Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success 9780199948826, 9780199948840

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Minority Rules

Minority Rules Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success

DAV I D L U B L I N

1

1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

© Oxford University Press 2014 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP record is available from the Library of Congress 9780199948826 (hbk.) 9780199948840 (pbk.)

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

For Eric

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures  Acknowledgments  xiii

1. Introduction 

ix

1

PA RT I  

EL ECTOR A L S YST E M S

2. Majoritarian Electoral Systems 

29

3. Proportional Electoral Systems 

68

4. Ni-Ni Electoral Systems 

114

PA RT I I   EL ECTOR A L PROV ISIONS DE SIGN ED TO A SSIST OR TO U N DER M I N E ET H NOR EGION A L PA RT I E S

5. Communal Lists, Reserved Seats, and Lower Thresholds  6. Apportionment and Boundary Delimitation 

176

7. Electoral Rules Designed to Limit Ethnoregional Parties 

PA RT I I I  DECEN T R A LI Z AT ION

8. Decentralization and Ethnoregional Parties 

vii

141

225

202

viii

9. Ethnic Decentralization 

contents

271

10. Non-Ethnic Decentralization and Multivariate Models  11. Conclusion 

292

328

Appendix I: Percentage Votes and Seats for Ethnoregional Parties, 1990–2012  Appendix II: Ethnic and Regional Parties, 1990–2012  432 Notes  443 Index  507

339

L IST OF TA BL E S A N D F IGU R E S

Tables   2.1   2.2   2.3   2.4   2.5   2.6   2.7   2.8

  2.9

  3.1   3.2   3.3

Percentage of Votes and Seats Won by the Scottish National Party in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales, 1979–2010  35 Percentage of British and Canadian Members of Parliament Elected with Less Than a Majority of the Vote  37 Percentage of Votes and Seats Received by the Parti Québécois and Bloc Québécois in Quebec  40 Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Parties Summary, 1990–2012  46 Voting Behavior in Canada by Language  55 Ethnoregional Minority Groups that Form Regional or Constituency Majorities  58 Electorally Relevant Ethnoregional Groups in Countries with Majoritarian Electoral Systems  61 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries with Majoritarian Electoral Systems Using Various Measures of Fractionalization and the Percentage Minority  63 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries and Regions with Majoritarian Electoral Systems, 1990–2012  65 Thresholds and District Magnitudes in Countries with Proportional Representation  74 Proportional Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Parties Summary, 1990–2012  80 Electorally Relevant Ethnoregional Groups in Countries with Proportional Representation Systems  93 ix

x

  3.4   3.5

  3.6

  4.1   4.2   4.3

  5.1   5.2   5.3   5.4   5.5   5.6   5.7   5.8   6.1

  6.2   6.3

list of tables and figures

Minorities and Thresholds at the Decisive Level of Allocation in Countries with Proportional Representation  97 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries with Proportional Electoral Systems Using Various Measures of Fractionalization and the Percentage Minority  109 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries and Regions with Proportional Electoral Systems, 1990–2012  111 Minorities and Regional Thresholds in Ni-Ni Countries  115 Ni-Ni Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Parties Summary, 1990–2012  133 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries with Ni-Ni Electoral Systems Using Various Measures of Fractionalization and the Percentage Minority  138 Aboriginal Representation and Voting Behavior in Taiwan  147 Number of Seats Reserved in the Los Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas by State after the Boundary Delimitations Based on the 1971 and 2001 Censuses of India  150 Performance of German Minority Parties in Poland  157 Ethnic Minority Parties in Lithuania  160 Support for the South Schleswig Voters Association in Elections for the German Bundestag and the Schleswig-Holstein Landtag  162 Percentage of Votes and Seats Won by the Schleswig Party in Danish Regional and Municipal Elections  167 Summary of Countries with Seat Reservations and Lower Thresholds  171 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties Including Controls for Lower Threshold  173 Ratio of the Electoral in the Average English Constituency to the Average Constituencies in Other UK Countries, Number of Members of Parliament by Country, and the Change in Members of Parliament Required to Minimize the Difference with the Average Constituency in England  183 Canadian Ridings with Greater Than 20 Percent Aboriginal Population  186 Impact of Malapportionment in Spain on Ethnoregional Parties in Elections to the Spanish Congress of Deputies  194



  6.4   6.5   7.1   7.2

  8.1   8.2   8.3   8.4   8.5   8.6   8.7   8.8 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7

list of tables and figures

Impact of Malapportionment on Ethnoregional Parties in Catalan, Basque, and Galician Autonomous Community Elections, 1980–2012  196 Impact of Delimitation and Malapportionment on Ethnoregional Minority Representation  199 Summary of Electoral Provisions Designed to Limit Ethnoregional Party Success  216 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties Including Controls for Ethnic Party Bans and Ballot Access Requirements  219 Mean Regional Support in National and Regional Elections for Selected Ethnoregional Parties  237 Ethnoregional Parties in and Supporting National Governments  240 Ethnoregional Party Vote Share in Spanish Congressional Elections, 1977–2011  251 Ethnoregional Party Vote Share in Spanish Autonomous Community Elections, 1980–2013  255 Regional Party Votes Share in Italian National Elections, 1946–2013  258 Upper Chambers and Method of Formation  263 Upper Chambers and Decentralization  265 Upper Chambers in Decentralized Countries  266 Models of the Impact of Bicameralism on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties  305 Models of the Impact of Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Decentralization on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties  308 Models of the Impact of Ethnoterritorial Decentralization on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties  312 Models of the Impact of Different Decentralization Types on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties  315 Models of the Impact of Electoral Systems on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties  318 Economic Models of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties  321 Strategic Models of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties  324

Figures   2.1   5.1

Hypothetical Outcomes of Elections in Two-Member Districts  38 Percentage of Maōri Members of Parliament in New Zealand by Election Source  143

xi

xii

  8.1   8.2   9.1 10.1

list of tables and figures

Mean Share of the Vote for Ethnoregional Parties in Spanish Congressional and Autonomy Elections, 1980–2012  253 Mean Share of the Vote for Ethnoregional Parties in Italian National Elections by Region  257 Votes and Seats Won by Regional Parties in India  289 Percentage of Support for Ethnoregional Parties in Germany  294

ACK NOW L E DG M E N TS

Throughout the development of the book, I’ve depended on the generosity of many people who helped me locate information, critiqued my ideas, and enriched my understanding. This book would never have been completed without you. The German Marshall Fund of the United States and American University provided funding. German Marshall Fund support spurred me to dive into ­comparative politics and to launch this project. Thanks to current and former American University colleagues who lent their expertise and made thoughtful comments, including Danny Hayes, Jennifer Lawless, Jie Lu, Saul Newman, ­Adrienne LeBas, Laura Langbein, and Antoine Yoshinaka. Special gratitude is owed to Matt Wright who coauthored two articles with me on related topics and worked mightily to keep me from drowning in the minutiae. One of the best aspects of working on this project has been getting to know Dave McBride at Oxford University Press. Dave gave good advice and waited very patiently for me to finish this project. I suppose it is unusual to thank an editor at a competing press, but I am grateful for Lew Bateman’s encouragement and ­confidence that I would complete this manuscript. Work by Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Posner inspired much of my own thinking on ethnicity and politics. Now I know what Dan was doing during those trips to Zambia during graduate school—and appreciate it all the more. Thanks to ­K anchan for her insights on the shifting sands of ethnic identity as well as ­organizing a group hike during a conference in Switzerland. Shaun Bowler and Erik Herron shared my unflagging interest in electoral systems in many great c­ onversations. I appreciate Shaun’s enthusiasm for the idea that electoral systems just might actually have an impact even though his own recent work suggests otherwise. Shaun also ­introduced me to Erik Herron who shares my passion for electoral systems. People around the globe took time to share their time and insights about ­politics in their country. In Switzerland, I am grateful to Georg Lutz who ­provided me with Swiss electoral data, invited me to speak at the University of Bern, and answered many questions about Swiss politics over the years. Thanks also to Wolf Linder, xiii

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André Bächtiger, Andrea Iff, and Regula Zürcher. I appreciate the ­w illingness of Giuseppe Falbo of Pro Grigioni Italiano, Manfred Gross of Scola auta da pedagogia dal Grischun, and Daniel Telli of the Lia Rumatscha to share their knowledge of the issues facing Italian and Romansch speakers in Graubünden. Thanks to Daniel Boschler and Bernie Grofman for inviting me to a simply terrific conference at University of Zurich where I received very helpful feedback from the other participants. Bernie and I have many common research ­interests, and I have always appreciated his support. Daniel’s work on ethnic ­geography and electoral systems led the way for my own research. He also introduced me to Nenad Stojanović, a kind political scientist and a member of the Ticino ­Parliament. Nenad not only gave me a first-hand view of politics in his canton and country but also recommended a good used bookstore in Bellinzona. In Canada, I am especially grateful for the assistance of André Blais of the ­Université de Montréal whose first invitation to give a talk made it possible for me to learn more about Quebec and Canada while the second permitted me to ­present an early version of my work to a perceptive audience. Louis Massicotte, now at Université Laval, has continually offered his unparalleled knowledge of electoral systems and corrected numerous errors in the manuscript. Besides André and Louis, many other Canadian scholars took time to share their insights, including Patrick Fournier, Elisabeth Gidengil, André Lecours, Pierre Martin, and Pierre Serré. Thanks to Éric Bélanger for arranging a talk at McGill U ­ niversity and answering far too many questions about Quebec, Canada, and the Canadian National Election Study. Many people in Estonia and Latvia lent their perspective on their countries’ efforts to deal with difficult histories and linguistic situations. In Estonia, I thank Aarne Veedla and Olga Burmakina in the office of the Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs, Vadim Poleštšuk of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, National Language Inspectorate Director General Ilmar Tomusk, and Member of Parliament Tatjana Muravjova. The Elections Department of the ­Estonian National Electoral Committee, particularly Epp Maatan and Arne ­Koitmäe, repeatedly went out of its way to provide valuable information. At ­Tallinn University, thanks to Raivo Vetik and Olesja Bykova for speaking with me about interethnic relations in Estonia. In Latvia, Viktor Makarov of the Baltic Forum proved an able and kind guide to Riga and his country. I would also like to express gratitude to Chairman Arnis Cimdars and Zane Duze of the Central Election Committee, Ilze Brands Kehris of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights, and Līga Biksniece of the Latvian National Human Rights Office for taking time to help me better understand Latvia. I cannot begin to offer enough thanks to John Jasik, Rhobyn Costen-Sykes, Mona Esquentini, and Jody Rose Platt of the Department of State’s International Information Programs for sending me on travels that have been among my most treasured and transformative life experiences. These exchanges made



acknowledgments

xv

it ­possible for me to learn more about politics and meet many actors and ­scholars that would never have otherwise been possible. While the purpose was usually for me to e­ xplain US elections, I learned far more than I taught. Though many of the ­countries that I visited are not part of this study, learning about their ­politics greatly informed my thinking. I also owe tremendous thanks to all of the ­d iplomats who shared their knowledge, satisfied my curiosity, and took great care of me during my ­travels. Thanks to Jonathan Berger, Tim Buckley, Ray ­Castillo, Larry Corwin, Karla Daniels, Robert Domaingue, Michael Fraser, Laura Hochla, Kathy Kavalec, Tina Kaidanow, Neil Klopfenstein, Jonathan Mennuti, Liz Murphy, Chris Palmer, Bob Post, Steven Ramirez, Michael Richards, Molly Stephenson, and many others. I have never met a more uniformly smart, quick, and—of course—diplomatic group than Foreign Service officers. I am very proud that all of these people represent my country and me. People in many places welcomed me and answered nagging questions about their countries during my travels. Thanks to Gulara Aliyeva in Azerbaijan. In Cyprus, I appreciated the generous hospitality and thoughtful discussions of the Cyprus question with Ulaş Gündüzler, Christos Yiangou, and Dr. Erol Kaymak of Eastern Mediterranean University. Thanks to Dr. Martina Kohl and Karin R ­ osnizeck for introducing me to Germany. Sophia Bosompem gave me a window into Ghana. At the University of Iceland, Ólafur Harðarson not only explained Icelandic elections but also treated me to an incredibly pricey drink. In Israel, I learned a lot from my conversations with Ambassador Barukh Binah, Boaz Ganor at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Dr. As’ad Ghanem, Ellen ­Schnitser, and those at the Israel Democracy Institute. In Jordan, I am ­g rateful to Suhad A ­ l-Khatib, Haifa Najjar, and Reem Zumot for sharing their views. Ardian K ­ astrati and Petrit Shala deepened my understanding and acquainted me with several ­d ifferent parts of Kosovo. Thanks to Bruno Jehle for his tour of the ­Landtag and outlining the political landscape in Liechtenstein. My knowledge of Namibia would be much poorer without the aid of George Beukes, Mao Tjiroze, and Johanna Henock. I learned much about Romania from Isabella Alexandrescu and Institute for Public Policy Deputy Director Adrian Moraru. In Serbia, Jelena Putre always made sure that I had a great time and taught me more about her country. Many people enlightened me about both the problems and the gains made by post-civil war Sri Lanka, including Acting ­Political Affairs Director General in the Ministry of External Affairs Himalee Arunatilaka, One Text Initiative Director Geetha de Silva, Nilan Fernando, Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council, and Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) Executive Director Rajith Keerthi Tennakoon. Thanks especially to Nilan for his hospitality. Jurij Toplak gave me a warm welcome to Slovenia and the University of Maribor and replied to repeated emails about his country’s electoral system. Ric Glaub of the National Democratic Institute helped me to obtain a visa for Uzbekistan and then to navigate the country. A word of thanks also to

xvi a

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Roselyn O’Connell and Ann Stone—completely different people who have both encouraged women to engage in politics in many countries. I learned much from both of you as we traveled Africa and the Middle East. Electoral commissions frequently provided election results and answered numerous questions. Beyond those already mentioned, I thank Elections ­ Canada, the Electoral Commission of Ghana, Guyana Elections Commission ­Chairman Dr. R. S. Surujbally, Electoral Office of Jamaica Director Orette Fisher, ­Electoral Commission of Namibia Director of Electoral Operations A. N. Elago, the ­Electoral Commission of New Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago Electoral and Boundaries Commission Chair Dr. Norbert Masson. I am also grateful to ­Maldives Elections Commission Vice Chairman Ahmed Fayaz Hassan, Commissioner Mohamed Farook, Secretary General Asim Abdul Satar, Senior Statistical Officer Hassan Nazim, and Senior Administrative Officer Fathimath Zuhudha. Many work in difficult circumstances, and all have made valuable contributions to democracy and transparency in their homelands. Several scholars took the time to answer queries sent out of the blue via email, including Jairo Nicolau in Brazil, Jørgen Elklit in Denmark, Henry ­Srebrnik ­regarding Mauritius, and Edward Dew and Patrick Vander Weyden on ­Suriname. Thanks also to John Coakley for sharing his thoughts on Ireland. Jon ­Fraenkel ­provided me with information and election results for several Pacific Island nations as well as providing a thoughtful critique of the first version of this manuscript. Deep thanks to the people in the town of Chevy Chase, Maryland who elected me to three terms on the town council and allowed me the honor and the privilege of serving as their mayor. Politics in Chevy Chase is undoubtedly at its most local but the insights gained have aided me in all aspects of my scholarly work. It has been like seeing the world in vivid colors after having only known black and white. Many others not listed here also assisted me in collecting data, understanding their country, and developing ideas, and I offer my sincere thanks and apologies to the people whom I have somehow forgotten to include. Of course, all errors of fact and conclusions are entirely the author’s responsibility and should not be attributed to any of the people or organizations mentioned here. No doubt many of them disagree—sometimes vehemently—with my perceptions and argument. The appendix lists all but the smallest ethnic and regional parties for countries included in this study. Much additional data from this project are available at ­davidlublin.com or electionpassport.com. This book has had a long gestation. Years ago, I carried a book on Swiss politics to read for fun on the Metro on the way to one of my first few dates with Eric Hostetler. Fortunately, Eric found this endearingly different rather than just plain odd. Over the years, he has continued to listen to my excited descriptions of ­electoral systems and elections in far off places and to welcome me home from my travels. Most important, Eric provides the day-to-day support, affection and love that not only enabled me to complete this project but makes life worth living.

Minority Rules

1

Introduction

When it comes to ethnic conflict, political scientists love to study failure. Books and articles abound on places where relations between competing ethnic, linguistic, religious, racial, and regional groups have degenerated into violence. Scholars devote entire journals to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but there are comparatively few works on why Switzerland functions peacefully.1 Admittedly, no one would tell the story of Humpty Dumpty if he had just stayed up on that wall. However, no one has figured out how to put him back together again. Proponents of ethnic peace nonetheless spend endless hours puzzling about how to fix broken polities like Bosnia and Cyprus while comparatively little effort is put into understanding the peaceful operation of Belgium and Canada despite linguistic strains.2 It is almost as if scholars wonder why anyone should bother to light a candle when there is so much darkness to curse. Minority Rules eschews the usual approach of shining attention on ethnic conflict. Instead, it looks at the representation of minority groups in largely peaceful and democratic countries. Specifically, it examines factors that lead to the success or absence of ethnic and regional parties as a first step toward gaining purchase on how peaceful democracies manage relations between different groups. Contrary to theories that emphasize resources possessed by minority ethnic groups or economic disparities that exacerbate ethnic cleavages, Minority Rules finds that electoral rules play a dominant role in explaining not just why ethnic and regional parties perform poorly or well but why one potential ethnic cleavage emerges ­instead of another. As the emergence of ethnic and regional parties along with the failure to incorporate them and the groups that they represent meaningfully into the political system have been associated with ethnic conflict, both findings have important implications not only for attempts to structure successful settlements to ethnic conflicts but also for understanding better how to manage the political system so that it does not promote competition leading to violent conflict. Not all political institutions have the same impact on ethnic and regional party success as electoral rules. Decentralization—the grant of control over some or many issues to regions—has been a controversial solution for the resolution of ethnic conflict. Designed to maintain the basic unity and integrity of countries, 1

2

minority rules

some argue that it may inflame the very sort of cleavages and tensions that it is intended to ameliorate. An examination of the impact of decentralization in free democracies reveals that ethnic and regional parties may spur countries to decentralize but decentralization has a smaller impact than previously realized on their success in national elections. Any impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties can be mitigated through the types of powers granted and the territorial organization of decentralization. Consequently, there is little danger that decentralization will launch a country on the path to conflict. The findings in Minority Rules are not drawn from only a few countries or a single region. Instead, they are based on the study of over 80 democracies around the globe. As a result, they should be especially trustworthy and generalizable. The inclusion of so many countries hopefully guards against ascribing an outcome to factors relevant in only some countries. Despite the large number of cases, Minority Rules still includes detailed examinations of politics in individual countries as they are crucial to illustrating and understanding variations in ethnic and regional party success.

Defining and Classifying Ethnoregional Parties Terminology is often treacherous in describing cleavages as one meaning can elide into others. “Ethnic” is used here as a less unwieldy synonym for linguistic, religious, and racial divisions as well as ethnic differences. “Country” is preferred to “nation” to describe separate polities as the latter often has ethnic connotations. Nevertheless, I employ “national” as a synonym for countrywide, though the nonethnic use of term should be clear from the context, and “region” as a catch-all term for subnational units within countries. I limit the use of “statewide” as it connotes throughout a region to Americans but throughout a country in most other places and as it is employed here.

Ethnic versus Regional Parties Ethnic parties appeal to specific groups based on ascriptive characteristics, ­including language, ethnicity, religion, and race. Regional parties appeal only to a portion of a country. As used here, ethnoregional parties include all ethnic parties and all regional parties with one exception. Since this study is concerned primarily with the political incorporation of minority ethnic and regional groups, parties that represent majority groups or regions that comprise a majority of the population are excluded. For example, Belgium’s party system has fractured completely along linguistic lines with all parties having either a Flemish or Francophone identity but only Francophone parties are counted here as ethnoregional because Flemings form a majority of Belgium’s population. In countries with completely

I n t r o d u c t i o n

3

regionalized party systems, the inclusion of both the majority and minority ­parties would ratchet up artificially the share of the ethnoregional party vote, ­effectively double counting the impact of regional party differences. Additionally, it leaves the ethnoregional party vote share unrelated to the minority share of the population unlike in other countries with ethnoregional parties. Nonetheless, parties identified with the majority ethnic group are classed as ethnoregional parties if they have regional support bases that encompass less than a majority of the country. So Shiv Sena—a Hindu-nationalist party in India—is counted as ethnoregional even though Hindus form a large majority of the population, as the party’s support is limited primarily to Marathis in Maharashtra. “Ethnoregional parties” or, alternatively, “ethnic and regional parties” is preferred here to either just ethnic or only regional parties as one type of party elides into the other. While there are some parties that are ethnic but not regional and others that one might classify as regional but not ethnic, many fall in a hazy middle ground. The Bloc Québécois in Canada, often perceived in both ethnic and regional terms, demonstrates this conundrum perfectly. Although it portrays itself as a regional champion of Quebec interests, its staunch advocacy for the promotion and the protection of the French language in Quebec limits its potential appeal to non-Francophone Quebecers. At the same time, as it runs candidates only in Quebec, the Bloc is not a party for all Francophone Canadians. Indeed, the Bloc’s firm support for Quebec’s limits on languages other than French leads it to advocate measures that undermine the right to use French in English-majority provinces. So classifying the Bloc as either a regional or an ethnic party does not seem wholly accurate. One might solve the dilemma via another route by excluding parties that are ­regional but not ethnic or vice versa. This solution, however, fails to satisfy and raises new problems. As matters of ethnic identity are also matters of ­self-perception and socially constructed, separating a regional from an ethnic identity is difficult. Most would not regard the residents of Nevis as ethnically different from those on St. Kitts but Nevisians have a strong separate identity akin to an ethnic identity. Attempts to impose a distinction based on perceptions also are problematic because group status and origins are often disputed. Additionally, the c­ omposition of ethnic groups can evolve over time and be influenced by borders and other political institutions. Some ethnic minorities are concentrated in portions of a country but also have potential co-ethnics elsewhere, compounding the difficulty. In Mauritius, Creoles of primarily African origin comprise almost all of the smaller island of ­Rodrigues’s population. But Creoles also form a significant share of Mauritius’s population, so Rodriguan regionalism surely has a strong regional as well as an ethnic or racial component. Finland Swedes, as Swedish speakers in Finland are called, pose similar issues. The autonomous Åland Islands are overwhelmingly Swedish but most Finland Swedes live on the Finnish mainland. While

4

minority rules

many Finland Swedes on the mainland inhabit Swedish-majority areas in south and southwest Finland, many others form a minority in predominantly Finnishspeaking municipalities, including the capital of Helsinki. In short, defining ­Finland Swedes as a regional minority would ignore many clearly identified as group members, though Ålanders also possess a regional identity. It is the flipside of the situation in Rodrigues in which the minority views itself as regional even though many of its co-ethnics live elsewhere—a good example of how similar situations can produce different identities. As a result, distinctions between ethnic and regional minorities are somewhat limited here.

Identifying Ethnoregional Parties Many parties mark themselves clearly as ethnoregional through their name and advocacy of ethnic or regional minority interests. As a result, parties such as the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, the Māori Party in New Zealand, and the Bloc Québécois in Canada are straightforwardly categorized as ethnoregional parties. These easily classified parties may also fit other classifications— the Ticino League, for example, is often also identified as an extreme-right party—but few would dispute the ethnic or territorial focus of their appeals and platform. The classification of ethnoregional parties is not always so simple. In many countries, particularly in Africa, ethnoregional parties take names lacking any sort  of ethnic or regional marker and do not air ethnic or regional grievances ­d irectly through their platforms. Nonetheless, ethnic and regional boundaries confine their electoral appeal, and supporters and opponents alike largely ­perceive them as ethnoregional. Standard sources, such as the Political Handbook of the World, do not necessarily identify them as ethnic or regional parties, so one has to move beyond nomenclature to classify parties properly as ethnoregional or not. Categorizing parties correctly is difficult but can be done through consultations with local experts and examination of election results. Local experts and their works provide valuable information on the perceptions of the party by its adherents as well as in- and outgroup members. Examination of election results provides confirmatory evidence. Ethnoregional parties gain the bulk of their vote from their home region or ethnic group but receive much less support outside their region or group. However, even parties viewed as ethnic or regional may still gain some support from outside their group from majority-group members attracted to the party by its platform or other reasons. In Finland, the Swedish People’s Party gains the great bulk of its support from Finland Swedes but small support from Finnish speakers helps the party qualify for additional seats. Finnish speakers have even won election to the Finnish Parliament on the Swedish People’s Party list.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

5

Another type of classification problem crops up in decentralized countries as regional branches of national parties append regional identifiers to their names or vary their names in different parts of the country. In Switzerland, the party known as the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party) in German is called the Union démocratique du centre (Democratic Union of the Center) in French. In bilingual Canton Fribourg, the Socialists appeared on the ballot in 2007 as the Parti socialiste fribourgeois (Fribourg Socialist Party) in the French portion of the Canton but as the Sozialdemokratische Partei des Kantons Freiburg (Social Democratic Party of Canton Fribourg) in the German part. 3 In decentralized countries, parties often decentralize for strategic reasons, ­rendering the boundaries between being a branch of a national party or a s­ eparate party somewhat hazy. The Christian Democrats in Germany and Socialists in Spain probably represent the two cases closest to the line. In Germany, the ­Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union always form a joint ­faction in the legislature and run a campaign in support of single candidate for chancellor. By mutual agreement, the Christian Social Union runs candidates and files a list only in Bavaria, and the Christian Democratic Union does not ­compete on the Christian Social Union’s home ground. Despite their close ties, the parties retain separate existences and identities, so they are treated as separate parties here. In Spain, the Catalan Socialists (PSC) work to cultivate a separate image and advocate for Catalan autonomy to attract left-leaning voters who also favor more powers for Catalonia. Nevertheless, though the PSC operates with a great deal of autonomy, particularly in regional elections and government, it remains federated with the Spanish Socialists’ Workers Party (PSOE). In national congressional elections, it runs using the abbreviation PSC-PSOE even if its full name appears  in Catalan. Consequently, the PSC is treated as part of the PSOE in ­examinations of Spanish elections.

Past Efforts to Identify Ethnoregional Cleavages Past efforts to estimate the size and number of ethnic groups have mostly been conducted separately from efforts to explain ethnoregional party success. ­I nstead, scholars have attempted to gauge ethnic diversity to assess its ­relationship to ­economic growth, the number of parties, and ethnic conflict.4

Identification of Ethnic Cleavages and Groups The definition of ethnic groups or cleavages has posed major challenges to s­cholars. The problem may appear simple at first glance as majority and ­m inority ­politicians alike often treat ethnic cleavages as unchanging constants

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and inherent sources of division to enhance their chances of political success. ­However, others  ­contend  that cleavages are not permanently fixed. 5 Societies may be riven by ­multiple cleavages and the identification of the politically salient cleavages may not be so obvious. Institutional and societal changes may alter the cleavage axis over time. Cleavages often overlap and act to reinforce one another. On Cyprus, the major division can be viewed as either linguistic—between speakers of Greek and  ­Turkish—or, alternatively, religious between Orthodox Christians and ­Muslims. Each cleavage splits Cypriots into virtually the same two groups so ­linguistic and religious cleavages buttress one other. Similarly, in Israel, the ­conflict is often depicted as a religious feud between the Jewish majority and ­non-Jewish—largely Muslim—minority. Essentially the same cleavage, however,  can also be delineated in ethnic terms as between the ethnically Jewish ­majority—whether they practice their religion—and the Arab or Palestinian ­m inority. Or, alternatively, one can even view the same dispute through the lens of linguistic conflict between speakers of Hebrew and Arabic. However, cleavages may not always overlap so neatly. Instead, they may ­instead crosscut so that the emphasis of one cleavage over another has radically different implications for the organization of politics. Unlike in Cyprus, linguistic, religious, and caste differences in India do not generally reinforce each other, and the primacy of one cleavage is not obvious. While the Indian subcontinent was divided along religious lines at independence, India has organized its states along linguistic lines, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes hold reserved seats in parliament. Kanchan Chandra stresses that people may possess more than one group identification with different contexts priming different identities. 6 Matters are further complicated by variations in the power of ethnoregional cleavages across countries. While the Belgian party system is divided entirely along linguistic lines, all major Swiss parties straddle that country’s language borders. Even if one can identify the politically salient cleavage, it does not necessarily produce ethnoregional parties. Moreover, where they exist, the strength of ethnoregional parties may vary over time, geography, and level of government. In India, ethnoregional parties have gained considerable strength over the past several decades, dominating politics in some states but remaining minor forces in others. Gauging the level of diversity in African countries has been a particularly knotty problem due to the complexity and multilayered nature of many African identities. Identities are commonly nested within one another, so a single linguistic group may contain many different tribes. The boundaries between linguistic groups or subgroups may be hard to determine with closely related linguistic groups nested within the same partially or wholly mutually intelligible language families. The syncretic approach of many Africans toward religion can render the boundaries between religious groups indistinct. At the same time, linguistic or other identities may be nested within a single religious group, or religious

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c­ onvictions may crosscut linguistic identities. In short, capturing the diversity of African countries is a complex task that has vexed scholars. Debates about the proper method for the identification of ethnic groups and the estimation of the size of groups and indices of ethnic diversity have centered on Africa and the linkage between various types of diversity and economic ­development. Since Soviet scholars calculated the first measures of ­ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa in the early 1960s,7 numerous scholars have ­criticized their methodology and constructed alternative indices of ethnic, ethno-linguistic, linguistic, cultural, and religious fractionalization with some measures also taking into account race while others ignore it. 8 Daniel Posner argues convincingly that measurement of a country’s ethnic heterogeneity should be done with its theorized link to the phenomenon being studied kept close in mind. Rather than relying on the classifications of ethnographers based on group differences that may include irrelevant cleavages (or ­exclude relevant cleavages) to the impact of ethnic diversity on the policy or ­political ­outcome, he argues that scholars should identify “politically relevant ethnic groups” to the policy under study. Studies testing the theory that ethnic divisions negatively affect economic growth should create an index of groups that compete over public goods since the theory rests on the notion that such interethnic competition causes violent conflict that undermines growth.9 Nauro Campos and V ­ italiy Kuzeyev demonstrate that ethnic divisions are dynamic in their study of the impact of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity on post-Communist transition economies.10

Boundaries and Ethnic Cleavages Scholars have begun not just to acknowledge that the basis and the strength of ethnic cleavages change over time but to explore why this occurs. Past studies suggest that political boundaries and government type can structure ethnic cleavages. Kanchan Chandra’s thoughtful research indicates that different ­ ­constituency boundaries may invoke different ethnic identities among the same voters in her study of ethnic cleavages in India. As the boundaries of both the constituency and the overall political community shift between federal and state elections, voters may emphasize different identities as the more advantageous choice depends upon the particular combination of groups. The strength of ­cleavages may also vary with constituency boundaries and the level of government even if voters opt to emphasize different identities.11 Daniel Posner comes to parallel conclusions in his compelling examination of identities in Zambia and Malawi. His study of Chewas and Tumbukas on both sides of their common border reveals that the two groups compete in Malawi but cooperate in Zambia. In Malawi, each group is large enough to form the anchor of a winning coalition in Malawi, which fosters rivalry. However, the two groups comprise too small a share of the Zambian population to contest for power and

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are subsumed together within the larger political coalition of Easterners or Nyanja speakers.12 The shift from a one-party to a multiparty state further altered Zambian ethnic cleavages. In Kenneth Kaunda’s one-party state, different tribes within each constituency fought to win the election and access to the spoils of office as part of the ruling party. Multiparty democracy shifted focus from the constituency to the national level. Each of Zambia’s numerous tribes is too small to win national elections without allies, so cleavages moved from tribal to large regional and linguistic coalitions.13

Past Explanations for Ethnoregional Party Success Scholars have taken three major approaches toward explaining the salience of ethnoregional cleavages and ethnoregional party success. Institutional theories stress the importance of the electoral rules and government structure. Electoral rules, including the electoral system and ballot-access laws, can facilitate or hinder ethnoregional parties based in certain groups, privileging some ethnic cleavages over others. Government structures, such as whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system and has a unitary or decentralized ­character, can also provide incentives toward ethnoregional party formation and support. In contrast, resource, economic, or sociological theories emphasize the socioeconomic status of ethnoregional minorities vis-à-vis other groups or at an absolute level. Group resources can shape not just the ability of a group to construct a viable ­ethnoregional party but relative economic success or deprivation compared to other regions can also serve as a source of discontent driving their formation. ­Finally, strategic theories highlight the role of ethnoregional parties within a complex ­political system and how the actions of major national parties can stimulate or stifle ethnoregional party growth. No consensus has been established in favor of one of these three main schools of thought and results within each approach are often contradictory.

