Muslim Women in the Economy: Development, Faith and Globalisation 2019054053, 2019054054, 9780367207397, 9780429263194

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Muslim Women in the Economy

This book explores the changing role of Muslim women in the economy in the twenty-first century. Sociological developments such as secular education, female-focused policies, national and global commitments to gender equality as well as contemporary technological advances have all served to shift and redefine the domestic and public roles of Muslim women, leading in many places to increases in workplace participation and entrepreneurship. The volume investigates the contexts of these shifts and the experiences of women balancing faith and other commitments to actively engage in the economy in vastly different countries. The book looks at how family codes and the understandings of Muslim male and female roles sit alongside social and economic advances and the increases in women partaking in the economy. Within a globalised world, it also highlights the importance of the implementation of the current sustain­ able development priorities in the context of Muslim societies, including Sustainable Development Goal 5 that focuses on the vital role of women and their full participation in all areas of sustainable development. With cases ranging from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indo­ nesia, Nigeria, Kenya through to Spain, Bulgaria and Australia, Muslim Women in the Economy will be of considerable interest to those studying, researching and interested in gender, development and religious studies. Shamim Samani is a research fellow at the University of Western Australia and a lecturer at Curtin University, Australia. Dora Marinova is a professor of Sustainability at the Curtin University Sustain­ ability Policy (CUSP) Institute, Australia.

Routledge Research in Religion and Development Series Editors: Matthew Clarke, Deakin University, Australia Emma Tomalin, University of Leeds, UK Nathan Loewen, University of Alabama, USA Editorial board: Carole Rakodi, University of Birmingham, UK Gurharpal Singh, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK Jörg Haustein, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK Christopher Duncanson-Hales, Saint Paul University, Canada

The Routledge Research in Religion and Development series focuses on the diverse ways in which religious values, teachings and practices interact with international development. While religious traditions and faith-based movements have long served as forces for social innovation, it has only been within the last ten years that researchers have begun to seriously explore the religious dimensions of inter­ national development. However, recognising and analysing the role of religion in the development domain is vital for a nuanced understanding of this field. This interdisciplinary series examines the intersection between these two areas, focusing on a range of contexts and religious traditions. Nigerian Pentecostalism and Development Richard Burgess A Theology of International Development Thia Cooper Muslim Women in the Economy Development, Faith and Globalisation Edited by Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova International Development and Local Faith Actors Ideological and Cultural Encounters Edited by Kathryn Kraft and Olivia J. Wilkinson

Muslim Women in the Economy Development, Faith and Globalisation

Edited by Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Samani, Shamim, editor. | Marinova, Dora, editor.

Title: Muslim women in the economy : development, faith and globalisation /

edited by Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova.

Description: New York : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in

religion and development | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2019054053 (print) | LCCN 2019054054 (ebook) |

ISBN 9780367207397 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429263194 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Muslim women--Social conditions--21st century. |

Women in development. | Sex role. | Sex discrimination against women. |

Muslim businesspeople.

Classification: LCC HQ1170 .M8474 2020 (print) | LCC HQ1170 (ebook) |

DDC 305.48/697--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019054053

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019054054

ISBN: 978-0-367-20739-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-26319-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgments List of contributors Introduction: Changing prospects for Muslim women in the global economy

vii ix x

1

SHAMIM SAMANI AND DORA MARINOVA

PART 1

Gender policies and economic participation 1 Progressing in a man’s world: Women’s workforce participation in Bangladesh

13 15

SHAGUFTA M. TRISHNA, AMZAD HOSSAIN AND DORA MARINOVA

2 Gender parity through the Saudi Vision 2030: Female representation in English as a Foreign Language textbooks

32

ABEER ALSHAHRANI, SHAMIM SAMANI AND DORA MARINOVA

3 Cultural assimilation policies in Bulgaria and the plight of Muslim women

48

SILVIA LOZEVA, DORA MARINOVA, SHAMIM SAMANI, KALOYAN TSVETKOV AND GEORGI BARDAROV

4 “Leaving no one behind”: Analysing contexts of education and economic challenges for Muslim women in Northern Nigeria

69

JESUDUNSIN OSINAIKE AND SHAMIM SAMANI

5 What hides behind the scarf: Iranian women’s participation in the economy ZAHRA AMROLLAHI BIYOUKI AND DORA MARINOVA

85

vi

Contents

PART 2

Negotiating the workplace 6 Narratives of empowerment: Female domestic workers in Karachi

101 103

ZEHRA GOAWALA

7 Mediating between the secular and the religious: Strategies of prominent Spanish women of Moroccan Muslim origins

118

DINA BOUSSELHAM AND JUAN IGNACIO CASTIEN MAESTRO

8 Multilayered workplace discrimination faced by Muslim women in a Western context

131

DERYA INER AND AMINA BAGHDADI

9 Being a Muslim working woman: Experiences of Australian women of Pakistan origin

146

SAMINA YASMEEN

10 A quest for balance: Analysing layers of consciousness beneath a Muslim woman’s career decisions

163

AMINAH MAH

PART 3

Opportunities in the global economy

177

11 Islamic finance and women-focused banking in Kenya

179

SHAMIM SAMANI

12 The influence of religion on the empowerment and economic mobility of smallholder women dairy farmers in Nigeria

195

NATHALIE GOGUE EBO, IFEOMA UMUNNA AND JESUDUNSIN OSINAIKE

13 Education, digital enterprise and Islam in the Indonesian modern embedded economy

214

MINAKO SAKAI AND BHIRAWA ANORAGA

14 Conclusion: Muslim women in the economy: Looking towards the future

229

SHAMIM SAMANI AND DORA MARINOVA

Index

234

Illustrations

Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3

Distribution of Muslim population in Bulgaria, 2011 Shi’ite sign in the Bulgarian village of Metodievo Ethnic Turkish women in Konevo in front of the local mosque with presents from the municipality of Varbitsa 3.4 Pomak women on a train in Southern Bulgaria 3.5a and Roma women employed in street sweeping, Sofia, 3.5b Bulgaria 5.1 Female labour force participation rate, Iran, 1990–2018 [%] 5.2 Female energy engineering students at Amirkabir University, Tehran, June 2019

52 53 53 55 56 87 89

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 8.1 9.1

City locations and EFL textbooks analysed – number of participants Adequate representation in EFL textbooks – number of participants Equal representation in EFL textbooks – number of participants Reason for the degree of representation – number of participants Preferred roles represented in EFL textbooks – number of participants Impact of representation on future career pathway – number of participants Preparation for the anticipated roles in Vision 2030 – number of participants Demographic details of the study participants Women’s access to education and labour force participation in selected Muslim countries

40 41 41 42 42 43 44 135 147

viii 9.2 9.3 11.1 12.1

List of illustrations Labour force participation by gender in Western Australia

(2016): Pakistani men and women Demographic data of respondents, Western Australia,

2019 Differences between conventional and Islamic banking Study respondents demographics disaggregated by gender

152

153

182

201

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the many people who have made this pub­ lication possible. Foremost we would like to thank the 19 contributors besides us for the time and effort they have put into the chapters. We are very grateful for their co-operation and collegiality in responding to our requests for revising the chapters several times after receiving feedback from external reviewers and ourselves. We are greatly indebted to the reviewers specialising in their areas who made the time to respond to our requests and most importantly for giving constructive feedback that helped to shape the chap­ ters. In addition, we would like to thank the editorial team at Routledge and Atiq Zaman for their assistance. We also thank our families and friends who gave their support and encouragement to bring this publication together. Thank you Ekbal, Javaid, Zara, Mira, Ana, Nikolay, Daniel and Alex for your love and patience while we were working on this book.

Contributors

Abeer Alshahrani is a PhD Candidate at Curtin University Sustainability Policy Institute (CUSP), Western Australia. Abeer works as a teacher of English as a Foreign Language within the Ministry of Education in Saudi Arabia. In 2003, she obtained a Bachelor of Education in English Litera­ ture from King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia. In 2011, she graduated with a Master’s degree from the Faculty of Education in Curriculum and Instruction from University of New Brunswick, NB, Canada. Zahra Amrollahi Biyouki is a PhD student at Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia. In 2014, she completed a Master of Business Administration at the Amirkabir University in Tehran, Iran. She also has a Bachelor of Sci­ ence from the University of Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. Zahra has a deep interest in sustainable energy marketing and corporate social responsibility. Bhirawa Anoraga is a PhD candidate at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, under the supervision of Associate Professor Minako Sakai. He is currently com­ pleting a thesis on the issues of inclusive development, civil society and civic crowdfunding in contemporary Indonesia. Bhirawa has a Master’s degree from Durham University in Islamic Finance and Management and has conducted research on Islamic microfinance in Indonesia. Amina Baghdadi is a Master of Islamic Studies’ student at Charles Sturt University. She is currently completing her degree while working as an English Additional Language and Dialect (EAL/D) teacher in a south western Sydney school in Australia. She has worked at the Department of Education for over ten years and has been a Head Teacher of English for the majority of her teaching career. Amina has an interest and passion for Islamic and language studies and has contributed to study guides for the current Higher School Certificate Studies of Religion and EAL/D courses. Georgi Bardarov is an associate professor at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. He is a specialist in Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Demo­ graphy. Georgi is the author of the scientific book Immigration, Conflicts and Transformation of Identities in the EU and founder and co-presenter of

List of contributors

xi

a successful presentation and public speaking course in Bulgaria. He is a vice dean of the Faculty of Geology and Geography. Dina Bousselham is a graduate in Political Science and Administration from the Complutense University of Madrid, and has a Master’s degree in Latin American and Caribbean Studies from the Institut des Hautes Études de l’Amérique Latine de Paris. Currently she is a PhD student at the Com­ plutense University of Madrid, focusing her research in the field of migra­ tion, identities and nationalism in Catalunya. She collaborates on opinion articles in different Spanish media and is a member of the regional execu­ tive of Podemos in Madrid. Juan Ignacio Castien Maestro is a professor in the Department of Social Anthropology and Social Psychology at Complutense University of Madrid. His main research lines focus on international migration, national identity and social and cultural change in Islamic societies, with a special attention to their social and psychological aspects. He is author of diverse publications about all these subjects. Zehra Goawala is an international development professional, with a research interest in labour rights and gender empowerment. She has a Master’s degree in International Development from the University of Melbourne, and a Bachelor’s degree in Labour Relations from the University of Tor­ onto. Zehra has previously worked in Pakistan and Uganda, in the field of global health and education and is now working in Canada as a commu­ nications professional in the field of public health. Nathalie Gogue Ebo is an associate partner at Sahel, a management consulting firm focused on the agriculture and nutrition sector in Africa. She holds an MBA from the Kellogg School of Management from Northwestern University as well as a Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Industrial Engineering respectively from the Université du Québec, Trois-Rivières and from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Nathalie leads her team to deliver on various strategic engagements focused on improving key crop value chains such as cassava and yam, on developing nutrition sensitive agricultural interventions and on improving pro­ ductivity and livelihood for women in sectors such as dairy. In addition, she represents Sahel on various national and international strategic platforms to discuss the transformation of Africa’s agriculture and nutrition sector. Amzad Hossain is a university associate at the Curtin University Sustainability (CUSP) institute in Western Australia and a guest teacher at the Institute of Environmental Science, Rajshahi University, Bangladesh. His interests cover research in indigenous cultures, values education, self-reliance, appropriate technology, climate change and spirituality. He has a Master of Commerce from Rajshahi University, a Master of Arts from Deakin University, Aus­ tralia and two PhDs (in Anthropology and Sustainability) from Murdoch University, Western Australia.

xii

List of contributors

Derya Iner is a senior Lecturer and a research coordinator at the Centre for Islamic Studies, Charles Sturt University, teaching and researching subjects on contemporary issues related to Islam, Islamic cultures and Muslims. She completed her PhD in Cultural Studies and Gender Studies in Wis­ consin-Madison (USA). Her research focus is on Islamophobia, especially women and children’s experience with Islamophobia, Western Muslim youth and religious identity, and early 20th-century Ottoman intellectual history. She is the chief investigator and editor of the Islamophobia in Australia 2014–2016 report, the second issue of which is in progress. Silvia Lozeva is an academic at the University of Western Australia who has lived and worked in Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Russia and in other Eastern European countries. Silvia completed her PhD in Migration and Sustainable Development in 2014. Since then she has applied her professional knowledge to advance equity, diversity and social justice initiatives, including gender equity, addressing violence against women, managing student equity projects and advancing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Reconciliation in Australia. Her research interests are multidisciplinary in the field of migration, political science and inter­ national development. Aminah Mah is the owner of Dewtiful Natural Skincare. To fulfil her reli­ gious, cultural and societal obligations, Aminah tread a career path with many twists and turns; from nursing to teaching to skincare making; col­ lecting several academic qualifications in her stride. Aminah’s experiences tell an encouraging story of someone who has waded through multiple challenges in life in order to balance her roles as a daughter, wife, and mother. In recent years when she is not researching and formulating skin­ care products, Aminah spends her time working on a book about devel­ oping parental wellbeing. Dora Marinova is a professor of Sustainability and former Director of the Curtin University Sustainability Institute. Dora is a member of the Aus­ tralian National Health and Medical Research Council’s Research Excel­ lence in Population Health and in Health Services Research. Her research interests cover innovation models including global green systems and sus­ tainometrics. Dora is an elected fellow of the Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand, the International Environmental Modelling and Software Society and elected member of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Islander Studies. Jesudunsin Osinaike is currently a doctoral student at Curtin University where she is conducting research on gender, policy implementation and legislation in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals. She has worked in the field of International Development in Africa as a researcher and project manager within multiple and complex projects for various bilateral and multilateral organisations. Her work includes the justice

List of contributors

xiii

component of the Justice for All (J4A) program, a UK Department for International Development (DFID) funded project on justice and eco­ nomic reforms in Nigeria. Jesudunsin holds a Bachelor of Law from Oba­ femi Awolowo University in Nigeria and Master of Law from the University of Melbourne in Australia. Minako Sakai is Associate Professor in Southeast Asian Social Inquiry at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Canberra. She is an anthropologist of development with a focus on Indonesia and leads the Asia Pacific Development Security Research Group at UNSW. Minako has published widely on the issue of Islam as social capital for inclusive community development including Islamic economies and businesses. Currently she has been researching women’s entrepreneurial pursuits and IT-based financial exclusion from gender per­ spectives in Muslim countries. She is a co-editor of Narratives of Muslim Womanhood: Women’s Agency (Routledge 2018). Shamim Samani is a researcher specialising in women and development. She has worked in the public, community and academic sectors in Australia and currently is a research fellow at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies and the Africa Research and Engagement Centre at the Uni­ versity of Western Australia. She also lectures and coordinates within undergraduate and postgraduate programs in sustainability at Curtin Uni­ versity. Highly enthusiastic about equity and inclusion, she has worked as a practitioner and researcher on various social justice projects and is an advisor and trainer in equity and inclusion in the workplace. Shagufta M. Trishna is a mother of two boys, an architect who pursued architecture in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Having recently migrated to Australia, she is currently doing her PhD at Curtin University, Western Australia. Her research focuses on the sustainable liveability of her birthplace, Dhaka. Trishna’s purpose and passion lie in teaching and she aspires to become a full-time academic in the future. She has recently joined Curtin University as a sessional academic for Open Universities Australia (OUA) students teaching postgraduate units. Kaloyan Tsvetkov is an assistant professor at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria. His PhD thesis is about post-socialist urban transfor­ mations in South-East Europe, putting emphasis on Sofia, Bucharest and Bratislava. He teaches Geodemography and Migration Processes, Urban Geography, Theoretical Geography and Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Ifeoma Umunna is a research analyst at Sahel Consulting, a management consulting firm focused on the agriculture and nutrition sector in Africa, based in Nigeria. She has a range of experiences in gender, maternal and adolescent health, agriculture and nutrition projects in many countries including Nigeria, South Africa, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.

xiv List of contributors With a focus on qualitative research, Ifeoma has conducted field research and in-depth report analysis with published and internal reports including Partnership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health (PMNCH) Partners’ Forum Report, Sahel Consulting Nigerian Dairy Development Programme (NDDP) Baseline Study, and the Toolkit for African Philanthropists Vol. 2. Samina Yasmeen, AM, is Director of the University of Western Australia’s Centre for Muslim States and Societies and a professor of Political Science and International Relations. She has published widely on Pakistan’s and Australia’s national security, Muslims in Australia as well as Muslim women as citizens in Australia. In 2011, she was awarded Member of the Order of Australia in recognition of her services to International Relations as an academic, advisor and social welfare advocate. This honour is in addition to other awards; in 2012 Samina was named a Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and was inducted into the Western Australian Women’s Hall of Fame. In 2011, Samina was also recognised with the Sir Ronald Wilson Leadership Award in the 39th annual Western Australian Citizen of the Year Awards.

Introduction Changing prospects for Muslim women in the global economy Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova

“Gender relations have actually changed a lot because the woman feels she also has a say in controlling the finances in the house; she has a say in the decisionmaking, the day to day running of the house, expenditures, education of the children, clothing and recreation, the whole lot. As far as I am concerned, I think Muslims’ lives have changed” (Muslim woman in Kenya). “Education plays a part in this. Definitely, I would say that traditional roles are being challenged. In parts where women are more educated, where women are participating in [the] economic part of the household in the family, you see equal roles” (Muslim woman in Australia).

The above narratives noting intergenerational as well as migratory changes in Muslim societies are from a comparative study of Muslim women between two disparate economies – Australia and Kenya completed in 2009 (Samani 2010). Although, the contexts were dissimilar between the two groups, the dynamics within the household were susceptible to change as economic pres­ sures of a modern lifestyle impelled women to join the workplace. A lot has changed in the decade since the completion of this study as we see major shifts in Muslim female economic participation globally. The foundations for these shifts in most economies have been laid through universal education; however, structural changes, emerging technologies, markets and the sociopolitical transformations in Muslim economies have also played a role in providing increasing prospects for many around the world to join workforces. What is notable about the unprecedented change is its rate of acceleration. Commenting on working women in today’s “Muslim world”, estimated at about 155 million of which a third “have joined the workforce since the turn of the millennium alone”, Zahidi (2018, 5–7) compares the dynamics to the change in women’s economic involvement that took place over half a century to transpire in the United States of America. While the accelerated current shifts are attributable to factors that affect all women around the world, the experiences of Muslim women are distinct; in that Muslim women are bal­ ancing their faith and traditions with the demands of living in the con­ temporary world.

2

Shamim Samani, Dora Marinova

Zahidi (2018, 5) refers to the current generation of working Muslim women as the legacy of Khadija, the first wife of the founder of Islam, Prophet Mohammed. This is a well-known heritage throughout Muslim societies. As a historical model of the female Muslim archetype of not only an empowered, successful woman operating in the economy, but also a compassionate and generous person, Khadija bint Khuwaylid was the first convert to Islam and an important figure in the history of the religion. The daughter of the leader of one of the principal tribes in the Arabian region of the time, she was an independent merchant in her own right who employed the Prophet to trade in Syria. Highly impressed by his conduct, honesty in business and kindness, the twice widowed Khadija proposed marriage to him. The Prophet had a 25-year monogamous marriage with Khadija who was significantly senior to him and fully supported him in his mission. Another notable example is Aisha bint Abu Bakr, a later wife of the Pro­ phet, who narrated his traditions which form an integral part of the Islamic Shariah. There are several other examples of inspirational women in Islam’s history who have been intellectual leaders, educators, scholars as well as businesswomen. They continue to serve as a reference frame for Muslims all over the world and over generations have been exemplified as the ideal in relation to the status of women in Islam. The impetus for this volume comes from both authors’ work in the areas of women and development. Shamim Samani’s PhD thesis from which the narra­ tives at the start are extracted, contends that in general, the issues facing Muslim women in the rapidly changing global environment can be understood as challenges internal and external to the Islamic faith. While the forces of a modern global culture offer opportunities and channels to redefine aspects of daily living and lifestyles, Islam keeps this in check through religious obser­ vance, cultural identity, values and morality. The challenges are not confined to those who live in Muslim-majority countries, but also to Muslim communities in the West. Dora Marinova has taught and researched women in the economy for over three decades and specialises in sustainability across various areas. In relation to Muslim women and development, her current work focuses specifi­ cally on the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG5 (which pertains to gender equality) in Bangladesh. The purpose of this publication is to focus on the intersections of faith with other influences on Muslim women’s participation in the economy. Significant elements in Muslim-majority countries include gender policies influenced by the religious orientations of these economies or in the case of women in the West, who follow Islam, the influence of public discourses that compound experiences of inclusion or indeed exclusion for some in public spaces, parti­ cularly the workplace. Focusing on diverse countries and settings, the inten­ tion of the publication is to uncover the contexts of different experiences and recommend changes in policies or approaches for increased economic empowerment of Muslim women. Given that this work is not exhaustive, and much more research is needed in this area, we specifically highlight the

Introduction

3

significant role that faith plays in the lives of Muslim women as they partici­ pate in economic development exacerbated and influenced by global forces and sustainability priorities. The geographic spread of Islam is very wide and contemporary Muslim women live in varied contexts not only in terms of their culture, language and historical roots, but also in their living conditions. The Middle East for instance has enjoyed very high standards of living as well as opportunities created through oil wealth and resulting economic progress, while rural pas­ toral communities of countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to struggle with the basic economic needs of their peoples. Considering the wide-ranging trajectories of growth, the scope of covering Muslim women in the economy, is indeed highly ambitious, but nonetheless required at a time when better understanding of Islam and its adherents is called for on the global level. Cultural stereotypes and generalisations have existed over time and in the post September 11, 2001 era continue to intractably surface in public dis­ courses despite the fact that historical and contemporary liberal and capitalist ideologies influence the lives of all societies in a fast-transforming globally connected world. According to the Pew Research Center (Lipka 2017), there were 1.8 billion Muslims in the world in 2015; around 24% of the global population. Islam is currently the second-largest faith (after Christianity) and the fastest growing major religion in the world. The role and place of women in development have been particularly high­ lighted since the 1970s when, led by Western feminists, approaches started to integrate women’s issues into economic growth processes. The contributions of different streams of feminism have added to the defining, redefining and posi­ tioning of the role of women in development. Steeped in the modernisation theory that identifies the variables contributing to social progress and develop­ ment of societies, the philosophy behind development practice that involves women has undergone major theoretical shifts. In general, though, the philoso­ phy postulates the economic, social and political well-being of women through female emancipation and gender equality. Since the 1970s, interventions to address these have focused on the absence of women in the development process and have prevailed in promoting their role as contributors to economic prosper­ ity (Rathgeber 1990; Malhotra, Schuler and Boender 2002; Jaquette and Sum­ merfield, 2006). The core of the discourse centres on identifying the structures that impede the advancement of women and the need for directed efforts to change these. Critical areas of concern are poverty, education, maternal health, violence against women, effects of armed conflict, economic structures and policies, women and the environment and more (Samani 2010). Although the theories and praxis of gender-focused development are directed towards non­ industrialised countries, the premises of gender inequality and women’s empow­ erment on which they are formulated are also applicable to the West. The issues of inequality are not unique to non-industrialised economies as many within Western countries too face degrees of disadvantage and their voices and needs are lost in dominant discourses (Samani 2010; Samani 2014).

4

Shamim Samani, Dora Marinova

The decade from 1976 to 1985 was proclaimed as the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace and a comprehen­ sive approach themed at the Third World Conference on Women in Nair­ obi in 1985 emphasised the central role of women as actors rather than beneficiaries in achieving economic development. This approach recog­ nised that the equal participation of women in the economy not only requires the expansion of human capital but also the need to improve women’s positions both as contributors and beneficiaries of development. While it also recognised that individual countries may adapt to diverse and changing situations as they maintain national priorities, the integration and the advancement of women in development was considered a pressing priority (UN 1985). It was around this time that the concept of gender mainstreaming was introduced as a mechanism to achieve gender equality (Moser and Moser 2005). Gender mainstreaming is a policy concept that assesses the different implications for women and men of any planned policy actions or interventions, including legislation at various levels. Its goal is to achieve gender equality in political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally. Sustainable development has become a major global policy agenda since the 1987 “Our Common Future” Brundtland Report (WCED 1987). The view of a “common future” emphasised the fact that we are all sharing the same planet which is being threatened by climate change and severe environmental and social problems. An emphasis has continued to relate to the shortcomings in women’s social status, reproductive behaviour and health, right to self-deter­ mination and land ownership, ability to participate in decision making and access to education. The 2001–2015 Millennium Development Goals stressed the importance of gender equality and women’s empowerment as well as improving maternal health and reducing child mortality. These were major steps taken by the global community to draw attention to the predicaments of women of all backgrounds and creeds, including Islam. Implemented since 2016, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) maintain the issue of prioritising women through the interlinkages across the 17 goals that are considered to be universal, holistic and indivisible, with a special imperative to “leave no one behind” (UN 2015, 3). Although SDG 5 specifically focuses on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls, it is inextricably linked to the goals of reducing poverty and hunger, good health and well-being, reducing inequalities between women and men, as well as the other goals that indistinguishably impact on societies in general. As much as the goals, their associated targets related to women are crucial for transitioning to more sustained and sustainable development globally (Klugman and Tyson 2016). These require not only major shifts in areas such as social justice, responsible consumption and production, sus­ tainable cities and communities, energy usage, transportation, improved gov­ ernance and more, but also better understanding of the role women play in achieving the integration of environmental, economic and social priorities.

Introduction

5

Development and the consequent social change in Muslim societies have always challenged traditional norms especially where faith practices and beliefs shape gender roles and economic contributions. Conventional attitudes towards women’s responsibilities in family life and caregiving have impacted on their roles in the public sphere, particularly in the workplace. In many Muslim households and societies, religion plays a significant part in the for­ mation of socio-cultural identities and often in Muslim-majority countries, it also informs the inclinations of public policies. Although secular, many Muslim-majority countries recognise Islam as their official religion and those that do not, have implicit influences of it both in society and governance. In many Muslim-majority countries, the economies and cultures have moder­ nised, yet the role of religion has been maintained in both the public and private domains. According to the 2016 United Nations Development Pro­ gram report, “[r]eligion is important in how states formulate their concept of governance and ensure continued legitimacy, and it is active in the public sphere as a key source of social capital and a strong stimulus for development outreach among the disadvantaged, amidst other issues” (UNDP 2016, 34). Whereas the interface of religion and politics is particularly significant in the case of theocracies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, in others, it is interwoven into religious discourses which can be used to support platforms of political agendas. Political beliefs themselves are influenced by varied experiences of colonisation, urbanisation and modernisation courses of nations that also shape cultural value patterns. Interpretations, beliefs and practices entwined in political ideologies contribute to the different approaches in these countries, further complicated by contemporary transnational exchanges in the everincreasing globalisation of economies. Despite the continual struggle for Muslim women’s place in the public sphere, examples of female leadership are evident from even highly con­ servative Muslim-majority countries. Notable female leaders are the late Benazir Bhutto who served two terms as Pakistan’s prime minister. In Ban­ gladesh, Khalida Zia also served for two terms as prime minister and Sheikh Hasina, the incumbent head of state likewise served previously in this capa­ city, and is the longest serving prime minister in the history of the country. Another example is Megawati Sukarnaputri, one-time prime minister of Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Other Muslim women who have also been national leaders are the former Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller in the 1990s; the former Senegalese prime minister Mame Madior Boye who was the first female holder of that position; Iran’s vice president for Women and Family Affairs, Masoumeh Ebtekar; Mali’s first female prime minister, Cisse Mariam Kaidama; and Kosovo’s third president, Atifete Jahjaga. Female Muslim leaders in non Muslimmajority countries are the former president of Mauritius, Ameenah Gurib and the incumbent president of Singapore, Halimah Yacoub elected in 2017. These women demonstrate the capabilities and achievements of Muslim women in the highest offices given the support and opportunity.

6

Shamim Samani, Dora Marinova

Variations in the religio-political spectrum and their relations to women in the workplace are manifest in the workforce demographics of Muslimmajority regions of the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. In the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region), female labour force participation, while growing, appears to be remarkably low. World Bank data accessed in 2019 using International Labour Office (ILO) estimates show Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain as outliers on the higher side in the MENA region, where female labour force participation is more than 40%; Qatar has the highest rate at 58%. On the other side, Jordan (14%), Iraq (12%) Syria (12%) and Yemen (6%) have much lower rates of participation. In parts of Southeast and Central Asia, female labour force participation is relatively high; more than 50% in the South-East Asian countries of Indonesia, Brunei Darussalaam and Malaysia. It is even higher in most of the Central Asian countries which were formerly under socialist regimes, except for Tajikistan which had 28%, while Kazakhstan recorded 65% female labour force participation in 2018 (The World Bank 2018). Although there are unequivocal variances in development demographics across countries, there are also intra-regional differences as well as urban/ rural differences. The levels can be attributed not only to resource richness (such as oil and gas) and economic strategies that have relied on female labour for development purposes, but also to cultural differences in how women’s access to the public sphere and the workplace is perceived and facilitated. An interesting picture emerges in the case of sub-Saharan Africa where except for Somalia, Sudan and Mauritania, the rest of the Muslim-majority countries have more than 30% female labour force participation and as high as nearly 65% in the case of Chad (The World Bank 2018). There is a high participation of women in the rural areas in economies where agriculture is the engine of growth and poverty reduction. Irrespective of religious affiliations, women make up nearly 50% of the agricultural labour force in sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2011). It is clear that Muslim women are active participants and contributors to the economy. Yet not much is known about how they are combining their focus and practice of faith with individual aspirations, or negotiating the private and the public sphere for individual social mobility and even more significantly, partaking in national economic development in an increasingly globalised world. In this volume, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach to uncover and highlight the various factors that impact upon Muslim women’s economic behaviours in both formal and informal settings. This allows us to go across individual disciplines and also bridge the gap between secular and faith ele­ ments. The chapters include a variety of conceptual, theoretical and practical methods that use a range of research techniques, perspectives, concepts, and theories from various disciplines and knowledge to advance our understanding of Muslim women in the economy. Although conventional approaches to women in the economy are highly valid, we find they are often limited by sets of assumptions about female workforce engagement depending on factors

Introduction

7

including work flexibility, childcare, marriage, maternity and paternity leave and so forth related to largely secular contexts where women’s participation is not restricted based on any faith ideology. While these also impact Muslim women in varied milieus, such studies do not capture the specifics or the strength of the influence of faith elements that are a vital part of Muslim women’s experiences in the economy. In both cases though, economic con­ tributions of home-related and caring activities which are mostly done by women, still remain absent in measures of national income accounting! Though ample numerical data exist on the gender pay gap, gender inequality and other gender related demographic indicators, the chapters in this volume offer the reality on the ground that can only be captured through engaging with the gradations that exist. The combination of countries, issues and perspectives in the volume offers insights into the nuances of Muslim women in the economy. All chapters included in the book are a response to calls for contributions from academics and develop­ ment professionals and are divided into three parts: “Gender policies and economic participation”, “Negotiating the workplace”, and “Opportunities in the global economy”. The chapters in the first part show the varied implications of government policies on Muslim women’s economic participation. In the first chapter, Trishna Shagufta, Amzad Hossain and Dora Marinova look at how women in Bangladesh are progressing in the workplace and public sphere in what is traditionally a “man’s world”. The official commitment to women’s economic empowerment has paid off through the country’s gender gap showing negative (ILO 2019). Even with tenacious male dominance, Bangladeshi women have carved out spaces for themselves in the economy through achievements in education and employment, and most importantly engagement with the economy on their own terms while maintaining their religious identities. Increased engagement with the economy is also the focus of the second chapter. The recent reforms in Saudi Arabia spell a contemporary course as part of a broader vision of modernisation impelled by the country’s diversifi­ cation of its economy. In a country that has been particularly known as restrictive of women in the public sphere, there are commitments to increase the female workforce participation to 30% by 2030 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 n.d.). Although the educational aspirations of Saudi women have already shown signs of surpassing those of men, the transitions into a modern economy are gradually materialising in keeping with the country’s future overall vision. Through the lens of female role modelling within English as a Foreign Language (EFL) textbooks, Abeer Saeed Alshahrani, Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova uncover the socialisation of young Saudi girls into traditional career goals keeping in line with the cul­ tural norms of the country. They contend that influencing the aspirations of young girls through increased and economically engaged female images in textbooks is necessary as the country implements radical shifts to employ more women in the economy.

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Shamim Samani, Dora Marinova

While these first two chapters centre on women in Muslim-majority coun­ tries, the third by Silvia Lozeva, Dora Marinova, Shamim Samani, Kaloyan Tsvetkov and Georgi Bardarov brings attention to Muslim women in a less known region to many English-speaking readers: that of Bulgaria, a former socialist country. Until the collapse of socialism, in countries such as Bul­ garia, Muslim women as part of minorities faced forms of coercion to make them conform to social modernity. The Bulgarian example in this volume shows the impacts on different Muslim groups; those of Turkish ethnic ori­ gins, Bulgarian converts to Islam (the Pomaks) and the Roma Muslims; where ethnicity proves to be a prominent factor in how women’s education and employment are shaped in the aftermath of assimilation policies with varying outcomes for the different groups of Muslims. Following this, Jesudunsin Osinaike and Shamim Samani’s exploratory study highlights the developmental differences between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria, a country where nearly half the population practises Islam. The chapter finds that not only religio-cultural and systemic developmental challenges exist for Muslim women in Northern Nigeria, but that these are exacerbated by the insurgency in the region that has sig­ nificant impacts on women’s education and economic opportunities. The chapter makes a case for understanding the intersecting barriers to ensure that inequalities are addressed through context-specific interventions. In the last chapter in this section, Zahra Amrollahi Biyouki and Dora Marinova focus their attention on Iran after the Islamic Revolution and the partici­ pation of women in the country’s economy. They describe the numerous achievements Iranian women have attained in the areas of education and the increasing engagement in the labour force as well as point out the different types of ceilings faced by them – some overtly visible and others not fully perceptible. Islamic feminism is put forward as a practical philosophical approach which allows the women of Iran to negotiate their place within society and define the issues that matter to them as they participate in the globalised economy. As demonstrated within the second part of the volume, encounters within workplaces as well as the public sphere also have regional variations. High­ lighting the need for labour-related policies for domestic workers in Paki­ stan, the first chapter of this section by Zehra Goawala demonstrates the interplay between the remnants of a historical feudalistic system that main­ tains a legacy of a caste/class structure and a meta-narrative of purdah (seclusion) that carries perceptions of dignity. The working conditions and lived experiences of female domestic workers in the city of Karachi, Paki­ stan are examined through a feminist empowerment framework. The chap­ ter explores the social, financial and emotional support available to them in a country where strong patriarchal and semi-feudal norms often undermine domestic workers, normalising exploitation and servitude. As shown in this case, any attempts at collective action and social justice need to consider the

Introduction

9

cultural interpretations of religion that women are comfortable with; that raise their self-worth by maintaining their self-identities. The rest of the section highlights the challenges of living between a reli­ gious orientation and secular cultures of the workplace and the public sphere. While not directly in the workplace, Dina Bousselham and Juan Ignacio Castien Maestro’s study of the role of intermediaries between the society of origin and that of location shows the struggle between what at times appear to be contradictory normative systems. As seen in the case of Muslim women of Moroccan origins in Spain, the challenges are about maintaining a balance between a religious identity and secular citizenship. Not being in conformity with the more traditional role attributed to women in the society of origin makes them outsiders within their own communities. On the other hand, having a Muslim identity is challenging in the broader Spanish society. In discussing the strategies adopted by the women to negotiate the public sphere, the authors shed light on the theoretical approaches to achieve the con­ vergence of Islamic culture within Western societies. Based on workplace experiences in Australia, the next chapter in this section uncovers multi-layered workplace discrimination experienced by Muslim women. Derya Iner and Amina Baghdadi show that although the gender gap is relatively small in Western countries such as Australia and there are systematic and structural efforts to improve women’s status and upward mobility, the outcomes of these are not effectively experienced by those of diverse backgrounds; in this case Muslim women. Intersectional disadvantage leading to differentials in outcomes both for occupational status and in income is also encountered by Indigenous and other groups of diverse backgrounds in Australia (Samani 2018). The experiences of Muslim women, however, are also related to anti-Muslim and Islamophobic atti­ tudes in the West. As much as Western governments are highly committed to improve the participation of women in the workplace, there is a need for proactive measures to counter obstacles such as these to enable Muslim and other diverse women as citizens to experience the same levels of opportu­ nities as the rest of the society. In the subsequent chapter, Samina Yasmeen also looks at the experiences of working women in Australia; however, her focus is particularly on migrant women of Pakistani origins. Samina shows how the processes of migration shape the experiences of Pakistani female diaspora in Australia particularly with reference to their participation in the labour market. She finds that while a mutation of cultural, religious and ethnic notions of identities (including those of gender related norms and expectations) occurs over time, the impact of perceptions acquired in the “home country” con­ tinue to shape women’s experiences as citizens in their adopted country. Such influences are often reflected in the lived experiences of migrant women and can be distinct when combined with the influence of religion and its perceptions at global and local levels. The subsequent chapter pro­ vides migratory experiences of a different kind as Aminah Mah reflects on

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Shamim Samani, Dora Marinova

the interplay between Chinese descent, a Muslim upbringing, the impacts of conflict displacement and resettlement being key influences on her attempts to balance a career with family commitments. This reflection is narrated in the context of a political dislocation that has been covered widely through historical accounts of Chiang Kai Shek’s retreat with his people from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Aminah’s chapter about her Chinese Muslim family relocating to Taiwan, Malaysia and then to Australia gives crucial insight not only into the impacts of displacement, but also how migrants have a legacy of cultural norms of origins; in this case associated with Chinese and Muslim cultures of origins; that determines their resettle­ ment in host countries. The chapter focuses on the quest of a Muslim woman despite intergenerational change trying to balance between home making and the pursuit of career inclinations. It also opens up a window to perceptions about how citizenship rights of individuals and belonging to a society can play a role in making or compelling such decisions. Given the large number of contemporary displacements and women at risk resulting from conflict in different regions of the world, this is an important con­ tribution to our understanding of not only the dilemmas of displacement, but also of the loss of human and social capital, and at the same time the resilience built up to counter such situations. The chapters within the third topic coalesce around opportunities in the increasingly integrated global economy. Focusing on Islamic finance and banking in Kenya, Shamim Samani’s chapter examines the prospects for financial inclusion for women through the availability of banking for women. Islamic finance is a rapidly growing global sector that offers banking options based on ethical Islamic principles and has potential for financial inclusion of unbanked groups. It was estimated to be US$ 2.4 trillion in 2017 and is pro­ jected to grow to about US$3.8 trillion globally by 2023 (Thomas Reuters and Dinar Standard 2019, 4). The chapter stresses the importance of religious values in financial systems as well as a part of the broader SDGs agenda for facilitating employment, decent work and increased productivity. Continuing with the theme of increasing levels of productivity, Nathalie Gogue Ebo, Ifeoma Umunna and Jesudunsin Osinaike’s chapter on Fulani women from pastoral communities (who are mostly Muslim) in Nigeria, explores their increased value-add to the Nigerian domestic supply of milk. Based on a development consultancy, the study calls for interventions for greater gender inclusion to scale up the Nigerian dairy industry. The study shows that the economic roles of women can be enhanced not only through better access to productive resources and freedom to exercise self-agency, but also engaging faith-based organisations, community leaders and male relatives who all play an indispensable part in the process. The last chapter under this topic by Minako Sakai and Bhirawa Anuraga provides insight into how modern education, current local Islamic inter­ pretations of gender roles, and abilities to engage with digital entrepreneur­ ship boost the “embedded” economy in Indonesia, the country with the

Introduction

11

highest Muslim population. The chapter provides case studies on the tenden­ cies of educated women choosing start-up businesses over formal employment to balance work and family life. The authors emphasise the need to broaden the concept of women’s participation in the economy beyond formal waged employment to capture the reality of the work women often engage in to balance their family and financial commitments. This can assist in developing new ways to measure women’s work participation and more significantly to develop social protection policies in emerging economies. Taken together, the readings make clear the changing prospects across the three overarching topics covered in the volume. Development policies, reforms and the vision for women at a strategic level, impact upon their eco­ nomic empowerment. These are inextricably intertwined with the political persuasions and gender related policies within different countries which intersect with faith at the national level in Muslim-majority countries and have to cope with faith in non Muslim-majority countries. However, women also exercise their agencies through negotiating the workplace and partici­ pating in the changing economic global landscape seeking opportunities beyond the formal workplace. The 21 contributors covering more than ten countries are sharing the common thread across the volume related to the place and importance of faith for Muslim women who are increasingly join­ ing economies as active contributors. Their research has captured important aspects of the changing prospects for Muslim women in today’s globalised world aspiring to shift to a more sustainable development path where no one should be left behind.

References FAO (The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations). 2011. The Role of Women in Agriculture. ESA Working Paper No. 11–02. March 2011. Agricultural Development Economics Division. http://www.fao.org/3/am307e/am307e00.pdf ILO (International Labour Office). 2019. Work Employment Social Outlook: Trends 2019. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgrep orts/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_670542.pdf Jaquette, Jane and Gale Summerfield. 2006. Women and Gender Equity in Develop­ ment Theory and Practice: Institutions, Resources and Mobilization. Durham, UK: Duke University Press Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030. n.d. National Transformation Program. https:// vision2030.gov.sa/en/programs/NTP Klugman, Jeni and Laura Tyson. 2016. Leave No One Behind: A Call to Action. Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Women’s Economic Empowerment, United Nations. http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/ facts-and-figures#_ednref1 Lipka, Michael. 2017. Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and Around the World. Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/ muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/

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Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler and Carol Boender. 2002. Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development. Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWER MENT/Resources/486312-1095970750368/529763-1095970803335/malhotra.pdf Moser, Caroline and Annalise Moser. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming since Beijing: A Review of Success and Limitations in International Institutions. Gender & Develop­ ment, 13(2): 11–22. doi:10.1080/13552070512331332283 Rathgeber, Eva. 1990. WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice. The Journal of Developing Areas, 24(4): 489–502. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4191904 Samani, Shamim. 2018. Workforce Diversity and Sustainability in the Western Aus­ tralian Public Sector. In Sustainability Issues in South Asia and the Pacific: Emer­ ging Policy Issues, edited by Xiumei Guo and Dora Marinova, 273–298. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Samani, Shamim. 2014. Economic Inclusion and Integration: Muslim Women in Western Australia. In Social Inclusion: Muslims in the West, edited by Samina Yasmeen and Nina Markovic, 157–180. London, UK: Ashgate Samani, Shamim 2010. Muslim Women Responding to Globalization: Australian and Kenyan Narratives. Unpublished PhD thesis, Curtin University. Australia. https:// espace.curtin.edu.au/handle/20.500.11937/2567 The World Bank. 2018. Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of female popula­ tion ages 15+) (national estimates). The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS Thomas Reuters and Dinar Standard. 2019. An Exclusive Ethical Economy. State of the Islamic Economy Report 2018/19. Dubai, UAE: Dubai International Financial Centre. https://haladinar.io/hdn/doc/report2018.pdf UN (United Nations). 2015. Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustain­ able Development. Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015. New York, NY: United Nations UN (United Nations). 1985. Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women. The Third World Conference on Women to Review and Appraise the Achievement of UN Decade for Women and NGO Forum. New York, NY: United Nations. http://www.5wwc.org/conference_background/1985_ WCW_strategies.html UNDP (United Nations Development Program). 2016. Arab Human Development Report: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality. United Nations Development Programme. http://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/2016/ english/AHDR2016En.pdf WCED (World Commission on the Environment and Development). 1987. Our Common Future. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our­ common-future.pdf Zahidi, Saadia. 2018. Fifty Million and Rising: The New Generation of Working Muslim Women Transforming the Muslim World. New York, NY: Nation Books

Part 1

Gender policies and economic participation

1

Progressing in a man’s world Women’s workforce participation in Bangladesh Shagufta M. Trishna, Amzad Hossain and Dora Marinova Their Lord responded to them: “I do not let go to waste the labour of any worker from among you whether male or female, for all of you (human beings) are the offspring of one another” (The Holy Qur’an, 3: 195)1

Introduction In the last few decades, Bangladesh has witnessed a sharp increase of women’s participation in the country’s workforce – from 24% in 1990 to 36% in 2018 (The Global Economy 2019a). The legal framework of the country also mandates equal remuneration for females and males for work of equal value as well as non-discrimination based on gender when employing (Our World in Data 2015). Women’s contribution has become visible not only in low-paid sectors, such as agriculture, the readymade garments industry, hotels and restaurants, but also in areas which require higher education, including telecommunications, banking and insurance services (Roy and Hossain 2015; Khatun 2018). The industrial sector, comprising mainly the apparel industry where 80% of the employees are women (World Bank 2017), has been the driving force fuelling up female employment over the past decade and has become the source of 90% of the country’s exports (Workman 2019). Despite this significant progress, according to the 2018 World Bank data (The Global Economy 2019b) Bangladesh remains one of the economies with a relatively low female labour force participation, ranking 155th of 181 countries (whose average rate is 52% or 16% higher than that of Bangladesh). Another worrying statistic that possibly contributes to the relatively low female engagement with the formal job market is the large share of women, namely 59% in 2014 (Our World in Data 2015), who marry before they reach the age of 18. Furthermore, there is serious under-representation of women in senior and middle management as well as in political and ministerial posi­ tions (Our World in Data 2015; Khatun 2018).

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Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country with 89% of its 168 million population following Islam; Hinduism is practised by 10% and the remaining 0.9% represent other spiritual or non-religious practices (World Population Review 2019). Religion obviously impacts women’s values and worldviews but since its establishment, Bangladesh has remained a secular country where the female contribution to its economy is determined by a range of factors. What this chapter argues is that religion is not a prohibitive factor to female parti­ cipation in the labour force of Bangladesh. There are numerous examples of women who have successfully achieved high positions of power and influence, including Sheikh Hasina, the country’s Prime Minister since 2009. However, we describe the obstacles faced by women as “a man’s world” dominated by male-centredness, decisions and behaviours which undervalue female con­ tributions to the economy. This situation is not unique to Bangladesh and transcends the fabrics of most contemporary, including Western, societies. Notwithstanding this and similar to many developed countries, the Bangladesh economy is being transformed by the emergent female consciousness and involvement which allow women to seek control and change their own material situation (Row­ botham 2015) as well as participate and be visible in all public spheres. The chapter analyses women’s progress referring to the latest available statistical and comparative information. Starting with the Islamic religious background, it argues that the significant achievements of Bangladesh and its women have occurred within a social environment that continues to represent a man’s world with male dominance. Women’s participation is challenging the foundations of patriarchy (Kabeer 2016) and hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987) contributing towards a more sustainable world where no one should be left behind (United Nations 2018) in the opportunities to work, study and fully display their potential.

Women in Islam Muslim women may be challenged with varied experiences within and between diverse societies and cultures, but they share adherence to Islam, which affects their lifestyle, quite often to a large extent. It also gives them a communal identity that assists in connecting eclectic social, cultural and eco­ nomic differences. According to Bae (2016, 7), religious “[b]eliefs are not only reflections of our being but they facilitate our orientations to our respective realities”. In this sense, religion is a societal identifier, a way of “being in the world” (Lindquist and Coleman 2008, 15) and part of the social and economic environment that connects and ties together the particular indivi­ dual – be it male or female, and society. Religious influence, however, can be used to justify gender inequality within a broader context of patriarchy or male dominance which can be found in any place where men continue to believe in “false entitlements to unequal power” (Carabí and Armengol 2014, 2). The impediments confronted by women in

Progressing in a man’s world

17

emerging Muslim economies are nonetheless more complex as they exploit factors, such as illiteracy, tradition and isolation, to make people blindly believe in the religious interpretations by predominantly male Islamic funda­ mentalists, rather than to study, discover and build a personal understanding of their own faith. Islam’s basic concept of men and women claims that they are to func­ tionally complement each other and similar to everything else in the uni­ verse, have been created in a pair where one is incomplete without the other (Eaton 2000). Both, “men and women are equal in God’s sight” (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam 2019, para. 1). Although Islam separates the social functions of men and women – a woman’s duties being within the periphery of her home where she is the dominant member, and a man’s sphere being the outside world, this distinction is not practically as unbending as it may appear (Murata 1992). Many Muslim women have held and continue to be part of the political power. In Islamic history and con­ temporary society, there are examples of Muslim women’s exemplary con­ tribution to public life where they have served as queens, elected heads of state or parliament and influential business administrators or entrepreneurs. Bangladeshi’s current and a former prime minister – Sheikh Hasina and Khalida Zia, are such examples. Although socially defined by religion, the status of women in contemporary Muslim societies is not predominantly directed by Qur’anic scripts but by the prevailing cultural norms, such as patriarchy, economic invisibility and hegemonic masculinity. Hence, tensions exist between those interested in maintaining patriarchy and those advocating that Muslim women should be liberated (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam 2019). None of these two positions provides a meaningful foundation for achieving sustainable development as they oppose the two genders rather than generate a common ground for synergies and complementarity in tackling the challenges of planetary health and economic prosperity. Within this context, even the use of terms such as “women’s empower­ ment” is questionable. Women already have the ability to bear another life for nine months, give birth, nurse and raise infants, and do not need to receive permission or authority from the opposite gender to be able to carry out other duties. Moreover, women should not see themselves or be seen as weak and lacking confidence as such attitudes are unjustifiable and can be degrading. In Islam, the conservative role of women overshadows that of men – family and home are considered to be the centre of their existence and a man’s profession is not to take precedence over the realm of his personal and family life (Eaton 2000). However, this guidance is seldom observed. Instead, women’s role is subjugated to that of their partners and any contributions within the home are left unnoticed. The economic system, including national accounts and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as its main indicator, reinforces this “man’s world” as it does not explicitly

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recognise work in the home, in subsistence agriculture or in raising chil­ dren. It measures goods and services that are traded outside the home (Messac 2018) – the realm of men in general and excludes women’s domestic and care responsibilities. Hence, it is the market-based eco­ nomic development and the monetary estimates of production introduced in the 1950s (United Nations 1953) that have disempowered women by making their contributions to society invisible. Within the current system of national income and GDP accounting women (and men for that matter) are left with the choice of embracing the new eco­ nomic realities, including the labour market and political life outside the home, or remain economically invisible by dedicating numerous hours to unpaid domestic and care work. One of the sustainable development goals calls for recognising and valuing the work in the family and home (the realm of Muslim women), and “shared responsibility within the household and family” (United Nations n.d.) in order to allow more time for female parti­ cipation in the paid workforce. With a history of women forming movements to assert their rights and who do not wait to be “empowered” socially or religiously, Bangladesh is witnessing a strong female participation in the country’s labour force increasingly evolving with each passing year.

Women in Bangladesh The patterns of female employment opportunities throughout the world have experienced considerable transformation. Bangladesh, as well as other Asian countries, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and the Middle East, have augmented the economic and employment involvement of women (World Economic Forum 2018). Population growth rate in the country where 49% of people are women, has begun to slow down and reached 1.03% in 2019 compared to over 2% in the 1990s (World Population Review 2019). The reduction in the total fertility rate to 2.1 children per woman compared to 4 in the 1990s (World Bank 2019a) has also allowed more time to be spent on activities outside the home. Women in Bangladesh, similar to other Muslim countries, are constantly transforming established perceptions about their role and place within the public realm. They are increasingly engaging with the broader society and the economy. In addition to employment, women have become active participants in politics. While the share of women in parliament in some Muslim countries, such as Yemen, Oman and Qatar, is still very low below at around 10%, in Bangladesh this has reached 21% (Inter-Parliamen­ tary Union 2019). Gender-based disparities are measured by the World Economic Forum (2018) based on four indicators, namely: economic participation and oppor­ tunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empower­ ment. Ranked 48th out of 149 countries, in 2018 Bangladesh is performing better than even industrialised countries, such as the United States which ranked 51st. Its achievements are particularly prominent in the area of health

Progressing in a man’s world

19

and survival where it scores 0.969 (out of 1), education with a score of 0.95 (out of 1) and political empowerment with a score of 0.526 (out of 1). This makes it the top-ranking country in South Asia and second among the lower middle-income countries with a combined score of 0.721 (out of 1) indicating that Bangladesh has closed 72% of the overall gender gap (World Economic Forum 2018). Bangladesh also ranks 5th in the world in political empower­ ment (World Economic Forum 2018). These are significant accomplishments for a country that began its history as an independent nation only in 1972. During this time, Bangladeshi women have had to reconcile and renegotiate their religious and social values. Laun­ ched as a secular country after its independence, women have been an esteemed part of the movement for the preservation and official use of the Bengali language, emancipation and economic development in recent dec­ ades. They have continuously raised their voices against violence, oppression and gender discrimination at home and also in the workplace. Bangladesh, acknowledged as a Muslim state with a society arguably dominated by men, has indeed been a role model in experiencing an appreciable reformation in its social and communal scenario. Women’s contribution to policy and decisionmaking has played an effective role in the country’s societal achievements. Bangladesh has been one of the few countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Bangladesh Planning Commission 2015). Women have been accredited as an indispensable asset aiding the potent reduction of pov­ erty and as a central force supporting the country’s economic evolvement, including Bangladesh being the recipient of numerous prestigious interna­ tional awards, such as the South–South Award, UNESCO Peace Tree Award for female education and Women in Parliaments Global Forum Award for bridging the gender gap in the political sphere (Bangladesh Planning Com­ mission 2015). The achievements of Bangladesh’s women are significant considering the fact that the country has historically been a nation exceedingly dependent on its male population to bring about any form of progress, particularly in the economy. It is only recently that the situation has changed in favour of the country’s female population and its democratisation has provided women with equal rights and opportunities, most of which had previously been exclusively reserved for men. However, the rapid spread of religious fundamentalism in the nation combined with influences from male hege­ mony and the worldwide reach of extremist elements of Islamic revivalism are posing new challenges to Bangladeshi Muslim working women, and maintaining the progress achieved so far can potentially be threatened. It is important to understand the labour force environment (a space that is still largely controlled by men) where women co-exist alongside their male counterparts and contribute towards the progress of this Muslim state, in order to assure reliable workplace conditions for the country’s female employees.

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Living in a man’s world Irrespective of their achievements, Bangladeshi women continue to be domi­ nated by a system that assigns more power to the male gender. The country’s social system still maintains the norm of authorising the man of the house to regulate a woman’s roles, responsibilities, mobility and her willingness to contribute to the family’s income. Only after having ensured childbearing and childrearing can a woman be expected to design her career along with con­ forming to religion, customs and social infrastructure. Repeatedly described as weak, unfit, submissive, emotional, helpless, soft and inferior (Lamrabet 2018), women seldom are considered as decision or policy makers in and outside the home. In Bangladesh the issue of whether Muslim women are at all permitted in Islam to function outside the boundaries of their abodes is still considered dubious (Davar 2019). In spite of that, female participation in numerous fields of work in Ban­ gladesh has been on the rise, particularly among urban women in the cities. However, their trials on a daily basis have remained inopportunely con­ stant in the form of harassment or discrimination (Farhin 2018; ActionAid 2019). Surveys carried out by the Global Action for Justice Federation – ActionAid estimate the share of women in Bangladesh who experience sexual harassment and violence at work to be higher than 80% (Farhin 2018; ActionAid 2019). It starts with a woman firstly having to seek per­ mission to work from her parents, husband, in-laws or even her son. If she is a mother, she is to resolve who is to look after her child/children and organise for the household to perform smoothly in her absence. Only after overcoming the domestic consequences can the woman pursue her career to furthermore endure a myriad of challenges within her workplace. Both married and single women of all ages encounter physical, psychological, personal as well as power harassment. Professional women often have to reconcile the conflict between family and work which can provoke them to abandon their ambitions or affect them mentally, causing stress, depression and lack of confidence. A survey carried out in urban areas of Bangladesh (Kona et al. 2018) shows that 89% of the working women experience challenges in the workplace that can jeopardise their mental and physical health and wellbeing. In the 2019 survey of ActionAid (2019) of 200 women working in the garment industry, 90% stated that their job is impacting negatively on their health. Apart from the obstinate compulsion to maintain proper equilibrium between family and employment, opportunists both at home and the workplace, exploit this sentiment as a weapon to influence a working woman to make a choice. Bangladeshi workplaces and families are not well accustomed to the concept of a woman working outside her home and making an identity for herself. More than anything else, surpassing education, talent and abilities, it is a woman’s gender that is most empha­ sised and dwarfs all her qualities in the field of work. While many women

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deal with uncooperative male colleagues, female counterparts can at times also be difficult, particularly as subordinates who are often unyielding towards a female authority or line manager. Although the country is led by a woman, the majority of the female population in Bangladesh is ser­ ving at the lower levels of most social hierarchies. Western influences and modernisation have also endangered women’s health and lives within a social environment resistant to cultural change (Harrison 2009). For example, the study by Harrison (2009) identifies acid attacks against women as a modern crime non-existent prior to the 1980s which represents the tensions between the public and private spheres brought about by rapid modernisation. As much as there is greater workplace participation in the country, con­ servative and incongruent attitudes towards women working still prevail. Women working outside the home can be judged for neglecting their family and children. On the other hand, there is also criticism of women that decide to settle on being primarily homemakers. They can be denigrated as having misused the money invested in their education considering that sig­ nificant efforts have been made to provide better opportunities for women, including in the poverty-stricken areas. Decisions to self-exclude from the corporate economy can also be related to how conducive workplaces are for women’s participation. Bangladeshi workplaces are not keeping pace with the turning tide and changing demographics to accommodate a diverse workplace. For instance, workplaces do not provide for women who would like separate praying areas or dining spaces to observe culturally appro­ priate protocols. In addition, women may require time off for caring responsibilities or maternity leave. As such, preference in recruitment goes to less qualified or less suitable male candidates for jobs that women have equivalent qualifications for. Whereas feminism and women’s rights’ movements have expanded the scope of opportunities for Bangladeshi women in the outside world, they have done little within their homes. A working woman can progressively participate in earning activities to enhance her family’s living conditions or ensure financial solvency for the future, but the idea of a professional man taking part in domestic chores is still unwelcome and even considered beneath men in this society. The fact that the home belongs to the man as much as it does to his spouse, as do the responsibilities, is an idea to which the society is yet to adapt. Yet interestingly, narrated by his wife Aisha, the Prophet of Islam, whom Muslims revere so highly and to whose traditions they adhere, used to do domestic chores, mend his own clothes and repair his own footwear! In contemporary times, regardless of a woman’s working status, she is expected to fulfil all her household accountabilities and com­ mitments, simultaneously with maintaining her religious practices. So being completely unaware and non-intentionally, women’s liberation has in fact benefitted the men more; their sole duty of earning for the family is now also voluntarily being shared by their spouses!

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Islamic culture and women in the public realm Women have had an arduous journey in Bangladesh and other Muslim countries in their quest for attaining the simplest rights and access to facil­ ities, such as education, decision-making and working outside their homes; provisions that come naturally to men. Gender justice in Islam has been debated most commonly in the context of female-oriented issues by funda­ mentalists, reformists and liberal Muslims (Hassan 1995). Although “the Qur’an, is particularly solicitous of women’s well-being and development”, the reality on the ground is that it has been used to discriminate against girls from the moment they are born (Hassan 1995, 5). The Muslim customs and traditions, such as purdah (keeping women separated and within the home) and veiling, were originally put in place to protect women, but instead have been used and are seen as instruments of oppression (Hassan 1995). What Bangladeshi women have been able to achieve is assert their independence by demonstrating creativity, ingenuity and dedication towards their faith and lifestyle, both individually and socially. A prominent example is BRAC (established in 1972 as the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee, then known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, and later as Building Resources Across Commu­ nities). It now provides sustainable employment for thousands of women across the country and internationally while reinforcing the cultural heritage and beauty of locally made apparel and hand-made fashion articles. This is the world’s largest non-governmental organisation (NGO) which was ranked as first globally by NGO Advisor for four years in a row; the latest being in 2019 (BRAC 2019b). Out of its 700,000 employees, 70% are women. It works as a community empowerment platform for a million of the poorest women providing social safety-net services and eliminating acts of violence, such as child marriage. Its activities range from economic development through microfinancing to education, including the BRAC University, public health and disaster relief. It is “creating violence-free enabling environments for women through realising their potential and increasing access to information and services” (BRAC 2019a, para. 2). Other examples exist across the country’s economy, including the not-for­ profit and voluntary sector referred also as “the third sector” (Business Dictionary 2019). The Dhaka-based not-for-profit organisation Bonhishikha was established and is run by women who advocate and educate in gender rights, equality and child protection while working towards elimination of family, domestic and work-based violence. Since 2015, Bonhishikha has been using theatre and plays as mediums to tackle issues often seen as uncomfor­ table as well as to inform the audiences about women’s reproductive systems and body stigmas (Tasneem 2016; Mortada 2017). Women are highly active on a voluntary basis in many national and international organisations. An example is Transparency International Ban­ gladesh, which actively fights against corruption, for mainstreaming the

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place of women within society and encouraging positive discrimination in motivating female participation in operational and managements levels (Mahjabeen 2014). Another initiative strongly supported by Bangladeshi women and the international community through crowdfunding is the Asian University for Women which among other things has provided essential educational support and access to tertiary courses for the Rohingya Muslim refugees (Lustig 2019). Islam also preaches sustainability, harmony and considers injustice and repression to be punishable. However, because of the lack of a centralised religious authority structure, such as for example in Catholicism, Islam is open to different interpretations (Platteau 2010). Some of the contemporary denigrations of women in the Muslim world are the outcome of inadequacies in interpretation and absence of profound Islamic research, examination and education advancing a sustainable development path. Moreover, the political power of the state and that of religion are much more intertwined in Muslim countries which allows for radicalisation of Islamic ideology (Platteau 2010), including attitudes towards women. The prevailing patriarchy and religious male conservatives have often demotivated and even intimidated women from gaining access to facilities of proper religious training and education. Yet, Bangladeshi Muslim women are evidently managing to actively participate in Qur’an study circles, religious community services and even activities that are based in mosques. Their involvement is as both tutors and pupils. Throughout the country, Muslim women are acting as Islamic educators, Qur’an reciters, female spiritual Baul singers,2 Islamic lawyers and researchers with increasing global recognition, such as Irene Khan – a lawyer, former Secretary General of Amnesty International and Director-General of the International Devel­ opment Law Organisation, as well as the many female teachers in women’s madrasas. There are however voices raised opposing women’s prominence in public life, the labour environment and work practices, with conservatives and reformists reigniting the debate about the equal position of women with men contrary to the affirmed, distinctive functions of the two genders. Normative social structures, that have been mainly managed by the male population, disregard the inherent ambiguities and crucial findings in Islam, perhaps because of egotistical reasons or anxiety about losing the power they hold. Islam in the 21st century is often outlined through such arguments, which are contentious, fervent and based on irrational faith rather than facts or actualities (Platteau 2010). From ancient times, women have been much more than just shadows in a society regulated by men. Examples include the wife of the Prophet Mohammad, Aisha bint Abu Bakr, a scholar, educator and orator, excelling in administration; Zubayda bint Jaffar, the wife of Caliph Harun al Rashid, a generous noblewoman who built watering and service stations along the pilgrimage route from Baghdad to Mecca employing underwater canals and aqueducts; Fatima bint Muhammed al Fahri, who

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built the Qarawiyin Mosque which hosts the oldest and most likely first uni­ versity in the world; and Dayfa Khatun (Dayfa bint al-Adil) who favoured scientists and the poor and established many charities to support them (AlHassani 2019). The achievements of the present-day Muslim women in the public realm similarly should not be underestimated. Many scholars, theorists and activists have identified evidence in sacred Islamic sources that suggests equal human rights for both men and women (Hashim 2010). This is much earlier than the emergence of the Western con­ cept of feminism, generally resisted in Bangladesh as being foreign and sub­ versive of the Islamic culture. Concepts such as liberation, empowerment and women’s emancipation, induced mainly by the Western world, emphasise specifically freeing Muslim women from their religious and social constraints. Such an interpretation, or misrepresentation, of Islam would take away the mechanisms Muslim women have to avoid oppression and discrimination (Hashim 2010). The Western political intellectuals’ move towards “rescuing” the helpless Muslim females “victimised” by the norms and faith of Islam can lead to deeper forms of discernment and create social conflicts in a world where “discrimination against women is universal” (Lamrabet 2018, para. 7) and manifested across all societies. It can also fuel identity crises and produce a dilemma about exposing women’s belongingness to Islam. This fear of not just being classified as a woman, but also a Muslim woman, can intensify male dominance. According to Hassan (1995, 5), “Muslim women must work in full part­ nership with Muslim men, rejecting Western models of liberation, but also, and more importantly, asserting their own”. Bangladeshi women have been able to assert their potential towards an equal presence and prominence in the workplace and the public realm. The trials of overcoming all the hindrances they confront as Muslim women, the religious, traditional barriers and intense detriments to endure in a man’s world are taking their toll, yet women are finding their own ways of owning the public space.

