactically selects as a potential controller for PRO only NPs in the surface subject position since this is the only position that c-commands the adjunct, given (69). Thus, Helen is selected as controller in the case of (65a) and I in the case of (65b). As both selections accord with the further thematic subject-as-controller restriction associated with in order (to) adjuncts, the result is syntactically and semantically well-formed. Since there is a fully convergent Obligatory Control derivation, a logophoric (Arbitrary) derivation is blocked. Turning to the examples in (67), these are ungrammatical on the indicated readings for three reasons. First, selection of the surface subjects (thematic objects) as controllers is ruled out by the thematic subject-as-controller lexical specification associated with in order (to). Second, selection of the implicit Agents of the passivized verbs as controllers is ruled out, first, by the constraint pronominal coreference associated with the passive morpheme, and, secondly, by the fact that the matrix verbs do not even c-command PRO in the IP/TP adjunct clause. In short, these examples are all ungrammatical on the Obligatory Control readings indicated. However, as one would expect, such examples actually become acceptable on arbitrary readings, as made clear by the (a) variants of the sentences below. And, as one would also expect, arbitrary readings are equally attested on the “pre-posed” (b) variants of these examples: (70) a.

Bernie’s testimony was examined [in order/so as to PROarb vindicate my clients].

b. [In order/So as to PROarb vindicate my clients], Bernie’s testimony was examined. (71)

a.

The children were put to bed [in order to PROarb have ourselves a little peace and quiet].

b. [In order to PROarb have ourselves a little peace and quiet], the children were put to bed.

On the reference of PRO

321

To clarify, we have just established that there are no convergent Obligatory Control derivations associated with examples of the type in (67), which are structurally parallel to the (a) variants of (70) and (71). Because of this, the logophoric option becomes available. I.e., the in order (to)-adjunct may adjoin to the right or to the left of ForceP. As no NPs c-command PRO in this position, its antecedent is logophorically determined. One final comment is in order in relation to Rationale Clauses, this one concerning ungrammatical examples of the type in (72): (72)

a.

*Mary was arrested [to PRO indict Bill].

Williams (1985: 309)

b. *The ship was sunk [to become a hero].

Lasnik (1988: 12)

c.

*The court was petitioned [to receive a fairer sentence].

d. *Thirty Hail Marys were recited [to be forgiven]. One might expect these examples to be acceptable on an Arbitrary reading, in a fashion parallel to those above in (70)–(71). I.e., Obligatory Control derivations are non-convergent since the thematic subject-as-controller lexical specification precludes the surface subjects from serving as antecedents for PRO and the constraint associated with passivization bars the implicit Agent of the matrix verb from doing so as well; therefore, PRO should be open to logophoric interpretation. The view being adopted here is that the ill-formedness of these data relates to the meaning of in order (to): Namely, the types of predicates involved in the adjunct clause preclude the type of deliberate causality associated with in order (to). In other words, Mary’s arrest cannot plausibly serve to bring about Bill’s indictment; someone cannot deliberately become a hero by sinking a ship, etc. The fact that such examples frequently become acceptable with the addition of a modal, as in (73) below, is in no way problematic for this interpretation of the data in (72) since, as suggested in Williams (1985: 321–313), it may be attributed to the presence of an implicit argument lexically associated with modal verbs. I.e., this implicit argument serves as the obligatory controller of PRO, parallel to what was suggested in Chapter 6 with respect to French falloir ‘to be necessary.’ (73)

a.

The court should be petitioned [(in order) to receive a fairer sentence].

b. Thirty Hail Marys must be recited [(in order) to be forgiven]. Inspired by parallel data observed in Chomsky (1982: 46)

322

On the reference of PRO

Let us conclude this survey of examples illustrating the functioning of the BOC in (24) with the case of talk about, exemplified by (74): (74) John talked to Sarah [about PRO taking better care of himself/herself/ themselves/oneself ]. Due to Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 523) As observed in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), PRO in (74) may be understood to refer to the matrix subject, the object, the two jointly, or an arbitrary individual. Under the analysis put forth here, these facts would follow if we assume that about-clauses are adjuncts that uniquely employ a “high” adjunction strategy, namely, adjunction to ForceP. If this is so, then, by (24), only a logophoric determination of PRO’s antecedent is available and the discourse considerations associated with logophoric pronouns will determine which antecedent is favored.

7.3 Summary In this chapter, I have argued that generative theory should approach the Control problem in terms of the lexical specifications long advocated by semantic and alternative syntactic theorists. In other words, future work on antecedent determination in Control clauses within this framework should recognize that lexical semantic specifications do play a key role in determining PRO’s antecedent at LF. Likewise, it has been argued throughout this work that any approach to the Control that fails to recognize the equally important role played by the syntactic notions of c-command and domain will likely fail to cover a significant range of empirical facts. More specifically, I have argued here that PRO is syntactically Case and phifeatureless. In order to be interpretable to the semantic component, it is subject to a Bare Output Condition that specifies that, by default, it must take on the phi-features of any implicit or explicit NP that c-commands it within the same phase and within the immediately dominating superordinate clausal domain, with a further proviso made to the effect that lexical semantic specifications may “rule out” syntactically licensed controllers. If the syntactic relations specified by the default condition are not met (i.e., if there are no c-commanding NPs within the relevant domain or phase), then an arbitrary index must be assigned to PRO, i.e., it is interpreted logophorically, which explains why it becomes limited to [+human] referents. This theory was shown to cover a wide range of well-known and previously unnoticed facts, both within verbal complement clauses and across various types of adjuncts.

On the reference of PRO

323

I would like to conclude by emphasizing that the goal of this chapter has not been to develop a comprehensive theory of antecedent resolution in Control contexts, clearly a book length topic in and of itself. Instead, this chapter was simply intended to demonstrate that an analysis of Control clauses that recognizes the existence of PRO, such as the one developed in Chapter 6, is capable of addressing the Control problem. That is, the fact that PRO has been analyzed in Chapter 6 as being an essentially bare non-expletive noun, otherwise unassociated with Case or, especially, phi-features, in no way renders mysterious the fact that it is understood to be associated with person, number, and gender features. Namely, it has been argued to acquire such features at the syntaxsemantics interface via application of the BOC in (24). There are, of course, many important issues that I have not addressed here, although not for lack of interest. For example, my analysis has the standard syntactic feature of recognizing just two types of Control – Obligatory Control and Arbitrary Control. Yet, authors like Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 521–523) have observed that there appear to be two distinct types of Arbitrary Control, which they dub “Free Control” and “Nearly Free Control.” That is, while the PRO in the surface subject position of a sentential subject clause allows an unrestricted range of potential controllers, as made clear by the sentences in (75), talk about (and other verbs of communication and thought) preclude control by the speaker and hearer, as well as long distance control, as made clear by the data in (76): (75)

a.

Cindy told Tim [ForceP that [FinP PRO undressing herself/himself/ themselves/oneself/myself/yourself in public] was a very bad idea].

b. Cindy knows that Tim told Bill [ForceP that [FinP PRO undressing herself/himself/themselves/oneself/myself/yourself in public] was a very bad idea]. (76)

a.

John talked to Sarah [about PRO taking better care of himself/herself/ themselves/oneself/*myself/*yourself ].

b. Cindy knows that John talked to Bill [about taking better care of *herself/himself/themselves/oneself/*myself/*yourself ]. Due to Jackendoff & Culicover (2003: 521–523). It is my hope that such facts point not to a fundamental flaw in my theory, but rather to the need to further explore the pragmatic and semantic factors that conspire to favor or preclude a particular antecedent for logophoric pronouns.

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On the reference of PRO

I have also not explored here the question of just why certain verbs lexically entail that PRO take on the phi-features of just one c-commanding NP, as in (77), whereas others allow so-called “split antecedents,” as in (78): (77) John told Mary [FinP to PRO help herself/*each other]. (78) John proposed to Mary [FinP to PRO help herself/each other]. Due to Koster & May (1982: 138) These contrasts, I believe, can be made to follow from a refined version of the types of lexical specifications developed in Sag & Pollard (1991), Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), and others. I have likewise left untouched (among other things) the issue of Partial Control, first observed in Lawler (1972), and explored at length in Landau (2000: Ch. 2). These authors have observed that certain Obligatory Control verbs allow the referent of PRO to be determined only partially by a c-commanding argument, as in (79), whereas others require that the c-commanding argument exhaustively determine PRO’s referent, as in (80): (79) Cindy wanted [PRO to meet at 6:00]. (80) *Cindy managed [PRO to meet at 6:00]. It is my view that Jackendoff & Culicover’s (2003: 548–551) semantic approach to this phenomenon largely resolves this issue. According to Jackendoff & Culicover, Partial Control examples like (79) involve “coercion,” which is a conventionalized process, triggered by semantic anomaly, that, in the case of control verbs like want, “introduces” a group argument that includes the matrix subject NP into the argument structure of the matrix verb. In other words, because a semantically singular NP like Cindy cannot literally meet at 6:00 – a “new meaning” for want is constructed in which what the thematic subject wants in (79) is for a group of individuals that includes herself to meet at six. In short, (79) involves Obligatory Control by the implicit group argument of want. Having examined the issue of antecedent resolution in Control clauses, we will turn in the next chapter to a distinct area in which semantic influences are clearly at work in Control configurations. These are verbal complement clauses in which Control is strictly disallowed.

Chapter 8

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO* In this chapter, we turn to a second area in which the semantic component of the grammar appears to exert a strong influence on Control clauses, one involving the fact, noted above in Chapter 4, that native speakers of English report that the (a) variants of the following sentences cannot be alternatively expressed via a simple Control structure, as the ungrammatical (b) counterparts make clear.1 That this restriction holds for the verbs listed in (6) as well may be verified by simply substituting each of the verbs in (6) into the frames in (1a,b). (1)

a. She disclosed [that she would retire in 2028]. b. *She disclosed [to retire in 2028].

(2)

a. She remarked [that she would retire in 2028]. b. *She remarked [to retire in 2028].

(3)

a. She explained [that she would retire in 2028]. b. *She explained [to retire in 2028].

(4) a. She answered [that she would retire in 2028]. b. *She answered [to retire in 2028]. (5)

a. She mentioned [that she will retire in 2028]. b. *She mentioned [to retire in 2028].

* This chapter is based on earlier ideas developed in Reed (2012), revised in light of the syntactic analysis of Control structures developed in Chapter 6. For equivalent empirical facts in French, see Reed (to appear). For comments and suggestions on the content of this chapter, I am grateful to Marc Authier, Lena Baunaz, Melvin Gonzales-Rivera, Genoveva Puskas, and the audience at LSRL 41 (held May 5–7, 2011 at the University of Ottawa). 1 For reasons that will be made clear by the end of this chapter (cf. the discussion of the examples in (60) in the text), the focus in this section is on Control (or rather the lack of it) in simple infinitival constructions; i.e., instances in which a matrix verb selects for a simple (uninflected) infinitival complement clause, as in (i), rather than an inflected infinitive of the type in (ii) or (iii). (i) John told/persuaded/promised Mary to stay at home. (ii) I happened to be waiting for the bus when he walked by. (iii) I’m so happy to have left school.

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(6) ascertain, bet, comment, confide, conjecture, deduce, emphasize, gamble, guess, hypothesize, mutter, reply, report, show, specify, stipulate, surmise, theorize, and understand The above restriction on Control complementation can, in fact, be argued to apply to an even larger class of verbs, minimally thirty-seven in all, if the verbs in (7)–(12) below are added to the list. (7) a.

He charged [that he was clearly the best man for the job].

b. *He charged [to be the best man for the job]. (8) a.

He guaranteed [that he would retire in 2015].

b. *He guaranteed [to retire in 2015]. (9) a.

He indicated [that he would retire in 2028].

b. *He indicated [to retire in 2028]. (10)

a.

I suppose [that I will retire in 2028].

b. *I suppose [to retire in 2028]. (11)

a.

He wrote [that he would retire in 2028].

b. *He wrote [to retire in 2028]. (12)

contend, gather, hint, preach, pronounce, say, submit, and wager

The case of these verbs is made less obvious, however, by certain obvious lexical ambiguities: Specifically, they are associated with polysemes or homonyms that do select for simple Control complement clauses, but, for reasons that will be made clear at the end of the next section, only on their alternative reading(s).2 Consider, for example, the case of the verb charge, which clearly disallows simple Control complementation in (7) above, but allows it in (13a,b) below: 2 A number of the verbs in (1)–(12) also possess an ECM or Raising entry that could be mistaken for a Control configuration. A few illustrative examples are given below: (i) a. We suspect [this disease to have killed over 25,00 people]. b. Whole grains are indicated [(whole grains) to (whole grains) have a positive effect on the control of high cholesterol]. c. I guarantee [him to be the best man for the job].

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(13)

a.

327

They will charge (a fee) [to write up the brochure].

b. The Dean charged the committee [to oversee these activities]. This difference in complementation correlates with a difference in meaning: Control complementation is disallowed when charge means to assert as an accusation, but is allowed when it means either to ask for payment (13a) or to impose a task upon as in (13b). One finds similar types of ambiguities in the case of the other verbs in (7)– (12). For example, a verb like guarantee disallows Control on the meaning to swear to the fact that in (8) above, but allows it on the meaning to promise, as in (14) below. Likewise, the verb indicate disallows Control on the reading to point to the fact that in (9) above, but allows it on the meaning to instruct someone to do something in (15) below. Parallel ambiguities obtain for the verbs suppose in (10) versus (16); write in (11) and (17); and similarly for the other verbs listed above in (12), which have the distinct meanings indicated below in (18). (14) He guaranteed [to teach them French in time for their stay abroad]. (15)

He indicated to me [to stop talking].

(16) Any attorney supposing [to teach law] should be aware of this. (17)

He wrote [to ask for your permission].

(18)

a.

contend: disallows Control on the meaning to allege/to maintain that something is true; allows Control on the meaning to vie/compete

b. gather disallows Control on the meaning to surmise/deduce that something is true; allows it on the meaning to congregate/assemble c.

hint disallows Control on the meaning to indicate/let it be known that; allows Control on the reading to threaten to

d. preach disallows Control on the meaning to advocate doing something; allows Control on the reading to urge someone to e.

pronounce disallows Control on the meaning to announce/declare; allows it on the meaning to articulate/vocalize

f.

say disallows Control on the meaning to mention; allows Control in its passive form, meaning is claimed to (e.g., He is said to be trustworthy.)

