Nationalism et globalization : East et West. 9789812300737, 9812300732

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute’s research programmes are Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is governed by a twenty-one-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administrative officer.

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Internet e-mail: [email protected] World Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Nationalism and globalization: East and West / edited by Leo Suryadinata. Papers originally presented at a Workshop on Nationalism and Globalization: East and West, Singapore, 9-10 April 1999, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1. Nationalism—Congresses. 2. Nationalism—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 3. Nationalism—Asia—Congresses. 4. Internationalism—Congresses. I. Suryadinata, Leo, 1941– II. Workshop on Nationalism and Globalization: East and West (1999: Singapore) III. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. JC311 N274 2000 sls2000032642 ISBN 981-230-073-2 (soft cover) ISBN 981-230-078-3 (hard cover)

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Contents

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Contributors

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Preface

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1

“Yugoslav” Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century Trond Gilberg

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2

Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying: The Challenge of Globalization in Indonesia Leo Suryadinata

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3

Globalization and Singapore’s Search for Nationhood Jon S. T. Quah

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Globalization and Nationalism in the United States: A Historical Perspective Joel Hodson

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Globalization and the Challenges to Malay Nationalism as the Essence of Malaysian Nationalism Halim Salleh

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Nationalism and Globalization in Australia Michael Wesley

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Nation, Nationalism and Globalization in France Laurent Metzger

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National Identity and Adapting to Integration: Nationalism and Globalization in Japan Takashi Inoguchi

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Globalization, Nationalism, and the Modernization of the United Kingdom of Great Britain David Martin Jones

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10 Nationalities, Nationalism, and Globalization: The Case of China Chang Pao-min

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11 Grasping the Nettle: Indian Nationalism and Globalization Kripa Sridharan

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12 Nationalism and Globalization in the Russian Federation at the Millennium Frank Cibulka

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13 Conclusion Leo Suryadinata

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Index

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Contributors

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Professor CHANG Pao-min Graduate Institute of Political Economy National Cheng Kung University Taiwan Dr Frank CIBULKA Senior Lecturer Department of Political Science National University of Singapore Associate Professor Trond GILBERG European Studies Programme National University of Singapore Associate Professor HALIM Salleh School of Social Sciences Universiti Sains Malaysia Penang, Malaysia Dr Joel HODSON Fellow American Studies Centre National University of Singapore

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Professor Takashi INOGUCHI Political Science Department University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture Tokyo, Japan Dr David Martin JONES Senior Lecturer School of Government University of Tasmania Hobart, Tasmania Australia Dr Laurent METZGER Senior Lecturer Université de la Rochelle France Professor Jon S. T. QUAH Department of Political Science National University of Singapore Dr Kripa SRIDHARAN Senior Lecturer Department of Political Science National University of Singapore Associate Professor Leo SURYADINATA Department of Political Science National University of Singapore and Associate Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Dr Michael WESLEY Research Fellow The Asia-Australia Institute University of New South Wales Australia

Contributors

Understanding Nationalism and Globalization

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After the end of the Cold War, nationalism re-emerged as a challenge to world order. Many countries have disintegrated as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts, which have been interpreted as a clash of different types of nationalism. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are two examples. The situation in the Balkans is often cited as an example of national disintegration. Some have cited nationalism and religion as two important factors that have disrupted the Balkans, but others have attributed it to globalization as the major culprit. What have been the factors contributing to conflict and national disunity? Is the situation in the Balkans unique? Why do some countries remain intact? Is it only a matter of time before other multi-ethnic countries will disintegrate? It was the challenge of nationalism and globalization that led to the undertaking of this project. Apparently, the roles that these two forces play and the impact of globalization on the countries differ. A comparative study was initiated to find the answers to questions raised. This was not an easy task but we felt that the project was a worthwhile one. The first hurdle was the definition of the terms themselves. There is no general agreement on the definitions of both nationalism and globalization as they are interpreted in accordance with the concept and theory used by each individual scholar. However, if there is no basic agreement on the key terms and concepts, a comparative study or any ix

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generalizations will not be possible. For this project, it was suggested that the paper-writers adopt working definitions of the key words, or at least, to use some of the definitions in their study. The definitions have been taken from well-known writers but their selection reflects my understanding and perhaps bias on the subject matter. For instance, I view nationalism as a concept which is related to nation or nationhood, but I do not argue which one comes first. I also assume that nationalism is related to the concept of ethnie or ethnicity, but they are not identical. They are also different from the concepts of race, state, citizen or citizenship.

Key Terms Used Below are the suggested definitions of the key terms used in the project: •

•

•

•

• • •

Ethnie or ethnic group is linked to assumed common descendant. Max Weber and many sociologists use it to refer to a group of people who share a common ancestry — real or imagined — and a common culture. However, the second component should be considered as secondary, because not all ethnic groups share an identical culture. I would like to suggest that ethnie is used primarily for a group of people who believe that they share a common ancestry; Nation is a socio-cultural and political concept. I would like to suggest that Rupert Emerson’s definition of nation be adopted. It is defined in terms of a sense of belonging to a community of people who share the same heritage and would like to share the same future. It commands the “supreme loyalty” of the people who are prepared to die for it. A common language is an important component of a nation. There are at least two kinds of nation: ethnic-nation and social nation. The former is a nation based on one ethnic group; the latter is a nation based on multi-ethnic groups. Nationalism is hence defined as an expression of “national” feelings. It often takes the form of a movement to glorify the “nation” which is either in existence or in the making. Race is used to refer to physical characteristics, for instance, physical features and skin colour. State is a political entity where there are three major components — a sovereign government, a people, and a territory. Citizen or citizenship is linked to a state. It is a political and legal concept rather than a socio-cultural one. Therefore, citizenship should be differentiated from nationhood. Ideally, citizenship should

Understanding Nationalism and Globalization

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also be differentiated from nationality, but many continue to use them interchangeably as if the citizen is a member of a nation. Globalization is used to mean a process of globalizing but it is used here to refer to the following: “the intensification of worldwide relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa” (Anthony Giddens).

The Proposed Study Scholars of nationalism often point to Western Europe, especially France, Germany and Italy, as the first countries where nationalism was born during the late eighteenth century. Since then, nationalism has spread all over the world. However, some scholars argue that quite a few Asian nations are older than those of the West. Others maintain that nations in East Asia are unique — the concept of Western nationalism cannot be compared with Asian experiences. How valid are these claims? Is it just a matter of different definitions or the existence of different historical experiences? However, there is no doubt that both Western and Asian nations have faced the challenges of globalization in recent decades, and they have become more intense since the 1990s. The decline of communism and socialism as ideologies, the decreasing importance of national boundaries for capital, companies, and even labour, have had profound implications for national identity. Nevertheless, the impact of globalization on the states is not identical. It has been greater on some compared to others. What have been the effects? Did it lead to stronger nationalism or national disintegration? What happened to national identity? Is the concept of nation still relevant in the era of globalization? To answer the questions raised above, we selected twelve countries — six from the West and six from Asia — for study. The selection of these countries was based on the availability of experts that we could mobilize, but the countries ultimately chosen represent a wide range of national experiences. In Europe, France is an example of the first Western modern nation, assumed to be homogeneous. The United Kingdom is a modern multi-ethnic nation. Yugoslavia is an example of nation-building that failed. Both the United States and Australia are immigrant states, one of which has arguably achieved “nationhood”, while the other is still searching for it. In Asia, Japan is an example of a homogeneous nation. Both India and China are examples of multi-ethnic nations, but the former does not have a dominant ethnic group while the latter does. Indonesia is an

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example of a nation based on a lingua franca. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic nation with an indigenous majority. Singapore is an immigrant country in search of nationhood.

Elements to be Included in each Case Study We are aware that each country has unique features that cannot be subsumed in a general framework. Nevertheless, to make the studies comparable, each paper-writer was urged to include the following elements: 1. Origins of nation: the role of ethnicity, race and religion; a brief discussion on the nation and their major components. 2. Concepts of citizen, nation and ethnie; state-defined and communitydefined ethnie and nation. 3. Presence and absence of “national indicators” or “national markers” (for example, national symbols, national language, national education, “national religion”, national institutions, etc). 4. Nation-building/nation preserving and ethnic groups: strategies and process. State policy to promote nation-building and preservation of the nation should be discussed. Although a historical account is needed, the emphasis should be more on recent/current periods. 5. Any separatist movement or major ethnic riots or ethnic war? 6. Challenges to nationhood, including globalization and immigration. 7. Is nationalism a force leading to integration or disintegration in the respective country? What are the problems and prospects of nationalism and globalization. Of course, the above served only as a guideline. Some writers have developed their own themes, but they have addressed some, if not all, of the issues outlined in the above framework. The findings of the project are summarized in the conclusion.

Leo Suryadinata

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“Yugoslav” Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century

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m 1 n “Yugoslav” Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century

TROND GILBERG

Balkan Nationalism and the “Curse of History” The tragic events occurring in Kosovo in 1999 represent the culmination of a long process which may be considered as the emergence of full-blown “ethnochauvinism” in this part of the Balkans. As such, Kosovo represents perhaps the most advanced (or most degenerate) form of a problem which is common to much of the Balkan area. This widespread phenomenon is the result of historical developments, geographical peculiarities, demographic trends, and the existence and development of various myths in the entire region. In Kosovo, personality factors and the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual leaders add to the general aspects found elsewhere in the region. Finally, actions by outside forces influence the manifestations of regional and specific examples of ethnochauvinism in the area, as will be shown below.1 Scholars have discussed a number of concepts relevant for a systematic examination of nationalism in the Balkans. In so doing, they have examined phenomena which are variously called nationalism, “ethnonationalism”, and “ethnochauvinism”. In the process of this discussion, they have also launched concepts such as “ethnie”, ethnicity, and ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that nationalism as a practical manifestation is only possible if there are discoverers, myth-makers, and mobilizers who can find, conceptualize, 1

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and operationalize the various forms of nationalism present in a region. Let us now proceed to examine this plethora of concepts, attempting in the process to establish a set of conceptual tools which can be used to examine nationalism in present-day Yugoslavia.2 Let us start with the simplest of these concepts, and work towards the more complex. “Ethnie” is seen as a group of people who have some characteristics in common, such as a common ethnic background. Normally, no other characteristics are attached to this concept; it does not connote a particular kind of political preference, nor does it assume any special form of organization. It is simply a marker which distinguishes this group from others. But students of “ethnies” also point out that there are frequently associated characteristics which produce additional markers, thereby enlarging the distance between this group and others. Such additional characteristics may include a language which is different from that of surrounding groups, and perhaps also religion; furthermore, a group of long standing and existence is likely to have developed its own historiography and iconography, which includes myths, heroes, and villains. As the group develops an awareness of its peculiarities and becomes convinced that it is special, it becomes an ethnic group, with ethnic consciousness. It comes as no surprise to students of history that many of the recorded events of previous generations, as well as our own, are replete with evidence of armed conflict between groups; thus, much of the mythology (as well as recorded factual evidence) shows conflict with “the others”, with the resulting demonization of “ethnies” which are different from one’s own. Depending upon the number of accumulative characteristics described above that are present in an “ethnie”, that group may or may not be primed for political action of various kinds in relations with other “ethnies” surrounding it.3 A number of eminent students of nationalism argue that characteristics of “ethnies” are not enough to produce political action; it is necessary to have individuals who can mobilize the group for such purposes. Further-more, even prior to mobilization, it is necessary to have individuals who can “discover”, conceptualize, and popularize the historical legacy of the group, and also disseminators, who can spread the message of historical commonality to the masses. There is an argument among these scholars about the times in history when the mobilization of “ethnies” could have been undertaken. Some argue that antiquity is replete with examples of such mobilizations (as, for example, Greeks vs. Persians), while others insist that the function of mass mobilization is only feasible under conditions of “modernity”, when technological capabilities, such as the printing and mass distribution of books and pamphlets assist in spreading the word. Scholars who focus

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on the emergence of the state as an organization in Italy a thousand years ago may also have a few words to add to this debate (see, for example, the magnificent history of Venice by Sir Julius Norwood).4 Fortunately, it is not necessary to enter this debate here, for nationalism in its various forms was alive and “well” (alive and sick may be more appropriate today) in the nineteenth century in the Balkans, and has developed further since then. Thus, it is not vital for the present argument to take sides in the debate on the issue of the birth of nationalism in European history. Suffice it to say that in the Balkans, specific forms of nationalism have been around for a long time, and they have shown themselves remarkably resistant to other political “isms”, such as globalism and the development of civil society. More on this later. Who are the discoverers and myth-makers of nationalism? In European history, they can generally be identified as writers, poets, painters, scholars, teachers, and religious leaders. These are the people who are literate, who have the capability of reading manuscripts, and of producing a written record of the often confusing past in such a way that it could make sense to the illiterate masses. Furthermore, as the Renaissance swept Europe, it was individuals such as these who “rediscovered” the glories of antiquity, and thus could begin the process of tying the present day with the great days of the past. This, in turn, induced efforts to develop a myth concerning the relations between the contemporary ethnic group and its glorious heritage, originating from ancient Greece or Rome. In addition, the historical record did reveal actual instances of past greatness (which will be discussed later), and such past glories necessitated an explanation of what had befallen the group in the meantime. In Europe, the great powers of the nineteenth century could confidently point to their contemporary standing, with a tradition of considerable achievements going back several centuries at least, but in the Balkans, the various ethnic groups could only make reference to a more distant past, before the arrival of the Ottomans, sometimes even before the establishment of Byzantine power in the region. In the Balkans, then, national awakening meant not only a rediscovery of distant glories but also necessitated an explanation of why such great times had been superseded by the misery of foreign occupation. More often than not, the explanation for this bleak state of affairs focuses on the evil deeds of “others” and the need to take revenge for such injustices. The resurrection of the glorious past, therefore, was only possible by punishing those responsible for the present condition. This is a driving force in Serb nationalism today, as we shall see below.5 The Renaissance “rediscovered” antiquity, with two important political consequences in Europe. In the western part, studies of the ancient Greeks and Romans revealed an emphasis on the individual and his role in the

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collectivity of the city-state, in Athens and elsewhere in Greece, while the Roman contribution was a system of law and advanced forms of administrative development. This part of the discovery, in turn, led to a brand of political thought that gradually evolved into “contract theory” in the West, especially manifested in the writings of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. This, it has been argued, is an important prerequisite for the development of representative systems and the evolution of the citizenship concept, which in turn is an integral part of Western political thought and practice. It certainly had an important impact on the Italian city-states, which developed complex systems of checks and balances, representation by various groups in the arenas of decision-making, and accountability for expenditure of public funds. The impact of Locke and Hobbes on modern European and American democracies is well established and needs no further elaboration here. Most important for our purposes is the fact that this aspect of the Renaissance, prevalent in the West, facilitated the role of artists, writers, scholars, and theorists as discoverers of nationalism. In the Balkans, however, the Renaissance was only a fleeting image in the minds of a few individuals; most of the discoverers here were religious leaders. And religious leaders were capable of tying the present with the glorious past, but they were most reluctant to worship the ideas of pagan antiquity in the fields of human interaction and political authority. For them, the nation must rally around Christ against Mohammed, holding high the cross as opposed to the crescent. This provided for very different symbols emitted in the name of the nation in the Balkans, as we shall see.6 The role of religious leaders as discoverers of nationalism in the Balkans had a pronounced effect on the “package” that emerged. Firstly, in the nineteenth century, the predominant religion in Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia was Orthodox Christianity; in Croatia and Slovenia it was Catholicism, and in Albania, Islam. Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian nationalism is therefore closely associated with Orthodoxy, while the emergence of national consciousness in the northwestern corner of the Balkans was closely tied in with Catholicism. Albanian nationalism cannot be understood without reference to Islam; in Bosnia, all three religious manifestations were present (and this helped to produce and aggravate the Bosnian conflict, which is closely related in this sense to the present tragedy in Kosovo). Furthermore, national discovery focusing on religion clearly helped to establish who “we” were and who “they” represented, because the dominant political force in much of the Balkans until the late nineteenth century was the Ottoman Empire, which represented the confluence of religious and political authority, according to the traditions of Islam. Thus, their religious enemy was also their

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political enemy; the Prophet and the Sultan represented the same system, and it was an alien system. This was true all over the Balkans, in the southern part because this region was under Turkish occupation, and in Croatia and Slovenia because of the fear of Turkish incursions, the memory of the past, and the fact that the political superiors of Zagreb and Ljubljana, the Austro-Hungarians, were in constant conflict with the Porte in Balkan affairs. The discoverers of nationalism in the region that was to become Yugoslavia thus focused on religious affiliation and solidarity, and combined this with animosity towards the religious infidels who were also the secular oppressors. Nationalism as religious fundamentalism emphasizes the Old Testament values of “an eye for an eye”, but pays scant attention to the New Testament ideas of love and forgiveness.7 The regional differentiation alluded to above had a pronounced effect on the “discovery” of nationalism in the Balkans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The whole region was under the control of multiethnic empires, with the Ottomans prevailing in the southern and eastern part of the peninsula, and the Habsburgs in charge in the northern and western parts. Yugoslavia, as we came to know it after World War I, was split between these two major powers, with Serbia under Turkish rule, and Slovenia and Croatia under Vienna and Budapest; Bosnia-Herzegovina was Turkish territory for most of this period, but was annexed by the Habsburgs early in this century, while Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania were in the Turkish zone. Macedonia was Turkish but subsequently hotly contested, politically and sometimes militarily, by Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. For our purposes, the main division to be discussed is that between the Habsburg Empire and the Porte. Briefly put, under the Habsburgs, Slovenia and Croatia developed much faster economically, socially, and educationally than their counterparts in Serbia and elsewhere under Turkish control. Thus, Western ideas of civil society, the role of the individual, and the notion of responsive government began to have a considerable impact in these areas, and educational development as well as the development of a Westernized intelligentsia firmly anchored these areas in “Europe” (or more accurately, in the traditions and idea world of Mitteleuropa). Nationalism in these areas, therefore, had certain characteristics found elsewhere in Central and Western Europe, with a considerable amount of secular thought included. Serbian nationalism (as well as the emerging consciousness of the other groups discussed here), on the other hand, was profoundly influenced by the struggle against foreign invaders, who were also alien in the religious sphere. Serbian nationalism is, therefore, more strongly influenced by the struggle against infidels and the need to restore past glory, which is both religious and

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national (and, indeed, the two are inextricably intertwined). The recovery and safeguarding of holy places, such as shrines found in present-day Kosovo, become a mission for which élites and the masses alike will lay down their lives, if necessary. Compromise is possible on some secular issues, but hardly on religious ones. Serbian nationalism is thus fundamentalist, millenarian, and uncompromising in nature. This is worth remembering today, because “Yugoslav” nationalism, for all practical purposes, is the Serb variety. It is this variety that will be discussed in detail below.8

Historians and Myth-makers: The Case of Serbia The history of Serbia, as presented by academics, teachers, many writers, artists, film-makers, and purveyors of popular culture, is a mixture of fact, fiction, and myth-making. The focus is usually on the ancient origins of the Serb nation; and some scholars have argued that the Serbs are among the original inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula (thus competing with the Albanians, who claim ancestry from the Illyrians, who in turn are said to have preceded even the Greeks in the area). This may be myth or fiction, because no definitive historical record exists (but it should be pointed out that fiction widely believed to be true becomes concretized and thus may serve as a source of present action). Furthermore, it is emphasized that Serbia was once a mighty empire with enlightened rulers who established one of the most progressive courts in Europe at that time (at least partly true). An important fact of the historical record was the role of the Serbs as a bastion against the Ottomans in the Balkans (true, but this glory, if glory it be, must be shared with others, for example, the Moldovan and Wallachian princes of Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave, who have hallowed places in Romanian iconography). A fundamentally important fact, with crucial contemporary relevance, is the event of the Battle of Kosovo Polje (“Field of Blackbirds”) in 1389, when Serb armies were allegedly defeated by Turkish troops, thereby setting the stage for a long period of Turkish overlordship. That the battle was fierce is true, and it is likewise historical fact that the Serbs struggled heroically, and that the result of the battle was Turkish domination and subjugation; but it is not so clear that the Serbs lost (some historians see it as a draw, with the Turkish commander losing his life on the field). It is also a myth that all Serbs fought the good fight on Kosovo Polje, because the record shows that some Serb noblemen, undoubtedly in pursuit of personal gain and fortune, joined the ranks of the Ottomans on this occasion. The most important point

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here is that the combination of fact and myth is believed in toto in present-day Serbia. Thus, Kosovo Polje is sacred, as are the monuments commemorating the event; the struggle between Orthodox Christians and Muslims is seen as a crusade of good against evil; the idea that all Serbs fought together reinforces the notion of national unity; the tragedy of defeat at the hands of the infidel has raised the cry of “never again” — never again will Serbia succumb to outside forces, never again will it yield to alien religions, and never again will it drop the banner of the Cross. In this day and age of rational thought, the Internet, and the fact that the greatest personal danger facing most people is a virus named “Melissa”, it is hard for non-Serbs to understand the fervour with which a mediaeval event has become a rallying point which is mystical, emotional, and sacred, a symbol for which many Serbs are undoubtedly willing to lay down their lives. Some may call it primitive nationalism, while others may see it as strangely alien in the twenty-first century, the age of globalism. Perhaps it should also be seen as one manifestation of the search for a collective entity other than multinational corporations and global communications in this era of globalism — but more on this later.9 Other mixtures of myth and fact in Serb historiography include the idea that Serbia was in the forefront of protection of the Christians in the Balkans (only partly true), that Serbs and Russians have a special relationship as part of a wider Slavic “brotherhood”, expressed through the notion of pan-Slavism and Slavophilism (certainly true in the sense that many Russians, among the mass public as well as the political élites, clearly believe this and make this belief a decisive part of contemporary Russian foreign policy); and that Serbia was always “picked on” by Western powers (only true as far as Austria-Hungary was concerned). This latter belief is of considerable importance in the development and nurturing of the Serb sense of victimization, which essentially assumed that most of what has happened in Serbian history is the result of others, often very powerful nations, conspiring to deprive Serbia of its rightful place in Europe. Given this mindset, present-day events can be easily explained and understood by the mass public. But this emotional reaction to the policy of others will also make compromise very difficult to achieve.10 Another set of truths mixed with fiction and mythology is the history of the Serbs during World War II. One of the unfortunate truths of that conflict in Yugoslavia is the ethnic warfare between Serbs and Croats, which in brutality rivalled anything perpetrated in Kosovo. It is certainly true that many Croats were fascists (after all, there was an avowedly fascist state on Croat soil), and many Serbs did engage in the struggle

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against fascism. But it is not true that all Serbs did this; for example, the so-called Chetniks, who were mostly Serb nationalists, often joined hands with German occupation forces to fight Tito’s Partisans. Tito had a mixture of support for his cause, only some of which came from the Serbs (and Tito himself was not a Serb, a fact which was to figure prominently in the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic, which will be discussed below). Thus, the notion that the Serbs represented “progressive” and “democratic” forces in the Balkans, in a brotherhood of arms with Western democracies, is only partly true, but it is an important feature of the sense of outrage now expressed by Serbs, who see the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) attacks as yet another betrayal of Serbia and a denial of the brotherhood gained through blood and common struggle.11 The final element in this blend of fact and myth is the current version of the history of the Serbs in Tito’s Yugoslavia. As is well known, Tito tried to keep a balance between the various ethnic groups in this multiethnic state, and this policy involved considerable autonomy for the republics and regions of the country — in fact, establishing a confederal system. This became particularly important after Tito’s death; the various republics achieved such wide-ranging autonomy that they began to establish their own security forces, and this, in turn, resulted in a vicious struggle during the war that started in 1991 and culminated with the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and the eventual construction of multi-ethnic Bosnia under international supervision and protection. One of the most potent rallying points for the Serbs in the 1980s and 1990s was the notion that Tito had discriminated against the Serbs, and that this policy had deprived Serbia of its heritage and its place in the federation. There was some truth in this, but that truth was inflamed by passionate rhetoric and tainted scholarship from sources within the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade. This resulted in the civil war, as has been described above. It also catapulted Slobodan Milosevic, a hitherto rather colourless apparatchik, to national prominence when he travelled to Kosovo and assured the Serbs there that they would no longer be “beaten” by others (the clear target of this was the Albanian majority in Kosovo ).12 As usual, there are elements of truth in this rendition of history. Tito’s policies did entail considerable autonomy for Kosovo, and there is little doubt that the Albanians in charge of the province discriminated against the Serb minority there. This kind of policy led to considerable outmigration of Serbs from the province. Still, Albanian-dominated political organs did not engage in ethnic cleansing, and thus there can be no historical excuse for Milosevic’s policies today. At the same time, we

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need to understand that ethnic cleansing is but the most vicious and brutal manifestation of one of the most important features of European nationalism in general, which is the quest for nations to acquire their own land and establish upon it a sovereign state structure. This had largely been achieved in Western Europe early in the twentieth century, in part because these areas had relatively homogeneous nations and fairly clearly established boundaries. In Eastern Europe, circumstances have not been so fortunate, and in the Balkans they have been the most difficult of all. Thus, history is playing itself out in the Balkans in the most disturbing manner, giving credence to the famous definition of history as just “one damned thing after another”.

Globalization, Globalism, and Universal Values The main features of Balkan and Serb nationalism, as discussed above, stand in sharp contrast to a process which is now known as globalization. Globalization is, presumably, a process which produces a confluence of political and economic trends in a world increasingly tied together by instant communication. Such instant communication allegedly also helps to establish similarities in values, attitudes, and behavioural patterns. Thus, these new values would most likely stand in contrast to other, “older”, ideas such as traditional nationalism. Furthermore, it is assumed that the values of the modern, global world would lend themselves to “rationalism” and the acceptance of certain basic features of human interaction and coexistence, as exemplified by notions of universal human rights. Thus, the globalization process would produce globalism, and one aspect of this globalism would be the emergence and spread of certain values, perhaps “human rights”, perhaps something else, but the assumption certainly is that the kind of ethnochauvinism found in Milosevic’s Serbia is outmoded and destined for the “dustbin” of history.13 The concepts of “globalism” and “globalization” are not new in scholarly discourse. Some economic historians will inform us that there have been other times in human history when trade proceeded virtually unimpeded between various parts of the world. In the late nineteenth century, it was still possible to travel around Europe without a passport, and skilled workers and artisans could readily find work in countries other than their own, often through the assistance of their fraternal organizations in other places. To such analysts, the present internationalization of economic interaction is simply a step away from the extreme nationalism that has characterized much of world history since the first “great war”. Other analysts, however, argue that the

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present era is the first in which instant communications produce a quest for the universalization of values and rules of interpersonal behaviour outside the economic realm. Whatever one’s view of this controversy, the Kosovo conflict represents an important landmark for one aspect of “globalism”, namely, the willingness of a number of major powers to go to war to uphold certain values and rules of conduct. In doing so, these states essentially asserted, by word and by actions, that certain kinds of activities are not permitted, even if they are carried out inside the hitherto sacrosanct confines of “national sovereignty”, and that the socalled “international community” has the right and the duty to undertake any and all actions necessary to stop them. Should this precedent lead to further actions along such lines, a situation new to the twentieth century has arisen (even though some historians may argue that mediaeval religious wars represent examples of struggles conducted on behalf of such universalistic notions in previous centuries).14 Another noteworthy aspect of this “globalism” is the fact that it is defined in large measure by leaders in the United States and its allies who represent a Weltanschauung quite different from the mindset that tended to pervade international relations in the past. As indicated above, national sovereignty is no longer considered sacrosanct in matters that pertain to perceived “universal” human rights. A new (or at least newfangled) moralism has invaded international relations. In addition, this drive is led by the United States, which is now the sole superpower of the world. This fact certainly worries many political leaders elsewhere (and not just dictators such as Slobodan Milosevic), and it has already sparked off a debate inside NATO and the European Union about the need for a more concerted effort to fashion a common European foreign and security policy. This debate is further fuelled by the fact that U.S. military superiority is now so vast that even limited wars like that in Kosovo cannot be conducted without American participation unless other NATO states are willing to wage a ground war and thereby incur losses of manpower that may be unacceptable in democracies. Thus, the new strategic “globalism” is becoming a factor of major importance in international relations, with potentially enormous consequences for states, nations, and nationalism as a political phenomenon.15 It should be pointed out that the assertions concerning “universal” values and behavioural norms emanating from Washington, London, and other places do not really lead to universalism in implementation; for example, the history of Africa during much of the decade of the 1990s is one of fearful ethnic strife, genocide, and systematic mutilation of individuals for political ends, without Western intervention to stop it. The war in Kosovo was about the implementation of goals based on

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values that may have universal validity, but pertain most clearly to Europe and North America in practical terms; in other words, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other reprehensible acts will not be tolerated in present-day Europe. Thus, the doctrine of globalism in this field is universal, but its implementation is regional. This brings forth interesting and difficult questions of definition (where does Europe end?), and also of capability and political will (is the strategic reach of the implementors sufficient to be universal rather than regional, and do the definers of the doctrine have the will to engage in such broad implementation?). For now, strategic globalism in terms of enforced implementation of common values and behaviour is limited to parts such as Europe. It is in Europe that such acts will not be tolerated, at least as it now stands. Unfortunately for people like Milosevic, Serbia and Kosovo are in Europe by anybody’s definition (including Milosevic’s own), and thus Serbian nationalism is unacceptable. In this sense, Kosovo, Milosevic, and Serbian nationalism represent more than an interesting and horrifying example of human atrocities and the thought packages that give rise to them; they represent the clash of Weltanschauungen at the beginning of the new millennium. Slobodan Milosevic found himself in the midst of this clash of value systems when he refused to implement the Rambouillet Agreement. Until that time, he had successfully manoeuvred the Western powers in various ways, because the leaders of those powers were reluctant to finally reject national sovereignty as the dominant principle of international relations. Having backed themselves into a corner by their posturing, which Milosevic took as mere bluff, they had little choice but to act. But once they did take action, the doctrine of universal values for Europe became a matter of faith, a gospel which was repeated with increasing intensity during the weeks of the conflict. Slobodan Milosevic, in turn, found that he had been transformed from a brutal but clever Balkan manipulator to a violator of fundamental values. He may have been bewildered by this change in his fortunes, yet it can be seen as a logical result of his own policies. It now behoves us to examine his journey towards vilification, and Serbia’s descent to the status of pariah state. Specifically, we must examine the basic features of Serb nationalism as it now stands and determine the historical roots of the widely held beliefs and prejudices found among the mass public and societal élites alike. Furthermore, we must explain why the experiment conducted by Tito, designed to produce a different form of nationalism, which we may call Yugoslavism, failed. The most conspicuous of these failures was the inability of Tito and his close associates to produce a real civil society in this multifaceted state. In addition, it is necessary to examine that

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external threat, known as the danger of Islam and “Greater Albania”, which became a catalyst for attitudes, values, and ultimately political and military action. Most important of all is an analysis of the crucial role of the mobilizers of Serb nationalism, as these individuals represent the link between attitudes and values, on the one hand, and political action, on the other. These themes will be examined in turn.16

The Mobilizable Nation: Serbia After Tito Let us now return to Serbia. In the 1980s, the following factors were dominant: After Tito’s death, Serb nationalism, always present in some form among the mass public as well as the cultural, socio-economic, and political élites, represented a mobilizable mass (for concepts of “atomization” and “mobilizability”, see, among others, William Kornhauser [1959]17). The Serbs were clearly a distinguishable ethnie; felt a strong communality with each other as an ethnic group; had a strong sense of the origin of the nation (even if this sense was based on partial myth and fallacy); associated their ethnic group with religious identity and a strong sense that their religion was also part of the vanguard of Christianity in the perceived struggle against Islam; and allowed for little or no deviation from the sum of all these markers of nationhood (in other words, as a Serb you were expected to be Orthodox, be convinced of the mission of the Serbs, and believe that a glorious future was ahead for your nation). Thus, national indicators and national markers were multifaceted and strongly integrated. The nation was, furthermore, characterized by its language (Serbo-Croatian to the Serbs, Croato-Serbian to the Croats, with Serb linguists struggling to show that the Serb language was indeed quite different from the Croatian version, which is only true if one accepts that the Cyrillic alphabet is fundamentally different from the Latin script, even if the meaning of the words written in either alphabet is very close or identical). National education in Serb schools hammered home the mixture of historical fact and myth discussed above. National symbols included the Serb coat of arms (with an eagle in the middle), the Serb three-finger salute, and the Orthodox cross (which is carried prominently by the ethnic cleansers of Kosovo today, and especially displayed by Arkhan and his infamous “Tigers”).18 It is of course true that the Serb nation had been mobilized for political purposes long before the advent of Slobodan Milosevic. Serb mobilizers had galvanized the nation into action in the nineteenth

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century, when the Serbs joined in the struggle for independence from the Turks and then proceeded to participate in two Balkan wars against their neighbours in the years immediately preceding World War I. Serb politics was one of the causes of the outbreak of the war. The establishment of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state after World War I represented state-building but not nation-building, because the new state was dominated by the Serbs, at the expense of the other ethnic groups in the country. Tito attempted to build a Yugoslav nation, but clearly failed in this effort. Instead, the various ethnic groups in the so-called federation built their own mini-states, based primarily on ethnicity, language, and religion. While the focus of this essay has been on Serb nationalism, it is fair to say that the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia constructed their own nationalism around a similar complex of ethnicity, language, religion, and history, but, in the case of Croatia and Slovenia, with important “Western” aspects of secularism included, as discussed above. The main point here is that, despite these national markers and emotional baggage which each nation carried with it, in the era of Tito Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians on the whole lived side by side and even occasionally married each other. This was partly due to the fact that the Yugoslav communists, despite their hankering for decentralization and relative autonomy, refused to allow ethnic strife, because they rightly saw it as the beginning of the end of the state and thus the end of their power and privileges. In part, it was due to Tito himself who, for all his faults, became a person who somehow stood above parochial considerations and could therefore be seen as representing all of Yugoslavia and not merely its constituent parts. Yugoslavia under Tito is an important example of attempted nationbuilding undertaken by a dominant and charismatic figure; the case of Yugoslavia is also an important example of what may happen if institutional anchors for a nation are not constructed when the personal nation-builder leaves the scene. Perhaps there is material here for a comparative study of this issue in some future project; for now, let us examine what is left of Yugoslavia, which, for present purposes, is primarily Serbia and Serb nationalism.19 The Tito era must be seen as an interregnum in the history of nationalism in Yugoslavia. It was a period when the various ethnic groups and nations of the country could live together because of specific and personal factors, as discussed above. What has happened after the death of Tito is the re-emergence of the various types of nationalism in the country in their original form, now urged forward by mobilizers who have as their agenda the intensification of each group’s nationalism and the settling of scores based on history, both ancient and fairly recent. In

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this sense, the Serb nation (as well as others) became “remobilized” in a fashion which has produced two vicious civil wars and a campaign of barbaric ethnic cleansing, in the process drawing in the international community and threatening a new cold war in Europe. Why did this happen in Yugoslavia? What are the reasons behind the intensity and ferocity of Serb nationalism today?

The Missing Link: The Lack of “Civility” in Yugoslav “Civil” Society The process of developing a national identity in the area that became Yugoslavia included the fusion of religion and politics, of secular themes and religious iconography, of foreign policy conflicts with demonization of “others”, as discussed above. This was true in Croatia as well as Serbia, even though it reached a higher pitch in the latter case. Slovenia may well be sui generis in the Balkan context and will not be discussed here. Montenegrin and Macedonian nationalism seems to be rather underdeveloped as yet. As for Albanian nationalism, it is clearly a relatively mature phenomenon which will be discussed primarily as one source of conflict in the region today, but will not be a major focus; besides, it is not yet clear that the separatism of the Kosovar Albanians includes a complete embrace of the ideas, aspirations, and passions of the Albanians in Albania proper (Albania today is divided into clearly separate regions, dominated by old tribal associations, such as the Ghegs and Tosks, and the political system has become severely infected with “Mafiaism”, so that it is difficult to determine what Albanian nationalism is). Thus, if the focus here is to be contemporary Yugoslavia, it must be on Serbia, for Serbia today is Yugoslavia, for all practical purposes. On this basis, it can be asserted that Serbia’s political culture includes some aspects of a civil society, but no civility for “others”, which means nonSerbs. Therein lies the crux of the matter in terms of Yugoslav nationalism. “Civil society” is one of the most frequently used (and occasionally misused) buzzwords of contemporary social science. For the purpose of this discussion, it is defined as a society in which there are autonomous groups and organizations in society (“subgroup autonomy”) which interpose themselves between political rulers and the ruled, and then act as the conduits for the expression of political views, preferences, and likes and dislikes of the mass public, or at least the politically aware public. The main point is that the groups involved are autonomous, that they can (and will) express the views held by the mass public (even as

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they help form those views), and that they therefore act as input mechanisms for political leaders. There are times when analysts confuse civil society with pluralist democracy, because some of the basic building blocs of the latter system are present in the former. For example, subsystem autonomy presumes freedom of speech and perhaps also freedom of association. But a civil society, as described, can be profoundly at variance with the usual definitions of pluralist democracy, because freedom of speech and assembly per se do not assure civility, or tolerance of others. For example, if freedom of speech is used to preach hatred, violence, and the need to destroy people of different faiths and ethnicity, this freedom can be profoundly destructive of law and order, of other presumed democratic rights, such as the expectation of personal safety and access to economic goods, and of the very fabric of society itself. Freedom of assembly could see the massing of thugs whose goal it is to destroy others’ right to assemble. European history has many examples of this, east or west. The lesson is this: civil society forms and formal democratic freedoms do not produce democracy by themselves. They may do so, if the underlying political culture is conducive to it. If this is not the case, democratic and civil society freedom and rights will merely speed the capture of power by undemocratic forces. The discussion below will argue in more detail that this is the case in post-Tito Yugoslavia, particularly Serbia.20 The argument above can be developed further. Essential elements of civil society and democracy may speed the dissemination of “undemocratic” ideas in the mass public by means of modern communications technology; conversely, it can propel to the level of political action profoundly “undemocratic” values held by the mass public, without any countervailing forces (one such force would be the willingness of communist leaders to partly curb these expressions for fear of their own political survival). Under the first scenario above, an undemocratic mobilizer can gain power by means of appeals to the “dark” side of public opinion; in the second case, demagogues of the street may rise to the top of the pyramid because they have captured a main aspect of the public’s likes and dislikes, loves and hatreds. Sometimes, an obscure political leader can grasp the dynamic between the masses and the élite in the context of such emotions, and can then use them to rise to power, thereafter employing them to stay at the top and to implement major features of those ideologies. Slobodan Milosevic represents the category of the mid-level apparatchik with the skills of the street orator and the conviction of a real Serb nationalist. He has climbed to power on extreme Serb nationalism; he cannot climb down, because this would be treason to the cause that brought him to the top

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of the heap in the first place. The implications of this are frightening. His rise to power was associated with a profound economic crisis in Yugoslavia, a crisis which had fundamentally deleterious effects upon the very class which could have provided a counterweight to populist and emotional nationalism, namely, the emerging middle class, and a “rational” technical and managerial intelligentsia. This confluence of factors proved to be decisive.21 If we proceed from the discussion of the basic features included in Serb nationalism, we can see that civility, in the sense of tolerance for “others” to exist, to assemble, to organize, and to compete for political and socio-economic power, is in very short supply in Serb nationalism. The strongly religious nature of this nationalism precludes compromise and lends itself to crusades. Historians can enlighten us on the atrocities committed by crusaders throughout the centuries, including those which were sanctioned by the Pope for the purpose of recapturing the holy city of Jerusalem, in the name of Christ. There may be limited tolerance in other areas, but not in the question of what the Serb nation is, what its mission will be, and how holy its quest has been and will remain. When religion invades nationalism, nationalism becomes intolerant. When religious-based nationalism becomes the main political feature of a state, great trouble will follow for those who are outside the “nation”. In other places, nationalism has been separated from the state, and the state has separated itself from religion; the public is capable of functioning in two dimensions, a secularized polity and a confessional spiritual sphere. If this is done, “citizenship” can be detached from ethnicity and religion, and “political nationalism “ can be achieved (thus, you may be Polish, Italian, Norwegian, or whatever, and still be an American citizen); if religion and ethnicity become the defining aspects of the nation per se, we have “cultural nationalism” (to be a citizen of Serbia means that you are first and foremost an ethnic Serb and an Orthodox Christian; if you are not, technically, you may be a citizen, but you are still suspect). In the latter case, the nation has hijacked the state, and uses the state to further its nationalism, at the expense of others. This is ethnochauvinism, and ethnochauvinism is a form of mobilized nationalism.22 The result of the discussion above is that there is no real civil society in present-day Serbia. Civil society, as defined by most scholars, includes the crucial element of civility, which in turn means the recognition that others have the right to develop their own organizations in order to express their views and preferences and actually attempt to gain power to implement them. 23 What Serbia has can be characterized as the infrastructure of a civil society, in the form of organizations that can be used for the purposes of political mobilization. The nature of the political

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system will then crucially depend upon the characteristics, goals, and objectives of the mobilizers. Let us now turn to an examination of these individuals in contemporary Serbia.

Mobilizers and Crusaders: Leaders of Yugoslav and Serb Nationalism The recently departed and much missed student of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, maintained that nationalism was a form of political mobilization, whereby a group of people with certain commonalities sufficient to make them feel like a nation is mobilized for two main purposes, namely, to achieve certain goals, as defined and accepted by the masses of the nation, and secondly, to prevent others from doing harm to the nation in the course of their mobilization. Gellner firmly maintained that nationalism must be “concretized” in this way. Similarly, Benedict Anderson speaks of nations as “imagined communities”, because members of a nation do not know each other personally (except for a few cases of friends or close associates), but see themselves as part of something else, the nation, which is partly reified (for example, ethnicity), partly learned (language, values, myths, history), but also imagined (in the sense that people of a perceived nation imagine that they have something in common with other conationals, even though much also divides them, particularly socioeconomic class). Walker Connor states flatly that it is the imagined and perceived aspects of nationalism that are most intense as mobilization devices, and that “given” characteristics, such as ethnicity, are less important. In all of these examples, the need for someone to remember, conceptualize, agitate, disseminate, and mobilize the symbols of nationalism is clear. In short, nationalism as discussed above is inconceivable as a political phenomenon and a guide to action without the mobilizer, the political leader of nationalism.24 When modern nationalism arose in the Balkans in the nineteenth century, the mobilizers were primarily members of the nobility, with scholars, writers, poets, and other intellectuals as important auxiliaries. As pointed out above, however, Balkan nationalism was also heavily influenced by clergymen; such individuals, in fact, acted as both discoverers, myth-makers, and also catalysts for political action. That this should be so is not surprising, given the conditions that prevailed in the Balkans at the time. The mass of the population lived and toiled on the land, most were illiterate, and the vast majority survived in a world of superstition, fear of the landlord, and with a psychological horizon which did not stretch much beyond the village. For such a peasant, the church

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was his only area of assembly, and the priest his only spiritual and material guide; the priest, therefore, also had the unique opportunity to act as a force to bring the village dwellers together for collective action. Thus, an unusually large number of the mobilizers in this region were clergy, and this fact had important ramifications for the message of nationalism as well as its practical manifestations in this region. Specifically, religious mobilizers ensured that religion would be a major organizing device for the identification and implementation of the nation’s goals; religion for the peasant masses in the Balkans meant Christianity, either Orthodox or Catholic (occasionally Protestant). With the political and economic system mostly in the hands of the Turks, the Balkan nations were therefore mobilized in the name of Christ, as juxtaposed to Mohammed. As indicated above, the message of Balkan nationalism, especially its Serb variety, was nation and Christ, sceptre and orb. The non-negotiable nature of religious nationalism has been discussed above. For the Turks, too, the problems experienced by the Porte in the Balkans were a combination of religion and politics, a fact which hardened Turkish rule as well.25 Paradoxically, the form of administration established by Istanbul in the Balkans furthered the cause of political organization among the Christian masses. The Ottomans divided the area into millets, which were religionbased territorial units, with considerable local autonomy. Essentially, the Porte allowed the Balkan Christians to run their own local affairs, as long as taxes and other levies were paid. This decentralization gave the mobilizers of Balkan nationalism relatively free rein to develop the mechanisms necessary to force Istanbul out of Europe later. The importance of religious personnel as mobilizers of Balkan nationalism was further enhanced by the fact that other leaders were held in low regard by the peasant masses, so that the priest-discoverers and mobilizers became important by default. Once the Turks had been compelled to grant autonomy to many areas of the Balkans, it became clear to the peasants that their own co-nationals were no better as rulers than the Ottomans had been, and the level of legitimacy for secular national leaders in the region was low. This in turn forced those leaders to take on an even more nationalistic stance, in order to salvage some of their political support. Thus, the anti-Muslim priest and the power-seeking nobleman vied with each other for the laurels of ethnonationalism, religious exclusives, and chauvinism. This combination culminated in several armed conflicts, which eventually drove the Ottomans out of Europe (except for a small sliver of land west of the Bosporus, which is still Turkish today). After the departure of the Turks from European soil, it was not long before the various successor states in the region confronted each other

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over territory. Old claims and counter-claims were resurrected, old history was dredged up and became holy myths, and in the end, these states fought two wars (the first and second Balkan wars), which, in turn, produced so-called “satiated” and “dissatisfied” powers. Among the former can be found Romania (which was further enhanced by the political settlement after World War I), and Greece. On the other hand, Serbia, which had been one of the most important successor states in the first round after the Turkish departure, now found itself with territorial settlements which were much less favourable than Serb valour on the battlefield would seem to warrant. Another dissatisfied power was Bulgaria, which will not be discussed here, except as it emerges as a contender with Yugoslavia for Macedonia, another recent state construct much in the news. The main point here is the fact that the Serb political leaders now felt that they had been cheated of the spoils of war by a political settlement which deprived them of territory rightfully won on the field. The villains were the victorious states in the Balkan wars but especially one major power, which was perceived as Serbia’s nemesis: Austria-Hungary. It was Vienna and Budapest which had worked most assiduously to limit Serbia’s power, or so it seemed in Belgrade. The fact that church leaders represented an important element among the political mobilizers in Serbia further exacerbated the problem with the Habsburgs, because the latter were staunch Catholics, and the Serbs, as mentioned earlier, were fervent Orthodox believers. In this conflict with Vienna and Budapest lay the immediate causes of World War I and also the political and eventually military struggles between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats and Slovenes.26 The post-World War I settlement represented a considerable victory for Serbia and its nationalist leaders, for their quest for a Southern Slav state was now implemented in the form of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was, presumably, a state for Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and other ethnic groups, but it soon became clear that the political and religious leaders in Belgrade intended to run the system with political control firmly in the hands of the first of these groups. Thus, the new state became more and more nationalistic throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The nationalism expressed was that of the predominant Serb mobilizers. Underneath the political surface, the old conflicts between ethnic groups remained, now fuelled by the clearly discriminatory policies introduced by Belgrade on behalf of the Serb nation, Serb nationals, and the wishes of the Orthodox Church. In reality, the leaders and mobilizers of the inter-war period acted very much in conformity with the policies established in old Serbia prior to World War I. Such policies also helped to harden the nationalism

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of the Croats and Slovenes. Here, too, religion played an important part, thus further reducing the possibility of establishing a secular nation and political nationalism. The stage was set for ethnochauvinism to become a predominant force in World War II.27 Very few commentators examining the current conflict in Kosovo seem to remember the events of World War II, when atrocities perpetrated by Serbs on Croats and vice versa represented far greater loss of life than is the case in Bosnia and Kosovo today. During the 1941–45 war, hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Croats died at the hands of each other; the carnage inflicted by these two supposed co-nations in Yugoslavia exceeded the losses perpetrated by Hitler’s armies in the field. The leaders of these unsavoury activities were Ante Pavelic in Croatia, who headed a fascist state firmly supported by the Catholic Church in Croatia and, on the Serb side, the so-called Chetniks were led by Draza Mihailovic, with similar support from the Orthodox hierarchy. A favourite tactic of mass murder was practised by Croat troops in Serb villages; they would simply herd the Serbs into the local Orthodox church and burn them alive; the favour was returned by Serb forces in Croat villages, where Catholic churches were similarly used as crematoria. Ethnnochauvinism with a strong religious component thus represented a temporary culmination of the ethnic and religious strife so prevalent in the Balkans. The respite provided by the policies of Marshall Tito was only temporary, and these destructive forces reasserted themselves after the interregnum of Titoism and the failed attempt at producing “Yugoslavism” and political nationalism. The failure of that interregnum must be analysed and explained, for therein lies the key to understanding the tragedy of Serb nationalism in the 1990s.

Tito, “Yugoslavism” and the Quest for a Civil Society The story of Joseph Broz Tito and his efforts to create a stable Yugoslav federation has been told in considerable detail by many scholars and will not be examined in full here, except to highlight those aspects of Tito’s policies that are crucial for an understanding of nationalism in Yugoslavia today. Briefly, Tito’s policies focused on the following main goals: 1. To establish a true federal system, in which each major ethnic group would have a political foundation in its own territory (republic or autonomous region) but where a fairly strong federal authority would ensure the fulfilment of basic political and economic goals;

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2. The development of a civil society which could bridge the gap between ethnic and religious groups and safeguard civil peace through overlapping memberships in non-governmental organizations (assuming, therefore, that Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Albanian engineers, for example, would have more in common with each other as professionals than what they shared with their ethnic brethren and co-religionists); 3. Through the process described above, to develop a society of civility and tolerance and thereby move towards a secularization of the political order; 4. By a combination of the first three goals above, to produce a sense of Yugoslavism (“unity in diversity”) which could begin to move cultural nationalism towards political nationalism. Tito sought to implement these political goals by introducing a set of social and economic policies which are well known and therefore will be summarized here in a few sentences. In brief, he instituted a policy to transfer economic resources from the more developed regions to the underdeveloped parts of the federation; he attempted to balance appointments to the civil service and the military so that no ethnic group became predominant; and he tried to produce an educational system that would become a catalyst for national integration. From the point of view of the analyst, this is enlightened policy indeed, but it was not implemented without conflict. The biggest challenge to Tito’s approach (and to his power) came from Alexander Rankovic, the most important leader of the Serb party at the time (1960s), and then, later, from the Croat nationalists (1970s). Tito succeeded in destroying Rankovic’s power base, and he controlled Croat nationalism as well, but it was a close call in both cases. Tito was greatly helped by the external pressure exerted by the Soviet Union until the death of Stalin, because that threat tended to pull the various groups and factions together within Yugoslavia itself, and after this period, his position as the “father of the country” helped him weather various crises. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, there are risks when the nationbuilding effort is closely associated with a charismatic leader, a freedom fighter who rids a multi-ethnic and multireligious society of foreign overlords. When such a leader leaves the scene, the system will come under enormous pressure. If the underlying divisions in society have not been bridged, if the political system has not been institutionalized and depersonalized, if the development of civil society has not meant the creation of a culture of civility, then the death of such a leader will

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engender problems. Tito’s death almost immediately resulted in diverging policies among his successors. Briefly put, the Yugoslav federation became a confederacy; the confederacy became a loose grouping of armed political entities, some of which increasingly fell under the spell of virulent nationalists as political mobilizers; and finally, these loosely connected entities fell out among themselves. The result was the Bosnian conflict and its settlement (which may be only temporary), and later the conflict in Kosovo.28 The conflict in Bosnia was one of several conflicts which erupted in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, but it represented a fundamental issue of “us” versus “them”, with staying power way beyond the war between Serbs and Slovenes, and Serbs and Croats. The reason for this is fairly clear. In Bosnia, the fight was between Christian Slavs and Muslims, and the fact that the Croats made temporary alliances with the Muslims against the Serbs reflected a combination of outside pressure and temporary expediency and did not conceal the fundamental fact that the Croats and Serbs harboured well-developed notions of dividing Bosnia between themselves and thus reducing the Muslims to insignificance. Behind that design was the age-old fear of Islam in the Balkans and the notion that the Muslims in Bosnia, albeit ethnic Slavs, were in fact a Trojan horse for the ethnic Albanians and their designs, real or perceived, for a “Greater Albania”.29 The nationalism represented and nurtured by Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia cannot be explained without an understanding of this fear and loathing of the Albanians — a set of feelings and attitudes which are common to all Slavs in the Balkans (but fortunately only expressed in such extreme forms by the Serbs at this stage of history). What, then, is the role of the Albanians in this region, and what lies behind this fear, loathing, and hatred of them exhibited by others?

The Albanians in Balkan History Throughout the turbulent century and a half which we can associate with modern Balkan nationalism, the Albanians of the region played a special part. By the time the Ottoman Empire began to falter as a political mechanism, thereby giving encouragement to various nationalist movements in the region (as discussed above), the overwhelming majority of the ethnic Albanians were Muslim. They represented the only ethnic group in the Balkans of any size that had converted to Islam en masse; among other groups, such conversions were relatively rare and represented individual choices, which in turn may have been based on

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careerist considerations rather than religious conviction, at least in some cases. The Albanians, however, converted as a group, and this fact has been greatly resented by other ethnies in the area. In a region in which historical memories are long and myths are particularly gory, the “betrayal” by the Albanians of the Christian cause has been endlessly discussed and condemned (it was even worse in Bosnia, where many of the Muslims are, in fact, ethnic Slavs whose ancestors converted under Ottoman rule). The resentment of the Albanians is particularly pronounced among the Serbs, for reasons which have been discussed before, but it is also widespread among the Croat population (and to some extent also among the Slovenes). This resentment is based on widely held prejudices of long standing, which still pervade large elements of Europe’s Christian populations, including certain segments of ruling élites, giving rise to what Edward Said has called “Orientalism” as a mindset.30 Resentment of Albanians among Serbs is understandable up to a point (but does not condone ethnic cleansing). After all, the Albanians did rule Kosovo under the Tito regime, when real autonomy existed in the region. The Albanian leadership’s policies were discriminatory towards the Serbs, resulting in considerable out-migration by the latter group (also discussed above). It is also clear that Albanian nationalism became an important political factor in Albania proper in the 1980s, while a strong sense of exclusivity resulted from Enver Hoxha’s insistence on ideological righteousness and Tirana’s special position as the sole upholder of the true Marxist faith, a development which dates back to the 1960s. The split between Albania and Yugoslavia, engineered under the auspices of Marxism-Leninism in the 1940s, in fact had strong overtones of ethnic rivalries and perceived personal snubs, much of which dates back to the very formation of Albania itself shortly before World War I. It is this volatile historical legacy that is now playing itself out in Kosovo. It may be a sign of the political development of much of Europe and North America that mostly Christian powers now are waging war on Serbia on behalf of a Muslim population; this may be an indicator that Europeans and Americans now value humanitarian concerns above sovereignty — a development which will have considerable ramifications for the future in many parts of the world. In the Balkans, however, and particularly on the ethnic, religious, and historical faultlines between Serbia and “the rest”, no such humanitarianism is forthcoming. Here, the “old” forms of nationalism are being implemented in a horrifying manner.31 The resentment of Albanians among the Serbs is widespread, and it is based on a number of stereotypes, myths, and prejudices of long

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standing. This set of mass attitudes and values represents a solid base from which political mobilizers can build their programmes and consolidate their power. The chief mobilizer and implementor of this kind of policy is Slobodan Milosevic.

Slobodan Milosevic: Myth-maker, Careerist, Manipulator, and Thug Slobodan Milosevic is the primary mobilizer of Yugoslav (that is, Serb) nationalism today. His rise to power is well known and will only be summarized here. Milosevic was a party apparatchik in the Yugoslav League of Communists. He rose in the ranks on the coat-tails of important leaders, who saw him as a protégé and helped him along the path to greater power and influence. It is an indication of Milosevic’s ruthlessness as a leader that he has abandoned most of his erstwhile benefactors since capturing the political pinnacle. Milosevic’s rise is closely associated with Serb nationalism, as discussed above, and also with Kosovo; it was in the latter province that he uttered his famous words that Serbs would no longer be “beaten” by others, and it was in this province that he began the process of implementing the practical features of Serb nationalism by removing Kosovo’s autonomy and then firmly enclosing it in the grasp of central power emanating from Belgrade. Finally, it was in this place that the ultimate test of Milosevic and Serb nationalism was joined. The outcome of the struggle will tell us much about the Serb version of nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic as a politician, and the future of Albanians and many others in the Balkans. It may also tell us a great deal about Western democracies and what they are willing to fight for (and how long and hard they will fight). Furthermore, on this small and poor province hinges the fate of postCold War détente in Europe, and possibly also the future of peace or war in the Balkans itself. Certainly, the outcome of the conflict will settle the political (perhaps also personal) future of this leader himself. If ever anyone had a “rendezvous with destiny”, it is Slobodan Milosevic. In several respects, Milosevic became a top political leader in Serbia at an opportune time. In the mid-1980s, Yugoslavia was experiencing a massive economic crisis which, to some extent, foreshadowed the crises and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Productivity was low, inflation was on the rise, unemployment, hitherto essentially “hidden”, now came out in the open and revealed how weak the economy really was. In the political field, the efforts directed towards creating a form of political

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nationalism under Tito had failed; there was increasing decentralization in decision-making and even in security matters, so that each republic began to develop its own armed forces (albeit mostly in the form of police troops and paramilitary units). Serb dissatisfaction with the relations between the various republics in the federation was at a high level, because the Serbs felt that the previous system under Tito had favoured the nonSerb units, and also because the process of decentralization clearly ran counter to the wishes of many Serbs, who hankered after a more centralized system under Belgrade’s control. The increasing nationalism among the Albanians in Kosovo resulted in low-level intimidation of Serbs and produced considerable out-migration from the province by all nonAlbanian groups, but primarily members of the Serb ethnic minority in the province. On the memorable occasion mentioned above, when Milosevic made the famous statement about Serbs no longer being victims in their own land, this hitherto obscure politician captured the moment and provided the spark that ignited long-standing grievances, and he thereby rekindled suppressed but not forgotten dreams and remembrances of past injustices, real or imagined. Slobodan Milosevic became the mobilizer of Serb nationalism under propitious circumstances, but, given the mobilizability of Serb political culture at the time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in the absence of Slobodan, there would have been other Milosevics just waiting for the opportune time to turn the dangerous mix of myth and reality into political action.32 It is possible to see Slobodan Milosevic as a real Serb nationalist who is simply attempting to realize the old dream of a Greater Serbia. As such, his policy can be considered as a logical outcome of the activities of discoverers from the nineteenth century to the 1980s, when Serb nationalism was “rediscovered” in its full force, and then mobilized by a true believer like Milosevic. The scenario in the middle of the 1980s seemed eerily familiar to students of Balkan nationalism. A severe economic and political crisis helped fuel aggressive nationalism; academics, writers and other presumed opinion-makers and opinionleaders became very vocal in their expression of their major national goal (witness the now infamous “manifesto” of the Serb Academy of Sciences on the rights and duties of the Serb nation). A leader emerged to either implement the “holy” ideals of popular emotions or, conversely, the masses “cast up” someone who could reflect the needs of the masses (I am reminded here of Isaac Deutscher’s statement that “the mantle of history” fell on Stalin’s shoulders in the late 1920s and that if it had not been Stalin, history would have deposited its garment of destiny on someone else). In any case, Milosevic has expressed the main ideas of Serb nationalism, as discussed above, frequently and eloquently. If,as

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suggested by some, he is a mere careerist (see below) he certainly knows how to use widely held fears, prejudices, hopes and preferences, in the most skilful manner, to reach his goals. Chances are that his frequent reference to Serb history and destiny reflect some measure of conviction on his part; in any case, his rise to power and his present unquestioned support among virtually all Serbs may also have convinced him of his special place in the annals of his people, which certainly requires adherence to hallowed principles. Political leaders frequently associate themselves with “manifest destiny” and their place in history. Occasionally, this identification leads to a protracted journey on the dangerous path towards full-blown dictatorship and even megalomania (for example, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania). There is much to suggest that Slobodan Milosevic has also embarked on this trip, with dangerous consequences not only for Serbia and the Balkans, but perhaps the very peace of Europe itself.33 Some scholars reject the notion that Milosevic is a true nationalist. They see him instead as a cynical careerist, who cleverly uses Serb nationalism (and the Serb nation in the bargain) for his relentless quest for power. There is much to be said for this interpretation as well. Milosevic has been ruthless in his climb to power; many are the close associates and mentors of his who are now in the political wilderness, without any opportunity to influence Serb politics. Frequent purges have marked the period of Milosevic’s ascendancy; 1999 saw several of these, all of which further strengthened his grasp on power. Having consolidated his position in this fashion, Milosevic then proceeded to implement a carefully thoughtout plan of ethnic cleansing, and the establishment of a form of “Greater Serbia” — a process which will finally lead to the complete convergence of the nation, the land, and the state, a process which is described by Ernest Gellner as the very essence of nationalism. This approach of cold, calculating realpolitik has banked on the inability or unwillingness of democracies (perhaps both) to clearly define their primary, secondary, and tertiary goals in the world. It is also a policy that assumes that the principle of national sovereignty will continue to hold sway in European politics in the twenty-first century, as it did in the twentieth. The confrontation between NATO and Milosevic is therefore more than the struggle between democracy and tyranny; it may be the starting point of a new way of defining human communities away from the nation to more “universal” principles, such as human rights. If this is indeed the case, the spokesmen of universal rights will have their work cut out for them, especially in the Balkans.34 There have been increasingly frequent suggestions that Milosevic is profoundly influenced by his wife, and that the latter is the real power

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behind the “throne”, so to speak. The evidence on this score is mixed, but it is nevertheless an interesting hypothesis which requires further study. If it is true that the spouse is one of the major forces behind Slobodan Milosevic’s policies in the region in general and in Kosovo in particular, the present Serb leadership will join the ranks of ill-fated husband and wife teams running and ruining other states and economies — to wit, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu in Romania.35 Some scholars, and a plethora of contemporary commentators, have characterized Milosevic as a “thug”, or, perhaps, a “Balkan thug”. There is some validity in this, to be sure. The Serb leader has shown his callousness and ruthlessness in the pursuit of his aims. He does employ terror, random violence, and bandit-like behaviour by extension in present-day Kosovo (by extension because it is his underlings who are engaged in these unsavoury activities, but Milosevic is clearly in charge of policy-making and implementation, and therefore is responsible for his underlings and their actions in Kosovo). It is important to realize, however, that the current banditry in Kosovo is similar to other activities undertaken by Serbs elsewhere, and by Croats in Bosnia earlier in this decade; in fact, the Muslims in Bosnia have also been indicted for such activities in the civil war in the early 1990s. Thus, banditry is not an exclusive Serb activity; it is more prevalent in the Balkans now than elsewhere in Europe, but historians will note that it is only recently that the rest of Europe has moved away from such behaviour. Thus, Milosevic may be “out of step” with much of the rest of Europe, but not so far removed from more general Balkan practices. This observation needs to be elaborated further. The concept of “banditry” assumes several things. First, it assumes that there are accepted legal and administrative systems which produce “proper” behaviour, and thus deviations from it can be classified as deviant, perhaps “bandit” in nature. Furthermore, such a concept presupposes basic acceptance of the legal regime and the legitimacy of those who represent it; otherwise one has no basis for judgement. In the Balkans, however, people who challenged the official legal and political order were not traditionally seen as bandits but rather as freedom fighters. This stems from the fact that much of Balkan history unfolds under foreign overlordship, and the people who hid in the mountains and raided Turkish or Hungarian travellers did so in the name of the nation and national liberation. The philosophy was essentially that the Turks and the Habsburgs were looting the Balkan nations on a grand scale, and that “banditry” was simply justice in a different form. Thus, the heroes of Balkan folklore are often the hajduks, the leaders of bands who attacked foreign authority and then retreated to the mountains. Since

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there was no real justice, the law of the jungle (or the forests) prevailed. To judge someone as a bandit assumes a common reference point that can determine “good” or “evil”. There is no such reference point when it comes to Balkan nationalism. Whatever is good for the nation is good in principle; whatever hurts it is bad in principle. We cannot begin to understand Slobodan Milosevic unless we understand this mindset, which exists in much of the Balkans even today.36 Whether Slobodan Milosevic is first and foremost a Serb nationalist, or primarily a pragmatist, or a thug, is now largely irrelevant, because the course of events in the Balkans at the present time gives him little choice. As a nationalist, he must continue his policies or be denounced as a traitor to the Serb nation. A pragmatist who takes his country to war with an overwhelmingly strong adversary in the name of the nation will be caught up in the nationalist fervour, which inevitably surges through a population under siege in the quest for the “sacred’ symbols of that nation. Whatever he was, Milosevic is now a Serb nationalist. And when, as a nationalist, he says that Kosovo is nash (ours), he means it. It means that Kosovo will either be completely Serb, or part of it will. The idea of a multi-ethnic, multireligious Kosovo of the future is a pipe dream. Serb nationalism precludes such a solution. At the same time, a nationalist who wages a form of “holy war” can ill afford to lose, or to make deals with the adversary; compromises do not fit into the scheme of things if fundamental values, holy places, and sacrosanct memories are involved. When Milosevic agreed to the terms set by NATO concerning the withdrawal of his forces from “Holy Kosovo”, with the Field of Blackbirds, he ipso facto betrayed the very ideals which he had used to climb to power and to execute his brutal policy of ethnic cleansing. He is therefore now in trouble and under fire from several directions; the nationalists blame him for betraying the ideal, the moderates for dragging Serbia into yet another useless and devastating war, and the masses of the population are simply tired of endless deprivation and exclusion from the European family of nations, while at the same time still believing firmly in many of the ideas of Serb nationalism, as discussed above. It is hard to see how Slobodan Milosevic can survive these challenges in the long run. But insofar as he represents widely held values and prejudices of Serb nationalism, it is equally difficult for the Serbs to accept the loss of Kosovo, or Albanian rule there even if it is within nominal Serb sovereignty. Finally, it is just as difficult to envision that the Albanians will accept coexistence with Serbs in the province. Thus, the unhappy land of Kosovo faces many years of Western military presence, merely to prevent another burst of ethnic cleansing. Attitudes, values and hatreds developed over centuries cannot be

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legislated away, and they cannot be erased by Western declarations of “universalism” and the emergence of a “global” society in Europe or elsewhere. Thus, Kosovo and Serbia will continue to represent a bastion of the “old” values of ethnonationalism in the global world of the new millennium.

The Role of the External Threat in Serb Nationalism Serb nationalism has always focused on external enemies, even if these enemies were located within the borders of Serbia itself (or some political and territorial configuration of which Serbia was a part). In the nineteenth century, the mobilizers of Serb nationalism focused on the Porte; in the first decade of the twentieth century the external foe was Austria-Hungary; in World War II it was Nazi Germany (even though the record here is quite ambiguous, as discussed above); and for a large part of Tito’s rule, the threat from abroad was the Soviet Union. Now, it is NATO, “the West”, and the United States. At the same time, the external threat was complemented by an internal threat aided by external forces — a most potent concept in Serb nationalism. Thus, in the Turkish period, the Albanians on territory coveted by the Serbs were seen as alien influences. After World War I, Serb nationalism gradually focused on the Croats and Slovenes inside recently established Yugoslavia; these types of nationalism were seen as dangerous representatives of “Western” and Catholic influences in the kingdom of the southern Slavs. Tito was denounced by Serb nationalists as being “soft” on non-Serbs and, in some cases, as a promoter of other national groups (after all, Tito was not a Serb and thus probably not nash in the perception of real Serb nationalists). Now, once again, the enemy is from within (Albanians), aided and abetted first by “Islam” in general, then by other Albanians in the Balkan region, and, finally, by “the West”. With this confluence of internal and external enemies, Serb nationalism has an extraordinarily well developed sense of betrayal, of encirclement, and of victimization. When Serb nationalists today speak of their bewilderment concerning Western actions and their inability to fathom why others cannot understand Serbia, we should realize that this is not merely cynical rhetoric; it is, at least in part, genuine confusion. At the same time, it also reflects a confirmation in Serb minds of something they had always suspected was “out there” — a deep dark conspiracy against them. If one reads the history of Serbia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with some care, one can see some of the nuggets of reality imbedded in this dangerous fallacy. But kernels of truth do not

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make the real truth, and they do not justify the systematic brutality carried out in Kosovo. That is why the West, if it is serious in its defence of human rights in the Balkans, is doomed to fulfil the Serb prophecy that “everyone is against us”.37 We would do well to remember this continuity of thought in Serb nationalism. What is happening now in Kosovo has happened before in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. After World War I, the Turks drove out one million Greeks from territories on which the latter had lived for two thousand years; similarly, half a million Turks were driven out of Greek-held territory, also from areas where Turks had lived for a long time. This resettlement process, which established the principle of the confluence of the nation, territory, and a sovereign state upon that territory was at least done under some international supervision, and therefore the loss of life was reduced. Similarly, after World War II, millions of Germans were driven from territories where they had lived for a long time; subsequently, millions of Germans left the Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania and went back to the “homeland”. The Bosnian war also saw massive transfers of people (but the scale was smaller than the other cases described). Kosovo represents the latest in these movements, which seem to confirm Gellner’s idea that nationalism as political mobilization is a quest for bringing the nation, the state, and coveted territory together. If this is the case, Kosovo is not unique; rather, it is predictable, and, some would say, inevitable.38 Given the analysis provided above, it becomes clear that NATO’s military victory in Kosovo is merely the successful completion of a campaign waged with overwhelming firepower and capabilities; it is not the victory of “universal” values over old-fashioned barbaric nationalism, and not the triumph of the new global order over the old retrograde mindset of a backward region. As the saying goes, this analysis provides some bad news and possibly some good news as well. The bad news is that established values, attitudes, and prejudices cannot be dismantled in a short period of time, and will remain for a generation or two, while other values are introduced to compete with them. The potentially good news is the fact that, a half century after the end of World War II, the French and the Germans no longer hate each other viscerally, and are unlikely to wage war upon each other again in the foreseeable future. Is such a development possible in Serbia and Kosovo? Only time will tell. In the meantime, Albanian nationalism has certainly been furthered by the events in Kosovo, and this phenomenon produces fear in many in the Balkans, including Croats, Macedonians, Bulgarians and Romanians, in addition to the Serbs. Thus, the temporary hedging in of extreme Serb nationalism may have produced another problem with

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even wider ramifications in the region. The Balkan problem was not solved in the twentieth century. It may take much of the twenty-first to see its solution, or even moderation.

Nationalism and Globalism on the Eve of the New Millennium One of the reasons why Serb nationalism today seems so alien is the fact that it is based on the past, and seeks to establish a future regime on a foundation of emotions, prejudices, realities, and myths that go back hundreds of years. In many ways, this ideology seems to be anachronistic in the age of instant communications, global networks of financial transactions, and the spread of “culture”originating in the United States (at least, pop culture) throughout the world. Certainly, much of Europe outside the Balkans is caught up in this wave, and even some of the states in that region are concerned with the need to become a “normal” country (that is, a country which looks like other European or “Western” countries in all relevant respects). In some ways, Serb nationalism can be seen as a reaction against this trend of globalization, because so much of the value system now pervading the rest of Europe is directly or indirectly in conflict with basic aspects of that nationalism. The secularization of global culture offends the emphasis on the “sacred” elements of Serb nationalism; the idea of “universal” human rights defy Serb claims of exclusivity; the worship of “Mammon” prevalent elsewhere presumably denies the notion that symbols are more important than “greenbacks”. In this sense, Serb nationalism is an anachronism to the West, but it is a vital and superior force to most Serbs. On another dimension, a real Serb nationalist sees himself as very much in the mainstream of European culture and the values of the “West”. After all, most of Europe is Christian, and the Serbs perceive themselves as a bastion of Christianity defending European culture against challenges from something very alien, namely, Islam. Furthermore, Slobodan Milosevic has cleverly (and perhaps even by conviction) billed himself as the last obstacle to the dangers of Albanian nationalism and the quest for a “Greater Albania”, which would, presumably, include all Albanians now living in neighbouring states and territories, especially Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and perhaps also Greece. As the spectre of Albanian nationalism in this manifestation is real to many in the Balkans, Milosevic can play upon perceptions and fears that go beyond his own territory on this issue. He can even appeal to the Greeks as fellow Orthodox trying to stem the tide of Albanian

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fundamentalism, and he can (and does) appeal to Russian nationalism and Moscow’s needs to once again become a major power in the Balkans, in Europe generally, and, perhaps, also the world itself. Defender of Europe’s values and religions, part of the Slavic brotherhood with Russia and the Orthodox brotherhood of Russians, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Romanians — who is to say that Milosevic is not European? This is the underlying message in Serb nationalism, and it is potent. Thus, to understand Slobodan Milosevic the mobilizer, we must also understand him as a Serb nationalist and a true son of the Balkans. If we do not, we cannot understand the wider implications of this kind of nationalism today.39

Conclusion: Theory and Reality This essay started out by examining a number of conceptual frameworks utilized to study the phenomenon of “nationalism”. Implicit in this study is the notion that nationalism is capable of generalization, even though it definitionally deals with a notion that is derivable only from the “nation”, and the “nation” presumably is sui generis in the sense that no two nations are completely alike while still remaining separate entities in real life. Thus, scholars have examined commonalities as well as differences between “nations”. Furthermore, they have studied the “building blocs” of nations, and have often focused on concepts such as “ethnies” and “ethnic groups”; furthermore, they have described “nationalism” as a political phenomenon of mobilization of entities which are (or perceive themselves to be) “nations”. In this context, the ideas of “ethnonationalism”, “ethnochauvinism”, “cultural” and “political” nationalism were developed. All of these concepts have been important in this study because they have helped us to focus and understand a phenomenon which is otherwise very complex and perhaps even unintelligible in the contemporary context. The most valuable tool for the present effort, however, is Ernest Gellner’s idea that nationalism in the modern era is fashioned by those who “discover” the various ingredients that go into the concept of “nation”; those who disseminate these ideas to others, so that Benedict Anderson’s notion of an “imagined community” can be established; and finally, those who mobilize the imagined community for collective action. This has made it possible to view Serb nationalism as something other than mere thuggery draping itself in false rhetoric about the “holy nation”. The most important contribution of the Gellnerian approach, however, is the idea that nationalism in Europe has been primarily about the quest for the nation

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to acquire its own territory and to establish upon it a state. This requires at the very least that each state has a dominant nation in it; it also leaves the door open to the possibility that this quest will result in only one nation having its territory, its country, and its state on that territory. The latter scenario seems to be the one pursued by the Serbs until the Kosovo conflict. This framework also makes it possible for us to understand the ultimate consequence of “cultural“ nationalism as opposed to the “political” variety. Does Gellner’s framework lend itself to further conceptualization, which may help to explain why Serbia today is “out of step” with much of the rest of Europe? Can it help us to understand why other nations which engaged in similar behaviour on behalf of the “nation” (for example, Nazi Germany) have now adopted an entirely different approach, so that the Germans, half a century after the excesses of extremist nationalism, now participate fully in a mission to defend “global” values such as universal human rights? This may be so for the following reasons. Gellner discusses the idea that a nation, once it has fulfilled its “mission” of acquiring territory and establishing a state, can begin to focus on the institutionalization of that political system. Institutionalization means that the structures of the state take on a life of their own, detached from the personalities involved in the functions of the state. Furthermore, an institutionalized system does not need to rely upon other support mechanisms, such as religion or a particular church, in order to survive and grow; it maintains itself as an institution, it exists in its own right (as the Germans would say in a language which is better at certain forms of conceptualization than English — the institutions have survival capability as a thing in itself, or an Sich). Thus, the developmental process of nations involves the acquisition of territory, the institutionalization of its rule over that territory (“sovereignty”), the concretization of a state (as a system of institutions), the development of a civil society, and the injection of civility (tolerance) into that society. This takes time. We may say that as this process unfolds, the nation becomes the nation-state, and the entire system gains in maturity (it becomes more “developed”). This is the story of many nations in Western Europe, which were fortunate to live in relatively homogeneous ethnic communities and could therefore deal with the “crises of development” without the centrifugal forces of multi-ethnicity, multi-religiosity, and foreign rule. This is now also true for states such as Germany, which only a few decades ago practised a form of nationalism which bears considerable similarity to present-day Serb nationalism under Slobodan Milosevic’s supervision and leadership. With help from others (the

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occupation forces, especially the Americans) post-war Germany became a state which reflected institutionalization, democratic procedures, a civil society, and a society of civility. Is this what it takes to turn nationalism from being aggressive and intolerant to being peaceful and accepting of others? Is “political” nationalism only possible in “secure” nations, which have had the chance to acquire their own territory and then establish institutions upon it, for the purpose of letting these institutions mature and then become vehicles of tolerance, not of oppression? If this is the case, Slobodan Milosevic’s quest is to be able to do the same as other nations have done before. He is unfortunate in the sense that he is pursuing goals which others have already achieved at a time when much of the rest of Europe no longer condones such behaviour. Whether Milosevic has conceptualized his position in this way, or he simply acts on instinct, is irrelevant. If he is trying to achieve something which others did fifty or a hundred years ago (sometimes with similar means), he may indeed feel “hurt” and “slighted”. In order for Serbia to become a “normal” country, it must achieve the same confluence of nation, state and territory as other countries have done; only when this is achieved can one begin to talk about (and practise) tolerance. This seems to be the underlying premise of Slobodan Milosevic’s idea world. There is another way of viewing this leader. It is that Milosevic represents another case in the long line of dictators who have used nations for the purpose of achieving power for themselves and those around them. In so doing, these dictators have engaged in behaviour which is alien to the cherished principles of the “West” (and perhaps the rest of humanity, even though the internationalization of Western values is a controversial topic nowadays). Such dictators must be stopped, for they will ultimately destroy basic human values if left to their own devices. While this argument is emotionally satisfying, it is not quite as easy in detached analysis. In the latter sense, there is the notion that European nationalism per se means the quest for nations to reify themselves on territories and in their own state structures. If this is true, Slobodan Milosevic is a true nationalist (as well as a thug and a manipulator).

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Notes 1. A very large literature on the Balkans exists. One of the best overview studies of the area is Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans (Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press, 1983). A good recent study is Constantine P. Danoupoulous and Kostas G. Mesas, eds., Crisis in the Balkans: Views from the Participants (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1997). 2. From the large and growing literature on these concepts, I have relied primarily on Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC.: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackewell, 1987); and Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List (New York, NY.: Oxford University Press, 1988). 3. Some of the most penetrating analyses of this phenomenon can be found in Connor, Ethnonationalism, especially ch. 3. 4. John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989). 5. One of the best studies of Europe and the Renaissance is John Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (London: Fontana Press, 1994). 6. For an analysis of Serb nationalism before Tito, see, for example, Jelavich, History of the Balkans, especially ch. 1,2. 7. An excellent study on this is Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992). 8. This message is reflected very clearly in folklore and epic songs, as shown in Helen Rotham, Kossovo, Heroic Songs of the Serbs (Great Neck, NY.: Core Collection Books, 1979). 9. Slobodan Milosevic has played on these feelings throughout the entire decade of his rule. For a discussion of this and other aspects of his leadership, see Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990’s (London: Hunt & Co., 1999). 10. For example, Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1984). 11. A good study of Tito’s policies during World War II is Nora Beloff, Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939–84 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1985). 12. The memorandum from the academicians was published in Vecerni Novosti (Belgrade), September 1986. See also Branka Megas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 1980–92 (London: Verso, 1993), especially pp. 40-55. 13. See, for example, Gary Sauer-Thompson, Beyond Economics: Postmodernity, Globalization, and National Sustainability (Aldershot, Hunts, UK: Avebury, 1996) for an economic analysis of these concepts. 14. By now it has become de rigeur to refer to Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York, NY.: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Here, Huntington postulates civilizational clashes rather than harmony. Others, and especially political leaders like Bill Clinton and

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15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

Trond Gilberg Tony Blair clearly believe that there is a need for a code of ethics that includes basic features of human rights, and specifically excludes such matters as ethnic cleansing. See, for example, The Economist, 24 April 1999, pp. 15–16, and “NATO Survey” in the same issue. For a penetrating analysis of the concept of “liberal ideology” and its alleged triumph, see Immanuel E. Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York, NY.: W.W. Norton, 1995). An interesting development in this regard is the fact that the most vociferous advocates of this view are the so-called “liberal hawks”, who demand the use of American power for moral ends (see, for example, The Economist, 12– 18 June 1999, pp. 31–32). On the negotiations that led to the end of the military conflict, see ibid., pp. 51–52. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL.: The Free Press, 1959), especially ch. 1–3. The logic of this kind of nationalism is well discussed in J.F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1994), especially pp. 229–308. Many books have been written on ethnic relations in Yugoslavia. Two of the best are Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); and Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literatue and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1998). For example, Wachtel, Making a Nation, especially pp. 173–227. For a discussion of civil society after the demise of communism, see Ralf Dahrendorf, After 1989: Morals, Revolution, and Civil Society (New York, NY.: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). On Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York, NY.: New York University Press, 1998), especially pp. 341–43. For example, Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hunt & Co., 1998), especially ch. 12. See Dahrendorf, After 1989, especially ch. 5. See note 2 which has listed some of the most important conceptual works on this subject. See, for example, Lawrence A. Trite, ed., Balkan Currents: Studies in the History, Culture and Society of a Divided Land (Los Angeles, CA.: Loyola Marymount University, 1998), especially ch. 1, 2, 3. There are several solid works on this; see, for example, Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (New York, NY.: New York University Press, 1999), especially the first four chapters. See also Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. See John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially ch. 5,6,7. There is considerable literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia. See, for example, Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992). See also David A. Dyker and Ivan Veyoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (New York, NY.: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1996), especially ch. 5 (by Slavo Radosevic).

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29. Albanian quests for land beyond the present borders were recorded at various times in history, for example, in the so-called League of Prizren. On this, see Malcolm, Kosovo, especially pp. 221–27. 30. On Albania, see Edwin E. Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson, NJ.: MsFarland & Co., 1995). On “orientalism”, see Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1978). 31. The best recent study on this is Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. 32. Ibid. 33. An earlier analysis of Milosevic is still valid; see Aleksa Djilas, “A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic”, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 81–96. 34. For example, The Economist, 12–18 June 1999. The title page read “Messy War, Messy Peace”; see also editorial in the same issue, pp. 13-14. 35. On the Ceausescus, see my book entitled Nationalism and Communism in Romania (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990), especially ch. 8. 36. This is also apparent in heroic songs and epics; see Rotham, Heroic Songs of the Serbs. 37. The most up-to-date discussion is Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. 38. A thorough study of the war in Bosnia is Michael A. Sills, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1996). 39. The interplay of politics and personality is examined in detail in Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic.

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m 2 n Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying: The Challenge of Globalization in Indonesia LEO SURYADINATA

Introduction Nation-building in Indonesia started in the period of Dutch colonialism, especially during the Indonesian nationalist movement before World War II. But the systematic measures adopted by the state only took place after independence. Nevertheless, the nation-building process in Indonesia has not been smooth. Although, generally, many ethnic groups have identified themselves with the “Indonesian nation”, ethnic tension and conflict continue, particularly in the three provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku as well as East Timor, which left Indonesia recently. The intensity of conflict has increased in the last decade, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the globalization of the Indonesian economy. As a result, some observers have commented that Indonesia may now be at the nation-destroying stage.1 The departure of East Timor has been cited as proof of this. Amien Rais, a leading opposition leader, has compared the Indonesian situation to that of Yugoslavia, warning of the danger of national disintegration. This chapter analyses the rise of Indonesian nationalism, its nature, and its relations with Western colonialism. It discusses the development of a modern Indonesian nation, its relationship with the citizenry, and various measures adopted by the indigenous dominated government to foster nation-building. The position of the ethnic Chinese in this new 38

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nation is also examined. The impact of globalization, on the Indonesian state and nation, is also discussed: Is globalization destroying the concept of a modern Indonesian nation? Are the concepts of the Indonesian nation and nationalism still relevant in the face of globalization? Will Indonesia disintegrate?

Indonesian Nation and Nationalism: Its Origins and Developments Indonesia is a multi-ethnic, multiracial and multireligious state. There are at least 250 ethnic groups, of which all but three are “indigenous” groups.2 They all have a homeland within Indonesia to identify with. Of these indigenous groups, the Javanese form about 47 per cent of the population. Five other indigenous groups each consist of more than 2 per cent of the Indonesian population: Sundanese (15 per cent) Madurese (7 per cent), Minangkabau (3.5 per cent), Buginese (3 per cent) and Balinese (2 per cent). There are foreign “racial” groups — the Chinese, Arabs, and Indians — of which the Chinese form the majority (3 per cent).3 Among these groups, there are at least six major religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholic, Hindu-Bali, Buddhism and Confucianism) but 87 per cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims. The emergence of the Indonesian state can be related to Karl Deutsch’s theory of social communication. It was Dutch colonialism which provided the various ethnic groups with a common experience. When these ethnic groups were under Dutch political rule, some of them received Western (Dutch) education and lived under the Dutch administration as well as its economic system. The modern Indonesian nation is a product of the nationalism which emerged as a reaction to Dutch colonialism. When the Dutch left, the process of nation-building in Indonesia continued. Various measures were taken but there were many challenges. Although globalization in the cultural aspect took place some time ago, in the economic sphere globalization has been more recent, coinciding with Indonesia’s active participation in the global economy. The ethnic problem preceded globalization as ethnic conflict and rebellions took place in the 1950s and the 1960s, but it was contained during the early years of the Soeharto regime. The Cold War also had an impact on Indonesia, and communism has always been perceived as a common threat. This led the government to take action against any ethnic discontent in the name of combating communists. The Western countries also supported Indonesian measures to secure

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political stability, often at the expense of the minority groups. The Indonesian adventure in East Timor can be seen in this light. The end of the Cold War removed the ideological justification and ethnic issues became very real problems. It appears that the globalization process — not only in the economic aspect but also in religious terms — has intensified these ethnic conflicts as it challenges the concept of the Indonesian nation and national sovereignty. Ethnonationalism has reemerged to directly challenge the old concept of an Indonesian nation. The concept of an Indonesian nation (natie or bangsa) did not exist prior to the arrival of the Europeans. What had existed were the concepts of kingdom (kerajaan) and ethnic group (suku). The argument put forward by Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin that Sriwijaya and Majapahit were ancient Indonesian nations and that present-day Indonesia is an extension of such empires is simply a myth. The Indonesian nation was largely the result of the independent movement led by Western-educated indigenous intellectuals in the twentieth century. The goal of the movement was not confined to the attainment of independence but also the creation of a “nation” of the people within the Dutch colonial boundaries (the Dutch East Indies). This nation is known as the “Indonesian nation”, or Bangsa Indonesia. Since the Indonesian nation was the product of the nationalist movement, a brief examination of the movement is in order. The movement can be divided into two phases:4 the proto-nationalist phase (1908–26), when the concept of an Indonesian nation was vague, if not absent; and the Indonesian nationalist phase (1927–42), when the idea of “nationhood” was crystallized. During the first period, the dominant ideologies were Islam and communism. The anti-Dutch movements were led by either Islamic or communist leaders. Their objective was to eradicate the colonial role but there was no specific idea of creating an “Indonesian nation state”. It was during the latter period that the nationalist party was established, the name of the nation emerged and popularized, and the symbols of the nation (such as the national language, the national flag and national anthem) were created. In a sense, the Indonesian nation is still young, and hence the Indonesian nation-state is still in the making. What we have here is an Indonesian “state-nation” — that is, a nation based on the colonial state — not a “nation-state”, or a state based on a single nation, as Indonesia is still at the stage of nation-building. Nevertheless, the “statenation” has faced serious challenges in recent years, particularly after the fall of Soeharto.

