New Media and Revolution: Resistance and Dissent in Pre-uprising Syria 9780228002307

Citation preview

NEW MEDIA AND REVOLUTION

McGill-Queen’s Studies in Protest, Power, and Resistance Series editor: Sarah Marsden

Protest, civil resistance, and political violence have rarely been more visible. Nor have they ever involved such a complex web of identities, geographies, and ideologies. This series expands the theoretical and empirical boundaries of research on political conflict to examine the origins, cultures, and practices of resistance. From grassroots activists and those engaged in everyday forms of resistance to social movements to violent militant networks, it considers the full range of actors and the strategies they use to provoke change. The series provides a forum for interdisciplinary work that engages with politics, sociology, anthropology, history, psychology, religious studies, and philosophy. Its ambition is to deepen understanding of the systems of power people encounter and the creative, violent, peaceful, extraordinary, and everyday ways they try to resist, subvert, and overthrow them. 1 New Media and Revolution Resistance and Dissent in Pre-uprising Syria Billie Jeanne Brownlee

NEW MEDIA AND R E V O L U T I O N Resistance and Dissent in Pre-Uprising Syria

Billie Jeanne Brownlee

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2020 ISB N ISB N ISB N ISB N

978-0-2280-0088-4 978-0-2280-0089-1 978-0-2280-0230-7 978-0-2280-0231-4

(cloth) (paper) (eP df) (eP UB)

Legal deposit third quarter 2020 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: New media and revolution : resistance and dissent in pre-uprising Syria / Billie Jeanne Brownlee. Names: Brownlee, Billie Jeanne, 1984– author. Description: Series statement: McGill-Queen’s studies in protest, power, and resistance ; 1 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20200203878 | Canadiana (ebook) 20200203932 | ISB N 9780228000891 (paper) | IS BN 9780228000884 (cloth) | I SB N 9780228002307 (eP df ) | IS BN 9780228002314 (eP U B ) Subjects: l cs h: Mass media—Political aspects—Syria. | l c sh : Mass media— Social aspects—Syria. | l cs h: Arab Spring, 2010– | l c sh: Social change—Syria. Classification: l cc p95.82.s97 b76 2020 | ddc 302.23095691—dc2

This book was typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon.

Contents

Figures and Tables

vii

Acknowledgements ix 1 New Media, New Battlefields for New Revolutions 3 2 From Virtual to Tangible Civic Mobilisation

40

3 ‘Change within Continuity’: The Lion Cub’s Reforms 71 4 Empowering Publics: Satellite tv and the Internet 5 Media Development and Foreign Aid Assistance 6 The Syrian Media Landscape after 2011 162 Conclusions – Media: Weapons of the Weak or the Weapons of Mass Distraction? 188 Notes

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References Index

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261

92 124

Figures and Tables

f i gur e s 2.1 Formations of Social Movements

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2.2 The Formation of Syria’s Pre-uprising Mobilisation 50 2.3 Two-Step Flow Theory 66 5.1 Media Development 134 ta b l e s 4.1 Internet Users in the Middle East, 2000–15 106 5.1 Media Aid Development Donors 145 5.2 Media Aid Development Implementers

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Acknowledgements

This book is the outcome of an eight-year journey, extensive fieldwork, hard research, long reflections, and the intellectual and practical support of many people I have met in the Middle East and Europe who made this book possible and who taught me many lessons in life. I apologise if I will not name them all herebelow, yet my sincere appreciation goes to them all. First and foremost, I want to thank Lise Storm, for her academic and non-academic support. Most of the pieces in this book were produced under her supervision during my doctoral degree in Middle East politics at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies (iais ) at the University of Exeter. The time, ideas, and critical engagement that she dedicated over the years and the enthusiasm with which she encouraged me to go forwards, have been vital for the conclusion of my PhD and for the publication of this volume. Today, it is extremely rewarding to be working as a lecturer in Middle East politics at the iais, where I earned my PhD, and to see my relationship with Lise transforming into a true friendship. I am grateful to my colleagues at the iais , students, and staff members who make the department an intellectually stimulating research environment, nurturing a friendly group climate and supporting innovative interdisciplinary education across themes, projects, and regional studies. My gratitude goes to William Gallois, director of research at the iais, who has been my internal examiner at the confirmation of status exam and my mentor during my Economic and Social Research Council postdoctoral fellowship. William’s continuous support, insightful comments, honesty, and professional commitment have been invaluable for the completition of this book as well as for my

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progression towards being an independent researcher. William is a source of continuous support and incentive for research innovation. I would also like to thank the American Political Science Association (apsa ) for inviting me to the Middle East and North African (mena ) workshops, and more specifically professors Fred Lawson, Denise DeGarmo, Lourdes Habash, Ghada al-Madbouh, and Bassel Salloukh for the support and guidance they offered me in shaping the theoretical framework of this volume. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College at the University of Oxford, the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut, and l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris for hosting me during my research. In their libraries I carried out much of the work written in this book and met wonderful people, with whom I shared life and scholarship over the years. Finally, I should mention that I am most grateful for the opportunity to work with McGill-Queen’s University Press and in particular my editor, Richard Baggaley, for his remarkable professionalism, commitment, and kindness. Last but by no means least, my gratitude goes to my family, my partner, and my friends for their unbelievable support. My family, Carmen, Bob, and Timothy, has been a constant source of support and strength all these years. I wish to thank them for their unfailing love, which is at the basis of any great deed in life. My partner, Maziyar, with whom I shared the tinest rooms and embarked on hazardous journeys, and who accompanied me to the most remote places, has been my compass in life. I am grateful for his power to transform my life in a continuous adventure. Sara, Federica, Anna, Alessio, Lorenzo, Elena, Rafa, Shireen, Negar, Viola, and Anne have sweetened these years with memorable moments and loving friendship. On a final note, I would like to convey my heartfelt thanks to Syria and its people, which despite the brutal civil war that has devasted the country, welcomed me with sincere love and nurshied my personal growth. My thought goes to the little Wafaa, a friend who, despite the many difficulties in life, is an inspirational model with her incredible willpower, which is essential to achieving any goal we strive for, and always with a smile.

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New Media, New Battlefields for New Revolutions1 April is the cruellest month. Thomas Stearns Eliot, The Waste Land (1922) Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail Better. Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho (1983)

syria a n d t h e r is in g u p of the arab world On 12 June 2009, an unprecedented number of Iranians flocked to the polling stations for the presidential election of the Islamic Republic, motivated by a belief in the power of their vote.2 On 13 June, the election results were released. People’s disbelief in the truthfulness of the election results provoked widespread protests, which lasted for several months and came to be known as the Green Movement.3 The country witnessed massive demonstrations, crushed by the heavy hand of the regime and its security apparatus. Video clips, photos, and voice recordings of the violence of those days circled the globe in real time, in spite of the relentless efforts of the Iranian authorities to prevent the flow of news inside and outside the country’s borders.4 Tehran and Iran’s major cities were flooded with protests and riots, recalling the days of the 1979 Revolution. Thirty years had gone by as if it had been overnight, but upon awakening the world had been digitalised.5 The Green Movement slowly vanished under the repressive measures employed by the Iranian government, though it marked the beginning of a new era of protests and revolts in a region which had for long been untouched by forms of popular mobilisations.

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Nearly two years went by and on 17 December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor, Mohammad Bouazizi, set himself on fire in protest against the confiscation of his wares and the endless harassment by the municipality of Sidi Bouzid, a small town in Tunisia’s hinterland.6 His act was the last straw for the Tunisian underclass and was effectively the spark that ignited the Tunisian revolution and what came to be known, at a later date, as the Arab Spring. Riots and demonstrations swept through Tunisia, reaching the capital Tunis. The popular protest that had started in the small village of Sidi Bouzid against the abuse of power of the local police had turned into a national popular struggle targeting a twenty-three-year-old autocratic and corrupt regime. Fearing the growing sense of frustration and resentment of the people and their determination in bringing an end to that regime, on 14 January 2010, President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali abandoned his post and fled to Saudi Arabia, where he is currently an honoured guest. On that day, two demonstrations took place in Tunis, one staged in front of the head office of the workers’ union and the other one in front of the Ministry of the Interior by the so-called ‘Facebook people’, entirely organised through the use of Facebook.7 Bouazizi was not the first Tunisian to set himself alight in an act of public protest; others had done so previously or had found other ways to contest the regime’s corruption, but their stories were consigned to silence. This time the locals in Sidi Bouzid wanted that news to be heard and to spread out, and they succeeded, with unimaginable results. A human sacrifice was recorded on a mobile phone and soon afterwards that image reached the web, satellite channels, newspapers, and the international public’s attention.8 Bouazizi’s story, which before the advent of the Internet would have been buried in the memories of his loved ones, reached numerous households rapidly, becoming the bridge for so many who understood the heretofore untold suffering but had so far, out of fear, failed to react. It is not that social networks and social capital did not exist under Ben Ali’s regime, but rather that because of the strict censorship, the only place where such networks could materialise was through social media.9 The spread of the Internet had provided new opportunities and effective instruments to channel social discontent and trigger political mobilisation.10 Tunisia was the first Arab country in the new millennium to rise up against corruption and authoritarianism, though in the course of a few weeks Tunisia’s example had developed into a regional

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phenomenon, infecting other countries like Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, and Libya, as well as Syria and, more tentatively, Saudi Arabia.11 This wave of unrest proved more enduring and resilient than could ever have been envisaged through the expression initially coined to define it (read ‘Arab Spring’). Eight years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, popular movements opposing authoritarian regimes have once again lit up, ousting long-serving autocrats: the Algerian president Abdulaziz Bouteflika and the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. The level of intensity of these movements, people’s demands, and regimes’ reactions – plus the West’s involvement – varied greatly, with different outcomes from country to country. In some cases, like Syria, the regime did not give in to protestors’ demands, and protestors themselves did not abandon the fight, dangerously spiralling the country into a civil war, with a still highly uncertain outcome. To the surprise of many, the mantra of the 2011 Arab revolutions, ‘the people want the fall of the regime’, swept through the impenetrable walls of Syria. On 15 March 2011, the Syrian chapter of the Arab Spring officially started. On that day and as a response to the call on a Facebook page encouraging people to protest against Bashar al-Asad’s regime, a group of around 150 men and women rallied in front of the Umayyad Mosque in downtown Damascus. As in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, social media played a fundamental role in the materialisation of that event and what became the Syrian uprising. Digital media in Syria and the rest of the region became the new venues by which to express grievances and challenge political power collectively, activities that were previously unthinkable in closed regimes. Despite the small number of protestors who heeded the call and the harsh reaction of the security forces, that day paradoxically changed the course of Syria’s history. In a country where formal permission was required for a social meeting of more than five people, such an inconspicuous event in the heart of the Syrian capital suddenly symbolised a turning point for both the regime and its opposition. On 18 March, a larger demonstration took place in the streets of Dera’a demanding the release of a group of children who had been arrested by the security forces for having drawn anti-regime slogans on the walls of their school. Since then, the number of demonstrations and of people joining them increased by the day, bringing together Syrians from different social groups, united in asking for political, social, and economic reforms and more rights.12

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The violence employed by the regime to crush peaceful protestors and the relentless documentation and dissemination by citizens of this violence was a catalyst for instigating more participation at the local level, and drew the international community’s attention to what was unfolding in Syria. In the Syrian context, the new citizen-led media played three crucial roles: they encouraged more people to express their anger and to join the demonstrations, they helped the protestors reach international public attention, and they kept the atrocities committed by the regime from going unnoticed, as had been the case in the past. In 1982, the massacre of 20,000 to 40,000 civilians in the city of Hama had occurred in complete silence, reaching the West only in June of that year, when an article on the Wall Street Journal disclosed the dreadful news to the world.13 If in the past, Seib argues, ‘governments could control much of the information flow and therefore keep tight rein on political change, that is no longer the case. Governments can jail some bloggers and knock some satellite stations off the air, but the flood of information, and the intellectual freedom it fosters, is relentless’.14 With the creation, in the summer of 2011, of an anti-regime military force – the Free Syrian Army, which was formed by deserters from the Syrian army – the Syrian popular upheaval took on a new dimension, one that was very different from the rest of the countries involved in the Arab uprisings and that eventually led the country towards civil war and its subsequent dramatic humanitarian catastrophe. From Iran’s Green Movement to the uprisings that swept through the Arab world, the new media have played a pivotal role, so much so that some scholars have actually doubted that such revolts could have occurred without the intermediation of the new media. However, as history bears witness, in the past dictators were toppled without the aid of social media. Similarly, in the Arab uprisings, it was the people’s voice and sacrifice in the name of freedom, dignity, and social justice that toppled or at least shocked fossilised regimes. It was not the sharing of the footage of Bouazizi’s self-sacrifice on YouTube, nor the opening of a Facebook page called ‘We are all Khaled Said’ or the disclosing of the pictures of Hamza al-Khateeb’s dead body that threatened the stability of Arab regimes. As the Egyptian blogger Tarek Shalaby pointed out, ‘it all comes down to taking the streets’, and it is here where real people and not their virtual avatars lost their lives during the revolution.15 In all the Arab

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uprisings, digital technologies played a significant role in the organisation and coordination of the struggle, but it was people and their energy, labour, and resistance that were the essential components of the uprisings. Philip Howard argues, ‘technology alone does not cause political change’, but it offers new capacities and ‘imposes new constraints on political actors’.16 This means that in contemporary societies, in democracy as well as dictatorships, the new media are not simply influential communication tools, but also a fundamental infrastructure for social mobilisation. They make it possible for political goals to accomplish what ‘had previously been unachievable’.17 When handled by the people, these tools prove how radical political transformation does not simply occur through top-down regime change or transitional models, as much academic literature asserts, it also occurs through and by the people. New media have become part of modern counterinsurgency strategy, thanks to their power to reduce the costs of participation and to facilitate the concentration of agency.18 The Arab Spring is only one example among many that in the last decade have seen citizens, empowered by the new information technologies, taking to the streets against dictatorship, corrupt governments, and oppressive legislations. What the Arab uprising did, however, was generate a whole new debate about the binding relationship among ‘communication technology, revolutionary dynamics, political activism and social movements’.19 The new media do not represent the casual condition for social discontent, but they do represent the platform whereby social discontent is channelled and translated into ‘actionable strategies and achievable goals’.20 Social discontent in the Arab world was determined by factors like the youth bulge, economic recession, rising wealth concentration, high unemployment, and low quality of life, not by citizens’ access to the new media. Yet, the new media allowed people who were sharing the same grievances to come together, interact, and advance contentious actions in contexts in which forms of social gatherings were controlled if not prohibited. Therefore, it is important to understand how new media technologies influence civil society activism and what effect this has, if any, on formal power structures. However, contrary to what much of the narrative on the Arab Spring seems to convey, this study shows how new media technologies were not adopted by protestors on the eve of the uprising, but rather throughout a period of gestation, experimentation, and

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maturation. Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust wrote about the ‘revolutionary infrastructure’ in reference to the development of contentious mediated resistance, which pre-dated the spark of the Arab Spring and which took different paths in each country involved.21 During this phase, citizens became familiar with the new technologies, employing them for social interaction, ordinary activities, and trivial purposes, which nonetheless produced deep changes in the social fabric of these countries and encouraged the formation of a culture of resistance that was initially limited to the new media. The ignition of the popular protests represents the moment in which online mobilisation moves from the virtual to the offline dimension, as the events of the Arab Spring clearly demonstrate. In light of this, Syria represents a unique and intriguing case with which to explore the way the new media provided a means and a medium for political resistance despite the restrictive authoritarian context of the Syrian regime, leading to the formation of a popular uprising as we witnessed in 2011. The purpose of this study is not to elaborate new theories concerning the role that these tools have in mobilisation – in the coordination and planning at the time of revolts – a notion most people would agree on, but rather to reconsider power in authoritarian regimes beyond the formal loci of power (state institutions) or resistance (parties, civil society, etc.), by looking at political dynamics happening below, within, or in parallel to formal institutions of power. This is to say that what this study suggests is the need to reconsider power and civic engagement according to what James Scott called ‘everyday life’, even in its everyday forms of localised micro-engagements or digital micro-dissent. Scott has shown how political participation of subordinate groups does not occur ‘in overt collective defiance of power-holders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites’.22 This space constitutes what we can refer to as infrapolitics, encompassing a variety of acts, practices, and mobilisations that refuse to be identified with the political as such, though may foreshadow political mobilisation yet to emerge. Jeffrey Goldfarb would define this type of analysis as a study of the ‘politics of small things’, meaning how apparently small or unobservable events working within established institutional practices may turn out to be politically significant in the long term.23 For Goldfarb, the politics of small things, such as conversations around the kitchen tables, in an underground bookstore, or at an illegal poetry reading,

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all went into the miraculous transformation of 1989.24 The outbreak of Syria’s uprising is here interpreted not as the start of Syria’s social mobilisation but as the shift from localised and hidden practices of digital dissent to tangible, mass street protests. The fact that people are denied access to official channels of expression does not mean that they will not express their claims in unconventional and discreet ways. As this book intends to reveal, a growing form of social and political opposition made its way under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad through online platforms. Exploring how this contentious culture emerged is important in order to contextualise the Syrian uprising and the pivotal role that the new media technologies played at the time of the uprising, but more importantly it helps reconceptualise the idea of power and civic engagement swirling below the surface of ‘usual politics’ through the deceptive forms of digital platforms. New media enabled forms of micro-grassroots resistance at the margin of institutional political life, creating new civic and political consciousness while altering power relations. A number of interrelated questions arise from this statement: How did (young) people develop interest in the Internet and become socially and politically involved in an authoritarian political system? How did this engagement emerge? When do apparently ordinary practices assume political relevance? Lastly, what are the socio-political consequences of Internet use for an authoritarian regime? Answering these questions is essential in order to understand the popular mobilisation which erupted in the spring of 2011, as well as more broadly in light of the growing debate around the tremendous impact the new information and communication technologies (ict s) are having on today’s contentious politics in all contexts, authoritarian or democratic regimes alike. Although this study focuses on the role that new media played in paving the way for the Syrian uprising of 2011, it does acknowledge that technology is a tool, and as such can be used by all actors for disparate purposes. For example, an authoritarian government can monitor mobile phone and Internet activity to locate dissidents. Facebook can be used as a platform to build a community of supporters for a progressive cause, and it can be used by corporations to influence public opinion and swing people’s votes in the run-up to elections. Terrorist groups can transform digital media to publicise their ideology, recruit followers, and ask for ransom. For example, the sophisticated use of digital media by the Islamic State in Iraq

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and Syria (isis ) and by the Russians meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, not to mention the Cambridge Analytica scandal of 2018, are some prime examples which demonstrate how the new media cannot be heralded as a liberation technology that strengthens democracy only, as it can just as easily be turned into a psychological weapon to influence public opinon, divide society, swing voters, and damage democratic institutions.25 This is especially true now that news is not something we actively seek out; rather it find us, through the push mechanism on social media platforms. New media are at the mercy of all actors. It is not only states or citizens that can manipulate social media, but third parties too, for the highest bidder, indifferent to the effects this may have. This is to say that if this study explores the formation of a culture of resistance in pre-uprising Syria that is engendered by the development of new media, it nonetheless invites the reader to reflect on the two-edged sword of these tools, their creative and destructive potential, depending on who controls the media. Yet, this is just one story of empowerment, resistance, and dissent.

n e w g e o g r a p h ie s of protes ts On 31 January 2011, the Syrian president Bashar al-Asad granted an interview by the Wall Street Journal about the outbreak of protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and the opening of a ‘new era’ in the Middle East. With a self-confident tone, the president talked about his regional neighbours as countries paying the price for not having been able to reform in due time and for lacking the capacity to understand the needs of the people, and about moving towards bridging the gaps together. In his view, Syria was a stable country. The difference, he added, was that ‘you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there are divergences … you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances.’26 With these words, the Syrian president demonstrated how badly he had misunderstood the underlying situation in his country. To many Syrians, their country was no better place than Tunisia or Egypt. For example, between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of Syrians living under the poverty line rose from 11 per cent to 33 per cent, leading to 7,000,000 Syrians living around or under the poverty line. In a country where 65 per cent of the population was under thirty, unemployment had reached 77 per cent among those under twenty-five

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years of age.27 This situation was also the effect of four years of devastating drought, which began in 2006 and had brought about the dispossession of several hundred thousand farmers in the northeast of the country.28 According to the un , in 2010 more than a million people were forced to move from the northeastern region of Syria to urban centres, adding to the frustration and impatience among the already numerous youngsters in search of an occupation to improve their future. These immigrants, who belonged to different ethnic, sectarian, and geographic areas, embarked on a steady campaign for the acquisition of land and shelter, squatting in urban settlements and demanding basic services as ‘electricity, running water, sewage system and telephone services’.29 Syria’s major cities were witnessing the increase of the urban disposseessed, disenfranchised, and disposed. All of this was occurring alongside an already restrictive political reality which excluded citizens from participating in political matters, limited cultural practices, and enforced crack-downs on any suspicious dissident, with an atrocious record of 4,500 political prisoners and 17,000 forced disappearances in the country on the eve of 2011.30 Surprisingly, despite the highly tense environment in Syria, both in terms of domestic risks and transnational pressures, the Syrian regime opted to invest in new ict s, as an expedient to boost economic development, co-opt a new class of middle-class investors, divert anti-establishment sentiments among the people, and help vent civic frustrations. It was a move to consolidate and legitimize power. Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia had chosen a similar path throughout 2001 to 2011, viewing the commercial and administrative advantages of the Internet as greater than its risk of fostering political and social unrest.31 Yet, they all inadvertely faced the same counterproductive consequences, as the limiting and often suffocating political climate encouraged citizens to seek refuge in cyberspace, transforming the online platforms into new ‘geographies of protest’32, new spaces of contestation in which to challenge the authorities and reappropriate the code of symbols and language that the regime had monopolised for many years. It is through these overlooked spaces that citizens, journalists, and activists experimented with new forms of civic engagement, elaborated new discourses, and expressed forms of grassroots resistance, a harbinger of the Syrian uprising of 2011. Authoritarianism, economic reforms, repression of political rights, and corruption combined with public access to the

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Internet proved to be a toxic cocktail for the Syrian regime. As Asef Bayat argues, political change happens when people discover ‘new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and assert their presence in pursuit of bettering their lives’.33 In today’s world, social media enhance the ability to transcend geographical distances and connect people who have become atomised in ways that can lead to active networks.34 It is through these digital interstices that one must trace the origin of Syria’s uprising. The Syrian uprising came as a surprise to both Asad’s regime and the epistemic community studying Syria, both having belittled the role that the development of the new communication technologies may have had in a closed regime like Syria. Paradoxically, both the Asad regime and scholars had been cocooned by what Gregory Gause called the ‘myth of authoritarian stability’, failing to capture the ‘forces for change that were bubbling from below, and at times above, the surface of Arab politics’.35 The myth of a change of regimes had proved to pass through a change in regimes, a development that had gone largely unnoticed.36 An inability by academics to foresee or at least suspect the coming of the Arab uprisings was somehow determined by the excessive attention that the social sciences devoted to evaluating the extent to which theories of democratic rule were being adopted and respected across the globe. Before the outbreak of the uprisings, scholarly work on the Arab world was narrowly focused on evaluating the stability of Arab regimes and analysing old and new political alliances, foreign policy, electoral procedures, and ethnic and sectarian divides, at the expense of what lay beneath elite politics: the voice and actions of ordinary people, the informal campaigns appearing on the web, civic engagement, media professionalism, and the growing sentiment against state power and the status quo. Though drawing on the findings of this scholarship on Syria, this book calls for a reassessment of the situation ante tempore the uprising, in which changes in technological development, civic engagement, and political management interacted and shaped the making of the revolt of 2011. This is done by putting the question of ‘how’ over and above the ‘what’ and ‘why’,37 extending our interest to those people and fields that have thus far been considered irrelevant to the analysis of a country’s structure, incapable of playing any role in a country’s transition, and simply not making history. To this type of scholarship, this book counterpoises, and encourages, a scholarship of silence, a revaluation of micro-empowerments and

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changes by ordinary citizens, of established and underground institutions, and of modes of social and political action that may have eluded the conceptual frames of social mobilisation and collective action, yet have paved the way for the tangible mass movements which emerged in the spring of 2011.38 More importantly, this book aims at drawing the attention of social movement theorists and media scholars back to those areas of the Global South that for a long time have been absent from the academic radar, considered as infertile grounds for the development of new theories. Yet, even in apparently stagnant authoritarian regimes, activism finds ways of expression and is constantly evolving and renewing itself, ‘even in the hardest of situations’.39 Only a small group of scholars had actually looked at what was happening below the radar of authoritarian regimes. Amin Allal and Karine Bennafla’s study on the protest movements happening in Gafsa (Tunisia) and Sidi Ifni (Morocco) between 2005 and 2009 well exemplified the trajectory of socio-economic decline which predated the outbreak of the uprisings.40 Samer Shehata’s fasinating work on shop culture and politics anticipates a well-awaited bottom-up perspective on the production of identities and power within the realms of everyday and industrial life.41 Although Shehata is not interested in making predictions, his study explores the complex everyday struggles of workers in Egypt just a few years before the outbreak of the revolution. David Faris’ work on Egypt’s digital space shows how Twitter posts, Facebook groups, and blogs contributed to to an overall erosion of trust in and support for the regime in the build-up to the outbreak of the uprising in 2011.42 Despite these few exceptions, the whole Arab region, Syria included, was enveloped in a double layer of political authoritarianism and academic ‘rustiness’, too insensitive to perceive the social and structural transformations the region was undergoing well before the outbreak of the revolts of 2011. The underlying argument of this book is that during the decade leading up to the uprising in Syria, a silent, localised form of resistance emerged as a result of contextual factors (economic, institutional, and social conditions, otherwise referred to as ‘opportunity structures’), conditioned by people’s access to the new media. The new media became the ‘mobilising structures’ of Syria’s pre-uprising social movement, the tools that changed people’s access to information and encouraged civic engagement in a period of structural frictions and social ferment. This book

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argues that what Bayat defines as ‘street politics’, the physical and social space of the ‘street’, where citizens confront the authorities, has moved from the pavements and public spaces of the city to the virtual alleys of the Internet. This is particularly significant in authoritarian contexts like the Syrian one, in which, although motives for popular mobilisation already existed before the emergence of the new information technologies, it was only through the Internet that people found a space in which to breach norms of social engagement and articulate their acts of protest and dissent. Satellite tv and the Internet dismantled the atomization of society, which the regime had created through decades of repressive rule. Through the new media, people discovered ‘new geographies of protest’, where they could exercise what Bayat defined as the ‘art of presence’, meaning imposing their scenic presence, confronting the authorities, exposing the state’s wrongdoings, and more importantly forming collective subjectivities that did not exist before. As a result of Syria’s online mobilisation, an unstructured expression of ‘everyday forms of resistance’ became a social movement per se, in the form of the uprising of 2011, when the actors involved became aware of their shared grievances and articulated their actions into a wider plan, which they hoped would be long-lasting, aimed at social transformation. The Syrian uprising of 2011 corresponds to the moment in which the anti-establishment campaigns moved from being atomised, episodic collective actions, limited to online platforms, to the durable mass public campaigns that we all recall, though already eight years have now gone by. Therefore, what this study proposes is a shift in perspective, one that reconstructs the presidency of Bashar al-Asad through the changes in the media sector. This does not mean that the work ignores the extensive literature existing on Bashar al-Asad’s presidency; rather it integrates this new perspective into its reading in order to provide a more thorough understanding of this important period of time of Syria’s history, in which the seeds of Syria’s revolution were sown. Only by having a more complete picture of the years that led to the Syrian uprising can one understand how changes occurring in one field may have interacted and affected changes in other fields. Despite the numerous difficulties of conducting this research with a civil war still unfolding in Syria, this study has reached a number of meaningful academic results. Firstly, the analysis of the Syrian media sphere that this book presents has an intellectual value per se, given

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the inadequate interest that the epistemic community has shown toward this field, expanding our understanding of Syria’s transition under the new president, Bashar al-Asad, as well as adding a new tile in the mosaic of the literature on Arab media, which has often neglected the Syrian media experience. As a direct consequence, this understanding provides new frames of analysis to the state of events in Syria and the root causes of its uprising, which is here argued to have been greatly influenced by the changes in structure and agents taking shape in the media sector. The hermeneutic enquiry into the role of the media in pre-revolutionary Syria is a necessary endeavour to understand the degree to which the new generations relied on these tools at the time of the uprising, often called the ‘YouTube revolution’, as opposed to the Egypt’s Facebook revolution and Iran’s Twitter revolution of 2009. How does the scholarly community account for the extensive reliance of Syrian protesters on the new media at the time of the uprising, when the country was depicted as backward in terms of international and regional standards of media development? Did Syrians learn overnight how to use the new technologies? Is the error in the statistics or is it in the bigger picture? Common knowledge would lead one to think that to transform the media into ‘liberating tools’, the whole population would need to be connected online, but is this really the case? Or could it be the exact opposite? If one looks at the West, where the new technologies have been used for a longer period of time and where the majority of the population has access to them, one would expect citizens to be politically and civically more aware and participative. Yet, this is not always the case. On the contrary, the amount of (dis)information and people’s unregulated access to the web are actually producing the exact opposite: distraction, fragmentation, unequal participation, misinformation, and foreign meddling, as the US presidential election of 2016 has proved. According to Howard, for the media to become powerful tools capable of generating political or social change, the whole population does not need to be tuned in online; only a few brokers suffice, acting as intermediaries between the strong yet offline social networks and the wider digital public.43 The two-step flow theory, discussed in chapter 2, explores the role of tight-knit groups of young digital activists mediating between the online and offline world. Yet, how did civic activism emerge under the radar of authoritarian regimes like the Syrian one? How did young activists become tech-savvy and

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capable of exploiting the digital space to foster micro grassroots resistance and civic consciousness? This study understands the development of civic activism as having occurred as a result of a combination of endogenous and exogenous causes: institutional reforms, the engagement of civil society, and the influence of international media development aid. In the build-up to the uprising in Syria, media assistance projects empowered a new generation of citizen journalists and activists tasked with widening the horizon of its citizens, holding the state responsible for its actions, and encouraging forms of civic engagement. Oddly enough, media development aid is a mechanism that has largely been sidelined by the scholarly community, despite it having been implemented in many other parts of the world since the Second World War. With the emergence of the new media technologies, Western powers have increased their foreign aid investment in this sector for purposes that are arguably going beyond a mere humanitarian response to resemble more the characteristics of ‘soft power’. As chapter 5 elaborates, these projects have created a class of citizen journalists and civil society actors that helped to bridge the gap between the online and offline networks, carrying out civic awareness campaigns and encouraging citizens to get involved in political and social matters. Such inititatives may have been ephemeral, but they contributed to an overall erosion of support for the Syrian regime, accelerated the flow of information, and nurtured the civic participation and cohesion that was the basis of the uprising of 2011. This represents a key element in the study of pre-revolutionary Syria and the changing patterns of civic engagement and resistance that were emerging as a byproduct of online platforms, satellite tv channels, the change in media professionalism, and the role of digital activists. It is the collusion of micro-changes happening at different levels of society, yet all tied to the access to a new information horizon, which created new forms of civic engagement and contentious politics. It is important to highlight how the conclusions that we draw on Syria’s pre-uprising mobilisation are relevant to the specific historical context of Syria under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad and to the role that the new media technologies occupied in the initial phase of their circulation and use by citizens. Hence, one should not confuse the new media technologies of today with those of ten years ago. Not only have these tools changed, multiplied, and spread widely, more impressively they have become intrusive in people’s

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lives, in ways that are fascinating and terrifying at the same time, as tools for how people organise their lives and how they interact with each other. Therefore, the liberating power of the new technology that one seems to recognise in the first years of their experimentation is giving way to forms of dependency, atomisation as individuals, and misinformation, which need to be assessed by employing a different analytical approach. The last chapter and the epilogue of this book provide a more comprehensive understanding of the dual nature of new media. Despite this difference, both yesterday’s and today’s new media have become means of social mobilisation (and demobilisation) to the point that no political action is possible today without the use of new media technologies. Finally, this book does not dwell only on the Syrian context but draws comparative lines with the Arab Spring phenomenon and its local ecologies of protest, and with its global counterparts that in the past decade have seen citizens empowered by new media technologies in their struggle against authoritarian rule, economic austerity, and social inequality. Popular mobilisations are in fact becoming a dominant trait of contemporary society – defined by some as a ‘movement society’44 – as an effect of the development of the new media, which are offering people, previously excluded from the realm of politics, more opportunities to contest political authority, as well as oppose social and economic inequalities worldwide. The role of the new ict s in promoting dissent and coordinating the logistics of the revolt has proved to be the unifying element of geographically dispersed protests like the edsa Revolution in the Philippines in 2001, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the Green Movement in Iran in 2009, as well as all the protest movements that have appeared beginning in 2011 as a response to the economic crisis and to the politics of austerity (Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados of Puerta del Sol, the Syntagma Square protests, the large protest of 2013 of Brazil’s 10-cent movement, and Turkey’s Gezi Park protests). This means that, in opposition to the common narrative that frames Arab protesters as taking to the streets against dictatorship and Western protesters as demonstrating their discontent with the economic crisis and austerity, both movements reveal elements of one global, localised community of protest, sharing a similar language of dissent, social ideals, and mobilising tactics, and also being subject to similar means of repression (with differing intensity).45 This may

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lead, as has been suggested in the case of Syria, to a reformulation of our understanding of civic engagement in authoritarian settings and the process of formation of social movements, as an effect of the development of the new media and the new milieu of dissent offered by digital platforms. In fact, the new media have revolutionised the process of formation and mobilisation of social movements, which do not require people to be physically present in the same place, if by ‘place’ one is referring to a physically existing space. Clearly, this element becomes extremely important when applied to authoritarian countries, where the pervasive control of the state over the population would never allow forms of social engagement to flourish in the offline world. Khatib and Lust argue that the academic community has mistakenly overlooked the fluid nature of activism in the Middle East and the more amorphous venues where activism emerged in the decade before the outbreak of the Arab Spring.46 As terminology is a locus of lasting influence and as definitions are generally conventional, it is important to clarify a few semantic and operational issues before stepping into the flow of the narrative. The first relates to expressions such as ‘Arab world’, ‘Middle East’, and the ‘region’ being used interchangeably in this book to address the Middle East in the larger sense, taking into account the mixture of racial and ethnic groups, social classes, religious affiliations, nationalities, rural and urban settings, and linguistic communities.47 Any discussion that makes use of these broad categories and that attempts to delineate some general patterns does not assume that they apply everywhere. The second semantic issue relates to the intention here to explicitly avoid the unfinished debate about the definitions of the Arab uprisings, opting to choose terms that are less hasty and broader, and that do not deny the possibility of a change of scenario, given the ongoing confrontation in many countries that joined the call to revolt in 2011. This means that expressions such as ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Arab Awakening’ are used with great circumspection, favouring terms like ‘uprising’, ‘upheavals’, or ‘revolts’, and at times ‘revolutions’, which are less limiting and better suited to the unsettled, dynamic reality of the Arab region. Third, this study focuses on new media or electronic media systems, and addresses traditional media like printed media, radio, and tv stations only so far as they have been influenced by some form of reform or by the Internet in terms of interactivity. However, the main focus of this study is the numerous forms of electronic media, which have their

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content available through the Internet, accessible via digital device and containing public participation and interaction. Examples of new media include satellite tv stations such as the well-known al-Jazeera, and the websites of online newspapers, blogs, and social media. Although traditional media are nonetheless important, this book holds that only the new media have been the agents of change of Syria’s past decade, forcing a level of professional development and civic participation that engendered the outbreak of the uprising of 2011.

c iv ic e n g ag e m e n t and di gi tal c o n n e c t iv it y at crossroads In 1998, the British human rights organisation Article 19 opened a report on Syrian journalism by saying that ‘Syria is a country of which few people, inside or outside, ever learn very much’.48 The reference was to the draconian state of emergency law that had since 1963 turned the country into a police state, building its stability on an absolute control over the flow of information and of the interaction of its people. This is how Syria was perceived by the scholarly community till the start of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency, when the absolute power that had characterised Hafez al-Asad’s rule seemed to have been partially relaxed. This book offers a very different story, one that though keeping many features of the classical scholarship on Syria, also sheds light on alternative discourses and on spaces of interaction, experimentation, and confrontation that have been left out of the picture and that I argue contributed to setting the stage for the 2011 uprising. This is achieved by creating a multidimensional spectrum of analysis that cuts across different disciplines, namely Middle East politics, media studies, and social movements studies. The aim is to understand the Syrian uprising of 2011 not as an inevitable yet unforeseeable event, but rather as the outcome of a rising grassroots resistance developed through the new media, which went unnoticed because it did not fit with our conceptual paradigms and imaginations. In order to understand better the approach of this book and the added value that aims to contribute to the existing scholarship, it is worthwhile to situate this study within the context of the wider literature on Arab authoritarianism, Arab media, and social movement theory. It is important to mention that each of the three disciplines has produced an extensive body of

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literature that would be impossible to summarise in a chapter and that are here reduced to what I consider as the most relevant ideas that have emerged from each field, and that are here woven together in a unique tapestery. Over the past decades in what had seemed unshakeably autocratic regimes, the ‘authoritarian resilience’ spread far and wide, overtaking the paradigm of democratization, which had dominated analyses of the region between the 1980s and 1990s. This literature paradoxically cocooned the region in a monolithic and exitless status quo. The under-thirty-fives (75 per cent of the population in the mena region) were described by the epistemic and policy community as the ‘passive generation’ or a generation ‘on hold’.49 The literature about Syria is a clear example of this wider scholarship, which has been investigating the sources of authoritarian persistence and its modes of expression within the whole Arab region. According to Jill Crystal, the emphasis on authoritarian survival has dominated the interest of most scholars working on the region, to the point of including ‘into the term authoritarianism all regimes that are not, or not yet, democratic’.50 The imperative for most of these scholars has been to identify the methods by which these regimes have survived, and the reasons why a democratic transition has been precluded.51 Civil society was seen as non-existent, static, weak, or strengthening authoritarianism, thereby remaining underexplored. The new generation of young rulers who came to power in the Middle East at the turn of the new millennium transformed the existing political system by placing components of democracy and authoritarianism together in the same mix. Daniel Brumberg defined the new Arab regimes as ‘liberalised autocracies’, while Steven Heydemann elaborated the model of ‘authoritarian upgrading’, which explained how authoritarian systems reshape their system of government with the changing times, modifying existing institutions and practices to ensure the regime’s survival.52 This model seems to reflect the teaching of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa in The Leopard, in which the character Tancredi says: ‘If you want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’.53 Though these studies represent a valuable contribution to the understanding of these countries’ politics, they still leave a gap concerning the social actors within these structures. In this regard, Jason Brownlee, while focusing on the longevity of Arab regimes, recognised that the scholarly community had mistakenly paid attention

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to Machiavellian princes or personalities only, rather than other structures or actors who might also have played a significant role in ensuring the continuity to the regime.54 In addition, this literature looked at civil activism only within formal organisations (i.e., human rights and pro-democracy groups, and labour unions), ignoring informal milieus of resistance and actors, like digital platforms and online activists. Most of the activism which drove the Green movement and the Arab uprising happened outside formal civil society organisations, which demonstrated that society at large was much more engaged than previously thought by the academic community.55 According to Khatib and Lust, the scholarly community before the Arab Spring was too focused on analyses of the state and of elites to take seriously youth initiatives, which were seen as apolitical and ineffective in bringing about change.56 If this is true for most literature on the Arab region, it is particularly true for Syria. Much of the scholarship on Syria depicted the country as a model authoritarian government, which consolidated around the leadership of the president Hafez al-Asad and the Ba’ath Party, with a thoughtful co-option strategy garnered through working class, social, and ethnic cleavages. On this basis, the new president Bashar al-Asad was seen as orchestrating a more strategic ‘revolution from above’, which allowed the regime to stay in power by upgrading authoritarian rule to the changing times – a change of the institutions and practices of power, but not of power itself.57 As mentioned, this book challenges traditional assumptions surrounding the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime and of civil society activism, and the role of digital media. It would be wrong to argue that no studies consider social actors, as emphasis has been placed on civil society, in such forms as political associations, religious charities, and nongovernmental organisations. The so-called Damascus Spring, the period of intense social and political debate which started with the death of president Hafez al-Asad in June 2000 and continued with his legacy through his son Bashar, had inspired many who saw in these practices attempts to institute reform from below’ in the absence of reform ‘from above’. However, the impression one gets is that all these writings tend to confirm a rather dim reality, that of a civil society that, instead of moving outside the state institutions, is captivated by the state, which uses it to outsource its social responsibility.58 According to Salam Kawakibi, the regime allowed civil society organisations greater room to manoeuvre, with the aim of delivering services in those

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sectors like health, social affairs, and culture that the state could not deliver.59 Paradoxically, civil society served the state’s interests without challenging its political structures. While most literature seems to agree on this point, only a few scholars like Kawakibi and Francesco Cavatorta move beyond this paradigm, arguing that the creation of these semiautonomous organisations, combined with other hybrid reforms, may have produced unintended political consequences, as was witnessed in the uprising of 2011. Kawakibi’s edited book Syrian Voices from Pre-Revolutionary Syria: Civil Society Against All Odds is an anthology of Syrian civil society flourishing under the ‘low ceiling’ of an authoritarian regime and yet energetically taking steps towards its own empowerment.60 Another important phenomenon happening below the radar of the Syrian government was what Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik describe as the mushrooming of Sunni charitable association, tightly linked to the private sector, which fulfilled the welfare obligations that the regime was no longer able to offer.61 Yet, by providing stability to the regime through alleviating poverty-related tensions, it also brought ‘unreliable elements into the state-supporting elite coalition’. This book has grown partially out of this literature, though it also stretches its domain to the media landscape and the numerous experiences developed within it. Along the same line of reasoning, it argues that the privatisation of the media – usually described as a strategy adopted by the regime to co-opt a new class of investors, appease citizens, and create the impression of change – engendered a transformation in its structure and institutions, as well in its agents: journalists, activists, and the audience. What appears to be missing in the existing literature – and this is what this book addresses – is a blueprint of the changes taking place in the media sector at a macro and micro level: media institutions and production, as well as activist campaigns and citizen engagement. To create this blueprint, one needs to leave behind the classical top-down conception of power, of the one-man rule, and adopt a more complex understanding of power, with its many dimensions. The concept of power has been explored by numerous academics focusing on the complex dynamics of rule employed by authoritarian governments. By drawing on postmodern literature, specifically that of Michel Foucault’s concept of power, Lisa Wedeen tries to explain the political contradiction between the cult of Hafez al-Asad and what she perceives to be a population that does not support its

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ruler. She reiterates what was previously conducting research about a literature on authoritarianism that focuses ‘on the causes of authoritarianism rather than the conditions of it’, meaning that it lacks an understanding of how ordinary people live their lives and the practices they articulate.62 However, in doing so, she argues that the cult was effective in disciplining and subjugating Syrians through their participation in symbolic ‘ritual gestures’.63 Citizens acted ‘as if’ they respected the leader and respected the guidelines for public behaviour. Yet these gestures hid a more complex society that recognised the disciplinary aspects of the cult and sought to undermine them. By doing so, she rightly places the importance of power and agency of citizens already under the rule of Hafez al-Adad. Writing in 2009, Aurora Sottimano reiterates Wedeen’s findings and extends them to Bashar al-Asad’s decade in power, in what she describes as a ‘disciplined and productive society’ which struggles between the indoctrination of the regime and reappropriation of their own agency.64 The literature on authoritarianism has been the dominant paradigm for conceptualising and analysing Syria. Though it provides an enriching perspective on the mechanism implemented by the Syrian regime to rule and to rework the structure of its authority, adjusting to the changing times, it does not capture the new layers of diffused power and contentious actions that emerge within the system, though from the bottom up. Foucault argued that ‘there is no relationship of power without the means of escape’ and that ‘every power relation implies, at least in potential, a strategy of struggle’.65 Therefore, one cannot understand the force of obedience without taking into consideration the force of disobedience, or what Michel de Certeau defines as the ‘network of an anti-discipline’.66 As Steven Lukes observes in his radical approach to power, the common trend by scholars has been to analyse power through a ‘two-dimensional model’ that ‘embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation’ from the ruler to the ruled.67 Instead, as he claims and as this book moves to assess, power may present a ‘three-dimensional’ model that also includes more insidious uses of power that might not necessarily involve confrontation or conflict, but rather just anti-discipline measures.68 The brief overview of the relevant literature on Syria is important to situate this work within the wider literature and identify the empirical void that this book aims to address. However, as previously mentioned, this book mingles Middle East politics with media studies and, inevitably, social movement studies. In both these literatures,

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this research does not claim to have found a complete answer to questions regarding the role of the new media in Syria and the growing social mobilisation that they have engendered. The literature on Arab media, while poorly represented before the nineties, shows a dizzying revival with the emergence of the competitive transnational satellite television market, firstly, and then by the Internet. Before the appearance of satellite tv , from roughly 1954 to 1990, Arab media were perceived as government institutions and thereby classified by scholars like William Rugh with the same paradigms used to describe the country’s political system.69 Instead, the advent of satellite tv and the Internet has produced an incredibly vast literature, mostly concerned with the relationship between media and politics. Two broad categories of writings can be identified, which in the words of Zizi Papacharissi are ‘rapt in the dualities of determinism, utopian and dystopian’.70 The first consists of writings by scholars who believe that new media inevitably helps usher in an irreversible change towards democratisation and political liberalisation.71 This view recalls Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society, which attributed to mass media the power to bring political and economic modernisation to Thirld World countries.72 In 1999, the late Augustus R. Norton predicted that new media would increase the public’s voice and its ability to mobilise, and in response authoritarian regimes would ‘slowly retreat’,73 thanks to the ability of new media to reach a critical mass quickly and cheaply.74 The second view focuses instead on the limited political role that the new Arab media are seen to be playing in advancing democracy, pointing instead at the ways in which these same tools discourage the flow of information, reduce participation to ‘clicktivism’, and can support authoritarian regimes in sustaining more power by virtue of their ability to monitor and control citizens.75 Evgeny Morozov argues that the promise of the new ict s to act as an antidote to tyranny is a form of cyber utopia, when in reality they serve to enhance surveillance of citizens by authoritarian regimes, stifle dissent, and de-politicise people.76 This results in a decline in democracy and freedom, and in a rise in social control. The arguments presented in this book echo Paolo Gerbaudo’s view that we need to leave behind such diametrical outlooks in favour of a more realistic one, ‘considering how these forms of communication are adopted within specific social movements, rather than assessing their properties in the abstract’.77

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According to Mohamed Zayani, all these analyses provide an important contribution to assessing the changes or alleged changes to the new Arab media, but they tend to be ‘prescriptive and often narrowly focused on pinpointing an outcome of sorts’.78 Aside from the actual difficulty and mostly the imprecision of reading the ‘effects’ of Arab new media as a single, unifying phenomena, this book moves to re-examine more subtle dynamics, in which these tools have been embraced, experienced, and appropriated within a specific context like Syria, historically marked by nonparticipatory structures of governance. These subtle changes seem to have been missed by the main body of literature on Arab media, which this study sees as being limited by a number of factors. Firstly, this literature is not particularly rich in empirical studies and theoretical conceptualisations. The fact that the media, as pointed out by Kai Hafez, are complex social phenomena with a wide range of manifestations and ramifications often confuses the objective of study and the type of tools, as well as the literature, to apply.79 Another dominant characteristic of media studies, which this book will be addressing at different stages, is the largely quantitative and technologically deterministic studies, which though important may risk producing categories that are not always empirically grounded or exactly representative of the whole reality. This type of study often needs to be paired with a qualitative approach, in which the number of views on an al-Jazeera story or of Internet users in a specific country can be balanced with a study on the different viewers or viewing habits, as well as on the offline interactions that social media generate among friends and peers.80 The point is not to know how many people surf the Internet, but to understand what they do with it, as pointed out by Zayani.81 This approach described above has been particularly detrimental for the study of Syrian media, which as shown by statistics retrieved by international organisations was sidelined as being an uninteresting case, in which the use of the new technologies was considered to be so low that no real democratising effect could be expected in this context.82 Yet, as this book argues, statistics were not always representative of the Syrian case, and more importantly, did not measure either the index of social interaction that these tools produced over time in people’s lives or changes to their worldviews. Consequently, although the literature on Arab media expanded in the last decade along with the expansion of the new media, there was not an equal

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development in the scholarship on Syrian media, other than on what one could refer to as entertainment media with the study of Syrian musalsalat (soap operas).83 One last point to make about the scholarship on Arab media is what Zayani identifies as the problématique of using Western frames of analysis for this part of world.84 The most commonly adopted one is Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, in which he argues that that though it might be useful to conceptualise the dynamics of the new Arab media sphere, the public sphere must be understood as a concept developed within Western enlightenment, and thus is very different from how it exists within Arab contemporary political settings.85 As pointed out by Dina Matar, the risk is to fall into the trap of ‘cultural essentialism and historical determinism’.86 What this study emphasizes, concerning Syria, is that the emergence of the new media sphere did not simply provide a space for a public sphere, but more importantly it reinforced the role of civil society. What the Syrian case shows in fact, is that citizens, journalists, and activists all become agents of social change – they all encouraged and nurtured new forms of civic accountability, engagement, and responsibility. Developing on these findings, this book stresses the need to adopt a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of Arab media. Sharing Hafez’s opinion on this point, this book argues that Arab media studies need to be considered as an interdisciplinary merger of theories and methodologies of social science and humanities.87 For this reason, this work moves towards political science and sociology, exploring the impact of the media on state–society relations in the Syrian context, attempting to elaborate useful theoretical models. Only by combining frameworks of analysis developed in sociology, political science, and media studies can one make better sense of the changes produced by the development of the new media. Crossing the discipline of social movement, as this book does, is an inevitable step toward a theoretical conception of what this study identifies as a rising grassroots resistance developing under the ‘low ceiling’ of the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Asad. This study does not pretend to disguise this form of resistance as the expression of a traditional form of organised social movement, ticking all the parameters largely developed in Western theory and expression of specific historical genealogies. On the contrary, it explores unconventional forms of agency and activism which reject Middle Eastern exceptionalism and rigid Western dictat with regards to

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conventional models and concepts of social mobilisation and contentious politics. The purpose is to introduce new perspectives and analytical tools to interpret dynamics of change and resistance in non-Western contexts, where authoritarian regimes do not tolerate forms of organized activism like those that have emerged in the Western world. This might mean that if traditional scholarship on social movements represents an important framework and departure point for this study, it does not necessarily help to capture forms of unconventional social activism and civic engagement like the ones described in this book. Asef Bayat speaks of the need to coin novel vocabulary to make sense of contentious politics and social change within specific regional realities.88 Up until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the region was depicted by mainstream Middle Eastern exceptionalism as an uninteresting laboratory for the study of social movements, as no form of contestation was seen emerging, nor was expected to emerge. It is interesting to note how the labelling of the region and its people as ‘monolithic and static’ strongly affected many disciplines and greatly limited Western understanding of the region. Yet, the modern history of the Middle East is a history of multiple and diversified forms of organised and/or unconventional activism which have transformed the region, from episodic protest actions to major revolutionary turnovers. The constitutional revolution of 1905 to 1906 against the Qajar’s despotic rule in Iran inaugurated a century of social and political struggles, with the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958; the overthrow of the French colonial rule in Algeria in 1962; the Islamic Revolution of 1979; the First and Second Intifada in 1987 and 2000, and more recently the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005 and the Kefaya movement in Egypt in 2005; and lastly, the Green Movement in Iran, boycotting the results of the 2009 presidential elections. Only a few scholars, like Joel Beinin, Frédéric Variel, and Asef Bayat, have gone against the grain of the established social movement theory and drawn attention back to the Middle East and to the myriad forms of political contestation and mobilisation that have developed. Along this line, this research encourages a re-evaluation of the years predating the outbreak of the Arab uprising and the forms of resistance and civic engagement that were emerging in Syria with the development of the new media landscape. This may lead us to expand, reconsider, or reformulate the classical definition

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of social movement, making sense of the complexities and specificities of regional contexts like the Middle East. The literature on social movement theory is vast, diversified, and in constant evolution, keeping track of social transformation. However, social movement theory remains a science that accounts for the social and political transformations that emerged in Western Europe and North America from 1750 onwards, far from the complexities of Arab and Muslim societies. Even since the turn of the last century social scientists have questioned the reasons that lay behind protests and have developed theories that are very much dependent on changes to the times and the different aspects of social movements and the actions they stage. The classical paradigm, whose founding father was the French psychologist Gustave Le Bon, held that (relative) deprivation and shared grievances and ideas were at the basis for people’s participation in collective action.89 For early students of this theory, contentious politics were seen as a spontaneous, irrational, unconventional outburst of collective action in response to the spread of grievances and discontent among the public.90 Theories of structural strain and relative deprivation suggested that participants in movements were not totally integrated into society and suffered some form of ‘normlessness’.91 With changing times and the growing phenomena of social mobilisations flourishing in the late 1960 in Europe and the United States (the student movement, the civil rights movement, the peace movement, the women’s movement, the environmental movement, etc.), the idea of protest slowly assumed a positive connotation: strengthening democracies rather than undermining them. Social movement scholars of the 1970s and 1980s, often activists themselves, removed the emphasis on the ‘irrational’ nature of movements by highlighting the concrete objectives, shared values, and rational strategies that the movements articulated.92 Though most of these studies offer a convincing analysis of the formation process of the movements they investigate, they often fail to identify the specific mechanism that links political process to movement activity. An exception to these was an important contribution provided by Doug McAdam, who emphasised the role of the structural aspects of the environment as well as its subjects.93 His argument that two necessary conditions need to be in place to produce political insurgency, namely the availability of resources and open political opportunities combined with cognitive liberation, significantly influenced the theoretical conceptualisation of this book.