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g.

submit disallows Control on the meaning to argue/advance/assert; allows Control on the reading to accede/agree/yield to

h. wager disallows Control on the meaning to speculate/contend; allows Control on the reading to pledge to As was noted in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, the above-mentioned restrictions on Control complementation in English may well obtain cross-linguistically. Two considerations provide support for this hypothesis. First, native speakers of French, Greek, Hebrew, and Serbian that I consulted reported identical contrasts in each of these languages for those verbs that exist with the same meaning(s) as their English counterparts.3,4 Secondly, an examination of numerous works on Control theory that included, in addition to the references already cited above, Andrews (1971, 1976, 1990), Iatridou (1993), Varlokosta (1993), Baltin (1995), Franks (1995, 1998), Cecchetto & Oniga (2004), Melnik (2007), and Madigan (2008), among others, revealed no examples of simple Control complementation in any language with the class of verbs enumerated above, be it an infinitival Control language (such as English or French), a language that exhibits Control only into finite complement clauses (as in, e.g., the languages of the Balkans), or a language that makes use of both options (as is the case for Hebrew).5

3 I wish to thank Marc Authier for providing me with his judgments on French; Sabine Iatridou for the equivalent data in Greek; Idan Landau for the Hebrew facts; and, finally, Ljiljana Progovac for her judgments on Serbian. 4 Not surprisingly, certain English verbs lack close equivalents in the other languages. For example, my informants report that Greek and Serbian both lack a true counterpart to the verbs wager ‘to speculate/contend’ and gather ‘to surmise/deduce that something is true.’ My French informant reports similar gaps in French for verbs like remark, comment, conjecture, and guess. In other cases, a verb has a wider (or narrower) semantic field than its English counterpart and differs (in ways predicted by the theory to be advanced later in this chapter) in its complementation options. Specifically, the Greek equivalent of show not only has the English meaning to demonstrate that something is true, which disallows Control, but also a meaning along the lines of to appear to become, which allows it; Hebrew apparently lacks the swear to the fact that meaning of its equivalent of guarantee, but does posses the Control-selecting promise meaning. Crucially for present purposes, in all cases, where meaning is equivalent, parallel restrictions on Control complementation obtain. 5 As mentioned, e.g., in Chapters 4 and 6, languages like Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian have (with the exception of a few idioms) lost infinitival verb forms. The embedded verb in a Control complement is tensed (in the subjunctive), exhibiting full person and number inflection. Its understood subject (PRO in standard generative terms) nonetheless exhibits the interpretative properties commonly associated with Control, e.g., it must be null; it must be co-referential with a c-commanding antecedent; it only permits a sloppy reading under ellipsis; and it supports a de se but not a de re interpretation. As pointed out in

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In short, there is a substantial class of verbs in English, French, Greek, Hebrew, and Serbian that disallow simple Control complements and there is no reason to suppose that the same is not true of semantically equivalent verbs in other languages. Why this should be so initially appears to be mysterious under current approaches to Control, including the one put forth in this work. More specifically, in Chapter 4, it was shown that the prohibition on Control in contexts like (1b) does not immediately follow from previous syntactic approaches to the phenomenon, nor, it was noted at the end of Chapter 6, does it follow from the novel proposal developed there. More specifically, the reader may recall from Chapter 4 that advocates of current null Case approaches to Control, such as Martin (1992, 2001), Bošković (1996, 2007), and Radford (2004), among others, correlate Control complementation with the semantic tense properties of the embedded I/T. Specifically, sentences like those in (19) below are argued to license PRO only because the embedded I/T semantically encodes a tense that is distinct from that of the matrix verb, cf. the past tense of the matrix verb versus the understood non-past tense of the embedded clause. In other words, only a semantically [+tense] to checks/values for null Case, the Case assumed by these theories to be uniquely associated with PRO. (19) I promised/tried/wanted [PRO to bring some wine to tonight’s party]. ECM sentences like *He believes to be intelligent., on the other hand, are claimed to disallow Control because the nonfinite I/T of the embedded clause selected by this type of verb fails to encode a tense distinct from that of the matrix (cf. the simultaneous tense relationships that must obtain between the matrix and embedded clauses in He believes himself to be intelligent.). In other words, ECM to is semantically [-tense] and so cannot value for/check off null Case, failing to license PRO. As was indicated in Chapter 4, this line of reasoning raises the logical question of just why verbs like disclose, remark, etc. consistently fail to select a semantically [+tense], morphologically nonfinite I: The tense of the embedded and matrix clauses are clearly semantically distinct in sentences like I disclosed/remarked/explained/indicated that I intend to bring Landau (2004) and Melnik (2007), Modern Hebrew is a language that exhibits both finite and infinitival Control, although finite Control is restricted to the third person, future tense of certain verbs. I.e., certain Control verbs in Modern Hebrew (e.g. nisa ‘try’) allow only infinitival Control complements; others (e.g. hitshir ‘declare’) accept only finite Control (limited to the third person, future); and still others (e.g. hivtiax ‘promise’) accept both complement types (with finite option being, again, restricted to third person, future).

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some wine to tonight’s party., so why can’t that distinctness ever be morphologically realized as a nonfinite [+tense] to, generating a Control structure like (1b)? Hornstein’s (1999) Movement approach to “Control” was shown in Chapter 4 to also offer no immediate, non-stipulative account of the restriction in (1b). As noted there, Hornstein (1999: ft. 21, 94) reanalyzes Obligatory Control as A-Movement with multiple thematic feature checking. This type of movement is hypothesized to be possible with Control verbs like try because these verbs arbitrarily lexically specify for optional Accusative Case feature “suppression.” That is, Case suppression is what allows the surface subject NP to raise from the embedded to the matrix subject position to check off the matrix verb’s Nominative Case since, were Accusative Case not suppressed, a Case feature would remain unchecked at LF in violation of the Principle of Full Interpretation. This line of reasoning is exactly what explains why “Control” is disallowed in ECM examples like *He believes to be intelligent. and so, presumably, any sentence involving one of the verbs in (6). I.e., these verbs would be assumed to idiosyncratically disallow suppression of their Accusative Case feature, which means that either the Nominative Case feature of the matrix I/T or the Accusative Case of AgrO/Tr would remain unchecked in such configurations if the surface subject initially merges in the embedded clause and undergoes movement into the matrix. Such a view leaves unanswered the question of why the facts exemplified by (1a,b) are, by all appearances, not subject to cross-dialectal or cross-linguistic variation. I.e., if idiosyncratic lexical specifications were indeed at work in accounting for this aspect of Control complementation, then one might legitimately expect to see it realized in some language or dialect with some of the verbs identified in Chapter 4. As the reader may verify by returning to that chapter, similar questions arise with respect to alternative approaches to Control, such as that of Landau (2004). And, finally, as was noted at the end of Chapter 6, the same question remains unanswered by the present analysis of Control since PRO has been analyzed here as simply being a non-expletive noun associated in the syntax with no Case or phi-features, making it normally compatible with any I/T that lacks phi-features. So again, why can’t the verbs in (6) ever select a simple clausal complement with such an I/T? In this chapter, the constraint illustrated in (1b) will be argued to follow from purely semantic considerations. Building and extending upon ideas in Vendler (1967), Bach (1981), Link (1983), ter Meulen (1984), Krifka (1987, 1989), Asher (1993, 2000), and others, it will be suggested that what distinguishes the verbs listed above from ones that select simple Control, ECM, and small clause complements is that verbs like disclose semantically select for complements that denote what will be referred to here as a Possible Fact, whereas simple Control/

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

331

ECM/small clause verbs select Eventuality, Proposition, or Actual Fact-denoting complements. Possible Facts, we will see, have a very specific and unique semantic property – the lexical semantics of the matrix verb is such that the truth value of its complement is indeterminate. That is, when one simply discloses, remarks, or explains that X, one is in no way committed to truth of X in any world at any time, as demonstrated by the grammaticality of sentences like At yesterday’s faculty meeting, he disclosed/remarked/explained that he doesn’t want a retirement party, but we all know that he really does. On the other hand, the meaning of the matrix verbs in sentences like Y causes X, Y believes that X, or Y regrets that X, the truth of the clausal complement is asserted or presupposed, as evidenced by the ungrammaticality of sentences like !Mary made John mow the lawn, but he never mowed it., !Mary believes that John mowed the lawn, but she doesn’t really think he did it., and !John regrets that he didn’t have a retirement party, but he had one. The truth indeterminacy unique to Possible Facts will be argued to be what precludes them from appearing in simple infinitival contexts. Specifically, work by Karttunen (1971) and Stowell (1982), overviewed in Chapter 2, has made it clear that simple Control, ECM, and small clause contexts all involve tense anchoring of the complement clause via the lexical semantics of the matrix verb – a possibility disallowed by Possible Fact-selecting verbs. For this reason, Possible Facts must independently establish their own index of evaluation by inflecting of the embedded I/T. In the case of full verbal inflection, this has, as a concomitant syntactic effect, a need to have the phi-features of the embedded I/T valued/checked, and, depending on the mechanics of one’s syntactic theory, possibly also have its Nominative Case feature checked, thereby barring PRO under all versions of the null Case approach to Control, NP Movement accounts of the phenomenon, bare VP approaches, as well as under the alternative PRO analysis defended in Chapter 6. The idea that inflected I/Ts that directly anchor to speech time are intrinsically phi-complete and hence fail to license PRO will also be argued here to have a further interesting consequence. Specifically, it raises the possibility of there being in some language(s) morphologically inflected I/Ts that are indirectly (i.e. lexically) anchored to speech time, hence phi-incomplete, and, therefore, licensors of PRO under the novel analysis developed in Chapter 6. This possibility will be argued to be instantiated by the embedded I/Ts of finite Control languages like Greek discussed in that chapter. In terms of organization, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, Section 8.1 makes it clear just what is meant in this work by the terms Actual Fact, Possible Fact, Eventuality, and Proposition. In that same section, we will also establish that the types of clausal complements selected by non-Control verbs do indeed

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fall into the denotational class known as Possible Facts. With this background in place, Section 8.2 then explains why complement clauses that denote Possible Facts must be tensed, the latter fact explaining why PRO is precluded from appearing in such contexts.

8.1 What are Facts, Eventualities, and Propositions? To begin then, how are the terms Eventuality, Fact, and Proposition being used in this book? The definitions being adopted, which are inspired by work in Vendler (1967: Chapters 5 & 6) and Asher (1993: Chapter 1; 2000), are summarized for convenience in (20) below; each will be discussed in turn in the paragraphs immediately following.6 (20) Four Semantically Distinct Types of Clauses a. Eventuality-denoting clauses: Eventuality-denoting clauses express concrete happenings asserted to be true in the real world. In other words, Eventualities are worldimmanent, contingent metaphysical objects. Examples: [ John mowed the lawn]. Mary made/let [ John mow the lawn]. Mary forced/helped John [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn]. b. Proposition-denoting clauses: Proposition-denoting clauses refer to states of affairs whose truth is asserted in world(s) consistent with the matrix subject’s beliefs, desires, fears, knowledge, etc. In other words, these are noncontingent metaphysical objects that entirely lack world-immanence. Examples: John wanted/asked/was anxious [(PRO/ec) to watch TV]. Mary hopes/is certain/is afraid [that he already mowed the lawn]. Mary believes [him to be insane].

6 Asher (1993, 2000) follows authors like Fine (1980) and Peterson (1997) in arguing for the existence of three metaphysically distinct entities – Eventualities, Facts, and Propositions. In this respect, he differs from authors like Vendler and Davidson, who recognize just two – Eventualities and Facts (Propositions being analyzed as a type of Fact).

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(20) c.

333

Realized/Actual Fact-denoting clauses: Actual Fact-denoting clauses refer to abstract metaphysical entities. Specifically, they make atemporal statements about Eventualities whose truth is either presupposed or asserted in the actual world. In other words, these are contingent metaphysical objects that have a relative lack of world-immanence. Examples: John forgot [that we had a retirement party for her]. It’s a fact/true [that she had a retirement party]. Mary was glad [(PRO/ec) to see her parents]. Mary remembered [(PRO/ec) to bring the wine]. John showed [the solution to be trivial].

d. Possible Fact-denoting complement clauses: Possible Fact-denoting clauses are also abstract metaphysical entities. That is, they also make atemporal statements about Eventualities. However, the truth of those Eventualities is not asserted or presupposed. It is only suggested/reported, etc. to be true in the real world. In short, these are also contingent metaphysical objects that have a relative lack of world-immanence. Examples: John remarked/hinted [that he doesn’t want a retirement party]. The government announced [that it is working to address the problem]. As indicated above in (20a), a standard definition of Eventuality-denoting clauses is adopted here: Following both Vendler (1967) and Asher (1993, 2000), these are clauses that denote concrete happenings whose truth is asserted by the speaker in the actual world, as the truth of the accomplishment denoted by John mow the lawn. is in the sentence Mary made John mow the lawn. and as the truth of the activity denoted by run is in the sentence John is running. This makes these world-immanent, contingent metaphysical objects. (For other familiar types of Eventualities, such as achievements and states, see, e.g., Dowty (1979).) As the three examples of Eventuality-denoting clauses in (20a) make clear, Eventualities can be syntactically realized as tensed clauses, simple small clauses, and simple Control structures. Turning next to Propositional-denoting clauses: As indicated in (20b), a fairly standard definition is being adopted here as well. Specifically, it is being assumed that the truth of a complement clause selected by a Propositional attitude verb like want or believe is not asserted by the speaker to be true in the

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actual world, but rather in at least one world consistent with the matrix subject’s beliefs, desires, and so on. For this reason, Proposition-denoting clauses are said to refer to non-contingent entities – their truth is not contingent on the real world. In addition, the type of semantic object they refer to is not concrete – it exists in the world of ideas, desires, and beliefs, and so is said to lack world immanence. With respect to syntactic realization, the examples in (20b) show that Propositional-denoting clauses, like Eventuality-denoting ones, can take diverse syntactic forms, including tensed clauses, simple ECM, and simple Control structures. Turning finally to Facts, it is here that this work differs from what may be the standard. Facts are defined in the two distinct fashions indicated in (20c) and (20d). Specifically, I follow authors like Vendler (1967: Chapters 5 & 6) and Asher (1993: Chapter 1; 2000) and depart from authors like Kiparksy & Kiparsky (1970) in recognizing not only Facts whose truth is presupposed, but also Facts whose truth is asserted, and even Facts whose truth is indeterminate. The first type, which I refer to as Realized or Actual Facts, is exemplified by verbs like forget and be true. When one utters either John forgot that we had a retirement party for her. or It’s true that she had a retirement party., the speaker is committed to the truth of the complement clause: In the first case, it is presupposed to be true, and in the second, it is asserted to be. In contrast, in the case of verbs like remark and announce – in other words, in the case of all of the verbs listed in (1)–(12) – the truth of the clausal complement is not asserted or presupposed – it is only suggested or reported to be true in the actual world. In other words, these complement clauses refer to states of affairs that we may have some reason to believe to be true, but are not yet certain whether or not they actually are. This key difference between Possible Facts, on the one hand, and Eventualities, Propositions, and Actual Facts on the other, is established by the contrasts given below in (21). !Mary made [ John mow the lawn], but he never mowed it. is contradictory, as are the Propositional and Actual Fact-denoting examples in (21b) and (21c). However, John remarked yesterday [that he doesn’t want a retirement party], but we all know he really does. is acceptable. The actual truth of the Possible Fact denoted by the complement clause in (21c) is irrelevant: The sentence is true if John made that remark. It doesn’t matter if he was telling the truth or not. (21)

Evidence that the Truth of Possible Fact-Denoting Clauses is not Asserted or Presupposed (it is only suggested, reported, indicated, etc. to be) a. Eventualities !Mary made [ John mow the lawn], but he never mowed it.

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(21)

335

b. Propositions !Mary believes [that John already mowed the lawn], but she really doesn’t think he did. c.