The Bangladeshi model Since independence, the majority of Bangladeshi Muslim women have con­ tributed to their households, staying involved in the informal zone of the economy – farming, agricultural work, post-harvest works, sewing, poultry, handloom, horticulture and more, which inevitably encourage traditional values and specified gender roles. In fact, the International Labour Office (ILO 2018) estimates that informality, that is participation in the informal economy, affects around 90% of all workers in Bangladesh. This is similar to many other developing countries across the globe. Bangladeshi women have experienced a significant change in attitude where they have taken up work from within the boundaries of their homes and discovered ways to earn from those services. Tailoring, catering, giving religious lessons and many other such services have led to a change in the financial status of housewives;

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perhaps not completely, but the discovery of such occupations connects the women to the outside world from within the limits of their homes. Although there are still those who are isolated from decision-making and confined within interpretations that constrict their lives to the domestic sphere, the contemporary Muslim women of Bangladesh are already contesting diversified professions outside the home and in the public realm. Religion is no longer a weapon that a male-dominated society can exploit to contain the rights or ambitions of Muslim women. This transformation is gradually gaining speed in Bangladesh and needs to be sustained so that issues such as domestic violence, oppression, dowry and child marriages can be properly addressed through sustainability values, education, laws and policies. The progress women have made in this lower middle-income country is remarkable. Their biggest achievement is in closing the gender pay gap in the workplace. According to the ILO’s factor-weighted gender pay gap (which groups men and women in comparable subgroups according to the factors: education, age, working-time status – that is, full time versus part time, and private-sector versus public-sector employment) (ILO 2018/19), Bangladesh is the only country in the world where women earn more than men (ILO 2019), in other words the gender gap is negative! In the rest of the world the gender pay gap is 10 to 25% positive in favour of men (ILO 2019). Bangladeshi women have found a way to be part of the country’s workforce that is unique and suits their own model of liberation. They are fast trans­ forming today’s world embracing and creating opportunities for themselves. This new model builds on fundamental human rights and existing strengths within Bangladesh society. Its characteristics include: 1

2

Education – access to education, educational opportunities and attain­ ments at all levels – from primary to tertiary, including postgraduate and doctoral degrees are essential for Bangladeshi women; the country has witnessed significant transformation with its educational gender gap almost closed (World Economic Forum 2018). This, combined with improved medical services, also leads to better health and survival out­ comes, including constantly increasing life expectancies (74.6 years for women in 2017 compared to 58.8 in 1990 and 71.2 for men in 2017 compared to 58.1 in 1990) (World Bank 2019b). Policy reforms – the participation of women in Bangladesh’s political sphere is better than in many Western countries; the country ranks 5th in the world (World Economic Forum 2018). However, more political reforms are needed to eliminate child, early and forced marriage, and the country is committed to achieving this by 2030 in line with target 5.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Child Marriage Restraint Bill already puts the legal age of marriage at 18 for women (and 21 for men) but also makes provisions for special cases resulting in the persistence of child marriages. Although there have already been positive changes with

26

3

4

5

S.M. Trishna, A. Hossain, D. Marinova the numbers of child marriages declining (Pritu 2018), much more work needs to be done. This is a high-level policy issue for the government sector with regular reviews and new monitoring mechanisms put in place. A National Plan of Action to End Child Marriage was launched in 2018 (UNICEF 2018) to bring together all sectors of society, including reli­ gious and civil groups, with a commitment “to preserve childhoods, secure children’s rights to education and life, reduce their exposure to violence and exploitation and contribute to ending intergenerational poverty” (UNICEF 2018, para. 4). Religiosity – Muslim women remain entwined within the religious and social web, and this needs to be acknowledged. As a predominantly Muslim society, practices related to gender equality can be effective only with engagement with their religious rationales from within the Islamic tradition (Larsen et al. 2017) in Bangladesh. Women have been able to reveal their potential and successfully engage in all economic, social and political spheres regardless of their religious belongingness and this has contributed to reinforcing the country’s developmental process. The con­ tribution of women is a prerequisite for purging world poverty and enhancement of human rights. Restraining Muslim women is not an alternative for Bangladesh and although some seek justifications for this in Islam, to the contrary, Bangladeshi women are showing that they can combine the best of all worlds. Creativity – the women of Bangladesh have been creative by opening up new opportunities for themselves and engaging in employment sectors where they can make their mark. In fact, the international image of Bangladesh through the readymade garments industry lies on the shoulders and artistic talents of the country’s women. There are also many women’s organisations and NGOs, including BRAC, that not only provide innovative employment but also social networks and legal sup­ port for women. Collaboration with men – all achievements of Bangladeshi women are alongside Bangladeshi men. For the survival, progress and thriving of this religious nation, Bangladeshi Muslim women work together with men to empower and liberate all members of society, not just themselves, from the ideologies of historical female exploitation, oppression and devalua­ tion. They work in partnership with men respecting the synergies and strength such relationships can offer sustaining and asserting their own power and competencies.

It is not possible to use a single solution for all sustainability commit­ ments to be translated into a substantial reality as part of the global 2030 Agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals and specifically SDG5 which calls for gender equality. The Bangladeshi model is proving to work suc­ cessfully in enhancing women’s rights, delivering gender equality and improving the wellbeing of people. Hegemonic models of masculinity can

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only destabilise the progress the country is already making. It is important to also acknowledge that where women’s rights and potential are compro­ mised, the progress and welfare of individuals, communities and nations, including men, are also destabilised. Women have never failed to surprise the world and can only remain hope­ ful through relentless determination. All-encompassing development of any country demands utmost utilisation of its human resources only achievable through the involvement of both genders. This is particularly relevant in times of challenges, such as the ones posed by the global sustainability agenda. In many ways, the global sustainability problems have been created in the man’s world but it will take both, men and women, for them to be overcome.

Concluding remarks “All the vice or bad in the world, and the pain or flowing tear, for half, man should be blamed, the other half only woman should bear”

These are the words of the greatest Bangladeshi Muslim poet Kazi Nazrul Islam who depicts the balance and joint responsibility between men and women. The principles of human responsibility have been existent for centuries in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah. Representing responsibility to current and future generations, sustainability is not a new concept to Islam or for the Muslims. In fact, the basis of all religions is to embrace God’s creations for humanity and protect them through sustaining life on this planet. However, Muslim women do this according to their understanding of their role in contemporary society. In Islam, the mindset is embedded in an overall socioeconomic infra­ structure that segregates gender roles and the dynamics of power. The drastic surge in the participation and contribution of employed Muslim women to Bangladesh indicates that these approaches are subject to modification and new interpretation. Women can claim credit for the remarkable achievements of the country not only through the readymade garment industry but also in education, policy participation and in closing the gender pay gap where Bangladesh is leading the world. Its women have achieved this by remaining true to themselves in their religiosity but also embracing education, creativity and working together with men, including on social policy reforms requiring protection of the nation’s children and its future. For an enriched and prosperous future, Muslim women must settle on continuing with their evolution in the workplace. The transitional process to sustainability has to be multi-dimensional, encouraging Muslim women to comprehend and exert their own potential in different spheres of life. As Gloria Marie Steinem, a leader and spokeswoman for the American feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s aptly stated, “the story of

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women’s struggle for equality belongs to no single feminist nor to any one organisation but to the collective efforts of all who care about human rights” (IWD 2020, para 1). The story of Bangladeshi women’s success belongs to no single individual nor to any one organisation but to the collective efforts of all those who care about the future.

Notes 1 Syed Abul A’la Maududi (2000, 293) explains this transliteration as “In My sight all of you are alike as human beings and I have the same standards of justice and judgement for all, ‘and men should not forget that women are of the same human status as they themselves have’. I do not discriminate between man and woman, master and slave, the black and the white, the high and the low”. 2 The Baul are mystic minstrels and singing philosophers who influence large sections of the Bangladeshi population (Hossain and Marinova 2012). In 2005, they were added to the UNESCO representative list of intangible cultural heritage of humanity. Bauls come from various backgrounds, including Islamic and Hindu, and can be male or female. Their songs stir the soul and are devoted to achieving spiritual liberation.

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Farhin, Nawaz. 2018. “Workplace Sexual Harassment Remains Unreported, Ignored.” DhakaTribune. May 21, 2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/special/2018/ 05/21/workplace-sexual-harassment-remains-unreported-ignored Harrison, Caitlin. 2009. “Loss, Gain, Survival: Women in Bangladesh.” Honours thesis. Edith Cowan University. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons/1404 Hashim, Iman. 2010. “Reconciling Islam and Feminism.” Gender and Development 7 (1): 7–14 Hassan, Riffat. 1995. “Women in Islam: Qur’anic Ideals versus Muslim Realities.” Planned Parenthood Challenges 2: 5–9 Hossain, Amzad and Dora Marinova. 2012. “Grassroots Cultural Policy for Water Management in Bangladesh.” Water Practice & Technology 7(1): wpt2012023. https:// doi.org/10.2166/wpt.2012.023 Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2019. “Women in National Parliaments.” https://data.ipu. org/women-ranking?month=7&year=2019 ILO (International Labour Office). 2018. Work Employment Social Outlook: Trends 2018. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgrep orts/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_615594.pdf ILO (International Labour Office). 2018/19. Global Wage Report 2018/19: What Lies behind Gender Pay Gaps. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_650553. pdf ILO (International Labour Office). 2019. Work Employment Social Outlook: Trends 2019. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgrep orts/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_670542.pdf IWO (International Women’s Day). 2020. “An Equal World Is an Enabled World.” https://www.internationalwomensday.com Kabeer, Naila. 2016. “Gender Equality, Economic Growth, and Women’s Agency: The ‘Endless Variety’ and ‘Monotonous Similarity’ of Patriarchal Constraints.” Feminist Economics 22(1): 295–321 Khatun, Fahmida. 2018. “Women’s Participation in the Job Market.” The Daily Star. March 8, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/supplements/womens-participation-the­ job-market-1545181 Kona, Monira Parvin, Abdullah Al-Mijjan, Tahmina Khatun, Nazrul Islam and Mohammad Didar Hossain. 2018. “Challenges Faced by Urban Working Women in Bangladesh.” Conference on Rethinking Development in South Asia, University of Chittagong, Rajshahi, Bangladesh, November 2018. https://www.researchgate. net/publication/329252767_CHALLENGES_FACED_BY_URBAN_WORKING_ WOMEN_IN_BANGLADESH_A_CASE_IN_RAJSHAHI_CITY Lamrabet, Asma. 2018. “Islam, Women and Reformism.” http://www.asma-lamrabet. com/articles/muslim-women-and-religious-identity/ Larsen, Lena, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Christian Moe and Kari Vogt (eds.). 2017. Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law: Justice and Ethics in the Islamic Legal Tradition. London, UK: Bloomsbury Lindquist, Galina and Simon Coleman, C. 2008. “Introduction: Against Belief ?” Social Analysis 52(1): 1–18 Lustig, Ingrid. 2019. “Rohingya Women Join Garments Workers in Pathways for Pro­ mise.” Global Giving. https://www.globalgiving.org/projects/educating-asias-women­ one-scholarship-at-a-time/reports/?subid=122986

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Mahjabeen, Tanha. 2014. “Social Movement against Corruption: Evaluating the Contribution of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB).” PhD thesis. Curtin University. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/891 Mortada, Syeda Samara. 2017. “Bonhishikha – Unlearn Gender.” The Daily Star, September 1, 2017. https://www.thedailystar.net/star-youth/bonhishikha-unlearn-gen der-1456804 Messac, Luke. 2018. “Outside the Economy: Women’s Work and Feminist Economics in the Construction and Critique of National Income Accounting.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 46(3): 552–578 Murata, Sachiko. 1992. The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook of Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press Our World in Data. 2015. “Does Law Mandate Equal Pay for Males and Females?” University of Oxford. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/law-mandate-equal-pay Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 2010. Political Instrumentalisation of Islam, Persistent Auto­ cracies and Obscurantist Deadlock. European Report on Development. EUI Work­ ing Papers, RSCAS 2010/32. Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/ 13857/RSCAS_2010_32.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Pritu, Johura Akter. 2018. “Report: Number of Child Marriages Declines.” DhakaTribune. October 19, 2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2018/ 10/19/report-number-of-child-marriages-declines Rowbotham, Sheila. 2015. Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World. London, UK: Verso Roy, Sajal and Muhammad Anwar Hossain. 2015. “Women’s Empowerment through Higher Education: A Case Study of Begum Rokeya University.” Human Rights Research Journal 3(2): 98–102 Tasneem, Shuprova. 2016. “Good Girls Don’t Do That!” DhakaTribune, August 24, 2016. http://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2016/08/24/good-girls-dont-2 The Global Economy. 2019a. “Bangladesh: Female Labor Force Participation.” https:// www.theglobaleconomy.com/Bangladesh/Female_labor_force_participation/ The Global Economy. 2019b. “Female Labor Force Participation – Country Rankings.” https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/Female_labor_force_participation/ The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. 2019. “Women and Islam.” Oxford Islamic Studies Online. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2510# United Nations. 1953. A System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables. New York, NY: Statistical Office, Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations. http s://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/1953SNA.pdf United Nations. 2018. “Leaving No One Behind.” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/susta inable/leaving-no-one-behind.html United Nations. n.d. “Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls.” Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations. https://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/ UNICEF. (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2018. “Plan of Action Launched to Eliminate Child Marriage in Bangladesh.” UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/bangla desh/en/press-releases/plan-action-launched-eliminate-child-marriage-bangladesh World Bank. 2017. “In Bangladesh, Empowering and Employing Women in the Gar­ ments Sector.” World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/02/07/ in-bangladesh-empowering-and-employing-women-in-the-garments-sector

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World Bank. 2019a. “Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman).” World Bank. https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=BD World Bank. 2019b. “Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years).” World Bank. https://da ta.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=BD World Economic Forum. 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report 2018. Geneva, Swit­ zerland: The World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ GGGR_2018.pdf World Population Review. 2019. “Bangladesh Population 2019.” World Population Review. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/ Workman, Daniel. 2019. “Bangladesh’s Top 10 Exports.” World’s Top Exports. http:// www.worldstopexports.com/bangladeshs-top-10-exports/

2

Gender parity through the Saudi Vision 2030 Female representation in English as a Foreign Language textbooks Abeer Alshahrani, Shamim Samani and

Dora Marinova

Introduction According to the 2018 Global Gender Gap (World Economic Forum 2018), the population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is 32,275,690; around 12 million of whom are migrants. Of the approximately 20 million Saudi nationals, 40% of men and only 10% of women are in employment (Hvidt 2018a, 3). The country scores well in educational attainment for women ranking at 93, yet, this is not matched in labour market participation placing the KSA 145 out of 149 countries in terms of its gender gap. Although nearly 50% of university graduates are female, the country is still considered to have a large workplace participation gender gap, despite the educational parity (Varshney 2019). According to Saudi Arabia’s voluntary national review (VNR) of the country’s progress towards the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2018, women account for 49.6% of the total Saudi population; however, they have a very low economic participation rate at just 19%, compared to 64.6% for men (KSA 2018, 64). Nonetheless, the labour force participation for women while low by international standards has been growing steadily since the 1990s – from 14.5% in 1990 to nearly 23.4% in 2018 (World Economic Forum 2018). Looking towards the future, through its strategic policy directions, the country has embarked on a mission to fully utilise its workforce and capacity potential, including that of women, and created significant opportunities to transform the economy to be more sus­ tainable and less dependent on oil for its future prosperity. In 2016, Saudi Arabia announced the Saudi Vision 2030 which is a plan to reduce the country’s dependency on oil revenues for economic growth and diversify its economy through non-oil sectors such as health, education, infrastructure, recreation and tourism. With Vision 2030, the Kingdom has endorsed a resolute program that aims to build a thriving modern society where “all citizens can fulfil their dreams, hopes and ambitions” and “provide opportunities for all through education and training, and high-quality services such as employment initiatives, health, housing, and entertainment” (Saudi

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

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Vision 2030 2016, 7). While investing in the education and training of Saudi young men and women is a key intention to equip the nation with future labour market needs, the focus on women is clearly prioritised and articulated in the vision as: “Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy” (Saudi Vision 2030 2016, 37). As the largest economy in the Middle East, the KSA also plays an impor­ tant role within the G20, a group of countries that aims to coordinate eco­ nomic policies across significant industrialised and developing countries. The G20 promotes gender parity as a priority, as can be seen in its “25 by 25” program, agreed upon by its members including KSA. This program aims to reduce the gender gap in the labour force and to increase women’s labour inclusion by 25% in the G20 economies as a priority by 2025 (Langou et al. 2018). To this end, a commitment to the Vision 2030, the SDGs as well as the “25 by 25” is observed within the country’s SDGs’ voluntary national review in 2018 where a section on “Women in the Saudi Vision 2030” outlines major areas of women’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s development (KSA 2018, 63). Since the announcement of the Vision and the Kingdom’s obligation under the SDGs, a large number of initiatives particularly addressing youth and the role of women in Saudi Arabia’s economy have been launched and imple­ mented. These include the largest share of the 2018 national budget allocated to education where a total of USD 51 billion (SAR 192 billion) were ear­ marked for general education, higher education and the training sector (KSA 2018, 53). The number of students enrolled in general education has increased fourfold since 1980 and the growth of enrolment for female students has been markedly high whereby it has increased by an average annual rate of about 5.3% since 1980 (KSA 2018, 55). As a building block for a sustainable society, Islam is at the forefront of the Kingdom’s commitment to its vision as well as the SDGs agenda and its importance is clearly articulated within the social dimension of the SDGs review which “focuses on safeguarding Islamic values, development of human resources and improvement of social welfare of citizens through scaling up of health, educational and cultural aspects” (KSA 2018, 19). This shows the esteem of religion as a significant aspect of Saudi life and well-being and is reflected in the structure of standards where the educational disciplines embrace religious sciences and knowledge. At the same time, the importance of sustainable development is also highly evident for the country’s long-term vision as it is listed as an education curricular priority (KSA 2018, 59). The noteworthy developments with regard to women’s emancipation in the Kingdom since the inception of Vision 2020 are very promising. These include Saudi women’s participation in initiatives holding several leading positions, such as vice minister, chairperson of councils and deputy minister;

34

A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova

women holding chief executive officer (CEO) positions of leading banks and in several companies; the first appointment of a woman as Dean of Student Affairs at Taif University as well as allowing women to pursue business without the consent of a guardian. In addition, women accounted for 20% of the private sector’s investments in 2017; 127,000 new commercial regis­ trations were issued for women in 2017 and over 450,000 jobs created for female employees. On the political side, women account for 20% of the Shura Council (the Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia; a formal advisory body permitted to propose draft laws and forward them to the King of Saudi Arabia and the cabinet) members and actively participated in municipal elections, having run for over 19 seats in 2016. The country has launched an electronic portal that allows job seeking women to register and obtain information on employment opportunities, a program supporting the transport of working women and providing childcare facilities for their children. A national observatory for women established at the King Saud University in 2018 monitors Saudi women’s participation in development initiatives and supports them in reaching their potential (KSA 2018, 83). An important move to bring women into the job market and change their status in society was the decree issued by King Salman that instated the right of women to drive from 24 June 2018. Unaffordable or inaccessible transport is just one factor that is an impediment to women taking part in the economy. Allowing women to drive offers opportunities for economic empowerment, previously unavailable, as many who wanted to were unable to participate in formal employment because of the struggles of commuting or not being able to afford hiring drivers to get them to work (Hvidt 2018b). While it is a given that quality of education plays an important role in labour market participation, gender equality in education is an essential requirement for this. As interrelated elements, both are major goals of the national Saudi 2030 Vision as well as the SDGs. The fourth SDG is about ensuring quality education for all and this goal puts an explicit emphasis on gender equality as a guiding principle linked to the recognition of the right to education. Furthermore, the global community through the United Nations sends a strong message about the realisation of gender equality in different sectors by stressing this in its fifth SDG. A gender review prepared by the Global Education Monitoring Report team emphasises that gender equality in education “requires unbiased curricula and textbook, how students perceive themselves and how they project their role in society is shaped to some extent by what they experi­ ence at school, including by how they are represented in textbooks” (GEM Report Team 2018, 52). There is strong evidence that gender perceptions about occupations and working life that individuals aspire to are shaped by what they see around them. A report on exploring the career aspirations of primary school children from around the world shows that a conscious and unconscious classification system starts at an early age through which individuals often rule themselves out of careers that they might otherwise

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

35

successfully pursue (Chambers et al. 2018). This also means that diverse sectors of employment globally do not benefit from all the talent that is potentially available within an economy (Chambers et al. 2018). The extent to which the Saudi Vision 2030 and its associated modifications diversify the economy of KSA and ensure greater participation of women in the workforce will rest on the provision of an education where equal opportu­ nities for both genders are reflected in the curriculum and where women are represented equally to men in textbooks, modelling opportunities across different career paths. The prominent position of the English language in Saudi Arabia and its direct and indirect relation to some of the major development goals of the country are the motives behind choosing this particular topic for analysis in the chapter. Incorporating an effective English as a Foreign Language (EFL) of instruction could immensely contribute to achieve some of the educational goals of the 2030 Vision and lead to improved employability among Saudi graduates. This chapter thus examines the effectiveness of the current approach of teaching EFL in Saudi Arabia and the appropriateness of the curriculum’s capacity to model female roles in the evolving modern economy. The chapter examines female students’ awareness of their part in the new development agenda as well as their perspectives of the current EFL curricu­ lum and its role in contributing to the 2030 Vision.

Traditional role-modelling through female education Before 1960, most women in Saudi Arabia were only provided with informal education and girls were taught in religious schools to recite the holy Quran and learn about matters that would prepare them for the roles of wives, mothers and daughters (Alyami 2014). A few women were allowed to receive primary and secondary education and to attend college; however, this was the exception as cultural norms had a strong resistance to female education. Structured education for females in the KSA started in 1960 (Yizraeli 2012). Since then, Saudi women have faced political and social pressures precluding them from entering the labour force. Disputes concerning the right of women to have formal education and work have evoked intense debate between con­ servative religious scholars and progressives. According to Hamdan (2005), in some instances Islamic and religious texts are interpreted literally, which provides the conservative religious scholars opportunities to silence women’s voices in the name of the religion (Hamdan 2005, 45). The role played by religious scholars (the ulama) in guiding mor­ ality in the Kingdom has been applied to the general society and is not just related to education and therefore has had wide-ranging gender related effects. Some researchers argue that deep-rooted beliefs in Arab culture concerning women existed before Islam and were incorporated into the Islamic traditions. It is difficult to distinguish between religious and social attitudes when these are so inextricably mixed in a culture (Hamdan 2005; Spierings, Smits, and

36

A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova

Verloo 2009) such as this. The modelling of female roles through education has over time, therefore been mostly about maintaining women’s depend­ ability as primary caregivers. Until 2002, female education came under the aegis of the General Pre­ sidency for Girls (GPG), which had the function of responsibility for all female education from primary through to the secondary level and worked under the guidance of a conservative group of ulama. Male students studied under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (MoE) which is less restrictive and more open to societal demands and economic reforms. Under the supervision of the GPG, women’s education was protected from “devia­ tions” from “the original purpose of female education, which was to make women good wives and mothers, and to prepare them for “acceptable” jobs such as teaching and nursing that were believed to suit their nature” (Hamdan 2005, 44). This gender segregation and persistent direction of girls’ education influenced all aspects of the Saudi society, restricted women’s areas of study and thus limited their fitness for many jobs. The Saudi curriculum endorsed conservative religious and social norms dictating how women should appear in public spheres. Such norms have long been accepted by a large part of the public, who were taught not only to agree with this through the system of education, but also through the character­ isation presented in textbooks. Having different administrators for male and female education has inevitably led to differences in focus and direction, with the more conservative approach to girls’ education not offering them the same breadth of opportunities that are provided for boys. Vision 2030 offers a whole shift in what Saudi women can aspire to do that moves away from these views. However religious interpretation and cultural adaptation are not the only reasons for women’s limited presence in the labour force in KSA. According to Sabri (2001), the first oil boom in Saudi Arabia between 1973 and 1980 and the sudden need to develop the country forced the government to rely on imported labour with key skills to boost its economy. Fakeeh (2009) notes that the Saudi labour market did not have time to make a gradual transition to the new economy, or to build necessary expertise and work ethics among its population. The country has thus relied largely on foreign labour to develop its economy with little role for women in the workforce as well as in the public sphere. Vision 2030 aims to change that through an ambitious undertaking to empower women and increase their public roles in society.

Portrayal of women in the Saudi English as a Foreign Language curriculum In Saudi Arabia, photographs of females have been banned from textbooks for both boys and girls since 1926, and only drawings of fully covered women are allowed (Al Arabiya 2012). In 2012, English as a Foreign Language (EFL) textbooks designed for Saudi schools included photographs of veiled

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

37

women in the medical and educational fields. In 2013, EFL textbooks were revised and the photographs removed. Sulaimani’s (2017) study of a uni­ versity-level EFL textbook found that women were under-represented and less frequently characterised than men, and that the textbook was biased in terms of gender representation. This study (Sulaimani 2017) shows that even in the progression of education there is a biased representation of gender in textbooks which further leaves an impression on aspirations. It is generally considered that the representation of men and women in any school system in any society accords with classifications that have been socially constructed; and that each gender may agree with and follow the norms or undermine, challenge or sometimes redefine them (Stromquist 1990; Kang 2009). A few studies have examined images of both genders in higher education textbooks used by male and female students in different Saudi universities, in terms of gender positioning. Sulaimani and Elyas’s (2018) investigation confirms bias in gender representation in these materi­ als. The study argues that a “glocalised” edition of textbooks that ensures equal representation of both sexes and contains images that present the current political and societal stances on men and women is required for learners. Their study finds that not only is there limited representation of women, but that men are presented as having higher status positions and are shown working hard, while women are shown in pictures that indicate the lack of seriousness required in the work environment. Similarly, Aljuaythin’s (2018) study that scrutinises the illustration of gender in two EFL textbooks for elementary students in the KSA, reveals imbalanced representation of both genders in favour of males. These findings indicate a need to review textbook representations of men and women in the workforce and public spheres, to help shift perceptions required for an effective increase of women in the workplace. The current EFL curriculum in Saudi Arabia covers three years of the secondary program, with a different textbook for each semester. The subject is compulsory in both humanities and science pathways and students must pass it to graduate. Four classes of 45 minutes are allotted to EFL each week which demonstrates the importance given to English as a vital skill that aligns with the country’s development plans and vision. The textbooks under examination, Traveller 6 and Flying High 6, are part of two series of texts used within the curriculum and are the last of each series. They are intended to include exposure to various aspects of the workforce and a variety of possible opportunities and pathways to the future, whether these be university study, the labour market, or supporting the family through caregiving. There are few references to females in general, and limited depictions of successful professional Saudi women in the texts. Traveller 6 shows no women in photographs or drawings at all. Flying High 6 offers ten images of women and 59 of men. Of the ten, six are in stereotypical female roles: cooking, cleaning, shopping, chatting, and taking care of the family. Two seem to be of

38

A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova

students at university, with their faces covered with the niqab (face covering). The only two depicted as professionals are one photographed at a desk, back to the camera, and the other one is of Marie Curie, the well-known historical female physicist and chemist. Only one photograph shows a woman’s full face who appears to be at home playing a board game with her son in the presence of her husband. This image is questionable too, as the woman is wearing a full abaya – the long black gown and a headscarf usually worn in public spaces. It is unlikely that a woman in her own household, engaging with her own family would wear these outer garments. The question raised here is whether Saudi female students notice the lim­ ited presence of females in textbooks that are taught at all schools across the country. Do they see this as a deliberate omission, or something required and intended or yet something that needs to be questioned in light of a new vision for the women of the country?

Flying High and Traveller textbooks According to Al-Haq and Smadi (1996), English has been taught in KSA since 1927. In 1969 it became compulsory at the intermediate level, which lasts for three years in KSA and starts at the age of 13. Until the completion of secondary education, students spend six years learning English. The stra­ tegic project for public education and curriculum reform announced in 2006 articulated the MoE’s commitment to sustainable development. A major initiative of the reform was the establishment of the Tatweer project to improve the quality of education, with a budget of about 12 billion Saudi Riyal (US$3.2 billion) (Wang 2013). One of the initiatives of Tatweer was the English language teaching and learning program on which the MoE collaborated with a number of international companies and training providers specialising in EFL to develop textbooks and teaching materials for Saudi students. A product of this partnership was an international series of EFL text­ books customised for the Saudi context, including Flying High, written by David Spencer which has been used in Saudi schools since 2012. It has been evaluated several times by researchers in terms of authenticity, quality, appearance, and suitability as educational material for Saudi students, as well as a resource for teaching English language skills. Alshumaimeri and Alzyadi (2015) examined its use of authentic materials that can deliver actual native speakers’ experiences of the target language through a survey distributed to female EFL teachers in public secondary schools in Riyadh. The findings revealed that Flying High has a moderate level of authentic material, but that some is beyond learners’ level and there is some need to adjust the book to the students’ proficiency level. Al Harbi (2017) and Almalki (2014) evaluated Flying High in terms of layout and instructional design from the perspective of teachers and found that they generally received the textbook positively.

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

39

Traveller 6, written by H. Q. Mitchell-Marileni Malkogianni, was first published in 2012. This text is one of the series approved by the English Language Development Project in the Saudi MoE. Like Flying High, the Traveller series consists of six textbooks covering the three secondary years. This series has also been evaluated several times and analysed by different researchers, usually one textbook of the series at a time. Some of the research that deals exclusively with a single part of the series or one textbook appears in Alhamlan’s (2013) study, where the researcher examines the Traveller 5 textbook taught in a third of secondary schools. A checklist was distributed to students to explore their perceptions of the textbook. The students’ percep­ tions were positive except in some areas. With reference to culture, around 60% of the students believed that the cultural context was suitable (Alhamlan 2013, 14). A study by Alharbi (2015) exclusively evaluated teachers’ views on Tra­ veller 3 and 4, taught in the second secondary grade. The results indicated that these texts need more development to be effective in learning and teach­ ing EFL. Allehyani, Burnapp and Wilson (2017) studied the extent to which Traveller 5 textbooks referred to inner-circle cultures – countries that use English as a first language, such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The study concluded that Traveller 5 needs to give more attention to the learners’ introduction to inner-circle culture, in ways that will be accep­ table to their local culture. The review of literature shows that gender is an under-researched topic in the case of Saudi EFL textbooks. Furthermore, from the literature review it is not clear how useful Flying High and Traveller are in relation to sustainable development, Vision 2030 and gender empowerment and more importantly for this study, to what extent they motivate or inspire female role modelling in educational and career aspirations among young Saudi girls.

Study design and methodology The first author, Abeer al-Shaharani’s PhD survey, which is the focus of this chapter, was administered in three Saudi cities (see Table 2.1). A six-item questionnaire was distributed in 2019 to high-school teachers who helped facilitate the connection between the researcher and the students. The survey was conducted as part of the larger PhD research which takes an exploratory approach to what implications Vision 2030 has for the Saudi education system.1 The total number of respondents to the survey was 279 students; 195 respondents who study Traveller 6 were from the cities of Makkah and Jeddah and 84 respondents who study the Flying High 6 text were from Al Taif city. To determine to what extent the EFL curriculum reflects the economic empowerment of women, the study asked Saudi high school girls to consider whether their EFL textbooks encourage them to explore new future career possibilities or endorse traditional roles for women. Given the new Vision

40

A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova Table 2.1 City locations and EFL textbooks analysed – number of participants City

Traveller 6

Flying High 6

Total

Makkah Jeddah Al Taif Total

98 97 0 195

0 0 84 84

98 97 84 279

2030 and its agenda of empowering women, how do the EFL textbooks Flying High 6 and Traveller 6 represent women in general, and their con­ tribution to the labour force? Is there any statistical evidence that one text­ book does this better than the other, or that students perceive their textbooks differently? The questions were: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Are women represented adequately in your EFL textbook? Are women represented in your EFL textbook (whether in traditional roles or those anticipated in 2030 Vision) at an equal rate to men? What do you think is the reason for the degree of representation of women in your textbook? What roles would you prefer to see women performing in your textbook? Do you think a traditional or non-traditional representation of women in your textbook will affect your employment pathway later in life? Do you think your textbook prepares female students for their new roles in line with Vision 2030?

Study findings The majority of participants in the total survey sample, namely 70%, is using the Traveller 6 textbook and teachers currently do not have the choice of which book to use. It is still insightful to understand how the two EFL text­ books contribute towards shaping Saudi girls’ futures. The next section sets out the findings according to each of the six questions contained in the survey. 1 Are women represented adequately in your EFL textbook? The majority of the respondents (78%), from the three cities did not consider that women in general or Saudi women in particular were well represented in the English language book they studied (see Table 2.2). This seems to be more pronounced in relation to the Traveller 6 textbook where respectively 82% and 79% of the respondents were of the opinion that women are not ade­ quately represented. A small and the same percentage, namely 11%, thought that the representation was or may be adequate.

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

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Table 2.2 Adequate representation in EFL textbooks – number of participants Are women represented adequately in your EFL textbook? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

%

Yes No Maybe Total

8 58 18 84

16 79 3 98

6 82 9 97

30 219 30 279

11 78 11 100

2 Are women represented in your EFL textbook (whether in traditional or non­ traditional and anticipated roles in Vision 2030) at an equal rate to men? The majority of the survey participants, nearly 77%, did not consider the topics and images in the book talked about women and their different roles, both traditional and modern roles, at an equal or similar rate to men (see Table 2.3 for more details). There was a comparable response across all three schools with no differences between the EFL textbooks used. 3 What do you think is the reason for the degree of representation of women in your text book? As seen in Table 2.4, the reasons behind the poor representation of women in the Saudi EFL textbooks were similarly divided between religious, social, economic and a combination of these. Although overall the combination of reasons dominated the survey sample, those who were using the Flying High 6 textbook were more inclined to see religion as being at the core of the inade­ quate representation of women. 4 What roles would you prefer to see women performing in your textbook? While a large share of the sample liked to see images of women working in all disciplines and fields without exception, a slightly smaller percentage Table 2.3 Equal representation in EFL textbooks – number of participants Are women represented in your EFL textbook (whether in traditional or anticipated roles in 2030 Vision) at an equal rate to men? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

%

Yes No Maybe Total

13 62 9 84

18 75 5 98

11 77 9 97

42 214 23 279

15 77 8 100

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A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova

Table 2.4 Reason for the degree of representation – number of participants What do you think is the reason for the degree of representation of women in your textbook? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

Religious reasons Social reasons Economic reasons All the above Total

30

17

26

73

26

15 23

21 25

22 16

58 64

21 23

16 84

35 98

33 97

84 279

30 100

%

preferred women to be represented in traditional roles and an even smaller group had no strong opinion as the representation of women in the textbooks did not worry them (see Table 2.5). The girls using the Flying High 6 text­ book seemed to be more indifferent to the way women are represented while those studying Traveller 6 expressed a slightly higher preference for seeing women across all fields and disciplines. 5 Do you think a traditional or non-traditional representation of women in your textbook will affect your employment pathway later on? Interestingly, more than three quarters of the respondents felt that the repre­ sentation of women in either traditional or non-traditional roles would not Table 2.5 Preferred roles represented in EFL textbooks – number of participants What roles would you prefer to see women performing in your textbook? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

I like to see women represented in the book in the traditional way: mother and her house or just a teacher in the school. I like to see women working in all dis­ ciplines and fields with­ out exception. The appearance of women in the book does not bother me. Total

14

43

27

84

30

30

38

47

115

41

40

17

23

80

29

84

98

97

279

100

%

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

43

influence their choice of career as seen in Table 2.6. This was consistently the preferred response irrespective of the EFL textbook used. However, 17% of the respondents felt that it would make a difference which means that close to 1 in 5 female students is likely to be influenced by the images of Saudi women in the EFL school textbooks when selecting future employment pathways. 6 Do you think your textbook will prepare female students for their new roles in Vision 2030? This last question tested the opinion of the female students in relation to the ambitious plans for women and vision set by the Saudi Government. The findings in Table 2.7 show that two thirds of the sample thought that their English language curriculum will prepare them for Vision 2030, while 22.6% felt the opposite and only 10.4% were unsure (see Table 2.7). These results were similar for both EFL textbooks used. Discussion This study is the first to explore gender and its connection to education for sustainable development in the context of the Saudi EFL curriculum after the inception of the 2030 Vision. The majority of the respondents to the survey indicated a clear awareness of the limited representation of women in their textbooks. It was expected that Traveller 6, which is devoid of any visual representation of women and has very few references to them in the text, would see most respondents agreeing that women were underrepresented. The significant difference in the answers to this question was attributed to Flying High 6. This suggests that the Flying High 6 textbook is seen to be making a difference to the way the girls perceive themselves and their role in society. Hence, this indicates that a greater push towards more equal and wider representation should be made in the other textbook, that is Traveller 6. The invisibility of women in Traveller 6 is noted by Blumberg (2008) as a major issue in textbooks and an impediment to quality education. Flying High 6 offers ten visual images of women in a mix of traditional and nonTable 2.6 Impact of representation on future career pathway – number of participants Do you think a traditional or non-traditional representation of women in your textbook will affect your employment pathway later on? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

%

Yes No Maybe Total

20 59 5 84

14 84 0 98

13 82 2 97

47 225 7 279

17 81 2 100

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A. Alshahrani, S. Samani, D. Marinova

Table 2.7 Preparation for the anticipated roles in Vision 2030 – number of participants Do you think your textbook and the degree of women’s representation prepares female students for their new roles in 2030 Vision? Variable

Flying High 6 Al Taif

Traveller 6 Makkah

Traveller 6 Jeddah

Total

%

Yes No Maybe Total

51 21 12 84

67 22 9 98

69 20 8 97

187 63 29 279

67 23 10 100

traditional roles, and students from Al Taif indicated that they were aware of the percentage of female representation in the text. This suggests that they feel their textbook is not ignoring them, even if they are not yet represented in the full range of social and public spheres. As Question 4 reveals, a large majority of students using Flying High 6 liked seeing images of women in all disciplines and fields. This indicates that the students recognise that tradi­ tional roles are already represented in their textbook and they desire women to be shown in more non-traditional roles. The two unanticipated findings were that two thirds of the sample think the representation of women in the textbook will not affect their employment pathway later in life. Similarly, surprising is that two thirds of the sample think that their EFL textbook even with the limited representation of women in the workforce, would prepare them for their new roles in Vision 2030, which promises to create more opportunities for Saudi women. The study suggests that the majority of female students surveyed were aware not only of their limited representation in the textbooks they study from, but also that this dearth of representation is due to a combination of religious, economic and social factors. The importance of religion in Saudi society is a given, and gender roles according to prevalent interpretations can explain why a rela­ tively higher percentage of respondents thought that the degree of repre­ sentation in the textbooks is determined by religion. Another justification for the results may be attributed to what Hamdan (2005) notes as the normal­ isation of gender differences through the national curriculum which empha­ sises traditional and socio-economic values that have gained legal force in Saudi society associated with particular Islamic teachings (Hamdan 2005, 45). The acceptance among students of gender inequality in the textbook can also be ascribed to what Offenhauer (2005) and Stromquist et al. (1998) note as the taken for granted invisibility that reflects larger gender stereotypes and stratification in a system. Yet many do not see this as a hindrance to their job opportunities in the future which shows young females are finding role models through mediums other than school texts and are modelling their aspirations on these. While there are indications that current reforms have started to impact upon society, gender equality is a narrative that has yet to

Gender parity through Saudi Vision 2030

45

catch up in the educational sphere in Saudi Arabia. Sections of the Saudi society have embraced gender equality, but further work needs to be done to alter cultural attitudes towards the new roles of women in the workforce anticipated in Vision 2030. The study thus raises an important question regarding the society’s endor­ sement of the phenomena of women’s empowerment. We see that a small percentage of respondents still prefer women to be presented in traditional roles only. If a change at the macro-level is to take place, then it must also take place at the level of the individual student to support women’s empow­ erment. This can provide modelling of women’s roles that offers equal opportunities for aspirations within curriculum texts for both girls and boys. Such a change would move modelling beyond traditional home-based roles and also depict women as being able to tackle diverse challenging professions and career pathways expected in Vision 2030.

Conclusion The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is unprecedented with respect to the historical ideals regarding gender roles held, inculcated and absorbed within the Saudi society. These ideals inform aspirations that young girls may have with regard to career choices or indeed pursuing further or higher educa­ tion. As many positive structural reforms and changes are underway and already happening, the revision of women’s images in the Saudi textbooks is an important contribution with respect to what may be a small change, but a necessary one in the bigger picture of attainting the outcomes of the Vision. The Saudi Vision 2030 sees women as valuable human capital and under­ takes political and social revisions that will make the most of women’s underutilised talents in the workforce. Part of the challenge lies in how the education system of the country responds to the new anticipated roles for women. With revised content that offers positive role modelling of women’s empowerment and embraces Saudi values as envisioned in Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the SDGs, EFL textbooks can make a differ­ ence in the contemporary environment where the local and global interrelate and interact to promote gender parity.

Note 1 Future research in the PhD study will gather and analyse information on the representation of females in textbooks from Grade 3 boys.

References Al Arabiya. 2012. “Saudi School Books Feature Women’s Photos for the First Time.” December 4. Al Arabiya News. https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/04/253290. html

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Al-Haq, Fawwaz Al-Abed and Oqlah Smadi. 1996. “The Status of English in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) from 1940–1990.” Contributions to the Sociology of Language, 72: 457–484 Al Harbi, Abdullah Abdul Muhsen. 2017. “Evaluation Study for Secondary Stage EFL Textbook: EFL Teachers’ Perspectives.” English Language Teaching, 10(3): 26–39 Alhamlan, Suad. 2013. “EFL Curriculum and Needs Analysis: An Evaluative Study.” Online Submission, King Saud University. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED542860 Alharbi, Ahlam. 2015. “A Descriptive-Evaluative Study of a Saudi EFL Textbook Series.” Cogent Education, 2(1): 1079946 Aljuaythin, Wafa. 2018. “Gender Representation in EFL Textbooks in Saudi Arabia: A Critical Discourse Analysis Approach.” International Journal of Applied Linguis­ tics and English Literature, 7(5): 151–157 Allehyani, Badr, Dave Burnapp and Janet Wilson. 2017. “The Place of Inner-Circle Culture in Saudi Secondary School Textbooks.” International Journal of English and Education, 6(2): 1–12 Almalki, Mosa M. 2014. “Teacher Perception of a New English as a Foreign Lan­ guage (EFL) Curriculum in Saudi Arabia.” Fredonia, NY: Master’s Thesis. State University of New York. Alshumaimeri, Yousif A. and Maha S. Alzyadi. 2015. “Using Material Authenticity in the Saudi English Textbook Design: A Content Analysis from the Viewpoint of EFL Teachers.” Advances in Language and Literary Studies, 6(2): 229–241 Alyami, Rfah Hadi. 2014. “Educational Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Tatweer Schools as a Unit of Development”. Literacy Information and Computer Education Journal (LICEJ), 5(2): 1515–1524 Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 2008. “The Invisible Obstacle to Educational Equality: Gender Bias in Textbooks.” Prospects, 38(3): 345–361 Chambers, Nick, Jordan Rehill, Elnaz T. Kashefpakdel and Christian Percy. 2018. Drawing the Future: Exploring the Career Aspirations of Primary School Children from around the World. London, UK: Education and Employers. https://www.educa tionandemployers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/DrawingTheFuture.pdf Fakeeh, Manal S. 2009. “Saudization as a Solution for Unemployment: The Case of Jeddah Western Region.” Glasgow, UK: University of Glasgow. http://theses.gla.ac. uk/1454/ Global Education Monitoring Report Team. 2018. Gender Review. Meeting our Com­ mitments to Gender Equality in Education. Paris, France: UNESCO. http://www. ungei.org/resources/files/GEM_Report_Gender_Review_2018.pdf Hamdan, Amani. 2005. “Women and Education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Achievements.” International Education Journal, 6(1): 42–64 Hamdan, Amani. 2006. “Arab Women’s Education and Gender Perceptions: An Insi­ der Analysis.” Journal of International Women’s Studies, 8(1): 52–64 Hvidt, Martin. 2018a. “The New Role of Women in the New Saudi Arabian Econ­ omy: News Analysis.” Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark. https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/centre/c_mellemoest/ videncenter/artikler/2018/hvidt+article+april +2018.pdf ?la=da&hash=A0045F5725 D8AAB15BF9C7D398F14F32DA9D4A4F Hvidt, Martin. 2018b. “The Real Reason Saudi Arabia Lifted Its Ban on Women Driving: Economic Necessity”. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/the-real-reason-sa udi-arabia-lifted-its-ban-on-women-driving-economic-necessity-97267

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Kang, Alice. 2009. “Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mat­ tered.” Politics & Gender, 5(4): 560–568 KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). 2018. Towards Saudi Arabia’s Sustainable Tomor­ row. Sustainable Development Goals, First Voluntary National Review, UN HighLevel Political Forum 2018, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. https://sustainabledevelopm ent.un.org/content/documents/20230SDGs_English_Report972018_FINAL.pdf Langou, Gala Diaz, Florencia Caro Sachetti, Eestela Rivero Fuentes, Margarita Beneke de Sanfeliu, Cynthia L. Drakeman, Paloma Ochoa, Caroline Robino, Boris Branisa and Alina Sorgner. 2018. “Achieving ‘25 by 25’: Actions to Make Women’s Labor Inclusion a G20 Priority.” T20 Solutions: Argentina 2018. https://t20argentina.org/publicacion/achie ving-25-by-25-actions-to-make-womens-labour-inclusion-a-g20-priority/ Offenhauer, Priscilla. 2005. “Women in Islamic Societies: A Selected Review of Social Scientific Literature, a Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division”. Washington, DC: Library Research Division. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/ Women_Islamic_Societies.pdf Sabri, Sharaf. 2001. The House of Saud in Commerce: A Study of Royal Entrepre­ neurship in Saudi Arabia. New Delhi, India: I.S. Publications Saudi Vision 2030. 2016. The Council of Economic Affairs and Development, Saudi Arabia. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en Spierings, Niels, Jeroen Smits and Mieke Verloo. 2009. “On the Compatibility of Islam and Gender Equality.” Social Indicators Research, 90(3): 503–522 Stromquist, Nelly, Molly Lee and Birgit Brock-Utne. (1998) “The Explicit and the Hidden School Curriculum.” In Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, edited by Nelly P. Stromquist, 397–407. New York and London: Garland Stromquist, Nelly P. 1990. “Gender Inequality in Education: Accounting for Women’s Subordination.” British Journal of Sociology of Education, 11(2): 137–153 Sulaimani, Amjjad. 2017. “Gender Representation in EFL Textbooks in Saudi Arabia: A Fair Deal?” English Language Teaching, 10(6): 44–52 Sulaimani, Amjjad, and Tariq Elyas. 2018. “A Glocalized or Globalized Edition? Contextualizing Gender Representation in EFL Textbooks in Saudi Arabia: A Cri­ tical Discourse Analysis Perspective.” In Conceptual Shifts and Contextualized Practices in Education for Glocal Interaction, edited by Ali Fuad Selvi and Natha­ nael Rudolph, 55–76. Singapore: Springer Varshney, Deepanjana. 2019. “The Strides of the Saudi Female Workforce: Over­ coming Constraints and Contradictions in Transition”. Journal of International Women’s Studies, 20(2): 359–372 Wang, Yan. 2013. Education Policy Reform Trends in G20 Members. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer World Economic Forum. 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report, 2018. http://www3. weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf Yizraeli, Sarah. 2012. Politics and Society in Saudi Arabia: The Crucial Years of Development, 1960–1982. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

3

Cultural assimilation policies in Bulgaria and the plight of Muslim women Silvia Lozeva, Dora Marinova, Shamim Samani, Kaloyan Tsvetkov and Georgi Bardarov

Introduction “I have a strong connection with the northern part of Bulgaria, the region of Shumen. I grew up in the village of Konevo, where my parents, grandparents and great-grandparents who were orthodox Christians lived surrounded by Muslims. In my first year of schooling in the 1980s, I was the only ethnic Bul­ garian in my class, apart from the teachers. All children spoke Turkish outside the formal classes and used the Bulgarian language only when socialising with ethnic Bulgarians. As a tightly knit society, the teachers, school staff, parents and other community members had very close relations, sharing fresh produce of garden vegetables, fresh milk and much more. This was the norm in small villages like ours. School was where I formed my earliest friendships. The good relationships and communal spirit in the village have stayed with me as pre­ cious memories, but I also vividly remember some bleak incidents… One day in 1985, as usual, I called out to my Turkish friend whom I knew only as Maya, to play outside. Her father angrily opened the door and did not allow me to see her. He also said that her name was Menhur, not Maya. At the time, it was difficult for me to comprehend her father’s reaction. I went home crying thinking I had said or done something wrong. I never saw Maya (Menhur) again and suffered for a long time from the loss of our friendship. It was never clear to me what happened to her and her family. Other ethnic Turks departed from our village around that time, leaving behind empty houses, uncultivated land and a weakened community. Later, as an adult I understood that what I had witnessed was part of a broader assimilation project affecting half a million people in Bulgaria which also crushed the social fabric of the Bulgarian society. The socio-political agenda targeted the elimination of Muslim minorities from the Bulgarian landscape…” (Silvia Lozeva 2019)

This chapter examines the implications of the historical assimilation polices targeted towards Muslims in Bulgaria under the pretext of fully integrating them into the Bulgarian society. In 2009, Bulgaria officially denounced the assimilation policies through the Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims (Bulgarian Parliament 2012).

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These assimilation policies of the Bulgarian state and totalitarian socialist regime, namely the “Re-naming”,1 “Inclusion”,2 “De-veiling”3 and “Revi­ val”4 processes, aimed at creating an ethno-linguistically and ethno-religiously homogenous Bulgaria (Kamusella 2018). There is limited knowledge about the impacts of the assimilation policies and the economic behaviours of the Bulgarian Muslim women available to the wider global community. As the status of Muslims in Bulgarian society cannot be fully comprehended without explaining the historical background of their presence, the chapter begins with a brief outline of their history in Bulgaria and proceeds to examine the waves of assimilation that the different Muslim minority groups have been subjected to as part of modernisation processes. This exploratory ethnographic study uses desktop research and scholarly literature in Bulgarian and English, and also draws from the perso­ nal experience of the first author and her roots in Konevo – a village situated in the region of Shumen (a region also known as Deli-Orman in Turkish and Ludogorie in Bulgarian). This is one of the regions in Bulgaria with a large number of ethnic Turkish-speaking Bulgarians part of the Bulgarian Muslim population. The region of Shumen hosts the first capital of the Bulgarian kingdom Pliska tracing back to the origins of Bulgaria to 681. It also held a significant place during Ottoman rule. In this region, Christian Bulgarians have lived side by side with Muslim Bulgarians for centuries. The last point of the 2009 Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims states that the responsibility for the assimilation policies should not rest with the entire Bulgarian population but only with those who were instrumental in putting them in place. This appears to be an attempt to avoid broad responsibility and put aside the mistakes of the past. However, the past needs to be properly acknowledged and under­ stood as it disrupted the lives of many and impacted on the future genera­ tions. This chapter attempts to do this by providing an overview of the forced assimilation and its effects on the Muslim minorities, and particularly Muslim women in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria – a brief history Bulgaria’s history goes back to 681 when the state was established as a union between the Bulgar tribes who arrived from Asia and the south Slavic tribes who lived in southern Europe. Two centuries later in 864, pagan Bulgaria adopted Christianity as its main religion and became the cultural centre of Slavic Europe, including through the Cyrillic script. The Bulgarian nation was characterised by a Slavic language namely Bulgarian, and Orthodox Chris­ tianity as a religion. Bulgaria’s history as an independent state however was interrupted by two centuries of Byzantine rule (1018 to 1185) and five cen­ turies of subjugation to the Ottoman Empire (1396 to 1878). The conquest by the Ottomans set into motion the restructuring of the religious composition of the populations where Muslim communities were introduced alongside the

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local ethnic Christian Bulgarians. During the time of the Ottoman Empire, military as well as civil Muslim people settled in the Bulgarian territory; and some Bulgarians were forcefully converted to Islam. The ethnic and religious composition of Bulgaria thus became more diverse. After the Second World War, in 1944, Bulgaria adopted socialism. In 1991, the Eastern Block collapsed and the country became a parliamentary repub­ lic. Located at the centre of the Balkan Peninsula in the south of Europe, Bulgaria now has a population of 7 million and its territory covers 111 km2 (NSI 2019). It is a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many Muslim Bulgarians nowadays identify as ethnic Turks and are des­ cendants of the Turkish population which lived in the Bulgarian territory of the Ottoman Empire. They adhere to Islam as their main religion and speak Turkish. Sections of the Bulgarian population were converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule and are known as Pomaks. They are ethnically Bulgarian and speak the Bulgarian language. Originally nomadic, gypsy tribes (or Roma) also settled in Bulgaria and some adopted Islam as their religion. Altogether these were the three main population groups targeted by the assimilation processes during the 20th century, namely Bulgarian ethnic Turks, Pomaks and the Muslim Roma. Before socialism, there were two waves of assimilation policies, the first in 1912–1913 and later 1937–1944 which were aimed at the Pomaks (Balkanski 2007). This Muslim section of the Bulgarian population were forced to change their Islamic names. Later too in the 1960s, there were new attempts to change the Muslim names of the Pomaks as well as those of the Roma. The biggest and most organised assimilation process entitled the “Revival” was carried out during the 1980s against the Bulgarian Turks. It converted all Turkish names into Bulgarian, banned the use of the Turkish language, and restricted access to places of worship.5 Within the “Revival” process, Muslim women were seen as a specific target group as they were the anathema of the socialist ideal of modernity and lib­ eration. More importantly, they were hard to reach and difficult to “control” by the state (Muratova 2013) as they did not engage with the public sphere as much as others. In attempts to integrate and assimilate Muslim women, the state apparatus introduced special measures in the course of the 40 years preceding the “Revival” process, including special education for them to improve their qualifications (Muratova 2013). The intention of the nationalist agenda of the state was to ensure that all sections of the Bulgarian population would have similar modern characteristics (Nahodilova 2010).

Muslims in today’s Bulgaria The last census conducted by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI 2019) shows that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religion (about 76 per cent of the Bulgarian population) while the Muslim minority is

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estimated to be at about ten per cent, and people who do not identify with any religion at under 12 per cent of the population. The remaining religious minority groups include Jewish and other Christian denominations, such as Catholics and Protestants. The majority of Muslims live in the north-east of Bulgaria within the Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen and Silistra municipalities and in the southern Rhodope region in the Smolyan and Kardzali munici­ palities (Raichevsky 2004; Ghodsee 2009). Between 2001–2011 there were also migrant Muslims who settled in Bulgaria from different countries and now account for about 15–20 per cent of the Muslims (NSI 2017). Although there is a higher concentration of ethnic Turks within specific regions of the country, this Muslim minority is spread across the entire territory of presentday Bulgaria (see Figure 3.1). Most Muslims in Bulgaria are ethnic Turks who have a strong cultural identity and their common language is Turkish (Zhelyazkova 2019). The majority of the ethnic Turkish are Sunni; there is also the Alevi/Kizibashi/ Bektashi minority which adheres to Sufi orders thought to follow a syncretic form of Islam influenced by various religious systems (Poulton 1997; Duman 2016). Although thought to be distinct groups, the Alevi/Kizibashi/Bektashi have evolved from Shi’ite creeds (Poulton 1997). The north-eastern part of Bulgaria has played a significant role in the heterodox Muslim Sufi-Dervish tradition (Mikov 2005) whose followers were themselves shunned by the Ottomans because of their unorthodox practices at the time of the Ottoman rule. In the villages of Yablonovo and Metodievo, 10 km away from Konevo, well-preserved sites and a cemetery with the Shi’ite sign from the 16th century in Arabic reads: “In memory of the battle of Karbala”, confirming affiliation with the Shia sect of Islam (see Figure 3.2). Villagers explain that these are the resting places of Persian teachers, sent a long time ago to spread their Islamic teachings to the region. Although the majority of the younger Muslim generation in Bulgaria is unidentifiable from the rest of the Bulgarian society, many older Turkish (and Pomak) women are easily recognisable through their distinct clothing styles with shalvars and headscarfs (see Figure 3.3). The successful peaceful co­ existence of Christian, Muslim and other minorities in Bulgaria nowadays is the result of the historical events but also from a political platform of inclu­ sion which emphasised citizenship over ethnic or religious differences (Grouev 2005). With its many wrong-doings, this platform attempted to build a sense of belonging and inclusive nationalism (Grouev 2005). It avoided separation and opposition along religious lines as was the case in other Balkan states, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bulgarian women of Turkish ethnicity continue to negotiate between their Muslim religion and the dominant secularism in the country. The Pomaks are a Bulgarian-speaking Muslim minority group, who are not ethnically Turkish but emerged as part of the Islamisation process in Bulgaria during the Ottoman rule. While they have converted to Islam, they maintain their Bulgarian language and many Bulgarian customs. Although the term

Figure 3.1 Distribution of Muslim population in Bulgaria, 2011

Source: Bulgarian National Statistician Institute. Data source: NSI 2011.

Figure 3.2 Shi’ite sign in the Bulgarian village of Metodievo Copyright: Authors

Figure 3.3 Ethnic Turkish women in Konevo in front of the local mosque with presents from the municipality of Varbitsa Copyright: Muzeker Isufov

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Pomak is considered colloquial, it is also used in scholarly literature. How­ ever, the Bulgarian authorities never recognised Pomaks as an ethnic identity defining them as ancestral Bulgarians. Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made throughout the years to reclaim them back as part of the Bulgarian identity. Not being considered an ethnic group, Pomaks are not accounted for in the national censuses. In 2014, the Council of Europe’s Advisory Commit­ tee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities noted that Pomaks were discouraged and even obstructed from registering their identity in the country’s censuses. Their numbers can only be estimated on the basis of religion being recorded as Muslim and language spoken as Bulgarian (World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2018). The Pomak groups live mainly in the southern Rhodope mountains and have a unique religious and cultural identity. Caught between the Islamic religion and Bulgarian ethnicity, they are seen as fluid and often considered as outsiders on both sides, amongst the Muslim minority and the main­ stream Bulgarian society. They continue to search for their identity through oral history and through archaeological evidence (Darakchi 2018; Zhe­ lyazkova 2019; Raichevsky 2004). Estimates for the Pomak population in 2001 were between 130,000 and 160,000 (Zhelyazkova 2001); however, in 2011, only 67,000 could be identified (NSI 2011). Researchers believe that the numbers of Pomaks may be almost double these estimates (Zhelyazkova 2001). Many Pomak women continue to adhere to the Muslim style of dress and headscarfs; their movements in public are restricted to being in the company of a male relative or older women. Such behaviour, however, is only present in the smaller Pomak-dominated settlements where agriculture is the main livelihood. In the bigger cities and Bulgaria’s capital Sofia, Pomak women, particularly younger women, prefer to blend with the rest of the Bulgarian society (see Figure 3.4) which allows them to participate easily in the country’s economy. The Muslim Roma are thought to be the second largest ethnic group after the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (Ilieva 2012). According to Ilieva (2012), there is a lack of studies and reliable data on the Roma who are heterogeneous in the way they identify themselves (as Bulgarians, Turks or Roma), and have con­ servative traditions and customs. While some have settled in communities, others retain travelling lifestyles. The origin of the Roma Muslims is traced back to the 14th and 15th centuries and is linked to the Ottoman invasion of Bulgaria. Although the majority of the Bulgarian population designates them as Turkish gypsies, the Muslim Roma commonly refer to themselves as millet (people), a term that dates back to the Ottoman years (Marushiakova and Popov 2013). Their main language can be a dialect of Romani but also Bul­ garian or Turkish. In general, the public prestige of the Roma is much lower than that of other ethnic groups. This is also the case for the Muslim Roma who, like many other Roma, are at the margins of society, associated with high crime, unemployment, high fertility and mortality, general impoverish­ ment, and are highly discriminated against.