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As the concept of an Indonesian nation is still new, what constitutes the nation is also problematic. Nevertheless, there has been agreement on the Indonesian national language, which is based on Malay and national education. But the position of Islam in this nation has not been resolved. Secular and Islamic nationalists continue to exist. In fact, Pancasila, the Indonesian national ideology, has been challenged by some Muslim fundamentalists.5 They prefer an Islamic order rather than the Pancasila order. Nevertheless, other Indonesians still feel that the Pancasila ideology, based on religious pluralism where every religion enjoys parity, should still be the basis of the Indonesian nation. Without this, there may be national disintegration. Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 but gained political power only in 1949. In the initial period, owing to different religious leanings, Christian and Islamic fundamentalists launched ethnic separatist movements (in Maluku and Aceh). These movements were easily suppressed as the central government was stronger and the sense of Indonesian nationalism and national unity among the majority of the population was powerful — there was a fear of the return of Dutch colonialism. However, the seed of separatist movement never disappeared in a number of provinces: Aceh, south Maluku, Irian Jaya, and East Timor. It should be noted that Irian Jaya was only included as part of Indonesian territory after 1962, while East Timor was annexed by Indonesia in 1976. Because of the different length of common experience in Indonesia, the level of integration of these provinces into the Indonesian mainstream also differs. If we apply the concept developed by Myron Wiener on political integration, one can argue that Indonesia has reached only a low level of national integration.6 The integration of the provinces (with the exception of East Timor) has recently been completed, but mass-élite integration, value integration and “integrative behaviour” still remain to be pursued. Perhaps when discussing the Indonesian nation and nationalism, East Timor should be considered as a special case, as the territory had not been recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesian territory. Otherwise, a distorted picture about Indonesian nationhood may emerge. Using different sets of indicators to measure the level of Indonesian nationhood may produce slightly different impressions. If the presence of a national language, national education, national institutions (such as political parties and the military), national symbols and the absence of a large number of separatist movements indicate the presence of nationhood, and the absence of four indicators as well as the presence

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of large numbers of separatist movements indicate the absence of nationhood, Indonesia may be considered to be at the mid-point of the nation-building process.7

The Concept of the Indonesian Nation and the Ethnic Chinese Although the concept of an Indonesian nation is quite clear, the national components mentioned above refer mainly to the “indigenous”, or pribumi, people. These indigenous groups are home-land minorities, who have a “home-land” to be identified with. This concept of nation can also be seen if we look at the attitude of Indonesian nationalist organizations and government policies towards the local Chinese.8 From the start of the proto-nationalist phase, the local Chinese had been excluded from the movement. Marked by the emergence of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK, the Chinese Association) in Java in 1900, overseas Chinese nationalism occurred before the appearance of the first Indonesian protonational organization, the Budi Utomo (founded in 1908). The local Chinese then considered themselves as part of the Chinese nation (bangsa Cina, later known as bangsa Tionghoa), separating themselves from both the Dutch (bangsa Olanda, later known as bangsa Belanda) and the indigenous Indonesians (bumiputra, later known as Indonesian asli). Each ethnic/racial group had its own social and political organizations. The structure of the Dutch East Indies society was based on racial division: Europeans (Dutch), “Foreign Orientals” (mainly Chinese, but also Arabs and the Japanese before the twentieth century), and the natives (inlanders). Each group had different laws and different rights. For instance, the local Chinese were considered as “native” for legal purposes and subject to the inferior native courts, but as “non-natives”, in entitlement to farmland. Membership to the proto-Indonesian organizations, with the exception of the Indisch Partij (Indies Party) and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party), was naturally exclusively for “indigenous Indonesians”. The most influential mass movement in this phase, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), had in fact an anti-Chinese overtone. It was initially founded by the indigenous batik traders in Surakarta to exclude the Chinese traders. It was only later that it was transformed into a political party with a wider political appeal. During the Indonesian nationalist phase, major political parties such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and Parindra, closed their membership to the non-indigenous population. The exception was a minor leftwing party, the Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, which welcomed peranakan Chinese (locally-born Indonesia-speaking Chinese). The PKI

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also accepted peranakan Chinese as members. It is important to note that in 1928, the Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda), which was regarded as the hallmark of Indonesian nationhood, and in which various indigenous ethnic organizations were represented, did not include any Chinese organizations.9 Ethnic/racial consciousness was intensified when the Japanese occupied Indonesia during World War II. The Chinese were administered separately from the indigenous population and were encouraged to retain their identity. The indigenous Indonesians as a group also developed a sense of unity. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, adopted by the Indonesian nationalists, stipulated that “the president [of the Republic of Indonesia] must be an indigenous Indonesian [asli]”10. This can be interpreted as distrust towards the other non-indigenous groups (such as the Chinese). When Indonesia became a sovereign state in 1949, the ethnic situation underwent slight changes as many indigenous political parties opened their membership to the peranakan Chinese. This relaxation in accepting peranakan Chinese members was a new trend (following the Dutch–Indonesian conflict) to gain local Chinese support for the Indonesian nationalist cause. Some Chinese showed their willingness to join indigenous parties because of their political convictions, longterm resilience, and lack of other alternatives. The trend continued during the Guided Democracy (1959–65) and the New Order (1966– 98) periods. Nevertheless, the concept of an Indonesian nation was still basically racial and indigenous based. The Chinese were urged to integrate with and eventually assimilate into the indigenous population. This was reflected in the state policy, particularly during the New Order period under Soeharto. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society but the “indigenous” population form the majority. When the Dutch were in power, Indonesian society (later known as “plural society”) was divided along racial lines.11 Each racial group had a different “culture” and economic function. After Indonesia’s independence, the concept of race remained dominant. “Nation” is still defined in racial and “indigenous” terms. It is relevant to mention here that the exclusion of the ethnic Chinese from the Indonesian nation may be due to the general perception of the indigenous leaders on the role of the Chinese during the nationalist movement. Although many Chinese were involved in the movement and sided with the Indonesian nationalists, the general perception of the indigenous groups was that the Chinese sided with the Dutch. Many studies show that this perception was not really correct,12 but as a trading

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minority, the Indonesian Chinese tended to be rather conservative. The Chinese in Indonesia were often considered as rivals, especially after the indigenous Indonesian nationalists succeeded in getting rid of the Dutch. Thus, they became the target of nationalist attacks. Some Indonesian groups even defined “Indonesian“ in terms of elements which are “non-Chinese”. Even the so-called Indonesian names were used to differentiate the “non-Chinese”. This type of “indigenous” Indonesian nationalism posed a problem for the integration of the ethnic Chinese, particularly in recent years.

Nation-Building Measures after Independence Since Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multiracial society, it is understandable that the Indonesian élites began the nation-building process seriously after the creation of the Republic of Indonesia. But since these nationalists belonged to the abangan, or nominal Muslim, group, the concept of the Indonesian nation was understandably also secular. Various steps towards nation-building have been introduced, the most outstanding of which are the promotion of the national language and education, Indonesian national symbols, the Indonesian national institution, and the Pancasila ideology.13 Also essential is the concept of development, which is meant to bring benefit to various provinces. Last but not least is the use of force. The central authority does not hesitate to use force in order to maintain national unity. For the ethnic Chinese, apart from the above measures, other means have also been employed to integrate and assimilate the “alien” minority. The citizenship law, name-changing, closing of Chinese schools, and discouraging the use of the Chinese language are most conspicuous. The different problems faced by the ethnic Chinese will be dealt with separately. First, let us look at the general measures taken for nationbuilding.

National Language and Education The national language policy has been crucial in creating an Indonesian national identity and fostering unity. Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian state which has adopted a minority language as the national language (bahasa nasional). The Indonesian language was formerly known as Malay, a minority language originating in Palembang (Sumatra) and Bangka in the seventh century. It was later used as a lingua franca for various ethnic groups in the archipelago and the medium of communication in market

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places for various ethnic Indonesians and foreigners. The language was accepted by the Indonesian nationalists prior to Indonesia’s independence partly because of its simplicity, and partly because of its non-controversial status. Javanese, the language of the major ethnic group, was not even considered, simply because it was not used by the non-Javanese. In addition, the Javanese language was considered to be complicated, with different social classes using different terms of speech. The acceptance by the Javanese of Malay as the Indonesian language also shows that the Javanese leaders were far-sighted, pragmatic, and tolerant of other ethnic groups. Therefore, Indonesia did not have the language problem that other new states faced. The Indonesian national language was first popularized in the nationalist press during the independence movement; it was further spread and developed during the Japanese Occupation. All major newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts have used the national language. Of 358 newspapers published in Indonesia during 1965–67, only three were published in Indonesian ethnic languages.14 In Medan, for instance, there were three Batak-owned newspapers but all of them used the Indonesian language. The publishers claimed that the Bataks in Medan would not buy a newspaper published in the Batak language.15 After independence, all state schools in Indonesia used the national language as the medium of instruction. However, ethnic languages could be taught in the local schools until the third grade, after which all education had to be in Indonesian. A leading historian has argued that: such institutionalized universal use of this language in a vast, multi-ethnic society ‘nationalized’ the generation that was going to school; their own local culture and language continued to be transmitted to them, but now the process occurred within a national cultural framework.16

The popularity of the Indonesian language was evident but it by no means replaced the ethnic languages. According to some observers, the use of the Indonesian language was more popular in urban than in rural areas. In most cases, urban dwellers (particularly in nonJavanese areas) tended to be bilingual, with Indonesian as the dominant tongue. In the rural areas, however, ethnic languages were still widely used. A survey on Indonesian school-children from primary to junior middle school level showed that only 26 per cent of the students used Bahasa Indonesia at home. In fact, there was a revival of ethnic languages in some areas. For instance, at a language conference in Jakarta held in the mid-1970s, some prominent Sundanese proposed that government servants assigned to West Java should be proficient in Sundanese so that they could better serve the

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villagers.17 However, no one has suggested that the use of ethnic languages should be at the expense of the national language.

Indonesian National Symbols The acceptance of the Indonesian language by the nationalist leaders before and after World War II helped to develop it as the unifying language (bahasa persatuan). At that time, the term “national language” (bahasa nasional) was not yet used to refer to Bahasa Indonesia. As early as 1928, during the second Indonesian Youth Congress in Jakarta, the “secular” young Indonesian nationalists from various regions succeeded in formulating the well-known Sumpah Pemuda (the Youth Pledge) declaring that they were Indonesians (Bangsa Indonesia), had a unifying language, that is, the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia), and had one motherland, which was Indonesia. Following the expression of nationalism, a national song and national flag were adopted. Some Islamic organizations refused to sign the Pledge because the nationalism advocated by the nationalists was a “secular” one.18 After the war, it appears that they quietly accepted (or at least did not openly oppose) these national symbols, with the exception of some radical Muslims who attempted to establish an Islamic state. The youth organizations from West Irian and East Timor were absent from the Youth Congress.

Indonesian National Institution A national party system has also been used to integrate various groups into Indonesian society. During the parliamentary democracy period (1950-58), Indonesian political parties were multi-ethnic in nature. The four major parties, the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Masyumi, and Nahdatul Ulama (NU), were national in their following although it was not without regional and ethnic preference. In other words, these were not ethnic parties. In the Batak region, for instance, the majority of the Batak people joined national parties. It was true, however, that there was a considerable measure of ethnic identification with particular parties: North Tapanuli Batak with Parkindo (Christian Party), South Tapanuli Batak with Masyumi, and the Javanese, although more divided in their partisan loyalties, with the PNI. Of the four Batak communities, only the Simalungun Bataks failed to support a national party.19 The popular participation in national parties rather than a local ethnic party is an

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indication that people were beginning to think in terms of a nationstate rather than a local ethnic group. During the Guided Democracy period (1959–65), national political parties (with the exception of the PKI) ceased to play vital roles. Parties in opposition to Soekarno — Masyumi and the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) — were banned. Soekarno introduced the concept of Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) in his attempt to unify the different political forces, but without success. Conflict between the procommunists (including the secular nationalists and the communists) and the anti-communists (including Islamic nationalists and the army) escalated and culminated in open conflict following the fall of Soekarno in 1966. The much talked-about massacre after the 1965 coup in Java was basically the consequence of a conflict between the anti-communist Javanese santris and pro-communist Javanese abangan rather than ethnic strife. Therefore, it was more ideological than ethnic. There were widespread ethnic conflicts between the local Chinese and indigenous Indonesians soon after the coup but they were also couched in ideological terms. The ethnic Chinese were portrayed as pro-communists and hence became the targets of the anti-communist forces. Ethnic animosity among the native Indonesians was overwhelmed by the struggle between the anti-communist alliance — the santri Muslims, Christians, and the army — and the pro-communist forces — non-Muslims and abangan Muslims. After the eradication of the communists, the army and the abangan Muslims united against the santri Muslims. The New Order (1966–98), which emerged after the fall of Soekarno, continued to be concerned with “national integration”. After the 1971 general elections, the Soeharto government fused the nine existing parties into two new ones: the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, a fusion of secular nationalist parties and Christian parties); and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, a fusion of Islamic parties). With the government-sponsored and military-dominated Golkar (the Functional Group), Indonesia had only three multi-ethnic parties, of which Golkar was the dominant one.20 To make the Indonesian parties more national, the government introduced a law which required all political parties to subscribe to the Pancasila ideology as the basis of their organizations. Many Muslim groups opposed this law, but eventually the majority were forced to accept. After the fall of Soeharto, more than 100 parties were established. With the exception of the one ethnic Chinese party (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia or Parti), the rest are multi-ethnic parties based either on nationalism or religion.21 There is no indigenous ethnicbased party. Parti did not contest in the June 1999 elections probably because it lacked sufficient party branches.

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The Pancasila Ideology Pancasila encompasses five principles, which had to be studied in school even during the Soekarno era. First formulated by Soekarno, it stresses five elements supposed to be common among Indonesian ethnic groups. The first principle, “Belief in One God” (without specifying a particular religion) is aimed at embracing all religious Indonesians. However, it also denies a special position for Islam, reflecting the abangan vision of an Indonesian state and culture. The second principle is Indonesian unity. The last three principles — humanism, social justice and democracy — are ideas vaguely shared by all ethnic groups. Since the downfall of Soekarno, the teaching of Pancasila in schools has been intensified. Furthermore, in 1978, the Soeharto government established an institution to instill the Pancasila ideology, making it a requirement for all civil servants and businessmen to take the course and pass the examination. In the view of the Soeharto government, Pancasila means “religious pluralism”. Under the umbrella of Pancasila, religious freedom is guaranteed. Thus, it also means that Islam is subject to Pancasila. This is opposed by many santri Muslims who are of the view that Pancasila should be subject to Islam.22 The Pancasila ideology attempts to separate Islam as a religion from Islam as a political force. While the Soeharto government tolerated and even encouraged Islam as a religion (as evidenced in its sponsorship in building mosques and assisting Islamic boarding schools), it suppressed political Islam. It is worth noting that the santri Muslims’ disagreement of “religious pluralism” is evidence of their opposition to the proposal of Pancasila as the Indonesian ideology during both the Soekarno and Soeharto periods. When Soekarno was in power, santri parties opposed Pancasila, which resulted in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1959. During the New Order period, when Pancasila became the sole ideology, there was also peaceful and violent opposition. The Tanjung priok incident in 1984 was closely related to the Pancasila issue. The fundamentalists were also against the adoption of Pancasila as the state ideology. However, unlike the Soekarno era, Indonesia under Soeharto succeeded in making Pancasila the sole ideology. Even the Islamic party, PPP, was required to drop Islam as the party’s ideological base and profess Pancasila. It should be noted that the sole ideology law was eventually repealed by the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly) soon after Soeharto stepped down, signifying that the Islamic forces do not completely accept Pancasila! The defender of the Pancasila ideology was the Indonesian military, which was dominated by the abangan group. However, currently the

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military is not united and there is a struggle between the “nationalist” and “Islamic” groups, although the nationalist group appears to have the upper hand. The military as an institution also serves as a means to integrate Indonesian society. The Indonesian armed forces, despite Javanese domination, are multi-ethnic in their composition. All ethnic groups have been included in the military and there is no special ethnic division. However, the above nation-building measures have only been partially successful. Apparently, elements which oppose national integration remain strong. The Islamic resurgence since the late 1970s has provided the fundamentalists with a new momentum. The government policy, especially the almost complete political and economic control over the outer islands, has generated strong discontent. In fact, ethnic and religious sentiments have always been very strong. Soon after Indonesia became a sovereign state, ethnic/religious rebellions began to threaten Indonesian unity.

Challenges to Nation-Building The nationalists proclaimed Indonesia’s independence in 1945. It was followed by Indonesian–Dutch armed conflict up to 1949 when the Dutch eventually agreed to transfer political power to the Indonesians. The form of the Indonesian state was at first federal, which would cater to the different regional/ethnic interests. However, a few ethnic groups rebelled against the central government to establish a separate state free from Indonesia. The most serious one was in South Maluku, the homeland of the Christian Ambonese. It should be noted that during the colonial era, the Dutch recruited Ambonese into the colonial army, resulting in the perception that they were pro-Dutch. In April 1950, Soumokil, the former Justice Minister of the Dutch-created “East Indonesia State”, with the support of the regional executive council of the area, proclaimed the Republic of South Maluku (RMS).23 The rebellion enjoyed a great measure of local popular support, but it was eventually quelled by the central government headed by Soekarno (Javanese) and Mohamad Hatta (Minangkabau). The military was definitely instrumental in crushing the rebellion. However, there were other factors which contributed to the failure of the rebellion. Many South Moluccans had family members in other parts of Indonesia, and the rebellion was assisted by the Dutch. In the eyes of the Indonesian nationalists, this was a Dutch plot rather than the genuine desire of the local people. After the rebellion, Indonesia became a unitary state, which gave more power to the central government.

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The second ethnic rebellion took place in Aceh, a strong Islamic area. Unlike the Ambonese, the Acehnese had participated in the Indonesian independence movement against the Dutch. But after Indonesia gained independence, the Acehnese saw the Indonesian Republic as a state dominated by the Javanese and Minangkabau. Aceh was not socioculturally integrated into Indonesia. Communications with the nationalists were weak and more links were established with the Middle East. Initially, Aceh was given the status of a province, but in 1951 this status was abolished, resulting in the downgrading of the Acehnese leaders, the disbanding of Division X which was the predominantly Acehnese unit of the Indonesian army, and the suspension of the right to trade directly with Singapore and Penang. The local leader, Daud Beureueh, started a movement to seek autonomy but in 1953 it became a separatist movement. He proclaimed Aceh as a part of the Negara Bagian Islam Indonesia under Kartosuwiro. His troops held many urban centres until 1954. However, the rebellion eventually failed. The government employed soft and hard strategies and in 1957 the Soekarno government restored the status of province to Aceh and appointed a moderate Acehnese as governor. Using strong military operation and a divide-and-rule policy towards the Acehnese, the rebellion was eventually crushed.24 The third was the West Irian (Irian Jaya) independence movement called the Free Papua Movement. Unlike the two movements described earlier, the Free Papua Movement is more recent and smaller in scale. Therefore, it has not yet developed into a major movement. Irian Jaya (known as Irian Barat during the Soekarno period) was included as part of Indonesian territory in 1963. The United Nations was involved in the transfer of West Irian from the Dutch to the indigenous Indonesians. It is clear that the central government did not hesitate to resort to military means to maintain territorial integrity. However, the fact that there have been so few separatist movements since the formation of the Republic of Indonesia cannot be solely explained in terms of the government’s control and suppression. A certain degree of national integration has been a contributing factor, which should not be overlooked. However, in the last ten to fifteen years, the Soeharto regime appeared to have changed the policy. Repressive measures have been adopted towards the minority groups, particularly towards the Acehnese.25 This change has been linked to the problem of East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1976, but not recognized by the United Nations. The East Timorese were split on their attitude towards Indonesia,

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but a higher percentage of the population, especially the younger generation, was quite militant in their opposition to Indonesian rule.26 Clashes took place over a period of ten years when the military used force to settle the issues. The East Timor issue has had a very negative impact on Indonesia’s overall policy towards minority groups because the military has used the same tactics to deal with other minority groups, including the West Irianese and Acehnese. Indonesian minority policy has undergone the “East-Timorization” process. It is clear that there is a constant conflict between ethnicity and nationhood, as well as between religions. To hold various ethnic groups together and integrate them into a new form of political unit, called Indonesia, the Indonesian nationalists have introduced a broad policy of national integration. But the motto of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity) allows the ethnic minorities to retain a high degree of cultural autonomy. However, there is also a strong integrating force compelling the minorities to join the major stream through national schools and national institutions. The popularization of national symbols and the national ideology, Pancasila, is also aimed at integrating Indonesian society. At one time, during the Soekarno era, the government also used the idea of an external threat to unite the people. But the conflict has yet to be really resolved.

The Resurgence of Islam and the Santri Group Since the end of the 1970s, there has been a resurgence of Islam worldwide. However, in Indonesia, the government has adopted a stern attitude towards the fundamentalist movement. In the 1980s, with the growth of Islamic influence domestically, Islam as a religion began to be cultivated by the Soeharto group. Soeharto realized that he could not depend on the military alone and hence attempted to co-opt Islamic groups. Indeed, from 1989, Soeharto began to introduce a more liberal policy towards Islam. For instance, the national education, which requires religious teaching, favours Islam; and the Islamic courts were given more power than before. In 1990, Soeharto even sponsored the Muslim Intellectual Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), which later became the “power base” of B.J. Habibie, Soeharto’s successor. With the official policy of cultivating Islam, there was a phenomenal growth of Islam as a religion as well as a culture. Politically, Islam has also been growing. Even the government party Golkar has been “Islamized” in the sense that the abangan group has been gradually marginalized. Islamic leaders have taken over the leadership of Golkar. Ironically, the student groups which were opposed to Soeharto consisted

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of many Muslim students. Amien Rais, the former chairman of the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, emerged as the leader of the Reformasi (reform) movement. It is worth noting that before Soeharto stepped down, he invited nine moderate Muslim leaders to seek their help and support but he was not successful.27 It is clear that Islam has played a major role in Indonesian politics. Nevertheless, the 1999 general election has shown that the political strength of the fundamentalists is limited, as Islamic parties did not win the majority of the popular votes. But the rise of moderate Muslims has been obvious. Unlike the abangan Muslims, these moderates belong to a new type of Muslims who are rooted in Islamic culture but are responsive to the nationalist developments in Indonesia.

The 1999 General Election and Islam In June 1999, Indonesia conducted the first free elections in more than 32 years. Forty-eight political parties contested the elections, of which more than twenty parties were based on Islam. Nevertheless, the election results did not show that the Islamic parties won the majority. Of the five parties which won the majority votes during the elections, only one (PPP) was an Islamic party.28

Name of Party

Party ideology

Percentage of Votes Gained

PDI-P Partai Golkar PKB PPP PAN Other 14 parties

Pancasila Pancasila Pancasila Islam Pancasila Islam or Pancasila

33.74 22.44 12.61 10.71 7.12 13.38

However, it is misleading to conclude that the Pancasila group won overwhelmingly. The PKB and PAN are different from the PDI-P. The PDI-P is dominated by abangan and non-Muslims. The PKB is based on the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama, and PAN is based on the second largest Muslim association, Muhammadiyah. Even Golkar is controlled by the ex-HMI (Muslim University Students Association) leaders. The last three parties accept Pancasila as long as this does not come into conflict with Islam. If there is a conflict, Islam prevails.

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Why did the Islamic organizations eventually change their party ideology? There are two views on this. One is that many Muslims, both abangan and santri, were disappointed with the Soeharto regime and wanted to have a change. They were aware of the dangers of religious polarization and hence preferred a Pancasila state. The second is that many pious Muslims have realized that they have gained more political power. However, a smaller number of them still insist that as Muslims they have the obligation to strive for the realization of an Islamic state, and hence support Islamic parties and reject Pancasila. Although the supporters of Pancasila appear to win, Islamic sentiments among the leaders are still strong. During the October 1999 presidential election, the Muslim members in the MPR — both moderate and fundamentalists — used Islam as a gathering point to oppose Megawati Soekarnoputri, the symbol of abangan nationalism. They formed the so-called Poros Tengah (Central Axis) and nominated Abdurrahman Wahid (alias Gus Dur) of the PKB as the presidential candidate. The leader of the Central Axis was none other than Amien Rais of the PAN. On the day of the election, B.J. Habibie withdrew, leaving only two candidates: the nationalist Megawati and the Islamicnationalist Wahid. The election results were 313 votes for Megawati and 373 votes for Wahid, who thus emerged as the new President of Indonesia. The triumph of Wahid signifies the victory of moderate Islam rather than secular nationalism per se.

The Transmigration Programme and Ethnic Conflict Islam could potentially be a destabilizing force in Indonesia if the fundamentalists had come to power. But the military and the nationalist group serve as constraints, and the emergence of Wahid as President may also help to keep fundamentalism at bay. However, the recent ethnic conflict was not due to the growth of Islam alone. The transmigration policy also had a part to play. The central government introduced transmigration in order to solve two problems: the overpopulation of Java, and to promote national integration. Transmigration was introduced before the New Order regime came to power but the programme was strengthened after 1968. During the period 1969–74, for instance, the government transmigrated 40,000 families from Central and East Java to Sumatra. In 1974–79, 250,000 families were moved to the same areas, and during 1979–84, about 500,000 families moved.29 The increased contact between different ethnic groups is believed to have promoted social communication and hence generated a sense of belonging to the Indonesian “nation-state”.

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But there was also contrary evidence that transmigration strengthened ethnic identity, as shown by the animosity and jealousy of the local people towards recent Javanese and Madurese migrants, who were perceived by the former as being better off. They were treated as outsiders who had come to take away the land of the local population. The concept of “territoriality” became important among the indigenous ethnic groups.30 The home-land minority groups refused to share their land with other ethnic groups. They did not consider other indigenous groups as part of the larger “indigenous Indonesian nation” but as “intruders”. This was the case especially in Irian Jaya, Aceh, Ambon,West Kalimantan, and East Timor . In Irian Jaya, for example, non-Irianese dominated the indigenous population. The Javanese and other non-Irianese controlled the bureaucracy and economy of Irian Jaya, resulting in local discontent. Conflicts between Irianese (or Papuans as they prefer to be called) and non-Irianese occurred quite often and was still prevalent thirty-seven years after Jakarta “liberated” West Irian. Aceh is resource-rich, with oil and gas being the major products of the province. However, the central government takes away a large share of the revenues, leaving less than 10 per cent for the province. In addition to the economic deprivation, the Acehnese, who are wellknown for their dedication to Islam, are resentful of the abangandominated government in Jakarta. The presence of a significant number of non-Acehnese in the area has also caused ethnic friction. Many Acehnese have complained that during the Soeharto era, economic benefits were mainly enjoyed by the non-Acehnese. Not surprisingly, a separatist movement began to emerge again but it was suppressed by the central government. After Soeharto stepped down from the presidency, it was revealed that many Acehnese were killed by the Indonesian army — a gross violation of human rights. The Indonesian military classified Aceh as a Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer) between 1989 and 1998, in attempting to use military means to solve the problem. According to one report, during these nine years, 781 people had been killed, 163 had disappeared, and 368 had been tortured.31 (According to another estimate, at least 2,000 people were killed.) Even after B.J. Habibie came to power, the same measures were used, but the resistance movement escalated, resulting in political instability in Aceh. Some villagers in Aceh burned down the national flag of Indonesia and displayed the Independent Aceh flag. On 13–14 September, senior Acehnese Islamic preachers got together and expressed their determination to have a referendum, indirectly demanding for

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independence. They threatened to stage a holy war (jihad) if they were denied.32 The Acehnese students conducted a survey, and claimed that 97 per cent of the respondents wanted to have independence. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Independence Movement) grew in strength. It claimed to have 10,000 members trained in Libya.33 Many government servants felt insecure, and in late September 1999, 64 village heads resigned en bloc because they were unable to control the population any longer.34 To resolve the regional dissatisfaction, Habibie hurriedly passed the Regional Autonomy Laws in May 1999 — Law No.22 on Regional Autonomy and Law No.25 on Balancing the Central and Regional Finance.35 Both laws were supposed to improve regional autonomy. The Regional Autonomy Law of 1957 had stated that regional officers, including the Bupati (district head), were to be elected by the DPRD (provincial parliament), but the 1974 Law, which was issued by the Soeharto regime, stated that regional officers were to be appointed by the Home Affairs Minister. The 1999 Law No. 22 restored the 1957 principle. The Home Affairs Minister would not have veto power over the selection of the DPRD. On the issue of revenue, the provinces were supposed to obtain an increased share, but no exact amount was mentioned. One source indicated that at the ministerial level, there was a mention of 25 per cent while in the past only 5–10 per cent was given to the provinces. When Abdurrahman Wahid became President, he promised to give Aceh 75 per cent of its revenue. Some ministers criticized this because they doubted that Jakarta would be able to deliver, and this might be taken that the government did not keep its promise. Another problem was that during the Soeharto era, the attitude of the central government towards the Outer Islanders, especially the troubled provinces, was hostile. The central authority regarded these people as trouble-makers, and did not deal with them fairly. Ben Anderson has argued that this is the root of the problem.36 Unless this attitude is changed, tension and conflict will continue. The third problem is the current government’s willingness and ability to correct past injustices. There were gross human rights violations against the minority groups, especially in Aceh, but until now those who were responsible have not been arrested and tried. As long as the government is unable to do this, its credibility will be questioned. The conflicts in Ambon between the Christian Ambonese and the Muslim Buginese, Buton and Makassarese also present similar problems. The Muslim migrants control the local economy and dominate the bureaucracy of Ambon. Gross disparity in bureaucratic and economic power between the indigenous Christians and migrant Muslims has been

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conspicuous.37 When the 1997 regional economic crisis occurred, provocateurs created incidents, and stirred up ethnic conflicts. Many Muslims from Ambon were forced to flee to south Sulawesi. Ethnic conflicts have also occurred in West Kalimantan. Starting from the 1965 coup, the Dayaks were sponsored by the military to attack the ethnic Chinese. However, with the presence of a large number of Muslim Madurese (migrants) and non-Muslim Dayaks (indigenes), friction between these two groups was inevitable. Attacks and killings by both sides eventually took place.38 The head-hunters, which had not been heard of for some time, re-emerged. Shocking pictures were printed in local and foreign newspapers. The Madurese fled for their lives. Many were resettled in other parts of Kalimantan but some chose to return to Java and Madura. The central government appears to have not been able to act quickly to resolve these ethnic conflicts. As a result, the sense of national belonging to an Indonesian nation is being tested. The East Timor case has become a symbol of the failure of nation-building in Indonesia.

The Escalation of Conflict and the Departure of East Timor After the annexation of East Timor in 1976, there was transmigration to East Timor from other areas, especially from Java. In fact, the non-East Timorese came to dominate all key positions in the newest province of Indonesia. A recent study put Muslims as constituting only 20 per cent of the population.39 Assuming that these Muslims were more recent migrants, this meant that the non-East Timorese formed a minority. These non-Timorese came into conflict with the Timorese on the issue of autonomy and independence. There were conflicting reports about the economic situation in the ex-Portuguese colony. The pro-integration group argued that East Timor was resource-poor and economically underdeveloped. Over two decades, the Indonesian Government had poured a large sum of money into East Timor to develop it and this kept the East Timorese afloat. After it became a province of Indonesia, Jakarta established basic infrastructure there, such as roads, schools and hospitals.40 However, the pro-independence group maintained that the resources in East Timor were exploited by the non-East Timorese and development only benefited these outsiders. The open conflict between the two groups escalated after the fall of Soeharto. During the Cold War, because of the threat of communism, the Western countries, including the United States, overlooked the human rights violation by the Indonesians in East Timor. However, after the Cold War, human rights issues became important in the foreign policy

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of the Western countries. As a result, the independence struggle of the East Timorese became a focal point. With the open support of the West, especially after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two leading East Timorese, Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, the East Timorese’s hopes for independence became higher. Indonesian rule of terror deepened the animosity, if not hatred, between the East Timorese and Indonesians. After the fall of Soeharto, Habibie suddenly announced that he would offer the East Timorese special autonomy a la Hong Kong 41 but if rejected, he would let East Timor be independent. There are many interpretations to Habibie’s sudden proposal. One argues that Habibie wanted to please the West so that Western support to his regime would continue and he would win in the forthcoming presidential election. Others maintain that Habibie was impulsive and made the announcement in a moment of “emotion”. He might have thought, naively, that the East Timorese would opt for autonomy rather than independence as East Timor depended on Indonesia, because there was little chance that poor and “backward” East Timor could survive on its own. Not surprisingly, his plan for East Timor was not well thought out and it did not have the full support of the Indonesian military, although it did not openly oppose the plan. Nevertheless, many military officers felt “betrayed”. Some political parties, especially the PDIPerjuangan of Megawati, also disagreed with Habibie’s plan and argued that Habibie did not have the right to offer a referendum to the East Timorese. This right belonged to the People’s Consultative Assmbly (MPR). In May 1999, Indonesia under Habibie reached an agreement with Portugal and the United Nations that a U.N.-sponsored referendum would be conducted in August to decide the fate of East Timor. Before the referendum, however, it became clear that there was no chance for Jakarta to win, despite the fact that 20 per cent of the East Timorese population were Indonesian migrants. The militia, who were supported by the military in Jakarta, began terrorizing the East Timorese population.42 The East Timorese, undeterred by the terror, registered to vote. On 30 August, in an historic event, 78.5 per cent of the votes favoured independence.43 The military in Jakarta, or at least a segment, was unable to accept the fact that Indonesia was losing East Timor. Terrorist acts were committed against the pro-independence East Timorese and East Timor became a killing field. The Indonesian military declared martial law, but the situation did not improve. Dili and other places were destroyed, and the East Timorese

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fled either to Australia or to the mountains. Others were forced to take refuge in Indonesian West Timor. Starvation threatened. The United Nations eventually forced Habibie to accept the U.N. peacekeeping force, known as the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to maintain law and order and to keep the humanitarian supply of food in the territory. Many Indonesian nationalists felt humiliated but had to accept the reality. The United Nations even wanted to set up a commission to investigate Indonesian crimes against humanity in East Timor. East Timor’s independence was eventually endorsed by the new MPR session in October. Although sentiments among the Indonesian nationalists in the MPR were strong, they could not reject the results of the referendum. Nevertheless, a poor and fragile East Timor may not be able to achieve political stability if Indonesia does not co-operate in the future. The loss of East Timor and the Bali Bank scandal reduced Habibie’s chances to be re-elected as President of Indonesia in late October. The Indonesian nationalists and the military figures in the MPR blamed Habibie for his mismanagement, if not incompetence. His accountability speech to the MPR in mid-October was rejected, and General Wiranto refused to be his running-mate during the presidential election. Habibie was forced to withdraw from the candidacy. However, a larger question is whether or not Indonesia is disintegrating. The independence of East Timor could stimulate the Acehnese, Irianese and Ambonese to follow suit, but it is difficult for them to succeed as these areas are legally Indonesian territories, and have been recognized by the United Nations as such. The situation was very different in East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1976 without the United Nations’ endorsement. Without international support, there is little chance of success for Indonesian separatist movements in other regions. In addition, the Indonesian Government, especially the military, is determined to keep these territories at all cost. Another obstacle is the widespread distribution of these people throughout Indonesia, and many of them have enjoyed high positions in the Jakarta government. Lastly, ironically, the East Timor case might also serve as a negative reminder that these provinces might face similar destruction if they decide to become independent. The departure of East Timor has no doubt inspired other provinces. Aceh has asked for a referendum, followed by Irian and Riau. Resourcerich Riau was never reported to have a separatist movement until Soeharto stepped down.44 East Kalimantan, which was also not known for its desire to be autonomous, demanded a federal system. President

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Abdurrahman Wahid has stated that he would conduct a referendum but there would be no option for independence. The referendum would be on whether Aceh would opt for Islamic law. Abdurrahman did not visit Aceh but sent his deputy, Megawati, to stop over. Although Amien Rais and Akbar Tanjung appealed to the President to visit Aceh, Abdurrahman refused to budge. The Indonesian military was even firmer. Although there was no declaration of martial law, in practice it seemed to be that way. Abdurrahman Wahid was also criticized for not being firm towards the military as the trial on the human rights violation in Aceh have not been conducted seriously. More problems are likely to arise in the future. The situation in Maluku also deteriorated. Clashes between Christians and Muslims occurred and thousands were killed. It was reported that provocateurs created the conflicts and many believed that they were linked to the New Order group who wanted to destabilize the country so that Soeharto and his group would not be investigated. There was also a rumour that the military created the chaotic situation so that they could continue to play a political role. In early January 1999, Jakarta eventually announced that it would replace the regional commander and the governor as they were unable to resolve the conflict. Jakarta also sent additional troops to control the situation. The Indonesian navy also blockaded the areas so that weapons and provocateurs could not enter. Jakarta faces great challenges from these provinces. The conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims has also been used by the politicians in Jakarta. When the death of Muslims in Maluku was reported in the newspapers, Muslim leaders such as Amien Rais and other parties joined the crowd to condemn the Abdurrahman government. Some even agitated to stage a holy war against non-Muslims (Christians). In Aceh, the situation reached a critical point. Better distribution of revenue and more genuine autonomy, even a form of federalism, would have to be introduced soon if the Indonesian Government wants to win the hearts and minds of these minorities.

Nation-Building Measures towards Ethnic Chinese If the indigenous Indonesians are not a homogeneous group, the same can be said about the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The six million Chinese can be divided into locally born Indonesian-speaking peranakan, and foreign-born and local-born Chinese-speaking totok. The former are concentrated in Java, while the latter are mostly found in the outer

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islands. However, the thirty-two years of Soeharto rule has gradually transformed the Indonesian Chinese into peranakan rather than totok. In terms of religion, the majority are either Confucian/Taoist/Buddhist, or Christian. Muslim Chinese are a minority. Politically, they are mainly locally oriented and economically, as a group, they are quite strong. Many indigenous leaders believe that the Chinese monopolize the distributive trade and hence “control” the Indonesian economy. Before Indonesia’s independence, indigenous Indonesian nationalists targeted the Dutch rather than the ethnic Chinese in their campaigns. However, with the removal of the Dutch and the achievement of political independence, the characteristics of Indonesian nationalism underwent some changes. Post-independence Indonesian nationalism has the following objectives: first, to build a modern Indonesian nation-state in which the various ethnic groups would be integrated into an Indonesian nation, and secondly, to achieve economic independence. As stated earlier, the concept of the Indonesian nation is indigenous, and the Chinese are expected to be absorbed into it. With regard to the second objective of Indonesian nationalism, the Chinese are economically strong, form the commercial middle class of Indonesia, and are part of the economic élite. Indonesian nationalists would like to curtail Chinese economic strength so that the indigenous middle class can take over the functions of the ethnic Chinese. The discussion that follows will focus on the first aspect, although the second aspect is equally important because by excluding the Chinese, Indonesian economic recovery will be very slow, if not impossible.

Indonesian Citizenship, Nationhood, and the Ethnic Chinese If the Indonesian Government has reservations about including the ethnic Chinese in the concept of the Indonesian nation, the state, especially the Soeharto regime, has been quite ready to grant them Indonesian citizenship. Apparently, in Indonesia the concept of citizenship (kewarganegaraan) is quite different from nationhood (kebangsaan). In the West, citizenship implies membership in a political community and a citizen is given equal rights and has equal obligations. However, in many Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, the indigenous population may enjoy more rights than immigrants and their descendants. According to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, as mentioned earlier, only an indigenous person can become the president. Apart from this clause, however, it appears that every citizen has equal rights. Nevertheless, in practice, indigenism has often guided state policy. There have been many regulations issued by the president

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or by his ministers which differentiate the pribumi from the non-pribumi.45 Some regulations have not been published and are therefore only known to insiders. For instance, there was a quota for ethnic Chinese students to study in state universities, and the Chinese were also discouraged from joining some government services (particularly the military college). Even after the Chinese had changed their names to Indonesian-sounding ones, their identity cards were and still are marked with special codes. Confucianism was not recognized because it was considered a Chinese religion. The use of the Chinese language was discouraged and advertisements in Chinese were banned. Even in the economic field, citizens were divided into the economically strong group (that is, the Chinese) and the economically weak group (that is, the pribumi). The Chinese had less cultural rights in that their customs were not allowed to be practised in public.46 The Cabinet even issued an instruction to change the terms “Tiongkok” (China) and “Tionghoa” (Chinese) to a derogatory term “Cina” for China and the ethnic Chinese, to humiliate the minority group. In Indonesia, the term WNI, which stands for Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizen), is often used to refer to Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, as the Chinese form the largest group among the foreigners, while indigenous Indonesians are automatically Indonesian citizens. Since citizenship does not equal nationhood in Indonesia, it can be regarded as the first step to becoming a member of the Indonesian nation. Once an ethnic Chinese becomes an Indonesian citizen, he/she is required to comply with Indonesian regulations for citizens. In fact, citizenship has been used by the state to absorb the Chinese minority into the mainstream of Indonesian society and to make the Chinese more “Indonesian” in terms of culture. Having no other alternative, many Chinese Indonesians have indeed attempted to be integrated into the indigenous Indonesian society by abandoning their language and culture. In return, the Chinese have achieved economic prosperity in Indonesia, especially during the Soeharto era.

Chinese Education and Language Initially, the Indonesian Government was not much concerned about Chinese education. There was virtually no control over the Chinese schools. However, with the consolidation of its power, the government began to turn its attention to these Chinese schools. Consisting of proBeijing and pro-Taipei schools, there were about 2,000 schools all over Indonesia. In 1957, the Indonesian Government issued the law that

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Indonesian citizens of foreign descent were not allowed to study in foreign schools, that is, the Chinese-medium schools. Many Chinese with Indonesian citizenship were at that time in the Chinese-medium schools. As a result of this regulation, about 1,100 Chinese-medium schools were converted into Indonesian schools. In 1958, there was an anti-Kuomintang campaign in Indonesia because of Taipei’s involvement in the regional rebellion. The Chinese schools associated with the Kuomintang were closed down. In the abortive coup of 1965, in which the communists were involved, Beijing was implicated, which resulted in the closure of pro-Beijing schools, marking the end of Chinese education in Indonesia. Although after 1968 a number of special schools were established by the ethnic Chinese community, these schools were called Sekolah Nasional Proyek Khusus (or Special Project National Schools). The medium of instruction was Bahasa Indonesia, but Chinese language was allowed to be taught as a subject after school. However, these schools were also dissolved in 1975. In fact, since the 1965 coup, all ethnic Chinese children, regardless of their nationality, have had to go to Indonesian national schools. Those who still want to study Chinese tend to engage Chinese tutors at home, but this is strongly discouraged by the government. Others who can afford it, send their children overseas to give them a chance to learn the Chinese language, but the number is small. The majority of Chinese children, even among the totok, have gradually lost active command of the Chinese language. The use of the Chinese language has been restricted in Indonesia. When the anti-Chinese feeling was high, in East Java for instance, the military authorities instructed telephone operators to cut off telephone conversations which were conducted in Chinese, but this practice has been abandoned. However, until recently, Chinese characters were not allowed to be displayed in shop names, which had to be in Bahasa Indonesia. Nevertheless, this practice has been relaxed. The Chinese language was seen to be not in accordance with the Indonesian national spirit. During the Soeharto years, Chinese sports such as Tai Chi and Wai Tan Kung were popular among both the Chinese and indigenous population who lived in the major cities. However, the government decided to change those Chinese names into Indonesian ones while allowing the sports to continue. Chinese music was also replaced by Indonesian songs in order to make the sports more Indonesian. During the 32-year rule of Soeharto, there was only one so-called Chinese newspaper run by the military in Jakarta — Yindunixiya Ribao (Harian Indonesia). It consisted of eight pages, four in Chinese. Much space was given to advertisements and official announcements of government policies. The objective of the government was to make the newspaper a

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regular Indonesian newspaper. During the New Order period, publications using Chinese characters were not allowed to be imported into Indonesia. English magazines or books with some Chinese characters were also banned. The Indonesian customs regulation on these Chinese publications was very specific. Even the visitor’s entry form had the words “Carrying narcotics, arms. ... printed matters in Chinese characters and Chinese medicines is prohibited” printed on them. This form was changed after the fall of Soeharto, and the clause on the banning of Chinese publications was removed. New Chinese dailies such as Yindunixiya Shangbao, Heping Ribao, and Longyang Ribao have been published. The study of the Chinese language has also been relaxed. Even the assimilationist figure, K. Sindhunata, has asked the government to promote the study of Mandarin as a second language because of its importance in the international community.47 But it is not likely that the government will allow the re-establishment of Chinese-medium schools.

Name-Changing Policy The most comprehensive strategy to change the Chinese identity was through name-changing. In 1961, when Soekarno was still in power, there was a regulation allowing people to change their Chinese names to Indonesian-sounding ones. In 1966 after Soeharto came to power, this name-changing regulation was re-introduced. The procedure for namechanging was simplified, and many Chinese were urged to change their names. But name-changing is not compulsory. Some still maintain their Chinese names (for instance, a prominent economist Kwik Kian Gie who is now one of the deputy chairmen of the Indonesian Consultative Assembly and the Co-ordinating Minister of Finance and Industry). However, for most of the Chinese Indonesians, especially during the sixties, there was a gentle pressure from the government and society to change their names. Name-changing was seen as a symbolic act to show whether the Chinese were “loyal” to Indonesia, and wanted to identify themselves with the Indonesian nation, defined in terms of “indigenous Indonesians”. However, not all Chinese Indonesians have changed their names, especially those who are already well known by their original Chinese names. Some use two names, an official as well as an unofficial name. The younger generation of Chinese Indonesians, especially those born after the 1965 coup, tend to adopt Indonesian-sounding names. It should be noted that alien Chinese (that is, those who are not Indonesian citizens) are not allowed to change their names to Indonesian ones.48 After the fall of Soeharto, some Chinese may re-adopt their Chinese names.

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Citizenship Law and Economic Policy The citizenship law has also been used to build a nation. Initially, the Indonesian Government freely granted citizenship to those who were born in Indonesia before independence. Later, the government gradually tightened the requirements and alien Chinese had to be naturalized to become Indonesian citizens. In 1980, there was still about one million Chinese who were foreigners. However, before Jakarta normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a mass naturalization exercise was introduced. Many alien Chinese took the opportunity to adopt Indonesian citizenship then. Many Chinese became Indonesian citizens because several sectors of the economy were only open to Indonesian nationals. But even among Indonesian citizens, division was present between the indigenous and non-indigenous people. Certain economic privileges were reserved for indigenous Indonesians, for example. In the 1950s, regulations had been introduced to exclude the ethnic Chinese from various activities but these regulations are no longer implemented. However, division between the indigenous Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians still exists, especially in the economic sphere. The Soeharto regime introduced a policy to confine the Chinese to the economic field and discouraged them from going into other sectors, especially in the civil service and politics. With the economic crisis since 1997, it appears that economic nationalism is declining in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Chinese Indonesians feel that they are not really welcome. They are often the targets of riots, and Habibie’s attitude towards the ethnic Chinese was far from clear.49 However, the Abdurrahman administration has changed its policy towards the Chinese. It has removed the discriminatory regulations (such as the 1967 regulation on the restriction of Chinese customs) and has appealed to the Chinese to return to Indonesia and to contribute economically. There is general agreement that the Chinese play an important role in the Indonesian economy and their full participation is crucial for Indonesia’s economic recovery and political stability.

Conclusion Indonesia’s integration policy towards the minority groups at first glance seems quite successful. Although there are more than 250 ethnic groups, very few are engaged in separatist politics. Irian Jaya and East Timor were the last to be included as part of Indonesian territory and hence they are the most problematic. Older territories, such as South Maluku and Aceh, also rebelled against the central government initially, but quietened

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down for a while. The government’s policies, especially the repressive policy and uneven distribution of resources, eventually gave rise to Acehnese discontent. As for Ambon, it was the transmigration policy and the rise of Islam in Indonesian domestic politics that led to the recent conflict. Even in West Kalimantan, it seems that the unrest was partially caused by the transmigration policy. In all cases, it appears that the invisible hands of some military groups have been involved. Of course, the decline in central government authority and the economic crisis in Indonesia are the two major contributing factors for ethnic conflict and potential national disintegration. Many observers have commented that Indonesia may face the same situation that Yugoslavia underwent. The first province to leave is East Timor. Indeed, the East Timor case clearly shows that a weakened Indonesia was unable to defend its “sovereignty”. Jakarta had to accept foreign political and military intervention. The U.N. peace-keeping force was forced upon Indonesia. Many Indonesians felt offended because their national pride was hurt, and staged demonstrations in protest. However, it should be pointed out that East Timor will not achieve stability without the co-operation of the Indonesians. In the process of globalization, Indonesia had plugged into the modern world economy. Some economists have argued that short-term loans, which were used in non-productive sectors, triggered the Indonesian economic crisis but in reality mismanagement and corruption have been found to be the fundamental causes for the economic debacle.50 Once Indonesia was in crisis, the nation-state was no longer “independent”. The concept of a nation-state presupposes a sovereign state, but with the economic crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has dictated how Indonesia should implement its economic policy. If Indonesia refuses, the IMF would stop the aid, which would cause the government to collapse. Nevertheless, in both political and security fields, Indonesia is still “independent”, although with globalization, the Indonesian Government has had to respond to Western pressures for a more democratic government. The West is concerned about human rights and democratic values. The Indonesian Government cannot ignore Western pressures calling for a more democratic government, otherwise it will be isolated and economic assistance will not be forthcoming. Human rights and economic recovery dictate that Indonesia should adopt a more moderate policy in its national integration programme. Thus, the impact of globalization on nationhood and the Chinese minority has been felt. Islam, which is the religion of the majority has asserted itself. Marzuki Darusman, the deputy chairman of Golkar has commented that in the past, secularism may have been

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abnormal, but now an Islamic Indonesia may be more normal.51 But a more Islamic Indonesia may serve as a destabilizing factor in Indonesian politics, as nominal Muslims and non-Muslims are concerned whether their life-style and the power configuration would be drastically changed. The Chinese minority had been pressured to assimilate completely into the indigenous society. This may no longer be possible as the ethnic Chinese network grows. Moreover, maintaining ethnic identity has become one aspect of basic human rights. Although a complete resinification process is not likely to happen in Indonesia because most Chinese have been acculturated, especially in Java, and new Chinese immigrants are prohibited, yet ethnic identity, especially the peranakan identity, has not disappeared. Therefore, a more pluralistic Indonesian nation rather than one based on race is likely to happen in the near future. It has to be pointed out that indigenous Indonesian nationalism is still strong. The Habibie group appointed a number of ministers who were well known for their anti-Chinese attitude. They were not ready to accept the ethnic Chinese completely. Habibie was even quoted as saying that the ethnic Chinese who left Indonesia during the May 1998 riots need not return as Indonesia would survive without them. Seven months later, he conceded that “no large foreign investment will come before the ethnic Chinese put their money back into the country.”52 However, with the demise of the Habibie regime and the emergence of Abdurrahman Wahid, the new President has introduced an accommodationist policy towards the ethnic Chinese. He has also redefined the concept of the Indonesian nation, making it a non-racial one, although it remains to be seen whether the new concept will be accepted by the majority of indigenous Indonesians.53 The issue of federalism is also crucial for the unity of Indonesia. Indonesia is a unitary state and central control has always been tight. The central government took away most of the revenue and left very little to the outer islanders. Thus, many resource-rich outer islanders are bitter about this. With the increase in ethnic and religious conflict, the demand for greater autonomy or even the creation of a federal state system has been raised. However, the government is still very reluctant. Although the central authority has agreed to grant greater autonomy to the region, federalism has not been on the government agenda. Jakarta is afraid that if it gave such a concession to the outer islanders, it would not be able to control them any longer. In the past, the Republic of Indonesia had once adopted a federal system but it was abolished because the Dutch were unable to retain their influence in the states. However, as there is no external enemy today, there is little reason for Jakarta not to try the system in order to have a more equitable distribution of power and resources.

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Notes 1. I am borrowing the phrase coined by Walker Connor in his well-known article, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying”, first published in World Politics 24 (April 1972): 319–55, and reprinted in his book, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 29–66. 2. A recent publication claims that there are at least 600 Indonesian “ethnic groups” and “sub-ethnic groups”. See Zulyani Hidayah, ed., Ensiklopedi Suku Bangsa di Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1997). 3. The percentages are based on the 1930 census, as ethnic category has never been included in the post-war census. 4. For the division of Indonesian nationalism, see Ruth McVey and Harry Benda, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926–1927: Key Documents (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960). 5. In fact, the Constituent Assembly was forced to dissolve in 1959 because of disagreement over the position of Pancasila and Islam in a new constitution. As a result, Soekarno declared that he would adopt the 1945 Constitution, which gives much power to the president. 6. Myron Weiner, “Political Integration and Political Development”, in Political Modernization, edited by Claude Welch (Belmont, California: Wadworth, 1967), pp. 15–66. 7. I have used these indicators to examine Indonesian nationalism in my earlier article. See Leo Suryadinata, ”Ethnicity and National Integration in Indonesia: An Analysis”, Asia Quarterly (Belgium), No.3 (1976). Reprinted in my book, Interpreting Indonesian Politics (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), pp. 69–87. 8. For a discussion on this issue, see Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 1917–1942, 2nd edition (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980). 9. Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesian Nationalism and Pre-War Youth Movement,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, no.1 (March 1978). 10. I read somewhere that the clause was meant to prevent a Japanese from becoming an Indonesian president, but I have not been able to find the reference. Even if this is true, the term ”non-asli“ has been perceived by both indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese to mean “Indonesians of foreign descent”, that is, the Chinese. In 1999, after the general election, the 1945 Constitution was amended. However, the clause on the requirements for president remains. It has been reported that the new MPR is reviewing the 1945 Constitution and the above clause may be amended. Jakarta Post, 19 October 1999. 11. The term “plural society” was first coined by J.S. Furnivall before World War II. For a discussion of this concept, see Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill, 1972). 12. Twang Pek Yang, in his recent study, documented many Indonesian Chinese who had collaborated with the Indonesian nationalists during the revolution. See his book, The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

Leo Suryadinata Independence, 1940–1950 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.254–316. For a discussion of Pancasila, see the section on “The Pancasila Ideology” in this chapter. Roger Paget, “Indonesian Newspapers 1965-1967”, Indonesia, no.4 (October 1967), pp.170–210. Ibid. David J. Steinberg, ed., In Search of Modern Southeast Asia (New York and London: McMillan, 1971), p.403. Information supplied by a participant at the conference. Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, p.59. See William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p.189. For a study of the situation after the fall of Soekarno and the rise of Golkar, see Leo Suryadinata, Political Culture and Military Ascendancy: A Study of Indonesia’s Golkar (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988). The other two parties, the Partai Pembauran Indonesia (Parpindo) and the Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI) are Chinese-led multi-ethnic parties, not ethnic Chinese parties. It is also worth noting that the Parpindo was transformed into an association later, probably because of lack of response. The concepts of abangan (nominal Muslim) and santri (rigid Muslims) were first used by Clifford Geertz. For a brief discussion of these concepts and their application to Indonesian politics, see Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, pp.29–48. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp.55–71. See also Richard Z. Leirissa, Maluku dalam Perjuangan Nasional Indonesia (Jakarta: Lembaga Sejarah Fakultas Sastra Indonesia, 1975), especially pp.174–201. For a study of the Acehnese rebellion, see Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). For a study of recent developments in Aceh, see Syamsumar Dam and Erni Budiwanti, “Ace: Otonomi atau Merdeka?” in Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan? edited by Syamsuddin Haris et al (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 1999), pp. 25–110. Recent analyses of the Acehnese conflict attribute it to the government’s political, economic and security policies. Ayub M. Hanafiah, “Sulitnya Masalah Aceh”, Republika, 31 August 1999; and “Military repeating old mistakes in Aceh:Researcher”, Tempo Interaktif, 25 August 1999. For a study of East Timor before the referendum, see Peter Carey and G. Carter Bently, eds., East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation (London: Cassell, 1995). Leo Suryadinata, “A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and Rise of Habibie”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 114,127. For the election results, see Jakarta Post, 16 July 1999. The information is based on figures given in the Indonesian Five-Year Plans.

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30. I owe this point to Sharon Siddique who discussed the issue during the workshop on “Nationalism and Globalization”. 31. Suara Merdeka, 25 August 1998. 32. “Pilih Referendum atau Jihad”, Tempo, 26 September 1999, p.29. 33. “AGAM”, Tajuk 2, no.12 (August 1999): 18. 34. See “64 Kepala Desa Undur Diri di Aceh”, Kompas, 29 September 1999. 35. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.22 Th. 1999 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Jakarta: BP Panca Usaha, 1999); and Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.25 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pusat dan Daerah (Jakarta: BP Panca Usaha, 1999). 36. Benedict R.O’G. Anderson, “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future”, Indonesia 67 (April 1999): 1–11. 37. For a Muslim view of the recent conflict in Ambon, see Tim Penyusun AlMukmin, Tragedi Ambon (Jakarta: Yayasan Almukmin, 1999). It blames the Indonesian military for siding with the Christians against the Muslims. 38. Parsudi Suparlan, “Sambas” (unpublished paper). 39. Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, eds., Freedom of Religion: A World Report (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p.206. 40. Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996). 41. For the Indonesian offer of autonomy, see Dino Patti Djalal, “For ‘Autonomy’ in East Timor”, Asiaweek, 13 August 1999. 42. For a study of the connection between the militia and the military in Jakarta, see Douglas Kammen, “Notes on the Transformation of the East Timor Military Command and Its Implications for Indonesia,” Indonesia 67 (April 1999), pp. 62–76. 43. The General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan announced that 344,580 East Timorese voted for independence while 94,388 voted for integration with Indonesia. Tempo Interaktif, 4 September 1999. 44. Riau’s discontent with the central government was first reported during the election for a governor. A popular local candidate, Ismail Suko, was not elected because of the intervention of Jakarta. However, during 1998–99, a group of Riau people began to form a movement demanding “independence” from the Republic of Indonesia. See R. Siti Zuhro, “Riauw dan Otonomi Daerah: Problematik Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat-Daerah”, in Sjamsuddin Haris, et al., op.cit., pp.111–74. 45. In 1984, General Benny Moerdani stated that the terms pri and non-pri should be abandoned. President B.J. Habibie also issued the Presidential Instruction No.26/1998 to renounce the terms pri and non-pri as this division contradicted the principle of national unity. But this had no effect. 46. See Leo Suryadinata, “Jakarta Government Needs Consistency”, Sunday Star, 28 March 1999. 47. H. Junus Jahja, Acong Kemana...? (Jakarta: Yayasan Tunas Bangsa,1999), p. ii. 48. See Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies, 2nd edition (Singapore: Heinemann 1986), pp. 163–64.

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Leo Suryadinata Suryadinata, “Jakarta Government Needs Consistency.” Suryadinata, “A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty,” pp.111–13. A comment made during one of his speeches in Singapore, 1999. Suryadinata, “Jakarta Government Needs Consistency.” In 1998, Abdurrahman Wahid argued that Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian Nation) comprised at least three races: Malay, Chinese and Austro Melanesian (Ambonese, Irianese, etc.). See Abdurrahman Wahid, “Prolog: PKB didirikan oleh PBNU”, in Pro-Kontra Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, edited by Munib Huda Muhammad (Jakarta: Fatma Press, 1998), pp. 7–8 .

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m 3 n Globalization and Singapore’s Search for Nationhood

JON S.T. QUAH

Introduction When Singapore was founded by Stamford Raffles in January 1819, the population consisted of 120 Malays and 30 Chinese.1 As a result of immigration from China, India and Indonesia,2 the composition of the population was gradually transformed into the multiracial one today, with the Chinese becoming the majority (77 per cent) and the other minority groups being the Malays (14 per cent), the Indians (7.6 per cent), and other ethnic groups (1.4 per cent). The population is also multilingual (there are four official languages and many dialects) and multireligious, consisting of 53.8 per cent Buddhists and Taoists, 14.9 per cent Muslims, 14.5 per cent with no religion, 12.9 per cent Christians, and 3.3 per cent Hindus.3 Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965 but it was not a nation4 yet in spite of the nation-building efforts of the People’s Action Party (PAP) government since its assumption of office in June 1959. Indeed, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s recent answer to the question “Will we become one tribe [that is, nation]?” was: Not possible. If we try, we will bring misfortune to ourselves, because there are tribal elements in our society that say: I want to be myself. The Sikhs do not want to be absorbed. The various Muslim sects do 71

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Jon S.T. Quah not want to be absorbed by other sects, let alone by other religions. And I say, leave well alone, let’s find common ground because those are the cards that we were dealt with. So much easier if we’re all one race, one language, one religion. ... So when we, having gone through that stress, came to the conclusion that we have to be the opposite: tolerant of each other, accommodative, multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-cultural; in other words, I’m not foisting myself on you.5

What is Singapore’s approach to nation-building? What is the impact of globalization on Singapore’s national identity? Why has the PAP government changed its approach to nation-building from its initial emphasis on the development of a Singaporean national identity in 1965 to the development of ethnic self-help groups since 1982 to improve the socio-economic status of the Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians in Singapore? Has the influx of permanent residents and emphasis on foreign talent resulted in the erosion of the loyalty of Singaporeans? These questions will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

Singapore as Part of the Federation of Malaysia Singapore was founded by Stamford Raffles in January 1819, and in August 1824 Sultan Hussein of Johor and Temenggong Abdu’r Rahman ceded Singapore to the East India Company. In 1826, Singapore became part of the Straits Settlements together with Malacca and Penang. Six years later, Singapore became the capital of the Straits Settlements and on 1 April 1867, the Straits Settlements became a crown colony under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office in London. The Japanese occupied Singapore for three and a half years from 15 February 1942 until September 1945, when the British forces returned with the setting up of the British Military Administration (BMA). In March 1946, the BMA ended and the Straits Settlements were dissolved. On 1 April 1946, Singapore became a crown colony, and Penang and Malacca became part of the Malayan Union in 1946 and the Federation of Malaya in 1948.6 In short, Singapore was part of the Straits Settlements and linked with Malaya for 120 years, from 1826 until 1946. However, a fully autonomous and separate Singapore Civil Service did not emerge during the post-war period as Singapore retained eleven departments organized on a pan-Malayan basis, and the 1934 Malayan Establishment Agreement provided for a common pool of senior officers to staff senior positions in the civil services of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States.7

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Hence, it was not surprising that when Singapore attained selfgovernment in June 1959, the newly-elected PAP leaders, particularly Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, did not envisage Singapore becoming an independent nation on its own. Indeed, in a series of twelve talks broadcast over Radio Singapore between 13 September and 9 October 1961, he argued passionately for merger with Malaya as Singapore could not survive on its own with a small domestic market, the declining entrepôt trade, and the labour unrest created by the communists. In his first radio talk on 13 September 1961, Lee said: Merger ... is as inevitable as the rising and setting of the sun. The two territories are so intertwined and interwoven in their economic, political and military complex that no man can keep up the artificial barrier at the Causeway [the bridge connecting Singapore with Johor Baru] for long.8

He provided the following reasons for Singapore’s merger with the Federation of Malaya, and also explained why the merger should not be delayed: Without merger, without a reunification of our two governments and an integration of our two economies, our economic position will slowly and steadily get worse. ... Instead of there being one unified economic development for Malaya, there will be two. The Federation instead of co-operating with Singapore will compete against Singapore for industrial capital and industrial expansion. In this competition both will suffer. But Singapore will suffer more, because we have less resources to fall back on. ... If we delay merger, Singapore will be restricted in its economic expansion. ... We cannot survive alone. If we delay merger, everyone of us ... will suffer.9

In his sixth radio talk on 25 September 1961, Lee explained why he and his colleagues rejected the communists’ preference for an independent Singapore: An independent Singapore was never a part of the PAP’s programme. What we wanted was merger. ... Clearly this unity of the Left-wing front which the M.C.P. [Malayan Communist Party] wanted was not for the purpose of establishing an independent, re-united Malaya, but for the purpose of establishing an independent Singapore from which the Federation could be subverted to Communism. So we openly stated during the Hong Lim by-election that we did not believe in an independent Singapore.10

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Before the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, Lee said that the new nation would face two problems: communalism in the short run, and the problem of building “a more equal society with equal opportunities for all” in the long run.11 In August 1964, Lee observed that Malaysia had to overcome three internal problems to survive. According to him: ... the first problem in survival is: have we got the will to be ourselves and not to be so many Malays, Indians, Chinese, Eurasians, and others? Do we feel more for each other and what we give to each other in Malaysia, or are we subdued, emasculated by pulls made to chauvinist feelings, pride in culture, race, language, in history and civilization? If we are not able to resist that, then we haven’t got the first pre-requisite of survival: cohesiveness and an identity of its own.12

After the racial riots of July and September 1964, Lee accelerated his campaign for a non-communal, multiracial Malaysia, that is, a “Malaysian Malaysia”, which culminated in the formation of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) on 6 June 1965, with the PAP, the United Democratic Party and the People’s Progressive Party of Malaya, the Sarawak United People’s Party, and the Machinda Party of Sarawak as the founding members. During the second session of the Federal Parliament on 27 May 1965, Lee regretted that “the Yang diPertuan Agong did not reassure the nation that Malaysia will continue to progress in accordance with its democratic Constitution toward a Malaysian Malaysia....”13 Twelve years later, Tunku Abdul Rahman wrote in his memoirs, Looking Back, that this speech of Lee was “the straw that broke the camel’s back” — that is, the key event that was responsible for “the Tunku’s decision to get Singapore out of Malaysia.”14 However, the final curtain fell on Lee and his colleagues when Singapore was forced to withdraw from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. Indeed, Singapore’s separation shattered Lee’s vision of Singapore as part of Malaysia. In Lee’s words: We had said that an independent Singapore was simply not viable. Now it was our unenviable task to make it work. How were we to create a nation out of a polyglot collection of migrants from China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other parts of Asia? ... Seventy-five per cent of our population of two million were Chinese, a tiny minority in an archipelago of 30,000 islands inhabited by more than 100 million Malay or Indonesian Muslims. We were a Chinese island in a Malay sea. How could we survive in such a hostile environment?15

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Contextual Constraints Three aspects of the Singapore context are relevant for analysing the nation-building process in Singapore. First, Singapore is a city-state with a total land area of 647.8 sq. km and had a resident population of 3.16 million in 1998.16 The small population and the successful family planning programme have contributed to the 1.9 per cent annual increase in population. This means that the population base for supplying and replenishing the local talent pool is a limited one. Accordingly, Lee Kuan Yew initiated the “search for talent” policy as early as 1982 as Singapore did not have sufficient local born talent to “maintain in the future the standards of leadership in the Cabinet and efficiency in the public service that has prevailed in the last 23 years [1959-1982].”17 Indeed, in recent years, foreign talent has increasingly been recruited for those jobs which Singaporeans cannot handle either because of their lack of expertise or training for skilled jobs or because of their unwillingness to work in construction and unskilled jobs. The second aspect is Singapore’s tremendous economic development since 1959. The PAP government has relied on the promotion of economic development as an important pillar of its nation-building programme. Rapid economic growth leads to an improvement in living standards among the population and strengthens their commitment to the incumbent government and their loyalty to Singapore. Singapore’s per capita gross national product (GNP) has increased by 74 times from US$443 in 1960 to US$32,940 in 1997, which is the fourth highest in the world.18 On the other hand, Singapore’s economic affluence has enabled many Singaporeans to travel to other countries. Furthermore, wealthy Singaporeans have also acquired property in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, either as second homes for their children studying in these countries, or for investment. This trend of Singaporeans owning property in other countries can have negative effects on the nation-building process in Singapore as it could encourage such citizens to emigrate to these countries especially after their retirement because of the lower cost of living there. The third and most relevant aspect is the heterogeneous nature of the population. As indicated earlier, Singapore has a multiracial, multilingual and multireligious population. Indeed, the population’s diversity in race, language, and religion requires any incumbent government in Singapore to first formulate and implement policies for encouraging and promoting racial and religious harmony. A second obligation of a government in a plural society is to ensure that both public and private organizations are

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fair and impartial in the treatment of their clients, regardless of their ethnic origin, language, or religion. Indeed, the multiracial nature of Singapore’s population and its racial composition imply that the Chinese voters constitute the majority in all the electoral constituencies. This means that minority candidates can only be elected with the support of the Chinese voters as the Malay and/or Indian voters would be inadequate to ensure their victory. Thus, there exists the possibility of Parliament consisting of all Chinese Members of Parliament (MPs) if all the minority candidates are not supported by the Chinese voters. The absence of minority representation in Parliament will hinder the nation-building process in Singapore as the minority groups will feel insecure and consider emigration to other countries as an option. Accordingly, to prevent the absence of minority representation in Parliament, the government amended the Constitution in November 1987 to establish Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) for the 1988 general election. The GRC scheme ensures that there is minority representation in Parliament as each GRC consists initially of three MPs, with at least one MP from the minority groups. The size of the GRCs was increased to six in the 1997 general election. As Parliament is unicameral, there is a Presidential Council for Minority Rights which examines bills presented to Parliament to ensure that the rights of the different minority groups in Singapore are protected. Furthermore, a Presidential Council for Religious Harmony was created in 1990 by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act to deal with “matters affecting the maintenance of religious harmony” referred to it by the government or Parliament.19 There is a close linkage between race and religion in Singapore as the majority of the Chinese are Buddhists or Taoists, almost all the Malays are Muslims, and more than half of the Indians are Hindus.20 Indeed, this third constraint constitutes the most serious obstacle to Singapore’s efforts in nation-building as, unlike Japan or South Korea, which has a more homogeneous population and a common language (Japanese or Korean), Singapore has a heterogeneous population and no common language.

Nation-Building Singapore Style My basic guiding principle in nation building is to unite the majority and minority races in Singapore, to impart to them common values, and to make them committed to share good and bad times together. — Lee Kuan Yew, in an interview with Takuhito Tsuruta, 25 November 1981.21

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The PAP leaders’ perceptions of the communal threat in Singapore have been influenced by the racial riots which occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, and also by their unsuccessful campaign for a “Malaysian Malaysia” when Singapore was part of Malaysia. Racial riots constitute the most serious threat to Singapore’s survival as they can undermine the multiracial basis of Singaporean society and tear the social fabric apart. In a plural society like Singapore, racial riots are more likely to occur when there is no harmony, understanding and tolerance between the different ethnic groups. So far, Singapore has experienced four episodes of racial riots, namely, the Maria Hertogh riots of December 1950; the July and September 1964 racial riots; and the racial riots arising from the spillover effects of the 13 May 1969 racial riots in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.22 Thus, for nation-building to succeed in Singapore, members of the various ethnic groups must be able to live together in harmony and to identify themselves as Singaporeans rather than as Chinese, Malays, Indians, or Eurasians. The rationale for the PAP government’s approach to nation-building in 1965 was to nurture the growth of a Singaporean national identity among the population in order to surmount the chauvinistic and particularistic pulls of the Chinese, Malay, Indian, or Eurasian identities of the different ethnic groups in Singapore. In 1973, the Minister for Social Affairs stated that “the objective of building one nation out of many races calls for an integrated national culture embodying the sentiments and values of the four great cultures that exist in our midst.”23 In short, the PAP leaders were concerned with building a nation of Singaporeans from the disparate groups in the country.24 More specifically, the PAP government has relied on the following four major instruments to promote nation-building, namely, economic development, education, national service, and public housing.

Promotion of Economic Development The most important pillar of the PAP government’s nation-building programme is the promotion of economic development. The PAP leaders had realized in 1959 that nation-building could only succeed if the people were committed to Singapore, and the most effective way of ensuring their political allegiance to the country was through the promotion of economic development. The rationale for this first strategy is based on two factors: the immigrant nature of the population; and the fact that Singapore’s survival depended initially on industrialization with the decline in entrepôt trade, and then on regionalization and globalization, with the world as its market and hinterland.

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To combat effectively the competing loyalties and other primordial ties exerted on the local population by their countries of origin, the citizens must be given a stake in Singapore. The best way of meeting this objective is to provide Singaporeans with a comfortable standard of living, which was the main reason for the migration of their ancestors from China, Indonesia, India, Malaya, and Sri Lanka to Singapore. Perhaps the best manifestation of the PAP government’s success in promoting economic development is the impressive improvement in the population’s standard of living during the past four decades of PAP rule. More specifically, as mentioned earlier, Singapore has been transformed from a poor country with a per capita GNP of US$443 in 1960 into “an advanced developing country”, and the fourth richest country in the world today, with a per capita GNP of US$32,940 in 1997.25 Thus, the promotion of economic development is a very important strategy of the PAP government’s nationbuilding programme as it has provided its citizens with the necessary material foundation for enhancing their commitment to Singapore.

Education To compensate for Singapore’s lack of natural resources, the PAP government has invested heavily in education to develop the country’s human resources. Education is the second most important instrument for nation-building, with 9 per cent of the population enrolled in all the educational institutions in Singapore in 1995.26 The large proportion of students and the youthfulness of the population (more than half are under 21 years old) indicate the significance of education as an instrument for nation-building.27 Education has a twofold role in nation-building: to provide students with the skills required in an industrializing and modern Singapore; and to inculcate in them values that will ensure their loyalty and commitment to the nation. As the PAP leaders are aware of the educational system’s potential for nation-building, they have accordingly allocated large sums of money for improving educational facilities and opportunities in Singapore. Government expenditure on education has increased by 74 times, from S$63.39 million in 1959 to S$4,691.53 million in 1997.28 Education remains the second priority of the government after defence, which has the lion’s share of the budget with 7 per cent of the GNP. Apart from providing students with the required skills for an industrializing economy through the introduction of technical education in the mid-1960s, the PAP government has also relied on its bilingual policy to inculcate those values required for nation-building. The rationale for adopting bilingualism in the schools was that a bilingual person would

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be able to communicate and interact with his community and members of another linguistic group. In June 1978, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew contended that bilingualism provided “a more balanced and rounded view of the world” as the “bilinguist sees both sides.”29 While the bilingual policy has strengthened the use of the mother tongue30 among the three major ethnic groups in Singapore, it has also given rise to another unintended consequence. The “Speak Mandarin” campaign was launched in November 1979 to encourage more Chinese Singaporeans to use Mandarin. However, the constant emphasis on this campaign resulted in unintended spillover effects on its non-target groups, that is, the non-Chinese Singaporeans, or the Malays, Indians, and Eurasians in the population. Indeed, these minorities feel threatened and perhaps even alienated by the repeated exhortations to the Chinese Singaporeans to speak Mandarin. They have also become more aware of their minority status as a result. In short, the annual exhortations to speak Mandarin during the past two decades, although directed at the Chinese Singaporeans, have not only increased the sense of insecurity among the minority groups, but also heightened considerably the racial consciousness of all Singaporeans.31

National Service Thirdly, the PAP government has used national service to promote nation-building. According to the National Service (Amendment) Act, which was passed on 16 March 1967, all male citizens on reaching the age of eighteen were initially required to undergo national service for two years in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). This period was later extended by six months to two-and-a-half years. After completing his stint, a national serviceman continues to serve as a reservist until he reaches the age of forty. On 13 March 1967, Goh Keng Swee, who was then Minister of Defence, spoke on the linkage between national service and nationbuilding in Parliament: Nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily and more thoroughly than participation in defence and membership of the armed forces. ... The nation building aspect of the armed aspect of defence will be more significant if its participation is spread over all strata of society. This is possible, only with some kind of national service.32

In spite of the traditional negative attitude of the Chinese population towards military service and the initial resistance from parents and

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grandparents, national service is now accepted as part and parcel of their lives for three reasons. First, the government mounted a campaign to explain the meaning and rationale of national service to the population when it was introduced in July 1967. Secondly, national service has been accepted by the population because of “the absolute impartiality with which it is being administered.” Finally, the initial policy of limited enlistment of Malays as national servicemen was rectified in 1973 in response to increasing Malay discontent, and since then all eligible male Malay citizens have been called up for national service.33 In June 1990, the former Minister of Defence, Lim Kim San, said that national service was “a key factor in nation-building” because it “gives the youth of our multi-racial nation a common experience and a common objective, binding potentially divisive strands.”34

Public Housing The fourth pillar of the PAP government’s nation-building programme is its successful and widely acclaimed public housing programme, which is responsible for housing 86 per cent of the population. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) was formed on 1 February 1960 to solve the housing shortage inherited by the PAP government from its predecessor. The HDB’s success in solving the housing problem is well known as it has built an impressive total of 833,814 housing units for 86 per cent of the population during 1960–97.35 Apart from solving the housing shortage, the HDB’s public housing programme also plays a nation-building role as it brings Singaporeans of different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups together and thus provides them with more opportunities for interacting with and understanding one another. In 1969, Riaz Hassan argued that the HDB’s public housing programme had contributed to national integration in Singapore through its role in desegregating the ethnic enclaves, created by immigration and the British colonial government’s policy of ethnic segregation. According to him: Public housing is playing an important role in the desegregation of these ethnic enclaves. The conditions of obtaining a public housing flat are citizenship, income and family size and not ethnic or racial affiliation. The public housing estates are, thus, desegregated communities where Chinese, Malay, Indians, Pakistanis and Eurasians live side by side, and in many instances, for the first time.36

The public housing programme’s nation-building role became more explicit in February 1964 when the PAP government introduced the Home

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Ownership for the People Scheme to enable those eligible Singapore citizens to own their own homes. The government’s rationale for promoting home ownership among Singaporeans was simple: it wanted as many of its citizens to become property owners as possible as it believed that their loyalty to Singapore would be enhanced if they were committed to and given a stake in the country.37 However, an unintended consequence of the HDB’s allocation of new flats and the resale of its flats contributed to the gradual emergence of racial enclaves in some public housing estates. For example, the Chinese prefer the estates in the Ang Mo Kio/Hougang zone, while the Malays choose to live in the HDB flats in the Bedok/Tampines zone. To deal with this problem and to ensure a balanced racial mix in the public housing estates, the HDB introduced measures to limit the proportion of races in each HDB neighbourhood and block from 1 March 1989. These limits are: 84 per cent (neighbourhood) and 87 per cent (block) for the Chinese; 22 per cent (neighbourhood) and 25 per cent (block) for the Malays; and 10 per cent (neighbourhood) and 13 per cent (block) for the Indians and other ethnic groups.38 Residents living in public housing estates where the existing racial proportions are within the prescribed limits are not affected by the new measures and can sell their flats to anyone, regardless of race. The new measures would apply to HDB neighbourhoods and blocks which have reached or exceeded the limits.39

Management of Singapore’s Ethnic Diversity Raj Vasil has divided the PAP government’s management of Singapore’s ethnic diversity into three phases: Phase I (1965–79); Phase II (1979– 90); and Phase III (since 1990).40

Phase I (1965–79) Separation from Malaysia forced the PAP leaders to “reconsider and redesign their strategy for state-making and management of ethnicity in the new context of an independent Singapore.”41 Accordingly, within hours of Singapore’s separation, Lee Kuan Yew said: “We are going to have a multiracial nation in Singapore. This is not a Malay nation, not a Chinese nation, not an Indian nation.”42 To ensure that Singapore would not be perceived as a “Third China” by its neighbours, the PAP leaders de-emphasized the “Chineseness” of Singapore by ensuring that the Chinese majority “did not insist upon securing a special role and status for themselves”, or their culture and language.43 More specifically, they

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had to persuade the Chinese community “to accept a multi-racial Singapore, a Singaporean Singapore that did not unduly emphasise its Chineseness.”44 Secondly, the PAP government gave special recognition to the Malays even though they constituted only 14 per cent of the population, to assure them that separation from Malaysia would not affect their special position and interests. Indeed, Article 152 (2) of the Constitution of Singapore recognized the special position of the Malays and stipulated that the government’s responsibility was to protect their interests and the Malay language, which was accorded the status of the national language. Furthermore, the national anthem was in Malay, and the state crest and flag were based on Malay symbols. Malay students were also provided with free education up to the university level.45 Thirdly, the PAP leaders also adhered to the founding principle of a multiracial cultural democracy and allowed the different ethnic groups “the fullest possible freedom in respect of their different cultures and ways of life, religions and values, and languages and educational institutions.”46 In practice, this resulted in the use of four official languages — English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil — for official documents and parliamentary debates, and in the mass media and schools. The PAP leaders also ensured that the “ethnic minorities secured fair representation at the highest levels of decision-making” in the Cabinet and Parliament to reflect the multiracial nature of the population.47 Finally, the PAP leaders wanted to create an English-speaking Singapore not only to enable the different ethnic groups to communicate with one another, but also to prevent the Chinese-educated from assuming a leadership role, to project an image of a cosmopolitan city, to retard the growth of Chinese chauvinism, and to ensure access to the “modern knowledge, science and technology” required for achieving continued economic growth.48

Phase II (1979–90) According to Vasil, the “Speak Mandarin” campaign “represented the beginning of a new, second phase in the PAP government’s management of ethnicity geared chiefly to, what in its totality meant, Asianising Singapore, including restoring the Chineseness of the Chinese.” Indeed, this phase of “Asianizing Singapore” was aimed at restoring and strengthening “the moorings of the different peoples of Singapore in their different cultures and heritages so that they would be able to function with equal confidence in both the traditional worlds of their

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own respective communities as well as the Western world of science and technology and international trade.”49 The second reason for the PAP government’s shift in emphasis to “Asianizing Singapore” was the growing disparities between the ethnic groups revealed by the 1980 population census. While the Englisheducated Chinese had benefited the most from Singapore’s economic growth, the Malays, on the other hand, were unable to take advantage of the opportunities provided, resulting in a widening gap between them and the Chinese.50 The 1980 census showed that the Malays had the highest proportion (86.3 per cent) of persons aged ten and above who had primary education, compared with the national average of 79.2 per cent. Similarly, only 13.7 per cent of the Malays had a secondary or higher education, which was lower than the national average of 20.8 per cent. Finally, only 4.9 per cent of the Malays were working in professional, technical and related occupations, compared with 9.1 per cent for the Chinese, and 8.9 per cent for the Indians.51 As the performance of the Malay students in English language courses was not good, they experienced difficulty in progressing to university education. Indeed, the number of Malay university graduates ranged from 22 in 1976 to 27 in 1981. To rectify this situation, the PAP government recommended the establishment of a community-run programme based on self-help to tackle the socio-economic problems of the Malay community in Singapore. According to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the Malay community “will be more effective with Malay/Muslim parents than the government school teachers and principals. You can reach them through their hearts, not simply their minds.”52 Accordingly, the Yayasan Mendaki or Mendaki Foundation was formed in 1982 to improve the educational achievements of Malay/Muslim children.53 Indeed, its success in improving the educational standards of the Malay community has encouraged the PAP government to establish similar self-help organizations for the Indians in 1990 with the formation of the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA), and the creation of the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) for the Chinese in 1992.54

Phase III (since 1990) In November 1990, Goh Chok Tong succeeded Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister and continued the PAP government’s policy of promoting a multiracial cultural democracy. However, Goh adopted a “consultative and a more open political style” as more Singaporeans believed that the PAP government should consult them and allow them to participate in the

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governance of their country.55 Thus, instead of encouraging Singaporeans to nurture a common Singaporean national identity in 1965 and excluding ethnic issues from public debate, the second-generation PAP leaders have initiated the creation of ethnic self-help groups from 1982 and encouraged open and “considerably uninhibited public discussion of sensitive ethnic issues.”56 In his speech to Nanyang Technological University students on 11 May 1999, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained why the PAP government shifted its emphasis from “the melting-pot approach” to the “overlappingcircles approach” to nation-building: I used “tribe” in the metaphorical sense of an extended Singapore Family with its distinctive core values and social characteristics, and sharing a common destiny. ... The word “tribe” is within inverted commas, to describe vividly our desire to achieve our long-term goal of becoming one family, one people and one nation based on multiracialism. ... It will be an extended family forged by widening the common area of the four overlapping circles in our society. The four circles, each representing a community, will never totally overlap to become a stack of four circles. ... This overlapping-circles approach to building a nation and common identity is diametrically opposite the melting-pot approach [which] ... would have meant absorption of the minority communities by the majority community. ... The overlappingcircles approach maximizes our common ground but retains each race’s separate identity. ... Though the divide between the races can never be totally removed, we can lower it to the extent that our common characteristics and values bind us as one people despite our differences of race and religion.57

The second-generation PAP leaders identified two key aims for their strategy in managing ethnicity in Singapore after 1990: the continued promotion of the Asianization of Singapore, with special emphasis on the problem of deculturation among the Chinese; and the reduction of disparities between ethnic groups.58 Since the first phase focused on deemphasizing the Chineseness of Singapore, the second phase of Asianizing Singapore was concerned with redressing the imbalance by focusing on encouraging the English-educated Chinese Singaporeans to speak Mandarin. Indeed, these leaders contended that if the Chineseness of the Chinese in Singapore was not restored, the country would lose its highlyeducated and skilled citizens, and its political stability and the traditional family system would be affected.59 Apart from restoring the Chineseness of Chinese Singaporeans, the younger PAP leaders were also concerned with reducing the disparities between the Indians and the Chinese, and between the English-educated

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and Chinese-educated Chinese.60 According to Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, the most effective way to minimize these disparities was by promoting and enhancing the education and skills of those lagging behind, by “getting the successful to help the less able in the community.”61 In September 1990, the six Indian Members of Parliament appointed a thirteen-member Action Committee on Indian Education (ACIE) to “study the problem of educational under-performance of IndianSingaporean students, at all stages from primary school to university.”62 The ACIE found that Indian students were lagging behind the national average as one in four Indian students in each cohort dropped out of the education system without obtaining a primary school leaving certificate. This attrition rate was two and a half times that among Chinese students. Moreover, nearly half as many Indians as Chinese students obtained the required qualifications for admission into the universities or polytechnics.63 The ACIE recommended a three-pronged Action Plan to be implemented by SINDA.64 In July 1991, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had suggested the setting up of a voluntary self-help group for the Chinese lower income group.65 The results of the August 1991 general election were interpreted by the PAP leaders as a “Chinese backlash” as they believed that “bread-andbutter issues and the dissatisfaction of the Chinese-educated had cost the PAP votes in the election.”66 According to Ho Khai Leong, “the need to set up the CDAC was quickly transformed into a political exercise after the general election” which was “a major catalyst” for accelerating the formation of the CDAC in 1992.67 Like MENDAKI and SINDA, the CDAC also focuses on the promotion of education and skills among Chinese students from the lower income groups, and also the low-income and unskilled Chinese workers.68

From Nation-Building to Shared Values With the shift in emphasis from the development of a Singaporean national identity in 1965 to the establishment of ethnic self-help groups from 1982 onwards, the PAP government has focused attention instead on the notion of a national ideology, which was introduced by Goh Chok Tong in October 1988 when he warned members of the PAP Youth Wing that the values of Singaporeans were being transformed from communitarianism to individualism among the younger generation as a result of their daily exposure to external influences. This value transformation of Singaporeans was viewed with concern by the PAP government because “it will determine our national competitiveness,

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and hence our prosperity and survival as a nation.” In Goh’s view, since Singaporeans share the same core values of hard work, thrift and sacrifice as the Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, these values must be preserved in the form of a national ideology in order to ensure Singapore’s continued prosperity and long-term survival. He suggested that these core values of Singaporeans should be formalized into a national ideology and taught in schools, homes, and work-places, as “our way of life” for two reasons: to immunize Singaporeans from the undesirable effects of alien influences and to bind them together as a nation.69 President Wee Kim Wee identified these values in his opening address at the Seventh Parliament on 9 January 1989 thus: If we are not to lose our bearings, we should preserve the cultural heritage of each of our communities, and uphold certain common values which capture the essence of being a Singaporean. These core values include placing society above self, upholding the family as the basic block of society, resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention, and stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony. We need to enshrine these fundamental ideas in a National Ideology. ... We need to inculcate this National Ideology in all Singaporeans, especially the young.70

In January 1989, Goh announced that a discussion paper on shared values would be presented to Parliament. The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) was commissioned by the government to conduct a study to identify those national values that would unify all Singaporeans. The IPS Study Group on National Values completed its study within ten months (August 1989-May 1990) and its report was published in September 1990.71 On 2 January 1991, the PAP government presented a White Paper on “Shared Values” in Parliament after considering the extensive discussion on the topic both within and outside of Parliament since President Wee’s identification of the four core values two years earlier. The White Paper identified the following five shared values, which are extensions and modifications of the original four core values: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Nation before community and society above self. Family as the basic unit of society. Regard and community support for the individual. Consensus instead of contention. Racial and religious harmony.72

The White Paper on “Shared Values” was debated in Parliament on 14–15 January 1991, and it was adopted with two amendments. First,

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the third shared value of “regard and community support for the individual” was changed to “community support and respect for the individual.” The second amendment concerned the fourth shared value of “consensus instead of contention,” which was revised to “consensus, not conflict.”73

Singapore as a Global City Singapore’s “small territorial size and limited domestic market” mean that it “must specialise to enjoy economies of scale and must export.”74 Indeed, Bellows has argued that Singapore’s smallness “compelled it to enter the global market place in the 1960s, restructure its entrepot economy and become internationally competitive.”75 The absence of natural resources in Singapore, the declining entrepot trade in the 1950s, and the small domestic market compelled the PAP leaders to launch an industrialization programme in August 1961 with the creation of the Economic Development Board (EDB) to promote economic development by means of foreign investment. Apart from promoting industrialization and foreign investment, the PAP government has also dealt with the country’s lack of resources by investing in education to develop its human resources and by establishing it as a regional centre for financial, communication, medical, and other services. Adopting Giddens’ definition of “globalization” as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shared by events occurring miles away and vice versa”,76 Singapore can be described as a global city. In 1975, Ho Wing Meng contended that what made Singapore “global” was “our extensive and far-flung trade and commercial ties, the weal and woe of Singapore is tied up with the fortunes of the industrially advanced countries in the world.”77 More recently, Murray and Perera have described Singapore as “the Global City State” in their book, but they did not provide an explicit definition of what they meant.78 In contrast, Stella Quah demonstrates that Singapore is a global city on the basis of the world orientation of its economic, administrative, political, socio-cultural, and physical dimensions. First, as the economic dimension of a global city emphasizes “the stronger role of international capital including investments by multinational corporations and foreign banks, and a move from low-technology manufacturing to hightechnology production and high-skill professional services”, Singapore has succeeded in attracting foreign investment, being ranked by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) in 1993 to be “the world’s third best investment location.”79

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More recently, the Economist Intelligence Unit has ranked Singapore’s business environment first among sixteen Asian countries. In terms of the amount of foreign direct investment received, Singapore was ranked second in the Asia-Pacific region by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1998.80 Secondly, the administrative dimension of the global city refers to its role as an administration hub for major world-class economic players as it houses the head offices and headquarters of many top multinational corporations, financial institutions, banks, governmental and non-governmental international organizations. More specifically, all the world’s twenty-five largest commercial banks have their offices in Singapore. Fourteen of the world’s twenty-five prominent information science companies and thirty-one of the world’s top fifty industrial corporations have subsidiaries in Singapore.81 Thirdly, the political dimension of the global city consists of its governmental system, its political leaders, and the political, administrative, and judicial rules guiding policy formulation and policy implementation. A global city is distinguished from a non-global city by the international orientation of the state and its bureaucracy, which is staffed by effective technocrats. As Singapore is an independent nation, its government “plays the role of coach in the task of creating the global city” by providing the necessary infrastructure and fiscal incentives to attract foreign investment.82 Fourthly, the socio-cultural dimension of the global city refers to its social fabric and consists of the population’s occupational and social class structures, standard of living, employment and educational opportunities, ethnic composition, cultural and religious values. Unlike a non-global city, a global city like Singapore provides “a higher proportion of jobs in high-skill occupations, attracting a wide range of experts and professionals who are typically high income earners, have university education, and demand an above-average standard of living, including culture and recreation.”83 Finally, the physical dimension of the global city consists of its infrastructure, physical environment, and geographical features. As housing is an important aspect of life in a global city and constitutes a substantial part of the physical dimension of globalization, Singapore’s success in providing public housing and implementing a comprehensive urban renewal programme has improved its physical environment and converted it into “a garden city” with clean rivers, upgraded physical facilities, and an efficient road network and subway system.84

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Globalization and Regionalization According to Bellows, globalization was “a conscious strategy designed for Singapore to enter the international manufacturing export business as well as to become the prime regional location for the headquarters of international service and financial institutions.”85 Lee Kuan Yew, who was then Prime Minister, explained that the aim of globalization was to attract foreign investment. By 1980, foreign investment constituted over 80 per cent of investment in Singapore. The PAP government’s commitment to globalization during the past thirty years has been manifested in its policy of support, infrastructure, training, and guidance.86 Following Switzerland’s example, Singapore embarked on its regionalization policy in 1991 with three major aims: 1. to establish linkages with regional economies by developing industrial parks in key growth areas; 2. to expand the relationship with multinational corporations by recruiting them to Singapore-built industrial parks in Asia and coinvesting with them in these parks; 3. to encourage Singapore businesses (wholly or more than 50 per cent owned by Singaporeans) to establish branches abroad or enter into joint ventures with local business.87 In his 1995 National Day speech, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained that Singapore had to expand its investment reach abroad as its small size and population do not provide the critical mass needed for an industrialized economy. He also pledged to “invest up to 30 per cent of Singapore’s US$50 billion foreign reserves in Asian regional economies.”88 Singapore’s efforts in promoting globalization and regionalization have reaped dividends as its diversified economy is based on international markets in various sectors. In 1997, there were 5,000 transnational corporations with about 2,500 handling regional markets, 850 manufacturing for the global market, and 220 banks dealing with regional and international finance.89 An important consequence of Singapore’s globalization was that 5,200 Singapore companies had increased their total direct foreign investments from S$13.6 billion in 1990 to S$36.9 billion in 1995.90

Whither Singapore’s National Identity? What has happened to national identity in Singapore, given the PAP

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government’s shift in emphasis from the development of a Singaporean national identity in 1965 to the development of ethnic self-help groups in 1982? There has been, so far, only one attempt to measure the extent of Singaporean national identity. In his master’s thesis on “Singaporean National Identity”, Chiew Seen Kong found that a random sample of 990 Singaporeans of voting age exhibited high levels of national identity on the basis of eight indicators even though Singapore had only been independent for about four years when the national survey was conducted in 1969.91 More specifically, Chiew found that: 1. 90 per cent of the respondents called themselves Singaporeans; 2. 74 per cent preferred being called Singaporeans rather than Chinese, Malays, Indians, Eurasians, or other ethnicity; 3. 80 per cent had seen or heard three or more of Singapore’s symbols of nationhood: National Day, National Anthem, National Flag, the President, and Prime Minister; 4. 58 per cent were correct in describing, naming, or dating three or more of these five national symbols; 5. 64 per cent expressed good feelings towards three or more of these symbols; 6. 75 per cent expressed good feelings towards two or more of Singapore’s three prideful symbols of national development — Jurong industries, community centres, and HDB flats; 7. 48 per cent considered that separation from Malaysia in 1965 was good for Singapore; and 8. 74 per cent professed willingness to fight and die for Singapore.92 Chiew’s 1969 survey has not been replicated but in 1989, Chiew and Tan conducted a national survey of a random sample of 706 Singaporeans for the Institute of Policy Studies.93 Comparing the 1989 survey with his 1969 survey, Chiew observed that: ... inter-ethnic friendships between the Chinese and Malays, and Chinese and Indians, have increased and are now at high levels. The Malay-Indian friendships have either increased or remain very high. Mutual invitations to celebrate birthdays, weddings and traditional/ ethnic festivals have increased significantly for all the three major races in Singapore. These index quite nicely the high degree of social cohesion in a multi-ethnic society. ... There is also consensus within each ethnic group and across the three races that race relations in the past five years [1984–89] have been harmonious or non-problematic, and that there will be racial harmony in the next five years [1989–94]. ... About 15 per cent of the respondents have ever considered leaving Singapore

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for good. The young, singles, the better-educated, those with high incomes, those educated in the English stream and the politically alienated tend to have ever considered emigrating. These are precisely the people Singapore cannot afford to lose for obvious reasons. ... In sum, racial goodwill, mutual social acceptance and cross-ethnic consensus over race relations and mutual dependence exist in abundance in Singapore. There is a large measure of social cohesion.94

In 1990, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) conducted a survey of one hundred former Singaporeans who had emigrated to Perth and Sydney in Australia, and Vancouver in Canada, to ascertain their reasons for emigration. The study found that for the fifty respondents living in Perth and Sydney, the most important factor pushing them to emigrate was their children’s education, which included problems with second language, the quality of education in Singapore (that is, high pressure and lack in developing creative thinking), the limited number of university places available and the resulting concern with the affordability of overseas university education for their children.95 A second “push” factor was “the socio-economic and political environment” in Singapore, which was described by 22 per cent of the respondents as “regimented, unbalanced and over-dominated by work concerns, lacking in compassion and intolerant of failure.” Thirdly, “personal frustrations with their jobs or businesses” were mentioned by 24 per cent of the Australian respondents as contributing to their decision to emigrate. On the other hand, the three important “pull” factors were the “economic opportunities offered by Australia (20 per cent), followed by educational opportunities (12 per cent), and the socio-economic and political environment in Australia (12 per cent).96 For the fifty respondents in Vancouver, the major reasons for emigration to Canada were the socio-economic and political environments in Singapore and Canada. Indeed, 32 per cent of the Canadian respondents viewed Canada as a country with economic opportunities, compared to 20 per cent of the Australian respondents who saw Australia as a country with economic opportunities. The presence of family members in Canada and the security offered by the country were two additional factors mentioned by the Canadian respondents but not the Australian respondents.97 Yap Mui Teng, the author of the 1990 IPS study on emigration, contended that the policies on citizenship, national service, and the withdrawal of Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings had “the unintended consequences of causing Singapore to lose its citizens, and sometimes two generations at once” as “some respondents renounced their Singapore citizenship in order to withdraw on their CPF savings for use and investment in their new country.” In the case of national service, emigrants

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who have given up their Singapore citizenship are required to ensure that their sons return to Singapore for national service on reaching 21 years by furnishing a bond of S$75,000. When parents are unable or unwilling to furnish these bonds for their sons, they are forced to renounce their citizenship.98 According to Yap, “if forced to choose between their citizenship on the one hand, and having their CPF savings at hand or the opportunity not to disrupt their children’s education on the other, the choice may often be to give up Singapore citizenship.”99 I agree with Yap’s view that “the solution is not to abandon these policies in order to accommodate the few who have emigrated for whatever reasons.” As time and distance might have diluted the sense of urgency among some overseas Singaporeans on the need for these policies, Yap has recommended that the government should communicate and reinforce its reasons for not changing the current national service policies to Singaporeans living abroad. Furthermore, as Singapore “does not provide for dual citizenship, Singaporeans who have given up their Singapore citizenship are likely to remain overseas permanently.”100

Impact of Globalization on Citizenship Given Singapore’s small population and the need for foreign talent, the PAP government has adopted a liberal policy of granting permanent residence to foreigners with the required skills or talent. Indeed, foreigners who have become permanent residents in Singapore enjoy the same benefits as Singapore citizens without being required to perform such obligations of citizenship as national service. For example, in the registration for Primary I, both permanent residents and citizens are given the same priority and privileges. In other words, permanent residents in Singapore are de facto Singapore citizens as they are given the same privileges. The only distinction appears to be that permanent residents cannot vote. This has two negative effects. First, the permanent residents, especially those from Malaysia and Hong Kong, are reluctant or unlikely to take up citizenship when there are no additional advantages for doing so. Since permanent residents are given the same priority for Primary I registration as citizens, the former are unlikely to acquire citizenship as they have been treated in the same way for such an important issue. Given the keen competition for Primary I registration, Singapore citizens should be given priority over permanent residents. If this is done, many hitherto reluctant permanent residents will take up citizenship to ensure priority for their children’s education.