Actual Facts !John regrets [that he didn’t have a retirement party], but he had one. !It’s true [that John didn’t have a retirement party], but he did.

d. Possible Facts John remarked yesterday [that he doesn’t want a retirement party], but we all know that he really does. Another key respect in which Possible and Actual Facts differ is, of course, in the types of complement clauses they allow. As was already noted earlier in relation to examples like (1)–(4), Possible Facts disallow simple Control (as well as simple ECM and small clause structures), accepting only tensed clausal complements. The data in (20c) shows that this is not true of Actual Facts, which accept such diverse complement types as tensed CPs, simple Control structures, and simple ECM structures. However, as indicated by the definitions in (20c,d), both types of Facts do share common metaphysical properties: They denote abstract entities that make atemporal statements about Eventualities in the actual world. As further proof for the claim that the verbs in (1)–(12) uniquely s-select for (Possible) Facts, I would now like to show that their clausal complements pattern like Facts and unlike Propositions and Eventualities with respect to the nine definitional characteristics summarized below for convenience in (22), characteristics that are due to Vendler (1967: Chapters 5 & 6) and Asher (1993: Chapter 1, 2000), the later drawing also from work in Bach (1981), Link (1983), Krifka (1987, 1989), and ter Meulen (1984), among others. As before, each characteristic in the summary will be discussed in the text immediately following. (22)

Nine Definitional Characteristics of Eventualities, Propositions, and Facts a. Only world-immanent semantic entities (Eventualities) can have concrete properties like taking place at specific times, occurring in specific locations, and having other non-spatiotemporal characteristics, such as being painful or taking place slowly. b. Only world-immanent semantic entities (Eventualities) can be observed directly.

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c.

Only contingent semantic entities (Eventualities & Facts) have causal efficacy.

d. Only world-immanent, contingent semantic entities (Eventualities) preserve truth value upon substitution of equivalent proper names and definite descriptions; contingent entities that are relatively lacking in world immanence (Facts) only allow substitution of proper names, not definite descriptions; those that are both non-contingent and entirely lacking in world immanence (Propositions) fail to preserve truth under substitution. e.

Only Facts consistently fail to sum up to form a new, singular entity.

f.

Only Eventualities are not consistently subject to closure under negation.

g.

Only Eventualities fail to be subject to closure under disjunction.

h. It is not possible to quantify over distinct semantic types. i.

Anaphoric links cannot be established across distinct semantic types.

As indicated above in (22a), only semantic objects that refer to concrete happenings in the world – namely Eventualities – can themselves have concrete properties, like taking place at specific times, in specific places, taking place slowly, or being painful for the person who performs them. The contrasts in (23) and (24) below show that, as predicted, this is true of clauses introduced earlier in (20a) as being Eventuality-denoting, but not of the Propositional or Possible Fact denoting ones in (20b) and (20d). Only Eventuality-Denoting Clauses have Concrete Properties (23) a. They forced/helped Mary [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn], an event (of lawn-mowing) that took place yesterday/at my house. b. They let/made [Mary mow the lawn], which was painful for her. (24)

a.

#Marie believed/was afraid [that John had already mowed the lawn], a belief/fear that took place at noon/at my house/that was painful for him.

b. #Bill hinted/answered [that Mary had already mowed the lawn], a claim that took place at noon/at my house/was painful for her.

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As indicated in (22b), only concrete entities – Eventualities – can be directly observed, as made clear by the contrast between (25) and (26):

(25)

Only Eventuality-Denoting Clauses can be Directly Observed a. They forced/helped Mary [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn], which I personally observed her doing. b. They let/made [Mary mow the lawn], which I personally observed her doing.

(26)

a.

#Marie believed/was afraid [that John had already mowed the lawn], a belief/fear that I personally observed.

b. #Bill hinted/answered [that Mary had already mowed the lawn], a claim that I personally observed. As indicated in (22c), only entities whose truth is contingent on the actual world – namely, Eventualities and Facts – can cause or bring about other events in the real world, as demonstrated by the contrast between (27) and (28):

(27)

Only Eventuality and Fact-Denoting Clauses Cause other Events a. They forced/helped Mary [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn], which made me very happy. b. They let/made [Mary mow the lawn], which made me very happy. c.

Bill hinted/answered [that Mary had already mowed the lawn], a claim that, if true, will make me very happy.

(28) #Marie believed/was certain [that John had already mowed the lawn], a belief/certainty that made me happy. As indicated in (22d), each of the three types of semantic objects differ in their identity criteria: substitution of equivalent proper names consistently preserves truth in both Eventuality-denoting clauses like those in (29a) and (29c) and Fact-denoting ones, like (30a) and (30c), but such is not true of Propositiondenoting ones, as evidenced by (31a) and (31c). Identity Criteria Differ Across all Three Semantic Types: Proper Names (29) a. Anne forced/helped Mary [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn]. b. Mary is Cherri.

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c.

Bill forced/helped Cherri [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn].

d. Valid conclusion given (29a–c): Bill and Anne did the same thing. I.e., an event of forcing/helping Mary to mow the lawn is the same thing as an event of forcing/ helping Cherri to do so. (30) a.

Anne hinted/answered [that Mary had already mowed the lawn].

b. Mary is Cherri. c.

Bill hinted/answered [that Cherri had already mowed the lawn].

d. Valid conclusion given (30a–c): Therefore, Anne and Bill hinted/answered the same thing. I.e., hinting/answering that it is a fact that Mary mowed the lawn is the same as hinting/answering that it is a fact that Cherri did. (31)

a.

Anne believed/was certain [that Mary had already mowed the lawn].

b. Mary is Cherri. c.

Bill believed/was certain [that Cherri had already mowed the lawn].

d. Invalid conclusion given (31a–c): Therefore, Anne and Bill held the same belief/were certain of the same thing. I.e., believing/being certain that Mary mowed the lawn is exactly the same as believing/being certain that Cherri did it. On the other hand, substitution of equivalent definite descriptions consistently preserves truth only in Eventuality-denoting clauses like those in (32a) and (32c) – truth is not consistently preserved in Fact-denoting ones, like (33a) and (33c), or Proposition-denoting ones, like (34a) and (34c). Identity Criteria Differ Across all 3 Semantic Types: Definite Descriptions (32) a. Anne forced/helped that woman [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn]. b. That woman happens to be my mother. c.

Bill forced/helped my mother [(PRO/ec) to mow the lawn].

d. Valid conclusion: Bill and Anne did the same thing. I.e., an event of forcing/helping that woman to mow the lawn is the same thing as an event of forcing/ helping my mother to do so.

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(33)

a.

339

Anne hinted/answered [that the first person to walk through the door this morning would have to mow the lawn].

b. My mother was the first person to walk through the door this morning. c.

Bill hinted/answered [that my mother would have to mow the lawn].

d. Invalid conclusion: Anne and Bill hinted/answered the same thing. I.e., hinting/answering that it is a fact that that the first person who walks through the door this morning will have to mow the lawn is always the same thing as hinting/answering that it was a fact that my mother will have to mow the lawn. (34) a.

Anne believed/was certain [that that woman had already mowed the lawn].

b. That woman happens to be my mother. c.

Bill believed/was certain [that my mother had already mowed the lawn].

d. Invalid conclusion: Therefore, Anne and Bill held the same belief/were certain of the same thing. I.e., believing/being certain that that woman mowed the lawn is always the same as believing/being certain that my mother did. As indicated in (22e) above, only Facts consistently fail to sum up to form a new, singular entity. To see this clearly, consider first the series of three separate Eventualities in (35a), which can be added together and referred to as a newlyformed collective Event with a singular pronoun, such as it. (35b) shows that the same is true of Propositions. Finally, (36) shows such is not the case for Possible Facts, which fail to sum up and hence disallow reference by a singular pronoun or definite NP.

(35)

Only Facts are not Closed under a Principle of Mass-Type Summation a. Anne forced Mary to mow the lawn; I helped John take out the trash; and Dave made Stevie do the laundry. I’m so glad it/the work/those tasks/#they all finally got done! b. Anne believes [that Bill is unreliable]; her mother fears [that he’s a liar]; and her sister is certain [that he’s a slob]. If it/#they all prove(s) to be true, then we shouldn’t have anything more to do with him.

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(36) Anne hinted [that Bill is unreliable]; her mother bet [that he’s a liar]; and her sister remarked [that he’s quite a slob]. If #it/ #this allegation/these allegations prove(s) to be true, I think that we should have nothing more to do with him. The contrast between (37b) and (38a,b) demonstrates that Possible Facts behave unlike Eventualities and like Propositions in being consistently subject to closure under negation; that is, the denotational character of both Possible Facts and Propositions is maintained under negation, but the negation of certain Events fails to denote an Event. Only Facts and Propositions are Consistently Subject to Closure under Negation (37) a. They forced Mary [to mow the lawn], an event that took place at my house. b. #The bad weather led Mary [to not mow the lawn], an event (of not mowing) that took place at my house. (38) a.

Anne hinted [that Mary had not yet mowed the lawn]i; Bill hinted it i too.

b. It’s not true [that Mary has already mowed the lawn]i; you know this i as well as I do. The contrast between the examples in (39) and (40) demonstrates that Possible Facts also behave unlike Eventualities and like Propositions in being subject to closure under disjunction. That is, Possible Facts and Propositions can be disjoined to yield a new, disjunctive, singular entity of the same type, but there is, apparently, no such thing as a disjunctive Event. Only Eventualities Fail to be Subject to Closure under Disjunction (39) a. Anne believes/is certain [that Mary has either mowed the lawn or done the dishes]i. Bill also believes/is certain that thisi is the case. b. Anne hinted to me [that Mary has either mowed the lawn or done the dishes]i, a facti that should allow for us to have a little fun this afternoon. (40) #Anne made [Mary either mow the lawn or do the dishes]i, an event (of either mowing or dish-doing)i that will allow us to have a little fun this afternoon.

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Turning to the final two properties that can be used to distinguish Eventualities, Facts, and Propositions given in (22h,i), first, Asher argues that since these are three distinct types of semantic objects, then it should not be possible to quantify over two incompatible types in a complex open sentence. The sentences in (41a–c) show that it is possible to quantify over two identical types of semantic objects, be they two Events (41a), two Facts (41b), or two Propositions (41c):

(41)

Quantification over Semantic Likes: Well-Formed a. Nothing that is painful ever occurs in the park. b. Everything that Anne hinted proved to be a fact. c.

Whatever Mary believes, Bill is certain of.

However, as (42) shows, quantifying over semantically distinct types leads to ill-formedness: Quantification over Semantically Distinct Types: Ill-Formed (42) a. #Everything that Anne hinted/believed proved to be painful. b. #Whatever Mary wishes, Bill hinted/bet. Asher also notes that an anaphoric link between two entities can only be established if those two entities are of the same semantic type – be they two Events, as in (43a), two Facts (43b), or two Propositions (43c). Anaphoric Links across Semantic Likes: Well-Formed (43) a. Bill made [Mary mow the lawn]i and it i was painful for her. b. Anne hinted [that Mary had mowed the lawn] i and Bill indicated it i to me as well. c.

Anne believes/hopes [that Mary has mowed the lawn] i , but Bill is certain of it i.

What is not possible is to establish an anaphoric link across two distinct semantic types, as the examples in (44) make clear: Anaphoric Links across Distinct Semantic Types: Ill-Formed (44) a. #Bill made [Mary mow the lawn] i, but Anne doubted it i even when she saw it i . (Relevant reading: Anne doubts the event of Mary mowing the lawn. Irrelevant reading: Anne doubts that it is true that Bill made Mary mow the lawn.) b. Anne made [Mary mow the lawn] i. #Earlier, Bill had hinted/bet it i would be true.

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(44) c.

#Anne believed/hoped [that Mary had mowed the lawn] i and Bill hinted/answered it i .

Having provided additional evidence for the claim that the verbs in (1)–(12), which are unique in disallowing simple Control, ECM, and small clause complementation, are also unique in s-selecting only for Possible Facts, it is now possible to consider in more depth the question of why Possible Facts require tensed clausal complements, in other words, why they disallow simple Control/ECM/ small clause complementation. Before doing so, however, let us very briefly consider one final piece of evidence in favor of the proposals developed thus far. Specifically, let us return to the class of verbs shown above to be semantically ambiguous and to allow both tensed CP and Control complementation, but only on a particular meaning(s). I.e., let us reconsider the case of the verbs in (7)–(12), using, in the interest of brevity, the verb charge as a representative member of this class. As was shown in detail above, lexically ambiguous verbs like charge allow for multiple c-selection frames. E.g., as (45)–(46) below show, charge can mean to assert as an accusation, in which case it is a non-Control verb, or it can mean to impose a task on someone to do something, in which case it allows simple infinitival Control: (45)

a.

charge: to make an assertion against

b. He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant]. c. *He charged [to be the best applicant.] (46) a.

charge: to impose a task upon someone to do something

b. *The Dean charged the committee [that they oversee the completion of the task]. c.

She charged the committee [to oversee the completion of the task].

These facts can be shown to immediately follow from the hypothesis that has been defended here. Specifically, it has been claimed that verbs that semantically select for Possible Fact-denoting complement clauses disallow simple Control, while those that semantically select for Eventualities, Propositions, and Actual Facts allow it. This predicts that the “accusation” meaning of charge in (45) should pattern with all of the other non-Control verbs examined above with respect to the various tests that Vendler, Asher, and others have uncovered. That this prediction is met is demonstrated by the data in (47):

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(47)

a.

343

#He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant], a charge that was true at one point in time, but is no longer.

b. #He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant], a charge said to have occurred at the office downtown. c.

#He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant], a fact that was painful for them.

d. #He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant], a fact that I personally observed. e.

He charged [that he had clearly been the most qualified applicant], a charge which, once legally substantiated, may eventually cause the company to go under.

f.

Anne charged [that the member of staff who signed this document mistreated the employees]. The member of staff who signed this document is my best friend. Bill charged [that my best friend mistreated the employees]. Therefore, Anne and Bill made exactly the same charge. Invalid on the following readings: (i) Anne charged that it was my best friend who mistreated them. (ii) Bill charged that it was the member of staff who signed this document who mistreated them. I.e., charging that it is a fact that that my best friend mistreated the employees is always the same as charging that it is a fact that the member of staff who signed this document did so.

g.

Anne charged [that Bill is unreliable]; her mother guaranteed [that he’s a liar]; and her sister indicated [that he’s quite a slob]. #If this allegation/#it/these allegations prove(s) to be true, I think that we should have nothing more to do with him.

h. Anne charged that [Mary did not treat her employees fairly] i; your evidence indicates this i as well. i.

Anne charges [that Mary would always either fire an employee or make their lives miserable] i , a fact i that we intend to prove in court today.

j.

#Everything that the employees believed, the D.A. charged.

k.

#Anne believed [that Mary had mistreated her employees] i and Bill charged it i.

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In contrast, the “impose a task upon” meaning of charge in (46), which allows Control in simple infinitivals, is predicted to pattern with one of the subclasses of Control verbs examined above with respect to the denotational character of its complement clause. That it, in fact, patterns with Eventuality-denoting Control verbs like force is demonstrated by the data in (48): (48) a.

The Dean charged the committee [to oversee the task], something the committee is doing now, but didn’t used to do.

b. She charged the committee [to print up the new brochures], a task that ideally should be completed here on campus. c.