Institutional Explanations Much work has focused on the effect of a variety of institutional rules on party politics. Scholars have debated the impact of electoral rules, ballot-access rules, decentralization, and government type on party systems with decidedly mixed findings. Electoral Systems

Maurice Duverger’s claim that proportional electoral systems make it easier for small or single-issue parties to emerge and majoritarian electoral systems tend to favor the dominance of two major parties has been cited so often as to

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be referenced routinely as Duverger’s Law.14 Essentially, majoritarian electoral ­systems discourage either elites or voters from putting their weight behind small or new parties because the electoral system discriminates against parties that do not gain a sizeable chunk of the vote. In contrast, by cutting the share of the vote needed to win a seat, proportional systems lower the barriers to entry for new parties, reducing the disincentive to vote for a small party out of fear that it has no chance to win a mandate. Additionally, small parties are particularly likely to flourish under proportional systems as average constituency magnitude increases since the vote share required to gain a mandate declines. Small parties perform more strongly in countries with lower legal thresholds to participate in the distribution of legislative mandates for the same reason.15 Arend Lijphart’s analysis of the impact of electoral systems in democratic countries confirms that more permissive electoral rules lead to a greater number of parties receiving votes and seats.16 Like Peter Ordeshook and Olga S­ hvetsova,17 William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder conclude that higher constituency magnitudes and ethnic heterogeneity lead to the proliferation of political ­ ­parties.18 Shaheen Mozaffar’s analysis shows that these same rules apply in the context of 27 African countries.19 Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter concur that the electoral system is “a major determinant” of ethnoregional party success.20 Not all scholars agree that majoritarian systems are inherently less friendly to ethnic and regional parties than proportional systems. Douglas Rae and Giovanni Sartori contend that the presence of geographically concentrated ethnic, linguistic, or other minorities will preclude a two-party system in the manner predicted by Duverger’s Law.21 Indeed, regionally concentrated minority groupings of any type should have the potential to win seats under a majoritarian system unless psychological or strategic pressures to back one of the leading parties prove too intense for its supporters to withstand. John Gerring confirms that minor parties flourish in many countries with single-member plurality elections.22 In his examination of party systems, Matthijs Bogaards finds that the rules regarding electoral systems and fragmentation of the party system do not fit the outcomes of African elections.23 Scholars have been severely divided on the impact of electoral systems on specifically ethnoregional parties. Lieven de Winter concludes that “the impact of the electoral system on the electoral score of ethnoregionalist parties is quite weak” in Western Europe.24 Dawn Brancati uncovers no consistent statistically significant relationship in her models of support for ethnoregional ­parties in 37  ­democracies.25 Contrary to much of the electoral systems literature on the impact of majoritarian systems on small parties—though in line with ­Douglas Rae and Giovanni Sartori’s ideas—Juan Montabes Pereira, Carmen Ortega Villodres, and Enrique Pérez Nieto argue that ethnoregional parties perform better in elections held under plurality than proportional rules.26 Robert Harmel and John Robertson find that plurality systems aid the emergence of

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new parties more  broadly. 27 On the other hand, Pascal Delwit argues that the impact of ­proportional ­representation remains open and notes the potential for boundary delimitation and constituency magnitude to shape its impact on ethnoregional parties.28 Studies of the relationship between electoral systems and other types of ­nontraditional parties, such as extreme-right and green parties, also have mixed results.29 Despite the broad consensus on the theorized and expected effect of electoral systems on party systems, scholars are quite divided about their actual impact on both the party system and ethnoregional parties. Decentralization

Decentralization refers to a political system in which regional governments have independent decision-making power over at least some issues that goes beyond the administration or implementation of decisions made by the central government. National governments lack the power to abolish or to alter the powers of regional governments without their consent as enshrined in the constitutions of countries with a written constitution. 30 Though it is tempting to use “federal” to describe such countries, Minority Rules shies away from this term because of ­resistance to its use in some countries and because it does not accurately describe all decentralized arrangements. In particular, federalism does not necessarily bring to mind asymmetrical grants of autonomy to one region of the ­country, such as the Åland Islands in Finland, though Daniel Elazar refers to these as federacies. 31 Decentralization has often been seen as a means to resolve ethnic conflicts that simultaneously prevents secession of a portion of the country, allowing it to retain its fundamental unity. However, Dawn Brancati argues that decentralization fails in this endeavor because it augments ethnoregional party strength, which undermines its tendency to mitigate ethnic conflict. In essence, decentralization encourages ethnoregional party growth as it provides opportunities to accrue power and resources at the regional level. These incentives toward ethnoregional party formation are especially powerful when regional legislatures select some or all members of the national upper house, providing the chance to gain influence at the national as well as regional level. 32 Moreover, as Lieven De Winter explains, the rise of ethnoregional parties in one region may stimulate the growth of ethnoregional parties in other regions due to demonstration effects or the escalation of ­regional conflicts. 33 Pradeep Chhibber and Geetha Murali in their study of Indian state assembly elections concur that federalism promotes the establishment of regional parties. 34 Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman’s analysis of Canada, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States indicates that regional parties fare better during periods of decentralization. 35 According to Jóhanna Kristín Birnir and Donna Lee Van Cott, decentralization assisted the

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emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America. 36 Imke Harbers’s research reveals that ­decentralization inhibits the formation of national party systems in Latin America, a finding that studies of Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela confirm. 37 John Gerring demonstrates that federalism stimulates greater success by small parties in his study of countries utilizing single-member plurality electoral systems. 38 Other scholars reach different conclusions. Margaret Levi and Michael­ Hechter contend that decentralization appeases ethnoregional party supporters and r­ educes their support. 39 Seth Jolly argues that low levels of decentralization fail to satisfy ethnoregional demands sufficiently to undercut ethnoregional parties but that more meaningful decentralization dampens their support.40 Robert Harmel and John Robertson uncover no statistically significant relationship between federalism and new parties in their study of Western European and ­A nglo-American democracies.41 Danielle Caramani also finds no link between decentralization and regionalized voting patterns in Western Europe.42 In short, no scholarly ­consensus has formed on the impact of decentralization on ­ethnoregional parties. Ethnic and Regional Party Bans

Some countries bar the participation of ethnoregional parties—an electoral rule that should straightforwardly limit their success. These rules have been most popular in African countries with numerous ethnic divisions not only due to the ­a rbitrary nature of colonial boundaries inherited by today’s states but also ­because of the multiplicity of identities and the nesting of identity groups within one another.43 However, ethnoregional party bans are not limited to Africa. Countries with a dominant majority group may adopt them for nationalistic reasons and to dampen the articulation of ethnic minority-group interests.44 Despite the seemingly clear-cut nature of the bans, they may not have much of an impact if they are not enforced because of weak state institutions and difficulties in distinguishing between ethnoregional and other parties. In Africa, many parties widely perceived as ethnoregional nonetheless present themselves officially as national parties. Governments may also be reluctant to ban parties because the practice is undemocratic even if mandated by law. Ballot-Access and Party Registration Laws

Party registration and ballot-access requirements may seem like highly technical rules of minor importance, but they have the potential to have an ­outsized impact. Ethnoregional parties are especially burdened by cross-regional ­requirements, such as the need to have a certain number of members, signatures, or voters in each region to obtain or to retain party registration or access to the ballot. In mixed

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electoral systems, the requirement to register candidates for single-member constituencies in many different regions for their party to qualify for list ­mandates can have the same effect. Dawn Brancati highlighted the negative impact of crossregional voting laws in her examination of regional parties.45 Donna Lee Van Cott and Jóhanna Kristín Birnir acknowledge that spatial r­ equirements made it much more difficult to form indigenous parties in p­ ortions of Latin America, though Rau΄ l Madrid believes that their effect is overestimated.46 Ken Benoit and András Körösényi find that requirements to qualify candidates in single-member constituencies across many regions to participate in the distribution of national list seats inhibit the formation of small, regional parties in ­Hungary.47 However, Elisabeth Carter uncovers no relationship between ballot-access requirements and the success of extreme-right parties in Western Europe.48 Similarly, Robert Harmel and John Robertson find no connection ­between ballot-access rules and the electoral success of new parties.49 Presidential versus Parliamentary Systems

Many different scholars have found that small parties win fewer votes and seats in countries with presidential rather than parliamentary systems. 50 Voters may be reluctant to cast ballots for parties unlikely to win the presidency because strong presidential candidates attract supporters to their party’s legislative candidates. Media focus on leading presidential contenders also provides valuable added ­attention to the party brand. The impact of presidential systems on ethnoregional parties may be particularly acute as ethnic and regional minority ­parties rarely produce competitive presidential candidates. Not all scholars agree, however, that presidential systems aid the legislative candidates of parties with strong ­presidential contenders. In his study of Brazilian elections, David ­Samuels d­ iscovers that strong gubernatorial candidates provide a greater lift to their ­party’s national legislative candidates. 51 Robert Harmel and John Robertson find no relationship between government type and the formation of new parties. 52 The potential for a tight linkage between voters’ identities and their support for ethnoregional parties might limit the negative impact of presidential systems on ethnoregional parties. Even if ethnic or regional minority voters feel compelled to support a majority presidential candidate for strategic reasons, the lack of ­representation in the executive could propel them to rally around ethnoregional party legislative candidates.

Resource and Economic Explanations Explanations categorized as resource or economic theories take on a number of ­d ifferent hues but can be boiled down to three major types that indicate, ­a lternatively, that ethnoregional parties form in comparatively poor regions, in

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c­ omparatively rich regions, or in affluent countries with post-material values. In his study of the United Kingdom, Michael Hechter finds that ethnoregional parties perform best in relatively poor, peripheral areas, like Scotland and Wales, as the sense of exploitation through internal colonialism stokes their support. 53 On the other hand, other scholars contend that ethnoregional parties form in comparatively well-off regions out of resentment at subsidizing less well-off regions through their taxes or simply because they possess more political ­resources. 54 Peter Gourevitch argues that peripheral nationalisms also arise in poorer r­ egions with an economy rising relative to that of the center or that possess critical ­resources giving it an economic edge. 55 Donald Horowitz concludes that separatist movements form most often in regions of less-developed countries that are notably advanced or backward but are rare in economically advanced countries. 56 The appearance of ethnoregional parties and movements in comparatively rich and poor regions as well as in both affluent and less-developed countries challenges resource and economic explanations of ethnoregional party success. An additional stumbling block for resource theories is that ethnoregional parties or movements can persist even as the relative economic position of the region shifts. Rapid increases in the development and the wealth of some of the countries examined in these studies also poses serious questions regarding their validity over time. Moreover, to the extent that the political impact of economic cleavages relies on voter perceptions of a peripheral region being milked or neglected by the center, rather than simply its relative economic position, the perception may result from the efforts of the ethnic or regional party movement instead of the reverse. Ronald Inglehart sees the rise of ethnoregional movements as resulting from the growth of post-materialist values in wealthy countries. In these countries, most citizens have their basic needs met and can turn toward post-materialist concerns, including the expression of ethnic or regional identities. 57 However, ethnoregional parties do not appear uniformly in affluent countries whose citizens are most likely to possess post-materialist values but often do exist in countries in which basic needs remain a more central concern. Indeed, Kanchan Chandra argues that ethnicity shapes political organization more in poor societies where politics centers on government patronage. 58 Robert Harmel and John ­Robertson find no relationship between the existence of post-materialist values and the ­formation of new parties. 59

Strategic Explanations Traditional rational choice explanations contend that parties can influence the votes won by other parties only through their positions.60 These theories suggest that nonethnoregional parties can undercut support for ethnoregional parties by taking positions closer to them on key issues that they use to attract support.

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The share of votes won by ethnoregional parties should decline if mainstream ­parties appease their supporters but should rise if they take hostile, oppositional issue stands. Bonnie Meguid argues innovatively that mainstream parties possess options other than positioning when they face challenges from ethnoregional parties. Beyond choosing positions on issues that attract or deflect support from ethnoregional parties, national parties can influence the salience of these issues and the ownership of them by ethnoregional parties. National parties can open up more political space for ethnoregional parties by taking opposed positions on key ethnic and regional questions. They can also raise the salience of these issues— and the profile of ethnoregional parties—through vocal hostility on these issues. Alternatively, national parties can reduce the salience of ethnoregional issues— and undercut ethnoregional parties—by taking a dismissive stance. The choices that national parties make depend not just upon the impact on the ethnoregional ­competitor but on other national competitors. After all, the rising fortunes of ethnoregional parties do not necessarily threaten all national parties equally. ­National parties may take vocal, hostile stances to raise the salience of ethnic and regional issues not to place political pressure on the ethnoregional party but to complicate matters for their main national competitor. Raising the salience of the issue by taking a hostile stance and consequently aiding the prospects of ­ethnoregional parties may be a smart strategic move because it places a national competitor in a sticky position.61 Meguid’s theories, developed in the context of West European politics, crystallize ideas about the strategic emphasis of certain issues over others observed elsewhere. In his study of how congressional Democrats continued to win seats in the American South long after the political terrain ceased to be favorable, James Glaser finds that Democrats downplayed racial questions that split their electoral coalition and touted populist economic issues to rally their diverse base.62 Terri Givens’s analysis of support for radical right parties in Western Europe suggests that the electoral system interacts with mainstream party strategic preferences to determine the level of strategic voting—when voters cast ballots for parties other than their most-preferred party to guard against victory by their least-preferred party—and the overall support for radical right parties.63 Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell explain that strategic behavior by political elites augments the power of national political trends in their seminal work on US congressional elections. Much of the impact of national tides, such as an unpopular president or a sour economy, on congressional elections occurs not just directly through the shift in voter attitudes toward a party’s candidates but through the reaction of potential high-quality candidates to these factors. The same political forces may encourage a strong candidate from one party to enter a race and simultaneously discourage the opposing party’s most viable candidate, to the benefit of one party and the detriment of the other. Much of the impact of changes in public opinion is mediated through actions of strategic politicians.64

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Data and Methodology Many of the studies that attempt to explain the strength of ethnoregional cleavages in the party system and the share of votes and seats gained by ethnoregional parties differ in their findings not just because of different scholarly perspectives but also because they examine only a small number of countries or only countries in one region of the globe.65 Other studies problematically contain countries that are not free and are not democracies.66 Inclusion of these countries may skew their findings as election results in undemocratic countries may have little to do with the will of the people and instead be an expression of the ability of rulers to manipulate the levers of power to legitimize their rule. At the very least, election results in these countries are subject to different interpretation than in countries with more meaningfully free exercises of the franchise. Reliance on broad brush and sometimes inaccurate characterizations of electoral systems can also lead to a failure to underestimation of the impact on ethnoregional party performance.

Casting a Wide Net In its exploration of ethnoregional party performance, Minority Rules includes most free, democratic countries in which ethnic tensions are not currently ­resolved primarily through violence. Over 80 countries are included—far more than in previous studies—and from all regions of the globe. Additionally, the analysis of electoral support for ethnoregional parties relies on all elections held from 1990 through 2012. Complete election results are used to assure greater ­accuracy and to avoid the exclusion of even minuscule ethnoregional parties. The breadth and completeness of the data set assist greatly in gaining more leverage in the assessment of factors that influence ethnoregional party performance so that conclusions reached should be more reliable and the results more generalizable. The universe of countries examined here is based on the countries rated as “free” by Freedom House in 2003.67 Countries not rated as free are excluded ­because one cannot expect political institutions to operate in the same way in ­undemocratic societies. Freedom House rates the political rights and civil liberties of all countries on a seven-point scale—lower numbers indicate greater freedom. Countries must score two or better in political rights and three or better in civil liberties to receive a designation of free. Despite being rated free by Freedom House, Mexico and Senegal are excluded from the study because—at the time this project commenced—ethnic tensions centered on insurgencies in Chiapas in Mexico and Casamance in Senegal. This does not mean that countries included in the study are wholly peaceful or that ethnic violence never occurs—just that it is arguably not as completely central to ethnic disputes. Insurgencies also existed in parts of India, including Kashmir and the northeastern states, but India stays in the study as ethnoregional politics in India extends far beyond these conflicts. Similarly, Cyprus is included despite

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the division of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots due to its stable endurance over more than three decades. However, all data for Cyprus are from the Greek Cypriot portion of the island since Turkish Cypriots play no role in the election of the Greek Cypriot government recognized internationally by most countries. The Minority Rules data set contains an array of countries from all corners of the globe. Though it remains heavy on European countries with 26 in ­Western Europe and another 9 in Eastern Europe, it also includes 12 Caribbean and 9 Latin ­A merican countries. Africa and Asia are somewhat less well represented, but the database still has ten African and five Asian polities. Additionally, the study p­ ossesses data from four democracies established by British settlers—­ Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—and seven Pacific Island countries. No countries were excluded on a population basis, so the Minority Rules data set includes tiny Monaco as well as populous India. While including some of the world’s smallest democracies may strike some as dubious, they still form functioning polities, and drawing the line between microstates and other countries is not so easy. The difference in magnitude between the populations of India and ­Estonia is actually larger than that between Estonia and Monaco, and no one would argue that Estonia is a microstate even though it remains a small country. Including microstates provides added benefits in that it adds to the variation in electoral systems. As it turns out, even the smallest countries are not necessarily free of regional divisions or ethnoregional parties. Selected countries included in the study more broadly are excluded from the multivariate models. Six Pacific Island countries—Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu—have either no political parties or very weak party systems. Three other cases are excluded because of data collection and other issues.68 Despite the exclusion of these nine cases, the multivariate models still rely on data from 72 countries. To assure greater reliability of the results, multivariate models are constructed at two different levels of aggregation. Besides the models with countries as the unit of analysis, models are also presented for the geographic units that correspond to the determinative level for the allocation of seats in countries with ­proportional or other nonmajoritarian electoral systems. For countries with majoritarian systems like Australia and the United States, results are aggregated to the regional level—below that of the entire country but still higher than individual constituencies—for reasons outlined in chapter 2. The Minority Rules database does not just include results from a large number of countries but very complete electoral data from over two decades—1990 through 2012. Official election results or data compiled from official election ­results were used whenever possible not just to assure accuracy but because many unofficial sources lump together parties that did not win any mandates or votes

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together into a single residual category problematic for this study because many ethnoregional parties are comparatively small and fall into the “other parties” group. Moreover, the goal was to include all ethnoregional parties—sizeable or minute—so complete returns were almost always obtained even in cases when reliance on unofficial sources was inevitable. India comprises the major exception to this rule. As parties in the world’s largest democracy are so numerous, only ­parties that won at least one seat in state or national parliaments are included.

Properly Classifying Electoral Systems The classification of electoral systems may appear a straightforward matter. Scholarly research has elaborated on the impact of the operation of electoral ­systems on political parties, seemingly rendering their classification into different categories clear.69 Indeed, organizations such as International IDEA (Institute for ­Democracy and Electoral Assistance) produce tables dividing countries into basic types.70 But appearances can be deceptive. The actual operation of electoral systems does not necessarily fit their broad categorizations. Differences in the operation of systems within basic types can produce drastically different results. Proportional systems are often seen as friendly to small parties, but the opportunities provided by these systems vary markedly depending upon the magnitude of ­electoral ­d istricts and legal thresholds to participate in the distribution of ­mandates.71 Chile and Israel both utilize proportional representation systems, but Chile’s reliance on two-member constituencies in contrast to Israel’s single national c­ onstituency have drastically different implications for parties attempting to enter the legislature. Moreover, some countries have adopted electoral systems that resist placement in either of the two major families of electoral systems.72 They are nonetheless often wrongly lumped into other categories. Greece is frequently described as using list proportional representation even though that country’s electoral rules contain critical elements designed to benefit the leading two parties and produce a single-party majority. Similarly, Panama is also sometimes characterized as utilizing a proportional system even though it uses a mixed system with some legislators chosen by single-member plurality with others selected in supposedly proportional multimember constituencies. Ironically, the specific allocation and election rules allow the leading two parties to win an even more disproportionate share of mandates in the “proportional” multimember constituencies.73 In short, summary lists can lead to incorrect results if relied upon for purposes of assessing the impact of electoral rules on ethnoregional parties. Consequently, much time was invested in making sure that each country’s electoral rules were properly classified to assure greater confidence in the results. In many cases, I  ­replicated the allocation of seats to make sure that I understood the

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operation of a country’s system. Countries that do not fit either the ­majoritarian or ­proportional  rubrics are treated separately in accordance with expectations generated by each system’s rules.

Methodology Minority Rules takes an eclectic approach, motivated by the belief that multiple methods allow one to gain leverage on a problem from several different angles. Multivariate models represent a key part of this study and are a thread that runs throughout this work as factors with the potential to shape ethnoregional party ­support are considered and tested. However, quantitative ­multicountry and ­regional models form only one component. Individual cases are ­repeatedly discussed in detail to illustrate and better understand the operation of electoral ­systems and their impact on ethnoregional parties. Additionally, they help validate that the theoretical explanations attributed to the results in multivariate models are the right ones. Part II, for example, examines the impact of special provisions designed to help or to hinder the representation of minorities and ethnoregional parties in individual countries before turning to multivariate models that assess the cross-national impact of these same provisions. The case discussions not only provide rich, detailed information on the success or the failure of these ­provisions but also animate the underlying theory tested in the multivariate models. Part III’s look at the impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties similarly relies on multiple methods. Investigating the historical record of decentralized countries individually unravels the much-debated question of whether ­ethnoregional parties precipitated decentralization or decentralization ­stimulated ethnoregional parties. Cross-regional comparisons within countries that decentralized authority to different regions over time further help gauge the effect of decentralization on ethnoregional parties while controlling for ­cross-national differences. In sum, the use of many different approaches makes maximum use of the broad array of data available here on so many democracies and increases the reliability of the conclusions.

Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Party Success Efforts to explain ethnoregional party success via institutions have had mixed success in the past, but a central contention of this work is that a renovated institutional approach pays major dividends in comprehension of ethnoregional party performance. This renewed institutional approach builds on insights of scholars like Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Posner regarding the flexibility of identities and the ability of different institutional contexts to alter the relevant identity in democratic political contexts. In particular, electoral systems interact with ethnic

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geography to constrain which identities can gain expression through the political system.74 In effect, the mechanical actions of electoral systems often privilege one ethnic cleavage over others. In combination with the ethnic geography, the electoral system determines which ethnic minority groups possess the potential to form ethnoregional parties and their scope for success. Past studies examining the relationship between ethnic cleavages, electoral systems, and political outcomes usually take the level of ethnic fragmentation in the population as previously established and then explore the impact of the ­mechanics of the electoral system with mixed results.75 I contend that it makes more sense to approach the question from a different angle in light of the potential for institutions to shape the salience of different ethnic cleavages. Instead of taking ethnoregional cleavages or group size as fixed, one should first examine which ethnoregional groups could conceivably form a successful party in light of the barriers placed by electoral system. Additionally, electorally relevant ­ethnoregional groups should not be defined to include all who share that ethnoregional identity but only those who inhabit areas where the group could experience ­electoral success. This theory presents a simple but crucial modification of previous models. Most prior efforts treat the share of ethnic minorities and the electoral system as separate independent variables. However, this theory suggests that the electoral system interacts with ethnic geography to determine the share of politically relevant ethnoregional groups—a modification to past approaches anticipated in Daniel Bochsler’s work as well as Shaheen Mozaffar, James Scarritt, and Glen Galaich’s study showing the interaction of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages in Africa.76 Defined in light of the electoral system, the share of electorally ­relevant ethnoregional minority groups serves as a new independent variable that predicts the performance of ethnoregional parties. As Part I shows, this measure has much more power to explain ethnoregional party success than previous measures. In short, by correctly operationalizing the interaction between electoral ­systems and ethnic geography, one can gain significantly more traction on how electoral institutions shape ethnoregional party performance. The impact of the electoral system on the political viability of ethnoregional groups varies with both the electoral system and ethnic geography. The common thread through electoral system types is that politically relevant ethnoregional groups possess the capacity to overcome the threshold of exclusion—the ­maximum share of the vote required to assure that a party wins at least one seat.

Majoritarian Electoral Systems In majoritarian electoral systems, such as those utilized in Australia, Ghana, and the United Kingdom, regional concentration of potential supporters is critical to ethnoregional party prospects as majorities within constituencies are required

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to gain seats. Dispersed ethnic minorities cannot form successful ethnoregional parties because majority-group members can outvote them. The high barriers to entry should further discourage strategic politicians from investing their limited resources in them, another brake on their success. In contrast, ethnic groups that form majorities can outvote majority-group candidates or parties if they remain sufficiently united. Ethnoregional minority-group members may live inside and outside constituencies where they comprise a majority. Group members who live outside regions where the group comprises a majority may give their votes to ethnoregional p­ arties but have a much lower probability of success as their votes alone cannot guarantee a victory and the nature of ethnoregional parties limits their attractiveness to non-group members. Consequently, electorally relevant ethnoregional groups should not be defined in terms of the entire group if only a portion of the group can overcome the barriers to entry erected by the electoral system. Instead, electorally relevant ethnoregional groups include only group members living in areas where they possess sufficient population to overcome the threshold of exclusion. Different dynamics in regions where an ethnic group does and does not form a majority should reinforce the impact of the mechanical operation of the electoral system. Minorities who live outside of their group’s core region may not support efforts by the group to assert political dominance through ethnoregional parties, as they cannot serve as effective local carriers of their aspirations due to the barriers to electoral victory. Minority-group members who live in regions where they comprise a regional minority may rightly fear that support for an ethnoregional party may lead to their exclusion from political influence in their regions. Majorities may mobilize to assert their political dominance just as the minority group does in its core region. Support for ethnoregional parties might push national parties to accommodate their interests but it can also backfire. Opposition from majority group members may limit the political viability of an accommodation or appeasement strategy. Opting out of national parties by minority-group members can also push majority parties to focus solely on majority-group interests as minority-group members no longer provide electoral support needed for victory. It follows that ethnic minorities should be less likely to form ethnoregional parties if most group members live outside of constituencies where the group has the potential to elect legislators. In these cases, ethnoregional parties do not take best advantage of group political resources since they do not utilize most of its voter base. Ethnic minority politicians who live outside of the region in which they form a majority may perceive ethnoregional parties as limiting rather than advancing their political opportunities. In countries with regional governments, ethnoregional minorities may fear that efforts to assert dominance in their core region would lead to similar efforts on the part of the majority, which would work to the detriment of their ethnic kin elsewhere. In countries with majoritarian

I n t r o d u c t i o n

21

electoral systems, ethnoregional minority groups should be less likely to form ethnoregional parties unless a majority of the group lives in regions in which they have the capacity to achieve political success.

Proportional and Other Electoral Systems Majoritarian electoral systems place a high bar on political access for ethnic and regional minority groups as they must form local or regional majorities to have a shot at gaining seats in the legislature. Proportional electoral systems are more ­accessible because groups can win mandates with lower levels of support. However, as in majoritarian electoral systems, ethnoregional parties must still ­overcome the threshold as dictated by the electoral system. In countries with ­proportional representation, this threshold is often set through a legal threshold that establishes a minimum share of the vote at either the national or constituency level that a party must exceed to qualify to receive mandates. Alternatively, ethnoregional parties must exceed the threshold implied by the constituency magnitude. Leaving aside any legal threshold, as the magnitude of a constituency rises, parties require a smaller share of the vote in the constituency to obtain seats. In contrast, the share of the vote needed to gain a mandate rises steeply as the number of mandates available for distribution in a constituency ­declines. This relationship is widely understood and has often been ­incorporated into studies of the relationship between the electoral system and the number of parties.77 Though studies of ethnoregional parties have examined the general impact of thresholds determined by law or by constituency magnitude, they have not systematically examined the interaction between these thresholds and the geographic distribution of ethnoregional minority groups within individual countries—a major exception is work by Daniel Bochsler.78 For any party, the distribution of its supporters is critical even under a proportional system as a party must overcome the threshold in specific constituencies to win seats. ­Fifteen percent of the vote earns a party several seats in high-magnitude constituencies but none in constituencies with only a few seats. Knowing where a party’s supporters are located is vital to gauging the impact of the electoral system on a ­party’s prospects. In studies of the impact of proportional systems, one should examine not the general threshold or average constituency magnitude across an entire country but the interaction between the threshold of exclusion and ethnic geography. More specifically, I study closely the potential for parties based in ethnic and ­regional groups to overcome the thresholds defined by law or constituency ­magnitude in  the regions where they live. Generally low thresholds do an ethnoregional party little good if thresholds are too high in the constituencies where its support base lives. At the same time, high thresholds may not impede an ethnoregional party if its support base is sufficiently concentrated so that its share of

22

minority rules

the electorate exceeds the exclusion threshold. The relative size of the threshold and the group’s ­population is far more important than the absolute size of either. ­Accordingly, in countries with proportional representation, electorally relevant ethnoregional groups are defined properly as the share of the population living in constituencies where they exceed the exclusion threshold at the key level for the allocation of mandates. Other electoral systems—labeled “ni-ni” systems in chapter 4—do not fit either the majoritarian or proportional rubric. However, similar methods make it possible to determine the politically relevant ethnoregional cleavages and the size of the ethnic or regional groups associated with them. Under any electoral system, one can examine the potential for parties based in ethnic or regional groups to obtain seats under the system and assess accordingly whether the system suppresses or encourages their political success. It may also be necessary to consider the impact of other aspects of these often complicated electoral systems on the outcome. Nonetheless, the general approach remains the same.

Other Electoral Rules One can further extend this approach to assess the impact of other electoral rules designed to impede or to aid the success of ethnoregional parties. In countries with a lower threshold for ethnic minority parties, one can measure the impact of this benefit in terms of the additional share of the ethnic minority population that exceeds the exclusion threshold due to this provision. Lower thresholds should have little benefit if the group remains too small to overcome the threshold barrier implied by constituency magnitude or the reduced legal threshold. Countries can also try to enhance ethnic minority representation through communal lists or reserved seats that allow members of the minority to vote separately for legislators from the minority group. Some countries apportion a ­d isproportionate number of seats to regions inhabited by ethnoregional minorities or adopt constituency boundaries designed to permit minority groups to elect their preferred candidates. Analysis of the actual effect of these efforts indicates that they have a variable impact. Lower thresholds aid ethnoregional parties in ­countries where the boost is sufficient for a party to surpass the exclusion threshold. The impact of communal lists and reserved seats is small in the countries examined here, though the separate lists and seats for Māori in New Zealand have been vital to Māori Party’s success. While boundary delimitation and malapportionment often help additional ethnic, racial, or regional minorities win election, they have not stimulated the creation of successful ethnoregional parties. Electoral rules can undermine as well as help ethnoregional parties. Party registration and ballot-access measures requiring parties to obtain support from many different regions around the country can stymie parties with regionally concentrated support. Legal bans on ethnic and regional parties may more

I n t r o d u c t i o n

23

directly produce the same result. Analysis of the political impact of these efforts to ­curtail ethnoregional party success indicates that ethnic and regional party bans do not consistently prevent the formation of successful ethnoregional ­parties in free d­ emocracies unless they are backed by party registration or ballotaccess requirements. Requiring parties to obtain signatures or electoral support across many different regions can serve as an effective legal or procedural barrier to the entry of ethnoregional parties. Even if regionally concentrated ethnic or regional minorities comprise a substantial share of the population, ethnoregional parties based in these groups cannot succeed if they need to receive support from outside their home region. Seemingly innocuous electoral rules can have a greater impact than a direct ban.

