Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader 9780231885195

Citation preview

K i m II S u n g

A Study oj the East Asian Institute,

Columbia

University

KIM IL SUNG The North Korean Leader Dae-Sook Suh

» Columbia

University

New York

Press

1988

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PRESS

N e w York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 1988 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

LIBRARY OF C O N G R E S S C A T A L O G I N G - I N - P U B U C A T I O N

DATA

Suh, Dae-Sook, 1931Kim II Sung : the North Korean leader. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Kim, Il-Söng, 1912. 2. Heads of state Korea (North) - Biography. 3. Korea (North) - Politics and government. I. Title. DS934.6.K5S84 1989 951.9'3043'0924 [B] 88-6106 ISBN 0-231-06572-8 I S B N 0 - 2 3 1 - 0 6 5 7 3 - 6 (pbk.)

Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books arc printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. c 10 p 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To James William Morley

Contents Preface to the P a p e r b a c k E d i t i o n Preface

Acknowledgments

PART I: YOUNG

KIM AND

xxi

THE UNITED

1. Background

ARMY

United Army

3. Guerrilla Accomplishments OF POLITICAL

POWER

5. The Workers' Party of Korea

74

6. The Republic and the Army

95

III. CHALLENGES

8. After the War FOR KOREAN

9. Mobilization

55

59

TO KIM'S LEADERSHIP

7. The Korean War and Kim's Rivals

PART IV: SEARCH

15

30

4. The Soviet Occupation of North Korea

PART

1

3

2. Kim and the Northeast Anti-Japanese

PART II: CONSOLIDATION

xi

xvii

Campaigns

107

111

137 IDENTITY

159

163

10. The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Kim II Sung

176

viii

CONTENTS

PART V: PROBLEMS

IN KIM'S INDEPENDENCE

11. The Rise of the Military

211

12. The South Korean Revolution

224

13. Disintegration of the Partisan Group PART VI: NORTH

KOREA

209

238

UNDER KIM

14. South Korea and the Third World

249

253

15. The Shift from Party to State

269

16. Semiretirement in the New Era

287

PART VII: CHUCH'E AND THE REPUBLIC 17. On Kim's Political Thought 18. The Republic by Kim

300

301 314

Appendix 1. Partisans of the United Army in North Korean Politics 325 Appendix 2. Partisans of the United Army Not in North Korean Politics 329 Appendix 3. Partisans Who Died Before the Liberation of Korea Appendix 4. Chronology of Kim II Sung Notes

339

Bibliography Index

402 423

333

330

Illustrations

Photographs Kim II Sung in his school days. Commander Wei Zhengmin Officers and men of the First Route Army, 1939 Kim II Sung and his soldiers of the Second Directional Army, 1938 Leaders of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army: Zhou Baozhong, Li Yenlu, and Feng Zhongyun Kim II Sung and his soldiers, autumn 1940 Commanders of the Japanese and Manchukuo Expeditionary Force; Maj. Gen. Nozoe Shotoku, Yu Chenzhi, and Lt. Col. Fukube Kunio Body of Yang Jingyu Japanese Expeditionary Force that killed Yang Jingyu Yilan Branch of the Japanese police that captured Chu Chin, February 1935 Li Zhaolin Li's Korean wife and children Leaders of the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association Ch'oe Hyon and his men, winter 1938 T h e First Route Army, summer 1939 Japanese atrocities toward guerrillas

9 9 9 10 23 24

25 26 27 39 40 40 41 41 42 43

X

ILLUSTRATIONS

Prominent guerrillas w h o surrended to Japanese: C h ö n K w a n g and Pak T ü k - b ö m 44 K i m II S u n g in the Soviet U n i o n , 1 9 4 3

45

K i m II S u n g , his w i f e ( K i m C h ö n g - s u k ) , and son K i m J o n g II K i m II S u n g in 1 9 4 7 Soviet generals o f the 2 5 t h Division w h o liberated N o r t h

45 64

Korea

64

O f f i c e r s o f the Soviet occupation, 1947 Leaders o f the Workers' Party o f N o r t h Korea

65 81-82

T h e First C a b i n e t , September 1 9 4 8

100

First weapons m a d e in N o r t h Korea

115

T h e Yi Hong-gwang Company

115

Korean volunteers in N o r t h e a s t C h i n a , September 1947

116

Graduation ceremony o f N o r t h Korean air force pilots and technicians, D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 9

117

At Pak H ö n - y ö n g ' s w e d d i n g

117

K i m II S u n g and Pak H ö n - y ö n g

118

Ambassador and Mrs. T.F. Shtykov, K i m II Sung and his wife, and Pak H ö n g - y ö n g and his w i f e

118

K i m S ö n g - a e and K i m II S u n g , with J o s i p B r o z T i t o and his wife, 1 9 7 5

194

K i m Söng-ae, 1 9 7 5

195

K i m II S u n g on top o f M t . Paektu, 1963

196

K i m II S u n g receives his first honorary degree, Indonesia, April 1965

196

K i m II S u n g receives his second honorary degree, May 1 9 7 5

261

K i m J o n g II, the Rising Son

283

T h e great S u r y ö n g

317

T h e Chuch'e

318

Tower

T h e Arch o f T r i u m p h

318 Maps

Areas o f Operation by the N o r t h e a s t Anti-Japanese U n i t e d Army T h e China-Korea Border

19 200

Preface to the Paperback Edition

W

» w hen he reached his eightieth birthday in 1992, K i m II S u n g began to write his m e m o i r s , entitled Segiwa tobur [with the C e n tury). H e published f i v e v o l u m e s in t w o years, c o v e r i n g the period f r o m his birth in April 1912 to M a r c h 1937; the fifth v o l u m e was released only t w o weeks before his death on J u l y 8, 1994. T h e account ends before the P o c h ' o n b o battle o f J u n e 1937, which is the most important event o f his guerrilla fighting days in Manchuria. His m e m o i r s fit neatly into the official N o r t h K o rean history o f the period. Since he revealed only a f e w facts concerning his b o y h o o d friends and the benefactors w h o helped him w h e n he w a s p o o r and h u n g r y , these w r i t i n g s o f f e r no significant n e w i n f o r m a t i o n that could change our understanding o f his early life. It is unfortunate that K i m passed a w a y w i t h o u t telling us his o w n version o f his long and illustrious life. H e could h a v e told us the fate o f his guerrilla groups in M a n c h u r i a and later in the Russian M a r i t i m e Province, as well as his opinion o f w h a t was heralded as the triumphant return o f his partisans. E v e n m o r e important w o u l d have been his stories o f the Russian occupation

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o f N o r t h K o r e a after the end o f World War II; o f the establishment o f the D e m o c r a t i c People's Republic ot Korea; of the K o rean War; and o f the purges and the consolidation o f his political p o w e r . H e could have described his successes at indoctrinating the people o f N o r t h K o r e a with his ideology o f self-reliance, chuch'e. H e must h a v e had a lot to reminisce about concerning his creation o f a dictatorial r e g i m e that survived him in the hands o f his son K i m J o n g II. K i m II S u n g ' s life spanned e i g h t y - t w o years o f the twentieth century. H e spent thirty-three years preparing f o r his political career and he ruled N o r t h K o r e a almost single-handedly for f o r t y - n i n e years, longer than any K o r e a n political leader o f this century. D u r i n g the course o f his political life, K i m w a s m a n y things to m a n y different people. A c c o r d i n g to his supporters, K i m II S u n g w a s the s u p r e m e leader, suryotig, o f the N o r t h K o rean people. H e w a s admired as the sun of the nation, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant c o m mander, an outstanding leader of the international C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t , an ingenious thinker, the red sun o f the oppressed people o f the w o r l d , and the greatest leader of our time. A statue built f o r h i m is larger than any built f o r other K o r e a n leaders, past or present. O t h e r m o n u m e n t s to him include a huge m u s e u m , a tall t o w e r c o m m e m o r a t i n g his political ideas, and a triu m p h a l arch, larger than the one in Paris, that signifies his victorious return to P y o n g y a n g after the liberation o f K o r e a . T h e s e tributes to his accomplishments w e r e dedicated at the time o f his sixtieth and seventieth birthdays. T o his enemies, h o w e v e r , K i m was a nonentity, a f a k e w h o fabricated his entire life's story, f r o m his family b a c k g r o u n d to his r e v o l u t i o n a r y past. H e w a s considered a potentate backed b y the Soviet U n i o n to create a small C o m m u n i s t satellite state in the northern half o f K o r e a . Detractors claimed that he started the fratricidal w a r at the c o m m a n d o f his C o m m u n i s t masters. When he s u r v i v e d the w a r and consolidated his p o w e r , he w a s perceived b y them to be a dictator w h o purged every political ene m y standing in his w a y . When he was able to finally declare independence f r o m his C o m m u n i s t masters, he w a s accused o f

Preface to the Paperback Edition

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building a cult o f personality unparalleled in the annals of K o rean history. Because he lived in a c o u n t r y that had been s u b j u g a t e d to J a p a nese colonialism for t h i r t y - f i v e years and then divided into t w o disparate political regimes for nearly fifty years, the existence o f such vastly c o n t r a d i c t i n g o p i n i o n s of K i m II S u n g seems inevitable and, to a certain extent, u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . H o w e v e r , the t r u t h of his successes and failures lies s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n these e x t r e m e and biased views. K i m II S u n g w a s a K o r e a n patriot w h o gallantly t o o k u p a r m s for his c o u n t r y against the Japanese militarists and can claim a place in the annals of m o d e r n Korea f o r what he a c c o m p l i s h e d . H e deserves recognition for his persistence and his resolve to fight to the end w i t h o u t s u b m i t t i n g to his enemies. It is notable that he attained recognition as a political leader of the K o r e a n people f r o m the Soviet occupation forces that liberated N o r t h Korea. Like o t h e r political leaders of Korea at the time, he wished to r e u n i f y the divided c o u n t r y — t h u s starting the K o r e a n W a r — b u t he failed to achieve this goal. It is to his credit that he was able to survive the a f t e r m a t h of the K o r e a n W a r and consolidate his political p o w e r in the n o r t h . O n the international level, he m a n e u v e r e d very skillfully d u r i n g the SinoSoviet dispute and charted a n e w course of self-reliance by building connection w i t h t h i r d - w o r l d countries. For better or w o r s e , K i m II S u n g is the b e s t - k n o w n K o r e a n politician of this c e n t u r y . K i m did h a v e his share of failures, a m o n g w h i c h is his a t t e m p t to reunify the c o u n t r y . H e never a b a n d o n e d his hard-line policy intended to s u b j u g a t e the South K o r e a n people to his rule. A l t h o u g h he built a stable g o v e r n m e n t that lasted fifty years, he failed to establish and refine a socialist political s y s t e m in Korea. Blinded by the a m b i t i o n to be an absolute ruler, he i n t r o d u c e d a system that m o r e resembles a m o n a r c h y than a socialist or c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t . In this sense, he b e t r a y e d the h o p e s of all those Koreans w h o f o u g h t to establish a c o m m u n i s t s y s t e m in Korea and w h o died f o r that cause. H e seems to h a v e succeeded in leaving his k i n g d o m to his son, b u t this consists of a p o o r , economically u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y isolated f r o m t e c h n o l o g i cally advanced and industrialized n a t i o n s of the w o r l d . T o secure

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the succession, K i m has given his son a huge standing a r m y with one or t w o nuclear b o m b s , but this inheritance is expensive to maintain. This b o o k was published six years before K i m ' s death. He still represented N o r t h K o r e a as the s u p r e m e leader o f its people, but he left most o f the daily political chores for his son to manage. N o r t h K o r e a suffered setbacks in its relations with f o r m e r allies after the Soviet U n i o n and fraternal socialist countries in Eastern E u r o p e collapsed, but K i m and his son maintained absolute control domestically. E v e n w h e n the N o r t h Korean e c o n o m y had begun to deteriorate, the people pledged their loyalty to the f a ther and the son. When C h i n a established diplomatic relations with South K o r e a , N o r t h K o r e a sought to negotiate with the United States to j o i n the f a m i l y o f technologically advanced and industrialized nations. H o w e v e r , these problems belong not to the father but to his son. Speculations abound as to w h e t h e r K i m J o n g II will be successful in his bid for p o w e r in N o r t h K o r e a or will fall prey to N o r t h Korean political maneuvers w i t h o u t the protection o f his father. T h o s e w h o predict d o o m f o r K i m J o n g II have already begun to forecast the collapse of the r e g i m e b y denigrating his character. His enemies portray him as a p l a y b o y , a w o m a n i z e r , and an irresponsible person o f little or no analytical mind. It is often alleged that he inherited his father's k i n g d o m but none o f his charisma or leadership skills. I see these, h o w e v e r , as politically motivated accusations o f little substance. K i m J o n g II m a y well be better equipped to g o v e r n today's N o r t h K o r e a than his father w o u l d have been. In fact, K i m II S u n g w a s b e c o m i n g too old-fashioned f o r modern N o r t h Korea. U n l i k e his father, w h o s e f o r m a l e d u cation ended at the eighth grade, K i m J o n g II is a collcge g r a d u ate w h o w o r k e d his w a y f r o m the b o t t o m to the top of the party's highest organs. He m a y have received undue f a v o r s w h e n he w o r k e d as a secretary to his father, but he was also trained f o r his current j o b f o r m o r e than t w o decades. In m y opinion, will be successful him f o r the task early as 1972 and

there are at least f i v e reasons w h y K i m J o n g II in assuming p o w e r . First, his father prepared for a long time. He w a s named successor as so was an understudy for at least t w e n t y - t w o

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years. Sccond, K i m J o n g II w a s careful not to upstage his father, whereas m a n y o f his father's partisan comrades have already been replaced by y o u n g e r supporters o f K i m J o n g II. Without f o r mally taking o v e r the position o f head o f state, K i m J o n g II already has control of the military and is in the process o f b e c o m ing the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r o f the N o r t h Korean armed forces. T h i r d , w e m a y surmise that a Chinese-style gerontocracy will not be created in K i m J o n g Il's N o r t h K o r e a . O f the t w e n t y - o n e plenums o f the Central C o m m i t t e e held during the past fourteen years, f r o m the Sixth Party C o n g r e s s in O c t o b e r 1980 until April 1994, sixteen plenums dealt w i t h "organizational p r o b l e m s " and ordered the replacement o f important party leaders with y o u n g e r people. K i m J o n g II will most likely r e m o v e his father's partisan comrades f r o m positions o f p o w e r and g i v e them more ceremonial duties. Fourth, K i m J o n g II has precedence o v e r other aspirants o f his generation, because f e w o f his peers are k n o w n to be in the top leadership g r o u p . A m o n g his relatives, K i m J o n g II can indeed claim legitimacy, as the eldest son o f K i m II S u n g ' s first w i f e . Fifth, and perhaps the most important reason f o r K i m J o n g Il's likely success, is that there is no recognizable opposition g r o u p or any identifiable individual to challenge him. In the end, the people o f N o r t h K o r e a m a y honor the wishes of K i m II S u n g in order to maintain political stability, but as his successor K i m J o n g II must chart a n e w course f o r the country. T h e future o f N o r t h K o r e a depends on h o w well K i m II Sung trained his son f o r the role o f head o f state.

Preface

m II Sung has ruled the northern half of Korea for four decades, the only political leader the North Korean people have known. While he is still general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and still president of the republic, he has effectively turned over the daily operation of the party and the government to his son. Kim II Sung is called the supreme leader and the sun of the nation. The record of Kim's accomplishments is indeed impressive. He fought the Japanese despite insurmountable odds and persisted to the end without submitting to the Japanese. Returning from the Manchurian plains at the end of World War II without political roots in Korea, he served under the Soviet occupation authorities in order to consolidate his power. Supported by his partisan guerrillas, Kim used the political division of Korea to his advantage by eliminating his rivals. In an effort to reunify the divided country militarily, Kim launched an attack on the South, thus starting the Korean War, and he was saved from sure defeat only by the Chinese volunteers. By the time the Chinese troops withdrew from Korea, he was able to claim undisputed political leadership.

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Except for a few anxious years at the beginning of the SinoSoviet dispute, he exploited the quarrel between his two neighbors and proclaimed self-reliance and independence. He even introduced his own political concept of self-reliance, but this idea placed more emphasis on the rejection of things non-Korean than on the domestication of communism. His search for Korean identity often led him to exaggerate and at times fabricate his past record, and he often projected himself as leader of the entire Korean people in both North and South Korea. Endowed with apparently infinite self-esteem, he even tried to promote himself as leader of the entire bloc of nonaligned nations. He has built monument after monument to himself until the countryside has become scattered with memorials extolling his achievements. What he has built in the North however, resembles more a political system to accommodate his personal rule than a communist or socialist state in Korea. It is not the political system he built that will survive him; it is his son, whom he has designated heir, who will succeed his reign. This is a study of Kim's life and politics. Voluminous biographies have been written about him, but amid the effusive praise and grossly distorted accounts only a few hard facts have emerged. An attempt will be made here to distinguish fact from fiction and to present a critical analysis of his life and politics; however, details of the lives of Communist political leaders are closely guarded secrets, and the available sources are less than adequate for a life story. Even the accounts of Kim's political record, particularly the earlier version dealing with the first two decades, have been revised to befit the glory and splendor of his rule in the third and fourth decades. He has undertaken many times to rewrite his own record, suppressing the unfavorable and inventing the appropriate to glorify his rule. The distortions, exaggerations, and absurd tributes to himself notwithstanding, it is important to study Kim II Sung and his rule - not merely to document the unsuccessful effort by the Korean Communists to establish and refine a Communist or socialist political system but to assess the true record of Kim's accomplishments and failures. Since his "wise and benevolent" leadership pervades every corner of the North, the study of Kim and his rule is the study of North Korea.

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This book examines Kim II Sung's revolutionary past, his rise to power, his efforts to reunify the country, the challenges to his leadership, his altercation with both the Soviet Union and China in the search for Korean identity, his problems in a self-reliant but isolated Korea, his exploits in Third World countries, and his adventures in South Korea. This book also analyzes North Korea under Kim's rule, his political thought, his shifting of political power from party to state in his effort to train his son to succeed him. Barring unforeseen calamities, Kim seems to have succeeded in appointing his son heir and has transferred the daily operation of the party and government to his son and his son's generation. The materials needed for a study of this nature are difficult to obtain. North Korean sources are highly propagandistic and unreliable for ascertaining factual information about specific events. In an effort to justify the system's present posture, many original records are suppressed and many more are rewritten to promote Kim. The problem is compounded by anti-Communist materials emanating from South Korea that denigrate Kim and his regime. An effort will be made to distinguish the original from the revised and to evaluate objectively both Communist propaganda and antiCommunist denunciation. Some of the more important sources used for the first time in this study are worth brief mention here. An exhaustive search was made for Kim's writings, speeches, interviews, and proclamations as well as for other materials about him. All the available unclassified works of Kim in their original form, amounting to more than seven hundred items, were read and studied (Korean Communism, 1945-1980). As for his family and educational background, the North Koreans seem to have settled finally on the three-volume biography by the party (The Great Supreme Leader, Comrade Kim II Sung). This version includes elaborated tales of his revolutionary past as well. As to that past, however, there are both Chinese and Japanese sources that put the record of Communist guerrilla struggles in Manchuria in more proper perspective than Kim has made it out to be. The Chinese have published, for example, biographical information on those guerrilla fighters who were Kim's contemporaries in the United Army (Dongbei kangri lishichuan in three volumes), revealing much of what actually took place. Furthermore,

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PREFACE

the Japanese have also published some of their government records to show how they suppressed the "Communist bandits." T h e Japanese veterans' association of the Manchurian police has published its history (Manshü kokugun), and the Manchurian police have also published their records (Manshitkoku keisatsushi and Manshükoku keisatsu shoshi in three volumes) to show how they maintained order. O n the liberation and occupation of North Korea by the Soviet Union, the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union has published a collection of reminiscences by members of the Soviet occupation authority. Contrary to Kim's claims, their essays reveal many details of their effort to implant a Communist system in the North (Osvobozhdenie Korei). These were written by prominent members of the occupation forces: General Ivan M. Chistiakov, w h o commanded the 25th Division of the Soviet Army, which occupied North Korea; Major General Nikolai G. Lebedev, w h o was in charge of political affairs of the occupation; Major General B . G . Sapozhnikov, a historian; and others. T h e Soviet Union has also made public the documents and materials dealing with their relationship with N o r t h Korea from 1945 to 1980 (Otnosheniia Sovetskogo Soiuza s narodnoi Koreei: Dokumentii i materialii). For the early period of the republic, there are important North Korean source materials seized by the U.S. military forces during the Korean War. T h e collection was declassified in 1977 and contains hitherto unavailable party and government documents, books, journals, newspapers, photographs, personal papers, and other items. There are, for example, minutes of the First and Second Party Congresses and the proceedings of the Supreme People's Assembly sessions and the minutes of its Standing Committee. These documents reveal much about the inner struggle for power in the early period. For the later period, there exist few objective studies that have scrutinized the available N o r t h Korean sources. There are four sets of K i m ' s selected w o r k s , for example, and the first set has undergone two subsequent revisions to support his inerrant prophecy and justify his infallibility. T h e North Koreans have published still another collection of Kim's works (Works of Kim II Sung), and the publication of the latest version is still in progress. It is essential to

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compare them and to study the writings that were added or discarded for subsequent collections. Emerging from the seclusion of the first three decades, N o r t h Korea expanded its horizon to the outside world in the 1970s, and a few non-Communist scholars and Western journalists have been given opportunities to visit the forbidden country. M u c h of the harsh and Spartan life was described by reporters, w h o asked hard questions about Kim's rule, but no serious effort was made to analyze his life and politics. I was fortunate to have been able to visit the North in 1974 and learned much both from firsthand observation and my conversations with North Korean scholars. It was also possible during the visit to acquire a number of rare books and source materials not available elsewhere. Undoubtedly, K i m II Sung is one of the important leaders o f divided Korea. He established a separate regime in the N o r t h and has ruled the people o f N o r t h Korea for four decades. Understanding his political successes and failures is instrumental to understanding the nature of his regime and the Korean division. It is hoped that better understanding of K i m and his politics w i l l contribute to the reunification o f the Korean people. Note on

Transliteration

Except for commonly accepted usage in English o f Korean names, such as Pyongyang, Seoul, and K i m II Sung, the M c C u n e Reischauer transliteration system is used for Korean. In romanizing Korean first names, the sound change only in the second syllable is observed - for example, it is C h ' o e Yong-g6n and not C h ' o e Yong-kon, Han Sol-ya not Han Sor-ya, and O Kuk-yol not O Kung-nyol. T h e Pinyin system is used for Chinese, the modified Hepburn system for Japanese, and the Library o f Congress system for Russian transliteration.

Acknowledgments Because of the unusual difficulties involved in acquiring source materials for this study, I am indebted to many scholars, librarians,

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and research institutes in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. I want to express my appreciation to all those who helped me, but because of the large number of people in various countries who provided valuable assistance, as well as the kind of information I have acquired from them, I cannot acknowledge them individually here. I would like to thank the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union for inviting me there and giving me opportunities to consult Soviet scholars on Korea. T h e Soviet scholars gave me valuable insight into the Soviet occupation of North Korea. I would also like to express my appreciation to the North Korean scholars w h o m I met in Pyongyang for inviting me there and helping me to acquire source materials not available elsewhere. As much as I appreciate their unbounded affection and loyalty to K i m II Sung, I hope that they will also understand my effort to be objective, although critical at times, in analyzing his life and politics. I have received generous help from my colleague, Masaaki Ichikawa of Tokyo, w h o secured many valuable source materials from Japan for this study. His unfailing friendship has been a source of encouragement. Special appreciation is expressed here to Bruce Cumings and the School of International Studies of the University of Washington, where I spent the fall semester of 1982 under a grant from the Henry Luce Foundation. I have made a number of trips to the National Archives and the Library of Congress, where I received valuable assistance from many colleagues and friends. I want to thank Sun-joo Pang of Amerasian Data Research Services and Rinn-Sup Shinn of the Foreign Area Studies Division of American University for helping me to find valuable sources and secure rare photographs. I also want to thank Key P. Yang for helping me at the Library of Congress. I am grateful for the assistance provided by the Woodrow W i l son Center for International Scholars, Washington, D . C . , in 1985, and I am deeply indebted to Ronald Morse, Director of its Asia Program, for his kind advice and encouragement. Without his support and constant reminders, this study might not have been com-

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pleted. I want to thank the Wilson Center for supporting me and providing me with a quiet place to work, and I want to thank Eloise S. Doane and Fran Hunter o f the Wilson Center for their assistance. To Bertrand Renaud and Young-key Kim Renaud, I express my sincere thanks for making my stay in Washington comfortable. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Kate Wittenberg, Executive Editor o f Columbia University Press, for her unfailing support, and to Don Yoder, who edited the entire manuscript. Last but not least, I want to acknowledge the able assistance o f Charlotte Oser, Administrative Officer, and Jean Tanouye, Secretary, o f the Center for Korean Studies at the University o f Hawaii for taking up many o f my administrative chores, thus providing extra time for me to devote to this study.

K i m II S u n g

I YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

official account of Kim's early life appeared for the first time during the Korean War, seven years after his return to Korea. It was a simple account of bare facts and basic information of his birth and early guerrilla activities in the plains of Manchuria. In view of subsequent revisions of this version, perhaps its significance lay in the timing of its release. The Soviet occupation authorities, who had put Kim into power, had left, and the initial setbacks of the war had been reversed by the Chinese Volunteer Army. It helped to remind his political rivals as well as the Chinese volunteers that he had earlier fought the Japanese imperialists under the Chinese command, and the Chinese and Koreans were once again fighting shoulder to shoulder against another imperialist, the United States, in the Korean War. This biography, written by the party and published in its official organ, stressed that there was a firm and unbreakable camaraderie between the peoples of China and Korea that was begun in an eightyear joint struggle against the Japanese in the 1930s.1 There are earlier versions: one by Han Sol-ya published by the North Korean Arts Federation in 1946 and another by Yun Se-p'yong in the North Korea historical journal in 1949. These are not official accounts, however.

2

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

The official version has undergone two subsequent revisions, once by Y i Na-yong in 1958,2 and again by two members of the Academy of Sciences of North Korea, Song Chi-yong and Kim Ulch'on, 3 in 1961. What seems to be the official biography of Kim was written by Paek Pong (Baek Bong) in 1968, and it is this version, translated into many languages including English, that the North Koreans promote internationally as the official account of Kim's biography. 4 A full-page advertisement of this three-volume version appeared in the New York Times on October 27, 1969, with a caption stating that the history of Kim's revolutionary struggle is the history of the Korean people's struggle for freedom and independence. The latest version of the three-volume biography, published in 1982 to commemorate his seventieth birthday, is an updated version of Paek Pong's work. 5 Kim's life story is still filled with exaggerated claims and unsubstantiated assertions. What comes through clearly in all these versions is an attempt by the biographers to build an image of Kim as a model revolutionary who led the Korean Communist revolution and succeeded in building a viable Communist state in Korea. North Korean historians and party officials are serious in their effort to trace the tradition of Korean communism to Kim and his guerrilla forces. His birthplace has become a sacred ground of the Korean revolution, and his family has become a source of inspiration for modern Korea. Even the founding of the present Korean People's Army on February 8, 1948, was backdated in 1978 to coincide with the alleged founding of Kim's first partisan force on April 25, 1932. Kim is proud of his statues, monuments, and slogans of the "glorious tradition" of his guerrilla activities. But it is more important to register the true record of his revolutionary past upon which the tradition of Korean communism is being built.

1 Background

I C i m ' s life from his birth to his return to Korea in 1945 is not a complicated story. His obscure past and the relatively minor role he played make it difficult to decipher the details of his accomplishments, but the basic information is known. Kim was born Kim Song-ju on April 15, 1912, in Pyongyang to a peasant couple named Kim Hydng-jik and Kang Pan-sok. He was the eldest of three sons, Song-ju, Ch'ol-chu, and Yong-ju, and followed his family into Manchuria and attended elementary school there. He returned briefly to Pyongyang to attend the fourth and fifth grades, but he finished grammar school and two years of middle school in Manchuria attending Chinese schools. His formal education ended in 1929 at the eighth grade when he was expelled from school for participation in unlawful activities. His father died early in 1926 when Kim was only fourteen. In the spring of 1930, when he was released from jail, he began to follow various bands of guerrillas, leaving his widowed mother and two brothers behind. His mother died two years later, in 1932, and his brothers became orphans. When the Chinese anti-Japanese forces absorbed most of the Korean partisans for operations against

4

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

the Japanese and Manchukuo forces, Kim fought in a group organized predominantly among Koreans within the Chinese groups, changing his name from Song-ju to II Sung in the process. He led a small band of Korean partisans several times into Korea attacking Japanese outposts in remote northern villages. He fought well within the Chinese guerrilla groups during the peak of the Chinese Communist guerrilla activities from 1937 to 1939. T h e Japanese expeditionary forces eventually crushed the guerrillas, and the survivors of these groups fled to the Russian Maritime Province in 1940 and 1941. Kim survived the Japanese drive and fled to the Soviet Union, where he joined others who fled there from 1940 to 1945. He returned to Korea with the Soviet occupation authorities when Korea was liberated in August 1945. To these basic facts, North Koreans have added a great deal of information to build a towering image. Many important characteristics of his early life have had a bearing on his political maneuvers as ruler of the North, and it is worthwhile to examine his record of accomplishments carefully. Family Every visitor to the North is urged to visit the so-called cradle of revolution, Man'gyongdae, the birthplace of Kim II Sung. It is located southwest of the capital on the banks of the Taedong River, one of the most scenic places near Pyongyang. The North Koreans explain that K i m was born in such a choice spot because his greatgrandfather, Kim Ung-u, had moved to the place as a tenant farmer with the promise that he would take care of the ancestral graves of a rich landlord named Y i P'yong-t'aek. T h e graves are nowhere visible today, but this hallowed ground is complete with a swing site, wrestling site, sliding rock, study site, and a favorite tree that Kim used to climb. T h e pine tree that stands there is a young tree, in fact too young for him to have climbed when he was a boy. T h e house he was born in is a shrine including, among other things, an old wooden desk sitting smartly on a bright red carpet. Poems and songs have been written about the place, and a modern museum was built nearby. 1 It gives visitors an eerie feeling to know that all these tributes are paid to a still-living head of state.

Background

5

North Korean historians trace Kim's ancestry back twelve generations, a family moving north from Cholla pukto to Pyongyang. They claim that his great-grandfather participated in the fight against the U.S.S. General Sherman which invaded Korea and that his grandfather fought gallantly against the Japanese. These are politically motivated fabrications of little importance. When it comes to his father and mother, their lives and revolutionary activities are described in more detail, but none of the assertions about revolutionary activities can be verified in any Korean or other records. His father, Kim Hyong-jik, was born on J u l y 10, 1894, and, at the age of fifteen, married the seventeen-year-old daughter of a local schoolteacher. He spent most of his life in Manchuria operating a herb pharmacy and died early in 1926 at the age of thirty-two. His mother, Kang Pan-sok, was born on April 12, 1892, in Ch'ilgol, near Pyongyang, and died on July 31, 1932, at the age of forty in Manchuria. Kim has erected a monument for his father in Ponghwari and one for his mother in Ch'ilgol on the outskirts of Pyongyang, both with museums and statues.2 In fact, Kim's father attended Sungsil School, established by American missionaries in Pyongyang. He may have joined an anti-Japanese nationalist group, but his activities were of little importance. His father had two brothers, Hy6ng-nok and Hyong-gwon. Hyong-gwon was arrested in Hongwon in a small skirmish with the local police and interned in Seoul, where he died on January 12, 1936. A statue has been erected for him in Hongwon, Hamgyong namdo.3 These efforts seem to be directed more toward upgrading the attributes of Kim as a pious son who reveres his parents rather than substantiating obscure facts of his family record. To be sure, his parents were ordinary people who suffered the poverty and oppression of the time and died early without giving much education or assistance to their children. Contrary to the efforts to build Kim's image as a person coming from a long revolutionary tradition and dedicated parents, his image may be more resplendent if he is described as he was: a "dragon from an ordinary well," so to speak. At least that would be closer to the truth.

6

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

Early Years From his official biographer, it has become clear that Kim's formal education ended at the eighth grade when he was expelled from the middle school he was attending for participation in illegal student activities. Earlier versions insist that he had finished the middle school, returning to the school after his release from jail. 4 In the course of six years of grammar school, he attended three different schools: the first four years at Badaogou Elementary in Manchuria, two years at Ch'angdok Elementary in Ch'ilgol near Pyongyang, and finally graduating from a Chinese school, Fusong Elementary in Manchuria. During his two years of middle school he attended two schools, a Korean school named Hwasong School and a Chinese school named Yuwen Middle School, both in Manchuria. Kim's attendance in Chinese schools is important not so much because the North Korean historians and his biographers deliberately omit this fact in their efforts to build a "Korean leader," but because his Chinese education and his facility in the Chinese language helped him in his future association with Chinese guerrillas in Manchuria. 5 The latest version corrects a number of dates, adjusting the transfers and graduations from one school to another, but these changes are of minor importance. Earlier biographies filled the gap from the end of Kim's education in 1929 to his active participation in guerrilla activities in 1932 with the claim that he had joined a Communist party, a Communist youth group, and had organized numerous student groups and led the anti-Japanese struggles in Manchuria, traveling from Jilin to the Changchun, Yitung, and Harbin areas. It was made abundantly clear in later studies outside of North Korea that there was no Korean Communist Party or Korean Communist Youth Association in Manchuria after their dissolution in 1930, and the latest version has dropped these claims.6 To maintain such a claim, North Korean writers would have to admit that he had joined a branch of the Chinese Communist Party, if indeed he had joined, and this is contrary to the Korean image they want to build. They now claim that Kim was engaged in an edification campaign of Korean peasants in Gelun, a village located halfway between Changchun and Jilin, a short distance west of where he went to his last school.

Background

7

They claim that he established a number of four-year elementary schools, such as Chinmyong and Samgwang, and taught students from the first to the fourth grades the basic doctrines of Marx's Das Kapital, dialectical materialism, and histories of the Soviet Union and Korea. The idea of an eighth-grade expellee teaching fourth-graders is curious enough, but teaching them dialectical materialism and the writings of Karl Marx is beyond belief. It is this sort of assertion that casts doubt on the true record of his achievements. In the great halls of the revolutionary museum built in marble to commemorate Kim's sixtieth birthday in 1972, one Japanese document was enlarged and prominently displayed covering nearly half of the wall. It is a report made by the Japanese consul-general of Jilin of a communist youth organization in the region.7 The document mentions among others one student of Yuwen Middle School named Kim Song-ju (Kim II Sung) for participation in the group and is perhaps the earliest record of Kim's participation in any group activities and the cause of his subsequent imprisonment and expulsion from his school. The organization was simple and short-lived, involving fewer than a dozen people. It was organized and headed by a man named Ho So, a member of the South Manchurian Communist Youth Association. Han Sok-hun was head of the organization section, and Kim Tong-hwa was chief of the propaganda section. Y i Kum-ch'on and his wife, Song Suk-cha, were in charge of liaison with other groups, and there were five or six students of local schools including Sin Yong-gun, a student at the Political and Law Institute, Ch'a Sik, a graduate of the South Manchurian Institute, Kim Song-ju (Kim II Sung), a student at Yuwen Middle School, and a few others. The individual initiation fee to the group was thirty cents and annual dues were twenty cents. The students were organized in early May 1929 and were arrested after their third meeting on May 10 of the same year. It is not unreasonable to expect a seventeen-year-old boy without his father and away from his family to wander into a subversive organization of this nature, or to join a subversive group, even one that was Communist, but it is quite different to claim that he organized and led the group. Kim was not only one of its youngest members - other students were either graduates of middle and high

8

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

schools or college students - but also the organizers were much older persons and seasoned revolutionaries: Y i Kum-ch'on and Kim Tong-hwa were both in their early thirties and were eventually expelled from Manchuria. 8 To support the claim of Kim's leadership role, the North Koreans have deleted names of other members of the group from the document they so proudly display in their museum. Regardless of their claims, Kim's learning about communism or association with Communists began at the tender age of seventeen. Kim claims that he read the classics of Marxism and Leninism, including Das Kapital, when he attended Yuwen School. The school was a Chinese private school where no instruction was given on communism. In fact, it is doubtful that such literature in Chinese or Korean was available at this time in a remote town of Jilin in Manchuria. Even if he were exposed to such literature, his level of comprehension at the age of seventeen as an eighth-grader is questionable. It is futile to challenge every assertion made by Kim's sycophantic writers, and their errors are too obvious to warrant detailed refutation. Kim's learning about communism was not through formal education, an intellectual awakening to the doctrines of Marxism and Leninism, as the North Koreans would lead us to believe. His education came through random association with anti-Japanese Korean Nationalists and Chinese Communist guerrillas, and his belief hardened through his own anti-Japanese activity under the Chinese Communist guerrilla forces in Manchuria. The person with the most profound influence on Kim's understanding of communism was perhaps Wei Zhengmin, Kim's immediate superior and comrade during his guerrilla days from 1935 to 1941. Wei was sent to Manchuria by the Chinese Communist Party in 1932, and he was secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee in 1934. Wei participated in the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in 1935 as a delegate of the Chinese Communist Party, and upon his return he served as chairman of the Political Committee of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army under its commander Yang Jingyu. Kim II Sung fought in this army as well, and Wei is the one who comes closest in teaching him about communism. 9 Wei wrote often to Kang Sheng in Moscow and later in Yanan,

Background

Kim II Sung in his school days. Commander Wei Zhengmin, Kim II Sung's Chinese mentor and political commissar of the First Route Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

Officers and men of the First Route Army,

1939

9

IO

Y O U N G KIM A N D THE UNITED ARMY

Kim II Sung and his soldiers of the Second Directional

Army,

1938

reporting his own activities and the various campaigns of the Chinese guerrillas toward the end of the 1930s in Manchuria. He made efforts to propagate communism to the guerrillas, teaching them about Lenin. He used to ride a white horse with pride, and in one of his last letters to Kang Sheng on April 15, 1940, he mentioned that his horse had died. Wei himself was suffering from ill health and was killed on March 8, 1941, in Manchuria. Kim seems to have learned much from Wei and tried to emulate him in many ways. There is a huge painting in the revolutionary museum that has K i m sitting smartly on a white horse, but in another section where an authentic photograph of the guerrillas is displayed, Wei's picture has been cropped out. 1 0 Many people, Koreans and Chinese alike, helped K i m II Sung and led him to the cause of communism during these guerrilla days, but Kim recognizes none. It was during this period between his release from jail and his active participation in an organized Chinese guerrilla force in the early 1930s that K i m adopted the pseudonym of Kim II Sung.The

Background

i1

North Koreans claim that his comrades in Wujiazi bestowed the name II Sung, meaning "one star," on him, citing a South Korean publication of 1945. He later changed to his current name, the same Korean pronunciation of different Chinese characters. 11 There is considerable controversy related to his name and identity, but suffice it here to state that there were others with the same name. T h e current North Korean President K i m II Sung is unmistakably the Kim II Sung w h o participated in an anti-Japanese Chinese Communist guerrilla force in Manchuria. There are still a few South Koreans w h o insist that the present N o r t h Korean president and a Korean revolutionary named K i m II Sung are two or three different persons with the same name, but this is idle speculation. 12 Both names, K i m Song-ju and K i m II Sung, appear in the Japanese police records, and there are more than adequate records of his partisan activities in both Chinese and Korean publications published before the liberation of Korea in 1945. 13 There are even photographs taken by the partisans themselves and captured by the Japanese in the late 1930s that show his guerrilla groups and identify him specifically. These photographs are displayed in the revolutionary museum in the North, and they were also reproduced by the Chinese Communists in Manchuria shortly after the defeat of Japan. 1 4 Partisan

Activities

Kim's partisan activities are important for several reasons. T h e first is that it was his participation in the anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in Manchuria that won him his first recognition, and toward the latter part of his campaign he was important enough for the Japanese to post a reward for information leading to his arrest. Another is that it is his partisan activities to which the N o r t h Koreans trace their revolutionary tradition. T h e y maintain that other revolutionary activities, Nationalist and Communist alike, are unimportant. Their revolutionary history is filled with details of his partisan activities, and others are mentioned only to show how unimportant they are in comparison. Still another reason is that it is this partisan group that constituted the core political leadership of the North. K i m used this group to consolidate his power against

12

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

all other factions that challenged him, and it is the children of this group and those who were trained by this group that hold the key to power in North Korea today. For these reasons and because Kim's biographers and North Korean historians make outlandish claims, it is important to put partisan activities in proper perspective - not so much to discredit Kim's considerable accomplishments, but to distinguish fact from fiction. It should be stated at the outset that the major organized efforts to resist the Japanese in Manchuria during the life of the Japanese puppet regime, Manchukuo, from 1933 to 1945, were carried out by the Chinese Communists and not Koreans. They were carried out against incredible odds by the Chinese Communists, and while Koreans in Manchuria joined the Chinese individually, there was no separate organized effort by the Korean Communists. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the Chinese Communists were defeated and ultimately driven out of Manchuria into the Soviet Union by 1941, long before the Japanese defeat in World War II by the allied forces. Kim claims that he first organized a partisan group in Antu, a small village in southern Manchuria, on April 25, 1932, and expanded his forces to create a Korean People's Revolutionary Army (Chosott itimiti hydngmydnggun) in February 1936. He was a commander of this army throughout his numerous and successful campaigns against the Japanese in Manchuria until 1945, when he returned to Korea. He admits that he went into a small-unit operation in 1940, a tactical dispersion of this army to continue his fight against the Japanese. The date of April 25, 1932, when Kim is alleged to have organized his first partisan group, was not revealed until 1968 when his biography was published. This version reported that Kim organized the group with eighteen members, naming only one partisan other than Kim himself, Ch'a Kwang-su. Ch'a died in July of that year. 15 The earlier version reported that it was organized in the spring of 1932 with Y i Yong-bae and Kim Ch'ol-hui, neither of whom North Korean histories mention in any subsequent writings. 16 Another version reports that it was organized in the winter of 1931, and still another version reports that Kim had joined a partisan group in Antu that was already in operation. 17

Background

13

It has been difficult for biographers and historians to piece Kim's past together, not because it is nonexistent but because they want to claim the earliest date possible for the beginning of his guerrilla activities. The North Koreans suddenly announced in February 1978 that the Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was created on February 8, 1948, was in fact founded on the day Kim's partisan group was organized, April 25, 1932. For the succeeding twenty-nine years, they marked February 8 as the founding date, celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary in 1977, but since 1978 they have celebrated April 25 as the founding date of the army, proclaiming that April 25, 1978, was the fortysixth anniversary. 18 The Korean People's Army celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on April 25, 1982. North Korean historians also claim that other Korean partisan groups were formed in southern and eastern Manchuria about this time and list some of the members and localities involved: Y i Kwang, Kim Ch'ol, and Ch'oe Ch'un-guk in the Wangqing area; Ch'oe Hyon and Kim Tong-gyu in the Yanji area; Y i Pong-su and An Kil in the Hunchun area; and Nam Ch'ang-su and Pak Yong-sun in the Helong area. 19 They claim that Kim organized these and other Korean partisan groups to form what he called a Korean People's Revolutionary Army in the spring of 1934. Here again the later version of Kim's biography has changed the date to February 1936. More important than the juggling of dates is the formation of the army itself. There is, of course, no record of such an army. It is a name that has been invented to designate a Korean group that operated under a Chinese guerrilla army. There was a group with a similar name, the Korean Revolutionary Army, but this was a Korean Nationalist army commanded by Yang Se-bong, 20 who was twice the age of Kim and who received a posthumous medal of honor for his contribution to Korean independence from the South Korean government in 1962. Members of Kim's partisan group and his army fought under a Chinese guerrilla army. They were many, but they were scattered all over southern, eastern, and northern Manchuria under different units of the Chinese forces. There was no unified command of all Koreans who participated in this army. It should be pointed out, however, that the largest concentration of Korean partisans was in

14

Y O U N G KIM A N D THE U N I T E D A R M Y

eastern and southern Manchuria, and that is the region where K i m II Sung proved himself. K i m is one of the better-known Korean guerrilla leaders, but there were others equally, if not more, famous among the Koreans, and in fact many were Kim's superiors and close comrades at one time or another. There were Y i Honggwang, A n Pong-hak, C h u C h i n , K i m Ch'aek, Y i Hak-man, Ch'oe Yong-gon, Ch'oe Hyon, and Chon Kwang, to mention only a few. Some of them fought in different regions, and K i m may not have had personal contacts, but he knew of their guerrilla activities. Many members of the various units were killed by the Japanese, and a number of them surrendered. Those w h o survived the war and returned north to tell the story of their struggle number approximately 120 men and women. 2 1 Almost all survivors were asked to reminisce, and their tales are published in many books and reprinted time and again in magazines and newspapers. 22 T h e y remembered no other leader but K i m and refused to remember those who surrendered to the Japanese. Only the most important ones, such as K i m II and Ch'oe Yong-gon, withstood the pressure and abstained from recounting their partisan activities. Other partisans who are not encouraged to remember are those w h o fought in northern Manchuria where K i m had no operational ties. Y i m Hae, Kim Ch'ang-dok, and K i m Kwang-hyop, for example, have not revealed how they fought the Japanese in northern Manchuria without Kim. It is conceivable that K i m began his guerrilla activities as early as 1932 when he was barely twenty years old. In some of the earlier accounts, K i m was said to have worked under a partisan named Yang Song-yong. Yang was reported by the Japanese police to be a common bandit near the Wangqing area, but Yang later did fight under the Chinese guerrilla army and died in September 1935. 23 T h e reason for these and other contradictory claims is not difficult to understand, but they certainly do not do justice to Kim's true record, which, as we shall see, is considerable.

2 Kim and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

T h e army that ultimately unified the scattered Chinese and Korean guerrillas in Manchuria was the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (Dongbei kangri lianjuti), led by a Chinese commander, Yang Jingyu. 1 It is under this army that Kim II Sung and his guerrillas fought against the Japanese in Manchuria from approximately 1932 to 1941. This army was unmistakably Communist but it was not Korean. Thus Kim II Sung did fight against the Japanese in Manchuria, but he did so under Chinese, not Korean, command. It is not my purpose here to examine fully the operation of this army, but since Kim traces his revolutionary tradition to the guerrilla activity against the Japanese in Manchuria, it is important to scrutinize the United Army and the Korean participation in it. The United Army The origin of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army began in 1932 when a guerrilla group in Panshi prefecture in southern Manchuria was reorganized as the 32nd Red Army. It is said that the 32nd Red Army of Panshi prefecture was so named to follow the

16

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

31st Red Army of the Chinese Communists in Sichuan province. 2 In January 1932, the headquarters of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was moved from Shenyang to Harbin, and various Communist guerrilla groups were organized under its command. On the second anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, September 18, 1933, Yang Jingyu reorganized the 32nd Red Army to found the first independent division of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (Dongbei renmin gemingjun) with approximately three hundred partisans. The following year, in November 1934, Yang expanded by adding the second independent division, and both divisions operated primarily in southern Manchuria. Yang became commander of the army and appointed Y i Hong-gwang, 3 a Korean, commander of the First Division, and Cao Guoan, a Chinese, commander of the Second Division. In eastern Manchuria, the Second Army was established under the command of a Korean guerrilla fighter named Chu Chin in March 1934 in Santouwai. This army was expanded into two independent divisions in May 1934 in commemoration of the Jiandao May 30 Communist Incident.4 Chu Chin commanded the first independent division with Wang Detai as his political commissar, and he appointed a Chinese, Fang Zhensheng, commander of the second independent division. This army united a number of scattered Chinese and Korean guerrillas amounting to nearly a thousand strong, including Chinese fighters led by Dong Changying. The majority of this army consisted of Korean recruits from Jiandao. In northern Manchuria, the Third Army was established under the command of Zhao Shangzhi, putting together the Communist guerrillas in the Zhuhe region in the autumn of 1933. During the following year, Zhao and his comrade Li Zhaolin fought the Japanese with approximately four hundred guerrillas. However, the formation of the Third Army was not announced until January 28, 1935. In northeastern Manchuria, the guerrilla fighters of Wang Delin were united under Li Yenlu to form the Fourth Army. Li had united the fighters of Shi Zhongheng and other guerrilla leaders, putting together a sizable group headquartered in the Mishan area. There were a number of Koreans participating in the Fourth Army including Kim Chin-guk and Y i Chin-bok. 3 In the area near

Northeast Anti-Japanese Army

17

Mudanjiang, Ningan guerrilla groups were formed shortly after the Japanese took over Manchuria; this group began with approximately two hundred guerrillas, but it expanded under the leadership of Zhou Baozhong and guerrilla groups led by Ping Nanyang. Zhou at times worked with the guerrillas of the Second Army, but in September 1934 he formed the Fifth Army and appointed such able commanders as Chai Shiying and Liu Hanxing of Jidong guerrilla groups. Farther to the north near Jiamusi on the lower reaches of the Sungari River, Tangyuan guerrilla groups were reorganized into the Sixth Army under the leadership of Xie Wendong. Tangyuan guerrilla groups were reorganized a number of times, moving from region to region on both banks of the Sungari River, and they were later commanded by Xia Yungjie. Soldiers of these six armies consisted of members of the Chinese and Korean Communist parties, youth volunteers, and other antiJapanese Nationalist armed groups. Even the Japanese estimated that the total number might have reached as many as I^AOO.6 There were many casualties as well as defections from these groups, but by the mid-1930s these six armies were under the direction of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, receiving directives from Kang Sheng in Moscow. Han Shoukui, who was sent to Manchuria from the Comintern to direct the activities of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1936, was arrested soon after his arrival on April 16, 1936, and he revealed much about Chinese Communist activities in Manchuria. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 called for a united front of all anti-imperialist forces, and the Chinese Communist Party issued the August First Declaration in 1935. In response to the declaration, the leaders of these six armies issued a declaration of their own addressed to the leaders of the entire Chinese anti-Japanese movement, including both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, on October 12, 1935, pledging a united front of these groups and other antiJapanese forces in Manchuria. Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 1936, some of the leaders of these armies held a meeting in Tangyuan prefecture in Sanjiang province to announce the formation of a united army named the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (Dongbei kangri lianjun) on February 20, 1936.7 There was much fighting by these groups, and casualties were high. But when the Japanese intensified their drive into Manchuria

18

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

in 1931 and continued into the China mainland in 1937, the resistance in Manchuria against Japanese rule also intensified. T h e major force o f resistance was in southern, southeastern, northern, and northeastern Manchuria, and during the mid-1930s more guerrilla armies were formed and joined the United Army. In Raohe, near the Soviet border, south o f Khabarovsk, the Seventh Army was organized by a Korean guerrilla leader named Y i Hak-man, known to the Chinese as Li Baoman. In this manner the United Army was expanded to include eleven armies. T h e Eighth Army was expanded from the Sixth A r m y and was headed by X i e Wendong in the Yilan and Fangzheng areas; the Ninth Army was expanded from the T h i r d A r m y and was headed by Li Huatang in Tonghua, Sanjiang province. In N o v e m b e r 1936, Wang Yachen announced the formation o f the Eleventh Army in Fuyuan near Khabarovsk on the banks o f the Amur River. W i t h the proliferation o f various armies operating in different regions, coordination from one army to another became difficult, and since all were engaged in guerrilla activities in the countryside and forests away f r o m towns and villages, strict control o f eleven armies was virtually impossible. Each army, more or less, operated on its own, and hence there were no large-scale challenges to the Japanese army or the Manchukuo police force. In an effort to coordinate their activities, these eleven armies were reorganized according to their operational regions into three route armies at various times f r o m 1936 to 1938. T h e First Route Army was announced on May n , 1938, by combining the First and Second Armies to operate primarily in southern Manchuria under the command of Yang Jingyu. T h e Second Route Army was organized with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Armies in January 1937 and operated in eastern Manchuria under the command o f Zhou Baozhong. T h e T h i r d Route Army was organized with the Third, Sixth, N i n t h , and Eleventh armies in 1936 and operated in northern Manchuria under the command of Zhao Shangzhi. T h e leadership o f the United Army during the latter half o f the 1930s changed rapidly. T h e roster of officers presented in table 2.1 was put together by combining information from a number of Chinese and Japanese sources.8 For a better understanding of their guerrilla activities, see map.

Northeast

NORTHEAST

Anti-Japanese

Army

19

CHINA

(MANCHUKUO)

Khabarovsk

Legend 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

First Army Second Army Third Army Fourth A r m y Fifth A r m y Sixth Army Seventh A r m y Eighth Army Ninth Army T e n t h Army Eleventh Army

•

Headquarters

'u an

THIRD ROUTE ARMY Raohe (7), Tangyuan ( 6 ) j |

i. Jiamusi

Yilan ( 8 ) J j t i Fangzheng ÎÎSX.XVN V A Mishan (4) Tonghua ( 9 ) S | | § | \ SECON D N S / Harbin •< ROUTE . ARMY \ (

Changchun •

sMudanjiang

SOVIET

Ningan ( 5 ) «

UNION

* ^ " ^ / ^ V / Z / A ^VV/Santouwai

(2)4

Nakhodka Tomen

(Panshi ( l ) y / > L o n g j i n g * ' / / / / / /

A n t

"

Fusong ^ / / / á . Paektusan

/FIRST ROUTE ARMYy '

*' '

1 Hyesanjin

KOREA

Area of Operation

by the northeast

Anti-Japanese

United

Army

20

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

Table 1.1. Leadership of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army from 1936 to 1941 First R o u t e A r m y ( C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f : Yang J i n g y u ) (Commander: Yang Jingyu; Political Commissar: Yi Hcmg-gwang') First Division ( C o m m a n d e r : C h e n g Pin) Second Division ( C o m m a n d e r : C a o G u o a n ) T h i r d Division ( C o m m a n d e r : C h e n H a n z h a n g ) Wang Detai; Political Commissar: Second Army (Commander: [Chu Chin'], Zhengmin)

First Army

Wei

F o u r t h Division ( C o m m a n d e r : An Pong-hak*; C h ' o e Hyon*) F i f t h Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Fang Z h e n s h e n g ) Sixth Division ( C o m m a n d e r : K i m II Sung*) Second R o u t e A r m y ( C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f : Z h o u B a o z h o n g ) (Commander: [Wang Delin], Li Yenlu; Political Commissar: Huang Yuqing) First Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Li Yanping) Second Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Z o u Yo'uyan) T h i r d Division ( C o m m a n d e r : G u o Fude) Fifth Army (Commander: Zhou Baozhong; Political Commissar: Song Yifu) First Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Ping N a n y a n g ) Second Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Fu X i a n m i n g ) T h i r d Division ( C o m m a n d e r : G u o Fude) Seventh Army (Commander: Yi Hak-man*; Political Commissar: Ch'oe Yong-gon') Eighth Army (Commander: Xie Wendong; Political Commissar: Liu Shuhua) Tenth Army (Commander: Wang YachenJ

Fourth

Army

T h i r d R o u t e A r m y ( C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f : Z h a o Shangzhi) (Commander: Zhao Shangzhi; Political Commissar: Feng Zhongyun, Ch'aek*) First Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Z h a o Shangzhi) Second Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Li Xishan) T h i r d Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Li Fulin) F o u r t h Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Shi Guilin) F i f t h Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Li Zhaolin) Sixth Army (Commander: Xia Yunjie; Political Commissar: Chang Shoujian) First Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Xia Yunjie) Second Division ( C o m m a n d e r : Feng Z h i n g a n g ) T h i r d Division ( C o m m a n d e r : C h a n g C h u a n f u ) Ninth Army (Commander: Li Huatang) Eleventh Army (Commander: Qi Zhizhong) Third Army

Kim

Northeast Anti-Japanese Army

21

Note: Among these leaders of the United Army, only a few survived World War II. Z h o u Baozhong of the Second Route Army survived the war and later became an alternate m e m ber of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in its Eighth National Congress. Zhou died in February 1964. W h e n a N o r t h Korean military delegation visited Beij i n g shortly before his death, Zhou was hailed as their former leader in Manchuria. Li Yenlu was elected to the Standing Committee of the T h i r d National People's Congress in January 1965. Feng Zhongyun was twice elected to the National People's Congress from Jilin. See their activities in Donald W. Klein and Ann B. Clarck, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921 -1945; Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 1:415-416; and Who's Who in Communist China, pp. 367-368. See also a similar chart in the Chinese People's Revolutionary Museum that was reproduced in Nishimura Shigeo, Chiikoku ktndai tohoku chiekishi kenkyu, pp. 290-304. 'Korean officer

It is this United Army that most of the Korean partisans joined to fight the Japanese from 1932 to 1941. T h e top leadership of this army was held primarily by the Chinese Communists. Koreans were scattered in all of these armies, but they were heavily concentrated in the Second Army because it operated in eastern Manchuria, where Koreans had emigrated and settled for a long time, outnumbering the Chinese in the region. There were many gallant Korean partisans in all armies, including Y i Hak-man w h o later became commander of the Seventh Army. 9 It was the Second Army in which Kim II Sung began his armed guerrilla activities. Kim and the Second

Army

W h e n the Second Army was first organized in March 1934 the commander was a Korean named Chu Chin, and his political commissar was Wang Detai, a Chinese who later succeeded him as commander. Chu Chin was a good fighter, well known for his exploits against the Japanese. He was eventually arrested in February 1935 by the Yilan branch of the Japanese police, whose members were rewarded with money and trophies. 10 K i m II Sung began in this Second Army as a fighter in the third detachment of the First Company of the Second Independent Division and rose through the ranks, eventually reaching the rank of Sixth Division commander. His activities along with such other Korean guerrillas as Kim II, Ch'oe Hyon, and An Kil were notable, and Kim consolidated his position within the army. 11

22

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

W h e n the Second and Fifth Armies were regrouped for a joint operation against the Japanese in 1936, the rise of Kim's prominence within the guerrilla group was obvious. Kim was assigned to the Chinese commander Chai Shiying and deputy commander Fu Xianming as political commissar of the Central Command. He also commanded his own division, named the Kim II Sung Division, of approximately one hundred men in the Emu area halfway between Jilin and Mudanjiang. 1 2 However, for a Korean to rise in the Chinese army was a difficult matter, even for a man with Kim's background of attendance at Chinese schools and fluent in the Chinese language. T h e commander of the Second Army, Wang Detai, was killed in a battle against the Japanese Seventh Cavalry Division in the Fusong ar^a on November 7, 1936. He was succeeded by another Chinese, Z h o u Shudong, but he too was killed, on April 24, 1937, in the battle of Antu. 1 3 T h e command of the Second Army was taken over by still another Chinese, Wei Zhengmin, Kim's mentor. There were a number of important casualties among Korean guerrillas too; K i m Myong-p'al, for example, w h o was four years senior to K i m and had an illustrious record of guerrilla activity against the Japanese, was killed in October 1937. O n the Japanese side, Major General Ishikawa Shigeyoshi was killed by a company of guerrillas led by An Pong-hak, a Korean partisan, in the battle near Tunhua prefecture on October 10, 1936. In an effort to control the Communist guerrillas, the Japanese in Manchuria launched a number of expeditionary forces. T h e Japanese army, particularly the Kantdgun (Guandong Army), was interested in securing their bases in Manchuria to support their advance into the China mainland. T h e Japanese wanted to develop and secure coal mines, timber industries, and other natural resources in Manchuria without interference from organized C o m munist resistance groups. This effort, together with the measures taken by the police of the Manchukuo government, eventually brought an end to the operation of the United Army. T h e final push to stamp out the Chinese Communist guerrilla forces in Manchuria came when the Kantdgun appointed Major General Nozoe Shotoku commander of the Second Independent Security Division in Jilin. In October 1939, leaders of the Japanese military and the Manchurian government met, and Nozoe's expe-

Northeast

Zhou Baozhong,

commander of the Second

L\ Yettlu, commander of the Fourth Army

Anti-Japanese

Army

Army

Feng Zhongyun, political commissar of the Third Route Army

23

24

Kim

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D A R M Y

II Sung and his soldiers,

autumn

1940

ditionary force was given thirty million yen to wipe out the C o m munist guerrillas by March 31, 1941. 14 Major General Nozoe was assisted by an able man and veteran "bandit hunter," Lt. Col. Fukube Kunio, who proposed a two-prong policy of defeating the guerrillas in combat and persuading them to surrender. T h e latter was called a submission operation that promised the guerrillas money and immunity from punishment if they would abandon communism and surrender. Fukube's policy was successful. Those w h o surrendered not only abandoned communism but assisted the Japanese in capturing the leaders of the guerrilla forces. In anticipation of the intensified Japanese expedition, the First Route Army in southern Manchuria reorganized themselves. T h e First and Second Armies of the First Route Army were organized into three directional armies (Fangmiatijuti). In this final reorganization of the First Route Army, K i m II Sung was appointed com-

Northeast

Anti-Japanese

Army

Commanders of the Japanese and Manchukuo Expeditionary Force: Major General Nozoe Shotoku, Yu Chenzhi, and Lieutenant Colonel Kunio

25

Fukube

2.6

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

Body of Yang Jingyu, Army,

February

23,

commander-in-chief

of the Northeast

Anti-Japanese

United

1940

mander of the Second Directional A r m y operating in Jiandao province where the majority of residents were Korean. The leadership of the First Route A r m y in N o v e m b e r 1938 was as f o l l o w s : 1 3

Northeast Anti-Japanese Army

Japanese

Expeditionary

Force that killed

27

Yangjingyu

Commander-in-Chief: Yang J i n g y u Deputy commander: Wei Zhengmin C h i e f of staff: Fang Zhensheng Political commissar: Chon Kwang (Korean) First Directional A r m y commander in Tonghua province: C a o Yafan Second Directional Army commander in Jiandao province: Kim II Sung (Korean) Third Directional Army commander in Jilin province: Chen Hanzhang

W h e n the Japanese expeditionary campaign under General Nozoe intensified, all of these leaders except K i m II Sung were either killed or surrendered. In the most famous campaign to capture the commander-in-chief of the First Route Army, Yang J i n g y u , the Japanese forces were guided by one of Yang's most trusted comrades, the former First Division commander C h e n g Pin w h o submitted to the Japanese. Yang was killed on February 23, 1940, in the battle of Mengjiang in Tonghua province. He was tracked down for about a week by C h e n g Pin, and it was claimed that the detachment which eventually killed Yang was commanded

28

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

by Nishitani Kiyojin of the Mengjiang Prefectural Police Expeditionary Force, which belonged to the Tonghua Provincial Police headed by Kishitani Ryuichiro. 1 6 Yang's chief of staff Fang Zhensheng was arrested and executed by the Japanese on February 15, 1940, and the commander of the First Directional Army, Cao Yafan, was killed by his own men in an internal squabble on April 8, 1940.17 The commander of the Third Directional Army, Chen Hanzhang, was killed by the Japanese on December 8, 1940, after a long chase from southern to northern Manchuria. After Yang died, the deputy commander Wei Zhengmin assumed leadership of what was left of the First Route Army. Shortly after the death of Yang, Wei called a small meeting, March 13-15, 1940, at the camp of the political commissar, Chon Kwang, in Huaxun. This meeting was attended by eleven leaders of various groups left in the First Route Army including Han Inhwa, Kim Kwang-hak, Ch'oe Hyon, Kim Chae-bom, Kim II Sung, and Chon Kwang. In view of the mounting casualties, Wei cautioned that all units, whenever possible, should avoid direct confrontation with the Japanese and change tactics to work more closely with the people. Even this new tactic did not work, however, as two members of this group, Kim Kwang-hak and Kim Chaebom, were arrested when they went into villages to work with the people. 18 The end of the First Route Army came when the political commissar, Chon Kwang, surrendered to the Japanese submission operation on January 30, 1941, and turned against his comrades-in-arms. Chon led the Japanese expeditionary troops to the hideouts of his fellow guerrillas. Soon thereafter, Wei Zhengmin was killed on March 8, 1941, in Huaxun. Others either surrendered or were arrested and later submitted to the Japanese, including Pak Tuk-bom, who gave the Japanese much information on the remaining guerrillas and their activities, making it almost impossible to continue fighting. Among the leaders of the First Route Army, Kim II Sung was the only one who neither surrendered nor was captured and killed. Kim continued to fight to the end, but when it became obvious that the United Army was defeated, and the Second and Third Route Armies were also defeated in the north and northeast, Kim fled to the Soviet Union. It is reported that Kim told Wei