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Figure 3.4 Pomak women on a train in Southern Bulgaria Copyright: Authors

The Roma have never been considered as a part of the Bulgarian society, both by the authorities and people in general (Marushiakova and Popov 2013). Many Roma continue to maintain their itinerant way of living, which implies extended families travelling together in groups from place to place. They establish themselves in spatially segregated areas in the periphery of a settlement, usually in low quality shanty places with open spaces for com­ munal activities. There are many negative stereotypes about the Roma; that they are not responsible for their children who often play uncontrolled, they party loud at festivities like weddings, music, dances and other celebrations, and generally, have a low work ethic. Almost each Bulgarian settlement has a gypsy district where population numbers vary depending on the lifestyle of its residents. Quite often, Roma moves are provoked by unacceptance and even antagonism from the local community where they have settled. Roma women’s occupations in the formal employment sector are mainly in agri­ culture and services, such as street sweepers (see Figure 3.5), toilet and hos­ pital cleaners. In the informal economy, they work as ambulant vendors, some are dancers, florists, musicians, fortune tellers and sex-workers. Roma’s

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birth rates are significantly higher than the rest of the Bulgarian society. Given the low employment rate of the Bulgarian Roma estimated at 39% in 2014 (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014), they are sup­ ported by the government with financial aid, including children’s benefits. Being very emancipated, Roma women are highly visible within the Bulgarian society, but their levels of education, labour force participation, employment rates and income levels are much lower compared to other Bulgarians. For example, in 2014, 93% of the Roma aged 18 to 24 had not completed upper secondary education (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014). Despite Bulgaria’s participation in the 2005–2015 European Decade for Roma Inclusion, the majority of the Bulgarian population – 59 to 80%, continues to hold negative attitudes towards them (Silverman 2012) which affects more women as they have fewer opportunities for employment and higher responsibilities in raising children. Collectively these three groups, the ethnic Turks, the Pomaks and the Muslim Roma were the focus of four assimilation policies of the Bulgarian government – the “Re-naming”, “Inclusion”, “De-veiling” and “Revival”, aimed at establishing a national homogeneity through forceful cultural integration. This included repudiation of their culture, languages, outward appearances and even expulsions from the country. The influence of these measures was felt across the entire Bulgarian Muslim population and women were severely affected given their traditional roles of maintaining the family unit.

Figure 3.5a and 3.5b Roma women employed in street sweeping, Sofia, Bulgaria Copyright: Authors

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Assimilation policies in Bulgaria The period of Ottoman rule is often referred to as “the dark centuries” in Bulgaria’s history because it is seen to have halted the cultural, social and economic development of the nation separating it from the rest of progressive Christian Europe (Darakchi 2018). With the re-establishment of the Bulgar­ ian state after the Ottoman rule, the government commenced the four waves of assimilation policies towards the Muslim populations which spread between 1912 and 1989. The “Re-naming” (1912–1913) After the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878, highly incoherent, contradictory and even violent state politics were pursued regarding Muslim populations. These policies, exacerbated by the conservative and patriarchal world characterising the Balkans of those times, had a strong effect on Muslim women. Prior to 1944, the attention was focussed mainly on the Pomaks with the ambition to re-integrate them within the dominant Christian Orthodox religion. The 1912–1913 “Re-naming” campaign was aimed at changing not only the names but also the religion of the Pomaks. Many of them switched to Christianity (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008) while others managed to hide and keep their Muslim beliefs. This pro­ cess was led by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church subsidised by the government and with the presence of military authorities. It was perceived as an attempt to rectify the mistakes of the past and strengthen the Bulgarian nation which at the time was at war with its Balkan neighbours. It is estimated that around 200,000 people converted to Christianity (Stoyanova 2006; Nahodilova 2010); however, this did not have a lasting effect as the majority of the newly chris­ tened people soon reverted back to Islam (Raichevsky 2004; Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). There were numerous negative and dramatic effects from the “Re-naming” process which shattered the foundations of women’s livelihoods. Women were forcefully de-veiled; those who were not the first wife in polygamous rela­ tionships were sent back home losing the economic support from their husbands. On the other hand, many girls were married off early to avoid developing relationships with Christians. The strong resistance to this assim­ ilation process mounted by the Pomaks forced the government to put a stop to it. Instead of bringing the Bulgarian nation together it achieved the oppo­ site effect of dividing it (Stoyanova 2006). The “Inclusion” (1937–1944) The second wave of assimilation that occurred between 1937 and 1944 was much heavier and more insidious. It converted 80,000 Pomaks and was conducted under the policy of “Inclusion” (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). The

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official government policy was to create a new united Bulgarian tribe (Stoyanova n.d.). A major role in the process was played by the newly established state-supported organisation Motherhood 6 whose leadership and members were male. Its initial focus was on the Bulgarian male Pomaks whose access to employment became subject to membership in Motherhood. Religious leaders (imams and muftis) in many mosques were selected from the members of Motherhood and the calls for prayers started to be con­ ducted in Bulgarian. Among the activists of Motherhood were both Pomaks and many Christians, including officials from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, local councils and administration. Men were required to abandon the traditional fez (Muslim male headdress) and replace it with European headgear. Women’s traditional Muslim way of dressing started to be of concern only after 1940. To get Muslim women to participate, Motherhood started organising various events in Pomak villages, such as large celebra­ tions of significant dates and holidays, dinners, excursions, courses in cook­ ing and tailoring. There was a common understanding that if they succeeded in bringing women into Christianity, this would gradually integrate the entire Pomak minority group into the Bulgarian society. In 1941, Motherhood announced its goal of gradually removing Muslim names of new-born babies. Muslim women who had to record new-born children were under the strongest pressure to use recommended lists of names with Bulgarian etymology but not linked to Christianity, such as related to plants, flowers and fruits. In 1942, Motherhood initiated a legislative change allowing any names to be replaced by administrative rather than judicial processes. This launched the process of the state enforcing a mass campaign for re-naming all Muslims in Pomak villages (Eminov, 1987; Crampton 1997; Savova-Mahon Borden 2001; Muratova 2013). Special attention was paid to the removal of the outer features of the Muslim and Turkish identity. Initially, this was done voluntarily, but due to the small number of women who stopped veiling, violent measures began to be used. Muslim women were subjected to brutal violence and humiliation with the uncovering of veils and removal of clothes done publicly as the Pomak regions were subjugated to fear, hatred and revenge. The socialist revolution of 1944 interrupted the process of “Inclusion” and the Pomaks were allowed to use their Muslim names and traditional outfits. Motherhood ceased to exist in 1947 (Eminov 1987; Crampton 1997; Savova-Mahon Borden 2001; Muratova 2013). The new government tried to reconcile the big division created between Muslim and non-Muslim Bulgar­ ians by acknowledging the human rights of those who profess Islam. As religion was excluded from the socialist agenda, there was a pronounced lack of understanding of the main teachings and subtleties of Islam. The cultural politics of the socialist state pursued modernisation and change in the gender roles aimed at achieving women’s equality (Darakchi 2018) without due attention to the balance between the private and the public sphere for Muslim women.

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For example, the Communist Party recruited Muslim women as members to demonstrate support within the broader community. This was not always wel­ comed by the women themselves who often feared retaliation and reprimand were they to reject such invitations. Even within the party circles, Muslim women were never accepted as high-level functionaries (Muratova 2013). One exception was Aisha Ibramova, a pedagogy graduate who became the school principal and local librarian, while being heavily involved with the propaganda of the Com­ munist Party. She spoke publicly about the role of the school in the formation of a modern, socialist individual. Her image was used as a role model for Muslim women (Muratova 2013). Education was widely promoted during this period. It was aimed at and had an effect mainly on the younger generations. The “De-veiling” (1959–1984) In 1948, the Bulgarian Communist Party gradually changed its attitude towards the Muslim communities and set off a new, transitional stage in its cultural politics. It launched the so-called “De-veiling” program in 1959 and attempted to forcibly abolish the traditional Muslim clothing. In the years to come, forcible campaigns alternated with temporary retreats, causing the dif­ ferent Muslim minority groups constant confusion and the illusion that the next action would be the last. Instead of inclusion, the measures had the opposite effect and the distances within the Bulgarian community were widening (Vassileva 1992; Ghodsee 2009). Some of the measures included pro­ hibition of traditional Muslim rituals, such as the circumcision of boys7 (Avramov 2016). The ban on enlisting Muslim men in the Bulgarian Army was lifted (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). Todor Zhivkov’s government in power in Bulgaria between 1954 and 1989 was committed to an atheist society and a cultural revolution where religious rituals and dress codes were not tolerated. In addition to the “De-veiling” Balkanski (2007) describes several waves of re-naming Muslim minorities in Bulgaria: in 1962 when the number of affec­ ted Roma was estimated at 400,000; in 1964 when the names of 10,000 Pomaks were unsuccessfully changed (as they reverted to Islam soon after); and in 1970–1974 when the names of 200,000 Pomaks were changed. Between 1982 and 1984, the names of 50,000 more Muslims were changed. Bulgaria also had had an agreement with Turkey since 1968, allowing ethnic Turks to migrate under family reunion and 115,000 Muslims left in the early 1980s escaping the re-naming process. The “Revival” (1984–1989) The higher fertility rates of the Muslim compared to the Christian Orthodox Bulgarians resulted in faster population increase of this minority which was a demographic concern for the government. To address this, it set in place the largest assimilation process for the “revival” of the Bulgarian nation (Dar­ akchi 2018).

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Muslim women were the main target of a range of policies during the “Revival” process. They were expected to present a secular European modern image and this related to clothing, education and employment opportunities as well as access to finances, health services and social security, such as pen­ sions. The aim was to achieve women’s equality without the religious brakes and barriers. Muslim women were even given special quotas for studying in Bulgarian universities. As the rest of the Bulgarian society abandoned its religious roots and endorsed secularism and atheism, Muslim women were seen as being held behind by their faith. The new political agenda in response to the perception of modernity was to merge gender and ethnic policies fuelled by nationalism. The “Revival” process was first approbated in the Bulgarian Muslim vil­ lages of Kornitsa, Breznitsa, Laznitsa and Musomishta in the Gotse Delchev region of Bulgaria in the 1970s. In October 1971, the names of the Muslims from these villages were changed overnight to Bulgarian names and people were called to the council houses to receive their new documents. This was a serious abrogation of their sense of self and many Muslims rebelled against the introduced changes to their names and ultimately their identities. Although expected, their rebellious reaction came as a surprise for the gov­ ernment, and led to violent conflicts with the law enforcement authorities. In commemoration of the Muslims who died in these riots, memorials are now erected in the village centres of Kornitsa and Breznitsa. Fleeing from the actions of the ruling party, part of the population of the affected villages migrated to the inner regions of the country where there were higher con­ centrations of Muslims, namely Velingrad, Razgrad and Shumen (Bardarov and Ilieva 2008). In the early 1980s, the pressure on individual groups, families and indivi­ duals to assimilate outside of the densely populated Muslim areas was again reinforced. Increasing numbers of ethnic Turks were forced to change their names when they commenced a new job, bought a house or obtained building permits. The scope of the policies expanded to children and the parents of mixed Turkish–Pomak marriages. Corresponding with the mass re-naming campaign was a massive change of the personal identity documents for all Bulgarians with the introduction of a single identity number. The escalation of the “Revival” process occurred between December 24, 1984 and February 28, 1985 involving all structures of the administration and the repressive apparatus of the totalitarian regime. In just over two months, they re-named over 800,000 people without their consent (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). Any protests were met by the severity of the law, military presence, including tank divisions of the Bulgarian Army, and incarceration in gulag type camps. The protests of tens of thousands of people across the country were suffocated with power and blood, including innocent young victims. In 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party called for Turkey to open its borders with Bulgaria in order for Muslim minorities to emigrate. Over four months, 345,000 people left Bulgaria without the right to return (Markova

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2012) in what is known as “the great excursion”. Almost all of them were Bulgarian ethnic Turks (Kalchev 2005). This in effect, was an attempt at ethnic cleansing of the Turkish-speaking people in Bulgaria by the communist state. After waves of assimilation policies, which seemed to have little effect (Avramov 2016), the Communist Party declared the otherwise “sealed bor­ ders” of the country open in May 1989, thus giving rise to a mass emigration of Turks living in Bulgaria. About 43% of the ethnic Turkish Bulgarian population emigrated to Turkey for political, religious and cultural reasons. This emigration was further exacerbated by better economic opportunities and the market reforms, which had started in Turkey in the 1980s, in contrast with the collapsing political and economic regime in Bulgaria (Vassileva 1992). Only six months later, the entire political order in Bulgaria collapsed, followed by a macro-economic catastrophe (Avramov 2016). Most of the people who emigrated during the “great excursion” were working-age peasants with lower levels of education and lacking in profes­ sional skills. They were fleeing to Turkey in search of a better life and eco­ nomic opportunities unified by the Islamic religion. However, cultural differences, political and even linguistic challenges were obstacles for those who had inter-generational close ties with their local Bulgarian communities, and this made many return. After the political changes and the shift to a democratic system in November 1989, nearly half of those emigrants returned back to Bulgaria (Vassileva 1992). The major political transformations resul­ ted in legal changes, and ethnic Turks were able to re-gain their names and have better access to educational and employment opportunities. However, serious damages were inflicted and disadvantages for Muslim minorities, and women in particular, still exist. These challenges are particu­ larly felt in the education system, where approximately 46 per cent of the Turks do not know the Bulgarian alphabet, which affects the average grades of children (Gal and Kligman 2000). This problem is coupled with school attainment, where most children from ethnic minorities leave school before the age of 16 with the main explanation being travelling abroad or for family reasons (Gal and Kligman 2000). Lack of education serves as a major barrier to entering the labour market and accessing further economic opportunities, both within the same generation, as well as inter-generationally.

Impacts of the assimilation The assimilation policies penetrated all levels of the public and private life of the Bulgarian Muslim minorities and disrupted their lives and lifestyles. Fur­ thermore, the macro-economic and political crisis after 1989, when the Bul­ garian state began its transitioning into a democracy, had particularly severe impacts on the socially weaker ethnic and religious minority groups. By the time the country transitioned to capitalism after the 1990 fall of the socialist government, Muslim communities had suffered disproportionately (Zhe­ lyazkova 2014). The economic crisis following the socialist rule and the flux

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created by the assimilation policies directed at Bulgarian Muslims created a broadening economic gap between them and the wider Bulgarian society. However, the impacts on the three Muslim sections are different because of their integration, historical disadvantage and relations with the wider society. The most notable of these barriers are visible in the case of Roma Muslims who have historically been outcast in the Bulgarian society. The characterisa­ tion of the Roma offered by Broun (2007, 107) suggests an adaptability where “they adopt the confession of the community in which they live”. Hence, the effects are related more to their marginal position and their distrust of the society and less to their allegiances to Islam. According to Broun (2007), Islam is not an integral constituent of the Roma’s community life. Data from the study by Ilieva (2019) in a ghetto in the city of Plovdiv reveals that none of the interviewed 50 Roma participant women had higher education qualifications, and their parents were also poorly educated. According to the study, even though they were of a working age, more than half of the women did not work and only a small number considered leaving their neighbourhood in the pursuit of better paid prospects. The occupations of the working women were in lowpaying sectors and included cleaning and hairdressing; as well as singing and music which may be because of their cultural heritage. Half of the interviewed women who did not work had been unemployed for more than a year and most were not actively seeking employment. The monthly income of their households was the equivalent to USD350 and many relied on social benefits, informal income, or remittances from abroad. Most of the Roma Muslim women surveyed in the ghetto did not wish to change their way of life and enter the labour market; they were reluctant to skill up for any social mobility either. Some, however, indicated that they would attend basic skills courses in reading, writing and vocational education. Despite the social care provided by the government, the economic prospects of these Roma women are bleak. The assimilation policies did not deliver real improvement in their job prospects or quality of life and the overt discrimination towards them persists. It appears that their religious beliefs are not a direct factor in their struggling to reconcile cultural heritage with economic opportunities. In contrast, a study by Darakchi (2018) reveals the impact of cultural pol­ itics on the Pomak population of two small settlements in the south of Bul­ garia – Breznitsa and Rudozem. The economic changes during the communist regime created opportunities for women and changed the tradi­ tional gender roles. However, the decline of agricultural industries resulted in larger unemployment for men and consequently a change in the gender roles for women as providers. Pomak women were able to gain employment during communist times and therefore have a greater sense of independence (Dar­ akchi 2018). In surveying Pomak families over three generations, the study reveals that younger Pomaks are looking for role models, to be like the “others”. In the case of the village of Breznitsa, the “others” are Bulgarian Christians, who are able to freely go to the big cities and obtain higher edu­ cation without being controlled and afraid of the older generations. The

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creation of a new culture and gender roles, learned outside of the community are an important factor in aspiring for and completing further education. However, in the village of Rudozem, where there is a lack of employment and education opportunities, the “others” are the conservative Arabic Islamic countries (Ghodsee 2009). They are being re-traditionalised under the influ­ ence of Arabic organisations. In either case, this can also be linked to the complex identity of Pomaks. The case studies confirm the importance of employment and engagement with the public sphere for Muslim women. They also show that the religious factor is open for interpretation by the women themselves. In comparison with the Roma and the Pomaks, the acceptance of the Turkish Bulgarians is higher within the Bulgarian society as they are thought to be committed to their faith principles, work harder, are honest and reliable (Broun 2007). Despite the harsh and forceful persecution based on religion, including closure of mosques and educational institutions, and confiscation of religious texts, which led to the deterioration of their practice of Islam, Muslim ethnic Turks have been able to rise above their situation. Although they still experience some occupational discrimination, their relations with the general Bulgarian population have helped them to re-establish the old tradi­ tions of neighbourliness and reassert themselves as Bulgarians of Turkish ethnicity. The mass expulsion of 1989, however, had the effect of severing close links formed between not only communities, but also within places of work, schools and universities as many of those who left did not return (Broun 2007). It also made those who stayed or returned stronger and more committed to explore opportunities within their own faith. The strong affiliation of Turkish Bulgarians with their faith and commit­ ment to Islamic education prior to the communist suppression were evident through the establishment of mosques and seminaries for religious education. They value education and its importance to them is demonstrated in their lobbying for funds to equip Muslim schools and to build institutions that not only educate students with Islamic knowledge, but also train them for secular professions. An example noted by Broun (2007) is Shumen’s major Islamic centre which reopened after being a museum under communism and is now a thriving university with diverse students where Muslim girls are free to man­ ifest their own identities, including through wearing headscarves. Below is a quote from Kolyo Marinov, a teacher of the first author and her parents in Konevo. His account as a primary teacher of predominantly Muslim children in the region of Shumen talks about the importance of edu­ cation to Turkish Bulgarians: “Ethnic Turks, including girls, were never discouraged from schooling. Some of them may have been under-achieving occasionally, but [were] never stopped from attending schools… There has been no such thing as preventing children from ethnic minorities to attend school in our region…

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Silvia Lozeva et al. The Turks were very eager learners and education helped them a lot. I can certainly say with 100 per cent confidence that it was of great benefit. Not only in Bulgaria, but also in Turkey – they were able to stand out and to establish themselves. For them… education was very important… they had a very good attitude. This is my opinion as well as the opinion of my colleagues – that education helped them a lot.” (Marinov 2019)8

Of the three communities, the ethnic Turks have been the least negatively affected by Bulgaria’s cultural assimilation policies. The main reasons are that even though the Turks are ethnically different from their fellow Bulgarians, they have established roots and language, are respected for their principles and have been accepted in the communities where they live. This level of respect is not extended to the Pomaks who are still finding their place and identity within the Bulgarian society and the Roma who have always been on the margins of the country’s life and economy. These findings are just a tip of the iceberg in terms of the impacts of the assimilation policies in Bulgaria, which are a reflection of the imposition of one set of values over others. While the three groups were subjected to similar assimilation practices, the pressure they were put under varied. Likewise, their history, commitment and devotion to Islam also vary. Studies on Muslim Roma are particularly limited, especially in relation to them being considered followers of Islam. Pomaks, on the other hand, do not have the option of identifying themselves as Muslims which may affect sta­ tistics but also erodes their position within the Bulgarian society. The out­ comes for these communities are not only related to their status, perceptions and relationship with the broader Bulgarian society, but also with the histor­ ical circumstances that reinforce their positions within the economy. Muslim women bear the brunt of all assimilation policies and no society would ever be unified unless care and respect are accorded to its female members.

Bulgaria of today Today’s Bulgaria is no longer a socialist country. The assimilation policies directed towards the Muslims in Bulgaria had an equally bigger effect on the rest of the Bulgarian society. Despite the emergence of some right-wing poli­ tical groups, Bulgaria remains united not through religion but through uni­ versal human values and the desire to lift all of its population out of poverty through meaningful economic employment. The capital of Bulgaria Sofia has been described as Eastern Europe’s Silicon Valley and a hotspot for start-up companies, many of which are founded by women (Henrichmann 2018). They range from information technology (IT) firms to environmentally friendly businesses, and often are operated from home offices. The statistics show that companies with women in charge achieve 63% better results than companies led by men (Henrichmann 2018).

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Bulgarian women have indeed adopted the political agenda of modernity, emancipation and inclusion and they are doing this irrespective of creed, cultural background or name. Although much more needs to be done to bridge the five centuries of historical divide between the ethnic Bulgarians and the Muslims, the employment opportunities provide incentives to women from any background who are well educated to participate in the current economy. The plight of Muslim women has ignited higher levels of under­ standing, compassion and support within the Bulgarian communities.

Conclusion In conclusion, cultural politics in Bulgaria in the 20th century followed inco­ herent and error-prone strings of policies regarding the Muslim population. Muslim women were at the forefront of the negative impacts of those policies. Despite the attempts of the government during the socialist period (1945– 1989) to take an active role in creating policies of providing educational opportunities for Muslim women, there are still challenges to be addressed. During this period, Muslim women had difficulties in accessing education and employment opportunities, largely due to the cultural and religious differ­ ences, which could not be addressed by official government policies alone without appropriate cultural and socio-economic responses. There are still large discrepancies in the educational and socio-economic status of Muslim minorities in Bulgaria. Although they have failed, the politically motivated processes to create a homogenous nation based on a common identity have also highlighted the importance of faith identities for Muslims. Contemporary Bulgaria is a peaceful and tolerant society which still holds the memories of the assimilation processes targeting Muslim minorities. The lessons learned about the importance of faith identity contribute to the diversity and creativ­ ity potential of Bulgarian women of all creeds and walks of life.

Notes 1 The Bulgarian term used is “кръстилката” which can be translated as “the naming” as well as “the christening”. 2 The Bulgarian term is “приобщаване” which also translates as “joining”. 3 The Bulgarian term “разфереджаване” has in its root the Turkish word for veil. 4 The term used by the Bulgarian Government is “възраждане” which can also be translated as “rebirth”. 5 During socialism, access to places of worship was also restricted for other religions, including Bulgarian Christians. 6 The Bulgarian name is Дружба “Родина”. 7 The Orthodox Christianity believes that circumcision for religious reasons should not be practised. By comparison, the Muslim Bulgarians adhere to the belief that it is needed to maintain cleanliness. This practice, or the lack of it, culturally separates Muslim from Orthodox Christian communities in Bulgaria who otherwise have very similar characteristics. 8 In personal communication with Silvia Lozeva 2019.

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References Avramov, Roumen. 2016. The Economics of the Revival Process. Sofia, Bulgaria: Centre for Academic Research Balkanski, Todor. 2007. Revival Movements and Revival Processes, Honomy and Onymy: Linguionymy, Ethnonymy, Ethnographonymy, Anthroponymy. Sofia, Bul­ garia: Znak [in Bulgarian] Bardarov, Georgi and Nadezhda Ilieva. 2008. “Characteristics of the Natural Repro­ duction of the Bulgarian Mohammedans in the Early 1990s.” Paper presented at the Demographic Processes and Labour Force Conference, May 26–27, 2008 [in Bulgarian] Broun, Janice. 2007. “Rehabilitation and Recovery: Bulgaria’s Muslim Communities.” Religion, State and Society, 35(2): 105–138. doi:10.1080/09637490701271137 Bulgarian Parliament. 2012. Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims. http://www.parliament.bg/bg/declaration/ID/13813 [in Bulgarian] Crampton, Richard J. 1997. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge, UK: Cam­ bridge University Press Darakchi, Shaban. 2018. “Gender, Religion, and Identity: Modernization of Gender Roles among the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks).” Women’s Studies International Forum, 70: 1–8 Duman, Didem Doganyilmaz. 2016. “Alevi-Bektashi Beliefs in Balkans: A Historical Legacy.” Balkan Social Science Review, 7: 67–87 Eminov, Ali. 1987. “The Status of Islam and Muslims in Bulgaria.” Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal, 8(2): 278–301 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2014. Roma Survey–Data in Focus. Poverty and Employment: The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States. Lux­ emburg: Publishing Office of the European Union. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/defa ult/files/fra-2014-roma-survey-employment_en.pdf Gal, Susan and Gail Kligman. 2000. The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A Com­ parative-Historical Essay. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Ghodsee, Kristen. 2009. Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Grouev, Ivaylo. 2005. “Beyond Essentialism. Bulgarian Inclusive Nationalism: The Case of the Turkish Minority.” PhD thesis. University of Ottawa (Canada) Gruev, Mihail and Andrey Kalyonski. 2008. The Revival Process: Muslim Commu­ nities and the Communist Regime. Sofia, Bulgaria: Siela [in Bulgarian] Henrichmann, Julia. 2018. “Sofia: Eastern Europe’s Silicon Valley.” Deutsche Welle. November 16, 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/bulgarian-capital-sofia-becoming­ a-womens-silicon-valley/a-43842959 Ilieva, Nadezhda. 2012. “Census Numbers of the Roma Ethnic Group in Bulgaria from the Liberation (1978) to the Beginning of the 21st Century.” Geography Problems, 4. http:// geoproblems.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2012_34/5_ilieva.pdf [in Bulgarian] Ilieva, Nadezhda. 2019. Spatial Segregation: Theoretical Aspects. Sofia, Bulgaria: Institute of Geophysics, Geodesy and Geography [in Bulgarian] Kalchev, Jordan. 2005. “Out-migration of the Population in Bulgaria at the End of the 20th Century.” In Demographic Development of Republic Bulgaria, edited by Mikhail Ivanov and Atanas Atanasov, 71–90. Sofia, Bulgaria: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

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Kamusella, Tomasz. 2018. Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks. Milton, UK: Routledge Markova, Evgenia. 2012. “Migration Effects on Bulgaria.” In Bulgarian Emigration: Theories, Policies and Empirical Studies, 265–281. Sofia, Bulgaria: Ikopis. ftp://ftp. repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/bas/ecbook/IKI_Migration.pdf [in Bulgarian] Marinov, Kolyo. 2019. Personal communication over the phone with the first author. August 11, 2019. Sofia, Bulgaria Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov. 2013. “Gypsy Groups in Eastern Europe: Ethnonyms vs. Professionysm.” Romani Studies, 23(1): 61–81 Mikov, Ljubomir. 2005. The Art of the Heterodox Muslims in Bulgaria (ХVІ–ХХ Centuries): Bektashi and Kazalbashi/Alevii. Sofia, Bulgaria: Marin Drinov Aca­ demic Publisher [in Bulgarian] Muratova, Nurie. 2013. “Muslim Women in Socialist Bulgaria.” Balkanistic Forum (2): 128–149. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281624001_Muslim_Women_ in_Socialist_Bulgaria Nahodilova, Lenka. 2010. “Communist Modernisation and Gender: The Experience of Bulgarian Muslims, 1970–1990.” Contemporary European History, 19(1): 37–53 NSI (National Statistical Institute). 2011. “Census 2011.” Republic of Bulgaria. http s://www.nsi.bg/en/content/13255/census-2011 NSI (National Statistical Institute). 2017. Statistics 1/2017. Sofia, Bulgaria: National Statistical Institute. https://nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/publications/sp_1_17.pdf NSI (National Statistical Institute). 2019. Statistical Reference Book 2019. Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia, Bulgaria: National Statistical Institute. https://nsi.bg/sites/default/ files/files/publications/StatBook2019_en.pdf Poulton, Hugh. 1997. “Islam Ethnicity and State in the Contemporary Balkans.” In Muslim Identity and the Balkan State. Edited by Suha Taji-Farouki and Hugh Poulton, 13–32. London, UK: Hurst & Company in association with the Islamic Council Raichevsky, Stoyan. 2004. The Mohammedan Bulgarians (Pomaks). Sofia, Bulgaria: National Museum of Bulgarian Books and Polygraphy Savova-Mahon Borden, Milena. 2001. “The Politics of Nationalism under Commun­ ism in Bulgaria: Myths, Memories, and Minorities.” PhD thesis. University of London. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1317549/1/248046.pdf Silverman, Carol. 2012. Romani Routes: Cultural Politics and Balkan Music in Dia­ spora. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press Stoyanova, Plamena. 2006. “The Baptising of the Bulgarian Muslims.” Anamneza. http://www.anamnesis.info/broi3/Plamena_Stoqnova.pdf [in Bulgarian]. Stoyanova, Snejina (ed.). n.d. “The Politics of the BCP towards the Muslim Popula­ tion in the Country during the 1940s–1960s. The Resettlement Problem in the Bul­ garian-Turkish Relationships.” https://istoriq.dokumentite.com/art/politikata-na-bkp -kym-miusiulmanskoto-naselenie-v-stranata-prez-40-te-60-te-godini-izselnicheskiqt­ problem-v-bylgaro-turskite-otnosheniq-/83774 [in Bulgarian] Vassileva, Darina. 1992. “Bulgaria Turkish Emigration and Return.” International Migration Review, 26(98): 342–355 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. 2018. “Bulgaria: Bulgarianspeaking Muslims (Pomaks).” Minority Rights Group International. https://minor ityrights.org/minorities/bulgarian-speaking-muslims-pomaks/ Zhelyazkova, Antonia. 2001. “Bulgaria in Transition: The Muslim Minorities.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 12(3): 284–301

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4

“Leaving no one behind” Analysing contexts of education and economic challenges for Muslim women in Northern Nigeria Jesudunsin Osinaike and Shamim Samani

Introduction A fundamental pledge of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted globally in 2015 through the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is “leaving no one behind” (UN 2015). This phrase is at the core of the agenda, placing social justice, equality, and non-discrimination at the foundation of sustainable development. It has been well established that people are at the centre of sustainable development, and that development is only sustainable and transformative when it influences positively and provides better and viable outcomes for all people (Saiz and Donald 2017). The com­ mitment to “leave no one behind” represents diverse and multiple perspectives for different groups and countries as the demographic imbalances and exclu­ sions across them are varied (UN 2018, 1). Understanding and responding to the contexts of marginal groups can advance the commitment to “leave noone behind”. The SDGs recognise that there are “group-based inequalities” (Kabeer 2016) whereby categories of people based on their gender, age, religion, race or other are systematically excluded from social, economic and political pro­ cesses. Some of those who have been identified as likely to be left behind include youth, women, and girls, especially in poor and developing countries (UN 2015). Although there is a lack of disaggregated data on women in Nigeria, studies generally show that Muslim women in Nigeria are subject to inequality of economic and educational opportunities associated with gender roles defined by a religious culture (Al-Amin 2018). However, in the case of especially Northern Nigeria, largely populated by Muslims, women have to contend with additional issues of the lack of development infrastructure, human insecurity and displacement due to the insurgency in the region. Nigeria’s commitment to “leaving no-one behind” is established in its Volun­ tary National Review (VNR) of the SDGs (Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs 2017, 20) which recognises sections of its population are excluded and need to be proactively incorporated in its eco­ nomic recovery and growth plans and that region-specific exclusion chal­ lenges, particularly in the Northern regions, need to be addressed.

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This chapter studies security and other factors that impact upon the socio­ economic development, particularly access to education and economic opportunities, for Muslim women of the Northern regions of Nigeria. The chapter employs an exploratory approach through a review of the literature on human development and gender equality in Nigeria, with a focus on Muslim women in the North. It also draws on data from the first author’s PhD research which investigates the role of policies and their implications for achieving Goal 5 (related to gender equality) of the SDGs in Nigeria. The PhD research seeks to unravel some of the social, economic and political complexities as well as fundamental gaps in the current Nigerian legal fra­ meworks that constrain women from full participation in the development process. Data for the PhD research was collected through interviews with a range of stakeholders including government officials, policymakers, non-gov­ ernmental organisations, academics, activists and advocates for gender equality, as well as focus group interviews with 23 women from various socio­ economic backgrounds in Nigeria. For the purpose of this chapter, narratives of the respondents to the study have been incorporated in the examination of the context of the education and economic challenges for Muslim women in the Northern regions of the country. The objective of the chapter is to provide a better understanding of the contextual realities of these women for a nuanced approach to improve their educational opportunities and economic well-being as the country seeks to progress the SDGs.

Economic disenfranchisement, insurgency, and polarised economies Nigeria is located in West Africa, occupying a landmass of 910,768 km2 with a population of approximately 193 million (NBS 2016) making it the most populous country in Africa and seventh most populous country in the world. It is Africa’s biggest oil producer and the 13th largest producer of oil in the world (OPEC 2017). According to the country’s VNR on SDGs report in 2017, despite its mineral resource wealth and prospects for economic growth, nearly two-thirds of the population are classified as poor (Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs 2017, 22). The country in general ranks amongst those with the highest gender inequality rate (118 out of 134) and low human development indicators (0.527 in 2017), ranking 158 out of 182 countries (UNDP 2017). The lack of the country’s adequate spending on health, education, and social protection has impacted many societal outcomes for its citizens. Oxfam (2018, 26) reports that one in ten children in Nigeria does not reach their fifth birthday, and that more than 10 million children do not go to school, of which 60% are girls. These worrying statistics challenge the future of the country and particularly its women. As a society, Nigeria is culturally diverse and heterogeneous (Zacharius and Barkindo 2016). In terms of its religious demography, Christianity and Islam are the two main religions in the country with about 46% of its population identifying as Muslims, 46.3% as Christians, and 7.7 % as

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traditionalists and other religions (Pew Research Center 2019). Although spread across all geographic regions of Nigeria, the majority of Muslims are from and reside in the Northern part (Adamu 1999) where most of the states have adopted the Shariah (Islamic) law (Nmehielle 2004). Nigeria as a nation operates a three-tier system of government, made up of the federal, state and local authorities, where state and local governments also have certain legislative powers. While it is a secular state, Nigeria has a tripartite system of law in relation to personal status (matters relating to inheritance, marriage, child custody, divorce, and other marital relationships) where citizens can access civic, customary, or Islamic law on personal and family matters. Although there is no tangible dividing line between them, the North is significantly different from the South in a number of ways. Historically, the North is a conglomeration of the remains of Islamic kingdoms in the region that were merged during the British colonial period. Nigeria’s contact with Islam dates back to the 11th century through activities along the famous trans-Saharan trade routes that linked the Northern region to commercial hubs as well as notable Islamic learning centres of Northern Africa. The ties forged with the political and commercial elite encouraged the widespread growth of Islam and Islamic scholarship in these areas (Baba 2012). In their analysis of current Muslims in Northern Nigeria, Zacharius and Barkindo (2016, 147) point out that the manipulation of Islam by different actors has served to hold back the social and economic development of Muslim com­ munities resulting in rampant poverty which is exacerbated by inadequate education. Compared with the South that has developed a comprehensive educational system, education in the North has largely focused on the teach­ ing of religious texts and maintaining a code of conduct in line with an extreme interpretation of Islam, such as that imposed by the insurgent group Boko Haram. Boko Haram is a group known for its extreme Islamic ideology and opposition to anything that is deemed to be Western. Casimir, Nwaoga and Ogbozor (2014, 59) explain that the group’s ideological “crusade” is hinged on “its ill-conceived belief that Western education is a sin”. In their philo­ sophy, women and girls are at the centre of political and social debate. Women’s status is often defined through marriage and childbearing that largely confines them to a domestic role. Since its emergence, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women both in its rhetoric and its actions and while it promotes women and girls access to Islamic education and offers financial assistance, the sect calls for tighter restrictions on them par­ ticularly in public areas of life and sees the influences of a Western educa­ tion as immoral (ICG 2016, 5). Research into the evolution of Boko Haram’s religious extremism (Imam 2004; Kukah 2010; Casimir, Nwaoga and Ogbozor 2014; Uba Njoku and Nwachukwu 2015; United Nations and the World Bank 2018) shows that the group did not start out as a violent faction but was fundamentally born

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out of a slow and unresolved tension within some of the poorest regions in the North due to feelings of marginalisation. The challenges of under­ development, extreme poverty, ethnic exclusion and inequality, as well as poor governance were left lingering and unaddressed by the state authorities for a long time. This ultimately escalated and was hijacked and exploited by Boko Haram which has ended up as a highly aggressive militant group that imposes its ideology forcefully in the region. Casimir, Nwaoga and Ogbozor (2014, 66) accentuate the complexity of the factors that gave rise to and have played a significant role to maintain the ideology. Their analysis shows that “religion is only marginal to the substantial socio-economic factors and variables that gave rise to and fertilized the emergence of Boko Haram’s religious violence”. Likewise, Kukah (2010) notes that Boko Haram’s reli­ gious violence cannot be isolated as purely religious but also needs to be seen through the lenses of political privileges and economic under­ development that have garnered a general frustration amongst Nigerian citizens about their government’s failings. Similarly, a UNDP report (2018) analysing the nexus of human develop­ ment and peace also highlights other influences such as land degradation, poverty, multiple levels of deprivation, low human development and the pro­ liferation of arms in the region as inter-related factors that have given rise to the emergence and strength of these groups in the region. In terms of the consequences of the conflict and violence, the report emphasises the significant convergence of impacts on general security as well as education and health infrastructure, loss of assets, loss of employment and the loss of livelihoods. As a result of these intersecting factors, Nigeria has polarised economies in which the South has high and diversified growth that provides modern jobs and income opportunities; and in the North, workers are often trapped in traditional subsistence activities or extensively suffering the con­ sequences of displacement (World Bank 2009; World Bank 2015).

Multidimensional challenges for women Women make up about half of the population and contribute significantly to Nigeria’s economic development and growth, however, their full capabilities are grossly underutilised. In general, poverty, discriminatory laws and prac­ tices, and a patriarchal cultural climate are among the barriers that continue to impede women’s full participation in the development process in Nigeria (Ajala 2017; Makama 2013). Although women in Nigeria, in general, face such issues, the above regional issues particularly compound the economic disempowerment of women in the North. It is important to note that Muslim women in Northern Nigeria are not a homogenous group and aside from the rural and urban differences, other factors such as class and socio­ economic status are an important determinant of their economic, social empowerment and agency (Iweagu, Yuni, Chukwudi and Andenyangtso 2015). An ICG report (2016, 3) notes that “Despite a cultural, religious and

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legal setting that disproportionately restricts them, many women are eco­ nomic providers in their own right; some sell goods in the market or from home or perform farming activities, while others work in offices.” However, several challenges exist for them and the following section characterises some of the overlapping socioeconomic and gender inequalities faced by women in the North. Data from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics showing regional poverty rates indicate that the North accounts for the largest population of citizens living in relative poverty (Dapel 2018). While this is due to a range of factors including those highlighted in the previous sections, a critical contributor is large household-induced poverty. Many studies show the correlation between large families and the incidence of impoverishment (Merrick 2002; Muhoza, Broe­ khuis and Hooimeijer 2014; Kugler and Kumar 2015). Children from large families are more likely to be poor. The higher fertility rates in the North of five children per woman as compared to the four in the South (NPC, 2019) are also intensified by the practice of polygyny and early marriage for girls, which are common phenomena in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Baba­ lola and Oyenubi (2018) go beyond the socio-demographic factors to high­ light the behavioural and attitudinal aspects of childbearing in the region. They state multiple inclinations for having many children, some of which are related to the value Islam places on procreating. Cultural elitism whereby more children are associated with wealth and affluence is also a factor recog­ nised for the higher number of children in these regions (Izugbara and Ezeh 2010, 197). However, the substantial increase in population in the region is not matched with economic growth resulting in high levels of poverty (Dapel 2018). This has ripple effects and induces a cycle of gendered poverty that without intervention is likely to perpetuate due to several overlapping issues. Besides the lack of amenities and infrastructure that impacts all, these include a domestic role for women and preferences as well as oppor­ tunities availed to boys as they are seen as future primary income-gen­ erators for the household. A girl child born into a poor household is most likely unable to get access to quality education. Even if she manages to enrol in school, she will likely be forced to drop out to contribute to household chores or be married off early and end up having children at an early age limiting her chances of gainful economic activity. This outlook emerged in the first author’s research. “Where I come from, men and boys are given more opportunity than women, and because I was born in a polygamous family, the boys were given priority in terms of education while the girls were made to stay at home to help, but thanks to my mother who strove to educate me; otherwise I would have been without education”. (Respondent A10)

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In her study on factors influencing girl child education in Nigeria, Mercy (2017) notes that more than in any other geographical setting in Nigeria, women in Northern Nigeria have very limited educational opportunities. Only a few girls complete their primary education, mostly due to inaccessibility to formal schools especially for rural communities, early marriage, poverty, mobility restrictions and oftentimes socialisation into gender-specific roles indoctrinated through interpretations of religion. Across all indicators, data from the 2015 Nigerian Education Data Survey (National Population Com­ mission Nigeria 2016) shows that outcomes for secular school enrolments and attainment for the Northern states were less than the Southern states. The data shows that in the North where more than 80% of children were Muslim, a larger number had religious only schooling (29% in the North-East and 35% in the North-West). What was more concerning was that 31% in the North-East and 16% in the North-West had no schooling at all. Data was not available for the South-East, however, in comparison, only 2% had religious schooling and 7% no schooling in the South-West where 38% were Muslim (National Population Commission Nigeria 2016, 19). Overall, the percentage of literacy and numeracy was much higher for the Southern states in com­ parison with the North. As much as religion, culture and poverty impact upon educational attain­ ment, one of the reasons for the discrepancy in attendance and completion is the insecurity challenges experienced in the North in the last five to eight years. In their rejection of Western education, attacks by Boko Haram insur­ gents targeting schools have resulted in children having no access to educa­ tion. The initial goal of the group was to purify Islam in Northern Nigeria through intensified proselytising and religious Islamic education. However, over time through increased radicalisation, Boko Haram is now identified as a combative terrorist group that associates with global jihadist cells and has killed thousands and displaced more than two million people (IDMC 2018). It has been responsible for the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the region that impacts women, girls and children disproportionately (Amalu 2015; ICG 2016; Williams, Istifanus and Ajufo 2017; Alhaji Ali, Zakuan and Ahmad 2018; IDMC 2018). According to UNICEF’s country profile on Nigeria, in three of the conflict-affected states (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa) at least 802 schools remained closed and 497 classrooms were listed as destroyed, with another 1,392 damaged but repairable (UNICEF 2018). Between 2013 and 2018, Boko Haram attacked a number of girls’ schools in different parts of the North and kidnapped students. Their actions were founded on the idea that girls should be married at these ages and not be influenced by Western schooling. Although through negotiations with the Nigerian government many have been released or have escaped, some are still being held and others have died (Maclean and Abrak 2018). The repeated attacks by Boko Haram have psychosocial impacts on both children and parents, discoura­ ging and causing a lot of parents to withdraw their children especially girls

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from schools due to the fear of future occurrences. This has been an obstacle especially to girls’ education in the North (Amalu 2015). In addi­ tion, many of the girls that escape face distrust, harassment and desertion from their own communities, and those that have had children through their ordeals live with the additional trauma of having to cope without much support (Epatko 2016). The ICG (2016) report points out some women have actually joined the group as a means of survival or even because of personal convictions and that there are blurred lines between victims and perpetrators that feed the suspicion of women and girls who have come into contact with the militant group. While the insurgency is blamed as the overriding factor in many accounts, the respondents in the first author’s study also pointed to the lack of the Nigerian government’s resoluteness to breaking the existing cycle of poverty including budget allocations as well as social protection programs which are necessary for pulling people out of poverty. Under the poverty related goal (SDG 1) the third target calls for the universal right to social protection to be built into national policies in order to reduce poverty, inequality and social exclusion (ILO n.d.). Although the Nigerian VNR on the SDGs clearly indi­ cates the government’s commitment to eradicating poverty through measures including “providing Social Safety Nets for the poor, welfare for the unem­ ployed and job creation and skills enhancement with a target of creating about 3 million jobs” (Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs 2017, 22), many respondents within the study were not convinced of its assurances. They noted that poverty continues to be a major threat to the socio-economic development of the region as no serious attention is given to the human and social enablers of breaking the cycles of poverty. Excerpts from some respondents such as the following verified this. “The government has never really been serious about human develop­ ment or breaking the cycle of poverty. Look at the poverty rates in the North, although this might be linked to or blamed on the current insur­ gency, but take a look at the last few budgets, take the 2015 budget for instance; only 9% on education, less than 1% on labour and productivity, health was less than 6% of the entire budget – all human and social capital sectors, really low. The bulk of the budget is on recurrent expen­ ditures, salaries, etc. Look at the high cost of governance, at the detri­ ment of human and social capital development that can provide basic amenities. How then can people escape from poverty? Poverty rates are high, the safety nets program, do you see the so-called social protection programs over the years have not been effective, just changing from one government to the other?” (Respondent A8) In overall percentages, the 2019 budget was not an improvement on the figures cited above as N4.04 trillion (50.3%) was set for recurrent expenditure;

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N2.03 trillion (nearly 23%) allocated to capital projects; education was allo­ cated 7% and health 4.3% of the budget (Budget Office of the Federation [Federal Republic of Nigeria] 2019). The insurgency in the Northern parts of Nigeria has caused a livelihood predicament for many of those in the conflict-ridden regions. The conditions have had dire implications through the destruction of property, farmland, and looting of farm produce. As their vulnerabilities increase, many women and girls are afraid to venture out and thus become further impoverished (Zenn and Pearson 2014; Uba Njoku and Nwachukwu 2015; Oriola 2017). The conflicts have seen many communities displaced and localities unsafe to live in. Consequently, many people are living within internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps for months and some for years having their lives and livelihoods disrupted. According to the UNDP, in 2016 nearly 1.7 million people mostly women and children who have been widowed or orphaned lived in various camps across three Nigerian states (IDMC 2018). Life in the IDP camps comes with not only the costs of economic challenges but others such as health, sanitation, outbreak of diseases, inability to access basic social amenities coupled with a lack of safety through sexual harassment and exploitation by camp staff and soldiers (Badiora 2017). To supplement incomes, some women find that they have to compromise on seclusion, where traditionally they would prefer not to mingle with men other than those of their families, to support households. However, incomes are barely enough to sustain them or give them any form of financial freedom or economic empowerment. Although there have been calls by community leaders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists for concerted efforts to improve the plight of women especially of poor women in the rural areas, there has been little or no continuous commitment by the government both at the state and local government levels to tackle poverty or the gender impacts of poverty. This is reflected in the following narrative. “A government that cannot provide you the most basic amenities, that kind of government or society cannot possibly support your right for equality. I really am not asking for much. I don’t want the government to train my children, I can train them and send them to school. Just give me basic amenities – good roads, water, proper drainage, and sewage sys­ tems, security. Is it too much to ask for?” (Respondent B4) Cross-cutting elements emerge in the above discussion that give an insight into the gendered challenges women and girls in the Northern regions face. The underpinnings of religio-cultural norms that impact upon their lives are an integral factor in attaining gender inequality, however, the insurgency and resulting insecurity also play a role in excessively disadvantaging women. Added to this, the lack of the government’s commitment to resolving the issues of basic development infrastructure leaves many entrenched in deep poverty.

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Addressing the realities of Muslim women in Northern Nigeria In this part we highlight how context-specific strategies are important for alleviating the challenges outlined in the above sections. Many respondents in the first author’s study emphasised the role of the government in addressing the issues of especially endemic poverty that is the root cause of much of the inequalities experienced by many in Nigeria and the gendered impacts of which are felt disproportionately by women. The need for specific responses for understanding and addressing the underlying imbalances and entrenched disadvantages faced by women in general and how specific responses are needed for different contexts emerged in the following narrative. “People rarely feel problems the same ways and I always have a problem with monolithic strategies that just assume that everybody is operating or feels some adversity in the same way. It’s hardly ever that way. So for instance in terms of the SDGs, the goals and targets make sense as part of a global philosophical and human development perspective, but in terms of implementation, it is good to disaggregate the population to know who has certain historical liabilities and therefore look for how best to achieve that goal with respect to those groups in line with what is feasible right now. So let’s take poverty for example, for some, the prior­ ity might be social protection, for others, it might be access to literacy and educational options, while in some other instances and context, it is getting women to access formal employment or access to financial resources.” (Respondent A3) Improved access to education for girls is a vital aspect of attaining the SDGs. Providing education that meets the need of the people and transforms lives to seek better opportunities is a development imperative. Although encouraging girls to enrol and get formal education remains an important step towards increasing economic opportunities for Muslim women, it needs to be beyond the quest for improved access to “quality” Western education. The current Islamic schools can be an appropriate channel to influence attaining a well-rounded education by incorporating Western education within integrated curriculums that are aligned with the realities and contexts of women in Northern Nigeria. Studies show the importance of integrated curriculum schools for Mus­ lims for maintaining their religious values (Umar 2001; Umar 2003; Baba 2012; Sheikh 2013; Abubakar and Abdullah 2017). Schools present an avenue for increasing student enrolments and particularly in regions where there is a suspicion of secular education there are opportunities to build trust amongst various stakeholders including parents and community elders. Combining the two is essential as religious education is an important aspect of developing a value system and secular education can equip students with

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the necessary skills that can prepare them for the modern economy and uplift their socio-economic status. Abubakar and Abdullah (2017) stress the importance of integrated religion, culture, and social ethics in order to bal­ ance a secular education with moral values that practising Muslims would want to maintain. In some cases, though, access to education may not be the only challenge girls face and they may need different types of support. Unfortunately, many girls who have escaped or been released by Boko Haram face the stigma of suspicion, rejection, and violence from their family members or others within the community. Supporting them to reintegrate into society is crucial for their continued well-being as well as to give them the opportunities for a better life. More projects such as those initiated by International Alert, a non-govern­ mental organisation (NGO) that works in collaboration with local stake­ holders including Muslim groups can assist in the rentegration of the victims through culturally appropriate services (International Alert n.d.). They can also help others to understand the challenges the victims have been through and how they experience the stigma of their ordeals. While these are com­ mendable efforts on the part of various stakeholders, they are piecemeal responses to what is a national calamity since they rely on the goodwill of donors, as is the case of International Alert. The government’s responsibility to undertake such projects is an imperative also brought up by this respondent: “…, look at anything that has to do with human development or social reform in Nigeria, it was never as a result of it being a national or poli­ tical priority. It is usually through pressure from activist advocacy groups, human rights’ activists, fear from the global community or protest by unions, citizens, etc.” (Respondent B4) Addressing the Boko Haram insurgency and the aftermath of the conflicts entails different and multilayered approaches for all stakeholders involved – government, non-governmental organisations, humanitarian and religious organisations. The government needs to ensure the security of women through active and targeted counterinsurgency and provide rehabilitation and justice as well as social and economic reintegration for survivors and victims of the insurgency. In addition, increased response to the humanitarian needs of women and children in the IDPs, villages, and areas affected by the conflicts by allowing more access by humanitarian organisations is critical for a muchneeded combined support. Including women in peace-building initiatives and conflict management that encourage dialogue and peaceful resolution of con­ flicts are also essential and, beyond that, as the following respondent suggests, first acknowledging and then putting an economic value on women’s domestic work is highly desired. In relation to eradicating poverty, this respondent in the study noted a quintessential issue that has been discussed and debated for dec­ ades in relation to the work that women all over the world do.

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“To eradicate poverty, it really starts from recognising the economic value of the kind of work that women do at home legitimately and then per­ haps also through that recognition, remuneration. Now I’m speaking for the stereotypical African conditions of course, you can eradicate poverty at that level by simply recognising the kind of work that is done at that level and it should not matter whether it is men who take care of the home or it is women who do so, that work itself ought to be recognised and remunerated, ….” (Respondent B2) This needs a radical shift in changing what is an entrenched patriarchal order where male dominance is deeply rooted in the culture and particularly endorsed through interpretations that give more authority and agency to men than to women. Aiming for a more nuanced approach means understanding and acknowledging that even within the same country, policy decisions and programs that focus on empowering women may work in one region but may not work in another and therefore need to be more context specific. Rather than a “one-size fits all” a discrete approach is needed. Related to this, one respondent commented: “I think some of the approaches create a utopia that might never be achieved and then frustrates all those activists, NGOs and all because they are not critically looking at the nuances and issues that affect women, especially in Nigeria. Even in Nigeria, creating the same poli­ cies for women and girls cannot work in the North and South because the lifestyle, culture, religion, and upbringing are shaped differently. Women in the South are often more educated, independent and politi­ cally active than women in the North so if you start making policies, you have to start from Level 1 or beginners, if you get what I mean, for those in the North and maybe Intermediate or Level 5 for those in the South. But when you just group all of them together, some people will lag behind.” (Respondent A9) Acknowledging the differences and understanding of the particulars are necessary as the inequality and divide between women in Nigeria require addressing in different ways. In the Northern part, illiteracy, lack of education coupled with insurgency, conflicts, and insecurity in the region discussed above, bring challenges on various fronts for women in the region which cannot be addressed in the same way as the challenges that women in the Southern parts encounter. There is, therefore, more reason to approach the issues through context-specific policies and programs that enable the agency of women. Another respondent noted this and how such an under­ standing would be useful in the implementation of the SDGs:

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In relation to the above response, it is also important to recognise the role of religion in the lives of individuals and groups, and how this shapes their choices. Emphasising that religion forms part of people’s lives and choices, Para‐Mallam (2010, 467) notes that for most women in Nigeria “both faith and tradition are sources of community belonging and prestige in relation to women’s prized roles as wives and mothers… compelling them to prioritise the socially acceptable female sphere of domesticity.” Many Muslim women especially in the North embrace their identity as mothers and caregivers and place emphasis on their domestic role of housekeeping, childbearing and rearing as a priority, which means that they would most likely be contributing to educational and economic sectors that offer them suitable flexible oppor­ tunities for engagement (Njoh and Akiwumi 2012). As such, government policies and programs need to support their empowerment by adapting ways of engagement that suit the socio-cultural and religious norms of these women. Working with community members and stakeholders to design con­ text-specific responses to the issues outlined in this chapter is an integral part of achieving better development outcomes for women.

Conclusion and policy implications In this chapter, we have highlighted the religio-cultural and systemic develop­ mental as well as security challenges faced by Muslim women in Northern Nigeria. Because women play a significant role in economic growth and development, it is imperative that each group or category of women in Nigeria is included in development initiatives that are sustainable according to their settings. To ensure that Muslim women especially those affected by the inse­ curity in the region are given the opportunities availed to their counterparts in other parts of Nigeria, there is a need for concerted efforts to address the complexities and intersecting barriers discussed here. Given the particular challenges in the North and the implications for women, the national and state governments need to seek the best workable options within the religio-cultural settings and circumstances of Northern Nigerian women. Finally, development discourse and practice also need to embrace and acknowledge the various religious and cultural influences on women’s well-being. If a global sustainable

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development agenda is to be achievable, it needs to be workable for women within the parameters of their lived realities and the basis for their choices so that group-based inequalities can be overcome and “no-one is left behind”.

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Njoh, Ambe J. and Fenda A. Akiwumi. 2012. “The Impact of Religion on Women Empowerment as a Millennium Development Goal in Africa.” Social Indicators Research, 107 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1007/s11205-011-9827-4 Nmehielle, Vincent O. 2004. “Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To Implement or Not to Implement, the Constitutionality is the Question.” Human Rights Quarterly, 26(3): 730–759. doi:10.1353/hrq.2004.0039 Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs. 2017. Implementation of the SDGs: A National Voluntary Review 2017. Voluntary National Reviews, Lagos, Federal Republic of Nigeria. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/ documents/16029Nigeria.pdf OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). 2017. OPEC Annual Statis­ tical Bulletin. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/4140.htm Oriola, Temitope B. 2017. “‘Unwilling Cocoons’: Boko Haram’s War Against Women.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40 (2): 99–121. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1177998 Oxfam. 2018. The Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index 2018: A Global Ranking of Governments Based on What They are Doing to Tackle the Gap between Rich and Poor. Development Finance International & Oxfam. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository. com/bitstream/handle/10546/620553/rr-commitment-reducing-inequality-index-2018­ 091018-en.pdf Para‐Mallam, Funmi J. 2010. “Promoting Gender Equality in the Context of Nigerian Cultural and Religious Expression: Beyond Increasing Female Access to Educa­ tion.” Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 40 (4): 459– 477. doi:10.1080/03057925.2010.490370 Pew Research Center. 2019. “The Countries with the 10 Largest Christian Populations and the 10 Largest Muslim Populations.” https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2019/04/01/the-countries-with-the-10-largest-christian-populations-and-the-10-largest­ muslim-populations/ Saiz, Ignacio and Kate Donald. 2017. “Tackling Inequality through the Sustainable Development Goals: Human Rights in Practice.” The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(8): 1029–1049. doi:10.1080/13642987.2017.1348696 Sheikh, Adan Saman. 2013. “Islamic Education in Kenya: A Case Study of Islamic Integrated Schools in Garissa County.” Dissertation. Nairobi, Kenya: University of Nairobi. https://www.academia.edu/4572149/Islamic_Education_In_Kenya_A_Case_ Study_of_Islamic_Integrated_Schools_in_Garissa_County Maclean, Ruth and Issac Abrak. 2018. “Boko Haram Returns more than 100 Schoolgirls Kidnapped Last Month.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/mar/21/boko-haram-returns-some-of-the-girls-it-kidnapped-last-month Uba Njoku, Julie and Josephine Nwachukwu. 2015. “The Effects of Boko Haram’s Insecurity on Nigeria’s Economy.” AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 4 (3): 26–41 Umar, Mohammed. (2001), “Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s–1990s”. Africa Today 48(2): 127–150. doi:10.1353/at.2001.0043 Umar, Mohammed. (2003), “Profiles of New Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria”. The Maghreb Review, 28(2–3): 146–169 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2017. “Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2017 Statistical Update.” United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NGA UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2018. National Human Develop­ ment Report 2018: Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria. Towards

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Understanding of the Humanitarian-Development-Nexus. Abuja, Nigeria: United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2018_ nigeria_finalfinalx3.pdf UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2018. “Statistics on Education in Nigeria Infographic.” UNICEF. www.unicef.org/nigeria/education United Nations. 2018. “Leaving No-one Behind.” https://sustainabledevelopment.un. org/content/documents/2754713_July_PM_2._Leaving_no_one_behind_Summary_ from_UN_Committee_for_Development_Policy.pdf United Nations. 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Pre­ venting Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-14648-1162-3 Williams, Amos and Jacob Istifanus. 2017. “Boko Haram Insurgency: A Threat to the Girl-Child’s Access to Education in the North-East of Nigeria.” European Journal of Education Studies, 3(12): 121–132. doi:10.5281/zenodo.1116989 World Bank. 2009. Africa Development Indicators 2008/09: Youth and Employment in Africa: The Potential, the Problem, the Promise. Washington, DC: World Bank Group World Bank. 2015. More, and More Productive Jobs for Nigeria. A Profile of Work and Workers. Washington, DC: The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/650371467987906739/pdf/103937-WP-P146872-PUBLIC-Nigeria-Jobs-Report.pdf Zacharius, Pierri and Atta Barkindo. 2016. “Muslims in Northern Nigeria: Between Challenge and Opportunity.” In Muslim Minority-State Relations. The Modern Muslim World, edited by Robert Mason, 133–153. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Zenn, Jacob and Elizabeth Pearson. 2014. “Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram.” Journal of Terrorism Research, 5(1): 46–57. doi:10.15664/jtr.828

5

What hides behind the scarf Iranian women’s participation in the economy Zahra Amrollahi Biyouki and Dora Marinova

Introduction The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 turned 40 in 2019 and what at the time replaced the pro-Western oriented monarchy has become a long-term lived reality of an imposed Islamic rule for the country’s population. One of the most prominent characteristics of the post-revolutionary era is the restrictions on women’s freedom to dress. After the revolution, the chador – a large fabric covering the entire body, or the hijab – a veil or scarf over the head, combined with a manteau – a light overcoat, became the mandatory dress-code for women in public places in Iran. Representing a pious, modest way to dress, this requirement is set in law and any violation attracts fines and imprisonment. The scarf is the external image imposed on and portrayed by Iranian women, but it also symbolises an array of complexities that they have to negotiate on a daily basis. Irrespective of how one feels or what one thinks about the scarf or this mandatory imposition, women’s lives are embracing the challenges of the modern era, including participation in the country’s economy. With a population of 83 million, in 2018, Iran was the 17th largest country in the world where 99.4% of the people are Muslim (CIA 2019) and 49.5% are women (World Population Review 2019). This chapter combines analysis of available information and a review of literature with personal observations to create a picture of the participation of Iranian women in the economy of the country. It also reflects on the global standing of Iran in relation to international standards and rankings. Despite the many stereotypical images of Iranian women in different media, the reality on the ground is that they represent a vibrant and powerful part of the changing global employment environment, making important contributions to the economy and society.