Decentralization and Ethnoregional Parties Assessing the impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties is complicated by the potential for the causal link to run in both directions. Decentralization may stimulate ethnoregional party development by providing the opportunity to gain control of meaningful resources and power at the regional level. The ­incentive to form ethnoregional parties is particularly strong when decentralization places the selection of members of the upper house in the national legislature in the hands of regional governments, as it provides the prospect of national as well as ­regional opportunities for power and influence.79 One can easily imagine, however, that the causality chain runs in the other direction with pressure from ethnoregional parties leading to decentralization. 80 Moreover, the incentive provided by ­decentralization exists even in the absence of decentralized ­institutions. If ­decentralization can motivate the growth of ethnoregional parties, the prospect of ­decentralization might also encourage them to form to press for ­decentralization in centralized countries. Fortunately, unlike the chicken and the egg, untangling which came first is more straightforward. Historical analysis can reveal whether ethnoregional ­parties preceded or followed from decentralization. Looking closely at the history of ethnoregional party development and the role played—or not played—by ethnoregional parties in the creation of decentralized institutions further allows for the division of decentralized countries into two categories based on why they decentralized. The key factor that distinguishes ethnically from nonethnically decentralized countries is that ethnoregional tensions and parties preceded decentralization in ethnically decentralized countries but not in nonethnically decentralized countries. While decentralization is an attempt to mitigate ethnic disputes in ethnically decentralized countries, nonethnically decentralized countries created decentralized institutions for other reasons. In countries like ­Australia and the United States, decentralization was a means to obtain consent

24

minority rules

to fuse previously separate territorial units into a new country. In other countries, like Argentina and Brazil, decentralization was an attempt to resolve nonethnic disputes between powerful leaders in the center and the periphery. In Germany, the Allies imposed decentralized institutions after World War II, though decentralization dates back to the German Empire. The division of decentralized countries into two types provides valuable ­opportunities to assess the impact of decentralization on ethnoregional party growth. Decentralization ought to stimulate similar increases in ethnoregional party performance in both ethnically and nonethnically decentralized countries if ethnoregional party growth stems from decentralization rather than the ­reverse.  However, statistical models presented in chapter 10 reveal that ­decentralization does not have a statistically significant effect in nonethnically ­decentralized countries. At a minimum, this finding demonstrates that decentralization does not stimulate ethnoregional parties in the absence of previously existing ethnic tensions manifested in ethnoregional parties. Closer examination of patterns of ethnoregional party development and ­decentralization deals further blows to the notion that decentralization causes ethnoregional parties to bloom rather than vice versa. Several ethnically decentralized countries had totally regionalized party systems prior to decentralization—a sequence of events consonant with the notion that ethnoregional parties propel decentralization but contrary to the idea that decentralization promotes ethnoregional parties. Countries in which ethnoregional parties existed prior to decentralization but the party system was not completely regionalized require more careful study but are not, on the whole, supportive of the theory that decentralization aids ethnoregional parties in national legislative elections. Examination of the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties before and after decentralization does not uncover a consistent pattern of ethnoregional party growth. In Canada and South Africa, ethnoregional parties lost strength in the wake of the establishment of decentralized institutions. India provides the most notable example of a ­country in which ethnoregional parties have grown since decentralization. However, the sharp growth in ethnoregional party fortunes occurred decades after India decentralized and appears closely related to the decline of the Indian National Congress. Italy and Spain provide valuable case studies of the impact of decentralization. Both countries decentralized in the wake of democratization—after World War II in Italy and after Franco’s death in Spain—but neither decentralized to all of its regions at the same time. Statistical models of ethnoregional party development within each country allow the opportunity to gain insight into the impact of the creation of decentralized institutions while holding constant the many factors that can vary across countries. Such models demonstrate that decentralization had no systematic effect on ethnoregional parties in either Italy or Spain.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

25

While this study refutes the conclusion that decentralization ­consistently spurs  the growth of ethnoregional parties, it suggests that its territorial ­organization and whether regions are granted power over the central government or within the region may shape its impact. In particular, the statistical models ­provide evidence that confirms the theory that ethnoregional parties ­perform more strongly in countries in which regional governments select members of the upper house of the national legislature. Even if decentralization alone is ­insufficient to propel ­ethnoregional party growth, the incentive provided by the opportunity for regional legislatures to select upper house members increases support for ­ethnoregional parties enough that they perform better in lower house elections.

Layout of the Book The remainder of the book is divided into three parts plus a concluding ­chapter. Part I looks at the operation of different electoral systems and their impact on ethnoregional parties. Each chapter is devoted to one major type of electoral system—majoritarian in chapter 2, proportional in chapter 3, and “ni-ni,” or other, in chapter 4. These chapters provide further elaboration of the theory—placing muscle on the skeletal outline presented here—regarding how the interaction of electoral systems and ethnic geography shapes ethnoregional party success. For all countries, electorally relevant ethnoregional groups are defined in terms of group members living in regions where they have the potential to overcome the barriers imposed by the electoral system as measured by the exclusion threshold. This gauge of the size of electorally relevant groups predicts the share of the vote won by ethnoregional parties in national electoral contests far more strongly than alternatives. In short, it provides powerful evidence in support of the renewed institutional approach outlined here. Part II examines the impact of other sorts of electoral rules with the potential to help or to hinder ethnoregional parties. Chapters 5 and 6 explore rules that may aid ethnoregional parties—communal lists, reserved seats, lower thresholds, and the best-loser system unique to Mauritius in chapter 5 and redistricting and ­apportionment in chapter 6. In contrast, chapter 7 analyzes the impact of i­nstitutional rules designed to undercut ethnoregional parties, including ethnic and regional party bans, cross-regional party registration, and ballotaccess r­equirements. This chapter further looks at impact of the imposition of higher threshold requirements on existing ethnoregional parties in two countries, Greece and ­Slovakia. Before attempting to draw cross-national conclusions ­regarding the impact of any type of rule, each chapter looks in detail at individual countries to better understand the operation and the effect of the rules in specific cases. Only after this examination of the impact of pro- and anti-minority

26

minority rules

provisions within cases does each chapter shift toward broader conclusions and multivariate models that estimate the impact of different types of rules. Part III considers the impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties. Chapter 8 dissects competing theories of why decentralization may or may not stimulate ethnoregional party growth. It then makes the case that decentralization likely has a smaller stimulative effect on ethnoregional parties than ­previously thought and that the territorial and institutional structure of ­decentralization shape its impact. Specifically, decentralization is more likely to ­promote ethnic parties when it is done on strict ethnoterritorial lines and when it gives regions more power over the central government rather than autonomy within the ­regions. The chapter then turns to two quantitative case studies of Spain and Italy, which reveal that decentralization did not result in the systematic growth of ethnoregional parties in national elections in either country. Evidence from Spain further indicates that ethnoregional parties have not made systematic gains even in regional elections since decentralization. Chapters 9 and 10 review the history of decentralization with the specific focus on the role of ethnoregional parties. Chapter 9 examines ethnically decentralized countries where ethnic tensions preceded and ethnoregional parties pressed for the creation of strong regional governments when the country was still ­centralized. The success of ethnoregional parties prior to decentralization and the lack of consistent improvement in the aftermath of the creation of decentralized institutions place in doubt the theory that decentralization inherently strengthens ethnoregional parties. Chapter 10 follows up with a look at the history of the adoption of decentralized institutions in nonethnically decentralized countries before turning to multivariate models that demonstrate that decentralization is not linked positively to ethnoregional party performance in nonethnically ­decentralized countries. Attention to the territorial and institutional ­structure of ­decentralization can eliminate any positive impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties. Chapter 11 concludes Minority Rules with a look at the implications for ­preventing ethnic tensions from turning into ethnic conflicts. It also takes a brief peek at avenues for future research, particularly the incorporation of minorities into nonethnic parties and of ethnoregional parties into national governments. As very few countries are ethnically homogenous and humans show a propensity to develop meaningful new divisions based on identity even in the ones that are, these remain important concerns even in peaceful, democratic countries.

PA R T I

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

2

Majoritarian Electoral Systems

Majoritarian electoral systems do not have a reputation for enhancing the ­electoral prospects of either minority parties or candidates. The winner-take-all aspect of majoritarian systems seems antithetical to the very notion of minority representation. Nonetheless, this reputation of majoritarian electoral systems for thwarting minority representation is at least partially undeserved. Regionally concentrated minorities may not only experience success but thrive under majoritarian institutions. Majoritarian electoral systems have a negative image regarding m ­ inority ­representation for a number of reasons. At the national level, these electoral systems frequently magnify victory through the award of a share of seats far in excess of the share of votes won by the largest party. This bonus occurs to detriment of other parties, including ethnoregional parties. Scholars cite often Maurice ­Duverger’s claim—usually referenced as Duverger’s Law—that single-member plurality (SMP) elections create pressure toward a two-party system in the fashion of the United States.1 Any party that divides into two separate parties may allow its ­opponent to win an election despite winning fewer votes than their combined strength. Less recalled is Duverger’s own belief that this pressure operates at the constituency level.2 Majoritarian systems may create strategic pressure toward two parties to maximize coalition size and electoral chances, but they do not have to be the same parties across all constituencies. The electoral systems literature has noted that smaller parties, including ethnoregional parties, may fare well in ­majoritarian electoral systems, as long as their support is regionally concentrated. 3 A central contention of this chapter is that ethnoregional parties can perform well relative to group strength if they possess regionally concentrated support. In ­contrast, dispersed minorities do not because majority groups can coalesce to defeat them. While the electoral systems literature is straightforward and clear on the expected impact of majoritarian systems on ethnoregional party performance, the ethnic politics literature is cloudier. As Pippa Norris summarizes, “The evidence for the relationship between the electoral system and ethnic representation remains limited and controversial.”4 In her study of ethnoregional parties around the globe, Dawn Brancati sees little relationship between electoral systems and votes won 29

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by regional parties at the national level. 5 In contrast, Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary Cox find that proportional electoral systems translate ethnic cleavages more strongly into the party system.6 Jon Gerring reports guardedly that greater ethnolinguistic fractionalization leads to more parties even in countries using plurality elections, in contrast to Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova.7 Robert Moser and Ethan Scheiner conclude that ethnic diversity has a curvilinear relationship to the number of parties under both majoritarian and proportional systems. Their research indicates that increases in diversity at low levels spurs party growth, but a rise in diversity at high levels reduces the number of parties, as members of different ethnic groups must cohere when ethnic groups are many and small.8 Studies focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa have produced clashing results. In his examination of elections in southern Africa, Joel Barkan argues that proportional representation produces no greater representation than plurality elections for ethnic parties due to their regional support bases.9 Andrew ­Reynolds, however, contends that plurality elections do an inconsistent job, at best, of promoting the inclusion of minority parties, especially those representing small groups, in parliament and facilitate one-party majority control. ­Shaheen Mozaffar has found somewhat mixed results, showing that the regional nature of African ethnic cleavages causes majoritarian systems to produce more proportional results than elsewhere but also noting that majoritarian systems ­representation raise the barriers to entry for small parties.10 This chapter commences with descriptions and examples of different types of majoritarian electoral systems. It then turns to a discussion of why some perceive them to be harmful to ethnoregional parties. After outlining how parties with regionally concentrated support flourish in countries with majoritarian electoral systems in the context of examples from Canada, India, and the United Kingdom, the chapter then explains why the alternative vote (AV), two-round, and block vote may place roadblocks in the path of ethnoregional parties. The chapter then takes the next logical step and builds a case that the most theoretically sensible way of defining electorally relevant ethnic groups in countries with majoritarian electoral systems is to include only ethnic groups living in regions of the country in which they form a majority. After showing that variables measuring the size of the electorally relevant ethnic group and ethnoregional fractionalization in this fashion outperform other measures, the chapter concludes with the presentation of multivariate models of the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties in countries with majoritarian electoral systems from 1990 through 2012.

Types of Majoritarian Electoral Systems Majoritarian electoral systems are strongly associated with the United Kingdom and its former colonies. France and Mongolia are the only two of the 24 countries with majoritarian electoral systems included in this study that are not former



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31

British possessions—other than the United Kingdom itself. In contrast, just five of the many free democracies in the data set currently using proportional or mixed electoral systems are former British colonies.11 There are several different basic types of majoritarian electoral systems. The SMP system is by far the most common. SMP’s greatest virtue may be its simplicity, as voters easily understand it. Divided into single-member constituencies, each voter may cast a ballot for only a single candidate, with the one who wins the most votes declared elected. SMP is used in most countries with majoritarian systems in the data set, all except Australia, France, Mauritius, and Samoa; Mongolia used SMP from 1996 through 2004.12 The block vote—plurality elections in multimember constituencies—is one majoritarian alternative to SMP. Some countries, like Samoa, utilize a mixture of SMP and the block vote (i.e., single and multimember constituencies) to elect their national legislatures. Majoritarian elections can, of course, be held in constituencies of any magnitude. Elections for the lower houses of American state legislatures are frequently held in multimember districts. Arizona, for example, elects its house entirely from two-member districts. The Maryland House of Delegates is largely elected from three-member constituencies, though it also has some one- and two-member districts. West Virginia currently has house districts with between one and nine members apiece. Australia and France both have adopted quite different majoritarian systems with the common goal of preventing candidates with an overly narrow electoral base from winning the election. Australia employs the AV electoral system to elect its federal House of Representatives. As in SMP elections, Australian elections occur in single-member constituencies. But rather than voting for a single candidate, Australians must rank all candidates from most to least preferred, placing a “1” by their most favored candidate, a “2” by their second choice, and so on. A candidate who wins a majority of first-preference votes immediately gains election. If no candidate receives a majority of the first-preference votes, the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes is eliminated and the candidate’s votes are redistributed to the second choice of each of the voters. The candidate who has the fewest votes is in turn eliminated if there is still no candidate with a majority. Again, their votes are redistributed to the highest-ranked candidates still in contention. The process continues until a candidate achieves a majority. The result is the same as if a series of plurality elections were held with the candidate receiving the fewest votes being eliminated each time until a candidate achieves a majority. Since voters rank candidates, they have to go to the polls only once. France utilizes the two-round system to elect the Chamber of Deputies. Voters cast their first-round ballot for one candidate in a single-member constituency, as in SMP countries like the United Kingdom. Candidates gain victory immediately if they receive a majority of first-round votes. Otherwise, all candidates whose vote share exceeds 12.5 percent of registered voters participate in a second round. France’s fragmented party system makes it difficult to achieve a majority, and

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usually more than one candidate passes the threshold for inclusion in the second round. Only 36 of the 577 deputies won in the first round in 2012. A plurality suffices to secure election in the second round. Attaining the 12.5 percent threshold is more difficult than it may appear at first glance because a candidate must obtain 12.5 percent of registered voters— not valid votes. For example, in the first constituency of Bouches-des-Rhône, the National Front candidate won 21.9 percent of valid first-round votes in 2012. However, as just 56.9 percent of registered voters cast valid ballots, this result corresponded to only 12.4 percent of registered voters, so the candidate did not qualify for the second round. In second-round races with more than two candidates, sometimes a candidate will voluntarily withdraw as part of a deal between parties. Naturally, deals occur most often between ideologically similar parties that fear that division will hand victory to the other side of the ideological spectrum. The dilemma is familiar to voters in many countries with SMP elections. The first round, however, allows French candidates and voters to more directly assess the relative strengths of the parties.

Why Majoritarian Electoral Systems May Hurt Minorities Majoritarian electoral systems have been widely perceived as making it more ­d ifficult for minorities and parties backed by them to win elections. One of the major criticisms of these systems is that the threshold of exclusion—the share of votes needed for a candidate to be assured of winning a seat in the legislature—is very high. Candidates must win more than 50 percent of the vote to guarantee victory, so candidates who are members of a minority party or group can collect many votes but fail to win any seats. Even parties with substantial vote shares can end up with comparatively few seats. Provincial elections in Prince Edward Island, Canada’s smallest province, ­v ividly demonstrate the potential for extreme disparities between votes and seats in plurality elections. In the 2000 election, the governing Progressive Conservatives received 58 percent of the vote but won all except one of the 27 seats. Their votes were distributed so evenly that they won outright majorities in all but five seats, and the second-place Liberals received only one seat for 34 percent of the vote. In sharp contrast to proportional election systems, additional votes gain a party no additional seats unless the votes allow the party to move into first place in more constituencies.13 Plurality elections also often punish smaller parties in national contests. The Liberal Democrats routinely win a much a lower percentage of seats than votes in the United Kingdom. In 2010, the Liberal Democrats won just 8.8 percent of the seats even though they received 23.0 percent of the vote. Viewed in light of historical results, this outcome was a good return of seats for votes. In 1983, the



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33

party—then called the Liberal-Social Democratic Party Alliance—won only 3.5 percent of seats with an even higher 25.4 percent of the national vote. Perhaps even more stunningly, Labour garnered 32.2 percent of parliamentary seats— 28.7 percent more than the dispersed Liberal Democrats—with only 2.2 percent votes more than the Liberal Democrats. Labour’s votes were sufficiently concentrated in urban areas to assure it many first-place finishes. The juxtaposition of these results nicely illustrates that majoritarian systems do not consistently translate the same share of votes into the same share of seats. The number of seats in which a party comes in first depends not only on its votes but the votes received by other parties and their distribution across constituencies. These sorts of disparities also shape the scope of victories by major parties. The Conservative vote is overconcentrated or packed in its core constituencies compared to the advantageous distribution for Labour. As a result, the Conservatives took just 51.6 percent of constituencies with 41.9 percent of the vote in 1992 while Labour won approximately 63 percent of seats in 1997 and 2001 with just 41 to 43 percent of the vote. In 2005, Labour gained a majority of 55.0 percent of seats on just 35.2 percent of the vote—the lowest share ever recorded for a party that won a majority. In contrast, 36.1 percent of the vote left the Conservatives short of a majority with 47.1 percent of the seats in 2010.14 By definition, ethnic minority parties are not in the majority. Parties and ­candidates that rely on ethnic minority support to win elections will not win majorities or benefit from the tendency of the majoritarian electoral systems to award a disproportionate share of seats to the party with the most votes. Instead, majoritarian systems seem likely to penalize ethnoregional parties with disproportionately few seats. Moreover, racial or ethnic parties suffer more permanently than other types of parties. Nonethnic parties like the Prince Edward Island Liberals can hope to expand their vote base sufficiently to become the majority party, as they did in 2007 when they won 53 percent of the vote and went from holding just four to a thumping majority of 23 seats in the 27-member provincial legislature. But parties grounded in a group defined by some ascriptive characteristic, such as race, language, ethnicity, or religion, have a limited voter base. If cleavages between majority and minority groups are sufficiently sharp as to inspire the formation of an ethnic party, and the party focuses primarily on the group’s concerns, it will find it impossible to attract enough support from the majority group to win a plurality or majority of votes and benefit from a majoritarian electoral system. The great virtue of majoritarian electoral system from the viewpoint of its proponents is that it helps assure a stable majority that can govern the country for the full term of the legislature. This outcome is the natural consequence of an electoral system that frequently gives a sizeable majority of seats to a party that received only a plurality or a narrow majority of votes. Majority governments have routinely been formed in the United Kingdom and Canada by parties that

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won a majority of seats but fell considerably short of a majority of votes. In the United Kingdom, the Conservatives won four successive parliamentary majorities from 1979 through 1992 with 42 to 44 percent of the vote. Labour returned to power with just 43 percent of the vote in 1997 and retained majority control of the House in 2001 and 2005 with successively lower vote shares. The Canadian Liberals similarly formed three successive majority governments after the 1993, 1997, and 2000 elections without ever garnering the support of more than 41 percent of the electorate. The Conservatives did the same in 2011 with 40 percent of the vote. In short, plurality elections often allows the leading party to obtain control of a legislative majority without the need form a coalition despite the absence of an electoral majority.15 The great virtue of majoritarian electoral systems is also its vice from the ­perspective of ethnic parties. Such parties, even if they manage to win seats, may be permanently relegated to the opposition benches. In contrast, proportional systems allow a greater number of parties to flourish and make it more likely that the leading party will need coalition partners to control a legislative majority. The absence of a majority party potentially gives ethnic parties more leverage than when confronting a single party that controls a sizeable majority of seats and does not need outside support. By making it harder for minority parties to win seats and easier for plurality parties to win stable legislative majorities, majoritarian electoral systems may curtail the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates and influence public policy. The post-partition Northern Ireland House of Commons remains the archetypal example of how majoritarian electoral systems can leave minorities powerless and exacerbate ethnic conflict. After the partition of Ireland in 1921, Northern Ireland was severely divided between Nationalists, overwhelmingly Catholics who preferred reuniting the island under an independent Irish government, and Unionists, mainly Protestants who favored retaining the link with the United Kingdom. After partition, the SMP electoral system awarded Unionists a disproportionate share of seats and helped solidify their control of Northern Ireland. The Ulster Unionist Party never fell below 33 of the 52 seats; on average, it won 36 seats and independent Unionists usually held a few more. Nationalists of any stripe never saw any possibility of gaining any access to power. Indeed, in divided societies, majoritarian systems may spur majority-group consolidation to prevent that possibility. Though the majoritarian electoral system helped prevent meaningful participation by Catholics in the governance of Northern Ireland, the electoral system did not prevent the formation of an ethnic minority party. Nor has it prevented the formation of nationalist parties in the two other minority countries of the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales. Table 2.1 shows, however, that both the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) usually win a lower share of parliamentary seats than votes. Between 1979 and 2010, the SNP



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Table 2.1  P  ercentage of Votes and Seats Won by the Scottish National Party in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales, 1979–2010 Scottish National Party

Plaid Cymru

Votes

Seats

Difference

Votes

Seats

Difference

2010

19.9

10.2

–9.7

11.3

 7.5

–3.8

2005

17.7

10.2

–7.5

12.6

 7.5

–5.1

2001

20.1

 6.9

–13.2

14.3

10.0

–4.3

1997

22.1

 8.3

–13.7

 9.9

10.0

0.1

1992

21.5

 4.2

–17.3

 8.8

10.5

1.7

1987

14.0

 4.2

–9.9

 7.3

 7.9

0.6

1983

11.8

 2.8

–9.0

 7.8

 5.3

–2.5

1979

17.3

 2.8

–14.5

 8.1

 5.6

–2.5

gained an average of 12 percent fewer Scottish seats than votes. The seats–votes gap rose to a high of 17 percent in 1992 when the SNP won 21.5 percent of the Scottish vote but only 4.2 percent of Scotland’s 72 seats. The seats–votes gap reached its lowest point in 2005, though the SNP still won 7 percent fewer seats than votes. Plaid Cymru has been less penalized by the electoral system. In three of the eight elections held since 1979, Plaid’s share of seats slightly exceeded its share of votes in Wales. On the other hand, in recent elections, Plaid has increased its share of the Welsh vote, but these gains have not won it additional seats. Indeed, the Plaid lost one of its four seats in 2005. At 13 percent, the party’s vote share was down from 2001; however, it was still over 40 percent higher than 1992 when the party went from three to four seats. The electoral system has not consistently translated the electoral strength of either the SNP or Plaid into parliamentary seats. The majoritarian electoral system can punish minority groups and parties far worse than the minority nationalities of the United Kingdom. African ­A mericans composed approximately one-quarter of Alabama’s population in 1990. But ­A labama sent no blacks to the US House—a situation that remained unchanged even over three decades after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 assured African Americans access to the franchise. African Americans formed no more than one-third of the population in any of Alabama’s ­congressional districts, so whites could easily outvote blacks in all of them. Prior to the 1992 elections, ­A labama’s congressional district boundaries were reconfigured so that one ­d istrict became over two-thirds black. Since that time, this district has consistently sent African-American representatives to Washington. The Alabama experience further suggests that majoritarian electoral systems may discourage minority candidacies and the formation of minority parties.

36

minority rules

In the context of studying American congressional elections, Gary Jacobson has demonstrated repeatedly that politicians are strategic actors. High-quality candidates, defined by him as candidates with previous experience holding public office, generally do not want to run for Congress if they think they are going to lose.16 African-American politicians only occasionally win office in districts with non-Hispanic white majorities in the United States,17 so black politicians may often be reluctant to pursue office in majority-white jurisdictions. For similar reasons, ethnic minority parties may fail to form or to attract a significant share of the minority vote in countries with majoritarian electoral systems because of the difficulty in achieving success. Instead, ethnic or racial minority leaders may perceive their opportunities for gaining political influence as greater through participation in a major party. Ethnic minority parties have not formed in a number of countries with ­majoritarian electoral systems despite significant ethnic cleavages. None of the many racial and ethnic minorities in the United States has successfully mounted a minority party, nor have indigenous peoples in Australia or Canada. New Zealand Māori attempted to launch Māori parties, but none won any seats until after New Zealand switched from SMP to a mixed-member proportional electoral system, more anecdotal evidence that proportional systems provide more fertile soil for ethnoregional parties. Elections held utilizing either the AV or the block vote are especially ­challenging for minority parties and candidates. While 50 percent of the vote is required to guarantee victory in SMP elections, the presence of multiple candidates can lower the percentage of the vote needed. If more than two candidates divide the vote, a plurality may suffice. Canada and the United Kingdom both have multiparty systems in which many victors emerge with less than a majority of the valid votes (see Table 2.2). Since 1979, 50 percent of candidates won without a majority in the average UK general election. A stunning two-thirds of British members of parliament were elected without less than a majority of the valid votes cast in both 2005 and 2010. Most Canadian members of parliament win with only a plurality of the valid vote; on average, 56 percent won their seats without majority support over the six elections held between 1993 and 2011. Nearly two-thirds of Canadian members of parliament won by only a plurality of the vote in 1997 when the governing Liberal Party won a narrow majority with only 38 percent of the vote—the smallest share ever received by a Canadian party able to form a majority government. Division among majority party candidates can greatly aid ethnoregional party candidates in plurality elections. In the United Kingdom, the SNP won Dundee East constituency in 2010 with only 38 percent of the vote. Though over 60 percent cast their ballots for other candidates, they divided them in such a manner that none gained more votes than the SNP candidate. Plurality victories are much less common in the United States, where the Democrats and the Republicans dominate congressional elections in a classic



M a j o r i t a r i a n E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

37

Table 2.2 Percentage of British and Canadian Members of Parliament Elected with Less Than a Majority of the Vote Canada

United Kingdom

2011

53

2010

67

2008

62

2005

66

2006

60

2001

50

2004

56

1997

47

2000

49

1992

40

1997

65

1987

44

1993

44

1983

52

1979

32

two-party system. Most US House members win a majority; very few win by much less than a majority. Though third-party candidates occasionally gain enough votes to deprive the winner of a majority, they rarely win US House seats. Ethnoregional parties have little chance of success in this context and are almost nonexistent. The AV electoral system used in Australia is even less friendly to ethnoregional parties than SMP in the United States because it precludes even the possibility of a plurality victory. Under AV, candidates who win a plurality of first-preference votes do not automatically win election. Instead, the lowest-ranked candidate is dropped from the contest and their votes are redistributed to the candidate ranked next on each ballot with the process repeated until one candidate receives a majority. While SMP elections give ethnoregional parties or minority candidates an opening if majority-group parties divide their votes, AV allows supporters of various majority candidates to coalesce in later rounds of the vote count to prevent the election of a candidate with only plurality support. The block-vote electoral system can likewise prove devastating to minority candidates. This aptly named system refers to the ability of a cohesive majority of voters to assure that its preferred candidates garner all of the seats in the multimember district by voting for the same set of candidates. As a result, it can decimate the prospects of minority-preferred parties or candidates. Dividing a multimember constituency into single-member districts might allow the minority to form a majority in at least one district. But multimember constituencies can submerge a minority that forms a local political majority. In the United States, combining single-member to multimember districts was a favored tactic of white southern politicians who wanted to prevent the election of blacks.18 Block-vote elections can disadvantage parties, including ethnic parties, as single parties frequently sweep them. In 2012, only two of Arizona’s 30 two-member

38

minority rules

state house districts elected representatives from more than one political party. Similarly, only three of Maryland’s 32 three-member state house districts sent mixed delegations to Annapolis in 2010. Of course, ticket splitting may vary across or within states and over time, as can the number of closely divided districts that are more likely to elect representatives from different parties even if voters are relatively cohesive. Moreover, changing from a SMP district to a multimember block-vote district may raise the threshold of exclusion above 50 percent. Imagine a two-member district with 100 voters and four candidates: Bill, Tony, Ron, and Margaret. Voters may cast ballots for up to two candidates but not vote more than once for a single candidate. On Election Day, 55 voters cast their first vote for Bill, 5 for Tony, 25 for Ron, and 15 for Margaret (example 1 in Figure 2.1). Bill does not receive any second votes but Tony gets 15, Ron 40, and Margaret 50. Though Bill has won 55 votes, reflecting support from 55 percent of voters, he loses. Ron and Margaret win the two seats with 65 and 70 votes apiece. Bill needs to win over two-thirds of the vote to be absolutely sure of winning a seat (example 2 in Figure 2.1). Imagine the same four candidates run again but 67 voters, just over two-thirds of the electorate, cast their first vote for Bill and 33 vote for Ron; Tony, and Margaret win no first votes. Unpopular Tony receives no second votes and neither does Bill. However, Ron picks up another 34 votes and Margaret wins 66 votes. When the votes are tallied, Bill and Ron have tied for first place and each win a seat. Despite winning support from almost two-thirds of the electorate, Margaret falls one vote short and does not win a seat.

Example 1 1st Vote

2nd Vote

TOTAL

Bill

55

 0

55

Loser

Tony

 5

10

15

Loser

Ron

25

40

65

Winner

Margaret

15

50

70

Winner

Example 2 1st Vote

2nd Vote

TOTAL

Bill

67

 0

67

Winner

Tony

 0

 0

 0

Loser

Ron

33

34

67

Winner

Margaret

 0

66

66

Loser

Figure 2.1  Hypothetical Outcomes of Elections in Two-Member Districts



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39

In real elections, votes are rarely distributed such that a candidate really requires support from over two-thirds of voters to win. Nonetheless, the share of the vote needed to win can easily rise above 50 percent. Examining the outcome of the elections held in 2006 for the Arizona state House, entirely elected from twomember districts, reveals that winners in four of the nine races in which both the Democrats and the Republicans ran two candidates needed more than a majority support to win. As in plurality elections, the level of voter support needed to win can also decline below 50 percent depending on the number of candidates and the distribution of the votes. Candidates in the other five Arizona House districts with four major-party candidates required less than majority support to garner their seats.19 The use of two-member districts for the Arizona House nevertheless makes it easier for a cohesive majority to defeat the minority. Monaco formerly used the most extreme form of the block-vote system, as it elected the entire legislature by the block vote from a single national constituency. Candidates needed to obtain majority support to win in the first round. Any remaining seats were filled in a second round with a plurality being sufficient.20 In 1998, the National and Democratic Union swept all of the 18 seats. Fifteen of its candidates won a majority in the first round. The three remaining candidates on its slate each won more votes than any other candidate even though they failed to win the majority required for a first-round election; all were easily elected in the second round. Giving resounding meaning to the “winner-takes-all” reputation of majoritarian elections, Monegasque opposition parties did not win a single seat even though they won 33 percent of first-round votes and 50 percent of secondround votes.

The Importance of Regional Concentration Majoritarian systems can prevent ethnoregional parties from winning elections if minorities are consistently outnumbered across constituencies. But many ethnic minorities are concentrated in particular regions of their countries. Though ethnic minorities do not, by definition, form a majority in a country as a whole, they can still form local and regional majorities. If ethnoregional groups compose regional majorities, majoritarian electoral systems may not harm ethnoregional parties. They may even win a disproportionate share of seats if their support is sufficiently strong and well distributed. At the same time, ethnoregional parties based in geographically dispersed minorities will find it very difficult to win seats under a majoritarian electoral system even with a strong majority–minority cleavage. This section first explores ethnoregional parties that flourish in Canada and the United Kingdom and how the geographic distribution of votes within a region as well as the share of votes received determines the share of seats. It then turns

40

minority rules

to why plurality elections promote the triumph of regional over nonregional ­cleavages in the context of hyper-diverse India.

Regional Parties in Canada and the United Kingdom Francophones in Canada constitute less than one-quarter of Canada’s ­population but over 80 percent of Quebec’s. The Parti Québécois (PQ ) and the Bloc Québécois (BQ ) fight for Francophone rights in Quebec and the separation of Quebec from Canada at the provincial and federal level, respectively. Both parties have thrived under the SMP electoral system used for both Quebec provincial and Canadian federal elections (see Table 2.3).21 The BQ benefitted from SMP elections from its first election in 1993 through 2008, as it won an average of 22 percent more seats than votes. Perhaps most notably, the BQ won two more seats than the federal Liberals in 2000 even though they trailed them by 4 percent of the vote. But in 2011 the BQ’s share of the Quebec vote dropped to 23 percent, substantially below its previously worst showing of 38 percent, and the party won just 5 percent of Quebec’s seats. The PQ also benefits from the electoral system, though the party sometimes wins a smaller share of seats than votes when badly trounced by the Liberals. 22 The PQ sweated out a narrow victory by less than 1 percent over the Liberals in 1994 but won 30 more seats than the Liberals in the 125-member National Assembly, Quebec’s legislature. The Liberals beat the PQ at the polls in 1998, albeit by less than 1 percent of the vote, but the Liberals nonetheless lost to the PQ by 28 seats. The Liberals won strong majorities in the National Assembly in 1985, 1989, and Table 2.3  P  ercentage of Votes and Seats Received by the Bloc Québécois and the Parti Québécois in Quebec Parti Québécois

Bloc Québécois

Votes

Seats

Difference

Votes

Seats

Difference

2014

25.4

24.0

–1.4

2011

23.4

 5.3

–18.1

2012

31.9

43.2

11.3

2008

38.1

65.3

27.2

2008

35.2

40.8

5.6

2006

42.1

68.0

25.9

2007

28.3

28.8

0.5

2004

48.9

72.0

23.1

2003

33.2

36.0

2.8

2000

39.9

50.7

10.8

1998

42.9

60.8

17.9

1997

37.9

58.7

20.8

1994

44.8

61.6

16.8

1993

49.3

72.0

22.7

1989

40.2

23.2

–17.0

1985

38.7

18.9

–19.8



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41

2003, besting the PQ by between 10 and 17 percent of the vote. The PQ fell to third place in terms of votes in 2007, but its seat share still corresponded to its vote share. The PQ bounced back to regain the status of official opposition in 2008 and then to form a minority government in 2012. But PQ turned in a disastrous performance in 2014, falling to just 25 percent of the vote—its lowest share of the vote since 1970. Even in 2014, however, the PQ’s 24 percent share of seats nearly matched its share of votes. The BQ and PQ benefit from two factors. First, the non-Francophone ­federalist vote is disadvantageously concentrated on the western half of the island of Montreal. In constituencies located there, federalist parties pile up enormous margins of victory, though a party wins only one seat whether its margin is 5 or 50 percent of the vote. In contrast, the BQ and PQ win many Francophone constituencies by solid, but less overwhelming, margins. As a result, their votes are distributed more efficiently and they win more seats than their opponents for the same vote share. At the federal level, the BQ has benefited from the presence of multiple federalist parties. This division makes it difficult for one federalist party to consolidate the vote sufficiently to beat the BQ , though the New Democratic Party managed the job through its successful appeal to soft nationalists in 2011.23 In short, parties designed to promote the interests of Quebec Francophones not only manage to win seats but often benefit from the general bias of majoritarian electoral systems toward the party with the most votes. The PQ has regularly managed to form the provincial government since it first took power in Quebec City in 1976. Indeed, the PQ benefits from manufactured majorities (i.e., majorities of seats won on a minority of the vote) at the provincial level in a manner similar to many governing parties at the national level in both Canada and the United Kingdom. The BQ always won a disproportionate share of seats in federal elections until its dramatic loss of votes in 2011. The experiences of Quebec and other cases point to where one may expect ethnoregional minorities or parties to succeed in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. First, the ethnic group must constitute a local majority. Concentration without majority status is probably insufficient; recall the failure of ­A labama blacks to win any congressional seats in 1990. Though blacks form around one-quarter of Alabama’s population, around twice the national average, African Americans did not constitute a majority in any of the state’s congressional districts and carried no districts. But ethnic minority candidates and parties can win where their ethnic base supporters form a majority. Second, majoritarian electoral systems reward success, not failure. So ethnic parties must gain relatively high levels of support from their ethnic base to win mandates. Ethnic parties with regionally concentrated support will still fare poorly if they are not big enough fish even within the smaller regional pond. The experience of national parties with dispersed support underlines why. In 1993, the Canadian Progressive Conservatives won 16 percent of the vote but only two

42

minority rules

parliamentary seats. The UK Liberal Democrats have also been heavily penalized by the electoral system, as they have won between one-sixth and one-quarter of the national vote since 1983 but have never captured even one-tenth of the seats. Majoritarian electoral systems award no prize for third place. The limited success of the SNP and Plaid Cymru reveals why smaller minority parties may nevertheless still gain some seats. Though both the SNP and Plaid are not fringe parties within their home regions, they hardly dominate parliamentary elections. Over the eight UK elections held between 1979 and 2010, the SNP averaged 18 percent in Scotland and Plaid only 10 percent in Wales. Nevertheless, both win seats regularly because their support is not just centered in Scotland and Wales but in portions of each. Plaid performs more strongly in the western fringes of Wales where Welsh speakers are concentrated. The SNP similarly run strongest in the Scottish Highlands. These bastions of support allow the parties to gain parliamentary representation even though they can convince only a fraction of their region’s electorate to support them. Regionally concentrated ethnoregional parties like the SNP and the Plaid have a huge advantage over parties with dispersed support bases in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Regionally concentrated parties, like the BQ and the PQ , even have the potential to benefit from the propensity of majoritarian systems to award extra seats to the victorious party. Although parties that lag in terms of votes tend to lose out for the same reason, like the SNP and Plaid, the distribution of votes for all candidates of all parties ultimately determines the relationship between votes and seats. Majoritarian systems often privilege ethnic cleavages because ethnic groups tend to be regionally concentrated.

Ethnoregional Parties in India Unsurprisingly for a country of over 1.2 billion people, India has an extremely complex party system despite its simple SMP electoral system used to elect the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the federal parliament. The world’s most populous democracy contains a welter of ethnic and regional parties. The Indian National Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) form two major poles that compete for the ability to form a government. But there are literally hundreds of other parties, and ethnoregional parties increasingly vie for a role in federal politics.24 Their share of the vote rose sharply over the six elections held between 1991 and 2009 from roughly one-seventh in 1991 to around one-quarter in 1996; one-third in 1998, 1999, and 2004; and a new high of 36 percent in 2009. The aggregate share of seats occupied by ethnoregional parties has very roughly tracked their aggregate share of votes. Collectively, these parties held over 30 percent of the seats after the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections, as compared to 10 percent after the 1991 elections. The number of ethnoregional parties entering the Lok Sabha has



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43

increased as well. In 1991, 17 ethnoregional parties won at least one seat; however, 30 or more did the same in the four elections held since 1998. The Indian case provides solid support for the theory that a regional base is absolutely critical to the emergence of ethnic parties in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. The non-statewide parties that have achieved the greatest success possess a strong regional base. Many of these parties champion specific ethnic, religious, linguistic, or caste groups within a state. For example, Asom Gana Parishad (Assam People’s Council) fights for the rights of native Assamese as opposed to Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam. Telugu Desam (Telugu Nation) has become a very successful state party by advocating for Telugu rights in Andhra Pradesh. Based in the Vanniyar community of northern Tamil Nadu, Pattali Makkal Katchi (“Pattali” People’s Party) supports the division of the state. Other Indian regional parties attempt to form a patchwork coalition of several groups grounded in ideology or opposition to another state party rather than ethnicity. The multiplicity and frequently overlapping nature of identities within India facilitate these efforts.25 Even more striking than the success of state-based ethnic parties is the general failure of Muslim parties. One might expect strong Muslim parties to have formed due to the long-term salience of religion in the politics of the Indian subcontinent. At independence, most of the Muslim-majority portions of the subcontinent joined together to form Pakistan rather than remain part of an independent India with its Hindu majority. The bloody scission of the subcontinent resulted in displacement and death of millions caught on the “wrong” side of the new border. Partition was inevitably a messy affair as Hindus and Muslims were greatly intermixed with Muslims concentrated on the far sides of colonial India in the now separate countries of Bangladesh and Pakistan. India retains a Muslim minority of 12 percent, despite the massive population shifts around partition. Religion has certainly not disappeared as a factor in Indian international relations or domestic politics. India has fought repeated wars against Pakistan with the status of Muslim-majority Kashmir remaining a major bone of contention. The BJP rose to power on a pro-Hindu platform. Although participation in government moderated the BJP’s policies, the religious element has not been eliminated, and the party retained power at the state level in Gujarat in 2002 after being criticized for doing nothing to stop or to prosecute anti-Muslim rioters. 26 Nonetheless, Muslim-oriented political parties on the Indian political scene impress mainly for their weakness. The Indian Union Muslim League, a remnant of the pre-independence Muslim League, contests few seats and wins none. The Muslim League Kerala State Committee, another Muslim League remnant, has achieved a modicum of success, winning approximately 5 percent of the Kerala vote in federal elections. Since Muslims compose 23 percent of Kerala’s population, over three-quarters of Kerala Muslims must have given their votes

44

minority rules

to non-Muslim parties. The general failure of Muslim parties to mobilize the Muslim vote becomes even more apparent when one considers that Kerala’s ­Muslims comprise less than 7 percent of India’s Muslim population. The only other explicitly Muslim party to have won a seat in recent years is the Majlis-E-Ittehadul Musalmeen (All India Muslim Federal Assembly), which has held Andhra Pradesh’s Hyderabad constituency since 1984. Despite its “all-India” pretensions, this party last contested constituencies outside Andhra Pradesh in 1991 and has never run more than three Lok Sabha candidates. The party has never exceeded 2.5 percent of the Andhra Pradesh vote, which could only account for around one-fifth of the state’s Muslim vote. The dearth of Muslim parties is hardly a sign of the absence of heated religious debates. Muslim parties remain very weak despite the high salience of religion and the success of numerous other ethnoregional parties. The lack of a regional base has proved an insurmountable barrier to the success of Muslim parties despite other favorable conditions. Most regions that would have formed the natural base of any Muslim party joined Pakistan instead of India.27 The limited success of national caste-based parties further highlights the importance of regional support in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Caste remains an important source of conflict in Indian politics. The INC has supported the reservation of university places and government jobs for lower castes while the BJP has gained support partially due to the upper-caste Hindu backlash against these policies. The Bahujan Samaj Party (Party of the Majority; BSP), formed to represent lower-caste and Dalit interests, is the major avowedly national party organized primarily around lower-caste interests. In the five elections held from 1996 through 2009, the BSP received between 4.0 and 6.2 percent of the vote with its 2009 showing of 6.2 percent making it the third most successful party. Though the BSP aspires to a national following, it receives the bulk of its support in Uttar Pradesh (UP)—an average of 69 percent from 1991 through 2009. 28 While BSP support rose to 27 percent in UP by 2009, the party usually received a far smaller share elsewhere. The BSP achieved its highest score outside of UP with 16 percent of the Haryana vote in 2009. Otherwise, the BSP’s best performances outside UP were 9 and 13 percent of the Punjab vote in 1996 and 1998, respectively. None of BSP’s Lok Sabha members hailed from outside UP in 1999 or 2004. The BSP picked off one seat in Madhya Pradesh in 2009 with a victory with just 28 percent of the vote in Rewa constituency. In short, though the party strives to break out of its regional bailiwick, it makes a major splash only in UP with its ability to win seats dependent of its support in this populous state. The BSP’s effort to compete in many states but difficulty in breaking out of UP is a common pattern. Many regional parties aspire to a following across India, or at least to expand into more states. The All India Anna Dravida Munnetra



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45

Kazhagam (All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation) contests seats in only one state, Tamil Nadu. Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji), a virulently Hindu nationalist party, has branches in many states but has experienced almost no success ­outside of Maharashtra, likely because of its close identification with Marathi nationalism.29 Of course, these parties would experience less success if their support was not regionally concentrated but dispersed around India.

Explaining Support for Ethnoregional Parties The last section demonstrates that ethnic geography and group cohesion shape the impact of majoritarian electoral systems on ethnoregional party success. Regionally concentrated groups can overcome the barriers to election in majoritarian systems, but dispersed groups cannot. As a result, majoritarian systems condition not only whether ethnoregional parties can gain electoral success but also which ethnic cleavages can emerge in the party system. Though many ethnic cleavages overlap, such as in Cyprus where people who speak the same language usually share the same religion, others crosscut, as with religion, language, and caste in India, so that cleavages compete for expression in the party system. In countries with multiple crosscutting and competing cleavages, majoritarian electoral systems privilege cleavages organized on regional lines over cleavages without regional basis. Accordingly, one should define electorally relevant ethnoregional groups (EREG)—a felicitous term borrowed (though slightly altered) from Daniel Posner’s thoughtful work on ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures30 —on the expectation that the party system articulates regional cleavages but not competing cleavages lacking a regional basis. After first exploring ethnoregional party success in countries with majoritarian systems, this section turns toward further theory development to explain variation in success levels. Measures of EREG defined in light of this theory predict electoral outcomes better than competing measures even though they remain independent of the political outcomes. The chapter concludes with multivariate models that show that the size of electorally relevant ethnic groups has a solid link to ethnoregional party performance even after controlling for other key factors.

Ethnoregional Party Performance Table 2.4 shows the average share of all votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties for all elections held from 1990 through 2012 in each of the 24 countries with majoritarian electoral systems. For countries in which ethnoregional parties won seats, the table further displays the level of success for these parties within their home regions. Ethnoregional parties have a limited scope for support so regional data helps gauge their success within their primary sphere of operation.

46

minority rules

Table 2.4  M  ajoritarian Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Parties Summary, 1990–2012 Electoral System

Country (and Electoral System Number)

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

 65.7

100.0

 39.9

 56.0

  9.0

  8.1

SMP

Antigua and Barbuda

Barbuda

1.4

5.9

AV

Australia

Indigenous, Tasmania

0.0

0.0

SMP

Bahamas

none

none

SMP

Barbados

none

none

SMP

Belize

none

none

SMP

Botswana 1 (1994)

Kalanga, Northern

4.6

0.0

SMP

Botswana 2 (1999–)

Kalanga, Northern

4.4

0.6

SMP

Canada

Quebec

10.5

13.8

SMP

Dominica

none

none

TwoRound

France (Metropolitan)

Multiple Regions

0.4

0.0

SMP

Ghana

Northern

2.2

1.0

SMP

Grenada

none

none

SMP

India

All

29.0

28.1

SMP

Andhra Pradesh

3.6

2.9

 38.3

 37.1

SMP

Arunachal Pradesh

0.0

0.1

 16.4

 16.7

SMP

Assam

0.6

0.5

 23.8

 17.9

SMP

Bihar

2.4

2.9

 26.0

 24.8

SMP

Dadra and Nagar Haveli

0.0

0.0

  8.1

  0.0

SMP

Goa

0.0

0.1

 19.1

  8.3

SMP

Gujarat

0.1

0.0

  2.2

  0.6

SMP

Haryana

0.5

0.3

 30.4

 26.7



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47

Table 2.4  (continued) Electoral System

Country (and Electoral System Number)

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

SMP

Himachal Pradesh

0.0

0.0

  2.1

  4.2

SMP

Jammu and Kashmir

0.1

0.5

 23.5

 36.1

SMP

Jharkhand

0.4

0.5

  9.8

 10.6

SMP

Karnataka

0.1

0.1

  2.4

  2.4

SMP

Kerala

0.4

0.5

 10.5

 15.8

SMP

Madhya Pradesh

0.0

0.0

  1.2

  1.0

SMP

Maharashtra

2.9

3.0

 30.9

 33.3

SMP

Manipur

0.0

0.1

 23.3

 25.0

SMP

Meghalaya

0.0

0.0

 10.3

 16.7

SMP

Mizoram

0.0

0.0

 20.7

 16.7

SMP

Nagaland

0.1

0.1

 23.2

 33.3

SMP

Odisha

0.8

1.4

 21.3

 34.9

SMP

Pondicherry

1.1

1.2

 47.5

 33.3

SMP

Punjab

0.7

1.0

 32.9

 42.3

SMP

Rajasthan

0.3

0.2

  0.9

  1.3

SMP

Sikkim

0.0

0.2

 80.3

100.0

SMP

Tamil Nadu

4.0

4.0

 67.1

 71.4

SMP

Uttar Pradesh

8.0

6.4

 43.9

 40.5

SMP

Uttarakhand

0.0

0.0

  1.8

  3.3

SMP

West Bengal

2.6

2.2

 24.9

 27.8

 76.0

100.0

SMP

Jamaica

none

none

SMP

Lesotho 1 and 2 (1993–1998)

none

none

Block

Mauritius

All

5.3

4.9

Rodrigues

2.2

4.1

Block

continued

48

minority rules

Table 2.4  (continued) Electoral System

Country (and Electoral System Number)

Block

Region or Minority

Mauritius (island)

National Mean of All Elections Votes

Seats

3.0

0.7

Regional Mean of All Elections Votes

Seats

100.0

100.0

TwoRound

Monaco 1 (1993– 1998)

none

none

Block

Mongolia 1 (1992) and 3 (2008)

none

none

SMP

Mongolia 2 (1996–2004)

none

none

SMP

New Zealand 1 (1990–1993)

Maori

0.4

0.0

SMP

St. Kitts and Nevis

Nevis

17.7

27.3

SMP

St. Lucia

none

none

SMP

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

none

none

Block

Samoa

none

none

SMP

United Kingdom

All

4.9

4.0

SMP

Scotland

1.9

0.8

 22.5

 10.2

SMP

Wales

0.6

0.6

 11.5

  9.1

SMP

Northern Ireland

2.5

2.7

 95.6

 98.9

SMP

Cornwall

0.0

0.0

  1.0

  0.0

SMP

England (except Cornwall)

0.0

0.0

Vermont, Alaska, others

0.1

0.0

SMP

United States

Notes: SMP = single-member plurality. AV = alternative vote.



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49

Among the 24 countries with majoritarian electoral systems, 13 have no e­ thnoregional parties; four have only fringe parties that failed to win even a single seat in any election. 31 Ethnoregional parties won seats in the remaining seven countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, Ghana, India, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the United Kingdom. India dominates the table as ethnoregional parties win a higher share of votes and seats than in any other majoritarian democracy. Fascinatingly, the table shows that no country is too small to experience regional divisions. Both Antigua and Barbuda (population: 69,000) and Saint Kitts and Nevis (population: 43,000) have major regional parties. The division of the population between two islands, one of which is much less populous than the other, appears to promote regional parties in both countries. Except Mauritius, all successful parties emerged in countries with SMP elections, though many countries with this system have not developed ethnoregional parties. Just seven countries with majoritarian electoral systems use alternatives to SMP, so it is difficult to test whether AV, two-round, or block-vote systems impede the formation of ethnoregional parties. In several countries, at least one region appears have to an entirely separate party system. Statewide parties did not participate in elections on the islands of Rodrigues in Mauritius or Nevis in St. Kitts and Nevis. In the United Kingdom, statewide parties win very few votes and no seats in Northern Ireland, 32 though they play an active role alongside regional parties in Scotland and Wales. Local parties also dominate Lok Sabha elections for the small state of Sikkim’s sole MP.

Defining Electorally Relevant Groups The task of defining electorally relevant ethnic and regional groups endures as one of the more intractable problems for studies of ethnic politics. Some ­ethnoregional divisions may be politically salient while others are not. ­Compounding the problem, scholars have often argued that race and ethnicity are socially c­ onstructed and that the relevance of group membership consequently can change. 33 While the Protestant–Catholic distinction remains important in Northern ­I reland, its role in politics in England and France has declined markedly. Though ethnoregional party activists focus on the supposedly immutable characteristics of their group or region, relevant groups may shift over time. The Problem of Multiple Crosscutting Identities

Individuals can also hold multiple group identifications, though there is often close overlap between different identities. Most Hebrew speakers in Israel, for example, are Jewish. But while markers of group membership may be cumulative in many countries, competing ethnic identities may alternatively crosscut one another,

50

minority rules

making it difficult to define groups as each group contains a large portion of another. In her study of India, Kanchan Chandra contends that voters may emphasize different identities in elections for different levels of government as the more advantageous choice may vary with the boundary of the political community. 34 A country with crosscutting religious, linguistic, and caste divisions, India is the archetypal case for her argument as it highlights vexing difficulties surrounding the focus on a single cleavage. One can easily construct arguments to make separate cases for religion, language, or caste as the key axis of division in India. 35 Divisions between Hindus and Muslims prior to independence led to the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan—now Pakistan and ­ Bangladesh—accompanied by extensive communal riots and population ­ exchanges. Religion remains a focus of communal conflict and also divides the two major national parties. The Hindu-Nationalist BJP has been accused of fanning the flames of communal tension and attracts few Muslim votes while the INC argues for more secular approach and receives significant Muslim support. Though religion served as the basis for partition, India constructed its states primarily to reflect language borders. India’s founding Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru acceded to the reorganization of India’s internal divisions on a linguistic basis in the States Reorganization Act passed in 1956. 36 Language has continued to help spur the division of existing states and the formation of new ones. India split Bombay State along linguistic lines in 1960, placing most Marathi speakers in Maharashtra and Gujarati speakers in Gujarat. In 1966, the Hindi and Hindu areas of Punjab were hived off to Haryana and Himachal Pradesh with the ­Punjabi and Sikh areas remaining within a reduced Punjab. More recently, Chhattisgarh split off from Madhya Pradesh in 2000. Chhattisgarhi, viewed ­a lternatively as a dialect of Hindi or its own language, dominates in the new state but not in Madhya Pradesh. Caste and tribe form yet another important cleavage. Indeed, though India does not reserve any constituencies for religious or linguistic minorities, it does for members of Scheduled Castes—Dalits, formerly known as “Untouchables”— and Scheduled Tribes—Adivasis, the indigenous peoples of India. 37 Anyone may vote in these reserved constituencies, but candidates must come from the appropriate group. Dispersed around the country, Scheduled Castes members form a majority in no constituency. In contrast, Scheduled Tribe members tend to be concentrated geographically and comprise a majority in many. Additionally, tribal identity contributed to the formation of selected Indian states. In 2000, India split the new state of Jharkhand from Bihar—fulfilling demands articulated by the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Jharkhand Liberation Front) for a tribal homeland. Chhattisgarh, created in the same year as Jharkhand, similarly contains a large Scheduled Tribe minority. Scheduled Tribes also form majorities in the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland and large minorities in Manipur, Sikkim, and Tripura.



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The Indian case places the theoretical problems underlying the definition of EREGs in sharp relief. The presence of crosscutting cleavages precludes simple solutions such as summing up the different types of ethnic minorities. Individuals may be members of the majority or the minority depending on the context. 38 Only a relatively small minority of Indians belongs to the dominant religious, linguistic, and caste groups. Hardly unique to India, similar issues arise in studies of Africa, where ­numerous groups are nested within larger groups. Each broad linguistic group may contain many tribes, which in turn may have several clans. Both the cleavage level and the nature of interethnic competition have the potential to shift over time, across different levels of government, and athwart frontiers—perhaps more than elsewhere due to the relative weakness of many African states with boundaries drawn by colonial powers without regard for ethnic geography combined with the presence of many different potential ethnoregional cleavages. 39 Even in countries with less complex divisions, groups may form a regional majority but remain a minority across the country as a whole. Electoral System Constraints as a Solution to the Problem

Daniel Posner argues that scholars wanting to get at the heart of the relationship between ethnicity and political behavior need to focus on current, salient distinctions relevant to the phenomenon being studied in identifying politically relevant ethnic groups. His analysis indicates dangers in relying on previously constructed measures without sufficient consideration of whether the measure captures politicized ethnic cleavages.40 Though reliance on previously constructed indices from outside sources can be particularly appealing in large-sample studies because of the ease in borrowing a measure for all countries, there is no guarantee that it is either a current or politically relevant measure. The CIA World Factbook, for example, classifies religion as India’s primary cleavage, a measure that leads to the erroneous conclusion that India is a comparatively homogenous society dominated by Hindus, belying not just the diversity of the country but its impact on the party system. At the same time, it is critical to avoid the trap of defining the EREGs via the very political outcomes that one wants to use it to predict. Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Posner’s compelling work on the salience of different political ethnic cleavages suggests a way out of this morass. If multiple ethnic cleavages divide a country and serve as alternative vehicles for party formation, the one that enables politicians to create the most successful parties under the electoral system will dominate. While promoters of ethnic parties may contend that ethnic politics is driven by innate and immutable differences, ­K anchan Chandra and Daniel Posner show that different cleavages may be invoked politically depending on the institutional setup.41 Politicians may be driven by ideas and passions just like voters, but the more successful act strategically to gain

52

minority rules

support. Desirous of victory and the spoils of office, strategic politicians opt for the cleavage that provides greater opportunities. In Kenya and Zambia, Daniel Posner found that the switch from single to ­multiparty regimes caused the cleavage to shift from local—tribal or clan—differences within constituencies to regional, linguistic differences that operate across the country. The desire to maintain state patronage motivated the change. Battles over patronage in a one-party state center on local differences as different tribes or clans compete to capture individual parliamentary seats to gain access to patronage. In contrast, competition moves to the national arena in multiparty states, as it is imperative to be part of the national winning coalition to receive a share of the spoils. Tribal or clan differences are too small to form the building blocks of such a coalition, so political elites pursue strategies focused on cleavages that provide the opportunity to construct a party of significant size on a countrywide scale.42 As Daniel Posner notes, arguments about the effect of regime change elide easily into the idea that the electoral system plays a central role influencing the salience of various political cleavages. The potential ability to form a viable ethnoregional party ought to relate to the group’s political or electoral relevance. Only geographically concentrated groups can overcome the barriers to entry in majoritarian systems and merit inclusion as electorally relevant. Though majoritarian systems undermine dispersed ethnic groups, ethnoregional parties with regional bases flourish in Canada, India, and the United Kingdom. Application of this idea to India indicates that language rather than religion or caste is the primary cleavage. Religious and caste minorities tend to be highly dispersed around India. Muslims form a majority in Jammu and Kashmir and Lakshadweep, but most live outside these states, and Muslims form a minority in all but a few parliamentary constituencies. Scheduled Caste members do not comprise a majority in any state or parliamentary constituency. In contrast, state boundaries reflect highly regional linguistic divisions, as India redrew its internal administrative divisions on a linguistic basis. The panoply of Indian languages precludes the choice of a single language group as India’s most salient minority group. Hindi is India’s most prevalent language and the only one, along with ­English, that serves as an official language of the federal government, so ethnic minority groups as defined here consist of different groups of non-Hindi speakers. Consonant with these choices, Muslim parties are very weak. Sikh parties based in Punjab achieve a great deal of success but precisely because Sikhs, who one could also classify as Punjabi speakers, form a strong majority in Punjab. The success of Sikh parties fulfills the expectation generated by the theory rather than contradicts it. Scheduled Caste parties must take on a regional flavor and ally with other groups, as Scheduled Caste members are too few to provide victory to a party in a contest dominated by only two candidates. India’s largest casteoriented party, the BSP, has organized exactly in this fashion with its UP support base and outreach to Other Backward Classes and even members of upper castes.43 Most Indian ethnic parties, however, are organized regionally with



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53

support overwhelmingly from speakers of one language, such as Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, Asom Gana Parishad in Assam, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tami Nadu. The same approach is similarly helpful in identifying the EREGs in Mauritius, home to a veritable kaleidoscope of identities. Analyses of Mauritius usually concentrate on the complex cleavages on the main island related to national origin, race, religion, and language. Indo-Mauritians form the largest group followed by Creoles, Sino-Mauritians, and Franco-Mauritians. Religious divisions between Hindus and Muslims divide the Indian community, and language also splits each of these groups. Though different groups compose a greater share of the population in parts of Mauritius than others, no major area on the island of Mauritius comes close to ethnic homogeneity and no region belongs to one group. In contrast, the smaller island of Rodrigues is a distinct region where, unlike the main island, Creoles form most of the population. Rodrigues also possesses its own regional assembly guaranteed by the constitution. Though Rodriguans are not the largest ethnoregional minority group in the country as a whole, they are the electorally relevant ethnic minority group because Rodriguans are the only minority clearly delineated on a regional basis, providing parties centered in Rodrigues with a distinct electoral advantage over ethnic parties organized by other groups. As predicted by the theory, regional parties dominate Rodriguan politics, ­w inning virtually all the votes and seats. But ethnic parties remain surprisingly weak on Mauritius despite the multiplicity of ethnic divisions, gaining an average of just 3.7 percent of the vote in the five elections held from 1990 through 2010. The electoral system in combination with the island’s complex ethnic geography forces parties based in different groups to come together in alliances or risk being outflanked by another party that seizes the opportunity. The Importance of Regional Boundaries

Strict adherence to a focus on incentives within electoral districts suggests that majorities, or at least strong pluralities, within individual constituencies ought to suffice to overcome barriers to entry. After all, constituency majorities should, at least in theory, allow groups to win legislative mandates. For several reasons, nonetheless, the incentives to ethnoregional party formation should be far stronger when a group comprises a regional majority rather than merely a majority in several constituencies but still forms only a regional minority. When a group composes a majority in only a few constituencies, its potential to win seats is usually more fragile than when it forms a regional majority. A regional majority group often forms very strong majorities in at least some constituencies due to variations in the level of group concentration. These large majorities make it easier for an ethnoregional party to gain seats, as victory requires lower levels of cohesion than when the group possesses only a narrow majority. Moreover, regional majority groups are far more likely to benefit from the nature of

54

minority rules

winner-take-all systems to award a disproportionate share of seats to the winner. On the other hand, groups that have majorities in only a few constituencies tend to have thinner local majorities than regional majority groups, necessitating greater cohesion for ethnoregional party success. In the United States, for example, African Americans make up less than 60 percent of voters in most AfricanAmerican majority districts. Very high rates of cohesion would be required for an African-American party to succeed, rendering its absence unsurprising despite the continuing salience of race in American politics. Furthermore, reduced governmental incentives should make this higher level of cohesion harder to achieve. Ethnoregional parties based in regional majority groups have the potential to win majorities and to capture power at the regional level. Even if the regional governmental tier remains weaker than in highly decentralized, federal countries, it equips political leaders with offices and status and still offers a modicum of power. Ethnoregional parties backed by a regional majority group may also possess a bloc of seats in the country’s legislature, offering a chance for power and influence in the country as a whole. But parties lacking a regional majority base cannot win control of regional governments. Nor are they likely to elect enough members of parliament to possess much heft in the country’s legislature. These differences are critical in countries where some ethnic minority group members live in regions in which the group forms a majority but others do not. If most group members live outside the region where they are a majority, the incentives to form an ethnic party decline, as it wastes too much group strength. The portion of the group living in the core region can alternatively attempt to redefine itself to include only those who live in the region. Moreover, group members who live outside the territory dominated by the group often have profoundly opposed political interests from coethnics inside the territory even if they comprise majorities in some constituencies. Inside the region, group members, who possess a local majority, can take steps to protect or to assert the group’s identity. But these same measures may be taken as justification for symmetrical actions antithetical to the interests of coethnics who live outside the region. Indeed, as local minorities, the interests of members of the country’s majority group living with the ethnic minority-run region parallel those of ethnic minority group members living outside of it in territory dominated by the country’s majority group. Both will share a negative view of measures designed the advance the local majority. Canada illustrates the importance of regional boundaries in practice. The specification of Francophones as Canada’s largest minority group is tempting but fits neither political reality nor the expectations created by Canada’s institutions. Francophones in Quebec organized the PQ to promote and protect the use of French in the province, advance their socioeconomic status, and promote Quebec independence. These projects offer little not just to non-Francophones in Quebec but to Francophones outside of Quebec. Efforts to guard French in Quebec left Francophones outside the province vulnerable to a backlash against



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55

these measures and to parallel efforts to assert the dominance of English. Indeed, PQ   governments never fight against measures perceived as anti-French outside of Quebec because they do not want to limit their right to impose similar measures in Quebec. If Quebec seceded from Canada, Francophones outside the new country would become a small, highly vulnerable minority. Existing Canadian support and protections for French might disappear. Assertions by Quebec nationalists that Francophones outside of Quebec are a disappearing minority hardly seem likely to assuage the sensibilities of Francophones living in other provinces. The results from Canadian National Election Study surveys from Canadian federal elections held from 1988 through 2011 displayed in Table 2.5 confirm that Francophone inhabitants of Quebec view politics in radically different terms than Francophones elsewhere in Canada. In every federal election from 1993 through 2008, roughly one-half or more Francophone Quebecers voted for the separatist BQ. Much smaller shares of non-Francophone Quebecers voted BQ with overwhelming majorities preferring federalist parties. The federal Liberals have long positioned themselves as the guardian of minority-language rights, and nonFrancophone Quebecers rewarded them with a disproportionate share of votes. Canadian National Election Study surveys indicate that between one-half and three-quarters of non-Francophone Quebec voters cast ballots for the Liberals until 2011. In contrast, only one-sixth to one-quarter of Francophone Quebecers

Table 2.5  Voting Behavior in Canada by Language Panel A. Quebec Liberal

Progressive Conservatives

New Democrats

Reform Then Conservative

Other

Bloc Québécois

Francophones

1988

22

60

14

4

1993

24

12

1

3

60

1997

25

22

3

1

48

2000

33

 5

2

 8

4

48

2004

23

4

 8

5

61

2006

10

9

25

8

48

2008

16

10

20

4

51

2011

10

46

17

1

26

Non-Francophones

1988

50

1993

missing data

40

8

1 continued

56

minority rules

Table 2.5  (continued) Panel A. Quebec Liberal

Progressive Conservatives

New Democrats

1997

74

14

3

2000

70

1

8

2004

64

2006

Reform Then Conservative

Other

Bloc Québécois

3

 7

 6

1

15

6

14

8

 7

43

7

23

19

 7

2008

52

20

13

2

14

2011

21

41

27

2

 9

Progressive Conservatives

New Democrats

Reform Then Conservative

Other

Panel B. Rest of Canada Liberal Francophones

1988

52

32

16

1

1993

76

8

9

 7

1

1997

61

12

13

13

2

2000

57

8

15

20

0

2004

60

9

26

5

2006

50

21

29

0

2008

44

22

25

9

2011

35

26

35

3

Non-Francophones

1988

28

45

22

 3

3

1993

45

15

8

27

4

1997

37

17

13

31

2

2000

40

13

12

34

2

2004

35

21

38

6

2006

29

20

46

5

2008

25

21

45

9

2011

20

28

48

4

Notes: Language is determined by answers to the question about which language the respondent “first learned and still understands.” Non-Francophones include speakers of English, Canada’s other official language, as well as all languages besides French. Source: Canadian Election Studies.



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voted Liberal during this period. Even in 2011, when support for the BQ and the Liberals collapsed and support for the New Democrats increased dramatically across the language divide, one-quarter of Francophones voted for the BQ and many more non-Francophones than Francophones voted Liberal or Conservative. Strikingly, the voting behavior of Francophones outside of Quebec resembled much more closely that of non-Francophone than Francophone Quebecers. Just like their language-minority counterparts in Quebec, Francophones who live in other provinces gave noticeably higher levels of support to the Liberals than nonFrancophones. Of course, voters who live outside Quebec cannot vote for the BQ as it does not run candidates elsewhere. The inescapable conclusion is that it would be erroneous to regard Francophones inside and outside Quebec as a single political group. Provincial boundaries promote and sustain highly meaningful political differences among Francophones. At the same time, it seems unwise to select Quebecers as the ethnoregional minority group due to linguistic divisions within the province. Additionally, non-Francophones do not provide a promising support base for a separate party oriented toward non-Francophones. While somewhat regionally concentrated on the western portion of the island of Montreal and certain other areas of the province, non-Francophones dominate relatively few Quebec parliamentary seats. In many constituencies with a significant non-Francophone presence, non-­Francophones require Francophone allies for their preferred candidate to win election, suggesting that an emphasis on linguistic divisions would be poor strategy. At the provincial level, Anglophones organized the Equality Party, which won 3.7 percent of the vote and 3.2 percent of seats in 1989 before falling off the electoral map in 1994. No parallel effort was made at the federal level in recent decades perhaps due to the failure of the provincial Equality Party in addition to an even smaller chance of playing a meaningful role in the federal parliament. Consequently, Francophone Quebecers are the appropriate electorally relevant ethnoregional minority group to classify for Canada, as they are the largest group likely to form an ethnoregional party. Empirical Verification

Together, electoral and governmental incentives combined with the impact of regional boundaries suggest that a theory for defining electorally relevant groups requires going beyond merely whether a group forms a majority in any constituency. One must also consider a group’s regional weight to develop a viable theory based in the broader impact of electoral systems and other institutions on strategic incentives. Regional majority groups should have greater potential to form successful ethnoregional parties than regional minority groups. Empirical analysis buttresses this conclusion; for each country in the database with a majoritarian electoral system, Table 2.6 identifies ethnoregional groups that form a majority in at least one constituency. The table further breaks countries

58

minority rules

Table 2.6  E  thnoregional Minority Groups That Form Regional or Constituency Majorities Country

Regional Majority

Antigua and Barbuda

Barbudans

Bahamas

Constituency Majority Whites (≈0–2)

Belize

Creoles in Belize District

Botswana

Kalanga in North-East

Canada

Francophones in Quebec, Inukitut in Nunavut

Dominica

Garifuna (1), Maya Ketchi (1) Francophones in New Brunswick (4) and Ontario (1) Caribs (1)

Ghana

Mole-Dagbon in Northern, Upper East and Upper West

Ewe (≈18)

India

Bengali in West Bengal and Tripura, Marathi in Maharashtra, Telugu in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, Gujarati in Gujarat and Daman and Diu, Kannada in Karnataka, Malayalam in Kerala and Lakshadweep, Odia in Odisha, Punjabi in Punjab, Kashmiri in Kashmir, Manipuri in Manipur, Lushai/Mizo in Mizoram

Telangana in Andhra Pradesh, Bodos in Assam, others

Mauritius

Rodriguans

Mongolia

Kazakhs in Bayan Olgii

New Zealand

Māori (4)

St. Kitts and Nevis

Nevisians

United Kingdom

Scots and Welsh

United States

Blacks (22), Latinos (21), Asians (1)

Notes: The Regional Majority column includes only groups in which a majority of group members live in regions where they form a majority. The only group in the table that comprises a regional majority but a majority of group members live outside such regions is the Ewe in Ghana, included in the Constituency Majority column.



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and groups into two categories: Regional Majority and Constituency Majority. Regional Majority includes groups with a majority of group members living in regions where the group forms a majority. Constituency Majority includes groups that form majorities in constituencies but not regions or form regional majorities but a majority of group members do not inhabit regions where the group forms a majority. Almost all Regional Majority groups have formed seat-winning ethnoregional parties, including in Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Canada, India, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the United Kingdom. The three exceptions are Kazakhs in Mongolia, speakers of Inukitut—an Inuit language—in Canada, and Creoles in Belize. Speakers of Inukitut in Canada and Kazakh in Mongolia are both relatively small groups. Inukitut speakers are dispersed across the Arctic and form a majority only in the territory of Nunavut’s sole constituency. In Nunavut, home to just 64 percent of all Inukitut speakers, 70 percent speak the language. Most of Bayan Olgii’s population in Mongolia is Kazakh—82 percent in 2000—and most Kazakh Mongolians live in Bayan Olgii—nearly 80 percent.44 Bayan Olgii’s population, often nomadic, is scattered across this very large, arid, mountainous region, making political organization difficult as in Nunavut. Many Kazakh Mongolians emigrated to Kazakhstan or maintain close family ties with people in that country since it gained independence. The region, moreover, sent just three, or under 4 percent, of all ­representatives to parliament. Belizean Creoles would seemingly be comparatively advantageously situated if they wanted to form an ethnic party, as they comprised majorities in Belize District and 11 of 29 electoral districts in 2000. But only 64 percent of Belizean Creoles lived in Belize District, where they comprised 59 percent of the population. Among the 11 districts with Creole majorities, Creoles averaged just 57 percent of the population. Belizean Creoles would find it much more difficult and less advantageous than appears at first glance. As expected, ethnoregional parties exist much more infrequently when the group is a majority in electoral constituencies but not a region. Seat-winning ethnoregional parties have not formed among Constituency Majority groups in the Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Ghana, New Zealand,45 or the United States. Most tellingly, Ewes in Ghana have not formed an ethnoregional party, though they comprise the bulk of Volta Region’s population. A slight majority of Ewes live outside Volta, so an Ewe party based there would leave many coethnics politically disadvantaged. The National Democratic Congress, the victor in the 2008 and 2012 elections, gains the lion’s share of Ewe support. Despite its strong Ewe base, the National Democratic Congress is a multiethnic party, nominating non-Ewe candidates for president and receiving substantial support from non-Ewes. India forms the glaring exception to the rule, as ethnoregional groups that ­dominate none of India’s states have formed parties. In Assam, Bodos concentrated primarily in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District, organized the Bodo­ land People’s Front, which gained a Lok Sabha seat in 2009. Similarly, Telangana

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minority rules

Rashtra Samithi has held Lok Sabha seats since 2004. Its main aim—achieved in 2014—has been statehood for Telangana, previously part of ­Hyderabad State and joined to Andhra Pradesh in 1956. The need for India’s two major parties, the INC and the BJP, to bargain with regional parties to gain votes in both elections and the Lok Sabha may help spur regional party creation. The sheer size of Indian states, more populous than most countries, may also lend itself toward the expression of regionally based cleavages even when a group does not form a regional majority. Empirical analysis of cases validates the linkage between Regional Majority status and the emergence of ethnoregional parties in countries with majoritarian systems. Ethnoregional parties exist frequently in Regional Majority countries but only in India among Constituency Majority countries. The linkage may not be perfect, but very few social science theories predict outcomes without error. The definition of electorally relevant groups for countries with majoritarian systems thus includes regional majority groups with two caveats. First, Regional Majority groups are not deemed electorally relevant if a majority of group members live outside the regions where the group is a majority. Second, electorally relevant groups include only group members who live in regions where the group is a majority and exclude group member who inhabit other regions. The selection of minority groups in most countries other than India and ­Mauritius with majoritarian systems was comparatively straightforward due to the existence of fewer or more obvious cleavages. As for India and Mauritius, regional minorities were preferred over non-regional minorities. To take one example, Barbuda—a smaller island with its own legislature—was selected as the main minority in Antigua and Barbuda instead of whites. Table 2.7 displays the percentage of EREGs (pEREG) for each of the 24 countries with a majoritarian electoral system. It also presents a fractionalization measure based on the EREG as indicated by the electoral system (EREGfr). Like other fractionalization measures, EREGfr equals the sum of the squared proportion of each group in the population subtracted from one and provides a gauge of ethnoregional diversity. The correlation between pEREG and EREGfr is extremely high—above .99. Neither pEREG nor EREGfr include all minority groups, as not all are electorally relevant. pEREG is less than the total minority percentage, listed in the third column, when some or all of a country’s minority groups are not incentivized by the electoral system. Just because pEREG equals zero for a country does not mean that it has no minorities but that the country lacks any regionally concentrated minority liable to attain political relevance in the party system. Few would argue that the United States contains several minority groups, such as African Americans and Latinos, but they are not listed in the table because they are not regionally concentrated. More broadly, the inclusion of some minority groups but not others in pEREG or EREGfr reflects their political potential to support a viable ethnoregional party rather than their existence.



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Table 2.7  E  lectorally Relevant Ethnoregional Groups in Countries with Majoritarian Electoral Systems Country and Electoral System

Ethnoregional Group Measures Group or Region Name % pEREG EREGfr

Decentralized Federal or Autonomous Regions

Antigua and Barbuda Barbuda, Whites

4

2

0.041

No

Australia

Aboriginals

2

0

0.000

Yes: Federal

Bahamas

Whites

12

0

0.000

No

Barbados

Whites

4

0

0.000

No

Belize

Creoles, Garifuna, Mayans

42

16

0.269

No

Botswana

North East Kalanga

11

6

0.120

No

Canada

Quebec Francophones 19

19

0.313

Yes: Federal

Dominica

Caribs

3

0

0.000

No

France

Muslims

8

0

0.000

No

Ghana

Northern, Upper East, Upper West MoleDagbon

16

11

0.200

No

Grenada

Mixed race

13

0

0.000

No

India

Non-Hindi speakers

56

42

0.637

Yes: Federal

Jamaica

Mixed race or Whites

8

0

0.000

No

Lesotho 1 and 2 (1993–1998)

None

0

0

0.000

No

Mauritius

Rodriguans

3

3

0.058

No

Monaco 1 (1993– 1998)

None

0

0

0.000

No

Mongolia 1 (1992) and 3 (2008)

Bayan Olgii Kazakhs

7

3

0.066

No

New Zealand 1 (1990–1993)

Māori

10

0

0.000

No

St. Kitts and Nevis

Nevis

26

26

0.387

Yes: Nevis

St. Lucia

Mixed race

6

0

0.000

No

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Mixed race

19

0

0.000

No continued

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Table 2.7  (continued) Country and Electoral System

Ethnoregional Group Measures Group or Region Name % pEREG EREGfr

Decentralized Federal or Autonomous Regions

Samoa

Euronesians

7

0

0.000

No

United Kingdom 1 (1992–1997)

Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland

9

16

0.291

No

United Kingdom 2 (2001–)

Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland

9

16

0.291

Yes: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland

United States

Non-Hispanic Blacks

12

0

0.000

Yes: Federal

Notes: pEREG = percentage of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. See text for discussion of the definition of electorally relevant group or region. Barbuda in Antigua and Barbuda and Rodrigues in Mauritius both possess regional assemblies with more limited powers than in countries categorized as decentralized here, as the country’s parliament retains ultimate control.

In some cases, muddy ethnic group boundaries render ethnic group size cloudy, particularly for regionally oriented groups. In Scotland, one could just count people who identify as Scots or speakers of Scottish Gaelic. But ­self-identification in surveys is not clearly independent of support for a Scottish ethnic party as ­support could drive identification with the region. Speakers of Scottish Gaelic form a tiny minority, and identification with Scotland extends well beyond the few areas where Gaelic is still widely spoken. The boundary and size of Scottish people consequently remains hazy. As a result, it seemed best to select Scotland as a whole rather than one of these competing measures, as the region comprises the maximum sphere of potential support for a Scottish party.

Modeling Ethnoregional Party Performance Before presenting simple multivariate models of the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties in countries with majoritarian electoral systems, this section compares the predictive power of EREGfr and pEREG to previous measures of ethnic fractionalization and the share of minorities. Bivariate Models

Table 2.8 presents the coefficients, standard errors, and Wald chi-squared tests from cross-sectional time-series generalized least squares regression models with clustered standard errors of votes won by ethnoregional parties. Each model



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63

utilizes a different fractionalization or percentage measure as the sole independent variable. Besides EREGfr, the table shows the results from models with eight other fractionalization measures. Phillip Roeder replicated and updated the original measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)—listed as Roeder’s ELF in the table. He further developed a measure—Roeder’s ELF with Grouped Races—that ignores racial differences; it treats blacks and whites in the United States as a single group.46 Alberto Alesina and his colleagues developed alternative measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization.47 Phillip Fearon calculated measures of cultural fractionalization as well as his own version of ELF. The final fractionalization measure included in the table is Fearon’s ELF with the values for African countries replaced with Daniel Posner’s PREG scores.48 In addition to pEREG, the table presents models with two percentage measures taken from the CIA Factbook: the total minority share of the population and the size of the largest minority group.49

Table 2.8  C  ross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries with Majoritarian Electoral Systems Using Various Measures of Fractionalization and the Percentage Minority Coefficient

Standard Error

Wald chi2

EREGfr

36.50

3.11

138.11

Roeder’s ELF

13.41

1.69

63.08

Roeder’s ELF with Grouped Races

13.33

2.42

30.33

Alesina Ethnic

12.55

1.88

44.73

Alesina Linguistic

15.13

1.74

75.81

Alesina Religious

–5.08

4.38

1.35

Fearon Cultural

13.53

3.54

14.63

Fearon ELF

15.14

1.25

147.42

Fearon ELF and Posner PREG

14.06

1.97

51.04

pEREG

0.63

0.04

244.86

CIA Factbook All Minorities

0.22

0.03

48.07

CIA Factbook Largest Minority

0.27

0.02

119.92

Fractionalization Measures

Percentage Measures

Notes: PREG = politically relevant ethnoregional groups. ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionali­ zation. EREG = electorally relevant ethnoregional groups.

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minority rules

Models utilizing EREGfr and pEREG outperform comparable alternatives. The coefficients on each are much higher than of the alternatives, indicating a substantively stronger relationship to votes won by ethnoregional parties. The coefficient on pEREG indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the EREG populations share results in 6.3 percent increase in the share of the vote won by ethnoregional parties. The Wald chi-squared tests reveal that EREGfr and pEREG fit the data substantially than other measures with the exception of Fearon’s ELF. The strong relationship between EREGfr, pEREG, and the ethnoregional party vote share suggests that past findings that majoritarian electoral systems inhibit the formation of ethnoregional parties are incorrect. Past results may stem from the bundling together of regionally concentrated and dispersed groups into the same variable. Majoritarian electoral systems do not discriminate against all ethnic groups, only dispersed ones. Additionally, the presence in some countries of both regionally concentrated and dispersed groups, sometimes overlapping as in India and Mauritius, makes it impossible to control for the impact of regional concentration with an interaction term between the share of all ethnoregional minority groups and regional concentration. Instead, EREGfr and pEREG rely on logical, theoretically driven decisions that take into account the constraints placed by the electoral system and regional concentration on groups likely to form ethnoregional parties. Multivariate Models

Table 2.9 presents coefficients and standard errors for multivariate crosssectional time-series generalized least squares regression models with clustered standard errors of the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties in countries and regions. There are three sets of country-level models. Models 1 and 5 include only the pEREG as an independent variable. Models 2 and 6 add controls for decentralized countries and the year. Countries are defined as decentralized if regional governments have constitutionally entrenched independent ­decision-making authority, as in similar definitions of federal polities. 50 Countries are also counted as decentralized if any region scores 15.0 or higher on the Regional Authority Index discussed in more depth in Part III, as all but one country with constitutionally protected autonomy have regions with scores of 15.0 or higher. 51 Country fixed effects (i.e., controls for each country) were tested with statistically significant (at p < .10) controls added to Models 3 and 7. Other factors are excluded for now; I explore many in later chapters. Models 4 and 8 are the same as Models 2 and 6 except the data are analyzed at the regional instead of country level of aggregation. Most countries with majoritarian electoral systems delimit constituencies within designated subnational units, such as provinces in Canada, regions in Ghana, and states in India; I use these units to define regions here. 52 Electoral system effects should operate at the

Table 2.9  C  ross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries and Regions with Majoritarian Electoral Systems, 1990–2012 Votes for Ethnoregional Parties (%) Country pEREG

Region

Country

Region

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.63***

0.64***

0.68***

0.37***

0.76***

0.60***

0.73***

0.42***

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(–0.02)

(0.13)

(0.06)

(0.08)

(–0.03)

0.85*

–0.01

1.19***

0.90

0.06

0.27

(0.43)

(0.45)

(–0.32)

(0.48)

(0.12)

(0.34)

–0.00

0.01**

0.01**

–0.01

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Decentralized Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 22) Fixed Effects Included Constant

Seats for Ethnoregional Parties (%)

^

X

X

0.13

–0.17

–0.05

0.05

–3.55

–0.72*

–0.01

–0.02

(0.15)

(0.38)

(0.06)

(–0.03)

(2.49)

(0.34)

(0.04)

(0.04)

Observations

121

121

121

1,490

121

121

121

1,490

Panels

24

24

24

220

24

24

24

220

Wald chi-squared

244.86

277.98

1,427.01

331.62

33.70

94.20

1,042.95

184.66

^

Notes: pEREG = percentage of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. Fixed effects for Belize, Canada, Ghana, Mauritius, Mongolia, and the United Kingdom are included in Models 3 and 6. The coefficient on pEREG remains statistically significant at p < 0.001 if the models in columns 4 and 8 contain country fixed effects. *** p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. ^ p < 0.10.

66

minority rules

regional level according to the theory, so modeling both regional and country levels of aggregation should provide a stronger test of its validity. The inclusion of country fixed effects does not alter the impact of pEREG in the analysis, and those results are not shown in the table. The relationship between pEREG and the share of votes or seats won by ­ethnoregional parties remains relatively steady across all country-level models. The share of votes or seats won by ethnoregional parties rises by at least 0.6 percent for each 1 percent increase in the pEREG. In the regional models, the impact of a 1 percent rise in pEREG drops to around 0.4, likely because difficulties with the measurement of group size, particularly for groups with indistinct boundaries, have a greater impact on the estimation of pEREG for regions than for countries. Changing the estimated Scottish share of Scotland’s population from 50 to 100 percent, for example, has an enormous effect on pEREG for Scotland but increases pEREG for the United Kingdom as a whole from just 12 to 16 percent. The inclusion of all potential group members for regions like Scotland, so that pEREG equals 100 percent, drives down its coefficient in the regional-level models. The overall conclusion nonetheless remains the same. The presence of regionally concentrated ethnic groups strongly predicts ethnoregional party success even after the introduction of controls. Though single parties often win legislative majorities in countries with majoritarian systems, it does not discourage ethnoregional parties with regional bases of support from contesting elections and winning representation in the legislature. Majoritarian systems do not suppress the emergence of additional regionally based parties. On the contrary, regionally concentrated ethnic minorities in countries with majoritarian systems may do just as well as their counterparts in countries with proportional systems. They can gain seat bonuses when they do well, like the BQ in Canada, and further benefit from the tendency of majoritarian systems to discourage weaker parties with dispersed support bases. At the same time, the smaller number of players reduces the competition to fill niches in the political market that could rob them of their supporters. Scholars and practitioners fiercely debate the impact of decentralization on ethnoregional parties, which suggests that it is important to examine its effects. During the debate over the creation of the Scottish and Welsh parliaments, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that devolution would tamp down regional nationalisms, while SNP leader Alex Salmond claimed that it would strengthen his party’s quest for Scottish independence. 53 Dawn Brancati’s study concludes that decentralization plays a central role in stimulating the ethnoregional party growth, as strong regional governments incentivize politicians to create ethnoregional parties to gain power at the regional level. She further contends that the power of some regional governments to appoint members of the upper house in national legislatures—and extend their influence—lends politicians further motivation to support such parties. 54



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The depth and type of decentralization can differ across countries, and regions within countries, such that its overall impact varies. Moreover, ethnoregional parties may promote decentralization so the relationship between it and ethnoregional party success may be reversed or endogenous. As decentralization takes a spatial format, it may serve as proxy for regional concentration, especially to the extent that decentralization occurs because of pressure from a regionally concentrated minority. These factors will be examined in far greater detail in Part III. Six of the 24 countries with majoritarian electoral systems are ­decentralized (see Table 2.6), including the federal countries of Australia, Canada, India, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the United States. St. Kitts and Nevis has a highly asymmetric arrangement, as Nevis possesses an autonomous assembly but the federal parliament governs St. Kitts. The United Kingdom is also coded as decentralized since the 2001 election because of asymmetric devolution to regional parliaments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. All but two of six decentralized countries possess regionally concentrated salient minority groups or regions—­ Australia and the United States. The multivariate models do not firmly support the conclusion that decentralization leads to more votes and seats for ethnoregional parties in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. In the country models without fixed effects, decentralization has a quite modest impact—around 0.9 percent—on votes and seats; even this effect disappears if one controls for fixed effects. Decentralization has no statistically significant impact on seats won in the regional-level model but increases votes gained by 1.2 percent. Part III examines decentralization in more detail and attempts to untangle the complex relationship between decentralization and ethnoregional parties.

Conclusion Ethnoregional parties with regionally concentrated support thrive under majoritarian electoral systems. These same systems undercut ethnoregional parties with spatially dispersed support. Identification of regionally concentrated minority groups remains crucial to accurate definition of EREG and to the analysis of the link between group size and ethnoregional party support. The presence of dispersed minorities makes it possible to underestimate the connection. This chapter demonstrates the error of reports that majoritarian electoral systems are inherently inimical to ethnoregional parties. The next chapter explores the question of whether proportional electoral systems deserve their reputation as facilitators of ethnoregional parties.

3

Proportional Electoral Systems

The previous chapter showed that ethnoregional minority parties with ­regionally concentrated support flourish in countries with majoritarian systems despite their reputation for impeding small party success. Proportional electoral systems are perceived as more open. Is this reputation more deserved than the negative stereotype of majoritarian systems? Studies on proportional representation’s (PR) impact on ethnoregional parties conflict. Dawn Brancati finds that ethnoregional parties perform better in ­majoritarian elections.1 In contrast, William Clark and Matt Golder, as well as Jorge Gordin, conclude that more permissive electoral systems allow greater expression of ethnic cleavages.2 Benjamin Reilly reports that the international community prefers PR in transitional democratic elections for this reason. 3 In her study of Latin American politics, Donna Lee Van Cott sees no benefit to ­indigenous ­parties from PR as compared to majoritarian systems. Nonetheless, her study also finds that, among countries with PR, indigenous parties fare better with low thresholds to win seats, as does another study she coauthored with ­Roberta Rice. But Van Cott’s work with Jóhanna Kristín Birnir along with a separate study by Birnir disagrees.4 Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary Cox confirm that increasing constituency magnitude, and thus reducing the threshold, strengthens the importance of ethnic cleavages. 5 Examination of PR systems reveals that their permissiveness and, indeed, their proportionality varies according to three factors. First, smaller parties find it easier to win seats as constituency magnitude—the number of seats in an ­electoral ­d istrict—increases. The more mandates available for distribution, the fewer votes required for a small party to gain one and the more proportional the overall outcome. Second, even if parties overcome the vote threshold needed to win seats as determined by constituency magnitude, it may still need to surpass a minimum vote threshold prescribed by law to qualify for seats. Naturally, countries often adopt legal thresholds precisely when it would otherwise be easy for small parties to qualify for seats. Third, as discussed in much greater detail in Part  II, countries can adopt laws designed to ease or to impede the electoral ­success of ethnoregional parties through rules unrelated to the threshold. Laws 68



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69

that r­ equire parties to gather a certain number of signatures or votes across many different ­regions can have just as negative an effect on ethnoregional parties as flat-out bans. Other countries make it easier for ethnic parties to overcome electoral barriers to enhance minority representation in their legislatures. The geographic distribution of a group further influences its potential to carry an ethnoregional party into office. In addition to any legal threshold, ethnic and regional minorities must overcome not the general thresholds dictated by ­constituency magnitudes for the country as a whole but the key electoral constituencies that contain the minority population. The interaction between the group geography and the electoral system thus plays a crucial role in determining the chances of an ethnoregional party. Accordingly, one must examine this interaction on a case-by-case basis to identify electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in ­countries with PR. A fine-grained study of the location of most ethnoregional minority groups reveals that the size of many linguistic minorities exceeds the electoral threshold. Moreover, ethnoregional parties exist in most countries with linguistic minorities able to overcome the threshold. In countries with other divisions, like race and religion, ethnoregional parties form more often when these differences are closely linked with language.6 This chapter begins with a brief exploration of different types of PR systems. It  then turns to a more detailed examination of why constituency magnitudes and  legal thresholds ease or hinder the entry of ethnoregional parties into the ­legislature and argues for defining electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in terms of their potential to overcome the threshold of exclusion. After testing this definition against alternatives, the chapter turns to models that explore the relationship of the share of electorally relevant groups to the proportion of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties as well as the impact of other factors, such as decentralization and simultaneous presidential elections, on ethnoregional party success.

Types of Proportional Electoral Systems Though there are numerous types, most PR systems fall into one of several basic categories. Countries utilize a limited number of mathematical formulas to ­a llocate seats. While many countries distribute seats in a single tier of constituencies, or even a single national constituency, others allot seats at multiple levels. Multiple tier systems differ according to the nature of the upper tier, as the higher level of allocation can be done independently of the lower tier or take into ­account lower tier results to produce a more nationally proportional result. Systems also differ in terms of the ability to indicate preferences for specific candidates. Though many countries have closed party lists, others allow or require

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minority rules

voters to mark ­preferences within a single party list. Still others permit voters to cast ballots for candidates across party lists. Electors can rank candidates in manner similar to the alternative vote under the single-transferable vote system.

Formulas The methods for allocating seats proportionally in multimember constituencies fall into two distinct categories: largest remainder and highest quotient systems. The calculation of quotas is central to each. In largest remainder systems, one first calculates a quota, typically by dividing the number of valid votes cast by either (i) the number of seats or (ii) the number of seats plus one. The former produces the Hare quota while the latter results in the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota.7 ­Regardless of quota type, all largest remainder systems award seats initially based on the number of full multiples of the quota won by each party. Any seats not yet distributed are given to parties with the largest remainder of unused votes—the number of votes not going toward full multiples of the quota. The Hare quota is the most favorable to small parties. The largest quota, it makes it more difficult for parties to win their last seat, leaving more seats for distribution by largest remainder, which advantages small parties.8 Namibia uses the largest remainder system with a Hare quota in a single national constituency; Costa Rica and El Salvador do the same in multiple constituencies. Slovakia currently allocates parliamentary seats by the Hagenbach-Bischoff largest remainder system. In contrast, highest quotient systems apply a series of divisors to calculate quotas with three series being the most common. D’Hondt utilizes positive ­integers: 1, 2, 3, 4 and so on;9 Sainte-Laguë uses odd, positive integers: 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on. Modified Sainte-Laguë has the same divisors as Sainte-Laguë except that the first divisor is 1.4 instead of 1. Regardless of the system, the first step is to calculate a quota for each party by dividing the votes for each party by the first number in the series. The first seat goes to the party with the highest quota, which then receives a new quota calculated by dividing its vote total by the next divisor in the series. The process repeats until all the seats have been awarded. SainteLaguë is the most fair to all parties regardless of size while d’Hondt is biased in favor of larger parties; Modified Sainte-Laguë falls in-between.10 Except for single-member plurality, d’Hondt applied in multiple constituencies is more commonly used than any other electoral system among countries included in this study, including Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Israel, ­Lichtenstein, ­Luxembourg, Peru, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Spain, ­Suriname, and ­Switzerland. Additionally, Bulgaria and the Netherlands allot seats by the d’Hondt system in a single national constituency, as did San Marino until recently. Latvia and Poland allocate seats in multiple constituencies by Sainte-Laguë and Modified Sainte-Laguë, respectively.



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Tiers Mandates can be distributed within a single level of constituencies, but many countries have a second, national allocation level.11 Countries can allocate seats in each tier independently, like El Salvador and Poland did until recently, though none do now. In many countries, the higher tier produces a more proportionate allocation. These countries calculate the seats deserved by each party based on their countrywide vote and then award parties top-tier seats in addition to seats won at the lower tier to get the party up to this total. Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden all currently utilize versions of this system. Germany and New Zealand employ different a version of this system, usually called mixed-member proportional, in which voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single-member district and one for a party list. Single-member plurality determines results in the single-member district, but the list vote controls the overall allocation of mandates with list seats distributed as top-up seats to correct for distortions caused by the single-member district results. Despite the use of a majoritarian electoral system in the single-member district, the system belongs firmly in the proportional camp as the list vote controls the overall seat allocation.12 Some multitier countries use a variation on largest remainder systems. Parties win seats in each lower tier constituency based on the number of full multiples of the quota for a single seat. Any unused votes are pooled across constituencies at the national level with any seats left to be allocated distributed to parties a­ ccording to these votes by the largest remainder or highest quotient systems. Only Cyprus and Romania utilize these systems among countries studied here.

Preferences All of the majoritarian electoral systems used by countries included in this study  involve candidate choice. In proportional electoral systems, voters often have a choice among parties but only limited or no influence over the candidates elected from the party. In countries with closed-party lists, such as Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Israel, Namibia, and Spain, candidates enter parliament strictly in the order on the party list. If a party wins, say, seven seats, the first seven candidates on the list become members of parliament. Voters have no power to alter the list to aid lower-ranked candidates. Some countries allow voters to express preferences for candidates on party lists but make it extremely difficult for preferences to alter the list order. Countries with truly open lists give voters the power to ­influence and sometimes to completely change the order of the lists. In Brazil and the Netherlands, preference votes completely determine list order. Switzerland,

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minority rules

Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein not only allow candidates to vote for as many candidates as there are seats but permits voters to cast ballots for candidates in different ­parties with each vote counted for the party and the candidate in a system known as panachage. Proportional systems that give voters wide leeway to shape list order weaken ties between candidates of the same party because they must jockey against one another for spots high on the list. The single-transferable vote weakens the link between voters and parties that is the norm in PR systems even further. As with the alternative vote, voters rank candidates according to their preference. The first-preference votes are summed, and any candidate who surpasses the quota wins elections. Surplus votes beyond the quota needed for election are redistributed to other candidates proportionately according to the second preference of the voters. If no other candidate passes the quota at this point, candidates with few votes are eliminated with their votes ­redistributed according to the next preference indicated on the ballot. The ­process continues until all seats are filled. Voters do not have to give their second preferences to candidates from the same party, so votes from a candidate of one party may end up transferred to another party’s candidate. Regardless of the rate of ­interparty transfers, the single-transferable vote encourages intraparty ­competition, as each candidate wants to be ranked higher to maximize their chances. Only Ireland and Malta now use this system; Malta’s system contains a provision that a party with a majority of first-preference votes receives extra seats to give it a parliamentary majority if it does not win them through the singletransferable vote.13

Thresholds and Ethnoregional Party Opportunity The mechanics of an electoral system do not determine potential support for an ethnic or regional party. The electoral system, however, constrains whether an ethnoregional party has much chance of electoral success through rules that govern the share of the vote needed to gain seats. An ethnic or regional grouping smaller than the proportion of votes required to win seats cannot hope to form a seat-winning party. Even though they do not influence the underlying issues that might motivate ethnoregional party formation, electoral rules may nonetheless shape the desire of strategic elites to accent ethnoregional cleavages. Parties that lose elections do not serve as useful vehicles for aspiring politicians. Even if voters prefer an ethnoregional party, they may also prove reluctant to support them, especially if they have preferences among parties likely to win seats. Constituency magnitude and legal thresholds shape the share of the vote that a party must garner to enter the legislature. Accordingly, these factors should influence ethnoregional party formation and support.



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Constituency Magnitude Constituency magnitude refers to the number of mandates up for election in an electoral district. It helps determine the share of votes a party must gain to win a seat and the proportionality of the outcome. The vote share needed for a seat shrinks and the proportionality of the result grows as the number of mandates in a constituency increases. Consider the situation of a party with 10 percent of the vote in a three versus 10-member constituency. The party receives one seat, a proportionate share, in a 10-member constituency. But the party would probably not obtain a seat in a three-member district.14 This example further demonstrates why proportionality declines with constituency magnitude. In the three-member constituency, parties can win sizable shares of the vote but still fail to receive any mandates. Just as in majoritarian elections, larger parties benefit at the expense of smaller ones. In a larger constituency, the same party finds it easier to win a seat, so fewer votes go to parties that do not win seats and greater proportionality ­between votes and seats is achieved. Table 3.1 details the number of constituencies and average constituency ­magnitude at the decisive level—the tier that most definitively shapes the overall allocation in the legislature—for countries with PR. Information is recorded for separate electoral systems utilized in a country, as defined by the Lijphart criteria.15 Mean district magnitude at the critical level varies widely. At the low end, Chileans elect their 120-member Congress entirely from two-member constituencies followed by Cape Verde with an average district magnitude of 3.6. At the other ­extreme, 22 countries allocate mandates within a single national constituency: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, ­Estonia, G ­ ermany, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Lesotho, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Z ­ ealand, Norway, Peru, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.16 However, only five—Lesotho, Namibia, Peru, San Marino, and South Africa—did not have a legal threshold that raised the share of the vote needed to qualify for seats higher than indicated by the constituency magnitude. Table 3.1 further shows the legal, exclusion, and effective thresholds. The ­exclusion threshold is the maximum share of the vote a party can receive without winning any mandates. Examination of electoral system components, especially constituency magnitudes and legal thresholds, permits calculation of the exclusion threshold. A party must win at least one seat in a constituency if its proportion of the vote exceeds 1 / (Number of Mandates + 1) in most PR systems. One can estimate a national exclusion threshold by averaging the threshold for each constituency weighted by the number of mandates.17 Legal thresholds, however, can raise the exclusion threshold to higher levels. The effective threshold is the proportion of the vote that party actually needs to win a seat. In practice, parties rarely need to surpass the exclusion threshold. Some voters cast ballots for small parties that do not earn seats. Among the parties

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minority rules

Table 3.1  Th  resholds and District Magnitudes in Countries with Proportional Representation Decisive PR Tier

Legal Thresholds

Number of Mean Districts Magnitude

District

Estimated Thresholds

National Exclusion Effective

Chile

60

2.0

33.3

3.2

Dominican Republic 3 (2002–)

46

3.8

20.6

2.3

Ireland

43

3.9

20.4

2.4

Cape Verde

20

3.6

20.1

3.6

Dominican Republic 1 (1990–1994)

30

4.0

18.3

2.7

Malta

13

5.0

16.7

3.5

Peru 3 (2001)

25

4.8

15.8

2.6

Peru 4 (2006–)

25

4.8

15.8

4

Suriname

10

5.1

15.8

3.9

Dominican Republic 2 (1998)

30

5.0

15.1

2.3

Argentina

24

5.4

14.5

2.4

El Salvador 1 (1991–2003)

15

5.6

14.3

2.9

El Salvador 2 (2006–)

14

6.0

13.6

2.9

Iceland 1 (1991–1999)

1

10.9 (Hare)

13.4

3.8

Spain

52

6.7

3

12.3

1.3

Peru 1 (1990)

25

7.2

11.1

1.8

São Tomé and Príncipe

 7

7.9

11.1

3.2

Costa Rica

 7

8.1

10.6

3.1

Switzerland

26

7.7

10.1

1.7

63

4

3



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

75

Table 3.1  (continued) Decisive PR Tier

Legal Thresholds

Number of Mean Districts Magnitude Belgium 1 (1991)

30

7.1

Poland 3 (2001–)

41

11.2

Portugal

22

10.5

Cyprus 1 (1991)

 1

56

Liechtenstein

 2

Poland 2 (1993–1997)

District

Estimated Thresholds

National Exclusion Effective 9.4

3.3

8.2

5

8.1

1.4

8

8

8

12.5

8

8

8

53

8.7

7

7

5

Finland

15

13.3

6.7

1.4

Czech 2 (2002–)

14

14.3

6.5

5

Luxembourg

 4

15.0

6.1

2.3

Belgium 2 (1995–1999)

20

7.5

4.4 (⅓ Hare)

5.5

2.9

Belgium 3 (2003–)

 9

16.7

5

5.5

1.5

Brazil

27

19.0

5.3 (Hare)

5.3

1.0

Czech 1 (1990–1998)

 1

200

5

5

5

Estonia

 1

101

5

5

5

Germany 1 (1990)

 1

656

5

3.5

Germany 2 (1994–)

 1

598

5

5

5

Iceland 2 (2003–)

 1

63

5

5

5

Latvia 2 (1995–)

 5

20.0

5

5

5

New Zealand 2 (1996–)

 1

5

5

4.6

120

9.4 (⅔ Hare) 5

5

5

continued

76

minority rules

Table 3.1  (continued) Decisive PR Tier Number of Mean Districts Magnitude Poland 1 (1991)

38

Romania 3  and 4 (2000–)

 1

Slovakia 2 (1992–1994)

Legal Thresholds District

12.1

Estimated Thresholds

National Exclusion Effective 5

5

1.1

314

5

5

5

 1

150

5

5

5

Slovakia 3 (1998–)

 1

150

5

5

5

Austria 1 (1990)

 2

91.5

4.9

1.6

Latvia 1 (1993)

 5

20.0

4.7

4

Greece 1 (1990)

14

21.4

4.4

0.9

Italy 1 (1992)

 1

629

0.8

4.3

0.8

Austria 2 (1994–)

 1

183

4

4

4

Bulgaria 2 (1991–)

 1

240

4

4

4

Norway 1 (1993–2001)

 1

165

4

4

1.9

Norway 2 (2005–)

 1

169

4

4

1.9

Slovenia 2 (2000–)

 1

88

4

4

4

Sweden

 1

349

4

4

4

Slovenia 1 (1992–1996)

 1

88

3.4

3.4

3.0

Romania 2 (1992–1996)

 1

328

3

3

3

4.9 (Hare) 4

4.3 (Imperiali)



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

77

Table 3.1  (continued) Decisive PR Tier Number of Mean Districts Magnitude

Legal Thresholds District

Estimated Thresholds

National Exclusion Effective

Slovakia 1 (1990)

 1

150

3

3

3

Denmark

 1

175

2

2

2

Israel 2 (2006–)

 1

120

2

2

2

Cyprus 2 (1996–)

 1

56

1.8

1.8

1.8

San Marino

 1

60

1.6

1.2

Israel 1 (1992– 2003)

 1

120

1.5

1.5

Namibia

 1

72

1.4

1.0

Lesotho 3 (2002)

 1

120

0.8

0.6

Peru 2 (1995– 2000)

 1

120

0.8

0.6

Netherlands

 1

150

0.7

0.7

Romania 1 (1990)

 1

390

0.3

0.2

South Africa

 1

400

0.2

0.2

1.5

0.7

Note: PR = proportional representation.

that gain seats, most win votes in excess of the minimum required to gain their last seat but not enough to pick up another. Rein Taagapera estimates the effective threshold in a single constituency as 0.75 / (Number of Mandates + 1) and the national effective threshold as 0.75 / (Average Constituency Magnitude + 1) (Number of Constituencies)0.5. The latter formula reflects that it becomes easier for a party to win seats not just as mean district magnitude increases but also as the number of constituencies increases.18 The threshold faced by any party depends not just on the electoral system or its national share of the vote but also on the geographic distribution of its supporters. When a country awards seats within constituencies, parties must garner the votes needed to gain a seat within each constituency. Just as earning many votes does a party no good if it does not come in first in any constituencies under single-member plurality, passing the national threshold in a country with PR

78

minority rules

does not aid a party unless it also passes the constituency threshold in individual electoral districts. Ethnoregional parties must surpass the threshold required in constituencies that contain its potential supporters—members of the appropriate ­ethnoregional group.

Legal Thresholds Even if a party can win seats based on the threshold implicit in the district magnitude, it must still also exceed the legal threshold. Legal thresholds require that a party surpass a certain share of the vote to qualify to receive seats. Even if the party would otherwise gain mandates, the party will not receive them if it does not overcome the legal threshold. Legal thresholds can exist at both the constituency and the national levels. Table 3.1 shows district and legal national thresholds for countries included in this study. Liechtenstein has the highest national legal threshold at 8 percent while the Netherlands possessed the lowest non-zero threshold of just 0.7 percent.19 ­Constituency thresholds also vary considerably. Indeed, constituency thresholds had little real impact in some countries. In Spain, the threshold indicated by the district magnitude exceeded the legal constituency threshold in all constituencies except Barcelona and Madrid. Even in these two provinces, few parties did not win seats that they would have otherwise received. Thresholds have excluded parties more often elsewhere. Germany’s threshold of 5 percent, or victory in three constituency seats, eliminated several parties classified as extreme-right or Neo-Nazi, including the Republicans, the German People’s Union, and the National Democratic Party of Germany. The total share of votes received by parties that failed to pass the threshold has been relatively low—averaging less than 5 percent since 1990. A higher proportion of votes—sometimes referred to as wasted votes—went to parties that failed to pass the threshold in several East-Central European countries. Weak partisanship and high volatility in support for parties magnified the threshold’s impact. The share of wasted votes was particularly high in early postcommunist elections held in 1992 or 1993: 35 percent in Poland, 19 percent in the Czech Republic, 24 percent in Slovakia, and 25 percent in Bulgaria. The share of votes going to parties that did not pass the threshold tended to decline over time, falling to 4 percent in Poland in 2007, 6 percent in the Czech Republic in 2006, 12 percent in Slovakia in 2006, and 8 percent in Bulgaria in 2009. The proportion of wasted ballots nonetheless still fluctuates, jumping up to 19 percent in Czech and 16 percent in Slovak elections held in 2010. Reduction in wasted votes does not indicate a decline in the threshold’s impact. Rather, over the long term, the threshold trains voters to cast strategic ballots for parties likely to pass it to maximize the impact of their ballots. As voters learn more about which parties have the best chance to pass the threshold, fewer votes



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

79

go to parties without seats. Voters react similarly to thresholds created indirectly via constituency magnitude. Ignacio Lago Peñas and Santiago Lago Peñas found that the percentage of wasted votes has gradually declined in Spain since the reestablishment of democracy in the late 1970s. 20 Robert Moser and Ethan Scheiner, however, argue that thresholds do not have a reductive effect in countries with highly volatile party systems.21 In some countries, parties can form cartels to escape the reductive pressures of thresholds. This practice, known as apparentement, permits parties to appear separately on the ballot but have their votes counted collectively for seat allocation. The linkage may not even appear in any visible form on the ballot. After the ­a llocation of seats to cartels, seats are then distributed among individual associated parties. Countries with forms of apparentement include Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Israel, and Switzerland.22 Constituency magnitudes and legal thresholds permit calculation of ­exclusion and effective thresholds, shown in Table 3.1. Exclusion and effective ­t hresholds range considerably across countries. Countries like Israel, Namibia, the ­Netherlands, and South Africa, in which the determinative seat allocation occurs in a single national district with no or a very low legal threshold, have the lowest e­ xclusion and effective thresholds. National legal thresholds appear most c­ ommonly in countries with the decisive allocation at the national level and have the effect of limiting extreme proportionality. Nonetheless, these countries ­generally still have lower exclusion thresholds than countries in which the allocation occurs in smaller constituencies. The countries with the highest thresholds of ­exclusion have low mean constituency magnitudes but no legal threshold. Chile’s two-member districts result in an exclusion threshold of 33 percent. Cape Verde, the Dominican Republic, and Ireland follow with mean district magnitudes under four and exclusion thresholds around 20 percent.

Explaining Support for Ethnoregional Parties After commencing with a look at ethnoregional party performance in c­ ountries with PR, this section turns to the correct method for defining electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in these countries. While majoritarian systems privilege regionally based ethnoregional parties, PR seemingly provides opportunities for parties with less concentrated support. Despite their reputation for permissiveness, PR systems nonetheless still place hurdles that parties must overcome. ­Ethnoregional parties must win a higher share of votes than the exclusion threshold to be assured of receiving seats. As Table 3.1 shows, this threshold serves as a major barrier in some countries. Depending on size and geographic ­d istribution, the threshold can block entry into the legislature for parties organized around some groups though not others. 23 As for countries with majoritarian systems, one can

80

minority rules

define electorally relevant ethnoregional groups for countries with ­proportional systems in terms of their ability to overcome the electoral threshold.

Ethnoregional Party Performance Table 3.2 presents the mean share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties in the 43 countries with proportional electoral systems between 1990 and 2012. The table also shows both the national and the regional average share of votes and seats for selected regions with information presented separately for each electoral system in countries that altered them during this period. Table 3.2  P  roportional Electoral Systems and Ethnoregional Parties Summary, 1990–2012 Country and Electoral System Number Argentinaa

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

All

5.7

6.1

Buenos Aires Distrito Federal Catamarca Chaco Chubut Cordoba Corrientes Entre Ríos Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Neuquén Río Negro Salta San Juan San Luis Santa Cruz Santa Fe Santiago del Estero

1.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

0.9 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

4.0 4.5 5.0 11.5 9.2 5.9 27.4 1.6 5.4 11.9 0.3 0.6 3.9 40.8 6.8 25.5 9.1 0.9 4.6 0.2 1.4

3.2 4.2 0.0 7.3 0.0 5.6 31.3 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 56.3 0.0 28.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

81

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

0.1 0.3

0.5 0.4

24.4 11.1

25.0 10.6

Austria 1 and 2 (1990–)

None

None

Belgium 1 (1991)

All Hainaut Liège Luxembourg Namur Brabant Belgium 2 (1995–1999) All Hainaut Liège Luxembourg Namur Brabant Belgium 3 (2003–) All Hainaut Liège Luxembourg Namur Brabant

37.5 11.5 9.4 2.3 4.2 10.1 36.7 11.2 9.2 2.3 4.2 9.8 37.2 10.9 9.0 2.4 4.3 13.0

41.0 13.2 9.9 2.4 4.2 11.3 39.3 12.7 10.0 2.0 4.0 10.7 41.3 12.7 10.0 2.7 4.0 12.0

99.2 99.5 99.3 99.6 48.8

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.0

97.7 97.5 98.3 97.8 47.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 47.1

98.0 96.8 98.9 98.1 52.1

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 52.9

Brazil

None

None

8.7

9.8

None 1.1 0.3

None 0.7 0.2

2.2

0.8

Northern Regions I, II, and III

0.3

0.3

 4.8

3.3

All Alajuela Cartago San José Limón

3.3 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.5

1.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3

 5.2  7.9  1.8  8.0

1.7 5.6 1.7 4.2 continued

Tierra del Fuego Tucumán

Bulgaria 2 (1991–) Cape Verde Chile

Costa Rica

Turks All Southern Regions IX, X, and XI

82

minority rules

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

0.1 0.1

0.0 0.0

1.0 1.5

0.0 0.0

None

None

All Moravia All Moravia

4.2 4.0 0.3 0.2

4.5 4.5

10.5

11.7

0.0

0.7

0.0

General Minority

0.1

0.0

None

None

0.0

0.0

 3.6

0.0

None

None

Heredia Guanacaste Cyprus 1 and 2 (1991–) Czech 1 (1990–1998) Czech 2 (2002–) Denmark Dominican Republic 1 and 2 (1990–1998) Dominican Republic 3 (2002–)

Santiago Rodriguez

El Salvador 1 and 2 (1991–) Estonia

Russians

3.1

2.0

Finland

All/Finland Swedes Helsinki Uusimaa Varsinais-Suomi Vaasa Åland

5.2

5.4

0.9 1.7 0.5 1.8 0.4

0.8 1.8 0.5 1.9 0.5

 8.0 11.0  5.2 19.9 100.0

7.6 11.2 5.9 22.1 100.0

Germany 1 (1990)

Bavaria

7.2

7.7

52.4

59.3

Germany 2 (1994–)

Bavaria

7.5

9.1

41.7

43.7

Greece 1 (1990)

Muslim

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

Iceland 1 and 2 (1991–)

None

None

Ireland

None

None

7.2 8.7

6.7 8.8

10.7 0.1

9.5

Israel 1 (1992–2003) Israel 2 (2006–)

Arabs Arabs

Italy 1 (1992)

All Aosta Valley

49.6



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

83

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Region or Minority

Bolzano/Südtirol Trento Veneto Piedmont Lombardy Friuli-Venezia Giulia Liguria Emilia-Romagna Tuscany Marche Apulia Sardinia

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Votes

Seats

0.5 0.1 2.1 1.5 4.2 0.3

61.0 13.9 17.9 18.9 24.3 15.3

0.4 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0

14.3 9.8 3.3 2.1 1.5 1.5

Latvia 1 (1993)

Russians

19.0

20.0

Latvia 2 (1995–)

Russians

19.3

20.6

Lesotho 3 (2002)

None

None

Liechtenstein

None

None

Luxembourg

None

None

Malta

None

None

Namibia

Damara, Herero, Afrikaaners, Nama

7.6

7.7

Netherlands

Immigrants

0.1

0.0

New Zealand 2 (1996–)

Māori

1.4

1.5

0.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1

0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Norway 1 (1993–2001) All Nordland Troms Finnmark Norway 2 (2005–) All Nordland Troms Finnmark

Seats

5.7 3.4 2.6

5.6 0.0 0.0

2.8 5.9 6.3

0.0 0.0 0.0 continued

84

minority rules

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number Peru 1 (1990) Peru 2 (1995–2000) Peru 3 (2001) Peru 4 (2006–) Poland 1 (1991) Poland 2 (1993–1997) Poland 3 (2001–) Portugal

Romania 1 (1990)

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

Loreto and Tacna Regional Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous

0.8

0.0

0.1 1.4 0.4

0.0 0.8 0.0

All Opole (Germans) All Opole (Germans) All Opole (Germans)

2.2 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3

2.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3

26.1

30.0

18.0

25.0

10.9

11.7

All Azores Madeira

0.1 0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0 0.0

0.5 0.1

0.0 0.0

All Transylvania (Hungarians) Other All Transylvania (Hungarians) All Transylvania (Hungarians) All Transylvania (Hungarians)

8.6 7.1

10.1 21.0

1.5 9.4 8.4

11.7 7.5

23.1

22.5

9.5 6.1

12.5 7.2

18.3

21.8

9.7 6.0

12.0 6.3

18.2

19.6

San Marino 1 (1993–2006)

None

None

São Tomé and Príncipe

None

None

9.4 5.8

9.3

Romania 2 (1992–1996) Romania 3 (2000–2004) Romania 4 (2008–)

Slovakia 1 (1990)

All West Slovakia (Hungarians)

17.3



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

85

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Region or Minority

Slovakia 2 (1992–1994) All West Slovakia (Hungarians) Slovakia 3 (1998–) All Trnava (Hungarians) Nitra (Hungarians) Banská Bystrica (Hungarians) Košice (Hungarians) Slovenia 1 and 2 South Africa

Spain

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

11.1 6.2

10.3

11.2 2.8

11.3

Seats

18.7

26.9

4.0 1.4

29.4 11.8

1.8

13.6

None

None

All KwaZulu-Natal Western Cape

28.9 9.3 5.2

29.0

All Andalusia Aragon Asturias Balearic Islands Basque Country Canary Islands Cantabria Castille-La Mancha Castille and Leon Catalonia Extremadura Galicia La Rioja Madrid Navarre Valencia Ceuta Melilla

11.2 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 2.2 0.9 0.0 0.0

8.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.0 0.0 0.0

3.4 11.6 1.4 8.3 40.0 24.7 4.6 0.2

0.3 3.8 0.0 0.0 38.3 22.1 0.0 0.0

0.1 5.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0

0.0 4.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0

1.3 35.1 0.8 12.5 2.2 0.1 12.6 4.0 2.7 4.3

0.0 36.1 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 13.3 1.6 0.0 0.0

51.4 52.0

continued

86

minority rules

Table 3.2  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Region or Minority

National Mean of All Elections

Regional Mean of All Elections

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

17.0

18.8

Suriname

Creole, Indian, Indonesian, Maroon

9.3

7.0

Sweden

All

0.1

0.0

Switzerland

All Ticino

1.3 0.8

0.7 0.8

Includes only elections held from 1991–2005.

a 

Ethnoregional party support varies considerably across the 43 countries. Fourteen countries had no ethnoregional parties: Austria, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cyprus, El Salvador, Iceland, Ireland, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Slovenia. Five additional countries—the ­ Dominican Republic, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands—­produced only very minor and unsuccessful ethnoregional parties.24 ­Ethnoregional parties gained at least one seat in one election but ­remained highly ­marginal or only intermittently successful in five other countries: Chile, Costa Rica, Norway, Peru, and Greece.25 Ethnoregional parties performed more consistently or won a larger share of seats in the remaining 19 countries. Classification of parties as ethnic or regional can be difficult, as parties can possess the characteristics of both, but parties in Argentina, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Italy have a regional flavor. Local political barons head regional parties in many Argentine provinces. Though provincial parties won an average of only 5.7 percent of the national vote from 1991 through 2005, their vote share has grown, as the Argentine party system has become increasingly denationalized. Parties performed especially well in Corrientes, Neuquén, Salta, and Tierra del Fuego where they gained roughly onequarter of votes and seats or more. Regional parties also won above 10 percent of the vote in Chaco, Jujuy, and Tucumán.26 In Germany, the Christian Social Union (CSU) averaged a majority of votes and seats in Bavaria, despite a recent drop in support. The CSU, the sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), stands on the cusp between regional and nonregional parties; the two parties never compete against one another as the CDU does not run in Bavaria and the CSU does not try to break out of its bailiwick. Together, the CDU and CSU form a single Bundestag faction and run a joint candidate for Chancellor.



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

87

A Moravian regional party emerged in the Czech Republic in 1990 and also ran well in 1992, though it won no seats in 1996 or 1998 before disappearing in 2002. The party’s decline reflected shrinkage in the share of people claiming Moravian ethnic identity on the Czech Census with the share of Moravians dropping from 13 percent in 1991 to 4 percent in 2001. In Italy, the Northern League leapt from just one seat in 1987 to 55 in 1992, the last year Italy used PR. This right-wing ­regionalist formation has become a major force on the Italian Right. Smaller ­parties representing German speakers in South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley, home to a Franco-Provençal population, also won seats. Ethnoregional parties in 15 other countries mainly represent linguistic, racial, and religious minorities. Ethnoregional parties gained more than 30 percent of votes and seats in Belgium and South Africa. In Belgium, politics is completely divided on linguistic lines with almost all votes and seats going either to Flemish or Francophone parties.27 Parties based in racial and linguistic minorities flourish in South Africa despite the dominance of the African National Congress. The Inkatha Freedom Party wins support from Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal. The Democratic Alliance, like the former National Party, aspires to expand beyond its White and Coloured base but has had little success so far and has primarily white leadership. Other small parties representing right-wing Afrikaners, Asian Indians, or small regional or linguistic black groups have won seats under South Africa’s ­generous PR system. Namibia’s politics mirrors that of its more populous southern neighbor, though the SWAPO Party—formerly the South West Africa People’s Organization—is even more dominant in Namibia than the African National Congress in South Africa. Small parties representing Nama, Damara, Herero, and Afrikaner minorities comprise much of the opposition and gained around 8 percent of votes and seats. In Latvia, parties representing Russian speakers took over one-sixth of the seats on average—the highest share held by ethnoregional parties after Belgium and South Africa. Similar parties in Estonia won fewer votes and seats—less than 4 percent of votes and 3 percent of seats—because Russian speakers comprise a smaller share of the electorate and majority-group parties have greater success in attracting the votes of Russian speakers. Ethnoregional parties averaged over 9 percent of the votes in Romania, ­Slovakia, Spain, and Suriname. Hungarian parties won the bulk of the ethnoregional party vote in Romania and Slovakia.28 Nationalist Catalan, Basque, and Galician parties along with a regional grouping from the Canary Islands account for most votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties in the Spanish Congress, though regional parties have won a smattering of seats in other regions. A bouillabaisse of Creole, Indian, Indonesian, and Maroon parties won an average of over 10 ­percent of the votes but just slightly more than 5 percent of seats in Suriname. These ­figures underestimate severely the role of ethnicity as the chart excludes ethnic ­parties that won seats as part of multiethnic coalitions. In Suriname,

88

minority rules

ethnic parties often run as part of multiethnic coalitions if only to help pass the threshold dictated by the district magnitude—mean magnitude is 5.1 nationally and 3.8 ­excluding Paramaribo—but these coalitions have little holding them ­together and fracture as soon as parliament convenes. Ethnic parties in Bulgaria and Israel with primarily Muslim support win strong representation in both countries. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is nominally a nonethnic procivil rights party—crucial to its fight against efforts to apply Bulgaria’s ban on ethnic parties, as discussed in chapter 7. While the MRF hopes to gather votes from all Bulgarian Muslims regardless of ethnicity, its main supporters remain Bulgaria’s Turkish minority, and it performs less well among other Muslims.29 Support for the MRF reached 14.8 percent in 2009 elections—the highest ever won by the party. In Israel, the share of votes won by Arab parties has increased along with the Arab share of the population and the decline in Arab support for Jewish parties. In the 2009 and 2013 elections, three Arab lists won over 9 percent of votes and seats in the Knesset. Finland’s Swedish People’s Party wins a share of the vote comparable to the share of Finland Swedes in the country’s population, though both have declined slowly. Including votes cast for local candidates in Åland, an overwhelmingly Swedish-speaking autonomous region of Finland whose single member of parliament always joins in the Swedish People’s Party parliamentary group, support for the party averaged 5.4 percent. Frequently part of the government coalition, the party has spent more time in government than any other ethnoregional party. Relatively small ethnoregional parties have experienced success in New ­Zealand, Poland, and Switzerland. As described in chapter 5, the Māori Party first won seats in New Zealand in 2005. The small German minority in Poland, aided by its exemption from legal threshold requirements, has repeatedly entered the Sejm. Finally, the Ticino League, an extreme-right party based in Switzerland’s only Italian majority canton, has won an average of one-sixth of the vote in Ticino, though the party’s vote share amounts to less than 1 percent of all Swiss votes.

Defining Electorally Relevant Groups and Where Ethnic Parties Emerge PR systems have a reputation for being more permissive of smaller political ­parties. But thresholds, determined either by law or implicit in the constituency magnitudes, set the bar that parties must overcome to gain entry into the legislature. These thresholds are often intentionally designed to eliminate small p­ arties to prevent parliamentary fragmentation. In some cases, PR seems a ­m isnomer because high thresholds reduce or eliminate the representation of parties of considerable size. Regardless, as in majoritarian countries, electorally relevant ethnoregional groups should be defined as those able to overcome the exclusion threshold.



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Identification of Cleavages

The identification of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups raises the same issues regarding conflicting cleavages and group size in countries with PR as ­majoritarian systems. A cursory examination of the groups forming successful ethnoregional parties in countries with proportional electoral systems reveals the importance of parties representing linguistic minorities. Belgium may be an ­extreme case as its entire party system is structured around the linguistic divide, but linguistically oriented parties nonetheless appear around the globe from parties for Swedish speakers in Finland to Zulu speakers in South Africa. Linguistic parties may show up more frequently than other party types ­because  of the inherently group nature of language use. The right to use one’s ­language holds little meaning if others cannot speak it. Governments can promote languages, permit or prohibit their use with officials and in schools, and even regulate their private-sector use. Language status can condition economic activity, including the ability to get a job or a promotion, as well as social interactions. Learning a new language fluently is difficult, though this varies depending on the language and age of the student. Language may also condition the circulation of political information. One cannot attend to news about government or politics in a language that one does not understand. Even multilingual individuals often have a strong preference for one language. Besides language, parties centered on race or religion also flourish, albeit not as frequently. Parties supported largely by Whites and Coloureds repeatedly have won seats in Namibia and South Africa. Lists backed by Muslims have won ­parliamentary seats in Bulgaria and Greece. The conflict in Israel is frequently cast in religious terms and votes from the largely Muslim Arab minority permit Arab parties to enter the Knesset. Of course, cleavages based on language, race, and religion do not necessarily conflict. While different cleavages may crosscut one another, they can also closely overlap closely so that they dovetail and are mutually reinforcing. Though identities based on language, religion, and caste often do not overlap in India and can lead to radically different potential political coalitions depending on the cleavage given emphasis, these sorts of cleavages frequently do not clash in other countries. Even if the cleavage between linguistic or religious or racial groups is not exactly the same, they are often tightly linked and similar enough to treat as the same for purposes of identifying electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in countries with PR. The cases described above as examples of countries with ethnoregional parties organized on racial or religious lines support this conclusion. Language and race are bound together closely in South Africa. Non-Blacks—Whites, Coloureds, and Asian Indians—account for 95 percent or more of Afrikaans and English speakers. Additionally, 98 percent of Coloureds, 98 percent of Whites, and 95 percent

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of Asian Indians speak one of these two languages. 30 The racial nature of the apartheid system had a strong linguistic component. Originally, the Nationalist Party took power to displace the Anglophone elite and assure the dominance of Afrikaans and Afrikaners. Language disputes sparked anti-apartheid protests; the 1976 Soweto uprising began in reaction to the killing of Hector Peterson, a 12-year-old student who protested against the imposition of Afrikaans in Black schools. The Inkatha Freedom Party, the major Black post-apartheid ethnoregional party, has a linguistic basis due to its support by Zulus. 31 Similar linguistic dynamics prevail in Namibia where Afrikaans is the first ­language of virtually all Coloureds and 85 percent of Whites. A minority of Whites prefers German or English, languages that, like Afrikaans, are spoken by very few Blacks. 32 Many opposition political parties are grounded in linguistic groups, including parties centered on speakers of Nama, Damara, Herero, and Afrikaans. The dominant SWAPO Party receives its most solid support from the Oshiwambo majority. Just as race is linked to language in Namibia and South Africa, religion is tied to language in Bulgaria, Greece, and Israel. The MRF in Bulgaria may aspire to represent all Muslims but performs much more strongly among Turkish speakers. The MRF has had less success attracting the 15 percent of Muslims who speak Bulgarian, or the 11 percent who speak Romani. 33 The MRF’s push to permit the use of Turkish in communications with authorities and in schools and to promote Turkish-language television broadcasts does nothing for Bulgarian or Romani speakers. No doubt the party’s calls for the government to give Turks the status of a national minority further emphasize the Turkish character of the party. 34 Most Muslims in Greece live in Rhodope and Xanthi prefectures, located in Western Thrace near the Bulgarian frontier. As in Bulgaria, most Muslims are ethnic Turks with ethnic Bulgarians and Roma comprising the remainder; none share the language of the Greek majority. In Greece, Bulgarian and Romani ­Muslims have tended to acquire Turkish identity and be incorporated into ethnic Turkish political coalitions in contrast to the Bulgaria. They attend Turkish ­language schools, have been attracted by Turkish support for the community, and viewed askance efforts by the Greek government to suppress the label of “­ Turkish” in favor of “Muslim” and to differentiate among Muslims by language. 35 This greater unity facilitated support for Muslim electoral lists among Muslims of all linguistic backgrounds in 1990 in contrast to mostly Turkish support in Bulgaria. Most Arabs or Palestinians in Israel share the Muslim faith but a significant, albeit declining, minority professes Christianity, and others belong to the Druze community. All share the Arabic language in contrast to the Hebrew-speaking Jewish majority, so language as well as religion defines the Arab minority. As with race in Namibia and South Africa or with religion in Bulgaria and Greece, ­language  is linked with the minority even if it is usually viewed through a ­d ifferent lens.



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Group Size

Disagreements over estimates of the size of linguistic groups occur for several ­reasons, including the desire to minimize or to maximize the weight given to claims made by language minorities. The percentage of people who understand, speak, read, and write a language can also vary considerably. The 2001 Catalan Census showed that 94.5 percent understand Catalan but that it is spoken by 74.5 percent, read by 74.3 percent, and written by 49.8 percent. 36 The membership of linguistic communities has been defined reasonably broadly here where such issues arise with an eye toward capturing all potential supporters of an ­ethnoregional party, including all who understand Catalan in this ­example. Measurement of the size of linguistic or ethnic communities derive from ­official ­statistics where possible and from unofficial authorities otherwise. Some ­countries, like Belgium, do not measure language use because of sensitivity surrounding the question. Others do not gather statistics on small minority groups. Unofficial estimates of group size differ the most for very small groups. In these cases, the impact of choosing one estimate over another is usually negligible even if estimates ­d isagree substantially. One should nevertheless emphasize the rough nature of some estimates. The Catalan case further illustrates difficulties surrounding the question of the boundaries of a community in terms of both geography and identification for purposes of calculating the community size. Linguists agree that Catalan, Ibizan, Majorcan, Minorcan, and Valencian are essentially the same mutually ­intelligible language despite local variations. Yet people in the Balearic Islands and Valencia overwhelmingly do not identify as Catalans. The Valencian Autonomy ­Statute refers to the “Valencian” language, though the Balearic Islands Autonomy ­Statute calls the “Catalan language” part of the region’s identity. 37 Fortunately, such issues arise relatively infrequently in the data set. Only people who live in the autonomous communities associated with the “historic nationalities” of the Catalans, Basques, and Galicians and understand the language are included in the ­estimates of ethnoregional minority community size in Spain. 38 Examination of the ethnoregional party data suggests that immigrant groups should not be classified as electorally relevant because they do not form successful parties. Immigrant parties in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands attracted infinitesimal support. Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel organized the only successful immigrant parties, but they have since merged into other parties and are counted here as majority-group (i.e., Jewish) parties. Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia present a more complex and delicate problem. Though both countries had Russian minorities before their occupation by the Soviet Union, the share of Russian speakers ballooned in the decades before they regained their freedom. The reestablished independent governments of these countries perceived the people who arrived during the Soviet occupation as illegal immigrants, but the Soviet citizens involved saw themselves as people

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who had just moved within their country. Today, many who remain in Estonia and Latvia have gained local citizenship; others have opted for Russian citizenship while still others remain stateless. The size of the minority is coded appropriately as the percentage of Russian speakers among the citizen population as only citizens can vote in parliamentary elections. Other countries contain sizeable immigrant groups with many noncitizens who cannot vote. When possible, the share of the minority has been calculated among the citizen population to gauge more accurately the group’s potential electoral power. Table 3.3 lists the percentage of ethnoregional minorities, the percentage of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups (pEREG), and the equivalent fractionalization measure (EREGfr) for all countries with PR. pEREG is less than the percentage of minorities if some groups or portions of group cannot overcome the exclusion threshold. The table further details if the countries are decentralized and have a strong elected president. Defining Electorally Relevant Ethnoregional Groups

The size and the geographic distribution of ethnic and regional groups should ­i nteract with the electoral system to determine the feasibility of an ethnoregional party. Strategic political elites should be less inclined to form ethnoregional parties and voters to support them when the electoral system precludes the party from winning seats. Such a party could form as a protest group or to deny votes to another party, but electoral system barriers will discourage strategic politicians and voters who desire political influence. At the same time, the potential to win seats does not necessarily mean that an ethnoregional party will form. Politicians may not rally around an ethnoregional party if they doubt minority grievances will animate enough support at the polls to carry them into office. Moreover, ethnoregional party legislators may find it hard to gain power because they may not be perceived as acceptable coalition partners. Still, surpassing the threshold remains a necessary, if not sufficient, provision for ethnoregional party success. The national thresholds listed in Table 3.1 give a sense of the level of difficulty posed by the electoral system to an ethnoregional party. However, rather than rely on the national threshold, it makes sense to examine the electoral potential of individual ethnic groups to see if parties based in them could overcome the threshold in the electoral districts that they inhabit. Twelve percent of votes in a single constituency would almost certainly be enough to gain representation in constituencies with 15 but not five mandates. In a similar vein, 10 percent of the national vote may be plenty of support if it is all concentrated in one constituency but insufficient to win any seats if dispersed. The constraints placed by the electoral system can be assessed properly only in the context of the geographic ­d istribution of the potential universe of supporters for ethnoregional parties.



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Table 3.3  E  lectorally Relevant Ethnoregional Groups in Countries with Proportional Representation Systems Country and Electoral System Number

Ethnoregional Groups

Decentralized Executive Strong President

Name

% pEREG EREG fr

Argentina

Indigenous, Mestizo

3

0

0.000

Yes

Yes

Austria 1 (1990)

Croat, Slovene

1

0

0.000

Yes

No

Austria 2 (1994–) Croat, Slovene

1

0

0.000

Yes

No

Belgium 1 (1991) French 41 (and German)

41

0.488

Yes

No

Belgium 2 (1995– French 41 1999) (and German)

41

0.488

Yes

No

Belgium 3 (2003–)

French 41 (and German)

41

0.488

Yes

No

Brazil

Indigenous

0

0.000

Yes

Yes

10

10

0.180

No

Yes

Bulgaria 2 (1991–) Turkish

 0.4

Cape Verde

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Chile

Amerindian

1

1

0.026

No

Yes

Costa Rica

Black Creole

2

0

0.000

No

Yes

Cyprus 1 (1991)

None

0

0

0.000

No

Yes

Cyprus 2 (1996–) None

0

0

0.000

No

Yes

Czech 1 (1990– 1998)

Moravian

13

13

0.226

No

No

Czech 2 (2002–)

Moravian

4

0

0.000

No

No

Denmark

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Dominican Rep. 1 None (1990–1994)

0

0

0.000

No

Yes

Dominican Rep. 2 None (1998)

0

0

0.000

No

Yes

Dominican Rep. 3 None (2002–)

0

0

0.000

No

Yes

El Salvador 1 (1991–2003)

Amerindian

1

0

0.000

No

Yes

El Salvador 2 (2006–)

Amerindian

1

0

0.000

No

Yes continued

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minority rules

Table 3.3  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Ethnoregional Groups Name

% pEREG EREG fr

Decentralized Executive Strong President

Estonia

Russian

14

14

0.242

No

Finland

Swedish

6

6

0.104

Germany 1 (1990) Danish, Sorbian, Romani

0

0

0.000

Yes

No

Germany 2 (1994–)

Danish, Sorbian, Romani

0

0

0.000

Yes

No

Greece 1 (1990)

Slavic and Turkish

2

1

0.018

No

No

Iceland 1 (1991– 1999)

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Iceland 2 (2003–) None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Ireland

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Israel 1 (1992– 2003)

Arabic

19

19

0.308

No

No

Israel 2 (2006–)

Arabic

19

19

0.308

No

No

Italy 1 (1992)

Sardinian, Friulian, German, FrancoProvençal, Slovene, Ladin and others

6

4

0.078

Yes

No

Latvia 1 (1993)

Russian

20

20

0.322

No

No

Latvia 2 (1995–)

Russian

20

20

0.322

No

No

Lesotho 3 (2002) None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Liechtenstein

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Luxembourg

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Malta

None

0

0

0.000

No

No

Only Åland

No No



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95

Table 3.3  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Ethnoregional Groups Name

Namibia

Nama/ Damara, Afrikaans, Kavango, Herero, Lozi

Netherlands New Zealand 2 (1996–)

% pEREG EREG fr

Decentralized Executive Strong President

46

46

0.659

No

Yes

Frisian

4

4

0.075

No

No

Māori

14

14

0.238

No

No

Norway 1 (1993– Sami, Kven 2001)

1

0.4

0.008

No

No

Norway 2 (2005–) Sami, Kven

1

0.4

0.008

No

No

Peru 1 (1990)

Quechua

16

15

0.259

No

Yes

Peru 2 (1995– 2000)

Quechua

16

16

0.276

No

Yes

Peru 3 (2001)

Quechua

13

13

0.226

No

Yes

Peru 4 (2006)

Quechua

13

11

0.200

No

Yes

Poland 1 (1991)

German and Silesian

1

1

0.008

No

No

Poland 2 (1993– 1997)

German and Silesian

1

0.3

0.007

No

No

Poland 3 (2001–) German and Silesian

1

0.3

0.007

No

No

Portugal

0

0

0.000

Yes: Azores and Madeira

No

Romania 1 (1990) Hungarian

7

7

0.130

No

Yes

Romania 2 (1992– Hungarian 1996)

7

7

0.130

No

Yes

Romania 3 (2000–2004)

Hungarian

7

7

0.130

No

Yes

Romania 4 (2008) Hungarian

7

7

0.130

No

Yes

San Marino

0

0

0.000

No

No

None

None

continued

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Table 3.3  (continued) Country and Electoral System Number

Ethnoregional Groups

Decentralized Executive Strong President

Name

% pEREG EREG fr

Angolar

6

6

0.113

No

Yes

Slovakia 1 (1990) Hungarian

10

10

0.180

No

No

Slovakia 2 (1992– Hungarian 1994)

10

10

0.180

No

No

Slovakia 3 (1998–)

Hungarian

10

10

0.180

No

No

Slovenia 1 (1992– Hungarian, 1996) Italian

1

0

0.000

No

No

Slovenia 2 (2000–)

Hungarian, Italian

1

0

0.000

No

No

South Africa

Zulu, Afrikaans, English

45

45

0.621

Yes

Yes

Spain

Catalan, Basque, Galician

24

24

0.400

Yes

No

Suriname

Hindi, Maroon, Sranan, Javanese, Indigenous

46

32

0.495

No

No

Sweden

Meänkieli and Sami

2

0

0.000

No

No

Switzerland

French, Italian, 24 Romansh

24

0.377

Yes

No

São Tomé and Príncipe

Table 3.4 compares the percentage of ethnoregional minority groups with the ­exclusion threshold in constituencies with the highest concentration of group members at the decisive level of seat allocation. When the decisive allocation occurs at the national level, the geographic distribution of group members is less relevant. Many countries, however, allocate seats within constituencies so their magnitude can shape the level of support needed for an ethnoregional party to win representation. The column on the right side of Table 3.4 reports whether the

Table 3.4  M inorities and Thresholds at the Decisive Level of Allocation in Countries with Proportional Representation

97

Country

Minority

Percent National

Constituency

Percent Minority

Mandates

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Argentina

Indigenous

3

Austria 1 and 2

Croatian

0.6

Buenos Aires Chubut Jujuy Neuquén Salta Burgenland

2 10 11 9 6 7

35 2–3 3 2–3 3–4 7

No No No No No No

Slovene

0.3

Carinthia

2

13

Legal threshold: 3 25.0–33.3 25.0 25.0–33.3 20.0–25.0 Land Hare quota: 14.3 Land Hare quota: 7.7

French

40

Large majority

German

0.7

Walloon arrondissements (13) and Brussels-HalleVilvoorde Verviers

65 Wallonia 34 Brussels-HalleVilvoorde 5

Belgium 1

24

No Yes

2/3 Hare quota in Verviers: 13.3, then 4.5 in Liège

1 Seat

continued

Table 3.4  (continued) Country

Minority

% National

Constituency

% Minority

Mandates

Belgium 2

French

40

Large majority

German

0.7

Walloon constituencies (9) and Brussels-HalleVilvoorde Verviers

48 Wallonia 22 Brussels-HalleVilvoord 4

French

40

Walloon provinces and Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde

Large majority

German

0.7

Liège

Brazil

Indigenous

0.4

Bulgaria 2

Turkish

Chile

Amerindian

Belgium 3

24

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold? Yes

1/3 Hare quota in Verviers: 8.3, then 6.3 in Liège

1 Seat

6.3

1 Seat

10

Acre Amazonas Roraima Amapá Mato Grosso do Sul Mato Grosso National

1 4 8 1 3 1 10

8 8 8 8 8 8 240

Hare quota: 12.5 Hare quota: 12.5 Hare quota: 12.5 Hare quota: 12.5 Hare quota: 12.5 Hare quota: 12.5 Legal threshold: 4

No No No No No No Yes

5

District 51 in Region IX

42

2

33.3

1 Seat

98

10

49 Wallonia 22 Brussels-HalleVilvoorde 15

Yes

99

Costa Rica

Black Creole

2

Limón

16

4–5

16.7–20.0

No

Czech 1

Moravian

13

National

13

200

Legal threshold: 5

Yes

Czech 2

Moravian

4

National Vysočina South Moravia Olomouc Zlín Moravia-Silesia

4 5 18 8 11 2

200 10–11 23 12 12 23

Legal threshold: 5 8.3–9.1 4.2 7.7 7.7 4.2

No

Estonia

Russian

14

National

14

101

Legal threshold: 5

Yes

Finland

Swedish

6

Åland Helsinki Uusimaa Vaasa Varsinais-Suomi

94 7 12 22 6

1 19–21 26–33 17–18 17

50.0 4.5–5.0 2.9–3.7 5.3–5.6 5.6

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Sami

0.03

Lapland

0.8

7–8

11.1–12.5

No

Danish

0.1

Western Germany

0.18

507

0.20

No

Sorbian

0.1

Eastern Germany

0.4

121

0.8

No

Romani

0.1

Western Germany

0.1

507

0.2

No

Germany 1

continued

Table 3.4  (continued) Minority

% National

Constituency

% Minority

Mandates

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Germany 2

Danish Sorbian Romani

0.1 0.1 0.1

National National National

0.1 0.1 0.1

598–656 598–656 598–656

0.2 0.2 0.2

No No No

Greece 1

Muslims

1

Slav Macdeonian

1

Rhodope Xanthi most of West and Central Macedonia (10)

52 41 4–11

3 3 42

25.0 25.0 Dispersed over too many constituencies

Yes Yes No

Israel 1 and 2

Arabic

19

National

19

120

Legal threshold: 1.5–2

Yes

Italy 1

German

0.5

36

10

0.1

3

10

Slovene

0.1

7–8

3

Udine-Belluno-GoriziaPordenone

2–3

12

Imperiali quota: 8.3 Imperiali quota: 8.3 Imperiali quota: 20.0 Imperiali quota: 7.1

Yes

Ladin

Trento-Alto Adige/ Südtirol Trento-Alto Adige/ Südtirol Trieste

100

Country

No No No

Latvia 1 and 2

Friulian

0.9

12

Sardinian

80

19

Catala

0.04

Sardinia

1–2

19

FrancoProvençal

0.2

Aosta Valley

16–58

1

Russian

20

National

20

100

Riga Vidzeme Latgale Zemgale Kurzeme

39 15 45 14 18

12

National

11 10 8 5

National National National National

101

46

2

Udine-Belluno-GoriziaPordenone Sardinia

Namibia

Nama/ Damara Afrikaans Kavango Herero Lozi/ Caprivi

Imperiali quota: 7.1 Imperiali quota: 4.8 Imperiali quota: 4.8 SMP: 50.0

Yes

Yes

27–28 25–26 17–19 15 14

Legal threshold: 4–5 3.4–3.6 3.7–3.8 5.0–5.6 6.3 6.7

12

72

1.4

Yes

11 10 8 5

72 72 72 72

1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes No Unclear

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

continued

Table 3.4  (continued)

102

Country

Minority

% National

Constituency

% Minority

Mandates

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Netherlands

Frisian

4

National

4

150

0.7

Yes

New Zealand

Māori

15

National

15

120–121

Legal threshold: 5 percent or 1 constituency seat

Yes

Norway

Sami

0.8

Kven

0.3

Finnmark Troms Finnmark

28 9 13

4–5 6–7 4–5

16.7–20.0 12.5–14.3 16.7–20.0

1 Seat No No

Quechua

19

Ancash Apurímac Arequipa Ayacucho Cusco Huancavelica Huanuco Junín Lima Loreto Puno

36 77 17 71 63 66 31 13 10 2 43

9 3 9 4 8 3 4 10 40 7 8

10.0 25.0 10.0 20.0 11.1 25.0 20.0 9.1 2.4 12.5 11.1

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Peru 1

Quechua

19

National

19

120

0.8

Yes

Peru 3 and 4

Quechua

13

National

13

120

Yes

Ancash Apurímac Arequipa Ayacucho Cusco Huancavelica Huanuco Junín Lima Loreto Puno

31 71 15 63 51 64 29 9 6 1 38

5 2 5 3 5 2 3 5 35 3 5

Legal: 0 in 2001, 4 in 2006 16.7 33.3 16.7 25.0 16.7 33.3 25.0 16.7 2.8 25.0 16.7

103

Peru 2

Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Poland 1, 2, and 3

German

1

Opole

13

10–13

7.1–9.1

1 Seat

Romania 1, 2, and 3

Hungarian

7.0

National

7

332–396

Legal threshold: 3–5

Yes

São Tomé and Principe

Angolar

6

Caué

91

5

20.0

Yes continued

Table 3.4  (continued) Country

Minority

% National

Constituency

% Minority

Slovakia 1, 2, and 3

Hungarian

10

National

10

Slovenia 1

Hungarian

0.4

Ptuj

3

Italian

0.1

Postojna

Hungarian

0.4

Italian South Africa

Spain

Slovenia 2

104

Suriname

Mandates

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Legal threshold: 3–5

Yes

11

Hare quota: 9.1

No

4

11

Hare quota: 9.1

No

National

0.4

88

Legal threshold: 4

No

0.1

National

0.1

88

Legal threshold: 4

No

Zulu White Coloured Indian

10.0 9 2 24

National National National National

10 9 2 24

400 400 400 400

0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Catala Basque

15 3

7

Large majority 25 51 58 51 Large majority

46–47 4 8–9 6 5 23–26

20.0 10.0–11.1 14.3 16.7

Galicia

Catalan provinces (5) Araba Bizkaia Gipuzkoa Navarre Galician provinces (4)

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Creole

9

Coronie

39

2

33.3

Yes

Paramaribo

9

17

5.6

Yes

105

Sweden Switzerland

Hindi

16

0.3 15

Nickerie Paramaribo Saramacca Wanica Commewijne Paramaribo Marowijne Sipaliwini

43 9 40 34 27 3 4 76

5 17 3 7 4 17 3 4

16.7 5.6 25.0 12.5 20.0 5.6 25.0 20.0

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes

Javanese

6

Indigenous Maroon Meänkieli

1–2

Norbotten

8–25

9

10.0

Unclear

Sami

0.3

Norbotten

8

9

10.0

No

French

21.0

French cantons (5) Berne Fribourg Valais Ticino Graubünden Graubünden

Large majority 8 63 63 99 10 15

43–46 26–29 6–7 7 8 5 5

3.3–3.7 12.5–14.3 12.5 11.1 16.7 16.7

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Italian

4.0

Romansh

0.6

Note: SMP = single-member plurality.

106

minority rules

group’s size exceeds the exclusion threshold. If an ethnoregional party could win only one seat even if all group members supported it, this column reads “1 seat” to reflect the fragile potential for an ethnoregional party. Only groups, or portions of groups, above the threshold are counted as electorally relevant groups and used to calculate pEREG and EREGfr. Table 3.4 reveals that few linguistic minority groups, except for relatively small ones, fall below the exclusion threshold. All with at least 4 percent of the population exceeded the exclusion threshold and had the theoretical potential to support viable ethnoregional parties. Moreover, most formed ethnoregional parties when they surpass the exclusion threshold. Three exceptions include Amerindians in Chile, Sami in Norway, and Germanophones in Belgium. Each could garner only a single seat even if all group members supported the party. Germanophones ­usually work with Francophone parties in national elections in Belgium. Successful parties failed to form in six additional countries with linguistic minorities of sufficient size to more easily pass the threshold. In Italy, the sole Sardinian party won only 1.5 percent of the regional vote in 1992—the only election in the data set held under PR—and no Friulian-based party ran even though Sardinia and Friuli-Venezia Giulia are among the five autonomous ­regions in Italy with a special statute. The relatively small and internally divided ­Caprivian minority did not form its own party in Namibia. In the Netherlands, ­Frisians form a compact, regional majority in Friesland, but the Frisian National Party has not run in recent decades in elections for the lower chamber, though it does have one member in the upper chamber and participates in provincial and municipal contests. 39 In São Tomé and Príncipe, speakers of Angolar, a Portuguese-based Creole related but not mutually intelligible with Santomean, have not created their own party though they comprise the overwhelming majority in one constituency. Much like most speakers of Italian dialects can speak standard Italian, Gerhard Seibert reports that “the entire population” of São Tomé and Príncipe can speak Portuguese and that the country “has no ethnic, linguistic or religious divisions” despite explaining the differences in the origin and speech of Angolars.40 Seibert describes politics as highly personalistic and patronage driven rather than centered on ethnicity: “São Tomé’s small Creole society lacks strong ethnic contradictions that could find their political expression in different parties.”41 Peru and Switzerland constitute the strongest challenges to the notion that ­linguistic minority groups form ethnoregional parties. Both countries possess sizeable, regionally concentrated minority groups. Nonetheless, Peru’s indigenous minority has formed only anemic indigenous parties in contrast to the ­success of their counterparts in Bolivia and Ecuador.42 Switzerland’s smaller ­Italian minority has backed a regional extreme-right party in Ticino, but the much larger Francophone minority has given almost no support to ethnoregional



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

107

p­ arties except for flashes of support in the Bernese Jura. The lack of parties based on ­l inguistic groups in other countries might be explained away by their size, dispersion, ­absence of resources, or lack of difference from the majority, but the cases of Peru and Switzerland seem to demand stronger explanations. The barriers to indigenous party formation in Peru lie in ballot-access and party registration requirements. Peru has adopted a variety of changing requirements that place formidable obstacles in the path of a prospective indigenous party. Parties have had to collect very large numbers of signatures, often from a greater number of provinces than those heavily populated by indigenous ­peoples. Parties that fail to win sufficient votes have needed to repeat the registration ­process.43 As discussed in chapter 7, other countries have enacted party registration and ballot-access laws that similarly influence the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties. Switzerland

This Alpine country poses an even greater puzzle than Peru. The weak performance by regional parties, particularly in Francophone Switzerland, contradicts theories about both the inherent salience of language and that decentralization stimulates regional parties. Ticino, the only Italian canton, has generated Switzerland’s only successful regional party, the Ticino League, a populist, ­right-wing party similar to the Northern League in Italy. The anti-immigrant Ticino League advocates for more autonomy for Ticino and opposes closer ties between ­Switzerland and the European Union. The League has won one or two of Ticino’s eight seats in the National Council in each election since 1991. Twenty-one percent of Swiss citizens consider French their principal ­language—far more than the 4 percent who claim Italian.44 Yet ethnoregional parties win far fewer votes in French Switzerland. Even the long-standing debate over the status of the Jura region failed to lead to ethnoregional party formation in other parts of Switzerland despite the strong linguistic component to the ­conflict. Many Jurassians, as a Francophone minority in predominantly German-­speaking Bern, felt unhappy about their status within Bern and Switzerland. Though ­language unquestionably motivated much of the conflict, religion and economic status did too, as Jura was more Catholic and less affluent than the rest of Bern. When a majority of Jura voted to create a new canton, the more Protestant and economically well-off southern districts chose to remain part of Bern. Voters in all cantons, ­including Bern, voted overwhelmingly to admit Jura to the Swiss Confederation.45 The political debate over the status of the remaining Bernese Jura districts continues. In 1991 and 1995, the separatist Jurassian Alliance won slightly more than one-quarter of the vote in the Bernese Jura. The Romande List gained 32 percent of the vote in 2003. Separatist lists did not participate in the 1999 or 2007 federal

108

minority rules

contests, and no separatist lists ever gained a National Council seat.46 ­Despite the ferment in this small part of Switzerland, French Switzerland remains far more striking for its lack of linguistic conflict or support for ethnoregional parties. A  new cantonal party, the Geneva Citizens Movement, made a splash in 2011, winning 10 percent of the cantonal vote and a National Council seat, but its program is not in opposition to non-Francophone Swiss. Scholars have argued that the crosscutting nature of other salient cleavages helps explain why language has not become an important source of division. Divisions over religion—between Protestants and Catholics—and class—­ ­ between working-class socialists, farmers, and the bourgeoisie—have historically cut across language lines. The cumulative nature of language, religious, and economic status cleavages between Jura and the rest of Bern may explain why conflict emerged in Jura but not elsewhere in Switzerland. This explanation has its limits as the country has divided along linguistic lines in past times, such as during World War I and its aftermath.47 Switzerland’s unique institutional structure undoubtedly works to mute linguistic conflict to a greater extent than in other linguistically divided countries. Jonathan Steinberg highlights the “cellular” nature of Swiss government.48 Switzerland has long been a highly decentralized federation with cantons ­ ­retaining many powers. The breakup of language regions into many cantons helps maintain cantonal identities and undercuts political organization on a linguistic basis.49 Additionally, language is largely a cantonal, not federal, responsibility, and cantons often leave it to communes to work out local solutions in multilingual areas. 50 As in the United States, political parties are highly decentralized with members of the same party often taking different viewpoints from canton to canton. 51 The Swiss federal and cantonal governments have been characterized by the oversized coalitions typical of the consociational political system outlined by Arend Lijphart. Switzerland differs from other consociational examples, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, in its multimember Executive Council and frequent use of direct democracy. Unusually, Switzerland has a plural executive of seven members, which makes it possible not only to balance partisan interests but also to assure constant inclusion of linguistic minorities. By tradition though not by law, the Council has two French or Italian members, though the number sometimes rises to three or falls to one. 52 The rotation of the presidency also prevents its monopoly by any one linguistic group and assures its regular occupancy by French and Italian Swiss. The frequent use of direct democratic public consultations promotes consensus as opposition to a new proposal can result in defeat at the hands of the electorate. 53 Along with Switzerland’s federal history, tradition, and the will to make their linguistically diverse country work—factors difficult to measure in terms of strength or impact—these institutional differences help explain the low level of linguistic conflict in Switzerland.