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In the same years in Europe, the social-constructivist ‘new social movement’ approach helped develop a new understanding of the movements that had come up in various Western countries since the mid-1960s. Scholars of this school emphasised different themes, adopted different perspectives, and related to traditional theories with an approach aimed at better understanding the changes in contemporary forms of organisations that started in the 1980s.94 Among these theorists, Frank Parkin stressed that the actors of these movements also differed from their precursors, as they were likely to come from the ‘new middle class’ rather than the lower class.95 This group emphasised the cognitive and affective roots of contention.96 What is important in the new definition of social movement, and what is still influential in the understanding of social movements in the Arab world, is that these movements consist of informal, loosely organised networks of supports. Paul Byrne synthesized it by stating that new social movements are ‘relatively disorganised’.97 The limit of these studies is their focus on single case studies, which though important per se, tend to say little about contextual variation.98 Since the 1990s, phenomena like globalisation and the development of a networked society and the information society have affected contentious politics significantly, and thereby its theoretical approaches have changed accordingly.99 Specifically, the spread of information and networks has had a profound effect on the dynamics of contention in democracies, as well as in authoritarian contexts.100 Scholars in the field felt that contentious politics was, more than ever before, sensitive to the developments of the outside world and affected by socio-political, organisational, and social-psychological factors. A number of social scientists elaborated explanatory models that could reveal the connection between these structures. In 1988, Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow presented a theoretical framework that integrated structural, cultural, and motivational factors.101 In 1996 a book edited by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald analysed the emergence and development of social movements by looking at the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement, the mobilising structures, and the framing processes.102 A third synthesis was produced by della Porta and Diani in 1999 and by Snow, Soule, and Kriesi in 2004 in which political opportunity, movement framing, and social network theory were brought together.103 Although these theories on contentious politics are more sophisticated and comprehensive than the ones of the past, and

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although they are more adaptable, they are not applicable to every context. Furthermore, the role of the new media technologies, which are now imbedded in our societies, speaks even more of the necessity to mould theoretical speculations to the local context and its constellations of power. According to Castells the new ict s have produced new kind of civil society based on giving grassroots democracy an electronic form.104 The theoretical framework of this book, discussed in chapter 2, though strongly influenced by the body of literature to which we briefly referred in this section, re-evaluates unconventional forms of resistance and the transformative impact of the new media in pre-uprising Syria. The role of the new media in collective action has recently received increasing attention, with the scholar Clay Shirky as one of the most prominent representatives.105 Shirky has showed how in the last few years, the whole communication system has changed, becoming denser, more complex, and participatory. As an effect of this change, people have greater access to information, more opportunities to interact and, thus, more opportunities to organize forms of collective action.106 If in the past, social mobilisation would generally emerge from social hubs like universities, cafés, and group meetings, with the rise of the Internet and its offspring, like blogs, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, people now have new organisational tools and spaces. For Shirky, the new media are simply replacing the old mobilisation structures and becoming the new coordinating tools, for their ability to provide communication, organisation, mobilisation, validation, and scope enlargement. This is particularly important in the context of authoritarian regimes, such as the Syrian one. According to Dorothy Kidd, social media are, more importantly, challenging the top-down mainstream media and shortening the communication distance between ordinary citizens.107 Despite the many limitations that one can recognize of the Internet’s effect on authoritarian societies, in primis the restriction of users’ access and the control which many regimes impose on web users, the Internet produces forms of creative action. Regardless of structural limitations and categorisations (is it a social movement or not?), when web users create a media message, and distribute and share it, they are inevitably laying the groundwork for a culture of contention, with new spaces of interaction, confrontation, and mobilisation. This emerging literature has not been spared from criticism. On the contrary, it is often blamed for being naïve and too optimistic about the potentials of social media, and incapable of explaining why social

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movements have occurred throughout history without the aid of social media. However, the idea for Shirky is not that the new media are making popular mobilisations happen, but rather that they have created new opportunities for people to protest and create new rules by which to play. Social movements are never the product of one factor, but rather the combination of different, interlacing ones. Goodwin and Jasper argue that social movements are not created by a single variable but by a set of variables that determine an interaction effect.108 Based on these findings, this book traces the roots of the Syrian uprising of 2011 by exploring unnoticed forms of political and social resistance that were in fact harbingers of significant political change.

whe n c o n f l ic t r ag e s : methods and ethi cs This book is based on extensive field research based on two oneyear periods spent in Syria between 2009 and 2010, and in Lebanon between 2013 and 2014, in addition to short though intensive data gathering field trips in Turkey (2013) and Jordan (2014) during my stay in Lebanon. The two extremely diverse contexts of Syria and Lebanon, geographically and politically speaking, determined a very different set of challenges. When I first started to collect data for this book, during my one-year stay in Damascus, the Syrian uprising had not yet started, nor were there any signs indicating that it would. At the time, I already knew that conducting research on issues like media, freedom of expression, and civil activism in Syria would be challenging, given what some defined as the ‘looming smell of the mukhaˉbaraˉ t’.109 Not only could the state have interfered by prohibiting investigations on issues that were considered harmful to the country’s security, but I would have faced problems interviewing key figures due to the political sensitivity of the topic or their unwillingness to speak freely, out of fear of retaliation or simply suspicion. Stories about foreign researchers who were under surveillance or who had had their apartments turned upside down by the secret police were numerous. Authoritarian and mukhaˉbaraˉt states are particularly difficult contexts for inteviewees, who as Clark and Cavatorta argue, are vulnerable to survelillance, harassment, and arrest when they are suspected of leaking information that could foment political unrest.110 Syrians who could be thought to be collaborating with foreigners on issues deemed ‘sensitive’ for internal security could face even worse charges, as the book Dissident Syria reveals.111

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Yet, among all the difficulties I was prepared to face, the prospect of an uprising was the least remote; hence, I did not expect that my second yearlong stay would be affected by this ‘event’ so deeply. By the time I prepared for my second journey, the uprising had taken the form of a civil war. Evidently, Syria was a no-go zone for fieldwork research. This implied, to say the least, that the research had to be reoriented to neighbouring countries, principally Lebanon, with supplemental research trips to Turkey and Jordan, with the effect of it being unsettling, disorienting, and at times emotionally draining. If my stay in pre-uprising Syria was marked by the difficulties of conducting research in a country ruled by an authoritarian regime, conducting research with Syrians working in the media sector in Lebanon and neighbouring countries after the outbreak of conflict was marked by technical problems such as getting contact information for informants and finding people willing to talk, as well as ethical concerns about how to use the material obtained or simply being able to weigh empathy with scientific detachment. The numerous car bomb explosions in Beirut, the Sunni-Shia armed clashes in the north and south of Lebanon, and the prospect of US-led intervention in Syria in August 2013, together with the constant waves of Syrian refugees fleeing their country and the rise of the Islamic State, made my fieldwork and fieldtrips in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan intense, and at times, I must admit, entrenched in disillusion and helplessness. Writing this book and using data provided by people who at the time were ‘living the revolution’ and hoped for change has been intellectually and emotionally distressful now that after eight years of conflict the Syrian regime appears to have won the war. Although this book is not concerned with narrating the conflict and abyss that is Syria today, the research that I conducted was nonetheless strongly influenced by the state of events unfolding on the ground pre- and post-uprising. By combining multiple sources, fieldwork observation, and ethnographic research methods, combined with an extensive review of relevant documents and digital sources in both Arabic and English, this book attempts to enrich the field of studies of Syria with alternative perspectives, beyond the single-method, single-observed, and single-theory viewpoint. This book moves against the grain of a literature on Syria dominated by the authoritarian resilience paradigm, which has been focused exclusively on mechanisms of state domination and co-option, and which has ignored all forms of activism and contention that

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has existed below official politics. The intent therefore is to interpret marginality and the way subjects have renegotiated spaces, discourse, practices, and identities through the new ict s. In order to achieve this aim, we need to move away from a literature on new media and social movements that has been obsessed with both the quantitative dimension of the data and the elaboration of charts and statistics that could quantify the information environment, and which have inexorably mapped an Arab world that is marked by an information deficit, low scores of Internet penetration, and a lack of free Internet access. The enthusiasm behind the idea that ‘open networks’ could open up ‘closed regimes’ was not applicable to this part of the world.112 If one had had to judge from the data on Internet penetration available on Syria, it would have been hard to expect the outbreak of an uprising in which the new media had such a dominant role. This says a lot about the value of statistics when this is not combined with a qualitative approach. A study conducted by Madar Research warned that Internet penetration rates in the Middle East were not reliable because they ignored Internet use at public access points, thereby cutting out a wide section of Internet users in most Arab countries.113 For instance, data on Syria revealed that the number of Internet users appeared to be very low, even within the region, because the data did not take into account that most people accessed the web – especially in the first years of the public’s use of the Internet – via numerous Internet cafés or community access points (610,000 compared to 1,500,000 in Saudi Arabia in 2005), and thus the actual numbers could not be determined.114 In Syria, Internet cafés have been very popular as places to surf the web and socialise. In 2002, two years after the decree that allowed public access to the Internet, Syria already counted 600 Internet cafés, compared to the 200 in Saudi Arabia, a country where people, due to better economic conditions, could afford home connections.115 Haugbolle’s study on Tunisia’s media landscape pre2011 delinates a very similar picture, where ‘publinets’ (Internet cafés with no café) also played a crucial role in developing Internet access in rural areas of the country and training people to surf the web.116 Studies focusing on the quantitative dimension of the data are unable to measure the ‘index of social connectivity’ produced by gathering points like Internet cafés, where young people carry on their online discussions with their peers offline and discuss information they read on the web. Therefore, the data collected from counting the numbers of Internet users within a society becomes meaningless when it does

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not inform about the effects that technology has on the culture of reference and the way it is leveraged by its people.117 The way quantitative studies have looked at Internet penetration in the region is just one example among many that supports a different approach to the study of the Syrian information ecology, one that is developed away from statistics, but that looks at the actual meaning of that variation, however small it might appear. Ethnographic methods used during my stay in Syria included going to Internet cafés and hanging out in them; speaking to Internet café managers and clients; interviewing journalists, media activists, bloggers, online dissidents, and ordinary Internet users; and attending public and underground cultural activities happening in the capital Damascus. In Lebanon, fieldwork was instead mostly based on trying to reach Syrian journalists and activists who had fled their country or who regularly crossed the border (which was closed from 2015 to 2018), meeting with international organisations involved in media development programmes in Syria, taking part in media training sessions aimed at training Syrian activists on news coverage and digital security, and spending time in cafés where Syrian intellectuals and activists regularly gathered. Living for a whole year in both Damascus and Beirut, speaking Arabic, taking classes, having a community of friends and colleagues, getting access to all media forms (mobile phone, Internet, satellite tv , newspapers), and engaging in leisure activities (going to the gym, theatre, cinema, cafés, parties) added a whole new dimension and insight to my study. This fieldwork paved the way for my long-term online ethnography, meaning the observation of the online dimension of social networks, blogs, and discussion forums of different kinds and quality. This did not take place in a specific span of time, but across all stages of the study; in fact the research never ended, if only for personal interest. What interested me was identifying and understanding the different forms of civic engagement and political activism that were to be found in online platforms. Yet, the fleeting nature of online material complicated my online ethnography, as some material became inaccessible, was deleted, or was blocked out after the outbreak of the uprising. The fieldwork was accompanied by extensive interviews, which constitute a significant portion of the primary information of this research. Over a period of two years (2009–10, and 2013–14), I collected around eighty-four interviews with key informants, namely Syrian activists, journalists, and around fifteen interviews

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with officials working for international organisations and ngo s working in the media development field, as well as media trainers and trainees. Interviews generally followed a semi-structured format, a planned set of fixed and thought-out questions or topics that were asked in no systematic order, but that were designed to create the impression of a natural and spontaneous interaction. Sometimes these were preceded by informal interviews, conducted in a more casual environment, aimed at building trust with the interviewees, gaining their confidence, and developing a concise understanding of their areas of interest. Informal interviews were also conducted during my participation in eight different media training sessions in Lebanon and Turkey to approach trainees and hear about their experiences. Informal and semi-structured interviews allowed me to ask a set of planned questions, without losing the natural flow of interaction with people who were facing great difficulties and suffering. Interviews with functionaries of international organisations or ngos working on media support programmes in Syria have also been hard. Although in these cases the interlocutors were often foreign nationals, and therefore did not have the psychological and cultural burden of belonging to a country at war, the topic of my research would often trigger concerns about their visibility and status in public. In fact, many of these organisations opt to keep a low visibility of their work in countries that are unstable and at war like Syria, for issues, they said, of security. For instance, when I contacted by e-mail an established European media organisation, with years of experience in media trainings in authoritarian regimes, war, and postwar conflicts, to inquire about their availability to talk about their programmes in Syria, they replied: Thank you for your interest in [name of the organization]. We are involved in a number of projects aimed at developing the media sector in developing countries; however we keep low visibility for security reasons. I regret to say that due to the sensitivity of the situation, we are unable to discuss our past and present work in Syria.118 This is just one among numerous similar responses I received from organisations involved in Syria, not to mention the many that did not reply at all. These organisations were generally very suspicious

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about my research project and the publication of my work, saying that as long as the situation in Syria did not become more stable, they could not make any revelations and I was not entitled to refer to them directly. Such a context imposed a number of ethical challenges to my work. Although ethical behaviour should always be at the base of every research agenda, in my case, given the specific context and the sensitive topic at issue, great care regarding ethical conduct has governed the whole process of this research project. This has been instructive in terms of not harming any of the participants, neither by forcing them, even psychologically, to talk, nor hurting their feelings or being dishonest when it came to explaining the nature of my study. Many interviewees preferred to talk off the record, in which case I was able to use the information for general considerations and yet be careful to remove any identifying detail in the text. This aspect has particularly influenced my research, as on the one hand I fully understood the desire for anonymity, to the extent that I also extended it to some people or organisations that were not opposed to being cited, but that I felt could have potentially been affected. On the other hand, the impossibility of citing people or organisations directly in the writing-up phase gave me the impression that it was diminishing the scientific validity of my research and that I was writing a narrative without its protagonists. Despite these difficulties, conducting this study at this particular stage of Middle East history (and perhaps global politics), with a civil war still in fieri, has been momentous, offering an opportunity for many reflections over the state of events and their correlations to other parts of the world.119 Without doubt, the extensive literature existing on research methods, though constituting a crucial pillar for any scholar approaching a field of study, does not teach you what you learn when you enter the research process. The methods required are the skills and the vision a researcher gains while entering the field; as such, it is an art made of calculi, imagination, and engagement.

o u t l in e o f t he book With the aim to track the roots of the Syrian uprising by looking at forms of grassroots resistance and dissent emerging with the development of new media under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, this

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book is structured to supply, through every chapter, a new tile to the mosaic of the whole research, by answering unanswered questions or those that have not been posed thus far. The starting point of this book, developed in chapter 2, is to present the theoretical approach that was adopted to study the causes of Syria’s uprising in 2011, which are believed to be rooted in the development of a new media ecology and social resistance under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. The chapter elaborates a conceptual model that, though designed for Syria, allows one to reflect on the general phenomenon of the Arab Spring and agency in times of constraint. The theory challenges traditional understandings and assumptions surrounding the nature of authoritarian regimes and their monolithic nature, it debates the applicability of Western paradigms to the Middle East, and it encourages a revaluation of distinct and unconventional forms of activism which may not fit our conventional paradigm of social movement, yet which represent spaces of sponteneous discontent that were in fact a harbinger of significant social change in 2011. Chapter 3 looks at the changes that occurred in the field of traditional media (newspapers, radio, and tv ) under Bashar al-Asad’s presidency. The merging of old and new practices of control and political management – in the attempt to ‘modernise authoritarianism’ – characterised a period of ambivalent transformations for the country which allowed traditional media to experiment some forms of professional and free journalism, within the limits imposed by the regime. Chapter 4 closely explores the changes produced in the sector of new media (satellite tv and the Internet) and the effects that this change caused in the structure (institutions) and agents (people), based on Bourdieu’s field theory. Built on a series of examples, the chapter reports cases of growing professionalism by journalists and of the increasing civic participation by citizens that occurred in the first decade of the 2000s. Chapter 5 completes the analysis on the changes affecting the Syrian media landscape by exploring a new avenue of research: media development aid. The change in structure and agents previously noted is defined here not exclusively as the byproduct of endogenous processes and factors, but as a consequence, at least in part, of the effect of international endeavours in the field of media development. By making use of data collected through extensive desk research, field observation, and interviews in the region, the chapter presents the complex structure of the media

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aid architecture and investigates the practices and programmes implemented by a number of representative organisations. What emerges from this overview is that the practice of promoting media assistance programmes comes as a (new) approach adopted by Western countries in the wake of unsuccessful and counterproductive military interventions in the region, which, with hindsight, have nourished hatred towards the West and prepared the ground for further radicalisation and terrorism. The development of media literacy, therefore, represents a new modus operandi of the West (the eu and the US especially), to promote democracy through alternative and noncollateral, bottom-up support. With the focus on media development aid, the research aspect of this volume ends, having explored the development of the Syrian media ecology and the effects this had on social and political structures under multiple perspectives. Nonetheless, the book ends with a follow-up section, chapter 6, aimed at supporting the hypothesis of the research, by proving that the new media had a dominant role in laying the foundation of the revolution of 2011 as well as subsequently, by informing, organising, and motivating civil participation in the midst of the revolt. For practical reasons, this chapter depicts the Syrian media as going through a three-phase development, which follows the evolution of the uprising: the initial period of protests and manifestations, the country’s entry into a state of conflict, and the current dramatic stalemate of the civil war. Contrary to the pre-uprising period, in the course of the revolt the new media assumed an additional role which was not limited to the purpose of informing, planning, and coordinating the protest, but rather ‘performing’ in the conflict, becoming de facto a weapon of war, capable of exacerbating the fight, instilling fear, and intimidating the enemy, while proselytising. This means that the new media do not just increase the opportunities for social movements to emerge, they change the way conflicts are mediatised, becoming at the same time tools to inform and weapons to attack. The end of this book sees the Syrian conflict still far from reaching any epilogue, although there are some clear signs that show a Syrian regime getting closer to the podium, bit by bit recapturing all lost territories and defeating all remaining enemies. The new media, which have maintained a dominant role in paving the way for the uprising and throughout the course of the uprising and civil conflict phases, will need to perform a more challenging task in the postconflict phase: healing the wounds that the civil war is inflicting on people’s lives,

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not just of those who have stayed but also of those who have fled the country. In light of the fragmentation of the social and political map of the Syrian state and society, this book calls for a reassessment of a situation ante tempore, in which changes in technological developments, civil engagement, and political management interacted and also shaped the making of an epochal transformation. My objective remains to interpret the situation in Syria through dynamic categories and open-ended projects, with no intention of providing all-encompassing theories and finalising an analysis of social events, but rather to learn in the process of studying.

2

From Virtual to Tangible Civic Mobilisation The media are not the end products of a simple technological revolution. They come at the end of a complex historical and social process; they are active agents in a new phase in the life-history of industrial society. Inside these forms and languages, the society is articulating new social experiences for the first time.1 Stuart Hall, Paddy Whannel, The Popular Arts (1964)

a t h e o ry o f t h e sy r i an upri s i ng Eight years have gone by since the beginning of the political upheaval that swept through many Middle East and North African countries. Syria was caught in the grip of this revolutionary moment, one that drove the country from a peaceful popular mobilisation to a deadly fratricidial civil war with no visible way out. Scholars advanced a number of explanations for this event, which included the demographic profile of the younger generations and the economic recession they were experiencing, rising wealth concentration, high unemployment, the use of techniques from successful campaigns, and the coordination of dissent through traditional/offline and new/online forms of contention. The employment of the new media has often been framed as a deus ex machina for the uprising, a Silicon Valley product that came to liberate citizens from the grip of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, did Syrians truly acquire the ability to use the new media technologies on the eve of the uprising or did they slowly master their ability through a period of maturation and gestation? Could one argue that Syria watchers had miscalculated the contingent and nonlinear impact of new media technologies on Syria’s civil society from an empirical as well as theoretical point of view? Can one add that academic interest has been oriented towards the role that the new media played at the

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time of the Arab uprising, while insufficient interest has been directed to the role they played in the years predating it, a period one might define as essential and one of maturation? Along this line of thinking, though the Syrian uprising started in 2011, is it possible to argue that the new media played an even more important role in the years that led up to the uprising, reconstructing forms of civic engagement, collective action, and social mobilisation that had not existed before in a closed regime like Syria? What this book does is explain the outbreak of the Syrian uprising and the role played by new media by focusing on an aspect that academic work has largely overlooked: the way new media became the major articulators and developers of a change in the political and social fabric of Syria prior to 2011. Up until the Syrian chapter of the Arab Spring began, most of the studies on Syria had focused on the strategies and techniques adopted by president Bashar al-Asad to tap new resources, diversify legitimacy bases, and redefine state– society relations, what Steven Heydemann defined ‘authoritarian upgrading’, Volker Perthes called ‘modernised authoritarianism’, and Raymond Hinnebusch described as ‘post-populist’.2 Only a niche group of Syria scholars had examined forms of subversive practices in pre-uprising Syria that – with hindsight – could have anticipated the weaknesses of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ argument. Within this group, the media had been the focus of an even smaller group of scholars, including Lisa Wedeen, Christa Salamandra, and Alan George, who had examined various expressions of political dissent, whether in the press or in tv series, but interpreted them more as safety valves rather than acts of political resistance with long-term consequences.3 Contrary to this, this book aims at contributing to the growing literature that analyses the root causes of Syria’s uprising by expanding our understanding on the links between prewar new media and wartime dissidence. Although this goes beyond the purpose of this study, the role of new media in Syria has been essential not simply in the pre- and post-uprising periods, as we will discover through this book, but also more crucially in the current displacement crisis, in which social media have turned into a compass for refugees embarking on dangerous journeys across land and sea. Syrian refugees are the first refugees to use mobile apps to plan their trips, establish networks, and pay their smugglers, transforming these tools in life-changing instruments in the hands of the most vulnerable. This may sound like another story, one that this book

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does not tackle, but it reveals the same extraordianary potential that these tools offer to people in times of constraints. The underlying argument of this book is that, if the Syrian uprising is said to have formally begun in 2011, its formation is thought to date back to the start of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency in 2000. It is during the decade that led up to the uprising in Syria that a form of silent, localised, and unstructured resistance emerged at the margins of formal power and institutions, as an effect of economic, institutional, and social factors (what social movement theory would refer to as ‘opportunity structures’), conditioned by people’s access to new media (‘mobilising structures’), which engendered that long ‘framing process’ that led to the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. If it is true that the Syrian government under Bashar al-Asad was able to modernise authoritarianism or to upgrade authoritarianism to the changing times, this study holds that these same changes contributed to making the Syrian regime more vulnerable and exposed to the challenge of popular elements of dissent emerging at the margins of institutional power. Illustrating Wheeler’s expression of ‘local constellations of power’, underlining contextual factors placed Syria under a singular ‘astral’ moment during the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, in which contrasting forces generated the opening of loopholes (of which some were merely virtual) where significant expressions of popular resistance took place.4 This scenario allowed for the creation of power vacuums, which then allowed alternative forces to emerge through the new spaces offered by the new media. The combination of economic liberalisation, authoritarianism, the repression of political rights, a rise in unemployment, sanctions, regional instability, and public access to the Internet created a toxic environment in Syria. The Syrian regime slowly lost control of two elements on which its stability was based: control over the flow of information and surveillance of people’s interactions. The emergence of the new media was a turning point for Syria, as they directed the already existing motives for popular mobilisation and offered people a space in which to network around the state and express political, cultural, and social dissent. What this book describes is a change that the new media landscape produced at multiple levels: at the individual and collective level; among citizens, journalists, and activists; behind the closed doors of people’s homes and of media offices; and in the public’s understanding of power, space, and agency. The outbreak of the revolt in 2011 did not symbolise the start of Syria’s

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revolution but the shift of an existing and unstructured growing mobilisation from virtual world to tangible street mobilisation. By locating the seeds of Syria’s uprising prior to 2011, this study encourages a ‘scholarship of silence’, a revaluation of actors, factors, spaces, and timings that have eluded traditional paradigms of social movement theory but which have mobilised impressive unstructured resistance in closed regimes like the one in Syria. This chapter is structured into two parts. The first part provides an overview of the context in which a combination of different factors (opportunity structures) created the condition for the perfect storm: the opening of loopholes in the system, in which forms of grassroots resistance found their expression through new media platforms, and which acted as the mobilising structures of Syria’s uprising. Satellite tv expanded people’s horizons and triggered new forms of media professionalism and civic engagement. The Internet, in particular, became a tool that channelled the public’s mistrust towards the regime and its hopes for reforms, as well as offered a space, a virtual platform, that facilitated manifestations of dissent and protest. As such, the new media did not simply provide the tool with which to spread discontent and mobilise civic engagement, they became the space in which to express contention and , and in which new collective subjectivities emerged, as well as the fuel that triggered the change, at both the individual and collective level. The second part of this chapter explains the long framing process which helped form a shared understanding of the state’s misconduct, while carefully negotiating collective actions to produce change. The Syrian uprising of 2011 was the outcome of an accumulation of micro-changes and mobilisations happening beneath the surface of the status quo whereby people gradually lost their fear, realised shared aspirations, and eventually issued the call to arms.

syri a’ s e a r ly o p p o s it io n al (non)movement The theoretical framework elaborated in this book is based on a multidisciplinary approach which marries the existing literature on Middle East politics with media and social movement studies. These two disciplines, in addition to being understudied in the context of Syria, have also developed along different lines of inquiry, the research focuses of which have rarely been integrated. In light of contemporary dynamics, ignoring the correlation between social

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movements and new information technologies would be senseless and self-defeating. The German political scientist Raschke eloquently synthesised this point, arguing that ‘a movement that does not make it into the media is non-existent’, a statement which underpins how facts and events that are not reported by the media have a low rate of success, as they are known only by the immediate participants and bystanders.5 It is not that social movement actors understood that the media could support their struggle, but rather that the development of new ict s have so strongly influenced people’s lives and become a part of society that all types of social actions are, willingly or not, influenced by the new media. This implies that it is not only social movements that have been affected by the new media technologies but society in toto. Therefore, any study concerned with social issues needs to investigate the role of media technologies within that field of study, as it regards the society being investigated.6 Media studies is a discipline that deals with the content, history, and effects of various media. After McLuhan’s aphorism ‘the media is the message’, the term ‘media’ has come to refer to all human artefacts and technologies that mediate our interaction with the world or other people.7 The most recent technologies like the Internet have been included, by now, in this discipline of study. Hence the term ‘new media’ commonly refers to those digital media, like the Internet, that are interactive and that present a two-way or multiple-way communication involving some form of computing, as opposed to the old media’s one-way communication, such as the telephone, newspapers, radio, and tv .8 This is to say that new media technologies allow users to become receivers, creators, and distributors of messages, with serious political and social implications. Therefore, ‘new media’ indicates the ability to combine text, audio, digital video, interactive multimedia, the web, e-mail, chat, cell phones, and the like, and to distribute information worldwide, instantly and often free of charge. The novelty of these tools does not simply lie in the newness of the product, but rather far more in the effects that they produce. The most obvious consequence is that people can become more informed at more moderate costs, and in contrast to traditional media, people are not passive recipients of news but active producers, and contributors to the information flow. Compared to traditional media, the new digital media disrupt the vertical, top-down forms of communication, inaugurating a new age of horizontal communicative networks, which empower previously

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marginalised groups.9 Every person is now entitled to validate or criticise any piece of information with his or her testimony on a specific subject. The new electronic communication reduces distances between people around the world, disrupts the traditional face-to-face interaction, and blurs the boundaries between the public and private spheres. Moreover, they have proved challenging to traditional state power, demonstrating resistance to state regulation and reducing the state’s capacity to control the flow of information.10 In this regard, Castells argues that since the age of new media, the state no longer monopolises information, and a significant portion of political, economic, and cultural power has moved from the state to the media system, otherwise called media networks.11 The power to control information no longer resides within the institutions of the state; it resides in media networks.12 The rapid spread of the Internet and the continuous development of new related technologies and applications has opened up a new area of research for media scholars, which looks at how the new communication technologies influence the formation of modes of communication, collective identity, the public sphere, and grassroots mobilisation, placing them side by side with social (movement) scholars.13 These tools offer social movements the potential to ‘reach a new level in the way they mobilize, build coalitions, inform, lobby, communicate, and campaign’.14 This means that the study of new communication technologies and their effect on society is causing the research focus of media studies and social movement to converge. The discipline of social movement studies has always taken into account the role of the media, even the most traditional ones, like underground newspapers, outlawed radio, tapes, and other old-fashioned information media. However, their role has never occupied a central part of study, because in practice the old media supported the development of a group’s mobilisation but have always been considered to be constitutive elements with no agency, and non-leading factors. Yet, technology has always played a crucial role in shaping social movements, with activists employing the latest communication devices available at the time, whether it be the pen, the printing press, the telegraph, radio, or television. In the 1700s the pamphlets and independent presses proved essential in the unfolding of the American Revolution.15 More than a century later, moving images proved critical to political struggle. In the 1960s, for the first time in history, movements conducted protest actions knowing that ‘the

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whole world is watching’.16 The footage of the carnage unfolding during the Vietnam War led to increasing public disenchantment and motivated a strong antiwar movement. Cassettes with recorded sermons of Ayatollah Khomeini, smuggled into Iran during his exile, paved the way for the historic Iranian Revolution of 1978 to 1979.17 The 1989 historic images of peaceful students in Tiananmen Square overrun by tanks changed the world’s view of the Chinese government. However, with the advent of the digital revolution, the process of formation and mobilisation of social movements has changed radically, allowing users to become creators and distributors of the messages, without requiring the permission of elites. More importantly, new media technologies do not require people to be physically present in the same place, if for ‘place’ we refer to an environment physically existing. The Internet may be thought of as a ‘virtual place’, or better yet a ‘space’ that allows physically dispersed people to converge. It may help people who are dislocated and living in different countries, as well as people within the same country, maybe only one block away from one another, to converge if contexts like those of authoritarian countries do not allow forms of social gathering to take place in the streets. New media technologies have not only changed the way people participate in the information process, they have enhanced interest in political and social issues as well. ict s have dismantled the traditional hierarchical model of established organisations, replacing them with a horizontal structure of connectivity, which Castells named the ‘electronic grassrooting of civil society’.18 This means that this new media ecosystem transforms the digital space into a space of politics by framing ‘processes, messages, outcomes and results in a new kind of civil society’.19 Successful movements have proved that the online dimension is not enough, and that it needs to be coupled with traditional/offline forms of contentions. Nonetheless, the new virtual media promote scholarly reflections on the role of the new media, the new online spaces of contention, the formation of social movements, and the long-term effects of the new media in closed-regime contexts. Yet, what do we really mean by social movement? Defining a social movement is a difficult task, as it tends to be a fuzzy and fluid phenomenon without clear boundaries, a moving target that may overlap with other movements, with forms, strategies, and goals that may change during its lifespan.20 Moreover, each social movement varies in ideology, size, organisation, and contextual background.

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Despite these factors, many scholars have tried to develop general conceptual definitions. Charles Tilly classically defines social movements as ‘a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others’.21 Very similar is the well-established definition by Goodwin and Jasper, who identify social movements as ‘conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspects of their society by using extra-institutional means’.22 The literature has also underlined what has been called a ‘social movement organisation’, defined as a formal organization that struggles to achieve a movement’s goal, or a marginalized group of people making claims to change society.23 Therefore the discipline of social movement studies looks at all the principal forms through which groups express their grievances and concerns by engaging in various forms of collective action and by investigating the social, cultural, and political consequences that action produces. The intersection of these two fields of research, media and social movements, constitutes the backbone of the conceptual model of this research. This book shares Anton Oleinik’s assumption that social, institutional, and economic contexts provide the primary conditions for social movements, though it asserts that it is the combination of motives for contention and the development of new media that enables those interpretative frames that are necessary to organize and guide action, as expressed in the outbreak of the uprising in 2011.24 Despite the challenges of applying social movement theory beyond the Western hemisphere, this book adopts the three key elements of the social movement literature (see figure 2.1: opportunity structures, mobilising structures, and framing process) to explain the outbreak of the Syrian uprising as a long revolution, one in which an earlier unstructured virtual resistance predated the outbreak of tangible street protests. The three main elements for the formation of a social movement are: ‘opportunity structures’, which constitute the opportunities or constraints that predispose collective action or not; ‘mobilising structures’, which are the resources, institutions, networks, leadership, ties, and identities necessary for the mobilisation;25 and the ‘framing processes’, which indicate the final motivational step for the engagement in collective action to affect change.26 However, contrary to the traditional framework of social movement literature, this book believes that these three elements interacted

opportunity structures

Social, institutional, economic, and international conditions

New media

mobilising structures

Motivational step to collective action

framing process

social movement

Figure 2.1 | Formations of Social Movements

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with different dynamics, timing, and rules, producing what Raymond Williams defined a ‘long revolution’.27 Syria’s uprising of 2011 was proceeded by a long process of ‘deep social and personal changes’, which may be interepreted as ‘scattered symptoms of restless uncertainty’, yet helped mobilise and countermobilse ideas, construct a shared understanding of problematic experiences, and negotiate acts to affect change. If for a social movement scholar, Syria’s uprising became a social movement per se only in 2011 with the extraordinary mobilisation of anti-regime street protests, this book believes that in the decade prior to the outbreak of such uprising, a distinguishable oppositional (non)movement made its way through the spaces offered by the development of the new media. The purpose of this book is to bring different areas of study together and to contribute modestly to wider debates within social movement theory about the conditions, emergence, and early formation of Syria’s uprising in 2011. It is during the presidency of Bashar al-Asad that we need to trace the early formation of oppositional dissent, when the country experienced the pressures of opposing forces pushing towards authoritarianism, reformism, and globalisation. Most research on opportunity structures has shown how changes in some aspects of the political system generate new possibilities for collective action. The vulnerability of the political system allows others to seize the opportunity and push through social change. This vulnerability can be the result of many factors, such as increasing political pluralism, a decline in repression, division within elites, or increased political enfranchisement.28 In the case of Syria, as represented in figure 2.2, three major dynamics are identified as placing the country under great friction, creating the opportunity structures necessary for a popular mobilisation: pressures from below, that is, coming from the people, pushing for socio-political reforms; pressures from above, that is, coming from the government, which granted limited reforms and openings; and pressures from the outside, that is, coming from the West, adopting the strategy of supplying development aid, in the form of media projects, to empower civil society organisations to the disadvantage of the state.29 The aim is to understand the Syrian uprising of 2011 not as an inevitable yet unforeseen event, but rather as the outcome of a rising civic engagement and digital connectivity that was emerging in the country in the years that predated the outbreak of the revolt.

pressure from outside

pressure from above

pressure from below

syria’s early resistance

social movement of 2011

OPP O RT UN ITY S T RUCT URES

MOB ILIS IN G S T RUCT URES

FRA M IN G PRO CES S

Figure 2.2 | The Formation of Syria’s Pre-uprising Mobilisation

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Opportunity Structures Pressure from below. Since the start of the presidency of Bashar al-Asad in 2000, an informal social mobilisation has made inroads in the country, challenging the regime’s authority and decision-making ability. As Najib Ghadiban argues, ‘The Syrian uprising of 2011 was not, by any means, the first opposition movement under Bashar al-Asad’.30 According to Ghadiban, Bashar al-Asad faced growing dissident activism ‘through rises and declines, articulating several enduring demands but ultimately failing to bring about the desired changes’.31 This process started on the eve of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency, with the outbreak of a lively civil society movement called the ‘Damascus Spring’, in which a diversified group of people, made up of intellectuals, artists, and activists, campaigned for a change in social, political, and economic structures. The country witnessed for the first time in decades the resurgence of public gatherings, discussion forums, political debates, community associations, cultural forums, and women and human rights organisations. Independent gatherings (muntadayat) spread through the country with the intent of offering a platform for discussions on arts and culture, yet these soon began to stage discussions on issues about politics, religion and human rights.32 Courageous political stances were taken by many civil society groups, like the ‘Statement of the 99’, drafted in September 2000, a manifesto signed by ninety-nine Syrian civil society activists demanding the end of the state of emergency which had been in effect since 1963. Along the same lines, but much bolder in its tone, was the ‘Manifesto of 1000’ in 2001, which repeated the earlier objectives, but also explicitly attacked the foundation of the Ba’ath Party and advocated a multiparty political system, with political and constitutional reforms.33 In 2005, opposition figures as well as religious and secular political parties became signatories of the ‘Damascus Declaration’, which publicly criticised the government for being authoritarian, and asked for profound reforms.34 It was the first document since the beginning of Ba’ath rule in 1963 to receive endorsement from so many different political forces, including leftists, nationalists, Kurdish parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, intellectuals, and artists.35 Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl note how, though unsuccessful in achieving their requests, these initiatives provided models of civil society mobilisation that activists would build on when the revolt of 2011 started.36 Despite their inability to

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obtain any noticeable change, such initiatives manifested a growing sense of political maturity in Syria’s civil society and represented a growing force exercising pressure on the government.37 In 2006, exiled Syrian opposition leaders established the National Salvation Front (nsf ), a coalition meant to bring democratic regime change in Syria, and which brought together different opponents to the Syrian regime, namely former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish and communist parties, and independents.38 Although often downplayed, diaspora communities played a role in influencing politics in their homecountry by ‘lobbying the international community, providing logistical aid to local activists and spreading information about opposition actions and regime responses through the international media’.39 Syrians also dove into a vivid cultural life represented by such fora as the Forum for National Dialogue and the Jamal Atassi Forum, offering people a place in which to express their opinions and debate the steps to produce reform.40 A number of human rights demonstrations, like those of the Syrian Human Rights Association and the Defence of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights took place in the capital.41 The regime hardly welcomed the emergence of a Syrian civil society movement, especially its political fringes. As a consequence, the movement was strongly ostracised, its members harassed and punished. Despite the repressive measures adopted by the authorities, the Syrian civil society movement did not die with the Damascus Spring but moved underground, or rather online, abandoning drawing rooms and coffee shops for the virtual space of the Internet. The regime tolerated the existence of such mobilisation if limited to cyberspace, believing that it would be innocuous to the state’s stability and would instead gain the West’s sympathy, representing the regime’s new openings towards pluralism. It is at this point that scholarly interest towards the thriving Syrian civil society phenomenon ended, undermining the role held by its online version. The beginning of the new presidency of Bashar al-Asad coincided with the country’s access to the Internet and its first social media users, the spread of satellite dishes on the top of Syrian homes, and the spread of smart phones. Successful campaigns like the national campaign for ending ‘honour’ crimes, the national campaign to annul an amendment of martial law, the campaign for women’s right to confer their citizenship on their children, the campaign to lower mobile rates, and the campaign to protect

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young women who had been victims of rape, all occurred through the Internet.42 Bashar al-Asad’s first decade in power represented a training ground for civil society actors, intellectuals, journalist, university students, and activists interested in bringing about change, by testing the regime’s red lines and experimenting with new communication tools and spaces. While at the beginning these initiatives took place offline, the regime’s strict censorship and control led to a relocation and a refashioning through online platforms. Although these initiatives were limited to small and restricted circles of intellectuals and activists, they nonetheless, by trial and error, nurtured a culture of resistance and set the framework for wider participation as they became visible at the start of 2011. The outbreak of the Syrian uprising signalled a shift from nonpolitical activism, mainly focused on issues of human rights, the empowerment of women, environmental issues, and trafficking, to political activism.43 As discussed thoroughly in the following chapters, the new media engendered an all-round revolution, which produced a new sense of civic responsibility, one that contested a decades-long culture of fear and established new state-society relations, while providing new territory to extend old struggles with new practices.44 Pressure from above. In Syria, the new president carried out a series of reforms, which at the time were ridiculed for not being ‘reformist’ enough. With the benefit of hindsight, those reforms may have been the stepping stone for long-term effects. Some of these reforms were literally cosmetic, like the one that changed school uniforms from a khaki colour to a light blue for boys and pink for girls. The same kind of reform allowed the opening of fancy cafés and restaurants for the well-off of the country. Of a different type were the reforms that led to the closing of the infamous Mezzeh prison in Damascus; the release of political prisoners (600 only in November 2000); the replacement of the old guard with young and Western-educated ministers between 2000 and 2005; the licensing of several private universities; the creation of a Ministry of Expatriates to encourage the return of Syrian migrants; the country’s access to the Internet, with projects to develop it literacy among the younger generations, as well as in remote areas of the country; and the new media law (Decree No. 50), which opened media outlets to private ownership.45 Public access to the Internet and the new media law nourished both a class of citizen activists and a class of media professionals,

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which helped overcome the atomisation of society and provide the basis for a mobilisation against the regime. It is not surprising that people’s access to the Internet increased from less than 1 per cent in 2000 to 21 per cent in 2010, while mobile phone use reached 60 per cent in the same period.46 Journalists working in the private media outlets developed high standards of professionalism, established links and trained with Western media organisations, and developed a new sense of professional responsibility. Amid other encouraging attempts at reform, there were also discussions about abolition the Ba’ath Party in Syria, which did not lead to its actual abolishing, but still represented an unprecedented hypothesis.47 Heydemann aptly defines these reforms as ‘authoritarian upgrading’, indicating an attempt by the new president to hold onto power, and ‘reconfigure authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic and social conditions’.48 However, as detailed by Hinnebusch and Zintl, the economic liberalisation inaugurated by Bashar al-Asad and his technocrats altered the regime’s social base, engineering a turnover on leadership and its cadres, and concentrating power in the presidency and the Asad family at large.49 Syrian regime officials referred to the ‘Chinese model’ of reform, one that improves living standards, but for the benefit and stability of the regime. By embracing neoliberalism, the economy was stronger, but important sections of society suffered setbacks.50 If one bears in mind de Tocqueville’s argument holding that the most dangerous moment for an authoritarian regime is when it attempts to reform itself, these reforms had potentially destabilised the status quo. In this regard, Salam Kawakibi observes that Bashar al-Asad’s upgrading consisted in the liberalisation of the economy, technological development, and the reliance on civil society organisations to deliver services that the state was not able to offer. One example was the establishment of a number of gongo s (government-organised nongovernmental organisations) under the patronage of the Syrian First Lady Asma al-Asad. While at first this strategy allowed the state to keep control of the new civil society actors, with time they widened their activities and audience away from the regime’s control and developed high standards of professionalism and accountability. The limitation of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ paradigm is also discussed by Pierret and Selvik, who investigate the growth of a ‘charitable empire’ based on a strong cooperation between the conservative Sunni ‘ulama’ and the private

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sector. With time they became the most efficient private welfare providers over whom the government had the least political control.51 Therefore, the survival tactics adopted by the regime, combined with other factors, produced unpredicted consequences.52 Pressure from outside. The change in Syria was not generated only by internal factors, whether coming from the people or the authorities, but also by exogenous causes. An overall picture would show Syria directly affected by the policies of foreign powers and by ongoing destabilising regional events. On the one hand, the country opted to initiate a process of liberalisation through economic and political reforms inaugurated by the government, which led to the signing of economic agreements with new international partners like the European Union, Turkey, Iran, China, and several Arab countries.53 On the other hand, ongoing discrepancies during the US administration, in particular with the Bush presidency, put Syria in a bad light, positioning it on the US’s expanded list of ‘axis of evil’ nations. This came at a time when the country was suffering from regional instability caused by the second intifada (2000–05), the dramatic events of the fall of Baghdad in 2003, and the fear of facing a similar destiny, in addition to the exacerbating effects of the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and Israeli wars against the Syrian allies Hezbollah and Hamas. Despite these external pressures, the regime proceeded with economic liberalisation, moving its trade towards China, Iran, Turkey, and the Greater Arab Free Trade Association (gafta ).54 The new investment inflows produced a boom in private sectors like trade, housing, banking, construction, and tourism.55 In this context of reforms, economic liberalisation, and increasing diffusion of media technology, Syria became the recipient of media assistance projects promoted by the West. As discussed in chapter 5, the country became the target of a number of media development aid programmes aimed at improving the development of the media sector in line with Western models of independent journalism, as well as at empowering a class of civil society activists. Arguably, this strategy represented the West’s new approach towards Syria and other unfriendly regimes: to destabilise them by simply implementing aid programmes that could empower civil society to push for regime change from within, instead of waging war like in Iraq. This scenario – which is an oversimplification – of the contextual situation in Syria under president Bashar al-Asad, demonstrates

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how a combination of factors created the opportunity structures necessary for people to form grassroots resistance at an individual, collective, and professional (that is, journalists) level, via the channels offered by the new media, and in particular the Internet. The vulnerability of the political system, generated by opposing deviant forces caused by a regime willing to open and modernise the country and at the same time tighten its control and systems of repression, combined with an unstable political regional setting and the West’s investment in media projects and civil society development, created the opportunity for micro-modes of social and political dissent to take place through online platforms. Mobilising Structures Goodwin and Jasper argue that social movements are not created by a single factor but by a set of variables that interact. It is a combination of social, institutional, and economic conditions – like the ones just described for Syria – which provide the underlying motives for social movements.56 In this regard, multiple studies have demonstrated that grievances alone are not enough to bring people to act collectively.57 In order to mobilise, people need organisation and resources. Opportunity structures and mobilising structures act in tandem to create social movements (see figure 2.2). Opportunity structures provide the motivation for movement organisations by creating the political, social, and economic conditions necessary for mobilisation. Mobilising structures, in turn, constitute those formal and informal vehicles through which people organise and engage in collective action. Communication, one infers, is at the basis of any form of popular organisation. As Tilly asserts, social movement theory should not regard the individual as the primary unit of social movements; rather it should identify this primary unit in the interaction between individuals.58 In fact, individuals have proven to participate in collective action only when they are sure that others are participating.59 Trust and confidence in the adherence of other participants can only grow out of communication between individuals.60 Within this understanding, the new ict s have inaugurated new paths for popular movements and new avenues of research for scholars. Despite the authoritarian rule of countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, citizens came out onto the streets in the spring of 2011 in response

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to a Facebook call for a revolution. That trust and confidence in the adherence of other participants had been created through the Internet through years of experimentation and gestation in the run-up to the 2011 uprisings. Eltantawy and Wiest, in their study of the Egyptian uprising, hark back to resource mobilisation theory, arguing that ‘social media introduced a novel resource that provided swiftness in receiving and disseminating information, helped to build and strengthen ties among activists, and increased interaction among protestors and between protesters and the rest of the world’.61 In a closed regime like that of Syria, the ability of traditional media to act as mobilising structures of a popular movement is practically impossible. The state and the media are nearly one and the same, as traditional media were owned and jealously controlled by the state. With the coming of the age of new ict s, the capabilities of the Syrian regime to control the flow of information and people’s interaction online were drastically reduced. This represented a turning point in the recent political narrative, given that the underlying motives for a popular mobilisation already existed. According to Asef Bayat, in order for change to happen, people need to create or discover spaces ‘within which they can voice their dissent and assert their presence in pursuit of bettering their lives’.62 In Syria, satellite tv channels expanded citizen’s information horizon dramatically, while the Internet acted as a vehicle with which to share aspirations, and a space in which to negotiate a shared understanding of specific problematic experiences, and experiment with collective action. While previous social movements had generally been organised around traditional hubs like cafés, universities, and underground meetings, with the age of the new media, people found new ways and spaces in which to meet, discuss, and organise, opting for a more convenient strategy in terms of time frame, safety, and money. This was the case in Syria, where the civil society movement born on the eve of Bashar al-Asad’s new presidency was crushed vehemently by the regime and was obliged to go underground (virtually speaking).63 The movement had, somewhat naively, believed in the initial promises of reforms from the new president, which would have promoted initiatives and debates on public matters in public spaces. However, in the course of a few months it became clear that the regime was not seriously committed to abiding by the promises it made, resulting in a staunch witch-hunting by the regime of all initiatives that the regime presumed could jeopardise the stability of the state. Satellite tv and

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the Internet produced the most visible changes in terms of civil awareness and engagement. Arabic-language satellite television in general, and al-Jazeera in particular, became a major source of information for Syrians, replacing national news production. Al-Jazeera’s effect in Syria was felt not just in terms of news and information production, but in the platform it offered for the Syrian civil society movement. For instance, at the time of the Damascus Spring in 2001, satellite television played a significant role in keeping Syrians updated with events, which went unreported by state-run television. Ghadiban notes how al-Jazeera infringed on all the regimes’ red lines, covering issues on democracy, human rights, and Islamic fundamentalism, and extensively covering the Arab–Israeli conflict.64 This generated a new awareness, and a motive for reflection, such as when a programme like Bila Hudud (Without Limits) hosted the leader of the banned Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who presented himself as a promoter of democracy, demanding the end of the state of emergency law. Even more daring was al-Jazeera’s interview with Monzer al-Mouseli, an independent member of the Syrian People’s Assembly, who opposed the constitutional amendment passed to allow Bashar al-Asad to run for president despite his youth.65 Besides established satellite tv stations like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, other media offered the Syrian opposition a place to express their views, like the two satellite tv stations launched by Syrian dissidents in Brussels and London – Zanoubia and Barada tv , respectively.66 The latter, in particular, played a fundamental role in the years predating the uprising as an anti-regime information campaign venue, with shows like Toward Change – a panel discussion on current events – and First Step – a programme produced by Syrian dissident groups based in the UK. Syrians’ responsiveness to the new programmes offered by satellite tv channels was evident from the proliferation of satellite dishes on the roofs of Syrian homes, as well as from the number of callers from Syria participating on live tv shows.67 The Internet produced the most thought-provoking examples of civic engagement, as the political opposition used it to circulate its bulletins and statements, to spread petitions and collect signatures on political and social issues, to inform the public of the regimes wrongdoings, and to publish literary works that had been censored by the state.68 Numerous news websites served as online platforms on which to discuss topics like drug consumption, homosexuality, female harassment, and interfaith marriage, progressively

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infringing on many established taboo topics. A significant case is represented by the news website All4Syria.com, one of the most read online bulletins, with over 15,000 daily subscribers.69 The website was shut down by the regime for its content. All of these means offered Syrians the opportunity, for the first time, to carry out crucial battles on social matters, breach norms of social engagement, and mediate new roles in relation to the state. All in all, the new media became the fuel, the tool, and the space for expressing political, cultural, and social protest.70 As a tool, the new media became the mobilising structures of Syria’s pre-uprising social movement, the instruments that channelled the mistrust towards the regime and the hopes for reforms that had emerged from a period of structural frictions and social ferment. As a space, which consisted of a virtual platform, the Internet facilitated the manifestation of dissent and protest, something that in previous times would have taken place in the streets and squares. These had de facto found a place in the virtual alleys of the Internet. The fabric of this new form of mobilisation requires a revitalisation (and adjustment) of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere.71 In his seminal study The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas defines the public sphere as a virtual or imaginary community which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space, a place between private individuals and government authorities in which public opinion is formed to serve or challenge the state’s policy.72 With the expansion of new media, the model of the public sphere enunciated by the German theorist – a model rooted in the example of bourgeois literary circles, intellectual gatherings which have taken place in physical locations since the late eighteenth century – is resuscitated (and emboldened) in the materiality of expressions of the virtual alleys of the Internet of the early twenty-first century. Its scope and nature, however, is less bourgeois and more popular, in view of the class identity of web participants and surfers. These web-salons become the expression of a growing political, anti-establishment sentiment in Syria, which dismantled citizens’ fear of the regime and created new social bonds. Going back to the assumptions made at the start of this chapter, Syria experienced the rise of unstructured opposition prior to 2011, a resistance which found the underlining motives for contention in the contextual situation of the country, channelled through people’s access to the new media. The new media were the triggering element,

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as the reasons to protest were present well before the age of the new technologies. It is not that the new media make social movements possible, they increase the opportunities for collective action; they enlarge the levels of participation and set out new rules by which individuals can play. The new media do not just provide the tools to articulate discontent and mobilise action, they become the space for contention themselves, where new collective subjectivities are formed, the struggle over meanings and power is staged, and contentious action takes place.73

n e w m e d ia f r a m e n e w t e rri tori es of protes t Despite the authoritarian context of Syria, in the decade prior to the uprising of 2011 a number of contextual factors changed, favouring the emergence of an unprecedented sentiment of dissent and resistance fostered by and expressed through the new media. Before the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, Syrian studies mainly covered issues of elite politics, foreign policy, and ethnic/identity politics. Few focused on civil society and grassroots resistance, and those that did mostly tended to conclude that the government’s practice of promoting some forms of civil society activism and online dissent was a tactical expedient to infiltrate society and control it.74 As such, this scholarly production failed to recognise the fact that in the long term these quasi-autonomous dynamics created unintended consequences for the country’s political and social stability.75 Aside from the scholarship presented on Syrian musalsalat (tv series), studies on the role of new media in Syria were scant, as the expansion of the Internet and new technologies was weighted with Western terms for comparison, therefore appearing unworthy of study and ineffective vis-à-vis the perspective of social or political change. However, as Kurzman argued, the fact that subtle practices of contestation ‘are not easily observable’ makes them even more interesting and valuable.76 The assumption here is that scholarly research on Syria failed to pay adequate attention to the development of a Syrian media landscape and the informal and hybrid civic engagement it produced. The Syrian uprising has gone down in history as a popular movement that broke out on 5 March 2011, gathering people from different social groups, aligned in their quest for reforms and political rights. In the course of few months and as an effect of the violent response adopted by the regime, the popular mobilisation took a different path with the