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Ironically, the two members of the Singapore expedition that reached the summit of Mount Everest in May 1998 were not citizens but permanent residents. According to Derek da Cunha, “Listening to what was said in the coffee shops and hawker centres throughout the country, it was apparent that public sentiment over the nature of the Everest climb was overwhelmingly negative.”101 For example, the following negative message was posted by “Louis” on 28 May 1998 on the Internet newsgroup devoted to social and political issues on Singapore: I’m surprised that Singapore sent in a team of PRs [permanent residents] to conquer Mt Everest. Even the team leader is not a Singaporean... Might as well get the sherpas to plant our flag. Worse [sic] still, some of the funding was made by charity contributions from the President’s Charity Nite [sic].102

Thus, this incident showed that citizenship was surprisingly excluded as a criterion for joining Singapore’s national expedition to Mount Everest. In other words, the inclusion of two non-citizens in the national team was a symbolic demonstration to Singaporeans that citizenship did not matter in the composition of the country’s first expedition to climb the world’s highest mountain. Secondly, if citizens are treated in the same way as permanent residents, they will question the value of their citizenship and think twice about fulfilling such obligations as national service. J.M. Barbalet has described “citizenship” as “participation in or membership of a community.”103 According to the Constitution of Singapore, Singapore citizenship can be acquired in four ways: by birth; by descent; by registration; and by naturalization.104 Conversely, Singapore citizenship can be terminated if a citizen fails to swear the oath of allegiance on reaching the age of 21 years; if he acquires the citizenship of another country; if the government deprives him of his citizenship; and if he renounces his citizenship.105 As it is not easy to acquire Singapore citizenship in the first place, such citizenship will not be valued highly by Singaporeans when permanent residents are treated in almost a similar manner as them. While foreign talent is required to enhance Singapore’s development as a knowledge-based economy, care must be taken by the government to ensure that foreigners are not hired at the expense of Singaporeans, especially during the current regional crisis when many Singaporeans have lost their jobs. Those Singaporeans from minority groups are particularly vulnerable and some of them have complained of being discriminated against in their search for jobs in the private sector. As educated Singaporeans are mobile and can migrate to other countries, the PAP government must be more sensitive to the needs of its citizens and make

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a distinction between citizens and permanent residents. If it maintains the existing policy of parity between citizens and permanent residents, citizens will not value their citizenship and permanent residents will not take up Singapore citizenship. This could have serious repercussions if younger Singaporeans do not see the value of their citizenship and consider migrating to other countries as a more attractive option than remaining in Singapore as de jure citizens.

Singapore 21: The Road to Nation-Building? Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong ended his 1996 National Day Rally Speech with this plea: I say to all Singaporeans: You have to feel passionately about Singapore. Being Singaporean should resonate in our hearts and minds. We built this country. We live, work and raise our children here. We will fight and, if we must, we will die to defend our way of life and our home. Here we will realise our hopes and aspirations. Here our children will have a bright future. Singapore becomes our home of choice. Let us work together to make Singapore our best home.106

In August 1997, he launched the Singapore 21 Committee to strengthen the “heartware” (that is, social cohesion, political stability and the collective will, values and attitudes of a people) of Singapore in the twenty-first century. This Committee and its five subject committees spent more than a year to discuss five dilemmas with about 6,000 Singaporeans from varied backgrounds “to understand their concerns and aspirations, and to seek their views and suggestions.”107 Two of the five key ideas formulated by the Committee are relevant for nation-building in Singapore, namely, “Every Singaporean matters” and “the Singapore Heartbeat: Feeling passionately about Singapore.” Since people will be more important than machines in the twentyfirst century, chapter 2 of the Singapore 21 Report reiterated that as “every Singaporean is unique” “everyone has a contribution to make to Singapore.” It also recommended that the “notion of success in Singapore society” should be reviewed to extend beyond “narrow academic and economic benchmarks” as Singaporeans must strive to “reach out to be the best” they could be as “every Singaporean matters.”108 Chapter 5 contends that with globalization, the demand for Singaporeans to work abroad is likely to increase in the future. This means that “the more international Singapore becomes in the twenty-first century, the stronger must our national bonds be. We need a strong Singapore

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heartbeat.”109 To achieve this heartbeat, emotional and social anchors like family, friendship, and fond memories of growing up, must first be strengthened. Secondly, Singaporeans should live together in harmony with unity of purpose and with a sense of national identity as “a shared history, common memories and myths, national icons in sports and the arts, all serve to bond all segments of society into a united and cohesive Singapore.”110 It concluded that the Singaporean of the twenty-first century will be “comfortable living and working abroad” and yet retain a srong emotional attachment to home.111 The Subject Committee for the Singapore Heartbeat made ten recommendations for the society and government. The first five recommendations are particularly relevant for nation-building in Singapore: 1. Preserving things Singaporean. We should identify, promote and retain areas and buildings which make Singapore unique and serve as anchors to Singapore. From community centres to ethnic-based groups to architects — all can play a role in conserving our heritage and keeping memories alive. 2. Fostering community spirit. This can be done at all levels, from young people doing community and voluntary work, to adults joining a Neighbourhood Watch, or organizing community bazaars. ... 3. National education. Every Singaporean, especially each new generation and every new citizen, should understand the facts surrounding Singapore’s journey to nationhood and the dreams and ideals that the founding generation strived for. Every Singaporean should have a realistic appreciation of the challenges and circumstances facing them, and develop a well-founded confidence in the future as a nation. 4. National icons. Apart from economic achievements, it is important to nurture icons in other areas, such as in the arts or sports. Singaporeans who are world-class artists or musicians; a national soccer team striking gold in regional or international sporting events, all make the Singapore heart beat faster. 5. Promote greater interracial understanding. Beyond just tolerance, there is a need to actively develop a better understanding of fellow Singaporeans of different races and cultures. Schools, businesses, and community groups can all help to encourage more frequent direct interaction among people of different races. The celebration of different ethnic festivals serves as focal points for inter-racial bonding.112

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The above recommendations will certainly enhance nation-building in Singapore if they are taken seriously and implemented by both the government and all Singaporeans in the years ahead. After forty years of nation-building under the PAP government, the standard of living in Singapore has improved tremendously as its per capita GNP has increased by 74 times from US$443 in 1960 to US$32,940 in 1997, making it the fourth richest country in the world after Switzerland, Japan, and Norway.113 Through education, which is the major channel for upward social mobility, Singaporeans from low-income families can improve their social status as the meritocratic system enables qualified graduates from the various races to enter and advance in the public bureaucracy. As mentioned earlier, Singapore has experienced four incidents of racial riots from 1950 to 1969: the Maria Hertogh riots of December 1950; the racial riots of July and September 1964; and the spillover of the 13 May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur. The absence of racial riots in Singapore during the last three decades is perhaps the best manifestation of the success of the PAP government’s efforts in nation-building. Furthermore, apart from controls on the press (to prevent what happened in the Maria Hertogh riots), the PAP government introduced Group Representation Constituencies in the 1988 general election to ensure multiracial representation in Parliament, and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1990 to prevent religious conflict between the different races. Indeed, the PAP government’s pre-emptive approach to maintain racial and religious harmony is an important prerequisite for nation-building in Singapore. On the other hand, nation-building efforts in Singapore would be considered unsuccessful if more Singaporeans emigrate to other countries and renounce their citizenship. To minimize this, the PAP government should first ensure that the recruitment of foreign talent is not done at the expense of Singaporeans. Secondly, permanent residents should no longer be treated as de facto citizens as this policy has discouraged them from acquiring Singapore citizenship. More importantly, the value of Singapore citizenship would be enhanced if permanent residents are not given the same privileges as citizens. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong ended his 1999 National Day Rally Speech thus: We must feel passionately for Singapore. Singaporeans have to be convinced that there is something special and precious in our way of life, in what we have built against the odds.114

For Singaporeans to feel passionately for Singapore, they must be treated better than permanent residents and foreign talent. This seems to

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be obvious to most Singaporeans, but not obvious to the PAP government, which has constantly (and at times tactlessly) emphasized the need for foreign talent and encouraged them to become permanent residents. This anomaly needs to be rectified as soon as possible to strengthen the Singapore heartbeat.

Notes 1. K.C. Tregonning, “The Historical Background,” in Modern Singapore, edited by Ooi Jin-Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (Singapore: University of Singapore, 1969), p. 14. 2. Edwin Lee, “The Colonial Legacy,” in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 36. 3. Singapore 1999 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999), pp. 34–38. 4. For this chapter, we will adopt Rupert Emerson’s definition of nation as “a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future.” He contends that the hallmark of a nation is that “it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation” and that they are “a community of brethren imbued with a sense of common destiny.” See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 95 and 105. 5. “Will Singapore become one tribe?” Straits Times, 7 May 1999, p. 51. 6. Singapore 1999, pp. 18–19. 7. Jon S.T. Quah, “The Origins of the Public Bureaucracies in the ASEAN Countries”, Indian Journal of Public Administration 24, no. 2 (April-June 1978): 417–18. 8. Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 3. 9. Ibid., pp. 4–5, emphasis added. 10. Ibid., p. 45. 11. Lee Kuan Yew, “Will Malaysia Succeed?” in Malaysia Comes of Age (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1963), p. 9. 12. Lee Kuan Yew, Some Problems in Malaysia (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1964), p. 8. 13. Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, Vol. 1 (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965), p. 51. 14. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998), p. 615. 15. Ibid., pp. 22-23, emphasis added.

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16. Singapore Facts and Pictures 1998 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998), p. 2. 17. Lee Kuan Yew, “The Search for Talent”, in Our Heritage and Beyond, edited by S. Jayakumar (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1982), p. 18. 18. World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge and Development (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1999), p. 191. 19. Maintenance of Religious Harmony, Cmd. 21 of 1989, White Paper presented to Parliament by Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore on 26 December 1989 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1989), p. 11. 20. Eddie C.Y. Kuo and Jon S. T. Quah, Religion in Singapore: Report of a National Survey (Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1989), pp. 15– 18. 21. Quoted in James Minchin, No Man is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1990), p. 234. 22. For details of these riots, see Jon S.T. Quah, “Meeting the Twin Threats of Communism and Communalism: The Singapore Response”, in Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, edited by Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 193–95. 23. Mirror, 22 January 1973, quoted in Geoffrey Benjamin, “The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s ‘Multiracialism’”, in Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 121. 24. For some early assessments of nation-building in Singapore, see David W. Chang, “Nation-Building in Singapore,” Asian Survey 8, no. 9 (September 1968): 761–73; Chan Heng Chee, Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Singapore Case, Occasional Paper No. 3 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971); Chiew Seen Kong, “Singaporean National Identity” (M.Soc.Sci. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Singapore, 1971); Chiew Seen Kong, “National Integration: The Case of Singapore,” in Studies in ASEAN Sociology, edited by Peter S.J. Chen and Hans-Dieter Evers (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978), pp. 130–46; George W.H. Chen, “The Social Bases of Political Development and Integration: The Case of Singapore” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1974); and Chew Sock Foon, Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore, Southeast Asia Series No. 78 (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1987). 25. World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge for Development, pp. 190–91. 26. Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 1995 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1996), pp. 22 and 226. 27. For two relevant studies, see David S. Bell, “Unity in Diversity: Education and Political Integration in an Ethnically Pluralistic Society” (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972); and Richard G. Juve, “Education as an Integrating Force in Singapore: A Multi-Cultural Society” (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975). 28. Economic and Social Statistics Singapore 1960–1982 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983), p. 248; and Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1997 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1998), p. 244. 29. Lee Kuan Yew, “Bilingualism for a More Balanced View of the World”, Mirror, 14, no. 25 (June 1978): 2.

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30. The mother tongue refers to Mandarin for the Chinese even though there are several dialects; Bahasa Melayu for the Malays; and Tamil for the Indians even though there are many other languages for this heterogeneous group. 31. Jon S.T. Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building,” in In Search of Singapore’s National Values, edited by Jon S.T. Quah (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), p. 57. 32. Republic of Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 25, 23 February 1966– 24 May 1967, col. 1160. 33. Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building,” p. 52. 34. Straits Times, 16 June 1990, p. 26. 35. Housing and Development Board, Annual Report 1997/98 (Singapore: HDB, 1998), p. 74. 36. Riaz Hassan, “Some Sociological Implications of Public Housing in Singapore”, Southeast Asian Journal of Sociology 2 (May 1969): 24. 37. Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore: Towards a National Identity”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1977 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), p. 215. 38. For more details, see Ooi Giok Ling, “The Housing and Development Board’s Ethnic Integration Policy”, in Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique and Soh Kay Cheng, The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing Estates (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1993), pp. 11–14. 39. Details of the new measures can be found in Promoting a Good Racial Mix in Public Housing Estates (Singapore: HDB, 1989). 40. See Raj Vasil, Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1995), chapters 4–6. 41. Ibid., p. 17. 42. Quoted in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew: The Struggle for Singapore (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974), p. 196. 43. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, p. 38. 44. Ibid., p. 40. 45. Ibid., pp. 43–45. 46. Ibid., p. 46. 47. Ibid., p. 49. 48. Ibid., pp. 52–53. 49. Ibid., pp. 64–65. 50. Ibid., pp. 88–89. 51. Making the Difference: Ten Years of Mendaki (Singapore: Yayasan Mendaki, 1993), p. 53. 52. Ibid., p.17. 53. Ibid., p. 89. 54. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, pp. 144–52. 55. Ibid., p.101. 56. Ibid., p.103. 57. Goh Chok Tong, “Whither Singapore?” Speeches: A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial Speeches 23, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 18–19. 58. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, p.110. 59. Ibid., pp.114–21. 60. Ibid., p.139.

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61. Ibid., p.145. 62. At the Crossroads: Report of the Action Committee on Indian Education (Singapore: ACIE, 1991), p. vii. 63. Ibid., pp. 9–10. 64. The ACIE’s Action Plan consists of programmes to educate and counsel parents to enhance their interest in their children’s education; improving existing community-run tuition programmes, especially in mathematics and science; and seeking the Ministry of Education’s assistance in removing the institutional impediments to higher performance of Indian students. See ibid., pp. 23–36. 65. Ho Khai Leong, “The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore”, Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (December 1995): 76. 66. Ibid., p.77. 67. Ibid., pp. 78–79. 68. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, p.149. 69. Goh Chok Tong, “Our National Ethic”, Speeches 12, no. 5 (SeptemberOctober 1988): 14–15. 70. Straits Times, 10 January 1989, p. 12. 71. See Quah, ed., In Search of Singapore’s National Values. 72. “Shared Values”, Cmd 1 of 1991, White Paper presented to Parliament by Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore, 2 January 1991, p. 10, paragraph 52. 73. Straits Times, 16 January 1991, p. 1. 74. Lim Chong Yah, et al., Policy Options for the Singapore Economy (Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), p. 1. 75. Thomas J. Bellows, “Globalization and Regionalization in Singapore: A Public Policy Perspective”, Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (December 1995): 50. 76. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 64. 77. Ho Wing Meng, “By Way of an Introduction: Singapore and the Concept of a Global City,” in The Future of Singapore: The Global City, edited by Wee Teong Boo (Singapore: University Education Press, 1977), p. 109. 78. Geoffrey Murray and Audrey Perera, Singapore: The Global City State (Kent: China Library, 1995), p. xi. 79. Stella R. Quah, “Values and Development in Asia: A Historical Illustration of the Role of the State”, International Sociology 12, no. 3 (September 1997): 301 and 305. 80. Singapore 1999, p. 8. 81. Quah, “Values and Development in Asia”, p. 305. 82. Ibid., p. 308. 83. Ibid., p. 302. 84. Ibid., pp. 311–12. 85. Bellows, “Globalization and Regionalization in Singapore”, p. 51. 86. Ibid., pp. 51 and 56. 87. Ibid., pp. 56–57. 88. Ibid., p. 57.

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89. Straits Times, 16 October 1997, p. 2, quoted in Victor R. Savage, “Singapore as a Global City: Change and Challenge for the 21st Century,” in Singapore: Towards a Developed Status, edited by Linda Low (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 143. 90. Straits Times, 30 January 1998, p. 23; quoted in Savage, “Singapore as a Global City”, p. 143. 91. Chiew, “Singaporean National Identity.” 92. Chiew, “National Integration: The Case of Singapore”, pp. 145–46, fn. 19. 93. See Chiew Seen Kong and Tan Ern Ser, The Singaporean: Ethnicity, National Identity and Citizenship (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990). 94. Chiew Seen Kong, “National Identity, Ethnicity and National Issues”, in In Search of Singapore’s National Values, edited by Jon S.T. Quah (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), pp. 73–74. 95. Yap Mui Teng, Singaporeans Overseas: A Study of Emigrants in Australia and Canada (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991), p. 16. 96. Ibid., p. 17. 97. Ibid., pp. 17–18. 98. Ibid., p. 44. 99. Ibid., p. 45. 100. Ibid., pp. 45–46. 101. Derek da Cunha, “Singapore in 1998: Managing Expectations, Shoring-up National Morale”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 281. 102. Quoted in ibid., p. 281. 103. J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), p. 2. 104. Goh Phai Cheng, Citizenship Laws of Singapore (Singapore: Educational Publications Bureau, 1970), p. 11. 105. Ibid., p. 38. 106. “Prime Minister’s National Day Rally Speech”, in National Day Rally 1996 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1996), p. 67. 107. Singapore 21: Together, We Make The Difference (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 1999), p. 7. 108. Ibid., pp. 22–23. 109. Ibid., p. 42, emphasis added. 110. Ibid., pp. 43-44. 111. Ibid., p. 46. 112. Ibid., p. 65. 113. World Development Report 1998/99, pp.190–91. 114. Zuraidah Ibrahim, “Singapore’s New Goal: Be a World-class Home”, Straits Times, 23 August 1999, p. 1; and “Prime Minister’s Speech in English”, in Prime Minister’s National Day Rally Speech 1999 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999), p. 58

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m 4 n Globalization and Nationalism in the United States: A Historical Perspective JOEL HODSON

American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognize in common ... America is already the intellectual, scientific, and artistic capital of the world. — Henry Luce, “The American Century”, 1941 At the annual Lower East Side Jewish Festival yesterday, a Chinese woman ate a pizza slice in front of Ty Thuan Duc’s Vietnamese grocery store. Beside her a Spanish-speaking family patronized a cart with two signs: “Italian Ices” and “Kosher by Rabbi Alper”. And after the pastrami ran out, everybody ate knishes. — New York Times, June 1983

Introduction “The United States,” political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset wrote in the early 1960s, “may properly claim the title of the first new nation. It was the first major colony to successfully break away from colonial rule through revolution.” Lipset’s claim, made in the halcyon days of American post-war prosperity, echoes the exceptionalism that permeated American historiography and social science at that time. Nevertheless, the statement rightly positions the United States at the forefront of 102

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modern national experience and, by extension, to the process of globalization. The majority of countries in the world today are newly independent since World War II and, like their eighteenth-century American predecessor, are post-colonial nations. Most are “state-nations” constructed on the basis of social nationalism, rather than nation-states of single ethnic origin. Like the United States, they too are products of an accelerated process of globalization that characterizes modern times.1 Considerable differences of opinion exist about what constitutes globalization, when it began, and where it is leading us. World-systems analysts, for instance, put forth a metahistorical perspective that globalization is contemporaneous with the rise of capitalism and is an outcome of European expansion. In this view, globalization becomes the inevitable result of the free market at work. Other theorists tie globalization to specific historical conditions in the last three decades of the twentieth century, linking it directly to the economic crisis of the 1970s. Conceptually, globalization is used to explain the way world economic and social relations have been reorganized since then. State and international regulation of trade and investment (the international economy) is being replaced by cross-border networks (the world economy) that can elude national and international regulatory powers. In other words, the world is entering an altogether new phase of supranational capitalism.2 Globalization is central to this “new world order”. Simply defined, it is the flow of people, goods and services, information and ideas, across borders, but it has come to mean much more. In the popular idiom of news magazines, globalization elicits images of instantaneous communication, transcontinental flight, international institutions and multinational corporations — products and processes embodied materially by communications satellites and the Internet, the Concorde, the International Monetary Fund, and companies such as Nike and IKEA. Globalization is also expressed through ambiguous concepts: global reach, Americanization, McWorld. These have become catchwords in the vocabulary of “globe-talk”, a “discourse about [the] powerful new forces transforming the lives and fates of the entire world’s population”. The discourse is comprised of many voices and is freighted with assumptions. Globalization is good, bad, at best inequitable, or fundamentally a Western phenomenon at odds with the non-Western world. And it raises far-reaching questions: Does the globalization of culture mean a global culture? Does homogenization of the world’s cultures equate to Americanization? To what extent is global culture a hybridization? Ironically, globalization can lead to disintegration rather than integration.

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In fact, some observers predict cultural polarization — a world deeply divided along cultural or civilizational fault lines.3 These several perspectives on and questions arising from globalization suggest the multiple ways in which the topic can be approached. For the purposes of this essay about the United States, I will treat globalization as a long-term trend. A relative change in the pace of globalization has occurred in recent decades as new technologies compress space and time and multinational enterprises (MNEs) proliferate, but the underlying processes associated with the notion of globalization — transborder flows of people, goods, ideas and culture — are long-standing historical phenomena. Secondly, I want to point out that globalization does not necessarily represent the same things to all nations. In Japan, for instance, the importation of foreign foods, especially foreign grown rice, and the popularity of McDonald’s (by customer volume the number one restaurant in Japan) are perceived as threats to traditional Japanese culture. In this way, for many Japanese, globalization undermines national identity. Similarly, France is threatened by the invasive practices of the U.S. audiovisual industry and reacts by trying to erect a protectionist cultural policy to keep out Hollywood movies. The English language, especially Americanisms transmitted through film and other media, is perceived as threatening to French culture. By contrast to such countries as Japan and France, the United States is relatively open to cultural imports. Because of its immigration history, laissez-faire economic philosophy, and preponderant global market share of “infotainment” production, it is less threatened by outside cultural influences. American identity is not challenged by French bread or by a Japanese buy-out of Hollywood studios. Segments of the American economy are challenged by manifestations of globalization — such as Japanese encroachment in domestic American steel production and the automobile market, or such corporate restructuring practices as moving U.S. manufacturing to labour-cheap countries — but the United States may be more resilient than many other countries to the vicissitudes of global change. With this perspective in mind — that globalization can be viewed as a long-term trend with various implications for different nations — the focus here will be on selected features of continuity and change in the United States that can be associated with globalization. On one hand, the United States is a particular, meaning that, like other modern nations, it constitutes a specific product of globalization. On the other, the United States may also serve as a common point of reference for processes of global modernism. In other words, the whole of the so-called American

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experience, from pre-nationhood to world superpower status, parallels global modernism and, as such, can be viewed as being central to the ongoing discussion about globalization and how it impinges on national sovereignty and identity.

The United States as a Global Nation The United States was global before it was national. Population movement, one register of globalization, is the most obvious example. To date, the United States has received some seventy million recorded immigrants from all parts of the world. This process of transcontinental migration has a long history. The peopling of the Americas has been in progress for at least 25,000 years. Early “boat people” crossed the now submerged subcontinent of Beringia, or skirted its shores, island-hopping across the Berring Strait to Alaska when sea levels were perhaps 300 feet lower than today. These emigres fanned out across the American continents and by the time Columbus arrived during the Aztec age of the Fifth Sun (1492), the majority of Native Americans were living in advanced Mesoamerican societies whose trade routes and influences reached as far north as present-day St. Louis in the United States. With its capital at Tenochtitlan, the Aztec civilization was an empire of tribute and, like Spain which conquered it, had its own expansionist project in Mesoamerica.4 From that time on, transoceanic migrations reconstituted the population of the “New World”. By 1700, about 400,000 immigrants had left England alone for British colonies in the Americas. During the next sixty years, an additional 200,000 Europeans travelled to the mainland colonies, whose population exploded after England defeated France in the Seven Years War. Irish, Scottish, English, and German emigres gave the American colonies such a diverse population that by the time of the American War of Independence, radical publicist Thomas Paine could reason in his separatist tract, Common Sense, that “Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America” (1776). Less than fifty years later, by 1820, eleven million people had crossed the Atlantic from Europe and Africa, the majority of them indentured servants and slaves. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States, as the single largest recipient of migrants in the Western Hemisphere, doubled its population every thirty years, a rate of growth that has not been matched since. With these tens of millions of immigrants came the multifarious languages and cultures of Asia, Europe, and Africa.5

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A concomitant of human migration, and another register of globalization during the age of European expansion, is what has been termed “the Columbian Exchange”. This is the resulting interaction between Europe and the Americas of cultures, products, ideas, diseases, and other forms of biology, including, of course, human genes. The most dramatic example of the exchange is disease. Just as the Black Death was unwittingly transmitted from Asia to Europe in the fourteenth century, wiping out approximately one-quarter of Europe’s population, the Europeans and Africans carried deadly diseases to America in the following centuries. Smallpox, influenza, measles, plague, chickenpox, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and the common cold all found “virgin soil” in the Americas. It is believed that 90 per cent of Native Americans succumbed to the scourge of new diseases. Their hemispheric isolation had given them no immunities to the new transatlantic microbes. In Mexico alone, the estimated 25 million “Indians” of 1500 were reduced, primarily by disease, to 2.5 million by 1600. A similar but slower process took place along the Atlantic coast of North America as French and English explorers and traders interacted with native populations. In exchange, the Native Americans shared with their visitors a virulent form of syphilis, which the latter carried back across the Atlantic to cause suffering and death in Europe.6 International trade is another indicator that globalization was well advanced by the eighteenth century, and it jump-started the nationbuilding process in colonial America before the United States became a nation. Such trade was, of course, a world-wide phenomenon prior to the early modern period. The same rationale that led Europeans around the tip of Africa and across the Atlantic in search of markets, had earlier lured Chinese “treasure ships” and Muslim traders to explore the Pacific and Indian oceans. They created sophisticated maritime networks. Because of advances in navigation and shipbuilding, however, European explorers by 1522 had circumnavigated the globe, becoming the advance agents of accelerated globalization. Traders and merchants soon followed, hooking up to pre-existing trade networks in Africa and Asia, and establishing trading posts from Japan to Brazil. Over the next two centuries, the Americas were swiftly integrated into a mercantilistic world system designed to enhance the power of competitive nation-states. Western Europe constituted the core in this system, generating the capital, technology, desire for profit, and imagination needed to maintain it. On the periphery of the system, the American colonies provided raw materials and a market for finished products. Competition for New World materials and markets kept Europe at continuous war. Between 1689 and 1763, for instance, England and

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France and their various allies fought four wars for control of North America. The decisive struggle, known in its North American sector as the French and Indian War, and in Europe as the Seven Years War, was in reality a global conflict, a war for empire, with campaigns fought on four continents — in India and Africa, as well as Europe and North America. In short, this competition for global hegemony was the first world war. The irony of the struggle, which ended with the Treaty of Paris of 1763, was that by winning the war against France and its allies, England lost the North American continent by creating the conditions that led to American independence. With France removed as a physical threat at their northern border, Anglo-Americans no longer needed England for protection and could turn their anti-colonial sentiment towards the English Crown. The imperiousness of the British army in the American colonies and the indifference of the Board of Trade in London, which could speak about the colonies as “mere factors for the purposes of trade”, also influenced colonialist sentiment against England. King George III, sensitive to pressure from the Board and its rationale for and designs on the interior of North America, proclaimed an end to American colonial expansion westward. Anti-British mood was further exacerbated when the Parliament passed an Act levying taxes against the colonies to pay for the war. The tea tax of 1773 was particularly odious to the American colonists, illustrating the interplay between global economic concerns and local political interests at the time. The Act was designed in part to help save the bankrupt East India Company, which had a legal monopoly on British trade in the East Indies. The American colonists resented this transference of economic burden, on principle as well as for political reasons. The infamous Boston Tea Party was a result, an incident which pushed local and global-oriented parties towards violent confrontation. Thus, even before the Americans declared independence from Britain to form a new country in 1776, they were both products and agents of a lengthy and quickening process of globalization that included large-scale population migrations, exchanges of culture, biology and ideas, international competition for power, penetrative trade practices and global corporations, and a world war. These global processes accelerated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the United States cemented its political compact and redefined its nationhood.

Concepts of Nation, Citizenship, and National Identity The creation/recreation of national unity is a problem facing any new state, and it takes on increasing relevance in the face of globalization.

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Among immigrant societies, such as the United States, the problem of unity is compounded by the diversity of its population. Composed of different ethnic groups (ethnies), the society does not necessarily share the standard characteristics of nationhood: common language, religion, origin (ethnicity, geography, history, and mythology). In the absence of similar origins and shared culture, an immigrant society needs something to tie it together, to give it “psychological coherence” as a nation. This bond usually takes the form of its peoples’ shared intentions and commitment to a common ideology. While such a bond may appear to be a make-shift solution to nationhood, a pervasive ideology provides a country with cohesion and flexibility — useful qualities to have in a rapidly modernizing world in which one of the few constants is change. Of the many attempts to define nation, those by Anthony D. Smith and Benedict Anderson best explain the United States — a multicultural society which has no single ethnie and is held together by a civic ideology. For Smith, a sociologist, a nation serves among other functions as a “legalpolitical community” and “the only realistic basis for a free society of states in the modern world.” The state provides a basis for the creation of a sense of nationhood among its members. The United States, an immigrant society, follows this model of “social nation”, in which the various ethnic groups are integrated into a national community by common values. Along these same lines, anthropologist Benedict Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community” that exists fundamentally in the minds of its inhabitant-members, people who may not in other ways be related. This last idea works especially well for a large, diverse country such as the United States.7 To begin with, the United States is a nation built on legend. Among the many myths of American history, the signing of the Declaration of Independence ranks first. The image of the “Founding Fathers” gathered together to pledge their “lives, fortunes and sacred honour” in treasonous rebellion against the British Crown provides a compelling national marker that runs deep in the American national psyche. Similarly, the War of Independence provides the United States with an epic nationbuilding event and a pantheon of ready-made heroes, real and folkloric, to commemorate. Despite a healthy degree of cynicism about presentday government institutions, Americans gather around the national flag each year on 4 July, Independence Day, to celebrate the ideas of freedom and liberty. The image of a nation which forged its freedom in blood is a powerful one, and it gives the United States a more clearly defined nationalism than other English-speaking settler societies, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, countries which followed the United States

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in national development and benefited from a liberal British colonial policy because of “the cautionary tale” of American independence. Anderson’s notion of an imagined political community also works well for the United States because it is a nation built on abstractions — a set of core beliefs and values sometimes referred to as “the American Creed” and that function as a social contract. The Creed is explicitly stated in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which begins: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. Penned by Thomas Jefferson in 1776, and subject to the meaning of that time, the paragraph nevertheless constitutes a verbal commitment to the “universal” ideas of equality, opportunity, freedom, and justice that have become the burden of American history. Failure to honour this contract accounts for what Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal aptly termed “the American Dilemma”, a contradiction between the lofty ideas of the United States and its sometimes tawdry practices, especially regarding race. The task of achieving nationhood for the United States was complicated by problems other than the contradiction between political theory and social practice. Besides ethnic and racial diversity, the polity of the nation encompassed various political and economic, regional and religious interests. The Articles of Confederation, the precursor to the American Constitution, had bound the separate states to a common purpose but respected the voluntary nature of union by allowing for divided loyalties. This recognition of difference is maintained in numerous ways in the Constitution, which provides not only for a system of checks and balances within the government but also for the separation of powers between the national government and those of the states. It also provides for a multicultural society by establishing immigration as a national policy (Article I: Section 8). This is not to say that the federal government did not exercise social control or that dominant groups have not imposed cultural standards in America. It is simply that the United States began its history as a federative body, that its principal legal framework recognized conflicts of interest and reinforced difference, and that the bond holding it together needed to be a flexible political compact because of the country’s diversity. In short, U.S. nationhood was in large measure constructed on social values because of the global nature of the American experience. Similarly, the concept of nation in the United States has been flexible and changed over time. The political nationalism of the late eighteenth century was superseded by, in Anthony D. Smith’s phrase, “a powerful continental providential nationalism”. This patriotic and messianic sentiment developed over the course of the nineteenth century

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as the United States fought wars against European nations and Mexico — as well as Native American tribes — to expand its territory across the North American continent. Nationalist sentiment in the nineteenth century was expressed through continental pretensions. It manifests itself today in different forms, for instance, whenever American economic interests are threatened, or the United States sends troops abroad, such as during the Gulf War when former President George Bush’s popularity rating soared to 90 per cent. The most direct challenge to U.S. nationhood was the American Civil War (1861–65). The underlying reason for the war was the moral issue of slavery, but the direct cause was an attempt by the southern states to secede from the union. Secession made the war a constitutional issue and a test of national unity, but it also transformed American national consciousness. Before the war, the term “union” was used more often than “nation” to describe the United States, plural. They were, after all, a voluntary union. Abraham Lincoln popularized the word “nation” by using it five times in his 272-word Gettysburg Address, perhaps the most eloquent articulation of American ideas after the second paragraph of Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. (The phrase “one nation ... indivisible” in the American Pledge of Allegiance also alludes to the attempted secession of the southern states.) Historians, taking their lead from Lincoln himself, have referred to the Civil War as “the Second American Revolution”, a phrase redolent of a change in American political consciousness but also of the radical social changes that occurred because of war. The war ended the economic institution of slavery, shifted the political balance of power in the United States from the south to the north, and freed four million people from bondage. These byproducts of the war constituted a social revolution that altered the way the United States viewed itself as a country. As a united nation of free states at last, it could face the world as a great power without the stigma of “the peculiar institution”. For these reasons, the Civil War is America’s second most important national marker.8 The concept of citizenship, like that of nation, has changed over time. The United States follows the jus soli rule of citizenship, according all persons born within its territories, excluding the children of foreign diplomats, the rights and privileges of American citizenship. Provided for in the Constitution, citizenship is a state-defined, rather than a community-defined, concept. Initially, however, full political membership in the state was a privilege of the élite. Certain rights as well as responsibilities of citizenship, such as the vote, were based on property ownership and other criteria, and they were not generally granted to women, minority groups, or, prior to the 1830s, the majority of white

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males. African-Americans were not, as a rule, granted citizenship until 1870, and universal suffrage for women did not occur until 1920. Native Americans, who remained wards of the state until 1924, were granted full citizenship only with the Citizen Act of that year. The rights and privileges of citizenship that are now taken for granted in the United States and many other democratic nations have had to be won in America through social protest, legal redress, and, at times, civil disobedience. Not until the Civil Rights Movement and the black freedom struggle of the 1950s and 1960s did the national government take responsibility for enforcing laws protecting the civil and legal rights of African-Americans in the southern states, where, as second-class citizens, they had been segregated from white society and systematically denied the right to vote since the end of Reconstruction. Reform, however, is a predictable and celebrated pattern of behaviour in American society. It is notable that civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. is honoured with a national holiday. Only two other Americans, Presidents George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, are similarly celebrated. The concept of American identity has also long been in flux. In large measure, the change can be attributed to such global factors as human migration. In the late eighteenth century, American identity was derived from and defined by Europe, which provided the American colonies with not only its settler population but also its language and culture. An early definition of American identity was provided by Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, a Frenchman. Attuned to the European fascination during his day with the American republican experiment, Crèvecoeur published Letters from an American Farmer in 1782, which contained the now famous essay “What is an American?” In it, Crèvecoeur asked: What then is the American, this new man? He is neither an European, nor the descendent of an European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations.

Like Thomas Paine, Crèvecoeur had a patently Eurocentric view of American identity that ignored the mestizo, or interracially mixed, character of early American society. Nevertheless, his observations are indicative of both the problems and promises of American society, and he gave the United States, for better or worse, the melting pot theory. In America, he wrote, “individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men”.9 During the next one hundred years, the concept of American identity altered dramatically to reflect conditions both inside and outside the

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United States. Between 1820 and 1870, recurrent potato famines and other factors drove 2.5 million Irish Catholics to the United States. The Irish diaspora provided a cohesive ethnic group of non-Anglo-Saxon Protestant stock, altering the make-up of America’s growing urban centres and testing its tolerance of religious and cultural difference. By the end of the century, the “old immigrants” from western Europe who had made up the initial waves of immigration to America were being replaced by “the new immigrants” from southern and eastern Europe, about 27 million of them between 1880 and 1924. The diversity of these peoples is hard to imagine, in part because Euro-Americans now tend to be lumped together by the colour category “white”. An excerpt from a contemporary Harper’s magazine article, however, helps us to see the complexity of this, or any, racial grouping. In a piece entitled “Thirty Million New Americans”, published in 1934, Louis Adamic, himself a Yugoslavian emigre to the United States, had this to say about the changing America of his day: Within its population of one hundred and twenty-five million, the United States has today about thirty million citizens who are the American-born children of immigrant parents of various nationalities: German, Italian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Russian, Carpatho-Russian, Dutch, French, Flemish, Spanish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Armenian, Syrian, Lett, Albanian, Greek, Turkish ... English, Scotch and Irish.10

Adamic’s list of nationalities had expanded considerably from that of Crèvecoeur done 150 years earlier. He nevertheless left out nonEuropean immigrant groups, such as the 300,000 Chinese, almost exclusively male, who had immigrated to the west coast from 1853 until 1882, when the Chinese Exclusion Act ended immigration from China. By Adamic’s time, the number of Asians in the United States had dwindled, and it did not begin to rebound until the Exclusion Act was finally repealed during World War II and Chinese immigrants could become naturalized American citizens. It remained manifest, however, that non-whites were still outside the definition of American identity, an ascriptive/prescriptive Americanism which until recently excluded non-English speaking Asian immigrants.11 Despite periods of nativist reaction, the United States has for the most part followed a historical policy of free immigration dating back to the Declaration, which had defined expatriation as a basic human right. Then, as now, it was taken for granted that becoming an American was a matter of choice, and that the nation’s powers of assimilation, ideological as well as economic, would make good citizens of its

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immigrants, fusing them into Crèvecoeur’s “new man”. These ideas were popularized by a Jewish immigrant Israel Zangwill in a 1909 play entitled “The Melting-Pot”, but their credibility was soon undermined by World War I. As social critic Randolph Bourne observed in 1916: “The discovery of diverse nationalistic feelings among our great alien population has come to most people as an intense shock”. By the 1920s, when nativist laws were introduced to place quotas on immigration, the “melting-pot” theory was discredited. Clearly, not all the immigrants — Slavs, Italians, and Jews — crowding into America’s teeming cities at the turn of the century were being melted into the Anglo-Saxon pot of American identity. They retained their languages and cultures, and, like the Irish before them, were associated by nativists with labour strikes, social unrest, crime, and slum housing. An Americanization movement sprang up to purportedly protect the country from dilution by “foreign elements” and, more positively, to help newcomers adjust to the demands of immigrant life in a modern developing nation. The community-defined movement took the form of settlement houses, civic leagues, and protective legislation for immigrants, and was supported by progressive reformers, but the “real work” of assimilation took place in the public schools. The schools inculcated the national language, English, and the responsibilities of citizenship so important to a republic.12 A series of immigration acts dating from the 1950s have reversed earlier exclusionist laws. The new acts prioritize such factors as job skills, political asylum, and family reunification. Today, the majority of immigrants to the United States are from South America and Asia. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, they come overwhelmingly from Mexico, with the Philippines and China ranking second and third. During the 1980s, such immigration was responsible for fully one-third of the nation’s net population increase. Today, the foreign-born make up 10 per cent of the total population, a post-World War II high. A 1993 census report estimates that by 2050 the American population will reach 390 million, and no one ethnic group will form a majority in the United States. The white/non-white ratio will be 53: 47 per cent.13 Dramatic changes in demographic composition since the Immigration Act of 1965 have raised various problems for the United States. During the 1980s, immigration resurfaced as a major topic in American political discourse because of the increase of illegal migrants. Liberals and conservatives alike found themselves all over the map on the issue. Within the conservative camp alone, the Wall Street Journal took the classical liberal economic position that immigrants help fuel economic growth, proposing a five-word constitutional amendment, “There shall be open borders” (3 July 1984). On the other end of the conservative spectrum, nativist groups,

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such as the Federation of American Immigration Reform and the conservative periodical National Review advocated a moratorium on immigration. Despite periodic nativist reaction in the United States, however, immigration has remained an American tradition. But earlier theories of assimilation clearly no longer apply. The “melting-pot” theory worked for millions of individuals but failed to account for the persistence of ethnicity in the United States. Similarly, the idea of cultural pluralism helped explain ethnic loyalty and social divisions, but it has not accounted for American ideological cohesiveness or the fact that the United States did not become a “federation of national cultures.” Instead, the United States has become something greater than its ethnic parts, a state-nation held together both by common values and by extensive structural and marital assimilation. For instance, American Jews reportedly marry outside their ethnic group at a rate of 30 per cent; Mexican-Americans and Japanese intermarry with other ethnic groups at a rate of 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. Still, “segmented assimilation” remains the rule in the United States. Most immigrants experience upward social mobility over time; others, however, “assimilate downwards” into a permanent underclass. The latter pose significant problems, not just for state and federal welfare agencies but also for American national identity. For instance, one minority group, Hispanics, presently comprise about 11 per cent of the U.S. population but constitute 40 per cent of its poor. They have a high school drop-out rate three times that of white and twice that of black students, and the rate is increasing rather than decreasing for U.S.-born Hispanics.14 While definitions of nation, citizenship, and national identity have changed over time as policies were altered to match changing demographics and national consciousness, one cultural aspect of an “American nation” has not changed. English remains, despite experiments with bilingualism in the schools, a hegemonic and quasiofficial language. Although the United States has no Ministry of Culture or single educational system, it has historically been dominated by white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture imported from Europe, specifically England and France. Successive waves of ethnic groups have had to accommodate themselves to the English language as it evolved in the United States. The diversity of these people has insured and added to American multiculturalism and enriched the language, but a globallysourced population has not, to date at least, spawned a multilingual society. Minority-majority cities may have large numbers of Chinese or Spanish speakers, but it is not likely, because of the cosmopolitan character of American immigration, for another language to be accepted

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on par with English. For better or for worse, American English may prove to be the most enduring cultural feature of the United States and perhaps, as a medium of culture, its single most influential global export.

Nationalism and American Foreign Policy For much of its history, the United States has enjoyed both the actuality and illusion of isolation. Bordered on the north and south by less populated and militarily weaker nations, and buffered east and west by vast oceans, the country was relatively free from external threat and left to develop independently from Europe and Asia. Even before independence, historian Daniel Boorstin has reasoned, the American colonists achieved a high degree of self-governance because the distance separating them from England promoted self-reliance from the mother country. This “therapy of distance” allowed for new democratic forms of political and social life in the American colonies, resulting in citizen militias, relatively autonomous colonial assemblies, and other locally-oriented institutions. Upon political independence, the United States adopted an isolationist stance vis-à-vis Europe. In his presidential farewell address in 1796, George Washington set forth the principles that would guide American foreign policy until World War II. The United States, Washington advised, should maintain economic ties with other nations but enter into no permanent alliances. Nevertheless, from its inception, the United States had the potential to be a world power and, circumstances permitting, acted like one. For instance, when it was to the new nation’s advantage, its diplomats played one European power off against another, maintaining neutrality during ensuing wars between long-time belligerents England and France. The United States also developed a merchant fleet that allowed the young nation to expand its commercial and national interests worldwide. By the 1780s, Boston merchant vessels, as well as privateers and letters of marque, were making voyages to Asia around the Cape of Good Hope. Long before Commodore Perry’s notorious “Black Ships” forced a treaty on Japan in 1853, and contrary to the popular belief that Shogun were always hostile to foreigners, American vessels sometimes stopped at Japanese ports. By the 1840s, the United States had a whaling fleet in the Pacific and traded competitively in China. Between 1790 and 1850, U.S. exports, carried largely by American vessels, increased from US$20 million to US$152 million. One might say that the American global expansionist foreign policy of today originated during this earlier period in the ports and commercial centres of New England.15

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A formal statement of U.S. foreign policy, however, had to wait for America’s fifth President, James Monroe. Presented before Congress in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement of America’s intentions to stay free of European wars and to keep Europe out of the Western Hemisphere, which it reserved for itself. European nations ignored this upstart nationalist doctrine, but it nevertheless became the principal statement of American foreign policy. U.S. nationalism during the nineteenth century, however, was more clearly expressed through Manifest Destiny, the expansionist belief that the United States, by virtue of a divine mission, was enfranchised to control the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By mid-century, the United States had gained territorial sovereignty over what today constitutes its continental boundaries. Thomas Jefferson had doubled the size of the country through the Louisiana Purchase from France (1803), and Spain ceded Florida in 1819. In 1845, the United States annexed Texas and then, by defeating Mexico in the War of 1847, acquired the rest of the southwest, as well as California. England ceded the Oregon territory in 1846, and Russia sold Alaska to the United States in 1867. In all, the United States had acquired from foreign nations over four million square kilometres of prime real estate in sixty years. That is not exactly the work of an inward-looking nation. For all intents and purposes, the United States became an imperial power when it defeated Mexico and annexed its territory north of the Rio Grande. The age of American imperialism is nevertheless generally considered to be the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century when the United States began purchasing, annexing, and conquering non-contiguous territories. Between 1898 and 1917, it joined the European race to acquire territory abroad, ranging from the Philippines in the Pacific to the Panama Canal zone in Central America. According to historian Robin Winks, however, U.S. imperialism differed from that of Europe in both ideology and policy. Because of its own history as a colony, the United States was self-conscious about colonizing other countries. As a consequence, there was always considerable internal opposition to expansion. The United States also differed from the European nations in its colonial intentions, which, Winks argues, was to remake other societies in its own image using the American model, offering independence or statehood. This assessment makes sense for several reasons. First, American colonial possessions, excepting Hawaii, were all taken away from European powers. Secondly, the United States has not added to its territory since 1917. Thirdly, its colonial intentions were clearly short-term. The United States had no permanent overseas civil service or military establishment, such as the British Colonial Office.16

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A neo-colonial reading of American fin de siècle expansion offers a different perspective. There are formal and informal types of imperialism. Economic domination, political manipulation, and the threat of intervention may not equate to sending in troops and settlers, but they are nevertheless coercive. American foreign trade figures tell part of this story. Between 1865 and 1914, the United States reversed its unfavourable balance of trade, with exports increasing ten times from US$234 million to US$2.5 billion. The increase occurred in part at the expense of European competitors, who protested against an “American export invasion”. Between 1870 and 1914, for instance, the U.S. percentage share of world manufacturing production rose from 23 per cent to 36 per cent while England’s declined from 32 per cent to 14 per cent. But U.S. expansion was particularly strong in Latin America where the value of exports increased six times in the same period. By 1910, Americans were controlling 43 per cent of Mexican property and producing half of Mexico’s oil. American political influence and culture accompanied its products and investments abroad.17 The “open-door” policy and dollar diplomacy tell another part of the story of American imperialism. Articulated by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 in response to Japanese and other imperial encroachments in China, the “open-door” policy represented the desire, if not the resolve, of the U.S. foreign policy élite to preserve the territorial integrity of nations around the world in order to foster free trade and protect American commerce. It was as much an ideology as a policy. The wellbeing of the U.S. economy, it was believed, depended on exports, and foreign trade would suffer unless the United States intervened abroad to maintain order — that is, serve as a global policeman. Thus, America’s arch-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt, whose motto was “speak softly but carry a big stick”, sent the U.S. Navy, the “Great White Fleet”, on a world tour to Asia in 1907. Similarly, President William H. Taft tried to counter Japanese advances in Asia through dollar diplomacy — the use of private funds to serve American diplomatic goals while at the same time profiting American financiers. Both approaches continue to underscore American foreign policy today. It is a cliché that after World War I the United States reverted to isolationism. True, President Woodrow Wilson was unable to garner votes for U.S. membership in the League of Nations, but the United States was nevertheless staking out new territory at the time in the international economy. As diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams convincingly argued fifty years ago, the central theme of American foreign policy has been the expansion of the United States. By the late 1920s, the United States had become a financial capital and

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was producing a hefty share of the world’s industrial goods. The growth of its economy had become dependent on foreign markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities. American companies such as General Electric were heavily invested in war-torn Europe as well as in Latin American and Middle East oil production. They could count on help from the U.S. Commerce Department and American banks, which were permitted to open foreign branches. Contrary to popular belief, the United States was global in outlook and outreach long before World War II, and the economic and political processes associated with globalization today were already in place.18

The American Century Prior to American entry into World War II, it was clear to irrepressible interventionists like Henry Luce, owner of the popular and influential American magazines, Time and Life, that the United States would not only intervene in Europe but that it would lead the world after the war was over. In the tradition of John L. O’Sullivan and the champions of nineteenth-century Manifest Destiny, Luce envisioned a global role for the United States in human history. The destiny of America, according to Luce, was not simply to save the world from totalitarianism but “to feed all its people” as well. In ridding the world of fear and want, Luce’s United States would also take the lead in trade, by exporting its technology, technicians, and ideas. The second half of the twentieth century would be a pax Americana, “the American century”. For all the interventionist rhetoric, considerable difference of opinion existed in the United States during and after World War II about the structure of post-war America and its international role and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the destruction of Europe and parts of Asia demanded immediate post-war attention. As Winston Churchill described it in 1945, Europe was “a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate”. The situation called for extraordinary means and presented extraordinary opportunities. The United States seemed to be the obvious hegemon to create and direct the post-war international economic order. The prevailing view among America’s allies in Europe was that the U.S. export economy, which had fuelled the war effort, could be relied on to reconstruct war-torn Europe. The enormous task of reconstruction presented an immediate need for international institutions to manage the international economy. Some of these institutions were already in place before the end of the war. International delegates met at Bretton Woods, New

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Hampshire, in 1944 and San Francisco the following year to create the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations committed the United States to world co-operation and advanced globalization by helping to stabilize trade and finance. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) followed shortly after the war. Largely authored and financed by the United States, all these institutions could be manipulated to support American policy and trade. The optimistic developmentalist view, however, was that U.S. hegemony would translate into a positive-sum game in which everyone would benefit. The United States, of course, was positioned to benefit most.19 Compared to many European and Asian nations, the United States came out of World War II relatively unscathed. America’s 400,000 dead were few compared to tens of millions in Europe and Asia. American cities were intact, and the U.S. industrial plants were running at full speed. By 1950, the nation was producing nearly half the world’s industrial output. American foreign trade leaped from US$4 billion in 1940 to US$10 billion in 1950, and then doubled to US$20 billion by 1960. A big question for businesses and corporations, as well as for individual wage earners whose real income increased by 50 per cent between 1940 and 1970 was what to do with the profits and savings? Much of this capital went into the domestic post-war boom and the resultant consumerism in the United States, but large amounts were also earmarked for investment in foreign markets. Multinational companies such as International Harvester and Singer Sewing Machine had been in these markets for decades, but they and other corporations were now positioned to reinvest their substantial war-time retained earnings in expanding overseas operations. Besides having the lion’s share of the world’s industrial capacity and investment capital, the United States after World War II also had a powerful army and arsenal, including the atomic bomb. This was a sea change for a nation that had entered the War with an army smaller than that of Holland. After 1945, the influence of the military-industrial complex pervaded American society. In his presidential farewell address in 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned the nation about the conjunction of military and big business interests. Throughout the Cold War, however, the military-industrial complex allowed the United States to counter Soviet expansion and advance American interests through the role of “global policeman”. The economic largesse of the post-war period also reinforced the liberal consensus in the United States that the benefits of American democratic capitalism would eventually

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eliminate social conflict at home. The federal government could set about the “unfinished work” of providing economic and social justice for minorities. Several things happened in the 1960s and 1970s, however, to undermine confidence in American institutions, challenge the notions of the liberal consensus, and deflate the post-war boom economy. First, President John Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963. As a political expediency in the tense Cold War context of the early sixties, a commission was formed to investigate the assassination and provide immediate answers for a grieved American public. Headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission issued a 900-page report which concluded that a lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, had assassinated the President. Many Americans found the report’s main conclusion, derisively referred to as “the magic bullet theory”, incredible. Public opinion polls conducted in 1964 before the Warren Report was issued registered that 76 per cent of Americans had a great deal of confidence in their government. Thirty years later, after the Vietnam War, Watergate, and subsequent investigations had overturned the findings of the Warren Commission, that number had dropped to 19 per cent. (According to a CBS [Columbia Broadcasting Service] survey conducted in 1993, 49 per cent of people questioned believed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been involved in the Kennedy assassination.) These numbers are not solely attributable to a perceived political whitewash, or to the Vietnam War, or any other single factor, but they are indicative of a major shift in public attitudes about their government that have undermined the ideals of America since the Kennedy assassination.20 Throughout the 1960s, the post-war liberal consensus in the United States unravelled. Race issues, which had been organizationally contained within the civil rights movement and localized in the South, swept the nation as Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders carried the black freedom struggle to the North. By the end of the decade, despite President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” legislation to end poverty and discrimination, destructive race riots erupted in Detroit, Los Angeles, and other cities. Meanwhile, television journalism had brought the war in Vietnam home to American living rooms. The war divided the public, first along generational lines, and later generally. Anti-war protests and marches disrupted university life across the nation. Economically, decades of guns-and-butter deficit spending on government social programmes and the war had also drained the treasury. By 1968, the war had become so divisive that Johnson’s presidency was no longer tenable, and he stunned the nation by not running for re-election.

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No incident in recent history, however, did more to undermine the office of the President, the chief symbol of the nation, than the Watergate scandal, which forced Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974. The President was indicted for a list of abuses of power that included obstruction of justice and the illegal manipulation of government agencies. (The political legacy of the Watergate impeachment proceedings still haunts Washington, recently in the attempt to impeach President Bill Clinton, whose legal and ethical troubles have further tarnished the presidency). During the turbulent decade between 1963 and 1974, assassination, resignation, and the threat of impeachment claimed three presidents. Finally, U.S. economic performance slowed in the 1970s as American interdependence with the rest of the world became more evident. The economic downturn was in large measure due to the Arab oil embargo and oil crises in the 1970s, but U.S. dependence on foreign sources for natural resources besides oil had also increased dramatically since World War II. There were financial factors, too. Interest rates had risen, and private investment had declined. Corporate profits began to fall. New economic terms, such as “stagflation” and the “misery index” were coined to describe the conjunction of economic recession (stagnation), inflation, and high unemployment. The generally poor economic climate reflected cumulative changes in the international economy. American corporations began to feel the sting of foreign competition. In the early 1970s, the United States experienced its first trade deficit in nearly one hundred years. By the end of the decade, it was running a US$30 billion a year trade deficit. Increasing imports meant significant market share losses for American manufacturers in the automobile and consumer electronics industries. The export deficit reached roughly US$150 billion by the late 1980s when reactions to globalization, disguised as Japan bashing, became a central political campaign issue. As the troubled presidencies of Jimmy Carter and George Bush aptly illustrate, the United States was vulnerable to adverse conditions in the world economy and to the negative consequences of globalization. Despite the fact that compared to most countries in the world the United States benefited disproportionately from globalization, in the 1970s and 1980s free trade and lower foreign production costs came home to roost. American businesses responded by corporate restructuring, an overall global market strategy that included eliminating jobs in the labourexpensive United States by moving production across the border or overseas to cheap-labour locations. AT&T, for instance, farmed out telephone assembly work first to Singapore and then to Thailand; General Electric, IBM, Eastman Kodak, and other corporations also linked job cutting to future competitiveness. By moving manufacturing

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overseas, U.S. companies could presumably protect themselves against a strengthening dollar, reduce transportation costs to markets, and benefit from cheaper labour. They also further shifted the balance of power away from labour to management. For American workers on the receiving end of “downsizing”, as it was euphemistically called, the results were harsh. Globalization in their case translated into reduced benefits and wages and lost jobs. Between 1980 and 1990, Fortune 500 companies reduced their work-force by 20 per cent. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which provided for tarifffree trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. As the results of the 1992 presidential election suggested, fears about jobs were foremost in the public mind. George Bush lost the presidency for failing to grasp the catch phrase “It’s the economy, stupid!” The economy in that phrase was spelled “g-l-o-b-a-l-i-z-a-t-i-o-n.” The NAFTA debate continued into the Clinton Administration and proved pivotal for the United States. First, it tested how far economic nationalism could push the nation towards neo-protectionism. Although President Clinton was able to get the treaty ratified in 1993, NAFTA proponents had to overcome strong opposition. Two years later, protectionists undermined the renewal of the fast-track negotiation authority for new trade agreements. Nevertheless, NAFTA held. Secondly, the debate addressed a new set of issues beyond traditional economic concerns with tariffs and trade barriers. It encompassed such social policy issues as environmental controls, labour standards, and human rights. Finally, unlike intra-regional co-operation in Europe and Asia, NAFTA provided a test case for a free trade agreement between vastly unequal partners. The U.S. population, for instance, is nearly ten times that of Canada and its gross domestic product (GDP) is more than twenty-five times that of Mexico. The problems of inequity are manifest. Whereas both countries profit from tariff-free access to the large U.S. market, Canada and Mexico risk being overpowered by American culture and capital. Free trade for these nations can equate to diminished national sovereignty and cultural identity.21 The late 1980s to early 1990s witnessed an array of books about American economic decline and the end of the American century, such as Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987). Because of “imperial overstretch”, Kennedy argued, the United States had ignored its domestic economy, which was consequently falling behind those of Germany and Japan. Certainly, these trends were apparent in the 1980s when Japan captured the semiconductor and telecommunications equipment market, growth in the Japanese stock market outpaced that

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of the United States, and the latter was displaced in the global service sector, such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. By 1992, for instance, the largest bank in the United States, Citicorp, ranked only twenty-seventh in the world, while Japan dominated the top ten list. In the same year, the U.S. trade deficit reached US$40 billion and by 1994 imports accounted for 50 per cent of American domestic consumption. However, by the end of the decade, after seven or eight years of strong economic growth, negative predictions about American economic and military power became out of date, if not out of print. The Dow-Jones average when President Bill Clinton took office in 1992 was 3242. It tripled by early 1999 to over 10,000. In the same period, the Federal Budget swung from a negative US$290 billion to a positive US$70 billion, and the overall economic growth rate rebounded to 3.5 per cent. Despite good news for the U.S. economy, changes in American business practices, such as greater reliance on part-time “contingent” workers and out-sourcing, continue to disrupt the American work place. Company profits have risen but many middle managers as well as lowerlevel white-collar and blue-colour workers are, if presently employed, in lower paying jobs than ten years ago. In the 1980s, McDonald’s and other U.S. multinationals penetrated far-flung markets in Japan, Turkey, and the USSR, but Japanese and Swedish companies, such as Toyota and IKEA, and other foreign multinationals did the same in the large U.S. market. Meanwhile, American companies moved production overseas. Nike footwear, for instance, subcontracts 100 per cent of its production to the Third World. In fact, 70 per cent of the U.S. domestic production is now subject to international competition, and American share of global manufacturing trade has decreased from 25 per cent to 12 per cent since 1960. Thus, globalization also impacts negatively on the United States by taking a harsh toll on increasingly larger segments of American society.22 Another way that globalization is negatively affecting the United States is by augmenting class differences. This is happening in two ways. First, the classic disparity between the rich and the poor in the United States is intensifying. The gap in average income between the top and bottom fifths of American society, which increased dramatically during the Reagan-Bush years, has continued to widen during President Clinton’s Administration. Secondly, globalization is segmenting the middle class. In a recent book entitled An Empire Wilderness, Robert D. Kaplan asserts that globalization is transforming the United States into “an economic and cultural junction point for the world’s most talented peoples — a sort of duty free zone for trade and commerce and cultural interaction.” In this scenario, class becomes as important as race in North America as divisions develop along

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educational and economic lines more than ethnic ones. Within the middle class, Kaplan sees what he calls “an upper-middle-class global, nouvellecuisine America, and a lower-middle-class, nation-state-oriented mobilehome America”. The former are global in outlook, IT-oriented, and live international lifestyles. The latter have little idea what Vice-President Al Gore is talking about when he promotes the information superhighway. The value of their human capital (skills and knowledge) is diminished in a post-industrial society. By contrast, upwardly mobile, globally conscious middle class Americans may now have more in common with international counterparts in France or Singapore, with whom they do business and vacation at Club Med, than with compatriots from the lower middle class.23

America and McWorld In obvious ways, the United States is the avatar of globalization. It dominates key segments of the world economy and key technologies. Its brand names are everywhere — McDonald’s, Marlboro, Microsoft. American popular music fills the world’s airwaves, and Hollywood feature films top the world’s list of highest-grossing movies. The U.S. aerospace industry, still the nation’s largest export, supplies the world with “American” aircraft. The national origin of many products, however, needs to be qualified. For instance, the F-16, America’s most popular fighter jet in the world, is assembled in three continents from parts and expertise derived from nine countries. With the “rationalization” of the defence industry after the Cold War, multinationals, such as LockheedMartin, have teamed up with corporations overseas to build planes. The same process occurs in other industries too. Thus, one of the greatest stories of the end of the Cold War may not be political — the collapse of the Soviet Union — but economic and cultural, seen in the proliferation of multinational corporations and the global reach of the soft power of U.S. culture.24 Perhaps the most apt statement of American economic and cultural imperialism is contained in Benjamin R. Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld (1995). The term “McWorld” expresses the economic, technological, and ecological forces that are inundating the world with “fast music, fast computers, and fast food — MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald’s — pressing nations into one homogeneous global theme park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment and commerce.” According to Barber, McWorld is American in form and style — laissez-faire, expansionist, post-modern, constructed on images

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generated by post-national corporations serving a universal tribe of consumers. Furthermore, McWorld constitutes an ideology, or more precisely a videology, of consumption mediated by the U.S.-dominated “infotainment" sector.25 At the centre of McWorld is the United States, which controls the flow of information, communication, and entertainment via the world’s software — books, movies, computer programs, magazines, videos, theme parks, advertising pages, songs, software, newspapers, and television programmes. Through these means, embodied by CNN, Hollywood, and even scholarly and academic presses, the United States establishes global cultural norms, in large measure shaping the material aspirations of the world’s youth. By controlling the production of communications, as well as its language, the United States gains power and influence through persuasion and insinuation, undermining world democracy by virtue of its hegemony. The result is “technopoly”, Neil Postman’s term for “the submission of all forms of cultural life to the sovereignty of technique and technology”. Barber does not view U.S. technopoly as some kind of conspiracy but rather as the result of market conditions in the New Information Age. For instance, American popular culture becomes, by virtue of its ubiquitousness, global culture. Moreover, American hegemony is partly the result of other nations’ growing dependence on the United States because it forms the basis of their export economies. (For forty countries in the world, the United States is their principal export destination; nearly half of the world’s exporters list America in the top three destinations for exports.) Such market conditions — and the integration of financial, military, and technological power that the United States enjoys — may not add up to conspiracy, but uncontested American hegemony justifiably concerns the nations of the world.26 Another way to measure U.S. influence on foreign economies is through its major multinationals, which earn significant portions of their income abroad. These companies hire large numbers of workers overseas and infuse significant investment capital into the economies of host nations. For instance, the United States accounted for nearly 40 per cent of new commitments to the manufacturing sector in Singapore in 1997. Cumulative investment by American companies in the island nation reached US$15 billion in total assets that year. In addition, as its largest trading partner, the United States also absorbed over 18 per cent of Singapore’s exports, a larger proportion than any other country. General Motors (GM), a single corporation, provides another dramatic example. Although it has downsized in the 1990s and is being challenged by Ford, GM is still the world’s largest corporation, with an employment

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force of well over half a million workers. Forty per cent of its production is done overseas. Like GM, other American companies do considerable overseas sales. Coca-Cola, for instance, does 80 per cent of its business abroad, where eight-ounce servings of Coke are ingested at the rate of over 720,000 per minute. McDonald’s, with 15,000 restaurants worldwide, serves twenty million customers a day. These several examples suggest a scale of American hegemony nearly unimaginable.27 In Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Anthony D. Smith asks, “Can a global culture avoid cultural imperialism? Can it become truly cosmopolitan?” Given the market conditions of the Information Age and the power inequities between nations, the answer appears to be “no”, at least for the present. The United States dominates the world economy and cultural production, and it controls strategic flows of information. Although a growing class of internationally-minded people are wired into the global network, their international culture is increasingly defined by American products and Western institutions. American English, for better or worse, has become the global lingua franca. Americanization has become nearly synonymous with globalization, or so it seems. This trajectory, however, can be misleading. Perhaps the answer is “yes”; global culture can become truly cosmopolitan. American culture, it may be argued, is also being transformed by global processes as nationalism loses relevance in the face of globalization. For instance, products are not always what they appear to be. “American” cars are made in Japan, and Japanese “imports” are manufactured in the United States. In the United States, something so basic to culture as to be almost unnoticeable — what people eat — has been globalized. Chinese, French, Greek, Indian, Italian, Mexican, Philippine, Thai, Turkish and Middle Eastern cuisines have become daily fare in American cities. There are also hybrid cuisines found nowhere else in the world, such as CubanChinese and Korean-Japanese. Salsa now outsells that most “American” of condiments, ketchup, as Heinz, an American company synonymous with it, scrambles to make up sales on the world market. The cuisine of the United States has regularly been reinvented by the rest of the world, just as American culture influences it. McWorld works both ways.28

Conclusion At the end of Luce’s “American Century”, it appears that the United States is positioned to benefit from, and to manipulate, globalization. I have argued that it is a long-term trend with various implications for different nations, and that the United States has, because of its history,

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enjoyed a favourable position in a globalizing world. From its inception, the United States was a global nation, propelled by “universalist” ideas and endowed with the material potential to be a world power. As it evolved throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, America periodically reinvented itself, not only through civil war and redefinition of citizenship, but also through territorial and economic expansion. Long before World War II, the U.S. economy had expanded into foreign markets and become dependent on overseas investment opportunities. Since then, the country has become increasingly global in outlook and outreach. After the war, for better or worse, it took the lead in the West in international affairs and the world economy, dominating international institutions and leading in the research and development of new technologies. Reflecting both a liberalized immigration policy and changing global conditions, the United States — whose immigrant numbers today are higher than at any time since World War II — remains a major recipient nation for the world’s peoples. They, in turn, continue to reinvent America in their own image, maintaining it as a globally-sourced nation of nations. Whereas American hegemony is understandably a world-wide concern, globalization also presents problems for the United States. The same processes that undermine the sovereignty of other nations, such as loss of state and international regulatory authority, also worry the United States. Similarly, international competition and the reorganization of production increasingly challenge American businesses and workers. Regional agreements, such as NAFTA, present social policy problems regarding labour standards, environmental controls, and human rights. It may be that regionalization will ultimately dilute American culture in the same way that it is presently perceived to undermine the national sovereignty and cultural identity of Canada and Mexico. But generally, I think globalization threatens the United States less than it does more traditional societies, such as France and Japan. In immigrant societies, the flow, so to speak, is already there. In the particular case of the United States, America was global before it was national, and it has remained so, both as a product and as an agent of globalization.

Notes 1. Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (1979), p. 15; and James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (1998), p. 3. The position taken on nationalism and globalization here is one by an American expatriate, who, although critical of U.S. policy, is presenting American-centred, and

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2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

Joel Hodson possibly Americentric, explanations, arguments, and concerns. From other perspectives, globalization and U.S. nationalism will undoubtedly appear differently. Because of the broad scope of this chapter, and the requirements of a volume on nationalism and globalization, which are large and contested topics, I have omitted much and found it necessary at times to make sweeping generalizations. The latter are meant to frame and initiate conversation about the United States, and I trust they will be received in that spirit. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (1974); and Robert W. Cox, “A Perspective on Globalization“, in Globalization: Critical Reflections (1996), p. 24. Various positions can be taken on globalization. See, for instance, Frederic Jameson’s listing in The Cultures of Globalization (1998), p. 54; and Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World (1997). Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (1998), p. 2; and Mike Featherstone, Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity (1990), p. 1. About cultural and civilization fault lines, see Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (1995); and Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993). A worst case scenario of globalization envisions significant segments of the global village disintegrating into anarchy. The authority of conventional national and international power structures becomes undermined and societies fragmented (Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 [February 1994]). Francis Jennings, The Founders of America (1994). John M. Murrin, “Beneficiaries of Catastrophe: The English Colonies in America”, in The New American History (1990), p. 5. Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange (1972). Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995), pp. 54, 147; and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983), p. 15. James McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (1990). Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer (1782), in The Heath Anthology of American Literature (1990), p. 895; and Gary B. Nash, “The Hidden History of Mestizo America”, Journal of American History (December 1995). Louis Adamic, “Thirty Million New Americans”, in American Perspectives (1934), p. 94. James P. Shenton, “Ethnicity and Immigration”, in The New American History (1990), p. 262. Randolph S. Bourne, “Trans-National America,” in War and the Intellectuals (1964), p. 107; and Philip Gleason, “American Identity and Americanization,” in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (1980), p. 40. Census cited in William Booth, “One Nation, Indivisible: Is It History?” Washington Post, 22 February 1998, p. A1. William Branigin, “Immigrants Shunning Idea of Assimilation,” Washington Post, 25 May 1998, p. A1. An example of the problems referred to is educational requirements for new jobs in California. According to a RAND report, 85 per cent of new jobs in the state now require post-secondary

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19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

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education. High drop-out figures for Hispanics suggest increasing polarity of income-earning potential. Ralph D. Paine, Ships and Sailors of Old Salem (1927), pp. 141–42. Robin W. Winks, “American Imperialism in Comparative Perspective,” in The Comparative Approach to American History (1968). Mary Beth Norton, et al, A People and a Nation (1994), pp. 661–62. William Appleman Williams, “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s”, Science and Society (Winter 1954). Ankie Hoogvelt, in Globalization and the Postcolonial World (1997) cites world trade figures and the development of a “global state system” early this century to illustrate the historical continuity of global processes. A measurement currently used to illustrate the increasing interconnectedness of the international economy, world trade has not, contrary to expectations, increased in relative terms since before World War I (pp. 70–71). The share of world production subject to transnational corporate control has also remained stable (p. 115). See also Anthony Giddens’ The Nation-State and Violence, which traces globalization to the early part of this century by discussing the maintenance of a global “reflexively monitored system of nation-states” after World War I (1987, p. 256). Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order (1987), p. 213. Figures here from the Louis Harris Poll are cited in Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (1996), p. 282. M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub, eds., The NAFTA Debate (1994). Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (1995), pp. 41, 75; Time, 25 January 1999, pp. 30–31; and Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World (1997), pp. 123–24. Robert D. Kaplan, Interview with Toby Lester in “Books & Authors”, Atlantic Unbound, 16 September 1998, p. 2 . Ann Markusen, “The Rise of World Weapons”, Foreign Policy 114 (Spring, 1999): 43. Barber (1995), p. 4. Technopoly 52, cited in Barber (1995), p. 274. Background Notes Singapore, October 1998; “Future 5 Hundred Largest Corporations”, Forbes, 26 April 1999, p. F-10; Barber (1995), p. 229; and Hoover’s Handbook, cited in Barber (1995), p. 18. Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era (1995), p. 18.

References Adamic, Louis. “Thirty Million New Americans” (1934). In American Perspectives: The United States in the Modern Age, edited by Carl Bode, pp. 94–99. Washington, DC: USIA, 1992. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Background Notes Singapore. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Public Affairs, October 1998.

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Baer, M. Delal and Sidney Weintraub, eds. The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. Barber, Benjamin. R. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books, 1995. Booth, William. “One Nation, Indivisible: Is It History?” Washington Post, 22 February 1998, p. A1. Bourne, Randolph S. “Trans-National America” (1916). In War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915–1919. New York: Harper Books, 1964. Branigin, William. “Immigrants Shunning Idea of Assimilation.” Washington Post, 25 May 1998, p. A1. Cox, Robert W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. . “A Perspective on Globalization.” In Globalization: Critical Reflections, edited by James H. Mittelman, pp. 21–30. International Political Economy Yearbook, Vol. 9. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Crosby, Alfred W. The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972. de Crèvecoeur, Hector St. John. Letters from an American Farmer (1782). In The Heath Anthology of American Literature, edited by Paul Lauter et al. Vol 1. Boston: D.C. Heath, 1990. Featherstone, Mike, ed. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity. New York: Sage Publications, 1990. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon, 1992. “Future 5 Hundred Largest Corporations”. Forbes, 26 April 1999. Gellner, Earnest. Nationalism. New York: New York University Press, 1997. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Gleason, Philip. “American Identity and Americanization.” In Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Thernstrom et al. Boston, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1980. Holton, Robert J. Globalization and the Nation-State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Hoogvelt, Ankie. Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations”. Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. Jameson, Frederic. “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue”. In The Cultures of Globalization, edited by Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998. Jennings, Francis. The Founders of America: From the Earliest Migrations to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Kaplan, Robert D. “The Coming Anarchy”. Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–76. . Interview with Toby Lester, in “Books & Authors”, Atlantic Unbound, 16 September 1998. Kellas, James G. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan, 1998. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

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Lipset, Seymour Martin. The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979. . American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword. New York: W.W. Norton, 1996. McPherson, James M. Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Markusen, Ann. “The Rise of World Weapons.” Foreign Policy 114 (Spring 1999): 40–51. Mittelman, James H. “The Dynamics of Globalization” and “How Does Globalization Really Work?” In Globalization: Critical Reflections, edited by James H. Mittelman, pp. 1–19, 229–41. International Political Economy Yearbook, Vol. 9. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Murrin, John M. “Beneficiaries of Catastrophe: The English Colonies in America.” In The New American History, edited by Eric Foner, pp. 1–23. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990. Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York: Harpers Brothers, 1944. Norton, Mary Beth et al. A People and A Nation. 4th edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Paine, Ralph D. Ships and Sailors of Old Salem. Boston, MA, 1927. Rich, Spencer. “U.S. Immigrant Population at Postwar High”. Washington Post, August 1995, pp. A1, A8. Shenton, James P. “Ethnicity and Immigration.” In The New American History, edited by Eric Foner, pp. 251–70. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990. Smith, Anthony D. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974. . The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Williams, William Appleman. “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s.” Science and Society 18, no. 1 (Winter 1954). Winks, Robin W. “American Imperialism in Comparative Perspective.” In The Comparative Approach to American History, edited by C. Van Woodward. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

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m 5 n Globalization and the Challenges to Malay Nationalism as the Essence of Malaysian Nationalism HALIM SALLEH

Introduction1 Globalization has reconstructed ethnicity and ethnic nationalism the world over. The exemplary case of Eastern Europe is too well-known to require elaboration. It suffered hitherto unknown mass ethnic violence to the point of ethnic annihilation. Closer to home, Indonesian ethnic nationalism has not only produced mass violence and hardships on a massive scale over an extended period of time but also threaten to break up the Indonesian state: the struggle for independence in East Timor, Aceh, and Kalimantan are probably just the beginning. Globalization in general seems to have re-ignited old ethnic fears and excited new ethnic demands in multi-ethnic societies. How does it affect Malaysia, a multi-ethnic state-nation which experienced serious ethnic clashes in the 1960s? Does it suffer a similar predicament? If not, why? What has happened to the fiery ethnic nationalism and ethnic struggles of post-colonial Malaysia? This chapter will discuss the rise of Malaysian nationalism and the challenges to it brought about by globalization. It will focus on how Malay nationalism emerged in the early part of the twentieth century and why it became strongly asserted in the 1980s under the New Economic Policy (NEP). Other types of ethnic nationalism in Malaysia, particularly Chinese ethnic nationalism, contested Malay dominance but internal splits and inter-ethnic élite alliance as well as rapid economic 132

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growth diluted non-Malay demands and diminished their position. This gave the opportunity for the Malays, through their major political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to exert their power and authority to define “Malaysian nationality” in terms of Malay interests, culture, and religion. But globalization brought about new challenges and opportunities, particularly to the Malay leadership. While they continue to safeguard Malay dominance, they at the same time turned Malay nationalism into an instrument for accumulation and concentration of corporate wealth in the hands of the few. In the process, they compromised the position of major symbols of Malay nationalism, such as Islam, the Malay-dominated education system, and the Malay language. Can the leaders defend themselves by creating new national myths and symbols and share it with other Malaysians in what may be called a new “Malaysian nationalism”? This chapter shows that ethnicity and ethnic nationalism are still pervasive and impair such a move. At the same time, the new nationalism is fragile and superficial because it is constructed mainly as a political defence. Opposing Malay camps hold UMNO leaders accountable for the decline of Malay nationalism and this seems to set the stage for a new political change in Malaysia .

Early Development of Malay Nationalism Peninsular Malay nationalism began with the rise of journals and newspapers in the Malay language which politicized the position of the Malay people in the face of colonialism and alien immigration (mainly Chinese and Indians). As far back as 1906, a monthly publication, Al-Iman, for instance, stirred up Malay consciousness by reminding them of their backwardness and their impending domination by aliens.2 By 1920, a Kelantan-based newspaper, Pengasuh called for a formation of a nationwide Malay association to unite Malay interests because “kami ini satu kaum” (we are one ethnic group).3 In spite of repression imposed by the Publishing and Book Enactment 1915 and Seditious Publication (Prohibition) Enactment 1919, there were no less than 147 newspapers and journals published in Malay between 1876 and 1941.4 Editors and writers such as Ibrahim Yaakob and Rahim Kajai from the Majlis and Utusan Melayu respectively questioned British colonialism and the threat this posed to the Malay people. At the same time, they mobilized the Malays into political organizations, starting with the formation of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM or Young Malay Union) in 1937. This led to a proliferation of Malay organizations throughout the country to lay the ground for a nationalist struggle in post-war Malaya, and later.

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The Conservative versus Radical Nationalists An interesting divide, however, developed among Malay nationalists, particularly after World War II. William R. Roff, for instance, differentiates them into a conservative English-educated Malay élite and a group of radical Malay-educated nationalists. Emphasizing the difference based on political ideology, however, John Funston argues that there were three streams of Malay nationalism, with the radicals distinguishable into a secular and a religious group which were both opposed to the conservatives.5 The conservatives consisted of Westernized urban élite who were bureaucrats and members of royal families. They shared a common English education mostly at the exclusive Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK). Their main concern was to seek British protection to preserve the Malay economy and the position of the Malays from being overtaken by immigrant communities.6 They formed voluntary organizations known as Malay Associations in various parts of the country “... to make “political” representations to the government on matters affecting the Malay interests...”.7 Although the primary objective of these organizations was to advance the interests of the Malays, the request for British protection of the Malay position was, in effect, an appeal for self-protection. For, subsequent British protection of the Malay position preserved the status quo and thus their position in society. Interestingly, the Malay Associations were the direct forerunner of UMNO. At the risk of over-generalization, this pattern of political engagement to maintain the position of the élite in society pervades UMNO’s struggle until today. Notwithstanding slight overlapping of memberships and personalities in the radical groups, the second stream of nationalists consisted mainly of radical Malay school-teachers who were educated in Malay at the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC). They were inspired by the ideas of KMM of the 1930s and later organized themselves into a political party known as the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu SeMalaya, or Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), in 1945. The party focused mainly on achieving independence and the control of the economy by the Malays. The anti-colonial stand of the party was particularly expressed by its radical youth wing, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), whose members later formed the Socialist Party after MNP and API were banned by the British (see below). Although the MNP did not focus on a religious agenda, it co-operated closely with the third stream of nationalists consisting of religious radicals who were inspired by reformist Islam as well as the immediate concern for Malay backwardness at the time. Using reformist religious organizations such as the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Se Malaya (Pan Malayan Supreme Religious Council, or MATA) and religious schools, notably the Maahad

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Il-Ehya Assyarif Gunung Semanggul in Perak as their base, they liaised with other radical groups to demand independence and self-determination to protect the dignity of the Malays (culture), and their identity based on Islam, and to prevent their economy from being dominated by immigrant communities. This concern for the development of Malay-Islam based on the Qur’an and the Hadith led to the formation of an Islamic religious party, the Hizbul Muslimin, which was the forerunner of the Parti Islam SeMalaysia, or PAS.8 It mobilized mass support from the peasantry to create “... an independent Malay nation, the building of an Islamic society and the realization of a Darul Islam, an Islamic state”.9 Although divided, a major post-war political reorganization of the country under a Malayan Union brought the nationalists together for a brief period. The British plan for a Union of the Malay States meant that Malay sultans would be subjected to a British governor and Malayan citizenship granted to immigrants born in Malaya or who had been resident in the country for ten years or more.10 The Malays opposed the proposal because, firstly, it would reduce the position and authority of their sultans who were a major and special symbol of the Malay nation. Secondly, the opening up of citizenship rights to the immigrant population would also erode the special position of the Malays. Indeed, the Malays claimed that, “Malaya belongs to the Malays. We don’t want the other races to be given the rights and privileges of the Malays”.11 Consequently, forty-one Malay Associations from all over Malaya met on 1 March 1946 in Kuala Lumpur and formed the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) under the leadership of Dato’ Onn Jaafar to assert Malay dominance (Ketuanan Melayu) over Malaya. In a typical non-antagonistic élitist UMNO style, however, the demands were negotiated with the British, who agreed to retain the Malays in a special position. The “successful” negotiated settlement later created what is known as the Federation of Malaya in 1948. The rights of the Malay rulers and “the special position of the Malays” were reaffirmed, but, in return, the “legitimate interests of other communities” were also protected. At the same time, federal citizenship was granted liberally to immigrant communities based on birth and on certain residential requirements.12 Although they supported UMNO in the fight against the Malayan Union, the Malay radicals who led the MNP and Hizbul Muslimin later took a different course. Instead of compromising the Malay position, they garnered support to overthrow the British. Alarmed by their popularity, particularly among the peasantry, the British suppressed both organizations and arrested their leaders in July/August 1948. The radicals, however, continued to oppose the British and the Malay élite until their organizations were banned (MNP in 1950), or died a natural death when the leaders were imprisoned.

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The organizations, however, subsequently reappeared in the form of new political parties known as the Socialist Front, and the PAS. Although somewhat smaller in size and with lesser resources compared to UMNO, these political parties, particularly PAS, constituted an effective and everlasting challenge to UMNO, thus creating a major split in the Malay community and hence Malay nationalism.

