Nicolaus of Autrecourt: A Study in 14th Century Thought

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NICOLAUS OF AUTRECOURT

Published with the aid of the University of Cincinnati's Charles Phelps Taft Memorial Fund

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NICOLAUS OF AUTRECOURT

JI Study in 14th- Century Thought BY JULIUS RUDOLPH WEINBERG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON FOR UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI · 1948

Copyright, 1948, Princeton University Press Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,

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London: Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press

To Ilse

I

AC KNOWLEDGMENTS

to express my d"eep gratitude to Dr. Julius Hyman, to the American Council of Learned Societies, to the Elizabeth Clay Rowald Scholarship of Ohio State University for the finan­ cial aid I received while engaged in writing this book. I wish to thank the University of Cincinnati for providing the funds for its publication. I am grateful to the editorial staff of the Princeton University Press for their courtesy and patience, and to the Librarian of the Bodleian Library for a microfilm of the manu­ script of the Exigit ordo executionis. Professors Richard McKean and Blanche Boyer, both of the University of Chicago, were very generous with their help and advice on philosophical and paleographical questions. Dr. Eliza­ beth Caskey and Professors Rodney Robinson, Malcolm Mc­ Gregor, Hilmar Krueger, and Robert Shafer of the University of Cincinnati were generous and unstinting with their time and aid. Professors Ralph W. Church and George H. Sabine of Cornell University were kind enough to read and criticize an earlier ver­ sion of the book. Professor Ernest Moody of Columbia, Professor Harry Wolfson of Harvard, and Father Philotheus Boehner of St. Bonaventure College provided me with special information and transcriptions or photographs of documents. _To all of them I express my profound thanks. I also wish to thank Mr. John Yolton for proofreading the typescript. My indebtedness to the researches of Lappe, Gilson, Vignaux, Michalski, O'Donnell, and some others who have studied the thought of Nicolaus of Autrecourt will be evident to the reader. I should not like my disagreement with some of their conclusions to obscure my gratitude for their work. Any words would be inadequate expression of my debt to my wife. Her reading the manuscripts of Nicolaus and clarifying difficult passages for me, and her constant encouragement, were indispensable. Without her help I should not have been able to complete my work. J. R. w. WISH

October 1947 Madison, Wisconsin

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Vll

INTRODUCTION

3 9 31 51 78

I. II.

THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE THE CRITIQUE OF CAUSE AND SUBSTANCE

III.

SOME DETAILS OF THE CRITIQUE

IV.

THE ALLEGED PROBABILITY OF SUBSTANCE

V.

THE POSSIBLE SOURCES AND PURPOSE OF

83

. THIS CRITIQUE SUMMARY VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI.

THE POSITIVE ASPECT OF PROBABILlTY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD THE ETERNITY OF THINGS RELATIONS, CONTINUA, AND THE VACUUM MOTION AND CHANGE THE POSITIVE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SENSE-CERTAINTY

XII. XIII.

THE OBJECTS OF COGNITION CAUSATION AND THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

II. III.

WHY "EXIGIT" IS REGARDED AS A LATER WRITING THAN CORRESPONDENCE WITH BERNARD OF AREZZO

233

CORRECTIONS OF THE EDITION OF THE "EXIGIT"

235

THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE "COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE"

IV. V.

175 194 215 226 231

APPENDICES I.

102 114 127 14 0 149 163

MORAL QUESTIONS THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONTINUUM

236 237 238

239

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX

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NICOLAUS OF AUTRECOURT

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INTRODUCTION

W

are often told that Truth never dies, and it·is to be hoped that it is so. It is certain, however, that error is capable of repeated resurrection. Only thus can the recent attempt to revive Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics be described. For the claims that Aristotelian philosophy made for natural knowledge were subjected to annihilating criticism in the fourteenth century by Nicolaus of Autrecourt and in the eighteenth century by David Hume. Apologists can make a specious case against Hume by urging that his climate of opinion and his temperament rendered him incapable of a correct understanding of Aristotle. It i� im­ possible to make a similar case against Nicolaus of Autrecourt who, we may be sure, lived in a period of intellectual history that was steeped in Aristotelian conceptions and procedures. Hence, it is of importance for us to realize that a successful refutation of Aristotle occurred in the scholastic period itself. For only in this way can we judge the rather extravagant claims currently urged in behalf of a return to Aristotelian modes of thought. The time and circumstances in which Nicolaus' critique was written assures us that its author had the benefit of a more com­ plete understanding of medieval Aristotelianism than any modern thinker could have had. The arguments he urged against Aris­ totelianism may be safely allowed to speak for themselves. This, then, is one reason for a careful study of the philosophy of Nico­ laus of Autrecourt. There is another reason also for studying the philosophy of Nicolaus. His condemnation by the Avignon Curia in 1346 was as important an event in the intellectual history of the fourteenth century as was the condemnation of Averroism in 12 7 7 in that of the thirteenth. The condemnation of 1346 marks a climax in the internal conflict of forces in medieval thought which ushered in a somewhat new and very radical change in philosophic method and outlook. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this conflict occurred within the confines of scholasticism, and that Nicolaus' E