Iranian women in the workforce The participation of Iranian women in the workforce is one of the lowest in the world. Although there has been an increase in the women’s participation rate in the country’s labour force since 1979, female unemployment remains

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very high. The International Labour Organisation’s 2018 estimates (The World Bank Data 2019b) show female labour force participation rate for Iran at only 17% (see Figure 5.1) – sixth lowest in the world, only ahead of those in Yemen (at 6%), Syria (at 12%), Iraq (also at 12%), Jordan (at 14%) and Algeria (at 15%). Iran’s female unemployment rate was at 20.1% in 2018 (The World Bank Data 2019c) compared to 10.1% for men (The World Bank Data 2019d). It is often believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the reason behind the lower female labour force participation rate in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. The data for Iran do not support this argument. There was no sharp reduction in the workforce participation rate of women after the Islamic Revolution and it actually increased in the 1990s. Starting from a very low point at below 10%, the female employment rate reached a peak of 19% in 2005 during the “reform era”, which “sought to create an environment that facilitated greater civil society activities, expanded freedom of the press marginally, instituted modest political reforms, and aided women in entering the public sphere” (Burkova 2017, 12). This however was followed by a steady decline to below 14% in 2014 (see Figure 5.1) resulting from a push for larger population growth in the country and many restrictions imposed on Iranian women, such as limited access to university courses. The Centre for Women’s Participation, which previously encouraged female pre­ sence in the country’s labour force and public life, was renamed as the Centre for Women and Family Affairs in 2005, reflecting the way women’s primary role was perceived within the Iranian society. According to the Iranian Stu­ dents’ News Agency (2017), 77 fields of study across 36 national universities did not accept female students during this period. The increase in the female employment participation rates in more recent years (see Figure 5.1) is the result of embracing gender justice based on the roles of women and men under Shariah law and the reversal of educational policies discriminating against girls (Burkova 2017). Furthermore, employing women is more attractive to employers because of their lower salary levels and high education (DW 2017). However, economic sanctions and other international political measures taken against Iran, including the US with­ drawal from the nuclear agreement and imposed economic sanctions (Human Rights Watch, 2019), impact more severely on employment opportunities for women than for men. Studies have shown that any economic sanctions against Iran trigger high levels of currency depreciation and inflation, creating economic uncertainty, underinvestment and higher unemployment (Taheri 2015). The consequences from the shrinking of the country’s economy and trade reduction are worse for Iran’s female population as men are given pre­ ferential treatment in the labour market (Taheri 2015). This is evidenced in the drop in the female labour force participation since 2016 (see Figure 5.1). Hence, other factors, including the international political economy (Bahra­ mitash 2003), rather than religion alone are affecting women’s employment participation rates in Iran by reducing employment opportunities.

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25

20

15

10

0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

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Figure 5.1 Female labour force participation rate, Iran, 1990–2018 [%]

Data source: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Iran/Female_labor_force_participation/

Irrespective of the progress made in expanding women’s labour force par­ ticipation rates, there is a combination of cultural and practical factors, which continue to deter their employment. According to the Economic Women (2018), they are: • • •

Not enough jobs available for women in suitable sectors, which reduces their employment opportunities; Legal limitations preventing women from entering the workforce, such as consent from husband or fiancé; Low income combined with personal and family responsibilities, stopping women from working.

The ill-structured bureaucracies in the public sector and occupational seg­ regation between men and women also contribute towards low job participa­ tion (Javadian and Addae 2013). All unemployment rates are affected by the number of people registered as actively seeking work and in reality many women may stop looking for jobs because of unfavourable outlooks and negative prospects about finding employment. This keeps official unemploy­ ment rates lower while the economy is underutilising the human resources of the country (Kalhor 2019). Education, including higher education, is considered a significant factor positively affecting employability and job prospects (Greenstone and

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Looney 2012; Jackson 2014), particularly for developing countries (Jun 2017; Harry, Chinyamurindi, and Mjoli 2018). Iranian women however cannot easily find a job according to their education, and ironically the unemployment rate is higher among educated women. In fact, in 2017 one of three women with a Bachelor’s degree was unemployed (Burkova 2017), and the share of degree holders amongst unemployed women was very high at 72% (Financial Tribune 2017a). Although female adult literacy levels in Iran are relatively high – 83.2% in 2016, compared to below 30% before the Islamic Revolution (Trading Eco­ nomics 2019), they compare unfavourably with the men’s rate of 90.35% for the same year (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2019). Women’s education and work were facilitated after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the provision of childcare centres, special schools and programs through radio, television and correspondence, which contributed to the improvement in female literacy rates (Ghorbani and Tung 2007). Never­ theless, in 2016, in Iran there were 5.9 million adult females aged over 15 who could not read and write a simple text related to everyday life nor make a basic arithmetic calculation (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2019). Hence, their formal employment opportunities remained very bleak and their con­ tribution to the economy was only through housework or the informal sector. The gap between the literacy levels of young men and women aged 15 to 24, however, has significantly narrowed, and in 2016 stood at less than half a percentage point, namely 97.93% for women compared to 98.27% for men (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2019). This progressive trend shows that in recent years there has been less gender discrimination, with education being available and affordable to most. As a consequence, the gender-based unem­ ployment gap has also narrowed with the ratio of female to male youth (15 to 24 old) unemployment rate estimated at 1.7 – down from 2.0 for the total adult population (Trading Economics 2019).1 Most statistical data refer to the employment situation in the formal sector. Iran’s oil-based economy creates limited opportunities for female jobs. Women are mainly employed in small-scale manufacturing that makes car­ pets, rugs and handcraft objects, or agriculture (Moghadam 2018). If employed at technical or managerial positions, women rarely receive the same remuneration as men for equal work. The conditions in the informal sector of the Iranian economy, where half of the jobs are held by women, are even worse because of employers’ pre­ ferences to keep people without contracts or on short-term arrangements that can easily be terminated (Burkova 2017). Whilst there are certain reg­ ulations, which govern and safeguard employment in the formal sector, such as the 1990 Labour Code (ILO n.d.), numerous exemptions and exclusions apply to smaller businesses and workshops of less than ten employees, making the protection of workers’ rights and monitoring of working condi­ tions more difficult. The services sector, including home-based enterprises, is the one providing the most informal jobs for women (Financial Tribune

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2017b) – from dressmaking and beauty salons to catering, food preparation, desktop editing, creating web content, tutoring, childcare and yoga classes. With the influx of refugees from Afghanistan, who take up manual jobs in agriculture and services, competition in the informal sector is becoming increasingly severe, allowing for more exploitation and financial abuse of unskilled labour. Education is seen as a major way to improve opportunities for women in Iran but ironically the job market also discriminates against those who are well-educated.

Educated Iranian women A particularly interesting fact about Iran is that the majority of the country’s university student population, such as at the Amirkabir University shown in Figure 5.2, is female. Women seem to outperform men in obtaining Bachelor’s or equivalent level 6 degree2 (according to UNESCO’s 2011 International Standard Classification of Education) with the share of adult (above 15) female population with such qualifications being 14.7% compared to men at 12.8% in 2016 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2019). Some speculate that women’s educational performance is better than that of men because they do not have access to other extra-curriculum activities, such as sports (Shavarini 2006), or want to increase their value on the marriage market (Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam 2011).

Figure 5.2 Female energy engineering students at Amirkabir University, Tehran, June 2019 Source: Authors

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Women are successfully studying across all discipline ranges – from mathe­ matics and engineering to medicine, architecture and social sciences (see Figure 5.2). This however is not a straightforward issue as there has been a long pro­ cess of resentment and opposition by the Iranian patriarchal society and par­ liament towards women’s achievements, particularly regarding girls outperforming boys in university entry exams. A legislation was put in place in 2012 which prohibited women from studying in many courses, such as accounting, chemistry, education, engineering and management. Different arguments were used to support such a decision – the low employment rate of women upon completion of their university studies, industry’s lack of desire to employ women, too many educated women would impact on the structures of the families with fewer children and more unhappy marriages (Winn 2016). Many universities introduced these restrictions by offering only-men majors or having gender quotas strongly preferencing men (Centre for Human Rights in Iran 2015). Since 2013, the new administration of the country has been com­ mitted to reversing such gender-based education and eliminating discrimination against women in employment opportunities too (Westfall 2018). However, it needs to deal with severe opposition by conservative circles within the Iranian society and politics. In reality, the sex segregation and gender quotas have been ineffective policy mechanisms and have been put aside (Winn 2016). In an environment where women are still experiencing economic inequality, the attainment of tertiary degrees seems to make their lives more difficult. First, there is more competition for any available and suitable jobs for female candidates; this is also combined with gender discrimination and preferences for male candidates (Radio Zamaneh 2014; BBC 2017), particularly during the selection and hiring process not covered by the Labour Code. The out­ come is low employment rates and low contribution to economic activities (Radio Zamaneh 2015). Second, professional women have to negotiate any employment opportunities with their husbands or fiancés, who need to con­ sent to them working in a particular occupation or place (Burkova 2017). Third, Iran’s domestic legislation specifically prohibits women entering some publicly visible and powerful professions and positions, such as being a judge or government cabinet minister – only one woman has held the latter post (Esfandiari 2019). Obtaining a degree does not guarantee equal economic benefits to those awarded to men nor properly protects female workers from sexual harassment in the workplace. Only in 2019 have some government agencies, such as the Information Technology Organisation of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, started publishing guidelines to deal with “forbidden conduct”, such as discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of power (Motamedi 2019). Reporting such behaviour is still an onerous task and can lead to vilifying the victim. Fourth, women’s agency and freedom of movement are legally restricted, when it comes to obtaining a job, deciding where to live, applying for a passport, travelling outside the home and the country; their testimony does not carry the same evidentiary value in a law court as that of men’s (World Bank Group 2018).

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All of the above restrictions can hinder women’s inclusion in the economy. Although there are many female university graduates, their rate of participa­ tion in the country’s workforce is not proportionate to their graduating share from tertiary institutions. Their income levels are also lower. The United Nations Development Program estimates the per capita gross national income (at 2011 purchasing power parity) was $32,000 for men and only $6,000 for women in 2017 (UNDP 2018). Employers overtly prefer men for senior posi­ tions, such as in management (BBC 2017). Gender discrimination against women is present in the university sector itself through “systematically excluding them from educational, managerial and administrative positions” (Rahbari 2016, 1003). Despite proven academic performance, the exclusion approach explains women’s lower levels of parti­ cipation in Iranian academia (Rahbari 2016). It emphasises the existence of socio-political, cultural and economic structures which act as barriers pre­ venting women’s participation in the creating and dissemination of knowledge and innovation (Rahbari 2016). Similarities can be drawn with other eco­ nomic sectors, such as industry, policy and administration. The scarcity of employment opportunities for female professionals creates dissatisfaction and many desperate women take on low-paid jobs because of financial pressures and to avoid staying at home. Other women explore opportunities to further their studies, particularly abroad. Nevertheless, the share of women with postgraduate degrees in Iran is lower than that of men – 3.6% compared to 4.5% respectively for Master’s or level 7 qualifi­ cation3 and 0.3% compared to 0.4% respectively for Doctoral or level 8 equivalent degree in 2016 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2019). On a global scale, Iran is also seen as a large outbound market for postgraduate studies in countries, such as USA, Canada, UK, Germany (ICEF Monitor 2015) and Australia. Iranian women’s higher education attainment is often quoted as one of the achievements of the Islamic Revolution, which opened up the road to unpre­ cedented rates of female university enrolments since the 1990s and high par­ ticipation in the public realm (Winn 2016). Paradoxically, many of these educated women are now calling for a reform in the discriminatory policies and practices implemented under the revolution, contributing to a “rise of Islamic feminism and an intrinsic movement of Iranian women pursuing advancement of their legal and social status” (Winn 2016, 1). Winn (2016) explains that this Islamic feminism is distinct from Western feminist thought and is consistent with Iranian and Islamic cultural values. The growing knowledge and confidence educated Iranian women have, allow them to advocate stronger and better for their legal and social rights, which facilitates other women attending university and being present in the public sphere; this in turn increases their participation in Islamic feminist thought (Winn 2016). Islamic feminism is grounded in Muslim values, providing alternatives to the patriarchal practices and allows women to advocate for their rights from within their own religion and society. These women are igniting a different

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kind of cultural revolution, which builds competence and abilities to remove obstacles to female employment participation in people’s mindsets and hope­ fully in the Iranian reality. Their efforts are likely to bear fruit and change the current global standing of Iran as a country of gender-based disparities.

Iran’s global standing Iran is one of a few countries globally, which is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.4 The Iranian economy continues to treat women differently from men, offering fewer opportunities and underutilising the labour force potential this part of society has. Out of 149 countries, Iran ranks 142nd in the 2018 Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum 2018). Notwithstanding this, the country shares the top position, when it comes to girls’ enrolment in primary and secondary education as well as according to sex ratio at birth, which shows that there is no explicit preference for boys within the Iranian society. Iran’s highly educated women excel in the arts and humanities but also in natural sciences, mathematics and statistics, where the share of female graduates is three times higher than that of males (World Economic Forum 2018). Although there are many other countries across the globe, where a higher share of women studies natural sciences, mathematics and statistics, the gender difference is nowhere as pronounced as it is in Iran. This proves that the Iranian women have both the opportunity, desire and abilities to engage with these fields of study. The detailed examination of the economic environment for women in Iran confirms that they have good incentives to work, including access to child­ care, and are guaranteed an equivalent position after returning from mater­ nity leave combined with free and compulsory primary education (World Bank Group 2018). Such provisions are missing in many other countries, such as Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau (which scores 0 in this area), India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Yemen and Zimbabwe (World Bank Group 2018). Iranian women however still rank poorly in many other indicators related to job opportunities, access to insti­ tutions and protection from violence. As a country, Iran performs very well globally according to its human development index which is “a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (UNDP 2019, para. 1). In 2017, it was ranked 60th out of 189 countries – on the border between very high and high human development index, and this indicator has been on the rise since 1990 (UNDP 2019). Iran is also presenting well in relation to women’s empowerment according to the majority of targets under Sustainable Development Goals 3 (Good Health) and 5 (Gender Equality); however, data about violence against women and employment in senior and middle man­ agement are not available (UNDP 2019).

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Within the current globalised and interconnected economy with smartphones and numerous digital and online platforms, the women in Iran are also influenced by the seven million Iranian diaspora abroad (Khadem 2018), 2.7 million of whom are direct migrant and 47% of whom are female (Migration Data Portal 2019b). Irrespective as to what historical, political, cultural or economic forces resulted in many Iranians leaving their home country, job opportunities for the highly educated, particularly young women are a serious consideration in such a decision. These migrant Iranian women abroad adopt a transnational identity (Moghissi 2006; Baser and Halperin 2019) and have a prolific transformative impact on both their new and origi­ nal society. Some see themselves and their role as advocates for social move­ ments (Sökefeld 2006), as they continue to relate to their homeland and maintain ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity (Cohen 2008). The International Organisation for Migration describes the links between the global diasporas and their home countries as “brain circulation” or “brain bank” – in other words, the transfer of and access to new skills, knowledge and attitudes even without return to the place of origin (Migration Data Portal 2019a). Being ethnically and religiously diverse and highly hetero­ geneous, the Iranian diaspora mediates the understanding of the place of women within the economy, including their rights under Islam, and con­ tributes towards imagining alternative futures and opportunities (Cohen and Yefet 2019).

Redefining women’s future Iranian women are active participants in defining the country’s history and future. By constantly negotiating the space between home and work, politics and employment, law and economic interests, religion and social values, the women of Iran are becoming agents of transformation within the Iranian society. Many women transcend individual differences, beliefs and attitudes to create more employment and job opportunities in the household, formal and informal sectors, for themselves and others in the future (Sedghi 2007). They have been able to achieve favourable changes in the marital law, particularly in relation to wealth sharing and payments of “wage equivalent” for house­ hold work after a divorce (Sedghi 2007). Fertility rates have declined from 6.9 children in 1960 to 2.1 in 2017 (The World Bank Data 2019a). Marriage age has increased by three years in recent times (Tehran Times 2018). These changes are allowing women to have more time to engage with the economy. The changing role of women in Iranian society, and particularly access to education, allows them to make use of knowledge, information and technol­ ogy as well as financial resources. They are also transforming its “familial, political, religious and economic institutions” (Gholipour et al. 2009, 100), which impacts not only on women themselves, but also on men. The histori­ cally entrenched patriarchal power, and with it the patriarchal interpretation of religion, is being challenged and this makes many uncomfortable.

94 Zahra Amrollahi Biyouki, Dora Marinova According to Gholipour et al. (2009), unless religious institutions in Iran accommodate for female empowerment and government services endorse gender neutrality, women will be drawn to Western forms of feminism. Moghadam (2004, 10) warns that without Islamic feminist contributions any processes of change in Iran may result in democratisation with “a male face” or “a capitalist economy that is detrimental to working women’s interests”. In relation to Islamic feminism, she argues that gender discrimination has a social rather than a natural or divine foundation, and supports the right of women to reinterpret the Qur’an with a recognition of universal standards, such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the need to protect the rights of all citi­ zens, irrespective of their religious affiliation (Moghadam 2002). For a female Westerner who visits the country, the compulsory veiling is the first impression and rule to follow. This is often seen as uncomfortable, particularly during the soaring summer temperatures. Many Iranian women, including historians and academics, however, are of the opinion that first, wearing the hijab has opened up opportunities for them to participate in the public sphere; and second, there are more important issues than the country’s dress code, such as female unemployment and inadequate protection from violence (Moaveni 2016). Whilst social support for the government regulating the wearing of hijab is now at less than 50%, and even lower at 40% for compulsory punishment for “bad” hijab (Maloney and Katz 2019), Iranian women are best positioned to negotiate and redefine their future from within their own Islamic feminism, which allows them to focus on the issues that matter to them. In this way, they form a part of the global feminist theoretical perspective and practice, which aims to transform the social, legal and eco­ nomic structures, allowing women better job opportunities.

Conclusion It is clear that Iranian women actively participate in the country’s economy, despite the relatively low numbers in the formal economy and the “glass ceiling” that prevents them from entering high-paying jobs and managerial positions (Ghorbani and Tung 2007). In many ways, similarities can be drawn with Western societies, where the gender gap continues to persist (ILO 2019). Women in Iran, however, also face many visible and explicit legal restrictions and lack of protection. The compulsory headscarf is a sartorial imposition within a society that allows overt gender preferences in the workforce and is challenging women to assert their rights under Islam. The key messages from the analysis of Iranian women’s participation in the country’s economy are summarised below. •

Iranian women have high literacy rates, are highly educated and the majority of the university student population is female. They however face challenges in finding formal employment because of reduced job

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• •

•

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opportunities, preferential policies towards men and the politically based economic restrictions against the country. Engagement with the informal sector through services and small manu­ facturing continues to be prevalent for Iranian women and by doing this, they are substantially contributing to the country’s economy. Iran continues to treat women differently from men; however, there are burgeoning changes in the country’s society which challenge the patri­ archal interpretation of religion and the existing patriarchal power. This is often mediated through the influence of the global Iranian diaspora. The growing knowledge and confidence of Iranian women have allowed them to use Islamic feminism to define their role within society and advocate stronger and better for their economic rights.

Iran has taken valuable steps in removing gender discrimination in health and education. There are still obstacles for women, resulting in a low parti­ cipation rate in the workforce. Nevertheless, the attitudes towards women in Iranian society and in the work environment have changed and are evolving. Women’s presence in the workplace is increasingly more accepted, particularly in comparison with other Islamic countries, such as Afghanistan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates or Qatar. According to professor of history Ettehadieh, “[a]ll these girls and women who would not have left the house, hijab gave them a chance to study, to progress, to become involved in all kinds of activities, from laboratories to business to academia” (in Moaveni 2016, para 15). Wearing the headscarf has allowed women to actively engage in the public sphere and also transform Iranian society. They are redefining their own future within a complex and changing social and political environment, shaped by internal and external challenges. What is hidden behind the scarf today is the story of a new unique practical feminism that is carried out by well-educated women in their pursuit for a better and more sustainable future for themselves, their daughters and the Iranian society.

Notes 1 In other words, young women were 1.7 times more likely to be unemployed com­ pared to twice for the total population. 2 “They are traditionally offered by universities and equivalent tertiary educational institutions” (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012, 51). 3 Programs at Master’s level or equivalent “are often designed to provide participants with advanced academic and/or professional knowledge, skills and competencies, leading to a second degree or equivalent qualification. Programs at this level may have a substantial research component but do not yet lead to the award of a doc­ toral qualification. Typically, they are theory-based but may include practical com­ ponents and are informed by state of the art research and/or best professional practice. They are traditionally offered by universities and other tertiary educational institutions” (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012, 55). 4 Another country not a party to this convention is the United States which has signed but not ratified it.

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References Bahramitash, Roksana. 2003. “Islamic Fundamentalism and Women’s Economic Role: The Case of Iran.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 16 (4): 551–568 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2017. “Reduction of Women’s Contribution in the Iranian Job Market.” June 26, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-40313129 Baser, Bahar, and Amira Halperin. 2019. “Diasporas from the Middle East: Dis­ placement, Transnational Identities and Homeland Politics.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46(2): 215–221 Burkova, Rozalina. 2017. “It’s a Men’s Club: Discrimination Against Women in Iran’s Job Market.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ iran0517_web_11.pdf Centre for Human Rights in Iran. 2015. “Women’s Education.” February 23, 2015. https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/02/womenreport-womens-education/ Cohen, Robin. 2008. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. Second Edition. London, UK: Routledge Cohen, Ronen A. and Bosmat Yefet. 2019. “The Iranian Diaspora and the Homeland: Redefining the Role of a Centre”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2019.1605893 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). 2019. “The World Factbook. Middle East: Iran.” Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica tions/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html Country Economy. n.d. “Iran – Literacy Rate.” Countryeconomy.com. https://coun tryeconomy.com/demography/literacy-rate/iran DW (Deutsche Welle). 2017. “Flagship Women Entering the Labor Market.” Deutsche Welle Farsi. March 23, 2017. https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/ ۹۵-‫ﺳﺎﻝ‬-‫ﺩﺭ‬-‫ﮐﺎﺭ‬-‫ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ‬-‫ﺑﻪ‬-‫ﻭﺭﻭﺩ‬-‫ﭘﺮﭼﻤﺪﺍﺭ‬-‫ﺯﻧﺎﻥ‬/a-38095700 Economic Women. 2018. “The Position of Women in the Iranian Economy.” Novem­ ber 8, 2018. Department of Women. http://economicwomen.ir/1397/07/18/%D8% AC%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9% 86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA %D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/ Esfandiari, Haleh. 2019. “Iran and the Women’s Question.” Atlantic Council. February 4, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-and-the­ women-s-question Financial Tribune. 2017a. “Iran’s Women Labor Force Participation Lowest World­ wide.” December 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business­ and-markets/78671/iran-s-women-labor-force-participation-lowest-worldwide Financial Tribune. 2017b. “Women Overshadowed in Iranian Labor Market.” July 3, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/67601/women-oversha dowed-in-iranian-labor-market Gholipour, Aryan, Mona Zehtabi, Tayyebe Amirkhani and Asal Aghaz. 2009. “The Consequences of Women’s Empowerment in Iran.” Problems and Perspectives in Management, 7(4): 100–108 Ghorbani, Majid and Rosalie L. Tung. 2007. “Behind the Veil: An Exploratory Study of the Myths and Realities of Women in the Iranian Workforce.” Human Resource Management Journal, 17(4): 376–392

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Greenstone, Michael and Adam Looney. 2012. “Education Is the Key to Better Jobs.” The Hamilton Project. September 17, 2012. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up -front/2012/09/17/education-is-the-key-to-better-jobs/ Harry, Tinashe, Willie T. Chinyamurindi and Themba Mjoli. 2018. “Perceptions of Factors that Affect Employability amongst a Sample of Final-year Students at a Rural South African University.” SA Journal of Industrial Psychology, 44(a1510). http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sajip/v44n1/11.pdf Human Rights Watch. 2019. “‘Maximum Pressure’: US Economic Sanctions Harm Ira­ nians’ Right to Health.” https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/ us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health ICEF Monitor. 2015. “Iran’s University Enrolment Is Booming. Now What?” December 1, 2015. https://monitor.icef.com/2015/12/irans-university-enrolment-is-booming-now­ what/ ILO (International Labour Office). n.d. “Islamic Republic of Iran.” National Laws on Labour, Social Security and Related Human Rights. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/ docs/WEBTEXT/21843/64830/E90IRN01.HTM#c3 ILO (International Labour Office). 2019. Work Employment Social Outlook: Trends 2019. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgrep orts/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_670542.pdf Iranian Students’ News Agency. 2017. “Collective Complaint of Student Activists to Administrative Justice Court Protesting Gender Quota”. https://www.isna.ir/news/ 92062314458/‫ﺍﻋﺘﺮﺍﺽ‬-‫ﺩﺭ‬-‫ﺍﺩﺍﺭﯼ‬-‫ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‬-‫ﺩﯼﻭﺍﻥ‬-‫ﺑﻪ‬-‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﯾﯽ‬-‫ﻓﻌﺎﻻﻥ‬-‫ﺍﺯ‬-‫ﺟﻤﻊﯼ‬-‫ﺷﮑﺎﯾﺖ‬ Jackson, Denise. 2014. “Factors Influencing Job Attainment in Recent Bachelor Graduates: Evidence from Australia.” Higher Education, 68(1): 135–153 Javadian, Golshan and Isaac Y. Addae. 2013. “The Impact of Bureaucracies and Occupational Segregation on Participation of Iranian Women in the Workforce.” Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 32(7): 654–670 Jun, Kong. 2017. “Factors Affecting Employment and Unemployment for Fresh Graduates in China.” Open access peer-reviewed chapter. IntechOpen. https://www. intechopen.com/books/unemployment-perspectives-and-solutions/factors-affecting-em ployment-and-unemployment-for-fresh-graduates-in-china Kalhor, Navid. 2019. “Improved Employment Leaves Iran’s Women, Youth Behind.” Al-Monitor. August 16, 2019. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/ iran-improved-employment-women-youth-left-behind.html Khadem, Nassim. 2018. “Can the Iranian Diaspora Aid Regime Change in Islamic Republic?” The Sydney Morning Herald. January 6, 2018. https://www.smh.com.au/ world/can-the-iranian-diaspora-aid-regime-change-in-irans-islamic-republic-20180104­ h0dpxt.html Maloney, Suzanne, and Eliora Katz. 2019. “Iran and the Headscarf Protests.” Brookings. January 24, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/ Migration Data Portal. 2019a. “Diasporas.” International Organisation for Migration. https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/diasporas Migration Data Portal. 2019b. “Total Number of International Migrants: Iran, Islamic Rep.” International Organisation for Migration. https://migrationdataportal.org/data? i=stock_abs_&t=2017&cm49=364 Moaveni, Azadeh. 2016. “Your Boycott Won’t Help Iranian Women.” The New York Times. October 7, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/opinion/your­ boycott-wont-help-iranian-women.html

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Moghissi, Haideh (ed.). 2006. Muslim Diaspora: Gender, Culture and Identity. London, UK: Routledge Moghadam, Valentine M. 2002. “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate.” Signs, 27(4): 1135–1171 Moghadam, Valentine M. 2004. “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal Status, Social Positions, and Collective Action.” Wilson Centre. https://www.wilson center.org/sites/default/files/ValentineMoghadamFinal.pdf Moghadam, Valentine M. 2018. “Iranian Women, Work, and the Gender Regime.” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. Spring 2018. https://www.thecairoreview.com/ essays/iranian-women-work-and-the-gender-regime/ Motamedi, Maziar. 2019. “Iran is Taking Steps to Combat Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.” Al Jazeera. August 9, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/ira n-steps-combat-sexual-harassment-workplace-190729214502127.html Radio Zamaneh. 2014. “Women’s Employment Restrictions.” November 7, 2014. https:// www.radiozamaneh.com/186824 Radio Zamaneh. 2015. “Iranian Women Involved Only in 2.5% of Economic Activ­ ities.” February 6, 2015. https://www.radiozamaneh.com/203885 Rahbari, Ladan. 2016. “Women in Higher Education and Academia in Iran.” Sociology and Anthropology, 4(11): 1003–1010 Rezai-Rashti, Goli M. and Moghadam, Valentine M. 2011. “Women and Higher Education in Iran: What Are the Implications for Employment and the ‘Marriage Market’?” International Review of Education, 57(3/4): 419–441 Sedghi, Hamideh. 2007. Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Shavarini, Mitra K. 2006. “The Role of Higher Education in the Life of a Young Iranian Woman.” Women’s Studies International Forum, 29(1): 42–53 Sökefeld, Martin. 2006. “Mobilising in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora.” Global Networks, 6(3): 265–284 Taheri, Elham. 2015. “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Women’s Economic Rights in Case of Iran.” Master’s thesis. Eastern Mediterranean University. http://i-rep.emu. edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11129/3663/TaheriElham.pdf?sequence=1 Tehran Times. 2018. “Average Marriage Age in Iran Increased by 3 Years”. June 12, 2018. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/424338/Average-marriage-age-in-Iran-increa sed-by-3-years The World Bank Data. 2019a. “Fertility Rate, Total (birth per woman) – Iran, Islamic Rep.” The World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT. IN?locations=IR The World Bank Data. 2019b. “Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate).” The World Bank Group. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS The World Bank Data. 2019c. “Unemployment, Female (% of female labor force) (modeled ILO estimate).” The World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS?name_desc=false&view=chart The World Bank Data. 2019d. “Unemployment, Male (% of male labor force) (mod­ eled ILO estimate).” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS? view=chart Trading Economics. 2019. “Iran – Literacy Rate, Adult Female (% of females ages 15 and above).” https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/literacy-rate-adult-female-percent-of­ females-ages-15-and-above-wb-data.html

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UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2018. “Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update. Briefing Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update: Iran (Islamic Republic of).” http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/ themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/IRN.pdf UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2019. “Human Development Index (HDI).” Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-devel opment-index-hdi UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2012. International Standard Classification of Edu­ cation ISCED 2011. Montreal, Canada: UNESCO UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2019. “Education: Literacy Rate”. UNESCO. http:// data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=166 Westfall, Dalton. 2018. “What You Need to Know about Girls’ Education in Iran.” The Borgen Project. May 16, 2018. https://borgenproject.org/girls-education-in-iran/ Winn, Meredith K. 2016. “Women in Higher Education in Iran: How the Islamic Revo­ lution Contributed to an Increase in Female Enrollment.” Global Tides 10(10): 1–17. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/933e/a0acab9287212ad7cd2541e8774df507489b.pdf World Bank Group. 2018. Women, Business and the Law 2018. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29498/ 9781464812521.pdf World Economic Forum. 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report 2018. Geneva, Swit­ zerland: The World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ GGGR_2018.pdf World Population Review. 2019. “Iran Population 2019.” http://worldpopulationre view.com/countries/iran-population/

Part 2

Negotiating the workplace

6

Narratives of empowerment Female domestic workers in Karachi Zehra Goawala

Introduction In Karachi, Pakistan, as in other urban areas of the country, domestic work is a major form of employment for working class women, sought due to condi­ tions of poverty, lack of resources and illiteracy. Often, rural women who migrate to urban spaces enter this field of work because of the absence of or unemployment of their menfolk (Shahid 2010). As the country fails to adopt pro-poor policies, insecure work and high rates of unemployment amongst men have pushed more women to work, many of whom resort to domestic work out of necessity. Domestic work is most likely the largest source of employment for women, yet the country fails to acknowledge its contribution to the economy, not considering it in its national income data, and hence there is no data on the number of domestic workers in the country or their current terms and conditions of work (Schwenken and Heimeshoff 2011). This chapter investigates the semi-feudal “servant–master” relations (Qayum and Ray 2009) that dictate relationships between employers and female domestic workers and the labour choices working class women make in the urban areas of Karachi, Pakistan, by analysing domestic workers’ sense of empowerment using Jo Rowlands’ theory (1995). Interviews of female domestic workers are analysed to investigate women’s self-percep­ tions, their gender and labour related ideologies, the support systems avail­ able to them, and the extent to which purdah and norms of female modesty, in relation to Islam and South Asian traditions, shape their choices. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how exploitation is legitimised and reinforced for working class women. It is grounded in two research ques­ tions: 1) What are the ideologies that maintain the exploitation of paid domestic workers? 2) Why do semi-feudal norms, that are founded on landlord–servant relationships, continue to dominate the employer and employee relationships in urban areas where there is a shift to more capi­ talist modes of production (Zulfiqar 2018)? The qualitative analysis of interviews explores women’s self-perceptions and viewpoints on gender and breadwinning roles. It aims to draw attention to challenges faced by Pakis­ tani female domestic workers in achieving economic and social security.

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Situating working class women in Karachi Pakistan identifies itself as an Islamic republic, decreeing that all laws need to adhere to the principles accorded by the religion (Weiss 2014). Between 1977 and 1988, under General Zia ul-Haq’s military rule, the country went through a rigorous Islamisation program which it has never recovered from, as laws condoning misogyny and gender-based violence punish victims of domestic abuse and rape and violence are often dealt with by zina (adultery) charges. Gender segregation was promoted; the state lauded “the self-sacrificing woman” and vilified working women who were blamed for the “disintegration of the family… and other social ills” (Shaheed 2010, 859). Consequences of these regressive, anti-women policies under the cloak of religion endure till today, as the moral and honour codes promoted by Zia have become accepted. Today, women’s visibility in the labour market and their interac­ tions with the public space are tethered to nationalist Islamist ideologies, promulgating that women belong in the four walls of a home (called ghar ki char deewar in Urdu), deeming their participation in the public space as inappropriate. A small segment of urban, working women has eschewed such orthodox interpretations of Islam, and advocated for rights of women in line with Islam, but they have been unable to reverse “state sponsorship of ortho­ praxy” undertaken by Zia (Shaheed 2010, 861). Karachi, Pakistan’s sprawling metropolis, 72 years after the country was formed, has yet to recover from the partition of colonial India. During and after independence from British rule, religious and political differences fuelled intercommunal violence between Hindus and Muslims. This culminated in the partition of the country in 1947, when it was divided into two states (India and Pakistan) based on religious lines. Following the partition, hundreds of thousands of Muslim migrants flooded to Karachi, growing at a rate of 369 per cent between 1941 and 1961 (Gayer 2014, 23). In 1941, the majority of its inhabitants were Hindu and their ethnicity was Sindhi, with only 42 per cent of Muslim residents. Ten years later, it became a Muslim-majority city at 96 per cent, with the migrant population vastly outnumbering the native Sindhi population (Gayer 2014, 24). Today, Karachi remains divided along ethnic, class and religious lines, failing to plan its development equitably; creating further problems for working class settlers, who continue to have problems with housing, water, electricity and adequate employment (Hasan 2002). The lives of working class women here lie in stark contrast with those belonging to middle- and upper-class backgrounds, lacking the privilege to follow purdah norms – to withdraw from the public space and stay in segregated spaces because of their need to work to meet basic survival needs. The increased precarity and insecurity of working class men’s employment has pushed women to work, with women’s presence in the public space and workforce a question of survival even when it conflicts with the way women’s role has been imagined by the state (Viqar 2018).

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Methodology and data collection This study is based on field research conducted in 2014 and 2018 in upperclass neighbourhoods of Karachi. Its analysis is based on the interviews and narratives of 24 female domestic workers, out of whom two were live-ins that stayed in their employers’ homes, and the rest were living in their own homes and commuting to work. The interviewees’ ages ranged between 18 and 65; their age was estimated due to the lack of accurate birthdates. The respon­ dents’ income ranged from US$30 to US$120 per month. This data was acquired through semi-structured interviews with selected female domestic workers of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. The workers were contacted through snowball sampling and accessing social networks of domestic workers. Twenty-two participants were Muslim, and two were Hindus. The majority of the domestic workers were Kutchi, with 14 workers from that ethnic group, due to the author’s social contacts within the community. There were two Siraiki women, two Sindhi women, three Baloch women, and three Yousufzai Pathan women interviewed. The interviews were conducted in Urdu and focused on the life stories and perso­ nal histories of the domestic workers using narrative analysis – a method of qualitative analysis through which the researcher analyses and uncovers the respondents’ personal stories to make sense of their experiences and actions (Schutt 2012). The narratives were then placed in the social and cultural contexts of the society to frame the personal stories and struggles (Schutt 2012). Any recurring themes and discourses in the narratives were identified in order to explain patterns of behaviour and actions of domestic workers.

Status of labour law and domestic workers Across Pakistan, except for the province of Punjab, domestic workers fall outside the ambit of labour laws; there are no equipping structures to support domestic workers to acquire decent, dignified treatment and value for their work. The country has committed to the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and accordingly to the eighth sustainable development goal (SDG 8) – “to promote sustained economic growth through full and productive employment and decent work for all”. In relation to achieving gender equality and empowerment (SDG 5), Pakistan’s voluntary national review (VNR) on the SDGs reports that “[p] rogressive legislations have been passed and workplace policies introduced to encourage more women to enter the labour market. With the establishment of provincial and national Commissions on the Status of Women, serious attempts to mainstream gender have been introduced by the Government” (Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform 2019, 36). The challenge, however, even in the presence of laws and a commitment through the SDGs, to provide decent work for all, is the poor capacity and priority of the government to implement labour laws. The statutory minimum wage of US$108 (Rs 15,000) per month for a 48-hour work week is rarely followed for workers, particularly in the informal

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sector (Ijaz 2019). Labour rights’ violations are common; employers continue to violate labour laws, requiring workers to work for long hours with wages below the minimum wage and rarely paying overtime. Workers who demand their rights are discharged and left without work (Ijaz 2019). Following the Interna­ tional Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 189 in 2011, labour unions such as the Pakistan Workers Federation (PWF) have been organising domestic workers, creating awareness of their rights and urging the government to ratify the convention to implement laws to protect domestic workers. Through advo­ cacy of PWF, Punjab was able to form a Domestic Workers Union (DWU) in 2014 and pass a Domestic Workers Bill in 2019 that would protect domestic workers (Rehman 2019; ILO 2015). Saad Muhammad, General Secretary of DWU, stressed that there remain a lot of challenges, especially in convincing domestic workers to participate politically against the state to demand changes and social security.1

Rethinking empowerment Empowerment as a term is overused by development actors, often used inter­ changeably with the term “development”, under the assumption that empower­ ment automatically results in economic resources (Rowlands 1995). It has been questioned by many feminists whether economic integration and modernisation lead to gender empowerment. They argue that women should be viewed as “agents of change” that need to organise themselves rather than “recipients of development assistance” (Rathgeber 1990, 494). Rowlands’ feminist concern towards empowerment showcases how internalised oppression maintains inequality. Drawing on Foucault’s model, her theory looks at relational power, perceiving power as “permeating all of life” (Rai 2007, 12). From a Foucauldian analysis, the individual is never outside power, because there are “no margins in which those in rupture with the system may gambol” (Morris and Patton 1979, 55). Rowlands argues that power is not something that can be given to someone, because “if power can be bestowed, it can just as easily be withdrawn” (Row­ lands 1997, 11). She studies the dimensions of power needed to achieve empow­ erment: the “power within,” requires an understanding of internalised oppression; the “power to” entails decision making power and the individuals’ capacity to take or influence action; the “power over”, “controlling power”, is responded to with resistance, manipulation or compliance; and the “power with” involves individuals coming together and acting to create change (Rowlands 1998, 14). This view of empowerment is applied in this chapter to critique social constructions and understand women’s concerns.

Behaviour codes that perpetuate inequality Majboori, a word in Urdu that describes the sentiment of helplessness and the lack of choice, was repeatedly used by women to explain their conditions and inability to negotiate with their employers as they were unable to make ends

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meet and struggled with poverty. Zara, a Kutchi worker, shared that women in her class and field of work “are born lacking choices, and live their entire life without choice because there is no one who helps them.” Priya, a Sindhi worker compared the treatment of women in the workplace and at home to animals, “Women are treated like cows and goats; they work in any type of work they can get. Even their husbands keep them like cattle.” Women like Priya struggle to cope with the “triple burden”, having to take on the responsibility of wage work, reproductive work and unpaid domestic work, and at times abuse by male members of their families (Lari 2010). The consensus among the workers was that their work carried low status; they were involved in domestic work because of their majboori. Women con­ veyed fatalistic attitudes and stated that they were going along with what God had planned for them, and made sense of their poverty by saying it was their destiny to be poor. Kiran, a Sindhi worker, said it was senseless to think about how she could have a better life because she could not help her situa­ tion – it was her destiny to be poor: “My employer tells me that if I was educated and well read, he would find me a great job. But I am not educated! So, what now, if I am not? It is in my destiny to be a maid.” Fatalism is gen­ erally prevalent in poorer communities, regardless of religion, as a method of understanding unfair life circumstances (Tanguy, Dercon and Taffesse 2011). The fatalistic attitudes amongst women in this study are connected to social positions rather than religious beliefs. A sense of powerlessness is reinforced as women believe that their life is controlled by what God has intended for them and they feel too paralysed to take any action to improve their circum­ stances. While this sentiment is understandable given the stark class divide in the country, it reduces the agency of women and prevents resistance against employers to demand workers’ rights as entitled by the law. Feroza, a middle-aged Siraiki domestic worker, succinctly described the unequal relations when she remarked that “the servant will never say no.” While all women did not share Feroza’s sense of class consciousness, they agreed that they could not negotiate effectively, and were distraught by their inability to say no to their employers because of their class position. Kiran discussed that her response in the face of any conflict was to admit responsi­ bility even when it was not her fault because of her social position: “I think, you are baraay [which means bigger in Urdu, but in this context would mean ‘of higher status’], I cannot say anything to you… I ask for forgiveness right away… and say I made a mistake to avoid conflict.” Similarly, Parveen, a Kutchi worker, argued her employer never empathised with her situation of poverty and was frustrated at her inability to refuse her employer’s requests regarding work that was not part of her job responsibility. “I do it and I never say no, because I cannot say no. But she [her employer] never realises that I am working so much and it breaks my heart.” While Kiran was frustrated with the class divide, she engaged in deference rituals to ensure that her needs were taken care of by her employer in return for her loyalty and devotion. However, she often felt that she was doing her

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duty in the relationship, yet her employer was not abiding by hers: “I think that no matter how much work they make us do, it’s alright, we will do it… However, they should at least help us as they know we are majboor.” Such expectations to be “taken care of” are not unreasonable when there is no social security or effective implementation of labour standards by the state. Pakistan, like many developing countries, does not have an effective welfare and social protection scheme, and the existing systems do not cover workers in the informal economy, that make up more than 70 per cent of the labour force (ILO, n.d.). Labour regulations in Sindh set basic labour rights, such as set hours of work, public holidays and a minimum wage, but they are not being followed by employers. Domestic workers invariably have to work on public holidays and receive a maximum of one day off a week. They put up with unfavourable working conditions and compensation because the employers are the only source of income and social support, however meagre the support may be.

Customary codes of respect and shame The narratives of shame and respectability carried weight for women, who put up with poor working conditions as long as the boundaries delineated by codes of respect were not violated (Shaheed 1989, 22). Women consider security and honour as most valuable, preferring to work in a private and more segregated space which would allow them some ability to adhere to norms of purdah. These ideologies shaped what was expected from their employers and how tolerant women were of poor wages and working condi­ tions. In Pakistan, the “respectable woman” is socially constructed as docile and subservient to male authority and the upper-class (Ali 2012, 601; Afshar and Agarwal 1989, 7). Women who are struggling with poverty face difficult choices between what is considered acceptable and meeting survival needs. What was considered as respectful behaviour from employers ranged from how they were spoken to, to taking care of women’s basic needs, such as being provided clean boiled water at work, to providing food, gifts, dowry, medication and basic social support when needed. Saira, a Kutchi worker, came from a conservative background with a rela­ tively higher social status. She was the first woman in her family to work because of the instability of her husband’s income. For her, there was no respect in domestic work, interpreting the word “maasi” – a term used to address domestic workers in Pakistan – as a derogatory word as it is asso­ ciated with the work. Saira felt grateful to work in a place where her employer did not refer to her as a maasi and distinguished herself from other workers by emphasising her higher status and well-spoken Urdu. She argued that her satisfaction as a domestic worker was related to her not being treated like one: “You can tell that I speak refined Urdu. The people who I work for do not consider me a ‘maasi’ and they do not say I am one… they talk to me with respect and for me that is most important.”

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Caste-based practices of untouchability have existed for centuries in the South Asian region. While these norms are commonly associated with the Hindu religion, they also continue to have an influence in Muslim households in Pakistan; manifesting in the ill-treatment of domestic workers. Practices of untouchability are apparent in the Muslim upper-class households, where domestic workers are not allowed to use the same kitchen utensils and toilets with the justification of hygiene and cleanliness, as well as eat the same food as their employers (Zulfiqar 2018). Raazia, an elderly domestic worker was one of many domestic workers that complained about this discrimination, she said: “The house where I work now, although my work is in the kitchen, I can’t touch anything, not even the fridge. We have water from the tap, and the water is not boiled… We use separate crockery and cutlery, not what they use. I bring my own teacup from home, I keep it in my purse, I don’t like the broken cups they give us.” Many domestic workers complained about not having water or not being provided with adequate food, and not having access to clean and equipped toilets – conditions that ought to be considered as basic human rights. Raazia complained about the washroom conditions as they had to be shared with the male staff: “The bathrooms are dirty, shared by the male and female staff, I try not to go to it but sometimes I have no choice.” Raazia had no choice but to use shared washrooms, even though it conflicted with cul­ tural norms and expectations of Muslim gender segregation. The separation of utensils, space and food was normalised, most domestic workers expected this discrimination. For Feroza, the good employer would provide food and allow her to use the same utensils and crockery – it was a great honour for her to be able to use the same utensils and eat the same food as her employer: “They [previous employer] would not feed me while I was there… if they gave food it would be stale and they would not help us out when we were in need. Right now, where I am working the employers are great. We even eat in the same dishes as them.” These narratives demonstrate that domestic workers are struggling with class-based insubordination influenced by caste-based norms of untouchability, despite belonging to a Muslim society, in turn internalising their social positions. Workers prioritised respect and honour over wages, hours and work responsibilities, and judged their employers based on codes of honour.

Meta-preferences of women in relation to “purdah” norms “Power to”, decision-making power to open up new possibilities (Rowlands 1995, 102), is shaped by social relations at home and in the workplace, impacting the ability of women to manoeuvre and exercise choice in rela­ tionships. “Power to” cannot be understood without unpacking the concepts of agency and structure. Kabeer (2000) provides a feminist perspective on women’s agency in a developing country context; here structure and agency are conceptualised as mutually interdependent rather than as dichotomous. She (Kabeer 2000, 40) challenges the structural argument, stating that women

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are not “passive dupes” of the patriarchal culture and simultaneously rejects the neo-classical model of rational choice, arguing how “meta-preferences” of gender, race and social upbringing play an important role in shaping women’s labour market decisions. The term “meta-preference” is used rather than a “choice” because behaviour is shaped by hidden dynamics of cultural norms and values that are a result of “conscious reflection” (Kabeer 2000, 23) The study findings reflect the idea that women’s meta-preferences are shaped by their relationship with the public space, their interpretation of gender norms, and semi-feudal expectations. Public and private space in the country is gendered and connected to dis­ courses of purdah (Shaheed 1989, 22). Women are constricted in their mobi­ lity, avoiding certain spaces as they are perceived as masculine and unsafe, and hence choosing to work in private spaces, closer to their homes (Masood 2018). Moreover, the social construction of the “respectable woman” influ­ ences women’s “meta-preferences” (Ali 2012, 601). Purdah, while it is broadly interpreted, is central to the social system (Chowdury 1993). Women’s selfrepresentations are concerned with the interplay of honour and shame, and how they interpret dominant ideologies of what is considered appropriate (Ali 2012, 601), based on norms of purdah, varies by socioeconomic and ethnic groups (Shaheed 1989). The “respectability” narrative is connected to purdah, determining what women are willing to put up with at work. In all cities of Pakistan, women from the poorest backgrounds have the least restrictions. Often for women from lower middle classes, purdah is the strictest because it is a means of separating themselves from the poor, who cannot afford to do without the added income provided by women working in public spaces (Shaheed 1989). Many women in this study could not afford to abide by purdah norms, which require women to keep a distance and cover themselves around men that are not mahram, unrelated men that they could marry or have sexual relations with. Women rarely referred to male employers and interacted solely with female employers as norms of purdah encouraged women to maintain distance from such unrelated men. While purdah was not an explicit concern, it influenced women’s relationship with the public sphere. The ideal situation for domestic workers rested in the employment of men in their families. Male employment would allow women to avoid the public domain. Many workers like Saira pointed out that they would prefer staying at home: “I always say, if my husband finds stable work, I have absolutely no desire to leave the house.” Wajiha, a Baloch elderly domestic worker who was also a widow, had strong opinions of female seclusion, stating that a woman should stay in the home to preserve her respect, and she would not allow her daughters to work outside the home the way she has had to: “The women leave the house only if they have to, there is no need to go out… My girls don’t leave on their own, we cannot allow them to go out… If a woman has her needs met why does she need to go out? If a woman has to work, she should work from home, not outside. What is the need to go out? We only get out because we are majboor.”

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Azra distinguished herself because she was not the primary breadwinner and attained work as a live-in domestic worker by convincing her husband that she could work without accessing the public by working as a live-in domestic worker. Her husband was not against the idea of her working, but was against her entering the public space. Eventually, she found a place with a “servant quarter”, the section of a house dedicated to accommodating domestic staff, to which her husband finally agreed. For Azra’s husband, working outside the private sphere connoted his failure as a provider. When asked about how she felt in public, she expressed that she did not enjoy leav­ ing her home and was proud of her distance from the public domain: “I do not leave the house much. I have never been to a market alone. I get scared and only go with my husband. I have fears. I do not like being alone; it doesn’t feel right.” Azra’s position is unique because she was able to adhere to the rules set by her husband. Purdah has significance in Pakistan because women value religion and tradition, and women express desire that their husbands or other male members abide by their duties, so that they are able to adhere to the norms of seclusion. However, it was not their main concern because they were struggling to meet basic needs.

Semi-feudal norms In traditional feudal societies, the employer was expected to bear complete responsibility for the labourers and exercised power over them. Rather than a contractual relationship, it was a “master–servant” relationship based on patronage and subservience (Qayum and Ray 2009, 27). A semi-feudal non­ professional relationship is prevalent in rural and urban areas of Pakistan; and employees are controlled through complex employer–employee relations rooted in feudal and oppressive structural conditions (Akhtar 2011). In Kar­ achi, expectations from employers and workers remain semi-feudal and castebased, as workers expect to be taken care of in basic ways such as being provided with dowry, food, and social support through in-kind assistance when required, and employers expect servitude. There was a disjuncture between the employer’s perception of their responsibilities and the domestic workers’ expectation of what the employer’s role was. Domestic workers argued that they were willing to accept their social position, as long as their employers “took care” of them. In a semi-feudal system, the employer or landlord had the implied responsibility for the welfare of workers, and those perceptions and norms even now have implications on the conditions of work for domestic workers (Menon 2013). The overdependence on the employer in the face of poor social support from government, creates asymmetrical power relationships, perpetuating exploitation of the working poor. Women are frustrated with low wages and poor working conditions but are willing to put up with them if their employers fulfil their expectations in other ways to “take care” of them. Regardless of employers’ financial capability, they are expected to

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assist in the form of dowries for workers’ daughters’ weddings, provide gifts and clothes on Eid and other religious holidays, and support their families’ health expenses. Dowry is deeply entrenched in Pakistani culture – the bride’s family is expected to pay the groom in the form of jewellery, furniture, money or property. It was a significant motivation for the domestic workers to work. Neha, a young Kutchi worker, was unable to get married because of her family’s inability to pay a dowry. By working in two households, she was trying to save enough, but she was unable to save because the salary was barely covering her basic needs: “If I had a decent salary, then I would be able to save for marriage, then I could get married. We cannot get married without a dowry; you get taunted by your in-laws after marriage if the dowry is inadequate.” Raeesa, another worker from the same community, left her previous job because when her daughter got married her employer did not assist with the dowry and wedding costs. She argued that she put up with poor wages and conditions, expecting to be compensated when she was in need. Ultimately, her employer’s worth was tested when her daughter got married: “When I told them my daughter is getting married… they refused to help, and then I decided that there is no point working there.” These narra­ tives of women show how domestic workers struggle with employers not taking care of their needs. While the employers adhere to capitalist norms of the relationship not considering social security as their responsibility, they continue to have semi-feudal expectations from their workers of deference, respect and loyalty. As such, domestic workers continue to be perceived as “servants” without set hours of work, pensions and social security, and any additional support provided beyond salary is arbitrary and considered as an act of charity.

Support systems: the “power with” The component of power most critical to social change is the “power with” – when individuals come together and engage in political activism (Rowlands 1995). In Pakistan, movements focused on collective action are dominated by men and exist in the formal sector; women continue to face obstacles to engage in any form of activism as gendered roles and limited access to public spaces hinder their mobility. For women to participate col­ lectively and resist regressive policies, a space which is accessible and catered to their requirements is needed, and factors that limit women’s agency need to be tackled (Lari 2010). Due to societal discrimination and taboos of women appearing in the public domain, they are precluded from partici­ pating in labour organising activities. Additionally, women’s rights’ agendas to attain empowerment formulated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been narrowly defined, focusing on social, economic and political rights of urban middle class and upper-class women (Bano 2009).

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Menon (2013) identified the workers’ ambiguous work identity as a bar­ rier to political resistance. Domestic workers struggle because “a decision to work in a domestic role in another woman’s home will often be seen as a temporary phase; not a primary identity” (Kabeer, Sudarshan and Milward 2013, 252). Women in this study often voiced concerns about their work impeding the performance of their primary duties as wives and mothers. While they are able to identify their needs and recognise the lack of justice, they lacked a strong work-based identity. Domestic workers often inter­ nalised beliefs that women’s work has lesser value than that of men. Sha­ bana, a young worker, expressed this concern, suggesting that the solution rested in the hands of the men in the society – if the men changed, women would lead better lives: “The women who are working, their earnings cannot bring blessings the way men’s work can and the men do not understand that.” Shabana felt strongly about men’s duties and obligations to their families by taking care of them to bring success and good fortune. She was upset that she was not fulfilling her gender role appropriately because of the failure of the men in her family to provide. Shalini Sinha has argued that “one of the most powerful barriers to organising is fear… They [women] live in constant fear of losing their live­ lihoods, of starvation, of losing their children to illness and of being thrown out of their houses” (Sinha as quoted in Kabeer, Sudarshan and Milward 2013, 250). This fear is often the result of isolation and women’s inability to view their work as valuable. It is difficult to organise domestic workers because they are working in the private sphere and there is not much opportunity to interact with other workers. Women were often isolated and unable to speak to their families and relatives when they were mistreated at work, with the private space they occupy inhibiting any form of resistance (Menon 2013). Haniza, an elderly worker, expressed the isolation she faced at home and in the workplace, “I find myself crying alone quite a bit over my misfortune… why is it that I have to bear so much at this age and work?” The workers were not fearful of the direct authority of employers, but they feared losing their jobs because they were continuously in debt and on the brink of extreme poverty. The financial stress was overwhelming for Nadia, another elderly Baloch worker: “I am always in debt. I take loans to pay off other loans.” The question related to collective action through union participation was a difficult one to answer, because there are no unions that focus on informal women workers in Karachi, even though it has the largest working population in Pakistan. There were women who could not imagine a union outside the context of factory work; and other women who associated unions with cor­ ruption due to the affiliation of Pakistan’s political parties. Many women were distraught by the absence of social, financial and emotional support systems, however only a handful felt that the presence of a union or support group would enable negotiation of better terms and conditions at work. Azra favoured participating in an organisation that would cater to domestic

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workers like her because of the failure of the government to support her, arguing that no matter how devoted she was, she would have to work in her old age: “I would join the union because I am working hard, and I deserve it… My mother has been working for over 30 years in a house. But now, if my mother leaves her work, what does she get? She is left with nothing.” She was troubled by how many domestic workers in her family worked until they were old and physically unable to, and she was worried about being in the same predicament. Jabeen similarly contended that a union would ensure a level of employment security and social mobility: “If there was a union, at least there would be less stress. We could get help to find other jobs if the work was bad. We can’t succeed or make something of ourselves; we cannot educate our chil­ dren properly.” Azra and Jabeen were among the few who raise important issues that domestic workers face in Karachi; where there is no security, pen­ sion or emotional support for working class women.

Discussion The study presents domestic workers’ overarching concerns and needs and finds that they remain divorced from the concerns of the country’s policy makers. The primary issues that concern women are related to basic questions of social justice and support. If women have stronger access to support sys­ tems, they are more likely to question their status. Before women workers in the informal sector can be organised to collectively act, dignity and respect must be granted to women’s paid and unpaid work and the labour legislations must enforce the rights of paid domestic workers. To meet the SDG target of providing “decent work for all”, the country needs to build the capacity of provincial labour departments to cover informal workers. Currently, the moves as shown within Pakistan’s SDGs VNR (Ministry of Planning, Devel­ opment and Reform 2019, 44) of registering domestic workers as part of for­ malising informal workers to enable access to social protection are limited to Punjab and not strong enough to implement any international standards. Strong patriarchal and semi-feudal norms have overridden formal justice sys­ tems; therefore, solutions must be sought beyond the formal law. Networking strategies related to the collective dimension of power have the greatest potential for advancing the situation of women workers. If women organise into cooperatives and pressure groups, there will be greater attention drawn to their issues locally and internationally. The study also draws attention to the isolation domestic workers face and elaborates the hidden discourse of women that questions authority and sub­ jugation. While it was conducted at a small scale and therefore is limited in its scope, it sheds light on the limitations and barriers to organising women, particularly pertaining to the way women imagine their gender roles in rela­ tion to their culture and religion. Domestic workers would tap into the bene­ fits offered by groups focused on collective action, such as the Domestic Workers Union, if they were able to build a strong identity as workers and

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feel entitled to their rights by law. Gender related empowerment cannot be achieved without resistance; through collective power there is a possibility for change to occur across all classes. A study evaluating domestic workers’ con­ cerns at a larger, statistically representative scale would be very beneficial to the community.

Conclusion This chapter calls for a shift in the focus of women’s rights in Pakistan to look at “actor-oriented” strategies to create change. The struggles of domestic workers in Pakistan remain atomised and socially dispersed. Semi-feudal roles of subservience are adhered to in order to attain social security, and employ­ ers fail to recognise the concerns of domestic workers because of class enti­ tlement and the low value accorded to paid domestic work. While employers seek a professional relationship with domestic workers in terms of financial remuneration, they continue to treat them as “servants” and fail to provide them with decent wages and conditions of work. Such overdependence on the employer creates unfair bargaining positions – domestic workers are willing to accept poor conditions, hoping that their subservience will ensure a level of social security. There exists a disjuncture between the expectations of domes­ tic workers and the employers’ perceptions of their responsibility towards the workers.

Note 1 Saad Muhammad, interviewed by author, February 1, 2019.