The 1957 Constitutional “Bargain” With the radicals suppressed by the British, subsequent Malay nationalism was presented by UMNO in élitist terms. However, because UMNO’s nationalism was constantly challenged by alternative people’s version from below, particularly through PAS, it had no alternative but to use the Malayan plural social structure to maintain its dominance. In this instance, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), a political party led by the Chinese élite which, like UMNO, had been “representing” Chinese interests to the British, constituted its natural ally. Maintaining dominance in their respective communities, UMNO co-operated with the MCA in an Alliance to win 24 out of 43 municipal and town council seats in the elections in 1952,13 and admitted the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 1955 into the Alliance to win the general election in 1955. Being the majority party and protected by the British, UMNO led the new government when Malaya gained independence in 1957. But this came with a price: it had to placate the MCA and the MIC by giving them citizenship and other rights in the new 1957 Constitution for independence. Based on the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, UMNO recognized Chinese and other immigrants’ “legitimate interests” (economic rights), their rights to citizenship by virtue of jus soli and residence as well as their “... freedom ... to preserve, practise and propagate their religion, culture and language”.14 The latter consented to the Malays retaining the major symbols of their nation, that is, their sultans, their special position, their language (as the official language), and their religion (Islam as the religion). Special rights were therefore implanted in the Constitution (Article 153) to safeguard the special position of the Malays, or those who “profess the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay customs...”.15 It must be noted that the 1957 Sino-Malay bargain did not go uncontested. Opposition Malay organizations opposed the Constitution because they wanted to retain Malaya primarily as a Malay nation, but this was rejected by UMNO. Based on the idea propagated by the defunct Hizbul Muslimin and the MNP, they wanted to maintain the Malay-Islamic

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definition of nationality, which required that all non-Malays and prospective Malayans should be “Malays”.16 They argued that the incorporation of immigrant groups into Malaya without them becoming Malays would reduce the position of the Malays into a mere community sharing the new state, albeit in a special position. As noted above, the Malay radicals strove to maintain cultural, religious, and political dominance in their homeland by defining Malayan nationality in terms of being Malay, with an undivided loyalty to Malaya. Accordingly, they perceived citizenship rights to extend beyond a simple legal guarantee and expected prospective citizens to adopt Malayan nationality and become Malays.17 Likewise, the radical Chinese-educated faction within the MCA opposed the Constitution (especially the special position of the Malays) for denying them equal status to the Malays, thus endangering Chinese education, and culture, and the position of Mandarin as an official language. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Huay Kuan, for instance, expressed dissatisfaction by initially refusing offers of membership into the Federal Legislative Assembly and other government bodies but, being pragmatic, they later succumbed.18 The radical Chinese even tried to form an alternative rival party to the MCA called the General Chinese Association to express their grievances, but they were not recognized by either UMNO or the British. The latter were prepared to deal only with the MCA as the “representative” of the Chinese community. In the end, a “bargain” (the 1957 Constitution) between the English-educated Malay élite and a similarly educated Chinese élite was accepted as the principle of ethnic negotiation in plural post-colonial Malaya.19 Radical Chinese opposition, however, did not die out. They continued to push for Chinese education and organized Chinese schools outside the mainstream education system in what is known as the Chinese Education Movement. Others opposed the liberal élite by forming different political parties, such as the Labour Party and later the Democratic Action Party (DAP). Pursuing a demand for equal status to Malays, some of them also joined the MCA to take over power and demand a tougher bargain with the Malays (UMNO). When the latter refused, the radicals broke away and formed other Chinese-based parties (such as the Union Democratic Party, and the Gerakan). Their objective was to create a Malaysia with equal status for all citizens. In terms of political culture, the 1957 Constitution maintained the status quo with dominant Malay and Chinese élite in power. It protected the Malays in a special position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups and brought about a negotiated peace among the ethnic groups, with each being separated into its own respective world in a truly plural Malaya. Nevertheless, efforts to create a new Malayan nation were put in place. Campaigns for the use

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of a single (Malay) language, Bahasa Kebangsaan, were launched to prepare for its implementation as the national language in 1967. An Education Act was passed in 1961 to streamline the existing ethnic education systems into a national system, with either Malay or English (Malay and English streams) as the medium of instruction. To retain the plural concept, however, the Act allowed vernacular schools to be retained at the primary level (called national-type schools). At the same time, independent schools (mainly Chinese and Arabic medium schools) were given the choice of joining the national system or remaining outside it without financial or other support from the government. A considerable number of Chinese (Mandarin) and Arabic medium schools chose to remain independent. The former survived mainly on community support and donations whereas the latter were either supported by local communities or assisted by state governments under the general administration of the Islamic religion. Thus, the Malays were able to retain their socio-cultural reproduction processes (Malay schools, Islamic religious schools, and so forth) and social identity (language, religion, and culture) with their ethnic symbols remaining intact. They continued to be Malays in the full sense of “Malayness”. Likewise, the new non-Malay citizens were not forced to change: they were allowed to retain their vernacular schools, run their independent (Chinese) secondary schools, practise their religion and culture, and operate Chinese language newspapers, publications and a Chinese channel in the national broadcasting system.20 Similar to the Malays, they were guaranteed freedom to flourish and reproduce in their full “Chineseness” and “Indianess” as the case might be. Although there were common areas which various ethnic groups could share, such as an English education and civil service employment, these were extremely limited, unequally distributed and mostly confined to the urban élite. Malayan pluralism effectively reinforced pre-existing ethnic divisions along employment type, education, religion, culture, residential area, and so forth. Extreme economic inequality, which was particularly skewed against the Malays, was increased by the growing monetization of the post-colonial economy. The earlier fears expressed by the Malay radicals that they would not be able to compete with immigrant groups came true. By 1970, the incidence of rural (mostly Malay) poverty reached 58.7 per cent, with the percentage for smallholders reaching 64.4 per cent, fisherman 73.2 per cent, and padi planters 88.1 per cent. Undoubtedly, Malay poverty became a major political issue, not only among the Malay nationalists but the Malays in general. The Malay élite in the government were accused of being irresponsible for allowing economic development to take place in favour of new citizen communities. This was translated into Malay protest votes during the 1969 general

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election, causing UMNO majority to suffer a major setback. The potential loss of Malay political power and dominance subsequently engendered the most serious (May 1969) ethnic riot in Malaysian history. Radical and younger Malay leaders questioned the nature of the alliance with the MCA and MIC, and opposed the existing leadership for giving in too much to the non-Malays. They demanded changes in the UMNO leadership, and intervened and directly controlled the economy and society to develop the Malays in a policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP 1971–90). This marked the beginning of an aggressive reassertion of Malay nationalism in Malaysia.

The Post-1969 New Malay Nationalism In essence, the spirit of the NEP lay in the old 1957 agreement (the Constitution). Article 153 empowered the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to reserve for Malays a reasonable proportion of positions in the public service, educational or training privileges (including scholarships), and permits or licences for trade or business.21 At the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the special position of the Malays was extended to the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak as well. The problem was that this provision was never fully implemented until the formulation of the NEP. Besides eradicating Malay poverty, the primary objective was to achieve a target of 30 per cent Malay equity in existing and future wealth, particularly in corporate wealth, employment and professional manpower development. For this purpose, the government imposed a Malay quota in all critical areas of economic activities, employment, and higher education. To provide political sanction to the project, however, a new political culture was instituted in the form of the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front). This incorporated most opposition parties, including PAS into a single front, with UMNO in the lead. The objective was to cultivate a political culture which will “...remove ambiguity ... that the Malay would be politically dominant .... (and) the government would be backing Malay economic activity and even competing on behalf of the Malays in economic areas previously dominated by the non-Malays (including foreigners)”.22 To soften the impact on other ethnic groups, however, the government launched the NEP not solely as a Malay but a bumiputra (indigenous) project, which would include the poor in general. This meant that the Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia and other indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak were entitled to the special position and privileges enjoyed by the Malays. In practice, however, the Malays obtained the larger share and maintained a dominant position. To curtail resentment, the

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government began to take a more authoritarian position by launching a Sedition Act (1971), which made it illegal for anyone to question the ethnically sensitive provisions of the Constitution, particularly the Malay special position and privileges. In short, economic sanctions and institutional restraints were firmly asserted to forge acquiescence from all citizens. Unlike the pre-NEP period, Malay nationalists now took full control of state power to politically redress the economic and socio-cultural imbalance created by the pluralism of the previous period.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) To enhance the economic position of the Malays, the government stipulated that 30 per cent of all shares in registered companies must be held by bumiputra (or bumiputra interests), and existing companies must be restructured to provide 30 per cent bumiputra equity. Business and government contracts were disbursed mostly to bumiputra entrepreneurs. Building on the work initiated by the Indigenous People’s Unit Trust, or MARA (its Malay acronym), in the previous period, the government intensified the Malay entrepreneurial development programme to train greater numbers of bumiputra entrepreneurs. To support the move, the government established a Malay bank known as the Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad. At the same time, the government either established or restructured no less than 72 government enterprises and agencies by the early 1970s to assist and accumulate wealth on behalf of the Malays. Major examples of these agencies include MARA, Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS), Urban Development Authority (UDA), and State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) which held major stakes in finance, trading, transport, construction, real estate, plantation, and other sectors. By 1978, the government had established a major investment institution called the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) to harness funds from the Malay population (in unit trust schemes called the Amanah Saham Nasional, or ASN, and the Amanah Saham Bumiputra or ASB) to invest them in profitable companies in all areas of economic activities.23 Through these agencies, the government gradually increased its stakes in major private companies and corporations as a trustee for the Malays. This new approach culminated in the takeover of two major and wellestablished British-owned plantation companies, Guthries and Dunlop, at the London Stock Exchange in 1982. It epitomized the pride and success of Malay nationalism of the NEP period. In terms of manpower development, a quota system in the ratio of 55:45 (bumiputra to non-bumiputra) on student enrolment in public

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universities was imposed. Building on a previous practice of sending selected students overseas, the government also expanded the programme to send large numbers of bumiputra students for overseas education, particularly for professional training in science, technology, and business. A special higher education institution was also set up by MARA, called the Institut Teknologi MARA (ITM) to provide skills training for Malay students. This was later followed by the establishment of a trade school known as the Institut Kemahiran MARA (IKM) to train Malay workers for the industrial sector. At the school level, a special highly subsidized boarding school with emphasis on science education (Sekolah Menengah Sains) was set up by the Ministry of Education to admit selected bumiputra children. This complemented several existing boarding schools established in the tradition of MCKK, but this time by drawing students from all socio-economic backgrounds based on merit. The boarding school system was later followed by a similar school system run by MARA (MARA Junior Science College). As a result, there was a sudden increase in the number of Malay school-children who were better qualified for higher education. Following an earlier practice of providing full scholarships to selected students to pursue higher education locally and overseas, the government increased the fund for this, to provide almost every qualified bumiputra student with the facility. Supported by the quota system at the local universities and the programme for overseas training, there was a marked increase in the number of professionally trained Malays by the 1980s. This constitutes a major indicator of the success of Malay nationalism during that period. To create the socio-cultural framework for such a move, programmes to nurture a national culture based on Malay culture and religion were launched, and the Malay language was enforced as the official language. The government, for instance, adopted a policy of creating a national culture based on Malay culture, Islam, and any aspect of other cultures which were deemed necessary and relevant following the recommendations of the 1971 National Culture Congress. To implement the policy, the government created a whole new bureaucratic structure under the Ministry of Culture, Youths and Sports to promote the national culture nation-wide. However, apart from developing a National Theatre, launching campaigns on good values, exhibitions, seminars and cultural performances, and training, little is known about the actualization of the national culture concept. Perhaps the concept itself was never made clear. The real culture seemed to develop on its own dynamics, creating crosscultural transfers and assimilation. Since the early period, borrowings and exchanges of cultural practices (language, diet, festivities, etc.) between ethnic groups had occurred on their own steam.

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To launch the language policy, the dual stream (English and Malay) school system was reorganized into a single stream using Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction. Vernacular primary schools (Chinese and Indian) schools as well as the independent secondary schools (mainly Chinese and Arabic) were retained, but their curricula were integrated into the national system. Bahasa Malaysia was also vigorously implemented as the medium of public communication, particularly in official communications with the government. Although non-Malay language media (newspapers and radio/television) were maintained, the emphasis was on Bahasa Malaysia. This was later extended as the medium of instruction in all institutions of higher learning by 1983. By the end of the NEP period, Bahasa Malaysia was widely used in both private and official communications and, apart from pockets of non-Malay educated living in non-Malay communities, a general sense of a common language seemed to have emerged among the multi-ethnic population. The government also showed its commitment to Islam in a more concerted way. For instance, apart from providing religious infrastructure, such as mosques (a popular election ploy since the 1950s), the government embarked on infusing Islamic values in the administration, established the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad in 1982, set up the International Islamic University in 1983, and imposed a ban on the importation of non-halal meat as well as on the consumption of alcohol at government functions. At the state level, the governments passed laws to enforce more strictly the Islamic code of conduct among Muslims, such as those relating to fasting during Ramadhan, relations between the opposite sex, decency in dressing, and so forth.24 To some extent, the Islamization policies were closely associated with the zeal and commitment of a single UMNO leader, Anwar Ibrahim, after he joined UMNO and the government in 1982. But once initiated, the Islamic institutions were well received and developed on their own. For instance, the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad evolved into a major holding company providing financial, insurance, and banking products as well as services according to Islamic principles. Likewise, another Islamic financial institution, the Pilgrimage Management and Fund Board, also evolved into a major corporation with interests in finance, plantations, and properties, besides playing its primary role in managing annual Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca. To the Malays, the NEP appeared as a resurrection of the special Malay position promised by the British during the colonial period. But this was achieved almost solely on the courage and commitment of Malay leaders, particularly those in UMNO, somewhat proving that the party was the bearer of Malay nationalism. For a second time in Malaysian history (after opposition to the Malayan Union), therefore, the majority of Malays came

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together in a united front actualizing their special position vis-à-vis other fellow Malaysians. PAS, for a time, joined the BN and worked with UMNO for a common Malay cause. Together, they dominated (other ethnic groups) and defined Malaysian nationality in Malay terms. Though the new nationalism did not appear entirely Malay because it was presented in bumiputra terms, the political impression that the NEP made on the country was unmistakably Malay. Indeed, the political struggles in Sabah and Sarawak revolved around keeping non-Malay and non-Muslim bumiputra power in check.25 The overall emphasis of the NEP on Malay education, employment, participation in business and industry, culture and religion thus brought the idea of Malay dominance (ketuanan Melayu) closer to reality.

The Chinese Response to the NEP This Malay dominance did not last long, however. In spite of the government’s show of commitment to Islam, the fundamental differences between the secular (UMNO) and Islamic (PAS) divide forced the latter to leave the BN in December 1977 and resumed its opposition to UMNO. This, however, did not threaten UMNO and the Malays in general, because the break-up was not used by the Chinese as an opportunity to undermine the Malay position. Indeed, the Chinese élite in the MCA needed the support of UMNO because they were facing similar opposition from some party members who were demanding greater Chinese rights, which were perceived to have been eroded by the NEP. In any case, supporting UMNO had its advantages. The MCA, for instance, obtained permission to establish a tertiary institution (the Tuanku Abdul Rahman College) for technical and professional training of Chinese students in 1975 and, emulating UMNO’s unit trust scheme, established a large co-operative (Multi-Purpose Holdings) to pool Chinese capital for investment. The Chinese radicals were, however, more concerted in their protests. At the beginning of the NEP, for instance, they launched what is known as the “Chinese Unity Movement” to demand greater Chinese cultural rights. Representing the spirit of the movement, the so-called “young Turks” in the MCA questioned the accommodative nature of the “old guards” in accepting the Malay special position. At the same time, young highly educated professionals reinvigorated the spirit of the Chinese Education Movement to demand a comprehensive Chinese (Mandarin medium) education system, including a Chinese-medium university (the proposed Merdeka University). Failing to change the subservient nature of the party stand (vis-à-vis UMNO), particularly to demand the establishment of the Merdeka

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University, the radicals opted out of the MCA and joined the Gerakan to fight for equality of all Malaysians.26 In the meantime, the Chinese community turned their focus on overseas education. Even without government sponsorship, the number of Chinese students rivalled and then exceeded that of Malay students overseas.27 The Chinese radicals also questioned the notion of national culture implemented by the government for they saw the concept as deficient because it played down other cultures. They argued that a real national culture should be a composite which truly reflected the various cultures of the Malaysian people.28 Although it sensed the implicit demand for the preservation and recognition of Chinese culture, the government remained unmoved and continued to manage and cultivate a national culture based on Malay culture and religion. Although there were reports of Chinese capital flight and reorganization of their enterprises to suit the new economic climate,29 opposition to the NEP was never expressed openly and confined mostly to individual stratagems. If any, the Sedition Act (1971), the infamous Internal Security Act (ISA), and other repressive laws were quite sufficient to instil fear and suppress the opposition in an authoritarian manner. The arrest of opposition leaders and critics under the ISA in the infamous “Operation Lalang” in 1987 was a case in point. Indeed, in spite of its political shortcomings, authoritarianism at this period functioned to maintain ethnic peace and social order necessary to launch and maintain the NEP. This, in turn, made it possible for the multi-ethnic élite to collaborate with one another to maintain the status quo.

Ethnic Antagonism In terms of everyday ethnicity and nationalism, however, it is not known to what extent the NEP policies reduced ethnic identities. The Malays recovered their Malayness and with a new vigour, giving the impression that it was the dominant model defining Malaysian nationhood. The Chinese, on the other hand, did not lose their Chineseness: their language, culture, religion and schools continued to exert a strong presence. The Chinese school system, for instance, developed into the most “comprehensive Chinese system of education” in Southeast Asia.30 For this reason, it was possible for a Chinese to adopt the Malay language, idioms and even sensitivities, that is, becoming more or less like a Malay-defined Malaysian, and even feel as if he belonged to the country,31 yet remain distinctly Chinese. It is also not certain how much the national school system succeeded in de-ethnicizing Malaysian

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identity and nationality. But being a Malaysian in an ethnic-free sense was difficult if not impossible because every sphere of life was dictated by the bumiputra and non-bumiputra divide which, in its final effect, reminded the general population of their ethnic origins. This was exemplified by a strong ethnic polarization among university students. In spite of drawing students largely from the single school system, the public university system was not able to integrate the multi-ethnic student population into a single community.32 Ethnic consciousness among the students persisted and reached such proportions that the government felt compelled to direct university authorities to require students of different ethnic origins to share rooms in campus accommodation.33 If anything, this seemed to indicate that by its very nature, the Malay definition of the Malaysian nation continued to be contested. But why did it not develop into an open contest?

Economic Development under the NEP Although ethnic identity and nationalism has a life of its own, it seems that relative freedom to sustain ethnic identity is only part of the explanation. Aversion to open contest is also attributed to the economic success achieved during the NEP period. At the close of the NEP, for instance, not only the Malays accrued significant economic success and became more confident with the creation of a new middle class of business élite and professionals.34 The non-Malays, particularly the ethnic Chinese, also expanded their wealth on a scale hardly expected at the launch of the programme. Indeed, the history of millionaires created by the NEP was a tremendous boost for the Chinese community.35 In the words of Ling Liong Sik, the current MCA president, “... economic success has benefited all Malaysians; more jobs, better quality of life, irrespective of their ethnic origin”.36 Inter-ethnic economic co-operation, such as joint ventures and employment across ethnic divide, took place and some measure of mutual understanding across ethnic lines followed suit.37 It must be noted, however, that the success can in large part be attributed to the favourable economic climate during the period, particularly in the 1980s. Given the advent of new technology, multinational corporations were internationalizing their operations, thus creating opportunities for industrialization in labour surplus Third World countries. This was seen by the government as an opportunity to launch industrialization programmes in what is now known as the Industrialization Master Plans (1981 and 1985). It also privatized the

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economy to promote the private sector as the engine of economic growth compatible with the changes towards greater liberalization taking place at the global level. The success of this strategy propelled Malaysia into an era of remarkable economic growth from the second half of the 1980s (8-10 per cent per annum). This allowed the government to nurture and prepare the Malay community for a modern industrial market economy without undermining the “legitimate interests” of other ethnic groups. Malay domination with ethnic freedom and rapid economic development seemed to have warded off ethnic tension in the two decades preceding globalization. Extreme Malay poverty of the 1960s, the progenitor of the NEP, was becoming a new myth, which reminded Malaysians of the need to co-operate and tolerate one another in order to prosper and enjoy a good life. All this, however, changed with the rise of globalization in the 1990s.

Globalization and the Changes to Malay Nationalism Following Anthony Giddens, who defines globalization as an “intensification of social relations” which compresses time and space across the globe,38 it is necessary to note, for the present purpose, that Malaysia has been part of the globalization process since the end of the Cold War. The revolution in post-Cold War technology in communication and information makes it possible for Malaysia to share the same stock of knowledge, capital and resources (including human resources) with the rest of world. Accordingly, it shares the same work culture, system of finance, technology, and to some extent social as well as politico-legal philosophy (democracy). It borrows in the international capital market, encourages foreign direct investment, and enters into international agreements to facilitate the movement of goods, services and people across its borders. To some extent, Malaysians similarly externalize with other economies and societies through trade and direct investment (in countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, South Africa, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan, to name a few). All this has been supported by better economic and diplomatic relations with a greater number of countries, particularly China and the Islamic countries.

The New Development Policy and Bangsa Malaysia To some extent, Malaysia was quite ready for the challenge of globalization because rapid economic growth and industrialization in the

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earlier period had set the stage for greater liberalization of the economy in the 1990s. Indeed, the National Development Policy (NDP, 1991–2000) was designed to cater for greater private sector participation compatible with the new globalized environment envisaged for Malaysia. Being a direct successor of the NEP, however, the new policy did not only perpetuate the primary objective of building a bumiputra economy but it has also brought a new sense of urgency and vigour. Thus, the government planned to accelerate the privatization of public projects for bumiputra, continued to provide “quotas, licenses and other special assistance” including training to them, and hastened the development of the Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). To achieve the objective, the government revised the 1983 Malaysia Incorporated concept to expedite the evolution of a more liberal and vigorous private–public sector collaboration.39 To create the social framework for the NDP, the government launched what is known as the Vision 2020. Following the NDP, which aspires to build a united Malaysian nation based on the Constitution and the Rukun Negara, Vision 2020 promises to integrate the expectations and aspirations of all Malaysians into a developed society called the Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation). This was envisaged to be a truly “Malaysian” society because it would not be based on any particular ethnic loyalty. At the same time it was expected to be a “... society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous and in full possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient”.40 This would be compatible with the perception of a modern industrialized society. The government hoped to create a modern and liberal industrial Malaysia by the year 2020. How did the new policy and globalization processes affect the newly revived Malay nationalism? The following will discuss consequent changes to Malay nationalism resulting from economic betrayal by the new Malay élite, emerging tension between nationalism and Islam, dysfunctional globalized education, and erosion of the Malay language.

The New Malay Business Élite The NEP and later the NDP were essentially about creating a new class of Malay élite (Melayu Baru), particularly in the form of a new Malay business élite and middle class. They were conceived to be shrewd, professional, hard-working, bold and risk-taking, aggressive, market driven and in possession of all the qualities which make a successful businessman.41 They were to be the engine of development for the Malay private sector,

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designed to check non-Malay economic dominance, particularly by the Chinese in the new liberalized Malaysia. MARA was the key institution given the task of creating this new class. In the 1990s, the Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development was established to enhance the process further. Together with the training by MARA and the emphasis on education in general, the Ministry has now produced a large corp of Malay professional businessmen who are continuously supported by the government either through market capitalization (easy access to loans), business opportunities (contracts), or statutory supports (licensing and quotas). Some of these businessmen now hold major stakes in and/or run large business corporations comparable to major business houses owned by non-Malays. Together with those who run government enterprises, they constitute what may be called the new Malay business élite. Though many of them originated from the peasantry, they are now Western-oriented, with a large majority trained in Western institutions (at government expense), liberal and mostly secular in outlook and knowledgeable enough to function in the international market. It must be noted, however, that the government emphasis on promoting the development of capital-intensive Malay businessmen is, to a large extent, political in nature. The government does not discriminate students for education sponsorship based on (parents’) political background, but in so far as entrepreneurial development is concerned, it is widely known that it is inclined to favour businessmen who are loyal to the government. This means that, in the majority of cases, UMNO members and particularly UMNO leaders get the best government support. Among other things, they are favoured for the bumiputra quota in the allocation of shares when companies are capitalized or restructured; they are given licences specially allocated for Malays; they are given priority for Malay allocation of business premises, and they are selected for government contract jobs most of which are given either through appointment or a closed tender system.42 The fact that the government has adopted such contract procedure for privatizing development work makes the process of nurturing UMNO businessmen quite a simple task. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find UMNO leaders having major stakes in business enterprises with easy access to government assistance. In many cases, the process has also transformed them into a distinct group of new wealthy Malays over a short period of time. The new Malay business élite also collaborate and operate joint-venture enterprises with established Chinese capitalists to tap the latter’s expertise and experience. The Chinese, on the other hand, welcome the Malay partners to gain direct access to government support, although in many cases, they are also leaders of political parties in the BN. Together with

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the wealthy Malays, they become a new class of Malaysians who are close friends, associates, and family members of UMNO and other government leaders. They lead luxurious lifestyles such as living in large mansions, owning expensive imported vehicles, helicopters, and even private jets, and with a liking for expensive overseas holidays, including owning holiday villas in temperate climates. The opportunity to accumulate wealth in a relatively easy manner and over a short period of time through UMNO created a new Malay (sub)culture of wealth accumulation in the 1990s. The NEP introduced the Malays to the world of intricate financial manipulations through business loan assistance, privatized projects, and the share market. Even ordinary Malays were incorporated into the sub-culture by simply subscribing to the ASB and ASN unit trusts. But the process was made easier by joining UMNO, and particularly by holding key party positions, even at the local level. Indeed, a significant number of Malays joined UMNO in the 1990s and vied for party positions with the sole objective of using the party to accumulate wealth and to advance their positions in society. As a result, competition for party positions made party elections quite tense and entailed vote-buying in what was known as “money politics”. By instituting economic favouritism through the party, UMNO leaders also created a new complementary sub-culture of “conspicuous showing of respect” (mengampu), sometimes in a very elaborate (verbal, physical, and material) manner, and turned it into a common practice among followers and supporters. For instance, leaders were shown such reverence as kissing the hands, which was traditionally reserved only for sultans, verbally praised in glowing terms, showered with material gifts, and treated to elaborate feasts. While Malay feudal heritage may play a part in such concocted reverence to a leader, UMNO members seemed compelled to show loyalty and support, even if they did not mean it, for fear of losing out on monetary rewards from party leaders. The latter took the form of new Malay patrons disbursing what was popularly termed as “projects” to loyal supporters. In the 1990s, UMNO and the government also embarked on major and expensive infrastructural projects. This included the well-known Petronas Twin Towers (the tallest building in the world at the time of its construction), the ultra-modern Kuala Lumpur International Airport, a new high-technology administrative capital called Putra Jaya, and a RM200 million new official residence for the Prime Minister. Opposition political parties and various quarters, of course, accused the government of misallocating scarce national resources. In so far as the new business élite and UMNO leaders were concerned, however, the endeavour constituted major business opportunities to accumulate wealth. Following

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the policy of privatization and the system of awarding contracts, Malay companies deemed favourable by the government stood to gain. Indeed, UMNO has changed dramatically from the commitments of the party shown at the beginning of the NEP period. In the name of fighting for Malay economic welfare, it has created an internal culture of aggressive competition for immediate material gains. Besides concocted reverence to party leaders, the process may also involve the use of corrupted means, possible misuse of positions and power, and even immoral practices.43 As a result, wealth accumulation, economic affluence, and high consumption appear to be the major objectives of UMNO leaders’ struggles rather than the concern for Malay welfare. Even the traditionally critical UMNO Youth, which used to champion the cause of Malays much more militantly than the parent body, became quite subservient and subjected to immediate materialist pursuits in the 1990s.44 In a way, it is not surprising that such a culture developed within UMNO because, in the majority of cases, UMNO members and leaders in the 1970s and 1980s came from modest backgrounds, consisting of schoolteachers, bureaucrats, and small businessmen. With escalating costs of both party elections and more so general elections, party leaders required huge sums of money either to claim or defend positions in the party as well as against other political parties. This became more pressing with the advent of “money politics” where political loyalty and support was largely based on monetary gains rather than party philosophy and struggle. It is probably because of this particular reason that UMNO, as a political party, also became involved in the business sector by setting up corporations to venture into profitable enterprises. With the shift in official policy towards liberalization and privatization following globalization, both UMNO leaders and UMNO companies obtained easy access to major privatized infrastructure projects at favourable terms and grew into major corporations comparable to established business houses in the country. Today there are a host of such corporations which either operate on behalf of UMNO or with major stakes held by UMNO and its leaders. Indeed, UMNO companies and those owned by UMNO leaders and their associates have appeared very profitable and successful, giving an illusion that Malays have come of age in business and industry. The overall reality is, however, rather different. At the close of the NEP, for instance, Malay ownership of share capital reached a figure of 19.3 per cent, far below the 30 per cent target. By 1998, the figure had reached only 19.4 per cent. Similarly, the development of Malay professionals registered a slow progress: Malay doctors and architects constituted only 15.7 per cent and 28.5 per cent respectively of all registered personnel in those fields.45 By 1997, the overall incidence of

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poverty had been reduced dramatically to 6.1 per cent but Malay majority areas were still suffering from a high incidence of poverty.46 No doubt employment patterns have changed, with the majority of Malays moving out of traditional agriculture. This, however, does not seem to have benefited them a great deal because most of them (28.2 per cent) are now concentrated in the industrial sector as production workers.47 The income gap and thus relative poverty of the majority of the Malays vis-àvis the Malay business élite (and non-Malays) are therefore tremendous.48 Given the affluence of the latter, and from the point of view of Malay workers and peasants (51.1 per cent of the Malays in 1997), therefore, it would appear that UMNO leaders have been appropriating state power to enrich themselves, their associates and relatives rather than the Malays as a whole. This has given rise to allegations of cronyism, nepotism, and irresponsibility on the part of UMNO leaders. The UMNO general assembly of 1997 brought out this phenomenon into the open. The then President of UMNO Youth delivered a speech at the assembly hitting out at the problem, and this precipitated the political crisis known as the Anwar saga.49 The crisis of 1997 made the situation worse because UMNO leaders began a programme of selective bail-outs for companies facing difficulties.50 The Malays, including some within UMNO, see all this as a betrayal of the Malay cause which had been entrusted to UMNO since the beginning. Others have criticized UMNO leaders for being non-transparent and misusing the special Malay position to squander national resources for themselves and their cronies. Led by Anwar Ibrahim, who was then Deputy Prime Minister, a critical faction within UMNO criticized the leadership for sacrificing the Malays for the benefit of a circle of cronies. UMNO leaders reacted harshly by repressing them, first, by sacking the Deputy Prime Minister from office and from the party (and later imprisoned him on what was widely seen as corruption charges), and secondly, expelled some of the latter’s main supporters from party positions as well as (in a few cases) from the party. Supporting Anwar Ibrahim, opposition political parties, including the PAS, DAP and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) and several leading non-governmental organizations formed a united front or a reformasi (reformation) movement called GERAK to oppose UMNO and the government. Demonstrations were held along the streets of Kuala Lumpur calling for political reforms and the Prime Minister to resign.51 To express opposition in a formal manner, a new political party, Parti Keadilan Nasional (keADI.Lan) or National Justice Party led by Anwar Ibrahim’s wife (Wan Azizah Ismail) was formed in April 1999 to harness support from Malaysians of all ethnic groups, although a large majority still consisted of Malays. Not only cronyism, nepotism and the misuse of state power became the foundation from

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which the people opposed UMNO, but authoritarianism and indeed cruelty as well as injustice (for the way Anwar Ibrahim was removed) excited them. The continuation of the drama, with his subsequent (from June 1999) trial on sodomy charges made a significant number of people, including some UMNO leaders and members finally lose their trust in the UMNO leadership.52 Consequently, many of them resigned from party membership to join the opposition, particularly PAS and the keADILan.53 The latter grew stronger by the day, particularly as the UMNO leadership began to retaliate by demeaning Malays who opposed them — professionals (middle class), Malay academics, and students — as unfit and incompetent.54 UMNO leaders accused them of being successful not because they were naturally capable like the Chinese and others but because they were put in their place by UMNO. They were accused of being ungrateful for opposing UMNO. If anything, this attack on the Malays indicates a weakening confidence in the UMNO leadership to achieve the ideals of Malay nationalism, which is somewhat similar to the 1969 event, following which the leadership was replaced for betraying the Malay cause.

Secularization of Islam A major challenge to nationalism has also arisen from concerted UMNO efforts to secularize Islam. Traditionally, UMNO has considered Islam as a theological issue quite separate from other areas of life, particularly politics, following the separation of religion from the state in European practice. And following Western notions of Islam as being conservative and an antimony to (capitalist) economic development, UMNO and the government have also tried to enlist Islam as an instrument of economic development, and prevent any inclination to reassert Islamic conservatism. Towards this end, it has suppressed the revival of what it considers regressive fundamentalist Islam by banning so-called fundamentalist Islamic organizations and arresting the leaders in the 1980s and 1990s. While PAS had supported the move in cases that it considered as preaching deviant Muslim teachings, this has opened up an old and basic UMNO– PAS debate on the role of Islam in development. Following its secular ideology, UMNO sees Islam, particularly Islamic economic practices, as requiring modification before it can be inserted into mainstream (capitalist) economic development. To do this, it developed modern Islamic institutions, launched a research institute to foster greater Islamic religious understanding (Institute for Islamic Understanding or IKIM) and increased religious coverage in the media. It expects to

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transform Islam into an instrument which can integrate Malays into a modern capitalist economy. On the other hand, PAS considers Islam as the ideological foundation to develop a total new way of life (civilization) and an alternative to capitalism itself.55 While UMNO has become eclectic and pragmatic and pursues the idea of establishing a modern nation along the model of developed countries today, PAS seeks the establishment of an Islamic state and society based on the Qur’an, Hadith, and Sunnah. Bringing the debate into the political arena therefore, PAS has accused UMNO of dragging the community into infidelity (kafir) whereas the latter has ridiculed PAS as being backward and incapable of running a modern government.56 This fight along secular and religious views of development stretches back to the early days of PAS–UMNO political contest during the first general elections in the 1950s and has continued to divide the Malays ever since.57 But because UMNO has the ultimate use of state power, it has successfully prevented the ideology of development propagated by PAS from taking root. In the recent past, for instance, it has thwarted PAS Islamization projects (such as the launching of hudud — Islamic criminal — laws in Kelantan) and opposed the implementation of what it perceives as ridiculous state religious laws, such as the prevention of Muslim women from participating in beauty contests.58 In the past, it had also imprisoned, marginalized and repressed PAS leaders and followers to the extent that Islam today has become secularized enough to accommodate programmes for (capitalist) economic development, including those which are rather dubious according to Islamic teachings (for example, mainstream commercial banking). In short, there is an obvious erosion of Islamic conservatism which in the past had formed the core of Malay identity. As a result, threats to the religion today do not invoke open and immediate public retaliation as in the past.59 Malay Muslims, particularly the Westernized sections, have indeed become accommodative and conciliatory in their religiosity. Notwithstanding those who are lax in their religious practice (irreligious), today, there exists among the Malays those who even feel threatened by some quarters calling for a strict enforcement of the Islamic code of conduct in daily life in what they consider as “creeping Islamization”.60 What this seems to mean is that a Malay today does not necessarily carry the identity of an integrated Malay-Muslim person as it did in the past. Similarly, the concerns have changed: though it is against the Constitution (that a Malay must be a Muslim and following Malay customs), it is possible for a Malay today to claim Malay status but without bringing Islam into it. Indeed, following the NEP precept, a Malay may simply camouflage as a bumiputra without having to deal

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with the demands of the Islam religion. Given the fact that UMNO today allows a non-Malay bumiputra to become a member, and more importantly, the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim as a symbol of Islam in UMNO, the diminution of Islam in UMNO Malay nationalism seems quite real. Nevertheless, Islamic religious appeal is far from dying out. Indeed, it is on the rise. Being opposed to globalism (spread of Western culture through globalization) in general and thus dubbed as the enemy by the United States, it is undergoing revivalism world-wide and Malaysia is an important part of this emerging Islamic internationalism. Supporting the move, Islamic non-governmental organizations in Malaysia have become active and together with the drive towards creating a civil society, open debates on the role of Islam have become inevitable.61 For once, sacred Islam has become debatable and open to public interpretation even by novices. PAS therefore continues to criticize UMNO and its Islamic projects as being superficial and instrumentalist. At best, UMNO is accused of just using Islam as a political device to appeal to the Malay people rather than genuinely developing Islam and the Malays. In that respect, PAS claims that it is more nationalistic because its struggle to promote Islam automatically promotes the Malays. In this sense, Malay nationalism remains an important part of PAS’ appeal to the Malays. In the process, however, PAS has brought out another dimension of Islam which may divorce Islam from Malay nationalism. With the idea of promoting an Islamic way of life, PAS conceives Islam as borderless and a religion beyond ethnicity: it preaches the unity of all Muslims who are principally bound by Islamic principles and values rather than narrow ethnic or national interests. The objective (in Malaysia) is to create an Islamic rather than a Malay state and society. To this extent, Islam is projected as a de-ethnicizing force. In a sense, closer international relations with Muslim countries, including parts of (Muslim) China and other Islamic countries in the 1990s have brought home the logic of this argument, that is, to foster an Islamic society. Irrespective of whether it is separated from Islam or not, however, Malay nationalism seems slightly less integrated. At the level of practical ideology, it seems that globalization has undermined the traditional MalayIslam identity underlying Malay nationalism. Whether UMNO or PAS realizes it, their propagation of an Islamic cause tends to separate Islam from Malay nationalism: UMNO’s secularization of Islam seems to be turning Malay nationalism largely economic and materialistic while PAS’ propagation of Islam is turning it into a religious struggle. How does globalization affect other important symbols of Malay nationalism such as the Malay language and Malay education?

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Globalization of Education The changes in the national education system following globalization have affected Malay nationalism in an important way. The process began with the introduction of liberal higher education and later the emphasis was on human resource development. In terms of content, the higher education system is a far cry from the ideals propagated by the SITC group early in the century. Public universities, for instance, had relied on the Western curriculum, predominantly English texts, Western academic structure as well as Western-trained local teachers. In the 1970s and 1980s, students were compelled to learn in Bahasa Malaysia but this changed in the 1990s to a more liberal use of English. The overall emphasis seems to have been the creation of modern Malaysians who are open in their outlook, particularly towards Western things and ideas. The dictates of the job market and the repressive nature of the Universities and University Colleges Act (1974), which prohibits students from participating in national politics, seemed to have made a large majority of them favourably disposed to support government policies, including those related to globalization.62 In so far as human resource development was concerned, the education system in the 1990s concentrated on developing science, technology, and business education in answer to skilled labour demands by industrial and commercial sectors, most of which were owned by foreign global enterprises. This had major drawbacks, particularly in relation to higher education. The reorganization of the school system under the NEP produced a great number of high performance students, particularly among the Chinese who were also more adept in science and technological subjects. However, places in the existing public institutions of higher learning hardly catered for the number of qualified students (around 30,000–40,000 annually), even after considerable numbers of students had opted for places overseas (around 15,000 annually in the pre-crisis period). The problem was compounded by the continuation of the quota system in higher education under the National Development Plan (NDP). Large numbers of students, particularly Chinese students, were denied places in the universities. This created a major waste of potential skilled manpower. On the other hand, the government did not have sufficient resources to satisfy the new demands on its own. To cope with the problem, the government increased the number of public universities slightly (three new universities in the 1990s) and planned to corporatize public universities (beginning in 1998) to make them self-financing and more flexible. It also stopped giving scholarships to students, including poor bumiputra students, thus terminating a thirty-

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year tradition of Malay financial dependence on the government for higher education. In its place, a student loan fund was instituted from which students may borrow and repay upon graduation. At the same time, the government encouraged private financiers (banks and other financial institutions) to provide loans to tertiary students. Ultimately, the government was forced to liberalize the education system. Following the trend of the 1980s, which allowed the setting up of private colleges for twinning programmes with overseas institutions, the government gave permission for the establishment of private universities as well as branch campuses for overseas institutions when it introduced the 1995 Education Bill. Today, the government also allows offshore degree programmes to be conducted by foreign universities, and encourages partnerships between local private colleges and local public universities to increase the number of professional and technical training programmes. As a result, Malaysia today has eight public universities, and 564 (and increasing) private institutions, with a handful of them being either fullfledged private universities, or branch campuses of foreign universities. While all these provide more places to qualified local students seeking higher education, it has also created a major change in the nature of education because with privatization, education has become an industry attracting capitalists from all ethnic groups as well as those from overseas. To justify the change, the Minister of Education announced that Malaysia was moving in the right direction by saving on the cost of overseas education (about RM3 billion a year in the 1990s) because students could now be accommodated in local institutions. At the same time, it was also turning Malaysia into a global centre for educational excellence and seeking to attract foreign students.63 How does this change affect Malay nationalism? Essentially, it seems that privatization and commercialization of education has turned it into a tool for industrialization (and globalization) besides promoting education as a commodity. Given the ease of student entry, particularly into private institutions, however, the ethnic tensions arising out of imbalances in the opportunities for higher education resulting from the NEP quota seems to have been somewhat reduced. Notwithstanding financial considerations, students now have greater access and choice in education, including the opportunity to obtain prestigious overseas degrees locally. This makes the anti-NEP education sentiment of the previous era rather subdued if not irrelevant. Even the Chinese radicals are now provided with the opportunity to vent their resentment by establishing their own private university, although following market forces as well as government regulations, the use of Chinese as the medium of instruction is largely restricted.

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Similar to other systems of higher education, it cannot be discounted that higher education in Malaysia engenders some measure of high ideals. However, the changes following globalization seem to be pushing the education system towards a more utilitarian approach: education is gradually becoming a process of acquiring marketable technical skills rather than a pursuit knowledge. In addition to this, privatization is also gradually turning it into a matter of simple economics for providers (profits), financiers (interests), and consumers (affordability) alike. In both senses, the function of higher education to reproduce cultural identity and to promote nationalist ideals is not only becoming highly suspect but current emphasis on narrow and specific skill areas in education may also remove them from high political and nationalist ideals. In addition to all this, and in so far as the Malays are concerned, the change in the education system does not seem to benefit them directly. Besides the fact that there are only a few Malay entrepreneurs sufficiently strong to venture into private education because of its high capital outlay, the fee imposed by private institutions is also beyond the reach of everyday Malay parents. As a result, the number of Malay students who can afford to study in private institutions of higher learning today is very small. Indeed, some of them even find it financially difficult to cope in the highly subsidized public institutions. Given the fact that the government has withdrawn the scholarship scheme for students, it appears that liberalization of education as a whole is working against the interests of the Malays. Education being one of the most sensitive areas of Malay well-being, UMNO is therefore criticized for its apparent insensitivity to Malay welfare in favour of commercial interests. As if to incite UMNO members, PAS leaders have thus accused UMNO of losing its nationalistic ideals for material gains and turning its back on poor Malays. As an alternative, they have promised to return the scholarships to Malay students if they are voted into power.

Resurrection of English Labour demands by foreign-dominated commerce and industry and the rise of private higher education heralded the resurrection of the English language. Private higher education requires the use of English as the medium of instruction because foreign universities and foreign degree programmes simply do not operate in Bahasa Malaysia. Similarly, foreign corporations communicate mainly in English because they operate on a global scale. What will happen to Bahasa Malaysia, a major symbol of Malay nationalism?

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To accommodate the needs of foreign employers and education enterprises, the Ministry of Education has made English a compulsory subject in schools since the early 1990s. The Ministry has also changed the rule and allowed the use of English as a medium of instruction in institutions of higher learning. Since the early 1990s, public universities have been allowed to conduct science and technology courses in English but some universities, on their own, have given greater freedom for academics generally to teach in English, and expatriate teachers to teach fully in English. By 1996, after the introduction of the 1995 Education Bill, teaching in private institutions became fully English, although Bahasa Malaysia was taught as a compulsory subject. The change in language policy represents a major new challenge to Malay nationalists who have regarded it as an apparent reversion to colonialism. For instance, the Third Malay Intellectual Congress in 1994 presented a ten-point memorandum to the government protesting the use of English in higher education, even though at the time it was restricted only to the teaching of science and technology. The protesting voices, however, gradually faded into insignificance as English made greater inroads into the education system. Today, there is no Malay opposition of any significance to the wide use of English in general. If any, the debate is confined mainly to the columns in the Malay daily, Utusan Malaysia, as if the issue affects only the Malay community. On the other hand, the non-Malays and Western-oriented citizens in general see the re-emergence of English as a symbol of progress. Indeed, they have never been confident that Bahasa Malaysia would be capable of ushering the country into the new globalized era (new millenium). English, they argue, is the language of international business and diplomacy, and by this very fact, the use of English would progressively enhance economic development as well as the position of Malaysia in the world. To them, this is particularly important because Malaysia had begun to internationalize its economy and society since the 1980s and was now becoming an integrated part of the globalized system. In any case, the protest from Malay nationalists appears irrelevant because the government seems united on this issue. The Prime Minister himself, for instance, called for greater mastery of English so that Malaysia would become more open and internationally respected.64 Consequently, English is now used openly and widely, particularly in the private sector, including in their official communications with the government. Indeed, it is alleged that English is even spoken at Cabinet meetings.65 It is clear that with globalization, English is taking over a significant part of public communication, and pushing Bahasa Malaysia into the background. It may also be true that the earlier policy on Bahasa Malaysia

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as a national integrative force has been quite successful (even those educated in Chinese schools are now fluent in Malay) so that it is now possible to change to English. But English has always been popular, particularly among non-Malays, and widely seen as superior to Bahasa Malaysia. Indeed, English is regarded as the language of the successful, modern, urban and educated wealthy class. Given the unbroken dominance of English in the private sector since the colonial days, however, it is conceivable that this new development is putting Bahasa Malaysia at risk. The resurrection of English in an expanding (globalized) private sector may simply entice Malaysians to draw on English as a major alternative and competing identity resource. In such a scenario, not only the Malay language, and thus a cultural resource for Malay nationalism, is threatened, but other languages such as Mandarin may face a similar fate.

The Rise of Malaysian Nationalism How do UMNO leaders and Malay nationalists in general defend the apparent erosion of Malay nationalism? In the 1990s, there seemed to be a general trend for the leaders and the government to open up the idea of nationalism by creating new myths and symbols which were Malaysian rather than Malay in nature. At a glance, this appears to constitute what may be called a new Malaysian nationalism. It consists of the emerging ideology of Malaysia boleh, the rise of government as a symbol of authority, and the creation of a new Malaysian consciousness. Let us discuss each one briefly in turn.

Malaysia Boleh The rise of authoritarianism and government control of the economy necessary to propel the NEP has put the power of the government in Malaysia in a new light. The government had been quite repressive, particularly against opposition political parties, radicals, and the communists before 1969, but the NEP made it imperative for the government to demand greater co-operation and loyalty from the people. At the same time, the government projected itself as benevolent (to the poor and underprivileged Malays). Regardless of criticisms, it protected NEP projects and elevated selected individuals (including non-Malays) into prominence. The government also became more aggressive in the 1990s by tapping on global financial liquidity to implement expensive infrastructure projects. 66 Warding off criticisms of wastage and

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misallocation of resources from opposition political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and social activists, the government defended the projects as a major national success and pride in achieving world class status. In the local idiom, this was expressed and propagated as Malaysia boleh (Malaysia can do it), marking the birth of a new ideology which urged Malaysians to believe that they were as good as, if not among the best people in the world. The so-called national pride was further boosted by the success of industrialization, particularly with the production of a national car, the Proton Saga, in 1985. By the mid-1990s, the Proton cars were being widely sold in the international market, marking the arrival of Malaysia as an emerging industrial country. One thing led to another and culminated in Malaysia holding a successful world-class sports event, the Commonwealth Games in 1997. Although the event was marred by the biggest political crisis in independent Malaysia (the Anwar saga), the myth of the power and determination of the government and the ideology of Malaysia boleh shared by all Malaysians seemed to remain intact.

The Government as a Legitimate Authority How did the government do it? Besides naked force and repression common in the 1980s, the government elevated itself to the status of the ruler, and claimed legitimacy by destroying competing authorities, in particular, the position of the sultans. The latter was instated as the “source of all authority” by the 1957 Constitution after the Malays won the fight against the Malayan Union. With it, the sultans claimed absolute loyalty and authority while at the same time symbolized the apex of Malay power. Through a Conference of Rulers, they appointed one of them to be the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the King, hereafter the Agong) on a rotating basis on five-year terms. Being rulers in their respective states, the sultans and the Agong became the guardian of the special position of the Malays, the head of the Malay (Islam) religion and customs and the patron which appointed key government officials, including the Prime Minister. Through the Conference of Rulers, the sultans and the Agong also deliberated on matters of national policies on the advice of the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers. Finally, the sultans and the Agong had the authority to consent or withhold consent to certain laws proposed by the government. In the 1980s, however, the position of the monarchs was seen by government leaders as a possible bottleneck which could hamper the freedom of the government to pass new laws to extend its power. Moreover, the monarchy and feudalism symbolized everything else but

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modern and progressive. To consolidate power and to demand legitimacy from the people, therefore, the government changed the Constitution to make it possible for a proposed legislation to become law after a stipulated period of time even if the sultans and the Agong disapproved. This precipitated what has become known as the constitutional crisis of 1983/84.67 In 1994, excessive behaviour patterns of some members of the royalty gave another excuse for the government to amend the Constitution to remove legal immunity that the royalty enjoyed under the law. Why did the government do this? In an extensive analysis, Hari Singh68 has suggested that the government, particularly UMNO, had grown confident by the 1980s that it did not need the support nor the alliance of the sultans to lead the Malays. In addition, by the 1980s, Malay politics was about economics and wealth accumulation rather than Malay cultural supremacy which the sultans symbolized. In some cases, the royal houses were also involved in major business enterprises that made them powerful economic competitors to rising UMNO business élite. Believing that UMNO was strong enough to protect the Malays, the government seized the authority from the sultans. Compared to the sultans, of course, UMNO has a direct and intensive everyday relationships with the Malay population. The UMNO party structure incorporates every Malay village into its fold and it plays a direct role as the economic patron of the Malays by giving them economic and social benefits under the NEP. The sultans had some support from the Malay population, particularly in the early 1990s from the (now defunct) Parti Semangat 46, a Malay political party led by a royal (Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah), but they could not withstand intensive media campaign and propaganda by the government. None the less, the sultans and the Agong still enjoy considerable power and influence, particularly at the state level. Indeed, the symbolic role of the sultans as the Malay sovereign remains intact. But with the constitutional change, the potential for the Agong to act against the government and the capacity of the sultans to act against UMNO at the state level are reduced substantially. In practice, the government is still dominated by the Malays, but the new symbol of authority, the government, is presented as multi-ethnic, that is, Malaysian. It projects itself as the protector of all Malaysians and defends whatever it does, particularly the expensive infrastructure projects, as in the interests of Malaysians so that the people will be “proud to be Malaysians”. Sometimes, even the old UMNO cry for “Bangsa, Agama dan Negara” (Race, Religion and the Country) is deliberately used to justify government projects, as if the “race, religion and the country” slogan meant a united singular Malaysian nation. These and other related slogans

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are recurrently played up in the mainstream media to create new myths and legitimacy for the new “ruler”.

The New Malaysian Consciousness To demonstrate strength, particularly at the international level, the government also began to assert itself and to show “recalcitrance” and independence in international relations. In the 1980s, for instance, the government took a “Look east” policy and initiated a trade policy of “Buy British last” to show independence from British imperialism. In the 1990s, when a British press alleged that a Malaysian and British aid-for-arms deal involved extensive corruption on both sides, the Malaysian Cabinet retaliated by stopping all government contract awards to British companies.69 In the same light, the Prime Minister also hit out and took on major Western (world) powers by criticizing them for not taking decisive action against ethnic atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.70 This was again repeated when the government, particularly the Prime Minister, launched a verbal campaign against financier George Soros for allegedly causing the 1997–98 economic crisis in Malaysia.71 Finally, and closer to home, the government continually and openly criticized Singapore’s policy on Malaysia whenever it found it necessary and politically beneficial to do so. To what extent the government consolidates its standing among the masses is difficult to gauge, but the fact that it takes a stand and normally a strong one on particular international issues seems to bring home some measure of pride to the “nation”. In fact, some citizens even go out of their way to support and openly approve the government’s stand on the issues.72 Without ethnic prejudice, the people seem to begin to gradually identify themselves with particular national stands as Malaysians. Together with the new myth above, this seems to give them a new feeling of togetherness as Malaysians, somewhat envisioning the notion of a Bangsa Malaysia or a new Malaysian nation envisaged by the Prime Minister in his famous Vision 2020. However, while this seems to operate towards building a nation out of different ethnic loyalties, it may not support the government in power all the time. As shown by the protest against the Prime Minister in the Anwar saga, the commonality of being Malaysians is drawing people of all ethnic groups to call for reforms and the Prime Minister to step down. The construction of national pride and confidence characteristic of a modern developed nation seems to work against the main creator, that is, the Prime Minister himself. The new Malaysians

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not only question him for deviating from basic democratic norms but also for ridiculing the sense of civility central to social relations in such nations. It has been reported, for instance, that seven out ten Malays surveyed by UMNO were not happy over the way in which the Prime Minister sacked his deputy from office.73 Similarly, the government has identified at least forty websites which are actively spreading information on alleged government abuses and inciting the public to support and fight for political reforms being called by opposition political parties. This is because, besides opposition political parties and non-governmental organizations, considerable numbers of young and urban educated Malays, intellectuals, students, professionals, and retired government servants are all taking the Prime Minister to task for his actions, ethics, and morality in UMNO politics. To some extent, these critics are also supported by non-Malay counterparts. The education and training systems, particularly overseas education, have undoubtedly made them more open and exposed to the ideas and practices of Western democracy, particularly those related to systems of governance and civility. This is legitimized further by its compatibility with Islamic precepts of fairness and justice. Given the fact that communication is now made relatively easy with information technology and globalization, it is hardly surprising that the new Malaysians, including those staying (and studying overseas) are standing up and demanding the Prime Minister to change his political culture and values to that of civility, transparency, and fairness. The Prime Minister and the government, however, continue to deny the legitimacy of the opposition by invoking their traditional source of authority as the ruler and patron. In a somewhat patronizing manner, and targeting mainly his Malay critics, for instance, the Prime Minister has charged them with being “ungrateful” and “disloyal” to the government that has created them. Others, he has accused of being agents of Western interests out to “recolonize” Malaysia. How far this contest will change Malaysian political culture is difficult to ascertain, particularly when the Prime Minister and the government has recourse to unlimited funds and repressive government power and facilities at their disposal. UMNO is also very well organized and highly experienced in manufacturing effective methods to gain votes during general elections. But if anything, the current contest indicates that Malays, and Malaysians generally, are developing a new set of political values and meanings (consciousness) to define their political space in the global era. Their demands for political reforms, open governance, and a new standard of civility are probably the beginning of an emerging alternative Malaysian consciousness.

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Future Tensions It may be argued, at this point, that the emerging Malaysian “nation’ and “consciousness” is rather weak and fragile. It has some built-in counteracting centrifugal tendencies which may lead to a recurrence of ethnic tensions as well as other forms of political instability. The first is religious violence. This was exemplified by the clash between Muslims and Hindus at Kampong Rawa in Penang in early 1998. Although the violence (without fatality) lasted only several days and was largely confined to a small locale, the tension continued for several weeks and excited support from outside the state. The police, of course, took immediate action to impose a local curfew, and the Chief Minister pleaded to community leaders to observe tolerance. Even the Deputy Prime Minister visited the site and paid special attention to the case for fear of it spreading to other places. If anything, this indicates the fragility of inter-religious relations in Malaysia. Thus far, the official religion (Islam) has been given special emphasis, defining the religious landscape of the Malaysian nation. Although provided for and legitimized by the Constitution, other religions have been sidelined by the government and sustain themselves on their own mechanisms and resources. But given the prominence of Islam, particularly as a result of its politicization by the contest between UMNO and PAS, and its revivalism in recent years, other religions are also consolidating and supercharging their positions. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are all protecting their followers and, like Islam, defending and spreading their faiths. This is further accentuated by the impact of globalization on religion in general. Besides reviving Islam as an alternative civilization the world over, it also provides the opportunity for other religions to reassert their positions and define their space in the new global world.74 In this light, it is hardly surprising that religious matters in Malaysia are becoming more sensitive and cautiously guarded by all parties. A slight interference and even a show of disrespect may cause harsh retaliation and escalate into open clashes. This sensitivity is particularly guarded by the followers of Islam because they believe that it is the definitive Malaysian religion and protected by the government. Challenges to it may not only lead to serious religious tension but also a holy war (jihad). Secondly, there is a greater popularity and demand for vernacular education. In particular, enrolments in both vernacular Chinese and Arabic primary school systems have registered a remarkable rise in recent years. Although Chinese schools are also attracting non-Chinese parents (5 per cent of pupils in Chinese schools in 1995 were non-Chinese), a

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large number of Malays, particularly those in the more underdeveloped states of Kedah and Kelantan are going back to once popular Arabic medium schools.75 The fact that Chinese and Arabic medium secondary schools continue to operate as independent schools (outside the national system) provide the impetus for parents to seek alternative largely ethnic education for their children. It is difficult to guess the direction of this tendency, but if it represents a reinvigoration of ethnic sentiments, then it is possible that the trend may be counter-productive to the present process of Malaysianization. In the first place, and no matter how erroneous it may be, revival of interest in Islamic education may be seen by the Chinese as a resurrection of Malay nationalism.76 Though this may not lead to “resinification”77 or revival of Chineseness, it will certainly sustain ethnic sensitivities, if not fears. The current political trend helps to reduce ethnic antagonisms, but under different political conditions, they may be easily resurrected because ethnicity and ethnic polarization are still strong. Liberalization of education as well as relaxation on the use of Bahasa Malaysia may, for the moment, sustain cordial Sino-Malay relations. Likewise, the everpresent attraction to Islam and the Arabic schools for the Malays, and Chinese schools for the Chinese may act as a safety valve to sustain the relationship. But under different political conditions, these may turn into a strain and break the relationship. Likewise, politicians may easily incite ethnic tension purely for political gains. At present, it is not certain where the threshold lies beyond which ethnic tolerance breaks down. Thirdly, the emerging Malaysian consciousness noted provides some grounds for optimism because it is multi-ethnic in nature. But it is superficial, if not shifty. It is created out of a concerted campaign by the government to justify some of its controversial projects. Given government control over the media, which is heavily used for the campaign, the rise of the new ideology may be more apparent than real. With the present UMNO culture noted above, supporters may also consist of cronies and those out to obtain favours from the government. It may turn out to be another type of concocted reverence by followers for material gains rather than real national pride. Indeed, the majority of the population may take it as another form of government propaganda. Under different political conditions, projects such as the new international airport, the high-rise buildings, and the national car project may not constitute national pride at all. Opposition political parties and reform movements, for instance, see the projects as extravagant and a major misallocation of national resources. They may undermine the new ideology when and if they do form an alternative government.

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Finally, the new Malaysian consciousness relies heavily on economic structures: the government apportions wealth in a way that promotes some inter-ethnic co-operation. The business sector, for instance, has been imposed with a quota system to encourage the development of Malay capital, employment and assets. In a way, non-Malays have been forced to take up Malay partners and collaborators. Given increasing deregulation and liberalization associated with globalization, however, it is not certain how long such inter-ethnic co-operation can last. For, liberalization may require pure business considerations based on market requirements. In such circumstances, Malay partners and Malay workers may turn out to be irrelevant, if not a burden. Therefore, balancing the requirements of the NEP and the demands of the market will pose a major challenge to the government in the future, not only to nurture the growth of the Malaysian consciousness but also for its own survival. Success depends very much on the competence of the Malays, for which the Prime Minister has expressed some doubts. Thus far, the trend has been largely supported by positive economic growth. But economic trends are also volatile and vulnerable to serious economic crisis (as in 1997–99). Under prolonged adverse conditions, inter-ethnic co-operation may cease to exist and the Malaysian consciousness may be seriously challenged. In the final analysis, the emergence of a new Malaysian consciousness is a complex phenomenon. Given the ever present threats from religious and ethnic counteracting forces, the superficiality of national pride, and volatility of economic trends, the emerging national consciousness may not even mature into a sustained new nationalism replacing the existing Malay nationalism, although the latter is undergoing major changes.

Conclusion To recapitulate, it has been shown that the rise of Malay nationalism in Malaysia had an uneasy beginning because of the split in the Malay community. Western-educated Malay bureaucrats (UMNO), however, managed to gain control at independence. With support from the British and Western-educated Chinese business élite (MCA), they tried to define the new nation in Malay terms but in a gradual, liberal, and largely secular form. Both Chinese and Malay radicals opposed the move but this only strengthened the inter-ethnic élite alliance to create multi-ethnicity and pluralism with Malay leadership. This, however, did not help the Malays very much. Twelve years after independence, the economic and social welfare of the Malays fell to a critical level compared to other ethnic groups. Younger UMNO leaders revolted and this brought about Malay

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political dominance, expressed in the NEP. Subsequently, Malay nationalism defined Malaysian nationhood and nationality, and set out to reinstate Malay economy and society. Using government power, Malay leaders suppressed the opposition and critics of Malay political dominance, but globalization brought new challenges. Malay nationalism became focused on economic pursuits and created a culture of aggressive wealth accumulation, with a tendency for it to be concentrated within a closed circle of wealthy Malays. The Malay masses, on the other hand, are still relatively deprived and this has given rise to charges of UMNO being irresponsible and betraying Malay nationalist causes. Globalization also enhances UMNO’s tendency to secularize Islam. Together with PAS’ struggle to promote pure Islam as an alternative way of life, Malay nationalism faces the danger of being detached from its Islamic base. Finally, globalization liberalizes education and supports the proliferation of English usage. The government encouraged the move because economic development through globalization requires both a skilled labour force and English communication. For that, the government is guilty of undermining some of the major pillars of Malay nationalism, that is, Malay education and the Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia). As a result, some critics argue, there is not much Malay content left in the present globalized Malaysia. The government is trying hard to justify its position by promoting a Malaysian consciousness as an alternative to Malay nationalism. But this seems to be superficial and lacking the fundamentals traditionally associated with nationalism: culture, religion, language, education, and the struggle to protect and promote the people sharing the same traits. Instead, it is based on an imposition of government power and constructed national pride (ideology), which are questionable and thus contestable. Globalization also provides different interpretations and alternative meanings to the new consciousness — a more democratic, just and transparent rather than authoritarian and corrupt political culture. But this alternative consciousness has not taken root. For all intents and purposes, Malaysian political culture, particularly in the post-NEP period, is largely ethnic and dominated by the Malays. However, in spite of Malaysianization processes, ethnicity still pervades everyday life. In the context of the UMNO leadership losing ground support, further globalization may excite new ethnic fears and suspicions, including a possible reassertion of the NEP Malay nationalism. For this reason, the 1999 general election is crucial to the political development of Malaysia. A continuation of the present political culture may see a greater drive towards authoritarianism, repression and injustice to contain ethnic fears as well as to thwart the development and maturity of the alternative (opposition) Malaysian consciousness. Moreover, given the fact

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that the opposition mainly comes from the Malays, perhaps a greater appeal and thus more concessions will be given to Chinese voters to make up for the deficit so that BN can remain in power. Alternatively, a defeat of the BN and a political change would require a major review of interethnic co-operation: will the Malays forgo their present dominance? Will non-Malays not demand equal position? Either way, Malaysians have a major political assignment ahead.

Notes 1. I am indebted to John Funston and Syed Farid Al-Atas for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 2. Firdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985), p.58. 3. See Abdul Rahman Ismail, “Nasionalisme Melayu dan Nasionalisme Melayu Setanah Melayu, in Isu-Isu Persejarahan, edited by Abu Talib Ahmad and Cheah Boon Kheng (Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1995), pp. 163–92, p. 180. 4. Firdaus Haji Abdullah, op.cit., p.3. The popular and influential ones include Al-Iman (1906–08), Pengasuh (from 19 July 1918), Jawi Peranakan (1876– 95), and Utusan Melayu (from 26 November 1907). See William R. Roff, The Origin of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Universiti Malaya, 1980), p. 157ff. 5. See John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books [Asia] Ltd., 1980), p. 29ff. 6. William R. Roff (op.cit., p.235), for instance, noted the political inclination of this group of nationalists in the following terms: “The concept of a Malay nation, though much discussed by the press and the intelligentsia, existed less than an ideal polity than as a defensive community of interest against further subordination to or dependence on ‘foreigners’, in particular against the domiciled Asian communities now so firmly entrenched in the states and settlement: the Chinese foremost, the Indians, and even the Arabs and Jawi Peranakan”. 7. Ibid., p.236 8. The acronym PAS, for Parti Islam SeMalaysia, comes from the Jawi script. 9. Nabir Haji Abdullah, quoted in Firdaus Haji Abdullah, op.cit. p. 46. 10. See Cheah Boon Kheng, “Malayan Chinese and the Citizenship Issue”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs (RIMA) 12, no. 2 (1978): 95–122. 11. The quote is taken from a placard used in the demonstration against the Malayan Union, organized by the Malay Union of Kelantan on 15 December 1945, reported by Utusan Melayu, and quoted in Ishak Tadin, “Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism: 1946–1951”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 1, no. 1 (March 1960): 67.

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12. For instance, “... more than 1.5 million Chinese had applied for and received recognition as Federal citizens of Malaya” between the beginning of the Emergency in 1948 and independence in 1957. See Cheah Boon Kheng, op.cit., p.120. 13. See F.G. Carnell, “Constitutional Reforms and Elections in Malaya”, Pacific Affairs 27 (1954): 221. 14. With the liberalization of citizenship, 800,000 non-Malays became citizens in 1958 alone. See R.S.Milne and Diane K.Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore: Times Books International, 1980), p.40. Quotation is from Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 235. 15. Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution. 16. In this instance, John Funston (op.cit., p. 140) noted that both MNP and Hizbul Muslimin shared more or less the same ideological emphasis by proposing that, “Malay Sultans were to remain as constitutional monarchs ...; Malay was to be the official language; Malaya’s national flag was to incorporate the Malay national colours (red and white); Islamic and Malay customs were to be fully controlled by Malays; Malays were to be guaranteed a majority of 55 per cent in the country’s central legislative body for the first 9 years of independence; and finally, the nationality to be adopted would be known as Melayu (Malay)”. 17. John Funston (op.cit., p.141) noted that they proposed a citizenship test as follows: “first, a person must be prepared to take on a new Malayan nationality; second, he must accept a new name for his nationality, Melayu; third, he must acknowledge full allegiance to Malaya ... and renounce all other allegiances; and fourth, he must indicate his preparedness to fight for Malaya against any country whatsoever”. 18. See Heng Pek Hoon, op.cit., pp.48–49. 19. The details are discussed in ibid., chapter 8. 20. There are today sixty independent Chinese secondary schools with about 60,000 pupils as well as 1,287 national-type Chinese primary schools, teaching (89 per cent of the total Chinese pupils) in Mandarin. See Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya 1945–1961 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1. 21. See R.H. Hickling, An Introduction to the Federal Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers Sdn.Bhd., 1982), p.71. 22. Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur-Singapore: Marican and Sons (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd., 1983), p. 143– 44. 23. Today, PNB has grown to become one of the biggest corporations in Malaysia with controlling stakes in more than twenty major companies having interests in insurance, finance, banking, light and heavy industrial products, real estate, plantations, shipping, and manufacturing. 24. See the discussion on the subject in Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991) especially p.102ff.

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25. See an interesting discussion on a related subject in Francis Loh Kok Wah, ed., Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and Federalism, A Special Issue of Kajian Malaysia (Journal of Malaysian Studies) 15, no.1&2 (1997). 26. See Loh Kok Wah, The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia: Reform and Conflicts in the Malaysian Chinese Association 1971–73, ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 70 (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982). 27. In 1995, the government estimated that there were 50,600 Malaysian students overseas. Of this total, about 20,000, or 39.5 per cent were sponsored by the government. In most cases, the sponsored students were Malays. See Government of Malaysia, Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1991–2000 (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Berhad, 1996), p. 315. 28. See the debates in Kua Kia Soong, National Culture and Democracy (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Kersani, 1985). 29. In 1976–85, for instance, RM30 billion of Chinese capital left the country with some Chinese migrating out of the country. See S. Jayasankaran, “Balancing the Act”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1995, p. 24– 26. 30. See Tan Liok Ee, op.cit., p. 1. 31. See, for instance, the identification of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia as Southeast Asians in Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians”, in his edited volume, Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 1–24, especially pp. 17–19. 32. A recent study among second and third-year students at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, showed that though they are all loyal to the country, they do not share the same outlook nor do they interact across ethnic lines. See the report in the New Straits Times (Education), 21 September 1999, p. 7. 33. See, for instance, the discussion on the subject in the New Straits Times, 31 July 1999, p. 10. 34. See the expansion of Malay interests in Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists (St.Leonard, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1999), chapter 3. The rise of the Malay middle class is also discussed in Abdul Rahman Embong, “Social Transformation, the State and the Middle Classes in Post-Independence Malaysia”, in Mediating Identities in Changing Malaysia, edited by Zawawi Ibrahim, special issue of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (1996): 56–79. 35. Seven of the top ten millionaires in the early 1990s were all Chinese and out of the total number, four of them emerged during the NEP period and with a much bigger margin than the three Malays in the group. See S. Jayasankaran, “Living Well: Chinese Entrepreneurs Beat the System”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1995, p. 31. 36. Ling Liong Sik, The Malayan Chinese Towards Vision 2020 (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1995), p. 65. 37. See Heng Pek Koon, “Chinese Responses to Malay Hegemony in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–96”, in Mediating Identities in Changing Malaysia, edited by Zawawi Ibrahim, special issue of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (1996): 32–55, especially pp. 50–51.

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38. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 1990), p. 63ff. 39. See Socio-Economic Research Unit (SERU), Prime Minister’s Department, Proceedings of the National Seminar: Towards a Developed and Industrialized Society: Understanding the Concept, Implications and Challenges of Vision 2020 (Kuala Lumpur, 1992), chapter 4; and Government of Malaysia, The Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991–2000 (Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1991.) pp. 14–21. 40. See “Malaysia: The Way Forward”, Working paper presented by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysia Business Council, Kuala Lumpur, 28 February 1991, para 5. 41. See Rustam A. Sani, Melayu Baru dan Bangsa Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd., 1993). 42. S. Jayasankaran wrote that “Nothing has been transparent about these deals, even those that have gone to non-Malay businessmen. No one, for example, was tendered for open bidding”. See his “The Chosen Few: Privatisation Allows Mahathir to Pick Winners”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1995, p. 30. 43. Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister, for instance, alleged that some senior party members were misusing their positions by allocating shares to family members, giving contracts without proper clearance and squandering party funds. He has lodged police reports on the cases. 44. For instance, S. Jayasankaran described an UMNO youth leader as a “flamboyant politician with the taste of high life”. See “Ageing Appeal: UMNO’s Youth Wing Falls on Hard Times”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 October 1994, p. 24. 45. The percentage of registered Malay professionals are as follows: Accountant (15.7 per cent); Architect (28.5 per cent); Doctor (31.3 per cent); Dentist (32.1 per cent); Veterinary Surgeon (40.3 per cent); Engineer (37.0 per cent); Surveyor (47.4 per cent); Lawyer (30.9 per cent); Total: 32.0 per cent. See Government of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan: 1996– 2000 (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad, 1999), p. 80. 46. Poverty rates for Malay majority areas are as follows: Kelantan (19.2 per cent), Trengganu (17.3 per cent), Kedah (11.5 per cent) and Perlis (10.7 per cent). This contrasts with less than 2 per cent in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor and Penang. Ibid., pp. 63–64. 47. Ibid., p. 78. 48. The figure for intra-Malay income difference is not available but the overall mean monthly gross household income of the Malays (bumiputra) in 1997 was only 54.5 per cent that of the Chinese. See ibid., p. 68. 49. Anwar Ibrahim was dismissed as the Deputy Prime Minister and later as an UMNO member because he was accused of committing sodomy (homosexuality) and thus being immoral, acting against the precepts of Islam and unfit to be a leader in Malaysia. He was later arrested and beaten in jail before being tried and sentenced to six years jail on corruption charges. He is undergoing trial for sodomy. See reports on the earlier trial by Zoher Abdoolcarim and Santha Oorjitham, “The Judgement of History”, Asiaweek,

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50. 51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

Halim Salleh 23 April 1999, p. 27–28; and Robin Ajelo, “On the Set of ‘K.L.Law’” in the same volume of Asiaweek, pp. 30–31. However, a comprehensive account of the saga and its analysis is provided by John Funston, “Malaysia: A Fateful September” in his (with Daljit Singh) edited volume, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 165–84. See, for instance, Murray Hiebert and S. Jayasankaran, “Oh for a Bailout”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1999, pp. 19–20. This occurred in spite of the fact that hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, charged and fined/imprisoned for violating the country’s tough law on illegal assembly (more than three people without a permit). Harakah, a popular PAS bi-weekly newspaper reported that, “Prosecutors have twice amended the date of the sodomy charge against Anwar and Sukma. The initial charge said that the incident took place in May 1994 but this was later changed to May 1992 and eventually to between January and March in 1993”. See Harakah headline, “Azizan repeatedly contradicts himself”, Friday 13 August 1999. PAS, for instance, claimed to have received 150,000 applicants for membership in a month. See Harakah, 16 August 1999, p. 40. In five months to March 1999, PAS also claimed to have registered 71,000 new members. See the interview with the President of PAS in Asiaweek, 12 March 1999, p. 26. See the headline report in all major newspapers on Tuesday, 20 July 1999. Subsequently, discussion and explanation of Malay students’ backwardness appeared in most newspapers. See, for instance, the most recent in the Sunday Star (Education Section), 22 September 1999, pp. 2–3, and 5. The debate is well documented and discussed by John Funston , “The Politics of Islamic Reassertion: Malaysia”, in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 171–79. For example, speaking out against religious fundamentalism in general, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir was quoted as saying that some Muslim customs stemmed from the desert environment of the Middle East and were thus unsuitable for Southeast Asia. If they wanted to be faithful to their concept, they should consider buying a camel. See Frank Ching, “Mahathir Grasps a Nettle”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 March 1994, p. 32. In a recent debate with PAS, the Prime Minister likewise ridiculed that the tradition of Muslim men sporting a beard stemmed from the absence of razor blades in ancient Arabia. This developed into a recurrent anti-ulama (religious scholar) campaign, particularly against PAS ulama, in speeches by UMNO leaders as well as in the mainstream media. See, for instance, recent reports in Utusan Malaysia, 24 April 1999 and 16 July 1999, and Berita Harian, 1 July 1999. In predominantly Malay areas, such as Kelantan and Kedah, this debate has divided families, relatives and villages along the UMNO-PAS divide, with some serious repercussions. Now the debate is more open but no less serious and divisive. The case of Muslim women participating in beauty contests has been a matter of debate for a long time. See, for instance, K.J. Ratnam, “Religion

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60. 61. 62.

63.

64.

65. 66.

67.

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and Politics in Malaya”, in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 143–58. In a recent case (13 June 1997), the Prime Minister criticized an ulama who was the Mufti of Selangor for being inflexible and discriminatory against women when three Muslim women were arrested by the Selangor Religious Department for taking part in a beauty contest. The ulama reacted by criticizing the Prime Minister’s action as tantamount to apostasy. The debate ended when the Mufti was not renewed in his job at the expiry of his contract. See Murray Hiebert, “A Woman’s Place”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 December 1997, pp. 44– 46. Comparison may be made between the famous cases of Maria Hertog in the 1950s and Noraishah in the 1990s. The former’s forced conversion to Christianity invoked mass demonstrations in Singapore after a judge ruled for it. In contrast, the latter’s tussle with the family and final abscondment to convert to Christianity in order to marry a Christian Chinese was seen as a private matter and received no opposition beyond the immediate family members. See, for instance, S. Jayasankaran, “Forbidden Love”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 February 1998, p. 21. See S. Jayasankaran, “Malaysian Dilemmas”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 September 1995, pp. 18–20. See John Funston, “The Politics of Islamic Reassertion”, pp. 171–79. Following the prohibition, students involved in politics, particularly those which oppose the government, are dealt with severely, including expulsion. To complement the repression, opposition political parties are barred from campus grounds. The Deputy Minister of Education, for instance, noted that “we want to develop education as a significant industry. Eventually we want to internationalise it, make it an export industry”. See S. Jayasankaran, “Lessons of Education”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 April 1995, pp. 44– 45. The Prime Minister has been quoted as defending the English policy in the following terms: “At the time when the globe is shrinking, no country can afford to focus only on its own language and culture. Even China, the world’s most populous country is encouraging its students to study all manner of foreign language. For a leader of any country to decide not to do so would be like competing with the rest of the world with his hands tied behind his back”. See Frank Ching, “Malaysia Returns to English”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 January 1995, p. 32. See Frank Ching, “Mahathir Grasps a Nettle”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 March 1994, p. 32. By 1996, Malaysia had spent RM137.6 billion on the projects. This is a huge sum by any standards. See M. Hiebert and S. Jayasankaran, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 August 1997, p. 21. See a comprehensive discussion of the events in Hari Singh, “Umno Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of Special Relationship”, Pacific Affairs 68, no.2 (1995): 187–205. See also Gordon P. Means, op.cit., especially p. 115.

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68. Ibid. 69. For details, see, for instance, M. Vatikiotis, “Trading Insults”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1994, p. 16–17. 70. See Mahathir Mohamad, “Bosnia and the West”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1995. 71. A summary of both their positions is summarized in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 October 1997, p. 32. 72. Lim Kok Wing, a prominent businessman, for instance, produced a book called The Hidden Agenda to support the Prime Minister and condemned international financiers for causing the economic crisis in Malaysia. See the report by Murray Hiebert, “Read and Weep”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 May 1998, p. 28. 73. See Murray Hiebert and S. Jayasankaran, “A Single Spark”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 October 1998, p. 12–14 74. See, for instance, Louis Baeck, “The Impact of Culture on Development”, in Living in the Global Society, edited by Robert Papini, Antonio Pavan and Stefano Zamagni (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997), pp. 33– 51. 75. The exact number of children in Arabic medium schools, particularly at the primary level, is not available. Records from the Ministry of Education, however, show that there were 166,544 pupils in the schools at secondary level in 1998. Judging from the fact that only 24.2 per cent and 22.1 per cent of all applicants to the schools gained entry in 1997 and 1998 respectively due to limited places, the demand for religious education is definitely on the increase. See Mohd.Syukri Salleh and Ku Halim Ku Ariffin, “Kemasukan pelajar-pelajar Aliran Agama ke IPTA Malaysia: masalah dan cadangan penyelesaian” [Entry of religious stream students into Malaysian public institutions of high learning], (Paper presented at the National Conference on Religious School Education, School of Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 11–13 October 1999). 76. See Lee Kam Hing, “Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020”, in Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 72–107. 77. I borrow the term from Leo Suryadinata, op.cit.

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m 6 n Nationalism and Globalization in Australia

MICHAEL WESLEY*

To trace the story of Australian nationalism is to trace the search for a national identity in the absence of a defining national moment or event. In 1977, Australia celebrated the bicentenary of Captain Cook’s “discovery” of Australia; yet Dutch explorers had discovered Australia for the European world decades before Cook. In 1988, the bicentenary was of the first European settlement in Australia, despite the continent’s 40,000-year prior habitation by Aborigines. The centenary of federation in 2001 — proposed as a celebration of national independence — will also be a highly ambiguous anniversary. Before 1901, several Australian colonies had exercised substantial democratic self-rule. Long after 1901, Australia was reluctant to exercise a sovereign voice independent of Britain: the 1931 Statute of Westminster, establishing foreign policy independence of the White colonies from Britain, was not ratified in Australia until 1943. One reason for this absence of a defining moment was the beneficence of the outside world. Australia’s initial European settlement phase occurred during the nineteenth century “long peace”, at a time when Britain was at the peak of its power — the first industrial state, with a navy that was globally dominant. Until 1942, Australia had no realistic external foe to foster nationalism out of the desperate struggle for defence. Neither was a unifying independence struggle against the colonial centre necessary. Australia’s colonization had occurred in the aftermath of the American War of Independence, from which the British Colonial Office learnt a great 175

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deal about leniency and large measures of self-rule for the White colonies: “Since the Colonial Office was itself an agent of reform, there was no need for the consolidation of an Australian nationality to carry issues which Britain would not concede.”1 The closeness of the relationship between Britain and the Australian colonies — defined in currents of people, manufactures and food, physical security, and pragmatic grants of self-government within the bounds of colonial deference — meant that neither could Australia initially be defined socio-geographically. The ebbs and flows of people between Britain and the colonies meant that at no time could all of those within Australia’s shores be defined as nationals, nor could all of those in Britain or in transit be defined as foreigners. Long into the twentieth century, Australians identified themselves as Britons living in the Australian colonies,2 and as Britain entered European wars, Australian leaders committed Australia to automatic entry at Britain’s side, with little stir of controversy among the wider population. Furthermore, from the start, Australia was settled as several colonies, rather than as one unified administration. A variety of barriers existed between the colonies, and the long debates preceding federation — not to mention the secession attempt of Western Australia in 1933 — attest to the modernity of the idea of Australia as a unified, common territory for Australians. From the beginning of the settler society, there was no common distinguishing religion or ethnic group around which an Australian nationalism could congeal. The early European Australians were not only Protestant English and Welsh convicts, but also Scots and Catholic Irish; later European Australians came from Germany, Italy, Central and Southern Europe; and even later Australians hailed from all continents. While Irish Australians have often defined their identity as distinct from those from England, this was something that set them apart from, rather than connecting them to, Australians of English background. These circumstances would give the observer who have read Anthony Smith’s celebrated definition of a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”3 cause to despair at the prospect of finding an Australian nationalism. Yet, despite the lack of common external and internal precipitants of nationalism, the impulse towards forming a national identity that was uniquely Australian existed from the early stages of European colonization. The rise of nationalism from the late eighteenth century was yet another European influence on Australia; and the very fact of close familial links to Britain and a benign external environment provided the early impetus

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towards defining a national identity that allowed Australian society to be distinguished from British, and later other societies.4 In Australia, no less than other countries, an “imagined community” was formed between inhabitants who for the most part would never meet, 5 through a competitive, relational, and comparative process with other societies.6 Australian nationalism would never have formed in the absence of nations and nationalism elsewhere; however, once it started, it took on a distinctive form. Without a galvanizing moment or common blood or belief, Australian identity coalesced around particular social and economic definitions. Initially convicts and native-born Australians — the permanent residents — distinguished themselves from the free settlers, the soldiers, and the administrators — temporary visitors given to returning to the British Isles — by reference to their social status. Early Australian identity focused on promoting and perceiving (whether it actually existed or not) an egalitarian, communitarian sense of “sameness” that differed markedly from the hierarchical, individualistic nature of nineteenth-century British society. It was a working class social ethos deeply influenced by the philosophies of the Chartist movement in Britain, which had reacted to the horror of the early industrial revolution and the squalor of the lives of the working class by advocating collective action in support of greater social and political justice. The numerical superiority of rural workers in the bush, and the early strength of the organized labour movement meant that first pastoralists and then industrialists were socialized by labour and its strong sense of communalism and egalitarianism. These social identifiers endured, serving to socialize the waves of immigrants that arrived in Australia. Australian nationalism possessed a strong assimilationist streak, ready to accept those immigrants that were willing to adopt the suspicion of authority, the dislike of pedigree or airs of superiority, and the loyalty to one’s “mates” that characterized the mass of Australian society. Without common origins, Australian society adopted the glue of social (rather than ethnic) nationalism, demanding adherence to common symbols and values and emphasizing a common present and future rather than a shared past. The second set of identifiers that emerged to sustain and drive the social bases of Australian identity was economic. Australia became wealthy extremely early. Its comparative advantage in the commodities that an industrializing world was hungry for, and the early capitalization of its primary industries, gave it the highest per capita income in the world by the late nineteenth century. Here was a primacy that truly distinguished Australia from other societies; what was more, it was a positive distinction for a society still coming to terms with its convict origins. These economic identifiers were influenced by earlier social identifiers. Australian society

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valued economic prosperity from a collectivist, distributive approach, seeking to spread national wealth through society. Extremes of wealth and poverty were shunned as echoes of the flawed world of industrializing Britain. The new society naturally wished to preserve these conditions of evenly distributed wealth and comfort. The main institutional structures of the Australian economy, set up in the aftermath of the Depression of the 1890s, were moderately distributive and defensive, designed to preserve for Australians their early prosperity: the politics of domestic defence consisted... of four closely interrelated policies: the protection of manufacturing industry through tariffs and other trade restrictions, the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, the control of immigration, and a residual system of income maintenance for those outside the labour market. Each may be seen as interlocking components of a system of shock absorbers designed to defend and stabilize the existing structure of economic opportunities and rewards against any rapid or excessive disturbance from exogenous forces.7

This is not to deny that Australian society did not create its distinctive national myths; it is to argue that these national myths were imbued with and sustained by these social and economic motivations. The popularity of Ned Kelly lay in his rebellion against unequally distributed property and authority; the emotion summoned by the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli was prompted by undertones of sacrifice for the community and of solidarity with comrades;8 the lionization of Australian sporting champions was underpinned by pride in Australia’s physical wealth, and Australia’s sporting prowess is often spoken of by Australians in terms of the country’s superiority in sports in per capita terms. It is important to clarify three crucial points regarding the dynamic of these social and economic identifiers of Australian nationalism. First, the state was expected to protect and promote social and economic egalitarianism and prosperity. The Australian state assumed responsibilities over aspects of civil society and the promotion of national development that other Western countries would have found profoundly unacceptable. Secondly, the social and economic motivators were most often atavistic: both social and economic critics have commonly looked back to times of lost egalitarianism, homogeneity, or prosperity in criticizing current conditions.9 Thirdly, every development in Australian national identity came as a reaction to, or was sponsored by, aspects of globalization. The European colonization of Australia itself resulted from the globalization of population movements.

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Tracing the story of Australian nationalism therefore requires monitoring the social and economic reactions to the pressures of globalization in Australia, channelled and driven by these common dynamics. This chapter will follow the changes and continuities in the social and economic markers of Australian national identity, as it developed from the time of European colonization. These markers are highlighted by focusing on population policy, particularly on the changes to population policy as a result of responses to the demands of globalization. While globalization, defined as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shared by events occurring miles and miles away and vice versa”,10 can be perceived, even in attenuated forms, from the beginning of Australia’s European colonization, the emphasis of this chapter is on how Australian nationalism reacted to the new forces of globalization after the 1970s.

Nationalism and Population Perhaps nowhere did the social and economic markers of Australian national identity exert a stronger policy form than in the areas of immigration and population policy. It is natural for the population to assume a major role in nation-building in a settler society; in a continent on the other side of the globe from the societies with which it most identified, and surrounded by oceans or different cultures, it was an imperative. As Australian nationalism developed, it exerted a strong influence on population policy, so that the history of Australia’s population policy has been one of social and economic nationalism interacting with exogenous global forces. Because the process of identity-building occurred at the same time as settlement in Australia, close attention was paid to the type of people who migrated there. Too great a diversity in migrants would render the process of forming an Australian nation difficult. The construction of the Australian identity depended partly on Australia’s isolation and the gradual build-up of the European population there. Nineteenth-century social attitudes inherited from Britain included not only Chartism but beliefs in White supremacy; colonial experiences had imbued British society, and by extension Australian society, with profound beliefs in the superiority of White people. The Civil War in the United States and the ongoing upheavals in South Africa caused Australians to draw further conclusions that racial heterogeneity inevitably bred conflict in settler societies. The fundamental racial bases of Australia’s population policy were reinforced by the early development of democracy in the colonies, and

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the need to reconcile profound beliefs about the inequality of races with the democratic necessity of the equality of citizens: “The particular solution... arrived at was to argue that the preservation of democratic values required strict maintenance of racial homogeneity, in which whiteness was the governing principle”.11 Racial homogeneity was also seen as imperative for the preservation of egalitarianism and communitarianism — both ideals that were difficult for nineteenthcentury attitudes to reconcile with racial heterogeneity. This led to an exclusionary reaction to non-White people both outside and inside Australia: “... all non-European migration was prohibited, ... [and] Aborigines were placed outside of the circle of citizenship where, it was almost universally assumed, they would demographically wither away.”12 As racial homogeneity became integral to Australian social identifiers, it was incorporated into the Australian national identity. Here was an issue on which Australia would not concede to British pressure when its raciallyexclusionary policies became embarrassing for the colonial centre in its relations with its non-White colonies and its Japanese ally after 1902. A later attitude developed in Australia which saw the preservation of racial homogeneity in a multiracial empire as evidence that only within Australia did the true British race endure. The social nationalism of Australia exerted a strong assimilationist, homogenizing pressure on new arrivals. From the early nationalism of the first native-born “currency”, Australianness was further identified with the longevity of one’s lineage in Australia. The longer one had lived in Australia, the less one could be suspected of sympathizing with countries other than Australia. The label “new Australian”, adopted for post-World War II immigrants, often perjoratively, illustrated the intent of this social identifier. After the war also, ideological homogeneity joined racial homogeneity and longevity of settlement as social identifiers, initially making (presumed) strongly anti-communist Eastern Europeans more acceptable migrants than Italians or Greeks, in whose homelands strong communist movements had sprung up.13 While social identifiers placed strong requirements on the type of immigrants that were accepted, security and economic considerations dictated the rate of population increase. Historically, the two impulses towards increasing immigration levels have been the desire to develop a population of sufficient size to defend Australia, and the need for labour. The countering impulse towards restricting immigration was economically driven. Early opposition to Micronesian and Chinese immigrants fused racism with labourism, with opponents arguing that non-White immigrants would work harder and for lower wages, thus undermining the basic wage and standard of living of the Australian worker. As much of the bargaining power and political and social influence of the labour

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movement came from its superior bargaining position, given the chronic nineteenth-century labour shortage, the labour movement came to advocate strictly controlled immigration levels. As usual, it looked to the state to manage Australia’s population: “This tradition of state intervention makes immigration a central area of public policy.”14 As will become clear, all the changes and continuities in Australia’s population policies have been economically driven to a greater or lesser extent, and have been the subject of competing interests — between the pastoralists’ and industrialists’ need for labour and the labour movement’s determination to preserve living standards and political influence; and between homogenizing communitarianism and the later need to “engage” the Asian region.