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INTRODUCTION

reaction to the ideas of his time depends heavily on considerations which fall entirely within the world-view of scholasticism. The internal conflict was the fundamental opposition between Aris­ totelian naturalism and Christian theology. The contradiction between the logic and the metaphysics of Aristotle is contained wholly within the medieval sphere of thought. The belief in the existence and efficacy of final causes and their use as principles of explanation is strictly medieval. Since these ideas lie at the foundation of Nicolaus' thought, it is important to emphasize their scholastic character. None of these ideas and conflicts is basically due to the introduction of extraneous elements. The philosophy and adventures of Nicolaus of Autrecourt provide the best representation of the ferment in the thought of this period. His philosophy and condemnation thus constitute an important landmark of intellectual history. Finally one must consider the permanent value of _the ideas which Nicolaus either discovered or elaborated in the course of his work. �is critique of the ideas of causality, substance, and natural knowledge contains permanently valid and important re­ sults which were understood only long after his name and writings had fallen into oblivion. He deserves a permanent place in the list of philosophers worth serious study if only for his analysis of the relation between intuition and inference and natural knowl­ edge. But since he also anticipates important ideas of such philos­ ophers as Leibniz and Berkeley his positive views also command our attention. The facts of Nicolaus' life are set forth by Lappe,1 and I de­ pend heavily on him for the following sketch: Nicolaus was born in Autrecourt, a village in the diocese of Verdun, about 1300. He resided at the Sorbonne between 13 20 1 J. Lappe, Nicolaus von Autrecourt. Beitrage zur Geschichte, der Philosophie der Mittelatters. Bd. VI. Heft 2. Munster, 1908. Pp. 1-8.

Lappe's discussion is paginated with ordinary numerals; the texts of Nicolaus are paginated with numerals to which asterisks are added, e.g., 4*. I shall follow this dif­ ferentiation in all references to Lappe. The texts have a marginal indication of line number. I shall also refer to passages by this means. E.g. 4*, 30-35.

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INTRODUCTION

and 1327, a period which Lappe assumes to have covered his student days at the University of Paris. He probably obtained the Licentiate in Theology sometime after 1327. He attained the degrees of 1\1aster of Arts and Bachelor of Theology and Laws, and lectured on these subjects between 1327 and 1340. The range of the propositions condemned against him shows that he lectured on the Sentences of Peter the Lombard, the Politics of Aristotle and probably on other works of Aristotle. In 1338 he was made a canon at the Cathedral of Metz. This was an ecclesiastical bene­ fice in absentia, the kind of stipendium frequently given the more advanced scholars in order to further their opportunities for study. In 1339, a decree of the Faculty of Arts was issued which indi­ cates insubordination among the �tudents and some of the faculty of the University of Paris. In December 1340, severe decrees were issued against the teaching of some doctrines attributed to Ockham and his followers. About the same time Nicolaus and a few other scholars were summoned by Pope Benedict XII to the Papal Curia at Avignon to answer for alleged errors in theology and philosophy. The Pope's death interrupted the process against Nicolaus, but it was resumed in 1342 after the coronation of Clement VI and was conducted by Cardinal Curty ( the process is always referred to, therefore, as the Articles of the Lord Cardi­ nal). 2 The condemnation was concluded in 1346 and a formal retraction took place on November 25, 1347. In addition to a public retraction, Nicolaus witnessed the public burning of his books, he was deprived of his degrees and declared ineligible for the l\ifaster's Degree in Theology. But one further authentic refer­ ence to Nicolaus exists. In 1350 the document recording the fact that he was made deacon at the Cathedral of Metz refers to him as a Licentiate in Sacred Theology. This title is curious in the light of the events which preceded. The reasons for the accusation and condemnation are difficult :.i

Ibid., pp. 31*-45*.