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Ijaz, Saroop. 2019. “No Room to Bargain”: Unfair and Abusive Labour Practices in Pakistan. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/ 01/23/no-room-bargain/unfair-and-abusive-labor-practices-pakistan ILO (International Labour Organization). 2015 “First Domestic Workers’ Trade Union Registered in Pakistan.” https://www.ilo.org/islamabad/info/public/pr/WCMS_338484/ lang–en/index.htm ILO (International Labour Organization). n.d. “Social Security in Pakistan.” https:// www.ilo.org/islamabad/areasofwork/social-security/lang–en/index.htm Kabeer, Naila. 2000. The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and their Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka. London, UK: Verso Kabeer, Naila, Ratna Sudarshan and Kirsty Milward. 2013. “Organizing Women Workers in the Informal Economy.” Gender and Development 21(2): 249–263. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2013.802145 Lari, Maliha Z. 2010. Gender Review of Labour Laws. Karachi, Pakistan: PILER Masood, Ayesha. 2018. “Negotiating Mobility in Gendered Spaces: Case of Pakistani Women Doctors.” Gender, Place & Culture 25(2): 188–206. doi:10.1080/ 0966369X.2017.1418736 Menon, Geeta. 2013. “The Challenge of Organizing Domestic Workers in Bangalore: Caste, Gender and Employer-Employee Relations in the Informal Economy.” In Organizing Women Workers in the Informal Economy. Edited by Naila Kabeer, Ratna Sydarshan and Kirsty Milward, 181–182. London, UK: Zed Books. Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Pakistan. 2019. “Pakistan’s Imple­ mentation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” Pakistan: MoPDR. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/233812019_06_15_VNR_ 2019_Pakistan_latest_version.pdf Morris, Meaghan and Paul Patton. 1979. Michel Foucault: Power, Truth and Strategy. Sydney, Australia: Feral Publications Qayum, Seemin and Raka Ray. 2009. Cultures of Servitude: Modernity, Domesticity and Class in India. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press Rai, Shirin M. 2007. “Redefining Empowerment, Measuring Survival.” Paper pre­ sented at the Workshop on Empowerment: Obstacles, Flaws, Achievements, Carle­ ton University, Ottawa, May 3–5, 2007. http://www.ethicsofempowerment.org/pap ers/RaiEmpowerment.pdf Rathgeber, Eva. 1990. “WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice.” The Journal of Developing Areas 24(4): 489–502. http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library. utoronto.ca/stable/4191904 Rehman, Shoaib. 2019. “Punjab Assembly Passes Three Government Bills.” Business Recorder. January 23, 2019. https://www.brecorder.com/2019/01/23/468238/punjab-a ssembly-passes-three-govt-bills/ Rowlands, Jo. 1995. “Empowerment Examined.” Development in Practice 5(2): 101–107. doi:10.1080/0961452951000157074 Rowlands, Jo. 1997. Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras. Oxford, UK: Oxfam Rowlands, Jo. 1998. “A Word of the Times, but What Does It Mean?” In Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World. Edited by Haleh Afshar, 11–35. New York, NY: Macmillan Press Schutt, Russell K. 2012. Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research. 7th ed. Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts

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Mediating between the secular and the religious Strategies of prominent Spanish women of Moroccan Muslim origins Dina Bousselham and Juan Ignacio Castien Maestro

Women of Moroccan origin in the public sphere in Spain This chapter is focused on the study of several Spanish women of Moroccan origin that currently enjoy a relevant position in the cultural, political and associative life in Spain, developing activities as opinion makers, social acti­ vists and politicians. We have also been interested in those who occupy posi­ tions with decision-making capacity in the so-called “third sector” of the economy. All these activities provide them with remarkable power and influ­ ence, as well as a clear public image. Their prominent position depends to a large extent on their role as inter­ mediaries between the Spanish society as a whole and the community of Moroccan origin. In relation to the majority, they conduct themselves as “representatives” of their own community. Thus, they manage to operate as privileged informants about the different problems that affect them, as well as the Moroccan community, either before the public opinion, the academic and intellectual world or the different political and social organisations. They also act as intercommunity mediators at the service of administrations and civil associations and as captors of votes for the political parties with which they collaborate. As far as their community of origin is concerned, they become their advocates and their spokespersons or, at least, those of a particular sector within it. The mediating activities exercised in relation to each of these two poles are intertwined with each other. In this way, their capacity to influence their own community depends partially on the recog­ nition they can gain within the majority society and vice versa. It is foreseeable that this bidirectional mediation, still emerging, becomes increasingly important by virtue of the strong Moroccan presence in Spain. In Spain, there are around one million people of Moroccan origin, including those who have obtained Spanish nationality as well as the Moroccan ethnic Spaniards from Ceuta and Melilla. However, this social group is undergoing degrees of social disadvantage. Their low level of income and high unem­ ployment, accentuated by the economic crisis (CCME 2016, 21–32), create

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the conditions for their stigmatisation. Islamophobia also reinforces the stig­ matisation from the majority population, who are mostly Christian. However, Islamophobia, currently common in the West, is concretised in this case in a “Moorofobia” which is fed by a complicated relationship with North Africa since the Middle Ages, and a Spanish identity that has been traditionally built up in opposition to the “Moor”. However, “the Moor”, as a historically constitutive element of “Hispanicness”, is part of a complex affective ambivalence (González 2002). On the Moroccan side, we find a similar ambivalence towards the Western world, a blend of admiration and rejection (Afaya 1997; Castien 2003, 499–524). The contradictory nature of these reciprocal attitudes provides the intercommunal mediators with a certain power to enhance some aspects of these complex attitudes, either positively or negatively. Likewise, the cultural, and almost always religious, specificity of these women can also be a clear asset for them. This is especially true in current contexts, where cultural diversity, along with several others, is so widely valued (Castien 2013, 252–256). The same happens with their status as women, given the current global inclination to promote a greater female presence in all areas. Their own connection with Islam, despite the fact that some of them do not define themselves as believ­ ers, also allows them to benefit from the widespread desire to promote greater public visibility of Muslim women. This is particularly true when they pro­ mote a vision of a “modernist” and “democratic” Islam, more acceptable in the West, and useful in countering both Islamophobia and radical Islamism. In this way, their positions within certain axes such as those of gender, ethni­ city and religion are, on the one hand problematic, and on the other also obvious advantages. Through this complex mediation between the two ethnic and cultural communities, these women can provide an important service to society, as generators of a cross-cutting social fabric. In the course of this, they are also impelled to develop, at least to a certain extent, a series of contents that must seem acceptable to the communities involved and that turns them into a sort of intercultural translators. They establish, in this way, meanings between values, such as justice and respect for others and for social stability, both present in the Islamic and the Western traditions, although not exactly in the same way. The results of this can enrich the collective social culture, as well as facilitate cooperation and understanding among people who belong to different philosophies. All this can be read as a remarkable con­ tribution to human development, and not exclusively defined by narrow economic criteria. However, this role as socio-cultural intermediaries can often expose them to a whole series of contradictory demands. Although this is a common problem among those who may be intermediaries, in this case the contradictions are accentuated, due to disparities between the systems in which their existence takes place. The search for satisfying some people may imply upsetting others and vice versa. We can also understand this as a specific manifestation of a

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widespread conflict which is present among immigrants from Muslim socie­ ties settled in the West and is faced in different and diverse ways. This conflict especially concerns dilemmas such as the decision of cultivating a differ­ entiated identity, especially through attire, particularly for women, or the choice of complying with dietary and sexual rules and ritual obligations sti­ pulated by the Shariah, or the recognition, to a greater or lesser degree, of individual autonomy and gender equality (Charfi 1999; Castien 2003, 350– 391; Cesari 2006). Our objective here is to study the different ways in which these women handle the contradictions they face. To this end, we analyse their practices and discourses by outlining a typology of ideological positions. We also investigate possible connections between these different positions and their different sociological profiles. Each of these positions is conceived as part of a broader system of positions, defined in relation to their similarities and con­ trasts with the rest of them. To this end, we apply a simplified version of Bourdieu’s field concept (1987, 24), as a social space where different indivi­ dual and collective actors compete, thus manipulating several material or symbolic resources. In this study we resort to contributions of symbolic interactionism (Goff­ man 1956; Blumer 1969). We are interested in the frequently ambivalent and conflictive character of social relations and the role of symbolic and discursive constructions as instruments to be managed within intermediary relationships. The women who form the focus of this study are well known people who write articles and books, and are present in the media and who, above all, remain very active in social networks such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook. Controversies are also frequent among those who hold different per­ spectives on social, cultural and religious issues. We have applied a qualitative discursive analysis of empirical materials that correspond to 50 people, mainly women, who are very active in the digital sphere. The “digital ethnography” has been completed through semi-directed interviews with six of these women, both in person and online. These women are opinion leaders and clearly represent different ideological positions. The interviews helped us to dig deeper into their sociological profiles and their positions on specific issues. The brevity of the chapter limits us to use only a small part of our analysis and empirical materials. It should be noted that the condition of these women as public figures has not allowed us to preserve their anonymity completely. Therefore, although our goal is to work with social types rather than individuals, we specify the name and position of the person to whom we are referring in certain passages.

Mediating structural and discursive contradictions The first requirement to achieve our objectives is to investigate in more detail the nature of the contradictions that all these women must face. To begin with we have a possible contradiction between their public and

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their active role in the economic, social and political spheres and the feminine traditional role in their own society, more focused on the domestic domain. Yet this same role is being increasingly challenged and weakened in Morocco over the past decades (Bessis and Belhassen 1992; Daoud 1993; Vermeren 2001; Bourquia 2011; Desrues and Hernando 2011). It is possible, therefore, that in their community they are required to assume a more traditional behaviour, and above all act more “modest” and “discreet”, while in the Spanish society they are encouraged to adopt a more “emancipated” and “empowered” behaviour. This contradiction is experienced by many women around the world, but in this case is more intense, because of the great public visibility of the target women’s pro­ fessional activities. Practically all these women have suffered harsh criti­ cisms from their communities of origin, due to their public activity, which is considered contradictory with the traditional feminine role. Those who declare themselves as Muslims more openly, and those who do not, those who wear the hijab, and those who refuse to wear it, have all been affected by these criticisms. This leads to a second and more specific contradiction derived from the public exhibition of the Muslim identity, exemplified mainly by the use of the hijab. It is no longer a question of just assuming a more “modest” behaviour, stipulated by interpretations of Islam whose orthodoxy we do not claim to judge here. It is intended to turn such behaviours into a sign of a religious belonging; however, this visibility generates various criticisms. It can be questioned as an intrusion of religious symbolism in an enforced secular public sphere. This can also be denounced as an expression of inequality in terms of the degree of modesty demanded by gender, thus revealing a more global inequality (Ramírez 2011). There is a third point of tension regarding the connection between religious and national identity. It is well known that Muslim identity is usually defined, by both Moroccans and others, as a central component of Moroccan national identity. Consequently, for many people the affirmation of their “Moroccan­ ness” would necessarily pass through their Islamic identity, through their more visible markers such as the hijab. The openly practising Muslim woman can then be accepted as a fully representative Moroccan and, therefore, as a useful mediator for the whole of her society, or rejected as insufficiently Spanish, especially by those Spaniards who radically oppose Islam and the idea of “Hispanicness”, because of centuries of wars against Muslim neigh­ bours. On the part of the Moroccan society, the most secularised individual woman will be reviled or praised, depending on the particular point of view of the observer, and by virtue of the degree of her connection with the host society and its values which are considered more modern. Likewise, she will also have to face the possibility of being dismissed as not representative enough of the devout Muslim community. Fourthly, all these women are involved in “left” or “progressive” spaces, in the usual meanings of these terms. These spaces are distinguished by a

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militant position in terms of gender equality and secularity, but at the same time, by their struggle against xenophobia and by defending the right of immigrant minorities that struggle to preserve their cultural spe­ cificities. The problem arises when such specificities are referred to reli­ gious mandates and considered exponents of a patriarchal social system. This is the conflict with which the world’s political left is recurrently con­ fronted with Muslim populations (Kepel 1996; Achcar 2003), and it does not have a simple solution. It is not possible to avoid it either, given the double location of the Spanish Moroccan population, both on the periph­ ery of the world capitalist system, as well as in the lower strata of the central metropolises. These four great contradictions constitute a challenge to which they must respond. The ability of these women to function successfully as agents of social development, apart from their own personal position, will depend on their ability to navigate between the two worlds successfully. It should not be forgotten, however, that this contradictory situation, common to some extent to all human beings, especially affects, as we already pointed out, Muslim immigrants in the West, but also, to the Moroccan society as a whole. Notwithstanding, the latter is a society that is subject to a process of intense and unequal transformation (Vermeren 2001; Bourquia 2011; Desrues and Hernando 2011). This results in deep contrasts between the nor­ mative systems of different sectors of its population. Many people have to strive to preserve a minimum balance between their disparate identity demands, thus developing a remarkable adaptive flexibility (Castien 2003; Ferrie 2004; Rosen 2008). It should be noted that none of these women profess an Islamist ideology, if we understand the latter as an ideology which makes of Islam the foundation of an expressly political program, aimed at organising globally the function­ ing of a modern society (Ayubi 1991; Roy 2002). At the most, some of them take from Islam general moral values and norms regarding several aspects of existence, especially those related to diet, family, sexual life and modesty. However, they also limit the applicability of the rules of the religion to such specific facets of everyday life and refuse its application to regulate the poli­ tical and economic sphere of human existence. Thus they postulate the pre­ sence of a space of autonomous activity with respect to religious statements and therefore conform with an implied secularisation (Berger 1967: 107). Likewise, all of them share a progressive political orientation that applies unevenly and ranges from the center-left Socialist Party to the far-left Catalonian separatist coalition Popular Unity Candidacy or Can­ didatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP). All are also positioned strongly against xenophobia, in general, and against anything affecting their native com­ munity in particular. Finally, all of them argue in a clear way for gender equality, which would allow them to be considered as feminists in a broad sense.

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Responses to contradictions The above four contradictions elicit different responses. However, despite all their differences, they have a series of common elements. In the following section, each of these responses is set up with respect to the others, by means of their reciprocal similarities and differences. Three shared features define a common space where different positions can be developed. A friendly multiculturalism The first of them is characterised by the search for a balance between two poles of existence. These women define themselves as Muslim and consider this identity an important aspect of their lives. However, they also retain other identities, like the Spanish, Moroccan, woman or progressive activist, prior­ itising one over the other depending on the circumstances. They try to reconcile these identities. This position embodies what we might call a “friendly multiculturalism”, a concept by which society is conceived as a mosaic of different groups that respect each other, that value the diversity provided by others and share some general democratic values. Whereas reli­ gion is a particular aspect of this multiculturalism, we could also speak of an equally “friendly” religious pluralism. Society would then be composed of different religious communities, capable of living together, thanks to their common acceptance of a modern way of life. The model postulated back in the 1960s by Will Herberg (1960), for Protestants, Catholics and Jews of the United States could be generalised to other societies and could also be extended to other religions. This position requires a globally benevolent attitude towards different con­ fessions. The Muslim identity does not have to be relegated to the strictly private sphere. It can be exhibited in public, through external markers such as the hijab. However, this is not perceived as an attack against the neutrality of public space, or against those who profess other different creeds. Tolerance towards religion and its visible manifestations are conceived as a right and a duty for everybody. Only those who adopt hostile attitudes towards other groups would face censure (Jatibi 2018). Naturally, it is not enough just to harbour such attitudes. It is also neces­ sary to develop a discourse capable of facilitating this conciliation. For this, it must be operated simultaneously at several levels. The first is that of nation­ ality. It is necessary to reconcile Moroccanness and Hispanicness. The women who are the focus of this study are defined as Spanish of Moroccan origin. They do not deny this origin, but they give it less importance than their cur­ rent Spanish membership. They define national belonging not in genealogical terms, but on the basis of other criteria, such as the place where they have grown or been born, the social bonds developed in the same, and their affi­ nities with most of their culture.

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Secondly, the Spanish national belonging would not be incompatible with a Muslim condition, or with an Islamic lifestyle, which may involve the use of the hijab. For a “friendly multiculturalism”, the Spanish identity must be detached from its traditional link with Catholicism and conceived as compa­ tible with religious pluralism; thus one can be perfectly “Hispanic-Muslim”. On the other hand, their Muslim identity will not have to continue to link them to the Moroccan identity. Although a preferential orientation towards their national community of origin may persist, a more general one will also be developed, towards the Muslim community in general and, especially, towards the Spanish Muslim community. Thus, a clear separation is drawn between the Muslim identity and the local, national or ethnic identities of its bearers. Islam is deculturised, in the sense defined by Olivier Roy (2012, 42–43), that is, in the sense of its dissociation with respect to the different cultures where it was previously inserted. It is known that, this process, common to different religions and promoted by globalisation, can favour, in turn, a drift towards neo-funda­ mentalism. Without having to adapt to complex, contradictory and par­ tially secularised cultures, religious principles now lend themselves to a more rigorous interpretation, which simplifies them, while seeking to turn them into the guiding principles of the whole existence. However, scholars like Leila Babés (1997) have pointed out other possible evolutionary lines, with which the positions we are analysing are more aligned. In these cases, the Islamic identity is detached from its old links with a patriarchal and traditional culture, develops itself as a religion more focused on general moral values rather than on particular norms, linked to concrete historical situations, as was the case in classical Islam. This fosters a search of con­ vergences with other religions conceived in similar terms, and a friendly attitude towards them. The deculturation would propitiate, in this case, a more modernist inter­ pretation of Islam, aimed at establishing a concordance between Islam and the concepts and general values of a modernity that first emerged in the West, but considered universal in scope, such as individual autonomy, democracy, equal rights among all human beings and progress (Hourani 1968). A parti­ cular aspect of this Islamic modernism would be the so-called Islamic femin­ ism, the subject of so many polemics nowadays (As-Sadawi 1985; Mernissi 1985 and 1987; Badran 2009; Tamzali and Ber 2010; Eltahawy 2015; Adlbi 2016). The latter would seek to separate Islam from its historical relations with patriarchal social models, reinterpreting the sacred texts in an egalitarian sense and postulating a concordance between gender equality and the general moral values of Islam (Mernissi 1987; Badran 2009). This conciliatory strategy is very useful for those who develop a profes­ sional activity based on their ability to mediate between different commu­ nities. We should not be surprised to find it in women like Najat Driuech, regional deputy of the independence party Republican Left of Catalonia, Miriam Hatibi, spokesperson of the Ibn Battuta Foundation, founded and

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directed by a leader of the Socialist Party, and the youtuber Ramia Chaoui, whose videos aim to offer an attractive image of her native Moroccan culture to the general public. This “friendly multiculturalism” is safeguarded in many cases thanks to a restriction of one’s critical sense. A more daring criticism of the abuses committed within each group could generate less reconcilable dif­ ferences. Likewise, the attempts to establish a concordance between feminist and modern values and those contained in the sacred Islamic texts lend themselves to intense criticism that we cannot address here (Charfi 1999; Tamzali and Ber 2010; Eltahawy 2015). A non-temporising and secularist feminism The assumption of the limits inherent in the above more conciliatory position leads some women to have a more critical and combative attitude. They adopt a much more militant stance against patriarchal structures which are more present in their country of origin than in the West and oppose the rela­ tionship between those structures and the versions of Islam that are hege­ monic today in the world as a whole. They also refuse to consider Islam as the main constitutive element of the identity of their group of origin. For them, the adherence to the political left implies a forceful defence of secular­ ism and gender equality. Some do not define themselves as Muslim and those that do, relegate religiosity to the private sphere, opposing their public visibi­ lity as Muslims and refuse to wear the hijab. For this reason, when defining themselves in relation to their collective of origin, they tend to shy away from the term “Muslim” and prefer to use others of national and ethnic character such as “Moroccan”, “Moor”, “Arab” or “Amazigh”. This different definition of identity has two main implications. The first consists of a claim and empowerment of the most secular aspects of Moroccan culture and the refusal to consider it as com­ pletely structured by Islam. In support of this position, it is frequent to insist on the well-known divergences that for centuries have existed between the way of life of many people and the presumed precepts of Islam. That which would be condemned, due to its more rigorous views, as a deviation from the divine commandments is claimed as a proof of a deeply rooted tradition of secular­ ity. In the same line, the current “Islamisation” of the customs among some of the Muslim population, exemplified in the dissemination of the hijab, can be strongly denounced, as a result of the influence of movements such as Islamism and Salafism, branded as reactionary. Here too, deculturation of Islam is present. However, now the dissociation with respect to one’s own traditions no longer serves to develop it independently in any particular direction – either neo-fundamentalist or modernist – but to dispense with it, without having to do so much with one’s own cultural specificity. The second major implication of this identity redefinition is that, with its relatively diminished ethnicity and the religious difference suppressed, its dif­ ferential elements facing the majority of the Spanish population and, in

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particular, against its left-wing sectors, are reduced to a minimum. Diver­ gences increase, however, with respect to an important part of their commu­ nity of origin, much more conservative in their customs and Islamic in their identity and normative references. Thus, a clear shift towards one of the two extremes of the equation is operated, in contrast with the previous more conciliatory strategy. Predictably, this position causes numerous conflicts. It not only clashes with the most conservative, but also with the conciliators, including several of the women presented in the previous section, with whom they continually polemicise in social networks. The latter are accused of complacency, and even of complicity, against the notoriously patriarchal practices and the con­ temporary religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world. Even the very concept of Islamic feminism can be denounced as intrinsically contradictory and a mere deceptive cover in the service of an Islamist policy radically opposed to feminist principles. Their intellectual references are based on pro­ moters of a secular and combative feminism, such as Nawal As-Sadawi (1985), Mona Eltahawy (2015) and Tamzali and Ber (2010). The response of those accused of such is the denial of links between patriarchal structures and Islam itself. In turn, the secularist feminists are accused of favouring Islamo­ phobic approaches. The same arguments, are also used in debates with nonMuslims, including those of a left-wing orientation, who can be reproached for their low belligerence against certain oppressions among Muslims that would not be tolerated in the Western society. Although we can admire the courage of these women, shying away from any comfortable temporisation, their position condemns them, at least in the short term, to gather scant support from their community of origin. Also, within the majority group, their position is also exposed to numerous criti­ cisms. Yet it could also serve to win new audiences. This would be the case with those who admire an uncompromising opposition to patriarchal struc­ tures and religious fundamentalism, although we can find among them those who instrumentalise such criticisms in the service of their Islamophobic approaches. These approaches find greater predicament among the right than among the left; an uncomfortable fact for these left-wing women. The risk of marginalisation is clear. When facing this, one can opt for greater prudence. One of our informants, a social worker in the field of migration, stated that, in the presence of Moroccans, she tried to dress in a “modest” manner, but without using the hijab, and avoided alcohol consumption or talking about subjects which may be considered controversial. Nevertheless, she was criticised despite the fact that she had gained respect on the part of many conservative people thanks to her honesty and her services. Obviously, her professional activity advised this restraint, which contrasted with the greater combativeness of those who, as journalists and writers, did not depend so much on the approval of their community of origin, but on that of a sector of Spanish public opinion. This was the case of communicators and journalists such as Mimount Hamido and Imane Rashidi and the novelist Najat El Hashmi.

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The “political anti-racism” and its aporias The third and last strategy that we analyse here is also characterised by its combativeness, only that it is now directed against the other pole of the equation, against the majority society. Its foundation lies in an intense hosti­ lity against advanced capitalist societies, including Spain. These societies are often accused of being intrinsically dominating and exploitative, not only with the world capitalist periphery, but also with their immigrant populations coming from this same periphery. Starting from a remarkably simplified ver­ sion of the intersectional approach, it is argued that all these populations would share a common “racialised” condition, as opposed to Western or “white”. Racism would be intrinsic to world capitalist society and Islamo­ phobia would be a particular variant of it. It would even be of the same essence as modernity as a product of the colonialist West. The project of Islamic modernism would then be disqualified at its roots and the very con­ cept of Islamic feminism would also become problematic, given the depen­ dence of feminism on this colonial modernity (Adlbi 2016). We think that these statements are deeply debatable. We disagree with this equation under the common label of “racism” of radically heterogeneous realities (Castien 2013, 248–252), as well as this essentialist reduction of modernity to its particular colonial side, underestimating all its emancipa­ tory aspects. Beyond these theoretical weaknesses, we are interested in exploring their practical implications. The inherent racism in modern Wes­ tern society would make the goal of receiving equal treatment within it utopian. Nor would the classical alliances postulated by the political left make any sense, on the basis of a common class membership, above national or ethnic differences. In fact, the Western “white” political left, as an advo­ cate of a specific version of this same modernity, would also inevitably be affected by a racist and colonialist perspective. The only solution would be to advocate a “political anti-racism”, aimed at achieving a radical change of the system. To get this, it would be necessary to form a large front of “racialised” populations and develop a global alternative to Western mod­ ernity based on dominated cultures. In the case of Muslims, this alternative would surely be based on Islamic heritage. Paradoxically, an approach developed from a very radical left could end up converging with Islamism. The extreme criticism with respect to everything Western and modern stops at Islam, where an authentically apologetic attitude is frequently adopted. It is not surprising, then, that pro­ gressive anticolonialism ends up being instrumentalised in the service of cer­ tain aspects of the Islamist project, to which it provides a protective shield against modernist critics. This is in fact a quite common ideological manoeuvre nowadays (Burgat 1988; Yassine 2003). It is obvious that, at least under the current circumstances, this strategy is bound to be marginal. It cannot gather support either among the majority of Spanish society, or among its most left-wing sectors, except for those more

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favourable towards identity politics, which are being harshly discussed today (Bernabé 2018). Neither does it seem to do so amongst the community of origin or among the Muslims of Spain as a whole. Their aggressiveness against the West clashes with the aspirations of most people towards a good coexistence. Also, despite their relative complacency with respect to the most patriarchal and repressive aspects of their culture, their far-leftist rhetoric does not seem to attract much sympathy either. Finally, the plan to create a large front of a “racialised” condition does not seem feasible, given the deep differences existing between these populations, and the frequent conflicts between them. Their only defenders in our case are a small number of young people, most of them university students, linked to leftist activism. They only get a small audience within the environments of their social networks, alternative media and certain ideologically related aca­ demic fields. Paradoxically they do it most of the time among people who do not belong to their native community.

Conclusion The analysis in this chapter has provided us with an overview of the specific situation of Spanish women of Moroccan origin who act as political, social and cultural mediators. We have seen how “friendly multiculturalism” and secular feminism develop, in part, through their mutual opposition. The “friendly multiculturalism” seems effective as a strategy for mediation between the different groups in the short term. Perhaps these more immediate successes are offset by a reluctance to engage in more substantive discussions, which also need to be addressed at some point. With secularist feminists it is the opposite situation. Their positions condemn them to be a minority, but they have the merit of raising questions that deserve to be discussed. Perhaps both approaches will converge at some point. They could then combine their different contributions to social development, the crea­ tion of a transversal social fabric, in one case, and creativity and critical power in another. Regarding the third approach, we think that this com­ bines the worst of the previous two, without any of their virtues. It does not seem able to create social bonds that may favour coexistence and it lacks the capacity to strengthen a necessary critical perspective on patriarchal struc­ tures. The criticisms of certain aspects of modernity could be enriching, but they are spoiled by their theoretical coarseness. Without a minimally con­ structive attitude and without an elaborate theory, activism can be useless, or even harmful. In a broader sense, the reality of these women is worthy of a much deeper investigation in relation to their different discourses and the relationships between them and their sociological profiles. Through this, they could also enrich the approach to deeper issues, such as the complex relations between Islam on the one hand, and modernity, feminism and national identity on the other.

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Goffman, Erving. 1956. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Edinburgh, Scot­ land: University of Edinburgh González, José. 2002. Lo moro. Las lógicas de la derrota y la formación del estereotipo islámico. Barcelona, Spain: Anthropos Herberg, Will. 1960. Protestant-Catholic-Jew. Un Essay in American Religious Sociol­ ogy. New York, NY: Anchor Books Hourani, Albert. 1968. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Ages 1798–1939. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press Jatibi, Miriam. 2018. Mírame a los ojos: no es tan difícil entendernos. Barcelona, Spain: Plaza & Janés Kepel, Gilles. 1996. A l’ouest d’Allah. Paris, France: Éditions Le Seuil Mernissi, Fatima. 1985. Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society. London, United Kingdom: Saqi Books Mernissi, Fatima. 1987. Le harem politique: Le Prophète et les femmes. Paris, France: Albin Michael Ramírez, Ángeles. 2011. La trampa del velo: el debate sobre el uso del pañuelo musul­ mán. Madrid, Spain: La Catarata Rosen, Lawrence. 2007. Varieties of Muslim Experience: Encounters with Arab Poli­ tical and Cultural Life. Chicago, IL and London, United Kingdom: University of Chicago Press Roy, Olivier. 2002. Généalogie de l’islamisme. Paris, France: Fayard/Pluriel Roy, Olivier. 2012. La sainte ignorance. Le temps de la religion sans culture. Paris, France: Éditions le Seuil Tamzali, Wassyla and Claude Ber. 2010. Burka? Montpellier, France: Editions Chèvre feuille étoilée Vermeren, Pierre. 2001. Le Maroc en transition. Paris, France: Éditions La Decouverte Yassine, Nadia. 2003. Toutes voiles dehors. A la rencontre du message coranique. Paris, France: Alter

8

Multilayered workplace discrimination faced by Muslim Women in a Western context Derya Iner and Amina Baghdadi

Introduction The participation of women in the workplace is a global problem, however the gender gap in economic participation and opportunity is relatively small in Western countries. Western countries, which can be defined beyond geographic location and understood as countries that are ideologically, culturally, ethically and economically aligned put in place systematic and structural efforts to improve women’s status by upward mobility through education and employment. Western countries such as Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and France are ranked amongst the top 65 countries in economic participation and opportunity according to the Gender Global Index 2018 (Zahidi, Geiger and Crotti 2018). Such com­ mendable efforts are not utilisable nor function effectively in favour of minority women, especially Muslim women living in the West. The antiMuslim ideological orientations currently and widely in force in the public sphere and recycled in political discourses (Cheng 2017) discard Muslim women within the framework of improving women’s workplace. Research by Shaw et al. (2016) on the discrimination faced by young Muslim women in the workplace found that urgent policy intervention is needed across all sectors of the labour market and society to address the barriers young people face, in particular women from Muslim groups, upon entry to the labour market. The report recommended employers provide carefully tar­ geted support to ensure Muslim women are able to achieve their career ambitions in the workplace. Furthermore, such anti-Muslim ideologies and attitudes lead to overt and covert discrimination of Muslims, especially Muslim women, who are visible and identifiable to the public gaze. The significant rupture between income and education level of Muslims, especially Muslim women emphasises sys­ tematic and structural workplace discrimination, from which Muslim women seriously suffer due to their identifiable Muslim status through their hijab (headscarf) (Syed and Pio 2010). By analysing the empirical data collected through interviews conducted with Australian Muslim women, some of whom reported their individual Islamophobia experiences to the Islamophobia

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Register Australia (a platform where individuals report Islamophobic inci­ dents), this chapter analyses Muslim women’s workplace dynamics in the West, particularly in Australia. Workplace discrimination for Muslim women appears as discrimination by employers, customers and colleagues. In addition, working Muslim women are repeatedly faced with Islamophobic harassments in everyday life. Analys­ ing the multiple layers of workplace challenges under the normalising and spreading of Islamophobic culture and arguing their consequences, this chapter contends that Muslim women in the West are disadvantaged, deprived of work opportunities, socio-economic empowerment, professional and social growth and contribution that would benefit not only the individual working women but also the entire society. While analysing the perception and positioning of Muslim women in workplace scenarios in the Western context, this chapter questions Western standards that advocate women’s emancipation, empowerment and positive discrimination, but disadvantage their Muslim counterparts due to the spreading and normalising of an Isla­ mophobia culture.

Women’s education: a broken mobility promise for Muslim women in the West Religion and culture are often perceived as an underlying reason behind women’s lack of participation in the workforce in Muslim populated countries (UNDP 2016, 34). Poynting (2009) found that both first and second genera­ tion Muslim women in Australia tend to be more committed to family and their community and appeared to maintain their own cultural characteristics in which the female labour force participation is usually low. Although it can be argued that other elements (such as economic, geographical, historical factors) are influential in disadvantaging women at work, this will stay beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this chapter will focus on cultural and religious settings disadvantaging Muslim women at work despite the fact that they are deemed to protect and even favour women at work. Although the Saudi Arabian case is frequently addressed to highlight Muslim women’s disempowerment in a heavily conservative religious society, which is called “Saudi piety” (Simons 1998, 282), Muslim women are similarly dis­ advantaged and disempowered in heavily conservative secular Western tradi­ tions, such as French laicism. French laicism forcefully removed the wearing of the hijab in educational settings in 2004 and public sector work settings in 2007, and in so doing deprived hijabi women of education and working rights in the public sector (Mass in Rootham 2015). In a study by Rootham (2015) on Muslim women in the French workforce, it was found that half of the participants despite their university education could not attain any work because of their hijab or were in low paid and undervalued work. Others chose not to wear the hijab in order to try and increase their employability. The research emphasised the irony of the French

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laicism in that all the participants articulated their choice to practise their religion freely, and the decision to observe the hijab was their own, despite the common perception of the hijab being the manifestation of fundamentalist male authority over women. However, the women in the study who chose to submit to their faith through the wearing of the headscarf were strictly dis­ criminated against in the workforce in the French context. Thus, the pene­ tration of conservatism and authoritarianism to control women’s bodies and lives is displayed differently in diverse societies based on the level of religious and secular conservatisms that exists in the East as well as in the West. What has not changed across the borders, cultures and societies is Muslim women’s disempowerment by such conservatism. The French model of disempowering Muslim women renders social mobi­ lity ineffective for educated Muslim women. According to Shaw et al. (2016) discrimination in the workplace has been found to put some groups, in par­ ticular Muslim women, at a disadvantage preventing them from translating educational attainment into labour market returns. Thus, while Muslim women appear to be above the national standards in education in both Aus­ tralia (Hassan 2015) and the UK (Shaw et al. 2016) there appears to be a broken mobility promise for Muslim women in the West.

Statistics on income earnings of Muslims in Australia Riaz Hassan’s (2015) analysis of the 2011 Australian census emphasises that the lower income earnings of Muslim females in particular must be explored in order to better understand the employment patterns of Muslim women and men. In his analysis, the groups with the lowest income are female Muslims born in Australia (an average of $538 per week) followed by female Muslims in general (an average of $597), followed very closely by Muslim migrant females ($621 per week) in comparison to an average of $648 per week for non-Muslim and non-migrant women (Hassan 2015, 53). The lower income for females is associated with being Muslim and migrant (regardless of being first or second generation). Hassan (2015) also argues that the lower income status of Muslim females is largely due to underrepresentation of Muslim women in the workplace, the discrimination they face in career advancement and lack of access to higher paying positions. Further, qualitative research (Stevenson et al. 2017) exploring discrimina­ tion in the labour market has found that discrimination in the workplace means educated Muslim women in particular are not able to achieve what they should in the labour market. Other research (Foroutan 2008) suggests that some Muslim migrant groups participate in the labour market by taking jobs lower than their educational level because their overseas qualifications are not recognised. The research on Muslim women’s lack of workplace suc­ cess, where educational qualifications are not leading to economic success, suggests failure in absorbing Muslim women and their ethno-religious differ­ ence in the workplace.

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Background information on the participants This chapter uses empirical data from semi-structured interviews with Aus­ tralian Muslim women on their perceptions and experiences of Islamopho­ bia. Because the project was a pilot study with a particular focus on Muslim women and Islamophobia, nonprobability sampling (including convenience, snowball and purposive sampling) was used to recruit participants. The participants included those who reported their own Islamophobia experi­ ences to the Islamophobia Register Australia (IRA) along with those who did not approach IRA at all. In addition to IRA’s contact lists, Muslim women from mosque communities and Islamic organisations in Muslim populated suburbs of Sydney were accessed. Facebook and email campaigns also helped reaching out to the broader Muslim community in Sydney. One participant was, however recruited from Adelaide, a city in South Australia. The majority of the participants were wearing headscarves with the excep­ tion of a few wearing niqab (face-veil) and one had stopped wearing a headscarf. Australian Muslim women’s workplace experience was not the main objective of the conducted interviews, except one which was specifi­ cally about workplace discrimination. However, the majority of the women eventually addressed their confrontations in employment and the workplace by referring to Islamophobia. Out of 20 Australian Muslim women, six participants were not taken into consideration because of their voluntary withdrawal from the job market. Five of them had received tertiary education, however refrained from working and applying for jobs. Three of them were niqabi and five of them were quite active as voluntary Islamic scripture teachers either in the mosque or in a school community. Likewise, the other three participants who were working in Islamic workplaces and did not raise any Islamophobia issue in the workplace were not taken into account either. The demographic details of the partici­ pants are provided in Table 8.1.

The experience of Muslim women in the Western workplace Islamophobia is generally addressed as “anti-Muslim racism” (Elahi and Khan 2018). In reporting on these incidents, all cases included are verified as genuine and classifiable as Islamophobic according to Salman Sayyid’s defi­ nition. The definition identifies Islamophobia as a form of racism that includes various forms of violence, violations, discrimination and subordina­ tion that occur across multiple sites in response to the problematisation of Muslim identity (Sayyid 2014). Many of the women in this study articulated that their name or hijab was a hindrance in attaining a position and some even left their field of study to pursue other vocations that are perceived as more diverse. One of the parti­ cipants, Nasrin explains that her daughter, who did very well at university applied for many jobs, however, was never shortlisted for an interview:

Age

Early 30s

Late 20s

50s

25

40s

30s

Late 30s 30s

20s 40s

Late 20s

Name

Bushra

Kim

Nasrin

Mariam

Akila

Amina

Samia Jinan

Jana Farah

Olivia

Anglo-Celtic (converted to Islam)

Lebanese Afghan

Indian Lebanese

Anglo-Celtic (converted to Islam) Lebanese

Lebanese

Half Syrian and half Bosnian Anglo-Celtic (converted to Islam) Lebanese

Ethnicity

Born in Australia Came to Australia in early adulthood and completed ter­ tiary and higher education in Australia Born in Australia

Arrived in Australia in childhood Born in Australia Born in Australia

Born in Australia

Arrived in Australia in childhood Born in Australia

Born in Australia

Born in Australia

Experience of living in Australia

Table 8.1 Demographic details of the study participants

PhD

University student Completed PhD

Tertiary education PhD Student

Tertiary education

Tertiary education

Tertiary education

Tertiary education

Tertiary education

Tertiary education

Education

Medical Researcher

Custom officer (before putting on hijab) High school teacher English teacher at a high school Shop assistant Teacher at TAFE1

Science teacher at a public school Social Sciences teacher at a public school Sales manager in an international company

Fast-food worker

Homemaker

Profession

Married

Single Married

Married Married

Married

Married

Single

Married

Single

Married

Marital status

136

Derya Iner, Amina Baghdadi “She applied for a lot of jobs and she never got not even one interview and she was very distressed, and she kept saying, ‘it is my name, it is my name’… she did very well at uni, she had quite a lot of experience, and not even one interview.” (Nasrin 2018)

Nasrin explains that eventually her daughter left the legal profession and opened her own company, reinforcing the conclusion put forward by Ste­ venson et al. (2017) where it was found that an identifiable Muslim name hinders workplace attainment. Another participant, Bushra who completed a degree in dental technology explains that when she tried to return to the workforce while raising her children, she was deterred based on the advice of her friends and her own observations that it would be a “waste of time” because “if you’re still in hijab, you won’t be employed”. She explains that the only job available to her was in retail which made her feel undervalued and depressed (Bushra 2018). In another example, Jana, a 19-year-old Muslim student explains her experience in trying to find work in retail. She recounts how she was suc­ cessful in gaining a position after a phone interview, however, was instantly discriminated against upon the realisation that she wears a hijab. After meet­ ing with her employer for the first time, within the first minute he brazenly asked: “Do you have to wear that?” After responding that she does, he pro­ ceeded to ask,: “but do you have to wear it?” In another phone interview, Jana was forced to explain her attitudes about modest Muslim clothing. In both instances she was not successful in sustaining the work (Jana 2018). These responses emphasise that women who aim to enter the labour market are disadvantaged because of their identifiable Muslim status. Scott and Franzmann’s (2007) study on veiled women in the workplace found that the discrimination in the workplace began as early as the job interview, and other research (Stevenson et al. 2017 in Elahi and Khan 2018) suggests that the discrimination against Muslim women begins even earlier, at the application process where they are discriminated against because of their identifiable Muslim name. Bushra, the dental technician for example, explains that the only job she felt she could attain was in work “with refugees, or any multi­ cultural organisation” (Bushra 2018). Bushra’s attitude on vocations appears to be a common one amongst Muslim women in the workplace according to studies conducted by McCrudden et al. (in Elahi and Khan 2018). Jinan, a teacher in a state school explains that while she did not feel any angst applying for a job because she works in education where people tend to be “open minded” and “embrace ethnic backgrounds”, she worries about her daughter’s future and the pro­ spects of being discriminated against if she were to observe the hijab and pursue a career in the corporate world: “Different industries accept and dis­ criminate differently. (…) if she wants to pursue something like, I don’t know, business or engineering or STEM [science, technology, engineering and mathematics], I think it’s different” (Jinan 2018).

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Thus, Muslim women appear to be restricted to certain vocations in order to avoid discrimination and gain upward social mobility while still being able to practise their religion freely. Akila is one who pushed such vocational boundaries as a Muslim by choosing to remove her hijab in order to avoid being outwardly identified as a Muslim. She explains her work environment in a big international pharmaceutical firm as follows: “I do have a background in health and one reason where it’s a big deci­ sion for me is although I’m very spiritual in heart, outwardly I’m not very spiritual looking, and the reason, I guess, is probably the fact that there is a lot of Islamophobia, and even in my workplace there is, out of about 550 employees, there is not one person who wears the hijab in our company. (…) and there’s also this hidden element under the table I feel, especially with employment and corporate, and more so in some sectors than the others” (Akila 2017). The fact that Muslim women are being pigeonholed into certain vocations contradicts the image of a supposedly free, diverse labour market that is commonly perpetuated in Western countries.

Multilayered discrimination at the workplace Being a woman is a disadvantage all over the world; however, according to the Global Gender Gap 2018, it is considered to be relatively better in Western countries (Zahidi, Geiger and Crotti 2018). Yet, efforts to close the gender gap in the West always work in favour of secular women from Judeo-Christian and Anglo-Celtic heritage as this is an established norm of Western societies (O’Leary, Groutsis and D’Almada-Remedios 2017, 3). Overcoming workplace discrimination in multicultural societies like Australia is addressed and repor­ ted. Diversity Council Australia (DCA), for instance, not only documents but also reinforces strategies to reduce workplace discrimination. Culturally diverse women are found to experience “double jeopardy” in accessing leadership positions due to their gender and cultural background (Diversity Council Aus­ tralia 2017, 7). These reports confirm racism in the workplace without focusing specifically on Muslim women’s workplace experiences. In fact, under an Isla­ mophobic climate where anti-Muslim hate is heightened and normalised through media and political discourse (Akbarzadeh 2016; Cheng 2017; Iner et al. 2017) and where women bear the brunt of Islamophobia (almost 70% of the victims were women and 80% of the victims were wearing hijab according to Iner’s Islamophobia in Australia Report 2017), Muslim women appear to be the group suffering the most from anti-Muslim hate and discrimination. The participants in this study all expressed that they have felt some level of dis­ crimination at their workplace. The discrimination was both multifaceted and multilayered where their intersectionality of ethnicity, gender and religion resulted in some level of prejudice by colleagues, employers and clients.

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Prejudice by colleagues Many of the participants articulated that they encountered a level of dis­ comfort around their colleagues after a “terrorist attack” where they felt pressured to explain their views and defend Islam and their religious choices. Nasrin who has been working as a teacher for over ten years in a public school explains that after the Sydney Siege, (a terrorist attack in Sydney where a gunman held 18 people hostage in Sydney’s centre) she began to feel a level of discomfort in her staffroom: “…that was quite a difficult time for me actually, you know, going into the staff room especially on the day it happened and as I walked in there would be a lot of talking, and then as soon as I walked in, you know, complete silence. To the extent where one day I said ‘you are free to say whatever you want. I know I will get offended’. I actually took a day off that week because it was quite distressing for me.” (Nasrin 2018) Nasrin’s response emphasises that despite working with her colleagues for a prolonged period, with the advent of terrorist attacks she was made to feel isolated and uncomfortable. Her response also highlights a sense of help­ lessness where she felt the changed behaviour was warranted under the guise of “freedom of speech”; a common guise perpetrated in the media where Islam and Muslims are openly slandered under the pretexts of freedom of speech (Samani 2007). This disempowerment makes Muslim women feel as though they should accept this type of implicit discrimination. However, Nasrin’s response clearly emphasises the extent to which this type of beha­ viour can have an impact; in this instance she withdrew from the workplace as a coping mechanism. In another example, Mariam, a state schoolteacher in the northern suburbs of Sydney details the experience of trying to establish a prayer room to allow students to pray in the holy month of Ramadan. Mariam sought the assistant of her Muslim colleague who was not scarfed to make the proposal as she felt a level of discomfort speaking directly to the principal, who had been dis­ missive towards her in past dealings. The permission to establish the prayer room was granted, however she was not permitted to supervise the students and was sternly reminded by the principal that she was not to “lead any prayers or give any sermons”. “I wasn’t allowed to be present while they were praying, but there was a Christian group that ran every Friday and the leader of that Christian group was a teacher himself. So, he was doing Bible studies… he was like, literally preaching Christianity which was totally fine, but me, all I wanted was a room to pray, and it was like ‘no, no, no’, like ‘you’re going to preach terrorism...’ and I don’t know what.” (Mariam 2018)

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Mariam expressed her irritation at this reprimand because, while she was not allowed to be present during the prayer times, a Christian group that was led by one of her colleagues was permitted. The double standards imposed on Muslims in this example emphasise the direct form of racism Muslim women are subjected to when they express their religiosity, and employers’ lack of understanding of Islam where, in this instance, Mariam is stereotyped as a terrorist preacher, a common behaviour characteristic attributed by some employers according to a study by Syed and Pio (2010). On another level, Muslim women’s intersectionality of gender, race and religion affects their performance at work where they need to exert more effort than non-Muslim women in order to survive a sexist, discriminatory labour market (Murray and Ali 2017). According to Aziz (2015) the inter­ section of gender, religion and ethnicity affects Muslim women’s identity performance as there is increased pressure to negotiate between the three parts of their identity in order to succeed within the workplace. Aziz (2015) describes this pressure as a form of discrimination coined “coerce assimila­ tion” where Muslim women are in a triple bind at the intersection of gender, religion, and race/ethnicity. Identity performance of Muslim women in the workplace according to Aziz (2015) is ill-fated regardless of whether they choose to accommodate or refuse to accommodate the majority group, because the stereotypes that shape what is expected of them by the majority group contradict each other. Muslim women who abide by their Islamic beliefs are perceived as passive, oppressed, meek and subjugated, as exem­ plified in the French context. Those who attempt to dispel those stereotypes and assert themselves as critical thinkers, strong and capable of leading may trigger stereotypes held by co-workers that Muslims are aggressive, prone to violence, untrustworthy, and disloyal outsiders. Some of the women in this study articulated the type of pressure they feel within the workplace to negotiate between the three aspects of their identities. Mariam, the state schoolteacher explains her futile efforts in developing a sense of belonging to her workplace and colleagues. She shares: “My strategies are to just be really nice all the time, which I don’t think works because you could be the nicest person, you could be the most helpful person, work the hardest, because that’s what I used to do, I’d work really, really hard and try to show people like ‘I’m just like you. I wear a scarf, but I’m just like you’. (…) but no matter how hard you try, they still look at you as different.” (Mariam 2018) Mariam clearly feels isolated and dejected in her workplace, where despite her actions of projecting a positive image of herself and working to the best of her ability, she feels as though she is still being perceived negatively by her col­ leagues and does not feel a sense of belonging, emphasising the negative psychological affects “coerce assimilation” can have on Muslim women. She continues to explain that she was aware that she was treated differently in her

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workplace and was held back in being professionally developed. She describes the situation to be a part of leadership opportunities as follows: “… whenever I’d apply for certain things like becoming a year advisor (…) I was given really weird excuses, like, ‘you are not experienced enough to do that’ even though there were other teachers who were at the same level as me but were given similar opportunities… When I asked to be a part of (leadership committees such as literacy) they told me I was not experienced enough, (despite) a teacher who has less experience than me being allowed to be part of that group.” (Mariam, 2018) For others in the study, the pressure to “assimilate” into their workplace manifested into making adjustments to their religious identity in order to integrate into their work culture. Jinan, an experienced, mature age sec­ ondary teacher made adjustments to integrate into the work culture by taking off her abaya (a traditional Islamic full-length outer garment), shortening her hijab and wearing colourful and Western clothes after starting to work. Despite finding the abaya “beautiful” to wear, Jinan felt compelled to give it up because she does not “want them to prejudge” her (Jinan, 2018). Consequently, she has a dual wardrobe for her professional and personal life. For others such as Akila, the pharmaceutical employer, the only way to enter the labour market was by taking off her hijab and hide her Muslim identity: “At the time of the Twin Tower attack in New York I was actually wearing a scarf, I was transitioning from internship to the workforce and I could not get a job with the scarf. So, I started going to all these inter­ views and not getting them and I was dux in Sydney [University], I was like, ‘What’s going on?’ (…) I really struggled finding work and then when I went to my first interview without a scarf, I got the job.” (Akila 2017) Although Akila initially only wore her scarf outside of work hours and removed it while she was at work, she could not manage this “dual identity” and indeed “hated” it and eventually decided to give up wearing the hijab permanently (Akila 2017). Initially, Akila did not mind expressing to her colleagues that she is Muslim. However, realising that even a little human error can be associated with her religion, she decided to hide her religious identity at work. “I had a bad experience when I was fasting, and I made a mistake in the chemist, it’s human error, everyone could have … I didn’t kill anyone, but it was just something like one of the medicines went in another bag, but they were the same family, and they were like, ‘Oh, because you’re

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fasting,’ and from that day on, anything negative they put onto the reli­ gion and it’s not fair. ‘Oh, you’re fasting. Glucose not going to your brain, and of course, you’re not drinking water.’ (…) So, I stopped telling people I was fasting, and I still do. And there’s a few Muslims at our work, we’re all undercover. When I say undercover, there’s a prayer room, we all discretely go and pray, but you’re not seen to be as part of that elite in-group because you don’t go out to drinks with them.” (Akila 2017) Despite trying to avoid the “dual identity” by taking off her scarf per­ manently, Akila is constantly confronted by the workplace culture supres­ sing her own way of life and daily choices. Eventually although Akila did enter and survive in the professional world for more than ten years, she does not foresee a promotion in her career due to not assimilating into the secular work culture. In fact, Akila has “got a background in pharmacy, pharma­ cology, a double-degree from Sydney University, very sort of medical and science orientated and, is more of a quantitative researcher” and her role at the firm is to manage the interactions between the outsourced medical information team, versus the internal team and the global medical infor­ mation body overseas. Other Muslim women in this study linked their inability to socialise with colleagues as a contributing factor to being disadvantaged in the workplace. Nasrin explains that the primary reason her daughter left the legal profession was due to her inability to socialise in the dominant culture’s own terms: “She was just pressured to do things she didn’t want to do. She never did them, but she felt that continuous pressure, you know, why don’t we go to the pub? Why don’t you have a drink? The culture… she didn’t like at all, so she quit being a lawyer.” (Nasrin 2018) In the study by Scott and Franzmann (2007), 50 Australian Muslim female graduates were interviewed about their working conditions and those who wore a hijab and worked in the “business or corporate world” faced dis­ crimination because they refused to partake in social gatherings that are considered “un-Islamic” such as being present at a gathering where alcohol is present. These women argued that this type of socialising was considered an important part of career advancement and their refusal to attend such func­ tions labelled them as being anxious to socialise, network and be a part of the workplace culture. Such areas must be further explored to better understand the employment patterns of Muslim women in the West. Customers and outside agents (i.e. general public) The most confronting type of discrimination at the workplace was the one some Muslim women have endured from customers as a result of hateful behaviour, which has caused them to withdraw from the labour market for

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a period of time. One of the participants, Kim, a fast food worker, who is an Australian convert to Islam and new to the hijab was humiliated by an elderly white male customer while working at an international fast food chain. The conversation with the customer begins by the customer asking her if she is Muslim. Kim responds in the affirmative and the following interaction takes place: “… he looked at me dead-on and said, ‘Are you circumcised?’ And, I was really taken aback at that because no one had ever asked me that before, and because it’s such a rude thing to ask and I said, ‘No. I haven’t been’ and he said, ‘Well, you will be’. And, I said, ‘No, I won’t’. And, he said, ‘Yes, you will. Mark my words, you will be’. And, I said, ‘Please don’t assume to know things about my religion. You don’t know what you’re talking about.’ (Kim 2018) When the customer “backed off,” the manager asked the target if she needed “a moment to compose” herself and advised her to call the manager next time. However, when the customer came back a few minutes later, the man­ ager served him with a smile on her face. This led Kim to feel unsupported because she expected that such an offensive exchange would warrant the cus­ tomer to be asked to leave the store, however, he was not. Furthermore, when the same customer came back after a short time, Kim withdrew from the front desk and realised how her supervisor was serving the customer with a smile on her face as if nothing had happened. This disheartened Kim further. The incident emphasises that such harassment is at times tolerated by employers under the pretext of “customer satisfaction”. However, the com­ plicity of tolerating racist comments and harassment makes Muslim women feel disempowered and unsupported. In another example, Olivia, a researcher in medicine explains how an inci­ dent where a man harassed her at her local supermarket by calling out racial slurs, and a barrage of anti-Islamic insults inadvertently affected her at the workplace. At the time, Olivia was heavily pregnant and had her (pre-school aged) daughter with her. The perpetrator ran over towards her and continuously yelled at her. He then proceeded to follow her in his car until she eventually drove into a police station. This however, did not deter him and he followed her into the parking of the local police station. Olivia recounts the incident with intense emotion explaining she felt “stressed”, “frightened”, “shaken up” and her “heart beating very fast”. She also describes the sheer disbelief that someone like her, a “moderate” looking Muslim woman was being attacked: “I was wearing jeans and a blouse, a white shirt or something and a colourful scarf. I was not wearing a niqab or wearing black clothing or something that is very foreign looking” (Olivia 2018). Although the event took place outside of the workplace, Olivia explains how the incident affected her at work:

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“I’m okay now… I have to travel a lot overseas on my own for work, so I’ve been forced to (be okay)… but for a long time, yeah, it was super stressful and the moment you hear someone, like a loud voice, or you know that they’re swearing you just – it makes your heart pump. It makes you start to sweat; you go through anxiety because you’re wondering instantly in a moment ‘Is it me that they’re yelling at?’” (Olivia 2018) The incidents emphasise that Islamophobia affects Muslim women in the West on multiple levels where they face more difficulties and challenges than other marginalised groups in public settings and this has had adverse effects on their ability to participate in society as a whole and hence in the work­ place. Research has found that Islamophobia has created an inherent dis­ advantage for some Muslim women where they are withdrawing from public spaces including the workforce in order to decrease their sense of vulnerability and as a result, common sensations cited by veiled Muslim women were those of panic attacks, worry, extreme anxiety and depression, where the potential experience and fear of anti-Muslim hate crime “forced” some women in the study to withdraw from wider social participation and limit vocational pur­ suits, their mode of transport, and even their access to educational opportu­ nities (Iner, Zayied and Vergani 2017; Awan and Zempi 2018). Thus, Islamophobia has been proven to affect Muslim women in both covert and overt contexts where for some there appear to be invisible barriers that hinder workplace opportunity and for others, covert attacks outside of the workplace have made Muslim women anxious about participating in society. In both instances, there is a clear link between women’s lack of participation, survival and achievement in the workplace and Islamophobia.

Concluding remarks This chapter has demonstrated the ways the systematic disempowering of Muslim women in the West has negatively affected Muslim women’s partici­ pation in the workplace. This systematic disempowering of women due to the conservative Western culture and anti-Muslim attitude appears to be ignored by Western governments where there is a lack of policy created to reduce or counter anti-Muslim discrimination in the workplace, despite Western gov­ ernments being committed to continually improving the participation and achievement of women in the labour market. Further, Muslim women’s workplace achievement in the West appears to be heavily ethno-centric, which simplifies the problem where minority communities’ differing religions and cultures are perceived to be the reason for the underrepresentation. Even­ tually, addressing culture and religion as being the underlying reason for Muslim women’s lack of participation in the Western workforce ignores the deep-rooted cultural, historical, ideological discriminatory practices that have marginalised Muslim women into certain vocations, impeded career aspira­ tions and increased pressure on Muslim women to survive in a secular, sexist

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labour market. Finally, the intersectionality of Muslim women’s identity has not only worked to disempower women in so called liberal Western societies but has had negative effects on Muslim women’s economic, social and phy­ siological wellbeing.

Note 1 TAFE stands for Technical and Further Education. TAFEs are vocational educa­ tion and training providers in Australia.

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O’Leary, Jane, Dimitria Groutsis and Rose D’Almada-Remedios. 2017. Cracking the Glass-Cultural Ceiling: Future Proofing Your Business in the 21st Century. Sydney, NSW: Diversity Council of Australia. https://www.dca.org.au/sites/default/files/ synopsis_-_cracking_the_glass-cultural_ceiling_available_to_public.pdf Poynting, Scott. 2009. The ‘Lost’ Girls: Muslim Young Women in Australia. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 30(4). 373–386 Rootham, Esther. 2015. Embodying Islam and Laïcité: Young French Muslim Women at Work. Gender, Place and Culture, 22(7): 971–986. doi:10.1080/0966369X.2014.939150 Samani, Shamim. 2007. Rhetoric and Realities of Multiculturalism: The Perpetuation of Negative Constructions of Muslims in Australia. The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations, 2(7): 113–119 Sayyid, Salman. 2014. A Measure of Islamophobia. Islamophobia Studies Journal, 2 (1): 10–25 Scott, Gai Christien and Majella Franzmann. 2007. Religious Identity and ‘Secular’ Employment: A Case Study of Young Muslim Women Graduates in the Sydney Workforce. Contemporary Islam, 1(3): 275–288. doi:10.1007/s11562–11007–0026–0027 Simons, Geoff. 1998. Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. London, UK: Springer Shaw, Bart, Loic Menzies, Eleanor Bernardes, Sam Baars, Philip Nye and Rebecca Allen. 2016. Ethnicity, Gender and Social Mobility December 2016. London, UK: Social Mobi­ lity Commission. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up loads/attachment_data/file/579988/Ethnicity_gender_and_social_mobility.pdf Stevenson, Jacqueline, Sean Demack, Bernie Stiell, Muna Abdi, Lisa Clarkson, Farhana Ghaffar and Shaima Hassan. 2017. The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims September 2017. London, UK: Social Mobility Commission. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642 220/Young_Muslims_SMC.pdf Syed, Jawad and Esther Pio. 2010. Veiled Diversity? Workplace Experiences of Muslim Women in Australia. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(1): 115–137. doi:1007/s10490–10009–9168-x UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2016. Arab Human Development Report. Youth and Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality. Pub­ lished for the United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/2699/ahdr2016en.pdf Zahidi, Saadia, Thierry Geiger and Robert Crotti. 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report. Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/ docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf

9

Being a Muslim working woman Experiences of Australian women of Pakistan origin Samina Yasmeen

Muslim women and labour force participation Muslim women account for half of the world’s 1.9 billion Muslim popula­ tion but lag behind other women in their participation in the labour force (Murphy 2016). This could partly be explained in terms of their access to education which is not always equitable vis-à-vis male Muslims. The lit­ erature however suggests that other barriers and obstacles also prevent women from operating in the marketplace (Youssef 1971; Read 2002; Haghighat-Sordellini, 2009; H’Madoun 2010). In the religious realm, the main challenge relates to the perceived notions of women’s roles in life. They are assumed to be the nurturers, who are not to take on the burden of earning a living for the family and whose roles are defined with respect to the family sphere. As mothers, daughters, wives and sisters, they are expected to operationalise their agency within the boundaries of the home. These positions/interpretations of religiously prescribed roles are defended with respect to Qur’anic verses and interpretations of ahadith1 that limit women’s operability to the family sphere. Culture also intersects with these views on women’s operation in the workplace; as in other religious tradi­ tions, different cultures draw upon notions of womanhood to insist that women restrict themselves to the family sphere (Haghighat-Sordellini 2009). Though by no means peculiar to those following Islam, these atti­ tudes have limited the extent to which Muslim women have been able to operate in the labour force. The trend, it is important to note, has not been static; data reveals that the number of Muslim women in the workforce in different countries has gradually increased. This growth has coincided with the relative increase in women’s levels of education, as well as the policies adopted by various states consciously encouraging female participation in the labour force (Murphy 2016). Despite the narrowing gap between female and male participation in the workforce, women continue to face challenges in Muslim-majority states. Cultural norms often work against women taking up jobs; with their familylife demands including child-rearing and nurturing members of the extended

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families, they face obstacles in the way of entering the labour market. Research on the Gulf countries, for example, showed that “one in three young Arab women between the ages of 23 and 29 participate in their country’s labour force versus about eight in 10 young Arab men” (Crabtree 2012, para 1). As shown in Table 9.1, the World Economic Forum ranks Muslimmajority countries among the lowest in terms of female labour force participation.2 Due to the limited job opportunities in the country and the possibility to reduce poverty, including through remittances, the Government of Pakistan has maintained explicit policies throughout the years of encouraging Pakis­ tanis to seek employment outside the country (United Nations n.d.). This, combined with people searching for better economic opportunities for them­ selves, has contributed to large numbers of Muslim Pakistani men and women working abroad as temporary workers or settling permanently as migrants. The experiences of Muslim migrant women however, differ from those of their male counterparts as most of them migrate as part of or are accom­ panied by their family units. Table 9.1 Women’s access to education and labour force participation in selected Muslim countries Global index

Labour force participation

Educational attainment

Country

Rank

Score (0–1)

Rank

Score (0–1)

Rank

Score (0–1)

Bangladesh Indonesia Malaysia Maldives Tunisia United Arab Emirates Qatar Turkey Egypt Jordan Oman Saudi Arabia Iran Syria Pakistan

48 85 101 113 119 121

0.721 0.691 0.676 0.662 0.648 0.642

135 118 103 127 137 134

0.425 0.632 0.679 0.528 0.354 0.448

116 107 1 27 108 95

0.95 0.967 1 1 0.966 0.979

127 130 135 138 139 141

0.629 0.628 0.614 0.605 0.605 0.59

120 133 141 147 136 143

0.623 0.466 0.31 0.222 0.358 0.287

62 106 99 45 83 93

0.995 0.968 0.975 0.998 0.99 0.982

142 146 148

0.589 0.568 0.55

145 148 142

0.238 0.173 0.307

103 113 139

0.969 0.955 0.81

Source: World Economic Forum 2018; United Nations n.d.