Globalization and Adjustment Much of modern Australia since 1788 has been the product of early precursors of the forces of globalization. Founded as part of a global empire, its society is an expression of the globalization of population movements; its economic development was based on the globalization of commodities trade and investment, and its involvement in both world wars from the beginning demonstrated the globalization of military strategy. The deep effects on Australia of the world Depression of the 1890s demonstrated to an emerging federation the negative aspects of globalization. In the first decade of federation, Australia adopted the pillars of the “Australian Settlement” — White Australia, Industry Protection, Wage Arbitration, State Paternalism, and Imperial Benevolence15 — as mechanisms of defence of the Australian egalitarian, communitarian way of life against disturbance by the forces of globalization. The demands of globalization have imposed on Australia the choices between defence and adjustment, and the mix between reliance on traditional structures and innovation to supplement these structures or take advantage of new situations has in turn influenced developments in Australian national identity. When challenged by the 1930s Depression, Australian leaders reacted partly according to the mechanisms that had been built up over the years: by raising tariffs, cutting immigration, and formalizing the imperial preferences trading system in the Ottawa Agreement of 1932. The “innovations” they tried — such as expanding the welfare state, intensifying industry policy towards import replacement — were already partly present within the Australian policy mix. More importantly, they resonated with the major traditions of Australian society: state direction and provision, collectivist welfare, and nation building. The coming of

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World War II, and the preoccupation of Britain in Europe while Australia was in danger of invasion, presented Australian leaders with, arguably, an even greater challenge. The policy response of turning to the United States was partly an innovation, but also one that was at all levels consistent with the tradition of depending for security on the friendship of a powerful, Anglo-Saxon ally. These were profound challenges; but they were interpreted by Australian leaders and society as being able to be coped with by the traditional mechanisms and tendencies developed by Australia. Of course, they were bad times, but they could be weathered; if the country stuck to its fundamentals, the good times would return. In the 1970s, Australia experienced five exogenous changes resulting from globalization, which individually were not as challenging as the Depression or World War II, but were serious enough in their simultaneity to profoundly affect Australian national identity. In July 1969, the United States announced the Nixon Doctrine, hailing a long era of policy tentativeness in the Asia-Pacific. In 1973, Britain entered the European Economic Community(EEC), signalling a shift of attention and loyalty from empire to regional bloc. In 1974, Australia’s seemingly endless growth and egalitarian prosperity vanished and never returned: from the mid1970s to the mid-1980s the Australian economy wandered weakly between times of contraction and negligible growth, inflation soared to double-digit levels, and unemployment rose and established itself as a permanent fixture. The 1970s saw the beginnings of the Asian economic miracle, challenging Australia’s view of the world: centres of economic and political power were much closer; Asia became of primary importance but also a symbol of Australia’s cultural isolation; and while relations with this region demanded great effort and nuance, they could not rely on European or American allies for assistance. The 1970s also saw the “third industrial revolution” change the global economy forever, driven by three interlinked processes: increasing internationalization of economic production and exchange; the application of sophisticated information and communications technology to production processes, organization, analysis, and financial markets; and after the Cold War, the ubiquitous but uneven rate of the spread of market liberalization to almost all states. These changes, taken together, profoundly challenged the pillars of the Australian identity. The Nixon Doctrine, Britain entering the EEC, and the rise of East Asia, collectively challenged Australia’s sense of security and place in the world. The world economic downturn and the onset of stagflation questioned the future of the easy, egalitarian prosperity of Australian society, while the acceleration of the Third Industrial Revolution seemed to suggest that Australia could no longer rely on its traditional products and markets to guarantee its prosperity. Resort to traditional

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defensive responses, modified by occasional innovations, brought no relief to a mounting sense of crisis. The shocks of the 1970s were not interpreted as stoically as previously, or with such confidence in the ability of traditional Australian structures to withstand or resolve them. Each of them was interpreted, on the one hand, as being unable to be resolved or defended against by established structures or methods, and on the other, as challenging the validity and sustainability of those very structures. The withdrawal of American and British interests and the empowerment of Australia’s neighbours left Australia with no powerful, culturally-similar state to turn to, and soon were taken to question Australia’s long dependence on “great and powerful friends”. The extent of the economic downturn and the prolonged agony of stagflation proved unresponsive to traditional defensive measures: import quotas, Keynesian demand management, wage indexation, and arbitration. These measures became even less relevant as the impact of the Third Industrial Revolution started to be felt. Soon, the traditional Australian policy instruments were to be blamed for the sluggish, uncompetitive, and relatively declining state of the Australian economy. Paradoxically, traditional Australian policy became the subject of critique by the atavistic social and economic motivations of Australian identity. A common theme in the popular thinking about Australia in the 1970s and 1980s focused on its one time position as the wealthiest country in the world per head of population, and its steady slide down the rankings ever since. Other states, the sites of economic “miracles” in Europe and East Asia, seemed to be lining up to surpass Australia in these stakes through the 1960s and 1970s. The belief in Australia that it was being left behind was not only economic. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, Australia’s affluence, egalitarianism, and democracy, together with innovations, such as conciliation and arbitration, and old age and invalidity pensions, were seen by some as proof of Australia’s status as a laboratory and innovator of new forms of popular government and social justice. As other countries caught up and surpassed Australia subsequently in measures of democracy, economic growth, the degree of state intervention and welfare provision, much of this early pride and praise for social experimentation turned into a condemnation of parsimony, laggardness, and sloth.16 A related strand of this thinking that surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s was comparisons between Australia and states like Argentina, which were similar to Australia in terms of resource endowments and early industrial structure, but which had experienced long economic declines after the 1940s. The implication of these comparisons was that Australia, unless it changed, could become a victim of a long economic decline as well.

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The result was that Australia moved away from domestic and international reactions stressing defence against external change towards embracing far-reaching programmes of international and domestic adjustment. Internationally, Australia moved away from its traditional attitudes of acquiescence (to the collective positions of the Western alliance) or avoidance (of the industrial tariff reductions mandated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT) towards greater international independence,17 involvement,18 activism,19 and even the creation of new regimes.20 Domestically, a wide-ranging programme of social and economic reform was instituted, which amounted to the dismantling of the “Australian Settlement” during the 1980s.21 The White Australia policy was dismantled in the late 1960s and officially abolished in 1972; a policy of multiculturalism was adopted; most tariffs and industry subsidies were either removed or substantially reduced between 1988 and 1991; the system of collective wage bargaining was slowly replaced by enterprise wage bargaining; the currency was floated and financial markets deregulated; broad-ranging microeconomic reforms based around a national competition policy were launched; and much greater “engagement” with the East Asian region was pursued. This was a time of massive change for Australia. Most of the period of societal transformation was under the leadership of Robert Hawke (1983– 91), whose public personality — “the former alcoholic philanderer who embraced sobriety, monogamy, and Pritikin”22 — mirrored the process of a society in transformation. Competition and the need for (national) individual initiative and creativity in the globalized market mandated a need for individualism and competition domestically. These pressures — and a belief that the longer it took Australia to adopt them, the further down the competitive scale of nations it would fall — were profoundly challenging to the traditional social and economic identifiers of Australian nationalism which stressed egalitarianism, communitarianism, and moderate wealth redistribution. Each of these traditional impulses was criticized as deadening initiative and contributing to Australia’s economic malaise, while its racial homogeneity, racist past, and continuing constitutional link to the British monarch were thought to hobble its efforts in the East Asian region. Adjustment in all policy sectors, domestically and internationally, provoked, by the 1990s, a questioning of national identity across a broad front. The debate over whether to become a Republic and change the national flag raised issues of independence, the salience of the British political legacy, and the status of British and European culture in modern Australia. High Court decisions on the Mabo and Wik cases, and the release of a report on policies aimed at promoting the assimilation of aboriginal

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children into White society, provoked divisive and painful questions about land ownership, relations with aboriginal society, and the status of aboriginal history and culture in modern Australia. Growing trade tensions with the United States questioned whether a “special relationship” existed with this “great and powerful friend”, and whether Australia could expect American assistance during times of attack; while the defence community pondered the effects of the passing of the “Coral Sea generation” which remembered the assistance of the United States in World War II. The rise of a wealthy and powerful East Asia had necessitated a reflection on cultural differences and the possibilities of divided loyalties between Asia, the United States, and Europe.23 None of these questions have yet been resolved, but the answers to all are crucial to the future of the Australian national identity. They are also crucial to the policy coherence of a country with widely distributed interests: a European heritage; North Asian trade complementarities; a North American alliance; and a Southeast Asian geopolitical context.

The Logic of Adjustment: From “White Australia” to Multiculturalism Before the 1970s, Australian national identity mandated two requirements of population policy: a strict limitation of heterogeneity of migrants; and a strong urge to assimilate all residents to the overriding egalitarian, communitarian ethos. Australian society and the state were able to maintain these conditions at that time because they were not profoundly at odds with global norms, and because of Australia’s isolation and relative obscurity. Globalization changed both of these conditions. Changes to global norms on racial equality and human rights after the Holocaust and during the era of decolonization began to challenge the rectitude of the White Australia policy. Voerword’s South Africa starkly illustrated the consequences of defying global opinion on racial discrimination; while the newly decolonized states made the United Nations General Assembly a potent instrument for monitoring and condemning racial inequalities — especially in places with a dominant White population — around the world. Racial criteria in selecting migrants were abandoned in Australia in the mid-1960s, and the last vestiges of the White Australia policy were abolished in 1972. At this point, the Whitlam government changed Australian population policy, and officially adopted a policy of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism rejected both of the traditional requirements of Australian population policy: the racial homogeneity of immigrants,

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and cultural assimilationism afterwards. But it included strong elements of continuity with the previous population policy: strict control by the state; strong correlation with economic conditions and requirements; and civil, rather than cultural assimilationism. Australian national identity changed towards a more modern form based on concepts of citizenship: “The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic or cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights.”24 This necessarily coincided with the politicization of the Australian national identity by the Keating government, particularly around the campaign for Australia to cut its constitutional ties to the British monarch and become a Republic.25 The shedding of racial requirements on immigration did not entail the shedding of the powerful assimilationist urge in Australian society; rather, assimilationism was modified to inform “an inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where immigrants are encouraged to become citizens and quickly gain access to all formal rights [of citizenship].”26 Civic nationalism in Australia is reinforced through the ritual of compulsory voting in elections, and by totemic initiation rituals, such as the naturalization oath of allegiance, in which loyalty is pledged to “Australia and its people, whose democratic rights I share, whose rights and liberties I respect, and whose laws I uphold and obey.”27 The abandonment of the White Australia policy did not mean the decoupling of national identity from population policy. Population policy remained strongly the preserve of the state and at the forefront of national attention, and multiculturalism was used no less as an instrument for the achievement of other objectives as was the White Australia policy: “Somewhat like other forms of national political ideology, multiculturalism offers a rudimentary social and political vision of an ideal Australian society, as well as a range of policies for its attainment.”28 The Australian forms of multiculturalism were also strongly determined by the social and economic markers of national identity. Socially, multiculturalism allowed the simultaneous creation of cultural diversity and the containment of cultural difference.29 The strong limits placed on difference were heavily motivated by the communitarian social ideals of Australian identity, and the fear of separatism and division within society. Beginning with the Malcolm Fraser government, a collectivist version of cultural diversity developed, with state welfare policies and even party electoral strategies formed according to defined ethnic communities and organizations. This “ethnic corporatist model” was to some extent dismantled in the late 1980s by the promotion of a more individual, citizen-based model of multiculturalism,

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... essentially seen as a system of rights and freedoms which, however, are limited by an overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the national language, and equality of the sexes. Multiculturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of cultural, social, and economic rights of all citizens in a democratic state.30

The abandonment of racial homogeneity was also strongly influenced by economic considerations. The dominance of trade with Japan from the mid-1960s, and the beginnings of the Asian economic miracle meant that racial exclusionism in immigration policy would be incompatible with equally highly-valued economic prosperity. By the time of the Fraser and Hawke governments (1975–91), the racial heterogeneity of the Australian population was itself promoted as a significant source of economic strength, providing Australia with the ability to communicate across cultures and to place itself as a broker between the industrialized West and the emerging “Asian tiger” economies. Globalization provided as much an impetus as Asian engagement: Paul Keating, looking back on his years as Prime Minister (1991–96) observed that with the growth in world trade in services, “Once our economy began to depend more heavily on the export of services rather than bulk commodities the way we presented ourselves to the world became more important.”31 Current immigration policy in Australia balances national needs, such as labour demands for specific skills, with obligations to family reunion and global norms on accepting refugees. Figure 1 shows how closely immigration levels have followed the unemployment rate since the 1970s, reflecting the strict economic criteria placed on immigration levels by governments on both sides of Australian politics. The state retains a strong role in the creation of diversity and the containment of difference entailed by Australian multiculturalism. This role for the state sits well with an established tradition of state liberalism in Australia: The founders of Australia believed that individual rights could only be defended by political action: the state had to act in support of private rights; those rights could not be sustained by individuals alone... Born modern, Australians believed that the state, far from encroaching on individual rights, would be the most likely protector of rights against other agencies of social coercion. Unlike doctrinaire liberals in Europe, Australians believed that the major constraints on individual liberty were not public, but private.32 This role for the state, as the protector of (rather than the main threat to) individual rights, has been adapted to a new vision of civic national identity informed by multiculturalism in contemporary Australia:

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Figure 1 Immigration and Unemployment, 1949–97

Note: Since the 1970s, immigration has followed unemployment. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Cultural identity and diversity are now seen as legitimate attributes of all citizens and residents — part of the private sphere, which is not to be promoted but certainly to be protected by the state. Thus, cultural rights are not seen as pluralism, let alone separatism, but as an aspect of citizenship, to be restricted only where they infringe other rights, such as the rule of law, tolerance of others, or equality of the sexes.33

The record of the 1970s and 1980s showed that Australian national identity was flexible enough to accommodate the changes required by the demands of globalization. The dismantling of the “Australian Settlement” was more than just a series of policy changes: it entailed the substantial redefinition and rebuilding of the Australian sense of self. The most striking example of this was perhaps the abolition of the White Australia policy and its replacement by the policy of multiculturalism, all within a very short space of time. Yet in this, the adaptability of the Australian identity was complemented by other factors. One was the general global acceptance of the need for adjustment and racial diversity. Australia was following trends, not setting them. It also had strong

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negative examples of the price of failure to change. Continuities with the social and economic motivators of identity were even more crucial. The changes to national identity were largely consistent with, rather than challenging to, the social and economic identifiers of Australian society. The economic need for change, in order to prevent future absolute and relative declines in national prosperity, was championed by political leaders and the media, and generally accepted by the population as a whole. Neither did the changes directly threaten the social values of egalitarianism and communitarianism, although tension did emerge where diversity and internationalization eroded some of the social values of “sameness”.34 Yet in the 1990s, the easy and seemingly consensual adaptation of the Australian national identity faced two challenges. The first was the rise of Aboriginal nationalism, distinct from and demanding different responses from multiculturalism. The second was the One Nation Party. As the pressures of globalization continued to mount, resistance to adjustment began to appear in Australian society, particularly in sections that had not accepted the need for change or had been marginalized by that change. Most of the areas of resistance clustered around issues and areas where adjustments most seemed to challenge the social and economic indicators of Australian identity.

The Emergence of Aboriginal Nationalism The status and rights of Australia’s indigenous people had slowly emerged as an issue for prominent political action partly as a result of the same globalizing norms that had spelled the end of the White Australia policy: self-determination, minority rights, civil and political rights. Aboriginal activism first snatched national attention in the early 1970s over the issue of “land rights”, the assertion by Aboriginal tribes to property rights over their traditional lands. The liberalization of public attitudes in Australia also focused greater and more sustained attention on other issues relating to the situation of indigenous Australians: appalling health conditions and child mortality; rampant alcoholism; continuing high levels of Aboriginal incarceration and deaths in custody. Within the indigenous population in Australia grew an Aboriginal nationalism that was defiantly distinct from mainstream Australian nationalism. Aboriginal nationalism emerged from the diversity of tribal origins and specific situations of the indigenous people, who were united by the common experiences of patronization, exclusion, discrimination, and deprivation at the hands of the nonindigenous Australian society.

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Aboriginal nationalism, and its relationship to non-indigenous Australian national identity, came to a head during the 1990s in the aftermath of two historic judgements by the Australian High Court, popularly named the Mabo and Wik judgements. These established the right of native title and the ability of native title to exist concurrently with more conventional property rights to land. Even more challenging to Australia’s sense of identity and history was its repudiation of the doctrine of terra nullius, formalized by a Privy Council reading in 1889, which assumed Australia to have been unoccupied at the time of settlement, because of a belief that indigenous Australians were not making use of the land. While the Mabo and Wik judgements focused attention on territory, they more importantly further stirred identity issues of Aboriginal sovereignty and self-determination. These cannot be addressed within the framework of multiculturalism or assimilation; neither are they susceptible to easy adjudication or economic compensation. It is likely that the vexed and contested issues of identity will remain long after the issues of property and access rights over land have been resolved. The Mabo and Wik judgements raised an awareness that the status of the indigenous Australians was unique in that no treaty, agreement, or autonomous homeland had been negotiated between them and the incoming Europeans as had occurred in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, or South Africa. There was no recognition of residual or continuing sovereignty of tribal law over tribal matters, as had been recognized in the United States in the famous Worcester v. Georgia (1830) or Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) cases.35 Clashes between Aboriginal tribal law and Australian federal law have grown into full-scale demands for the negotiation and signing of a treaty between indigenous and nonindigenous Australians as a step towards reconciliation. The symbolic links between Aboriginal sovereignty and nationhood as distinct from the Australian identity are by no means unintentional. The notion of a treaty implies the existence of sovereign entities. The Aboriginal flag has become a potent symbol, especially when flown by prominent indigenous Australian sports people. Aborigines have publicized alternative interpretations of Australian national days: Australia Day is annually commemorated as “invasion day” by indigenous groups and supporters. Finally, Aboriginal groups, by taking their activism to international fora — most prominently the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights — have both multiplied their points of pressure and criticism of Australian governments and stirred powerful symbols of a distinct Aboriginal identity at both the national and international levels.

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Aboriginal nationalists have from the outset rejected any suggestion that a reconciliation between indigenous nationalism and nonindigenous Australia can be negotiated through the framework of multiculturalism. Many cite the different circumstances in which indigenous people and migrants encountered the state as justification for rejecting the status of just another multicultural group in modern Australia. Whereas post-convict migrants as individuals voluntarily accepted Australia and its institutions, Aboriginal Australians had no choice and were assumed to have at some point accepted the jurisdiction of the Australian state.36 The demands for a treaty and measures of autonomy and self-government by some Aboriginal nationalists reflect this reality: the individual contracts made with the Australian state by migrants have not been extended to indigenous Australians. This remains a powerful challenge to the new civic nationalism in Australia, and its emphasis on voluntary individual membership of Australia and its institutions. Two brands of nationalism have emerged in Australia: a dominant migrant nationalism and an indigenous nationalism. The ability of Australia to reconcile these two types of nationalism, and to establish a continuity between indigenous and migrant history and a reconciliation for past injustices, are issues crucial to the identity of the dominant Australian nation. Modern Australia has appropriated many of the symbols, art, and culture of indigenous Australia as a way of distinguishing itself and its identity in a rapidly globalizing and homogenizing world. Qantas, the national airline, has covered two of its international jets with Aboriginal paintings. This has not been accompanied by a reconciliation with the bearers of this culture. It remains an issue that is bitterly contested within Australia. While large numbers of non-indigenous Australians support the causes of land rights and cultural preservation of Aboriginal society, there is little support for Aboriginal autonomy or self-determination, in whatever constitutional form. Issues of Aboriginal reconciliation challenge values of egalitarianism and “fair go”, of sameness and fellow-feeling in many different ways and often in opposite directions. While at some levels reconciliation appears to be advancing, such as the negotiation of regional agreements between indigenous and non-indigenous authorities, at other levels the divide seems to be widening. The defensive reactions of Australian governments, conservative interests, and the One Nation Party are matched by the rising sense of disappointment and stridency in Aboriginal demands. It appears that the relationship between these two forms of nationalism will remain the contested heart of Australian national identity for some time to come.

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The Insistent Demands of Globalization Unlike the global economic downturns of the 1890s, 1930s, and 1970s, the exogenous pressures of globalization on Australia have not receded. Notwithstanding difficult and painful adjustments already made, continuing rapid changes to the global market, in the communications revolution, and in other aspects of globalization continue to make demands on Australian society. Since the adjustments of the 1970s and 1980s and the attendant reconstitution of national identity, there has been little time for a society emerging from a defensive, conservative mindset to digest the changes. Unsurprisingly, this has led to confusion and resistance among sections of the Australian community to adjustment and change. Much of the resistance relies on the social and economic markers of Australian identity, and refers to the three drivers of identity: statism, atavism, and reactions to globalization. It is important to document this reaction, because it has emerged to challenge the adjustments that have been made to Australian national identity. It also signals that this identity is now contested, and the outcome of this contest could profoundly challenge Australia’s internal robustness and external enterprise. The advance of the global market to nearly all countries and regions, coupled with the increased internationalization of finance, firms, and production processes, has a number of consequences for national economies and societies. It has provided the market with a greater range of factor endowments, a greater variety of comparative advantage, a broader distribution of the stages of the product cycle, a greater selection of government types, labour standards, market regulations, and domestic economic conditions, from which to choose to site production and sell products. Yet the ease of moving investment and capital, and the ability of transnational firms to site discrete stages of their production processes in the lowest-cost locations among several countries, has generated a paradox. Despite the greater choice of domestic economies available to the global market, the growing competition for footloose investment and industry in the 1990s is exerting a socializing pressure as never before on domestic economies. Exercising independence over national economic policy is now seen as coming at the expense of attracting international investment, and industrialized economies must adapt to the demands of the global market with as much urgency as developing economies, if they are to maintain acceptable growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) and exports.37 For Australia, this means that even though the logic of adjustment has triumphed, the demands for continued flexibility are insatiable. Because of the continued decline of the terms of trade for primary

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products, and the development of global over-capacity in manufacturing, Australia, no less than other countries, has had to compete for market share in the emerging global market for services. This sector has been dubbed the “soft economy”, and is most strongly identified with the information and communications sectors: “Whereas the old economy, mirroring hard power, dealt with hard goods aimed at the body, the new economy, mirroring soft power, depends on soft services aimed at the mind and spirit.”38 In the 1990s, the United States emerged as the price-maker in the soft economy, leading the information technology and communications revolution, as well as continuing its dominance over the global market for popular culture. With no alternative but to be a pricetaker in the global soft economy, Australia has faced the need to continue to adapt, and to shun a relapse into a traditional, defensive economic structure. The demands for flexibility and creativity in the new soft economy have affected different sections of Australian society differently. Globalization is increasingly bifurcating the Australian labour force into the knowledge-rich and the knowledge-poor: “... skilled workers ... find an expanding world market for their skills, while unskilled workers see no particular gains in an expanding market. Therefore, the scale of the world market would affect skilled workers differently from unskilled workers, leading to a worldwide rise in the market premium for skills.”39 The basic logic of this bifurcation is that generally the knowledge-rich view globalization positively, seeing benefits in short-term employment, flexibility, and internationalization; they often identify more closely with the knowledge-rich in other societies than with the knowledge-poor in their own. The knowledge-poor, on the other hand, have grown to distrust globalization: they see it as destroying jobs and regional communities, disrupting traditional ways of doing things, and swamping traditional identity and culture in a sea of outsiders and unfamiliar images.40 The strong statist tradition in Australia meant that it was inevitable that this economic and social cleavage would be carried into politics. Since the 1970s, Australian politics has been dominated by the knowledge-rich, and the rapidity of adjustment and the (seeming) lack of opposition to change has given rise to the belief that globalization is accompanied by an internationalization of attitudes in Australian society. The knowledgerich political and business élites have developed their own brand of “internationalist nationalism” which has attempted to advance Australia’s interests and identity at all turns in the global market and on the global stage. From pride in and patronage of Australia’s entrepreneurs in the newly competitive global market to the use of “niche diplomacy” in the post-Cold War world order, to attempts to use the Collins-class submarine

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and Jindalee radar projects to foster a domestic defence industry, one brand of Australian nationalism has pressed for national advancement through flexible adaptation and competition with others internationally. The other brand of nationalism has rejected flexibility, adaptation, and international involvement and competition in favour of defence, autarky, introspection, and a return to the traditional bases of the Australian identity in the Australian Settlement. The rise of the One Nation Party after the 1996 federal election, and its patterns of support and popularity throughout Australian society severely challenged the belief that globalization fosters the internationalization of attitudes. The One Nation Party reaction was at the same time a profoundly defensive response to the ongoing demands of globalization, and a trenchant criticism, based in the traditional Australian values of egalitarianism and communitarianism, of the individualist élitism which was perceived to have crept into Australian society and politics. The charge of élitist individualism was profoundly challenging to the traditional Australian conceptions of self-identity. It also introduced a dangerous cynicism and disaffection into the political process. Australian democracy, now well over one hundred years old, has always been strongly grounded on the egalitarian and communitarian aspects of national identity. Crucial concepts, such as legislative representation and loyal opposition, were based on a concept of citizenship defined as a voluntary membership of free and equal citizens within a common political unit, where the good of the whole received priority over the interests of the particular. The charges of élitism in politics endanger these basic principles: One Nation Party rhetoric has charged “elites” with advancing individual and sectional interests over those of the community; of greater loyalty to the international than the national interest, thereby calling into question the effectiveness of representation and loyal opposition, and proposing solutions such as citizen initiated referenda. When charges of elitism are coupled with the wrenching changes occurring within the internationalized Australian economy, the result is political disaffection: As citizens... many people have been left feeling that the nation’s central representative institution, the Parliament, has abandoned them. Such feelings of abandonment and powerlessness are particularly acute when government policies have an impact at the local level, in the closing of a school, a bank or a factory, thus confronting people with a lack of control they have over the larger forces shaping their lives.41

Political support for One Nation Party in Australia reflects this alienation; in this sense, its electoral support is a positive indication that between 10 and 20 per cent of the Australian electorate continue to

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participate politically — mainly by virtue of compulsory voting — rather than becoming permanently excluded and estranged from the political system.42 One Nation Party also represents a return to the atavistic impulse in the Australian national identity, in reaction to the newer, forward-looking logic of adjustment: Hanson shakes the cage into which Australia has consigned its history. She is an echo of our Anglo-Celtic origins; the claims of the once mighty bush to define the Australian legend; a descendant of the romanticism and racism of Henry Lawson whose hold on national identity was once so comprehensive; a reminder that our politics have always revolved around the individual making claims upon the state; the latest manifestation of our reflex to distrust authority, abuse our elites and damn our leaders in a psychological displacement of our own worst failings; a symptom of how in this country it is possible, even easy, to steal community legitimacy by genuflection before the ethic of egalitarianism...43

One Nation’s policies, which call for a reimposition of trade barriers and industry subsidies, a reversal of the process of reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, zero net immigration growth and a reduction in Australia’s foreign involvements echo strongly aspects of the Australian Settlement, of times when the economy boomed, and society seemed stable and secure. Pauline Hanson’s criticisms of Asian immigration reveal a nostalgia for the comfort of a racially homogenous society, for the cultural assimilationism of White Australia, as well as a deep-seated belief that racial heterogeneity will breed conflict. In her maiden parliamentary speech, she stated: I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. Between 1984 and 1995, 40 per cent of all migrants into this country were of Asian origin. They have their own country and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country. A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united. The world is full of failed and tragic examples, ranging from Ireland to Bosnia to Africa and, closer to home, Papua New Guinea.44

One Nation links economic internationalization and multiculturalism directly with regional decline and unemployment, emphasizing negative associations between unemployment and immigration (“migrants stealing our jobs”), while suggesting a perceived loss of government ability or will to ensure widespread prosperity, full employment, and a relatively

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egalitarian distribution of national wealth. It is important to note that One Nation is not the only political party to react defensively to the demands of globalization: both the Labor Party and the Australian Democrats have advocated moderate restrictions on trade and investment, while repudiating the views of One Nation on matters of immigration and indigenous affairs. An intriguing aspect of One Nation critiques of multiculturalism, indigenous policy, and the welfare state, is that they combine atavistic ideals with more contemporary arguments, which are often borrowed from the neoclassical economics of the élites they despise. Ethnic and indigenous groups, as well as “idle” unemployed youth and single mothers are portrayed as vested interest groups who have captured the patronage of the political élites and have skewed the benefits of wealth distribution away from the ordinary Australian “battlers” towards themselves.45 These arguments have more than a passing reference to the theories of institutional sclerosis adopted by post-Keynesian neoclassical economics. The reactions to globalization that have clustered around the One Nation Party have thus combined a number of visceral fears and resentments associated with traditional conceptions of the Australian identity: heterogeneity and conflict, economic decline, the benefits of Australia’s wealth accruing to outsiders, the erosion of the egalitarian distribution of wealth, the development of hierarchy and social preference for some in society over the interests of the long-term, “average” Australian.

Conclusion Australian history, while unable to provide a “defining moment” of unifying national struggle, does have the ability to furnish uncanny symmetries. One such symmetry exists between the 1890s and the 1990s: both periods of accelerating globalization in which international forces profoundly shaped the national economy; both periods of political reconstitution and design; both times of social and cultural tumult; and both times witnessing the emergence of protest-oriented political parties, the Australian Labor Party and One Nation Party respectively.46 A series of events at the end of the decade add urgency to the quest for an Australian national identity that commands internal acceptance and that is externally attractive. One is the centenary of federation. Another is the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. Yet at this crucial time, national identity is contested as never before. The ability of popular communications and culture, and a national economy, to forge feelings of national community and commitment has

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been eroded by global communications and the global market, at a time when internationalization continues to place demands for change and flexibility on a society traditionally oriented towards communitarianism, defence, and conservatism. The Sydney Olympic Games challenge Australia to exhibit a marketable, distinctive national identity and culture to the world, while at the same time demonstrating a national consensus behind that image. Australia’s odyssey since the 1970s, with the issues of the link with the British monarchy, relations and reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, and the rise of a powerful East Asia, has wrestled with different aspects of national distinctiveness and solidarity. It is an understanding of this basic dilemma that has motivated Aboriginal groups to demand concessions on native title to land based on threats of publicizing their grievances during the Sydney Olympics. Yet at the same time, there are powerful reasons for optimism about Australian national identity in the future. Historically-defining struggles and ethnic or religious bonds have forged strong nationalism in other countries, but their absence in Australia has fostered a high degree of social harmony. Incidences of ethnic conflict or animosity are rare in Australia, and one of the great successes of the Australian model of nonracially discriminatory immigration has been the establishment of a society notably free of ghettos or ethnic conflict.47 As globalization further erodes the hermetic seals of the nation state and national society, strengths developed within the Australian national identity because of the absence of a defining event or blood tie — tolerance, flexibility, basic social and economic identifiers, commitment to a civic identity and periodic recommitments to an established democratic process — might prove more enduring and less dangerous than other, more traditional forms of nationalism in other countries.

Notes *

My thanks go to Nancy Viviani, Sayoko Iizasa, John Funston, Joel Hodson, Leo Suryadinata, and the participants at the ISEAS Workshop on “Nationalism and Globalisation: East and West”, April 1999. Some of the thinking underlying this work derives from conversations and joint research undertaken with Elaine Thompson in 1998. 1. Richard N. Rosecrance, “The Radical Culture of Australia” in The Founding of New Societies, edited by Louis Hartz (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964), p. 293.

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9.

10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

Michael Wesley W. K. Hancock, Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961). Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 14. Russel Ward, The Australian Legend (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 252–57. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6. Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity”, International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995). Francis Castles, Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 93. Helen Pringle, “The Making of Australian Civic Identity: The Bodies of Men and the Memory of War”, in The Politics of Identity in Australia, edited by Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 96. K. S. Inglis, “Multiculturalism and National Identity”, in Australian National Identity, edited by Charles Price (Canberra: Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 1991), p. 19. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, 1990), p. 64. John Kane, “Racialism and Democracy: The Legacy of White Australia”, in The Politics of Identity in Australia, edited by Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 119. Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty: Three Nations, One Australia? (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp. 175–76. Stephen Castles, “The Australian Model of Immigration and Multiculturalism: Is It Applicable to Europe?”, International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 551. Ibid., p. 550. Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), pp. 1–2. Castles, Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability. Beginning with the Whitlam government, Australia has taken a noticeably more independent line in its voting at the United Nations, while its stringent criticisms of U.S. and European trade policies have often placed it in direct conflict with members of the “Western alliance” in trade forums. Beginning with the Tokyo Round of the GATT, Australia abandoned what Anderson and Garnaut (1987) called the “Midway Doctrine” at the GATT, accepting the exclusion of agricultural trade from the GATT, in return for being allowed to maintain high industrial tariffs and subsidies, and became much more closely involved in the GATT regime, as well as a number of other regimes and negotiations. Australia was highly active during the U.N.-sponsored talks on finding a solution to the Cambodian war, during negotiations on mining in the Antarctic that resulted in the Madrid Protocol, and during the final stages of negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, not to mention its instigation of the Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations during the Uruguay Round. Most notably, its early involvement in the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) process. Kelly, The End of Certainty.

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22. Carol Johnson, “‘Other Times’ Thatcher, Hawke, Keating, and the Politics of Identity”, in The Politics of Identity in Australia, edited by Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 43–44. 23. Stephen FitzGerald, Is Australia an Asian Country? (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997). 24. Jurgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe”, Praxis International 12, no. 1 (April 1992): 3. 25. Sayoko Iizasa, “Republicanism and Multiculturalism” (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1999), forthcoming. 26. Castles, “The Australian Model”, p. 562. 27. Geoffrey Stokes, “Introduction”, in The Politics of Identity in Australia, edited by Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17. 28. James Jupp, “Immigration and National Identity: Multiculturalism”, in The Politics of Identity in Australia, edited by Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 133. 29. Ien Ang, “The Curse of the Smile: Ambivalence and the ‘Asian’ Woman in Australian Multiculturalism”, Feminist Review 52 (Spring 1996): 41. 30. Castles, “The Australian Model”, p. 557. 31. Paul Keating, “The Labor Government, 1983–1996”, Lecture at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 19 March 1999. 32. Rosecrance, “The Radical Culture of Australia”, p. 310. 33. Castles, “The Australian Model”, p. 559. 34. Elaine Thompson, Fair Enough (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1994). 35. Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty. 36. Sarah Pritchard, “From Terra Nullius to Mabo and Beyond”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 1996. 37. Jeffrey Sachs, “International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalisation”, Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, p. 101. 38. Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 60. 39. Sachs, “International Economics”, p. 108. 40. Mark Latham, Civilising Global Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998). 41. Judith Brett. “Representing the Unrepresented: One Nation and the Formation of the Labor Party”, in Robert Manne, et al., Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia (Melbourne: Bookman, 1998), p. 28. 42. Ibid., p. 27. 43. Paul Kelly, “Hanson — Symptom of a Deeper Problem”, in ibid., pp. 92–93. 44. Pauline Hanson, Maiden Speech to the Australian House of Representatives, September 1996, pp. 5–6. 45. Paul Sheehan, Among the Barbarians: The Dividing of Australia (Sydney: Random House, 1998). 46. Brett, “Representing the Unrepresented”, p. 32. 47. Nancy Viviani, From Burnt Boats to Barbeques: The Indochinese in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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m 7 n Nation, Nationalism and Globalization in France

LAURENT METZGER

France is often regarded as one of the first modern Western nations in the world. This chapter attempts to address the origins and development of the French nation and the impact of European regionalism/globalization on it. It seems that there are two types of French nationalism: open nationalism and closed nationalism; the former is broader and closer to the concept of citizenship, and tends to be more inclusive, while the latter is narrower and closer to the concept of ethnic-nation. There have been conflicts between these two concepts in France. But what is more important is the challenge of European regionalism and globalization, which may dilute French nationalism.

The Origin and Development of the Modern French Nation The French Revolution was a very important moment in French history. It was indeed during the Revolution that the motto of France — liberté, égalité, fraternité (liberty, equality, fraternity) — was coined. As a result of the Revolution, all people residing in France became citizens without any distinction, unlike in the past. People began to call one another citoyen (citizen) instead of the usual “Monsieur “or “Madame” (Mr or Mrs). Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century in France, the idea of equality was firmly established. 200

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In discussing the idea of nation in France, the first name that comes to mind is Ernest Renan, who delivered a lecture entitled “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a nation?) at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1882. The lecture was important in the sense that the concept of nation addressed differed from the earlier concept of nation defined by the German philosopher Fitche, who had argued that the most important element in a nation is its common language. Fitche wrote earlier (1807–8) and addressed the issue of the German nation. The purpose was “to reawaken the spirit of the German people after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806–07” (1956, p. xiii). Renan also wanted to revive the spirit of the French people by maintaining that a nation is much more than a common language. Otherwise, England and the United States would not have formed a nation. For Renan, “the modern nation is a historical result brought about by a series of convergent factors”. He also pointed out the importance of the past and the desire of the community to live together. In his words: “to have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more. These are the essential condition for being a people.” (Renan 1996, p. 52). Therefore, for Renan, “a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle”. I tend to agree with this concept of nation proposed by Renan and will review the rise of the French nation/nationalism in that perspective. A common language was essential but insufficient to form a nation. A common religion was required initially but its importance declined in the twentieth century. Like many European countries, initially France consisted of many “tribes”, of which the Wisigoths and Burgonds were the most important. These tribes formed their own kingdoms but gradually the major kingdoms were able to annex the smaller ones. From AD 987, Hughes Capet started to enlarge his kingdom in France. According to Renan (1996, p. 45), “the king was almost the perfect instance of an agent that crystallized a nation over a long period.” Although the idea of the modern French nation emerged after the French Revolution in the eighteenth century, the process of nation-building had commenced in the sixteenth century, when France gave up one of the sacred languages the country had been using until the Renaissance. Latin was indeed the language of the élite until writers and thinkers opted for the more colloquial French. The change from Latin to French was accomplished in two ways. First, the King of France issued a decree requiring all legal decisions to be written in French in the courts. This famous decree, L’ordonance de Villers-Cotterets, was issued by King Francis I in 1539. Then the philosopher Descartes chose French when writing Le discours de la methode (Discourse on method) in 1637. These firmly established the French language as the national symbol in France.

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In the past, the French had been Christians, belonging mostly to the Catholic Church. However, in 1598, King Henry IV issued a decree, L’édit de Nantes, which recognized the freedom of religion, especially because of the Protestants who had appeared during the Reformation. But in 1801, Napoleon signed a document called Le concordat with representatives of the Catholic Church, which recognized Catholicism as the religion of the majority of the French, but was not the state religion. Then in 1905, a real separation was agreed upon between the Catholic Church and the state. In France, therefore, religion has not been seen as a component or an element constitutive of a nation but rather a field to be left to the discretion of the believers. Nevertheless, as the majority of the French people were Catholic-Christians, Christianity has had a bearing on French national culture. The definition of nation continues to be modified. An interesting definition of a nation has been given by Anthony D. Smith (1996, p. 107): “A nation is a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education and common legal rights.” It seems obvious that a nation needs a specific territory. According to Etienne Balibar (1996, p. 133), in France, absolute monarchy created the concept of frontier and territory. Thus, the numerous kings of France played their part in nation building, especially in the case of territory. Nevertheless, the territory of the French nation was not static. It expanded or shrank in accordance with the fortunes of France. For instance, Corsica became French when that island was ceded by the Genoese in the Treaty of Versailles in 1768. On the other hand, a few decades later, in 1803, Louisiana was ceded by Napoleon to the United States. Another unifying factor mentioned by Smith is the education system of a nation. In France, the education system has been credited for playing a substantive part in the creation and development of the nation. For instance, at the turn of the nineteenth century, two ministers of education, Victor Duruy and Jules Ferry decreed that primary education would be compulsory, free of charge, and secular. This constituted a pillar of French society and no change to that policy has been made since, except that it was extended to secondary education, and the age limit was progressively extended to reach sixteen years old. In France, since the Revolution at least, education has remained a state concern and therefore private education has not played a very important role. However, the School of the Republic has brought together children of different backgrounds. Nation-building in France has been a long process. As stated earlier, France was a small kingdom in 987 and only became a full-fledged modern

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nation much later. It is doubtless that the French Revolution was instrumental in uniting the French people. For instance, people from Britanny or from the South became French without any distinction. A year after the start of the Revolution, on 14 July 1790, the Festival of the Federation did not distinguish the different regional communities — such as Bretons and Normands — which had constituted France formerly, but celebrated the occasion as one French nation. This has been clearly analysed by Winock (1990, p. 189). Apart from being a long process, nation-building in France became violent at times. It has been said that nations developed at the expense of other nations. At times, wars helped a country to acquire land or they were the cause of the loss of a territory to the winner. For instance, after a war between Henry II of France and Philip II of Spain, a peace treaty was signed at Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 which stated, among other things, that three cathedral towns of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were to be given to France. Renan has also noted that nations often came about through violence: “The union of Northern France with the Midi was the result of massacres and terror lasting for the best part of the century” (1996, p. 45). Of course, wars were not always waged for conquest and expansion of territory. For a long period of time, wars were part and parcel of everyday life in Europe. Ernest Psichari argued that “In my country (that is, France) we love war and secretly desire it. We have always made war. Not to conquer a province, not to exterminate a nation, not to settle a conflict of interests...We make war for the sake of making war, with no other purpose” (Lucien Benda, 1928, p. 105). Another interesting feature of nation-building is the national consciousness. Karl Deutsch remarked long ago that for a national consciousness to arise, there must be something for it to be conscious of (Eley and Suny 1996, p. 61). In France, national consciousness might have emerged as early as the tenth century, when the Capetians started to expand the kingdom of France. On the other hand, Smith believed that French national consciousness arose later, that is, in the twelfth century, and only in the northern part of the country as the south was quite apart at that time (1996, p. 105). Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, national consciousness evolved with time and a “real” consciousness of being French only emerged when Latin was replaced by French. Common enthusiasm is also essential for the development of a nation. At least in the case of France, such strong feelings for the country have been deemed necessary. This fact has been stated by different personalities such as de Gaulle who started his War Memoirs

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with a long paragraph on his relationship with France: “All my life I had a certain idea of France...” He ended the paragraph with the following line : “In short, to me France cannot be France without any grandeur” (1954, p. 9). Enthusiasm is also apparent in Mme de Stael who stated that “Enthusiasm was a universal principle for action.” A famous historian, Fernand Braudel, tried to assess the “real France, the France in reserve, or the deep France”, when he embarked on the project of writing The Identity of France. There is indeed a sense of pride in being a member of such a nation. In any nation, there must be a sense of a tie to that nation. In a lesser known novel, Face au drapeau (Facing the Flag), Jules Verne wrote about a citizen who had left his country and did not maintain any communication with it, but when facing the flag of his former country, he could not fight against its army. The flag still had meaning for him. In France, many tend to confuse nationhood with citizenship. This is due to the old concept of the French nation which is culturally quite homogeneous. This will be discussed later.

French National Symbols and Characteristics National symbols such as the national flag, national anthem, national army, national heroes, and national airline are common to most nations. Any emerging nation after gaining independence would start acquiring these symbols to prove its uniqueness and identity among other nations. France is not an exception. Most nations have their own armed forces, and national service is compulsory for many of them, and so it is in France. Military events are considered crucial for the French nation. All French school-children are taught to remember several victories (such as Poitiers in 736, Bouvines in 1214, Marignan in 1515, Austerlitz in 1815, and so on) and place names where French troops won the battles. In Paris, several train or subway stations are named after military victories, such as Austerlitz, Iéna, Wagram, Bir-Hakeim Station. Of course, in other countries, the victories may be different. For instance, in London, we can find Waterloo Station, which is named after a victory for England, which was a defeat for France. National pride is also deemed imperative. That is why Général Charles de Gaulle insisted that the first battalion to enter Paris to liberate it in August 1944 had to be French and not American. Thus, General Dwight Eisenhower agreed and complied (Crémieux-Brilhac 1996, p. 646). This was to prove that the French did take part in the liberation of France.

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Among military events, victory parades have also played an important part in most nations. In France, one of the most famous victory parades was on the Champs Elysées, from L’étoile to Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris on 26 August 1944. Led by Général de Gaulle, that procession “belongs to one of the great moments of national unity”, according to René Rémond, quoted in Crémieux-Brilhac (1996, p. 903). National monuments also play their part. In many countries, a tomb of the unknown soldiers can be found, such as the one under the Arch of Triumph, at the top of the Champs Elysées in Paris. The remains of unknown soldiers were laid to rest under the Arch of Triumph on 11 November 1920. Monuments can be grand or just simple. For instance, the tomb of Napoléon in the War Museum of Les Invalides is huge and impressive — it reminds us of Lenin’s mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow — while the tomb of de Gaulle in the small cemetery of Colombey-les-deux-Eglises is simple. Yet both sites are regularly visited by numerous French and foreigners alike. Other symbols can be peculiar to one country. For instance, in France several heroes are venerated. Is such hero-worshipping out-of-place in our time? As I see it, myths are important as well as the consciousness of having a common legacy. Thus, for any nation, the past is important. The heroes of a nation are individuals who fought for their own country, either to repel invaders, or to prevent invaders from stepping foot on the land. In this respect, several historical figures can be mentioned for France. First, Vercingetorix, the Gaul leader who fought against Caesar but was finally defeated, remains an important hero because he tried his best to prevent the invasion of Gaul — the name that the country was known as at the beginning of the Christian era — by Rome, although he failed to achieve what he wanted to do. Another hero is Charles Martel, who stopped the advance of Islamic forces in Poitiers in 736. Without this victory, the Islamic forces would have advanced further north. A heroine should also be mentioned: Joan of Arc who attempted to expel the English forces out of France in the fifteenth century. After the event, a myth was created about Joan of Arc, who came from rural France to serve her king and pushed back the English forces out of the kingdom of France. She was later captured by the British and burnt alive. A holiday was instituted to commemorate her sacrifice. Probably the most respected hero in France is Napoleon. To most observers, Napoleon is mainly remembered as a military man. Yet Napoleon was much more than that. He did much for the institutions of France. For instance, he was the one who gave instructions for the Civil Code to be drafted. In this century, two leaders have become new heroes. First, Georges Clemenceau who led France during World War I,

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and then Général de Gaulle, who became known during World War II. With regard to the latter, when he delivered a speech at the WaldorfAstoria Hotel in New York in July 1944, he was described as follows: “It was not a simple mortal who was giving a speech, it was France itself” (Crémieux-Brilhac, 1996, p. 853). Général de Gaulle mentioned once that his only real competitor was not a political figure, but “Tintin”, the hero of a comic strip. Another feature of a nation is the slogans used to arouse feelings of patriotism and to bring people together when the need arises. A few examples can be given here. For instance, under the French monarchy, the slogan “Long live the king”! was quite popular. With the new regime, this was changed to “Long live the nation”! At the famous battle of Valmy in 1792, the French soldiers rejoiced at their victory by shouting “Vive la nation!” (Long live the nation!). Later, a new slogan appeared; it was “Long live the republic”! On a monument commemorating the French Resistance in Cerdon, in southeast France, the following words are engraved “Où je meurs, renait la patrie” (Where I die, the motherland lives again). Of course, it has often been said that dying for one’s country is a noble act (Anderson 1991. p. 144). More recently, an interesting slogan has emerged; it is “Tous ensemble” (All together), which clearly conveys a feeling of common destiny, which is important for any nation. Another symbol is the land itself. “The land one has to be born to take part into the values of such race. The land where one has to take root in order to belong to the large entity which is a nation” says BernardHenri Lévy (1981, p. 29). The term “nation” (in French) is often used in the country. For instance, a large square in Paris is called “Place de la Nation” (Nation Square). As a matter of fact, when French people go on strike or organize a procession, they usually start or end at that Square which is on the right bank of the Seine river. Another example is that every year, a rugby competition takes place in Western Europe, known as “Le tournoi des six nations” (The six-nation tournament) in which England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland, and Wales take part. This shows that the idea of nation can be received in different ways.

Two Types of French Nationalism There are two types of nationalism in France: open and closed nationalism. This has been stated by Smith (1996) and Winock (1982–90). Open nationalism emerged from the optimistic philosophy of the Enlightenment period and the Revolution. It can also be found in the works of other

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authors such as Michelet and de Gaulle. Closed nationalism is based on a pessimistic view of historical development. One of the main ideas of this brand of nationalism is decadence and the obsession to protect, reinforce, and isolate the collective identity from any danger or threat. (“Race” has also been seen as a core concept in this identity.) (Winock 1990, p. 7.) France, probably like many other nations, fluctuated between these two types of nationalism. At times, the distinction between the two was not obvious. Like nation, nationalism evolved with time. Nationalism is defined here in terms of national expression or national manifestation. Initially “the national feeling was mostly confined to kings and their ministers, it consisted chiefly in attachment to the same interests.” Later on, it was more commonly accepted. “By becoming popular, national feeling became national pride, national susceptibility” (Benda 1928, pp. 10–11). In the evolution of the concept of nationalism in France, the Revolution did play an important part. For instance, in the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, Article 3, it is stated that “the principle of all sovereignty lies essentially in the nation” (Winock 1990, p. 13). Closed nationalism has often been noticed in the history of France. The first feature of closed nationalism is the concept of race and the emphasis given to it. During Renan’s time, such a concept was deemed not very scientific. “The truth is that there is no pure race and that to make politics depend upon ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera” (Renan 1996,p. 48). We may wonder why closed nationalism appears from time to time in our societies. According to Winock (1990, pp. 104–7), nine motives are necessary for closed nationalism to develop: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Dislike of the present times, Nostalgia of a golden era, Praise for immobility, Anti-individualism, Praise for elitist societies, Nostalgia of the sacred, Fear of genetic degradation and of a demographic downfall, Moral loosening, and Anti-intellectualism.

Therefore, when a feeling of fear and of decadence prevails in any society, features of closed nationalism may appear and develop because the people begin to feel threatened and tend to look inwards to settle their problems.

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Another strong cause of the development of closed nationalism is an economic crisis. In such a difficult period, nationalism may emerge as an answer to new and major economic problems faced by a country. France has experienced such nationalism. When threatened, for instance, by an economic crisis, the population of a country tends to look inwards and blame foreigners for their misfortune. One of the most obvious examples of closed nationalism — that is, the negative type — in France was the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the last century. A military captain, who was a Jew, appeared to have been wrongfully sentenced to jail for spying for Germany in 1894. Many believed that he was jailed because of his ethnic background. Some important personalities intervened to request for a retrial. The most wellknown personality was Emile Zola, a noted French writer, who wrote an article which was published on the front page of the newspaper L’Aurore under the title “J’accuse.” Eventually, Dreyfus had a retrial and was freed in 1899 and rehabilitated in 1906. This shows that open nationalism eventually won in France. However, it should be noted that at times several influential French writers embraced the cause of closed nationalism, giving it more weight. For instance, during the 1930s and after, famous writers such as LouisFerdinand Céline, Robert Brasillach, and Drieu La Rochelle were closed French nationalists. On the other hand, some observers felt ashamed of these closed nationalism movements and expressed it publicly. For instance, Bernard-Henri Lévy declared of the Vichy government: “Four years to be struck out of our history” (1981, p. 72). Indeed, the collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II remains a dark period in French history. Léopold Senghor, an African French who was first a member of the French Parliament before becoming the first President of independent Sénégal, was even more critical: “Oh Lord, put away from my memory France which is not France, this mask of pettiness and hatred over the face of France” (1988, p. 130). This also showed the strength of closed nationalism in France.

French Citizenship There seems to be a difference in some countries between nationality and citizenship. In France, there is no such distinction. One is either a national (or a citizen) of France, or not. Citizenship, or nationality, as mentioned earlier, became important with the Revolution. The Revolution set the tone regarding citizenship when it proclaimed that “Men are born and remain free and have the same

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rights”. This was stated in the Declaration of Human Rights on 26 August 1791. The Declaration was the pioneer of several other similar declarations, including the United Nations Organization Declaration of 1948. Traditionally, France has accepted a dual principle in offering citizenship to applicants. Thus, France applied both jus soli and jus sanguinis, that is the right based on the land and on blood. By contrast, Germany only applies the jus sanguinis. That is why problems have occurred in that country recently since foreigners — such as Turks, who have long lived in that country and speak German — born in Germany cannot be considered German citizens while other communities of German descent established in Eastern Europe, who do not speak German nor practice German culture, are deemed German citizens. New rules are now being drafted in Germany regarding citizenship and finally Germany is devising a new system which is not based solely on jus sanguinis. Presently, to be eligible for French nationality, one has to have at least one French parent, or be born in France and lived in France for at least five years (Civil Code, Article 21.7). A foreigner born abroad can also apply for French citizenship, when he is over eighteen of age and has a command of the French language (Civil Code, Article 21.15). Finally, the foreign spouse of a French national can apply for French citizenship a year after marriage. It is also interesting to note that the bearer of the highest office in France, that is, the President of the Republic, need not be born on French soil (like the President of the United States), or even to be born French, as long as he (or she) is French during the polls. The concept of citizenship became even more important as France expanded its territory. The people in the colonies, who are culturally French, are given French citizenship and considered as French. Nevertheless, as there are two types of French nationalism — open and closed — non-European French are often considered as not totally French. The distinction between the French nation and citizens has widened in recent years following globalization.

Globalization and French Nationalism France’s dual approach to giving French citizenship has resulted in many foreigners becoming French citizens in the course of history. In the past, French nationalism was strong so that many new citizens completely identified with French culture and were assimilated into the French community. For instance, when dealing with its colonies, in 1944, France “wanted that Africans become French without ceasing to be African” (Brazzaville Conference Seminar Proceedings 1988, p. 172).

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However, with the rise of globalization and intensification of ethnic nationalism, problems have arisen because some applicants try at the same time to keep their first citizenship and culture. For instance, recently in a court of law in France, a suspect was asked to state his nationality, and he replied “Musulman” (Muslim) (Libération, 17 March 1999). This angered the presiding judge, but was in line with the religion of the suspect. A new Nationality (Citizenship) Code was introduced in France in 1998 in order to make things clearer for foreigners who intend to take up French citizenship because between 1983 and 1998 laws on immigration and nationality were modified many times. It appears that the majority of the French people welcome foreigners to settle in France, provided they show some signs of willingness to adapt and to integrate into French society. This seems to be an obstacle, as some foreigners do not easily give up their culture in their new country of residence. On the contrary, they wish to keep their own traditions as much as possible and openly practise them. This can create conflicts when the new country is willing to accept the foreigners as their citizens but these new citizens are unwilling to abandon their original culture. Not only that, new citizens have also proudly displayed their different cultures. This attitude is quite different from the past — “since the end of the nineteenth century, ‘French Identity’ has continually been dependent upon the capacity to integrate immigrant populations” (Balibar 1996, p. 137). A clear example of such a situation can be seen in the use of the Islamic scarf. On several occasions, some Muslim girls showed up at their French schools wearing an Islamic scarf over their heads. The French school administration asked them to remove the scarf, which was deemed incompatible with the secular education provided by the schools. Yet, at the same time, if those students were not allowed to wear the scarf, which is an important part of their attire, they might stop going to school, and thus be deprived of a complete education. Apparently, there is conflict between French nationalism and basic human rights. The possibility of a culture conflict is high as a new immigration act of parliament was introduced in 1998. As a result of this new legislation, France will continue to admit immigrants and give them, with time, French citizenship should they ask for it, but at the same time, it would not be possible for the country to open its borders completely to all potential immigrants. Regionalism also poses a challenge to French nationalism. This regionalism will be reflected in a new European Charter of languages, which is to be signed, according to Catherine Trautmann, the French Minister for Culture, in an interview she gave to Libération (14 May 1999).

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According to the minister, 75 minority languages will be listed in that Charter. Most of these languages are spoken in French territories in the Pacific Ocean, Central, and South America, and of course in France itself. Thus, although France has made much effort to ensure the development of the French language, it has agreed that regional languages should be listed, learnt and developed. For Catherine Ttrautmann, this is an example of “an extraordinary cultural richness”, but in reality, this may also be at the expense of the French language. Regionalism may also affect national symbols. For instance, national airlines in many countries are in the process of grouping under new codesharing alliances. So instead of having one airline per country, new groupings are making their way into the skies. France does not seem to have joined that bandwagon yet, but will probably do so in the future. Globalization has also given rise to a double identity in France. An interesting example can be seen in an interview with Naima Kouadria, in Le Nouvel Observateur ( No. 1799, 29 April 1999). She states clearly that she feels both French and Algerian and that such a “double belonging” should not be any problem. For her, she is happy to live in France, but at the same time she does not want to cut herself from her family history. This may be a new trend in our world of globalization. Finally, a third example, which has been mentioned earlier, illustrates the modern constraints of nationalism. The Islamic scarf has given rise to some problems in France since a few students wore the scarf to school. Immediately, many people in France objected to this, arguing that it was against the principles of the republic, and against the secular school concept, and so on. Finally, France’s highest legal authority, the Le Conseil d’état, had to decide and two judgments were passed in 1989 and in 1992. In the first judgment, it stated that France practised the freedom of religion and in the second decision, it indicated that differences should not be seen as a threat to the status quo. In practice, the Islamic scarf can give rise to two problems. First, it may be seen as an obstacle to national integration, which is deemed important by the majority; however, it may also be seen as a mark of respect for differences, which is important to the minorities. Apparently, there is a clash between nationalism and basic human rights/religious freedom. Human rights organizations can also pose a challenge to state authorities. At times, non-governmental organizations have been at odds with the authorities, in particular in the case of foreigners who do not have the necessary documents to stay longer in France. Some organizations help these foreigners to stay in churches and other places and protect them from the officers of the Home Affairs Ministry. For instance, in 1996, some Africans stayed in the Saint Bernard Church in

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Paris. This is interesting as it shows that some French people do not accept the official policy and are ready to take action to make their point. From time to time immigration issues make headlines in the newspapers. For instance, in February 1999, the French Home Affairs Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement criticized the system of quotas proposed by his partners in the European Union. For him, such quotas would encourage an immigrant to take his chance and try to enter the European Union (Straits Times, 13 February 1999). Europeanization or European regionalism also poses a challenge to the French nation. We see that European construction has been on course for quite a while. Since the end of World War II, Europeans, or some of them at least, have finally realized that wars lead them to nowhere and that peace should be complemented with real economic and even political union between former warring states. Gradually, an economic union took shape, especially among France, Germany and the three Benelux countries. The most recent stage of European globalization was the introduction of the new currency, the Euro, in January 1999. This was indeed an important step towards harmony in Europe as many countries accepted the fact that their national currencies would be phased out progressively and that the Euro dollar would be the sole official currency in the future. The emergence of the European Union has no doubt tended to dilute French identity. Not surprisingly, France showed some reservations in the process. For instance, France had always been careful in preventing the monopoly of English, maintaining that language plurality had a richness and should be accepted. Nevertheless, France continues to produce feature films while other countries which had done so in the past, such as Sweden and Italy, have now accepted the domination of the Americans in the production of motion pictures. For France, globalization should not mean Americanization. Globalization should be a harmonization of the best features found in most countries of the world and not a simplification imposed by a strong economic and cultural power.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is necessary to remember that nations are not static. On the contrary, nations are always evolving and developing. In France itself, a stronger regionalism within the country is apparent in Corsica. A by-election which took place in March 1999 gave more votes than before to Corsica Nazione, a party which favours independence for

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the island (Libération, 8 March 1999). Of course, from time to time, some politicians in Corsica have called for liberation and independence. When Général de Gaulle was in power, he used to say that Corsica had already been liberated, that is, in 1944, at the end of World War II and thus it does not need a second liberation. Corsica is just one part of the country, which has shown signs of strong regionalism. The Basque country, which stretches over part of Spain and part of France, has also been expressing for a long time its desire to become a nation. This has been translated into terrorist activities which have occurred regularly, in both Spain and France. One intriguing factor in the Basque regionalism is the Basque language itself, which does not seem to be related to any of the other national languages. If the language is indeed unique, can it help to build a nation? If the concept of nation is still evolving, the idea of nationalism is not settled either. At times observers have been very pessimistic about nationalism, especially ethnic-nationalism. “What divides people is stronger than what brings them together” writes Bernard-Henri Lévy (1981, p. 240). Of course, there seems to be many reasons to be weary of the idea of ethnic-nationalism, especially when we have witnessed the collapse of the largest country on earth, that is, the former USSR, and then the collapse of a smaller country, the former Yugoslavia, which is still in the dismantling process. Are all countries going to suffer the same fate? Are we on the way back to the tribalism of the past? Will France encounter the same fate? This is not likely because the French as a nation is becoming more flexible. Open nationalism is growing while closed nationalism is diminishing. In fact, recently, the Front National, the extreme right party split into two factions, one led by Le Pen and the other by Megret. With this division of the party and followers, the right wing organization will be less influential. Furthermore, at times events have also helped in nation-building. For instance, in the field of sports, France was proud to host the World Cup Football league in 1998 in which it emerged victorious. The victory was largely attributed to a field-striker Zidane, fondly called “Zizou” by everyone in France. The fact that Zidane is the son of an Algerian immigrant to France helped people to realize that a nation has to be open, and made up of long-time residents as well as new immigrants. The performance of Zidane helped not only to secure the cup, but also to reduce closed nationalism pressures. Thus, sports played an important part in French nationalism. Several statements were made after the World Cup. For instance, a former Home Minister, Charles Pasqua, who had not been so ready to offer French citizenship to immigrants, declared that France should accept even those immigrants who did not have the proper

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documents — they are called les sans papiers in French (or the paperless). His change in attitude was mostly due to Zidane’s success in winning goals on the football pitch (Straits Times, 18 July 1998). The Zidane chapter is not closed since he is still among the three most popular persons in France, according to journalist Claude Imbert (Le Point, 6 March 1999). Another hero in France is Astérix. Astérix, the main character of a famous comic strip, is the diminutive Gaul who is very strong and a source of refuge when things go wrong in France. The creation of such a character is also meant to show that culture is not only made in America. Thus, 50 kilometres from Paris, there is not only a Disneyland but also an Astérix Park, both of which receive many visitors. It has been said that at times, nations have emerged at the expense of other nations. Thus, some nations have appeared because their armies have defeated another. Yet at other times, some nations have shown admiration for another nation. For instance, when Général de Gaulle visited Germany in 1962, a year before President Kennedy made a similar tour, in several of his speeches, most of which were delivered in German, the French President showed his admiration for the German nation. When addressing a meeting of young people in Ludwigsburg in September 1962, he said that he was meeting with “the children of a great people. Indeed a great people...”(Lacouture [1986], vol.3, p.305). Coming from Général de Gaulle, who once led France against Germany from London and Algiers, it was indeed a compliment.

References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983–1991. Anglade, Jean. Le grillon vert. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1998. Balibar, Etienne. “The Nation Form: History and Ideology”. In Becoming National. A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, pp. 132–50. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Benda, Lucien. La trahison des clercs [The Great Betrayal]. London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1928. Braudel, Fernand. L’identité de la France. Paris: Artaud-Flammarion, 1986. Crémieux-Brilhac. La France libre. De l’Appel du 18 juin à la Libération. Paris: Gallimard, 1996. Eley, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. Becoming National. A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Fichte, Johan N. Gottlieb. The Vocation of Man. New York: The Liberal Press, 1956. Gaulle, Charles de. Mémoires de guerre. Paris: Plon, 1954.

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Hroch, Miroslav. “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation: The NationBuilding Process in Europe”. In Becoming National. A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 60–78. Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle, le souverain. Paris: Seuil, 1986. Lévy, Bernard-Henri. L’idéologie française. Paris: Grasset, 1981. Morin, Edgar and Anne Brigitte Kern. Terre-Patrie. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993. Renan, Ernest. “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation (What is a Nation)”. In Becoming National. A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, pp. 42–56. New York: Oxford University Press,1996. Smith, Anthony D. “The Origins of Nations”. In Becoming National. A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, pp. 132–50. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Winock, Michel. Nationalisme et antisémitisme en France. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982–1990.

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m 8 n National Identity and Adapting to Integration: Nationalism and Globalization in Japan TAKASHI INOGUCHI*

Introduction In this chapter, nationalism and globalization are examined with specific reference to Japan. Here, nationalism is defined as a political principle holding that the political and national unit should be congruent, as a sentiment about that principle, and as a theory of political legitimacy requiring that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones (Gellner 1993). Globalization is defined as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1987, p. 64). Japan poses a challenge when examining this subject because it was one of the non-Western countries that made use of nationalism in building its modern, territorial sovereign state and constructing a modern, industrial national economy under the slogan of fukoku kyohei (a rich country and a strong army) (Samuels 1996). While nationalism cements integration within a state by differentiating the inside and the outside, globalization works in the opposite direction. Globalization tends to fracture the national body politic and the national economy by linking some components within with counterparts outside. If Japan was highly successful in mobilizing its populace with nationalist appeals, it should be interesting to consider how Japan may be able to adapt successfully to the forces of globalization with an equal amount 216

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of adeptness and adroitness. Before moving on to this subject, it is necessary to give a historical portrayal of Japanese nationalism and how the modern Japanese nation was created and has been maintained till today.

Origins of the Ancient Japanese State The ancient Japanese state was born and shaped under Chinese influence (Okada, 1994). When the centre of continental East Asia experienced disorder and disintegration, local rulers could claim a modicum of freedom and independence (Yoshida 1998). It was around the seventh century (the time of the Sui and early Tang dynasties in China) when the first ancient Japanese state was recorded in an official Chinese historical document and thus legitimized. Subsequently, the ancient Japanese state, presumably unified with the help of such legitimization, continued to rely on international legitimization by the Chinese imperial state within the Sino-centric order based on the tributary system (Fairbank 1968; Inoguchi 1979; Basabi 1983). As time went on, however, the Japanese state, being located at the periphery of the Chinese world order, made use of the Chinese tributary system ostensibly for commercial purposes. Officially defining identity by the ancient state was quite natural. Distancing itself from China and cementing its own separate identity through its official documents was the course of action the ancient Japanese state took. While the initial legitimation by the Chinese emperor was very useful in facing internal competitors, establishing a distance from the legitimator was both necessary and desirable after such legitimization (Yoshida 1998; Okada 1994). It is not uncommon that history is written for the specific purposes of those who commission the writing of history, and such was the official Chinese history by Shiji, and for official Japanese history by Kojiki. History was written to legitimize their rule, with a certain set of political statements about the origins of those political units they governed. When discussing an ancient state, one should not conceive it as akin to what one understands now. Here, a state is defined as consisting of those political units which have relative cohesion in a society and which have a distinction between the rulers and those ruled. In the ancient Japanese historical context, there was a plurality of such units even if they may not be called states. The official Japanese historians from time immemorial to the Meiji to the early Showa period have long portrayed Japan as not having a plurality of states. If the plurality of states had not been widely accepted in ancient Japan, it is largely because of two

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factors: first, the success of these Japanese official historians to conceive that the Japanese state has been one and unified for a long time; and secondly, one has tended to look at the state from the angle commonly understood during much of the modern period in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What was the ethnic composition of this ancient Japanese state? The question of the ethnic origin of the ancient Japanese is complex and controversial! It is believed fairly widely, however, that the ancient Japanese were akin to those inhabiting such areas as the lower Yangtze valley of China and the southern part of the Korean peninsula. These people were also regarded as akin to those who inhabited maritime Southeast Asia. With the disorder and disintegration in the locus of regional power, some continental peoples from north-central China or southeastern Korea seem to have migrated to Japan, where some of them successfully established themselves as the ruling élites on the strength of their higher civilization on the continent, that is, in weapons, written language, and Buddhism. They were considered to be the northern peoples who became sinicized and even ruled China later. In the ancient Chinese period of the Sui and Tang dynasties, the enormous influence of peoples like the Mongols, Turks, Persians, Arabs, and other non-Han ethnic groups was evident. Once they conquered Zhongyuan in the area of what is now called Shensi and Shaansi provinces in the middle valley of the Yellow River, they gradually assimilated themselves and started to call themselves Chinese (Wang 1996). In other words, the ethnic origin of the ancient Japanese was two-layered, with the ruling strata consisting largely of those migrating from the continent as a result of disorder and political disintegration in continental East Asia. What is most important about the ancient Japanese state is that whatever the ethnic origin of the new ruling élites, they were keen on not accommodating migrants from the continent once they themselves assimilated with the local population. Those who came to Japan earlier had no reason to welcome other migrants since they would be equally equipped with higher civilization and thus be a threat to their position in Japan. One can argue, therefore that an awareness of being Japanese in an exclusive sense was already taking shape in the seventh to eighth centuries when the ancient Japanese state was born. It is in this context that Prince Shotoku sent an emissary to the Sui emperor, referring to China as the land where the sun sets while calling the Japanese state the land where the sun rises. After all, the official name of the Japanese state, Nihon or Nippon, means, literally, the root of the sun. This is the classical example of writing an identity by an emerging state.

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The Development of the Japanese State In the context of the well-controlled interaction with China and Korea that followed the establishment of the centralized Japanese state, the Japanese developed their phonetic syllabury (katakana and hiragana) and literature (such as Prince Genji) as early as in the tenth to eleventh centuries, while continuing to import higher technologies from the mainland. Extolling the indigenous achievements during this period and even before in terms of writing history and literature increasingly in the vernacular called Japanese was perhaps the exaggeration and even artifacts created by the eager nation-state builders of nineteenth century Japan (Shirana and Suzuki 1999; Ishikawa 1999). In the medieval period, there were a number of military designs to invade Japan. There were two Mongol attempts to conquer Japan in the twelfth century, but they were repulsed. Throughout this period, there must have been a small number of migrants from the continent, but their proportion of the total population must have been much smaller than during the ancient period. Hence, a slow but steady awareness of being “Japanese” developed during the medieval period at least among the ruling élites, who continued to develop an indigenous Japanese culture clearly separated from Chinese influences. The sixteenth century brought dramatic changes to Japanese society. The thriving commercial trade throughout East Asia made Japan into a major focal point of global trade. Portuguese, Spanish, and others were attracted by the rosy prospects of profits and converts in East Asia, ushering in the first age of Western imperialism in Asia (Frank 1998).

Early Modern Twist and Turn Hideyoshi, a warrior who unified Japan towards the end of the sixteenth century, went on to invade Korea later. Massive Japanese forces were sent to Korea, but they were defeated by the combined Chinese-Korean forces in Korea. Then the tide changed. The Japanese expelled the Portuguese and Spanish in the early seventeenth century, suspecting that they had ambitions of colonization. Only the Chinese and Dutch traders, who were considered not to have missionary-inspired colonizing ambitions, were allowed to conduct trade through a tiny port called Deshima under the strict regulation of the Japanese state then represented by the Tokugawa lord. Keenly aware of the often decisive advantage external commerce provided to political power, the Tokugawa lord monopolized external commerce, with minor exceptions allowed to the

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peripheral local lords, such as the Satsuma with the Ryukyus, the Tsushima with the Koreans, and the Matsumae with the Ainu and the Russians (Toby 1984). Japan was ruled separately by 300-odd feudal lords who enjoyed a fairly large autonomy, while the Tokugawa lord claimed the sole government vis-á-vis external powers. During this early modern period (seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century), the consciousness of being Japanese seemed to increase somewhat among the ruling élites who were largely demilitarized and had transformed themselves from warriors to bureaucrats (Ikegami 1996). The sense of identity among the populace was more pronounced among the local groups with distinctive local dialects. With the arrival of Westerners in the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, the ruling élites acutely enhanced their consciousness of the nation. They were apprehensive of the possibility of being colonized by the Westerners, having observed the plight of the bombarded and colonized or half-colonized fellow Asians, that is, the Indians, Vietnamese, and Chinese. The fear of being colonized brought about political transformation from the early modern, partly decentralized system to the modern centralized system where the trinity of the nation state, the national economy, and national culture was to be vigorously created by the ruling élites from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. It is this trinity that moulded the contemporary Japanese national consciousness and nationalism (Inoguchi 1999).

The Westphalian Trinity and Japanese Nationalism The modern Japanese state was Westphalian in its emphasis on state sovereignty, on state-led industrialization taking advantage of backwardness, and on state-led, foreign-threat-inspired nationalism (Spruyt 1994; Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Krasner 1999). “Westphalian” is the adjective used to characterize the modern Euro-centric and state-centric world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, named after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which is believed to have laid the foundation of the modern inter-state system. While Japan was not colonized in the mid-nineteenth century or thereafter, modern Japanese nationalism was critically shaped by the fear of being threatened by external powers. Its markets were forcibly opened in the mid-nineteenth century through gunboat diplomacy, although of a slightly more benign kind than that applied to India or China (Kato and Kawakita 1998). The Western threat as applied to Japan in the nineteenth century was strong enough to induce endogenous endeavour to modernize itself but not so strong as to stifle such endeavours, as was the case with India, or China. After

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all, when Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy came to Japan to open the ports and the country in 1853–54, he did not bombard Japan. Japan, a peripheral economy in the Far East, suffered immensely from the resulting lack of autonomy over tariffs on commodities traded externally for more than half a century until the early twentieth century. The lack of tariff autonomy in the most difficult period of modern nationbuilding (the latter half of the nineteenth century) accentuated the Japanese drive for fukoku kyohei. Results were indeed positive and negative: positively, the foundation of a rich country was laid during the first strenuous century since Commodore Matthew Perry’s arrival at the mouth of the Edo (Tokyo) Bay; negatively, the drive not to be humiliated by the Western powers eventually led Japan to an all-out war against the rest of the world, and to defeat. Writing about the Japanese identity after 1945 depends critically on how the authors conceive of themselves in the light of their modern history and their aspirations and frustrations (cf. Dower 1999). How to evaluate Japan’s war of 1937–45 has been a focus of competing conceptions. There are roughly three versions. First, some have portrayed Japan’s modern history as that of imperialist oppression at home and aggression abroad, with the United States as a liberator. This was the view put forward by the communists immediately after the war, as part of their portrayal of themselves as the force of liberation, even though they had mostly been imprisoned until the American occupation. This portrayal has affinity with East Germany’s former portrayal of modern German history. Secondly, some have portrayed modern Japanese history as fixated on their efforts for fukoku kyohei and made a fatal mistake in 1937–45. Instead of the fixation on the trauma of the Western-coerced opening of the country in the mid-nineteenth century and onwards, they portrayed the nation as pursuing a democratic, commerce-oriented, peace-oriented, proud non-Western country in a new environment with its new Constitution expressing its aspirations to the rest of the world. Many on the centre-left and the centre-right took this portrayal. It is not far from the West German portrayal of its modern history in which all ancient German history led to the Third Reich, and an entirely new German history began in 1945 with all its past criticized from its foundation. Thirdly, the United States Government and the Japanese Government took the position that modern Japanese history tread the right path more or less towards further industrialization and democratization, but in the 1930s and 1940s they had derailed themselves from the right path and made a fatal mistake but that, with the vigorous help of the United States as absolute reformer, a new Japan had returned to the right path. The 1930s and the 1940s were portrayed

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as an aberration during which military cliques led the country to disaster and defeat. The United States Government took such a position at a time when the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union was looming alarmingly large. They argued that the Japanese had been misled by the military cliques who were subsequently subjected to the War Tribunal. This version of history gave the nation the continuity of national identity and aspiration. At the same time, this version was able to place the meaning of its modern history well in the context of the Cold War alliance with the United States and the new pacifist Constitution which forbids the state to use military force in the settlement of international disputes. The first portrayal was not accepted widely. The second portrayal has been widely accepted, but its basic weakness lies in its excessive reliance on the new Constitution’s nowar provision which delegates the critical responsibility to the United States. The third portrayal has a state-led majority more or less in terms of making compatible two basic priorities: keeping national identity intact and modern Japanese history meaningful while playing the role of a supporter (Inoguchi 1991) to the hegemonic victor-cum-guarantor of Japan’s national security. Its weakness lies in its conception of its recent historical past, which has intermittently become a troublesome issue even half a century after 1945 (Inoguchi 1996). The portrayal was not different from the Austrian portrayal of themselves as being forced to act in such a way in order to satisfy Hitler.

Concepts of Citizenship and Nation The relationship of mutual dependence between the rulers and the ruled is one of the principles of democractic thought originating from modern European history. What one finds in a number of writings on warriors, bureaucrats, and philosophers in the early modern period of Japan (seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century) is this discovery of mutual dependence, though not in sufficient strength to warrant the name of democratic thought (Kasaya 1989). Shifting domains and lords during the century-long history of the Warring States period of the sixteenth century was followed by the political rearrangements of the Tokugawa lord whereby some lords and ruling bureaucrats were given entirely new and alien land and people for governance after the great unifying battle of Sekigahara of 1600. Once the rulers of a small number of people, say, 100–500, had to settle in an alien domain, the most important task was to establish rapport with the local populace who were in a position to sabotage tax remission and disrupt law and order if the rulers did

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not live up to their expectations. Here emerged an early modern quasidemocratic thought which can be regarded as state-defined or community-defined since about 300 local domains were more or less autonomous in governance. Needless to say, this quasi-democratic thought was not purely democratic since bureaucratic authoritarianism was more or less presumed in the first place. What is important is that the ruling officialdom from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries was cognizant of the need to satisfy and respect the preferences of the populace, and for officialdom to behave well vis-à-vis the populace in terms of corruption, observance of law, and regard for the public. To quote Yamaga Soko, “The lord can stand at the peak of hierarchy for the heaven and for all the people, never for his own private benefits...hence with the populace’s support can the lord stand, with the lord standing can the state (domain) establish itself. Hence one should say that the people are the basis of the state (domain).” To quote the first sentence of Akita Chiranki, “The lord is a vessel, subjects are water; water enables a vessel to float, and water subverts a vessel” (Kasaya 1989). This early modern current of thought helped Japan to establish a modernizing regime in the mid-nineteenth century. The concepts of citizenship and nation in the modernizing regime (1868–1945) were borrowed from the early modern period, and the domain of nationhood was enlarged to one integrated space instead of 300-odd segmented feudal domains without much difficulty.

The Modern Nation-State and its Minorities The modernizing regime’s success in creating a nation state, a national economy and a national culture enabled national markers of Japan to permeate widely and deeply. Those national markers were the symbols and instruments by which the modernizing regime differentiated the inside from the outside and tried to consolidate the unity and solidarity of the nation state. Some of the most notable ones include the national flag, which has a red sun on a white flag; the national flower, the cherryblossom; the national anthem called Kimigayo (Long Live Thy Reign!), all of which are highlighted in national ceremonies and graduation ceremonies of compulsory education; the national language called Japanese as spoken through state-owned radio; national education, tailored to produce a massive labour force who are literate and reasonably skilled; national firms, which mean that foreign direct investment has been fairly effectively curtailed for one and a half centuries since the opening of the country and the economy in the mid-

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nineteenth century; and national institutions that are headed and manned almost exclusively by Japanese. Apart from the ancient origins of Japanese, there are the following groups in today’s Japan: mainlanders, Okinawans, hisabetsu burakumin, ethnic Koreans, ethnic Chinese, and Ainus. Historically, Okinawa constituted an independent kingdom which flourished especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a commercial centre connecting various parts of Japan, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Then in 1609, it was subordinated to the Satsuma lord in Kyushu, and by 1872 it was incorporated into Japan. Of course, between 1945 and 1971 it was ruled by the United States, completely separate from mainland Japan. Okinawans have been somewhat influenced by the Chinese, especially the Fukienese culturally. And because of U.S. rule there, the Okinawan élites are disproportionately English-speaking among Japanese. The hisabetsu burakumin are a group of ethnic Japanese discriminated against heavily by the Buddhist-related beliefs related to lower castes, whose occupation was to use leather and produce leather products that had originated in medieval Japan. This discrimination was strengthened by the government for a century. Occupation reforms and democratization efforts done there since have been slowly but steadily eradicating discrimination. But much remains to be improved. Ethnic Koreans are the largest ethnic minority in Japan, with some 600,000 registered. A large number of them have been assimilated. Discrimination against them have been weakening but much remains to be rectified. Assimilation has been quite steady, with most of the children and grandchildren speaking in Japanese becoming a norm. Most of them came during the war mobilization period of the 1930s and 1940s, many brought to Japan forcibly by the Japanese. Ethnic Chinese number some 200,000. Most of them came in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when China was facing disintegration and humiliation. Many of them have been assimilated. The Ainus are the original inhabitants of Hokkaido, Karafuto (Sakhalin), and Chishima (Kurile) islands, who now number about 24,000–80,000 (Morris-Suzuki 1998, p. 183). The Ainus on Hokkaido were discriminated against by the Japanese who began to migrate into this thinly populated island from the early nineteenth century. The modernizing government only encouraged migration to Hokkaido, and, thus, the Ainus declined drastically in number in the century after the Japanese migrated there. The Ainu language is now almost extinct. Since 1868, the modernizing state had made efforts to legitimize territories in Hokkaido, Chishima, Karafuto, Okinawa, Korea, and even

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Manchuria. Assimilation was the ultimate aim of the Japanese imperial state, but it was the assimilation policy which differentiated the mainlanders from the minorities. The modern Japanese imperial state inherited from the early modern conception of world order in which Japan was placed at its “centre” with such “peripheries” as Ainus, Okinawans, Koreans, Chinese, and Western traders (Morris-Suzuki 1998). This Japanese imperial world order was expanded beyond its limit in its “Greater East Asian War” of 1941–45. Ethnic minorities constitute less than one per cent, thus not necessarily posing a threat to national preservation. Rather, while assimilation has accelerated in the last half century, the use of ethnic minority languages has become a norm on the notice-boards of local governments whose domain include a large number of ethnic minorities. In many parts of central Tokyo’s local government office, such as Shinjuku and Ikebukuro, all instructions are written in four languages — Japanese, English, Korean, and Chinese — for instance. Multiculturalism does exist. Movements to break away from Japan did not exist during the last half century. All imperial aggrandizement was taken away by Japan’s defeat in World War II. The minorities are in absolute minority, and the Japanese economy has provided increasing affluence to the nation for the period. However, one latent sentiment which disturbs the central government is how the Okinawans feel about the mainlanders. After all, the Okinawans were the only people in Japan who were killed massively in land warfare during World War II as the Japanese imperial army used the Okinawa battle to demonstrate the Japanese will to resist and to delay the American military landing on the mainland. The Okinawans still feel strongly about the Japanese treating them as sacrifice vis-à-vis the Americans. Furthermore, the Okinawans were placed under U.S. rule for the long period from 1945 to 1971 whereas the Japanese mainland was given independence as early as 1952. The U.S. military bases still occupy a large part of the Okinawa islands. When a young schoolgirl was raped by U.S. marines in 1995, protests against U.S. military bases in Okinawa flared up and threatened to disrupt the Japan– U.S. talks over new defence co-operation guidelines. Governor Masahide Ota vigorously protested to both the U.S. and Japanese governments and demanded the Japanese central government to remove one of the largest military bases in Okinawa to somewhere in the mainland. All the possible locations in the mainland refused to agree, and the central government suggested a military base offshore, like the airport on the sea off Osaka. But the Okinawan government under Governor Ota refused. He was defeated in a gubernatorial election soon after. Thus, the idea of such a military base has been stalled. The Okinawans have

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been developing their own scheme to revive their medieval ideal-cumreality concept of peace and prosperity within the framework of Japan. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ryukyu kingdom had flourished through trade, taking advantage of its geographical location. The scheme is to create links regionally, not via the central government, but through free trade and foreign direct investment in Okinawa.

Challenges to Nationhood, including Globalization and Immigration Does globalization pose challenges to nationhood? Does immigration pose a threat to nationhood? The answer is no, with some provisos. Globalization facilitates new immigrants in general. Japan is not an exception. Although the Japanese Government maintains a very strict policy on immigration, illegal migrants are steadily increasing in Japan, registering some 270,000. The recent revision of immigration controls and the refugee identification law are based on the recognition that illegal aliens have increased, and also the crime rate. In a number of areas like Shin-okubo and Akasaka in Tokyo, for instance, many restaurants and shops are run by ethnic Asians. It is suspected that some illegal immigrants are also involved which cry out for regulation. However, it is not on a scale that would pose a challenge to nationhood. Yet their concentration in metropolitan and other cities creates the situation in which multiculturalism is visible. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, firms and land have also become less expensive so that takeovers by foreign capital have been steadily increasing. One can detect mild hostility to foreign capital takeover attempts, such as the recent attempt to capture one of the firms under the umbrella of the Nippn Telephone and Telecommunications. In terms of openness and vigilance to foreign capital, China has shifted from one extreme of self-reliance until 1978 to the other extreme of massive short-term borrowings from outside later, whereas Japan has been steadfastly cautious in increasing foreign direct investment within the broad framework of free trade and the market economy. Two earlier experiences are normally said to have nurtured such a mentality. First was the difficulty of achieving a developmental take-off in the absence of tariff autonomy from 1858 to 1911. Fortunately, some argue, the Japanese did not purchase British thin cotton cloth, preferring the Japanese thick cotton cloth for winter seasons, thus helping a fledgling endogenous cotton industry to take off at this difficult juncture of modern economic development (Kawakatsu 1977). Secondly, the legacy

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of the state-led industrialization programme especially during the war (1937–45) and high economic growth periods (1952–73) has left a strong institutional and mental framework of national autonomy in manufacturing in virtually every sector of the economy (Noguchi 1995). Globalization during the last decade and the next will be a force to help modify this bias. But it would be wrong to portray globalization as a sharp challenge to nationhood. The Japanese capacity to adapt has been amply tested during the past two centuries. For instance, the Japanese were able to overcome what must have been serious globalization tides in the latter half of the nineteenth century after opening its ports without tariff autonomy. Globalization at the turn of the century is potentially more serious, one can argue, because it fractures the national economy and because its success is determined far more strongly by the ability to use short-term capital from outside, to make technological breakthroughs, and to process information strategically and tactically over a wide range of areas. Therefore, it does pose a new challenge to the Japanese as they have been used to be contented with strong manufacturing combined with state-protected (that is, not so competitive) financial and service sectors. In this sense, the pure form of the Japanese developmental model has been steadily modified. The Japanese model consists of (1) an emphasis on a long- term contractual relationship between keiretsu firms and banks, enabling them to have their stocks reciprocally purchased and to borrow a huge amount of money without having their own capital; (2) an emphasis on permanent employment practice and relative equality in wages among employees and between employers and employed, (3) an emphasis on manufacturing and its infrastructral basis in industrialization; (4) state-led nurturing and guidance within the framework of free trade and the market economy, and (5) a strong national identity, which effectively curtails the volume of foreign direct investment and borrowing from abroad (Sakakibara 1996; Inoguchi 1997). Already, much of the above features have been undergoing some modifications. But if we recall that the origin of the Japanese developmental model was from the war mobilization and post-war reconstruction periods when the role of the state was pervasive, it is not difficult to accept a newly adapted Japanese economic model. Globalization is bound to force the Japanese to adopt some compromise solutions to the above five features, but it cannot force the Japanese to abandon it entirely. A strong national identity especially will help to cushion the impact of globalization than otherwise. Needless to say, this means that market liberalization and all the necessary adjustments that it entails will be made more complex in the near future. In this sense, globalization will never be a challenge to nationhood. Rather, it will give new impetus to a stronger nationalist self-assertion than in

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the recent past. The irony of globalization is that the fracture of the national economy and the increase in immigrants and foreign products seem to lead the people and the government to give more emphasis to the state’s ability to play roles in the cultural and symbolic policy areas. After all, the state’s ability to run an open economy under steady globalization has been reduced, compared to the largely closed nationaleconomy framework. And the state’s ability to represent people under steady globalization has been circumscribed compared to the transnational business regime.