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formation of a military arm, the Free Syrian Army, a situation which slowly dragged the country into a civil war–like state and its dramatic humanitarian catastrophe. In these terms, social mobilisation in Syria seems to have occurred only in 2011 when people took to the streets and gained international resonance. How then, would we describe the unstructured mobilisation taking place prior to 2011? Was it a prototype of Syria’s uprising of 2011? Does it classify as a ‘social movement’, understood as an organised and territorially based movement qualifying for Castell’s ‘social transformation’ or van Naerssen’s ‘emancipation’ (see Schuurman and van Naerssen), or should it opt for other definitions, for instance Bayat’s ‘non-movement’?77 If one had to adhere to the classic definition of a social movement, it would most probably identify the Syrian uprising of 2011 as such, but not its preliminary mobilisation. If social movements are classified as durable structures of collective action aimed at producing social change, then the Syrian pre-uprising mobilisation was not a self-identifying movement, with organized and sustained claims, structured action, and with clear-cut objectives. More likely, it was a form of collective action with strong elements of spontaneity, whose organisation focused on single-issue campaigns, and whose unravelling was largely self-generated and primarily concerned with action over identity or meaning.78 According to Diani, the nature of regimes in the Middle East is to criminalise politics and to impose strategies of control and repression, and not to allow citizens to challenge the authority through coalitions and movements, but rather through community-based informal resistance.79 In this light, Syria’s online mobilisation can be defined as the expression of ‘everyday forms of resistance’, which, however, differs from Scott’s definition in that its actions were not simply individualistic and quiet, but took the form of collective campaigns, aimed at widening adhesions (i.e., the numerous online petitions) and visibility through online platforms. In a way, these campaigns may be seen as forming a ‘movement in itself’, a social movement per se only when the actors involved become aware of their shared grievances and articulated their actions within a wider and long-lasting plan aimed at social transformation.80 This may be identified with the uprising in 2011, when the anti-establishment campaigns moved from the online platforms to the streets, becoming a public and visible movement with shared objectives and tactics. The call of a Facebook page for a Syrian revolution in March of 2011 signalled the start of this transition. This shift from online to

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offline street protests marks the change from atomised, episodic collective actions, limited to online platforms, to ‘molecular’, durable mass campaigns – intentional political acts targeting political authority. I argue that what Bayat defines as ‘street politics’, the physical and social space of the ‘streets’, where citizens confront the authorities, has moved from the alleyways, pavements, and public parks of the city to the virtual alleys of the Internet. As Fahmi claims, the new information technologies have created new ‘geographies of protest’, ‘shifting their [activist] campaigns and resources to alternative virtual venues’.81 Citizens now have the chance to choose or combine traditional mobilisation in the urban space with online platforms on which they can engage in debates and organise collective protests.82 In Syria, no real anti-establishment movement would have been able to mobilise in the streets of Damascus or Aleppo, as the regime would have crushed it, as it did in Hama in 1982.83 Wiktorowicz stresses that contrary to Western democracies, in which social movement activity takes place largely through social movement organisations, in the Arab world this can be pursued only through dense, informal networks.84 Fear has been the most powerful weapon adopted by the Syrian regime, which translated into obedience, civic disengagement, social fragmentation, and atomised connectivity.85 With the new media (satellite tv and the Internet), Syrians not only learnt about other realities, they also engaged in communication exchanges, discussion forums, awareness campaigns, and petitions on social matters, which would have been impossible before. The online platforms became the only space on which organisation, communication, and networking among citizens was possible. Although the Asad regime had been able to impose full dominion in the public space, and ensure full respect and discipline of its citizens in the streets – to put it in Foucault’s words, where space is power – this could not be replicated in the infinite space of the Internet.86 Here ordinary people could exercise what Bayat defines as ‘the art of presence’, citizens’ ability to circumvent constraints and discover new spaces of contestation, to confront the authorities, expose the state’s wrongdoings, and reappropriate the code of symbols and language that the regime had monopolised for a long time.87 Bayat argues that the ‘street’ has the capacity to allow people to mobilise without an active network, through the instantaneous communication that the public space of the street generates. The street gathers people and sentiments and thereby becomes the space where

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citizens engage in collective actions, driven by the force of necessity and the realisation of sharing the same grievances and of desiring the same goals, rather than articulating political acts. Instead, the new icts have the capacity to create a durable communication among dispersed citizens, create a network based on a common identity, and produce public campaigns with broader adhesions.88 While the state’s police might occupy a street or square, breaking the solidarity and cohesion that that physical space had created, with the Internet, the bond among people is rarely broken by the state’s interference, or if it happens, it only lasts for a few hours, or at maximum days. Both Bayat’s ‘streets’ and the Internet have the advantage of also being able to gather up the passive networks, and bystanders, meaning people not politically committed and who are drawn into the contestation by simply walking by at the time of the contestation, or in the case of the Internet, following online debates and campaigns. This feature of the Internet is what Tilly calls ‘catness’ (strong group cohesion) and ‘netness’ (interpersonal communication and inter-network communication), a feature important for the success of any social mobilisation, as it enables people to mobilise without having an active network.89 This means that the Syrian online mobilisation that preceded the uprising of 2011 can be defined as a movement in itself, though very different from what the mainstream Euro-American social theorists would define as a movement, in that it did not take place within geographical national territories but in the borderless and vague space of the Internet. Syrian online mobilisation resembles more Bayat’s definition of non-movement, which is different from the prevailing social movement theories formulated by Western social scientists, as non-movement is the collective action of non-collective actors, ‘ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognisable leaderships and organisations’.90 Syria’s online mobilisation identified with a growing, collective intolerance towards the state’s authority and a quest for political and social reforms, taking the form of episodic and single-target political and social campaigns through online platforms. Only in 2011 did this (non)movement became self-conscious and cohesive, organized under common objectives and coordinating public acts of contestation. The online predecessor of this movement was its virtual avatar, smaller in size but still unifying voices under common

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targets and actively involved in countering the authorities through the online public spaces. The success of such a (non)movement was limited by its virtual existence. In fact, in order for a non-movement to become a real movement – as opposed to a virtual one – the virtual space needs to meet the real ground; online activism needs to be coupled with offline activism. Accordingly, for the Internet to influence political participation it must include activities that can be carried out both online and offline, activities that can be executed only online, and activities that can occur only offline.91 In 2011, by spreading contention from the virtual peripheries to the physical space of the streets, the Syrian mobilisation acquired the full degree of social movement, complying with the mainstream framework of Euro-American social science studies.

i n t e r d is c ip l in a ry r e flecti ons across p ol i t i c s , s o c ia l m ov e m e n t, and medi a studi es In this book, I attempt to contribute to wider debates within social movement theory by focusing on the early resistance (non)movement that predated the street protests of 2011. In doing so, I am concerned with the factors, emergence, and early formation of oppositional resistance that was engendered by and developed through the space provided by the new media. It appears that the presidency of Bashar al-Asad from 2000 to 2011 was a period of great transformation, with strong pressure coming from the authorities, ordinary people, and external powers, and with contrasting forces pushing towards modernisation, conservatism, and globalisation. Under these circumstances, the hybrid regime of Bashar al-Asad witnessed the development of modes of social and political action that have eluded common conceptual frames of social movement because of their online format that developed despite the presence of a recalcitrant authoritarian government. The online nature of the mobilisation generates some difficulties in terms of theoretical conceptualisation, having to join two fields of research, media, and social movement studies and clashing with Western-centric scholarly works. Indeed, with only a few exceptions, the Middle East is generally analysed with Euro/Western-centric normative assumptions, which have emerged from specific historical formations in the West and which are still regarded as teleological, universalistic, and totalising ways of understanding the world.92

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European studies have been framed by the Marxist/Hegelian tradition and notion of history, while the North American tradition adopted a more empirical approach, concerned with the specific conditions that facilitate or impede the rise of social movements. What these Western approaches have somehow failed to do is to engage with the rise of collective mobilisation in non-Western societies and specifically in the Arab region, at least till the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. Bayat aptly suggests that the main problem derives from assuming the Western model to be the ‘norm’ and uncritically explaining non-Western contexts which have a clearly different social composition and political institutions, and therefore different dynamics of resistance. Ignoring the fact that the Middle East might not be compatible with the modern Westphalian nation-state has caused Western researchers to, on the one hand, turn a blind eye to the vast array of often institutionalised and hybrid social activities occurring in the region and, on the other hand, produce a body of work that conceptualises the Middle East as inherently ‘exceptional’.93 As the edited book by Fadaee, Understanding Southern Social Movements, shows, the Global South displays different social settings and forces wanting to usher in change in ways that are different from those displayed in the open and legally sanctioned environments of the Global North.94 This study, though deeply indebted to mainstream Euro-American political science, privileges alternative perspectives to traditional ones that failed to understand the changes maturing within the Syrian social fabric and that were at the basis of its uprising. According to most Western sociologists, the definition of social movement applies to those movements that present an organised and sustained claim on the authorities, display a repertoire of performances (i.e., street protests and public meetings), and are represented by a (charismatic) leader.95 This type of structure does not necessarily comply with Middle Eastern states (and often not even with Western cases, if one considers the anti-austerity and anti-corruption movements that have recently developed from Europe to South America). Social mobilisation in the Arab world seems to be oriented towards the attainment of economic and political rights rather than more generalised human rights. In Syria, the authoritarian structure of the state, the overwhelming presence of secret service agents ingrained in the social fabric, and the fear that the regime instilled in its subjects would not have permitted the rise of any type of dissent, especially if represented by a leader and

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M ED IA

BRID G E LEA D ERS

BROA D ER PUBLIC

Figure 2.3 | Two-Step Flow Theory

taking place in public areas.96 In the age of new ict s, the opportunity for people to mobilise through collective actions has changed, as the regime was not able to impose its full dominion and control over the Internet and satellite tv channels. These tools produced an all-round transformation at an individual and societal level, which entailed new interpretative frames and the experimentation of a new modus operandi and repertoire of tactics to confront the authorities for the first time. The online mobilisation in Syria, whether one classifies it as a movement or non-movement, made claims or opposed the authorities, but not as an anti-establishment movement, with defined objectives and established strategies, and driven by ideology. The repertoire of actions differed from those of traditional, offline protests, with protestors opting for online petitions or campaigns with no recognisable leadership, as the Internet tends to dismantle pyramidal power structures, allowing everyone to be part of the same voice. This movement

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developed over time, circumventing constraints and transforming the online platforms into spaces in which to make ‘oneself heard, seen, felt and realised’.97 This implies that the analytical treatment of social movement may require a more fluid and flexible framing, one that is grounded in the cultural landscape and aware of the influence played by the new media technologies and the power dynamics exercised by all operating structures. What has been said hitherto on social movement theory can easily be extended to media studies. Scholarly work on Arab media, including recent research, is deeply embedded in Western methodology of research, with a tendency to conceptualise the region through a top-down analysis.98 William Rugh’s founding volume on Arab media studies, Arab Mass Media, is structured on Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s model of the press, thereby arguing that Arab media systems reflect the political system of the society they live in.99 This book has become a major reference in the field of Arab media studies, despite Rugh’s overreliance on typologies associated with Western contexts with only minor modifications to fit the Arab world.100 The advent of the new information technologies has not produced any substantial change in the analysis, which still remains confined to Western approaches, whether for narrative or thematic reasons. Thematic research is mostly interested in issues of structure, censorship, and ownership, while the narrative is ingrained in Western paradigms of analysis, which tend not to problematise the issue in question within the socio-political context and its agents. For instance, the focus of scholarly work on transnational satellite broadcasting and its impact on the construction of identities and politics, lingers on in institutional changes (private media) and structure (talk shows with call-in audiences), discarding completely the non-institutional transformation that satellite tv channels produce within private domains and domestic spheres.101 The obsession with finding the ‘public sphere’ within the new broadcasting phenomenon diverts the question to whether such concept can be transported to other contexts, tout court.102 Another common trait of the literature on Arab media studies is the tendency to flatten the subjects of their inquiry into a monolithic group of people. This appears when it comes to referring to the Arab people as a coherent and unitary group, speaking one language and sharing the same cultural background, but also when referring to the class of media professionals or the audience.103 The media field needs to be thought of

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as a microcosm, à la Bourdieu, in which those who operate within this field are active agents, with some form of (symbolic or cultural) power, which affects and is affected by the developments of other fields.104 In Syria, as chapter 4 shows through a number of significant cases, Syrian journalists working in the private sector developed a strong sense of professional responsibility, while ordinary citizens responded positively, and enthusiastically, to this form of media – both becoming part of a new process of civic consciousness. As a consequence, journalism became more accountable and citizens more participatory, each group contributing to the development and empowerment of the other. This means that the effect that the new media may have on a society cannot be measured in terms of the number of existing satellite channels or private media outlets. Such a measurement needs to be coupled with a more in-depth analysis of what the changes are at an individual and collective level. Similarly, studies that looked at levels of Internet penetration in Syria and the phenomena of blogging and social networking have been limited in scope due to their quantitative approach and because of an unshakable Western bias. Studies have focused on data that quantify the number of web surfers, websites, and Internet cafés existing in the country, rather than looking at the way the new technology is leveraged by people.105 This data has proven to not be objective for not taking into account factors such as the fact that Syrians primarily accessed the web at Internet cafés, or that family members logged in using the same account.106 This means that the study of Internet use in Syria necessitates an assessment of the specific local circumstances to perceive its true nature, rather than comparing it, as is often done, to the standards of the West, where the Internet has had a longer history.107 The results of this form of research have not been supported by studies that looked at who was using the Internet, what the content of online activism was, and what offline connectivity was created among peers or family members once the laptops were switched off. When quantitative analysis is not supported by a qualitative and contextual study, the data retrieved is poor in informative content and risks (re)producing disorienting knowledge or, as is often the case for the mena region, labelling the region with a sort of inescapable exceptionalism. Surely, new media diffusion cannot be interpreted as an index to determine political and social change if the data collected focuses on the hic et nunc, while ignoring the

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historical transformation that brought about the emergence of the new media. Moreover, as Howard points out, to transform the Internet into an information weapon, it is not necessary to have all citizens tuned in online, as a networked society only needs a few ‘brokers’ or ‘tech-savvies’ to keep everyone else up to date.108 In Syria, as chapter 5 discusses by exploring the role and effects of media development aid, this group of brokers with high levels of it knowledge constituted a minority, approximately 10 to 20 per cent of the population, made up of professionals, students, and governmental employees. This diverse group of people assumed the task of keeping an online connection between the strong, yet offline, social networks (i.e., universities, mosques, unions, and families) and the wider digital public.109 The role of these ‘bridge leaders’ is explained by the two-step flow theory developed by sociologists Katz and Lazarsfeld (see figure 2.3).110 The theory holds that a minority of people who have access to broader information sources receive the information and channel it to the broader public. In Syria, a pocket of online dissent propagated by activists like Rami Nakhle, Razan Ghazzawi, and Rami Jarrah became essential at the time of the uprising of 2011, when to ensure mass participation in protests and manifestation, it was fundamental to homogenise the strong ties of the online social networks with the weak ties of the offline ones, through turning to graffiti, collective revolutionary hymns, and public gatherings.111 Coupling street demonstrations with new media technologies allowed the circulation of information in real time, countering the regime’s propaganda and, what is more significant, internationalising the struggle.112 However, these activists played an even more important role prior to the uprising, which was using the Internet as a medium on which to stir debate among citizens, stimulate critical thinking, and coordinate online campaigns, which expressed the new power relationships being established between citizens and authority.

f in a l r e marks In view of what has been discussed this far, this study frames the outbreak of the Syrian uprising by looking at the historical formation and process that helped a new type of media to emerge and at the effects this had on the local social fabric. The aim is to place the Syrian case within a wider debate, moving towards a reconceptu-

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alisation of social movement theory as a result of the tremendous impact that ict s are having on popular contentious politics.113 After all, revolutions were always aided by new technologies: the Reformation in Europe went hand in hand with the printing press;114 the revolutions of 1848 were loosely supported by the use of the telegraph, which transmitted news across Europe;115 the age of modern terrorism started with the invention of dynamite.116 Today, newly emerging ict s are redefining social relations, cultural practices, and economic and political orders, offering hope for closed regimes. As Johnston and Lio argue, new technology is allowing the formation of alternative collective identities based on ‘interactions in submerged networks and emergent through the dialectical and dialogical process of reality construction’.117 With a specific reference to the Syrian case, the new technologies served as a counterweight to the culture of fear that dominated society and offered new civil society agents the possibility of mobilising campaigns that challenged the centralised hegemonic vision of the ruling elite in ways that traditional media would have never permitted. This study critically confronts the ‘conceptual stretching’ that both media and social movement theory have made with, especially, the Middle East. This study’s investigation of the pre-uprising Syrian resistance aims at encouraging social movement scholars to expand the conceptual frames of their theory to earlier expressions of dissent, as well as to unconventional spaces, tools, and actors involved in oppositional dissent and action. In furtherance of its objectives, this study makes a case for a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach, one ingrained in the historical, political, and social-economic context of the country at issue. Beyond the sterile debate of whether a movement can be categorised as a social movement according to classic paradigms or to the ongoing arguments of those maintaining that new media foster, inevitably and faithfully, democratisation, new media are here conceived as a driving force for the social and political change taking place in Syria. They influenced and were at the same time influenced by the all-round and steady transformation of the country, qualifying with Alain Touraine’s definition of social movement, a macroscopic social change, a Hegelian Geist that takes shape in society in all its forms.

3

‘Change within Continuity’: The Lion Cub’s Reforms1 Words are deeds. The words we hear May revolutionise or rear A mighty state. The words we read May be a spiritual deed Excelling any fleshly one, As much as the celestial sun Transcends a bonfire, made to throw A light upon some raree-show. Charles Harpur, ‘Words’

n o s ta l g ia f o r t h e pas t i n syri a Syria lies at the heart of the Middle East in terms of location, but also at the heart of Western history in terms of culture. Known as the ‘cradle of humanity’ or the ‘gateway to history’, Syria is the melting pot of different cultures, religions, and people that from the beginning of history have met, mixed, and settled down in this land.2 Most of this history and these stories remain etched on the ancient ruins and in the rarefied atmosphere that characterises this country, which survived despite the flow of time and which only the outbreak of the recent civil conflict is putting at risk. A strong nostalgia moulds the mood of Syrians, who praise their past with an attitude that is common to those whose present hardly offers anything to be proud of. Blame lies with Syria’s modern rulers, from the French who imposed their authority between 1920 and 1946 to the numerous military regimes that succeeded independence, and latterly the Ba’ath Party, which had been in place since 1963.

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The outbreak of Syria’s uprising in 2011 represented for many the chance for redemption, to put an end to decades of silence and degradation, and a new page of history. The fast development of the uprising into a civil conflict, waged across the country and fragmenting the population into opposition groups, fighting against each other, shifts this bright future into the distance. This book attempts to re-evaluate the decade that preceded the Syrian uprising of 2011 and the process of reforms carried out by President Bashar al-Asad, with specifc attention paid to the trasformation of the media sphere. In order to explain the role of the new media and its effects on Syrian society, and the (f)actors that contributed to this change, this chapter presents a historical reconstruction of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency and the presumed reforms that were carried out under his rule. Without specifically looking at the new forms of media represented by satellite tv and the Internet, which will be dealt with in chapter 4, this chapter discloses the slow and at times contradictory change that made its way through traditional media like printed press, radio, and tv . Despite the limits imposed by the regime, traditional media underwent an identity crisis, in which transformation was longed for and at times attempted, in line with the regime’s slogan of ‘change within continuity’. Through a number of significant examples, this chapter shows how the Syrian media sector underwent a process of relentless hybridisation, which became more stark with the development of new media, a process that created spaces for brief experiments of independent and professional journalism that was not in line with the regime’s precepts.

faci n g r e a l it y: ba’ at h is m and hafez’s legacy During the stagnant years of the Ba’athist era, intellectuals looked with melancholy at the ‘good old days’ of the post-independence period, from 1946 to 1963, a golden age for democratic reforms and political freedoms, and the lively cultural atmosphere in which independent and free media operated.3 But the newborn, independent Syria was still a fragile state, at the mercy of stronger forces eager to impose their domain.4 The decline came with the Ba’athist coup of 1963, which paved the way for the rise of the Asads and their long and hereditary regime. It is in this framework that the national media in Syria was born, emerging from a series of events of national significance rather than in response to a need to communicate with

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citizens. The media became a governmental tool, reduced to a mere means of propaganda, unable to perform their essential functions of disseminating news and keeping the government accountable for its actions. Since 1963, the government and the Ba’ath Party have owned and controlled the media at all levels: funding, management, topic coverage, and distribution. Just after the coup, independent newspapers were shut down by military authorities and a state of emergency was imposed that issued restrictive laws and gave the state the right to control newspapers, books, radio, television, advertising, and the visual arts.5 Under Ba’athist rule, the daily news supply was provided through three national newspapers (al-Ba’ath, al-Thawra, and Tishreen), which have been under the responsibility of the Wahda Foundation for Press, Printing and Publishing Establishment.6 The Foundation has been operating under the umbrella of the Ministry of Information, monitoring every publication on Syrian soil. Al-Ba’ath (Resurrection) is the party’s newspaper and was first printed in 1946 as the organ of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, a role it has kept until today. Al-Thawra (Revolution) was initially launched as al-Wahda (Unity) in 1958 by the Wahda Press. In 1963 this organisation was transferred to the Ministry of Information and the newspaper was relaunched under its new name, representing the official paper of the government. Tishreen (October) was founded in 1975, when Arabs regained their pride in the fight against Israel, after the defeat of the Six-Day War in 1967. The paper was relaunched by the Tishreen Organisation for Press and Publishing, created in 1975 by a presidential decree to fight ‘imperialism and Zionism’.7 A look at the archives of the three state newspapers would show how headlines and articles of a certain day in a given year would not differ from their equivalent on the previous year or even ten years earlier, under the Asad’s rule.8 Hazem, a Syrian journalist, told me how this practice gave people the impression of living a timeless life, as if the past and present merged, without the opportunity to change the future.9 With regards to the format, papers usually displayed an honorific sentence to the president of Syria, sometimes accompanied by a small picture in the upper corner of the newspaper’s first page. The Syrian media, rather than being a tool for communicating information to citizens, was transformed into a vehicle promoting the regime’s grandeur, a public relations operation to support the government. As Hazem argued, the Syrian media were ‘politically steered’, in that

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they managed the demarcation between facts and fiction. As a consequence, many Syrians readers stopped buying papers, despite them being sold at a subsidised price and distributed for free in public institutions.10 Radio and television did not offer a different perspective, but remained a more popular medium for Syrians, though for entertainment rather than for their information value. Only in the 1990s did Arabic satellite tv channels reach the Middle East and therefore Syria. Before the advent of satellite broadcasting, the only access to foreign media in Arabic was limited to the broadcasts of the bbc , Radio Monte Carlo, and Voice of America. 11 As for international printed press, this did not enter the country’s borders, or if it did, it did so only after having been censored on sensitive and critical issues. Rami, a Syrian journalist who had worked for twenty years for the state’s daily newspapers, first under Hazef and then under Bashar al-Asad, commented from his second house in Beirut, ‘we [state journalists] served the regime and not the people. The regime had made us perpetuators of their own faults. You became part of the regime’s machine; you learnt the job and replicated it day after day without thinking’.12 The topics and the main concerns present in the media were established by the regime and were centred on the activities of the president and other leading figures of the regime, while foreign issues were mainly focused on the Arab–Israeli struggle.13 The uniformity in news coverage reflected the reliance on the national news agency sana (Syrian Arab News Agency) for publications and on the directorate-general of radio and television for all national broadcasting services.14 sana was established on 24 June 1965 and placed under the Ministry of Information, with branches in all the governorates and journalists in foreign countries.15 The agency was entitled to supply news to the daily newspapers, radio, and television channels. Not surprisingly, the minister of information was the chairman of its board of directors.16 In this system, journalists themselves were in many cases bureaucrats or government officials, who had been appointed to serve the centre of power and disseminate a particular view. Middle East Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, once referred to the Syrian journalist as ‘someone who is not expected to have an opinion’.17 Theatre production, cinema, and books were similarly scrutinized by the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance.18 The government also maintained the right to confiscate and destroy any cultural,

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artistic, and/or literary work which could potentially harm national security, in the belief that ‘truth is not a product of a great mass of people, but of a few wise men in a position to guide and direct their fellows’.19 Both ministries, the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture, were closely supervised by the president, with particular attention paid to the Ministry of Information, ‘since information policies are part of the President’s main concerns’.20 The media played a strategic role during the twenty-nine years of Hafez al-Asad’s rule: they were not simply controlled and censored by the regime, but were actively used to mould the public’s ideas and ideals, with the aim of creating a national community in which a respect for the ruler was bolstered and a fear of opposition was instilled among the people. For instance, the frightening figure of Hafez al-Asad was cleverly created through the media. The minister of information, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad (1974–83), invented the myth of the ‘immortal leader’ (al-qa’id al-khaled), the guiding father and teacher, the brave general and the comrade, the beloved friend and brother, and disseminated it through the media.21 Hafez’s name was always preceded by a reverential title, his presence was perceived in every place through posters hanging on walls and immense statues appearing at every turn. No one actually knew who was behind that statuesque man and above all no one suspected Hafez’s poor health, the hypochondria from which he suffered, the unstable physical condition that many times prevented him from delivering public messages to the nation, and, at the end of his days, the dementia that supposedly affected him.22 According to Patrick Seale, the myth of the ‘immortal leader’ was intentionally created to distract people’s attention from other impending domestic issues like the economic and the security challenges that the regime was facing.23 The media made this possible; they created a myth and kept it real. Despite the epithet, Hafez died in 2000. However, the myth of the great leader outlived him, surviving in the public imagination.24 The media also played a fundamental role in paving the way, in people’s minds, for the succession to power of Bashar. Bashar was Hafez’s second choice as ruler of Syria.25 His oldest sibiling, Basil, who had been raised to succeed his father, had died in a car accident in 1994. The event was a terrible blow for the regime and a confusing one for its citizens. Syrians had been accustomed to the idea that the oldest sibling Basil, who had chosen a military career like his

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father, would succeed to the presidency. He had slowly followed in his father’s steps: he accompanied his father on important missions, covered significant positions, delivered messages to the nation, and had started to appear at his father’s side in posters all around the country. Once again with Basil’s death, the media played a fundamental role in ensuring the regime’s stability, becoming the tool that the regime used to replace Basil with Bashar in people’s imagination, and thereby easing his succession. As an example, Syrian media coverage of the funeral procession played on symbolism, showing Bashar by his father’s side, supporting him and leading him by the arm. Later, Basil’s photos were replaced with Bashar’s or photos of the trio, which started with Hafez and ended with Bashar. This had been possible because of the ownership and subjection of traditional media (i.e., newspapers, radio, and television) to the regime, which used them to subject citizens to their ideology. As Rami, the Syrian journalist mentioned earlier, commented, ‘the media were the engine for the creation of myths, which grew into people’s minds and that with time simply became true’. For this reason, Syrian media, considered a mere mouthpiece of the regime and therefore offering no new insight into the dynamic of political power, have been disregarded by scholarly work. This attitude is criticized by Miriam Cooke, who, reflecting on a similar disinterest towards Syrian literature under the Asads, argues provocatively: ‘Syrian literature is [seen as] all the same, just one nightmare response to undifferentiated oppression. Such an attitude implied that it is all cathartic, not worth studying’.26 Despite this widespread view and a state of fear among citizens, Syria already had at the time a long tradition of underground publishing, including journals distributed clandestinely, often hand-to-hand in the tradition of the Soviet samizdat.27 These publications, like al-Ra’i (Opinion), the journal of the illegal Communist Party led by Riad al-Turk, and the many Kurdish-language publications outlawed by the regime, represented the alternative voice to the amalgam and uniformity of news and views presented by the regime’s media, keeping dissent quiet, if not silent, but still alive.28 This custom was preserved and brought back when the Syrian uprising broke out in 2011, with more than thirteen underground newspapers and magazines distributed throughout the country. Among them were Oxygen in Zabadani, Enab Baladi in Daraya, and Hurriyat in Damascus. These publications were secretly printed in homes and left in front of doors in the

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various neighbourhoods of the city, including the pro-government ones, despite the high risk of being caught, arrested, and tortured for spreading anti-regime information.

bas h a r a l - asa d ’ s n e w era of reformi s m Bashar al-Asad was elected president of Syria on 10 July 2000. The young and inexperiencd president, a would-be ophthalmologist, it -savvy and educated in Western culture, seemed willing to reform domestic affairs and change the reputation that his father had earned in the eyes of Western countries.29 With the succession of Bashar al-Asad, political topics, including democracy and human rights issues, were more freely debated in the media, as well in the streets and cultural centres. In July 2000, Tishreen, one of the country’s three newspapers, made a careful call for democracy in one of its pages, recounting the hypothetical case of a headmaster who had taken control of his school, and suggesting how it would have been better to have shared that power with an administrative board, which made decisions for the majority.30 It is revealing that the article was issued precisely at the time of Bashar’s succession, as a call for change and to sensitise the ruling class. The relaxed atmosphere brought intellectuals and activists together to build a civil movement, which became the main actor of what is now known as the Damascus Spring.31 This period of Syrian history started with Bashar’s inaugural speech to the nation on 17 July 2000, an inspiring speech for the promises it made and plans it proposed, but also an interesting document to refer to in light of the Syrian uprising. The speech asserted the importance of ‘creative thinking’, and ‘the desperate need for constructive criticism’, ‘transparency’, and ‘democracy’, along with the Ba’ath slogan of ‘change in the framework of continuity’.32 Perthes argues that Bashar tried to modernise authoritarianism – which in itself is a difficult task to implement – by keeping traditions safe, and keeping authority and the regime in place, while fostering modernisation and openness in civilian matters.33 In this speech, Bashar said that ‘educational, cultural and media institutions had to be reformed and modernised’, although this needed to be done with due respect to national and pan-Arab issues, and in a way that ‘strengthens our genuine heritage, renounces the mentality of introversion and negativity, and treats the social problems that negatively

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affect the unity and security in society’.34 The path to reforms was not an easy one, though. Scholars seemed to be divided between those who believed in the new president’s intent to reform and those who more pessimistically saw in this new rethoric an attempt to hold on to power and camouflage the same old rule of law. The first real obstacle to reforms was co-opting the old machinery of power. Hafez al-Asad had in fact positioned his loyal comrades in the government at the time of his seizure of power, who had then kept their seats, apparently with no intention of ceding their turf once his son, the new president, succeeded him.35 Many had also been commissioned by Hafez al-Asad to work as right-hand men and advisors for the young president, who would have to bridge the wide gap left by his father. The new president opted for a long-term strategy to renew the regime’s circle of power, which came into effect with the removal of the old icons of the regime through two changes of government and the tenth regional conference of the Ba’ath Party in 2005. Indeed, at the time of Bashar’s accession to power in 2000, the ruling Ba’ath Party appeared to be divided into two factions. On the one side, the ‘old guard’, as had been defined by the Western media, represented influential barons of Hafez al-Asad’s time, and on the other side, those newly elected by the president and his young advisors. The old guard was stagnant, old hat, and deaf to any new ideas and suggestions of political, economic, and social reform. The average age of these people was around sixty, and almost all of them had risen through the Ba’ath Party, though not for demonstrating specific abilities. The vast majority did not have an academic degree and had never travelled abroad and therefore lacked knowledge about other countries’ administrative, technical, or political environments.36 In other words, this group of people personified the stagnation of the Syrian state, its growing corruption, and the endurance of personal privileges. In contrast, the new entourage, composed of young men of Bashar’s generation, brought fresh blood to the regime, through shared modern ideas and desires to reform the country.37 These newly appointed men had studied at the university level, some abroad, and several were brought in from the Syrian Computer Society, where they had been involved in promoting computer literacy and Internet awareness. Some of the new men had also worked for the World Bank and the United Nations.38 However, the result of this new shake-up was in many ways a replacement of the old-guard party officials with new hacks, sons of the same school and committed to maintaining the status quo.39

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Some might argue that Bashar’s reforms were merely cosmetic; yet the president did introduce some small but not insignificant changes. For example, he cut down the military service by six months, from thirty months to two years, and reduced the presence of militaristic symbols and army-related narratives from school curricula.40 The educational system was probably the field that benefited the most from the new reforms. Indeed, in the fall of 2003, children’s uniforms were changed from the traditional military khaki colour to a light blue for boys and pink for girls; corporal punishment in classrooms was abolished, and private universities were opened.41 Moreover there was a reduction of portraits of the president adorning buildings, streets, and squares, as well as the opening of fancy cafés, resturants, and hotels, often surrounded by shanty neighbourhoods. Less visible yet more importantly, the regime reformed the code of conduct for police forces, which brought about a more civil and less brutal manner of arresting people. This signified the cessation of the secret service’s secretive tactics (e.g., entering homes and arresting people on the spot), in favour of a system of notices and reporting through the mukhaˉbaraˉ t.42 This shows how some changes did occur that were not just rhetoric used by the newly elected president but resulted in tangible practices. Hinnebusch argues that Bashar al-Asad, on his succession to power, wanted to open the country to the world market and to bring Syria into the age of globalisation, through measures such as the introduction of the Internet.43 These steps, nevertheless, had to be made carefully. Bashar wanted both political and economic reforms, but having been put under pressure by the old guard, he opted for economic reforms exclusively, leaving the political ones for a later stage.44 Economic liberalisation without political liberalisation is defined by Slavoj Žižek as ‘authoritarian capitalism’ or ‘capitalism with Asian values’.45 In the meantime, the president attempted to diminish the power-sharing mechanisms with the old guard, trying to concentrate power in the presidency and sending the older generations into retirement.46 Heydemann defines Bashar’s reformism as a mechanism of ‘authoritarian upgrading’, a process initiated by authoritarian regimes to respond to the changing times, which allows them to hold on to power by allowing a number of selected reforms, but which instead of liberalising and modernising the country, strenghtens the regime and its stability.47

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th e w in d s o f r e f o r m hi t the medi a Political reforms, hence, were placed on a reserve list, to be implemented once the old guard had completely left the stage of the state. This never occurred – even when, in 2005, political conditions seemed ripe for such an event – allegedly out of the conviction that external pressures impeded the smooth introduction of systemic reforms.48 However, other fields such as education, administration, and the economy were affected by new reforms. The media in particular benefited from a vast plan of reforms. Indeed, if it is true that, on the one hand, the structures of regime control were preserved, on the other hand, the new media found ways to overcome atomisation and evade repression, producing a ‘multi-heated swarm’ that became difficult for the regime to put an end to.49 This meant that the media system under Bashar became a dual and to some extent contradictory reality, one which maintained the façade of an authoritarian regime, with traditional media (newspaper, radio, television) tight in its claws, and new media (satellite television, Internet) evading the regime’s control and creating a new reality in terms of both providing people with access to alternative sources of information and facilitating citizens’ participation in discussion forums on matters of public interest. This bipolar environment, involuntarily created by the regime’s reform policy and by the cultural and social outlook of a new generation of citizens engaged in the political and social life of their country, can be seen as being at the basis of the ferment which broke out in March of 2011. This contradictory, bipolar environment is here explored by assessing the reforms shaping the traditional media; an assessment of the weight of change produced by the new media will be left for chapter 4. The first important step taken by Bashar al-Asad to reform the media sector was the nomination, at the time of the cabinet reshuffle in 2004, of the minister of information, Mahdi Dakhlallah.50 This came as a surprise to many, as the new minister had been previously dismissed for having questioned the role of the Ba’ath Party at the core of the political system.51 His nomination was symbolically important, as he was the first minister in twenty years to have actually worked as a journalist, having been the former editor of the Ba’ath Party newspaper and having written openly about the need for democratic change.52 Dakhlallah actively attempted to produce some change within Syria by introducing the broadcasting of the

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cabinet’s weekly meetings on state television; allowing journalists to interview ministers without going through a complex bureaucratic and administrative procedure; facilitating the reporting in full of un resolutions and international treaties in the news, even when they were directed against Syria; and, ultimately, pushing for the substitution of the old television and radio presenters with younger ones.53 In addition, Bashar, in the early days of his mandate, replaced the heads of Syrian radio, television, and the three main newspapers – a cosmetic reform, which nonetheless refreshed the environment and the audience’s perception of the media.54 The new president also expressed the desire not to have a picture of his face on the main page of each newspaper and not to be referred as the ‘immortal leader’, as had been the case for his father. However, the landmark of Bashar’s media reforms was the issue of a new press law, the Decree No. 50, in 2001. The bottom line of the new law was the authorisation for private media outlets to operate, under the supervision of the prime minister and the minister of information, ending a decades-long history of state media monopoly.55 As a result, more than 220 new publications were licensed, hundreds of Internet news sites were launched, thirteen new radio stations went on air, and a number of private tv channels were set up, most of them having a short life, except for Al-Dunia tv , a mouthpiece for the regime.56 Moreover, in November 2000, six member parties of the National Progressive Front (npf ) were given authorisation to print their own newspapers, whereas before they had been allowed to distribute their journals only privately and, de facto, informally.57 Among these publications there was the twice-monthly Sawt al-Sha’b (Voice of the People) of the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Party’s weekly journal al-Wahdawi (The Unionist), the ‘Faisal faction’ of the Syrian Communist Party’s al-Nour (The Light), and the Arab Socialists’ monthly al-’Arabi al-Ishtiraqi (Socialist Arab).58 Decree No. 50 marked the end of state monopoly over the ownership of media institutions but it did not guarantee the freedom of expression to which journalists were aspiring, above all with regards to critical political debates. Restrictions on topic and tone were incredibly numerous, allowing only a few media outlets to operate as news agencies, specifically if they were presenting political news.59 The majority of the licenses given to private operators had been assigned to established media outlets covering entertainment topics, celebrity gossip, music, heritage, and tourism, as well as sports and

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economics. Among the numerous new publications that stepped into the media market, some are worthy of mention, such as the private daily al-Watan (The Nation), the only one to obtain a licence necessary to cover political topics, besides the weekly magazine al-Abyad wa al-Aswad (Black and White);60 Forward magazine, published in English; al-Iqtisadi (Economics), a business bi-weekly magazine in Arabic; and Baladna (Our Country) newspaper in Arabic, with a reputation of providing alternative information.61 Nevertheless, all the new publications were still subjected to censorship by the Ministry of Information; therefore, although these endeavours were independent, they could not be described as private. Moreover, with time the new media market became the domain of a few players like Haykal Media, United Group, and Dar al-Watan (National House), which limited the positive effect that the Decree No. 50 should have had through the privatisation of the sector.62 Despite the limited effects that the new reforms had for traditional media (printed press, radio, and tv broadcasting), which was still under scrutiny by the regime, a number of significant attempts were made to change the media sector, and are hereunder analysed. If these small steps did not produce any transformation per se, they still represented a significant shift in the media sector, in terms of professionalism, social responsibility, and civic awareness.

p ri nt in g p r e s s :

al-dommari

and

a l - t h aw r a

As mentioned above, private publication started only in 2001. Of the 220 privately owned publications authorised at the time, seventy were hastily shut down for different reasons, but in most cases out of economic troubles, at least according to the Ministry of Information.63 If economic management and strained circumstances were the cause for the closure of some of the newly born publications, other reasons contributed to their failure. In fact, the wide choice of publications on sale by that time was not intended, perhaps deliberately, to cover every topic of interest. Political analysis remained limited to a handful of authorised news outlets that had been licensed by the regime, represented by the three daily newspapers, plus the newspapers al-Watan (The Nation) and Baladna (Our Country), whose independence has regularly been brought under scrutiny. Nonetheless, two short-lived though important attempts at new information production took place, those of al-Dommari and al-Thawra, inaugu-

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rating a whole new way of doing journalism and encouraging new debates among readers. The first example of a critical and informative source of news which emerged over this period is al-Dommari (The Lamplighter). Launched in 2001, al-Dommari was the first privately owned newspaper since the Ba’athist coup in 1963.64 In reality, al-Dommari was not a proper newspaper, at least not in the traditional sense, but a weekly satirical journal, owned by the Syrian journalist and world famous cartoonist Ali Farzat. The journal was an enormous success, providing Syrians with sharp criticism, largely absent in other Syrian papers. Despite the price of twenty-five Syrian pounds – five times more than the cost of state-run papers – sales were around 75,000 copies per week, whereas the three national papers could hardly reach the sale of 80,000 copies all combined.65 The twenty-five-page paper was enriched by Farzat’s cartoons and those of other emerging artists, who with subtle though incisive satire tackled topics of public interest like corruption, mismanagement, inefficiency, and waste. The combination of the professionalism of the authors and editorial staff and the novelty of discussing topics of public interest became the key to the journal’s success. The cartoons attacked such things as corruption in public institutions and social disparities in every context, including national prisons and health service malfunctions, in addition to tackling taboo topics, like cases of paedophilia, which previously went unmentioned. A Syrian cartoonist who had contributed to the paper with a few cartoons told me that the success of the paper was due to two reasons: first, it was unconventional in its form, and by using images rather than long speeches it was accessible to all readers, regardless of their level of education; second, it was the only voice that critically analysed society and state, expressing views that, though shared among many, had never been expressed before.66 The paper became an important tool for criticising and confronting social problems, pushing the red lines further at every publication. On some occasions, Farzat deliberately went too far, as when he criticised the prime minister, Mustapha Miro. Miro had been entrusted with carrying out President Asad’s reform agenda, and because Miro had not particularly excelled in this role, Farzat dedicated one of his pieces to him, with the title: ‘Doctor Miro is depressed. He has lost his enthusiasm’. The publication caused a stir, and brought about a reaction from the government, which threatened, on that occasion, to

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close the magazine and punish its producers. The paper did not save civil society actors from criticism. Farzat’s opinion, which emerged from some of the comic strips, was that many actors involved in civil programmes and ngo s were attempting to change the country by adopting Western ideals as unquestioned models without examining whether these models could be implemented in Syria, rapidly and without consideration.67 The novelty of the paper was not simply driven by the issues it tackled but by the means it used to convey the message. Comic strips are a sharp and catchy weapon that, as Bergson suggests, stimulate immediate laughter in the reader, but are aimed at creating complicity with others who laugh, and leaving a bitter aftertaste.68 The intent is to send a message and stimulate reflection. The effect produced by this mechanism can help transform citizens’ awareness and dissatisfaction into a time bomb, ready to explode at any time. As a consequence, the regime obstructed the paper, by imposing censorship on topics considered harmful to the state and also by imposing unbearable charges by the state’s own Establishment for Printing and Publishing, which led to the paper’s decline, interruption, and final closure in 2003.69 The closure of the paper did not interrupt nor silence Farzat’s genius, and he continued to draw daring cartoons, which continued to circulate on online platforms. The second important example to mention is that of al-Thawra (The Revolution), one of the three main papers of the regime, which experienced a short ‘oblivion phase’ from the directives of the regime, moving to become a popular platform for exponents of the Syrian civil society movement. The unexpected turn of the newspaper was the effect of having appointed Mahmoud Salameh as the new editorin-chief. Salameh had very little professional experience in the media field, having built his career working in Syria’s trade union hierarchy, eventually becoming economic affairs secretary to the General Federation of Trade Unions and later permanent secretary of a committee responsible for offering economic and administrative advice to President Hafiz al-Asad.70 In short, Salameh had not had much to do with journalism, and what is more, he had never even been a member of the Ba’ath Party. On assuming the appointment, Salameh approached influential and prominent figures of the civil society movement, which was increasingly taking root, and assigned them to write articles for the newspaper. For example, Michel Kilo and Aref Dalila contributed to

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debated discussions about civil society and the prospect for development, attracting the attention and participation of civil society actors from other Arab countries. The newspaper also started a project that had great success in the press and even more in web news, which consisted of creating a page of ‘public surveillance’ where citizens could express complaints about malpractices and maladministration, and receive responses from those directly involved. Despite having worked for the regime, Salameh had seen in the emerging intellectuals a necessary and beneficial force that could change Syria for the better. Apparently, however, the time was still not ripe for such change. The newspaper had moved from being a tool of propaganda to, moderately yet decisively, an anti-regime paper. Clearly, the regime did not welcome the editorial re-direction and, after a year, replaced Salameh with a new editor – one securely aligned with the Ba’ath Party, bringing al-Thawra back to its mission of maintaining the regime’s interests.71 As has already been said, the press did not undergo substantial changes, as a consequence of being trapped under the watchful eye of the regime’s Establishment for Printing and Publishing and under the shrewd eye of the censor. Rarely some exceptions would break the routine, like the case of the journalist Hakam al-Baba, working for Tishreen, who openly criticised the mukhaˉbaraˉ t for invasion of privacy, and other offences by the government.72 However, these episodes remained contained and confined to a few cases. The survival of privately owned publications was made very precarious by the regime through the laws governing advertising and distribution, which made it practically impossible for new publications to break into or simply succeed on the Syrian market.73 It is not by chance that concerns regarding the quality of the press were expressed during the tenth Ba’ath Party conference in 2005, where the Syrian minister of information, Mahdi Dakhlallah, stated that Syrian newspapers were ‘unreadable’, an opinion that is all the more surprising given that the minister had been the editor-in-chief of the Ba’ath newspaper for several years.

r a d io b roa d cas ti ng Radio broadcasting in Syria was ruled by Law No. 68, which came into force in 1951 and was updated by several subsequent amendments, which were seen as renovating its text, at least formally. While

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radio broadcasting was initially placed under the control of the prime minister, it was then transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Information.74 Following the new media law of 2001, private radio stations started to operate in 2002.75 The new amendment meant the end of state monopoly over radio broadcasting and the opening of several new fm radio channels, which numbered around thirteen by 2009. Nevertheless, radio broadcasting was not spared censorship, which targeted a list of topics similar to those of other media outlets. Politics was, as expected, on the blacklist, limiting the scope of the new channels to music and entertainment programmes. The first private radio station launched in 2005 was al-Madina fm, which was then copied by a number of entertainment stations, the most popular of which included Arabesque, Souriya al-Ghad, Cham fm and al-Arabiya.76 According to the radio broadcasting law, the role of radio is to contribute to public guidance; raise cultural, social, and moral values; and strengthen national cohesion. However, decades of the state’s steering programmes – whether they had been created more explicitly, and bombastically, as under the rule of Hafez al-Asad, or more implicitly and benevolently, under his son Bashar – had narrowed the scope of radio broadcasting to a government mouthpiece, with few cultural programmes, none of which were targeted by state censorship. A famous radio presenter of Radio Medina, who wishes to remain anonymous, affirmed that she had returned to Syria from the Gulf countries because of the new atmosphere and the call for democracy that the new political establishment seemed to represent.77 Despite the restrictions imposed on radio broadcasting, she recounts how the attempts to test the new media environment and push at the boundaries were part of an approach cautiously adopted by most anchors. For instance, Radio Madina show Good Morning Syria often explored sensitive issues like corruption, homosexuality, and child abuse.78 Indeed, the slow change in the political environment attracted all the professionals who had distanced themselves from Syria’s media environment, triggering a carrier interest in their homeland. The younger generation of media professionals working for the traditional media industry, such as radio, were aware of the severe control that the regime imposed over their job. However, given the widespread diffusion of radio listeners, from taxi drivers to shopkeepers, the radio could, more than any other information tool, produce effective changes in society. For this reason, radio anchors

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tried by any possible means to extend their influence and domain under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. Khaled, a young Syrian activist, who I met during a media training event in Beirut and who was previously involved in the music industry in Syria, told me that for his generation the reforms in the media sector had some significant effects: [Music] is never thought to have revolutionary power, but it does. In Syria, it was not simply that radios would discuss topics that were previously silenced, but people would listen to music coming from the West, like hip hop that was politically and socially engaged. For a population like the Syrian one that was used to waking up to songs of Fairuz and ending their day with those of Marcel Khalife, those songs coming from the West made the difference. It was not a question of taste or genre; it had to do with social positionality. These songs made us think about our own reality, the corruption and repression that oppressed us.79 Some of this music would be aired in radio stations. Other music that was too explicit would be sold through the black market or downloaded online. In parallel to a growing civic and political awareness that was appearing on in radio programmes, one should mention the growing religious sentiment among society, which was also being reflected on the numerous radio programmes that broadcasted religious shows. Anyone who travelled to Syria in those years would recount taxi trips spent listening to religious sermons, and shopkeepers livening up their working days by listening to religious debates. Though this may not be exactly related to the focus of this book, it does say a lot about the religious radicalisation that emerged in Syria following the outbreak of the civil war and the need for the epistemic community to draw attention to aspects that have been sidelined and would instead be useful to reconsider, like radio airwaves.

t e l e v is io n b roa d c as t i ng and tv drama: m u s a l s a l at

Concerns regarding the quality of the media were directed not just at the press but at Syrian state tv as well. Quite telling is the attempt by Syrian tv to avoid reporting on the fall of Baghdad in 2003,

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opting to distract viewers by broadcasting an entertaining Syrian drama. The attempt was short-lived, as Syrians were already aware of the need to turn to satellite tv to access world news, while relying on state tv for entertainment and cultural programmes, like the regionally famous Syrian soap operas. Entertainment programming on tv is an interesting case within the media sector in Syria, as the regime was so concerned with other media tools and programmes, and with tackling political news that it relaxed its grip on the entertainment sector, involuntarily allowing the emergence of forms of resistance to the state. It is in these narrow spaces that the uniformity of Syrian state tv did present some interesting though limited examples of cracks in the system, in which the traditional praise of the regime gave way to significant episodes of social and political criticism. This did not occur through the news channels or tv programmes, however, but in the production of Syrian television dramas. As an unconventional and subtle change, it stimulated critical thinking on social problems among large swaths of the public and, in fact, affirmed popular feelings with regard to the everyday problems of living in Syria. Syrian television dramas have in recent years opened a new avenue for the study of Syrian creative cultural production.80 In the words of Christa Salamandra, the study of Syrian television drama becomes the story of the new era of Bashar al-Asad, with its complexities and contradictions.81 Indeed, Syrian musalsalat, or soap operas, are emblematic of a change that also encompassed artistic and cultural production. Syria’s musalsalat have become famous throughout the Arab world and have competed with their Egyptian counterparts for sheer popularity. Around 1980, filmmakers, playwrites, and novelists, often trained in the Soviet Union, began acquiring a solid knowledge of videography and learning the techniques of realism, which privileged the treatment of historical themes, with great reliance on dialogue.82 This affected not only the quality of the technical production of dramas, but also their content, which increasingly adopted social themes and historical reflections, two traits that arguably contributed to challenging the primacy of Egyptian tv . Syrian drama, prima facie, reproduces cultural themes and political messages as commanded by those in power, but at the same time it carries out an enlightened (in Arabic, tanwiri) project, one that is critical of existing power structures, by carefully and selectively focusing on themes that are popularly perceived as Arab maladies.83

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The choice of the themes in a production like Buq’at Daw’ (Spotlight) is particularly innovative. A satirical sketch series, which started in 2001 and is still broadcasted, Buq’at Daw’ lampoons sectarianism, regionalism, Islamic revivalism, women’s rights, corruption, and the mukhaˉbaraˉ t. Interestingly, one of its episodes, named ‘Rajul al-bakhakh’ (The Spray Man), which was aired in 2001, presented the case of a citizen who used the walls of the city to spread political messages. Ten years later, the first public manifestations of the Syrian uprising began with brave ‘spray men’ who wrote anti-regime messages on city walls around the country.84 Another programme was Ghazlan fi Ghabat al-Dhi’ab (Gazelles in a Forest of Wolves), a drama serial that went on air during the month of Ramadan in 2006, and engaged with issues of corruption of high-ranking officials and of the mukhaˉbaraˉ t, while depicting the precarious lives of young people seeking a way out of poverty and social stigma. Syrian tv drama also tackled contemporary topics, such as on al-Hurr al-’Ayn (The Beautiful Maidens), which dealt with terrorist attacks on a compound in Saudi Arabia, or Saqf al-’Alam (The Ceiling of the World), which talked about the publications of cartoons mocking the prophet Muhammad in Denmark.85 However, it was the comedy series Day’a Daay’a (A Forgotten Village), directed by Mamduh Hamada and airing between 2008 and 2010, that became the standard for the depiction of everyday corruption in Syria, and of poverty and authoritarian rule, with a clear criticism directed towards what was seen as being the heart of the problem: the regime’s authoritarian rule, and the people who fatalistically accepted the way things were.86 It is significant that the ‘musalsalat industry’ did not stop, even when the initial protests of 2011 turned into a civil war and by 2013 had become a self-perpetuating conflict. Not only that, but Syrian tv drama productions have continued being sold to the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have been supporting the Syrian rebels against the government in Damascus. The musalsal Wilada min al-Khasira (Birth from the Waist) depicts in a quasi-realistic way the events that led to the current situation in Syria, including the abuse of power of the mukhaˉbaraˉ t and the corruption of the state, but always stopping short of mentioning the Syrian president as being part of the malaise.87 It is generally said that the regime allowed certain criticism as a temporary release of the pressure valve for Syrians. As a

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matter of fact, Syrians, whether writers or theatre directors or cinema directors, have become savvy creators, masters in the art of expressing themselves between the lines, a technique that helps them avoid censorship while still allowing them to deliver a message to their audience that is critical of the regime. What is certain is that these tv dramas not only became critical of social problems and of the ruling elite that perpetuated them, they were being watched by a wide audience, especially when they were shown during family gatherings at Ramadan. Al-Anani, while observing the Egyptian context pre-2011, drew a similar analysis with ‘satellite Salafism’, the mushrooming of Salafi satellite television stations after state approval in 2006, which did not make Egyptian society more religiously conservative but rather more critical of the regime’s social and economic policies.88 A Syrian director, currently living in Europe with his family, though at the time active in the production of musalsalat and engaged with the local community, argued that tv dramas were imposing strong psychological pressures on people, on the one hand offering a space for them to recognise themselves, and on the other, encouraging reflection and allowing for a buildup of anger.89 This way, domestic drama production, to which Syrian scriptwriters bestowed not just artistic integrity but an implicit, but rather clear call for political reform and social transformation, was significant in encouraging civic participation and engagement.90

f in a l r e m a rks The brief historical analysis of the transition from President Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar presented here examines the transformation that shaped Syria and its media sector. As this theoretical chapter highlighted, the combination of pressures coming from above, below, and outside the country created the opportunity structures for Syria’s social mobilisation. The institutional reforms carried out by the new president, Bashar al-Asad, produced some key changes in a number of sectors, particularly in the media field. These reforms were clearly mild and in line with Bashar al-Asad’s motto of ‘change within a framework of continuity’. However, the president’s will to modernise the country without losing the grip of power and control that had dominated his father’s rule resulted in a contradictory and at times schizophrenic environment, specifically in the media sector. This chapter sheds light on some examples of traditional media out-

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lets that veered away from of the regime’s propaganda and produced forms of journalism that were more professional and accountable, though extremley dangerous for the regime’s stability. What is evident here is that the micro-changes taking place in the media sphere did not affect journalists and media production only, but citizens as a whole, including readers, listeners, and viewers of such media outlets. The change was happening, though slowly, at both an individual and societal level in terms of access to information, ways in which news was being framed, and reflection around civic responsibility and consciousness. Chapter 4 completes this picture by presenting an even more contradictory environment, one in which the monopoly of information that the Syrian state safeguarded through traditional media co-existed and was challenged by the new media outlets, represented by satellite tv and the Internet. The opening of the country to satellite tv and the Internet proved risky and problematic. It clearly paved the way for the emergence of pockets of online dissent, which were initially tolerated by the regime in the hope that a degree of pluralism could win favour among external critics, though this proved extremely detrimental for the regime in the long run.91 As chapter 4 argues, this strategy produced unexpected consequences for the regime’s stability, because it encouraged media professionalism and inspired values of free and independent journalism, while nourishing a culture of public participation in the information sphere, which increased civic awareness and participation in social and political debates.