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Muslim women migrating to the West Global migration as a phenomenon involves more than the mere movement of individuals across national and state boundaries. It is closely intertwined with the transfer of cultural, religious and ethnic notions of identities includ­ ing a focus on gender related norms and expectations. While a mutation of these norms and ideas occurs over a period of time, the socialisations within the “home countries” continue to shape the experiences of migrants in their adopted places. Such influences often reflect themselves in the lived experi­ ences of migrant women and can be pronounced when combined with the influence of religion and its perceptions at global and local levels in the countries of relocation. Migration out of the Muslim-majority states to the West does not neces­ sarily reduce the scope of challenges faced by women practising Islam. Muslim women face the challenge of adjusting to a new environment, cul­ tural norms, traditions and legal regimes that impact on their participation in the labour force. These challenges are linked to the dual identities of women at play: the work identity and the home identity (Bhavnani 1994 cited in Burki 2018, 40). The challenges faced by Muslim women have become pronounced since the terrorist attacks on the United States of America in September 2001. Identified as the “other”, Muslim women who subscribe to traditional dress codes face the impact of Islamophobia that affects their participation in the economic, social and political spheres. They are more likely to be “othered” and their access to employment or career opportunities stifled (Ghumman and Ryan 2013). For example, research shows that some Muslim women do not opt for careers where health and safety regulations oblige them to expose their arms or not to wear headscarves (Malik et al. 2019). Such challenges have been noted for even highly educated women, for instance, in the United States of America Muslim women who occupy managerial positions have experienced stereotyping in the workplace, often based on the lack of knowledge about their respective cultures, religion, and/or race by co-workers and supervisors (Burki 2018, 33–40). This type of discrimination negatively “affects personal well-being, contributes to lower self-esteem, and to increased stress, anxiety, and depression” and “individuals who have been discriminated against are likely to have low organisational commitment, poor job performance and high turnover rates” (Ghumman and Ryan 2013, 689).

Women in Pakistan and Pakistani diaspora With regard to labour force participation, Pakistan follows the broad trend visible in Muslim-majority states. Women account for 49.18 per cent of the total population of 216.56 million people (World Population Review 2019 and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2019), but they are underrepresented in the labour force. Their participation as a share of the country’s total workforce

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has remained limited. The trend has gradually been shifting with the female labour force participation (FLFP) rising from 16.1 per cent in 2000, to 21.7 per cent in 2010 and 25 per cent in 2016 (United Nations Development Programme 2018). Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 9.1, Pakistan ranks below a number of other Muslim states. A complex interplay of social, cul­ tural, religious, economic and institutional factors contributes to this lack of access to jobs by women. Although women are often contributing to the informal sector, their participation in formal employment is prevented by their identification as nurturers whose primary responsibility remains limited within the family sphere. This role identification is justified with reference to restrictive interpretations of religious injunctions, as well as cultural norms that argue against women’s participation in the public space, including its economic dimensions. Such views limit female access to educational oppor­ tunities from an early age that further undermine their chances of employ­ ment later in life. Sadly, as evident in the case of “doctor brides”, education also becomes a pathway to being suitably married in the appropriate social and income group. Pakistani girls study medicine but do not necessarily practise the profession and instead remain homemakers, thus perpetuating patriarchal structures (Masood 2019). Even when educational opportunities are available and women are able to participate in the labour force, their options are circumscribed by cultural understandings of occupations that are safe and respectable. Their participation is shaped by the economic status of the women and their families: while low- and high-income households see women working, middle-income households have the lowest participation rate at just 13 per cent (Majid 2019). Lack of mobility also constrains women’s participation in the labour force, as does the perception of the lack of safety in the public space (Amir et al. 2018). By limiting female participation in the labour force, these barriers significantly undermine productivity and economic development in Pakistan. Workplace cultures also pose major obstacles to women’s participation in the labour force in Pakistan. Though previously a taboo subject in the coun­ try, it is increasingly being recognised that women experience sexual harass­ ment at workplaces that can range from sexually suggestive gazes to sexual bribes or threats. The incidence is not limited to certain kinds of occupations, and exists across public and private organisations, academia and even the Parliament where female representatives are exposed to suggestive remarks (Sethna, Masood and Jahangir, 2018; and Stop Harassment Now n.d.3). Women also experience discrimination and are often underpaid compared to their male colleagues. Nor are they aware of their rights in the workplace, including accessing maternity leave sanctioned under the law of the country (Amir et al. 2018). However, it is important to note that the trend has been gradually changing with FLFP increasing in Pakistan from 13.3 per cent in 1992 to a quarter of the female population in 2016 (Amir et al. 2018; United Nations Development Programme 2018). Relatively more women are employed in service industries,

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academia and public and private organisations. The Pakistan Government has been actively supporting women’s employment across all sections. This has occurred with reference to the Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015. Pakistan was the first coun­ try to formally adopt the SDGs with its Parliament’s approval. The Govern­ ment has also initiated programs and established vertical and horizontal institutional structures to achieve these goals. Particularly focusing on women’s empowerment, the Pakistan Government has initiated the 12th Five Year Plan (2018–2023) which aims to increase FLFP by 10 per cent. The Gender Equality & Women Empowerment Policy (2019–2023) is designed “to create a conducive environment for women in society and the workplace, strive towards gender inclusivity in the labour force, support girls’ education, and facilitate equitable economic opportunities for women” (Government of Pakistan 2019b). That these initiatives were included in the SDGs Voluntary National Report submitted by the Pakistan Government in June 2019 indi­ cates its willingness to alter the space in which women can contribute to productivity and the economy. However, until the efforts translate into viable positive outcomes that demonstrate women’s increased participation in the labour force, the fact remains that Pakistan ranks 133 on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) (United Nations Development Programme 2018). Pakistan ranks sixth globally as the source of diaspora overseas. Currently estimated to be 8.8 million, more than half of this population (4.7 million) lives in the Gulf countries, whereas the United Kingdom hosts 1.2 million people of Pakistani origin (Government of Pakistan 2019a, 50). Pakistani diasporic women living in the UK and other Western liberal societies face somewhat similar barriers to their participation in the labour force. The assumptions underpinning women’s role being restricted to the family often prevent them from seeking employment in the public sphere. This is particu­ larly the case for women who migrated in the 1960s and early 1970s. While still bound by notions of gender-specific roles, some of them participated in family-run businesses mostly in the background with their men dealing with the public aspects of the work. More recent immigrants, and second-generation women of Pakistani back­ ground, however, tend to be more willing and able to access employment in the public space. However, they also tend to face constraints due to the pre­ vailing perceptual environment that “others” them due to their ethnic identity or as Muslims. This sometimes reinforces their personal dispositional reluc­ tance to enter the job market. The problem is compounded by the fact that, as in case of other migrant women, those from Pakistani background end up shouldering the dual responsibilities of working in the public and private space. It is, nevertheless, important to note that differentiation in experiences among these, as well as other migrant women, cannot be discounted; their educational, economic, and family circumstances do contribute to different outcomes for women.

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Pakistani migrant women in Australia Immigration into Australia from areas that constitute today’s Pakistan started in the mid-19th century when cameleers from British India arrived in this continent. Though often identified as Afghan cameleers, they mostly origi­ nated from Balochistan and the Punjab. Their numbers remained relatively small and increased in the early 1970s with the end of the White Australia immigration policy. Arriving predominantly as professionals, they went against the wave of Pakistani emigration that was directed towards Britain, Europe, and the United States. Since the turn of the new millennium, Australia has attracted more attention among Pakistanis who seek to settle overseas. This has been caused by a combination of growing regional instability, increased militancy in Pakistan and the perceived negativity towards Muslims in the United States of America. There has been, therefore, a sudden increase in the number of immigrants from Pakistan during the 2006–2016 period. The 2016 Australian Census places the total number of immigrants from Paki­ stan at 61,913. Most of them live in the eastern states in the cities of Mel­ bourne, Sydney and Brisbane. Migrants also follow employment opportunities. In 2014 alone during the mining boom in Western Australia, 647 Pakistani born people arrived in this state (Office of Multicultural Interests, Western Australia n.d.).4 Though not all Pakistani immigrants in Australia and, by extension in Western Australia, are Muslims, a sizeable majority identifies itself as adhering to Islam. Women have been a significant part of the history of immigration from areas that are part of Pakistan. They constitute approximately 40 per cent of the 84,340 of the Pakistani-Australian population (ABS 2016). This is a far cry from the early settlement of “Afghan cameleers” when only a handful of women from the Pakistani parts of British India arrived in Australia. The patriarchal norms prevalent among these cameleers and early settlers some­ times resulted in misunderstandings about the treatment of these women. In Western Australia, for instance, the head of the Bux family was ordered by a judge to ensure that females in his family were brought out of home, even if at night (Bux 2007). Since then, the changing cultural milieu in Australia has altered the context in which Pakistani (and other) immigrant women live their lives. However, the underlying dynamics of migration have not changed; as is the case among other immigrants, Pakistani men generally make the decision to immigrate with women accompanying them. Western Australia fits within the overall pattern of immigration: the 2016 Census places the total number of Pakistani immigrants living in the state at 5,441. Men outnumber women: 3,323 men as opposed to 2,118 women from Pakistani background were reported to be living in Western Australia in 2016. A large proportion of these immigrants (4,463 or 85.3%) are Muslims, with Christianity being identified as the second most common religious affiliation (0.2%) of Pakistani migrants in Western Australia. Those between 25 and 34

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years of age form the largest cohort in this group of Pakistanis accounting for 38.5% of the total population of Pakistani origin. They have a good com­ mand of the English language with 91% of them reporting that they speak English well or very well. The data also shows that 43 per cent of the 2,118 women born in Pakistan have completed bachelor’s degrees, graduate diploma and postgraduate degrees (Office of Multicultural Interests, Western Australia n.d.). As shown in Table 9.2, a difference exists between female and male parti­ cipation in the labour force. As compared to 1,308 males employed, only 204 women are fully employed. The proportion of women who are not in the labour force is more than twice (68 per cent) that of men (31 per cent). Given the constraints experienced by Pakistani Muslim women in their home country, the question arises as to what extent they are replicated in Australia and how they impact on the Australian labour force participation. The answer to this question is proffered with reference to Pakistani diasporic women living in the state of Western Australia.

Experiences of Pakistani migrant women in Western Australian In order to assess the relative similarity or difference between women in Pakistan and migrant women of Pakistani background in Western Aus­ tralia in 2019, we sought views of a group of 14 women of Pakistani background on the interplay between their religion, culture and ethnicity on the one hand and their participation in the labour force on the other.5 They were to share their experiences of gaining employment, and the advantages and challenges experienced by them as a result of being in the

Table 9.2 Labour force participation by gender in Western Australia (2016): Pakistani men and women

Employed full time Not in the labour force Employed part time Unemployed and looking for full time work Unemployed and looking for part time work Employed – hours of work not stated Employed – away from work Labour force status not stated

Women

Men

Total

204 1035 251 73

1308 469 734 142

1512 1504 985 215

91

114

205

17

59

76

17 14

39 26

56 40

Source: Search Diversity WA. https://www.omi.wa.gov.au/StatsInfoGuides/Pages/Search-Diversi ty-WA.aspx

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labour force. Given demands on their time, these women were presented the option to either participate in face-to-face and on-line interviews or share their views in writing. The demographic data of the interviewees is presented in Table 9.3. The responses from the women are analysed with reference to a set of “construct of deterrent into” theories of participation in adult education identified by P. K. Cross (1981), and Darkenwald and Merriam (1982) in two different studies. Cross (1981) highlighted three different categories of deter­ rents that prevented adults from accessing education: situational, dispositional and institutional. In their research, Darkenwald and Merriam identified dis­ positional as psychological barriers and added informational barriers to the list (Darkenwald and Merriam 1982). Together they draw attention to the fact that situational barriers, including financial constraints, family responsibilities and assessment of the best use of available resources could act as a constraint to women furthering their education. The psychological, or dispositional,

Table 9.3 Demographic data of respondents, Western Australia, 2019 Number of respondents

Age 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59

years years years years years years years years

Entered labour force

Number of respondents

2 1 5 1 1 2 1 1

Before 2000 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2014 2015–2019 Not stated Total Occupation

1 3 3 3 3 1 14

Total Years since arrival in Australia Less than 5 years 5–9 years 10–14 years 15–19 years 20 years plus Total Educational qualifications

14

IT specialist Public health

2 1

1 1 1 4 7 14

Doctor Accountant Pharmacist Statistician Lawyer Education Sales worker

3 1 1 1 1 2 1

Bachelors and above

13

1

Year 12 Total

1 14

Administrative worker Total

14

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barriers include “beliefs, values, attitudes and perceptions that inhibited par­ ticipation in organised learning” (Muhamad and Ahmad 2009,339). Institu­ tional barriers refer to the way in which institutions create an environment that enables individuals to participate positively in learning activities. Infor­ mational barriers include lack of awareness of what (educational) opportu­ nities are available (Muhamad and Ahmad 2009, 339). For the purpose of analysis in this study, these categories are used not just as deterrents but also as spaces that may boost women’s participation and experiences in the labour force. The analysis also is premised on an under­ standing that these categories do not exist independently of each other but have complex and inter-related linkages. Though not identified by Cross (1981), or Darkenwald and Merriam (1982), the institutional dimension includes the workplace culture that may promote a sense of inclusion or exclusion. This, in turn, may be shaped by prevailing ideas and attitudes about gender, ethnic and religious diversity. Together, they may promote or inhibit women’s participation in the workforce. A woman, for example, may be enthusiastic and confident in her ability to participate in the workforce but could be prevented from doing so due to the situational barriers such as the responsibility of rearing children. In another case, she may be confident and able to find solutions to situational demands on her time and energy, but external biases related to her ethnicity or identity could hinder her participa­ tion in the labour force. Alternatively, a concerted effort on behalf of the institutions to engage women of culturally and linguistically different back­ grounds, with appropriate childcare facilities, could enable some women to go beyond their comfort zone and secure employment. Employing this modified use of the variables identified by Cross (1981), and Darkenwald and Merriam (1982), it can be argued that the situational context in which the respondents participated in the labour force in Western Australia was essentially positive.6 None of the women who participated in this research reported lack of partner support. On the contrary, their partners were most supportive of them seeking employment. They also did not identify family commitments, particularly child rearing responsibilities, as a barrier to their workforce participation. This does not mean that they did not face challenges while combining labour force participation with motherhood. As reported in previous research (Bhavnani 1994 cited in Burki 2018, 40) on employed Pakistani women in Pakistan and overseas, some of them also had to face extra pressure of combining family commitments with job requirements. The dual responsibilities in Australia were aptly summarised by one respondent who stated that she “really struggled with long hours of work, exams and kids school pick [ups] and drops, and before and after school care”. The burden of dual responsibilities meant that she had to ask her “mother a few times to come and look after the kids” (Respondent aged 45–49 years). The responses reflected women’s agency in addressing their situational con­ text: when faced with additional responsibilities, they opted for actions that

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enabled them to remain in the workforce. Only one respondent reported that she had been teaching until she gave birth to her children. She opted for taking time out from employment but then returned to her teaching profes­ sion. Others found solutions to dealing with additional pressures of combin­ ing work with family responsibilities. One woman reported sharing household responsibilities with her husband. Another indicated that she had recalibrated her expectations with respect to household chores and socialisation. In her words: “Really don’t care if my house is not clean or can’t socialise. I prefer my career and family time [that are the] most important things in life” (Respondent aged 45–49 years). The psychological (dispositional) milieu in which the respondents operated also reflected women’s agency. None of the women reflected “low self-con­ cept” that could prevent them from engaging in the labour market. There appeared, however, a slight difference in the sense of “self-confidence” among them: those who migrated to Australia after receiving education in Pakistan indicated that they had gained more confidence in the course of their employment. This suggests that they felt somewhat less confident at the start of their labour force participation in Australia – something acknowl­ edged by one respondent who narrated her initial concerns regarding seek­ ing employment in Perth, Western Australia’s capital city. Others felt during the early years of their arrival in Australia that the cultural norms were different, including “a different sense of humour” in the wider community. These concerns, even if present, did not prevent the respondents from updating their job skills or acquiring new knowledge that could facilitate their entry into the labour force. The women who arrived in Australia at a younger age and were educated in this country demonstrated a slightly different sense of self-perception: they reflected greater self-confidence and resilience to engage in the labour market and explore different job options over time. Natalie, who arrived with her parents in Australia in 2004 and studied at a local university, accessed the job market while still studying. She worked part-time as a research assistant at a university, at a local supermarket, and then as a consultant overseas. Upon returning to Perth, she joined public sector employment. Sarah, who came to Australia as a young girl and was educated in a local private school and then enrolled in a Western Australian university, also reflected greater confidence and ability to navigate herself through the labour market. She worked as an intern in a company, followed by an international company and then opted for job as a sales worker. These moves, she commented, were easier for her because she had “a natural flair for it”. Then she commented: “I’ve noticed… even with friends…, sometimes it can also depend what generation [you are from]: if you are from an immigrant family, what generation you are and how long you’ve been here, how well you can sort of assimilate with people. The longer you’ve been here, the easier it is for you to assimilate with, into the culture. So even little things like… I’ve

156

Samina Yasmeen got an Australian accent. Sorry, that in itself just does automatically make it easier for me too… Compared to other people or my parents, it just makes it easier for me to… flow into a situation.” (Respondent aged 30–34 years)

These expressions of self-confidence and a capacity to acquire skills necessary for employment occurred alongside a sense of isolation, and perception of racism, and biases against Muslims and Pakistanis in the wider community. One respondent who had lived in Australia for over 20 years shared this per­ ception with reference to her personal and family experiences. She recounted being called “Iraqi” and “curry-muncha” during the first Gulf War (1990–91), and having her accent mocked. She maintained that her sister’s school also reflected such views. In her words: “Within the community, I find that people are more willing to accept Pakistanis and Muslims if they are small in number. Once the number grows, people become fearful, which leads to subtle and not-so-subtle racism. When I was a teenager, for example, my sister’s school was at half capacity, and the Muslim primary school wanted to use the remaining empty classrooms for their students. A meeting was called, where people adamantly said ‘no’. These were people who knew us very well. Several parents said they would withdraw their children from the school if that happened. My parents were told that one was okay (my sister), but not any more. This was said by people who had eaten at our home, and whose children were often over to play. They returned home extremely distressed. Another example is when A Current Affair approached the Muslim community and asked for someone to appear on the program to respond to an issue. My mother and her friends suggested several wellknown and informed people, but Channel Nine rejected them, and ASKED for someone with strong radical views.” (Respondent aged 40– 44 years) She stated that such views had not disappeared from the wider community. Her son was not called names but was told to say “stay back, I’m black”. “This is as a joke”, she said, “but jokes are still words which carry weight. He has also been told by other kids that he could not possibly have been born in Australia as his skin is darker than his brother’s. He has come to me crying, and I have shown him his birth certificate, but he still did not believe me.” Studies on the impact of Islamophobia and racism suggest that there is an influence on individuals’ access to employment and their workplace experi­ ence (Ghumman and Ryan 2013; Malik et al. 2019). The responses by the Pakistani Muslim women in Western Australia, however, presented a mixed picture. Some women were of the view that racism and/or Islamophobia had impacted on their experiences at their respective workplaces. Sarah’s case was

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interesting in this respect: she worked for a UK-based company in Perth and, even though one of the few Australian employees, was consistently made to feel that she was not an Australian. She would be asked questions about eating curries at night or watching Bollywood movies. In her words: “[I]t was very apparent there weren’t too many people of colour in that workspace. So I think… it was (sic) more of separated me, made me dis­ tinctive rather… than Australian, it almost… was a bit divisive at times….[E]ven if I participated in any jokes, like Haha, the Aussies are outnumbered here, I’ll get a bit of a look like you are not Aussie.” (Respondent aged 30–34 years) Zahida, who is employed in the education sector, was of the opinion that she had been denied career opportunities while others less qualified than her had been given supervisory positions. For her, Muslim and ethnic identity were the determining factors. She said: “[F]aith is very important to me. And I think the faith has kept me going so far, because I believe that everybody, everybody has challenges. These are my challenges. Other people have different kinds of challenges… I know… For the past few years, since I started feeling this. I’d say [I have felt] discrimination. I have a firm belief that it is because I’m a Muslim. And because of my skin colour. That’s why I’m not getting the opportu­ nities that other people get without having all that… But I have no regrets.” (Respondent aged 45–49 years) Similar views were expressed by another respondent from the public education sector: she recounted her efforts to secure a good teaching job in the private sector and felt that she was not successful due to her religious and ethnic identity. The public sector offered her the opportunity of establishing her cre­ dentials as a good and committed teacher who earned the respect of her stu­ dents and colleagues. Reflecting on this transition, she said that given the quality of her curriculum vitae (CV), both her teacher and she had concluded that her initial failure to secure a job at a private school was because of: “[her] different name, [her] place of birth, [her] teaching experience in Pakistan and that [she] may be a Muslim all worked against [her]. So, there I was, a qualified and experienced teacher, and one who was excel­ lent in all the required areas, could not get a job. Fortunately, the state sector had no qualms.” (Respondent aged 40–44 years) For the majority of respondents, however, racism and Islamophobia did not shape their experiences at the workplace. On the contrary, they considered their Muslim and Pakistani identity as an advantage: it enabled them to dis­ cuss developments around the world with others, and promote understanding

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of Muslim practices. A doctor also considered it to be a bonus as it guaran­ teed her access to ethnically diverse patients. The interviews indicated that some respondents were more concerned about the challenges of sexual harassment, bullying, and the male-dominated nature of their respective workplaces. For example, a respondent in her late thirties said: “Once I got into work, I definitely found a very harsh, and at times unprofessional male-dominated work culture. I have experienced sexual harassment (without knowing that’s what it was) and a whole bunch of racism but I don’t believe that any of those things held me back.” (Respondent aged 34–39 years) Another respondent mentioned favouritism as an obstacle to better job pro­ spects. She was of the view that the pathways to advancing one’s career in the state sector required one to have filled in some higher vacancy in acting position. She felt that despite frequently expressing interest in gaining such experience, she was not supported at the workplace. A respondent interest­ ingly listed ageism as a challenge in her labour force participation: she was between 20–24 years of age and felt that her age prompted interviewers to doubt her capability. In her words: “It may seem trivial, but ageism is something that pops up for me. When they ask for a pharmacist and I show up it does shock people but once I am able to pass my ‘health expertise’ on, they realise I do know what I’m talking about.” (Respondent aged 20–24 years) The institutional context, it is noteworthy, also exposed the female respon­ dents to positive experiences that were not limited to either public or private enterprises. Some of them mentioned the supportive workplace environment that enabled them to live as working, Muslim and Pakistani women. This was not restricted to a particular age group, but as mentioned below, women from the early twenties and late forties shared these views. “My workplace is also quite supportive and understanding of my culture and religion and I’m able to take days off for celebrations, break my fast when I need to, pray when I need to etc.” (Respondent aged 20–24 years) “Very different work environment as compared to Pakistan, took some time to understand the culture, but more supportive administration in terms of leave, easily delayed my exams due to family commitments etc.” (Respondent aged 45–49 years) “[M]ost people are aware that some Muslim women do not shake hands and some women do shake hands. And I was really amazed by one of the persons over here [who] asked me… whether I am comfortable shaking hands with him or not.” (Respondent aged 25–29 years)

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The positive institutional environment was further highlighted by a young woman, Madiha, who had prior experience of working in Pakistan in a professional capacity. She narrated how her prospective employers in Pakistan would ask her questions, such as whether she intended to get married, and whether she would be opting to have children. This, in turn, was used to query the logic of offering her the job. She indicated that she was unaware at the time that the employers should not have asked such questions, and also commented that these biological processes were part of being a woman. She contrasted such comments with the positive and empowering environment encountered while looking for employment in Australia. She was of the view that it does not matter in Australia “what gender you are”: “They are going to take you seriously for your work. They are not… going to ask you whether you’re married or not. Even if it’s required for technical documentation, that is a part but there, they are not going to dare to ask you, when you are going to get married or your personal [information].” (Respondent aged 25–29 years) She also felt that the Australian workplace offered her good working con­ ditions, and that she was able to achieve a better personal and work life bal­ ance. She was not expected to work long hours without being paid and would receive prior communication in case she was needed to work extra time. Importantly, she felt that if she needed to take time out due to family com­ mitments, her employer in Australia showed more understanding. In her words: “People are more understanding without judging me that I am a girl, and I am just making excuse to go home… They understand me that I have a family priority. Whereas… back home I was not able to say that.” (Respondent aged 25–29 years) Significantly, she commented on the need for Pakistani employers to learn from laws governing the Australian workplace environment. The practice of informing employees of their rights and responsibilities during the probation period, in her opinion, was “a really good practice that… [could] be imple­ mented in Pakistan.” Implied in this comment was the recognition of the significance of the informational context in which women participate in the labour force. Although other respondents did not draw attention to this dimension, their responses suggested the multiple sources of information they accessed in the process of seeking and during the course of their employment. Social networks were identified as being significant both to facilitate settlement in a new environment, and to advance one’s career. Natalie also recounted how her friend had commented on the appropriate­ ness of her application for placement in an acting position. Based on these

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references, it could be argued that Pakistani Muslim women predominantly used informal networks of information to seek employment and for career advancement.

Similarity or difference of experiences: concluding comments The question arises as to what these responses cumulatively suggest about the extent to which experiences of Pakistani Muslim working women in Australia are similar to those living in Pakistan. Any answer to this question needs to acknowledge the limitation of the data gathered for this study; it represents views of women who have been educated in tertiary educational institutions and are already employed. A larger sample might produce different results that reflect the totality of experiences of Pakistani working women, as well as those who are prevented from entering the labour market. The limitations notwithstanding, however, the research produces results similar to those detailed by Burki (2018) with reference to her research in the United States of America. Despite the increasing Islamophobia and the rise of right wing extremism that is gradually being translated into racism in Western liberal societies, including Australia, the experiences of Pakistani Muslim women vary depending upon their educational qualifications, level of family support, sense of self-concept, and the institutional structures that employ them. As in other Western liberal states, they did face the pressures of dual responsibilities but were able to navigate by either seeking help from the family or recalibrating their own expectations vis-à-vis family space. Sig­ nificantly, most of the respondents were not hampered by Islamophobia, and reported feeling supported and appreciated at their workplaces. They also reflected agentic activism by creatively using the policies that focus on diver­ sity in the workplace. These findings can be relevant for designing policies for Muslim migrant women irrespective of their ethnic origin. Instead of assuming weakness, vic­ timhood among all Muslim women, these positive stories could assist with developing leadership among women so that they could guide other women of both Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds to traverse Western workplaces.

Notes 1 A collection of the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad that also constitute the major source of guidance for Muslims. 2 I am grateful to Azim Zahir for interpreting and organising the data published by the World Economic Forum. 3 This website has information including facts and figures, legal advice, prevention and defence guides on sexual harassment in workplaces in Pakistan: http://stophara ssmentnow.org/workplace-harassment-in-pakistan/ 4 I am grateful to Rita Afsar for providing this information based on an online tool called Search Diversity WA. https://www.omi.wa.gov.au/StatsInfoGuides/Pages/Sea rch-Diversity-WA.aspx

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5 I wish to thank Natalia Saeed for her help with research for this chapter. 6 Note that the discussion of responses uses pseudonyms for all respondents.

References ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics). 2016. “2016 Census QuickStats Country of Birth: People in Australia who were born in Pakistan.” https://quickstats.censusdata. abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2016/quickstat/7106_036 Amir, Saman, Aphichoke Kotikula, Rohini P. Pande, Laurent Loic Yves Bossavie and Upsana Khadka. 2018. Female Labour Force Participation in Pakistan: What Do We Know (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group Bhavnani, Reena. 1994. Black Women in the Labour Market: A Research Review. Manchester, UK: Equal Opportunities Commission Burki, Uzma. 2018. “Muslim Women as U.S. Organizational Leaders: An Intersec­ tional Study.” Dissertation submitted to Fielding Graduate University. https://sea rch.proquest.com/openview/25a831650b188df5c2c43731ebf07399/1?pq-origsite=gsc holar&cbl=18750&diss=y Bux, Mian Mohammad. 2007. Lahore Ka Sindbad: Mian Mohammad Bux Murhoom Australia Walay-Sawaneh Hayat Ba Zuban-E-Khood (Sindbad of Lahore: The Late Mian Mohammad Bux of Australia-His Autobiography). Lahore, Pakistan: Mak­ taba Akhuwat Crabtree, Steve. 2012. “Two-Thirds of Young Arab Women Remain out of Workforce.” Published electronically. https://news.gallup.com/poll/153659/two­ thirds-young-arab-women-remain-workforce.aspx Cross, K. Patricia. 1981. Adults as Learners. Increasing Participation and Facilitating Learning. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Darkenwald, Gordon G. and Sharan B. Merriam. 1982. Adult Education: Foundations of Practice. New York, NY: Harper & Row Darkenwald, Gordon G. and Thomas Valentine. 1985. “Factor Structure of Deterrents to Public Participation in Adult Education.” Adult Education Quarterly, 35(4): 177–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001848185035004001 Government of Pakistan. 2019a. Yearbook 2017–2018, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development, Islamabad, Pakistan. http:// callsarzameen.ophrd.gov.pk/web/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Year-Book-2017-18.pdf Government of Pakistan. 2019b. “Pakistan’s Implementation of 2030 Agenda for Sus­ tainable Development: Voluntary National Review.” Islamabad, Pakistan: SDG Section-Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms Ghumman, Sonia and Ann Marie Ryan. 2013. Not Welcome Here: Discrimination Towards Women Who Wear the Muslim Headscarf. Human Relations, 66(5): 671–698. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726712469540 H’Madoun, Maryam. 2010. “Religion and Labour Force Participation of Women.” In IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, 1–39. Antwerp, Belgium: Department of Economics Haghighat-Sordellini, Elhum. 2009. “Determinants of Female Labour Force Partici­ pation: A Focus on Muslim Countries.” International Review of Sociology, 19(1): 103–125. doi:10.1080/03906700802613970 Majid, Hadia. 2019. “Poor vs Rich Women’s Work.” Dawn, 27 July 2019. https://www. dawn.com/news/1496467

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Malik, Abida, Hafsah Qureshi, Humayra Abdul-Razakq, Zahra Yaqoob, Fatima Zahra Javaid, Faatima Esmail, Emma Wiley and Asam Latif. 2019. “‘I Decided Not to Go into Surgery Due to Dress Code’: A Cross-Sectional Study within the UK Investigating Experiences of Female Muslim Medical Health Professionals on Bare Below the Elbows (BBE) Policy and Wearing Headscarves (Hijabs) in Thea­ tre.” BMJ Open, 9. doi:10.1136/ bmjopen-2017–19954 Muhamad, Mazanah and Farizah Ahmad. 2009. “Barriers to Continuing Education among Working Muslim Women in Government and Semi-Government Organiza­ tions in Malaysia.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 29(3): 337–343. doi:10.1080/13602000903166606 Masood, Ayesha. 2019. “Influence of Marriage on Women’s Participation in Medicine: The Case of Doctor Brides of Pakistan.” Sex Roles, 80(1–2): 105–122. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11199-018-0909-5 Murphy, Caryle. 2016. “The Muslim Gender Gap in Educational Attainment Is Shrinking.” Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/ 27/the-muslim-gender-gap-in-educational-attainment-is-shrinking/ Office of Multicultural Interests, Western Australia. n.d. “Search Diversity WA”. Govern­ ment of Western Australia. https://www.omi.wa.gov.au/StatsInfoGuides/Pages/Search-Di versity-WA.aspx Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2019. “Labour Force Statistics: Detail of Tables (2017–2018).” http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/labour-force-survey-2017-18-annual-report Read, Jen’Nan Ghazal. 2002. “Challenging Myths of Muslim Women: The Influence of Islam on Arab‐American Women’s Labour Force Activity.” Muslim World, 92(1– 2): 19–37. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/27/the-muslim-gender-gap -in-educational-attainment-is-shrinking/. doi:10.1111/j.1478–1913.2002.tb03730.x Sethna, Razeshta, Tooba Masood and Ramsha Jahangir. 2018. “Misogyny in the Workplace: Hidden in Plain Sight-Special Report: Sexual Harassment in Work­ places in Pakistan.” Dawn, 20 March 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1395215 Stop HarassmentNow. n.d. “Workplace Harassment in Pakistan: Statistics, Facts and Figures, Laws, Legal Prosecution, Advice, Prevention & Defence Guide.” http://stop harassmentnow.org/workplace-harassment-in-pakistan/ United Nations. n.d. Outmigration. Situation Report. International Migration in South and South-West Asia. Country: Pakistan. https://sitreport.unescapsdd.org/pa kistan/out-migration United Nations Development Programme. 2018. “Human Development Reports-Table 5: Gender Inequality Index.” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii World Economic Forum. 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report 2018: Insight Report. 1–367. Geneva. World Population Review. 2019. “Total Population by Country 2019.” http://worldpop ulationreview.com/countries/ Youssef, Nadia. 1971. “Social Structure and the Female Labour Force: The Case of Women Workers in Muslim Middle Eastern Countries.” Demography, 8(4): 427–439. https://doi. org/10.2307/2060680

10 A quest for balance Analysing layers of consciousness beneath a Muslim woman’s career decisions Aminah Mah

Introduction Participating in this edited book project gave me an opportunity to examine, reflect, and make sense of my career decisions. I wish to share my personal journey to highlight the influences on Muslim women as they accommodate family commitments, by balancing religiously or culturally determined roles in the contemporary times. I have explored my own upbringing influenced by Chinese cultural values intertwined with Islamic principles. Carrying the trauma first, from decades of Japanese invasion and civil war in China, and then as refugees fleeing from the communist regime to Taiwan, my parents bore the brunt of the political, social and economic turmoil of their time. My siblings and I were fortunate enough to never experience war, yet our lives, education and career choices were significantly affected by the cascading effects of war and displacement from our parents’ past. Employing critical reflection research methods, I examine my career deci­ sions in this chapter. Critical reflection as defined by Fook (2011, 56) is “a way of learning from and reworking experience”. Fook proposes that as a research method critical reflection is carried out in two stages (2011, 56). The first stage involves an individual unravelling his/her assumptions about a situation. By scrutinising these assumptions, one reflects on one’s fundamen­ tally important values and beliefs. It avails the participant reflexivity, where one identifies and analyses any blind spots or discrepancies in their assump­ tions to gain better self-awareness. This new self-awareness allows the parti­ cipant to understand and reinterpret the situation that takes the participant to stage two where he/she can respond to their environment in a way that is better aligned with their core values. Such an exercise of analysis of deeper consciousness availed me clear lenses to understand the rationales behind my career decisions. Reflexivity opened up possibilities for me to look at my new career choice that was more in-line with my values. The organisation of this chapter begins with sketches of my background followed by phases of my career paths and education decisions. Following interpretation of events and analyses of influences on my decision-making is a discussion of five questions to which I found answers that gave me peace.

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Background In this section, I describe in brief my family background in terms of my ancestry, the culture and religious values that have been passed on from one generation to the next within the family. I also highlight a number of events that took place in my parents’ lives and the challenges they faced consequent to these events. I am the descendent of a Hui Muslim family from China. The Hui and Uyghur are two Muslim groups in China. The Hui Muslims are a recognised ethnic minority in China whose ancestry traces back to Tang and Song dynasties (Ain 2015, 210). Forefathers of the Hui were traders and soldiers from Persia, the Mongol courts or South-East Asia who intermarried with the Chinese Han majority and founded close-knit communities scattered throughout China (The Economist 2016). My family tree traces back to the Yuan Dynasty where one of our forefathers settled in northern China. Hui Muslims have integrated into the Chinese society in terms of material, epistemological and philosophical cultures yet they have successfully retained their Islamic religious traits over cen­ turies (Ain 2015, 212). However, some Chinese and Islamic traditions are compatible; for example, the obligation on children to fulfil their duty towards their par­ ents is similar both in Chinese culture and in Islam. According to Tu (1999, 13), filial piety in Confucianism is fundamental to moral excellence; it is about “recognition and reverence for our source of life”. Its ultimate aim is to transform a person beyond self-centeredness (Tu 1999, 13). In the Qur’an, God decrees that believers worship God alone, followed by fulfilling their duty towards their parents. This is found in chapter 17, verses 23 and 24 of the Qur’an: “Your Lord has commanded that you should worship none but Him (God), and that you be kind to your par­ ents. If either or both of them reach old age with you, say no word that shows impatience with them, and do not be harsh with them, but speak to them respectfully, and lower your wing in humility towards them in kind­ ness and say, ‘Lord, have mercy on them, just as they cared for me when I was little’” (Abdel Haleem 2016). As filial piety was inculcated through implicit examples in my family culture, I was brought up to obey adults in my life without questioning. Traditional gender role division was practised in my family. Men primarily carried out duties of protection and maintenance not only towards their immediate family, but also towards extended family members if required. As such, as a Muslim woman, I learnt that I am not obligated to contribute to my family financially, unless I choose to do so voluntarily. This I believe is rooted in Islamic traditions. To my knowledge, the majority of the women of the older generation in my family were responsible for home duties, caring and rearing of the children. All of these women received varying levels of education but only a handful had their own careers.

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In the next sections, I narrate the experiences of my family’s displacement from China and the associated challenges, the uncertainty of long-term resettlement and financial hardship. Experiences of displacement Prior to Chiang Kai Shek’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, my paternal grand­ father was a commander serving the military of the Republic of China (ROC) in Shandong Province. He served the country at a time when China was experiencing much unrest. Within a few decades China lived through revolu­ tions against the Qing imperialism, the formation of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911 (Office of the Historian, n.d.a), the rise of the warlords in various regions in China who ignored the new government of ROC, the AntiJapanese war amidst the civil war between Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalists led by Chiang Kai Shek and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) headed by Mao Zedong (Office of the Historian, n.d.b). My parents had barely started primary school when the civil war broke out in 1928 (Kucha et al. 2018). They were adolescents when the Japanese invaded China for the second time in 1937 (Yang and Chang 2010, 111). In 1949, Chiang Kai Shek’s troops were defeated by Mao’s CCP (Kucha et al. 2018). Chiang retreated with his people from Mainland China to Taiwan. My family was among the two million civil war refugees and troops (Wang 2005) who fled to Taiwan. As Chao (quoted in Yang and Chang 2010, 109) aptly described, my family was among the “swarms of unchecked refugees and troops pouring into the island [Taiwan] every day from 1948 to 1950”. Chiang’s plan was to let his troops recuperate in Taiwan before they fought their way back to reclaim his power as the president of the Republic of China (Rhally 2015). Being the only child to her widowed mother, my mother declined my father’s invitation to further their studies in cities less affected by the civil war with the intention to spend some quality time with her mother before she was due to be married. However, the forced migration shortly after my parents’ marriage changed everything. My maternal grandmother was left behind in Shandong and there she remained until her passing in the 1970s. The on­ going political rifts between Taiwan and Mainland China made it impossible for my mother to reunite with her mother. Chiang imposed on his people a “three no” policy from 1949 which continued until 1987. The three “nos” included no contact, no negotiation and no compromise with Communist China (The New York Times 1987). My mother felt trapped in a double jeo­ pardy; in her mind she denied herself the chance to higher education, yet she still failed to look after her mother. Financial hardship When most of the family fled to Taiwan, my father’s older brother stayed behind. He was charged with the responsibility to settle my grandfather’s

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financial matters before joining the rest of the family in Taiwan. A few months later, my uncle was on board the Taiping steamer headed for Taiwan when it collided with a smaller vessel leaving only 37 survivors (Wang 2005). Unfortunately, my uncle was among the casualties. My uncle’s death changed the family’s destiny overnight as all financial means for resettlement were lost in that tragic accident. From that day on, my father, being the second eldest of his siblings, assumed the responsibility as the main breadwinner of his large family to assist my grandfather in sup­ porting my uncle’s young family and his children’s education, my father’s younger siblings, and my mother, who was due to give birth to my eldest sister. At the time my father was 25 years old. He considered it his duty to share my grandfather’s burden of familial guardianship and maintenance. By the time I was born, our financial situation had improved compared to the first decade of my family’s resettlement in Taiwan. It meant that my father was able to make ends meet on a very tight budget working three jobs. His main source of income was from teaching English full-time at the highestranking boys’ high school in Taipei. He also held part-time teaching jobs at two other night schools. Despite their struggles, my parents spared no effort to ensure all of us, including my uncle’s children, were sent to school. Uncertainty of long-term settlement My parents lived with much uncertainty during the years in Taiwan as the political tensions between Taiwan and China continued. Chiang’s political position for the ROC (Taiwan) was constantly emphasised to his people. In our primary school textbooks I remember learning about the cruelty and evil of the communists. For decades my father was distressed over the family’s resettlement. After a sudden blood pressure surge that caused massive haemorrhage through his nose in his late forties, specialists sternly warned that unless my father lessened his workload, he was at high risk of stroke and other cardiovascular diseases. He decided to write to an influential family friend of my grandfather’s in Malaysia seeking opportunities to work and live abroad. He was offered a job to work in Malaysia when I turned ten. My father’s younger siblings accepted the responsibility to take care of my grandparents. The years in Malaysia gave my parents some relief from the hardship they endured in Taiwan. Although on very modest remuneration, we managed to live on my father’s salary from one job instead of three. However, other challenges surfaced. We were to learn decades later that our non-citizenship status in Malaysia had the most significant ramifications on our career options for decades to come. In those days, education after high school or employment was only open to Malaysian citizens. Most expatriates in Malaysia sent their children back to their home country to further their stu­ dies, or those who had the means sent their children to Western countries to

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study. In our situation, while self-finance to study abroad was out of our reach, going back to where we came from was a step backward. One by one, my brothers and I had to carve out our own paths to either accept any employment open to us just to get by or to find free education abroad until we acquired the necessary skills or qualifications as a means to apply for citizenship through immigration, wherever that might be. It was during the years in Malaysia that we witnessed more and more nations around the world recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the international political arena, which meant the weakening of the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) diplomatic connections. In those days we had two options if we ever needed to travel: either with our Taiwanese passports with all accompanying visa restrictions or with certificates of identity as Malaysian permanent residents which carried a set of restrictions imposed on the document holders of a yearly renewable re-entry visa. We began to share our parents’ anxieties over the family’s resettlement concerns. The following sections are an account of my career paths and education decisions arranged in three phases in a chronological order.

Career paths and education decisions After finishing high school, I applied for a place to study in one of the uni­ versities in Taiwan. A renowned university accepted me to undertake a Bachelor’s degree in Health Education. This was a university that trained teachers and offered all students a stipend, accommodation and free educa­ tion in exchange for five years of graduate teaching service in Taiwan’s public middle schools. My father was reluctant to let me go because he feared that I would be left stranded there if another war broke out between Mainland China and Taiwan. Since we found no way forward for me in Malaysia, he conceded. That was the year when the United States of America recognised the People’s Republic of China after ending its relations with ROC (Taiwan) at the end of 1978 (Kan and Morrison 2014, 4). About one and a half years into my course in Taiwan in 1981, my father instructed me to withdraw from my studies to take up nursing training in Australia, through the help of another family friend. It was a huge risk to take but my father had a strong instinct that obtaining a nursing certificate from Australia would allow me better prospects than getting a degree from Taiwan. As it turned out, he was right. On enrolment, I was on the payroll at a hospital as a trainee nurse. That was the beginning of phase one of my career life. Phase 1 During my training I was happy I could contribute financially to help lighten my father’s burden. After three years of training, I gained registration with the New South Wales Department of Health. I thought this was to be the

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beginning of my life-long nursing career, but fate had other plans. By the sti­ pulation of the Australian Department of Immigration, all foreign students had to leave the country for a minimum of two years before they could apply to work or migrate to Australia. I went home to my parents and got married instead. As I followed my husband to Saudi Arabia where he was working at the time, I felt I was moving further away from realising my dream of obtaining a university qualification. Life in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s was very different from what I was accustomed to in Australia. Although the majority of people were Muslims, I felt very much out of place in every other sense. Strict segregation in social settings, the imposed dress code and restricted movement for women in the public space were all a cultural shock to me. To lessen my boredom, I worked as an administration assistant at the Chinese (Republic of China) Consulate General in Jeddah. That was my second job. Phase 2 My husband’s situation in many ways was quite similar to mine. His grand­ father had escaped the Communist regime from Yunnan Province in China to Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) with his family. The opportunities for higher education and employment for Muslims in Burma were limited. He left Burma in his late twenties in search of a better future. Lacking financial means meant that he too had to go about a convoluted route to get profes­ sional qualifications outside of Burma. His journey took him through Thai­ land, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. When our son turned two, we began to consider migrating to a politically and economically more stable country in which we could settle and bring up our children. I contacted my former employer in Australia and due to a shortage of qualified nurses at the time he nominated me for migration. Two months into my new job we found out we were expecting our second child. I dropped to part-time work. In those early years we both juggled between work, raising our children, and strategising to improve our financial stability. Initially my husband’s job applications with his Master’s degree all returned with the same reply: no employment without Australian work experience. As a new migrant he was in a catch 22 situation. He decided to use our savings to study for a second Master’s degree in Australia to increase his employ­ ability in his profession. When he still had difficulty finding work after com­ pleting his Master’s studies, he opted to undertake doctorate studies with a scholarship and worked in casual jobs on weekends to support us. I could hear the disappointment and worry in my parents’ responses each time I broke the news that I was expecting another baby. That had a profound impact on me. I felt obligated to pursue my studies. I worked and studied part-time. Eventually my husband found work in his profession in a city on the opposite end of Australia from where we lived. That ended the eight and a

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half years of his student life. After our relocation I volunteered at a Muslim women’s organisation in the new city. Through my volunteering work I was offered to work at the community school that our children attended. My role was to provide support and guidance to adolescent girls in that school. In the second year, due to a shortage of Muslim female teachers for Islamic Studies, I was given three classes to teach as well. It was then that I decided I owed it to the students to gain my teaching qualification. Phase 3 A few months after I began my education studies my husband was retrenched due to the company’s decision to downsize. Two months later he accepted a job offer in Saudi Arabia and there he stayed for over one and a half decades. I persevered with my teaching studies in his absence followed by two years of full-time teaching with many trips back and forth to Saudi Arabia. During this time our second child went to study medicine in another city when she barely turned 16. I travelled to give her support whenever necessary. Suddenly I had not one but three houses to take care of. I resigned from my full-time teaching position and for the second time, I put my career on hold. I enrolled in postgraduate research degrees, first my Master’s then my PhD, because postgraduate study was the only occupation that allowed me the flexibility to travel so I could give support to our family of five spread out in three locations. It seemed that the only position that I kept consistently was my job as a mother! By the time I was nearing the end of my doctorate research, our children had all finished their tertiary studies. I applied for a Saudi dependent resi­ dence visa to be with my husband. It was during that period when I fell into a heap, exhausted and disillusioned. Over time I was to appreciate that it was the lack of freedom to move around in that society as a woman that gave me the stillness I needed to examine my life layer by layer into the sub-conscious of which I was never fully aware. It took me three years on a journey inward to make sense of the iceberg beneath my feelings of emptiness. One of the steps I took was to reconnect spiritually with my Creator. When I was finally led onto a new occupation that was meaningful and enjoyable, I was able to see the wisdom behind the twists and turns I had in my careers and be at peace with my decisions. I am into my third career venture formulating, making and selling natural skincare products. In the next section, I present the analysis of my reflections in rela­ tion to my career decisions.

Analysis The emptiness prompted me to examine the major events in my life and in my parents’ lives for hints that might have influenced my decisions. My study in Positive Psychology and Wellbeing gave me insight to understand and accept

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my decisions. Family and close friends gave me their unreserved love and support to rediscover myself. Finally, it was through my prayers that this almost inaudible voice was allowed to come through, louder and clearer each time I knelt asking for direction and deliverance from the feeling of void. I have arranged my analyses under the headings of “Understanding my internal conflicts”, “Rippling effects of war and displacement”, and “Cultural and Islamic gender role influences” concerning my career decisions. Understanding my internal conflicts The depletion of energy that I experienced towards the final years of Phase 3 described in the previous section prompted me to stop and take stock of what had taken place within my own psyche. I have identified two internal conflicts: guilt and neglect. An internalised sense of duty and desire to do the right thing prompted me to make those “rational and responsible” decisions to choose family over career, not once but twice. I recognise that my decisions were driven in part by guilt. I did not want to regret not being there for my children. When they were still young, I did not want to force them out of bed or hurry them along just because I needed to get to work on time. If one of them was sick I could not see myself leaving them with someone else for an entire day. It was hard enough leaving them with a babysitter for three hours in the afternoon, twice a week to attend lectures until my husband picked them up before nightfall. As the children got older and the challenges they faced increased, I did not want them to return to an empty house after school while I was busy chasing my career dreams. I could not live with the guilt of my adolescent children going the wrong way due to a lack of parental supervision. As much as I was conflicted by my wish to have a successful career, I chose to live with less regret. I believe my sadness was associated with the fact that I did not allow myself to grieve over suspending my careers. I neglected my duty to myself. Some­ how, I denied myself the chance to grieve over my sacrifice. I considered it wrong, selfish and childish to feel sad giving up my careers for the sake of my family. I am quite certain that it would not have made much difference to my decision in the end, but it would have made a world of difference to how I felt along the way. A major mental obstacle began to chip away when I recognised my obses­ sion for perfection. I wanted to be perfect in everything I did. I focused on taking care of everyone around me; everyone except myself. The light bulb moment came when I read Kristen Neff’s explanation of self-compassion that it “entails seeing one’s own experiences in light of the common human experience, acknowledging that suffering, failure and inadequacies are part of the human condition, and that all people – oneself included – are worthy of compassion” (Neff 2003, 87). Accepting my own imperfections was the best gift I could ever give myself. I had learnt in that moment that there was nothing wrong to say that it was a real sacrifice I made for my family.

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Rippling effects of war and displacement I have identified two deeper layers of consciousness concerning the parenting style and mental health of my parents, which I believe are linked to their experiences of war and daily stressors of displacement. Loss of family members, land, status, wealth and social network con­ sequent to war and displacement left my parents struggling financially and feeling insecure for most part of their lives. I had an older sister who died as a neonate due to severe maternal malnourishment. Had it not been for the injections of supplements that sustained her, my mother probably would have met her end a lot earlier. As much as they struggled financially, my parents’ anxieties over instability were greater than dealing with poverty. This sense of uncertainty and lack of belonging became more evident after we moved to Malaysia. As a child I had little insight into how hard my parents’ lives were. I believe my parents’ approach in raising us showed some tendencies toward author­ itarian parenting. This was due in part to our family culture, but also from the trauma they suffered and daily stressors they had to face (Sim et al. 2018, 22–23). According to Baumrind’s (1967, 890) parenting prototypes, author­ itarian parents exert control over their children’s conduct according to a set standard they believe is right, and they value obedience and favour punitive measures to shape their children’s behaviour. My parents literally had to account for every last cent they spent. Resources were so scarce that if one of us accidentally broke something, we would be told to sit on our knees for some time. I got in trouble at school for not having adequate art supplies. I was afraid to make mistakes, so much so that my voice would shake when I had to speak to other adults in front of my parents. I aimed for perfection in everything I did for their approval. Sometimes I wondered why my parents never allowed me to go to places by myself, yet they let me travel to Taiwan and Australia without a chaperone. I identified that their vigilance was country-specific. We arrived in Malaysia in 1970 when the country was still recovering from a violent Sino-Malay sectar­ ian riot that broke out on May 13 in 1969 (Vengadesan 2008). Hundreds were killed and thousands were left homeless from the fires in that riot. As Chinese Muslims we often felt an undercurrent of suspicion no matter which com­ munity we were with. The predictable questions we were asked were two. The Malay Muslims would say: “You are Muslim… so when did you convert?” The Chinese would ask: “If you are Chinese, why did you convert to the Malay religion?” My mother’s language barriers in Malaysia might have indirectly con­ tributed to her anxiety as well. She only knew Mandarin. Her only window to the unfamiliar multiracial society was through newspapers. When all she read was bad news as newspapers had a tendency to present, she was frozen with fear. I remember my mother suffering from frequent headaches, difficulty in sleeping, and inability to focus. She used to keep a hot water flask by her bed

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at night for self-defence in case someone broke into our flat. After we moved to another area, my father had three locks put on the front door for safe measure. A study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon shows parents’ perception of insecurity in the community of resettlement contributes to increased parental control and parental psychological distress has been linked to harsh parenting (Sim et al. 2018, 22). My mother’s “attention bias toward threat and ampli­ fied attention to safety” (Creech and Misca 2017, 2) was manifested in her restricting my activities outside the safe confines of home and school in an environment she perceived as unsafe. Cultural and Islamic gender role influences From a theoretical perspective, evolutionary and socio-biological accounts show, “women in early human societies were the logical candidates for child care” whereas cultural determinist accounts are founded on the premise that gender roles find their origin in cultural beliefs, institutions and practices (Ickes 1993, 77). I grew up in a time when traditional gender roles were changing over a few decades in certain societies in response to economic pressures of capital­ ism. Since the late 1960s female participation in the labour force has increased in European countries for economic reasons (Olah et al. 2014, 10). In a sum­ marised report by Asia Development Bank (ADB 2016, 1), women’s partici­ pation in the labour force ranged from 16% in Afghanistan to 83% in Nepal. In 2016, women in Pakistan, Indonesia, People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea accounted for 28% of world’s working age women (ADB 2016, 3). Despite women’s increased participation in the workforce, women in this account were reported to be primarily responsible for housework and childcare (ADB 2016, 1). Likewise, women in Europe “have continued to bear a disproportionately large share of family responsibilities in terms of household work and care, despite their increasing involvement in paid work” (Olah et al. 2014, 12). My decision to choose family over career was in part influenced by the norm in my family. In addition, as new migrants we had neither a social network nor extended family support. It would be counter-productive if I were to sacrifice my time to be with my children for earning an income to be spent on childcare. Certain aspects of the Islamic teachings available to me at the time also influenced my decisions. When my children were still very young, I began to attend religious study circles within the Muslim community. Eager to be a good wife and a good mother, I learnt about the “ideal” Muslim woman. We were told that the highest position of a woman in society was to be a mother. We were also reminded of our role in protecting our children from ideologies that contradicted our religion in a pluralistic society. Some quoted the verse “stay at home” in the Qur’an (33:33) to emphasise the importance of women making their homes as their primary sphere of activity. However, I was to realise later that this quote was only part of a verse, which, in its entirety read as “stay at home, and do not flaunt your finery as they

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used to in the pagan past”. The intent of this verse was not to confine women to their homes. What was more, this verse was addressed to the Prophet’s wives who were “not like any other women” (Qur’an 33:32) because they were role models to other Muslim women and as such they were held to a higher standard of conduct. Immersed in such teachings in addition to my upbringing and values my parents imparted to me, it should come as no surprise that I chose family over career. Five questions emerged concerning my career decisions to help me see them from different angles. These questions and their answers are presented next in the discussion section.

Discussion The period of emptiness and sadness forced me to stop and find answers to questions surrounding my career decisions. To the first question: What would life be like had I insisted on building my own career? I answered that potentially I could be happy with a career and I would have likely gained a degree of confidence in this regard. However, I do not believe we would be better off financially because of the high cost of living in Australia. At the same time, it is very likely I would live with other forms of guilt, to be elaborated in my answer to the second question as follows. What was happening at each crossroad of my career that stopped me from pushing ahead with my career? Had I continued to work, my support to my husband would be greatly compromised. My husband would have managed to succeed in his studies regardless, but how would my insistence to work have affected our relationship? What kind of pressure would both of our commit­ ments to work and study have put on our children? I know without question I would have been burdened by guilt and worn out by stress. I am thankful for being in a position to prioritise my family’s wellbeing over my careers. The third question was: If taking care of the family was important to me, why was I feeling empty? On reflection I denied myself the chance to examine my own feelings. I failed to be fair to myself. If I were to do this again, the one thing I would change is to give myself the space to voice and acknowl­ edge how difficult it was for me to give up my careers that I worked so hard to qualify for. My fourth question was: Now that I have the time and freedom, what is it that I want to do in my twilight years? This was a difficult one! My PhD supervisors encouraged me to publish my thesis. At an international conference I met the head of school of a university who was ready to hire me. That was my chance in life to work towards a satisfying career… except my heart was not in it. The perplexing fact was I did not know what I wanted. I was like a traveller exhausted from a long hard journey only to feel completely lost after having arrived at her scheduled destination. I tried to see myself working as a nurse. Then I pictured myself as a teacher. Would I want to go back to nursing or teaching? I was surprised that I was not overly enthusiastic about either.

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Realistically, my time for these two careers had passed. Both careers demand considerable mental and physical fitness. Most of my peers were nearing retirement after decades of service. If I had to take up either career for survival, then I would not hesitate to do a refresher course to start again. I was grateful that I was free from financial obligations. Although I did not know what it was, I was thankful again for being in a position to explore my options. This brought me to my final question. What would make me feel whole? I listed what I did not want to do. Per chance through a process of elimination, I would be led to where I needed to be. Perhaps the single most essential layer of consciousness was recognising my need to connect with my Creator, not through rituals, or a set text in a foreign language; rather, connect directly in my own words from the heart. My Creator knows better what is ultimately good for me more than I. He is the source of abundance. I audaciously gave my Creator a list that sounded almost like a job description of which only I met all the criteria! I asked for an occupation that sustained my interest and allowed me flexibility and freedom. I asked to be of benefit to others. I asked to make a modest income so I would not depend on welfare. I wanted this occupation to mend the void in me.

Conclusion The exploration of my career decisions as I have outlined in this chapter has helped me to see the importance of faith in my life. I recognise that it was the same power that enabled my grandparents and my parents to survive the hardship they were dealt. Within academic research the strength of its influence is yet to be recognised, as it is personal and non-tangible. It is a deep fountain of strength and hope that guided and carried all of us through life. I waded through cultural influences of religion, especially in regard to my roles as a daughter, a wife and a mother. My decisions were brushed by the realities of economic challenges and compounded by the concept of citizenship as a result of relocation. At times I was manipulated by certain “out of context” interpretations of the scripture while other times I was persuaded by teachings that emphasised “saving” our children from unIslamic influences. Whatever it was, it was the pursuit of finding a balance between my faith, my culture, my family values and my self-actualisation that brought me to where I am today.

References Abdel Haleem, Mohammed. A.S. 2016. The Qur’an: A New Translation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-953595-8 Ain, Ayesha Qurrat ul. 2015. “Everyday Life of a Chinese Muslim: Between Religious Retention and Material Acculturation.” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 14(40): 209–237

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Asia Development Bank (ADB). 2016. “Female Labor Force Participation in Asia: Constraints and Challenges”. Asia Development Bank, ADB Brief No. 71. www. adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/209666/female-labor-force-participation-asia. pdf Baumrind, Dianna. 1967. “Effects of Authoritative Parental Control on Child Beha­ viour.” Child Development, 37(4): 887–907 Creech, Suzannah K. and Gabriela Misca. 2017. “Parenting with PTSD: A Review of Research on the Influences of PTSD on Parent-Child Functioning in Military and Veteran Families.” Frontiers in Psychology, 8(1101): 1–8. doi:10.3389/ fpsyg.2017.01101 Fook, Jan. 2011. “Developing Critical Reflection as a Research Method.” In Creative Spaces for Qualitative Researching, edited by Joy Higgs, Angie Titchen, Debbie Horsfall, and Donna Bridges, 55–64. Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense Publishers Ickes, William. 1993. “Traditional Gender Roles: Do They Make, and Then Break, our Relationships?” Journal of Social Issues, 49(3): 71–85 Kan, Shirley and Wayne M.Morrison. 2014. “U.S.–Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues.” Congressional Research Service. 7–5700. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R41952.pdf Kucha, Glenn, Jennifer Llewellyn, Steve Thompson, and Sara Taylor. 2018. Chinese Revolution Timeline: 1928–1949. Alpha History. https://alphahistory.com/chineser evolution/chinese-revolution-timeline-1928-1949/ Neff, Kristin D. 2003. “Self-compassion: An Alternative Conceptualization of a Healthy Attitude Toward Oneself.” Self and Identity, 2: 85–101. doi:10.1080/ 15298860390129863 Office of the Historian. n.d.a The Chinese Revolution of 1911. Milestones: 1899–1913. Department of State, USA. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev Office of the Historian. n.d.b The Chinese Revolution of 1911. Milestones: 1945–1952. Department of State, USA. https://history.state/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev Olah, Livia Sz, Rudolf Richter and Irena E.Kotowska. 2014. “The New Roles of Men and Women and Implications for Families and Societies.” Report. Project funded by European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme. Grant agreement no. 320116. Families and Societies, 2014. https://www.familiesandsocieties.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/12/WP11OlahEtAI2014.pdf Rhally, Christian. 2015. “Remembering 1949: Finding a New Home Across the Strait.” Huffington Post, March 16, 2015. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/remem bering-1949-finding_b_6882332 Sim, Amanda, Mina Fazel, Lucy Bowes and Frances Gardner. 2018. “Pathways Linking War and Displacement to Parenting and Child Adjustment: A Qualitative Study with Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.” Social Sciences & Medicine, 200: 19–26. https://doi/org/10.1016/j.soscimed.2018.01.09 The Economist. 2016. “China’s Other Muslims; The Hui.” The Economist, 421(9010), October 6, 2016. https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/06/chinas-other-muslims The New York Times. 1987. “Taiwan to Allow Travel to Chinese Mainland.” The New York Times, October 15, 1987. https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/15/world/taiwa n-to-allow-travel-to-chinese-mainland.html Tu, Wei-Meng. 1999. “Confucius and Confucianism.” In Confucianism and the Family, edited by Walter H. Slote and George A. De Vos, 1–22. New York, NY: State University of New York Press

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Vengadesan, Martin. 2008. “May 13, 1969: Truth and Reconciliation.” The Star, May 11, 2008. https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/watching-the-world/2008/ 05/11/may-13-1969-truth-and-reconciliation/ Wang, Hsiao-wen. 2005. “Historic Sea Tragedy Revisited.” Taipei Times, January 27, 2005. www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/01/27/2003221111 Yang, Dominic M.H. and Mau-Kuei Chang. 2010. “Understanding the Nuances of Waishengren.” China Perspectives, 3: 108–122. https://journals.openedition.org/ chinaperspectives/pdf/5310

Part 3

Opportunities in the global economy

11 Islamic finance and women-focused banking in Kenya Shamim Samani

Introduction A Global Findex database report which looks at how adults save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk, finds that while a lack of money is the most common justification why people do not use banking services, among others, religious reasons are also cited as concerns for not having an account with a financial institution. The report finds that 6% of adults without a financial account gave religious reasons for this and most of these were from predominantly Muslim countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018, 40–41). However, the share of those citing solely religious reasons for not having financial accounts was very low. The reasons for this can be attributed to the increasing availability of Shariah-compliant financial institutions in diverse economies. Shariah-compliant or Islamic banking is based on the principles and prac­ tice of economic transactional activities permissible within Islam. The Inter­ national Monetary Fund defines Islamic finance as: [T]he provision of financial services in accordance with Shariah Islamic law, principles and rules. Shariah does not permit receipt and payment of “riba” (interest), “gharar” (excessive uncertainty), “maysir” (gambling), short sales or financing activities it considers harmful to society. Instead, the parties must share the risks and rewards of a business transaction and the transaction should have a real economic purpose without undue speculation, and not involve any exploitation of either party. (IMF 2017, para 4) Development theories see inclusion and access to finance as a critical factor in overcoming persistent income inequality and slower growth in economies (Demurgic-Kunt et al. 2018). Well-functioning financial systems are not only important for channelling funds to the most productive uses and helping to boost economies, but also for improving opportunities and reducing poverty (Demurgic-Kunt et al. 2018). Without inclusive financial systems, individuals

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and small enterprises rely on limited earnings and savings to realise goals of education, entrepreneurial activity and opportunities for scaling enterprises (Demurgic-Kunt, Beck and Honohan 2008). As the importance of a healthy financial system is increasingly focused on globally, development practice progressively recognises the significance of the ethical and religious suitability of financial frameworks. Studies (for instance Mardhatillah and Rulindo 2007; Mardhatillah and Rulindo 2008; Rulindo and Mardhatilla 2011; Rulindo and Pramanik 2013) point to the importance of religion for Muslim entrepreneurs and show a positive rela­ tionship between spirituality, religiosity and economic performance that can be used to economically empower people and alleviate poverty. In relation to this, Bohi (2017) contends that although conventional microcredit has achieved success in fostering female entrepreneurship in Ban­ gladesh, Islamic microfinance can fulfil customised religious needs of women. Bohi (2017) argues that microcredit institutions have not deliber­ ated on the moral and ethical dimensions of human-socio-economic development. Microfinance has been operating in Bangladesh for almost 40 years and despite being seen as a commended way of poverty allevia­ tion, the key principles of microcredit are considered incompatible with the social fabric of the Bangladeshi society which is largely Muslim. While providing an avenue for people especially women to overcome poverty, it puts undue pressure on them as well as those responsible for the interest bearing loans as a collective responsibility, and may in fact disempower them (Mahdi 2015). This chapter is based on a small qualitative study carried out to investigate women’s access to and take up of Islamic banking and finance in Kenya. The objectives of the study are to investigate: the preference for Islamic banking in Kenya; the Islamic or Shariah-compliant products and services available especially for women; and how these products contribute to the financial inclusion of women, and particularly Muslim women, in the broader econ­ omy of the country. In addition to other online materials, the websites of the three major Islamic banks and one Islamic banking digital platform operating in Kenya were used in the analysis. Five Islamic bank personnel were also asked to respond to a questionnaire survey to enquire about women’s access to Islamic banking and finance. As the Islamic banking industry in Kenya is still expanding and women’s Islamic banking is in its infancy, the survey respondents were limited to five staff working in various positions in the banks. Due to ethical considerations of privacy, there was no access to female customers of the banks to obtain their perspectives which is a limitation of the study. The chapter begins by explaining the ideology behind Islamic finance and goes on to look at the market for Shariah-compliant banking in Kenya. It then explores the prospects for female access to and uptake of such financial services and concludes with what the prospects of Islamic finance are for furthering women’s banking and their financial inclusion in a developing economy such as Kenya.