The Resurgence of Nationalism Globalization fractures the economy and thus the nation. To tighten the somewhat fractured nation, the state instinctively tries to enhance its appeal to the unity and solidarity of the nation. Hence, the rise of nationalism is natural to a certain extent. But ever deepening globalization does not seem to allow nationalism to explode. Let us take a look at some of its manifestations one by one. A number of territorial disputes did take place between Japan and Russia, between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and China. The south Kurile islands dispute between Japan and Russia has been placed in limbo since 1957 when Japan and the Soviet Union normalized their diplomatic relations, but did not conclude a peace treaty. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Boris Yeltsin signed in 1998 a joint communiquè in which both promised to work towards resolving territorial disputes and concluding a peace treaty by 2000. Both differed subsequently on how to proceed. But the very strong ultranationalism exhibited in the Russian Duma and the public opinion in Russia led Japan to adjust somewhat its approach to the territorial issue. Creating a good atmosphere for a peace treaty and territorial settlement was important to Japan as well. Needless to say, the Japanese claim over the islands has not changed at all. In the longer term, the south Kurile islands are not a big issue. Rather, the issue of how to develop Siberia and the Far East will come to the fore in the first half of the twentyfirst century especially when the Russian population is heading towards further contraction. The idea of applying a United Nations trusteeship or a non-U.N. consortium to Siberia and the Far East has already been mooted in an informal non-governmental meeting. The territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima (Togdo) islands flared up in the last days of President Kim Young Sam. President Kim used his anti-Japanese card during the talks

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on demarcating fishing lines between the two countries, when he was facing internal unrest and dissidence amidst economic difficulties. Although the islands have been occupied by South Korea, President Kim ordered fighters to fly over the islands to demonstrate South Korea’s determination to defend them. Japan was firm on the principle of demarcation as it had agreed amicably with China on the demarcation of fishing lines in the same sea (East China Sea) and Japan wanted to apply the same principle to South Korea as well. These factors helped to alleviate the tension. With the ascent of Kim Dae Jung to power, the deepening of the economic crisis in South Korea, and the tensions with North Korea, Japan–South Korea relations have never been better. A territorial dispute between Japan and China flared up on the eve of the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Democratic dissidents in Hong Kong were against the return of the territory to China under the “onecountry-two-systems” scheme and used the occasion to demonstrate their patriotism. Anti-Japanese campaigns were organized in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, and most dramatically in the sea surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands, which Japan occupies. With the passing of the return of Hong Kong to China, their efforts have focused on the Chinese “investigative” boats roaming around the Senkaku and Ryukyu island chains. Looking at the three territorial disputes that Japan faced recently , it is not easy to detect a dramatic increase in Japanese nationalism. In all the three cases, Japan acted fairly calmly and in a pragmatic fashion. On the Kurile islands, the Japanese Government has started to accommodate Russian intransigence on a possible territorial concession. The fishing line demarcation was completed largely according to the same principle applied to both China and South Korea. In the Senkaku islands dispute also, Japan has tended to play down any disturbances originating from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, or from Japanese “dissident” groups. What about the dispute with North Korea? North Korea launched its missile over Japan in 1998, and further launching has not been ruled out. Japan has again acted very pragmatically. First, the Self Defense Forces demonstrated Japan’s determination to defend itself by shooting at suspected boats, which subsequently fled back to a North Korean port. It was arguably the first time that the Self Defense Forces used force for self defence. Secondly, Japan signed an agreement to develop a Theatre Missile Defence system with the United States. Although it would take ten to twenty years for any envisaged work to be completed, the aim was to warn North Korea that it could not keep threatening Japan. Thirdly, Japan banned the remittance of money to North Korea. Given

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the paucity of foreign reserves, the remittance of money from Japan, mostly from Korean residents, constituted a large portion of money available to North Korea. On the North Korean issue, a number of Japanese including some parliamentarians argue that a pre-emptive strike might be necessary. On the whole, however, Japanese reactions have been carefully self-restrained. One can argue that the legislation of the national flag and anthem in the parliament in 1999 may presage the rise of nationalism. The legislation was prompted by the suicide of the principal of a junior high school in Hiroshima, who found himself torn between pressure from the teachers’ union against the use of the national flag and anthem at a graduation ceremony, and the public order on these symbols. There was no domestic law defining the use of the national flag and anthem in Japan until 1999. The teachers’ union in Hiroshima as well as those at many other western Honshu islands had been vigorous in asserting their stance against the Emperor system, of which the national flag and anthem are symbols. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka persuaded Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to pass legislation to put an end to such tragic incidents. The fact that such a legislation was made 47 years after the Constitution was promulgated in 1952 indicates that Japan has been only mildly nationalistic. Japan’s neighbours, such as the United States and South Korea, not to mention China and North Korea, seem to manifest stronger support and respect for national flags and anthems.

Conclusion: Is Nationalism Integrative or Disintegrative? Nationalism per se is a force which neither leads to integration nor to disintegration. When globalization reaches a global scale as a result of the progress of technology, nationalistic integrative projects will be curtailed by sheer global market forces. An overtly nationalistic integrative project cannot be sustained. As long as globalization enhances the linkages of subnational sectors and actors within the somewhat weakened Westphalian trinity framework, nationalism per se cannot be a disintegrative force. Fierce competition among ethnic groups in some ethnically divided societies may sometimes bring about disintegration but this will only happen when the national economy keeps a closeddoor policy and the national political regime retains its unadaptive repressive policy. Globalization can therefore be viewed in two ways: fragmentation and co-development. Globalization fractures the national economy to a certain extent. The global market does not discriminate any geographical space

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or consider national economic settings. It only respects those business actors that operate on the basis of market logic and mood, and act with agility. In order to overcome the gradual penetration of globalizing forces in the national setting, the nation state sometimes calls for nationalistic mobilization. This is the theme of this volume. However, globalization has another face. By linking and developing together, the global market is consolidated. The global linkage leading to global co-development is a picture of integration. This face may not apply to many parts of the Third World, which have the problem of structural irrelevance rather than structural exploitation or structural co-development. But for Japan, globalization works for co-development rather than for fragmentation. Hence, for Japan globalization brings about only a mild manifestation of nationalism. In conclusion, it is not likely that Japanese nationalism will exert much influence over events in the near future. Globalization has aroused only mild nationalistic reactions. Two major factors contribute to this phenomeon. First, Japanese national identity has been very strong for years because of the success in writing an identity from the seventh century onwards, especially from 1868. Secondly, globalization works for co-development rather than fragmentation in Japan. This dilutes the forces for nationalistic agitation in Japanese society to a larger extent than one might like to think.

Notes * This article was completed while I was a visiting professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore in August 1999. I am grateful to Leo Suryadinata and an anonymous referee on a draft of this chapter for their most helpful and useful comments for revision.

References Basabi, Morris. China among Equals. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber, eds. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: New Press, 1999. Fairbank, John King, ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

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Frank, Andre Gunder. Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. Ikegami, Eiko. The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Inoguchi, Takashi. Gaiko taiyo no hikaku kenkyu [A Comparative Study of Diplomatic Style: Qing China, Victorian England, and Modern Japan]. Tokyo: Gannando shoten, 1979. . Japan’s International Relations. London: Pinter, and Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. . “Distant Neighbors: Japan and Asia.” Current History 93, no. 528 (1994): 121–27. . “Japan and Pacific Asia: Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Second World War”. Japan Foundation Newsletter 15, no. 12 (December 1996): 65–71. . “The Japanese Political System: Its Basic Continuity in Historical Perspective”. Asian Journal of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1997): 65–77. . “Peering into the Future by Looking Back: The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Paradigms”. International Studies Review 1, Issue 2 (December 1999): 173–91. Also in Davis Bobrow, ed. Approaching the Millennium: Fusion, Fission and Dominance in International Relations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 173–91. Ishikawa, Kyuyo. Niju gengo kokka [Two Language State]. Tokyo: NHK Press, 1999. Kasaya, Kazuhiko. Shukun osahikome no kozu [The Framework of the Lord Forced to be Shut Up]. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1989. Kato, Yuzo and Minoru Kawakita. Ajia to Oubei sekai [Asia and the EuroAmerican World]. Tokyo: Chuo koron shinsha, 1998. Kawakatsu, Heita. “Meiji zenki mi okeru naigai men kankeihin no hinshitsu” [Quality of Cotton Products at Home and Abroad during the Early Meiji Period]. Waseda seiji keizaigaku zasshi, nos. 250–251 (1977), pp. 184–211. Krasner, Stephen. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocricy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation. Armonk: M.E, Sharpe, 1998. Noguchi, Yukio. Yonjunen taisei [The 1940 Regime]. Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimposha, 1995. Okada, Hidehiro. Nihonshi no tanjo [The Birth of Japan]. Tokyo: Yudachisha, 1994. Sakakibara, Eisuke. Beyond Capitalism: The Japanese Model of Market Economics. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996. Samuels, Richard. Rich Country, Strong Army: National Security and Technological Transformation of Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Shirana, Haruo, and Timo Suzuki, eds. Sozo sareta koten [Created/Fabricated Classics]. Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1999. Spruyt, Henrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

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Toby, Ronald. State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Wang, Gungwu. The Chinese Way: China’s Position in International Relations. Stockholm: Scandinavian University Press, 1996. Yoshida, Takashi. Nihon no tanjo [The Birth of Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1998.

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m 9 n Globalization, Nationalism and the Modernization of the United Kingdom of Great Britain DAVID MARTIN JONES

Introduction In 1996, the New Labour government of Tony Blair embarked upon an ambitious programme of constitutional modernization for the United Kingdom (UK). In Northern Ireland, this involved a dramatic series of initiatives culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, that sought to reconcile the warring communities in Northern Ireland and create a new power-sharing arrangement for that troubled province. At the same time, New Labour, in the course of 1997, organized referenda for Wales and Scotland which, it was contended, legitimated the creation of new directly elected assemblies for these regions of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the House of Lords was persuaded in the course of 1998 to cull radically its hereditary peers, and the government put proposals in place to elect a mayor for London. Apart from these new constitutional initiatives within the United Kingdom, the new government also launched the Jenkins Commission to examine the majoritarian or “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) voting system and propose more equitable, minority friendly alternatives. This attempt to remodel the United Kingdom as a planned rational arrangement eminently suitable for merging a weakening British identity into a prospective Euroland composed of functionally integrated regions constitutes a radical departure from British constitutional practice and raises a number 234

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of questions concerning the relationship between national identity and its democratic representation, the state and the region in an era economically shaped by globalized investment, Internet trading, and rapid capital flows. Retrospectively, it was one of the achievements of the British “nation” that evolved in the United Kingdom after the Act of Union (1707) that it contained a plurality of communities. From distinctively unpromising resources, a British union came initially to embrace North and South Britons, Scots, Welsh, Irish and, after 1945, included Chinese, Cypriot, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Guyanese, Gujerati, Nigerian, and Bangladeshi migrant communities. This essentially pluralist construct was even flexible enough to tolerate a variety of religious affiliations: Sikhs, Jews, Muslims and even Catholics, seemingly facilitating Prince Charles’ desire to reign as a multi-faith monarch. Consequently, mainstream politics in the United Kingdom has rarely been troubled by issues of blud and boden. This constitutional evolution of the United Kingdom, the Irish question apart, differed in both degree and kind from the experience of most modernizing nation states that emerged in Europe, Africa, and Asia after 1815. Significantly, Rodney Barker’s Political Ideas in Modern Britain in and after the 20th Century (1997) contains one passing reference to Scottish nationalism and omits Welsh nationalism entirely (p. 162). This raises an interesting question concerning the extent to which the United Kingdom, in fact, ever was a nation state, and the related issue of whether nineteenth and twentieth century industrialization required states, which in turn demanded national communities to run the programme of modernization effectively. Indeed, as Eric Hobsbawm has observed, “the development of nations and nationalism within oldestablished states such as Britain and France, has not been studied very intensively.... The existence of this gap is illustrated by the neglect, in Britain, of any problems connected with English nationalism” (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 11). How, we might ask, does the rise and fall of that curious civil association known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain (1707–1998) affect the most compelling thesis on the manufactured relationship between nationalism, nation-building, and modernization articulated from somewhat different perspectives by Benedict Anderson (1991), Eric Hobsbawm (1983; 1990), Ernest Gellner (1983), and Tom Nairn (1997). From the standpoint of modernization, nationalism was a direct consequence of the process of the first age of industrialization. The modern state and its philosophy of recht required the mobilization of the people to developmental ends through a shared sense of belonging, an imagined community, a common language, and

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a common educational experience. It was Gellner’s understanding that the relationship between the state and the nation was conspicuously less fraught in those West European arrangements like France, Spain, and Britain where the former dynastic state of the early modern period most fitted the demands of the modernizing and industrializing nation of the nineteenth century. In fact, Gellner contends that the problem of linking a reinvented volkisch high culture codified and educationally transmitted to the needs of industrialization became more acute as nationalism moved across time zones from the Atlantic seaboard (time zone 1) to Eastern Europe (time zones 3 and 4) (Gellner 1997, ch. 7) Thus, as one moved eastwards, particularly towards Gellner’s own former heimat, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the competing claims of rootless (sometimes Jewish) cosmopolites ran up against the emerging claims of the romantic desire for translating the gemeinschaft folk dancing of the village green into a single linguistically closed community. The contradictory desire for gemeinschaft adumbrated by the need for economic growth and development was to prove too much for a number of imperial arrangements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Austro-Hungary to contemporary China and Indonesia. The question remains, however: did the United Kingdom as a dynastic arrangement that fortuitously coincided with a dynamic modernizing state escape the process, or is it only now, in an era of anxious globalization and internetted world markets, like contemporary Indonesia, coming to grips with it? And if this is the case, why now?

Making Britons In order to explore this series of questions, we need first to examine the context in which the modern United Kingdom of Great Britain as a multi-ethnic and multiple faith arrangement first emerged. Currently, the discipline of British history is awash with fashionable studies of what J.G.A. Pocock now terms, with due deference to the politically correct, the “Atlantic Archipelago”, and J.G. Morrill calls the British multiple monarchy (Morrill 1998, ch. 1). Following Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s seminal analysis of The Invention of Tradition (1983), and Linda Colley’s work on Britons Forging the Nation (1992), it has become increasingly evident that the British state that emerged in the course of the eighteenth century out of the wreckage of the Tudor-Stuart multiple monarchy was essentially a political construct. Moreover, it was this manufactured British entity that provided the political and economic foundations for the industrial revolution and the trading empire of the

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early nineteenth century that ultimately paved the way for the creation of a British imperial monarchy at the end of that century. As Conrad Russell (1990), John Morrill and J.G.A. Pocock have recently shown, the weak absolutism of the Stuart monarchy of the seventeenth century collapsed into a war of three kingdoms after 1639. The problem of uniting the three culturally and religiously separate kingdoms of Ireland, Scotland, and England together with the more tractable Principality of Wales had proved beyond the wit of seventeenth century Stuart absolutists or Tory Anglicans. It was only during the ascendancy and consolidation of a London Whig financial oligarchy allied to lowland Scottish Presbyterian mercantile interests against English Toryism and Scottish Jacobitism that a strong British state emerged from the factionalized Stuart realm. The Act of Union (1707), what Bruce Lehmann (in Morrill 1998, p. 223) termed a “political job”, by which Scotland lost its parliament, but kept its distinctive legal code, was rendered palatable by a mixture of highland clearances, lowland economic growth, and political ascendancy. In other words, complex issues of tribal identity, language, culture, myth, and history were subsumed into a new British unit facilitated by constitutional stability and prolonged economic growth. The “imagined community”, to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain was, therefore, an ideological construct of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, founded upon success in war and the development of the largest free market in Europe. As Linda Colley observes: as even the briefest acquaintance with Great Britain will confirm, the Welsh, the Scottish and the English remain in many ways distinct peoples in cultural terms, just as all three countries continue to be conspicuously sub-divided into different regions. The sense of a common identity here did not come into being, then, because of an integration and homogenization of disparate cultures. Instead, Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences.15

This superimposition, moreover, as David Starkey recently observed, was always somewhat half-hearted. In fact, it was a unique combination of a Whig theory of identity premised upon respect for “freedom, and diversity and reverence for the institutions of parliament and common law that guaranteed them” amalgamated with a Tory superstructure and the reconciling “edifice of nation as village, enlightened by the BBC... and crowned by the monarchy at once mysterious and everyday” (Starkey 1996). This curious and distinctive amalgam made possible a rule-governed civil association that contrasted dramatically with the neo-corporatist

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enterprise associations that shaped political and national development elsewhere in continental Europe in the course of the nineteenth century, and in Asia and South America after 1945 (see Oakeshott 1975, ch. 4). This distinctively British construct, which writers like Colley clearly find problematic and increasingly redundant (Colley 1992, p. 6), however, was notably successful in achieving both a parliamentary democracy, industrial modernization and a high degree of what American political scientists like S.M. Lipsett would term efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (Lipsett 1959). Significantly, the legitimacy of British constitutional arrangements survived the profound political crises of two world wars, the loss of the empire and the radical economic and social restructuring of the Magaret Thatcher and John Major Conservative governments (1979–97). The evolution of a British idiom of self-understanding, premised upon the command of the English language and its export globally, had the further consequences of integrating a distinctive British identity. This identity, moreover, was sufficiently flexible, with certain reservations, to adapt itself to the needs of migrant communities from the British Commonwealth in the course of the 1950s. In other words, the artificial eighteenth century British state constituted a resilient arrangement constructed from “a patchwork in which uncertain areas of Welshness, Scottishness and Englishness were cut across by strong regional attachments” (Colley 1992, p. 17). This incoherent patchwork mutated over time into a political construct of Britishness capable of weathering the storm-crossed seas of development, distribution, penetration, and legitimacy (Grew 1978). Thus, in the course of the eighteenth century not only did colonial adventures and economic growth dissipate tensions within the consolidated multiple monarchy, there also occurred a notable fusing of the emerging English and Celtic Protestant élites that ruled the evolving entity. At the same time, the ritual of the coronation, the spectacle of royal marriage, and the imperial image of the monarchy, especially in the latter part of Victoria’s reign, provided Great Britain with an image of deference and family bonding appropriate to an age of mass democracy. As Walter Bagehot observed, “to state the matter shortly, royalty is a government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions .... Accordingly, so long as the human heart is strong and the human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffused feeling” (Bagehot 1968, p. 86). Significantly, a British monarchy, of German extraction, came by the end of the nineteenth century “to order“ but not to struggle. The monarchy was “commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes

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paraded like a pageant, but in neither case is it contentious. The nation is divided into parties, but the crown is of no party. Its apparent separation...enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties — to be a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol” (p. 90). Centrally then, the United Kingdom was a collocation of identities which in turn facilitated the transmission of the multiple monarchic mystique across the Empire. Victoria was Empress of India and the Queen remains the symbolic, as opposed to the efficient, head of the contemporary Australian and Canadian states. The unique evolution of a British representative governmental style in the course of the nineteenth century resulted in an integrating monarchy, linked to the notion of an integrating Britishness that, in Bagehot’s view, disguised the operations of an efficient Cabinet or executive government of the United Kingdom (Bagehot 1968). This mutation in the character of British representative institutions inspired John Stuart Mill to conclude that, although the nineteenth century was the century of nationalism, experience proved that “it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage” (Mill 1961, p. 313). Mill applied this case particularly to the Welsh and Scots who would otherwise remain sulking on their “own rocks the half savage relic of past times, revolving in ...(their) own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world” (p. 314). For those like Mill (of lowland Scots provenance, like Hume and Boswell a century earlier) within the British construct, it was preferable to be a bundle of associations rather than a Scotsman. This notwithstanding, whilst Scots, and Irish Protestants formed the backbone of the British Imperial state both at home and overseas, the evolving British entity paradoxically facilitated the reinvention of a number of traditions that both promoted a Greater British identity and, at the same time, made possible the maintenance of distinctive cultural and linguistic traditions in Wales, Scotland, and, to a much lesser degree, in (problematically Catholic) Ireland. In the case of integrative invented pan-British traditions, the ritual surrounding parliament, coronation, and royal marriage evolved dramatically after 1870. By contrast, distinctive cultural rituals like the Highland Games, the cult of Burns, kilts and bagpipes are notable nineteenth-century Scottish rebrandings of poets and practices that had either to be invented to gratify the growing romantic thirst for the Celtic twilight or had fallen into desuetude. Ironically, it was an English Quaker who invented the kilt in the late eighteenth century, whilst Walter Scott invented the various clan tartans

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that constituted the historic legacy of highland tribes in the 1820s (Trevor Roper, in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, ch. 2). Meanwhile, in Wales, as Prys Morgan demonstrates, the esiteddfodau genedlaethol, the contemporary symbol of Welsh cultural and linguistic solidarity, was largely the invention of a Welsh obsessive, Iolo Morganwg. Iolo introduced a number of ancient “rites”, such as the gorsedd, the various orders of druids and the crowning of the bard. Significantly, the first eisteddfod actually took place in North London in 1792 (Morgan, in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, p. 61). In other words, it was in the context of an evolving nineteenth century pluralist British state that new cultural myths of Welshness, Scottishness, and Irishness were also invented. For an incipient Welsh nationalism, it was language that came to constitute the core of an emergent identity in the late nineteenth century, in Ireland of course, it was religion and religious mysticism, whilst in Scotland it was myths associated with a strong and independent unitary identity that had established itself as a coherent realm before the “sell out” of 1707. Such myths significantly ignored the fact that Wales historically had been composed of at least two distinctive ethnies and that by the nineteenth century, the most economically vibrant part was highly Anglicized, whilst the Scots myth sedulously ignored the fact that prior to 1745 Scotland, its “independent” parliament notwithstanding, was notably underpopulated, economically and politically backward, and bitterly divided along tribal and religious grounds. To adapt Ernest Renan’s classic observation, a Welsh, Irish and Scottish nationalism that emerged from the Celtic twilight of nineteenth-century romanticism was both a kind of remembering and a kind of forgetting. It was the product of anxious, deracinated intellectuals, usually of mixed ancestry, like W.B.Yeats and Padraig Pearce in Ireland, Henry Richards and Saunders Lewis in Wales, Hugh Macdiarmid or, more recently, Douglas Dunn in Scotland. Poets, folk-singers and painters, unreconstructed romantics who despised both rationalism and modernity and neurotically sought to re-establish a lost gemeinschaft through the rediscovery of folk dances, folk music, poetry, and arts and crafts. This entirely contingent activity of self-conscious scribbling and daubing was at best of marginal concern (Ireland apart) for the twentieth century British state, a fruit of idle pens providing soul food for gullible readers who required the myths of the Mabinogion, or, even worse, Braveheart, to give meaning to otherwise meaningless lives. The enthusiasm of minor poets and folk musicians would have remained of peripheral political interest until the Blairite watershed of 1997 when, in Robert Harris’ telling phrase, “the tectonic plates” of British politics shifted. It is to this shift and the recent deconstruction of the United Kingdom that we next turn.

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Deconstructing Britons in Democracy’s Second Age via the Third Way Given the not inconsiderable achievement of the United Kingdom in developing representative institutions from its ancient constitution and feudal law and sustaining and tolerating pluralism and difference whilst at the same time adapting to the complex requirements of late modern economic developments, why has New Labour’s insistence upon modernization appeared so appealingly cool Britannic and at the same time given a powerful animus to particularist and nationalist sentiments? From the perspective of New Labour’s much vaunted Third Way, the application of neoclassical Thatcherite economic remedies in the shape of fiscal monetarism and privatization to the valetudinarian post-war British economy had deracinating social and political consequences. Although the conservative restructuring of the economy had the benign effect of reviving economic growth, and reducing unemployment, the neoclassical economic individualism that constituted the basis for the restructuring of British industry from 1979 to 1987 had a devastating impact on local communities in the north of England, Scotland, and Wales. Moreover, the fact that the ruling conservative party had no local mandate for change in these regions only gave a powerful fillip to a burgeoning sense of local grievance. The disastrous implementation of the Council or Poll tax, experimentally introduced in Scotland before its extension to the rest of the United Kingdom in 1989, seemed to indicate that majoritarianism and the central authority of Westminster could ride roughshod over the sensibilities of the local élite, or “chattering classes”. A central feature of the New Labour Party, created during the 1980s by the purgation of militant leftism and the establishment of pro-market credentials, was its growing sensitivity to issues of accountability, community, and diversity. Its new bourgeois élite of either a Scottish, feminist or homosexual provenance developed a manifesto that mitigated the excesses of market individualism with a new communitarian concern that attended to the wishes of marginalized groups of women, gays, West Indians, Irish, Asians, Scots, and Welsh. Such attention clearly required enhanced representation either at Westminster in the case of women and migrant communities or with new assemblies in the case of the Scots and Welsh, who had, in fact, always been over-represented at Westminster since the Act of Union. In this project, officially and academically sanctioned understandings of representation and presence promoted by left of centre theorists of democracy and difference, like Anne Phillips (1993), powerfully reinforced the New Labour orthodoxy that democratic accountability requires more

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and greater participation from a variety of previously ignored, but always excluded, and probably oppressed minorities. The new universities, and their gender-challenged heads of departments particularly, promoted this dominant academic discourse. Indeed, by the late 1990s rarely a day went by in the Anglo-American world without some soi disant spokesperson for a tribal, gender, or disabled group requiring more and better access to the state and compensation for its previous and untoward neglect. Theorists of democracy endorse such claims on the grounds that they enhance participation by minorities and consequently render representative democratic institutions that might otherwise have a majoritarian bias, pluralistic. It is in the light of this fashionable preoccupation with broadening democratic participation, and thereby rendering outmoded constitutional arrangements more accountable, initially articulated by Charter 88 in the United Kingdom, that New Labour’s current concern with granting devolved powers to assemblies in Wales and Scotland must, in part, be viewed. Informing New Labour’s think-tank, the predictably named Demos, and Anthony Giddens’ The Third Way (1998) is the intimation that such tinkering with new models of what is fashionably termed “governance” and new systems of voting somehow fits with a progressively developing understanding of social justice. Thus, for Giddens, Blair’s current guru of choice, Third Way politics builds “a cosmopolitan nation that helps promote social inclusion but also has a key role in fostering transnational systems of governance” by “devolving power both upwards and downwards” (Giddens, in Lukes 1998). Such devolution, Blair, Giddens and the enthusiasts of democratization and difference believe, merely strengthens “one nation politics” within a more inclusive and modern union. Yet, at the same time as New Labour ideologues assert that a “cosmopolitan nationalism” is “the necessary condition of a multicultural society in a globalizing order” (Giddens 1998, p. 136), they also incoherently maintain that such active cosmopolitanism may well entail independence for Scotland. Scotland and Wales it would seem, but not England, have the active cosmopolitan right to be non-cosmopolitan (pp.135–36). To a large degree, the devolution agenda, therefore, has been set by the incoherent desire of a New Labour élite to modernize British institutions in what New Labour advisers understand to be the second age of democracy. Tony Blair, like Bill Clinton, is clearly a post-modern politician who thrives on information, new age gurus, and instant policy fixes. Robert Harris has termed Blair’s obsessive policy-making “permanent revisionism” (Sunday Times, 20 September 1999), while Andrew Sullivan has observed that the “sheer scale of Blair’s proposals is a little hard to absorb let alone convey” (in Barnett 1999, p. 3). For

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Anthony Barnett, “European Union membership, national parliaments, regional agencies, a London region, some electoral reform and other much needed devices of constitutional democracy have been transplanted into an uncodified regime in two years” (Barnett 1999, p. 4). This urgent constitutional modernization is, in fact, the most notable feature of a government otherwise characterized by its style rather than any identifiable political or economic substance. For Blair, the first age of democracy involved the achievement of universal suffrage. But since the first age, the economic and social structure of the United Kingdom has changed. The government now spends more than 42 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). “Should spending decisions reside exclusively with a highly centralised national government?” Blair asked rhetorically in September 1996 (The Economist, 14 September 1996). For Blairites, it followed that “changing the way we govern and not just changing our government is no longer an optional extra for Britain”. In Third Way thinking, “Britain is struggling to find its way after the collapse of the grand twentieth century ideologies of left and right. These too often placed ends above means, grand projects of social or economic reconstruction above the democratic requirement for consent, self-government and respect for rights” (Tony Blair, The Economist, 14 September 1996). To introduce Britain to the second age of democracy, New Labour made particular use of the machinery of “referendums (sic)” to “give citizens a veto over proposals to change their system of government and to give legitimacy to the changes to which they do agree”. Consequently, it followed that the “intermediate tier” between Westminster and the regions should be strengthened. In this context, the Scots and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Welsh increasingly “insist upon something more democratic in the form of a Scottish parliament with legislative powers” (ibid.). The second age of democracy, conducted according to Third Way principles, Blair maintains, will save the union from its incipient demise, rather than cause its dissolution. Interviewed by the Financial Times in February 1999, Blair maintained “you need a new relationship within the UK for the UK to survive.” Indeed, as Anthony Barnett observed, “Tony Blair is personally convinced that a new constitutional settlement is vital to his ‘project’ of turning Britain into a modern European state” (Times Literary Supplement, 26 March 1999). This Third Way reflects, then, both a desire to modernize Britain, render it more politically accountable and socially just whilst at the same time forging a growth-oriented British economy at the technological heart of a modern Europe, integrated into a global economy and a global

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democratic order. But does this package of democratic reform and economic integration into Euroland constitute a coherent programme appropriate to the needs of an era of globalization? The New Labour’s faith in a felicitous conjunction between greater political accountability and economic growth, has attracted the party and Blair, in particular, to the seemingly more accountable electoral models practised in the commonwealth countries of New Zealand and Australia. Blair was early influenced by Australian social democracy. During his Baliol days, he came under the influence of his first guru, the muscular Christian socialist John Thomson, who introduced the impressionable young Tony to both Geoff Gallop, a future Keating apparatchik and current leader of the Western Australia Labour Party, and the dubious joys of the otherwise justly neglected Christian communitarian socialist, Scottish philosopher James Macmurray (Macmurray 1944). The success of the Australian Labor Party in maintaining power in the course of the 1980s, in contrast to the sad failings of British Labour, drew Blair increasingly to Keatingite pragmatism with its odd mix of élitism, multiculturalism, and constitutional reform linked to a programme of limited and bureaucratically determined economic restructuring (Frankel 1997). In the process, Blair evidently acquired a predilection for the collocation of federal and state electoral arrangements that render any radical economic reform of taxation or labour unions almost unachievable in that country. This notwithstanding, Blairites evidently find the Australian federal and state structure with their mystifying arrray of transferable voting arrangements oddly appealing, more democratically accountable, and therefore “modern”. The decision of New Zealand to shift from FPTP to an Additional Member System (AMS) in 1997 further influenced New Labour’s burgeoning antipodean proclivities. From a related, but somewhat different perspective, constitutional modernization was further required because the British experiment had ultimately failed. Historians that analysed British state formation after 1707, like Linda Colley, David Cannadine and Jeremy Black, were notably pro-European and sought to relate British modernization to its European destiny. Thus, Colley maintains that recognizing how Britishness was “imposed” on distinctive Welsh, Scots and Irish communities explains current British constitutional and communitarian failings. “As an invented nation heavily dependent for its raison d’etre on a broadly Protestant culture, on the threat and tonic of recurrent wars...and on the triumphs, profits and otherness represented by a massive overseas Empire, Britain is bound now to be under immense pressure” (Colley 1992, p. 6). Given the growing disutility of the British “construct”, Colley circumspectly prognosticates that “how all this resolves itself — whether Great Britain will break down into separate Welsh, Scottish and English states, or

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whether, as is more likely, a more federal Britain will emerge as part of an increasingly federal Europe — remains to be seen” (p. 375). The appeal of both a regional and a European identity was given economic credence by anti-Thatcherite Social Democrats like Will Hutton who considered The State We’re In (1995) a lamentable product of conservative fiscal and monetary policy determined by the interests of city financiers. The more interventionist and governed market approaches pioneered in Germany and Japan, and sustained by the Maastricht Treaty, and deeper European political and monetary union in Euroland after 1998 offered the seductive prospect of a more equitable and humane management of the market. This view curiously shared the Leninist or provisional IRA premise that Great Britain requires either armed or electoral struggle to liberate first Ireland, then Wales, and Scotland from the “imposition” of an ultimately English liberal bourgeois determined Britishness. However, unlike revolutionary Irish nationalism, the resolution of the identity issue in Britain would be by locating it in a pluralistically integrated, but essentially incoherent Europe des Regions. In other words, it seemed central to the evolving modernizing agenda that the nineteenth century construct of Britishness should now be subsumed under a pan-Europeanness that had evolved dramatically in the wake of the Single European Act of 1985. This was the view that fitted well with the European vision of Presidents of the European Commisssion like Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer. Consequently, the Maastricht Treaty and the further institutional bonding facilitated by the creation of a European political union and a single currency, introduced in January 1999, presented, from the perspective of both Brussels and the Third Way, the potential for an integrated modern supranational European identity. In this European context, too, the traditional political construct of a sovereign United Kingdom seemed increasingly outmoded. Curiously, whilst the notion of Britishness seemed obsolescent and the BBC in April 1999 decreed that its usage should be attenuated, the distinctive regions that constituted it were not. Or more precisely, whilst the process of Europeanization enhanced certain regional identities like the Welsh and Scots, other identities like the Geordie or the Cornish remained trapped in the cloying embrace of a rather vapid multicultural Europeanness. Let us then next examine the character and extent of constitutional change promoted by New Labour since 1997 by first exploring the extent of the demand for nationalism in Wales and Scotland, the consequences of the elections for devolved assemblies in May 1999, and the current state and future prospects of these putative regional economies within the greater European supranational entity.

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How Welsh were the Valleys, or the Low Road of Identity Politics Given that the new political élites in both the media and at Westminster assume the necessity of greater autonomy and accountability, it is interesting to note that this interest in the region is of very recent vintage. The referendum held in March 1979 showed “weak support for national devolution, let alone independence in Scotland and Wales (only 11.9 per cent of Welsh votes supported it). Significantly, the Scotland Act (1978) had provided for a devolved assembly in Edinburgh but subject to approval by 40 per cent of the electorate in an advisory referendum. The Scottish voters approved by only 33 per cent to 31 per cent, and the proposal therefore failed. In the 1983 and 1987 elections, Nationalist support averaged a mere “13 per cent in Scotland and 7.5 per cent in Wales.” As Denis Kavenagh and Bill Jones observed in 1991, “the referendum showed weak support for devolution, let alone independence” (Jones 1991, p.196). Indeed, for all the talk of the strength of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, it is worth noting that “overwhelmingly Scottish and Welsh MPs are drawn from parties which are pro-union. Indeed, the ‘national’ party in both nations is Labour” (p. 264). Nevertheless, in order to achieve the second age of democratic accountability, Blair, once again influenced by antipodean Labour practice, has rapidly expanded the use of referenda to address constitutional issues. Clement Atlee once described referenda as the instrument of Fascism and Nazism, and its provenance is that of European, Rousseauian idealism rather than British constitutional practice. Yet Blair has held four referenda since 1997 and proposes a future referendum on British entry into the European monetary union. The device of the referendum in 1997 legitimated the passage of the new Government of Scotland and Government of Wales Acts (1998) that established new regional assemblies elected in May 1999. In Scotland, the referendum of August 1997 saw 74 per cent of Scots favouring devolution, with 26 per cent opposing — a margin of 42 per cent on a turn-out of 63 per cent of the electorate. The referendum gave the government the mandate to establish an assembly responsible for managing the Scottish budget of 14 billion pounds per annum, and with a limited capacity to vary the level of taxation in Scotland. In Wales, the support for devolution was much less decisive. On a low turn-out of just over 50 per cent of the electorate, the “Yes” vote succeeded by a margin of 0.3 per cent, representing 559,419 votes to 552,698 votes against (Financial Times, 19 September 1997). Significantly,

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the turn-out was particularly low in the richer urban and Anglicized centres of Cardiff and Newport. Indeed, voters in the Welsh capital clearly rejected devolution. Moreover, in 1998 the Neil Committee report on party funding accused the Welsh office of “unfairly influencing the outcome of ... the referendum”, observing that “a fairer campaign might have resulted in a different outcome” (Financial Times, 14 October 1998). As The Economist observed, whilst Labour, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh TUC, and the Welsh office all campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote and received sponsorship from the Reform Trust and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, a Mrs Cerys Pugh ran the ‘No’ vote campaign with four thousand pounds of her own money, subsequently enhanced by a donation from the Cardiff-based Julian Hodge Bank. Mrs Pugh contends that with another hundred thousand pounds, the ‘No’ vote would have triumphed. Nevertheless, on the basis of this referendum, the Government of Wales Act created a new National Assembly with responsibility for the annual Welsh budget of seven billion pounds. Unlike Scotland, the Welsh assembly has no capacity to vary the rate of taxation. Peter Hain (a South African), Welsh Office minister, maintained that business which had fuelled Welsh growth in the early 1990s would “lose interest in Wales if people did not have the confidence to support devolution” (The Times, 17 September 1997). Meanwhile, Ron Davies, the Minister for Wales (1997–98) and potential First Secretary of the Welsh Assembly, in a “moment of madness” at Clapham Common in November 1998, contended that devolution would create “a Wales which is more self confident, has a clearer sense of identity, is more clearly recognized internationally, is more prosperous and has a better quality of public services” (Ron Davies, Western Mail, 3 August 1998). Such a clear sense of identity evidently failed to trouble the burgeoning Scottish entity, like Wales, buoyed by an economic boom in the early 1990s. A burgeoning Scottish “feel good” factor, facilitated by the success of the local film and television industry in promoting a fashionable, but largely vacuous, Scottish repertoire in films like Shallow Grave and Trainspotting not only gave credence to a distinctive identity but also helped to articulate a demand for independence. Interestingly, this was demonstrably the case with Scots pseudo-historical films made in Hollywood, like Rob Roy and Mel Gibson’s Braveheart, aptly dismissed by Billy Connolly as “a piece of pure Australian shite”. In the words of a Scottish National Party (SNP) press officer, they “helped immensely” by raising “national-self confidence” (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 June 1997). They have also heightened a not well concealed Scottish antipathy for all things English. Braveheart caused demonstrations in Glasgow, and there has been a noticeable rise in the number of racist attacks on “English Bastards” (Times Magazine, 6 June 1998).

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In other words, devolution has released what Anthony Barnett has termed “the genie” of nationalism. This was not supposed to happen according to the somewhat ambivalent doctrine of the Third Way for a supranational Europe. Devolution for Third Way enthusiasts offers partnership not independence. “The idea that you can’t change the relationship (between Westminster and Edinburgh) without unleashing unacceptable forces is absurd,” Tony Blair declaimed in February 1999 (Financial Times, 4 February 1999). However, the AMS voting system applied to the assembly elections held in May 1999 had the built-in propensity to release “unacceptable forces” and render both Wales and Scotland ungovernable. The AMS system provides for both constituency and list candidates. Thus, in the new 129–member Scottish assembly, 73 members were elected by FPTP in constituency elections whilst a further 56 members were returned according to the number of votes cast for each party list in 14 regions. Under this system, the May elections returned 56 Labour, 35 SNP, 18 Conservatives, 17 Liberal Democrats, and 3 others to the new Scottish Assembly in Glasgow. Whereas under a FPTP system, Labour would have held a clear majority and the SNP would have held a mere 7 seats, under the new system the SNP constitutes a very significant opposition clearly committed to independence, whilst Labour in the meantime struggles to form a coalition (The Economist, 15 May1999). In other words, devolution amplified by fashionable electoral systems has unleashed the unacceptable force of Scottish nationalism and established the SNP as the second largest party in the Scottish Assembly. For the SNP, devolution was merely “a leap forward to the full goal of independence”. Moreover, the nature of the AMS system suggests that at some point the SNP will govern the Scottish Assembly either in a coalition or on its own. This would add credence to Robert Hazell’s contention that “devolution is a process not a settlement” (Hazell 1999, p. 15). For the SNP, the settlement will be an independent, self-governing Scotland within a federal Europe. Analogously in Wales, the 60-seat Assembly has 40 seats elected on an FPTP system, and 20 additional members drawn from 5 electoral regions. In Wales too, the AMS system resulted in a Labour minority government, with the Labour Party holding 28, Plaid Cymru 17, Conservatives 9, and Liberal Democrats, 6 seats. Once again, in an FPTP system Labour would have had a clear majority while Plaid Cymru would have a mere 7 seats. In Wales, devolution is also a process, but here the problem of identity is both more contentious and more ambiguous. AMS created a serious Welsh nationalist political force for the first time. Significantly, Plaid Cymru is essentially a Welsh-language party in a

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region where Welsh is spoken by less than 20 per cent of the population. Increasingly, to be Welsh is to ciarad Cymraeg. Those without the language cannot obtain grants from the Welsh Council, or jobs in academia, or the Welsh media. In 1993, the Welsh Language Act gave Welsh equal status with English in the principality. As The Economist observed, “there is a burgeoning disquiet that the promotion of Welsh is becoming the tyranny of a minority” (18 June 1998). In the 1970s, Denis Balsom argued that Wales was divided along three linguistic-economic cleavages: Welshspeaking Wales of the rural west; Welsh Wales of the former mining valleys where people feel Welsh but do not speak it; and British Wales where most people are either English-born or work in English cities like Liverpool, Manchester, or Bristol (Financial Times, 27 September 1997). Significantly, devolution and the Assembly will serve to reinforce these cultural cleavages. From the perspective of the new Welsh language élite, the Sorelian idea that “I speak, therefore, I am” is crucial to a Welsh renaissance and a reinvigorated Welsh identity. Consequently, the new Welsh cultural legislators through their control of the Welsh media, including the world’s most expensive publicly subsidized TV channel, S4C, endlessly promote inconsequential writers like Saunders Lewis and the ersatz Celtica of eisteddfodau and folk museums, whilst the AngloWelsh popular cultural heritage of West Wales rugby, Cardiff City, Antony Hopkins, Dylan Thomas, Tom Jones, and Dave Edmunds and the Rockpile is ignored or reviled. As the Welsh Office explains, “the system ensures that all parties which command a significant level of support across Wales will win some seats in the Assembly”. In fact, in both devolution elections turn-out was remarkably low (in Wales just over 40 per cent) and the result provided a powerful fillip to the separatist politics of the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Somewhat curiously, the creation of a new ethno-linguisticism in both Wales and Scotland is viewed with equanimity by the Blairites in Westminster. It is assumed that devolving power to the regions is isomorphic, promoting multiculturalism in the United Kingdom generally, and modernizing institutions for integration into a dynamic federal European Union. This assumes that the new identity politics in Wales and Scotland will allow for pluralism, an assumption that flies in the face of its increasingly gemeinschaft character. It also assumes that the creation of a new partnership and a new tier of government will promote rather than inhibit economic growth. Ironically, this unexamined orthodoxy is the only one shared by the apostles of the Third Way and by Welsh and Scottish nationalists alike. Significantly, it is the least sustainable feature of the modernizing agenda.

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The Political Economy of Nationalism in an Era of Global Capital As we have suggested, the rise of nationalism in Scotland and Wales is of recent vintage, an élite avocation driven by a self-promoting minority. In Third Way thinking, devolution is supposed to articulate local sensibilities and facilitate more efficient political and economic management, paving the way for an economically and politically integrated Europe. Hence, despite the rhetoric of local accountability, the leadership of New Labour has gone to considerable lengths to ensure that Blairites dominate and lead the new assemblies. Yet, whether devolution is a terminus or a launching point, both nationalists and Blairite democrat New Age advocates assume that the process will ineluctably sustain and promote economic growth, regionally, nationally, and through integration with Europe. In this context, it is important to recognize that the élite driven intimation of autonomy and independence has itself been propelled by economic growth. As we have seen, there was little enthusiasm even for devolution in Scotland and Wales during the era of British economic postwar decline, particularly in the period of Harold Wilson, Edward Heath, and James Callaghan. Indeed, it was as a consequence of the radical economic restructuring of the Thatcher era that both South Wales and lowland Scotland became attractive destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI). It was the Thatcher government which introduced a new ideological dimension to British politics in the 1980s and broke the mould of consensus. Indeed, Thatcherism had the necessary conviction to bring about this restructuring. In economic terms, it was prepared to countenance conflict with militant trade unions and privatize formerly nationalized industries in order to rid the economy of “lame ducks”. Significantly, it was in regions like South Wales and Scotland that Thatcherite restructuring went deepest. It was also in these regions that Thatcherism had its weakest constituency. The impetus to nationalism in both Wales and Scotland, therefore, was initially fuelled by resentment at the unaccountable way in which Westminister privatized steel, coal, and other utilities and in the process undermined local communities structurally dependent on these nationalized and highly subsidized industries. Yet, paradoxically, it was precisely because of the radical reform of the labour market, the closure of sunset industries and the promotion of Quangos (quasi-autonomous government organizations — like the highly successful Welsh Development Authority) that these regions began to attract large amounts of FDI in the late 1980s.

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Curiously, economic success facilitated by locally unaccountable, but regionally responsive Quangos created the desire for greater local accountability. Yet, it was precisely because economic decisions were made in a way that did not have to take account of local cronyism that the restructuring and economic renewal of South Wales and lowland Scotland took place at all. Thus, between 1986 and1998, 16 per cent of UK FDI came to Wales. However, Wales accounts for less than 5 per cent of the UK population. Most of the investments, moreover, went to anglicized southeast Wales (WDA, August 1998). Labour market reform and the activity of the Welsh Development Authority (WDA), which assumed responsibility for inward investment in Wales after 1983, have been largely responsible for creating an increasingly modern and diversified South Wales economy based on services and light industry, replacing a traditional dependence on coal and steel. As Juliette Jowett observes, “the growth was kick started” by grants and favourable investment conditions provided through the Welsh Office and the WDA (Financial Times Survey, Wales, January 1999). Significantly, overseas companies employed over 30 per cent of the manufacturing work-force. These multinational companies were notably “footloose.” The propensity to footlooseness, moreover, could be exacerbated by a local assembly which made investment decision-making “more muddled and complex by individual members’ local interests” (ibid.). Welsh politics have historically been prone to the self-promoting activities of the local Taffia. In July 1997, Elizabeth Heywood, the director of the CBI in Wales, expressed concern that Wales’ success in attracting ten billion pounds of inward investment over the previous fifteen years might be compromised by the new Assembly. “An additional layer of government indicates an extra tier of bureaucracy”, she commented (Financial Times, 23 July 1997). Moreover, as the new Assembly would be increasingly open to nationalist influence, Professor Kent Matthews noted, it could become increasingly “politically unstable”. An analogous instability could undermine economic growth prospects in Scotland, described in the Financial Times as the British Quebec (14 August 1998). Significantly, the SNP first came to prominence in the 1970s with the slogan, “Its Scottish Oil”. Crucial to the growth of Scottish nationalism is the widely held view, among Scots, that they would be economically better off as an independent state within Europe, its comparatively greater GDP sustained, in part, by revenues from North Sea oil (The Economist, 16 January 1999). However, this claim is seriously flawed. The growth of the Scottish economy, although no doubt helped by North Sea oil revenues, has

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largely been propelled, as in Wales, by FDI sustained by an attractive Westminster-devised investment climate. Scotland’s silicon glen has become home to Europe’s leading centre of semiconductor production, and electronics accounts for one-fifth of Scotland’s entire manufacturing production (Financial Times Reporting Britain, 18 December 1998). As in Wales, the Scots electronics industry is multinational, and established in Scotland because of the start-up incentives and the attractiveness of the local labour market. Apart from electronics, the other feature of the revived Scottish economy is the strength of the services sector. By 1999, finance and business services accounted for 20 per cent of Scottish GDP and one in seven jobs. Under the influence of Thatcherite restructuring, unemployment in Scotland fell from 14 per cent in 1987 to 6.4 per cent a decade later (ibid.). The problem for the SNP and the increasingly hysterical demand for independence, facilitated by the devolution debate, is that the new Scotland would be significantly worse off as an independent entity. Scotland, like Wales, receives substantially more in government spending than it generates in taxable revenue (The Economist, 16 January 1999). Revenues from North Sea oil, not all of which is within Scottish waters, would not cover the shortfall in revenue that an independent Scottish government, without Westminster subsidy, would have to make good. A recent government study indicated that this shortfall would amount to between 5.5 per cent of GDP in 1996–97 and, depending on the fluctuation in the price of Brent crude at between 3.25 to 4.25 per cent of GDP over the next five years, Iain Maclean, a Scottish economist at the University of Oxford, calculates that public spending is six hundred pounds per head higher in Scotland than in England. Indeed, England presently subsidizes Scotland by 6 billlion pounds a year (Financial Times, 24 August 1997). An independent Scotland would presumably have to cover this shortfall either by cuts in public services or by taxes on the booming electronics and services sectors, sectors that are footloose and attracted to business friendly regimes. Already, the new Scottish Assembly’s capacity to vary the tax rate by three pence in the pound has seen a number of financial services and successful start-up companies, like the independent Stagecoach bus service, contemplate moving their corporate headquarters over the border to tax-friendly Newcastle. As the Financial Times observed, “what worries business is the prospect of endless political uncertainty” produced by a Scottish Assembly in which the SNP have the potential to be the majority party (14 August 1998). The revelation in the course of the election campaign of the extent of Welsh and Scottish subsidies (The Guardian, 12 April and 8 May 1999),

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has had the additional unforeseen consequence of igniting English regional resentment over both the inequitable distribution of subsidies and the over-representation of Scotland and Wales at Westminster. As the Western Mail worried as early as December 1997, the whole devolution debate in Wales had “opened up a huge can of worms” concerning how much public money should go to Wales and Scotland (13 December 1997). With the establishment of separate assemblies for Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, the traditional assumption that the richer parts of the United Kingdom should subsidize the poorer regions has been put into question. Lord Barnett, responsible for the Barnett formula, the government scheme that after 1977 ensured that Wales, Scotland, and Ireland received more public spending per head than England, has stated that his formula now needs radical revision (Financial Times, 2 October 1997). Significantly, the English regions claim that they have suffered lower levels of inward investment as a direct consequence of the formula and the aggressive pursuit of FDI by quangos like the WDA. The northeast of England still resents the way in which the WDA manoeuvred the bidding for a Korean semiconductor plant eventually built in South Wales. Whilst it is generally accepted that the maximum subsidy available per job to a foreign investor is seventeen thousand pounds, the WDA offered forty thousand pounds per job to the Korean chaebol LG to guarantee that its semiconductor plant opened in Newport, Gwent (Western Mail, 13 December 1997). Given the government’s favourable subsidies to Wales and Scotland, it is not surprising to find the English regions calling for an analogous autonomy. This is particularly evident in the northeast of England, an area like Scotland or Wales where folk musicians, artists and romantic novelists are busily at work trying to rebuild a previously lost Northumbrian identity as the basis of an independent Northeast (The Economist, 27 March 1999). As Robert Hazell has observed in Constitutional Futures (1999), “the English could be forgiven for thinking that devolution is some special deal for Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish, because no one has bothered to tell them otherwise” (p. 7). In political terms, this special deal has raised the mid-Lothian question initially posed by Tam Dalyell in 1979. Dalyell asked why Scottish MPs who represent 72 underpopulated constituencies at Westminster should vote on legislation affecting England, when English MPs cannot, post-devolution, vote on similar laws in Scotland (Financial Times, 7 January 1999). From a somewhat different perspective, Lord Hope, a senior Scottish law lord envisaged increasing legal conflict between Scotland and England as a consequence of devolution (Financial Times, 2 October 1997).

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Thus, whilst the Third Way vision of local accountability has, as if by a hidden hand, raised the imminent prospect of the Balkanization of the United Kingdom, the New Labour élite have demonstrated a studied indifference to the economic and political difficulties raised by the devolution agenda. As we have seen, Blair considers “absurd” the notion that the redescription of the relationship between the regions of the United Kingdom could release the genie of nationalism (Financial Times, 4 February 1999). Central to the politics of the Third Way is the assumption that devolution and greater accountability to Blair-approved minorities will somehow make Britain more competitive in the twenty-first century, whilst at the same time integrating it into the heart of a dynamic federal European entity. This modernization further assumes that the civil association that had evolved contingently since 1689 was no longer applicable to the needs of a modern global economy. Was this the case?

Conclusion: Globalization, Regionalism, and the Dismantling of the British Competition State Any examination of the causes and consequences of the current global economic and financial crisis, sparked by the fall of the Thai baht in June 1997, casts a disturbing light on fashionable theories concerning the relationship between globalization, regionalism, and democratization that inform so much of New Labour’s constitutional experimentation. The recent experience of Pacific Asia, the increasing sclerosis and the Korrupsi, Kollusi dan Nepotism that informs the operations of the European Commission in recently established Euroland (The Economist, 16 January 1999) indicates that the unfashionable territorial state remains far from irrelevant to the globalization process. Moreover, the state that adapts most effectively to the opportunities afforded by the rapid internationalization of financial markets is not the strong, bureaucratically driven developmental state of the former Asian miracle, once much admired by former Blair gurus like Paul Keating and Will Hutton. Such developmentalism at the state and regional levels in both Europe and Asia had lent itself to market-unfriendly bureaucracy and fiscal malfeasance, clearly apparent in the “corruption and mismanagement” that led to the resignation of the European Commission in January 1999 (The Economist, 16 January 1999). As Philip Cerny observes, “globalization as a political phenomenon basically means that the shaping of the playing field of politics is increasingly determined not within insulated units... globalization is a process of political structuration” (Cerny 1997, p. 253). In the European context, post-war welfare mechanisms became increasingly

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redundant for a globalization process that ultimately facilitated the flexibility and transparency of neoliberal competition states. By the early 1990s, the most effective competition states were fiscally transparent ones that enforced decisions which emerged from the world markets. Those Euroland states suffering from welfare overload and high rates of taxation failed to attract global market support or significant FDI. This was not the case with the United Kingdom which, as a consequence of neoliberal reforms, transformed itself into the most successful European competition state. The emerging functional relationship between flexible competition states and the internetted global financial order necessarily undermines the economic pertinence of bureaucratically overloaded supranational arrangements like Euroland or autonomous and bureaucratically dysfunctional regional arrangements like Wales or Scotland within it. Whatever else they are, regional arrangements are evidently not halfway houses on the way to a new international order. Rather, both at the supranational and the regional levels, they constitute sclerotic obstructions to the free flow of capital and ideas, and hinder the efficient performance and market transparency of marketized states. A further casualty of the global financial crisis is the blind faith in the necessity of a democratic or democratizing end of history. Instead, greater insistence on local accountability in Europe has had three anti-competitive outcomes: firstly, it has created a new tier of bureaucracy accountable to cronyist local interests in both Scotland and Wales, rendering those areas less attractive to FDI; secondly, it has created through fashionable electoral mechanisms largely ungovernable regions; and thirdly, it evokes the anxious search for local identity in an attempt to escape the bland uniformity of a global or regional consumer culture. As we know, “all around the world its Mac time now.” Benjamin Barber has observed that this McWorld order is Janus-faced and offers the blandishments and deracination of McWorld, which in turn promotes the neurotic drive into the primordialist certainties of Jihad (Barber 1996, p. 7). In Wales and Scotland, then, the much vaunted accountablity of the Third Way merely creates uncompetitive bureaucratic overload, and unleashes the search for economically unproductive, but neurotically reassuring closed communities of gemeinschaft. To return to our initial question, it is quite clear that the United Kingdom succeeded as a political and economic unit precisely because it was a civil association regulated by law rather than an enterprise association driven by the desire to create an integrated and homogenized nation. Such a civil association proved uniquely adaptable to the requirements of modernity. Indeed, it was responsible for inventing it. Its singular virtue consisted in its pluralism

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and openness rather than its search for a monocultural identity and a closed society. Its resilience and legitimacy enabled it to survive the loss of Empire and two world wars and reinvent itself as a globally effective competitive state through the radical economic reform programme of the 1980s. Disturbingly, Blairism by attempting to modernize British institutions has in fact done nothing of the sort. It has, rather, undermined the effectiveness of the competition state by introducing vast tracts of bureaucracy across an already overgoverned landscape. It has also introduced an entirely contingent nationalism into a pluralistic political arrangement which had, until the late twentieth century, escaped its more perverse manifestations. With folk singers and romantic poets, rather than businessmen and economically focused quangos deciding the economic destinies of Wales and Scotland, the prospects for those regions in the next century become increasingly bleak. Meanwhile, the inexorable creation of an English nationalism leads to the unedifying prospect of a British Balkanization within an increasingly sclerotic and corrupt Europe des Regions. The irony is that the creation of this new nationalism is entirely contingent, undermines economic efficiency, and is driven by the mistaken assumption that somehow regional arrangements informed by greater political accountability induce greater economic efficiency and political legitimacy.

References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991. Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution. London: Fonatana, 1968 Barber, B Jihad versus Macworld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Shaping the World. New York: Ballantine, 1996 Barker, R. Political Ideas in Modern Britain In and After the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, 1997. Barnett, Anthony. “Anthony Giddens’ Third Way”. Times Literary Supplement, 26 March 1999. Black, J. The Politics of Britain, 1688–1800. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993. Cerney, P. “Paradoxes of the Competiton State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization”. Government and Opposition 32, no. 2 (1997). Colley, Linda. Britons Forging the Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Frankel, B. “Beyond Labourism and Socialism: How the Australian Labor Party Developed the Model of New Labour”. New Left Review 1 (1997). Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1983.

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. Nationalisms. London: Phoenix, 1997. Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity, 1998. R.Grew, ed. Crises and Political Development in Europe and the United States. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Hazell, Robert, ed. Constitutional Futures. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Hutton, Will. The State We’re In. London: Viking, 1995. Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990. Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger, ed. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Jones, Bill, ed. Politics UK. London: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Lipsett, S.M. “The Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”. American Political Science Review 53 (1959). Lukes, S. “Left Down the Middle”. Times Literary Supplement, 25 September 1998. Macmurray, J. Freedom in the Modern World. London: Faber,1944. Mill, J.S. Considerations on Representative Government. Chicago: Gateway, 1961. Morgan, P. “From a Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past”. In The Invention of Tradition, edited by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Morrill, J.G., ed. The British Problem 1534–1707. State Building in the Atlantic Archipelago. London: Macmillan,1998. Nairn, Tom. Nationalism. London: Verso, 1997. Oakeshott, M. On Human Conduct. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. Phillips, Anne. Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993. Russell, Conrad. The Causes of the English Civil War. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1990. Starkey, David. “The Death of England”. Times Magazine, 20 April 1996. Welsh Development Authority (WDA). Monthly Economic Overview. Cardiff: WDA,1998.

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m 10 n Nationalities, Nationalism, and Globalization: The Case of China

CHANG PAO-MIN

Nationalism and globalism are two mutually contradictory terms and incompatible goals. To emphasize one is to demean the other. Yet ironically enough, they also represent two phenomena coexisting in the contemporary world. Indeed, most countries have been consciously striving for the realization of both objectives and simultaneously. This is perhaps precisely the new dilemma or paradox confronting us at the turn of the century. Indeed, in an age of high technology and instant communication, which recognizes no national borders, nationalism loses much of its original appeal and value. In a world of ever-growing volume of international flow of both people and goods, and in view of the towering size of multinational corporations and the accelerating rate of privatization of world assets, national consciousness has also become practically irrelevant. But this is also a time when neither God nor Karl Marx inspires much awe or generates any appeal to the human world, when global competition for resources and markets become increasingly tense and ugly, and when uneven economic development has widened, rather than narrowed, the gap between the advanced and the backward nations, rendering many nations increasingly vulnerable and insecure. As a result, national identity, national awareness, and national dignity also appears to gain new currency, both for the power-hungry or security-conscious politicians and for the ideal-thirsty or economically deprived masses of the common people. 258

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The case of China is a unique one for a number of reasons. First, as a nation, China has been in existence perhaps longer than any other country in the world. Yet nationalism in its territorial and political sense is a new phenomenon emerging only in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, owing to the absence of a common religion and a rigid class structure, the Chinese nation has always been a loose community bound more by a common way of life than by any Messianic appeal. In fact, both “China” and “Chinese” are vague terms, the former referring more to a geographical area and a cultural phenomenon than to a territorial state, and the latter also more to a cultural than to a political group. Moreover, Chinese perspectives on “nation” and “state” have always had global connotations. The inherent tension and ambiguity between “nation” and “state”, and between “nation” and the world has, therefore, caused confusion among the Chinese at a time of rapid globalization, leading from time to time to conflicting and contradictory behaviour in China’s international conduct. Whereas globalization does present China an opportunity to advance its moral ideals, it is certainly a challenge to its newly born and still vulnerable political nationalism. What follows is a modest attempt to present some of the basic facts about nationalities in China, to make some preliminary observations on Chinese perspectives on nationalism, and to survey the development of modern Chinese nationalism together with its problems.

National Composition in China Like so many other countries in the world, China is a multiracial, multinational, and multi-ethnic country. According to most recent official statistics, there are a total of 56 nationalities, but their sizes vary a great deal, the largest being the Han nationality, or simply the Han Chinese, making up as much as 92 per cent of China’s population. The next four largest nationalities are, in descending order, Zhuang, Man (Manchu), Hui, and Miao, making up 1.38 per cent, 0.87 per cent, 0.76 per cent, and 0.65 per cent, respectively, of the total population. But these four are still a far cry from the Han Chinese in numbers and, like all the rest, are classified as “minority nationalities” in China (Table 1). It is noteworthy that the often mentioned Mongolians and the Tibetans rank only the eighth and ninth among the minority groups. The following is a list of China’s principal nationalities:

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Chang Pao-min TABLE 1 Principal National Groups in China (1990 census data*) Name Han (Chinese) Zhuang Manchu Hui Miao Uygur (Uigur) Yi Tujia Mongolian Tibetan Bouyei Dong Yao Korean Bai Hani Li Kazakh Dai She Lisu Others Unknown Total

Number

%

1,039,187,548 15,555,820 9,846,776 8,612,001 7,383,622 7,207,024 6,578,524 5,279,525 4,802,407 4,593,072 2,548,294 2,508,624 2,137,033 1,923,361 1,598,052 1,254,800 1,112,498 1,110,758 1,025,402 634,700 574,589 3,838,337 752,347

91.92 1.38 0.87 0.76 0.65 0.64 0.58 0.51 0.42 0.41 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.34 0.07

11,30,510,638

100.0

* New data on the population of minority nationalities are not available, but should affect the percentage rates only marginally. Source: Europa Worldbook 1998 (New York: Europa Publications Limited, 1998), p.896.

However, the numerical predominance of the Han Chinese is contrasted sharply by the relatively small geographical area they habitually reside, namely, only about 30–40 per cent of China’s land territory, compared with nearly 70 per cent for all the minority nationalities. Moreover, the Han Chinese are found mainly in the northeast and coastal regions, whereas the minority nationalities are

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concentrated in the border regions in the north, the west, and the southwest, thereby flanking the Chinese from three sides. But the distribution pattern of the minority nationalities is far from uniform. Most of them, including the larger ones such as the Chuang, the Mongolians, the Uigurs, and the Tibetans, and the smallest ones such as the Koreans, the Russians, and the Thais, occupy relatively compact and clearly identifiable areas. Some live scattered among other groups, while still others until recently led nomadic or semi-nomadic lives. Nevertheless, to a large extent, the geographical distribution of the 55 minority nationalities is reflected in the administrative structure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which includes five province-status “autonomous regions” stretching all the way from Inner Mongolia in the northeast to Guangxi in the southwest. Among the five autonomous regions, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet are also the largest territorial units in China, with each embracing 12–17 per cent of China’s land territory (Table 2). Moreover, the Mongolians, the Tibetans, and the Uigurs in Xinjiang are all ethnically and racially related to inhabitants beyond China’s state boundary, thereby constituting a potential but longstanding threat to China’s political integrity and national unity. But in nearly half of the regular provinces traditionally inhabited by the Han Chinese, there are also minority groups given the status of “autonomous district” (zhou), “autonomous county” (xian), or “autonomous rural area” (xiang). Such large provinces like Yunnan, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Guizhou are all multinational Chinese provinces. They represent more or less meeting points between, and melting pots of, the Han Chinese and non-Han cultures. As of 1999, there are, in addition to the five autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures (zhou), 117 autonomous counties, and 1,517 autonomous rural areas, pointing to a considerably complicated situation.1 Two national groups, nevertheless, deserve special mention since the reason for their being classified as “nationalities” is somewhat at variance with the criteria given above, namely, the Hui and the Manchus. The Hui nationality, which literally means “Muslims”, appears to be based largely on religious grounds, as they are believers of Islam. Descendants of Arab traders and soldiers of the eighth century, today the Hui are physically indistinguishable from the Han Chinese and also speak only Chinese. They are found scattered widely in China proper in addition to being concentrated in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The Manchus are descended from the Manchus who conquered China in 1644. Although representing the second largest minority nationality in China, with a population close to 10 million, the Manchus are classified

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Chang Pao-min TABLE 2 Autonomous Regions in China

Name

Area( sq.km.)

%

Population

Density

Xinjiang Uygur Tibet Inner Mongolia Guangxi Zhuang Ningxia Hui

1,600,000 1,228,000 1,183,000 236,000 66,000

16.7 12.8 12.4 2.5 0.7

16,890,000 2,440,000 23,070,000 45,890,000 5,210,000

11 2 20 194 79

Total All China

4,313,000 9,571,000

45.1 100.0

93,500,000 1,212,950,000

22 127

Source: Europa World Book (1998), pp. 896–97.

as a “nationality” merely because of their common group descent. In fact, owing to their original small numbers, the Manchus have become completely sinicized after nearly 300 years of Manchu rule in China. And, like the Hui, they are scattered in different parts of China, speak only Han Chinese, and are physically indistinguishable from the Han. In sharp contrast, Han Chinese settlement in Manchuria has been most phenomenal and successful. Originally the homeland of the Manchus but scantly populated, this vast agricultural land mass was opened to Chinese immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century, and has attracted a continuous stream of Chinese settlers ever since, with the result that by the mid-twentieth century, both the land and the indigenous people had become thoroughly sinicized. To be sure, Han Chinese migrants have also settled in other autonomous border regions as a policy of the post-1949 Chinese government, particularly in such strategically important areas as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, all of which are huge in size but sparsely populated, and are contiguous with potentially hostile nations. However, the Han Chinese have remained a minority in all the five autonomous regions, with relatively few intermarriages for cultural reasons. It is important to note that the national composition in China is mostly “alien” in origin. Historically, the Chinese nation was for centuries confined to areas inhabited by the Han Chinese. Even the southward expansion of the Han Chinese culture after the Sung dynasty in the eleventh century was a gradual and evolutionary process. The current geographical extent of China has been the result of military expansion executed by the Manchus in the seventeenth century, which only for the second time in Chinese history extended China’s territory officially

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into the non-Chinese area. The Manchus, because of their small numbers, were never able to absorb the vast Han population into their culture, let alone other minority nationalities. On the contrary, the Manchus were themselves thoroughly assimilated into the Han Chinese culture by the middle of the eighteenth century, in spite of their initial attempt to insulate themselves from Han influence. On the other hand, the Han Chinese were reluctant to migrate to the newly acquired border regions because of the harsh topography and forbidding climate conditions. As the Chinese Empire under the Qing court went through its new round of dynastical decline, and was torn by civil unrest and external aggression from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, neither the government nor the people of China proper were able to extend their influence into the border regions. The first real attempt at colonization in, and effective control of, the border regions and minority nationalities was made only after 1949 with the establishment of the communist regime in China. One outstanding characteristic of almost all the nationalities in China is their racial similarities. There are no black, or Malay, or Indian races. The Caucasian stock is confined to the tiny Russian nationality, and the mixed Caucasian groups with visible non-Chinese features are found only in Xinjiang among the Uigurs and the Kazakhs. Their total numbers are small anyway. Although the Tibetans and other minority nationalities in the southwest may have a darker skin, their facial features are similar to the Chinese. Perhaps the deeper gap separating the Han Chinese and the minority groups is linguistic and religious, as the non-Han nationalities speak in multi-syllabic languages, and twenty-one of them, including all the major nationalities, also have their own scripts. But some of the scripts, like the Manchu script, have long fallen into disuse. Others are also dying out because of the steadily growing Han influence. As for religious differences, it is worth noting that the two major belief systems among the minority nationalities, namely, Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in China are either inward-looking or lack the Messianic spirit characteristic of other religions in other parts of the world. All the other minority groups are animistic in their worship habits, and highly parochial in their religious orientations. Consequently, at least in modern history, there has been relatively little tension and few conflicts among nationalities on religious grounds. On the other hand, the Han Chinese are non-religious and make peace easily with all major religions. All these are at least positive features conducive to interracial and inter-ethnic harmony and even integration. But different spoken languages, customs, and life-styles continue to keep all the nationalities

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apart. Among all the minority groups, the Tibetans are most entrenched in their religion and language, thereby constituting the single biggest barrier to national integration. No wonder that the Chinese Government has been particularly sensitive to any sign of undesirable developments in Tibet. Moreover, by virtue of sheer size, the Han Chinese are not a completely homogeneous nationality themselves, but are divided by their spoken languages into at least three dozen ethnic groups, with each displaying a strong sense of self-awareness. This is especially true in southern China. In particular, the dialects of the coastal provinces, from Jiangsu to Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan are mutually unintelligible, with differences close to those distinguishing the European national languages (Table 3). The Han Chinese inhabiting the north of the Yangtze River, customarily referred to as the “northerners”, are also generally taller, and rely mainly on wheat and corn as their staple food, whereas the “southerners” are shorter in stature and are rice eaters. But these are conditioned by geography and climate conditions more than by design, and such differences have been diminishing in recent decades. The Han Chinese can also be grouped into Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and so forth. But the actual numbers of subscribers to these religions are insignificant. Almost all of them have continued to practise ancestor worship, and Han Chinese festivals are still honoured universally by all Chinese groups.

TABLE 3 Principal Dialect Groups of the Han Chinese Dialect Group

Geographical Location

Shanghai Ningbo Fuzhou Xiamen Chaozhou Hakka Guangzhou Hainan

Shanghai Zejiang Northern Fujian Southern Fujian Eastern Guangdong Middle east of Guangdong Central and Western Guangdong Hainan

Source: Data compiled from Zhongguo ziran ditu ji [The Physical Atlas of China] (Beijing: Ditu chuban she, 1998).

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All the Han Chinese are, moreover, bound by one common written language, which has been in use for at least 2,000 years, and which is also the single most conspicuous national marker of the Han Chinese. Being the most important reservoir of culture, the script has been used to record the activities of all the Han Chinese regardless of their linguistic habits. In fact, owing to the early invention of the Chinese script, all the dialects of the Han Chinese have come to display the common feature of being monosyllabic, with one sound representing one meaning and convertible into one character. The official adoption and propagation of the so-called “court language” (guan hua) as the lingua franca for all ethnic groups since the eleventh century and its ensuing centuries-old interaction with the Chinese script has had a mutually enriching effect and has also fertilized local dialects across China. What is less obvious but perhaps more important, common ideas and values have been transmitted through the script into all ethnic groups of the Han Chinese, thereby moulding them gradually into one common culture. By coincidence rather than by design, the Nationalist government as early as 1912, upon the establishment of the Republic and the communist regime in 1950, both launched a concerted and vigorous effort to unify the spoken language by promoting the use of Mandarin. The Nationalist Government persisted in the same policy after its retreat to Taiwan. As a result, by the 1990s, all Han Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and even the minority nationalities in the border regions were conversant in Mandarin, thereby further solidifying the cultural homogeneity of the Han Chinese. Precisely because of the high degree of cultural homogeneity among the Han Chinese in general, and the absence of religious differences among all the ethnic groups in particular, dissident or protest movements in Chinese history have been almost invariably economically and politically motivated, rather than ethnically or religiously oriented. That is, they have been either based on pragmatic needs, having to do with physical survival, or rooted in a naked struggle for supreme power. As such, they usually left no lasting animosities between the contesting groups, however bloody such movements might have been. Nevertheless, the cultural unity of the Han Chinese has been significantly compromised by the political division between mainland China and Taiwan since 1949, and the embryonic “Taiwanese nationalism” emerging since the mid-1980s. Although 98.5 per cent of the Taiwanese population are by all criteria Han Chinese and have inherited their mother tongue from southern Fujian and use the same Chinese script, because of a distinct socio-political experience, the Chinese in Taiwan have developed a separate identity, which has in turn

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been deliberately promoted by the leadership since the early 1990s, in order to preserve its separate political existence from mainland China. So far, this new type of nationalism has been branded as sheer “separatism” and vehemently attacked by the Chinese Government in Beijing. Culturally speaking, there is indeed hardly any visible uniqueness that the Taiwanese could claim to be their own, except for the aborigine culture which is after all non-Chinese and embraces only 1.5 per cent of Taiwan’s 21 million people. But politically, the appearance of “Taiwanese nationalism” represents a new force that could challenge the long-standing claim of all Chinese regimes that China is one nation, past, present, or future.

Chinese Perspectives on Nation, State, and the World Whereas the meaning of nationalities is quite clear-cut, the term “nationalism” has been used more loosely and could mean a variety of things. In this essay, only two general dimensions of the concept will be discussed, namely, cultural and political. Nationalism in its cultural dimension refers to a common sense of identity based upon a common culture. Nationalism in its political dimension refers to a common sense of identity based upon a common political consensus and a common political destiny. For the purpose of analysis, the first may be conveniently referred to as cultural nationalism, and the second, political nationalism. Perhaps the single most outstanding feature of nationalism in China is that it is much more cultural than political — that is, the Chinese display a strong sense of cultural awareness but a weak sense of political identity. In fact, “China” and “Chinese” are ambiguous terms precisely because they have often been used to refer, before anything else, to a cultural phenomenon or a group of people bound by the Chinese language, Chinese customs, Chinese values, and Chinese way of life, rather than to a territorial state or its citizens. To be “Chinese” or part of “China” in the eyes and minds of the Chinese is always, first of all, to be included in this cultural phenomenon and to accept its systems of values and way of life, rather than to have a special bond to a territorial state or to be loyal to a specific political regime in China. Although this is indeed the original meaning of nation or nationality from which the term “nationalism” derives, its political dimension, as represented more aptly by the word “state”, which has overridden its cultural counterpart in the modern West, has never struck root in the Chinese soil. In other words, if there is usually no difficulty for a Chinese to admit his cultural

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identity or roots, he is often more ambivalent when it comes to locating his political loyalty or choosing a political regime to identify with. In this context, perhaps it cannot be overemphasized that the very terms “China” or “Chinese” were first coined by Westerners, not invented by the Chinese themselves. Both terms apparently originated from the first Chinese dynasty that unified China, namely, Chin. But they were not used by the Chinese until the nineteenth century. This inevitably has rendered the usages of these terms more problematic. In fact, the Chinese for centuries had called themselves Han ren (meaning “Han people”, originating from the second Chinese dynasty, Han), and referred to their country as zhong yuan (meaning “central lands”) or hua xia (meaning “brilliant or prosperous xia, with xia referring to the earliest recorded Chinese dynasty and also the model dynasty). Zhong yuan and hua xia are clearly vague in their political or territorial implications. Neither was the name of any Chinese dynasty but only implied a culturally advanced country that could be easily marked apart from all the less cultured, barbarian lands, or peoples (yi di). Similarly, the term “Han” has strong cultural and sociological connotations, as it is closely associated with a specific nationality that can be distinguished from all the other ones. Moreover, it does not refer to the subjects or citizens of a particular dynasty, but applies to all residents of all ages in cultural China. Even after the Chinese accepted the usages of “China” (zhong guo) and “Chinese” (zhong guo ren) in the late nineteenth century, with the corresponding Chinese characters meaning “state” (guo) rather than “nationality” (min zu), thereby implying political not cultural ties, they have continued to favour the cultural, rather than political, yardsticks for necessary measurements and analysis. At least, the Chinese remain ambivalent in their interpretation of the two terms. Hence, the continuing ambiguity of the meaning of “China” and “Chinese”. The reasons for the early development of cultural awareness among the Chinese, but not political nationalism in China, are many. Perhaps the most obvious one is that China as a nation is a product of many centuries of evolutionary change that had begun long before the modern age of nationalism appeared in Europe. This long process of evolution also took place more or less in an isolated environment, with relatively little input or interference from other nations. Moreover, it was accomplished mainly through gradual cultural assimilation, rather than by abrupt military conquest. Starting with a common script, uniform standards of measurement, and an identical wheel distance of all vehicles, a common set of customs and values gradually emerged to become the Chinese way of life, with which all Chinese came to identify. In fact, over the ages China has developed an independent, highly sophisticated,

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and self-sufficient civilization that embraces all realms of human activities (that is, food, dress, language, literature, fine arts, medicine, architecture, moral and political philosophy, and system of government, and so forth.) China, therefore, is actually “a civilization that pretends to be a nation”, as one American scholar aptly put it. As such, “China” cannot be readily confined to a territorial state with clearly demarcated boundaries. Nor can the “Chinese” be easily required to identify their focus of political loyalty. To be part of China is to be included in an all-encompassing but self-contained world in itself. To be “Chinese” is to be involved in or concerned with the activities in that world. The early blossoming of cultural nationalism in China, to be sure, also has to do with the early maturing of the Chinese nation, which did mark China apart from all the neighbouring nations and peoples. In other words, China was for centuries simply much more advanced culturally, economically, and politically than all the surrounding known nations or peoples. As such, China naturally became the centre of the world, and the absence of sustained competition from equally developed nations around China has weakened the political awareness of all Chinese, and consequently, also their sense of political loyalty. At a time of technological underdevelopment and poor international communication, when national or racial groups around China were either nomadic or tribal, there was certainly no need nor possibility to demarcate clearly the boundaries between China and other nations. Instead, the distinction between China and other parts of the world, or between Chinese and foreigners, could only be cultural rather than territorial or political. Different races of the world were indeed graded and ranked by their cultural proximity to the Chinese nation. For the Chinese, therefore, political awareness was already inherent in cultural identity and intertwined with the latter. As China was the only well organized political entity in Asia for centuries, it was also unthinkable for the Chinese to abandon China and shift their loyalty to another political regime. Even if the alternative had existed, the choice would have been one between civility and barbarity. In a similar manner and to a similar degree, a non-competitive political environment also persisted within China. Here, unlike Western Europe which broke up into territorial units of similar size and developmental stage following the demise of the Holy Roman Empire, and were entangled in nearly four centuries of intense political rivalry and military conflict right up to the twentieth century, China for two thousand years has been a politically unified entity ruled from one single centre of power. Since spatially, there was only one unified China that was coterminous with the Chinese civilization, cultural identity was

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indistinguishable from political identity. The frequent rise and fall of dynasties in Chinese history, which is also a unique feature, further implied that loyalty to a specific political regime was both unnecessary and meaningless for the Chinese in the long run. Indeed, as the old Chinese sayings go: “Every new dynasty recruits its new team of ministers”, and “When the leader passes away, his policies also go with him”. Rather than committed to any specific political regime or ruler, the Chinese traditionally took a highly pragmatic stand on the question of political loyalty and had a long view of history. All this has tended to promote cultural rather than political nationalism. After all, the sheer size and large population of the country and the thinly spread fleet of government officials usually produced a situation in which “Heaven is high above and the emperor far away”, thereby making the cultivation of a strong political consciousness a massive social engineering task that was both difficult and unnecessary. The combined effects of all the above factors have also produced another most unique feature of the Chinese civilization that has, in turn, sustained the cultural dimension of Chinese nationalism and impeded the development of political nationalism in China, namely, a cosmopolitan orientation and a moralistic approach towards the affairs of man and state. In other words, Chinese nationalism, as outlined above, actually contains elements of globalism, thereby further complicating the whole issue of cultural versus political nationalism, and also rendering the distinction between “nation” (or “state”) and “world” ambiguous. Indeed, the traditional Chinese perception of the world has always been global and even cosmopolitan, not national or “inter”-”national”. The Chinese Empire was customarily referred to as tian xia, literally meaning “all under heaven”, and the Chinese emperor was habitually known as tian zi, meaning “son of heaven”. The imperial dynasty was addressed as tian chao, meaning “heavenly dynasty”, and the ordinary citizens, tian chao zi min, meaning “subjects of the heavenly dynasty”. China, of course, was for ages believed to occupy the central position of the entire globe, if not indeed the entire universe. Hence, there was no need to inculcate a specific sense of political identity. Hence also the usage of zhong guo or “Middle Kingdom” even after the Chinese discovered the existence of the West and recognized the extent of the world in the nineteenth century. In fact, the word guo (meaning “state”) was for centuries used in China to refer to geographically limited and politically transitory entities perpetually competing for the tian ming (mandate of heaven). The very existence of guo also implied a divided globe which was seen as a passing phenomenon. Hence, the well-known Chinese saying: “The world (tian xia) will be divided after prolonged unity, and will be reunited after

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prolonged division”. In other words, the Chinese somehow took it for granted that the entire world (or at least the “Chinese world”) could be and should be united, but at the same time also recognized the presence of recurrent and even resilient divisive forces. It was also a conflict between the ideal — unity, and the reality — division, a natural phenomenon that could not be avoided. At any rate, guo, meaning “state”, was not a unit worthy of complete or lasting Chinese allegiance. And for centuries, the educated Chinese were taught to “take up responsibility for all affairs under heaven” (yi tian xia wei ji ren), and “to worry about problems before all others under heaven do, and to enjoy life only after all others under heaven do” (xian tian xia zhi you er you, hou tian xia zhi le er le). Clearly, for the Chinese, the boundary between nation or state on the one hand, and the world on the other, was never sacrosanct, and the distance never that far. Nevertheless, contrary to the views of many Western scholars, the traditional Chinese perception of the world was not so much politically self-centred as culturally discriminative and morally hierarchical. In other words, all races and nations, like all men, were to be judged and ranked by the level of culture or civility they had attained, rather than by their actual size, strength, or possessions. Whereas the concept and scope of tian xia is an all-encompassing one, the mandate of heaven was to be won and preserved not by superior might, military conquest, brutal force, or involuntary submission, but by superior culture, moral persuasion, exemplary conduct, and voluntary assimilation. In fact, this was also the Chinese experience. The Chinese Empire as the centre of civilization was open to all nations and all races that were prepared by their own choice to be associated with, and socialized into, Chinese culture and way of life. Hence, the well-known Confucian motto: “Forced submission is no genuine submission; virtuous conduct ensures genuine submission”. The Confucian classics contain numerous such admonitions against the use of brutal force for political purposes, a recourse which was believed to be in itself a testimony to deficient moral appeal and absence of good government, and which, therefore, would produce no lasting effects and would eventually lead to the downfall of all power-holders. Confucian teachings also abound in appeals to all rulers for humane and benevolent government and exemplary conduct as the rightful and also the most economic way of ruling and enlarging small kingdoms, and eventually unifying “all under heaven”.2 Now the very realization of the superiority of moral persuasion to forced submission, and the practice of such a principle, was believed not only to serve a most useful political purpose, but also to mark a superior man apart from an inferior man, a civilized person from a

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barbarian, and a cultured race or nation from all the uncultured ones. Since the inferior, the barbarian, and the uncultured tended to be naturally attracted to, assimilated into, and eventually led by, the superior, the civilized, and the cultured, all men and all nations should strive to become cultured and civilized. The use of force, in particular, was to be considered only as a last resort, and only for a rightful moral purpose. But even in the conduct of war, the best strategy was, as the legendary Sun Tzu put it, to disarm the enemy psychologically, whereas the worst was to launch an actual attack. And until the minds and hearts of the people (or nations) were won over, the war was not really over. Indeed, to the Chinese, the truly mighty are those men or nations which know how to restrain their might, not to use it. And heroism is always associated with the courage and ability to resist the mighty, whereas the height of cowardice always refers to the strong intimidating the weak, or the many bullying the few. Indeed, the Chinese character wu (might), is a combination of two characters, zhi (stop) and ge (fighting).3 This essentially culturalistic, moralistic, and non-military approach of the Chinese to the affairs of man and state, therefore, further blurs the boundaries between the state and the world. Indeed, by almost negating the moral value and practical utility of physical strength and military might, the Chinese have brushed aside the single most important ingredient and concrete manifestation of modern statehood, and for that matter, modern nationalism. The actual historical experience of China in both domestic and external affairs further tends to reinforce the Chinese way of thinking. It is now a well-known fact that the Chinese Empire was managed by a civilian bureaucracy based upon meritocracy, and there was no large standing army during peace time. Dynasties rose and fell often not because of their military strength or weakness, but because of their ability or inability to resolve the problems of the people. In fact, the soldier was not only kept out of politics, but also downgraded to the very bottom of the social hierarchy, even lower than the merchant. China and the Chinese, to be sure, were superior to the surrounding world at least up to the end of the nineteenth century, but this was by virtue of their well developed institutions and superior cultural heritage, not because of China’s superior military might. Other nations and races were attracted to China because of the intrinsic appeals of China, not because of any colonizing effort it had made. In fact, the Chinese Empire, particularly under the Han Chinese rulers, rarely launched wars of aggression against its neighbours and almost never dispatched a military expedition on its own initiative. The only large-scale maritime expedition launched by a Chinese dynasty, namely, the Ming in the early fifteenth century, was

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not even externally targeted, and led to no military occupation or colonization of any territories overseas. The entire tributary system that governed China’s external relations and was so often claimed by Western scholars to be unequal in favour of China, was based on voluntary choice on the part of the vassal states rather than imposed upon the latter. It was certainly predominantly cultural rather than military or political in connotation. What is more, although the centuries-old presumption was that Chinese culture was superior to the neighbouring barbarian cultures, the logic of the mandate of heaven implied that any foreign ruler that qualified to be the son of heaven would be equally acceptable to the Chinese. Hence, the not infrequent phenomenon of “diarchy” in Chinese history. The Manchus actually produced the second longest dynasty in Chinese history precisely because they brought peace and order to a chaotic China and were also quickly assimilated into Chinese culture. By contrast, the Mongols had one of the shortest reigns mainly because they relied almost exclusively on force to rule China, thereby quickly losing the mandate of heaven. Taiwan under Japanese rule, and Hong Kong under British rule merely presented the most recent examples. In both cases, the co-operation between the colonizers and the colonized was near perfect, and the Chinese residents developed a remarkable sense of trust in, and identity with, their colonizers. In other words, China could and did lose the mandate of heaven even in its own perceived universe and according to Chinese rules of the game. To be sure, China ought to strive for it and could regain such a coveted status with sincere efforts and hard work, but China could also lose it again. As a corollary of this universalistic, moralistic, and non-military view deeply rooted in Chinese history, the Chinese traditionally had a relatively weak sense of nation or nationalism, much less in their modern, political sense. Because of their universalistic and even cosmopolitan orientation, the Chinese have always been ambivalent in their attitude towards the boundaries of nation or state, as well as towards territorial issues. They have also ventured beyond the nation and the state more readily than any other people, as reflected in the consistently large volume of Chinese emigrants. Indeed, for the Chinese, political boundaries are somewhat elastic and changeable according to the performance of individual governments. Because of their culturalistic interpretation of the nation and the state, the Chinese have been most pragmatic in their political attitude, often to the extent of readily shifting their loyalty from nation to nation, and from regime to regime. And because of their moralistic approach towards the affairs of states, the Chinese have been much less sensitive to international power politics,

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particularly with regard to the art of balancing acts, and to the utility of military might. All these national traits apply to both the ruling and the ruled. They have not only impeded the development of political nationalism in China, but have also cost the Chinese state dearly in their encounter with the West. As will be shown later in this essay, these national traits have continued to cause problems to China in the 1990s, both internally and externally. But that is not all. As a result of the unique characteristics of the Chinese perception of nation and the world, the resulting ambiguity between the two concepts, and the high-sounding moral principles or ideals the Chinese view embodies, concepts and habits of loyalty to the Chinese state as such, or the emperor in particular, cannot be taken for granted but needs to be actively inculcated. This process of politicization has been done usually through an energetic and sustained programme of moral and political education in order to take root. However, two unique institutional features have rendered the task of nation-building all the more difficult. One has been the persistent absence of a common God or national church that could play a politically unifying force or at least serve as a source of inspiration for concerted public actions or dedicated mass movements. The other was the early demise of a system of graded aristocracy that could supply the Chinese with a ready symbol of leadership or target for identification, and ensure a high degree of social order and hierarchy that is conducive to political mobilization. The periodic rise and fall of dynasties and the replaceability of the emperor, both in theory and in practice, have certainly rendered the legitimacy of all political regimes equally vulnerable. The vast expanse of the Chinese Empire, functioning in an ethnically diverse but technologically backward society, has tended to weaken further the Chinese sense of national identity and national awareness, and confining it more or less to the educated upper levels of Chinese society. For all these reasons, beneath the universalistic outlook of the Chinese and all the noble principles and moral arguments associated with it, one not infrequently finds the simmering and even prevalence of their antitheses, namely, parochialism, localism, familism, and self-serving individualism, all of which are also intrinsic to Chinese society and culture, and are barely submerged in Chinese thinking. Indeed, with no church to go nor God to pray to, no inherited loyalty to any political regime or ruler, and not even the habit of associating with people outside the blood relations as in a country with a feudal tradition, the family has always been the centre of Chinese life, and pragmatism, the rule of thumb in almost every undertaking of the Chinese. The family, in particular, is not only the most important economic and social unit in

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Chinese society, but also constitutes the only source of spiritual support and the only emotional haven for all Chinese. No wonder that even after nation, meaning “state” (guo jia) has become a daily term throughout the twentieth century, it is still a combination of two terms, namely “state” and “family”, a combination that could mean “a nation of families” or “the nation as a family”, or even “a nation ruled by a family”. No wonder too that some form and degree of political and moral education has always been central to the domestic policies of all regimes in Chinese history, if only to ensure their own survival. No wonder also that the idea of Chinese nationalism in the modern sense has had to be intensely propagated by all governments in post-imperial China, often to the point of making it sacrosanct, in order to be effective. And in this process, demigods have had to be created and deification of living figures promoted, in order to command the allegiance of the masses. But if and when all such efforts at acculturation or politicization should lose its vigour or steam, or in the absence of a sustained and pervasive programme of moral education, or simply in times of economic crises, social unrest, or political turmoil, the opposites of nationalism would quickly burst into the open and even spread like wild-fire, turning Chinese society into a chaotic mess. A weak sense of nationalism and the distant ideal of globalism, or rather being both family-centred and cosmopolitan in orientation, have also combined to produce often apparently contradictory behaviour patterns among the Chinese, no matter where they are found. Hence, the Chinese have only grand visions but no religious zeal to pursue them. They can be politically aroused to a point of fanaticism, yet all political movements with Messianic goals can also lose steam overnight or instantaneously. Indeed, frequently expressed determination for national undertakings and occasional outpourings of patriotic feelings are often not followed by concerted action, and unity for any common cause is almost always undermined by considerations of family and individual self-interests, and marred by disputes over means and strategies. Hence, the political disunity characteristic of all Chinese communities found anywhere. The Chinese have also been among the most enthusiastic immigrants to Western countries and the most eager subscribers to Western culture, and yet at the same time they are perhaps also the most Chinese or nationalistic in their political orientations, forever concerned with the affairs and destiny of their motherland. Hence, the vehement claim of all Hong Kong residents to be Chinese has been coupled by their demonstrated unwillingness to return to “the embrace of the Motherland”.

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All these traits also mean that China as a modern nation-state faces perennial challenges from both sub-national and supranational elements. Together they constitute powerful centrifugal forces that could easily divide the Chinese and tear the Chinese state into pieces. The development of the modern Chinese state and Chinese nationalism, therefore, is nothing less than settling down on the golden mean, by controlling one force while resisting the other. But even the government may not be always aware of the confused state of mind in which it operates.

