Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies: Islamist Movements and the Challenge of Globalisation 3031448243, 9783031448249

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Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies Islamist Movements and the Challenge of Globalisation Asif Mohiuddin

Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies “Mohiuddin’s refreshingly original work delves into the complex interplay between established religious authority, globalisation and the emergence of new information technologies. The book expounds as to how Islamist movements go beyond traditional geographic limitations by harnessing the power of technology to disseminate ideas, attract supporters and mobilise their cause. This remarkable exploration of technology’s transformative role in reshaping religious authority significantly contributes to the field. It offers fresh and informative perspectives on the influence of globalisation on religious dynamics, delivering valuable insights for researchers in the field. This book may be recommended to anyone who seeks to understand the evolving dynamics of the interfaces of religious authority, globalisation and technology.” —Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Emeritus Professor, Founding Chairman and CEO, International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia “In this well-researched, nuanced, and very readable work of scholarship, Asif Mohiuddin has made an important contribution to the study of Muslim politics and geopolitics in our current moment. The challenges of writing such a book are as enormous as the regions covered (the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia) and as diverse as the religious, cultural, and political modes and movements represented by the millions of Muslims who populate them. Complicate these basic characteristics of lands and peoples with variations in institutional authority, the dynamics of individual and group alliances with, and contestations of, that authority, remain mindful of the deep and lengthy histories that shape the present and place constraints on future possibilities, account for the transformative role of cyberspace in all of the above, and do so with a measured understanding and, indeed, appreciation of the difficulties that confront every human being who struggles to find an integral modus vivendi in a rapidly evolving global order— such is the achievement of this book. I highly recommend it.” —Peter Matthews Wright, PhD, Associate Professor of Religion, Colorado College, United States of America “Asif Mohiuddin presents an overview of the interplay between Islamist movements and larger processes such as national politics and globalization. Each of the earlier chapters is solid introduction and analysis of a different body of literature that informs understanding these movements. These culminate in a thought-provoking analysis of the how different streams of global experiences: capitalism, democracy,

Islamism, and others come together to influence the direction of various movements. Rather than place Islamism in opposition to globalization or see Islamism as a failed enterprise, Mohiuddin presents Islamism as part and parcel of globalization and suggests that its relative success and failures must be understood in that context.” —Ronald Lukens-Bull, PhD, Professor of Anthropology and Religious Studies, University of North Florida, United States of America “Amidst the swift and seamless propagation of ideas and the far-reaching impact of global communication, Islamist movements find themselves entangled in a complex dynamic with traditional religious authority, as they strive to assert their influence and navigate the vast expanse of global religious discourse. This thought-provoking book by Asif Mohiuddin delves deep into the dynamic landscape of Islamist movements, meticulously unraveling their adept contestation of religious authority in the face of the transformative impact of information communication technology. Through an analysis of strategies and approaches, the author sheds light on the intricate relationship between religious authority, Islamist movements and the broader impact of globalization.” —Adis Duderija, Griffith University, Australia “Reading this book gives readers from Europe a unique opportunity to trace the entire range of reactions developed by the contemporary world of Islam in response to the problem of globalization, which is increasingly affecting it. The author’s merit lies in showing how diverse these attitudes are, determined not only by local cultural distinctiveness or different socio-political conditions, but also by the degree of openness to other value systems accepted in a given country, or even simply by economic wealth, usually subjectively assessed. A closer understanding of the specificity of each of these approaches seems to be a necessary condition for trying to comprehend the currently prevailing relationships, both interpersonal ones built between people, and those of an international scope, when observed from a broad, although formally external, perspective.” —Prof. Mariusz Mas ́lak, Cracow University of Technology, Cracow, Poland “This book offers an excellent insight into the changing dynamics of religious authority in the Islamic worlds, a historical-sociological process that unfolded in response to the technologically-mediated Eurocentric mechanisms of modernization, secularisation, and globalization. By exploring the theoretical and praxeological possibilities of reconciling the regressive and progressive forces both inside and outside the Islamic worlds, this book offers a valuable contribution to the contemporary literature on political Islam, religion and theology, peace and conflict studies, discourse ethics, and global politics.” —Deepshikha Shahi, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, O. P. Jindal Global University, India

Asif Mohiuddin

Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies Islamist Movements and the Challenge of Globalisation

Asif Mohiuddin Faculty of Human Sciences Sultan Idris Education University Perak, Malaysia

ISBN 978-3-031-44824-9    ISBN 978-3-031-44825-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

The modern world is undergoing significant cultural transformations due to globalisation and digital technology, which have far-reaching implications for religious authority in Muslim societies. Islamist movements have emerged as formidable actors, challenging established religious authority and leveraging the opportunities provided by globalisation and modern technology (Esposito & Voll, 1996). Concurrently, globalisation, with its unparalleled connectivity and rapid dissemination of ideas, poses substantial challenges to religious authority in Muslim communities (Appadurai, 1996). As individuals and communities strive to maintain their cultural and religious identities, these dynamics influence identity formation, often leading to resistance. For instance, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be interpreted as a response to perceived homogenisation resulting from globalisation (Roy, 2004). Consequently, Islamist groups have evolved and adapted to the changing societal landscape over time, utilising social media platforms to mobilise supporters, disseminate their message, and challenge established religious authorities (Awan, 2017). Driven by a steadfast commitment to upholding the foundations of Islamic law as they perceive it, these groups employ the tools of globalisation, particularly digital technology, to challenge and redefine religious authority (Mandaville, 2007). Throughout history, Islamic religious authorities have demonstrated resilience and adaptability, evolving to accommodate changing societal contexts and external forces such as globalisation and technology (Hefner, 1998). However, even in the face of these changes, the fundamental principles of Islam continue to guide the spiritual lives of Muslims worldwide v

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(Esposito, 2002). The dynamics between Islamist movements and religious authority can vary across regions due to differences in cultural, political and religious contexts. Consequently, Islamist movements have played a significant role in shaping religious discourse and challenging established religious authorities in regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (Nasr, 2001). In this phase of development, the rise of information technology, particularly the internet, has profoundly transformed religious authority in Muslim societies. The internet has enabled Islamist movements to transcend traditional geographical boundaries, facilitating the dissemination of their ideas, recruitment efforts and mobilisation of supporters (Bunt, 2003). Consequently, the religious authority landscape has been reshaped, with traditional religious leaders and institutions grappling with the challenges posed by digital technology (Anderson & Eickelman, 2003). Additionally, language, culture and national identities play significant roles in religious discourse and expression. Religious institutions must navigate these shifting paradigms, striving to maintain relevance and influence amidst changing societal dynamics (Eickelman & Piscatori, 2004). The intersection of globalisation and information technology is fundamentally reshaping religious authority in Muslim societies. As these forces continue to evolve, so will the dynamics between Islamist movements and religious authority. These changes present both challenges and opportunities for Muslim societies as they navigate their religious, political and social landscapes (Roy, 2004). The phenomenon of globalisation, coupled with the proliferation of information technology, has significantly influenced the perception and exercise of religious authority in Muslim societies. This intersection has led to the democratisation of religious discourse, with traditional religious authorities now facing competition from new actors in cyberspace (Bunt, 2000). These changes have provided most Muslims with greater access to a wider range of Islamic teachings and interpretations. The internet has made it possible for Muslims, regardless of their geographical location, to engage with diverse interpretations of Islam (Hoffman, 2007). However, this democratisation of religious discourse has also resulted in confusion for some Muslims and distraction for others, as the multitude of voices and perspectives often lead to conflicting interpretations of Islamic teachings (Rane et al., 2014). While some Islamic religious authorities have adapted to changing societal contexts and external forces such as globalisation and technology (Hefner, 1998), the rigid tenets of Islam

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continue to guide the spiritual lives of Muslims worldwide (Esposito, 2002). Due to differences in cultural, political and religious contexts, the dynamics between Islamist movements and religious authority may differ across regions. As a result of the challenges presented by decolonisation and democratisation, Islamist movements in regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia have played a significant role in shaping religious discourse and challenging established religious authorities (Nasr, 2001). Consequently, the primary academic challenge concerning Islam, globalisation and religious authority lies in elucidating the mechanisms through which authority is formed and manifested within the global Muslim populace. Building on this premise, a secondary focus is Muslim activism in the European domain, specifically investigating the situation of authority and representation in this context. Another area of academic interest is transnational and global religious authorities, encompassing a comprehensive understanding of how religious authority has been propagated or influenced by various states and movements, such as the Gülen movement and the Iranian Revolution. Additionally, there are the effects of globalisation on Islam, with a specific focus on its manifestation in Europe. This investigation examines how religious communities generate and shape globalisation, challenging the conventional secularisation thesis, which posits that religion diminishes in importance as societies progress. This rigorous investigation notably emphasises the role of Islam in the European context, critically assessing its shaping by the colossal forces of globalisation. The academic inquiries and concerns outlined herein represent a microcosm of the prevailing scholarly discourse on Islam, globalisation and religious authority. However, it must be noted that these considerations are not exhaustive. The prospect of future research promises the potential discovery of more intricate dialogues and spheres of investigation within the broad domain encompassing Islam, globalisation and religious authority. As we navigate the complexities of the modern world, understanding the dynamics of religious authority becomes increasingly important. In Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies: Islamist Movements and the Challenge of Globalisation Asif Mohiuddin presents a scholarly work that not only illuminates the intricate dynamics of Islamist movements but also sheds light on the broader implications of globalisation on religious discourse and expression. Mohiuddin’s work stands out for its rigorous research and comprehensive analysis. By structuring the book

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across seven well-organised chapters, he provides readers with a systematic exploration of the multifaceted nature of religious authority in the context of Islam and globalisation. The introductory chapter serves as a solid foundation, setting the stage for subsequent discussions that delve into various dimensions of religious authority and its interaction with Islamist movements. One of the book’s strengths lies in its comparative approach, which allows for a nuanced understanding of the contestation of religious authority in different regions. Through in-depth case studies from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia, readers gain insights into the diverse cultural, political and religious contexts that shape Islamist movements and their relationship with traditional religious authorities. Furthermore, Mohiuddin’s exploration of the role of technology in transforming religious authority is a timely and essential contribution. As we witness the unprecedented advancements in information technologies, understanding their impact on religious dynamics becomes imperative. The author skilfully navigates this terrain, uncovering how Islamist movements utilise new information technologies to transcend geographical boundaries and reshape the landscape of religious authority. The book’s richness also lies in its exploration of key themes such as identity, resistance, evolution and contestation within Islamist movements. By examining these themes within the broader framework of globalisation, Mohiuddin reveals the intricate and often subtle ways in which religious authority is negotiated, contested and reimagined. In the realm of religious authority, the intersection of globalisation and information technology has been transformational. Islamic movements across the world have presented unique opportunities and challenges that significantly influence their evolution, strategies and impacts. Globalisation has facilitated the transnational flow of ideas and practices, breaking down geographical barriers that once constrained the spread of Islamic movements. Through globalisation, these movements have connected with broader audiences, fostering a sense of a global Muslim community (Ummah) and enhancing their ability to mobilise support across borders. The advent of information technology, particularly the internet, has been instrumental in this process. Online platforms have facilitated the proliferation of diverse Islamic teachings, enabling Muslims, regardless of their location, to engage with various interpretations of Islam. This digital revolution has resulted in the democratisation of religious authority, with traditional religious figures sharing the stage with new actors who leverage these platforms to disseminate their views (Abbas, 2017).

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However, the impact of these phenomena is not uniform across Muslim communities. The experiences of Muslim majorities in the East differ significantly from those of Muslim minorities in the West. In countries where Muslims form the majority, such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia, the proliferation of Islamist movements has often led to increased contestation over religious authority, contributing to religious and political volatility. Conversely, for Muslim minorities in the West, globalisation and information technology have often served as tools for identity construction and community building. In these contexts, the internet has provided Muslims with a space to negotiate their religious and cultural identities, navigate the challenges of minority status, and resist Islamophobia (Abbas, 2020). These developments have also presented challenges. The democratisation of religious discourse, while empowering individuals, has also led to a mixture of voices, sometimes resulting in confusion and sectarianism. Moreover, extremist groups have exploited the rise of online religious platforms to spread radical ideologies (Awan, 2008). The intersection of globalisation and information technology has profound implications for Islamic movements and Muslim societies. As these forces continue to shape the religious landscape, it is crucial for scholars, policymakers and Muslim communities to understand and navigate these dynamics. By doing so, they can harness the opportunities presented by these developments while mitigating their potential risks, fostering the development of pluralistic, peaceful and inclusive Muslim societies worldwide. As societies become more interconnected through globalisation and technology, non-Muslim majority societies face the challenge of cultural adaptation. The proliferation of diverse cultural and religious ideas, facilitated by globalisation and digital technology, has led to an increase in cultural heterogeneity (Vertovec, 2007). In this context, Islam, as one of the world’s major religions, has become more visible and influential in non-Muslim societies (Hunter, 2002). This has prompted debates about multiculturalism and the integration of Muslim communities, with societies grappling with questions of cultural tolerance, accommodation, and assimilation (Modood, 2007). Another challenge pertains to security. The rise of Islamist movements and the spread of extremist ideologies, facilitated by digital technology, have raised security concerns in non-Muslim majority societies (Neumann, 2013). While most Muslims do not endorse extremism, the actions of a small minority have contributed to a climate of fear and suspicion. This has led to increased scrutiny of Muslim

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communities and, at times, curtailment of civil liberties in the name of national security (Kundnani, 2014). The growing influence of Islam in non-Muslim majority societies has prompted debates about national identity. In some societies, the presence of large and visible Muslim communities has been perceived as a challenge to national identity and social cohesion (Kymlicka, 2010). This has been particularly evident in societies with strong ethnic or religious homogeneity, where the arrival of Muslim immigrants has raised concerns about the dilution of national identity and culture (Joppke, 2004). The intersection of globalisation, technology and Islamism presents significant challenges for majority non-Muslim societies, including cultural adaptation, security concerns and debates about national identity. Addressing these challenges requires a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics at play, as well as a commitment to upholding the principles of tolerance, inclusivity and social cohesion. Undoubtedly, a comprehensive analysis of these issues necessitates further research. Although not a beginning, Asif Mohiuddin’s contribution undeniably constitutes a significant addition to the overarching themes within this academic discipline. Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

Tahir Abbas



References Abbas, T. (2017). Understanding the nature of online extremist narratives. In H. Rompuy et al. (Eds.), The challenge of Jihadist radicalisation: In Europe and beyond (pp. 90–98). European Policy Centre. Abbas, T. (2020). Islamophobia as racialised biopolitics in the United Kingdom. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 46(5), 497–511. Awan, A. (2008). Antecedents of Islamic political radicalism among Muslim communities in Europe. PS: Political Science & Politics, 41(1), 13–17. Anderson, J. W., & Eickelman, D. F. (2003). New media in the Muslim World: The emerging public sphere. Indiana University Press. Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalisation. University of Minnesota Press. Awan, I. (2017). Cyber-extremism: Isis and the power of social media. Society, 54(2), 138–149. Bunt, G. (2000). Virtually Islamic: Computer-mediated communication and Cyber Islamic environments. University of Wales Press.

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Bunt, G.  R. (2003). Islam in the digital age: E-Jihad, online fatwas and Cyber Islamic environments. Pluto Press. Campbell, H. (2010). When religion meets new media. Routledge. Eickelman, D.  F., & Piscatori, J.  P. (2004). Muslim politics. Princeton University Press. Esposito, J.  L. (2002). What everyone needs to know about Islam. Oxford University Press. Esposito, J. L., & Voll, J. O. (1996). Islam and democracy. Oxford University Press. Hefner, R. W. (1998). Multiple modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a globalizing age. Annual Review of Anthropology, 27(1), 83–104. Hoffman, V. (2007). The Internet’s impact on Islam. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 5(2), 3–7. Hunter, S. (2002). Islam, Europe’s second religion: The new social, cultural, and political landscape. Praeger. Joppke, C. (2004). The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy. The British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 237–257. Kundnani, A. (2014). The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic war on terror. Verso. Kymlicka, W. (2010). The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies. International Social Science Journal, 61(199), 97–112. Mandaville, P. (2007). Global political Islam. Routledge. Modood, T. (2007). Multiculturalism: A civic idea. Polity. Nasr, S.  V. R. (2001). Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the making of state power. Oxford University Press. Neumann, P. (2013). Options and strategies for countering online radicalisation in the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(6), 431–459. Rane, H., Ewart, J., & Martinkus, J. (2014). Media framing of the Muslim world: Conflicts, crises and contexts. Palgrave Macmillan. Roy, O. (2004). Globalized Islam: The search for a new Ummah. Columbia University Press. Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054.

Declaration About Funding and Competing Interests

This work has not received any funding for research, writing or publication. The author affirms that the content presented in this material has been driven solely by academic inquiry and independent research without any external financial support. There are no competing interests, either financial or nonfinancial, that may have influenced the content or findings presented in this work. The author confirms the absence of affiliations, financial involvements or personal relationships that could be perceived as potential sources of bias or conflict of interest in the context of this work.

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Acknowledgements

As I reflect upon the arduous journey of writing this book, I am acutely aware of the myriad individuals who have selflessly supported me along the way. Thus, I am compelled to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the Faculty of Human Sciences at Sultan Idris Education University, Malaysia, for graciously providing me with the opportunity to embark upon this research endeavour. The intellectual journey fostered by Sultan Idris Education University, intertwined with the unwavering assistance and support from the faculty members of the Faculty of Human Sciences, has been an extraordinary gift for which my gratitude knows no bounds. It is their exceptional expertise, further fortified by the invaluable assistance rendered by the Research Management and Innovation Center (RMIC), that has truly shaped the very essence of this book. In this pursuit, I find myself humbly indebted to the brilliance of Prof Tahir Abbas, who invested his time and wisdom into refining and perfecting the ideas encapsulated within this work. His profound insights and scholarly guidance have been nothing short of indispensable. Moreover, I am compelled to express my deepest appreciation to the esteemed Prof TS. Dr Nor Kalsum Binti Mohd Isa, the Dean of the Faculty of Human Sciences, Sultan Idris Education University, whose unwavering support and encouragement have acted as pillars of strength throughout the entirety of this book. I find myself deeply grateful to Dr Abd Hadi bin Borham, whose profound tutelage, infinite patience and sagacity have steered me through the labyrinthine path of this endeavour. Furthermore, I am honoured to acknowledge the Faculty of Theology at Sakarya University, Turkey, for their support and encouragement throughout this xv

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expedition. Their unyielding commitment and belief in the significance of this research have been invaluable beyond measure. I am truly humbled by the support and contributions of Prof Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Prof Peter Matthews Wright, Prof Gerhard Van den Heever and Dr Rahman Dag. To say that I am indebted to them is an understatement, for their dedication went above and beyond mere assistance. Their keen interest in meticulously reviewing the entire draft and offering thoughtful and timely suggestions and edits has been nothing short of a blessing. I would be remiss not to express my sincere appreciation to Dr Adis Duderija for his constructive feedback, which compelled me to delve deeper and articulate my ideas with greater precision. I am also grateful to Prof Ramazan Biçer for his meticulous feedback and boundless generosity. I extend my thanks to Prof Ronald Lukens-Bull whose esteemed academic insights have indelibly shaped the contours of this book. His scholarly inputs have played a pivotal role in refining and enriching the ideas presented within these pages. Lastly, I would like to express my appreciation to Philip Gets, the commissioning editor at Palgrave, for his support and guidance throughout the publication process of this work. In closing, it is essential to acknowledge that the culmination of this book has been the result of a collaborative effort spanning three diverse nations: Turkey, India and Malaysia. The amalgamation of insights, perspectives and scholarly support from these distinct academic landscapes has imbued this work with a truly global essence. With deep appreciation, I extend my heartfelt thanks to all those who have contributed to this endeavour, be it through their intellectual discourse, mentorship or practical assistance. Your collective efforts and support have elevated the scholarly quality and significance of this book, making it a true testament to the power of collaboration across borders and cultures.

About the Book

This book aims to explore the ways in which Islamist groups are contesting religious authority in Muslim societies and the implications of these challenges for religious, political and social structures in these societies. It sheds light on how these movements skilfully navigate the complex interplay between traditional religious structures and the forces of globalisation. In cyberspace, information technologies and the internet have become the catalysts of transformation, redefining how communication and interaction unfold beyond geographical confines. Islamist groups, keenly aware of the vast possibilities these powerful tools bestow, have boldly embraced them, defying territorial boundaries and venturing forth to challenge the hallowed dominion of the traditional religious establishment. The book thoroughly explores their tactics, strategies and beliefs, offering a nuanced comprehension of the struggle for religious authority. With compelling case studies spanning diverse Muslim societies, the book traverses regions such as the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. It reveals how the challenge of globalisation manifests uniquely within each context, presenting rich and complex scenarios of religious authority contestation. By offering insightful perspectives, this book equips readers with a deeper appreciation for the complexities of religious authority in the face of globalising forces.

Contents

1 Introduction:  Islam, Religious Authority and Islamist Movements in the Age of Globalisation  1 1.1 Introduction  1 1.2 Globalisation, Islam and Secularism  3 1.3 Globalisation, Social Movements and Resistance: The Case of Islamist Movements  5 1.4 Islam, Religious Authority and Islamism  8 1.5 Crisis of Religious Authority: The Role of Social Media, IT and the Internet  9 1.6 Objectives and Methodology of the Book 11 1.7 Structure of the Book 13 References 14 2 Globalisation,  Identity and Resistance 17 2.1 Introduction 17 2.2 Conceptualising Globalisation: Issues and Implications 19 2.3 Winners, Losers and the Pluralisation of a Singular Term 23 2.4 The Shift From Globalisation to Glocalisation 27 2.5 Unpacking the Dialectics of Identity in a Globalised World 31 2.6 Social Identity Approach to Globalisation 35 2.7 Factors Influencing Group Social Comparison 37 2.8 Culture 38 2.9 Group Identity and Personal Benefit 39 2.10 Threat to Identity 40 xix

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2.11 Limitations of Social Identity and Self-Categorisation Theories 41 2.12 Globalised Western Culture: Universal Values and Exclusionary Tendencies 41 2.13 Vectors of Opposition to Globalised Western Culture 44 2.14 Particularistic Opposition 44 2.15 Universalistic Opposition 45 2.16 Power and Organised Resistance 46 2.17 Beyond Modern Globalisation: Investigating Early Ties Between Europe and the Muslim World 51 2.18 Globalisation at the Crossroads: Muslim World’s Diverse Responses and Interpretations 55 2.19 Clash or Convergence? Globalisation’s Dual Effect on Civilisational Identity Conflicts 58 2.20 Conclusion 62 References 64 3 Islamist  Movements: Evolution, Approaches and Contestation 73 3.1 Introduction 73 3.2 Globalisation, Social Movements and Transnational Public Sphere 76 3.3 Islamist Movements: Terminology and the Basics 79 3.4 Approaches to the Study of Islamist Movements 83 3.5 Historical Approach 83 3.6 Political Economy and Sociological Approaches 85 3.7 Towards an Integrated Approach 86 3.8 Islamist Movements and Democratic Politics 88 3.9 Islamist Movements as Social Movements 91 3.10 Islamism in Transition: Neo-Fundamentalism and Post-­Islamist Politics 95 3.11 Islamism and the Ills of Globalisation104 3.12 Islamism and Religious Authority106 3.13 Conclusion108 References110

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4 Religious  Authority in Islam: Resilient Patterns of Evolution From the Formative Period to Contemporary Times117 4.1 Introduction117 4.2 Authority in Sunni Islam: An Overview119 4.3 Sources of Religious Authority in Sunni Islam123 4.4 Hadıt̄ h and Religious Authority124 4.5 Religious Authority in Shi‘ı̄ Islam: Charisma and Hereditary Succession128 4.6 Religious Authority and the Imams in Shi‘ı̄ Islam130 4.7 The Heirs of the Prophet134 4.8 Authority in the First Centuries of Islam136 4.9 Decline of the Caliphate138 4.10 The Role of Qadis in Upholding Islamic Law and Ethics141 4.11 Qur’a n ̄ , Models of Authority and the Caliphate142 4.12 Religious Authority, Traditional Society and Religious Movement144 4.13 Sunni Legacy, Shia Lineage: Unravelling the Origins of Al-Azhar University144 4.14 Reimagining Islamic Authority: Metamorphosis and Continuity in a Globalised World150 4.15 Strategies for Establishing Authority: The Case of International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS)153 4.16 Conclusion155 References157 5 Mapping  the Terrain of Islamism and Religious Authority: Insights from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia165 5.1 Introduction165 5.2 Islamism, State and Politics168 5.3 Globalisation and the Revival of the Muslim Ummah170 5.4 Reasserting Authority in the Middle East: Traditional Islamic Institutions in Response to Crisis172 5.5 Egypt173 5.6 Tunisia177 5.7 Saudi Arabia and Qatar180 5.8 Turkey182

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5.9 Southeast Asia185 5.10 Indonesia186 5.11 Malaysia190 5.12 South Asia192 5.13 Religious Pluralism and the Paradox of Sufism in South Asia192 5.14 Rise of the ‘Ulamā193 5.15 The Rise of Religio-Political Leaders194 5.16 Conclusion195 References197 6 Islamism  in the Digital Age: The Role of Cyberspace in Transforming Religious Authority203 6.1 Introduction203 6.2 Islam, Social Media and Technology206 6.3 Religious Authority and Digital Cyberspace209 6.4 The Internet, Digital Communication and New Religious Authority Figures212 6.5 Islamism and Decentralisation of Religious Authority: The Case of ISIS or ISIL214 6.6 ISIS, Salafism and Islamist Claims to Religious Authority215 6.7 Changing Digital Spaces: ISIS or ISIL, the Cyber Caliphate and the Internet217 6.8 Countering Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS or Daesh) Online219 6.9 The Proliferation of Interpretations: Media, Education and the Marginalisation of Traditional Scholars222 6.10 Navigating the Digital Divide: The Intersection of the Internet and Radicalisation225 6.11 Conclusion228 References230 7 Conclusion:  Globalisation, Islamism and People’s Participation in Religious Discourse and Expression237 7.1 Introduction237 7.2 Challenges to Religious Authority239 7.3 The Future of Islamist Movements241 7.4 One Islamism or Many?241

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7.5 Beyond the Uniformity242 7.6 Political Systems and Authoritarian Regimes in the Muslim World244 7.7 The Global Power Structure and US Foreign Policy245 7.8 Islam in the Digital Age247 7.9 Countering the Crisis of Authority: The Possibilities for Change250 References253 Index255

About the Author

Asif  Mohiuddin  works as an Academic Officer in the Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Human Sciences, Sultan Idris Education University, Malaysia. Previously, he served as a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Theology, Sakarya University, in Turkey from 2021 to 2022. Prior to joining Sakarya University, he worked as a Lecturer in the Department of Higher Education, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, India. He received his PhD from the University of Kashmir in 2018. His research interests include globalisation and Islam, intersection between politics and religion in the Middle East, Islam and the West and Muslim minorities in multicultural societies (Europe and South Asia).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Islam, Religious Authority and Islamist Movements in the Age of Globalisation

1.1   Introduction As a consequence of its interdisciplinary pervasiveness, globalisation has become an indispensable point of reference for any examination of contemporary cultural, political and social transformation. It is currently the preeminent paradigm of our world, championed by its advocates and contested by its detractors. For many, it represents a ‘grand narrative’ with a visionary power that is on par with any that has preceded it. It is viewed as a momentous and history-altering movement, signifying a transition to an uncharted world. Proponents of globalisation lay great emphasis on its novelty. In this context, Giddens (2001, p. 4) agrees with those who contend that ‘the new communications technologies, the role of knowledge as a factor of production, and the new discoveries in the life sciences, signal a profound transition in human history’. This discourse is perceived as a revolutionary force, a fundamental shift in the human trajectory that is now in full swing. While there are optimistic and pessimistic versions of the globalised scenario, the unifying thread is that the shifts involved in all areas of human life are irreversible and of global significance, whether we regard them as benign or not (Munck, 2007, p. 3). Globalisation today exhibits many characteristics, but one can also discern continuities with previous stages of capitalism. It could be said that ‘one-third of the globalization narrative is over-sold; one-third we do not understand; and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Mohiuddin, Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6_1

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one-­third is radically new’ (Drache, 1999, p. 3). There are a multitude of political, social, cultural and economic tendencies that differ across regions and time. There is simply no unilinear strategy waiting to be applied. The restructuring of the world order is an intricate and constantly evolving process that the concept of globalisation may point towards and partially elucidate, but it cannot serve as a master narrative that comprehensively explains and interprets it. What, then, is the unique place of Islam within this era of globalisation? While some perceive it as a religion that is at odds with the secular values that globalisation espouses, such a one-dimensional view fails to appreciate the multidimensional nature of Islam’s relationship with globalisation. Rather than rejecting globalisation outright, Islamic revival, Islamist movements, and the resurgence of religion across the world can be seen as key components of the globalisation process (Biçer, 2012, pp. 1–14). This inquiry acts as a web of possibilities that interconnects various concepts and realities, with the goal of presenting a more comprehensive understanding of Islam and its evolution in relation to globalisation. The emergence of new public spheres, which have been facilitated by globalisation, have led to the interaction of religious identities with modern ideas and technologies. For instance, the advent of the printing press transformed Islamic education and the study of Islamic texts, as well as the conceptualisation of the Muslim world (Robinson, 1993, pp. 229–251). Similarly, the IT revolution and the internet have had a significant impact on the way Islamic authority and knowledge are perceived and contested. While these developments have provided new intellectual possibilities for Muslim religious authorities to reflect on Islamic concepts of the right and the good, they have also allowed lay interpreters and ordinary citizens in Muslim countries to challenge the intellectual productions of the religious elite and propagate new, radical and narrow interpretations of Islam to their audiences. This has, in turn, formed the basis of some Islamist movements (Eickelman, 1992, pp. 643–655). The religious discourse within Islam has undergone a process of transformation as a result of the persistent imposition of secular thought and modern values, as well as the opposition to religion. Nonetheless, the growth of Islam rests on the strength of globalisation. If the movement of people and ideas that globalisation promotes did not exist, it would be challenging for religion to spread. In an ironic twist, globalisation strengthens Islam by advancing its far-reaching influence. This demonstrates how the secular-religious divide can give way to interdependence rather than xenophobic distance and how the opposition

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between globalisation and Islam can be seen as collapsing upon closer inspection (Sean, 2002). There are three significant components to this introductory chapter. The first of these components is an expansive overview of the complex and ongoing debate on the relationship between globalisation and Islam and the consequent emergence of Islamist movements in the globalised milieu. This analysis deftly unpicks the intricate interplay of forces that have given rise to these movements and casts a searching gaze on the multifarious factors that continue to fuel their proliferation. The second component of the chapter is a rich and textured exploration of the evolution of religious authority and the kaleidoscope of actors, groups and Islamist movements that contest it. This exploration delves deep into the heart of the contestation process, revealing the intricate dynamics at play and tracing the profound impact of religious authority on the development and dynamics of Muslim societies. The third and final component of the chapter is an exposition of the significant advancements that have occurred with regard to religious authority, and in particular, the pervasive use of the internet and social media by radical Islamist groups. These groups have harnessed the power of technology to challenge the authority of the ‘ulamā, the religious experts and to recruit followers online. The internet and social media have upended the traditional means of delineating religious authority, enabling non-experts, with no prior background in Islamic tradition, to contest the authority of religious experts. This has resulted in a profound crisis of religious authority in Muslim societies, characterised by fragmentation and disunity. Beyond merely providing a clinical analysis of these pivotal developments, the book endeavours to paint a vivid and evocative portrait of the impact of globalisation, Islamist movements and the crisis of Islamic authority in Muslim societies across the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia. The book brings to bear the full spectrum of its artistry and creativity to capture the nuances and complexities of these phenomena and to reveal the vibrant tapestry of human experience that lies at their heart.

1.2   Globalisation, Islam and Secularism Globalisation is a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon that has not only fundamentally altered the world’s structural landscape but has also transformed social relations at a fundamental level (Shaw, 2000).

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The term ‘global’ not only implies a reimagining of the concept of time but also carries with it significant social implications. Specifically, it signifies the emergence of a shared consciousness of human society on a global scale (Esposito & Voll, 1996). There is a need to view the position of Islamic societies within a global framework of experiences if its resources are to be understood. As Esposito and Voll (1996) have noted, even radical Islamist actors are cosmopolitan in their interactions, relying heavily on the network of operatives and specialists that globalisation has made possible. It follows, then, that Islam evolves, replicates and reinforces itself through globalisation. Globalisation also posits an awareness of the totality of human social relations. However, the exclusion of religious experiences from consideration as viable modes of relations has led secularism to colonise the ideational structure of globalisation using non-religious terms. The assumption that Islam will inherently oppose globalisation is predicated on a religious-secular dichotomy that fails to capture the complex interdependence of the two. Any religious system that is to survive the challenge of secularism must be rooted in a comprehensive worldview, a way of life and a social entity that realises that way of life and explains it through the specified worldview. The absence of these elements indicates the dominance of secularism, which effaces the epistemological and ontological existence of religion. Nonetheless, Islamist actors refuse to be silenced and their movements must not be seen as merely revolutionary forces seeking to institute an alternative social and political order in opposition to globalisation (Neusner, 1996, p. 12). Secularisation, far from being a natural outgrowth of reason and rationality, is in fact an ideology that suppresses religious thought and expression. Radical Islamist movements are not predicated on the destruction of the secular but rather on a literal and narrow interpretation of Islam, which serves as a referential system that requires secularism to establish its difference and distance from it. In this way, secularism and religion are mutually dependent and their relationship is paradoxical. Tradition must not reject the philosophical grounds of its foundational interdependence with the other but must rather recreate the difference between itself and the other by defining the other’s mere existence as a threat to the universality of its practices, traditions and social order (March, 2015, p. 104). Both secularism and Islam are often given fixed meanings that do not evolve over time, but this binary view is false. It is a fiction that binds together global theories of chaos and Islam’s battle with globalisation. Each representation is a

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type of moral enclavism that defines its traditions and goals in opposition to what the other represents, thereby transforming one another in a mutually dependent relationship.

1.3   Globalisation, Social Movements and Resistance: The Case of Islamist Movements Globalisation is an intricate phenomenon that entails the integration of various aspects of human activity across national borders, including cultural diffusion, policy convergence, information exchange and trade interdependence (Boswell & Chase-Dunn, 2000; Robinson, 2014; Sassen, 2007). Scholars have dedicated extensive research efforts to investigating the effects of globalisation on social structures and movements, which are often characterised by non-institutional strategies aimed at social change (Tarrow, 2011). As proposed by Snow and Soule (2009), social movements can either challenge or defend existing systems of authority and they typically originate from grassroots activism rather than elite influence. However, the role of elites in mobilising social movements should not be underestimated, as they often use informal channels of communication to promote their interests and engage with non-elites (Auyero, 2007). Furthermore, research on social movements has traditionally focused on national-level collective action, while neglecting the global conditions that can give rise to such movements. Nonetheless, recent studies have increasingly recognised the importance of economic and cultural globalisation in shaping the nature and scope of social movements, including the emergence of reactionary movements that centre around ethnic and religious identities. Among these movements, Islamist movements may be seen as ‘movement of movements’ with an overarching goal of providing a solution to political, economic and cultural problems (Amenta, 2006; Meyer, 2004, pp. 125–145; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). These groups vary in their tactics and strategies, with moderate Islamist groups engaging in nonviolent civil society advocacy and participation in politics (Tilly, 1996; Tilly & Wood, 2013). These groups include the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Islah of Yemen, the AKP (Justice and Development Party of Turkey), PJD of Morocco and Ennahda of Tunisia. Such groups engage in populist rhetoric about justice, dignity and the Muslim people. In contrast, extremists, call for the overthrow of systems they consider as un-Islamic, dictatorial and Westernised. Operating in clandestine ways, they form networks

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across countries and may engage in spectacular forms of violence. These groups may or may not have links to the global network of al-Qaeda, with its affiliated groups in North Africa, Iraq, South Asia, or with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS or ISIL), which formed a caliphate in some parts of Syria and Iraq. Some Salafists argue that Islam is at once economic, political, social, religious and cultural. This view is shared by those Islamist groups who promote Islamisation of their societies and often engage in fiery rhetoric, though they may not engage in violence. The complexities of these movements reflect the multifarious and often contradictory nature of globalisation, which can simultaneously promote economic growth, cultural diversity and social tensions. Islamic frames were used in anti-colonial struggles, but Islamist groups often opposed progressive nationalist leaders, not to mention communist movements and parties (Smith & Fetner, 2007, pp. 13–57). During the Cold War, the United States’ vehement anti-communism stance resulted in a determined effort to eradicate left-wing movements and governments, as well as nationalist governments perceived to be sympathetic towards communist ideals (Moghadam, 2019). In the 1960s and 1970s, some regimes in the Muslim world actively encouraged the revival of Islamist ideologies in the hope of neutralising left-wing forces. The global transition towards neoliberal capitalism during the 1990s was accompanied by the growth of radical Islamist movements and this period saw a multitude of noteworthy events such as the emergence of the Afghan mujahedeen in 1992, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the Chechen revolt and terrorist attacks that occurred in various parts of the world. Islamism became a globalised ideology during the post-Cold War era. Concerning radical Islamist movements, a connection could be established between structural strain and movement contention at a national level. Global processes served to exacerbate structural strain in Muslim societies and the Islamist message began to resonate primarily with young men who were confronting socio-economic difficulties and cultural changes that provoked feelings of anger, fear and anxiety in both Muslim-­ majority countries and Europe (Ibrahim, 1980, pp.  423–453; Mernissi, 1987; Moghadam, 1989, pp.  74–101). Islam was viewed as a powerful mobilising force and an organisational resource that could be leveraged to combat cultural imperialism and changes in family values. Geopolitical rivalries and the challenges created by the Left also contributed to the

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growth of Islamism. Additionally, the internet and Arabic-language media aided in diffusing Muslim grievances across the Muslim world during this period. These grievances were connected to the national effects of the global economy, including the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, the withdrawal of the state from a wide range of services and subsidies, growing inequality and a lack of employment opportunities. These conditions generated grievances and opportunities for protest and mobilisation, ultimately culminating in the Arab Uprisings. This perspective is crucial in understanding the rise of Islamist movements, as it contextualises the protests that emerged as a result of structural adjustment programs and unemployment since the 1980s, the expansion of Islamic non-governmental organisations and the political openings that allowed Islamist groups to emerge and present themselves in different ways, some as moderate and parliamentary, while others as radical and extremist. Certain Islamist groups, such as Ennahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco, achieved successful electoral outcomes. Islamists were at the forefront of blaming the proliferation of Western values for a range of socio-economic ills and what they perceived as the disintegration of traditional Muslim family values. For Wiktorowicz (2004), blaming Western influence is ‘an essential component of most Islamic movement diagnostic frames’. For some Islamists, the solution lies in peaceful regime change, utilising parliamentary means and incremental Islamisation of social institutions, including schools, clinics and other associations. Such measures entail the implementation of Muslim family laws and sharı ̄‘ah to regulate public and personal conduct. This strategy was adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the early 1990s. In stark contrast, for radical Islamists, the perceived threat to Islam precipitates a swift escalation from nonviolent resistance to armed conflict against the West and its allies. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the insurgency in Algeria and the targeting of secular intellectuals in Turkey and Egypt, all emerged from the same worldview of Islam under attack. This same perspective also undergirded the rise of extremist Islamist organisations, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS or ISIL, following the Arab Spring, with violence being the primary mode of contention in such cases.

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1.4   Islam, Religious Authority and Islamism The concept of religious authority in the context of Islam is predicated on the acknowledged ability of an individual or institution to legitimise and approve religious actions, both in private and public spheres (Robinson, 2009, pp.  339–354). Within the historical trajectory of Islamic civilisation, the concept of religious authority first became established with the advent of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as a compelling figurehead in seventh-century Arabia, as well as through his challenging of the prevailing traditional Arab order. Muhammad’s (PBUH) authority was cemented through his recognition as the Prophet of God, who had been able to establish the first Muslim community via divine revelation. The matter of succession to his authority became a contentious and highly contested issue following his death. The most significant force that emerged after the passing of the Prophet was the charismatic legacy of Muhammad (PBUH), which had a strong impulse to gain permanent establishment (Dabashi, 1989). As Weber noted, if a charismatic movement is to survive and endure beyond a transitory phase, it must strive to secure itself permanently within the historical course of the society to which it belongs (Derman, 2011, pp.  55). In both the public and private domains, the charismatic movement that the Prophet initiated aimed to establish and sustain the particularities of its order of authority. Through the Prophet, the omnipotence of God was manifested in the all-encompassing authority of Muhammad (PBUH) and the complexity of the relationship between God and the Prophet became a significant issue during the post-prophetic period. Concurrently, a second force became activated as the Prophet’s charismatic movement challenged the authority of the Arab tribal system, a system that had little regard for the Prophet and that fought to eliminate his perceived threat to their existence. The forceful pressure exerted by this mode of authority was countered by the charismatic force of the Prophet’s spiritual presence, as well as by the metaphysical superiority of Islam over Arab paganism. A return to traditional authority was impossible, yet there was a constant pressure to resurrect certain aspects of that past (Alatas, 2021). The Prophet’s compound authority began to disintegrate after his death, which highlighted the complexity of the authority that the Islamic community had inherited. As Muslims grappled with how to preserve or dismantle the Prophet’s authority, this added a third layer of complexity to the institutionalisation process of his legacy. Following the Prophet’s

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death, his political authority was institutionalised in the office of the caliphate, a role that was finally abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924. His judicial authority was institutionalised in the office of the qadis, or judges, his military authority in that of the amirs, or military commanders and his spiritual authority in the roles of the Sufi saints, the Islamic mystics. And finally, his religious authority was institutionalised in the roles of the ‘ulamā, or learned men (Robinson, 2009, p. 341). Over the last two centuries, the system for the authoritative transmission of Islamic knowledge has broken down. The rise of Islamism and the emergence of new figures of authority have challenged the traditional authority of the ‘ulamā as interpreters of Islam, leading to a proliferation of individual interpretations of religion. The present epoch is characterised by the convergence of Islamist leaders with the traditional ‘ulamā in their promotion of Islamic principles and values for daily life. The emergence of such leaders, who have garnered recognition owing to their original insights into Islam, is in consonance with earlier trends in Islamic discourse that arose as a reaction to the European expansion and Ottoman responses to it. The survival of Islamist groups bears testimony to the mainstreaming of religious discourse that originated outside the power centres of the ‘ulamā. This has entailed an expansion of religious discourse beyond the confines of the traditional ‘ulamā establishment and their centrality in religious discourse has correspondingly diminished as non-traditional interpreters of Islam have emerged. The proliferation of new voices of authority, some leveraging print media to boost their credibility while others rising up to challenge them, has led to the emergence of a new kind of Islamic authority (Robinson, 1993, pp.  80–81). These new authorities may consult the opinions of the ‘ulamā and Islamists, but they are increasingly interpreting Islamic texts on their own, drawing their own conclusions and pursuing their own intellectual trajectories. Thus, as Robinson (2009) notes, ‘the individual human conscience, that most vexatious bedfellow of all forms of authority, began to gain a stronger foothold in the life of Muslim societies’.

1.5  Crisis of Religious Authority: The Role of Social Media, IT and the Internet In the midst of the twentieth century, there was a fragmentation of religious authority, as lay interpreters began to challenge the traditional Islamic scholars or ‘ulamā and more individuals began to interpret

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religious texts for themselves. In recent decades, this process has been significantly accelerated by the rise of the internet, information and communication technology, social media and increased literacy. As a result, there has been a further fragmentation of authority, leaving the traditional scholars struggling to be heard amidst this crisis. In this world of democratic access to knowledge, religious authority has become a ‘bricolage’, or a DIY project, in the words of the French political scientist Olivier Roy (2004). We can therefore argue that the Muslim world has returned to the interpretive anarchy that characterised its early years. Through the internet, Muslims are now able to connect with each other and the wider public beyond the Muslim world. They can share views that were previously confined to narrower circles and bring new techniques for interpreting Islam drawn from the very tools that facilitate internet access. This has given rise to an expanded discursive space in which new interpreters can emerge and engage in a continuum of communication between separate communities. Anderson (2003) refers to this process as ‘creolization’, involving the formation of intermediate communities of discourse. Islam is represented online in the form of transcribed sermons, texts of the Qur’ān and hadı ̄th collections, as well as advice and self-help information. The internet has facilitated intense debate and discussion about how to reconcile Islamic requirements with modern life and how to live as a Muslim in a non-Muslim majority country. Islam on the internet exists as an intermediate realm of mixed content and intellectual techniques, populated by a diverse group of individuals who form a virtual community. This is a social-communicative sphere comparable to the creoles that arose with the spread of print capitalism and modern newspapers. The internet and its ambience, often referred to as ‘cyberspace’ or the new information age, have not only given a voice to established Islamic institutions but have also enabled a broader range of new or newly visible interpreters of Islam to emerge (Anderson, 2003, p. 48). The diffusion of social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter has brought about a transformative effect on religious authority in most Muslim majority countries. Its popularity has led many scholars to anticipate that its impact on religious life will continue to rise. Social media, with its potential to alter people’s religiosity and faith practices, has had a more profound effect on Muslim countries than in countries with liberal and open political cultures. While some religious authorities counsel their followers to avoid using social media platforms, the majority of scholars have recognised its effectiveness and efficiency in engaging with the community of believers and enhancing

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their loyalty. Initially, traditional websites were considered sources for religious information and comprehensive services to the Islamic community, but the proliferation of digital platforms has led to a process of undermining and contesting religious authority by a wide variety of individuals and Islamist groups. The emergence of what some have termed ‘Facebook fatwas’ has introduced a new paradigm to the practice of religious institutions, provoking commentary and feedback from a wide range of sectors in Muslim societies, including religious authorities, Islamist intellectuals, as well as young urban or secularised Muslims. Social media has also opened the opportunity for many young Muslims to engage with their faith in ways that their parents could not have imagined before. By breaking barriers and enabling Muslims to connect, regardless of their location, social media has revolutionised the way people interact with their religion. However, social media has also provided radical Islamist groups with a platform to disseminate literal and narrow interpretations of religion across multiple media platforms, leading to increased exposure in media, funding, recruitment and diverse campaigns and agendas (Ibahrine, 2014). The use of the internet, information technology and social media has made these organisations more robust and proactive, both online and in numerous conflict zones. While the internet has brought many communities together, it has also posed a challenge to religious authority, enabling users to create their outlets online via various social media platforms, thereby allowing them to seek answers to their questions without having to consult traditional authorities or experts of Islam. In summary, social media has become an important source for Muslims seeking information on Islamic beliefs and practices and the internet serves as an emerging space for understanding Islam. However, with its ready access to key sources and its host of different opinions, it has led to the increasing fragmentation of religious authority and further opportunities for individuals to decide for themselves.

1.6  Objectives and Methodology of the Book As current conceptions of religious authority hardly go beyond historical descriptions of its transformation and when religious actors appear to play an increasingly prominent role in the contemporary world and the religion-­ politics nexus appears to have gained significant importance, a thorough analysis of Islamic religious authority is imperative. Accordingly, the main purpose of this study is to analyse how Islamist groups are contesting

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religious authority in the Muslim world. This study is animated by three key observations about Muslim majority countries and three related questions. Firstly, many Islamist groups across a plethora of Muslim countries have gained considerable electoral traction. However, does this popularity translate into religious favourability and authority for Islamists? Secondly, scholars presume that state-affiliation tends to undermine the religious authority of state-affiliated religious leaders. Given this, what level of authority do religious officials affiliated with the state wield? Finally, it is evident that there are a number of radical Islamist groups operating in the Muslim world, including ISIS or ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliates. But how large is the support base for such groups in the region? This research also delves into the role of information and communication technology (ICT), the internet and social media in contesting religious authority. It attempts to examine how some radical Islamist groups have successfully disseminated their messages via the internet and how they have leveraged an online presence and social media to attract supporters. The study reveals that these groups have contributed to the fracturing of religious authority as new authority figures, who lack expertise in Islamic tradition, have emerged to challenge traditional religious scholars, and have begun to assume authority previously reserved for them. In this study, the qualitative approach is chosen to provide an in-depth understanding of religious authority in the context of globalisation. This approach allows for a detailed analysis of the texts and their underlying meanings, as well as the context in which they were produced. The study focuses on textual analysis as the primary method of data collection, as this allows for the examination of a wide range of sources, including primary and secondary sources, such as books, articles, government reports, newspapers, and other courses of study. By adopting a comprehensive theoretical framework, the study aims to provide a faithful representation of the religious authority discourse in the context of globalisation and how it has been challenged and transformed by various factors, such as individualism, technological advancements and the emergence of resistant identities. The aim of this research is to provide a systematic investigation of religious authority in the context of globalisation, using qualitative sources of data. The findings will be useful for policymakers and researchers working on the dynamics of religious authority and for identifying the channels through which religious groups and actors contest authority within Muslim majority societies.

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1.7  Structure of the Book The book comprises a total of seven chapters, with the first chapter examining the impact of globalisation on Muslim societies and the place of Islam in the era of global interconnectedness. This chapter presents a discourse on the contestation of religious authority in Muslim societies by a plethora of actors, including Islamist movements. Moreover, it delves into the fragmentation of religious authority with respect to the internet and social media. Chapter 2 illuminates the intricacies and paradoxes of globalisation by adopting a social identity approach to analyse the relationship between globalisation and social change. By critiquing the notion of a globalised Western culture that promotes an exclusive globalised identity that privileges only certain cultures, the chapter highlights the centrality of resistance to globalised Western culture for developing inclusive globalised identities. The chapter also analyses the dynamics of intergroup relations, examining how identity changes amid the pressures of global interconnectedness. To expound further, the chapter analyses the clash of civilisations theory and how it overlooks the complexity and polyvalence of intercultural relations, promoting a simplistic view of the world. In Chap. 3, the focus shifts to the interaction between Islamist movements and globalisation processes. This chapter provides an overview of the various approaches that scholars have used to study Islamist politics, with particular attention paid to the attitudes of Islamist movements towards democracy and religious authority. The chapter argues that to develop effective political strategies, Islamist movements have demonstrated the ability to accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. However, some radical Islamist movements are challenging the established Islamic scholarship on the sciences of religion, taking advantage of the power gap between civil and religious institutions in Muslim countries, thus causing a severe crisis of authority in Muslim societies. Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of Islamic religious authority and the transformations it underwent during the formative period of Islam. The chapter assesses the causes of the fragmentation of authority in Islam, considering attempts to counter this crisis by establishing new institutions that centralise Islamic authority. These institutions seek not only to promote legal pluralism and religious tolerance but also to encourage trust and respect for Muslim communities worldwide. Chapter 5 provides an assessment of how religious authority is challenged by religio-political actors, Islamist groups and governments in

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Muslim majority countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia. By focusing on the relationship between religion and politics in the Muslim world and how globalisation has shaped this interaction between different actors, this chapter uncovers how religious actors possess the broadest religious authority and how their authority varies across various issue areas. Additionally, it demonstrates how Muslims place their trust in the religious authority of different religious leaders in Muslim majority countries. Chapter 6 presents an intricate analysis of religious authority in the context of radical Islamist groups and their adept use of social media to advance their religious and strategic objectives. By examining the ways in which these groups have employed online media and communities to expand their following and influence individual Muslims, the chapter underscores how they have contributed to the fragmentation of religious authority. The chapter concludes with reflections on how religious leaders are working to counteract the influence of these groups and emerging authority figures in the digital space. In Chap. 7, the concluding chapter, a broader discussion on religious authority and the future of Islamist movements will be presented. The chapter will argue that the future of these movements will depend on two crucial factors: the nature of political systems in the Muslim world and the global power structure, specifically the foreign policy of the United States. Moreover, the chapter will offer essential recommendations for addressing the ongoing crisis of religious authority in the digital age and discuss the future of Muslims in this dynamic landscape.

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Dabashi, H. (1989). Authority in Islam: From the rise of Muhammad to the establishment of the Umayyads. Transaction Publishers. Derman, J. (2011). Max Weber and Charisma: A transatlantic affair. New German Critique, 38, 51–88. Drache, D. (1999). Globalization: Is there anything to fear? Center for the study of globalisation and regionalisation (CSGR). University of Warwick. Eickelman, D. F. (1992). Mass higher education and the religious imagination in contemporary Arab societies. American Ethnologist, 19(4), 643–655. Esposito, J., & Voll, J. (1996). Islam and democracy. Oxford University Press. Giddens, A. (2001). Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton in conversation. In W.  Hutton & A.  Giddens (Eds.), On the edge: Living with global capitalism. Vintage. Ibahrine, M. (2014). Islam and social media. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2014/10/28/islam-­and-­social-­media/ Ibrahim, S. (1980). Anatomy of Egypt’s militant Islamic groups: Methodological notes and preliminary findings. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12(4), 423–453. March, A. F. (2015). Political Islam: Theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 18, 103–123. Mernissi, F. (1987). Beyond the veil: Male-Female dynamics in modern Muslim society (2nd ed.). Indiana University Press. Meyer, D.  S. (2004). Protest and political opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 125–145. Moghadam, V. (1989). One revolution or two? The Iranian revolution and the Islamic republic. In R.  Miliband, L.  Panitch, & J.  Saville Revolution (Eds.), Socialist register 1989: Revolution today. Aspirations and realities (pp. 74–101). Merlin. Moghadam, V. (2019). Globalisation and social movements, Islamism, feminism, and the global justice movement (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Munck, R. (2007). Globalization and contestation: The new great counter-­ movement. Routledge. Neusner, J. (1996). Why and how religion speaks through politics: The case of classical Judaism. In J.  Neusner (Ed.), Religion and the political order (pp. 58–62). Scholars Press. Robinson, F. (1993). Technology and religious change: Islam and the impact of print. Modern Asian Studies, 27(1), 229–251. Robinson, F. (2009). Crisis of authority: Crisis of Islam? Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 19(3), 339–354. Robinson, W. I. (2014). Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity. Cambridge University Press. Roy, O. (2004). Globalised Islam: The search for a new ummah. Columbia University Press.

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Sassen, S. (2007). A Sociology of globalization. W. W. Norton. Sean, L. Y. (2002). Islam and globalization: Secularism, religion, and radicalism. Retrieved June 7, 2023, from https://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG4_2002/ ARTYOM.HTM Shaw, M. (2000). Theory of the global state: Globality as unfinished revolution. Cambridge University Press. Smith, J., & Fetner, T. (2007). Structural approaches in the sociology of social movements. In B.  Klandermans & C.  Roggeband (Eds.), Handbook of social movements across disciplines (pp. 13–57). Springer. Snow, D. A., & Soule, S. A. (2009). A primer on social movements. W. W. Norton. Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in movement (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (1996). European revolutions, 1492–1992. Blackwell. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious politics. Oxford University Press. Tilly, C., & Wood, L. J. (2013). Social movements, 1768–2012 (3rd ed.). Routledge. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Introduction: Islamic activism and social movement theory. In Q.  Wiktorowicz (Ed.), Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach (pp. 1–36). Indiana University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Globalisation, Identity and Resistance

2.1   Introduction Globalisation, which refers to the intensified interconnectedness and interdependence of people, economies and cultures across national borders, has emerged as a significant area of interest in the fields of human and social sciences. This phenomenon has caused a considerable stir among scholars and experts, as it has profound implications for various aspects of society (Wallerstein, 2000). Although the concept has been around for a considerable period of time, the terms ‘globalise’ and ‘globalisation’ only gained widespread usage in the late 1950s, with the first significant definition provided by Webster’s dictionary in the 1960s (Waters, 2001). Some scholars assert that globalisation involves the compression of both space and time, marking a far-reaching phenomenon that encompasses various domains such as the economy and culture, along with unprecedented levels of global trade and capital movements and widespread access to sources of information and entertainment for people worldwide (Harvey, 1989). The evidence of rising indices of globalisation over the past few decades highlights the extent to which the world has become increasingly interconnected and interdependent (Dreher, 2006, pp.  1091–1110). The increased connectivity brought about by globalisation has enabled more individuals to envision and adopt different identities. Globalisation’s pervasiveness has restructured people’s sense of self, social identity and

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attachment to local versus global communities. Concurrently, globalisation raises questions about identity, particularly with regard to where individuals and groups stand in a world that tightly encompasses them. Although the identity work people undertake in response to globalisation is multifaceted, for some groups, globalisation itself can represent a new source of identity. For example, a cosmopolitan appreciation of cultural differences or an explicit commitment to ‘world citizenship’ as a means of promoting universal goals (Lechner & Boli, 2015, p. 458). In the age of rapid globalisation and rampant consumerism, the concept of identity has become increasingly central to modern social organisation. In traditional social structures, an individual’s social status was determined by a broader framework, such as religion, custom or caste. However, in the contemporary globalised world, identity is founded upon the notion of absolute difference, of an indivisible and unique inward reality of the self. While social distinctions such as class, gender and race play a significant role in shaping identity, they are not considered as important as the hidden depths of the self (Elliott, 2011). The social sciences have developed a perspective on identity that emphasises interpretative analysis and the deconstruction of differences between the internal self and external appearance, from psychoanalysis to hermeneutics. Since modernity generates a new form of social experience, it is reasonable to believe that such a condition permeates the very fabric of lived experience and social structure. The self is not immune to change in our fragmented societies; rather, it is the object of social change itself. This is also why traditional character classifications based on religion or class are falling out of favour and why the public fascination with individual identity differentiation is on the rise (Elliott, 2011). The recognition of identity issues in the context of globalisation should not be misconstrued as implying that all individual or collective identities are shaped by participating in global processes, or that globalisation completely transforms them. Nevertheless, the construction of a global society through power and ideas highlights the importance of identifying one’s place in the larger context for an increasing number of individuals. Globalisation has a tangible impact on people’s perceptions and experiences, which can range from providing new opportunities to presenting an oppressive force (Lechner & Boli, 2015, p. 458). As such, the identity work that globalisation engenders poses vital questions about its value and consequences, whether it is a beneficial or harmful, intrusive or liberating, enriching or unjust process. Postmodernist scholarship on identity views it as a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon. Such perspectives repudiate the notion of a

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stable core of selfhood that can be discovered and used as a foundation for knowledge or action (Gilroy, 2002). Postmodernists argue that our conditions of life are becoming increasingly fragmented and mobile due to globalisation. The expectation is that new space, distance, travel and movement might replace or undermine the concept of rootedness, fixity and temporality, resulting in a more progressive direction for identity (Gilroy, 2002). The prevalence of hybridity in contemporary society, which reveals the structure of identity, has the potential to challenge introverted cultural concepts underlying ‘romantic nationalism, racism, ethnicism, religious revivalism, civilizational chauvinism and cultural essentialism’ (Pieterse, 2004). Against such commitments is the frequently restated argument that globalisation may usher in a new era of rigid and exclusionary commitments to particular identities. In this context, progressive political thought is overridden by expressions like Balkanisation, Eurabia, Islamisation of Europe and ‘the clash of civilisations’, which refer to the broad issue of cultural globalisation characterised by polarisation. In this situation, the search for meaning and identity-building occurs through the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles, rather than on the basis of civil or political society (Castells, 2000). Through an examination of cases of resistance identities, it is possible to see them as defensive reactions to the challenges brought about by globalisation, networking and flexibility. This chapter aims to explore the discourse on globalisation and major theoretical responses to it. It adopts a social identity approach to elucidate the relationship between globalisation and the dimensions of societal change believed to accompany globalising transformations. The chapter is particularly attentive to intergroup dynamics to explore the issue of identity and to determine whether it is undergoing changes under the pressures of increasing global interconnectedness. To investigate this further, the chapter concludes with reflections on the theory of the clash of civilisations and Islamic identity.

2.2  Conceptualising Globalisation: Issues and Implications The term ‘globalisation’ has become a ubiquitous buzzword in political, academic and business circles, resulting in a wide-ranging and multifaceted body of literature, encompassing various connotations, associations and mythologies (Robertson & Khondker, 1998, pp. 25–40). Given the

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diversity and comprehensiveness of this literature, it is not surprising that it has developed into distinct and often fiercely guarded discourse. Economists are preoccupied with the degree to which we currently inhabit a global free market that is characterised by the mobility of goods, labour and capital. This condition has been summoned by the financial liberalisation, deregulation and the information technology revolution. Political economists, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the extent to which such processes undermine the authority of the state, which is weakened by the heightened capital mobility and the discipline of the financial markets (Garrett, 1995, pp. 659). Simultaneously, political scientists concentrate on the viability and the asserted reality of global governance, while sociologists consider the extent to which political struggle and patterns of mobilisation that go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state can create a global civil society (Tomlinson, 1991). Finally, a heterogeneous group of cultural theorists debate the nature and existence of a postcolonial, post-­ nationalist, postmodern and cosmopolitan global culture (Appadurai, 1996). Waters (2001) sees globalisation as an outcome of European expansionism through colonisation, settlement and cultural emulation, intertwined with capitalist development that has expanded to political and cultural domains. This requires cultural and religious groups to relativise their positions and identities vis-à-vis the West. The process of cultural globalisation has resulted in a form of cultural hybridisation, particularly in the global South, where the relevance of local cultures is lost. This phenomenon is considered a formidable challenge to the revival and integrity of local cultures and global cultural influences are felt intensely in the Muslim world. In this context, Islamic culture is challenged by two variant cultures: modern pop culture, which has proliferated through media and Western culture, particularly American, which is driven by modernisation. Through these forms of culture, cultural globalisation tends to promote a society that is free of religion, leading to the transformation of Islamic cultural values. The transnational industries that promote convergence of consumer tastes and preferences are rooted in the Western cultural experience, particularly American and are driven by the desire for greater wealth (Nurullah, 2008, p. 47). Therefore, the global industries try to dominate various forms of culture by producing a transnational civilisation that promotes convergence of consumer tastes and preferences. Muzaffar (1998) contends that cultural globalisation threatens more than just the homogenisation of cultural diversity and variety. He argues that globalisation promotes superficial American culture that provides sensory pleasure

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but diminishes spiritual reflection and contemplation. This feature distinguishes contemporary globalised entertainment culture from the music and plays of earlier religious civilisations, which frequently aimed to elevate the moral consciousness of the community. The discourse surrounding globalisation is diverse and multifaceted, as scholars and intellectuals from various fields of study have contributed to the discussion. A common thread in these discussions is the focus on the movement or flow of various elements, such as capital, labour, information, technology, culture and people (MacCannell, 1992). These flows give rise to ever-changing landscapes, or ‘scapes’ as coined by Arjun Appadurai, that consist of five interrelated dimensions. The first is ‘ethnoscapes’, which refers to the movement of people such as tourists, immigrants and refugees. The second is ‘technoscapes’, which refers to the flow of technology across boundaries. The third is ‘finanscapes’, a virtual landscape that is regulated by currency markets and currency speculations. The fourth is ‘mediascapes’, which involves the circulation and proliferation of images. The fifth is ‘ideoscapes’, which pertains to the political dissemination of images by states and oppositional movements (Appadurai, 1996). Apart from the political, cultural and economic dimensions of globalisation, scholars have also addressed other topics, such as the direction of transnational flows, the emergence of transnational social movements such as Islamic movements, the globalisation of military technology and the spread of global diseases (Hutton, 2000, p. 41). The global trend in the ‘security industry’ is also notable, where technologically advanced security services are provided to private corporations with vast financial resources. Companies like Defense System Limited offer expertise in warfare and military interventions to a range of clients, including petrochemical companies, mining or mineral extraction companies, multinationals, banks, embassies, NGOs and national and international organisations that operate in hostile environments (Friedman, 1999). Despite the persistence of academic divisions on globalisation, certain points of agreement have begun to emerge. Analytical research programs have contributed significant value to the study of globalisation. However, the tendency to separate socio-scientific investigations of globalisation from ideological considerations can be counterproductive, as it perpetuates stale disputes over definitions and methodological differences (Steger, 2008). It is important to recognise that all socio-scientific concepts are both analytical and normative, meaning that they are engaged in a process of normative construction of meaning. Nevertheless, many experts

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contend that the normative/ideological nature of the globalisation debate that takes place in the public sphere undermines the objective and value-­ free accounts of globalisation. This concern about ideological contamination is partly due to the historic mission of academic institutions, which subscribe to the belief that the world is controllable through the balanced operation of human rationality. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to conduct their research within the parameters of objectivity and neutrality to gain a clear understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Matters of ideology are regarded as compromising the scientific integrity of the research project. As a result, the normative dimension of ideology is often neglected when attempting to comprehend the dynamics of globalisation. However, some scholars regard any discussion of the normative and ideological dimension of globalisation as nothing more than unscientific journalism, thereby missing the importance of globalisation as a public discourse. The public debate over globalisation represents a crucial aspect of the phenomenon itself. As several empirical studies have demonstrated, the term ‘globalisation’ remains associated with multiple ideological frames of reference (Guillen, 2001, p.  237). Therefore, if a researcher wants to analyse the normative stakes raised in the debate, they must examine the frames of reference that generate public judgements regarding the meanings and likely implications of globalisation. As such, the researcher must focus on the value-laden arena of ideology, expanding their task beyond the objective classification of globalisation to include a critical assessment of the language about globalisation that is constitutive of the phenomenon itself. This requires an analysis of the exhibited normative preferences and the polemical and rhetorical manoeuvres deployed by the main participants in the public debate on globalisation. It is worth noting that researchers cannot interpret the public discourse on globalisation without taking their own ideological and political frameworks into account. However, including one’s own beliefs and values does not necessarily invalidate one’s research project. As Gadamer (1975) asserted, the motivations of researchers condition every act of understanding. Therefore, it would be incorrect to view one’s values and preconceptions as an obstacle to a proper comprehension of social processes. Consequently, the study of globalisation as a real-life phenomenon must involve an inquiry into ideological projects. In the face of significant global problems, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, poverty, climate change and inequality, it seems that a fundamental change is needed, expressed

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through a substantially different vision. There is an urgent need to link the future course of globalisation to a global new deal agenda. Many experts believe that increased manifestations of social interdependence that accompany globalisation are acceptable as long as they address global problems before it is too late. Governments must support a form of globalisation that is not solely defined by self-interests but is deeply ethical and compatible with our natural environment. As such, a new global deal should place considerable emphasis on the role of ethics in politics and economics, serving as the normative framework for a democratic society (Monbiot, 2006). In Kung’s (1998) view, a global ethic comprises four commitments: nonviolence and respect for life, solidarity and a just economic order, a culture of tolerance and truthfulness and equal rights, particularly gender and racial equality. For educators and other relevant stakeholders, the most crucial endeavour lies in formulating a critical theory of globalisation that challenges both market-driven globalisation and terrorism, while simultaneously subjecting justice-driven globalisation to thorough investigation. Such a concerted effort ought to prioritise media and education as the core constituents of any progressive strategy, founded on the notion that a novel world is feasible. Once pernicious expressions of global imagery and their corresponding centres of influence lose their grip on the construction of meaning, alternative interpretations of globalisation can propagate more openly in public discourse. Accordingly, the forthcoming scenarios shall be inexorably linked to matters of ideology, inclusive of the concepts, principles and values that envelop our communities. It would be unreasonable to anticipate the termination of the ideological struggle of the twenty-first century, but it would be equally imprudent to rely on humanity’s inability to establish general principles governing the world in a more equitable and peaceful manner (Steger, 2008).

2.3   Winners, Losers and the Pluralisation of a Singular Term The widely held notion of globalisation as a linear and irreversible process, which homogenises cultures and societies, is erroneous but pervasive in modern discourse. Despite its apparent simplicity, the concept of globalisation obscures more than it reveals about the complexities of global developments. In fact, when examined critically, the supposed transparency of globalisation can be seen as a strategic political manoeuver designed

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to serve ideological ends. Two critical reasons support the need to dispel the myth of globalisation’s inevitability. Firstly, there is the deterministic fallacy, which mistakenly frames globalisation as a spontaneous and unstoppable process that follows its internal logic and dynamics, independent of human decisions. This fallacy overlooks the reality that globalisation is the outcome of deliberate political choices that have been made over time and across geographies. The second reason is the fictitious vanishing of the South, which assumes that the world is now so integrated into a global economy that distinctions between the North and the South or the core, periphery, and semi-periphery of the world system have disappeared. This position neglects the many interdependencies between regions that maintain and reinforce these distinctions. The deterministic fallacy trivialises the negative effects of neoliberal globalisation by denying their analytical centrality. Despite the rhetoric of globalisation’s benefits, inequalities between the North and the South have widened dramatically in recent decades. This makes it crucial to examine the ideological motivations behind the end of the South and the disappearance of the Third World. In recent years, the fallacies of determinism and the vanishing of the South have been challenged by a growing awareness of the negative consequences of globalisation, such as social exclusion, ecological degradation and loss of food sovereignty (Escobar, 2007, p. 394). The ongoing debate on globalisation is characterised by a fundamental conflict between those who view it as an unstoppable force of capitalism and those who see new opportunities to expand transnational capitalism through innovations in communication and information technologies. It is increasingly clear that the simplistic view of globalisation as a linear and irreversible process does not do justice to the complex and multidimensional reality of the world system. Rather, it serves to promote a narrow ideological agenda that disregards the nuanced complexities of the global social and economic landscape. In light of these contradictions and conflicts, it becomes clear that the term ‘globalisation’ is used to refer to a multitude of distinct processes that sometimes conflict with each other. What we commonly refer to as globalisation is in fact an amalgamation of various social interactions that lead to a range of globalisation-­ related phenomena. Therefore, the term ‘globalisation’ should be treated as plural, as there are several globalisations instead of a single one (Daun & Arjmand, 2018, p.  334). Each globalisation, as a collection of social connections, is characterised by conflicts and the emergence of winners

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and losers. The historical narrative of globalisation, as conveyed by the winners, dominates public discourse. At an abstract level, globalisation can be defined as an unjust series of interactions in which one object, condition, entity or local identity expands beyond its regional or national borders and has the power to label another object, condition, entity or local identity as local. This definition has several significant implications. First, globalisation always begins as the successful globalisation of a particular form of localism. Second, localisation is a precondition for globalisation. Therefore, it would be equally valid to analyse current issues in terms of localisation as in terms of globalisation. The same dynamic that results in the domination of the local position in unequal trades also results in the domination of the global position in such transactions. Consequently, our world is one of equal localisation and globalisation. It would be equally valid to examine issues in terms of localisation as in terms of globalisation from an analytical perspective. However, the term ‘globalisation’ is preferred because dominant scientific discourse tends to favour the version of global history as presented by the winners. There are many instances where localisation emerges as a result of globalisation. For instance, English as a lingua franca has led to the localisation of other languages, including French, which until recently had been considered as having the potential to become a universal language. The compression of time and space, or the social process by which events spread rapidly across the globe, is one of the most significant transformations linked to the processes of globalisation. However, it is impossible to analyse this process without considering the power relations that react to the many kinds of temporal and geographical mobility. While appearing monolithic, globalisation comprises a diverse range of situations and settings. On the one hand, the global capitalist class controls the compression of space-time and can modify it to their advantage. On the other hand, others make significant contributions to globalisation while remaining confined to their local time and place. For instance, peasants in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia contribute significantly to the global drug culture by cultivating coca, yet they continue to be localised in their towns and mountains. Similarly, slum inhabitants in Rio, constrained by their substandard urban lifestyle, contribute to a transnational music culture through their songs and dances, notably the samba. Therefore, localisation must also be produced for globalisation to occur.

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We can discern two primary modes of production that drive globalisation. The first mode consists of two intertwined processes: globalised localisms and localised globalisms. Globalised localism refers to the successful globalisation of a specific phenomenon, such as the global activities of multinational corporations, the widespread use of the English language as a lingua franca, or the global proliferation of American fast food and popular music (Escobar, 2007, p. 150). Additionally, there is the aggressive promotion of telecommunications, patent and intellectual property laws worldwide. In this mode of globalisation, the victor is determined by the appropriation or valorisation of resources or the hegemonic recognition of cultural, racial, sexual, ethnic, religious or regional diversity. The victor gains the power to determine the conditions of inclusion, competition and blending. The second mode of production is localised globalism, which encompasses the precise effects that transnational behaviours and demands, brought about by globalised localisms, have on local conditions. Local conditions are fragmented, subjugated, excluded, destructured and finally reformed as subordinate inclusion to adapt to these transnational imperatives. Examples of localised globalisms include the disappearance of traditional trade and subsistence farming, the establishment of free trade enclaves or zones, massive deforestation and resource degradation to pay off debt, and the exploitation of historical sites, sacred sites, places of worship, indigenous crafts and animals for the benefit of the global tourism industry. It also involves ecological dumping and the ethnicisation of the workplace, which devalues compensation because workers belong to an ethnic group perceived to be inferior, and the conversion of subsistence agriculture into agribusiness for export as part of structural adjustment. The hegemonic form of globalisation, also known as neoliberal, top-down, or globalisation from above, is made up of these two interrelated processes. Since different causes, agents and conflicts influence these two processes differently, it is best to treat them as independent entities. The development of globalised localisms and localised globalisms has been progressively determining or conditioning the many hierarchies that make up the global capitalist world. The global division of labour in the creation of globalisation often takes the form of core nations that specialise in globalised localisms and periphery countries that only have access to localised globalisms (Santos, 2006, p. 396).

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2.4  The Shift From Globalisation to Glocalisation Until the early years of the twenty-first century, the theoretical landscape was not conducive to what Robertson termed an ‘inclusive paradigm’, one that could account for the interplay between the local and the global (Robertson, 2001, p. 459). The concept of glocalisation has gained prominence among social scientists, reflecting a new reality that has emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Turner, 2007, p.  288). Globalisation is moving into a more measured and regulated phase and a ‘gated globe’ or ‘enclave society’ is being constructed as governments adopt a more restrictive posture towards their trading partners, the capital flowing into their borders and those who are eligible for membership in their communities. Walls have been erected to impede the free flow of commerce, money and people (Samuelson, 2013). Social scientists have come to embrace the notion of glocalisation on a pragmatic level, recognising that globalisation is not simply dislodging local living worlds from their customary local settings and structures, but is instead interacting with them in a process of localisation or glocalisation (Khondker, 2004, pp.  1–9). The definition of glocalisation in the Encyclopedia Britannica rebuts simplistic understandings of globalisation as a linear expansion of geographical scales. Instead, it demonstrates an awareness of this transformation (Blatter, 2022). Glocalisation posits that both the local and regional levels are increasing in importance, as are the continental and global levels. Concurrently, there are trends towards heterogeneity and decentralisation, as well as towards uniformity and centralisation. The concept of glocalisation implies a significant shift in perspective, underscoring the interconnectedness of global and local scales. It refers to the amalgamation of local and globalisation processes into a unified framework. The idea of glocalisation opens the door to a theoretical reorientation, addressing the theoretical impasse surrounding certain aspects of globalisation, such as its novelty and timeline, the interplay between heterogeneity and homogeneity, or the distinction between modernisation and globalisation. As a result, social theory can now describe the complexity and multidimensional nature of social processes, owing to the additional layer introduced by the glocal. One of the most striking interpretations of modern globalisation is Castells’ trilogy of the emergence of the network society, which places a paramount emphasis on the local-global dialectic (Roudometof, 2016a,

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2016b, p. 392). As Castells (1998) asserts, the current era of information technology, which encompasses computers, email, SMS and other forms of ICT, heralds a new epoch characterised by the dominance of networks. These networks facilitate the spread of de-territorialised activities and information flows, such as video conferencing and emails, enabling actors to connect with each other through novel forms of interconnectivity that transcend physical proximity. In this networked landscape, urban environments worldwide are undergoing a paradigm shift, giving rise to what Castells (1998) refers to as a ‘space of fluxes’. Thus, the possibility of two actors being in different locations, like a broker in London and another in New York City conducting simultaneous trades when the financial markets are open, is now a reality that challenges conventional notions of spatial organisation. These brokers are linked through a new type of space that is not bound by physical constraints, leading to a transformation in the social reality of space itself. As such, Castells’ insights provide a fresh perspective on the complex interplay between the local and the global in an era characterised by unprecedented technological connectivity. The concept of the ‘space of flows’ does not suggest the complete annihilation of time or space, but rather, it modifies and alters their social dynamics and functional logic by interlinking locations in specific ways. Although physical locations still exist and are condensations of human history, culture and substance, the creation of the ‘space of flows’ marks a turning point in history and the start of a new age. Barber (2013) argues that this new global realm of circulation is fundamentally urban, and the urban setting is where the concept of glocalisation is most strongly experienced. However, the conflict between the ‘space of flows’ and physical locations serves as the central theme of Castells’ trilogy (Castells, 1998, p. 93). Communities built around specific locations act as a form of resistance to the ‘space of flows’, often on the basis of (neo-)tribal or fundamentalist identities. People who are displaced or excluded from the network society tend to be drawn to or forced into these identities of collective resistance because electronic networks tend to amplify the cosmopolitanism of the emerging professional and managerial elites, who, symbolically and in contrast to the general populace, live in a global frame of reference (Castells, 1996). While these communities could eventually function as agents of resistance against free market neoliberalism, their tendency towards localisation and the various forms of localism that result from it are not movements of struggle against globalisation. Castells’ approach sharply contrasts the

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global ‘space of flows’ with the local ‘space of places’, but it does not address the binary opposition between the two. One of the notable impacts of glocalisation is a human situation suspended between these two universes, each subject to a distinctly separate set of norms and regulations (Bauman, 2013, p. 5). The notion of the space of flows, as elucidated by Castells, has been enriched by Appadurai’s proposition, which posits that such spaces should be recognised as cultural landscapes that interconnect people, institutions and objects. Appadurai’s use of the suffix ‘scape’ to label his five suggested landscapes is intended to encapsulate the idea of fluidity, evincing the constantly fluctuating milieu we inhabit, while also illustrating the possibility of divergent perspectives regarding the impact of a particular landscape on the global community (Appadurai, 1996). Robertson, in coining the term ‘glocalisation’, sought to underscore the duality of global processes, contending that local forces and global processes are not mutually exclusive concepts, but rather mutually constitutive (Robertson, 2001). The goal of this concept is to illustrate that the global cannot be considered in opposition to or in isolation from the local; that both the global and local are active agents in contemporary social life; and that the future is not solely shaped by macro-level forces, but also by groups, organisations and individuals operating at the micro level. The chasm between the space of flows and the space of locations can be bridged by glocalisation, offering a means of utilising the ‘space of locations’ as a foundation for empowerment. Blatter (2004) posits, for example, that cross-border regimes in North America and Europe follow distinct logics; European regimes often adhere to the logic of spaces of locations, while North American regimes frequently abide by the logic of spaces of flows. The quandary of devising an appropriate idiom that conveys the intricate social interactions witnessed in our world is emblematic of the growing pains accompanying the observance of a glocal reality (Latour, 2004). Nonetheless, is the term ‘glocal’ truly the most fitting choice? Other lexical items seem to point to a similar, if not identical, concept, such as hybrid, syncretism, transcultural, mestizaje and creole. What sets ‘glocal’ apart from its counterparts? Some of these designations have an extensive history of usage and could be deemed precursors to ‘glocal’, while others intimate akin but distinctive notions. The word ‘syncretism’, the earliest mention of which can be traced to the historian Plutarch (46–120 A.D.), could be the most archaic expression to connote the amalgamation of multiple constituents (Burke, 2009, p. 23).

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Not only has transculturalism been employed in literary and social sciences circles, but it has also been broadened to encompass hybridity. Transculturalism denotes the fusion of two concurrent phases: a present-­ day métissage and a de-culturing of the past (Cuccioletta, 2001, p. 10). Consequently, American culture is regarded as an innovative, shared culture founded on the interplay and blending of numerous peoples and civilisations. Hybridity or creolisation has been utilised to describe the emergence of fresh third cultures in the Latin American domain. This type of hybridity has been suggested as an all-encompassing term and has morphed into the descriptor of the national cultures of several Latin American nations (Cohen, 2007, p. 369). There is a distinction between creolisation, which serves as the cornerstone of novel national cultures and the mere existence of hybridity in and of itself. Despite the fact that the cultures of the South, the Caribbean, and North America stem from the fusion of countless cultural facets, they remain distinct entities. Numerous hybrid forms that have been borrowed from European cultures are familiar features of American popular culture, while numerous American influences have also been absorbed and reformulated into European social milieus following World War II (Roudometof, 2016a, 2016b, p. 14). Hybridity, as a term, transcends its original cultural context and instead embodies the fundamental cultural interdependence that characterises our global reality. While creolisation may remain a relevant concept within its respective framework, hybridity proves to be incredibly versatile, able to encompass anything from texts and objects to entire cultures. Hybridity is not a novel concept, as all cultures have undoubtedly been shaped by others to some extent. However, in our current post-colonial era, it has emerged as an especially significant concept in academic circles. Prominent post-colonial thinkers such as Edward Said (1978), Stuart Hall (1994), Homi Bhabha (1996), Paul Gilroy (2002) and Roland Robertson (2001) have all explored the nature of hybrid existence during the twentieth century (Roudometof, 2016a, 2016b, p. 15). A key distinction exists between two types of hybridity: one that represents the fusion of cultures without the creation of a distinct third culture and another that serves as the basis for a new and identifiable third culture. Along with these two types, two other scenarios for modern cultures exist: those of cultural homogeneity and global cultural conflict (Pieterse, 2004). While the term ‘hybrid’ encompasses much more than the concept of glocal, which involves the blending of local and global cultural elements, the proliferation of glocal forms remains a defining aspect of

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contemporary globalisation. Thus, glocal serves as an appropriate descriptor for our current world, despite the historical significance and nuance associated with other terms such as ‘creolisation’. By avoiding these historical relics and cultural connotations, ‘glocal’ proves to be a fitting term for our contemporary historical context.

2.5  Unpacking the Dialectics of Identity in a Globalised World The overarching phenomenon of globalisation, which entails the interconnectivity of societies, cultures and economies, has become a fundamental feature of social life (Scholte, 2000, p. 167). It not only involves political, economic and technological interdependence but also elicits changes at the psychological level of human behaviour and identity. The transformation of identity at the psychological level involves the disassociation of identities from their traditional attachments and the evolution of broader categories that characterise global culture (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012, p. 755). This expanded sense of identity, in light of the growing awareness of the global crisis, plays a significant role in the coordination of responses to major global issues such as rising inequality and climate change. Nonetheless, globalisation can also breed heightened uncertainty and socio-economic strife, thereby evoking reactionary responses from individuals who perceive their culture to be threatened (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007, p. 748). In all of these cases, globalisation not only gives rise to an unparalleled identity crisis but also lays the groundwork for a potential clash between cultures and civilisations on a global scale (Huntington, 1996). As an ever-increasing number of individuals engage in foreign travel and encounter diverse cultures through the consumption of information and media, such interactions may prompt efforts to fortify local cultures against the encroachment of global culture (Berry, 2008, p. 335). This paradoxical process of globalisation fosters both the softening and hardening of identities as various ideologies assume a reassuring certainty for many individuals navigating a world in flux. Prior to exploring these prospects in depth, we will delve into the notion of identity and the social identity approach to globalisation (Short, 2001). In the course of tracing the historical progression of the notion of identity, two divergent approaches have emerged, each seeking to shed light on the essence and composition of identity. The traditional viewpoint

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defines identity as a composition that arises from the recognition of common attributes, whether ethnic, linguistic, historical, cultural, or political, shared with other people or groups (Hall, 1994, p. 397). This perspective presupposes that cultural identity is a single shared identity, camouflaged within the many superficial or artificial identities held in common. The issue with this approach lies in the notion that every identity possesses an intrinsic and essential core, founded on either a common origin or shared experiences or both, that accompanies a person from birth, serving as an indelible symbol of an identical harmony. This perspective, therefore, views identity as a static and naturalistic construct that remains stable over time, depicting the individual as a unique, unchanging and unified entity (Koç, 2006, p. 39). In contrast, the discursive approach perceives identification as an evolving process, always open to change and influenced by contingent factors, though rooted in history. It acknowledges the past influence on identity, but also recognises that identity is not biologically predetermined, rather, it is an entity that a person inhabits, and one that may manifest as multiple identities at various times and situations (Gergen, 1991). Both approaches seek to explain the same phenomenon, but their dissimilarities emanate from the existence of a fixed, authentic and stable identity. This debate between essentialists and constructionists, or more recently, between modern and postmodern identities, constitutes a key contention in social and cultural studies. In this regard, Bauman (1996) argues that the major predicament of identity in modern times revolves around how to build an identity and keep it stable. Conversely, for postmodern identity, the challenge is how to avoid getting locked into a fixed identity and remain open to multiple possibilities. In modernity, the buzzword for identity is creation, while postmodernity emphasises recycling (Bauman, 1996, pp. 1–17). In Castells’ (2000) nuanced examination of identity, he posits that the essence of identity lies in the cultural attributes that inform people’s perceptions and experiences, within a larger context shaped by power dynamics. Castells identifies three distinct modes of identity formation, each with its own social implications. Firstly, the legitimising identity, which is instilled by dominant institutions to maintain control over social actors, creating a structured and organised civil society. Secondly, the resistance identity, which is born out of the marginalisation of certain groups by the hegemonic power structures, and serves as a means of building communities in response to oppression, thus reinforcing the boundaries between

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the dominant and the subaltern. Finally, the project identity, which creates a new form of identity by redefining social actors’ positions in relation to existing cultural materials. The feminist movement is a prime example of project identity, which initially emerged as a form of resistance against patriarchal society but eventually evolved into a transformative force that liberated women and allowed them to develop a new, independent identity (Koç, 2006, p. 42). Identity formation occurs in relation to power, representation and difference and can be either positively or negatively constructed, depending on the particular context. The symbolic tools of discourse play a critical role in the process of identity formation, as posited by the ideas of Said’s Orientalism and Robertson’s Occidentalism, which both converge in their recognition of the significant role of symbolic and representational tools in identity construction (Bhabha, 1996, p.  56). For instance, Koç (2006) contends that the identity of Oriental culture is subaltern and constructed through its exclusion from Western culture, thus oriental identity is defined in relation to the West. As Sakai notes, ‘if the West did not exist, the Orient would not exist either’ (cited in Morley & Robins, 1995). In the era of globalisation, the notion of identity has been inextricably intertwined with the social logics of privatisation. The technocratic fantasies of cyberspace and the egotistical allure of psychotherapy have conspired to cast identity in today’s world as fundamentally privatised. This connection between privatisation and identity can be investigated at the political level in relation to policy changes that have led to profound transformations in the Keynesian welfare state across Europe and the ascendancy of neoliberal free markets in the United States. These changes entail the deregulation of financial and labour markets, the banking system and the privatisation of public institutions. Privatisation not only impacts political institutions, but also has unintended or intended consequences on the political deregulation of state and public agencies, resulting in the privatisation of identity or identity strategies. In this context, the individual is redefined as a consumer identity that meanders from one seduction to another. However, neoliberalism not only transforms consumer identities but also opposes all forms of living and conduct. For instance, lifetime employment is replaced by individualised contracts and stable patterns of class identities shift to episodic working identities. This is equally pertinent to gendered identities, as marriages are dissolved, reimagined and dissolved once again (Elliott, 2011, p. xxi).

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Identity is a concept and a reality simultaneously. To have a sense of identity, an individual requires all thoughts, assumptions, beliefs and emotions about who they are and what their relationship to others entails. It is worth noting that to live an identity necessitates immersion in the received language, ideas, family heritage and social relationships. Identity is also a political issue. The prevailing political currents that shape the global agenda today place identity at their core. Identity, lived experience and freedom are the key concepts in which politics is contested. Since the 1960s, people have come together to form alliances in pursuit of specific forms of social and political change, resulting in the emergence of identity politics. Ethnicity and race have been the focal point of much of identity politics. Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that identity politics has spread to encompass a wide range of political and cultural interests. The deployment of identity within the women’s movement has given rise to an entirely new dimension of identity politics. In recent years, the identity politics that has received significant attention is the anti-globalisation movement. The brand of identity politics promoted by the anti-­ globalisation movement offers a list of grievances that catalogue the populist deficits of globalisation. The rise of a global market has unleashed turbo-charged capitalism of unparalleled intensity with severe ramifications such as political repression and economic exploitation, according to the anti-globalisation movement. Finally, our discourse leads us to a contemplation of the far-reaching impact of globalisation on cultural identities and the prospects of identity politics in the future. It is unequivocal that globalisation has a transformative effect on modern institutions, but its influence is not limited to the institutional realm alone. Rather, it pervades the fabric of everyday practices, social relationships and cultural values. Such a sweeping force, it is clear, reconstructs the very foundations of identity-politics. And yet, paradoxically, the overwhelming power of economic globalisation appears to have a scant impact on cultural identities. Thus, we find ourselves facing a daunting conundrum: while the juggernaut of economic globalisation advances inexorably, there is little evidence of a corresponding globalisation of cultural identities, despite the fact that some cultural forms may advance consumerist ideas, they have yet to coalesce into a fully realised global identity (Elliott, 2011, p. xxiii).

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2.6  Social Identity Approach to Globalisation Human existence is characterised by the presence of social groups, which have a profound impact on our lives. Our primary conjecture is that the social, cultural and psychological engagement in the phenomenon of globalisation plays a pivotal role in the transformation of an individual’s identity. Social identity refers to the self-concept of individuals that stems from their associations with social groups, including the value and emotional significance attached to such membership (Tajfel, 1981). Social identity is contingent upon the processes of categorisation (assigning people to specific groups), identification (associating with certain groups) and comparison (evaluating groups in relation to one another). The distinction between the ‘ingroup’ and the ‘outgroup’ is critical in understanding social identity. The ingroup refers to the group an individual identifies with and with whom they compare other groups. This comparison often results in ‘ingroup bias’ (a positive attitude towards group members) or ‘ingroup favouritism’ (treating ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members during strategic interactions) (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000, p. 120). The vast body of academic literature on social identity and ingroup bias attests to the human inclination to exhibit preferential treatment towards members of their own group (Mullen et al., 1992, p. 123). This bias is often observed in naturally occurring groups based on ethnicity, nationality, or residential community, although some studies show little to no ingroup bias between certain ethnic groups, instead linking ingroup solidarity to ethnic-specific social norms (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001, p.  351–355). However, despite the salience and primary relevance of ingroup attachment in the formation of self-concept, some scholars suggest that cultural or social factors that define social groups, both individually and in relation to their interactions with other groups, may weaken or even reverse the binding force of ingroup attachment on individual behaviour. These scholars argue that globalisation may redefine traditional boundaries between groups that have been previously considered part of the ingroup. Turner argues that there are three levels of self-­categorisation, with differences and similarities between groups defining the self at the intermediate level, while at the lowest level, differentiation from other ingroup members defines an individual’s identity (Turner et  al., 1987, p.  45). In theories of globalisation, two opposing ‘ideal types’ for individuals resulting from globalisation are identified: the ‘cosmopolitan’

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individual and the ‘reactant’ individual (Buchan et  al., 2009, p.  4140). The former suggests that individuals involved in global networks experience heightened global social identity, while the latter predicts an increased attachment to traditional social relations as an effect of globalisation. The presence of an ‘other’ strengthens the constricted parochial boundary between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, potentially leading to the emergence of fundamentalist movements or entrenchment in the state-nation community (Appadurai, 2000, pp. 1–21) An extensive corpus of academic literature corroborates the ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal type, which posits that individuals who are actively involved in global networks exhibit a greater propensity to cooperate with others than those who are less globalised (Buchan et  al., 2009, p.  4142). Moreover, individuals who exhibit a stronger identification with the globalised world are significantly more inclined to cooperate with global others. This phenomenon suggests a shift in the motives of individuals from self-interest to group interest, and an increased concern for the welfare of the group. According to research, increases in global social identity were associated with increased cooperation with the global collective. Significantly, this positive effect of global social identity on cooperation was above and beyond expectations about how others in the group would behave (Grimalda et al., 2015, p. 9). Despite this, there are some who argue that globalisation leads to homogenisation of culture, production and value (Hannerz, 1992). However, others reject this thesis and contend that globalisation creates a sense of attachment to all of humanity. The proliferation of global social movements, such as those advocating for human rights, environmental protection and humanitarian aid, all serve as evidence of the diffusion of a ‘cosmopolitan’ individual (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 3). The link between globalisation and social identity may have both direct and indirect impacts on cooperation. Direct effects may occur for various reasons, independent of the restructuring of global identity. As Grimalda, Buchan and Brewer (2015) explain: Increased involvement in global networks may increase the amount of information and knowledge that an individual has about people living outside local and national communities. Global networks provide individuals with information about events taking place in faraway places, report on global others’ life-style and cultural traits, and distribute products and objects from foreign countries. The idea of a ‘global other’ may thus turn from being a

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remote and indefinite notion to a more concrete and well-defined image of geographically distant people living in a globalised world. Such increased familiarity with groups of people previously held as remote—both in geographical and social terms—may be a trigger for increased propensity to cooperate. Increased involvement in global networks may also make an individual more aware of the opportunities arising from cooperating worldwide. Deeper awareness of the global nature of the problems facing people from all around the world may instill a greater consciousness of the importance of global cooperation, and may increase the symmetric expectation that global others also become more conscious about the necessity of global action. This in itself may act as a powerful trigger for global cooperation. Moreover, the observation of cases in which global others have successfully achieved and maintained cooperation may increase an individual’s trust in them, thus strengthening a positive disposition to cooperate with them. (Grimalda et al., 2015, pp. 9–10)

Aside from the aforementioned mechanisms, the involvement in global networks may yield an indirect impact on cooperation with others by enhancing one’s identification with the global community. This particular mechanism can be segregated into two fundamental constituents (Tomasello, 2014, p.  188). The first constituent implies that increased engagement in global networks stimulates the relevance of the global community to the construction of the self, leading to an upsurge in global social identity. The second constituent posits that as per social identity theory, increased identification with a group corresponds with a higher inclination to interact with the group. As individuals develop a sense of self tied to their group, they perceive themselves as an inalienable part of a larger social entity, causing their values and motives to shift from self-­ interest to group interest. This results in group interest being a direct and innate manifestation of self-interest. When these two constituents coalesce, ‘increased involvement with the global networks will increase identification with the global community and this in turn will be accompanied by increased propensity to cooperate with global others’ (Grimalda et  al., 2015, pp. 9).

2.7  Factors Influencing Group Social Comparison Our primary objective is to augment the existing framework of the identity process by contending that identity is shaped by an individual’s position in a group, as well as the group’s position. Both of these factors are

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social in nature and necessitate social comparisons. Brewer, Manzi and Shaw (1993) posit that group members are constantly confronted with two potent forces: the yearning for autonomy and the desire for group inclusion (Turner et  al., 1987, pp.  42–67). What we posit here is that individuals manifest discrimination towards the in-group without even placing it in the out-group category, in the same manner as they discriminate against out-groups. Given this perspective, we can infer the circumstances that impact the focus of this discriminatory behaviour.

2.8  Culture Many scholars have advanced the view that cultures differ along the collectivism dimension (Triandis, 1994, p. 32). Collective cultures place significant emphasis on interdependence, whereas individualistic cultures prioritise the accountability and individuality of the person, thereby placing value on personal autonomy and interdependence. Some researchers have suggested that group categorisation is more prominent in collective cultures than in individualistic ones, leading to the notion that discrimination will be more apparent in collective cultures (Feather & Mckee, 1993, pp. 67–70). Culture, therefore, plays a crucial role in intergroup discrimination, but there are several plausible dynamics that underlie this effect. One possibility is that in-group and out-group distinctions are more prominent in collective cultures. This implies that interactions in collective cultures are more likely to occur at the intergroup level. Nonetheless, culture also impacts the dimension that will be most salient in social relationships and individual identity by accentuating the group membership dimension. Feather and McKee (1993) contend that collective cultures discourage individual members from standing out within their group, as it may disrupt group cohesion. Consequently, the intragroup identity becomes less significant. In individualistic societies, there is a preoccupation with assessing an individual’s status vis-à-vis others. This tendency to engage in social comparisons occurs primarily within the confines of the ingroup, where one’s intragroup identity assumes a critical role in shaping intergroup relations. In such a context, the focus tends to be more on the extent of ingroup favouritism rather than on the devaluation of the outgroup. Those individuals who perceive that they will derive benefits from comparing themselves with other ingroup members will undertake measures to improve their standing within the group. On the other hand, individuals who resist

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this line of thinking will abstain from taking any steps that might enhance the ingroup’s position. Interestingly, in collective cultures, the position of the ‘individual within the ingroup’ is not considered to be a significant factor influencing intergroup behaviour. This could be attributed to the fact that such cultures attach greater importance to the collective identity, which supersedes any individualistic concerns (Worchel et al., 2000, p. 26).

2.9  Group Identity and Personal Benefit The concept of social identity theory is based on the idea that the individual’s identity is closely linked to their ingroup. Numerous studies have suggested that people tend to favour their ingroup over the outgroup when it comes to assigning resources (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995, pp.  179–193). However, these studies are often based on the minimal group paradigm (MGP), which presents several characteristics that make it challenging to consider them as examples of self-sacrifice for the group. Firstly, the groups used in these studies are vague categories, which makes it difficult to determine the strength of people’s identification with the group. Secondly, assigning points or resources to the group rarely involves any sacrifice from the participant’s end. Finally, it is difficult to ascertain whether the assignor expects to share in the distribution of resources and, if so, what size their share might be. Despite the few instances of self-sacrifice, there are numerous examples of the opposite, which begs the question of why groups would want members who only serve themselves. The evidence suggests that individuals tend to adopt an egocentric approach when faced with social dilemmas (Bruins et al., 1989, pp. 160). This view of individuals as parasites is also supported by the freeriding literature (Petty et  al., 1980, pp.  81–92). Logically, from an egotistic perspective, reducing effort in group settings is a sensible behaviour if there is no group goal to be achieved. However, from a social identity perspective, loafing is difficult to explain because it can have a detrimental impact on the group. Some studies, based on a traditional social loafing perspective, argue that individuals tend to work harder in a group when intergroup comparisons are emphasised. They suggest that emphasising the intergroup context highlights the group’s role in the individual’s social identity, leading individuals to enhance their ingroup’s intergroup advantage.

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2.10  Threat to Identity In order to elucidate the importance of identity-related concerns at both the individual and group levels, let us now direct our attention to another realm of inquiry, namely, the domain of identity threats. As per the tenets of social identity theory, individuals harbour a fundamental desire to cultivate an optimal self-image. However, such a self-image is susceptible to compromise on two distinct levels: On one hand, social identity may suffer if one’s ingroup is threatened or demeaned. The threat to the group may develop from events internal to the group, such as failure to reach a goal, economic or structural collapse, or events of fate (natural disaster). On the other hand, the threat may arise from the actions of an outgroup. The outgroup may directly attack the ingroup or it may simply raise its own position, thereby creating a negative social comparison for the ingroup. We’ve argued elsewhere…that although both types of group identity threats should increase intergroup discrimination, the external threat should instigate the highest level of discrimination. However, regardless of its origin, threats to the self-identity that affect the ingroup should excite concerns with intergroup comparisons, thereby affecting ingroup identification, and influencing responses to both in group and outgroup (Worchel et al., 2000, p. 29).

At the crux of social identity theory lies the notion that individuals strive to attain a favourable self-image. However, it is important to consider that such a self-image can be subject to dual levels of threat. The first level of threat may stem from external factors, particularly the ingroup, wherein an individual’s standing within the group may be at stake. Such a threat can emerge from the possibility of exclusion from the group, for instance. The second level of threat could be internal in nature, such as personal calamities, health issues, or the loss of individual resources. This form of threat could lead to an individual increasing their level of commitment to group membership and becoming more inclined to discriminate against the outgroup. In situations where these dual threats are present, the actions taken by individuals are more likely to be directed towards the ingroup than the outgroup. An intriguing dynamic is at play when both threats are considered simultaneously, particularly in the context of nationalism and ethnocentrism. People who engage in discriminatory behaviour towards outgroups are usually those who are grappling with ‘a combination of threat to their relation with their ingroup and a threat to the

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identity of their group, particularly when the threat is external to the group’ (Worchel et al., 2000, p. 29). Such an effect can be expected by taking into account the interplay of identity issues at different levels, namely personal and group levels.

2.11  Limitations of Social Identity and Self-Categorisation Theories The social identity approach has been the dominant theoretical framework for examining both intergroup and intragroup phenomena. However, the dichotomy between ingroups and outgroups, or between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide, is not always straightforward (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000, pp. 143–156). Similarly, self-categorisation theory has mainly been applied to discrete identities with well-defined stereotypical features (Kashima, 2007, pp. 107–120). Yet, in real-world scenarios, such descriptions tend to be indistinct, particularly with respect to cultural groups. Cultural groups revolve around shared systems of meaning. Since culture is continuously evolving as a result of human interaction, its content is in constant flux. Therefore, while clear-cut divisions between cultural ingroups and outgroups do manifest, individuals’ sense of cultural identity is often nebulous and involves varying degrees of attachment to multiple and possibly conflicting, cultural worldviews. Moreover, due to this fluidity, cultural identities carry the potential for cultural rejection or resistance (Rosenmann et al., 2016, p. 204). Cultural rejection relates to a reference culture, such as the currently pervasive globalised culture (Becker & Tausch, 2014, pp. 296). However, individuals’ identities contrast with this reference point, an aspect often overlooked in traditional conceptualisations of social identities. While identification helps establish ‘who and what we are’, rejection emphasises ‘who and what we are not’ (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). These possibilities underscore the relevance of cultural identities in the psychosocial study of globalisation, which circulates cultural content across established group boundaries.

2.12  Globalised Western Culture: Universal Values and Exclusionary Tendencies Contemporary globalised culture is characterised by a homogenised amalgamation of Western values and cultural artefacts. As the foremost economic, political and military global power, the US has exerted significant

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influence on this culture. Some argue that globalised Western culture is synonymous with American culture, which is substantiated by the fact that American English is the lingua franca of globalisation and the US dollar is the most widely recognised currency (Rosenmann, 2015, p. 28). However, while American pop culture and brand names are ubiquitous, their form, format and function have been transformed and integrated into the global culture. Christian symbols and rituals, for instance, have been secularised to ensure inclusivity and participation of non-Christians in festivities and consumer activities (Schmitt et al., 2010, pp. 1017–1022). Thus, the evolution of contemporary globalised culture is an intriguing phenomenon, notable for its scope and cultural content. While it highlights Western values, it also promotes individualism, personal autonomy, self-expression and consumerism (Ho-Ying Fu & Chui, 2007, pp. 636–653). Globalisation has elevated consumer interests to unprecedented power, making consumer hedonism a pervasive marketing tool (O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2002, p.  540). This culture reveres free-market capitalism, which prioritises competitiveness, innovation and quantifiable gains. In this meritocratic society, individuals are free to seek self-worth and status based on their financial success, fame or personal achievements (Ritzer, 2009, p. 56). However, the content and operations of this global culture pose intriguing questions. How do we analyse and understand this phenomenon? To explore this, we must delve into the Western cultural experiences of postmodernism. The analysis of this phenomenon requires a closer examination of the Western cultural experiences of postmodernism. Shedding light on this subject, Smith (2003) offers valuable insights that help us understand the intricate nature of a global culture. He states: Beneath a modernist veneer, we find in practice a pastiche of cultural motifs and styles, underpinned by a universal scientific and technical discourse. A global culture, so the argument runs, will be eclectic like its western or European progenitor, but will wear a uniformly streamlined packaging. Standardized, commercialized mass commodities will nevertheless draw for their contents upon revivals of traditional, folk or national motifs and styles in fashions, furnishings, music and the arts, lifted out of their original contexts and anaesthetized. So that a global culture would operate at several levels simultaneously: as a cornucopia of standardized commodities, as a patchwork of denationalized ethnic or folk motifs, as a series of generalized ‘human values and interests’, as a uniform ‘scientific’ discourse of meaning, and finally as the interdependent system of communications which forms

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the material base for all the other components and levels…. It might be argued that there is nothing especially new about a ‘global culture’, that earlier cultural imperialisms were every whit as eclectic and simultaneously standardized. After all, the hellenization that Alexander’s armies carried throughout the ancient Near East drew on a variety of local motifs as well as giving them expression in the Greco-Macedonian forms of theatre, assembly, marketplace and gymnasium. And the same was true of the pax Romana throughout the Mediterranean world. (Smith, 2003, p. 278)

Pre-modern imperialisms, despite their assertive nature, were in fact limited in their scope and geography, with deep ties to their respective countries of origin and a promotion of singular, mythological symbols that were meant to be emulated by other cultures. In contrast, contemporary global culture has no such connections to any specific place or period, rendering it contextually elusive and a composite of disparate elements drawn from around the world, facilitated by the modern infrastructure of global telecommunication systems. The concept of a global culture is similarly characterised by an almost timeless quality, detached from any meaningful historical context, with only fragmentary elements from the past being repurposed as mere patches for its patchwork fabric. This inherent sense of timelessness is reinforced by the highly technical discourse that constitutes the essence of global culture, which employs folk motifs with a detached and playful spirit, expressing itself as a sort of quantitative calculation. In fact, the foundation of global culture is its intricate web of overlapping communication systems, ‘bound by a common quantitative and technical discourse, manned by an increasingly technical intelligentsia, whose “culture of critical discourse” replaces the social critique of its earlier humanistic counterparts’ (Smith, 2003, p.  278). The phenomenon of globalised Western culture is intrinsically tied to the liberal humanistic political ideals that are deeply rooted in Western traditions. Central to this culture is a set of ideas, such as the value of tolerance for human diversity and the discourse surrounding universal human rights. This culture may cultivate a comprehensive moral sensitivity and encourage global citizenship (Shokef & Erez, 2006, pp. 325–352). As such, the content of this culture aligns well with transnational forms of cultural identification. However, one of the challenges that arises in the smooth facilitation of intercultural exchange is the existence of particularistic heritage. Scholars assert that economic globalisation operates most effectively when such traditions are flattened, thereby

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creating a local variant that can be easily integrated into global commodities (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2012, pp. 858–870). Globalised culture has the potential to pose a threat to identity if particularistic traditions serve as anchors for deep-seated identities that are based on factors such as ethnicity, gender or religion. Furthermore, heritage traditions evolve within regional systems of social hierarchy in order to legitimise them. Consequently, the content of this emerging global culture often comes into conflict with the content of local heritages, while simultaneously undermining social stability (Ram, 2004, p.  20). This results in an increase in objective uncertainty for people around the world. Given this state of affairs, we contend that globalised Western culture serves as the foundation for an exclusive global identity. While this identity is relevant to all human beings, its worldviews contradict those of other cultures, thus excluding them. This sets this culture apart from more inclusive versions of globality and local cultures.

2.13  Vectors of Opposition to Globalised Western Culture Owing to the entrenched social hierarchy that caters to the interests of a select few, a tension arises in almost every social grouping between the global order and the interests of the individual and collective identity. Despite the apparent stability of this system, opposition to globalised Western culture exists among individuals and groups. Two distinct modes of resistance exist: a particularistic and a universalistic opposition. Although both entail rejecting the global social order, they do not necessarily oppose the substance of globalised Western culture.

2.14  Particularistic Opposition As previously noted, globalisation may erode the cultural heritage of distinct communities, imperilling its vitality and, ultimately, its survival. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in preserving the vitality of particularistic cultures from a diverse array of stakeholders, including academics and policymakers. The loss of local cultures is seen as a pauperisation of human possibilities and wisdom, analogous to a catastrophic decline in biodiversity (Hammack, 2008, pp.  222–247). In the face of assimilation pressures from the dominant culture, individuals who

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perceive a threat to their cultural heritage often oppose globalised Western culture (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 421). Cultural groups are typically eager to maintain the vigour of their heritages in response to the pressures imposed by global culture, giving rise to revitalisation efforts in the global arena. Such resistance arises as a reflexive response to cultural globalisation and the values and social order of globalised Western culture. The discourse surrounding particularistic opposition to globalised Western culture has chiefly revolved around fundamentalism and nationalism, which function as platforms for the disavowal of this cultural paradigm (Berry, 1997, pp.  5–10). According to social identity theory, the renunciation of globalised Western culture allows marginalised cultural groups to disengage from intergroup comparisons, opting instead for alternative dimensions of comparison such as cultural authenticity and adherence to divine law to assert their superiority over rival groups. Some studies conducted in Arab societies offer tacit support for this viewpoint, revealing how such societies recognise the global dominance of the West, but perceive it as fleeting due to the inherent inadequacy of global Western culture. These studies also highlight how the universalistic aspirations of global culture are reimagined as missionary and its value inconsistencies are interpreted as hypocritical veils for imperialist power (Kinnvall, 2004, p.  756). Furthermore, given the highly bifurcated nature of the global social order, champions of societal egalitarianism view globalised Western culture as a tool of global domination that must be resisted at all costs, occasionally resorting to violent methods in response.

2.15  Universalistic Opposition This particular vector of opposition does not wholeheartedly reject the values of globalisation but instead endeavours to apply its humanistic and inclusivist elements by challenging the current global social order (Moghaddam 2009a, 2009b, pp.  337–347). As previously mentioned, globalisation engenders a hierarchy that is founded on neoliberal economics and a global consumer culture. Such a system directly contradicts other integral aspects of its cultural content, such as the pursuit of human welfare and global citizenship. In order to genuinely uphold the principles of global citizenship, it is paramount that we acknowledge and tackle the concerns regarding the long-term viability of global economic development.

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The march of economic globalisation, which lies at the core of the global social order, has resulted in great costs to the natural environment and the distributive justice of global Resources…. Stated differently, whereas globalised Western culture’s neoliberal practices mandate little concern for the effects of economic activities on the environment or people in the global periphery, humanistic values inherent in the same culture promote such concerns. Thus, universalistic opposition to globalised Western culture entails the rejection of its social order but not of its entire cultural frame. In support of this point, researchers have found that in globally aligned, Western settings, endorsement of egalitarianism predicts involvement with ‘antiglobalisation” protest and universalistic opposition of global injustices. (Rosenmann et al., 2016, p. 209)

To recapitulate, the responses to globalised Western culture are construed with reference to the cultural identification and acceptance or resistance of its social order. The dominant forces on the international stage, in certain cases, reinforce the dominance of this culture by aligning themselves with it (Nafstad & Blakar, 2012, pp.  282–294). Unconventional attitudes towards globalised Western culture can be categorised into two distinct factions: universalistic and particularistic. The universalistic reaction corresponds with other emerging strains of positive global identities, such as identification with the global community, which has attracted significant empirical scrutiny in recent years. These all-embracing forms of identification accord primacy to the universalist humanist impulses of globalised culture while negating the hierarchical social order it automatically engenders.

2.16  Power and Organised Resistance The notion of resistance has gained traction as a means of critically examining subaltern actions in relation to authority during recent decades. Nevertheless, research on how various types of resistance interact with each other, in general and how ordinary acts of resistance interact with more organised and occasionally mass-based resistance actions, in particular, remains scant. Such complex interactions need to be thoroughly scrutinised in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of resistance as a practice, taking into account the relationships between diverse forms of resistance and the technologies of power. Modalities of power and resistance should also be conceptualised in connection to the ideas of ‘agency’,

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‘self-reflexivity’ and ‘techniques of the self’ for a more nuanced understanding (Ram, 2004, p. 12). Resistance takes on various forms that are gradable; ‘withdrawal’ and ‘daily resistance’ are interpreted in relation to potential follow-up forms of resistance, such as riots, social movements and the creation of political parties. Scholars in this trajectory frequently (and indirectly) promote particular conceptualisations of power in their research, which often assumes that power and subjects are things with characteristics that predate social connections. We will delve deeper into two scholars who, in different ways, exemplify this trend: James Scott and Asef Bayat. In addition to this first trajectory, there is a corpus of study that is supported, among others, by Saba Mahmood. This second group of scholars supports the idea of agency and focuses on resistance via a lens that emphasises the relational nature and agency of the subjects as informed by the historically contingent discursive traditions in which they are situated. Scott has played a pivotal role in advancing the field of everyday resistance as a subfield within the emerging academic discipline of resistance studies. Through his extensive investigations, he has demonstrated the profound impact that unorganised forms of opposition can have on driving social change, serving as a source of inspiration for numerous scholars. Scholars like Campbell, Richter-Devroe and others have further expanded on this notion by exploring various strategies employed by marginalised individuals to resist, such as foot-dragging, dissimulation, feigned compliance and the use of narratives. These strategies serve the dual purpose of fulfilling their own desires while also responding to the oppressive political climate that currently prevails (Campbell, 2002, p. 30). In this context, the concept of ‘everyday resistance’ represents a distinct form of resistance, one that is less overt and dramatic compared to uprisings, riots and other organised acts of opposition. As Bayat (1997, pp.  53–72) points out, it is a scattered and discreet form of resistance, often disguised or appearing invisible. Scott also refers to this phenomenon as ‘infra-politics’, highlighting the subtle nature of resistance (Scott, 1985, p. 78). He argues that certain behaviours exhibited by subaltern groups, such as flight, sarcasm, apathy, sloth, misunderstandings, betrayal, slander, avoidance and theft, serve as strategies to both endure and challenge oppressive dominance, especially in situations where overt defiance carries significant risks. Scott introduces a basic classification of resistance relying on two key expressions: (a) the public and (b) the concealed. There are six different types of resistance as a result of these two forms of resistance in relation to

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the three different types of domination: (i) material; (ii) status; and (iii) intellectual. As a result, resistance can be openly announced resistance (open revolts, petitions, protests, land invasions, etc.) against the following: (1) material dominance; (2) assertion of worth or degradation of status symbols against status dominance; (3) counter-ideologies against dominance. In addition, resistance can also take the covert form of ‘infra-­ politics’, which includes the following: (4) direct resistance by covert resisters against material domination; (5) covert transcripts of rage (6) dissident subcultures against ideological domination (Scott, 1989, p. 34). Although there are many different types of practical approaches, they are often discrete, covert and anonymous. Scott (1989) argues that the nature of resistance is closely intertwined with the type of power that is being utilised. However, those who assert that ‘true resistance’ is organised, morally upright and has revolutionary implications fail to acknowledge the constraints that power relations impose on various forms of resistance. If we are only interested in evaluating ‘genuine resistance’, we may simply be measuring the amount of repression that organises the available options (Scott, 1989, p. 37). Scott’s arguments are particularly intriguing in relation to how different forms of resistance interact with each other. He suggests that ‘withdrawal’ may precede ‘daily resistance’, riots, social movements and political parties, which are other recognised forms of resistance (Scott, 1989, p. 40). This implies that ‘ordinary opposition’, such as riots or social organising, may also play a significant role in resistance. While Scott’s theoretical work has earned him a great deal of respect in the Resistance Studies community, it has not gone without criticism (Gupta, 2001, pp. 89–108). His concept of resistance has been challenged for assuming that the thinking of the peasant class is unconstrained by hegemonic arguments and that domination is entirely coercive. Bayat, on the other hand, argues that Scott’s description of ‘daily modes of resistance’ has been instrumental in freeing the Third World poor from ‘passivity’, ‘fatalism’ and ‘hopelessness’. Bayat highlights the importance of Scott’s research in determining whether the impoverished are a destabilising factor, particularly in challenging the traditional dichotomy of revolutionary versus passive politics (Bayat, 1997, pp.  53). The notion of ‘daily forms of resistance’ plays a significant role in changing this perspective. However, Bayat also criticises Scott’s work, arguing that the definition of ‘daily resistance’ needs to be expanded upon. According to Bayat (1997), Scott’s ‘Brechtian form of class struggle and resistance’ fails to account for the dynamic contacts and

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ongoing activities of the urban poor in the ‘Third World’. The struggle of the urban poor should not be perceived as silent, solitary or concealed. Rather, it is proactive in that marginalised groups work to reduce the advantages of more powerful groups, thereby improving their own chances in life in terms of resources, social goods, opportunities and power (Bayat, 2009, 2013). Bayat presents a theory of resistance that not only expands upon Scott’s work but also differs from most other theories proposed about social movements. He concludes that when common people from Third World cities participate in political activism, such as street vendors, squatters, the jobless, or underemployed, they are acting in a distinct way from ‘formal’ citizens who live in permitted urban neighbourhoods and work in the formal economy. Their activism is routine and involves resistance, but it is not always secret, disguised, non-collective or haphazardly planned. Bayat (2009) suggests that this ‘silent creep’ of fluid categories of excluded and informal groups is flexible and adjusts to circumstances, all with the goal of promoting a more self-regulated and dignified way of life. When the state or other power elites clamp down on the advancements of the informal people, resistance first takes the shape of solitary, private acts. However, it gradually evolves into a public, group battle. Despite competing with each other on the street market, atomised people such as street vendors come together and mobilise when the police threaten to remove them. They have no prior organisation or movement, and may not even know each other beforehand. Instead, they come together through ‘passive networks’ of dispersed individuals who share a similar position in a common public area and are threatened by the power elite against their little subsistence activities. These inactive networks are awakened when they must assert collective rights in opposition to a state that they would typically ignore and seek independence from. In Bayat’s (2000) view, the political character of the poor is seldom the catalyst for long-lasting mobilisations akin to those initiated by the middle class or other more dominant groups that take on the form of conventional ‘social movements’ The urban poor predominantly rely on mobilisations based on kinship, ethnicity, or ‘imagined solidarities’ that coalesce into fluid and diverse groupings, lacking consistent communication or a shared identity. Bayat (2000) designates these ‘social movements’ as quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisations that sporadically manifest as collective acts. These movements are bereft of a clear leader, ideology or organisation that would serve as a contrast to the state.

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Their actions are not deliberate political statements; rather, they are motivated by the need to survive and lead respectable lives. However, they frequently avoid group efforts, massive operations, noise and notoriety. Squatters, for instance, occasionally prohibit others from residing nearby, while sellers often reprimand their competitors for doing the same. Many people even hesitate to discuss their tactics with other groups that are similar to them. Nonetheless, as these seemingly dispirited people and families traverse the same pathways, they burgeon into a potential societal force due to their colossal numbers. Tarrow (1998) describes the players’ accessible structure of opportunities and social status as actors, which cumulatively result in this complex amalgamation of individual and communal activity. Scott’s work on the subtle and covert forms of resistance among subalterns offers valuable insights into the resilience and creativity of marginalised communities in navigating oppressive environments. However, Bayat’s argument emphasises the limitations of solely relying on such a framework, particularly when examining the urban poor. The urban poor in the ‘Third World’ often face a unique set of challenges and opportunities due to their concentrated living conditions and frequent interactions within dense urban spaces. In contrast to rural settings, urban environments offer opportunities for more overt collective action and public displays of resistance, owing to the sheer density of population and the potential for creating solidarity networks. Bayat’s criticism underscores the need to acknowledge the diverse and dynamic forms of resistance that may be more salient in urban settings. It draws attention to the significance of visible, vocal and collective actions taken by the urban poor to challenge oppressive systems. Street protests, demonstrations and other public expressions of discontent can become powerful instruments for the urban poor to assert their rights, demand social justice and advocate for change. Bayat highlights how the urban poor often engage in incremental and incrementalist resistance, such as unauthorised urbanisation, squatting and informal economic activities, to improve their living conditions. These activities may be neither entirely hidden nor overtly confrontational but can still be impactful in gradually reshaping urban spaces and challenging dominant power structures. To contextualise Mahmood’s theories with the resistance literature discussed above, we may glean useful insights from her interaction with Foucault. This will help us to grasp how resistant subjectivities and daily resistance arise from more organised forms of resistance in detail.

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Mahmood (2005) advances the idea that agency is inseparable from the historical and cultural circumstances that produce the subject in her interpretation of Foucault. In contrast, certain subordination connections permit the necessary capacities to execute particular forms of moral activities. The subject may come to realise the truth about themselves and how they interact with people who are believed to possess the truth via some authority, whether it be divine law, rational rule, or cosmic order (Mahmood, 2005, p. 30). These procedures involved in becoming an ethical subject are referred to as the ‘techniques of the self’ by Foucault. Mahmood’s Foucauldian formulations aid our understanding of agency as a product of the discursive traditions in which it is situated. We arrive at a different conclusion from Mahmood’s explanation of how women from the ‘mosque movement’ evaluate themselves in light of conventional values and rules, compare themselves to and uphold these ideals. We contend that affiliation with diverse resistant groups has given our respondents the opportunity to assess their identities and power dynamics, prompting them to develop moral questions and varied forms of resistance. The extent to which individuals resist various forms of power is fundamentally tethered to their comprehension of organised resistance’s goals and discourses, as well as their perception of their relationship with these understandings. Such an idea, in turn, gives rise to specific self-­conceptions, thereby empowering the respondents to engage in daily resistance that transcends the limited boundaries imposed by the very organisation that is leading the resistance movement. Ultimately, self-reflection stands as the indispensable foundation for a person’s decision to engage in daily resistance (Lilja et al., 2017, pp. 40–54).

2.17  Beyond Modern Globalisation: Investigating Early Ties Between Europe and the Muslim World Abu-Lughod posits that the process of globalisation involves a continuous expansion of interconnectedness across the world through the exchange of goods, commodities and currencies, as well as the greater mobility of people across larger geographic areas (Coleman & Sajed, 2013, p. 399). She contends that this process encompasses deeper economic and political integration, as well as increased symbolic and cultural interaction. However, the distribution of the effects of globalisation is uneven, with the pressures emanating from hegemonic powers and cultures producing

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disproportionate outcomes (Abu-Lughod, 1999). This disparity is also evident in global cities, defined as urban hubs that experience a disproportionate amount of national and international interaction and serve as command centres for the entire system, with London and New  York being pivotal in international financial markets (Abu-Lughod, 1999). Abu-­ Lughod concludes by warning against the misconception that globalisation leads to greater cultural convergence. In reality, she suggests that we observe a fast, incomplete and highly differentiated flow of worldwide transmission. Through her investigation of the ‘world system’ that existed from 1250 CE to almost a century later, Abu-Lughod adds to our understanding of globalisation. She identifies three communication and trade circuits systematically linked during this time: the first was centred on Flanders, east-central France, Genoa and Venice in Western Europe, the second included Baghdad, Alexandria, Cairo and Constantinople in the Middle East and the third encompassed China, Southeast Asia and some regions of India. Notably, the European circuit was the least advanced of the three (Abu-Lughod, 1997, p. 132). She postulates that despite significant geographical differences, a shared set of features can be identified in three regions of the world (Abu-Lughod, 1989, pp. 15–17). These regions all exhibited notable examples of capitalism, facilitating a network of economic exchange and production. States played a vital role in the production, circulation and stabilisation of currencies, with China adopting a paper currency system by 1280. They also developed mechanisms to spread risk and raise finance. Within this global system, various cultural systems coexisted, including Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, which interacted with diverse economic systems, ranging from ‘near’ private capitalism with governmental assistance to ‘near’ state capitalism with the assistance of private businesspeople (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 355). Abu-Lughod further examines the evolution of later world systems, where connections expand and deteriorate over time. The bubonic plague of the thirteenth century rendered the linkages in the global system obsolete and they were eventually revived in the sixteenth century when Europe took on a more dominant position, establishing connections over the Atlantic to the Americas and regions of Eastern Europe and Western Africa. As world systems expanded, more people from different social strata engaged, leading to a deepening of the economic and cultural links. In the final stage of the European-led global order, Abu-Lughod anticipates the United States becoming the hegemon, but notes that this global hegemony is now waning, and a

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balanced distribution of power across multiple centres is likely to be restored, as was the case in the thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 371). Abu Lughod’s inquiry into global cities provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of the history of globalisation. Her investigation explores how cities functioned as vital nodes in global networks, facilitating the process of globalisation. She examined the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, using significant ‘world cities’ as lenses to study the global economy and to analyse how these cities promoted communication among various nodes in the network. Global cities are urban concentrations that serve as hubs for an excessive amount of contacts on a national and worldwide scale (Abu-Lughod, 1999, pp. 2–3). These cities are distinguished from other cities incorporated into global networks by their high levels of economic, political and cultural influence, serving as command centres of the global system. In contrast to other major cities that act as intermediaries between the global economy and more localised, regional economies, global cities hold a unique position in the global network (Coleman & Sajed, 2013, p. 11). There were noteworthy differences not only between the nations of the Old World core in the Middle East, India and China, but also within the European periphery, which was the leading contender for hegemony. Despite often being more developed than Europe, the Middle East featured sizable regions that were mostly disconnected from the centres of power. Although both Cairo and Baghdad were important imperial cities, their connections to a vast network of hinterlands by land and sea made them stand out. Baghdad was linked to the Mediterranean by Antioch, Aleppo and Acre, but to the Indian Ocean and the trade of the east through Basra. The overland route from Baghdad to the east, used by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, passed through the desert heading northeast. The Nile connected Cairo to the Mediterranean through Alexandria and desert highways linked North Africa to the rest of the world. Red Sea commerce made port calls at Jeddah or Upper Egypt before passing through Aden to the east. Similarly complex was the Indian subcontinent, which was divided into sub-regions with radically differing needs. When ties to the Muslim world were strong and there were free land routes to Russia in the north and China in the east, northern India thrived. The state of south India was frequently distinguished by its coastal and interior zones and was more reliant on maritime commerce across the Indian Ocean (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 14). Abu Lughod’s research on the

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history of globalisation reveals a startling conclusion that the similarities between trading partners in the thirteenth century exceeded the differences, which contradicts the prevailing wisdom. In contrast, Western researchers focused on the ‘Rise of the West’ and emphasised the distinctiveness of Western capitalism. However, a comparison of economic institutions in the Western, Asian and Arab regions unveils striking similarities and parallelisms. This finding is particularly noteworthy since variations cannot be explained by constants, as we all know. Recognised currencies were a prerequisite for international commerce in all three cultural zones, with Western Europe lagging behind and if Abu Lughod’s theory holds, Italian merchants stealing pre-existing mechanisms from their Middle Eastern Muslim counterparts who had been using them for decades. States played a crucial role in creating, issuing and/or securing these currencies in all three areas (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 10). In fact, gold coins minted initially by Byzantium and subsequently Egypt were the dominant currency for cross-border trade in Europe, the Middle East and even India before the fifteenth century. Similarly, the social status of ‘banker’ was established in the East long before it appeared in the form of ‘benches’ or ‘bancos’ of the Italian merchants who established them at the Champagne trade shows. Some scholars have observed that letters of credit were frequently exchanged between owners and their agents or factors overseas. Moreover, in the case of significant Middle Eastern and Indian businessmen, including Jews, they were linked through familial relationships. In long-distance trade, substantial upfront capital was required to purchase the goods that were to be sold later. The Middle East had sophisticated methods of profit allocation based on formulae that divided the proceeds between the advancing merchant and the partner who oversaw the sale. Partnerships were commonly established within families or with co-nationals, such as Jews, Indians and overseas Chinese. The European economy was also impacted by these practices (Abu-­ Lughod, 1989, p. 15). Traditionally, Western capitalism is characterised as ‘laissez-faire’, while the Orient is seen as being more heavily influenced by the state. The perception is that Asian and Arab merchants relied on monarchs who had their own interests, whereas European merchants were independent from the state. However, these beliefs are only partially correct. Merchant wealth played a significant role in all three cultural sectors, and despite being at the mercy of the ruling elite, merchants had some degree of freedom to accumulate wealth. Nevertheless, the governing elite often

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borrowed funds from merchants without repayment or imposed substantial forced contributions to the state. Ultimately, merchants were subject to the whims of the governing apparatus, which frequently borrowed their wealth without repayment or imposed significant forced contributions to the public coffers in times of financial difficulty. This critical function of financiers was shared across all three regions. The intervening territories along the overland trade route, which had been united by Genghis Khan in the early thirteenth century but had fragmented among his successors by the end of the century, initially underwent disintegration. The relative peace that prevailed even during Kublai Khan’s reign was disturbed by warring clans. While Arab Asia escaped the Crusaders and the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258, it did not seem to escape Tamerlane’s devastation in the late 1400s (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 16). Egypt’s success and contribution to global commerce persisted. In the third decade of the fourteenth century, prosperity peaked in Baghdad and Cairo (Abu-Lughod, 1971, p. 32). Second, the Black Death, which spread from China to Europe between 1348 and 1351, decimated most of the towns along the major sea route of global commerce, disrupting customary behaviour, altering exchange terms due to disparate population losses, and producing fluidity in global circumstances that enabled drastic shifts, benefiting some while harming others (Gottfried, 1983, p. 67). This could be observed in Europe, where England, which had previously been on the periphery, began to play a more important role after the Plague because her death rate was lower than that of the continent, as well as on the Italian peninsula, which had been severely impacted due to her extensive commerce and traffic with the Middle East. Despite the fact that Renaissance Italy regained its power, with Italian cities remaining affluent and important well into the sixteenth century and dominating commerce in the Mediterranean even later, the Mediterranean lost its prominence, in part because the eastern Mediterranean no longer served as a special doorway to the East.

2.18  Globalisation at the Crossroads: Muslim World’s Diverse Responses and Interpretations Whether the Muslim world formally accepts globalisation’s accompanying theological and cultural ramifications, as well as its material side effects, is a crucial subject at this point. While the matter at hand cannot be addressed

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with certainty at this point, early indicators suggest that globalisation is not embraced nor rejected across the board in the Muslim world; rather, it is perceived differently across various regions (Mohiuddin, 2018, pp. 343–361). As evidenced by the intricate privatisation process, technological aspects of globalisation are widely accepted with almost blind obedience, whereas its underlying economic institutional elements are only partially and conditionally accepted. The political and cultural consequences of globalisation, on the other hand, provoke much controversy. Although neoliberalism, which is integral to globalisation, introduces new identities, values and norms that could potentially undermine established institutions and sources of power, the inclination to positively adapt to such challenges is as palpable as the inclination to retrench. Morocco exemplifies this nuanced dynamic, as does Turkey with its Customs Union agreement with the European Union. The vast majority of Muslim governments in the Islamic world unambiguously welcome the tangible benefits they hope to gain from closer ties with the EU.  Nevertheless, globalisation runs the risk of distorting the overall dynamic between the EU and the Islamic world. Blum (2000) identifies three primary elements that comprise globalisation: conditions pertaining to institutional and infrastructural openness, process (flow of information, capital and ideas) and convergence with respect to technological harmonisation, social structure, popular culture and norms. However, the nature of globalisation is equally important in addition to its main categories or elements. Private property, freedom of commerce and travel, minimal government intrusion with government enforcement and fundamental individual rights are among the set of norms and functional institutions entrenched within globalisation. In essence, neoliberal institutions and practices are disseminated through globalisation. Conversely, the term ‘globalisation’ may merely refer to ‘Americanisation’ or the escalation of capitalism-based social interactions on a global scale. Although ideological conflict is inherent in globalisation, Huntington’s theory of conflict between monolithic civilisations is less prevalent than the conflict between numerous, competing interpretations of the relationship between meaning and material existence. This conflict is, to a great extent, simply a new guise for a long-standing political battle over power and money, marked by radically different normative arguments about state formation, state-society relationships and the ceaseless pursuit of legitimacy. As always, this is a conflict that exists both within and between

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countries or civilisations (Stone, 2002, pp. 121–131). The experiences of Muslims with regard to globalisation may be regarded as a manifestation of ‘post-modern culturalism’, intricately linked to the culturalisation of politics and economy as a defining feature of contemporary globalisation. Within this discourse, many Arab and Muslim thinkers advocate for ‘the right to be different’ as the cornerstone of democracy, highlighting the significance of cultural diversity, as globalisation often leads to a forced differentiation that exacerbates poverty and inequalities within and between nations. While some perceive globalisation as undermining the Islamic personality and infecting the masses, there has been a longstanding tradition of Muslim criticism of capitalism and materialism dating back to the likes of Al-Jabarti, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati spanning over two centuries. According to this view, culture plays an essential role in the success of modern globalisation, as it leads individuals to abandon their allegiance to their national identity and adopt equally influential discourses such as Islamism to oppose it. In addition to the apparent threat to democracy and independent development posed by American-sponsored globalisation, there is a growing concern that consumerist/materialist culture at the heart of globalisation would lead to the destruction of national frontiers. This brings forth the question of how important the nation-state remains in the ‘global’ era, particularly when tens of millions of Muslims now reside in Western nations and the dār al-harb (i.e. non-Muslim countries) is gradually transforming into the dār al-Islam. As globalisation has effects that extend beyond mere economic interactions, it has also given rise to anti-global attitudes among particularistic groups, especially in the Muslim world. This has prompted many Muslims to emphasise their identity within their cultural context, which may be described as both universal and local or sub-global, through what can be seen as Islamic cloning. Islam, as a potent globalising force, has far-­ reaching impacts on other phenomena, and yet, it is also excluded from positive globalisation processes and threatened by dominant (Western) globalisation forces. While some Muslim scholars do not oppose globalisation per se, they are critical of its Western and secular components, advocating for an Islamic interpretation of globalism that capitalises on the changing cultural and communication aspects of globalisation. However, this view is not universally shared among Muslims, with traditionalists more inclined to view Islam as a victim of globalisation (Levine, 2002).

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Daun and Arjmand (2018) outline four distinct pathways that Muslims may follow to determine their view of and engagement with globalisation: secularism, traditionalism, fundamentalism and modernity. These pathways are informed by the one-sided accentuation of points of view and the synthesis of numerous dispersed, discrete, more or less present and occasionally missing concrete individual occurrences, which are ordered in accordance with those one-sidedly accented perspectives into a single analytical construct. They include localities (national, subnational and other) into transnational networks of solidarity and mobilisation that have the power to forge new ties or reaffirm existing divisions, such as those between Sunnis and Shi‘ı ̄s. Thus, it is consistent with a traditional Islamic philosophy that gives connections on a global scale priority. These inclinations appear to be strongly correlated with perspectives on globalisation. Within the Muslim intellectual discourse, there are several lenses through which globalisation and its effects can be viewed (Daun & Arjmand, 2018). These include grappling with the ramifications of the globalisation of Islamism and adopting a rights-based approach to address them. The latter entails a conscientious endeavour to comprehend and devise justifications and mechanisms for transcending the hegemony of global Islamism. For Bayat (2013), this approach involves a concerted effort to fuse religion and rights, belief and freedom and Islam with liberty. It seeks to upend the fundamental tenets of Islamism by prioritising rights over obligations, pluralism over a singular authoritative voice, history over inerrant texts and the future over the past (Ahmed, 1992). The proliferation of neoliberalism, the human rights movement and liberal, pluralist and market-oriented lifestyles has cast doubt on hitherto unchallenged Islamic ideas, philosophies, systems and ways of life. As a result of the diffusion of a universal culture, traditions have had to justify themselves, open themselves up to interpretation and dialogue and evolve (Waters, 2001).

2.19  Clash or Convergence? Globalisation’s Dual Effect on Civilisational Identity Conflicts Viewed through the lens of neoliberalism, globalisation is frequently regarded as a process that enables international markets to thrive at the expense of state power (Ohmae, 1999). Nevertheless, this portrayal often overlooks the impact of globalisation on social identities, especially in the

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developing world. Scholte (1997, p. 431) observes that globalisation is a process whereby ‘social relations become less tied to territorial frameworks’, and ‘territorial distance and territorial borders hold limited significance in these circumstances’. Globalisation thus transforms social interaction and restructures social space beyond delimited territorial boundaries (Hughes, 2010, p. 424). Giddens (1990, p. 64) defines globalisation as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’. This creates an environment in which international relations are shaped by societal forces within each state, allowing national politics to impact international politics. In their interactions, social actors respond to perceptions formed through previous and new encounters. Identity is the sum of these perceptions that an individual forms about themselves, their environment and others sharing the same ambience (Kosebalaban, 2005, p.  28). Identity also shapes one’s standards of judgement by providing space for value discriminations. Globalisation can positively or negatively alter these perceptions, expanding one’s horizon and promoting the idea that all are equal citizens of a global village. This perception about the transformative impact of globalisation on social identities assumes that transnational flows can reduce the differences on which national identity rests between insiders and outsiders (Clapham, 2002, p. 791). However, globalisation may also create an opposite effect by promoting political conflict and instability, exposing previously contained social, economic and political problems. Giddens (2000) argues that globalisation can empower underprivileged societies and create a phenomenon known as ‘reverse colonisation’ by influencing developments in the West. But the empowerment of societies can also create tension and, rather than blur the sense of separation, globalisation can foster a deep sense of resentment by enabling comparisons at the global level. Thus, it is crucial to understand under what conditions globalisation creates a positive effect that would lead to a blurring of the sense of separation among global social actors. In order for globalisation to yield positive outcomes, several prerequisites must be fulfilled. First and foremost is the need for domestic political internationalisation, a concept rooted in Huntington’s ‘political order in changing societies’ model, albeit in a modified form (Huntington, 1968). Huntington initially used this framework to analyse the destabilising effects of economic modernisation in developing nations, suggesting that the mobilisation of society must be accompanied by the establishment of

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participatory institutions to avoid potential instability. Huntington emphasised the lag in the development of political institutions compared to the rapid social and economic changes occurring (Kraidy, 2005). His focus on domestic political instability overshadowed global conflicts and identity politics. Later, however, Huntington turned his attention to global conflicts, adopting a new paradigm centred on culture, the clash of civilisations. This culturist paradigm explains global violence through the lens of civilisational identity. It posits that future conflicts will be driven by cultural differences, viewing civilisation as a monolithic entity and thus failing to recognise diversity within each defined civilisation. Huntington’s thesis rests on three building blocks. First, civilisational culture will shape alliances between countries in future conflicts. Second, while multiple civilisations will compete for power, the primary faultline will be between the West and the Rest, between the United States and Islamic civilisations. Third, the West should eschew universalism and multiculturalism in favour of bolstering Western values, such as capitalism, the rule of law, liberty and human rights. Huntington’s model of civilisational conflict overlooks the complexity and polyvalence of intercultural relations, promoting a simplistic view of the world that fails to account for the nuanced dynamics at play in contemporary society. This model stirred controversy for a variety of reasons: Intellectually, his division of the world into neatly separated civilizational blocks is not representative of global cultural complexity. Huntington uses ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ in a manner that suits the examples he offers to support his thesis. While his use of ‘civilization’ is hazy, his use of ‘culture’ is wanting in its assumption of cultural homogeneity. As an example, communities and nations as fundamentally diverse as the Shiites of Lebanon and Iran, the Malays in Malaysia, and the Wahhabi Sunnis in Saudi Arabia are lumped under the monolith of Islamic civilization. In addition, the intercivilizational borders that form the foundations of Huntington’s edifice are arbitrary. If Western civilization’s core identifier is Christianity, as Huntington assumes, why is Latin America, with its hundreds of millions of Catholics, excluded from Western civilization? Skidmore traced Huntington’s cosmetic attempts to remedy these unfortunate contradictions between the article, where China and its sphere of influence were referred to as Confucianist civilization, and the book, where Huntington replaced ‘Confucianist’ with the even vaguer characterization ‘Sinic’. (Kraidy, 2005, p. 19)

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Huntington’s thesis on the ‘clash of civilisations’ diverts attention away from crucial debates about the roots of political violence by emphasising essentialist arguments that identify Islamic identity as the primary source of conflict. However, the inadequacy or nonexistence of political institutions should not be overlooked if we are to grasp the nature of political violence today. In this regard, the Huntington of the 1960s offers greater insights into this issue than the Huntington of the 1990s. The crux of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ model is the process of economic and political modernisation. Economic modernisation has led to massive urbanisation and has significantly increased levels of education and social mobilisation. Political modernisation, in turn, has amplified political participation, which has further intensified social demands for greater participation. Under these circumstances, globalisation exacerbates these effects by furnishing the tools for human mobility and increasing media exposure and education levels. However, it does not offer participatory institutions that could amplify social mobilisation and facilitate global participation by marginalised populations. By mobilising these populations, globalisation merely magnifies the scale of confrontation from the local to the global arena. As Hoffmann (2002) notes, globalisation exacerbates conflicts by removing various barriers, especially the proliferation of global media, which enables disadvantaged populations to compare their circumstances with those of the free and prosperous. In the Muslim world, repressive state systems prevent societal actors from mobilising into participatory institutions. Under such conditions, globalisation is perceived as having a greater impact by weakening state controls and uprooting social forces. However, globalisation also helps these forces to gain access to global education and communication. In brief, globalisation empowers societal forces living under highly restrictive political systems to express themselves globally (Eickelman, 2002, pp.  36–39). Despite these developments, there is a sense of disillusionment among Muslims with the global system because of their lack of participation in global decision-making. Falk (1997) attributes the main cause of global Islamic unrest to the exclusion of Muslims from global decisionmaking processes. Muslim exclusion from such processes undermines the effectiveness of these decisions. However, Islamic participation on issues such as the Palestine-Israel conflict, international terrorism and the preservation of nuclear regimes could make a difference in the role of the United Nations in these issues (Falk, 1997, p. 15).

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Emerging as a language to express a wave of frustration in Muslim-­ majority countries, Islamic identity has its roots in structural factors. Globalisation helps alleviate this frustration by channelling social mobilisation into participatory institutions. Without these institutions, globalisation enables social actors to express their frustration. Globalisation has empowered individuals in Muslim countries under repressive authoritarian regimes to interact with other societal actors on a global scale. As products of authoritarian political systems, these actors are not prepared or equipped with the necessary tools to benefit from global interaction. They, however, exploit those tools that cause instability within the international system. Thus, participation by social actors under authoritarian regimes, particularly when these regimes are supported by global market mechanisms, tends to be violent. In contrast, democratic countries provide an environment for peaceful participation at both the domestic and global levels. In democratic countries, political openness and pluralism play a significant role in adapting to globalisation (Henry & Springborg, 2001).

2.20  Conclusion Our world is in a constant state of flux and the ever-changing nature of our global society necessitates a perpetual evolution of our identities and actions. Social changes resulting from advances in technology, medicine, sciences and political upheavals, among other factors, can impact our lives, alter our self-perception and affect our interactions with others (Jaspal, 2014, p. 3). Globalisation is widely regarded as a political, economic and cultural phenomenon that characterises this dynamic, ever-evolving world. It is a complex process that is associated with rapid and significant social transformations, such as the movement of people from rural to urban areas, which has led to the growth of cities and improved living standards for many. In this globalised world, traditional concepts of identity, nationality and tradition are rapidly and significantly changing, raising concerns that globalisation is leading to more individualistic societies. Conversely, rapid social change can also encourage a desire for the past and a loss of tolerance for differences in culture and religion. Moreover, globalisation is frequently perceived as a threat to national and cultural identities, with some arguing that it tends to homogenise different cultural realities, eradicating every single trace of uniqueness. However, globalisation cannot be denied to have created similar life patterns around the world. Yet, in the process, cultural identities can be

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shattered and critical thinking can disappear. Properly understood, cultural identity can be a product of globalisation rather than its victim. Identity is not a zero-sum game, but how national identity is experienced within the context of globalisation does suggest that everything is changing. In contrast, others argue that globalisation, far from destroying cultural identity, is perhaps the most significant force in creating and proliferating cultural identity. The idea that globalisation and identity can go hand in hand reveals the actual power that identity has against the massive process of globalisation. The preservation of cultural identity against the massive force of globalisation has been a significant concern for states and cultural groups that are trying to balance globalisation and cultural identity. Cultural identity remains one of the necessities that could become a source of conflict within societies. The risk of rupture increases as the consequences of historical learning backwardness begin to be felt. There is tolerance but not the most honest acceptance of technologically progressive nations. Here we must pay attention to two basic themes: polarisation (acknowledging unity without perceiving unity) and the redistribution issue (the right to diversity implying the need for global solidarity) (Tomlinson, 2003, p.  272). Cultural identity gives people dignity and allows them not to submit to others only to survive. There is a common cultural heritage of humanity whose protection is one of our biggest responsibilities. This legacy would become more relevant if we focused on the human role in its process of creation. The problems posed by cultural identity are even more complicated because they cannot be resolved through a process of redistribution. Cultural identity is viewed as a set of relationships and human values (Tomlinson, 1999). For a culturally viable twenty-first century, there is an urgent need for a learning process that involves mutual fertilisation of cultures and global interdependence based on a plurality of cultures, excluding the imposition of a unique learning model (Wang, 2007, pp. 83–86). Moreover, there is a need for total respect of others, a consensus on a minimum number of universal values, and recognition of the global nature of the inheritance of the whole world from a perspective outside our culture. This should be considered one of the major objectives of a new approach to globalisation. Upon comparing cultural values across different countries and geographical areas of the world, it becomes apparent that convergence of such values is not a typical occurrence. However, economic development has

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been observed to propel all nations towards a shared trajectory, bringing forth common values that have far-reaching effects. In this context, the strengthening of identities has emerged as a mechanism for controlling the chaotic effects of globalisation. Furthermore, identity formation represents a vital tool in generating meaning and purpose in individuals’ lives, exhibiting ethnical, national, religious and territorial dimensions that shape the world as much as technology and globalisation. Effective communication is key in facilitating a transition from dialogue to cooperation, although the popular belief that globalisation necessitates cultural hegemony has proven to be misguided, as cultural resistance persists and even intensifies in some cases (Labes, 2014, pp. 87–96). One of the more notable cases of such resistance is manifested in the form of transnational Islamic movements that position themselves in opposition to the postcolonial state’s inability to manage peripheral economies and preserve Islamic culture. These movements propose alternative forms of social engineering that draw from modernist notions of societal development and political power, despite such views often being overlooked in mainstream discourse on Islam (Zubaida, 1995, p.  178). By presenting different terms of discourse, distinct from those employed by Westernising elites, Islamicist movements rely not only on the sources of consciousness rooted in Islam but also on modernist principles. Such movements present a challenge to the hyper-liberal promise of a world unified by markets, telecommunications or global Western culture (Pasha, 2000, p. 252). While there are numerous homogenising forces at work, the transformative social context requires an acceptance of diversity and resistance against unilineal pathways towards the future. By reframing Islam via these movements under globalising conditions, it highlights the critical role of human agency in shaping history. In our subsequent chapter, we delve further into the emergence of Islamic movements and their complex relationship with various political and cultural globalisations.

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CHAPTER 3

Islamist Movements: Evolution, Approaches and Contestation

3.1   Introduction Until the 1990s, the terms ‘global’ and ‘transnational’ were not commonplace in mainstream social science theories. These terms were of course understood but supra-national developments could hardly be fathomed. While scholars studied the Cold War world order in which they divided countries into three categories (First World, Second World and Third World), their analysis tended to focus on single societies and economies. World-system theory, a variant of dependence theory, challenged the traditional social science theories by highlighting the transnational nature of capital and labour flows and the implications of this for economic and political processes at the societal level, as well as for the perpetuation of global inequalities (Moghadam, 2009, p. 2; Chase-Dunn, 1998). Back in the mainstream, scholars focused their attention on social movement theories and national-level dynamics in the West or post-industrial society. These theories gained prominence in the 1980s, but new developments began to challenge some of their fundamental assumptions. The global shifts in political economy, forms of governance and activism on a world scale, for instance, prompted the need for a more nuanced understanding of global dynamics. As globalisation began to manifest itself in various ways, some scholars observed that there is a global tendency towards common values, or a

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movement towards what they termed ‘world culture’ and a kind of ‘world polity’. World culture is perceived to encourage countries to adopt similar strategies for addressing common problems. Concurrently, in the 1970s, as the economic shifts unfolded, a new phenomenon occurred in the form of the rise and spread of Islamist movements. These movements were viewed as emancipatory, post-class and post-ideological new social movements. Islamist movements emerged out of a complex philosophical tradition that advocates a return to the true spirit of Islam (Balfour et  al., 2010). Having roots in the reactions to cultural, social and colonial influences, some of these movements date back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In the last two decades, Islamist movements have gained renewed support in the Muslim world due to the political crisis in the region and some aspects of the relations between the region and the rest of the world. Numerous Muslim intellectuals have long been opposed to the secularism of communist movements. The growth of such movements in the 1960s and 1970s led many countries to welcome the Islamic tide in hopes of counteracting the left. Anwar Sadat released Muslim Brotherhood members from prison to counter the Egyptian left in his campaign of de-­ Nasserisation. Iran’s Shah and Turkish authorities followed the same strategy by encouraging Islamic ideas and education as an antidote. In the 1980s, the military regime made the teaching of Islam compulsory in schools. In Iran, the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1978–1979 inspired and encouraged Muslims and Islamists across the globe (Esposito & Piscatori, 1989, p. 15). By the time of the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and the toppling of the modernising government of President Najibullah in Afghanistan, Islamist networks existed across the globe and steadily proliferated. The collapse of the Soviet Union was seen by many as the harbinger of the worldwide expansion of liberal democracy. However, in the Muslim world, it meant the failure of socialism/ communism. In the wake of the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, a profound transformation in the global economic system unfolded, resulting in a surge of discontent, grievances and mobilisations. This change was accompanied by political liberalisation, as exemplified by the emergence of democratic forms of governance in several nations, including Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Algeria. A broad world-systemic perspective is fundamental in understanding the underlying dynamics of Islamist movements since it situates the protests that arose due to the structural adjustments

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and unemployment within a wider context. This includes the dissemination of Islamic non-governmental organisations and their social welfare activities, along with the political openings that facilitated the rise of the ‘Islamic alternative’. This alternative has taken various forms, ranging from moderate and parliamentarian to radical and jihadist, depending on the specific socio-political conditions in which it has emerged (Moghadam, 2009, p. 43). The analysis of Islamist movements cannot be deemed comprehensive unless reference is made to the intricate interplay of socio-demographic factors, urbanisation and class background. Empirical research indicates that members of Islamist movements are frequently first-generation urbanites hailing from the lower echelons of the middle-class strata (Ibrahim, 1980, p.  430). These characteristics have been widely theorised to be indicative of status anxiety and cultural discomfort, which ultimately drive their allegiance to these movements. Concurrently, a national-level linkage between structural strain and movement contention can be inferred in the analysis of these movements. Moreover, the global processes that are integral to Muslim societies have served to exacerbate the structural strain experienced by Islamist movements both in Europe and Muslim-majority countries. Young people facing socio-economic challenges, who are often beset by feelings of alienation, anger and exclusion, have come to identify with the Islamist message as a mobilising force and a source of organisational resources with which to combat domestic injustices, cultural imperialism and traditional family values. This chapter endeavours to examine the origins, activities and discourses of Islamist movements by delving into the most influential approaches used in the study of contemporary Islamist politics. It is crucial to note that these approaches take into account the historical situatedness of Islamist movements, thereby recognising that they are not merely a moral reaction to a context of decay or a response to conditions of economic strain. Instead, Islamist movements, much like other social movements, are propelled by a desire to make their mark in particular political arenas. In addition, this chapter pays significant attention to Islamist movements’ approach to democratic politics and religious authority. Contrary to popular belief, Islamist movements are not impervious to democratic transitions in Muslim countries. In fact, they have demonstrated a keen ability to develop effective political strategies that are specifically designed for both political and social work. However, the power gap between civil and religious institutions in Muslim countries has been

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exploited by certain radical Islamist groups, posing a challenge to the longstanding tradition of Islamic scholarship in the religious sciences. Consequently, this has given rise to a severe crisis of authority in the Muslim world, which has facilitated the increased acceptance of such movements within traditional and modern Muslim circles.

3.2   Globalisation, Social Movements and Transnational Public Sphere Globalisation denotes a profound shift in the very conditions of human existence, the nature of which remains a subject of intense debate. Nonetheless, current research on globalisation has identified several key trends that have pushed the sources and implications of social action beyond the borders of nation-states. Recent advancements in transportation and communication technologies have led to a compression of space and time, reshaping our sense of distance (Harvey, 1989; Giddens, 1994). Transnational corporations now wield unprecedented power, while the media have become increasingly global, providing the building blocks for epistemic communities that span the globe (Appadurai, 1996). Social movements are viewed as riding the waves of these global processes and they offer innovative ways of understanding how the world is changing. From the perspective of social movements, globalisation offers contradictory possibilities. On the one hand, it reduces the ability of states to act within their boundaries, dislocating social movements from their traditional role of petitioning states to address grievances. On the other hand, it provides social movements with significant resources and opportunities to influence both state and non-state actors. The ‘boomerang effect’ is a telling example of this phenomenon, as it explains how national human rights movements can bypass their target state and rely on other international states and movements to achieve their objectives (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Social movements are often characterised as sustained campaigns for social change that employ non-institutional strategies (Snow & Soule, 2009). They are collective actions that either challenge or defend existing systems of authority. When analysing social movements, it is important to question several assumptions that are frequently made in the social movement literature. One such assumption is that social movements are an exclusively modern phenomenon that began with the European Enlightenment and secular humanism (Adams et al., 2005, pp. 50–57).

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This means that peasant revolts and religious revolutions that were legitimised in a religious context fall outside the domain of this field. Recent research on revolutions acknowledges that popular movements similar to modern political upheavals were already happening in Bronze Age Egypt (Goldstone, 2013). It is now believed that rudimentary social activity may have played a significant role in social change since the Stone Age (Chase-­ Dunn, 2016). Moreover, religious movements continue to be important in world politics (Denemark, 2008, p. 575). The literature on social movements also emphasises that movements come from below, obscuring the collective action aspects of elite behaviour, including elites within nation-states. Collective action is any goal-­ directed activity engaged jointly by two or more individuals. It involves the pursuit of a common objective via joint action, often motivated by the belief that doing so enhances the prospect of achieving the objective (Snow et al., 2004, p. 8). Since collective action encompasses a variety of human behaviours, it is useful to differentiate between those collective actions that are institutionalised or normally sanctioned and those that fall outside the domain of institutional channels. Social movements are a form of collective action, defined in part by their use of non-institutionalised means of action. Tarrow (1998, p. 3) notes that collective action not only ‘takes many forms—brief or sustained, institutionalised or disruptive, humdrum or dramatic’, but that ‘most of it occurs within institutions on the part of constituted groups acting in the name of goals that would hardly raise an eyebrow’. Analysing collective action alongside the institutional/non-institutional distinction leaves numerous collective actions within the latter category. Traditionally, most of these collective actions have been treated as varieties of collective behaviour. Generally conceived, collective behaviour refers to ‘extra-institutional, group-problem solving behavior that encompasses an array of collective actions, ranging from protest demonstrations to behavior in disasters, to mass or diffuse phenomena, such as fads and crazes, to social movements and even revolution’ (Snow & Oliver, 1995, p. 577). Thus, social movements are a form of collective action, constituting a species of collective behaviour. However, they differ from most other variants of collective behaviour such as panics, crowds and fads. Just as these movements overlap with certain forms of collective behaviour, they also overlap with interest groups, which represent another set of collective actors often associated with social movements. While interest groups and some social movements share similarities in terms of objectives

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and interests, there are also notable differences between them (Walker, 1991). Firstly, these groups are defined in relation to the state or government, while social movements extend beyond the polity to other institutional spheres and authorities. Secondly, social movements’ standing is different when directed towards the state, as they exist outside or in a tenuous overlap with the polity, lacking the same status or recognition from political authorities. Thirdly, interest groups may pursue their objectives via institutionalised means, whereas social movements employ non-­ institutionalised means and operate squarely within the political arenas, focusing on influencing party platforms at national political conventions (Bunis, 1993). However, their action repertoires are oriented towards non-institutionalised avenues of action. There exists a persistent debate regarding the aims of social movements, namely whether they strive to bring about alterations in political institutions, or seek to extract concessions from such institutions. Moreover, the nature of the changes sought by such movements remains a topic of contention. While some scholars define social movements as collective efforts to promote or resist change, others conceive of them as a form of contentious politics—a politically engaged struggle that is irregular, public, and directed against the government (Turner & Killian, 1987; Benford et al., 2000, p. 2719). As noted by McAdam et al. (2001), contentious politics means collective political struggle that is episodic in the sense of not being regularly scheduled on the political docket, ‘public’ by excluding claim-­ making that occurs within well-bounded organisations and political in the sense that a government is involved as a target. Some studies suggest that neither an open-ended nor a political approach is entirely satisfactory in conceptualising social movements. In order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of such movements, one must examine them as challengers or defenders of authority—be it religious, corporate, political, or educational—or as patterns of cultural authority that reflect certain belief systems or practices (Snow et al., 2004, p. 9). As previously noted, globalisation has a range of effects on social movements. While it can empower national organisations to frame their claims in a manner that transcends borders and obtain resources from abroad, it also raises questions regarding the fundamental nature of globalisation. Giddens (1994) has attempted to address this issue by defining globalisation as ‘action at a distance’, which refers to the influence exerted by actors or events in one place on those in another through political, economic, or media processes. In addition to enabling national organisations to engage

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with transnational audiences, globalisation has facilitated the emergence of a transnational public sphere, which is a space where social movements and organisations interact and learn from one another. This public sphere is not just an abstract concept; rather, it has tangible consequences for real actors occupying specific communities and spaces. While the communication networks that make up the transnational public sphere are uneven in terms of authorship and consumption, it provides an alternative site for the elaboration of practices and principles beyond the confines of heavily censored or strictly local or national contexts. This transnational public sphere is a milieu where various forms of collective action strategies are disseminated globally (Guidry et  al., 2000, p. 6). It serves as a conduit through which multiple social movement repertoires and tactics are communicated across long distances. Furthermore, this sphere offers a site where material resources can be allocated transnationally in ways that curtail the ability of nation-states to endorse or object to practices and external influences. Despite the perception that the transnational public sphere is distinct, one should examine it in conjunction with national and localised spheres. The practices that materialise in the globalised space provoke local reactions that alter global practices when applied. Some responses may be assimilated into global discourses that seek to erode the dichotomy between the transnational and the localised public spheres (Tarrow, 1994). Conversely, other movements may challenge global discourses and maintain certain aspects of their locality in a distinctive form, opposed to globalisation. The interplay between transnational and localised public spheres can be highly intricate, posing a challenge to our comprehension of the role of movement activists in politics, the supremacy of nation-states in the face of international conventions and even the boundary between the state and the public sphere. In the subsequent section, we will expound upon the emergence of Islamic movements as localised reactions that transform global practices, along with the diverse networks of interaction and their interconnectedness as they manifest in the trajectories of these movements in various socio-political settings.

3.3   Islamist Movements: Terminology and the Basics In the era of globalisation, we find ourselves amidst a planetary tectonic shift. The age-old order of industrial capitalism is in flux and it remains unclear whether the emerging post-industrial order will prove a boon or a burden for humanity. We observe a trend towards the market-driven

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metamorphosis of culture, whereby participation in a free-market economy is deemed the hallmark of progress. Nevertheless, this process is manifestly imbalanced, creating a global chasm between the North and South that defines relationships between states and territories. In both Western and non-Western contexts, cultural institutions and traditional structures of meaning are experiencing a wane in influence. As a reaction, the affluent indulge in the opiate of consumerism, while ordinary people endeavour to re-establish collapsed boundaries, revive stable communal identities and restore systems of values. Through diverse social movements, they strive to engage with the future on their own terms, avoiding the prospect of remaining second-class participants in systems governed by the beliefs and values of others. Islamic revivalist movements represent defensive and broad-based reactions to Westernisation, foreign manipulation and internal malaise (Aziz & Funk, 2001, p. 308). Lapidus (1997, p. 446) contends these movements are a direct response to the global changes that constitute modernity. The modernisation of societies, the emergence of capitalist economies, scientific and technological developments and the cultural changes that accompany these phenomena have given rise to religious movements and other populist, nationalist and ethnic movements. These movements are not a new phenomenon and the history of Islamic societies contains many instances of reform movements that arose in response to changing political and economic circumstances. These movements can be traced back to the Prophetic era, and in the globalised era, they represent the amalgamation of contemporary circumstances and historical cultural norms. Just as Islam is not a monolithic religion, Islamist movements exhibit significant variations in their origins, ideas, strategies and leadership. In fact, many movements vie with each other for popular support while opposing the state. For the sake of clarity, before we delve into the history of these movements, we use the expressions ‘Islamism’, ‘Islamist movements’ and ‘Islamic social movements’ in this chapter to refer to those Islamic social and political forces that are engaged in change strategies through powerful, nonviolent as well as violent means. These movements, conceived as Islamic, employ a normative and ideational framework that claims to be rooted in Islamic teachings. Scholars have distinguished between Islamism (an ideology) and Islam (a religion), whereby Islam is viewed as a historical religious force that was characteristically more pluralistic and flexible than the contemporary Islamist movements allow it to be (Amin, 2012, p.  404). Collins (2007, pp.  67–70) defines Islamism as a

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modern political ideology that links Islam in some way to the state (Collins, 2007, pp.  67–70). When projected as a form of contentious politics, Islamism constitutes a type of social movement based on common objectives and social solidarities in sustained interaction with authorities, opponents and elites (Tarrow, 1998). A movement comprises a group of activists and followers who adhere to a particular set of rules, identity, or platform that defines their group or organisation (Aminzade & Perry, 2001, p. 158). Armajani (2011) presents a finely grained examination of Islamist ideology in his analysis: Islamism is nothing new. It is rooted in long-standing currents within modern Islamic history. Alongside democracy, socialism, communism, monarchy, and autocratic authoritarianism, Islamism is one of modernity’s most influential political and religious ideologies. Islamists, also known as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ and ‘Islamic revivalists’ (among other designations)— assert that the literal truth of the Quran, Islam’s most sacred text, together with its legal and ritual injunctions based on Islamic law (Sharia), must be applied to all Muslims and to religious minorities living in majority-Muslim countries… Islamists also believe that: (1) Islamic principles must dictate every aspect of life, both personal and societal; (2) Islam contains the truth and that other religions are either false or of limited validity; (3) traditional rules must govern sexual relations (i.e., sex may only take place within heterosexual marriage and licit concubinage); and (4) Western and secular cultures promote a range of consumerist and permissive lifestyles which are antithetical to Islam. Thus, Islamism…is the reinflection and reaffirmation, in substantially changed political and socio-cultural settings, of time-­ honored forms of understanding and behavior. Yet, Islamists are not utterly opposed to every kind of change; rather, they maintain that change must be regulated by traditional beliefs and practices. (Armajani, 2011, p. 1)

In the analysis of Islamist movements, it is imperative to consider the concept of ‘post-Islamism’, which has emerged as a response to various factors, such as globalisation, new media, market economy consumerism and failed Islamist experiments in society. Post-Islamism is a relatively new intellectual and social response within Muslim societies that does not draw inspiration from secular or anti-religious ideologies. Its adherents have largely retreated from the original idea of creating an Islamic state and instead, the focus is on addressing issues related to minorities, gender discrimination and human rights (Amin, 2012, p. 410). These movements can be referred to as global or transnational Islamist movements, even

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though they may be locally or nationally based, as the term ‘global’ acknowledges the scope, scale and reach of Islamism, with many Islamists engaging in coordination, communication, solidarity and direct action. Scholars have differentiated between local and transnational Islamism, but both have roots in history, theology and contemporary events. It is crucial to note that the theoretical literature on Islamist movements is often impoverished, viewing these movements as forms of internal religious disorder. However, this assumption can be problematised in three ways. First, some Islamist movements may not be forms of disorder but work within existing institutional structures. Second, some of these movements may not be centred in religious institutions. Third, some Islamic movements may not be internal, but rather, they may have an international scope and their manifestations in particular societies may be explicable only in terms of their location within a larger social order (Gould, 2014, p. 35). Not all Islamist movements are forms of internal disorder and some work within existing legal, political and religious structures to reform them without violating the institutionalised norms that regulate them. Although some may disagree with this analysis, the crucial issue is whether we can differentiate between disorderly and non-­disorderly movements analytically. The non-disorderly movements do not entail the systematic violation of norms that regulate religious action within extant religious institutions. The absence of a deflation of value commitments differentiates these movements from religious disorders, as value commitments are defined as the generalised capacity to affect the implementation of values and they are defined in terms of moral authority in their societal reference. A deflation of value commitments implies a situation where a security base of the system is supposed to ensure its strength. The activation of commitments depends not only on symbolically defined commitments to common values but also on religious activists’ capacity to deliver and ground their claims. If we analyse political movements to illustrate this point, an Islamist movement will become a political disorder if there is a deflation of power. If it does not manifest, it will operate within the authority code of the extant state, and if allowed to participate politically, it will conform to the rules of the game, provided it is not in a situation of power deflation (Gould, 2014, p. 54). It is imperative that we take cognisance of the fact that in discussions surrounding Islamist movements, there is an observable inclination to accord primacy to political disorder, while relegating the religious disorder that frequently underpins these movements to the periphery. This

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religious disorder is characterised by the emergence of nascent ‘faiths’ that coexist alongside established ones and may culminate in the displacement of entrenched institutional structures. It is notable that notwithstanding the potential for such religious disorder to escalate into violent conflict or provoke violent reprisals, it does not invariably impugn the convictions, social mores or beliefs of individuals who remain beyond the confines of the affected communities. In instances where this religious disorder permeates society at large, it is often owing to its inextricable entanglement with the state apparatus, or its absolute indistinguishability therefrom.

3.4  Approaches to the Study of Islamist Movements The intricacies of Islamist movements extend far beyond the realms of abstract concepts and practical considerations and encompass the complexities of moderation, the nuances of dogmatism and their inherent adaptability to contemporary trends, all in pursuit of self-preservation and the attainment of political power, among other objectives. The diversity of these movements is underpinned by the fundamental tenets of Islam, which are susceptible to myriad interpretations. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that within the Islamist milieu, there exist divergent understandings of Islamic laws, accounting for the malleability of Islamism itself. The various facets of Islamist movements have been examined from an array of perspectives, and it is through these multifarious lenses that we shall endeavour to construct a rudimentary framework for comprehending these movements in the context of the contemporary world.

3.5  Historical Approach Numerous studies have sought to elucidate the complexities of contemporary Islamist movements, often by delving into the annals of Islamic history. For Esposito (1998), the crux of Muslim motivation for establishing a divinely mandated government lies in the unshakeable belief in God’s revelations, the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) and the unification of religion and politics. However, the underlying assumptions that underscore these assertions demand further scrutiny, particularly with regard to the objectification that ensues. A key supposition here is that social and national collectives whose members adhere to Islam share a primary

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identification as Muslims, bound by common beliefs. Yet, Esposito appears to overlook the nuances of how beliefs intersect with everyday sociality in diverse settings, leaving the content of these defining beliefs unexplored. Against this backdrop of Muslim unity, Esposito proposes that the continuity of Islamic history serves as the bedrock for current Islamic ideas and beliefs (Esposito, 1998, p. 5). The early Islamic community, which embodied the fusion of religion and politics, provides a blueprint for modern-day revivalist movements. The shared commitment to the sharı ̄‘ah, or Islamic law, serves as a primary principle that undergirds these movements. In Esposito’s opinion, the public commitment to the sharı ̄‘ah, coupled with the early Islamic model, inspires Muslims in various contexts to engage in restorative or corrective action. Islamist movements, in this view, represent basic responses and modes of action that echo early historical phases. Voll (1982) likewise contends that the continuity of Islamic history offers a fruitful avenue for probing the rise of Islamist movements. He challenges the notion that Islamic activism can be reduced to national or economic interests. Rather, he argues that the current resurgence of Islamist movements constitutes a continuation of basic themes, albeit expressed in new ways. Voll’s approach involves constructing ideal categories of Muslim activism or styles of action. Regarding government, he identifies four such styles of Muslim activism: adaptationist, conservative, fundamentalist and individualist. These styles serve as a framework for comprehending the entirety of Islamic history and revivalism, with Voll focusing on the relationship between action and actual conditions. For Voll (1982), the emergence of fundamentalist style of action stems from the failure of adaptationists’ secularising reforms. When such reforms falter, fundamentalism steps in to fill the void. Conversely, adaptationism assumes the guise of Islamic modernism, radical and secular reformism. Other styles, such as fundamentalism, may be present only in the everyday life of Muslims or during moments of contestation. Given the religiosity of the popular sector, fundamentalism holds sway among the religious substratum in Muslim societies. Thus, adaptationism appears as an elitist style that fails to achieve modernisation, while fundamentalism embodies a desire for authentic modernisation as opposed to mere Westernisation (Ismail, 2006). It is noteworthy to mention that while Voll (1982) finds it necessary to devise four categories to analyse the actions of Muslims across Muslim societies, his account is developed around the organising principle of revivalism. The notion that a wave of revivalist action is imminent is used

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to substantiate the contention that revivalism is a recurring feature of Islamic history. Ismail (2006), however, takes issue with this account on several grounds. While it encompasses a broad range of Muslim contexts, it propagates a version of Islamic history that is ‘totalised’ in terms of a series of reform and renewal movements, all of which embody some intrinsic modes of responding to generalised socio-political conditions. These conditions are abstractly depicted as representing decline. The revivalist perspective on Muslim societies perceives them as having deviated from the ideal model of the early period. This notion is pervasive among Muslims worldwide and is manifested in reformist ideas that lend continuity to Islamic history. Scholars frequently conceptualise continuity in terms of intellectual lineage and the contemporary discourse emphasises revivalism as a prevailing and recurrent theme. Davis (1987, p. 39) argues that the notion of continuity creates an intellectual link between Islamic reform in the nineteenth century and revivalism in the twentieth century. Davis, however, questions this link in light of the differences in social background, ontological views and activities of the participants in the various movements. The reception of discourses is indeed contextual-dependent. Therefore, Islamist movements cannot be evaluated solely based on the slogans they espouse. Indeed, the notion that ‘Islam is the solution’ and the call for the implementation of the sharı ̄‘ah are all part of ‘the constitution of particular systems of meaning that are themselves historically and materially inscribed’ (Ismail, 2006, p. 11).

3.6   Political Economy and Sociological Approaches The study of Islamist activism has been approached from a variety of perspectives, including political economy and sociology, which offer alternatives to the essentialist views that dominate master-narrative accounts (Tessler, 1997, p.  98). These approaches interpret the social reality of Islamist activism in terms of the actors’ backgrounds and socio-­ psychological states. Sociological studies examine the social characteristics of Islamist actors, including their age, education and family conditions, while political economy explanations of Islamist movements emphasise class struggle and social conflict. In this view, Islamism is seen as an expression of class interests that develop against the backdrop of the idea of the crisis of the state in the Arab world. However, cultural factors should not

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be overlooked in the case of structural analysis. While these perspectives emphasise structural and institutional conditions, cultural factors are also important determinants that interact with political-economic factors (Ayubi, 1991). The materiality of culture and its mobilisation are important determinants that interact with the political-economy determinants. The idiom of Islam, expressing claims of oppositional groups, could not simply be a matter of displacement or convenience. Rather, structural transformations in cultural and educational production made it possible to instrumentalise religion in the public space (Starrett, 1998). The nexus between cultural production and economic transformation is demonstrated in both formal and informal spheres. Gran (1999) notes that in eighteenth-century Egypt cultural production was dependent upon early capitalist transformation. In the late twentieth century, the commodification of religious books and the aesthetic appeal of artefacts must be understood in relation to the circulation of cultural symbols reinvented as part of a wider process of the commodification of identity and the consumption of religious referents. This process involves both dominant and dominated strata, with cultural production entering into the constitution of power relations in a dynamic process shaping the positions of the various actors. In sum, the political economy and sociological approaches offer a nuanced understanding of Islamist activism that takes into account both structural and cultural factors. While these approaches present a critique of essentialist views that attribute primacy to culture, attitudes and norms, they also recognise the materiality of culture and its mobilisation in shaping power relations. Ultimately, a comprehensive understanding of Islamist activism requires an analysis of the complex interplay between cultural, economic and political factors (Ismail, 2006, p. 15).

3.7  Towards an Integrated Approach Burke III (1988, p. 28) posits that studying movements in their historical contexts requires a thorough examination of their patterns and connections to structures of social action. This approach entails analysing the institutions that organise social and political life, as well as the social and economic structures that shape social movements. The relationship between changing social structures and patterns of action is of paramount importance and it is crucial to understand the interplay between macro and micro levels of analysis to highlight the connection between macro changes and everyday forms of social and political organisations.

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Infrastructures of action must be identified in relation to practices and strategies of action at the local level. The determinants of local-level action should be seen as part of an ongoing interplay between the various levels of the political and social spheres. Ismail’s (2006) analysis of prevailing approaches to Islamist movements emphasises the tendency to generalise about socio-historical conditions, which are characterised by the decline or decay of the state when it fails to meet rising expectations. Islamist opposition emerges as the expression of social discontent in response to these conditions, but they are not directly connected to structures of action and change. Therefore, it is crucial to uphold the distinction between general socio-economic processes and specific historical conditions (Zubaida, 1993). In the Middle East, the capitalist world economy determines the general socio-economic processes, and the articulation of the national economies with the international economic system took the form of state capitalism sustained by welfarism and populism in several Arab countries. The changes accompanying the shift from state capitalism to market economies constitute the background against which Islamist politics took shape. The analysis of Islamist movements in the Middle East suggests that structural transformations have contributed to the development of specific forms of organisations at the local level. For instance, in countries like Algeria and Egypt, semi-autonomous spheres emerged in the urban setting where the economy thrived. Social groups in these settings enjoyed a degree of autonomy and took oppositional positions, and the articulation of such opposition in Islamist terms cannot be ignored. Local conditions favoured the organisations of this opposition in Islamist terms. Another crucial factor is social disengagement, which has gradually unfolded in popular quarters and communities, and its nodal points are the urban neighbourhoods and the web of social relations. The expansion of the informal economy has constituted the actors in this disengagement, and it is essential to understand how it interacts with the broader social and economic transformations that have shaped the Middle East’s political landscape. Regarding the positioning of social actors in this disengagement, Ismail (2006) argues: The engagement of these social forces in Islamist politics, and the strategies they pursue, are shaped by their positioning from the state and their standing in the social hierarchy. For the entrepreneurs, support of Islamist groups (FIS and Nahda for instance) reinforced their position of notability and

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enhanced their economic and political power. For small merchants and trabendistes, their pursuit of Islamist politics represented an affirmation of their autonomy or a protection of gains achieved. Local activism linked up with national struggles involving the various wings of the state, particularly the secularists and the Islamists. At the national level, Islamist politics became imbricated in the historical divisions involving military cliques and state clans. The interaction among the multitude of actors and factions was shaped by the juncture of economic privatisation that took the form of the liquidation of state assets and their transfer into private hands. (Ismail, 2006, p. 25)

Expanding on the modification of interactional patterns, Islamist politics evolves in relation to pre-existing political fields (Zubaida, 1993, p. 146). The political field extends beyond the state and its elites, encompassing other actors and societal spheres of action. Politics cannot be confined to the formal sphere alone. Even in countries with highly centralised state structures, like Tunisia, other power centres exist. By broadening the notion of politics to include power relations that structure society, we can apprehend the terms of Islamist involvement in politics. In Tunisia, for instance, Islamist movements emerged as a response to the weakening of state control. The ability of Islamists to mobilise popular support was contingent upon the local-level historical structures of state-society incorporation and the role of mediating agents and spaces. In summary, Islamist movements were influenced by micro-contexts and specific processes linked to changing social conditions. These movements are also intertwined with cultural and social practices, including gender relations, arbitration, solidarity and sociability. We must be cautious in embracing the views of some scholars who claim that Islamists are omnipresent or that Islamism is homogenising. The existence of alternative lifestyles calls for a more nuanced understanding.

3.8   Islamist Movements and Democratic Politics The proliferation of Islamist groups within political opposition movements across the Muslim world highlights the urgent need for insightful and comprehensive discussions. Unfortunately, the current classification system employed by scholars to label Islamist groups as either ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’ is not only overly simplistic but also unhelpful (Mohiuddin, 2019, p. 72). The criteria used to categorise these groups are vague and

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imprecise, making it difficult to assess their true nature and the challenges they present to policymakers. One problematic criterion often used is violence, which is only attributed to radical factions. However, this criterion does not account for groups that do not engage in violence themselves but justify violence carried out by others. Another criterion is the acceptance of democratic electoral rules. While it is true that many Islamists reject democratically elected governments, their commitment to the rules of democratic elections is not synonymous with a commitment to democratic governance. Therefore, we must strive to understand the complexities of Islamist movements to identify the challenges they pose and the dangers policymakers face in deciding how to engage them. To address this problem, Wittes (2008, p. 13) proposes a more nuanced typology of Islamist movements based on three categories. The first category comprises small yet ideologically driven groups, such as al-Qaeda, ISIS or ISIL and their affiliates in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the world. These groups are not interested in formal politics but aim to establish a pan-Islamic state based on divine law and governance, targeting those who they perceive as heretics. The second category includes nationalist or local Islamist movements, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, which combine Islamist ideology with local political demands. These movements usually exist in weak or failing states. Lastly, the third category consists of groups that reject violence and seek a political role without any revolutionary goals. They may operate as legal parties, such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, or be excluded from formal political recognition while still engaging in the political process, like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. These groups aim to transform society and government into something ‘Islamic’ by persuading citizens to follow Islamic ideals, demand Islamist policies from government and behave as more closely observant Muslims. To assess whether an Islamist group can play a constructive role in a democratic system, it is essential to evaluate its attitude towards minorities and political pluralism. Liberal democratic politics uphold equality before the law for all, including ethnic, religious and sectarian minorities in the Muslim world. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the Muslim community’s view of non-Muslims and the state’s view of non-Muslim citizens to establish the sincerity of their democratic credentials. Additionally, the movement’s attitude towards political pluralism, its willingness to yield power if it loses at the ballot box and its willingness to

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forge political coalitions with non-Islamist movements are important factors to consider. These questions will help us to gauge how these groups would behave if elected to a position of power, and their stance on essential democratic elements such as pragmatism, alternation of power and political compromise. A third attitudinal question is whether such groups believe that religious authority should have a veto on the democratic process. The example of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) serves as an illustrative case study. In 2007, the group rattled Egyptians with the release of a document advocating for religious scholars to adjudicate government decisions in compliance with Islamic law. This proposal encountered fierce backlash, ultimately prompting many MB members to repudiate it, for fear of compromising their democratic principles (Wittes, 2008, p. 14). The decision to publish this document represents a noteworthy step towards increased transparency. Evaluating these three attitudes can aid in determining the viability of Islamist groups operating within democratic contexts (Elmenshawy, 2007). However, conducting such evaluations is a complex task. Many Islamist groups espouse support for democracy while simultaneously engaging in actions that undermine key principles such as legal equality. In fact, some peaceful Islamist groups thrive on the ambiguity surrounding their agendas, often using language that is vague and contradictory. In cases where moderation is in question, how can we ascertain its authenticity? Schwedler (2006) posits that meaningful moderation must manifest not only in public discourse but also in internal deliberations. Nevertheless, securing access to evidence of internal Islamist debates poses a formidable challenge. It is equally crucial to assess the level of democracy within a given movement relative to the degree of political freedom obtainable in the broader society (Schwedler, 2007, p.  77). However, many Islamist groups are opaque and feature hierarchical internal structures, limiting scholars’ access to information regarding internal debates and struggles and constituents’ ability to steer these movements in particular directions. If internal democracy is essential for effective participation in external democracy, many Islamist groups warrant serious concerns. In analysing Islamist groups’ moderation, the focal point must centre on political freedom, as without it, moderation cannot thrive. Survey results demonstrate that in Lebanon and Morocco, Islamist movements stem from diverse backgrounds and political orientations, with their primary shared attribute being dissatisfaction with the policies of authoritarian regimes (Tessler, 1997, p. 99). As a relatively untested quantity in Arab

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politics, these movements benefit from their potential for evolution. Wittes (2008) argues that Islamist groups’ place in Arab politics necessitates ongoing scrutiny. She writes: That Islamists continue to bear the brunt of regime repression, and that their views and platforms remain unchallenged by any other viable movement, only solidifies their reputation as the most authentic opposition. Islamists benefit organisationally as well as ideologically from the closed nature of Arab regimes. The state cannot shutter all mosques or control all that is said in them; thus they give Islamists a base that secular political activists cannot match. By continuing to deny basic political freedoms, Arab regimes hand Islamists a competitive edge over other opposition forces— and preserve Islamists as a bogeyman. All this makes the current climate in most Arab states rather hazy (for locals as well as outsiders) when it comes to sizing up what the Islamists are all about and how they will sit with democracy. Indeed, the current environment makes it less rather than more likely that Islamists will feel compelled to behave moderately or pragmatically, or will give voice to such moderate or pragmatic attitudes as their members may hold. (Wittes, 2008, p. 11)

Upon exhaustive reflection, in order to effectively gauge the extent to which Islamist movements are dedicated to democratic processes, a meaningful democratic process must exist with which they can engage. To truly comprehend a movement’s aspirations, an open and unrestricted public discourse is crucial in which leaders are compelled to elucidate their policies beyond a mere catchphrase like ‘Islam is the solution’. Thus, the evaluation process must not only prioritise the proliferation of political discourse but also facilitate the easing of restrictions on political association and the establishment of political parties. These measures are necessary to enhance the quality of political life and bolster the long-term potential for democratic transformation. In summary, fostering Islamist movements that fully embrace democratic participation will be a critical component of successful democratisation. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of these groups will be contingent upon the broader democratisation process.

3.9   Islamist Movements as Social Movements Islamist movements have been the subject of multifaceted analyses from a plethora of perspectives. In this section, we delve into the intricacies of Islamist activism and offer a nuanced hypothesis by applying social

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movement theory. Our investigation is centred around the structural changes that instigate the emergence of new social groups and interests and the resultant state-society relations associated with these changes. In a multitude of socio-political settings, transformations at the macro and micro levels have given rise to new actors and interests that have found expression through Islamist movements. At the macro level, the state’s retreat has resulted in the weakening of corporatist frames of organising state-­society relations. As the state’s role as a welfare provider recedes, arenas of societal disengagement from the state have expanded, and the resultant social transformations have been anchored in modes of organisations that reject state control. This is evident in the formation of neighbourhood welfare organisations around mosques, informal employment networks and norms of social regulation. Ismail (2006, p. 54) argues that it is not the informal housing and economic activities that have given rise to violent opposition; rather, it is the attendant forms of organisations of these political economies that have offered resources for action and presented opportunities to actors whose positioning was affected by structural changes in the labour market and welfare system. During the early 1980s and 1990s, Islamist groups were engaged in protest action and confrontation with the state. An analysis of such groups in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria brings to our attention the macro and micro-level changes that occurred during that time. These movements began at the university level, primarily attracting students (Burgat & Dowell, 1993, p. 32). During the latter phase, the movements became neighbourhood-based and drew on a wider constituency of supporters. The shift to the urban neighbourhood and the widening of popular support entailed changes in outlook and strategies while also allowing for the development of existing resources such as mosques and welfare associations. Additionally, it allowed Islamism to take shape in spaces that were disengaged from the state in the economic sphere. In urban settings, informality—removing workers from the public sector and entering them into a network of relations that sometimes went beyond urban spaces— contributed to social disengagement and this was reinforced by housing conditions by which the daily lives of residents were organised. For instance, in Algeria, local mosques effected a disjunction from the state. The social embedding of these movements should be studied not only in relation to the changes in the social structure that gave rise to new actors but also the merging of old and new ones that was facilitated by the movements (Ismail, 2004, p. 390). The process of embedding consisted

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of the widening of the ranks of participants and new actors such as traders, youths, entrepreneurs and merchants in Egypt and Algeria. In Cairo, most of the Islamist groups comprised of activists who were traders (Ismail, 2004, p. 392). In Algeria, Islamist actors acquired influence in accordance with their position in the social system. In this system, the three groups of actors and their interrelations were important to the movement: entrepreneurs, youths and small traders. While members of the first group ran trafficking networks and assumed positions of notability by supporting charitable work, small merchants contributed to mosque construction. Youths, on the other hand, fashioned themselves as awlad al-houma (sons of the quarter) and functioned as an alternative fraternity by providing a form of group solidarity. The FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) found members among the three groups. All three groups were incorporated into the FIS through financial, familial and religious networks, resulting in a complex web of interrelationships. The intricate social fabrics of Islamist movements are woven with the threads of familial, religious and employment networks that stretch across neighbourhoods (Ismail, 2000, p. 386). However, it would be naive to suggest that such support was exclusive to Islamist groups, as anyone could draw upon these resources if they had access to them. To unveil a more nuanced understanding of the Islamist mobilisation capacity, we need to introduce an intermediary variable of cultural practices and interpretive frameworks. Some scholars contend that Islamism’s ability to anchor itself socially was fortified by the convergence of certain ideological practices with local cultural customs. One salient example is the regulation of women’s conduct, which was ingrained in societal governance and remains a critical issue to this day. To assess the movements’ efficacy, we must consider two key factors. First, we need to examine the mobilising structures and their ability to formalise and coordinate disparate social actors. Second, we must scrutinise the organisational links and the dynamic interactions among different segments within the movements. However, the latter poses a vexing challenge, as the terms of inclusion and exclusion are continually in flux. Within Islamist movements, we can identify a range of coordination strategies. For instance, in some instances, Islamist groups engage in brokerage activities designed to unite disparate collectives. This was exemplified by efforts undertaken by some organisations to connect various mosque groups and individuals (Ismail, 2004, p. 394). For example, Al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmı ̄yyah in Cairo operated a network of mosques and flats and

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recruited members from neighbourhood mosques while also appropriating social spaces such as clinics and welfare centres. The group utilised activist cells organised through mosques and committees for social aid, education and training. Unfortunately, one of the organisation’s significant drawbacks was the use of violence to implement its vision of an Islamic society, which was justified by invoking the injunction of al-amr bi al ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil). At the political level, the organisations came into conflict with state agents and carried out activities such as assassination attempts aimed at high-ranking officials. Drawing upon the rich stock of local protest culture, they clashed with the police in markets and on the streets, followed by attacks on police stations. The group sought to exclude official channels of participation in elections or influence their outcomes, opting instead for a more confrontational approach. In contrast, the FIS in Algeria managed to unite disparate constituencies by appropriating existing resources and fostering links between local actors, such as entrepreneurs, and national leadership. By acting as a broker between disparate elements of Islamism, the FIS enhanced its level of organisations and transformed informal mobilising structures into agencies of the social movement organisations. The strategies of implementation were carried out through local mosques and sports associations, enabling the FIS to evolve into a political movement that followed the party-oriented model. However, the complementarity between formal and informal organisations disintegrated in the face of state-sponsored violence when the second round of elections was suspended in Algeria in 1991. The FIS mobilised thousands of supporters to occupy the centre, but ultimately the movement failed to maintain its momentum. As we delve deeper into the complexities of Islamist movements, we encounter the intricacies of their internal organisational structures and the interconnections among their diverse segments. Islamist groups are not monolithic entities; instead, they comprise loosely linked networks that may converge or diverge on various issues such as their positioning with regard to the state and their modes of action. While their discourse on morality may converge, their different approaches may lead to the diffusion of practices and the containment of protest potential of militants. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) adopted a political strategy of forming electoral alliances with the Wafd Party in 1984 and with the Labour Party in 1987 to overcome the ban on its functioning as a political party. Meanwhile, conservative preachers focused on re-Islamisation

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efforts and neutralising militants to reinforce the status quo (Ismail, 2000, p. 386). In Algeria, the violent response of the state resulted in the collapse of the integration of various constituencies, leading to the decentralisation of youth activism and the disappearance of much popular support (Martinez, 2000, p.  40). Thus, analysing networks of interaction in Islamist movements should be contextualised within state-society relations. While a weakening of the repressive system may contribute to tolerance of opposition, the ability of the state to enframe the population reveals challenges faced by social movements. For example, in Tunisia, the state responded to the emergence of Islamists through local associations by reinforcing its policies through the ruling party and local organisations. The regime employed coercive measures, manipulation of other parties and groups and marginalisation of Islamist leaders to neutralise the Islamist challenge successfully. The examination of mobilising structures of Islamist movements also sheds light on the building blocks that support Islamist opposition. Networks of social relations that form the basis of oppositional activism are everyday life networks and Islamist movements mobilise within these structures. However, the movements’ heterogeneity is reinforced in the discursive field of Islamism, characterised by discourses engaged in the production of Islamist identities. Although Islamist movements appropriate the resources made available by these networks, their limited formal organisations and the existing institutional setup restrict their potential for coordination with other actors. Thus, their strategic and tactical choices create impediments in establishing a more sustained organisation. Overall, analysing Islamist movements vis-à-vis social movement theory requires paying significant attention to micro-practices of mobilisation, specific histories, and avoiding generalisations about the inherent nature of Islamic beliefs.

3.10   Islamism in Transition: Neo-Fundamentalism and Post-Islamist Politics In his seminal work ‘The Failure of Political Islam’, Roy (1994) posited a nuanced argument that the ideologies of Islamist groups could not serve as a viable blueprint for the establishment of an Islamic state. These groups were at a crossroads and they could either choose to embrace political normalisation within the contemporary nation-state framework or morph

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into what he termed as ‘neo-fundamentalism’. This form of Islamism was characterised by a closed, scripturalist and conservative interpretation of Islam that rejected the national and statist dimensions in favour of the global Muslim community or ummah, founded on Islamic law or sharı ̄‘ah (Roy, 1994, p. 10). Unlike the more politically engaged Islamist groups, neo-fundamentalism appeared to prioritise the enforcement of sharı ̄‘ah over articulating a clear vision for what an Islamic state should look like. In recent years, this brand of Islamism has gained popularity among young, rootless Muslims in second and third-generation immigrant communities in the West. Although a small percentage of people are involved, the phenomenon encourages radicalisation, which is manifested in the support of groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS or ISIL, as well as the promotion of sectarian communitarian ideology that emphasises diversity as a way of resisting assimilation into Western civilisation (Roy, 2004, p. 5). The growth of militant neo-fundamentalism has coincided with the deterritorialisation of a significant portion of the Muslim population through migration and the proliferation of private madrasas with curricula based on Salafi or Wahhabi philosophy throughout the Muslim world. This trend has blurred the lines between traditional ‘ulamā and modern educated Islamists, leading to strategic alliances between various radical Islamist groups. Roy’s theories have been the subject of intense criticism since the emergence of political Islam following the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, he maintains that the failure of Islamism is due to two factors (Roy, 2004, p. 6). Firstly, these groups’ intellectual failure to adapt to modern societal changes and their adherence to traditional norms of Muslim culture, which led to the loss of one of their primary sources of mobilisation. Secondly, the political project of these groups was guided, to a large extent, by secularism, which was at odds with the dominant moral discourse. However, these signals of failure do not necessarily signify a decline in the expansion of Islamism, but rather a reevaluation of the concept that Islam is a political and economic philosophy capable of resolving all societal issues. Göle (2006) posits that the very foundation of Islamism as a revolutionary and authoritarian movement rested on its anti-systemic stance and a stringent doctrinal corpus. However, in recent times, we have witnessed a transformation in the way some Islamists function. A new generation of Muslims, nurtured on the principles of Islamism, have started to alter their behaviour to align with the norms and expectations of civic democracy. Consequently, in certain circumstances, the internal

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dynamics and political goals of the Islamist movement have also undergone a metamorphosis. Post-Islamism can be conceived of as a state of affairs and a live political enterprise. Bayat (1996, p. 46) defines it as a political and social condition in which the ‘appeal, energy, symbols, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted, even among its once ardent supporters’. Or, to put it another way, post-Islamism is what happens when political Islamism is tried and fails in the real world. Islamists are then compelled to reassess and restructure their political ideology through democratic competition with other intellectual and religious tendencies, taking cognisance of the discrepancies and deficiencies in their movement’s quest for supremacy (Bayat 2007a, 2007b, p. 18). This shift is prompted by both the internal contradictions inherent in Islamism and societal pressures. Building on this, Bayat (1996) characterises post-Islamism as a political or intentional endeavour to conceive and plan the strategies and mechanisms of overcoming Islamism in the social, political and intellectual domains. The post-Islamist movement seeks to modernise Islamism by blending it with the principles of freedom of choice, democracy and religious modernism. The movement aspires to dismantle the monopoly of religious truth by acknowledging the demands of the secular world and eschewing dogmatism (Roy, 1994, p. 21). While Roy’s book, The Failure of Political Islam, brought the term ‘post-Islamism’ to the fore, Bayat is credited with coining it, in reference to Iran’s pragmatic leadership after Khomeini’s demise. Roy’s book highlights the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood and the broader Ikhwani heritage as political Islam on two counts. Firstly, it had never managed to evolve into a large-scale movement capable of winning a substantial portion of the vote. This reality prevailed when Roy authored the book, with the exception of the Islamic Salvation Front’s (FIS) triumph in Algeria, which occurred just as the book was about to be published. Even after accounting for state intervention in the electoral process, further research in 2010 by Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi found that most Islamist parties had received less than 8% of the vote in elections where they participated (Kurzman & Naqvi, 2009). Ennahda’s stunning election victories in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) victories in Egypt in 2011 and 2012, however, have compelled a fundamental reevaluation of past views and profoundly changed the narrative around the rise of political Islam (Mandaville, 2014). Roy (1994) astutely discerns that Islamist groups and parties, in their quest for accommodation and assimilation within the contemporary nation-state’s political

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machinery, have gradually relinquished their capacity to assert distinctive ideological orientations. Consequently, they have encountered mounting challenges in proffering authentically Islamic responses to foundational matters pertaining to governance and economics. Despite the ostensibly ubiquitous employment of the catchphrase, Roy (1994) posits that Islamist ideology and policy proposals have become increasingly indistinguishable from those put forth by mainstream centre-right political factions. The ascendancy of political pragmatism has unequivocally eclipsed the primacy of theological justifications. A decade after his initial thesis, Roy further expounded upon post-­ Islamism in his book, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. He argued that while religiosity has certainly surged throughout the Muslim world, it has simultaneously retreated into the private sphere (Roy, 2004, p. 5). That is to say, while Muslims may be more devout, they are becoming less and less interested in politicising Islam in an effort to impose it on society. For Roy (2004), the desire for Islamic normativity is now primarily personal and individualised. To portray Muslims’ transition towards post-Islamism as a wholly individualistic and politically apathetic outlook, in which religion and pro-capitalist consumption patterns converge, would be to ignore the other significant factors at play in the ever-shifting terrain of Muslim politics. Other scholars have noted that the movement towards more distinct religious expressions does not necessarily imply a total rejection of Islamic activism. Thus, Muslims continue to possess a strong desire to work together to influence society in a manner consistent with their view of Islam. The apparent shift lies in the character and mechanisms of that collective action. Does the defeat of political Islam indicate its complete extinction? Not necessarily, since it could refer to structural changes that set plans in motion for either failure or success. The viability of any thesis hinges on its ease of refutation by alternative theories. Islamism, in its classic form, arose as a promising and ascending project and an alternative to the failures of earlier national and development programs. Even though it fell short of its goals, the alternatives do not appear very promising, particularly considering the authoritarian shapes they have adopted. On the other hand, models based on inclusion in democratic choice, the civil state, and separation have approached the changes that political Islam has undergone. The models that have approximated the changes of political Islam, such as those based on democratisation, the civil state and the separation of religion and politics in the experiences of Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco,

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appear to imply accomplishments that come close to the core of the post-­ Islamist notion (Imad, 2019, pp. 3–5; Bayat, 2013, p. 8). The Justice and Development Party (AKP), currently in power in Turkey, serves as a classic example of a post-Islamist movement that emerged from Islamism. Without a thorough examination of this crucial post-Islamist player, any study of political Islam and democracy would be incomplete. Some analysts disagree with the AKP’s classification as secular and claim that it remains very much an Islamist organisations. They argue that its pivot away from its Islamist objective is a ruse to avoid being as openly condemned as its more open-minded forebears (Kuru, 2005, p.  256). The AKP’s primary founders were former Islamists who converted to secularism and established this post-Islamist organisation. Unfortunately, many people are unable to perceive this significant change due to the binary perception of the Turkish political environment, which characterises the conflict between the AKP and its Kemalist rivals as one between an Islamist-rooted party and an absolutely secular group. Additionally, this viewpoint makes it impossible to understand the intricate nature of the party’s philosophy. In contrast to the ‘assertive’ French laicist model of strong (and maybe even militant) secularism that the Kemalists have enforced since the republic’s foundation, the AKP has been advocating for ‘passive’ and moderate secularism in the United States (Kuru, 2007, p. 257). To gain a comprehensive understanding of how Islamism in Turkey transformed into post-Islamism, it is imperative to first acknowledge Turkey’s distinct historical characteristics. While it is commonly believed that the roots of Turkish democracy and the unique brand of Islamism can be traced back to the establishment of the republic, Mustafa Akyol contests this idea. In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire implemented a substantial reform drive in response to the rising power of Europe (Akyol, 2019). Under the leadership of Sultan Mahmud II, the Tanzimat reforms were instrumental in introducing the 1876 constitution and establishing a parliamentary system. It is important to note that Turkish Islamists were not influenced by the extreme Islamist ideologies that permeated other Arab and Muslim countries, as Sufi Islam had already taken root throughout the Turkic heartland during the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, radical Islamists have never been a significant force in Turkey, lacking the presence of a charismatic Turkish or Sunni leader as seen in Iran or Arab nations (Heper, 1997, p. 40). Additionally, Turkish radical Islamists have always been scattered among relatively minor Islamist

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organisations such as Giriim, Buyuk Dogu, Vahdet and Hezbollah, which lack a common organisational core. These foreign beliefs did not resonate with Turkey’s religious groups, making it challenging for Turkish radical Islamists to gain an audience for their views (Kuru, 2005, p. 254). The Refah Party was elected to office in December 1995, following a series of coalition governments. For the first time in Turkey’s modern history, an Islamist party secured the most seats in the legislature, with 158 members. Two additional center-right parties, the True Path Party of former prime minister Tansu Ciller and the Motherland Party, which was dissolved in 2007, also held a total of 130 seats. Erbakan was appointed prime minister, and in June 1996, he formed a new coalition government with Ciller’s party after the original coalition government established by the two secular parties fell apart. Erbakan’s Islamist rhetoric, decision to host prominent Sufi order leaders at a Ramadan feast, and initiatives to refocus foreign policy on the Muslim world angered the military, leading him to back down (Bokhari & Senzai, 2013, p. 175). Following Erbakan’s ouster, moderate Islamist leaders from a younger generation, such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gul, challenged Erbakan’s leadership of the Islamist movement. With the closure of Refah in January 1998 and the establishment of Fazilet a month earlier, Erbakan no longer had a monopoly over the party’s doctrinal stance. Erdoğan and Gul emphasised that their party should be distinguished from other Islamist groups in the region because Turkish Islam has always been unique. They advocated for human rights, a free market and democracy. It was vital for this newly formed reformist sector to reject both the Islamism of the party and the laicism of the Kemalist state. Erdogan asserted that individuals who practiced a particular faith were not the government (Yilmaz, 2011). The AKP was founded as a classic centrist party with conservative social policies, liberal economic views and support for a secular democratic society. Given its history and the influence of the entrenched Kemalists, it was a daunting task to establish civilian control over the military, so the party avoided any conflicts with the establishment. As a result, post-Islamism had supplanted Turkish Islamism just before 9/11. Following the cataclysmic events of 9/11, the AKP confronted intricate political terrain, deftly manoeuvring to reconcile its Islamic origins with the imperative of cultivating amicable relations with Western powers. Although the party had long distanced itself from its Islamist associations, it still grappled with the persistent perception of being an ‘Islamist-lite’ entity, thus occupying a distinctive position vis-à-vis the global

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counterterrorism campaign. Paradoxically, despite this perception, the AKP emerged as a beacon for Islamist parties in the region, serving as a guiding force on how to effectively engage with the West while preserving their core values. Acutely cognisant of this delicate dynamic, the AKP’s leadership diligently preserved a complex equilibrium, skilfully navigating between their Western allies and the imperative to assuage domestic nationalist sentiments. Among the most pivotal junctures in this intricate juggling act materialised in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. The United States had proposed using Turkish territory as a staging area for the invasion, which would have put the AKP in a difficult position. On the one hand, the party had no desire to antagonise its Western allies, but on the other hand, it could not afford to be seen as complicit in an invasion that was deeply unpopular among Turks. Ultimately, the AKP chose to reject the US proposal, a decision that initially produced tactical advantages for the party. In December 2002, Parliament changed Article 76, which prohibited anyone convicted of ideological offences from running for public office. This change allowed party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to assume the role of prime minister, which he won in a by-election in March of the following year. Until then, Abdullah Gul had been acting as prime minister. Erdogan’s ascension to power was a turning point for the AKP, as he proved to be a skilled and charismatic leader who was able to consolidate the party’s power in the years that followed. Under his leadership, the AKP was able to shed its Islamist image once and for all, positioning itself as a modern and progressive party that was committed to Turkey’s economic and social development. Despite the many challenges it faced in the post-9/11 world, the AKP emerged as one of the most successful and influential political parties in the region, a testament to its ability to navigate complex geopolitical terrain and adapt to changing circumstances (Bokhari & Senzai, 2013, p. 178). Despite the challenges that the AKP faced, they remained persistent in their efforts to reform the legal system and strengthen democracy in Turkey, using the EU accession process as a tool to do so. The Kemalist movement, which had long prioritised secularism over democracy, was unable to effectively oppose the AKP’s reforms, leading to a shift in the balance of power between the military and the civilian population. In order to challenge the dominance of the Kemalist movement within the judiciary and other parts of the civilian bureaucracy, the AKP needed to expand its influence beyond the legislative branch of government. While Islamism had played a significant role in Turkish society in the past, its

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influence had diminished since the AKP came to power in 2001. This was due in part to the fact that insurgent and propagandistic Islamism had not established itself in the country. Instead, most of Turkey’s Islamists had been of the participative type, actively participating in society and working within the democratic process. The historical religious experiences of the Ottoman Empire’s Turkish and Arab citizens may have contributed to the different expressions of Islamism in Turkey in recent decades. Moreover, the singular Kemalist experience, which was based on the Tanzimat era, had a significant impact on secularising Turkish society. Unlike in other Arab and Muslim countries where secularisation was mostly state-driven and did not substantially affect society, secularisation in Turkey was driven by the Kemalist elite and had a profound impact on society. Opposition to secularism during the early republican period was not a rejection of the idea itself, but rather a response to the repression of religion by the Kemalist elite. The AKP’s forerunners were Islamists who actively participated in society and this participatory Islamism helped to pave the way for the emergence of the AKP, which is situated between participatory and post-Islamism. The AKP’s support for secularism and its affinity for Islamists can be explained by its connection to both groups. Despite the military’s attempts to prevent them from participating in the democratic process, the AKP and other Islamists continued to participate in Parliament and local government, gradually changing the movement from within. In 2011, the Turkish prime minister urged the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to embrace secularism during his first visit to the country following the Arab Spring (Bokhari & Senzai, 2013, p. 179). Even after the coup that removed former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi from power, Erdoğan remained one of the Brotherhood’s most vocal supporters. The AKP’s complex relationship with Islamism, secularism and democracy reflects the intricacies of Turkish society and politics and its efforts to balance these competing forces have profound implications for the future of Turkey and the wider region. The influence of Islamism on Erdoğan and his supporters has led to a nuanced secularism that does not seek to impose religion through the state, nor does it oppose its presence in society. The AKP, in fact, views moderate secularism as essential for creating a balanced environment in which both the more outwardly devout religious components of society and those who adhere to the Western view that religion is a personal choice can coexist peacefully. This understanding of secularism, which complies with Islamic precepts, has raised questions about the

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degree to which the AKP can serve as a role model for Islamists in Arab nations and the wider Muslim world. Kuru (2013) has promoted the concept of a secularism that is both passive and forceful as a model for Islamist democratisation in the broader Muslim world. He argues that there are still useful lessons to be learned from the AKP’s experience, despite the fact that it represents a unique transition from Islamism to secularism. A number of forces outside of Turkey find themselves in a similar position, including Egypt’s Hizb al-Wasat, Morocco’s PJD, and Tunisia’s Ennahda Party. These are all Islamist groups that could eventually move towards post-Islamism. Indeed, the AKP is widely regarded as the premier example of post-Islamism. Yilmaz (2011) has provided a thorough application of this concept to Turkey, examining how the AKP developed from the Milli Gorus (National Vision) movement that gave rise to the Islamist political groups that came before the current ruling party. He also explores the contribution of the Gülen movement, a multinational socio-religious movement with Turkish leadership, to the emergence of the AKP. Yilmaz draws a distinction between what he calls non-Islamism and post-Islamism. In the former, Islamism and democracy are combined, while in the latter, Islamist ideals are rejected in favour of a stronger commitment to democratic principles. The AKP is an example of a non-Islamist party, while the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), which the AKP replaced, is a case of a post-­ Islamist organisation. For Yilmaz (2011), post-Islamism is a stage in which players may either advance and completely abandon Islamism or turn back to it. Unlike a meeting point between Islamism and secularism, we agree with Bayat that post-Islamism is a secularising trend that represents a rejection of Islamism because it does not advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state. In his analysis of Iran, Bayat (1996) demonstrates how post-Islamists have learned from experience that, to tackle the social, political and economic issues that modern countries are facing, it is necessary to go beyond religious teachings. However, he distinguishes between secularisation and secularism, with the former being the process of recognising the need for extrareligious concepts and the latter being the marginalisation of religion. Post-Islamism departs from Islamism and may move closer to a secularism that does not reject the place of religion in public life. As Bayat notes, post-Islamists have recognised the weaknesses in their intellectual foundations and the need for secular methods (Bayat 2007a, 2007b). Therefore, post-Islamists have altered their earlier understanding of secularism as being antireligion in addition to their interpretation of Islamic religious

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values. In their view, secularism is not something un-Islamic and embracing it does not necessarily require them to give up their core religious beliefs. Therefore, post-Islamists are former Islamists who have abandoned their dogmatic doctrinal stances on using the state to impose Islamic rules and are now working towards fulfilling their religious aspirations through democratic politics and a secular government. Taking into account Turkey’s existing prohibition on head coverings in public spaces, despite the allowance for observant women in the private sector to wear them, the AKP has refrained from forcefully overturning this restriction imposed by Ataturk, even after more than two decades in power and its efforts to strengthen democracy. A statement issued by the former Deputy Prime Minister Arinc on 21 March 2013, highlighted the AKP’s deliberate decision to postpone legal action aimed at lifting the ban until societal and political conditions had matured. Evidently, the AKP’s approach has been focused on fostering national unity concerning this contentious issue and others, rather than imposing policies that would mandate the wearing of headscarves, a scenario more likely under an Islamist administration. Instead, the AKP has framed the discourse as one centred on individual freedom of choice. To achieve its objective of overturning the prohibition on headscarves, the AKP has resorted to legal means. Its success in having the ban lifted in the public sector workplace as part of a package of reforms is testament to this. Furthermore, the AKP has endeavoured to increase civilian control over the military, which had traditionally been a bulwark against the open expression of religiosity. As Heper (1997) had observed during Erbakan’s rise to power, the coexistence of Islam and democracy in Turkey is feasible, provided that radical secularists refrain from imposing their way of life and values on Islamists and the latter do not seek to undermine the fundamental principles of Turkey’s secular democratic state either through word or deed (Heper, 1997, p. 43). It seems that the AKP has learned from this lesson and is endeavouring to establish a lasting bond between secularists and Islamists (Bokhari & Senzai, 2013, p. 184).

3.11   Islamism and the Ills of Globalisation The concept of globalisation is far from novel, with historical precedents found in the empires of the past, such as the Persian, Roman, Greek and Chinese empires, which introduced new modes of thinking under a degree of political unification. In an earlier era, the Islamic world represented a high

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form of globalisation. However, contemporary Muslim nations perceive globalisation as a Western initiative with a distinct ideology and agenda. Those on the receiving end of globalisation often seek alternative ideologies to resist its impact, such as an alliance of states united in opposition to neoliberalism (Fuller, 1995). The criticisms levelled against globalisation include questions about the nature of the project and its primary beneficiaries. Some argue whether it is an inherent process resulting from modern technology or an enterprise driven by advanced states and the massive institutional support only the United States is capable of providing. Additionally, scholars question the capacity of the free market to benefit all, whether it represents a new theology like the ‘IMF consensus’ pushed by the US, which it believes to be the universal model for the future (Fuller, 2003). Numerous Islamists voice their opposition to the hazards of globalisation, primarily regarding the preservation of local cultures and values against the proliferation of Western media and the negative economic consequences on states and their people. These concerns also arise in various Asian, American and European countries. Islamists talk about Islamic economics by referring to their concerns for the ideological assumptions and values under global marketisation. They also raise concerns about market efficiency at the expense of the social impact of globalisation. This sentiment is not limited to Islamists, but also shared by East Asian cultures and societies, which regard market institutions as a means to generate wealth, not as ends in themselves. This approach enables market institutions to be evaluated and reformed in relation to how their workings impact society’s values and stability, avoiding the Western obsessions that make economic policy a doctrinal battleground (Gray, 1998, p. 192.). Opposing the hegemony of globalisation, various Asian countries pursue independent paths in their economic development, none of which is based on the Western model but instead prioritises social stability and economic efficiency. These societies exhibit differences not only in their family structures but also in their religious life, in which their diverse capitalisms are rooted. None of these societies is Muslim, but all are grappling with the risks of globalisation. According to John Gray, we are entering an age where ‘the identification of the West with modernity is being severed’ (Gray, 1998, p. 193). Islamist thinking on the issue of globalisation reflects these straightforward ideas, though Muslim nations have not been able to achieve their version of modernisation compared to East Asia’s remarkable success story. Finally, Islamists and sceptics of globalisation alike share concerns about social and economic justice, viewing Western capitalism as

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promoting a Darwinian social order. They also retain a fondness for certain traditional values in the Global South, which have been eroded by modernisation and the enhanced role of individualism in society, particularly in the United States (Fuller, 2003, p. 74).

3.12   Islamism and Religious Authority The exponential growth of extremist organisations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS or ISIL) has sparked heated discussions concerning the character of the ISIS group and the approaches that mainstream Muslims can adopt to counter their impact. Although some assertions made by the group may intersect with specific orthodox principles, their interpretations significantly deviate from the pluralistic traditions widely embraced by the majority of Muslims. While many Muslims adhere to well-established religious institutions like Egypt’s Al-Azhar, the pursuit of a credible and authoritative voice to challenge the influence of extremist factions presents a multitude of complex challenges. In the Muslim world, authority indeed exists, albeit in a splintered and challenging form. The religious authority crisis predates the emergence of ISIS or ISIL by a considerable margin and has served to undermine the legitimacy of traditional Muslim institutions, although their physical infrastructure remains intact. The predicaments facing conventional Muslim institutions highlight the quandaries faced by religious authorities in contemporary Muslim society. These establishments face significant obstacles in their efforts to hold the powerful accountable and articulate their positions with clarity (Fuller, 2003, p. 74). The issues affecting these institutions are frequently overlooked, as the nature of their authority defies easy characterisation. Some even argue that nobody can legitimately claim religious authority in Sunni Islam, as formal political authority cannot assert itself in this realm, nor can any establishment impose its interpretation of faith matters. Nonetheless, reality belies such tidy theories. Political authorities often meddle in religious matters for partisan reasons, and not all interpreters of Islamic doctrine can be deemed equally valid. In recent discourse concerning religious authority in Muslim societies, scholars have emphasised the individualisation of religious beliefs as a manifestation of the fundamental ruptures underlying this predicament. The current state of affairs depicts individualisation/ fragmentation as a catalyst for the decentralisation of Islamic authority. Increasingly, individuals take it upon themselves to define concepts of

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Islamic authority, trust, and responsibility (Peter, 2006, p. 106). Of these concerns, the responsibility for interpreting religion assumes particular importance. The internet has played a pivotal role in expanding the public space available to a diverse spectrum of seekers, thereby enabling a new class of interpreters to ‘address and … reframe Islam’s authority and expression for those like themselves and others who come there’ (Anderson, 2003). Chapter 5 offers an in-depth analysis of the internet’s impact on transforming religious authority in Muslim societies. Grinin and Korotayev (2019) argue that Islamism has expanded opportunities for religious people to interpret religious texts, opine on religious matters and pursue their spiritual callings. In this way, the scope of textual interpretation extends far beyond the traditional purview of religious custom. Concomitantly, conventional Muslim scholars and religious authorities cede their authority to unofficial Islamist spiritual leaders. This phenomenon has given rise to a multitude of discussions concerning interpretations of sacred texts in the media, many of which diverge significantly from the established canon. Theologians bemoan the fact that people no longer heed their fatwas, as ‘everyone who has an opportunity for it appears with fatwas’ (Grinin & Korotayev, 2019, p. 85). In this context, the proficient scholars remain entrenched in the confines of purely religious activity, while Islamism assumes responsibility for missionary activities and the practical application of Islamic teachings. The marginalisation of traditional Islam and Muslim scholars and experts is compensated for by the fact that Islam is being interpreted by people who are passionately invested in it. This phenomenon implies an understanding of Islam that derives from personal perception, akin to that seen in the Protestant Reformation. Within this particular context, it is crucial to acknowledge that the advent of the printing press and the internet has enabled even ordinary people to partake in the discourse surrounding the appropriate way to situate Islam within the modern world (Bunt, 2005, p. 238). The impact of these cyber Islamic environments on real-world decision-making processes is a significant new dimension of Islamic discourse and expression. The rapidity and intensity of this transformation have wide-reaching implications for global understandings of Islam and Muslims. Moreover, the proliferation of mass media, education and novel communication technologies has granted more space for individuals and groups claiming to represent Islam, who not only offer new formulations for consumption but also actively reshape the religion (Mohiuddin, 2020, p. 84). In light

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of the current crisis of religious authority in the Muslim world, it is evident that cyberspace has become an integral component in the mapping of Islamic knowledge and Muslim networks within the era of globalisation. Subsequent to this, Chap. 3 will delve into the concept of religious authority in Islam and how it is being debated and contested in the Muslim world, with Chaps. 4 and 5 further assessing the ways in which Islamist movements are challenging religious authority in contemporary Muslim societies.

3.13  Conclusion The emergence of Islamism on the international stage in the late 1970s was spurred by both global and national opportunities and includes a diverse range of local and transnational networks that have varying objectives. Some groups seek to obtain power by toppling local regimes, while others desire cooperative relationships with them and yet others pursue political, social and legal reforms. It is noteworthy that the majority of Islamist movements are nonviolent and the minority who resort to violence rarely do so from the outset (Moghadam, 2009, p.  61). Among those who do employ violent tactics, some justify their actions only after initially being formed as nonviolent movements. Once groups resort to violence, they tend to continue using such methods throughout their lifespan, while others delegitimise armed resistance. Moderate Islamists, on the other hand, endeavour to gain power through participation in elections and the promotion of democracy to expand their social base. They also try to adopt framing strategies that align with the prevailing opportunity structure and master frame (Emy Matesan, 2019, p. 45). However, in some cases, the effectiveness of such groups can be undermined by flaws within their own frames. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, despite being the primary opposition movement at the time of uprisings, the group was unable to consolidate its power. Given the opportunity structure in Egypt, which was not Islamist, the Brotherhood sought to frame its movement as advocating for a democracy guided by Islamic principles, an approach that was well suited to the existing opportunity structure. However, this strategy made it difficult for the group to consolidate its power. Seeking to establish a democratic state, the Brotherhood linked its legitimacy to its ability to lead a successful political transition. When this effort faltered, its popularity waned. The group attempted to revive its religious credentials

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by appealing to its base, but its failure to advocate for an Islamic state left it in a precarious position. This situation enabled other groups, such as the military, to reframe the Brotherhood as having deviated from its original stance on democratic and religious reform (Hoyle, 2016, p. 187). Since the late 1970s, Islamists have come to power in various Muslim countries and the expansion of Middle Eastern states has allowed members of Islamist groups to become employees of state bureaucracies. These developments have raised questions about the compatibility of Islamism with democracy and human rights. To date, no Islamist group has succeeded in making a transition from authoritarianism to democracy and civil liberties. As Pasha and Samatar (1997, p. 193) point out, ‘The challenge for Muslims is how to capture the massive dissonances of these times by retrieving the depth of faith without slipping into monasticism or zealotry. A democratizing and synthesizing Islam, reflecting influences from the bottom, is better placed to respond to globalisation.’ As we have observed, even moderate Islamists exhibit ambiguities in their views and practices on many social issues, which positions them at the opposite end of the spectrum in some respects. The Islamists’ ability to connect with societal forces is contingent upon their efficacy in leveraging spaces of contestation. Initially, their focus was primarily directed towards local arenas, such as universities, from which they originated, but subsequently expanded to encompass urban neighbourhoods and venues of cooperation and solidarity, including the mosque, sports associations, and the neighbourhood society. The Islamists endeavoured to assume the role of arbitrators in disputes, appropriating the responsibility of safeguarding women and supervising gender relations. In this context, they utilised their unique vernacular to describe activities that were not inherently Islamic. These arbitral practices were designated as tahakum, or arbitration to God. Similarly, their involvement in social services was predicated on the principles of self-help and mutual aid. In this scenario, the alternative polity was not to be attained through a coup of the state but rather through social intervention. In new domains, Islamist activism was shaped by the socio-spatial dimensions of those areas. In this process, self-help, mutual aid and autonomy evolved, providing a foundation for activism and endowing a specific positioning vis-à-vis the state. Concurrently, these tactics intertwined with existing forms of social organisations. The modalities of power and authority were articulated internally, based on the strategic choices of Islamist actors. Being embedded within the social fabric, they have adopted

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strategies that were identical to those employed by the communities in which they had previously operated. Moreover, the roles occupied by actors within the movement expressed network ties rooted in the social formation. For instance, in Algeria, the process of notabilisation expressed power relations that emerged from economic liberalisation and the social disengagement from the state. Here, entrepreneur-notables validated their position by funding the construction of mosques (Ismail, 2006, p. 176). By providing services that extended beyond the basic needs of the community, the mosques facilitated the development of solidarity and social relationships. In both Egypt and Algeria, political processes paralleled those that were observed in political claims-making, such as the deployment of identities based on contingent relationships with other people. These identities fluctuated with transformations in social and political configurations. The fortunes of Islamism were conditioned by structures of opportunities and contingent identities. As we have seen throughout this chapter, Islamists have employed a myriad of strategies, ranging from direct confrontation to political engagement and the infiltration of societal spaces. This highlights the dynamic and adaptive nature of Islamism. The relationship between Islamism and re-Islamisation should not be reduced to one of conflicting impulses. The distinction between Islamism and re-­ Islamisation in terms of the political nature of the former and the depoliticised nature of the latter obfuscates the fundamental issues at stake: those of dominance and resistance. Our evaluation must be subjected to contextual analysis so that any outcome is dependent on the dynamics of action and interaction. In conclusion, globalisation has presented both opportunities and grievances for the growth of Islamist movements. Concerns regarding military interventions, cultural invasions, and economic hardships have galvanised some Islamist groups, while the internet has provided them with the means to disseminate their messages and coordinate their activities. If Islam is a global religion, then Islamism has certainly become a globalised movement.

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CHAPTER 4

Religious Authority in Islam: Resilient Patterns of Evolution From the Formative Period to Contemporary Times

4.1   Introduction Religious authority or the recognised capacity of an individual or an institution to sanction the undertaking of religious acts affects many Muslims in their daily lives as well as in exceptional circumstances (Arendt, 1961). Whether emanating from bureaucratic or legal norms, or from charismatic and accomplished personalities, religious authority wields immense sway over the behaviour of Muslims across the globe. In the early period of Islam, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) served as the quintessential lawgiver, disseminating divine revelations not only through his words but also through his exemplary actions, thus imparting his followers with a potent ethical and spiritual compass (DeWeese, 2010). After his death, these revelations, sayings and experiences were codified as the essential content of the Islamic faith, constituting the textualisation of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, which were major steps towards the birth of Islamic law. Sharı ̄‘ah, the path of Islam, is composed of the rules on how Muslims are supposed to live or act in light of the teachings of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, encompassing the way that mankind should follow to attain happiness in this world and the hereafter (Kelsay, 2007). The successors of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), also known as the rightly guided caliphs, maintained the unification of the religious, political and military authority, although they did not possess his legislative authority as they were not prophets. It was by virtue of their personal piety that they were able to speak authoritatively on matters of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Mohiuddin, Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6_4

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religious law. The unification of the religious, political and military authority ended in the second century of Islam, with the successive transfer of real political power to conquerors of the Islamic Empire and the consolidation of the ‘ulamā as the guardians of right and wrong. The ‘ulamā, comprised of men with extensive training in the religious sciences, functioned as scholars, jurists, judges and administrators, and were the most visible authority figures for Muslims. They were often divided into ‘official’ ‘ulamā, linked to the government and legitimising it, and ‘unofficial’ ‘ulamā, self-supporting and operating apart from the state. Thus, although it was the duty of the caliph to govern according to sharı ̄‘ah, it was the ‘ulamā who governed civil society according to the law which they propagated. In the absence of the Prophet, who offered answers to questions, the ‘ulamā expanded the body of Islamic law by interpreting the Qur’ān and the Sunnah to respond to questions not accounted for in sharı ̄‘ah. It is important to note that Islamic law is not a closed body of law but rather a product of human reasoning and interpretation (Alatas, 2021). Within the Sunni context, the four sources of sharı ̄‘ah are the Qur’ān, the hadı ̄th, ijmā‘ (the consensus of the jurists on a point of law), and qiyās (Hallaq 2009a, 2009b; Bakircioglu 2010, p. 413; Ayubi, 1991). It is from these sources that Islamic jurists derive Islamic law, which remains an ever-evolving, intricate and dynamic system (Hallaq, 2004, p. 245). Prior to the twentieth century, the religious authority in Islam was predominantly held by the ‘ulamā. However, this structure was disrupted by the early European colonisation and Western influence on Muslim societies. The resulting challenge to the established religious authority was led by new contenders who employed media and print to disseminate their ideas to a larger audience. Presently, there is a growing trend of individuals taking up the responsibility of defining religion and interpreting its texts. The internet has emerged as a prominent medium enabling a new class of interpreters to address and reframe Islam’s authority and expression for those who are like-minded. This has led to the decentralisation and fragmentation of the Muslim world, with no region or community remaining unaffected by this phenomenon. With the advent of internet sites, social media, ad-hoc establishments and itinerant carriers of religious messages, anyone can present himself or herself as an authority-wielding Muslim, contributing to the increasing decentralisation. Though decentralisation

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has always been a component of any religion, recent developments have hastened the process considerably. These new religious intellectuals undoubtedly merit close attention and the contemporary Islamist movements continue to be in need of sober analysis. The emphasis on new and emerging intellectuals and activists should not, however, obscure the importance of ‘ulamā who had existed in Muslim societies for more than a thousand years. The modern challenges of globalisation and modernity have impacted the ‘ulamā significantly, as mass higher education and the impact of print and mass media have significantly reduced their access to authoritative religious knowledge (Zaman, 2002). In addition, the need to adapt existing forms of knowledge, institutions and social relations to relentless flows of information poses a severe challenge to the credibility of their discourses (Hallaq, 2004, p. 245; Anderson, 2003). This chapter delves into the evolution of Islamic authority and its transformation during the early centuries of Islam. The power dynamics between the caliphate and political usurpers brought political realism to the surface and tested the ability of a theory to be adapted to practice. An assessment of the causes of the perceived fragmentation of authority in Islam is presented and attempts to counter this phenomenon by establishing new institutions to centralise Islamic authority are examined. These institutions aim to unify Muslim schools of law and create an environment of legal pluralism and religious tolerance.

4.2   Authority in Sunni Islam: An Overview The elusive nature of the concept of authority renders it a particularly intricate and challenging topic to define (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006, p. 1; Dabashi, 1989). Authority, the ability to have one’s rules and rulings followed without the need for coercive power, pertains to a social structure that seeks to maintain order by controlling individuals’ access to desired goods (Chaves, 1994, p.  750). This control is legitimised by a divine source based on societal norms, roles and beliefs that reinforce the authority. Due to its complexity, religious authority takes on multifarious forms and functions, including the ability to define correct beliefs and practices, shape others’ conduct and eliminate deviance, heresy and apostasy and their agents and advocates. In religions where texts are considered revealed, religious authority includes the power to compose and define the canon of authoritative texts and legitimate methods of interpretation (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006, pp. 1–2). However, the distinction

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between authority and power can become blurred and some scholars consider authority to be linked not just to legitimacy but also to trust (Campbell, 2007, p. 1045). While religious authority can be ascribed to institutions, groups of people, or individuals, it is premised on recognition, rather than a fixed attribute and is contingent on the willingness of others to legitimise a given institution or individual to make it effective (Peter, 2006, p. 109). Often conceptualised in institutional structures or hierarchical power structures, religious authority can also exist at the micro-level, such as state-wide, community-­wide, or transnationally. In Islam religious authority is associated with religious experts such as muftis, preachers and intellectuals. As there are no institutions of priesthood or religious leadership, religious authority in Islam is based on an individual’s choice to follow specific religious teachers that they find knowledgeable and worthy of respect. Respect is not conferred but earned. Yildirim (2019) contends that religious authority in Islam is primarily defined by the notion of a free market of religion. Two significant differences set Islam apart from other religions: the authority of the text and the absence of a centralised hierarchical religious structure (Abou El Fadl, 2014). In the absence of any centralised religious authority, God and the Prophet embody the authoritative corpus in Islam. However, when God does not speak to people directly and the Prophet is no longer alive, the authoritative revealed text and the Prophet’s life represent the authority of God. This view is not limited to Islam, as other faith traditions also consider revealed texts to be sources of authority (Sherkat & Ellison, 1999, p.  367). For example, many Protestants regard the Bible as a source of authority and individuals sometimes follow opinions that are not endorsed by their religious authorities. It is a well-established fact that although religious authority and moral authority share a certain correlation, the former does not necessarily translate into the latter (Hamil-Luker & Smith, 1998, p. 374). This dichotomy is highlighted in the context of French Muslims, where French Muslim authorities are often perceived ‘watered down’ or secularised in comparison to their more orthodox counterparts (Bowen, 2003). The lack of a centralised institution within Islam to establish the orthodoxy of its followers has led to divergent and, at times, conflicting interpretations of the Qur’ān, particularly as it relates to extremist factions. Islamists often invoke the Qur’ān and the Prophetic sayings to bolster their positions and exercise authority in pursuit of their broader strategic and religious goals.

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Delving into this intricate nexus between religious authority and politics, Yildirim (2019) states: So the central question is, who can interpret the text with authority in Islam? At its core, this is not a religious question; it is a political one. In the absence of clear parameters for determining the rightful owners of such interpretation, politics assumes a key role. Conflicts over the right to interpret the holy text or to authorize the ‘correct’ interpretation of it have partially shaped the early evolution of Islamic history. Indeed, political and religious authority split very early in the Sunni tradition shortly after the Prophet’s death… The conflict between the fourth caliph ‘Ali’s and the Kharijites …, or the Umayyad caliph al-Ma’mun’s mihna ordeal are examples of religious conflicts that were political in nature. The absence of a centralized hierarchical institution complicates matters in another way as well. Following a religious authority in Islam is ‘entirely voluntary’; individual Muslims cannot be compelled to accept the religious authority of a person, body, or institution—it is an ‘individual decision’…. Until the turn of the 20th century, ulama (Islamic scholars) largely possessed the religious authority in Sunni Islam; for Shiite Islam, the ulama continue their prominent role to this day. The ulama’s central role was by virtue of their scholarship; their ‘competent human agency to discover God’s law’ and the fact that they largely stood for the ‘best interests’ of their community as ‘Guardians of Religion’ legitimized their claim. (Yildirim, 2019, p. 9)

Throughout history, the lack of primacy assigned to religious texts has generated conflicts over who possesses the right to wield religious authority. The inquisition, or mihna, conducted by three Abbasid caliphs between 833 CE and 849 CE. was a turning point that allowed the ‘ulamā, or religious scholars, to institutionalise their authority. Initiated by the caliph al-Ma’mun to advance his doctrine that the Qur’ān was created, the inquisition aimed to gain wider acceptance among the masses, especially the ‘ulamā (Nawas, 2003, p. 17). By trying to make the caliph and the caliphal institution the religious authority in Islam, al-Ma’mun aimed to limit the growing influence of the religious scholars. The most significant legacy of the mihna was the transformation of the ‘ulamā from a small group of followers of the Prophet into a societal group that focused on education and the promotion of law within the confines of religious schools. In essence, the mihna ‘confirmed the sole and exclusive authority of the ‘ulama’ in their capacity as “heirs to the prophets” or the “people that bind and unbind”’ (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006, p. 11).

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From the tenth to the twentieth century, the institution of the ‘ulamā underwent significant changes in the Muslim world (except in Iran and Indonesia), evolving from a highly autonomous enterprise into an increasingly irrelevant one. During the early period, there was no government intervention, and the religious authority was dominated by the ‘ulamā (Hallaq, 2009a, 2009b). After the mihna, the relationship between the ‘ulamā and the state was defined by countervailing dynamics. The ‘ulamā viewed the political elite with great suspicion, equating political power with vice and corruption. However, the political elite was seen as the principal mechanism through which the ‘ulamā could uphold Islamic law and control rulers’ ambitions (Winter, 2009, p. 22). For the political elite, the ‘ulamā provided assistance in securing political legitimacy and they, in turn, ensured the support of the ‘ulamā in upholding the application of Islamic law in their states. The breakdown of this nexus, in the wake of early European colonisation drives in the Middle East, created a void in Islamic religious authority. The changes in the legal institutional structure disrupted the intimate connection between law and religion, with the key loss being the religious authority of the ‘ulamā (Brown, 1997, pp. 361–363). Though this process was gradual between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its effects were decisive. Historically, the ‘ulamā acquired their authority from their ability to derive Islam from the primary sources of authority, i.e. the Qur’ān and the hadı ̄th. However, once the ‘ulamā lost their hold on exclusive religious authority due to colonialism, modernisation and the rise of nation-states, the field paved the way for new challengers to emerge and contest the religious authority of the ‘ulamā (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996). These transformations resulted in the fragmentation of religious authority. The new equilibrium in religious authority, along with the introduction of the printed press, secular and mass education, has engendered a new society with a different and more sceptical approach to religion, resulting in the objectification of Islam. Throughout the history of Muslim societies, the authority of the ‘ulamā has been contested by various challengers, including political leaders like Abbasid caliph Ma’mun and his successors, as well as philosophers, storytellers and Sufis. However, the contemporary challenges to their authority are markedly different in terms of scale and severity. In this new context, the competition comes from a diverse range of sources, including new religious intellectuals, the state, and reformist ‘ulamā who are deeply

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committed to the Islamic character of both society and the state. These new claimants of Islamic authority are determined to implement their version of Islam as a counter-narrative to the current practices that they view as un-Islamic (Bein, 2011). Their answers to political questions are grounded in religious discourse and they hold those who possess religious authority responsible for the underdevelopment of the Muslim world. As a result, some Islamist actors with varying convictions have contributed to the fragmentation of religious authority and have emerged as significant wielders of religious authority themselves.

4.3   Sources of Religious Authority in Sunni Islam The topic of religious authority in the Muslim world has been a subject of interest among scholars for a long time, with many academic studies investigating the interplay between religion, law, politics and society (Seferta, 1986, p. 161; Kister, 1994). Despite a rich corpus of works on this subject, there is still much that remains to be explored (Abou El Fadl, 1997, 2001; Johansen, 1999). While works on this topic in French are particularly noteworthy, there are certain assumptions regarding the sources of religious authority that require critical analysis, such as the notion that religious authority derives solely from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet and that individuals matter more than institutions in terms of knowledge and authority. Undoubtedly, the Qur’ān and its interpretations are of utmost importance in Islam, being a foundational text that has been debated and interpreted by scholars and laypeople alike since the Prophetic era. The complex and diverse interpretations of the Qur’ānic text have engendered various streams of theology, mysticism, ethics and law, while the language of the Qur’ān itself is poetic and complex. Moreover, Muslims have relied on the person of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and historical accounts of his interpretation of the Qur’ān, as well as those of the early Muslims, to understand the context in which the Qur’ān was revealed (Saeed, 2008). Indeed, the revelation of the Qur’ān occurred within the broader socio-­ political and intellectual context of Arabia and understanding this context is crucial to grasping the environment in which the text emerged. This includes the norms, customs and values associated with the social, spiritual, political, economic and legal climate of the time. However, by the tenth century, the socio-historical context of the Qur’ān played a less significant role in Islamic scholarship, with the non-linguistic context of revelation being emphasised instead. While reports purporting to explain the

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immediate context of particular verses may help in this regard, their ability to provide a comprehensive understanding of the actual socio-historical context is limited due to contradictions and difficulties in piecing together a coherent illustration of the context of specific revelations. Notwithstanding the momentousness of socio-historical context, a substantial number of Muslims persist in harbouring a wariness towards this concept. To them, any discourse predicated on the socio-historical context of the revelation is perceived as a looming peril to their fundamental tenets regarding the divine provenance of the Qur’ān. However, the import of certain verses of the Qur’ān cannot be comprehended facilely without an apprehension of the circumstances in which they were revealed. Moreover, a greater knowledge of the context in a historical and cultural sense is the key to a more perspicacious comprehension of the Qur’ān. The status of the sunnah, representing the interwoven fabric of Islamic tradition, which is intimately linked to the nature, intent and methodology of Qur’ānic revelation, is more contentious and less definitively defined (Brown, 1996). It is crucial to appreciate that the sunnah is deemed as the second most consequential source of Islamic normativity, alongside the Qur’ān, augmenting the divine word with the practice of the Prophet and the early Muslim community members. Muslims seek guidance from the hadı ̄th, which are writings delineating how to lead a life and understand and adhere to the teachings of the Qur’ān based on the sayings, actions and tacit approvals of the Prophet. When a Muslim follows the life of the Prophet as illustrated in the hadı ̄th, they are following the sunnah, or the customary practices of the Prophet. The term ‘sunnah’, which denotes ‘precedent’ or ‘custom’, was initially ‘employed by the Muslims for the accepted practice of the community, and, in later years, for the practice of the prophet only’ (Siddiqi, 1993). Several Muslim writers have regarded these philologically unconnected words to be synonymous, while others have attempted to draw a distinction between their connotations. Notwithstanding, such distinctions have long remained in the realm of theory.

4.4   Hadıth ̄ and Religious Authority

Hadı ̄th, being the second source of law and authority in Islam, has played an instrumental role in shaping the development of religion in various forms. Written collections of hadı ̄th trace back to the second and third centuries after the Prophet’s migration to Medina in 622 CE, and it is only

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through their media that one can access the Prophetic Sunnah (Musa, 2008, p.  1). Although hadı ̄th literature is widely regarded as having uncontested authority, such has not always been the case throughout Muslim history. From the ninth century onward, many questioned the transmission and recording of hadı ̄th among early Muslims and opposition to hadı ̄th reemerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries among Muslims. Examining the opposition to hadı ̄th recorded in various classical Muslim sources, it is evident that two trends of opposition exist: one to hadı ̄th as a source of scriptural authority that may rival the Qur’ān and the other to particular hadı ̄th whose absurd or even outrageous content made religion a potential object of ridicule. Both trends reflect concerns about the authority of hadı ̄th in matters of religious practice and law as well as theology. Musa (2008) raises crucial concerns regarding hadı ̄th criticism, such as questions of authenticity and authority. The question of authenticity pertains to whether a particular saying or action mentioned in the hadı ̄th literature can be traced back to the Prophet or his companions. Related questions include the origin, time, place and reliability of the transmitters. The issue of authority in the context of hadı ̄th literature relates to the hadı ̄th’s position as a source of religious law. Scholars have raised questions about the role of the Prophet, his words and practices, the nature of divine revelation and whether the hadı ̄th represent the teachings of the Prophet given to him by God (Musa, 2008, p. 4). The existence of early controversies about the status of hadı ̄th is widely discussed in scholarly works on hadı ̄th criticism, but the issue of authority has received less attention than that of authenticity. Traditional scholars focus mainly on hadı ̄th criticism and resolving the question of authenticity, as this determines the reliability and veracity of hadı ̄th as a valid source of law and guidance. Through the scrutiny of the chains of human transmitters, the authenticity of a given hadı ̄th is determined, with the piety, personal qualities of transmitters and quality of the linkages in the chain being of primary importance. Hadı ̄th are judged as having varying degrees of authenticity, ranging from authentic to weak, based on the quality of the chain of transmitters. The fields of Qur’ānic exegesis and hadı ̄th scholarship are known to be incredibly intricate and sophisticated, particularly when it comes to the question of the normative weight assigned to specific categories of reports. Consequently, it becomes exceedingly challenging to ascertain the relative significance of other factors that contribute to the determination of what is deemed authoritative in the Islamic tradition. The legal tradition, which

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encompasses the emergence of both the Sunni and Shi‘ı ̄ schools of thought, has been the focus of extensive study (Melchert, 1997; Wheeler, 1996). The assessment of the scope and basis of religious authority in Islam necessarily entails a rigorous analysis of the Qur’ān and the sunnah, understood as normative textual evidence that regulates human activity. These scholars contend that the inquiry into religious authority must be grounded in a nuanced understanding of the historical, social and political context in which the Islamic tradition emerged and evolved. They further argue: As is well known, there is no church in Islam, and no ordained clergy. What did emerge at an early date is a class of religious semiprofessionals and professionals (sg. ‘alim, pl. ‘ulamā’, derived from Arabic ‘ilm, knowledge relevant to religion), religious experts closely resembling Jewish rabbis rather than the ordained clergy of the Christian churches, who claimed the right, on the basis of their acquired religious knowledge, to interpret the foundational texts of the Qur’an and sunna and to compose authoritative texts themselves. For obvious reasons, the ‘ulamā’ have received considerable attention, and we are now much better informed about the rise of various types of religious and legal scholars, their background, training, and fields of activity, their self-views, and to an extent, their place and image in their respective community or society… In their vast majority, the ‘ulamā’ are men and always have been. The study of women in Islamic scholarship narrowly defined is slowly developing…. The institutes of higher learning (sg. madrasa) which from the eleventh century C.E. onwards spread and developed in all parts of the Muslim world, have met with special interest…. We also have a growing number of studies on individual institutions of higher Islamic learning in the pre-modern and modern periods, first and foremost al-Azhar in Cairo and several large Islamic schools and colleges in South Asia. (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006, p. 6)

There are a variety of pertinent inquiries that merit exploration when considering religious authority. One such query involves determining the extent to which knowledge, or ‘ilm, equates to authority in religion. Who can claim the right to interpret the authoritative scriptures or who can compose authoritative texts and to what extent can reason play a role in interpreting the text? To what degree can reason be employed when interpreting texts? The significance of isnad mentality among Muslim scholars and their marked tendency to rely on authoritative texts to justify their beliefs are also topics of interest (Berkey, 2003, p. 29). Employing such

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conventions and formulae as a legitimising strategy is a familiar practice, but examining their implementation within specific contexts is necessary to gain a comprehensive understanding. The majority of the preceding discussion is more relevant to religious scholars than to Sufis or Muslim mystics. For Sufis, access to God can be attained not solely through textual knowledge, but also via spiritual experiences (Jong & Radtke, 1999, p. 4; Knysh, 2000). A vast corpus of literature on Sufism exists, in which various discussions on realising the path of illumination or spiritual experience can be found. Although Sufis were initially confined to small circles, they eventually gained a broad social base by the eleventh century. It is worth noting that Sufis, in addition to being trained scholars, were in close contact with the ‘ulamā and rulers. While some individuals criticised these associations as incompatible with their spiritual quest, within the Sufi brotherhoods, religious authority was practised in ways that diverged significantly from those of the ‘ulamā. It would be an intriguing area of research to comprehensively examine the inclusivity and exclusivity associated with spiritual and textual authority: if the former is predicated on charisma, either acquired or inherited, the latter is based on literacy. Perhaps the official policies of rulers require closer scrutiny. From an early period, caliphs asserted religious authority (Crone & Hinds, 1986; Crone, 2004). The issue of rulers claiming religious authority is also reflected in various forms, ranging from coins and court poetry to inscriptions and actual policies. Within the Sunni context, it has been argued that religious authority was far from settled by the outcome of the mihna (inquisition), in which certain caliphs attempted to impose their interpretation of the Qur’ān. This led to the torture and killing of a number of religious scholars who opposed the doctrine of the creation of the Qur’ān based on caliphal authority (Zaman, 1997). Sunni caliphs wielded wide-­ ranging powers in organising the judicial sphere, allowing them to promote specific schools of law, patronise individual scholars and marginalise others. However, their role in setting boundaries for legitimate expressions of faith remains an area requiring further study. The nature and scope of religious authority, then, is far less clear with regard to the pre-modern as well as the modern period. The contemporary era is marked by a growing trend of individuals, regardless of their expertise or qualification, claiming the right to speak on matters concerning Islam (Mir-Hosseini, 2015, p.  70). This claim often extends to the interpretation of the text and while the language employed to maintain

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patriarchal and authoritarian structures is a cause for concern, the text itself remains unchallenged. In order to confront these challenges, it is necessary to engage in critical thinking and informed reinterpretation from within the tradition, as well as to understand the motivations and goals of those who speak on behalf of religion with authority and who seek to alter accepted readings of the text for their own purposes (Bunt, 2003). The rise of mass media and new communication technologies has contributed significantly to the current state of affairs. Access to information has become the foundation of wider claims to religious knowledge and authority, leading to a proliferation of religious knowledge, actors and normative statements of the ‘ulamā. While traditional scholars have not disappeared, the emergence of other actors and forms of expression has transformed the religious field. In this context, the impact of the internet on the public sphere is of great importance, as it has enabled not only religious scholars but also intellectuals and political activists to lay claim to religious authority and to use new channels of expression (Bano, 2017, p. 10). This has led to what some scholars refer to as ‘the fracturing of traditional Islamic authority’, as the right to interpret Islamic texts is no longer viewed strictly as the preserve of traditionally trained scholars.

4.5  Religious Authority in Shi‘ı ̄ Islam: Charisma and Hereditary Succession Undoubtedly, the efficacy of Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) leadership was largely attributed to his charismatic style. However, the means by which the early Muslim community perceived the dissemination or preservation of this power structure is a particularly intriguing topic of investigation (Weber, 1978, p.  248). In addition to the routinisation of the founder’s charisma, it can also be transmitted to his adherents or progeny. The concept of inherited charisma, as defined by Weber, indicates that the bearer’s kin, particularly the closest ones, share the charisma. The transfer of charisma through a family line results in the perpetuation of the leader’s charisma, which often leads to discord among relatives who stake exclusive claims to it. When charisma is transmitted through inheritance, the new charismatic individual inherits a social order rather than creating one, resulting in the loss of many of the revolutionary qualities associated with charismatic power, such as the ability to challenge established social structures and conventions and to establish a new type of authority. As a result,

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rather than attempting to create new social structures, hereditary charisma aims to maintain existing ones. In stark contrast to the Sunni viewpoint, the Shi‘ı ̄ notion of post-­ Muhammadan charismatic power is distinct. The Shi‘ı ̄s attempted to maintain the Prophet’s personal charismatic power, whereas the Sunnis attempted to diffuse it by declaring it as routine. The Shi‘ı ̄ notion of the imamate proposed an inherited charismatic system of dominance in which the imam served as a fusion of political and religious authority and it was believed that the imams had received the Prophet’s full and all-­ encompassing political and religious authority. The imams’ charismatic power was not as revolutionary as that of the Prophet since their form of power was a continuation rather than an initiation of prophetic charisma (Weber, 1958, p. 79). Therefore, instead of institutionalising or dismantling a social structure, charisma became an important element within it. It should be noted that the idea of hereditary succession was not unknown to Arab tribes due to their focus on noble ancestry or nasab. The notion of hereditary succession was commonly accepted among the Quraysh, the most significant and influential tribe during the Prophet’s time (Madelung, 1997). Despite this, the Shi‘ı ̄te belief in the inherited charisma principle was put to the test and somewhat weakened as it had to confront a much stronger force that had institutionalised the Prophet’s charisma. The Shi‘ı ̄s could not legitimise the routine office of the caliphate without casting doubt on the imams’ status as the Prophet’s rightful heirs. Furthermore, the revival of traditional Arab polity after the original charismatic ruler’s death posed another challenge for the Shi‘ı ̄s. Consequently, early Shiism differentiated itself from early Sunnism by rejecting rather than restoring the pre-Islamic Arab political tradition. In the mosaic of power dynamics that defined early Islamic society, those who advocated for inherited charisma emerged as a daring, countercultural faction that stood in stark opposition to the establishment’s institutionalised charisma. Throughout Shi‘ı ̄ history, this subversive movement took on various forms and shapes. The voices of dissent were first heard when they vehemently opposed the succession of Abu Bakr to the Prophet, championing Ali’s ascension based on the charisma of his noble lineage. This discordant chorus echoed through the ages, manifesting itself in numerous conflicts, including the confrontations between Ali and Muawiyah, Hussain and Yazid, as well as the several Shi‘ı ̄ uprisings against both Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs (Takim, 2006). The roots of Shi‘ı ̄ belief in the hereditary succession concept can be traced back to several

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statements attributed to Muhammad himself, who was said to have supported Ali’s ascension. Furthermore, the Shi‘ı ̄s drew on the Qur’ānic idea of succession to conceptualise the nature of post-Muhammadan authority. However, as Takim (2006) argues, the Prophet himself could not have seen his succession in any other light than as an extension of the Qur’ānic accounts of the earlier prophets’ succession. In a similar vein, he viewed his own prophetic mission, the opposition he encountered and his eventual triumph as part of a broader pattern, one that was documented in the Qur’ān’s accounts of the experiences of past prophets. Shi‘ı ̄s rejected the division of the Prophet’s authority, seeing it as a corollary of their belief in inherited charisma. They firmly believed that this type of authority was the only one that could sustain the community for the next 230 years. However, it is worth noting that not all Twelver Shi‘ı ̄s invoked the concept of inherited charisma. In reality, many descendants of Ali’s family claimed that the charisma still resided in one or more of their family lines. Even the Abbasids insisted that their ancestor, the Prophet’s uncle Abbas, was the source of their prophetic charisma. According to various ghulat sects, the charisma of their leaders had been passed down from the Prophet himself over time. In summary, the Shi‘ı ̄s’ passionate embrace of inherited charisma serves as a testament to the enduring power of charismatic leadership, which persisted up to the time of the twelfth imam, rather than its traditionalisation or routinisation. This complex historical narrative attests to the rich diversity of Islamic thought and the intricate interplay of power dynamics that defined early Islamic society.

4.6  Religious Authority and the Imams in Shi‘ı ̄ Islam The doctrine of inherited charisma begets a corollary that the imams must embody the exceptional and extraordinary traits previously reserved for prophets, given that the imamate’s responsibility is to carry forth the Prophet’s charismatic influence and lead humanity. In other words, the imams’ inherent charisma mandates that they possess various exceptional qualities that differentiate charismatic individuals. Curiously, human qualities do not significantly influence the notion of genetic charisma, as in cases of inherited charisma, the focus lies on the validity of the position the individual has inherited rather than their charismatic characteristics. One may even lack any and all charm (Weber, 1978). However, the Shi‘ı ̄

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community refutes Weber’s theories, viewing religious identity through the lens of adoration for the imams. The imam’s persona serves as the cornerstone for his followers’ religious objectives, owing to both his divine appointment and charismatic disposition. In Shi‘ı ̄ism, the imams are accorded complete authority according to various traditions cited in Shi‘ı ̄ texts and they enable the worship and understanding of God. The same terms that were applied to the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs were also applied to the Shi‘ı ̄ imams. Shi‘ı ̄ism also endorses a unique charismatic lineage of redeeming individuals who pledge salvation to the pious. This is because, in Shi‘ı ̄ism, soteriology is contingent on reverence for and loyalty to the imams in general and the current imam in particular. In the cauldron of history, the imams served as the sole moral authorities. The concept of inherited charisma within Shi‘ı ̄ism is centred around the imams and their embodiment of three key principles: nass, ‘ilm and isma. Nass, or divine designation, is pivotal to the Shi‘ı ̄ notion of power since it connects the imams to the Prophet and grants them the legitimacy required to hold the office of the imamate. The belief in nass also discredits claims of alternative candidates to the imamate, limiting the leadership to one candidate. Isma, or infallibility, is the sole assurance that the imam is infallible and it is interdependent with nass to guarantee the succeeding of the legitimate imam (Sachedina, 1988). Thus, any assertion of political power without the appropriate title lacks divine sanction and is considered an innovation in politics by Shi‘ı ̄s. Additionally, ‘ilm, or divinely conferred knowledge, is crucial in the Shi‘ı ̄ idea of religious authority. In the absence of any political investiture, the possession of ‘ilm becomes the source of all authority. The belief in the divinely given knowledge restricts charisma to one person, ensuring that just one imamate candidate from multiple candidates may inherit the charisma of the imam. ‘Ilm serves as a mitigating element, ensuring that the imam accurately interprets the divine revelation. Nass and ‘ilm take centre stage in the Shi‘ı ̄ philosophy of leadership as they safeguard the transmission of the divine word through a chain of authority that is divinely safeguarded and prevent it from becoming tainted (‘Umar Kashshi, 1969, p. 423). This ‘ilm and the accompanying authority must be fully preserved within a certain branch of the Prophet’s family, specifically among the ahl al-bayt, according to the Shi‘ı ̄ interpretation of holy history. The exposition on the ninth Shi‘ı ̄ imam, Ali al-Rida (d. 818), is replete with intricate nuances that underline the importance of charismatic authority and knowledge, as well as the key role played by the Prophet’s

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inherited scrolls and weaponry in validating an imam’s authority (Al-Husayn al-Saduq, 1966). Ali al-Rida’s counsel to a companion to consult a local (Sunni) faqih and then do the opposite when confronted with a legal issue in the absence of other Shi‘ı ̄s is emblematic of the central tenets of Shi‘ı ̄ charismatic authority and ‘ilm. In other words, the source of knowledge and authority is deemed paramount over the content of the knowledge itself and only knowledge that can be traced back to the ahl al-bayt (the family of the Prophet) is considered legitimate. In the Shi‘ı ̄ perspective, an imam’s authority is not only bolstered by his knowledge (‘ilm) but also by the Prophet’s inherited scrolls and weaponry, which are believed to be indispensable for establishing an imam’s identity and legitimacy. The possessions of the Prophet, including his weapons and armor, are regarded as alamāt (signs) that validate the true imam, and only an imam who has been divinely chosen can wield them. According to some accounts, Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765) possessed the white jafr, which contained divine revelations including the Psalms of David, the Gospel of Jesus, the Torah of Moses and other scrolls that bestowed upon him remarkable foresight (Al-Nu‘man al-Mufid, 1981). The scrolls of the imams, such as the al-Jami‘a and the mushaf of Fatima, were believed to bestow upon them exceptional knowledge (‘Ilm) surpassing that of the prophets. Even the jinn (spirits) were said to seek out the imams for their wisdom and guidance (Al-Hasan al-Saffar, 1983). Thus, the scrolls constitute a vital component of the Shi‘ı ̄ understanding of religious leadership as they authenticate the imam’s authority and refute any competing claims. The notion of hereditary charisma posits that responsibilities can be appropriated in addition to the transmission of supernatural abilities and prophetic charisma. The concept of apostolic power is paradigmatic and Shi‘ı ̄sm accords the imams the role of successors to the archetypal figure of authority, namely, the Prophet. Like the Prophet, the imams are believed to possess the quality of being immune to sin (isma), which enables them to serve as models for the community. As the community cannot possibly follow someone whose deeds are immoral or evil, the principle of isma is of immense significance in the Shi‘ı ̄ idea of authority and is fundamental to the imams’ responsibility to establish exemplary precedents. Moreover, the isma principle posits that the deeds and sayings of the Prophet, along with their actions and declarations, constitute the second most important source of law after the Qur’ān. This principle also functions as a polemical weapon against the corruption that, in the Shi‘ı ̄ view, was introduced by Sunnite lawyers’ arbitrary individual reasoning (rayy, ijtihād) and the

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transmission of hadı ̄th by Sunnite traditionalists (Takim, 2006, p.  29). This is because the Shi‘ı ̄ belief in the imams’ immunity from error makes it a potent tool for defending the law against corruption. In Shi‘ı ̄ Islam, it is argued that the imams possess a precise comprehension of the revealed texts owing to the notions of inherited charisma, specialised knowledge and infallibility. According to this doctrine, the Prophet received both the Qur’ān’s text and its interpretation (ta‘wı ̄l) from God, and these two were transmitted to the imams. As a result, the imams hold a unique connection to the Qur’ān because of their exegetical power. The fact that the scripture and the imams are regarded as having revealed status emphasises the significance of recognising and honouring both the imamate’s concept of hereditary succession and the imams’ exegetical role, which is inspired by divine knowledge (‘ilm). As per the renowned hadı ̄th althaqalayn (tradition of two heavy things), the two sources of authority, namely, the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s family, will not be separated until the end of time. Furthermore, the imam’s status as an exegete qualifies him to be called the Qur’ān’s speaker (al-Qur’ān al-­natiq) (Bar-Asher, 1999). Shiites believe that acknowledging the link between the text and the Prophet’s charismatic successors as exegetical illustrates the existence of an authoritative source beyond scripture. The imams’ capacity to execute this exegetical function is supported by their alleged distinctive hermeneutic abilities, which are indicative of the spiritual gifts and abilities they are believed to have inherited from the Prophet. Therefore, the concept of inherited charismatic power is inseparably linked to the imam’s spiritual superiority over other exegetes. Shiites’ emphasis on the imam’s infallibility and his distinctive relationship with the text underscore the contradiction surrounding human involvement in the revelatory process. It is conceivable that individuals in positions of authority in their societies could misinterpret or distort the revelation. However, Shiites refute this notion and hold that extrabiblical authority can only serve as a source of guidance when accompanied by an authoritative interpreter who is immune to error. In other words, by granting revelatory significance to the charismatic imams, the conflict between divine text and potential human distortion is resolved (Takim, 2006, p. 30). Thus, the isma principle ensures that the authority of scriptural exegesis remains unaltered by human involvement. Isma grants the imam exclusive control over Qur’ānic hermeneutics and interpretative power over the sharı ̄‘ah. Consequently, an inevitable source of authority is

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created when the Qur’ān and the imam’s genuine interpretation skills become intrinsically connected to each other. Shi‘ı ̄s view these diverse characteristics as clear indications of where the Prophet’s charisma is present today. These features together further validate the imam’s office and his captivating persona. One may examine the notion of the shari man in Shiism in the context of the imam’s relationship with the law and his imagined ability to establish the law and establish a sunnah.

4.7  The Heirs of the Prophet In the realm of Islamic scholarship and the dynamics of religious authority, the term ‘heirs of the Prophet’ has been the subject of considerable discourse and inquiry (Nasr, 2003, p. 18). After a detailed examination and contemplation of the notion of religious authority as it was advanced by various Muslim factions, we are now better equipped to grasp the ramifications of this honorific title. During the early period of Islamic history, there existed numerous groups that laid claim to a direct lineage to the Prophet, invoking it as a means to legitimise their assertion of governmental and/or religious authority. Even intellectuals made the audacious claim of being the Prophet’s descendants. This was a highly coveted designation, conferring upon its bearer a certain measure of authority and esteem. It is worth noting that both the Umayyad and the Abbasid caliphs may have aspired to such a position, as is attested to by a wealth of evidence. As they occupied the very same office that the Prophet himself held as the political head of the Muslim community, it is only reasonable that they would be considered the rightful heirs to this honorific appellation. The caliphs further avowed their divinely sanctioned status as religious authorities, thereby bolstering their claim to prophetic power. Through various means, they vigorously defended their right to wield the mantle of prophetic leadership, invoking such justifications as their possession of the Prophet’s cloak, or even claiming that God Himself had granted them the right to take the caliphate from the Prophet (Hodgson, 1977). Some caliphs sought to assert their authority to execute ijtihād, while others sought to establish a sunnah. In either case, the caliphs were able to demand obedience and submission from the populace by virtue of their claim to be the rightful heirs to prophetic power. Their representation of themselves as religious leaders was, in all likelihood, an attempt to compete with the Shi‘ı ̄ perception of their imams and to work in tandem with

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the ‘ulamā. The ‘ulamā, or religious scholars, similarly invoked the notion of the Prophet’s religious authority to establish their own legitimacy. A saying attributed to the Prophet, ‘Al-‘ulama waratha al-anbiya’ (the scholars are the successors of the Prophets), served to buttress their claim (Isma‘il Bukhari 1986, p.  23). While this ‘waratha’ tradition may have been employed as a polemical tool by the ‘ulamā to challenge the caliphs and other competitors for authority, it underscored the fact that the Prophet had left behind only knowledge, which was now firmly in their hands (Musa al-Shatibi, 1991, p. 179). The ‘ulamā’s capacity to comprehend, elucidate and disseminate the law marked them out as distinct from the rest of the community and conferred upon them the ability to govern the community with respect to religious matters. Their power and influence was instrumental in the propagation of prophetic knowledge. As inheritors of the Prophet, the ‘ulamā wielded tremendous authority, including the role of shari men. The shari men, who acted as intermediaries between God and the community, interpreting and expounding upon the law, were held in high esteem, and their position was upheld and codified through frequent references to the waratha tradition. Notably, the ‘ulamās claim to be the Prophet’s sole successors carried the potential to expand the Prophet’s authority, as they inherited both his knowledge and his authority, and thus served as his custodians. The ‘ulamā, being the inheritors of the Prophet, wielded tremendous power. Their responsibilities included acting as shari men, the prophetic role of serving as a mediator between God and the community, and interpreting and promoting the law. The prestige and role of the shari men were upheld by frequent references to the waratha legacy, reminding the community of their rank based on the heirs tradition. Significantly, the ‘ulamā claimed to be the Prophet’s only successors, which expanded the Prophet’s authority since it meant that the ‘ulamā inherited both his knowledge and authority as guardians. Their wisdom and the prophetic tradition they represented formed the basis of their followers’ loyalty and submission. The bay‘ah, the pledge of allegiance given by the laity to the caliph, established the foundation of their allegiance (Takim, 2006, p. 31). The sense of submission required by the bay‘ah, along with the acceptance of the prophetic lineage, increased the authority of the caliphs and the‘ulamā. The Shi‘ı ̄ imams, through the features they had collectively inherited, were also able to assert their status as the Prophet’s successors (Al-Baqir al-Majlisi, 1983, p. 92). The waratha tradition is frequently mentioned in

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Shi‘ı ̄ hadı ̄th literature, with Jafar al-Sadiq himself stating, ‘We are the actual descendants of the prophets’ (Takim, 2006, p.  32). This contradicted the Sunni and Sufi claims that the centre of power for religion lay within their ranks. Shi‘ı ̄ imams claimed to be the Prophet’s heirs, in contrast to Sunni scholars who made this claim based on the features and knowledge they had received from the Prophet as well as the prophetic knowledge they had attained. In Shi‘ı ̄ism, the idea that the imams are the Prophet’s spiritual and political heirs forms the foundation for the legitimacy of the imam, who has been chosen by God to be a source of knowledge and as a saintly intercessor before God. The phrase ‘heirs of the Prophet’ has broad implications. It goes beyond awarding the ‘ulamā with honorific titles and power. In the post-ghayba period, Shi‘ı ̄ ‘ulamā claimed to be the successors of the Prophet since they viewed themselves as the keepers of the knowledge of the Prophet and the imams. For instance, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli states that the jurists are the prophets’ descendants. Husayn b. al-Hasan al-Karaki, a sixteenth-century jurist, refers to himself as the heir of the prophets, whilst Muhammad al-Baqir al-Bihbihani refers to the jurists as the caliphs or heirs of the Prophet (Al-Baqir al-Bihbihani, n.d. p. 9).Ayatullah al-Muntaziri, a modern Iranian scholar, reads the waratha tradition as particularly referring to jurists (Stewart, 1998, p. 216). The exclusive authority of the jurists is theoretically justified by a number of passages cited by both Sunnis and Shi‘ı ̄s. Shi‘ı ̄ jurists depict their exclusive power as emanating from prophetic authority through the intermediary authority of the imams, whereas Sunni jurists present their exclusive authority as deriving directly from prophetic authority. Some Shi‘ı ̄ scholars even made the assertion that the imams and the Prophet supported this claim. Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi is reported to have said that the ‘ulamā were the gates to paradise and disrespecting them would bring down the wrath of God. They were the conduits through which people may contact the imams (Turner, 2002).

4.8   Authority in the First Centuries of Islam Throughout the annals of history, an ongoing debate has raged among scholars regarding the nature of the caliphate institution, with some positing that it was originally political in nature, while others assert that the religious authority of the caliph emerged in a confrontational manner. It is commonly accepted that the religious power initially resided with Prophet

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Muhammad (PBUH), who sealed it and that it extended further to his companions, who transmitted his teachings and practices. During the reign of the first four caliphs, known as the rightly guided caliphs, both the political power and the religious power were embodied to some extent. However, the succession dispute concerning the fourth caliph, ‘Ali, and the subsequent rise of the Umayyad dynasty between 660 and 750 CE, severed the chain of the companion caliphs. Following this upheaval, other individuals assumed the role of specialists in the prophetic word, known as muhadı ̄thūn (singular, muhadı ̄th) or traditionists. Nonetheless, disputes over the rightful heir of the caliphate persisted, with some contending that ‘Ali was the rightful heir as opposed to Abu Bakr. According to Melchert (2020), differences of opinion arose regarding the order of precedence of the rightly guided caliphs, with some placing Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Ali and ‘Uthmān in that order, while others held that the proper order was Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and ‘Ali. Certain individuals even subscribed to the belief that Abu Bakr should be given precedence based on companionship, while ‘Ali should be accorded greater importance based on blood relationship, among other factors (Décobert, 2004, p. 2). This dispute, as Crone and Hinds (2003) suggest, took shape and found its language by monopolising the message revealed through this line, a message that was still being revealed and not merely the memory of a sealed tradition. The Umayyads were the first to use the title Khalı ̄fat Allah (God’s Deputy), which refers to somebody who stands in the place of another, either as a deputy or a successor, depending on whether the other is absent or deceased. However, since Muslims believed that God was alive, the term ‘Khalı ̄fat Allah’ cannot be translated as ‘God’s successor’. To accommodate the notion that the caliphate is succession to the Prophet rather than deputyship on behalf of God, some construe it as meaning the successor of the prophet approved by God. It is worth noting that when the term ‘Khalı ̄fa’ was used on its own, it was an elliptical reference to the phrase ‘Khalı ̄fat Allāh’. Two Qur’ānic verses were invoked by those who considered themselves Khalı ̄fat Allah, one of which concerns Adam, who was appointed as a vicegerent on earth, while the other relates to David, who was made a successor upon the earth (Al-Qur’ān; 2:30). While some historians opine that the title Khalı ̄fat Allah was coined in reference to these Qur’ānic verses, which clearly indicate that Khalifa means God’s successor, others contest this view and claim that the provenance of the title is unknown. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that Khalı ̄fat Allah was understood to mean ‘deputy of God’ (Al-Qur’ān;

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38:26). As asserted by Watt (1998), the honorifics ‘amin Allah’ (trustee of God), ‘sultan Allah’ (the authority of God) and ‘na‘ib Allah’ (lieutenant of God) clearly indicate that ‘Khalı ̄fat Allah’ denoted the deputy of God. Furthermore, since Uthman was also referred to as ‘amin Allah’, there is no reason to surmise that ‘Khalı ̄fat Allah’ acquired its meaning through the course of its evolution. This serves to clarify that ‘Khalı ̄fat Allah’ meant deputy of God from its inception. It was not merely a term of flattery, but rather an official designation of the Umayyad caliphate, attested not just for some caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty but for all those who ruled for more than a year. The caliph wields a direct authority bestowed upon him by God, enabling him to establish the world order. Muslims who acknowledge his authority recognise this order. However, for this order to be realised, it must be revealed by the caliph. In accomplishing the objectives of Islam, the caliph plays a dual role: ‘an active one, in the sense that the caliph decides the order and ensures it is recognized, and a passive one, in as much as it is in his own person—as a simple successor, one could say—of a caliph who has lived, that the reproduction of this necessary order lies’ (Décobert, 2004, p.  4). This caliphal authority, founded upon such ambivalence, must be expressed in a manner that is both highly theoretical and procedural, drawing upon the principle of the sacred king which existed in the Near East. There is an element of disembodiment of the order signified by the ruler. While the caliph’s physical presence symbolises the order, his words articulate this order. The caliph’s power is supported by two pillars: while his authority emanates directly from God, his succession is the moment when the divine order is established. If this transpires according to his wishes, historical Islam will be accomplished. This divinely inspired law is also known as the caliphal law. The caliph defines and elaborates upon the law, while establishing the link between God and human beings (Hablil Allāh, literally meaning ‘God’s rope’). This link imbues the religious with its significance, representing a highly significant symbol that defines the mediating role played by political power.

4.9  Decline of the Caliphate The Ummayad dynasty was a building process, which was not only political but also religious, that is, jurisprudential, ritual, dogmatic, etc. Despite its ambitious scope, this dynasty was also a divisive and fracturing process that ultimately contributed to its own downfall. The Sufyānids were the

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pioneering architects who constructed this vast empire. By strategically distributing governorships across various regions, they established a centralised tax and payment system within the administrative offices, while simultaneously creating a reliable communications network through the implementation of a relay station known as the ‘barı ̄d’ (Crone & Hinds, 2003, p.  30). During this period of transformation, tribal structures underwent a significant metamorphosis, the effects of which would shape social interaction practices for centuries to come. The tribes underwent a process of general fusion, characterised by a condensation that adhered to a particular model. The genealogies that previously helped to identify and differentiate tribal units and individuals were reformulated into a dichotomous distinction. Initially, tribes were distinguished on the basis of their origins, whether Yemeni or North Arabian, and gradually, this became a general system for the representation of self and other. This system of representation became so effective that arguments began to be framed in terms of this dichotomy. In short, this system of representation produced factions that proliferated in those areas where political power was at stake, even in relatively small areas (Grabar, 1959, p. 35) Rather than serving as mediators between these factions or adopting a system that defined conflicts based on factional affiliation, the Ummayads became entangled in the factional rivalries. During the successive revolts, the Marwānids allied themselves with the Banū Qays to bolster their own power. As a result, factional rivalries became increasingly prevalent within the empire, overshadowing the Ummayads’ efforts to maintain control. The crucial point, however, is that for the Marwānids, it was the Ummayad succession that they sought to ensure by aligning themselves with the Banū Qays, one of the most emblematic tribes of North Arabia. Through their association with the Banū Qays, the caliphs took the risk of undermining their aspirations to maintain a meta-historical transmission of power. That is, instead of maintaining a discourse that would distance themselves from factionalism, the last Ummayad caliphs undermined their own discourse by perpetuating factionalism. In the context of the expansion of Islamic art and architecture, the Ummayad caliphate was an epoch of splendid affirmation of Islam, marked by numerous monuments and artistic creations. A notable example of this artistic and religious resurgence was the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. This octagonal structure, erected on ‘the Noble Sanctuary’ (haram

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al-sharı ̄f ), boasted two ambulatories encircling its centre. The construction of this hallowed sanctuary was linked to a tradition that states that the Prophet placed his foot there during his nocturnal ascension or night journey. As a commemorative monument, the inner ornamentation of the Dome of the Rock evoked the sanctity of the place, utilising a blend of Byzantine and Persian symbolic motifs to express the unique and absolute oneness of God. Moreover, this monument was not solely intended for Muslims, but was directed towards both the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) and the Islamic community, signifying the common Abrahamic origin of various religious faiths. Despite marking its difference from Islam, this monument is directed towards Christians through a doctrine of absolute monotheism, which repudiates the concept of the Trinity and Jesus’ divinity, while elevating Islam to the fulfilment of the Christian history of salvation. Additionally, this monument was also directed towards those who triumphed in the conquest, being a doctrinal and ideological foundation in the face of the Byzantine Empire, which posed a threat to Islamic dominance. In 750, the Abbasids came into power and modified the basis of caliphal authority. Although the caliphs maintained a legislating role and devoted considerable attention to the delicate matter of caliphal succession, the accession of the Abbasids was a revolution that altered the nature of caliphal rule. The Abbasids were descended from the Prophet’s family (Banū Abbās) and their rise to power marked a significant transformation. One of the fundamental issues regarding the succession of the Prophet concerned the qualities required of a successor, such as piety, bravery, being the best among the faithful and being closely related to the Prophet’s family. This last criterion held sway in the appointment of the four rightly guided caliphs. However, the question of closeness necessitates further examination, particularly with the emergence of Shi‘ı ̄ism. In the early eighth century, the Hāshmiyyah (a branch of Banū Hāshim) appeared, considering the Ummayad family as illegitimate. The Hashmiyyah spearheaded a potent anti-Ummayad campaign, which culminated in their seizure of power in 750 CE. From that point onwards, the succession of the caliph no longer solely relied on the reproduction of the natural and human order, but on the genealogical line of the caliphs, as the legitimacy of the line was now returning to its origins.

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4.10  The Role of Qadis in Upholding Islamic Law and Ethics During the early Abbasid era, the structures for the implementation of law became increasingly intertwined with patrimonial administration. To reinforce this system, the Abbasids introduced qadis, whose roles were delegated by the caliph and hinged on his power to adjudicate disputes (Yusuf, 1981a, 1981b). Alongside their religious responsibilities, the qadis were bestowed with the responsibility of administering waqf institutions and serving as guardians for orphans. In the earlier periods of the Umayyad and early Abbasid eras, the qadis performed non-judicial functions and religious scholars were appointed to various administrative, judicial or religious positions. Despite their standing as an administrative, social and religious elite, the majority of ‘ulamā remained aloof from the government hierarchy and pursued other vocations. While some ‘ulamā declined government posts on principle, others did so even in the face of punishment (Lapidus, 1984). Under Harun Rashid’s governance, the autonomous status of the qadi was officially recognised during bureaucratic centralisation. The role of the qadi was amplified under the Mu‘tazilite caliphs, who emphasised the predominance of reason to instill religious-ideological conformity throughout the Muslim world. However, when the Mu‘tazilite caliphs failed to impose their doctrines, qadis were equated with other influential officials in the governmental administration. The formation of administrative institutions, including the Qada, was accompanied by the rivalry between the head of the bureaucracy and the head of the ‘ulamā, the chief qadi. The kuttab (clerks who were influenced by Iranian culture) and the ‘ulamā (who were trained in Islamic religious sciences) vied for recognition of their capacity to establish rules for effective government. Through this rivalry, the two institutions, namely the vizierate and the chief judiciary, were fortified. Between 661 CE and 932 CE, which corresponded with the emergence of classical Islamic institutions, there were specific stages when one of the two groups held an advantage. During the Mu‘tazilite period, the qadi was the caliph’s preeminent official for religious purposes. Nonetheless, the ‘ulamā’s function remained influential and consequential in moulding the administration, social, and religious dimensions of early Islamic societies. Lapidus (1984) underscores the importance of ‘ulamā as an administrative, social and religious elite who penetrated the

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entire society. Even though they were not a distinct class, their importance in Islamic institutions cannot be understated. During the period between 786 CE and 809 CE, the functions and status of the qadi underwent gradual changes that were firmly institutionalised. Although the jurisdictional boundaries of this office were strictly defined, its officeholders gained increased autonomy and prestige. However, the qadis were still susceptible to arbitrary dismissal by the central government and they often struggled to apply their legal theories coherently in practice. The first ruler to appoint judges to provincial capitals was Al-Mansur, who aimed to centralise the appointment of qadis on a systematic basis. While this change strengthened the caliph’s control, it also created sources of friction in the provincial administration. The governor of Egypt, Kafur, once prevented a qadi from giving an independent judgment, and the famous qadi of Egypt, Abu Zur‘a, collaborated in the revolt of the governor, Ibn Tulun, against the ‘Abbasids. Despite these challenges, some qadis demonstrated personal honesty and courage by rendering judgments against the will of secular authorities. Nonetheless, judicial independence remained dependent on the integrity of individual qadis (Bligh-Abramski, 1992, p. 43). In essence, the role of the qadis was inextricably linked to that of the caliph and they were appointed by both the caliph and the governors. The chief judge delegated his authority to the provincial judges, who received their appointments directly from the caliph. The judicial system was bifurcated, with the Baghdad model, in which the chief qadi was appointed by the caliph, being replicated in the provinces. This close connection between the judicature and the caliphate meant that, in the provinces, the qadis acted as agents of the caliph in maintaining order.

4.11   Qur’ān, Models of Authority and the Caliphate Concerning the nexus between the nature of the Qur’ān and the models of authority embodied by the caliphs, we observe the supremacy of the principle of prophetic exemplarity during the formative period of Islam. The belief that the ‘Qur’ān was created’ was regarded by many as a stratagem for suppressing history and separating the Qur’ān from the realm of creation. The upshot of this proposition was the attainment of direct comprehension of the significance of phenomena by the man of erudition. The interconnection between immediacy and divine arrangement is further elucidated by Christian Decobert in the following terms:

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The uncreated Qur’an could only be accessible to humans in perfect immediacy. This immediacy of God’s words and of the rules is one of the conditions for imposing the dogma of the universe’s absolute conformity to the will of its creator. The risk was that, in the fideistic acceptance of what was, the link between the world of the fundament and the one here on earth would weaken greatly. The counter-offensive, which was later led (particularly by mystics) against the fideistic strands of traditionism, focused precisely on the accusation that the link with the world of the fundament had been broken and that the initial principle of heteronomy had been renounced. In al-Ma’mūn’s case we have the central idea that the divine design was being accomplished within history for the sake of human salvation. However, what was essential was the principle of mediation since that was what connected the world of the fundament to the one here on earth. This mediation was performed by a virtuoso who could tell just from unjust, and enabled the access to a Qur’an whose meaning was not necessarily obvious since it had been created. The deciphering of meaning, as an inevitable type of mediation, partook of the link which defined the profound ontological unity between natural and supernatural, human and superhuman. (Décobert, 2004, p. 20)

In regard to the acrimonious conflict between al-Ma’mun and certain traditionists, a deeper analysis of the religious field provides an explanation. The caliphal empire, with its dual effect of tribal groups, witnessed the weakening of tribal chiefs and the solidification of genealogy. The Ummayads, who had marginalised many of the first-generation fighters and tribal chiefs that had participated in the wars of conquest, caused resentment among these individuals who then settled in various regions, such as the Euphrates, the Egyptian Delta or Khurasan. This discontentment ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Ummayads. The descendants of these early fighters and tribal chiefs found themselves aligned with the ‘ulamā in their effort to construct an independent discourse separate from the caliphal authority. These individuals were drawn to the centrality of the Prophetic figure and his exemplary conduct. In contrast, the new elites, who emerged from the bureaucratisation of the empire, could only focus on the caliph as the one who established order and maintained patrimonial power. Eventually, opposition from scholars, theologians and historiographers denied caliphs of any active religious authority, thereby depriving them of the legitimacy of the title of imam (Calder, 1984, p. 254).

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4.12  Religious Authority, Traditional Society and Religious Movement In order to discern the nature of religious authority within a traditional society, one must contextualise it within the religious institution in which it is operational. The religious institution is not merely a set of beliefs and a formal structure, but rather an embodiment of a mode of belief. This mode of belief involves the transmission of a characteristic trait of religious belief through a continuous chain of believers, allowing for the passage of religious tradition (Décobert, 2004, p. 22). This tradition is authorised by a body that affirms the validity of the true tradition and religious authority is thus a function of this body. The body of religious authority serves as the archetypal original model upon which the institution is founded. Examining the issue of religious authority within Islamic history reveals its fundamental and largely reconstructed nature. Its fundamental nature is demonstrated by its connection to the way in which a religious movement is established—how it garners its initial followers, develops its community and hierarchies, and regulates its relationships with outsiders. Understanding how religious authority was constructed, its modus operandi and how it was contested in Muslim societies during the early Islamic period would aid our comprehension of the subject matter. However, as the ‘religious movement’ was being established, the discourse on the history of salvation defined the central facts that constructed these initial movements, largely overlooking the reality of early Islam. Thus, the history of the nascent Islamic movement was reconstructed, particularly in the elaboration of the prophetic tradition, through the stable milieu of scholars who held expertise in religious knowledge and sought to monopolise their capital. This establishment of the prophetic tradition resulted in a shifting of the centre of religious authority.

4.13   Sunni Legacy, Shia Lineage: Unravelling the Origins of Al-Azhar The illustrious Al-Azhar University and Mosque, situated in the bustling metropolis of Cairo, Egypt, occupies a preeminent place as the most influential Sunni centre of religious learning in the entire Muslim world. Beyond its spiritual significance, this institution commands formidable sway over the political, intellectual and theological currents within Egypt and many other countries (Zeghal & Elston, 2018). Indeed, the

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vicissitudes of Egyptian politics, coupled with the attention or neglect that this university receives from the country’s political leaders and affluent supporters, have left an indelible imprint on its storied history from its inception. Dating back to the year 970, Al-Azhar traces its roots to the Fatimids, a North African Ismaili Shi‘ı ̄ dynasty, who had gained ascendancy over Egypt in the preceding year (Halm, 1997). In their zeal to build a new, triumphant city known as Cairo, meaning ‘the victorious’, distinct from the ancient Muslim capital of Fustat, which had been founded in the seventh century following the Islamic conquest, the Fatimids erected Al-Azhar to serve as the royal mosque, situated close to a newly built palace intended for Caliph al-Mu‘izz (r. 953–75) and his kin. Al-Mu‘izz, for his part, had made the strategic decision to relocate the entire Fatimid court from its former seat of power in Tunis to Cairo, with Al-Azhar serving as a vital instrument in cementing Fatimid control over Egypt. While Sunni mosques in the vicinity retained their traditional role as Sunni institutions, Al-Azhar was designated the core institution to propagate Fatimid views. Despite the fact that lectures on Ismailism, aimed at introducing the masses to the tenets of this faith, were regularly delivered at Al-Azhar, the Fatimid court remained the primary locus of Ismaili teaching. To this end, the court appointed officials charged with spreading the dynasty’s ideology both within and beyond its domains. Al-Azhar gained further importance as a hub for the study of Isma‘ı ̄li fiqh, with the dynasty sponsoring 37 jurists who taught at the mosque. Although funding for Islamic education would later become a hallmark of patronage by political and military elites, in these early times, the financing for Al-Azhar instruction was not yet institutionalised. Instead of relying on a waqf, or immovable endowment, which only became commonplace for major mosques in Cairo (including Al-Azhar) and Fustat in the early eleventh century, the treasury paid the wages of the 35 jurists. Yet, these endowments served to support mosque upkeep rather than to specifically fund education. Despite the Fatimid court’s crucial role in promoting Ismailism, Al-Azhar’s lower status allowed for general public attendance at classes on exoteric Islamic law, serving a crucial role in the da‘wah, or propagation of the Isma‘ı ̄li fiqh literature (Nu’mān, 1960–63, p. 67). In the annals of Egypt’s history, the madrasah, a bastion of religious education, emerged as a potent force during the 1130s when the Fatimid regime underwent a restructuring of its governance. This venerable institution, known for its scholarly pursuits, offered a unique platform for the explicit establishment of government sponsorship and influence over the

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realm of religious scholarship. With the passage of time, the Fatimid imams saw their influence wane, while the viziers, by contrast, rose in prominence. This allowed them greater independence, which they utilised to patronise ‘ulamā as they saw fit. The Ayyubids, an aristocratic Kurdish military dynasty, rose to the position of vizier under the Fatimids and employed patronage as a means of boosting their own fortunes and prestige. In the throes of the turbulent twelfth century, the Ayyubids gradually gained control over the Levant amidst an ongoing conflict between the Seljuqs, the last Abbasid caliph in Iraq, the Byzantine Empire, the Crusader nations, the Fatimids and the Zangid sultans of Syria. Salah al-­Din, a celebrated figure also known as Saladin, served as vizier and maintained his independence from the Fatimid caliphs. He deftly curtailed official support for Ismailism in Egypt, restricted its teaching, silenced the Shi‘ı ̄ version of the call to prayer and appointed only Sunni qadis. In a dramatic turn of events, in 1171, Salah al-Din declared himself ruler of Egypt and ousted the final Fatimid caliph (Lev, 1999, p. 45). Salah al-Din pursued a decidedly pro-Sunni strategy in consolidating Ayyubid control. In addition to the measures he implemented while serving as vizier, he decreed that Al-Azhar was no longer a jami‘ mosque and confiscated its endowments as sultan. Al-hakim Mosque, the other significant Shi‘ı ̄ mosque in Cairo, was dealt an even harsher blow, serving as a Crusader jail before being transformed into a stable. The madrasah played an instrumental role in Salah al-Din’s efforts to promote Sunni identity. He established an array of endowments specifically geared towards the study of Sunnism, including programs at the formerly Shi‘ı ̄ Husayniyah Mosque that taught Sunni fiqh. Salah al-Din’s approach was not exclusively motivated by anti-Fatimid sentiment. In response to the pro-Hanafi stance of the Ayyubids’ rivals, the Zangid sultans of Syria, he patronised Ash‘arism in particular, as well as Shafi‘ı ̄sm (two closely associated schools), while lending some measure of support to all four legal systems in madrasahs and khanqahs. During the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt (1250–1570), state sponsorship for formal education reached its zenith. The Mamluks, a Turkic military dynasty, whose name implies servitude, offered considerable patronage to the ‘ulamā, whose support lent legitimacy to the Mamluk rulers and helped establish a rapport with the Egyptian population. The Mamluks were themselves of Turkic ethnicity and spoke the Turkish language. They granted extensive intellectual support to the ‘ulamā through lavish patronage, endorsing the latter’s endeavors and building numerous madrasahs

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and khanqahs in Cairo alone. Waqf funding and official favor once again poured into Al-Azhar (El-Rouayheb, 2006, p.  264). The mosque was considerably expanded and renovated, with additional classrooms built to accommodate the swelling number of students. Around the time of the Ottoman invasion in 1517, significant advancements were made in theological studies in Egypt. Thanks to a synthesis of Iranian and North African scholastic movements, the study of logic and Ash‘ari kalam flourished in the sixteenth century, producing a unique strain of Ash‘arism in Egypt. This represented a departure from the preceding period, during which logical and philosophical disciplines were rejected and considered religiously unsound. In contrast to the Mamluk practice, the Ottomans explicitly endorsed hanafism as the official madhhab. The chief judges and their aides, who travelled with them from one assignment to the next, were hanafis by law since they had a personal relationship with them. Additionally, district judges were also hanafis. Although other schools of thought were well-represented in larger cities like Cairo, Maliki and Shafi judges were subordinated to their hanafi counterparts in the hierarchy and did not travel around the empire. This resulted in a considerable gap between native, non-hanafi ‘ulamā who enjoyed a degree of social and religious autonomy and Ottoman hanafi intellectuals who wielded significant authority and were closely linked with the centre of power in Istanbul (Winter, 2003). The status of Al-Azhar within the Egyptian religious landscape was markedly altered by the establishment of the hanafi-centric religious hierarchy, controlled by Istanbul and predominantly staffed by non-Arabs. As a consequence, Al-Azhar emerged as the centre of indigenous religious identity, distinct from Ottoman bureaucracy. It thus assumed greater significance than other mosques and madrasahs in Cairo, if not the entire country. It became deeply embedded in Egyptian culture and its affiliated scholars developed a collective identity independent of madhhab. The emergence of the Shaykh al-Azhar signifies this transformation. When Muhammad ‘Ali acceded to power in 1805, he ushered in sweeping reforms to the Egyptian government and society. While these measures had the unintended consequence of enhancing the government’s influence over society’s fundamental functions, they effectively curtailed the roles of other social players. Across the modern era, Muhammad ‘Ali undertook a systematic expansion of state authority, many of whose effects were felt by the ‘ulamā, both directly and indirectly. Seeking to subvert the pre-existing merchant class associated with the ‘ulamā and redirect the

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epicentre of economic activity away from the vicinity around Al-Azhar, Muhammad ‘Ali tightened control over business, with the establishment of wide-ranging monopolies on goods and fresh marketplaces on the fringes of Cairo (Eccel, 1984). As a result, a new paradigm took shape, where state authority predominated, while the ‘ulamā were relegated increasingly to the fringes of society (Mohiuddin, 2022, p.  165). Broader socio-economic developments progressively changed the context in which religious authority was wielded, thereby impacting the function of Islamic institutions and scholarly traditional discourse. Notably, the state refrained from directly meddling in the affairs of the ‘ulamā or their institutions; instead, government measures transformed the social framework, thereby making the state the main player and the ‘ulamā the secondary one. As new options, particularly in the field of education, developed, the ‘ulamā lost importance and played a smaller role and had less general acceptance. Under the auspices of the newly independent Egyptian government, Al-Azhar underwent further restructuring in 1961. President Gamal Abdel Nasser (r. 1956–70) named reformist Mahmud Shaltut as Shaykh al-Azhar in 1958 (serving until his death in 1963) with the aim of modernising Al-Azhar for a new era in Egyptian history, in response to the Free Officers’ mutiny of 1952. The law of 1961 resulted in significant reform, nationalising Al-Azhar and transforming it into a university with new faculties in non-religious fields (medicine, engineering, agriculture and business) and additional campuses, including one for women, in Cairo. After the 1961 restructuring, there was, and remains, a possibility that Al-Azhar would be assimilated into the political machinery of the government, as any structural independence from the state was lost. The Academy of Islamic Research (Majma‘ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah), founded within Al-Azhar in 1961 to engage in original research on modern challenges, was mandated by the government to bolster religious justifications for its policies. The Academy has been heavily criticised by Islamist detractors for being ineffective and excessively subservient to the government. Nonetheless, it strives for religious reform. This body of work serves as a ‘collective ijtihād’, a religious interpretation that is supported by a recognised group of experts (Zaman, 2012, p. 93). Each scholar’s religious status is likely enhanced by his affiliation with Al-Azhar, a university that, as Zeghal observes, embraces a variety of perspectives and orientations in its ideological and theological reach (Zeghal, 2007, p. 108). Consequently, this institutional platform serves as

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the justification for all Azhari ‘ulamā, who rely on it as the source of their extensive authority over this religious cornerstone of Egyptian society. Although certain Azhari scholars may hold Salafi or Islamist beliefs, the institutional authority of Al-Azhar University is inextricably tied to the erudition of its scholars and their profound understanding of Islamic tradition. This aspect serves to distinguish them from these groups. Such an aptitude is reflected in the comprehensive religious curriculum offered by Al-Azhar, where students in key faculties study a diverse array of courses irrespective of emphasis. This feature has been an integral aspect of Azhari education for generations and every discipline incorporates knowledge essential for a scholar. In the face of the political changes that have taken place in Egypt since the Arab Spring, Al-Azhar’s role as a reputable religious interpreter has become increasingly crucial. The Azhari ‘ulamā, or Islamic scholars, consider themselves autonomous from the government and espouse the interests of the people by offering reliable Islamic teachings that are devoid of political fluctuations. Al-Azhar’s conservatism is a strength in this context, providing a desirable option compared to more extreme religious viewpoints (Brown, 2015, p. 118). In June 2011, the ‘Azhar Document’ marked the beginning of Al-Azhar’s more active involvement in politics. This manifesto, authored under the guidance of Shaykh al-Azhar, Ahmad al-Tayyib, outlines a series of ideals that the post-revolutionary government should strive to achieve. It advocates for representative democracy and civil liberties, while also calling for structural independence for Al-Azhar and its recognition as the primary authority on all Islamic matters, including sciences, legacy, and current jurisprudence (Nakissa, 2012). After General Sisi overthrew Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, Al-Azhar aligned itself more closely with the present administration. This association has created new opportunities while also presenting significant threats to Al-Azhar’s public legitimacy, sparking concerns about the institution’s survival. Nevertheless, despite the profound changes that have occurred since the Arab Spring, the Azhari ‘ulamā still strive to establish themselves as the community’s preeminent spiritual leaders and authorities (Spannaus, 2018, p.  81). Al-Azhar remains the primary centre of Islamic authority not only in Egypt but also across the broader Muslim world and this is so because of the ‘ulamā’s familiarity with and connection to its past, even though they may dispute about the specifics of their power and their function in relation to the government.

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4.14  Reimagining Islamic Authority: Metamorphosis and Continuity in a Globalised World To scrutinise the intricate patterns of Islamic authority that prevail in the contemporary world, one must inquire into the extent to which these power structures have undergone metamorphosis and which components remain impervious to change (Voll, 1982). Although this inquiry has long been a pivotal concern for Muslim scholars, it has gained particular relevance for policymakers in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks. Consequently, a significant portion of the public and media discourse has been fixated on the fringe instances of Islamism, which have come to epitomise the new models of religiously sanctioned social authority in the global Muslim community (Halliday, 2004; Roy, 2004). Nevertheless, a more comprehensive assessment of the transformation of Islamic authority in the Muslim world suggests that these exceptional events merely reflect the underlying dynamics of religious authority that have been evolving over time. If we apply the framework of the ‘structure-agency’ debate to the transformations of Islamic authority, we could identify two distinct narratives to explain these changes. The agency perspective would posit that many established structures of Islamic authority are currently being contested by the agents of change (Volpi & Turner, 2007, p. 17). Conversely, the structural perspective would assert that these peculiar religious claims to authority are symptomatic of the larger transformations in the Muslim world, which cannot be reduced to the individual behaviour of a few powerful actors. These processes of transformation embody profound conceptual shifts that seek to redefine the self-perception of Muslim communities, as well as other religious identities, in response to the forces of globalisation. These transformations are deeply embedded in the historical legacy of the Muslim world and are not merely a recent or transient phenomenon. The notion of globalisation is indispensable when discussing contemporary religious phenomena. While some scholars tend to view globalisation as a modern development that correlates with the emergence of global communication networks, others subscribe to the belief that today’s globalisation merely repeats earlier patterns or is part of far longer historical processes (Scholte, 2005). This is particularly evident in the concept of ‘world religions’, which denotes that religions like Islam and Christianity have been agents of global religious consciousness for centuries. Indeed,

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Islam has always possessed a global outlook and its revelation was directed towards the entire world. After the collapse of the USSR, the pace of religious globalisation has only intensified, underscoring the salience of Islamic authority in the global arena. The current state of affairs should not overshadow an equally significant phenomenon: the revival of Islamic identity. The pace of Islamic globalisation mirrors the expansion of Muslim educational and training institutions, ranging from numerous Qur’ānic training institutions in Asia, where the memorisation of the text of the Qur’ān has an indelible influence on the mental and cultural dispositions that are forging an Islamic habitus, to the establishment of novel, higher education Islamic institutes in Europe that serve a generally affluent and cultured Muslim cohort. These transformations are also accompanied by the formation of identities and allegiances that reinforce the social flexibility of the communal expression of these identities. In a globalised world, the issue of authority becomes more complex in terms of interpreting the law. A central feature of Islam as a religious system has been the significance of a functional or practical consensus on legal norms. While there is no shared term for law in the Indo-European languages, there is a common conception of order underpinning the relations between people and God and social relations within communities. Following the development of secular states, law was regarded as the command of the state. Islam is seen as sharing with Judaism the centrality of law to religious and ritual practice. The Prophet was the divinely appointed lawgiver and the caliphs were deputies responsible for good governance. The Prophet established a polity that was bound together by a constitution that established the legal obligations of people, particularly newly converted tribes. After his passing, certain tribes endeavoured to terminate the contract. Consequently, the Apostasy war ensued. The sharı ̄‘ah is regulated by fiqh, and in Sunni Islam, there are four major schools of law (Hanafis, Shafi‘ı ̄s, Malikis and Hanbalis). Shi‘ı ̄ Islam has its own symbols and systems. Because there is no church or priesthood in Islam, its legal structure is an expression of its social solidarity. The discourse on authority in Islam is reinforced by the realisation that the debate over ijtihād in the modern era has yielded a modernisation of Islamic thought and practice. In essence, the attempt to implement sharı ̄‘ah in contemporary times has engendered a widespread discussion on the relevance of Islam in novel contexts. As modern communication technologies have greatly facilitated this global discussion, more and more individuals and groups, even those lacking expertise in the Islamic

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tradition, are claiming to represent Islam. As a result, the legal debate over authority has become localised, decentralised and fractious. In this scenario, imposing ‘any transnational authority over this debate, where local mullahs pass legal judgments on websites for an audience that has no clear cultural or spatial boundary, becomes exceedingly difficult. The fundamentalist or maximal view that Shari’a must possess some form of monopoly or definite authority becomes highly problematic in a context of legal pluralism, especially in diasporic communities, where innovation is an inevitable outcome of migration and cultural adaptation’ (Scholte, 2005, p. 8). The ever-expanding reach of mass media and the swift growth of information technology and the internet have triggered the emergence of elevated competition among many traditional centres of learning (Bano, 2017, p. 9). This has resulted in individuals without any formal Islamic training, proclaiming their views in the name of Islam. This phenomenon has been famously referred to by Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) as the fragmentation of Islamic authority. Some scholars perceive this as an opportunity to establish a pluralistic Muslim public sphere, while others see it as a challenge, attributing the rise of militant groups to this very fragmentation of religious authority, whereby the right to interpret religious texts is no longer restricted to scholars trained in classical Islamic tradition. For some, the emergence of self-taught and self-proclaimed online scholars, leaders of radical Islamist groups, or hosts of popular Islamic television shows has not reduced the importance of traditional centres of authority and those with conventional education. They perceive traditional centres of Islamic authority as utilising the same technology, while also expanding their influence beyond their local communities to a global audience. All traditional centres of authority use the internet, radio, television to convey their messages and their phone and online fatwa hotlines have massive participation. It is noteworthy that the debate about the fragmentation of Islamic authority in modern times is not solely based on new modes of communication, which make it convenient to spread information about Islam without the need for a mosque-madrasah platform. It is also premised on an inverse relationship between the need for an expert and increased literacy (Robinson, 1993, p. 237). An increase in literacy provides direct access to the sacred texts, which in turn removes dependence on Islamic authority structures. Although this is true, it is also possible that, in the long run, improved literacy nurtures greater appreciation for the work of the

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specialist, particularly among the educated populace. While for some educated Muslims, the Salafi methodological emphasis on reasoning seems intellectually empowering, ‘for most, such efforts quickly reveal the limits of one’s own intellectual ability to reach a depth of meaning without seeking specialist advice’ (Bano, 2017, p. 13). Reddig (2011, p. 162) argues that Salafist thinking challenges the religious authority of the ‘ulamā and not only rejects the ‘long tradition of scholarship in the Islamic sciences of religion’ but also deconstructs ‘the traditional notions of established authority within Islam’. Analysing Salafist movements in relation to mass media and how they took advantage of the power gap that existed in the Muslim world when religious institutions were replaced by civil institutions reveals how, under the impact of modernisation and Western power, the religious authority of the ‘ulamā started to disintegrate. Although Salafism is not one of the dominant theological orientations in Islam, it is on the rise and is challenging many conventions in mainstream Islam. In the next section, we will examine how authority is being reconstructed and how new Muslim institutions are adopting various strategies to establish religious authority.

4.15   Strategies for Establishing Authority: The Case of International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) The practice of issuing religious-legal opinions, known as iftā’, has evolved to include the emergence of fatwa organisations, wherein multiple muftis can jointly issue a fatwa (Masud et al., 1996, pp. 6–7). In the face of the challenges posed by modernity and globalisation, contemporary Muslim scholars attach great importance to collective iftā’. Indeed, such organisations have been in existence since the beginning of the twentieth century (Mudzhar, 1990, pp.  6–7; Al-Atawneh, 2010, p.  2). Some of the most notable organisations include the Board of the Senior ‘Ulamā’ at Al-Azhar, which consisted of thirty leading ‘ulamā from among whom the Shaykh al Azhar was selected. Other organisations, such as Nahdat al Ulama in Indonesia, the World League of Mecca, the Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan, Islamic Fiqh Academy India and the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), were established during the twentieth century in both the Muslim world and the West. In the twenty-first century, the establishment of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS)

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under the leadership of Yusuf al-Qaradāwı ̄ in 2004 in Dublin, Ireland, is considered a significant development. The institution has its headquarters in Doha, Qatar, and two other branches in Egypt and Tunisia. Today, the IUMS has almost 60,000 members representing thousands of religious councils and organisations throughout the Muslim world. A key objective of this institution is to promote unity among diverse Muslim groups, which is the fundamental strategy for establishing religious authority. This is achieved by building the trust of communities in the IUMS, thereby providing a unified Muslim front and paving the way for global Islamic authority (International Union of Muslim Scholars Project). The transnational character of the IUMS that cuts across socio-political and cultural differences is an important feature that sets it apart from other religious institutions (Shideler & Daoud, 2014). The IUMS ‘is neither local, nor regional, not Arab, Eastern, or Western, but represents Muslims all over the world’ (International Union of Muslim Scholars Project, 2023). In his opening remarks at the founding conference of this institution, al-Qaradāwı̄ (2004) emphasised that it is well known that today Muslims do not have a religious or priestly authority. After the collapse of the caliphate in 1924, Muslims lack a religious authority to which they can refer. To address this need, the IUMS was established. The institution’s membership being open to scholars from across the Muslim world is one of the distinguishing characteristics that set the IUMS apart from other religious institutions, as it demonstrates full interaction with regional and global affairs. This is evidenced by the publication of statements on various conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Somalia and the Arab uprisings. To foster greater unity among diverse Muslim groups, the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has adopted a multifaceted approach that combines legal pluralism and the principle of wasatiyyah to bring scholars from different religio-legal and theological backgrounds together. The legal pluralism methodology is grounded in the belief that the differences between the various schools of Islamic thought are far outweighed by their areas of agreement, which can be explored to promote reconciliation (Al-Qaradāwı̄, 2004). Additionally, the IUMS has introduced a new mechanism of cooperation based on the principle of wasatiyyah, which entails bridging the gap between differing views and finding common ground. While the IUMS acknowledges the doctrine of fiqh al-ikhtilāf, which promotes tolerance and legal pluralism among the various schools of thought, it suggests moving beyond it to fiqh al-Ikhtilāf, or cooperative methods, as a means of fostering greater harmony and cooperation. In

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this context, the concept of wasatiyyah plays a key role in promoting balance and harmony between different schools of thought, as exemplified by the name of the IUMS magazine, al-umma al-wasat (International Union of Muslim Scholars Scientific mission, 2023). It is worth noting that the IUMS’ approach emphasises the importance of freedom in the workplace and the rejection of any attempts to impose one’s views on others. In Daghi’s (2015) opinion, the IUMS Secretary-General, the goal is to ‘bridge the gap between the sons of the same nation’. This approach is intended to create an environment of cooperation, which encourages scholars to collaborate and work towards the greater good of the Muslim ummah (Al-Taskhiri, 2009). Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world and the ongoing challenges faced by the Muslim community, the IUMS’ approach represents an attempt to promote a ‘median way’ of understanding Islam. In the words of Al-Qaradāwı ̄, the founder of the IUMS, this is necessary to counter the negative portrayal of Islam in the media and foster a greater sense of unity and harmony among the Muslim community. By bringing scholars together from different backgrounds and promoting greater understanding and cooperation, the IUMS is making a significant contribution to the ongoing effort to strengthen the Muslim ummah and promote greater harmony and cooperation among its diverse members (Al-Qur’ān; 2:143). The IUMS espouses a nuanced and balanced perspective, aiming to promote wasatiyyah not as just a strategy, but as a comprehensive worldview that eschews both the extremes of liberal and conservative approaches towards Islamic matters (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009, pp.  2–9). The IUMS endeavours to create a middle path, which rests on a well-balanced understanding of responsibility and action in light of usūl (fundamentals) and furū (substantive law). If any rigidity exists, it is in the fundamentals rather than the furū (Al-Atawneh, 2013, p. 225). Through this approach, the IUMS seeks to forge a common ground that unites the various schools of thought and divergent interpretations within the broader Muslim community.

4.16  Conclusion The question of Islamic authority is a multifaceted one that encompasses not only religious but also political and social structures of authority. Muslim self-organisation is guided by a well-known commandment that states that if at least three Muslims are traveling together, they are supposed to select one of them as an amı ̄r, or commander. Although this

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commandment was initially intended to address social matters during the early days of Islam, Muslim scholars have derived far-reaching conclusions for the Muslim community from it. One such conclusion is that Muslims should never be without an amı ̄r among themselves, which has implications for the establishment of political structures of authority (Al-Qur’ān; 4:59). If the question is asked whether a specific system of society is suggested in the Qur’ān, then the answer would be that it is Prophecy, as the Qur’ān focuses on the presence of the Prophet and does not refer directly to the time after his death. It points out that the believers are not supposed to turn away (Al-Qur’ān; 3:144). However, system-related thought only emerged in modernity and the concept of the state as the subject of communal action was alien to the first generation of Muslims. In the course of the centuries, institutional thought in this direction did emerge in outline, but the modern understanding of an Islamic state could only emerge under the influence of ideas of a nation-state. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as a representative of God, defined Islamic practices through his ability to transmit relevant revelations as well as his management of community affairs, establishing Islam as a religion and a way of life (Inam, 2013, pp. 66–67). After his death, the continued unification of the Muslim community depended upon the installation of a new narrative around which Muslims could unite, which eventually became Islam as a master narrative. This restructuring of authority was linked to the protection of the state by the caliph, or successor of the Prophet, and the attainment of religious knowledge through the study of Islam that equipped the ‘ulamā with the ability to derive Islamic law (Sayyid, 1997). As long as the caliphate was in existence, the legal system was largely based on the law and jurisprudence produced by the ‘ulamā, with the caliph assuming the role of keeping the community of Muslims together, coordinating Muslim affairs and solving religious, political and social problems according to the demands of each time and age. The caliph was considered the highest authority whose commands were to be followed by the faithful and was elected by the community of believers to be their leading amı ̄r. The mandate of the caliph was overseen by the Electoral College (ahlu l-hall wa l-‘aqd), which had far-reaching authority in other matters (Enayat, 1982). After the caliphate lost its integrity, Muslims had to devise new structures for the betterment of their community. This task was not undertaken by the authoritarian dynasties but by the jurists, who represented the community more than the political personalities. The Muslim community

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relied on the legal system to protect itself from the power of the rulers, which made religious authority primarily rest with the jurists. One notable feature of the Islamic social order is the independence of the legal system from the rulers’ power. In other words, the law supersedes any office in Islam. Hence, rulers must strive to come to an agreement with the jurists. After the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth century, rulers widely deprived the ‘ulamā of their power, deciding based on legal codes imported from the West rather than Islamic law. As a result, most Muslim scholars distanced themselves from the rulers. This led to the emergence of a new class of intellectuals who were conditioned by Western concepts, and who were not involved in public processes but only dealt with purely religious functions and political and social changes. Among these intellectuals were also lay interpreters who emerged from outside the ranks of the ‘ulamā. They felt empowered to make God’s revelation live on earth, engaging with the central message of Islam. This led to the growing fragmentation of religious authority as new interpreters rose from outside the traditional systems for transmitting knowledge. They used print and mass media to bolster their authority, while others came forward to rival them. These developments gave rise to new Muslim interpreters who engaged with the texts themselves instead of following the methodology developed over the last 1400 years by the ‘ulamā in interpreting the texts. They formed their own conclusions and pursued what their conscience dictated. Thus, the individual human conscience, ‘that most uncomfortable bedfellow for all forms of authority, began to work its way more fully in the life of Muslim societies’ (Robinson, 2009, p. 350).

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CHAPTER 5

Mapping the Terrain of Islamism and Religious Authority: Insights from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia

5.1   Introduction Contemporary Muslim societies face an array of multifarious socio-­political challenges, including the proliferation of democratisation, the ascension of Islamist movements and the assertion of authoritarianism. The rapid socio-religious transformations that have taken place in the past two centuries have resulted in complex reconfigurations of religious authority in Muslim societies. These transformations have not only given rise to new forms of leadership but have also engendered adaptations of the models established by the ‘ulamā of the formative period. The modern-day conceptions of religious authority in Islam can be traced back to the previous century. The ‘ulamā developed out of inchoate bodies of religious experts who based their claims on many forms of religious knowledge. Among these groups were popular storytellers whose claims were contested by self-proclaimed Islamic experts who insisted on the primacy of studying Islamic law based on authoritative texts (Swartz, 1971). This provides a paradigmatic example of how different interpretations of Islamic traditions have informed the making and refutation of claims to religious authority in the public sphere.

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The critics of the storytellers emerged as a force of social critique in early Islamic history (Hodgson, 1974). After the rise of the Abbasids, the scholars of classical Islamic tradition continued to reinforce their position as authoritative leaders. By the late eleventh century, the ‘ulamā of Baghdad had become a more structured group through the establishment of schools of law (Ephrat, 2000, p. 96). These new schools served to consolidate the curriculum around the study of fiqh and contributed to a ‘professionalisation’ of scholars, funded by religious endowments. Concurrently, another new form of structuring religious authority and institutions, supporting networks of ‘ulamā, was thriving—that of the Sufi order. The Sufi orders, with their particular practices, proliferated and various branches spread across the expanding Muslim world. By the eighteenth century, many Sufis began adapting more formalised and hierarchical structures to channel their energies into various religious and social projects in the public sphere (Nehemia, 2000, p. 110). However, it was within that corresponding era that a notable upsurge in hostilities towards Sufism materialised, posing a direct challenge to the well-established institutional pillars supporting the ‘ulamā. At the turn of the twentieth century, modernising Islamic reformers posed challenges to the system that had underpinned the religious authority of the ‘ulamā for nearly a millennium. These challenges came in various forms, including the rise of new forms of voluntary associations that were perceived as alternative building blocks for civil society in modernising public spheres. Changing state structures also impacted the ‘ulamā’s professional activities and engagement with the Muslim population. This period also saw a considerable flourishing of traditionalist forms of Islam. For example, print media, the most dramatic technological innovation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, presented both challenges and new opportunities to the ‘ulamā. While the new textual practices associated with modern print media transformed understandings of textual authority fundamentally, the same technologies were also deployed to disseminate the religious visions of traditional Muslims. Moreover, rapid developments in transportation and communication technologies brought Muslims into new conversations and debates in which numerous voices sought to establish themselves as religious authorities. This new discursive space served to foster the emergence of modernising critiques of religious and social leadership while simultaneously energising the responses of the ‘ulamā to recalibrate their standing in diverse ways in societies all across Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Feener, 2010, p. 40; Gelvin & Green, 2014).

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In addition to the proliferation of print and communication technologies, the advent of the internet has further expanded the ways in which Islam can be interpreted, while also facilitating the massification of education in Muslim societies, allowing for greater access to texts and a wider array of interpretative voices. The internet serves as a conduit for novel forms of discourse, enabling diverse individuals to come together and form a virtual terrain or cyberspace, ushering in a new information age (Anderson, 2003, p.  45). Alongside the economic, socio-religious and political transformations that marked the late twentieth century, another phenomenon emerged—the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. These movements sought to counteract the Western influences that had permeated their societies, embodying a post-ideological social movement that championed emancipation. Islamist groups, both moderate and radical, are not only shaping the future political landscape of the region but also challenging the religious authority of the ‘ulamā and the long-standing tradition of scholarship in Islamic religious sciences (Brown, Hamzawy & Ottaway, 2006). Since their inception, Islamist movements, including the Salafiyya, have exploited the power imbalance between religious and civil institutions, creating a shift in power dynamics within the religious sphere and resulting in a crisis of religious authority in the region (Reddig, 2011, p. 163). Consequently, these movements have been able to gain support from both traditional and modern sectors of society. This chapter delves into the contestation of religious authority by religio-­political actors such as Islamist groups (whether moderate or radical), governments and other organisations in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. It begins by exploring the intricate interplay between religion and politics in the Muslim world and how globalisation has impacted the interaction between different actors, both religious and political. While the primary objective is to map the religious authority in Muslim majority countries, the chapter also identifies the channels of influence between various religious leaders who claim to hold Islamic authority, such as Islamists, state religious officials, religious scholars, Salafists, Sufis and individual Muslims. The study uncovers how religious actors wield their authority across different issue areas such as religion in public life, state-society relations, the economy, religious practices and culture. Additionally, the chapter sheds light on how individual Muslims place their trust in the religious authority of different types of religious leaders across diverse issue areas.

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5.2   Islamism, State and Politics As a richly nuanced and multifaceted religion, Islam represents a compelling and emancipatory movement that seeks to liberate all of humanity from the constraints of narrow-mindedness and ignorance (Qutb, 1964; Ahmad & Ansari, 1979). In Qutb’s (1979) view, Islam is a comprehensive way of life that permeates every aspect of human existence. For many adherents, this implies that there is no dichotomy between religion and state in Islam and this sentiment gained considerable currency among Islamist movements in the twentieth century (Voll, 2013, p. 58). However, for others, Islam as a comprehensive way of life means that it encompasses a community of believers, known as dı ̄n, dawla and ummah, which forms the bedrock of the Islamic faith. The changing contours of these concepts not only reflect the evolving political and social ideals in the Muslim world but also shape the contours of political visions that animate political discourses in the contemporary world. Over the course of the twentieth century, debates surrounding the relationships between religion and state had undergone significant transformations, reflecting the changing political and historical conditions in the Muslim world. The transformation of religion from an impediment to modernisation to the basis for ideologies of postmodern challenges to modernity played a crucial role in shaping these debates. After the Second World War, the primary objective of most Muslim leaders was to attain independence from foreign domination and the concept of the nation-­ state came to dominate the way most Muslims thought about politics. Even Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamā‘at-Islāmı ̄ in South Asia operated within the framework of nation-­ state politics during this period. In Indonesia, a revolutionary Islamist group called Dar al-Islam defined its struggle in terms of the nation-state, vowing to continue its ‘Holy War or Revolution until the Islamic State of Indonesia emerges safe and secure … in all of Indonesia’ (Riddell, 2001, p. 265). By the mid-twentieth century, the idea of Islam as dı ̄n had become a central theme in political debates and many countries actively considered adopting Islamic Constitutions. In Malaysia, for example, discussions centred on the Islamic party’s (Persatuan Islam se Malaya and, later, Parti Islam se Malaysia) emphasis on establishing an Islamic political structure based on the nation-state model. The concept that Islam is dı ̄n wa dawla was a concerted attempt to challenge the notion that modern states must

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be secular. These debates occurred in the context of a book written by the Egyptian scholar Ali Abd al-Raziq who argued that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was a messenger of God and not a ruler and that he did not establish a government or kingdom in the political sense of the term (Kurzman, 1998, p. 13). Although these debates set the stage for subsequent political discussions in the Muslim world, they paid little attention to the nature of the caliphate itself and instead focused increasingly on the modern state and whether or not Islam was dawla or dı ̄n. In the 1960s, the debates surrounding Islam and politics entered a new phase, as Qutb’s vision of Islam as a comprehensive way of life came to the fore. Qutb’s use of the term minhaj, derived from the Qur’ānic verse which posits that every group has a revealed law was intended to convey that Islam was not just a religion and state but a comprehensive way of life that encompasses all aspects of human existence (Al-Qur’ān, 5:48). His explanation for the success of the great revolution during the Prophetic era spoke of dı ̄n and dawla but included them as part of the broader Qur’ānic programme. Qutb argued that the new society was possible ‘because those who established this religion (dı ̄n) in the form of a state (dawla), a system, and laws had first established it in their hearts and lives’ (Qutb, 1964). This shifts the discussion on Islam as dı ̄n and dawla to dı ̄n as dawla or religion understood as the foundation for society, state and faith. By the tumultuous 1970s, the conventional political leadership had failed to provide adequate care for their people, prompting a unifying opposition movement based on the Islamic critique. The clarion call for the establishment of Islamic states became the bedrock for the ascendancy of Islamism, or political Islam, which viewed the state as the embodiment of Islam. These movements took on novel forms and targeted the Islamisation of both modern society and the state. The new political activism centred on two distinct paths to Islamisation. One approach aimed to gain control of the state to enforce the sharı ̄‘ah, upholding the notion that dı ̄n is dawla. In contrast, the other approach focused on bottom-up reform of the political system. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 yielded a state that publicly expressed Islam and served as a model for other Islamist movements. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, advocated that Muslims must destroy inherently corrupt government systems to achieve triumphant political revolution (Algar, 1981). During the 1980s, some leaders who came to power through military coups implemented sharı ̄‘ah programmes via dictatorial means, which

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others criticised, asserting that a truly Islamic State should be founded on democratic principles. In Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq, who took control of the government in 1977, implemented a sweeping Islamisation of law, aimed at transforming the socio-political system in line with Islamic teachings. He established sharı ̄‘ah courts and his own brand of democracy (shuracracy), a system of non-partisan consultation. Similarly, in Sudan, Ja‘far Numayri launched a significant program of Islamisation of law, but political leaders like Sadiq al-Mahdi and Hasan Turabi criticised it for presenting an outdated and incorrect version of sharı ̄‘ah (Voll, 2013, p. 62). The second mode of Islamism regarded politics as the critical arena for activism, with the Islamisation of society as the primary goal. Advocates of this mode believed that any program for success should be developed through public opinion. This shift in perspective moved the emphasis from dı ̄n and dawlah to Islam as a comprehensive program for state and society. In the early 1990s, many activists adopted the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’, defining the vision of Islamised modernity in the last decades of the twentieth century. The third movement in Algeria exemplifies the ‘hearts-and-lives’ approach. Abbasi Madani, a prominent figure in this movement, was an opponent of the authoritarian rule of the National Liberation Front (FLN). He founded the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which achieved significant victories in the 1990s and was on the verge of winning national elections until the military intervened in 1992. The party focused on presenting a programme based on the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’. These debates were vastly different from the conventional debates about a secular state, reflecting the changing global experiences of modernity.

5.3   Globalisation and the Revival of the Muslim Ummah Khatami (1998), the former president of Iran, argues that today humanity is searching for a new vision for its future, a new civilisation capable of meeting its spiritual and material needs. For him, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has been successful in creating this new system. Khatami perceives the 1990s as an epoch in the course of Islamisation, wherein both the Western and Islamic civilisations were at the nadir of their decline. By virtue of his emphasis on the ummah as the central unit of Muslim identity, Khatami postulates that this newfound perspective will transfigure the

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interaction between Islam and the modern nation-state (Khatami, 1998). The evolution from political Islam to a cultural framework for Islamic society and politics is exemplified by political events in Malaysia. Despite acknowledging Islam, the country had long adhered to a secular mode of politics. The Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS propagated the establishment of an Islamic State. Islamism, however, emerged in the 1980s, with the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, known as Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). Nevertheless, at the outset of the twenty-first century, Mahathir Mohammad proclaimed Malaysia to be an Islamic State. In the context of the debates on the Islamic State in Malaysia in the 2000s, Voll expounds: [These debates] reflected the changing concepts in much of the Muslim world, going beyond Islam as dı ̄n and dawla and dı ̄n as dawla to viewing Islamic values as the normative foundations for state and community. PAS, for example, repositioned itself as a party of reform reflecting views of ‘a new generation of technocratic-inclined professionals who were different from the older generation of religious scholars who were the traditional leaders’ of the party …. Anwar Ibrahim, who had been removed from his leadership positions in Mahathir’s government in 1998 and imprisoned, became the major leader of the pluralist, reformist opposition coalition. Abdullah Badawi, who became prime minister in 2003, proclaimed Islam hadhari (civilizational Islam) as central to his party’s program in ‘an eff ort to bring the ummah (the worldwide community comprising all adherents of the Muslim faith) back to the basics of Islam’ …. As in the perspective of Khatami, the discourse had shifted from dı ̄n and dawla to Islam as civilization and community in a globalized world. A similar transition from older leaders with old-style understandings of an Islamic State to more cosmopolitan businesspeople and technocrats was part of the political victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. (Voll, 2013, p. 64)

The erstwhile discourse concerning the demarcation of religion and politics had been relegated to the fringes of the political arena. The debates that have gained more prominence are those which centre on social issues and the imposition of constraints on the public sphere that determine the nature of lifestyle. However, the imposition of strict secularism becomes problematic when it excludes religious entities from participating in politics, thereby curtailing the influence of opposition parties in electoral politics. The shift in emphasis from political debates that were framed in the context of nation-states and secularism reflects the evolving conceptions of

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the intersection of religion and politics in the Muslim world in the era of globalisation. Muslims now perceive themselves more in terms of global networks of human interaction. Bulaç (2010) argues that ‘the world has set upon a novel trajectory … Despite the apparent rise of nationalism, the primary transformative factor is global concepts. Responding to something that is global necessitates the employment of a global language, which can only be possible by employing the language of the ummah’ (Bulaç, 2010). In Al-Banna’s (2003) view, the phrase ‘Al-Islam dı ̄n wa dawla’ might have been relevant in the 1940s, but its application has evolved significantly in the twenty-first century. The parameters of the debate have undergone a momentous transformation.

5.4  Reasserting Authority in the Middle East: Traditional Islamic Institutions in Response to Crisis Following the advent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) in 2014, more than 120 Muslim scholars issued an open letter to the group’s leader condemning the instrumentalisation of religion for heinous political ends (Yildirim, 2019). Yet, despite its gravity, the letter received scant international attention and failed to ignite significant support from the global Muslim population. This outcome raises critical questions regarding the nature of religious authority in Islam and its political utility, which is a valuable resource wielded by both Islamist groups and governments across the Muslim world (Robinson, 2009, p.  340). Despite its centrality to the interplay between religion and politics, there remains a significant lack of rigorous analysis concerning this vital concept in the Muslim world. Such dearth of knowledge is highly problematic due to the non-hierarchical and decentralised nature of religious authority and its unique structuring both in and beyond the region. As such, religion and religious authority are predominantly defined by a free market of religion. As discussed in the previous chapter, the rapid rise of groups like ISIS or ISIL has ignited a debate about their Islamic credentials and the need for Islamic authority to counter them. However, the quest for such an authority raises challenging issues. Religious authority in the Muslim world exists but operates in a fragmented manner. The challenges faced by religious institutions like Al-Azhar in Egypt are emblematic of the dilemmas confronting religious authorities in the Muslim world today. While struggling to ensure the continuation of its approach to the promotion of

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religious sciences, the institution finds it difficult to speak unambiguously on issues of power and accountability. These challenges are often overlooked due to the complex nature of their authority. Moreover, one might argue that Sunni Islam lacks a formal religious authority, given that no individual or state can assert authority in a political sense, determining what Muslims should believe by virtue of their political office. There is also no institution or state that can impose its teachings on matters of faith or doctrine. In practice, matters are more complex. Sometimes, political authorities do intervene in matters of faith and instrumentalise religion for partisan gain. As religious matters cannot be decided through fiat, debates about the validity of particular interpretations often overlook how religious authority is constructed in Islam. While there is no formal authority that can define particular doctrines, claiming all interpreters are equally valid is untenable. Historically, religious authority was mediated by learned individuals or ‘ulamā, who frequently coalesced in institutional settings. In countries where such institutions exist, they serve as the litmus test for what can or cannot be considered Islamic. Nevertheless, over the past two centuries, the Muslim world has undergone massive transformations in how religious authority is constructed. The authority of the ‘ulamā has been marginalised and new contenders have emerged with no expertise in religious sciences. For many Muslims, Islam has become a matter of individual conscience and people interpret the faith for themselves (Zaman, 2002). As the saying goes, ‘no one knows who speaks for Islam’. In reality, there is a crisis of authority and in the following sections, we will explore how authority is contested in Muslim-majority countries and how traditional Islamic institutions are striving to reassert themselves in response to this crisis.

5.5  Egypt As posited in the preceding section, the mediation of authority was predominantly under the purview of the ‘ulamā, in conjunction with institutional frameworks that delineated what could be deemed as Islamic or not. One such institution, known as Al-Azhar, was established in Egypt during the reign of the Fatimid dynasty (tenth to twelfth century CE) in 969 CE. It is the premier Sunni Islamic institution that has wielded a significant impact, both religiously and politically, within the Muslim world. From a historical perspective, Al-Azhar’s authority was moulded by its

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independence from the state or ruling authority. The institution followed a methodological approach to the interpretation of Islamic texts derived from the four schools of Islamic law. This very approach remains the quintessential frame of reference for the ‘ulamā, and ‘the cornerstone of their authority and identity’ (Scott, 2012, p. 132). This approach is often juxtaposed with the more monolithic and simplistic interpretations of the Islamists, stemming from their scientific and educational background. The ‘ulamā’s relationship with Islamic tradition confers upon it considerable gravitas and for many people, it is the most preeminent symbol of their religion. Nevertheless, numerous questions have been raised concerning the uncritical acceptance of tradition and the ‘ulamā being in a state of decline due to their adherence to methods of argumentation and interpretation that, while historically rooted, appear archaic and unresponsive to the needs of the people. Other voices have emerged to fill this void. The new claimants to religious authority have emanated from several Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and other conservative Salafi groups, who endeavour to define Islam outside the confines of Al-Azhar. Their relationship with tradition is often employed to differentiate the Islamists from the ‘ulamā. As Brown (2011) noted, Al-Azhar scholars ‘portray themselves almost as the voice of the society’s conscience and view the institution as playing a paternalistic role, guiding Egypt as well as safeguarding its people’s interests’. Islamists who are products of modern secular institutions are less familiar with the traditional methodology of religious commentary and interpretation taught at Al-Azhar. They posit that one does not necessarily require a background in traditional Islamic sciences to interpret the sources (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, pp. 377–380). While the Muslim Brotherhood undoubtedly poses a challenge to Al-Azhar’s authority, it does not suggest that Al-Azhar is in a linear state of decline. With respect to their approach to tradition, we observe substantial diversity within both groups and there are overlaps between them regarding their focus on tradition and the degree to which they regard expertise as a precondition for exercising religious authority. The boundaries between the two groups are considerably porous, with some ‘ulamā even expressing sympathies towards the Muslim Brotherhood. As argued by Zeghal (1999, pp. 371–380), the ‘ulamā of Al-Azhar have begun to speak the same language as the Islamists and the institution is entertaining various tendencies. It is also noteworthy that Islamists are interacting with the ‘ulamā and this interaction is fostering a degree of cohesion between

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the two groups. This has been evident with the peripheral ‘ulamā, the scholars who studied at Al-Azhar but operate without formal connections to the institutions. Scholars such as Yūsuf al-Qaradāwı ̄ and Muhammad al-Ghazālı ̄ are considered to constitute the peripheral echelon of the ‘ulamā, as they not only inhabit the world of the ‘ulamā, but also possess broad appeal and affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Their significance has been further amplified by the fact that they have built their careers outside the purview of Al-Azhar, yet their scholastic credentials, having graduated from Al-Azhar, imbue them with tremendous appeal among the ‘ulamā-centric Egyptians. This was particularly evident during the 2011 uprisings when al-Qaradāwı ̄, exhorting the protestors, issued a statement saying that ‘going down into the street on Friday of Decision is a duty under sharı ̄‘a for all those able’ (Scott, 2012, p. 144). The consultative role of Al-Azhar has long been subject to scrutiny with regard to the resurgence of the Senior ‘Ulamā Body and the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court in overseeing the implementation of sharı ̄‘ah. Notably, despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s endorsement of Al-Azhar’s advisory role, many of its members expressed trepidation about the possibility of the ‘ulamā’s counsel being disregarded. Scott (2012) in her extensive analysis, sheds light on the intricate issue at hand. This has been nourished by the political reality in which the opinions of al-­ Azhar have been disregarded and the Supreme Constitutional Court has taken decisions as to the compatibility of legislation with the sharı ̄‘a. Indeed, even for Muslim Brotherhood members who are wary of giving the ʿulamāʾ the ability to have their advice enforced, it is important for the People’s Assembly to adhere to an Islamic framework. ‘Abd al-Ḥ amı ̄d al-Ghazālı ̄, for example, regarded it as important to have independent ‘ulamā’ within the People’s Assembly in order to guard against any deviation from the sharı ̄ʿa. In matters of religion, he demanded the final say for al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Academy…. In addition, while ‘Iṣām al-‘Aryān argued that the Supreme Constitutional Court and the People’s Assembly can reject the opinion of al-Azhar, he also stated that these institutions are obliged to refer to al-Azhar on account of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution. To him, it might be a matter of choosing between different interpretations put forward by different members of al-Azhar, although he did not suggest how to formalize this obligation. (Scott, 2012, p. 161)

The act of selecting among divergent interpretations potentially heralds a broader scope for public choice within the democratic process. Ultimately,

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the eminence of Al-Azhar hinges on the populace’s acceptance of the scholars and this is contingent upon the calibre of their hermeneutics. It is frequently presumed that Islamist factions are relatively indifferent to the phenomenon of religious authority fragmentation, as it has enabled them to enjoy a dominant voice in the political arena. However, Ahmad al-­ Tayyib, the current Shaykh al-Azhar, has consistently accused the Muslim Brotherhood of harbouring unrealistic aspirations of usurping Al-Azhar’s position and its standing in the Muslim community’s hearts. Some Islamists repudiate the notion that religious authority ought to be situated in Al-Azhar or any other institution of the ‘ulamā‘. In one of his interviews with Fahmı ̄ al Huwaydı ̄, Scott (2012) claims that according to Huwaydı ̄: [Al-Azhar] is a historical thing. Muslims came before al-Azhar. There is no place for al-Azhar in an Islamic state. It is part of so-called civil society. The people decide to have al-Azhar say as a religious university as the Copts have their own religious university […] We can say that it represents the conservative school of Muslim thinkers and that this opens the door for more liberal schools to compete and to introduce their views. (Scott, 2012, p. 161)

It is of interest to observe that the peripheral ‘ulamā share Fahmı ̄ Huwaydı ̄’s sentiments. Al-Qaradāwı ̄ (2004) has asserted that the notion of ‘men of religion’ is devoid of substance, as every Muslim is a keeper of his or her faith. Rather, there are specialists who have an extensive knowledge of the sciences of Islam, called ‘ulamā. He has furthermore defined these ‘ulamā as graduates of sharı ̄‘ah faculties or anyone with an interest in Islamic sciences and tangible experience (Zeghal, 2007, p. 110). Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood’s acknowledgement of the advisory role for Al-Azhar was aligned with Sayyid al Tantāwı ̄’s position, who regarded his fatāwā as not legally binding (Hareir, 2012, p. 381). In brief, both Islamist and Azharite discourses manifest the perplexities and quandaries surrounding the role of Al-Azhar and the institutionalisation of the sharı ̄‘ah in Egypt concerning the formation and defence of religious authority. There is a commitment to legitimise the role of Al-Azhar to ensure that Egyptian law does not contradict the sharı ̄‘ah. As per the authors of the Muslim Brotherhood’s platform, a mechanism other than the Supreme Constitutional Court should be established to guarantee that legislation is consistent with the sharı ̄‘ah. Nonetheless, reformists within the organisation object to granting the ‘ulamā a direct role, as it

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violates not only the concept of a civil democratic state within an Islamic framework but also undermines the democratic process in which legislative authority rests with the Supreme Constitutional Court and the People’s Assembly. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood recognises the Supreme Constitutional Court as the ultimate authority on the constitutionality of legislation, internal conflicts about this issue may resurface in the future.

5.6  Tunisia In the year 670 of the Common Era, the religion of Islam arrived on the shores of Tunisia, brought by an army led by ‘Uqba Ibn Nafi, who successfully established a base in the city of Kairouan. The city quickly grew in popularity and soon became the premier Islamic capital of the Maghreb, regarded as one of the most sacred sites in the Islamic world (Harris & Koser, 2004). Despite its illustrious Islamic history, Tunisia became inexorably linked with secularism, a paradigm that gained dominance after the year 1956 when the first president, Habib Bourguiba, abolished the traditional Islamic system of governance. Advocates of Tunisia’s secular heritage maintain that it is a natural extension of the nineteenth-century reform movement, which sought to advance the country’s position on the world stage by modernising the military, education and technology, in order to challenge European hegemony. The reformist ideology became the backbone of official discourse during the reigns of Bourguiba and his successor, Ben Ali, and enjoyed significant success among the Tunisian population, for whom the reformist tradition became a defining characteristic of their national identity (Hibou, 2011). Although the secular elite spearheaded this movement, Sufism, a mystical religious practice that aimed to combat corruption, greed and egotism, was one of the earliest reformist trends in the country (Esposito, 2011). Furthermore, some scholars have long called for ijtihād, which involves the interpretation of Islamic law using independent reasoning. With regard to the legal framework of Tunisia, the country’s constitution recognises Islam as its official religion, yet it also defines Tunisia as a secular state. The constitution stipulates that the president must be a Muslim and designates the government as the custodian of religion. While guaranteeing freedom of belief, conscience and practice, the constitution also obliges the state to promote the values of moderation and tolerance, safeguard holy sites and prevent accusations of apostasy. According to the law,

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all religious services must take place within places of worship or other non-public settings. The constitution not only lists reasons for potentially restricting the rights and freedoms it guarantees but also upholds the right to public education and seeks to strengthen the Arab-Muslim identity among younger generations. The government is responsible for overseeing Islamic prayer services, appointing imams, paying their salaries and subsidising mosques. The President appoints the Grand Mufti, who is responsible for addressing religious issues, representing the country at the global level and providing opinions on the study and interpretation of Islam. The government may initiate legal proceedings to remove imams who are deemed to preach divisive theology (International Religious Freedom Report, 2020). In 2017, Tunisia’s former President, Beji Caid Essebsi, proposed a law that would grant men and women equal inheritance rights. The proposal was supported by the Grand Mufti, who believed that equal inheritance would ‘affirm the place of women and eliminate discrimination between the sexes’ (Kebsi, 2022). However, other religious groups, including the Islamist party Ennahda, denounced the proposed reform as a violation of Islamic precepts. Ennahda has been the primary Islamist party in Tunisia and was subjected to repression under Ben Ali’s dictatorial rule from 1987 to 2011. Following the 2011 uprisings, Ennahda won the 2011 elections with 37% of the vote and became a significant political force in the country. Since then, Ennahda has gradually moved towards the political centre, compromising on many of its Islamist objectives (Marks, 2014). For example, during the drafting of the 2014 constitution, Ennahda chose to enshrine gender equality and freedom of conscience, rather than implementing sharı ̄‘ah as the basis of legislation. These compromises while being attributed to Ghannouchi made him an important representative of a ‘moderate’ Islamism. The issue of religious authority in Tunisia is a complex and nuanced one, with multiple actors vying for dominance in this space. While Ennahda, the dominant political force in the country, may seek to push a more liberal and progressive interpretation of Islam, there are other religious actors within the movement who are more conservative and favour a more Islam-centred approach to the constitution. For instance, the former grand mufti of Tunisia, Othman Battikh, has often been at odds with Ennahda more progressive views, particularly on issues such as equal

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inheritance. Despite claiming to be ‘independent in his positions and activities’ and enjoying freedom in conducting them, his position on equal inheritance raises questions about his autonomy, as he opposed it when it was proposed by an independent MP but supported it when the President promulgated it (Grewal, 2019). This lack of independence from the government has led some to question the credibility of religious authorities like Battikh. Additionally, figures like Hossein al-Obeidi, the grand Imam of Al-Zaytuna Mosque, represent a modern, liberal and state-imposed interpretation of Islam. However, they are not viewed as credible actors due to their association with the state. However, despite being outlawed by the government, a number of Salafi figures, such as Seifallah Ben Hassaine (d.2019), who belonged to the well-known Salafi movement Ansar al-Sharı ̄‘ah, which was founded in 2011, were largely supported by the Tunisian populace. A survey conducted by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy in 2017 revealed some interesting insights into the religious authority landscape in Tunisia. For instance, figures associated with Islamist groups like Ennahda perform in line with their electoral success but perform poorly when seen as religious authorities (International Religious Freedom Report, 2020). This means that political actors like Racid Ghannouchi may enjoy support in the political arena, but not as religious authorities. Furthermore, even though state religious authorities like the grand Mufti and the grand Imam of Al-Zaytuna Mosque are not viewed as credible actors due to their association with the state, they are still among those most trusted as religious authorities. However, the survey also revealed a troubling finding—that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (d.2019), the former leader of ISIS, was the most popular figure in the endorsement experiments. On questions of religious interpretation, support for Baghdadi increased by about 10%, double that of the state religious authorities. This suggests that the religious authority in Tunisia is being challenged by radical groups and people are showing higher approval for these groups on matters of religious interpretation. Overall, the religious authority landscape in Tunisia is characterised by ongoing disputes and competition among different entities striving for prominence. While Ennahda may be the dominant political force in the country, matters of religion are dominated by state religious authorities and the Islamic State. This suggests that there is a disconnect between political and religious authority in Tunisia and that the issue of religious authority is far from settled.

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5.7  Saudi Arabia and Qatar The Saudi Arabian political framework adheres to the Caliph-Dynasty model of the Sunni Islamic state, wherein the caliph serves as the religious leader whose authority commands obedience and loyalty from all. This model was instituted when Ibn Saud consolidated his power over the territories in 1932 and named the state after his own family name. The Saudi Arabian government has always asserted itself as an Islamic state that implements Islamic law, thereby bolstering its reputation as a leading player in the global Islamic struggle against Western aggression (Fandy, 1999). Consequently, religious institutions in the country have devoted their efforts to promoting the sanctity of the monarchy through the Wahhabism doctrine, including emphasising the royal family’s role as the protector of sharı ̄‘ah. Theocratic rule in the country vehemently rejects any form of secular challenge to the state, including significant public participation in the public sphere or the election of parliamentarians. Qatar, on the other hand, recognises sharı ̄‘ah as a fundamental source of legislation in its constitution, while designating Islamic law as the ‘moral anchor’ of Qatari society (Caeiro, 2018). Caeiro (2018) highlights the role of the Qatari state in promoting Islam in the country. The Qatari state is committed to maintaining the public hegemony of Islam, upholds the primacy of the Ḥ anbalı ̄ School of jurisprudence favored by the Wahhābı ̄ movement, and criminalizes any assault on monotheistic religions … Many state-sponsored institutions are actively engaged in da‘wa activities. The longstanding presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country has helped to shape an understanding of Islam as a comprehensive social system, fostering a new kind of religious activism among sections of Qatari society…. Islam is invoked today in debates about art exhibits, financial institutions, foreign nannies, and science education…. At the same time, the public role of religion in twenty-first century Qatar appears to be clearly circumscribed. Unlike Saudi Arabia, where the alliance between religious and political authorities has produced a distinctive form of religious nationalism… the Islamic referent appears to occupy a more ambivalent space in Qatar’s nation-building efforts. Debates about the application of sharia, so prevalent in other Muslim countries, have been rather subdued here. The state officially promotes religious moderation and interfaith dialogue, notably through the Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue…. Sectarian animosity towards the Shı ̄‘ı ̄ minority, fostered by Wahhābı ̄ institutions elsewhere in the region, is not tolerated by the authorities…. Officials in religious institutions have seen their work curtailed by red tape and state

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bureaucracy… while some Islamic charities have recently fallen prey to the state’s punctilious regulatory drive. (Caeiro, 2018, p. 3)

In terms of its Wahhabi state model, Qatar differs significantly from Saudi Arabia, as it lacks a state-linked religious clergy. Instead, its clerics are mainly composed of individuals from foreign countries, who depend on the Qatari government for employment and livelihood. This particular composition of the clergy has given Qatari society a more secular character, as evidenced by the absence of a dress code, lack of strict enforcement of gender segregation and the smooth operation of business during prayer time (Baskan & Wright, 2011, p. 100). Nonetheless, the Qatari government maintains considerable authority in the country, particularly through its Ministries of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. Overall, Qatar’s reliance on non-nationals for religious guidance has afforded its government a greater degree of autonomy in matters related to state religion relations. This is in stark contrast to Saudi Arabia, where the role of the clergy is highly institutionalised. In Qatar, the role of the ‘ulamā is relegated to one of personal contacts and the best-known religious scholar in the country was Yusuf al-Qaradāwı ̄, an Egyptian-born ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood who later became a Qatari citizen and served as the Dean of the college of sharı ̄‘ah and Islamic studies at Qatar University. Despite the absence of institutionalisation of the clergy in Qatar, it does not necessarily follow that there is a lack of authority. Qaradāwı ̄’s influence as a religious figure, for instance, suggests that the authority still lies in the hands of the clergy. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar fund various religious programmes through their Ministries of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, which serves as another avenue beyond ministerial control to propagate the state-sponsored version of Islam. However, this does not imply that there are no other sources of religious authority. In fact, there are cases of religious leaders from outside the Gulf region influencing people in both countries, even though Wahhabism may be hesitant to accept other interpretations of Islam. One of the primary differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is the lack of a unified ‘ulamā in Qatar, which means that the government does not always have to communicate a consistent religious message, resulting in public missteps, social media campaigns and public protests (Commins, 2015). While both countries have closed political systems, making it challenging to ascertain public opinions about religious authorities, it is clear that government-linked religious authorities in both countries are more

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influential in shaping national religious authority. Given that state religious authorities wield considerable influence in both countries, there is a need to engage with them. It is essential to recognise, however, that their authority is not absolute. For example, the Grand mufti of Al-Azhar has a negative endorsement effect in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, economic levers of social change are unlikely to be effective in the Arabian Peninsula countries. Groups that support their followers do not have an advantage over other groups and expatriates buy into local religious authorities, which must be considered when communicating with these countries. Finally, it is important to recognise that Wahhabism looks different in different environments and a singular strategy to engage with it is likely to be unsuccessful.

5.8  Turkey As per a 2019 survey conducted by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite being a lay figure, ranks among Turkey’s leading figures of religious authority due to his public display of piety, his status as a graduate of Imam Hatip School and his position as the head of an Islamist party (Sarfati, 2019). Nonetheless, the survey reveals that 40% of respondents do not regard him as a religious authority, indicating the prevalence of disagreement surrounding his standing among the populace. Nihat Hatipoglu, a religious scholar, follows Erdoğan in popularity as a figure of religious authority. Meanwhile, the survey identified Mehmet Gormez, the former president of Diyanet and Hayrettin Karaman as other influential figures of religious authority in Turkey. Notably, the findings indicate that religious authority remains constrained within national borders, implying a lack of familiarity with Arab authorities among Turkish citizens. Regarding the relationship between Islamist actors and the state, Turkey diverges from other Arab countries in a variety of ways affecting perceptions of religious authority. Islamist movements are seen as oppositional groups vis-à-vis the state religious establishments in Arab countries (Brown, 2011). Some state authorities see Islamists as politically motivated actors who misinterpret the true meaning of religion to position themselves against political Islam. In the 1970s, a similar divide existed in Turkey when the first Islamist party was established. However, with the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Diyanet, which controls the religious

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establishment in the country, became more conservative in its religious interpretations. Consequently, due to the Islamists’ dominance in Turkey, there exists a notable overlap between official Islam and political Islam. As the survey indicates, the AKP holds a hegemonic position in Turkey’s religious public sphere. Nevertheless, certain groups challenge the party’s hegemony in the Islamic public sphere, including the counter-hegemonic discourses circulated by social movements, such as the Islamic left and platforms and networks centred around socially conscious interpretations of Islam. At the heart of these discourses is the religious scholar and author, Ihsan Eliaçik. By focusing on two different approaches to Islam: restoration (ihya) and construction (inşa), he argues that Muslims must reform their perception of Islam (Eliaçık, 2003). For him, Islamic culture is influenced by the political conditions of past Muslim empires. Embraced by religious authorities in Turkey, this approach to restoration is defensive, authoritarian and diverges from the Qur’ān (Sarfati, 2019, p. 9). Eliaçik advocates a construction approach to get rid of the wrongs of the past, which centres on reconstructing the Qur’ānic messages for the contemporary world (Eliaçık, 2014). Eliacik’s stance against using state power to facilitate religious indoctrination contradicts the AKP’s Islamisation discourse (Hareir, 2012). This agenda was exemplified when the Prime Minister stated that the AKP aims to raise a pious generation (Dindar bir gençlik yetiştirmek, 2011). To achieve this objective, the AKP adopted new policies, including banning abortions in all public and private hospitals, funding religious schools and increasing the role of religion in school curricula. For instance, the history of various battles was written with an Islamic emphasis to strengthen religious nationalism and extol the concept of martyrdom among youth (Lüküslü, 2016). Meanwhile, Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamic Jurist affiliated with the AKP party, endorses using state power to legislate Islamic morality among the public (Akyol, 2014). Karaman believes that Muslims living in multicultural and multi-religious societies must not permit any behaviour that goes against their morality (Sarfati, 2019, p. 11). In contradistinction, Eliaçık posits that the need of the hour is the decentralisation of authority and the fostering of pluralism. In his published work, he expounds on the viewpoint put forth by the Covenant of Medina as ‘democratic Islam’, asserting that it ensured the participation of each community in religious and tribal matters. According to him, the salient feature of this Covenant is its acceptance of all parties as subjects.

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Compared to earlier Islamists’ perspectives on the Covenant of Medina, Eliaçik’s interpretation foregrounds a radical pluralism. He avers that the Qur’ānic verse, ‘And of his signs is the diversity of your languages and colors’, is indicative of God’s reverence for the diversity of beliefs, identities, rituals and traditions (Al-Qur’ān: 30:22). To achieve the objective of diversity, he contends that democracy is the most fitting system, whereby the states are held accountable to their citizens and leaders must incorporate the diversity of voices in society into decision-making. Eliaçik’s proposal for the decentralisation of authority involves the creation of separate assemblies in all the provinces of Turkey. His stance resonates with the theories of participatory democracy and progressive pluralism (Young, 1990; Fraser, 1990). In terms of the treatment of Kurds, he challenges the AKP’s nationalist stance and its emphasis on unity. He proposes a position that foregrounds Kurdish empowerment, recognition of the Kurds as well as other marginalized ethnic and religious identities, and a radical decentralization of political authority. While the AKP reformed the parameters of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds during the years of the so-called Kurdish opening (2009–2015) by engaging in limited reforms, it embraced an exclusionary and authoritarian nationalism after the process was dismantled. In this context, the AKP created an alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), emphasized monolingualism, criminalized explicit signs of Kurdish ethnic identity by associating them with terrorism, and cracked down on nonviolent Kurdish political actors and members of civil society. Eliaçık also adopts a more inclusionary position with regard to the rights of religious minority groups and freedom of conscience. He suggests that the foremost criterion to judge a person is his/her moral character, rather than piety. He sums up his ideas succinctly in an interview: Only four actions require a punishment in the Quran: killing someone, stealing, slandering, and committing adultery. When we look at these, we see that these are totally regarding human rights. Not believing in Allah or afterlife, not praying, not fasting, not going to hajj, not wearing the veil do not have any punishments in this world. These rituals are left to people’s voluntary commitments and beliefs. (Sarfati, 2019, pp. 10–11)

This interpretation posits that the ceremonial aspects of religion are subordinate to the Qur’ān’s message regarding social justice. As such, this interpretation is believed to promote an inclusive discourse towards marginalised groups in Turkey, including Alevis and atheists. This viewpoint

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stands in contrast to the official religious authority of the Diyanet, which regards atheism as a deviant ideology and does not acknowledge Alevi cemevis as places of worship (Crete, 2016). Karaman’s ideas regarding Islamist political thought serve as theoretical justification for the Diyanet’s views on religious pluralism, which maintains that political disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims can only be resolved by the latter embracing Islam and its system (Sarfati, 2019, p. 12). Such a view undermines the concepts of tolerance and pluralism towards minority groups. In summary, despite being a layperson, Erdoğan commands significant authority as a religious figure in Turkey. This is due to the AKP’s significant influence on the Diyanet and Imam Hatip schools, leading to significant overlap between official Islam and political Islam in Turkey. There is a positive correlation between trust in Erdoğan and trust in the former head of the Diyanet, Mehmet Görmez, indicating that Islamism and state religion are interconnected. Moreover, supporters of the AKP are more likely to trust the Diyanet’s fatwas. However, the Islamic Left has challenged the AKP’s brand of nationalist Islamism and over the past decade, youth groups, workers’ rights movements and Islamic feminists have backed Ihsan Eliaçık’s reformist vision of Islam. Eliaçık’s liberal and democratic interpretations offer an alternative to the intolerant and majoritarian discourses of the AKP and pro-AKP factions. Consequently, many view Eliacik as a religious authority, demonstrating that the Islamic Left’s reach is not insignificant. The ideological differences between Eliaçık’s liberal Islamic thought and the AKP’s Islam are also reflected in their respective social bases. Survey results indicate that those who trust Eliaçık’s are more supportive of democracy and religious minorities and are more likely to believe that there are multiple ways to interpret Islam. Meanwhile, those who trust Erdogan do not view corruption as a significant concern in Turkey, while Eliaçık’s followers regard it as a major issue.

5.9  Southeast Asia Islam is recognised in Southeast Asia as a multifaceted and multilayered religion. A plethora of interpretations of Islam have given rise to a wide array of groups that have contested religious authority in the region (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, pp. 1–2). In Indonesia, for instance, the Nahdatul Ulama, which focuses on the Shafi‘ı ̄ school of law and the Muhammadiya, which merges modernist ideals with Islamic thought, are two notable groups (Gibson, 2007). From the sixteenth century to the present,

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numerous other Islamist groups have also challenged religious authority and wield significant influence in Indonesian society, with their adherents forming political parties and Islamic civil groups. Since the late 1970s, an Islamic revival has taken place in Southeast Asia (Azra, 2005, p.  17). Islamic movements have proliferated throughout the region in response to changes in societal values, resulting in a strengthened Islamic identity and an expanded role for Islam in public life. In Malaysia, the government has been at the forefront of promoting its Islamisation policies in education, economics, and, more recently, Islam Hadari (Abdul Hamid & Ismail, 2014). The latter is a theory of government based on Islamic principles and should be seen as a renewal of the old concept aimed at addressing contemporary problems faced by the modern Muslim ummah (Ali, 2013). Some of these movements reflect not only a tension between modernity and tradition but also global trends taking place in other regions, such as the Middle East. In the subsequent sections, we will delve into how religious authority is constructed and challenged in Indonesia and Malaysia and how Islamist groups compete with established religious authorities, deploying novel methods ranging from social media to community-based activities.

5.10   Indonesia A substantial portion of the scholarship dealing with the changing roles of ‘ulamā focuses on the Middle East, while few studies make reference to Indonesia. Notably, Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population and is home to two Muslim mass organisations, namely Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In 1946, the Indonesian government established a Ministry of Religious Affairs, ostensibly as a gesture of goodwill towards committed Muslims. The ministry’s upper echelons were filled by Western-educated individuals, though its ministers were drawn from Muslim organisations. This institution governs religious education in schools, the Islamic courts, religious endowments and the hajj. During Suharto’s reign (1965–1998), the Ministry became the chief apparatus for governing Islam, especially after the Communist Party’s downfall. Suharto viewed Islamist groups with suspicion, as they held a potential for mass appeal. Consequently, he dismantled the control of NU and Muhamadiyah over the Ministry. In 1971, he replaced the last NU-affiliated Minister with a modernist religious thinker, A. Mukhti Ali, who had been educated in the West (Subhan, 2010, p. 126).

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The Ministry oversaw the expansion of modern religious education, advocating for a curriculum that consisted of 70% general and 30% religious subjects in state madrasas and state Islamic universities. This approach was expected to produce a cadre of enlightened religious bureaucrats and scholars. In the 1980s, the Ministry sent a considerable number of graduates from these institutions to universities in Europe, North America, Australia, Japan and the Middle East to study the humanities and social sciences of religion. Upon their return, they were to fill the higher positions in the religious bureaucracy or as teaching staff in universities. In 1975, the government established a national council of Islamic scholars, Majelis ‘Ulamā’ Indonesia (MUI), which provided religious legitimacy to the government’s developmental policies (Bruinessen, 2006). The council is viewed as Indonesia’s primary fatwa-issuing body, and at times, coercion was used to align its fatwas with the government’s needs. The MUI does not possess a ‘monopoly of fatwa issuing; the large Muslim associations have their own bodies and procedures for answering religious questions, and even individual ulama may publish fatwas on issues of public concern (Ichwan, 2006). But the MUI’s opinions had the weight of government recognition. Not all of its fatwas have been in response to the government’s needs’ (Bruinessen, 2018, p. 7). Through this institution, the government positioned itself as neutral between religions but interventionist in Muslim affairs, with the state determining what constituted acceptable religion. In each province, district and sub-district, offices for religious affairs were set up to register marriages, supervise religious education and provide zakat and hajj services. Until 2004, the Ministry also administered religious courts, but new legislation has placed them administratively and financially under the Supreme Court (Bruinessen, 2018, p. 7). In the period following the fall of Suharto, there has been a widely held belief among the upper echelons of Indonesian society that the status and influence of the ‘ulamā have been in decline (Fealy & Bush, 2014). This downturn is not only based on cultural considerations, but is also tied to the political activities of the ‘ulamā. Specifically, the ‘ulamā and the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) no longer exert the same level of power that they once did within both the religious and political spheres. The erosion of religious authority is associated with the emergence of new Islamic authorities who have been able to gather followers through their use of social media, the internet and television. Research into this subject has aimed to create a connection between the rise of Islamism and socio-political trends in Indonesia (Vedi, 2016; Marcus & Muhtadi, 2018). One of the significant

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factors contributing to the growth of Islamism in the country has been the challenge to the authority of established groups such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, as newer organisations have sought to undermine their control over Islamic discourse in Indonesia by promoting more traditional and narrow interpretations of Islam. These phenomena are linked to Indonesia’s experience of a significant technological transformation that has created a new marketplace of ideas (Arifianto, 2020, pp. 37–50). As a result of emerging democratic norms and institutions, a space has been created where previously suppressed and marginalised groups can promote alternative interpretations of Islamic theology via innovative new media outlets. While this marketplace has led to the fragmentation of Islamic religious authority, it has further contributed to the waning influence of groups such as NU and Muhamadiyah (Mohiuddin, 2023, pp. 121–128). This shift has allowed more conservative groups to occupy the space formerly dominated by moderate organisations, using new forms of propagation to influence a new generation of middle-class Muslims. These conservative groups have used the internet and social media to conduct da‘wah activities and dominate propagation efforts on university campuses. Over time, these new Islamist figures have been able to develop networks and alliances with other Islamic authorities and the political elite. By using innovative preaching methods and a literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine, preachers such as Abdul Samad, Abdullah Gymnastiar and Hanan Attaki have established themselves as fresh sources of Islamic authority. These groups include the Tarbiyah Movement, Wahdah Islamiyah, Ja’maah Tabligh, HTI and the Islamic Forum for Islamic Society (FUI) (Fahlesa, 2017, pp. 242–263; Fahlesa, 2018). The popularity of these new preachers and Islamist groups is reducing the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah clerics, whose ideas are increasingly perceived as irrelevant by millennial Muslims aged 20–35 (Hoesterey, 2016). Their use of up-to-date communication tools along with the media has enabled them to better address the needs and expectations of a new generation of Indonesian Muslims (Weng, 2018, p.  134). Numerous adherents of Islam express disillusionment with the two major Islamic organisations due to their university affiliates’ recruitment tactics, which tend to target students who already possess pre-existing ties to NU and Muhammadiyah through family or school-related groups (Greg, 2018; Slama, 2017). These affiliates, while possessing a strong presence in major

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universities, have engendered dissatisfaction among some millennial students, who regard both organisations as part of the establishment. Accordingly, these students prefer to affiliate themselves with more conservative groups as a means of conveying their discontent with the public sphere. This disenchantment with established authorities has resulted in the emergence of breakaway groups and activists who have established their own organisations to challenge the senior leaders’ authority regarding the proper interpretation of Islam. A prominent example of such an organisation is the Salafi-oriented Wahdah Islamiyah group, headquartered in South Sulawesi. This group separated from Muhammadiyah in 1988 when the latter group decided to acquiesce to the Suharto regime’s demands and ‘to accept the national ideology Pancasila as its sole foundation’ (Chaplin, 2018, pp. 208–211). Currently, Wahdah has 120 branches throughout Indonesia and is the most extensive Salafi organisation in the country (Chaplin, 2018, pp. 212). Its citizenship-­based exclusivist focus prioritises pious Muslims over non-Muslims. Through extensive networks that encompass national and local politicians, as well as security officials, Wahdah has established itself as a leading Islamic organisation in Sulawesi, a significant educational and social service provider, and an organisation with substantial national and local political support. In Post-Reformasi Indonesia, the marketplace of ideas has disrupted the equilibrium between new Islamic authorities and established ones. Established authorities have abandoned their traditional stances and adopted narrow theological positions, aligning themselves with the Islamist agenda promoted by the newcomers. This shift in Islamic doctrine has led to a more conservative trend currently observed in the country, resulting in the curtailment of minorities’ freedoms and the limitation of non-Muslims’ political participation. While the prospect of radical Islamist groups remains remote, their success can no longer be overlooked in contemporary Indonesian politics. During the 2019 presidential elections, the Islamist groups experienced a significant setback when incumbent President Joko Widodo, backed by a coalition of moderate Muslim activists from NU and Muhammadiyah and non-Muslims, defeated Prabowo Subianto (Arifianto, 2020, p. 12). Nevertheless, moderates must not become complacent. With their newfound ability to persuasively communicate new ideas to millennial Muslims, Islamist authorities will undoubtedly make a resurgence in the Indonesian public sphere in the short term.

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5.11  Malaysia In the Malaysian context, the traditional authority of the ‘ulamā has faced substantial challenges in the wake of the establishment of a modern nation-­ state, the emergence of new forms of governance and the ascent of various Islamist groups. With the consolidation of modern state authority, the interpretation of Islamic law has become a domain in which the state is required to assert its power. While the promotion of the application of sharı ̄‘ah enjoys popular appeal among certain Islamist groups and religious leaders, such interventions could be construed as posing a threat to the authority of the ‘ulamā. In a number of Malaysian states, ‘ulamā are now engaged in the public sphere, but the criteria utilised by the state to employ them are not based on traditional measures of religious knowledge. Rather, they rely on degree certification from modern universities. As a result, these university-educated ‘ulamā have come to assume a greater role in Malaysia’s bureaucracy. Consequently, the spaces for the authority of traditionally educated ‘ulamā have been increasingly limited. With these developments, the composition, authentication and occupations of the traditional ‘ulamā have undergone significant transformation over the last few decades (Yuki & Hiroko, 2014, p. 615). Graduates of Islamic universities, especially those from the Middle East, are now commonly referred to as ‘ulamā and they teach in Islamic schools, work at mosques as Imams, and serve as public officers in government departments and religious institutions. However, the mass production of the so-called ‘ulamā has also led many critics to lament what they perceive as a degradation of the intellectual quality of the ‘ulamā. In the twentieth century, religious education in Malaysia underwent a significant transformation with the introduction of the madrasa model. These schools are commonly referred to as modern religious schools because they incorporated some elements of the modern education system, such as classroom teaching and certifications for educational progress. Initially, these madrasas were designed for religious education at the elementary level, but they gradually evolved into institutions for ‘ulamā training. The majority of pondoks (institutions of Islamic learning headed by a Tok Guru) have now established madrasas within their compounds. In Malaysia, modern madrasas became part of the national educational system in the twentieth century. By importing the concept of a yearly curriculum, these changes destabilised the role of Tok Gurus and reduced their independence from the state. In other words, rather than focusing

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on the figure of the Tok Guru, religious education gradually became institutionalised, which, in turn, undermined the extent of their independent religious authority. Following Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the ‘ulamā began to bolster their religious, social and political authority. While attempting to engage with the state, the ‘ulamā sought to advance specific priorities for the future of their communities. The challenge was to navigate their interaction with the state rather than simply becoming captured by the interests of the state. After World War II, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) endeavoured to cultivate relationships with the ‘ulamā. The party established the Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (PUM) to attract the ‘ulamā and gain their support for its political activities. However, the ‘ulamā were more interested in forming their own political alliances. In 1955, the political grouping rose again and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) subsequently grew to become a prominent Islamist party in Malaysia that continues to wield significant influence today (Kessler, 1979). Following the 1955 elections, the tentacles of the party network reached further and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) celebrated its inaugural success during the 1959 general elections, triumphantly securing electoral victories in three states—Terengganu, Kedah, and Kelantan. It was at this crucial juncture that the most eminent leaders of PAS in Kelantan, Mohammad Asri Muda and Ishak Lotfi, assumed the mantle of leadership, despite not being the esteemed Tok Gurus (Rolf, 2009). Nonetheless, the party’s cadres were under the control of these esteemed religious figures, who wielded considerable influence. Eager to imbue the principle of leadership by the ‘ulamā into the organisation, the newly elected leaders strived to follow in the footsteps of the Iranian Revolution and its tenets, particularly the principle of the guidance of clerics (wilayat al-faqih) as elucidated by Ayatollah Khomeni, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. A delegation was sent to Iran in 1981 to study the Iranian model of leadership, which inspired the PAS to realign its policy positions and restructure the party. The new leadership structure gave rise to the establishment of the ‘Ulamā Council, which assumed the mantle of being the supreme decision-making body for the party. In the 1990 general election, the PAS recaptured the reins of power in Kelantan under the astute leadership of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat. During his administration, policies that aligned with Islamic precepts were introduced, including the imposition of restrictions on alcohol consumption, the ban on prostitution and the subsidisation of pondok education

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by the state (Feener, 2013). However, it must be noted that the political milieu in Malaysia is not necessarily conducive to the realisation of the Tok Gurus’ aspirations or Nik Aziz’s vision. The country has initiated several concerted efforts at social engineering, which have drastically transformed traditional pondok communities into more contemporary religious schools. Similarly, the PAS has undergone significant changes, with the authority of the Tok Gurus being significantly diminished. Although the coalition of PAS with other parties like the Democratic Action Party and People’s Justice Party has attracted a higher number of voters, this has led to the erosion of the ‘ulamā’s socio-political status and religious authority.

5.12  South Asia Indubitably, the evolution of religious authority in South Asia has been a multifaceted process, encompassing various facets of social, political and religious life (Sanyal, 1996; Buehler, 1998). Yet, the attention of most scholars has been concentrated on the religious history of the ‘ulamā and Sufis, with scant attention paid to the realm of political-religious leaders (Douglas, 1988). However, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the intricate dynamics of the evolution of religious authority in South Asia, we must delve into the fortunes of the three distinct categories of religious leaders and assess their respective trajectories over time.