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INTRODUCTION

to understand. Though not an Ockhamist, he probably taught some of the doctrines that were prohibited in the University de­ crees of 1339 and 1340. He was probably suspected of reintro­ ducing under the guise of probabilism some of the forbidden Averroist doctrines. In the Middle Ages, reason, revelation, and experience were regarded as reliable sources of knowledge, and while revelation took precedence over the others, no fundamental conflict among them was considered possible. Accordingly, any challenge of the claims of reason or experience or any genuine conflict among them would have been sternly rejected and sup­ pressed. Since Nicolaus claimed that reason and experience pro­ vide man with very little knowledge and that propositions con­ trary to those of revelation are often more probable than the dogmas of revelation, it was almost inevitable that he should in­ cur the displeasure of the authorities of the University and the Church. Nicolaus insisted before his judges at the trial that all his assertions were made disputatively rather than definitively and that, whatever he said, his readers or hearers should adhere strictly to the Catholic Faith. The Articles of Cardinal Curty called all this a "foxy excuse." In my own opinion, this is partly justified. When Nicolaus said that all of his views in the cor­ respondence with Bernard of Arezzo were stated disputatively and for the mere purpose of seeing the consequences of a critical point of view, he was speaking under duress and fear. Therefore, this part of what he said is not to be taken seriously. The statement that his probable propositions, to the extent to which they contra­ dicted dogma, are false despite their probability occurs in the prologue to his chief work. This prologue was not, I think, com­ posed under any such duress and ought therefore to be taken at its face value if there is no other reason for suspecting his sin­ cerity. The writings of Nicolaus which we possess are in a somewhat mutilated and fragmentary form. Two of the nine letters which he wrote to Bernard of Arezzo are complete. A letter written to a certain Egidius in connection with the controversy with Bernard

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INTRODUCTION

is nearly complete. Excerpfs from the fourth ' fifth ' sixth ' seventh ' and ninth letters to Bernard are quoted in the Articles of Cardinal Curty. Fragments from disputations and lectures also come down to us from this source. A theological question "utrum visio crea­ turae possit naturaliter intendi" and the chief work, Exigit ordo etc. 3 are extant. The latter is not quite complete in the only manu­ script which is known. For reasons which I have indicated in the Appendices, the Exigit was probably written before 1340 but after all the other extant writings. This last point is important since it enables us to trace the gradual development of Nicolaus' thought, and since it enables us to show the historical as well as the logical iJ!de­ pendence of his critical and his positive views. In Chapter· I, I give an exposit�on of Nicolaus' theory of evi-:­ dence. Here we learn that the sources of certainty are intuitive experience and logically necessary implications. In terms of this strict limitation of certainty, any inference from the existence of one thing to that of another is found to be impossible. This is dis­ cussed in Chapter II. In Chapter III, I show the effect of this critical view on the Christian Aristotelianism of medieval times. If substances and causes cannot be strictly demonstrated, it is still possible that experience may provide a probability of their existence. Nicolaus shows that this suggestion is illusory by means of an argument that is almost verbally identical with the one made famous by David Hume much later. All this is dealt with in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the historical sources and the purpose of Nicolaus' critique of natural knowledge and of scholastic philosophy are investigated. Chapter VI introduces Nicolaus' later views on probability. Here I attempt to elucidate the medi­ eval meaning of probable and to explain in particular how Nico­ laus came to use probable arguments for elaborating his positive views about the world and human cognition. It turns ou"t that, a Both are edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell, Medieval Studies, vol. 1 ( 1939), pp. 179-280. References to O'Donnell's edition will be henceforth as follows: "f 239l ( 11)" means "page r239l line 11."