The Rise of Modern Chinese Nationalism To argue that nationalism in its political sense has never existed in Chinese history is too far-fetched. As one of the oldest and also largest territorial states in human history, with relatively identifiable administrative boundaries and a complex but unified structure of civil service, the Chinese have always been clearly aware of the presence and extent of state power, except that this state is so huge that it was once believed to be coterminous with the civilized world, if not indeed the entire known universe. By the same token, service to the Chinese state was service rendered to mankind or at least to the civilized portions of it. Identification with the Chinese state was identification with the civilized, that is, the Chinese way of life, the Chinese system of government, and Chinese rules of the political game. And loyalty to the Chinese Emperor meant the recognition and acceptance of his mandate of heaven. In sum, due to the early maturing of Chinese civilization and its prolonged isolation from modern Europe with all its socio-political movements, the cultural and political aspects of Chinese nationalism were for centuries intertwined and indistinguishable. In an age of technological underdevelopment and in the absence of the modern nation-state and modern nationalism, the sense of political identity prevailing among all Chinese was already quite advanced and remarkable. Indeed, it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the Chinese have been more politically conscious of their state and for a longer period of time than peoples in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, Chinese nationalism in the modern and contemporary Western sense, with its emphasis on a clearly defined and delimited territorial state distinct from all other states, and a clear, solid bond between government and citizens with mutual obligations, has been a relatively new phenomenon, emerging only in the second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, nationalism has taken a new political meaning for the Chinese, and has also gained wide currency in China.

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Not only has “nation”(min zu) or “state” (guo jia) replaced the “world” or “universe” (tian xia) as the new focus of attention and locus of identity, but also “state” has superseded “nation” to command the attention and allegiance of all Chinese. In view of the foregoing analysis, the rise and development of political nationalism in China still entailed a fundamental reorientation of traditional Chinese thinking and practice, which in turn involved essentially the accomplishment of at least three immediate and challenging tasks: first, the scaling down of the global and cosmopolitan world outlook to the nation or the state; secondly, the recognition of China’s backwardness rather than superiority, in comparison with the newly industrial West; and thirdly, the promotion of technological advancement in general and the building up of military strength in particular, with a determination to defend China’s territorial integrity and political independence by all means. The development of political nationalism in China was, therefore, a process of painful self-negation for China. As such, it was inevitably marred by cultural inertia and slowed down by twists and turns, with frequent emotional outbursts. It has had also to be forced upon China. But not all the three tasks were equally difficult to achieve. The cosmopolitan orientation of the Chinese was quickly modified by the very appearance of a new breed of “barbarians” and after a few rounds of military encounters, followed invariably by China’s loss of territories and payment of indemnities. After all, the world or universe perceived by the Chinese had been imagined, not real. The Chinese were never ignorant of the vast expanses of lands and oceans beyond China’s cultural borders, though they had never bothered to ascertain their limits. Hence, the term guo meaning “state”, rather than “nation”, was used by the Qing court to refer not only to all the Western barbarians, but also to China itself. By the time Wei Yuan compiled the epoch-making Atlas of the Maritime States (Hai Guo Tu Zhi) in the late nineteenth century, China had already accepted the multitude of states and the fact that China was merely one of them. The more painful task, however, was to admit China’s cultural inferiority to the West. Indeed, it took twenty years and two wars with the West, that is, 1840 and 1858, for China to recognize the necessity to “learn the barbarian skills in order to control the barbarians”. For at least another thirty years or so, China did not believe that the value of the “trivial skills” of the West could ever overturn the old Chinese Empire or cause great danger to China. Even after China had gone ahead to construct its own modern shipyards and military arsenals, there was doubt in the Chinese mind that the Western learning, which was fit

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only for “application” (yong), could really replace the Chinese learning, which was and should remain the “foundation” (ti). And it was not until the end of the nineteenth century, and only after another massive invasion by the Western countries in 1900, during the Boxer Movement, that the decision was finally made to launch belated institutional reforms that were essential to technological innovation and military advancement. But such systemic reforms came too late and only brought down the Qing dynasty.4 It was the moralistic approach towards affairs of man and state that turned out to be the most tenacious and difficult to alter. It certainly slowed down China’s modernization progress on all fronts. In spite of the demonstrated military superiority of the West, the very nature and scale of Western intrusion in China, namely, through military aggression and economic plunders, made the Westerners no less barbarian than their predecessors during earlier periods of Chinese history. It also rendered the Western model of development unworthy of emulation. Indeed, the Westerners were labelled as xi yi, meaning “Western barbarians”, in all official Chinese documents. In the eyes of the Chinese, the arbitrary and indeed brutal way of the West could not have got them very far. Certainly, it could not have handed them the mandate of heaven. Somehow, China believed that with some tactics and after offering some favours, the Western intruders, like their predecessors from the north, would eventually fade away and leave China in peace. It was this moral self-confidence that hampered China’s modernization efforts. It was also this moralistic approach that came back later to haunt the Chinese throughout the twentieth century, and also revived the traditional Chinese world outlook. Therefore, even when the Chinese had adopted a policy of complete Westernization by the early twentieth century, doubts about the moral superiority of the Western countries persisted and efforts for modernization remained halfhearted. No wonder that the entire modernization drive of China up to the late 1970s was characterized by periodic rejection of the Western model. But even after all the three tasks were more or less accomplished, or rather accompanying this process of self-negation, there was a constant and urgent need for inculcating among all Chinese a new sense of political loyalty if only to hold China together in one piece. As it turned out, this task was at least equally difficult because of rapid changes in the character of political regimes in China. The Qing government, torn by internal unrest and external threat, was simply unable to carry out any programmes of moral and political education. After all, old-fashioned education was out of touch with new realities. Moreover, Chinese nationalism based on one nationality would have been confined to either

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the Han Chinese or the Manchus, but not both, and however programmed, it could backfire and turn out to be more divisive than unifying. Hence, loyalty to the Qing court, or da qing guo, meaning literally “great Qing state”, was stressed in all imperial edits and documents. Although in so doing the Qing government did for the first time cross the cultural boundary of “nation” and upheld a new concept of “state” that embraced many nationalities, it also aroused the nationalistic feelings of the educated Han Chinese. No wonder that the Nationalist movement led by Sun Yat-sen was the first political movement that openly championed Chinese nationalism based upon the Han Chinese culture. In fact, the blame of China’s repeated military defeats and economic sufferings at the hands of the West was placed squarely on the now “alien Manchus”. And one of the banners hoisted by the Nationalist movement was “expulsion of the northern barbarians, and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. However, the swift collapse of the Qing dynasty compelled the Nationalists to drop quickly this line of propaganda. The demise of the old empire actually left behind two novel problems for the new republic, namely, a territory much larger than the cultural China which the new government now had to defend, and a great variety of non-Chinese minorities which needed to be absorbed into the Han culture, or the “Chinese nation”. In other words, the “Chinese state” was no longer confined to the “Chinese nation”, or the “cultural China”. In order to synchronize the two hitherto quite distinct concepts and phenomena, the Nationalist government coined a new, all inclusive term, zhong hua, by combining the two concepts of “middle kingdom” (zhong guo) and “brilliant xia” (hua xia). Hence, the new republic had the name of Zhong Hua Min Guo (Republic of China, or more literally, the Chinese Republic), and the new Chinese nation, that of zhong hua min zu (Chinese nation or nations). Whereas the “Republic of China”, or its short form “China” (more precisely, “Chinese state”) was now used by the government in all its official documents, the term “Chinese nation(s)” was specifically meant to embrace the Han Chinese and four major minority nationalities, namely, the Manchus, the Mongolians, the Tibetans, and the Hui Muslims, with emphasis upon their “harmonious coexistence” (wu zu gong he). By making the new “Chinese state” coterminous with a new “Chinese nation”, the Nationalist government therefore officially accepted China to be a multinational and multicultural state, which was also a landmark in Chinese history. In fact, to underscore the equality of all nationalities in the new state, border areas inhabited by minority nationalities were all accorded the status of regular provinces, and minority nationalities were even guaranteed representation in the national parliament.

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In fact, by all criteria, the Nationalist government was hitherto the most enthusiastic promoter of modern Chinese nationalism not only by virtue of the historical role assigned to it, but also because of its many Western-educated leaders. Not only were many symbols of the new state created for the first time in Chinese history, but such symbols were also conspicuously displayed and widely circulated. Thus, the national flag was hung or flown in all government buildings and, on national holidays, even outside all private homes, and the national anthem was played or sung on all solemn occasions. Flag-raising, flag-saluting, bowing to the portrait of Dr Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic, and even reciting his last will, became the essential ritual of all public ceremonies and the daily exercise of students of all levels. National holidays were also invariably celebrated with elaborate rituals and much fanfare, usually complete with military bands, political speeches, slogan-shouting, and mass rallies. That was not all. An extensive programme of nationalist and civic education centring around the new republic, its missions, and its leaders, and focusing on modern ethics and model citizenship, was propagated throughout the nation, not only through the printed media, but also using banners, posters, billboards, and what not. Whereas the civics course incorporating modern ideas and new values, and the new political bible, Three Principles of the People (san min zhu yi), outlining China’s political goals, were compulsory subjects in all schools, textbooks on history and geography contained many stories of China’s humiliation and sentiments of patriotism. On top of all these efforts at explicit political socialization, the Nationalist government adopted Mandarin, the court language, as the official spoken Chinese and required all schools to teach and use it as a medium of instruction. A system of alphabetics was even designed to facilitate its learning and circulation. After its retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist government also introduced compulsory military service for all males over eighteen years of age and compulsory military training courses for all senior high school students, in order to inculcate patriotism. With all these efforts, the Nationalists clearly sought to blend the new Chinese state with the new Chinese nation, and to rally all Chinese around the new government in times of continuing crises. Riding on the tide of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, and capitalizing on China’s old predicaments and new woes, the Nationalist government did succeed to create a new sense of Chinese nationalism and arouse the patriotic sentiments of ordinary citizens. China’s eight-year-long protracted war with Japan certainly attested to the truth of the frequently used slogan that “the survival of the Chinese nation is at stake”, and

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therefore helped the Nationalist government to crystallize further its nationalistic appeals and to form a broad united front against foreign aggression. In fact, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the entire nation was mobilized for the single-minded task of national salvation. And Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, also became unmistakably the symbol of unity and hope during this period, commanding widespread respect and unprecedented popularity throughout China. Nevertheless, like the Qing court, the Nationalist government was beset by both internal unrest and external threat throughout its reign on mainland China, and was unable to safeguard all territories of the new Chinese state. Confronted first by the worst separatist movements and then by the worst foreign aggression in modern China, the Nationalist government could not but have been preoccupied with China proper. Although it did seek to keep border areas within the boundaries of the new Chinese state, no effort was made or could have been made to promote Han settlement in the minority regions, or to absorb them into cultural China. The fact that the Nationalist government consistently identified only four minority nationalities in the new Chinese state also reflected its limited ability to tackle all the nationality issues, if not also its ethnocentric approach towards non-Chinese groups. In fact, by the early decades of the twentieth century, Western influences, primarily Russian and British, had already penetrated such border provinces as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Outer Mongolia, fanning separatist movements in all these minority strongholds. Although treaties entailing territorial losses in Tibet and Xinjiang were successfully rejected by China, the Nationalist government did succumb to the combined pressure of the United States and Soviet Russia on the formal cession of the huge Outer Mongolia, apparently not without the consideration that it was after all not part of cultural China. In fact, in all the recriminating accounts about Western imperialism and colonialism in China propagated by the Nationalist government, one could detect a strong sentiment of injustice wrongfully imposed on China, and therefore a tacit conviction of China’s intrinsic moral righteousness. In all the programmes of political education, one clearly saw China’s earnest desire to play a major peace-making role on a global scale. And in all the international negotiations, one certainly found a China unwilling to impose harsh demands from a position of strength, and even ready to honour friendship at the expense of China’s sovereign rights. No wonder that China was the only Asian country which declined to seek compensation from Japan for war damages, though it had suffered the most. China even withdrew its occupation troops from Hong Kong following the Japanese surrender, at the request of Britain and

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the United States. The return of Taiwan to China after the war was specifically inserted into the Cairo Declaration only at the insistence of a smart Chinese diplomat, not by instructions of the Nationalist government.5 At any rate, the intense process of politicization started by the Nationalist government was abruptly terminated in 1949, at least on mainland China, and the name and character of the Chinese state was changed for the second time in less than forty years. The Communist regime, therefore, had to develop a new programme of political education, focusing not only on a wholly new set of political symbols, but also on the denunciation of everything connected to the Nationalist regime, which had now become a renegade. The Communist government did, however, inherit all the means and tactics of propagating nationalism developed by the Nationalist government, but added to them new tools of totalitarian propaganda and control, with particular emphasis upon mass mobilization techniques. The Communist regime also inherited the same kind of enemy, that is, imperialism, except that there was now also another kind of enemy, capitalism, to be on guard against. Moreover, the new Chinese state had to function in an equally unfavourable international environment, being confronted first by a hostile United States, then by the Soviet Union, and for a period of time, by both superpowers. Consequently, like its Nationalist predecessor, the Communist regime was no less enthusiastic as a promoter of Chinese nationalism. Thus, the name of the new regime, “People’s Republic of China” (Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo), retained the term zhong hua, and “China”, or more precisely “Chinese state” (zhong guo), continued to be its short form. In fact, the Communist regime took the further step of replacing “nationalism” (min zu zhu yi) with “patriotism” (ai guo zhu yi) to underscore the new Chinese state. Being able to pacify the entire country and to exercise control over all the border areas for the first time in nearly a century, the Communist government also took the trouble to conduct extensive surveys of China’s minority groups, identified as many as 55 nationalities apart from the Han Chinese, and officially declared China to be a multinational state. The term “Chinese nation(s)” (zhong hua min zu) was now officially extended to include a total of 56 nationalities. And to help foster national unity on this new basis, the Chinese script was simplified and a Hanyu Pinyin system devised to facilitate the studying of the Chinese language. Mandarin was also vigorously propagated as pu tong hua, meaning the commoners’ lingua franca. Nevertheless, the Communist regime’s effort at promoting Chinese nationalism was apparently undermined by at least two main factors,

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that is, the international bent and foreign origin of communism, which tended to distract China’s attention away from the Chinese state, and the orthodox communist teaching that favours national selfdetermination for the minority nationalities, which tended to split the Chinese nation and weaken the Chinese state. But ironically enough, both factors lent support to the global orientation and ethnocentric outlook of traditional China. Thus, for years portraits of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin were displayed alongside that of Mao, with the former clearly dwarfing the latter. And for years the “Communist Internationale” was played together with the new Chinese national anthem. In fact, the Communist government emphasized the authority of the Communist Party of China, or simply “the Party”, far more than it underscored the Chinese state. Hence, Beijing’s open declaration on the “leaning to one side” policy of the 1950s. Hence, the position of the “Party” was progressively upgraded in the ensuing years, eventually to the point of superseding the state. Hence also the fanaticism during the ten-yearlong Cultural Revolution. All these policies affected adversely the development of Chinese nationalism, and it was not until the late 1970s that the regime came back to enshrine the “Chinese state”. On the other hand, although the Communist regime had means and ways to pursue a course of forced assimilation, its policy towards the national minorities was torn between an unwillingness to impose forcibly Chinese culture on the non-Han Chinese and the need to safeguard China’s territorial integrity by warding off almost continuous foreign subversion. Therefore, Beijing borrowed the Soviet model of autonomous units for the minority nationalities, allowing them a substantial degree of self-government and cultural independence within the framework of the Chinese state. Except for Tibet where China did carry out extensive social reforms to wipe out deep-rooted feudal slavery, the Communist government made no serious attempt to assimilate the non-Han minority nationalities. Even in Tibet, a more or less laissez faire policy has prevailed on matters of culture, religion, and language. Such a policy clearly has its drawbacks, not only because it has kept the minority groups apart and aloof from the Chinese nation, but also because it has inevitably weakened the regime’s capability to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Chinese state. As a result, the century-old efforts of modern China to synchronize the Chinese nation with the Chinese state remains a dream, not a reality. But that was not all. The Communist government’s progressive elevation of the Party and its leaders also had the effect of confusing the Chinese sense of identity. Its open and vehement denunciation of feudal China with all its cultural underpinnings certainly left the Chinese

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very much rootless and also resentful of the state. The Communist regime’s preoccupation with the class enemy – capitalism — and with class struggle, rather than imperialism, further distracted the Chinese attention from the Chinese state. The perennial class struggle conducted through political campaigns had the serious divisive effect of pitching ordinary Chinese against one another, thereby sowing seeds of discord and hatred in Chinese society. In view of all the above, the Communist regime did as much harm to Chinese nationalism as it had promoted it. However, the complete socialization of land and other productive forces in strict observance of the socialist principle, and the concomitant reorganization of Chinese society with emphasis upon what was “common” and “public”, did significantly balance much of the international bent of Chinese communism. The concept of state, that was frequently expressed in such daily terms as “state property”, “state leaders”, and “state policies”, became a household concept throughout the country. Loyalty to the Party or its leaders and “service to the people” became synonymous with good citizenship and loyalty to the state. In spite of all the drawbacks of a socialist economy and a totalitarian state, the powerful undercurrents of provincialism, familism, tribalism, and self-serving individualism were successfully suppressed as never before, and so was pragmatism replaced by idealism. Indeed, the unity between the state and society in China had never been greater as it was under communism. Ironically and not to a small degree, the concept and practice of the “Chinese state” was also upheld by the prolonged U.S. policy of economic blockade and military containment, which, on the one hand, confined China’s attention and activities within its territorial borders, and on the other, also heightened China’s vigilance on its political independence and territorial integrity. In other words, if the Western impact of the nineteenth century had globalized China’s orientation and drawn China into a multi-state world, the closed-door policy forced upon China in the mid-twentieth century helped to consolidate its new sense of statehood. Thus, no sooner had the People’s Republic been established than it launched a well-rounded programme of military modernization, tested its own nuclear devices, developed its own modern forces, and even deliberately upgraded the social status of the soldiers, ranking them in the same honourable class of “peasants and workers”. On the other hand, the PRC’s re-entry into the United Nations and many other international organizations after 1971 also compelled China, for the first time after 1949, to deal with other states regularly and strictly on a stateto-state basis, and according to the well-established rules of the international community. It certainly diluted further the ideological basis of China’s relations with other states.

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In fact, as a result of the combined pressure of internal problems and external pressure and the resulting insecurity of China, the Communist regime did carry out the most massive, intensive, and sustained programme of political education on nationalism and patriotism that could be paralleled perhaps only by its rival regime in Taiwan. Not only was the entire nation deliberately mobilized through pervasive political propaganda and perennial mass campaigns, but the process of politicization reached fanatical heights during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, during which “colluding with foreign states” (li tong wai guo) or “having overseas connection” (hai wai guan xi) were deemed “counterrevolutionary crimes” punishable by death. As emotions of Chinese nationalism ran higher and higher in the 1960s and 1970s, the country was also virtually shut off to the entire non-communist world. It is perhaps also no accident that during this period of intense Chinese nationalism, China went to war so many times: with the United States in Vietnam during 1965–75, with the Soviet Union in 1969, and with Vietnam in 1974 and again in 1979. But fortunately or unfortunately for China, this period did not last long. The launching of a new open-door policy and economic reform in 1979 quickly began to erode much of the previous efforts made at nationalistic and patriotic education in China. For one thing, China’s awakening to a much more advanced West and the surrounding countries once again proved the false superiority of socialist China, thereby negating much of the fruits of politicization, be it on communism, nationalism, or patriotism. Indeed, the very adoption of the new policy represented an official denunciation of the Maoist past, thereby drawing the value of all political doctrines into doubt. What is perhaps less conspicuous but more destabilizing, the official embrace of Western capitalism and the progressive relaxation of social control quickly unleashed powerful centrifugal forces inherent in Chinese society, leading not only to the full play of familism, tribalism, and individualism, but also to the rapid increase of all categories of corruption and crime. Although the government has continued to propagate nationalism and patriotism, it is now devoid of any real appeal to the ever-pragmatic Chinese with their newly gained freedom. It was under these circumstances that the dual but world-wide trend of economic globalization and minority nationalism set in during the late 1980s, posing a new threat to Chinese nationalism as never before. At a time when all ideologies and political doctrines, both new and old, were in disrepute, and when official efforts at moral and political education were intermittent and half-hearted, the trend of globalization has led to a continuing exodus of talented Chinese emigrants and a

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massive influx of “decadent” capitalist ideas, behaviour patterns, and way of life since the early 1980s. On the other hand, border regions that had never been integrated into China proper quickly became vulnerable targets of foreign subversive activities and indigenous separatist elements. Not only was the exiled Dalai Lama of Tibet accorded more spotlight and support by many Western countries in the 1990s, but a formal independence movement was organized for Xinjiang in 1992 and was responsible for a series of terrorist bombings in China in the mid-1990s.6 It was also in the 1990s that Taiwan, the rival regime of the People’s Republic of China, began to move increasingly towards formal independence from China, a move that climaxed in the 1996 missile crisis. Given the current social conditions in China, its largely unchanged cultural environment, the still incipient nature of China’s political nationalism, and indeed the new confused state of the Chinese mind, whether the Communist government can cope with the combined pressure of globalization and privatization remains to be seen. It certainly poses a real challenge to China as it enters the twenty-first century.

Problems and Prospects Nationalism however defined is incompatible with the concept of globalism or the trend of globalization, and the tension and conflict between the two has caused concern and instability to all multinational states and will continue to do so. The case of China is a complicated one not only because of China’s size and the diversity of its national groups, but also because the idea of globalism inheres in the Chinese brand of nationalism. Owing to China’s unique social environment and cultural tradition, the fostering of Chinese nationalism entails not only a scaling down of the Chinese world outlook from empire to nation, and from the universe to the state, but also an upgrading of provincial, parochial, and even individualistic sentiments prevailing in Chinese society. In addition, there is a continuing need to extend effective control to all Chinese territories and to broaden the concept of China or Chinese nation to embrace 55 minority nationalities that inhabit large and strategically vital parts of the Chinese state. All these tasks already require a strong state and a continuous programme of political education, failing either of which the Chinese nation would become a vulnerable prey of both sub-national and supranational forces. Even the Chinese state itself would become prone to political disintegration. Nevertheless, one must recognize that after decades of Nationalist rule and half a century of Communist rule, the development of Chinese

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nationalism had reached a maturing stage by the late 1990s. In spite of much discontinuity and disruption in the tortuous socialization process, China as a territorial and political entity with clear boundaries has already struck root in the Chinese mind. China as a regular and major actor in the international community bound by its many rules of the game is also well accepted by Chinese leaders. In fact, Chinese citizens have never been more clearly aware of the state, its authority, its policies, and its relationship to themselves than they are today. On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the residents have no doubt which political regime they are under. In the international arena, both the PRC on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan have also been avid and faithful observers of international law. The Communist regime, in particular, has enshrined the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of the Chinese state as the top priority concern in China’s foreign relations, and has even gone to wars at great risk to itself in order to safeguard this glorious principle of modern statehood. However, as the foregoing survey shows, the development of modern Chinese nationalism has been a zig-zag process, with many twists and turns, leaving its fruits unsecured and many problems unresolved. The still incipient nature of political nationalism in China and its uncertain future points to the heavy cultural baggage the Chinese continue to carry. Indeed, orientations evolved over centuries cannot be easily erased or negated in a few decades. Here, in spite of its strong anti-tradition, antiConfucian bent, the Chinese Communist regime has conspicuously displayed very traditional and very Chinese outlooks. Thus, having ensured national survival and regained political independence in 1949, the Chinese government in Beijing quickly fell back on a global and strongly moralistic approach towards the affairs of nations. From an enthusiastic advocate of peaceful coexistence in Asia to a global champion of Third World interests, from the generous territorial concessions made to its small and weak neighbours to the most risky military assistance extended to North Korea and North Vietnam, from the uncompromising posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s to the widely propagated policy of anti-hegemonism against both superpowers in the 1980s and the 1990s, and from the consistent condemnation of the use or threat of force in resolving international disputes, to the reiterated policy of not using nuclear weapons first nor against non-nuclear countries, one sees the long shadow of the old Chinese Empire, a China not only aspiring for a global role for itself, but also adamantly abiding by its age-old principles of moral conduct, and even constantly lecturing to the two superpowers about such principles. In all these incidents, one also finds a China striving to regain

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its cherished status at the centre of civilization and as the moral leader for the entire world. Indeed, Chinese foreign policy since the Korean War has repeatedly subjected realistic considerations to grander, moral ideals, often to the extent of totally disregarding the existing international balance of power and the acute danger incurred. In the light of all the above, China under communism has not been contented with or confined to nationalism, even during its darkest days. Similarly, in spite of all the official efforts made to glorify the Chinese state and to promote political nationalism following the fall of the Manchu rule, the boundary between the “Chinese nation” and the “Chinese state”, or for that matter, between “nation” and “state”, has remained blurred under communist rule. Thus, when China declares that Tibet or Xinjiang is an “inseparable part of China” as it has done many times, the “China” referred to is political and territorial, meaning the “Chinese state”. But when Beijing proclaims Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan to be “an inseparable part of China”, the “China” is cultural, as the concept of “sovereignty” is completely brushed aside. In the case of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Island was ceded to the British in perpetuity. Macao was not bound by any formal treaty of cession, but has been unmistakably a Portuguese colony for 400 years. Yet the Chinese official position had been that both Hong Kong and Macao “have always been Chinese territory except that they are temporarily under foreign administration”, thereby not only denying the principle of international law on cession, but negating the reality of actual foreign rule. The rationale underlying this position clearly gives a premium on the cultural origin of Hong Kong and Macao, both of which are indeed at least 98 per cent Chinese in terms of population. In recovering control of the two colonies, Beijing has also invented the ingenuous phrase of “resuming the exercise of sovereignty” over the two colonies, a position that implied that Chinese sovereignty over the two places had never been lost, but merely “lapsed”. Similarly, in spite of the undeniable fact that Taiwan is separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait, and has been a sovereign state for more than half a century, Beijing still insists that Taiwan is an “inseparable part of China”, a claim that is true only by the cultural, not political criteria. Indeed, all the diplomatic offensives launched by Beijing have been in total disregard of the political dimension of nationalism. And in its appeal to Taiwan, Beijing has also emphasized the common cultural roots of the two states and the same traditions they have inherited. In other words, mainland China sees Taiwan as unequivocally “Chinese” culturally, and therefore an “inseparable” part of China. Thus, Lee Teng-hui, by promoting Taiwan’s formal

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independence, has been branded a “traitor of the Chinese nation(s)”. In all these respects, the traditional Chinese outlook has not changed, that is, one sees a China unwilling to differentiate the cultural and political dimensions of nationalism. Hence, China’s dogmatic position on all these three territories. The continuing ambiguity associated with the Chinese perspectives on nation, state, and globalism has led to persistent misunderstanding and misgivings between China and the West ever since the midnineteenth century in their diplomatic dealings. It has certainly cost China tremendous territorial losses in the nineteenth century. During the past fifty years, China’s propensity to go beyond the nation and nationalism in its external relations and to play a role larger than its physical strength warrants, plus its often unpredictable conduct in the affairs of nations, have apparently caused repeated concern and alarm in many quarters of the world. These traits have certainly constituted the basis of a new China threat theory current in many capitals, including Washington. Although what China is seeking is most likely more cultural and moral than military or territorial, and China most likely also harbours no expansionist ambitions, it is not so perceived by other countries which do not have the same cultural tradition nor do they appreciate its political implications. Indeed, from the perspective of Western countries in general and the United States in particular and even Japan, all of which are ingrained in the tradition of balance of power and convinced of the wonders that military technology can do, China’s search for any kind of global role or influence cannot but harbour ulterior motives and include a design for territorial aggrandizement and political domination. China’s very emphasis upon moral principles and cultural superiority merely attests to its temporary deficiency in military calibre and political means, if not also revealing China’s hypocrisy. But any Western or American effort to confine China’s role to the political and territorial China will in turn be seen by China as over-reactive and unwarranted, and therefore hostile. The resulting vicious circle can only turn the China threat theory into a self-fulfilling prophesy. China’s unwillingness to accept fully the political connotations of the modern nation or nationalism has also caused problems on another level. By using the terms “nation” and “state” interchangeably, depending on China’s own needs or aspirations, the Chinese Government has certainly aroused suspicions among other countries in general and its Southeast Asian neighbours in particular, about its aggressive stance and even imperialistic designs. China’s perennial concern about the well-being of the so-called “overseas Chinese” has clearly angered many Southeast

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Asian governments. Although in defending its claim to the border regions and the tiny islands in the South China Sea, China is merely exercising its sovereign rights as a state, and in taking an adamant stance on the issue of Taiwan, China is most likely also seeking merely the recovery of the last piece of culturally Chinese territory, the combination of these positions can easily be seen as already aggressive and potentially disruptive. By the same token, China could also be underestimated in its determination to honour its claims, as it has been in the case of Hong Kong. China might well be mistaken again on the issue of reunification with Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the thinking of the Chinese in Taiwan on nationalism and related issues has been strikingly similar. In spite of the small size of Taiwan, for decades the Nationalist government had displayed the “Middle Kingdom” mentality by pursuing a foreign policy that was not only on a global scale but also with a strong culturalmoralistic orientation, giving its primary attention to the major powers of the world, particularly the United States. For years too, Taiwan had maintained a close liaison with the so-called “overseas Chinese” communities all over the world, and still does. On the other hand, in handling relations with its immediate neighbours in Southeast Asia, all of which are much larger than Taiwan, as well as with all other relatively small and weak nations, Taiwan has demonstrated a conspicuously bigpower but benevolent attitude, making territorial and other concessions that have often been both unnecessary and unwarranted, in order to cultivate friendship and the support of these nations. In other words, the Chinese in Taiwan for decades have remained global and moralistic in their perception of world affairs. So the suspension of diplomatic relations by the United States has been viewed in Taiwan as a brutal betrayal of a trusted ally, just as the unwillingness of the former Soviet Union to back up China in confrontation with the United States was seen as most unbecoming to a close comrade, and even cowardish. Moreover, for decades, both Chinese governments have expected special considerations or preferential treatment from Japan because of the extensive damages Japan had caused the Chinese during the SinoJapanese War. Furthermore, until very recently, the Nationalist government in Taiwan had persisted in a one-China policy, admitting itself to be only a part of China, just as the mainland is. No question whatsoever was raised about the “Chineseness” of the Taiwanese residents. The Nationalist government also claimed sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, in addition to Outer Mongolia, in spite of the fact that all these territories were either under effective foreign control, or politically independent.

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And for at least twenty-two years, the ROC claimed to represent all China in spite of the fact that its exercise of sovereignty was confined to Taiwan. Indeed, it was on this basis that a General Guidelines for National Reunification was drafted in 1990 and a National Reunification Council set up in 1991, to promote cross-strait contacts and to handle related problems. Even when Taiwan’s pro-independence opposition began to promote a separate brand of “Taiwanese nationalism” in the mid-1980s, they faced difficulties in making it compatible with the “Taiwanese state”. They still do as most Taiwanese residents have continued to consider themselves as both “Taiwanese” and “Chinese”. In fact, the term “Taiwanese nationalism” has never been clearly defined by anyone, as a clear definition is impossible. And the fact that the concept has never been accepted outside a small group of hard-line independence supporters also reflects the strong “Chineseness” of Taiwan’s residents. It was apparently only after failing to develop its own brand of nationalism did Taiwan’s new leaders decide to opt for a “twostates theory” in July 1999, in a most recent and provocative bid for formal independence.7 Although this stance merely reflects the reality of the current state of affairs on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, it is yet to gain currency within the island republic. All these show that the Chinese tradition dies hard. Moreover, in spite of the tense relations between Taiwan and mainland China, and the once intense brain-washing programmes implemented by both sides, public opinion surveys in post-authoritarian Taiwan have almost consistently shown more people supporting eventual reunification with mainland China than those favouring independence. Indeed, the abrupt but smooth shift from the decades-old anticommunist policy and propaganda to an accommodating mood towards mainland China with an unmistakable sense of common identity with their cultural brethren across the Taiwan Strait points to the powerful influence of Chinese culture. It is perhaps also no wonder that the Chinese on the mainland have overwhelmingly stood for reunification, including all the most prominent dissidents of the communist regime. Here, the cultural rather than the political dimension of Chinese nationalism again stands out clearly. Now the prolonged tension between mainland China and Taiwan can also be seen as a contest for the mandate of heaven in the Chinese universe. Both sides have also taken it in this light. Hence, the intensive and prolonged war of propaganda in which both sides have taken turns to claim to be the sole legitimate government of all China, seeing each other as the bandit regime and usurper. Each side has also drawn freely and extensively from ancient Chinese wisdom to reinforce its claim to

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superior cultural status, or moral standing. Whereas Taiwan’s anticommunist policy has for decades assumed the fervour of a religious crusade, mainland China’s reunification drive has also taken the form of world-wide campaigns. Since the late 1970s, both sides have certainly sought eagerly to drive a cultural edge over each other in a new round of economic competition. It is perhaps also no accident that the final, decisive round of military conflict has been consciously postponed by both sides, and even its necessity and desirability has been openly played down, first by the Nationalist government in Taiwan during the most tense period of the 1950s to 1970s, and then by the communist side since 1979, even though Beijing has apparently gained the military capacity not only to demoralize its rival regime, but also to destroy the island republic without crossing the Taiwan Strait. Viewed in this light, the Chinese in Taiwan do not really fear an actual military attack from mainland China, any more than their cultural brethren across the strait are eager to launch it. By the same token, any form of U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait might well trigger off a real war between the two sides rather than forestall it. Looking to the future, it may be predicted that China is unlikely to abandon its traditional outlook on the affairs of nations, if only because it is deep-rooted in Chinese culture and Chinese thinking. Although tian xia has already been replaced by the Chinese state as the locus of political allegiance, by virtue of its size and potential influence, China will continue to think big and see problems on a global scale. After all, there is still a tian xia that continues to affect the security and prosperity of China which no Chinese regime can afford to overlook. As for the moralistic approach to the affairs of man and state, one must admit that there is an intrinsic value in judging peoples and nations not by their physical strength, but by their standard of morality. In other words, there is a strong persuasive element in the Chinese approach which no Chinese will readily forsake. To propagate this approach through China’s global role and influence will certainly enhance, rather than downgrade, China’s international status. Indeed, it might even confer China the laureate of moral leadership of the world, an honour which China has always cherished. All this also means that China will continue to project an image that is perhaps larger and more aggressive than it actually is, with the result that problems and misunderstanding will recur in China’s external relations. As for the ambiguity between nation and state, it is bound to persist for some time, if only because China remains very much divided ethnically and racially, and the building of one truly united and homogeneous nation out of 56 nationalities will not be easy or fast. The problem of making the Chinese state truly coterminous with the Chinese

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nation depends upon the will and ability of the Chinese Government not only to suppress separatist movements effectively in the border regions, but also to absorb them gradually into cultural China. So far, the Chinese Government has indeed been most sensitive to any encroachments upon Chinese territory and to any separatist movements that challenge the authority of the government. But in view of the apparently growing external pressure to split China and to confine China to its cultural borders, the future is less certain. In this context, Taiwan clearly presents a most immediate challenge to the one-China principle and China’s nation-building process, both politically and culturally. Apart from the strategic value of the island to China and the continuing threat it poses to China’s security, China could not tolerate the formal cession of a “Chinese province”, as it would permanently compromise the sovereign rights of the Chinese state and also break up the Chinese nation irreparably. What is worse, China would lose its bargaining position on all the issues of minority nationalities, with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences. To keep Taiwan in China, therefore, is essential to the preservation of the integrity of both the Chinese state and the Chinese nation. For years, Beijing had adopted a policy of gradual reunification with Taiwan through peaceful contacts and peaceful competition, on the presumption that the common culture the two sides share would eventually override their political differences. But the recent flare-up of new tensions arising from Taiwan’s “two-states theory” might force China to take more threatening action against the island republic again. When it does, Beijing would be convinced of its moral right to settle this “domestic” issue within the “Chinese nation”, and therefore unlikely to succumb to any external military pressure. The Chinese Government’s ability to integrate Taiwan fully into the Chinese state, therefore, constitutes a crucial indicator of the success in crystallizing the concept and practice of Chinese nationalism. In fact, unless and until the Taiwan problem is fully resolved, the boundary between the Chinese nation and the Chinese state will remain blurred for both China and Taiwan in the foreseeable future. However, the ageless, changeless Chinese culture is not a completely negative factor in the development of modern Chinese nationalism, or the consolidation of the Chinese state. After all, it constitutes a powerful bulwark against thorough globalization and the complete alienation that globalization could bring about. As the “Chineseness” of all Chinese is a self-contained and self-sufficient phenomenon, it cannot be easily erased or changed no matter where they are found. The Chinese may refrain or even forget to identify with a specific political regime, but they will

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always retain their “Chineseness” in thinking, habit, and so forth, and their concern with the affairs of their homeland. They can also readily identify with people of the same culture. In this regard, cultural Chinese nationalism alone can also generate among all Chinese a common sense of belonging that will pull them back from time to time from the abstract tian xia to the more concrete Chinese state. On the other hand, in spite of the powerful undercurrents of pragmatism, familism, and individualism in Chinese society, the common culture all Chinese share also represents a potentially powerful reservoir of nationalistic sentiments that can be usefully tapped for political purposes, as they have effectively been during the twentieth century. Viewed in this light, the distance between the Chinese nation and the Chinese state is perhaps not so long or significant, and the gulf between the two rivalling Chinese states, not unbridgeable.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

Zhongguo Xingcheng Quhua Diming Shouche [Handbook on the Administrative Units of China](Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chuban she, 1999), p. 1. The culturalistic and moralistic approach is most vividly presented in one of the Four Books, namely, Mencius. This non-military orientation is conspicuous in the Chinese bible on military strategy, namely, Sun Tzu Bingfa [The Art of War by Sun Tzu]. For a systematic presentation of both documents and analysis on China’s interaction with the West since the mid-nineteenth century, see Teng Ssuyu, ed., China’s Response to the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954). Chiu Hungda, ed., Xiandai guoji fa jiben wenjian [Contemporary International Law: Basic Documents] (Taipei: San Ming Book Co., 1989), pp. 440–41. A series of terrorist bombings took place in both Tibet and Xinjiang from late 1996 to early 1997 that culminated in a bombing incident on a Beijing bus on 7 March 1997, resulting in one dead and thirty-three wounded. The Eastern Turkistan Independence Movement claimed responsibility for at least one of these incidents. Lianhe Bao [The United Daily] (Taipei), 30 December 1996, p. 9; 9 March 1997, p. 2; 10 March 1997, p.9. Lee Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, advanced the theory on 9 July 1999 that the relations between mainland China and Taiwan are “special stateto-state relations”, thereby abandoning the one-China principle Taiwan had hitherto abided by. Lianhe Bao, 17 July 1999, p. 1.

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m 11 n Grasping the Nettle: Indian Nationalism and Globalization

KRIPA SRIDHARAN

Introduction With the near completion of the decolonization process which resulted in the birth of a host of Afro-Asian states in the 1960s, it was generally assumed that nationalism had passed its heyday. Ever since the French Revolution, nationalism had exerted such a powerful influence on the thinking of mankind that it was hard to imagine that it would ever lose its appeal. But the end of colonialism and the gradual emergence of an interdependent world seemed to suggest that the age of nationalism was well and truly over. Economic, cultural, and communication links that have been operating regardless of national borders seemed to confirm the presence of a transnational world rather than a community of narrow, national entities. Sovereign states were thus seen to be fighting a rearguard action as boundaries became porous and penetrable by unconventional intruders. But the events associated with the end of the Cold War, particularly the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have belied such claims. Several new states have emerged in the wake of the disintegration of these two former federations, fuelled by the spirit of nationalism. Consequently, the present day world is witnessing a resurgence of nationalism as manifested in the integration and fragmentation processes operating between and within states. Increasingly, nationalist demands are surfacing both in the developing 294

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and developed countries. Nationalism has once again begun to take centre stage in many places. In developing countries, its manifestation is evident in the people’s aspiration for autonomy and greater political participation together with the urge to negotiate for these benefits on the terms and conditions set by them. The developed world too has not been spared the nationalist challenge as seen in the case of Canada, Spain, and Britain. Even in a clearly defined nation-state like France tensions are apparent as the country experiences a sharp cultural diversity between the migrants from the Maghreb and the French people. These developments warrant a fresh look at the process that leads to the emergence and propagation of a national identity. The cases of individual nation-states while being important must, however, be located within the broader context of the contemporary international order, the defining feature of which is globalization. It would appear that the world we live in at present is confronted by the contradictory pulls of nationalism and globalism. The essence of globalization being a closer integration of states and societies, overriding the particularist identities of people and nations, it should in theory stand opposed to nationalist urges. But it is argued that the very forces of invasive globalization has unleashed a virulent backlash in the form of resurgent nationalism with assertions of freedom in all spheres. What distinguishes people from one another rather than what amalgamates them is finding new emphasis in many societies. But oddly enough, this is only one side of the story. Contemporary nationalism is both a reaction to and a consequence of globalization. The communication and information revolution associated with globalization has created a heightened awareness of particular identities among some nationalities, culminating in their demands for a separate nation state, thus reinforcing the disintegrative propensities within multi-ethnic states. In this sense, globalization began hastening the disintegration process in some states. Many multi-ethnic states in the communist bloc that had failed to satisfy the aspirations of the minorities began to be perceived as prisons from which dissatisfied groups longed to escape. The global electronic revolution greatly facilitated such yearnings. The transmission of news and views across state boundaries not only tended to help in sensitizing the viewing public about their identities but also spurred them to act to realize their dreams for a national homeland. It was not surprising therefore to witness the emergence of several new states in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Many pessimistic observers of India have also been predicting that a similar fate awaits the multi-ethnic state of India. The various secessionist movements within the country are seen as embryonic sovereign entities.

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While nationalist impulses prompting the disintegration of states remains a fact, being a multifaceted phenomenon nationalism born of such globalization has also resulted in the unification of divided countries like Germany and Yemen. This should make it clear to any observer that the dynamics between globalization and nationalism is a complex and an overwhelming one. For many states, globalization is like the proverbial tiger which they are forced to ride but do not quite know when or how to dismount. While they may react against its corrosive influence on their societies, they would be the last to deny themselves its benefits. It is this dilemma which haunts policy-makers in many states who want to reconcile the influence of Western pop-culture propagated via the mass media with the values of their traditional culture. Similarly, they see the benefits of integrating their economies with the global economy but also chafe at the prospect of being dictated to by outsiders. Cultural intrusion is not only frowned upon by the nationalistic élites of developing nations but also by countries like France where there is a palpable concern about the unrestricted broadcasting of American television programmes. In India too, nationalists of various hues have been vociferous in their criticism of cable television and its corrosive influence on the viewing public. Thus, this aspect of globalization has set in motion a virulent nationalist reaction in many countries. In a sense, much like what Benedict Anderson has pointed out with respect to the earlier phase of nationalism, which “imagined” itself into existence greatly aided by the development of “print capitalism”,1 the present stirrings of nationalism have been facilitated by the explosion of the telecommunication revolution.

Nations and Nationalism Before moving on to a discussion on the Indian nation–state, a brief overview of nationalism as an ideology and movement might be instructive. Most scholars of nationalism endorse the view that the concept is fairly modern. Anthony Smith, however, expressed a certain reservation on this score as he questioned the connection between nationalism and modernization by pointing out the link between premodern ethnic communities, which he termed “ethnies”, and modern nations.2 Ernest Gellner, on the other hand, posited that the process of industrialization prompted the search for a cultural cohesion which nationalism ideally provided for, and he observed that, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations

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where they do not exist.”3 In Gellner’s view “nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national should be congruent”.4 This is a norm or value ordaining that every nation is entitled to its own state, and every state must consist of one nation. Benedict Anderson alluded to the nation as an imagined community, emphasizing that nations “should be distinguished not by their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”,5 and a history of imaginings is conducive to easy nation-building. The reference to history is pertinent to the entire process of nation-building. Much the same is implied in Rupert Emerson’s characterization of a nation. According to him, “the nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and they have a common destiny for the future.”6 It is therefore not uncommon to find references to common descent and common sufferings and struggles against foreign oppression in nationalist accounts of countries like India. A great deal of reliance on history is therefore deliberately sought in order to foster and consolidate national identity. Consequently, “for most nationalisms ‘history’ has been that space where national identity is formed and/or found.”7 As we shall see later in the case of India too, selective use of history by the political élites for the purpose of creating such an identity has been very much in evidence. The process of reconfiguring past events is never complete because of the presence of different forms of peripheral nationalism which react against the dominant, centralist nationalism,8 and in course of time begin to question such constructions. This eventually leads to separatist struggles of the kind witnessed within India, in Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast. In the evolution of nationalism, the eighteenth century is regarded as the period when nationalism as we know it today originated and went through three interrelated phases:9 the thinking of the Enlightenment period formed the first phase which emphasized the principle of the selfdetermination of communities. This was followed by the period of revolutions in the Americas (revolt against British rule in the North and subsequently against Spanish domination in Latin America), and in Europe. The French Revolution gave a great impetus to the nationalist dream. The third phase is associated with the ideas of culturalism, as found in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder and J.G. Fichte. Herder argued that the nation was an organic group characterized by a separate language, culture, and spirit. Cultural nationalism of the sort propagated by these two German philosophers spread throughout Europe and beyond and powerfully influenced nascent Indian nationalist sentiments. According to Thomas Hansen, “In India, the romanticist vision of

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recuperation of past glory and latent spirituality of India through employment of modern techniques of scholarship, modern organization, discipline and collective will in order to overcome the humiliation inflicted by colonial rule struck a receptive chord in parts of the intelligentsia”.10 Over time, two different ways of portraying the nation became evident in the nationalist tradition generally, and in India in particular. One perceives the nation in terms of cultural variables emphasizing the significance of ethnic ties and loyalties. The other views it in terms of a political entity highlighting civic loyalties and the bonds between people created through a common citizenship regardless of their ethnicity or culture. According to Katherine Verdery, this confirms the observation that modern nationalisms have operated in the name of at least two major meanings of nation as a state-subject relation. Eric Hobsbawm identifies the two principal senses of nation in modern times as: a relation known as citizenship, in which the nation consists of collective sovereignty based in common political participation, and a relation known as ethnicity, in which the nation comprises all those of supposedly common language, history, or broader cultural identity.11

Cultural or ethnic nationalism lays stress on the regeneration of the nation as a civilization in a mystical sort of way rather than conceiving the nation as a discrete political entity, which is what civic nationalism represents. This facile distinction is challenged by Rogers Brubaker who argues: ... the Manichean view that there are at bottom two kinds of nationalism, a good, civic kind and a bad, ethnic kind and two corresponding understandings of nationhood, the good, civic conception in which nationhood is seen as based on common citizenship, and the bad ethnic conception, in which nationhood is seen as based on common ethnicity ... is both normatively and analytically problematic.12

Notwithstanding this dissenting note, the distinction is valid for a discussion on Indian nationalism where the good-bad/civic-ethnic representation forms the central plank in contemporary debates on nationalism. In the Indian context, this roughly translates as secular and communal/Hindu nationalism. Beyond this, of course, the question of what constitutes an Indian nation, or national identity, remains a heavily debated issue. This is understandable in a country which is the embodiment of heterogeneity in all its imaginable forms. India has fifteen national languages, about 850 languages are said to be in daily use, and there are about 1,683 mother tongues. Identities based on religion are

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many, of which Hindus form 82 per cent, Muslims 12 per cent, Christians 3 per cent, and Sikhs 2 per cent. There are also significant differences between the Indo-Aryans, Dravidians, and Mongoloids. Identities grounded on tribal affiliations also abound. This mind-boggling plurality makes it impossible to conceive of a definitive Indian national identity. The two types of nationalism mentioned above nevertheless seek to collapse all these criss-crossing identities into one amalgam as part of the nation and state-building process. The effort to steam-roll the divergent identities has produced a reaction in the form of a third type of nationalism, commonly referred to as the secessionist movement. But any consideration of this development must be preceded by a brief overview of Indian nationalist thinking in the colonial period which set the context for the subsequent victory of secular nationalism in independent India.

The Colonial Phase Much of the early conceptualization of Indian nationalism was reactive in the sense that it was a revolt against colonial domination and exploitation. This type of consciousness was élite-driven even though subsequently it reached out to the masses, and in so doing made liberal use of certain religio-cultural symbols, ideas, and values. The Hindu élites of the nineteenth century applied themselves to the task of inventing and reinterpreting India’s history and traditions, not only to salvage their own confused identity but also to shape a cohesive entity out of the hopelessly fragmented Indian society. Various writings of the period invoked an idealized image of an ancient Hindu culture and used powerful narratives from history to mobilize the people. Referring to the contribution of Bankimchandra and other pioneers who sought to shape the thinking of their audience through story-telling, Sudipta Kaviraj writes: This story-telling about the collective self represents an important contribution to the making of a nationalist mentality, an act of imagining, of conceiving things narratively in a radically different way. In the earlier phases of colonial history, the defiance of Tipu, of the Marathas, or the princes of the north, had happened as different, distinct struggles of political principalities and their often selfish rulers against equally selfish British expansionism.13

These seemingly isolated episodes “were united in history books and novels and eventually in the more intangible and powerful popular

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imagination.”14 This represented the effort to replace “segmental identity”15 with the notion of a community cutting across various inconvenient divides. Following Bankimchandra’s admonition that “We have no history! We must have a history!”, history-writing truly became a rage. But as Partha Chatterjee explains, “What is noteworthy in Bamkim’s nationalist call to history writing is, (first), that whereas he identifies his subject nation sometimes as ‘Bengali’ and at other times as ‘Indian’ (Bharatavarsiya), in both cases he names the foreign ruler and aggressor as the Muslim.”16 Most Hindu élites of the period were unabashed in their identification of Indian national identity with a Hindu identity. Swami Vivekananda, Aurobindo Ghosh, Lokmanya Tilak, and others were firmly in this tradition. They conceptualized the nation as anchored in the religion and culture of the Hindus and imagined its future in terms of a recreation of past Hindu glory. “The most arresting political figure in this search for a seamless Hindu past was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, from whose writings the BJP would later take their mantric prosody, Hindutva.”17 Savarkar proclaimed: What is called nationalism can be defined as in fact the national communalism of the majority community ... Thus in Hindustan it is the Hindus, professing Hindu religion and being in overwhelming majority, that constitute the national community and create and formulate the nationalism of the nation.18

This powerful depiction impressed another Maharashtrian Brahmin, Dr Hedgewar, whose disillusionment with the Indian National Congress found expression in the creation of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925. Such a rigid formulation was not of course acceptable to everybody and an alternative version of nationalism did not take long to emerge. With the advent of the Congress, a different nationalist conceptualization became obvious. Both Gandhi and Nehru, despite their differing orientations, found it hard to subscribe to the overdrawn notion of Hindu nationalism. Acutely aware of the enormous diversity of India, they embraced a pluralist alternative instead. Eventually, it was this political imagination which was translated into the founding institutions of the Indian state with several parallel and mutually reinforcing principles of pluralism. Secularism provided for a pluralism of religious practices; federalism encompassed the pluralism of regional cultures and democracy allowed expression of plural political ideals. The constitutional form of this nationalism was civic, based on

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a secular, republican citizenship rather than belongingness to any mystical cultural or ethnic essence; at the same time with characteristic prudence, it provided for an expression of more ethnic identities within limits. Interestingly, there was no way, in this political arrangement for any person to be only Indian and nothing else; indeed, one could not be an Indian without being some other things at the same time.19

But this was not regarded as an insuperable problem because according to the “tributary theory of nationalism, according to which small nationalisms build into larger identities and eventually flow into the great cosmopolitan sea”20 there would be a natural progression ultimately towards the attainment of a harmonious, super identity. It bears emphasis that in both the colonial and post-colonial phases the two versions of nationalism,21 exclusive and eclectic, managed to coexist. While Gandhi and Nehru were united in their recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of Indian culture they were divided in their projections of the future Indian state and the place of religion in society. Gandhi did not forswear the role of religion in politics even though he had his misgivings about the brand of Hindu nationalism propagated by the “revivalists”. Even though he was accused of deftly turning the “national movement into a mass movement by Hinduizing it”22 he firmly believed that, notwithstanding the differences in religious practice, all religions basically contained the same universal message. Gandhi had the talent to press into service traditional ideas and symbols in his construction of an Indian identity. His vision of society was not cast in modernist terms as he advocated a decentralized polity undergirded by autonomy for the different communities that constituted the nation. The Gandhian vision, however, did not become dominant or pervasive in post-colonial India. Neither did it save the country from fracturing along religious lines as it failed to convince the Muslims led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah that it would work.

Independence and After When India became independent, both Gandhi’s vision and Hindu nationalism lost out to the Nehruvian nationalist thought as it was perceived by many to be the best way to propel India towards modernization and development. Gandhi’s assassination at the hands of a Hindu nationalist with close links to the RSS automatically put Hindu nationalism beyond the pale of decency. Ever since that time, the Nehruvian vision of nation-building has remained a pervasive feature of much of independent India’s existence, which is now being challenged

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by the revival of Hindu nationalism. The Nehruvian vision with its emphasis on modernization, industrialization, and a strong, secular state became the basis for forging the new Indian identity. The centrality of the state in this nation-building enterprise was pronounced. Thus, the state was meant to encompass and transcend the different interests and identities within the country, and it was to play the central role in nationbuilding.23 But it would be a mistake to hastily conclude that Nehru was a rabid modernist. He was sensitive to India’s composite culture and therefore envisioned a multicultural polity. But his concern was more with crafting a modern, secular nation. In Nehru’s scheme of things, a more secure way to build and sustain an Indian identity rested on his faith in India’s future rather than in harking back to its past. The past in any case was not a straightforward affair since it contained several unresolved contradictions and unpalatable facts. A selective scanning of history of course could not be avoided to project the view that India had always been a nation. Certain syncretistic figures from history like Ashoka, Akbar or Kabir were fondly invoked by Nehru. Leaning more towards culture and civilization rather than getting mired in history, Nehru envisioned a forward-looking India that would be the result of economic development through planning, modern education, industrialization, improved communication, and social reform. Such state-sponsored activities would inevitably create a modern nation allowing the people to rise above their religious and ethnic identities. The institutions of liberal democracy as enshrined in the intricately designed constitution was to guide the new nation towards this goal. Nehru and his followers placed immense faith in democracy and citizenship as the means by which national integration would occur. Institutions like the parliament, the federal structure, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law were the essential features of the system. The presence of a party such as the Congress added immense strength to the process as it maintained close links with the grass-roots, drawing its legitimacy from the contribution it made to the struggle for independence. The Indian Constitution made common citizenship a basis for nationhood. Such a citizenship was not conceived in narrow, exclusivist terms. In order to be a citizen at the Union’s inception, a person had to have some kind of territorial connection, based on domicile, birth, or descent (Articles 5–8 of the Indian Constitution). Neither language nor faith was permitted to become the decisive factor in identifying an Indian even though subsequently some concessions had to be made over the linguistic issue. The task before the new state was thus an awesome one as it simultaneously pursued the creation of a democratic polity,

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economic development, social justice, and an independent role in its external relations all through the means of the state. Certain inherited structures of the colonial period proved invaluable in undertaking some of these tasks. Foremost among these was the British Indian army, a highly disciplined force recruited from all parts of the country, and permeated by an allIndia rather than a provincial character. It was complemented by the celebrated bureaucracy of the British Raj which, by the time of independence, was largely manned by well trained Indian officers. Finally, and not least significant, the British had patronized the enterprise of indigenous enthusiasts in developing an educational system which worked with a common curriculum all over the country.24

These efforts could be put down as nation-building through statebuilding. Daunting though the undertaking was, the first two decades of independence could be called a qualified success. The state managed to successfully overcome the demands of linguistic particularities by the reorganization of the territorial boundaries of states to coincide with the language. At the same time, the use of the vernacular in day-to-day administration within states was provided for. The debate over making Hindi the national language did become acrimonious at a particular point but it was imaginatively handled by designating it as the official language, and English continued to be treated as the working language. All this meant operating under what became the bane of many a school-going child at the time, the three-language formula. All the same, the linguistic challenge was efficiently contained, at least for the time being. As mentioned earlier, the other conventional marker, religion, also received a sensible treatment under the secular order. The Indian Constitution contains the key provisions guaranteeing secularism even if the word “secular” itself was inserted into it much later in the 1970s. The Constitution enshrined the principle of the neutrality of the state in the religious domain. Special protective provisions were offered to the minorities and other underprivileged sections by way of reassurance that their welfare in any way would not be threatened in the new state. While much of the reform of Hindu laws was initiated, the personal laws of religious minorities were left untouched. The secular edifice was expected to provide a sense of security to the minorities and seemed the best solution for a country as heterogeneous as India. Together, the various structures and spaces were to cumulate towards creating a nation out of an amorphous entity. But the nagging question after more than half a century of independence is: has this been accomplished?

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The fiftieth anniversary of India’s independence provided a grand opportunity for many to subject the nation-building experiment, so consciously undertaken by the Nehruvian state, to close scrutiny. The general verdict pointed to its failure. The integrationist nationalist ideology as crafted by Nehru and the Congress Party stands challenged as it faces fissures along various dimensions. As Rajni Kothari laments: This model of a nation state is today in disarray. On the one hand the state is ceasing to be the central mechanism of the nation, while on the other hand the ‘nation’ that had come into being has entered a process of acute fragmentation, multiple polarizations and likely disintegration. Both the retreat of the state and the erosion of the nation are going hand in hand ...25

The cracks in the edifice had begun to occur soon after Nehru’s death but in more recent times they have become unbridgeable chasms. The dream of a unified national community occupying a given territory remains unfulfilled. As the country faces disintegrative pulls from various quarters, the two dominant strains of Indian nationalism, secular and Hindu, are once again in the forefront of the contest to define and determine the contours of India’s identity. The role of the state in this enterprise still remains central for the protagonists of both types of nationalism. Before reflecting upon the two main strands of nationalism, a summary account of the challenges posed by the different types of secessionist nationalism, especially those based on religion as in the case of Punjab and Kashmir, may be instructive.

India’s Secessionist Nationalism26 In a highly diverse and divisive society such as India’s it is not unusual for groups with different identities to press for autonomy or even selfdetermination. A virulent Tamil nationalism based on a distinct linguistic identity existed in the 1950s and 1960s. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) spearheaded the movement. In time, it became less extreme and ceased to pose a challenge to the unity of India owing to the fair way in which the central leadership accommodated the Tamils’ demands for greater control over their affairs. Once the DMK captured power in Tamilnadu in 1967, it felt more comfortable to pursue mainstream politics within the Indian federal framework. There was a great deal of give and take in the stand-off between the Tamil nationalists and the central government, which helped to defuse the crisis. This

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pattern, however, did not repeat itself in the case of Punjab and Kashmir where religious identity is the issue at stake. Although the situation in Punjab, after reaching a precipitous point, was successfully rolled back, the demands of Sikh nationalism, on the whole, was clumsily handled by the central leadership. Sikh nationalism had been noticeable even in the pre-independence days but the mainstream Sikh opinion favoured the option to be part of independent India. Despite the creation of a separate state for the Punjabi-speaking people in 1966, the Sikhs never completely felt that their identity was secure since the new state also contained an equal percentage of Hindus within it. This posed a problem for the main Sikh party, Akali Dal, since it could never win enough votes on its own to form a government against the Congress Party, which continuously manoeuvred to keep the Akalis weak. This led to much frustration and forced the Akali party to invoke religion to keep the Sikhs politically within its camps. Mrs Indira Gandhi’s style of politics did not help matters as she attempted to drive a wedge between the moderate and extremist wings of the Akali party in order to cut it down to size and control the politics of the state. By encouraging the Sikh militants, she made it possible for them to gain the upper hand over the moderates and gradually lost control of the situation in Punjab. The militants under the leadership of Bhindranwale acquired arms and began a holy war to carve out a separate Sikh state. The central government reacted to this with full force, and this created a cycle of violence and repression which finally led to the storming of the Sikhs’ holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, in 1984. The enraged Sikh sentiment eventually led to Mrs Gandhi’s assassination at the hands of her Sikh bodyguards. Rajiv Gandhi made a gallant effort to mend the situation but his well-intentioned efforts remained a non-starter. With the gradual success of the government in eliminating the militants and with the coming to power of Narasimha Rao, who was more accommodating, the cycle of violence abated and the state gradually returned to mainstream politics. A similar trajectory for the strife in Kashmir would certainly be welcomed by the central government but it is nowhere in sight as the violence continues unabated in that state. Ever since the partition and independence of India and Pakistan, the issue of Kashmir’s status has bedevilled relations between the two sub-continental neighbours. The Hindu ruler of this Muslim majority state, after his initial vacillation decided to accede to India in the face of a tribal invasion supported by Pakistan. The legality of the accession has since been disputed by Pakistan and consequently there have been three wars between the neighbours over the issue.

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After the first war in 1948, Kashmir faced a division, with one-third of the state slipping into Pakistan’s control. The rest of Kashmir came under Indian administration and was accorded a special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Owing to its Muslim majority complexion and the sensitivities of culture and religion, Kashmir enjoyed an autonomous status and also received a considerable amount of financial subsidy. Until 1980, ethnic nationalism in Kashmir remained relatively dormant. But the centralizing tendency of Indian politics as practised by Indira Gandhi, coupled with the rising expectations of the younger generation of Kashmiris and the development of a specific Islamic identity, led to an assertive ethno-nationalist movement by the end of the 1980s. The crisis of legitimacy faced by the Indian Government had much to do with the machinations of the Congress Party under Mrs Gandhi and her son who succeeded her. The non-Congress government that came to power in the state under Farooq Abdullah in 1983 was brought down with indecent haste in 1984, which left the Kashmiri Muslims with little hope that their legitimate grievances could be resolved through the democratic process. Farooq Abdullah’s opportunistic alliance with the Congress and his victory in the 1987 elections led to further disillusionment. When elections were called once again in 1989, militant groups boycotted them and an intensification of the armed struggle followed which continues unabated till today. Full-scale insurgency and massive retaliation by Indian security forces have become a feature of Kashmiri life. Pakistan actively supports the insurgency and, with the installation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, militants in Kashmir have found yet another patron. The most serious manifestation of the nexus that exists between the three was evidenced in the summer of 1999 when India and Pakistan clashed in Kargil on the Indian side of the Line of Control breached by the Pakistani-backed insurgents. India’s success in pushing back the insurgents notwithstanding, violence continues to mar the Kashmir valley. During the recent general election, the militants’ call to boycott the polls was quite successful, which shows that secessionist nationalism in Kashmir has not turned the corner yet. India’s secular credentials thus remain challenged most severely in Kashmir.

Secular Nationalism: The Current Crisis It is presently recognized in India that secularism is but a shadow of its former self and has almost evaporated from the Indian scene. This may be a bit exaggerated but there is a general consensus that it is encountering

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a serious crisis. All the exclusivist tendencies that it was supposed to gradually supplant have become the ordering principles of present-day Indian politics. Religion, region, caste, and creed have all been invoked by the political parties and leaders to mobilize the people and coax the votes out of them. It is no secret that even those parties wedded to the principle of secularism carefully compute the worth of party candidates in purely religious or caste terms. This has made a mockery of secularism and has led some to question its value at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Influential intellectual voices have been raised regarding the futility of holding on to the secular principle on the grounds that “secularism is alien to Indian culture and tradition” and therefore should be abandoned by returning to “genuine religion and the indigenous traditions of religious tolerance as the best means to preserve and maintain a pluralist and multireligious Indian society”.27 Among those who advocate such a view are Ashis Nandy, T.N. Madan, and M.N. Srinivas. Nandy avers: (T)he time has come for us to recognise that instead of trying to build religious tolerance on the good faith or conscience of a small group of de-ethnicised, middle-class politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals, a far more serious venture would be to explore the philosophy, the symbolism and the theology of tolerance of the various faiths of the citizens ...28

In his view, secularism has become a legitimizing tool in the hands of the élites. In a similar vein, T.N. Madan argues: “...in the prevailing circumstances secularism in South Asia as a generally shared credo of life is impossible, as a basis of state action impractical, and as a blueprint for the foreseeable future impotent.”29 As Joseph Tharmalingam has pointed out, M.N. Srinivas also finds secularism inadequate and “believes that India needs a new philosophy to solve the grave cultural and spiritual crisis facing the country”.30 It would appear that the disillusionment with secularism is born out of the unprincipled use made of it by the political class. To a large extent, much of the blame for this must rest with the Congress Party primarily because of its often asserted claim of being the only true custodian of secularism. As long as Nehru and his generation were at the helm, there was probably some truth to the claim, but his successors have hardly been scrupulous in adhering to the tenets of secular nationalism. As the Party began losing its cohesion and popular appeal, the compulsions to veer from the “true path” became more pronounced, and only the rhetoric remained. The institutional decay of the Party under Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv forced it to use any available instrument to sustain itself in power and, not surprisingly, appealing to the religious

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sentiments of both the majority and minority communities figured prominently in this strategy. The 1980s particularly represented a break with the past in this respect: The insecurities of different minorities were played on: Hindu minorities in Kashmir and Punjab and Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, all were invited to support Congress if they wanted the state’s protection and favours. The politics of secularism was interpreted to mean that the state was visibly solicitous of all religions. To prove her ecumenical largesse, Mrs Gandhi ‘balanced’ her appeals to Muslims by frequenting Hindu places of worship, surrounded herself with Hindu insignia, and welcomed mysterious swamis to her retinue.31

The dangerous mix of politics and religion indulged in by Mrs Gandhi and Rajiv respectively represented “secular arrogance” and “secular innocence”.32 In Mrs Gandhi’s case, this was amply demonstrated in her handling of Punjab’s politics. Her flirtation with Sikh religious extremism, born out of the expediency of marginalizing the moderate Akali Dal, a competitor of the Congress Party, and the subsequent tragic events such as the storming of the Golden Temple, her own assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, and the anti-Sikh violence that followed in its wake, are too well-known to be chronicled in detail here. But they point to the dangerous choices made by the Congress Party under her stewardship, given the secular claims of the party. The Punjab case was also instructive in another way: it brought out the inherent clash between two types of identities: separatist versus the secular-national. Such a clash was not confined to Punjab alone as the country faced similar challenges in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Northeast. Alternately pleasing the Muslims and Hindus, Rajiv Gandhi epitomized the identity crisis that Congress itself faced. His inept handling of the Shah Bano case in the 1980s set the secular enterprise on a perilous course. The point in dispute was the claim of maintenance allowance due to Shah Bano by her divorced husband. The husband invoked Muslim personal law, which prohibits such payments. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favour of Shah Bano’s claim, who sought protection in civil law as opposed to the Islamic one. The orthodox Muslims were enraged by the Court’s verdict, which was regarded as a threat to their religion. Rajiv Gandhi initially supported the Court’s decision and then, fearing the loss of Muslim votes, hurriedly pushed a law through Parliament exempting the Muslims from the obligations of the civil law in matters concerning the maintenance of Muslim women who were divorced. This episode and the manner in which it was handled by Rajiv Gandhi equally alienated both the

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majority and minority communities.32 As a sop to the Hindus, the government decided to open the disputed Temple-Mosque site in Ayodhya after the site had remained closed for years. This brought about a predictable angry response from the Muslims. This was followed by the ban on Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses by the Rajiv government which “obviously wanted to avoid a renewed mobilization in the face of already heightened communal tensions produced by the Ayodhya affair.”34 (Even the present Congress leadership despite its ad nauseam castigation of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] as a communal party, is not unmindful of the benefits of close identity with the Hindu voters, as evidenced in Mrs Sonia Gandhi’s controversial visit to Tirupathi, a much revered Hindu shrine. According to temple custom, non-Hindus may visit the temple but they are required to proclaim their faith in the presiding deity of the temple, which even some Muslim politicians are said to have honoured. But Mrs Gandhi, a Catholic, made no such proclamation and reportedly gatecrashed her way into the temple, which raised the ire of BJP supporters. Mrs Sonia Gandhi’s purpose in visiting the shrine presumably was to secure electoral rather than ethereal benefits!) Such twists and turns by an avowedly secular leadership has led to much public disenchantment and delegitimized the claims made hitherto by the Congress Party that its commitment to secular nationalism was genuine. The resulting vacuum provided an ideal space for Hindu nationalism to raise its voice and present its demands.

Hindu Nationalism Much like the pre-colonial period, contemporary Indian politics has once again become the arena for two competing types of nationalism, secular and Hindu. While the former emerged victorious in the earlier period, the latter seems to be on the ascendance recently. As represented by the BJP and its associated groups, Hindu nationalism offers an alternate vision of India’s national identity and is equally keen to employ the state in the creation and consolidation of that identity. A party which began its new life in 1980 at the fringes and only managed to obtain two seats in the 1984 elections suddenly emerged with 86 seats in 1989, and 119 seats in 1991, and has not looked back since. Once it came to power at the head of the 1998 coalition government, it was well-placed to redeem its pledge on establishing its brand of nationalism. Its commanding presence now is largely a result of a combination of factors, such as its successful appeal to pro-Hindu sentiments in the wake of the Congress Party’s legitimacy crisis, the rise of a variety of secessionist movements

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particularly in the Punjab and Kashmir and other proximate reasons, such as the Meenakshipuram mass conversions of caste Hindus to Islam, the Shah Bano case, and the Temple-Mosque dispute. The secular principle, as enshrined in the Indian Constitution, received its rudest shock when the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was destroyed in December 1992. This alienated many moderate Indians who were shocked by the vandalism of a place of worship. There is a strong disposition on the part of Hindu nationalists to favour a particular homogeneous national identity for the whole nation. They are convinced of the flaws in Nehruvian secular nationalism which, according to L.K. Advani, had merely meant pandering to the wishes of the minority community for the narrow purpose of extracting their votes, which he derisively termed as “minorityism”. Contrary to the view of India’s composite culture, Hindu nationalists argue that the dominant culture of India is Hindu even if it is conceded that it may have been influenced by other cultures. Convinced that the principal virtue of Hinduism is its tolerance, which enables it to adopt a secular worldview, they feel that minorities need not be given any special guarantees to safeguard their religious identities. Irrespective of their religious beliefs, Hindu nationalists expect the minorities, particularly the Muslims, to identify with the ancient cultural heritage of India. In their redefinition of Indian national identity, the concept of the Hindu nation occupies a prominent spot. Therefore, they see no contradiction in a Muslim taking pride in India’s pre-Islamic past. Their advocacy of a Hindu rashtra (nation) is not couched in theocratic terms but is essentially a cultural construct. They believe that India being a democratic nation provides enough avenues for dissent and, therefore, there is little likelihood of arbitrary laws threatening the rights of the minorities. As in all such systems, the will of the majority, of course, has to be respected by the minority. Since Hindus form the majority, obviously India, in their opinion, should be conceived in terms of a Hindu rashtra. Accordingly, Hindutva or Indianness becomes the organizing principle in this conceptualization. “The term Hindutva equates religious and national identity: an Indian is a Hindu — an equation that puts important religious communities, such as Christians and Muslims, outside the nation”,35 despite the claims of the BJP to the contrary. In the words of a party ideologue: “There is no incompatibility between Hindu national culture and the individual faith of Muslims. Our culture welcomes all religions, all prophets. Again, the Indian Muslims are not aliens ethnically. They are flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood.”36 All this at the theoretical level may not mean the stranglehold of any one particular religion over other faiths but in practice it exhibits a strong

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exclusivist bias and leaves a lot of room for ambiguity and suspicion. The homogenizing tendency that is evident in the scheme of Hindu nationalists leads them to be wary of any threatened dilution of the identity of the Indian people, especially in the border states of India’s northeast. This region has witnessed large-scale migration from Bangladesh, especially into West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. Movements of people across national frontiers in search of better economic prospects or for reasons of security have no doubt become a global phenomenon. But the BJP argues that the scale of the migration from Bangladesh, which is largely illegal, is transforming the demographic and ethno-cultural profile of the northeast region, apart from creating communal tensions. More Muslims than Hindus enter India illegally, which is worrisome for the BJP. In 1991, out of the 55,553 illegal immigrants who crossed over, Hindus accounted for 13,457 and Muslims constituted 42,090.37 This is regarded as a serious security threat to the nation as these migrants are perceived as a potential Fifth Column. In the case of Assam, the effect of this migration has been quite serious as the Assamese feel that the presence of non-Assamese in such overwhelming numbers in their state has eroded their majority status. It is also held that the insurgencies in the northeast have been mostly fuelled by the influx of migrants and refugees into the area and the failure of the Indian government to stem the flow of people. Over time, this has given rise to a sustained civil disobedience movement in Assam. More galling has been the practice of political parties like the Communist Party of India (Marxists) and the Congress to enlist the illegal aliens as voters so that they could be assured of their support during the elections. In 1977, more than 1.3 million such outsiders had been registered as voters.38 The discovery in 1979 of the registration of the illegal aliens from Bangladesh as voters fuelled massive agitation in Assam, which continues to challenge the central government. The BJP’s plea has thus been to seek the expulsion of the migrants, and prevent them from settling down in the border regions and in the hinterland. But even if the government decided to seriously tackle the issue it would not be easy to expel the aliens, given the difficulty of detection and the costs of deportation. Moreover, the flow of people across borders in search of a better life in this globalized world is not unique to India. But this type of globalism is not particularly appealing to the nationalists who are desirous of consolidating India’s Hindu identity, which they perceive is challenged by the presence of the Muslim migrants. The Hindu nationalists also take exception to some aspects of economic globalization. The economic programme of the Hindu nationalists, who have been trenchant critics of development planning and have also opposed the strategy of a state-controlled command economy, presents a

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mixed bag. It frowns upon vulgar consumerism and emphasizes the principles of swadeshi (indigenousness) and swavalambhan (self-reliance). In order to protect both the culture and sovereignty of the state, Hindu nationalists are cautious about permitting foreign investment in all sectors. L.K. Advani’s pithy remark “consumer chips, no potato chips” starkly sums up this bias. The predatory nature of foreign multinationals figures keenly in the economic discussions of the party. The RSS has been in the forefront of the argument against the multinationals, as well as denouncing the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as neo-colonialist exploitative agencies. The stress on the local rather than the global forms a continuing theme in the BJP’s economic policy orientations. The BJP, of course, was not original in distrusting foreign capital and calling for an indigenous approach to economic development. “The rhetoric of swadeshi and the call for nationalist consumption had deep resonances in modern Indian nationalism. The critique of multinational investments and the notion of swavalambhan (self-reliance) were borrowed from the Left and from Gandhian discourse.”39 It would be wrong, however, to assume that all Hindu nationalists are unvarying in their distrust of economic liberalization. The RSS represents one end of the spectrum but among the traditional supporters of the BJP, such as small traders and minor industrialists, the 1991 Congress-induced economic reforms did find favour. The BJP’s economic agenda therefore reflects this ambivalence as it struggles between “a desire to achieve national strength as fast as possible through a strong high-tech type of capitalist growth” while nurturing “an equally powerful desire to control and check the consequences of such a development within a vision that elevate(s) ‘cultural harmony’ to be the main component of the economic strategy.”40 Such contradictions are not easy to resolve and at the practical level they assume farcical proportions, as seen in the zeal displayed by the BJP government in Delhi in closing down a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet because of its alleged lack of hygiene. On the whole, Hindu nationalists are visibly upset by the consumerist culture increasingly on display in urban India, most of which is imported from the West. This applies to the kind of food that is consumed, the style of dressing that is in evidence, and the type of entertainment on offer. They fret about the all-round invasion of Western pop-culture via the mass media and are clearly uncomfortable with what globalization is doing to the indigenous culture of the country and its traditional values. The implication clearly is that economic globalization has ramifications beyond economics as it spills over into other domains of people’s lives. Hindu nationalism, however, is not an undifferentiated whole. It is divided between the moderate and extremist wings, with an ever present

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tussle between the two to dominate the movement. Prime Minister Vajpayee represents the moderate face of the party and his tensions with the hard-liners is well-known. Despite the efforts of the extremist wing to influence decision-making, at the moment the moderates seem to be in control. But many people are not convinced that the moderates are really in command as instances of violence against the minorities, allegedly instigated and perpetrated by the extremists, have hit the headlines in the recent past. The most tragic was the brutal killing in Orissa of an Australian Christian missionary and his two young sons. Such acts obviously make Hindu nationalists of all hues equally unappealing. By and large, however, the responsibility of power and the compulsions of coalition politics have prevented the BJP from embarking on some of its extreme programmes. India’s federal structure too has had a restraining influence on the party’s policies, as was evidenced in the controversy during the 1998 Education Ministers’ conference over the proposed educational agenda which, among other things, sought changes in the minorities’ right to run their own educational institutions, and favoured the compulsory teaching of Sanskrit, Vedas, and Upanishads in schools.41 Ministers from the non-BJP ruled states vehemently protested against these proposals, forcing the withdrawal of the objectionable document. Earlier, when the BJP was in power in states like Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, reportedly its interventions in the educational arena, especially its effort to modify the history textbooks to conform with its views on the matter, had raised the ire of many groups. These moves were, however, reversed in the wake of the dismissal of the BJP government, following the demolition of the Babri Masjid, when the two states were brought under central rule. Despite these federal correctives, the temptation to use the state in the promotion of a national identity remains strong with the Hindu nationalists.

The Two Types of Nationalism and Globalization As is evident from the record of the past five decades, a unified notion of a nation as envisaged by the élites is yet to emerge in India. Will the Hindu nationalists succeed where the secular nationalists failed? It seems doubtful. The reason is that India is too plural, too heterogeneous, too vast and too divided for this to happen in a programmed way. Some may argue that it is precisely because India is all of these that we need to create a common national identity. This at least has been the rationale behind the projects engaged in identity creation which has been further complicated by the globalization process.

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According to the secular nationalists in India, common citizenship was expected to transcend the force of segmented identities and weld the people together as Indians. Such a hope was natural since “the modern notion of citizenship is direct”,42 linking the individual to the state without the mediation of any other type of association. This makes the individual equal as it nudges him away “from ‘network’ or ‘relational identities’ to categorical ones”.43 But this does not mean that at the empirical level all these nuances are firmly grasped and acted upon, even by those who represent secular nationalism in India. The issue of citizenship and nationalism in contemporary Indian politics assumed a dramatic turn when Mrs Sonia Gandhi was projected by the Congress Party as its prime ministerial candidate in the aftermath of the fall of the BJP-led coalition government in April 1999. While it is true that a campaign against her suitability for the job, given her foreign birth, emerged from the BJP side, it was tame in comparison to the objections that surfaced from within the Congress Party itself. Veteran Congress Party leader Sharad Pawar together with his two colleagues, Purno Sangma and Tariq Anwar, in a letter to the party president demanded that Sonia Gandhi should rule herself out from the prime ministerial race based on the fact that she was not a natural-born Indian citizen. The Indian Constitution, unlike some constitutions in other parts of the world, does not bar naturalized citizens from becoming the head of government or state, but a palpable feeling of discomfort on the possibility of a foreign-born person becoming the next Prime Minister could be discerned among some Indians and, therefore, it is not surprising that it became a matter of public debate. Pawar’s letter in fact suggested that the Congress Party should work towards amending the “Constitution of India to the effect that the offices of the President, Vice-President and Prime Minister can only be held by natural born Indian citizens.”44 More forthrightly, in a public meeting, Pawar elaborated on the theme of citizenship and nationalism by saying that a person could not be patriotic to a nation that he or she was not born into, and that a person’s acquired citizenship did not make him or her sufficiently patriotic towards the adopted country.45 It is odd that Pawar should have chosen the issue of naturalized citizenship as a delegitimizing factor in Sonia Gandhi’s quest for the highest office. This has put him and others in his party closer to the position of the Hindu nationalists who are naturally against the idea of a foreign-born person occupying such a high office. Pawar’s reasons for raising this issue may have been born out of his desire to head the Congress Party himself, and therefore he may have used the foreign-born status of Sonia Gandhi as a convenient issue to question the suitability of her leadership, but it is significant that he should have invoked the distinction between formal citizenship and

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patriotic nationalism for this purpose. From this, it is clear that citizenship and nationality, although used interchangeably in common legal parlance, are not one and the same thing. The latter is understood in terms of sharing a common ancestry and culture notwithstanding what the legal status may denote. Even after fifty years of the dominance of secular nationalist thinking in India, parochialism of this sort has not been obliterated.46 However, this must not be put down as a particular Indian failing because, despite growing instances of people adopting different citizenships in a rapidly globalizing world, the inherent dichotomy between country of origin and country of domicile is not always happily bridged. It is well recognized that there are push–pull dynamics that exert influence on people who have migrated. Their emotional bonds with their country of origin tend to remain strong and, with the facility of global communication, they are able to reinforce these ties. Interestingly, in the case of India, such people are now being targeted by the government with the offer of a Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card. To the 15 million people of Indian origin living abroad (with the exception of those from Bangladesh and Pakistan), the card provides visa-free visits, economic, and educational benefits. For twenty years, the card holders can enjoy all the rights that an Indian citizen is entitled to, with the exception of political rights. It has been pointed out that “the launching of the scheme is in keeping with the international trend to cash in on the potential of diaspora — harvesting the migrant’s emotional urge for cultural affinity for economic gains at home and in the process also raising the community’s profile in the countries of adoption”.47 Tapping into this resource has been fuelled by the demands of an economy which seeks to integrate itself with the global economy in its search for markets and investments, and India recognizes the great potential of this diaspora which could be wooed by the offer of something which falls short of a dual nationality but is very close to it. The scheme has been welcomed by Indians residing abroad, and within India there has been no great opposition to it. There seems a general understanding that the passport one holds need not be a barrier to the feelings one has for one’s country of origin. This adds another layer to the national identity question.

Conclusion On the whole then, if the secular nationalists led by Nehru tilted to one side by emphasizing modernity, liberalism, a scientific temperament and ignoring the force of history and culture to create a nation, the Hindu

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nationalists tilt to the other side. But it is the nature of Hinduism that complicates the process of creating a single, uniform Indian identity. As Bharat Waravwalla insightfully notes in the following extensive quotation: Hindutva nationalism and Hinduism do not complement each other in the same way that Lutheran Protestantism or Anglical Protestantism complemented German and English nationalisms. The Ayodhya episode illustrates this well. Rama became a contested symbol of the nation right after Hindutva nationalists demolished the Babri mosque at Ayodhya in December 1991(sic.). Whose Rama, Mayavati would ask, while campaigning for the assembly election in Uttar Pradesh in November 1993? Rama of Ramayan is revered by all; Rama as a symbol of Indian nation at once divides the Hindu social order. Apart from clashing economic and political interests among them, if one can at all speak of the Hindus as a people united by a single common faith, the idea of a Hindu nation (in the modern sense) would be alien to their thinking.48

This being so, should the Indian state be used primarily as an instrument to craft this elusive identity? Equally, must the élites attempt to rewrite the history of the nation based on their own particular preferences? Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party indulged in this earlier, and now the BJP vows to do the same in the name of restoring the balance, but in the process it may very well create its own tilted version. It is doubtful whether these stratagems will be conducive to producing an “acceptable” national identity. Instead, if the ruling élites were to productively use their energies in attending to the task of governance, the sole purpose for which they are elected, it would be more beneficial to the nation. All the gimmicks of using the state machinery to artificially produce a national identity would be a waste of time, energy, and resources. The more the state is brought into the arena of identity creation, the more elusive the quest becomes. Left to their own devices, Indian people may resolve the issue of identity by themselves, choosing according to their own genius what is best for them. The rudiments of this are already in evidence judging by the common feelings of anguish/revulsion over events like the imposition of the Emergency in the 1970s, the destruction of the Babri Masjid, the killing of Graham Staines and his two sons, and pride and euphoria over a World Cup victory in cricket, nuclear explosion in Pokhran, or the Nobel prize honour for Amartya Sen, whose genius in economics received as much praise as the fact that he was still an Indian national. This may ultimately be what national identity is all about — a spontaneous reaction from below rather than a laboriously orchestrated move from the top.

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Notes 1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 17–49. 2. A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 3. Ernest Gellner, Thought And Change (London: Widenfield & Nicholson, 1964), p. 169. 4. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p.1. 5. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6. 6. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 95. 7. Sanjay Seth, “Nationalism, National Identity and ‘History’: Nehru’s Search for India”, Thesis Eleven, No.32 (1992), p.37, quoted in Jan Jindy Pettmen, “Nationalism and After”, Review of International Studies 24, Special issue (December 1998): 153. 8. For a good discussion on peripheral nationalism, see D.L. Seiler, “Peripheral Nationalism Between Pluralism and Monism”, International Political Science Review 10, no.3 (1989): 191–208. 9. Fred Halliday, “Nationalism”, in The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 362. 10. Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 43. 11. Katherine Verdery, “Whither Nation and Nationalism”, Daedulus 122 (Summer 1993): 38. 12. Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism”, in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, edited by John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 274. 13. Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Structure of Nationalist Discourse”, in State and Nation in the Context of Social Change, edited by T.V. Sathyamurthi (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 320. 14. Ibid. 15. This term is used by Romilla Thapar and is quoted in Achin Vanaik, The Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India (London: Verso, 1990), p.142. 16. Partha Chaterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.77. 17. Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), p.160. 18. Quoted in Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 158–59. 19. Sudipta Kaviraj, “Crisis of the Nation-State in India”, in Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?, edited by John Dunn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 119. 20. Malcolm Yapp, “Language, Religion and Political Identity: A General Framework”, in Political Identity in South Asia, edited by David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (Guilford: Curzon Press, 1979), p. 3. 21. Ashis Nandy depicts them as “modernists” and “restorationists” in his article “The Culture of Indian Politics”, Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (November 1970): 59.

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22. Achin Vanaik, The Painful Transition, p. 142. 23. Rajni Kothari, “Under Globalisation Will Nation State Hold?”, Economic and Political Weekly, 1 July 1995, p.1594. 24. Sudipta Kaviraj, “Crisis of the Nation-State in India”, p.121. 25. Rajni Kothari, “Under Globalisation Will Nation State Hold?”, p.1594. 26. Much of the discussion in this section is based on Atul Kohli’s “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism?” in Community Conflicts and the State of India, edited by Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 17–32. 27. Joseph Tharmalingam, “Indian Social Scientists and Critique of Secularism”, Economic and Political Weekly, 4 March 1995, p. 457. 28. Ashis Nandy, “A Critique of Modernist Secularism”, in Politics in India, edited by Sudipta Kaviraj (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 340–41. 29. T.N. Madan, “Secularism in its Place”, in ibid, pp. 342–43. 30. J. Tharmalingam, “Indian Social Scientists ...”, p. 459. 31. Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India, p.183. 32. Ashutosh Varshney, “Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety”, Daedelus 122 (Summer 1993): 247. 33. During Rajiv’s regime, the serialization of the various Hindu epics, Ramayana, the Mahabharata and Chanakya, on television was also interpreted as an instance of tapping into the support of the majority community through the skilful use of mass media. 34. Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.186. 35. Ibid., p. 1. 36. Quoted in Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, p. 222. 37. See Ranabir Samaddar, The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration From Bangladesh to West Bengal (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), p. 206. 38. Harish K. Puri, “Political Uses of Federalism: Managing Diversities in the States of North-East India”, Asian Journal of Political Science 6, no. 1 (June 1998): 23. 39. Hansen, The Saffron Wave, p. 171. 40. Ibid., p.172. 41. Hindu-International Edition, 31 October 1998. 42. Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity”, in John Hall, The State of the Nation, p. 196. 43. Ibid., p. 198. 44. Hindu-International Edition, 22 May 1999. 45. Times of India, 21 May 1999. 46. In the September 1999 general election, Mrs Sonia Gandhi’s Italian origin did not handicap her as she won handsomely in both the constituencies she contested. But the Congress Party under her leadership met its worst fate, winning the lowest number of seats. One can only speculate that her inexperience rather than her origins had a greater role to play in such an outcome. 47. India News (High Commission of India, Singapore) 2, no. 6 (1999): 3. 48. Bharat Warivwalla, “ The Problem”, Seminar 442 (June 1996), pp.14–15.

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m 12 n Nationalism and Globalization in the Russian Federation at the Millennium FRANK CIBULKA

Art thou not, my Russia, soaring along even like a spirited, never-tobe-outdistanced troika?....Whither art thou soaring away to, then, Russia? Give me thy answer! But Russia gives none. With a wondrous ring does the jingle-bell trill; the air rent to shreds, thunders and turns to wind; all things on earth fly past and, eyeing it askance, all the other peoples and nations stand aside and give it the right of way. — Nikolai Gogol, The Dead Souls

Introduction Examining nationalism within the post-Soviet Russian Federation in the context of an increasingly globalized world is a complex task, given the propensity of the various historical forms of the Russian state to resist inclusion in the prevalent socio-economic, artistic, and political PanEuropean trends. Thus, Russia never experienced the impact of Renaissance or Protestant Reformation,1 while its embrace of the Age of Reason had been ambivalent in its nature, and limited in scope. Both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, in spite of their universalistic and Messianic impulses, functioned within the context of a highly isolationist autarkic political culture. That globalization has indeed emerged as a factor in the post-communist Russian state is, nevertheless, beyond reasonable denial. Russia had first confronted aspects of 319

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modernity in the late seventeenth century through the reforms of Peter the Great and was fundamentally transformed by the Marxist mobilization model of socio-economic modernization thrust upon the Soviet empire by Joseph Stalin during the 1920s and 1930s. Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policy of glasnost exposed his country to the Information Age, while the set of policies collectively known as perestroika marked a decisive departure from traditional Russian autarky through seeking Western aid from such global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the failure of Gorbachev’s attempt to fuse socialism with reinvigorating elements of capitalism, a highly flawed and predatory form of capitalism emerged in Russia, fostering nevertheless its integration into the global economy. This chapter will examine the traditional sources and current manifestations of nationalism in contemporary Russian Federation, and then explore the degree and nature of interaction between globalization and various forms of ethnic nationalism flourishing on the Eurasian continent. The sweep of Russian history from its origins in the Kievan Rus state more than one thousand years ago, through the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century and the period of Appanage Russia, the rise of Muscovy and the Russian Empire to the Bolshevik revolution, and the Soviet Union constructed upon Marxist-Leninist ideology, betrays a strong common thread of civilizational continuity provided for by a remarkable persistence of Great Russian ethnic domination and largely unchanging political culture. The international relations supernova which twinned the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the demise of European communism resulted in a sudden break-up of the Soviet Empire and the addition of fifteen sovereign states to the international community. In the case of the Russian Federation, which assumed many of the privileges and obligations of a de facto successor state to the Soviet Union,2 the fundamental question which arose was whether the seemingly resurgent Russia, newly emerged from its opaque Soviet shell, would constitute a case of transformation of a large empire into a smaller empire or, as one might hope, of change from an empire to a multicultural state. It will not be the purpose of this chapter to examine the entire spectrum of the nationalism of the various former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic states, Georgia, or Turkmenistan, but to assess the manifestations of nationalism of both majority and variable minority ethnic groups within the Russian Federation, as well as to examine the nationality policy of the Russian state under President Boris Yeltsin, in order to relate them collectively to the globalization process.