4

Empowering Publics: Satellite TV and the Internet In the dark times Will there be singing? Yes, there will also be singing. About the dark times. Bertolt Brecht, ‘Motto’1

w ir e d c it iz e n s h ip and new medi a Ten years before the spark of the upheavals in the mena region, Laith Kubba was among the few to predict a time of instability for the long-lived Arab regimes, as the result of an awakening of civil society. More precisely, he argued that Arab states were losing one of the most effective instruments of authoritarian rule: control over the flow of information. In his view, the ministries of information would have been unable to withstand the impact of mass communication technologies.2 Many would have liked to believe in Kubba’s diagnosis, especially on the eve of Bashar al-Asad’s new presidency, when hopes for change were still high. However, when it became clear that the reforms of the Damascus Spring were mere exercises in rhetoric, in search of international approbation and an updating of an aged political infrastructure, rather than sincere intentions of systemic change, one hardly could believe that any real transformation would eventually take place in Syria. Established scholars like Lisa Wedeen and Aurora Sottimano kept on talking about Syria as a ‘disciplined society’ and using Foucault to explore notions of authority and ‘production and reproduction of power structures’.3 A sort of implicit – and often explicit

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– exceptionalism labelled the country and its people, perceived as a uniform group of non-thinking subjects, passive perpetuators of the regime’s stability. The breakthrough that should have been produced by the expansion of new media was eventually damped down by the new media regulation, Law No. 20, in 2001, which was dealt with in chapter 3. Yet despite the severe media environment imposed by the authoritarian regime, and as an effect of institutional, social, and international pressures, Syrian media underwent deep changes in terms of structure, quality of media production, media professionals, and public participation. Chapter 3 highlighted how glimmers of change were already visible through traditional media, in which despite the tight grip that the regime imposed on these media outlets, a number of significant structural changes took place, and more importantly, attempts for more professional journalism emerged. The most visible changes, however, took place with satellite tv and the Internet, as this chapter moves to assess. However, the Western methodological approach to the study of Arab media, with its top-down analysis and the appeal of quantitative studies, proved unable to assess the transformation occurring within the media sphere and the effects this had on other fields.4 The focus on the here and now, while ignoring the historical transformation that brought the emergence of the new media and the effect this had on both media professionals and audiences, reproduced ever-changing typologies of study, concerned with the authoritarian structure of the state and not with the small cracks which were instead undermining the system from within. Moving against the grain of this scholarship, this chapter completes the discourse started in the previous chapter which showed how the process of liberalisation, the infitah (opening) inaugurated by Bashar al-Asad, which affected the Syrian media system, produced a hybrid and contradictory outcome. On the one hand the regime tried to integrate itself into the global economy and be considered a fair partner by Western democracies, while on the other hand it scrupulously safeguarded the main features of its political and power system. This bipolar approach was particularly evident in the media, in which the information system became schizophrenic, perpetuating regime propaganda and the tight control via state media, while allowing Syrians to access world news through access to satellite tv channels or navigating the Internet.5

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If we apply Bourdieu’s field theory, Syria’s media ecology underwent two main changes, specifically in structure and in agents. The structure changed as an effect of the privatisation of media institutions, the spread of a multiplicity of transnational satellite tv , and the acquisition of new ways of making news, available especially online.6 More importantly – and apparently under-researched – is the change that occurred in the ‘agents’, that is to say in the journalists, as Mellor observes, but also at the level of the audience and citizens. Indeed, with the new media, journalists and citizens both became part of a mutually responsive reformation process, in which journalists working in the private sector became more professional and responsible, while citizens responded positively to this new form of media, becoming civically more responsive and engaged. Therefore, journalism became more accountable and citizens more participatory, each contributing to the development of the other. As Bourdieu suggests, to understand journalism one needs to understand the effects that the people engaged in that microcosm have on one another.7 Both journalists and the citizens/audience, in their singularities, are active agents who possess a form of power that affects the development of their society.8 In Syria, journalists have historically been employed to support the building of the nation and sustain the ruling party. With the privatisation of the media, and the development of satellite tv channels and online alternative news outlets, the regime lost its previous totalising control over the media and journalists, who gradually came to question their professional role and civic duty. As a consequence, the private media tried to overcome the negative performance of the offline state media, pushing the new media to explore issues which were relevant to citizens and which had not been covered thus far. Citizens responded very positively to the new media performance and became more aware of national issues, as well as willing to contribute to the new dialogue. It soon became evident that Syrians, especially the younger generation, were experimenting with new forms of ‘wired citizenship’,9 redrawing the boundaries of the social contract for the first time. In order to fully understand the actual meaning of such changes, this chapter investigates the development of and role played by satellite broadcasting and the Internet in Syria under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. If Bashar’s reformism, or infitah, produced a mild transformation in what has been labelled traditional media, the changes produced by the new media were profound and had long-term consequences.

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sat e l l it e t v: t h e n e w o nshore democracy Printed press, radio, and television stations have had limited beneficial effects in terms of widening the news horizon and reawakening citizens’ social and political awareness, aside from the few cases described in chapter 3, as they had to submit to restrictive national laws and conspicuous censorship. Only foreign and Arab satellite channels were able to bypass government control, some of which offered news whose content differed considerably from the content of national stations. Therefore, the real media boom in the region was inaugurated by satellite tv channels, before the Internet. Interestingly, in 1995 the ministers of information from Arab countries met in Cairo to discuss two major threats looming over the region: terrorism and satellite tv . During the meeting, the Egyption Minister of Information Safwat El-Sharif commented, ‘it is an extremely sensitive period because the Arab mind is subjected to infiltration by a satellite culture falling from an open sky and bringing traditions and values foreign to our society. This is threatening our idenitity and our culture with the worst dangers’. El-Sharif’s description of the threat had assumed proportions resembling those one could find in Star Wars. El-Sharif was not only Egypt’s minister of information but also the founder of Egypt’s satellite communications company Nilesat.10 This says a lot about the state of media in Egypt and, more broadly, the whole region. The threat represented by satellite tv for Arab regimes started in 1991, when cnn extended its reach to the Middle East during the war in Kuwait, bringing to an end statecontrolled broadcasting and opening it up to independent commercial broadcasting.11 However, cnn offered only an English version of its broadcast, which limited the number of potential viewers who could follow its coverage of the news. The real transformation came with the Qatar-based al-Jazeera, a 24-hour Arabic channel, in 1996, followed by other all-news channels which entered the market a few years later, like the Saudi-owned al-Arabiya, based in Dubai.12 These two major companies have acquired a significant share of the market, while other channels compete for the remaining shares, like the London-based Middle East Broadcasting Centre (mbc ), the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (lbc ), and Future tv , as well as the Syrian-owned Arab News Network.13 In 2008, the bbc relaunched its Arabic tv service, which had closed in 1996, sensing the potential influence that this service could have on the region.

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Access to satellite tv channels was not either/or.14 People in the region watched both satellite tv channels and state television, each one responding to different needs, whether access to information or entertainment. As discussed later in the chapter, the transformation brought about by this new media landscape affected both the audience, in terms of the flow of information, and journalists, with regard to working ethics and professionalism. Syrians were ‘officially’ allowed to import receiver dishes in July 2000, when one third of the population already seemed to be having their homes connected to satellite dishes. In fact, satellite receivers started to spread in Syria in the mid-1990s, when the low cost of setting up a dish encouraged many families to buy them.15 Arabic-language satellite television in general, and al-Jazeera in particular, became a major source of information for Syrians, replacing national news sources. According to the anti-censorship group Article 19, the regime allowed satellite dishes in the country to benefit well-connected people who would profit from the sale of the satellite equipment, rather than for broadcasting information.16 In Syria, the change has been on a wide scale, considering that an estimated 74 per cent of Syrians viewed satellite tv , with al-Jazeera Arabic in the lead.17 Al-Jazeera’s effect in Syria was felt not just in terms of news and information programmes, but in the platform it provided for the Syrian civil society movement. For instance, at the time of the Damascus Spring in 2001, satellite television services played a significant role in keeping Syrians updated with events, which went unreported by state-run television. In this way, the civil society movement had the capacity to spread news of events happening in the capital to rural areas, something which would have been unthinkable before the advent of the satellite television. This new condition engendered a paradox in which Syrians could appreciate two versions of the same story, the reassuring one from the government, and the critical one coming from satellite television. Al-Jazeera revolutionalised the Arab media landscape by adopting an ‘overtly political focus and a dramatic new style’.18 Ghadiban notes how al-Jazeera infringed on all the regime’s red lines by talking about issues such as democracy, human rights, and Islamic fundamentalism; having extensive discussion about the Arab–Israeli conflict; and covering Syria’s economic development.19 Marc Lynch argues that it represented a cutting-edge platform for talk of reform, with programmes on such topics as ‘corruption and unemployment

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in the Arab world’, ‘reform projects and the Arab position toward them’, ‘the future of reform projects’, ‘reform in the Arab world’, ‘corruption in Arab countries’, and ‘the reality of change in Arab countries’.20 Clearly, al-Jazeera represented a totally new source of information for Syrians, generating new understandings and cause for reflection, such as when the programme Bila Hudud (Without Limits) hosted the leader of the banned Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who presented himself as a promoter of democracy, demanding the end of the state of emergency law and the legalisation of his party.21 More daring was al-Jazeera’s coverage of the opposition of Monzer al-Mouseli, an independent member of the Syrian People’s Assembly, who raised an objection to the constitutional amendment that was passed to allow Bashar al-Asad to run for president, despite his young age.22 Syrians’ responsiveness to the new programmes offered by al-Jazeera and other satellite tv channels was evident from the proliferation of satellite dishes on the roofs of Syrian homes, as well as from the number of callers from Syria participating on live tv shows.23 Phone-in programmes offered by the new satellite channels created the idea of horizontal communication. Wafaa, a friend and activist, currently living in Damascus, now looks at satellite channels like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya with a critical eye, given their unprofessional coverage of the Syrian uprising, which served the interest of their patrons and local proxies (Qatar and Saudia Arabia).24 Yet, she recognises the precious role that these tv stations played in her country. She recounts how, ‘when me and my family would zap from one channel to another, we would compare the two opposite news coverage that the state’s tv and satellite channels provided of the same event. We laughed but we also felt outraged, leading to one of those endless family discussions on the future of our country, where everyone would raise their voice and try to impose his view on others’. ‘My dad’ she added, ‘would tell me how after the coup of Hafez al-Asad and the brutal crackdown of opponents, they [Syrians] had simply accepted it and lived on … But this was not possible anymore. The regime could not think to keep us hostages and feed us with bits of freedom while keeping us segragated’.25 In contrast to al-Jazeera, Syrian satellite tv channels were a less successful story, limited to a number of cases. Sham tv was the first private Syrian satellite channel; launched in 2006, it survived only eight months and was eventually relocated by its owner, Akram al-Jundi, to Egypt after disputes arose with the regime.26 In

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that same year, the regime licensed two other private tv outlets, al-Dunya tv and al-Ra’i tv . The former covered a wide range of topics, including political debates, but did not offer a narrative that differed from that of the Syrian state, and opted to act as the mouthpiece of the regime’s propaganda campaign during the uprising in 2011,27 while the latter focused on the activities of Iraqi resistance groups.28 In 2009, the Syrian broadcasting panorama was broaden with the launch of a new Syrian tv channel, Orient tv , this time Dubai-based, offering cultural, social, and economic programmes, including three daily news bulletins.29 A radically different story is the one of Barada tv , the Londonbased satellite channel, which started broadcasting in April 2009, with 24 hours of continuous programming explicitly against the Syrian regime’s propaganda machine.30 Barada tv has been closely affiliated with the Movement for Justice and Development (mjd ), a political opposition group banned in Syria that gathered a network of London-based Syrian exiles.31 The channel, though not excelling in the technical production of its programmes when compared to big names like al-Jazeera or al-Arabiya, was consolidated over the years, becoming a pro-democracy and anti-regime voice for Syrians abroad and within national borders. Barada tv , named after the river Barada, which runs through Damascus, offered news as well as cultural, social, and economic programmes, which, although said to aspire to high professional standards of journalism, were instead usually ingrained with populist and anti-regime sentiments. The founder and director of the channel, Malik al-Abdeh, admitted in an interview that the channel adopted a more explicit stand when the fervour of the Arab Spring had begun in the region and in particular when it reached Syria.32 The channel was among the first to report on protests and regime crackdowns over peaceful demonstrations, and to investigate into people’s disappearances. In particular, Barada tv was the first to report on and show the pictures of the tortured thirteen-year-old boy of Dera’a, whose body was given back to his family after his death in the spring of 2011. However, a cable provided by the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that the US State Department secretly financed Syrian opposition projects, among which was Barada tv , which had received around $6 million since 2006, when the Syrian anti-regime mjd was funded.33 The 24-hour channel, no longer on air, became very popular among Syria’s opposition, with its shows, like ‘Toward Change’ – a panel

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discussion on current events – and ‘First Step’ – a programme produced by Syrian dissident groups based in the US – progressively becoming reference points for many antagonists of the regime.34 During the interview, al-Abdeh rejected any allegation of US funding that his channel received over the years, maintaining that the channel was simply supported by private donations from Syrian businessmen and from a California-based ngo , the Democracy Council.35 In fact, the channel played a fundamental role in the years that predated the uprising as a venue for an anti-regime information campaign which stimulated civic awareness about taboo topics, as well as in the first two years of the conflict, covering the events and acting as a mobilising tool that tried to reach out to the silent majority. The contradictory nature of Bashar al-Asad’s media reforms and the even more contradictory media sector that these reforms created can best be seen in the regime’s creation of media free zones (mfzi s). mfzis are modelled on Dubai’s Media City, which in 2006 hosted more than fifty regional and international broadcasters.36 These zones are concrete spaces where the production of television programmes takes place, but they are also concepts that refer to the status of media that transcend national boundaries, are set outside national jurisdiction, and that are transmitted in other countries. Among the key features of satellite tv is that these television companies are technically able to be located in one place and transmit in many others. Through this system, the wall of silence that ruled the domestic media in Syria was brought down, allowing both economic incentives and a hands-off approach amid the usual limitations imposed on dealing with political issues.37 Hence, a closed society like Syria accepted alternative news, but also set up its own media duty free zones, with the restriction of assigning licences only to Syrian broadcasters, which operated on Syrian soil for the first five years. mfzi s became a successful example of the globalisation of Arab media and therefore of Syrian media, but they also become a legislative and bureaucratic loophole, in the form of tax havens, where the operators found profitable and flexible environments in which to prosper.38 The strong censorship imposed by the regime added to unclear regulations, and a lack of financial security made the national broadcasting television less competitive, especially when compared to the quality of the hundreds of Arab satellite channels which reached Syrian homes.39 As Alan George points out, for authoritarian regimes like Syria, the advent of satellite television and the Internet posed a serious

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challenge.40 For this reason, a special meeting requested by Egypt and Saudi Arabia brought together the ministers of information of Arab League members to sign the Arab League Satellite Broadcasting Charter in February 2008.41 The charter, signed by all member states except Lebanon and Qatar, was emblematic of Arab governments’ fear of losing control over the flow of information, as well as their determination to do something about it. In this regard, the charter clearly delineated what should and should not be broadcast, demanding more focus on Arab identity against the negative effect of globalisation, and promoting the integrity of Arabic language, culture, intellectual culture, and politics.42 The fact is, these precautionary measures should most likely have been taken earlier, when the spread of satellite dishes on rooftops could still have been controlled.

t h e in t e r n et: t h e n e w o f f s h o r e d e mocrati c agent If satellite tv was the first area for experimentation in news media for Syrians, the Internet produced the most effective and thoughtprovoking examples of journalistic professionalism and civic engagement. The state’s obsession with information control was not spared on the Internet and e-communications services. In fact, Syria was the last Arab country to introduce mobile phones and Internet connection, at the time of the changeover of the presidency in 2000. As the new president, Bashar worked hard to open the country to modernity and modern technology, starting with delivering an image of himself as a vigorous, dynamic young man who fostered modernisation and heightened awareness of computer and Internet use. King Abdullah of Jordan called the new Syrian president, aptly, a ‘child of the Internet generation’.43 Syria’s love story with the Internet, however, had started much earlier, with the establishment of the Syrian Computer Society in 1989 by Hafiz al-Asad’s initial heir, Basil. In 1997, a pilot Internet project was implemented by the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment, but it was limited to a group of 150 subscribers, mainly ministers and state organisations.44 This was further expanded to a larger but still limited group of entrepreneurs, doctors, and engineers. Despite the regulations, which restricted access to the Internet to a small number of people, over 65,000 Syrians were illegally connected to Lebanese, Jordanian, or Turkish Internet providers. On this point,

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Human Rights Watch declared that, ‘until 1999, Syria was one of the rare countries in the world which was connected to the global Internet network but did not allow its citizens to access it, in spite of official speeches and declarations praising the tool’.45 The decision to grant public access to the Internet can be traced back to a curious and striking event in 1999. Imad Mustapha, head of the Syrian Research Centre in Damascus and, previously, Syria’s long-time ambassador to the United States, was asked to give a lecture about the Internet at the Al-Asad National Library, the major national library in Damascus.46 At that time, Hafez al-Asad was president and his son Bashar was head of the Syrian Computer Society. Mustapha accepted the assignment and decided to give a lecture on the topic of Israel, Syria, and the Internet. Using a PowerPoint presentation, he projected images of Israeli websites that would be of interest to Syria (including websites about the Golan Heights) and of the foreign ministry website and how it was acting to promote Israeli’s vision of history and of events. When he came to the last section of his lecture on Syria, he projected a black picture on the wall and said, ‘This is Syria’s participation on the Internet’, and sat down.47 Mustapha hit a nerve; with his presentation he expressed the necessity of enabling these new technologies to provide Syrians with knowledge about their history and culture, but also of enabling the outside world to receive a new vision of Syria, one which emanated directly from Syrians. One year later, once Bashar had become the new president, Mustapha was asked to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement Internet programmes in the country. After putting into action a scrupulous system of control and censorship of the web and creating functionaries entitled to control the flow of information, Syrians could formally, though not always easily, access the Internet. From that year onward, the black wall that had been screened in the Al-Asad National Library slowly started to be replaced with new images. The implementation was a gradual process, but already in mid2000, full public Internet access had been made available at a number of state-own Syrian Telecom (ste ) Internet cafés. ste is a governmental body, part of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology, which owned all telecommunication infrastructure in the national territory.48 Wheeler argues that the ‘fear-based approach to the Internet was eventually subverted by a more pronounced need-based approach’.49 The need to develop it infrastractures and expertise had

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turned into a market demand, which could not be put off any longer. The information revolution was a risky card to play for all Arab leaders, however the advantages of pleasing a new class of entrepeneurs and it technocracts, stimulate new private-sector growth, and solve problems associated with the youth bulge through job creation were all too important to be silenced by the fear of losing their grip over the flow of information. The idea was that the risks associated with public access to the Internet could be managed by empowering the state to control public consciousness and oppositional activities online through sophisticated it monitoring infrastractures, like the ones employed by the Chinese government. On this particular point, Morozov observed that ‘authoritarian regimes … have been actively promoting a host of e-government initiatives … not because they want to shorten the distance between citizen and the bureaucrat, but because they see it as a way to attract funds from foreign donors such as the imf and the World Bank while also removing the unnecessary red-tape barriers to economic growth’.50 In Syria, the number of Internet cafés and subscriptions grew rapidly, and despite the high cost, Internet subscription soared by 4,900 per cent in the subsequent seven years, far exceeding the global growth rate of 249 per cent.51 This growth was influenced, after 2005, by the arrival of private service providers like Aya, cec , Best Italia, Areeba, and Syriatel. This proactive policy helped in the development of computer literacy and rapidly increased Internet access, through national campaigns of it teaching in schools, investing in it connections in rural areas, and creating several high-tech parks in Syria.52 In 2006, the minister of communications and technology, Amr Salem, approved the distribution of one million computers with Internet connection to citizens, eased access to credit to encourage Internet surfers, and established a number of high-tech parks in Syria which could attract foreign investment.53 Universities, public corporations, and authorities all invested in it training for their staff, while ministers showed off it jargon in their speeches or used it tools in their presentations.54 The development of Internet connection was also extended to rural areas, through the Fund for the Integrated Rural Development of Syria, which was sponsored and headed by Asma al-Asad, Bashar’s wife, while technical advice was provided by the French ngo Children of the Web.55 As one can see, this contradictory and ambivalent behaviour of the regime towards the media, which characterized the whole

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presidency of Bashar al-Asad, was even more evident with regard to the Internet. On the one hand the regime tried to modernise the country by allowing public access to the Internet, while on the other it carefully attempted to monitor and censor Internet access and websites considered immoral or dangerous. It was a challaging balance to maintain. Syria modelled itself on China, a country which operated a strict supervision of news.56 But unlike China, Syria did not master control over the new media, especially the Internet and transnational satellite tv channels. The regime realised the double-edged nature of the Internet after it was already rooted in the social fabric; the witch-hunting that ensued simply contributed to the exacerbation of poor relations between the authorities and Internet surfers, which created a highly tense situation. As a result, Syria held a negative record with regard to Internet freedom: in 2006, Reporters without Borders ranked Syria among the thirteen enemies of the Internet; in 2007 the country obtained the tragic record of incarcerating the largest number of cyber-dissenters in the Middle East, and of having the largest number of arrests and greatest mistreatment of online activists, and in 2009 the Committee to Protect Journalists named Syria the third-worst country in which to be a blogger.57 When looking at the specific case of Internet penetration in Syria, one needs to develop a critical attitude towards the meaning of data collected within the context of Syria and the reductive quantitative narrative that has been applied to the study of this sector. The late access to the Internet in the Arab world, and in Syria in particular, has been counterbalanced by the region’s higher rate of Internet growth compared to the rest of the world. Statistics show that in 2009, Internet use for 100 inhabitants was 16.4 per cent, reaching 17.7 per cent in 2010, 58 with a total number of Internet users around 1,100,000 according to Internet World Stats (see table). Sceptics tended to minimise the beneficial effects of the Internet in closed societies like Syria, arguing that in order to transform the Internet into a democratising tool it is necessary that there be a higher number of Internet users. Yet, what scales of measurement can assess technology’s democratic potential? As Wheeler observes, counting the number of Internet users within society tells us little about how such technology is leveraged by people in their everyday life.59 This is particularly true when trying to quantify civic engagement generated by the Internet, which is impossible to determine and ‘must be worked

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out in the context of local constellations of power’.60 In Syria, for instance, statistics do not take into account the fact that Syrians have been accessing the Internet predominately at Internet cafés and from houses using dial-up connections via landlines.61 This characteristic of Internet access in Syria unveils a situation that cannot be reported by statistics; indeed, the number of Internet servers alone does not illuminate the way the Internet affects social contexts. In particular, the level of social interaction that a social environment like an Internet café engenders for those who continue online conversations or news discoveries with their offline community – family, friends, and peers – is of undeniable significance and influence. Rami, now working for an international media development organisation in Gaziantep, told me about this during our interview. As an ingeneer and it geek, he recalls the last years before the uprising as incredibly important for him and for his generation: I was one of the lucky ones to have a laptop and Internet connection at home but nonetheless I spent hours everyday at the same Internet café in Bab Touma [in Damascus]. I loved to go there because I could meet foreigners living in Damascus – particulary girls – and because I could talk to my friends about world news and possible applications to foreign universities, and complain about the government. With a group of friends, we created a blog where we posted articles about events happening in the world and in Syria – usually in English or French – followed by the same news covered by Syrian state media.62 The new communication technologies, and the Internet in particular, gave Syrians the opportunity to engage in activities such as chatting, accessing news pages, exchanging photos, playing games, watching sports, and flirting, as well as watching porn. All of this had been denied by political and societal norms thus far. In her study on the impact of the Internet within Saudi society, Wheeler argues that the process of ‘seeing how other live’ through the space offered by the Internet has significant consequences, as the youth experience freedoms online that are denied in real life.63 Examples like this, and the actual potential of Internet cafés in terms of integrating online and offline communities, cannot be disclosed by statistics on Syria’s Internet penetration. This process grew even more when, in 2010, Syrians became the second most

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frequent users of Opera Mini, a mobile application used to browse the Internet, which increased opportunities to connect to the web and to bridge the digital divide.64 Syria’s Internet culture, encompassing more than is represented by the meagre data quantifying the number of Internet users or the number of blogs, provides a stimulating and dynamic source of information. In 2007, the German Arabist scholar Albrecht Hofheinz argued that no other language group has such lively debates on the Internet as Arabic speakers, especially Syrians.65 This is perhaps the effect of the severe and limiting restrictions imposed by the regime, which have led Syrians to transfer their prolific street and café conversations to the digital world, paying no attention to the ‘walls that have ears’, as a Syrian proverb describes – that is, the security measures in force within the country.66 Censorship and the blocking of websites, though very common, has not prevented Syrians from surfing the Internet, instead bypassing the government’s efforts through the use of proxy sites and free tools available online. Blogs and Facebook have been the main target of the regime, persecuting bloggers both online and offline, and adding Facebook to the blacklist of blocked sites. Interestingly, however, Bashar al-Asad and his media advisor, Bouthaina Shaaban, kept using their Facebook accounts despite the regulations. In March 2008, Syrian authorities decided to extend their monitoring of Internet users by ordering Internet café owners to register the names, identification cards, and time spent on the Internet of every customer. Moreover, the government blocked hundreds of websites, including the Arabic blogging host service Maktoob, as well as Facebook and YouTube, but also Amazon and prominent Arabic newspapers like Al-Quds al-Arabi, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, and Elaph, while websites of human rights organizations were generally unavailable.67 Filtering was applied to sites that criticised government policies or that reported on opposing political views, and was justified by the government as a fight against what they described as an attempt to weaken national sentiment, spread sectarian division, and facilitate the penetration of Israel’s propaganda.68 The infrastructure and expertise for filtering and surveillance was brought in from Western companies, notably the Canadian company Platinum Inc.69 The company uses the ThunderCache solution for url filtering, a system that allows it to monitor and control a user’s web-based activities and inspect their content. Oddly enough, a US-company acted as a material censor of

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Table 4.1 | Internet Users in the Middle East, 2000–15 Middle

Internet

Internet

Internet

Internet

East and

Population

Usage

Usage

Usage

Usage

North

2000

2005

2009

2015

Africa Algeria

32,557,738

50,000

500,000

1,920,000

11,000,000

Bahrain

707,357

40,000

195,700

155,000

1,297,500

Egypt

69,954,717

450,000

3,000,000

5,000,000

48,300,000

Iran

68,458,680

250,000

4,800,000

32,200,000

46,800,000

Iraq

26,095,283

12,500

25,000

300,000

11,000,000

Jordan

5,788,340

127,300

457,000

1,500,500

5,700,000

Kuwait

2,530,012

150,000

567,000

1,000,000

3,145,559

Lebanon

4,461,995

300,000

500,000

700,000

3,336,517

Libya

5,980,693

10,000

160,000

205,000

2,400,000

31,003,311

100,000

1,000,000

4,600,000

20,207,154

Oman

2,398,545

90,000

180,000

285,000

2,584,316

Qatar

768,464

30,000

140,800

219,000

2,016,400

21,771,609

200,000

1,500,000

2,540,000

18,300,000

Morocco

Saudi Arabia Syria

18,86?,743

30,000

610,000

1,100,000

6,426,577

Tunisia

10,116,314

100,000

630,000

953,000

5,408,240

3,750,054

735,000

1,110,200

1,397,200

8,807,226

UAE

the web in Syria; when Microsoft users refused to provide technical courses and certificates to Syrian nationals, they paradoxically prevented them from taking part in online activities. Similarly, Google blocked anyone living in Syria from downloading their software tools, and rim (BlackBerry) prevented its services from reaching Syria.70 Therefore, Syrian Internet users faced a double system of restrictions, on both a national and an international level. This was coupled with a legislation that prevented access and that monitored the Internet in order to intimidate web users. High taxes on hardware

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and software, and the installation of phone lines were other effective ways used by the government to limit Internet access to a restricted group of people. As mentioned, despite the government’s efforts to block websites, Syrians have kept using the Internet and have found ways to bypass web-surfing restrictions through the use of proxy sites and free tools, available for download online. The restrictions implemented by the government have produced a cat-and-mouse game of the state blocking and users bypassing the blocks. Paradoxically, the regime, instead of inhibiting access, took actions that only stimulated more attempts to infringe the red lines. This process generated a peculiar dynamic in Syria, whereby citizens and the state transformed cyberspace into a place of confrontation, where they could continually test each other’s boundaries. As Cavatorta and Shaery-Eisenlohr argue, this dynamic determined new state–society relations which countered the atomisation of society and stimulated a culture of civic resistance.71 Blogs The phenomenon of blogging in Syria, though fairly new and not exactly widespread, is another area in which significant insight into the analysis of the Syrian media ecology can be gained. Blogs, al-mudawwana in Arabic, are a personal record of events that tend to become discussion forums on various aspects of life, including conflicts and questions within society. Numbers here are even more meagre, if one considers that in 2005 there were only five Syrian blogs, increasing to thirty-five in 2006 and then to eighty-six in 2010.72 Nonetheless, as a comparative study on Arab blogs edited by Bruce Etling shows, the Syrian cluster appears to be very active, located predominately in Syria (as opposed to abroad), concerned with domestic issues, and expressing frequent mild criticism of the domestic political leadership.73 Similarly, the first Arab Bloggers Meeting, hosted in 2008 by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, showed how blogs were becoming the most important form of political mobilisation and activism in the Arab world.74 Bloggers in Syria have been using this new space as a way to disseminate information about Syria, and as a means to connect with people sharing similar views at home and across national borders.75 A Syrian female blogger who wishes to remain anonymous told me how she started

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blogging for fun, though she soon realised how this simple tool was bringing together people she did not know in person but who had much in common with her.76 This, she said, ‘was extraordinary. I realised that if only we wanted, we could gather significant numbers of Syrians who wished for a different Syria from the one we had, which had been imposed to us. We had not chosen it’. The phenomenon of blogging, she added, was an important medium of experimentation, in which young people were trained to use these tools, though at the time only for social interaction and entertainment.77 In a closed regime like Syria, the phenomenon of blogging and social networking became increasingly significant, as through these online platforms, younger generations regained an interest in getting involved in political and social issues, something that was unthinkable in their everyday, offline life, and which established an alternative or a counter-public sphere that increasingly clashed with the regime. In Syria, young people started using blogs along with other social media platforms to join debates on issues of public interest and reclaim their right to be active citizens, at least within cyberspace. Unlike the trend characterising today’s online phenomenon, the role of the Internet in the Arab world was, at the time, far from one of being a vehicle for radicalisation, as Etling’s study on Arab blogs argued. Little support was expressed on the Internet for terrorist organisations and violent jihad; instead it was used as a way to voice criticism and be politically engaged.78 News Websites Alongside blogs were many websites devoted to news only, concerning mainly social and economic issues. Many of these news websites, including Syria Today, Syria Story, Syria Now, Syrian News Station, Shabablek, and Syrian Cultural Magazine, served as news services or youth magazines, often starting on Facebook.79 These new online publications have not just become a stage for citizens and journalists to share their views on relevant social issues, they have also become the source of information for national newspapers about topics like drug consumption, homosexuality, female harassment, and interfaith marriage, progressively infringing on many taboo topics.80 A number of national newspapers have created online sites and have allowed readers to leave their comments at the end of articles. News websites have also started to translate articles from the international

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news arena, sometimes even extending this to Israeli news media, like Haaretz. This new form of online and participative journalism has also given space to the voice of experts who are called to express their views on sensitive and debated topics, like giving legal advice to women about their rights and possible actions they can take. This type of online journalism is socially useful and involves interacting with citizens, widening their knowledge about issues that are of public interest, and adding the opinion of an expert to debates. Other topics included interviewing the parents of a young man waiting for a court verdict, but also more contentious questions such as discussions about arrest campaigns by the government in Aleppo.81 This type of online journalism, besides acting against the regime’s information system, has also become an information platform for those who have access to it, and a form of social glue that has connected citizens through interactions that previously would not have been possible. The time and effort taken to encourage people to participate in discussions and share their opinion has been troublesome in a society in which the regime has been deeply concerned with keeping people isolated, fearful, and badly informed. Some of these efforts are worthy of more thorough discussion. The All4Syria.com news website is an interesting case study. It has been edited since 2003 by Ayman Abdelnour, a young engineer and member of the Ba’ath Party.82 He has also been a representative of the reformist faction in the ‘young guard’, a group of young technocrats close to the president, Bashar. Despite these close ties to the ruling leadership, the site has been banned since 2005. However, its editor contrived to bypass the blocking by the regime by sending daily e-mails free of charge to more than 17,000 subscribers. Today, the website is still operating, though it is constantly targeted by the regime, which at times manages to take it offline and block its operations. All4Syria.com presents itself as an online, widely read bulletin, with over 15,000 daily subscribers.83 The content is a collection of articles from the national and foreign press, as well as specific articles written for its bulletin and translated in Arabic. The website has given voice to senior government officials as well as opposition leaders, both of whom write articles of public interest. Similarly, All4Syria.com offers a ‘readers’ complaints section’. This section, in addition to acting as a safety valve for citizens who need to vent their frustration and receive solidarity from those having experienced similar situations, also motivates journalists to investigate cases. By doing so, the bulletin

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has exposed problems and corruption in the country by directly naming those involved. On one occasion, a journalist investigated a case of malpractice in the health service, of a girl badly treated in a public hospital, which put pressure on the state to take direct action. The website has also managed to influence Syrian legislation and push the government to change some of its policies. Nadia, a journalist working for a private media outlet, explained how the ‘readers’ compaints section’ was an incredible tool ‘which changed people’s understanding of their role in society as well as the role of state institutions in terms of their responsibility … Citizens felt they had regained their voice and they were encouraged to make themselves heard’.84 The other significant example of a Syrian news website is Syria News, a privately owned news and business website offering information about Syria and the world.85 The website came into existence in 2005 with the aim of producing reports and updates on regional, national, and international economic and business developments.86 It presents itself as an Internet-based intermediary for transferring media information to an audience that might not have access to all mass media. The website is in Arabic, though it contains some material in English. It now has a staff of over fifty journalists. Syria News has not had an easy existence either, and is constantly in fear of being banned. The website’s survival technique, while attempting to produce something new, has been to constantly push against what is allowed, the red lines, without ever crossing them, waiting to see if action is taken, and if not, to move on. Juliette Harkin, a bbc journalist and academic, conducted a study on Syria News in 2008, in which she acknowledged the determination and effectiveness of the company in building a staff of professional journalists with the aim of high international standards.87 Syria News has also been working to create a new generation of well-trained journalists, by providing training to graduate students from the Journalism Department at Damascus University. In particular, Syria News offered scholarships for candidates at their offices, in addition to training materials and support.88 Its staff also attended foreign-run training courses in journalism skills and editorial ethics, delivered by media organizations like the bbc , the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (iwpr ) and the Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (arij ), discussed in depth in chapter 5. The website covers a wide range of topics, attempting to offer a comprehensive panorama, including topics considered more contentious and usually kept under wraps, like

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corruption, homosexuality, and religion. The positive response of readers has been clearly demonstrated by the numerous and extensive comments that the published stories generate. The Internet has done more than simply expand the news horizon for Syrians. Thara, an online weekly magazine, offered women extensive coverage on news, culture, literature, and laws concerning women.89 The weekly magazine provided information on women’s affairs from the international and national arena and monitored social practices that violated their rights and freedoms. Thara belongs to Etana Press, which has strong links with the international community and receives funding from several international organisations. This weekly news outlet represents an exemplary case of a magazine in which journalists demonstrate high standards of professionalism, working under pressure to update news, respond to e-mails, and provide legal advice to their readership. The intent is to raise women’s awareness about their rights and opportunities, while countering social atominsation and building a counter-hegemonic space to the one established by the regime. Cavatorta and Shaery-Eisenlohr, in their chapter on ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, discuss the role of a particular news outlet – kept anonymous – that monitored Syrian official media and revealed to the public what the national media omitted in their news coverage.90 Journalists working for this organisation were the expression of a new spirit of professional and civic responsibility, pushing the red lines further, competing with the news coverage presented by the regime and holding the state accountable for its actions. The news outlet was not accepted by the regime and its website was blocked; however, the staff decided to transform its outet through reports sent as e-mails to subscribers. The monitoring organisation reached more than 11,000 subscribers through their e-mail news. The organisation transformed the Internet into an educational tool, raising people’s awareness of their rights and building networks between like-minded people sharing a common desire to resist oppressive power. E-Elections Proof of a change in the social and political landscape and, more importantly, of the new ways of informing and communicating with and to people can be found in the legislative elections of 2007. For these elections, some candidates used the Internet to advertise

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their campaign. The advertisement consisted mostly in showing their best photo(s) and adding a few catchy phrases to better represent them, rather than reporting their political manifesto.91 Political manifestos, in fact, have not existed in Syria since 1963. The ‘young’ candidates created personal pages, such as syriaparlement. com, parlementsy.com, and voiceofsyria.com, which represented a new face or a new way of doing politics, though the candidates themselves remained the same.92 This new practice, though not bringing any material change in the way elections were carried out in Syria, promoted a new way of doing politics, one that is now strictly dependant on digital media. By modernising the electoral campaign to the needs of a digital world, Syria was slowly moving into a process of technological makeover that we (read ‘Westerns’) are witnessing in its full significance. In the 1920s, radio served to disembody candidates, allowing them to promote themselves using only the tone and content of their political speech, and in the 1960s, television gave candidates back their bodies, allowing them to invest in both their physical and moral appeal. Today, with a public hypnotized by smartphones, politicians have changed the way they communicate with their voters, and political speeches have shrunk to fit the screen of a smartphone. After the 2016 US presidential elections, the Trump phenomenon seems to have taught politicians that authority and respect are not valued on social media. Value is placed on the way you say things, not on the content. What counts is only your last tweet, and thereby your ability to keep tweeting, regardless of the content, in order to grab the attention of the perpetually distracted. Online National Campaigns Syrian digital space had become a platform on which both the regime and citizens could display their programmes, advance suggestions, and direct criticisms. Significantly, this virtual space became a new arena for participating in the social and political life of the country. In particular for citizens, the Internet allowed the formation of an alternative or counter public sphere, where people could connect to peers and share views on civic issues. The digital space has allowed people from different walks of life to find their preferred communication means, whether blogging, tweeting, or Facebooking. Through these means, Syrians carried out crucial battles on social

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matters for the first time, some worthy of mention. For instance, a university student launched a campaign on Facebook called ‘We want to go forward, not backward’, which counted 1,339 members in March 2010.93 The group was concerned with women’s rights and hosted debates on topics such as interfaith marriage, honour crimes, and discrimination against women in Syrian law. A student from the University of Damascus told me that the Facebook page became extremely popular among university students who felt that things were changing for the better, and that for the first time, they could make a difference by simply participating.94 The Facebook page gathered students online but also became a topic of conversation offline, on the university campus and at Internet cafés. Students discussed and suggested reforms that they felt were necessary at the university level as well as in society, and to a small extent in politics. Rami Nakhle, a prominent Syrian activist who gained an international reputation and visibility only after 2011, launched two important online campaigns in 2009, the ‘Get Your Rights’ campaign, to help Syrians circumvent Internet censorship, and the ‘Enough Silence’ campaign, calling for the lifting of the emergency law and the release of political prisoners.95 Less political, yet still engaged in social and environmental issues, was the group called the National Campaign for Encouraging the Use of Bicycles, which counted fifty-four members in March 2010. In other cases, the Internet has been used to denounce misconduct, like the YouTube video that showed a police officer receiving a bribe, which was watched 366,703 times and received 1,323 comments.96 Many examples of this type of activity can be found online, along with many documenting the repression of Syria’s Kurdish minority.97 All these initiatives represent a changing social and political pattern in Syrian civic life that breaks the civic stagnation that the regime had created and had invested so much in. The new ict s have contributed to new ways of learning, and new ways of using information, whether for mere personal knowledge or for civic awareness and social mobilisation. Moreover, the type of dialogue that emerged in the digital space broke with traditional hierarchies that were based on an imbalance of powers and deconstructed much of the fear that the regime had inculcated in citizens. Several local and international organisations have been working with grassroots actors to offer online resources for activists and people working in civil society, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

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Other important campaigns that had a large online presence and a successful outcome mostly due to the Internet include the National Campaign against Honour Crimes, and the Personal Status Law campaign. The National Campaign against Honour Crimes was born within a wider movement aimed at improving women’s rights in Syria and promoting citizenship. In Syria, Decree 121 banned organisations working for women’s rights, but this has not prevented many women’s organisations from meeting informally or developing anonymously online. The Syrian journalist Bassam Al-Kadi launched the Syrian Women’s Observatory, an online campaign for the recognition of women’s rights and the repeal of the Article 548, which permitted honour killings, or, as the article referred to them, ‘crimes of passion’.98 The organisation built a network of ngo s and associations representing different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds, and committed to building a society based on equal rights for men and women. The campaign was clearly very important for a country like Syria, where approximately 200 to 300 women were allegedly victims of honour killings on an annual basis.99 Besides an online information campaign, the Syrian Women’s Observatory organised seminars and workshops, and promoted an online petition to repeal Article 548. The campaign managed to obtain 10,254 signatures from men and women, which were then sent to the president, the prime minister, the justice minister, the bar association, and the media.100 In 2008, the campaign brought about a change in the law, raising the punishment for honour killings from one year to two years. One could arguably describe this as still being a light penalty, but given that this campaign took place exclusively online, it represented a significant achievement.101 Layla, a Syrian woman and activist currently living in Beirut and who confessed of having been tortured by the regime for her activism in Dera’a, told me that the National Campaign against Honour Crimes was an incredible step forward for women, but more importantly ‘it taught citizens that changes could be done if people were united and determined’.102 Equally important has been the Personal Status Law campaign, which occurred mostly online to abrogate a draft of a new personal status law that was leaked in June 2009. The draft law was formulated by a conservative Islamic committee that did not represent Syria’s heterogeneous social mosaic, and would have resulted in a tragic setback for civil rights, especially for the rights of women.