5.13  Religious Pluralism and the Paradox of Sufism in South Asia In the complex religious landscape of South Asia, the position of Sufism is wrought with contradictions and complexities (Troll, 1989; Ernst & Lawrence, 2002). Despite a long history of traditional practices at Muslim shrines, Sufism is often criticised by various religious groups, including Wahhabis, modernists and Islamists, who view external manifestations of Sufi practices with contempt. This has led to a paradoxical situation where Sufism is both celebrated and disparaged, depending on the context and the observer’s worldview (Gaborieau, 1999, p. 452). One example of this paradox is seen in the Deobandis, a reformist religious group in India, who have chosen to retain only minimal Sufi practices in the private sphere (Metcalf, 1982). In contrast, the Barelwis, another reformist group, has embraced the full Sufi heritage and is often compared to the Nahdatul Ulama in its

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approach to Sufism (Sanyal, 2005, p. 11) However, the Barelwis have not actively participated in the political process, except for some recent and marginal involvement in Pakistan (Gaborieau, 2010, p.  8). These groups are incredibly influential in the private sphere, but their role in the public sphere is often kept in the background, reflecting the complex and dynamic nature of religious authority in South Asia.

5.14  Rise of the ‘Ulama ̄ The dawn of the twentieth century saw a momentous shift in the religious landscape of South Asia, with the emergence of the ‘ulamā as authoritative figures in the realm of Islamic scholarship (Smith, 1963, p. 42). This rise to prominence was spurred on by the development of three distinct schools of religious thought, each placing a premium on the acquisition of religious knowledge: the Deobandis, the Ahl al-Hadı ̄th and the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’. The ‘ulamā entered the political arena with the Khilafat movement, receiving support from the venerable Farangi Mahall school, which played a pivotal role in establishing the Association of the ‘Ulamā’ of India in 1919. This organisation quickly became the de facto religious authority for Indian Muslims. In reflecting on the leadership of the movement, Gaborieau (2010) posits that: The leadership of this organization was soon captured by the Deobandis, who kept it till the end of the British Raj. They publicized a very elaborate doctrine of the role of the ulama in an United India, and of their control of the religious and social life…. Post-1947, the Association of the Ulama of India remained the official interlocutor for the Indian Union, in connection with Deoband and the Nadwatu’l-’Ulama, to preserve the Muslim institutions, particularly the personal law…. The most famous spokesman for the ulama in India and abroad was the famous Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi. In Pakistan, after Partition, two rival associations arose…: the Barelwi one (Association of the Ulama of Pakistan) remained marginal; the Deobandi one (Association of the Ulama of Islam) was prominent and tried to influence the Islamization of the state; its principal spokesman was Muhammad Shafi’ (1897–1976), a former mufti of Deoband. (Gaborieau, 2010, p. 9)

It would therefore seem that the ‘ulamā should stand as the final religious authority and have the final say on Islam. But that does not seem to be the case. The ‘ulamā’s authority was undermined by new charismatic leaders.

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5.15  The Rise of Religio-Political Leaders The rise of charismatic political figures with religious proclivities was perceived by many as a more ground-breaking occurrence than the emergence of the ‘ulamā as prominent religious experts. In 1919, a peculiar coalition between Hindu and Muslim leaders set the tone for the Khilafat movement and the non-cooperation movement, which served as a prelude to India’s independence. Notably, laypeople such as Muhammad Ali, the principal organisers of the Khilafat movement, had a lasting impact on Abul A‘la Mawdūdı ̄, to whom he attributed his conversion and Muhammad Iqbal, a philosopher, poet and lawyer, who laid the theoretical groundwork for Muslim separatism and the establishment of an Islamic state, later known as Pakistan. These compelling leaders were known to hold greater sway than the ‘ulamā (Gaborieau, 2010, p. 9). To underscore this statement, we can look at the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The Indian ‘ulamā largely opposed the partition and favoured a united, multi-­religious India. Those who joined the Muslim League and Jinnah were a small minority led by Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Mufti Muhammad Shafi’. As Hardy (1972) observed, the Muslim community disregarded the traditional authority of the ‘ulamā to follow a charismatic leader (Muhammad Ali Jinnah), who not only argued for the creation of a separate Muslim state but also ‘devised the strategy to obtain a massive vote in favour of Pakistan, bypassing the apparently well-established authority of the ulama’ (Gaborieau, 2010, p.  9).The fact that charismatic leaders held more authority than the ‘ulamā is also evident from the framing of Pakistan’s constitution between 1948 and 1956. The ‘ulamā were ill prepared and presented an outdated model of the medieval caliphate. As a result, they had to concede to the leader of an Islamist group (Jamā‘at-e-Islami), Abul ‘Ala Mawdūdı ̄, who came forward with a more contemporary theory of the Islamic state. For Binder (1961), Mawdūdı ̄ was the real leader and driving force behind the debate. From the preceding discussion, we may safely conclude that religious authority has undergone changes over the past six decades. First, it has changed in the identity of its holders, who are neither Sufis nor the ‘ulamā. Notably, remarkable decisions concerning the future of the South Asian Muslim community were made by charismatic leaders who neither belonged to the ‘ulamā nor represented any mainstream religious faction. The second change is in the nature of the authority: these leaders drew on

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messianic aspirations and played on their own charisma. The spectacular evolution of Pakistan was triggered by a populist orator who invoked religious authority to excite his audience. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who many regard as a secular leader, utilised Islam to legitimise his domestic and foreign policies, surpassing his successor, Zia-ul-Haq, who is typically blamed for the Islamisation of Pakistan and its institutions (Jaffrelot, 1996). As Nasr (1994) asserts, the actual innovation since the third decade of the twentieth century was the charismatic religious authority embodied in lay politicians. This authority supplanted the more legal-rational form of authority that the British had promoted and that traditionalist groups like the Deobandis had adopted. It revived a new type of leadership exemplified by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi. However, whereas the latter represented medieval modes of leadership, the new millenarianism prefigured Islamism as propagated in Egypt. This recent epilogue should be considered in light of the perils of charismatic leadership. It also illustrates the limitations of the authority of the ‘ulamā, which can be easily circumvented.

5.16  Conclusion The Muslim world is currently in a state of disarray, but the rise of Islamist movements is a phenomenon that has gained considerable traction. Islamist leaders have entered the ranks of the ‘ulamā in advocating perspectives on how to live in accordance with Islamic principles under dynamic circumstances (Sonn, 2018, p. 145) The emergence of such leaders, whose innovative viewpoints may be deemed radical or extremist, marks a progression from earlier trends in Islamic discourse, and represents an enduring legacy of the upheavals that were sparked by European expansion and the Ottoman response to it. The persistence and proliferation of Islamist groups in the Muslim world reflects the integration of religious discourse originating from sources beyond the traditional strongholds of the ‘ulamā (Voll, 2013, p. 57). This does not suggest that the scholarship of those trained in the classical Islamic tradition has become outdated, but rather that religious discourse has transcended the boundaries of their conventional domain. Lewis (1976) contends that Islam remains the most effective mode of consensus in Muslim nations, serving as the fundamental group identity among the masses (Lewis, 1976). This efficacy will continue to increase as the regimes in the Muslim world become more genuinely popular. In

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essence, what Lewis characterises as consensus is simply the customary terminology that defines the Islamic community of discourse. Current articulations may not be conventional within the vernacular context, but rather incorporate new developments in the discursive legacy of Islam. Moreover, these articulations are not uniform. Islamist groups that challenge religious authority have acquired power by adapting to the shifting interests of specific groups within the Muslim community. The principles of modernisation and globalisation serve as the framework for affirming one’s identity and extend individuals’ opportunities to adopt these principles. However, this can lead to a sense of insecurity and frustration since, after being freed from traditional social constraints, individuals are required to take responsibility for their own lives. In Muslim societies, the concepts of modernisation and globalisation are associated with the dominance of the West. Thus, the West constitutes an important point of reference, but also raises concerns about the erosion of Muslim identity and status in the world. The fears that arise from modernisation and globalisation exert a profound influence on the religious interests of Muslims, as religion is a means of expressing and legitimising the social order and the corresponding attitudes towards it (Reddig, 2011, p. 172). Salafist groups, particularly, are adept at accommodating the altered religious proclivities of their followers, providing a platform for them to articulate their feelings of identity crisis and repudiation of modernisation and globalisation through religious discourse. These groups censure both the Muslim elite and the West for the crisis, which renders them all the more alluring to those who feel disconcerted by the rapid changes brought about by modernisation and globalisation. The rise of these groups poses a severe threat to religious authority, jeopardising the theological and ethical underpinnings of Islam, thus presenting a major predicament for the Muslim world (Reddig, 2011, p. 172). In effect, we are witnessing a transformation of power dynamics in the religious arena of Islam, which engenders considerable ambiguity about the authority structures (Riaz, 2008, p. 39). At present, it is uncertain which factions will emerge as the dominant actors in the religious field of Islam (El Fadl, 2005). To preclude these movements from usurping religious authority, the modified religious predilections within the ranks of the ‘ulamā must be given due consideration. While transformation of the religious field is an inevitable outcome of modernisation and globalisation, the various agents in the religious sphere can shape the course of this transformation.

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CHAPTER 6

Islamism in the Digital Age: The Role of Cyberspace in Transforming Religious Authority

6.1   Introduction The tenets of Islam espouse peace and harmony, yet in the Western world, a lingering suspicion persists that the faith may not be the serene entity it proclaims to be. The tragic events of 9/11 have only served to further reinforce this notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’, an arduous and enduring battle against terrorism that appears to have no end in sight (Bulliet, 2002, p. 12). Given this fraught state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that Osama bin Laden declared war on the West, believing it to be the only viable option available to a devout Muslim. In his eyes, those religious experts, or ‘ulamā’, who chose not to ally themselves with his cause, were nothing less than traitors to the faith. At the same time, those who seek to extol the virtues of a peaceful Islam have been drowned out by the conspicuous silence of their peers who have yet to condemn acts of violence unequivocally. This deafening silence serves as a painful reminder of a crisis of authority that has enabled radical ideologues, bereft of any formal religious education, to assume the mantle of spokesman for the staggering 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide. This crisis of Islamic authority has rendered the traditional leaders marginalised, unable to disqualify those who speak or act in ways that are not reflective of the faith. This lack of centralisation and hierarchical structures has been a source of strength for Islam, allowing it to adapt to changing conditions over the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Mohiuddin, Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6_6

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centuries. But it has also made it exceedingly challenging for Muslims to speak with one voice on critical issues. What we are witnessing today is a crisis of Islamic authority exacerbated by a series of historical forces that have steadily eroded the legitimacy of traditional scholars and leaders in the Muslim world. These imams and jurists, who were once viewed as the arbiters of religious authority, have been supplanted by more radical figures with tenuous links to tradition. What is truly noteworthy is that a growing number of ordinary Muslims, lacking any formal religious education, now feel empowered to speak about their faith. In this context, the proliferation of mass media, information technology and the internet have made it possible for these individuals to speak on behalf of Islam, leading to a fragmentation of religious authority. Some argue that this development presents a unique opportunity to establish an Islamic intellectual sphere, while others view it as a challenge, with the rise of radical Islamist groups being attributed to this very fragmentation of authority. The right to interpret Islamic texts is no longer the exclusive domain of traditionally trained scholars (Bano, 2017, p. 10). Turner (2007) contends that modern communication technology has fundamentally altered the social conditions by which religious and political authority are produced. Information society cannot be regulated by governments and controlling the flow of information via newspapers, TV channels and text messages on the internet is a nearly insurmountable task. As such, modern communication systems have emerged as a veritable threat to Islamic authority. The discussion around the media, religion and religious authority centres on the disparate and contradictory effects of information technology, where the circulation of cassettes, text messages and video clips initially proved an efficient method for religious revivalism (Turner, 2007, p. 118). At the same time, the sheer volume of this religious traffic threatens to overrun traditional voices. With the emergence of new information technologies and the internet, we have seen the evolution of new religious voices of authority, who are largely self-trained and independent (Crow, 2000, p. 54). However, these new voices represent a sharp departure from traditional and formally trained religious authorities of earlier generations. Critics often contend that these new authorities undermine the religious message of ‘ulamā’. In the Muslim world, these new intellectuals have begun to supplant the authority of traditional sources of knowledge (Roy, 1994). This evolution of new voices of authority is a function of the spread of higher education in the Muslim world and

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a consequence of the failure of modernisation under the conditions of neoliberal globalisation. As we have discussed in Chap. 2, Islamist movements emerged as a consequence of the economic and ‘social frustrations following the economic crisis that were the result of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s’ (Turner, 2007, p. 129). The rise of these new authority figures could be contextualised in relation to the cry for global Islamisation in the 1970s. The proponents of Islamism were young intellectuals who had freshly graduated from technical and scientific fields and who were themselves inspired by the ideologues of the 1960s (Kepel, 2002). These novel authorities inveighed against the shortcomings of contemporary Muslim societies in the name of the Islam of the early community of the Prophet. Various scholars have discussed the utilisation of the media and the internet by these novel voices of authority and radical Islamist groups to propagate their ideology and propaganda. The internet has metamorphosed into a virtual repository of radical material, providing facile access to a panoply of content ranging from political and theological material to fatwas and khutbas. This propaganda serves to legitimise a cause and targets both an internal and an external audience. Internally, it focuses on religious education and the creation of a shared theoretical and ideological groundwork. Externally, the propaganda aims at demoralising the adversary. Above all, the dissemination of ideology and propaganda creates a common base for radical groups and represents a form of one-way communication, which contributes to the formation of online communities. This chapter attempts to scrutinise the nexus between social media and Islamic authority and to unveil how radical Islamist groups have proven successful in disseminating their messages via the internet in order to accomplish their overarching strategic and religious goals. The chapter focuses on radical Islamist groups such as ISIS or ISIL and al-Qaeda to examine how these groups have invested in an online presence and leverage online communities and social media to attract adherents. It evinces that all these groups and the so-called new authority figures, who lack expertise in Islamic tradition, have to some extent contributed to the fragmentation of religious authority as lay interpreters have stepped forward to contest the religious scholars, and as individual human conscience has assumed an increasingly pivotal role. Consideration is also given to how these groups contest religious authority, challenge traditional scholarship and how religious leaders and governments are endeavouring to counter their influence online.

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6.2   Islam, Social Media and Technology The ubiquity of social media in various virtual spaces and contexts renders it virtually impossible to conceive of the modern world without it. Muslim contexts are no exception, where internet use while on the go has become commonplace. Owing to the reduced digital divide and increased access, social media has emerged as a global phenomenon that pervades all aspects of life through tools such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram. With mobile phone access to the internet, the channels for disseminating information about Islam have experienced exponential growth and the connections made within networks have evolved such that even groups previously averse to technology are increasingly accepting the need to respond to the challenges of social media. For those who seek to make an online impact, the need to maintain a constant and regularly updated online presence has become imperative. Studies on the intersection of Islam and social media are scarce, with the few available ones mainly conducted by either sociologists or computer science specialists. For instance, in a 2014 study, Ibahrine (2014) investigated the role of social media in spreading Islam among users, focusing on its impact on religious practices. His exploration of the effects of social media on young Muslims led Ibahrine to conclude that ‘the use of social media has created an open sphere for a young Muslim generation that started to assume an authority that was usually assigned to Muslim scholars, thus making religious authority a contested domain rather than an accepted reality by the uneducated masses’ (Ibahrine, 2014, p. 738). Meanwhile, Allievi (2002) coined the term ‘neo-communities’ when referring to the emerging Muslim communities in Europe, to describe how this community had started to assume an underlying authority manifested in political views towards foreign policy regarding the Muslim world. His work is an ‘attempt to investigate the role of the internet and the mass media in constructing transnational and non-ethnic Muslim communities, focusing on the processes involved in the way they establish their borders as well as transborders. Allievi (2002, p. 22) provided examples of Islamic networks that contributed to the building of Muslim neo-­ communities in Europe and fostering a new image of Islam’. In another study, researchers conducted a survey to study social media usage among students in Jordan, focusing on usage, purposes and Islamic effects. The study revealed that social media increased information ‘promoting Islam to 78% calling for more utilization of social media by religious scholars’ (Hatab, 2016, p. 223).

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The seminal scholarship of Bunt (2018) has brought to light the nuanced dynamics at play in the ever-evolving cyber-Islamic landscape. In its nascent stages, digital space was fiercely contested by incumbents and new entrants alike and the power balance was often tipped in favour of the technologically adverse players, who leveraged their creativity to gain an edge. Consequently, this gave rise not only to new Islamic voices and influences but also to new identities that were rooted in social media constructs. The global and digital cyberspace in which Islam operates today is being constantly reshaped and the internet has had a monumental impact on the Muslim world. By analysing the crucial components of the development of Islamic cyber networks and pathways, one can discern a diverse range of hypertextual approaches that have been created by Muslims to present their political, religious and spiritual lives online. It is worth noting that apart from the various applications of the internet, the Web can create online notions of Muslim identity and authority that intersect with the non-digital real world, while also nurturing new networks in cyberspace. By harnessing the power of the internet, Muslims have been able to further the understanding of their religion for individuals of diverse worldviews and, in some cases, a wide non-Muslim readership. For a Net-literate generation, it is often easier to seek out specific truths and affiliations online when they cannot be accessed in a mosque or community context. This point highlights the intersection between religion and the internet, as Dawson (2004, p. 85) eloquently put it: ‘The Internet is used most often to expand people’s social horizons and involvement. People use the Internet to augment and extend their preexisting social lives, not as a substitute or alternative.’ Tech-savvy Muslims have developed expectations of how Islamic discourse should be presented online and how they can contribute to it through distribution and interaction. In contrast, previously technologically unaware sectors were eager to go online to meet the needs of their networks. Shades of the Islamic spectrum have sought to channel readers and manage knowledge with their belief perspectives through appealing portals. Anderson (2001), in his work, has identified the emergence of a ‘creolised discourse’ that has arisen between different Muslim spheres, a form of Islam in cyberspace that is performative in nature, demonstrating pragmatic engagement with witness and connection. These connections are seen to grow uniquely in this system and include ways that Muslims connect their lives with Islam and extend those connections for a wider spectrum of individuals. Ultimately, these diverse voices, identities and connections ‘represent a “missing middle” between the Islam of

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intellectuals subject to textual analysis (of thought) and Islam of the folk or masses more likely to be examined in terms of social forces’ (Anderson, 2001). In Muslim contexts, the role of social media as a game-changer in the articulation of religious concepts and values has become a subject of considerable academic inquiry, yet the extent to which it has become a cliché or oversimplified is a matter of ongoing discussion. It is important to consider the larger context when examining the role of social media in events such as the Arab Spring and the 2009 Iranian Green Revolution, as there are often multiple factors that contribute to such movements, including political, economic and human rights issues that intersect in complex ways. The Arab Spring, often referred to as the Facebook and Twitter revolutions due to the pivotal role of social media in mobilising protesters, was a series of interconnected events that occurred in multiple locations and contexts via the internet, facilitating protests and organising campaigns across national boundaries (Ansani & Daniele, 2012, p. 19). However, the optimism and promise of this movement was tempered by the grim reality faced by many participants in countries like Yemen, Syria and Egypt, where protests were met with violent repression and authoritarian crackdowns (Mohiuddin, 2016). While it is true that Facebook and Twitter hashtags played a significant role in enabling users to follow events in Tunisia and Egypt, it is important to note that the campaigns themselves were not necessarily Islamic in orientation, despite the fact that many participants had Muslim identities. In fact, some Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, did not fully engage in demonstrations, illustrating the complex and nuanced relationship between Islam and political activism in the context of the Arab Spring. In countries such as Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, protests continued in various forms even after the initial wave of the Arab Spring had subsided. These events were accompanied by extensive online activities via Twitter feeds and other social media platforms, with every stage of the protests documented digitally. Groups that had previously been reluctant to use social media acquired technological literacy and began to use it to consolidate support among an increasingly youthful and digitally literate demographic, highlighting the ways in which social media can be a tool for empowerment and mobilisation in the face of political repression and marginalisation.

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6.3  Religious Authority and Digital Cyberspace In the ever-evolving landscape of the internet, the question of verifying the authenticity of Muslim religious authorities in cyberspace has emerged as a complex and intriguing puzzle. Like a virtual Rubik’s cube, the process of unravelling the qualifications and trustworthiness of online Islamic sources can prove to be a daunting challenge. It is akin to peering through a digital looking glass, where feedback, popularity and audience ratings are the currency of credibility. But the questions do not end there—they also delve into the nature of online fatwas, and how they differ from their conventional counterparts. As we navigate the endless digital corridors of cyber Islamic environments (CIEs), we find that they can be as varied and nuanced as the interpretations of Sunni and Shi‘ı ̄ Islam. Some are created by individuals seeking to express their personal worldview, while others are carefully crafted by well-funded Islamic organisations vying for online ideological dominance. And amidst this cacophony of online voices, it can be difficult to determine the authenticity of a given Islamic authority. In the end, the question of what constitutes a legitimate online fatwa remains a tantalising and vital enigma for contemporary Islam. As Muslim scholars and activists seek to engage with the complex and rapidly changing landscape of the internet, they are faced with the daunting task of reconciling traditional religious authority with the demands of modernity. Some look to the Qur’ān for answers, while others chart new territory beyond the bounds of conventional sources. But as the impact of these decisions ripples throughout Muslim societies, it is clear that the puzzle of online Islamic authority is far from solved. The stakes are high and the challenges are many, making the quest for digital religious legitimacy an exciting and unpredictable journey. As Bunt (2018) observes: The application of Islamic sources within decision-making processes in different CIEs has had an impact on the nature of Muslim societies. Understanding authority within Islamic contexts informs approaches toward decision-making processes in such areas as ethics, personal law, economics, technology, education, and medicine. Knowledge of the diversity of Islamic values enhances the potential to see beyond the homogenized perspectives presented in some media and academic sources relating to Islam. An interest in human interaction and intellectual thought is informed by an awareness of how Muslims reconcile the dynamics of varied Islamic beliefs and interpretations with life in secularizing or modernizing societies. Extra-Islamic sociopolitical and religious interests also have an impact on decision-making

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processes. Exploring CIEs has incorporated a subtext on interpretations of Islam. One underlying theme is the frequently articulated understanding that solutions for all issues can be located in the Qur’an: ‘and no question do they bring to thee but we reveal to thee the truth and the best explanation (thereof). (Bunt, 2018, p. 67)

In order to gain a more profound understanding of the religious authority within Islam, it is imperative to consider the concept of ijtihād. This term, which is frequently employed in Sunni contexts, refers to a pragmatic interpretation of Islamic texts in the context of current conditions. Ijtihād is often associated with renewal and reform, but it may also encompass reevaluation and realignment. It is, therefore, viewed as a process whereby a mujtahid—one who exerts himself to the utmost degree to comprehend sharı ̄‘ah (divine law articulated in the Qur’ān and interpreted by scholars to contribute to Islamic law or jurisprudence) through disciplined judgement—is able to offer a thorough understanding of Islamic law (Faruki, 1962). As to the application of ijtihād, there exists a range of differing perspectives on who qualifies as a mujtahid and whether his decision is binding upon individuals or the wider Muslim community. A mujtahid is an individual who is deemed qualified to exercise judgement on issues of interpretation, drawing upon authoritative sources that may vary according to the individual’s perspective, but often include the Qur’ān (Bunt, 2018, p. 68). This opinion may be articulated in the form of a fatwa. Although referring to a variety of authoritative statements and declarations, the term fatwa on the internet possesses inherent flexibility in Islamic discourse. It is important to note that if a mujtahid is drawing upon the opinions of early sources, a fatwa may not necessarily require ijtihād to be effective or relevant. It is worth noting that the issue of an excess of questions pertaining to religious issues predates the emergence of the internet. The Qur’ān, for instance, advises believers not to ask about matters which, if made known to them, might prove burdensome; the implication being that such questions may be left unasked. The classical Islamic tradition places a great emphasis on avoiding an excess of questions (Al-Qur’ān; 5:102–3). One hadith even warns believers to avoid that which they are forbidden to do and to do what is commanded to the best of their capacity (Siddiqi, 1986). A further hadith noted, ‘a person asked about a thing from Allah’s apostle (may peace be upon him) and he indulged in hair-splitting’ (Khan, 1984, p. 281). For, as history has shown, previous generations have gone astray

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by putting too many questions to their prophets and then disagreeing with their teachings. Despite the potential for error, many cyber Islamic environments have been preoccupied with questions of religion and religious authority. Numerous activists have presented their views on these interpretations, seeking to take authority away from scholars trained in classical Islamic tradition to construct new paradigms for contemporary societies. With these substantial opinions presented online, the term ijtihād has acquired new connotations amid discussions about whether the doors of interpretation were closed during the period of classical Muslim scholarship (Hallaq, 1997). The reforms articulated by reformists and other activists may be perceived as a threat by other authorities. These reforms may be based upon ulterior political agendas rather than sincerely held Muslim beliefs. There is no single reform paradigm; it ranges from ultra-orthodox Sunni to modernising reforms that integrate secular elements with Islamic thought. Among the reform-centred influences, mystical interpretations have attempted to bring new perspectives to Islamic understandings. These endeavours, however, are seen by many Muslims as a challenge to their model of how pragmatic the Qur’ān is in every situation. They may also raise questions about relying on subsequent texts when Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was understood to be the final Prophet. Some critics emphasise disunity rather than any unity of Islam. However, the recognition of difference has been an important feature of Islamic tradition from the time of the first medina community in the early history of Islam. Critics often try to confine Islam within narrow and restrictive or fundamentalist boundaries. It is possible to conclude that the mechanism within Islam was intended to accommodate diverse interpretations on certain matters. When considering the statements and actions of the Prophet, we are presented with an extensive body of material that has been compiled from a multitude of sources. The accuracy of the information is contingent on the reliability of these sources, which is evidenced by the existence of varying accounts of the same event. In contrast, the Qur’ān provides a single revealed text. Despite this, a single verse may be subject to numerous interpretations, contingent on the expertise of the interpreter(s). This variability has played a critical role in giving rise to reform-oriented movements, particularly when layers of comprehension obscure the true meaning of the text. Indeed, disparities between literal and contextual interpretations of the Qur’ān have historically led to conflict, tracing back

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to the formation of law schools and the collection of hadı ̄th in the classical era of Islam. However, modern times have witnessed a complete shift in the situation. With the advent of cyber networks and the digital age, the transmission of knowledge to scholars can now be accomplished instantaneously and virtually. Thus, there has arisen a nexus between Ijtihād and the nature of religious authority. These issues have become a ubiquitous subtext, with their expression extending beyond the bounds of traditional mediums such as print and oral discourse to platforms like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. The transfer of knowledge across the centuries, from oral to written to print and digital, is touted by proponents as a reflection of continuity with the message delivered by Muhammad (PBUH) from God via the angel Gabriel. Nonetheless, contemporary Islamic authority is characterised by live streaming, instantaneous transmission and virtual reality (Bunt, 2018, p. 71).

6.4  The Internet, Digital Communication and New Religious Authority Figures In the present era of globalisation, the acquisition of knowledge and expertise has undergone a fundamental transformation, wherein established religious authorities are seeking to leverage cutting-edge technological platforms to disseminate their messages to a wider audience. A striking example of this phenomenon can be observed in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, where workshops were held to train Islamic scholars in digital literacy and social media proficiency, acknowledging the evolving nature of religious instruction in online settings. A scholar who participated in these workshops observed that younger generations prefer to access religious knowledge without having to physically attend mosques, thereby compelling religious leaders to adopt proactive online strategies (Mukankyzy & Najibullah, 2018). Furthermore, limited access to mosques in minority contexts has amplified the role of the internet in disseminating religious knowledge, leading to an ongoing debate about the legitimacy of religious teachings disseminated online (Today’s Zaman 2010). The emergence of celebrity religious figures has challenged traditional notions of authority, with these figures now holding a coveted position of moral superiority and piety (Ansari, 2015). Through the internet, scholars have come together to share their interpretations of religious texts, while imams have established their own websites to disseminate sermons and

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religious teachings (Bunt, 2018, p.  72). In this context, websites and mobile apps provide creative opportunities for engagement and interaction with religious authorities, with many countries already providing online religious services and digital tools for conducting religious rituals and ceremonies (iMulla, 2016). However, despite these developments, traditionalists remain sceptical of the impact of technological innovation on religious authority. For instance, Yusuf al-Qaradāwı ̄ (d.2022), an influential Muslim scholar with a pro-media organisation, was a vocal advocate of digital media, utilising the internet to disseminate his fatwas on various issues, particularly the conflict in Libya involving Muammar Gaddafi (Bunt, 2018, p.  73). Al-Qaradāwı ̄ leveraged the internet to influence mixed-media conversations, reflecting the opinions of key players within the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab uprisings (Michot, 2011). Although was blacklisted in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt for his alleged links to extremism, his media work continued unabated (Al-Arabiya News, 2017). It is worth noting that the internet has conferred a degree of authority to individuals who are not necessarily associated with institutional structures. Through video conferencing and live lectures, authority figures can connect with audiences across vast geographical distances, transcending local boundaries and fostering meaningful discussions on sensitive topics. The power of the internet has enabled ideologues and organisations to articulate their understanding of Islam in cyberspace, thereby expanding their presence and impact on societies at the local and regional levels. Finally, the influence of social media and the rise of individual voices have fundamentally transformed traditional forms of discourse, particularly in the context of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath (Wheeler, 2017; Bunt, 2012, p. 77; Howard, 2010). The internet has served as a powerful tool to advance specific political and religious viewpoints, exemplified by the endeavours of the distinguished Iranian philosopher and scholar, Abdolkarim Soroush (Byrd & Martin, 2014). Through his website and YouTube channel, Soroush puts forth his perspectives on religious knowledge, decrying the monopolisation of interpretations by religious clerics and the enforcement of rigid religious-political stances (Tabrizi, 2013; Vakili, 2001, p.  150). Other Iranian intellectuals have similarly taken advantage of the online sphere to voice their opinions on religion and politics, both from within and outside Iran (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010, p.  32; Khiabany, 2010). For instance, Mohsen Kadivar, a prominent Iranian scholar, supported the 2009 Iranian Green Revolution and

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advocated for the separation of religious and civil law in Iran (Matsunaga, 2011, pp.  359). Meanwhile, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari utilises an online platform to provide a sustained commentary on Iranian issues, drawing on his base in Germany (Eshkevari, 2023). In minority contexts, influential figures have also made use of the internet to express their views on political and religious matters. Notably, Tariq Ramadan’s online outputs, available in French, Arabic and English, grant him a global audience for his interpretations of reform. Ramadan’s social media output contains content depicting his activities in various settings, including his use of the Periscope app on Twitter to present and archive his lectures. Concerning women, the internet has proven to be an instrumental element since the early days of the World Wide Web (Cooke & Lawrence, 2005, p.  11). Amina Wadud, a prominent American scholar, utilises social media to promote her interpretive approach to the Qur’ān. Similarly, Farhat Hashmi, a Pakistani scholar of hadı ̄th studies based in Toronto, leverages satellite television and the internet to advance her worldview, which concentrates on family and gender issues and is primarily geared towards a female audience, grounded in traditional interpretations of the Qur’ān and hadı ̄th (Hermansen, 2014). Over the past decade, organisations have emerged to provide online platforms for global networking, one of which is ‘Women Living Under Muslim Laws’. Not only does this organisation provide an online forum for various stakeholders, but it also chronicles significant news stories and developments in multiple languages, comparing approaches within different contexts, especially in regard to the law and legal reform.

6.5   Islamism and Decentralisation of Religious Authority: The Case of ISIS or ISIL The statements made by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, a prominent member of ISIS or ISIL in 2014, urging the killing of non-believers who fought against the Islamic State had a deep-seated and long-lasting impact on the political and religious landscape of the region (Hamming, 2017). As a high-ranking member of ISIS or ISIL, al-Adnani’s pronouncements served to galvanise both the group’s supporters and its detractors and his rhetoric further fuelled sectarian and ideological divides within Muslim communities across the Middle East and beyond. Subsequently, a number of acts of terrorism were committed by ISIS or ISIL in Western countries as a response to the military coalition against the group. The question

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then arises as to why individuals would heed al-Adnani’s words and act upon them. The influence of such groups has been dependent on the ever-­ changing religious authority within Islam, which has been characterised by its fragmentation and lack of centralised religious authority since the disintegration of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 (Hallaq, 2004). Sunni Islam, in contrast to Christianity or Shi‘ı ̄ism, has never been united under the sacred canopy of a singular voice of a centralised religious authority and the authority of the ‘ulamā’ (Islamic scholars) has fluctuated over time, thereby enabling certain groups to challenge mainstream Islamic interpretations and religious authority sources. The idea of religious authority has been closely associated with the discipline of ijtihād, specifically through the commentaries on the primary sources of Islam. While the Caliphate retained political authority after the Prophet’s demise, religious authority remained under the control of the ‘ulamā’ (Crone & Hinds, 1986). However, the ‘ulamā’s authority has always been subject to change and the factors that have contributed to the changing conditions of ijtihād, such as the modern means of communication, mass higher education and the spread of liberal thought, have made religious authority more reliant on practice and piety as opposed to knowledge (Zaman, 2007, 2012). As per several scholars, traditional sources of Islamic authority have changed over time (Devji, 2005; Roy, 1994). This is partly due to changed conditions of ijtihād, where there is only scope for ‘limited ijtihād’ as opposed to ‘absolute ijtihād’, which focuses more on ‘expanding the boundaries of a school of law in accordance with the principles of that school), modern means of communication, mass higher education, and the spread of liberal thought’ (Zaman, 2012). While challenging the ‘ulamā’s access to religious knowledge, these factors are making religious authority more dependent on practice and piety as opposed to knowledge (Alshech, 2014, p. 420). This change should be seen as an intensification of a tendency towards decentralised authority that has given rise to new Islamist intellectuals (Mandaville, 2007, p. 2).

6.6   ISIS, Salafism and Islamist Claims to Religious Authority Salafists and other radical groups have been at the forefront of challenging the very foundations of established religious authority. During the 1980s, Salafists placed great emphasis on education, whereas radical Islamists like

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Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian extremist leader, rejected the importance of education altogether and actively discouraged it. Lahoud (2010) sheds light on how radical ideologues have spearheaded the movement to undermine any form of established authority by promoting a hyper-individualised approach to ijtihād. These leaders have de-­emphasised the significance of both political and religious leadership and have empowered extremists to assume complete authority over the interpretation of religious teachings (Lahoud, 2012). They have argued that religious loyalty must be given solely to God, as opposed to any shaikh or religious institution. This disposition is highly prevalent among the officials of ISIS.  Uthman Ibn Abdur Rahman al-Tamimi, a former official of the Islamic State, while quoting a hadı ̄th in which the Prophet said, ‘Listen and obey, even if the Abyssinian slave whose hair is as kinky as a raisin is appointed to rule you, as long as he is governing you according to the book of God’ (Hamming, 2018). In reference to the manner in which present-day extremist groups have endeavoured to profit from the decreasing impact of religious authorities, Hamming observes: While not the first to succeed in obtaining a platform partly founded on religious authority, al-Qaida under the leadership of Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri nonetheless took this endeavour to an unprecedented level within the Jihadi movement. What remains certain is that none of the two al-Qaida leaders had the religious credentials to speak authoritatively in religious matters (even their senior shari’ figures such as Abu Hafs al-­ Mauritani and Abu Yahya al-Libi would be regarded novices by most traditional ‘ulama). They, nonetheless, still managed not only to challenge established Sunni authorities in the form of prominent Saudi and Egyptians ‘ulama but also to redefine what was considered legitimate Jihad. While Bin Laden came to personify the fighter scholar persona despite being neither, it was the broader message al-Qaida espoused that was key to its authoritative standing in the eyes of potential supporters…. Abu Musab al-Suri theorized this in his famous statement ‘a system of operations and not an organization for operations’ (nizam al-amal wa laysa tanzim lil-amal). Al-Qaida’s status was not to be dependent on its leaders or the organisation itself, but on the ideas and ideals it represented. (Hamming, 2018, p. 63)

Although the emphasis on individualisation has played a crucial role in the success of extremist groups, it has also created a source of instability (Lahoud, 2010, p.  245). Anwar al-Awlaki, the late al-Qaeda operative, once articulated the importance of encouraging Muslims to respect their

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scholars and avoid criticising them unless they have deviated from the straight path (Deutscher, 2003). However, different Salafist, Islamist and radical groups contest religious authority, each claiming to represent the correct methodology or straight path, which has resulted in intra-group rivalry and conflict. Every group following a new trend tends to excommunicate its predecessors and considers their ideas to be deviations from the correct road. This pattern seems to be evident among various radical groups, including the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) in Algeria, which opposed the presence of other Islamist groups, claiming that they were inferior. Similarly, when the Islamic State emerged in 2014, it severed its organisational ties with al-Qaeda and emphasised the establishment of the caliphate as the end of the grey zone between good and bad (Dabiq Magazine, 2015). The group argued that all other groups were required to join the Islamic State and those who did not were deviating from the correct path. The Islamic State claimed that loyalty should not be to any group but God alone and as the group followed the true Prophetic example, allegiance should be exclusively to the caliphate. The Islamic State successfully challenged al-Qaeda’s authority, leading to a severe challenge to al-Qaeda’s position by the newly recruited group members and some veterans who joined the Islamic State and fought against al-Qaeda. In summary, the Islamic State exploited the authority structures within Sunni Islam, the opportunities offered by the Syrian civil war and the leadership vacuum after the death of Bin Laden, which further demonstrates how religious authority has become detached from traditional sources (Al-Arabiya News, 2014).

6.7  Changing Digital Spaces: ISIS or ISIL, the Cyber Caliphate and the Internet In a time when societal and technological developments have marked a significant shift in the perceptions of Islam, the emergence of the Islamic State and its utilisation of social media and the internet have contributed to a renewed interest and understanding of the faith. Known under several names, including ISIS or ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Daesh, the group declared a caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2014, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its self-proclaimed caliph. The adoption of the caliphate mantle by al-Baghdadi, despite being denounced by mainstream

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religious scholars, garnered widespread attention and discussion about the legitimacy and accountability of religious authority. While it was met with criticism by many in the Muslim world, it also sparked an ideological conflict between al-Qaeda and supporters of ISIS or ISIL, which played out predominantly in the online arena. The activities carried out by the group have been accompanied by extensive and effective social media output. The term ‘hashtag warriors’ has been applied to the Islamic State to present the group in a favourable light to its supporters and potential recruits (Berger, 2014). The group’s online activities have shown positive response from many individuals, portraying benefits for those who support the group. The scenes and images disseminated by the group are meticulously staged and expertly edited, with some media outlets unwittingly portraying these images as actual events. To appeal to a diverse range of users, ISIS has developed a multi-­ faceted media outreach, employing various social media platforms to persuade Muslims across the globe to join them in fulfilling their religious duty of reviving the global caliphate through videos, messages, and pictures (BBC News, 2017). Furthermore, it aims to create a formidable image for its opponents, inspiring fear and panic in the minds of its enemies (Farwell, 2014). In cyber Islamic environments, Arabic-language forums are more prominent than English-language forums and most online activities are targeted towards Arabic-speaking communities. Although these groups attempt to produce online media outputs in multiple languages, Arabic is still the most dominant language, and Arabic-­ speaking communities are more vulnerable to extremist messages than Muslims living in the West. As Zelin (2013) notes, groups such as ISIS or ISIL belong to a recent phase of radical extremist organisations’ use of communication technologies. In the first phase of the 1980s, the distribution of sermons and other lectures was mainly accomplished through magazines, audiotapes and videotape cassettes. In the second phase, radical groups went online and developed websites to communicate their propaganda via the internet during the mid-1990s. After the mid-2000s, terrorist groups started to explore interactive online forums and blogs to build virtual communities with like-minded individuals from all over the world. ISIS or ISIL has been known to utilise a multidimensional information warfare strategy to advance its cause (Piazzaa & Gulerb, 2021). In order to effectively disseminate its propaganda, ISIS employed two main techniques: consumed and performative propaganda (Ingram, 2015, p. 730). While the former

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concentrates on the distribution of magazines, media reports, documentaries and other audio-visual products, the latter relies on small group discussions, face-to-face interactions and communication efforts between provincial media bureaus and local populations under the tyrannical control of ISIS (Winter & Haid, 2018). To coordinate its information operations, the group applied a variety of strategies and tactics to reach its intended audience, both friends and enemies, depending on its territorial presence (Ingram, 2014, p. 10; Siegel & Tucker, 2018). Information operations undertaken by ISIS or ISIL were designed not only to convey narratives of the group’s success and power to people in the areas under its expansion but also to send a message of fear and global warfare to its opponents (Gambhir, 2016). During the height of its expansion, the group was able to establish an information monopoly by imposing restrictions on the internet, radio signals and satellite dishes for the local population, thereby preventing them from accessing any information that contradicted the group’s agenda. Furthermore, ISIS employed a multidimensional strategy to encourage supporters to join and bolster the group’s efforts while creating a sense of terror and dread among its enemies and rivals (Milton, 2018). Despite its downfall and loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS continues to pose a grave threat to global security, largely due to its persistence in disseminating propaganda through both offline and online networks.

6.8  Countering Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS or Daesh) Online In response to the perilous threat posed by the intricate and pervasive propaganda network of the Islamic State, governments, religious institutions and other pertinent stakeholders have devised a multifaceted array of online counter-strategies. Among these strategies, religious organisations have taken up the mantle of propagating sermons and organising programmes aimed at cultivating internet proficiency for imams, while also augmenting counter-measures against their technologically adept and mobile opponents (Gee, 2015). Activists have undertaken concerted efforts to hack and thwart the group’s nefarious activities online, employing sophisticated methods such as honey traps and identity theft. Governmental agencies, in both private and public spheres, have availed themselves of the expertise of hackers to scrutinise online activities through

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software regulation. Nonetheless, such monitoring has attracted reproach from a multitude of organisations, who contend that it poses a threat to freedom of expression (Taylor, 2015). Human intervention has been deemed to be a more effective mechanism to prevent online recruitment. For an efficacious counter-radicalisation process, both religious authorities and governments must collaborate to identify vulnerable individuals and thwart the nefarious schemes of the Islamic State (Goodstein, 2015). In terms of social media usage in countering ISIS, Bunt (2018) has advanced a compelling argument: Through the use of social media, independent individuals have generated a counternarrative to IS.  For instance, ‘Average Mohamed’ is an animated cartoon with content focusing against ISIS. Produced by Somali American gas station manager Mohamed Ahmed, it has achieved a sustained online and media profile. Average Mohamed is also credited with engaging Facebook users on issues associated with gender and identity/identities, for example through the video ‘Be like Aisha’…. Government agencies have become involved, with the Iranian government launching its own cartoon campaign online against IS in 2015…. The open Your eyes video series shows young UK Muslims presenting advice to peer groups to dissuade radicalization and commenting on film clips, suggesting that Is does not represent ‘mainstream’ Islam. The website includes the voices of IS victims in Arabic. Viewers are encouraged to send in their own videos for use in neighborhoods and schools. The videos highlight the impact on families of radicalization and provide religious justification for abstaining from militaristic jihad…. Counternarratives have also emerged from broadcast channels. The middle east Broadcasting center aired the satirical Selfie show online, with an ironic take on ISIS and radicalization in the context of Saudi Arabia…. even from within Syria, Youtube was being applied to satirize the conflict in 2015, with a nine-year-old being the focus of ‘Umm Abduh’. (Bunt, 2018, p. 132)

The role of governments in Muslim countries in countering the group online cannot be overstated. A prime example of this is the Jordanian government’s initiative in 2015, which facilitated the reporting of suspicious activities (Frank, 2015). In Britain, the Muslim community took an innovative approach and introduced Haqiqah magazine to combat ISIS. Similarly, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, has encouraged the use of online platforms to combat ISIS (Al-Arabiya News, 2015). In Malaysia, an online religious school was established to

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challenge ISIS propaganda, which many traditional scholars were hesitant to do (Malay Mail, 2016). The UK-based Quilliam Foundation has been working on a counter-extremism initiative to rehabilitate former extremists and stop indoctrination. In order to refute ISIS propaganda and spread counterarguments, this initiative uses social media channels. In order to strengthen their ability to oppose extremist rhetoric, the foundation has also created training programmes for leaders of religious institutions and civil society organisations. Additionally, several digital firms have created tools and technologies to combat ISIS online. Google and Facebook, for instance, have created algorithms to find and delete extremist content from their platforms. Additionally, Telegram has banned ISIS channels and organisations from its network, while Twitter has suspended hundreds of ISIS-related accounts (Taylor, 2023). These policies, nevertheless, have drawn criticism for their lack of openness and ability to restrict free speech. In addition, scholars and experts have pushed for the creation of an all-encompassing strategy to combat ISIS online. This strategy combines measures from the military, diplomacy, economy and ideology. To oppose ISIS ideology and present a positive image of Islam, efforts should be made to create counternarratives and alternative narratives. The basic reasons of radicalisation, such as political and social exclusion, poverty and prejudice, must also be addressed as part of this strategy. Despite these measures, ISIS continues to find ways to circumvent technological barriers to the presentation of its message. The European Union developed an internet referral program aimed at removing radicalising materials from the internet, but even that has not been foolproof (Fleming, 2015). Some governments have resorted to using the issue of jihād to silence the platforms they used, such as the Russian government’s blacklisting of websites and other online platforms containing ISIS videos in their archives (Moscow Times, 2014). Countering ISIS online requires a multi-faceted approach involving governments, NGOs, technology companies, scholars and experts. Such an approach must be comprehensive and address the underlying causes of radicalisation while also utilising a range of tools and technologies to counter extremist messaging and propaganda. In short, the war against ISIS propaganda is an ever-evolving battlefield, where creativity and constant innovation are essential for successful countermeasures.

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6.9  The Proliferation of Interpretations: Media, Education and the Marginalisation of Traditional Scholars The Islamic civilisation, from its very inception, has been indelibly influenced and moulded by the Qur’ān, which remains the paramount sacred text of Islam. The task of interpreting Islamic law has long been a pivotal activity for regulating the authority of those who claim to hold a monopoly over the interpretation of Islam’s foundational texts, namely the Qur’ān and hadı ̄th. However, the past two centuries have witnessed a seismic shift set in motion by the European conquest that lasted from 1800 to 1920 and was subsequently intensified by the process of globalisation driven by industrial capitalism. During the latter half of the twentieth century, this process was catalysed by the ‘next great movement of globalisation, powered by finance, communications, and increasingly large movements of people’ (Robinson, 2009, p.  339). In this era, Muslims have taken active steps to tackle the challenges posed by Western domination, which have had far-reaching implications across all aspects of Muslim societies, from their ethos of accountability, cultural and aesthetic values to their artistic and religious traditions. Within the realm of religious authority, the long-held power of traditional interpreters or the ‘ulamā’ has been substantially undermined. Consequently, new contenders to the throne of authority have come forward, with little or no expertise in traditional Islamic sciences (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006, p. 11). As a result, a growing number of Muslims today view Islam as a matter of individual conscience, with individuals assuming the prerogative to interpret and construe the faith as per their personal understanding. As discussed previously in Chap. 4, in Islam, the foundation of authority was established following the emergence of the Prophet as a charismatic leader in the early seventh-century Arabian Peninsula. Nevertheless, after his demise, different Muslim factions were at odds over how to achieve authoritative understandings of the Qur’ān and Sunnah through autonomous spheres of authority. During the Abbasid caliphate from 750 to 1258, the Prophet’s authority was standardised in a variety of forms for the Sunni community, ‘which was eventually annulled by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924’, leading to the termination of the Prophet’s military, spiritual, judicial, and religious authority in the office of the ‘ulamā’ or religious experts (Hodgson, 1974). In the latter half of the twentieth century, there were a multitude of developments that resulted in the further

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fragmentation of religious authority, often described as an ostentatiously exuberant growth of interpretation (Rahman, 2001, p.  195). Across numerous Muslim nations, religious authority persists to be exercised against the backdrop of Western domination. Between the late 1940s and early 1990s, Muslim states gained independence, only to be entrapped first by the Cold War and then by global capitalism, as it sought to expand its markets and commodities in addition to exhibiting great-power assertion. Muslim leaders were profoundly preoccupied with the economic and political interests of external forces. Numerous events of Western bullying transpired during the second half of the twentieth century, such as the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran (1953), the British invasion of Egypt (1956), the Russian intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and the US and British intervention in Iraq (2003), to name a few. After the Gulf War, when the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia declined to criticise the establishment of US bases in Saudi Arabia and the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine, Osama bin Laden voiced his opinion on the matter: Honourable Shaikh you have reached a good age, and you have achieved much in the service of Islam, so fear God and distance yourself from these tyrants and oppressors who have declared war on God and His Messenger and stand with the righteous men … the most prominent characteristic of these righteous scholars was the way they dissociated themselves from sultans. (Lawrence, 2005, p. 12)

In a plethora of Muslim countries, the religious leaders, or ‘ulamā’, have been reduced to being mere paid functionaries of the state, rendering their authority and influence gravely diminished. However, a key catalyst that has transformed the religious authority in Muslim societies has been the proliferation of mass education, particularly in countries like Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain and Indonesia, where literacy rates range from 71% to 100% among school-going students (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, pp. 7–8; Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996). The prevalent context in which religious authority operates has changed dramatically. The surge in education has precipitated the development of print media, where books written by both the ‘ulamā’ and laypeople provide guidance on Islam or present biographical models from Islamic history (Robinson, 1996, p. 247). This wave of media growth has also paved the way for the emergence of new and diverse interpreters, from ‘the school teacher Rashid Ghanoushi of Tunisia, to the lawyer Hasan al-Turabi of Sudan, and the engineers Mehdi

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Bazargan of Iran and Mahamed Shahrour of Syria’, all of whom not only speak the language of secular education but also undermine the traditional religious scholars (Robinson, 2009, p. 352; Farouki, 2004, pp. 18–19). Driven by the belief that followers of Islam should engage directly with the foundational sources of their faith, a multitude of individuals have asserted their right to interpret the Islamic scriptures. Consequently, these individuals have brought to the table an array of skills that they have acquired outside of the Islamic tradition, further marginalising the religious scholars. Moreover, the growth of new media and the advent of the internet have also played a vital role in transforming the nature of religious authority. By using various media platforms, Osama bin Laden was able to disseminate his message across the Muslim world and beyond, while Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradāwı ̄ (d.2022), a traditionally educated Islamic scholar, was an advocate for using the media to propagate his views on several Islamic issues (Petersen, 2004, p. 155). The internet, considered by many as a great equalising force, has pushed authority even further from the grasp of religious scholars. The proliferation of the internet, with its access to primary sources and the diversity of opinions, has further fragmented religious authority and created more opportunities for individuals to make their own decisions. It is crucial to note that while some ‘ulamā’ still wield considerable influence, some militant ideologues have continued to engage with certain contemporary scholars to advance their extreme version of Islam. These ideologues may not be part of any traditional institution, yet their influence persists, and some have bolstered their religious authority online. Osama bin Laden (d.2011), a layman without any religious qualification, was audacious enough to position himself as someone capable of giving his opinion on waging war against non-believers. Similarly, Ayman al-­ Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d.2006), among others, felt emboldened by their actions and interpretative abilities. This development could be linked to the long-standing debates surrounding ijtihād, a concept in Sunni Islam associated with the ability to interpret the Qur’ān and other Islamic sources in the light of modern conditions and circumstances. This ability is deemed inherent in all humanity, not just in those who are experts of classical Islamic tradition and has long been a source of contention regarding religious authority within Islam. The advent of the internet has ushered in a new era in the domain of religious authority, particularly in the realm of Islamism. The dissemination of specific interpretative models has been facilitated by the

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far-reaching power of the internet, which effectively bypasses traditional structures of religious authority. The implications of this phenomenon are particularly significant in the context of the Islamist sphere, where the promotion of such models is often reinforced by the cultivation of closely connected virtual communities that espouse ideals of belonging and religious justification. These communities, which intersect with real-world networks, give rise to their own unique phenomena and issues. In the realm of Islam and Muslim communities, both those situated within and outside the purview of Muslim identities, the internet has emerged as an important source of individual and self-knowledge, particularly within the confines of Islamist virtual networks. These networks, often operating beyond the purview of authorities linked to religious, state and commercial interests, are capable of articulating solutions to popular causes in a radical fashion (Bunt, 2009, p. 186).

6.10  Navigating the Digital Divide: The Intersection of the Internet and Radicalisation The infusion of social media and the internet into the sphere of radical campaigning has become a pivotal driver in the formulation of strategic plans that cater to diverse audiences. From the images generated by Chechen forces to the videos disseminated by al-Qaeda and the use of social media during campaigns, there has been an upsurge in the expectations of audiences towards the employment of internet-driven media across a wide range of contexts and conflict zones. Indeed, a considerable body of research has focused on the contents of radical messages that are propagated on the internet (Frissen, 2021, p. 2). Within several organisations, technical personnel have formed an integral part of the hierarchy, rather than being an afterthought to campaigns (Behr et al., 2013, p. xi). From the creation of posters to the real-time tweets by al-Shabaab (an al-­ Qaeda affiliate group in Somalia) and the live streaming of ISIS, a multifaceted array of content has emerged. The primary objective of these organisations is to attract more followers and the internet serves as an echo chamber: a space where ‘individuals find their ideas supported and echoed by other like-minded individuals’ (Behr et al., 2013, p. xi). The internet thus catalyses the process of radicalisation. Unlike its infrequent usage before 9/11, the term ‘radicalisation’ has now become a buzzword. It has become a focal point around which numerous

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academic disciplines have actively converged. Despite the plethora of conflicting theoretical conceptualisations of radicalisation and the dearth of empirical data, a growing consensus has emerged on two fundamental properties of radicalisation. The first pertains to the question of what constitutes radicalisation. Although it is often referred to as that ‘what happens before the bomb goes off’, more recent research has criticised this assumed nexus between processes of radicalisation and violent extremism and has argued that radicalisation is more than just a precursor to violence (Behr et al., 2013). Accordingly, scholars have made a crucial distinction between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation. For those who assert that radicalisation is predominantly a process that occurs at a cognitive level, they define radicalisation as ‘the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology’ (Wolfowicz et al., 2019, p. 413). Radicalisation may not ‘necessarily lead to violence, but is one of several risk factors required for this’ (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 279). Radicalisation is best depicted as two pyramids: an opinion pyramid and an action pyramid. Each level ‘in the pyramids represents a more radical form of political/religious beliefs and more violent actions, but also a smaller and more exclusive group of active individuals’ (Frissen, 2021, p. 2). The opinion pyramid comprises the masses who hold contentious political or religious beliefs. The middle range of the pyramid refers to activists who have a cause and the apex represents a small subset of individuals who believe in a moral obligation. In contrast, the basis of the opinion pyramid consists of the masses who hold relatively neutral beliefs towards contentious political and/or religious topics. The middle range of the pyramid refers to groups of activists who sympathise with a cause and the apex represents a rather small set of individuals who strongly believe in a personal moral obligation. The action pyramid, on the other hand, extends from the individuals who are inert to political violence at the base to a small group at the top who are actively engaged in illegal violent actions such as terrorist activities (Clark & Moskalenko, 2017). A plethora of scientific studies have elucidated the omnipresence of extremist and radical groups on the internet, with a significant focus on the manner in which these groups communicate with like-minded individuals (Alava et al., 2017). One such example is the online presence of ISIS, which seeks to promote its propaganda materials and recruit financial and military support (Atwan, 2015). A growing body of research has focused on the contents of these messages, shedding light on the role of

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(online) social forms and ideologically consonant networks (Frissen et al., 2018). Although few studies have explored the relationship between exposure to these materials and radicalisation (Sageman, 2009; Sunstein, 2009). Wolfowicz et al. (2019) have identified exposure to violent media as a crucial factor contributing to the process of radicalisation. Attention has also been paid to the dissemination of interpretations of jihād across multiple media platforms by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, with consequential increases in exposure in media and integration of online production aspects of campaigning, resulting in increased funding, recruitment and diverse campaigns and agendas. The Taliban have similarly been active in the use of online platforms for campaigning, recruitment and finances, despite the limited internet infrastructure in Afghanistan. The group has even incorporated offline models of distribution for areas lacking internet access (Hairan, 2011). Their media strategy has evolved to include an emphasis on encryption, secure messaging and fundraising, with continuity from offline to online forms of media targeting international and local audiences. Multiple languages are used for nuanced audiences, with a focus on social media and content (Anzalone, 2011). Furthermore, other radical Islamist groups, such as al-Shabāb, have drawn on concepts developed by al-Qaeda, with members participating in its activities across different zones. The group has firmly integrated social media into its strategy for updates and statements, prompting social media companies to shut down their accounts. However, such attempts have been sporadic and generally unsuccessful, as al-Shabāb activists have established new accounts and even transferred their followers across. Supporters receive and repost information, quickly circulating it across networks, thus allowing the group to successfully disseminate its ideology and recruit followers in Somalia and other countries. The employment of social media by al-Qaeda has aroused apprehension among many observers, yet it is a natural progression from their use of other forms of media (Lara, 2010). These online platforms could have been created by both official and unofficial supporters, or they may have been ‘honeypot’ pages designed to obtain information about visitors. The US Department of Homeland Security has issued a report detailing how the group endeavours to disseminate its message and reach diverse audiences. The report notes that social bonds hold greater significance than external factors such as shared hatred or ideology in terror networks, and that social networking interfaces created to connect people based on such bonds may be vulnerable to extremist use and recruitment efforts (Taylor,

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2015). The report focuses on analysing the ways in which al-Qaeda channels present advice on anonymity and internet security. Within al-Qaeda, there are discussions on moving to various social media platforms and the ways they affect traditional online forums and chatrooms, which were previously hubs of activity. As a result of more secure and immediate modes of communication, numerous media strategies were adopted, including tailored products for specific audiences (Mcelroy, 2011). For al-Qaeda, mobile communications and encoding of internet activities became crucial elements. Online magazines such as Inspire included details on digital methods, encryption keys and relevant tools. User guides were distributed through magazines that went beyond the support of al-­ Qaeda and became influential (Zelin, 2011). The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 prompted some reflection on the methods he and al-Qaeda used to employ social media and the internet to achieve their objectives. The emotional reaction to his death was also extensively articulated online, indicating that his message would persist in diverse local and global contexts. The most significant impact of social media methodologies has been on ISIS. Pronouncements by al-Qaeda were in many ways overwhelmed by the worldwide interest in ISIS. The group ‘pushed the boundaries’ in terms of how social media and the internet were utilised and integrated into their campaigning. Although these factors were not the sole contributors to their impact, they were certainly relevant and significant. In some cases, these factors may allow al-Qaeda to be more competitive online in terms of the way they apply media forms to achieve their many objectives. Since the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda has benefitted from the relatively less focus it received. However, they remain proactive online and in numerous conflict zones today.

6.11  Conclusion As contemporary forms of authority within the Islamic tradition are increasingly challenged by the rise of new media technologies, the need for authoritative interpretations of religious law becomes ever more pressing. As a result, we observe a kind of ‘war’ in which competing authorities vie to outdo one another in their ability to craft and promote specific interpretations of legal concepts. This push for strict adherence to religious principles in turn leads to an expanding emphasis on purity that follows an upward trajectory. However, the strict and fundamentalist view of Islam that results from such interpretations is often at odds with

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established cultural and societal norms and practices. Throughout the chapter, we have seen that various social changes have contributed to the challenge facing traditional religious authorities in the Islamic world. One such change is the widespread availability of the internet, which has allowed Muslims around the world to explore matters of faith and spirituality via an ever-expanding array of websites, chat rooms, and other online discussion forums dedicated to religious issues. The internet represents a significant challenge to traditional religious authority in several ways. On the one hand, it provides easy access to information that can be used to challenge established interpretations of religious texts and practices. On the other hand, it also offers alternative spaces where new rituals and social practices can be developed and disseminated. Furthermore, the rise of social media platforms such as Twitter and blogs has further amplified the challenges facing traditional religious authorities. Users of these platforms can easily create their own outlets and seek answers to their religious questions without having to rely on traditional religious scholars or interpreters (Campbell & Teusner, 2011). Through these platforms, religious leaders and their followers can discuss and debate religious issues, with the latter able to critique and reinterpret the former’s claims through their own theological lenses. In essence, what we are witnessing with regard to the relationship between Islam and the internet is a forging of three sets of related links. The first set links individual Muslims in social networks of communication that are rapidly evolving as technology continues to develop. The second set is characterised by the application of techniques and models drawn from higher education and the sciences to religious subjects and contents (Anderson, 2003, p. 56). The third set links together the various realms that have emerged through these links, creating a new public sphere characterised by alternative voices and authorities. This new sphere is populated by a diverse array of interpreters drawn from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds, many of whom have emerged as a result of technology-enabled participation. The emergence of this new body of interpreters of Islam is one of the most significant outcomes of the rise of the internet and social media. These interpreters reflect a diversity of views and expressions of Islam that are often at odds with more established forms of religious authority (Anderson, 2003, p.  57). However, while these new voices of authority may represent a challenge to traditional Islamic institutions, they also offer opportunities for the development of new and innovative approaches to Islamic thought and practice. Ultimately,

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the internet and social media have brought to the fore the ‘in-between’ and ordinary character of the efforts that mark it, highlighting its practical diversity and the wide range of perspectives that it encompasses. The phenomenon of the self-reflexive religiosity within Islam has been generated by two significant developments, the propagation of mass media and the proliferation of literacy, which have contributed to the systemic and systematic dissemination of Islamic thought through a multitude of written sources, including religious literature such as books, personal guides and catechisms. This dissemination has not only led to the subtle or overt interrogation of traditional modes of knowledge that were hitherto the exclusive domain of religious scholars and the ‘ulamā’, but also engendered a proliferation of autonomous religious thought beyond the purview of traditional sources of authority. This new mode of religious interpretation has been primarily driven by intellectuals of diasporic and nomadic backgrounds. Furthermore, the diffusion of literacy among the masses has substantially expanded their accessibility to religious texts and digital platforms. This has resulted in a remarkable expansion of the pool of interpreters of Islam and intensifying competition amongst them over the claim to authoritative representation of Islam. However, these new interpreters are not the product of the traditional schools, but of secular institutions of higher education, more specifically the engineering faculties (Turner, 2007, p. 132). These educators demonstrate their scholarly merit by elucidating the compatibility or incompatibility of any given idea with the tenets of sharı ̄‘ah, the more conclusive the interpretation, the more prestige is conferred upon the pedagogue in question. Consequently, these claims to authoritative representation are characteristically inflated.

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CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Globalisation, Islamism and People’s Participation in Religious Discourse and Expression

7.1   Introduction The book delves into the multifaceted realm of Islamist movements, probing their intricate relationship with globalisation processes and how they are vying for religious authority in Muslim majority countries. Throughout our in-depth investigation, we have meticulously scrutinised the resources that facilitate the formation of these movements and the myriad of Islamist subcurrents, tactics and approaches that are at play. At the outset, this work has proffered a gamut of incisive queries: What is the correlation between globalisation and Islamist movements? In what manner are these movements competing for religious authority? To what extent have they been able to disseminate their messages via the internet and online media? And, what role does information technology, the internet and social media play in the fragmentation of religious authority? The political, economic and cultural dimensions of globalisation have created opportunities as well as grievances that have prompted two types of transnational responses: nonviolent and violent. Islamist movements have adroitly harnessed technology to their advantage, particularly the internet, which has emerged as a key tool for mobilisation and framing collective identities. Although the internet has not replaced physical sites of action, it has enabled and facilitated the emergence of a transnational public sphere. Cyber connectivity has helped movement mobilisations to proceed swiftly, challenging the hegemony of global governance, capital © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Mohiuddin, Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6_7

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and repressive authoritarian regimes (Moghadam, 2013, p. 119). Islamist movements stand out from other movements due to their unique repertoire of collective action. These movements are comparatively unaffected by neoliberal capitalist globalisation and perceive the problem as a cultural invasion rather than a purely economic one. For them, democracy does not present the solution, as they consider Islam to be the panacea. The state continues to exert a significant impact on Islamist movements. Highly authoritarian regimes in countries such as Syria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, among others, prohibit all meaningful political parties in response to Islamist activism. This forces Islamist groups into underground Islamist activity. States can ban political parties organised on the basis of religion, as seen in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt, or manipulate the system to the detriment of such groups or other challengers to state power (Fuller, 2003). In response, some Islamists resort to violent tactics not only against state repression but also in reaction to slurs against their religion and culture. Moderate Islamists attempt to expand their reach by engaging in electoral processes, professional associations and other societal institutions, but they face criticism from sceptics who question their commitment to democratic procedures, civil liberties and all-inclusive citizenship. The ascendancy of violent militant groups such as ISIS or ISIL has engendered a newfangled discussion concerning religious authority within the Muslim world. The advent of such groups has enervated the legitimacy of traditional Muslim institutions while leaving their physical existence intact. Unquestionably, Islamism has amplified the opportunities for religious devotees to construe sacred texts and to articulate opinions on these issues. Thanks to Islamism, the interpretation of holy texts and preaching in sundry forms surpasses Islamic conventions. The ‘ulamā’ or religious scholars (rijāl al-dı ̄n) have witnessed a decline in their popularity and are compelled to cede their power to unorthodox Islamist spiritual leaders. Decades ago, printed Qur’ānic interpretations surfaced that were at odds with the traditional understanding. The ‘ulamā’ lamented that people no longer sought fatwas from religious experts, but rather ‘everyone who has an opportunity for it appears with fatwas’ (Grinin & Korotayev, 2019, p. 180). What we witness nowadays is a scenario where the ‘ulamā’ remain confined to the realm of religious activities while Islamists assume responsibility for enforcing Islamic law. The delegitimisation of traditional Islam and the authority of the ‘ulamā’ transpired due to ‘the fact that Islam is increasingly being interpreted by all people who are

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not indifferent to it’ (Grinin & Korotayev, 2019, pp. 84–85). This inconsistency between the Sunni ‘ulamā’ and Islamists may be attributed to the fact that most Sunni ‘ulamā’ are an integral part of the state apparatus, while Islamists usually work in opposition to the state. Indeed, the state-­ sponsored religion aims to protect the existing order of things and hence cannot serve as the ideology of political opposition.

7.2  Challenges to Religious Authority This book explores the complexities surrounding the impact of online engagement on our understanding of religious authority, a topic that elicits diverse opinions among scholars. The multifaceted discussions on this issue centre on how the internet challenges or disrupts traditional religious hierarchies, whether it engenders new religious leaders or interpreters, if online texts alter traditional systems of interpretation and how online interpreters reshape people’s comprehension of Islamic teachings or a group’s religious identity. Several scholars posit that the non-­ hierarchical nature of the internet poses a significant threat to religious authority. In fact, Dawson (2001, p.  27) argues that the internet may result in the proliferation of misinformation by adversaries of religious groups or leaders, jeopardise the control over religious texts by religious organisations, and ‘give rise to new opportunities for grassroots forms of witnessing’ that encourage alternative voices to emerge in lieu of traditional discourses. Moreover, the internet might promote practices that circumvent or undermine the authority of religious leaders and structures. Religious organisations have expressed concern about airing theological discussions of religious leaders in public internet forums where new perspectives and ideas may emerge, which could potentially contradict the desired public image (Piff & Warburg, 2005, p. 87). Consequently, certain stakeholders argue that the internet will give rise to new religious authorities, such as the moderator of an online religious group who is regarded as a religious authority by members of the virtual religious community (Herring, 2005, p. 150). Scholars have been divided on the impact of the internet on religious authority, with some questioning the assumptions that the internet inherently weakens such authority. In fact, some researchers have observed that religious institutions have actively infiltrated online groups to regulate the flow of information and create alternative forums that reinforce their established structures (Barker, 2005, p. 68). These elites may use various tactics

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to control the dissemination of information online, such as exerting public pressure on members who post contentious material or publicly condemning the internet to discourage its use (Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005, p. 28). Nevertheless, the internet’s features, including its ability to connect individuals across time and space, offer both opportunities and challenges to religious institutions. Social media platforms, for example, allow users to create their own news outlets and build personal networks that transcend traditional boundaries of family and geography. This has created a marketplace of religious denominations and associations in which religious leaders are held accountable by journalists who challenge their messages and authority. Such challenges to religious authority must be viewed within the context of broader social trends in which people are becoming increasingly mobile and less tied to specific religious communities. The internet has facilitated the development of personalised networks of acquaintances and online communities that are replacing more traditional religious institutions as the locus of religious identity formation. As a result, religious leaders may find themselves competing for the loyalty and attention of followers in this new marketplace, which may require a reconsideration of traditional models of religious authority and power (Campbell, 2007). The influence of the internet on religious authority is a multifaceted issue that demands an intricate examination of the media landscape, as well as the social and cultural patterns that govern people’s behaviour. In essence, the internet is merely the latest addition to the media landscape that has transformed the religious marketplace by altering practices and patterns. Therefore, it is essential to consider why people seek answers beyond their communities, what attracts them to the internet as a platform for gaining information and connecting with others, and why some online sources are more preferred than others. To analyse the impact of the internet on religious authority, it is imperative to grasp the complexities of this issue, taking into account the internet’s unique features that pose challenges for religious communities (Campbell & Teusner, 2011, p. 64). Like print media, radio and television, the internet is a platform that enables us to scrutinise religious leaders and religious practices. Moreover, the internet creates a pattern of sociability among people whose connections are fluid, mobile and extend beyond traditional spatial and temporal boundaries. The primary challenge that the internet poses to traditional structures of authority is the democratisation of religious knowledge, giving people unprecedented access to various sources of religious information and empowering them to contribute opinions,

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information and experiences to public debates and conversations. Consequently, members of the Muslim community must develop new technological literacy skills and new skills of discernment to navigate this new social sphere that facilitates spiritual interactions, establishes new authorities and legitimises practices for their community.

7.3  The Future of Islamist Movements Islamists have been historically committed to fashioning the future in the likeness of the past, with their adherence to traditional and conservative interpretations of Islamic doctrine. Their agenda may have been considered valid during the tumultuous encounter of Muslims with modernity in the late nineteenth century and it may have served a purpose in creating a discourse that resonated with the majority of the population. It may have been acceptable when Islamists sought to compare their ideology with the other dominant philosophies of the time, such as Arab nationalism and liberalism. However, this approach has become obsolete and ineffective in the contemporary era. The crucial question of how Islam can be the principal frame of reference for modern societies remains a highly contested matter with no clear solution in sight. It is hoped that Muslim societies will learn from not only their recent painful experiences but also from the lessons of their journey over the past century. Ultimately, the future of Islamism will hinge on how Islamists redefine it and present it afresh to their communities. In this quest, their most formidable adversaries are not the secularists of the region but their own selves, as they strive to reconcile their political aspirations with the tenets of Islamic thought and practice (Osman, 2017).

7.4  One Islamism or Many? The question of whether Islamism represents a homogeneous and cohesive phenomenon or is instead influenced and defined by the unique national contexts within which it operates has been the subject of much scholarly discourse. Indeed, those familiar with the socio-political dynamics, economic transformations and trajectory of intellectual development in the Muslim world are likely to recognise that the political manifestation of Islam, much like the practice of Islam itself, is largely contingent on context-specific factors and reflects the interplay between religious precepts and the political and cultural peculiarities of a given society (Ayoob,

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2005, p. 953). While certain terminology may be shared across political boundaries, the deployment of such terminology is often tailored to serve specific objectives within a particular setting. Thus, while the Islamic idiom may appear superficially similar to the casual observer, the substance and emphasis of the messages that utilise this idiom vary considerably according to the context in which they are employed. As Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) have noted, the politicisation of Islam occurs through the invocation of ideas and symbols that Muslims in a given context identify as ‘Islamic’, with the aim of advancing organised claims and counterclaims. However, the limits of such claims are typically defined by the boundaries of the sovereign territorial state, and as a result, much of the political discourse and action of Islamist movements is necessarily circumscribed by these same geographic borders (Ayoob, 2004). Even movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which has branches in many Arab countries, including Palestine, Syria and Jordan, are constrained by contextual factors that shape their strategies and tactics. In short, Islamist movements are subject to the same spatial and temporal dynamics as their secular counterparts, and their political imagination and objectives are inextricably linked to the existence of multiple nation-states within the Muslim world (Ayoob, 2005, p. 954).

7.5   Beyond the Uniformity Should one assume that there are multiple forms of Islamism? If this is the case, why do Western political commentators tend to portray it as a homogenous phenomenon? This can be partly attributed to their lack of knowledge about Muslim societies and to the tendency of media elites to pontificate with a self-righteousness that only the poorly educated can match. Additionally, the rhetoric of Islamist groups worldwide appears nearly identical to outsiders, as they draw from similar sources. Nevertheless, a close examination of the goals of various Islamist groups reveals that they are engaged in advancing divergent national agendas, rather than a single, universal endeavour. Even when Islamist groups aspire to create an ‘Islamic state’, they envision it solely within existing state borders. Therefore, Islamist groups have internalised the notion that the international system is composed of multiple territorial states and will remain so indefinitely

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(Ayoob, 2005, p. 955). They also recognise the ethnic, cultural and territorial divisions within the Muslim world and acknowledge that Islam is not always the foremost identity that people in Muslim countries value. The idea of establishing a caliphate is only cherished by a small number of groups on the fringes of political Islam, who lack any significant political base within Muslim countries. The radical groups, such as al-Qaeda, that purport to represent Islam are, in fact, marginal entities that are not representative of the mainstream Islamist movements and are, in terms of addressing regional political issues, relatively ineffectual. By contrast, the majority of Islamist groups, which are considered mainstream, operate through peaceful means and endeavour to transform their societies by democratic processes, even when constitutional obstacles and political challenges abound. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is considered to be reformist in nature rather than radical. The transnational groups, including al-Qaeda, are rooted in specific contexts. Indeed, the US-sponsored war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan played a significant role in the emergence of Islamist radicals in that country and subsequent American backing for favoured Islamist movements, such as the Taliban, is a case in point (Wickham, 2002; Nasr, 1994, p. 67). The findings presented in the book underscore two critical points. First, Islamism is a political ideology that is predicated on offering solutions to contemporary political and social dilemmas, rather than being a mere theoretical construct. Second, given that Islamism is a response to modernity, it is inherently contextualised due to the presence of multiple sovereign states. The number of Islamisms is likely to exceed the number of Muslim majority states, given the existence of several Muslim secessionist movements that operate within predominantly non-Muslim states and espouse political Islamist ideologies (Ayoob, 2005, p. 957). When considering the future of Islamism, it is essential to examine two key external factors: the nature of the regimes in the Muslim world and the international power structure, including the policies adopted by the dominant powers. Without analysing the role of these two factors in enabling or impeding political Islam, it is impossible to make meaningful predictions about the future of Islamism.

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7.6   Political Systems and Authoritarian Regimes in the Muslim World The political systems and regimes that predominate in many Muslim countries wield a formidable impact on the evolution of political Islam and the tactics that Islamists employ. Specifically, it is the closed political structures and authoritarian regimes that offer a conducive environment for the proliferation of Islamic political organisations and movements. These regimes are often known to stifle political and intellectual discourse through intelligence agencies that have permeated society, leading to the effective curbing of virtually all secular opposition. It is, however, paradoxical that these regimes have, as a consequence, created a political and intellectual vacuum by eliminating the opposition movements and parties of the ‘normal’ politics, which Islamists have been quick to occupy. This is because even the most oppressive state cannot fully extinguish opposition expressed through religious parlance. In contrast to secular groups, Islamic political activities are difficult to suppress due to the linguistic and institutional resources at their disposal. Notably, Islamic religious vocabulary can be used for political purposes and simultaneously presented as politically innocuous, which makes it less vulnerable to government retaliation. Publishing houses that produce religious texts, as well as mosques and affiliated institutions that operate outside the purview of the state, can be utilised to promulgate political messages cloaked in religious symbolism. The Islamic Revolution in Iran stands out as the most prominent instance of this phenomenon. The Shah’s unrelenting suppression of the entire opposition created a political vacuum that the Islamists led by Khomeini skilfully filled. It was this vacuum that allowed the radical factions of the clergy to present themselves as the main vehicle of opposition to the Shah’s authoritarian regime. The anti-Shah ‘ulamā’ depicted the Shah as a contemporary embodiment of Caliph Yazid, whose orders led to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in 680 CE, which resonated powerfully with the Shiite populace of Iran. Meanwhile, the repressive state institutions were incapable of mounting an effective response to the implied political use of such imagery, as doing so would have run the risk of offending the religious sensibilities of the Iranian people and triggering further unrest. Indeed, it is worth noting that between August and September of 1978, the Shah’s regime attempted to suppress the radical clerics and launched a public campaign to discredit their leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who ultimately unleashed the revolution. This counterproductive strategy

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proved to be a fatal error for the Shah’s regime. However, Iran is not the only country where such a phenomenon has occurred. The repressive policies of the FLN regime in Algeria significantly bolstered the popularity of the Islamic Salvation Front by eliminating all its secular rivals. Similarly, successive Egyptian regimes have weakened secular opposition groups, ranging from liberals to Arab nationalists and communists, to the point where the field has been left open for the Islamists. The same pattern has been observed in other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. While in Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where real political competition has been allowed, Islamists have been politically marginalised, even though they have occasionally resorted to dramatic acts of violence. The configuration of political power in myriad Muslim nations, specifically those within the expansive Middle Eastern region inclusive of Central Asia, is a critical determinant in shaping Islamic political organisations. Drawing from this analysis, it can be inferred with reasonable conviction that the persistence of authoritarian regimes within Muslim countries will invariably foster the proliferation of Islamism, both as a political movement and an ideology. While the attributes of such regimes can be elucidated by reference to a range of factors that yield diverse outcomes in varying locales, the impact on Islamism is largely uniform across different Muslim nations (Ayoob, 2005, p. 89). In essence, the nature of a state’s governing regime serves as an independent variable in ascertaining the prevalence of Islamist movements within disparate Muslim nations.

7.7  The Global Power Structure and US Foreign Policy The international power structure, along with the policies of great powers such as the United States, constitutes an additional independent variable that has profound implications for the future of Islamism. It is widely acknowledged that the current distribution of power in the international system is heavily tilted against Muslim countries, owing largely to the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial policies of dominant powers aimed at securing and expanding their strategic and economic interests. This history of direct and indirect rule has left an indelible mark on the psyche of politically conscious Muslims, providing Islamists with fertile ground for their ideology to take root. The appeal of Islamism lies in its simplistic and coherent explanation for the decline of Muslim politics, based on the

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argument that Muslim society has strayed from the pure and primitive Islam of the Golden Age. According to this view, only a return to a truly pure Islamic society can enable Muslims to regain their former glory or at least compete with the West on equal terms. The rallying cry of ‘Islam is the solution’ captures this sentiment, resonating deeply with a divided Muslim society that has grown disillusioned with the failures of secular and nationalist projects to deliver dignity, freedom, power and wealth. Despite the allure of this romanticised vision of an ancestral past, there are inherent contradictions and limitations that must be acknowledged. There is a strong tendency to revert to the highly romanticised model of ‘ancestors’ despite the fact that ‘[t]he people who surrender to the ancestors are, strictly speaking, surrendering to strangers … Authenticity can be as much an escape as dependence and mimicry can be’ (Ajami, 1992). In many parts of the Muslim world, US policy is viewed as being intentionally anti-­ Muslim, aimed at preventing any challenge to Western dominance in Muslim countries. This perception aligns with the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ narrative put forth by scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, further fuelling the popularity of Islamism as a political movement (Lewis, 1990, p. 49; Huntington, 1993, p. 25). It is notable to mention that the incessant and unassailable support of the United States towards Israel, specifically regarding its policy of continued occupation and settlement of Palestinian territories acquired in the year 1967, serves as a vivid illustration to the politically conscious Muslims that the United States is not only insensitive but also holds their world in utter contempt. This policy is viewed as a blatant violation of their dignity, an aspect that frequently eludes the attention of the majority of Western political analysts with regard to the Muslim world. For most Muslims, their antipathy towards America is not rooted in opposition to American values of democracy and freedom, but rather, it is based on specific foreign policies of the US, particularly in relation to the Middle East, which exhibit gross double standards. The disillusionment with American foreign policy, both historical and contemporary, has kept the resistance to Western dominance in the political consciousness of Muslims alive. Islamists capitalise on this widespread disillusionment and animosity to advance their agendas and oppose the regimes backed by the United States. When the feeling of helplessness among the Muslim population reaches a critical level, extremists are emboldened to employ violent tactics to achieve their goals. These extremist groups, who purport to speak on

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behalf of Islam, perceive violence as the only viable means to address the inherent power imbalance between Muslims and the West. They believe that violent extremism is the only strategy capable of wresting the initiative from the powers of the West and their perceived agents in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, the pivotal point to be underscored is that the US policy towards the Muslim world, specifically the Middle East, is a crucial element in elevating the popularity of Islamist groups among ordinary Muslims. What makes Islamism an alluring political ideology is its ability to provide religious idioms that resonate with Muslims, allowing them to articulate their genuine grievances, both domestic and international. This, in turn, endows Islamist groups with a wider presence in Muslim societies than they might otherwise enjoy, as they are able to voice opinions about the concerns of a significant number of Muslims, many of whom do not consider themselves to be Islamists (Ayoob, 2005, p. 954).

7.8   Islam in the Digital Age This book has attempted to demonstrate that activism and decision-­ making are the two main areas in the Cyber Islamic Environments. These domains hold a central position in Muslim online activities: certain religious viewpoints are more secure to articulate in cyberspace than in the tangible world and the deployment of destructive technology remains under the purview of dispersed groups, networks and knowledgeable individuals who do not necessarily operate under a unified organisational banner. These instances reflect the burgeoning electronic interconnectivity between Muslims living in both minority and majority environments, and in some instances, they supplement or even supersede traditional networks. It is widely acknowledged that information technology is not equitably accessible to all members of society, and the ‘digital divide’ continues to loom as a significant factor in many Muslim societies. There is an observable polarisation within the Muslim community itself. Media remains the province of educated elites, particularly in circumstances where Muslims constitute the majority, technology access is ubiquitous and communication channels are scant. If (or when) technology for browsing the World Wide Web becomes more affordable, alternative interfaces may offer better access to disenfranchised individuals and communities. These interfaces may rely on subsidised internet cafes and other public access forms, dedicated email and internet hardware, telephone and

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television interfaces, wireless technology and more affordable computers (including those produced and manufactured by Muslims). Moreover, the relationship between internet media and other forms of media warrants meticulous scrutiny, especially in view of the content level provided by newspapers and broadcasters that compete with ‘new’ internet portals and channels. The subject matter of this book concerns the websites and opinions that defy the narrow confines of nation-state interests and instead pertain to global concepts that are rooted in specific interpretations of Islam and Muslim identity. These digital platforms are predominantly accessed and curated by the intellectual and financial elites, but this does not necessarily negate their reach or impact. In the post-9/11 era, the internet played a pivotal role in reshaping the interplay between Islam, Muslims and the West. When discussing the intersection of Islam and the internet, the term ‘Western’ is often rendered ambiguous, if not superfluous, in light of the circulation of concepts like Islam and the internet across diverse forums and in varying Muslim contexts. There is no justifiable reason why Muslims should not fully avail themselves of technology. Although certain orientalist stereotypes may posit otherwise, many are surprised by the extent of technological sophistication exhibited by the online Islamic milieu and how it has facilitated the emergence of traditional and radical network models. However, it remains to be seen whether these developments have any tangible impact on the existing, traditional networks, a matter that warrants further investigation and scrutiny, especially considering the ever-­ evolving nature of this situation. If one were to assess the effect of these developments on individuals and communities through the lens of major events, then it is clear that the online statements contained in sermons or fatwas, even if they were originally disseminated via traditional channels, can still exert significant influence on those who come across them on the internet. It is evident that the creators of fatwa-endorsed websites are incentivised by the number of visitors they receive and the manner in which questions are put forth to them online. Measuring the impact of online activities that are overtly destructive ‘in the name of Islam’ is a more difficult endeavour. Is it considered a success if such activities leave a physical or psychological impact on their intended targets? Such actions could be construed as part of a wider ‘mission’ (da‘wa) or labelled as a ‘jihād’, but these terms may serve as convenient labels for commentators and analysts and their use in relation to e-jihād should be approached with

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caution. While digital weapons may prove to be potent tools against selected targets, their impact may not always be discernible in the non-­ digital sphere. If the scope of destructive activity extends to the point where it begins to affect the daily lives of targeted communities by compromising their computer networks, for instance, then e-jihād could attract the attention of not just technology enthusiasts and contemporary Muslim observers, but also those directly affected by its pernicious effects. The extent to which militant groups and other clandestine organisations, such as al-Qaeda, utilise electronic media remains a contentious topic that has not been fully discussed. The discourse surrounding this topic often exhibits a sensationalist flair, thereby proposing that greater regulation and, in certain instances, censorship of the media may prove necessary. However, the call for such control displays a lack of understanding regarding the nature and plausibility of such measures, particularly outside of the domestic arena. For example, opposition groups and their supporters in Saudi Arabia have been able to evade limitations on generating and accessing pivotal website content despite substantial investments in blocking technology by the Kingdom. The tragic events of 9/11 revealed that while the use of electronic networks is confined to an educated elite, it may serve as a means of dialogue and dissemination during crises, particularly due to its capacity to circumvent censorship. Internet discourse plays a crucial role in a broader Muslim conversation, contributing to the global opinion that emerged on the web following the aforementioned tragedy. Although its impact may not prove as enduring as that of the well-established satellite channel Al Jazeera, which boasts a reputable website, it does offer a more personalised medium for cyber Islamic environments (Echchaibi, 2011, p. 27). Whether the articulation of jihād and fatwa in cyberspace would have been familiar to Muslims during the formative period of Islam remains a matter of debate. While some conceptual themes related to these topics are evident in the Qur’ān, which form part of the authoritative scholarship surrounding the paradigm of the Prophet, the development of the intellectual themes related to fatwa and jihād during the century after the Prophet’s death became an integral part of the theological and philosophical pursuits of Muslim networks. Islamic institutions, academics, politicians and other individuals have since refined the theme of jihād and the concept of authority as an essential aspect of the fatwa. In the scholarship of hadı ̄th, the transmission sequence concept serves to validate or negate the knowledge attributes contained in the Prophet’s statements and

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actions based on the transmitter’s level of authority. The process of disseminating knowledge has now entered a new electronic phase, closely linked to a process idealised in a series of Muslim contexts that can be traced back to the Prophet (Bunt, 2003). The speed of transmission is now subject to the constraints of available bandwidth. Within this milieu, it is plausible that the ubiquitousness of technology has led to its utter disregard. For the educated stratum, the internet has assumed a pivotal role within the religious conceptual schema, incorporating sacred texts, symbols and utterances that are imbued with spiritual significance and endowed with the power to galvanise individuals towards righteous conduct and divine aspirations. A synthesis of electronic, neural and spiritual circuits has been seamlessly integrated into the psyches of devotees and it is through the digital interface that an ever-expanding cohort of adherents will envision their faith and their position within the Islamic world. These communities are affiliated with a wider collective, in which the West is increasingly deemed extraneous, at least within the domain of cyberspace.

7.9  Countering the Crisis of Authority: The Possibilities for Change The predicament confronting the Muslim world today is attributable to three historical factors that are interconnected: the sidelining of conventional Islamic authorities over the past one and a half centuries; the ascendance of novel, inadequately qualified authorities who have gained traction among the masses through their adroit utilisation of contemporary print and electronic media; and the concomitant propagation of widespread literacy and the proliferation of advanced technical expertise throughout the Muslim world, which has opened new vistas of intellectual inquiry and provided platforms for the exposition of radical, non-traditional Islamic ideas (Bulliet, 2002, p.  14). This crisis can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when the Muslim world was compelled to confront the challenge of European imperialism. In response, several countries began to initiate reforms based on the European model, such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, while by the close of the century, Iran, Tunisia and Morocco had followed suit, and in the post-colonial world, many other countries had also adopted such reforms (Fieldhouse, 2008). European anti-clericalism exerted a profound influence on Muslim leaders in the nineteenth century, who deemed it a crucial element of European

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nation-building, leading them to curtail the power of the traditional Muslim authorities. Later, leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Hafiz Assad of Syria continued this attack in the name of secular nationalism, but their notion of secularism did not entail the separation of religion from the state, but rather its subjugation to the state. Traditional religious authorities had long exercised interpretive and enforcement powers over Muslim lands, but reformers discarded the traditional sharı ̄‘ah legal system in favour of European-inspired codes and secularised legal education, leading to the replacement of religious judges and advisors with lawyers trained in new legal methodologies who presided over the new European-style courts (Rock-Singer, 2019) The gradual but persistent erosion of religious authority has dealt a severe blow to the power and influence of traditional religious leaders in the public sphere (Bulliet, 2002). Increasingly, many ordinary Muslims have become sceptical of their religious leaders’ pronouncements. They wonder whether their opinions have been shaped by genuine religious knowledge and awareness or whether they are merely catering to the whims and fancies of government officials who control their funding. By the 1930s, the traditional religious authorities were on a downward trajectory, exacerbated by the arrival of a powerful technological revolution. While for centuries, religious authority was formed through personal connections between teachers and disciples, this system is now being challenged by writers, editors and publishers who lack formal religious training and have few ties to established teachers. These new religious authorities have gained traction simply by printing books, articles and newspapers. A Muslim in Egypt can become a devoted follower of a Pakistani writer without ever knowing him or meeting him. Nonetheless, many Muslims still rely on the legal advice (fatwas) and the moral guidance of traditionally educated Muftis and Imams in their local mosques. Despite this, the momentum appears to be with the new authorities. An unusual dynamic has thus emerged in the Muslim world, in which the new authorities rarely defer to the old, while the old feel compelled to support some of the ideas of their competitors to retain influence. As a result, the locus of debate is constantly shifting in favour of the new authorities. Local imams and other religious leaders find themselves squeezed between the interests of their national government, their religious upbringing and the popular doctrines of their rivals. This helps to explain the curious silence that has prevailed since 9/11. Some traditional religious figures have chosen to remain silent, while others have either condoned the act of terrorism, denied any

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connection between Islam and Muslims and the attacks, or resorted to anti-American rhetoric. Still, others have condemned the terrorist acts but stopped short of denouncing the instigators. These remarkable changes bear witness to the perennial struggles of a faith without central authority. Yet, this narrative also testifies to the Muslim community’s enduring resilience and capacity to overcome such crises. How can we surmount this present crisis of authority? The solution is not to rebuild religious authority upon the old foundations. Rather, contemporary nations, modern media and progressive citizens must contribute to any viable solution. Throughout its history, Islam has demonstrated that the emerging institutions that arise from any crisis will not replace the existing ones. Seminaries will persist in their time-honoured mission to teach basic laws and elucidate texts. Their graduates will remain instrumental in issuing significant legal opinions. Since Muslims retain a sense of historical unity under the Caliphate, the aspiration for political unification will endure. Any response to the current crisis must appeal to the spiritual, moral and intellectual aspirations of those Muslims who do not find satisfaction in traditional institutions of faith. The welcome fact is that the totalitarian doctrine espoused by extremist Islamist groups constitutes only one of several conceivable options. The others hold more promise. Another array of possibilities for change within Islam is offered by independent educational and research institutions that exist outside the realm of traditional seminaries and formal governmental education systems. These institutions serve as spaces for contemporary Muslim intellectuals to develop innovative ideas on contemporary issues. These centres are established in diverse locations such as London, Paris, Washington, Cairo and Istanbul. The scholars they invite offer invaluable guidance to Muslims living beyond the traditional boundaries of the Islamic world. Some Muslim countries are now home to government-funded educational institutions that teach Islam from the vantage point of the modern world. Notably, the Higher Islamic Institute in Indonesia provides an excellent example of such institutions. Some of these institutions may eventually mature into universities that offer both religious and secular courses. Finally, another source of innovation may be the large number of modern Muslims who not only live outside the traditional borders of the Islamic world, but also within it. Despite their divergent approaches and conflicting views, the modernist Muslim intellectuals of today must find a way to unite their efforts to

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overcome the current crisis of authority within Islam (Bulliet, 2002, p. 14). They have been advocating the concept of ‘turath’ or inheritance, which emphasises the intersection of the past and the present, rendering the details of religious practices and laws somewhat irrelevant. By engaging with other contemporary Muslim intellectuals, these thinkers aim to legitimise non-observant forms of Islam. It is highly improbable that intellectuals who do not practice Islam, leaders of Islamist movements, scholars affiliated with Islamic centres and institutions and government-funded teachers from religious schools will ever see eye to eye on all matters. However, historical examples demonstrate that when Muslim leaders respected varying viewpoints and recognised the common interest in the welfare of Muslim communities globally, conflicts within Islam were often resolved. Yet, it is imperative to take more direct measures than merely developing long-term harmony within Islam. The only alternative to prevent a ‘clash of civilisations’ is to take proactive measures. The polarisation of the world between Islam and the West will serve the interests of those who will bring tragedy to others. Even if the Islamic authorities cannot resolve the failure of the traditional leadership they should be able to recognise the imminent disaster and take steps to avoid it.

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Dawson, L. (2001). Researching religion in cyberspace: Issues and strategies. In J. Hadden & D. Cowan (Eds.), Religion on the internet: Research prospects and promises, religion and the social order (Vol. 8, pp. 25–54). JAI Press. Echchaibi, N. (2011). From audio tapes to video blogs: The delocalisation of authority in Islam. Nations and Nationalism, 17(1), 25–44. Eickelman, D. F., & Piscatori, J. (1996). Muslim politics. Princeton University Press. Fieldhouse, D.  K. (2008). Western imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958. Oxford University Press. Fuller, G. (2003). The future of political Islam. Palgrave Macmillan. Grinin, L., & Korotayev, A. (2019). Islamism and its role in modern Islamic societies. In L.  E. Grinin, A.  V. Korotayev, & A.  Tausch (Eds.), Islamism, Arab spring, and the future of democracy: Perspectives on development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (pp. 59–118). Springer. Herring, D. (2005). Virtual as contextual: A net news theology. In M. T. Højsgaard & M. Warburg (Eds.), Religion and cyberspace (pp. 149–165). Routledge. Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 24–49. Lewis, B. (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. Atlantic Monthly, 266(3), 49. Moghadam, V. (2013). Globalisation and social movements, Islamism, feminism, and the global justice movement. Rowman & Littlefield. Nasr, S. V. R. (1994). The vanguard of the Islamic revolution: The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan. University of California Press. Osman, T. (2017). The future of Islamism. Retrieved July 3, 2023, from https:// yalebooks.yale.edu/2017/10/27/the-­future-­of-­islamism/ Piff, D., & Warburg, M. (2005). Seeking for truth: Plausibility on a Baha’i email list. In M.  T. Højsgaard & M.  Warburg (Eds.), Religion and cyberspace (pp. 86–101). Routledge. Rock-Singer, A. (2019). Practicing Islam in Egypt: Print media and Islamic revival. Cambridge University Press. Wickham, C. R. (2002). Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism, and political change in Egypt. Columbia University Press.

Index

A Abbasid caliphs, 121, 122, 129–131, 134, 140–142, 146 Abbasid era, 141 Absence of centralised hierarchical religious structure, 120 Abu-Lughod, Janet, 51–55 Action pyramid, 226 Al-Adnani, Abu Muhammad, 214 AKP (Justice and Development Party), 99–104 AKP’s Islam, 185 Al-Azhar, 126, 145–149, 153, 172–176, 182 Al-Azhar scholars, 174 Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 217 Alexandria, 52, 53 Algeria, 170 Algorithms, 221 Ali, Muhammad, 121, 137, 147, 148, 186, 194 Ali’s ascension, 129, 130 Al-Ma’mun, 121, 143 Al-Mu‘izz, 145

Al-Qaeda, 6, 7, 12, 89, 96, 205, 216–218, 225, 227, 228, 243, 249 American culture, 20, 30, 42 American foreign policy, 245–247 Americanisation, 56 American pop culture, 42 Amı ̄r, 9, 155, 156 Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 171 Apostasy, 119, 151 Apostolic power, 132 Arab capitalism, 54 Arabic, 126 Arabic-language forums, 218 Arab Spring, 7, 208 Arab tribal system, 8 Arab tribes, 129 Arab Uprisings, 7 Arbitration, 88, 109 Archaic globalisation, 29 Armed conflict, 7 Asian capitalism, 54 Association of the Ulama of India, 193

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Mohiuddin, Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6

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INDEX

Association of the Ulama of Islam, 193 Association of the Ulama of Pakistan, 193 Authenticity, 125 Authoritarianism, 81, 109, 165 Authoritarian regimes, 62, 238, 244–245 Authoritative texts, 165 Authority, 117–157 Authority of the text, 120 Ayyubids, 146 Azhari ‘ulamā (Islamic scholars), 149 B Baghdad, 52, 53, 55, 166 Bankers, 54 Barelwis, 192, 193 Bayat, Asef, 47–50, 58, 97, 99, 103 Behavioural radicalisation, 226 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 195 Bin Laden, Osama, 203, 216, 217, 223, 224, 228 Black Death, 55 British Raj, 193 Bubonic plague, 52 Buddhism, 52 Byzantium, 54 C Cairo, Egypt, 52, 53, 55, 126, 144–148 Caliph, 117, 118, 121, 122, 127, 129, 134–143, 145, 146, 151, 156 Caliphate, 6, 9, 119, 129, 134, 136–140, 142, 154, 156, 169, 194 Capitalism, 1, 6, 10, 24, 34, 42, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 79, 87, 105 Capitalist development, 20 Capital movements, 17

Charisma, 127–134 Charismatic lineage, 131 Charismatic power, 128, 129, 133 China, 52, 53, 55, 60 Chinese empire, 104 Civilian bureaucracy, 101 Civilisational conflict, 60 Civilisational identity, 58–62 Civil liberties, 109 Civil society, 118 Clash of civilisations, 19, 60, 61, 203, 246, 253 Class struggle, 85 Cognitive radicalisation, 226 Collective identities, 237 Collective iftā,’ 153 Colonialism, 245 Colonisation, 20, 59 Communist movements, 74 Compression of space and time, 17 Compression of time and space, 25 Conflict between civilizations, 56 Conflict zones, 11 Confucianism, 52 Constantinople, 52 Constructionism, 32 Consumerism, 18, 42 Context, 118, 120, 122–128, 134, 139, 148, 149, 151, 152, 155 Controversies, 125 Cosmopolitan individual, 36 Cosmopolitanism, 4 Council of Islamic Ideology, 153 Countering ISIS/ISIL online, 219–221 Counterproductive strategies, 244 Covenant of Medina, 183, 184 Covert resistance, 50 Creole, 29 Creolised discourse, 207 Creolization, 10 Crisis of religious authority, 167

 INDEX 

Critical theory of globalisation, 23 Critical thinking, 128 Criticisms of globalisation, 105 Cultural artefacts, 41 Cultural convergence, 52 Cultural diversity, 20, 57 Cultural globalisation, 5 Cultural hybridisation, 20 Cultural imperialism, 6, 43 Cultural invasion, 238 Culture, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38–39, 41–46, 51, 56–58, 60, 62–64 Curriculum, 166, 187, 190 Customs Union agreement, 56 Cyber caliphate, 217–219 Cyber Islamic environments, 247, 249 Cyberspace, 10, 108, 167, 203–230 D Decentralisation of Islamic authority, 106 Decline of Muslim politics, 245 Decline of the Caliphate, 138–140 Deconstruction, 18 Defensive identities, 19 Deforestation and resource degradation, 26 Democracy, 74, 81, 90, 91, 96, 97, 99–104, 108, 109, 170, 184, 185, 238, 246 Democracy in Turkey, 101, 104 Democratic countries, 62 Democratisation, 165 Deobandis, 192, 193, 195 Deregulation, 20, 33 Dialogue and dissemination, 249 Digital age, 203–230 Digital communication, 212–214 Digital cyberspace, 207, 209–212 Digital platforms, 230

257

Digital spaces, 207, 217–219 Dı ̄n and dawla, 168, 169, 171 Discord among relatives, 128 Discourse on morality, 94 Diyanet (Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs), 182, 185 Dome of the Rock, 139, 140 Domination, 25, 45, 48 E Early Muslim community, 124 Early Shiism, 129 Ecological degradation, 24 Ecological dumping, 26 Economic crisis, 205 Economic globalisation, 5 Economic integration, 51 Economy, 17, 24, 49, 53, 54, 57 Egalitarianism, 45, 46 Egocentric approach, 39 Egypt, 54, 55, 168, 172–177, 195 Egyptian law and the sharı ̄‘ah, 176 Egypt’s contribution to global commerce, 55 E-jiha ¯d, 248, 249 Electoral processes, 238 Electronic media, 249, 250 Eliaçik, Ihsan, 183–185 Emancipatory movements, 74 Enclave society, 27 Ennahda (Islamist party), 178, 179 Entrepreneur-notables, 110 Environmental protection, 36 Epistemology, 4 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 100, 101, 182, 185 Essentialism, 19 Ethics, 123, 141–142 Ethnic identities, 5 Ethnocentrism, 40 Ethnoscapes, 21

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INDEX

European colonisation, 118, 122 European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), 153 European expansionism, 20 European imperialism, 250 Everyday resistance, 47 Evolution of world systems, 52 Extremist groups, 5 Extremist organisations, 106 F Facebook, 10, 11 Facebook and Twitter revolutions, 208 Factional rivalries, 139 Family lineage, 135 Failure of Political Islam, 95, 97 Fatimid dynasty, 173 Fatimids, 145, 146 Fatwa organisations, 153 Fatwas, 185, 187 Financial liberalisation, 20 Finanscapes, 21 Fiqh, 146, 151 Fiqh al-Ikhtilāf, 154 Flanders, 52 Foreign manipulation, 80 Foucault, Michael, 50 Fragmentation of religious authority, 9, 11, 13, 14 Free market, 100, 105 Free-market capitalism, 42 Free market of religion, 120, 172 Free Officers’ mutiny, 148 Fundamentalism, 45, 58, 84 G Genealogy, 139, 143 General Sisi, 149 Genghis Khan, 55 Genoa, 52

Al-Ghazālı ̄, Muhammad, 175 Giddens, Anthony, 76, 78 Global cities, 52, 53 Global citizenship, 43, 45 Global civil society, 20 Global conflicts, 60 Global diseases, 21 Global division of labor, 26 Global ethic, 23 Global governance, 20 Globalisation, 1–14, 17–64, 73, 76–79, 81, 104–106, 108–110, 119, 150, 151, 153 Globalisation of military technology, 21 Global Muslim community, 150 Global power structure, 245–247 Global security, 219 Global social order, 44–46 Global society, 18, 62 Global telecommunication systems, 43 Global tourism industry, 26 Global trade, 17 Global/transnational Islamist movements, 81 Glocalisation, 27–31 God, 120, 121, 125, 127, 131, 133–138, 140, 143, 151, 156, 157 Gold coins, 54 Gormez, Mehmet, 182, 185 Grand narrative, 1 Greek empire, 104 Group Identity, 39, 40 Guardians of right and wrong, 118 Gul, Abdullah, 100, 101 H Hacking, 219 Hadı ̄th, 118, 122, 124–128, 133 Hadı ̄th collections, 10

 INDEX 

Hadı ̄th literature, 125, 136 Hanafism, 147 Ḥ anbalı ̄ School of jurisprudence, 180 Harun Rashid, 141 Hashtag warriors, 218 Hatipoglu, Nihat, 182 Heirs of the Prophet, 134–136 Hereditary succession, 128–130, 133 Heresy, 119 Hermeneutics, 18 Heterogeneity, 27 Higher education, 204, 215, 229, 230 Historical approach to Islamism, 83–85 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI), 188 Homogenisation, 20, 36 Human distortion, 133 Humanitarian aid, 36 Human rights, 36, 43, 58, 60, 76, 81, 100, 109 Human welfare, 45 Huntington, Samuel, 31, 56, 59–61 Huwaydı ̄, Fahmı ̄, 176 Hybridity, 19, 30 I Ibn Saud, 180 Identity, 17–64 commodification, 86 crisis, 31 politics, 34, 60 Ideological dimension of globalisation, 22 Ideology, 4, 6 Ideoscapes, 21 Iftā‘, 153 Ijtihād, 210–212, 215, 216, 224 Ilm (divinely conferred knowledge), 126, 131–133 Imam, 129–136, 143, 146 Imamate, 129–131, 133 Imam Hatip School, 182, 185

259

IMF consensus, 105 Immunity from error, 133 Impact of print and mass media, 119 India, 52–54 Indian ‘ulamā, 194 Indian Ocean, 53 Indian subcontinent, 53 Individualism, 42 Inequalities, 22, 24, 31, 57 Infallibility, 131, 133 Information and communication technology (ICT), 10, 12 Information society, 204 Information technology, 21, 28, 204 Information technology revolution, 20 Information warfare, 218 Ingroup bias, 35 Ingroup favouritism, 35, 38 Inherited charisma, 128–131, 133 Inquisition (mihna), 121, 127 Insurgency, 7 Intellectual dominance, 48 Interfaith dialogue, 180 Interfaith harmony, 253 Intergroup discrimination, 38, 40 Intergroup dynamics, 19 International conventions, 79 International financial markets, 52 International stage, 108 International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), 153–155 Internet, 2, 3, 7, 9–13, 118, 128, 152, 167, 187, 188, 204–210, 212–214, 217–219, 221, 224–230 Internet misinformation, 239 Intragroup identity, 38 Invasion of Iraq, 101 Iqbal, Muhammad, 194 Iranian Green Revolution, 208, 213 Iranian Revolution, 169, 191, 244 ISIS or ISIL, 6, 7, 12, 89, 96, 106, 205, 214–221, 225, 226, 228

260 

INDEX

Islam, 1–14, 52, 57, 58, 64, 203–213, 215, 217, 220–225, 228–230 and globalisation, 1–14 in the modern world, 252 and the West, 253 Islam Hadari, 186 Islam hadhari (civilizational Islam), 171 Islamic art and architecture, 139 Islamic authority, 2, 3, 9, 13 Islamic cyber networks, 207 Islamic discourse, 107 Islamic education, 2 Islamic Fiqh Academy India, 153 Islamic Forum for Islamic Society (FUI), 188 Islamic identity, 19, 61, 62 Islamic ideology, 81, 89, 98, 99 Islamic interpretation of globalism, 57 Islamic jurists, 118 Islamic knowledge, 108 Islamic law, 83, 84, 90, 117, 118, 122, 141–142, 145, 156, 157, 165, 174, 177, 180, 190 Islamic law (Sharia), 81, 83, 84, 90, 96 Islamic law, Grand Mufti, 178, 179, 182 Islamic non-governmental organisations, 7, 75 Islamic normativity, 124 Islamic political organisations, 244, 245 Islamic revival, 2 Islamic revivalist movements, 80 Islamic revolution, 7, 74 Islamic Revolution of Iran, 170 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 170 Islamic schools, 190 Islamic social movements, 80 Islamic social order, 157

Islamic State, 81, 95, 96, 103, 106, 109, 169–171, 176, 179, 180, 194 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL), 172, 179 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS or ISIL), 106 Islamisation, 169, 170, 183, 186, 195, 205 Islamism, 6–9, 57, 58, 80–83, 85, 88, 92–110, 165–196, 203–230 in Southeast Asia, 165–196 in Turkey, 99, 102 Islamist activism, 85, 86, 91, 109 Islamist groups, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11–14, 76, 87–97, 100, 103, 109, 110, 167, 168, 172, 174, 179, 186, 188–190, 194–196 Islamist movements, 1–14, 73–110 Islamists as a large-scale movement, 97 Isma (infallibility), 131, 133 Ismaili Shi‘ı ̄ dynasty, 145 Ismailism, 145, 146 Isma principle, 132, 133 Isnad, 126 Israel, 246 IT revolution, 2 IUMS membership, 154 J Jafar al-Sadiq, 132, 136 Ja‘far Numayri, 170 Ja’maah Tabligh, 188 Jamā‘at-e-Islami, 194 Jihād and fatwa in cyberspace, 249 Jinnah, 194 Judaism, 52 Judiciary, 101

 INDEX 

Justice and Development Party (AKP), 171, 182–185 Justice-driven globalisation, 23 K Karaman, Hayrettin, 182, 183, 185 Kemalist movement, 101 Kemalist state, 100 Khalı ̄fat Allah (God’s Deputy), 137, 138 Kharijites, 121 Khatami, Muhammad, 170, 171 Khilafat movement, 193, 194 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 169 Kurdish empowerment, 184 Kuttab, 141 L Law, 118, 119, 121–125, 127, 132–135, 138, 141–142, 145, 147, 148, 151, 155–157 Lay interpreters, 2, 9, 157 Legal pluralism, 119, 152, 154 Legal reform, 214 Legislative authority, 117 Life sciences, 1 Limitations of social identity theory, 41 Lingua franca, 25, 26, 42 Literacy, 10 Literature, 19, 20, 35, 36, 39, 50 Local imams, 251 Local Islamism, 82 M Madrasa, 126 Madrasah, 145–147 Madrasa model, 190 Mahathir Mohammad, 171

261

Mahmood, Saba, 47, 50, 51 Majelis ‘Ulamā’ Indonesia (MUI), 187 Malaysia, 168, 171, 186, 190–192 Mamluk sultanate, 146 Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, 216 Market-driven globalisation, 23 Marketplace of religious denominations, 240 Mass higher education, 119 Mass media, 107, 204, 206, 230 Material dominance, 48 Materialism, 57 Mawdūdı ̄, Abul ‘Ala, 194 Media landscape, 240 Mediascapes, 21 Micro-practices of mobilisation, 95 Middle East, 52–55, 165–196 Migration, 96 Militant groups, 238, 249 Military authority, 117, 118 Minhaj, 169 Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP), 39 Ministry of Religious Affairs, 186 Moderate Islamist groups, 5 Moderate Islamists, 100, 108, 109, 238 Modern communication technology, 204 Modern education system, 190 Modernisation, 80, 84, 105, 106, 122, 151, 153 Modernity, 18, 32, 58, 80, 81, 105, 241, 243 Modern period, 126, 127 Mongol Empire, 53, 55 Morocco, 56 Mosque construction, 93 Mosques, 91–94, 109, 110, 144–147, 178, 190 Mu‘tazilite, 141 Muftis, 120, 153 Muhamadiyah, 186, 188

262 

INDEX

Muhammadiyah, 186, 188, 189 Muhammad, Prophet, 117, 123, 128, 130, 136, 137, 156 Mujtahid, 210 Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 74, 89, 90, 94, 97, 102, 108, 149 Muslim communities, 134, 150, 155, 156 Muslim criticism of capitalism, 57 Muslim family laws, 7 Muslim League, 194 Muslim majority states, 243 Muslim motivation, 83 Muslim networks, 108 Muslim online networks, 247 Muslim scholars, 172 Muslim schools of law, 119 Muslim world, 20, 51–58, 61, 74, 76, 88, 89, 96, 98, 100, 103, 106, 108, 118, 122, 123, 126, 141, 144, 149, 150, 153, 154 Mysticism, 123 N Nahdat al Ulama, 153 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 185–189, 192 Nass (divine designation), 131 National identity, 57, 59, 63 Nationalism, 19, 40, 45 Nation-states, 76, 77, 79, 168, 171, 190 Neo-fundamentalism, 95–104 Neoliberal capitalism, 6 Neoliberal capitalist globalisation, 238 Neoliberal economics, 45 Neoliberalism, 28, 33, 56, 58, 74, 105, 205 Network society, 27, 28 New communication technologies, 1, 128 Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, 191

Noble ancestry, 129 Non-cooperation movement, 194 Nonviolent movements, 108 O Occupation and settlement of Palestinian territories, 246 Official ‘ulamā, 118 Online communities, 205 Online engagement, 239 Online interpreters, 239 Online Islamic sources, 209 Online sermons, 212, 218 Ontology, 4 Opinion pyramid, 226 Organised resistance, 46–51 Ottoman Caliphate, 215 Ottomans, 147 P Pakistan, 170, 193–195 Pakistan’s constitution, 194 Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS), 191, 192 Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), 171 Partition of the subcontinent, 194 Patrimonial administration, 141 Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (PUM), 191 Persian Empire, 104 Personal piety, 117 Pluralism, 58, 62, 183–185, 192–193 Policy convergence, 5 Political and religious authority, 121, 129 Political authority, 78, 106, 117, 118, 121, 129 Political disorder, 82 Political economy, 73, 85–86, 92 Political ideology, 81, 97

 INDEX 

Political integration, 51 Political Islam, 169, 171, 182, 183, 185 Political openness, 62 Political order, 59 Political processes, 73, 89, 110 Political project, 96 Political transition, 108 Political use of religious imagery, 244 Pondoks, 190–192 Post-Islamism, 81, 97–100, 102, 103 Post-Islamist politics, 95–104 Post-modern culturalism, 57 Post-revolutionary government, 149 Poverty, 22, 57 Power, 18, 25, 26, 32–34, 41, 42, 45–51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 60, 63, 64 Power and authority, 109 Power dynamics, 119, 129, 130 Power relations, 86, 88, 110 Pre-modern, 126, 127 Print and electronic media, 250 Printing press, 2 Print media, 9, 166, 223 Privatisation process, 56 Progressive political thought, 19 Propaganda techniques, 218 Prophet, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123–125, 128–137, 140, 151, 156 Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH), 83 Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), 8, 117, 123, 128, 137, 156 Prophet’s migration to Medina, 124 Prophetic charisma, 129, 130, 132 Prophet’s inherited scrolls and weaponry, 132 Protestant Reformation, 107 Protestants and the Bible, 120 Psychoanalysis, 18 Public discourse, 22, 23, 25

263

Public resistance, 47 Public sphere, 128, 152 Pure and primitive Islam, 246 Q Qadis, 9, 141–142, 146 Al-Qaraḍāwı ̄, Yusuf, 175, 176, 181 Qatar, 154, 180–182 Qur’ān, 10, 117, 118, 120–127, 130, 132–134, 142–143, 151, 156, 249 Qur’ānic hermeneutics, 133 Quraysh tribe, 129 Qutb, Sayyid, 168, 169 R Radical groups, 243 Radical ideologues, 203, 216 Radical Islamist groups, 76, 96, 204, 205, 227 Radicalization, 96, 220 Refah Party, 100 Reform interpretations, 211, 214 Re-Islamisation, 94, 110 Re-Islamisation efforts, 95 Relationship between ‘ulamā’ and state, 122 Religion, 18, 20, 44, 62 Religious authority, 1–14, 75, 90, 106–108, 117–157 Religious disorder, 82, 83 Religious education, 186, 187, 190, 191 Religious identities, 2, 5 Religious law, 118, 125 Religious modernism, 97 Religious practices, 240, 253 Religious scholars, 238 Religious sciences, 118, 141 Religious tolerance, 119

264 

INDEX

Repressive state institutions, 244 Resistance, 5–7, 13 Resistance identities, 19, 32 Restoration (ihya) and construction (inşa), 183 Resurgence of religion, 2 Return to pure Islamic society, 246 Revealed text, 120, 133 Revival of traditional Arab polity, 129 Revolutionary force, 1 Rightly guided caliphs, 117, 137, 140 Role of clergy in Qatar, 181 Roman Empire, 104 Roy, Olivier, 95–98 S Salafi, 96 Salafiyya, 167 Salah al-Din (Saladin), 146 Saudi Arabia, 180–182 Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, 195 Scott, James, 47–50 Scriptural exegesis, 133 Secularisation, 4, 42 Secularism, 74, 96, 99, 101–104 Security industry, 21 Self-categorisation theory, 41 Self-help and mutual aid, 109 Seminaries, 252 Shafi’, Mufti Muhammad, 193, 194 Sharı ̄‘ah, 7, 84, 85, 96, 117, 118, 133, 151, 169, 170, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 190 Shari man, 134 Shaykh al-Azhar, 147–149, 176 Shi‘ı ̄ Islam, 128–134, 151 Shı ̄‘ı ̄ minority, 180 Shi‘ı ̄ notion, 129, 131 Shi‘ı ̄ philosophy of leadership, 131 Social change, 18, 47, 62

Social hierarchy, 44 Social identities, 17, 35–37, 39–41, 58, 59 approach, 19, 31, 35–37, 41 theory, 39, 40, 45 Social impact of globalisation, 105 Social intervention, 109 Social issues, 109 Social loafing, 39 Social media, 3, 9–14, 181, 186–188 impact on Islam, 206 platforms, 240 Social mobilisation, 61, 62 Social movements, 21, 36, 47–49, 73–81, 86, 91–95 Social status, 18, 50, 54 Social structures, 119, 128, 129, 155 Social transformations, 62 Societal forces, 109 Sociocultural patterns, 240 Solidarity and social relationships, 110 Sources of religious authority in Qatar, 181 Sources of sharı ̄‘ah, 118 South Asia, 126, 165–196 Southeast Asia, 52, 165–196 State power, 58 State repression, 238 State-sponsored version of Islam, 181 Status dominance, 48 Status of the Sunnah, 124 Structural adjustment programs, 7 Structural adjustments, 74 Structure-agency debate, 150 Succession dispute, 137 Succession of Abu Bakr, 129 Successors, 117, 122, 132, 133, 135–138, 140, 156 Sudan, 170 Sufi orders, 166

 INDEX 

Sufis, 122, 127, 166, 167, 192, 194 Sufism, 127 Sunnah, 117, 118, 123–126, 134 Sunni context, 118, 127 Sunni identity, 146 Sunni Islam, 119–124, 151 Sunni ‘ulamā, 239 Sunni viewpoint, 129 Supreme Constitutional Court, 175–177 Syncretism, 29 T Tamerlane’s devastation, 55 Tarbiyah Movement, 188 Technical expertise, 250 Terrorism, 22, 23, 61, 203, 214, 251 Textual authority, 166 Textualisation, 117 Thanawi, Ashraf ‘Ali, 194 Theology, 123, 125 Tok Guru, 190–192 Trade circuits, 52 Tradition, 3–5, 12 Traditional Islamic authority, 128 Traditional Muslim institutions, 238 Traditional religious authorities, 209, 229 Traditional religious hierarchies, 239 Traditional values, 106 Traditional vs. new authorities, 251 Transcribed sermons, 10 Transcultural, 29 Transculturalism, 30 Transformation of Islamic authority, 150 Transmission, 125, 131–133, 139, 144 Transmitters, 125 Transnational flows, 21, 59 Transnational groups, 243

265

Transnational public sphere, 76–79 Transportation and communication technologies, 166 Tunisia, 154 Tunisia’s secularism, 177 Turath (inheritance), 253 Turkey, 56, 171, 182–185 Turkish democracy, 99 Turkish Islamism, 100 Twitter, 10, 208, 212, 214, 221, 229 U Ulamā (Islamic scholars), 3, 9, 96, 165–167, 173–176, 181, 186, 187, 190–196, 203, 204, 215, 216, 222–224, 230 Ulamā Council, 191 Umayyad dynasty, 137, 138 Ummayad dynasty, 138, 139, 143 Unemployment, 7, 75 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 191 United States, 245–247 Unofficial ‘ulamā, 118 US dollar, 42 US foreign policy, 245–247 V Venice, 52 Violent militant groups, 238 Violent tactics, 108 W Wahdah Islamiyah, 188, 189 Wahhābı ̄ movement, 96, 180 Wahhabism, 180–182 Waqf institutions, 141 Waratha tradition, 135, 136 Wasatiyyah, 154, 155

266 

INDEX

Wasatiyyah as a strategy, 154, 155 West, 246–248, 250, 253 Western capitalism, 54, 105 Western dominance, 246 Westernisation, 80, 84 Western media, 105 Widespread literacy, 250 Wilayat al-faqih, 191 Women in Islam, 214 Women in Islamic scholarship, 126 World citizenship, 18 World League of Mecca, 153

World system, 24, 52 World-system theory, 73 Y YouTube, 10 Z Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 224 Zia-ul-Haq, 170, 195 Zoroastrianism, 52