He charged the committee [to print up quality color brochures], a painful task that must be completed within the next 48 hours.

d. He charged the committee [to print up quality color brochures], a task I personally observed the step-by-step completion of. e.

He charged the committee [to print up quality color brochures], a task the timely completion of which should make us all rich!

f.

The Dean has charged this committee [to oversee the task]. This committee is the committee responsible for outreach activities. The president charged the committee responsible for outreach activities [to oversee the task]. Therefore, the Dean and the president did the same thing. I.e., an event of charging this committee to oversee the task is the same as an event of charging the committee responsible for outreach activities to do so.

g.

They guaranteed [to land the contract]. They’ll charge the client a hefty fee [to complete the job]. And they have indicated to me [to start the work]. I’ll be so glad when it’s/#they’re all over!

h. #The Dean charged the committee [to not undertake this sort of task just yet], an event (of not undertaking a task) that must continue all year. i.

#The Dean charged the committee [to either revise the curriculum or prepare a mission statement] i, an event (of either revising or preparing) i that should keep them busy for some time.

j.

#Everything that the Dean charged, the president hinted.

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(48) k.

345

The Dean charged the committee [to oversee the task] i. #By the end of the year, the president indicated it i was true. (I.e., he indicated that they had overseen the task.)

In short, the behavior of the lexically ambiguous verbs identified in (7)–(12) offers additional support for the claim defended here that Possible Fact-denoting clauses are incompatible with simple Control and ECM/small clause clausal complementation. Having provided evidence for the hypothesis that the verbs in (1)–(12), which are unique in disallowing simple Control, ECM, and small clause complementation, are also unique in s-selecting for Possible Facts, I will turn to the issue of why this type of semantic entity requires tensed clausal complements, whereas other semantic entities are compatible with a fuller range of complement types ranging from tensed ForcePs (formerly, CPs) to VP small clauses. As alluded to above, I am going to propose that this restriction follows from an interaction of the truth indeterminacy of these types of clauses with the type of tense anchoring found in simple Control, ECM and small clause structures.

8.2 Explaining the gap in simple Control (ECM/small clause) complementation We will begin by considering the type of temporal interactions that have long been known to exist between matrix and embedded clauses in simple Control, ECM, and small clause configurations, discussed at length in Chapter 2, specifically, Section 2.3.2.1. As indicated there, it has been known since Karttunen (1971) and Stowell (1982) that the lexical semantics of the matrix verb in simple Control, ECM, and small clause contexts limits the understood tense of the complement in predictable ways. For example, Karttunen (1971: 346) observed that the Control use of implicative verbs invariably fixes the time of the embedded clause to an interval identical to that of the matrix clause – an observation illustrated below in (49a).7 In this example, the matrix and embedded clauses are both understood to be in the same past tense, as evidenced by the ungrammaticality of examples like (50a) and (51a) in which the two tenses do not match. The same requirement of tense identity is, incidentally, found with certain factive adjectives, like be lucky in (49b), (50b), and (51b).

7 Karttunen (1971: ft. 6) cites Huddleston (1969) for similar data.

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On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(49) a.

John saw fit [(PRO/ec) to remain silent at last week’s meeting].

b. John was lucky [(PRO/ec) to see his parents last week]. (50) a. *John saw fit [(PRO/ec) to remain silent at next week’s meeting]. b. *John was lucky [(PRO/ec) to see his parents next week]. (51)

a. *Yesterday, John saw fit [(PRO/ec) to remain silent at last week’s meeting]. b. *Yesterday, John was lucky [(PRO/ec) to see his parents last week].

Importantly, and as Karttunen also observes, again in relation to implicatives, this requirement of tense identity is not unique to the past tense, as evidenced by the parallel future examples in (52) and (53) in which the matrix clause is now in the future and so too must be the embedded one. (52)

a.

John will see fit [to remain silent at next week’s meeting].

b. John will be lucky [to see his parents next week]. (53)

a.

*John will see fit [to remain silent at last week’s meeting].

b. *John will be lucky [to see his parents last week]. As Stowell (1982: 565) points out, one finds the same requirement of tense identity with certain ECM verbs, as demonstrated by the data below in (54) and, as made clear by (55), the same is true of certain small clause verbs. As before, the tense identity requirement is maintained in other “tenses,” such as the future, as evidenced by (56). (54) a.

The boys found [them to be amusing yesterday/*next week].

b. Jane showed [the solution to be trivial yesterday/*tomorrow]. (55)

a.

Bill made [himself sick last week/*next week].

b. Jane saw [her sister drive her new car last night/*tomorrow night]. (56) a.

Jane will show [the solution to be trivial *yesterday/next week].

b. Jane will see [her sister drive her new car *last night/tomorrow night].

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

347

As Karttunen (1971: 346), Stowell (1982: 562), and others have also observed, the lexical semantics of other Control, ECM, and small clause constructions is such that they do not require that the understood tense of the embedded clause be identical to that of the matrix, but, rather, that some other sort of temporal ordering exist. Specifically, they note that the Control use of non-implicative verbs like agree and decide requires that the embedded clause be true at a some time interval subsequent to the moment(s) at which the matrix predicate holds, as demonstrated by (57a), and the same is true of the ECM and small clause examples in (57b,c): (57)

a.

Yesterday, John agreed/decided [(PRO/ec) to remain silent at next/ *last week’s meeting].

b. Yesterday, John expected [her to win tomorrow’s race/*last week’s race]. c.

I need [him home by 9:00 tomorrow night/*last week].

As made clear by Karttunen’s (1971: 349, ft. 4) analysis of implicative Control verbs and Stowell’s (1982: 565–566) analysis of ECM and small clause structures, what is important about all of this is simply that it is the meaning of the matrix verb that primarily determines the time at which the embedded clause is understood to hold. In other words, on the basis of these facts, it seems legitimate to draw the conclusions given below in (58): First, the I/T of simple Control/ECM/ small clauses is impoverished – it fails to establish an index of evaluation for the clause containing it. Second, given that a clause requires an index of evaluation to be interpretable, the lexical semantics of the matrix verb must instead provide this information. For example, a verb like decide will select as the index of evaluation for the truth of the complement clause, world’s consistent with the matrix subject’s intentions at a time interval subsequent to the moment of the decision, and similarly for other Control, ECM and small clause verbs. Conclusions: The I/T of simple Control, ECM, and small clauses fails to establish tense etc. and hence is “parasitic” on the matrix verb to do so (58) a. The impoverished temporal inflection of the I/T associated with simple Control/ECM/small clause structures fails to establish an index () for the evaluation of the truth of clauses containing it.

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On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

(58) b. Since every clausal complement must be associated with an index (world and time interval) in order to be interpretable, the I/T of these Control/ECM/small clause structures is lexically specified to stand in a specific relation to the I/T of the matrix. For example, given the type of property decide denotes, one must first decide before one can actually do. And this leads to the final conclusion in (59): The semantic nature of the verbs in (1)–(12) is such that they fail to provide any indexical information concerning their clausal complements. That is, if one simply announces, answers, or hints that X., one is in no way committed to the truth of X in any world at any time, unlike when one causes, believes, or forgets that X. Given this, the index of evaluation of clausal complements denoting Possible Facts can only be established independently, via inflection. And given that, Control will not be licensed for the reasons already advanced by one’s favorite theory of the phenomenon. I.e., according to the standard null Case approaches to Control overviewed in 2.3.2.1, tensed I/T cannot check null Case; under the novel PRO approach developed in Chapter 6, (phi- and Case featureless) PRO is barred in such contexts because it cannot value [+tensed] I/T’s phi-features; under Hornstein’s (1999) Movement approach to Control overviewed in Section 3.1, tensed I/T must check Nominative Case, thereby barring Movement into the matrix; and, finally, the “bare VPs” assumed in the implicit argument approaches to Control overviewed in Section 3.2 obviously preclude a tensed I/T, there being no such head in these clauses. (59) Final Conclusions: Why Control can’t be a Possible Fact in simple infinitival contexts a. Possible Fact-selecting verbs, by definition, fail to provide indexical information concerning their clausal complements. I.e., if one announces/answers/hints that X, one is in no way committed to the truth of X in any world at any time, unlike when one causes/ believes/forgets X. b. Given this, the index of evaluation of clausal complements denoting Possible Facts can only be established independently via inflection. c.

Given this, Control is incompatible with semantically inflected clauses for the reasons advanced by one’s favorite theory of the phenomenon.

To summarize the discussion thus far, a class of verbs has been identified that has the interesting characteristic of disallowing simple Control, ECM, and

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

349

small clause complementation, apparently universally. It was argued, on the basis of the contrasts in (21), as well as a novel application of nine tests developed in previous literature, that what distinguishes these verbs is the lexical semantic feature of selecting for a Possible Fact-denoting clausal complement. The metaphysical feature of truth indeterminacy – unique to Possible Facts – was then used to explain why they cannot be realized as simple Control, or for that matter, simple ECM or simple small clause complements. Specifically, a matrix verb that selects a Possible Fact-denoting clause fails to lexically specify an index of evaluation for the truth of the complement. For this reason, an index must be independently established, for example, by fully inflecting the embedded I/T for tense. Such tensed I/Ts are, of course, well known to value NPs for Nominative Case and to themselves be associated with phi-features, thereby precluding Control in these contexts. In contrast, simple Control, ECM, and small clause complements set up their index of evaluation via the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. When these clauses project an I/T, it lacks semantic tense, hence lacks phi- and Nominative Case features, allowing for PRO, NP Movement or bare VP complementation.8 This section will conclude with a brief consideration of two topics directly related to the analysis proposed above. Specifically, it has been suggested here that it is the need to anchor the embedded clause in time, coupled with the failure of the lexical semantics of Possible-Fact selecting verbs to do so that accounts for the initially puzzling gap in Control complementation noted in Chapter 4. This raises two interesting possibilities, both of which appear to be attested in natural language grammars. First, one might expect to find PRO licensed in inflected infinitival contexts in which the tense of a Possible Fact denoting complement clause is established, either via an interaction of the 8 Of course, nothing precludes an Eventuality, Propositional, or Actual Fact-selecting verb from projecting a fully inflected complement clause as well. That is, the lexical semantics of these verbs is such that they allow the tense of the complement to either be lexically determined or set up independently via inflection of the embedded I/T. A Propositional-selecting verb like believe, for example, may either allow the complement to be realized as a full clause, with independent tense and Nominative Case valuation by the embedded I/T, as in (ia); as an ECM structure with dependent tense and Accusative Case valuation by the matrix AgrO/Tr head, as in (ib); or as a Control structure with dependent tense and, under the theory of Control developed in Chapter 6, no feature valuation, as French believe (croire) does in (ic). (i) a. Peter believes [that he kissed Mary at the party last night]. b. Peter believes [himself to be quite the ladies’ man]. c.

Pierre croyait [embrasser Marie]. Pierre believed to-kiss Marie ‘Pierre believed he was kissing Mary.’

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On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

lexical semantics/tense of the matrix verb with the meaning of the embedded inflectional morpheme(s) or by the inflectional morpheme alone. That is, the gap in Control in Possible Fact-denoting clauses like (1b) is hypothesized here to be attributable only to a need to anchor such clauses in time. Normally, this is done via full inflection of I/T, but if it is possible to do so otherwise, nothing would preclude the appearance of PRO. Inflected infinitives of the type in (60) appear to fit this description: The verbs report and mention select Possible Factdenoting complement clauses, yet they allow Control, but only if the embedded infinitival is inflected; in other words, only if the Possible Fact-denoting clause is temporally anchored by an I/T not associated with phi-features: (60) a.

The enemy reported [PRO having suffered a decisive defeat in yesterday’s /#tomorrow’s battle].

b. He mentioned [PRO taking on a new job last/next year]. A second interesting case is raised by the phenomenon of finite Control. As the reader may recall from the Chapter 6, authors like Iatridou (1993), Varlokosta (1993), Landau (2004), and the many authors cited therein have noted that in finite Control languages like Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian, the embedded verb in a Control complement is always tensed – in the subjunctive (which in the case of these particular finite Control languages is morphologically identical to the indicative). Importantly, the embedded verb exhibits full person and number inflection, as illustrated by the Greek examples in (61a,b) below, drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 154–155):9 (61) a.

b.

o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ tora, o Yanis elpizi [na figi avrio]. now the John hopes Particle leave-3-sing tomorrow ‘Now John hopes to leave tomorrow.’

9 As mentioned in Chapter 4, and as Landau (2004) and Melnik (2007) discuss in detail, Modern Hebrew is a language that exhibits both finite and infinitival Control, although finite Control is restricted to the third person, future tense of certain verbs. I.e., certain Control verbs in Modern Hebrew (e.g. nisa ‘try’) allow only infinitival Control complements; others (e.g. hitshir ‘declare’) accept only finite Control (limited to the third person, future); and still others (e.g. hivtiax ‘promise’) accept both complement types (with finite option being, again, restricted to third person, future). The discussion of finite Control in the languages of the Balkans applies equally to finite Control structures in this language.

On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

351

As was noted in Chapter 6, most authors agree, on the basis of the interpretive properties of the understood embedded subject, that the class of verbs exemplified in (61a) – namely, the equivalents of know how to, manage, start, try, and fear – uniquely instantiate Control structures in these languages.10 (These are the so-called C-Subjunctives.) However, there is some debate as to the syntactic status of the class of verbs exemplified by (61b), namely the class of verbs that includes the equivalents of hope, want, decide, and expect – the so-called F-Subjunctives. Many researchers, like Varlokosta (1988), have argued that this class of verbs does not select Control complements. In other words, the phonetically non-overt embedded subject in examples like (61b) is analyzed as pro, not PRO. Terzi (1992, 1997) and Landau (2004: 846), on the other hand, have suggested that these clauses are actually ambiguous, allowing both a Control and a non-Control configuration. Regardless of which approach to F-Subjunctives one favors, finite Control structures were taken in Chapter 6 to indicate that morphologically inflected I/Ts are not always associated with a bundle of phi-features, as is the case in French and English-type languages. Specifically, the morphologically inflected I/T of C-Subjunctives such as (61a) was treated there as being phi-incomplete, licensing only PRO, while the I/T of F-Subjunctives was assumed to either be unambiguously phi-complete (under a Varlokosta-style approach to F-Subjunctives) or ambiguous between a phi-complete use and a phi-incomplete one (under the alternative Terzi-style analysis). Under the former approach, the unambiguously phi-complete I/T will license only lexical NPs (and pro). Under the latter view, the phi-complete use of I/T will again license pro and lexical NPs, while the phi-incomplete use will license PRO. The analysis of Possible Facts undertaken in this chapter can now offer a response to a question left unanswered in Chapter 6: Namely, why are just these morphologically inflected I/Ts phi-incomplete? The answer appears to be that these verbs semantically select for Propositional, Eventuality, and Actual Factdenoting complement clauses – ones which, we have already seen, allow both direct temporal linking to speech time (as in the pro structure associated with examples like (61b)) and indirect linking to speech time via the matrix verb (as in C-Subjunctives like (61a) and, under a Terzi approach to F-Subjunctives, the PRO derivation in (61b)). As is well known since Varlokosta (1993: 155), examples

10 These interpretive properties are discussed in detail, e.g., in Varlokosta (1988), who notes that the understood embedded subject in clauses of the type in (61a) must be null; it must be co-referential with a c-commanding antecedent; it only permits a sloppy reading under ellipsis; and it supports a de se but not a de re interpretation – all classic properties of PRO. Clauses of the type in (61b) exhibit the opposite characteristics.

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On an unexpected gap in the distribution of PRO

involving indirect linking (in the terms developed here, those involving determination of the understood tense of the embedded clause via the lexical semantics of the matrix verb) are those that license PRO and, as expected, they are also those that exhibit tense dependencies of the type in (62): (62)

#tora, o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai avrio]. now the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing tomorrow #‘Now, John knows how to swim tomorrow.’

To summarize, this chapter examined a class of verbs that has the interesting, heretofore unremarked, characteristic of disallowing simple Control, ECM, and small clause complementation, perhaps universally. It was argued that what distinguishes these verbs is the lexical semantic feature of selecting for a Possible Fact-denoting clausal complement, a hypothesis that was shown to receive further support from the semantic and syntactic behavior of lexically ambiguous verbs that allow only tensed ForceP complements on one reading (in which the complement denotes a Possible Fact), but a Control, ECM, or small clause complement on another reading(s) (in which the complement denotes an Eventuality, a Proposition, or an Actual Fact). The semantic feature of truth indeterminacy unique to Possible Facts was then used to explain why they cannot be realized as simple Control, ECM, or small clause complements under the theory of Control developed in Chapter 6 of this book, as well as under alternative approaches to the phenomenon overviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, the lexical semantics of Possible Fact-selecting verbs fails to provide a temporal index for the evaluation of the truth of the complement. Therefore, the I/T of the complement clause must itself establish this index via inflection. In the case of full inflection, this means that the I/T will also be associated with phi-features, requiring checking by a phi-associated N, and it will also value Ns for Nominative Case, thereby disallowing PRO. This hypothesis led to two final predictions, which appear to be met. First, if the temporal index of a Possible Fact-denoting infinitival clause can be established by inflection not associated with phi-features, as is the case, e.g., with perfect and progressive infinitives, then PRO will be licensed. Finally, PRO will also be attested in clauses morphologically inflected for phi-features that fail to encode independent tense, as seems to be the case in finite Control languages like Greek and Serbian.

Chapter 9

Conclusions In this final chapter, the results of this investigation into certain aspects of the syntax and semantics of Control clauses will be briefly summarized and highlighted. Specifically, we will review the answers that the preceding chapters have developed to each of the following questions: (1)

Is there a level of syntactic analysis at which a Control clause has a thematic subject?

(2)

If the answer to (1) is affirmative, then does that subject remain clause internal at Spell-Out or does it undergo overt movement into the matrix clause?

(3)

What syntactic mechanisms are needed to account for the empirical facts used to formulate the answers to the preceding questions?

(4) What semantic factors, if any, are needed to account for any remaining Control-related phenomena? Chapters 2 and 3 provided an overview of some of the answers to these questions that have been developed in the past, with critical discussion of each of the currently competing analyses of Control. Chapters 4–6 then specifically focused on the first two questions: The purpose of those chapters was to determine which basic type of theory of Control – a PRO approach, a bare VP analysis, or a theory involving NP Movement – currently offers the most compelling account of various empirical paradigms. More specifically, Chapter 4 critically re-examined four arguments that continue to be advanced in favor of a PRO approach to Control in the generative literature. These are briefly summarized below in (5). The reader is referred to Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of each of them. (5)

Four standard arguments in favor of the PRO hypothesis a. Natural language grammars require an explicit, predictable means of mapping argument structure onto syntax. As part of that mapping process, generativists assume that if the lexical semantics of a verb entails the existence of a thematic subject, then that thematic role must be assigned to one and only one non-expletive argument entering the

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derivation in the Spec of a thematic v/Pr. This hypothesis accounts, among other things, for contrasts of the type I/*There saw him. in which the subject theta-role of the verb see in the there variant fails to be assigned. One consequence of this approach to argument mapping is that it entails that a subject theta-role be assigned to a non-expletive argument in the Spec vP/PrP of the complement clause of a Control verb like plan in I was planning to attend the meeting. b. The PRO hypothesis provides an explicit, systematic account of binding and agreement facts in Control clauses, accounting for contrasts like *For John to help oneself would be nice./ To help oneself would be nice. I.e., positing a non-overt subject in the Control clause in the second example provides an appropriate antecedent for the anaphor oneself. c.

Agreement contrasts such as They want PRO/*their son to become millionaires. follow from the PRO hypothesis in a manner parallel to the binding facts above in (b).

d. The PRO hypothesis provides a means of explaining how predicative elements in Control structures surface in a non-default case form in rich case languages like Ancient Greek, Icelandic, and Russian. I.e., the predicative element in a Control clause undergoes agreement with PRO. One striking observation that can be made with respect to the preceding arguments is that none of them are purely syntactically in nature: The first three are arguably based on primarily semantic considerations; the fourth is clearly related to overt morphology. As a consequence of this, it was concluded in Chapter 4 that alternative semantic and morphological accounts of Control structures offer what are, arguably, equally plausible accounts of these particular paradigms. As the latter analyses do not require reference to PRO, they are superior on grounds of simplicity. To reiterate just two examples of these alternative accounts, in Chapter 4 we noted with Hornstein (1999) that if one rejects two specific aspects of the standard generative approach to argument mapping, then expletive facts like the one mentioned in (5a) continue to follow under a Movement approach to Control. Specifically, if one assumes, contra standard theory, that the same argument may bear more than one thematic feature (not role), then I saw him. will be grammatical because the subject thematic feature of see is checked off by non-expletive I, but *There saw him. will crash because that feature remains unchecked. Finally, I tried to attend the meeting. will be grammatical because I

Conclusions

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checks off the subject thematic features of both attend and try. Similarly, we noted with Dowty (1985) that these same facts also fall out of an entailment approach to thematic roles: The contrast between I saw him. and *There saw him. follows from the fact that the meaning of the verb see is such that it entails that its subject be non-expletive; likewise native speakers understand that I is the subject of both try and attend in I tried to attend the meeting. because the meaning of try is such that its thematic subject logically must be the person who perhaps succeeds in performing the action s/he is trying to perform. In Chapter 4, it was also demonstrated that if one assumes the existence of abstract Case (and numerous reasons were provided there for doing so), then alternative accounts of the surface case forms of predicative elements in case rich languages emerge. I.e., it was established in Chapter 4 that it is not true that the existence of a non-default case form is incontrovertible proof of case valuation by a given functional category since predicative heads not infrequently surface in “unexpected” structural case forms – forms not usually assumed to result from agreement with a specific type of functional category. For example, accusative case is not the default case form in French, yet predicative adjectives still surface in that case in sentences like Marie l’est. “Marie is just that (e.g. intelligent).” The predicative adjective is not assumed to have participated in an agreement relation with the functional category (AgrO/Tr) normally assumed to be responsible for Accusative Case valuation, yet still it surfaces in this, normally structural, case form. This suggests that the structural case forms of predicative elements in Control structures in case rich languages may involve a similar type of structural case “mismatch” determined by post-syntactic morphological rules. I.e., the case form of predicative elements in Control complement clauses in these languages may well not be a reflection of the case associated with an empty category known as PRO. If this is correct, then obviously these facts fail to provide conclusive evidence of the existence of that empty category. In short, Chapter 4 established that these four paradigms do not provide the conclusive answers to questions (1) and (2) above that they are frequently claimed to: On the basis of just these facts, it is unclear which approach to Control provides the most compelling account of the data. Given this, Chapter 5 introduced five syntactic arguments that are argued to make this determination. A summary is provided below in (6). The reader is referred to Chapter 5 for in-depth discussion and additional supporting data. Also, it should be borne in mind that the summary in (6) is incomplete in that it does not make explicit just how a PRO analysis does account for these facts (only a broad indication is given). This is because this issue formed the subject matter of Chapter 6, which will be summarized in a moment.

356 (6)

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a. At present, only the PRO hypothesis straightforwardly accounts for the placement of wh-elements in indirect questions like Larry told them [ ForceP which outfit to buy for themselves]. Assuming Arbitrary Control always involves ForceP (formerly, CP) complementation with Last Resort insertion of pro, as Hornstein (1999) must do in order to provide a landing site for the wh-element, makes incorrect predictions with respect to the Obligatory Control readings associated with sentences like This game is played nude/*mad at Bill., sentences which clearly do not involve movement. In addition, such an approach raises questions about the nature of pro in English: I.e., why is pro in English only licensed in the subject position of untensed clauses (unlike the pro of Romance languages, such as Italian and Spanish); why can’t English pro be expletive as it is in, e.g., in German, etc. Assuming bare VP complementation, as in Dowty (1985) and others, provides no landing site for wh-elements in these types of sentences. Making recourse to adjunction to VP in order to do so has the undesirable effect of overgenerating similar (but ungrammatical) adjunction structures in non-Control sentences. b. Only the PRO approach presently provides a means of accounting for the fullest range of floating quantifier placement facts attested in Control complement clauses. For example, a bare VP approach to Control predicts no contrasts in Q-Float between Control sentences and other implicit argument constructions, failing to capture differences like I urged my students [to all take that course]. and *This point needs [all emphasizing]. Movement approaches to Control treat Subject and Object Control in a parallel fashion – both involve simple NP movement – thereby failing to predict contrasts in floating quantifier placement of the type *The students wanted [all to be ready to leave by 9]. versus I persuaded the students [all to be ready to leave by 9]. c.

At this point, only the PRO approach offers a reason why the presence of an expletive is forced in Control complement clauses headed by a non-thematic verb. For example, both the bare VP and the Movement approaches to Control seem unable to provide a non-stipulative account of examples like the following: *It is desirable [to become known that he is dishonest.] I.e., why can’t a Control head like desirable accept a bare VP headed by a non-thematic verb like become? Alternatively, in Hornstein’s terms, why do Control heads select for infinitival clauses whose [+T] feature must be checked by a theta-marked NP?

Conclusions

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d. Only the PRO approach leads one to expect potential expletive contrasts involving verbs like French falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must.’ Bare VP approaches to Control would lead one to expect that since these two verbs both express deontic modality, there is no principled reason why both would not select the same type of complement clause, incorrectly leaving one with no explanation for contrasts such as the following: Il *faut/doit y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. ‘There must be soap in all public restrooms.’ Hornstein’s movement approach to Control would predict both of these examples to be licit as pro, under this theory, can be inserted as a Last Resort to check off infinitival I/T’s features. e. The PRO approach leads one to expect contrasting clitic pronoun placement in Control structures across the Romance languages. Bare VP approaches to Control assume that meaning dictates selection for a bare VP. Therefore, the equivalent of want in the Romance languages should select for a bare VP complement, incorrectly predicting clitic climbing in French-type languages of the type *Je le veux faire. ‘I want to do it.’ (The Movement approach does not offer an immediate account of the ungrammaticality of such examples either, but was argued in Chapter 5 to be open to a modification that would allow it to be captured.)

Having provided a number of syntactic arguments in favor of the existence of PRO, Chapter 6 turned to an in-depth examination of the exact form this analysis should take in view of accommodating these (and other) facts. In other words, it was in Chapter 6 that the answer to question (3) above was developed. In that chapter, two different versions of the PRO hypothesis were put forth. The first involved the minimal modifications required to enable a Chomsky & Lasnikstyle (1993, 1995) analysis to accommodate the data in Chapter 5. The second analysis involved what some might view as a much more radical reworking of the original PRO approach. Its development was primarily motivated by novel data introduced in Chapter 6 involving the distributional patterns of NPs in gerundive clauses, facts that were not discussed in Chapter 5 as they were not directly relevant to the PRO versus Movement versus Bare VP debate. Considering first the revised standard PRO theory put forth in Chapter 6, the data enumerated in Chapter 5 collectively indicate that the original Minimalist approach to Control put forth in Chomsky & Lasnik (1993, 1995) should be modified in the following two respects: (a) PRO should no longer be assumed to consistently enter an agreement relationship with the I/T of a Control clause

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in order to be valued for null Case and check an [EPP/D] feature of I/T. (b) Control verbs should no longer be assumed to c-select uniquely for ForceP/CP complements. The first modification was, in fact, originally suggested in Baltin (1995), who noted that it is necessary in order to account for the ungrammaticality of examples like *Both to be betrayed by their friends would be disastrous. Specifically, under current approaches to Q-Float (i.e. Baltin’s (1995) Predication approach and Bošković’s (2004) version of a Sportiche-style (1988) “stranding” analysis), if PRO moves to Spec of the embedded IP/TP, as assumed by Chomsky & Lasnik, then the quantifier both should be licit in pre-infinitival to position in the preceding example. Under Baltin’s approach, movement of PRO to the embedded Spec of IP/TP would make that clause [+predicative], licensing the preverb both. Under the alternative stranding analysis, movement of PRO is assumed to be detectable by the surface position of floating quantifiers; i.e., floating quantifiers “mark” every position through/to which PRO moves. In Chapter 6, three additional arguments were offered in support of Baltin’s conclusion. First, it is needed if one wishes to explain why both of the following types of sentences are ungrammatical: *They decided [to all not leave at the same time.] (a fact concerning negative sentences that was first observed with respect to French in Sportiche (1988: 437–438)) and *The workers deliberately got [all hurt]. I.e., employing the same logic as above, the ungrammaticality of these examples indicates once again that PRO cannot have moved to the embedded Spec IP/TP. Similarly, if one wishes to account for contrasts in clitic pronoun placement in Romance Control clauses (i.e. the acceptability of the equivalents of the French example *Je le veux faire. ‘I want to do it.’ in southern and central dialects of Italian and Spanish), then one must again assume that PRO does not move to Spec IP/TP. That is, under present accounts of clitic climbing, namely those offered by Cinque (2001) and Cardinaletti & Shlonsky (2004), the licitness of such examples in certain Romance languages follows only if we assume that the verb meaning want selects for a vP/PrP in those languages.1 This means, of course, that there is no Spec IP/TP to which PRO can move in these examples. While Baltin (1995) concludes from his original example given above that PRO must remain in its initial merge position throughout the derivation, in Chapter 6 it was concluded, on the basis of data due to Radford (2004: 310) (who himself offered it in support of Chomsky & Lasnik’s original hypothesis over that of Baltin), that PRO actually can undergo movement – namely, to a position lower than NegP. Radford’s example was To both be betrayed by their friends would be disastrous., in which the licitness of both vP/PrP-externally clearly indicates PRO has moved from its initial merge position. Furthermore, 1 See Authier & Reed (2009) for arguments against Cinque’s (2004) alternative approach to these contrasts, as well as the earlier Kayne (1989) and Roberts (1997) analyses.

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the grammaticality of the anaphor in a example like To seem to yourself to always be in the right is a common flaw., brought to my attention by Sabine Iatridou (p.c.), clearly establishes that PRO may move into the matrix clause provided that such movement is necessary for convergence, although again, the ungrammaticality of *Both to seem to yourselves to have been betrayed by your friends would be disastrous. establishes that PRO does not move as far as the Spec of the matrix IP/TP. In short, given our understanding of linguistic theory at this time, there appears to be sufficient evidence in favor of the view that PRO does not undergo movement to Spec of IP/TP for feature valuation/checking purposes. The second minimal modification that is necessary for the standard PRO approach to account for the data in Chapter 5 involves the view that Control verbs can select a variety of complement types, not just ForceP. This conclusion too was motivated by Q-Float and Romance clitic placement facts. For example, it was noted in Chapter 6 that if one assumes that English causative get is a Control verb that selects for a passivized VP complement clause (and good reasons for assuming this were given in Chapter 4; see also Reed (2011)), then the ungrammaticality of *The workers deliberately got [all hurt PRO]. follows. I.e., Q-Float is impossible in such sentences because PRO has no position to move to. The Romance clitic pronoun placement facts mentioned above also require this assumption. E.g., as was pointed out above, a vP/PrP complementation frame for the equivalent of want in Spanish and central/southern dialects of Italian is necessary in order to allow for clitic climbing out of the complement clause. In sum, the standard PRO approach appears to minimally require the following two modifications if one wishes to account for the paradigms enumerated in Chapter 5: (a) we should no longer assume that feature valuation/checking triggers consistent movement of PRO to the Spec of the I/T of a Control clause (b) Control verbs should no longer be assumed to c-select uniquely for ForceP complements. With these two modifications in place, the revised standard approach to Control was then shown in Chapter 6 to offer the following account of the data previously established to be problematic for competing theories: (7)

a. The revised PRO hypothesis accounts for the placement of wh-elements in indirect questions like Larry told them [which outfit to buy for themselves]. by assuming that Control verbs may (no longer must) c-select ForceP complements. b. The revised PRO approach provides a means of accounting for the fullest range of floating quantifier placement facts attested in Control complement clauses. For example, it predicts contrasts between

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Q-Float in Control sentences, which involve an explicit thematic embedded subject (PRO) and implicit argument constructions, like English Retroactive Gerunds, capturing contrasts like I urged my students [to all take that course]. and *This point needs [all emphasizing]. This approach does not entail that Subject and Object Control be treated in a syntactically parallel fashion, allowing for the development of an account of contrasts in Q-Float placement of the type: *The students wanted [all to be ready to leave by 9]. versus I persuaded the students [all to be ready to leave by 9]. E.g., one could follow Baltin (1995: 212, 217, 224–226) in assuming that in the latter, the DP the students stands in a mutual c-command relationship with the complement clause, making it predicative (licensing Q-Float), whereas in the former, it clearly does not. c.

The revised PRO approach offers a reason why the presence of an expletive is forced in Control complement clauses headed by a nonthematic verb. For example, *It is desirable [to become known that he is dishonest]. is ungrammatical for two reasons (a) PRO continues to be analyzed as a non-expletive nominal element. The lack of a theta role is one factor precluding its merger in such clauses also (b) Control adjectives like desirable are assumed to select for a ForceP heading by a phonetically overt or covert for that is associated with a non-null Case feature, requiring checking by a noun compatible with that Case. For these reasons, the subject position must be filled by an expletive nominal. (It cannot be left empty, be filled by PRO, or be filled by any other non-expletive NP.)

d. The revised PRO approach leads one to expect potential expletive contrasts involving verbs like French falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must.’ E.g., the contrast between falloir and devoir in Il *faut/doit y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. ‘There must be soap in all public restrooms.’ is due to the fact that devoir selects a defective vP/PrP, one that does not value PRO for null Case and is unassociated with its own features that would require valuation, thereby allowing the embedded subject position to remain “empty.” In contrast, falloir selects a non-defective vP/PrP, one that can undergo Agree with PRO and value it for null Case (and thereby have its own features valued), but PRO cannot fulfill this function in this type of example as it requires a thematic role.

Conclusions

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e. The revised PRO approach leads one to expect contrasting clitic pronoun placement in Control structures across the Romance languages. E.g., the contrasting grammaticality of the equivalent of sentences like *Je le veux faire. ‘I want to do it.’ is due to a difference in c-selection. Clitic-climbing languages like Spanish and (certain dialects of) Italian associate Control verbs with both ForceP and vP/PrP complements. Control verbs in non-clitic climbing languages like French select uniquely for XPs “larger” than vP/PrP, which blocks movement.

While the revised version of Chomsky & Lasnik’s approach to Control was shown in Chapter 6 to account for the facts enumerated in Chapter 5, as well, of course, as for the standard paradigms provided in Chapter 4, it was noted that the following distribution of NPs in gerunds remains mysterious: (8) Les villageois/PRO/*Ils/*Eux étant pauvres, ils n’avaient pas the villagers they them being poor they Neg had not les moyens d’engager un expert. the means of to-hire an expert ‘The villagers/PRO/*They/*Them being poor, they didn’t have the financial resources needed to hire an expert.’ Under both the original and the revised standard accounts, the acceptability of PRO in (8) indicates that v/Pr head of gerundive clauses can be associated with a null Case feature. The licitness of the non-pronominal NP indicates that the introduction of this null Case feature is optional. I.e., it appears to be the case that gerunds can also either be entirely Caseless (licensing a lexical NP associated with default Case) or that they involve structural (Nominative) Case (licensing lexical NPs in that fashion). But if either of these views is correct, then why are pronominal NPs not also licit? That is, if the non-pronominal variant in (8) happens to instantiate an entirely Caseless structure, then a default Case pronoun like eux ‘them’ should be acceptable; if, on the other hand, a structural Case position is available, then a structurally Case-marked pronoun like ils ‘they’ should be. But all pronominal forms are rejected. The question, then, is why and it is left unanswered by the present (as well as the original) standard version of the PRO approach. For this reason, Chapter 6 developed a second, more radically revised PRO analysis in which the following assumptions are made:

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Conclusions

a. As previously assumed, agreement and feature valuation occurs when a head that is inherently valued for a feature stands in the closest c-commanding relation to a head unvalued for the same feature, within the same phase (i.e. ForceP or vP/PrP). b. As has also been previously assumed, a noun’s Case feature can only be valued by a phi-complete functional head. c.

The set of phi-incomplete functional heads is assumed to include not only the previously assumed I/T of complement clauses selected by ECM and small clause verbs and the I/T of gerunds, but also the I/T of Control clauses.

d. All Case and phi-features (even interpretable ones) must undergo Agree at some point in the derivation. e. The presence of an abstract Case feature on a noun is recoverable from overt, morphological inflection. Therefore, in English and French-type languages, only pronouns are associated with an unvalued Case feature. Non-pronominal Ns like cats and PRO are Caseless. f.

The presence of phi-features on a noun is recoverable from overt, morphological inflection. Therefore, in English and French-type languages, only pronouns and lexical Ns are associated with inherently valued phi-features. PRO entirely lacks phi-features in the syntactic component.

g. The presence of unvalued phi-features on functional categories is recoverable from overt syntactic effects of agreement (e.g., phi-feature inflection, adverb placement, etc.). Therefore, in English and Frenchtype languages, only AgrO/Tr and tensed I/T are associated with phi-features. h. While gerundive I/T lacks phi-features, perhaps as a consequence of its tense inflection (in English, –ing), it can still undergo Agree with a phi-associated N. The discussion of Chapter 6 demonstrated how an approach to Control that makes the preceding assumptions can accommodate all of the data introduced in Chapter 5, the standard NP distributional paradigms, the overlapping distribution of PRO in finite Control clauses in languages like Greek, and, of course, the previously unnoticed case of gerundive examples like (8) above.

Conclusions

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For example, in relation to gerunds like (8) above, only PRO and non-pronominal NPs are licensed because only their feature values are compatible with those of gerundive I/T. Specifically, PRO enters the derivation with the features [N, -expletive]; les villageois ‘the villagers’ with the features [N, φ], the pronouns with the features [N, φ, Case-unvalued], and étant ‘being’ with the features [I/T, +tense]. PRO and étant ‘being’ have no Case, phi-, or, for that matter, other features that require valuation. Therefore, the derivation with those lexemes converges. A derivation with a non-pronominal lexical NP is also convergent since [+tense] I/T is assumed to be able to enter an agreement relationship with inherently phi-valued NPs. (The reader will recall that under this approach non-pronominal NPs in languages like French and English are Caseless.) In contrast, derivations with pronominal forms crash because gerundive I/T is phi-incomplete and hence unable to value NPs for Case. The data enumerated in (7) above are also accounted for. How this is achieved is briefly summarized below in (10). (The reader is referred to Chapter 6 for detailed discussion.) (10)

a.

The novel PRO analysis accounts for the placement of wh-elements in indirect questions like Larry told them [which outfit to buy for themselves]. in the same fashion as before, i.e., by continuing to assume that Control verbs may (not must) c-select ForceP complements.

b. The novel PRO approach still provides a means of accounting for the full range of floating quantifier placement facts. For example, as before, it predicts contrasts between Q-Float in Control sentences, which involve an explicit thematic embedded subject (PRO) and implicit argument constructions, like English Retroactive Gerunds, capturing contrasts like I urged my students [to all take that course]. and *This point needs [all emphasizing]. As before, Subject and Object Control are not necessarily treated in a parallel fashion, making it possible to capture contrasts in Q-Float placement of the type: *The students wanted [all to be ready to leave by 9]. versus I persuaded the students [all to be ready to leave by 9]. E.g., one may follow Baltin (1995: 212, 217, 224–226) in assuming that only in the latter sentence does the students stand in a mutual c-command relationship with the complement clause, making it predicative (licensing Q-Float). c.

The novel PRO approach continues to offer a reason why the presence of an expletive is forced in Control complement clauses headed by a non-thematic verb. For example, *It is desirable [to become known that

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he is dishonest]. is ungrammatical because (a) PRO continues to be analyzed as a non-expletive nominal element, requiring a theta-role and (b) Adjectives like desirable are still assumed to be able to select for a ForceP heading by a phonetically overt or covert for associated with an unvalued feature requiring agreement with a phi-associated N. (10)

d. The novel PRO approach also accounts for expletive contrasts involving verbs like French falloir ‘to be necessary’ and devoir ‘must’ once the contrasting lexical semantics of these two verbs is taken into consideration. E.g., Il doit y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. ‘There must be soap in all public restrooms.’ is grammatical because the embedded verb avoir ‘to have’ has no features requiring valuation (being phi-incomplete, it cannot value any either); it also has no subject theta-role to assign. Consequently, no subject can appear in the embedded clause: PRO cannot merge there because it requires a theta-role; expletives (and other NPs) cannot either because they are associated with features that would remain unvalued. The expletive il ‘there’ initially merges in the matrix clause in order to have its own features valued and so also values those of the tensed matrix I/T. In contrast, *Il faut y avoir du savon dans toutes les toilettes publiques. ‘It is necessary to have soap in all public restrooms.’ is ungrammatical because falloir means It is deontically required of NP that p. and it is absurd to require of any arbitrary individual that there be soap in every public restroom. (Chapter 6 offered a number of independent arguments in support of this semantic analysis: For example, it explains why falloir + infinitive disallows inanimate and weather-expletive subjects; i.e., it accounts for the ungrammaticality of *Pour attraper des truites dans cette rivière, il faut pleuvoir. ‘In order to catch trout in this river, it is necessary to rain.’ Specifically, any arbitrary individual cannot be deontically required “to rain.”) e.

The novel PRO approach leads one to expect contrasting clitic pronoun placement in Control structures across the Romance languages as before. E.g., the contrasting grammaticality of the equivalent of sentences like *Je le veux faire. ‘I want to do it.’ is due to a difference in c-selection. Clitic-climbing languages like Spanish and certain dialects of Italian associate Control verbs with both ForceP and vP/PrP complements. Control verbs in non-clitic climbing languages like French select for phrases “larger” than ForceP, which block climbing.

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Having provided a discussion of some of the syntactic mechanisms at work in Control phenomena, Chapters 7 and 8 turned to two separate empirical issues that appear to require reference to the semantic component of the grammar. First, Chapter 7 made clear just how PRO ultimately comes to be understood to be associated with phi-features under the novel theory of Control developed in Chapter 6. That is, it was indicated above that Chapter 6 developed a theory of PRO according to which it crucially is not associated with a bundle of person, number or gender features in the derivational component. I.e., the lack of such features (as well as a Case feature) explains why PRO is attested only in constructions lacking a phi-complete functional head: phi-complete functional heads are associated with phi-features that must be valued via agreement with a noun inherently valued for person and number (and, in some languages, gender) features that PRO lacks. Given this, how then do native speakers ultimately come to obligatorily associate PRO with the phi-features of the matrix subject in examples like (11a), with those of the matrix object in examples like (11b), but with those of some syntactically unexpressed referent in sentences like (11c)? (11)

a.

He claims [to PRO have already filed the necessary paperwork].

b. She always expects me [to PRO do my best]. c.

[To PRO leave for Spain tonight] may prove impossible.

The goal of Chapter 7 was to develop a novel, although tentative, answer to this question, one that naturally draws from insights in earlier work in both the generative and non-generative traditions overviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. More specifically, it was first noted in Chapter 7 that the current standard PRO approach to determining the reference of PRO is still implicitly based on some version of Rosenbaum’s (1967) Minimal Distance Principle (MDP). I.e., following Chomsky (1980: 33) and Chomsky (1981a: 75), standard generative theories still implicitly assume that PRO is “normally” obligatorily assigned the referential index of the closest c-commanding NP and that, barring this, an arbitrary referential index is assigned. While nothing precludes the adoption of this hypothesis under the analysis developed in Chapter 6, a number of considerations were introduced (many drawn from previous literature, see especially Sag & Pollard (1991), Culicover & Jackendoff (2001), and Jackendoff & Culicover (2003)) that militate against this view. To provide just one of the novel arguments given, it was pointed out that for-adjuncts of the type in (12)–(13) below seem to pose serious problems for any

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MDP-based approach to antecedent resolution since PRO’s controller is obligatorily the matrix object NP in examples like (12), but obligatorily the subject NP in the structurally parallel sentences in (13). (12)

a.

They i punished Johnk [for PRO*i/k driving drunk]. Example drawn from Hornstein (1999: 76, ft. 11), who attributes it to an anonymous reviewer.

b. They i cited Chomskyk [for having PRO*i/k made that observation].

(13)

c.

I i thanked themk [for PRO*i/k doing that].

a.

The prisoner i petitioned the judgek [for having PRO i/*k received an unfair sentence].

b. They i recited thirty Hail Marysk [for having PRO i/*k committed a venial sin]. c.

I i’ll bathe the kidsk for a whole week [for having PRO i/*k stuck you with it for the last month].

These contrasts and many others, it was noted, seem to naturally follow from the meaning of the adjunct clause (namely, to give the reason why something took place) interacting with a difference in the lexical semantics of verbs like punish, cite, and thank on the one hand, and verbs like petition, recite, and bathe on the other. That is, it is logical in the case of a verb like punish that the punishing event is taking place because of something the matrix object — the person being punished – has done, not because of something the punisher has done. However, in the case of recite, it is logical that it is subject, the person doing the reciting, that is doing so because of something he or she has done not because of what is being recited. In this respect, these contrasts mimic what Sag & Pollard (1991), Jackendoff & Culicover (2003), and others have noted previously for Obligatory Control verbs like the following, which also exhibit interpretational properties at odds with an MDP-based approach to the Control problem: (14)

a.

John i promised Fredk [to PRO i/*k shave himself ].

b. John i agreed/contracted with Susan [to PRO i take care of himself ]. c.

John i vowed/is obligated to Susan [to PRO i take care of himself ].

Conclusions

367

For these reasons and others, the view defended in the present work is that PRO is indeed a phi-featureless nominal in the syntax: Its antecedent is determined at the syntax-semantics interface (LF) by the application of a Bare Output Condition (BOC) that makes equal reference to syntactic and semantic factors. Specifically, it was suggested that if there are any explicit or implicit NPs that c-command PRO within the same ForceP phase and within the domain of the superordinate clause dominating the Control clause, then PRO must select one of those arguments as its controller, with lexical semantic specifications ruling out potential candidates in cases where more than one exists. If, on the other hand, there are no c-commanding NPs within the relevant domains, then an arbitrary index is assigned to PRO, i.e., it is interpreted logophorically. Finally, in structurally ambiguous contexts, the presence of a convergent “default” derivation (i.e. one involving Obligatory Control) will serve to “block” a logophoric (Arbitrary) one. This theory was shown to make the correct predications across a wide range of structures that include both verbal complement clauses and adjuncts. Finally, Chapter 8 took as its point of departure an issue that arose in the discussion of Chapters 2, 4, and 6. Specifically, it was noted there that finite Control languages like Greek allow PRO and pro (as well as lexical NPs) in what superficially appear to be the same type of syntactic configuration, as illustrated by the following Greek examples drawn from Varlokosta (1993: 154–155): (15)

a. o Yanis kseri [na kolimbai]. the John knows-how-to Particle swim-3-sing ‘John knows how to swim.’ b. tora, o Yanis elpizi [na figi (o Giorgos)]. now the John hopes Particle leave-3-sing (tomorrow) ‘Now John hopes that he/George will leave.’

That is, the example in (15a) shows that in Greek (and other languages) Control structures involve an inflected embedded verb (in the subjunctive) that bears full phi-feature morphology. Example (15b) shows that the same verbal form appears in embedded clauses that license full NPs like George and pro (and, some authors have argued, also PRO). In short, the class of verbs that includes the equivalent of to know how to selects an inflected clause licensing only PRO, whereas the equivalents of verbs like to hope select what appears to be the same type of clause, yet those clauses license pro and full NPs. The novel PRO analysis was shown in Chapter 6 to be able to account for these distributional facts. Specifically, to accommodate these data one need only assume

368

Conclusions

that the morphologically inflected I/T of Control Subjunctives such as (15a) is phi-incomplete, licensing only PRO, while the I/T of Free Subjunctives is either unambiguously phi-complete (under a Varlokosta-style approach to Free Subjunctives) or ambiguous between a phi-complete use and a phi-incomplete one (under the alternative Terzi/Landau-style approach to them). Under the former approach, the unambiguously phi-complete I/T will license only pro and lexical NPs. Under the latter view, the phi-complete use of I/T will again license pro and lexical NPs, while the phi-incomplete use will license PRO. While the analysis could accommodate the facts, it still left unanswered the question of why such overlapping distribution of PRO, lexical NPs, and (nonovert) pronouns is attested in just these sorts of clauses. In general, the featural make-up of PRO and other types of nouns is so distinct as to prohibit overlap, although, as we have already seen above, something similar (though by no means identical) is attested in gerunds. In other words, what makes the I/T of these subjunctive clauses fundamentally different from that of other tensed clauses? Similar questions are raised by the examples of apparent “overlap” given in Chapter 4. For example, the well-known data in (16) below were provided; they demonstrate that a verb with the same meaning (equivalent to believe) may select for a Control complement in one language (in this case, French), but an ECM complement in another (English): (16)

a.

*I believe [to have told you not to touch my stuff ].

b.

Je croyais [PRO t’avoir dit de ne pas toucher à mes affaires]. I believe to-you to-have told of Neg not to-touch at my things ‘I believe that I told you not to touch my things.’ Contrast originally observed in Italian and French by Rizzi and Vergnaud respectively (see Chomsky (1980: 32, ft. 37)).

Similarly, it was noted in Chapter 4 that the same verb in the same language may make use of either complementation option: English remember and causative get, as well as French entendre ‘to hear’ were given as illustrative examples: (17)

a.

I distinctly remember [PRO/myself/her sending that letter].

b. John deliberately got [PRO/himself hurt.] c. J’ai entendu [PRO/Médor aboyer]. I have heard Médor to-bark ‘I heard (Médor) barking.’

Conclusions

369

While in Chapter 4 it was noted that this type of apparent “overlap” poses interesting problems for earlier approaches to Control, the revised PRO analysis was shown in Chapter 6 to easily accommodate such facts via a simple difference in syntactic transitivity. Namely, Control clauses licensing lexical NPs (those not licensing PRO) are assumed to involve syntactically transitive matrix verbs, verbs selecting a complement clause dominated by a TrP/AgrOP headed by a phi-complete Tr/AgrO that must have its own phi-features valued via agree with an inherently phi-associated N, and by so doing values any Case (or phi-) features associated with that N. On the other hand, clauses licensing PRO (but not lexical NPs) are assumed to be syntactically intransitive, lacking such a phicomplete Tr/AgrO head, leaving lexical NPs with no means to have their phi(and in some instances Case) features undergo agree. In short, these cases of “overlap” are only apparent: The syntactic structure is actually different in the PRO and lexical NP derivations. While the approach again accommodated the data, as it did for finite Control languages like Greek, it still left unanswered the question of why this variation is attested with just these types of complement clauses. The issue becomes even more pressing since, as noted in Chapter 4 and in even more detail in Chapter 8, it appears that “overlap” is non-existent cross-linguistically with the fairly large class of verbs that includes disclose, remark, explain, and so on, in simple infinitival contexts like the following: (18)

a.

I disclosed/remarked/explained that I would retire in 2028.

b. *I disclosed/remarked/explained to retire in 2028. Chapter 8 offered a semantic solution to this particular problem, one that extends notions developed, in relation to other constructions, in work by Vendler (1967), Bach (1981), Link (1983), ter Meulen (1984), Krifka (1987, 1989), Asher (1993, 2000), and others. Specifically, it was argued there that what distinguishes the non-Control/non-ECM/non-small clause verbs in (18) from those that do allow simple Control, ECM, and small clause complementation is that the former semantically select for complements denoting a Possible Fact, not an Actual Fact, an Eventuality, or a Proposition. Possible Facts, it was argued in Chapter 8, are by definition truth indeterminate, which entails independent anchoring of their tense to speech time – in English-type languages via morphological inflection. This semantic requirement was argued to have, as concomitant syntactic effects in fully inflected clauses, a need to have the phi-features of the embedded I/T valued, and, depending on the mechanics of one’s exact syntactic theory, possibly also have its Nominative Case feature valued, thereby barring

370

Conclusions

PRO under all versions of the null Case approach to Control, NP Movement accounts of the phenomenon, bare VP approaches, and, of course, the alternative PRO approach defended in Chapter 6. The idea that fully inflected I/Ts that directly anchor to speech time are intrinsically phi-complete and hence fail to license PRO was argued to have a further interesting consequence. Specifically, it raised the possibility of there being in some language(s) inflected I/Ts that are indirectly anchored to speech time, hence phi-incomplete, and, therefore, licensors of PRO. This possibility was argued to be instantiated by the embedded I/Ts of finite Control languages like Greek. It also predicts that it may be possible to have infinitives associated with tense but not phi-features, again licensing PRO. Thus, Chapter 8 offered a semantic reason why one may find apparent and true overlapping simple Control, ECM, and tensed complementation with verbs like believe and get, but never with verbs like disclose. The former select for complement clauses of a very specific nature: The clausal complements of such verbs denote Propositions, Eventualities or Actual Facts. These types of semantic entities share the property of allowing dependent tense relationships to be established between the matrix and embedded clauses: Such relationships are established when these verbs select simple Control/ECM/small clause complements; they are not when these verbs select fully tensed clausal complements. In summary, in this book, I have argued that there is convincing syntactic evidence that PRO does exist and that it is a Caseless, phi-featureless, non-expletive noun that does not undergo movement to Spec of IP/TP for feature valuation purposes. It has also been argued here that a more complete theory of Control requires reference to minimally two types of semantic factors. First, lexical semantic information, when available, interacts with the syntactic notions of ccommand and domain to determine the reference of this syntactically phi-featureless empty category. Secondly, the type of semantic entity denoted by a clause may create a “gap” in the licensing of PRO. Specifically, in simple infinitival contexts, PRO is limited to Eventuality, Propositional, and Actual Fact-denoting clauses as only they allow for the type of temporal dependence that gives rise to a phi-incomplete I/T.

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Index à ‘at/to’ (as a Dative Case marker) 315–316 Action (ACT) 204–210, 303–305 Adjuncts 300, 315–316, 322–323, 367 – see also for adjuncts, Purpose Clauses, Rationale Clauses, while-type adjuncts Affected datives 238 Agent-oriented manner adverbials 4, 109– 110, 176, 205, 221–223, 258, 267, 269, 319, 321, 358–359, 368 Agree 257, 264–271, 355, 357, 360, 362– 365, 369 Agreement (morphological) 2, 195, 215, 229–240, 255, 354–355 – see also binding, case rich languages AGR-O: see syntactic transitivity Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD) 184– 186 Arbitrary PRO 13, 21–22, 27, 31, 33–34, 36– 37, 43–46, 52, 58–65, 68–70, 74–77, 93, 117, 140, 154–155, 156n6, 157n7, 161–171, 187–190, 195–198, 200, 204– 206, 209, 211, 213–214, 230–232, 242– 244, 249–250, 293, 295–296, 299–302, 308–315, 317–323, 365, 367 Argument structure 215–229, 240, 278, 303–304, 324, 348–349, 353–354 – see also Argument structure approaches to Control, c-selection, s-selection Argument structure approaches to Control 172–173, 189–201, 213–214, 295–296, 331, 353–357, 370 – see also Bare VPs Ask 19–20, 43–44, 150–156, 188–189, 191, 197, 204, 208–209, 211, 213, 294, 296, 302, 310–311 – see also indirect questions, shifts in controller Backwards pronominalization 16 Bare Output Condition (BOC) 302–323, 367 Bare VPs 171, 186, 188–189, 192–197, 201, 204, 206–207, 209–210, 212, 215, 217, 229–230, 239, 241–242, 246, 247n5, 248–250, 252, 254–255, 296, 331, 348– 349, 353–357, 370

– see also implicit arguments Be allowed to 11, 37–38, 44, 150, 152–153, 195–196, 294 Belfast English 241–242 Binding 2, 15, 29–30, 33, 37, 39n11, 46–83, 89–96, 113, 123, 140–141, 163, 165– 168, 170, 183, 195, 202 206, 215, 222n7, 229–232, 240–242, 244, 255, 261, 293– 294, 296, 304, 308–310, 318–320, 322–324, 354, 359, 366 Bridge verbs 69 By-phrases 84–89, 307–308 Calculus of Control 129–138, 143, 224–228 – see also [R] feature Case (abstract) 4, 31, 33–35, 38, 41–42, 52, 54–55, 61–62, 65–73, 77–79, 83, 86, 88–120, 129, 134, 140–143, 145–146, 159, 161, 169–170, 219–220, 222n7, 224, 228–229, 234–239, 241n2, 247, 252, 254n9, 256–258, 260–273, 276, 282, 284, 288–289, 291–293, 315, 329–331, 348–349, 352, 355, 358, 360– 363, 365, 369–370 Case Filter 31, 34, 38, 41, 52, 54–55, 63, 65– 66 case (morphological) 2, 66–67, 127–129, 134–136, 215, 232–240, 255, 265, 270n7, 354–355 case rich languages 2, 38n10, 52, 66, 127– 129, 134–136, 138, 142–143, 165, 232– 240, 270n7, 354–355 Case suppression 228–330 c-command 34, 36, 45, 48, 60–62, 77, 81, 95–96, 125, 139, 146n2, 147, 159, 162, 184, 217n2, 232, 234, 247–248, 260, 264–267, 297–300, 302–309, 311–315, 317, 320–322, 324, 328n5, 351n10, 360, 362–363, 365, 367, 370 Clitic pronoun 300–301 – see also clitic pronoun placement Clitic pronoun placement 3, 240, 253–256, 258–259, 288–289, 303, 357, 361, 364 Coercion 152–153, 195–196, 211, 324

Index

COMP deletion (or non-overt C) 25n6, 32, 42, 59, 259–260, 295, 303 Conceptual structure approaches to Control 172–173, 189–190, 201–211, 213–214, 231n11, 295–296, 303–305, 331, 348–349, 353–357, 370 – see also Bare VPs Control (C-) subjunctives 134n30, 143, 146, 270–271, 351–352, 367–368 Control problem 11, 13, 19, 45, 58, 62, 150n4, 174, 176–178, 180–181, 192, 197–199, 201, 206, 210, 214, 293–294, 296–297, 301–302, 312, 322–323, 366 – see also Control Theory Control Theory 23–24, 26–38, 43–46, 52– 53, 57, 62–63, 71, 73–77, 81–83, 96, 139–141, 169–171, 182, 201, 278–279, 294–324, 352–370 – see also argument structure approaches to Control, conceptual structure approaches to Control, Control problem, model-theoretic approaches to Control Coordinate NPs 17 Croire ‘to believe’ 4, 35, 152n5, 196, 211, 213, 223, 227–229, 235, 268, 292, 349n8, 368 Crossover 18, 47n15 c-selection 8n1, 14, 24–25, 31–32, 38–42, 53–54, 62, 67, 70–71, 99, 101, 104–105, 112–116, 118–123, 161, 171, 173–174, 181, 189, 192, 194, 201, 212, 219, 222, 231, 241, 247–248, 251–254, 258–260, 262–263, 268–269, 278–282, 289– 290, 303–304, 333–335, 342, 356–364, 368–370 Default case 122, 128, 135, 143, 233–238, 354–355, 264, 267, 361 Deliberately: see Agent-oriented manner adverbials Deontic modality 252, 255, 273–274, 278– 287, 289–290, 357, 364 – see also modal contexts de re interpretation 167, 217n2, 271n9, 328n5, 351n10 de se interpretation 126–127, 148, 163, 217n2, 271n9, 328n5, 351n10

381

Devoir ‘must’ 3, 121, 240, 251–253, 256, 262–263, 272–291, 293, 357, 360, 364 D-feature: see EPP feature Domain (role of in the determination of PRO’s antecedent) 28–30, 32–34, 49– 53, 56–62, 146n2, 297, 301–302, 305, 308–311, 322, 367, 370 Donkey anaphora 306–307 Doom pronoun 12–31, 229n10 Dutch 168, 301–302, 308 ECM 35–36, 42, 49–51, 61, 63, 67–68, 72, 98–118, 130, 137–138, 141, 219–227, 265–269, 326n2, 329–335, 342, 345– 349, 352, 362, 368–370 – see also get, small clauses Elsewhere Condition 63–64, 67–69, 302 Empty Category Principle (ECP) 95, 260 Epistemic modality 107, 274, 278n13, 279– 285, 289, 290n14 – see also modal contexts EPP (or D) feature 117–123, 145, 159, 230– 231, 247–250, 252, 257–262, 291, 358 Equative sentences 186–187 EQUI-NP Deletion 9–10, 16, 18, 24, 42 Ethical datives 238 Event control 82–83, 157n7, 163–164, 169– 170, 203–204, 243–244 Eventive predicates 107–108, 221, 223 Event nominals 73, 77–89, 157n7, 165, 172, 181–184, 192, 200, 202–203, 213, 240, 245, 256, 296, 307 Eventualities 331–352, 369–370 Exhaustive Control (EC) 227–228, 235, 324 Expletives 2, 40, 52–53, 61, 68, 73n20, 75– 77, 90–93, 120–121, 142, 163, 216–217, 229, 240, 243, 247n5, 248–253, 256, 259, 262–263, 271–284, 289–291, 299– 302, 308, 315–316, 353–357, 360, 363– 364 Extraposition 59–60, 68–69 Factive verbs 103, 114, 129–130, 132, 220, 225, 227 Facts 330–352, 369–370

382

Index

Falloir ‘to be necessary’ 3, 240, 251–253, 256, 259, 262–263, 272–290, 293, 304, 321, 357, 360, 364 Feature checking/valuation 264–273, 276, 282, 284, 287, 291–292, 329–331, 348– 352, 354–364, 367–370 Finite Control languages 29n8, 123–127, 133–134, 138, 142–143, 217, 265n4, 270–271, 328n5, 331, 350–352, 362, 367–370 FinP 168, 279–282, 285–289, 303, 306, 308–311, 315, 323–324 Floating quantifiers 3, 122, 127, 136–137, 142–143, 233n12, 240, 245–248, 255, 257–258, 260–261, 288–289, 356, 358–360, 363 For adjuncts 157n7, 159–161, 169, 316–318, 365–366 ForceP 24, 168–170, 257–260, 262, 266, 272, 279, 281, 289, 301–303, 308–314, 317, 320–323, 345, 352, 356, 359–364, 367 Free (F-) subjunctives 134n30, 143, 218n3, 218n4, 223n8, 265n4, 268n6, 270–271, 351–352, 367–368 Free (Nearly Free) Control 161, 204, 209, 323 – see also Arbitrary PRO Free relative clauses 240, 241n1, 259 French 3–4, 35–36, 76, 98n22, 106, 110–111, 120–123, 138, 152n5, 157n7, 168, 170, 211, 213, 217n1, 218–219, 223, 227–229, 235, 237–238, 240, 249, 251–257, 259, 262–293, 299–301, 303–304, 307–308, 314–317, 325n*, 328–329, 351, 355, 357–358, 361–364, 368 Genitive morpheme 85–89 German 35, 75, 237, 356 Gerunds 76, 97–98, 101–102, 104, 120–121, 122n27, 136, 141–143, 157n7, 159, 162, 204, 219–220, 226–227, 247, 263n3, 264, 266–267, 269, 288–289, 357, 361– 363, 368 Get 4, 104–105, 108–110, 113, 116, 138, 221– 223, 227, 229, 235, 258, 267, 269, 358– 359, 368, 370 – see also ECM, small clauses Governing category 47n15, 48–53, 55

Government-Binding Theory (GB) 7, 39–89, 139, 212 Grammatical functions 86–87 Greek 4–5, 29n8, 38n10, 66, 123–127, 129, 133–134, 142, 215, 217n1, 217n2, 218n3, 223n8, 232, 240, 265n4, 268n6, 270– 271, 291n15, 328–329, 331, 350–352, 354, 362, 367–370 Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) 192, 194, 210–211, 295 Icelandic 2, 38n10, 66, 110–111, 127, 128n28, 134–135, 142, 165, 168, 215, 232, 233n12, 233n13, 234–235, 240, 270n7, 354 Identity Erasure: see EQUI-NP Deletion Idioms 277–278, 283–290 Implicative verbs 102–104, 106–107, 114, 220, 222, 345–347 Implicit arguments 1, 6, 22, 26, 60–61, 78– 89, 139, 144, 157n7, 167–168, 170–173, 175, 177, 179, 181–183, 186, 188–192, 194–197, 199, 201–203, 205, 207, 210– 214, 231–232, 240, 245–246, 250, 255– 256, 278–279, 282, 287, 296, 302, 304–308, 314–316, 318, 320–322, 324, 348, 356, 360, 363, 367 – see also argument structure approaches to Control, conceptual structure approaches to Control, model-theoretic approaches to Control Inanimate NPs 74, 276–277, 283–290, 314, 318, 364 Indirect questions 3, 19, 25–27, 31, 33–34, 40, 43–44, 59, 68–69, 99, 101, 151, 153–156, 161, 188–189, 197, 211, 213 240–243, 255–256, 259, 294–296, 302, 309–311, 356, 359, 363 Infinitives: see tense of, inflected infinitives Inflected infinitives 108, 325n1, 349–350, 352 In order to: see Rationale Clauses Instrument theta role 73, 84–88, 187 Italian 3–4, 35, 98n22, 122n27, 163, 165, 168, 218n3, 243, 253–255, 258–259, 263n3, 267, 268n6, 356, 358–359, 361, 364, 368

Index

Last Resort 91, 111, 114, 161–162, 164, 187, 214, 230, 242, 244, 247, 249, 252–253, 356–357 Left-Dislocation 237–238 Left periphery: see FinP, ForceP Logophoricity 203, 302, 309, 313–314, 318– 323, 367 Long distance control 46, 161, 166, 297, 323 L-selection 115 Meaning postulates (MPs) 172, 177–181, 188–190, 212–213, 230–231, 249–250, 296 Metalinguistic negation 313 Minimal Distance Principle (MDP) 4, 10–13, 19–20, 35–39, 43–46, 58, 60–61, 147, 149–151, 156–161, 169, 171, 214, 294– 296, 365–366 Minimalist Theory 89–143, 144–151, 157– 171, 215–324, 348–370 Minimal Link Condition (MLC): see Minimal Distance Principle Modal contexts 17, 19–20, 107–108, 112, 153–156, 157n7, 189, 207–209, 240, 251–256, 259, 262–263, 272–290, 321, 357, 360, 364 Model-theoretic approaches to Control 171– 190, 200–201, 211–213, 230–231, 248– 250, 252, 254–255, 295–296, 331, 348– 349, 353–357 – see also Bare VPs Move 91–92, 261 – see also Movement Theory of Control Movement Theory of Control 2, 6, 144–171, 188n12, 212, 214–217, 228–230, 238, 242–244, 246, 247n5, 248, 250–255, 294, 330–331, 348, 353–357, 370 Must 289–290, 290n14 – see also devoir ‘must,’ falloir ‘to be necessary’ Nominative Island Constraint (NIC) 32–34, 38, 49, 52–53 Nonfinite I/T: see tense of infinitives Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) 222n7 *[NP to VP] Filter 28, 34, 54

383

On ‘one’ 74, 155, 187, 249 Opacity Condition 32–34, 49, 52–53 Opaque domains 23, 28–30, 32–34, 49, 53 Partial Control (PC) 154, 227–228, 324 Passives 7–8, 13, 26, 59–60, 68, 84–89, 118n26, 157n7, 158, 162–164, 182, 198, 203–204, 221–222, 235, 257, 260–261, 287–288, 298, 301–302, 305–308, 314, 317–321, 327, 358–359 Person, number, gender (phi-) features 2, 4– 5, 42, 46–51, 64–70, 89, 97, 117–120, 130–137, 195, 222n7, 224–225, 229– 231, 236n15, 257, 264–273, 276, 282, 284, 291–293, 302, 309, 330–331, 348–352, 362–365, 367–370 – see also PRO, phi-features of Phi-features: see Person, number, gender features Pr: see v(P) Principle of Agreement 65, 67–69 Principle of Denotability 63, 67 Principle of Full Interpretation 92, 115, 144, 172, 212, 216–217, 249, 330 Principle of Lexicalization 66–68, 70, 72 pro 39n11, 47n15, 50–51, 57, 62–64, 76, 124–127, 131, 133–134, 161–171, 187, 214, 218n3, 218n4, 224, 230, 242–244, 251, 253, 268n6, 271, 351, 356–357, 367–368 PRO – As a derivative vs. primitive 46, 54, 57, 78, 95 – Case properties of 28, 34, 38, 41, 52, 54– 55, 61–62, 66–68, 70, 72–73, 78–79, 88–120, 127, 135–136, 140–143, 148– 149, 234, 265, 267–271, 289, 291–293, 322–323, 330–331, 348–349, 352, 362– 363, 370 – Gap in the distribution of 5, 217–219, 221, 229, 325–352, 369–370 – Phi-features of 42, 46, 51, 64–70, 96–97, 117–120, 131–135, 140–142, 257, 266– 271, 289, 291, 293, 302, 309, 322–324, 330–331, 348–352, 362–363, 367, 370

384

Index

– Pronominal behavior (or lack of) 15–18, 51–53, 55, 63, 68, 70, 124–127, 139– 140, 298, 302, 314, 318–319 – Semantic determination of antecedent 12– 13, 19–20, 22, 27, 31, 38, 43–45, 58–59, 61–63, 67, 69, 73, 140, 150n4, 151–161, 169, 173n9, 182–184, 190–214, 293– 324, 365–367, 370 – Semantic features of 74–77, 179, 187–188, 211, 213, 249, 257, 262, 266, 271–272, 291–292, 296, 302, 309, 322, 330, 363–364, 370 – Syntactic determination of antecedent 7–12, 15, 25–39, 43–89, 144–148, 169– 171, 197–200, 201–204, 210, 293–324, 365–367, 370 – Thematic constraints on 73–74, 85, 187– 188 – see also Arbitrary PRO Procrastinate 247 Projection Principle 41, 70 Promise 11, 19–20, 24–25, 27, 31, 33, 35–37, 44, 50, 67, 79–82, 86, 106, 110–111, 128, 135, 150, 152, 166, 168, 170, 179, 180n11, 181, 183, 191–196, 204–207, 209, 210, 212, 217n2, 232–233, 294– 296, 303–304, 306–308, 319, 327, 328n4, 328n5, 329, 366 Propositional Island Constraint: see Tensed S Condition Propositions 331–352, 369–370 PRO Theorem 53, 91–92 Purpose Clauses 45n14, 60–61, 68–69, 83, 160, 169, 182, 198–199, 295–296 Q-Float: see floating quantifiers Raising 86, 90–94, 98–123, 137, 141–142, 146–149, 162, 165, 168, 217, 219–224, 229, 245–255, 275, 280, 284–290, 316, 326n2, 359 Rationale Clauses 11, 45n14, 51, 60–61, 68– 69, 83, 157n7, 159–160, 169, 199, 202– 204, 221–222, 295–296, 318–321 R(eferential)-index (or nature) 23, 26–28, 31–32, 37–38, 42–54, 63–69, 74–77,

82, 89, 131, 139–140, 187–188, 294– 295, 365 – see also [R] feature Reconstruction 94–95 Restructuring effects: see clitic pronoun placement Retroactive gerunds 240, 245, 256, 360, 363 [R] feature 129, 131–132, 136–138, 143, 224, 226, 235, 236n15 Rules of Control: see Control Theory Russian 38n10, 66, 127–129, 134–136, 140, 215, 232–235, 237–238, 240, 270n7, 354 S0 Deletion: see ECM Secondary predicates: see case rich languages Seem: see Raising Selectional restrictions 13–14, 71, 130–132, 217 Semi-predicative phrases (SemPs): see case rich languages Sentential subjects 68–69, 79, 82, 161, 200, 204, 228, 230, 244, 260, 293, 295, 308–309, 323, 365 Shifts in controller 19–20, 37–38, 43–44, 54, 151–156, 171, 195, 296, 310–311 Sloppy readings: see VP-Ellipsis Small clauses 39n12, 49, 56, 61, 104–105, 108, 112–114, 129–130, 137–138, 221– 223, 225–227, 229, 235, 247, 258–260, 262–263, 265–269, 276, 291, 330–331, 333, 335, 342, 345–349, 352, 362, 368– 370 – see also ECM, get Specified Subject Condition 28–30, 32–33, 49, 52–53 Spell-Out 4, 90, 93, 95–96, 148, 169, 224, 248–249, 257, 353 Split antecedents 126, 148, 163, 165–167, 170–171, 176, 212, 296, 324 S-selection 41, 71, 80–81, 85–89, 105, 111– 115, 157n7, 172, 176–177, 184, 190, 193, 212, 220–221, 252, 275, 278–283, 305, 315–316, 335, 342, 345 Strict readings: see VP-Ellipsis

Index

Syntactic (in)transitivity (TrP) 114, 117–120, 123, 134–136, 138, 142–143, 180n11, 229, 247n5, 264–270, 317, 330, 349n8, 355, 358, 362, 369 Tensed S Condition 28–30, 32–33, 49, 52– 53 Tense “mismatch” 100, 106, 130, 132, 138, 225–227, 345–347 Tense of infinitives 97–117, 129–130, 141– 142, 219–228, 329–331, 345–350, 352, 370 There-sentences 2, 40, 52, 61, 92–93, 180, 188, 216–217, 247n5, 249–251, 263, 272, 275, 281–282, 301, 308, 354–355, 357, 360, 364 Theta Criterion 2, 41, 57, 61, 68, 70, 73n20, 85–89, 91, 119, 145–146, 169, 172, 212 Theta Theory 2, 39, 41, 57, 61–62, 68, 70, 73n20, 84–89, 91–94, 119–121, 139, 142–146, 149, 157–159, 165, 169, 171– 172, 175–177, 184, 190, 193, 196, 207, 212, 214, 216–217, 229, 231, 246, 249– 253, 261n2, 263, 273, 275, 280, 281– 290, 295–296, 298, 304–305, 319–321, 330, 353–356, 360, 363–364 Tough-Movement 240, 245, 256 Tr: see syntactic transitivity Traces, Minimalist approach to 94–95, 141, 146, 260–261 Transformational Grammar 7–39, 139–140, 144n1

385

Unexpanded NPs 25–27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 42, 46, 63, 139–140 Verb Raising 110–111, 301 Visibility Condition 92–94, 141, 145 Visser’s Generalization 305–308 v(P) 104n24, 171, 216–217, 226, 234, 247– 248, 254, 256, 258–264, 266–267, 272, 280–282, 286–289, 354, 358–362, 364 VP-Ellipsis 108–110, 125–126, 147, 162, 166– 167, 185, 217n2, 220–221, 223, 328n5, 351n10 Wanna-contraction 42, 148–149 Want 2–3, 14, 24n5, 39n12, 42, 57, 66, 71, 75, 91, 97, 109n25, 114–116, 148–149, 151, 153, 179, 191, 194, 206, 211, 213, 218n4, 220, 222n7, 223, 225, 230–231, 245, 250, 253–255, 258–259, 267, 271, 287, 324, 329, 332–335, 351–352, 354, 356–361, 363–364 Wh-elements 3, 18, 20, 25–26, 33–34, 38, 42, 50–51, 59, 68, 71, 94–95, 141, 146n2, 151, 188–189, 197, 211, 240– 243, 255–256, 259, 294–296, 309–311, 316, 356, 359, 363 – see also Indirect questions While-type adjuncts 78–79, 82–83, 157– 160, 182–183, 199–200, 202–204, 213, 246n3, 293, 295–296, 298–299, 312– 315, 318