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Intellectuals and scholars, as well as ordinary people, sided with media organisations, like Etana Press and the Syrian Women Observatory, and started a campaign to raise awareness of the implications of such a law, signing petitions calling for the withdrawal of the law and presenting them to officials of the government. When in November 2009 the government proposed minor corrections to the law, the campaign became fiercer, occupying more websites, but also involving tv and cinema celebrities. The widespread mobilisation managed to get the draft law sent back for further examination.103 Layla, the Syrian activist who had been active in both campaigns, said during our conversation how this second campaign saw unprecedented participation from people coming from different classes. This is significant, she said, because despite what people might think of Syria after the expansion of isis , ‘we [Syrians] are strongly hostile to any transformation of society towards religious fanatism [ta’ssub]’. She also added, ‘both campaigns were important for the purpose that they were an experimental ground, a platform that drew people together to talk, discuss and act collectively [ma’an]’.104 In addition to these more popular campaigns, there have been a number of smaller initiatives taking place since 2006 that were strongly rooted in the Internet and telecommunication technology. Some examples are the efforts to support a Syrian child who was raped by four men in Aleppo, to reduce the cost of mobile phone calls and services, and to keep the country clean. Many petitions on crucial political and social issues circulated online, gathering wide visibility, denouncing misconduct and collecting signatures with the aim of bringing about change. For instance, the Damascus Spring Committee and the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Civil Society were two movements that embodied a growing culture of civic participation and resistance, both of which used the Internet as a tool to stimulate debates, circulate statements, and encourage participation in matters of common interest.105 Two political events in particular have had a great success thanks to the Internet: the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change (October 2005) and the Beirut-Damascus/Damascus-Beirut Declaration (April 2006).106 Both documents circulated online and collected large numbers of signatories. In addition to these types of civil activism, intellectuals, poets, and novelists have also used the Internet as a platform to publish their censored texts, on websites like jidar.com and alwan.com. These sites host the writings of

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Syrians and other Arab writers, with translations and commentary, which help them have global resonance. From this cursory glance of the main online initiatives, it is evident that the Internet became the space where citizens could share experiences, express dissent, empathise with others, and mobilise public opinion. In essence, the Internet became the antidote to social isolation, which had characterised Syrian society for decades. Cavatorta and Shaery-Eisenhohr argue that this mass dissent was certainly political but not institutional, as it was confined to the cybersphere and for this reason tolerated by the regime.107 Although dissent may have been limited to cyberspace, it was still expressed through forms of civic engagement and activism espousing alternative discourses to the official one. The regime let it live, believing that external players would perceive signs of criticism as a form of pluralism. However, online political activism can easily and quickly coalescence offline, in tangible street protests, as the events in 2011 demonstrate, compelling the regime to adopt heavy measures to crack down on what was previously perceived as harmless cyber activism.

t h e h u m a n ag e ncy factor It seems that the academic world before 2011 had been inebriated by the myth of authoritarian stability, and thus failing to capture the ‘forces for change that were bubbling from below, and at times above the surface of Arab politics’.108 Wedeen, in Ambiguities of Domination, readopted Foucault’s theory in Discipline and Punishment, arguing that by displaying respect of the cult of the Asads and participating in the ‘ritual gestures’, Syrians had over time become disciplined and contained.109 On the same theme, Sottimano argues that Syria had turned into a ‘disciplined society’, citing Foucault’s notions of authority and ‘production and reproduction of power structures’.110 Such analyses remove the notion of human agency from Syrian citizens, who are reduced to non-thinking subjects, easy to manipulate. How does this approach explain the events in 2011? Did this change occur overnight? It seems that below the surface of a law-abiding society, small changes were occurring within the system, starting with people themselves. Similarly, the media have been considered one of the elements in the regime’s stability, its role being the maintaining of citizens’ acceptance of the forces of power. Nonetheless, the advent of the private media has instead produced

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some structural transformations. These changes took place not just in the production of alternative news and the availability of new information tools, but also in the professionalism displayed by those working in the new media and, not least, in people’s new attitudes and participation in the media environment. This phenomenon is explained in this chapter as a multifarious process of change that was the result of institutional, social, and international pressure. The regime was in fact a victim of its own reformism, carrying out reforms in the media sector that inevitably hit back. As Wafaa, another Syrian activist, told me, ‘the regime could not really believe that they could make us happy by allowing us to watch satellite tv , surf the Internet, and read articles that were more critical of politics and society, and think that we would stay silent … The regime is partially responsible for what happened; the rest we did it ourselves’.111 What Wafaa meant was that Syrians themselves produced the rest of the change, whether journalists, activists, or ordinary citizens, all of whom participated in making journalism more accountable and empowering the public. The online activism that this chapter looks at is the product of a two-way process of a media sector becoming more professional and responsible, and citizens becoming more engaged. The last tile in this mosaic is the change produced from the outside through international organisations that provided media support, with projects that helped modernise the media sector, train media professionals and activists, and, thereby, engage the public to become part of this transformation. This last aspect is discussed at length in the next chapter. Scholars of the mena region and of Arab media have underestimated the change that occurred in the subjects rather than just in the institutions. People, whether in journalism or in any other field, are an integral part of this changing mood, which affects both them and the structure, each one influencing the other. For instance, when looking at the media, one cannot assume that the change occurred only in the privatisation of the market and the emergence of new online and offline news production. The change happened on a deeper level, behind the news, with journalists themselves and, sitting behind a computer or tv screen, with citizens themselves. Based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, journalists, as active agents, are said to possess a form of symbolic and cultural power, which influences and is influenced by developments that occur in the cultural context as a whole.112 What needs to be understood is the extent to

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which Syrian journalists have been able to operate (produce material independently) in such a blurred arena between the state and private media. Thus far we have looked at the increasing involvement of citizens in the news system and the development of a more profound sense of civic engagement. More words need to be said about the change in journalistic professionalism. Before the advent of the new media in Syria, journalism was considered ‘just a job’, rather than a profession. And, as a job, it was not well remunerated, considering that the average salary of a journalist was between $200 and $300 per month.113 Many journalists were therefore obliged to look for a second profession, within ministries or public institutions, without realising the potential collision of interests that the two positions would generate. In other cases, journalists have opted for less fulfilling jobs, as one journalist working for one of the regime’s traditional newspapers told me, admitting that to make a living he had to work as a journalist during the day and as a taxi driver in the evenings, which made his life hard and was pushing his anti-establishment sentiments to intolerable levels.114 In addition to financial reasons, it was difficult for him to keep up the ideals of journalism in an environment that did not provide an adequate legal framework to protect journalists or a guaranteed right of access to information. The Syrian Journalists Syndicate (sjs ), the only professional association in Syria for journalists, has been serving the political elite rather than the profession. Becoming a member of the syndicate offered privileges and, more importantly, connections. However, applying for membership has never been an easy process, one usually characterised by two stages: the ‘training’ membership, which represents the first stage, and for many the last one; and the ‘working’ membership, which allows for medical compensation, discounts, and full retirement benefits. In the Syrian context, the syndicate exists to represent the interest of the state, as in the case of Ali Farzat’s al-Dommari newspaper, where, despite his membership in the syndicate since 1975, when it came to defend his rights as a journalist, the sjs did not offer any type of support and sided explicitly with the state prosecutors.115 Journalists in Syria, as much as in other countries, are a class of workers, often mistreated and at the mercy of the laws of the market. Bourdieu recalls how painters had to fight for centuries to break free from the state or patronage, and affirm their independence through the right to choose the colours and the subjects they

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wanted. In Western ‘democracies’, journalists are still struggling to reach the full autonomy of Quattrocento painters.116 This is particularly evident today with the precarious conditions of employment, which force journalists to succumb to the laws of the market and consequently a loss of liberty. Though the situation is different in Syria, the notion of journalism has changed for Syrian journalists, as well as for citizens, with the advent of the private media, satellite tv channels, the Internet, and the influx of foreign professionalism in the sector. Beside the investments in style, design, and aesthetics, Syrian journalists operating in the private sector internalized the change and expressed it through professional quality. This quality was represented by their id card, which distinguished them from their colleagues working in the state sector, who have never really been considered journalists, but rather civil servants.117 The ‘newness’ of the new media was essentially linked to journalists viewing their profession as one that served the people rather than the interests and ideology of the ruling party. Walid, who studied journalism at the University of Damascus and then trained at Syria News, told me how ‘our job was more difficult and at times more professional than the one of Western journalists. I went to London for training and learnt a lot from that experience. Me and my collegues [working for private media outlets] were doing a very difficult job; we had to be creative, sympathise with the regime but at the same time be professional, change people’s attitude towards what had been journalism for the last thirty years’.118 This change was also the result of reforms coming ‘from above’, as the regime became aware of the necessity to revamp the study and training of journalists. The teaching of journalism had been part of the literature faculty of the University of Damascus, under the name ‘Information Section’. The programme included courses in sociology, history, philosophy, and psychology, with no particular emphasis on media studies, and therefore not preparing the graduate students for the job market. Under Bashar, the Faculty of Journalism at Damascus University expanded, adding new buildings and facilities.119 The academic curriculum for journalists changed, with the addition of new classes, textbooks that were up to date with regards to new technologies and practices, and it training, and mandatory internships to facilitate access to the job market. The faculty also signed a cooperation agreement with other universities in the region and appointed media experts, including foreign ones,

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who would share their expertise during their short-term contracts.120 Moreover, private institutions and both foreign and international donors invested in training for journalistic professionals up until 2011. Fadi, a Syrian press journalist, argued that he had received a stronger education in journalism compared to his elder colleagues. He stated, I am a ‘real’ journalist! Not like the previous generation who served the state rather than the people … I have a real degree in journalism, I took exams in different media disciplines, participated in exchange programmes with international media, and worked for Thomson Reuters. But this makes my professional life very frustrating, because you know you have the capabilities, tools, and will to bring about change but then you are constantly faced with the reality of an authoritarian regime. It is like teaching someone to drive but not authorising him drive. Do you see the contradiction?.121 Fadi argued that given this contradictory environment, the whole new generation of journalists who had been brought up in the past decade were tirelessly involved in bringing about micro-changes in the media field, changes deemed too insignificant to be noticed but which became more significant as they accumulated over time. The best example of this revolution affecting media instituions, journalists, and audiences is of a particular human rights organisation operating online. The organisation aimed at creating a culture of human rights through the use of social media among ordinary people who had lived under an authoritarian regime for over forty years. As Cavatorta and Shaery-Eisenlohr argue, the organisation faced many obstacles, starting with the government’s denial to publish any material that included the words ‘human rights’ (al-huquq al-insan).122 The organisation, which I am not naming for safety reasons, was very well known in Syria under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad and became the first reference point for everyone looking for legal advice or asking about the whereabouts of people who were detained. Thanks to a presence on the ground, an extensive network throughout the country, and connections with international organisations, the human rights organisation was able to publish official statements online, while also communicating with members and followers via e-mail. Although the challenges and risks faced

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by the organisation were numerous, the high levels of professionalism shown by its human rights experts and other staff enabled the creation of a community of people who, ‘prior to the advent of the media, either did not know each other or did not trust each other’.123 This high level of professionalism was reflected in a network of citizens who were engaged online in debates on crucial issues. Juliette Harkin, who worked in Syria for a media development project of the bbc , argues that the shift in professionalism also affected the recruitment process of the state’s agency, sana , which was no longer based only on connections (wasta) but also on requiring a degree and qualifications in journalism. Harkin notes how in the new environment, particularly with the emergence of the new private sector, Syrian journalists have been encouraged to work differently.124 In fact, with the new media came new administrative, management, and working practices. The new cadre of journalists was inspired by the ideals of Western journalism, no longer passively reproducing the sources provided by the state and official sources, but proactively looking for their own sources, investigating cases, and giving voice to the views of people on the streets.125 The increased competition, too, between the private and international media and the state media, increased the impetus for change in both sectors, which inevitably translated into an improvement in the quality of the news, and of the journalists, and increased audience’s responsiveness. More should be said about the audience and how this new way of making news conditioned them and their ways of thinking, and more importantly their participation in the social and political life of their country. However, the conflict in Syria has not only made this type of research impossible but has to a great extent influenced the way people perceive their past, even if the ‘past’ refers to just a few years before the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. What is certain, at least from what I witnessed during my stay in Damascus between 2009 and 2010, is that a anti-establishment sentiment was growing among the new generations of Syrians, who, at least in the capital, were highly educated and incredibly knowledgeable of what occurred in the West. This was evident from the debates that often occurred in Internet cafés about issues they had read online; in the numerous literary events, which often turned into discussions that had political references; and not least in home gatherings, where young people watched Western documentaries, often very politicised ones, that they had bought on the black market. This situation was not peculiar to Syria only, but was very much the case

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in other authoritarian regimes in the region, like Tunisia, where ‘publinets’ (Internet cafés with no café) played an essential role in training people to access and use the Internet, as well as providing a venue for debates among peers about topics and issues that circulated online but were not covered by national media outlets.126 If the argument that the new media caused the Syrian uprising of 2011 is highly debatable, and the root causes are instead to be found in the deterioriating economic and social conditions of the country, the new technologies have certainly laid the groundwork for an alternative public sphere and for new ways of understanding citizenship and state–society relations.

f in a l r e m a rks In The New Lion of Damascus, David Lesch provides food for thought in telling a story he had heard during one of his stays in Syria and that seemed to contain promising overtures for the country’s future.127 The story is about a visit that Bashar al-Asad made to Aleppo in 1998, when he was still an almost total stranger to most Syrians, on the occasion of a conference sponsored by the Syrian Computer Society.128 He entered the covered market (suq) of Aleppo and in a short time, word travelled and a crowd soon gathered, anxious to look at the man who was the president’s son. Bashar, who had been running away from the crowd, decided to enter a shop in order to catch his breath. The family who ran the shop was honoured by the visit and the son of the shop owner showed his respect by drying off the sweat on Bashar’s face with a napkin. Bashar thanked him for his kindness and asked how he could return their generosity. With no hesitation, the son of the shop owner answered that he wanted to learn how to use a computer. The next day Bashar gave a new computer and printer to the family and paid the registration fees for the boy to attend a computer course at the University of Aleppo.129 If not for a different time and setting, the story seems to hail from a children’s storybook, where the prince disguised as a common man walks into the city, gets to know how people actually live and what they are in need of and returns to his palace completely altered and eager to make a change for his people. Although this was not the case for Syria, which headed progressively toward an uprising and a brutal crackdown of popular mobilisation, one needs to acknowledge that attempts to modernise the country were made by the president, within the framework of what he called ‘change within continuity’.130 Besides

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the actual curiosity of whether the boy who received a computer and free training decided to turn his back on his president when the uprising of 2011 spread to Aleppo, this chapter shows how the reforms and transformation of Syria’s media and information landscape significantly influenced the course of events of this country. Bashar al-Asad had thought that by allowing a slow but steady set of reforms, he would restore a level of popularity among his people, which would have granted stability and longevity to his regime. The media sector was among the fields touched by the winds of change, partially implemented by the regime and partially by citizens, and partially supported by Western aid policy, as discussed in chapter 5. However, as an effect of a contradictory policy, oriented at times towards reformism and at times towards conservatorism, the media itself became a hybrid, contradictory field. In this environment, traditional media was under state control and serving the regime’s propaganda machine and the new media, specifically transnational satellite tv and the Internet, was freed from the state monopoly and fostered a growing anti-establishment sentiment. These two aspects collided and could hardly exist side by side. Under these circumstances, journalists working in the private sector developed new professional working practices and civic responsibility, while a new generation of media activists became engaged in online information campaigns and constructive political and social criticism. Not least, the change stimulated civic mobilisation and public reaction for the first time, contesting the hegemonic relationship of the state and the media to the state and citizens. It introduced a new level of accountability in politics. Cyberspace made room for a counter discourse that the Syrian regime tolerated as long as it remained confined to online platforms and did not translate into concrete street dissent. In this way, online dissent granted citizens a safety valve and allowed the regime to show the West that a degree of pluralism existed in Syria. As the Syrian case shows, the spread of the Internet leads to an increase in free expression and acts that breach social norms. Social media, as Pollock observes, create bridges and channels between activists and ordinary people to speak out and reach out to others who think alike.131 Online activism, often minimised by a combination of surveillance, a lack of infrastructure, and fear, may unexpectedly materialise into massive street protests, adopting the critiques that had up until then been voiced online.

5

Media Development and Foreign Aid Assistance He who has a tongue is never lost. Arab proverb

g l o ba l m e d ia a id i ndustry Within the wider purpose of this book to investigate the role played by the new media in fostering popular mobilisation in Syria, one cannot overlook the nature and effects of international media assistance. This book argues that the leading role played by the new media since the very start of the Syrian uprising cannot be explained as a deus ex machina, but needs to be investigated in the years that predated the uprising. By exploring the changes that occurred under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, this study holds that the Syrian media sphere changed significantly as an effect of institutional, social, and international pressures. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown how the Syrian media landscape changed as an effect of endogenous causes, meaning a combination of reforms carried out by the regime and citizens. The regime felt the need to modernise and update the country with modern information technologies, while journalists, activists, and citizens proactively engaged in this process of reform, making journalism more professional and stimulating a more responsible and civically engaged public. As has been repeated numerous times, this was not a linear and clear process, but rather a quite ambivalent and contradictory one. The presidency of Bashar al-Asad was a precarious balancing act between conservatorism and reformism, which created loopholes in the system that eventually led to the outbreak of the 2011 uprising. However, the development

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of the media sphere was also produced by exogenous causes, as this chapter explains, which are to be found in the role of international media assistance. This means that the emergence and development of a new media sphere in Syria was influenced by tailored projects implemented by foreign organisations working officially or unofficially in the country, supporting local reports, citizen journalists, and civil society activists. It was precisely the blending of these three different pressures that paved the way to the Syrian uprising of 2011. Firstly, the Syrian regime relaxed its grip and agreed to privatise the media sector and open the country to transnational satellite tv and the Internet. With these conditions, journalists working in the private sector acquired more space in which to operate, became more professional, and produced a type of journalism that was more critical and responsible. Subsequently, citizens responded positively to this transformation and took small steps towards a more active role in society. Finally, a class of citizen journalists and civil society activists, trained through international media support programmes, enriched and raised the standards of journalism in both the state media and the private media, but also helped foster a class of activists engaged in strengthening civil society, through removing the barriers to free expression and citizen engagement. Although these three phenomena are analysed as distinct phases in this book, their actual unfolding happened at the same time, as a unique process with multiple effects. However, the media aid industry played a complementary role in the whole process, helping to foster the potential contained in a regime in the process of reforming itself, a media sector in full expansion, and a new generation of media and civil society actors, all of whom could potentially work together and have a positive influence on the country. Investing in this class of activists was particularly important to ensure that the progress made in the media sector could be beneficial to society and help push for good governance, bridging the gap between the strong but often isolated offline social networks (families, mosques, universities) and the wider digital public. It may sound odd to consider the role and effects of the media aid industry in a country like Syria, given the unprecedented interest that scholars have displayed towards this field following the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. However, the blind eye that scholars have turned to the Syrian media sector as a whole explains why scholars have also completely neglected the media aid system. Moreover, one needs to recognise that academic disinterest towards the media aid industry is

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a generalised phenomenon, which affects all geographical contexts. As Kumar observes, no books, doctoral theses, or even research articles have been written on the subject of media development, and, though there is a growing literature on emerging media in developing countries, such scholarship does not examine the role of international assistance.1 Interestingly, though the literature on media development can be defined as nascent at its very best, the practice of media development has marked Western foreign policy programmes since the Second War World.2 Communication and information technologies have always been considered as having beneficial effects on the health, food, education, and economy of developing countries, though with time they have started to be used to promote democracy and for economic development.3 This has been based on the assumption that the more information that is available through the media, the more citizens are empowered to make informed choices, and the better the media serve democracy.4 This is precisely why undemocratic regimes, from the former Soviet Union to Singapore, have kept a tight lid on communication and information over the years, with China at the top of the list, despite the pressure of globalisation.5 For Syria, the state’s control over information and communication had worked flawlessly under Hafez al-Asad, though it was not preserved by his son Bashar, who, in hopes of inaugurating a new era for Syria, opened the country to the outside world and granted selected reforms, among which was public access to the new media. If past communication technologies, such as newspapers, radio, and television, could hardly foster democratic transition in authoritarian contexts, given the tight control to which authorities subjected them, the emergence of the new ict s of the last generation – in particular the Internet and its offspring – interrupted the state’s monopoly over the means of information. Citizens benefitted in terms of the acquisition of knowledge, the creation of networks, and the increase in political opportunities. For this reason, foreign aid investment in the media sector has seen a visible increase in the past decade, given the potentials that the new media tools seem to offer in terms of citizen empowerment in contexts unfavourable to democratic values. This type of Western support has proved pivotal in mobilising populations to overthrow repressive regimes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Lebanon, to only mention a few.6 Media development projects in these countries have supported the emergence of a class of citizen journalists and activists who, by providing

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a fairer news coverage and engaging citizens in social and political debates and initiatives, simply helped in empowering citizens and weakening state power. Today Western governments are investing huge sums in media projects in Arab countries, to the point that, as Bruce Stanley holds, such intervention has become an industry.7 In this regard, not enough rigorous research and scholarship exists on the integration of new media and information assistance by development actors (eu countries and the US) as part of democracy promotion programmes implemented in prospective democracies. This type of analysis is, to a great extent, non-existent with regards to the Middle East, despite how much it would add to our understanding of the causes that brought about the turbulent events of 2011. This chapter places the study of the media aid industry within a wider picture, aimed at understanding the roots of Syria’s uprising by looking at the development of its media landscape in a decade of significant structural, institutional, social, and economic changes. The chapter consists of two parts: the first, which is more descriptive, frames the concept of media development within the wider literature, highlighting the way it has been implemented in other historical periods and geographical contexts. By understanding how the media aid industry developed and was enforced, one can better understand its importance and the effects that it can have in undemocratic contexts. The second part analyses Syria’s media aid architecture, the actors involved, the projects that have been implemented, and the impact this mechanism produced on civil society in a rather closed society like Syria. Ultimately, the chapter attempts to locate this issue within the broader and unfinished debate about the role and effects of international assistance in fragile contexts where humanitarian and development aid are not simply conveying international altruism but favouring political ends.

o r ig in s o f m e d ia development Before getting into the analysis of the media aid industry in pre-revolutionary Syria, it would be appropriate to dwell on the concept and significance of media development. The Centre for International Media Assistance (cima ) refers to the term ‘media development’ to indicate the efforts by organisations, people, and governments to develop the capacity and quality of the media sector within a specific

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country or region.8 Actors can range from governments to multilateral organisations, and large numbers of national and international ngos. In general, these actors are classified into two categories: donors and intermediaries. Donors provide funding whereas intermediary organisations design and implement projects, often in cooperation with local partners in the recipient country.9 Donors can be bilateral donor agencies, international governmental organisation, or private foundations (e.g., usaid , the European Commission, unesco, the Ford Foundation). The implementers are intermediary organisations (e.g., bbc Media Action, Internews, the International Federation of Journalists, irex ) that provide donors with practical advice and put the project into practice. As earlier mentioned, in the past twenty years, the expenditure in media development assistance by Western agencies has skyrocketed, reaching an estimated $645 million in 2010.10 The increased investment in the sector has occurred in concomitance with or as an effect of the emergence of the new media technologies, which have proved better at meeting the needs and requests of international actors than traditional media. The promotion of free and independent media around the world takes many forms: journalist training and education, improving the legal environment for media, funding new media outlets or improving existing ones, media literacy training, digital and cybersecurity training, and infrastructure development.11 Much of the aid from the official aid channels, including media assistance, is often criticised for favouring political ends rather than development aims.12 In this regard, media assistance can be easily, and to some extent misleadingly, read through the lens of conspiracy theory, meaning media assistance is interpreted as a foreign effort to buy influence, manipulate people’s minds, and push for regime change. Not surprisingly, media development assistance is often confused with public diplomacy media programmes, though the two have different objectives and strategies. In fact public diplomacy seeks to generate positives attitudes toward a government’s policies and social and political institutions, while media assistance tries to develop local media institutions to bolster democratic transitions.13 With regard to the strategies, media development strengthens the indigenous media sector by pushing for reforms of the legal system, supporting civil society organisations that promote free media, and offering training to media practitioners. Public diplomacy plays on a different level, broadcasting in foreign languages, selecting only

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positive news stories from foreign media, and organising exchange visits by media experts.14 This does not exclude, as is sometimes the case, the fact that media assistance is actually merged with public diplomacy, raising some doubts about donors’ intentions.15 The problem of discerning between media development projects and public diplomacy ones adds more difficulty to the already complex task of analysing governance projects, which appear as well-written reports but are poorly supported by thorough explanations about the projects that are funded. Frequently, organisations supporting media projects do not have a separate office or division in charge of their media development portfolio, including media assistance under broader headings, such as ‘democracy and governance’, ‘capacity building’, ‘human rights’, or ‘civil society’ (as in the case of the European Commission), making it very difficult to track projects carried out by the organisations and to understand their policies precisely. The benefits of investing in media assistance programmes are summarised in the words of Eric Newton, senior adviser at the Knight Foundation, who argued, ‘the basic news literacy argument is that you can’t get the vaccine in someone’s mouth until you get in that someone’s head the idea that the vaccine is good for you’.16 This statement explains why media development aid has become an instrument of foreign aid assistance. Funding media projects is seen as a vaccination, helping people to acquire the knowledge and create the networks that are at the base of any democratic transformation. Media assistance, hence, becomes a means by which to face the problem at its roots, by creating the conditions for the solution of the problem from within, with no direct external intervention, at least not formally. When applied to developing countries with undemocratic institutions, the promotion of media literacy acts as a tool to create better-informed citizens who can pressure governments to become accountable and to root out corruption. Under these conditions, media development becomes a means of soft power, which, according to Joseph S. Nye Jr.’s definition, is the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce, as a means of persuasion, through intangible means like culture, values, and institutions of politics.17 The US administration has recently opted for a foreign policy approach, called the Obama Doctrine, which combines soft power with hard power, and which Nye defines as ‘smart power’. This doctrine was put into action in Syria and has more recently been enforced in Myanmar, Cuba, and Iran, substituting

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the long-lasting isolation policies with engaging in alliances and partnerships, with the full assurance that ‘the threat of power is far more effective than the delivery of power’.18

m e d ia d e v e l o p m e nt as si s tance in t h e m id d l e eas t The change of the media sector (structure and agents) in Syria was not a homemade product only. The West (US and eu ) took an active part in the development of media literacy, as part of a new approach to promote democracy in alternative and non-collateral, bottom-up support. This approach, however, is not a newly adopted policy but a concept, albeit in a different form, that dates back to the Cold War era, when the Middle East had been transformed into a confrontational battleground between the United States and the ussr , a reality (alas!) not that far from the present time. The two superpowers were fighting to win the hearts and minds of the ‘new nations’ of the postcolonial world by providing them with modernisation projects. Both states mostly adopted two tactics: the provision of development aid and the competition of the airwaves: Radio Moscow versus Voice of America (voa ).19 To ensure greater success, in 1949 voa commissioned empirical research to be conducted in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran on people’s radio-listening habits.20 The paradigm of ‘communications and development’ was first articulated in this research and then extensively explained by one of the researchers, Daniel Lerner, in his contentious volume The Passing of Traditional Society.21 The book, ingrained in an Orientalist approach, first developed the idea of using the media to ‘modernising’ societies through a top-down, or more accurately ‘outside-in’, approach.22 Despite the numerous critiques in the academic community towards the ‘patriarchal, xenophobic and simplistic character’ of this model of social change, de facto, this model still persists in Western (US and eu ) development discourse.23 Through the geopolitical controversies of the Cold War and post-Cold War period, the industrialised ‘North’ and the developing ‘South’ found a place in the concept of a ‘new world information and communication order’, intended to set a framework on the media’s role in society and the world at large.24 Yet this idea carried over to the new millennium, embedded in the agenda of Western politics towards the Middle East. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the growing concern

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of the international community regarding the threat posed by ‘fragile states’, democracy assistance was bolstered by new incentives as a means for the international community to counterbalance the threat and push for democratic transitions. Military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq had, once again, proved unsuccessful, and what was worse, counterproductive, feeding more hatred towards the West and encouraging an increase in terrorism.25 As a consequence, the international community became more aware of the need to develop new strategies of democracy promotion that could engage and build partnerships with nongovernmental Arab groups and local citizens, and build links across Middle Eastern countries.26 The main asset of the new approach was the assertion that democracy could not be imposed ‘from above’ but had to grow from within the country, perhaps with some small Western incentive. This type of approach, as noted by Cofman, implied that Arab governments were in need of this help, as they were not capable of understanding the looming demographic and economic challenges and the need for political, economic, and social reform that their countries required.27 Today, democracy promotion programmes are mainly implemented by a number of international actors, with the United States Agency for International Development (usaid ) and the European Commission (ec ) as the largest providers of democracy assistance.28 The principal areas of democracy building that the West has been engaging with in the Middle East are elections and electoral processes, political parties, judicial reforms, civil society, and the media. At the core of these programmes is a common intent to raise people’s communication and information literacy, which is considered to be at the basis of any regime change.29 It is no coincidence that usaid , the largest provider of democracy assistance programmes, holds that the basis of their strategy in the Middle East is to support ‘a prosperous and democratic Middle East … that actively participates in the free exchange of ideas’.30 With the new media, the opportunities to challenge the ‘monopoly of communication’, traditionally held by the state, and allow for political participation of the ‘third sector’ (individuals and organisations distinct from the state) has increased significantly.31

t h e sy r ia n m e d ia a id archi tecture The analysis of media development programmes in Syria that follows aims at supporting the broader study of the book, with no

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presumption of being exhaustive; it attempts rather at providing a snapshot of the sector, which should be supported by further study and perhaps placed in comparison to other realities in the region. Foreign investment in the media sector does not simply mean creating a more modern and professional media environment; it means making citizens more informed, engaged, and active. It means creating the conditions, tools, and networks necessary for the emergence and development of civic engagement and political accountability. Therefore, the study of media development aid in Syria and the effects it had on society goes back to what that this book identifies as the micro-changes that led to the uprising of 2011. Although beyond the purpose of this book, the study of media aid development and its objectives and consequences after the Arab uprisings remains a field that is understudied and incredibly fascinating. The study of media development projects in Syria has not been an easy one. The upgrade of the uprising into a civil war has made all approaches to research arduous, in terms of the accessibility of sources, availability of information, and reliability of people. In addition, it has engendered a sense of inappropriateness that the researcher often feels when conducting research about a country torn by war, where academic issues may easily appear like mental ponderings detached from a reality that is afflicted by more compelling issues. The interviews have been conducted with key informants of media agencies, the donor community, local ngo s, academics, activists, and other commentators of the media sector. As has been mentioned in chapter 1, the number of contacts who agreed to give interviews or simply offered to provide more information was relatively small compared to the list of individuals and organisations involved in the field that I had initially arranged to interview. Many of the contacts declined to offer any valuable information of media support programmes in Syria because of issues of visibility and in order to protect those involved, especially if they were US-based (with usaid and Freedom House, for instance), though they implied that these programmes existed and, more significantly, that they endured even after 2011. Other interlocutors have preferred to talk off the record, adding material to the research but not allowing me to cite them in the book, because they are still engaged unofficially in Syria and therefore very much concerned with not disclosing information which might constitute a threat to the project, or the people involved. Ultimately, a substantial group of organisations did not

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reply, even though they were mentioned by activists who attended their training sessions or by other organisations working in the same field. These data bear meaning and evidence per se, beyond the actual readiness of the agents to contribute with direct references. Issues of safety and/or political interests, leverage, and calculus have also strongly circumscribed the operational space of this research. Looking at the media aid industry in Syria opens a new avenue in the study of the role and purpose of media assistance programmes in a country that witnessed a wide-scale popular uprising in 2011 and that heavily relied on the use of new media. As this chapter elaborates, Bashar al-Asad’s decade in power was a period of great change for Syria, in which contrasting pressures tending towards reformism and modernisation, and, at the same time, authoritarianism and conservatism, produced a vulnerable political and social environment in the country. This very same context presented itself as fertile ground in which to engage in media assistance programmes between 2000 and 2011, given the reforms carried out by Bashar al-Asad, the new agreements signed with foreign countries, the access to foreign investment, the establishment of a private sector, the approval of civil society organisations to operate without interfering in political issues, the spread of satellite dishes and Internet connections, and, most importantly, a population of young people who were increasingly educated but underemployed, and who were valuable resources in whom to invest.32 Stregthening the media sector, making it more professional and accountable, as well as empowering Syrian citizen journalists and activists with the knowledge and capacities to raise civic awareness and participation, simply meant weakening the foundations of the Asad regime. According to the Directory of Development Organizations, in 2011 a total of 107 development organisations operated in Syria, consisting of international organisations, government institutions, private sector support organisations (including fair trade), finance institutions, training and research centres, civil society organisations, development consulting firms, and information providers. However, the actual number of actors involved in development programmes was higher, given the often unofficial way of operating that many organisations adopted in the Syrian context. Despite the opening up that the newly elected president Bashar al-Asad promoted at the start of his presidency, the regime kept a strict control over both foreign funding and organisations working in the development sector.

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D O N O RS Governmental organisations (ec , usaid , sida , etc.) International Organisations (unesco , World Bank, osce ) Foundations (Open Society Foundations, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

INTE RM ED IA RIES AG EN CIES / CO N T R AC TO RS International ngo s (irex , Internews, icfj , Independent Journalism Foundation) Western universities, media outlets, and experts conducting training, exchanges, and partnerships Media watchdog and freedom of speech organisations

LO CA L PA RTN ERS Media outlets Media organisations and other ngo s Professional schools, universities Policy makers and government institutions

Figure 5.1 | Media Development

The main tactic adopted by the regime to control the work of civil society organisations was to act as principal promoter and funder of these organisations, a cunning expedient to reinvigorate the regime’s image abroad and at home, while also guaranteeing the monitoring of these organisations’ activities. In these circumstances, donors had two possible options for operating in Syria – one official, with the regime’s approval, and one unofficial, more difficult to realise, which consisted in having to operate underground, online, or by training Syrians abroad.33 The aid structure through which media development programmes are put in place is a complex mechanism that varies according to the

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specific case. A simplified version (see figure 5.1) of this structure would be organised in terms of structure and level of participation.34 In this graphic, the flow of funds comes from donors (rich governments or individuals). It then reaches agencies (multilateral institutions), and at this point is funnelled to the recipient country through the implementers (ngo s, local partners, etc.).35 The standard map includes donors and donees, governments, quasi-governmental organisations and ngo s, funders, intermediaries, and local partners. Some actors participate in more than one stage. This scheme is only partially respected, as there are numerous private sector groups engaged in aid, both as donors and as implementers of ngos. In addition, if the recipient country is an authoritarian state, as in the case of Syria, this may hamper activities that appear to be politicised or could be viewed as jeopardising the state’s stability. In this case, some organisations resort to a ploy to dupe the regime’s restrictions, by working behind the backs of governments, implementing projects underground, online, or through working with citizens (such as the Syrian diaspora) outside their national borders.36 As an example, the Dutch agency Hivos (Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation) has been involved with online journalists and bloggers from Syria, supporting numerous initiatives including Global Voices and Mideast Youth. Hivos has maintained a low visibility regarding its activities in Syria, though its involvement has often been brought to light through activists’ neglect in keeping their involvement undercover. The bbc has also supported online initiatives, like training people to use social media tools, and through a section on the Syria News site called ‘the place I live’, with the intention of creating a space for citizens to share complaints with public officials. Online training is arguably the safest option when conditions do not allow journalists to travel or when the risk of being tracked is too high – the Ara2 Academy project, an online training course funded by the bbc in Syria, is an excellent example. In some cases, training is also done from the outside, taking journalists, writers, broadcasters, filmmakers, and technicians outside to safer locations where they undertake intensive workshops – a method adopted by the well-established media organisation Freedom House.37 In contrast, all international donors like the un and the ec can only work through official channels, meaning in partnership with Syrian ministries or gongo s. According to the bbc study report ‘Country Case Study: Syria’, the United Nations Development Programme (undp ) and the European

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Union and its member states are the largest providers of funding for media development.38 Among the regional donor community, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development are the main players.39 On a general note, given the restrictive media environment in Syria, many organisations have preferred to carry out their work below the governmental radar, resulting in no visibility of any kind within the country or abroad. To understand the extent of international involvement in the sector, it is worth presenting in detail the work of some organisations that agreed to share information on their activities for this research.

d o n o rs European Commission The results of programmes promoting independent and robust media in developing and transitional societies have encouraged donors like the eu to invest incrementally in the sector.40 The ec is the major source of funding for media assistance at the European level. The ec has two levels of assistance: macro-projects, which are implemented with international organisations working with local entities, and micro-projects, which directly fund local organisations.41 The eu ’s project spending in developing countries is mainly done through EuropeAid, whose mission is to implement the ec ’s external aid instruments. Hence, EuropeAid manages all phases of the project cycle: identification, appraisal, preparation of financing decision, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.42 The ec ’s structure and funding are famously complex and byzantine, making attempts to get accurate figures of its funding for these different fields a difficult, if not impossible, task. In the last decade, the ec has been profoundly restructured.43 As an effect of this process, the instrument regulating economic and financial cooperation with nations on Europe’s fringes, in North Africa and the Middle East, has been included in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (enpi ), which for the period 2007 to 2013, was assigned twelve billion euros. Media assistance programmes have been implemented in the European Neighbourhood, including Arab countries, through programmes directed at developing independent press and broadcasting,

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strengthening the professionalisation of media producers and outlets, supporting the reform of media legislation, and establishing networks of information and interregional exchange of information on human rights.44 However, the media sector has not been the main recipient of assistance or target of development programmes, but rather the vehicle by which to achieve far-reaching goals, such as to increase citizen participation in politics, strengthen the respect of human rights, and democratise institutions.45 Indeed, media development projects fall within broader sectors such as ‘social development and democratisation’, ‘civil society’, and ‘human rights and democracy’.46 According to a study financed by the ec , the total amount spent on media development and freedom of expression by the ec in the period 2000 to 2010 was approximately 148 million euro, of which 12.5 per cent was for the Middle East and North Africa.47 ec support for media development has been scant, given the bilateral support from eu member states and other bilateral donors (the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency [sida ] or bbc Media Action) to the field.48 As in the case of another important donor agency, usaid , media development projects are difficult to track, as they are scattered across different sectors and funding instruments.49 A study produced by the ec recognises how the ec funded 437 media-related projects between 2000 and 2010, although no distinction is made between support for media assistance and support for freedom of expression.50 An interview with the eu functionary working on the Syria desk, Raniero Leto, from the Directorate General of Development and Cooperation, confirmed that prior to 2011, media assistance programmes were carried out by specific partner implementers, but under broader projects focusing on support for civil society, democracy, and human rights.51 In particular, Syria has been the beneficiary of funds aimed at the production, broadcasting, and distribution of new and existing television and radio programmes and the distribution of Internet-based media products; training programmes provided by the European Neighbourhood Journalism Network; establishing online networks between media producers; and producing audiovisual products promoting intercultural dialogue (see table 5.1).52 Syria has also benefitted from funding channelled through un agencies used for increasing media and it literacy rates at the school level. Following the escalation of violence in Syria in 2011, the eu suspended all of its cooperation instruments with the Syrian

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government and started a programme with the intent of supporting the Syrian population affected by the crisis. Most of the funding was assigned to humanitarian aid, to support the huge numbers of refugees scattered across Syria and in neighbouring countries. However, part of the funding was also given to projects supporting independent and free media, on the assumption that ‘the possibility to access independent, balanced and reliable sources of information will be the key to reducing tensions in the post-conflict period’.53 Many media assistance projects have been implemented since the start of the uprising in 2011; however, at the beginning projects were taking place in the Syrian hinterland, but with the increase in violence, the eu ’s media funding has been directed to neighbouring countries or to rebel-held areas inside Syria before they were recaptured by the regime. In these circumstances, the eu visibly increased its spending on media assistance, along with the number of its implementing partners.54 Nonetheless, the type of support offered to Syrian activists and journalists has changed since the start of the uprising, tailored to a conflict-like context, in which the media could potentially be used to organise information campaigns, document the horrors occurring in the country to national and international audiences, and to heal the wounds of years of civil war. Media training institutes have sprouted across Syria’s neighbouring countries (Gaziantep and Istanbul in Turkey, Beirut in Lebanon, Amman in Jordan) and workshops on media development occur on a daily basis, not only offering journalists and activists lessons on how to write a story or shoot a video that can reach the international stage, but also offering trainees professional media tools, like mobile phones, cameras, and laptops, to support their work. Some organisations send their trainers to rebel-held areas, where they set up training sessions, while others opt for the safer option of making activists and journalists cross the borders to Lebanon or Turkey. In practice, however, media training is putting trainers and trainees in great danger, as a female journalist working for a well-established international organisation as a media trainer told me when we met in a service station on the road between Gaziantep and the border with Syria. She revealed how she had to dress in disguise, and how every time her mobile rang she feared receiving news of retaliations on her family, as had already been the case.55 Similarly, Syrian activists run high risks to participate in media training, having to cross borders and conflict areas, often

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smuggling broadcasting devices that are strongly forbidden either by the Syrian regime or by sections of the Islamist fronts. A group of women attending a media training in Beirut – some having left Ghouta province in the aftermath of the chemical attack – said that these dangers frightened them, but also convinced them even more of the importance of such training sessions, to ensure that the events of the civil war remain visible to the public and to the international community.56 The ec ’s most recent media assistance funding for Syria has been devolved between a number of projects; these include building the Internet management capacity of bloggers and human rights defenders, teaching cybersecurity, training young activists on the use of social media, and facilitating access to information for the Syrian population through radio stations or printed materials. Most of these projects, though extremely useful, are on a short-term contract, making it very difficult to achieve durable results. In contrast to these projects, bbc Media Action implemented a three-year project, the enpi Media Neighbourhood, delivering journalism training and a networking programme for 1,200 journalists across seventeen eu -neighbouring countries, including Syria.57 The programme, started in 2012, included training, study tours, conferences, workshops, networks, and meetings with media experts, with the intent of creating a new generation of professional journalists who can support the building of democratic institutions in their country of origin. Concerning the objectives of these trainings, an employer of an ec -funded ngo working in Gaziantep, training Syrian journalists and activists, told me, ‘I believe that true democracy stands on a free media sector. However, sometimes I have some doubts on Western ways of exporting democracy. Do you think that all this investment in the media sector is only oriented at rising the standards of Syrian journalism? Now they justify it saying that it is to provide a fairer coverage of the conflict. But how about before the conflict? I feel these trainings we are doing are using Syrian activists to conduct a more subtle battle’.58 usaid

Support for independent media is one of the main fields of action for usaid and, along with the eu, is the main foreign aid agency in the world.59 Despite usaid ’s record, the initial plan for the research for this book did not include an analysis of usaid , as it was designed

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to focus only on European media assistance funding – given, as well, the organisation’s poor response to my numerous attempts to receive more information about their media assistance programmes in Syria and the wider region. The off-the-record interviews obtained about the organisation did not provide sufficient elements to support a serious analysis, either. However, the numerous Syrian activists interviewed who received training, travel grants, and scholarships through one of the media development organisations funded by the usaid have instead confirmed the need to include an analysis of usaid . In the 1980s, usaid ’s media assistance programmes focused on Latin American countries, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, usaid launched a major campaign to support independent media in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which has lasted up to the present, with a new shift towards Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.60 The encouraging results achieved in these contexts motivated the US Department of State and usaid to invest more in the media sector, with more than half a billion dollars spent to support independent media development between 2005 and 2010, nearly doubling the previous amount.61 It is noteworthy that the increase in media assistance investment by usaid also corresponds to a geopolitical shift in involvement towards the Middle East and Central Asia region.62 In 2008, spending on media development in the Middle East shot up from $1 million to more than $42 million in a single year.63 In Syria (see table 5.1), given the restrictions imposed by the regime and the not-ideal relations with the US administration before 2011, usaid has only been able to intervene indirectly through programmes supporting nascent civil society groups and actors that promoted independent media by providing training, overseas travel grants, and scholarships to local civil society actors.64 The limited collaboration that usaid has shown with regards to the visibility of their own programmes makes it very difficult to know what the organisation has done and where exactly in the Middle East they have been involved. Official documents online do not offer clarification, given the fact that media development projects are often embedded in larger civil society and international development projects, making it hard to break down usaid’s funding for media development for each country and year.65 It is rather emblematic that media aid programmes, which are aimed,

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apparently, at enhancing freedom of expression and transparency, are so obscure and secretive. Moreover, the complex organisation of the US agency obfuscates the tracking of media assistance funding even more.66 Most usaid assistance projects, including media development, are implemented under four main regional departments: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Eurasia, and Asia Near East.67 However, the regional departments are not the only channels supporting media development programmes, as State Department bureaus also provide aid assistance. For instance, the Department of Defense spends millions of dollars on strategic communications and information operations every year.68 Though little of the Department of Defense’s work falls into the category of classic ‘media development’, its media-related initiatives often affect international media development efforts in quite significant ways.69 The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the State Department also leads a number of initiatives of media development in the form of grants under the headings of freedom, democracy, and human rights.70 The State Department also relies on the Middle East Partnership Initiative (mepi), a governmental instrument designed to fund grassroots and bottom-up initiatives of civil society groups in the Middle East and North Africa, many of which are related to media assistance projects.71 mepi was recently linked to Syria in the release of the WikiLeaks’ cables on US secret backing of Syrian opposition groups before the uprising in 2011.72 According to the released documents, mepi was transformed into the main channel for destabilising the Syrian regime under the name of civil society support programmes. While Edgar Vasquez, a State Department spokesperson, said mepi had allocated $7.5 million for Syrian programmes since 2005, the WikiLeaks cable pegged a higher amount of $12 million between 2005 and 2010.73 In particular, the cable held that US funding had been allocated to start up an anti-Assad satellite channel, Barada tv, which I discussed in chapter 4. The financial backing of the tv station started under President George W. Bush after he froze diplomatic ties with Damascus in 2005, and continued under President Obama despite the attempts to rebuild relations with the regime.74 As one can observe, the media aid industry was actively developed in Syria with projects not merely aimed at strengthening the media sector but targeting the stability of the political system.

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unesco is within the United Nations system, the main organ with a specific mandate to promote ‘the free flow of ideas by word and image’. unesco ’s media assistance programmes are located within its Communication and Information sector, which supports free, independent, and pluralistic media in print, broadcast, and online, fostering universal access to information and knowledge, and the development of infrastructures.75 The Freedom of Expression and Media Development division is specifically charged with implementing activities that promote the free flow of information, and is where most media development work is implemented and funded.76 unesco regards itself not only as a founding organisation on media work but as a ‘thought leader’, one that coordinates the main activities in this field and that is regarded as an exemplary model. George Awad, national programme specialist for unesco at the Beirut Cluster, explained in an interview how the support in the media field in pre-revolutionary Syria was in line with the programme of the organisation, specifically working on three different levels: institutions, professionals, and academia (see table 5.1).77 In fact, as an agency of the United Nations, unesco can only operate through official channels, meaning the government’s approval is always needed. At a top level, unesco engaged with institutions of the government on issues like media laws, a code of ethics, constitutional matters, capacity building with state institutions, and journalists. unesco has put a strong emphasis on legal matters in Syria, pushing for the revision of existing laws and the drafting of new laws relevant to public media, but no concrete agreement was reached before the uprising. Positive results have instead been obtained by engaging with state media institutions like Syria’s national news agency (sana ), radio, and tv council, by offering training to its members, providing more efficient technologies, and modernising their professional curricula. unesco has also been working with Syrian journalists directly, organising trainings for young professionals on freedom of expression, democracy, online journalism, and writing skills, both in urban and rural areas, while also supporting the establishment of community centres for youth and women, where media literacy is taught. The organisation has also worked in the academic sector, both at a university and

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secondary school level, by updating the academic curriculum, providing more up-to-date tools, and training students on aspects such as critical thinking and writing skills. unesco ’s partners in Syria were sana , the Ministry of Information, and Damascus University. unesco organised, in conjunction with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (escwa ), the second meeting of the Regional Preparatory Conference for the World Summit on the Information Society, in Damascus in 2005, as an incentive for Syria to create ‘new partnerships for building the Arab information society’.78 The conference aimed at reducing the digital divide by promoting partnership among the numerous stakeholders of the information society, including the government, the private sector, and ngo s. In 2005, unesco also sponsored a threeday workshop entitled ‘Writing Skills in a Pluralistic and Updated Approach’, gathering correspondents of sana in Damascus. The workshop sessions focused on ‘practical applications on how to write news items, the different types of journalistic writings, how to use pluralistic approaches in the news coverage and the impact of the Internet on the new media’.79 With a different target, unesco held a two-day training session in Beirut for Syrian teachers on media literacy in 2009.80 The media training was part of a worldwide project to expand education, media use, and e-learning. A tool kit that included manuals and guidelines on how to introduce media education as a subject in school curricula was provided to teachers, though it was intended to be distributed to students, parents, and professionals alike. The training kit offered a comprehensive overview of media education, for all types of media, old and new. The aim went beyond media literacy per se and addressed people’s participation in the political and cultural life of their community. All of these projects were among the numerous initiatives carried out by unesco in pre-revolutionary Syria, intended to support media development by tackling it from diverse though interwoven perspectives, spanning education, law, and technology. At the onset of the uprising, unesco moved its headquarters to Beirut and has been obliged to redirect its efforts to safer zones like Syria’s neighbours (Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey), where Syrians, who have fled the country, currently live. The main focus of their activities has been directed to supporting the younger generations, teaching them how to use social media, surf the web safely, and use the new media as tools to facilitate dialogue and to mediate the conflict.

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United Nations Development Programme The United Nations Development Programme (undp ) is another of the un agencies that promotes free and independent media in developing and transitional countries. undp , like unesco , has been operating within the boundaries of the Syrian system, which means in cooperation with governmental organisations and through projects benefitting media institutions, national media outlets, and state-journalists (see table 5.1).81 In 2005, undp claimed that by improving the quality of the media sector in Syria, it would have addressed other core concerns, such as public participation, economic development, women’s development, and enhancing relations between the government and citizens.82 More specifically in the past decade, undp has funded a number of significant media support initiatives: Empowering Young Journalists in Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Tawasul).83 The undp media and communication team was the initial catalyst for the project, while the International Centre for Journalists (icfj ) was engaged for technical advice. The project was carried out in partnership with the Ministry of Information between 2007 and 2011 with the intent of building ‘knowledge, skills and good citizenship principles among young Syrian journalists’.84 The project was implemented by Miriam Sami, a professional media consultant and a Knight International Journalism Fellow. Prior to the launch of the project, Sami trained fifty-nine Syrian journalists under the age of thirty on covering social issues and producing online stories. Besides the training, she helped set up the organisational structure of the network. The young professionals produced multimedia stories on social issues, including using cartoons, photographs, and animation, while tackling thorny issues. These included a video uncovering pollution problems in the capital’s main river, a teenager’s battle with a debilitating disease, and the online debate over Syrian citizenship for children with a foreign parent.85 icfj president Joyce Barnathan said that the project would bring Syrian youth into the digital arena, offering them a place where they would report on important issues, and that by doing so ‘these journalists will identify hidden problems and find solutions that can improve life in Syria’.86

145 Table 5.1 | Media Aid Development Donors ec

usaid

undp

unesco

Pre-2011: Projects aimed at production, broadcasting, and distribution of new and existing tv programs, radio programs, and Internet-based media products; establishing online networks between media producers; and audio-visual products promoting intercultural dialogue

Pre-2011: Projects supporting civil society groups that promote independent media through trainings, overseas travel grants, and scholarships

Pre-2011: Tawasul project, in cooperation with icfj , to build “knowledge, skills, and good citizenship principles among young Syrian journalists”; and the training of 59 Syrian journalists ($682,000)

Pre-2011: Projects supporting institutions, professionals, and academia; pushing for revision of media legislation; modernization, reform of the national news agency (sana ); training independent journalists

Post-2011: Projects supporting independent and free media; and building Internet capacity of bloggers and human rights defenders; training on cybersecurity, news-writing, and use of broadcasting devices

mepi instrument: Allocated $12 million to Syria between 2005 and 2010 Start-up of antiregime Barada tv station (2006–11)

2008: Support to the Syria Times newspaper (English daily) 2010: Support for a two-year period to the whole media sector ($444,000)

Second meeting of the Regional Preparatory Conference for the World Summit in the Information Society in Damascus (2005) Workshop entitled “Writing Skills in a Pluralistic and Updated Approach” (2005) Training on media literacy targeting Syrian teachers (2004) Post 2011: Operative in neighbouring countries; providing media projects targeting the younger generations on Internet surfing, writing skills, and use of social media to promote dialogue and ethnic reconciliation

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The programme had a sizable impact on the young journalists, developing their skills and knowledge, and building confidence. On another level, the programme also had a positive impact on the Ministry of Information, which favoured the idea of investing in young journalists and establishing a journalism network. The empowerment of the young journalists project operated on an initial budget of $682,000, which increased with new donors bringing new funding and consequently an addition of activities.87 Five main goals were planned for this project: 1) national debates on topics related to the Millennuim Development Goals (mdg s) with young journalists in rural and urban settings, 2) a national network of youth journalists to work on mdg themes as a means to enhance good citizenry practices, 3) advocating for the future integration of civic education in school programmes, 4) a media reform strategy prepared and submitted for consensus, and 5) the design and implementation of a capacity development programme for Syrian journalists and media outlets, with a focus on special engagement.88 The Tawasul network has remained active and vibrant long after the end of the project, though it symbolises the serious difficulties of working in restricted media environments. Hence, the icfj and Miriam Sami had to move carefully in the narrow space that the Ministry of Information allowed her, while ensuring that the government would not control the content of her activity too strictly. Support to the Syria Times Newspaper, launched in 2008 in partnership with the Ministry of Information, was intended to re-establish the Syria Times as an influential English-language daily newspaper in Syria and abroad. The newspaper, with an estimated readership of five thousand, was the only English paper in the country, but due to an imperfect use of the English language and an unattractive layout, it reached neither educated Syrians nor the international population. The project focused on revising the internal organisational structure, as well as improving the quality and efficiency of the newspaper, both administratively and editorially.89 The strategy was based on a number of imperatives, including the improvement of the newspaper’s content, service, local news, cultural section, web navigation, advertising, and, not least, establishing a customer service department.90 By modernising the Syria Times newspaper, the project contributed to enhancing the capacity of civil society and the media to monitor and advise the performance of public institutions, while becoming a model for future media development projects in Syria. The positive

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results obtained by these projects encouraged the undp to donate $444,000 in 2010 for ‘Support to the Media Sector in Syria’ to the Ministry of Information, a grant valid for a two-year period.91 The project was aimed at supporting institutional and human resource capacity in the media sector, directed towards media institutions, national media agencies, and journalism students. As part of this effort, the project was meant to facilitate an international exchange programme for media professionals and offer training in the ethics of journalism, as well as it training.

c o n t r ac to rs / im p lementers 92 bbc

Media Action

bbc Media Action is an important player in the field of media development in Syria. As an international development charity, bbc Media Action has a long and successful history of international media assistance, producing radio and television programmes, social media, and mobile phones that, in their words, ‘enable face to face dialogue to build knowledge, and bring about shifts in attitudes, norms and behaviour’.93 bbc Media Action has been working with broadcasters, governments, ngo s, and donors ‘to provide information and stimulate positive change’ in twenty-eight countries across fields as different as governance, health, resilience, and humanitarian response.94 Despite bbc Media Action’s high level of competence, Syria has not been an easy environment in which to work, given the regime’s tight supervision and the suspicion with which any foreign activity is met. These difficulties are outlined in a bbc Media Action study on support for media freedom in Syria, ‘Country Case Study: Syria. Support to media where freedoms and rights are constrained’, which discusses the reasons why the media is constrained and how outside agencies and donors can support free and independent media.95 The report, commissioned by sida , highlights the chronic lack of research and literature on Syrian society and politics, a requisite deemed fundamental by donors and implementing partners willing to fund media development programmes in the country. bbc Media Action has been among the pioneer organisations implementing media assistance programmes in Syria. Juliette Harkin, a bbc journalist and specialist on Syrian media, stated in our first interview that Syria was selected, among seven other Middle Eastern

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countries, for a £1.5 million project between 2004 and 2007.96 The project, the Arab Media Dialogue programme, consisted of building partnerships with Arab media organisations and training staff of media agencies.97 Harkin, project manager of the programme, and based in Damascus at the time, said that the programme in Syria consisted of training courses in journalism skills, business, and management for selected journalists, editors, and managers, working in partnership with both state and private media outlets (see table 5.2). As in the case of the iwpr (see following section), this training was extremely useful in stimulating a new class of journalists, helping them become more responsible in their professional duties and update their journalistic skills. In 2006, the bbc directed its support to a newly created, private online newspaper, Syria News, by training its managers on sustainable business models for online news and by organising tailored bbc -run workshops for seven of its staff.98 Part of the team was selected to take part in business development training and in study courses in London. In turn, Syria News became a role model in the field of professional media outlets in Syria, as mentioned in chapter 4, working with high international journalistic standards that provided practical training scholarships and materials to graduate students from the journalism department at Damascus University.99 This means that the training acquired in the first place by the bbc Media Action was then transferred to the Syria News staff and to the graduate students in journalism who had internships at the newspaper headquarters. Of a different nature was the three-year Socially Responsible Media Platforms in the Arab World project that the bbc launched in 2008, with the aim of setting up an interactive online training platform for Syrian journalists and bloggers. The project, the Ara2 Academy (‘Ara’ being Arabic for ‘options’) was directed by a young Westminster University PhD fellow, Maha Taki, recruited by the bbc for this specific project because of her extensive knowledge on Syrian and Lebanese blogs, which she had demonstrated in her doctoral thesis.100 Her work highlighted how, despite academic interest being directed only toward the Egypt and Persian Gulf blogosphere, Syrian and Lebanese bloggers were no less active than their neighbours; they only lacked the means and capacity to reach a wider audience.101 The Ara2 Academy project was therefore thought of as a tool for bridging this gap and making the community of Syrian bloggers and journalists stronger. Based on the already existing

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bbc online media training model, though targeting the whole Arab world, the Ara2 Academy was thought of as an online training platform, in Arabic, targeting only Syrian journalists and bloggers.102 Taki contended that, under president Bashar, both journalists and bloggers had tried to make small changes by creating news spaces online, whether in the form of a magazine or a blog, but with no attempt at connecting these two worlds, which remained completely separate.103 Conversely, the Ara2 Academy tried to create a link between these two worlds, to bring them closer, help them get to know each other, and find ways to make them interact. The project developed through two courses, Basic Journalism Skills and Social Media Tools, based on basic journalist and blogger skills like how to open a blog, upload videos, interact online, write news pieces, and use Twitter and other aggregators. Through these courses, bloggers and journalists would learn each other’s skills and competencies, and interact in the production of news. Despite having no official advertisement, the programme managed to train, by word of mouth, over seventy-five men and women, among whom were journalists, bloggers, and webmasters, before the worsening of the political situation in 2011, which led to an inevitable freeze of all development aid.104 Because of such insecurity, many ngo s have preferred to train journalists rather than build local institutions, which requires overcoming more obstacles, like the control of the regime or the need for the organisation to justify their presence in the country.105 Two young Syrian women trainees who I met during a media training session in Beirut told me how in their view the bbc trainings were very effective: ‘Contrary to other organisations, the bbc has a wider plan, with long-term objectives. You learn about journalism, but more importantly you understand how to use your skills, particularly under a regime like the Syrian one’.106 The deteriorating situation in Syria, which had seen popular upheavals turn into a civil conflict, obliged many international organisations to sit back and wait for the situation to clear up before they could adopt adequate responses. Media assistance programmes take specific directions according to the political status of the target country, whether it is an authoritarian regime, a country in conflict, or a country emerging from a conflict. With the increase of violence in Syria, bbc Media Action stepped aside for some time, feeling, in the words of Taki, very nervous of any involvement in such circumstances. After all, media assistance organisations operate in all types

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of contexts, including authoritarian states, conflict areas, and transition settings, through adopting different plans. This means that the media development project in Syria had to respond to a reality that was very different from what had been previously envisaged, one that was characterized by a civil war with sectarian friction, an expanding refugee population, and low media coverage of the ongoing conflict. When it became clear that the Syrian conflict was far from ending anytime soon, bbc Media Action launched a refugee project, with drama, documentary, and animation projects, at the end of 2013, to support the over two million people who had been displaced by the conflict.107 As Taki recounts, despite the overpopulated refugee camps, most refugees were scattered outside the camps, completely cut off from all types of information, even the most basic that would help them receive food stamps. To respond to this problem, bbc Media Action, in partnership with the un High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr ) and nongovernmental and media partners, decided to install loud speakers and big screens in gathering points for refugees, such as unhcr registration centres (four in Lebanon and five in Jordan that could take around 2,000 people per day), to meet the information needs of refugees.108 The information campaign was designed to offer practical advice about where to get medical treatment and vaccinations, increase people’s awareness of trauma and domestic violence, and restore values of peace and solidarity that had been lost during the conflict, by screening fifteen video clips that encouraged tolerance, and respect for women and children’s rights, as well as a revival of Syrian culture.109 Maurice Aaek, a Syrian journalist and researcher who worked on the project, highlighted how the project had a strong grassroots dimension, targeting Syrian refugees and involving them in the production of the project, on both an a technical and artistic level.110 The Institute for War and Peace Reporting The The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (iwpr ) is one of the main institutions involved in media development, working on frontlines and in crises and transition areas around the world. iwpr works with local reporters, citizen journalists, and civil society activists to develop the ‘knowledge, skills, relationships and platforms they need to communicate clearly, objectively, effectively, persua-

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sively and safely and to use that knowledge and those tools to affect positive change’.111 iwpr has a long history and varied experience across the world, having started its mandate in the Middle East after the war in Iraq in 2003. According to the manager of iwpr ’s mena programme, Susanne Fischer, interviewed in Beirut in 2013, their strategy in Syria has been, in primis, to educate a new generation of journalists.112 ‘The university curricula [at the national level] had nothing to do with what we, the West, meant by journalism’, Fischer said. Decades of authoritarian rule had transformed the field of journalism into an extension of the Ministry of Information, and transformed journalists into the state’s functionaries.113 iwpr was one of the few organisations, like the bbc and Deutsche Welle, that started working in Syria long before the uprising in 2011, with the intent of nourishing young journalists with new values and skills (see table 5.2). Conversely to the modus operandi of the bbc and Deutsche Welle, which operated with the state’s approval, iwpr worked undercover. Working with state authorisation and working without it both have their limits. In fact, having to work undercover requires more time for projects to take off, for networks to be created, and mostly to gain people’s trust, while working under state authorisation means less freedom in programme planning. The organisation became officially active in the country in 2007, when it hosted a first round of media training in Istanbul. The training was offered to journalists and media activists belonging to three different groups: a Kurdish group, a group in opposition to the regime, and a mixed group (ethnically and politically speaking). These first training sessions, Fischer asserted, were a primary way to assess the general level of media literacy in Syria, draw a profile of Syrian journalist-activists, and tailor future training according to their specific needs. From 2008, iwpr became operative in Syria, working with a local partner, the Syrian International Academy for Training and Development (sia ), which became the basis for their practical training.114 The sia was a Damascus-based institution which offered specialised training and development in the fields of media, public relations, and international affairs and diplomatic studies. In particular, the Department for Media Training employed elite experts, specialists, and trainers from partners like the al-Jazeera Media Training Centre in Qatar and Radio Monte Carlo, providing wellequipped facilities which suited any media courses and activities.

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iwpr’s mena manager had found in the director of the sia an openminded person willing to offer new curricula to Syrian journalists, even if it might not always coincide with the regime’s views. The trainings organised by iwpr were not a one-day shot, but intensive one-week or more training sessions. They did not finish on the last day of the training, either; on the contrary, ‘the actual training would start at the end, when the trainees made their first steps as media professionals, shadowed by their trainers’. iwpr ’s trainings continued over time, with mentoring that continued at a distance. For this purpose, iwpr established two news websites, the Damascus Bureau and CyberArabs, to assist their trainees beyond the training. The Damascus Bureau was thought of as an open window to Syrian issues and beyond, tackling prominent political, economic, and cultural news. Rather than covering breaking news, the website presents in-depth coverage of issues related to civil society, refugees, human rights, justice, and more recently the dire reality of the Syrian conflict.115 The CyberArabs website instead addresses a wider audience, targeting issues of cybersecurity and delivering up-to-date information on the latest digital security threats.116 In 2010, the regime imposed strict surveillance on suspiscious activities, progressively limiting the operational activity of organisations like iwpr . Under an ultimatum from the regime, iwpr decided to relocate to Beirut and set up its trainings from there. According to Fischer, the regime had been aware of their activities before 2010, but it somehow tolerated their presence, apparently seeing them as non-hazardous. Indeed, most of the articles that the trainees wrote had been intentionally uploaded online in English (whether they were written in English in the first place or translated afterwards), in order to draw less attention and fuel less hatred from the government. Despite this shrewdness, the often-politicised stances that some of the articles took, especially when covering human rights issues, eventually convinced the government to issue a clear and definitive signal to end production. iwpr had a dominant role in the field of media development in pre-revolutionary Syria. Media training ranged from classes on basic journalism to print and online journalism, as well as video journalism; the training became increasingly sophisticated and tailored with the advancement of the programmes and with groups that were called for a second round. The organisation trained around eighty Syrian journalists between 2007 and 2010, with a selection of people

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with profiles that were not specifically media-related, but who came from different occupations, though all were motivated to learn how to use the new media. Since the outbreak of the uprising, iwpr has been very cautious with its Syrian journalists and activists, relocating all the training to Lebanon (Beirut) and Turkey (Istanbul and Gaziantep). Moreover, the selection of candidates requires great care and vigilance, in order to avoid selecting regime-supporters or members of the mukhaˉbaraˉ t infiltrating its ranks. Given the sectarian divide that characterises the Syrian conflict, the selection of trainees has once again proved to be a challenging task, one in which attempts are made to leave behind localism but that inevitably leads trainees to face the consequences of a war that is digging trenches based on fear, ignorance, and religious and ethnic divisions. Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (arij ) is the first and only ngo in the region dedicated to promoting investigative journalism. The Amman-based organisation was established in 2005 to support ‘independent quality professional journalism, through in-depth journalism projects, and offering media coaching’.117 The organisation has been working in the field of print, radio, tv , and online media in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Bahrain, Palestine, Yemen, and Tunisia. arij was initially the outcome of a number of meetings held by Arab journalists, editors, media activists, and professionals who were committed to enhancing the quality of Arab journalism. Supported by the Copenhagen-based International Media Support, sida , the Open Society Foundations, unesco , icfj, and others, arij has grown over the years and has established three units in Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt. The main purpose of the organisation is to train journalists in investigative journalism and support their specific investigative reports through funding their travel costs, providing access to national and international databases, translating their reports, and, what is more, providing legal support if action is taken against a journalist.118 Saad Hattar, head of the Investigative Reporting Department at arij, and who has more than twenty years experience as a media trainer, revealed that he had provided media training to more than 1,200 journalists in the region, of whom around 150 were Syrians,

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since its opening.119 arij , explains Hattar, has been working in Syria in an official way, meaning that all training has occurred in the open with the approval of Taleb Qadi Amin, assistant to the minister of information, which is the only way, he holds, to work effectively in Syria without jeopardising those participating (see table 5.2).120 By having the regime’s consent, arij has been able to offer training to both private and state-sector journalists through their offices in Damascus and Aleppo, with some fieldtrips to their headquarters in Amman. arij has been able to gain the regime’s blessing in the name of the new type of journalism that it promotes, investigative reporting, presented to the Syrian government as an experimental field that, albeit not encompassing political issues, can support the government through keeping track of cases of social mismanagement and corruption. Nonetheless, Hattar admits that given the often weak professional profile of some of their Syrian journalists, arij has actually carried out training that was not focused only on investigative reporting but more broadly encompassed more general knowledge on how to write a news story, how to use online databases to dig for accurate information, how to make use of social media, and how to produce video reporting.121 The legal support offered by the organisation constitutes a precious factor for many journalists in Syria, who have thus far been strongly limited by a mechanism of self-censorship, fearing the overstepping of red lines. Rana Sabbagh-Gargour, arij executive director, stresses that arij ’s training is not political: ‘our ultimate goal is to teach a new, professional technique that journalists can apply to any issue that they deem to be of public concern’.122 In fact, most investigative reports that Syrian journalists have published, through arij , have covered issues affecting the lives of the Syrian public, like an increase in child sexual abuse, public health risks from environmental waste, illnesses due to family intermarriages, or the increased number of women working in the private sector with no social insurance. Hattar explains that Syrian journalists have been offered weekly training, workshops at their headquarters in Amman, and one-to-one mentoring and continual supervision of investigations.123 In return, those trained had to spend extensive hours on investigative fieldwork, which included anything from interviews to archival research to data collection, all of which required their steadfastness in overcoming bureaucratic obstacles limiting access to information.124

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arij has been carrying out impressive work that is not just introducing a new type of journalism, a novelty in the region, but trying to update the Arab education system, which is outdated and which has produced a generation that is largely apolitical and lacking in critical thinking skills. Not only this, but arij has taught students not simply to memorise, but to think and to respect their work.125 arij kept working when the the Arab revolts broke out and despite the hardships that the political unrest brought about, investigative journalism seems to be gaining more ground as a tool to investigate and disclose recent cases of money laundering, political corruption, and organised crime.126

o t h e r p l ayers Media assistance programmes in Syria are not limited to the actors presented thus far, but are populated by many other players. However, tracking media assistance projects has revealed itself to be quite a challenge. As Sakr observes, American donors such as the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations are so embedded in the scenery that the ‘intricate web’ they have woven with ‘government, business, academic and military leaders’ is rarely investigated.127 For instance, while the Ford Foundation generously sustains Arab projects related to transparency, human rights, and democratisation through freedom of expression, the rules that direct its programmes restrict much of the information sharing. For the purpose of this study, a few words need to be said on some of these other actors, who have not been particularly keen to reveal information about their programmes in Syria, though have yet played a relevant role. Reporters Without Borders (rwb ) is a nonprofit organisation that has been working in the whole region monitoring attacks on freedom of information, denouncing such attacks in the international arena, and providing finances to assist persecuted journalists.128 Since 2001, their support for freedom of expression has not only covered press journalists and media activists but also those working in cyberspace, through their New Media Desk. Saozig Dollet, from rwb ’s Middle East and North Africa Desk, explained how in Syria their activities have been directed mainly at supporting the media industry by supporting the Syrian Journalists Association, providing legal advice and support to journalists persecuted for their activities and assisting journalists in exile, whether by following up on their request for

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asylum or providing financial aid (see table 5.2).129 Moreover, with its consultant status at unesco , rwb has provided assistance for a number of educational and media-related programmes implemented by the un agency in the country. Media assistance projects that involved trainings offered to a significant number of Syrian activists and bloggers were carried out by ‘American government-financed non-governmental organizations’, like the Albert Einstein Institution and Freedom House.130 The Albert Einstein Institution is an organisation working for the defence of freedom, justice, and democracy, funded by Gene Sharp, author of the book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which has supported activists in a number of nonviolent protest movements across the world, such as those against Slobodan Miloševic´ in Serbia and Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine. The message of the organisation is that ‘as soon as you choose to fight with violence you are choosing to fight against your opponents’ best weapons and you have to be smarter than that’.131 Jamila Raqib, the executive director of the Albert Einstein Institution, denies any accusation that the organisation is behind the revolutions that broke out in the Arab region.132 However, she admits having organised a set of meetings over the years with Syrian activists and media professionals ‘interested in their work’ and in the techniques of ‘non-violent weapons’, which the organisation promotes in the fight against tyranny and dictatorship (see table 5.2).133 Similarly, Freedom House is another organisation dedicated to strengthening freedom around the world, investing in projects aimed at empowering citizens and protecting fundamental human rights.134 Their areas of focus are wide, covering media issues under their media freedom, freedom of expression, Internet freedom, and civil society programmes. The organisation has been very reluctant to provide any type of information concerning media assistance programmes in Syria, other than broader awareness campaigns and the research analysis they have produced. Nonetheless, a relatively large number of Syrian activists, bloggers, and journalists that I interviewed – whose identity cannot be disclosed for safety reasons – confirmed they had been trained by Freedom House in Jordan and in the US (see table 5.2).135 Most of the activists affirmed that Freedom House was among the most useful in which they had participated, in terms of organisation and content, which ranged from enhancing writing skills to use of social media, to video-production and digital security, as well as leadership skills.136

157 Table 5.2 | Media Aid Development Implementers bbc Media Action

Working with state approval Support for a newly created online newspaper, Syria News (2006) Three-year project: set up of the Ara2 Academy, organising two courses: “Basic Journalism Skills” and “Social Media Tools” (training 75 journalists) Post-2011: Refugee project, using media to document and entertain, and raise social awareness

iwpr

Working with no state approval First round of media training (media activists and journalists) in Istanbul in 2007 Operative in Syria in 2008, working with the Syrian International Academy for Training and Development (sia ) Training of 80 journalists and media activists between 2007 and 2010 Set up of the websites Damascus Bureau and CyberArabs

arij

Working with state approval Training of state journalists and journalists from the private sector in investigative journalism (weekly training sessions, workshops, and one-on-one mentoring) Funding specific investigative reporting through translating reports and offering legal support

rwb

Working with state approval Post-2011: Supporting press journalists, media activists, and cyber-activists through the New Media Desk Support to the Syrian Journalists Association (asj ) Legal advice to persecuted journalists

Albert Einstein Institution

Bypassing state approval by working with Syrian journalists and activists abroad Extensive set of meetings with Syrian journalists and activists; and seminars on techniques for “non-violent weapons” to fight tyranny and dictatorship in closed regimes

Freedom House

Bypassing state approval by working with Syrian journalists and activists abroad Advanced media trainings in the US and Jordan, enhancing writing skills, use of social media, video production, digital security, and leadership

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To complete the gamut of media development programmes implemented by US-based organisations, one needs to mention the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, which have provided training for Arab activists, among whom have been numerous Syrians. In this regard, Michael Posner, the assistant US secretary of state for human rights and labor, affirmed in the spring of 2011 that the US government had budgeted $50 million in the previous two years to develop new technologies to help activists protect themselves from arrest and persecution by authoritarian governments, as well as organising sessions for 5,000 activists around the world.137 Posner himself had to specify that, contrary to what one may think, the US does not ‘promote Internet freedom or connective technologies as a means of promoting ‘regime change’. We promote the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly online and offline because these universal freedoms are the birth right of every individual’.138 Yet, Posner’s statement recalls what at the beginning of this chapter was said to be the thin line dividing media development from public diplomacy, and the politics of masking foreign policy intervention through development aid programmes.

f in a l r e m a rks This study does not aim to represent a comprehensive study of the media assistance sector in Syria, as that would require dedicating a whole book on this topic, conducted in a time of peace and with solid institutional support or authorisation. Only under these circumstances could one access government foreign policy programmes that represent the core date of any comparative undertaking on this subject.139 For this reason, this chapter presents a glimpse of a sector that is understudied and that provides a new tile in the mosaic of the pre-uprising decade in Syria and the beginnings of new answers for the many unanswered questions regarding the seeds of the popular revolts. This study corroborates the hypothesis, which aims at demonstrating how the growth of the media sector had a direct influence in laying the groundwork for the uprising in 2011. What emerges is that the Syrian media landscape did not change simply as an effect of the country’s opening up to the new media technologies and to modest institutional reforms affecting the sector, but also as a result of foreign aid projects. Media assistance projects contributed

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to the improvement of the media sector, supporting newly established media outlets, reforming existing ones, expanding social media use, and improving the quality and quantity of news, as well as journalists’ professionalism. What is more telling, however, is how media development positively affected civil society activism, empowering new civil actors in the use of new technologies to push the government’s red lines further, to explore the information horizon offered by the Internet, and to transform the online space on platforms to reclaim their rights and get involved in civil and political issues. The effects produced by media assistance projects were most probably beyond the expectations of the projects’ implementers and the objectives of the projects. Yet, the media aid industry found a particular favourable astral moment during the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. In fact, the president had proved to be more inclined to open a dialogue with Western countries, within limits – aware that compromise had to be signalled in order to avoid an Iraq-style scenario. On the other hand, the US has shifted its strategy from military confrontation to smarter means for leverage, among which the new media occupied a most prominent role. Democracy building could be, therefore, pursued in closed and authoritarian countries through other long-term means, notably democracy assistance projects and media aid development. Initially, media assistance projects did not produce immediate, far-reaching results. In this sense, Maan Abdul Salam, the owner of Etana Press – an online portal on women’s issues funded by a variety of international organizations – argued that the Internet provided a window to the world, but did not make any change in the end.140 However, the empirical evidence from Syria demonstrates how, with time, cyberspace ‘activated’ citizens, producing an important counter-discourse to the regime’s official discourse.141 Media assistance aid did not have an effect on the whole of society, but only on a minority directly involved in the media training, whether as journalists, activists, or institutions. This minority of people, as explained in chapter 2 through the two-step flow theory, acted as connectors between the online and offline worlds.142 They used the Internet as a medium to stir debates among citizens, inform citizens of cases of corruption or of the government’s wrongdoings, stimulate critical thinking, and coordinate online campaigns, which expressed the new power relationships being established between citizens and the authority. The role of these ‘bridge leaders’ perhaps became more

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evident when the Syrian uprising broke out in 2011, given the leading and coordinating role they had and the visibility they acquired, yet in the years that predated the uprising they ‘activated’ society, and made it receptive and aware of issues that had previously been silenced. Although the type of social mobilisation they produced was limited to online plaftorms, often with single-issue campaigns and primarily concerned with action over identity and meaning, this type of activism still represented a form of contestation, which was growing below the surface of the state and which would have a long-term influence on traditional political structures. It is in the accumulation of micro-changes in the media sector that we need to trace the formation of Syria’s civic resistance and mobilisation. Evidence for this research can be found in a survey conducted by the Dubai School of Government that found that, in 2014, 70 per cent of people in the Middle East believed that social media enhanced civic engagement.143 What this suggests is that the West’s foreign aid investment is not driven by development aims exclusively, but by broader political and strategic aims, among which is to destabilise unfriendly regimes. Syria burst into a revolt before this policy was uncovered. However, in countries like Cuba, these techniques have been shortlived. The multi-million dollar programme of usaid , disguised as humanitarian aid, established an anti-regime social network called ZunZuneo designed to spark political dissent. The attempt failed when the authorities discovered the truth about it in early 2014.144 Interestingly, the US’s attempts to destabilise the Castro regime through media development projects goes back to the late 1980s, employing radio or tv stations like Radio and tv Martì, which broadcasts from Miami and is aimed at encouraging bottom-up revolts against the communist regime.145 The denial of media assistance programmes by international agencies and Western governments does not hold water in the case of Syria, as well as in the rest of the region. The high numbers of activists and journalists trained by international organisations are clear proof of this multifaceted strategy. A well-known Tunisian blogger, Ben Gharbia, complained in September 2010 about the role of Western governments in using digital activists to achieve their geopolitical goals and foment unrest.146 He argued that Western funding programmes were the ‘kiss of death’ for Arab activists, as their anti-regime activities would sooner or later put their lives in

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danger, and the support that Western governments had offered them would dissipate.147As Rolf Paasch of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation stated, ‘I personally find it very problematic to use journalists to drive an agenda. There is a value in journalism in and of itself. If I use the media to drive my agenda, the government can do the same. It’s actually a bad precedent’.148 Rami Nakhle, a well-known Syrian activist who became one of the spokespeople of the Syrian revolution, was able to escape the regime and move to Beirut and then to the US.149 Nakhle is a prime example of a Syrian activist who, with it knowledge and curiosity, was trained by a number of media organisations, including in his case the iwpr and Freedom House in Syria and abroad (Lebanon, Jordan, and the US), and who later became a trainer for other Syrian activists.150 In his words, his first encounter with the Internet in 2006 and the first seventy-two hours he spent surfing the web represented the ‘crossing of the bridge from darkness to light’. After that, he says, ‘I started questioning the information I had been fed with at school, on tv , from religious leaders and also my family … I realised how we had been brainwashed by the regime’.151 Nakhle received training on news writing, social media, digital security, and leadership, becoming active in Syria as well as throughout the region, through networks of Arab activists. He later became a trainer himself for other Syrian activists and funded the online campaign Get Your Rights, to help Syrians circumvent Internet censorship, which reached 900 followers in 2009, and the Enough Silence campaign, which called for the lifting of the emergency law and the release of political prisoners. As he affirmed, every time he taught another Syrian how to use the Internet and about the many possibilities this tool offered, another person ‘would cross that bridge from darkness to light, and that is the foundation of the Arab Spring’.152 With these words, Nakhle unintentionally said something that echoed one of the first speeches by Bashar al-Asad – himself it savvy – when he said, ‘I have always seen the problems caused by chaos and corruption, and these problems can be fought with the computer. And if you see a computer, you must be organised, and you cannot be chaotic and be good with a computer. The technology was created to make things easier and faster, and we need to make things easier and faster in this country’.153

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The Syrian Media Landscape after 20111 Enemies are many … the revolution is one … and it will continue. Banner in the city of Kafranbel, Syria (3 January 2014) 2

re volt, r e vo l u t io n , a n d c ounterrevoluti on t h ro u g h t h e medi a Since 2011, 15 March has marked the anniversary of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Syrian revolution’. Eight years later, this anniversary still bears contradictory meanings and feelings. The date does symbolise the rising of the Syrian people against decades of authoritarian rule, but it also signals the outset of the extreme violence and immense suffering that this revolution has caused and continues to produce. Putting up with the enduring conflict has made many Syrians sigh, wishing it had never happened, given the perceived impossibility of reaching any tangible result, in primis that of putting an end to the cycle of death that has hit the country. Judging from the current state of events, the Syrian revolution appears to have been a tragedy of epic proportions, dashing the hopes for freedom of the early days and leaving behind the humanitarian catastrophe of a country in rubble, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, and millions displaced. The expansion of rebel-held areas between 2012 and 2015, combined with the fall of entire regions under the control of the Islamic State, made many believe that the days of the Syrian regime were numbered. Yet, in the past two years the situation has reversed completely, with the Syrian regime recapturing the bulk of the territories lost and slowly approaching ‘victory’. In short, after eight years of struggle, Syria is back to square one, with the regime holding on to power. The Syrian uprising broke out at the time of what many defined as the ‘Arab Spring’, a period of revolutionary ferment in the Arab

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region, of popular mobilisation and protest against authoritarian and corrupted regimes.3 Most of the terminology adopted to define this period is embedded in controversy, ingrained in the Orientalist framework and Eurocentric narratives. The attempt to speak about these events as a singular and unifying phenomenon proved inaccurate and inappropriate when, beyond the initial common features of the upheavals, each Arab country affected by popular unrest underwent a specific development, different from the rest, and often diverse in itself. Therefore, the domino effect that had been expected has proven, rather, to be less smooth and predictable.4 The Arab upheavals have been complex tectonic shifts with aftershocks in the following years. Syria is the quintessential case, where the unrest of the initial months has driven the country from an uprising to an armed conflict, with many players involved and several fronts engaged. The initial rebels-versus-regime narrative turned into a civil war, with scattered rebel infightings and regime resilience. In addition, the permanence of war, combined with a weak state and a fragmentation of the country into regime territories, rebel-held areas, and contested fronts has split insurgents into mutually hostile guerrilla groups. These conditions have made Syria a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalist groups, often with heavy participation from foreign fighters, which has led to a highly unorthodox jihad aimed at establishing a Dar el-Islam or new caliphate, ruled by sharia law. A description of such a complex scenario would not be complete without mentioning the role of regional powers, like Hezbollah, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Turkey, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and international superpowers like Russia and the US that have contributed with direct or indirect military, financial, technical, and political support to the opposing sides.5 This study has by no means tried to unravel the knot of the Syrian revolution, as that would require devoting a whole new research project to this purpose. On the contrary, this book has tried to trace the steps that led to its outbreak, by looking at the emergence of a new media landscape which had a strong influence on the spark of the uprising. Thus, if 15 March 2011 represents the start of the Syrian revolution, it also represents the end of this research, as the purpose of this research – tracking the roots of the Syrian revolution – terminates. This chapter represents a follow-up section that supports the hypothesis of this book by proving the indispensable role that the new media played in mobilising citizens, not only in the pre-revolutionary period

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but also subsequently, through informing, organising, and motivating civil participation in the midst of the revolt. However, limited space only permits one to touch upon the multifaceted Syrian media landscape and to outline some of the numerous debates that have emerged with regards to how the new information technologies have changed people’s power, the profession of journalism, and the nature of the conflicts in many diversified ways. Syria’s media landscape cannot be presented as a homogenous and compact field, as the role and usage of the new media changed during the course of the revolt, with very different outcomes. For practical reasons the analysis of Syria’s media field is presented as a three-phase development, which follows the evolution of the revolution: the initial period of protests and manifestations, the country’s entry into a state of conflict, and the current draining stalemate of the civil war. The demarcation between these phases has been more gradual and less evident than might appear in this analysis. Nonetheless, a framework that helps one understand the changing role of the new media over the course of the Syrian revolution provides some points of reference that may prove useful in offering a more thorough understanding of the events in Syria. It may also prove useful for reflecting on the enormous potential that the new media technologies are offering people in closed regimes around the globe, as well as the dangers and harm that these same tools produce when handled by authoritarian governments, terrorist organizations, and, not least, international media outlets that are often more concerned with sensationalist reporting rather than fundamental ethical principles.

( m e d ia ) t in g t h e sy r i an revoluti on If one had to trace the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the actual start of the popular movement would appear to date back to 17 February 2011. As Wieland Carsten asserts, this date, only six days after the ousting of Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, represents the last moment when the old and new Syria met.6 On that day, popular protest took place in the neighbourhood of al-Hariqa, in central Damascus, when the son of a shopkeeper was beaten up by police officers. The event was nothing exceptional for Syria. What was unusual was the reaction that people had on that day, when they did not

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stay still and cautious while watching the police hitting a man; they reacted by gathering around the victim to support him, opposing the indiscriminate abuse of power and chanting the words, ‘The Syrian people will not be humiliated’. Clearly, the hymn of the Tunisian revolution had already reached Syria. The neighbourhood of al-Hariqa, whose name in Arabic means ‘fire’, bore the memory of the fire that the French colonial powers ignited while shelling the city on 9 May 1926. Eighty-five years later, more than 1,500 Damascene citizens gathered around the police officers in protest, impeding the flow of city traffic. The event provoked the intervention of the minister of the interior, Major General Said Sammur, who drove into the crowd and, with no bodyguards, talked to the protestors across the roof of his car. People cheered him and expressed their discontent, eventually ending the rally by raising the chant, ‘With our soul and our blood we’ll fight for you, Bashar!’7 The paternalistic approach of the minister to the crowd had been part of the code of practice of politicians in the region since the Ottoman Empire was split into governorates. It suggested that, in this initial phase, the social bond between the people and power had not yet broken. Nonetheless, that habit was never repeated again, as the circumstances changed dramatically. Interestingly, that day, Minister Sammur is said to have pronounced these words, ‘This is a demonstration’, when looking at the crowd.8 Ironically, these words recall the exchange of words between King Louis XVI and the Duke of Liancourt. When hearing the news of the fall of the Bastille, the king is said to have asked, ‘Is this a revolt?’ and the duke to have replied, ‘No Majesty, this is a revolution’.9 In both cases, the French king and the Syrian minister of the interior had misread the meaning of the events. The old saying that every country is three meals away from revolution, once more turned out to be correct. Whether the term ‘revolution’ can be used to refer to Syria is perhaps too early to say, given the ongoing instability in the country. The small rally of al-Hariqa was the start of an escalation of events, which eventually led up to 15 March, when, after the call for popular demonstration on a Facebook page, ‘The Syrian Revolution 2011’, people of the cities of al-Hasaka, Dara’a, Deir al-Zour, and Hama replied by taking to the streets.10 The revolution had officially started. The increase in the number of popular demonstrations, as well as of those taking part in them, combined with the unwise decision by the government to suppress them with

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force, eventually caused the unrest which spread to the whole country. With the creation in the summer of 2011 of an anti-regime military force, the Free Syrian Army, formed from deserters from the Syrian army, the popular upheaval took on a new dimension and led the country towards civil war. In the course of all these events, the new media were a dominant feature, deeply affecting the development of the revolution, its narrative, the making of news, and the management of the conflict. From the Philippines to Belarus to Iran, people found in the new technologies tools to help them unite and with which to counter authoritarian and corrupt governments. In the West, movements like Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados of Puerta del Sol, and those of Syntagma Square or of Brazil’s ten-cent movement also relied on the new media technologies to coordinate protest activities and connect people. Though the former type of protests have been framed as mobilisations against authoritarian regimes and the latter as protests against austerity measures brought in after the economic crisis, the way new media have empowered citizens and enabled collective action draws many similarities between the local (Arab) anti-establishment movements and the global (Western) movement against capitalism (and the economic crisis-cum-austerity).11 This has not changed power relations, nor has it made regimes weaker and citizens stronger. Surely, people are less isolated, more informed, and more capable of coordinating massive public gatherings than ever before. Yet, new media technologies have not replaced street protests, sit-ins, and popular chants. It is not enough to protest and criticise the government on digital pages; people’s presence in the street is still at the basis of any successful political campaign. As Shirky holds, ‘social media are not a replacement for real-world action but a way to coordinate it’.12 In Syria the uprising became possible only when the online mobilisation was coupled with offline activism. The online anti-establishment mobilisation that this study analyses in the years that predated the uprising represented an important step in view of the uprising of 2011, in which citizens used online platforms to spread awareness campaigns, engage in discussion forums, and confront the authorities on the wrong doings of the state through public petitions on social matters. This phase was fundamental to bringing citizens closer, creating durable communication among atomised citizens, building a network based on a common identity, and ending the social fragmentation that the

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regime had created through decades of threat and fear. However, it was only when the arena of confrontation between citizens and the authorities spread from the virtual peripheries of the Internet to the physical space of the streets that the Syrian mobilisation became a tangible movement in the form of an uprising.

p h as e o n e : t h e u p ri s i ng and the ‘ sy n d ro m e of hama’ On 15 March 2011, a number of social rallies assembled in the main streets and squares of several Syrian cities, in response to the call for mobilisation on a Facebook page called ‘The Syrian Revolution 2011’.13 A few days later, the page had counted more than 41,000 fans.14 The framing process which had helped construct and negotiate a shared understanding for change and had urged people to act in concert to bring about change had reached its peak. The call to arms of the Facebook page signalled the shift from Syria’s early online resistance to tangible street protests. Syria’s early oppositional (non) movement had materialised into a real revolution. Since that date, the Syrian Revolution Facebook page became the revolution’s main manifesto and coordination network. Each Friday, the first day of the weekend in Syria, the page called for people to rally in defence of fundamental rights and values, and to comfort the relatives of those who had lost family members in the course of the unrest.15 The Facebook page, in the wake of the Egyptian call for a Day of Rage, became the manifesto for the Syrian chapter of the so called Arab Spring, but it also became instrumental in helping citizens communicate, motivating people to take part in the protests, and creating a sort of social glue through which people could find support in each other and acquire a sense of common destiny. The great success of the Facebook page, as seen through the growing number of followers, led to the opening of many other pages created in support to the Syrian revolution, like the ‘Syria Free Press’, started on 20 February 2011, the ‘Sham News Network’, on 18 March 2011, and the ‘Ugarit Network’, on 2 April 2011.16 One year later the number of online pages had reached the thousands. Facebook was the springboard of the Syrian uprising. However, with time and with the changing political scene, activists turned to other social media tools like YouTube, Skype, and Twitter. In this phase one could argue that the role performed by social media expressed a sort of ‘syndrome of Hama’, a reaction to the

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mass killing of civilians (between 10,000 and 40,000 deaths) at the hands of the government in 1982 and the absence of media coverage that the event received.17 In order to prevent the recurrence of such episodes, groups of young activists held on to their smartphones and cameras and kept filming every protest and peaceful march, and their brutal repression by the regime. The act of uploading photos or videos documenting the regime’s brutality – which are known as tanseeqiat – paradoxically encouraged more people to join the civil resistance despite the high degree of risk and uncertainty.18 Doug McAdam defines this process as ‘cognitive liberation’, an evolution that people experience when they witness a public condemnation of the regime’s wrongdoings, which drives them to reject any further tolerance.19 Events like the regime’s harsh punishment of the children of Dera’a and the torture of the thirteen-year-old boy Hamza al-Khateeb acted as a ‘catalytic event’, the click or fuse that lit the revolt.20 These events exposed the regime’s viciousness on a national level via alternative news outlets that the regime was unable to block, and which had developed over the years prior the uprising. This initiated a process in which people suddenly and collectively realised that they were no longer afraid and that the chain of respect and tolerance was now broken. What marked the difference between the events in Hama of 1982 and those of 2011 was the public condemnation they received through the online media, rather than by word of mouth, as would have been done in the past. In Syria, online media represented a cheap means to communicate, a fast way to coordinate action, and, what is more, the only space where Syrians could express their dissatisfaction and call for action. In other Arab countries, citizens relied on social media to coordinate action, but expressed their dissatisfaction through massive gatherings in public spaces, like Habib Bourghiba Street in Tunis, Tahrir Square in Cairo, Sittin Square in Sanaa, and Pearl Roundabout in Manama. In Syria, however, the lack of large protest spaces, combined with the repressive security and military system, pushed the concentration of protests to the peripheries (such as Dera’a). Damascus and Aleppo, the two main urban agglomerations, were largely unencumbered by political rallies, at least in the initial stages of the revolt. For this reason, new media were used to bridge these gaps and create a unifying force that, albeit online, was capable of keeping the revolution alive, through the continual reporting on every event, protest, or act of revolt that was happening around the country.

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With the passing of time, the tanseeqiat became committes responsible for meeting, planning, and organising events on the ground within local districts and coordinating with others at the regional and national level. Sawah and Kawakibi argue that the tanseeqiat brought together activists coming from different political and ideologiacal backgrounds (secular, religious, liberal, and conservative) but who were united by the desire to overthrow the regime.21 The digital world of social networks and news websites gradually tore down the wall of fear and silence that had dominated Syrian history since the coup d’état of the Asads. By fighting fear, they inevitably won more support to the cause of the revolution. Facebook and YouTube’s Effect In the early days of the uprising, Facebook and YouTube were the most popular sites of social interaction in Syria. This coincided with the regime’s decision to lift the ban on their use in February 2011, a move that appeased the younger generations and that allowed the regime to monitor and tail all possible anti-regime activists.22 Despite this risk, users and viewers flooded both social networks. Facebook pages had in some ways inaugurated the Syrian uprising, with the organizers of those pages using them to uphold the first calls for a revolution, inspired by the examples of Tunisia and Egypt. The popularity of this social network grew with the escalation in violence and the militarisation of the conflict. Facebook pages were used as news bulletins, to build bridges with other activists in Arab countries and abroad, as well as for simply sharing opinions. Facebook pages were also very popular among pro-regime supporters, who shared videos on the violence perpetuated by the rebels and uploading videos about the regime’s military grandeur and patriotic sacrifice. However, after a year, YouTube surpassed Facebook’s popularity, which actually relied on YouTube videos posted on its pages. These networks are closely interconnected, as videos are usually uploaded to YouTube, shared on Facebook, and then referred to on Twitter. The number of YouTube videos uploaded about the Syrian revolution – approximately two million in the first two years of the revolution – has made some refer to the Syrian revolution as the ‘YouTube revolution’, as opposed to the Egyptian ‘Facebook revolution’ or the Iranian Green Movement’s ‘Twitter’s revolution’.23 The nature of the page drove its success, as everyone

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with a phone or any rudimentary technology was able to post his or her video of the revolution, and everyone sharing his or her own experience of the revolution. As a result, YouTube became an online archive of homemade videos. Based on this, Fares Abed held that the Syrian revolution ‘is the most documented revolution in history’.24 Moreover, with the increase of violence and the high risk for foreign journalists reporting from conflict areas, combined with the regime denying visas to international reporters, the role played by Facebook and YouTube has grown even more. However, given the still limited number of Internet users in Syria, their relevance grew at the same time as the information and footage uploaded on these social media was portrayed on satellite tv channels, the mass communication medium par excellence. Hence, it is when these two media, social media and satellite tv , interacted that the Syrian news coverage reached the largest audiences.25 This made the work of Syrian activists vital for international media reporting, but it also helped the aim of the revolution, giving it an international echo. The nature of video-documentation on the Syrian revolution is wide and diverse. Some testify to the creativity and humour of the Syrian people even in dark times, as seen in things like Top Goon: Diaries of the Little Dictator, a web-series puppet show that went on air in 2011 mocking President Bashar and his violent repression of protesters.26 A wide number of videos testify to the resilience of the Syrian people, like the women of Salamiyah, who organised sit-ins at home, in which women in disguise and holding banners with political slogans are filmed, and the videos later posted on the web.27 By doing so in disguise, women are able to support the cause of the revolution while avoiding the risk of being arrested. Other videos capture the courageous demonstrations that ignited the uprising, the conflict between the regime and the rebels, and the hard days of people under siege. Many videos report the horror and violence of a civil conflict, with scenes that are often censored for the brutality of the images, like the ill-famed video of the rebel fighter eating the heart of a fallen enemy.28 Virtual Conflicts The extent to which new media have dominated the development of the Syrian conflict is expressed by the establishment of the regime’s Syrian Electronic Army, a group of it specialists specifically recruited

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to fight anti-regime online mobilisation. The group, which defines itself as ‘enthusiastic Syrian youths who could not stay passive towards the massive distortion of facts about the recent uprising in Syria’, was launched in 2011 to operate digital spamming campaigns and attacks on individuals, groups, and organisations undermining the legitimacy of the Syrian government.29 The regime had always kept a close eye on the Internet, being the last Arab country to allow public access, and even then, being very cautious about permitting unlimited access to all online content. However, at the onset of the uprising in Syria, it became clear that new media were driving the social mobilisation and that to combat the anti-regime sentiment it was not sufficient to crush it in the streets and squares, but also to wear it out online. To achieve this, the regime realised that the new media could also be used for its own benefit, for controlling citizens’ activities and mobilising a counter-response to the online anti-regime propaganda. The formation of a digital army became necessary for tracking ‘illegal’ online activities, locating those involved in these activities, and arresting them. The group operated on different fronts: hacking into and shutting down Syrian opposition websites, spamming popular Syrian opposition websites with pro-regime comments, and uploading fabricated videos on YouTube to discredit protestors.30 When activists were identified and arrested, security forces extracted information from them through the use of force, obtaining usernames and passwords of activists’ social media accounts, which would be passed to the Syrian Electronic Army who would post pro-regime slogans on their pages and contact the user’s friends. Paradoxically, the confrontation between the Syrian Electronic Army and activists was as harsh as a traditional fight, though taking place in the no-man’s-land of cyberspace.31 A coalition of Free Syrian Hackers in support of the Syrian revolt operated on the opposite front, hacking into government websites, posting amateur videos depicting the slaughter of peaceful civilians, and encouraging citizens to join the struggle.32 The regime’s it army worked in close collaboration with the Syrian security communications branch, codenamed Branch 225, the hub for all telecommunications security in Syria, which intensified the electronic surveillance system by controlling text messaging, e-mails, and Internet use, and by blocking messages that might contain terms such as ‘revolution’, ‘meeting’, or ‘demonstration’.33 They also deployed a new virus, which was able to spy on opposition activities, steal

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people’s online identities, impersonate them in online chats, and pass the malware to other computers. All these aspects are not usually mentioned when referring to the Syrian conflict, though they constitute an important component, one that has doubled the frontline clashes in the virtual world, through spy war and cyber espionage. The Boom in Net-Art Social media have not only provided space for news coverage of the Syrian revolution, they have also opened venues of artistic expressions of resistance. While violence seems to dominate most of the online coverage of the Syrian conflict, local artists have transformed the Internet into a virtual gallery to exhibit their works of art. Syrian net-art is an innovative phenomenon of cultural production that encompasses visual art, mash-ups, cartoons, jokes, songs, and web-series. One example is represented by the Raised Hands campaign, an outdoor campaign promoted by the regime to gain popular support, which entailed putting up billboards showing a colourful hand and the slogan ‘Young or old, I’m with the law’ (s·aghir aw kabir, ana ma’a al-qanun) or ‘Whether a boy or a girl, I’m with the law’ (s·abiy aw fatà, ana ma’a al-qanun). Syrians reacted to this Orwellian atmosphere by reusing the same slogans and images, and posting them across different social media with new slogans that said, ‘I’m free’ (ana hurr), ‘I lost my shoe’ (faqadhtu hidha’i – suggesting it had been thrown at the dictator), or ‘I’m not Indian’ (Ana mu hindi – a Syrian expression, politically incorrect, which signifies that one is not stupid). Because of the popularity of the digital version of the Raised Hands campaign, the regime felt obliged to replace the old banners with new ones that displayed more rhetorically neutral mottos like, ‘I’m with Syria. My demands are your demands’ (Ana ma’a suriya. Mat.labi huwwa mat.labik). Once more, social media were filled with a new version of the slogan, which read, ‘I’m with Syria. My demands are freedom’ (Ana ma suriya. Mat.labi al-hurriya). As the scholar Donatella Della Ratta observes, this campaign, like many others, shows how Syrians no longer accepted the official rhetoric of the regime, but challenged it, regaining control over the world of public symbols.34 The Raised Hands campaign is one among numerous examples of creative and politicised art that had stepped into the digital space of social media. This art of resilience emerges in the powerful canvases of Monif Ajaj and Yasser Abu Hamad, and

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the banners of Kafranbel, a stronghold of resistance in the centre of Syria; likewise, it can be found in the Facebook page ‘Meals Under Siege’, created by the people of Homs to share improvised and creative recipes using the scarce ingredients at their disposal. In this way, social media has allowed Syrians to rediscover their creativity, once monopolised or censored by elite-driven cultural production. By posting arts and crafts online, with no regime interference and no censorship, creators of this user-generated art established a new relationship vis à vis power and state authority and a new connection between ordinary citizens and artists.35

p has e t wo : f ro m u p r is ing to confli ct, and f rom m e d ia ac t iv is m to ci ti zen journali s m When it became clear that the popular demonstrations were not ending and that the regime was not handing over power to its people, as had been the case in Tunisia and Egypt, a military confrontation between the rebels and the regime took place. This change had an impact on the media scene. Activists, initially organised by the tanseeqiat, sought greater coordination among themselves across the Syrian territory by establishing the Local Coordination Committees, with media centres providing local news coverage and sharing information. New media, in this context, progressively acquired a new status, one which was not linked exclusively to informing and to documenting events, but that had a positive impact on the organisation and management of community. The continuation of the conflict, therefore, compelled Syrian activists to think beyond the short-term objective of the fall of the regime, pushing them to value the importance of freedom of expression and communication as fundamental rights of a new society. In this second phase, Syrians joined the revolution by fighting and by ‘doing journalism’, signalling a transition from ‘media activism’, conceived as a form of militant journalism, to ‘citizen journalism’, a form of participation that supported social development and focused on the needs of the domestic audience rather than of international stakeholders. This new type of journalism, also known as ‘public’, ‘participatory’, ‘democratic’, or ‘street’ journalism, assigns the role of collecting, reporting, analysing, and disseminating news and information to citizens. The news coverage of the Syrian conflict has been

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reliant on citizen journalists to fill the information gap caused by the regime’s denial of visas to foreign journalists and to dispel the distorted propaganda put out by the regime’s own journalists. The profession of citizen journalist has been the subject of extensive, though not exhaustive, debate. Whether one considers it a contribution from an ‘insider’ to the making of news, or a courageous effort by the people, though one lacking professionalism and worthiness, the work of citizen journalism remains crucial to the understanding of the media landscape during the Syrian uprising. The latter bears some truth when one looks at the context in which activists offered media coverage strongly imbued with political value and militant language, casting doubt on their training and coordination when compared with traditional media institutions. In this sense, media tools become weapons with which to protect the cause of the revolution. A media activist interviewed in Gaziantep during a media training session argued: ‘My aim is to use the media to help my people topple Bashar. Why shouldn’t I serve the interests of my people and of myself? I have been silenced for my whole life by the regime, now I need to have my say’.36 This attitude, shared by many and evident in the early media production, has changed with time, both because of the endurance of the conflict and because of technical and financial support received by media activists from foreign powers.37 Media development – discussed in chapter 5 – is one of the sectors that foreign powers have consistently supported in Syria, with the alleged objective of securing professional media coverage of the conflict, as well as teaching a new profession to new generations. The Syrian revolution is teaching us that the world is changing and with it the making of news. The status quo of traditional journalism is not preserved by accredited journalists or established media outlets acting as media gatekeepers, as in the past. Today, potentially every man or woman with a cell phone camera in his or her hand can contribute to and even question news coverage. Unlike in the past, news has become more visual and emphatic, including images such as those of death and destruction, engaging the audience even more. The combination of old and new media and of online and offline forms of resistance signalled the success of the media campaign and its reach. If in the initial stage of the uprising – or actually prior to it – the renaissance of the media landscape apparently developed through digital platforms, with the passing of time it moved toward the

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revaluation of traditional forms. The Internet had offered an infinite and free space of production, which was extremely important in raising the first voices, gathering an opposition, and organising collective action. However, the conflict had limited people’s access to the Internet, resulting in traditional media like newspaper, radio, and tv channels regaining popularity as forms of expression which were not only meant to inform or boost support, but also entertain and educate. Moreover, social media, though popular and welcoming of all types of content, were not affordable for all, whether because of generational gaps, the high cost of devices, or the limits imposed by a conflict that had caused food and water shortages and electricity restrictions. Newspapers Underground newspapers first appeared in Syria toward the end of 2011, marking an important change in the panorama of the Syrian revolution.38 The publication and distribution of periodicals produced a symbolic rupture with the monopoly of information that the regime had imposed up until then, offering alternatives to the propaganda operated by the government. It is important to mention how, besides the merely informative aspect of the phenomenon, the production of newspapers, as well as radio channels, constituted a necessary step bridging the pre-revolutionary phase, in which alternative news circulated only online and were thereby limited to those who had access to the web, to a post-uprising phase, in which the news horizon has expanded to offline production and become accessible to the wider public. As this chapter argues, in order for a social movement to gain ground it is necessary to combine online and offline actions, social media campaigns with street protests, and online awareness campaigns with underground newspapers and anti-government graffiti. Between 2011 and 2012, a dozen independent grassroots newspapers, often with an online version, were printed in Syria, including Suryitna (Our Syria), Oxygen, Hurriyat (Freedoms), Enab Baladi (Local Grapes), to mention just a few.39 Although these periodicals initially featured a poor editorial line and an unattractive format, they constituted an important source of information for those who did not have access to the Internet and were subjected to the propaganda machine of the regime. Since their initial launch, these periodicals have developed and refined their format, offering news,

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essays, drawings by local artists, horoscopes, jokes, and newsletters. The production and distribution of these periodicals put the lives of those involved in these projects in jeopardy, especially those distributing copies within pro-governmental areas.40 In the following years, the number of oppositional papers grew enormously, with production both in government-held areas and in regions under the control of armed groups. Some of these papers were also produced in Turkey and then redistributed to the rebel-held territories. Higher-quality publications have appeared, thanks to the financial and technical support of international media organisations. Many of these papers are published in local dialects or languages (such as Kurdish and Arabic), and target ad hoc groups such as women, children, and religious minorities.41 Among the numerous printed papers that have emerged, Sayedat Souria (Lady of Syria) is a particularly meaningful voice. This magazine put forward a vision that went beyond the scope of the revolution. The magazine began as an advocacy paper that had been in circulation since the beginning of 2014, and which was supported financially and technically by the French media organisations Syrian Media Action (smart ) and l’Association du Soutien aux Médias Libres (asml ). Printed in Gaziantep, on the Turkish border with Syria – with a working plan to open branches in the liberated areas – the paper had a distribution of five thousand copies in the liberated territories and two thousand copies in Syrian refugee camps. Sayedat Souria is the first paper in Syrian history to be dedicated to Syrian women, with no political or religious orientation; it was aimed at raising women’s awareness about politics, society, and justice by having women address and write about other women. Yasmine Merei, editor-in-chief of the magazine, affirmed that before the revolution began, people spoke only of one Syrian woman, Asma al-Asad, the president’s wife, the female icon of Syrian society.42 With the revolution, the magazine substituted that icon with one that portrays all Syrian women, regardless of whether they are for or against the regime. The paper touched on pressing issues for the female community – victims of a civil war, and faced with problems like forced marriage of minors, childcare, environmental destruction, and food constraints. With violence perpetuated by the regime and Islamist groups alike, Sayedat Souria provided a perspective which differed from the monolithic narratives of the contending parts, with an eye to what the future of Syria could be.43

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Radio After an initial period of digital flourishing, radio re-emerged as perhaps the most efficient way to reach local audiences inside Syria. Requiring only a cheap receiver and small battery, radios could easily be used across the country and could reach out to communities otherwise marginalised geographically. Radios have always been the best way to access news and they have proved very useful in times of war. Radiowaves have the advantage of not having to pass checkpoints and frontiers, and being able to reach areas under attack, offering the only way to receive news coverage of events and of the outside world. Numerous radio stations were established with foreign support in Turkey (both in Istanbul and in Gaziantep), though aired in Syria. These radio stations are the byproduct of the current civil war, and therefore designed to support those Syrians afflicted by military rule and suffering from economic restrictions, as well as the numerous refugees scattered across the country. Radio stations present entertainment programmes, music, cultural programmes, and everything concerning daily life, whether in regime-held or opposition-held areas. Both radio and tv channels that have emerged since the start of the conflict offer an agenda of ‘social programming’, meaning that they focus on reporting on and for a population affected by a war, offering debates, advice, and discussing possible solutions to problems of daily life, like power cuts, lack of water and gas, and how to cook with food shortages.44 They also present cultural programmes based on the revival of Syrian history, culture, music, dialect, and food. A very good example is represented by Radio SouriaLi, an Internet-based radio station broadcasting from October 2012, born from a project of a group of Syrians of different ethnic, religious, and intellectual backgrounds, based both inside and outside Syria. Caroline Ayoub, co-manager of the radio station and an activist who had been detained by the regime, explains how the name ‘SouriaLi’ sums up the current situation in her country. SouriaLi is a play on words which combines ‘sourialia’, meaning ‘surrealism’, with ‘souria li’, meaning ‘Syria for me’, referring to the surrealistic condition that Syria is in and the need for all Syrians to come together to build a new Syria.45 Radio SouriaLi defines itself not as a radio channel but as a means of communication connecting Syrians to each other, and to other

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people and cultures.46 It is a platform, without political or religious orientations, with programming that varies from news to entertainment, to education. The aim is to raise people’s awareness about the concepts of freedom, justice, and equality, as well as to emphasise the importance of democracy and citizenship. Ayoub affirms that the radio station is trying to sew up the wounds of the war and reunite Syrians in the name of their rich cultural heritage. This is done through a number of programmes, like ‘Ayam el Lulu’ (Good Old Days), in which well-known episodes of Syrian history are celebrated; ‘Fattoush’ (a traditional Syrian salad dish), which airs a fifteen-minute cooking show on traditional recipes; or ‘Hakawati Souria’, a twenty-minute programme on traditional storytelling.47 Radio SouriaLi is just one of the many radio programmes that are showing how life in Syria endures and working to preserve the great culture of its people.

p has e t h r e e : m e d ia p rofessi onali sati on a n d wa r s tag nati on The revolution has by now entered a new phase, with new participants who have walked onto the stage and in which military confrontations and war-like techniques have taken over. With the regime not expected to fall anytime soon, but rather is enganged in a fierce war to recapture all lost territories from the rebels and the radical Islamist guerrillas, the media sector has also moved into a new phase and changed its status. Syrian media have in fact developed in terms of their professionalism and widened their sphere of production. Despite the war, media centres and media professionals are working with higher standards of professionalism, inspired by Western models and supported by foreign media support programmes. Media development, intended to provide material support, technical assistance, training, and financial support to media centres and activists, has influenced the field greatly. Media development aid, like civil society support programmes, presented in the previous chapter, was among the only tools that Western powers could adopt to foster change in the country under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. The long-awaited change did come in 2011, and with it the nature and extent of media assistance aid, which has not only changed in its approach but has grown enormously, to an extent that it resembles an industry. The actors

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engaged in media assistance range from governments to multilateral organisations, to a large number of national and international ngos. The US government and the eu are two of the main donors, entrusting the projects to a vast number of implementers. The donor community and the implementing organisations place the media development portfolio under broader headings, such as ‘democracy and governance’, ‘capacity building’, ‘human rights’, or ‘civil society’, making it difficult to track the exact use of the funding. Moreover, many organisations prefer that their programmes have a low profile, as they say their activities may endanger the people involved. Once again, this limited the number of agencies that agreed to be mentioned in the research for this book, while also leaving out others that publicly sponsor their projects, like bbc Media Action, Internews Europe, the National Democratic Institute, Hivos, Free Press Unlimited, Deutsche Welle, Canal France International, asml , and Avaaz. One can argue that media development programmes have become a pillar of the international response to the ongoing Syrian crisis, with an industry of implementers, trainers, and trainees emerging in Syria’s neighbouring countries, principally Turkey. Gaziantep, a city on the Turkish border with Syria, has become the hub for media organisations, which have established their offices here and operate trainings and workshops for Syrian media activists in the city. Here they learn the basics of journalism and video shooting, and are provided with broadcast equipment to use for their news coverage. Some become trainers themselves, returning to Syria to teach others media skills and provide them with the necessary equipment, in some cases establishing media centres in the different governorates. smart , which started as a support network for journalists and activists, had turned into a news agency by the end of 2011, while also distributing media equipment (satellite modems to connect to the Internet, mobile phones, and cameras) and teaching courses on media writing and production via Skype. The organisation trained around four hundred journalist activists. The story of Zaina Erhaim, coordinator of the iwpr and cofounder of a Local Coordination Committee, is quite representative. Erhaim was completing a master’s degree in journalism in the UK when the Syrian revolution started, and she established a network of citizen journalists and activists in Syria to help them report according to professional standards. She trained more than one hundred citizen journalists and supported

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the establishment of numerous independent media outlets in Syria.48 At the beginning of the uprising the type of media aid facilitated training in digital media, social media, and digital security, but with the worsening of the situation inside Syria and the spreading of the war across the country, the availability of the Internet worsened, forcing many to rely on offline mechanisms. For this reason, media support projects have returned to work on traditional media, principally radios and newspapers, which can reach areas under siege. Radio stations, tv channels, and newspapers, some of which have been mentioned in this chapter, are produced in neighbouring countries, primarily Turkey, and then distributed or aired in Syria. These programmes are specifically designed to respond to a crisis that has left people without houses, reduced many to being refugees across the country and in the region, and confined others in refugee camps, while sectarian strife and the terror of an Islamist takeover is spreading across the country. One of the main initiatives of this phase is the formation of platforms fulfilling the critical task of mediating between the online production of news and the public: checking the contents, contextualising events, and verifying their authenticity. One example is the Damascus Bureau, a news platform where independent journalists and inexperienced media activists can publicise their articles, have them translated, and receive comments from experts and the public.49 Other types of initiatives gather news and videos provided by activists in the field, verifying and contextualising raw material into useable footage, which is then distributed to international media. One example is the citizen press group ana News Media Association, a Cairo-based network of journalists providing training and equipment to media activists working in Syria, with support from private donors and eu funding.50 ana , cofunded by the British-Syrian journalist Rami Jarrah, offers Syrian activists clandestine training and equipment, usually smuggled through the Lebanese border. The organisation has grown substantially, reaching a network of 350 Syrians who file news from across the country.51 Another example is the Aleppo Media Centre, active since October 2012, a group of citizen journalists working to provide news coverage about the city of Aleppo and its outlying areas.52 Of a different nature is the platform Syrian Media, funded by the media activist Monis Bukhari. It constitutes a database of the different headlines that have appeared since the outbreak of the revolution and connects different media

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platforms. Monis Bukhari, also a funder of the online radio station Baladna (Our Country), holds that the objective is to create a common language for Syrian journalism, based on more professionalism on the part of journalists and more collaboration among them.53 All of these initiatives testify to an epochal change in the Syrian media landscape, which is strongly dependent on the Internet as its main platform. The emergence of these organisations charged with the selection and publication of news guarantees that the news will be more reliable, and have more relevance, as opposed to what was a chaotic, if not piecemeal, uploading of news by activists on social media. Other news organisations have emerged in the West with the aim of collecting and filing the different news on Syria available on the web. Dawlati (My Country) is a web portal that, since March 2012, has collected all forms of news content coming from Syria, whether articles, drawings, cartoons, videos, or caricatures, that focus on democratic issues.54 Another web portal is Syria Untold, which files all types of content online about Syria and turns it into a news story, verifying the authenticity and contextualizing its content.55 These types of initiatives attest to the need to cover the Syrian crisis in multiple ways and to transform this news into a narrative that can reach the public, both locally and internationally.56 Despite these initiatives, aimed at portraying a more balanced picture of the Syrian crisis, based on authentic and verifiable news, a large section of news outlets are still lacking professional rigour and ethical responsibility, adopting highly partisan narratives that serve the aims of specific state authorities or factions, or specific political agendas. This includes both national and international media outlets, which, driven by more overt political and strategic purposes, have contributed to the marketization of fear, the sectarianization of the conflict, and the demonization of specific minorities. This means, as Marc Lynch points out, that if the media played a prominent role in enabling the outbreak of the uprising, the fragmentation in the media coverage that followed also transformed it into a vehicle for proxy warfare by regional powers and encouraged the logic of violence.57 For instance, the emphasis that has been put on the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil war, whether by the regime, some opposition groups, or regional state actors, has been employed and manipulated by the different parties operating on the ground to serve their political aims. Gulf monarchies in particular promoted

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a sectarian understanding of the Syria uprising, hosting Salafist sheikhs who could fuel sectarian tensions, like the Egyptian sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi. In May 2013, al-Qardawi declared a jihadi war against the Syrian regime and its Shi’a support base, which he defined as ‘more infidel than Christians and Jews’. The Syrian regime has inevitably stressed the sectarian nature of the conflict to justify its repression against rebel forces and its call for national unity against the takfiri Islamist threat. Regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, have on their part embarked on a proxy war that has also taken place through competing media channels and networks.

i s l a m ic s tat e a n d t h e cyber cali phate The analysis of the Syrian mediascape would not be complete without mentioning the state-of-the-art digital jihadi war directed by the so-called Islamic State in the third phase of the Syrian conflict. Despite the retrograde aim of restoring an Islamic caliphate over the territories of Iraq and Syria, harking back to the religious and political state that succeeded the Prophet Muhammad’s death (632 ce ), the new Islamic State, or as Jean-Pierre Filiu defines it, the ‘Deep State’, is anything but retrograde in terms of the sophisticated media propaganda campaign it launched. isis invested enormously in its marketing strategy, which proved to greatly improve the use of media by Islamists since the ‘fuzzy, monotonous camcorder sermons’ of Osama bin Laden a decade ago.58 Intrestingly, electronic media had not simply provided a space and tools for people to organise and express dissent against authoritarian governements, but also transformed the relationship between diasporas and their homelands, emphasised in the idea of a transnational, unifying Islamic community.59 The success of isis ’s use of social media can be seen in the estimated 40,000 foreign nationals from 110 countries that joined the group.60 isis ’s global media operation makes use of YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, and other social media to instil fear, discredit and stir hatred against its enemies (i.e., Iran and Shi’a groups), provoke the US and its allies, and recruit from outside the Middle East. The hi-tech media campaign is carried out by members mastering new technologies and educated in ‘graphic design, marketing, advertising and information technology’.61 The group has also founded the al-Hayat Media Centre, a broadcaster aimed at non-Arabic speakers, with programmes modelled on Western tv channels, streaming in several languages, with the intent of

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showing the perfect life of those living within the confines of the Islamic caliphate. Other isis -produced content differs from the dreadful video footage showing the brutality of the group when killing Western hostages or different ethnic and religious groups who face isis ’s military advance. This includes videos circulated on mujdatweets, short videos in the form of a jihadi travel show, showing colourful scenes of street life, children in playgrounds or eating ice cream, with people joyfully coming up to the camera to express the security and peace that the ‘land of the Khalifah’ offers, saying, ‘We don’t need any democracy, we don’t need any communism or anything like that, all we need is shari’a’.62 Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, wrote that isis ’s most effective instrument is this ‘Islamic utopia’, a fantastical propaganda aimed at developing stories on how Muslims live joyful and happy lives under the Islamic caliphate.63 The Western origin of many of its fighters is revealed by the professional audio and visual techniques being used, as well as by the expressions of ostentation and pride in the form of selfies taken by Islamic fighters (something whose religious ‘legality’ – haram versus halal – is questionable).64 Sadly, these ‘poster boys’, posing in Rambo-like stances and circulating their selfies through isis ’s social networks, have proven successful at finding their way into the hearts of future recruits. The emergence of isis further complicated the conflict in Syria, presenting a third contending party in the already fragmented conflict and deepening the crisis. However, besides the actual brutality of the group, experienced by all those falling under its authority, the group has also waged a war that trespasses the borders of the presumed Islamic caliphate, reaching Western countries through cyberspace and undermining fundamental questions about the idea of territorial sovereignty. isis ’s ‘electronic war’, waged against Europe and the US, has threatened Western computing systems, involved hacking into business and government websites, and provoked serious economic and national challenges. In April 2015, for example, isis hacked into the French Television network tv 5Monde, preventing it from broadcasting for three hours and controlling its Twitter and Facebook social media accounts. This confirms that the media are malleable tools; they can be used to serve popular democratic movements, authoritarian governments,

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and terrorist organisations alike. In this regard, it is necessary to stress how the alarming expansion of the Islamic State, or of the so-called ‘caliphate’, has not just occurred on Syrian and Iraqi territories but also through the virtual world. It is in cyberspace that the power of the caliphate is rooted. Here, digital platforms have become the main tool for finding recruits, who discover not only isis but, as Adam Shatz argues in the London Review of Books, Islam itself.65 Indeed, digital media have paradoxically bridged the gap between two crises of citizenship: the exclusion of young Muslims in Europe and the exclusion of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the impact of the new media in the Syrian conflict has to be carefully weighed and its various forms examined according to the specific player and audience to which it appeals, as they can equally bridge gaps between atomised citizens and drive regime changes, or gather disfranchised people suffering under fanaticism and violence.

f in a l r e m a rks The role and development of new media in Syria has been a revolution within a revolution. Social networking sites, web-aggregators, tv channels, satellite stations, radios, and online and printed newspapers and magazines, have emerged in the midst of the revolt, with those involved eager to replace what had been the official and meagre news diet that the Syrian regime had offered thus far. It was the combination of old and new media, and online and offline protests that marked the success of the media campaign. On the one hand, activists opened new web pages and uploaded videos reporting on the brutality of the regime; on the other, there were underground newspapers distributed in rebel-held areas, radio stations operating from neighbouring countries that reached the Syrian airwaves, and satellite tv channels spreading the news of Syrian social networks to an international audience. All of this amplified the capacity of the movement and the reach of its message across the population. In all its phases and aspects, the Syrian revolution has been influenced by the media, to an extent that it would be very difficult to think of the Syrian uprising separately from the media. Based on this assumption, this chapter analyses the diversified role that the new media technologies have played during the course of the Syrian uprising – from its early days to the current civil war – identifying

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the actors employing them, the strategies used, and their impact on the development of the conflict. Specifically, the chapter argues that the Syrian media scene underwent three major phases in its development: the emergence of alternative sources of information through the digital space that acted as catalysts, mobilisers, and organisers of the popular movement; the evolution from media activism to citizen journalism; and finally what we are now witnessing as the professionalisation and diversification of the media sphere within a state of stagnating war. Images and live footage have dominated the news coverage of the Syrian revolution since its onset and have profoundly affected the development of the revolution. Some images are now glued in our collective memory, like the massacre of Izra’, near Dera’a, on 22 April 2011, and the picture of an anguished father carrying the dead body of his son, who had been shot in the head.66 The videos of the singer Ibrahim Qashush, who gathered thousands in the streets of Hama by writing the song ‘Come On, Bashar, Leave!’ (Yallah, Irhal ya Bashar!) and who was found dead in a river with his throat cut, is another symbolic icon67 – and even more, the rows of dead children heaped up after the chemical attack in East Ghouta province in August 2013.68 Difficult and horrifying videos and images like these have encouraged Syrians to participate in the uprising and have shaped the world’s understanding of the violent repression of peaceful protestors by the Syrian regime. Equally shocking videos, like the one of the rebel commander eating the heart of a fallen enemy, have shown how the black-and-white picture of the conflict is more an invention by the media than actual reality – much more complex, and a situation in which good and evil do not exist as starkly defined forces. Eventually, the emergence of isis as a new military force in the region and its global media operation is proving how conflicts today are not simply fought on the ground but are spilling over into cyberspace, swallowing other countries in their turmoil and destabilising international security. If the Vietnam War was the first televised war and the Gulf War the first 24/7 cable news war, the Syrian revolution can be regarded as the first social media war. Lynch defines it as ‘the most socially mediated civil conflict in history’, in which the media have been so entwined with the conflict that it would be impossible to understand the war without considering the role that the media are playing.69

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The mediatisation of an event is generally regarded as a process that creates distance from the physical space of the event; the Syrian conflict, in this regard, is unprecedented in the way it brought foreign audiences closer to the conflict, through the raw and often bloodcurdling material activists uploaded, as opposed to the material selected and supplied by professional journalists.70 The rise of citizen journalists and their use of new media is progressively changing the nature and limits of journalism, extending ‘journalistic authority in questionable ways’.71 If on the one hand the media coverage offered by citizen journalists can be criticised for being imbued with political value and militant language, on the other hand one should also question the agenda of international media outlets that collect the material uploaded by citizens journalists to build a narrative serving the interests of their patrons or local proxies, or one that is simply at the mercy of the market. This means that this type of media, instead of giving voice to the voiceless, as was the case at the onset of the uprising, is once again a tool of expression by bigger and stronger actors and countries that, in order to pursue their political agenda, focus their coverage on sensationalism, inciting hatred against political adversaries and deepening ethnic and religious divisions. This suggests that the media are powerful tools which can be equally effective in encouraging collective action and driving popular mobilisations as they can in producing fear, resentment, and divisions.72 The recent catastrophe of Syrian refugees fleeing their country and embarking on an unknown journey has given the media the decisive role of documenting the crisis and calling for the international community to act promptly. When in September 2015 the image of a dead Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore in the coastal city of Bodrum in Turkey, appeared on social media and in international newspapers, it not only led to a questioning of the ethics of journalism, but more importantly reminded the international community that the Syrian crisis had not ended, but instead was growing and coming closer to Europe with the calamity of its refugees fleeing the war. The image provoked an unprecedented involvement of civil society actors around Europe, who rallied in the streets and pushed their governments to provide temporary asylum to the many Syrian refugees, a fact that per se shows the unprecedented potential of the new media in changing society and politics. And yet the role of the

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media does not stop here. The Syrian revolt, which seems to have succumbed to a self-perpetuating war, still lives in the hearts of its people. Once it is over, the new media will have to take part in a much harder task: sewing up the wounds that the violence caused by sectarian, religious, and political divides has provoked during these years of civil war.73

c o n c l u s io ns

Media: Weapons of the Weak or Weapons of Mass Distraction?

We used to welcome the sleep of the tyrant As though hoping that the Slaughterer Might die in his sleep But nowadays The tyrant even if he’s dead he sleeps Tyranny follows its course Even after the tyrants go We must not delude ourselves That the death of the tyrant Guarantees the people’s happiness. Mamduh ‘Adwan, ‘The Ghoul’1

Eight long, endless years have gone by since the outset of the Syrian uprising. Much has changed and even more has vanished into the pile of rubble that the civil conflict is leaving behind. Concluding a book with this state of events is not simply difficult, but also feels like a forced and undesirable act. A mixture of feelings restrains my attempt to set an end to this book. On the one hand, there is the irrational thought that by not drawing proper conclusions, one contributes to the chaos and distruction that is taking hold of Syria, especially now that the Syrian regime seems to be winning the war. On the other hand, there is the awareness that everything is evolving with a speed that makes any attempt to capture this change ephemeral, fragile, and destined to be overturned by some uncontrollable and unexpected events.

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This book focuses on a period of time that was as yet untouched by the wave of popular protests that spread across the Arab world, specifically the presidency of Bashar al-Asad from 2000 to 2011. The outbreak of the uprising and armed conflict, however, abrubtly reshaped the life and politics of Syria, together with fundamental aspects of this research. The media, which are regarded through the analytic lens of this book as having played a crucial role in the making of a popular uprising, have undergone a metamorphosis in terms of structure and function. The constraints and objectives of the operation of the media needed to be adapted to the battlefield, both in the forms of communication with the international community and to the local population, and as a form of recruitment and propaganda. From being tools of interaction and social networking, the media have entered the power game – to which they symbolically and essentially always belonged – between contending agents. This represents an epochal change in the life of the media in, and of, Syria. With this ‘event’ – in the sense expressed by Alain Badiou – in mind, this book tracks the developments of the new media landscape under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, and scrutinises the effects that this new form of political management produced on social and political structures in the country. In this regard, this study is not directly related to the scholarship currently in vogue on the Arab Spring, including its Syrian version. It does not examine the evolution of the Syrian media landscape during the uprising, if not in minimal terms, and it does not present the media coverage of the Syrian conflict either. Nonetheless, the imperative to find analytical tools with which to study how the Syrian uprising unravelled prior to its spectacular outbreak, compels us to pay attention to the processes that materialised, in multiple, often incoherent ways prior to 2011. Quite ironically, the motivation for writing this book began in 2010 at a conference when I presented a paper on Syrian journalism, at a time when the topic of new media as tools to foment radical social change in a closed society like Syria sounded marginal and self-contained. The paper mainly focused on traditional media, the practice of journalism, and the historical trajectories of newspapers in the Syrian Republic, giving large space to the experiences of Syrian journalists working within the limits and loopholes of an authoritarian government. A final section of the paper, however, explored the challenges and opportunities that the new media, specifically satellite tv and the

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Internet, were creating in the closed regime of the Asads. At the very end of the question and answer session, someone in the audience asked me whether I thought that the media could trigger a regime change in the recalcitrant authoritarian government that had been ruling over Syrians for the past four decades. I pondered the question, as it did not strictly fall within the realm of my research, and responded that the new media had already produced visible and tangible transformations in the practice of journalism; they offered people alternative information tools, and, above all, they worked against the grain of what was the regime’s primary objective: the atomisation of people and the uprooting of collective dissent. Forms of civic engagement and awareness could be seen emerging with extraordinary lucidity, considering the tightly controlled context of Syria. These could hardly continue coexisting with the political reality of the country, because they were inherently insoluble in it. In other areas of the world, from Eastern Europe to the Philippines, the new media had already played a transformative role in triggering and coordinating popular revolts; therefore, it was likely that a similar scenario could occur in Syria, especially in light of my fieldwork in Damascus. Indeed, far from being a prophetic note, or the expression of a personal desire or hope, my analysis came from my fieldwork observation and research among the new generation of journalists, media activists, and, crucially, ordinary Internet users in Syria. At that time, I had noticed that the ideas discussed among people and the practices promoted in the cyber community were de facto expressions of a society that had undergone profound changes in terms of political vision and social participation; these changes, it appeared to me, could hardly fit in the narrow space of existence left void, or granted, by the regime. Certainly, I was not expecting a popular uprising in Syria only one year after that conference, an event that materialised on 15 March 2011. The new media tools proved to have had a leading role in the making of the uprising: informing people, encouraging participation, and coordinating the protests, all of which came as an incentive to investigate even more their role in those years that predated the uprising. This book intends to provide responses to the unanswered questions about the transformations and the making of the uprising in Syria. Yet, I feel that this book raises even more questions alongside the ones it tries to answer. Central to this work is the need for the epistemic community to reconsider the role that new media play in

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reconstructing forms of collective action and social mobilisation in closed regimes and authoritarian settings like Syria. Most of the academic interest has focused on the role that new media played at the time of the Arab uprisings, while there has been insufficient interest in the role they played in the years predating it, which constituted an essential period of maturation. This is due to false assumptions belonging to the legacy of Western-centric study on the Arab world, combined with incorrect approaches applied to the study of the media, largely quantitative-based and technologically deterministic. Rather than being interpreted as a deus ex machina for the uprising and for the collective mobilisation it manifested, the media must instead be understood as a field of engagement among different, hitherto unrelated (f)actors in the making of the uprising. This understanding brings into narrower focus the domestic and international agents operating in the context of Syria, without excluding the underpinning socio-economic and cultural processes that had been in place over the first ten years of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency. The peripheries of the Syrian regime, conceived as both spaces and agents operating at the margins of institutional power, could hardly be captured by the static, fossilised application of theoretical approaches focused on elite politics, ethnic and identity issues, and foreign policy. If on the one hand this research encourages the study of local variables, on the other it places the local phenomenon of the Syrian uprising within a broader picture, which is seeing popular mobilisation on the rise globally, in conjunction with the expansion of new media and information technology. In the last decade, citizens – from the suqs of the Arab world to the squares of Brazil, Spain, Mexico, Greece, and the US (Black Lives Matter and the dream ers) – have challenged state power, contested the unaccountability of authorities vis à vis the everyday administration of public life, and experimented through their participation in new venues of political engagement among people previously excluded from the realm of power. Social media and the Internet have engendered community building and established platforms on which citizens can display their discontent, identitfy common goals, and make calls to action for the streets. Although there have been substantial differences in what has motivated people to take to the streets in Brazil or Spain versus in the Arab region, in both contexts the new ict s have offered citizens opportunities to work around the state, promote dissent, and coordinate the logistics of the protest. As an effect of the

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development of new media, citizens have had more opportunities to contest authoritarian and corrupt regimes, as well as oppose social and economic inequalities worldwide. In the Middle East in particular, the use of new media technologies threatens the status quo, because regimes have ‘depended so heavily on their ability to dominate and control the public sphere’.2 Yet, for collective resistance to lead to effective and radical change, contentious politics that exist in the virtual realm must be grounded in offline, enduring mobilisation, transforming weak ties (peer-to-peer digital connections) into strong networks (offline solidarity). This book elaborates a conceptual model that explains the way new media became the major articulators and developers of a change in the political and social fabric of Syria prior to 2011. In this sense, the Syrian uprising becomes the eventual element of analysis, and the concluding state of the narrative, towards which this project has constantly been working toward. What emerges is that, if the Syrian uprising is said to have formally begun in 2011, its early formation actually dates back to the start of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency in 2000. The underlying argument of the book is that during the decade that led to the uprising in Syria, a form of grassroots resistance emerged as an effect of opportunity structures (economic, institutional, and social contexts), conditioned by people’s access to new media. The framing process which brought people to the street was a long process of accumulation of micro-changes at the individual and collective level, engendered by the new media. If it is true that the Syrian government under Bashar al-Asad was able to modernise authoritarianism, or upgrade authoritarianism to the changing times, this work argues that these same changes contributed to making the Syrian regime more vulnerable and more exposed to the challenge of popular elements of dissent, which have largely been neglected by the scholarly community. The vulnerability of the political system was produced by a combination of contradictory factors, such as economic liberalisation, authoritarianism, the repression of political rights, a rise in unemployment, sanctions, regional instability, and public access to the Internet, which together created a toxic environment in Syria. This scenario led to the creation of loopholes or power vacuums that allowed alternative forces to emerge through the new spaces offered by new media. The new media offered a space for those with existing grievances to articulate demands, negotiate shared understandings of problematic experiences, and mobilise collective action.

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Notably, the new media technologies weakened the stability of the Syrian regime by infringing on the regime’s absolute control over two elements: the flow of information and people’s interactions. The Internet, in particular, became a tool that channelled the mistrust towards the regime and hopes for reforms, as well as a virtual platform that facilitated forms and manifestations of dissent and protest. As such, the new media did not simply provide the fuel that triggered the change at the individual and collective level, but also the tool with which to spread discontent and mobilise civic engagement, and the space in which to express contention, where new collective subjectivities could emerge. What this book describes is an all-round revolution occurring in the media sector, which affected citizens, journalists, and activists; media outlets and products; and people’s understandings of power, space, and agency. The spark of popular mobilisation in 2011 did not represent the start of Syria’s revolution but the shift of an existing and unstructured form of resistance from the virtual space to tangible street protests. As the second chapter elaborates at length, Syria’s early opposition does not classify as a ‘social movement’ in the classical Euro-American definition of the term, as it was not a self-identifying movement with structured action and clear-cut objectives, occurring within geographical national territories. On the contrary, it represented a form of resistance limited to the borderless and vague space of the Internet, characterised by strong elements of spontaneity, and whose organisation focused on single-issue campaigns, aimed at widening adherence and visibility through online platforms. These forms of resistance became a social movement only in 2011, when the anti-establishment campaigns moved from the single-issue and episodic collective actions, limited to cyberspace, to the tangible public street protests, with shared objectives and tactics, of the Syrian uprising. Although this book sets out a fundamental criticism of the traditional analysis of the Arab world, and especially of its politics, it does not ignore its own shortcomings and limitations. Indeed, there are fundamental challenges both to the theoretical and practical undertaking of the research project that cannot be ignored. Among the practical challenges, the most obvious and compelling is the transition into civil war of the Syrian uprising. The conflict strongly affected the reach of my research, and my initial objectives. It also made access to the country unthinkable during the second phase of

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my fieldwork. Said stresses the importance of flexibility when conducting research on a region that is politically unstable, yet this is a quality one develops with time.3 Therefore, studying the local environment and its subjectivities in the field, and calling for a more localised study of Arab politics – something for which I repeatedly made arguments – was rather misplaced. How can one pretend to give voice to the agents agitating from below, when in the second phase of my fieldwork I had to redirect my research from Syria’s neighbouring countries due to the war that spread across Syria? I had it in mind that this book should speak on behalf of those whose voices could hardly be heard in academic scholarship, but this endeavour evaporated because of practical impossibilities. The war, and the lack of connections with people whose daily lives had been uprooted and devastated by the events, made any research interaction not only ethically problematic but also disgraceful. Therefore, I opted to deviate from this initial plan towards a study of the structures operating within this context, so as to develop a conceptual model to intercept the transformations affecting the lives of people, and through which these silences could somehow be heard. Furthermore, the research project faced theoretical obstacles, embodied by the boundaries of different disciplines. To produce a scholarly work which straddles these grey zones of academic research is no easy task, as it means opening up new venues of engagement with theoretical underpinnings about which many show mistrust, or, worse, disinterest. And, in fact, the research project remains far from conclusive on this issue, and opts, instead, for encouraging further undertakings, perhaps in different social and cultural contexts. In spite of its limits, this work sheds light on new media as a key element of contemporary politics around the globe, from democratic states to authoritarian regimes, offering opportunities for an analysis of social and political transformations in contexts that are regarded as fundamentally incompatible. It does so by bringing in certain cultural and political specificities, while not underestimating the degree to which local ecologies are embedded within broader international politics. In this sense, it offers perspectives of analysis on contexts with similar conditions to those of Syria, or political dimensions in which socio-political developments allow such analysis. These may include, for instance, that of Cuba, in light of the overture of the United States under the Obama administration; or of China and Iran, given the massive impact of the Internet and media

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technologies on their societies, as well as their governmental policies with regard to the management of such new media. However, as the Arab Spring demonstrates, although new media may have paved the way for the uprisings and brought people to join the protests of 2011, to bring about true revolutionary political change, online mobilisation needs to be supported by strong offline ties and societal organisation which can sustain change over a long period of time.4 Apart from these immediate comparative reflections, the research encourages further analysis of international aid development programmes within political contexts such as closed regimes. The enthusiasm and confidence in the allegedly all-powerful liberating potential of the Internet and online social networking have been included in the foreign policy agenda of Western countries. Alec Ross, the State Department’s senior advisor on innovation during Hilary Clinton’s tenure, put it very simply this way: ‘I think the fight over an open Internet is today’s version of a battle between open and closed that has been raging now for 2,300 years … What distinguishes the Bush ‘freedom agenda’ from Clinton’s Internet freedom agenda is that [Clinton’s] is less politically deterministic’.5 As a matter of fact, international development aid has included and implemented programmes of media development assistance in contexts considered in need of regime change. Between 2008 and 2011, the US Congress authorised the spending of $76 million in programmes to support Internet freedom where some form of political transition was thought to be needed.6 But can one weaken dictators without weakening democratic governments? Can you be a full-throated supporter of Internet freedom as a human right, while also restricting such rights in your own country (such as, for example, the UK Internet censorship law of 2016)?7 Today one cannot deny that international humanitarian assistance has increasingly invested in the new emerging media technology. If these programmes were carried out with a certain level of discretion until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, their agenda has become more public in the midst of the revolt, particularly in the context of Syria, where a civil conflict justified any approach aimed at protecting civilians, ensuring fair converage of the conflict, and empowering civil society actors. As a result, since the beginning of the uprising, Syrian rebels have been provided with million of dollars worth of new media equipment and training by both Western governments and the Gulf states.8 This type of aid is usually referred to by American or European officials as ‘non-lethal’ aid, blurring the boundary between

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assistance for media activism and humanitarian assistance even more. The ambiguity that often frames the policies of these programmes suggests that development aid is a category under which different, often irreconcilable strategies fall, some of which are far beyond basic humanitarianism or support for technological improvement. Eventually, new media brings the study of Arab politics and that of politics in general closer to each other. This is because cyberspace is an infinite, undistinguished place where individual subjectivities – or those of collective groups – do not differ manifestly. It is a truism that online activism uses similar tactics around the world; however, what makes new media a single field of inquiry is the interconnectedness of the politics of control and at the same time the defiance that characterises it. This not only brings people who are operating online to use similar tactics in the form of Internet tools, languages, and venues of engagement, it also brings them closer to each other, physically or, perhaps, virtually, as they interact from East to West, and South to North in the process of political participation and contenstation. Although new media seem to have enormous potential for social liberation in closed regimes, this book does not claim that digital technologies are all inherently good or that they are the only factor one needs to consider when trying to understand social movements. One aspect that has recently made headlines is the destabilising role that these tools may play in our societies, through spreading false information, intensifying divisiveness, poisoning the public domain, and not least allowing foreign powers or third parties to influence election campaigns and their results. Recent scandals such as the Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, Cambridge Analytica, and Facebook’s business of exploiting personal data for use by advertisers are only some examples of how these tools can be used to corrode democratic institutions as much as to fight authoritarian regimes. David Kaye, un Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, talks in his book Speech Police about the Internet that existed fifteen years ago as a ‘flat Internet’, a kind of free speech paradise where everyone could become their own publisher. Today that type of Internet is gone. The Internet of today, he argues, makes censorship easier because it is highly centralised by major platforms, whether in China with WeChat or Weibo, or through the global behemoths of Youtube, Google, Facebook, and Twitter, which give governments the ability to restrict freedom of expression.

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Unfortunately, it is through these platforms that most of the world experiences the Internet and accesses information.9 Another aspect that people have increasingly become aware of the use of new media technologies is the negative effect these tools may have on users’ well-being. In the Middle East as much as in the rest of the world, new digital media is revealing its pernicious, highly disaggregating, and counter-effective influence among people, especially the youth. The negative effects of social networking sites on society are now openly discussed, though not confronted, in our societies, with a clear awareness of their negative effects on people’s ability to interact, through producing attention disorders, self-centred attention seeking, cyber-bullying, and social isolation, not to mention loss of privacy. Hence, the Internet can easily act as either an all-powerful liberating technology or an enslaving machine. Two very different and yet equally alarming effects of the use of new technology, which should be strongly contrasted, are apathy/ detachment and isolation/radicalisation. This is to say that rather than facilitating networks of participation and knowledge, as has been depicted here in the context of the Syrian uprising, the Internet – and its offspring (such as smartphones and tablets) – can become a tool for the defusing of dissent and political participation, or worse, foment hatred and division. In other words, it can become an instrument of ‘mass distraction’, in which instead of finding ways of increasing awareness of social conditions and political problems, users find an endless number of distractions that keep them from participating and being engaged. The words of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben come to mind: it is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves.10 On the one hand, likes, shares, tweets, and hashtags have become tools for spreading awareness, by introducing users to topics about which they may have never heard, opening their eyes and inspiring them to do research on their own; while on the other hand, digital activism tends

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to make people think, incorrectly, that their simple online actions are enough to promote change. Hence, if it is true that awareness can be equated to power, it is also true that this awareness requires an anvil on which it must be hammered out and forged into action. Otherwise, the quest for change remains solely and bitterly virtual. Equally worrisome is the ability of new media technology to widen divisions and foment hate speech. The livestreaming of the Christchurch white supremacist mosque attack in March of 2019 epitomises the risk of an unrestricted Internet and of transforming these online platforms into ungoverned spaces on which to spread fake news and post offensive content and violence. The Syrian conflict fits such concerns very well. As we are now in the eighth year since the outset of the Syrian uprising, the new media have proven not to be the Trojan horse that could smuggle democracy and freedom into the country. As the uprising turned into an armed conflict, the media too have been swallowed up into its cycle of violence. The number of citizen-led information sources has grown rapidly, but this has eventually caused audiences to fragment even more. Syrian rebels, the regime, and jihadists all portray a different narrative, none of which seem to speak about the same reality, or rarely. Therefore, the new media have gone from a unifying tool for citizens to counter the Syrian regime to a weapon that duplicates the fight on online platforms and divides citizens among each other. The online media war is as fierce as the fighting on the ground, with a seemingly infinite number of different information sources, and a vast number of people who are shaping it, making everyone involved as a citizen, a journalist, and partisan. And yet one can argue that such a complex mosaic of the media might have paradoxically lessened activism itself, weakening opportunities for discussion and replacing it with an echo chamber of unclear, ferocious, and conflicting voices. If the new media can be argued to have paved the way for the Syrian uprising, having influenced the unravelling of the conflict, they are also likely to determine its end. As the online media war is just as real as the one offline, ending the military conflict will most probably not occur until the media battle dies down. Syria was once known as the ‘kingdom of silence’, with an autocratic ruler who controlled people’s lives, their interactions, and the flow of news. Today, though the authoritarian regime is still there, people have access to an inifinite news horizon and a myriad of connections, and yet truth is harder than ever to find.

Notes

c ha p t e r o n e 1 For transliteration, I have modified the system developed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies, dispensing with diacritical marks and, where possible, adopting the spelling used in the mainstream media. Due to the multiplicity of transliteration forms which regularly appear in the media, I opted for this simplified, inclusive model of transliteration which privileges the forms used in the media, rather than the established academic transliteration. 2 For further discussion on this topic see Kurzman, ‘The Arab Spring’. Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a populist platform of fighting corruption and promoting better income distribution. However, his presidency was characterised by economic mismanagement, human rights violations, and foreign policy adventurism. Therefore, the 62.6 per cent of votes that Ahmadinejad claimed to have won, against the 33.75 per cent of his opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, were at the origin of the widespread protests that took place in the months following the election. 3 The Green Movement refers to a series of actions after the 2009 Iranian presidential elections, in which protesters demanded the removal of Ahmadinejad from office. Green was initially the colour chosen by Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign, but after the election it became the symbolic colour of those asking for the annulment of what they regarded as a fraudulent election. 4 Dreyfuss, ‘Iran’s Green Wave’. 5 Howard, The Digital Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy, 1. On the role of the Internet in Iran, see Golkar, ‘Liberation or Suppression Technologies?’, 50–70.

200 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Notes to pages 4–13

Day, ‘The Slap that Sparked a Revolution’. Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’, 173. Thebian, ‘The Tunisian Online Revolution’. Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’, 159. Doran, ‘The Impact of the New Media’, 40. Bishara, ‘The Miracle Generation’. Despite what this book describes as resistance and dissent against the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Asad enjoyed a certain degree of popularity among sections of the Syrian population, like the Alawi, Christians, and other minorities, as well as the Sunni middle class, who had benefitted from the regime’s economic liberalization policies. See Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’. Syrian Human Rights Committee, ‘The Massacre of Hama’. Seib, as quoted in Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 41. Nordeson, Online Activism in the Middle East, 1. Howard and Hussein, Democracy’s Fourth Wave, 12. Ibid., 18. Wheeler, Digital Resistance in the Middle East, 2. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, 3. Howard and Hussein, Democracy’s Fourth Wave, 25. Khatib and Lust, Taking to the Streets, 2. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 136. Goldfarb, The Politics of Small Things. Ibid., 145. Madrigal, ‘What Facebook Did to American Democracy’. Solomon and Spindle, ‘Syria Strongman’. Chaaban, ‘The Cost of Youth Exclusion in the Middle East’. Solomon and Spindle, ‘Syria Strongman’. Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’, 140. Kahf, ‘The Syrian Revolution’. Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’, 165; Faris, Dissent and Revolution in a Digital Age, 17. Fahmi, ‘Bloggers’ Street Movement’. Bayat, Life as Politics, IX. Ibid., 22. Gause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring’. Ibid. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, 14. Brownlee and Ghiabi, ‘Passive, Silent and Revolutionary’. The concept of ‘scholarship of silence’ was discussed by Asef Bayat, ‘After the Arab

Notes to pages 13–24

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

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Spring’, a paper presented at the brismes conference, ‘The Middle East in Global Perspective’. Khatib and Lust, Taking to the Streets, 16. Allal and Bennafla, ‘Les Mouvements Protestataires’. Shehata, Shop Floor Culture and Politics in Egypt. Faris, Dissent and Revolution in a Digital Age. Howard and Hussein, Democracy’s Fourth Wave, 12. Meyer and Tarrow, The Social Movement Society. Brownlee and Ghiabi, ‘Passive, Silent and Revolutionary’. Khatib and Lust, Taking to the Streets, 2–5. Bayart, ‘Dessine-moi un mena ’. Article 19, ‘Walls of Silence’. Herrera, Revolution in the Age of Social Media, 3. Crystal, ‘Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World’. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation; Lust-Okar, ‘Elections under Authoritarianism’; Posusney and Angrist, eds., Authoritarianism in the Middle East; Pratt, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World; Oliver Schlumberger, ed., Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Brumberg, ‘Authoritarian Legacies’; Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’. Stacher, Adoptable Autocrats, 1. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation, 203. Aarts and Cavatorta, Civil Society in Syria and Iran, 9. Khatib and Lust, Taking to the Streets, 3–6. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above; Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism’. Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl, Civil Society and the State in Syria. Kawakibi, ‘The Paradox of Government-Organized Civil Activism’. Kawakibi and Kodmani, eds., Syrian Voices from Pre-Revolution Syria. Pierret and Selvik, ‘Limits of ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ in Syria’, 611. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 26, 162. Ibid, 18–19. Sottimano, ‘Ideology and Discourse in the Era of Baathist Reforms’, 33. Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’. De Certeau, The Practice of Every Life, XIV. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 24. On the concept of ‘anti-discipline’ see, De Certeau, The Practice of Every Life, XIV. Rugh, Arab Mass Media, 254.

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83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

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Notes to pages 24–9

Papacharissi, ‘The Virtual Sphere 2.0’, 243. Shirky, Here Comes Everybody. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Norton, ‘New Media, Civic Pluralism and the Struggle for Political Reform’, 20. Bimber, Information and American Democracy. Morozov, The Net Delusion, 10. Morozov, ‘Why the Internet Is Failing Iranian Activists’. Gerbaudo, ‘The “Kill Switch”’, 30. Zayani, ‘Arab Media, Political Stagnation, and Civil Engagement’, 16. Hafez, ‘Arab Media’, 1–16. Amin, ‘Arab Media Audience Research’, 113. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, 12. Internet World Stats, ‘Syria’; Heeks, ‘Global ict Statistics on Internet Usage, Mobile, Broadband’; OpenNet Initiative, ‘Internet Filtering in Syria’. Salamandra, ‘Through the Back Door’, 252–62. Zayani, ‘Arab Media, Political Stagnation’, 20. Ibid. Matar, ‘Rethinking the Arab State and Culture’, 124. Hafez, ‘Arab Media’, 1–16. Bayat, Life as Politics, 5. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour. Klandersmans, The Social Psychology of Protest. Carty, Social Movements and New Technology, 20. Ruciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. Carty, Social Movements and New Technology, 25. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, 170. Klandermans, Kriesi, Tarrow, eds. From Structure to Action. Byrne, Social Movements in Britain, 10. Melucci, Nomads of the Present. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society; Rheingold, Smart Mobs; Wellman, ed., Networks in the Global Village; Garrett, ‘Protest in an Information Society’. Della Porta and Tarrow, Transnational Protest and Global Activism. Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow, eds., From Structure to Action. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.

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103 Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, eds., The Backwell Companion to Social Movements. 104 Castells, The Internet Galaxy. 105 Shirky, ‘The Political Power of Social Media’. 106 Ibid. 107 Kidd, ‘Which Would You Rather?’ 108 Goodwin and Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements. 109 Clark, ‘Field Research Methods in the Middle East’, 421. 110 Clark and Cavatorta, Political Science Reseach in the Middle East and North Africa, 7. 111 Cooke, Dissident Syria. 112 See chart in Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 7. 113 Madar Research, ‘PC Penetration vs. Internet User Penetration in gcc Countries’, 1. 114 Saudi Arabia is here presented only as an example, given the similar population estimate to Syria: 21,771,609, compared to Syria’s 18,586,743 in 2005. Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 5–6. 115 Ibid., 7. 116 Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’, 163. 117 Wheeler, ‘PC Penetration’, 1–15. 118 E-mail exchange with an international media organisation, 7 January 2013. 119 Said, ‘Doing Research during Times of Revolution’, 84–93.

c h a p t e r t wo 1 Hall and Whannel, The Popular Arts, 45; Sabry, ‘Arab Media and Cultural Studies’, 237–51. 2 Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, 1–37; Perthes, Syria under Bashar al-Asad; Hinnebusch, ‘Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East’. 3 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination; Salamandra, ‘Creative Compromise’; George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom. 4 Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 113. 5 Raschke, Soziale Bewegungen. 6 Howard, Castells and the Media, 17. 7 McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, The Medium Is the Message. 8 Logan, Understanding New Media, 4. 9 Downing, ‘Social Movement Theories and Alternative Media’.

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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Notes to pages 45–52

Kidd, ‘Indymedia.org’. Howard, Castells and the Media, 20. Ibid. Carty, Wired and Mobilizing, 169. de Donk, et al., Cyberprotest, 1. Ibid., 18. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching. Here the author considers for the first time the importance of mass media for social movements, reflected in his study on the interaction between mass media and the US New Left movements in the sixties. Hoveyda, The Shah and the Ayatollah. Castells, The Internet Galaxy. Carty, Social Movements and New Technology, 12. de Donk, et al., Cyberprotest, 2. Lopes, ‘The Impact of Social Media on Social Movements’, 20. Ibid. Della Porta and Diani, eds., Social Movements. Oleinik, ‘Institutional Exclusion’. See also Diani and McAdam, Social Movements and Networks. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Ibid., 2. Williams, The Long Revolution, XII. Cragun and Cragun, Introduction to Sociology, 233–4. This argument is closely related to Schlumberger’s thesis of the three phenomena absent from the records of the Arab world until 2000: political protest, political reform, and pressure from external players. See Schlumberger, ed., Debating Arab Authoritarianism, 2. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting Authoritarianism’, 91. Ibid. Salamandra and Stenberg, eds., Syria from Reform to Revolt, 5. Sawah, ‘Syrian Civil Society Scene Prior to Syrian Revolution’. On Syrian civil society and opposition, refer to Pace and Landis, ‘The Syrian Opposition’. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting Authoritarianism’. Hinnebusch and Zintl, eds., Syria from Reform to Revolt. Kawakibi and Kodmani, ‘Introduction: Civil Society against All Odds’. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting Authoritarianism’, 96. Khatib and Lust, eds., Taking to the Streets, 7. Sawah, ‘Syrian Civil Society Scene Prior to Syrian Revolution’.

Notes to pages 52–7

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41 In the months following Bashar al-Asad’s taking office, human rights organizations like the Committees for Defence of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights in Syria (cdf ) and the Syrian Human Rights Association (shra ) emerged. 42 Sawah, ‘Syrian Civil Society’. 43 Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’, 137. 44 Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’. 45 According to Amnesty International, the majority of those released were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and members of communist parties. The number of political detainees amounted to 1,500 after November 2000, with another 140 political prisoners released in 2001. Amnesty International also commented that in Syria there were fewer instances of torture. See Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, 84–89. With regards to the change in the Ba’ath party, see George, Syria, 77–8. On the Decree No. 50 see Caldwell, ‘Privileging the Private’. 46 ‘Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet’, un Data, http://data.un. org/Data.aspx?q=Syria&d=ITU&f=ind1Code%3AI99H%3Bcountry Code%3ASY. 47 In June 2005 the Ba’ath Party Congress recommended the establishment of a new political party law that would allow non-religious and non-ethnic parties to run in future elections. See Human Rights Watch, ‘A Wasted Decade’. 48 Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’. See chapter 4. 49 Hinnebusch and Zintl, eds., Syria from Reform to Revolt, 6. 50 Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’, 141. 51 Pierret and Selvik, ‘Limits of “Authoritarian Upgrading” in Syria’. 52 Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “Authoritarian Upgrading” to Revolution?’; Kawakibi, ‘The Paradox of Government-Organized Civil Activism in Syria’, 169–86. 53 Scheller, The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game. 54 Hinnebusch and Zint, eds., Syria from Reform to Revolt, 14. 55 Ibid., 288. 56 Goodwin and Jasper, The Social Movement Reader. See also Oleinik, ‘Institutional Exclusion’. 57 Buechler, Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism. 58 Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparison. 59 Wright, ‘Strategic Collective Action’. 60 Lim, ‘Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses’. 61 Eltantawy and Wiest, ‘Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution’.

206 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

Notes to pages 57–66

Bayat, Life as Politics, X. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 30–63. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting Authoritarianism’, 91. Zisser, Commanding Syria, 78. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting Authoritarianism’, 106. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting the State Media Monopoly’, 81. Ibid. Kawakibi, ‘Internet or Enter-Not’. Ibid. Carty, ‘New Information Communication Technologies’. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 176. Bernal, ‘Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination’, 161. Ward and Gilbert, ‘Community Action by the Urban Poor’, 61. Kawakibi, ‘The Paradox of Government-Organized Civil Activism’, 171. Kurzman, ‘The Arab Spring Uncoiled’. Bayat, ‘Un-Civil Society’, 57. Ibid. Diani, ‘Social Movement Theory and Grassroots Coalitions’. Ibid. Fahmi, ‘Bloggers’ Street Movement and the Right to the City’. Ibid. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 15–16. Wiktorowicz, ‘Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’. Wedeen, ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times’, 841. Foucault, ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’, 428–39. On ‘the art of presence’, see Bayat, Life as Politics, 1–26. Comparison with Bayat’s, Street Politics, 64. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Bayat, Life as Politics, 14. Anduiza, et al., ‘Los Usos Políticos de Internet en España’. Matar, ‘Rethinking the Arab State and Culture’, 123–37. Bayat, ‘Un-Civil Society’, 55. See also Matar and Bessaiso, ‘Middle East Media Research’, 202. Fadaee, ed., Understanding Southern Social Movements, 1–12. Bayat, Life as Politics, 1–26. Alan George argues that in 2001 Syria had one full-time secret police officer for every 257 Syrians, considering the country’s population of 16.7 million. This means that if 59.5 per cent of Syrians are over fifteen years old, and if only these adults are of interest for a secret agent, then the ratio

Notes to pages 67–71

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is of one police officer per 153 Syrians. See George, Syria: Neither Bead nor Freedom, 2. Bayat, Life as Politics, 26. Mellor, Modern Arab Journalism, 42. The Siebert-Peterson-Schramm model, elaborated by the three professors of communication, divides the development of the world’s press into four different typologies, defined according to the type of state government: authoritarian theory, libertarian theory, communist theory, and social responsibility theory. See Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, Four Theories of the Press. Matar and Bessaiso, ‘Middle East Media Research’, 199. The same can be said about Kamalipour and Mowlana, Mass Media in the Middle East. Reference to Lynch’s definition of the ‘public sphere’ in Mellor, Modern Arab Journalism, 76. Matar and Bessaiso, ‘Middle East Media Research’, 203. Mellor, Modern Arab Journalism, 77. Bourdieu, ‘The Political Field’, 32–43. Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’. Ibid. Access to the internet increased from 0.2 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 2012. See Kelly, Cook, and Truong, ‘Freedom on the Net 2012’. Howard, The Digital Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy, 26. Della Ratta and Valeriani, ‘Remixing the Spring!’ Katz and Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence. Brownlee, ‘The Myth of Prometheus Repeats’. Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 120. Carty, ‘New Information Communication Technologies’, 155–73. Rubin, ‘Printing and Protestans’. McKeever and Rapport, ‘Technology and the Revolutions of 1848 and 2011’. Merriman, The Dynamite Club. Johnston and Lio, ‘Collective Behaviour’, 453–72.

c h a p t e r t h re e 1 Bashar al-Asad was often described as the lion cub at the time of his succession to power. ‘Cub’ refers to the family name, al-Asad, which means ‘lion’ in Arabic. For this, Bashar was seen as Hafez’s cub. The expression ‘change within continuity’ is taken from the inaugural and very promising speech that Bashar al-Asad delivered to the nation on 17 July 2001.

208

Notes to pages 71–4

2 On Syria’s heritage, see Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 16–18. 3 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’. 4 Syria was still a fragile, newborn state, which in the words of Tabitha Petran ‘seemed to its citizens to be an island of liberty in an imperialistic-controlled ocean, an island in constant danger of submergence under the weight of great power pressures and the intrigues of neighbouring client states’. See Petran, Syria, 80–2. 5 Petran, Syria, 80–2. The state of emergency law in Syria was decreed in 1963 and lasted for 48 years. In 2011, amid the protests that broke out in the country and attempts to reform the country, president Bashar al-Asad passed a bill which lifted the country’s state of emergency law. See Al-Jazeera, ‘Syria to Lift Decades-Old Emergency Law’. 6 Al-Ba’ath was established in 1946 as the party’s newspaper, al-Thawra was created in 1963 after the Ba’ath Party came to power on 8 March, and Tishreen came to be in 1974 soon after the 1973 October War in which the Arabs regained their pride against Israel. See Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 10. 7 See George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 124–5. 8 Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 9. 9 Syrian journalist who worked for one of the state’s newspapers, interviewed in Beirut, 28 August 2013. 10 According to the Syrian Arab Establishment for the Distribution of Printed Matter, which controls the sales of all printed media in Syria, al-Thawra has the largest circulation in Syria with 35,000 copies, followed by Tishreen with 25,000. See Roumani, ‘Journalists Can Play a Significant Role in Syrian Reform’. See also, Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 10. 11 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 124–5. 12 Rami, a Syrian journalist who, after serving the regime for twenty years, escaped to Beirut in 2012 and worked as a trainer for an international media organisation. I met with Rami on several occasions in Beirut between July and August 2013. 13 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 124–5. 14 Ibid. 15 Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Enviroment’, 10. 16 Ibid. 17 Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, 133; George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 126. 18 Ibid.

Notes to pages 75–8

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19 Rugh, Arab Mass Media, 23–4. Over the years, the Syrian government has developed a long list of taboo topics that are embarrassing or threatening to the regime, such as criticism of the president and his family, the Ba’ath Party, the military, or the legitimacy of the regime. 20 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, 237. 21 Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, 339–40. 22 Zisser, ‘Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?’, 4–11. For example, in the Asad–Clinton summit in Geneva in March 2000, one of Asad’s last meetings with foreign leaders, the Syrian president gave signs of having difficulty speaking and relied on his translator, Buthayna Sha’ban, to complete his sentences. 23 Ghadbian, ‘Contesting the State Media Monopoly’, 76. The minister of information Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad replaced George Siddiqni (1973–74), who refused to cover everyday school books with images of Asad, arguing that this would insult the religious sensibility of people. See Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 33. 24 Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, 492. 25 Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Asad, 1–2. Early in the 1990s, signals began pointing to the likelihood of Asad grooming his eldest son, Basil, as his heir. The signals included Basil’s advance in the military, Basil’s exposure to the public in order to gain popularity, and Basil’s increasing appearances at his father’s right hand during important events and political gatherings. See Zisser, Commanding Syria, 27–8. 26 Cooke, Dissident Syria, 40–1. 27 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 125. Also, see Bali, ‘Alternative Voices’. 28 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 125. 29 Ghadry, ‘Syrian Reforms’, 61–70. 30 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 127. 31 The Damascus Spring is the name attributed to the period of intense activism and tentative political liberalisation that followed the death of Hafez Asad in 2000. It was characterised by a fervent civil society movement asking for political, legal, and economic reforms. See Carnegie Middle East Center, ‘The Damascus Spring’. 32 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy, 249–50; George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 31–3. 33 Perthes, Syria under Bashar al-Asad, 7–26. 34 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 129. 35 On assuring Bashar al-Asad’s succession, see Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, 166–7. 36 Ibid.

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56

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Notes to pages 78–81

Zisser, Commanding Syria, 60–1. Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria, 50. Zisser, ‘Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?’, 15–23. Wieland, Syria at Bay, 42. Ibid. Ibid., 65. Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “Authoritarian Upgrading”’. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, X–XI. Herrera, Revolution in the Age of Social Media, 11. Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “Authoritarian Upgrading”’. Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’. Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria, 55. The tenth Ba’ath Party congress, held in June 2005, occurred at a highly sensitive moment of Syrian history. That is to say, when hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees had taken refuge in Syria, the US Congress had imposed sanctions against Syria and pushed Syrian troops out of Lebanon, increasing the severe isolation that characterised the Syrian economy. See Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’. Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “Authoritarian Upgrading”’. Wieland, Syria at Bay, 43. Ibid. Roumani, ‘The Thin Red Line’. Wieland, Syria at Bay, 43. These replacements consisted of appointing the ex-editor of Tishreen, Muhammad Khair al-Wadeis, ambassador to China; Al-Ba’ath’s ex-editor, Turki Saqr, was appointed ambassador to Iran, while Tishreen’s ex-editor, Amid Khouri, retired. See George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 129. The prerequisites are that an owner be over twenty-five years of age, have been a holder of Syrian nationality for at least five years, and be a university graduate. See Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 13. Syria’s first privately owned newspapers were al-Dommari (The Lamplighter) and al-Iqtisadiya (The Economy), both weeklies, and launched respectively in February and June 2001. See al-Zubaidi, Fischer, and Abu-Fadil, ‘Walking a Tightrope’, 134–46. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 129. The npf is a coalition of political parties that supports the socialist and Arab nationalist orientation of the government and accepts the leading role of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Ibid.