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INTRODUCTION

while a demonstrative metaphysics and epistemology is impos­ sible, a probable theory of the structure of the universe and of the validity of cognition is possible. This theory is based on Nicolaus' belief in final causes. What he calls the Principles of the Good are the foundation of his system. This is explained in Chapter VII. One of these principles states that the universe is an every­ where equally perfect whole, another that its parts are mutually adapted to one another, a third that they are all ordered to a First Being. These principles imply that _all things in the universe are eternal. This is taken up in Chapter VIII. In Chapters IX and X, I attempt to show how apparent exceptions to the eternity of things are dealt with, and how motion and change can be recon­ ciled with the doctrine that all things are eternal. In Chapters XI and XII, I discuss Nicolaus' attempt to save natural knowledge and to reconcile a positive theory of knowledge with his view that all things are eternal. In the final chapters I discuss his positive views on causation, his attempt to reconcile the idea of reward and punishment with his probable theory, and I try to give an estimate of the value and influence of his philosophy as a whole. His probable theory of the universe has a twofold purpose. He wishes to show that the philosophy of Aristotle and the school­ men cannot be demonstrated, that another philosophy can be shown to be more probable than that of Aristotle, and that prob­ able argument is not merely the only known way of proceeding in natural investigations but also a far better one than the vain attempt of the scholastics to discover the truths of reason and the secrets of nature from the study of Aristotle and his Commen­ tator, Averroes.

CH A P TE R I

The Theory of Evidence

I

order to understand the content of Nicolaus' doctrine of evidence it is best to begin with an account of the views of his adversary, Bernard of Arezzo, O.:f .M.1 Superficially, the views of Bernard bear some resemblance to those of William of Ockham. But it will be plain that the resemblance is only superficial. In the interest of the theological dogma with which the creed begins, "credo in patrem omnipotentem, etc.," Bernard of Arezzo held the following views about intuitive cognition (notitia i_ntui­ tiva clara) : "Clear intuitive cognition is that by which we judge that a thing exists, whether it exi�ts or not." Now as God, by His absolute power, can create an intuitive act without any natural cause cooperating, we cannot infer that something exists from the fact that we have a clear intuitive cognition of that thing. "The inference, the object does not exist, hence it is not seen, is not valid. Nor is it valid to infer this is seen there/ore it exists." All this is the case because "Intuitive cognition does not necessarily require an existing object." Ockham had argued that, by absolute power, God was able to produce anything which is distinct in place and subject from another thing without producing that other thing, so that He could produce an intuition without producing its corre­ spondi�g object. But he did not argue that God could produce an evident'assent to the existence of an object which in fact does not exist. This, Ockham held, would amount to an open contradic­ tion, for it would be a contradiction for one to assent with complete evidence to the existence of something which actually does not exist. Hence, intuitive cognition naturally caused by an object produces eviden{assent to the existence of that object. But intui­ tive cognition of an object can be supernaturally caused when that object does not exist. Ockham holds that in such a case intuitive _cognition would produce an evident' denial of the existence of the 1

N

For the views of Bernard and Nicolaus' critique, see Lappe, op. cit., 2*-6*.

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THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE

object. The intrinsic difference between these different cognitions must exist and must be ostensibly present in consciousness. 2 Ock­ ham, as far as I know, did not make it plain what this difference is, but I am sure that some scholastics holding simila� views did not make the distinction at all. In particular, there is not the slightest suggestion in Nicolaus' first letter to Bernard, that the latter had made such a distinction. Hence his view of the subject differs in an important respect from Ockham's. The intrinsic con­ tent of a supernaturally caused intuition is not distinct from that of a normally caused intuition. Nicolaus began his critique of Bernard by showing that his view leads to utter scepticism involving all the absurdities of the Academics. For if Bernard's views are _carried out to their logical conclusion there is no end to doubts. In order to see precisely what is involved we must consider the matter from the standpoint of the perceiver, for this is the standpoint which is inescapably our own. If I perceive a person or a thing, whether or not the person or thing really exists cannot be determined from any intrinsic mark in my perception. My perception will be the same if God miracu­ lously causes it or if it is normally caused by an appropriate natu­ ral object. From our inescapable standpoint, it is impossible to examine the cause of the perception. Hence, it is impossible to infer with certainty the existence of an object from the facts of perception. It is pointless to suggest that the facts of perception and the assumption that the cause is a natural (rather than a supernatural) one will justify any inference from experience to reality. For we can never have the slightest reason to believe that the additional assumption is true. It fallows that the epistemic difference between perception and its alleged object renders any inference from the one to the other entirely precarious. The historian will recognize in the argument that veridical and deceptive perceptions are not intrinsically distinguishable one of 2 Cf. Philotheus Boehner, The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents According to Wil­ liam Ockham. Traditio vol. 1. New York, 1943. Pp. 223-275.