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The Soviet Union’s Nationalities Policy Although nationalistic sentiments and even the survival of the nation itself had no secure place in Marxist-Leninist ideology, during the formation of the Soviet state Vladimir Lenin had no qualms about using the nationalistic feelings of the various ethnic groups formerly suppressed under Tsarist rule to mobilize support for his regime. In the globalizing Marxist view, however, the nation was a specific historical category emerging from the economic necessities of capitalism, and, in the long run, this temporary phenomenon was to give way to a world community with a single culture and language. But the political reality after the Bolshevik revolution, which eliminated the forced unity of the Tsarist empire, also known as the “prison of nations”, made it mandatory for the revolutionary leadership to seek support from the national minorities during the period of political mobilization. After an initial experiment with confederation, a federal form of statehood was granted to the largest minorities under the 1922 constitution which created the USSR. This form survived even during the severe repression of national minorities under Stalin’s rule and the assimilationist policies known as Russification. In the post-Stalinist period, the Soviet nationality policy developed in a more ambivalent or even contradictory manner. While the official Soviet position seemed to favour an assimilationist model conceptualized by Vernon V. Aspaturian for nation-building, the actual policy during the last three and half decades of Soviet rule seemed to be a commonwealthbuilding model, favouring the long-range preservation of the federal system and further development of individual national, cultural and linguistic identities within the framework of loyalty to and congruence with the Russian-dominated Soviet state.3 The changing and inconsistent nature of the official Soviet pronouncement regarding the long-term solution to the Soviet nationality issue seemingly reflected the policy discussions within the Communist party leadership. Thus, while the twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956 embraced a commitment to the “flourishing” (ratstsvet) of individual nations within the Soviet Federation, by 1958 the concept of “coming together” (sblizhenie) or even “merging”(sliianie) of nations within the USSR seemed to have gained favour within the Soviet rhetoric.4 This ideological trend was reflected in Nikita Khrushchev’s highly futuristic official Communist Party Program, adopted at the twenty-second CPSU Congress in 1961: The boundaries between the union republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance.... Full-scale Communist construction signifies a new stage in the development of national

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Frank Cibulka relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together and their complete unity will be achieved.5

While the new Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, after the fall of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, had initially stressed the benefits of dual patriotism of Soviet citizens to their individual nations as well as to the Soviet state, the concept of “merger” (sliianie) came to be associated with the period of mature or developed socialism and persisted into the interregnum period of Konstantin Chernenko’s rule.6 Mikhail Gorbachev took over the reins of power in the Soviet Union when its command-based economic system began to grow progressively more obsolete and weak through confrontation with the globalizing forces of modernity. Gorbachev’s reform campaigns of glasnost and perestroika, which, owing to the elimination of the regime’s control mechanisms and erosion of official ideology, permitted a resurgence of strong nationalistic sentiments within the Soviet Union, failed to deal with this issue in a timely and serious fashion. This ultimately proved to be the leading reason for the demise of the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev at last realized the need for the fundamental constitutional restructuring of the relationship between the nationalities and began his consultative talks with representatives of the Soviet republics at NovoOgarevo, in the Spring of 1991, it was far too late. The outcome of the talks was the draft of the Union Treaty proposing to set up a new union to be called the Union of Sovereign States, which would provide the union republics with far-reaching economic autonomy. This blueprint, containing elements of confederalism, pleased almost no one, as many Soviet nationalities now demanded outright independence, while a conservative coalition of party, military, and secret police officials was disturbed enough by its implications to prevent its imminent signing by staging the August 1991 coup, which set in motion the events surrounding the final unravelling of the Soviet state four months later.

Centre–Periphery Relations One of the central features of the great revolution of our times which has brought the modern world into being is that people of mankind in successive stages have been swept into vivid and sometimes allconsuming sense of their existence as nations — or at least of their desire to create nations where none existed before.7

The demise of the Soviet Union brought about the establishment, not of a Russian national state, but of another multinational federation,

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albeit a more homogenous one. The Russian Federation was initially thought by many to be a symbolic return to the form of the Tsarist Russian Empire. However, especially after the reign of Alexander III, Tsarist Russia was clearly a unitary, highly centralized assimilationist state, covering far greater territory. The demise of Tsarist Russia allowed the newly formed Soviet state to establish itself within approximately the same boundaries, in contrast to the Russian Federation of 1991, which lost one-quarter of the Soviet Union’s territory and almost half of the population. The Soviet Union’s 290 million inhabitants were composed of 100 different nationalities, with 22 major ones each with a population of more than one million. While just over half of the Soviet Union’s inhabitants were ethnic Russians — the figure for the Russian empire was 45 per cent — the Russian Federation had in 1996 a population of 148 million, and the Russians accounted for 81.5 per cent of the total. The diminished state, however, still contained a myriad of ethnic groups, as was reflected in the continuing federal arrangement in which the former union republics of the Soviet Union gained independence, while the autonomous republics, possessing a lower level of administrative autonomy and primarily located in the heart of the Russian state, were simply renamed as “republics” within the Russian Federation. This ethnic condition of “nations within nations” has been labelled by scholars as “matrioshka nationalism”.8 Certainly, basic differences can be identified between the past empires of Peter the Great and Vladimir Lenin and the current smaller Russian multinational state. First, although both the Soviet Union and the current Russia were organized as federations, the Russian federal constitution does not provide for the right of secession. Secondly, the current major ethnic groups, with the exception of the Tatar and Tuva republics, have no history of sovereign statehood. Thirdly, while the Soviet Union was glued together by the ideological bond of Marxist-Leninist ideology and by the vision of a communist paradise, no truly common bonding element exists among the disparate nations of the current Russian state. At the same time, the current Russian Federation presumes a perpetual survival of distinct ethnic groups, while the Soviet Union vaguely charted their merger and demise. Finally, while the Soviet Union provided for a separate Russian political entity — the Russian Federal Republic metamorphosed in 1991 into the present independent state — no distinctly Russian ethnic area exists within the boundaries of the contemporary Russian Federation. The relationship between the centre and the periphery has been spelled out within Chapter 3 of Section One of the 1993 Constitution, which recognizes 21 republics and a large number of lower administrative units based on regional and ethnic identity, such as the

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territories and regions, autonomous areas, and federal cities, largely preserving the old Soviet structures. There is one unified citizenship, although the still existing internal passports of the citizens identify their ethnic identity. The state language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory is the Russian language, although the republics have the right to institute their own state languages, which are used alongside the state language in all administrative bodies.9 The Constitution clearly enumerates the power of the national government in Moscow, as well as that of the republics and the joint jurisdiction. The predominance of the federal government is, however, apparent from Article 76, which includes a provision asserting that “In the event of a contradiction between a federal law and any other act issued in the Russian federation, the federal law shall apply.”10 Significantly, President Boris Yeltsin has consistently eschewed resort to exclusionary Russian nationalism, both in his quest for power and in his subsequent nationality policy. While it is clear that he decided to play “the Russian card” in 1990 in order to gain ascendancy in his rivalry with Mikhail Gorbachev, this must be understood in terms of Yeltsin’s decision to use the revitalized Russian Federal Republic rather than the moribund Soviet Union as his primary vehicle for attaining power. This was best indicated by the fact that Yeltsin in 1990 sought and secured the chairmanship of the Russian parliament and in June 1991 won a highly contested election for the new republican presidency of the Russian Federation. All along, however, his Russian nationalism has been directed at the composite Rossiiskii narod rather than at its ethnically pure Russkyii component.11 Throughout his subsequent decade at the helm of Russia, he did not waver from this principle.

The Re-Emergence of the Russian Question In spite of the ethnic Russian domination of the Soviet Communist Party and polity, the Soviet system did not bestow special privileges on ethnic Russians, and patriotic attachment to the Soviet Union was chosen over ethnically based Russian sentiments. For many ethnic Russians, the Soviet Union represented a continuation of the historical Russian state and, when it disintegrated, they found themselves ill at ease and in many cases searching for an alternate source of identity. Within this lies the essence of the “Russian question”: What is Russia? What are its sources of identity? What are its internal and global missions? Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated the problem forcefully in his 1990 book How to Reconstitute Russia?:

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The word “Russia” has become soiled and tattered through careless use; it is invoked freely in all sorts of inappropriate contexts. Thus, when the monster-like USSR was lunging for chunks of Asia and Africa, the reaction the world over was: “Russia, the Russians”... What exactly is Russia? Today, now? Who, today considers himself part of the future Russia? And where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?12

Today, the narrow ethnic definition of being Russian (Russkii) inevitably gives way to a broader definition of Russian by citizenship but not necessarily by ethnicity (Rossiianin). The search for identity perhaps inevitably turned primarily to the historical forms of the Russian state. The new flag of the Russian Federation is the flag of Tsarist Russia, while the music of its new anthem is inherited from the prerevolutionary Tsarist anthem composed by Mikhail Glinka. The icon and the red flag with the hammer and sickle ironically both remain powerful symbols of the Russian polity. The search for the most fundamental sources of Russian national identity reveals three basic elements: the ancestral descent from the Kievan Rus state more than a millennium ago, the Slavic racial identity of its people, and its identity as an Orthodox Christian country. While these elements may be clearly evident today in the unwillingness of Russian nationalists to accept the separation of Russia and the Ukraine, in the Pan-Slavic sense of brotherhood and solidarity with other Slavic people — particularly if they adhere to the Orthodox creed (such as the Serbs) — or in the powerful role and exalted societal status of the formerly oppressed institution of the Russian Orthodox Church, none of the three provide an acceptable source of identity for the non-Slav ethnic nations located within the Russian Federation. Many of these elements can be labelled as mythomoteurs, which have been defined by John Armstrong as “constitutive myth of polity”.13 Anthony D. Smith has poignantly applied this concept to the Russian Empire when he wrote that: By identifying the state in the person of the Tsar, the people and the Orthodox faith, the rulers were able to create an effective sacred mythomoteur which was in effect limited to Russian community claimed to descend from Vladimir I of Kiev and ultimately Rurik, even though the Tsarist empire soon expanded to include non-Russian and nonOrthodox peoples .... In this we may include the peculiar Russian fusion of dynastic and communal-religious mythomoteur which undoubtedly paved the way

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Frank Cibulka for territorial consolidation around an Orthodox Russian Slavic core and hence the growth, through bureaucratic incorporation, of national state in the early modern era.14

Similarly, Armstrong argues that the “attachment to Slavic as a holy tongue constituted a major part of the mythomoteur.”15 This is a key point, as it refers to the remarkable fact that Russia, in spite of being Christianized by Constantinople, never became linguistically incorporated into the Greek-language Byzantine civilization, permitting it to eventually claim a status as a Third Rome, while retaining its distinct Slavic identity. Somewhat deviant from the classical notions of modern Russia as a child of the Kievan Rus and of Moscow as a Third Rome and a Messianic inheritor of Byzantium’s Orthodox traditions, is the currently hugely popular movement of Eurasianism associated with the names of Nikolai Trubetskoi, Pavel Savitsky, and Lev Gumilev. This movement, which progressively developed in the nineteenth and twentietth centuries, has embraced neither the Slavophile nor the Western notions of Russia but significantly validates the amalgamation of its Slav and Asian origins. It contains the argument that “Eurasia is the natural geographic setting for the Russian people’s distinctive ‘ethnos’, the consequence of historic symbiosis between them and the non-Russian inhabitants of the open steppes, creating thereby a unique Eurasian cultural and spiritual entity”.16 The ideas of Eurasianism have proven to hold a powerful attraction for a wide spectrum of Russia’s intellectual and political life, because they restate the unique civilizational nature of the Russian state. They also provide a possible source of common identity for the nonSlavic nations of the Russian Federation by diluting the importance of the mythometeurs of the notions of common Slavic descent and of Russia as the Third Rome. Paul Dukes lucidly assessed the importance of Gumilev’s controversial ideas,17 when he wrote: In Gumilev’s view, an ethnos was a group distinguishable from another by a typical pattern of behaviour, and sometimes combining with other such groups in a superethnos such as the Graeco-Roman, the Byzantine, the Arab, the Ottoman, the West European, the Old Turkish, the Mongol and the Great Russian. While the affinity that could be found within a superethnos was lacking in the relations between one superethnos and another, according to Gumilev, Great Russia was able to prosper because it could move away from the Byzantine superethnos and resist the West European because of its long symbiosis with the nomads of the steppe. So, far from being unbearable yoke, the Mongol invasions presented an opportunity for beneficial alliance.18

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In his introduction to Gumilev’s seminal work Medieval Russia and the Great Steppe, the Russian historian Dimitrii Likhachev highlighted the revisionist nature of the study and the significance of the professed lack of fusion of Slavic Rus and the Greek Byzantium, by asserting that “the Byzantium, according to the author’s opinion, was not ‘Second Rome’ but Anti-Rome”.19 The notion of mixed descent has also been previously dealt with by Western scholars, though in a somewhat different, less positive way. Hans Kohn wrote more than half a century ago: “The Russian Empire conquered vast territories alien in race and civilization and welded them into centralized despotism mightier than any other in history.”20 Inherent in the discussion of the “Russian Question” is, however, the argument that Russia and the Russian nation, far from being the oppressors within the Soviet Empire, were in fact its primary victims. Solzhenitsyn has emerged as a vocal critic of post-Soviet Russia, lamenting its loss of traditional values and sense of identity and its decline into soulless materialism. The Nobel prize-winning author maintains that the present form of the Russian Federation, in part owing to the lack of any national Russian political institution, fails to adequately address the needs of the Russian nation. In his 1998 book, Russia in Collapse, he sounded a distinctly alarmist tone: Although, according to the last census, Russians in the Russian Federation constitute 82 per cent (not even every ethnically homogenous country exhibits such preponderance), they are fragmented by autonomies and, even where they constitute a majority, they find themselves with a status of a minority and with lesser rights, deprived by those who represent titular nationality. ...The ethnic Russians especially lack that which is possessed by other nations of the Russian Federation — a separate ‘republican’ voice in the governmental administration and legislation. If we look yet deeper, we then find our fateful historical legacy — that of all-embracing nation. Should we now have delivered all the governmental laws related to the autonomies, Russia will not endure, it will collapse.21

Other scholars have conceptualized Russia’s post-Soviet crisis of identity in terms of an aftermath of a decolonization process: Russian political elites have not brought to decolonization a clear awareness of the distinction between nation and empire, as did, for example, British elites following their empire’s eventual decolonization. As a consequence, the question of what and where is Russia, what is its sense of national self, remains highly ambiguous.22

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The creation of the diaspora and the rise of the nationalistic right within the Russian Federation have been among the key aspects of this decolonization process and the quest for redefinition of the Russian selfidentity.

The Russian Diaspora and the Extreme Right The Russians have just recently joined the Chinese, Indians, and Jews as one of the great diaspora nations of the world, since 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves living outside the boundaries of their motherland at the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. They were the Russians who resided more or less permanently in the other union republics, namely, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic States, who suddenly became an unwilling part of the diaspora without having ever formally emigrated from their native land. Their presence in the former republics of the Soviet Union — now collectively labelled by Moscow as the “Near Abroad”— has presented a potentially explosive problem because of the discrimination in the areas of employment and citizenship which suddenly confronted these frequently unwelcome guests in the new countries. At the same time, their return to the Russian Federation is largely precluded by a lack of jobs and housing. Dual citizenship for these Russians has been a rare practice in the absence of bilateral or multilateral legal arrangements between Russia and the countries of the Near Abroad.23 In spite of the fact that a certain “gathering in” of Russians from the Near Abroad has become evident in the 1990s, this reverse emigration has confronted the Russian returnees with severe existential problems at home. Alexander Solzhenitsyn agonized in his influential volume, The Russian Question: Russia has truly fallen into a torn state: 25 million have found themselves “abroad” without moving anywhere, by staying on the lands of their fathers and grandfathers. Twenty-five million — the largest diaspora in the world by far; how do we dare turn our back to it?? especially since local nationalisms (which we have grown accustomed to view as quite understandable, forgivable and “progressive”) are everywhere suppressing and maltreating our severed compatriots.24

Not surprisingly, the issue of the Russian diaspora in the Near Abroad has contributed to the proliferation of extreme-right nationalistic movements in the country, ranging from the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky to the far more dangerous Pamyat (Memory) of Dmitrii Vasilev and the neo-Nazi paramilitary organization, Russian

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National Unity, headed by Aleksandr Barkashov. One common ground for all these groups is the intense anti-Semitism, which has formed an integral part of the Russian political culture. Their racial intolerance and the danger of their tactical coalition with the communists (red-brown coalition) present an enduring danger to the stability of the Russian Federation. Among the common themes of the Russian nationalist right have been the notions that Russia’s ancient history, prior to being tainted by foreign-inspired reforms, should be regarded as a wellspring of enduring values for prospective national rebirth; that Orthodox Christianity must regain its central position within Russian spiritual life if Russia is to retain its national identity; the argument that Russia was the prime victim of the Soviet Union; and finally, the assertion that Russia must free itself of its subsidizing patronage relationship with the minority cultures in Central Asia.25 A century ago, the Russian Empire contained roughly half of all the world’s Jewry and possessed ancient and deep-seated traditions of antiSemitism. Unrelenting economic hardship, which settled over much of Russia’s population during the 1990s, has fuelled a surge in anti-Semitic manifestations, particularly among the youth. This has taken the form of two attacks on Moscow synagogues in July 1999, prompting the Russian Jewish Congress to issue a statement calling such actions “a threat to all Russian citizens”. 26 The Jewish community in Russia, diminished by the steady emigration to Israel and to the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union, now, just as it did under communist repression, finds itself increasingly appealing to foreign governments to ease their plight. Since 1989, some 700,000 Jews emigrated from the territory of the former Soviet Union, leaving an estimated 450,000– 700,000 Jews within the boundaries of the Russian Federation. Even though the most intense tide of emigration took place during 1990–91 when, during the two-year period, some 333,000 Jews departed, within the relatively stabilized rate in 1998 the figure still reached some 46,020 persons.27 As the largest concentration of Russian Jews can be found in the two largest cities — 200,000 in Moscow and 100,000 in St. Petersburg — most of the anti-Semitic attacks tend to take place there.

The Variable Non-Russian Nations and the Islamic Threat Today, as I write these lines, I am unbearably saddened to see what is happening to my country. Conflicts between nationalities have developed into wars, hundreds of thousands of refugees have been

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Frank Cibulka forced from their land, their homes, the graves of their forefathers. Jaunty soldiers pose against the background of burning cities.

— Mikhail Gorbachev28 The greatest threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation could undoubtedly arise from the reawakened nationalism of the various non-Russian ethnic groups, which stand ready for ethnonational mobilization by radical nationalistic groups that regard post-Soviet Russia as simply a diminished version of the Russian/Soviet colonial empire. The country’s largest minority group are the Tatars with 5.5 million people, constituting 3.8 per cent of the Russian population. The second largest are the Ukrainians — themselves a harmless diaspora with 4.4 million people, or 3 per cent of the population, while the heterogenous Dagestani, the Middle Volga Chuvash, the Bashkirs and the Mordvinians boast populations between one to two million each. The republics of the Russian minorities are spread throughout the territory of the Russian Federation, from the Arctic republics of Sakha (Yakutia) and Komi to the Budhist Tuva, which is adjacent to Mongolia. Many of the republics, such as the resource-rich Sakha, have won considerable economic autonomy, without challenging the sovereignty of the Moscow-based federation. While a decade ago the Soviet Union contained some 50 million Muslims, it is estimated that the Russian Federation has inherited about 18 million citizens of Islamic creed. Accordingly, the greatest areas of ethnic unrest are to be found in the largely Muslim regions — the mountain republics of North Caucasus and the republics of the Middle Volga. Two ethnic groups — the Chechens and the Tatars — have attempted to win independence. The million-strong, proudly nationalistic, and largely homogenous Chechens, with their long history of struggle against Russian colonization, took advantage of the political vacuum in November 1991 to declare their independence from the Soviet Union and were forced to defend it in a bloody war with the Russian invasion force in 1994–96. They ultimately inflicted a defeat on the Russian military, but at the cost of the destruction of their country’s infrastructure and the collapse of their social and political order. It is estimated that some 80,000 people died while more than 400,000 refugees were displaced in the Chechen conflict. Chechnya, impoverished and crime-ridden, remains in an uneasy limbo of de facto independence, having paid a high price for its separatism. The Tatars, who share their oil-rich republic with a large Russian population (49 per cent Tatars and 43 per cent Russians in 1989), live

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in the heartland of Russia. Faced with the prospect of civil war or Russian military action, they voluntarily moderated their demands for independence and signed a special compact of association in 1996 providing them with the most extensive autonomy of any unit within the Russian Federation. Islamic militancy is, however, steadily gaining ground in the republic. During 1999, a number of Pakistani “missionaries” were expelled from Tatarstan for engaging in illegal activities, including advocating a holy war. The conservative Muslim sect, the Wahhabis, began to operate in the republic and is seen as a potential source of support to the ultra-nationalist forces.29 The danger of ethnic separatism within the Muslim areas of the Russian Federation clearly persists, not the least because of the presence of the fault lines between what Samuel Huntington identifies as the Orthodox and Islamic civilizations. The threat of a future “clash of civilizations” can be seen from a divergent reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign against Yugoslavia on behalf of the Kosovo Albanian Muslims in April 1999. As the first Russian volunteers arrived in the northern Serbian town of Novi Sad to provide Pan-Slavic assistance to the Serbs,30 a Tatar nationalistic organization called for volunteers to enlist and fight on the side of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. An official of the Tatar Public Center (TPC), an independence-oriented organization with 50,000 members, stated that the volunteers would “protect, with weapons in their hands, the interests of the persecuted Albanian Moslems”. At the same time, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party opened recruitment offices in Tatarstan, initially signing up 100 men to fight alongside the Serbian forces in Kosovo. 31 The increased importance of the panOrthodox Slavic ties manifested itself in mid-April 1999 when the Yugoslav parliament voted to join the proposed loose union between Russia and Belarus, and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said in Moscow that he favoured the idea of including Yugoslavia in a closer economic and political integration.32 These symbolic gestures were followed up in late July with the setting up of a joint commission, consisting of the members of the Russsian-Belarus Interparliamentary Assembly and of the Yugoslav parliament, which was designed to pave the way for Belgrade’s membership.33 It is difficult to visualize how the pan-Slavic impulses manifesting itself currently in the diplomatic activities of the Kremlin leadership may be compatible with the interests of the multi-ethnic Russian Federation. The unrelenting nature of the threat to the stability of the Slavdominated Russian state coming from the Northern Caucasus region has

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been more than clearly demonstrated by a renewed outbreak of conflict in the Muslim regions of Dagestan and in Chechnya during 1999. Dagestan is a mountainous republic of 2.2 million people composed of 34 ethnic groups, such Lezkis, Kumyks, Avars and Kalmyks, but possesses no dominant titular nationality. In August 1999, an estimated force of more than 2,000 guerrillas crossed over from neighbouring Chechnya and, under the leadership of the legendary Chechen field commander and former Prime Minister Shamil Basayev, seized several border villages and held them for two weeks under heavy Russian bombardment and shelling before withdrawing. It was reported that some 2,000 guerrillas and 275 troops and police were killed in the fighting.34 Many believed that the Islamic fighters could draw on a natural reservoir of support from about 100,000 Akkin Chechens, who were resettled from their homeland to Dagestan in 1921. In addition, about 10 per cent of the Dagestan population are alleged to belong to the Wahhabist sect, or constitute its sympathizers.35 In the course of the conflict, however, it became clear that the Dagestani Akkins refused to support the Islamic rebellion and, on the contrary, according to the Russian human rights activist Sergei Kovalyev, themselves became a target of harassment by the numerically stronger Lak ethnie.36 The attack was mounted by a military force subordinate to the Congress of Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, which was formed in 1998 under Basayev’s leadership. It proclaimed as its goal the creation of an independent Islamic state combining Chechnya and Dagestan.37 This arrangement would allow the land-locked Chechnya access to the Caspian Sea. The root causes of the rebellion, which did not attract the support of the republican leadership of Dagestan’s pro-Moscow administration of State Council Chairman Magomedali Magomedov, can partially be found in popular dissatisfaction, and reach deeply into the republic’s social and economic situation. Much of the population lives in poverty with a 70 per cent unemployment rate, while the larger ethnic groups, such as the Avars (27 per cent of the population) and Dagins tend to exclude the smaller ethnies from their share of economic activity.38 In any case, the situation appeared to be serious enough to prompt the then Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin to admit that “today the situation in Dagestan is very difficult” and warn : “We could really lose Dagestan”.39 In spite of the fact that Chechnya and Dagestan have during the 200-year-old history of antiRussian resistance in the North Caucasus usually acted as an undifferentiated unit, the flare-up of guerrilla activity in Dagestan has to be seen primarily as restricted to dissident elements within the Chechen leadership, not supported either by the elected Chechen

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government of President Aslan Mashkhadov or by Dagestan’s general population. On the other hand, one can regard the guerrilla forces headed by commanders Basayev and Khattab as a direct legacy of the radicalization of Islamic elements in the aftermath of the Afghan war. The mujahideen tradition of the Afghan resistance has never been extinguished and has been shifting along the periphery of Russia and the former Soviet Union in a highly destabilizing fashion, as could be seen in the civil war in Tajikistan and the guerilla activities in Kyrgyzstan. Commander Khattab, who appears to be the most radical of the field commanders in the North Caucuses, appears to be of Jordanian origin, a product of an earlier Chechen diaspora in the Middle East. He received his first experience of war as a mujahideen fighter in Afghanistan fifteen years ago and, before moving to Chechnya in 1995, fought with the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan in 1992.40 The uncompromising attitude of both leaders was clearly displayed in unique exclusive interviews granted in early September to a Czech journalist representing the newspaper Lidove Noviny. Basayev declared on the subject of Russia’s responsibility: Russia has abolutely no workable political concept of its relationship to the Caucasus and Chechnya. The lack of recognition of Chechen independence will lead to great tragedies. Equally, the subversive, diversionist activities of the Russian secret services in Chechnya will eventually turn against the Russians. Moscow destroyed our entire country and did not pay us even a kopek in war reparations. We have massive unemployment. Our youth, no matter what the adults tell them, place the blame for everything on Russia. In the maturing generation is evident a growing feeling of hatred and contempt for Russia and we will support and in every way cultivate this contempt in them, because Russia is truly the guilty party in all our sufferings. Time has come when they have to pay all their accounts.41

Basayev then added menacingly: Against the Russians, we will always fight with happiness and we will help anyone who will be striving for freedom. In any form. And help to brothers in Dagestan is directly our duty.42

Commander Khattab similarly claimed that: As long as I am needed by Muslim brothers here or anywhere else on earth, I shall be there. So far, I have a rich programme in the Caucasus. Side by side with my brother Shamil, I have much work here. Not only in Dagestan, but also in the entire Northern Caucasus.43

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He clearly articulated his goal as “the departure of Russians from the Caucasus”, stating: “I have a goal. All Muslims who were earlier under the control of the Russians within the framework of the USSR, are today attempting to liberate themselves from the Russian rule. .... The moment came when all nations must drive the Russian army out of their countries”.44 Referring to the civilian casualties in Dagestan, Khattab sounded an ominous warning: Up till today, my programme was to fight only against the Russian army. But after the recent events in Dagestan, it will not only be the Russian soldier who will answer for his deeds, but the Russian nation. Prior to this, I answered their aggression with attacks against military targets — for example, we liquidated military columns, killed soldiers. I did not hide it. But now I have had enough. I have prepared a concrete answer. Not only against the army, but against the entire Russian nation which will soon be held answerable for what has taken place in Karamachi, what they are doing to Muslims. For how Dagestani women and children have suffered there.45

Almost immediately following this interview, a series of brutal attacks upon civilian housing in Moscow and Dagestan left some 300 people dead. Although Basayev denied responsibility for these actions and in spite of an attempt at mediation by the leaders of the neighbouring federal republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia, which have remained loyal to Moscow, the primary suspicion fell upon the Chechens. The Russian response, directed by a newly appointed hard-line Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, was swift and decisive. Clearly determined to take advantage of the public outrage over the terroristic bombing campaign against the civilians, the Russian government might have decided to weaken Chechnya’s de facto independent status, which was supposed to remain unresolved by mutual agreement until the year 2001. In late September 1999, Russia first formally sealed its borders with Chechnya, and then began a series of air raids which included a bombardment of the capital Grozny, and later, on 1 October, sent its troops into Chechen territory in order to create protective “security zones” within its borderlands. As Moscow remained poised for a possible full invasion of Chechnya, the situation, at the time of writing, 46 threatened a repeat of the bloody conflict of 1994–96 in another round of the North Caucasus wars. The role of a constitutional vehicle for the variable non-Russian nation, which has been conferred upon the post-Soviet Russian Federation is indeed a most difficult one. The Islamic nations and ethnies

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in the Volga region and in the North Caucasus have much less in common with the dominant Russian Slav-Orthodox majority than many of the former Soviet republics which gained independence following the demise of the Soviet Union. To deny the possibility of a future secession in the Caucasus on the basis that the ethnic groups there enjoyed only marginal self-rule as autonomous republics under Soviet rule, or because they lack economic viability as sovereign states, would be a fatal mistake. Historical, religious, and cultural factors point towards a strengthening agitation for an independent confederation of Islamic peoples in North Caucasus. This is in part due to the fact that, while the Russian government has so far resisted following the path of exclusionary nationalism and ethnic mobilization of the Russian population through invoking their various founding myths, the same is not true among the minority peoples in the Caucasus. The rival political élites which emerged in opposition to the loyalist pro-Moscow republican élites did so precisely by invoking the emotional power of the various regional mythomoteurs, such as the anguish of the first Russian conquest in the eighteenth century and the tradition of bloody ghazawats (holy wars) against the infidel oppressors. This was clearly argued by Anatol Lieven when he wrote that : It is perfectly clear that, while certain primordial traits have survived to a greater extent than elsewhere, Chechnya’s modern identity and self-consciousness as a nation have also been overwhelmingly shaped by two factors, both of them originating outside of Chechnya. The first was conquest first by the Russians and then by the Soviet Union (viewed by the Chechens as simply Russia in a new guise). The second and intimately connected with Russian conquest and the resistance to it was the adoption of Sufi Islam, which then for several decades became both the inspirer and the organizer of Chechen resistance. The wars of Shamil — not a Chechen, and acting in the name of a form of Islam which in Chechnya was really only a few years old — have become another central part of the ‘national myth’, indeed probably the greatest element in the national ‘mythometeur’....47

Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see what policies Moscow could pursue to avoid a future conflagration within its Islamic zones.

Russian Nationalism and Globalization If one wishes to analyse the relationship between Russian nationalism and globalization, one must first become involved in the complex

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discussion as to when globalization actually began. Even if one can ignore the various postmodern approaches to globalization, the two foremost intellectual fathers of the concept — Roland Robertson and Anthony Giddens — differ on the question of its temporal boundaries. Robertson, who defines globalization as “a concept (which) refers both to the compression of the world and intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole..”,48 argues that globalization predates modernity and the rise of capitalism and has been around for much of recorded history.49 Giddens, defining globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”,50 on the other hand, offers the view that “globalization is cotemporal with modernization and the development of capitalism”.51 Both authors agree, however, that there has been a recent acceleration of the process. If one accepted Robertson’s approach, globalization in Russia could be traced to the adoption of Christianity by Prince Vladimir of Kievan Rus in 988, since this act provided a more or less permanent connection between Kievan Rus and the Byzantium. In fact, in terms of economic interdependence, as Thomas G. Masaryk pointed out in his Russia and Europe (1913), Kiev enjoyed lively trading ties with both Constantinople and the Teutonic north as early as in the ninth century.52 I will, however, follow Anthony Giddens and define Russia’s globalization primarily in terms of twentieth century modernization and in particular its intensification following the demise of the Soviet Union. While the complex dynamics of Russia’s post-imperial effort to construct a multicultural federal state cannot be easily linked to the world globalization trend, it must be admitted that the post-Soviet Russia did indeed embark upon a road of post-communist (though not postnomenklatura) transition with the gradual establishment of a pluralistic political system and elements of a market economy. Giddens claims that “modernity is inherently globalizing”53 and in that sense, one can argue that the evolution of the past decade represents an intensification rather than initiation of the globalizing process in Russia. In particular, the gargantuan task of economic reform and recovery has necessitated strong co-operation with and dependency upon leading Western lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This process already began in the later stages of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. Concurrently, the withdrawal of state control over the media and publishing enterprises resulted in a rapid flood of Western cultural influences into Russia. Australian sociologist Malcolm Waters divides the contemporary process of globalization into economic, political, and cultural aspects. It

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is evident that the post-Soviet Russian Federation has been exposed to all three, although perhaps to a somewhat different degree of intensity. If one considers economic globalization to be composed of such elements as growth of world trade, international division of labour, and growth of transnational corporations, floating finance and migrant labour,54 it must then be concluded that the troubled process of economic transition, which began in 1992, has allowed much of the Russian population to take the full brunt of the impact of the globalizing forces of capitalism. Much of this effect has been negative. Unemployment currently stands at 10 per cent (constituting 9 million members of the labour force in mid-1999), real wages are falling and there exists a 55-billion rubles (US$2.2 billion) backlog of unpaid wages.55 Labour productivity is declining, the country is awash in rampant economic corruption, alongside a rapid growth of income and social disparity. The disastrous capital flight out of the country, averaging between US$1.5 billion to US$2 billion every month since 1992, adds up to a total of around US$168 billion.56 Arguably, without opening up to the global economic forces, the Russian economy today would not have sunk so deeply into the economic abyss. This was well illustrated by recent investigations into allegations that as much as US$15 billion, some of it from International Monetary Fund loans, was diverted by Russian officials and Mafia elements through banks in the United States and other countries. Turning to political globalization, with its emphasis upon democratization and alleged crisis and attenuation of the state, the globalizing forces of modernity have now for a decade been intensely confronting the powerful elements of Russia’s authoritarian and collectivist political culture and its statist traditions. But it is the cultural aspect of globalization, symbolized, among others, by the emergence of consumer sovereignty and global culture, and with its uncertain impact upon a sense of identity, which is of greatest interest to us. The cultural penetration has been somewhat uneven, because of the deepening poverty of much of the Russian population. Nevertheless, while the youth of Russia consumed with relish the salubrious offerings of the mass culture of the West, it was argued that their own sense of Russian cultural rootedness was endangered. In other words, as Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen began to compete against Vladimir Vysotsky, and Madonna on the compact disc outshone her namesake on the icon, Russia was deemed to have arrived in the global village. What then is the link to nationalism? Globalization theories allow for three broad possibilities of globalization’s impact upon ethnic identity: an erosion of national identities as a result of the growth of cultural homogenization, a strengthening of national or local identities as a

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reaction or resistance to globalization, or a decline of national identities accompanied by the creation of new identities of hybridity.57 One could argue that the first option might be equated with the Russian Westernizer cultural tradition and has been primarily adopted by Yeltsin’s government as its national policy. The two remaining options could also be conceptualized, using the work of Kevin Robins, as adaptive responses of tradition or translation. According to Waters, “translation is a syncretic response in which groups that inhabit more than one culture seek to develop new forms of expression that are entirely separate from their origins”, while “tradition involves a search for the certainties of the past”.58 The strategy of tradition is linked to the Slavophile intellectual influences in Russia and can be found among the more nationalistic political and cultural groups. The concept of translation, which was introduced by Salman Rushdie in his volume Imaginary Homelands and primarily referred to the Indian literary diaspora in the United Kingdom, has been defined by Stuart Hall: This describes those identity formations which cut across and intersect natural frontiers, and which are composed of people who have been dispersed forever from their homelands. Such people retain strong links with their places of origin and their traditions, but they are without the illusion of a return to the past. ...They are the products of the new diasporas created by post-colonial migrations. They must learn to inhabit at least two identities, to speak two cultural languages, to translate and negotiate between them.59

Such a creation of hybrid identities might in time provide a coping strategy for the vast Russian diaspora in the Near Abroad, given the constraints upon the “gathering in” option, in the light of their unwillingness to leave their new homes and Russia’s inability to accommodate them. The process of translation of the Russian diaspora would, however, clearly be a task reaching across several generations. The Russian sources conceptualize globalization mainly as a catalyst forcing the Russians to answer the questions relating to their own identity and to place their own house in order prior to becoming more deeply engaged in the global community. This was expressed by academician Georgy Shakhnazarov: Russia is entering the twenty-first century in the throes of severe economic, social and political crisis. Its troubles are made even more difficult by the turmoil in people’s minds. As the Soviet Union broke up, the society lost its goals and values that guided it for seventy years and the resulting vacuum has yet to be filled. The nation that has more than a thousand years of history behind it is now once again in search

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of identity, trying to answer the questions important for itself and for the world: ‘Who are we, and what do we want?’ Primary among these questions will be the issue whether Russia belongs to Europe or to Asia or perhaps constitutes a unique society which is to serve as a bridge between the two continents, a country with a unifying mission that expresses the Eurasian (ecumenical) spirit.60

Thus, while Russian scholars believe that globalization provides an opportunity for national and ethnic self-realization, some Western sources regard its future impact as potentially dangerous. Huntington, discussing the concept of universal civilization in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, quotes Roland Robertson: “In an increasingly globalised world — characterized by historically exceptional degrees of civilizational, societal and other modes of interdependence and widespread consciousness thereof — there is an exacerbation of civilizational, societal and ethnic self-consciousness.”61 Giddens pointedly argued in favour of a somewhat more ambiguous impact of globalization on nationalism when he wrote: The development of globalized social relations probably serves to diminish aspects of nationalist feeling linked to nation-states (or some states) but may be casually involved with the intensifying of more localized nationalist sentiments.62

After quoting Daniel Bell that “in circumstances of accelerated globalization, the nation-state has become ‘too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life’”, Giddens concludes that: “At the same time as social relations become laterally stretched and as apart of the same process, we see the strengthening of pressures for local autonomy and regional cultural identity”.63 This might well be true of the Russian Federation where the largely inclusionary nationality policy of the Russian majority élite stands in contrast to the exclusionary and separatist ethnic mobilization of its Muslim minority nations and ethnies. An additional issue raised by the globalization process in Russia is the unevenness of its benefits. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) statistics, Russia’s standard of living, as measured by life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment and per capita gross domestic product, placed it in seventy-first position in world ranking. While in the 1990 UNDP survey of best countries to live in, the Soviet Union was ranked twenty-fifth, by 1998 Russia had slipped to seventy-second position. 64 The 10th Annual UNDP Human Development Report pointed out that globalization has benefited only

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the top 20 per cent of the world’s population. The report predicted that “ultimately, people and nations will reject global integration and global interdependence if they do not gain from it. Pressures will mount to retreat to isolationism in economic policy, culture and in political priorities”.65 This prediction certainly does not bode well for the stability of Russia’s masses, impoverished by far-reaching societal corruption and economic mismanagement. For a typical Russian citizen, be it a destitute Moscow pensioner or a poor peasant in the foothills of the Caucasus, the mirage of a consumerist society and technological revolution either evokes bitterness or simply remains irrelevant in the face of their ever growing hardship and the gulf between them and the privileged class. The fundamental conclusion that one can currently draw about the relationship between the process of globalization and nationalism in the Russian Federation is that, while globalization seems to have encouraged Russia’s political élites to pursue inclusionary national policy and to avoid the destabilizing instruments of ethnic mobilization of the majority Russian population, it may be indirectly contributing to — or at least be creating more fertile conditions for — ethnic mobilization and separatism on the country’s Islamic periphery. Whether globalization will eventually energize the Messianic element of the Russian Orthodox religious beliefs or exacerbate Russian anti-Semitism, or whether it will further encourage a jihad in the North Caucasus remains to be seen. For the present time, the enormity of the task of managing the consequences of dismantling the vast Russian/Soviet multinational empire through the shaping of its rump into a stable multicultural state entity is a sufficiently great challenge for its leadership and peoples.

Notes 1.

The Russian poet Alexander Pushkin argued that Russia did not experience the Renaissance because of the Mongol invasion, but this argument is generally not accepted by modern historians. In addition, a period of cultural revival can be dated to the fourteenth century. See Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 122. Furthermore, the argument that Russia experienced no Reformation, while certainly true with respect to the Protestant Reformation, must be conditioned by pointing out that the European religious influences eventually made themselves felt in its ecclesiastical domain, resulting in the seventeenth century liturgical reforms of patriarch Nikon. They brought about a schism (raskol) in the church and a traditionalist minority came to

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

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be known as the Old Believers. See Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, Volume One (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1961), pp. 46– 47. The term frequently used for Russia’s status is “continuer state”. Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 30–31. Grey Hodnett, “What’s in a Nation?” Problems of Communism 16, no.5 (September-October 1967): 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 3; and Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 404 and 407. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 89. Ian Bremmer, “Post-Soviet Nationalities Theory: Past, Present and Future”, in New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, edited by Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge University Press,1997), pp. 11–12 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, at www.departments. bucknell.edu/russian/const/ch3.html. Ibid., chapter 3, article 76, paragraph 4. John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 54–56. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia ( Harvill, 1991), p. 11. John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, p. 280), p. 22. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), p. 67. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 280. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books,1997), p. 111. Gumilev defines ethnos as “ a collectivity of people naturally forming on the basis of original stereotype behaviour, existing as an energetic system (structure) and contrasting with other such groups due to the feeling of complimentarity”, while defining “superethnos” simpy as “complex forms” of the former. Lev N. Gumilev, Drevnaija Rus i Velikaija Step [Medieval Russia and the Great Steppe] (Moscow: Institut D–DIK, 1993), vol. II, p. 329, and vol.I, p. 29 respectively. Author’s own translation from the original Russian text. Paul Dukes, “Globalization and Europe: The Russian Question”, in Globalization and Europe. Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, edited by Roland Axtmann (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998), p. 104. Gumilev, op. cit. , p. 22. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 561. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, Rossija v obvale [Russia in Collapse] (Moscow: Russkij Put, 1998), pp. 128–29. Author’s translation. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, Edward Allworth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 9.

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23. Aaadne Aasland, “Russian Outside Russia: The New Russian Diaspora”, in The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, edited by Graham Smith (Longman, 1996), p. 491. 24. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Russian Question at the End of the 20th Century (London: Harville Press, 1995), pp. 94–95. 25. Illya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 204–5. 26. Paul Goble, “Responding to Anti-Semitism in Russia”, RFE/RL Newsline, 30 July 1999, http://wwww.rferl.org/newsline/5-not.html 27. “Immigration from the Former Soviet Union”, AICE, The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE), 1999, at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/ Immigration/FSU/html 28. Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 326. 29. “Moslem Extremism Threatens Tatarstan’s Stability”, Russia Today, 12 April 1999, at http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news 30. “Russian Volunteers Arrive in Yugoslavia”, Russia Today, 5 April 1999, at wysiwyg://15/http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news/1999040501.html 31. “Tatarstan Calls for Fighters to Aid Kosovo Albanians”, Russia Today, 7 April 1999, at http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news/10html 32. “Yugoslavia to Join Russia-Belarus Union”, Russia Today, 12 April 1999, at http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoda/news. 33. “Russia, Belarus, Yugoslavia Prepare for New Union,” Russia Today, 2 August 1999, at http://wwwrussiatoday.com./news. 34. “Russia Said to Seal Off Chechnya Border”, Russia Today, 22 September 1999, p. 2, at http://www.russiatoday.com/news/php.3?id=94096. 35. Liz Fuller, “Dagestan Rebels’ Aims, Moscow’s Plans Remain Unclear”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 August 1999, p. 2, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/ features/1999/08/F.RU.990812135402.html. 36. Sophie Lambroschini, “Kovalyov Warns of Interethnic Tension in Dagestan”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 September 1999, p.1, at http:// www.rfel.org/ncafeatures/1999/09/F.RU.990929130816.html. 37. Ibid., p. 1. 38. Sophie Lambroschini, “Is Dagestan Second Chechnya?”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 11 August 1999, p. 2, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/ 1999/08/f.ru.990811133943.html See also Liz Fuller, “Dagestan’s Rebel’s Aims, Moscow’s Plans Remain Unclear”, p. 2. 39. Sophie Lambroschini, “Is Dagestan Second Chechnya?”, p. 1. 40. “Khattab, Veteran of Anti-Moscow Struggle”, Russia Today, 15 September 1999, at http://www.russiatoday.com/features.php3?id=92500 41. Lidove noviny, 9 September 1999, p. 7. Author’s own translation. 42. Ibid., p. 7. 43. Lidove noviny, 6 September 1999, p. 9. Author’s own translation. 44. Ibid., p. 9 45. Ibid., p. 9. 46. In early October 1999.

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47. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 332. The legendary Iman Shamil, who led the nineteenth century’s most tenacious resistance against the Russians, was in fact a Dagestani Avar. 48. Quoted in Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 41. 49. Ibid., p. 43. 50. Anthony Giddens, The Consequence of Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 64. 51. Waters, op. cit., p. 4. 52. Thomas G. Masaryk, Rusko a Evropa, dil I (Praha: Jan Leichter, 1931), p. 22. In English, this study is better known under its later title, The Spirit of Russia. 53. Anthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 63. 54. Waters, op. cit., derived from chapter 4. 55. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 22 September 1999, at http:// www.rfel.org/newline/1-rus.html 56. Robert Lyle, “Institute Estimates that $2 Billion a Month Leaves Country” , Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 September 1999, p. 1, at http:// www.rfel.org/nca/features/1999/09/F/RU.990927124413.html 57. Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”, in Modernity and its Futures, edited by Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 300. 58. Waters, op. cit., p. 137. 59. Hall, op. cit., p. 310. 60. Quoted from materials provided by the International Foundation for SocioEconomic and Political Research (The Gorbachev Foundation) in Moscow. 61. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 68. 62. Giddens, op. cit., p. 65. 63. Ibid., p. 65. 64. Joe Lauria, “Report Says Globalization Mainly Benefits One-Fifth of World”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 July 1999, p. 2, at http://www.rfel.org/ nca/features/199/07/F.RU.990713143430.html 65. Ibid., p. 2.

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m 13 n Conclusion: Nation, Nationalism and Globalization

LEO SURYADINATA

In this concluding chapter, I would like to highlight some interesting points mentioned in the preceding chapters and occasionally offer my own interpretation. I will also draw some brief comparisons between the countries in order to show similarities and differences in the process of nationalism and globalization. As I see it, “nation/nation state” is the product of modern history. In the past, there was a concept of “dynasty” or kingdom rather than the “nation/nation state”. It is also true that “ethnic group” emerged long before “nation”, if one defines “ethnic group” in terms of common ancestry. Nevertheless, it seems that “ethnic group” can also develop into a nation, the so-called “ethno-nation” or “ethnic-nation”. Japan is one example. Nevertheless, the majority of nations in the world are multiethnic nations, also known as “social nations”. Whether it is an ethnic nation or a social nation, there are similarities in terms of their components. A common history, a common heritage (including a common language) and common values often constitute the basis of national belonging. The political élite promoted this sense of national belonging, which is often called nationalism. It was the élite who defined nation and nationalism. Some writers, for instance, Ernest Gellner, even maintain that nationalism is a creation of the élite in order to achieve certain political goals. It is a political construct. To a large degree, this is certainly true but one should not ignore the “foundations” (components) 344

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of a “nation” that other writers mention. Without these “foundations” it is hard to recognize that there is indeed a “creature” called “nation”. The twelve countries under study, with the possible exception of Japan, are “nations” at different stages of development. Some have just completed state building, while others have been “nations” for different lengths of time, but their components continue to develop. Even the United Kingdom, which is considered to be one of the first modern nations, is actually a “multinational state” rather than a “nation state”. Because of the difficulty in building a nation with a common culture, common language, and common heritage, many countries have abandoned nationbuilding efforts and concentrate instead on citizenship. They have abandoned the building of a national culture or a national identity but accept multiple cultures and multiple identities. Citizenship, it would seem, can be developed into nationhood, but citizenship is not identical with nationhood. One can change citizenship relatively easily but it is more difficult, if not impossible, to change his/her nationhood. Unlike citizenship, which is a legal concept, nationhood is socio-cultural, emotional, and political. Nevertheless, in the West, nationhood and citizenship have been used interchangeably. I would argue that nationhood and citizenship should be differentiated, as the former is a politico-cultural concept while citizenship is a legal concept. Nevertheless, some chapters in this volume have occasionally used these two concepts interchangeably, and hence have weakened, if not confused, the arguments.

Immigrant States Australia Australia is an immigrant nation rather than an indigenous nation. The immigrants, mainly European, defined Australia as a White man country, using English and Anglo-Celtic culture as a model. Initially, it took neither non-European nor Asian components. However, with the increase of Asian immigrants to Australia, the state began to take in some Asian elements, and professed cultural pluralism as a state policy. The impact of Asian immigrants on the Australian nation is significant, as Australia is no longer defined as a European nation. Economic needs required Australia to be oriented towards Asia but a minority, represented by the One Nation Party led by Pauline Hanson, continues to perpetuate the White Australia concept. During the era of globalization, the narrow concept of “One Nation” (that is, European Nation) appears to be anachronistic but this sort of nationalism dies hard.

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Although Australia is still in the process of building a nation based on “multiculturalism”, the basic foundation of this nation in terms of language and values is still European. Michael Wesley maintains that there are two types of nationalism in Australia: a dominant migrant nationalism and an indigenous nationalism (that is, Aboriginal nationalism). The Aboriginal nationalism, as an alternative nationalism, has not been able to reconcile with this “multiculturalism”. Aborigines have refused to be assimilated into the immigrant society and some groups promote a separate national identity, but this has been rejected by the majority of the Australian people.Therefore, the national problem in Australia has not been solved.

The United States America is another immigrant nation, which originated in the AngloSaxon tradition. Joel Hudson gives a historical perspective of the development of the American nation. This American nation developed over more than 200 years and established itself as the champion of democracy, equality, and freedom. Basically, the American nation has been defined in terms of legal and political ideology. As I see it, until 1924, the concept of the American nation remained largely Eurocentric. Ethnic minorities were excluded from nationhood. Although laws professing racial equality were promulgated before the civil rights movement, the actual implementation of these laws only took place after the success of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. The concept of an American nation is sometimes elusive. In the past, the “melting pot” concept was assumed to produce an American nation and culture. It was later replaced by multiculturalism. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Europeans formed the majority and the original concept of the nation and values was “Western”, it is unavoidable that the foundation of the American nation is largely European and Christian. English was never declared as an official language but it was the de facto national language of the United States. The concept of bilingualism, that is, English and the mother tongue (for example, Spanish), is not “genuine bilingualism”. A mother tongue is used to improve the language skill rather than to be used as a cultural language. When bilingualism becomes “genuine bilingualism”, it may challenge the concept of “Americanness” that we know today. Many writers often use American nationhood and American citizenship interchangeably, as if one can be accepted as a member of an American nation once American citizenship is conferred. To regard citizenship as nationhood is to ignore the deeper feeling of national sentiments possessed

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by a nation. It also ignores the perception of traditional Americans towards new citizens. As the only remaining superpower, American influence has been global. American culture has gone beyond the boundaries of the state, and so have American multinational corporations (MNCs). Globalization has also affected American culture as it has had to absorb new and foreign elements continuously, although on its own terms.

Singapore Singapore is another immigrant nation. Unlike the United States and Australia, however, it is the youngest of all three. Before its birth in 1965, Singapore was a British colony and was part of the Straits Settlements. The people of Singapore have always considered themselves Malayans. During a short period of time, 1963-65, it was part of Malaysia and assumed Malaysian national identity. Since independence, it has had to build a separate Singapore nation, using education, national service, and material incentives. It modelled itself as a “melting pot” but this was abandoned because of its impracticality. Although national values have been emphasized, the problem of nation-building — to form a “Singapore Tribe”, as coined by Goh Chok Tong — was unattainable. Instead, the emphasis has been on citizenship. Nevertheless, in the era of globalization, Singapore’s leaders have seen the need to maintain a robust economy by attracting foreign talent. Jon Quah argues that permanent residential (PR) status has been given freely by the government in order to enlarge the limited talent pool, and PR and citizenship status have been considered almost equal. Some critics have raised the question whether the government has gone too far in watering down the significance of its citizenship. Increasingly, immigrant nations are exceptions globally. The majority of nations on earth are the so-called “indigenous nations”, which have a sizeable “indigenous” population who are still in control of the country rather than relegated into an insignificant position. But this “indigenous” status has also been used to protect the interests of the so-called natives. Indonesia and Malaysia can be used as examples. Indigenous States Indonesia The Indonesian state was based on the Dutch East Indies and became independent only in 1945. A multi-ethnic state, the new authority

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intended to build a modern nation based on the Dutch East Indies, but state integration was seemingly completed in 1976. Using the Malay (later renamed Indonesian) language and other means, the government embarked on its nation-building process. To a certain extent, it was quite successful until the state began to use force to integrate East Timor and suppress dissidents brutally. Globalization in the economic field has had a profound impact on Indonesian nationalism. The recent economic crisis, largely as a result of globalization, contributed to the tension and ethnic violence in Indonesia. The fall of President Soeharto led to the eventual departure of East Timor from the Indonesian entity. Other territories, which are much more integrated, are also threatened by the revival of ethnicity. Aceh also demanded a referendum and Irian Jaya followed suit. Maluku joined in the turmoil. In December 1999 and January 2000 serious conflicts between Christians and Muslims occurred, resulting in a hundred people being killed. The Acehnese, who are supported by some Middle Eastern countries, stepped up their activism. The result of this separatist movement is not yet clear. As I see it, Indonesia is a “nation” based on the indigenous model. Indigenous minorities are considered to have Indonesian citizenship unless one renounces it. However, for the non-indigenous population, particularly the Chinese, birthplace may or may not entitle a person to Indonesian citizenship. Even if they are Indonesian citizens, the Chinese are expected to be assimilated into the Indonesian nation, which is modelled on the indigenous society. Until very recently, the Chinese were often considered as “outsiders” and second-class citizens. Globalization has had a profound impact on the concept of the Indonesian nation. It has become more difficult to forcefully assimilate the Chinese, and a more liberal concept of nationhood is likely to be adopted by the state in order to face the challenges of globalization.

Malaysia Like Indonesia, Malaysia is also an indigenous state. Being a multi-ethnic (multiracial) society, the young Malaysian nation is a product of British colonialism. The Malays, being “sons of the soil”, enjoy more rights than the migrants and the model of the Malaysian nation is also essentially Malay. Halim Salleh’s chapter focuses on Malay nationalism in Peninsular Malaysia and the experiences of the Malays in building a multiracial society. When Malaya was still confined to the peninsula, the concept of a Malayan nation based on Malay was not problematic. With the expansion of the country to include the eastern part, namely, Sarawak and Sabah, it became more difficult to impose Malay supremacy. Therefore,

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the concept of bumiputra was created in order to include non-Malay indigenous people into the Malaysian nation. However, the fact that the Malays still form a majority and hold political power creates tension, if not friction, among the Malays and other non-Malay bumiputra. The concept of the Malaysian nation after 1963 is therefore rather ambiguous, although Malay dominance can be detected and forced upon the non-Malays. The non-bumiputra Malaysians are in a difficult position. They have to accept Malay supremacy. The Chinese, born and brought up in Malaysia and hence citizens of the country, have different rights from the Malays who have special privileges guaranteed by the constitution. Globalization, which advocates equality and democracy, thus poses a challenge to the concept of the Malaysian nation. Non-Malays may increasingly challenge the concept in the future, as human rights and equality become more widely accepted norms in the post-Cold War era.

Old-Established States and Modern Nations France France can be considered the first modern nation in Europe, if not in the world. It defines the French nation in ideological terms of freedom, equality and fraternity, but implicitly, French also refers to its specific language and tradition. In the past, the French believed that they had strong “assimilationist” powers. Some people in the French colonies became French. French has also become a cultural concept regardless of racial origins. To be French is to be not only a French citizen but also French in cultural terms, that is, to speak French, be Christian, and identify with French values. According to Laurent Metzger, there are two types of French nationalism: closed and open nationalism. These types of nationalism were in constant conflict, as reflected in the French citizenship law. The “closed” nationalists wanted to have a more rigid citizenship law while the “open“ nationalists wanted to liberalize French citizenship. In the end, the liberals appeared to have the upper hand. The French nation is still defined in terms of language and religion. However, French citizenship does not equal French nationhood. Metzger maintains that globalization and the pressure of both American culture and the European Union have affected French selfunderstanding. However, French nationalism has not faded. It continues to develop its film industry and other cultural expressions to retain its identity.

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The United Kingdom The United Kingdom is also considered as one of the first modern nations. However, this multinational/multi-ethnic state only became a “nation” in the modern era. In David Martin Jones’ words, “The ‘imagined community’, to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain was, therefore, an ideological construct of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century founded upon success in war and the development of the largest free market in Europe”. There was an attempt to build a “British” nation based on the “English nation” but it was only partially successful as the Welsh, the Scottish, and the English remained culturally distinctive. The nation-building process in the UK is still in progress. There are at least four national identities: the Welsh, the Scottish, the Irish, and the English. The effort to merge these “nations” into the British identity has never been completely successful. Although at the peak of the British Empire, people in the UK tended to accept the British national identity, yet when the British Empire declined, ethnic identity re-emerged. The most obvious is the Irish who have fought against the British since the nineteenth century. In fact, globalization has heightened ethnic identity, which had been suppressed earlier. Nevertheless, David Martin Jones maintains that “[T]he United Kingdom succeeded as a political and economic unit because it was a civil association regulated by law rather than an enterprise association driven by a desire to create an integrated and homogenized nation. Such a civil association proved uniquely adaptable to the requirements of modernity.” The creation of an English nationalism, he argues, “creates the unedifying prospect of a British Balkanization”.

Ancient States and New Nations Japan Japan is a “real” nation-state in the sense that the Japanese form more than 99.5 per cent of the population. Of course, if one speaks of the Ainu, Korean, and Chinese minorities, Japan is not a homogeneous nation. However, there is a qualitative as well as quantitative difference between Japan and other multi-ethnic nations. The homogeneity of Japan cannot be matched by most other countries on earth. Takashi Inoguchi has argued in his chapter that Japan was not born as a homogeneous nation. It also underwent a historical process, which

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eventually became a nation. The national identity only became clear in the modern period, especially after the Meiji restoration. Because of Japan’s ethnic homogeneity, strong economy and social cohesion, it has not been much affected by globalization. There are neither separatist movements nor a large-scale ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, under the pressure of globalization, Japan began to relax its citizenship law and more foreigners have been given citizenship compared to the past. Japanese culture is so strong that foreigners who live in Japan for a long period of time will be acculturated. But one can also notice that Japanese culture has absorbed many foreign, especially Western/ American elements. Japanese nationalism remains strong. This is reflected in Japan’s foreign policy towards Russia and China. The Japanese continue to attempt to recover the four northern islands “occupied” by the Russians but without much success. Japan also has problems with China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku (Diaoyu Tai) island. Nevertheless, the territorial conflict has not resulted in armed conflict.

China China is a multi-ethnic state, although the Han Chinese constitute 93 per cent of the population. However, China has been considered an ancient culture. It is difficult to pinpoint when China became a nation. Many have equated the Han Chinese with the Chinese nation. However, if we use the modern concept of a nation, that is, to include the non-Han Chinese to form a people, China, like other countries, is a modern product. The Chinese nation is still developing, and national feeling among the ethnic minorities (or national minorities as the Chinese themselves term it) is uneven. Chinese nationalism in Xinjiang and Tibet remains weak. The Chinese authority in Beijing considers not only the national minorities in the mainland but also the people in Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese nation. Chinese nationalism is therefore reflected in the desire of Beijing to unify the mainland with Taiwan. The Chinese nation will not be complete without Taiwan. Officially, the Chinese authority in Beijing recognizes the national rights of the minorities but in practice, the presence of the overwhelming number of Han Chinese who are very advanced both economically and socially, if not culturally, have made “Chinese” equivalent to Han. The integration policy appeared to be more successful towards the Mongolians, Hui, and Manchu but less successful

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with regard to the Tibetans and Uighurs in Xinjiang. The globalization process has made it more difficult for Beijing to integrate these people. Taiwan is also another problem for mainland China as the people there have evolved a different political identity, if not national identity. But Chang Pao-min maintains that “China is unlikely to abandon its traditional outlook on the affairs of the nation, if only because it is deep-rooted in Chinese [Han-based] culture and Chinese [Han-based] thinking.” This culture, in his view, “constitutes a powerful bulwark against thorough globalization and the complete alienation globalization could bring about.”

India India is a multi-ethnic state rather than a nation. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Indian leaders have not been interested in developing a nation. Because of its diversities and religious cleavages, it has not been easy to create a national identity acceptable to all ethnic groups. Kripa Sridharan in her chapter argues that there are two concepts of nation: Hindu nationalism, and secular nationalism. After India gained independence, the first generation leaders, such as Nehru, wanted to build a nation based on secular ideology, especially democracy, and federalism. Although Hindi was made an official language, other languages were officially permitted and given a similar status to Hindi. With the rise of globalization and the revival of ethnicity and religion, Hindu nationalism has emerged as a strong force. Hindu nationalists have even succeeded in creating a national party to propagate its ideology. It won the elections and formed the government. Thus, whilst Hindu nationalism was never fully accepted by the Indian population, the nationalist concept based on Hinduism has never disappeared. It remains a challenge to secular Indian nationalism. This irritates the Sikhs, the Muslims, and Christians in India, resulting in religious tension and conflict. One can argue that the question of Indian nationalism has not been resolved. With globalization, the Indian Government has begun to establish links with overseas Indians by offering them Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card. This has been created so that ethnic Indians overseas can invest and buy property in India, providing the investment India needs in order to develop the economy. In the past, the Indian Government was very reluctant to extend this kind of treatment to overseas Indians. The idea of using ethnic ties for the economic benefit of the ancestral land has also been used by China. This will increasingly complicate nation-building in some Asian countries.

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Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying Russia The Soviet Union, which was dominated by the Russians, was dissolved, giving rise to a dozen of independent ethnic republics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union is complex but two facts are important: the failure of Moscow to cope with modernity, especially the economic challenges of the capitalist system, and the decline of the central authority, following the revival of ethnicity all over the world in general, and the Soviet Union in particular. Frank Cibulka in his chapter maintains that modernity (including globalization) does not reduce but intensifies ethnic identities. Within the multi-ethnic Russian Federation, the Russians continue to dominate. The non-Russians play a role at the periphery, challenging Russian dominance but without much success. The Russians have used force to solve the minority issue. The results have been equally unsatisfactory. However, it is perhaps more effective as the present Russian Federation is much smaller than the former Soviet Union. Globalization has had a major impact on the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the Russian Federation. In the economic field, it has been largely negative, as shown in high rates of unemployment, declining productivity, and falling wages. The impact on nationalism is most interesting. In Cibulka’s view, “while globalization seems to have encouraged Russia’s political elites to pursue inclusionary national policy and to avoid the destabilizing instruments of ethnic mobilization, it may be indirectly contributing to — or at least creating more fertile conditions for — the ethnic mobilization and separatism in the country’s Islamic periphery.” Yugoslavia Yugoslavia is an example of nation-destroying rather than nationbuilding. The country, which was dominated by the Serbs, tended to have a balance when Marshall Tito was still in power. Federalism, national communism, and the strong figure of Tito were the three factors which held the delicate federation together. Tito had a dream of creating a Yugoslav identity by uniting different national minorities under the umbrella of Yugoslavia. However, the death of Tito and the end of the Cold War released ethnic forces which had been contained for many years. Trond Gilberg in his chapter explains this complex situation. He argues that the Serbian élite, in order to remain in power, has glorified

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Serb nationalism. This Serb nationalism has an irredentist basis and is based on the past rather than the future. In this sense, it is anachronistic rather than modern. It also wants to recover the “lost” territories to the other ethnic group, namely, the Kosovars. The chief architect of this irredentist nationalism is Slobodan Milosevic, who introduced authoritarian rule in Yugoslavia. Kosovo, mainly occupied by Albanians, also wanted to build its own separate identity, refusing Serb domination and even attempted to drive out the Serbs who are a minority. Conflict arose, and Kosovo was transformed into a killing field, which caused the exodus of Kosovars from Serb-occupied Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) eventually became involved and tried to restore the pre-exodus situation, but bad blood had already been created, and lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved.

Quo Vadis, Nationalism? Globalization has had an impact on all nations and proto nations. It has revived ethnic identity, which challenges nationalism and the nationstate. Some have predicted that with globalization, the nation-state would decline in significance. However, from the studies of the twelve countries, it appears that the impact of globalization differs from country to country. The influence of developed and major countries over other states — developing and smaller countries — has increased, both in economic and political terms. Some “nation-states” experienced the loss of their sovereignty and were subject to the influence of the major powers (for example, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Indonesia). They began to disintegrate. Others adjusted to the challenge by liberalizing the concept of nation (for example, Australia, and Singapore), while still others started to revamp their socio-political and economic system to survive the onslaught (such as China and India) It is obvious that developing countries benefited less than the developed ones from globalization but they are unable to escape the intrusion of globalization. They have to continue to adjust to this challenge. Globalization is often interpreted as Westernization, or even Americanization. This is perhaps due to the tremendous influence of the United States in its soft power, particularly through the mass media. American culture has penetrated other countries, enriching as well as eroding their respective national culture. Each state strives to preserve its national cultural tradition by limiting the absorption of American

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culture, or creating an alternative one. However, the pressure remains and some are worried that their culture will be overwhelmed. Some use either ethnicity or even religious teaching to combat the influence of Western culture but its results are uncertain.

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Index

m Index n

American multiculturalism 114 American nation 114, 346 American Pledge of Allegiance 110 Americanization 212 Amien Rais 38, 52, 53, 59 Anderson, Benedict 17, 35, 55, 69, 108, 109, 129, 198, 235, 237, 256, 296, 297, 317, 350 Annan, Kofi 69 Ante Pavelic 20 Anwar Ibrahim 151, 160, 162 ANZAC 178 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 198 Appleman, William 117 Armstrong, John A. 325, 326, 341 ASB unit trust 149 Ashis Nandy 307 “Asian tiger” economies 187 Asianizing Singapore 82, 83, 84 ASN unit trust scheme 140, 149 Aspaturian, Vernon V. 321 Assam 311 Astérix 214 Astérix Park 214

A Abdurrahman Wahid 53, 55, 59, 66, 70 Aboriginal nationalism see nationalism Aceh 38, 41, 54, 58, 59, 64 Action Committee on Indian Education (ACIE) 85, 100 Adamic, Louis 112, 128 Additional Member System (AMS) 244, 248 Advani, L.K. 310, 312 Afghanistan 306 Ainu 220, 224 Akali Dal 305, 308 Akbar Tanjung 59 Akita Chiranki 223 Albania 4, 14 Albanian nationalism see nationalism Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) 140 Ambon 54, 55, 56, 65 Ambonese 49, 50, 70 American Civil War 110 American English 115, 126 American hegemony 125 American identity 104 356

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Index AT&T 121 Atlee, Clement 246 Australia xi Australian Labor Party 196, 244 Australian national identity 176, 177, 181, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191 Australian nationalism see nationalism Australian Settlement 181, 188 Ayodhya affair 309

B Babri Masjid 313, 316 Bagehot, Walter 238, 239, 256 Bahasa Kebangsaan 138 Bahasa Malaysia 142, 155, 157, 158 Balibar, Etienne 202 Balkan Christians 18 Balkan nationalism see nationalism Balkans ix, 3, 5, 9, 17, 18, 23 Balsom, Denis 249 Baltic States 328 Bangka 44 Bangladesh 311 Bangsa Malaysia 146 Bangsa, Agama dan Negara 161 Bankimchandra 299 Barbalet, J.M. 93, 101 Barber, Benjamin R. 124, 128, 129, 255, 256 Barisan Nasional (BN) 139 Barkashov, Aleksandr 329 Barker, Rodney 235 Barnett, Anthony, 243, 248, 253, 256 Basayev 333 Basque 213 BBC 237, 245 Bell, Daniel 339 Bellows, Thomas J. 87, 89, 100 Benda, Harry 67 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316 Bhindranwale 305

357 bilingualism 78 Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo 57 Black, Jeremy 244 Blair, Tony 36, 234, 242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 254 Blairism 256 boat people 105 Bolshevik revolution 320 Boorstin, Daniel 115 Bosnia 4, 8, 20, 22 Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 Boxer Movement 277 Brasillach, Robert 208 Brezhnev-Kosygin regime 322 British Colonial Office 116 British “nation” 235, 350 British Military Administration (BMA) 72 Budi Utomo 42 Bulgarian nationalism see nationalism bumiputra 42, 140, 141, 145, 147, 148, 154, 155, 349 Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) 147 Bush, George 121, 122 Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) 87

C 1993 constitution 323 Callaghan, James 250 Cannadine, David 244 Cape of Good Hope 115 Captain Cook 175 Carter, Jimmy 121 CBS [Columbia Broadcasting Service] 120 Ceausescu 37 Nicolae 27 Elena 27 Céline, Louis-Ferdinand 208 Central Intelligence Agency 120 Central Provident Fund (CPF) 91, 92 Cerny, Philip 254 Chatterjee, Partha 300 Chechen conflict 330

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358 Chechnya 332 Chernenko, Konstantin 322 Chevènement, Jean-Pierre 212 Chiang Kai-shek 280 Chiew Seen Kong 90, 98, 101 China xi Chinese Communist government see People’s Republic of China Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) 83, 85 Chinese nation 259, 278, 281, 282, 287, 351 Chinese nationalism see nationalism Chinese state 278 Chinese-educated Chinese 82, 85 Chinese-medium schools 62, 63 Chishima islands 224 Chiu Hungda 293 Churchill, Winston 118 Civil Rights Movement 111 civil society 3, 14, 15, 16, 21 Clapham Common 247 Clemenceau, Georges 205 Clinton, Bill 121, 122, 123, 242 CNN 125 Coca-Cola 126 Colley, Linda 236, 244 Collins-class submarine 193 Commonwealth Games 160 Communist Party of India 311 Confucian classics 270 Congress Party 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 314 Connolly, Billy 247 Connor, Walker 17, 35, 67, 341 Corsica Nazione 212 Cox, Robert W. 129 Crèvecoeur, Hector St. John de 111, 112, 113 Croatia 5, 14 cultural China 278 cultural pluralism 345 Cultural Revolution 282, 284 D da Cunha Derek 93, 101 Dalai Lama 285

Index Dalyell, Tam 253 Darusman, Marzuki 65 Daud Beureueh 50 Davies, Ron 247 de Gaulle, Charles, General 204, 205, 206, 207, 213, 214 Declaration of Human Rights 209 Declaration of Independence 109 Delors, Jacques 245 Democratic Action Party (DAP) 137, 151 Descartes 201 Deutsch, Karl 203 Disneyland 214 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 304 Dreyfus Affair 208 Dukes, Paul 326, 341 Dunn, Douglas 240 Duruy, Victor 202 Dylan, Bob 337 E 1995 Education Bill 156 East India Company 107 East Kalimantan 58 East Timor 38, 40, 41, 46, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 64, 65, 68, 69 economic crisis in Malaysia 162 Economic Development Board (EDB) 87 Edmund, Dave 249 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 119 Emerson, Rupert x, 97, 297, 317, 341 English nation 350 English nationalism see nationalism English-educated Chinese 83, 84 ethnic Albanians 331 ethnic cleansing 9, 11 ethnic group see ethnie ethnic-nation x, 344 ethnie (definition) x, 2, 240 ethno-nation 344 European Economic Community 182 European nationalism see nationalism European Union 10

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Index F Farooq Abdullah 306 Feith, Herbert 68 Ferry, Jules 202 “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) system 234, 244, 248 Fitche, J.G. 201, 297 FitzGerald, Stephen 199 France xi Fraser, Malcolm 186, 187 Free Papua Movement 50 French identity 210 French nation 349 French nationalism see nationalism French Revolution 200, 201, 203, 294, 297 Funston, John 168 Furnivall, J.S. 67

G Gandhi 300, 301 Gandhi, Indira 306–8, 316 Gandhi, Rajiv 307, 308 Gandhi, Sonia 309, 314 Geertz, Clifford 68 Gellner, Ernest 17, 26, 32, 33, 35, 130, 216, 235, 236, 256, 296, 297, 317, 344 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 119, 184, 198 General Electric 118, 121 General Guidelines for National Reunification 290 General Motors (GM) 125, 126 Gerakan 144 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 55 German nation 201 Germany xi, 33, 34, 296 Ghosh, Aurobindo 300 Gibson, Mel 247 Giddens, Anthony xi, 87, 100, 130, 146, 198, 216, 242, 257, 336, 343 glasnost 322 Gleason, Philip 130 global nation 105, 127 globalization (definition) xi, 103

359 Goh Chok Tong 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 94, 96, 99, 100, 347 Goh Keng Swee 79 Golden Temple 308 Golkar 47, 51, 52, 65, 68 Gorbachev, Mikhail 320, 322, 342 Gore, Al 124 Greater Albania 12, 22, 31 Greater East Asian War 225 Greater Serbia 26 Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) 76 Guangxi Zhuang 261, 262 Gumilev, Lev 326, 327, 341 guo jia 276 Gus Dur see Abdurrahman Wahid H Habibie, B.J. 51, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 64, 66, 68 Hain, Peter 247 Han Chinese 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 271, 278, 281, 351 Han nationality 259 Hansen, Thomas 297 Hanson, Pauline 195, 345 Hanyu pinyin 281 Harian Indonesia 62 Harris, Robert 240, 242 Hashimoto, Ryutaro 228 Hawke, Robert 184, 187 Hay, John 117 Hazell, Robert 248, 253 Heath, Edward 250 Heping Ribao 63 Herder, Johann Gottfried 297 Heywood, Elizabeth 251 Hideyoshi 219 Hindu identity 311 Hindu nationalism see nationalism Hinduism 352 Hindus 299 Hiromu Nonaka 230 Hiroshima 230 hisabetsu burakumin 224 Ho Khai Leong 85, 100 Ho Wing Meng 87, 100

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360 Hobbes, Thomas 4 Hobsbawm, Eric 235, 236, 257 Hollywood 104, 125 Holocaust 185 Holton, Robert J. 128 Holy Roman Empire 268 Hong Kong 272, 274, 287, 289 Hopkins, Antony 249 Housing and Development Board (HDB) 80, 81, 90 Hoxha, Enver 23 hua xia 267, 278 Hui 259, 260, 261, 262, 351 Hui Muslims 278 human rights 9 Huntington, Samuel P. 35, 130 Hutton, Will 245, 254 I IBM 121 ICMI (Ikatan Candakiawan Muslim Indonesia) 51 IKEA 103, 123 immigrant nation 345, 346, 347 Immigration Act of 1965 113 India xi, 306 Indian National Congress 300 Indian national identity 300 Indian nationalism see nationalism Indian nation–state 296 indigenous nation 345 indigenous nationalism see nationalism indigenous states 347 Indonesia xi Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 42, 46, 47 Indonesian nation 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 63, 70, 348 Indonesian Youth Congress 46 Industrialization Master Plans 145 Inner Mongolia 262 Institut Kemahiran MARA (IKM) 141 Institut Teknologi MARA (ITM) 141 Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) 86, 91 Internal Security Act (ISA) 144

Index International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) 58 International Harvester 119 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 65, 103, 119 Irian Jaya 38, 41, 50, 54, 64 Islamic Union 42 Israel Zangwill 113 Italy xi Ivanov, Igor 331 J Japan xi Japanese nationalism see nationalism Javanese 39, 45, 46, 49, 54 Jefferson, Thomas 109, 110, 116 Jenkins Commission 234 jihad 340 Jindalee radar projects 194 Johnson, Lyndon 120 Jone, Bill 246 Jones, Tom 249 Joseph Rowntree Foundation 247 Josey, Alex 99 Jupp, James 199 K Kaplan, Robert D. 123, 124 Karafuto see Sakhalin Kartosuwiro 50 Kashmir 297, 305, 306, 310 Kavenagh, Denis 246 Kazakhs 263 Kazakhstan 328 keADILan see Parti Keadilan Nasional Keating government 186 Keating, Paul 187, 199, 254 Keiretsu 227 Kellas, James G. 127, 130 Kelly, Ned 178 Kennedy, John 120, 214 Kennedy, Paul 122, 130 Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) 133 Khattab, Commander 333 Khrushchev, Nikita 322 Kievan Rus state 320, 325, 336 Kim Dae Jung 229

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Index Kim Young Sam 228, 229 Kimigayo 223 King, Martin Luther Jr. 111, 120 Kohn, Hans 341 Kojiki 217 Koreans 260, 261 Kornhauser, William 12 Kosovo 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 331, 354 Kosovo Polje 6, 7 Kouadria, Naima 211 Kuomintang 62 Kurile islands 224, 229 Kwik Kian Gie 63

L La Rochelle, Drieu 208 Labour Party (Malaysia) 137 Lawson, Henry 195 Lee Kuan Yew 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 83, 89, 97, 98 Lee Teng-hui 287, 293 Lehmann, Bruce 237 Lenin, Vladimir 321, 323 Lévy, Bernard-Henri 206, 208, 213 Lewis, Saunders 240, 249 Liberal Democratic Party 328 Liddle, William 68 Lieven, Anatol 335 Lim Chong Yah 100 Lim Kim San 80 Lincoln, Abraham 111 Ling Liong Sik 145 Lipset, Seymour Martin 102, 103, 131 Lipsett, S.M. 257 Locke, John 4 Lockheed-Martin 124 Longyang Ribao 63 Luce, Henry 102, 118, 126

M 13 May 1969 riots 96 Maastricht Treaty 245 Mabo and Wik cases 184, 190

361 Macao 287 Macdiarmid, Hugh 240 Macedonian nationalism see nationalism Macintosh 124 Maclean, Iain 252 Macmurray, James 244 Madan, T.N. 307 Madhya Pradesh 313 Madonna 337 Magomedov, Magomedali 332 Majapahit 40 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) 48 Majlis Agama Tertinggi Se Malaya (MATA) 134 Major, John 238 Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) 134 Malay nationalism see nationalism Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) 134, 135 Malay special position 140 Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) 136, 137, 139, 143, 144, 145, 166 Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 73 Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) 136, 139 Malayan nation 348 Malayan Union 72, 142 Malaysia xii Malaysian consciousness 162, 166 Malaysian Malaysia 74, 77 Malaysian nation 147, 164, 348, 349 Malaysian nationalism see nationalism Malaysian nationality 143 Maluku 38, 41, 59 Man see Manchus Manchu rule 262, 287 Manchuria 225 Manchus 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 272, 278, 351 Mandarin 265 mandate of heaven 270 MARA 140, 141, 148 Maria Hertogh riots 77, 96

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362 Marlboro 124 Marx, Karl 258 Marxism-Leninism 23 Mashkhadov, Aslan 333 Masyumi 46, 47 Matthews, Kent 251 May 1998 riots 66 McDonald’s 104, 123, 124, 126 McVey, Ruth 67 McWorld 103, 124, 125, 126, 255 Medan 45 Megawati Soekarnoputri 53, 57, 59 Meiji period 217 Meiji restoration 351 melting-pot approach 84, 113, 114 Mendaki Foundation 83 Miao 259, 260 Microsoft 124 Middle Kingdom 269, 289 migrant nationalism see nationalism Mill, John Stuart 239 Milosevic, Slobodan 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 354 min zu 276 Moerdani, General Benny 69 Mohamad Hatta 49 Mohammad Ali Jinnah 301 “money politics” 149 Mongolia 261 Mongolians 260, 261, 278, 351 Mongols 272 Monroe Doctrine 116 Monroe, James 116 Morgan, Prys 240 Morganwg, Iolo 240 Morrill, J.G. 236 Muhammad Yamin 40 multiculturalism 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 199, 225, 346 Multi-Purpose Holdings 143 Myrdal, Gunnar 109, 131 N Nahdatul Ulama (NU) 46 Nairn, Tom 235

Index Nanyang Technological University 84 Napoleon 202 nation (definition) x, 297 National Development Plan (NDP) 155 National Front see Barisan Nasional National Justice Party see Parti Keadilan Nasional National Review 114 nationalism (definition) x, 216, 297 Aboriginal 189, 190, 346 Albanian 4, 14, 30, 31 Australian 175, 179, 189, 194 Balkan 1, 18, 22, 25 Bulgarian 4 Chinese 259, 269, 275, 282, 284, 285, 351 modern 275, 279, 292 political 276 English 235, 350 European 34 French 200, 209, 213, 349 Hindu 298, 301, 302, 309, 312 Indian 294, 299, 352 indigenous 191 Indonesian 44 Japanese 220, 231 Macedonian 14 Malay 133, 141, 142, 146, 154, 165, 166, 167 Malaysian 132, 159 migrant 191 Romanian 4 Russian 32, 335 Scottish 235 Serb 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 354 Sikh 305 Taiwanese 266, 290 Welsh 235, 240 Yugoslav 14, 24 Nationalist government 265, 278, 279, 280, 281, 289, 291. See also Taiwan Nationalist movement 278

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Index nation-state 40, 65 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin 68 Nehru 300, 301, 302, 304, 307 Neil Committee report 247 New Economic Policy (NEP) 132, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 153, 156, 159, 161, 167 New Labour 234, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 250, 254 Nike 103 Ningxia Hui 262 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 261 Nippon Telephone and Telecommunications 226 Nixon Doctrine 182 Nixon, Richard 121 Nobel Peace Prize 57 non-Russian nation 334 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 122, 127 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 8, 10, 26, 28, 29, 30, 36, 119, 331, 354, Norwood, Julius 3 O O’Sullivan, John L. 118 Obuchi, Keizo 230 Okinawa 224, 225 One Nation Party 189, 194, 195, 196, 345 one-China principle 292 “open-door” policy 117 “Operation Lalang” 144 “Orientalism” 23 Ota, Masahide 225 Ottoman Empire 4 Ottomans 3, 6, 18 Outer Mongolia 280, 289

P Paine, Ralph D. 129 Paine, Thomas 105, 111 Pakistan 306

363 Palembang 44 PAN 52, 53 Pan Malayan Supreme Religious Council 134 Pancasila ideology 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 68 pan-Slavism 7 Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI) 68 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) 47 Partai Kebangsaan Melayu SeMalaya 134 Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) 42, 46 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 47, 48, 52 Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia 47 Partai Sosialis Indonesia 47 Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) 135 Parti Keadilan Nasional (keADILan) 151, 152 Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) 135, 151, 136, 143, 151, 152, 153, 154, 164 Parti see Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia Pasqua, Charles 213 PDI-P 52 Pearce, Padraig 240 People’s Action Party (PAP) 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, 92, 93, 96, 97 People’s Progressive Party 74 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 64, 261, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286 peranakan 59 peranakan Chinese 42, 43 Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) 140 perestroika 322 Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) 140 Perry, Commodore Matthew 221 Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) 315, 352 Peter the Great 320, 323

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364 Phillips, Anne 241 PKB 52, 70 plural society 43, 67 Pocock, J.G.A. 236, 237 Poland 30 Portugal 57 Presidential Council for Minority Rights 76 pribumi 61 Prince Genji 219 Pushkin, Alexander 340 pu tong hua 281 Punjab 297, 305, 310 Putin, Vladimir 334 Putra Jaya 149 Q Quah, Stella R. 87, 100 R racial riots, 1964 (Malaysia) 74 Raffles, Stamford 71, 72 Ramos-Horta, Jose 57 Ranger, Terence 236 Rankovic, Alexander 21 Rao, Narasimha 305 Rashtriya Swayan Sevak Sangh 300 referendum (Aceh) 58, 59 reformasi 151 Rémond, René 205 Renaissance 3, 4 Renan, Ernest 201, 203, 207, 215 240 Republic of China (ROC) see Taiwan Republic of South Maluku (RMS) 49 Riau 58 Riaz Hassan 80, 98, 99 Richards, Henry 240 Robertson, Roland 336 Robins, Kevin 338 Roff, William R. 134 Romania 27, 30 Romanian nationalism see nationalism Roosevelt, Theodore 117 Roper, Trevor 240 Rushdie, Salman 338

Index Russell, Conrad 237 Russian Federation 320, 340, 353 Russian Jewish Congress 329 Russian nationalism see nationalism Russians 261

S Said, Edward W. 23, 27 Sakhalin 224 san min zhu yi 279 Santer, Jacques 245 Sarekat Islam 42 Satsuma 220 Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar 300 Savitsky, Pavel 326 Scottish National Party (SNP) 247, 248, 249, 252 Scottish nationalism see nationalism Sen, Amartya 316 Serb nation 12, 14, 16, 19, 25, 26 Serb nationalism see nationalism Serbia 14, 17, 19, 22 Shakhnazarov, Georgy 338 Shamil Basayev 332 Sharad Pawar 314 Shenton, James P. 131 Sikh nationalism see nationalism Sikhs 299 Sindhunata, K. 63 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 79 Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) 83, 85 Singapore xii Singer Sewing Machine 119 Single European Act of 1985 245 Sino-Japanese War 289 Sino-Soviet dispute 286 Slovenia 5 Smith, Anthony D. 35, 100, 108, 109, 126, 128, 129, 131, 146, 198, 202, 206, 242, 296, 317, 325, 336, 341, 343 social nation x, 344 Soeharto 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 Soekarno 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 63

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Index Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 324, 327, 328, 341, 342 Soros, George 162 South Maluku 64 Soviet Communist Party 324 Soviet Union ix, 29, 30, 124, 222, 228, 284, 289, 294, 295, 353 “Speak Mandarin” campaign 79, 82 Special Project National Schools 62 Springsteen, Bruce 337 Srinivas, M.N. 307 Sriwijaya 40 Stalin, Joseph 21, 25, 320 Starkey, David 237 state-nation 40, 103 Sullivan, Andrew 242 Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) 134 Sumpah Pemuda 43 Sun Tzu 271, 293 Sun Yat-sen 278, 279 Switzerland 89, 96 Sydney Olympic Games 197 T Taft, William H. 117 Tai Chi 62 Taiwan 265, 272, 281, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 352 Taiwan Strait 290 Taiwanese nationalism see nationalism Tamilnadu 304 Tatars 330 Tatarstan 331 Tea tax of 1773 107 Thais 261 Thatcher government 250 Thatcher, Margaret 238 Thatcherism 250 “Third China” 81 Third Industrial Revolution 182 Third Malay Intellectual Congress 158 Thomas, Dylan 249 Thomson, John 244 Three Principles of the People 279

365 tian xia 269, 276, 291 Tibet 261, 262, 280, 282, 285, 287, 293 Tibetans 260, 261, 264, 278, 352 Tilak, Lokmanya 300 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) 42 Tito, Joseph Broz 8, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 35, 353 Titoism 20 Tokugawa 219 totok 59 Toyota 123 Trautmann, Catherine 210 Treaty of Paris, 1763 107 Treaty of Westphalia 220 Tripura 311 Trubetskoi, Nikolai 326 Tsushima 220 Tuanku Abdul Rahman College 143 Tunku Abdul Rahman 74 Twang Pek Yang 67 two-states theory 292 U U.N. Commission on Human Rights 190 U.N. peace-keeping force 65 Uigurs 260, 261, 263, 352 Ukraine 325, 328 United Democratic Party 74 United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166 United Nations 41, 57, 58, 284 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 88 United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Population 190 United People’s Party 74 United States xi, 10, 75 Universities and University Colleges Act 155 Urban Development Authority (UDA) 140 USSR 213, 321

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366 Uttar Pradesh 313 Uygur see Uigurs V Vajpayee (Prime Minister) 313 Vasil, Raj 81, 82, 99 Vasilev, Dmitrii 328 Vietnam War 120 Vision 2020 147, 162 Vivekananda, Swami 300 Voerword 185 Vysotsky, Vladimir 337 W Wai Tan Kung 62 Wall Street Journal 113 Wan Azizah Ismail 151 Warren, Earl 120 Washington, George 111, 115 Watergate 121 Waters, Malcolm 336 Weber, Max x Wee Kim Wee 86 Wei Yuan 276 Welsh Development Authority (WDA) 251, 257 Welsh Language Act 249 Welsh nationalism see nationalism West Irian 46, 50 West Kalimantan 54 Western barbarians 277 White Australia 181 White Australia policy 184, 185, 186, 189 Whitlam, Gough 198 Wiener, Myron 41, 67 Wilson, Harold 250 Wilson, Woodrow 117

Index Winks, Robin W. 116, 129, 131 Winock, Michel 206, 207 Wiranto, General 58 World Bank 119, 336 X Xinjiang 261, 262, 263, 280, 287, 293 Y Yamaga Soko 223 Yap Mui Teng 91, 92, 101 Yayasan Mendaki see Mendaki Foundation Yeats, W.B. 240 Yeltsin, Boris 228, 324 Yemen 296 Yindunixiya Ribao 62 Yindunixiya Shangbao 63 yong 277 Young Malay Union 133 Youth Oath 43 Yugoslav League of Communists 24 Yugoslav nation 13 Yugoslav nationalism see nationalism Yugoslavia ix, xi, 2, 5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 24, 29, 38, 65, 295, 331 Yugoslavism 11, 20, 21 Z Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 328 zhong guo 269, 281 zhong hua min zu 278 zhong yuan 267 Zhuang 259, 260 Zola, Emile 208 Zuraidah Ibrahim 101

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore