North Korea After Kim Il Sung 9781685859657

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NORTH KOREA AFTER K I M I I SUNG

NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM I I SUNG

edited by

Dae-Sook Suh Chae-Jin Lee

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers. Inc. 1800 30th Street. Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data North Korea after Kim II Sung / edited by Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee. p. cm. ISBN 1-55587-763-X (alk. paper) 1. Korea (North) I. Suh, Dae-Sook, 1 9 3 1 - II. Lee. Chae-Jin, 1936DS932.N665 1998 951.93—dc21 97-32958 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 . 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Preface

Introduction Robert A. Part 1

Figures

Scalapino Political and Economic D e v e l o p m e n t

1

Kim Jong II and New Leadership in North Korea Dae-Sook Suh

2

Prospects for the North Korean Economy Marcus Noland Part 2

U.S.-North Korean Relations

3

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Selig S. Harrison

4

North Korean Policy Toward the United States B. C. Koh

5

North Korea: From Containment to Engagement C. Kenneth Quinones Part 3

Nuclear and Security Issues

6

Nuclear Issues Between the United States and North Korea Doug Bandow

7

The Conventional Military Strength of North Korea: Implications for Inter-Korean Security Edward A. Olsen

v

vi 8

Contents

New Security Arrangements Between the United States and North Korea Patrick M. Morgan Part 4

9 10 11

165

External R e l a t i o n s of N o r t h Korea

China and North Korea: An Uncertain Relationship Chae-Jin Lee

193

North Korean Relations with Japan Richard Halloran

211

North and South Korean Confrontation in the Nuclear Age Chong-Sik Lee

231

Appendix Appendix of Kim Appendix

1: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 2: Members and Ranks of the Funeral Committees II Sung, O Chin-u, and Ch'oe Kwang 3: Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue

Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

245 247 255

259 263 267 275

TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 7.1 8.1 8.2

Changes in the Central Committee, 1980-1993 26 Composition of the Funeral Committee, 1994 28 Socioeconomic Indicators, 1992 35 Educational Attainment Rates 36 Distribution of Labor Force in Selected CPEs 36 International Income and Capital Stock Comparisons 37 Ratio of South Korean to North Korean per Capita Income, 1990 38 North Korean Trade by Largest Commodity Groups, 1992 41 North Korea's Trade Partners, 1992 42 Debt-Export Ratio 44 Estimated Remittances, 1993 45 Alternative Reform Scenarios 48 Actual and "Natural" North Korean Trade Shares 50 Comparison of R O K and DPRK Armed Forces 148 National Security Balance Sheet, External Dimension 180 Domestic Security Balance Sheet, Internal Dimension 186

Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

North Korean Arms Trade Estimates of Real Growth Rates North Korean International Trade North Korean Debt and Debt Service/Export Ratio

vii

35 39 40 43

PREFACE

In October 1994, more than four decades after the Korean War, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement designed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework was the first constructive measure that the United States and North Korea had taken to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. During the Cold War, North Korea was firmly ensconced in the socialist camp in alliance with the Soviet Union and China, while the United States supported South Korea. In an effort to stave off a recurrence of North Korean aggression, U.S. troops have been stationed in South Korea for nearly fifty years. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, North Korea has been searching for a place in the community of nations. It joined the nonaligned movement and has succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with more than one hundred countries, but it is completely isolated from the technologically advanced and industrialized countries of the world. In the eyes o f the world community, in particular the industrialized countries, the image of North Korea is unfavorable. The country is so isolated that few hard facts about its people and politics are known to the outside world. It has been accused of practicing state terrorism and has been labeled a rogue state that cannot be trusted. The U.S. perception of North Korea is especially bad. Because of its long-standing ties with South Korea, the United States has maintained an adversarial relationship with the North. During the Korean War, the United States placed North Korea in the rank of enemy state, a move that prevented U.S. citizens from transacting business with North Korea. (The United States has not rescinded that statute.) E v e n after the war, encounters between the United States and North Korea were military confrontations, such as the Pueblo incident and the ax murders in the Demilitarized Zone. These incidents did not help the North Korean cause in the United States, nor did the North's constant and often vitriolic propaganda campaigns to denounce the United States as the enemy of the Korean people. The United

ix

Preface

X

S t a t e s v i e w s North K o r e a as a militant state that threatens the s e c u r i t y o f S o u t h K o r e a , a n d it h a s d e p l o y e d its t r o o p s t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e o n t h e K o r e a n p e n i n s u l a . North K o r e a is a l s o c o n s i d e r e d an a g g r e s s i v e state that c a n disturb the p e a c e and s e c u r i t y o f its n e i g h b o r s when and i f it d e v e l o p s and a c q u i r e s w e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n . W h e n North K o r e a w a s s u s p e c t e d o f d e v e l o p i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s b e g a n to n e g o t i a t e in e a r n e s t to p e r s u a d e N o r t h K o r e a to r e m a i n a m e m b e r o f the T r e a t y on the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n o f

Nuclear

W e a p o n s and to d i s s u a d e it f r o m further d e v e l o p i n g n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s by p r o v i d i n g a l t e r n a t i v e e n e r g y s o u r c e s . In c o o p e r a t i o n with J a p a n and S o u t h K o r e a , the U n i t e d S t a t e s o r g a n i z e d the K o r e a n

Peninsula

Energy

D e v e l o p m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n to i m p l e m e n t this a p p r o a c h . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is w o r k i n g to e s t a b l i s h a l i a i s o n o f f i c e in P y o n g y a n g and will a l l o w North K o r e a to e s t a b l i s h the s a m e in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . T h e s e tentative first steps o f d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s m a y or m a y not lead to n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , U . S . initiatives in this regard r e p r e s e n t the m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s any c o u n t r y h a s m a d e to b r i n g North K o r e a into the c o m m u n i t y o f the industrialized c o u n t r i e s o f the w o r l d . N o r t h K o r e a w a s r u l e d b y K i m II S u n g , o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e s u p r e m e leader, for fifty y e a r s until his death in J u l y 1 9 9 4 . A l t h o u g h K i m prepared his s o n , K i m J o n g II, as s u c c e s s o r , the c o u n t r y s e e m s to h a v e f a l l en into disarray s i n c e his death. It has yet to c o n v e n e its S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s A s s e m b l y to e l e c t a n e w p r e s i d e n t o f the r e p u b l i c ; and the ruling party, the W o r k e r s ' P a r t y o f K o r e a , w h i c h has not held a party c o n g r e s s in s e v e n t e e n y e a r s , has not e l e c t e d a n e w g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y . T h e p e o p l e s e e m to b e l o y a l to K i m J o n g II, w h o c o n t r o l s the N o r t h K o r e a n m i l i t a r y as c o m m a n d e r - i n c h i e f , but they s u f f e r f r o m f o o d s h o r t a g e s and g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c h a r d s h i p s . N o r t h K o r e a has r e c o r d e d n e g a t i v e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h e v e r s i n c e t h e c o l l a p s e o f the S o v i e t U n i o n , and the s e v e r e f l o o d s o f 1 9 9 5 and 1 9 9 6 d e p l e t e d w h a t e v e r s a v i n g s it had in f o o d r e s e r v e s . T o p r e v e n t m a s s s t a r v a t i o n , N o r t h K o r e a sought a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o m i l l i o n m e t r i c t o n s o f grain to c o v e r t h e f o o d s h o r t a g e until the h a r v e s t o f 1 9 9 7 . T h e n u m b e r o f N o r t h K o r e a n r e f u g e e s f l e e i n g to the S o u t h

has

i n c r e a s e d s i n c e the death o f K i m II S u n g . T h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t d e f e c t i o n o c c u r r e d in F e b r u a r y

1997, when Hwang Chang-yop, secretary of the

W o r k e r s ' P a r t y o f K o r e a and c h a i r m a n o f the F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e o f the S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s A s s e m b l y , turned to the S o u t h s e e k i n g p o l i t i c a l a s y l u m . H w a n g ' s d e f e c t i o n is a s i g n o f d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a m o n g t h e o l d l e a d e r s l o y a l to K i m II S u n g , but it a l s o s i g n i f i e s the r i s e o f n e w and y o u n g e r p o l i t ical leaders o f K i m J o n g II's generation. M o r e important than H w a n g ' s d e f e c t i o n is the r e s i g n a t i o n , a l s o in F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 7 , o f P r e m i e r K a n g S o n g s a n , an a r c h i t e c t o f the North K o r e a n e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . It w a s K a n g w h o in the 1 9 8 0 s i n t r o d u c e d j o i n t - v e n t u r e l a w s to attract f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t a n d w h o tried to c r e a t e t h e s p e c i a l e c o n o m i c z o n e in N a j i n - S o n b o n g in t h e