Northeast Anti-Japanese Army

29

Zhengmin he wanted to follow Zhou Baozhong, commander of the Second Route Army, into the Soviet Union, but Wei was said to have withheld permission. Kim fled shortly after the death of Wei in March 1941 by way of Hunchun prefecture, using a wooded area called Meili across from Vladivostok. 19 General Nozoe's expeditionary forces had succeeded in their campaign to wipe out the United Army, and General Nozoe ordered dissolution of his own force on March 12, 1941. The Japanese and Manchukuo joint victory celebration was said to have been held on March 19, 1941, about two weeks ahead of schedule. 20 There are various reports on numbers of Communist guerrillas in Manchuria, but both Chinese and Japanese accounts are either exaggerated or discounted. The Japanese estimated that approximately 15,000 guerrillas were operating from 1932 to 1940, and the Chinese claim there were more than 30,000 guerrillas in the eleven armies of the United Army. 21 Irrespective of their claims, Communist revolutionary struggle in Manchuria was an ordeal to be remembered by both Chinese and Japanese forces. 22

3 Guerrilla Accomplishments

T h i s account of the United Army is not intended to deny or belittle the many successful exploits of K i m II Sung and his partisans. T h e fact that he outlasted his Chinese superiors and Korean comrades in the First Route Army to the end is commendable. K i m survived as a true Communist guerrilla without surrendering, despite numerous Japanese campaigns to defeat him and without submitting to the many invitations to defect. T h e reward posted by the Japanese for information leading to his arrest in 1936 was only 20,000 yen compared to 200,000 yen for Yang Jingyu, but by 1939 K i m commanded the same amount as Yang. 1 At one point, one of the Japanese expeditionary forces thought they had killed him, and the money was paid and a citation was issued to the commander of that force, but K i m turned up in another region. 2 Kim's accomplishments are impressive, as we shall see, but what is most damaging to his record is his exaggerated claims. K i m has built an image of a benevolent and righteous leader w h o took from the rich and gave to the poor and still fought for the Korean C o m munist revolution. His fame as a successful guerrilla fighter comes not from his benevolence but from the ruthlessness with which he

Guerrilla Accomplishments

31

dealt with Japanese and Korean collaborators. It is a good record for a young man to have taken up arms against the Japanese while many of his compatriots were collaborating with the enemy. K i m claims many campaigns in southern and eastern Manchuria prior to 1935, but these seem to have been small-scale operations. His most illustrious campaigns do not start until about 1936 and they end in 1940. Koreans in the United

Army

Kim does not mention his former affiliation with the United Army; he claims that he organized a Korean anti-Japanese partisan group on April 25, 1932. He says that he fought the Japanese in Wangqing prefecture in March 1933, in Xiaowangqing in April, in Dongning prefecture in September. He also claims that he reorganized his partisan groups into a Korean People's Revolutionary Army in March 1934, twice going to northern Manchuria to Ningan prefecture near the city of Mudanjiang from 1934 to 1936. Kim's effort here is to establish a Korean identity and to build a Korean tradition out of his association with the Chinese C o m m u nist guerrilla group. Kim began his guerrilla activities early in a Korean Nationalist group, led by Yang Se-bong, but soon changed to fight for the Chinese group headed by Wu Yicheng w h o was not a Communist guerrilla leader. Kim said that his first encounter with the Chinese commander W u was in June 1933 when he visited him in Luozigou to resolve the problem of Chinese killing some thirty Korean partisans led by Y i Kwang in April 1933. K i m is supposed to have had a conference in which he was able to persuade W u to work with and not against Koreans. As a result of this meeting K i m is said to have brought Wu's forces, including Shi Zhongheng and Li Sanxia, under his command. 3 These claims are absurd to say the least. Wu was a well-known Chinese commander w h o inherited most of the soldiers of Ma Zhansan and Li D u , both of w h o m fled to the Soviet Union after the Japanese took over Manchuria in 1931. T h e Japanese at one time reported that Wu's command had several thousand Chinese soldiers. It should be remembered that K i m had

32

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

organized his own partisan forces in April 1932, only a year earlier, with eighteen men. Friction between Chinese and Koreans was not uncommon, and at times the Chinese discrimination against Korean partisans was intolerable. Many Koreans w h o were uncertain about their role in the Chinese guerrilla force left to join a partisan group headed by a Korean commander. This was the Second Army of the United Army, headed by a Korean commander named C h u C h i n , that operated in the Jiandao region where Korean residents outnumbered the Chinese. In the Jiandao region of eastern Manchuria, 78 percent of the population were Koreans compared to 22 percent Chinese, and in southern Manchuria the percentage was reversed, about 80 percent Chinese and 20 percent Koreans. Most of the Koreans were engaged in farming, working about half of the arable land in this region. 4 T h e racial conflict in the United Army came out in the open in January 1935 through the Minsaengdan Incident. T h e Minsaengdan was a Japanese police front organization of Korean residents in Manchuria established to curb the constant looting by bandits. Members would disguise themselves as bandits, penetrate the camps of the guerrillas, and return with information of their whereabouts, numerical strength, condition of arms, and the like. This organization was in existence for only a short period, from February to J u l y 1932, but its name became a catchword among the partisans and any Korean agent was called a minsaengdan. A similar organization named Hyopchohoe was organized to perform more or less the same function on September 6, 1934, by a Japanese gendarme, Lt. Col. Kato Hakujiro of Yanji prefecture. T h e president of the organization was a Korean collaborator named K i m Tong-han, and it had a membership of 8,195 men in the Jiandao region. This group openly advocated assassination of guerrilla leaders, induced the surrender of partisans, and rewarded informers. It was in operation until December 27, 1936, when it merged with still another organization known as Kyowakai or Hyophwahoe. 5 T h e incident that touched off the open hostility between Korean and Chinese guerrillas was the penetration by an agent of Hyopchohoe into the armed camp of the Second Army. T h e agent knew that a certain guerrilla named Han Yong-ho had gone to fetch food

Guerrilla Accomplishments

33

in nearby Baicaogou. Acting as Han's friend, he had entered the campground and escaped with vital information about the guerrilla base. W h e n he returned to the base, Han insisted on his innocence but was executed after interrogation. Han named others before his death, and a wave of interrogation and execution spread throughout the Second Army, eventually reaching as far as the commander, C h u Chin, and his political commissar, Y i Sang-muk. Chu was able to escape, but he was later captured and executed by the Japanese; Y i Sang-muk surrendered to the Japanese and revealed much information about the impact of the minsaengdan on the SinoKorean relationship in the United Army. 6 After this incident, Wang Detai, a Chinese, was appointed to succeed C h u Chin as commander of the Second Army, and its leadership was taken over by the Chinese. Worse than the change in leadership was the suspicion hanging over every Korean partisan. Many innocent Koreans were suspected and tortured. Ho Yong-ho, for example, was immediately dismissed from his position as Second Company commander, and Ch'oe Hak-ch'ol and some sixty men in Hunchun prefecture were expelled from the army. According to one report, the enraged Korean partisans even conspired to assassinate the new Chinese commander, Wang, in retaliation. 7 A conference to solve the problem of minsaengdan was held from February 24 to March 3, 1935, in Daihuanggou in Wangqing prefecture under the new political commissar of the Second Army, Wei Zhengmin. Some of the excessive punishments were recognized and rectified by the Chinese. While there was no change in the composition of leadership circles, the Chinese persuaded the Koreans to stay and fight with them in the United Army. K i m Chae-su, w h o later detected, reported that in some areas the Chinese and Koreans organized separate detachments. In others, however, the prejudice against the Koreans continued, and many Koreans left the United Army. In Tangyuan, for example, the commander, X i a Yunjie, was a heavy opium smoker w h o ordered his Korean subordinate Y i In-gun to cut off the ear of a kidnapped Korean hostage; when Y i refused, X i a called him a minsaengdan and shot him to death on the spot. Five Korean partisans in that army escaped and reported the incident to the commander of the Third Army, Zhao Shangzhi. Zhao rectified the situation by relieving X i a from his

34

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY 8

post. However, the United Army was no longer the same place for Koreans and many left. North Korean historians claim that K i m played a leading role in mediating the differences between Chinese and Koreans in the incident. T h e records of the conferences held under the auspices of Wei Zhengmin in February and March 1935 are available, and Kim was not present at those meetings, let alone playing any role in them. T h e earlier version of Kim's biography condemned the leaders of the Korean delegation to these meetings, Song II and Kim Song-do, as factionalists, but the latest version omits their names. K i m Song-do was not even present. Song II headed the delegation, but he was later falsely accused of being a minsaengdati himself and was executed. 9 T h e more important consequence for K i m II Sung was his future role in the United Army. Most of the fainthearted Koreans defected, and cooperation between the Chinese and Koreans was difficult at best. K i m was one of the few Koreans the Chinese had trusted because of his facility in the Chinese language and his Chinese educational background. For those w h o remained, the Chinese leaders paid extra attention and treated them well, particularly after the August First Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party that called for a united front of all ethnic groups in Manchuria. The Poch'dnbo Raid and the Korean

Association

T h e largest and most successful campaign K i m waged during his guerrilla days was the raid on Poch'onbo, a Korean town just over the Manchurian border. Kim's Sixth Division of the Second Army of the First Route Army, consisting of nearly two hundred guerrillas, attacked the town on June 4, 1937, destroying local government offices and setting fire to the Japanese police box, the local elementary school, and post office. He took four thousand yen from the local people and inflicted damage estimated at sixteen thousand yen. He took the town and occupied it for that day, but early the next morning he retreated to Manchuria. T h e stunned Japanese police pursued Kim's unit to the Yalu River on June 5, but K i m II Sung turned around and defeated the Japanese police force, killing seven Japanese police officers including Police Chief Okawa. 1 0 In

Guerrilla Accomplishments

35

a related campaign, Kim was joined by the Fourth Division commander, Ch'oe Hyon, who was returning from a similar raid on Musan on June 9, 1937, in Ershidaogou in Changbai prefecture in Manchuria. The combined forces raided the outpost of Yokoyama timber camp and attacked the Japanese forces, killing more than ten and taking nine hostages as well as guns and ammunitions. This was the raid that made Kim famous and known to the Japanese. The raid was important for its military impact alone, but more important to the Japanese was the fact that the raid on Poch'onbo was coordinated by the anti-Japanese united front organization known as Hatiiti choguk kwatigbokhoe, the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association. Members of the association were in touch with Kim II Sung's Sixth Division for nearly half a year planning for the raid. Kim claims that he was president of the association, but the facts on the association are well documented and its operation is known. The association was created to form a united front of the antiJapanese Koreans in Manchuria following the August First Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935. The association was founded on June 10, 1936. Its declaration, platform, and bylaws of eight chapters and fourteen articles are documented. 11 The person who played the most important role in organizing the association was Chon Kwang, Kim's superior in the United Army. Chon Kwang was directed in turn by Wei Zhengmin who came from the Comintern. Branches of this association were created in various border towns within Korea; for example, Kwon Yong-byok organized the Changbai Operation Committee (Changbaek kcmgjak wiwdnhoe), the Kapsan Operation Committee was organized by Pak Tal and Pak Kum-ch'ol, and the Kangguri Operation Committee by Ch'oe Kyong-hwa. Kim II Sung did have a role because he used the members of the Kapsan group to attack Poch'onbo in June 1937, but his connection did not go beyond his military campaign. The organizational work of establishing various branches seems to have been the work of Chon Kwang. Chon Kwang is a celebrated revolutionary known to the Korean revolutionary movement as O Song-yun. The declaration of the association was signed by an initiatory committee consisting of three men: O Song-yun, Om Su-myong, and Y i Sang-jun. Of the

36

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

three, O Song-yun is most famous. Together with an accomplice named Kim Ik-sang, O tried to assassinate a Japanese general, Baron Tanaka Giichi, in Shanghai on March 28, 1922. He missed Tanaka, however, and killed an innocent woman who was getting off the boat behind Tanaka. O was immediately arrested and interned in the Japanese consulate jail in Shanghai. He escaped on May 2, 1922, and eventually made his way to Manchuria through Europe and the Soviet Union and joined the United Army. 12 O was known in the United Army as Chon Kwang and worked closely with Yang Jingyu and Wei Zhengmin. In fact, O was Kim's superior in the United Army, serving as political commissar under Wei, while Kim was one of its division commanders. Wei Zhengmin held one of his last meetings of the First Route Army at O's operational headquarters. Kim II Sung did participate in this meeting, and Kim knew O Song-yun, known to him as Chon Kwang, very well, but he does not mention Chon Kwang or O Song-yun at all. Even without his claim to membership in the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association, his military exploits are impressive. The raid on Poch'onbo was particularly important because he crossed the border and came into Korea from Manchuria, using an underground group that was organized by the United Army. Kim's earlier guerrilla activities in Manchuria were reported in Korea as early as October 1936. An article in Choson ilbo described Kim with about forty men descending on a Korean farmer named Pak Hung-yong in a small village named Shiliudaogou and taking his cow and grain on October 4, 1936.13 There are many more articles about Kim's activities of this kind, but they deal with Kim's banditry and general condemnation of his plundering, sympathizing with the suffering of the Korean immigrants in Manchuria. It was difficult for Korean-language newspapers of the 1930s under strict Japanese censorship to report any patriotic and Communist activities.14 However, the Japanese made a big issue of Kim's raid into Poch'onbo, because Kim's activities did not stop with Korean farmers or Korean collaborators but extended to killing Japanese police officers in Korea. Kim's guerrilla activities in both Manchuria and Korea commanded the immediate attention of the Japanese because he was an able guerrilla leader efficient in killing Japanese soldiers and police.

Guerrilla Accomplishments Guerrilla

Activities:

37

1937-1940

Many Japanese accounts of Kim's guerrilla activities report on this period, and there are even more claimed by Kim in North Korea. There is no need to describe them all in detail, but it is important to know how Kim fought, recruited guerrillas, procured supplies and arms, and conducted himself. Even before his raid into Korea, Kim's force of nearly 150 guerrillas, joined by an equal number of partisans headed by Cao Guoan, met the Japanese expeditionary force in February 1937 and engaged them in a number of battles in Changbai prefecture near Paektusan. Especially noteworthy is the battle of Limingshui on February 26, 1937. A small detachment of approximately 50 guerrillas challenged the Japanese forces, but when the Japanese expeditionary force gave chase to the retreating guerrilla detachment, Kim II Sung's main group of 250 guerrillas attacked from the snow-covered highland where they were hiding, covering their heads with white cloth. It is reported that nearly five feet of snow fell the night before. Kim and Cao's guerrillas defeated the Japanese, killing thirteen officers under Lieutenant Kawada, wounding fourteen Japanese soldiers, and taking seventeen prisoners including Lt. Murayama Masashige. 15 Kim II Sung fought all during 1938 and 1939, mostly in southern and southeastern Manchuria. There are numerous accounts of his activities, such as the Liudaogou raid of April 26, 1938, and his raid into Korea once again in May 1939. Another noteworthy engagement was Kim's battle with the Japanese Special Police headed by Maeda Takeshi that tracked Kim's group for months in early 1940. When Maeda's forces finally caught up with Kim in March 13, 1940, at Daimalugou in Helong prefecture, they were attacked by Kim's guerrillas. After the attack, Kim is said to have released his captives because he had to move on quickly. Maeda's police pursued him for nearly two weeks, catching up with him in Hongqihe, Antu prefecture, on March 25, 1940. In this battle, Kim deployed 250 guerrillas against 150 of Maeda's force and defeated him completely. Kim killed the commander Maeda Takeshi, 58 Japanese police officers, and 17 workers attached to the police force and wounded many police officers and workers. He took 13 prisoners and much ammunition and weapons from Maeda's force. To the

38

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

Korean captives, Kim is said to have preached Communist revolution in Korea, and he asked them to join his guerrilla forces voluntarily. He promised them he would someday invade Korea. 1 6 Kim's force expanded to approximately 340 guerrillas in J u l y 1940, and such trusted comrades as C h ' o e Hyon, Ch'oe Ch'un-guk, K i m Tong-gyu, and An Kil worked closely with him. However, his force became one of the main targets of Major General Nozoe Shotoku's expeditionary forces, and K i m himself admits that he went into a small-unit operation from August 1940. Kim's largest command was approximately 300 men, both C h i nese and Koreans, at the height of his operation from 1937 to 1940, but at times he operated with fewer than 50 men. This is not to belittle his efforts. T h e nature of his operation was such that the forces were divided into many small companies and detachments, constantly moving from one location to another in deep mountain forests and difficult-to-reach areas. It was an arduous undertaking with the Japanese expeditionary forces constantly following their trail. To avoid heavy casualties, his campaigns in most cases were hit-and-run operations. There were many casualties, particularly in the winter months. Kim said that the winter of 1936-1937 was so harsh that he spent most of the time in the snow-covered impassable mountains with only a few soldiers. K i m recruited Chinese coolies and Korean farmers, and in many of his raids into towns and villages he kidnapped young men and trained them to fill the ranks. In his raid on Poch'onbo, for example, K i m recruited nearly ninety Koreans into his company. For the recruitment of officers, the Second Army advertised a training school and printed handbills to announce the recruitment of o f f i cers. Among several qualifications listed, such as age and loyalty to the cause of China and Chinese communism, was a provision that the prospective candidate should not smoke opium. These handbills were printed in Chinese and were directed to the Chinese and Korean residents in Manchuria. Kim's principal method, however, was to take hostages. 17 T h e guerrillas acquired their provisions in several ways. T h e most commonly used methods were demands made on rich Koreans, enforced by taking hostages. At times they attacked small villages and trains to replenish their supplies. At other times, they

Guerrilla Accomplishments

39

mm

In commemoration of the capture of Chu Chin nese police, February 1935

by the Yilan Branch

of the Japa-

offered opium and ginseng farmers their protection and exacted their crops. K i m often used threats against farmers to collect supplies and money. One of the phrases he often used against the farmers and Japanese collaborators was to give "guns if you have guns, people if you have people, money if you have money, and goods if you have goods." Kim used to threaten people that if they did not comply, he would cut off the ears of the hostages, and if they still did not comply he would cut off their heads. 18 Numerous reports in Korean newspapers cite Korean immigrants who suffered at the hands of the guerrillas. Kim's partisans took 5,000 yen from a rich Korean miner named K i m Chae-hung; from those w h o did not have cash on hands, they took promissory notes to be collected later. 19 K i m spoke often of the dire need for food and described grievous circumstances with little clothing in the dead of winter. Kim and his men had to go for more than two or three days without food, and at times they maintained a diet of salt and water. T h e methods they used to acquire provisions were not unusual for an underground guerrilla force. 2 0

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

Li's Korean wife and

children

Guerrilla

Leaders of the Korean Fatherland Poch'dnbo raid, December 1937 From left to right, seated front

Restoration

Association

arrested after

the

row:

So In-hong, Yi Che-sun, Chi T'ae-hwan, and Kwon standing back row: Pak Nok-kiim (free), Hwang Kum-ok (six months), months), and Pak Kum-ch'ol (life imprisonment)

Ch'oe Hydn

41

Accomplishments

and his men in Dunhua

prejecture,

winter

Yong-byok Chang

1938

(all

Chung-yol

executed); (eight

42

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

Members

of the First Route Army,

summer

1939

In an effort to find out more about the internal operation of Kim's guerrilla force, the Japanese police sent in a woman named C h i Sun-ok whose husband had earlier joined the force. She joined ostensibly to look for the husband she had not seen for three years, but in truth she was sent in by the Japanese police equipped with a poison pill to swallow if she was unmasked and unable to withstand the torture. She joined the Seventh Detachment commanded by O Chung-hup of Kim's guerrillas in August 1939 and worked nearly a year as a cook and seamstress. She was released from the guerrillas by Han Ik-su because she was weak and unable to move fast when the guerrillas had to retreat into mountain forests. Chi Sun-ok reported that when she first joined the guerrillas, she was interrogated by K i m II Sung in person for nearly four days, and she was allowed to join the women's detachment consisting of about thirty-two women.

Guerrilla Accomplishments

Public display oj the

43

beheaded.

Shortly after she joined, Kim's group raided a wealthy Chinese landlord named Liu and took him hostage to get food and clothing. She and other women made clothes from the fabric for the

44

Y O U N G KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

Chon Kwang (second from left), Kim Army, surrendered January 30, 1941

II Sung's

Pak Tuk-bom

superior

in the First

surrendered September 28,

Route

1940.

Guerrilla

Accomplishments

Kim II Sung in the Soviet Union, 1943 Left to right: Kim II Sung, unknown, Ch'oe Hyon, and An

Kim II Sung, his wife, Kim Chóng-suk,

Kil

and son Kim Jong II

46

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

guerrillas. After repeated requests, she was allowed to see her husband once, but her husband was transferred to another unit. In N o vember 1939, the Seventh Detachment commander O Chung-hup was killed in a raid and O Paek-yong succeeded him as commander. She reported that K i m II Sung was an able leader, constantly preaching to his men about international communism and Korean nationalism when they were not fighting or retreating. She also said that on October u , 1939, eight Russians came with two interpreters and stayed nearly ten days discussing something with K i m in the forest near Sandaogou, Helong prefecture. She suspected that the Russians supplied ammunition and arms from the Soviet Union at least once in three months. She confessed that the most difficult part of her guerrilla life was the hunger and cold. 2 1 As for the procurement of arms, Kim said that he fought with weapons he took from the Japanese. This was one method the partisans used to acquire arms, but in most cases the Korean partisans received weapons from their Chinese counterparts, and sometimes they bought ammunition locally. There are many Japanese arrest reports dealing with the illicit sale and purchase of firearms, particularly those attempts by Ch'oe Hyon, w h o was the supply officer for the Second Army. At times the Manchurian police, after faking an encounter with the guerrillas, sold their weapons and ammunition for profit. It was reported that Fang Zhensheng, one of the Chinese commanders, regularly obtained arms and ammunition in this way. 22 Still another method was to make arms. Pak Yong-sun made a crude form of grenade, for example, which the Koreans called ydtt'gil p'okt'an (Yanji bomb). 23 Simple repairs of guns and pistols were all done by the partisans themselves. Perhaps most noteworthy was the fact that the guerrillas often crossed the border into the Russian Maritime Province and bought arms from the Soviet Union. This practice was common in the northern region across from Khabarovsk where the Second Route Army, and more specifically the Seventh Army, operated. T h e commander of the Seventh Army, Y i Hak-man, used to cross the border into the Soviet Union and bring back large numbers of arms and ammunition. 24 Kim's accomplishments as a guerrilla are therefore many. He fought the Japanese expeditionary forces at great odds. He was ulti-

Guerrilla Accomplishments

47

mately defeated, but he never feared the Japanese. W h a t he feared more was the hunger, the cold, and the defection in his ranks. Many of his men, including Kim Pong-jun, Y i m U-song, Pak Tukbom, Han In-hwa, and Kim Chae-bom, did defect. Even his superior officer in the First Route Army, Chon Kwang, surrendered to the Japanese and then helped the Japanese expeditionary force hunt K i m down, but Kim escaped and survived. There was strife in his own ranks also, such as the quarrel between C h ' o e Hyon and Pak Tuk-bom. W h e n Pak defected, he joined the Japanese in the search for Ch'oe Hyon. Among those captives and hostages K i m took in his numerous raids into timber camps and coal mines, few believed in his Communist revolution and virtually all looked for an opportunity to defect. In the Soviet Union:

7947-/945

While K i m is silent about his retreat into the Soviet Union, there are many reports of his trek there. He is said to have entered the Soviet Union to evade the pursuing Japanese forces soon after the death of Wei Zhengmin on March 8, 1941. Wei was Kim's superior and mentor, and his death convinced K i m that his guerrilla activities in southern Manchuria had come to an end. In the biographical sketch of Wei, there is a story of camaraderie between Wei and K i m , signifying the joint effort by Chinese and Koreans against the Japanese. Kim always cared for Wei, w h o was in ill health, securing rare herb medicine for him and giving him food when it was scarce. Wei, in turn, is said to have prepared Korean buckwheat noodle soup (naengmyon) when Kim visited him in his camp. Wei said that Kim's love for naengmyon was well known, and he prepared it properly, even when it was difficult to get foodstuffs. 2 5 Kim is said to have left from Hunchun prefecture, using the wooded area called Meili, along the banks of the Tumen River into the area west of Vladivostok. It is said that K i m had only six men with him when he crossed the border and that he was temporarily interned until his identity was verified by Z h o u Baozhong, the commander of the Second Route Army w h o had earlier retreated to the Soviet Union in 1940.26 K i m eventually joined the Chinese guerrilla group led by Zhou Baozhong in three training camps.

48

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

One defector f r o m N o r t h to South Korea related that w h e n he was a reporter f o r the N o r t h Korean newspaper Minju Choson, he was told by K i m II Sung himself that he had fled to the Russian Maritime Province in 1 9 4 1 . H e said his article to that effect appeared in the paper on August 15, 1947. 27 Chinese and Korean partisan retreats, either tactical or by necessity, were not uncommon. O n e of the more famous Chinese leaders, Li D u , f l e d to the Soviet U n i o n in the early 1930s. In addition to Z h o u B a o z h o n g , K u n g X i e n y i n g and Chai Shiying also fled to the Soviet U n i o n , and Y i Hak-man, the Korean commander of the Seventh A r m y , crossed the border into the Soviet U n i o n . In a Russian study about the liberation of Korea, Major General B . G . Sapozhnikov relates that there were many partisan crossings as early as 1 9 3 6 and 1 9 3 7 . H e recounts one incident that he investigated while stationed in the Russian Maritime Province. H e was asked on February 2 2 , 1 9 3 6 , to investigate a crossing of armed guerrillas into Soviet territory. Accompanied by one Korean interpreter named K i m Soy ( K i m So-i, or Lieutenant Kim), he found that some sixty partisans, of w h o m two-thirds were Koreans and onethird Chinese, under the command of a Korean partisan named Pak In-ch'ol, had come into the Russian Maritime Province. He said that many were wounded and hungry, and the commander, Pak, was wounded in his left arm. Sapozhnikov related that after he had helped them he sent them back to Manchuria in April 1936. He also expressed the general concern of the Russians at the time that it was difficult for them to distinguish between genuine antiJapanese partisans and Japanese agents disguised as partisans. 28 T h e Soviet U n i o n seems to have welcomed the Chinese and Korean guerrillas f r o m Manchuria in the 1940s after they had forcibly relocated Korean residents f r o m the Russian Maritime Province to the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the latter half of the 1930s. Survivors of all units of the United Army eventually retreated at various times f r o m 1940 to 1 9 4 1 into the Soviet U n i o n . T h e y were camped and trained in three locations: Okeanskaya Field School near Vladivostok, Voroshilov C a m p in Nikolsk, and a training camp in a wooded area south of Khabarovsk. 2 9 Korean partisans were scattered in all three Soviet training camps, and K i m II Sung was trained at Okeanskaya Field School.

Guerrilla Accomplishments

49

Kim eventually met all Koreans from the Second and Third Route Armies including those under Zhou Baozhong, among them Ch'oe Yong-gon, K i m Ch'aek, and Kim Kwang-hyop, but survivors of Kim's own group from the First Route Army, including So Ch'ol, An Kil, and Ch'oe Ch'un-guk, stayed with K i m in the southern camps near Nikolsk and Vladivostok. The purpose of the Soviet Union in training these men seems to have been to use them against the Japanese if ever the Soviet Union had to fight the Japanese in Manchuria. These guerrillas, though defeated in Manchuria, had both the experience and the will to fight the Japanese. There are scattered reports that Kim II Sung led a small detachment and reentered Manchuria near Dongning prefecture and fought the Japanese. One report says that Kim II Sung, Ch'oe Hyon, and Chai Shiying and their partisans of 150 men were reorganized into three detachments with fifty guerrillas each in the Voroshilov Camp commanded by a Soviet officer of the 57th Guard Unit in Iman. T h e same report says that Kim II Sung headed the second detachment and taught antiJapanese songs and trained his men. Kim is said to have returned to Manchuria and fought the Japanese police unit headed by Koga on April 26, 1941. 30 There are other reports of his men fighting in Manchuria after the retreat to the Soviet Union, among them were An Kil, Kang Kon, K i m II, and Y i Pong-su. The most important revelation is a report made in February 1943 when a Soviet-trained Korean guerrilla named Pak Kil-song was arrested. Pak was one of the Korean detachment leaders arrested on January 4, 1943, after entering Manchuria from the Soviet Union. 3 1 Pak revealed there were approximately 700 men in Khabarovsk Camp taking orders from a Soviet officer named Vassiliev, but such Chinese leaders as Zhou Baozhong and Chang Shoujian appealed unsuccessfully to the Soviet authorities to let them be autonomous and take orders only from the Chinese Communist Party. Pak also revealed that, when he returned to Manchuria, he discovered that the Korean underground leader in Manchuria, Ho Hyong-sik, was killed on August 3, 1942, and the operation in Manchuria had had to undergo reorganization. In this reorganization Kim Ch'aek was elected leader of the underground organization in September 1942, but he was ordered to return to the Soviet Union.

•jO

Y O U N G KIM A N D THE UNITED ARMY

A m o n g others w h o returned and were arrested were Han H u n g son and K i m Ch'un-sop, w h o told of their training in the Soviet U n i o n in anticipation o f the Soviet war against Japan. Details of the Soviet training of partisans are not k n o w n , but some sort of sophisticated training seems to have taken place, including parachute exercises. Major General Sapozhnikov has related that w h e n the Soviet army entered Manchuria at the close of W o r l d War II, they dropped paratroopers near Harbin and were able to link up with them after crossing the border in August 1945. In a jovial mood shortly after his return to Korea, K i m II Sung said that he and his men were planning a dramatic entrance into Pyongyang by parachute, but the confounded Japanese had surrendered before their plans could be realized. 32 Pak Kil-song also revealed that the Soviet U n i o n was in the process of creating an international military unit under their Far Eastern C o m m a n d by recruiting and training the anti-Japanese guerrillas from Manchuria, an army 10,000 strong, to prepare for their campaign against the Japanese. In an effort to train the retreating guerrillas from Manchuria, the Soviet Far Eastern C o m mand appointed a few officers of the international unit. Pak said that in the camp near Khabarovsk, Z h o u Baozhong, commander of the Second Route Army, and C h a n g Shoujian were appointed colonel; K i m C h ' a e k and Feng Z h o n g y u n were appointed lieutenant colonel; and W a n g M i n g g u i , Bian Fengxiang, C h a n g Guangdi, and Pak himself were appointed to the rank of major. 33 Similar organization must have taken place in Voroshilov C a m p and Okeanskaya Field School, and K i m II Sung is said to have been appointed major in the 88th Division of this international unit of the Far Eastern C o m m a n d of the Soviet army. W h e n K i m first appeared in Pyongyang, he was reported to have returned to Korea in a Soviet army uniform wearing the rank of captain or major. It was during his five-year stay in the Soviet U n i o n that K i m was married to K i m C h o n g - s u k , a member of his partisans w h o fought with him in Manchuria. T h e record o f K i m C h o n g - s u k appears in Japanese police files, and the N o r t h Koreans recognize her as a partisan w h o was a close comrade of K i m II Sung, but not his wife. K i m Chong-suk,was born on December 24, 1919, the elder of

Guerrilla Accomplishments two daughters of a poor farmer in Hoeryöng, Hamgyöng pukto. She was seven years younger than K i m and had a background similar to Kim's own. She followed her mother to look for her father in Yanji, Manchuria, but found that he had already died there. Soon thereafter she lost her mother and became an orphan. She is said to have joined Kim's guerrilla force in 1935 at the age of sixteen as a kitchen helper. She worked at many odd jobs for the guerrillas and was arrested by the Japanese in the summer of 1937 while working as an undercover agent to procure food and supplies. W h e n she was released, she rejoined the guerrillas. She is said to have cooked, sewed, and washed for the guerrillas and even saved Kim's life once in 1939.34 Japanese Major General Nozoe Shötoku, whose expeditionary force hunted K i m and his partisans during his last days in Manchuria, related that his able military police sergeant Nagashima Tamajirö had captured a woman partisan named Kim Hye-sun w h o claimed that she was the w i f e of K i m II Sung. She was arrested on April 6, 1940, and has related that she and another woman along with three male partisans were left behind because she was wounded. T h e Japanese tried to use her to lure Kim to surrender, but they were not successful. There is no record of such a woman partisan in any of the Chinese or Korean sources. 35 Kim Chöng-suk followed K i m II Sung into the Soviet Union, apparently married him there, and bore him a son on February 16, 1942. This son was given the Russian name Yura and the Korean name Chöng-il (Kim J o n g II). W h i l e in the Soviet Union, she bore him another son. Kim's second son, named Shura (Kim P'yöng-il), was born in 1944, but he drowned in a swimming accident in J u l y 1947 in Pyongyang. She also bore him a daughter (Kim Kyöng-hüi) in Pyongyang, but the whereabouts of this daughter are not known. Kim Chöng-suk died on September 22, 1949, in Pyongyang while delivering a stillborn baby. 36 She was affectionately called Vera by the generals of the Soviet occupation forces in Pyongyang, and for one year after the establishment of the republic in N o r t h Korea until her death in September 1949, K i m Chöng-suk was the first lady of North Korea. Major General N . G . Lebedev, executive officer of the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea, remem-

•>2

YOUNG KIM AND THE UNITED ARMY

bcred her as a vivacious and generous lady who always cooked enormous amounts of food for the hungry Soviet generals when they visited Kim's home. 37 A statue was erected and a museum was built in her home town in Hoeryong after her son Kim Jong II became prominent in North Korea in the late 1970s, but this tribute to her is in commemoration of the contribution to the Korean revolution as a partisan and not as wife of Kim II Sung or mother of Kim Jong II. Given his personal background and the circumstances in Korea and Manchuria during the latter part of the Japanese occupation, Kim's record of anti-Japanese guerrilla activities is commendable. For a young man who had no family life to speak of and deprived of basic support from his family and friends, Kim did well to join a subversive, Communist group to fight for his country. Even if the United Army was a Chinese guerrilla force, he fought against the Japanese for the cause of communism in China and Korea. He suffered many defeats, but he also scored some impressive victories and made a name for himself — indeed, he became the most wanted guerrilla leader in Manchuria. He persisted in the hopeless fight without much support, but he endured and did not surrender or submit to the Japanese. He also preached to his men the cause of Korean independence and the need for communism and fostered anti-Japanese spirit in the darkest days of the Korean independence movement. He did not win many converts, and he had to resort to taking hostages to prolong his guerrilla activities, but he did fight to the end. When the Japanese expeditionary force crushed the guerrillas in Manchuria, he fled to the Soviet Union, where he was trained by the local Soviet authorities. He returned to North Korea when his country was liberated. In an effort to denigrate his past records, South Korean sources consider him a fake, denying him his past revolutionary activities. But Kim is not a fake. To be sure, there were countless patriots who attained majority at the time of the fall of the Korean kingdom in 1910 and fought the Japanese throughout their adult lives, returning to Korea at the end of thirty-five years of Japanese occupation. There were many who perished, fighting for freedom in

Guerrilla Accomplishments

53

Korea during the period. Compared to these men, Kim's period of struggle is indeed brief, and his contribution may not be considered significant as that of others, but his record is a solid one and deserving of recognition even if it was under the United A r m y of the Chinese Communists. A more serious difficulty comes from his attempt to build a towering Korean image of himself by denying any of his Chinese and Soviet connections. N o r t h Koreans have manufactured evidence to prove that K i m was a Korean revolutionary w h o fought solely for Korean liberation, claiming nonexistent records and denying the contribution of others to the cause of Korean independence. Evidence of his close relationship with the Chinese guerrillas is overw h e l m i n g , however, and his persistent denial of such records does not improve his image as a Korean revolutionary. Many Koreans fought against the Japanese alongside whoever supported their cause. Even the Korean Nationalists w h o despised communism asked for assistance from the Soviet Union in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and the Comintern in the 1920s. K i m ' s image-building campaign is indeed extreme in many respects. His show of filial piety, for example, does not seem to be simple reverence of his parents, w h o in fact did little f o r K i m in his boyhood. His purpose, rather, seems to be more self-serving: an e f f o r t to build his own image as a pious Korean son f r o m a revolutionary Korean family. As an uneducated Korean youth w h o spent most of his young life fighting what he considered to be his enemy, the Japanese, Kim's record is commendable, and his lessthan-adequate knowledge of the tenets of communism is nothing to be ashamed of. His insistence that he taught fourth graders dialectical materialism w h e n in fact he was expelled f r o m school in the eighth grade does not make him a good Marxist. T o refute K i m ' s claims is not difficult. But more important than the false claims is his effort to build the tradition of Korean communism and Korean revolutionary spirit upon such fallacious foundations. His Chinese and Soviet connections were fortunate for his future in the northern half of liberated Korea, but the suppression of such records to show that he accomplished all for Korea in the name of Korea does not bring about the intended result. His parti-

54

Y O U N G KIM A N D T H E U N I T E D ARMY

san activities with the Chinese were not ever-victorious; in fact, they ended in defeat. It is his persistence and obstinate will, characteristics of many successful revolutionaries elsewhere, that deserve recognition. It was also his political good fortune to have had Chinese and Soviet connections that distinguished him from other Korean revolutionaries.

II CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

T l i e Koreans greeted their liberators in 1945 with uncommon enthusiasm — not so much because they approved or disapproved the disparate political ideologies of the Soviets and the Americans but primarily because their military occupations brought an end to the harsh Japanese rule under which they had suffered so long. But they soon learned the consequences of the liberation their own revolutionaries did not bring home. T h e United States instituted direct military rule in the South and the Soviet Union virtually dictated its wishes in the North. T h e so-called temporary division of the country was to last longer than the entire period of the Japanese occupation. Numerous efforts at peaceful reunification of the country have failed, and the N o r t h Korean military attempt to reunify the country brought even more unwanted non-Korean military forces into Korea and killed more Koreans, yet left the country still divided. T h e flames of the Korean revolutionary spirit have died without truly attaining the ultimate objective: an independent and unified Korea. There were many organized Korean independence groups outside of Korea, but none of their military units entered the country

56

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

with the liberators. There was not even a contingent of an organized Korean group operating in either the United States or the Soviet forces that occupied Korea. T h e only organized group of any consequence, the Korean Provisional Government with its military unit, was with the Chinese Nationalists in China, but it was not the Chinese Nationalists that came and occupied Korea. T h e American occupation forces immediately dismissed the Korean Provisional Government as well as all other political groups when they returned to Korea. T h e long and sometimes grueling activities of the Korean Communists ended without any formal ties or o f f i cial relationship with the Soviet Union and its occupation forces. K i m II Sung's unit that was defeated by the Japanese and retreated to the Soviet Union came closest to being a Korean armed unit operating with the occupation forces. His unit was small and without foundation in Korea, but none of the others had any political roots or organized base in the North because the Japanese had succeeded in extirpating all organized resistance groups within Korea. W h e n compared with other, more popular Korean revolutionaries and their groups, K i m had two crucial elements on his side: one was the support of the Soviet occupation forces, the other was the division of Korea itself. T h e Soviet Union recognized no political groups in the North, nor had they prepared a leader in Moscow for Korea. Not knowing the past records of the Korean C o m m u nists, the Soviet military unit that occupied the North supported one of their own number. T h e division of Korea lured most of the prominent revolutionaries to Seoul, the capital of Korea in the South, leaving the North free for K i m to maneuver. It was in the South that major leaders fought each other for political hegemony, not realizing that they were fighting for the southern half only. In retrospect, it was fortunate for K i m II Sung to have fought with the Chinese in Manchuria and to have received training in the Soviet Union. His association with the Soviet military units there, although it lasted less than five years, was more than any Korean revolutionary group had ever had in the Soviet Union in more than three decades under the Japanese. During the Soviet occupation of three years and four months from August 1945, K i m faithfully carried out Soviet directives, putting himself in a leader-

Consolidation of Political Power

57

ship position and managing to control his opposition. He created a new party, a new army, and a new government, all patterned after the Soviet Communist system. Less than five years after he returned to Korea, Kim II Sung tried to unify the country militarily with his newly trained soldiers. This effort failed just as surely as his partisan struggles in Manchuria, but in the process Kim had begun to lay the groundwork for his power. He used the failure in the Korean War to suppress his opposition and consolidate his power, just as he had used the defeat in Manchuria to his advantage in regrouping his partisans in the Soviet Union.

4 The Soviet Occupation of North Korea

C j e n e r a l Ivan M. Chistiakov, w h o commanded the 25th Division of the Soviet army that liberated and occupied N o r t h Korea after World War II, related that he was stationed in the Soviet Far East from 1935 to 1941. 1 He left the area for the German front in 1941 and led the 21st Division of the Red A r m y in the Stalingrad campaign, 2 but he returned to the Soviet Far East at the order of Marshal Stalin on J u n e 24, 1945. T h e top generals of the 25th Division, P.F. Lagutin, V.A. Penkovsky, B . A . Makarov, V . C . Cherenkov, and N.P. Boroviagin, had all served in the Primori region and knew well the activities of the Chinese and Korean guerrilla groups. Major General Nikolai G . Lebedev, for example, had been in the area since 1941 until he led the assault into Korea in August 1945. T h e extent of Kim II Sung's relationship with these generals is not known. General Chistiakov later recalled that he had heard about the partisan activities of K i m II Sung in Manchuria in the late 1930s, but if there was any meaningful relationship between Kim and Chistiakov, it was only from J u n e to August 1945. K i m had not followed General Chistiakov to the German front, for when he fled Manchuria into the Soviet Union Chistiakov had al-

6o

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

ready left the area. Furthermore, Kim denied participating on the German front many times after he returned to Korea.3 Major General Lebedev said that he himself did not meet Kim until after the war. When he first met him in Pyongyang, however, Kim was in a Soviet uniform wearing the insignia of a Soviet army captain. Lebedev said that Kim's men numbered about forty and were all in Soviet army uniform. 4 While the major thrust of the Soviet occupation forces of 40,000 men under General Chistiakov came into Korea by sea, landing in Unggi, Najin, Ch'ongjin, and Wonsan, the advance party came through Manchuria. Major General B.G. Sapozhnikov related that his advance troops came through Harbin, Mudanjiang, and Tumen and entered Korea through Kyongwon, Hoeryong, and Ch'ongjin. 5 He also said that when he came into Manchuria he looked for a Korean partisan group led by Pak In-ch'ol, whom he had helped earlier and returned to Manchuria. He found the group, but he learned that Pak In-ch'ol had been killed by the Japanese in August 1937.6 The Liberation of Korea Kim claims that he returned to Korea triumphantly waging a joint operation of his own army with Soviet forces to defeat the fleeing Japanese. The Soviet generals who liberated Korea related that the main Soviet assault forces landed from the sea along the eastern coast from Unggi and Ch'ongjin in early August and marched throughout Kangwondo and Hwanghaedo, eventually arriving in Pyongyang on August 26, 1945. Kim II Sung returned to Korea with his fellow guerrila leaders in the 88th Division of the international unit from the Soviet Union on September 19, 1945,7 a day before Ch'usok, a Korean holiday. They arrived in Wonsan harbor long after Japan had surrendered, and the Soviet occupation forces completed the report of the 25th Division's combat operation to the commander-in-chief of the Soviet army in the Far East on August There are many eyewitness reports of the events in the North shortly after the liberation, but most of them are vituperative accounts by defectors from the North to the South, berating the Communists and Kim II Sung. 9 Korean leaders knew about Kim

Soviet Occupation of North Korea

61

and his record of guerrilla activities in Manchuria because he fought primarily with the Chinese Communist guerrilla groups. During the first month after his arrival, Kim made several visits to local North Korean leaders such as Cho Man-sik, but he seems to have impressed no one. Among so many committees, political parties, or governments that sprang up in both North and South Korea after the liberation, none listed Kim among their leaders. The Communists certainly did not include him, for he had not participated in any Korean Communist activities. It took a herculean effort on the part of the Soviet occupation authorities to introduce him to the people as a Korean patriot. Even then few believed he was really what he claimed to be — partly because he was so young, only thirty-three years old then, and partly because he claimed so many patriotic and Communist revolutionary activities that the people knew nothing about. Many considered him a fake, thinking that the real Kim II Sung was a much older man. When the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States became more pronounced, most Koreans in the South subscribed to the idea that he was indeed a fake put up by the Soviet Union to turn the northern half of their country into a Communist state. Kim may have had the support of the Soviet Union and the loyal following of his partisans from Manchuria, but his political future in Korea was an uphill fight. The Soviet occupation authorities in North Korea followed closely the pattern of sovietization used in Eastern Europe. 1 0 T h e occupation was headed by an able and trusted Soviet army general, Ivan M. Chistiakov, and his chief-of-staff, Lt. General Valentine A. Penkovsky. His chief executive officer was Major General Nikolai G. Lebedev, who handled the political affairs of the occupation. His political advisor was Gerasim M. Balasanov, w h o had worked in Japan and spoke Japanese. Later in 1946 Anatolii I. Shabshin, who worked in the Soviet consulate in Seoul as deputy consul, joined them in the North. The military affairs of the 25th Division were handled by Major General G. I. Shanin, and the civil administration of the North was headed by an expert organization officer, Major General Andrei Alekseevich Romanenko. It was Romanenko who was chief civilian administrator of the occupation

62

C O N S O L I D A T I O N OF POLITICAL POWER

authorities and w h o handled the Koreans and political leaders in the North shortly after the liberation. General Terentii F. Shtykov, w h o negotiated with American forces in Seoul, did not arrive until February 1946, but he stayed in the North to oversee the civilian administration of the 25th Division. W h e n the Soviet troops withdrew from the N o r t h , he was appointed by Stalin as first ambassador of the Soviet Union to North Korea. General Chistiakov related that Major General Romanenko was an experienced organization officer formerly associated with the 35th Army w h o had prepared himself for the North Korean occupation in the Primori region. There are many critical accounts by defectors of the role played by Major General Romanenko, but General Chistiakov contends that he was a fair man w h o assembled several groups of experts and brought them along to the North. There were, for example, Colonel G . R. Lazarev on communication, Colonel A. T. Ilatovsk on finance, Major I. I. Kadishev on agriculture, Major A. I. Rotblyut on public health, and Colonel N . I. Dolgikh on army and civilian relations. 11 T h e most important of them all, perhaps, was Colonel Alexandre Mateevich Ignatiev for civil administration. It was Colonel Ignatiev, under the direction of Major General Romanenko, w h o dealt with all Korean political leaders and the process of the sovietization in the North. Colonel Ignatiev was the key person w h o maneuvered Kim II Sung into power, sustained him there, and supported him in the North. Ignatiev stayed long after Romanenko had left Korea. In fact, most of the generals and the occupation forces left Korea rather early; for example, General Chistiakov left the N o r t h as early as March 1947, and 30,000 soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces left within a year. General G. P. Korotkov succeeded him and commanded the remaining occupation forces, 10,000 strong, for another year. There was a further reduction of the occupation forces when Korotkov was replaced in May 1948 by General Merkulov, w h o commanded a small force until the entire army withdrew on December 24, 1948. But Colonel Ignatiev remained. W h e n the Soviet embassy was established in October 1948 after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed, Ignatiev was retained in the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang as an adviser to Ambassador Shtykov.

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63

General Lebedev related that Ignatiev had a good personal relationship with Koreans and handled civilian affairs well. He was in his mid-forties and was benevolent, restrained, and hardworking. Indeed, at times he used to work through the night to discuss setting up administrative machinery with Korean political leaders. Ignatiev was the chief architect of the sovietization of North Korea, and it was Ignatiev, together with Major General Romanenko, w h o engineered K i m II Sung into the supreme power position. T h e choice of Kim as leader of the liberated northern half of Korea should not be understood as a complicated procedure. T h e Soviet Union was more concerned with their occupation of Eastern Europe, and K i m II Sung was not what Boleslaw Bierut was for Poland, nor was he for Korea what W i l h e l m Pieck or Walter U l bricht were for East Germany. T h e Soviet Union came into Korea not knowing any revolutionary leader or revolutionary organization. Their preparation for the occupation of Korea was made in the Primori region by the 25th Division, and it seemed to be truly an ad hoc preparation for military occupation. Stalin chose his military commander for the task only in J u n e 1945, and General Chistiakov's major concern was a military operation against the Japanese army first and the sovietization of the North second. T h e Soviet Union needed no Korean assistance for the first objective, and it needed only a Korean figurehead for the second. There was no prominent Korean Communist operating in Moscow who had a link to underground Communist organizations in Korea. Even after the Soviet occupation began, in fact, the indigenous Korean Communists w h o were known to the people in Korea for their past revolutionary activities did not actively seek cooperation with the Soviet authorities. T h e Soviet Union seemed to have chosen a fellow in the region where they were preparing for their campaigns against the Japanese. K i m was a young Korean C o m m u nist leader w h o m they trained, w h o wore their uniform of his own volition, and whose anti-Japanese guerrilla record they knew. T h e y may not have been as confident on him as they might have been with someone groomed and dispatched from Moscow by Stalin. T h e y might have preferred a national hero known to all Koreans, but once they had decided on K i m , they promoted and popularized

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL P O W E R

Kim II Sung in 1947,

chairman oj the North Korean Provisional People's Committee

Soviet generals of the 25th Division who liberated North Korea to right: S. G. Chiplenkov, G. I. Shanin, I.M. Chistiakov (commanding general), N.G. Lebedev, I.M. Sokolov, P. F. Lagutin

Soviet Occupation of North Korea

Officers

of the Soviet

Pyongyang,

occupation

that implanted

communism

in North

65

Korea,

1947

him. In the absence of any competing Communist groups and leaders in the N o r t h , it was not a difficult task. Kim's obscure past and lack of popularity mattered little. T h e only alternative to K i m the Soviet authorities encountered after their arrival in the North was a Nationalist leader, a deacon of a Presbyterian church, C h o Mansik. 1 2 More prominent Korean political leaders, Nationalists and Communists alike, were all in the South, trying to negotiate with the Americans. W h e n they arrived in Pyongyang on August 26, 1945, the Soviet occupation authorities announced in their first declaration that the Korean people were liberated and their future happiness was in their own hands. Independence was given to Korea; the Koreans must bring about their own happiness. T h e authorities also proclaimed that the Soviet Union would help in every way it could in this Korean endeavor. 13 This declaration was quite a contrast to the proclamation issued to the people of Korea by General MacArthur on September 7, 1945, which stated in its first article that all powers of government over the territory and the people in the South would be exercised "under my authority." 14 For the Korean revolutionaries w h o read both documents, the difference seemed profound.

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CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

In reality, however, the contrast was not as great as the declarations seemed to suggest. Despite the American proclamation, most of the revolutionaries returned to the South, and there was a constant flow of refugees from North to South. American occupation authorities, of course, denied the legitimacy of any group — including the People's Republic of Korea, hastily put together by the Preparatory Committee for Korean Independence; the Korean Provisional Government, which returned to Seoul from Zhongqing after twenty-six years of continuous operation in China; and Syngman Rhee and his group from the United States. The Sovietization

of North

Korea

The Soviet occupation forces accomplished the sovietization of the North in three stages in a relatively short time: the first stage of "genuine cooperation" from August 1945 to January 1946, the second stage of what may be called a "bogus coalition" from February 1946 to early 1948, and the final stage of establishing a monolithic regime from February to September 1948, when the Communist state was formally proclaimed. Local leaders in the North organized a branch of the Preparatory Committee for Korean Independence in P'yongan namdo, where Pyongyang is located, and three representatives of this group were in the Pyongyang railroad station to welcome the Soviet army on August 26, 1945. This group presented, within a few days after their arrival, a roster of a fifteen-man Interim People's Committee of that province to Major General Romanenko and Colonel Ignatiev, but they were told to double its membership by adding fifteen Communists. Two women were added later, one each from the Communist and the Nationalist camps, to bring the administration staff to a total ot thirty-two members. This was the first group organized to handle the day-to-day activities of P'yongan namdo, and similar groups, commonly known as the Interim People's Committee, were organized in all five provinces of the North. On October 8, 1945, Major General Romanenko and Colonel Ignatiev called for a congress of representatives of the Interim People's Committees of all five provinces to organize an administrative unit to govern the entire northern half of Korea. Some seventy-five delegates attended this congress, which was held for

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67

only one day, and adjourned in various committees to work on the proposed agendas of the congress. 15 It was not until November 19, 1945, that the results of the congress were announced. It was known as the Five-Province Administration Bureau (Odo haengjongguk), a simple organization of ten bureaus headed by Nationalist leader C h o Man-sik. 1 6 K i m II Sung was not a delegate to this congress, nor was he elected or appointed to head any bureau. There seems to have been "genuine cooperation" by the occupation authorities to bring together various local elements, Nationalists as well as Communists. However, this bureau did not last long. T h e coalition collapsed with the controversial issue of the trusteeship of Korea in December 1945. In an effort to resolve military occupation and bring reunification of Korea, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in Moscow to a five-year trusteeship of Korea. Colonel Ignatiev tried without success to persuade the chairman, C h o Mansik, and members of the bureau to endorse the proposed five-year trusteeship by the allied powers. T h e Communists agreed but the Nationalists refused, thus dividing the bureau into two camps. This was true also of the situation in the South. Except for the C o m m u nists, most of the Korean leaders opposed trusteeship for any length of time. T h e Soviet Union was able to force the C o m m u nists to accept trusteeship, but the American authorities relented to the persistent and earnest desire of the Korean people to be independent and abandoned the idea. 17 Unlike East European countries, the Korean Nationalists in the North did not challenge the Soviet occupation authorities — not because they were not determined to force the issue but because they had the ready alternative of fleeing the North and going to the South, thus avoiding, for example, such incidents as the Katyn forest massacre in Poland and the bloodshed in Warsaw. General T. F. Shtykov, w h o negotiated with the Americans on the future of Korea, condemned the Nationalists and C h o Man-sik in no uncertain terms. Regarding Cho's defiance, Shtykov said that C h o was not the only leader, and the meaning of class struggle should be explained to these defiant Koreans. 18 C h o himself had several opportunities to flee, but he remained in the North. He was later arrested and interned and presumed executed shortly before or after the outbreak of the Korean War. T h e genuine effort of coop-

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eration between the Nationalists and the Communists ended with the trusteeship question by early January 1946. After the collapse of the Five-Province Administration Bureau, the Soviet occupation authorities established the N o r t h Korean Provisional People's Committee on February 8, 1946, and appointed K i m II Sung as its head. Some Nationalists participated in the committee, but it was unmistakably a Communist-dominated body created by the Soviet occupation authorities — a good example of a "bogus coalition." W i t h Kim II Sung as its chairman, the committee instituted six major "democratic reforms" in rapid succession: the land reform that redistributed more than 50 percent of the arable land, the labor law that instituted an eight-hour work day, the nationalization of all heavy industry, institution of an agriculture tax-in-kind system, equality of the sexes, and the new election code. These reforms were completed in less than six months. 19 In instituting these measures and reforms, occupation authorities maintained a broad popular front, recruiting people from various groups and organizations. Behind the facade of the "bogus coalition," however, there seems to have been a clear distinction between the position of prominence and the position of power. T h e Soviet occupation authorities used Koreans from the Soviet Union, the Soviet-Koreans, in positions of power and controlled the sovietization process during this period. 20 Kim's lack of training and the dearth of trained manpower were augmented by the second-and third-generation Soviet-Koreans w h o returned to Korea after World War II. T h e exact number of these Soviet-Koreans w h o returned to Korea is not known, but they did play an important role in North Korean politics during the first decade after the liberation. T h e sovietization process was given credibility in February 1948 when the Soviet Union helped Kim II Sung to create the Korean People's Army. K i m consolidated his power with his guerrilla group from Manchuria, and his partisans played a key role in the formation and operation of the Korean People's Army. T h e Soviet occupation authorities helped in this process by assuring K i m that no other Korean armed group challenged him and his partisans. K i m was successful in disarming the only military group that was capable of challenging him — the group returning to Korea from Yanan, China, the Korean Volunteer Corps under the command

Soviet Occupation of North Korea

69

of Kim Won-bong. It was reported that an estimated 2,000 members of the corps were disarmed by Kim and his group as they entered Korea at Sinuiju from Andong across the Yalu River. Kim is said to have personally inspected the situation and followed the directives of the occupation authorities of October 12, 1945, and disarmed all men of the Korean Volunteer Corps before permitting them to cross the border into Korea. 21 On the domestic front the Public Security Bureau was headed by a Soviet-Korean, Pang Hak-se, who was assisted by Kim's own partisan from Manchuria. Pang was for North Korea what Stanislaw Radkiewicz was for Poland. There were others, such as Nam Ch'ang-yong and Kim P'a, but these men were all under the direction of Colonel Zagruzin of the Soviet secret police. Kim's partisans dominated every security and police organization in the army. All senior officers of the Red Security Corps, the Peace Preservation Corps, the Border Constabulary, and the Railroad Guards that controlled the movement of the people were members of Kim's partisans. These security and army groups backed up Kim's administration of the sovietization and enforced his pronouncements. The Soviet authorities may have appointed Kim to administer their programs, but Kim had no organizational roots in Korea; he may have controlled military and security sectors of the administration, but the Communist Party was beyond his reach. Major General Romanenko and Colonel Ignatiev completed the sovietization process when they helped Kim to create a mass party in North Korea. The Korean Communist Party knew little about Kim II Sung, and he certainly was not one of its members who shared the ordeal of two decades under Japanese police surveillance since its establishment in April 1925. The party was reestablished in Seoul shortly after the liberation of Korea under the leadership of Pak Hon-yong and was in the process of rebuilding its branches throughout North and South Korea. The person sent to Pyongyang to organize the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party was Hyon Chun-hyok, a native of Pyongyang who was educated by the Japanese but worked against them during their occupation of Korea. Hyon had a good record well known to the Korean revolutionaries.22 Similar to the effort by the Korean Communist Party

JO

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

that tried to work with the Nationalists and the American occupation authorities in the South, Hyon tried to work with C h o Mansik and the Nationalists in the North. Korean Communist leaders from the five provinces in the North began organizing a branch bureau in the North, and Hyon headed this effort. But in September 28, 1945, Hyon was assassinated on his way back from a meeting with Major General Romanenko. He was in the front seat of a truck with C h o Man-sik, but his assailant killed only Hyon. There is an elaborate account of his death implicating K i m II Sung as the culprit. K i m had arrived in Wonsan on September 19, 1945, less than ten days before the shooting, and it is unlikely that he was involved in the plot to eliminate Hyon. It was reported that K i m had conspired with Chang Si-u, head of the Justice Department of P'yongnam Provincial Bureau, to have one of their henchmen murder Hyon. 2 3 Political assassination was common in both N o r t h and South Korea shortly after the liberation. K i m II Sung proceeded to organize the branch bureau that Hyon had originally planned with one important modification — that is, a Communist Party independent of the party in Seoul. T h e negotiations for such an organization seem to have coincided with the congress of the Interim People's Committee held in October. T h e North Koreans claim today that the meeting was held for four days, October 10-13, '945» but their own publications at the time stated that only a decision to establish such a branch was made on October 13, 1945, in a one-day meeting. 24 T h e latter version seems more accurate because it was one day after the declaration of the occupation forces giving permission for local political groups to organize themselves. On October 12, 1945, a five-point proclamation was issued in the name of Generals Chistiakov and Penkovsky that permitted Koreans to organize anti-Japanese democratic groups, to organize unions and other nonpolitical groups, to attend church services, to report the roster of officers and men as well as platforms and bylaws of all such organizations, and to disarm all military groups and establish a security force in the North. 2 5 T h e official announcement of the formation of the North Korea Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party in Pyongyang was not made until October 20, 1945. However, K i m was not elected chairman of the bureau, but K i m Yong-bom, a relatively unknown

Soviet Occupation of North Korea

71

figure, was chosen to succeed Hyon as leader. T h e bureau was established as a branch of the Korean Communist Party headquartered in Seoul. In fact, it was reported that permission for establishing such a branch in North Korea was granted by the central organization of the Korean Communist Party in Seoul on October 26, 1945. T h e plenum of the bureau was held on November 15, 1945, to form a united front of all political and semipolitical groups in the North. It was not until the third enlarged plenum, held on December 17-18, 1945, that Kim took over the chairmanship of the bureau. K i m Yong-bom died later during a simple operation on a stomach tumor. W h e n K i m did succeed in getting control of the bureau, he immediately began to detach it from the Korean Communist Party in Seoul, and he met considerable opposition. It took him six months, and during the seventh plenum of the bureau on J u n e 22-23, '946» the name of the bureau was changed to the N o r t h Korean Communist Party, thereby proclaiming its independence from the Korean Communist Party in Seoul. K i m followed closely the instructions of Colonel A. Ignatiev, w h o attended the plenums of the bureau and participated in every discussion of the meetings. 26 For Colonel Ignatiev, the process was merely a preliminary step for the creation of a mass party by uniting this party with other political parties. At the eighth plenum of the N o r t h Korean C o m munist Party in J u l y 1946, barely one month after they had detached themselves from the Korean Communist Party in Seoul, Kim was told to form a coalition of the N o r t h Korean Communist Party with the N e w Democratic Party (a political party of the returned Communist revolutionaries from China) to form a Workers' Party. T h e work of Colonel Ignatiev in forming this coalition is obvious, for K i m had neither the vision for such a party nor the ability to win support of those returned revolutionaries from Yanan without Soviet persuasion. In fact, the similarity of the Soviet occupation policy in coercive fusion of political parties to create a mass party is striking in the creation of the Socialist Unity Party in East Germany, the United Polish Workers' Party, and the Workers' Party of Korea. As a guerrilla leader who fought the Japanese in Manchuria with the Chinese, K i m was unable to forge a united front organization or a mass party of this kind in Korea. N o r is it conceivable that

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Korean revolutionaries from other regions would follow his leadership without the persuasion of the Soviet occupation authorities. General Romanenko and Colonel Ignatiev used K i m well in their effort to institute the Soviet system in the North. Kim II Sung for his part served as a good agent of the Soviet occupation authorities in this process, following faithfully their instructions. Perhaps K i m followed more faithfully than any spirited Korean Nationalist leader or any leader of the Korean Communist Party would have done, because others tended to look more toward Moscow and the Soviet government for instruction than to the Soviet military officers stationed in Korea. T h e Soviet occupation authorities accomplished sovietization in a short time, taking full advantage of the lack of resistance to their programs. T h e y used K i m II Sung in accomplishing their objectives of organizing a mass party, instituting Communist reforms, and creating a military unit to support the system they instituted. All administrative directives and decisions by the Soviet occupation authorities were executed through Kim, making him the pivotal link between the Korean people and the occupation forces. In this way, it was possible for the Soviet Union to disavow unequivocally any direct measure to administer militarily while still succeeding in implanting a Communist system in Korea. For the Soviet Union, it was far more important to implant a Communist system in the North than to promote Kim, but in the process they succeeded in anointing him as leader of the Korean people and made serious efforts to promote him as a national hero. This endorsement of K i m II Sung by the Soviet occupation forces was the most important advantage he had in his competition with political rivals. A ballad about his heroic deeds in Manchuria, which schoolchildren were forced to sing, eventually became the most popular song in the N o r t h . A university was named after him, and poets were mobilized to write poems and stories about his partisan activities against the Japanese. Although K i m received the blessing of the Soviet occupation authorities, his relationship with rival Korean political groups was quite another matter. He had to deal with three groups. T h e first and most numerous was the group of indigenous Communists, known as the domestic group, w h o operated underground in Japan and Korea; the second group was the returned revolutionaries from

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73

China that formed the New Democratic Party (Sinmindang), more commonly known as the Yanan group; and the third was the Soviet-Koreans who returned to Korea with the Soviet army but remained to participate in the political process after the Soviet forces withdrew. Kim had fewer than two hundred regrouped partisans from Manchuria; though they were completely loyal to him, they were few in number. Many factors helped Kim in his quest for power. First and foremost, of course, were the Soviet occupation authorities and Colonel Ignatiev. The second was the division of Korea itself, which kept most of the well-known veteran Korean C o m munists in the South. Seoul was the capital of Korea, and all prominent Korean political leaders thought their political future was to be decided in Seoul and not in Pyongyang. The third reason was that other groups were not united in supporting a single political figure. Not all Korean Communists supported Pak Hón-yóng; not all members of the Yanan group supported Kim Tu-bong; and the Soviet-Koreans did not even consider themselves as a group. In fact, many Soviet-Koreans supported Kim at first because he was the choice of the Soviet occupation army. And finally, Kim's control of military and security forces meant that no other group had any control or exercised any influence. Kim's partisans and those Soviet-Koreans who returned to Korea as regular members of the Soviet army were united in supporting him. Kim did have to deal with the domestic group when the old Communist revolutionaries came to the North from the South, however, and he also had to maneuver the Yanan group, some of whom had fought with Chinese Communist forces on the China mainland. Kim also had to pacify returning Koreans from the Soviet Union who claimed to have more knowledge of communism and Communist organization than he had. Colonel Ignatiev was confident in what he had created, however, and Kim met the challenge head on. Nowhere was this struggle more obvious than in the two most important organizations: the party and the government.

5 The Workers' Party of Korea

l ^ i o r t h Korea claims that the Workers' Party of Korea was founded on October 10, 1945, under the wise leadership of the great leader K i m II Sung and commemorates the day annually. It was first organized by uniting the N e w Democratic Party and the North Korean Communist Party at its founding congress, August 28-30, 1946, under the direction of the Soviet occupation authorities. It was then known as the Workers' Party of North Korea. A similar coalition of political parties was made in the South among the Korean Communist Party, the N e w Democratic Party, and the People's Party, November 23-24, 1946, in Seoul to found the Workers' Party of South Korea. T h e formal union of the Workers' Party of N o r t h and South Korea was not consummated until June 24, 1949, when the first joint plenum was held. T h e "union" of the two parties was in truth an absorption of the party in the South by that in the North. Thus the founding congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea is considered as the first congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, and the second congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea, held March 27-30, 1948, before the union, is the second congress of the Workers' Party

The Workers' Party of Korea

75

of Korea. The party congress held from April 23-29, 1956, is the third congress, and the party held three more congresses: the fourth congress, September n - 1 6 , 1961, the fifth congress, November 2-13, 1970, and the sixth congress, October 10-14, 1980. The first move to create a mass organization by the occupation authorities was not in the party but in the youth organization. Kim II Sung was told by the occupation forces to dissolve the Young Communist League and create a mass youth organization known as the Democratic Youth League. This move met resistance from the indigenolis and local party leaders, for it was a forced merger of all youth groups in the North. T h e new Democratic Youth League that absorbed the Young Communist League as well as other groups was announced as early as January 17, 1946.1 T h e Democratic Youth League later absorbed the youth section of the trade unions, expanded its membership rapidly, and claimed 1.25 million members within a year of its creation. When it came to the forced fusion of the political parties, the occupation authorities ordered the N e w Democratic Party to take the first step and propose the merger of the two parties. This was done on July 23, 1946, and a reply by the North Korean Communist Party was sent on the following day to express agreement, although the party's official decision was not made until the eighth plenum on July 27, 1946.2 The founding congress was held one month after the decision. The First Party Congress:

1946

It is worthwhile explaining the details of the first congress because such information has not been made public heretofore. 3 T h e tounding congress was held in Pyongyang, August 28 to August 30, 1946, and 801 delegates representing 336,339 members were present. The meeting of the first day, presided over by Kim II Sung, was a short session of less than three hours beginning at 2:30 in the afternoon. The first order of business was to elect various officers of the congress — including a thirty-one-member executive group, a five-member credentials committee, a four-member secretariat, a five-member editorial committee to compile the records of the congress, a five-member platform committee, and a five-member

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CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

bylaws committee — and establish a six-point agenda of the congress. 4 At the suggestion of a delegate from Hamgyong pukto, Ho Kuk-bong, the great Marshal Stalin was elected honorary chairman of the congress and an open letter to him from the founding congress was read, thanking him and the Red Army for the liberation of Korea and hoping for continued support for the establishment of a unified and independent government in Korea. T h e delegates heard congratulatory remarks from representatives of the trade unions, the youth league, the agricultural unions, and the Korean Democratic Party; then the first session was adjourned. T h e second day was presided over by Kim Yong-bom, and the meeting lasted from nine in the morning to seven in the evening. Delegates heard an elaborate statistical report from Pak Il-u about the 801 delegates to the congress, and his recommendation to certif y the credentials of all 801 delegates to the congress was adopted. T h e delegates were mostly young men in their thirties with high school educations and many were office workers. Delegates w h o had fought abroad and those w h o had worked within Korea were evenly divided; delegates w h o had not been imprisoned by the J a p anese for their revolutionary activities outnumbered those w h o had been captured and jailed. 5 T h e most important business was the two keynote addresses by K i m II Sung, chairman of the N o r t h Korean Communist Party, and Kim Tu-bong, chairman of the N e w Democratic Party. Kim's speech was a stunning condemnation of Nationalist leaders in the South, including K i m K u and Syngman Rhee, and general conditions in the South under the American occupation. He then outlined the reasons for creating the Workers' Party and said that the purpose was to unite the democratic strength of the working masses to build a state that would represent and protect the rights of the working people. He condemned those members of the N o r t h Korean Communist Party w h o opposed the merger with the N e w Democratic Party and said that these men were a small group of arrogant leftists w h o thought they were the only true Communists in Korea. K i m said that the united party should become a strong vanguard party, bring about ideological unity of the two parties, work for the interests of the workers, lead other social organizations, and pay serious attention to the education of new cadres. 6

The Workers' Party of Korea

77

Kim Tu-bong, like Kim II Sung, condemned those members of the N e w Democratic Party w h o voiced opposition to the merger of the two parties and pointed out that many had committed the error of right opportunism. Kim Tu-bong said that these men were misled when they said the Communists were a bunch of roughnecks compared with the trained intellectual revolutionaries of the N e w Democratic Party. Kim Tu-bong concluded his speech, like Kim II Sung, by presenting a five-point task to the members to strengthen the new party by firmly supporting the merger. 7 T h e two speeches were similar in many ways. Clearly there was considerable dissension over the merger among members of both parties. T h e chairmen of both parties criticized their own dissident members in support of the merger. Colonel Ignatiev, w h o ordered the merger, was present throughout the congress. Fifteen delegates discussed the two speeches, and Kim II Sung made concluding remarks in support of the merger. A resolution was adopted to approve the merger, to have a single party for the working masses, and to name the new party the Workers' Party of N o r t h Korea. C h ' o e Ch'ang-ik, a leader of the N e w Democratic Party, proposed a thirteen-article platform for the party, and after a brief discussion the platform was adopted and the congress adjourned. O n the third day, the congress was presided over by Chu "Yong-ha and draft bylaws of the party were introduced by Kim Yong-bom. There were brief discussions of the bylaws by several delegates before they were adopted. Then came a brief report on the publications work of the party by T'ae Song-su, a Soviet-Korean, proposing the merger of two newspapers — Chongno (Correct Path) of the North Korean Communist Party and Chonjiti (Forward) of the New Democratic Party — into a new organ of the Workers' Party, Nodong sinmun (Workers' Daily). This proposal was adopted. 8 C h ' o e Ch'ang-ik delivered a short speech concerning the conditions prevailing in the South and the progress made in merging three political parties to found the Workers' Party of South Korea. He reported that six dissident elements in the Korean Communist Party in Seoul who were obstructing the merger had been expelled f r o m the party. 9 C h ' o e recommended that the decision to expel these men be approved by the Workers' Party of N o r t h Korea, and it was so approved.

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The last and perhaps the most important business of the congress was to elect the members of the Central Committee. A prepared list of forty-three candidates was introduced by Kim II Sung, and since there were no other nominations, each nominee was introduced and voted upon. All forty-three members were unanimously approved. 10 Another slate for an eleven-member Inspection Committee was introduced by Kim Tu-bong, and it too was approved unanimously after each nominee was introduced. 11 T h e congress adjourned at six in the evening after issuing an open letter to the people of Korea.

Leaders of Other

Groups

In the merger of the two parties to found a mass party, several things became evident. Most apparent is that the leadership of K i m II Sung was forced upon the leaders of other groups. T h e Soviet support of K i m made it clear that to oppose Kim was to oppose the Soviet occupation authorities. Such popular leaders of the N e w Democratic Party as Kim Tu-bong, Mu Chong, and Ch'oe Ch'angik, w h o were well known to the people for their revolutionary activities in China, were told to hail Kim and shout long live K i m II Sung, something these old, self-righteous Korean Communist revolutionaries in their late fifties would never have done for a young man of thirty-three with a non-Korean revolutionary record without Soviet coercion. O n e of the first to comment on Kim's speech, Pak Pyong-so, remarked that in order for the Koreans to rule their own country, they must have a Korean leader, and that leader was Kim II Sung. He went on to say that Kim was "the only leader," and anyone w h o opposed him or refused to vote for him was a reactionary and a traitor. 12 Pak Chong-ae, a woman delegate from P'yongnam, said that such a remark was abrasive and unnecessary because K i m was already recognized as the leader of the entire Korean people. 13 It was Kim II Sung w h o presided over the congress, delivered the address to the congress, and presented the forty-three nominees for the Central Committee. T h e potential rivals acquiesced not because of Kim himself or his personal power, but because of the omnipresence of the Soviet occupation forces and the omniscience of Colonel Ignatiev about the Communist future of Korea.

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The leader of the domestic Communist group after the assassination of Hyon Chun-hyok was O Ki-sop, but O played only a minor role in this congress. T h e leaders of the Yanan group w h o had returned from China remained silent for the most part. Only one partisan, Y i m Ch'un-ch'u, and one Soviet-Korean, Han Il-mu, spoke out in this congress, but it was an uneasy coalition and a tense congress where Korean groups acquiesced to K i m II Sung as an agent of the Soviet Union. T h e merger may have seemed a sign of cooperation and consolidation of the two parties, but in reality it took place amid significant opposition and mutual suspicion. Neither side understood the concept of a mass party — and if they did, no Korean Communist leader wanted to organize such a party. There was serious resistance within the North Korean Communist Party to a merger without the consent of the party in Seoul. Many Communists in the provinces resisted even the creation of a Communist party independent of the central Communist party in Seoul, let alone the merger with the N e w Democratic Party. T h e N e w Democratic Party was more interested in enlisting the support of the socialists and intellectuals and considered the Communist group much too radical for their purpose. Both Kim II Sung and K i m Tu-bong therefore used their addresses to the congress to dispel suspicion of the members of both parties. Many hard-core members of both sides were apprehensive of recruiting large numbers of untrained members into the party, and some even said that the party would become a common ruck of undisciplined mobs. Kim II Sung cautioned against such remarks and urged the training of new recruits. 14 Kim did recruit indiscriminately in his effort to build a support group of local people. K i m said there were 4,530 members in the North Korean Branch Bureau when he assumed the chairmanship at the third enlarged plenum on December 17, 1945, but by April 20, 1946, the party had expelled approximately 1,400 members. 1 5 B y the time of the founding congress in August 1946, however, K i m said the combined membership of the new party was 336,339 with the N e w Democratic Party contributing only 60,000 members. One discussant reported that in Hamgyong pukto alone they had recruited 9,200 members in eleven days from J u l y 9 to J u l y 20, .946.16

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According to the bylaws of the party, the Central Committee was charged with electing the officers of the party, a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and five members of the Political Committee. The bylaws provided that the chairman must also be a member of the Political Committee. The delegates may have acknowledged Kim's leadership in the congress, but the secret ballot to elect the top leaders of the party was quite different. The forty-three members of the Central Committee were divided into four groups; 13 members were from the domestic group, 12 were from the Yanan group, 6 were Soviet-Koreans, 8 members' affiliation were not known, and there were only 4 in Kim's partisan group. 17 The first session of the Central Committee, held on August 31, 1946, elected Kim Tu-bong 18 of the Yanan group, not Kim II Sung, chairman of the party. Kim II Sung and Chu Yong-ha 19 of the domestic group were elected vice-chairmen of the party. Ho Ka-i, a Soviet-Korean, and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, a Yanan group leader, were elected members of the Political Committee. The election of the top officers may be interpreted in two ways. One is that Kim had made a tactical arrangement with the leaders of the Yanan group prior to the congress and yielded the chairmanship of the party to the more popular Kim Tu-bong as the price for the Yanan group's initial cooperation in merging the two parties. Another is that Kim was defeated in the election. Since the election process in the plenums of the Central Committee was not made public, it is difficult to assess whether a secret ballot did in fact take place and Kim did lose in the balloting or whether the election was merely a pro forma approval of a predetermined slate of officers. Colonel Ignatiev might have operated under the assumption that it was wiser to work with a non-Communist figurehead under Communist control within the party. One South Korean account relates that Kim was defeated in a fair election. This source states that various nominations were made and that after judging that Kim might not be elected chairman, Colonel Ignatiev had intervened and announced that there was no reason why Kim II Sung had to be the chairman of the party.20 However, this source seems to be in error, for it relates that the chairman was elected by the delegates of the congress and that the nomination of Kim II Sung was made during the party congress

The Workers' Party of Korea

Kim II Sung,

vice-chairman

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CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL P O W E R

Hö Ka-i,

the

Soviet-Korean

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by Pak Pyong-so, a delegate from P'yongan pukto. The election of the top officers took place in the first plenum of the Central Committee, not in the party congress, and Pak was not elected to the Central Committee and thus was incapable of nominating a chairman of the party. Whatever the interpretation, Kim was not elected chairman. In the Political Committee, two members represented the Yanan group (Kim Tu-bong and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik); Kim II Sung and Ho Ka-i, a Soviet-Korean, represented the Soviet occupation authorities; and one member, Chu Yong-ha, represented the domestic group. In his defeat, if it was indeed a defeat, Kim had succeeded in separating the local old Korean Communists from their headquarters in Seoul and, with the help of the Yanan group, forced the old Communists in Seoul to organize a similar mass party in the South. Within three months of the founding congress of the Workers' Party in the North, a similar coalition took place in the South among three leftist parties, November 23-34, 1946, and the Workers' Party of South Korea was founded. 21 Many old Communists stayed away from this coalition, dividing and debilitating the strength of the old Communists in the South. They were also under constant pressure and suppression from the American occupation authorities. These developments contributed much to the eventual consolidation of power by Kim II Sung in the North. The Second Party Congress:

1948

It was not until the Second Party Congress, March 27-30, 1948, that Kim made public the details of his difficulties and the opposition to his effort after he returned to the North. 2 2 The second congress was presided over by Kim Tu-bong and Chu Yong-ha throughout the four-day meeting. Some 990 delegates representing 750,000 members were assembled for the second congress.23 The first day was a short session that began at six in the evening and ended in less than two hours. As in the past, officers were elected to handle the business of the congress.24 The great leader Marshal Stalin was again elected honorary chairman, and a message extolling his achievements was adopted and sent to him. A simple agenda of three items was adopted, and the delegates heard congratulatory

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messages from various organizations, including the Workers' Party of South Korea. 2 5 O n the second day the delegates heard a report by K i m II Sung on the work of the Central Committee. Kim first reviewed the international situation and the struggle of the two camps in the bipolar world and its effect on the domestic situation. He then praised the work of the party in instituting democratic reforms and condemned the situation in the South under the American occupation. In the third part of his speech he reviewed the work of the Central Committee, pointing out shortcomings of the party that needed to be improved. 26 In his report K i m II Sung said that some members of the party were engaged in factional struggles and individual heroism and were not cooperating in the work of the party. It is clear from the ensuing discussion that when K i m tried to organize a separate unit of the Korean Communist Party in North Korea, most of the indigenous Communist leaders in the North opposed his effort and pledged their loyalty to the party in Seoul. Kim said that this point was discussed extensively at the fourth plenum of the North Korean Branch Bureau in February 1946, shortly after he took over the bureau at the third plenum in December 1945, but the leaders of the indigenous Communist groups refused to cooperate. T h e titular head of the domestic group in the North, after the assassination of Hyon, was O Ki-sop. O, born in 1903, was nine years senior to Kim. He had engaged in Communist activity from about 1923. One of the f e w Koreans w h o graduated from K U T V in the Soviet Union, he returned to his native town of Hongwon, Hamgyong namdo, and established a Communist group. He was arrested and imprisoned for his role in organizing a Communist youth group in October 1934. W h e n he was released he remained in Korea and engaged in underground Communist activities. O was well regarded by his fellow Communists as both theoretician and pragmatist. He was important enough to occupy the chairmanship of two bureaus (labor and propaganda) in the North Korean Provisional People's Committee shortly after the liberation of Korea. Accused with him by K i m II Sung were other members of the domestic group, including Chong Tal-hyon, Ch'oe Yong-dal, Y i Sun-gun, C h a n g Si-u, and Chang Sun-myong. 27

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Leading the attack on these men after K i m II Sung were SovietKoreans. Han Il-mu, opened the criticism of O Ki-sop, accusing him of individual heroism and demanding that O recant his mistakes before the congress. 28 He accused C h o n g Tal-hyon of engaging in factional activities in Wonsan when he was chairman of the Hamgyong namdo party committee. He also accused C h ' o e Yongdal of conspiring with Y i Chu-ha, w h o fled to the South, and C h o Chung-hwa, w h o sent embezzled party funds to the party in Seoul. Ch'oe was also accused of conspiring with Y i Kang-guk to reinstate C h o in the party. 29 Pak Ch'ang-ok, another Soviet-Korean, 3 0 attacked O Ki-sop for his article on the role of the trade union in the N o r t h , which appeared in Nodong sinmun on September 18, 1946. O Ki-sop maintained that the collective interests of the workers must be preserved even when major industries were nationalized. Pak pointed out that such an idea was a direct challenge to the state and a deliberate act to mislead the workers against the state. Still another Soviet-Korean, K i m Yol, 3 1 condemned O Ki-sop and Chong Tal-hyon for their refusal to cooperate in creating the North Korean Communist Party independent from the party in the South. K i m said that these men had failed to understand new and favorable conditions prevailing in the N o r t h under the Soviet occupation and had looked to the party in Seoul under the American occupation for leadership. These men also failed to communicate the directives from the party in Pyongyang to Hamgyong namdo and engaged in building a regional party — conduct similar to that of a semifeudal petty bourgeois. K i m Yol also accused Chang Sun-myong for failure to perform his duty on the Inspection Committee. 3 2 He said that Chang was derelict because he inspected only party members and not party organizations in various localities. T h e targets of these attacks by the Soviet-Koreans were all indigenous Communists. It was obvious that the Soviet-Koreans were helping K i m II Sung in his struggle to consolidate power, and the members of the domestic group painfully realized the price they were paying for the liberation they themselves did not win for Korea. In the eyes of native Communists, Han Il-mu, Pak Ch'ang-ok, and K i m Yol were Soviet-Koreans, strangers, whose

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names they heard for the first time after the liberation, and they wondered what these men had to do with the Korean Communist revolution. T h e y knew a great deal about the Communists from Yanan, but the Yanan group remained silent in this struggle. None of the Yanan group was criticized, nor did anyone in that group attack the members of either the domestic group or the SovietKoreans. In his turn, O Ki-sop did admit his mistakes and said that he had indeed committed an error in supporting the party in Seoul. O said that when he was criticized by Kim II Sung as early as the fourth plenum of the North Korean Bureau in February 1946, his acceptance of Kim's criticism was formalistic. In truth, he did not agree with K i m and withheld his support, thus committing the error of double dealing. O apologized fully for his errors before the delegates of the second congress. However, he did defend himself, and said that Pak Ch'ang-ok's criticism of his article on the trade union was incorrect. O said that he had become obsessed with defending the interests of the workers during the struggle against the Japanese and he was not now advocating special rights or privileges for the workers against the state. As head of the Labor Bureau he had rejected all collective bargaining aimed at increasing the affluence of the workers at the expense of the state's treasury, but he said that workers' interests must be defended even in a socialist state. Furthermore, O said that many points in K i m Yol's criticism were factually incorrect. Nevertheless, he apologized for the time spent in the congress on things he had done or failed to do for the party. 33 T w o others followed O in apologizing to the congress. Chang Si-u, w h o headed the Commerce Bureau, merely apologized for his mistakes and pledged his loyalty to Kim II Sung without any rebuttal. Y i Sun-gun, w h o headed the Agriculture and Forestry Bureau, promised technical improvements in agriculture and vowed his support for K i m II Sung. Y i Sun-gun did this even before anyone lodged a complaint against him. C h ' o e Yong-dal also recanted, admitting his errors in recruiting members of the Justice Bureau without a thorough investigation of their qualifications. He said that if some of the new members had collaborated with the Japanese in the past, the mistakes would

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be corrected. Ch'oe presented elaborate statistics showing the number of judges assigned and the alarming increase in the number of crimes and criminals in the liberated N o r t h and said that as head of the Justice Bureau he would improve the work of the judiciary. But Ch'oe also defended himself by pointing out that the general criticism of his selection of judges was incorrect because many high-level judges were not appointed by him but elected. Therefore, many of those w h o criticized him, including Han Il-mu, should share the responsibility for electing such judges. Furthermore, Ch'oe said that to point out his errors in the Wonsan City Party Committee operation in dealing with Communists who defected to the South was one thing, but to accuse him of factional struggle in the region was quite something else and unjustified. 34 W h e n Ch'oe finished his discussion, there was a ten-minute break in the session. W h e n the meeting resumed, Ho Ka-i, 35 one of the most influential Soviet-Koreans, delivered a stunning condemnation of these men. In fact, he had not been scheduled to speak, and the presiding officer had to change the order of discussion to accommodate him. Ho said that since all four who recanted had not fully admitted their mistakes, their apologies were mere formalities. He said that O Ki-sop and Ch'oe Yong-dal in particular were defending their own personal dignity at the expense of party progress. T h e party had often discussed with Ch'oe the problems of teaching new students at the Law Institute, for example, but he still maintained the institute as a reeducation center for those who had been educated by the Japanese. Ho said that the party wanted to educate new students and build new leaders of liberated Korea; it was not interested in reeducating intellectuals w h o had been taught Japanese law. Ho then attacked O for his contemptuous attitude toward the party and his individual heroism. Chu Yong-ha, vice-chairman of the party and a member of the domestic group, explained that the position of these men, particularly O Ki-sop's position on the question of the trade union was a phenomenon of the transitional stage of the time, and these mistakes would be corrected in due course. However, the message was clear. W h e n Chong Tal-hyon's turn came, he admitted everything without defense or rebuttal. Chong said that he was one of those who opposed the establishment of the Branch Bureau by Kim II

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Sung. He said that he had operated underground so long for the party in Seoul under the Japanese that he failed to recognize the rapidly changing international situation which was creating a more favorable condition in the North. He admitted that he was slow to learn from those w h o operated in advanced Communist countries abroad such as the Soviet Union. Even after the fourth plenum of the Branch Bureau when K i m II Sung told him of the need for an independent party in place of the party in Seoul, he supported the party in Seoul. These were serious mistakes, he said, and he apologized and pledged his support for K i m II Sung. 36 Still another member of the domestic group, Chang Sun-myong, said that he had joined the Korean Communist Party in 1925 when it was first organized. However, he said his present party identification card recorded his admission date as August 25, 1945. He had not recognized the great difference between the past and the present party, and he had obstructed the work of Kim II Sung. He admitted that he did not support Kim's effort to organize a mass youth organization by uniting all youth groups and dissolving the Young Communist League. He confessed that he had secretly organized and maintained a Young Communist League in Hamgyong namdo and that there were secret Communist youth groups in many provinces in the North. He said that he too had opposed the creation of the Branch Bureau by K i m II Sung and looked to Seoul for leadership. Chang thought that such serious crimes might be cleansed only by death. He also admitted every criticism leveled against him in the work of the Inspection C o m mittee. He said that 4,134 members were convicted and sentenced for violation of the party bylaws during the past year, and he alone was responsible for this. Chang even admitted things he was not accused of. At the end of two days of discussion by thirty-two delegates, K i m II Sung delivered his concluding remarks to the congress. K i m said there was no substance to the self-criticism of O Ki-sop, Ch'oe Yong-dal, and C h o n g Tal-hyon. O's article on the trade union was not written for the workers, K i m said, but for O himself. He also accused O of plagiarizing from Lenin's book on new economic policy and said that had O submitted such an important article to the Political Committee for perusal he could have avoided his serious

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mistake. O was pretentious and arrogant, Kim charged, and had opposed the Branch Bureau for no other reason than his own selfishness. Had he been elected chairman of the Branch Bureau, he would have supported it; but since it was Kim Yong-bom who was elected, O opposed the Branch Bureau. 37 Chong Tal-hyon's opposition to the Branch Bureau was also purely personal, Kim said. Had Chong been elected chairman of the Hamgyong namdo provincial committee of the bureau, he would have supported it. Ch'oe Yong-dal was courting the former Japanese collaborators and reactionaries from the South, and he was wrong to protest Han Il-mu's constructive criticism of him. Kim concluded by saying that those who were toying with the idea of playing the party in the North against the party in the South were engaged in a dangerous game, because the two would eventually become one. Control of the Party In his first confrontation with his rivals in Korea, Kim used the Soviet-Koreans to attack the indigenous Communists. None of his partisans spoke in this congress. It was the Soviet-Koreans who lashed out at members of the domestic group. The Yanan group remained neutral in this clash. Kim Tu-bong and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik refrained from discussing the subject. At one time, O Ki-sop accused Mu Chong, a member of the Yanan group, of individual heroism because he was popularly called "the great father" in Hwanghaedo. But Mu Chong did not reply, and Kim II Sung condemned O for dragging Mu Chong into his troubles. Kim's main weapon, of course, was the backing of the Soviet occupation authorities and the Soviet-Koreans, who were rootless in Korea. The indigenous Korean Communists had no reason to support Kim II Sung and the Soviet-Koreans, of whom they knew nothing, in place of their own party in Seoul. They did oppose Kim II Sung and Colonel Ignatiev, who dismantled the existing Communist party and youth groups in the North and forced the local Communists to support creation of a new party. Kim and the Soviet-Koreans argued that their tactics were more advanced, and their organization methods more Leninist, than those the local Communists had learned from the Japanese. The local Commu-

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nists were not convinced, but at the same time it was difficult to argue against those w h o had come into Korea with the Soviet army, wearing the Soviet uniform and operating under the direction of the Soviet occupation authorities. Many local Communists were subjects of brutal personal attacks by Kim II Sung and suffered the consequences of their failure to adjust to this new reality. Kim used another weapon, as well — the elimination of everyone w h o had ever col, iborated with the Japanese. This policy was carried out without exception, and the domestic group suffered most. Kim's partisans, the Soviet-Koreans, and the Yanan group had all returned home from abroad, but many of the local C o m munists had, under significant pressure, ultimately submitted to the Japanese. It was not that collaboration with the Japanese was justifiable in any way, but to sustain Communist activities under the Japanese occupation was not an easy task, a fact not fully appreciated by revolutionaries w h o operated abroad. Many indigenous Korean Communists were released shortly before the liberation of Korea with the promise that they would not return to underground Communist activity in Korea. In fact, Ch'oe Yong-dal, Chang Si-u, Hyon Chun-hyok, and many other Communists were unacceptable to the "pure and unmarked Communists" who had conducted their revolutionary activities abroad. Kim II Sung used this weapon mercilessly at all levels of the N o r t h Korean political arena. At the recommendation of Ho Ka-i, a slate of nominees for membership on the Central Committee was prepared by an elevenmember committee consisting of five members of the Political C o m m i t t e e and one chairman each from six Provincial Party Committees. Kim II Sung announced sixty-three nominees for membership and twenty nominees for candidate membership. Kim said the committee was guided by four principles in selecting nominees. T h e y were recruited, first, from outstanding cadres; second, from leaders of various social, military, government, and security organs and the provincial party committees; third, from new cadres; and fourth, from those w h o had been reprimanded by the party but were basically good Communists. In order of nomination each candidate stated his personal history and was voted upon by the delegates. Everyone was voted in unanimously except O Ki-sop. O was nominated as the forty-second

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member of the Central Committee. He said that he was born in 1903 and began his Communist revolutionary activities from 1923 and became head of the Hamgyong namdo Party Provincial C o m mittee. He then said that "when I heard Kim's remark about me yesterday, I was not convinced, but..." O was sharply interrupted and told to confine his remarks to his qualifications. O stopped and the vote was taken. There were 985 votes in favor and five votes against his election. 38 In selecting candidate members of the Central Committee, the same procedure was followed, and everyone was voted in unanimously except one, Kim Tu-yong, 3 9 w h o had 989 votes for and one vote against his election. There was also an election of a seven-man Central Auditing Committee. All those nominated were unanimously elected. Some w h o had been severely criticized in the congress, among them C h ' o e Yong-dal and Chong Tal-hyon, were not elected, but some, including O Ki-sop and Chang Sun-myong, were reelected. O f the Central Committee's 67 members, 30 were returnees from the first Central Committee and 37 were new members. Four new partisans from Kim II Sung's guerrillas were elected at this time (Kang Kon, Kim Kwang-hyop, Kim Kyong-sok, and Pak K u m ch'ol) and at least 8 new Soviet-Koreans were added. Members of the domestic group were still the most numerous in the Central Committee. 4 0 During the first session of the newly elected Central Committee, officers of the party were elected. K i m Tu-bong remained chairman and Kim II Sung and Chu Yong-ha retained their posts as vice-chairmen of the party. All five members of the Political Committee were reelected, and two new members were added: Kim Ch'aek from the partisan group and Pak Il-u from the Yanan group. By the time two separate governments were declared in Korea in 1948, many leaders of the old Korean Communists had fled from the South to the North. They were given important posts in the Communist government. The chairman of the Korean Communist Party, Pak Hon-yong, was appointed vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs in Kim II Sung's first cabinet. Ho Hon, chairman of the Workers' Party of South Korea, was elected first chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly. Others followed their lead and

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joined the Communist regime in the North, but many were simply refugees from the South rather than leaders of the mainstream of the Korean Communist movement. Pak Hön-yöng was said to have fled to the North as early as October 1946, where he had established a temporary North Korean center of the Workers' Party of South Korea in Haeju, a town near the 38th parallel, to direct Communist activities in the South, where the Korean Communist Party was banned. Pak had rented a building in Haeju and brought many of his followers from the South, among them Y i Süng-yöp, Kwön O-jik, Chöng Chae-dal, Y i T'ae-jun, Pak Mun-gyu, Hö Söng-t'aek, Y i Pyöng-nam, K i m O-söng, Pak Süng-wön, Y i Wön-jo, and Y i m Hwa. W h e n these men fled north, the party in Seoul was manned by those who refused to leave the South, such as K i m Sam-yong and Y i Chu-ha, who had earlier fled south from Wonsan. In August 1948, shortly before the Communist republic was proclaimed in the North, the leaders of the Workers' Party of North Korea and these men organized a temporary central committee of the two parties known as the Joint Central Committee of the Workers' Parties of North and South Korea (Nambuk nodongdang yötthap chungang wiwönhoe).4i Although it was reported that this body was headed by K i m II Sung, the two parties remained separate. Even so, K i m and his Soviet-Koreans in the North were the hosts and the refugees from Seoul were the guests. K i m moved further to strengthen his control of the Workers' Party of North Korea. At the third plenum of the second Central Committee, September 24-25, 1948, C h u Yong-ha, vice-chairman of the party, was replaced by Hö Ka-i. Another important decision made at this plenum was the establishment of an Organization Committee to control party operations; this committee was chaired by K i m II Sung and included four Soviet-Koreans, Hö Ka-i, K i m Yol, Pak Ch'ang-ok, and Pak "Yong-sön. T h e Inspection Committee was chaired by Hö Ka-i. It was not until after his return from his month-long first official visit to Moscow in March and April 1949 to express appreciation to the Soviet Union that K i m moved to wrest control of the party chairmanship. T h e first joint plenum of the two Central Committees of the

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Workers' Party of North and South Korea was convened on June 24, 1949. Entirely new officers of the Central Committee were elected without a party congress. It was at this joint plenum that the official name of the Workers' Party of Korea was adopted, and Kim was formally elected chairman. Pak Hon-yong, former chairman of the Korean Communist Party in Seoul, was elected first vice-chairman, and Ho Ka-i, a Soviet-Korean, was elected second vice-chairman. There were three secretaries. T h e first secretary was Ho Ka-i; the second was Y i Sung-yop, a key member of the C o m munists from the South; and the third was K i m Sam-yong, a South Korean Communist w h o remained in the South to direct underground Communist activity there. A nine-member Political C o m mittee included all five of these men and four additional members: two from the Yanan group, K i m Tu-bong and Pak Il-u; one partisan, K i m Ch'aek; and one from the South, Ho Hon. T h e Organization Committee was expanded to eleven members including the nine mentioned above and one from the Yanan group, C h ' o e Ch'ang-ik, and a Soviet-Korean, K i m Yol. 4 2 When the two parties were united, the challenge to K i m II Sung was real — not only because there were many South Korean C o m munists in the North but also because his staunchest supporter and the backbone of his power, the Soviet occupation forces, had withdrawn from the North in December 1948. Some of the SovietKoreans left with the occupation forces, and only the handful w h o held high positions in the army, the party, and the government remained. Kim's partisans were still few in number and were ineffective in the party, concentrating most of their strength in the army and security affairs. Those indigenous Communists w h o were on the receiving end of the attacks from K i m II Sung and the Soviet-Koreans strengthened their group somewhat with a large number of hard-core Communists from the South. Kim II Sung had more than a fair chance for successful competition with rival groups. He controlled the administration of the newly established republic. He was premier of the cabinet. He was chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea. His mentor, Colonel Ignatiev, remained in the North after the Soviet army's withdrawal as an advisor to the Soviet ambassador, Terentii F. Shtykov, and gave him valuable direction for the future of his government. T h e

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Soviet-Koreans w h o decided to stay in the North remained loyal to Kim. T h e Yanan group also avoided direct confrontation with the Soviet-Koreans and K i m II Sung's group. North Korea in 1949 was still under the heavy influence of what was then known as the "fatherland of the proletariat," the Soviet Union, and Kim II Sung was its chosen agent to run the satellite.

6 The Republic and the Army

I C i m II Sung had fewer problems establishing the republic than in gaining control of the party. Kim used local leaders and returned revolutionaries at his discretion to implement the sovietization program, and so long as he was effective in this endeavor by following Soviet directives, his position was secure. K i m went through two preliminary administrative reorganizations before formal pronouncement of the Communist republic. Establishment

of the

Republic

The first administrative unit K i m headed was an improved version of the original Five-Province Administration Bureau. It was organized on February 9, 1946, the second day of the two-day conference held to create a central administration unit, and was known as the North Korean Provisional People's Committee (Puk Chosön imsi inmiti wiwönhoe). On the first day, K i m delivered a ten-point outline of the sovietization program and said that the first task of the committee was to institute democratic reforms. In the original version of this speech, K i m said that the initiation committee had re-

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ceived permission from the Soviet occupation authorities to organize the Provisional People's Committee, but this statement was later edited to read that the Soviet occupation authorities supported his proposal, and in the latest revision of this speech the entire reference to the Soviet authorities was deleted. 1 It was reported that K i m II Sung was elected chairman of the Provisional People's Committee, but it is not known w h o elected him or how he was elected. K i m Tu-bong was chosen vicechairman and Kang Yang-uk secretary. There were eleven bureaus, and the head of each bureau was appointed by K i m II Sung. Only one partisan, C h ' o e Yong-gon, w h o headed the Internal Security Bureau, and one member of the Yanan group, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, w h o headed the General Bureau, were appointed; the rest were from the domestic group. 2 This group was expanded as the workload increased and included O Ki-sop, w h o served concurrently as head of the Propaganda and Labor Bureaus, Y i Chu-yon, and Chong Chin-t'ae, all members of the domestic group. This group carried out Colonel Ignatiev's initial democratic reforms, including land reform, agricultural tax-in-kind, nationalization of major industries, labor laws, laws governing equality of sexes, and election laws. 3 Under the new election law passed by this committee, the first election was held on November 3, 1946, and a legislative body known as the People's Assembly of North Korea with 1,159 representatives was convened February 17-20, 1947.4 This representative body elected K i m chairman of a new People's Committee. In this reorganization, K i m retained most of the members of the Provisional People's Committee with one important change — the appointment of his fellow partisan Kim Ch'aek as vice-chairman, replacing K i m Tu-bong, w h o became chairman of the People's Assembly. K i m Ch'aek was also appointed concurrently as head of the National Defense Bureau. A few from the Yanan group were appointed to head bureaus — Pak Il-u to the Internal Security Bureau and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik to the People's Procurator's O f f i c e — but the majority of the People's Committee still consisted of members of the domestic group. 5 Not a single Soviet-Korean was appointed to head a bureau in the People's Committee. Many local leaders in the provinces did not coop-

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erate with Kim, and those who were criticized by Kim at the party congresses, including Y i Sun-gun, Y i Pong-su, Ch'oe Yong-dal, and O Ki-sop, were replaced. Kim brought in such obscure, manageable, and non-party-affiliated people as Y i Mun-hwan and Ho Nam-hui. In this way, Kim was able to manipulate his rival groups and their leaders by using and discarding them at will. The People's Assemby held five sessions from February 1947 to September 1948 when the Communist republic was formally declared, but the work of founding the new republic was completed long before the official announcement. The first session of the assembly elected a chief justice of the court and appointed a procurator-general, and by the third session in November 1947 a committee was appointed to draft a constitution of the republic. The fourth session of the assembly, February 6-7, 1948, decided to establish an armed force, and the following day, February 8, seven months before the formal announcement of the establishment of the republic, the Korean People's Army was founded. Even a new national anthem was composed and proclaimed as early as June 1947, and the groundwork for creating a separate Communist government in the North was more or less completed. 6 Kim II Sung was opposed to the establishment of two separate governments in Korea, and he waited until after the establishment of a government in the South to proclaim his republic in the North. However, had there been a single government in Korea, Kim would not have enjoyed the leadership position he held, even with Soviet assistance. Compared with more prominent Nationalist leaders in the South — Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and Kim Kyusik — Kim II Sung was a junior revolutionary. There were many in South Korea who could easily match or surpass Kim's record of revolutionary activity. After negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union failed to establish a unified governing body in Korea, the Soviet Union refused to allow the United Nations observer group to oversee a general election throughout Korea. An election was held only in the South on May 10, 1948, under U N supervision, and a government was established there. This was one keystone assuring Kim's leadership position in the North. Many leaders feared the permanent division of Korea and refused

98

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

to participate in any efforts to establish a government by either side. Some leaders in the south — Yo Un-hyöng, Kim Ku, and K i m Kyu-sik — did go North to talk with K i m II Sung, hoping to prevent the creation of a separate government. Kim emphatically agreed with them and vowed that he would not establish a separate government first in the North. Yo Un-hyöng, who first organized the Korean People's Republic in the South after the liberation, had gone to see K i m II Sung as early as the summer of 1946. K i m had shown his respect for Yo and had greeted him cordially. K i m Ku and K i m Kyu-sik, president and vice-president of the defunct Korean Provisional Government, abstained from participating in the creation of a separate South Korean government and visited the North in 1948, but this meeting, held from April 19 to 23, turned out to be a political rally instigated by Kim II Sung to oppose the UN-supervised election in the South. A four-point joint communiqué was issued at the end of the meeting calling for withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea, prevention of civil war, establishment of a single government for Korea by Koreans, and rejection of any unilateral establishment of a separate government in the South. 7 In all meetings, however, the older revolutionaries went to the North as individuals to meet with a leader w h o himself had completed the task of establishing a separate government. In the review of a parade on April 25 in their honor, Kim Ku had complained to K i m II Sung about the North Korean people carrying a huge portrait of Stalin and shouting long live Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union. Both Kim Ku and K i m Kyu-sik returned south on May 4, 1948, shortly before the May 10 election. O n September 9, 1948, less than a month after the Republic of Korea was established in the South, a separate Communist republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was proclaimed in the North. Both sides claimed jurisdiction over the entire territory of Korea. North Korea legitimized its claim by the alleged election of 360 out of 572 members of the Supreme People's Assembly from the South. T h e Supreme People's Assembly, meeting from September 2 to September 10, adopted a constitution, elected Kim premier and approved his first cabinet, elected a chief justice, appointed a

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procurator-general, and elected a twenty-one-member Standing Committee of the assembly. 8 For K i m , however, the Supreme People's Assembly was merely a legitimizing organization and not a functioning legislative body. Many political, religious, and social organizations were represented in the assembly, but there was not a single partisan or SovietKorean on the twenty-one-member Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. T h e representatives were elected for four years but served from September 1948 to September 1957. During those years, the assembly rubber-stamped unanimously everything that the party and K i m asked. It was the party and Kim's cabinet, controlled by the Soviet authorities, not the Supreme People's Assembly or its Standing Committee, that exercised power in the North. Kim's first cabinet had three partisans: K i m (premier), K i m Ch'aek (vice-premier and concurrently minister of industry), and Ch'oe Yong-gón (national defense). There were four from the Yanan group: Pak Il-u (interior), K i m Wón-bong (state control), Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (finance), and Hó Chóng-suk (culture and propaganda). Thirteen other members were from the domestic group. Most prominent where those w h o came from the South, headed by Pak Hón-yóng, w h o was appointed to serve concurrently as vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs, Y i Süng-yóp (justice), and Pak Mun-gyu (agriculture and forestry). Some of the domestic Communists of North Korean origin were kept, including C h u Yong-ha (transportation) and Chang Si-u (commerce); representatives of the People's Party of South Korea, Paek Nam-un (education); the Ch'óndogyo Young Friends Party, Kim Chong-ju (communication); and the Progressive Party (Sitijindang), Y i Yong (city management). There were only a few technocrats — Chóng Chunt'aek (state planning), Y i Pyóng-nam (public health), and Hó Sóngt'aek (labor). A philologist, a long-time independence fighter w h o fled from the South to the North, Y i Kük-no, was appointed minister without portfolio. Changes within the cabinet were frequent, and Kim used cabinet posts to recruit men loyal to him and purge those w h o stood in his way. By the time of the second cabinet in 1957, more than fifty persons had served as cabinet ministers, but only six other than

IOO

C O N S O L I D A T I O N O F POLITICAL P O W E R

The First Cabinet,

September

1948

Front rou>: Chöng Chun-t'aek (State Planning), Kim Ch'aek (vice-premier and Industry), Hong Myöng-hüi (vice-premier), Kim II Sung (premier), Pak Höng-yöng (vice-premier and Foreign Affairs), Ch'oe Yotig-gön (National Defense), Hö Chötig-suk (Culture and Propaganda) Middle row: Yi Pyöng-nam (Public Health), Kim Won-bong (State Control), Paek Nam-un (Education), Chu Yong-ha (Transportation), Chang Si-u (Commerce), Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (Fianance), Pak Il-u (Interior) Back row: Pak Mun-gyu (Agriculture and Forestry), Yi Kuk-no (Without Portfolio), Yi Yong (City Management), Kim Chóng-ju (Communication), Yi Súng-yóp (Justice), Hö Söng-t'aek (Labor)

Kim himself were reappointed to the second cabinet. Only technocrats (Chöng Chun-t'aek, Hö Söng-t'aek, and Yi Pyöng-nam) w h o pledged complete loyalty to Kim and abstained from political struggles in the party were reappointed. 9 There was not a single Soviet-Korean in Kim's first cabinet. A State Department study on the Soviet takeover alleged that SovietKoreans were appointed vice-ministers and controlled the ministers, but this was not true. Most of the Soviet-Koreans were concentrating on the operation of the party and army, and in many cases the Soviet-Koreans headed various departments of the party

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that set the policy for the cabinet to implement, but they themselves were not appointed as vice-ministers. More than ten viceministers out of seventeen ministries of the first cabinet were local Korean Communists. Soviet-Koreans also served as heads of various security groups, but not as vice-ministers. 10 Most of Kim's partisans and the Soviet-Koreans concentrated their efforts on building the military and security forces. The Army and the Security

Forces

T h e Soviet occupation authorities helped Kim fight the local opposition in creating the mass party and also helped him become leader of the newly established republic, but they went one step further and helped to create an armed unit to sustain him. In this endeavor K i m faced the least opposition, and he used his partisan comrades to firmly control the military and security forces. Kim's only potential opposition was the military unit of the Yanan group under K i m Won-bong, Mu Chong, and Pak Il-u, but the Soviet authorities had helped K i m to disarm them when they returned from China. Furthermore, any reference to their military hero M u Chong as a leader in the North was immediately denounced as promotion of individual heroism by the Soviet-Koreans and the occupation forces. 1 1 Almost immediately after his return to Korea, K i m II Sung began to organize a security unit. All military and internal security posts from the liberation to the establishment of the Korean People's Army were taken by Kim's partisans. T h e first military o f f i cers and political cadre training school was founded as early as N o vember 1945. Called Pyongyang Institute (P'yongyang hagwon), it was headed by K i m Ch'aek, a guerrilla from the Second Route Army in Manchuria, w h o had with him a Soviet-Korean, Ki Sokbok, as dean of the institute. Ki was educated at Leningrad State University and later became editor of the party organ, Kulloja. W h e n the first Provisional People's Committee was organized in February 1946, the head of the Security Bureau was another partisan, C h ' o e Yong-gon. B y August 1946, the central security officers training school (Chungang poati kanbu hakleyo) in Pyongyang and all other cldre training centers were headed by partisans. B y the

102

C O N S O L I D A T I O N O F POLITICAL P O W E R

end of 1946 the training centers in Kaech'on (P'yongan namdo), Sinuiju (P'yongan pukto), Nanam (Hamgyong pukto), and Wonsan (Hamgyong namdo) had produced enough officers to staff an army of approximately 20,000 men. T h e y were divided into the Nanam Division, Chinnamp'o Brigade, Kanggye Artillery Regiment, Railroad Constabulary, Border Constabulary, Internal Security Bureau, and Secret Police. T h e headquarters of these units were in Pyongyang and they were commanded by An Kil, a partisan. 12 In his speech to the first graduating class of the Central Security Officers School on October 26, 1947, K i m emphasized that the army had a special mission in the creation of the people's government in the N o r t h . 1 3 T h e army did in fact enjoy a special status, primarily because it was led by the partisans and Soviet-Koreans, the military phalanx of the party. Some of the early recruits were trained by the Soviet occupation forces, and approximately 10,000 men were sent to Siberia each year for training. T h e first wave of the Soviet withdrawal from North Korea occurred as early as March 1947, and the second in less than a year. It was important for K i m II Sung to build his own armed forces, and the Korean People's Army was formally established on February 8, 1948, nearly seven months before proclamation of the government in North Korea. W h e n the government was established, the military and the security police were separated. T h e military was entrusted to the Ministry of National Defense while the security police were reorganized into the Interior Ministry. T h e minister of national defense was C h ' o e Yong-gon, the vice-minister was K i m II, and the commander-in-chief of the North Korean armed forces was Kang Kon, all partisans. 14 During the first year after the Communist republic was established approximately 40,000 men were conscripted into the army, and many were sent to the Soviet Union and Manchuria for training. Kim II Sung also recruited heavily among the Koreans living in Manchuria w h o chose to remain even after the Korean liberation. These Koreans were also recruited into the Chinese C o m m u nist army to fight the Chinese Nationalists in Manchuria during the Chinese civil war. T h e y were called the Y i Hong-gwang Unit in honor of the Korean political commissar Y i Hong-gwang (Li Hongguang) of the First Route Army under Yang J i n g y u .

The Republic and the Army

103

Some of the Korean leaders of the United Army w h o chose to remain in Manchuria participated in the Northeast (Manchuria) Interim People's Committee in China. For example, K i m Kwanghyop, w h o helped train many Korean soldiers in China. K i m Kwang-hyop eventually returned to Korea with a Korean contingent of Chinese army units after the Chinese Communists won their civil war in Manchuria, and he became general of the Korean People's Army. 1 5 T h e North Korean army had approximately 60,000 men divided into three army divisions by 1949. T h e First Division was commanded by Ch'oe Kwang, the Second Division by C h ' o e Hyon, and the Third Division by K i m Kwang-hyop. These men were all guerrilla fighters from the United Army and were loyal to K i m II Sung. T h e Interior Ministry was headed by Pak Il-u, a member of the Yanan group, but many Soviet-Koreans and partisans worked in the ministry. There were 12,000 regular police, 3,000 political thought police, 5,000 secret police, and a few others. T h e secret police were headed by Pang Hak-se, a Soviet-Korean, but he was later succeeded by Chi Kyong-su, a partisan. T h e partisans also moved into many local security police organizations; for example, the head of the Hwanghaedo security police was Sok San, another partisan. In this way, Kim II Sung and his partisans completely dominated the military and security forces in the North, and no other group was able to challenge him. Shortly after they fled to North Korea from the South, the leaders of the domestic group established a cadre school of their own, known as the Kangdong Political Institute in Kandong county, P'yongan namdo, in September 1947. T h e officers and men trained in this institute remained loyal to Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the Korean Communist Party, but these men were trained for the purpose of Communist operation in South Korea. However, even in this Kangdong Political Institute, the military training was conducted under the direction of So Ch'ol, a partisan. T h e school was disbanded in 1949 after the so-called September offensive in which some 630 agents were sent to the South for an abortive guerrilla operation. T h e graduates of this institute often shouted " L o n g live Pak Hon-yong!" instead of the customary pledge of fealty to K i m II Sung, but their primary goal was to win the South, not to chal-

I04

CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

lenge Kim. W h e n the school was closed, K i m established a new guerrilla training school in Hoeryöng, Hamgyöng pukto, known as the Hoeryöng Cadres School under the direction of still another partisan, O Chin-u. Kim II Sung claims today that the liberation of Korea was the culmination of his long and arduous revolutionary struggle for Korea and asserts that he and his partisans defeated the Japanese and brought home the liberation. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s North Koreans have omitted any reference to the role played by the Soviet Union in the liberation of Korea. T h e y claim that it was Kim w h o returned triumphantly and founded the Communist republic of the North. These assertions deserve no refutation. K i m II Sung did, however, show uncommon skill in his consolidation of political power in the North. As in his guerrilla days in Manchuria, when he survived while other guerrilla leaders perished under the Japanese punitive expedition, Kim not only survived but gained strength. W h a t he accomplished during the Soviet occupation was far beyond what he himself might ever have dreamed. Kim's consolidation of political power was the result of many contributing factors. Foremost was the Soviet support he received during the period immediately after the liberation, particularly from Major General Romanenko and Colonel Ignatiev. K i m served the Soviet Union well in their effort to institute a Communist system in the North, and the Soviet Union in turn supported him in his quest for power. For the Soviet Union, the sovietization of the North was more important than the promotion of a local leader, but the success of their programs depended on the effectiveness of their chosen agent. In a way, K i m earned his leadership position by faithfully executing Soviet directives. Another factor was the perpetuation of what was then known as the temporary division of Korea. K i m was indeed a minor figure in the context of the entire Korean revolutionary movement. There were people like Syngman Rhee, K i m Ku, and Kim Kyu-sik in the political arena, and there were generals like Y i Ch'öng-ch'ön and Y i Pöm-sök in the military. But these Korean leaders, C o m munists and Nationalists alike, were all in the southern half of

The Republic and the Army

105

Korea, and the political vacuum that was created in the N o r t h helped Kim II Sung to consolidate his political power. He was sharply aware of his lack of a political base in Korea, and his guerrillas and comrades from Manchuria were untrained and uninformed in the politics of liberated Korea. Kim filled the ranks with any and all w h o supported him in combating his opposition, primarily by manipulating the Soviet-Koreans, w h o were rootless in Korea. He was also effective in neutralizing the Yanan group, thus preventing rival groups from uniting against him. Such unity had never been contemplated by his rivals, but even if they had united in opposing his takeover, Kim had the most important element on his side — control of the military and security forces. Kim's takeover of N o r t h Korea, in a sense, can be characterized as a military takeover under Soviet tutelage. His partisans and the Soviet-Koreans controlled every military and security unit in the N o r t h , and they supported Kim's consolidation of political power. T h e local N o r t h Korean Communists w h o opposed Kim by professing their loyalty to the Korean Communist Party in Seoul were dealt severe blows, while the leaders of the party in the South were getting their share from the American occupation forces. By the time these leaders from the South fled north, their strength had suffered significant setbacks from many abortive coups. Kim did share party and administrative posts with members of various other groups, but in dealing with the local Communists from the domestic group, Kim used his strongest weapon to dispose of many potential rivals: the stigma of collaboration with the Japanese during their occupation of Korea. Except for those who had spent their entire lives away from Korea during the Japanese occupation, people like Kim II Sung and Soviet-Koreans, many of the Korean revolutionaries w h o had remained had submitted to the relentless Japanese campaign of subjugation. Many leaders in the domestic group suffered in this purification campaign by Kim II Sung, and Kim used this weapon too to consolidate his political power.

Ill CHALLENGES TO KIM'S LEADERSHIP

I n his consolidation of political power, K i m showed the resilience and resoluteness of a guerrilla fighter. He served the Soviet authorities well, and they in turn continued to support his drive for power. K i m showed his resolve to sustain his advantageous position even after the Soviet army withdrew from Korea, and even then a large number of the Soviet advisors remained to assist him. 1 By the time the Communist republic was established in 1948, however, political group affiliation became more pronounced, and each group began to readjust and assert its position. T h e most numerous were the members of the domestic group, but they had to divide their energies between their operation in the N o r t h and their underground operation in the southern half of Korea. T h e Yanan group of returned revolutionaries from mainland China suffered much from the Soviet occupation of Korea. Kim's own partisans and the Soviet-Koreans were not distinguished as separate bodies during the first decade after the liberation because they supported each other under Soviet tutelage, but they were two distinctly separate groups. It took Kim less than two years after he proclaimed the republic

108

CHALLENGES TO KIM'S LEADERSHIP

to build his military to launch an attack on the South. Studies on the Korean War often attribute the cause of the war to international rather than domestic factors. It is important to examine domestic factors, however, and Kim's foremost objective in the war was to unify the divided country by military means. His effort to reunify the country militarily grew into an international conflict involving the United Nations and many other countries. K i m realized that his "fatherland liberation war" turned out to be a war he could not himself fight to win or lose. Shortly after the Chinese volunteers entered the conflict, management of the war was taken away from him, and the ultimate cease-fire was agreed upon by the United States and China. More important to K i m was the challenge to his leadership, coming from an unsuccessful conclusion of the war. During the Korean War and shortly thereafter cach group challenged his leadership. K i m managed not only to meet these challenges but also used the opportunities to crush his opponents and firmly establish himself in a position of power. T h e domestic group challenged him during the war when it was obvious that the fighting was not going as planned. At the height of the de-Stalinization campaign, some members of the Yanan group and a few Soviet-Koreans challenged him, but he crushed them mercilessly. Many key posts in the party, military, government, news media, and cadre training schools were occupied by the Soviet-Koreans; their challenge was not taken lightly. Ho Ka-i, perhaps the most influential Soviet-Korean, was the first secretary of the party, and K i m Sung-hwa, another Soviet-Korean, headed the central party school where all new party cadres were trained. T h e editors of the party organs, newspapers and journals, were also Soviet-Koreans, and they controlled the information networks in the North. Even at K i m II Sung University, many professors came from the Soviet Union. 2 However, Soviet-Koreans lost much when the Soviet Union withdrew and did not return to fight for Korea during the Korean War. T h e remaining members of the Yanan group were purged by the time the Chinese troops withdrew from Korea in 1958, and K i m did show a sign of his unique leadership quality. It took him more than a decade, but by the time the Fourth Party Congress convened

Challenges to Kim's Leadership

109

in 1961, traces of all these groups save Kim's own partisans had disappeared. Only those who were unconditionally loyal to Kim remained. In this process, Kim elevated his comrades from the guerrilla days into positions of prominence, established his partisan struggle as the only correct revolutionary tradition in Korea, and began to mold a new Communist Man in the tradition of the partisans.

7 The Korean War and Kim's Rivals

I t is commonly alleged that the Soviet Union instigated Kim to wage a war of national liberation against the South to unify the country. The North Koreans, of course, accuse the United States and the South Koreans of aggression against the North. In a limited conflict such as the Korean War, where the hostilities ended with neither victory nor defeat, it is difficult to arrive at a version to which both sides are willing to subscribe. While there is overwhelming evidence that North Korea launched what they themselves have called the "fatherland liberation war," it is impossible to pinpoint the extent of Soviet instigation or Chinese persuasion. Because Kim II Sung and the North Koreans were so strongly influenced by the Soviet Union at the time and because so many foreign troops, including the United Nations, were involved in the war, most efforts to assess the origin of the war have concentrated on international rather than domestic factors. T h e war has always been analyzed from the cold war viewpoint: the confrontation of superpowers, a complex accusation of collusion among North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China, and the concept of aggression

I 12

CHALLENGES T O KIM'S LEADERSHIP

by persuasion. However, it has not been analyzed from the North Korean or Kim's point of view. T h e objective of the war for K i m was quite different. It was neither the development of the concept of limited war, nor was it the expansion or containment of communism in Asia. T h e war for K i m was primarily the function of his own political ambition, and his effort to resolve the question of Korea's division. 1 Kim's reasons for the war should therefore be examined in terms of N o r t h Korean politics. T h e U.S. troop withdrawal, the success of the Chinese Communists in mainland China, the Acheson declaration regarding the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, and the general cold war atmosphere that characterized the period after World War II may all have contributed to Kim's decision to attack, but the decision was his own. Since he was so closely supervised by his advisors in the Soviet embassy, including his mentor, Colonel Ignatiev, it is indeed inconceivable that the Soviet Union was unaware of Kim's plan to march south. Kim must have had at least their acquiescence, if not their approval. He might have received Stalin's permission, as Khruschshev remembered, but Kim's own reasons for launching the war are quite different, and they should be analyzed. Domestic Causes of the Korean

War

Three domestic causes of the Korean War are considered here: Kim's resolve to reunify the country militarily, his difficulty in the 1949-1950 two-year economic plan, and his precarious relationship with the Communists from the South. Kim II Sung wanted to reunify his country, if and when the international political situation surrounding the Korean peninsula was suitable for such an undertaking. K i m considered military reunification to be the most e f f i cient solution, and he was not alone in this line of thinking. Many Korean revolutionaries w h o returned from abroad thought that Korea should be reunified, and Syngman Rhee in the South made his intention "to march N o r t h " known to the people of Korea. T h e difference between K i m and Rhee was that K i m was able to implement his plan and prepare his army for the task. From the time he was installed as head of the Provisional People's Commit-

The Korean War and Kim's Rivals

113

tee on February 8, 1946, to the outbreak of war in June 1950, Kim never advocated peaceful reunification of Korea. He thought that the only way to achieve national reunification was by force of arms. That Kim with his military past should resort to such a solution is not surprising, particularly when South Korea was in political and military disarray. It is true that Kim had the Democratic Front for the Fatherland Unification (Choguk t'ongil minju chutii chonson), consisting of many social leaders, propose a peaceful unification in June 1949, approximately one year before the hostilities, but Kim himself did not appeal to the leaders of the South for peaceful reunification. As early as 1947 in his New Year address Kim said that the united and democratic Korea to which all Koreans aspired could be had only by ultimate victory over the reactionary traitors in the South. In another New Year address in 1950, Kim emphasized that unification was possible only through strengthening the People's Army and the security forces. 2 Furthermore, on January 19, 1950, at the Third Party Congress of the Ch'ondogyo Young Friends Party, Kim made an important speech on the unification question. He said that building and strengthening the revolutionary bases in the North for the purpose of unifying the country was not enough; the North Koreans must wipe out the traitors in the South. He said that the great task of national reunification must be accomplished quickly and by "ourselves." He cited the examples of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union and the recent success of the Communist forces in mainland China. Citing Malenkov's speech at the thirty-second anniversary of the October Revolution, Kim said that he was not afraid of a war; it was South Koreans who should be afraid of the people's war. If there should be a third world war, not just one or two capitalist states but all the reactionary capitalist states would be doomed. He emphasized that "we will be victorious, but victory does not come on its own; victory must be won." 3 Kim's effort to build a strong army in the North was evident from the beginning. He took steps to assign all his partisans to this effort. One of the first factories he built was a munition plant to manufacture guns and ammunition. When the Korean People's Army was formally established, Kim symbolically posed for a pic-

114

CHALLENGES T O KIM'S LEADERSHIP

ture with his partisans, C h ' o e Yong-gôn, Kim Ch'aek, Kang Kôn, and K i m II, giving them the first weapons manufactured in the North. K i m built an army that was much larger and stronger than that in the South. K i m had many units trained during the Chinese civil war in Manchuria, and he brought many combat troops from northeastern China into N o r t h Korea prior to the beginning of the war. 4 B y the time of the Korean War in June 1950, the military balance in his favor became much more apparent. Kim had approximately 120,000 men in arms compared with slightly more than 60,000 troops in the South. T h e extent of his mobilization becomes clearer when it is recalled that the North had about half the population of the South. T h e Fatherland Defense Assistance Association (Choguk powi huwônhoe) was organized as early as July 15, 1949, by the youth and women's groups to strengthen the People's Army. T h r o u g h this organization the North Koreans began to urge the people to contribute to the defense fund. A number of individuals and private corporations contributed airplanes and tanks through this organization. In his interview with a reporter of the French Communist newspaper L'Humanité on J u l y 17, 1950, when the war was going in his favor, K i m said that he envisioned a short war, and had it not been for the American intervention the war would have been over. Kim's timetable was to liberate the entire South by August 15, 1950, and to celebrate that day in Seoul. In his radio address on October n , 1950, when the United Nations forces began to cross the 38th parallel and march North, K i m said for the first time that he knew about the South Korean plan to attack the North in early May, more than one and a half months before the outbreak of war, and therefore was able to prepare for the South Korean invasion. 5 One cause of the war that has often been neglected is the economic situation in the North. K i m had completed two one-year economic plans for 1947 and 1948, which he claimed were resounding successes. By the time of the Korean War, he had instituted a two-year economic plan for 1949-1950 which was in considerable difficulty. In contrast with his earlier economic figures, which he gave in great detail, counting even the number of domestic animals, no detailed economic statistics were announced in 1949 and

The Korean War and Kim's Rivals

First weapons made in North Korea From lefi to right: Ch'oe Yon-gön, Kim Ch'aek, Kang Kon

115

Kim 11, Kim II Sung, and

JL?

The Yi Hong-gu>ang Company, Korean soldiers in Northeast

China

I 16

Korean

C H A L L E N G E S T O KIM'S LEADERSHIP

volunteers

in Northeast

„van

4-6 5, 6

3-5, 7

Yi Kuk-chin

4

3, 4

Yi Pong-su Yi Song-un

4 2-4

2

Kwang-hyop Kyong-sok Myong-jun Myong-suk Ok-sun Pyong-sik Song-guk Tae-hong Tong-gyu Yang-ch'un Yo-jung

4 4 5 4, 5 4, 5

M OP

gen gen

OP

gen

M

M

M

OP OP

Korean

10 3 2, 4, 5 2, 7, 9 4, 9 3, 5, 6 10 3, 7- 10 7, 8 1

gen

2, 4, 7, g

gen gen

4, 5 5, 6

Politics

327

vice-president of the republic; died 1984 president of the republic purged 1969 died 1962 woman woman diplomat purged 1977 diplomat died 1978

Joint Chief-ofStaff of KPA gen 2-6, 8, 9 died 1984 sec/gen 1-3, 6, 7 gen purged 1967 7 gen diplomat 8 wife of Kang Kon gen 1-3, vice president 5-8 of the Republic gen 8 gen 1-8 gen 8 diplomat sec/gen 8 purged 1969 sec 1, 2, 5, f.u gen 8 4 wife of C h ' o e Yong-gon 8 former chief justice gen died 1967 1, 9 former procurator- general; diplomat

328 Yi Yi Yi Yi

APPENDIX 1

Tu-ch'an Tu-ik Ul-sol Yong-gu

6 5, 6 5, 6

5, 7 3-5, 7 3-5, 7 4

Yi Yong-ho 3, 4 Yi Yong-suk Yim C h ' o l 4, 5 Yim C h ' u n - c h ' u 4-6

3, 4, 4, 3,

Yim Hae 1-3 Yu C h ' a n g - g w o n 4 Yu Kyong-su 3

2 3, 4 2

Yun T ' a e - h o n g

4

4

4 5 5 5, 7

1, 5, 12 OP

OP

gen gen

gen gen

4, 5 4-6 1, 2

gen gen gen

6

M M

9 9, 10

gen

former chief justice diplomat woman diplomat diplomat vice-president diplomat

died 1958 statue 1968 1-4, 7, 8 former procurator- general

Appendix 2. Partisans of the United Army Not in North Korean Politics

These are mostly men and women who are illiterate, elderly, or physically handicapped. Chang Chol-gu* Cho To-on* Ch'oe Pong-ho Ch'oe Pong-song Ch'oe Song-suk* Chon Hui* Chon Sun-hui* Han Ch'on-ch'u Han T'ae-ryong Hong Ch'un-su Hwang Kum-ok* Hyon Ch'ol Kang Wi-ryong Kim Chi-myong Kim Ch'ol-ho* Kim Chong-p'il Kim Ch'ung-yol Kim Myong-hwa* Kim Yong-hwa* Kim Yu-gil * Woman.

Ko Hyon-suk* Kong Chong-su Nam Tong-su O Chuk-sun* Pak Chong-suk* Pak Kyong-ok* Pak Song-u Pak Tal Pak Tu-gyong Sok Tong-su Song Sung-p'il Yi Chong-in* Yi Chong-san* Yi Myong-son Yi O-song Yi Pong-nok* Yi Tu-su Yu Kyong-hui* Yu Myong-ok* Yu Ung-sam

Appendix 3. Partisans Who Died Before the Liberation of Korea

P r o m i n e n t Korean partisans w h o were Kim's superiors or comrades w h o m the N o r t h Koreans refuse to recognize An Pong-hak C h o n Kwang (alias O Song-yun) C h u C h i n (alias C h u Chin-su) Han Ho H a n In-hwa Kim Chae-bom Kim Hwa K i m Kwang-hak K i m Se-hyong Pak T u k - b o m So Pyong-san

Fourth Division Commander, Second Army; surrendered September 3 0 , 1 9 3 6 Political Commissar, First Route Army; surrendered January 3 0 , 1 9 4 1 Commander, Second Army; arrested February 1 9 3 5 First Division Commander, First Army; died 1 9 3 7 C h i e f - o f - S t a f f , First Army; died N o v e m b e r 16, 1939 C o m p a n y C o m m a n d e r , First Division, Second Army; arrested J u l y 12, 1 9 4 0 Division C o m m a n d e r , Eastern C o m m a n d , Fifth Army; whereabouts unknown C o m p a n y Commander, Second Army; arrested J u l y 12, 1 9 4 0 Deputy Comander, First Army; died in 1 9 3 8 C h i e f - o f - S t a f f , T h i r d Directional Army; arrested September 2 7 , 1 9 4 0 Political Commissar, Seventh Army; whereabouts

Partisans

Who Died Before Liberation

331

unknown Y i Kwang-nim Y i Sang-muk Y i Tong-il

Third Division C o m m a n d e r , Fifth A r m y ; whereabouts unknown Political Commissar, Second Army; whereabouts unknown Organization Chief, Southern Provincial C o m m i t tee; surrendered

Prominent Korean partisans whose contribution the N o r t h Koreans recognize An T ' a e - b o m Chong Il-gwon Ho Hyong-sik Ho Song-hak Kang Ton Kim Hak-sil Kim Nak-ch'on Kim San-ho Ma Tong-hui Mun Pung-san Nam Ch'ang-il O Chung-hwa Pak Kil-song Pak N o k - k u m Pak Sun-il Sin Kwang-sun Son W o n - g u m Yi Hak-man Y i Hong-gwang Yi Kwon-haeng Yi Kye-sun Yi Tong-gwang

C h i e f o f Staff, Third Army; died August 3, 1 9 4 2 (1914-1938) ( 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 8 ) ; woman (1907-1935) (1911-1937) (1912-1938) Company Commander, Second Army; died 1 9 3 5 Detachment Commander, Second Army; died 1 9 3 5 ( 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 4 3 ) ; Detachment Commander, Second Army; executed August 12, 1 9 4 3 ( 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 4 0 ) ; woman who participated in the Poch'onbo raid Division Commander, Fifth Army; died 1 9 3 7

Commander, Seventh Army; died August 6, 1 9 3 8 Deputy Commander, First Army; died March 1 9 3 5 (1921-1940) ( 1 9 1 6 - 1 9 3 8 ) ; woman Company Commander, First Army; died July 1 9 3 7

Korean guerrillas o f the United Army w h o m the Chinese Communists recognize Ch'a Yong-dok

O Ung-yong

332

APPENDIX 3

Han Ho Han In-hwa Ho Hyong-sik Ho Song-suk* Kim Chong-guk Kim Kun Kim Sun-hui* Ma Tok-san O Se-yong * Woman

Pae Song-ch'un* Pak Chin-u So Kwang-hae Yang Yim Yi Hak-bok Yi Il-p'yong Yi Kwang-nim Yi Tong-gwang Yim Chong-ok*

Appendix 4. Chronology of Kim II Sung

1912

April 15

1919

Autumn

1923

April

1925

January Spring

1926 1927

June 5 June January 17

1929

Autumn

1930

May July

1932

April 25

July 31 1933

Born Kim Song-ju as the eldest son of Kim Hyong-jik and Kang Pan-sole in Man'gyongdae near Pyongyang. Kim goes to Manchuria and enters Badaogou Elementary School. Kim returns to Pyongyang and enters Ch'angdok Elementary School. Kim returns to Badaogou, Manchuria. Kim enters Fusong Elementary School in Manchuria. Kim's father, Kim Hyong-jik, dies. Kim enters Hwasong Middle School. Kim transfers to Yuwen Middle School in Jilin, Manchuria. Kim is arrested and jailed for participating in a subversive organization. Kim is released from jail. Kim goes to Gelun to teach school and he is given the pseudonym of Kim II Sung. II Sung claims to have organized the first anti-Japanese guerrilla unit in Antu, Manchuria. ( N o r t h Korea celebrates this day as the founding date of the Korean People's Army.) Kim's mother, Kang Pan-sok, dies. Kim participates in small-scale guerrilla

334

APPENDIX 4

September 18

1934

March

1935

February

1936

February

J u n e 10 August 1937

June 4 June 9

1938

April 2 6 November

1939

May 18

1940

February 2 3 March 13

1941

March 8 March

1942

February 16

1945

August 15

September 19

operations led by Korean and Chinese revolutionaries in Manchuria. Yang J i n g y u organizes a Chinese C o m m u nist guerrilla force, the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. Chu C h i n , a Korean guerrilla fighter, establishes the second army o f the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. T h e Daihuanggou meeting is held to deal with the minsaengdan problem. T h e Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army ( N E A J U A ) is established with Yang J i n g y u as commander. T h e Korean Fatherland Restoration Association is founded by O Söng-yun. Kim fights in the region of Fusung prefecture. T h e Poch'önbo raid by K i m II Sung and his guerrillas. T h e musan raid by C h ' o e Hyön. T h e Liudaogou raid by Kim II Sung. K i m becomes commmander of the Second Directional army of the N E A J U A . K i m reenters Korea to fight the Japanese police in border towns. Yang J i n g y u is killed by Japanese expeditionary forces. Kim's guerrillas fight the Japanese police force headed by Maeda Takashi at Daimalugou in Helong prefecture in Manchuria. Wei Z h e n g m i n is killed by the Japanese. K i m retreats into the Soviet Union and marries his long-time comrade Kim Chöng-suk. Kim's first son, K i m J o n g II, is born in the Soviet U n i o n . Korea is liberated by the United States and the Soviet Union, bringing the end o f World W a r II. K i m returns to Korea from the Soviet U n i o n via Wönsan by boat.

Chronology of Kim II Sung October

December 17

1946

February 8 August 28-30

October 1 November 23-24 1947

February 17-20 October 12

1948

February 8 March 27-30 September 2 September 9

1949

June 26 June 30

September 1950

June 25 October 25

1953

July 27

335

Kim is introduced to the N o r t h Korean people as a hero of the Korean revolution by the Soviet occupation forces. Kim becomes chairman of the N o r t h Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party at its third enlarged plenum. Kim becomes chairman of the N o r t h Korean Provisional People's Committee. At the founding congress of the N o r t h Korean Workers' Party, Kim is elected vicechairman of the party. Kim II Sung University is established. T h e South Korean Workers' Party is established. First Congress of the People's Assembly of N o r t h Korea. Mangyondae Revolutionary School is established for the children of Korean Communist revolutionaries. T h e Korean People's Army (KPA) is established. Second Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party. First Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). T h e Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is founded and Kim becomes its first premier. T h e Democratic Front for the Fatherland Reunification is formed. T h e N o r t h Korean Workers' Party and the South Korean Workers' Party unite to form the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Kim becomes its chairman. Kim Chong-suk, Kim's wife, dies while delivering a stillborn baby. T h e Korean War breaks out. Chinese volunteers join the N o r t h Koreans and fight the U N forces. T h e cease-fire agreement is signed, bringing an end to the Korean War.

336

APPENDIX 4

August 3 - 6 September 1 0 - 2 9 November 1 2 - 2 7

1955 1956

1957 1958

December 2 8 April 2 3 - 2 9 June-July

September 18 November 1 4 - 1 9

1959

March 3 - 6 NovemberDecember January-February

1960

February

1961

June-July September 1 1 - 1 8 October

1962

October 2 2 November

1963 August 10

1965

April 1 0 - 2 0

1966 1967

October 5 - 1 2 December 1 4 - 1 6

Trials are held to indict twelve conspirators for high treason. K i m travels to the Soviet Union to seek aid. K i m travels to China to express appreciation for Chinese help in the Korean War and to seek aid. K i m delivers his speech on the chuch'e idea. T h i r d Congress o f the W P K . K i m visits the Soviet Union for the 2 0 t h Congress o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet U n i o n ( C P S U ) ; he also visits East Germany, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Mongolia. Second Supreme People's Assembly. K i m visits the Soviet Union on the fortieth anniversary o f the October Revolution. First Conference o f the W P K . Kim visits China and Vietnam. K i m visits the Soviet Union for the 21st Congress of the C P S U . K i m goes to Ch'öngsalli and devises the Ch'öngsalli method in agriculture. Kim visits the Soviet Union and China. Fourth Congress o f the W P K ; K i m is reelected chairman. K i m visits the Soviet Union to participate in the 2 2 n d Congress of the C P S U . T h i r d Supreme People's Assembly. Kim visits Taean electric factory and prescribes the Taean work method. K i m marries his second wife, K i m Söng-ae. Kim ascends Paektusan, the mountain that signifies the border dispute between China and N o r t h Korea. Kim visits Indonesia, delivers a lecture at Ali Archam Institute for Social Sciences, receives an honorary doctorate from Indonesian University. Second Conference o f the W P K . Fourth Supreme People's Assembly.

Chronology of Kim II Sung 1968

January 16

January 23 1969

August

1970

November 2-13

1972

April 14

July 4

1973

December 25-28 December 27 June 25

1974 1975

April 18-26 May 22-June 9

1977

December 15

1980

May 7-12 October 10-14

1982

April 5 April 15

337

North Korean commandos attempt to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee. North Korea captures the USS Pueblo in the Sea of Japan. North Korea's organization of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR) in South Korea is revealed. Fifth Congress of the W P K . On his sixtieth birthday, Kim is awarded the Order of Double Hero of the DPRK by the Standing Committee of the SPA. Kim declares the Joint Statement with the South stipulating three principles for national reunification. Fifth SPA; Kim is elected president of the DPRK. A new socialist constitution is proclaimed. Kim proclaims the Five-Point Policy for national reunification. Ninth plenum of the Central Committee of the W P K (held in secret). Kim visits Mao Zedong in China. Kim visits Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia. In Algeria he receives his second honorary doctorate. Sixth SPA; Kim is reelected president of the DPRK. Kim attends Tito's funeral service and visits Romania on his way back from Yugoslavia. Sixth Congress of the WPK; Kim is reelected general secretary of the party. His son Kim Jong II is promoted to the second highest position in the party. Kim announces the ten point policy for national reunification, including the proposal to establish the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea. Seventh SPA; Kim is reelected president of the DPRK. Kim's seventieth birthday is observed by

338

APPENDIX 4

September 15-25 1983

October 9

1984

January 10 May 19-June 21

1985

November 26-28 April 9-10

September

1986

March 8-11 May 31

unveiling the Arch of Triumph, the Tower of Chuch'e, and Kim II Sung Stadium. Kim visits China and meets with Deng Xiaoping and H u Yaobang. N o r t h Korean terrorists attempt to assassinate President C h u n of South Korea in Rangoon. They fail to assassinate C h u n but kill seventeen high-ranking South Korean gove r n m e n t officials. Kim proposes a tripartite talk among N o r t h Korea, the United States, and South Korea. Kim visits the Soviet U n i o n , Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Kim makes an unofficial visit to China. Kim proposes that representatives f r o m the National Assembly of South Korea and the Supreme People's Assembly of N o r t h Korea meet to discuss the question of national reunification. For the first time since Korea's division in 1945, 151-member delegations of N o r t h and South are exchanged, reuniting separated families and introducing performing arts troupes in Seoul and Pyongyang. Fidel Castro of Cuba visits Kim in Pyongyang. Kim delivers a lecture to the teaching staff and students of Kim II Sung Higher Party School.

Notes

PART I. Y O U N G KIM A N D THE UNITED ARMY 1. T h e official account is in Nodong sinmun, supplement, April 10, 1952. T h i s work was translated into Chinese and appeared in the Chinese weekly magazine Shijie zhishi in 1952 in four installments (May 17, 24, 31, and J u n e 7). For earlier versions see, for example, H a n S6l-ya, Uri ui t'aeyang and Yun Se-p'ydng, "Kim II Sung changgun ui hangil mujang t'ujaeng." 2. Yi Na-yong, Choson minjok haebang t'ujaengsa, pp. 321-448. This version is n o longer used by the N o r t h Koreans. Yi was purged and his writings are no longer cited in any of their publications. 3. I met Kim U l - c h ' 6 n during my visit to the Academy of Sciences of N o r t h Korea in 1974. We had extensive discussions on Kim II Sung's early revolutionary activities. We agreed on some basic information but disagreed much on interpretation. See his writings in Choson kundae hydngmyong undongsa, pp. 292-444. 4. Paek Pong is, of course, a pseudonym, and the identity of this person is not revealed. H e is said to be a Korean literary writer residing in Japan w h o has done extensive research into the life of Kim. See Paek Pong, Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun. T h e original Korean version is in two volumes. O t h e r versions appeared in three volumes. See the English version, Baik Bong, Kim II Sung, Biography. 5. Widaehan suryong Kim II Sung tongji chon'gi. 1.

Background

1. T h e r e are many pamphlets about the place; see, among others, Mangyongdae and The Magnolias of Mangyongdae.

340

1. B A C K G R O U N D

2. T h e r e are m a n y p r o p a g a n d a p a m p h l e t s a b o u t K i m ' s f a t h e r and his alleged r e v o l u t i o n a r y activities. See, a m o n g o t h e r s , Kim Hyong-jik. For his m o t h e r see, a m o n g o t h e r s , Mrs. Kang Ban-sok, Mother of the Great Leader oj Korea. 3. For K i m H y o n g - g w o n , see An Indomitable Revolutionary Hyong Gwon. 4. Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, claims of g r a d u a t i o n see, a m o n g o t h e r s , Nodong sinmun, N a - y o n g , Choson minjok haebang t'ujaengsa, p p . 3 3 6 - 3 3 8 .

Fighter, Comrade

Kim

1:75-76. For earlier April 10, 1952; Yi

5. K i m is f l u e n t in C h i n e s e , a n d this fact was o f t e n e m p h a s i z e d by his fellow partisans. See, f o r e x a m p l e , Hangil mujang t'ujaeng chonjokchi rul ch'ajoso, p. 199. 6. It is i n t e r e s t i n g to c o m p a r e t h e a c c o u n t s of K i m ' s early life in Paek P o n g w i t h t h o s e by Yi N a - y o n g a n d K i m U l - c h ' o n . T h e r e was n o Korean C o m m u n i s t P a r t y in M a n c h u r i a in 1930; see m y earlier study. The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, pp. 261-268. 7. I was very h a p p y t o see this d o c u m e n t displayed because I had f o u n d it a n d used it in m y earlier study. T h e N o r t h K o r e a n s told m e t h e y had located t h e d o c u m e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y , b u t t h e y a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e y had also seen it in m y study. T h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t is available in t h e J a p a n e s e Foreign M i n i s t r y Archives " Z a i K i r i n s o r y o j i k a n oyobi T o n k a b u n k a n , " reel SP86, f r a m e s 9 6 4 0 - 9 6 4 3 . T h i s is a p a r t 12 of t h e H i s t o r y of t h e M i n i s t r y of Foreign Affairs Police, M a n c h u r i a , April 1 8 7 6 - D e c e m b e r 1 9 3 7 . See t h e discussion of this i n c i d e n t in m y earlier study, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, pp. 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 . 8. Yi K u m - c h ' o n , alias Yi K i - h o , was f r o m K y o n g s a n g p u k t o and a m e m b e r of t h e Tuesday Association. B o t h m e n w e r e e x p e l l e d f r o m M a n c h u r i a on O c t o b e r 10, 1931, for t h r e e years by t h e J a p a n e s e g e n d a r m e s stationed in J i l i n . See t h e details in t h e H i s t o r y of t h e M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n Affairs Police, M a n c h u r i a , April 1 8 7 6 - D e c e m b e r 1 9 3 7 , " Z a i K i r i n s o r y o j i k a n oyobi T o n k a b u n k a n , " reel S P 8 6 , frames 9994 and 10264. 9. For W e i Z h e n g m i n , see J i Y u n l o n g , Yang Jingyu huo kanglien diyilujun\ " S h i n k y o k o t o kensatsu c h o n a i shiso j o s e i , " Shiso geppo, ( N o v e m b e r 1940), pp. 1 5 0 - 1 5 2 ; Wei Manzhuoguoshi, pp. 5 3 0 - 5 3 3 . 10. I spent a b o u t t h r e e days in May 1 9 7 4 in this r e v o l u t i o n a r y m u s e u m , a m a g n i f i c e n t b u i l d i n g w i t h m a n y e x h i b i t i o n s to g l o r i f y K i m ' s past activities. However, m a n y of t h e valuable e x h i b i t i o n s s u f f e r f r o m unnecessary omission and displays of u n a u t h e n t i c items q u i t e easy to d e t e c t . M a n y parts of a u t h e n t i c p h o t o g r a p h s f r o m t h e guerrilla days a n d a f e w J a p a n e s e d o c u m e n t s have been edited, leaving m a n y b l a n k spaces, a n d t h e h u g e p a i n t i n g s d e p i c t i n g h i m as an ever-victorious g e n e r a l , well e q u i p p e d w i t h b i n o c u l a r s and pistol and s m a r t l y dressed w i t h l e a t h e r b o o t s and all, h a r d l y m a t c h t h e h a g g a r d look in t a t t e r e d partisan clothes, l u g g i n g an o l d J a p a n e s e rifle, in t h e o r i g i n a l p h o t o g r a p h s . H i s b i o g r a p h e r s claim t h a t K i m had a w h i t e horse; see t h e c l a i m in Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 1 ; 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 . 11. T h e N o r t h K o r e a n c l a i m of C h i n e s e characters m e a n i n g " o n e star" seems t o b e s t r e t c h i n g a p o i n t t o o far, because t h e r e w e r e o t h e r revolutionaries w h o f o u g h t in M a n c h u r i a w i t h t h a t n a m e . T h e c u r r e n t l y used characters are " I I "

1. Background

341

m e a n i n g sun or day and " S u n g " m e a n i n g t o c o m p l e t e o r t o b e c o m e . T h e S o u t h Korean publication t h e y cite is C h ' o e H y o n g - u , Haeoe Choson hydngmyong undong sosa, p. 31. 12. As late as 1974, o n e S o u t h K o r e a n study still m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n P r e s i d e n t K i m II S u n g was a fake, b u t this is m o r e a politically m o t i v a t e d e f f o r t t h a n a scholarly study. See Yi M y o n g - y o n g , Kim Il-song yolchon. T h i s is an u n f o r t u n a t e study, for t h e a u t h o r seems t o have d o n e considerable research, interviewing many people w h o knew Kim, including a few former Japanese army officers w h o f o u g h t K i m in M a n c h u r i a . However, t h e a u t h o r seems t o have g a t h e r e d i n f o r m a t i o n o n l y to substantiate his politically m o t i v a t e d c o n c l u s i o n t h a t K i m is a fake, w h i c h h e fails t o prove. For m o r e responsible studies see, a m o n g o t h e r s , K i m C h u n - y o p and K i m C h ' a n g - s u n , Choson kongsan chuui undongsa, 5 : 5 1 - 8 3 ; T a m a k i M o t o i , Kin Nichisei no shiso to kodo, pp. 2 9 - 5 3 . For clarification of his names and controversy s u r r o u n d i n g his identity, see m y earlier study, The Korean Communis! Movement, 1918-1948, pp. 2 5 6 - 2 7 6 . 13. For a C h i n e s e a c c o u n t see, a m o n g o t h e r s , M a Y i , ed., Chaoxian geming shihua, pp. 4 9 - 5 0 . For a K o r e a n a c c o u n t p u b l i s h e d b e f o r e t h e liberation of Korea, see an o r g a n of t h e K o r e a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y a r m y in Z h o n g j i n g , Chondo [ F o r w a r d path] (June 2 8 , 1937), no. 18. T h i s m a g a z i n e b r i e f l y m e n t i o n s K i m ' s activities in Manchuria. 14. T h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r s , are in t h e Library of C o n g r e s s . O n e appeared in Paek P o n g ' s b i o g r a p h y b e t w e e n pp. 2 1 8 a n d 2 1 9 . For t h e C h i n e s e r e p r o d u c t i o n of these p h o t o g r a p h s see Dongbei huabao [ N o r t h e a s t pictorial] (May 1946), 1 (2): 14-15. 15. C h o s o n m i n j u c h u u i i n m i n k o n g h w a g u k sahoe k w a h a g w o n yoksa y o n ' guso, Yoksa sajon, pp. 7 2 0 - 7 2 1 . 16. Y i m C h ' u n - c h ' u , Hangil mujang t'ujaeng sigiriil hoesang hayo, p p . 2 2 - 2 4 . 17. Y i m C h ' u n - c h ' u , Hangil mujang t'ujaeng chonjokchi rul ch'ajoso, pp. 4 7 - 4 9 ; Yi N a - y o n g , Choson minjok haebang t'ujaengsa, pp. 3 4 2 - 3 4 3 . 18. For this c h a n g e , see an editorial in Nodong sinmun, also Nodong sinmun, April 2 5 , 1 9 7 8 .

F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 7 8 . See

19. Choson kundae hyongmyong undongsa, p p . 2 9 4 - 2 9 5 ; Y i m C h ' u n - c h ' u , mujang t'ujaeng sigiriil hoesang hayo, pp. 2 2 - 2 4 .

Hangil

20. Y a n g was b o r n in 1 8 9 6 and died in 1 9 3 4 . T h e r e are m a n y r e c o r d s of Y a n g ' s activities in M a n c h u r i a . H e was as old as K i m ' s father. For personal details of Yang see, a m o n g o t h e r s , Han'guk inmyong taesajon, p. 4 5 3 . 21. I have m a d e several lists of K o r e a n partisans, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e w h o r e t u r n e d to t h e N o r t h and r e c o u n t e d t h e i r activities. See a p p e n d i x e s 1, 2, a n d 3. 22. T h e r e are twelve v o l u m e s of Hangil ppalchisan ch'amgajadul ui hoesanggi. T h e s e are also r e p r o d u c e d in Inmin ui chayu wa haebang ul wihayd. T h i s series has appeared in f o u r v o l u m e s so far, a n d t h e y have b e e n p u b l i s h e d in a n o t h e r e d i t i o n f r o m J a p a n . T h e r e are m a n y E n g l i s h p a m p h l e t s of i n d i v i d u a l stories taken f r o m these b o o k s . M a n y of these stories a p p e a r e d m o r e t h a n o n c e in such m a g a z i n e s as Korea Today and n e w s p a p e r s i n c l u d i n g Nodong sinmun. T h e latest a d d i t i o n is a f i v e - v o l u m e r e m i n i s c e n c e by l e a d i n g N o r t h K o r e a n partisans, Pulgun haebal arae

342

1. B A C K G R O U N D

hangil hyongmyong 2 On yon. 23. Saikin ni okeru Chosen chian jokyo (1936), pp. 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; Yoksa sajon, pp. 6 1 5 - 6 1 6 . For his death, see J a p a n e s e Foreign Ministry Archives, reel SP86, frame 10704. 2. Kim

and the Northeast

Anti-Japanese

United

Army

1. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of accounts of Yang's guerrilla activities in Manchuria: J i Y u n l o n g , Yangjingyu huo kanglien diyilujun\ Lei D i n g , Dongbei yiyongjun yundong shihua; and his life stories in Hongqi biao biao, 5 : 1 1 9 - 1 2 3 and 124-131; 8:57-58. 2. M a n s h u k o k u chianbu k e i m u s h i , Manshukoku keisatsushi, pp. 5 3 3 - 5 4 2 . 3. Yi H o n g - g w a n g was a close c o m r a d e in arms of Yang J i n g y u . H e was b o r n in 1910 in T a n d o n g , Y o n g i n - g u n , K y o n g g i d o , Korea, and went to Manchuria in 1 9 2 6 w i t h his parents. H e f o u g h t gallantly, killing m a n y Korean collaborators, such as Ko Sok-kap. D u r i n g his f i g h t i n g days, he was also k n o w n as Yi H o n g - h a e or Yi Ui-san, and his disguise was so effective at times that the Japanese mistook h i m for a w o m a n . Yi died in May 1935 at t h e age of twenty-five. H e is one of t h e very few guerrillas w h o m N o r t h Koreans recognize as a Korean fighter in M a n c h u r i a . D u r i n g t h e C h i n e s e civil war after the end of W o r l d W a r II, the Korean v o l u n t e e r g r o u p that helped t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s in N o r t h e a s t C h i n a was k n o w n as t h e Yi H o n g - g w a n g C o m p a n y . For an account of Yi's life see, a m o n g others, D o n g b e i lieshi j i n i a n g u a n , ed., Dongbei kangri lieshichuan, 1:69-82; Xinghuo liaoyuan, 4 : 3 7 8 - 3 8 8 . 4. T h e J i a n d a o May 30 C o m m u n i s t Incident was a j o i n t uprising by Chinese and Korean C o m m u n i s t s on May 30, 1930. It was one of the rare uprisings that was successful. T h e insurrection was t o c o m m e m o r a t e t h e dissolution of Korean C o m m u n i s t organizations in M a n c h u r i a and encourage t h e Korean C o m m u n i s t s to j o i n t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s . See t h e details in m y earlier study, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948. 5. For t h e F o u r t h Army, t h e r e is an excellent account w r i t t e n in 1936 and published in Paris: Sun Jie, Dongbei kangri lianjun disijun. T h i s book was later translated into Russian; see Sun Tsze, Partizanskaya bor'ba Man'chzhurii [Partisan struggles in M a n c h u r i a ] (Moscow, 1939). 6. M a n s h u k o k u chianbu keimushi, Manshukoku keisatsushi, pp. 5 3 6 - 5 3 7 . C h i nese C o m m u n i s t accounts today claim m u c h larger n u m b e r s , b u t there is n o way to verify their claims. For t h e C h i n e s e account, see Wei Manzhouguoshi, p. 497. 7. For t h e text of t h e declaration and draft bylaws of t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e N o r t h e a s t Anti-Japanese U n i t e d Army, see Gunseibu g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu. 1 : 7 7 5 - 7 8 6 . 8. T h e r e is m u c h c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m different sources. Recent C h i nese C o m m u n i s t sources include Wei Manzhouguoshi, pp. 4 9 8 - 5 0 0 ; D o n g b e i lieshi j i n i a n g u a n , ed.; Dongbei kangri lieshichuan. Earlier C h i n e s e sources include Ji Y u n l o n g , Yangjingyu huo kanglien diyilujun, for t h e First Route A r m y and Sun Jie, Dongbei kangri lianjun disijun f o r t h e F o u r t h Army. Recent Japanese sources include Kato Toyotaka, Manshukoku keisatsu shoshi\ Cendaishi shiryo; Ranseikai, Manshu kokugun, pp. 2 8 7 - 2 9 2 . For earlier Japanese sources, see S h i h o s h o , keiji-

2. Northeast Anti-Japanese

343

Army

kyoku, dai goka, Manshü

ni okeru kyösan shugi undö, Shisö kenkyü shiryö tokushü,

dai 4 1 - g o ,

shisatsu hökokusho,

Shisö jösei

gomonbu, Manshü

kyösan

hi no kenkyü,

May 4

1938,

p. 2 0 5 ;

Gunscibu

1:162-762.

9. T h e r e were others too numerous to m e n t i o n here. In the First Route Army, there were Pak T ü k - b ö m , H a n In-hwa, An K w a n g - h u n , K i m In-guk K i m C h a e b ö m , and others. In the Second Route A r m y , there were K i m C h ' ö l - u ,

Kang

Tong-su, Kang Sin-il, and Kang Sin-t'ae. In the T h i r d Route Army, there were K i m Kang, C h ' o e M y ö n g - g u , and Y i I n - g ü n , and others, to m e n t i o n only a few. Consult the partisan lists in appendixes 1 to 3. 10. C h u C h i n , born in 1 8 7 8 , was also known as C h u C h i n - s u . H e fled to M a n churia shortly after the Japanese annexation o f Korea and participated in Korean C o m m u n i s t activities in both Russia and Manchuria. Today the N o r t h Koreans do not mention any o f his anti-Japanese activities. C h u was e x e c u t e d by the Japanese shortly after his arrest. See the record o f his arrest in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, History o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Police: J i a n d a o and H u n c h u n areas, May 1 9 1 0 - M a r c h 1 9 3 8 , pt. 8, " K a n t ö c h i h ö heihi no bödö to waga keisatsukan no katsudö oyobi kögun n o shutsudö," reel S P 1 0 5 , frame 9 3 0 3 . See the photographs in reel S P 7 6 , frame 3 6 0 8 . 11. Others mentioned include Y i Pong-su, w h o was vice-minister o f the Ministry o f defense until his death in the N o r t h in 1 9 6 7 ; C h ' o e H y ö n , w h o was the vice-chairman o f the National Defense C o m m i s s i o n ; N a m C h ' a n g - i l , w h o died fighting the Japanese in Manchuria; and A n P o n g - h a k , w h o surrendered to the Japanese on September 30, 1936. See ibid, reel S P 1 0 5 , frames 9390, 9 3 % , 9 4 0 2 , 9408, 9 4 1 2 - 1 3 , 9418, 9 4 2 0 , kokugun,

and other frames in the series. Ranseikai,

Manshü

p. 3 5 4 . Here again the N o r t h K o r e a n historians m e n t i o n nothing o f

An's guerrilla activities. 12. T h e joint operation o f the Second and Fifth Armies had four c o m m a n d s : Western, Central, Eastern, and Auxiliary. T h e entire force was under the c o m mand o f Z h o u B a o z h o n g , and K i m was in the C e n t r a l C o m m a n d under C h a i Shiying. F o r the entire roster see ibid.,

p. 2 8 9 . It is also available in Gunseibu

gomonbu, Manshü

1:176-177.

kyösan

13. Ranseikai, Manshü

hi no kenkyü, kokugun,

pp. 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 .

14. For N o z o e ' s c o m m a n d , there are a n u m b e r o f sources that give division-bydivision information. F o r the conference on O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 3 9 , attended by the c o m m a n d e r of the Kantögun, Manshükokushi,

General Iimura, Minister Hoshino, and others, see

pp. 3 2 1 - 3 2 2 ; Gendaishi

15. J i Yunlong, Yang Jingyu

shiryö,

huo kanglien

pp. 4 5 6 - 4 7 1 .

diyilujun,

pp. 6 2 - 8 9 . T h e r e are some

errors in dates and places in this book, but it is one o f the most reliable records in Chinese. T h e author related that he had interviewed many participants in the United Army, including K i m II Sung. T h e r e are m a n y records o f this final reorganization in Japanese sources. See, for e x a m p l e , Ranseikai, Manshü 4 0 1 - 4 0 2 ; Manshükokushi,

kokugun,

pp.

pp. 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 .

16. Y a n g was invited to surrender, but he f o u g h t to the end; w h e n he was killed, the police honored h i m with a samurai-style burial. Today there is a museum built in his h o n o r and even a town named after h i m in N o r t h e a s t C h i n a .

344

2

- N O R T H E A S T ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY

For t h e account of Yang's final battle, see Kato Toyotaka, Manshiikoku keisatsu shoshi, 3:31-41; Ranseikai, Manshu kokugun, pp. 4 1 5 - 4 1 7 . For the C h i n e s e source, see Dongbei lieshi j i n i a n g u a n , ed., Dongbei kangri lieshichuan, 1:41-68. 17. See t h e record of Cao Yafan's death in Gendaishi shiryo, p. 432. See the Chinese version in Dongbei lieshi jinianguan, ed., Dongbei kangri lieshichuan, 2 : 5 9 - 6 5 . 18. Shiso ihd ( D e c e m b e r 1940), no. 25, pp. 62-75; Shiso geppo ( N o v e m b e r 1940), no. 77, pp. 129-176. 19. For t h e record of Kim's retreat into t h e Soviet U n i o n in M a r c h 1941, see, a m o n g others, Manshiikokushi, p. 325; Ranseikai, Manshii kokugun, p. 4 1 1 ; Kato Toyotaka, Manshiikoku keisatusu shoshi, 3:48-49. H e r e Kato believes that K i m entered the Soviet U n i o n as early as J u l y 1940, but there is ample evidence of Kim's activities into early 1941 in Manchuria. 20. Ranseikai, Manshii kokugun, pp. 4 1 3 - 4 1 7 . 21. T h e r e are m o n t h l y statistics of "bandit appearances" f r o m N o v e m b e r 1934 to March 1940 in Ranseikai, Manshii kokugun, pp. 4 2 2 - 4 8 9 . For t h e C h i n e s e account, see Wei Manzhouguoshi, p. 497. 22. For a study of the Chinese C o m m u n i s t revolutionary struggle in M a n c h u ria, see Chong-sik Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945. For Chinese sources see, a m o n g others, Z h o u Baozhong, Zhandou zai baishan heisui, and t h e m e m o i r s of Li Yen-lu. See also Suzuki Shoji, " M a n s h u kyosan shugi u n d o kenkyu no gendankai."

3. Guerrilla

Accomplishments

1. For others in this category, including C a o Yafan, C h e n H a n z h a n g , and C h ' o e H y o n , see Ranseikai, Manshu kokugun, p. 402. 2. Ibid., pp. 350, 3 7 1 - 3 7 3 . 3. Paek Pong, Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 1:112-119. 4. For many informative statistics about t h e Koreans in M a n c h u r i a , see Gunseibu g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyii, 1:139-146, 4 8 4 - 6 0 9 . 5. There were other organizations that performed similar functions. T h e most commonly cited is a Nationalist group, Yonbydn chach'i ch'okchinhoe, headed by C h o n Song-ho. For details of Hyopchohoe, see Gunseibu gomonbu, Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu, 2:149-200; also in Ranseikai, Manshu kokugun, pp. 491-501. 6. Yi Sang-muk w r o t e an open letter decrying t h e unfair treatment of Korean partisans by t h e Chinese. A s o m e w h a t m o d e r a t i n g Chinese attitude was expressed in a statement by the Chinese. See b o t h d o c u m e n t s in my earlier study, Documents of Korean Communism, pp. 4 5 2 - 4 5 4 . 7. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was t h e result of t h e i n t e r n m e n t and t o r t u r e of a g r o u p of Korean partisans under K i m H y o n . See t h e report in Gunseibu g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu, 1:120-121. 8. T h e five Koreans f r o m Tangyuan w h o reported Xia's i n h u m a n e activities to Z h a o were Yi Man-sul, K i m Song-gyo, Pae Kyo-jik, Sin C h e - s o p , and H o C h o n g bin. T h e r e are many stories of this nature. See the details in Gunseibu g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyii, 1:755-756.

3. Guerrilla Accomplishments

345

9. Pack Pong, Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, pp. 1 6 0 - 1 6 2 . For t h e earlier version, see Choson kundae hydngmyong undongsa, pp. 2 2 9 - 3 3 0 . For a c o m plete list of those w h o participated in t h e m e e t i n g see G u n s e i b u g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu, 1:115. 10. K i n Seimei, Chosen dokuritsu undo, kyosan shugi undo hen, 5 : 4 4 1 - 4 6 8 . T h i s raid is also k n o w n as t h e H y e s a n j i n Incident. See Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 2 5 7 - 3 2 3 . 11. N o r t h Korean historians claim that t h e association was f o u n d e d o n M a y 5, 1936, a n d that t h e association had m o r e t h a n one h u n d r e d branches and m o r e t h a n 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e m b e r s . T h e ten-article p l a t f o r m of t h e association was w i d e l y circulated, but a heavily edited declaration of this association appeared f o r t h e first t i m e o n l y in J u n e 1 9 7 8 (Nodong sinmurt, J u n e 2, 1978). T h e original p l a t f o r m , declaration, and bylaws are available in Shiso ihd (March 1938), no. 14, pp. 6 0 - 6 4 . T h e original d o c u m e n t s w e r e translated and appeared in m y earlier study Documents of Korean Communism, pp. 4 5 5 - 4 6 7 . 12. For O ' s activities, see Tong-a ilbo, M a r c h 30, M a r c h 3 1 , April 1, a n d M a y 6, 1 9 2 2 . T h e y are also recorded in Kuksa p ' y o n c h ' a n w i w d n h o e , Ilche ch'imyak haui han'guk samsimyungnyonsa, 6 : 7 4 4 and 782. See also a study of O ' s activities in Yi M y o n g - y o n g , " T o n g m a n ui p ' u n g - u n - a O S o n g - y u n . " Yi has also w r i t t e n an interesting article on t h e F a t h e r l a n d Restoration Association in Songgun'gwan taehakkyo nonmunjip [Collection of essays of S o n g g y u n ' g w a n University], n o . 17. 13. Choson ilbo, O c t o b e r 7, 1936. 14. F o r o t h e r r e p o r t s on K i m ' s b a n d i t r y in M a n c h u r i a , see Choson ilbo, N o v e m ber 11, 2 0 , 22, 24, 27, D e c e m b e r 5, 2 2 , 1936. T h e r e are m a n y N o r t h Korean claims t o various r e p o r t i n g of Kims's activities in Tong-a ilbo (August 17, 1936) a n d Choson ilbo ( S e p t e m b e r 12, 1936), describing K i m ' s guerrilla forces of 5 , 0 0 0 strong, b u t n o such article can be f o u n d . See t h e South K o r e a n rebuttal of N o r t h K o r e a n claims in Kim II Sung kwa Kim Song-ju, pp. 4 5 - 6 6 . 15. K i m II S u n g claims t h a t h e killed 110 J a p a n e s e a n d took m o r e t h a n 6 0 prisoners. See Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 1 : 2 5 2 - 2 5 4 . For t h e J a p a n e s e a c c o u n t , see Ranseikai, Manshu kokugun, pp. 3 5 4 - 3 6 1 . T h e r e are several J a p a n e s e maps of t r o o p d e p l o y m e n t against K i m ' s guerrillas. A n o t h e r J a p a nese a c c o u n t is in Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 3 4 4 - 3 4 6 . 16. K i u c h i Tadao, " K a n t o shonai h i z o k u tobatsu j o k y o ni k a n s u r u k e n " [ C o n c e r n i n g suppression of bandits in J i a n d a o province], r e p o r t of J a p a n e s e consul in H u n c h u n , April 19, 1940. For o t h e r activities, nearly a day to day a c c o u n t of t h e last days of t h e U n i t e d A r m y , see Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 2 2 2 - 7 2 8 . 17. Tong-a ilbo, J u l y 11 and 16, 1937; G u n s e i b u g o m o n b u , Manshu kenkyu, 1:196; Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 4 0 9 - 4 1 3 , 4 3 5 .

kyosan hi no

18. T h e r e are t h r e e e x a m p l e s of t h r e a t e n i n g notes w r i t t e n by m e m b e r s of t h e Second A r m y in m y earlier study, Documents of Korean Communism, pp. 4 4 9 - 4 5 1 . For t h e originals and m o r e examples, see G u n s e i b u g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu, 1 : 2 1 3 - 2 1 7 , and 2 : 2 7 2 - 2 7 6 . 19. Saikin ni okeru Chosen chian jokyo (1939), p. 4 1 5 . See also K i n Seimei, Chosen dokuritsu undo, 5 : 4 4 6 - 4 5 3 . For Korean n e w s p a p e r reports, see Choson ilbo,

346

3. G U E R R I L L A A C C O M P L I S H M E N T S

O c t o b e r 7, 2 3 , 29, N o v e m b e r 7, 2 2 , and D e c e m b e r 4, 5, 1936. T h e r e are o t h e r s t o o n u m e r o u s to cite here. 20. See Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim ¡1 Sung changgun, 1:240-242. T h e r e are m a n y unbelievable stories in various a c c o u n t s of t h o s e w h o participated in t h e guerrilla activities, so i n f l a t e d t h a t it is q u i t e easy t o d i s t i n g u i s h fact f r o m fiction. See a m o n g o t h e r s t h e m a n y stories in 12 v o l u m e s of Hangil ppalchisatt ch'amgajadul ui hoesanggi. 21. K i u c h i Tadao, " K i n N i c h i s e i hidan n o naibu j o k y o ni kansuru k e n " [ C o n c e r n i n g t h e internal conditions of t h e K i m II S u n g C o m m u n i s t Bandit G r o u p ] , by t h e consul of H u n c h u n , t o p secret no. 186, J u l y 2 6 , 1 9 4 0 . 22. T h i s was revealed d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n of a s u r r e n d e r e d Korean partisan n a m e d C h ' o e K w a n g - s u k o n D e c e m b e r 14, 1 9 3 5 . For t h e acquisition of arms by C h ' o e H y o n , see G u n s e i b o g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyii, 1 : 1 8 9 - 2 2 2 . 23. T h e r e are m a n y articles on this small b o m b Pak i n v e n t e d . T h e m o d e l I saw in t h e revolutionary m u s e u m looked m o r e like a g r e n a d e . Pak has w r i t t e n a b o o k about this device, Y5n'gil p'okt'an [Yanji b o m b ) ; Yanji is t h e p r e f e c t u r e in eastern M a n c h u r i a w h e r e he was f r o m . 2 4 . T h e r e are m a n y accounts of Yi H a k - m a n ' s p u r c h a s e of arms f r o m t h e R u s sian M a r i t i m e Province. See G u n s e i b u g o m o n b u , Manshu kyosan hi no kenkyu, 1:808-809. 25. Wei Manzhouguoshi, pp. 5 5 5 - 5 5 7 . 26. For K i m ' s retreat, see Tokumu ihd (May 1943), n o . 4, pp. 5 - 6 0 . For Z h o u B a o z h o n g , see D o n a l d W . Klein and A n n B. C l a r k , Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1 : 2 2 5 - 2 2 8 ; M u Q i n g , " D o n g b e i k a n g r i l i e n j u n d o u z h e n g shilo" [Brief history of struggle of t h e N o r t h e a s t A n t i - J a p a n e s e U n i t e d Army], in Wei dongbei di heping minzhu er douzheng, 1:62-79; Manshiikokushi, p. 325. 27. See t h e reference in H a n C h a e - d o k , Han'guk kongsan chuui wa pukhan ui yoksa, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 . T h e r e is n o way t o verify this fact because that particular issue of Minju Choson is n o t available. 28. Korei, 29. 4, pp.

B. G . Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi d r u z v y , " in Osvobozhdenie pp. 1 6 4 - 1 8 3 . M a n s h u k o k u , c h i a n b u , keimushi, t o k u m u k a , Tokumu ihd (May 1943), no. 2 3 - 3 2 . " H a b a r o s u k u yaei g a k k o n o j o k y o , " Gaiji geppd.

30. Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 6 9 4 and 7 3 3 - 7 6 7 . See also excerpts f r o m B a o z h o n g ' s diary, " Z h o u B a o z h o n g ' K a n g l i e n riji' z h a i c h a o , " Shehui zhanxian ( 1 9 8 4 ) , no. 2, pp. 2 1 3 - 2 2 6 .

Zhou kexue

31. Gendaishi shiryo, 3 0 : 7 0 8 - 7 2 0 . T h e Soviet U n i o n sent Korean agents into M a n c h u r i a to h e l p K o r e a n partisans t h e r e . See J a p a n e s e F o r e i g n MinistryArchives, H i s t o r y of t h e M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Police: J i a n d a o and H u n c h u n areas, pt. 7, " M a n s h u j i h e n oyobi sono i g o , " reel S P 1 0 5 , f r a m e s 9 0 8 2 - 9 0 8 7 . See also an i n f o r m a t i v e study of K i m ' s activities by W a d a H a r u k i , " K i n N i c h i s e i to M a n s h u no konichi buso t o s o . " 3 2 . O n e d e f e c t o r w h o m e t K i m several t i m e s in P y o n g y a n g b e f o r e he f l e d the N o r t h related in his m e m o i r t h a t K i m had told h i m a brief story of his partisan activities. T h e accounts of t h e defectors, i n c l u d i n g this o n e , are in most respects

4. Soviet Occupation

of North Korea

347

unreliable. See O Yöng-jin, Hana üi chüngön, p. 176; "Soren busö Chosen jin chösha no sennai sennyü jiken," in Tokkö gaiji geppo; "Kin Nichisei no katsudö j ö k y ö , " Tokkö gaiji geppö\ B.G. Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzvy," pp. 164-183. 33. For the interrogation report on Pak Kil-song, see top secret reports by Japanese consul Hiraoka N i n in H e i h e consulate on January 12 (no. 7), January 18 (no. 13), February 17 (no. 53), March 20 (no. 76), March 26 (no. 82), and others of 1943. Reproductions of these reports are also available in Gendaishi shiryö, 30:694-731. 34. See the N o r t h Korean version of Kim Chöng-suk in Yoksa sajdn, 1:251-254. For her guerrilla activities, see several articles mentioning her in Hangil ppalchisan ch'amgajadül üi hoesanggi, 2:140; 7:108; and 10:55; see also "Kin Nichisei hidan no naibu jökyö ni kansuru ken," Report of Kimura Tadao, July 26, 1940. 35. There is a newspaper article of the capture of Kim's wife in Chosön ilbo, July 5, 1940. See also Yi Myöng-yöng, Kim II Sung yölchön, pp. 318-320. In this book, Yi Myöng-yöng is trying to prove that Kim II Sung is a fake, and the man named Kim II Sung w h o f o u g h t in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army had died in Manchuria. 36. Akahata, September 28, 1949. 37. Interview with Major General N . G. Lebedev in Moscow on July 21, 1978. PART II. CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

4. The Soviet Occupation of North Korea 1. I. M. Chistiakov, "Voevoi puti 25-i armii," pp. 11-60. 2. See the account of Generals Chistiakov and Romanenko in T h e Stalingrad campaign in A. I. Evemenko, Stalingrad, pp. 387-426; also in A. M. Samsonov, Sialingradskaya bitva, pp. 3 7 9 - 3 8 1 and 526-527. 3.There are many accounts of his denial. In answer to one direct question about w h e t h e r he had fought on the German front, Kim is reported to have said that he himself had not, but some of his men were sent; O Yöng-jin, Hana üi chüngön, pp. 176-177. 4. My interview with General Nikolai G. Lebedev in Moscow on July 21, 1978. Many South Korean accounts relate that Kim was wearing the uniform of a Soviet army major, but there are other reports that he was wearing the insignia of a captain. 5. B. G. Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzhvy," pp. 168-169. 6. I have not been able to identify the guerrilla leader known as Pak In-ch'öl. T h e r e are records of Paek Yong-ch'öl and Pak Ch'öl; both died about 1937. 7. Kim II Sung is said to have returned w i t h C h ' o e Yong-gön, Kang Kön, C h ' o e Hyön, C h ' o e Yong-jin, Yi Yong-ho, C h ' o e Kwang, Kim Kwang-hyöp, Kim Kyöng-sök, C h o C h ö n g - c h ' ö l , Kim C h ' u n - y ö k , C h ' o e C h ' u n - g u k , Yi Pong-su, and Yu Kyöng-su. All these men came back on a boat with their wives. Kim did

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not r e t u r n to Korea f i g h t i n g t h e Japanese; he simply r e t u r n e d h o m e as m a n y Korean revolutionaries had d o n e after t h e close of W o r l d W a r II. For K i m ' s r e t u r n , see Y i m Ü n , " S u r y ö n g üi c h ' a n g s e g i : K i m II S u n g ilsa." T h i s m a n u s c r i p t was later translated i n t o J a p a n e s e a n d English by South K o r e a n authorities. Y i m O n is a Soviet-Korean w h o participated in N o r t h K o r e a n politics a n d is k n o w n to N o r t h Korea as H ö C h i n . 8. For t h e r e p o r t of t h e 2 5 t h Division and its operation in N o r t h Korea, see D o c u m e n t 6, r e p o r t of A u g u s t 2 7 , 1 9 4 5 , stating that t h e operation was c o m p l e t e d t h e previous day. Otttoshetiiia Sovetskogo Soiuza s narodnoi Koreei, 1945-1980: dokymentii i materialii, pp. 9 - 1 0 . 9. T h e y are t o o n u m e r o u s t o m e n t i o n in detail, but s o m e i n f o r m a t i v e accounts are by those w h o participated in t h e initial phase of t h e Russian o c c u p a t i o n . Since these m e n are defectors, t h e i r views are biased and t h e i r criticism c a r p i n g . See a m o n g others; H a n C h a e - d ö k , Han'guk üi kongsan chuüi wa pukhan üi yöksa\ O Yöng-jin, Hana üi chüngön\ K i m C h ' a n g - s u n , Pukhan sibonyönsa. 10. O n t h e Sovietization of t h e N o r t h see m y article "A Preconceived F o r m u l a for Sovietization: N o r t h Korea," pp. 4 7 3 - 4 8 9 . See a S o u t h Korean analysis in Yang H o - m i n , Pukhan üi ideorogi wa chöngch'i, pp. 7 9 - 1 0 9 . See a n o t h e r recent study in Pukhan chdngch'iron, pp. 8 7 - 1 0 6 . 11. B. V. S c h e t i n i n , "V Koree posle o s v o b o z h d e n i a , " pp. 2 4 4 - 2 4 9 . See also I. M . Chistiakov, "Voevoi puti 25-i a r m i i , " p. 5 1 - 5 2 . 12. C h o Man-sik led t h e initial K o r e a n cooperation w i t h t h e Soviet o c c u p a t i o n authorities, b u t C h o was a m a n of p r i n c i p l e w h o later o p p o s e d t h e Soviet plan t o institute a trusteeship in Korea. H e was later i n t e r n e d and p r e s u m e d killed in t h e N o r t h s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e start of t h e K o r e a n War. See H a n K ü n - j o , Kodang, Cho Man-sik. 13. For t h e Russian text of this declaration, see Otnosheniia Sovetskogo Soiuza s narodnoi Koreei, 1945-1980: dokymentii i materialii, pp. 6 - 7 . For t h e K o r e a n version, see Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1949, pp. 5 7 - 5 8 . 14. Documents on Korean-American Relations, 1943-1976, pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . K i m c o m pared these t w o p r o c l a m a t i o n s in his speech at t h e second p a r t y congress in M a r c h 1948. See t h e text in K i m II S u n g , " P u k C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g che ich'a c h ö n d a n g taehoe esö chinsul h a n t a n g c h u n g a n g w i w ö n h o e saöp kyölsan p o g o w a k y ö l l o n " [Report to t h e Second C o n g r e s s of t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of N o r t h Korea on t h e w o r k of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e ] , Kim It Sung sönjip, 2 : 3 8 - 3 9 . 15. T h e r e w e r e 31 delegates f r o m P ' y ö n g a n n a m d o , 15 f r o m P ' y ö n g a n p u k t o , 11 f r o m H w a n g h a e d o , 11 f r o m H a m g y ö n g n a m d o , a n d 7 f r o m H a m g y ö n g p u k t o . T h e agenda included agricultural p r o d u c t i o n and f o o d supply, t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of factories f r o m military to civilian use, financial and b a n k i n g p r o b l e m s , a n d reorganization of local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . See Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1950, pp. 196-197. 16. Haebang hu simnyön ilchi, 1945-1955, p. 24. T h e ten bureaus were: Industry, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , A g r i c u l t u r e and Forestry, C o m m e r c e , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , Finance, Education, Public H e a l t h , Justice, and Security. 17. For details of t h e negotiations and t h e issue of t r u s t e e s h i p , see U . S. D e p a r t -

5. The Workers' Party of Korea

349

m e n t of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 6 : 5 9 6 - 8 8 9 . For d o c u m e n t s relating to t h e trusteeship, see a m o n g others U . S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960. 18. For S h t y k o v ' s c o m m e n t on C h o M a n - s i k , see I. M . Chistiakov, "Voevoi p u t i 25-i a r m i i , " p. 56. G e n e r a l Shtykov's n e g o t i a t i n g team consisted of M a j o r G e n e r a l Lebedev, M i n i s t e r G . I. T o u n k i n f r o m t h e Soviet Foreign O f f i c e , a n d political advisor G. M . Balasanov, w h o spoke Japanese. 19. C h ' i a n - g u k t ' ü k b y ö l c h ö n g b o g w a , Pukhan kongsan koeroe chönggwön e taehan koch'a!, pp. 3 1 - 5 3 . 2 0 . U . S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Technique of Takeover, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 . T h i s study claims t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 0 0 key positions w e r e occupied by t h e Soviet-Koreans. See also Yi H o n g - g ü n , Ssoryön kunjöng üi simal, pp. 4 - 1 0 . 21. K i m C h ' a n g - s u n , Pukan sibonyönsa, pp. 6 1 - 6 5 . 22. H y ö n C h u n - h y ö k was b o r n in Kaech'ön, P'yöngan namdo, and was highly educated, graduating f r o m Yonhüi College (Yonsei University) and Keijö Imperial University (Seoul National University). H e taught at Taegu N o r m a l School and was imprisoned for six years for his participation in the antiwar m o v e m e n t , opposing the Japanese advance into C h i n a . H e later submitted to the Japanese and was released. 2 3 . T h e r e are m a n y d i f f e r e n t accounts of H y ö n ' s d e a t h , all f r o m South Korea; see K i m C h ' a n g - s u n , Yöksa üi chüngin, pp. 2 0 - 4 0 . See a Japanese account in T s u b o e Senji, Hokusen no kaihö jünen, pp. 2 - 5 1 . For a e u l o g y of H y ö n , see Haebang ilbo, O c t o b e r 3, 1945. 24. Haebanghu simnyön ilchi, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . For t h e revised version of these dates, see Chosön nodongdang i köröon yönggwang süröun kit, pp. 7 3 - 7 4 . 25. T h i s p r o c l a m a t i o n is in Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1949, pp. 5 8 - 5 9 . 26. For t h e date of c h a n g i n g t h e n a m e , see Haebanghu simnyön ilchi. H a n C h a e d ö k , a defector w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d in some of these early m e e t i n g s , r e p o r t e d t h a t C o l o n e l Ignatiev was always present; see H a n C h a e - d ö k , Han'guk üi kongsan chuüi u>a pukhan üi yöksa, pp. 1 9 8 - 1 9 9 .

5. The

Workers'

Party

of Korea

1. K i m 11 S u n g , The Youth. Must Take Over the Revolution and Carry It Forward, pp. 1-4. K i m m a d e a speech at this c o n f e r e n c e , but it appears only in t h e second e d i t i o n of his selected w o r k s . 2. Chöngno, J u l v 31, 1 9 4 6 . Chöngno was t h e official o r g a n of t h e N o r t h Korean C o m m u n i s t Parry. 3. T h e m i n u t e s of t h e congress were m a d e k n o w n for t h e first t i m e in 1 9 7 7 in t h e Records Seized by U n i t e d States Military Forces in Korea, Record G r o u p 2 4 2 , N a t i o n a l Archives C o l l e c t i o n of F o r e i g n Records Seized, S h i p p i n g Advice 2 0 0 8 , Box 9, i t e m 101: Puk Chosön nodongdang ch'angnip taehoe hoeüirok [ M i n u t e s of t h e f o u n d i n g congress of t h e W o r k e r s ' Parry of N o r t h Korea]. H e r e a f t e r cited as Minutes of the Founding Congress. 4. Minutes oj the Founding Congress, pp. 1-3.

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5. T h e r e w e r e 8 9 f e m a l e delegates o u t of 8 0 1 delegates. T h e r e were 229 delegates in t h e i r t w e n t i e s , 4 1 7 delegates in their thirties, 129 delegates in their forties, and 2 6 delegates in t h e i r fifties and above. As t o o c c u p a t i o n , 183 delegates w e r e classified as w o r k e r s , 157 w e r e peasants, 3 8 5 w e r e o f f i c e workers, and t h e r e w e r e 7 6 o t h e r s . S o m e 2 2 8 delegates had o n l y e l e m e n t a r y school education, 3 5 9 delegates had h i g h s c h o o l e d u c a t i o n , and 2 1 4 delegates had college or above e d u cation. O n l y 2 9 1 delegates ( 3 6 p e r c e n t ) had a record of i m p r i s o n m e n t by t h e J a p a nese, a n d 4 2 7 delegates ( 5 3 p e r c e n t ) w e r e r e t u r n e e s f r o m abroad. T h e s e statistics w e r e m a d e k n o w n in o t h e r publications, b u t t h e original list is available in t h e Minutes of the Founding Congress, pp. 14-15. 6. T h i s speech is available in m a n y sources. It can be f o u n d in its entirety in t h e m i n u t e s of t h e f o u n d i n g congress and in a p u b l i s h e d p a m p h l e t of d o c u m e n t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e f o u n d i n g congress. See Puk Choson nodongdang ch'angnip taehoe, checharyo, p p . 2 - 1 8 . It also a p p e a r e d in t h e first issue of t h e p a r t y o r g a n , Kulloja, u n d e r t h e title " M o d u n k o s u n m i n j u y o n g y a n g c h u n b i rul w i h a y o . " A heavily edited version appears in all editions of K i m ' s selected w o r k s . 7. For t h e t e x t of K i m T u - b o n g ' s speech, see Puk Choson nodongdang ch'angnip taehoe, checharyo, p p . 1 9 - 3 3 . It also appeared in Kulloja ( O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1946), no. 1, p p . 19-30. 8. T h e first issue of Chongno was p u b l i s h e d on N o v e m b e r 1, 1 9 4 5 . T h e Nodong sinmun b e g a n p u b l i c a t i o n a f t e r t h e first p a r t y congress. A n e w j o u r n a l n a m e d Kulloja was d e c i d e d u p o n a f t e r t h e congress, and t h e first issue was published on O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1 9 4 6 . It was n o t p u b l i s h e d as a m o n t h l y in t h e b e g i n n i n g . T h e seco n d issue was p u b l i s h e d in D e c e m b e r 1946, and t h e c o m b i n e d t h i r d and f o u r t h issue was p u b l i s h e d in F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 7 . T h e f i f t h issue was p u b l i s h e d in M a r c h 1 9 4 7 . It was n o t u n t i l t h e sixth issue, p u b l i s h e d in J u n e 1 9 4 7 , t h a t it b e c a m e a m o n t h l y . T h e e d i t o r of t h e j o u r n a l was T ' a e Song-su, and all editors d u r i n g t h e o c c u p a t i o n of t h e N o r t h w e r e Soviet-Koreans. T ' a e was succeeded by Pak C h ' a n g - o k a n d t h e n Ki S o k - b o k . 9. T h e s e m e n w e r e K i m C h ' o l - s u , K a n g C h i n , M u n K a p - s o n g , Yi C h o n g - y u n , So C h u n g - s o k , a n d K i m K u n . T h e y w e r e all m e m b e r s of t h e old Korean C o m m u nist Party w i t h records of anti-Japanese C o m m u n i s t activity in Korea, M a n c h u r i a , a n d t h e Soviet U n i o n . T h e y v e h e m e n t l y opposed t h e m e r g e r of t h e Korean C o m m u n i s t P a r t y f r o m C h i n a a n d t h e People's Party in Korea. All r e m a i n e d in t h e S o u t h e x c e p t K a n g C h i n , w h o g r e w u p in t h e N o r t h . H e was elected to t h e First S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s Assembly b u t was p u r g e d soon thereafter. 10. T h e m e m b e r s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e First C o n g r e s s of t h e W o r k ers' P a r t y of Korea w e r e K i m T u - b o n g , K i m II S u n g , C h u Yong-ha, C h ' o e C h ' a n g - i k , H o Ka-i, Pak C h ' a n g - s i k , K i m C h ' a n g - m a n , H o C h o n g - s u k , K i m Y o n g - t ' a e , Pak C h o n g - a e , K i m C h ' a e k , M u C h o n g , Y i C h ' u n - a m , An Kil, K i m Ye-p'il, K i m II, Pak H y o - s a m , C h a n g S u n - m y o n g , K i m Yol, K i m C h a e - u k , Yun K o n g - h u m , H a n I l - m u , K i m M i n - s a n , Pak H u n - i l , Pak Il-u, T ' a e Song-su, H a n Sol-ya, C h ' o e K y o n g - d o k , K a n g C h i n - g o n , C h a n g Si-u, C h 6 n g T u - h y o n , Y i m T o - j u n , Y i m H a e , O K i - s o p , K i m U k - c h i n , Yi S u n - g u n , K i m K y o - y o n g , M y o n g H u i - j o , H a n P i n , Y i C h o n g - i k , C h i n S o n g - h w a , K i m W o l - s o n g , and C h a n g

5. The Workers' Party of Korea

351

Chong-sik. T h e y are listed in rank order according to Minutes of the Founding Congress, p. 110. A slightly different rank order p u t t i n g three men (Kim Min-san, Pak Hun-il, and Pak Il-u) at the end is in Puk Choson nodongdang ch'angnip taehoe, checharyo, p. 72. 11. T h e y were Kim Yong-bom, C h i n Pan-su, Pang U - y o n g , Kim S u n g - h u m , Yi Tong-hwa, Kim C h ' a n , C h ' o e Yong-dal, Kim C h ' a e - r y o n g , Pak C h ' u n - s 6 p , Yu Yong-gi, and Pak U n g - i k . Ibid. 12. Pak was a delegate f r o m P'yongan pukto and u n k n o w n to most Koreans. See his discussion in Minutes of the Founding Congress, pp. 42-43. 13. Pak C h o n g - a e was generally known as the wife of Kim Yong-bom, but she seems to have been a common-law wife. After Kim died, she became one of the most powerful w o m e n in the N o r t h , supporting Kim II Sung. See her discussion in Minutes of the Founding Congress, pp. 55-56. 14. Puk Choson nodongdang ch'angnip taehoe, checharyo, pp. 34-35; also in Minutes of the Founding Congress, pp. 63-64. 15. Kim II Sung, "Uridang i koroon kilgwa t a n g m y o n han myotkaji kwadp e taehayo" [The path trodden by our party and several current tasks], Kim Jl Sung sonjip, 1:80-88. T h i s speech is available only in the second edition of his selected works. 16. Minutes of the Founding Congress, p. 46. For a slightly different number for party membership, see Choson nodongdang yoksa kyojae, p. 185. 17. T h e y were Kim II Sung, Kim Ch'aek, An Kil, and Kim II. For details on various groups and their successes and failures w i t h i n the Central C o m m i t t e e in subsequent elections see my earlier study, " C o m m u n i s t Party Leadership," in DaeSook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds., Political Leadership in Korea, pp. 159-191. 18. Kim Tu-bong, also k n o w n as Kim Paek-yon, was b o r n on M a r c h 16, 1889, in Kijang, Kyongsang namdo. Kim was a philologist by training and had published important works on the Korean language. H e received a doctorate in linguistics in 1948 in the N o r t h . H e first fled Korea in 1919 shortly after t h e March First Incident to Shanghai and engaged in Korean revolutionary activities in Z h o n g q i n g until 1942. H e then went to Yanan where he organized and headed the Korean Independence League and fought the Japanese in N o r t h C h i n a on the side of the Chinese Communists. W h e n he returned to Korea, t h e league was changed into the N e w Democratic Party. H e held a n u m b e r of important positions in the N o r t h , including the first chairmanships of the party, the Standing C o m m i t t e e of t h e Supreme People's Assembly, and the Democratic National United Front of the Fatherland. He was also president of Kim II Sung University and held many other important positions until 1958, w h e n he was purged. 19. C h u Yong-ha was educated in Seoul and studied at the C o m m u n i s t University of the Toilers of the East ( K U T V ) . H e had participated in C o m m u n i s t activities in his native province of H a m g y o n g n a m d o at t h e H u n g n a m Fertilizer C o m pany in N o v e m b e r 1930. In May 1935 he was arrested in P'yongan n a m d o w i t h Kim Yong-bom and imprisoned. W h e n Korea was liberated he became t h e first chairman of the People's C o m m i t t e e of Wonsan city in H a m g y o n g n a m d o . H e was appointed first minister of transportation in Kim II Sung's first cabinet in

352

5. T H E W O R K E R S ' P A R T Y O F KOREA

S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 8 , b u t h e resigned t o b e c o m e t h e first N o r t h Korean ambassador to t h e Soviet U n i o n . C h u was p u r g e d in 1953. 20. K i m C h ' a n g - s u n , Pukhan sibonyonsa, pp. 9 9 - 1 0 2 . T h e r e are m a n y reasons w h y this version is i n c o r r e c t - such as t h e dates of t h e congress, t h e o r d e r of speakers, t h e alleged n o m i n a t i o n o f K i m by Pak, and t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of C o l o n e l Ignatiev, w h i c h t e m p o r a r i l y halted t h e p r o c e e d i n g s of t h e congress. T h i s b o o k w a s w r i t t e n w i t h o u t b e n e f i t o f a s o u r c e that is n o w available, the m i n u t e s o f t h e f o u n d i n g c o n g r e s s . A s s u c h , h o w e v e r , this s o u r c e gives m u c h i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e early politics o f K i m . 21. For t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of S o u t h Korea, see t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e study by K i m N a m - s i k , Sillok, namnodang, p p . 2 9 1 - 3 2 0 . 22. H e r e again t h e m i n u t e s of t h e Second Party C o n g r e s s were revealed for t h e first t i m e in 1 9 7 7 in t h e Records Seized by U n i t e d States M i l i t a r y Forces in Korea, R e c o r d G r o u p 2 4 2 , N a t i o n a l Archives C o l l e c t i o n of F o r e i g n Records Seized, S h i p p i n g Advice 2 0 0 8 , Box 9, item 100: Puk Choson nodongdang che ich'a chotidang taehoe hoeuirok [ M i n u t e s of t h e Second C o n g r e s s of t h e W o r k e r s ' P a r t y of N o r t h Korea], h e r e a f t e r cited as Minutes of the Second Congress. T h e r e is a c o m p a n i o n b o o k , Puk Choson nodongdang chondang taehoe che chaeryojip. T o g e t h e r w i t h t h e materials on t h e f o u n d i n g congress, these t w o books are very valuable and not available for e x a m i n a t i o n even in t h e N o r t h . 23. T h e elected delegates totaled 9 9 9 , but 9 w e r e absent. O f t h e 9 9 0 delegates o n l y 96 w e r e a u t h o r i z e d by t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e to speak in t h e congress. T h e r e is detailed statistical i n f o r m a t i o n on these delegates in Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 8 4 - 8 7 . 24. T h e r e was a 5 7 - m e m b e r e x e c u t i v e g r o u p of t h e congress, a 9 - m e m b e r secretariat, a 7 - m e m b e r credentials c o m m i t t e e , and a 1 5 - m e m b e r c o m m i t t e e to d r a f t t h e d o c u m e n t s ot t h e party. N a m e s o f m e m b e r s of all these c o m m i t t e e s are available in Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 1-8. N a m e s of m e m b e r s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e and t h e a g e n d a of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e and t h e p a r t y congresses f r o m t h e first to t h e sixth are available in English in D a e - S o o k S u h , Korean Communism, 1945-1980. 25. T h e message f r o m t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of South Korea was read by H o C h o n g - s u k , and o t h e r s delivered c o n g r a t u l a t o r y messages r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e w o r k ers, peasants, and o t h e r g r o u p s . H o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e were 5 , 2 8 7 letters and 7 , 5 1 5 t e l e g r a m s c o n g r a t u l a t i n g t h e congress. 26. T h e text ot this speech is available in m a n y places, i n c l u d i n g all editions of his selected w o r k s , b u t later versions are heavily edited. See t h e u n e d i t e d original in K i m II S u n g , Tang ui konggohwa rul wihayo, pp. 105-212. T h e e x t e n t of revision and r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this speech may be seen in the latest c o m m e n t on t h e t h i r t i e t h anniversary of this speech in Nodong sinmuti, M a r c h 29, 1978. 27. T h e s e m e n w e r e all i m p o r t a n t native Korean C o m m u n i s t s w h o had participated in s o m e capacity in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e N o r t h . For e x a m p l e , C h ' o e Yong-dal was head of t h e J u s t i c e B u r e a u , Yi S u n - g u n was head of t h e A g r i c u l t u r e and Forestry B u r e a u , a n d C h a n g Si-u was head of the C o m m e r c e B u r e a u . 28. H a n I l - m u was o n e of t h e first Soviet-Koreans to participate actively in

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353

N o r t h Korean politics. H e was born and raised in the Soviet U n i o n and u n k n o w n to the C o m m u n i s t s at h o m e . Han served in the Soviet navy and contributed to the building of the N o r t h Korean navy, becoming its chief with the rank of admiral. H e was the N o r t h Korean ambassador to Mongolia f r o m 1958 but retired and returned to the Soviet U n i o n in 1962. 29. Details of these affairs were not revealed, but important figures in the N o r t h were implicated. Yi C h u - h a , a p r o m i n e n t native C o m m u n i s t , fled South and was one of the key members of the Korean C o m m u n i s t Party in Seoul. Yi Kang-guk was head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in the Provisional People's C o m m i t t e e . For his speech see Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 84-89. 30. Pak C h ' a n g - o k was another Soviet-Korean w h o was active in N o r t h Korean politics. Pak was born and educated in the Soviet U n i o n and remained in the N o r t h . H e became editor of the party j o u r n a l , Külloja, and climbed as high as vice-premier of the N o r t h in 1954, but he was purged by Kim II Sung in 1956. For Pak's speech, see Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 112-115. 31. Kim Yöl, another Soviet-Korean w h o was b o r n and raised in the Soviet Union, became head of the Hwanghae Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e in 1951 and also the vice-minister of heavy industry in 1952, but he too was purged in 1956. For Kim's speech, see Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 126-130. 32. C h a n g Sun-myöng was a member of t h e Central C o m m i t t e e of the First Party Congress, but he must have been appointed to the Inspection C o m m i t t e e after the party congress because he was not a m e m b e r of t h e Inspection C o m m i t tee at the time of the First Party Congress. H e apparently replaced Kim Yongb ö m w h e n Kim died. In spite of the criticism, C h a n g was elected vice-chairman of the Inspection C o m m i t t e e at the Second Party Congress. See the list of Inspection C o m m i t t e e members in Puk Chosön nodongdang che ich'a chöndang taehoe che chaeryojip, p. 132. 33. For O ' s speech see Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 134-138. 34. C h ' o e was a leader of the old Korean C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t in the late 1930s. H e was highly educated, graduated f r o m Keijö Imperial University (Seoul National University), and taught at Posöng College (Korea University). Arrested and imprisoned for his participation in the Wönsan Labor U n i o n Incident, he was released on the pledge that he would not engage in C o m m u n i s t activities. H e was the first head of the Justice Bureau of the N o r t h Korean Interim People's C o m mittee. For C h ' o e ' s speech, see Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 144-148. 35. Hö Ka-i was perhaps the highest-ranking Soviet-Korean in the N o r t h . H e became vice-chairman of the party, replacing C h u Yöng-ha, and later became first secretary of the party. H e was vice-premier of the N o r t h , but he too was purged during the Korean War. Hö did much to support Kim's position and reorganized the party in support of h i m . Hö was born in 1904 in the Russian Maritime Province and was said to have held a local party post in the Possiet region. See Hö's condemnation in Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 149-151. 36. C h ö n g Tal-hyön was educated both in Korea and the Soviet U n i o n . H e was also a graduate of K U T V w h o returned to Korea and engaged in the labor union movement. H e was arrested for his role in the famous Pyongyang Red

354

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- T H E W O R K E R S ' PARTY O F KOREA

Labor U n i o n I n c i d e n t of F e b r u a r y 1 9 3 1 a n d was i m p r i s o n e d f o r six years. H e a n d O Ki-sop w e r e p e r h a p s t h e t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t C o m m u n i s t leaders in H a m g y o n g n a m d o after t h e liberation of Korea. 37. M o s t s u b s e q u e n t publications d o n o t can-y K i m ' s c o n c l u d i n g remarks, t h o u g h heavily edited versions are carried in s o m e . See t h e original in Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 1 7 1 - 1 7 9 . 38. It was n o t k n o w n w h o cast t h e f i v e n e g a t i v e votes. T h e v o t i n g record is in Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 2 3 2 - 2 3 7 . 39. It is n o t k n o w n w h o voted against K i m T u - y o n g , b u t K i m T u - y o n g was a w e l l - k n o w n f i g u r e w h o devoted m o s t o f his r e v o l u t i o n a r y activities to Korean C o m m u n i s t s in J a p a n . K i m was a g r a d u a t e of T o k y o I m p e r i a l University and was arrested M a r c h 2 8 , 1933, for his C o m m u n i s t activities in J a p a n . H e o r g a n i z e d leftist g r o u p s and p u b l i s h e d an u n d e r g r o u n d j o u r n a l called Musanja. A f t e r t h e e n d of W o r l d W a r II, K i m was v i c e - c h a i r m a n of t h e K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t g r o u p a t t a c h e d to t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t Party. K i m is f r o m C h o l l a n a m d o , and h e t o o s u b m i t t e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e war. P e r h a p s that was t h e reason for t h e o n e negative vote. 40. For a detailed analysis o f t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e and c h a n g e s in t h e c o m m i t t e e , see m y earlier study, Korean Communism, 1945-1980, pp. 2 7 3 - 2 7 8 . 41. K i m N a m - s i k , Sillok, namnodang, p p . 4 2 3 - 4 2 6 ; see t h e N o r t h Korean account in Choson nodongdang yoksa kyojae, p p . 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 . 42. For t h e c o m p l e t e roster see m y study, Korean Communism, 321-322.

6. The Republic and the

1945-1980,

pp.

Army

1. C o m p a r e t h e texts of this speech. T h e o r i g i n a l version is in K i m II Sung, Choson minju chuui inmin konghawaguk surip ui kil, pp. 1 - 1 4 . T h e revised version is in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 1 : 2 4 - 3 7 . T h e latest revision is in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 3d ed., 1:22-29. 2. T h e 2 4 m e m b e r s of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n Provisional P e o p l e ' s C o m m i t t e e c h o sen on February 9, 1946, were: c h a i r m a n , K i m II S u n g ; v i c e - c h a i r m a n , K i m T u - b o n g ; secretary, K a n g Y a n g - u k ; C o m m e r c e B u r e a u , H a n T o n g - c h ' a n ; C o m m u n i c a t i o n Bureau, C h o Yong-yol; F i n a n c e B u r e a u , Yi Pong-su; Education Bureau, C h a n g C h o n g - s i k ; Public H e a l t h B u r e a u , Y u n K i - y o n g ; Justice Bureau, C h ' o e Yong-dal; I n t e r n a l Security B u r e a u , C h ' o e Y o n g - g o n . See Choson chungang ydn'gam, 1950, p. 197. For t h e Russian a c c o u n t of t h e People's C o m m i t t e e , see B. V. S h c h e t i n i n , " V o z n i k n o v e n i e n a r o d n y k h k o m i t e t o v v severnoi K o r e e . " 3. Details of t h e w o r k of this c o m m i t t e e are in Haebang hu simnydn ilchi, pp. 17-41. See also a g o o d analysis of t h e s e r e f o r m s in C h ' i a n - g u k t ' u k b y o l c h o n g b o g w a , Pukhan kongsan koeroe chonggwon e taehan hoch'al, pp. 3 1 - 5 3 . 4. In his speech on N o v e m b e r 25, 1 9 4 6 , to r e p o r t on t h e election results, K i m said that 4 , 4 0 1 , 8 1 3 (99.6 percent of t h e electorate) had voted and elected 3 , 4 5 9 representatives to t h e provincial, city, a n d c o u n t y assemblies. O n l y 1,159 representatives w e r e elected for t h e central P e o p l e ' s Assembly. Details on t h e represent-

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355

atives' affiliation, education, age, and other statistics are available in Haebang hu simnydn ilchi, p. 17, and in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1949, pp. 83-84. For Kim's speech on the election, see Kim II Sung, Minju chuui inmin lumghawaguk surip ul wihayo, pp. 143-170. 5. T h e r e were two representing the Nationalist Democratic Party, Hong Ki-ju and Yi Tong-yong, and there were two w h o represented C h ' d n d o g y o Young Friends Party, C h u H w a n g - s o p and Kim C h o n g - j u . See the complete roster of the committee in Puk Choson inminhoeui che ilch'a hoeui hoeuirok, pp. 1-64. 6. All the details of the People's Assembly sessions are available in the minutes of the sessions. These documents were made public for the first time in the captured documents. See the minutes of t h e People's Assembly f r o m the first to the fifth sessions in the Records Seized by United States Military Forces in Korea, Record group 242, Shipping Advice 2005, Box 5, Items 6-10: Puk Choson inminhoeui hoeuirok. Item 6 is the first session (64 pp.), item 7 is the second session (76 pp.), item 8 is the third session (172 pp.), item 9 is the fourth session (174 pp.), and item 10 is the fifth session (117 pp.). T h e y were published by the Standing C o m m i t t e e of the N o r t h Korean People's Assembly; the first two sessions were published in 1947 and the rest were published in 1948. Many important source materials were made available in 1977 w h e n the captured documents were declassified. T h e r e are detailed records, for example, Puk Choson inminhoeui t'ukpydi hoeui hoeuirok. Shipping Advice 2008, Box 9, item 93, 202 pp. There is also a bulletin of the Standing C o m m i t t e e of the People's Assembly, the first issue (49 pp.) in Shipping Advice 2008, Box 9, item 99. 7. For the details of the meeting between Kim II Sung and Kim Ku, see Kim Nam-sik, Sillok, namnodang, pp. 370-386. For the N o r t h Korean account see Paek Pong, Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 2:172-181. See also Nambuk Choson che chongdang sahoe tanch'e taep'yoja yonsok hoeui chungyo charyojip. This book is available in the Records Seized by United States Military Forces in Korea, Record group 242, Shipping Advice 2005, Box 2, item 51. 8. For the complete record of the first session of the Supreme People's Assembly, see Choson minju chuui inmin konghwaguk ch'oego inmin hoeui che ilch'a hoeuirok. This book is available in the captured documents in Shipping Advice 2005, Box 5, item 3. For Russian studies of the state structure, see B. Baianov and M. Shafir, Gosudarstvennyi stroi Koreiskoi Narodno-Demokratichskoi Respubliki, and another one by the same title by V. A. Kim in 1955. 9. T h e other three were Hong M y o n g - h u i , w h o was reappointed vice-premier but died shortly thereafter f r o m old age; Pak Mun-gyu, a Japanese-educated South Korean intellectual w h o completely abstained f r o m the political struggles of the South Koreans in the N o r t h ; and Ho Chong-suk, the only woman member of the cabinet, from the Yanan group. See the complete roster of cabinet members and members of the Supreme People's Assembly in Dae-Sook Suh, Korean Communism, 1945-1980, pp. 360-494. 10. North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, pp. 15-16, 29-30, 100-104. This study was a report by the State Department Research Mission sent to Korea during the Korean W a r in October 1950; it was declassified in 1961 and

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6. T H E R E P U B L I C A N D T H E A R M Y

p u b l i s h e d by t h e U . S. State D e p a r t m e n t as publication 7 1 1 8 . It is an i n f o r m a t i v e analytical study, but it suffers f r o m i n c o r r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d f r o m r e f u g e e s in i d e n t i f y i n g Soviet-Koreans and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n t h e Soviet-Koreans a n d K i m ' s partisans. It s h o u l d be added t h a t t h e distinction a m o n g t h o s e r e t u r n e d revolutionaries f r o m m a n y f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s was d i f f i c u l t to make at t h e time. 11. M u C h ö n g was a native of K y ö n g s ö n g , H a m g y ö n g p u k t o , and w e n t t o C h i n a in t h e early 1920s. H e g r a d u a t e d f r o m H e n a n M i l i t a r y Academy a n d w o r k e d f o r Yan X i s h a n . H e is said t o have j o i n e d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y in 1 9 2 6 in S h a n g h a i and w o r k e d in t h e R u i j i n Soviet in J i a n g x i province. H e is o n e of t h e few Koreans w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e L o n g M a r c h . H e was an artillery o f f i c e r of t h e E i g h t h R o u t e Army. H e w o r k e d in t h e Korean I n d e p e n d e n c e League in Yanan and r e t u r n e d t o Korea at t h e end of t h e war. H e was w i d e l y acclaimed by Koreans as a g e n u i n e general f r o m C h i n a , to t h e great displeasure of K i m II S u n g . M u C h ö n g was p u r g e d d u r i n g t h e Korean W a r by K i m . For o t h e r C h i n e s e c o n n e c t i o n s of M u C h ö n g , see C h o n g - s i k Lee, " K o r e a n C o m m u nists a n d Y e n a n . " 12. A n , o n e of t h e closest c o m r a d e s of K i m II S u n g f r o m M a n c h u r i a , was also k n o w n as An Sang-gil. H e was b o r n on February 24, 1907, in K y ö n g w ö n , H a m g y ö n g p u k t o , and participated in K i m ' s guerrilla forces all d u r i n g t h e 1930s. H e was k n o w n for his f l u e n c y in C h i n e s e . An died on D e c e m b e r 13, 1947, after a l o n g illness. K i m II S u n g built a statue for h i m in 1968. For m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n about An Kil, see Yöksa sajön, pp. 1 1 7 9 - 1 1 8 1 . 13. F o r K i m ' s speech, see Kim II Sung söttjip, 1st ed., pp. 4 8 1 - 4 8 9 . A slightly edited version is i n c l u d e d in t h e 2d ed., pp. 3 7 1 - 3 7 7 , b u t this speech was d r o p p e d in t h e 3d ed. 14. K a n g succeeded An Kil as c o m m a n d e r of t h e People's Army. H e was also o n e of K i m ' s close comrades. K a n g was b o r n on J u n e 2 3 , 1918, in Sangyu county, K y ö n g s a n g p u k t o , and was said to have j o i n e d K i m w h e n he was only a t e e n a g e r in 1 9 3 3 . Hi' f o u g h t w i t h K i m in M a n c h u r i a d u r i n g t h e 1930s a n d fled M a n c h u r i a w i t h K i m . K a n g was c o m m a n d e r of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n army w h e n the K o r e a n W a r started and was o n e of t h e first casualties; he died on S e p t e m b e r 8, 1 9 5 0 . T h e r e is a military a c a d e m y n a m e d a f t e r h i m , K a n g Kön Military Academy, in t h e N o r t h , and K i m also built a statue for h i m in 1 9 6 8 . For his life storv, see Yoksa sajön, pp. 2 3 - 2 5 . 15. For K i m K w a n g - h y ö p ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e N o r t h e a s t ( M a n c h u r i a ) I n t e r i m People's C o m m i t t e e , see Liu Baiyu, Huanxing dongbei, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 1 0 ; Z h o u E r f u , Dongbei hengduanmien, pp. 1 2 9 - 1 3 2 .

PART III. CHALLENGES T O KIM'S LEADERSHIP 1. A m e m o r a n d u m by t h e C e n t r a l Intelligence A g e n c y on J u n e 19, 1 9 5 0 , r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e as m a n y as 4 , 0 0 0 advisors in P y o n g y a n g ; U . S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 7 : 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 . 2. T h e record of t h e Liberal Arts D e p a r t m e n t of K i m II S u n g U n i v e r s i t y revealed t h a t m a n y professors c a m e f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n - for e x a m p l e , H ö Ik,

7. The Korean

War and Kim's

Rivab

357

f o r m e r l y of t h e L e n i n g r a d State University, O W a n - m u k , K i m Y o n g - s ö n g , Pak Yöng, and Yi M u n - i l . T h e r e is a c o m p l e t e file of vitae of all m e m b e r s of t h e C o l l e g e of Liberal Arts of K i m II S u n g University in t h e Records Seized by t h e U n i t e d States M i l i t a r y Forces in Korea, Record G r o u p 2 4 2 , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s C o l l e c t i o n of F o r e i g n R e c o r d s Seized, S h i p p i n g Advice 2 0 1 1 , Box 7, i t e m 3 5 . In his speech on M a r c h 17, 1 9 5 0 , to c o m m e m o r a t e t h e first anniversary of t h e Soviet-Korean E c o n o m i c a n d C u l t u r a l A g r e e m e n t , K i m hailed t h e Soviet U n i o n for assistance of all kinds, material as well as moral. K i m p r o u d l y said t h a t m o r e t h a n 30 Russian scholars w e r e in t h e N o r t h t e a c h i n g t h e Koreans. T h i s speech, of course, is n o l o n g e r carried in any N o r t h Korean sourcebook. See K i m II S u n g , Choguk üi t'ongil tongnip kwa minjuhwa rül wihayö, 1 : 5 1 3 - 5 3 0 . T h e chief e d i t o r of Nodong sinmun was Ki S ö k - b o k ; t h e editor of Külloja was T ' a e Söng-su.

7. The Korean War and Kim's

Rivals

1. T h e r e are m a n y b o o k s a n d articles w r i t t e n on t h e Korean War, and it is n o t m y p u r p o s e here to elaborate on sources available on t h e subject. For t h e official N o r t h Korean a c c o u n t , see t h e i r History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People. For t h e A m e r i c a n decision to enter t h e war, see G l e n n D . Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950. For the C h i n e s e entry in the K o r e a n War, see Allen S. W h i t i n g , China Crosses the Yalu. For t h e s t u d y on t h e b a c k g r o u n d leading t o the w a r , see B r u c e C u m i n g s , The Origins of the Korean War. 2. For the N e w Year address of 1 9 4 7 , see K i m II S u n g , Chosön minju chuüi inmin konghwaguk surip üi kil, pp. 1 5 8 - 1 6 5 . For t h e N e w Year address of 1 9 5 0 , see K i m II Sung, Choguk üi t'ongil tongnip kwa minjuhwa rül wihayö, 2 : 4 6 5 - 4 7 2 . 3. T h i s i m p o r t a n t s p e e c h appeared o n l y in t h e first edition of K i m ' s selected w o r k s . See K i m II S u n g , Kim II Sung sönjip, 1st ed., 2 : 4 8 5 - 4 9 6 . 4. T h e r e are m a n y r e p o r t s of C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t units c o m p o s e d of soldiers of Korean descent c o m i n g i n t o N o r t h Korea f r o m M a n c h u r i a ; t h e y w e r e a m a l g a mated into t h e Korean P e o p l e ' s A r m y units. In N o v e m b e r 1949, a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e t h o u s a n d t r o o p s c a m e i n t o N a n a m and Sinüiju. See Report of KMAG Liaison Officer, April 1. 1950. 5. Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1951-52, pp. 2 1 - 2 3 ; K i m II Sung, Chayu wa tongnip ül wihan Chosön inmin üi chöngüi üi choguk 'naebang chönjaeng, pp. 3 5 - 4 0 . 6. T h i s speech was delivered at t h e f i f t h session of t h e first S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s Assembly on February 2 8 , 1950. It was n o t selected for inclusion in t h e first edition and appeared only in t h e second edition of K i m ' s selected w o r k s . See K i m II Sung, Kim II Sung sönjip, 2d ed., 2 : 3 9 9 - 4 0 8 . 7. A detailed r e p o r t of his t r i p as well as t h e e c o n o m i c and cultural a g r e e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g some trade f i g u r e s , are available in his r e p o r t t o t h e t h i r d session of t h e first S u p r e m e People's Assembly on April 21, 1949. See K i m II Sung, Ssoryön ül pangmun han Chosön minju chuüi inmin konghwaguk taep'yodan üi saöp e taehayö, pp. 1-26. See also Paek N a m - u n , Ssoryön insang, pp. 2 - 3 4 2 . 8. T h e s e v e n - m e m b e r c h a i r m a n g r o u p of t h e D e m o c r a t i c Front i n c l u d e d K i m T u - b o n g and H ö H o n a m o n g others. T h e r e w e r e n o politically p r o m i n e n t S o u t h

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Korean leaders in this g r o u p , and m o s t w e r e o l d e r revolutionaries k n o w n t o t h e p e o p l e of t h e S o u t h . T h i s f r o n t was o r g a n i z e d exactly o n e year b e f o r e the o u t break of war. For details of this f r o n t , see Choguk t'ongil minju chuui chanson kyolsong taehoe munhdnjip, pp. 1 - 1 8 8 . 9. See t h e text in Choson chungang yon'gam,

1951-1952,

pp. 8 0 - 8 1 .

10. T h e S o u t h K o r e a n guerrilla o p e r a t i o n was c o m m a n d e d by K i m Tal-sam and N a m T o - b u . An elaborate a n d detailed a c c o u n t of t h e arrest and prosecution o f t h e guerrillas is in an e l e v e n - v o l u m e r e p o r t b y t h e Public Security B u r e a u of t h e S o u t h Korean P r o s e c u t o r ' s O f f i c e . See Chwaik sagon sillok. 11. K i m II S u n g , Namchoson hydngmytmg kwa choguk t'ongil e taehayo, p. 117. M a n y S o u t h Korean accounts i g n o r e t h e fact t h a t Pak h a d insisted on t h e war, c h a r g i n g K i m and t h e Soviet U n i o n w i t h s t a r t i n g t h e war. T h i s line of a r g u m e n t c o m e s f r o m t h e defectors w h o w e r e f o r m e r u n d e r l i n g s of Pak. T h e y claim that Pak p r e f e r r e d p o p u l a r uprising to an a l l - o u t w a r to u n i f y t h e S o u t h . See, a m o n g o t h e r s , Han'guk e issoso ui kongsan chuui, p p . 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 . 12. K i m II S u n g , Uri ui hydngmyong kwa inmin kundae ui kwadp e taehayo, pp. 148-216. T h i s speech is also available in E n g l i s h in his Selected Works, 3:316-325. 13. His radio address on S e p t e m b e r 11, 1 9 5 0 . T h e t e x t appeared only in t h e first edition of his selected w o r k s : Kim 11 Sung sonjip, 3 : 1 0 4 - 1 1 5 . 14. T h e N o r t h Koreans claim that P y o n g y a n g was r e c a p t u r e d on D e c e m b e r 6, 1 9 5 0 , by t h e C h i n e s e forces and t h e N o r t h K o r e a n a r m y e n t e r e d t h e city on D e c e m b e r 10. A mass rally t o w e l c o m e t h e soldiers was held on D e c e m b e r 11, a n d it was K i m C h ' a e k and n o t K i m II S u n g w h o delivered t h e m a j o r speech. See P'yongyangji, p p . 4 7 2 - 4 7 3 . M o s t S o u t h K o r e a n a c c o u n t s of t h e third j o i n t p l e n u m state t h a t t h e m e e t i n g was held in a small t o w n n a m e d P y o l - o - r i , b u t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n account states t h a t it was held in K a n g g y e , C h a g a n g d o . See History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People, p. 162. 15. K i m II was criticized f o r his d e f e a t i s m a n d was relieved of t h e vicem i n i s t e r ' s position in t h e M i n i s t r y of D e f e n s e . H e was alleged to have said that t h e w a r was lost because of t h e lack of airplanes. C h ' o e K w a n g and K i m H a n - j u n g w e r e busy t a k i n g care of themselves a n d n e g l e c t e d t h e i r duty, a n d t h e y were relieved of t h e i r posts as division c o m m a n d e r s . M u C h o n g was charged w i t h disob e y i n g direct orders and w i t h killing m a n y r e t r e a t i n g soldiers. K i m Yol failed to supply war materials f r o m t h e rear to t h e f r o n t . H o S o n g - t ' a e k had failed to carry o u t t h e orders of t h e p a r t y in t h e guerrilla o p e r a t i o n in t h e S o u t h . O t h e r s , such as Y i m C h ' u n - c h ' u a n d Pak K w a n g - h u i , w e r e accused of disobeying t h e orders of t h e c o m m i t t e e s . See t h e details in his s p e e c h , w h i c h appeared in t h e first edition of his selected w o r k s a n d t h e c o l l e c t i o n of d o c u m e n t s relating to t h e war. A f t e r t h e war, it was suppressed and n o t r e p r i n t e d . See t h e full text in Kim II Sung sonjip, 1st ed., 3 : 1 2 2 - 1 7 3 . 16. For K i m ' s caution, see Kim II Sung sonjip, 3 : 1 6 6 - 1 7 2 . See also D e c r e e 4 2 o f t h e M i l i t a r y C o m m i t t e e p r o h i b i t i n g i n d i s c r i m i n a t e p u r g e s in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1951-52, p. 105. H o ' s Russian first n a m e was considered t o be Alexandr; see C h o n g - s i k Lee a n d K i - w a n O h , " T h e Russian Faction in N o r t h Korea."

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17. Kim said in his speech delivered on April 7, 1956, that on the average the party had expelled about 2 , 2 5 0 members each year from 1 9 4 8 to 1 9 5 6 , approximately 15 percent o f the entire membership o f the provincial party. See Kim II Sung, P'yongan pukto tang tanch'e dul ui kwadp, pp. 2 - 6 6 . 18. Kim II Sung, Tang tanch'e dul ui chojik sadp eso ui mydtkaji kyolham dul ui taehayo, pp. 3 - 8 5 . This report was made at the fourth j o i n t plenum o f the Central Committee on November 1, 1951. 19. Kim II Sung, Sasang saop eso kyojo chuui wa hydngsih chuui rut t'otch'i hago chuch'e rul hwangnip halte taehayo, pp. 9 - 2 9 . T h i s is one o f the most famous speeches made by Kim, announcing his Chuch'e idea. T h e original version is important because it was edited many times in subsequent editions. T h e original version is also available in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 4 : 3 2 5 - 3 5 4 . 20. Kim II Sung, Nodongdang ui chojikchdk sasangjok kanghwa nun uri sungni ui kich'o, pp. 2 - 7 3 . T h i s speech was delivered on December 15, 1 9 5 2 , at the fifth joint plenum o f the Central C o m m i t t e e . T h e r e are many edited versions o f this speech in subsequent publications. T h e r e is even a 20th-anniversary article on this speech written by Chang Yong-ch'ol in Nodong sinmun, December 15, 1972. It is important to read the original. 21. T h e r e are many edited versions o f this report to the Third Party Congress, and this is the only report by K i m to the party congress that was not included in the third edition o f his selected works. It is worthwhile to scrutinize the original. See Kim II Sung's report in the second edition o f his selected works, 4:433-571. 22. See his speech carried in Nodong sinmun, anniversary and April 16, 1 9 5 2 , for the grain.

March 17, 1 9 5 1 , for the second

23. M y interview with General Nikolai G . Lebedev in Moscow on J u l y 2 1 , 1978. General Lebedev said that Major General Romanenko had died some years before. Lebedev returned to N o r t h Korea several times as deputy head o f the Soviet-Korean Friendship Association. He had passed by Colonel Ignatiev's grave near Pyongyang. See General Lebedev, " S Soznaniem ispolnennogo dolga," pp. 61-105. 24. See Kim's concluding remark at the eighth plenum o f the Central C o m m i t tee of the Third Party Congress on February 2 5 , 1959. This speech appeared only in the second edition o f the selected works and was not selected for the third edition. See Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 6 : 2 6 9 . See Kim's comment on Ho's ability to speak Korean in a speech at the enlarged plenum o f the Standing C o m m i t t e e o f the Central Committee on February 2 3 , 1960, in Kim II Sung, Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo, 1 : 3 4 2 - 3 8 3 . 25. Kim's condemnation o f Ho lasted more than a decade. In addition to those already cited, see Kim's speeches on April 4 , 1 9 5 5 , April 7, 1 9 5 6 , April 2 3 , 1 9 5 6 , March 7, 1 9 5 8 , November 2 0 , 1 9 5 8 , February 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 , February 2 3 , 1 9 6 0 , J a n uary 2 3 , 1 9 6 1 , October 18, 1 9 6 6 , and May 2 7 , 1968. T h e y appear in Kim's selected works, Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 2 : 5 3 1 ; 3:7; 4 : 2 6 7 , 3 3 5 - 3 3 6 , 3 4 4 , 3 8 5 , 4 0 7 , 4 0 9 , 536; 5 : 8 5 , 4 0 9 . 26. Pak Ch'ang-ok and Pak Y5ng-bin were both Soviet-Koreans, and H6's

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c h a i r m a n s h i p of t h e Inspection C o m m i t t e e was given t o K i m O n g - g i , a m e m b e r of t h e domestic g r o u p . T h e r e w e r e m a n y c h a n g e s in various p a r t y posts d u r i n g and shortly after t h e war. For e x a m p l e , Pak C h ö n g - a e , c h a i r m a n of t h e D e m o cratic W o m e n ' s U n i o n , was a p p o i n t e d secretary in t h e party. See t h e details of t h e c h a n g e in D a e - S o o k Suh, Korean Communism, 1945-1980, pp. 3 1 5 - 3 3 6 . 27. Pak H ö n - y ö n g was b o r n in 1 9 0 0 in Yesan, C h ' u n g c h ' ö n g n a m d o . H e graduated f r o m T a e h ü n g E l e m e n t a r y School in his h o m e t o w n , w e n t to Seoul and graduated f r o m t h e First H i g h School, t h e n l e a r n e d E n g l i s h in t h e Y M C A b e f o r e g o i n g to S h a n g h a i , w h e r e he c o n t i n u e d his study in E n g l i s h . Pak w e n t to t h e Soviet U n i o n f r o m t h e r e . H e was a g r a d u a t e of t h e C o m m u n i s t U n i v e r s i t y of Toilers ot t h e East ( K U T V ) and was arrested w h e n h e r e t u r n e d to Korea and served 18 m o n t h s in jail. U p o n his release h e w o r k e d as a r e p o r t e r f o r Tong-a ilbo in Seoul. H e was also k n o w n at various t i m e s as K i m S ö n g - s a m and W a n g Yangok and was married to a w e l l - k n o w n C o m m u n i s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y , C h u Se-juk of Hamhüng. 28. Yi S ü n g - y ö p was b o r n on F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 0 5 , in P u c h ' ö n c o u n t y , K y ö n g g i province. H e e n t e r e d t h e Korean C o m m u n i s t Party in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 5 and was a r e p o r t e r for Chosöti ilbo. H e was arrested in 1 9 3 1 , 1 9 3 7 , and 1 9 4 0 , each t i m e serving a p p r o x i m a t e l y four years. H e was arrested f o r p r i n t i n g and d i s t r i b u t i n g antiwar handbills against t h e Japanese police a n d w o r k e d u n d e r Pak H ö n - y ö n g . W h e n Korea was liberated, Yi b e c a m e a m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e Korean C o m m u n i s t Party and was e d i t o r of t h e p a r t y o r g a n , Haebang ilbo. 29. T h e y were Pak K w a n g - h ü i for t h e K y ö n g g i Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e , Yi S ö n g - g y ö n g for t h e C h ' u n g c h ' ö n g p u k t o Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e , Pak U - h ö n for t h e C h ' u n g c h ' ö n g n a m d o Provincial P a r t y C o m m i t t e e , Pang C h u n g p ' y o for t h e C h ö l l a p u k t o Provincial Partv C o m m i t t e e , Pak Yöng-bal for t h e C h ö l l a n a m d o Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e , Pak C h o n g - g ü n for t h e K y ö n g s a n g p u k t o Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e , N a m K y ö n g - u for t h e K y ö n g s a n g n a m d o Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e , and K i m O n g - b i n f o r t h e Seoul C i t y Party C o m m i t tee. See K i m N a m - s i k , Sillok, namnodang, pp. 5 2 9 - 5 3 0 . 30. T h e r e were o t h e r officers, such as Yi I n - d o n g , w h o was t h e d e p u t y director for rear operations, and Y i m H o for m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g . T h e r e is a detailed a c c o u n t of t h e operation of t h e K ü m g a n g Political I n s t i t u t e in K i m N a m - s i k , Sillok, namnodatig, pp. 5 5 5 - 5 5 6 . K i m N a m - s i k is a g r a d u a t e of t h e institute and f o r m e r m e m b e r of the g r o u p in the N o r t h . See also Pukhan koejip chönsul munhönjip, pp. 425-458. 31. C h o I i - m y ö n g (alias C h o T u - w ö n ) , b o r n o n D e c e m b e r 1, 1 9 0 3 , in Y a n g y a n g county, K a n g w ö n d o , was a m e m b e r of Pak H ö n - y ö n g ' s brain trust and was Pak's speech writer. Pae C h ' ö l was b o r n on J a n u a r y 6, 1 9 1 2 , in Seoul. H e g r a d u a t e d f r o m S o n g d o H i g h School and studied at N i p p o n U n i v e r s i t y , m a j o r i n g in sociology. H e j o i n e d t h e Japanese C o m m u n i s t Party in 1932. A f t e r t h e liberation of Korea, he h e a d e d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n section of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n , Chösören, b e f o r e he r e t u r n e d to Seoul in J a n u a r y 1946. H e b e c a m e c h a i r m a n of t h e K y ö n g s a n g p u k t o Provincial Party C o m m i t t e e in 1 9 4 8 b e f o r e h e f l e d t o t h e N o r t h .

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Pak Süng-wön (alias Pak I-ch'öl) was born on February 28, 1 9 1 3 , in Yongju county, Kyöngsang pukto. H e was a political reporter for Seoul sinmun and also served as associate editor o f Külloja, the party organ, in 1 9 4 9 . Yun Sun-dal was born on January 16, 1 9 1 4 , in Kangjin county, Chölla namdo. He worked underground with K i m Sam-yong in the Kwangju region in 1 9 4 0 . After the liberation o f Korea he was chairman o f the Kwangju City Party C o m mittee. Yun was arrested by the South Korean police in August 1 9 4 9 and was one o f those Communists released by the North Korean armed forces when they occupied Seoul on J u n e 2 8 , 1 9 5 0 . 3 2 . Y i m Hwa was born on O c t o b e r 13, 1 9 0 8 , in Kangwöndo but lived in Seoul. He graduated from Posöng School and studied in Japan. He was a member o f the Korean Proletarian Literary Association ( K A P F ) and became its chairman in 1 9 3 2 . He was arrested by the Japanese several times for his leftist writings and was one o f the leading leftist literary writers o f Korea. He was married to C h i Ha-yön. 3 3 . Maeng C h o n g - h o (alias Hö Chong-il) was born on August 10, 1911, in Kyöngsöng county, Hamgyöng pukto. Maeng served four years in prison before the liberation and was chairman o f the Central District Party Committee in Seoul in 1 9 4 6 before he fled to the N o r t h in 1 9 4 7 . He was trained as a guerrilla in the Kümgang Political Institute and became commander o f its Tenth Division. 34. Information given here is based on the official document and trial records released by the North Korean authorities. T h e most comprehensive is the book entitled Mijeguk chuüi koyong kanch'öp Pak Hön-yöng Yi Süng-yöp todang üi Chosön minju chuüi inmin konghwaguk chönggwön chönbok ümmo wa kanch'öp sagön hongp'an munhön, pp. 1 5 3 - 1 6 0 (hereafter cited as Trial Records). Many sources carried the trial records, the indictment, the prosecution and defense questioning, testimony o f the witnesses, and the sentence. All are available in the above-cited source. T h e y appear also in Minju Chosön and Nodong sinmun, August 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1952. 35. Y i W ö n - j o was born on J u n e 2, 1 9 1 9 , in Andong county, Kyöngsang pukto. He graduated from Hösei University in Japan in 1935 and was a reporter for Chosön ilbo. He became editor o f Hyöndae ilbo in 1946 before he fled the South in 1947. 36. Trial Records, pp. 1 5 0 - 1 6 0 . 37. Chosön nodemgdang yöksa kyojae, p. 2 9 7 . 38. Ibid., pp. 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 . For Kim's speech on December 15, 1 9 5 2 , see Nodongdang üi chojikchök sasangjök kanghwa nün uri süngni üi kich'o, pp. 3 5 - 7 3 . 3 9 . Kim Ik-sön, the first c h i e f justice o f the N o r t h , was arrested in April 1938 for his participation in Communist activities in Korea. W h e n released from prison he went to the Soviet Union and studied the Soviet legal system. Kim is a native o f Hamgyöng pukto. His associate judges for this trial were Pak Yong-suk and Pak Kyöng-ho. T h e secretary for the court was Kim Yong-ju, brother o f Kim II Sung. 4 0 . Y i Song-un was one o f the few educated partisans. He had participated in guerrilla activities with Kim in the Hyesanjin incident, for which he was arrested. He later fled to the Soviet Union to study and returned to Korea after the libera-

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tion. H e was a p p o i n t e d p r o c u r a t o r - g e n e r a l d u r i n g t h e K o r e a n War, succeeding C h a n g H a e - u , t h e first p r o c u r a t o r - g e n e r a l . 41. Yi K a n g - g u k , a native of Seoul, w a s b o r n o n F e b r u a r y 7, 1906. Yi was o n e of t h e leading intellectuals of Korea. H e studied u n d e r J a p a n e s e leftist professor Miyake S h i k a n o s u k e at Keijö Imperial U n i v e r s i t y (Seoul N a t i o n a l University), g r a d u a t i n g in 1930. H e w e n t to G e r m a n y a n d s t u d i e d at B e r l i n U n i v e r s i t y f o r t h r e e years, r e t u r n i n g t o Korea in 1 9 3 5 . H e p a r t i c i p a t e d in a n u m b e r of leftist activities, such as t h e Red Labor U n i o n I n c i d e n t in 1 9 3 6 , a n d was arrested several times. W h e n h e was finally released in 1 9 4 1 , h e b e c a m e a m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t Party. Y i w a s o r d e r e d arrested by t h e American o c c u p a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 6 . H e f l e d t h e S o u t h in O c t o ber 1946 and b e c a m e t h e first head of t h e F o r e i g n Affairs B u r e a u in K i m II S u n g ' s first People's C o m m i t t e e in t h e N o r t h . See his b o o k , Minju chuüi Chosön üi könsöl. 42. H a r o l d N o b l e r e c o r d e d details of his activities d u r i n g t h e war in his m e m oirs, Embassy at War, pp. 4 3 - 6 4 . See t h e c h a r g e s in Trial Records. 43. C h o Yong-bok (alias Pak S a n g - o k ) was b o r n o n M a y 2 1 , 1909, in M i r y a n g county, K y ö n g s a n g n a m d o . C h o j o i n e d t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t Party in 1 9 3 2 and was e m p l o y e d as a clerk for t h e K o r e a n F o r w a r d i n g C o m p a n y w h i l e w o r k i n g as a C o m m u n i s t . H e w o r k e d u n d e r K i m S a m - y o n g in Seoul in 1 9 4 9 and was arrested by t h e S o u t h K o r e a n police in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 9 . H e f l e d to t h e N o r t h in May 1 9 5 0 after he was released. Paek H y ö n g - b o k was b o r n on O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1 9 1 7 , in C h a n g h ü n g c o u n t y , C h ö l l a n a m d o . Paek was a police o f f i c e r f r o m 1 9 4 0 u n d e r t h e J a p a n e s e and was a detective assigned to t h e h i g h c r i m i n a l division o f C h ö n j u city b e f o r e t h e liberation and b e c a m e chief detective of t h e C e n t r a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n Division. An Yöng-dal was a c o m r a d e of Y i S ü n g - y ö p . A n h a d w o r k e d w i t h Yi in 1931 p r i n t i n g and d i s t r i b u t i n g a n t i w a r h a n d b i l l s to J a p a n e s e soldiers g o i n g t o M a n c h u ria. It was alleged t h a t w h e n Yi S ü n g - y ö p f o u n d o u t a b o u t A n ' s role in t h e arrest of K i m S a m - y o n g a n d Y i C h u - h a , Yi h a d A n sent to t h e f i g h t i n g f r o n t d u r i n g t h e war and had h i m shot. 44. T h e S o u t h K o r e a n police records s h o w t h a t t h e arrest of An Yöng-dal was t h e b e g i n n i n g of an intensive search for K i m S a m - y o n g a n d Y i C h u - h a . I n f o r m a tion An p r o v i d e d was used for t h e arrest, b u t it was t h e w o r k of t h e S o u t h K o r e a n police. See t h e details in Chwaik sagen sillok, pp. 8 6 6 - 8 9 5 ; see also Hyöndaesa wa kongsan chuüi, pp. 2 1 2 - 2 2 6 . 45. In general most S o u t h Korean a c c o u n t s d o w n p l a y all charges leveled against Yi S ü n g - y ö p and his g r o u p . O n e of t h e m o s t logical d e f e n s e s of these m e n can be f o u n d in t h e study of Pang I n - h u , Pukhan Chosön nodongdang HI hyöngsönggwa palchön, pp. 1 7 1 - 1 7 4 . 46. Söl C h ö n g - s i k was b o r n on S e p t e m b e r 18, 1 9 1 2 , in T a n c h ' ö n , H a m g y ö n g n a m d o . Söl was also o n e of t h e intellectuals w h o w o r k e d w i t h t h e C o m m u n i s t s . H e graduated f r o m Y ö n h ü i C o l l e g e (Yonsei U n i v e r s i t y ) a n d studied in t h e U n i t e d States, g r a d u a t i n g f r o m M t . U n i o n C o l l e g e in O h i o a n d C o l u m b i a University. H e w o r k e d in t h e I n f o r m a t i o n Bureau of t h e A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y occupation forces

8. After the War

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and joined the C o m m u n i s t Party in September 1946. Sol was editor o f Seoul Times, an English-language paper. He was the first North Korean interpreter at the initial cease-fire negotiations held in Kaesöng in July 1951. 47. For a dramatic story about Y i m Hwa and the fate o f the South Korean Communists made into a novel, see Matsumoto Seichö, Kita no shijin. A similar book in Japanese about this incident is Bokareta imbo. 48. Only Y i Süng-yöp was assigned an individual defense attorney, Chi Yongdae. Other defense attorneys were Y i Kyu-hong, Kim Mun-p'yöng, Chöng Yonghwa, and Kil Pyöng-ok. 49. T h e y were C h ' o e Yong-gön, Kim Ik-sön, Y i m Hae, Pang Hak-se, and C h o Söng-mo. 50. T h e witnesses were Han C h ' ö l , Ha P'il-wön, Kim Hae-gyun, Kim So-mok, Hyön Hyo-söm, Kwön O - j i k , Y i Sun-gün, Y i Kang-guk, and C h o Il-myöng. There is no doubt that these witnesses were forced to testify against Pak because all ot them were Pak's loyal supporters and comrades from the 1930s. T h e y had worked together against the Japanese and often shared prison cells, and it is most unlikely that they would have testified against Pak o f their own free will. 51. Pak was accused o f arranging positions for most o f the twelve conspirators and other South Korean Communists in the North including Chu Yong-ha and Kwön O - j i k as ambassadors to Moscow and Peking. All the names and positions are cited in Trial Records, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 2 .

8. After the War 1. In exercising Big-Power chauvinism Peng was reported to have told Kim that "during the period o f the war o f resistance [World War II], I was the deputy commander-in-chief o f the Eighth Route Army, while you were a division commander o f the United Army in Manchuria." This sort o f statement contributed to the strained Sino-Korean relations during the Korean War. Peng was also alleged to have said that the credit for the "Resist the U . S., Aid Korea" struggle was due to two persons, Gao Gang and Hong Xuejin. It was alleged that this sort o f statement enabled Soviet revisionism to creep in and Zhou Enlai denounced Peng for Exercising Big-Power chauvinism. See " W i c k e d History o f Peng Dehuai," Current Background. 2. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, p. 555. For Dean Rusk's reaction to this reply, see "Briefing o f Ambassadors," U.S. State Department, July 3, 1951. 3. T h e speech appears in the first edition o f Kim II Sung's selected works ( 4 : 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 ) , and it is also available in Kim II Sung, Chayu wa tongnip ül wihan Chosön inmin üi chöngüi üi choguk haebang chönjaeng, pp. 5 1 - 7 8 . 4. Pak Chöng-ae was one o f the most powerful women o f the North. She was born in August 1 9 0 7 in Kyönghüng, Hamgyöng pukto, and was said to have studied in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s, she was arrested and imprisoned several times for her participation in the labor disputes in the Pyongyang Rubber Company. She was a common-law wife o f the chairman o f the North Korean

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B r a n c h B u r e a u of t h e K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t Party, K i m Y o n g - b ö m . She was released f r o m jail w h e n Korea was liberated, a n d she was involved in a n u m b e r of political g r o u p s s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e liberation, b e c o m i n g c h a i r m a n of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e D e m o c r a t i c W o m e n ' s U n i o n of t h e N o r t h . For t h e next t w o decades or so, Pak m a i n t a i n e d h e r s u p p o r t for K i m and was one of t h e m o s t p o w erful f i g u r e s of t h e N o r t h . 5. T h e s e i n c l u d e d C h a n g Si-u, K i m O - s ö n g , A n K i - s ö n g , K i m K w a n g - s u , K i m U n g - b i n , Ku C h a e - s u , Yi C h ' ö n - j i n , C h o P o k - y e , and Yi C h u - s a n g . 6. T h e p a r t y b y l a w revision c o m m i t t e e consisted of Kim II S u n g , Pak C h ö n g - a e , Pak C h ' a n g - o k , K i m Ii, Pak Y ö n g - b i n , Y i K i - s ö k , K i m K w a n g - h y ö p , Yi K w ö n - m u , H a n Söl-ya, K a n g M u n - s ö k , H w a n g T ' a e - s ö n g , K i m Yöl, K o P o n g gi, K i m S ü n g - h w a , a n d Pak K ü m - c h ' ö l . 7. T h e serious f i g h t i n g of t h e K o r e a n W a r e n d e d by J u n e 1951 w h e n t h e t r u c e negotiations b e g a n , b u t d u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 3 p e r i o d of small-scale f i g h t i n g a n d d u r i n g t h e truce n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e U . S . Air Force b o m b e d N o r t h K o r e a n cities, i n c l u d i n g P y o n g y a n g , a l m o s t b e y o n d r e c o g n i t i o n . See t h e N o r t h K o r e a n a c c o u n t in Pyongyang lii öje wa onül, p p . 2 3 8 - 2 7 6 . It was e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of p r o p e r t y f r o m t h e w a r a m o u n t e d to 4 2 0 billion w o n in o l d N o r t h K o r e a n currency. See Chosön nodongdang yöksa kyojae, p. 3 1 1 . 8. T h e d e l e g a t i o n consisted of K i m II S u n g , Pak C h ö n g - a e , C h ö n g Il-yong, C h ö n g C h u n - t ' a e k , N a m Ii, a n d K i m H o e - i l . For details of Kim's visit to t h e Soviet U n i o n , see Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1954-55, p p . 9 - 1 9 ; G. F. K i m , " E k o n o m i s c h e s k o e razvitie Koreiskoi N a r o d n o - D e m o k r a t i c h e s k o e R e s p u b l i k i . " 9. For t h e details of K i m ' s t r i p t o C h i n a a n d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s see his c o m p r e h e n sive r e p o r t of his t r i p to f r a t e r n a l socialist c o u n t r i e s in K i m II Sung, Hyöngje kukka inmin dül MI kogwi han kukche chuüijök wönjo, pp. 2 - 6 0 . T h e delegation t o C h i n a consisted of K i m II S u n g , H o n g M y ö n g - h ü i , Pak C h ö n g - a e , C h ö n g C h u n - t ' a e k , N a m Ii, K i m H o e - i l , a n d t w o o t h e r s . 10. A n o t h e r d e l e g a t i o n led by Y i C h u - y ö n left P y o n g y a n g even b e f o r e t h e e n d of the K o r e a n W a r in J u n e a n d r e t u r n e d on N o v e m b e r 2 6 , 1953, after visiting C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , P o l a n d , East G e r m a n y , H u n g a r y , R o m a n i a , and Bulgaria. T h i s g r o u p received a n u m b e r of m a c h i n e s , e c o n o m i c aid, a n d c o m m i t m e n t s f r o m these c o u n t r i e s t o h e l p d e v e l o p heavy industries in t h e N o r t h . Slightly m o d i f i e d figures are in P a n g H o - s i k , Sahoe chuüi chinyöng naradül kanüi kisul kyöngjejök hyöpcho. 11. T h e t h r e e - y e a r e c o n o m i c plan was a p p r o v e d on April 23, 1954, at t h e seve n t h session of t h e S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s Assembly. T h e proposal was presented by Pak C h ' a n g - o k o n April 2 0 a n d was a d o p t e d o n April 2 3 . T h e plan was n o t adopted in 1 9 5 3 after t h e war, as c o m m o n l y alleged. See t h e details of K i m ' s p o l icy on agricultural c o o p e r a t i v i z a t i o n in K i m II S u n g , On Our Party's Policy for the Future Development of Agriculture. T h e a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperatives w e r e h i n t e d at as early as A u g u s t 1 9 5 3 by K i m , b u t w e r e n o t i m p l e m e n t e d until 1954. Sec Agricultural Cooperativization in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, p. 85. 12. It is n o t m y p u r p o s e h e r e t o give c o m p l e t e details of e c o n o m i c policies o r statistical i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e p o s t w a r N o r t h . K i m ' s

8. After the War e c o n o m i c policy deserves a separate study. See t w o e x c e l l e n t studies by sön, Kwadogi e issösö üi Chosön nodongdang üi kyöngje chöngch'aek; Chosön inmin konghwaguk sahoe kyöngje chedo. For a c o m p r e h e n s i v e coverage and industrial d e v e l o p m e n t in E n g l i s h , see R o b e r t A. Scalapino a n d Lee, Communism in Korea, 2 : 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 9 5 .

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13. Pak Il-u was o n e of t h e m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s f r o m C h i n a . H e was b o r n in 1904 in P ' y ö n g a n n a m d o a n d w e n t to M a n c h u r i a w h e n h e was a boy. H e w e n t t o m a i n land C h i n a for t r a i n i n g a n d m i l i t a r y activities against t h e J a p a n e s e t h e r e . Pak was d e p u t y c o m m a n d e r of t h e K o r e a n R e v o l u t i o n a r y A r m y in C h i n a a n d o n e of t h e leaders of t h e Korean I n d e p e n d e n c e L e a g u e in Y a n a n . Pak was i d e n t i f i e d as B o k u Ichiu (Japanese p r o n u n c i a t i o n of Pak Il-u) in C o n r a d B r a n d t , B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , and J o h n K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 2 9 3 . W h e n he r e t u r n e d to Korea Pak was K i m ' s first m i n i s t e r of i n t e r i o r and c o n trolled s o m e of the security forces in t h e N o r t h . H e was a m e m b e r of t h e M i l i t a r y C o m m i t t e e d u r i n g t h e K o r e a n W a r and o n e of t h e few K o r e a n m i l i t a r y leaders w h o w o r k e d closely w i t h t h e C h i n e s e V o l u n t e e r A r m y . Pak was m i n i s t e r of c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h e n h e was p u r g e d . T h e r e is a r e p o r t t h a t Pak was s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e cause of Pak H ö n - y ö n g and his g r o u p o f S o u t h K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t s , b u t t h e r e arc n o details of his a n t i p a r t y activities o t h e r t h a n t h o s e related here. 14. K i m C h ' a n g - d ö k was a partisan w h o w o r k e d w i t h C h ' o e Y o n g - g ö n in n o r t h e r n M a n c h u r i a . K i m r e t u r n e d t o Korea as c o m m a n d e r o f t h e 1 6 4 t h Division of t h e Korean c o n t i n g e n t in M a n c h u r i a in J u l y 1 9 4 9 a n d b e c a m e h e a d of t h e F i f t h Division of t h e K o r e a n P e o p l e ' s A r m y . K i m is said t o have r e p o r t e d Pak ll-u's a n t i p a r t y and a n t i - K i m activities. For K i m ' s loyalty t o t h e partisans, see K i m C h ' a n g - d ö k , " C h o s ö n i n m i n ' g u n ü n h a n g i l p p a l c h i s a n üi h y ö n g m y ö n g j ö k a e g u k c h ö n t ' o n g ül k y e s ü n g h a n h y ö n g m y ö n g j ö k m u j a n g y ö k . " 15. K i m ' s accusations of Pak Il-u, P a n g H o - s a n , K a n g M u n - s ö k , O Ki-söp, and o t h e r s appear in his c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s at t h e April 1 9 5 5 p l e n u m of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e . See K i m ' s speech on April 4, 1 9 5 5 , in Kim II Sung sönjip, 2d ed., 4:254-286. 16. For the o r i g i n a l s p e c c h see Kim II Sung sönjip, 2d e d . , 4:325-354. For t h e revised version of this speech, see Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 3d ed., 1:560-585. For t h e revised edition in E n g l i s h , see K i m II s u n g . On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work. K i m ' s s u p p o r t f o r t h e K o r e a n Artists Proletarian F e d e r a t i o n ( K A P F ) is t r u l y ironic because h e h a d j u s t p u t away one of its f o u n d e r s a n d t h e last c h a i r m a n , Y i m H w a , w h o was s e n t e n c e d to d e a t h in t h e trial of Yi S ü n g - y ö p a n d t h e S o u t h K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t s . 17. K i m also c o n d e m n e d Pak Y ö n g - b i n in his speech o n April 7, 1 9 5 6 . See K i m II S u n g , P'yöngan pukto tang tanch'e dül üi kwaöp, pp. 2 - 6 6 . K i m also a t t a c k e d h i m for his m e t h o d s , w h i c h r e s e m b l e d an i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t gathers i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e people. Pak was s u p p o s e d to have c h e c k e d u p on t h e n u m b e r of suits p e o p l e o w n e d . See Kim II Sung sönjip, 2d ed., 5 : 3 9 7 . Pak Y o n g - b i n was regarded as a revisionist in t h e N o r t h , a n d K i m c o n d e m n e d h i m o f t e n ; see his speeches on M a r c h 7, 1 9 5 8 , A u g u s t 2 5 , 1 9 6 0 , a n d J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 6 1 . 18. K i m ' s political t h o u g h t is discussed in ch. 17.

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19. For t h e c o m p l e t e text of K h r u s h c h e v ' s r e p o r t , see N . S. K h r u s h c h e v , Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. 20. O t h e r delegation m e m b e r s w e r e Yi H y o - s u n and H o P i n . Yi H y o - s u n is a b r o t h e r of t h e late Yi C h e - s u n , w h o helped K i m make t h e P o c h ' o n b o raid. See Yi Che-sun tongji ui saengae wa hwaltong. Yi later b e c a m e a m e m b e r of t h e Political C o m m i t t e e of t h e party. H o Pin was a Soviet-Korean w h o later b e c a m e ambassador t o P o l a n d . 2 1 . For K i m ' s speech, see K i m II S u n g , P'yongan pukto tang tanch'e dul ui kwaop, pp. 12-14. For t h e d e f i n i t i o n of collective leadership (chipch'ejdk chido), see Chongch'i sajon, pp. 1 0 8 4 - 1 0 8 5 . M a n y S o u t h K o r e a n accounts claim that t h e r e was a M a r c h p l e n u m , held M a r c h 2 8 a n d 2 9 , but n o such p l e n u m was held. T h e last p l e n u m of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e b e f o r e t h e T h i r d P a r t y C o n g r e s s was t h e D e c e m b e r p l e n u m of 1955. O n collective leadership, see a g o o d article by C h o n g In-sop, " C h i p c h ' e j d k c h i d o r u n t a n g mit k u k k a c h e d o ui c h ' o e g o w o n c h ' u k ida." 22. For t h e Korean text of B r e z h n e v ' s speech, see Nodong sinmun, April 25, 1956. T h e text is r e p r i n t e d in Choson nodongdang che samch'a taehoe munhonjip, pp. 4 7 9 - 4 8 6 . T h i s b o o k is available in m a n y languages, i n c l u d i n g English a n d J a p a nese; see Documents and Materials of the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, April 23-29. 1956. W h i l e t h e d o c u m e n t s of t h e p a r t y congress were w i d e l y circulated, t h e m i n u t e s of t h e congress w e r e not m a d e public. 23. In addition to B r e z h n e v and N i e t h e r e w e r e representatives f r o m Poland, East G e r m a n y , C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , R o m a n i a , H u n g a r y , Albania, Bulgaria, M o n g o l i a , V i e t n a m , and Indonesia. T h e y all spoke at t h e congress, o f f e r i n g c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s to t h e delegates. 24. K i m for t h e first t i m e called K i m Ku and K i m Kyu-sik teachers or elders (sonsaeng) in this speech. See Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 4 : 5 1 8 . K i m later c o m m e n t e d t h a t b o t h K i m Ku and K i m Kyu-sik w e r e opposed t o c o m m u n i s m , but they were on his side for c o m m u n i s m b e f o r e t h e y died. See Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 4 : 3 3 5 - 3 3 6 . N o t h i n g could be f u r t h e r f r o m t h e t r u t h . K i m Ku was assassinated in t h e S o u t h , and K i m Kyu-sik was k i d n a p p e d by t h e N o r t h Koreans d u r i n g t h e Korean W a r and p r e s u m e d dead in t h e N o r t h . See K i m ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n of these m e n in his earlier speeches - f o r e x a m p l e , K i m II Sung, Choson minju chuui inmin konghwaguk surip ui kil, p. 118. 25. For t h e text of K i m ' s entire speech, see K i m II Sung's r e p o r t t o t h e T h i r d Party Congress. T h i s speech is n o t available in t h e latest e d i t i o n of K i m ' s selected w o r k s . It is available only in t h e 2d ed., 4 : 4 3 3 - 5 7 1 . 26. Yi was educated in J a p a n and r e g a r d e d as o n e of t h e p r o m i n e n t intellectuals in t h e N o r t h . H e was c h a i r m a n of t h e H i s t o r y D e p a r t m e n t of K i m II S u n g U n i versity and also c h a i r m a n of t h e H i s t o r y C o m p i l a t i o n C o m m i t t e e of t h e N o r t h . H e b e c a m e C h a i r m a n of t h e Social Science Division of t h e A c a d e m y of Sciences of t h e N o r t h and was its leading m e m b e r . H i s Choson kundaesa was translated into Russian b y A. M Pak, Ocherki novoi istorii Korer, into C h i n e s e by D i n g Zeliang and Xia Y u w w e n , Chaoxian jindaishv, and into Japanese by K a w a k u b o K o b u and

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367

O C h a c - y a n g , Chosen kindaishi kenkyu. Yi was p u r g e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , however, f o r allegedly giving credit t o a m a g a z i n e , Choson ji ku/ang, an u n d e r g r o u n d o r g a n of t h e old Korean C o m m u n i s t Party in t h e 1920s a n d 1930s. 2 7 . E x a m p l e s are m a n y , b u t m o s t w i d e l y circulated is t h e b o o k by Y i N a - y o n g . Yi said in t h e preface t h a t it was w r i t t e n in response to t h e call by K i m II S u n g t o study t h e partisans at t h e t i m e of t h e T h i r d P a r t y C o n g r e s s . Y i was p u r g e d s o m e t i m e a f t e r t h e b o o k was p u b l i s h e d . See Yi N a - y o n g , Choson minjok haebang t'ujaengsa. See also Choson kundae hydngmyong undongsa, and Choson t'ongsa. 28. For Yi S o n g - u n ' s discussion of K i m II S u n g ' s speech, see Nodong sinmun, April 25, 1 9 5 6 . 29. For K i m ' s criticism of Pak M u n - g y u , see K i m ' s speech o n April 4, 1955, in t h e second e d i t i o n of K i m ' s selected w o r k s , 4 : 2 8 3 . H e was criticized for his h a n d l i n g of agricultural p r o d u c t i o n d u r i n g t h e war. Pak was p e r h a p s t h e only m e m b e r of t h e d o m e s t i c g r o u p w h o lasted u n d e r K i m II S u n g . H e was a m e m b e r of t h e inner circle of t h e d o m e s t i c g r o u p a n d a close c o m r a d e of Yi S u n g - y 6 p and his followers. Pak was a student of Miyake S h i k a n o s u k e at Keijo Imperial U n i v e r s i t y (Seoul N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y ) and was very active in t h e d o m e s t i c g r o u p . H e served in seven d i f f e r e n t cabinet posts u n d e r K i m II S u n g a n d was t h e first m i n i s t e r of a g r i c u l t u r e . Pak was elected to t h e t h i r d , f o u r t h , a n d f i f t h C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e s of t h e party. H e died o n O c t o b e r 15, 1 9 7 1 , at t h e age of 6 5 after a l o n g illness. 30. T h e eleven partisans w h o w e r e m e m b e r s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e included in rank o r d e r K i m II S u n g , C h ' o e Y o n g - g o n , K i m II, Pak K u m - c h ' o l , K i m K w a n g - h y o p , C h ' o e H y o n , Yu K y 6 n g - s u , K i m K y o n g - s o k , Y i Y o n g - h o , K i m C h ' a n g - d o k , a n d Yi S o n g - u n . T h e six partisans w h o w e r e c a n d i d a t e m e m bers of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e i n c l u d e d Sok San, O C h i n - u , C h ' o e K w a n g , C h ' o e Yong-jin, K i m C h ' a n g - b o n g , and So C h ' o l . In addition t o t h e f o u r p a r t i sans, K i m T u - b o n g a n d Pak C h o n g - a e c o n s t i t u t e d t h e t o p six m e m b e r s of t h e Central C o m m i t t e e . 31. For Pak's speech, see Nodong sinmun, April 20, 1956. For t h e text and explanation of t h e bylaws a d o p t e d at this congress, see Choson nodongdang kyuyak haesol. 32. For t h e m e m b e r s h i p figures, see K i m ' s speech at t h e T h i r d Party Congress; K i m 11 S u n g , Choson nodongdang che samch'a taehoe eso han chungang wiwonhoe sadp ch'onggyol pogo. 33. In addition to K i m II S u n g , t h e m e m b e r s of t h e delegation consisted of Pak C h o n g - a e , v i c e - c h a i r m a n of t h e party; N a m II, f o r e i g n minister; Yi C h o n g - o k , c h a i r m a n of t h e State P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n ; Ko C h u n - t ' a e k , v i c e - c h a i r m a n of the Korean D e m o c r a t i c Party; K i m P y o n g - j e , v i c e - c h a i r m a n of t h e C h ' o n d o g y o Young Friends Party; C h ' o e H y o n , vice-minister of t h e M i n i s t r y of D e f e n s e ; C h o K u m - s o n g , president of K i m C h ' a e k E n g i n e e r i n g C o l l e g e ; a n d t w o labor heroes, H a n K i - c h ' a n g and C h o n S o n g - b o k . See t h e details of t h e trip in Kukche chuui ui ch'inson. 34. It is n o t m y p u r p o s e h e r e t o g o i n t o t h e details of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . For a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e p o r t on t h e first five-year e c o n o m i c plan of 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 1 ,

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sec t h e r e p o r t by Yi C h o n g - o k at t h e first p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e , M a r c h 3 - 6 , 1958, in Nodong sinmuti, M a r c h 4, 1 9 5 8 . For t h e statistical f i g u r e s , see Nodong sinmun, M a r c h 8, 1 9 5 8 . 3 5 . C h ' o e C h ' a n g - i k was b o r n in 1 8 9 6 in O n s o n g c o u n t y , H a m g y o n g p u k t o . H e was e d u c a t e d in K o r e a a n d J a p a n a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d in o n e of t h e first K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t activities in S h a n g h a i in 1 9 2 1 . H e was arrested f o r his p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e t h i r d K o r e a n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y I n c i d e n t in Seoul in F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 8 a n d was i m p r i s o n e d f o r six years. H e was released f r o m j a i l in 1 9 3 4 , f l e d t o C h i n a t h e f o l l o w i n g year, a n d w o r k e d in various u n d e r g r o u n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s in N a n j i n g , W u h a n , a n d Y a n a n . H e was v i c e - c h a i r m a n of t h e K o r e a n I n d e p e n d e n c e L e a g u e in 1 9 4 2 a n d w a s t h e l e a d i n g m e m b e r of t h e Yanan g r o u p . H e w a s o n e of t h e v i c e - p r e m i e r s of t h e N o r t h as w e l l as t h e first m i n i s t e r of f i n a n c e in K i m ' s f i r s t c a b i n e t . At t h e t i m e of his s i x t i e t h b i r t h d a y in 1 9 5 6 he was d e c o r a t e d by K i m . 3 6 . T h e r e are m a n y h i g h l y unreliable accounts of this incident in t h e S o u t h . See Pukkoe ui p'abol t'ujaengsa\ Pukhan chonggwon ui amt'usang, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 4 8 . 37. Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 2 : 3 9 9 - 4 0 3 . 3 8 . K i m m a d e m a n y facts public in his c o n c l u d i n g speech at t h e first p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e on M a r c h 6, 1 9 5 8 . See t h e e n t i r e text of his speech u n d e r t h e title " F o r t h e Successful F u l f i l m e n t of t h e First Five-Year P l a n , " in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 5 : 3 5 9 - 3 9 3 . A s l i g h t l y edited version is in 3d ed., 2 : 1 0 1 - 1 3 1 . A b o u t t h e A u g u s t p l e n u m , see an article by Yi S o n g - u n in Kuttoja (August 1959), no. 8, pp. 19-25. 39. Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim ¡1 Sung changgun, 2 : 4 0 1 - 4 0 3 . 4 0 . K i m m a d e these facts public in his speech t o t h e officers and m e n of t h e 3 2 4 t h A r m y U n i t of t h e K o r e a n People's A r m y on F e b r u a r y 8, 1958. See t h e t e x t of t h e speech in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 5 : 3 0 8 - 3 4 9 . It is also available in t h e 3d ed., 2 : 6 4 - 1 0 0 . 4 1 . I n t e r v i e w records w i t h defectors, So C h o n g - j a and K i m N a m - s i k , w e r e cited in P a n g I n - h u , Pukhan Choson nodongdang ui hydngsonggwa palchon, p. 2 3 1 . See also Hydndaesa wa kongsan chuui, pp. 3 6 9 - 3 7 8 . 4 2 . See c h . 5, n. 18 f o r K i m T u - b o n g . 4 3 . For criticism of these p e o p l e by K i m II S u n g , see his c o n c l u d i n g s p e e c h at t h e first p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e on M a r c h 6, 1 9 5 8 , in Kim ¡1 Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 6 : 1 4 8 . For t h e criticism of O K i - s o p , see K i m ' s speech on M a r c h 23, 1959, in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 6 : 3 2 1 a n d 3 2 7 . K i m even ridiculed O for u s i n g t o o m a n y f o r e i g n w o r d s a n d t o o m u c h Russian in his speeches. H i s c o n d e m n a t i o n of O c o n t i n u e d i n t o t h e 1960s a n d 1970s. See K i m ' s speeches on J a n u a r y 3, 1 9 6 4 , Febr u a r y 23, 1 9 6 5 , a n d D e c e m b e r 5, 1972. 4 4 . T h e N o r t h K o r e a n electoral districts are still divided into n i n e p r o v i n c e s and t w o cities: P ' y o n g a n n a m d o , P ' y o n g a n p u k t o , H a m g y o n g n a m d o , H a m g y o n g pukto, Hwanghae namdo, Hwanghae pukto, Yanggangdo, Chagangdo, K a n g w o n d o , a n d t h e cities of P y o n g y a n g and Kaesong. 4 5 . For a n u m b e r of K i m ' s articles in c o m m e m o r a t i o n of t h e f o r t i e t h a n n i v e r sary of t h e O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n , see Pravda, O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1957, and N o v e m b e r 7,

9. Mobilization 1957, and Nodong 8, 1957. See also A p o r t i o n of t h e N o v e m b e r 1957,

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sinmun, O c t o b e r 29, N o v e m b e r 5, N o v e m b e r 7, and N o v e m b e r a p a m p h l e t entitled Widaehan siwöl üi sasang ün sürtgni hago ilia. article in this p a m p h l e t appeared in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, pp. 31-49.

46. M u c h of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n described h e r e c o m e s f r o m his speeches at this first party conference of M a r c h 1958. T h e p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e was a n e w invention at t h e t i m e of t h e T h i r d Party Congress t o a c c o m o d a t e c h a n g e s in t h e p a r t y b e t w e e n congresses. But article 41 of t h e bylaws stated that t h e p a r t y conference may not replace m o r e than o n e - f i f t h of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e . N o c h a n g e s w e r e a n n o u n c e d at this party conference. 4 7 . For K i m ' s speech on t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e judicial policy of t h e party, see Kim II Sung sönjip, 2d ed., 5:438-458. T h i s text is also available in t h e 3d ed., 2 : 1 3 2 - 1 5 0 . For studies on N o r t h Korean law, see P y o n g C h o o n H a h m , "Ideology and C r i m i n a l Law in N o r t h Korea," and also doctoral dissertation by K o o - c h i n Kang, "Law in N o r t h Korea," Harvard Law School, 1969. 48. Nikolai M . Gribachev, " K i m Ir Sen" [Kim II Sung], in Stikhotvoreniia i Poemy, pp. 1 7 7 - 1 9 1 . T h i s is a narrative poem G r i b a c h e v w r o t e about K i m d u r i n g the Korean W a r in O c t o b e r 1951. It relates m a n y facts such as t h e death of K i m ' s w i f e and K i m ' s perception of South Korean politics.

PART IV. SEARCH FOR KOREAN I D E N T I T Y 9. Mobilization

Campaigns

1. T h e N o r t h Koreans have compiled sixteen volumes of tales and conversations K i m had w i t h t h e people w h e n he visited various localities. See Inmindül sogesö. Some of these stories were translated into English and began to appear in a n u m ber of p a m p h l e t s in the 1970s. 2. See Kibon könsöl saöp palchön ül wihan uri lang üi chöngch'aek, K i m Ii Sung, Nodong haengjöng saöp e taehan myökkaji munje, pp. 3 - 2 1 . For a good study of t h e N o r t h Korean e c o n o m i c system by t h e E c o n o m i c and Law Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of N o r t h Korea, translated into J a p a n e s e by K i m U n g - j i and Ko S ü n g - h y o see Chosen ni okeru shakai shugi no kiso kensetsu. 3 . " C h ' ö l l i m a " literally means "horse of a t h o u s a n d ri." It was taken f r o m a legendary horse that was capable of r u n n i n g one t h o u s a n d ri per day. T h e r e is much literature on this m o v e m e n t . See Ch'öllima undonggwa sahoe chuüi könsöl taegojo e taehayö; Ch'öllima chagöppan undong\ K i m Ii S u n g , Ch'öllima kisudül ün uri sidae üi yötigung imyö lang üi pulgün chönsa ida. 4. K i m II S u n g , Könsöl punya esö lang chöngch'aek ül kwanch'öl halte taehayö, pp. 2-19. For K i m ' s conversation w i t h workers in t h e Kangsön steel mill, see Paek Pong, Minjok üi t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 2 : 4 0 7 - 4 1 2 . 5. K i m II S u n g , Sahoe chuüi könsöl üi widaehan ch'udongyöl in Ch'öllima chagöppan undong ül töuk simhwa palchön sik'ija, pp. 3 - 3 8 . T h i s was t h e speech K i m m a d e on the second congress of the C h ' ö l l i m a w o r k t e a m m o v e m e n t on May 11, 1968. 6. Paek Pong, Minjok üi t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 2 : 4 1 2 - 4 1 5 .

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7. Kim II Sung, Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 5:518-537. Sec also Kim II Sung, Konsol ui ckiriil nop'igi wihayo, pp. 2-15. 8. Kim II Sung, Kongsan chuui kyoyang e taehayo, pp. 1-32. 9. Kim said that the collectivization of all farmland was completed by the end of August 1958. See his speech in English, " O n the Victory of Socialist Agricultural Cooperativization and F u r t h e r Development of Agriculture in O u r C o u n try," in Documents on the National Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives, pp. 1-56. This speech was widely circulated and translated into many languages, including English and Japanese. 10. T h e concept of chipchung chido, an intensive guidance system, should not be confused w i t h chipch'ejdk chido, collective leadership. Many defectors f r o m the N o r t h claimed that the intensive guidance system was a method to weed out antiparty elements. T h e r e were other purposes, however, such as to devise new methods to boost production and improve the control mechanism of the central party organs. For these two terms and their differences, see Chongch'i sajon, pp. 1083-1085. 11. Kim criticized the mistakes of prominent local leaders such as H a n Sang-du, Kim T ' a e - g u n , and So U l - h y 6 n . H a n Sang-du, for example, was formerly chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions. H e was a member of the domestic group but survived Kim's criticism and later became minister of finance in K i m ' s fourth cabinet. K i m also condemned the crimes of C h a n g S u n - m y o n g , w h o was f r o m this region and was purged. See Kim's speech at the enlarged plen u m of the H a m g y o n g p u k t o provincial committee in Kim II Sung, Hamgyong pukto tang tanch'e dul ui kwaop. 12. I visited the Ch'ongsalli cooperative in May 1974. T h e place w h e r e Kim had stayed while leading his fifteen-day on-the-spot guidance was enshrined with m o n u m e n t s and mementos, and the tree he planted in commemoration of his visit had grown tall. W i t h its nurseries, schools, and cultural and recreation halls, it was a showpiece of N o r t h Korea's agricultural cooperatives. T h e chairman of the cooperative informed me that their farm's grain production had more than doubled since Kim's visit. 13. Kim made three important speeches concerning his visit to Ch'ongsalli, the first at the Ch'ongsalli Party C o m m i t t e e meeting on February 8, 1960, the second at the Kangso C o u n t y Party C o m m i t t e e on February 18, 1960, and the third at the enlarged plenum of the Standing C o m m i t t e e of the party in Pyongyang on February 23, 1960. All are available in Kim II Sung, Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo, 1:277-383. 14. T h e r e are two important speeches by Kim on the Taean work system. O n e is the speech he made at the Taean Electric Plant on December 16, 1961, entitled " O n the Reform of Leadership and Management in Industry to Fit the N e w Circumstances;" the other, given on November 9, 1962, is entitled " O n Further developing the Taean W o r k System." Both speeches are available in Kim II Sung, Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo, 2:86-143 and 423-441. For a description of the Taean work system, see Yoksa sajon, pp. 586-593. 15. Paek Pong, Minjok ui t'aeyang, Kim II Sung changgun, 2:580.

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Campaigns

371

16. T h e total party membership as of August 1, 1961, was 1,311,563 counting both regular and probationary members. This was an increase of 146,618 m e m bers during the five years since the T h i r d Party Congress, w h e n membership was reported to be 1,164,945. Kim reported that workers represented 30 percent of the members, an increase of 12.3 percent f r o m the T h i r d Party Congress w h e n it was 17.3 percent. Indiscriminate recruitment of party members seems to have stopped sometime during t h e latter half of the 1950s, and Kim wanted to improve the ratio of workers (industrial proletariat) in the party. T h i s was also the last congress at which the party disclosed its membership figures. 17. Four delegates spoke on the second day: Kozlov, D e n g , Alfred Krehler of East Germany, and M i y a m o t o Kenji of Japan. T h e r e were 28 other delegates, and they spoke on the third, f o u r t h , and f i f t h days of the congress. 18. T h i s speech is available in many places in many languages. See the Korean original in Kim II Sung, Choson nodongdang che sach'a taehoe eso han chungang wiwdnhoe sadp ch'onghwa pogo. An English version is available in Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, pp. 1-157. It is also in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip. 3:60-203. 19. For Kim Il's speech see the text in English in Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, pp. 159-260. Statistical figures were represented separately, and they are also available in Atarashii sedai [New era], (November 1961), no. 20, pp. 177-198. 20. Texts of both Kozlov and Deng's speeches are available in Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, pp. 254-271. For Korean text see Nodong sinmun, September 13, 1961. 21. Some changes were made, but the basic texts remained the same. T h e n u m ber of chapters was reduced f r o m ten to nine and the n u m b e r of articles was increased f r o m sixty-two to seventy. T h e N o r t h Koreans did not publish the revised text of the party bylaws, but they are available f r o m a South Korean source, Pukhan ch'onggam, pp. 671-678. 22. Those partisans w h o were reelected f r o m the third to the f o u r t h party C e n tral C o m m i t t e e were: Kim II Sung, Cl^oe Yong-gon, Kim II, Pak K u m - c h ' o l , Kim Kwang-hyop, C h ' o e Hyon, Kim Kyong-sok, Yi Yong-ho, Kim C h ' a n g - d o k , and Yi Song-un. General Yu Kyong-su, w h o was a m e m b e r of the Central C o m mittee of the Third Party Congress, died on N o v e m b e r 19, 1958. 23. Those 25 partisans w h o were newly elected to the Central C o m m i t t e e of the Fourth Party Congress were: So C h ' o l , Sok San, Kim C h ' a n g - b o n g , Ho Ponghak, C h ' o e Yong-jin, Pak Song-ch'ol, O C h i n - u , C h o n Mun-sop, C h o n C h ' a n g ch'dl, C h ' o e Kwang, An Yong, Han Ik-su, Kim Tae-hong, Kim Tong-gyu, Pak Yong-sun, C h ' o e Ki-ch'ol, O Paek-yong, K i m Pyong-sik, Ho Sok-son, Kim Ok-sun, Yim C h ' o l , C h ' o e Min-ch'ol, Kim C h w a - h y o k , C h i Pyong-hak, and Ho Hak-song. For complete listings of changes between party congresses, see DaeSook Suh, Korean Communism, 1945-1980, pp. 309-359. 24. T h e 8 partisans were Paek Hak-nim, Yu C h ' a n g - g w o n , T ' a e Pyong-yol, Pak U-sop, C h o n g Pyong-gap, Yi Kuk-chin, H w a n g Sun-hui, and Pak Kyongsuk. Several factors seem to have been considered in choosing some partisans as

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regular m e m b e r s and some as candidate members. T h o s e w h o became candidate m e m b e r s were in general y o u n g e r and lower-ranking military officers. 25. N a m II was b o r n on J u n e 5, 1913, in Russia and was t h e son of a p o o r peasant f r o m K y o n g w o n county, H a m g y o n g p u k t o . H e is reported to have graduated f r o m Smolensk Military School and also f r o m a college in Tashkent. H e apparently r e t u r n e d to Korea w i t h t h e occupation forces as an officer of t h e Russian army. N a m died on M a r c h 7, 1 9 7 6 , at t h e age of 64. See his record in Nodong sinmun, M a r c h 8, 1976. 26. K i m C h ' a n g - m a n was b o r n in 1907 in Y o n g h u n g , H a m g y o n g n a m d o . H e f l e d Korea in 1934 to j o i n t h e anti-Japanese revolutionary activities in C h i n a . H e is r e p o r t e d to have graduated f r o m a college in G u a n g z h o u and became an officer of t h e Korean I n d e p e n d e n c e League, t h e Yanan group. K i m was purged in 1966. 27. K i m C h ' a n g - m a n , Modun kosun choguk konsol e. T h i s was t h e book K i m had published s h o r t l y after he r e t u r n e d to Korea. It is an interesting work; see his accusation of K i m Ku on p. 27 and his praise of K i m II Sung on p. 96. 28. K i m C h ' a n g - m a n , " C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g yoksa yon'gu eso chegi d o e n u n myokkaji munje," 29. Hangil mujang t'ujaeng chonjokchi rul ch'ajdsd. A team of party cadres led by a partisan w e n t to M a n c h u r i a and spent five m o n t h s f r o m May to O c t o b e r 1959 retracing t h e b a t t l e g r o u n d s of K i m II Sung. T h i s book is the report of their visit. 30. Books c o n c e r n i n g t h e partisans and their activities are t o o n u m e r o u s to m e n t i o n here. T h e standard t w e l v e - v o l u m e reminiscence is Hangil ppalchisan ch'amgajadul ui hoesanggi. T h i s was reorganized in chronological order and reprinted in a series k n o w n as Inmin ui chayu wa haebang ut wihayo. 3 1 . T h e r e are m a n y individual accounts such as t h e ones by Y i m C h ' u n - c h ' u , Hangil mujang t'ujaeng sigirul hoesang hayo, and Pak Tal, Choguk iin saengmydng poda togwihada. T h e r e are others by C h ' o e H y o n and K i m M y o n g - h w a in Hydngmyong ui kireso [ O n t h e road of t h e revolution] available in t w o volumes. Some of these were translated i n t o Japanese u n d e r such titles as Fukutsu no uta or Hakuto no yamanami o koete. For t h e heroes w h o died in M a n c h u r i a see Hydngmyong sonyol dill ui saengae wa hwaltong.

10. The Sino-Soviet

Dispute

and Kim

II Sung

1. It is not m y intention to describe t h e Sino-Soviet dispute. O n l y certain issues relevant to N o r t h Korean relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n and C h i n a are discussed here. For t h e dispute itself, see t h e standard works on t h e subject, such as D o n a l d S. Zagoria, The Sino-Souiet Conflict, 1956-1961; David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev:; W . E. G r i f f i t h , The Sino-Soviet Rift. 2. Most of Kim's references to Stalin are o m i t t e d f r o m his works. See the original speeches of K i m - for e x a m p l e , his speeches on J u l y 9, 1948, August 15, 1951, and D e c e m b e r 15, 1952, in Kim II Sung sonjip, 2:171-210; 3:252-280; 4:317-407. 3. In his speech at t h e t h i r d enlarged plenary m e e t i n g of t h e F o u r t h C e n t r a l

10. Sino-Soviet C o m m i t t e e o n M a r c h 8, 1962, K i m e l a b o r a t e d on ical w o r k of t h e party. In t h e t h i r d part o f his K o r e a n revisionists and tried w i t h o u t success t o revisionists m e a n t t o t h e d o m e s t i c politics of t h e

Dispute and Kim

373

the organizational and ideologspeech, K i m lashed o u t at t h e clarify w h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l N o r t h . See t h e speech in Kim

11 Sung chöjak sönjip, 3 : 2 9 0 - 3 3 0 . 4. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of studies on t h e f o r e i g n policy of N o r t h Korea. See a m o n g o t h e r s B y u n g C h u l K o h , The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea; C h i n O . C h u n g , P'yongyang Between Peking and Moscow:; a n d H o - m i n Y a n g , " N o r t h Korea, T h i r t y Years b e t w e e n M o s c o w and P e k i n g . " See also J o h n B r a d bury, "Sino-Soviet C o m p e t i t i o n in N o r t h K o r e a , " and J o s e p h C . K u n , " N o r t h Korea: B e t w e e n M o s c o w and P e k i n g . " 5. For his trip of N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 8 to C h i n a a n d V i e t n a m , see Yongwön han ch'insön. For t h e activities and relationship of Z h o u B a o z h o n g a n d Li Yenlu w i t h K i m , see part I of this study. Z h o u B a o z h o n g a n d Li Yenlu survived t h e war in M a n c h u r i a , and Z h o u even b e c a m e an a l t e r n a t e m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t tee of t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t Party. See t h e i r activities a n d t h e r e u n i o n m e e t i n g at t h e b a n q u e t in H o w a r d L. B o o r m a n , ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 1 : 4 1 5 - 4 1 6 ; D o n a l d W . Klein and A n n e B. C l a r k , Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, 1:225-228. 6. In this article K i m e m p h a s i z e d t h e past r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e Koreans and t h e C h i n e s e , tracing t h e cooperative e f f o r t s f r o m t h e partisan days in M a n churia t h r o u g h t h e Korean War. K i m also expressed a p p r e c i a t i o n to t h e C h i n e s e people for t h e i r aid and said that trade b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s f r o m 1 9 4 5 t o 1958 had increased 17 times. For t h e C h i n e s e text, see Renmin ribao, S e p t e m b e r 26, 1 9 5 9 . It is also available in Russian in K i m II S u n g ( K i m Ir-sen), Izbrannye stat'i i rechi, pp. 5 7 9 - 5 9 1 . For t h e Korean o r i g i n a l see Kim II Sung sönjip, 2 d ed., 6:440-454. 7. T h e o n l y m e e t i n g f r o m w h i c h K i m was c o n s p i c u o u s l y absent was t h e N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 0 m e e t i n g of t h e representatives of t h e w o r k e r s ' and C o m m u n i s t parties of t h e w o r l d in Moscow. K i m sent K i m II in his place to represent t h e N o r t h . For t h e chronicles of t h e various trips t o b o t h B e i j i n g a n d M o s c o w by various leaders of t h e N o r t h , see Chosön chungang yön'gam for t h e relevant years, particularly 1 9 6 0 and 1961. 8. For t h e treaty b e t w e e n t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d N o r t h Korea, see Nodong sinmun, J u l y 7, 1961; Izvestia, J u l y 7, 1961; a n d also Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1962, pp. 1 5 7 - 1 6 1 . For t h e treaty b e t w e e n t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a and N o r t h Korea, see ibid. pp. 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 ; Nodong sinmun, J u l y 12, 1961; and D . M . J o h n s o n and H . C h i u , Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 1949-6 7: A Calendar, pp. 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 . For his visit to C h i n a , see Shi L i c h e n g , Chaoxian renmin gaoju hongqi qianjin. 9. For K i m II S u n g ' s r e p o r t on his p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e t w e n t y - s e c o n d congress of t h e C o m m u n i s t Party of t h e Soviet U n i o n , see Külloja ( D e c e m b e r 1961), no. 12 (193), pp. 3 - 1 2 ; Nodong sinmun, N o v e m b e r 2 8 , 1 9 6 1 . A n e x c e r p t o f this speech appeared in Pravda, D e c e m b e r 4, 1961, a n d also in E n g l i s h in A l e x a n d e r D a l l i n , ed.. Diversity in International Communism, p p . 3 8 8 - 3 9 4 .

374

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S I N O - S O V I E T D I S P U T E A N D KIM

10. "Cho-sso yangguk kanüi pulp'ae üi tongmaeng" [The invincible alliance between Korea and the Soviet Union], Nodong sinmun, J u l y 6, 1972; "Pulmyöl üi ch'insön konggo han tongmaeng" [ T h e eternal friendship and firm alliance], Nodong sinmun, July 11, 1962. 11. For the Chinese editorial entitled "Reexamination o f Nehru's Philosophy in View of the Sino-Indian Border Problem," see Renmin ribao, October 27, 1 9 6 2 ; it appeared in Nodong sinmun in Korean on October 31. 1 9 6 2 . For Zhou's letter in Korean see Nodong sinmun, November 2 3 , 1 9 6 2 . 12. "Paekchön paeksüng üi siwöl k i c h ' i " [ T h e ever-victorious banner o f O c t o ber], Nodong sinmun, November 7, 1 9 6 2 . 13. Yi was one o f the very few Communists o f domestic origin w h o survived the purges and remained in high posts in the N o r t h . B o r n in 1 9 0 3 in Tanch'ön, Hamgyöng namdo, Y i was imprisoned from 1931 to 1 9 3 6 for his participation in the Tanch'ön Peasant Union Incident. He served in a number o f important positions, including ambassador to China during the Korean War, minister o f commerce, minister o f finance, minister ot trade, and deputy premier; he was also a member o f the Political Committee. He died on August 20, 1 9 6 9 . 14. "Sahoe chuüi chinyöng üi t'ongil ül suho hamyö kukche kongsan chuüi undong üi tan'gyöl ül kanghwa haja" [Let us protect the unity o f the socialist camp and strengthen the solidarity o f the international Communist movement], Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1964, pp. 8 0 - 8 4 . See also Nodong sinmun, January 30, 1 9 6 3 . For Yi's undelivered speech, see Nodong sinmun, January 2 2 , 1 9 6 3 . 15. Pak Küm-ch'öl represented the Supreme People's Assembly and visited China in June 1962. For the Chinese welcome o f Pak, see Zhong Chao yongshi tuanjie. For C h ' o e Yong-gön's visit in J u n e 1 9 6 3 , see the Chinese welcome in Ch'oe Yong-gön weiyuanchang fangmen zhongguo. For the editorial in Nodong sinmun about Ch'oe's visit, see J u n e 5, 1963. T h e j o i n t communique was issued and the text is available in Nodong sinmun, J u n e 24, 1 9 6 3 . For Liu Xiaoqi's visit, see Nodong sinmun, September 15, 1963. 16. There are many articles about the promotion o f self-resuscitation and the self-reliant economy in the North. See, for example, an excellent article in Külloja (March 1962), no. 3, (196), pp. 2-7; Charyök kaengsaeng üi hyöngmyöng sasang; see also Nodong sinmun editorials on June 12, 1 9 6 3 , and October 26, 1 9 6 3 . 17. Kim Sök-hyöng is the foremost Korean historian o f the North. Born on November 7, 1915, Kim is a native o f Kyöngsang pukto and was educated at Keijö Imperial University. He is head o f the History Research Center of the Academy o f Sciences and professor o f history at Kim II Sung University. He led the N o r t h Korean delegation to the 25th International Orientalist Congress held in Moscow in August 1 9 6 0 . Among his many works on Korean history is Chosön yöksa. He is a Communist historian who emphasizes the correct attitude in the study o f Korean History. See his article in Yoksa kwahak ( 1 9 6 6 ) , no. 6, pp. 1-7. Kim Hüi-il is another leading historian o f the N o r t h , specializing in the modern period. See his book Miguk cheguk chuüi üi Chosön ch'imyaksa and other works. Son Yong-jong is a young scholar who specializes in Chosön dynasty history. See his articles in VSJba kwahak (1959), no. 5, pp. 4 2 - 6 1 ; ( 1 9 6 6 ) , no. 4, pp. 1 2 - 2 0 .

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Dispute and Kim

375

18. Akademiia nauk, SSSR, Vsemirnaia istoriia. Ten volumes in chronological order were published f r o m 1955 to 1965; three volumes were added f r o m 1977 to 1983. 19. T h e entire text of the N o r t h Korean attack appeared first in Nodong sinmun, September 20, 1963. It was reprinted in Kulloja (September 1963), no. 18 (232), pp. 47-56. 20. For various sections on Korea in Akademiia nauk, SSSR, Vsemirnaia istoriia, see the following: (1957), 2:57; 3(3): 47-51; (2):537-541; 4:685-695; (1959), 6:434-444; (I960), 7:275-279; 8(3):427-432; (1965), 10(3):507-509; 11(3):160-169. 21. For N o r t h Korean studies of Korean history, see the standard work done by the History Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of N o r t h Korea, Choson yoksa. 22. A good study of Kim O k - k y u n is Kim Ok-kyun, done jointly by members of the History Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences, including Kim Sokhyong and Kim Hui-il. 23. T h e r e are many excellent studies by Soviet scholars on the contemporary history of Korea. See, a m o n g others, Istoria Korei; 2 vols.; F. I. Shabshina, Narodnoe vosstanie 1919 goda v Koree\ and G. F. Kim and F. I. Shabshina, Proletarian Internationalism and Revolutions in the East, pp. 262-323. 24. See a stunning editorial entitled "Saohe chuui chinyongul ongho haja" [Let us defend the socialist camp] in Nodong sinmun, October 28, 1963. T h e r e is a good collection of pertinent editorials of Nodong sinmun, including this one, in Japanese in Chosen no kokusai rosen. 25. For t h e Chinese editorial see Renmin ribao, November 2, 1963. T h i s was reprinted under the title "Ssoryon kongsandang chidobuga indowa y6nhap hayo chungguk ul pandae hago innun chinsang" [The true picture of the leadership of the C o m m u n i s t Party of the Soviet U n i o n in collusion with India to o p p o s e China], Nodong sinmun, N o v e m b e r 3, 1963. For Pak's article, see Pak Kum-ch'ol, "Maruk'usu renin chuui kich'i rul nop'idulgo siwol hyongmyong lii w i o p ul kyesung haja." See related articles in Kulloja, (November 1963), no. 21 (235), pp. 31-37; Nodong sinmun, N o v e m b e r 7, 1963. 26. O n the National Liberation m o v e m e n t , see Nodong sinmun, January 27, 1964. O n revisionism, see Nodong sinmun, April 19, 1964. About the Japanese C o m m u n i s t Party, see "Ilbon kongsandang e taehan p'agoe ch'aektong u n kyolk'o hoyong halsu opta." 27. Pravda, August 18, 1964. A Korean version of this article appeared in Nodong sinmun, September 7, 1964. 28. Kim II Sung gave a banquet for participants of the seminar and thanked them for holding the seminar in Pyongang. T h e r e were 34 countries represented. For Kim's speech at the banquet, see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1965, pp. 34-35. About the seminar, see Second Asian Economic Seminar: Pyongyang. T h e first seminar was held in C o l o m b o , Ceylon, in 1962; for the N o r t h Korean account, see Nodong sinmun, J u n e 23, 1964. 29. T h e j a Gunawardhana of Sri Lanka was chairman of the Asian Economic

376

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Bureau; t h e Soviet U n i o n called h e r a T r o t s k y i t e . T h e r e w e r e representatives f r o m J a p a n , C h i n a , Sri Lanka, V i e t n a m , Indonesia, Pakistan, and N o r t h Korea. M a n y delegates r e p r e s e n t i n g 34 countries a t t e n d e d t h e seminar, but t h e Soviet U n i o n and India were not invited. For t h e N o r t h K o r e a n editorial, see Nodong sinmurt, S e p t e m b e r 7, 1964. 30. For N o r t h K o r e a n articles against t h e Soviet U n i o n after t h e seminar, see Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 6, O c t o b e r 2 9 , D e c e m b e r 3, a n d D e c e m b e r 21, 1 9 6 4 . 31. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of sources r e p o r t i n g t h e alleged wall posters in C h i n a , but none of t h e m is of C h i n e s e or N o r t h K o r e a n o r i g i n . T h e r e is a detailed account of this and subsequent allegations in a "restricted d o c u m e n t " e n t i t l e d North Korea, 1945-67, pp. 2 7 - 2 8 . T h e r e are a n u m b e r of S o u t h Korean accounts; see a representative o n e in Pukhan chönsö, 1 : 3 0 2 - 3 1 2 . T h e J a p a n e s e also r e p o r t e d on t h e subject; see a m o n g others Hayashi T a k e h i k o , Kita Chosen to minami Chosen, pp. 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 . 32. R e p o r t e d in T a n j u g N e w s A g e n c y of Yugoslavia on F e b r u a r y 19, 1 9 6 7 . T h i s source was cited in North Korea, 1945-67, p. 28. See a similar r e p o r t by Nakayasu Yosaku, " C h ü - S o k o k k y ö f u n s ö to k i t a - C h ö s e n . " 33. H a v a n a Radio and Television of F e b r u a r y 2 8 and M a r c h 1, 1967, w e r e cited as sources in North Korea, 1945-67, p. 29. S o m e studies cite t h e P y o n g y a n g r a d i o broadcast as a source of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n r e f u t a t i o n of m a n y of these charges; see, for e x a m p l e , H o - m i n Yang, " N o r t h Korea, T h i r t y Years B e t w e e n M o s c o w and P e k i n g , " pp. 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 . 34. T h i s is also available in Current Background C o n s u l a t e - G e n e r a l ) (April 3, 1968), n o . 8 5 0 , p. 27.

(Hongkong:

American

35. T h i s minister was Pak Y o n g - s u n , also k n o w n as Pak P'o-su. H e was a f a m o u s partisan, and t h e stories of his partisan activities in M a n c h u r i a w e r e well k n o w n . H e is t h e one w h o invented a h o m e - m a d e grenade k n o w n as t h e Yon'gil p'okt'an (Yanji b o m b ) , and he w r o t e a b o o k by t h a t n a m e . H e was head of t h e C o m m u n i c a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t of t h e p a r t y and b e c a m e minister of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in O c t o b e r 1962. H e was also a m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e F o u r t h Party Congress. H e was r e a p p o i n t e d m i n i s t e r of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in D e c e m b e r 1967. 36. It is assumed t h a t he was m a r r i e d in t h e s u m m e r of 1 9 6 3 because f r o m May to J u l y K i m II Sung m a d e n o public appearances or speeches, t h e longest silence he has ever m a i n t a i n e d . T h e r e is n o i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t K i m ' s w i f e , but she appears as t h e first lady of t h e N o r t h at official f u n c t i o n s . Party cadres in N o r t h Korea told m e t h a t she has f o u r c h i l d r e n by K i m , t h r e e boys and a girl. 37. It is said that its p u m i c e rock gives its crest a w h i t e color and it appears s n o w - c a p p e d even in s u m m e r , h e n c e t h e n a m e . See S h a n n o n M c C u n e , "Physical Basis for Korean B o u n d a r i e s . " 38. For t h e Korean chronicle of t h e negotiations, see Sukchong siliok, voi. 51, in Chosön wangjo siliok, 4 0 : 4 2 7 - 4 4 9 . For C h i n e s e studies, see Z h a n g C u n w u , " Q i n g d a i z h o n g h a n b i a n w u w e n t i t a n y u a n , " and " M u k e d e n g s u o d i n g d i zhonghan guojie." 39. T h e r e are considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s in t h e n a m e of t h e T u m e n River. T h e r e

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Dispute

and Kim

377

is a n o t h e r river t h a t f l o w s n o r t h t o t h e Soviet b o r d e r t h a t is n a m e d T u r n e n ( T ' o m u n in Korean), and t h e Koreans u n d e r s t o o d t h e b o u n d a r y t o be this river r a t h e r t h a n t h e c u r r e n t T u r n e n River, w h i c h is p r o n o u n c e d " T o u m a n " in C h i n e s e . Such an interpretation w o u l d include most of t h e Yanbian area of N o r t h e a s t C h i n a , w h i c h is heavily p o p u l a t e d by Koreans, in t h e t e r r i t o r y of Korea. It was r e p o r t e d that C h i n a insisted t h a t t h e river m e a n t w h a t was k n o w n as t h e T u r n e n River in 1880. See Yi H o n g - j i k , Kuksa sajón, p. 560; C h ' o e N a m - s ö n , Paektusan fewn ch'amgi, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 2 9 . 4 0 . See a detailed description of a n u m b e r of difficulties in Yi S ö n - g ü n , " P a e k t u s a n kwa k a n d o m u n j e . " In this article, t h e m o u n t a i n is claimed as Korean. 41. See a representative of such maps, m a d e by t h e n o t e d Korean c a r t o g r a p h e r K i m C h ö n g - h o in 1861, in K i m C h ó n g - h o , Taedong yö chido, 2:7-8. 42. " T h e Korean B o u n d a r y A g r e e m e n t , " pp. C , app. 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 ; also cited in S h a n n o n M c C u n e , "Physical Basis for Korean B o u n d a r i e s " ; see also U . S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, China-Korea Boundary (June 29, 1962), no. 17, p. 3. 43. Renmin huabuo, N o v e m b e r 1961. It is also available in t h e N o v e m b e r 1961 issue of China Pictorial. 44. Facts About Korea, p. 1. T h e g e o g r a p h e r of t h e State D e p a r t m e n t stated that this b o o k was published in 1961 w i t h t h e m a p captioned, prepared in August 1961, a n d speculated that t h e C h i n e s e m i g h t have responded t o this m a p in China Pictorial. It s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t as late as 1958 w h e n t h e N o r t h Korean h a n d b o o k was published, n o question r e g a r d i n g t h e m o u n t a i n was raised by t h e C h i n e s e . T h e h a n d b o o k said that t h e Korean m o u n t a i n ranges start f r o m Paektusan, situated on t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n Korea and C h i n a . It also added t h a t " t h e m a i n ranges e x t e n d a l o n g t h e n o r t h and east b o u n d a r i e s , " Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pp. 1-3. 45. O n e study claimed t h a t t h e C h i n e s e and t h e N o r t h Koreans reached an a g r e e m e n t in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 3 at t h e t i m e of Liu X i a o q f s visit to t h e N o r t h . See Area Handbook for North Korea ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : G P O , 1969) p. 253; David Rees, " N o r t h K o r e a - C h i n a R i f t . " T h i s article was based on an Indian article in Amrita Bazar Patrika of C a l c u t t a . Since India was having its difficulties w i t h C h i n a on their border, t h e i n f o r m a t i o n is h i g h l y suspect. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of errors in t h e article as to t h e l e n g t h of t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d Korea and various details of dates and locations. T h e disputed t e r r i t o r y is estimated by t h e g e o g r a p h e r of t h e State D e p a r t m e n t to be 6 0 0 square miles. See The China-Korea Boundary, p. 4. See also a N o r t h Korean travelogue to this area by M o o n In-soo, " M t . B a i k d o o and R e g i o n . " 46. T h e picture of K i m s t a n d i n g on top of t h e m o u n t a i n , his hands folded b e h i n d , and l o o k i n g at t h e lake, C h ' ö n j i , was w i d e l y circulated in 1969. See Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1969\ J i a n g D a o , " Z h o n g g o n g yu b e i h a n di x i n g u o j i e , " pp. 4 8 - 5 4 . 47. Korea Review, p. 2; Yoksa sajón, p. 976. 4 8 . K i m was a c c o m p a n i e d by V i c e - P r e m i e r K i m K w a n g - h y ö p , Foreign Minister Pak S ö n g - c h ' ö l and his w i f e , Y i m K y e - c h ' ö l , C h ' a e H ü i - j ö n g , H ö T a m , a n d

378

10. S I N O - S O V I E T D I S P U T E A N D KIM

a f e w others. See t h e details of his visit in Korea Today (May 1965), no. 108, p p . 25-36. 4 9 . For t h e Soviet delegation see Nodong sinmuti, A u g u s t 13, 1965. T h e r e w e r e t w o o t h e r veterans, o n e a d m i r a l a n d a navy captain. In his m e m o i r s , G e n e r a l C h i s t i a k o v related t h a t h e visited K i m in 1968, and K i m t o o k h i m t o his f o r m e r place of residence w h i c h was b o m b e d by t h e Americans b e y o n d r e c o g n i t i o n . See I. M . Chistiakov, "Voevoi p u t i 25-i a r m i i , " p. 60. M a j o r G e n e r a l Lebedev t o l d m e t h a t h e has since b e c o m e d e p u t y c h a i r m a n of t h e S o v i e t - K o r e a n F r i e n d s h i p Association a n d has r e t u r n e d t o P y o n g y a n g several times. 50. For a c o m p l e t e list of t h e C h i n e s e delegation, see Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1965. See also t h e C h i n e s e celebration of t h e anniversary in C h i n a in Renmin ribao, O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1965; " C h i n e s e People's Volunteers' Anniversary," Peking Review ( O c t o b e r 1965), n o . 4 4 , p. 4. 5 1 . Chajusöng ül ongho haja. T h i s is a w i d e l y q u o t e d article. It appeared in Nodong sinmun, A u g u s t 12, 1966. B. C . K o h identifies this article as N o r t h Korea's declaration, " N o r t h Korea a n d t h e Sino-Soviet S c h i s m . " 52. K i m 11 S u n g , Hyön chöngse wa uridang úi kwaöp. T h i s speech is also w i d e l y publicized. It is available in E n g l i s h in a p a m p h l e t , K i m II S u n g , The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party, also in Kim ¡I Sung chöjak sönjip, 3d ed., 4:317-403. 53. A p p a r e n t l y K i m was reluctant t o send his troops t o V i e t n a m w h i l e n e i t h e r t h e Soviet U n i o n n o r C h i n a w e r e s e n d i n g theirs. B u t h e was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e fact t h a t t h e S o u t h K o r e a n a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e s e n d i n g their t r o o p s to V i e t n a m , and K i m had w a n t e d to o p t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l volunteers a m o n g t h e socialist c o u n t r i e s in t h e style of t h e U N t r o o p s in t h e K o r e a n war. At t h e t i m e of t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e , such an i n t e r n a t i o n a l v o l u n t e e r force could hardly have b e e n realized. 54. R e f e r e n c e here is to C h i n e s e m e d d l i n g in t h e internal affairs of t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t Party. T h e N o r t h Koreans strongly s u p p o r t e d t h e J a p a n e s e against t h e C h i n e s e . See t h e details in R o b e r t A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-66, pp. 2 1 4 - 2 9 1 .

PART V. PROBLEMS IN KIM'S I N D E P E N D E N C E

11. The Rise of the

Military

1. K i m II S u n g , Sökt'an kongöp ül ppalli patchön sik'igi wihayö, pp. 3 - 3 4 . 2. K i m Ii Sung, Kun nongöp hyöptong chohap kyöngyöng wiwönhoe rül naeolte taehayö-, K i m II S u n g , " K u n üi y ö k h w a l ül k a n g h w a h a m y ö c h i b a n g k o n g ö p kwa n o n g c h o ' o n k y ö n g n i rül t ö u k p a l c h ö n sik'yö i n m i n s a e n g h w a l ül h w ö l s i n n o p ' i j a " [Let us radically i m p r o v e t h e people's living standards by s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e role of t h e c o u n t y and f u r t h e r d e v e l o p i n g local i n d u s t r y a n d agriculture], in Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 3 : 3 3 1 - 3 7 1 ; K i m Ii S u n g , " K u n h y ö p t o n g n o n g j a n g k y ö n g y ö n g w i w ö n h o e rül t ö u k k a n g h w a p a l c h ö n sik'ilte t a e h a y ö " [ O n f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d d e v e l o p i n g t h e C o u n t y C o o p e r a t i v e F a r m M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e ] , ibid., 3:438-460.

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379

3. Kim II Sung, Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo, 3:350-382; Kim II Sung, Choson minju chuui inmin konghwaguk chongbu ui tangmydn kwaop e taehayo. 4. For the report of Kim Kwang-hyop's visit, see Nodong sinmun, December 6, 1962. O n l y a short article indicating his return was featured, and there was no usual lengthy report of his visit to the Soviet Union. 5. T h e agenda for the fourth plenum of the Central Committee was kept secret. T h e plenum was held sometime between March and December 1962, and it might have been in this secret plenum that the crucial decision was made to strengthen the military. It has become the practice that whenever important problems were discussed in the plenum, both the agenda and date of the plenum were kept secret. 6. Choson chungang yon'gam, 1963, pp. 157-162. See also the report on the plen u m in Nodong sinmun, December 16, 1962. T h e r e is a huge sign bearing this slogan in the Revolutionary Museum in Pyongyang. W h e n I was introduced to the Socialist Construction Section of the museum, I jokingly mentioned the slogan, implying that a man can neither shoot nor work with both hands occupied with arms, hammer, and sickle. This remark drew immediate anger and I quickly offered my apology. T h e y were serious about the slogan. For Kim's reference to this slogan, see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 4:365. See also Choson nodongdang yoksa kyojae, pp. 494-495. 7. Kim II Sung, The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party, pp. 51-95. 8. T h e Red Young Guard were reorganized from the Student Worker-Peasant Red Guards at Kim's fifty-eighth birthday on April 15, 1970. T h e guards consisted mostly of N o r t h Korean high school students. See Pukhan chonso, 1:37. 9. Kim II Sung, Uri hyongmyong eso ui chuch'e e taehayo, 1:228-229. 10. T h e original Military C o m m i t t e e was established by decree of the Standing C o m m i t t e e of the Supreme People's Assembly of J u n e 26, 1950, a day after the Korean War began. It was a seven-man committee headed by Kim II Sung. Others were Pak Hon-yong, Hong Myong-hui, Kim Ch'aek, C h ' o e Yong-gon, Pak Il-u, and C h o n g C h u n - t ' a e k . See Choson chungang yon'gam, 1951-52, p. 82. 11. See Article 27 of the bylaws in Pukhan chongch'iron, pp. 574-575. 12. Kim II Sung, Uri ui hydngmyong kwa inmin kundae ui kwaop e taehayo, pp. 148-216. 13. T h e r e are a number of interesting examples and much interesting information in Kim's speech. See ibid. This speech also appeared in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 3:461-522, under the title of "Uri ui inmin kundaenun nodong kyegup ui kundae, h y o n g m y o n g ui kundae ida. Kyegup chongch'i kyoyang saop ul kyesok kanghwa haydya handa" [Our People's Army is an army of the working class, an army of the revolution. Class and political education should be continuously strengthened]. 14. Kim II Sung, " U r i inmin kundae rul hyongmyong kundae ro mandul myo kukbang eso chawi ui pangch'im ul kwanch'ol haja" [Let us transform our People's Army into a revolutionary army and implement the self-defense policy in the national defense], in Uri hyongmyong eso ui chuch'e e taehayo, 1:216-234. 15. For details on these ten goals, see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1963, pp. 161-162.

380

11. T H E RISE O F T H E MILITARY

16. Nodong sinmun, January 1, 1 9 6 3 . It also appears in Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1964, pp. 1-5. 17. Kim II Sung, "Nongch'on e taehan noryök chiwön saöp ül chön inminjök undong uro pöllimyö könsöl e taehan chido ch'egye rül koch'ilte taehayö" [On developing the program to augment manpower in agriculture into the movement o f the entire people and correcting the leadership system in construction], in Sahoe chuüi kyöngje kwalli munje e taehayö, 3 : 4 6 7 - 4 9 2 . 18. This instruction was given to the workers in the Unyul mines on January 22, 1965. Kim said that some workers made their eight-hour workday as little as a 190-minute workday and this should be corrected to have everyone work 480 minutes per day. See Kim II Sung, Soedol saengsan esö hyöksin ül irük'ilte taehayö, pp. 2-28. 19. Kim II Sung, "Ch'ilgaenyön kyehoek üi kangch'öl kojirül chömnyöng hagi wihayö" [For conquering the steel highland in the seven-year plan], in Sahoe chuüi kyöngje kwalli munje e taehayö, 3 : 9 2 - 1 1 4 . 20. For the reference to the drinking o f the workers, see ibid., pp. 6 7 - 9 1 . Kim also made known such movements as the Y i Man-söng movement and the Kim Tük-ch'an movement in transportation work. T h e details behind these movements were not mentioned, but Kim also mixed praise o f this sort with stern criticism o f the transportation workers. See Kim II Sung, Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 4:13-30. 21. Kim Ii Sung, Yanggangdo tang chojik dül app'e nasönün kwaöp, pp. 2 - 5 4 . 22. For some o f Kim's writings during this period, see Kim II Sung, Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country; Kodüng kyoyuk saöp ül kaesön halte taehayö. Some intellectuals wrote about the problems o f economic development, specifically balance and speed; see, for example, Chöng T'ae-sik, Uri tang e üihan sokto wa kyunhyöng munje üi ch'angjojök haegyöl. T h e r e are a number o f newspaper editorials urging people to work hard for a self-sustaining economy. See, for example, a collection o f such editorials for 1 9 6 3 (all from Nodong sinmun, April 11, April 23, and October 26) in Self-Reliance and the Building of an Independent Economy. 23. See Kim's New Year address o f January 1, 1965, in Chosön chungang yön' gam, 1966-67, pp. 1-5. 24. There were more than a dozen agreements signed between North Korea and the Soviet Union from 1965 to 1 9 6 9 , including two defense-related military agreements on May 31, 1965, and March 2, 1967. See George Ginsburgs and Roy U . T. Kim, Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs, Democratic People's Republic oj Korea, 1945-75, pp. 9 1 - 1 2 3 . For a number o f individual agreements see, for example, Izvestia, February 24, 1 9 6 5 , March 14, 1 9 6 5 , February 16, 1967; Pravda, March 6, 1967; and S'odong sinmun, March 4, 1965. For a list of agreements, see the North Korean yearbooks, for example, Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1966-67, p. 394. 25. See Kim's New Year address on January 1, 1 9 6 5 . he also made reference to the problem in his speech at Aliarcham Academy o f Social Science of Indonesia on April 14, 1965. See Kim II Sung, Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 4 : 1 9 5 - 2 4 0 .

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381

26. See, for e x a m p l e , his instruction at t h e p a r t y m e e t i n g of t h e State P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n in K i m II S u n g , Inmin kyongje kyehoek ui irwonhwa, sebuhwa ui widae han saenghwllyok ul namgim opsi palhwi hagi wihayd. See also his speech on t h e t w e n t i e t h anniversary of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of Korea on O c t o b e r 10, 1 9 6 5 , in Kim ¡1 Sung chojak sonjip, 4 : 2 7 9 - 3 1 6 . T h e N o r t h Koreans were i n d e e d f o r c e d t o f o l l o w t h e policy. See an editorial in Nodong sinmun, N o v e m b e r 7, 1 9 6 6 . 27. T h e bylaws of t h e T h i r d Party C o n g r e s s stipulated t h a t t h e p a r t y confere n c e may n o t replace m o r e t h a n o n e - f i f t h of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e (Article 41). However, at t h e F o u r t h Party C o n g r e s s in 1961, this provision was d r o p p e d . See Choson nodotigdang kyuyak haesol, p. 12. For t h e bylaws after t h e F i f t h Parry C o n g r e s s , see Pukhan chongch'iron, pp. 5 6 6 - 5 8 2 . T h e First Party C o n f e r e n c e was h e l d in M a r c h 1958. 28. For K i m ' s speech on international relations, see t h e previous chapter; for his r e p o r t on t h e r e v o l u t i o n in South Korea, see c h a p t e r 12. For t h e text of t h e declaration of t h e p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e on t h e V i e t n a m p r o b l e m dated O c t o b e r 12, 1 9 6 6 , see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1966-67, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 . 2 9 . For t h e r e p o r t on t h e e l e v e n t h p l e n u m of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , held in J u n e and J u l y 1965, and K i m C h ' a n g - m a n ' s activities in it, see Nodong sinmun, J u l y 2, 1 9 6 5 . T h e r e was an editorial after this p l e n u m about u p g r a d i n g h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n in Korea. See Nodong sinmun, J u l y 4, 1965. 30. It is most likely that she was purged because it is customary that the activities of a party official of her stature are reported. In the case of Pak, the problem is m o r e complicated because Kim II Sung was married in 1963, and Kim's wife, K i m Song-ae, was introduced in a n u m b e r of political functions. In t h e past, w h e n K i m was alone it was Pak C h o n g - a e w h o usually accompanied Kim. Pak was a c o m m o n law w i f e of K i m Yong-bom, first chairman of the N o r t h Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean C o m m u n i s t Party in Pyongyang shortly after the liberation of Korea. For the activities of Pak, see chapters 2 and 4. Pak was b o r n in August 1907 in K y o n g h u n g , H a m g y o n g pukto. T h e r e is no report of her whereabouts after 1967. 3 1 . N a m II was b o r n on J u n e 5, 1913, in t h e Soviet U n i o n . H i s h o m e t o w n in Korea was K y o n g w o n c o u n t y of H a m g y o n g p u k t o . H e was educated at S m o l e n s k M i l i t a r y School and g r a d u a t e d f r o m a college in T a s h k e n t . W h e n h e r e t u r n e d t o Korea h e was a Soviet a r m y o f f i c e r w i t h t h e rank of captain and b e c a m e vicem i n i s t e r of e d u c a t i o n . D u r i n g t h e Soviet occupation of t h e N o r t h , h e held a n u m ber of i m p o r t a n t posts; general of t h e army, first chief delegate to t h e armistice talks at P a n m u n j o m , f o r e i g n minister, minister of railways, and c h a i r m a n of state c o n s t r u c t i o n . N a m was one of t h e most durable officials. H e was elected to t h e S u p r e m e People's Assembly and was one of t h e very few w h o were elected to t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e f o u r times f r o m t h e second (candidate m e m b e r ) to t h e f i f t h C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e s . N a m died on M a r c h 7, 1976, at t h e age of 64. See Nodong sinmun, M a r c h 8, 1976. 32. T h e secretaries w e r e C h ' o e Y o n g - g o n , K i m II, Pak K u m - c h ' o l , Yi H y o - s u n , K i m K w a n g - h y o p , Sok San, H o P o n g - h a k , K i m Yong-ju, Pak Y o n g - g u k , and K i m T o - m a n . K i m II S u n g was general secretary.

382

12. T H E S O U T H K O R E A N R E V O L U T I O N 12. The

South

Korean

Revolution

1. K i m II S u n g , Chigop tongmaeng saop e taehayo, pp. 1 6 6 - 2 1 4 . 2. For e x a m p l e , see K i m ' s speeches at t h e T h i r d Party C o n g r e s s in April 1 9 5 6 , second a n d t h i r d S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s Assembly speeches in S e p t e m b e r 1957 a n d O c t o b e r 1 9 6 2 , and t h e t e n t h anniversary speech of t h e f o u n d i n g of the D e m o cratic People's Republic of Korea in S e p t e m b e r 1958. Even t h e proposal to create a C o n f e d e r a l Republic of K o r y o was m a d e at t h e tail e n d of t h e speech at t h e f i f t e e n t h anniversary c o m m e m o r a t i n g t h e national liberation in August 1961. For K i m ' s l e n g t h y speeches on u n i f i c a t i o n p r o b l e m s , see his speeches at t h e tenth a n d f i f t e e n t h anniversaries of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e Korean People's A r m y on F e b r u a r y 8, 1958, and F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 6 3 . 3. T h e e i g h t h p l e n u m was held f r o m F e b r u a r y 25 t o F e b r u a r y 2 7 , 1964. A t this p l e n u m K i m revealed t h e theses on t h e socialist agrarian questions, and in general t h e discussion of these theses o v e r s h a d o w e d o t h e r i m p o r t a n t items on t h e a g e n d a . Yi H y o - s u n , w h o was in charge of t h e party's S o u t h K o r e a n o p e r a t i o n , gave a l o n g speech in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e u n i f i c a t i o n issue. T h e t h i r d item was o n s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e w o r k w i t h t h e masses, and Pak K u m - c h ' o l also spoke on t h e subject. T h e speeches by Y i a n d Pak w e r e not m a d e public. For t h e r e p o r t s of t h e e i g h t h p l e n u m , see Nodong sinmun, F e b r u a r y 26 and F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 6 4 . 4. K i m II S u n g , Choguk t'ongil wiop til sirhydn hagi wihayo hydngmyong ul paekbang uro kanghwa haja, pp. 1 - 2 4 .

yongyang

5. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of speeches by K i m w h o s e entire texts w e r e kept secret, b u t this is t h e o n l y d o c u m e n t w h e r e o n e p a r t of t h e text was blatantly o m i t t e d . For this o m i s s i o n , see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 4:96. 6. For t h e details of t h e e i g h t h p l e n u m of February 1964, see Chosdn chungang yon'gam, J 9 6 5 , p. 4 4 . 7. T h e Treaty on Basic Relations and O t h e r Agreements between t h e Republic of Korea and J a p a n was signed on J u n e 22, 1965. T h e South Korean National Assembly ratified it on August 14, 1965, and t h e National Diet of J a p a n on D e c e m b e r 1, 1965. T h e instruments of ratification were exchanged on D e c e m b e r 18, 1968. It is not my purpose here to discuss t h e controversy surrounding the normalization treaty or its content. For a study of t h e treaty see, a m o n g others, Kwan Bong Kim, The KoreaJapan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System. 8. T h e S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s Assembly decision c o n d e m n i n g t h e treaty was issued o n May 2 1 , 1 9 6 5 . A m e m o r a n d u m on t h e crimes of t h e Korea-Japan Treaty by t h e D e m o c r a t i c P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of K o r e a w a s issued o n J u n e 18, 1965. T h i s w a s a l o n g m e m o r a n d u m r e v i e w i n g K o r e a - J a p a n relations t h r o u g h o u t h i s t o r y . A f t e r t h e f o r m a l s i g n i n g o f t h e treaty, a n o t h e r m e m o w a s issued on J u n e 23, 1965. See these d o c u m e n t s in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1966-67, pp. 63-64, 7178, 90-92. S o m e w r i t e r s equated this treaty w i t h the treaty of 1905 that m a d e possible the f o r m a l annexation o f Korea by Japan. See, a m o n g others, Pae P y o n g - d u , " K a n n i c h i kaidan t o otsui h o g o j o y a k u . " T h e r e are m a n y editorials and articles a b o u t this treaty in newspapers a n d magazines; see a m o n g o t h e r s , Nodong sinmun, August 25, 1965.

Ì2. The South Korean Revolution

383

9. See, for e x a m p l e , K i m ' s reply to a q u e s t i o n by C u b a n r e p o r t e r s in K i m II S u n g , Oeguk kijadul i chegihan chilmun e taehan taedap, 1 : 3 2 - 4 5 . K i m reoeats t h e p l e d g e in t h e i n t e r v i e w w i t h reporters f r o m t h e U n i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c on S e p t e m ber 14, 1965; ibid., p p . 4 6 - 5 4 . See t h e decision of t h e S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s A s s e m b l y o n M a y 2 0 , 1 9 6 5 . T h e r e are n u m e r o u s m e m o r a n d a o f t h e N o r t h K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t t h e V i e t n a m situation a n d Korea. See all these d o c u m e n t s in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1966-67, pp. 6 1 - 1 4 1 . 10. K i m m a d e these r e m a r k s in his speeches at t h e t w e n t i e t h anniversary of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e W o r k e r s ' P a r t y of Korea in O c t o b e r 1 9 5 5 and at t h e Second P a r t y C o n f e r e n c e in O c t o b e r 1 9 6 6 . See K i m II S u n g , Choson nodongdang ch'anggdn 20chunyon e chehayd. See also K i m II S u n g , The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party, p p . 9 5 - 1 2 3 . 11. For K i m ' s basic policy toward t h e S o u t h K o r e a n r e v o l u t i o n , see his speech on F e b r u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 6 4 . T h e r e are a n u m b e r of articles s u p p o r t i n g his policy. See, a m o n g others, " N a m c h o s o n hyonchongsewa namchoson h y o n g m y o n g e taehan t a n g ui kibon p a n g c h ' i m " [ T h e present c o n d i t i o n of S o u t h Korea a n d o u r p a r t y ' s basic policy on t h e S o u t h K o r e a n revolution], Kulloja ( 1 9 6 6 ) , no. 12 ( 2 9 8 ) , p p . 18-27. 12. T h e official N o r t h K o r e a n accounts did n o t disclose w h e n t h e f i f t e e n t h p l e n u m was held; t h e S o u t h Korean a c c o u n t s e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e p l e n u m was h e l d in M a r c h 1 9 7 6 . T h e f i f t e e n t h p l e n u m was h e l d f o r five days f r o m M a y 4 t o M a y 8, 1 9 6 7 . See Paek P o n g , Minjok ui t'aeyang Kim II Sung changgun, 2 : 9 2 0 . T h e sixt e e n t h p l e n u m was h e l d f r o m J u n e 2 8 t o J u l y 3, 1 9 6 7 . A g e n d a s of b o t h p l e n u m s w e r e kept secret. It is t h e general practice of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s t h a t w h e n i m p o r t a n t decisions are m a d e , t h e dates and agendas o f t h e p l e n u m s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e are kept secret. 13. H o was a partisan w h o was alleged t o have i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o W o n s a n as an a g e n t of K i m ' s partisan g r o u p on N o v e m b e r 18, 1 9 3 7 , a n d w a s arrested. H o , o n e of t h o s e rare intellectuals in t h e partisan g r o u p , h e a d e d t h e p a r t y s c h o o l and w o r k e d in t h e p r o p a g a n d a section of t h e party. K i m T o - m a n w o r k e d in t h e p a r t y ' s p r o p a g a n d a a n d agitation section f r o m 1 9 5 4 a n d b e c a m e secretary of t h e p a r t y in O c t o b e r 1 9 6 6 . Ko H y o k was head of t h e p a r t y s c h o o l of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e in 1 9 6 1 and was v i c e - p r e m i e r of t h e cabinet in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 6 . All t h e s e m e n w e r e n o n m i l i t a r y partisans. 14. T h i s was a lecture given by K i m II S u n g to cadres of p a r t y a n d state o r g a n i zations on O c t o b e r 11, 1 9 6 9 . For t h e c o m p l e t e text in E n g l i s h , see K i m II S u n g , On Some Experiences of the Democratic and Socialist Revolutions in Our Country. For t h e S o u t h K o r e a n a c c o u n t of t h e purges, see, a m o n g o t h e r s , Pukhan chonsd, 1:262-264. 15. H o P o n g - h a k is a typical partisan general. H e had j o i n e d the partisan g r o u p in t h e early 1930s a n d f o u g h t u n d e r a n o t h e r f a m o u s p a r t i s a n , t h e late A n Kil. H e has w r i t t e n a n u m b e r o f articles r e m i n i s c i n g a b o u t t h e guerrilla d a y s in M a n c h u ria. T h e r e is a r e c o r d o f his p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e c a m p a i g n o f t h e T h i r d D i r e c t i o n a l A r m y in A u g u s t 1939 w i t h C h ' o e H y o n . A n Kil, K i m T o n g - g y u , a n d Pak U - s o p . H o w a s already a m a j o r general d u r i n g t h e K o r e a n W a r , b e c a m e a full

384

12. T H E S O U T H K O R E A N R E V O L U T I O N

general in 1963, and was director of t h e Political Bureau of t h e K o r e a n People's Army. H e was elected to t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e p a r t y and t o t h e S u p r e m e People's Assembly, and w h e n t h e partisan generals b e c a m e politically p r o m i n e n t his speeches were p r i n t e d in t h e newspapers. See, for e x a m p l e , his speeches in Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 26, 1963, and J u n e 2 6 , 1965. H o ' s w i f e is also a partisan, K i m O k - s u n , f o r m e r c h a i r m a n of t h e D e m o c r a t i c W o m e n ' s U n i o n of Korea. 16. " N a m c h o s o n h y o n g m y o n g ul c h o k k u k c h i w o n hayo uri sedae e k i o k ' o c h o g u k t'ongil ul silhyon h a j a " [Let us assist t h e S o u t h K o r e a n r e v o l u t i o n a n d a c c o m p l i s h t h e f a t h e r l a n d u n i f i c a t i o n in o u r generation], Kiilloja ( 1 9 6 8 ) , no. 1 (311), pp. 16-24. 17. K i m II Sung, Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All Fields of State Activity, pp. 2 0 - 2 9 . 18. K i m H y o n g - s u , a native of K y o n g s a n g p u k t o , d e f e c t e d to t h e N o r t h d u r i n g t h e Korean War. H e was trained as a espionage a g e n t in t h e N o r t h and was sent back to his h o m e t o w n to recruit his older b r o t h e r , w h o was professor of m e d i c i n e at K y o n g b u k U n i v e r s i t y in T a e g u . T h e t w o b r o t h e r s succeeded in r e c r u i t i n g some 13 m e n in T a e g u , and after briefly t r a i n i n g these m e n t h e a g e n t , K i m H y o n g - s u , r e t u r n e d to t h e N o r t h . T h e t w o b r o t h e r s m a i n t a i n e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h s h o r t w a v e radios, but K i m Tae-su a n d all 13 m e n were arrested on M a y 17, 1967. K i m briefly m e n t i o n e d this i n c i d e n t in his speech on D e c e m b e r 16, 1967. For t h e S o u t h Korean a c c o u n t of this incident, see, a m o n g o t h e r s , K i m C h o n g - g i , Pukkoe ui taenam chollyak iil haebu handa, pp. 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . 19. K i m II Sung, Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All Fields of State Activity, p. 28. 20. For t h e festivities p l a n n e d , see Nodong sinmun, J a n u a r y 14, 1968. See a n u m ber of articles on J a n u a r y 6, 10, and 18, 1 9 6 8 . 21. C h ' o e H y o n was b o r n on J u n e 8, 1907, in H u n c h u n p r o v i n c e , J i a n d a o , M a n c h u r i a . H e g r e w u p in his sister's h o m e in K h a b a r o v s k and did n o t a t t e n d s c h o o l . H e j o i n e d guerrillas several t i m e s b e f o r e h e j o i n e d the N o r t h e a s t A n t i J a p a n e s e U n i t e d A r m y . C h ' o e held a b o u t as h i g h a p o s i t i o n as K i m II S u n g did, a n d m e t for t h e first t i m e in S e p t e m b e r 1933. C h ' o e w a s o n e o f the f o u n d e r s of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n m i l i t a r y a n d o n e o f t h e f e w w h o w e r e already generals of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n A r m y b e f o r e t h e K o r e a n W a r . H e r e m a i n e d in the military e s t a b l i s h m e n t as a p r o f e s s i o n a l soldier b u t b e g a n t o m o v e into political circles f r o m 1965, w h e n h e first b e c a m e a m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of the p a r t y a n d also v i c e - m i n i s t e r o f national defense. H e w a s t h e f i f t h - h i g h e s t m e m b e r o f t h e Political C o m m i t t e e at t h e t i m e o f t h e Fifth P a r t y C o n g r e s s . C h ' o e died o n A p r i l 9, 1982. 22. O n e c o m m a n d o captured alive was K i m Sin-jo, w h o later confessed the entire u n d e r t a k i n g f r o m t h e r e c r u i t m e n t and t r a i n i n g to t h e e x e c u t i o n . M o s t of t h e S o u t h Korean accounts of t h e i n c i d e n t c o m e f r o m his testimony. See, a m o n g others, K i m C h o n g - g i , Pukkoe ui taenam chollyak ul haebu handa, pp. 1 0 8 - 1 1 2 ; see also Pukhan ch'onggam, pp. 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 ; a n d Tong-a ilbo, J a n u a r y 2 2 - F e b r u a r v 28, 1968. 23. For various r e p o r t s of S o u t h K o r e a n revolutionary activities, see hlodong

12. The South Korean Revolution

385

sitimun, J a n u a r y 2 3 - F e b r u a r y 8, 1968. For the statistics and the d e s c r i p t i o n o f a n u m b e r o f s m a l l i n c i d e n t s b y N o r t h K o r e a n n e w s services, sec Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1969, pp. 3 1 4 - 3 2 6 . For K i m ' s e n c o u r a g e m e n t , see his t w e n t i e t h a n n i v e r sary speech o f t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e republic on S e p t e m b e r 7, 1968, in Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 5 : 1 3 3 - 2 0 0 . 2 4 . It is n o t m y p u r p o s e h e r e to discuss t h e Pueblo incident, b u t o n l y its i m p a c t o n N o r t h K o r e a n d o m e s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t s . For t h e N o r t h K o r e a n official a c c o u n t of t h e i n c i d e n t , see t h e N o r t h K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t declarations o n J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 6 8 , and an article in Chosön chungang yon'gam, 1969, pp. 1 8 9 - 1 9 2 and 5 2 9 . For t h e N o r t h K o r e a n a c c o u n t of t h e i r release of t h e crew of t h e Pueblo in D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 8 , see t h e s t a t e m e n t by t h e Foreign M i n i s t r y s p o k e s m a n on D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 6 8 , and t h e n e w s release by t h e K o r e a n C e n t r a l N e w s A g e n c y on D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 1968; ibid., pp. 5 5 0 - 5 5 1 . For t h e capture of t h e Pueblo, see t h e Nodong sinmun, article on J a n u a r y 2 4 , 1 9 6 8 , and an editorial on J a n u a r y 28. 2 5 . For t h e text o f his speech in English see a small p a m p h l e t , K i m II S u n g , On the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Korean People's Army. 2 6 . See his speech t o t h e y o u n g people on April 13, 1968, in K i m II S u n g , Ch'öngsonyön saöpkwa sahoe chuüi nodong ch'öngnyön tongmaeng üi immu e taehayö, 2:484-522. 2 7 . In t h e same speech, K i m boasted that N o r t h Korea was giving f o r e i g n aid t o a less f o r t u n a t e c o u n t r y , m e a n i n g V i e t n a m ; Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip, 5:10-44. 2 8 . For t h e c o n g r a t u l a t o r y messages by K i m t o these units, see Invincible Is the Korean People's Army Founded and Trained by Ever-Victorious, Iron-Willed Genius Commander, Marshal Kim II Sung, pp. 1 4 - 3 4 . 29. D i r e c t i n f i l t r a t i o n s of t h e S o u t h are t o o n u m e r o u s t o m e n t i o n h e r e . See, for e x a m p l e , t h e K i m Tae-su incident. F r o m J a p a n , operations w e r e f i n a n c e d a n d directed by t h e Korean resident g r o u p in J a p a n ; see, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e Minjok ilbo i n c i d e n t , for w h i c h C h o Yong-su, S o n g C h i - y ö n g , and o t h e r s w e r e s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h . T h e r e was even a N o r t h K o r e a n agent (Yi C h a e - s ö n ) w h o s u b v e r t e d a J a p a n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y official ( Y a m a m o t o ) for espionage activities. In E u r o p e , activities w e r e directed m o s t l y f r o m East Berlin, w h e r e a f o r m e r director of t h e Liaison B u r e a u (Pak I l - y ö n g ) was ambassador. T h e N o r t h Koreans attracted intellectuals and s t u d e n t s in E u r o p e and tried to c o n v e r t t h e m into agents t o o p e r a t e in S o u t h Korea. See K i m C h ö n g - g i , Pukkoe üi taenam chöllyak ül haebu handa, p p . 44-189. 3 0 . K i m C h o n g - t ' a e was b o r n on N o v e m b e r 24, 1926, in N a e n g c h ' ö n - d o n g , K ü m h o m y ö n , Y ö n g c h ' o n c o u n t y , K y ö n g s a n g p u k t o . T h e r e are a n u m b e r of accounts of this i n c i d e n t f r o m b o t h t h e N o r t h and t h e S o u t h . For t h e N o r t h Korean accounts, see Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1969, pp. 3 1 1 - 3 1 4 . See also Chosen shiryö (August 1969), no. 9 9 , pp. 2-9. For t h e S o u t h K o r e a n account see, a m o n g others, Pukhan chönsö, 3 : 7 5 - 9 1 . See also K i m C h ö n g - g i , Pukkoe üi taenam chöllyak ül haebu handa. 31. Yi was b o r n in 1934, a native of P ' y ö n g a n p u k t o . H e fled t h e N o r t h s h o r t l y after t h e liberation of Korea and lived m o s t l y in T a e g u , K y ö n g s a n g p u k t o . U p o n

386

12. T H E S O U T H K O R E A N R E V O L U T I O N

g r a d u a t i o n f r o m h i g h s c h o o l , t h e r e , h e a t t e n d e d Seoul N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , m a j o r i n g in political science. H e served in t h e S o u t h K o r e a n air force as an o f f i c e r a f t e r h e graduated f r o m college. 32. O t h e r s t h e y m e n t i o n e d w e r e Ch'dngnyon munhakka hydphoe [Young Literary W r i t e r s ' C o u n c i l ] , Tonghak hoe [Eastern L e a r n i n g Association], Kitokkyo ch'ongnydn kyongje pokchihoe [Christian Youth E c o n o m i c Assurance Association], and Songsan suyanghoe [Songsan D i s c i p l i n a r y Association]. M o s t of these w e r e organizations i n n a m e only w i t h a t o k e n m e m b e r s h i p to j u s t i f y t h e n a m e . See Choson chungang yon'gam, 196 7. 33. K i m C h o n g - t ' a e and his f o u r sentenced to death, four others were w i f e , Y i m Yong-suk, and 21 p e o p l e various t e r m s of i m p r i s o n m e n t f r o m

accomplices, i n c l u d i n g Yi M u n - g y u , w e r e sentenced t o life i m p r i s o n m e n t , and K i m ' s related to K i m ' s f a m i l y were sentenced t o t w o to t w e n t y - f i v e years.

3 4 . T h e decision was m a d e at t h e Political C o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e on J u l y 1, 1969. See t h e details in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1970, p. 204. 35. For t h e full text of t h e d o c u m e n t s , see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1970, p p . 5 1 3 - 5 1 7 . K i m said that t h e p l a t f o r m was m a d e public in A u g u s t 1 9 6 9 by t h e p a r t y h e a d q u a r t e r s in Seoul. For K i m ' s r e f e r e n c e to this p l a t f o r m , see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 5:485. 36. For t h e text of K i m ' s speech on t h e t w e n t i e t h anniversary of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e republic on S e p t e m b e r 7, 1 9 6 8 , see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 5 : 1 3 3 - 2 0 0 . See also an article by Paek K i l - m a n , " N a m c h o s o n i n m i n d u l un ojik p ' o n g y o k c h o k p a n g b o p e u i h a e s o m a n c h u g w o n ul c h a e n g c h ' w i halsu itta."

13. Disintegration

of the Partisan

Group

1. A n u m b e r of statues w e r e erected in 1968 h o n o r i n g t h e partisans An Kil, C h o C h o n g - c h ' o l , C h ' o e C h ' u n - g u n , K a n g K o n , K i m C h ' a e k , and Yu K y o n g - s u . T h e r e were n u m e r o u s b o o k s p u b l i s h e d about t h e partisans w h o died b e f o r e t h e liberation of Korea. See a m o n g o t h e r s , Hyongmyong sonyol dul ui saengae wa hwaltong. 2. For t h e text of this speech by K i m K w a n g - h y o p , see Nodong sinmun, 15, 1 9 6 8 .

February

3. T h e partisan generals d o m i n a t e d t h e political scene on every occasion and m a d e speeches o f t e n . T h e texts of t h e i r speeches were o f t e n p r i n t e d in full in n e w s p a p e r s . See, for e x a m p l e , K i m C h ' a n g - b o n g ' s speeches of F e b r u a r y 8 and J u n e 2 8 , 1968; C h ' o e K w a n g ' s speech on J u l y 27, 1968; and Yi Y o n g - h o ' s speech on J u l y 2 9 , 1968. 4. K i m C h u n g - n i n is a native of H a m g y o n g p u k t o w h o has w o r k e d in his native provincial p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n for a long time. H e was elected a candidate m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e at t h e t i m e of t h e F o u r t h Party C o n g r e s s in 1 9 6 1 , b u t w o r k e d as a key m e m b e r of t h e N o r t h Korean Red Cross, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e N o r t h at G e n e v a Red Cross m e e t i n g s . H e facilitated t h e r e t u r n of Koreans in J a p a n to N o r t h Korea. A f t e r t h e p u r g e of t h e partisan generals, he b e c a m e

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prominent and was the tenth-ranking member o f the Central Committee by the fifth congress in 1970. 5. T h e text o f Kim's concluding remarks is available and no such order was issued. Kim spoke on the manpower administration on November 16, 1968, the last day o f the plenum. 6. T h e plenums and party committee meetings o f the army were never made public. This source reported that such a plenum was held from January 6 - 1 4 , 1969, but this source, presumably a South Korean intelligence source, may not be accurate because Kim was participating in the festivities o f the tenth anniversary o f the Red Workers-Peasant Militia on January 13, 1969. For the South Korean sources see, among others, Pukhan chonso, 1 : 2 6 3 - 2 6 5 , and 2 : 3 1 - 3 3 . See also Pukhan chongch'ircm, pp. 2 5 8 - 2 6 7 . For Kim's whereabouts in January 1969, see North Korean accounts in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1970, p. 583. 7. This is a portion o f a speech Kim made at the eighteenth plenum o f the Central Committee on November 16, 1968, Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 5:284. 8. T h e entire speech Kim gave at the nineteenth plenum o f the Central C o m mittee on J u n e 30, 1 9 6 9 , is not available. Only some excerpts were included in Kim II Sung, Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo, 3 : 5 2 2 - 5 8 1 . 9. This was Kim's speech at the P'yongan namdo party conference on February 15, 1969. Here again only excerpts are available; ibid., pp. 4 8 1 - 4 9 4 . 10. See Kim's speech on February 2 7 , 1970, to the conference o f industrial workers in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 5 : 3 6 4 - 3 9 5 . 11. Choson chungang 12. None o f these South. T h e y have not existence o f the R P R

yon'gam, 1970, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 5 . representatives was known either in the North or in the been heard o f since. T h e North Koreans have claimed the in Seoul, but no such organization exists in the South.

13. For the full text, see Kim II Sung, Choson nodongdang che och'a taehoe eso han chungang wiwdnhoe saop ch'onghwa pogo. This speech was delivered on the first day, November 2, 1970. 14. Kim later elaborated three major tasks o f the technological revolution: to reduce the imbalance in the burden o f heavy and light industry workers, to narrow the gap between the workloads o f industrial and agrarian workers, and to free women from the heavy burdens o f daily household chores. See Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6 : 7 4 - 1 1 1 . 15. Fot the text o f Kim Kuk-hun's report, see Nodong Sinmun, November 4, 1970, 16. For details o f the six-year economic plan, see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1971, p. 1 0 1 - 1 1 6 ; for details o f the Fifth Party Congress, see pp. 1 5 7 - 1 7 1 . 17. See the complete roster o f newly elected members and the analysis o f the change in Dae-Sook Suh, Korean Communism, 1945-1980, pp. 3 0 9 - 3 3 7 .

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PART VI N O R T H KOREA U N D E R KIM 1. T h e reference can be f o u n d in party, his report at t h e f i f t h j o i n t D e c e m b e r 15, 1952. It is i m p o r t a n t t h e reference because it was o m i t t e d Kim 11 Sung sonjip, 4 : 3 5 3 - 3 5 4 .

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one of t h e most i m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t s of t h e p l e n u m of the Central C o m m i t t e e held on to see t h e first edition of Kim's work to f i n d f r o m later versions of his selected works. See

Korea and the Third

World

1. F r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n came Sharaf R. Rashodov, t h e first secretary of t h e Uzbekistan C o m m u n i s t Party, in D e c e m b e r 1971 and later Vice-Premier Yevgnity N o v i k o v and Konstantin Katushev, secretary of the C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e C o m m u n i s t Party of t h e Soviet U n i o n . In J u l y 1971, the C h i n e s e delegation headed by Li X i a n n i a n , vice-premier of the State C o u n c i l , and Li D e s h e n g , director of t h e General Political D e p a r t m e n t of the People's Liberation Army, visited t h e N o r t h . M a n y delegations f r o m t h e N o r t h went to Beijing and M o s c o w d u r i n g 1971 and 1972, i n c l u d i n g such h i g h g o v e r n m e n t officials as C h ' o e Yonggon, C h o n g C h u n - t ' a e k , H o T a m , and O C h i n - u . 2. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of references in Kim's speeches to Nixon's trip to China. See, a m o n g others, his speeches on December 2 and December 14, 1971, in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6:136-63 and 164-93. T h e r e was a report by Utsunomiya T o k u m a in Yomiuri shinbun (August 19, 1975) that Kim II Sung himself made a secret trip to Peking to celebrate Prince Sihanouk's fiftieth birthday in October 1972, but Utsunomiya's report was unfounded because Prince Sihanouk celebrated his fiftieth birthday in Pyongyang w i t h Kim II Sung on November 4, 1972. See Kim's speech on the occasion in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1973. pp. 107-115. 3. T h e second p l e n u m was held April 19-23, 1971, and discussed t h e unification p r o b l e m , t h e technical revolution in orchards, and public health programs. T h e third p l e n u m was held N o v e m b e r 15-23 and discussed t h e quality of cons u m e r goods. K i m II Sung made a speech at t h e third p l e n u m , b u t t h e text of his speech about unification was not made public. For the account of t h e plenums, See Choson chungang yon'gam, 1972, pp. 2 6 7 - 2 7 0 . 4. See t h e N o r t h Korean accounts of Kim's interview w i t h reporters f r o m Asahi shinbun and K y o d o N e w s Agency in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6 : 7 4 - 1 1 1 . See also a similar reference in his speech at the f i f t h congress of the General Federation of Trade U n i o n s of Korea on D e c e m b e r 14, 1971, in K i m II Sung, On the Character and Tasks of the Trade Union in Socialist Society, pp. 32-35. 5. See t h e report on t h e f i f t h session of the f o u r t h Supreme People's Assembly in Choson chungang yong'am, 1972, pp. 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ; see also t h e N o r t h Korean account of t h e Red Cross talks on pp. 3 6 9 - 3 7 1 . For Kim's speech on August 6, 1971 to w e l c o m e Prince Sihanouk to Pyongyang, see K i m II Sung, The NonAlignment Movement Is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times, pp. 114-130.

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6. T h e r e are seven articles in t h e c o m m u n i q u é . T h e first delineates t h r e e p r i n c i ples u p o n w h i c h t h e dialogue was t o be c o n d u c t e d . F o r t h e t e x t of t h e c o m m u n i q u é , see Nambuk taehwa paeksô, pp. 3 6 - 3 7 . T h e s a m e text can be f o u n d in N o r t h K o r e a n publications in Chosôn chungang yon'gam, 1973, p p . 3 3 6 - 3 3 7 . 7. A g r e e m e n t on t h e c o m p o s i t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of t h e N o r t h - S o u t h C o o r d i n a t i n g C o m m i t t e e , Nambuk chojôl wiwôtihoe, was r e a c h e d on N o v e m b e r 4, 1 9 7 2 . T h e c o - c h a i r m e n w e r e Yi H u - r a k (director of t h e S o u t h K o r e a n C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y ) a n d K i m Yông-ju (secretary and m e m b e r of t h e Political C o m m i t t e e a n d b r o t h e r of K i m II Sung). In addition to t h e c o - c h a i r m e n , t h e r e w e r e f o u r m e m b e r s f r o m each side, and t h e c o m m i t t e e consisted of t e n m e n . T h e S o u t h K o r e a n m e m bers were C h a n g K i - y ô n g ( f o r m e r v i c e - p r e m i e r a n d m e m b e r of t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly), C h ' o e K y u - h a ( f o r m e r f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r a n d assistant t o t h e p r e s i d e n t on d i p l o m a t i c affairs), K a n g I n - d ô k , and C h ô n g H o n g - j i n ( t w o b u r e a u chiefs of t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency). T h e N o r t h K o r e a n d e l e g a t i o n consisted of Pak S ô n g - c h ' ô l , w h o acted on behalf of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n c o - c h a i r m a n , Yu C h a n g - s i k ( m e m b e r of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e and c h a i r m a n of t h e p a r t y ' s e x t e r n a l affairs section), Yi W a n - g i (councilor to t h e cabinet), H a n U n g - s i k a n d K i m T ô k - h y ô n ( t w o staff m e m b e r s of t h e Political C o m m i t t e e of t h e p a r t y ) . 8. T h e r e are n u m e r o u s accounts of t h e S o u t h K o r e a n p o s i t i o n a n d t h e i r initial proposals. In addition to t h e w h i t e paper cited above, see Pukhan chônsô, 3:115-126. 9. For details of t h e N o r t h Korean position, see Chosôn chungang yôn'gam, 1973, pp. 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 . T h e N o r t h Korean t r e a t m e n t of t h e C o o r d i n a t i n g C o m m i t t e e was p e r f u n c t o r y at best w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e S o u t h K o r e a n s , w h o h a d h o p e d f o r s o m e sort of c o n t i n u e d d i a l o g u e to reduce tension in K o r e a . 10. For t h e Red Cross c o n f e r e n c e s t h e r e are a n u m b e r of p a m p h l e t s f r o m t h e S o u t h , i n c l u d i n g serialized news bulletins, g i v i n g details of each session. See, a m o n g o t h e r s . The Dispersed Families in Korea, p p . 2 1 9 - 2 9 5 . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 m i l lion N o r t h Koreans f l e d f r o m t h e N o r t h to t h e S o u t h f r o m 1 9 4 5 t o 1 9 5 0 , a n d it was estimated that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 5 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e w e r e e i t h e r t a k e n o r v o l u n t a r ily fled to t h e N o r t h d u r i n g t h e Korean War. 11. T h e s t a t e m e n t was m a d e in answer to t h e q u e s t i o n raised by r e p o r t e r s ot Mainichi shinbun on S e p t e m b e r 17, 1972. See t h e N o r t h K o r e a n version in K i m II Sung, On Some Problems of Our Party's Juche Idea and the Government oj the Republic's Internal and External Policies, p. 26. 12. See Kim's explanations m On Some Problems of Our Party's Juche Idea, pp. 15-32. See also his interview w i t h t h e m a n a g i n g e d i t o r of Sekai m a g a z i n e on O c t o b e r 6, 1972; K i m II S u n g , Talk with the Managing Editor of the Japanese PoliticoTheoretical Magazine, Sekai, pp. 2 4 - 3 4 . 13. T h e first proposal for c o n f e d e r a t i o n of t h e N o r t h a n d S o u t h was m a d e on August 14, 1960, as a transitional step for u l t i m a t e u n i f i c a t i o n . K i m has repeated this proposal on a n u m b e r of occasions since t h e n , b u t h e has n o t revealed w h a t the c o n f e d e r a t i o n of t h e t w o systems w o u l d entail. N o r has h e ever d e f i n e d w h a t he m e a n t by c o n f e d e r a t i o n as opposed to f e d e r a t i o n or a n y o t h e r f o r m of unity. For his first reference, see K i m II S u n g , Chosôn inmin ûi minjokchôk p'ariro haebang

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15 chunydn kyongch'uk taehoe eso han pogo, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . K i m a n n o u n c e d his f i v e - p o i n t policy at t h e P y o n g y a n g mass rally t o w e l c o m e t h e p a r t y a n d g o v e r n m e n t d e l e g a tion of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a o n J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 7 3 . See K i m II S u n g , Let Us Prevent a National Split and Reunify the Country, pp. 5 - 1 7 . 14. It is n o t m y p u r p o s e here t o analyze t h e S o u t h Korean strategy in t h e N o r t h - S o u t h dialogue. T h e S o u t h Koreans have also c o n t r i b u t e d significantly t o t h e deterioration of t h e d i a l o g u e . 15. For t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of P r e s i d e n t Park's J u n e 2 3 s t a t e m e n t , see K i m II S u n g , On the Five-Point Policy for National Reunification, pp. 1 - 1 1 . For K i m ' s d e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e S o u t h , see K i m II S u n g , For the Independent, Peaceful Reunification of the Country, pp. 2 3 8 - 2 4 5 . F o r S o u t h Korean views on t h e dialogue, see five essays on t h e subject in Theses on South-North Dialogue. 16. For details of t h e assassination a t t e m p t by M u n S e - g w a n g that killed t h e president's w i f e , see Korea-Japan Relations and the Attempt on the Life of Korea's President, pp. 7 - 1 1 8 . K i m disavowed any responsibility on t h e p a r t of N o r t h Korea o r t h e N o r t h Korean f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n in J a p a n ; see K i m II S u n g , On the Situation of Our Country and Tasks of the League of Korean Youth in Japan, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 . 17. T h e first t u n n e l was discovered on N o v e m b e r 15, 1 9 7 4 , t h e second in M a r c h 1975, and t h e t h i r d in O c t o b e r 1 9 7 8 . See t h e details in Secret Tunnel Under Panmunjom, pp. 3 - 6 1 . 18. See t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d o r d e r f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n in Nodong sinmun, August 2 0 , 1976. T h e earlier m o b i l i z a t i o n o r d e r at t h e t i m e of t h e Pueblo was c o n f i n e d o n l y to t h e a r m e d forces, b u t this o n e i n c l u d e d t h e Red W o r k e r - P e a s a n t Militia and Red Young G u a r d s . For a detailed r e p o r t of t h e i n c i d e n t see Kita Chosen kenkyu (September 1976), no. 2 8 , pp. 5 - 5 4 . 19. See a representative article a b o u t t h e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea by Yu K y e - h a n g in Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 13, 1 9 7 8 . 20. K i m was awarded an h o n o r a r y d o c t o r a t e by Algiers U n i v e r s i t y d u r i n g his visit to Algeria in May 1975. See K i m II S u n g , Speeches Delivered During the Visit to the Algerian Democratic and People's Republic. 21. For t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of T i t o , see his speeches on D e c e m b e r 15, 1945, O c t o b e r 2 3 , 1 9 6 2 , a n d O c t o b e r 5, 1 9 6 6 , in K i m II S u n g , Uri hyongmyong kwa konsol eso inmin chonggwon ui kwadp e taehayo, pp. 4 0 9 - 4 6 3 . See also K i m II S u n g , The Present Situation and the Task of Our Party, pp. 2 - 5 1 . 22. For K i m ' s speech at Ljublijana, Yugoslavia, see K i m II S u n g , Speeches Delivered During the Visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For K i m ' s speech in P y o n g y a n g d u r i n g T i t o ' s visit, see Korea Today, N o v e m b e r 1977, pp. 2 9 - 3 1 . 23. T h e first seven countries w e r e t h e Soviet U n i o n , M o n g o l i a , Poland, C z e c h oslovakia, R o m a n i a , H u n g a r y , a n d Bulgaria. Albania, C h i n a , East G e r m a n y , a n d V i e t n a m r e c o g n i z e d t h e N o r t h by 1 9 5 0 b e f o r e t h e K o r e a n War. See t h e N o r t h Korean a c c o u n t of their relationships, i n c l u d i n g t h e dates w h e n they established d i p l o m a t i c relations, in Choson chungar.g yon'gam, 1966-67, pp. 5 0 5 - 5 0 6 . 24. For a list of c o u n t r i e s w i t h d i p l o m a t i c relations w i t h N o r t h Korea, see B y u n g C h u l K o h , The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 ; a n d Tai S u n g A n , North Korea: A Political Handbook, pp. 8 0 - 8 2 .

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25. In addition to Prince Sihanouk, who practically lived in China and visited the North often, visitors to the North included Daddah o f Mauritania in 1967, Nyerere o f Tanzania in 1968, Adassi o f Syria in 1969, Nimeri o f Sudan in 1970, and Ceausescu o f Romania in 1971. During 1972, there were Barre o f Somalia, Aini o f Yemen, and Beavogui o f Guinea; during 1 9 7 3 , Husak o f Czechoslovakia, N'gouaubi o f Congo, and Zhivkov o f Bulgaria visited the North. There were seven in 1974: Boumedienne o f Algeria, Senghor o f Senegal, Eyadema o f Togo, Daddah o f Mauritania again, Assad o f Syria, Ali o f Yemen (D), and Mobutu o f Zaire. Because of Kim's own trip in 1 9 7 5 , only two visited, Mintoff o f Malta and Da Costa o f Sao Tome and Principe. There were five in 1976: Traore o f Mali, Ali Bhutto o f Pakistan, Ratsiraka o f Madagascar, Kerekou o f Benin, and Khama o f Botswana. 26. T h e r e were only three in 1977: Tito o f Yugoslavia, Pol Pot o f Kampuchea, and Honecker o f East Germany. In 1978, there were Burnham o f Guyana, Kokassa of Central Africa, Rene o f Seychelles, Hua o f China, Machel o f Mozambique, Ceausescu o f Romania, Yhomby-opango o f Congo, Juvenal o f Rwanda, Zia o f Bangladesh, and Ratsiraka o f Malagasy. 27. For the text o f Kim's speech see among others, Korea Today (June 1975), no. 6, pp. 2-8; Peking Review (April 25, 1975), no. 17, pp. 14-17; and Kim II Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, pp. 1 7 5 - 1 8 3 . 28. Speeches Kim made in Romania, Algeria, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia are in a number o f English-language pamphlets published by the North Koreans, but all o f them are also available in Chosön chungang yön'gam, 1976, pp. 5 8 - 9 9 . Most conspicuously absent is the record o f his visit to Mauritania. 29. Most o f his interviews had been with reporters from the socialist and C o m munist countries in the past, but from the 1970s he did grant interview to reporters from nonaligned nations and even a few reporters from such capitalist countries as the United States and Japan. Reporters from the New York Times and the Washington Post as well as reporters from Yomiuri shinbun and Asahi shinbun interviewed Kim, and their reports were widely circulated. Reporters from Yomiuri shinbun interviewed him three times (January 10, 1972, September 2 8 , 1975, and April 2 3 , 1977); Mainichi shinbun twice (September 17, 1972 and November 2 5 , 1975); Asahi shinbun on September 2 5 , 1971; the New York Times (Harrison Salisbury) on May 25, 1972; and the Washington Post (Selig S. Harrison) on J u n e 2 1 , 1972. Most o f these interview accounts are available in the respective newspapers, sec the North Korean account o f all interviews in Kim 11 Sung, Oeguk kijadul 1 chegihan chilmun e taehan taedap. 30. See Kim's interview with Yasue Ryösuke o f the Japanese Magazine Sekai [The world] on March 2 8 , 1976; Kim II Sung, Talk with the Editor-in-Chief of the Japanese Politico-Theoretical Magazine Sekai, pp. 2 6 - 2 8 . 31. See Kim's article about the nonalignment movement where he mentions the entry o f the North into the conference o f the nonaligned nations in Lima, Peru, in Kim II Sung, The Non-Alignment Movement Is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times, pp. 3 1 7 - 3 2 2 . 32. Kim made a number o f denunciations o f the United Nations. See, for exam-

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pie, his speech t o t h e first session of t h e t h i r d S u p r e m e People's Assembly o n O c t o b e r 23, 1962, and his speech to t h e K o r e a n People's A r m y unit on F e b r u a r y 8, 1963, in K i m II Sung, Un üi hyöngmyöng ku>a inmin kundae üi kwaöp e taehayö, pp. 1 4 8 - 2 1 6 . 33. K i m Ii Sung, On Some Problems of Our Party's Juche Idea, pp. 15-23. 34. T h e proposal favoring t h e S o u t h ( G e n e r a l Assembly Resolution 3 3 9 0 A ) was passed by 59 to 51 w i t h 29 abstentions, and t h e proposal favoring t h e N o r t h (General Assembly Resolution 3 3 9 0 B ) was passed by 54 to 4 3 w i t h 4 2 abstentions. T h e question was debated in t h e First C o m m i t t e e on O c t o b e r 2 9 and was voted on N o v e m b e r 18, 1975, in t h e G e n e r a l Assembly. See t h e details in Yearbook of the United Nations, 2 4 : 1 9 3 - 2 0 4 . See also t h e r e p o r t in "Korea: T w o Resolutions Sponsored by D i f f e r i n g G r o u p s A p p r o v e d . " 35. K i m must have e x p e r i e n c e d a less t h a n a d e q u a t e w e l c o m e in M a u r i t a n i a . For Kim's brief speech at t h e N o u a k c h o t t Mass M e e t i n g in Mauritania, see Korea Today (1975), no. 8, pp. 3 6 - 3 8 . 36. For the N o r t h Korean e x p l a n a t i o n for severing d i p l o m a t i c relations w i t h Mauritania, see Nodong sinmun, J u n e 14, 1977. 37. T h e N o r t h Koreans claimed t h a t t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c mission was t h e target ot surveillance and was also t h r e a t e n e d by t h e authorities. See their e x p l a n a t i o n on J u n e 18, 1977, about A r g e n t i n a in Kita Chosen kenkyü (June-July 1977), 4 ( 3 7 ) : 2 7 - 2 9 . For t h e report of severance w i t h Australia, see ibid. ( O c t o b e r 1975), 2(17):38-39. 38. W h i l e N o r t h Korean sources are relatively quiet about their a d v e n t u r e in Sri Lanka, it is generally regarded by t h e T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s that t h e N o r t h Koreans suffered a d i p l o m a t i c setback in t h e f i f t h c o n f e r e n c e of t h e n o n a l i g n e d nations in C o l o m b o in 1976. See Chosen mondai chishiki no subete, pp. 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 . 39. T h e r e were a n u m b e r of r e p o r t s about t h e N o r t h Korean d i p l o m a t s w h o were arrested and expelled f r o m t h e Scandinavian countries. See a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e p o r t on t h e subject in Kita Chosen kenkyü ( N o v e m b e r 1976), no. 30, pp. 1 0 - 1 4 . T h e y were also expelled f r o m S o u t h Y e m e n in April 1975 and f r o m C o s t a Rica in May 1975. 40. Chosen mondai chishiki no subete, pp. 1 9 5 - 1 9 8 . T h e r e are detailed a c c o u n t s of various p e r f o r m a n c e s and exhibitions. 41. In t h e U n i t e d States, t h e r e was a g r o u p k n o w n as t h e A m e r i c a n - K o r e a n Friendship and I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r in N e w York. T h i s g r o u p published i r r e g u larly a p r o p a g a n d a m a g a z i n e called Korea Focus f r o m fall 1971 to spring 1976, but it t o o was discontinued. For N o r t h Korean e c o n o m i c assistance to various T h i r d W o r l d countries, t h e r e is a g o o d survey by N o K y e - h y ö n , " P u k h a n üi pidongmaeng oegyo punsök." 42. T h e seminar was held f r o m S e p t e m b e r 14 t o S e p t e m b e r 17, 1977. T h e r e were no representatives f r o m e i t h e r C h i n a or t h e Soviet U n i o n . See t h e speeches of t h e participants in The International Seminar on the Juche Idea.

15. The Shift from Party to State

393

15. The Shift from Party to State 1. It is not my purpose here to discuss political changes in the South. Only brief mention is made to give proper perspective on the changes that took place in the North. For the programs and constitution o f the revitalized reform in the South, see the details o f the amendment and the text o f the constitution in Pak Il-gyong, Yusin honbop, and The October Revitalizing Reforms of the Republic of Korea. T h e constitution o f the Republic o f Korea had been amended seven times, thrice by Rhee, once by the second republic, and thrice by Park Chung Hee, including the October Revitalized Constitution o f October 1972. 2. For a slightly different interpretation of the new constitution see Chong-sik Lee, " T h e 1972 Constitution and Top Communist Leaders," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds. Political Leadership in Korea, pp. 1 9 2 - 2 1 9 . 3. For the text and analysis o f the Socialist Constitution, the new 1972 constitution o f the North, see On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 4. Article 76 stipulated that the Supreme People's Assembly has the right to elect or recall the vice-president o f the republic, the secretary, and members o f the Central People's Committee, but only on the recommendation o f the president o f the republic; ibid., pp. 6 5 - 6 6 . 5. T h e r e were 25 members o f the first Central People's Committee in 1 9 7 2 , and it included all 15 members and candidate members o f the Political Committee o f the Central Committee except two, So Ch'ol and Han Ik-su. These two were elected to the Standing Committee o f the Supreme People's Assembly. In addition to the 13 members and candidate members o f the Political Committee o f the party there were 12 new members o f the Central People's Committee. For the composition o f the Central People's Committee and other officers o f the government elected at the fifth Supreme People's Assembly, see Korea Today ( 1 9 7 3 ) , no. 196, pp. 3 1 - 3 2 . 6. For details o f the discussion o f farming at the twelfth plenum in October 1976, see Kulloja (December 1976), pp. 2-8. For the report o f the plenum, see Nodong sinmun, October 11, 1976. 7. See, for example, Kim's speech in Kim II Sung chojale sonjip, 6 : 3 2 6 - 3 6 9 . This speech was made at the first session o f the fifth Supreme People's Assembly on December 25, 1972. He made a similar speech at the first session o f the sixth Supreme People's Assembly on December 15, 1977. See Kim II Sung, Let Us Further Strengthen the People's Government. 8. T h e open letter was adopted at the sixteenth plenum o f the Central C o m m i t tee held on January 8, 1978. For the report o f Y i Chong-ok at the sixth Supreme People's Assembly, see Pyongyang Times, December 17 and December 2 4 , 1977. 9. C h ' o e Yong-gon, perhaps the most famous partisan after Kim, died on September 19, 1976, at the age o f 76. See the announcement o f his death in Nodong sinmun, September 2 0 , 1976. Chong Chun-t'aek, the foremost technocrat, who was appointed twelve times to five different cabinet posts, died on January 11, 1973. See the report in Nodong sinmun, January 12, 1973. Chong was 63 years

394

15. T H E S H I F T F R O M P A R T Y T O STATE

old w h e n h e died. H a n Ik-su, partisan general and d i p l o m a t , died on S e p t e m b e r 5, 1 9 7 8 , at t h e age of 6 6 . See Nodong sinmun, S e p t e m b e r 6, 1978. 10. T h e e i g h t h p l e n u m was h e l d F e b r u a r y 11-14, 1974, and t h e t e n t h p l e n u m was held F e b r u a r y 1 1 - 1 7 , 1 9 7 5 . T h e n i n t h p l e n u m was held s o m e t i m e in b e t w e e n , m o s t likely in t h e fall of 1 9 7 4 . T h e p r o b l e m of succession m i g h t have been t h e a g e n d a for this p l e n u m , h e n c e t h e silence. 11. For K i m ' s speech on t h e anniversary of t h e party, see K i m II Sung, On the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Workers' Party of Korea. For his speech o n t h e a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t , see K i m II S u n g , Let Us Step Up Socialist Construction Under the Banner of the Juche Idea. 12. Sec t h e t e x t of K i m ' s speech in English in K i m II S u n g , Let Us Further Strengthen the People's Government. T h i s speech was m a d e on D e c e m b e r 15, 1977. 13. For K i m ' s r e f e r e n c e to material incentives, see his speech at t h e e n l a r g e d m e e t i n g of t h e Political C o m m i t t e e of t h e party on F e b r u a r y 1, 1973; Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6 : 3 9 2 - 4 0 7 . 14. For t h e r e f e r e n c e a b o u t t h e y o u n g people l e a r n i n g f o r e i g n languages, see his speech in K i m II S u n g , The Youth Must Take Over the Revolution and Carry It Forward, pp. 1 8 2 - 2 2 9 15. T h e T h r e e R e v o l u t i o n s refer to t h e ideological, t e c h n o l o g i c a l , and cultural revolutions. It appeared in N o r t h K o r e a n publications f r o m about O c t o b e r 1973. See Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1 9 7 3 . For a discussion of t h e t h r e e - r e v o l u t i o n policy, see Kyongae hanun suryong Kim II Sung tongji kkeso palk'yo chusin samdae hyongmyong noson ui widaehan saenghwallydk. 16. See K i m ' s speech o n M a r c h 3, 1975; K i m II S u n g , Samdae hydngmyong til himikke pollyo sahoe chuui konsol ul touk taguch'ija. In c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h this m o v e m e n t , see an article o n t h e s u b j c c t b y a S o u t h K o r e a n analyst, Y a n g H o - m i n , " S a m d a e h y o n g m y o n g ui w o l l y u w a c h o n ' g a e . " 17. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of articles in b o t h Kulloja, t h e party o r g a n , and Nodong sinmun, t h e p a r t y daily, o n t h e subject. A representative o n e is " S a m d a e h y o n g m y o n g p u l g u n ' g i c h a e n g c h ' w i u n d o n g un o n s a h o e ui c h u c h ' e sasanghwa rul t o u k h i m i k k e t a g u c h ' y o nagagi w i h a n saeroun t a e j u n g j o k u n d o n g " [ T h e t h r e e - r e v o l u t i o n Red Flag m o v e m e n t is t h e n e w mass m o v e m e n t for f u r t h e r d e v e l o p i n g t h e Chuch'e i d e o l o g y t h r o u g h o u t society], Kulloja (1976), no. 4 (408), pp. 4 3 - 5 0 . See Nodong sinmun, N o v e m b e r 11, 1976. 18. For t h e text of this speech, w h i c h was n o t included in t h e selected w o r k s , see t h e text in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1974, pp. 8 - 2 4 . 19. T h i s speech was m a d e in t h e Political C o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g held in K a n g s o on M a r c h 14, 1 9 7 3 . T h e t e x t is available in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6:415-445. 20. K i m ' s first r e f e r e n c e to this phrase c a m e as early as his speech on J u n e 2 4 , 1 9 7 1 . See K i m II S u n g , The Youth Must Take Over the Revolution and Carry It Forward. H e repeated it again t o t h e visiting K o r e a n resident y o u t h groups f r o m J a p a n on A u g u s t 3 1 , 1 9 7 3 . For t h e K o r e a n text ot this speech, see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6 : 4 7 8 - 4 9 3 .

15. The Shift from Party to State

395

21. For t h e r e f e r e n c e to " h u m a n wave tactics," see his speech on M a r c h 14, 1973; Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 4 : 4 1 5 - 4 4 5 ; also available in Kulloja ( 1 9 7 5 ) , no. 3 (395), pp. 2 - 2 2 . 22. M o r g a n E. C l i p p i n g e r , " K i m C h o n g - i l in t h e N o r t h K o r e a n Mass M e d i a : A Survey of Semi-Esoteric C o m m u n i c a t i o n , " Asian Survey ( M a r c h 1981), 21(3):289-309. 23. Nodong sinmun, J a n u a r y 14 and J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 7 6 . T h e s e c a m p a i g n s w e r e t a k i n g place in t h e Suan mines and 9 - 2 8 factories. 24. See a representative article by C h ' o n S e - b o n g , " O n s a h o e ui c h u c h ' e sasang h w a e i b a j i h a n u n h y o n g m y o n g j o k m u n y e c h a k p ' u m ul c h ' a n g j a k halte t a e h a n t a n g ui t ' a g w o l h a n p a n g c h ' i m . " 25. " W i d a e h a n s u r y o n g n i m k k e k k u t opsi c h ' u n g s i l h a y o t t o n p u r g u l ui kongsan c h u u i h y o n g m y o n g t'usa K i m C h o n g - s u k t o n g j i . " 26. For t h e story about t h e m u s e u m , see H w a n g C h o n g - h u i , " Y o n g w o n h a n c h ' u n g s o n g uro p u r u n u n h y o n g m y o n g ui c h i p . " See K i m S o n g - a e ' s speech on M a r c h 7, 1975, in c o m m e m o r a t i o n of t h e s i x t y - f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l W o m e n ' s Day, M a r c h 8; Nodong sinmun, M a r c h 9, 1 9 7 5 . 27. T h e full text was r e p r o d u c e d in a secret d o c u m e n t by t h e C e n t r a l Intelligence A g e n c y in S o u t h Korea; Pukkoe kanbu mil tangwon haksup iharyo, pp. 1 8 7 - 2 1 3 . P o r t i o n s of t h e text w e r e r e p r o d u c e d in J a p a n e s e in Kita Chosen kenkyu ( M a r c h 1977), no. 34 pp. 5-9; a n d ( J u n e - J u l y 1977), n o . 3 7 , p p . 5 0 - 5 5 . See t h e r e p o r t on t h e release of t h e d o c u m e n t a n d t h e lecture series of t h e C h o s o r e n in F e b r u a r y 1977 in Mainichi shinbun, F e b r u a r y 12 a n d 13, 1 9 7 7 . 28. Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 15, 1980. 29. T h e s e w e r e t h e theses presented t o t h e e i g h t h p l e n u m of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e p a r t y on February 2 5 , 1964. See t h e text in E n g l i s h , K i m II S u n g , Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country. 30. I n o u e S h u h a c h i , Modern Korea and Kim Jong II, p p . 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 . 31. For K i m J o n g Il's biographical i n f o r m a t i o n , see C h ' o e In-su, Kim Jong It: The People's Leader, N a d a Takashi, A Paean of Great Love; Kim Jong II and the People. T h e s e are all N o r t h Korean official accounts, a n d s i m p l e fact a b o u t his life are hard t o f i n d . 32. For t h e guerrilla activities of K a n g K o n a n d O C h u n g - h u p , see Part 1 of this study. 33. C h ' o e In-su, Kim Jong II: The People's Leader, 2 : 3 7 8 - 3 7 9 . 34. In an interview w i t h a J a p a n e s e socialist on M a y 13, 1 9 7 8 , K i m said t h a t he o f t e n plays w i t h his g r a n d c h i l d r e n on holidays. See Shakai shinpd. M a y 2 6 , 1978; also in Kita Chosen kenkyu (June 1978), n o . 4 8 , p p . 5 6 - 5 7 . H i s c h i l d r e n f r o m his present w i f e are too y o u n g to give h i m g r a n d c h i l d r e n , a n d t h e y m u s t be f r o m either his son K i m J o n g II or his d a u g h t e r . 35. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of r e p o r t s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t his second w i f e has h a d t w o t o f o u r c h i l d r e n by K i m . See, a m o n g o t h e r s , t h e a c c o u n t of N i s h i t a n i K u n i o , w h o spoke of t w o c h i l d r e n , a boy and a girl, in Mirai, D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 0 , p. 54. O t h e r s r e p o r t e d f o u r ( t w o boys and t w o girls) and i d e n t i f i e d t h e boys by t h e n a m e s of K i m Kyong-il and K i m Pyong-il and t h e girls by t h e n a m e s of K i m S o n g - i l a n d

396

15. T H E SHIFT F R O M PARTY T O STATE

K i m Yong-ja. W h e n I visited the N o r t h , t h e parry- cadres' replv to mv direct question about the n u m b e r of children f r o m Kim's second w i f e was that she had four children, three boys and a girl.

16. Semiretiremetit

in the New

Era

1. Pyongyang Times, April 12, 1986. 2. For the death of these m e n , see Nodong sinmun, J a n u a r y 10, 1983, and M a r c h 10, 1984. 3. Nodong sinmun, September 20, 1976. 4. Nodong sinmun, April 10, 1982. 5. Kim II Sung, Tasks of the People's Government in Modelling the Whole of Society on the Juche Idea. 6. Kim II Sung, On the Korean People's Struggle to Apply the Juche Idea. 7. K i m II Sung, Historical Experience of Building the Workers' Party of Korea. 8. Pyongyang Times, S e p t e m b e r 11, 1983. 9. Texts of these interviews are available in English in individual pamphlets published by t h e Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang. 10. The Leader Comrade Kim II Surig's Official State Visit to the People's Republic oj China (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), P. 11. 11. Nodong sinmun, September 18 and 28, 1982. 12. Pyongyang Times, May 26, 1984. 13. Pyongyang Times, May 30 and J u n e 6, 1987. 14. Nodong sinmun, July 12, 1985. 15. Nodong sinmun, April 10, 1985. 16. Nodong sinmun, August 9, 1985. For detailed discussion of the change in N o r t h Korea's reunification policy, see Dae-Sook Suh, " C h a n g e s in N o r t h Korean Politics and the Unification Policy," Korea and World Affairs, 9(4):684-706. 17. T h o s e newly elected to the Central C o m m i t t e e included C h o n H a - c h ' o l at the e i g h t h p l e n u m in D e c e m b e r 1983 and Kang Sun-hui, Kim W o n - j u n , and C h o n C h i n - s u at the t e n t h p l e n u m in D e c e m b e r 1984. T h o s e w h o were elected candidate m e m b e r s included Kim Kwang-jin, O Song-yol, C h ' o e Kwang-yong, C h ' o e T o k - h o n g , Pak Yun-sok, Y i m T ' a e - y o n g , and C h u C h ' a n g - j u n at the e i g h t h p l e n u m in D e c e m b e r 1983. At the tenth p l e n u m , K i m Kwan-hak, C h o n g H o - g y u n , N a m Sang-hak, K i m Song-gu, C h ' o e P o n g - m a n , and Kim C h ' o l m y o n g were elected m e m b e r s of the Central C o m m i t t e e . See Nodong sinmun, D e c e m b e r 11, 1984. 18. Nodong sinmun, O c t o b e r 2, 1985. 19. Nodong sinmun, February 17, 1985. 20. For t h e text of t h e j o i n t - v e n t u r e law in English see Pyongyang Times, Sept e m b e r 15, 1984. 21. Pyongyang Times, May 31, J u n e 7, July 19, 1986.

17. On Kim's

Political

Thought

397

PART VII. C H U C H ' E A N D T H E REPUBLIC

17. On Kim's Political

Thought

1. T h e r e are m a n y books on t h e subject of chuch'e by K i m , but these are all collections of his speeches, reports, and p o r t i o n s ot interviews. See, a m o n g o t h e r s , K i m II S u n g , Chuch'e sasang e taehayo', K i m 11 S u n g , Uri hyongmyong eso ui chuch'e e taehayo. For t h e study of t h e chuch'e idea, see such representative w o r k s as t h e t h r e e - v o l u m e study by t h e Social Science Institute of t h e A c a d e m y of Sciences, Hyongmyong kwa kdnsol e kwanhan Kim II Sung tongji ui sasanggwa ku widaehan seanghwallyok [ T h e t h o u g h t of C o m r a d e K i m II S u n g on revolution and construction and its great s t r e n g t h ] ( P y o n g y a n g : Sahoe k w a h a g w o n c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1969). A n o t h e r w o r k by t h e same institute is entitled Widaehan surydng Kim II Sung tongji ui chuch'e sasang. T h e same institute has b e g u n t o publish separate v o l u m e s on t h e implications of t h e chuch'e idea in various fields such as w o r l d revolution, socialist and C o m m u n i s t construction theories, socialist e c o n o m i c theories, t h e T h r e e Revolution T e a m theory, and language and linguistic theories. See, for e x a m p l e , Chuch'e sasang e kich'ohan samdae hyongmyong iron; Chuch'e sasang e kich'ohan segyen hyongmyong iron. 2. K i m II S u n g , " R e p o r t to t h e F i f t h C o n g r e s s of t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of Korea on t h e W o r k of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , " in Selected Works, 5 : 5 0 0 - 5 0 1 . 3. K i m 11 Sung, Uri tang ui chuch'e sasang kwa konghwaguk chongbu ui taenaeoe chongch'aek ui myot kaji munje e taehayo, pp. 1 - 1 3 . 4. Hyongmyong kwa kdnsol e kwanhan widaehan surydng Kim II Sung tongji ui kyosi,

pp. 2-13. 5. For discussion of t h e idea of chaju, see Widaehan ui chuch'e sasang, pp. 1 5 3 - 1 7 0 .

suryong Kim II Sung

tongji

6. Ibid., pp. 1 7 1 - 1 8 5 . See also K i m II S u n g , On Some Problems oj Our Party's Juche Idea and the Government oj the Republic's Internal and External Policies, pp. 1 - 1 5 . 7. Widaehan surydng Kim II Sung tongji ui chuch'e sasang, pp. 1 8 5 - 2 0 4 . See also K i m ' s speech to t h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s a n d c o m p a n y political commissars of t h e K o r e a n People's A r m v on O c t o b e r 11, 1973, in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 6:494-523. 8. Kim II sung tongji ui hydngmyong sasang e taehayo, pp. 18-49. 9. For K i m ' s discussion of national n i h i l i s m , minjok homu chuiii, see K i m II S u n g , Sahoe kwahak immu e taehayo, pp. 5 0 9 - 5 1 1 . For his discussion of restorationism, pokko chuui, see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 5 : 4 5 8 - 4 6 0 . For t h e d e f i nition of these and o t h e r t e r m s , see Chdngch'i sajon. 10. Kim 403-462.

II Sung tongji ui hyongmyong

sasang e taehayo, pp. 2 7 - 2 8 , 4 7 - 4 9 , and

11. H i s earlier b i o g r a p h y had h i m back in m i d d l e school after his j a i l i n g in J i l i n at this t i m e , b u t this was later corrected and had h i m in G e l u n s p e a k i n g t o t h e y o u n g people. For t h e t e x t of his speech, see K i m II S u n g , Choson hydngmyong ui chillo.

398

17. O N KIM'S P O L I T I C A L T H O U G H T

12. Published in t h e 1970s w e r e speeches of J u n e 30, 1 9 3 0 , M a y 2 0 1931, D e c e m b e r 16, 1931, April 25, 1932, M a r c h 11, 1933, M a r c h 2 7 , 1933, May 10 1933, M a r c h 27 1935, February 2 7 , 1936, May 5, 1936, M a r c h 2 9 , 1937, J u n e 4, 1937, N o v e m b e r 10, 1937, A u g u s t 10, 1940, and S e p t e m b e r 15, 1943. Texts of all these speeches are available, m o s t l y p u b l i s h e d in t h e 1970s in p a m p h l e t s . 13. T h i s speech is said to have b e e n delivered to t h e political cadres and political instructors of t h e Korean People's R e v o l u t i o n a r y A r m y on S e p t e m b e r 15, 1943. T h e y d o not say w h e r e h e delivered it, b u t K i m at this t i m e was in t h e Russian M a r i t i m e P r o v i n c e . See t h e p a m p h l e t , K i m II S u n g , The Korean Revolutionaries Must Know Korea Well. 14. K i m 11 Sung, Sasang sadp eso kyojo chuui wa hydngsik chuui rul t'oech'i hago chuch'e rul hwangnip halte laehayd. E n g l i s h versions of this speech w e r e published once in 1964 and again in 1973. 15. C o m p a r e t h e edited version w i t h t h e original. For t h e original see ibid.\ for t h e latest edition w i t h o u t t h e r e f e r e n c e to t h e rectification c a m p a i g n , see Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 1 : 5 6 0 - 5 8 5 . 16. D u r i n g t h e e i g h t - y e a r period f r o m D e c e m b e r 1955 to F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 3 , K i m once m e n t i o n e d to p a r t y leaders of t h e K a n g s o local party c o m m i t t e e t h a t they should not use heavy political j a r g o n ; those w h o used such w o r d s w e r e leaders w i t h o u t chuch'e. T h i s speech was o n F e b r u a r y 18, 1960; see ibid., 2 : 4 8 0 - 5 0 4 . 17. K i m 11 S u n g , Uri ui hydngmyong 148-216.

kwa inmin

kundae ui kwaop e taehayo, pp.

18. K i m II S u n g , Uri hydngmyong eso ui chuch'e e taehayo, pp. 2 1 6 - 2 3 4 . 19. T h e speech he m a d e in Indonesia is i m p o r t a n t in m a n y respects. It revealed K i m ' s t h o u g h t on chuch'e, his policy toward T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s , a n d his policy toward t h e S o u t h . See t h e c o m p l e t e text in Kim II Sung chojak sonjip, 4:195-240. 20. See a l e n g t h y exposition of t h e subject in his speech at t h e f o u r t h S u p r e m e People's Assembly on D e c e m b e r 16, 1967, in K i m II Sung, Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All Fields of State Activity. 21. Kim II Sung sonjip, 2d ed., 5 : 2 1 6 - 2 4 9 . 22. See C h ' o e S o n g - u k , Uri tang ui chuch'e sasang kwa sahoe chuiiijok chuui.

aeguk

23. T h e r e is a newsreel d o c u m e n t a r y on H u a ' s visit t o t h e N o r t h , a n d a n y selfreliant Korean a r m e d w i t h t h e chuch'e idea w o u l d question such K o r e a n subservience to t h e C h i n e s e visitor. See a revealing p h o t o g r a p h in a special issue of t h e N o r t h Korean pictorial Democratic People's Republic of Korea, special issue, 1978, pp. 4-5. 24. C o m p a r e his speeches of A u g u s t 15, 1946, in Kim II Sung sonjip, 1st ed., 1 : 1 4 7 - 1 8 1 , w i t h t h e same in t h e 2d ed., 1 : 1 4 2 - 1 6 6 . 25. Find similar deletions in his speeches on February 19, J u n e 14, a n d D e c e m ber 21, 1947, February 8, M a r c h 2 8 , a n d A u g u s t 23, 1948, April 2 2 a n d S e p t e m ber 9, 1949, N o v e m b e r 1, 1951, D e c e m b e r 15, 1952, S e p t e m b e r 20, 1 9 5 7 , and others.

18. The Republic

by Kim

399

2 6 . See K i m ' s speech on J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 , in K i m II S u n g , Uri hydngmyong munhak

yesul ui immu,

2 7 . Kim II Sung chum hyongmyongnon; ory and

ad

pp. 1 - 1 0 . M u h a m m a d al Missuri, Kimilsungism:

The-

Practice.

18. The Republic by Kim 1. See Article 5 4 o f the constitution. O n e o f K i m ' s most difficult tasks after establishment o f the state was the handling o f Christians. H e often said that there is f r e e d o m o f religion in the N o r t h , but there is also f r e e d o m to demonstrate against religion, and he mobilized young people to demonstrate against c h u r c h services on Sundays. T h e r e are no c h u r c h e s or Buddhist temples in the N o r t h today. For K i m ' s speech deriding Christianity, see Kim

II Sung sonjip,

4:414-415.

for K i m ' s style o f guaranteeing h u m a n rights for only selected people, see his speech on D e c e m b e r 15, 1 9 7 7 , at the sixth Supreme People's Assembly in K i m II S u n g , Lei Us Further

Strengthen

the People's

Government,

pp. 1 7 - 1 8 .

2. T h e first assembly was held in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 8 and the second one ten years later in 1 9 5 7 . Ever since the second assembly, the N o r t h Koreans have held their sessions o f the Supreme People's Assembly once every five years, but the constitution still stipulates that it should be held once every four years. See Article 7 5 o f the new constitution. 3. F o r K i m ' s reference to the constitution as a historic d o c u m e n t , see his speech on D e c e m b e r 2 5 , 1 9 7 2 ; K i m II S u n g , Let Us Further

the Socialist

System of

Our

Country. 4 . B y u n g C h u l K o h , "Political Leadership in N o r t h Korea: Toward a C o n c e p tual Understanding o f K i m II Sung's Leadership Behavior". 5. K i m II Sung, " S a e c h o s o n konsol kwa m i n j o k t'ongil c h o n s o n e taehayo," Kim

II Sung sonjip,

1:1-10.

6 . See K i m ' s speech on D e c e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 5 2 , at the fifth j o i n t plenum o f the C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e in K i m II Sung, Nodongdang nun uri siingni ui kich'o, 7 . See Pravda,

ui chojikchdk

sasangjok

kanghwa

pp. 2 - 5 7 .

August 15, 1 9 5 2 . T h i s article appeared only in the first edition

o f K i m ' s selected work and was dropped f r o m subsequent selections. See Kim Sung sonjip, 8 . Cltoson

II

4:255-279. (hungang

yon'gam,

1954-55,

pp. 1 4 - 1 5 .

9 . T h e K i m II Sung flower very m u c h resembles a c o m m o n tropical orchid. See the story behind the flower in " K i m i l s u n g

Flower A b l o o m the

World

Over." 10. W h e n I visited the m u s e u m , I asked the guide w h e t h e r K i m II Sung had ever personally visited the m u s e u m , for surely any man would react adversely to such elaborate personal glorification o f both fact and f i c t i o n . T h e guide replied that he had not only visited once but m a n y times and personally directed w h a t should be displayed w h e r e in the m u s e u m . 11. For detailed statistical and o t h e r information c o n c e r n i n g the activities o f the 6 0 t h birthday, see Choson

chungang

yon'gam,

1972,

pp. 4 9 - 2 6 4 .

400

18. T H E REPUBLIC BY KIM

12. For the South Korean claim of the Pyorori plenum, see Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan sibonyonsa, pp. 121-131. T h i s work was considered a standard account of the N o r t h at the time of publication, but it contains many errors in interpretation as well as in factual information about dates and places. Some of the errors were pointed out by Pang In-hu in his study of the Workers' Party of Korea in 1964. For the account of this particular m o n u m e n t , see Choson chungang yon'gam, 1972, pp. 168-169. 13. T h e marker is erected atop the mountain near Lake Ch'onji. See the text of the inscription in Choson chungang yon'gam, 1973, p. 140. 14. Kim II Sung, Talk with the Editor-in-Chief of the French Newspaper Le Monde, pp. 12-13. See the same in Korean in Kulloja, 1977, no. 8 (423), pp. 2-7.

Bibliography

Writings of Kim II Sung

Chayu wa tongnip til wihan Choson inntin ui chongiii ui choguk haebang chotijaeng [Th just fatherland liberation war of the Korean people for freedom and independence]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1954. Chigop tongmaeng saop e taehayo [On the work of the trade union]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1968.

Choguk t'ongil e kwanhan widaehan suryong Kim Il-song tongji ui munhon [Documents of the great leader Comrade Kim II Sung on the fatherland unification]. N.p.: Samhaksa, 1975.

Choguk t'ongil wicp ul sirhyon hagi wihayo hyongmyong yongyang ul paekbang uro kanghwa haja [Let us strengthen the revolutionary forces in every way to achieve the cause of reunification of the country], Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1969. Choguk iii t'ongil tongnip kwa mittjuhwa rii/ wihayo [For the unification, independence, and democratization of the fatherland], 2. vols. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1949.

Ch'oUima kisudultinuri sidae ui yongung imyo tan^ ui pulgun chonsa ida [Ch'ollima riders are heroes of our time and red fighters of our party]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1973.

Ch'ongsonyon saop e taehayo [For the work of the youth and children]. Pyongyang: C h o s o n nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1966.

C/iongsonyon saojkwa sahoe chuui nodong ch'dngtiydn tongmaeng iii immu e taehayo [The w o r k of the youth and children and the task of the League of Socialist W o r k i n g Youth], 2 vols. Pyongyang: C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g ch'ulp'ansa, 1969. Chonhu inmin kyongje pokku palchon it I wihayo [For the rehabilitation and development of the postwar people's economy], Pyongyang: C h o s o n nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1956.

402

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Choson hyongmyong ui chillo [ T h e p a t h of t h e K o r e a n revolution]. Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1978.

Pyongyang:

Choson inmin ui minjokchdk myongjol p'ariro haebang 15 chunydn kyongch'uk taehoe eso han pogo [Report at t h e rally in c o m m e m o r a t i o n of t h e f i f t e e n t h anniversary of t h e August 15 liberation, t h e national holiday of t h e Korean people], P y o n g yang: C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1 9 6 0 . Choson minju chuui inmin konghwaguk chongbu ui tangmydn kwaop e taehayo [ O n t h e i m m e d i a t e tasks of t h e g o v e r n m e n t of t h e D e m o c r a t i c People's Republic of Korea]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1 9 6 2 . Choson minju chuiii inmin konghwaguk surip ui kit [ T h e p a t h to t h e establishment of t h e D e m o c r a t i c People's Republic of Korea]. P y o n g y a n g : P u k c h o s o n i n m i n wiwonhoe, 1947. Choson nodongdang ch'anggdn 20chunyon e chehayo [ O n t h e occasion of t h e t w e n t i e t h anniversary of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of Kora]. Pyongyang: C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1965. Choson nodongdang che och'a taehoe eso han chungang wiwonhoe saop ch'onghwa pogo [Report on t h e w o r k of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e to f i f t h congress of t h e W o r k ers' Party of Korea], P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1970. Choson nodongdang che sach'a taehoe eso han chungang wiwonhoe saop ch'onghwa pogo [Report on t h e w o r k of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e to t h e f o u r t h congress of t h e W o r k e r s ' Party of Korea], P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1961. Chuch'e sasang e taehayo c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1977. For Correct Management Foreign Languages For Socialist Economic House, 1958.

[ O n t h e idea of chuch'e]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g of the Socialist Rural Economy in Our Country. P y o n g y a n g : P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1977. Construction. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g

For the Independent, Peaceful Reunification Associates, 1976.

of Korea. Rev. ed. N e w York: G u a r d i a n

For the Independent, Peaceful Reunification of the Country. P y o n g y a n g : Foreign Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1976; rev. ed. ( N e w York: G u a r d i a n Associates, 1976). Hamgyong pukto tang tanch'e dul ui kwaop [Tasks of t h e party organizations of N o r t h H a m g y o n g province]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1968. Historical Experience oj Building the Workers' Party of Korea. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1986. Hyon chongse wa uridang ui kwaop [ T h e present situation and t h e tasks of o u r party]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1966. Hyongje kukka inmin dul ui kogwi han kukche chuiiijdk won jo [Precious i n t e r n a t i o n a l aid by t h e peoples of f r a t e r n a l countries]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s o n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1953. Inmin kyongje kyehoek ui irwdnhwa, sebuhwa ui widaehan saenghwallydk u/ namgim dpsi palhwi hagi wihayo [For t h e e x h i b i t i o n of great vitality of t h e u n i f i e d and

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detailed p l a n n i n g of t h e national e c o n o m y ] , P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1969. Izbrannye stat'i i rechi. M o s c o w : G o s p o l i t i z d a t , 1962. Juche! The Speeches and Writings of Kim II Sung. E l d r i d g e C l e a v e r , f o r w o r d ; Li Y u k s a , ed. a n d i n t r o d . N e w Y o r k : G r o s s m a n , 1972. Kim II Sung chöjakchip [ W o r k s of K i m II Sung]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1979. Kim ¡1 Sung chöjak sönjip. [Selected w o r k s of K i m II Sung], 3d ed. 6 vols. P y o n g yang: C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 3 . Kim II Sung, Selected Works. English t e x t of Kim II Sung chöjak sönjip. 6 vols. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 . Kim II Sung, Selected Works. English text of selected titles f r o m Kim II Sung 2 vols. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 6 5 .

sönjip.

Kim II Sung sönjip [Selected w o r k s of K i m II Sung]. 1st ed. 4 vols. P y o n g y a n g : Chosön nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1953-54. Kim ¡1 Sung sönjip [Selected w o r k s of K i m II Sung]. 2 n d ed. 6 vols. P y o n g y a n g : Chosön nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1960-64. Kim II Sung tongji üi chuyo munhönjip [ I m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t s of C o m r a d e K i m II Sung], 3 vols. N . p . : Sahoe k w a h a k s a , 1971. Kin nichi-sei senshü [Selected w o r k s of K i m II Sung]. 3 vols. T o k y o : Sanichi s h o b ö , 1952. Kodüng kyoyuksaöp ül kaesön halte taehayö [ O n t h e r e f o r m in h i g h e r education work], P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1973. Kongsan chuüi kyoyang e taehayö [ O n C o m m u n i s t education], P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1960. Könsöl punya est5 tang chöngch'aek ül kwanch'öl halte taehayö [ O n c a r r y i n g o u t t h e party's policy in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n sector]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1958. Könsöl mi chirül nop'igi wihayö [For h i g h e r quality in construction]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1959. The Korean Revolutionaries Must Know Korea Well. P y o n g y a n g : Foreign Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1973. Kun nongöp hyöptong chohap kyöngyöng wiwönhoe rül naeolte taehayö [ O n t h e f o r m a tion of t h e C o u n t y C o o p e r a t i v e F a r m M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e ] , P y o n g y a n g : Chosön nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1970. Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, SelfSustenance and Self-Defense in All Fields of State Activity. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1967. Let Us Further Strengthen the People's Government. P u b l i s h i n g House, 1977. Let Us Prevent a National Split and Reunify guages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1973.

Pyongyang: Foreign Languages

the Country.

P y o n g y a n g : Foreign Lan-

Let Us Step Up Socialist Construction Under the Banner of the fuche Idea. P y o n g y a n g : Foreign L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1978. Minju chuüi inmin konghwaguk surip ül wihayö [For t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e D e m o -

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cratic P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of Korea]. P y o n g y a n g : P u k c h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p'ansa, 1 9 4 8 . Namchosön hyöngmyöng kwa choguk t'ongil e taehayö [ T h e S o u t h Korean revolution and u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e f a t h e r l a n d ] . P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p'ansa, 1 9 6 9 . Nodong haengjöng saöp e taehan myökkaji munje [Some p r o b l e m s of m a n p o w e r administration]. Pyongyang: C h o s ö n nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1972. Nodongdang üi chojikchök sasangjök kanghwa nun uri süngni üi kich'o [ T h e o r g a n i z a tional a n d ideological c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t h e p a r t y is t h e basis of o u r victory]. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1953. The Non-Alignment Movement Is A Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1976. Oeguk kijadül i chegihan chilmun e taehan taedap [Answers to t h e questions raised by f o r e i g n c o r r e s p o n d e n t s ] . 2 vols. P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p'ansa, 1 9 7 5 . On Juche in Our Revolution. 2 vols. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 7 5 . Ort Our Party's Policy for the Future Development of Agriculture. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages Publishing House, 1964. On

Some Experiences of the Democratic and Socialist Revolutions P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1973.

in Our

Country.

On Some Problems oj Our Party's Juche Idea and the Government of the Republic's Internal and External Policies. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1972. On the Building of the People's Government. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h ing House, 1 9 7 8 . On the Building of the Workers' Party of Korea. 2 vols. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1 9 7 8 . On the Character and Tasks of the Trade Union in Socialist Society. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages Publishing House, 1974. On the Five-Point Policy for National Reunijication. P y o n g y a n g : Foreign L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 7 7 . On the Korean People's Struggle to Apply the Juche Idea. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1 9 8 3 . On the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Workers' Party of Korea. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1975. On the Situation of Our Country and Tasks of the League of Korean Youth in Japan. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1974. On the 20th Anniversary oj the Founding of the Korean People's Army. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1968. On the Work with Children and Youth. P y o n g y a n g : F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 7 8 . Pogön wisaeng saöp ül palchön sik'igi wihayö [Foi t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of public h e a l t h w o r k ] . P y o n g y a n g : C h o s ö n n o d o n g d a n g c h ' u l p ' a n s a , 1968. The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party. P y o n g y a n g : Foreign L a n g u a g e s Publishing House, 1968.

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P'yongan pukto tang tanch'e dul ui kwaop [Tasks o f the party organizations in P'yongan pukto]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1 9 5 6 . Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea: Selected Writings of Kim II Sung. New York: International Publishers, 1971. Sahoe chuui konsol ui widaehan ch'udongyol in Ch'dllima chagoppan undong ul touk simhwa palchon sik'ija [Let us develop the Ch'ollima workteam movement in depth, a great impetus to socialist construction]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1968. Sahoe chuui kyongje kwalli munje e taehayo [On the problems o f socialist economic management]. 3 vols. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1970. Sahoe kwahak immu e taehayo [On the duty o f the social sciences]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1969. Samdae hyongmyong ul himikke pollyo sahoe chuui konsol ul touk u tagiich'ija [Let us further assist socialist construction by developing the three revolutions]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1975. Sasang saop eso kyojo chuui wa hydngsik chuui rul t'oech'i hago chuch'e rul htvangnip halte taehayo [On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Chuch'e in ideological work]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1960. Soedol saengsan eso hyoksin ul ¡ruk'ilte taehayo [On the reform o f ingot production], Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1970. Sdkt'an kongdp ul ppalli palchon sik'igi wihayo [For the rapid development o f the coal industry]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1 9 7 0 . Speeches Delivered During the Visit to the Algerian Democratic and People's Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1 9 7 6 .

Republic.

Speeches Delivered During the Visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1 9 7 6 . Ssorydn ul pangmun han Choson minju chuui inmin konghwaguk taep'yodan ui saop e taehayo [On the works o f the government delegation o f the Democratic People's Republic o f Korea on their visit to the Soviet Union]. Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1949. Talk with the Editor-in-Chief of the French Newspaper Languages Publishing House, 1977.

Le Monde. Pyongyang: Foreign

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Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964. Uri hyongmyong eso munhak yesul ui immu [Duty o f literature and arts in our revolution], Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1 9 6 5 .

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Archival

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N a t i o n a l Archives C o l l e c t i o n of Foreign Records Seized in 1941. R e c o r d G r o u p 2 4 2 : Records Seized by U . S . M i l i t a r y Forces in Korea. W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1977. Shipping Advice 2005 Box 1: items 2 4 , 34; Box 2: items 2 - 3 , 4 3 , 51, 6 4 , 8 0 , 113; B o x 3: items 1, 5, 15-21, 39; Box 5: items 3 - 1 0 , 44; Box 6: items 1 - 2 0 , 3 7 - 4 2 ; Box 7: i t e m 22; Box 8: items 1 - 3 5 , 3 6 - 5 9 ; Box 9: items 1 - 5 0 ; Box 10: items 6 - 1 3 , 3 1 - 3 7 , 38-48, 49-53; Shipping Advice 2006 Box 1: items 1 - 8 0 , 8 6 , 1 0 7 - 1 1 2 ; Box 2: items 1 - 2 6 , 2 7 - 3 8 ; Box 3: items 2 - 3 ; Box 4: items 1 - 5 , 10, 2 7 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 57, 59; Box 6: i t e m 68;

Bibliography Shipping

Advice

407

2007

Boxes 1-6; Box 9: i t e m 8; Shipping Advice 2008 Box 4: items 1 - 8 , 9 - 2 7 , 2 8 - 6 4 ; Box 8: items 2 - 7 0 ; Box 9: items 1 - 9 6 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; Box 10: items 9, 16, 8 9 - 9 0 , 9 4 , 131; Shipping

Advice

2009

Box 1: items 1, 7 5 , 9 5 , 111, 195; Box 2: i t e m 173; Box 3: i t e m 2 3 2 ; Box 8: items 15, 96; Shipping

Advice

2010

Box 2: item 64; Box 3: i t e m 107; Shipping

Advice 201 1

Box 7: items 2 7 - 3 1 , 35; Box 8: i t e m 36; Shipping

Advice

2012

Box 3: item 17; Box 4: items 16, 17, 2 0 , 3 1 , 37; Box 5: items 4 5 , 113; Box 6: i t e m 23; Shipping

Advice

2013

Box 1: items 26, 3 4 , 8 1 , 111 Archives of t h e J a p a n e s e M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n Affairs: 1 8 6 8 - 1 9 4 5 " K a n t o c h i h o h e i h i n o b o d o t o waga keisatsukan n o katsudo oyobi k d g u n n o s h u t s u d o " [Riots by bandits, t h e activities of t h e police, a n d t h e dispatch of J a p a n e s e troops], reel S P 1 0 5 , f r a m e s 9 3 0 3 , 9 3 9 0 , 9 3 9 6 , 9 4 0 2 , 9 4 0 8 , 9 4 1 2 - 9 4 1 3 , 9 4 1 8 , 9 4 2 0 . Reel S P 7 6 , f r a m e 3 6 0 8 . " M a n s h u j i h e n oyobi sono i g o " ( T h e M a n c h u r i a n I n c i d e n t and thereafter]. Reel SP105, frames 9 0 8 2 - 9 0 8 7 , 9599-9619. "Zai Kirin s o r y o j i k a n oyobi T o n k a b u n k a n " [ T h e consulate-general in J i l i n a n d sub-consulate in T u n h u a ] . Reel SP86, f r a m e s 9 6 4 0 - 9 6 4 3 , 9 9 9 4 - 1 0 , 2 6 4 .

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Index

Abolition o f taxes, 272

B a n d u n g C o n f e r e n c e , 203

Acquisition o f provisions, 38-39

Bertsch, L.,

Administration Council, 2 7 1 - 7 3 , 275,

B i a n F e n g x i n g , 50

132

B i e r u t , B . , 62

286, 2 9 5 , 2 9 7 . 3 1 5 A i d i t , D . N . , 203

B o g u s coalition, 65, 67

A l g e r i a , 260, 2 6 2 , 268

B o r o v i a g i n , N . P . , 58

A l i y c v , G . A . , 291

B r e z h n e v , L. I., 1 4 6 , 1 4 7 , 1 8 0 , 1 8 9

An C h ó n g - s u k , 325

Bulganin, N . ,

A n K i l , 1 3 , 2 2 , 38, 49, 1 0 2 , 3 2 5 , 3 5 1 ,

B y l a w s , 76, 80, 1 4 9 ; p a r t y , 7 7 ,

146 171,

2 1 5 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 3 ; r e v i s i o n , 364

3 5 6 , 3 8 3 ; p h o t o , 45 A n P o n g - h a k , 1 4 , 20, 2 2 , 3 3 0 , 343 A n S u n g - h a k , 2 9 5 , 296

C a b i n e t , first, 100; see also A d m i n i s -

An T'ae-b6m,33 1

tration C o u n c i l

An Y ó n g , 325

C a d r e s , 76; r e c r u i t i n g , 2 1 ,

An Y ó n g - d a l , 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 362 Arch o f T r i u m p h , 285, 287

C a o G u o a n , 1 6 , 20, 37

Armisticc C o m m i s s i o n , 192, 202

C a o Y a f a n , 2 7 , 28

Asian e c o n o m i c seminar, 160,

Ceausescu, N . , 2 9 1 , 391

185-88

Assassination attempts, 2 1 0 , 2 3 1 , 232, 258 A u g u s t First D e c l a r a t i o n , 1 7 , 3 4 - 3 5 B a l a s a n o v , G . M . , 60

170-71;

training s c h o o l , 1 0 3 , 1 0 8 , 2 1 3 - 1 4

Central Auditing C o m m i t t e e , second congress. 91 C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , 83, 84; f i f t h p l e n u m 2 1 3 ; first c o n g r e s s , 78, 80, 3 5 0 - 5 1 ; first j o i n t p l e n u m , 9 3 ;

424

INDEX

C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e (continued) fourth congress, 171-72; second c o n g r e s s , 90, 9 1 ; s t a n d i n g c o m m i t tee, 139, 167; t h i r d c o n g r e s s , 1 4 8 49; see also W o r k e r s ' P a r t y o f K o rea

C h ' o e Y o n g - j i n , 1 5 2 , 326, 347

Central Court, 271, 3:5 C e n t r a l I n s p e c t i o n C o m m i t t e e , 246 C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s C o m m i t t e e , 250, 2 7 0 - 7 3 , 286, 294, 295, 3 1 5 , 393 C h ' a K w a n g - s u , 12 C h ' a Sik, 7 C h ' a Y o n g - d ó k , 331 C h ' a e H u i - j ò n g , 295, 3 7 7 C h ' o e C h ' a n g - i k , 77, 78, 89, 93, 96, 99, 100, 1 5 0 - 5 1 , 3 5 3 , 368; c h a l l e n g e s to K i m , 1 5 1 - 5 5 ; p h o t o s , 82,

C h ' o n d o g y o Y o u n g Friends Party,

83 C h ' o e C h ' u n - g u k , 13, 38, 49, 138, 326, 347 Ch'oe Chong-hak,

151

C h ' o e H a k - c h ' o l , 33 C h ' o e H y ò n , 3, 14, 20, 22, 28, 35, 38, 4 5 - 4 7 , 49, 103, 142, 152, 222, 2 3 1 , 246, 326, 343, 347, 383, 384; d i e d , 288; p h o t o , 41 C h ' o e I n - d o k , 326 C h ' o e K i - c h ' ò l , 326 C h ' o e K w a n g , 103, 1 2 2 - 2 3 , >4 2 . ' 5 2 > 190, 1 9 1 , 2 1 9 , 223, 239, 2 4 1 , 242, 326, 347, 358 C h ' o e K y ò n g - h w a , 35 C h ' o e M i n - c h o ' ò l , 2 4 1 , 326 C h ' o e P o n g - h o , 329 C h ' o c P o n g - s o n g , 329 C h ' o c S ò n g - s u k , 329 C h ' o e T u - s ò n , 254 Ch'oe Wal-chong,

151

C h ' o e Y o n g - d a l , 8 5 - 9 1 , 97, 3 5 1 , 3 5 2 C h ' o c Y ó n g - d o , 235 C h ' o e Y o n g - g ò n , 14, 20, 49, 96, 99102, 1 1 4 , 142, 145, 153, 1 7 2 , 179, 1 8 1 , 187, 190, 1 9 1 , 202, 2 1 9 , 222, 246, 2 7 3 , 288, 326, 347, 363, 3 8 1 , 388; d i e d , 393; p h o t o , 100

C h ' o e Y o n g - n i m , 294, 295 C h ' o l l i m a : m e a n i n g o f 369; m o v e m e n t , 164, 207, 308, 3 1 0 ; r i d e r s , 164; s p e e d , 276; w o r k t e a m ,

164-65,

169 99. " 3 . 149, 355 C h ' o n g s a l l i , c o o p e r a t i v e s , 370; m e t h o d s , 167, 207, 308, 3 1 0 C h a i S h i y i n g , 17, 22, 48, 49, 343 C h a j u , 302-3; see also Chuch'e C h a n g C h ' u n - s a n , 173 C h a n g C h o l - g u , 329 C h a n g C h u a n f u , 20 C h a n g C h u n g - y o l , p h o t o , 41 C h a n g G u a n g d i , 50 C h a n g P ' y o n g - s a n , 151 C h a n g S a n g - y o n g , 325 C h a n g S h o u j i a n , 20, 49, 50 C h a n g Si-u, 69, 85, 86, 90, 99, 100, 119, 130, 352, 364 C h a n g S u n - m y o n g , 85, 88, 91, 353 Charip, 302-3; see also Chuch'e Chawi, 302-3; see also Chuch'e C h e n H a n z h a n g , 20, 27, 28 C h e n g P i n , 20, 27 C h e r e n k o v , V. C . , 58 C h i C h ' a n g - i k , 295 C h i K y o n g - s u , 103, 325 C h i P y o n g - h a k , 325 C h i S u n - o k , 42 C h i T ' a e - h w a n , p h o t o , 41 C h i U n g - w o n , 164 C h i n a , P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f , 153, 169, 170, 178, 187, 199, 202, 263, 2 9 1 ; civil w a r . 102; C o m m u n i s t a r m y , 102,143, C o m m u n i s t g u e r rillas, 4, 8, 1 1 , 13, 14, 3 1 , 32, 47, 60; C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , 8, 16, 17, 2I

. 3 4 - 3 5 . 49. ' 4 6 , 202, 2 9 1 ; C o m m u n i s t s , 12, 17, 2 1 , 53, 103, 1 1 2 , 1 2 1 , 128, 156, 201; c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n , 182-92, 197, 202, 203, 208, 262, 290, 309, 3 1 6 ; r e c t i f i c a t i o n

Index

425

campaign, 144; Red Guards, 160, 189-91, 197, 203, 208, 285, 290; Volunteer A r m y , 1, 122, 123, 154, 204, 3 1 3 China-Korea boundary, 189, 197-202; map, 200 Chipch'ejök chido, 370 Chipchung chido, 370 Chiplenkov, S. B . , photo, 63 Chistiakov, I. M., 58-62, 69, 204, 378; photo, 63 C h o Chöng-ch'öl, 325, 347 C h o Chung-hwa, 85 C h o Il-myöng, 129-31, 360, 363 Cho Man-sik, 60, 64, 66, 67, 69, 348 Cho Myöng-sön, 325 C h o Se-üng, 295 C h o Söng-mo, 154, 363 C h o To-ön, 329 Cho T o n g - u k , 326 Cho Yong-bok, 133, 262 Chön Ch'ang-ch'öl, 288, 326 Chön Hüi, 329

282, 289, 302-5; meaning, 301; nationalism, 309-10; tower, 287, 318, 320 Collective leadership, 145-47, 177 Collectivization, 140-41, 169, 184 Comintern, 17; seventh congress, 8, 35. 53 Commando raid, 231-34, 236, 259 Communist guerrilla, 29-31 Confederal Republic o f K o r y o , 257, 260, 293 Constitution of North Korea (1972),

Chön K w a n g (O Söng-yun), 14, 27, 28, 35-36, 47, 330; photo, 44 Chön Mun-söp, 326 Chön Mun-uk, 326 Chön Sun-hüi, 329 Chöng Chae-dal, 92 Chöng Chin-t'ae, 96 Chöng Chun-t'aek, 1 1 9 , 246, 247, 273, 388; died, 393 Chöng Il-gwön, 331 Chöng Il-yong, 179, 2 2 1 , 222 Chöng Kyöng-bok, 223 Chöng P y ö n g - g i p , 241, 326 Chöng Tal-hyön, 85, 87-89, 91 Chu Ch'ang-jun, 295, 396 Chu Chin, 14, 16, 20, 2 1 , 32, 33, 39,

Daddah, Mokto Ould, 224, 391 De-Stalinization, 108, 143, 145, 146, 177, 191 Deba, Massamba, 224 Declaration of independence, by Kim II Sung, 203-08 Democratic Front for the Fatherland Unification, 1 1 3 , 120 Democratic National Front, 120 Democratic People's Republic of K o rea, 13, 61, 9 5 - 1 0 1 , 299-324; Academy of Sciences, 201; new constitution in 1972, 270-76; republic by Kim II Sung, 314-24, shift from party, 270-86 Democratic Women's Union, 163,

330, 343 Chu To-il, 326 Chu Yong-ha, 77, 80, 83, 87, 91, 99, 100, 123, 130, 139, 174, 351. 353 Church'e, 143, 144, 285; criticism of, 309-13; development, 305-9; idea,

193, 222, 242, 279 Democratic Youth League, 75 Democratic reforms, 67, 84, 96 Deng Xiaoping, 169, 1 7 1 , 176, 266 Dialogues between North and South Korea, 253-68

314-15 County Cooperative Farm Management Committee, 212, 244, 3 1 0 Cross recognition, 263 Cuba, 180, 2 1 3 ; Communist Party, 290; Granma, 289; missile crisis, 180 Czechoslovakia, 206; Communist Party of, 180

426

INDEX

D i p l o m a t i c relations of N o r t h Korea, 262; difficulties, 266 D j u r a n o v i c , V., 290 D o l g i k h , N . I., 61 D o m e s t i c g r o u p , 72, 79, 80, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 96, 99, 107, 108, 139, 141 D o n g C h a n g y i n g , 16 E C - 1 2 1 spy plane, 231, 239, 248 Eastern E u r o p e , 60, 62, 66, 140, 149, 180 East G e r m a n y , 62, 71, 149, 284; C o m m u n i s t Party of, 181 E c o n o m i c plans: 2-yr plan, 112, 119; 5 - y r plan, 140, 147, 149, 154; 6-yr plan 273; 7 - y r plan, 209, 220, 242; s e c o n d 7 - y r plan, 272-73; t h i r d 7yr plan, 292; 10-yr plan, 209 E s p i o n a g e activities, 1 3 1 - 3 6 F a n g Z h e n g s h e n g , 16, 20, 27, 28, 46 F a t h e r l a n d D e f e n s e Assistance A s s o ciation, 1 1 4 F e n g Z h i n g a n g , 20 F e n g Z h o n g y u n , 20, 21, 50; p h o t o , 23 First C o n g r e s s of the Toilers o f the Far East, 53 First D i r e c t i o n a l A r m y , 28; see also N o r t h e a s t Anti-Japanese U n i t e d Army First R o u t e A r m y , 9, 18, 24, 26, 27, 30, 34, 36, 44, 47, 49, 102, 343; p h o t o , 42; see also N o r t h e a s t A n t i Japanese United A r m y Five-Province Administration Bureau, 66, 67, 95 F l o o d relief g o o d s t o S o u t h K o r e a , 293-94 Fu X i a n m i n g , 20, 22 F u k u b e K u n i o , 24; p h o t o , 25 G e n e r a l Association of K o r e a n Resid e n t s in J a p a n , 280

General Federation of T r a d e U n i o n s , 163. 370 G o r b a c h e v , M . , 291 G r o m y k o , A., 251 G u a n d o n g A r m y , 22; see also K a n t ô gun G u o Fude, 20 Ha A n g - c h ' ô n , 222 H a n C h ' ô n - c h ' u , 329 H a n H o , 330, 332 H a n H û n g - s ô n , 50 H a n Ik-su, 42, 246, 273, 326, 393; died, 394 H a n l l - m u , 79, 85-87, 89, 352-53 H a n I n - h w a , 28, 47, 330, 332, 343 H a n Pin, 152, 174 H a n S a n g - d u , 222, 370 H a n S h o u k u i , 17 Han Sôk-hun, 7 H a n Sôl-ya, 1, 143 H a n T ' a e - r y o n g , 329 H a n Y o n g - h o , 32-33 H ô C h ' a n g - s u k , 326 H ô C h ô n g - s u k , 99, 100, 295, 352, 355 H ô H a k - s o n g , 326 H ô H ô n , 91, 93, 357 H ô H y ô n g - s i k , 49, 3 3 1 , 332 H ô Ka-i, 80, 83, 87, 90, 92, 93, 108, 128, 137, 139, 142, 144, 152, 156, 3°7. 353; c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h K i m , 123-26; p h o t o , 82 H ô K u k - b o n g , 76 H ô N a m - h u i , 97 H ô P o n g - h a k , 191, 223, 230, 239, 326, 381, 383, 384 H ô So, 7 H ô S ô k - s ô n , 228, 326 H ô S o n g - h a k , 331 H ô S ô n g - s u k , 332 H ô S ô n g - t ' a e k , 92, 99, 100, 122, 148, 358 H ô T a m , 242, 292, 293, 295, 377, 388

Index H o Y o n g - h o , 33 Hodge, J . R., 132, 135 Honecker, Erich, 290, 391 Hong Ch'un-su, 329 Hong Hyong-gi, 129 Hong Ki-mun, 295 Hong My6ng-hui, photos, 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 , 355

Hong Si-hak, 282 Hong Song-nam, 296 Hong Song-yong, 273, 295, 296 Hong YSng-sik, 183 Hu Yaobang, 290 Hua Guofeng, 3 1 1 , 391 Huang Qiguang, 290 Huang Yuqing, 20 Husak, G . , 290, 391 Hwang Chang-y6p, 282, 295 Hwang Kum-ok, photos, 41, 329 Hwang Se-hwan, 154 Hwang Sun-hui, 326 Hyon Ch'ol, 329 Hyon Chun-hyok, 69, 79, 90, 349 Hy6n M u - g w a n g , 246, 273 Ignatiev, A. A., 61-62, 65-66, 70-73, 77. 79-8o, 89, 93, 96, 104, 1 1 2 , 125 Ilatovsk, A. T . , 61 Individual heroism, 89, 142, 146 Inspection Committee, 78, 85, 88, 123, 124, 139, 148, 173, 222 Interim People's Committee, 65, 69 Interior Ministry, 102, 103 Internal Security Bureau, 96 International Communist movement, 203, 205, 207 International Parliamentary Union, 263 Ishikawa Shigeyoshi, 22 Ivanov, V. I., 150 Japan: army, 62; campaigns against guerrillas, 30; Communist Party, 185, 205; expeditionary force, 4, 37, 38, 46, 47, 52, 324; imperial-

427

ism, 183; militarism, 205, 207; occupation, 202; police, 37; Yilan branch photo, 39 Jaruzelski, W., 290 Jiandao May 30 Communist Incident, 16, 342 Joint-venture law, 297 July 4 joint communique, 254-57 June Tenth Movement, 307, 3 1 2 Justice Bureau, 86, 87 Kadar, J . , 290 Kadishev, I. I., 61 Kaganovich, L. M . , 146 Kang Kon, 49, 91, 102, 1 1 4 , 138, 142, 286, 326, 347, 356; photo, 1 1 5 Kang Mun-sok, 142, 365 Kang Pan-s6k, 3-4 Kang Sang-ho, 326 Kang Sheng, 8, 10, 17 Kang S6ng-san, 286, 295, 297 Kang Ton, 331 Kang Wi-ryong, 329 Kang Yang-uk, 96, 288, 294 Kangdong Political Institute, 103, 121 Kantogun, 22, 23 Kapsan Operation Committee, 35 Kapsin Coup in 1884, 183 Kato Hakujiro, 32 Kawada, Lieutenant, 37 Keita, Modibo, 187, 224 Khabarovsk camp, 48, 49 Khrushchev, N . S., 145, 176, 178-80, 189, 1 9 1 , 208, 2 1 3 , 219, 221 Ki Sok-bok, 101, 144, 306, 350 Kim Ch'aek, 14, 20, 49, 50, 91, 93, 1 0 1 , 1 1 4 , 138, 142, 145, 286, 326, 351; photo, 1 1 5 Kim Ch'ang-bong, 152, 1 9 1 , 2 1 1 , 222, 239-42, 326 Kim Ch'ang-d6k, 14, 142, 152, 173, 1 9 1 , 241, 326, 365 Kim Ch'ang-ju, 295 Kim Ch'ang-man, 139, 172-74. '89. 219, 2 2 1 , 372

428 Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim

INDEX C h ' o l , 13 Ch'ol-chu, 3 C h ' o l - h o , 329 Ch'ol-hui, 12 C h ' o l - m a n , 326 C h ' u n - s o p , 50 C h ' u n g - y o l , 329 Cha-rin, 2 4 1 , 326 C h a e - b 6 m , 28, 47, 330, 343 Chae-hung, 39 Chae-su, 33 Chae-uk, 144 C h i - m y o n g , 329 Chin-guk, 17 Chong-guk, 332 C h o n g - j u , 99, 100, 1 1 9 , 355 C h o n g - p ' i l , 329 C h o n g - s u k , 50, 5 1 , 279, 282,

347; photos, 45, 1 1 7 K i m C h o n g - t ' a e , 234-36, 385, 386 K i m Chung-nin, 246, 247, 2 7 3 , 2 8 1 , 282, 296, 386 K i m C h w a - h y 6 k , 326 K i m Dae J u n g , 256 K i m Hak-sil, 3 3 1 K i m Han-jung, 122, 358 K i m Hui-il, 1 8 1 K i m H w a , 330 K i m H w a n , 282, 293, 295, 296 K i m Hye-sun, 51 Kim Hy6ng-gwon, 5 K i m H y o n g - j i k , 3-4 Kim Hy6ng-nok, j K i m H y o n g - s u , 230, 384 K i m I-hun, 295 K i m Ik-hyon, 326 K i m Ik-sang, 36 K i m Ik-s6n, 130, 1 7 3 , 222, 3 6 1 , 363 K i m II Sung: alleged killing o f , 30; background, 3 - 1 4 ; challenges to, 107-57; children of, 395-96; China and, 140, 178, 190-97, 292, 364; c h r o n o l o g y , 3 3 3 - 3 8 ; consolidation of p o w e r , 55-73, 104; declaration o f independence, 203-48; degrees,

196, 203, 260; guerrilla activities, 30-54; higher party school, 289; Korean identity, 159-208; m a r riages of, 45, 50-52, 3 8 1 ; military acadcmy, 2 1 7 , 307; Northeast Anti-Japanese United A r m y , 15-29; Order of Lenin, 268; partisans and, 1 1 - 1 4 , 239-48; personal k i n g d o m , 3 1 4 - 2 4 ; political thoughts, 3 0 1 - 1 3 ; records of, 3 2 1 - 2 4 ; religion, 1 5 4 55; scmiretirement, 287-97; SinoSoviet dispute, 176-208; Soviet Union and, 29, 45, 47-52, 1 1 9 , 140, 1 5 3 - 5 4 . ' 7 8 , 179, 364. 367; Stadium, 285; T h i r d World, 267; tributes to, 3 1 5 - 2 1 ; unification policy, 2 2 5 - 3 1 , 256-58; United N a tions 264; University 108, 284, 286, 356, 357; villas of, 193; p h o tos, 45, 63, 261 K i m II, 14, 22, 49, 102, 1 1 4 , 122, 138, 139, 142, 1 5 3 , 172, 187, 188, 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 222, 246, 2 8 1 , 293, 294, 3^7, 3 5 1 . 358, 3 8 1 ; photo, 1 1 5 K i m Il-tae, 295 K i m J o n g II, 5 1 , 52, 279-86, 289, 294, 296, 297; musical productions b y , 284; photos 45, 283 K i m K u , 76, 97, 98, 104, 147, 174, 355. 366 K i m K u k - h u n , 245 K i m Kun, 332, 350 K i m K w a n g - h a k , 28, 330, 396 K i m K w a n g - h y o p , 14, 49, 9 1 , 142, 152, 1 5 3 , 179, 1 9 1 , 2 1 3 , 222, 239, 2 4 1 , 327, 347, 356, 378, 381 K i m K y o n g - h u i , 5 1 , 282, 286 K i m K y o n g - s o k , 9 1 , 1 5 2 , 327, K i m K y u - s i k , 97, 98, 104, 1 4 7 , K i m M a n - g u m , 288, 295 K i m M u - s a m , 234 K i m M y o n g - h w a , 329 K i m M y 6 n g - j u n , 327 K i m M y o n g - p ' a l , 22

103, 220, 377,

347 366

Index Kim M y ö n g - s u k , 327 Kim Nak-ch'ön, 331 Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim

Nam-ch'ön, 130 O - s ö n g , 92, 364 O k - k y u n , 183 O k - s u n , 197, 222, 242, 327, 384 P'a, 68 P ' y ö n g - i l , 51 Pok-sin, 295 P o n g - j u , 295 P o n g - j u n , 47 Pyöng-sik, 327 S a m - y o n g , 92, 93, 1 2 1 , 1 3 2 San-ho, 331 S a n g - d o , 234 S e - h y ö n g , 330 Sin-jo, 232, 384 S ö k - h y ö n g , 1 8 1 , 374 Söng-ae, K i m ' s second w i f e ,

193, 242, 279, 3 8 1 ; photos, 194-95 K i m S ö n g - d o , 34 Kim Söng-guk, 327 K i m S ö n g - j u , 3, 7, 1 1 ; see also K i m II Sung K i m S o y , 48 K i m Sun-hüi, 332 K i m S ü n g - h w a , 108, 139, 164 Kim Tae-hong, 327 K i m Tae-su Spy Incident, 230, 385 K i m T o - m a n , 223, 229, 3 8 1 , 383 K i m T o n g - g y u , 1 3 , 38, 223, 246, 247, 2 7 3 , 2 8 1 , 3 2 7 K i m T o n g - h a n , 32 K i m T o n g - h w a , 7, 8 K i m T u - b o n g , 72, 76-80, 83, 89, 9 1 , 93, 96, 1 2 3 , 1 5 2 , 174. 3 5 1 . 357, 367; photo, 8 1 , 1 1 7 K i m T u - y o n g , 9 1 , 354 K i m U l - c h ' ö n , 2, 339 Kim Ul-gyu, 151 K i m U n g - b i n , 1 2 9 - 3 1 , 360, 364 K i m Ü n g - g i , 139, 360 Kim Üng-u, 4 K i m W ö n - b o n g , 68, 99, 100, 101 K i m Y a n g - c h ' u n , 327

429

K i m Y ö - j u n g , 327 K i m Y ö l , 85, 86, 93, 122, 1 2 3 , 138, 3 5 3 . 358 K i m Y o n g - b ö m , 76, 77, 3 5 1 , 363, 381 K i m Y o n g - h w a , 329 K i m Y ö n g - j u , 3, 1 7 2 , 223, 242, 246, 254, 256, 273, 3 8 1 , 389 K i m Y ö n g - n a m , 282, 292 K i m Y o n g - y ö n , 327 K i m Y u - g i l , 329 K i m i l s u n g i s m , 285, 299, 3 1 3 , 324 Kishitani Ryüichirö, 28 K o H y ö k , 229, 383 K o H y ö n - s u k , 329 K o g a , Japanese police, 49 K o n g Chin-t'ae, 295, 296 K o n g C h ö n g - s u , 329 Korean Artist Proletarian Federation, 143 Korean Central N e w s A g e n c y , 1 9 1 , 192 Korean C o m m u n i s t Party, 6, 6 8 - 7 1 , 74, 77. 84. 88, 9 1 - 9 3 . 103, 105, 1 2 7 , 1 3 5 , 174, 350, 367 Korean C o m m u n i s t revolution, 2, 30, 38, 86, 127, 143, 322 Korean C o m m u n i s t Y o u t h Association, 6, 1 2 7 Korean C o m m u n i s t s , 12, 17, 56, 62, 72, 83, 89-91, 1 0 1 , 134, 166, 299 K o r e a n Democratic Party, 76, 149 K o r e a n Fatherland Restoration A s s o ciation, 34-36, 41 K o r e a n People's A r m y . 2, 1 3 , 67, 97, 98, 1 0 1 - 5 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 , 1 2 1 , 142, 1 5 1 , 154, 1 7 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 5 , 225, 2 3 1 , 286, 307; criticism of, 239-48; modernization of, 2 1 5 ; rest home, 306 K o r e a n People's Republic, 98 K o r e a n People's Revolutionary A r m y , 12, 1 3 , 31 Korean Provisional G o v e r n m e n t , 56, 65, 98. 174

430

INDEX

Korean history: ancient, 147, 160, 174, 182; K o g u r y o , 182-83; Paekche, 182-83; Silla, 182-83; Soviet-Korean dispute, 181-85; Three Kingdoms period, 182-83 Korean identity, search for, 3 1 , 159208 Korean liberation, 59-65 Korean people, 66, 78, 146, 159, 178, 290, 3 1 2 Korean revolution, 141-42, 175, 197 Korean revolutionaries, 64, 7 1 , 105, 174 Korean volunteers, in Northeast China, photo, 1 1 6 Korean War, I, 57, 108, 1 1 1 - 5 7 , 170, 173, 178, 1 9 1 , 204, 2 1 5 , 216, 225, 227, 236, 241, 247, 249, 259, 263, 264, 282, 286, 288, 290, 291, 306, 307, 3 1 1 , 316, 319, 322, 324 Korotkov, G. P., 61 Kosygin, A . , 176, 179, 180, 189, 2 1 9 Kozlov, F. L., 169, 1 7 1 , 176 Kulloja, 1 0 1 , 174, 180, 279 Kumgang Political Institute, 128-29, 360 Kunayev, D. A . , 268 Kung Xienying, 48 Kwangju student incident, 3 1 2 K w o n O-jik, 92, 139, 363 K w 6 n Y o n g - b y o k , 35; photo, 41 K y e Ung-t'ae, 296 Lagutin, P. F., 58; photo, 63 Lake Ch'onji, 197-202; photo, 63 Land reform, 67, 128 Lazarev, G. R . , 61 League of the Socialist Working Youth, 163, 170-72, 276 Lebedev, N . G . , 51, 58-60, 62, 204, 347. 359; p h o t o , 63 Lenin, V. I., 197, 268, 315 Li Baoman, 18 Li Desheng, 388 Li Du, 3 1, 40

Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li

Fulin, 20 Huatang, 18, 20 Peng, 291 Sanxia, 31 Xiannian, 292, 388 Xishan, 20 Yanping, 20 Yenlu, 16, 20, 2 1 , 178, 373; photo, 23 Li Zhaolin, 20; photo, 40 Liaison Bureau, 228, 230, 239, 385 Lie, Trygve, 120 Liu Hanxing, 17 Liu Shuhua, 20 Liu Xiaoqi, 181, 182 Liu, the Chinese landlord, 43 Ma Tok-san, 332 Ma Tong-hui, 331 Ma Zhansan, 31 MacArthur, D., 64, 137 Maeda Takeshi, 37 Maeng Chong-ho, 129, 1 3 1 , 361 Makarov, B. A., 58 Malenkov, G. M., 1 1 3 , 140, 146 Man'gyongdae School for Children of Revolutionaries, 282 Manchukuo, 12, 18, 29 Manchurian Provincial Committee, 16, 17 Mao Zedong, 17, 176, 178, 192, 197, 262, 276, 299, 3 1 5 , 316 March First Movement, 183, 3 1 2 Mass Party, 79, 83, 125 Mauritania, 224, 262, 265, 266, 392 May 1961 military revolution, 225 Mazurov, K. T . , 2 1 9 Merger of parties, 76-78; 79 Merkulov, 61 Military Affairs Commission, 288 Military Committee, 215 Military policy, 244-45; f ° u r basic policies, 2 1 3 - 1 6 Ministry of National Defense, 102 Minjok ilbo incident, 385

Index Minsaengdan, 32-34; conference on, 33; incident, 32 Mobilization campaigns, 163-75 Modern revisionism, 205 M o k t a r Ould Daddah, 265 M o l o t o v , V. 146 Monolithic ideological system, 302; see also Chuch'e M u C h o n g , 78, 89, 1 0 1 , 122, 123, 156, 356 Mukedeng, 198 Mun Pung-san, 33 1 Murayama Masashige, 37 Musan raid, 35 Nagashima Tamajiro, 51 Naktong River, 121 N a m Ch'ang-il, 3 3 1 , 343 N a m Ch'ang-su, 13 N a m C h ' a n g - y o n g , 68 N a m II, 139, 156, 172, 173, 2 2 1 ,

222,

371-72, 38' N a m T o n g - s u , 329 N a m p ' o barrage, 297 National Assembly, 293-94 National Defense Bureau, 96 National Defense Committee, 271 Nationalization of industries, 67, 1 4 1 , 169

431

ation and map, 19; eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh armies, 1 8 - 1 9 ; first a r m y , 1 5 - 1 6 ; formation of, 17; fourth, fifth, and sixth armies, 1617; Koreans in, 3 1 - 3 4 ; numbers, 17, 29; second a r m y , 16, 2 1 - 2 9 , 3234; seventh a r m y , 18, 2 1 , 46; third army, 16, 33; see also specific armies, e.g., First Route A r m y , etc. Northeast Interim People's C o m m i t tee, 103 Northeast People's Revolutionary A r m y , 16 N o r t h Korean Branch Bureau, of the Korean C o m m u n i s t Party, 79, 84, 88, 89 North Korean C o m m u n i s t Party, 70, 74-77, 79. 85 N o r t h Korean Provisional People's C o m m i t t e e , 63, 67, 84, 95, 96, 354 N o r t h Korean agents, 234-35, 236 N o r t h Korean air force, photo, 1 1 7 North-South Coordinating C o m m i t tee, 255-58, 259, 389 N o r t h - S o u t h meetings of 1948, 98 N o v i k o v , V . , 190, 2 1 9 N o z o e Shotoku, 24, 27, 29, 38, 5 1 ; photo, 25

National People's Congress, 21 N e w C o m m u n i s t man, 164, 165-68, 3'4 N e w Democratic Party, 70, 72-79, 150 Nie Rongzhen, 146 Nishitani Kiyojin, 28 Nixon-Sato joint communique, 202 Noble, Harold, 132, 362 Nodotig sinmun, 77, 85, 180, 229, 2 3 1 , 232, 306 Nonaligned movement, 260-268 Normalization with Japan, 225, 226; treaty, 227 Northeast Anti-Japanese United A r m y , 8, 15-29, 178; area of oper-

O C h ' a n g - s u , 243 O C h a e - w 6 n , 327 O Chin-u, 104, 1 5 2 , 223, 240, 246, 327, 388 O Chuk-sun, 329 O C h u n g - h u p , 42, 46, 286 O C h u n g - h w a , 33 1 O Ki-sop, 79, 84-89, 9 1 , 96, 97, 142, 150, 1 5 2 , 174, 365 O K u k - y o l , 286 O K y o n g - s o k , 183 O P a e k - y o n g , 46, 288, 327 O S e - y o n g , 332 O S o n g - y u n , see C h o n K w a n g O Ung-yong, 331

432

INDEX

October Revolution, 180, 183, 40th a n n i v e r s a r y , 1 5 3 ,

185;

178:47th

P a k M u n - g y u , 9 2 , 99, 1 0 0 , 3 5 5 , 3 6 7 Pak N o k - k u m , 3 3 1 ; p h o t o , 4 1 Pak P y ô n g - s ô , 78, 83

anniversary, 189, 2 1 9

Pak S ô n g - c h ' ô l , 1 7 3 , 2 1 1 , 222, 242,

O k a w a , p o l i c e c h i e f , 34

246, 2 4 7 , 2 5 4 , 2 8 8 , 3 2 7 , 3 7 7 , 3 8 9

O k e a n s k a y a Field S c h o o l , 48, 50 O m S u - m y ö n g , 35

Pak S ô n g - u , 3 2 9

On-the-spot guidance, 166-68, 2 1 2 ,

Pak S u - d o n g , 282, 295 Pak S u n - i l , 3 3 1

289, 3 1 9 Organization Committee, 93, 126,

123,

Pak S ù n g - w ô n , 92, 1 2 9 - 3 1 , 134, 361 Pak Tal, 35, 3 2 9

139

Pak T u - g y ó n g , 329 P ' y ö n g n a m P r o v i n c i a l B u r e a u , 69

P a k T u k - b ô m , 28, 4 7 , 3 3 0 , 3 4 3 ; p h o t o , 44

Pae C h ' ö l , 1 2 9 - 3 1 , 1 3 3 , 3 6 0 Pac S ö n g - c h ' u n , 3 3 2

Pak U - s ô p , 3 2 7

Paek H a k - n i m , 3 2 7

Pak U i - w a n , 1 5 2 ,

Paek H y ö n g - b o k , 132, 362

Pak Y ô n g - b i n , 1 2 6 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 4 ,

P a e k N a m - u n , 99, 1 0 0 ,

119

156

P a e k P o n g , 2, 3 3 9

Pak Y o n g - g u k , 2 2 3 , 3 8 1

Paektusan, 1 9 7 - 2 0 2 , 284, 320, 323 P a k C h ' a n g - o k , 85, 86, 1 2 6 ,

139,

Pak Y ô n g - s u n , 1 3 , 46, 1 9 3 , 1 9 7 , 3 2 7 , 376

1 4 3 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 4 , 306, 3 5 0 ,

P a n g H a k - s e , 68, 1 0 3 , 363

353. 359, 364

Pang Ho-san, 142, 365

Pak Chin-u,

332

Park C h u n g Hee, 2 3 1 , 232, 236, 257, 260, 2 6 3 , 270, 285

P a k C h ö n g - a e , 78, 1 3 8 , 1 4 8 , 2 2 1 ,

Partisans, g r o u p , 80, 9 1 , 9 3 , 2 3 8 - 4 8 ;

2 2 2 , 3 5 1 , 360, 3 6 3 , 3 6 7 , 3 8 1

i m p o r t a n c e , 1 1 - 1 2 ; m e m b e r s o f the

Pak C h ö n g - s u k , 329 Pak H ö n - y ö n g , 1 0 3 , 1 1 9 , 120,

137,

C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , 3 6 7 , 3 7 1 ; in

142, 1 4 5 - 4 8 , 1 7 4 , 227, 360; about

politics, 3 2 5 - 3 2 ; rise o f ,

h i m , 1 2 7 ; called a liar, 1 2 1 ; c h a l -

statues, 386; t r a d i t i o n ,

l e n g e to K i m , 1 2 6 - 3 6 ; p h o t o ,

117-

171-75; 154

P a r t y center, 2 7 8 - 7 9 P a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card,

18 Pak H ü n g - y o n g ,

193,

1 9 7 , 306, 3 5 9 , 365

124

Peaceful coexistence, 144, 143,

36

P a k Il-u, 76, 9 1 , 9 3 , 96, 9 9 - 1 0 1 ,

103

1 2 6 , 1 4 2 , 1 5 6 , 3 0 7 , 365

Peaceful unification, 55, 1 1 3 ,

Pak Il-yöng, 228, 385

171,

176-177 120,

1 7 0 , 1 7 7 ; see also U n i f i c a t i o n

P a k I n - c h ' ö l , 48, 59

Peng Dehuai, 1 3 7 ,

P a k K i l - s o n g , 49, 50, 3 3 1 , 3 4 7

P e n k o v s k y , V . A . , 58, 60, 69

Pak K ü m - c h ' ö l , 35, 9 1 , 172,

People's A s s e m b l y o f N o r t h K o r e a ,

181,

185, 187, 222, 228, 229, 327, 374, 3 8 1 ; p h o t o , 41

138

96, 97 P e o p l e ' s P a r t y , 74

Pak K w a n g - h ü i , 122, 358, 360

P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a , 65

Pak K w a n g - s ö n ,

P e t r o v , V . I., 2 9 1

Pak K w ö n ,

327

198

Pak K y ö n g - o k , Pak K y ö n g - s u k ,

P i e c k , W . , 62 329 327

Ping N a n y a n g , 17, 20 P l a t f o r m , 77; c o m m i t t e e , 7 5

Index Poch'onbo, 284; raid, 34-36, 41 Poland, 62, 66, 68, 149, 290 Political Committee, 128, 139, 143, 393; first congress, 80, 83; membership in, 221; second congress, 90-93 Pravda, 144, 185, 186, 306 Preparatory Committee for Korean Independence, 65 Procurator-General, 130, 134, 147 Procurement of arms, 46 Production campaigns, 164-65 Progressive Party, 99 Proletarian internationalism, 176 Propaganda Bureau, 96 Provincial Party Committee, 90 Provisional People's Committee, 96, 101, 1 1 2 - 1 3 Public Security Bureau, 68 Pueblo, 210, 2 3 1 , 233, 234, 238, 239, 247, 259, 285; incident, 385 Purges, 228-29; of generals, 241 Pushkin, Aleksander, 144, 306 Pyongyang Institute, 101 Qi Zhizhong, 20 Radkiewicz, S., 68 Rangoon bombing incident, 293 Rashodov, S. R., 388 Reagan, R., 292 Reconstruction from the war, 139-41 Red Cross: exchange of visits, 294; North Korea, 239, 293; South Korea, 254; talks 254-56, 258 Red Security Corps, 68 Red Worker-Peasant Militia, 240, ^59, 387, 390 Red Young Guards, 214, 259, 379, 390 Rehabilitation from the war, 139-41 Revolutionary Party for Reunification, 234-37, 256, 294, 324 Reykjavik summit, 291-92

433

Rhee, Syngman, 65, 76, 97, 104, 112, 120, 155, 225 Robinson, J . N . , 132 Romanenko, A. A . , 60-62, 65, 69, 7 1 , 104, 204, 359 Romania, 149, 262, 284, 291; C o m munist Party, 289; Young C o m munist League, 290 Rotblyut, A. I., 61 Russian Maritime Province, 4, 46, 48. 156 Sadat, A., 204 Sapozhnikov, B. G., 48, 50, 59, 92 Second Directional A r m y , 26 Second Party Conference, 205, 213, 220-23, 228, 246, 261, 308 Second Route A r m y , 18, 28, 29, 46, 47, 49, 50, 101, 343 Secretariat, 75, 282 Security Bureau, 101; forces, 101-5 Seoul Political Institute, 128 Seychelles, Republic of, 262, 264 Shabshin, A. I., 60 Shanin, G. I., 60; photo, 63 Shelepin, A. N., 190, 203 Shi Guilin, 20 Shi Zhongheng, 16, 31 Shiga Yoshio, 185 Shtykov, T. F., 61, 66, 94, 125; photos, 1 1 7 , 118 Shura, 51 Sin Kwang-sun, 331 Sin Yông-gùn, 7 Sino-American normalization treaty, 259; rapprochement, 207, 249 Sino-Indian border dispute, 180 Sino-Japanese peace treaty, 249, 251 Sino-Korean relations, 33; camaraderie, 178; dispute, 188-203, 316, 323; friendship week, 207 Sino-Soviet dispute, 154, 160, 161, 175, 176-208, 309, 323; Kim's position in, 220, 2 2 1 , 224, 247, 249, 260

434

INDEX

S 6 C h ol, 49, 103, 246, 282, 327, 393 So H w i , 150-151 So I n - h o n g , p h o t o , 41 So K w a n g - h a e , 332 So P y o n g - s a n , 330 Socialistic p a t r i o t i s m , 153, 3 1 0 Socialist U n i t y Party, 71 S o k San, 103, 191, 2 1 1 , 223, 239, 2 4 1 , 327, 381 Sok T o n g - s u , 329 S o k o l o v , I. M . , p h o t o , 63 S61 C h 6 n g - s i k , 131, 134, 362 S o n C h o n g - j u n , 327 Son S 6 n g - p ' i l , 295 Son W 5 n - g u m , 331 Son Y o n g - j o n g , 181 Song Chi-yong, 2 S o n g II, 34 Song Suk-cha, 7 S o n g S u n g - p ' i l , 329 S o n g Y i f u , 20 S o u t h Korea, 251-68; d i a l o g u e w i t h , 249, 2 5 1 - 6 0 ; Liaison B u r e a u , 129; r e v o l u t i o n , 2 2 1 , 2 2 4 - 3 7 , 245, 294 Sovietization, 60; o f N o r t h Korea, 62, 6 5 - 7 3 ; p r o g r a m of, 95 Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, 249 S o v i e t - K o r e a n E c o n o m i c and C u l tural A g r e e m e n t , 357 S o v i e t - K o r e a n Friendship Society, 268, 359 S o v i e t - K o r e a n dispute, 179-88, 2 1 2 , 2 1 7 , 2 2 1 , 229, 323 S o v i e t - K o r e a n s , 67, 68, 72, 77, 79, 80, 85, 89, 91, 96, 1 0 0 - 1 , 103, 105, 107, 108, 122, 123, 138-45, 150, 156, 157, 164, 172, 173, 222, 228; attacks o n the d o m e s t i c g r o u p , 8488; 1 7 1 , 306, 307; p u r g e s , 126 Soviet U n i o n , 47-52, 60, 61, 94, 97, 102, 153, 154, 170, 1 7 1 , 206, 291; A c a d e m y Sciences, 31, 182; agent of, 79; aid to N o r t h K o r e a , 149; a r m y , 155, 157; C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f the, 145, 179, 184, 2 9 1 ; consulate

in Seoul, 60; declaration to the K o rean people, 64; e m b a s s y in N o r t h Korea, 61; Far Eastern C o m m a n d , 50; liberation of Korea, 104; N o r t h K o r e a n accusation of, 184-85; o c cupation of N o r t h Korea, 1, 62, 64. 55. 58-73. 74. 78, 79. 83, 89, 96, 101; O c t o b e r r e v o l u t i o n , 1 1 3 ; revisionism, 189; secret police, 68; s u p p l y of a m m u n i t i o n s , 46; t r a i n ing guerrillas, 49; 21st p a r t y c o n gress, 154; 2 2 d p a r t y congress, 176-78; 23d p a r t y congress, 219; 25th division, 58-63, 65, 72, 90, 204; w i t h d r a w a l of, 102, 107; w o r s e n i n g relations, 2 1 7 Special E c o n o m i c Z o n e in S h e n z h e n , 297 Stalin, J . , 58, 61, 62, 76, 83, 98, 1 1 2 , 125, 140, 143, 146, 157, 177, 187, 197, 247, 249, 276, 3 1 2 , 315, 3 1 6 S u k a r n o , 187, 283 S u p ' u n g h y d r o e l e c t i r c plant, 165 S u p e r h u m a n drives, 164-65 S u p r e m e C o u r t , 130, 134, 154 S u p r e m e People's A s s e m b l y , 98-99; f o u r t h assembly, 222, 230, 254; military c o m m i t t e e , 2 1 5 ; second assembly, 153-55; seventh a s s e m bly, 287, 294, 295; sixth a s s e m b l y , 222, 272, 274; S t a n d i n g C o m m i t tee, 133, 134; t h i r d a s s e m b l y , 2 1 1 Suryong, 197, 279-80, 304, 3 1 2 , 3 1 3 , 315, 316; p h o t o , 3 1 7 Suzuki Ichizo, 185

T ' a e P y ö n g - y ö l , 327 T ' a e S o n g - s u , 77, 350 Taean w o r k i n g s y s t e m , 167, 207, 308, 370 T a e d o n g River, 4, 193, 3 1 7 Taesöngsan, revolutionary martyrs in, 297 T a n a k a , K a k u h e i , 253

Index Tanaka Giichi, 36 Tangyuan guerrilla groups, 17 Tarasov, N . N . , 268 Ten-year compulsory education system, 272 Territorial dispute, Sino-Korean, 197203 Third Directional A r m y , 28 Third Route A r m y , 18, 28, 40, 49, 343

Third World, 161, 203, 204, 207, 210, 226, 247, 249, 250, 251-68, 270, 299, 305, 308, 3 1 3 , 323, 324 Three-Revolution: council, 277; honor badge, 280; movement, 27778, 310; red flag, 280 Tito, J . B . , 177, 260, 261, 390; photo, 194 Treaty for economic and cultural cooperation, with Soviet Union, 119; Treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, 179, 180, 187 Trials, of the domestic group, 130-36 Tumen River, 47, 197-202 Tunnels in the demilitarized zone, 258 U C h 5 n g - g y u , 183 U.S.S. General Sherman, 5; Enterprise, 233; see Pueblo Uisin chakch'iik, 163, 323 Ulbricht, W., 62 Underwood J r . , H., 132, 135 Unification of Korea; hardline policy, 292-94; military, 1 1 2 ; North K o rean policy explained, 256-57; North Korean proposal, 120; peaceful unification, 55, 1 1 3 , 120, 170, 177; policy, 225-31; ten-point policy, 293; United Nations, 264 Union of Agricultural Working People, 163 United Nations, 120, 225, 250, 26265; forces, 108, h i , 1 1 4 , 120, 122,

43 5

123, 128; joint admission to, 257; supervision of, 97, 98 United Polish Workers' Party, 71 United States, 60, 97, 170, 190, 202; military, 55; occupation, 65, 132; troop withdrawal, 245, 257 Vassiliev, 49 Vera, 51 Victory 58 truck, 165 Vietnam, 190, 191, 205, 2 1 3 , 221, 234, 248; war in, 225-27, 262 Voice of National Salvation, 294 Voroshilov Camp, 48-50 Wang Delin, 20 Wang Detai, 16, 20-22, 33 Wang Minggui, 50 Wang Ok-hwan, 327 Wang Yachen, 18, 20 Washington monument, 320 Wei Zhengmin, 8-10, 20, 22, 27-29, 33-36, 4 7 , 3 4 0

West Germany, 1 7 1 ; militarism, 205 Workers' Party of Korea, 70, 7 1 , 7494; expulsion from, 124-25; fifth congress, 75, 210, 215, 223, 24248, 272-73, 308; first congress, 7478; fourth congress, 75, 159-60, 168-71, 174-79, 207, 210, 2 1 1 , 220, 223, 228; judicial policy, 154, 369; membership, 125, 149; merger, 9293; of North Korea, 74, 77, 92, 120; party conference, 154, 205; Politburo, 292; second congress, 74-75. 83-89; Secretariat, 223; shift to state, 270-86; shock brigade, 177, 249; of South Korea, 74, 77, 83, 84, 92, 120, 235; third congress, 75, 125, 145-49. 169 World Health Organization, 263 Wu Yicheng, 31 Xia Yunjie, 17, 20, 33 Xie Wendong, 17, 18, 20

4 3 6

INDEX

Yalu River, 227,

34, 68,

72, 79, 80, 82, 83,

90, 91, 96, 139,

142.

70-73.

Kim,

101, 143,

103, 145.

150-52.

Yi K w a n g - m m ,

126,

Yi K w a n g - s u ,

8, 15, 16, 18, 2 0 ,

102; p h o t o ,

to

273,

28,

26-27

13,

31

Söng-yong,

Yi Kye-sun,

Yöng,

154

Yi M u n - g y u ,

235,

329

Yi N a - y ö n g ,

367

2, 329

104 329

Yi Pong-su,

Yi Ch'öng-ch'ön,

104

Yi C h ' ö n g - w ö n , Yi Che-sun,

243

Yi P o n g - n o k ,

46 147,

13, 4 9 , 97, 3 2 7 , 343,

Yi P y ö n g - n a m , 174,

172; p h o t o ,

366

Yi Sang-jo,

41

Yi S a n g - m u k ,

Yi Chin-bok,

17

Yi Sön-bu, 243

329

Yi C h o n g - o k ,

221, 222, 273,

329

Yi Chu-ha,

121,

92,

Yi C h u - y ö n ,

353

180, 219,

222,

332

Yi H a k - m a n ,

14,

18, 2 0 , 2 1 , 4 6 ,

48,

Yi H o n g - g w a n g ,

14, 16, 2 0 ,

331, 342; C o m p a n y , 254,

Yi H y o - s u n ,

172,

366, 381,

115

138,

181, 222,

228-30,

332 85,

130-32,

353,

362,

Yi Tong-il,

Yi Ki-yöng, Yi K u k - c h i n ,

328

Yi T u - s u ,

329

Yi Ül-söl,

Yi K ü m - c h ' ö n ,

100 7, 8,

340

128-

130, 331,

134.

361

143 332

198 328

Yi W o n - j o , 92,

130,

131,

100

Yi Y ö n g - b a e ,

12

Yi Y o n g - g u ,

328

Yi Y ö n g - h o ,

152, 222, 239, 241,

328,

347

Yim

327

99,

100,

363

328

Yi Tu-ik,

Y i m C h ol,

143

361

363

33 1

294

Yi Y ö n g - s u k ,

139

147, 327,

92, 93, 99,

Yi T o n g - g w a n g ,

Yi Y o n g - i k ,

363

134,

145, 3 6 0 ,

Yi Y o n g , 99,

382

Yi Kang-guk,

Yi K ü k - n o ,

102,

photo,

389

Yi Il-p'yöng,

Yi Ki-sök,

Yi Süng-yöp,

Yi O i - b o k ,

346

Yi Hu-rak,

130,

85, 86, 97, 352,

Yi Tu-ch'an,

374

Yi H a k - b o k ,

331.

133,

331

Yi Sun-gün,

Yi T'ae-jun, 92, 132,

140,

96,

33,

198

Yi Song-un,

35,

Yi Chong-san,

364.

286,

295

347

100

35

172

Yi Chöng-in,

92, 99,

150

Yi Sang-jun,

Yi Chi-ch'an,

Yi C h o n g - h y ö k ,

256

97

Yi M y ö n g - s ö n ,

Yi P ö m - s ö k ,

204

331

Yi M a n - h w a ,

Yi M u n - u ,

332

331

Yi O - s o n g ,

14

332

Yanji bomb,

292,

331, 143

Yi K w ö n - h a e n g ,

156,

242, 246, 247,

297

31

Yi M u n - h w a n ,

Yang Yim, Yang

296, 13,

86,

295

Yang Se-bong, Yang

107,

149-57

Yangjingyu, 30,

105,

174, 221, 307; c h a l l e n g e s

Yang Hyöng-söp, 281,

Yi K ü n - m o ,

197-202,

Yi K w a n g ,

Yanan group,

1

193,

320

328

328 79,

142,

223, 288, 294, 328,

Ch'un-ch'u,

358

Yim Chong-ok,

332

122,

123,

Index Y i m Hae, 14, 139, 228, 328, 363 Yim Hwa, 92, 129-31, 134, 361, 363 Y i m U-song, 47 Y o Un-hy6ng, 98 Y o Yon-gu, 295 Yon Hyong-muk, 282, 295, 296 Young Communist League, 75, 88 Y u Ch'ang-gwon, 328 Y u Chenzhi, 25 Yu Kyong-hui, 329 Y u Kyong-su, 152, 172, 328 Yu M y o n g - o k , 329 Yu Tae-ch'i, 183 Y u Ung-sam, 329 Yugoslavia, 177, 1 8 1 , 184, 260-62, 266, 289, 290 Yun Ki-bok, 282, 295

43 7

Y u n Kong-hum, 151 Y u n Se-p'yong, 1 Y u n Sun-dal, 134, 361 Y u n T'ae-hong, 328 Yura, 51 Y u w e n Middle School, 6, 7, 8,

Zagruzin, 68 Zaire, 266 Zhao Shangzhi, 16, 18, 20, 33 Z h i v k o v , T . , 290, 391 Zhou Baozhong, 17, 18, 20, 2 1 , 29, 47-50, 178, 343, 373; photo, 23 Zhou En-lai, 176, 180, 202, 203 Zhou Shudong, 22 Z o u Youyan, 20

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Institute

1 he Ladder o f Success in Imperial China. Ping-ti Ho. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962. T h e Chinese Inflation, 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 4 9 . Shun-hsin C h o u . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963. Reformer in M o d e m China: Chang Chien, 1 8 5 3 - 1 9 2 6 . Samuel C h u . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965. Research in Japanese Sources: A Guide. Hershel Webb, with the assistance o f Marleigh R y a n . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1965. Society and Education in Japan. Herbert Passin. N e w Y o r k : Teachers C o l l e g e Press, 1965. Agricultural Production and Economic Development in Japan, 1 8 7 3 - 1 9 2 2 . James I. N a k a m u r a . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Japan's First M o d e r n N o v e l : U k i g u m o of Futabatci Shimei. Marleigh R y a n . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1967. The Korean Communist Movement, Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967.

1 9 1 8 - 1 9 4 8 . D a e - S o o k Suh.

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T h e First V i e t n a m Crisis. Melvin G u r t o v . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a Press, 1967.

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Cadres, B u r e a u c r a c y , and Political P o w e r in C o m m u n i s t China. Barnett. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1968.

A.

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The Japanese Imperial Institution in the T o k u g a w a Period. Herschel Webb. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1968. Higher Education and Business Recruitment in Japan. K o y a Azumi. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. The C o m m u n i s t s and Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting o f Chinese History. J a m e s P. Harrison, J r . N e w Y o r k : Atheneum, 1969.

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H o w the Conservatives Rule Japan. Nathaniel B . Thayer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Aspects o f Chinese Education. C . T . H u , ed. N e w Y o r k : Teachers C o l l e g e Press, 1970. Documents o f Korean C o m m u n i s m , 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 4 8 . Dae-Sook Suh. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Japanese Education: A Bibliography o f Materials in the English Language. Herbert Passin. N e w Y o r k : Teachers C o l l e g e Press, 1970. Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan. Koji Taira. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1970. T h e Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. Shumpei O k a m o t o . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1970. Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan. H . Paul Varley. N e w Y o r k : Columbia University Press, 1 9 7 1 . J a p a n ' s Postwar Defense Policy, 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 6 8 . Martin E. Weinstein. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1 9 7 1 . Election C a m p a i g n i n g Japanese Style. Gerald L. Curtis. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1 9 7 1 . China and Russia: T h e " G r e a t G a m e . " O . E d m u n d C l u b b . N e w Y o r k : C o l u m bia University Press, 1 9 7 1 . M o n e y and Monetary Policy in C o m m u n i s t China. Katharine Huang Hsiao. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1 9 7 1 . T h e District Magistrate in Late Imperial China. J o h n R. Watt. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1972. L a w and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice. J a m e s C . Hsiung. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1972. Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 1 . Dorothy B o r g and Shumpei O k a m o t o , eds., with the assistance of Dale K . A. Finlayson. N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1973. Japanese Culture: A Short History. H . Paul Varley. N e w Y o r k : Praeger,