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TH E TH EORY OF EVIDENC E

the "leading principles" .. of the ancient Sceptics. There is no reason to suppose that Nicolaus obtained his argument from this source but it is not impossible. In any case it is not very important. For Nicolaus, as we shall see, made more consequent use of this and similar principles than any of the Sceptics of antiquity. In order to discover why perception and inference are thus unable to provide knowledge of reality, it will be necessary to undertake a careful analysis of the nature of implication. - For necessary inference depends on implication. At present Nicolaus notices only a particular feature of Bernard's theory of knowledge which puts it in an especially difficult position. According to Bernard, the direct act of cognition (by which an object is cognized) and the reflex act ( by which our various forms of awareness are themselves grasped) are always distinct. Now if this be the case, it is not only impossible to obtain knowledge of external objects but also impossible to obtain knowledge of our­ selves. The distinction between any act of awareness and the object of the act makes it impossible to infer the existence of the object from the existence of awareness. That is, the nonexistence of any object and an act of awareness of that object (miraculously produced in us ) are always logically compatible. Hence, we are just as uncertain that we are really sad, given an awareness of sadness, as that we are perceiving a real object, given the percep­ tion of that object. If all-this were the case, we would be uncertain of everything. To avoid this conclusion we must be prepared to grant that, in some of our cognitive acts, there is no distinction, either in knowl­ edge or in fact, between the act and its object. The direct and the reflex act of cognition will thus be identical and in this way we avoid the absurd consequences of academic scepticism. If we maintain that each one is certain of his acts and the objects of his senses, we must maintain that act and object are in such cases identical. Such an argument is a clue to the nature and limits of certitude. When the object of knowledge is immediate and therefore, in [ 11

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THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE

Nicolaus' view, identical with the act of awareness by which it is grasped, we have certitude. Whenever this immediacy is not pres­ ent, then such certitude is lacking. It is easy to see the course which this view of things will take. Inference from percept�on to any­ thing not directly perceived will carry us beyond the limits of certitude. Hence, any inference from perception to reality will be problematic. The full significance of all this will be developed as we proceed. A few critical observations are in order here. It is to be observed that the controversy between Nicolaus and his adversaries has its origin and its setting in some theological problem. In particular, the parties to the controversy are plainly trying to reconcile the strict Aristotelian conception of science_ (brw-T1Jf.L11) --�ith the pos­ sibility of miraculous exception to the common course of nature. Miracles put science in serious question. Indeed, suspicion of natural knowledge might tend to undermine all forms of cogni­ tion, faith itself not excepted. While the controversy has this theological setting and origin, it is by no means thus limited. On the contrary, Nicolaus draws the quite general conclusion that if theological dogmas render natural knowledge suspect, there are basic logical reasons for this. He goes on to elucidate these logical reasons and, by so doing, puts the discussion into the setting of pure philosophy. It is this fact which distinguishes the epistemo­ logical discussions of Nicolaus from those of many, if not all, of his predecessors and contemporaries. He seems quite clear that he is discussing a perfectly general question which has no essential connection with theology, and he appears equally clear that he has made an important if belated philosophical discovery. In the second letter to Bernard of Arezzo, Nicolaus sets forth his general theory of the nature and limits of evidence. To begin with, Nicolaus lays it down that there is just one fundamental principle of discourse. This is the law that a contradiction cannot be true. Indubitable knowledge is circumscribed by this formal principle and by the diverse illustrations of . it with which imme­ diate experience provides us.

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T H E T H EORY O F EVIDENC E

This doctrine is verbally identical with Aristotle's dictum in Metaphysics r that the first principle of being, and hence of significant discourse, is the impossibility of an attribute belonging and not belonging to the same thing at the same time, etc. The principle of noncontradiction is, according to Aristotle, the most certain of all principles. It is impossible that we should be mis­ taken about it, it is the best known, and it is true absolutely rather than hyp othetically. The medieval followers of Aristotle, if not indeed Aristotle himself, maintained that "all principles are reduced to this one as to a first : it is impossible to affirm and deny at the same time." 3 What is possible, unqualifiedly, is whatever does not involve a contradiction. Whatever is necessary, unquali­ fiedly, is that the opposite of which is self-contradictory. 4 In necessary propositions, the subject involves the predicate or the predicate involves the subject, so that there is an identity be­ tween the signification of the terms. Put in still another way, in a necessary consequence or implication, the antecedent cannot stand with the denial of the consequent without contradiction. 5 Such necessities are, there£ore, so many diverse and specific illustra­ tions of the law of noncontradiction. It is true that the metaphysical statement of the principle as we find it in Aristotle is in terms of a substance-accident ontology and is only intelligible in such terms in its Aristotelian context. But the principle, although it was perhaps first explicitly stated as such by Aristotle, is universally valid. Hence we may disengage it from the philosophy in which it first made its appearance under its right name, and so apply it without any restriction. In other words, it is philosophically neutral. Now if this is done, a logical s Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, nae, Ha, q. 1 , a. 7. 4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1019b, 22 ff. ; Anselm, cf. J. Fischer, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd. 10, Heft 3, p. 33 ; Abelard, "Logica lngredientibust Beitr iige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd. 21, Heft 3, pp. 496 1 4 , 3665 i 367 2 ; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, art. 3, resp. ; q.25, art. 3 ; Duns ScotuSi Opus oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 4, art. 2 ; William of Ockham, Summa totius logicae, n1, n, 8 ; Gabriel Biel, Collectorii, d. 17, q. 1. 5 See Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, John of Glogau, et al. in Prantl, Bd. IV, and also in Salamucha, Logika zdan u Wilhelma Ockhama, Przeglad Filozo.ficzny xxxvm, 1935, pp. 208-239.

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criterion of necessary truth is available to which all philosophical claims, including, indeed, those of Aristotle himself, can be sub­ jected. When this is done, some very unexpected results will fol­ low. The logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen can the_n be turned against their metaphysics with devastating consequence. The argument is frequently encountered, that to subject all existence to the alleged requirements of pure thought is to set limits to being prior to its examination and so to stultify inquiry. But this is beside the point. If noncontra�iction is a valid and pervasive condition of reality it is inescapably so no matter whether it is understood and expounded before or after we discover what, in particular, that reality consists of. And, indeed, if the law of noncontradiction is valid and pervasiye, it is no less so even if very little of the reality to which it applies can ever be discovered. Hence, there can be no objection to starting with noncontradiction. This is what Nicolaus does. In contrast to Aristotle, he makes no assumptions about substance and no attempt to derive the law of : noncontradiction from the existence of substance. For Nicolaus philosophical questions would be begged at the outset if any such connection between substantival existence and the law of noncon­ tradiction were to be made out. It is, then, stated that : "The first thing which lies at the basis of discourse is this : Contradictories cannot be true at the same time. Concerning which two things obtain. ( 1 ) This is the first princi­ ple speaking negatively, to which nothing is prior. ( 2 ) This is the first affirmatively or positively, because it is prior to any other. "These are proved by one method as follows : (a) All the certi­ tude we possess is resolved into this principle, and (b) the princi­ ple itself is not resolved into anything else as a conclusion is resolved into its premise ; it there£ore fallows that the principle in question is first in a two-fold primacy. The consequence is known from the mea�ing (quid nomi�i�) of first according to either expo­ sition given. The antecedent is proved in two parts. (a') And as far as concerns the first part, to wit, that all our certitude short of this certitude is resolved into this principle, I propose the follow[ 14

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THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE

ing consequence of that gf which you say you are certain : It is possible, without any contradiction which might fallow therefrom that it will appear to you to be so and yet that it will not be so ; therefore you are not evidently certain that it is so. It is clear to me, if I would admit that the antecedent is true, I would concede that the consequent is true, and hence that I would not be certain evidently and without qualification of that of which I said I am certain. " (b' ) From this it is clear that all our certitude is resolved in our said principle and that the principle itself is not resolved into another as a conclusion is resolved into its premise. It is plain from this, that all are resolved into the principle and it follows : this is prior to everything else which is not itself : therefore noth­ ing is prior to it. " 6 It is evident that the assumption of a specious certainty inferior to the law of noncontradiction would entail no contradiction. Nic­ olaus means to say this : If anything other than the law of non­ contradiction were assumed to be certain, it might appear to be certain and yet not be, without any ensuing contradiction. In the case of the law of noncontradiction, however, its denial entails a contradiction. Now, since we are attempting to prove only that the law of noncontradiction is the first principle, and not to prove that it is true (that having been assumed) , we repose complete confi­ dence in it because its negation entails a contradiction. This should, therefore, be the case with any other candidate for cer­ tainty, so that if this other candidate were nqt reducible to the law 6 Lappe, op. cit., 6*, 32-7*, 24. This passage has been differently interpreted. Lappe supposed that it meant "Gaebe es naemlich ein anderes Denkgesetz, auf welches das Gesetz des Widerspruchs sich zurueckfuehren liesse, so waere es ohne Widerspruch denk­ bar,