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The ideology of Islamic finance Islamic banking is based on the principles of Shariah and transactions ruled by the Islamic jurisprudence related to muamlat which can be translated as economic, political and social activities between individuals in a society, including financial transactions. These are distinct from ritual acts such as prayer and fasting that are called ibadat. Key principles that distinguish Isla­ mic banking and finance from conventional banking and finance are the pri­ mary belief that God is the owner of all creation including resources and that humankind is entrusted with carrying out all transactions responsibly. Although individual needs are prioritised, they must be balanced with ethical obligations and societal requirements. While the free market concept is acceptable, it must take place in a just and responsible manner in which members of a society are not taken advantage of. The work of Mohammed Yatim and Mohammed Nasir (2007), Kadubo (2010), Hasan (2011), Jamaldeen (2012), Hersi (2014) and Askari, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2014) and others on Islamic finance explains the following prohibited transactions according to Islam and the reasons behind this. Interest – taking of interest or what is termed in Arabic as riba, means to increase, grow, or multiply into more than what would be due. The owner of the wealth gets a return without making any effort, while the borrower carries all the risk. Uncertainty – the Arabic word gharar means uncertainty or to cheat or delude. Gharar exists when two parties enter a contract and one of them lacks complete information of the transaction. Gambling – two Arabic words — maysir and qimar — refer to transactions that involve gambling. Maysir is the acquisition of wealth by chance instead of by effort. Qimar refers to a game of chance. Both types of transactions are based on uncertainty; no one can know how a gamble will pay off. Prohibited products and industries – considered haram or prohibited, are products and industries that are harmful to society and may be deemed a threat to social responsibility. Examples include alcohol, prostitution, porno­ graphy, use of tobacco, any products based on uncertainty or gambling and the consumption of pork. While all transactions entered by individuals should be in accordance with what is permissible in Shariah, they should also be fair, free from elements of coercion, misrepresentation or other illegal means, but more importantly beneficial to the broader society. Islamic banking can thus be defined as having an economic, social and spiritual purpose; facilitating economic activity that benefits the individual and the society within moral and ethical parameters. On the practical side, Islamic banks use equity participation or profit and loss sharing to earn money. As interest-based lending and borrow­ ing is forbidden, products are available for lease or sale contracts and trans­ actions are asset-based. Simplistically put, the key differences between Islamic and conventional banking are summarised in Table 11.1.

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Table 11.1 Differences between conventional and Islamic banking Conventional banking

Islamic banking

Based on the free-market principles Interest allowed Capital transferred through borrowing; lender earns interest while borrower (entrepreneur) makes profit Risk of loss largely borne by borrower

Based on religious principles Interest prohibited Both lender and borrower share profits

Both lender and borrower share the risk of loss

The largest and most influential Islamic finance hubs are not only in Muslim-majority countries, but also in Hong Kong, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Ireland (The Economist 2015). While the industry is split into several global regions, namely Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Western Asia, as well as Western Europe, there is a growing market in many parts of Africa (Domat 2018). In Africa, besides increasing Muslim populations, the expansion of the sector is also attributed to among other factors, the aftermath of the global financial crisis that led to the ques­ tioning of the ethics of conventional financial systems. A report on Islamic banking by The Economist (2015, 5) maintains that the values and princi­ ples of Islamic financing appeal to investors seeking ethical schemes or bank customers looking for alternative products. The report also finds that many African governments recognise the potential of Islamic finance as a means of boosting economic growth including raising capital for largescale infrastructure projects. This endorsement from governments is encouraging for investors setting up both fully fledged Islamic banking institutions as well as conventional banks that operate windows of such financial products and services. This is significant considering that the current United Nations Sustainable Development Goals place financial inclusion as an enabler for the achieve­ ment of targets related to eradicating poverty, hunger and gender equality and empowerment. Access to financial services is seen as a crucial aspect of enabling the attainment of individual goals of safeguarding money, provid­ ing liquidity, promoting savings and providing credit facilities for entrepre­ neurial activities (King 2014). On the macroeconomic level, empirical studies show that there is a positive relation between economic growth and the dimensions of financial inclusion, largely access to banking services (Sharma 2016). On the micro level, women’s financial inclusion is key to their economic empowerment which includes the abilities to participate better in the workplace and existing markets. The consequences of these can lead to their acquisition of productive resources, access to decent work, increased agency and meaningful participation in decision-making within the household and the public sphere.

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Islamic finance and women’s banking services in Kenya Islamic finance is fast becoming a significant commercial sector in Kenya that seeks to service not only its Muslim population, but also offers ethical bank­ ing to non-Muslim clients. The Muslim population of Kenya is approximately 11.1% (CIA n.d.). There are large concentrations of Muslims in the coastal towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu which are major economic centres, as well as in parts of the capital city, Nairobi, where Muslim Somali commu­ nities fleeing the unrest in Somalia since the 1990s have established a strong economic presence. The western and north-western regions of Kenya also have large Muslim populations; however, these are sparsely populated and do not attract the business intensities of other major economic hubs. There is no data available on the commercial activities of Muslim women per se in Kenya. However, they are notably visible in all sectors of the economy, including as professionals, in corporate employment, as businesswomen as well as traders in the major commercial centres with large concentrations of the Muslim population. Commencing through lobbying by Muslim banking professionals and law­ yers, Kenya has established itself as a centre for Islamic finance in eastern and central Africa (Hersi 2014). The sector has positioned itself well through amendments in banking regulations to accommodate and attract Islamic finance structures and assets. An instance is the amendment in 2008 to the Banking Act that originally referred to “interest” through the addition of the phrase “a return in the case of an institution carrying out business in accor­ dance with Islamic law” (Salim 2017). Other amendments include the refine­ ment of the Stamp Duty Act to provide for Islamic financial products to compete with conventional products in the market and allow for Islamic financial products to be available through savings’ cooperative societies (Mwaniki 2017). Although it is relatively new to Kenya, projections for the growth of Islamic finance in the country are ambitious, not only focusing on a Muslim market but also offering services to non-Muslims and creating a niche market for women-focused banking. The complexities that contribute to women’s exclusion from banking and finance are well documented in development literature. They include women’s lower decision-making positions and caring responsibilities that impose time and travel restrictions impacting on their economic emancipation. Additional factors are views about women’s abilities as well as their own perceptions about being able to make optimal business decisions and take risks. Embedded social stereotypes that tend to perpetuate inequality of opportunity between men and women prevail and women are therefore not seen as independent economic actors and socialised as dependent on men (Buvinic and Jaluka 2018). Women are also viewed as sec­ ondary income earners by financial institutions and further disadvantaged in society through cultural constraints, such as the lack of property rights and land ownership (Gincherman 2013). As such, financial institutions and products are not always designed to serve a market that suits women’s needs.

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While gender roles are clearly specified in Muslim ideals, where maleheaded households are the norm, economic imperatives often impel women to participate in supporting their families. Many Muslim women who participate in the workplace balance their care giving roles and partake on their own terms, for instance through choosing to wear the hijab or niqab (full face covering) in the workplace or when conducting businesses. For some, main­ taining their presence in domestic spaces is important and therefore they engage in home-based enterprises. Kenya’s experience shows prospects open­ ing for women through the availability of Islamic financial services to all and specific services availed to women through women-focused banking. These initiatives are developed to address challenges women face in access to both banking services and credit facilities. While men in general are amply sup­ ported in conventional as well as Islamic banking systems, the needs of some Muslim women are different. Their earning capacities can be limited as a result of observing seclusion and reluctance about accessing services in mixed gender environments due to personal convictions. For those practising seclu­ sion, places where there are interactions with men outside of their families are not desirable. The following sections details Shariah-compliant services available espe­ cially for women in Kenya and how the products can contribute to increased economic activity for Muslim women in particular. It uses excerpts from the survey conducted as well as other material from the Islamic banks’ websites.

Shariah-compliant banking and women-focused services At the time of writing this chapter, there were three fully fledged Shariah­ compliant banks offering a range of finance products to their customers, one digital finance platform and a number of other lenders including saving and credit co-operatives (SACCOS) presenting both Islamic and conventional financial products and services. With a large number of females in senior positions and both Muslims and non-Muslims represented, the staff portfolios of these banks were significantly diverse. The first Islamic bank to operate in Kenya was the First Community Bank (FCB) licensed in 2007 and opened to the public in 2008. The Gulf Africa Bank (GAB), incorporated in 2006 also started operating in 2008 and is the largest Islamic bank in Kenya. These two banks have branches spread across regions with a high proportion of the Kenyan Muslim population. Besides the coastal towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu, in the Coast Province, they have branches in the capital city, Nairobi and other towns with concentrations of Muslim populations. The Dubai Islamic Bank Kenya (DIB), incorporated in 2016, is a subsidiary of the Dubai Islamic Bank PJSE (AE) and a relative newcomer to the Kenyan market. All three are physical banks that offer dif­ ferent products and services including personal and savings accounts, perso­ nal finance, business, trade and house finance as well as microcredit. The Medina Islamic Finance which has just entered the Kenyan market claims to

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be a disruptor in Islamic finance in Africa. It is a branchless, digital platform that promotes itself as targeting youth and women in urban and rural areas to provide microfinance. While all banks are governed through the country’s banking regulations, a major difference between Islamic and conventional banks are the Shar­ iah advisory bodies that supervise their operations. In relation to the motivation for customer preference for Islamic financial/banking products over those offered by the conventional banking system, respondents to the survey affirmed that it was for religious and ethical reasons as well as for suitability that customers choose their products over those offered by other financial institutions. Adhering to Islamic principles in relation to their depositing, borrowing and investing of money is a core motivating factor for customers who prefer to bank with Islamic banks. One respondent confirmed that their bank’s core principles are based on forms of ethical investing and lending which are what draw customers to their services: “[no] loans are possible unless they are interest-free. The ethical restric­ tions are the prohibition on alcohol and gambling and the consumption of pork. Islamic funds would not knowingly invest in companies involved in haram activities such as gambling, alcoholic beverages, or pork food pro­ ducts” (Respondent 1). Although religious orientation is a motivating factor, the differentiation in product and services is likely to attract larger target customer groups (Kas­ mani 2013). Product differentiation on the one hand fulfills customer needs, and on the other, gives the banks a share of the market not available to con­ ventional banks. In addition to current and savings accounts, the banks offer accounts for religious purposes such as for the hajj pilgrimage. The Labeyyk account offered by the FCB, and the Hajj account available at the GAB are savings accounts for Muslims to save for the hajj pilgrimage (one of the core pillars of faith for Muslims) or the umrah (a minor, non-obligatory pilgrim­ age). Customer perceptions about the Islamic nature of the products and ser­ vices are significantly important. The banks enhance these through appropriate brand images, messages and language. Promotional images show women in abayas and headscarfs, family and parenting, as well as children, placing an importance on key Islamic pro­ priety and family values. Messages include Islamic terms such as halal and Shariah to appeal to a Muslim target market. “Driven by ethics” (FCB), “Bringing Halal Microfinance to Africa” (Medina Digital Finance), “Your Values, Your Bank” (DIB) are taglines in marketing and promotion stra­ tegies employed by the banks. Also, messages about Muslim significant dates and celebrations posted on different media send culturally sensitive communications as do community engagement activities such as the dis­ tribution of food items to the needy and almsgiving in the month of Ramadhan. As part of its corporate social responsibility, the GAB has an independent foundation that engages with communities, schools and other institutions to promote health and education programs consistent with

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Islamic principles of addressing humanitarian issues. Islamic societal obli­ gations expressed by Respondent 1 show the bank’s ethos goes beyond the economic ideology of not just dealing with interest: “In Islam there is a sense of cooperation, that we must help one another according to the principles of our religion and aim to remove exploitation and harm. We need to establish a compassionate society in our transac­ tions not only in general muamlat but also through the operations of our financial institutions.” (Respondent 1) While it can be argued that the banks are applying conventional marketing techniques to create brand affiliations, through these a holistic approach that proposes to meet the spiritual, social and economic needs of customers emerges as part of a broader set of values that would appeal to Muslim customers. All three physical banks have customised accounts for women. The FCB offers the Lulu account, the GAB, the Annissa, and the DIB, the Malkia accounts which are all promoted as catering for women’s needs. While they are similar in most ways to other deposit current and savings accounts, a common feature across them is minimal operating balances, set-up fees and transaction costs which can incentivise women to take up the offers. Though women in general believe in the benefits of savings, studies show that there are varied responses to monetary costs related to account access and main­ tenance. Such costs include initial deposits needed to open an account, mini­ mum cash balances required to keep an account open, account maintenance charges, and charges for making deposits and/or withdrawals. In some set­ tings, these costs also include time, travel and expenses for items such as identification documents needed to complete the required paperwork (Buvinic and Jaluka 2018; Knowles 2018). Although services for women are available at all Islamic banks, the FCB has dedicated a floor that services female customers solely. The GAB has two branches, one in Nairobi’s Eastleigh suburb and the other in Mombasa’s Bon­ deni area, that service only female customers. Both these locations are com­ mercial hubs in the two cities, with large concentrations of Muslims residing and many female-led small businesses and retail outlets. A visit to the Bondeni branch of Annissa (translates as “The Woman” in Arabic and takes its name from a chapter of the Quran) in Mombasa in 2019 established that it is a women’s-only banking space. Visiting the bank, the author observed a small but busy, cramped banking hall with pulsating activity where the demand for services seemed to exceed the space. Women in abayas and hijab or niqab were highly engaged and absorbed in accessing the services. The women appeared self-assured about their dealings with the staff and were observed articulating their needs confidently. They were being served by tellers and other staff that were all female in similar clothing. Except for the guard and a male accom­ panying one female customer, all those present were women.

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Personal communication with a senior staff member revealed that most of the customers were businesswomen from the surrounding commercial area; that 60% of the micro, small and medium sized businesses (MSMEs) in the area are owned by women who are engaged in enterprises trading in clothing, food, hair and beauty salons as well as manufacturing. For their business purposes, women borrow unsecured loans (murabaha) ranging from 15 thou­ sand (approximately $145 USD) to one million Kenya shillings (approxi­ mately $9700 USD) and are not likely to default on these. Murabaha is a cost-plus mark-up sale contract – a contract where the bank purchases a particular asset or raw material and charges a mark-up on the cost price. Therefore, as a contract, the bank, rather than advancing money to a bor­ rower, buys the goods from a third party and sells those goods to the custo­ mer at a profit (Jamaldeen 2012). Services are also provided to women at the other branches too and the survey respondents highlighted the importance placed on servicing female clients to promote the MSME sector: “[M]ost branches are in major towns in Kenya. We have women-only branches in areas where we have a high number of women traders.” (Respondent 3) “Women are offered unsecured finance; a product is also available for the smallest businesses like food and vegetables vendors where they are given small loans for their businesses.” (Respondent 4) “Banking on Women program provides financing and expertise to an extensive network of institutions and retail customers to help them acquire women-owned small and medium enterprises and profitably finance them.” (Respondent 1) This is crucial not only for fulfilling individual financial aspirations, but also in relation to Kenya’s development growth drivers. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS 2016), the country’s micro, small and medium enterprise sectors have long been known for their role in generating employment and effectively alleviating poverty. A KNBS survey in 2016, showed that there were nearly 7.5 million micro, small and medium businesses in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy (KNBS 2016, 25). Owned by both men and women, most of these were operated at the house­ hold level. Overall, the MSMEs were owned by sole proprietors (KNBS 2016, 34) and about 46% were reported to have closed within one year of their operations. The main reason for not being able to sustain businesses beyond this period was the shortage of funds due to increased operating expenses, declining incomes and losses incurred from the businesses. Those owned by women also suffered lack of longevity because of care giving responsibilities. Traditional sources for financing MSMEs have pivoted around personal sav­ ings, loans from friends and family, and other informal means of raising funds (Mwangi 2016). To bridge the unmet financing demand and encourage

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greater bank-led financing, the Kenyan government has increased its focus on the MSME sector through lending and credit facilitation programs and the private sector also plays a significant role in meeting the demand. In terms of value added, it is estimated that MSMEs contribute around 28.5% of the total economy (Mwangi 2016). This vital contribution is recog­ nised in Kenya’s Vision 2030 launched in 2008 – the development blueprint which seeks to transform Kenya into an industrialised middle-income country by the year 2030 (Kenya Vison 2030 n.d.). The MSME sector has been iden­ tified and prioritised as a key growth driver for achievement of the develop­ ment plan. One respondent emphasised support for women in small businesses by linking it to the broader Kenyan government initiative of sup­ porting women, young people and people with a disability: “The biggest opportunity for women-owned businesses is in procurement where 30% of government spend has been allocated to women, youth and persons with disability. The biggest challenge is access to unsecured financing, and information about procurement access by women” (Respondent 2). Launched in 2013, the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) is a Kenyan government initiative committed to empower the coun­ try’s women, youth and persons with a disability through opportunities for public procurement in doing business with the government. There is a legal requirement for government procuring bodies to set aside 30% procurement opportunities specifically for enterprises owned by these groups (Government of Kenya 2019). To engage and spread such information, in 2017, the GAB held a gender equality and inclusivity in supply chains’ forum attended by around 200 women entrepreneurs in Mombasa. A key pledge from this was the bank’s commitment to increase its own women suppliers to at least 20% by the end of 2017. The bank reports that since the workshop, several participants felt more confident and have started to apply for tenders both with GAB and other companies, including government entities (Khan 2017). While all the banks engage with their custo­ mers through their online presence, the GAB has a website solely for women’s banking and related services. Through the Annissa website, the bank offers local networking opportunities, posts motivating accounts of female empowerment, female entrepreneurship and also family matters. In the contemporary digital era, the growth of mobile banking has led to many banks revising their models to serve their customers. Mutinda (2018) points out that digitisation and the use of third-party infrastructure, as well as self-service devices have transformed the banking experience in Kenya. With technology continually defining the daily running of businesses in Kenya and the financial technology sector among the fastest growing, Islamic banks are also leveraging on these innovations and technologies to reach a larger

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market. Although they have regional branches and localised banking services, these banks cater largely for an urban population. All three physical banks have mobile and Internet banking to increase their market reach. The digital finance platform, Medina Digital Finance’s entire operations draw on part­ nerships, existing banking infrastructure such as ATMs, existing mobile pay­ ment infrastructure and established global payment entities. All the products and services are to be offered exclusively through mobile banking, mobile agents and agencies. Mobile money transfers in Kenya have increased expo­ nentially and the Central Bank of Kenya data shows that mobile money transactions stood at Sh3.98 trillion ($38.5 billion) in 2018 having increased 10% from 2017 (Rolfe 2019, para 1) and services are available in rural and regional areas too. In countries such as Kenya these modes are crucial to reach many poor customers, including women, as well as small enterprises that operate in the rural and regional areas. As currently, the fully fledged Islamic banks are largely urban based, their reach is limited in making a dif­ ference in addressing the broader issues of female financial inclusion. Lever­ ing on existing financial technology infrastructures, there is the potential of penetrating into rural settings as the Medina digital platform intends to do. Access to such services in rural areas could to some extent address the rural– urban divide in economic activity. Although women-focused services and segregated banks are new in Kenya, they are very common in the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan where services are provided to women by women. Women-only banking is not just restricted to Muslim nations. In recent times, banks catering for female spe­ cific banking needs operate in India (Bharatiya Mahila Bank) which pre­ dominantly loans to women and also employs mostly women. These banks offer a unique opportunity for women to participate in the banking system in line with their needs as well as values and principles, and at the same time allow them to be included in the finance system. It is clear that the role of spiritual and religious values cannot be divorced from the choice of banking and financial services. While Islamic finance and women-focused banking are highly promising in Kenya, they are not without challenges. The following section outlines these and offers some means of addressing the identified challenges.

Challenges of Islamic banking uptake The survey responses showed that around 20–50% of the bank clients at dif­ ferent branches are female, and although there is adequate awareness of the availability of financial services for women, there is limited interest. The low uptake of the services can be attributed to a number of factors. The demand for them can be constrained by women not being primary income generators in the household. Many women have shared accounts and therefore are not the primary applicants or users of the accounts. Also, not all of the target market is necessarily satisfied with the services offered by Islamic banks. One

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respondent from a regional branch shared two further reasons – low incomes and religious constraints on female business activities, for the low uptake: “Most women are low income earners and have little or no money to save. Some communities believe that women should only be housewives, thus do not educate them neither do they let them work. This has increased the poverty level of women in particular since they do not get employed and are not learned to create their own… Very few Muslim women are in business due to religious constraints; thus the uptake of credit facilities is low as they do not qualify. Most have small businesses which do not generate enough income to bank thus prefer women groups or merry-go rounds [borrowing through saving circles to finance needs].” (Respondent 5) Many Muslim women in particularly rural Kenya women are deprived of income generation where poverty as well as ingrained traditional values not only bar them from getting an education or owning assets, but also con­ strain them from earning an income. Those that do engage in economic activity are either in very low value sectors or have limited resources to upscale their ventures. Not having access to other forms of saving, they use what are commonly known as rotating savings and credit which are local groups where peers come together to save and lend within their groups. The KNBS 2016 survey showed that the main source of capital for 80.6% of unlicensed MSMEs was family and friends and only 0.8% borrowed from banks. This survey also showed that 1.1% of unlicensed MSMEs rely on rotating credit circles for their capital (Mwangi, 2016, 15). As all the Islamic banks are primarily located in urban areas, they currently do not reach the wider population. However, with newcomers coming into the sector, such as the Medina digital finance platform, there is the potential to reach a wider target market. Another challenge has been the complexity of understanding Islamic banking and finance. As the reference points are still entrenched in the con­ ventional financial system that is based on interest in banking, the transition to complex financing and deposit modes based on a religious economic system (which are markedly different from the conventional economic system) is not easy and hard to comprehend. While there is some attempt to explain Islamic finance terms and terminology through website communication and verbal exchanges, the system relies a lot on trusting the information put forth by the banks as well as the belief in the expertise of the Shariah boards advising the bank operations. Except for the DIB, all other banks and institutions have internal advisory boards. Being a subsidiary of the Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE, these responsibilities at the DIB are carried out by an advisory body based in the UAE. Islamic scholars on these boards approve financial products, offer advisory services, train the stakeholders, resolve Shariah commercial disputes

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and exercise oversight on the implementation of their endorsements. The respondents shared that the uptake of products was also affected by scant regulatory infrastructure and the lack of harmonisation of the Shariah stan­ dards across the sector. A further issue faced by the Islamic financial institu­ tions is not having qualified staff fully conversant with the principles of Islamic finance to adequately deliver products based on them. Personal communication with four respondents showed that their qualifications were not related to Islamic banking or finance and that they received professional development as part of their employment. Together, these create poor per­ ceptions about the products and are likely not to appeal to those who find them too complex or have not established the trust in the scholars to take their endorsements at face value. To this end Kasmani (2013) and Abdulkadir (2018) point out the need for civic education as well as standardisation across the sector, which brings into question the integrity of some products based on varied interpretations of the underlying Shariah principles. Such challenges are also acknowledged in the wider sector globally, where there is concern over Shariah regulations between countries and within countries. According to World Finance (2017, para 8), “[a]lthough Islamic financing regulators, such as the Accounting and Auditing Orga­ nisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board, have been very active in recent years, differences still exist”. The issue of addressing standardisation is crucial to realise the full potential and the desired impact for the economy. At the same time, a key element in ensuring the integrity of the system is to proactively engage with people about the core features of Islamic finance products and ser­ vices for future development of the sector. Abdulkadir (2018) points out that some of these concerns are being addressed through private stake­ holders but need deeper engagement of various parties including renowned Islamic scholars well-versed in Islamic economic principles at the global level. This is an important aspect of maintaining credibility as the global sector has matured enough to have an indicator (Islamic Finance Devel­ opment Indicator) that rates countries not only on quantitative develop­ ment, but also on knowledge, governance, corporate social responsibility and awareness (ICD and Thomas Reuters 2018).

Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the importance of religious values in the multilayered issue of financial inclusion of Muslim women in Kenya. As much as the stability of financial systems is important, their suitability is also increas­ ingly recognised in development discourse. In its exploration of women’s inclusion, the study has uncovered the practical challenges of the Kenyan Islamic finance market including the competitiveness in the sector and how the services are designed and what they mean for women. One area high­ lighted in this study is the significance of finance for female-led micro, small

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and medium enterprises provided through culturally appropriate services as Islamic banks also acknowledge raising the entrepreneurial potential of women engaged in such enterprises. However, it is unclear as to how the availability of Islamic finance particularly would impact upon uptake within the broader population. Further research in this area is needed to explore the competitiveness in relation to conventional finance and to what extent moral principles appeal and impact upon preferences to access and use Islamic finance. Overall, more understanding is needed on religion and values as underpinning financial systems that can be appealing to women as well as men for their financial inclusion in the contemporary economic world.

References Abdulkadir, Jaffer Sheikh. 2018. “Why Islamic Finance is Yet to Realise Its Full Potential in Kenya.” Business Daily. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/ ideas/4259414-4643122-77gdmb/index.html Askari, Hossein, Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor. 2014. Introduction to Islamic Economics: Theory and Application. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Bohi, Shajahan. 2017. “Enhancing Women Entrepreneurship though Islamic Microfinance in Bangladesh.” International Conference on Education, Business and Management (ICEBM-2017), Bali (Indonesia), January 8–9, 2017. http://heaig.org/ images/proceedings_pdf/H0117516.pdf Buvinic, Mayra and Tanvi Jaluka. 2018. Mindful Saving: Exploring the Power of Savings for Women. Evidence-based Report Series on Women’s Economic Empow­ erment. Washington DC: Centre for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/p ublication/mindful-saving-exploring-power-savings-women#what-works CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). n.d. The World Factbook: Kenya. https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, Saniya Ansar and Jake Hess. 2018. The Global Findex Database 2017. Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/ Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Thorston Beck and Patrick Honohan. 2008. Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC: The International Bank for Development and Reconstruction/The World Bank. https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099 583-1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf Domat, Chloe. 2018. “Islamic Finance: Just for Muslim-Majority Nations?” Global Finance: Global news and insight for corporate financial professionals. https://www. gfmag.com/topics/blogs/islamic-finance-just-muslim-majority-nations Gincherman, Anna. 2013. “Designing Women Focused Financial Products: Women’s World Banking Approach.” Women’s World Banking. https://www.slideshare.net/ womensworldbanking/anna-gincherman Government of Kenya. 2019. “Access to Government Procurement Opportunities.” Government of Kenya. https://agpo.go.ke/ Hasan, Aznan. 2011. Fundamentals of Shariah in Islamic Finance. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IBFIM.

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Mohammed Yatim, Mohammed Nasir, Amirul Hafiz Mohammed Nasir. 2007. The Principles and Practice of Islamic Banking and Finance. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pearson Prentice Hall Mutinda, Stanley. 2018. “Kenyan Banks Feel the Pain – and Now Some Gains – From Digitization.” BFA. https://medium.com/f4life/kenyan-banks-feel-the-pain-a nd-now-some-gains-from-digitization-ba2d6bef473e Mwangi, Zachary. 2016. The 2016 National Micro, Small and Medium Establishment (MSME) Survey: Highlights of Basic Report. http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index. php/catalog/91 Mwaniki, Charles. 2017. “IMF Warns Kenya of Loopholes in Islamic Banking Reg­ ulation.” Business Daily. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/IMF-warns-Ke nya-risk-Islamic-banks/539546-3981960-jbhr1pz/index.html Rolfe, Alex. 2019. “Mobile Money Transactions Equivalent of Half of Kenya’s GDP.” Payments Industry Intelligence: Payment Cards and Mobiles. https://www.paym entscardsandmobile.com/mobile-money-transactions-half-of-kenyas-gdp/ Rulindo, Roland and Ataul Haq Pramanik. 2013. “Finding a Way to Enhance Impact of Islamic Microfinance: The Role of Spiritual and Religious Enhancement Programmes.” Developing Country Studies, 3(7): 41–53. https://pdfs.semanticscholar. org/8674/38fe52c50dd32fbdb55a31ab7cfbb5970023.pdf Rulindo, Ronald, and Amy Mardhatillah. 2011. “Spirituality, Religiosity and Economic Performances of Muslim MicroEntrepreneurs.” 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, December 19–21, 2011. Doha, Qatar: Center for Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Qatar Foundation. http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Ronald-Rulindo.pdf Salim, Islam Mohammed. 2017. “Expanding the Islamic Financial Services Frontier: Lessons from Islamic Finance Sector in Kenya.” Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, 5(1): 1–6. doi:0.15640/jibf.v5n1a1 Sharma, Dipasha. 2016. “Nexus Between Financial Inclusion and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Emerging Indian Economy.” Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 8(1): 13–36. doi:10.1108/JFEP-01-2015-0004 The Economist, Intelligence Unit. 2015. Mapping Africa’s Islamic Economy. A report by Economist Intelligence Unit. The Economist. https://eiuperspectives.economist. com/sites/default/files/MappingAfricasIslamicEconomy.pdf World Finance. 2017. “ICSFS: Islamic Banking Must be Standardised.” World Finance, The Voice of the Market. https://www.worldfinance.com/banking/icsfc-i slamic-banking-must-be-standardised

12 The influence of religion on the empowerment and economic mobility of smallholder women dairy farmers in Nigeria Nathalie Gogue Ebo, Ifeoma Umunna and Jesudunsin Osinaike Introduction Hajia Rakiya ‘Lami’ Abubakar and Hajia Zubaida Abubakar are highly educated working Muslim women in Northern Nigeria. Zubaida is a lawyer and Lami holds a BSc in Biological Science as well as a degree from the prestigious Lagos Business School. The two women are both wives of Alhaji Muhammadu Damakka Abubakar, with whom they have equal shares of and run a prominent dairy and poultry company called L&Z Integrated Farms in Kano, Nigeria. As their husband has recounted in numerous instances, their initials form the name of the company and he is the “&”, that binds things together. Zubaida served twice as a Commissioner in the Kano State government. Lami’s and Zubaida’s stories are somewhat uncommon in the region and in the communities that they operate in, in Northern Nigeria. In fact, the smallholder women dairy farmers that they source their milk from live a different reality. Hajia Binta Shehu and Hajia Yarali Shehu live 10 km from Lami and Zubaida. They are the two wives of Alhaji Muhammadu Shehu. Up until 2017, they were nomadic smallholder dairy farmers moving across the region with their husband and community. They recently settled in Behun, on a government reserve in Kano State and supply milk daily to L&Z. This chapter examines various factors that Northern Muslim smallholder women dairy farmers including Binta and Yarali face and how issues such as their decision-making capacity and access to productive resources including land, farm machinery and financial services impact their empowerment and their ability to exercise agency. While these issues cut across smallholder women dairy farmers in rural settings in the South, the socioeconomic dis­ parities between Northern and Southern Nigeria and more significantly the influence and interpretation of religion (Islam) in the North, often compound and exacerbate these challenges. Such factors impact on their productivity, ability to make decisions as well as inhibit effective participation in the formal dairy value chain (Okojie 1991; Damisa and Yohanna 2007; Rahman 2008; NPC and ICF 2019).

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Based on a gender study conducted on Muslim Fulani women dairy farmers in Oyo and Kano states, Nigeria, this chapter discusses the impact of religion on women farmers’ role in the dairy value chain and their empowerment and agency. Through this chapter, we examine the argument that based on the structure of the local dairy value chain and the critical role that these women play, improving their participation in and contribution to the formal dairy value chain is dependent on positive changes in cultural and religious norms that can enable them to be actively involved in agricultural decision making.

Same country, different worlds: North and South Nigeria Nigeria has experienced a steady increase in its GDP; in 2018 it stood at $397.27 billion (World Bank 2019). However, this growth has not been inclusive, nor has it been evenly distributed between the North and South. The Northern and Southern regions of Nigeria are distinctively different; often characterised through the lens of religion. They also differ in terms of population growth, size of investments per capita, presence of internal con­ flicts, educational attainment level, and gender parity, all of which contribute substantially to the Muslim North being poorer and undernourished com­ pared to the majorly Christian South (Westoff and Ejembi 2016; BMGF 2018; Dapel 2018). High (and increasing) population growth in the North can be in part attributed to the Islamic practice of polygamy in which a man can have up to four wives. High fertility rates coupled with the fact that Northern women also tend to get married younger have an impact on increasing population growth; the median age at their first marriage is 16.8 years compared to 22 years in the South. Moreover, fertility rates are higher in the North, with women having on average five children compared to the four children their Southern counterparts will have (NPC and ICF 2019). They are also less educated with 57% of Northern women having no education compared to 8% of Southern women (Ejembi et al. 2005). The case of Lami, Zubaida, Binta and Yarali indicates however that Islam can have different outcomes for Northern women when they are educated. On another note, in terms of investments, the South directs more resources to social services provision than the North. Although oil makes up 75% of the government’s revenues, oil producers as well as companies in other growing sectors such as financial services, telecommunication, technology, consumer packaged goods etc. are all concentrated in the South (Watts 2013). The South also has on average 2.3 times more investment per capita than the North, fur­ ther explaining the disparity in health and education prospects between the two regions (Dapel 2018). Furthermore, internal conflicts and clashes between nomadic herdsmen and agrarian communities over grazing land as well as continued insurgency have curtailed economic activity in the North, including in the agriculture sector, and have increased population displacement, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition levels (Adesoji and Adewumi 2018).

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Finally, gender disparities including in labour force participation, income and wages, educational and literacy levels are also very visible across both regions. Gaps in gender outcomes are significantly higher in the North than in the South. For instance, the income gender gap in the North is more than double that in the South; 46% compared to 17% (BMGF 2018). This dis­ parity is partly due to the greater degree of mobility that Southern women have, and which gives them more access to local markets to sell their goods and products, control their sales and income compared to Northern Muslim women (BMGF 2018). This is demonstrated for instance through seclusion (purdah), an Islamic practice that restricts women from going outside their household, especially for work (Coles and Mack 1991; Callaway and Cree­ vey 1994; Zakaria 2001; Adesoji 2010). The practice has been adopted in recent years in Northern Nigeria, especially in areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgencies. Studies have shown that there are similar productivity gaps between men and women in the North and South due to factors such as women’s limited access to productive resources, to finance and to male family labour (Phillip et al. 2009; Alahira 2014). However, in the North, in addition to the aforementioned factors, gender dynamics due to cultural norms (based on people’s understanding and interpretation of Islamic teachings) further worsen the productivity gaps in the predominantly Muslim region; differing in comparison to the Southern part of Nigeria (BMGF 2018). According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2017), the agricultural sector’s contribution to the Nigerian GDP is about 21%. The sector employs about 30% of the working population, most of whom are women (Fapohunda 2012; IFAD 2016). Women play a central role in food production, sustainable food security and economic growth. Nevertheless, their contribution and participation in agriculture production systems are often unpaid, under­ estimated and largely ignored in measuring economic growth in Nigeria (Adekanye 1984; Babatunde et al. 2008; FAO, IFAD and ILO 2010). Existing literature on gendered labour force participation and employment of Muslim women especially in the agriculture sector, reveals that the deter­ minants of partaking are influenced by the patriarchal gender division of labour often institutionalised through social and cultural norms, and religion, rather than by their capabilities (Moghadam 1998; Spierings 2014). Within the Nigerian context, there too is a gendered division of labour in most societies, impacting women’s economic participation and labour force con­ tribution and this also applies in the agricultural sector (Callaway and Cree­ vey 1994).

Women’s role in the livestock subsector in Nigeria Women smallholder farmers play a critical role in the livestock subsector, which represents 7.5% of the Nigerian agriculture sector (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). The country has the fourth largest cattle population in

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Africa, estimated at 20 million cattle; 2.46 million of which are used for dairy production (FAO 2014). It is important to note that in a country like Nigeria that continues to face food limitations and hunger challenges, animal husbandry is an extremely important aspect of food and nutrition to the survival of millions of Nigerians. The subsector is mostly dominated by Fulani pastoralists, who practice cattle rearing. Fulani are mainly nomadic and often migrate across the country in search of water and better grazing opportunities for their cattle. Fulani, along with Hausas are the majority tribes represented in Northern Nigeria (Coles and Mack 1991; Zakaria 2001). However, some Fulani and Hausa livestock farmers have migrated to and settled in the South where they learn the local language of the indigen­ ous Southern communities while simultaneously maintaining their cultural and religious customs and traditions. Fulani are predominantly of the Sunni Muslim sect, with Islam largely influencing their social and cultural life (Ibrahim, Bello and Ibrahim 2009). Various studies such as Lockett and Grivetti (2000), Harris (1999) and Ndukwe (1995), on pastoral farming among the Fulani in Nigeria show that traditionally, men’s role and primary source of income is herd rearing and management (Callaway 1987). Meanwhile women’s role, primary economic occupation and source of income is dairy production, including milking the herd, processing, marketing and selling milk and dairy products. In essence, men own and control the cattle, while women own and control the milk (Mortimore and Adams 1999; Babatunde et al. 2008; Ibrahim, Bello and Ibrahim 2009; Ogwumike and Akinnibosun 2013). This emphasises the role of adult men as herd owners and managers, male children and adolescents as herdsmen while adult women are the custodians of milk, with the support of adolescent girls (Sahel 2018). As the bulk of Fulani women’s labour or input is usually in small-scale dairy processing of various small products such as milk, butter, and cheese, their ability to perform and contribute to the large-scale value chain or formal dairy business remains limited (Osotimehin et al. 2006; FAO 2011). They face similar challenges to their productivity and livelihoods as rural women in other agricultural sub-sectors in the South (Phillip et al. 2009). These challenges are however further exacerbated by gendered norms and relations in Muslim communities, which often see women lacking more autonomy and agency outside the household. The challenges have implica­ tions for Fulani smallholder women dairy farmers’ economic and labour opportunities and ultimately hamper the inclusive development of the local dairy value chain.

Case study background The case study presented in this chapter is based on a gender analysis of Fulani smallholder dairy households in two states in Nigeria – Kano State in the North and Oyo State in the South.

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Smallholder dairy farmers are an important and essential part of the agri­ cultural sector in Nigeria, contributing to economic growth, food production and food security. They also contribute to meeting local dairy demands and provide household income and a means of livelihood for many rural families. Although smallholder dairy production and processing has evolved due to industrialisation and technological advances, creating overall improved stan­ dards of milk processing, production and marketing among smallholder dairy farmers around the world, progress remains slow in Nigeria in comparison to other countries. Due to the issues of low quality milk, poor collection, hand­ ling and transportation challenges, the local dairy market remains largely unable to meet demand. Therefore the country relies on significant importa­ tion of milk and other processed dairy products to meet its demands (Ogbimi & Oyewale 2000; Akinyosoye 2007). The study was conducted in 2018 as part of the Nigeria Dairy Development Programme (NDDP). The NDDP is a processor-led dairy program imple­ mented by Sahel Consulting Agriculture and Nutrition Limited (Sahel 2018) in partnership with two leading dairy processors, the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Kano and Oyo states’ governments. The program aims to enhance the livelihoods of participating smallholder dairy farmers by improv­ ing their productivity and integrating them into the formal dairy value chain. Given the critical role that Muslim Fulani women play in the chain, the program has a gender component seeking to improve their livelihoods and their communities’ nutrition outcomes. To that end, Sahel commissioned a study that examined gender relations, norms, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and practices among participating smallholder dairy communities in order to inform the design of interventions to improve the inclusion and empowerment of Fulani women dairy farmers. More specifically, the study aimed to under­ stand how gender relations impact women’s economic empowerment and productivity in smallholder dairy households; understand and analyse gender roles, dynamics and power differentials in these communities; identify and analyse gendered vulnerabilities and structural norms that affect dairy pro­ duction; identify existing support structures and understand the dynamics of community structures that support or undermine participating women’s efforts for economic empowerment. The study employed a mixed method design of quantitative and quali­ tative research methodologies. It integrated a formal qualitative survey tool – the Abbreviated Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (A­ WEAI), with Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Inter­ views (KIIs) and direct observations. The A-WEAI, the first comprehen­ sive and standardised measure to directly capture women’s empowerment and inclusion levels in the agricultural sector, was developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Inter­ national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) (IFPRI 2012). This tool measures five domains of empowerment (5DE):

200 a b c d e

N. Gogue Ebo, I. Umunna, J. Osinaike decision-making power over agricultural production;

ownership, access to and decision-making power over productive

resources; decision making over the use of income; participation in the community; and workload.

The study was conducted on 515 dairy households across nine local gov­ ernment areas in Kano and Oyo States, Nigeria. These households were within the local government target areas of the two dairy processing com­ panies working on the NDDP program. In Kano, the study covered 16 communities in four clusters – Kura, Dawakin Kudu, Gezawa, and Garun Mallam. In Oyo State, the study covered 17 communities and 24 settlements in five clusters – Saki, Alaga, Maya, Fasola, and Iseyin. The survey sample involved 1,115 respondents from Kano and Oyo states; 539 were male and 576 were female. The survey was administered to the head of the household (mostly men) and their first wife, as it is customary that the first wife has the most decision-making power. Study participants were selected using purpo­ sive sampling. To complement the quantitative analysis and gather addi­ tional insights, 15 FGDs, ten KIIs and direct field observations were also conducted. A strong limitation within this study was the fact that the survey was not administered to all wives within the focus areas due to lack of capacity. Thus, it is unclear whether the findings may differ if the second, third and/or fourth wives, those who historically have less decision-making power, were interviewed. All survey instruments were administered in local languages. Qualitative data was transcribed and translated from the local languages Hausa/Yoruba to English by competent third parties to minimise bias. The data was coded, and emergent themes were developed. Ethical considerations were observed by the study team to ensure confidentiality and safety of all respondents and communities. The team engaged male and female groups separately in accordance with the cultural practices in Fulani communities. Consent for participation was sought, and consent forms were verbally read out to the participants in their local language. The findings and recommendations made in this chapter are tailored for the target study population of Muslim Fulani smallholder dairy farmers. This limitation means that caution must be used when utilising the presented findings and recommendations on a broader sample set that differs in nature, culture, and characteristics than those of the study population.

Findings The study showed that the intertwining of factors such as religion and cul­ tural norms was prevalent and clearly influences the behaviour and way of life of both men and women in Muslim Fulani smallholder dairy households

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in both states and consequently the women’s contribution to economic development. Most respondents indicated that religion influences their per­ sonal, family choices and dynamics, gender roles and division of labour, as well as decisions about their businesses. Table 12.1 highlights the key char­ acteristics affecting the lives of the smallholder dairy farmers who partici­ pated in the study.

Table 12.1 Study respondents demographics disaggregated by gender

Total sample size of 1,115 (Kano & Oyo, Nigeria)

More than one spouse (polygamy)

Leader of household No formal education Ownership of livestock Ownership of land Ownership of bank accounts & access to credit facilities Control over use of income and resources

Decision-making power

Men

Women

49%

51%

58%

0%

97% 84% 93% 34% 9%

3%

91%

6%

10%

4%

Control all the income that comes into the household except income from the sale of milk and milk products. Main decision makers within household and community.

Control the income from sale of milk and milk products. They however lack agency over that income.1 Mainly restricted to child care and minor household expenditures.

Source: Sahel 2018

Households dynamics Religion, through its understanding and interpretation by the studied com­ munities, remains a strong factor that shapes their behaviour, gender dynam­ ics and interaction in the private and public sphere. The studied households are Fulani, predominantly practise Islam, and are engaged in polygynous marriages with an average of two wives per husband. They are also patri­ archal societies with women engaged in activities seen as less significant in comparison to the men’s. This patriarchy is a product of the traditional society, present across Nigeria, that enables men to dominate women based on material advantages given to males while simultaneously placing severe constraints on the roles and activities of females (Asiyanbola 2005; Koopman 1992). Male respondents in an FGD noted:

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N. Gogue Ebo, I. Umunna, J. Osinaike “We are all Muslims and whatever we told you earlier is drawn from Islam. Islam is our tradition, so you as a person cannot make any change even if you are not comfortable with it. It’s just a way of life, there are things God didn’t give you power over, you must learn to live with it.” (Men’s FGD, Oyo)

Over 90% of the study households are male-led, with the remaining led by widows, who tend to significantly rely on their older sons or extended family members for support. Most married women (80%) are in the labour market productive age group of 18 to 59. At the time of the study, they were all still actively engaged in reproduction as women of childbearing age or pregnant. Child marriage is rife within these communities, with adolescent girls having children as early as 14 years (Nwachuku 1996; Makama 2013). This is partly due to the belief that family and children are a blessing from Allah (God), a blessing that should occur once the girl child has reached puberty (El Hamri 2010). These beliefs and way of life lead women to bear children for much of their productive lives, leaving very little time for non-reproductive work. As such, the average household size of 8.6 among the study households in Kano is much larger than the Nigerian average household size of 5.9 (NPC and ICF 2019; National Bureau of Statistics 2017): “The three (3) children I have are not enough. I even want to marry more wives and have more children. Because if I have more children, I will have more money when they start working. Besides Prophet Mohammed allows it.” (Men’s FGD, Oyo). Access to formal education is also an important determinant of women’s empowerment. In most of the communities, literacy levels are extremely low, particularly among women, who have little or no access to formal education. In fact, education is seen as a luxury that girls are not perceived to need. Many parents believe that investing in a girl-child’s education is unnecessary because they are expected to marry at a young age and leave the home. Those who have formal education attended mainly Islamiyah schools, where they were taught about teachings from the Qur’an and the Muslim way of life. These communities thus continue to lack the needed level of secular education and training to support their economic upward mobility: “I wanted to go to school but my parents did not let me because they believe I am supposed to be at home and do housework. According to them, only boys are allowed to go to school.” (Adolescent Girl, FGD, Kano). Islamic cultural norms among these households also strongly influence the interactions between genders. Men and women gather and socialise separately,

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and women are strongly discouraged from interacting with men from outside of their community: “Actually, I won’t lie to you, women don’t have equal access to the mosque and village square. The women don’t sit with the men in the vil­ lage square. When you see a woman in the square, she has done some­ thing wrong that needs to be sorted, or she brings food to the men sitting there or she comes to pick used plates. They pray outside the mosques in the shade.” (Men’s FGD, Oyo). Gender norms and division of labour Within Islamic culture and religion, men and women have distinctly separate roles both inside and outside of the household (AfDB 2013; Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009; Makama 2013; Mohammed and Abdulquadri 2012). Women (including widows and adolescent girls) in the communities under study spend most of their time on unpaid work. They are entrusted with all household chores, and the care for the children and elderly. They are also tasked with caring for calves and sick animals. Their paid work revolves around dairy production, which includes milk production, processing and selling. Men meanwhile are viewed as the head of the household and responsible for the security of the family and livestock as well as activities outside of the home. Adolescent boys are treated as future leaders and heads of house and thus shadow older men and perform their tasks: “Our culture does not permit us to have the same roles” (Married ado­ lescent girls, FGD, Kano). “Women are supposed to take care of the household chores, cook and clean, care for children and elders.” (Women’s FDG, Kano). “Well, women are not expected to do much aside [from] their normal duties at home and selling [milk].” (Men’s FGD, Oyo). Decision-making power in agricultural production Given household dynamics in these communities, women’s decision-making power tends to be restricted to childcare and minor household expendi­ tures like food and daily consumables. This contrasts with the man of the house who is the main decision-maker for major decisions within and outside of the household. Religion, tradition and culture also hamper Fulani women dairy farmers’ decision-making power in agriculture pro­ duction. Crop farming is not commonly practiced among Fulani commu­ nities due to their limited access to land and nomadic lifestyle. When done, it is usually for household consumption. Almost 60% of women respondents indicated having no or limited input into decisions around food crop farming. Livestock, meanwhile, is the mainstay of Fulani

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communities. Men make most decisions regarding the rearing and sales of large livestock such as cattle: “… But for the men, we are the decision-makers and protectors. We protect both our lives and that of our cattle.” (Men’s FGD, Oyo). It should however be noted that some male respondents stated that despite clearly defined roles, they consult their wives before making a big decision. The first wife usually has the most power of all the women in the household. Women on their part noted consistently consulting their husbands before making decisions. In female-headed households, the woman has full authority over all household decisions, though she consults the family’s male relatives as needed: “I do not make decisions on my own because I need my husband’s input” (Married adolescent girl, FGD, Kano). Similar studies in the region support the findings of the NDDP Gender Study. For instance, Damisa and Yohanna (2007) using Zaria (a pre­ dominantly Muslim region) in Kaduna State of Nigeria as their case study examined the level of participation of rural women in decision making within different areas of agriculture and studied factors influencing their power and participation in processes pertaining to farm management. Damisa and Yohanna’s findings (2007) also showed that like NDDP, women’s participa­ tion in the decision-making process is minimal within agricultural production. Although there are studies that have found that a woman’s decision-making power regarding farm and agricultural production has the potential to increase when her income increases, it is however never to the level (or at the expense) of her male counterpart (Koopman 1983; Okojie 1991; Rahman and Alamu 2003). This further illustrates that while Muslim women smallholder dairy farmers have some decision-making power within the household and at times the farm, it is not at the level of the men. Access to and ownership of productive resources Access to and ownership of productive resources such as land, livestock, finance, extension services and training continue to be a challenge for smallholder dairy farmers, particularly women. Ownership of land is limited for both men and women in Fulani communities (Phillip et al. 2009). Women can get half of the land their male counterparts are entitled to through inheri­ tance. When owned, the land is typically in the husband’s name due to cul­ tural and religious beliefs (Malhotra, Schuler and Boender 2002). Participants within the study expressed their interpretations and understandings of Islam and how this is practiced in their everyday lives:

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“We don’t have land, not to even talk of our wives… We the Fulani pre­ dominantly follow the teaching and doctrine of Islam, so whatever we do is drawn from the Holy Book. So, what Islam doctrine gives the woman, we give them, but in Islam, women mostly don’t inherit land except in a situation where there is no man in the entire family. But if there is a man, he automatically inherits” (Men’s FGD, Oyo). “Normally a woman does not own land. But if she does, the land is not identified as hers rather it is identified as her husband’s.” (Women’s FGD, Kano). Large livestock (cattle) are also primarily owned by the men. There are instances in which women own cattle (6% of respondents), usually through inheritance or as part of their dowry. However, this ownership does not translate into decision-making power because women’s cattle are often kept with the husband’s livestock. The woman is often only informed if the cow is pregnant, has given birth, or is old and needs to be sold. Women tend to have more ownership (37% of respondents) and control over small livestock such as goats and chicken. One respondent noted: “Some women own cows, but their husbands take care of them for her” (Women’s KII, Oyo). In addition to women lacking basic literacy and financial literacy skills, they have less access than men to finance, loans and formal credit services as well as to other productive assets such as cell phones, further restricting them from full productivity (Afolabi 2008). This is compounded by the lack of effective means of transportation and mobility. Additionally, women lack access to extension, training and agricultural information partially due to their remote rural locations, low literacy levels and social norms disallowing them from what is perceived as Western education and interactions with “outsiders” (Coles and Mack 1991; Chikwendu and Arokoyo 1997; Damisa and Yohanna 2007). These factors ultimately impact women’s productivity and efficiency. Control over use of income Income in Fulani households is typically derived from sale of cattle, milk and dairy products. Women traditionally are understood to be able to control and make decisions around dairy production and handle the proceeds from the sale of the products. The women usually use their income for minor house­ hold purchases and for their personal needs. Most female respondents how­ ever indicated typically consulting their husband or male guardian prior to making major decisions, putting in question whether Fulani women truly have autonomous decision-making power regarding the use of their income (Ludgate 2015). This contrasts with men who have autonomous control over their income. Cultural norms however dictate that men provide the money for food purchases:

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N. Gogue Ebo, I. Umunna, J. Osinaike “The women handle the money from selling the milk product and it’s used for daily cooking and buying some household materials such as soap and other things.” (Women FGD, Oyo). “As the man in the house, I always take decisions within my house­ hold, but sometimes seek the consent of the elder ones in the commu­ nities before taking such decisions.” (Men’s FGD Oyo).

Traditionally, men have had little interest and knowledge of women’s gains from milk production. However, in recent times due to households getting integrated into formal dairy processors’ supply chains, men have better visi­ bility into their wives’ earnings as they often act as intermediaries between their wives and the dairy processors. They transport the milk to the collection centres, and often coordinate the financial exchange between the processors and the women. They are also increasingly getting involved in price negotia­ tion decisions. Male respondents during focus group discussions highlighted preferring their wives to stay close to the homestead and travelling only within walking distance from the household and never unaccompanied, using the Islamic practice of seclusion (purdah). This inhibits their control over quality, price, and timely payment and consequently the control they have over their dairy business and related income as well as their participation and impact on the formal dairy value chain: “Our wives do not go out for no reason without the consent of their husbands.” (NDDP Men’s FGD, Kano). Moreover, as the income generated from milk sales is usually invested in buying household needs and consumables it is not ploughed back into the business. Women do not have any direct or significant ability in farm decisionmaking processes or management of the herds; their productivity or income is determined by how well the men feed and manage the cattle to produce enough milk. Group membership and participation While both women and men have support structures in the community, the formalised organisations tend to favour men and sometimes exclude women, which might be as a result of clear division of gender roles and expectations as well as cultural norms that tend to segregate women. As a result, Fulani women’s membership structures remain mostly informal and disconnected from opportunities which poses further challenges to the goal of promoting the empowerment of their members. Men have more support from structured systems such as cooperative societies and associations who can provide financial support and other resources while women rely on their social sys­ tems and networks. Although the associations are less formal and structured, they are often democratic in nature. Their potential can be harnessed and

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extended into more formal and structured associations that can support women’s empowerment and improve their productivity. The case study supports key findings from the literature review as it indi­ cates that Northern Muslim Fulani women such as Binta and Yarali typically face challenges around ownership of and access to productive resources, decision, authority etc., which are exacerbated by cultural norms (based on people’s understanding and interpretation of Islamic teachings). Two main insights seem to emerge when contrasting Lami’s and Zubaida’s stories with those of the women in the study. Lami’s and Zubaida’s success can be linked in part to their own capabilities including their education level, which is much higher than that of the average Northern woman. It is also in great part due to their husband’s exemplary support and championship, which plays a fun­ damental role in their achievements. These insights can thus be leveraged to inform recommendations to ensure greater inclusion and empowerment of Muslim Fulani women dairy farmers.

Recommendations Key factors contributing to the disempowerment of women in smallholder dairy households include limited input into major decision-making including reproductive health, limited access to credit and to formal group membership, as well as limited ownership of productive assets. Nevertheless, beyond addressing these factors, it is also critical to consider the way gender norms influenced by the way Islam is understood, interpreted and practised among these communities in order to foster greater inclusion and empowerment of women in smallholder dairy households. To that end, various interventions are needed. First, there is a strong need for Fulani women dairy farmers to get formally organised through the formation of self-help groups and their inclusion into existing dairy associations. These organisations can also be used as entry points for adult education, capacity building, technical and leadership training, to improve their productivity and access to resources, as well as their control and decision-making power over these resources. For instance, through the self-help groups, Fulani women can elect representatives and have direct access to and manage their relationships with processors in order to retain control of the dairy business. In addition, deliberate efforts should be made to recruit and train women within and outside of these communities as extension agents as well as staff within the processors’ organisations, given the restrictions around Fulani women engaging with men from outside their communities. Second, gender sensitive financial inclusion and income diversification interventions as well as adult literacy programs can be provided to these communities to improve the livelihoods of the women. Again, the self-help groups can be leveraged for these initiatives. Moreover, due to restrictions based on religion and cultural norms, they should be led by trained female agents that are known to and familiar with the communities.

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Furthermore, increased literacy levels and formal access to education is important for economic advancement, formal education should be incorpo­ rated into Islamic education for boys and girls. Also, financial education for women should also be encouraged to improve women’s understanding of the dairy formal chain and enhance their dealing with dairy processors. L&Z Integrated Farms for instance is a dairy processor that has recognised the aforementioned challenges and has created an incentive system to increase female literacy levels among the Fulani dairy communities they are sourcing milk from. More specifically, every household that sends their girls to school receives a premium price for their milk – an additional 20 Nigerian Naira per litre of milk sold to L&Z. The company also provides school kits to the children. The enrolled girls are monitored to ensure effective attendance, and the best student in each community is sponsored throughout their schooling years. Between 2008 and 2014, 60 girls from about 60 households benefitted from the school support program (Sahel 2018). Finally, but certainly not the least important, given the influence of patri­ archy, cultural norms and religion on household dynamics and decisionmaking patterns in Fulani communities, women’s empowerment cannot be achieved in these communities without an active involvement and support from the men. Faith-based organisations, especially Islamic institutions, community leaders and husbands are paramount and need to play a critical role in the advancement of women’s agency and empowerment in order to ultimately change the narrative around the role and economic contribution of women in these communities. Potential interventions to attract male support similar to that received by Lami and Zubaida for women such as Binta and Yarali include sensitising and educating community leaders and men in their communities on the benefits of female empowerment; engaging the men in open dialogue to identify potential reservations they raise against women being empowered in order to develop mitigation strategies to be incorporated in operationalising the outlined interventions. Interventions also include identifying and engaging “male advocates/champions” to support the estab­ lishment of the women self-help groups and other initiatives targeted at women and adolescent girls. In addition, for long-term change, young men and adolescent boys must be included into the behaviour change process. This means that, from an early age, boys should be taught differently about the role of women within their household and community as well as about the economic contribution women can have for the community and beyond. The opportunities for addressing these findings should occur with any future engagements by the dairy processors themselves and interested parties that embark on fostering a productive and empowering environment for the women in discussion. Additionally, the second phase of NDDP will scale to other Muslim communities across Nigeria and address these recommenda­ tions with proposed interventions aimed at enabling women in those com­ munities to participate to their full potential in the dairy value chain and improve their livelihoods.