Notes to pages 81–6

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59 ‘Political news’ refers to those papers covering current affairs and issues of relevance to both the domestic and foreign politics of Syria. The new decree was built on an ambivalent, ambiguous, and often misleading use of terms and expressions, such as ‘breaching national unity’, which allowed for broad and arbitrary interpretations, as expediency required. See Haidar, ‘Creeping Ahead’. 60 Al-Abyad wa al-Aswad, owned by Nilal Tourekmani, tackled sensitive topics such as the emergency law and corruption. See Roumani, ‘Journalists Can Play’. 61 Weyman, ‘Empowering Youth or Reshaping Compliance?’ 62 ‘Media & Advertising’, in Oxford Business Group, The Report: Emerging Syria 2008, 132. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., 130. 65 George, Syria: Neither Bread not Freedom, 129–30. 66 Syrian cartoonist interviewed via Skype on 18 Novemeber 2013, at the time still living in Damascus. 67 George, Syria: Neither Bread not Freedom, 129–30. 68 Reference to Henri Bergson in Wedeen’s work, ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times’, 870. 69 George, Syria: Neither Bread not Freedom, 130–31. 70 After all, the criteria of selection for job positions did not seem to depend on specific skills or personal background. For example, when Bashar replaced the heads of the three main national papers, he assigned these people, who had worked for years in the media sector, to completely different appointments: the ex-editor of Tishreen, Muhammad Khair al-Wadei, became ambassador to China, and al-Ba’ath’s ex-editor, Turki Saqr, was appointed ambassador to Iran. See George, Syria: Neither Bread not Freedom, 129–32. 71 Ibid., 133–4. 72 Roumani, ‘Journalists Can Play’. 73 The Syrian Arab Establishment for the Distribution of Printed Matter applied taxes of around 40 per cent on all publications. See, Roumani, ‘Journalists Can Play’. 74 Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 15–16. 75 Haidar, ‘Creeping Ahead’. 76 Ibid. 77 Interviewee working in Syria as a radio presenter, interviewed via Skype, March 07, 2014. 78 Worth, ‘Web Tastes Freedom inside Syria’.

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Notes to pages 87–93

79 Khaled, Syrian activist interviewed in Beirut on 17 July 2013. 80 Donatella Della Ratta argues that Syrian drama production is not really a regime product. It is more the product of a satisfying formula by which the regime would get local drama produced without having to pay for it. However, according to Della Ratta, under Hafez al-Asad, drama directors and playwrights did not feel represented by the ruling elite and therefore tried to push the red lines. Instead, under Bashar there has been a pact between the regime and drama producers about which topics to deal with. She points out how Bashar opted for a ‘whisper strategy’, not having to deny, but rather to suggest. See Esber, ‘The Whisper Strategy’. 81 Salamandra, ‘Prelude to an Uprising’. 82 Kraidy, ‘Syria: Media Reform and its Limitations’. 83 Esber, ‘The Whisper Strategy’. 84 Della Ratta, ‘Drawing Freedom on Syria’s Walls’. 85 Ibid. 86 Wedeen, ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times’, 864. 87 The president is actually mentioned only when he concedes amnesty to some prisoners. So his figure is connected to piety, understanding, and trying to find a political solution to the crisis. See Esber, ‘The Whisper Strategy’. 88 Al-Anani and Malik, ‘Pious Way to Politics’. 89 Interview with the Syrian director, who wishes to remain anonymous, via Skype on 7 March 2014. 90 Salamandra, ‘Spotlight on the Bashar al-Asad Era’. 91 George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 136.

c ha p t e r f o u r 1 Wedeen, ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times’, 863. 2 Kubba, ‘The Awakening of Civil Society’. 3 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination; Sottimano, ‘Ideology and Discourse in the Era of Baathist Reforms’. 4 See ‘Civic Engagement and Digital Connectivity at Crossroads’ in chapter 1. 5 The ‘plan to modernise the media’ presented at the Ba’ath Party Congress in 2005 is a good example of the regime’s ‘much ado about nothing’. This was in fact a plan in which reforms were connected to, for example, the physical criteria for television anchors – they had to be under 160 centimetres tall and weigh no more than 60 kilograms – along with the ban on

Notes to pages 94–8

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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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showy makeup for women. Kraidy, ‘Syria: Media Reform and its Limitations’. Pies and Madanat, ‘Media Accountability Practices Online in Syria’. Mellor, Modern Arab Journalism, 43. Ibid. Herrera and Sakr, ‘Wired and Revolutionary in the Middle East and North Africa’. Wheeler, ‘In Praise of the Virtual Life’. Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 17. Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 17. However, a closer look at these new satellite television channels reveals how most of these outlets are not state-independent. For example, the Middle East Broadcasting Centre, despite being London-based, belongs to Sheikh Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, a brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation is controlled by a board dominated by ministers and officials close to the Syrian government, while Future tv was partly owned by Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri. The Syrian Arab News Network is not any better, belonging to the son of Rifaat al-Assad, brother of the previous president of Syria, Hafez al-Asad. See Sakr, ‘Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East’. Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 135. Ibid. Dubai Press Club. ‘Arab Media Outlook 2009–2013’, 148. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 41. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting the State Media Monopoly’, 79. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 241. The amendment lowered the minimum age required for a president to be elected, from 40 to 34 years, Bashar’s age at the time (2000). Ghadbian, ‘Contesting the State Media Monopoly’, 79–80. Zisser, Commanding Syria, 78. Ghadbian, ‘Contesting the State Media Monopoly’, 81. Brownlee, ‘Mediating the Syria Revolt’. Wafaa is an invented name. She is a Syrian journalist and activist, interviewed on several occasion during my stay in Beirut. This conversation was recorded on 28 August 2013. Haidar, ‘Creeping Ahead’. Al-Zubaidi, Fischer, and Abu-Fadil, ‘Walking a Tightrope’, 146.

214 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

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Notes to pages 98–103

Haidar, ‘Creeping Ahead’. Ibid. Whitlock, ‘US Secretly Backed Syrian Opposition Groups’. Ibid. Interview with Malik al-Abdeh, via Skype, 5 April 2014. Whitlock, ‘US Secretly Backed’. In this regard, see chapter 6. Ibid. Interview with Malik al-Abdeh, via Skype, 5 April 2014. Sakr, Arab Television Today, 179. McPhail, Global Communication, 295. Haddad, ‘The Formation and Development of Economic Networks in Syria’, 37–8. Ibid. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 134. Arab Media and Society, ‘Arab League Satellite Broadcasting Charter’. Al-Zubaidi, Fischer, and Abu-Fadil, ‘Walking a Tightrope’. Zisser, Commanding Syria, 31–4. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 135. Kawakibi, ‘Internet or Enter-Not’, 9. Loewenstein, The Blogging Revolution, 95–6. Ibid. Ibid. Telecom providers, instead, include Syriatel, mtn , Aya, and scs -net, which is technically the arm of the Syrian Computer Society (scs ). Wheeler, Digital Resistance in the Middle East, 20. Morozov, The Net Delusion, 87. Ibid. The ste charged subscribers an initial one-off fee of 5,000 Syrian pounds ($100), plus a monthly fee of 1,000 Syrian pounds ($20) and a connection fee of one Syrian pound for one minute ($0.02). See Zisser, Commanding Syria, 75. The number of subscriptions grew rapidly: 7,000 in 2000, 70,000 in 2002, and 200,000 in 2008. See, OpenNet Initiative, ‘Syria’. Ibid. Aarts and Cavatorta, Civil Society in Syria and Iran, 124–5. Ibid., 126. George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, 136. China has the most expansive, advanced, and extensive broad-ranging internal and external controls. Over a dozen ministries and agencies, and 30,000 technicians and censors are devoted to controlling the Internet. See the unesco report, ‘New Media: The Press Freedom Dimension’; Rohde,

Notes to pages 103–10

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58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

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‘China’s Newest Export’; Earp, ‘China Not Most Censored but Maybe Most Ambitious’, 8. Reporters Without Borders, ‘Syria: Annual Report 2007’ and ‘List of the 13 Internet Enemies’, Reporters Without Borders; Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger’. Pies and Madanat, ‘Media Accountability Practices Online in Syria’, 8. Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 113. Ibid. Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 19. Rami is an invented name. He is a media trainer, interviewed in Gaziantep on 1 August 2013. Wheeler, Digital Resistance, 14. Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 133. Al-Zubaidi, Fischer, and Abu-Fadil, ‘Walking a Tightrope’, 28. The Syrian proverb says, ‘Even walls have ears’, referring to the numbers of mukhaˉ baraˉt (secret agents) who control people’s lives, even behind the walls of people’s homes. On Syrian Internet filtering, see OpenNet Initiative, ‘Syria’. Ibid. OpenNet Initiative, ‘Internet Filtering in Syria’. Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 20. Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 119–41. Pies and Madanat, ‘Media Accountability Practices Online in Syria’. The study also reveals the second highest proportion of male bloggers, at 87 per cent. See Etling, et al., ‘Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere’. Al-Zubaidi, Fischer, and Abu-Fadil, ‘Walking a Tightrope’, 31. Wheeler, ‘Empowering Publics’, 21. Syrian blogger interviewed via Skype, 20 April 2014. Ibid. Etling, et al., ‘Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere’, 10. Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 4. Pies and Madanat, ‘Media Accountability Practices Online in Syria’, 11. Ibid. Visit the All4Syria website at http://www.all4syria.info. Refer also to Kawakibi, ‘Internet or Enter-Not’, 6–7. CreativeSyria, ‘Ayman Abdel Nour’. Nadia, Syrian journalist, interview in Beirut, 20 July 2013.

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Notes to pages 110–18

85 Syria News belongs to Nedal Ma’louf. See the website, at http://www. syria-news.com. 86 For more information on Syria News, see chapter 5. 87 Harkin, ‘A Reappraisal of the Practise of Journalism in Contemporary Syria’. 88 Ibid. 89 Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 128. 90 Ibid., 129. 91 Kawakibi, ‘Internet or Enter-Not’, 11. 92 Ibid. 93 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 11 94 A Syrian student who I knew from my last visit in Syria in 2010 and who I met in Beirut in August 2015 on several occasions. 95 See chapter 5. 96 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 12. 97 Pavel ‘On-line Social Networks in Syria’. 98 Gabriel, ‘Syria Women’s Rights’. 99 Kaur, ‘Honour Killing: A Global Scenario’. 100 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 13. 101 Birke, ‘In Syria, the Fight for Women’s Rights’. 102 Layla is an invented name. She is a Syrian activist interviewed in Beirut on 13 August 2013. 103 Birke, ‘In Syria, the Fight for Women’s Rights’. 104 Layla, Syrian activist interviewed in Beirut on 13 August 2013. 105 Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 137. 106 Kawakibi, ‘Internet or Enter-Not’, 11. 107 Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 135–6. 108 Gause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring’. 109 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination. 110 Sottimano, ‘Ideology and Discourse in the Era of the Baathist Reforms’, 3–40. 111 Wafaa, a Syrian journalist and activist, interviewed on several occasion during my stay in Beirut. This conversation was recorded on 28 August 2013. See the section ‘Satellite tv : The New Onshore Democracy’ in this chapter for the rest of the interview. 112 Mellor, Modern Arab Journalism, 43. 113 Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 23.

Notes to pages 118–28

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114 Interview with the journalist/taxi driver in Beirut, where he had moved after 2011 and kept working as a taxi driver, 12 August 2013. 115 Abul Latif, ‘Syria’s only National Journalists’ Union’. 116 Bourdieu, ‘The Political Field’, 41. 117 Hamadi, ‘Journalism Training’, 114. 118 Walid, a journalist now working as a media trainer in Gaziantep. Interviewed in Gaziantep on 5 August 2013. 119 Bugs and Huguenin-Benjamin, ‘The Syrian Media Environment’, 24. 120 Ibid. 121 Interview with Fadi, a Syrian journalist, who worked for a private media outlet and who wished to remain anonymous, in Beirut, 9 July 2013. 122 Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 131–2. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Harkin, ‘A Reappraisal of the Practise of Journalism in Contemporary Syria’. 126 Haugbolle, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Media’, 163. 127 Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, 198–9. 128 The Syrian Computer Society (scs ) was founded by Basil al-Asad in 1987 with the intent of promoting computer awareness. Bashar al-Asad replaced his brother at the scs in 1995. See Zisser, Commanding Syria, 31–2. 129 Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, 198–9. 130 Ibid., 200. 131 Pollock, ‘Streetbook’, 78.

c ha p t e r f i ve 1 2 3 4 5

Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, 10. Colle, ‘Threads of Development Communication’. Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, 1. Sakr, ‘Media Development and Democratisation of the Arab Middle East’. Kedizie and Aragon, ‘Coincident Revolutions and the Dictator’s Dilemma’, 123. 6 Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, IX. 7 Stanley, ‘Crafting the Arab Media for Peace-Building’, 134. 8 The term ‘media development’ often overlaps with that of ‘media for development’, though they are structurally different. In fact, while ‘media development’ indicates engaging in developing the media in a country as

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15 16 17

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Notes to pages 128–34

an end in itself, ‘media for development’ goes beyond this aim, referring to the use of the media to convey specific messages on other topics, such as health care, poverty reduction, good governance, the environment, and the like. See cima , ‘What Is Media for Development?’, cima . Kumar, Developing Independent Media, 8. Nelson and Susman-Pena, ‘Rethinking Media Development’. Ibid. See unesco ’s index of media development indicators: ‘Media Development Indicators’. Edwards, Future Positive, 111–23. Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, 3. Ibid. As an example, after 9/11 the US State Department funded an advertisement campaign in the Middle Eastern media to portray the religious freedom enjoyed by Muslims in the US. The purpose was to convey an image of coexistence and respect among faiths in the US and to dispel any misunderstandings. Ibid., 4. Moeller, ‘Media Literacy’. As opposed to ‘hard power’, thought of as the use of force and hard weaponry to obtain tangible results. After the mass protests of Iran’s post-2009 elections, Western media outlets explained the whole movement in terms of a media phenomenon related to Twitter. This view was so widespread that Twitter was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, as if ‘Twitter and other social media outlets have become the soft weapons of democracy’. See, Pfeife, ‘Changing the Face(book) of Social Activism’. Dabashi, ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal and the Obama Doctrine’. Shah, The Production of Modernization, 226. Matar and Bessaiso ‘Middle East Media Research’, 206. Lerner and Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Ibid., 6. Wilkins, ‘Considering Traditional Society in the Middle East’, 2–3. Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication, 72. Sakr, ‘Foreign Support for Media Freedom Advocacy’, 3. Yerkes, Cofman Wittes, ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’. Ibid. Menocal and Fritz, ‘Assessing International Democracy Assistance’. Moeller, ‘Media Literacy’. Wilkins, ‘Considering Traditional Society in the Middle East’. Barber, cited in Karolak, ‘Civil Society and Web 2.0 Technology’. Roudi, ‘Youth Population and Employment’. Taki, ‘Country Case Study: Syria’.

Notes to pages 135–8 34 35 36 37

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Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’, 5. Kharas, ‘Trends and Issues in Development Aid’. Taki, ‘Country Case Study: Syria’. Interview with Rami Nakhle, via Skype, 8 July 2013; also an interview with another activist met in Gaziantep in August 2013, but who opted to remain anonymous. Both activists were trained by Freedom House in Jordan and in the US. Taki, ‘Country Case Study: Syria’, 11. Ibid. European Commission, ‘A New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy’, 142. Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’. Ibid. LaMay, Exporting Press Freedom, 93. See also Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’, 11. Ibid., 10. Babayan, Democratic Transformation and Obstruction, 143. Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’, 11. European Commission, ‘Mapping of eu Media Support 2000–2010’. The European Commission’s major partners are bbc Media Action, Internews (Internews Europe is the biggest entity), Reporters without Borders, and the International Federation of Journalists. Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’, 7. European Commission, ‘Mapping of eu Media Support’, 10. Ibid. Interview with Raniero Leto, via Skype, 31 March 2014. For more information regarding the programmes of media assistance in Syria refer to the eu Neighbours website: http://www.enpi-info.eu/index. php. European Commision, ‘Support for the Syrian Population Affected by the Crisis’. A job opportunity between October 2014 and March 2015 at the European External Action Service gave me access to the matrices of the eu’s Syria funding since 2011. Unfortunately, most of this information cannot be disclosed, as many of the contractors that are implementing the projects have not agreed to my using the data and interviews released for any purpose, with the justification that the visibility of their projects may put those taking part in danger. Interview with a media trainer and activist – who wishes to remain anonymous – in Gaziantep province, on the Turkey-Syria border, 7 August 2013.

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Notes to pages 139–41

56 The media training of an international organisation, whose name I have to conceal for safety reasons, occurred on the first week of September 2013. 57 About the ‘Media Neighbouring Project’: http://www.medianeighbourhood.eu/about-the-project. 58 Interview with a media trainer and coordinator who wished to remain anonymous, in Gaziantep, 7 August 2013. 59 See the usaid website: https://www.usaid.gov. 60 Price, ‘Mapping Media Assistance’, 7–8. 61 Mottaz, ‘US Government Funding for Media Development’. As to the achievements of usaid funding programmes for regime change in Central America, one needs to mention the role of the Latin American Journalism Project in improving professional standards of print journalism and the establishment of a regional journalism training institute in Panama; the extensive training, technical assistance, and support to about 600 regional television stations in Russia; and the training of hundreds of journalists and the support to independent media outposts that could compete with state-owned enterprises in Bosnia. In this regard, see Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, IX. 62 Ibid. 63 Cary and D’Amour, ‘US Government Funding for Media’. 64 Kumar, ‘usaid ’s Media Assistance’, xiv. 65 Mottaz, ‘US Government Funding’, 4. 66 See the usaid ‘Who We Are: Organization’ website: http://www.usaid. gov/who-we-are/organization. usaid has recently been restructured and organized under four pillar bureaus: Food Security; Global Health; Economic Growth, Education, and Environment; Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. The bureaus are then subdivided into geographical areas, development areas, and administrative functions. 67 Mottaz, ‘US Government Funding’, 7. 68 Since the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Defense’s strategic communication spending has increased exponentially, going from $9 million in 2005 to a $1 billion request in 2010. See Nakamura and Weed, ‘US Public Diplomacy’. 69 Mottaz, ‘US Government Funding’, 8. 70 Ibid. 71 Yerkes and Cofman Wittes, ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’. It is useful to mention that mepi was headed at its inception by then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (and the vice-president’s daughter) Elizabeth Cheney. 72 Whitlock, ‘US Secretly Backed Syrian Opposition Groups’. 73 Ibid.

Notes to pages 141–8

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74 MacAskill, ‘US Appoints First Ambassador to Damascus since 2005’. 75 unesco , ‘Fostering Freedom of Expression’. The Communication and Information sector is then divided into several relevant areas, including media development, freedom of expression, and capacity building tools. 76 In 2000 the unesco World Press Freedom Prize was awarded to the Syrian journalist Nizar Nayyouf, on the recommendation of an international jury of media professionals, for having been sentenced to ten years of forced labour for belonging to the Committees for the Defence of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights in Syria (cdf ). See unesco , ‘Nizar Nayyouf, Syria’. 77 Interview with George Awad, unesco Regional Bureau, Beirut, 31 July 2013. 78 The Conference was held from 22 to 23 November 2004. See, unesco , ‘Partnership for Building the Arab Information Society’. 79 unesco , ‘Journalist Training in Syria Completed’. 80 The training was held on 24–25 November 2009 in cooperation with the Syrian National Commission. See, unesco , ‘unesco Beirut Newsletter’. 81 undp , ‘Country Evaluation’. 82 Ibid. 83 Specificities of the project can be found at: undp , ‘An Empowered Civil Society’. 84 undp , ‘Country Evaluation’, 5–6. 85 Kalathil, ‘Developing Independent Media’, 38–40. 86 Knight Foundation, ‘Knight International and undp ’. 87 See total budget, implementing partners, and goals in specific: Salmon and Al-Khoury, ‘Final Report: Socio-Economic Outcome Evaluation under Outcome B3’. 88 Ibid. 89 undp , ‘Support to the Syria Times Newspaper’. 90 Ibid. 91 Taki, ‘Country Case Study: Syria’. 92 Summary graphic of main contractors: Figure 5.2. 93 bbc Media Action, ‘Transforming Lives through Media around the World’. 94 bbc Media Action: http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction. 95 Hivos, ‘Hivos Provides Analysis to bbc on Support to Media Freedoms’. 96 Juliette Harkin, interviewed via Skype on several occasions during the period May 2013 to March 2014. 97 Harkin, ‘A Reappraisal of the Practise of Journalism in Contemporary Syria’.

222

Notes to pages 148–55

98 Taki, ‘Country Case Study: Syria’, 13. See also, Harkin, ‘A Reappraisal’, 64–5. 99 Ibid., 70–1. 100 Maha Taki submitted her PhD research, ‘Bloggers and the Blogosphere in Lebanon and Syria: Meanings and Activities’, in 2010 at Westminster University. 101 Interview with Maha Taki, via Skype, 4 April 2014. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Kumar, Promoting Independent Media, 14. 106 Group interview at a media training session held in Beirut on 3 September 2016. 107 Halberg, ‘Filling the Information Vacuum for Syrian Refugees’. 108 bbc Media Action, ‘Supporting Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan’. 109 Funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. 110 bbc Media Action, ‘Supporting Syrian Refugees’. 111 See the iwpr website: https://iwpr.net/what-we-do. 112 Interview with Susanne Fischer, at the iwpr ’s office in Beirut, 30 July 2013. 113 Schleifer, ‘Media Explosion in the Arab World’. 114 Syrian International Academy for Training and Development: http://sia-sy. net/sia/index_en.php. 115 Syria Untold, ‘Damascus Bureau’. 116 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ‘Arabic Online Academy Boosts Cyber-Security’. 117 See the Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (arij ) website: http:// en.arij.net. 118 Ibid. 119 Interview with Saad Hattar, via Skype, 18 July 2013. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism, ‘With the help of ngo arij’. 123 Interview with Saad Hattar. 124 Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism, ‘With the help of ngo arij’. 125 Ibid.

Notes to pages 155–61 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144

145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153

223

Bajec, ‘How to Practise Investigative Journalism in the Arab Region’. Sakr, ‘Foreign Support for Media Freedom’. Interview with Soazig Dollet, via Skype, 27 August 2013. Ibid. Ramadan, The Arab Awakening, 11. Arrow, ‘Gene Sharp’. E-mail exchange with Jamila Raqib, executive director of the Albert Einstein Institution, 4 April 2014. Ibid. See the Albert Einstein Institution website: http://www.aeinstein.org/about. Interviews conducted with Syrian activists in Lebanon and Turkey between June and September 2013. Ibid. Cartalucci, ‘The US Engineered “Arab Spring”’. Posner, ‘Internet Freedom and the Digital Earthquake of 2011’. This may happen in about fifty years time, when archives will be accessible. Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, ‘The Internet and Civil Activism in Syria’, 128. Ibid., 128–35. Katz and Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence. Mourtada and Salem, ‘Citizen Engagement and Public Services in the Arab World’. ZunZuneo was a social network, based on Twitter, initially presenting noncontroversial content like weather, sports, and music, which later developed anti-regime content, mobilising users to organise political gatherings that would have triggered dissent against the Cuban regime. See, Lewis and Roberts, ‘White House Denies ‘Cuban Twitter’ ZunZuneo Programme was Covert’. Alvarez, ‘Radio and tv Martì, US Broadcasters to Cuba’. Cary and D’Amour, ‘US Government Funding for Media’. Ibid. Alcorn, et al., ‘Mapping Donor Decision Making on Media Development’. Shadid, ‘Exiles Shaping World’s Image of Syria’s Revolt’. Interview with Syrian activist Rami Nakhle, via Skype, 2 July 2013. Ibid. Ibid. Bashar al-Asad, as quoted by Shaery-Eisenlohr, ‘From Subjects to Citizens?’

224

Notes to pages 162–70

chapter six 1 Parts of this chapter have been published in Brownlee, ‘Mediating the Syrian Revolt’. 2 Slogan written on a banner in the city of Kafranbel, now known for its courageous spirit, carrying out distinctive acts of civil activism in the midst of a civil war. See Daher, ‘The Roots and Grassroots of the Syrian Revolution’. 3 Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring’. 4 Piven, ‘The Domino Effect’. 5 The Asad regime has benefitted from a trustful and generous friendship with Russia, Iran, and Lebanon, while the rebel groups have been fattened by Turkey, the conservative Arab states – specifically Qatar and Saudi Arabia – the eu member states, and the US, with financial revenues from Gulf countries fuelling the Islamic groups. 6 Wieland, Syria: A Decade of Lost Chances, 16–17. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Sonn, Sex, Violence, and the Avant-Garde, 28. 10 Wieland, Syria: A Decade of Lost Chances, 19. 11 Brownlee and Ghiabi, ‘Passive, Silent and Revolutionary’. 12 Ibid. 13 The page was created on 18 January 2011. Landis, ‘The Man Behind “Syria Revolution 2011”’. 14 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 8. 15 Fares, ‘Pro-Regime Versus Opposition Media’, 192. 16 Ibid. 17 Association de Soutien aux Médias Libres, ‘Emergence: Inform to Protect’. 18 Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’, 142. 19 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 48–51. 20 Ayoub, ‘Syria’s Revolution, a Year On’. See also Macleod and Flamand, ‘Tortured and Killed’. 21 Sawah and Kawakibi, ‘Activism in Syria’, 142–7. 22 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 18. 23 Khatib, ‘Transforming the Media’, 81. See also, Fares, ‘Pro-Regime Versus Oppositional Media’. 24 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 8. 25 Ibid.

Notes to pages 170–81

225

26 The series was created by ten artists from inside Syria and consists of two seasons. It met with incredible success, with more of 40,000 viewers. See Witness, ‘Little Dictator’. 27 Syria Untold. 2014. ‘Salamiyah Women Coordination Committee’. 28 Wood, ‘Face-to-Face with Abu Sakkar’. 29 Fowler, ‘Who Is the Syrian Electronic Army?’ 30 Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, ‘Beyond Egypt’s Facebook Revolution’. 31 Baiazy, ‘Syria’s Cyber Wars’, 20. 32 Sandels, ‘Syria: Facebook Group Calls for Uprisings’. 33 Zaluski, ‘Syria’s Cyberwar Branch 225 at Work’. 34 Della Ratta, ‘Towards Active Citizenship in Syria’. 35 Ibid. 36 Interview with a Syrian activist in Gaziantep, on the Turkish border with Syria, 8 August 2013. 37 See ‘Phase Three: Media Professionalisation and War Stagnation’ in chapter 6. 38 Syria has a long history of underground papers. See Paul, Human Rights in Syria. 39 Al-Arabiya, ‘Revolutionary Press Blooms Underground in Syria’. 40 Observers, ‘Activists Take Big Risks to Deliver Underground Newspapers in Syria’. 41 De Angelis, Della Ratta and Badran, ‘Against the Odds’. 42 Interview with the editor-in-chief of Sayedat Souria, Yasmine Merei, via Skype, 4 March 2014. 43 Ibid. 44 De Angelis, Della Ratta, and Badran, ‘Against the Odds’. 45 Interview with one of the main contributors of Radio SouriaLi, Caroline Ayoub, via Skype, 3 March 2014. 46 See the brochure about SouriaLi at http://www.souriali.com/SouriaLi%20 Brief%20EN.pdf. 47 Interview with Caroline Ayoub, via Skype, 3 March 2014. 48 Zeina Erhaim, who I met during my stay in Gaziantep in August 2013. 49 See the Damascus Bureau website, at https://damascusbureau.org/en. 50 McGeagh and Johnson, ‘Citizen Journalism in Syria: Rami Jarrah’. 51 Lowe, ‘Syria: A War Reported by Citizen-Journalists, Social Media’. 52 See the Aleppo Media Centre website, at http://www.amc-sy.net/en. 53 De Angelis, ‘Tre Anni Dopo lo Scoppio Della Rivoluzione’. For more on Radio Baladna, see Deutche Welle, ‘Online Radio Station Gives Syrians Hope’.

226 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Notes to pages 181–97

See the Dawlati website, at http://www.dawlati.gov.lb. See the Syria Untold website, at http://www.syriauntold.com/en. De Angelis, ‘Tre Anni Dopo lo Scoppio Della Rivoluzione’. Lynch, ‘After the Arab Spring’. Rose, ‘The isis Propaganda War’. Roy, Globalised Islam. Ward, ‘isis Use of Social Media’. Carty, Social Movements, New Technology, 115. Rose, ‘The isis Propaganda War’. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate”’. Diab, ‘The Jihadist Selfie’. Shatz, ‘Magical Thinking about isis ’. Al-Abdeh, ‘The Media War in Syria’. Shadid, ‘Lyrical Message for Syrian Leader’. Mahmoud and Chulov, ‘Syrian Eyewitness Accounts of Alleged Chemical Weapons’. Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, ‘Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War’. Hoskins and O’Loughlin, War and Media, 4. Zelizer, ‘On “Having Been There”’. Lynch, ‘After the Arab Spring’. Sierra Leone is an interesting example of a country where the media is trying to sew up the wounds of a ten-year civil war, teaching to forgive but not to forget. For a comparison, see Oately and Thapa, ‘Media Youth and Conflict Prevention in Sierra Leone’.

c o nc l usi o n s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Cooke, Dissident Syria, 160. Lynch, The Arab Uprising. Said, ‘Doing Research during Times of Revolution and Counterrevolution’. Bayat, Revolution without Revolutionaries. Burkeman, ‘Inside Washington’s High Risk Mission’. Ibid. MacAskill, ‘Extreme Surveillance Becomes UK Law’. Harkin, ‘Good Media, Bad Politics?’ Kayne, Speech Police. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 72.

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Index Page numbers in italics indicate either figures or tables.

al-Abdeh, Malik, 98–9 Abdelnour, Ayman, 109 Agamben, Giorgio, 197 Ahmad, Ahmad Iskandar, 75 aid. See media development aid al-Arabiya, 58, 95 al-Ba’ath (Resurrection) (newspaper), 73, 208n10 al-Dommari (The Lamplighter) (newspaper), 82–4, 118, 210n56 al-Hayat Media Centre, 182–3 al-Hurr al-’Ayn (The Beautiful Maidens), 89 al-Jazeera, 58, 95, 96–7, 151 al-Madina radio, 86 al-Thawra (The Revolution) (newspaper), 73, 82, 84–5, 208nn6,10 al-Watan (The Nation) (newspaper), 82 Albert Einstein Institution, 156, 157 Aleppo Media Centre, 180 Algeria, independence movement, 27 All4Syria.com, 59, 109–10 Allal, Amin, 13 ana News Media Association, 180 Ara2 Academy project, 135, 148–9, 157 Arab League Satellite Broadcasting Charter (2008), 100

Arab Media Dialogue, 148 Arab News Network, 95 Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (arij ), 110, 153–5, 157 Arab Socialist Party, publications, 81 Arab Spring: new media in the pre-revolt phase, 12–14; new media’s pivotal role, 6–7, 17; offline ties needed for permanent change, 195; origins, 4–5, 13; public protests, 168; satellite television coverage, 98; terminology, 18 al-Asad, Asma, 54, 102, 176 al-Asad, Bashar: Aleppo visit, 122–3; authoritarian reforms, 21–2, 41–2, 53–5, 77–9, 133; dissident activism, 51–2; Facebook, 105; inaugural speech, 77–8; modernisation attempts, 100, 122–3; oppositional dissent, 49; popularity among minorities, 200n12; presidential candidate, 58, 97; on Syrian stability, 10 al-Asad, Basil, 75–6, 209n25 al-Asad, Hafez: authoritarianism, 21; ill-health, 75; myth of ‘immortal leader’, 75; respected yet undermined by citizens, 22–3;

262

Index

state of emergency law, 19, 58 l’Association du Soutien aux Médias Libres (asml ), 176, 179 authoritarian regimes: academic study, 12–13; danger from reforms, 54; fieldwork challenges, 31–6; social media use, 9; survival, 20–21; Syria’s destabilising reforms, 21–2, 41–2, 53–5, 77–9, 133 Awad, George, 142 Ayoub, Caroline, 177–8 Ba’ath Party, 21, 51, 54, 71, 73, 78, 80, 84, 85, 205nn45,47, 208n6, 209n19, 210nn48,57, 212n5 al-Baba, Hakam, 85 Baladna (Our Country) (newspaper), 82 Baladna (Our Country) (radio station), 181 Barada TV, 58, 98–9, 141 Bayat, Asef, 12, 14, 27, 57, 62–3, 65 bbc : Ara2 Academy project, 135, 148–9, 157; Arabic TV, 95; training for journalists, 110, 131, 151 bbc Media Action, 128, 147–50, 157, 179 Beinin, Joel, 27 Beirut-Damascus Declaration (2006), 115 Ben Ali, Zine El Abedine, 4, 11 Bennafla, Karine, 13 Bila Hudud (Without Limits), 58, 97 blogging/bloggers, 103, 105, 107–8, 139, 147–8 Bouazizi, Mohammad, 4 Bourdieu, Pierre, 94, 117 ‘bridge leaders’, 15–16, 66, 69, 159– 60, 161 Brownlee, Jason, 20–21 Brumberg, Daniel, 20

Bukhari, Monis, 180–1 Buq’at Daw’ (Spotlight), 89 Byrne, Paul, 29 Carsten, Wieland, 164 Castells, Manuel, 30, 45, 46, 61 Cavatorta, Francesco, 22, 107, 111, 116 censorship, 74, 82, 84, 86, 87–8, 105, 120, 171 China, Tiananmen Square, 46 citizen journalists, 173–4, 179–80, 186 citizens, civic engagement, 68, 94 civil society: agent for social change, 26; crushed by Bashar al-Asad, 57; empowered by the state, 21–2; provider of welfare, 21–2, 54–5; use of satellite television, 96; Western aid programmes, 55–6 civil society activism: against Bashar al-Asad, 51–3; Committee for the Rehabilitation of Civil Society, 115; emergence, 15–16; empowered by media development aid, 49, 158–60; informal activism, 21; media and security training, 34, 49, 157, 158; mistreatment of cyber-dissenters, 103; new media as protest and awareness tool, 52–3, 57–60; non-violent protests, 156, 157; online-offline ‘bridge leaders’, 15–16, 66, 69, 159–60, 161; political activism, 111–16; and social change, 26; tanseeqiat, 168–9, 173; two-step flow theory, 15–16, 66, 69, 159–60, 161 civil war. See Syrian uprising/civil war cnn, 95 Cold War, 130 Communist Party, 76, 81

Index contentious politics, 29–30 Cooke, Miriam, 76 Crystal, Jill, 20 Cuba: US policy, 129–30, 160; ZunZuneo, 160, 223n144 CyberArabs (website), 152 Dakhlallah, Mahdi, 80–1, 85 Dalila, Aref, 84–5 Damascus: Hurriyat (newspaper), 76–7, 175; Information Society Preparatory Conference (2005), 143, 145; Mezzeh prison, 53; Umayyad Mosque rally, 5 Damascus Bureau (website), 152, 180 Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change (2005), 51, 115 Damascus Spring, 21, 51, 58, 92, 96 Damascus Spring Committee, 115 Damascus University, 110, 119, 143, 148 Dawlati (My Country) (web portal), 181 Day’a Daay’a (A Forgotten Village) (tv drama), 89 Decree No. 50, 53–4, 81–2 Della Porta, Donatella, 29–30 Della Ratta, Donatella, 172 democracy: and the internet, 24, 103–7; and media development aid, 126, 128, 129, 131, 159 Dera’a, 5, 185 Deutsche Welle, 151, 179 development aid. See media development aid Diani, Mario, 29–30, 61, diaspora: media education, 143, 145; Ministry of Expatriates, 53; political influence, 52; satellite television stations, 58, 98 displacement: urban migrants, 11. See also refugees

263

donors, 128, 131, 134. See also media development aid e-elections, 111–12 economic crisis, protests, 17 education: reforms, 79. See also schools Egypt: internet users, 106; Revolution (1952), 27; satellite Salafism, 90; social media and 2011 uprising, 13, 57 elections (2007), 111–12 entertainment industry, 74–5 Erhaim, Zaina, 179–80 Establishment for Printing and Publishing, 73, 84, 85 Etana Press, 111, 115, 159 ethical challenges, of research, 36 ethnographic research, 34–5 Etling, Bruce, 107, 108 EuropeAid, 136 European Commission, media development aid, 128, 131, 135–6, 136–9, 145 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (enpi ), 136–7, 139 Facebook: campaigning tool, 9; and Egyptian uprising, 13, 57; regime target, 105; and Syrian uprising, 5, 61–2, 165, 167–9; and Tunisian uprising, 4; women’s rights campaign, 113 Fadaee, Simin, 65 Fahmi, S. Wael, 62 Faris, David, 13 Farzat, Ali, 83–4, 118 fieldwork, 31–6 Fischer, Susanne, 151, 152 Ford Foundation, 155 Foucault, Michel, 22, 23, 92, 116 Free Syrian Army, 6, 61, 166

264

Index

Free Syrian Hackers, 171 Freedom House, 132, 156, 157, 161 Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 134, 161 Future TV, 95, 213n13 Gause, Gregory, 12 George, Alan, 41, 99–100 Georgia, Rose Revolution, 17 Ghadiban, Najib, 51, 58, 96 Gharbia, Ben, 160–1 Ghazlan fi Ghabat al-Dhi’ab (Gazelles in a Forest of Wolves) (tv drama), 89 Ghazzawi, Razan, 69 Goldfarb, Jeffrey, 8–9 Goodwin, Jeff, 31, 47, 56 Google, 106 Green Movement, 3, 17 Gulf states, in Syria, 163, 181–2 Habermas, Jürgen, 59 Hafez, Kai, 25, 26 Hama massacre (1982), 6, 167–8 Hariri, Rafiq, 55 Harkin, Juliette, 110, 121, 147–8 Hattar, Saad, 153–4 Heydemann, Steven, 20, 41, 54, 79 Hezbollah, 163 Hinnebusch, Raymond, 41, 51, 79 Hivos (Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation), 135, 179 Hofheinz, Albrecht, 105 honour crimes, 114 Howard, Philip, 7, 15, 69 human rights: demonstrations, 52; government censorship, 120; online community, 120–1 humanitarian assistance, 138, 195–6 Hurriyat (newspaper), 76–7, 175

information control: by Syrian regime, 45, 57. See also censorship Information Society Preparatory Conference (2005), 143, 145 Institute for War and Peace Reporting (iwpr ), 110, 150–3, 157, 161, 179 International Centre for Journalists (icjf ), 144, 153 International Federation of Journalists, 128 internet: art of resilience, 172–3; civic engagement, 58–9; civil society campaigns, 52–3; destabilising potential, 196–7; news websites, 19, 58–9, 81, 108–11; offshore democratic agent, 100–16; online petitions, 115; penetration data, 33–4, 54, 68, 103–5, 106; pilot project (1997), 100; political activism, 111–16; public access granted, 101; space for dissent and protest, 43, 57, 112–16; state control, 9, 102, 105–7, 170–1; training and literacy campaigns, 102 internet cafés, 33, 34, 68, 101, 102, 104–5, 121–2 Internews, 128, 179 interviews, research method, 34–5, 132 Iran: election (2009), 3; Green Movement, 3, 17, 27; internet users, 106; proxy war, 163, 182; Revolution (1978–9), 46; unconventional activism, 27 Iraq: internet users, 106; Revolution (1958), 27 Islamic fundamentalist groups, 161 Islamic State (isis ), 9–10, 182–4, 185

Index ‘Islamic utopia’, 183 Izra’ massacre, 185 Jarrah, Rami, 69, 180 Jasper, James M., 31, 47, 56 journalists: average salary, 118; and bloggers, 148; citizen journalists, 173–4, 179–80, 186; investigative journalism, 153–5; professionalism, 54, 68, 94, 110, 119–20; second jobs, 118; as state functionaries, 151; support from outside, 117; Syrian Journalists Syndicate (sjs), 118. See also training of journalists Al-Kadi, Bassam, 114 Katz, Elihu, 69 Kawakibi, Salam, 21–2, 54 Kaye, David, Speech Police, 196–7 Khatib, Lina, 8, 18, 21 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 46 Kidd, Dorothy, 30 Kilo, Michel, 84–5 Klandermans, Bert, 29 Kriesi, Hanspeter, 29 Kubba, Laith, 92 Kurds, 51, 52, 113, 151 Kurzman, Charles, 60 Kyrgyzstan, Tulip Revolution, 17 Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 69 Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, 95, 213n13 Lebanon: Cedar Revolution, 27; fieldwork research, 31–2, 34, 35; Hariri assassination, 55; internet users, 106 legislation: Article 548 (honour killings), 114; Personal Status Law, 114–15. See also media laws Lerner, Daniel, 24, 130

265

Lesch, David, The New Lion of Damascus, 122–3 Louis XVI, King of France, 165 Lukes, Steven, 23 Lust, Ellen, 8, 17, 21 Lynch, Marc, 96–7, 181, 185 McAdam, Doug, 28, 29–30, 168 McCarthy, John, 29–30 ‘Manifesto of 1000’ (2001), 51 Matar, Dina, 26 media: dual effects of liberalisations, 93–4; hybrid, contradictory field, 123; media free zones (mfzi s), 99; private/state competition, 121; privatisation (Decree No. 50), 22, 53–4, 81–2; taboo topics, 58–9, 83, 99, 108, 110–11. See also new media media development aid, 124–61; academic neglect, 125–6, 127; agencies/contractors, 128, 134, 135, 147–55; aid structure, 133–6, 134; benefits, 129–30; citizen and civil society empowerment, 16, 49, 126–7, 158–60; danger and risks, 138–9; democratic benefits, 126, 128, 129, 131; donors, 128, 131–47, 134, 145; expenditure, 128, 137, 140, 141, 146, 147; local partners, 134, 135; low visibility for security reasons, 35–6, 132–3; Middle East, 130–1; online initiatives, 135; post-conflict growth, 178–80; and public diplomacy agenda, 16, 128–9, 158, 195; regime control/state approval, 133–4, 157; regional donors, 136; soft power, 16, 139–40; to encourage independent journalism, 55; to Syria’s neighbours, 138

266

Index

media equipment aid, 179, 180, 195–6 media laws: Decree No. 50, 22, 53–4, 81–2; Law No. 68 (radio), 85–6; unesco support, 142 media studies, Western methodologies, 67, 68, 93 Merei, Yasmine, 176 Microsoft, 106 Middle East: concerns over satellite television, 95; definition, 18; exceptionalism, 65; internet users, 106; media development aid, 130– 1; unconventional activism, 27 Middle East Broadcasting Centre, 95, 213n13 Middle East Partnership Initiative (mepi ), 141 Millennium Development Goals (mdg s), 144–6 Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, 74–5 Ministry of Expatriates, 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 101 Ministry of Information: media development aid projects, 143, 144, 146, 147; news control, 73, 75, 82; radio broadcasting control, 86 Miro, Mustapha, 83 mobile phones, 41–2, 52, 54, 105, 112 mobilising structures, 47–9, 48, 50, 56–60 Morocco: internet users, 106; uprising, 13 Morozov, Evgeny, 24, 102 al-Mouseli, Monzer, 58, 97 Movement for Justice and Development (mjd ), 98 Mubarak, Hosni, 11 mukhabarat, 31, 79, 85, 89, 153, 215n66

musalsalat (soap operas), 26, 60, 87–90 music, 87 Muslim Brotherhood, 51, 52, 58, 97 Mustapha, Imad, 101 Naerssen, Ton van, 61 Nakhle, Rami, 69, 113, 161 National Democratic Institute, 179 National Progressive Front (npf ), 81, 210n57 National Salvation Front (nsf ), 52 new media: challenge to state power, 45, 192–3; change at multiple levels, 42–3; channel for discontent and mobilisation, 4–5, 5–6, 7, 11–15, 17, 66–7, 166, 190; collective online mobilisation, 61–4; and contemporary politics, 9, 24–5, 194–5; definition, 18–19, 44; democratisation vs authoritarian control, 24–5; divisiveness and misinformation, 16–17, 198; and foreign audiences, 185–6; global popular mobilisations, 17, 191–2; horizontal information networks, 44–5, 46; images and videos, 185, 186; limits of scholarship, 25–6, 60; new mobilisation opportunities, 30–31; and politics, 9, 24–5; pre-uprising experimentation, 7–8; protest tool, 52–3, 57–60; public sphere, 59–60; and social discontent, 4–5, 7, 11–15, 17; and social movements, 43–5; third party manipulation, 9–10; two-step flow theory, 15–16, 66, 69, 159–60, 161. See also mobile phones; satellite television; social media news websites, 19, 58–9, 81, 108–11 newspapers: censorship, 82, 105; private publications, 81, 82–4;

Index state newspapers, 73–4; Syria Times, 146–7; underground publications, 76–7, 175–6 ngos, 156–8 Norton, Augustus R., 24 Nye, Joseph S., 129 Oleinik, Anton, 47 Open Society Foundations, 153 opportunity structures, 47–56, 48, 50 Palestine, intifadas, 27, 55 Papacharissi, Zizi, 24 Parkin, Frank, 29 Perthes, Volker, 41, 77 Philippines, edsa Revolution, 17 Pierret, Thomas, 22, 54–5 police forces, 79 political activism, 111–16 political prisoners, 11, 53, 161, 205n45 Posner, Michael, 158 poverty, 10 privatisation of the media, 22, 53–4, 81–2 protest movements: global mobilisations, 17–18, 191–2; move from online to offline street protests, 61–4, 166–7. See also social movements public diplomacy, 16, 128–9, 158, 195 al-Qardawi, Youssef, 182 Qashush, Ibrahim, 185 radio: censorship, 86; foreign broadcasts, 74; Law No. 68, 85–6; popularity, 74; postuprising re-emergence, 175–8; private radio stations, 81, 86–7; religious shows, 87

267

Radio Monte Carlo, 74, 151 Raised Hands campaign, 172 Raqib, Jamila, 156 Raschke, Joachim, 44 refugees: Aylan Kurdi image, 186; bbc Media Action project, 150, 157; humanitarian aid, 138; use of mobile apps, 41–2 regional actors, proxy warfare, 163, 181–2, 224n5 religious broadcasting, 87 Reporters Without Borders (rwb ), 155–6, 157 research methods, 31–6, 132, 193–4. See also scholarship limitations Ross, Alec, 195 Rugh, William A., Arab Mass Media, 24, 67 Russia, in Syria, 163 Sabbagh-Gargour, Rana, 154 Salam, Maan Abdul, 159 Salamandra, Christa, 41, 88 Salameh, Mahmoud, 84–5 Sami, Miriam, 144, 146 Sammur, Said, 165 Saqf al-’Alam (The Ceiling of the World), 89 satellite television, 95–100; Arab concerns, 95, 99–100; arrival in Syria, 96; civil awareness and engagement, 57–8; diaspora use, 58, 98; foreign funding allegations, 98–9; media free zones (mfzi s), 99; Middle East concerns, 95; scholarship writings, 24; in Syria, 19, 43, 57, 95–100; Syrian channels, 97–8; and Syrian uprising, 96, 170; transformations in private/domestic sphere, 67. See also al-Jazeera; Barada tv

268

Index

Saudi Arabia: internet users, 106; in Syria, 182 scholarship limitations: Arab media, 67–8; Arab world, 191; media development aid, 125–6, 127; Syrian new media, 25–6, 60; Western frames, 26, 64–7, 93 schools: civic education, 146; Dera’a protest, 5; media education, 143, 145; reforms, 79; uniforms, 53, 79 Scott, James, 8, 61 Seale, Patrick, 75 Selvik, Kjetil, 22, 54–5 Shaaban, Bouthaina, 105 Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack, 107, 111, 116 El-Sharif, Safwat, 95 Sharp, Gene, 156 Shehata, Samer, 13 Shirky, Clay, 30–1, 166 Snow, David A., 29–30 social discontent: hidden practices, 8–9; Middle East factors, 7–8; and new media, 4–5, 7, 11–15, 17 social media: channel for discontent and mobilisation, 4–5; development aid, 149; hate speech and social divisions, 198; potentially negative effects on users, 197–8; Syrian uprising, 167–70; use by Islamic State, 182–4. See also blogging/bloggers; Facebook; new media social movement formation: framing processes, 47–9, 48, 50, 60–4; mobilising structures, 47–9, 48, 50, 56–60; online and offline activities needed, 63–4; opportunity structures, 47–56, 48, 50; in Syria, 191 social movement theory, 26–31, 47–50, 48, 50

social movements: definitions, 46–7, 65; and new media, 43–5; traditional hubs, 57. See also protest movements soft power, 16, 129–30 Sottimano, Aurora, 23, 92, 116 Soule, Sarah A., 29–30 Souria (Lady of Syria) (newspaper), 176 SouriaLi (radio station), 177–8 ‘Statement of the 99’ (2000), 51 Sunni charities, 22, 54–5 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (sida ), 134, 137, 147, 153 Syria: authoritarianism, 21–3; Bashar al-Asad’s reforms, 21–2, 41–2, 53–5, 77–9, 133; collective online mobilisation, 61–4; economic agreements, 55; Hafez al-Asad era, 71–7; Hama massacre (1982), 6, 167–8; independent gatherings (muntadayat), 51; mukhabarat, 31, 79, 85, 89; police state, 19; pressures from above, 49, 50, 53–5; pressures from below, 49, 50, 51–3; pressures from outside, 49, 50, 55–6; repression, 52; social discontent, 8–9, 10–12; state of emergency law, 19, 58, 113, 161 Syria News (website), 110–11, 148 Syria Times (newspaper), 146–7 Syria Untold (web portal), 181 Syrian Arab News Agency (sana ), 74, 142, 143 Syrian Computer Society, 100, 101, 122 Syrian Electronic Army, 170–2 Syrian International Academy for Training and Development (sia ), 151–2, 157

Index Syrian Journalists Association (asj ), 155–6, 157 Syrian Journalists Syndicate (sjs ), 118 Syrian Media (website), 180–1 Syrian Media Action (smart ) (news agency), 179–80 Syrian uprising/civil war: al-Hariqa protest, 164–5; causes, 5, 40, 41; East Ghouta chemical attack, 185; effect on media assistance programmes, 149–50; enduring conflict, 162; images and videos, 185; Local Coordination Committees, 173; move from online to offline street protests, 61–4, 166–7; move into civil war, 60–1, 161; not foreseen, 12–13; online virtual conflicts, 170–2; opportunity structures, 43; phase one, 167–73; phase two, 173–8; phase three, 178–82; regime’s violent response, 5–6, 168; and regional powers, 163, 181–2, 224n5

269

new media, 18–19, 184; one-way communication, 44; post-uprising re-emergence, 175–8, 180–1; reforms, 80–2; and social movements, 45–6; state control, 57, 73–4, 76. See also newspapers; radio; television training of journalists: Ara2 Academy, 135, 148–9, 157; bbc Media Action, 148; by iwpr , 151–3; candidate selection, 153; Damascus University, 110, 119, 148; Freedom House, 132, 156, 157; investigative journalism, 153–5; undp young journalists project, 144–6; unesco , 142–3; writing skills, 143, 145 Tunisia: internet cafés, 122; internet users, 106; uprising, 4, 6, 13 Turkey, media hub, 179, 180 Twitter, 13, 15, 30, 149, 167, 169, 182, 183, 196, 218n17 two-step flow theory, 15–16, 66, 69, 159–60, 161

unesco, 128, 142–3, 145, 153, taboo topics, 58–9, 83, 99, 108, 110–11 Taki, Maha, 148–9, 150 Tarrow, Sidney, 29 Tawasul project, 144–6, 145 television, 81, 87–90. See also satellite television terrorist groups, 9–10, 163, 182–4, 185 Thara (magazine), 111 Tilly, Charles, 47, 63 Tishreen (October) (newspaper), 73, 77, 85, 208nn6,10, 210n54, 211n70 Tomasi di Lampedusa, Giuseppe, 20 traditional media: ambivalent transformations, 37; interactivity with

156 United Nations Development Programme (undp ), 135–6, 144–7, 145 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr ), 150 United States: allegations of funding Syrian opposition, 98–9; democracy assistance projects, 159, 160–1; Department of Defense, 141; media development assistance, 156, 158, 179, 195; policy in Cuba, 129–30, 160; protection for activists, 158; smart power, 129–30; State Department, 141; Syria as ‘axis of evil’, 55; Voice of America (voa ), 130

270

Index

University of Damascus: Journalism Department, 110, 119, 148; unesco partner, 143 usaid (United States Agency for International Development), 128, 131, 132, 139–41, 145 Variel, Frédéric, 27 Vietnam War, 46 Wahda Foundation for Press, Printing and Publishing Establishment, 73, 85 Wall Street Journal, 6, 10 Wedeen, Lisa, 22–3, 41, 92, 116 welfare provision, 21–2, 54–5 Western governments: geopolitical goals, 129–30, 158, 159, 160–1. See also media development aid Wheeler, Deborah, 42, 101, 103–4 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 62

Wilada min al-Khasira (Birth from the Waist), 89 Williams, Raymond, 49 women’s rights: Facebook, 113; honour killings, 114; Personal Status Law, 114–15; reforms, 52–3; Souria (Lady of Syria), 176; Thara (magazine), 111 young people: passivity, 20, 21; undp young journalists project, 144–6; unemployment, 10–11 YouTube, 6, 15, 30, 105, 113, 169–70, 171, 182, 196 Zald, Meyer, 29–30 Zanoubia, 58 Zayani, Mohamed, 25, 26 Zintl, Tina, 51, 54 Žižek, Slavoj, 79