Preface

xi

1990s. Although Kang has been replaced by Vice-Premier Hong Song-nam as acting p r e m i e r , his e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m s s e e m to h a v e s u r v i v e d the change. Since the death of Kim II Sung, many other important leaders of the older generation have also passed away. Marshal O Chin-u died in February 1995; Marshal C h ' o e Kwang, who replaced O Chin-u as minister of the People's Armed Forces, died in February 1997; and one week after C h ' o e ' s death, his deputy, Kim Kwang-jin, vice-minister of the P e o p l e ' s Armed Forces, also died. Approximately 10 percent of the 270 individuals who constituted the top leadership at the time of Kim II Sung's death have since passed away. Kim Jong II compares the current North Korean difficulties with his father's "march in distress" in the winter of 1938 and the spring of 1939, which the Korean guerrillas made during their revolutionary struggle for independence f r o m Japan. The hardship the North Korean people suffer today may be similar to the s u f f e r i n g the guerrillas e x p e r i e n c e d in the Manchurian plains without food, adequate clothing, or warm shelter. The guerrillas had to fight the pursuing Japanese expeditionary force to survive; and despite their share of defectors and traitors who betrayed the cause of the revolution, Kim II Sung persisted and fought for Korean independence. Like his father, Kim Jong II claims that his "inaich in distress" will be victorious. This book is an effort by U.S. scholars, longtime observers of North Korea, to introduce readers to a country in transition after the death of Kim II Sung. True to the U.S. tradition, the contributors' views vary, but collectively they represent our current understanding of this long-hidden, enigmatic, and impoverished state. The book grew out of two w o r k s h o p s held at the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies of Claremont McKenna College in 1995 and 1996. We express our appreciation f o r the able assistance of Mary Anderson, administrative officer of the Keck Center, and the editorial recommendations of John C. Thomas. The Editors

Introduction Robert A.

Scalapino

For those who enjoy a mystery, North Korea is an ideal subject of study. Where else does a state exist without an officially designated head and with a political system that operates with scarcely any visible institutions? Is there any other nation where the paucity of data regarding the economy is so great or outside estimates of intentions regarding future economic policies so diverse? Even in the strategic realm, external opinions vary greatly regarding both the capabilities and intentions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and for good reason. Only with respect to the North's relations with other nations are the data sufficient to permit reasonably assured analyses, but this is also an area where unexpected changes can occur, subject to leadership decisions. Yet it would be a serious mistake to a s s u m e that because there are many lacunae in our knowledge, we know nothing about the DPRK. The chapters in this volume are testimony to the fact that much is known, and even when the available data do not permit precision, they enable perimeters to be created or varying degrees of probability to be assigned to alternative scenarios. One should start with the North Korean domestic scene because in the final analysis domestic conditions, political and economic, are likely to be the decisive factor in determining the N o r t h ' s relations with others and, indeed, the crucial question of its survival. It seems clear that the political operation of the DPRK is not dependent upon those formal institutions embedded in the constitution. When was the last time the Supreme People's Assembly met or the Central Committee of the Workers' Party was c o n v e n e d ? Personal relationships, operating through certain institutional f r a m e w o r k s but a b o v e all d e p e n d e n t upon informal ties, especially ties to the supreme leader, are the essence of governance in this society. Today, "the great leader" is Kim Jong II, and in Chapter 1 Dae-Sook Suh gives us an informed analysis of this enigmatic man and his present political role.

1

2

Introduction

The decision to transmit power from father to son was made long ago, and young Kim was steadily groomed for his role, albeit through indigenous training. His personal interests appear to have been in making motion pictures, and being an introvert, he has never relished the public role that his father played so effectively. Yet, to partially compensate for this lack of charisma, the succession has been suffused with a religious aura: The father is not truly dead; he is being reborn in the son. Kim II Sung is eternal. There may be practical reasons why the formal inauguration of Kim Jong II as president or party general secretary has been delayed. The people had to be adjusted to a new era after decades of regarding the first great leader as the source of all wisdom, especially in this period of great economic hardship. Thus, m o u r n i n g — a n d with it the full panopiy of tradition—remains in effect as North Korea moves into the fourth p o s t - K i m II Sung year, but with growing signs that with the third anniversary duly commemorated, the son will assume one or more high offices in addition to his command of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the evidence strongly suggests that Kim Jong II is without challenge at this point. His primary attention has been directed toward the military, and in this realm, he is taking care to pay due homage to those remaining of his f a t h e r ' s generation while elevating a younger group in whom he has confidence. Several key generals of the older generation have recently passed away, making this task easier. At the same time, a few civilian contemporaries of Kim Jong II, including certain relatives, have that all-important access that gives them power. Whether there are three separate channels through which information flows to the top—military, party, and government—or whether such information is often synthesized before reaching the great leader remains unclear. Spotty e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g leaders of North Korea have existed, at least over timing and tactics, some of them requiring very high level decisions. Indeed, North Korean sources have recently made such assertions to the United States, but to what extent this information is a part of the bargaining game—with the implication that "modera t e s " must be s u p p o r t e d lest " h a r d - l i n e r s " gain g r e a t e r a u t h o r i t y — i s unclear. Stronger evidence points to sharp rivalry for turf and recognition at horizontal levels, for example, between party and governmental agencies. In sum, the power structure is undoubtedly tight but less than monolithic. Since the capacity of the D P R K to survive—or, if one prefers, the length of its s u r v i v a l — d e p e n d s heavily upon the economy, it is vitally important to weigh this factor as carefully as possible, as Marcus Noland has done in Chapter 2. On the broad facts, there is wide-ranging agreement; even North Korean spokespeople acknowledge that the economy is in crisis today. Naturally, they place primary emphasis upon the recent floods. More detached observers point to the intrinsic flaws in the command economy that have been operative since its establishment: an autarky that has pre-

Introduction

3

eluded keeping pace with the t e c h n o l o g i c a l revolution; scanty foreign trade and a c c e s s to foreign e x c h a n g e ; a strong i m b a l a n c e between heavy industry and c o n s u m e r goods and a military quotient that has constituted a crushing burden; overbureaucratization, with ever-increasing reliance upon exhortation in an effort to raise production. T h e list o f d e f e c t s could be extended. T h e n c a m e the deluge, literally and figuratively. T h e c o l l a p s e o f the S o v i e t Union largely removed North K o r e a ' s c h i e f source o f vital trade and e c o n o m i c aid in the f o r m o f p o s t p o n e d debt p a y m e n t s and " f r i e n d s h i p p r i c e s . " T h e s e benefits had been o f crucial importance to the D P R K e c o n o my. C h i n a a l s o t o u g h e n e d its t e r m s o f trade. S u d d e n l y , c h u c h ' e ( s e l f r e l i a n c e ) b e c a m e all too real. T h e floods o f 1 9 9 5 and 1 9 9 6 were the final blow. T h e e v i d e n c e s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e s that f r o m 1 9 8 9 to 1 9 9 6 , the g r o s s d o m e s t i c product ( G D P ) o f the D P R K declined yearly, between roughly 2 to 5 percent per annum. Despite efforts to obtain energy supplies from the M i d d l e East through military sales, shortages in North K o r e a have had a s e r i o u s e f f e c t upon the ability o f industrial plants to o p e r a t e at or near c a p a c i t y . Agriculture has also been a f f e c t e d by inadequate fertilizer and w e a k m e c h a n i z a t i o n . Trade has probably represented only 12 percent o f total G D P , and while estimates o f per capita G D P vary widely, most analysts believe that it is s o m e w h e r e between one-fourth to one-tenth that o f the South. F o r these reasons, a number o f o b s e r v e r s are prone to argue that the c o l l a p s e o f the D P R K is inevitable, the only uncertainties being those o f timing and c o n s e q u e n c e s . Others are m o r e cautious, emphasizing that this society has long known hardship, that it is governed by a tough elite intent upon survival at whatever price, and that external influences can be kept far m o r e m i n i m a l than w a s the c a s e with E a s t e r n E u r o p e and the U S S R . Nonetheless, it is extraordinarily difficult to maintain that the status quo is t e n a b l e . Indeed, the e v i d e n c e a c c u m u l a t e s that a g r o w i n g portion o f the North K o r e a n elite, recognizing this fact, is exploring e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s . T h i s group is taking cautious steps b e c a u s e it r e c o g n i z e s the hazards that a process o f opening up can have upon a political system. Yet the exploration o f c h a n g e gathers m o m e n t u m . It has been m o r e than a decade s i n c e the first j o i n t venture law was promulgated in the North, but limited progress has been m a d e in inducing foreign investment despite heightened efforts. T h e International Investment and Trade Forum held in N a j i n - S o n b o n g in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 6 represented a m a j o r effort to attract outside investors. However, other than the funds from the C h o c h ' o n g n y o n adherents ( p r o - N o r t h K o r e a n s living in J a p a n ) , investm e n t s have been sparse, most o f them small scale and generally for proc e s s i n g , taking advantage o f the N o r t h ' s c h e a p and e f f i c i e n t labor f o r c e . G r o u p s o f f o r e i g n e n t r e p r e n e u r s c o n t i n u e to b e i n v i t e d to i n s p e c t t h e North's sites; special attention is being directed toward the South K o r e a n

4

Introduction

chaebol (business conglomerate). And the DPRK actively participates in the T u m e n R i v e r A r e a D e v e l o p m e n t P r o j e c t u n d e r U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) auspices. Pessimists say that these efforts, even if they go forward, are too late. Optimists give the DPRK a chance of following a modified Chinese or Vietnamese path and, by this route, achieving a "soft landing." The D P R K ' s advantages lie in an educated, effective labor force, important natural resources, and political stability (up to date). Yet in a highly competitive field, when the quest for foreign capital and technology is growing ever more acute, can the DPRK hold its own? Or if it needs external assistance, which seems inescapable, will agencies like the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank—together with South Korea and Japan—be available? Recently, North Korea's prospects for joining these organizations have brightened somewhat. As noted by E d w a r d Olsen in C h a p t e r 7, one cannot separate the North's economic difficulties from its high level of militarization. With some 25 percent of its population enlisted in military or militia forces and military expenditures taking more than one-fourth of the total budget, the DPRK is truly a garrison state. Although much of the North Korean military is utilized for civilian purposes—construction, road building, harvesting, and various other activities—there are also legitimate questions about its qualitative aspects. The evidence suggests that while there are areas such as missile production where advances are significant, much of the North's conventional forces are antiquated and certainly no match for those of the South. Indeed, it is for this reason that the DPRK is currently seeking external assistance in upgrading its military equipment. With the nuclear field off limits for the present, will this lead to moves toward chemical and biological weaponry in an effort to achieve balance? And will advances in missile production constitute a growing regional threat, with repercussions for Japan's security policies? Given these questions and the fact that the great bulk of the DPRK military is in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), it is not surprising that strategic-military issues have loomed large in the evolution of U.S.-North Korean relations. In Chapter 3, Selig Harrison goes beyond these concerns, setting forth his views on a full range of issues confronting the United States in its relations with both North and South Korea and suggesting specific proposals that will evoke varied responses and serious reflections. B. C. Koh follows in Chapter 4 with a discerning analysis of the North's approach to the United States. As Koh underlines, the DPRK leaders, using brinkmanship tactics, have made the most of their meager bargaining chips. By inducing a crisis and exhibiting toughness as both parties move toward the edge of confrontation, North Korea has done remarkably well in bringing the most powerful nation in the world to the table and ultimately obtaining an outcome, the Agreed Framework of October 1994, that is favorable to the

Introduction

DPRK. Doug Bandow details the difficult and painful steps in reaching this agreement in Chapter 6. As Kenneth Quinones points out in Chapter 5, however, North Korea's bargaining skill should not be overrated. For profoundly important reasons, the United States has been moving from policies of containment regarding traditional foes to those of engagement. Such a move has been most clearly exemplified with respect to China, but it has also been applied elsewhere. After the collapse of the USSR, the United States found that containment attracted limited international support, pushing the United States into an increasingly isolated position. Further, containment strengthened extremism, whereas engagement encouraged reform—both economic and political—in authoritarian states, making them a more integral part of the ongoing global revolution and pushing them into the stream of rapid change. As Patrick Morgan sets forth in Chapter 8, in North Korea, there is an added factor: Policies designed to induce stagnation and collapse could exact a heavy penalty on the South and create a potential crisis for the region. Failing or failed states in strategically important regions can easily induce multiple forms of external intervention. U.S. policies toward North Korea have been constructed with both general and specific considerations in mind, and the D P R K ' s priorities have also c l e a r l y b e e n in e v i d e n c e , t h o u g h on o c c a s i o n the tactics used to achieve those objectives have not always seemed well chosen. The North's principal goal has been to establish a full range of relations with the United States, using the nuclear card as the initial ploy. The D P R K hopes that recognition and reparations from Japan will follow. Official North-South relations will be given the most minimal attention possible, though various unofficial ties will be cultivated. This strategy is eminently logical from Pyongyang's perspective. It also represents a silent tribute to the South's earlier nordpolitik. If Seoul could induce Moscow and Beijing to establish a t w o - K o r e a s policy, should the North not seek a similar o u t c o m e f r o m Washington and Tokyo? The strengths in the North's strategy have been considerable. First, the United States has always taken the issue of nuclear proliferation very seriously despite the argument of some that it is less consequential than the r a p i d a d v a n c e s b e i n g m a d e in s o p h i s t i c a t e d c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s — weapons that, unlike nuclear bombs, will be used in the event of conflict. Other bargaining chips available to Pyongyang include such issues as soldiers missing in action (MIA), an end to terrorism, and the replacement of a precarious armistice. But Washington's concern about a "rogue state" having nuclear weapons and the impact this would have upon the region as a whole has proved of the greatest consequence. The North's strategy has major weaknesses as well. Unlike China, the DPRK has had no U.S. business constituency; the United States has shown scant interest in economic opportunities in the North. Indeed, virtually all

6

Introduction

U . S . pressure groups, both those in the private sector and those in the public domain, have seen the D P R K in a very negative light and have frequently questioned whether any c o n c e s s i o n s made have not been e x c e s s i v e . M o r e important, however, the North's effort to relegate the South to the position o f an outsider is totally unrealistic. S u c h a stance is unacceptable to the United States and is regarded negatively by Japan and by China and R u s s i a as w e l l . A s C h o n g - S i k L e e i n d i c a t e s in C h a p t e r 11, North K o r e a ' s e f f o r t s to separate the United States and the R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ( R O K ) have borne s o m e fruit; U . S . - S o u t h Korean relations have been troubled from time to time over the issue o f how to handle the North. However, as the a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a E n e r g y

Development

Organization ( K E D O ) clearly demonstrates, while s o m e f a c e - s a v i n g may be permitted, the North must accept the South as a principal actor in determining the future o f the K o r e a n peninsula both strategically and e c o n o m i c a l l y . N o amount o f vitriol directed at K i m Y o u n g S a m or o t h e r South K o r e a n leaders can alter this fact. T h e immediate c a s e in point is the R O K - U . S . proposal for a four-party d i a l o g u e , to include the United States, the R O K , the D P R K , and C h i n a , possibly arranged so as to a c c o m m o d a t e various c o m b i n a t i o n s o f the parties in the course o f the meetings. Pyongyang has been reluctant to officially respond to the proposal, which clearly constitutes a dilemma. T o accept would advance a series o f desired e c o n o m i c and political agreements with the United States and others, but it would also constitute recognition o f the R O K as a full dialogue partner, equal to the United States and C h i n a , howe v e r c a m o u f l a g e d for purposes o f face-saving. M e a n w h i l e , the United States has responded to North K o r e a n provocat i o n s s u c h as D M Z v i o l a t i o n s in a l o w - k e y f a s h i o n . T h e p r e d o m i n a n t assumption is that these maneuvers are bids for attention, not a prelude to c o n f l i c t . T h e d e c i b e l level o f D P R K propaganda is so continuously high that it c e a s e s to have e f f e c t . T h u s , when Nodortg

sinmun

(Workers'

Daily)

declares that there is " a n imminent risk o f w a r , " the external response is a stifled y a w n . Certainly, a risk o f c o n f l i c t d o e s e x i s t , as the statement in April 1997 o f d e f e c t o r Hwang C h a n g - y o p indicates. Yet given the certainty o f being pulverized by U . S . and R O K power, will D P R K leaders elect suic i d e ? C o n f l i c t m i g h t m o r e l o g i c a l l y e m e r g e f r o m the fallout that c o u l d a c c o m p a n y a weakening or collapse o f the North r e g i m e . Indeed, it is precisely because the costs and risks o f D P R K collapse are so high that the United States has been able to construct an ad h o c coalition o f m a j o r powers among the countries directly involved in the K o r e a n issue. W h i l e no c o n s e n s u s has been achieved, the U n i t e d States, J a p a n , C h i n a , and R u s s i a have been in frequent consultation, with subsequent actions, at a m i n i m u m serving to contain further deterioration and, on o c c a s i o n , advancing the cause o f tension reduction. At the same time, the United States has maintained its alliance with the

Introduction

7

S o u t h — d e s p i t e r e c u r r e n t d o u b t s in s o m e S o u t h K o r e a n q u a r t e r s — i n c l u d i n g the c o m m i t m e n t to r e g u l a r c o n s u l t a t i o n on all c r i t i c a l m a t t e r s . In S o u t h K o r e a , as e l s e w h e r e in E a s t A s i a , n a t i o n a l i s m s o m e t i m e s t a k e s a n t i - U . S . f o r m , e s p e c i a l l y a m o n g y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n s . T h e shift f r o m p a t r o n - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s to d e m a n d s f o r p a r t n e r s h i p is a g e n e r a l trend. B u t the U . S . - R O K a l l i a n c e still c o m m a n d s the support o f a strong m a j o r i t y o f e a c h c o u n t r y ' s c i t i z e n r y a n d the o v e r w h e l m i n g p o r t i o n o f the e l i t e s . A n d it c a n be a r g u e d that e v e n w h e n K o r e a is u n i f i e d , there is l i k e l y to be a d e s i r e for a c o n t i n ued U . S . p r e s e n c e o f s o m e type as a b a l a n c i n g f o r c e to m u c h n e a r e r n e i g h bors. North K o r e a ' s c u r r e n t p r e d i c a m e n t is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d than that o f the S o u t h . T o d a y it is b e r e f t o f trusted a l l i e s . R e l a t i o n s with R u s s i a fell to an a l l - t i m e l o w a f t e r 1 9 9 0 , with the D P R K f e e l i n g b e t r a y e d by R u s s i a n p o l i c i e s at h o m e and a b r o a d . In r e c e n t t i m e s , R u s s i a has s o u g h t to r e e s t a b l i s h n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h P y o n g y a n g s o a s to r e g a i n s o m e l e v e r a g e on t h e K o r e a n i s s u e . T h e North l i s t e n s , h o p i n g to o b t a i n R u s s i a n m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e a n d a i d in u p d a t i n g its o b s o l e s c e n t S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s . B u t w h e n c e w i l l c o m e the f u n d s ? T h e North o w e s a large d e b t to R u s s i a , a d e b t that h a r d - p r e s s e d M o s c o w is r e l u c t a n t to c a n c e l . P r o g r e s s in r e b u i l d i n g R u s s i a n - N o r t h K o r e a n r e l a t i o n s is l i k e l y to be slow. A s C h a e - J i n L e e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s in C h a p t e r 9 , N o i t h K o r e a retains iis c l o s e s t r e l a t i o n s with C h i n a . B e i j i n g is e a g e r to m a i n t a i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p with the North that k e e p s it f r o m straying t o w a r d o t h e r s — J a p a n or, m o r e l i k e l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h u s , e f f u s i v e p l e d g e s o f an e t e r n a l f r i e n d s h i p s e a l e d in b l o o d are r e p e a t e d o n c e r e m o n i a l o c c a s i o n s . M o r e o v e r , C h i n a has r e c e n t l y g i v e n s i g n s o f a w i l l i n g n e s s to i n c r e a s e its a s s i s t a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y with r e s p e c t to f o o d . P r i v a t e l y , h o w e v e r , the C h i n e s e not o n l y insist that t h e i r i n f l u e n c e upon P y o n g y a n g is l i m i t e d but i n d i c a t e a strong a v e r s i o n to the North K o r e a n s y s t e m , r e g a r d i n g it as c h a u v i n i s t i c and t r a d i t i o n a l — f a r f r o m true s o c i a l i s m . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the i m b a l a n c e in C h i n a ' s e c o n o m i c r e l a tions with the S o u t h a n d N o r t h s t e a d i l y g r o w s . B y the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , the trade d i f f e r e n c e ( s o m e $ 1 1 . 7 b i l l i o n v e r s u s $ 6 2 3 m i l l i o n ) w a s m a s s i v e . W i t h this trend, cultural i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n C h i n a and the R O K g r e w as w e l l a n d i n c l u d e d n o n o f f i c i a l d i a l o g u e s on p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c m a t t e r s . S i g n a l i n g its a n n o y a n c e , P y o n g y a n g h a s t w i s t e d t h e tail o f t h e d r a g o n s l i g h t l y b y e n c o u r a g i n g T a i w a n ' s i n v e s t m e n t a n d t o u r i s m a n d b y a g r e e i n g to a c c e p t T a i w a n ' s n u c l e a r w a s t e f o r m u c h n e e d e d m o n e y . In s u m , w h i l e the C h i n a North K o r e a r e l a t i o n s h i p will a l w a y s b e o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e to b o t h part i e s — a s it has b e e n t h r o u g h o u t h i s t o r y — t r u e i n t i m a c y h a s g i v e n w a y to h e i g h t e n e d a p p r e h e n s i o n s b y e a c h side. R i c h a r d H a l l o r a n b r i n g s North K o r e a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h J a p a n into f o c u s in C h a p t e r 10. In this r e l a t i o n s h i p , r a t i o n a l i t y c l a s h e s w i t h e m o t i o n , l e a v i n g the picture c o n f u s e d . L o g i c a l l y , J a p a n c o u l d b e o f g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e to t h e N o r t h , both in m a k i n g a v a i l a b l e its c a p i t a l and t e c h n o l o g y — a s it has d o n e

8

Introduction

to other developing Asian s t a t e s — a n d in serving as a balance to the other m a j o r p o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Further, g o o d r e l a t i o n s with T o k y o would make even more useful the services o f C h o c h ' o n g n y o n . T h e r o l e o f t h e p r o - N o r t h K o r e a n s l i v i n g in J a p a n h a s b e e n

significant.

Although figures on remittances from this source vary widely, when such remittances were at their peak, they m a y have totaled $ 7 0 0 million. Fully 7 0 percent o f foreign investment in the D P R K appears to have c o m e from Japanese Koreans. Japan has no interest in seeing either a nuclear North or a c o l l a p s e d North. T h u s , a variety o f Japanese political leaders have periodically shown an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t in n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s with the D P R K .

Moreover,

T o k y o , together with South K o r e a and the United States, has recently indicated a willingness to provide a substantial quantity o f food. However, it is questionable whether Japan wants a unified K o r e a given the clouds that are destined to hang over the relationship. W h y would T o k y o want to see a greatly strengthened, still antagonistic K o r e a ? In their respective attitudes toward J a p a n , the North and the South are brought c l o s e r together than on any other issue o f foreign policy, with a full array o f s u s p i c i o n s and a n t a g o n i s m s r e v e a l e d . T h u s , e f f o r t s to a c h i e v e D P R K - J a p a n normalization have foundered on a range o f issues: nuclear inspections; reparations; " c o m f o r t w o m e n " ; the mysterious c a s e o f Yi Unhye, the J a p a n e s e woman who was supposedly kidnapped and used to tutor a North K o r e a n terrorist in J a p a n e s e ; and m o r e recently kidnapping c a s e s i n v o l v i n g J a p a n e s e y o u t h . D e s p i t e the f a c t that J a p a n is c u r r e n t l y the N o r t h ' s largest trading partner, the p r o s p e c t s f o r a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between T o k y o and P y o n g y a n g can s c a r c e l y be considered bright. A c o m b i nation o f history and ethnic prejudice impinge heavily upon this s c e n e . In the final analysis, one must return to the issue o f North-South relations b e c a u s e these two governments and peoples will determine the future o f K o r e a . A s C h o n g - S i k L e e points out in C h a p t e r 11, within the S o u t h , advocates o f containment and e n g a g e m e n t vie with e a c h other, and at t i m e s it appears that individuals shift position on this crucial matter. Current a n i m o s i t i e s b e t w e e n North and South are high. T h e N o r t h ' s vulnerability and its deep feeling that the South is preparing to a b s o r b it, coupled with the e m o t i o n a l i s m that surrounds the issue o f Southern leaders having o f f e r e d no c o n d o l e n c e s at the time o f K i m II S u n g ' s death, h a v e caused P y o n g y a n g to unleash a steady stream o f violent rhetoric against the S e o u l g o v e r n m e n t . O n the part o f the South, resentment o f these vitriolic attacks and o f the effort to keep all k n o w l e d g e o f the S o u t h ' s aid f r o m the North K o r e a n people stimulates those who argue for tougher p o l i c i e s . Despite the high level o f verbal hostility and the a b s e n c e o f any m e a n ingful dialogue at official levels, however, e c o n o m i c c o n t a c t s are gradually expanding. T h e South is beginning to penetrate the North through s m a l l scale investment and trade, including such operations as the D a e w o o j o i n t

Introduction

9

venture in textiles at N a m p ' o . Moreover, as the K E D O operation unfolds, the R O K presence will expand irrespective of measures to keep it controlled. Thus, whatever the future holds, it seems highly unlikely that a return to total isolation between the two Koreas can take place. As one surveys the North Korean scene, there is room for hope despite the grim domestic picture. Indeed, the very grimness of that picture is causing some flexibility of policy at home, however begrudging. The D P R K quest for external e c o n o m i c involvement is genuine if limited. Furthermore, on the international front, there is a significant consensus among the major powers about desired policies and results. Most important, despite internal divisions of opinion over the desirable course of action, South Korea is committed to the effort to bring the North into the regional and international arena. One must expect the unexpected, but the risks of conflict appear less at present than at many points in the past, and a road map toward an evolutionary course exists.

PART 1

Political and Economic Development

1 Kim Jong II and New Leadership in North Korea Dae-Sook Suh Three years have passed since Kim II Sung died, and Kim Jong II has ended the three-year m o u r n i n g period. Kim Jong II was r e c o m m e n d e d to take over the helms of the party and the government. The 1997 New Year's editorial of Noclong sinmun replaced the familiar New Year's message of Kim II Sung with a joint editorial of three North Korean newspapers, Noclong sinmun (Workers' Daily), Choson inmin'gun (the Korean People's Army), and Nodong eh'ongnyon (the Working Youth). The three newspapers represent the three most powerful organizations in North Korea after the death of Kim II Sung: the Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean People's Army, and the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League. 1 T h e e d i t o r i a l c l a i m e d that the N o r t h K o r e a n p e o p l e are m a k i n g progress in dealing with the setbacks they suffered after the death of Kim II Sung. It compared the current difficulties with Kim II Sung's "march in distress" (konanui haenggun) in the winter of 1938, during which Kim's partisan guerrillas had to march for five months from the northeastern part of Manchuria to the southeastern region to escape the Japanese expeditionary force. They often marched without food for three or four days at a time, fighting the cold and hunger without adequate shelter. They also suffered t h e d e f e c t i o n and b e t r a y a l of their c o m r a d e s w h o s u r r e n d e r e d to the Japanese, but they claim their revolution persisted. Kim Jong II characterizes the current difficulties as his "march in distress" and claims that his march will also end in victory. The editorial also hinted that the transitional period will come to an end in 1997. It proclaimed that the North Korean people will carry on with pride the revolutionary task of the previous gene r a t i o n and that the p r e s e n t g e n e r a t i o n will h o n o r Kim II S u n g as its supreme leader of the country under the leadership of the great leader, Kim Jong 11.2 The real situation in the North is quite different from what has been propagated. The North Korean people are starving. Food shortage is so severe that the F l o o d D a m a g e and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n C o m m i t t e e of North

13

14

Political & Economic Development

Korea made an international appeal for food. It is difficult to comprehend how North Korea, once a proud and self-reliant state that often boasted its people had nothing to envy in the world, has been reduced to mendicancy. Kim Jong II's p r o b l e m s are not c o n f i n e d to economic woes alone. In February 1997, Hwang Chang-yop, one of the top ideologues, defected to the South, an indication of serious discord among the top leaders of North Korea. More important than Hwang's defection is the resignation of Kang Song-san, premier of the Administration Council, for health reasons. Kang is the economic reformer who advocated the joint venture laws and the development of the Najin-Sonbong special economic zone. In addition, some of the very top military leaders have passed away. Following the death of Marshal O Chin-u in February 1995, Marshal Ch'oe Kwang and Vice-Marshal Kim Kwang jin, who headed the Ministry of People's Armed Forces as minister and vice-minister respectively, died in February 1997. 3 Few would dispute that today North Korea is undergoing a difficult time. Some even argue that it may not overcome the current crisis; still others contend that its political regime as we understand it may not survive the current emergency. North Korea, however, is a resilient state, and it will most likely endure the current "march in distress" and recover from the setbacks, but much depends on the leadership capabilities of its new leader, Kim Jong II, and his new generation of leaders in North Korea. The reason for serious concern is that Kim Jong II is an unknown leader who may not be able to manage the current difficulties to a successful conclusion. It is quite clear that the North Korean people and their mass media do not refer to Kim Jong II as their supreme leader, suryong, but as their great leader, widaehan yongdoja. The fine line dividing these titles may not mean anything to the uninitiated, but it is important in terms of North Korean ideology, chuch'e, which requires a supreme leader in a country that claims to be self-reliant. According to Kim Jong II's interpretation of chuch'e, a selfreliant country must have a supreme leader, a functioning party, and the people. 4 When Kim Jong II was selected as heir to Kim II Sung in the 1980s, North Koreans said that they were blessed with suryong generation after g e n e r a t i o n , i m p l y i n g that Kim Jong II would e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e the supreme leader of the next generation. It seems logical that when Kim Jong II assumes his position as general secretary of the party or president of the republic, or both, he will be called suryong. Although suryong is a ceremonial rather than a legal title, it seems that one must obtain one or both of the top positions (i.e., of party and g o v e r n m e n t ) in order to b e c o m e o n e . Obviously, the title of the commander-in-chief of the North Korean armed forces is not sufficient to make one a suryong. According to the definition of a self-reliant state based on the idea of chuch'e. North Korea is still, even after the death of Kim II Sung, ruled not by Kim Jong II but by his deceased father. However, Kim Jong II seems to be in firm control of the

Kim Jong 11 & New

Leadership

15

transitional period as the supreme commander of the armed forces of North Korea. The delay in convening the party congress or the Supreme People's Assembly seems to be more an expression of deference to the death of Kim II Sung than a result of political dissatisfaction or dispute about the succession. Kim Jong II could have assumed the top positions of the party and the government at the time o f the death of Kim II Sung, and it does not seem that he will have any trouble in taking over the power anytime in the future. There is no way to ascertain the state of his health accurately, but there is evidence that he was seriously ill in 1993 and 1994. He seems to have regained his health gradually, and he will be officially elected to the top positions o f the party and the government in the near future.

Background It has often been alleged that Kim Jong II is an incoherent, short-tempered, reclusive person of little consequence, and it was predicted that when his father died, the succession scheme would come to an abrupt end. Many disparaging remarks have been made about his personality: He is a playboy, a philanderer, and a movie and video fanatic who enjoys not Korean but Western films. These reports are similar to the false allegations lodged against his father when he first took office in North Korea. It is important to recognize that Kim Jong II is now the top leader of approximately 2 2 million people, one-third of the entire Korean population, and there is no political group that can challenge his leadership. Like his father, Kim Jong II shows a tendency to paint a glorious and patriotic picture in order to make his true record of meager accomplishments look more resplendent. It is not important to refute every detail of his claims, but it is important to ascertain his true record. Compared with his father, who fought the Japanese under difficult conditions, Kim Jong II seems to have enjoyed a normal life. Kim Jong II was born on February 16, 1942, the eldest of three children (two sons and a daughter) o f K i m II Sung and his first wife, K i m Chong-suk. North Koreans claim that he was born in an armed guerrilla camp on the Korean side of Paektusan, the legendary mountain on the border of China and Korea. This claim seems to emanate from the desire of North Koreans to locate the birthplace of their leader within Korean territory, but this is not true. Both his father and mother were guerrilla fighters in the northeastern part of China, formerly Manchuria, and they fled from there into the Russian Maritime Province of the Soviet Union as early as March 1941. Their first son was born in a special forces camp in Vyatsk, near Khabarovsk. Because he was born in Russia he was given a Russian name, Yura, and a Korean name, Chong-il (Jong II, meaning Correct Sun).

16

Political

& Economic

Development

Their second son was also born there, and he was named Shura (Alexandr) in Russian and P'yong-il in Korean. 5 The family returned to North Korea after the end of World War II, and the couple gave birth to a third child, Kyong-hui, a younger sister to Kim Jong II. He and his sister are the only surviving members of the family today. His brother and mother died soon after they returned to North Korea. Shura drowned in a large water fountain in Pyongyang while playing with his friend, a son of Major General N. G. Lebedev, executive officer of the Soviet occupation authority. In September 1949, when Kim Jong II was seven years old, his mother died while giving birth to a stillborn baby. His father, Kim II Sung, died in July 1994. Unlike his father, who lost both of his parents early and had to scramble for his sustenance. Kim Jong II seems to have enjoyed a fairly normal family life and an affluent childhood. He was close to his sister when they were young, and he grew up under the watchful eyes of his powerful father. Early in the Korean War, when Kim Jong II was eight years old, he and his sister were evacuated to northeastern China along with many children of Kim II Sung's guerrilla comrades, and there he attended a school specifically designed for the children of North Korean leaders. Kim Jong II is said to have written a number of letters to his father from there. Except for this short period in northeastern China, Kim Jong 11 has spent all of his life in North Korea. When he returned to Korea from China, Kim Jong II was enrolled in S a m s o k E l e m e n t a r y S c h o o l , a n d he l a t e r t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e F o u r t h Pyongyang Elementary, where he graduated in 1954, when he was twelve years old. He advanced to the First Pyongyang Intermediate School that year and went on to N a m s a n High School in Pyongyang. He graduated from this high school in July 1960 at the age of eighteen. Thus, he received the regular elementary and secondary school education that North Korea offered at the time. North Koreans highly praise Kim Jong II for his academic achievements during this period. They assert that he had already read and understood the writings of Marx and Lenin and had mastered the theory of dialectical materialism and his father's idea of chuch'e when he was in secondary school. Such attributions are without foundation. It is not clear how well Kim Jong II understood Marxism and Leninism or mastered dialectical materialism, but his understanding of his father's chuch'e could only be cursory at best. Kim II Sung first e x p o u n d e d on the idea of chuch'e in December 1955, when Kim Jong II was only thirteen years old, one year after his elementary school graduation. There are no significant stories of his high school days or of any teacher or close friends who influenced him. Perhaps it is more important to note that Kim, as a son of the most powerful political figure in North Korea, went through his elementary and secondary schools without any fanfare.

Kim Jong II & New

Leadership

17

Unlike his father, Kim Jong II graduated from college. The university he attended bears his father's name, Kim II Sung University, and it is the premier institution of higher learning in North Korea. Kim Jong II entered the university in September 1960 and graduated in 1964, majoring in political economy. It has been mentioned in North Korean writings that Kim Jong II was given the opportunity to go abroad for his college education, but out of patriotism and national consciousness, he refused, staying home to learn more about Korea. There is also a false story that he studied in East Germany; Kim Jong II did travel to Eastern European countries, but he did not stay there any length of time. North Korean writers also claim that Kim Jong II was a brilliant student who authored articles on many different topics—about party policies on local economy, tradition of the party, loyalty to the supreme leader, and others—throughout his college years. However, such articles have not yet been published in their entirety. These writers also assert that Kim Jong II had good personal relations with his friends and that he was a leader among his peers. 6 North Korean writers acknowledge that Kim Jong II spent his college years preparing himself for the future of North Korea. He was apparently active in campus politics during his college days and often accompanied his father to inspect factories and collective farms in North Korea. For his g r a d u a t i o n , he wrote a t h e s i s titled " T h e Position and the Role of the County in Socialist Construction," about the role of the county in solving agrarian problems in North Korea. He allegedly studied the problem of the gap in urban and rural developments and tried to bring the earnings of the farmers in rural areas to the level of industrial workers in urban areas. For this study, it is claimed, Kim Jong II closely followed his father's theses on the issue. This is; an incredible claim. Kim II S u n g ' s Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country was first made public on February 25, 1964, at the time of the Eighth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee. 7 Kim Jong II's graduation thesis was submitted on March 18, 1964. This means either that the father and son coauthored the theses or that Kim Jong II got his f a t h e r ' s draft in a d v a n c e . T h e choice of this thesis topic was excellent because the county-centered solution for agrarian problems was an innovative idea unique to North Korea, but the timing of its announcement in the party by the father and its submission by the son for graduation was somewhat too close to be taken seriously. To be sure, Kim II Sung seems to have had the idea of solving North Korean agrarian problems, and Kim Jong II seems to have claimed credit for understanding it. Regardless of these exaggerated claims, it is important to note that Kim Jong II did receive a four-year college education; although he may or may not have shown brilliance, he successfully concluded his formal education from elementary school through college, something his father was not able to accomplish. Kim II Sung remarried in 1963 while Kim Jong II

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was in college. Kim Jong II hated his stepmother. Kim Song-ae, and his bond with his sister grew stronger. She later married a man named Chang Song-t'aek; both his sister and her husband exercise significant influence over Kim Jong II today.

T h e Plot of 1967 Unlike his classmates, Kim Jong II was not drafted to serve in the North Korean armed forces. Instead, he was assigned to work in the party on June 19, 1964, soon after his graduation. In June 1994, shortly before the death of Kim 11 Sung, North Koreans celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the work of Kim Jong II in the party. 8 Kim Jong II was first assigned to work in the Organization Section, one of the most powerful sections of the party Secretariat. He was transferred in 1965 to the office of his father, the prime minister's office, and from there he was reassigned to the party post in the office of his uncle, Kim Yong-ju, who was then the head of the party's Propaganda and Agitation Section. Kim Jong II showed great interest in promoting cultural and artistic works, and he worked closely with Kim Kuk-t'ae, son of the famous partisan comrade Kim Ch'aek. He also showed interest in ideological works within the party, and he worked closely with Yang Hyong-sop in developing his father's idea of self-reliance. From the rapidity with which he was assigned to various important offices within and outside the party, it is not difficult to see that Kim Jong II was given treatment worthy of a son of Kim II Sung. North Koreans claim that Kim Jong II made "an important contribution" to the party in 1967 by uncovering a plot by bourgeois and revisionist elements within the party who conspired to overthrow his father. After Kim Jong II purged these traitors, he is said to have helped establish the unitary ideological system and elevated his father to the position of suryong. The plot was taken up in secret at both the Fifteenth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee on May 4 - 8 , 1967, and the Sixteenth Plenum on June 28-July 3, 1967. These two plenums addressed what the North Koreans referred to as "antiparty activities" by Pak Kum-ch'ol and Yi Hyo-sun, who, along with their supporters, allegedly promoted individual heroism and regionalism against the party. Pak Kum-ch'ol, who had been imprisoned during the J a p a n e s e colonial period, commissioned a film titled Ilp'yon tansim (One-Track Mind), which depicted the passionate devotion of his wife not to the party or to the cause of the revolution but to Pak himself. Thus, he had promoted individual heroism. He also commissioned a play titled Naegohyang (My Hometown), which praised the people from Hamgyongdo, home of both Pak Kum-ch'ol and Yi Hyo-sun. Yi Hyo-sun supposedly heavily favored party cadres from the northeastern region of H a m g y o n g d o , thus trying to create a regional faction favorable to the

Kim long lì & New

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p e o p l e f r o m that region. Kim Jong II purportedly uncovered this plot, purged the two, and identified their co-conspirators. This version of events is incredible. These incidents occurred only three years after Kim Jong II graduated from college and joined the party, and the people who were purged were leaders of the party with impressive records and credentials. But the episode is important enough to warrant closer examination, and to understand it, we must examine the political scene of North Korea in 1967, a time when Kim II Sung was having trouble with China's Red Guard and its Cultural Revolution. In 1965 Kim II Sung had just restored normal relations with the Soviet Union and declared an independent, self-reliant policy for North Korea by expressing his interest in joining the ranks of nonaligned nations. Kim was tired of revisionism in the Soviet Union as well as dogmatism in China, and he wanted to chart his own self-reliant course for North Korea. Instead of blindly following the course of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Kim wanted to e s t a b l i s h a s e l f - r e l i a n t N o r t h K o r e a with h i m s e l f as suryong. However, the Chinese Red Guard began to attack him personally, and some North Korean leaders expressed doubts about his policy and about elevating him to the position of supreme leader. The persons identified as the leaders of the opposition were Pak Kumc h ' o l and Yi H y o - s u n , heads of an o r g a n i z a t i o n known as the Kapsan Operation Committee (KOC). The KOC was organized in the 1930s to support the Korean independence movement, and it supported Kim II Sung and his most illustrious raid into Korea, the P o c h ' o n b o battle of June 1937. Members of the K O C and another anti-Japanese organization, the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria (KFRAM), provided Kim II Sung and his partisans with local information about the Japanese police movement and its security arrangements. The battle of P o c h ' o n b o was one of Kim II Sung's most successful guerrilla raids; however, after Kim and his g u e r r i l l a s r e t r e a t e d , the local i n f o r m a n t s f r o m the K O C and the K F R A M were arrested. They were tried, and those identified as informants were found guilty and executed, including such loyal supporters as Kwon Yong-byok, Yi Che-sun, Chi T ' a e - h w a n , and So In-hong. 9 P a k K u m - c h ' o l w a s o n e of a f e w i n f o r m a n t s w h o s u r v i v e d t h e Poch'onbo raid. He was arrested and found guilty of helping the guerrillas, but he was not executed. Instead, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to Seoul to be incarcerated. He r e m a i n e d in jail at S o d a e m u n prison until the end of World War II, and when he was released he returned to North Korea and was reunited with Kim II Sung and his partisans. Yi Hyo-sun was a brother of Yi Che-sun, who was found guilty and executed after the Poch'onbo raid. Yi Hyo-sun himself was engaged in anti-Japanese revolutionary activities in the region of Hamgyongdo, but he did not participate in the P o c h ' o n b o raid. During the time Kim II Sung was consolidating his power, he identified all former members of the K O C and the K F R A M

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as partisans and as members of the partisan group. However, by the mid1960s, when leaders of other competing groups were purged and when the partisan group was the only group that remained, some leaders began to distinguish between the guerrillas who had fought in the front against the Japanese and those who had supported them in the rear. They also began to distinguish among units within the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army that had operated in different regions in northeast China. The KOC was a rearguard organization of partisans, and although members of this group were in powerful positions within the party and the government, they were no match for the guerrilla fighters of the partisan group. At the time of the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961, some members of the KOC held high positions. Pak Kum-ch'ol, for example, ranked fourth in the Political Committee of the party behind Kim II Sung, Ch'oe Yong-gon, and Kim II. Yi Hyo-sun was not far behind; he ranked sixth behind these four and Kim Ch'ang-man. Five years later, at the Second Party Conference in 1966, Pak Kum-ch'ol and Yi Hyo-sun ranked fourth and fifth, respectively, in the Political Committee as a result of the purge o f K i m C h ' a n g - m a n . Pak K u m - c h ' o l was in c h a r g e o f the Organization Section of the Secretariat, and Yi Hyo-sun was in charge of North Korean operations within South Korea. 1 0 In addition to Pak Kum-ch'ol and Yi Hyo-sun, other leaders were implicated in the conspiracy. These included Kim To-man, who ranked tenth and was appointed a secretary of the party in October 1966; Ko Hyok, who was in charge of the culture and arts section of the party; and Ho Sokson, who was in charge of the party's education section. Others were Kim Wal-yong, chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions; Ho Haksong, chairman of the Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee; and Yi Songun, procurator-general of the Central Procurator's O f f i c e . " All of these individuals were powerful, but they were never a threat to Kim II Sung, because none of them had been fighting men in Kim's guerrilla units. They had not organized a separate group to challenge Kim. The KOC had become more an organization to commemorate its support for Kim II Sung and his Poch'onbo raid than a political organization that plotted to challenge him. Yi Hyo-sun was in charge of North Korean underground operations in South Korea, and his operations were not going well. Yi was replaced by Ho Pong-hak, a partisan fighter who instituted a new militant policy toward the South, including an attempt to assassinate the president of South Korea in January 1968. Also, members of the Chinese Red Guard spread a rumor during the Cultural Revolution that North Korean general Kim Kwang-hyop, a partisan who had operated in the northern region of Manchuria under the direction of the Fourth Route Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, was planning a coup to overthrow Kim II Sung. This allegation proved false. It is commonly alleged that Pak Kum-ch'ol and his group cautioned

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Kim II Sung about his policy toward the Soviet Union and China, particularly in view of the fact that South Korea had been taken over by a professional soldier who understood the military balancc between the North and the S o u t h . T h e y r e m i n d e d K i m that South K o r e a was m o d e r n i z i n g its armed forces by sending troops to Vietnam and making significant strides in economic development by normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan. Pak K u m - c h ' o l and Yi Hyo-sun seem to have had reservations about supp o r t i n g the c a m p a i g n to m a k e Kim II Sung the s u p r e m e leader of the K o r e a n p e o p l e . It was also said that Pak K u m - c h ' o l , w h o h e a d e d the O r g a n i z a t i o n Section of the S e c r e t a r i a t , f a v o r e d p e o p l e f r o m his o w n region, Hamgyongdo, over other areas in recruiting officials for the party. Yi Hyo-sun was supposedly not doing his job to promote the national liberation movement in South Korea. It is clear, however, that the members of the K O C and those officials recruited into the party by Pak and Yi did not constitute a powerful enough political force to challenge Kim II Sung and his partisans. It is ludicrous to claim that Kim Jong II uncovered a plot by these men and purged them. Even if the claims about the plot had been true, it would have taken Kim 11 Sung and all his fighting partisan guerrillas to purge these men. Kim Jong II joined the party in June 1964, and it would have been virtually impossible even for the son of Kim II Sung to purge these men in 1967. This tale seems to be an effort on the part of North Korean writers to give credit to Kim Jong II for something he was not able to do. Choson nodongdang yoksa, the official history of the Workers' Party of Korea, which was published in December 1991 to c o m m e m o r a t e Kim II S u n g ' s eightieth birthday, mentions the antiparty activities of Pak Kumch'ol, Yi Hyo-sun, and their supporters at the time of the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Plenums of the Fourth Central Committee, but it does not mention any role played by Kim Jong II. It was after the purge that the North Korean people began to call Kim II Sung suryong of the Korean people. Kim Jong II may have c o n t r i b u t e d to the c a m p a i g n to p r o m o t e Kim II Sung's cult of personality to a higher level, but he did not play an important role in uncovering the plot of 1967. 12

Works in the Party Had he uncovered a plot and saved the party, Kim Jong II would have attained a prominent position within the party after the antiparty elements w e r e p u r g e d , b u t w h e n t h e F i f t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s w a s c o n v e n e d in November 1970, Kim Jong II was not elected as a member of the Central Committee. Nor was he elected to any official post within the party organization. Instead, he was assigned to work in the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the party's Secretariat, and he began in earnest to make films to

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glorify his father's revolutionary guerrilla activities of the 1930s. In this endeavor, Kim Jong II did outstanding work. Films representative of this work include P'ibada (Sea of Blood) in 1969, Han chawidanwon ui unmyong (Fate of a Member of the Self-Defense Corps) in 1970, and Kkotp' anun ch'onyo (Flower Girl) in 1972. He made many other films as well, and his frequent contacts with the film industry earned him a reputation for flirting with actresses and dancers. It is claimed that the films were artistic productions of high quality that contributed to the cultural life of the North Korean people and that the films aroused the national consciousness of the people and renewed their appreciation of Kim II Sung's past revolutionary activities. Kim Jong II made a deliberate effort to link his f i l m s with the tenets of his f a t h e r ' s chuch'e idea by emphasizing and promoting a close relationship among the people, the party, and the supreme leader, and his films are said to have expressed his loyalty to his father. The films entertained the people and enhanced the position of the party and its propaganda and agitation, but most important, they won the approval of Kim II Sung, who was apparently extremely pleased with the quality of his son's work. Kim Jong II worked hard to impress his father and to gain recognition as a pious and able son who could be trusted. T h e f i l m s were widely distributed within North Korea as well as abroad. It was not until September 1973, at the Seventh Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee, that Kim Jong II was elected to the Secretariat as a secr e t a r y ; f i v e m o n t h s later, at t h e E i g h t h P l e n u m of the F i f t h C e n t r a l Committee, he was elected as a member to the Political Committee. 1 3 Of course, such "important" elections were not made public at the time. The agenda of the plenums dealt with the task of the three revolutions (ideological, t e c h n i c a l , and c u l t u r a l ) that had b e e n initiated at the F i f t h Party Congress in 1970. There were reports by Kim II Sung on general mobilization for construction and a report by Yang Hyong-sop on the complete abolition of taxes, but neither plenum addressed the election of new members to the Secretariat or the Political Committee. However, it does seem that at these meetings serious questions were raised about Kim Jong II, the three-revolution movement, and possibly the succession, because the Ninth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee was held in secret. Even its exact date was unknown: It was held sometime after F e b r u a r y 1974 a n d s o m e t i m e b e f o r e F e b r u a r y 1975, \vhen the Tenth Plenum was held. Kim Jong II's election as a member of the Secretariat and the Political Committee was unusual to say the least; no one had ever been elected to the top leadership organization of the Central Committee without first being elected to the Central Committee. Such extraordinary personnel actions and the secret meeting of the plenum signaled that the larger issue of selecting Kim Jong II as the successor to Kim II Sung was imminent. It is assumed that the selection of Kim Jong II was made at the Ninth

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Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee and that the meeting of the plenum was most likely held in April 1974. It was not Kim II Sung who recommended Kim Jong II as succcssor but his old partisan comrades such as Kim II, Yim C h ' u n - c h ' u , and O Chin-u. At first, Kim II Sung was supposedly not in favor of the idea, citing the fact that his son was still too young for the job. Indeed, at the time, Kim Jong II was only thirty-two years old, younger than Kim II Sung was when he took power in 1945 at the age of thirty-three. It may have taken some persuasion on the part of the leaders of Kim II S u n g ' s own generation to convince him that a successor must be chosen not from the older but from the younger generation. Kim II Sung supposedly acquiesced to such a demand f r o m the leaders of his generation only after careful deliberation. 1 4 There is speculation that a number of high party officials at the Ninth Plenum opposed the selection of Kim Jong II as successor. For example, Kim Tong-gyu, who ranked third behind Kim II Sung and Kim II in the Political Committee of the Central Committee at the time, suddenly disappeared from all public functions shortly after the Ninth Plenum, and he was never mentioned again in the North. It was also after the Ninth Plenum that North Korean media began to use a mysterious term, "party center," to refer to Kim Jong II. T h e succession of Kim Jong II was implied in a Nodong sinmur, article to commemorate the forty-second anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army on April 25, 1974. The article mentioned that the people should support the "party center" generation after generation. 1 '' It was not Kim II Sung who tried to force the mantle of power onto his reluctant or indifferent son; it was Kim Jong II who actively sought to succeed his father. To gain his f a t h e r ' s blessing, Kim Jong 11 worked hard throughout the 1970s under his f a t h e r ' s tutelage. In addition to making films for his father, Kim Jong II led various campaigns to increase industrial and agricultural production by mobilizing young people. He took charge of the Three-Revolution Team Movement and later developed it into the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement to improve the sagging economy. Kim Jong II and the young people of his generation went out to the factory and farms to encourage tired old workers to increase production by using new methods and new technology. In the beginning, Kim Jong II failed miserably in the campaign. Many older workers resented working under the watchful eyes of the younger cadres, who knew nothing about the work. Their new methods were unworkable and their new technologies needed explanation and proper application. Industrial as well as agrarian production dropped sharply in the mid-1970s. Kim II Sung made serious efforts to teach his son and the young people how to conduct mass c a m p a i g n s to increase production. At the same time, he had to encourage the tired workers to continue the pace they were used to and gradually to adopt new methods whenever possible. 1 6

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Toward the end of the 1970s, it was claimed that the Three-Revolution Team Movement and the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement were successfully concluded, and in December 1979 Kim Jong II was awarded the highest medal in North Korea, the Kim II Sung Medal, First Class, for his accomplishments. In addition to the production campaigns, Kim Jong II launched a campaign to compile the complete works of his father into a n e w s e r i e s c a l l e d Kim

II Sung

chojakchip

(Works

of Kim

II Sung).

This

effort to compile all of Kim II Sung's writings, including his earlier collection of selected works, has thus far filled thirty-four volumes. 1 7 Kim Jong II began to refer to his f a t h e r ' s idea as " K i m i l s u n g i s m , " in line with such terms as " M a r x i s m " and "Leninism." Kim Jong II worked hard to impress his father that he was a pious son who would honor his father. He built several landmark monuments to his father, including a tower for the chuch'e idea and an Arch of Triumph to c o m m e m o r a t e his f a t h e r ' s t r i u m p h a n t r e t u r n to N o r t h K o r e a f r o m Manchuria. There were celebrations for his father's seventieth and eightieth birthdays on a scale larger than any other tribute ever made to Kim II Sung. Through these efforts, Kim Jong II also wanted to prove to his father that he was an able person who could meet his father's expectations. Kim Jong II wanted the job, and Kim II Sung seems to have acquiesced and supported his son's quest.

New Leadership in North Korea It was at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, on October 10, 1980, that Kim Jong II was first introduced as an important officer of the party. His earlier elections to the Secretariat and the Political Committee in 1973 and 1974 were never publicly announced, and his rise to power was only implied through obscure terminology. However, by the time of the Sixth Congress, all unofficial references to Kim Jong II were dropped, and his p h o t o g r a p h was displayed a l o n g s i d e his f a t h e r ' s to indicate that he would be the successor. Kim Jong II was elected to the Secretariat as a secretary, ranking second only behind his father, who was the general secretary. He was also elected to the Presidium of the Politburo, ranking fourth behind Kim II Sung, Kim II, and O Chin-u. He maintained his fourth-place rank in the Central C o m m i t t e e , and he was also elected to the Military Commission of the party, ranking third behind Kim II Sung and O Chin-u. No one else had been elected to these organizations, and no one ranked higher than Kim Jong II except his father, who ranked first in all important party leadership organizations. Kim II and O Chin-u, for example, ranked higher than Kim Jong II in the Politburo, but neither one had been elected to the Secretariat. This was a clear indication that Kim Jong II had won the approval of his succession f r o m both his father and the party. 1 8

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Even after the Sixth Party Congress, when his selection as successor was publicly proclaimed, Kim Jong II moved cautiously within the party. From October 1980 to August 1982, he held Central Committee meetings f r e q u e n t l y u n d e r h i s f a t h e r ' s d i r e c t i o n . D u r i n g this time the C e n t r a l Committee held six plenums and its Politburo held five joint meetings with the members of the Central People's Committee of the government to coordinate party activities with those of the government. It was not until the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in August 1982 that Kim Jong II began to replace officers and members of the Central Committee and its leadership organizations with people of his own generation to build new leadership in North Korea. From that time until the Twenty-First Plenum in December 1993, Kim Jong II was busy replacing leaders from his father's generation with leaders from his own generation. A total of 261 personnel actions were taken during this p e r i o d . T h e s e a c t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e in the Central Committee, which consisted of only 248 members, of whom 145 were full members and 103 were alternates. Seventy-nine full members and 111 alternate members were either promoted or demoted from the Central Committee (see Table 1.1). The plenums were held an average of twice a year from 1980 to 1984 and in 1986 and 1990, but no meetings were held in 1985 or 1987. There were three plenums in 1988, but in 1989 and from 1991 to 1993, the Central Committee held only one meeting per year, usually in D e c e m b e r . A great n u m b e r of p e r s o n n e l a c t i o n s took p l a c e in plenums in 1986 and 1988. Of course, no plenums of the party and no sessions of the Supreme People's Assembly have been held since the death of Kim II Sung in July 1994. The ruling party of North Korea, the Workers' Party of Korea, has not convened its party congress since 1980, although the bylaws of the party stipulate that a party congress must be held every four years. In addition to his work in the Central Committee, Kim Jong II took control of the military of North Korea. As early as December 1991, Kim Jong II was made commander-in-chief of the Korean People's Army. This event was timed to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the army on April 25, 1992. On this day in 1932, Kim II Sung is said to have organized his first guerrilla unit in Antu to begin his anti-Japanese guerrilla fighting. On this day sixty years later, Kim Jong II took over his f a t h e r ' s army, now one million strong, and honored old comrades of his father by promoting them to a higher rank. At the same time, Kim Jong II also promoted 524 young colonels to the rank of general. Assuming control of the military was the method his father had used to secure power when he returned to Korea in 1945, placing all his partisan guerrillas in military organizations, the police, and the security forces so that no one could challenge him with force. T h r o u g h o u t 1995 a n d 1996, K i m J o n g II m a d e m o n t h l y visits to

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