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Conclusion This chapter contributes to the understanding of the challenges being faced by Muslim women in the agricultural sector and more specifically in the Nigerian dairy value chain. It has argued that the value chain, which is pre­ dominantly controlled by the Muslim Fulani of Northern descent, cannot reach its full potential until women in these communities gain agency and empowerment. The study outlined in this chapter found that Islamic culture and tradition fundamentally influence norms and behaviours in Fulani dairy communities and inhibit women’s empowerment and full participation in the sector. These underlying factors exacerbate issues contributing to their disempowerment, which include their limited ownership of and access to pro­ ductive resources, their inadequate input into productive decision-making, limited access to credit, and to formal group membership, their social posi­ tioning within the household, limiting their time to do non-domestic activ­ ities. In addition, if the integration of women dairy farmers into the formal dairy value chain is meant to help improve their livelihoods, it must counter the gendered vulnerabilities and barriers they face. Given these circum­ stances, tailored and robust sensitisation and advocacy initiatives are fun­ damental in shifting the interpretation and application of the Islamic culture among these communities. This will help to enable the successful imple­ mentation of interventions aimed at improving the empowerment and live­ lihoods of these women dairy farmers. Through deliberate actions and change, the average rural smallholder woman dairy farmer such as Binta and Yarali who sits at the bottom of the dairy value chain can have the opportunity to transform her realities and that of her daughters. This will in turn support an inclusive growth and transformation of the local dairy sector, reduce poverty and gender inequality in the North of Nigeria.

Note 1 A percentage of the income derived from milk still goes to the husband to con­ tribute to the cost to feed the cows and other animal care related expenses.

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FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2011. The State of Food and Agriculture 2010–2011. Women in Agriculture: Closing the Gender Gap for Development. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2050e.pdf FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2014. “Production of Livestock Processed – Nigeria.” FAOSTAT. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QP FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), & International Labour Organization (ILO). 2010. Gender Dimensions of Agricultural and Rural Employment: Differentiated Pathways out of Poverty. Rome. http://www.fao.org/3/i1638e/i1638e.pdf Harris, Frances. 1999. “Nutrient Management Strategies of Small-Holder Farmers in a Short-Fallow Farming System in North-East Nigeria.” The Geographical Journal, 165(3): 275. doi:10.2307/3060443 Ibrahim, Mohammed Auwal, Muhammed Bello and Hamidu Ibrahim. 2009. “Food Security and Resource Allocation Among Farming Households in North Central Nigeria.” Pakistan Journal of Nutrition, 8(8): 1235–1239. doi:10.3923/pjn.2009.1235.1239 IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture Development). 2016. The CommunityBased Agriculture and Rural Development Programme – Nigeria Report. Interna­ tional Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/documents/ 38714182/39731335/Nigeria%20CBARDP%20PPA%20-%20full%20report%20for% 20web.pdf/b2c60d57-eb63-4b46-8889-6ed3ac1ed133 IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute). 2012. Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index. International Food Policy Research Institute. http://www.ifpri. org/publication/womens-empowerment-agriculture-index Koopman, Jeanne. 1983. “Feeding the Cities and Feeding the Peasants: What Role for Africa’s Women Farmers?” World Development, 11(12): 1043–1055. doi:10.1016/ 0305–750x(83)90099–90092 Koopman, Jeanne. 1992. “The Hidden Roots of the African Food Problem: Looking within the Rural Household.” In Women’s Work in the World Economy, edited by Nancy Folbre, Barbara Bergmann and Bina Agarwal, 82–103. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan Lockett, Cassius Tyrone and Louis E. Grivetti. 2000. “Food-Related Behaviors during Drought: A Study of Rural Fulani, Northeastern Nigeria.” International Journal of Food Sciences and Nutrition, 51(2): 91–107. doi:10.1080/096374800100796 Ludgate, Nargiza. 2015. “Muslim Women in Agricultural Education and the Labor Force.” Office of International Research, Education, and Development. Virginia Tech. https://www.agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/InnovATE_Muslim% 20Women%20in%20AET6-15-15Final.pdf Makama, Godiya Allanana. 2013. “Patriarchy and Gender Inequality in Nigeria: The Way Forward.” European Scientific Journal (ESJ), 9(17): 115–144. doi:10.19044/ esj.2013.v9n17p%25p Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler and Carol Boender 2002. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” In Background Paper prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/ 486312-1095970750368/529763-1095970803335/malhotra.pdf Mohammed, Bolarinde T. and Aderemi F. Abdulquadri. 2012. “Comparative Analysis of Gender Involvement in Agricultural Production in Nigeria.” Journal of Devel­ opment and Agricultural Economics, 4(8): 240–244. doi:10.5897/jdae11.034

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Moghadam, Valentine. 1998. “Women, Work, and Economic Reform in The Middle East and North Africa.” African Studies Review, 41(2): 213. doi:10.2307/524864 Mortimore, Michael and William Mark Adams. 1999. Working the Sahel: Environ­ ment and Society in Northern Nigeria. London, UK: Routledge National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 2017. “Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report”. Lagos: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics. https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/ download/315 NPC (National Population Commission) [Nigeria] and ICF. 2019. Nigeria Demo­ graphic and Health Survey 2018 Key Indicators Report. Abuja, Nigeria, and Rock­ ville, Maryland, USA: NPC and ICF Ndukwe, Pat I. 1995. Fulani: Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria. New York, USA: The Rosen Publishing Group Inc Nwachuku, Daisy. 1996. “The Gender Factor in Family Size and Health Issues in Modern Nigerian Homes.” Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies, 13(3): 13–15 Ogbimi, Francis E. and Adesina Ayobami Oyewale. 2000. “Analysis of the Experience of Developing the Dairy Industry in South-western Nigeria,” Food Reviews Inter­ national, 16(4):485–502. doi:10.1081/fri-100102320 Ogunlela, Yemisi I. and Aisha A. Mukhtar. 2009. “Gender Issues in Agriculture and Rural Development in Nigeria: The Role of Women.” Humanity & Social Sciences Journal, 4(1): 19–30. https://idosi.org/hssj/hssj4(1)09/3.pdf Ogwumike, Fidelis O. and M. K. Akinnibosun. 2013. “Determinants of Poverty among Farming Households in Nigeria.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2): 365. doi:10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n2p365 Okojie, Christiana. 1991. “Achieving Self-reliance in Food Production in Nigeria: Maximising the Contribution of Rural Women.” Journal of Social Development in Africa, 6(2): 33–52 Osotimehin, Kehinde O., Akeem Abiade Tijani and E. O. Olukomogbon. 2006. “An Economic Analysis of Small-Scale Dairy Milk Processing in Kogi State, Nigeria.” Livestock Research for Rural Development, 18(11): 157. http://www.lrrd.org/lrrd18/ 11/osot18157.htm Phillip, Dayo, Ephraim Nkonya, John Pender and Omobowale Ayoola Oni. 2009. “Constraints to Increasing Agricultural Productivity in Nigeria: A Review.” Inter­ national Food Policy Research Institute. http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/ getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/18535/filename/18536.cpd Rahman, Shehu. 2008. “Women’s Involvement in Agriculture in Northern and South­ ern Kaduna State, Nigeria.” Journal of Gender Studies, 17(1):17–26. doi:10.1080/ 09589230701838347 Rahman, S. A. and J. Fola Alamu. 2003. “Estimating the Level of Women Interest in Agriculture: The Application of Logit Regression Model.” Nigerian Journal of Sci­ entific Research, 4(1): 45–49 Sahel Consulting Agriculture & Nutrition Limited. 2018. Nigerian Dairy Development Programme: Gender Study Report. Lagos, Nigeria: Sahel Consulting Agriculture & Nutrition Limited Spierings, Niels. 2014. “How Islam Influences Women’s Paid Non-Farm Employment: Evidence from 26 Indonesian and 37 Nigerian Provinces.” Review of Religious Research, 56(3): 399–431. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43186236 Watts, Michael. 2013. Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press

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13 Education, digital enterprise and Islam

in the Indonesian modern embedded economy Minako Sakai and Bhirawa Anoraga

Introduction Using the case of Indonesia, this chapter investigates the emergent preference of middle-class women for informal work and self-employment despite their educational attainment. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world, and it also has a growing middle-class. It is one of the few countries that have implemented effective educational policies to achieve gender equality (Suryadarma and Jones 2013). Nevertheless, gender equality in education attainment has not been adequately translated into equal parti­ cipation of women in the economy. For example, according to the 2019 data of Indonesia’s Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the proportion of economic parti­ cipation by men and women is 83.2% and 55.5% respectively (BPS 2019a), leaving a significant gender gap. This number contrasts with the level of edu­ cational attainment that reaches almost 100% respectively for both genders. The latest data from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (IBS 2019b) also show that there was hardly any increase in women’s participation in formal employment from 2015 to 2018. The paradox of the gender gap in work participation compared to edu­ cation has become an issue that has attracted the attention of scholars. Some argue that the gender gap between education and work participation is due to the result of the education sector’s failure to provide appropriate skills that meet employers’ needs (Di Gropello 2013; Leonor 2018). Pre­ vailing cultural norms that assume men to be the main breadwinners can also explain this gender gap (Utomo 2012; Jayachandran 2015). The latest research highlights that the female labour force participation in Indonesia has stalled due to the changing industrial structure in the country, even though young and educated women without children in urban areas are actively participating in the economy (Cameron et al. 2018). Furthermore, women who enter the labour force after their children have become independent do not seek waged employment, but rather prefer being either self-employed or work in family businesses (Cameron et al. 2018), which makes their economic employment statistically invisible.

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This study contributes to the current scholarly debates by highlighting the need to re-conceptualise a framework that reflects the complex relationship between the formal concept of work and the working patterns preferred by women in Indonesia. In Indonesia, informal and irregular work at home has been seen as an extension of women’s domestic work to generate additional income, and such work has been embedded in daily household activities without being formally identified. On this point, the concept of an embed­ ded economy proposed by the sociologist Granovetter (1985) and recently highlighted by the anthropologist Bråten (2013) on micro entrepreneurship practice in Southeast Asia, offers an insight when we try to capture the reality of women’s economic participation in Indonesia. Embedded economy refers to economic action that is undertaken as part of social relations and everyday activities. The relevance of this concept is that the majority of work conducted by women including micro entrepreneurship and startups belongs to part of the embedded economy, as these fit the existing socio­ economic norms of the gendered economy in Indonesia. We argue that the significance of the embeddedness of work is often overlooked by scholars who examine women’s economic activities. Currently, formal and waged employment is used to define the concept of work (Spierings 2016) along the lines of decent work promoted by the ILO (n.d) because the informal econ­ omy is hard to regulate and is negative for participants (Kalleberg and Vallas 2017, 2). However, it is worth noting that such a rigid concept of work does not adequately capture the nature of activities that the majority of Indonesian women perform. Furthermore, we also argue that the growing use of social media and the Internet in Indonesia has supported the informal and micro businesses run by women. This social trend on small-scale selfemployment runs counter to the emphasis on formal work by scholars and policy makers. As a result, social policies tend to exclude women’s con­ tribution which fails to meet the widely accepted notion of economic activ­ ity. Mahon and Michel (2017) have shown that this approach has led the involvement of women in the informal sector to be “out of focus” of inter­ national development agencies. Our chapter aims to emphasise the need to broaden the concept of women’s participation in the economy beyond formal waged employment in Indonesia and other developing countries (Mahon and Michel 2017). We highlight that this approach will capture the reality of the work in which women in Indo­ nesia and other lower-middle-income countries often engage. Such a notion is needed to assist in developing new ways to measure women’s economic par­ ticipation and to develop social protection policies in emerging economies. As this chapter shows, there is a growing tendency for educated women to choose startup businesses over formal employment as such working patterns fit their gender role to balance work and family (Sakai 2018, 2019) and to overcome the lack of suitable employment opportunities. This chapter shows that the three following factors are contributing to the recent increase of women participating in the informal economy: 1) gender equality in access to

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education has not fully translated into equal job opportunities; 2) domestic gender role expectations have led women to home-based income-generating activities; 3) the growth of online business opportunities supported by the Indonesian government policies is attracting women to participation in the informal economy.

Women and successful educational attainment in Indonesia Indonesia is one of the most successful countries in fostering citizens’ par­ ticipation in education. The recent national survey on Indonesian youth by BPS (2018a) found that almost all Indonesian young people (99.17%) have been enrolled in school. On average, Indonesian youth pursue education up to Year 10. Women’s educational attainment is slightly higher than that of men with an average of 10.49 and 10.26 years of schooling respectively. These figures demonstrate the success of Indonesia in closing the gender gap in participation in education. One of the reasons women gained important recognition as Indonesian citi­ zens was due to their prominent role during the independence struggle. Indo­ nesian women cared for injured fighters and actively participated in a range of other nation building activities (Robinson 2008). Their role in making Indo­ nesia independent assisted them in gaining the right to have access to education immediately after independence on August 17, 1945. Schooling was an important vehicle to teach allegiance and love for the newly independent nation and all citizens learned the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. This was legalised by the 1961 Education Law under the first President Sukarno (Baunto et al. 2011) as the education principle of Indonesia. Subsequent policy to foster participation in education was developed by the second President Suharto (1966–1998). The program was named Wajar or Wajib Belajar (compulsory education). This program was initiated by the Suharto government (1966–1998) in 1984 making six years of education for all Indonesian citizens mandatory. In 1994 it was extended to nine years of schooling. The program required Indonesian citizens from seven to 15 years to pursue six years of primary school and three years of junior high school. After the end of Suharto’s government in 1998, the subsequent government attempted to increase participation and completion of higher education. The post-Suharto’s government emphasised human capital via education as essential to develop the nation into the future. Hence, since 2008, the fourth amendment of the 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has stipulated the allocation of the minimum of 20% of the state’s budget for education. The Widodo government (2014 onwards) has also strengthened the Wajar program in 2015 to 12 years that is part of Nawacita or the President’s nine main agendas. This development illustrates the strong com­ mitment of the Indonesian government to support educational attainment of all citizens.

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The success of the Wajar program is attributed to the citizens’ support towards education because it is perceived to bring utilitarian benefit. Secular education is seen as a key for social mobility for all citizens. A university degree from one of the top state-funded universities is a ticket for a secure and formal job, including in the public service (Naafs 2018). Because of this perception, Indonesians have developed a strong preference for secular public over religious or private education (Azra et al. 2007). Although the size is smaller than its secular counterparts, formal education provided by religious institutions, commonly known as pesantren, also con­ tributes to women’s participation in education. These Islamic schools have long played an important role specifically in providing affordable education for the poor. The adoption of progressive teaching has enabled pesantren to provide education for women (Azra et al. 2007). Initially, pesantren was exclusively for boys. Recent data show that girls’ participation in pesantren has equalled that of boys with the ratio of 49% and 51% respectively (Keme­ nag 2013). Parents view pesantren as a safe and Islamic environment which provides modern schooling and religious education for their teenage daugh­ ters (Azra et al. 2007). In short, the overall positive perceptions of Indonesian citizens also explain the success of educational attainment irrespective of gender in Indonesia.

Impact of education for Indonesian women In this section we analyse the impact of education on job preferences. Indonesian women have a long history of being active economic agents. For example, on the island of Java, women have worked to produce rice and vegetables. They also take local produce to rotating markets. Such markets have been predominantly run by female traders and sellers. Tra­ ditionally, in Java, women have been given the task of being the manager of the household to make ends meet while the men’s job has been to earn an income, leaving their wives to manage the financial concerns. Thus, women’s economic activities such as producing and selling snacks are embedded in their daily lives and are seen as an extension of their house­ hold chores. Gendered division of labour has created a tradition of women running a kiosk in their neighbourhood from their home. In fact, a woman is proud to generate an additional income to cater for the family needs without embarrassing her husband by showing that his earnings do not meet the household’s needs. As a result, female traders producing handicrafts and textiles such as batik became prevalent in Java (Alexander 1987). However, their economic activities have received mixed social responses. These female traders were traditionally seen as driven by their desire to maximise profits (Brenner 2012). Indeed, in traditional markets buyers and sellers constantly negotiate the price of goods for sale to maximise profit. To make things worse, private money lenders also operate to facilitate these businesses. In addition to the profit-driven nature of

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the traditional markets, the ambience is dirty, wet, crowded and hazard-prone to fires. As a result, since the 1990s, the majority of these markets have been refurbished to give a cleaner impression to patrons, but they remain in compe­ tition with modern air-conditioned shopping malls which attract middle-class Indonesians (Suryadarma et al. 2010). Since many women are educated, working in traditional markets or running micro and small businesses have attracted only limited attention from younger Indonesians who have completed high school, let alone university graduates. Working in the agricultural sector also became unattractive (White 2012) due to lower expected incomes. After completing higher education, younger Indo­ nesians now aspire to be upwardly mobile in society by gaining employment in government offices and companies. However, such job opportunities were and are highly competitive, and high-school graduates have had to seek employ­ ment in retail and service sectors, and also in factories (Naafs 2012). Some have started to work as overseas migrant workers in the Middle East, Singa­ pore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Hugo 2002), primarily as domestic work­ ers. However, such jobs have posed the risk of abuse and strain on family ties, and in Indonesia the social standing of these women’s work remains low despite their ability to send remittances to their home (Silvey 2004). The increasing emphasis of the roles of women as both domestic carers and as mothers and wives derives from two factors. First, promotion of Indone­ sian women as such was initially pushed by the Indonesian government, par­ ticularly the Suharto government (1966–1998), which allocated a citizen’s role based on gender. While men were depicted as heads of the family who were working to build the nation through their public service, the wives of public servants were mobilised through an organisation called Dharma Wanita to disseminate and implement state policies relating to family affairs.1 Women in Dharma Wanita and PKK (Pembinaan/Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga – village women’s organisations) have been involved on a voluntary basis in programs related to family planning, infant care, basic health care, and early education (Newberry 2014). Producing extra food for sale to make ends meet, once a common practice of women’s embedded economic contribution, has become less visible in middle-class households as women were mobilised for assisting the imple­ mentation of state policies concerning the welfare of families through female volunteers. Thus, middle-class women have allocated their resources to com­ munity work to build Indonesia through being wives and mothers, instead of pursuing a professional career. Second, since the beginning of the 1990s the Indonesian middle-class have embraced Islam in everyday life. As a result, Islamic financial services, Isla­ mic food and clothing businesses are growing to cater for the consumer needs of Indonesian Muslims (Fealy and White 2008). Along with this development of Islamic lifestyle, after the fall of the Suharto government in 1998 and the subsequent democratisation period, conservative interpretations of Islam became prominent in the public sphere (Van Bruinessen 2013; Sakai and

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Fauzia 2014). The rise of conservatism among middle-class Muslims also fostered social expectations that good Muslim middle-class women prioritise domestic over professional roles. This has led to the creation of a new Islamic womanhood (Sakai and Fauzia 2016; Sakai 2019), in which women use Islam to justify their primary role as a domestic carer, but also try to Islamise their professional aspirations. Their choice is not necessarily to seek rigid office work, but to start small businesses which they view as flexible and profitable.

Indonesian women and the challenges of formal employment The OECD report (2019) on Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) highlights Indonesia as a country with a high level of discrimination against women despite their high achievement in education. An illustration of such discrimination against Indonesian women in a formal business sector is pre­ sented below. For women who defy domestic expectations, formal employment poses other obstacles. Formal employment in Indonesia is regulated under the Labour Law of 2003. Under this law, the government of Indonesia supports both men’s and women’s participation in the formal economy. Specifically, for women, the law ensures that women’s rights are protected at work. For instance, the law states that women have rights for three months of paid maternity leave, two days leave during menstruation, and breastfeeding breaks at work. However, in practice, equal opportunity is unlikely to be achieved given the assumed gender roles that are also legalised by law. In the Law of Marriage No. 1 of 1974, it is stated that the husband is the breadwinner in the family and the role of the wife is to manage domestic chores. Hence, the contradiction between the Labour Law and Marriage Law results in sig­ nificant challenges for women who pursue office work. Interestingly even female university students perceive their primary economic role as future secondary earners and their husbands as the breadwinners (Utomo 2012). One of the challenges comes from employers who view women as less productive than men due to their biological differences and gendered norms. This inequality is reflected in the salaries of women which are sig­ nificantly lower than those for men (BPS 2018b). The employers also practise discrimination by preferring to hire unmarried women (Nilan and Utari 2008). A common practice, often written into a female employee’s job contract, is to prohibit marriage for the first several years of employ­ ment or that female employees agree not to take leave during and after pregnancy to maintain the company’s productivity (Setyonaluri 2013). Laying off female workers who are pregnant also occurs frequently, given the loose enactment of the law (Bennington and Habir 2003). Some employers also make maternity leave hard to obtain, forcing pregnant women to resign (Setyonaluri 2013).

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The employers’ discrimination is not the only challenge faced by women with salaried jobs. They also face pressure from family and the broader society regarding their gender roles. Delaying marriage for women in Indo­ nesia is socially unacceptable (Himawan et al. 2018). Unmarried women find it difficult to use lack of financial resources as a reason for postponing their marriage given the fact that men are the breadwinners (Nilan 2008). Fur­ thermore, women who postpone marriage are often despised or frowned upon in society. Married women are often subject to social pressures to stay at home, especially after the birth of the first child (Cameron et al. 2018). Unless they can afford to employ a domestic worker or receive assistance from an extended family member, women tend to resign from their work to focus on their role as a mother as this gender responsibility is widely accepted in Indonesia. A survey found that female university students, for instance, perceive their primary economic role as future secondary earners while their husbands are seen as breadwinners (Utomo 2012). These stories epitomise the multiple difficulties women are facing to remain in formal employment. One alternative strategy for women’s participation in the economy is to create small businesses, often in informal sectors of the economy. This is discussed in the next section.

Safeguarding micro businesses and the informal economy While women’s involvement in formal employment has stagnated in Indone­ sia, the number of micro and small businesses owned by women has been on the rise. These businesses play an important role in the Indonesian economy. They contribute to over 60% of the Indonesian gross domestic product and absorb more than 97% of total employment in Indonesia (Kemenperin 2018). Currently, approximately 59 million micro, small and medium enterprises operate in Indonesia, of which 14.3 million businesses are owned by women (Walfajri 2018). Between 2017 and 2018, 3.3 million newcomers initiated micro or small businesses and the report’s author indicates that this number could be higher as it does not include women’s involvement in the informal sector (Walfajri 2018). Most of the micro and small businesses in Indonesia are operating as part of the informal economy. The main reason is the complicated bureaucracy required to formalise their work (Sakai 2016). As law enforcement is generally loose, small businesses in Indonesia tend to operate without following the legal procedures. However, their services and products are usually utilised by community members because they are cheaper and convenient, despite potentially questionable hygiene or health standards (Gibbings 2016). Fur­ thermore, informal relationships with people in the neighbourhood are rou­ tine and this is how small business owners mitigate risk (Malasan 2017). Sellers and buyers usually develop social relations (Gibbings 2016) through regular transactions. Sellers remember and accommodate buyers’ personal preferences. Such personally tailored services strongly appeal to buyers.

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Additionally, the sellers usually trade at the same location and are known to the nearby-traders. It is common for nearby-traders to form informal social security such as rotating credit groups (arisan) which operate on trust among members (Vial 2011). This personal relationship between the sellers and buyers coupled with an informal safeguarding system fosters essential trust in economic transactions supporting micro informal businesses, despite the lack of legal business licences. Furthermore, the cost of running businesses can be an additional expense that cannot be absorbed by these small enterprises. For instance, the Indonesian government is planning to legislate a guarantee for halal products that will require all business owners to have halal certification issued by MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Board of Indonesian Islamic Cle­ rics). Yet, to obtain this certificate, rigorous examination processes which entail substantial costs for small business owners are required. It is reported that only 12,000 of the micro, small and medium enterprises in Indonesia have halal certification (Intan 2018). Personal relationships between the seller and the buyer are also evident in the Internet-mediated small businesses that are trending in Indonesia. Such small enterprises have begun to utilise social media to promote their business. Social media such as Facebook with its interactive features enables sellers and buyers to comment on products, sales, and deliveries. Buyers and sellers can also rate each other. This feature facilitates trust-building between buyers and sellers and the online business community. Virtual friends on Facebook are usually friends in offline settings such as schools’ alumni, pengajian (Qur’anic study group) members, or arisan groups (Utomo 2016). These social mediamediated personal connections have supported the operations of online busi­ nesses in Indonesia.

Women and economic participation in digital Indonesia The numbers of users of the Internet and social media are growing rapidly globally. In the context of Indonesia, over 170 million citizens, almost 65% of the country’s population, have access to the Internet (APJII 2018). Women are reportedly more active than men in using social media by commenting, liking and accessing personalised advertisements on Facebook (We Are Social 2019). Younger trendy Muslim women are prone to use social media to upload their selfies donning a colourful hijab in Instagram to seek positive comments from friends, and possibly to seek company endorsements as a social influencer (Beta 2014; Abidin and Brown 2018). Women’s active use of the Internet has also translated into their engage­ ment in the digital economy (Utomo 2016). This new economy has been strongly endorsed by the Indonesian government in the last five years. For instance, President Joko Widodo aims to create 1,000 digital entrepreneurs, often called “startups”, by 2020 (Jurriëns and Tapsell 2017). These startups are expected to grow the digital industry as part of the government’s bigger plan to position Indonesia as the “Digital Energy of Asia”, estimated to be

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worth US$130 billion (Noor 2016; Jurriëns and Tapsell 2017). Along with this strong government support, various digital startups are mushrooming such as e-commerce platforms, online transportation providers, and financial technology (fintech) companies. Particularly, the growth of fintech is sig­ nificant for facilitating small businesses to flourish because the use of banking and credit cards has been limited in Indonesia. A pioneer new fintech pro­ ducts and services company Go-Pay has an e-money licence from the Bank of Indonesia to facilitate the financial inclusion of people who have never owned banking accounts previously (Harsono 2019). The value of the company GoPay is estimated at US$25 billion (Harsono 2019). The relevance of this rapid fintech development is that clients can order food online, pay through Go-Pay and have it delivered by Go-Jek, a motorcycle courier. Go-Jek is one of the pioneers in this online delivery business and is also a recent Indonesian startup (Ford and Honan 2017). It delivers either passengers or goods using motorcycles that are effective in tackling the heavy traffic in urban areas like Jakarta. In this way, small businesses and clients are closely and conveniently linked to fostering online commerce. The following two cases show how women operating culinary businesses are drawn to new startup businesses over formal office employment. As expected given their domestic role, the culinary sector is dominated by women. Catering businesses are currently growing because people make orders through mobile phone applications, pay through fintech services and have the food delivered by a motorcycle courier service.

Women selling food through social media: the case of Yanti Yanti is a university graduate and started a culinary business that uses the Internet. She worked in the marketing section of a private company before she started her online culinary business in 2013. While Yanti worked in Jakarta, she lived with her family in Depok, West Java, adjacent to Jakarta. She admitted that it was difficult to manage her time between work and family, especially since she had to leave home at 6am for work and could only return at 9pm due to the extremely heavy traffic in Jakarta. Her husband was also a salaried worker and they relied on their house assistant to look after their sons. One day her youngest son cried, begging her to take him to school and pick him up as other mothers routinely did. It was a turning point where she began to ask herself about her role as a mother. She felt she was neglecting her primary role as a woman. After giving some thought, she decided to resign from her job and started to dedicate her time to her family. In our interview (July 1, 2019) she emphasised that her life “turned 180 degrees” for the better. She now has suf­ ficient time for her family and can assist her children in undertaking their studies. This makes her feel proud to be a part of their achievements at school. At the same time, she can attend to her Islamic devotional duties (ibadah). All of these things were beyond her reach when she was working full-time in formal employment.

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To occupy her time fully, in 2013 Yanti started selling food at a small stall in front of her house. She cooked extra food to accommodate both her business and her family’s daily needs. Initially, it was difficult to find custo­ mers. As she is an avid social media user, she started utilising Facebook and Instagram to promote her business by posting new photos and videos of her products almost every day. This strategy has proven to be fruitful and she now receives more orders through social media than people who physically shop at her stall. As most of Yanti’s clients lived far away from her stall, she decided to use the service of Go-Jek. Without much difficulty Yanti was able to register with GoFood, a service provided by Go-Jek to deliver food from the sellers to the custo­ mers by Go-Jek drivers. In Jakarta alone, it is reported that Go-Food has increased the city’s economy by about US$21 million (WowShack 2018). This number translates into an increased revenue of food sellers by 250% (WowShack 2018), emphasising the benefit this service offers to small traders. In August 2019 a blackout affected the Greater Jakarta region for 24 hours, and one of the frequent complaints among the city’s middle-class we observed was that people could not source food as previously they had relied upon online deliveries and did not carry cash for such emergencies. The absence of electricity stopped online transactions and food delivery services; however, this was an unusual occurrence. Using the online strategies above, Yanti is helping as a secondary earner of her household by selling home-cooked food. Although her income fluctuates daily, on a busy day her turnover through social media can reach US$135. The case of Yanti demonstrates that Indonesian women can participate in the economy relatively easily from home using social media, online purchasing and suitable transportation. It also shows that the development of the digital economy in Indonesia has enabled women to balance income-earning work and their role as mothers and wives. The trend of women’s involvement in online businesses will likely increase in the future because government and non-government agencies have identi­ fied business areas dominated by women as potential sectors that will grow the Indonesian digital economy. For instance, since 2013 the newly created government agency for creative industries, BEKRAF (Badan Ekonomi Krea­ tif, the Indonesian Agency for Creative Economy), has run an annual pro­ gram called Indonesia Food Startup. According to BEKRAF, culinary businesses make up the largest proportion of Indonesia’s creative industries. Hence, the agency supports and invests in startups that are related to food (Rezkisari 2019). Non-government agencies have also been interested in the culinary sector. A notable example is an incubator called Kinara, funded by Australia’s aid program, which offers mentoring opportunities for Indonesian culinary businesses. One requirement to participate in this initiative is that the startup is led by women. Hence, this supporting environment is expected to foster women’s economic participation in the digital economy, as shown by the case of Eatever below.

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Eatever and women’s economic participation through online platforms Eatever won the finalist place in Kinara’s startup mentoring program in 2017. This startup was founded in 2016 by Dian Widayanti, a Muslim middle-class woman. She received her Master’s degree from the University of Indonesia, arguably the most reputable university in the country, giving easier access to high-paying office job markets. Dian successfully secured a job in a multi­ national company and was employed there for two years but then moved to work as an entertainer to earn more money. However, her work turned to be too timeconsuming and she decided to quit this job when she married in 2016 as she felt that her work was not compatible with her role as a wife. In the same year, Dian started Eatever to help raise her family and to assist other women who are staying home. She chose her startup project as an online platform to sell food. According to Dian, her mission in creating Eatever is the following: There are 70 million women who are not working, who are not produc­ tive as they are not contributing to the family’s economy. So, we (Eatever) would like to turn these unproductive women to be productive as they can actually make money by selling their high-quality home-cooking to the people nearby. So, they can make money without [the] necessity to leave (sic) house. (Widayanti 2018) One of Eatever’s partners is Ibu Lidya (Eatever 2019). She is a widow and is the breadwinner for her family. Every year, she uses the opportu­ nities of Ramadhan (Muslims’ fasting month) to sell her home-made snacks. Since 2009, she has been a partner of Eatever. She claims that her orders grew drastically, from 30 to 150 packs per day, after joining Eatever. Dian aspires that more women would earn an income by partnering with Eatever, like Lidya. To facilitate this process, Eatever does not require a legal license to sell food. Yet, the company conducts random food test­ ing and kitchen inspections to guarantee that the meals are hygienic. Eatever assists these women in branding their foods and delivering the orders to clients. The cases of Yanti and Dian show how the rapid development of social media and transport applications through the Internet, such as Go-Jek, have supported women in participating in income-generating activities from home. Both Yanti and Dian are well-educated middle-class women who have chosen to leave formal employment to balance their family carer’s role by actively utilising the Internet to promote their food for sale. These small businesses reflect the embedded economy as the economic activities fit with the patri­ archal gender norms. Furthermore, since there is a growing prospect to sup­ port online businesses by the government, women’s increasing participation in the economy is seen to back up governmental policies to develop Indonesia with digital technology.

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Conclusion In this chapter, we showed that three broad factors are supporting the growing participation of middle-class Indonesian women in the informal economy. First, while the government supports women’s access to education, they face discriminatory situations in formal employment arising from conflicting laws on gender equality. Second, since the 1990s Islam has become an important element among the urban middle-class Muslims and conservative interpreta­ tions of its teachings emphasise women’s domestic roles as mothers and wives. This development further adds social pressure for women to develop homebased income generating activities which reflect the embedded economy in social relations and everyday activities (Granovetter 1985; Bråten 2013). Third, opportunities to gain an income in the informal economy are increasing due to the popularity of digital technology, particularly social media and online mar­ ketplaces, among middle-class Indonesians. The government’s policy to sup­ port digital Indonesia also justifies women’s online business platforms using social media. While regulatory matters regarding creative industries are still developing, startups using social media and fintech have become a strategic choice for Indonesian women to balance work and family (Sakai 2019) they also represent Indonesians who make efforts to be part of developing digital Indonesia. This situation has led to women starting a new form of small and informal businesses. This development may not be adequately captured if we continue to measure women’s work through formal employment only. In order to fur­ ther facilitate their work and provide social protection, particularly in a Muslim-dominant country like Indonesia, there is a strong need to reconcep­ tualise the definition of work, and critically design policies to protect women in the embedded economy.

Note 1 However, the Indonesian government introduced a moratorium for taking public servants in 2015.

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14 Conclusion

Muslim women in the economy: Looking towards the future Shamim Samani and Dora Marinova

Women’s role in development has evolved from discourses dominated mostly by Western secular contexts. While a lot of work has been done on the recognition of the intersections of ethnicity, class, culture and other differ­ ences between women that play a role in how they engage with the economy, relegated to the personal domain, faith has not featured much in such aca­ demic analyses. The chapters in this collection thus establish an important step towards understanding how the connection of faith with economic development and globalisation shapes the positions and interactions of Muslim women within current economies. They also add to the discourse of feminism and gender studies through their scope of covering various contexts of Muslim perspectives and settings. Glimpses into the history of Islam and Muslim societies, at different times, show that although their roles have been determined through scriptural interpretations and the rulings that have evolved around these, Muslim women have always been a part of economic affairs. However, what is differ­ ent in contemporary times is that they are an integral part of aspirations to contribute to, expand and grow national economies. As the volume shows, faith, development and globalisation are variably experienced by Muslim women around the world. Each chapter in this collection thus adds to our understandings of the particular settings and the complexities of interactions between these and other elements as Muslim women actively participate in the economy in the 21st century. As demonstrated through the representation of more than ten different countries, at disparate levels of economic development, there is no doubt that there are challenges on various fronts for Muslim women as much as there are for others living in what is still a male-dominated world. In almost all economies, occupational systems have always favoured men through socially accepted gendered roles for males and females. These assumptions have been decisive in not only determining the structures of economies, but also have been influential in work-related policies, protocols and practices of work­ places in all countries across the globe. However, in Muslim countries and societies, patriarchal norms are sanctioned through established religious interpretations and hence have a strong hold over maintaining a male­

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dominated public sphere including the workplace, as well as upholding the role of men as household heads in the domestic sphere. Within Islamic cultures, men and boys are conditioned into having the primary responsibility of financial provision for their households as well as in major decision-making, and women are socialised as young girls into pri­ marily caregiving and nurturing roles for the family. Nevertheless, this has changed over time as ideological influences that see women as assets in the development project have been integrated into national policies. Conse­ quently, the economic and social changes have affected household gender roles and relations and are observable across generations. Although men may be considered the main income earners, women are increasingly taking on the roles of financial provision as contemporary lives impel improved standards of living and the consumption of goods and services related to technological advances and global lifestyles. While women’s work has traditionally been seen as supplementary income in varied settings, in many instances it is becoming a shared primary responsibility. The challenges here lie in the resistance faced towards giving up patriarchal structures and norms that pri­ vilege men far more than women. On the macro level, human capital infrastructure and interventions, policy shifts and structural changes globally as well as expansion of markets through digital and other modern means of commerce facilitate increased productivity and the growth therefore in female labour force participation. Muslim women’s roles as income earners have traditionally been influenced by state-implemented development policies. The growing interdependence through globalisation, the collective commitments to global goals and sus­ tainability oblige taking gender equality and female related issues seriously in the contemporary world order. The current era thus allows levels of agency that push the boundaries of what is achievable and changes percep­ tions about female contributions and indeed how women view themselves in relation to the economy. Impacted by geo-political, social and economic differences, the intersections of faith with gender equality, and economic and social mobility are complex. In some countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia, there is a para­ dox of gender parity as women outdo men in educational outcomes and yet lag behind in employment and occupational status. On the other side of the paradox is that a country like Bangladesh has attained gender pay parity surpassing the achievements of many industrialised nations. The likelihoods of others achieving this may take a long while, however, employment partici­ pation prospects look positive as increasingly countries aspire towards invol­ ving more women in economic development and leadership particularly in light of the global agenda of transforming the world by 2030 through the SDGs. Having come a long way, the current sustainable development agenda is highly ambitious about the integration of gender equality within envir­ onmental, social and economic priorities. How this pans out will depend on how committed governments are to promote and sustain conducive

Conclusion

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environments and putting in place disruptive policies that allow new initiatives to emerge and support the trajectory towards a better, more sustainable world for all. In countries where Muslim women are a part of migrant or minority groups, individual aspirations to participate in the workplace and public sphere are interwoven with migration, cultures of origin, minority status and social identifiers pertaining to religion. The workings of these are heightened by the broader circumstance of integration or assimilation of minority groups within plural or multicultural societies which have historical roots. As demonstrated in the chapter on the assimilation policies affecting Muslim women in Bulgaria, the project of modernity meant a coerced form of fitting women into the former socialist economy and involved pressuring followers of Islam to suppress their religious identities. Although this can be put behind as a sinister political program, the learnings from it are important for the way forward as societies become more ethnically diverse with migrant populations, and “belonging” to nations comes to the fore. Muslim migration into many Western countries has become con­ troversially linked to terrorism activities, especially in the post-2001 era, and sentiments about Muslim belonging/not belonging to Western societies keep surfacing within public discourses. In Australia, perspectives as well as gaps in cultural awareness about people practising Islam and their faith prove to be particularly challenging for Muslim women in the public sphere, including the workplace. Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic senti­ ments are often directed at them mostly because of their visibility as Mus­ lims. Many have to negotiate or repress their religious identity and practices to maintain a sustained presence in the workplace. Bearing the brunt of such attitudes, the resilience of women also surfaces in these accounts as they bridge the gaps in the lack of awareness and proactively work to overcome their sense of exclusions. The prevailing discourses in the West tend to see women’s workplace par­ ticipation in relation to secular orientations, and anything related to faith is outside the realm of the existing structures of Western workplaces and how they are organised. This equally applies to all religions. To ensure no-one is left behind, the discourses about Muslims need to be strongly nudged to gain an increased understanding of Islam and its adherents to include Muslim women better within workplaces. For sure, advances have been made in countries like Australia for particular professions and places of employment, such as policing and nursing, but there is much more work to be done. In many instances in the West, there is a scepticism over migrants and refugees (many of whom are Muslims). As the baseless fear of them bringing undesirable cultural changes or taking jobs away from citizens becomes part of entrenched perceptions, it is important to understand the circumstances of relocation. For refugees and asylum seekers, dislocation at any point in time and situation is a traumatic experience that they are forced to undergo. It disrupts lives and lifestyles which take a long time, perhaps generations, to

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rebuild. The ordeals of displacement place a lot of burdens on people, including that of making do with little chances of upward mobility through opportunities for education and more. As conflicts have increased and many around the world are at risk of displacement, further research is urgently needed to understand the needs of displaced populations especially those of women at risk. There is a lot to be learnt from one another to bridge the gaps that exist and build cohesive societies. As much as the issues of social and economic mobility present them­ selves as a part of the formal economy, unprecedented opportunities exist in the globally connected world. The significant economic transformation facilitated by advances in technology, infrastructure, transport, media and increasing sustainability awareness in the current era is a driving force for new business opportunities. In such settings, Islamic economics and finance, as well as other emerging sectors and markets offer opportunities for women to participate in the economy on their preferred terms. The increasing integration of local markets in the national and international economy enables a redefining of the economic roles of women including Muslim in all societies. The use of contemporary media allows women to bypass the formal channels of engaging with the economy – through social and digital media in a borderless world. This flexibility that social media and disruptive tech­ nologies offer blurs the differences between home and office, between the private and the public, and allows for circumventing the traditional channels through which formal businesses have been conducted. The new technolo­ gies and infrastructure have totally transformed the way we live and work, and the speeds at which the changes are occurring suit the current genera­ tions of women who are able to adapt to these with ease. As commutes and other issues with formal work with set hours become cumbersome, the importance of small enterprises (both physical and virtual), operable from the domestic space and their suitability for women, is significant. The rapidly growing digital infrastructure and particularly financial technologies enable an environment for conducting businesses through easily accessible tools, and women can be a part of this on their own terms. Work patterns allow them to combine their domestic roles with those of their provider roles. The future thus is not an extension of the past but is developing through new ways and strategies that give opportunities to women to be successful on their own terms. Living between religion and the imperatives of modern times, Muslim women are certainly increasingly visible as gender relations transform with changing economic environments; they are changing and will change in the future. The chapters in this volume show, Muslim women are entering the labour force in large numbers by seeking or creating employment through enabling environments and there are prospects for this to intensify further. The emerging tendencies may not be consistent, but they are prevalent and are signs of what lies in the future. In all social classes this is

Conclusion

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becoming the rule rather than an exception and demonstrates increased acceptance of Muslim women’s extended roles in the economy. For cer­ tain, this will have a multiplier effect as today’s women become models for the future generations and pave the way for realising greater aspirations. Being strong advocates of not only the recognition of women’s potential, but also their self-agency, we see this volume as contributing significantly to the dis­ course of sustainable development. The chapters provide convincing evidence that there is a new model of development emerging. It is built on the foundations of education and policy reforms, but more importantly on spirituality and faith which call for creativity and synergistic collaboration between various stake­ holders. As sustainability fulfils the needs of individuals and groups beyond just the concept of economic needs, the right conditions for supporting women’s participation in the globalised economy can further enhance their role and con­ tribution to social, cultural and environmental priorities. Although traditional­ ists have used Islam as a barrier to women’s empowerment, Muslim feminists, activists and intellectuals, some of whom are men, draw from Islamic teachings to promote the uplifting of women’s roles in the economy. Undoubtedly there are challenges on a spectrum of the intimidating to the life-threatening, and they will continue to be encountered on different fronts and at different times. These include extreme views that hinder women from partici­ pating in the public space, gender segregation in educational institutions and the job-market, discriminatory labour laws, sexual and other harassment in the workplace, violence in different spheres and even encounters with militancy that opposes development altogether. Appropriate measures need to be taken not only by governments, but also by various stakeholders such as workplace administrators, educational institutions, community leaders, NGOs and the community as a whole to address these issues at the different levels. Where there is resistance, there is also the opportunity for engagement, as arguments can be grounded in a discourse that is perceived as legitimate and cul­ turally more acceptable to many Muslims. This can lead to a more sustained expansion of opportunities for Muslim women in the economy and the public sphere. Although there are many obstacles Muslim women face in the economy, their faith has become a galvanising factor rather than a barrier to sustainable development. Most likely the progresses made will not fully eliminate the deeply rooted patriarchal attitudes and norms across many Muslim societies as women’s achievements continue to challenge men. These issues need to be explored further as we aspire to improved models of development and governance. What gives hope is the collaboration, the resilience, creativity, diasporic engagement and integrity in maintaining cultural identities in how women exercise agency in the economy. The responses to development in Muslim societies are coming from within and the solutions to challenges are also being sought from underpinnings of principles and faith values which are likely to be sustained as they are at the core of individual and collective convictions. This is what this book is about.

Index

abaya 38, 140, 185–186 activism: agentic 160, leftist 128; political 112 ahadith 146 Aisha bint Abubakr 2, 21, 23 Amazigh 125 anti-Muslim: hate and discrimination 137, 143–144; racism 134; see also Islamophobia anticolonialism 127 As-Sadawi, N.124, 126, 129 Assimilation policies in Bulgaria: De-veiling 49, 56–59; Inclusion 49, 51, 56–59, 65; Re-naming 49, 56–60; Revival 49–50, 56, 59–60, 66 Australia: Diversity Council 137, 145; Islamophobia Register 134, 144; Muslim women in 132, 145 Australian Muslim women 131, 134 Babés, L. 124, 129 Balance; career and family commitments 10; employment and family 224; religious identity and secular citizenship 9; private and public sphere 58; quest for 163–176; secular education with moral values 78; work/income-earning and family/life 11, 159, 184, 215, 223; 225 Bangladesh: achievement of Millennium Development Goals 19; Bonhishikha 22, 30; BRAC 22, 26, 28; economy 16; garment industry 20, 27; gender pay parity 230; labour force of 16; UNESCO Peace Tree Award 19 Bangladeshi women 7, 19–26, 28, 116 Baul 23, 28n2 Boko Haram 71–72, 74, 78, 81–84, 197, 209

Bourdieu, P. 120, 129 Braten, E. 215, 225–226 Bulgaria: and modernity 8, 50, 60, 231; assimilation 8, 48–51, 55–59, 61–67, 139, 144, 231; Communist Party in 59, 60–61; cultural politics 58–59, 62, 65, 67; Bulgarian ethnic Turks 48, 50–51, 54, 56, 59–61, 63–64; Bulgarian Muslim 48–49, 56, 60–62, 66–67; Bulgarian Muslim Roma 50, 54, 56, 64; mass emigration of Turks from 61 capitalism 61, 172 career: decisions 163, 169–170, 173–174; opportunities 148,157; pathways, 43, 45 caregiving 5, 37, 184, 187, 230 caring responsibilities 21,183 Central Asia 6 chador 85 Chiang Kai Shek 10, 165 Child marriage 22, 25–26, 30, 202 child mortality 4 childcare 7, 34, 88–89, 92, 172, 203 China: Chinese and Islamic traditions 164; civil war 163, 165; Hui Muslims 164; filial piety 164; Japanese invasion of 163, 165; Kuomintang 165 Conflict displacement 10, 69, 72, 81–82, 96, 163, 165, 170–171, 175, 196, 232 Confucianism 164, 175 Consciousness: class 107; female 16, 30; ethno-communal 93; layers of 171–174 Conservative: attitudes towards women 21, 23, 35–36, 90; interpretations of Islam 218, 225, 228; role of women 17 corruption 22, 30, 113 creative industries 223; and BEKRAF Indonesia 223, 226–227

Index critical reflection research 163 cultural diversity: culturally and linguistically different background 154; culturally appropriate services 78, 192; culturally diverse 70, 137 Dayfa Khatun 24 democratic: Islam 119; values 123 development: gender-focused 3; theory 11, 179 diaspora: Pakistani 9, 148, 150, 152; Iranian 93, 95–98 digital: entrepreneurship 10, 214–228; ethnography 120; finance 180, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190; industry 221; online platforms 93 dislocation: political 10; refugees and asylum seekers 231 domestic work 78, 103, 107–108, 115, 117, 215 domestic workers 8, 103, 105–117, 218, 220, 228; and collective dimension of power 114 Domestic Workers Union 106, 114 double jeopardy 137, 165 dowry 25, 108, 111–112, 205 dual identity in workplace 140–141, 148 economic development: global 3–4, 6; in Bangladesh 18–19, 22, in Bulgaria 57; in Nigeria 71–72, 75, 201; in Pakistan,149, economic empowerment 2, 7, 11, 34, 39, 76, 132, 182, 192, 199, 228; see also female empowerment; women’s empowerment economic participation 1, 7, 13, 18, 32, 131, 197, 214–215, 221, 223–224 economic role 10, 96, 219–220, 232 embedded economy 214–215, 217, 219, 221, 223–225, 227 employment opportunities for females/ women 18, 34, 60–61, 65, 86–88, 90–91, 151, 215 equity participation 181 exclusion: of women in public spaces 2; region specific in Nigeria 69; of women in education in Iran 91; ethnic 72; social 75, 88; women’s financial 183, 231; workplace 154 extremism: religious extremism 71; right-wing 160

235

factor-weighted gender pay gap in Bangladesh 25 family: and children 21, 202; commitments 10–11, 154; life 5, 11, 17, work and family 11, 215, 222, 225, 228; 158, 159, 163; polygamous 73; size 82, 212; support 160, 172; values 174, 185 fatalism 107, 117; see also majboori female: education 19, 35–36; emancipation 3; employment 15, 18, 86, 92; empowerment 94, 188, 208; entrepreneurship 180, 188; population 12, 19, 21, 86, 89, 98, 149 female labour force participation 6, 15, 82, 86–87, 132, 147, 149, 161, 214, 226, 230 feminism 3, 8, 21, 24, 29, 91, 94–95, 98, 124–129, 229; see also Islamic feminism fertility/fertility rate 18, 31, 59, 73, 82, 93, 98, 196 feudalistic 8; see also semi-feudal system financial hardship 165–166, 174 financial inclusion 10, 180, 182, 189, 191–194, 207, 222 financial system 10, 179–180, 182, 190–192; see also inclusive financial system free market 181 friendly multiculturalism 123–125, 128 Fulani women dairy farmers 196, 199, 203, 205, 207 gender: discrimination 19, 81, 88, 90–91, 94–95; division of labour 197, 210; equality 2–4, 26, 29–30, 34, 44–47, 70, 83, 92, 105, 120, 122, 124–125, 150, 182, 188, 214–215, 225, 230; gap 7, 9, 19, 25, 31–33, 47, 92, 94, 99, 131, 137, 145, 162, 197, 211, 214, 216; inequality 3, 7, 16, 44, 47, 70, 73, 76, 82, 150, 162, 209, 211, 227; mainstreaming 4, 12; pay gap 7, 25, 27, 29; policy 2, 7, 13; relations 1, 199, 232; segregation 36, 104, 109, 233 Gender Inequality Index 150, 162 gharar 179, 181 global: economy 1, 7, 10, 15, 30, 177; financial crisis 182; global gender gap 31–32, 47, 99, 137, 145, 162 Global Findex database 179, 192 globalisation 5, 124, 229–230 Gloria Marie Steinem 27 Granovetter, M. 215, 225–226

236

Index

harassment 20, 28–29, 75–76, 90, 98, 132, 142, 149, 158, 160, 162, 233 headscarf 38, 63, 94–95, 97, 129, 131, 133–134, 148, 161–162 hegemonic masculinity 16–17 hijab 85, 94–95, 121, 123–126, 131–137, 140–142, 162, 184, 186, 221 Hispanicness 119, 121, 123 home-based enterprise 88, 184 honour 29, 104, 108–110 household: decision-making 182, 203, 204, 210; head 200, 201, 230; division of labour 203, income-generators 189, 217; income 199, 223; responsibility 155; size 202 human capital 4, 45, 216, 230 human development 12, 70, 72, 75, 77–78, 83–84, 92, 99, 119, 145, 162, 199 Human Development Index 83, 92, 99 ibadah 222 ideology: Boko Haram 72; faith 7; Islamic 23, 71; Islamic finance, 180–181; Islamist 122 ILO 6–7, 11, 24–25, 29, 75, 82, 88, 94, 97–98, 106, 108, 116, 197, 211, 215, 227; see also International Labour Organisation immigration 151, 167–168 inclusion: gender/women 10, 12, 33, 91, 97, 154; of women in workplace, 2, 154; of Fulani women 199, 207, 210; political of women 49, 51, 56–59, 65 inclusive financial system 179 income: and education rupture 131; con­ trol over household 199–206, 209n1; earnings of Muslims in Australia 131–133; family 20; monthly 62; gender gap in 197; low 87, 91, 105, 118, 190; inequality in 174, 179; opportunities for 72–73; secondary income earners 183, 189 individual autonomy 120, 124 Indonesia: educational attainment of women 216; digital economy 221–225; discrimination against women 219; female labour force participation, 214; formal employment in 219, 220; informal: economy 6, 24, 55, 108, 116, 215–216, 220, 225 inheritance: access and ownership of resources 204–205; law in Islam 71;

insecurity: conflict and displacement 69, 74, 76, 79–80, 83, 172; of income 104; food 196, 210 insurgency 8, 69–70, 75–76, 78–79, 81–82, 84, 196–197 internalised oppression 106 International Labour Organisation 82, 86, 227 International Organisation for Migration 93, 97 Interpretation: of Islamic teachings/culture 197; of Islam 24, 71; modernist of Islam 124; of religion 36, 93, 95, 195, 201 Iran: economic sanctions 86; population 85; labour force participation rate and education 85–99; Iranian Islamic Revolution 85 Islamic: banking digital platform, 180; finance 10, 179–185, 189–194; financial institution 191; jurisprudence 181; microfinance 180, 192, 194; traditions 26, 35, 164; values 33, 78, 122, 124, Islamic feminism 8, 91, 94–95, 98, 124, 126–127 Islamic law 71, 179, 183; see also Shariah Islamisation 51, 104, 125 Islamism 119, 125, 127, 228 Islamophobia 119, 127, 131–132, 134, 137, 143–145, 148, 156–157, 160 Jihadist 74 Kabeer, N. 16, 29, 69, 82, 109–110, 113, 116 Karachi 8, 103–105, 107, 109, 111, 113–117 Kenya: Islamic banking in 179–194; Muslim population 183; MSMEs in 187–188, 193–194 Khadija bint Khuwaylid 2 Labour: force participation 6, 15, 32, 56, 82, 86–87, 132, 146–149, 152, 154–155, 158, 161, 197, 214, 226, 230; market 9, 18, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 61–62, 86, 104, 105, 110, 116, 131, 133, 136, 137, 139–140, 141, 143–144, 147, 155, 160–161, 202 laicism 132–133 leave no one behind 4, 11, 69 literacy 46, 74, 77, 88, 94, 96, 98–99, 140, 197, 202, 205, 207–208

Index madrasa 23, 225 majboori 106–107 man’s world 7, 15–17, 19–21, 23–25, 27, 29–31 marriage law 219 maysir 179, 181 MDGs 28; see also Millennium Development Goals Mediation between secular and religion 118–119, 128 Melilla 118 MENA 6, 86; see also Middle East and North Africa micro, small and medium enterprise 187, 193, 220–221; see also MSME microcredit 180, 184 micro entrepreneurship 215, 228 Middle East 3, 6, 18, 33, 46, 96, 129, 182, 189, 212, 218 Middle East and North Africa 6, 212 middle-class 214, 218–219, 223–225, 227 middle-income 19, 25, 149, 188, 215 migrants 10, 32, 97, 104, 147–148, 151, 172, 231 migration 9, 66–67, 93, 96–97, 126, 148, 151, 162, 165, 168, 226–228, 231 Millennium Development Goals 4, 19, 28 minimum wage 105–106, 108 minority 8, 48–51, 54, 58–61, 63, 65–67, 84, 122, 128, 131, 143–144, 162, 164, 231 mobile money transfer 189 mobility restrictions 20, 74, 110, 112, 116, 149, 205 modernity 8, 50, 60, 65, 116–117, 124, 127–128, 226, 231 modesty 103, 121–122 Moor 119, 125 Moorofobia 119 moral values 78, 122, 124 Moroccan 9, 118–119, 121–126, 128 Moroccanness 121, 123 MSME 187–188, 190, 193–194 muamlat 181, 186 Muslim: economy 1, 17; entrepreneur 180, 193; female 1, 24, 133, 141, 169; identity 9, 67, 121, 123–124, 134, 140; majority country 2, 5–6, 8, 11; majority state 146; minority 48–51, 54, 59–61, 65–67, 84, 144, 162; population 5, 11, 49, 52, 56–57, 65, 67, 83, 122, 125, 146, 182–184, 214; society 1–2, 5, 17, 26, 81, 109, 120, 130, 229, 233; world 1, 12, 23, 84, 126, 162;

237

National income 7, 18, 30, 91, 103 neo-fundamentalism 124 NGO 12, 22, 26, 76, 78–79, 112, 233; see also non-governmental organisation Nigeria: agricultural sector 197, 199, 209, 218; dairy industry 10; Islamic law in 71, legal framework 70; religious demography 70, 71 niqab 38, 134, 142, 184, 186 non-governmental organisation 22, 70, 76, 78 North Africa 6, 119, 212 online businesses 221, 223–224 Orthodox Christianity 49–50, 65 Ottoman 49–51, 54, 57 Our Common Future 4, 12 Pakistan: basic labour rights 108, domestic workers in 103–117; labour laws 105–106, 116; Gender Equality & Women Empowerment Policy 150; state-sponsored orthopraxy 104; see also Punjab parenting 171–172, 175, 185 patriarchy 16–17, 23, 82, 201, 208, 210–211 Pew Research Centre 11, 162 Policy reform 25, 27, 47, 233 Pomak 8, 50–51, 54–60, 62–64, 66–67 Poverty: alleviation 180, 193; and domestic workers in Karachi 103, 107–108, 113–117; and financial inclusion, 179–180, 182, 187, 190, 193; and the Abbreviated Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 199, 209–212; economic employment 64; rampant in Nigeria 71–79; reduction and female empowerment 3–4, 6, 12, 19 profit 22, 181–182, 187, 217 public sector 12, 87, 132, 155, 157 Punjab 105–106, 114, 116, 151 purdah 8, 22, 103–104, 108–111, 117, 197, 206; see also seclusion

practising/observing

Qatar 6, 18, 95, 147, 194 qimar 181 Qur’an 15, 23, 27–28, 94, 164, 172–174, 202 Qur’anic 81 racism 127, 134, 137, 139, 156–158, 160 readymade garments industry in Bangladesh 15, 26

238

Index

reflexivity 163 refugee 23, 89, 136, 163, 165, 172, 175, 231 religio-cultural 8, 76, 80 religion and culture 132 religiosity: and economic performance 180, 194; and Muslim women in Bangladesh 26, 27; expression in the workplace 139; relegate to the private sphere 125 religious: extremism 71; pluralism, 123–124 remuneration 15, 79, 88, 115, 166 resistance 35, 57, 106–107, 113, 115, 230, 233 respectability 108, 110 riba 179, 181 risk of loss 182 rotating credit group 221 Rowlands, J. 103, 106, 109, 112, 116 Salafism 125 Saudi Arabia: English as a Foreign Language in 7, 32, 35–36, 46; reforms in 7,36, 44, 45; Saudi piety 132; Saudi Vision 2030, 32–47; Saudi women 7, 33 -37, 40, 43–44; traditional values 44 scarf 85, 95, 139–142 SDGs 2, 4, 10, 32–34, 45, 69–70, 75, 77, 79–80, 83, 105, 114, 150, 230; see also Sustainable Development Goals Seclusion practising/observing 111,184, 197, 206 secular: secularisation 122; secularist 125–126, 128; secularist feminism 125; secularity 122, 125 self-actualisation 174 self-agency 10 self-awareness 163 self-employment 214–215 semi-feudal system: caste-based practices/ norm 109, 111, 114; caste/class struc­ ture 8, 116; class consciousness 107; semi-feudal norms 8, 103, 111, 114; expectations 110,112; subservience 103, 115 sexual harassment 20, 29, 76, 90, 98, 149, 158, 160, 162 Shariah: compliant 79–192; law 71, 86, 179; principles 120, 191 Shi’ite 51, 53 Shia 51 small and medium enterprise 187, 193, 220–221

Social Institutions and Gender Index 219 Social: justice 4, 8, 69, 114; media 215, 221–225, 232; mobility 6, 62, 114, 133, 137, 145, 217, 230; protection 11, 70, 75, 77, 82, 108, 114, 215, 225; security 60, 97, 103, 106, 108, 112, 115–116, 221 socialist 6, 8, 49–50, 58–59, 61, 64–65, 67, 122, 125, 231 socialist regime 6, 49 socio-economic: development of Northern Nigeria 75; empowerment in the West 132; status of Muslim minorities in Bulgaria 65; values in Saudi Arabia 44 South Asia 12, 19, 29, 115 Southeast Asia 6, 182, 215, 226–227 Spain: cultural diversity in 119; Moroccan presence in 118, Muslims in 127–130; Spanish identity 119, 124 startup 215, 221–225, 227 stigmatisation 119 Sub-Saharan Africa 3, 6, 73, 81, 193 Sunni 51, 198 sustainability 2–3, 12, 23, 25–27, 230, 232–233 sustainable development 2, 4, 11–12, 17–18, 23, 25–26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 43, 47, 69, 80, 82–84, 92, 105, 116, 150, 161, 182, 230, 233 Sustainable Development Goals 2, 4, 18, 25–26, 30, 32, 47, 69, 83, 92, 150, 182; see also Voluntary National Review symbolic interactionism 120, 129 Taiwan 10, 163, 165–167, 171, 175–176 the Prophet 2, 21, 23, 160, 173 Third sector 22, 28, 118 Transparency International Bangladesh 22, 30 trauma 75, 163, 171 UNDP 5, 12, 28, 70, 72, 76, 83–84, 91–92, 99, 132, 145, 162 UNESCO 19, 28, 46, 88–89, 91, 95, 99 UNICEF 26, 30, 74, 84 United Nations 4–5, 11–12, 16, 18, 30, 32, 34, 71, 82–84, 91–92, 94, 99, 145, 147, 149–150, 162, 182, 211, 227

Index United Nations Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 92, 94 United Nations Decade for Women, 4, 12 United Nations Development Program 5, 12, 91 universal: education 1; human values 64; right to social protection 75; SDGs 4 untouchability 109 violence against women 3, 92 violent faction 71 Voluntary National Review 32–33, 47, 69, 83, 105, 161 war 50, 57, 67, 83, 121, 156, 163, 165, 167, 170–171, 175 welfare 27, 33, 75, 108, 111, 174, 218 Western: society 9, 94, 126–127, 137, 144, 231; tradition 119, 132; work­ place 134, 160, 231

239

Women in Parliaments Global Forum Award 19 women’s agency 29, 90, 109, 112, 154–155, 208 women’s empowerment 3–4, 11, 17, 30, 45, 92, 96, 150, 193, 199, 202, 207–209, 211, 233 women’s health 21 women-focused banking 179, 181, 183–185, 187, 189, 191, 193 working class 103–104, 114 World Bank 6, 12, 15, 18, 25, 30–31, 71–72, 84, 86, 90, 92–93, 98–99, 161, 192, 196, 211, 213 World Economic Forum 18–19, 25, 31–32, 47, 92, 99, 145, 147, 160, 162 xenophobia 122