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109

Models of Ethnoregional Party Performance In this section, bivariate models of the percentage of votes won by ethnoregional parties test the predictive power of pEREG and EREGfr, the equivalent fractionalization measure, compared to alternative measures in countries with PR and then turn to multivariate models with additional independent variables. Bivariate Models

Table 3.5 displays coefficients along with their standard errors of different f ractionalization and percentage measures from cross-sectional time-series ­ ­generalized least squares models with clustered standard errors of the percentage of votes won by ethnoregional parties. 54 Electorally relevant ethnoregional groups, used to calculate pEREG and EREGfr include only groups, or portions

Table 3.5  C  ross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries with Proportional Electoral Systems Using Various Measures of Fractionalization and the Percentage Minority Coefficient

Standard Error

Wald chi2

EREGfr

25.69

2.24

131.91

Roeder ELF

11.87

1.64

 52.31

Roeder ELF with Grouped Races

19.86

1.72

132.93

Alesina Ethnic

15.25

1.58

 93.11

Alesina Linguistic

17.90

2.52

 63.13

Alesina Religious

11.17

2.30

 25.53

Fearon Cultural

12.41

2.68

 21.49

Fearon ELF

18.25

2.18

 69.94

Fearon ELF and Posner PREG

16.26

2.25

 52.37

pEREG

0.42

0.03

207.21

CIA Factbook All Minorities

0.08

0.03

 10.68

–0.08

0.03

 10.68

Fractionalization Measures

Percentage Measures

CIA Factbook Largest Minority

Notes: PREG = percentage of politically relevant ethnoregional groups EREG = electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

110

minority rules

of groups, that exceed the exclusion threshold in the constituencies where they live at the decisive level of allocation. Comparing the Wald chi-squared tests from the different models reveals that EREGfr and pEREG fit the data better than equivalent alternative measures except for Roeder’s ethnolinguistic fractionalization with grouped races. The coefficients on EREGfr and pEREG are also higher, ­indicating a stronger substantive relationship between pEREG and EREGfr with ethnoregional party performance than other measures. The coefficient on pEREG from the bivariate model indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the size of the electorally relevant ethnoregional groups results in a 4.2 percentage point upward shift in the share of votes won by ethnoregional parties. As in majoritarian systems, basing the definition of electorally relevant ­ethnoregional groups in terms of the potential for parties supported by these groups to win mandates pays dividends. It results in a solid relationship b­ etween the presence of ethnic and regional minorities and votes won by ethnoregional parties because it more accurately captures the theorized impact of the ­operation of an electoral system. Moreover, these results suggest that electoral systems matter a great deal in terms of shaping ethnoregional party success. The difference in the impact of majoritarian versus PR systems, however, lies not so much in the general benefits of either system for ethnoregional parties but in how they mold their capacity to win seats and to realize their electoral ­potential  from  their voter base. Both majoritarian and proportional systems constrain political opportunities for ethnic and regional groups. The extent of those ­constraints ­depends on the interaction of the geographic distribution of group members and the electoral thresholds. In assessing the impact of any electoral system on the chances of a particular ethnic cleavage gaining traction in a political system, one must look not just as the system but the geographic distribution of ethnic groups. Multivariate Models

Coefficients and standard errors for similar cross-sectional time-series generalized least squares models with additional independent variables appear in Table 3.6 with all at the country level of aggregation except Models 4 and 8. Models 1 and 5 control only for the pEREG. Models 2 and 6 also explore the impact of decentralization, a simultaneously elected strong president, and year, while Models 3 and 7 also control for fixed effects. The latter—variables coded 1 for the country named in the variable and zero otherwise—were included only when statistically significant at p < .10. Models 4 and 8 repeat Models 2 and 6 except that the data are aggregated at the decisive level for the allocation of mandates, usually regions for countries where the key allocation occurs below the country level. The inclusion of fixed effects in Models 4 and 8 does not alter the statistical significance of coefficients on pEREG and EREGfr.

Table 3.6  C  ross-Sectional Time-Series Generalized Least Squares Regression Models with Clustered Standard Errors of Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties in Countries and Regions with Proportional Electoral Systems, 1990–2012

pEREG

Votes for Ethnoregional Parties (%)

Seats for Ethnoregional Parties (%)

Country

Country

(1)

(2)

0.42***

0.39***

(0.03) Decentralized

Region (3)

Region

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.21***

0.35***

0.32***

0.37***

0.19***

0.33***

0(.04)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.02)

5.85***

9.72***

1.38***

9.40***

8.88***

0.53

(1.71)

(1.26)

(.31)

(2.15)

(1.25)

(.33)

Simultaneously Elected Strong President ×

–0.25*** –0.37***

–0.30***

–0.23*** –0.35***

–0.33***

pEREG

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.02)

(0.06)

(0.10)

(0.02)

Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 22)

–0.00

–0.00

0.01

–0.00

–0.00

–0.00

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

with Significant Fixed Effects Constant

^

X

X

0.42*

0.17**

0.01

0.20***

0.96***

0.12

0.01

0.03

(0.18)

(0.06)

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.30)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.07)

Observations

237

237

237

1995

237

237

237

2005

Panels

40

40

40

375

40

40

40

375

Wald chi-squared

207.21

271.63

28,908.27

357.04

43.57

149.31

15,334.76

294.93

Notes: pEREG = percentage of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. *** p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. ^ p < 0.10.

112

minority rules

The share of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups retains the same strong connection to the percentage of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties ­retains even after introducing other controls and fixed effects in both country and regional levels of aggregation. Model 4 at the regional level indicates that ethnoregional party votes grow by 3.5 percent for every 10 percent increase in pEREG; Model 8 shows that the share of seats won increases by 3.3 percent for a similar change. Decentralization may help to explain the emergence of regional parties. As ­d iscussed at length in Part III, regional governments provide politicians an ­incentive to form regional parties as they offer an opportunity to gain access to power at the regional level. The additional resources available from regional governments may also help nurture regional political parties. Three of the four countries with parties more regional than ethnic in flavor are decentralized. ­A rgentina and ­Germany both have federal systems, and Italy has also decentralized in recent years. The Czech Republic is not decentralized, but the relatively short-lived success of Moravian regional parties may buttress claims that decentralized systems support and maintain regional parties. 55 Jóhanna Kristín Birnir and Donna Lee Van Cott also found that decentralization aids indigenous parties in Latin America. 56 Unlike in models for majoritarian systems, models for PR systems at the country level uncover a positive relationship between decentralization and the share of votes and seats earned by ethnoregional parties. But regional level models differ substantially. Decentralization has an impact only in the seats model; its ­substantive impact is lower in the votes model and ceases to attain statistical significance if one controls for fixed effects. Caution is required in interpreting these coefficients because ethnic parties may predate and successfully push for decentralization, as in Belgium, South Africa, and Spain. Part III attempts to unravel the relationship between decentralization and ethnic parties. The multivariate models also control for elections for a strong president held simultaneously with legislative elections with this variable weighted by the ­percentage of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in the population. The concurrent election of a strong president, defined here as an executive with more than ceremonial powers, has been hypothesized to reduce support for small parties as voters rally to the parties of comparatively successful presidential candidates. Major party presidential candidates may gain more media ­attention and usually have stronger organizations to promote them—and their party. Strong presidential candidates may produce a coattail effect with voters lending ­support to their candidate’s party in legislative elections. 57 David ­Samuels, however, argues that gubernatorial candidates have greater coattails in Brazil, suggesting that simultaneous elections may not always aid the parties of presidential candidates. 58 Ethnoregional parties may suffer particularly as ethnoregional party candidates find it extremely difficult to win presidential



P r o p o r t i o n a l E l e c t o ra l S y s t e m s 

113

elections due to their concentration on a minority of the population and the consequent difficulties in attracting sufficient votes from the majority group to win election. A simultaneously elected strong president, coded 1 for countries with a strong president elected at the same time as the legislature and zero otherwise, is ­multiplied by pEREG as its potential impact should grow with minority group size. After all, simultaneous presidential elections cannot undercut ethnoregional parties in the absence of ethnoregional cleavages likely to stimulate their ­appearance in the first place. The reductive effect on ethnoregional parties should ­correspond at least roughly to group size. All models indicate that simultaneously held presidential elections greatly ­u ndercut the success of ethnoregional parties. Several models (3, 4, 7, and 8) ­indicate presidential elections held at the same time as legislative elections eliminate and even reverse any relationship between the size of the electorally relevant groups and the share of votes or seats won by ethnoregional parties. If so, the creation of a powerful, simultaneously elected chief executive could serve as a means to undercut the expression of ethnoregional cleavages in ­national legislatures.

Conclusion PR systems largely live up to their reputation for encouraging ethnoregional party success. Nevertheless, they vary significantly in the opportunity offered to ethnoregional parties, which is regulated by the specific interaction of ethnic ­geography with constituency magnitudes, legal thresholds, and other institutional factors within each country. Most linguistic minorities above a small size have the potential to surpass the electoral threshold required for an ethnoregional party backed by the group if it exhibits sufficient cohesion. The emergence of ethnoregional parties in most countries with PR systems and linguistic minorities of sufficient size reinforces this conclusion. The share of seats and votes received by an ethnoregional party grows with the size of the electorally relevant group, particularly if the group is regionally concentrated. The final chapter of Part I turns to the study of systems that do not fit either the majoritarian or the proportional rubric. These systems often have many aspects familiar from majoritarian or proportional systems but have their own quirks— some found only in a single country. These unique features often contain important incentives—or disincentives—for ethnoregional parties.

4

Ni-Ni Electoral Systems

French provides electoral system terminology lacking in English, like panachage and apparentement, and French political scientist Maurice Duverger helped found the modern study of electoral systems, so it seems appropriate to use a shortened version of the French phrase ni l’un ni l’autre—neither one nor the other—to ­describe the residual category of electoral systems that are neither majoritarian nor proportional. Although ni-ni systems are a grab bag that fit ­neither the ­w inner-take-all rubric of majoritarian systems nor the proportionality ­conditioned by thresholds that characterizes proportional systems, one can find common threads among them. In different ways, they tend to blunt the success of smaller parties, including ethnoregional parties. Ni-ni systems fall into two broad types. Mixed electoral systems allow voters to cast separate votes for two sets of seats allocated by different systems, most commonly single-member plurality (SMP) and proportional representation (PR). The other broad type of ni-ni electoral system might be labeled accurately as deformed proportionality or proportional with majoritarian incentives. Confusingly, some label these systems as “reinforced proportionality” even though proportionality is undermined rather than reinforced. These systems possess the contours of a proportional electoral system, but the seat allocation formula disadvantages small parties severely or other electoral rules give incentives to support larger parties. Several ni-ni systems combine aspects of both types in unusual ways.1 The remainder of this chapter explores the operation of ni-ni systems and their impact on ethnoregional parties. Ni-ni systems may often seem strange or highly complex. However, unpacking how they operate reveals the degree of constraint on the formation of ethnic and regional parties much as for majoritarian or proportional systems. Just as in these systems, the electoral rules of ni-ni systems provide thresholds that parties must overcome to win seats and make it possible to define electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in line with their ability to overcome them. Some ni-ni systems, however, shape party formation not only through thresholds but also via disincentives to form small parties. Table 4.1 compares the share of ethnic minorities in the population with ­exclusion thresholds for all the ni-ni electoral system cases included in the data 114

Table 4.1  Minorities and Regional Thresholds in Ni-Ni Countries Country

Type

Minority

Andorra

PR

None

Block Bulgaria 1

PR

Percent National

115

Hungary

PR SMD

Percent Minority

Mandates

0

National

14

0

7 Two-member constituencies

14

Turkish

SMD

Greece 2 and 3

Constituency or Region

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Hare Quota: 6.7

Kurdzhali Razgrad Silistra Targovishte Shumen

62 50 36 37 31

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Kurdzhali Razgrad Silistra Targovishte Shumen

62 50 36 37 31

Yes Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear

Muslim

1

National

1

300

Legal: 3

No

Slav Macedonian

1

National

1

300

Legal: 3

No

Roma

2

National

2

210

Legal: 5

No

2

National

2

176

No continued

Table 4.1  (continued) Type

Minority

Percent National

Italy 2

PR

Sardinian Friulian German Ladin Slovenian Valdotain

2.3 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2

National National National National National National

SMD

Sardinian Friulian

2.3 0.9

80 45

14 10

Yes Yes

German

0.5

33

8

Yes

Ladin

0.1

4

8

No

Slovenian

0.1

8

10

No

Valdotain

0.2

Sardinia Friuli-Venezia Giulia Trentino-Alto Adige Trentino-Alto Adige Friuli-Venezia Giulia Aosta Valley

52

1

Yes

Sardinian

2.3

Sardinia

80

Friulian

0.9

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

45

116

Country

Italy 3

PR

Constituency or Region

Percent Minority

Mandates

2.3 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2

155 155 155 155 155 155

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

Legal: 4 Legal: 4 Legal: 4 Legal: 4 Legal: 4 Legal: 4

No No No No No No

Legal: 20 in Region Legal: 20 in Region

Yes Yes

German

0.5

Trentino-Alto Adige Trentino-Alto Adige Friuli-Venezia Giulia

33

Ladin

0.1

Slovenian

0.1

SMD

Valdotain

Japan 1

SNTV

Japan 2

PR

0.2

Aosta Valley

52

1

Yes

Ryukyuan

1

Okinawa

86

5

Yes

Ryukyuan

1

National

1

21

1

Okinawa

86

4

SMD 117

Lesotho 4

PR

None

SMD Lithuania 1

PR SMD

Polish

Legal: 20 in Region Legal: 20 in Region Legal: 20 in Region

4 8

0

40

0

80

7

National Vilnius District Municipality Šalčininkai District Municipality

7

70

Legal: 3

Yes No No

No Yes

Legal: 2 (Minority)

Yes

61

Yes

79

Yes

continued

Table 4.1  (continued) Country

Type

Minority

Percent National

PR

Russian

6

SMD Lithuania 2

PR

Polish

7

118

PR

Russian

6

PR SMD

National SMDs

None

Block Panama

National Vilnius District Municipality Šalčininkai District Municipality

SMD Monaco 2

National SMDs

SMD

PR

Constituency or Region

Indigenous

Percent Minority 6

Mandates

Threshold of Exclusion

Above Threshold?

70

Legal: 2 (Minority)

Yes

0.95) if one controls for Northern Ireland, whose unique party system developed prior to the creation of the Northern Irish regional government.

Autonomy versus Power at the Center Decentralization varies not just in its territorial organization but also in the powers granted to decentralized regions. Lisbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan Schakel’s Regional Authority Index (RAI) highlights “self-rule” powers that give regions more autonomous control over their internal affairs as compared to “shared rule” powers that enhance regional influence over the central government’s actions. Shared rule should encourage ethnoregional party participation in national elections due to the expanded opportunity for political influence over the central government. Self-rule should not have the same effect, though greater autonomy might still spur ethnoregional party success in regional elections—a question not examined here. Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel measure four factors to calculate their measure of self-rule. Regions with autonomous decision-making power have more ­institutional depth than regions that merely administer central government ­decisions or do not possess any regional administration. Policy scope captures the range of regional policy responsibilities, while fiscal autonomy increases with ­independent regional taxation powers. Finally, regions that have their own assembly and e­ xecutive receive higher marks for representation. Self-rule scores range from 0 to 15. Shared rule similarly has four components. Regions that form c­ onstituencies for national elections or whose governments select members of the central ­government legislature score higher in law-making power. They hold more executive control when they make policy and fiscal control when they negotiate with the ­central government over the distribution of its revenues. Regional governments also rate higher the more control that they have over constitutional reform. Shared rule scores range from 0 to 9. 39 Models displayed in Table 10.4 show the estimated effect of self-rule and shared rule on votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties. The coefficients on the ­measures of self-rule in Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 belie the idea that decentralization helps ethnoregional parties. All are close to zero, suggesting that an increase in s­ elf-rule does not assist ethnoregional parties.40 Shared rule, however, has a consistently positive impact on ethnoregional party votes and seats. Models 2, 4, 6,

Table 10.4  Models of the Impact of Different Decentralization Types on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties Percent Votes Country Self-Rule

Shared Rule

Region

(1)

(2)

0.01 (0.01)

–0.03 (0.01)

Self-Rule × Ethnically Decentralized

(3) *

0.00 (0.01)

–0.10 (0.08) 0.31* (0.14)

Shared Rule × Ethnically Decentralized

Percent Seats

–0.09 (0.07)

Country (4) –0.04 (0.01)

***

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.00 (0.01)

–0.02 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.00)

–0.19 *** (0.04) 0.18*** (0.04)

2.67*** (0.43)

0.07*** (0.02)

Region (8) ***

–0.15 (0.10) 0.36** (0.12)

2.88*** (0.12)

0.01 (0.08)

–0.01 (0.01) –0.29 *** (0.03)

0.17*** (0.03)

3.11*** (0.53)

0.02 (0.03) 2.54*** (0.28)

pEREG

0.48*** (0.03)

0.37*** (0.02)

0.35*** (0.01)

0.28*** (0.01)

0.48*** (0.04)

0.32*** (0.03)

0.42*** (0.01)

0.25*** (0.02)

Simultaneously Elected Strong President × pEREG

–0.06 (0.10)

–0.11 (0.12)

–0.36*** (0.01)

–0.29 *** (0.02)

–0.35*** (0.07)

0.00 (0.10)

–0.42*** (0.01)

–0.25*** (0.03)

Ethnic Party Ban × pEREG

–0.26** (0.09)

–0.08 (0.12)

0.06 (0.05)

0.07^ (0.05)

0.04 (0.06)

–0.15^ (0.09)

0.01 (0.04)

0.02 (0.04)

Ballot-Access Requirements × pEREG

–0.37*** (0.10)

–0.24* (0.12)

0.04 (0.03)

0.04 (0.02)

–0.10^ (0.06)

–0.24** (0.08)

0.01 (0.01)

0.00 (0.02) continued

Table 10.4  (continued) Percent Votes

Percent Seats

Country (1)

Region (2)

(3)

Country (4)

(5)

Region (6)

(7)

(8)

Lower Threshold × Percentage Additional Ethnoregional Groups

1.55 (0.31)

1.60 (0.35)

0.87 (0.18)

0.83 (0.18)

2.80 (0.34)

2.53 (0.26)

0.90 (0.29)

0.84** (0.30)

Best-Loser System (Mauritius or Rodrigues)

5.09 *** (0.73)

4.80*** (0.73)

63.43*** (1.58)

70.39 *** (1.25)

5.19 *** (0.91)

5.38*** (0.91)

57.99 *** (1.82)

74.65*** (2.10)

Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 23)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00*** (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Constant

0.00 (0.02)

0.65*** (0.12)

0.07 (0.05)

0.28*** (0.05)

–0.04 (0.10)

0.24 (0.18)

0.01** (0.01)

0.09 (0.07)

Observations Panels Wald chi-squared

***

***

***

***

***

***

**

443

443

4338

4338

444

444

4388

4388

76

76

746

746

76

76

746

746

522

801

7415

153,803

364

583

6728

15,054

Notes: pEREG = percent electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. All models are cross-sectional time-series generalized least squares models with clustered standard errors. ***p < 0.001. **p < 0.01. *p < 0.05. ^p < 0.10.



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and 8 add interactions between self-rule and shared rule with ethnic decentralization. These models indicate that the shared rule’s positive effect on ethnoregional ­parties occurs mostly within ethnically decentralized countries. All of the country and region models indicate that a one point increase in shared rule raises the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties by around 3 percent in ethnically decentralized countries or regions—a sizeable impact for a small change. Interestingly, region Models 4 and 8 indicate that i­ncreases in self-rule reduces the ethnoregional party vote share by 0.2 percent and seat share by 0.3 percent in ethnically decentralized regions. Country Models 2 and 6 point in similar directions but the coefficients are not statistically significant at ­conventional levels. These results suggest that even if decentralization stimulates ethnoregional parties that its effects can be contained through the construction of decentralized institutions. Decentralization has little or no impact outside of ethnically decentralized countries. If anything, additional self-rule slightly dampens ­ ­support for ethnoregional parties in line with the theory that autonomy assuages regional d­ emands. Shared rule may increase the share of votes and seats obtained by ethnoregional parties within ethnically decentralized countries beyond their strength prior to decentralization. In ethnically decentralized countries, ­decentralization’s impact on ethnoregional parties remains neutral or negative if ­regional powers focus on additional autonomy rather than more influence for the region over the central government.

Electoral Systems Multivariate models presented in Table 10.5 test the direct impact of electoral systems on votes and seats received by ethnoregional parties. While PR systems should make it easier for parties representing ethnoregional minorities to enter the legislature, increasing the incentive to vote for them, majoritarian systems should undercut them.41 The effect should be muted, however, because the definition of electorally relevant ethnoregional groups already takes into account the impact of the electoral system and any penalty it places on a group’s ability to support a viable ethnoregional party. Ethnoregional groups that cannot pass the threshold of exclusion, and are consequently unlikely to win seats, are not counted as electorally relevant, so pEREG does include them. In ni-ni systems with two votes, one for seats allocated by a majoritarian system and another for seats allotted by PR, each portion of the system is lumped separately with majoritarian and PR systems as appropriate. The remaining ni-ni systems tend to ­possess incentives to vote for larger parties so should have a similarly negative effect on ethnoregional parties as majoritarian systems. Country Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 reveal that proportional and majoritarian electoral systems have no statistically significant effect but that ni-ni systems reduce slightly the share of votes and seats won by ethnoregional parties. Region

Table 10.5  Models of the Impact of Electoral Systems on Votes and Seats Won by Ethnoregional Parties Percent Votes Country (1) Proportional Electoral System

Percent Seats Region

(2)

0.08 (0.13)

(3)

Country (4)

0.29 *** (0.05)

(5)

Region (6)

0.01 (0.08)

(7)

(8)

0.07 (0.04)

Majoritarian Electoral System

0.01 (0.17)

–0.29 *** (0.05)

0.10 (0.17)

–0.08^ (0.04)

Ni-Ni Electoral System

–0.18* (0.07)

–0.30 *** (0.05)

–0.32*** (0.04)

–0.08^ (0.05)

Ethnic Decentralization

5.69 *** (0.92)

5.41*** (0.09)

8.09 *** (0.24)

8.07*** (0.24)

5.40*** (1.00)

4.95*** (0.98)

5.99 *** (0.77)

5.95*** (0.77)

Non-Ethnic Decentralization

0.79 (1.38)

0.78 (1.43)

0.02 (0.05)

0.01 (0.05)

0.72 (0.95)

0.75 (1.00)

0.05 (0.06)

0.05 (0.05)

pEREG

0.42*** (0.03)

0.41*** (0.03)

0.29 *** (0.01)

0.29 *** (0.01)

0.39 *** (0.04)

0.36*** (0.03)

0.28*** (0.02)

0.28*** (0.02)

Simultaneously Elected Strong President × pEREG

–0.09 (0.10)

–0.10 (0.10)

–0.29 *** (0.01)

–0.29 *** (0.01)

–0.26*** (0.07)

–0.22*** (0.06)

–0.28*** (0.02)

–0.28*** (0.02)

Ethnic Party Ban × pEREG

–0.16^ (0.09)

–0.14 (0.09)

0.01 (0.05)

0.01 (0.05)

0.03 (0.05)

0.03 (0.04)

0.01 (0.04)

0.01 (0.04)

Ballot-Access Requirements × pEREG

–0.23* (0.10)

–0.22* (0.10)

0.10 ** (0.04)

0.10 ** (0.04)

–0.13* (0.06)

–0.13** (0.05)

0.00 (0.01)

0.00 (0.01)

Lower Threshold × Percentage Additional Ethnoregional Groups

1.23*** (0.36)

1.27*** (0.32)

0.84*** (0.16)

0.84*** (0.17)

2.18*** (0.49)

2.23*** (0.44)

0.83** (0.28)

0.83** (0.28)

Best-Loser System (Mauritius or Rodrigues)

5.26*** (0.73)

5.16*** (0.75)

69.74*** (1.42)

69.72*** (1.42)

5.42*** (0.91)

5.39 *** (0.92)

72.37*** (1.66)

71.72*** (1.65)

Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 23)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00* (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

Constant

0.03 (0.10)

0.11 (0.07)

0.02 (0.02)

0.31*** (0.04)

–0.00 (0.08)

0.01 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

0.05 (0.03)

Observations Panels Wald chi-squared

446

446

4385

4385

447

447

4435

4435

77

77

761

761

77

77

761

761

891

895

60,398

61,718

361

353

142,634

162,580

Notes: pEREG = percent electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. All models are cross-sectional time-series generalized least squares models with clustered standard errors. ***p < 0.001. **p < 0.01. *p < 0.05. ^p < 0.10.

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Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 suggest that all electoral systems have at least some effect on ­ethnoregional party vote and seat shares. Proportional systems increase their share of votes by 0.3 percent and majoritarian and ni-ni systems decrease it by a similar amount. The impact on seats is smaller—less than 0.1 percent in each direction. Though in the expected direction, the electoral system has only a small direct effect, suggesting that their impact occurs primarily via shaping the political ­relevance of ethnoregional groups (i.e., pEREG).

Economic Explanations The remainder of the chapter tests non-institutional explanations for ethnoregional  party success starting with economic explanations. Citizens may feel freer to turn to post-material concerns, such as the expression of ethnic or ­regional identities, once more fundamental needs, such as those related to food, shelter, employment and health care, have been met.42 In poor countries, however, ­ ethnoregional parties have often successfully utilized group-oriented ­patronage to mobilize voters, so high living standards may predict ethnoregional party p­ erformance less well than post-materialist theories suggest.43 Income and human development should both correlate strongly with the emergence of ­post-materialist values; Model 1 in Table 10.6 controls for the natural logarithm of purchasing power parity while Model 2 includes the UN’s Human Development Index, which can range from 0 to 1.44 The models indicate that income and human development do not increase votes for ethnoregional parties. Indeed, the coefficient on human development is negative—opposite that predicted by post-material theories—though neither coefficient is statistically significant at ­conventional levels.45 Though high living standards conducive to post-materialism do not increase ethnoregional party support, inequality might produce a stronger effect. Regardless of a country’s wealth, high levels of inequality may create discontent that ­ethnoregional parties can harness. Parties can blame inequality on unfair favoritism of one group over another. In order to permit assessment of this ­hypothesis, Model 3 in Table 10.6 includes the Gini income inequality index, which ranges from 0 to 1. Contrary to the notion that inequality promotes ethnoregional ­parties, the coefficient on the Gini index predicts that inequality ­decreases ­support for ethnoregional parties. An increase of one standard deviation in ­inequality among the countries in the dataset (0.10) reduces ethnoregional party votes by 0.2 percent. Finally, several theories indicate that either comparatively poor or rich regions may provide disproportionate support to ethnoregional parties. Michael Hechter argues that exploitation related to internal colonialism of poor peripheral regions stimulates ethnoregional party gains.46 Peter Gourevitch sees this outcome as



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Table 10.6  Economic Models of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties Percent Votes (1) Natural Logarithm of Purchasing Power Parity ($1000)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.01 (0.12)

Human Development Index

–0.22 (0.43)

Gini Income Inequality Index

–2.01** (0.66)

Rich Ethnoterritorial Region Weighted by its Proportion of the Population

16.53 (14.66)

Poor Ethnoterritorial Region Weighted by its Proportion of the Population

8.05 (5.12)

Upper House Chosen by Regional Governments

–19.91***

–18.82***

(4.84)

(4.86)

20.50 ***

(4.97)

Upper House Chosen by Regional Governments × Decentralized

26.90

25.28

20.50

22.82***

(5.14)

(5.15)

(4.72)

(5.40)

Ethnic Decentralization

2.86 (0.62)

2.76 (0.63)

2.87 (0.66)

1.59 * (0.69)

Non-Ethnic Decentralization

–0.23 (0.25)

–0.33 (0.26)

0.06 (0.29)

–0.24** (0.09)

pEREG

0.36*** (0.03)

0.38*** (0.03)

0.37*** (0.03)

0.37*** (0.03)

Simultaneously Elected Strong President × pEREG

0.21* (0.10)

0.15 (0.10)

0.02 (0.09)

0.18^ (0.10)

Ethnic Party Ban × pEREG

0.04 (0.07)

0.07 (0.08)

0.08 (0.07)

0.05 (0.08)

Ballot-Access Requirements × pEREG

–0.55*** (0.09)

–0.51*** (0.10)

–0.34*** (0.09)

–0.68*** (0.13)

1.25***

1.27***

1.37***

1.23***

Lower Threshold × Percentage Additional Ethnoregional Groups

***

***

(0.21)

***

***

(0.21)

–12.58** ***

***

(0.22)

–18.98***

(0.21) continued

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Table 10.6  (continued) Percent Votes (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Best-Loser System (Mauritius)

5.21 (0.72)

5.02 (0.71)

5.23 (0.73)

4.93*** (0.73)

Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 23)

–0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

Constant

0.25 (0.37)

0.54 (0.35)

1.00** (0.32)

0.28*** (0.09)

Observations Panels Wald chi-squared

***

***

***

446

446

446

446

77

77

77

77

582.91

571.30

698.76

723.96

Notes: pEREG = percent electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. All models are crosssectional time-series generalized least squares models with clustered standard errors. The Human Development Index and Gini Coefficient range from zero to 1. ***p < 0.001. **p < 0.01. *p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.

e­ specially likely if the poorer region’s economy is improving relative to the center or if it contains resources that give it in an economic edge for future development.47 Several scholars, however, believe that affluent regions develop stronger ethnoregional parties because their citizens resent subsidizing poorer ­regions through taxes or possess greater political and economic resources.48 Donald Horowitz views separatist movements as most likely to grow in either advanced or backward regions but rare in economically advanced countries—the latter point belied by Models 1 and 2.49 Model 4 includes controls for rich and poor ethnoterritorial regions weighted by the region’s proportion of the country’s population. Some countries, like Spain, contain ethnically distinct poor regions and rich regions. The measures exclude a few microstates, such as St. Kitts and Nevis, for which data on the relative wealth of regions was unavailable. Neither of the coefficients on the two controls achieves statistical significance (p < 0.10). The positive value of the two coefficients, however, suggests that theories that comparatively affluent or impoverished regions support ethnoregional parties at higher rates might point in the right direction even if they are not validated here. The models displayed in Table 10.6 provide little support for economic theories of ethnoregional party performance. Neither deprivation nor affluence—in the country as a whole or ethnically distinct regions—predict ethnoregional party success. Regions that have reason to be angry over poor economic development or possess the resources to go their own way are not especially likely to vote



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for ethnoregional parties. Similarly, countries prone to post-material concerns do not lend ethnoregional parties particularly high levels of support. Even inequality does not aid ethnoregional parties.

Strategic Explanations Strategic explanations of ethnoregional party success focus not on institutions or underlying grievances that stoke minority discontent but on positions taken by other parties. Rational choice theory traditionally focused on the distance between positions held by ethnoregional and other parties. When other parties take strongly different positions, ethnoregional parties should prosper as they can occupy greater political space left open by parties opposed to their platform. In her innovate study, Bonnie Meguid argues that mainstream parties hold other weapons in their arsenal beyond positioning. Specifically, their actions can raise ethnoregional party salience through vocal hostility or deflect attention from them by taking a dismissive stance and turning their focus to other issues. ­Mainstream parties make strategic choices based not just on ethnoregional ­parties but also on the impact of these choices on their mainstream party opposition. In the United Kingdom, Conservative opposition to Scottish and Welsh autonomy undoubtedly fit well with the party’s strong unionist views. It also had multiple strategic advantages. Highlighting their opposition placed the SNP and Plaid in the spotlight and put pressure on the Labour Party. Most nationalist gains occur at Labour’s expense as they have dominated Scottish and Welsh ­constituencies. If Labour moves too far to accommodate peripheral nationalisms, it risks alienating the dominant English electorate. 50 The models presented in Table 10.7 contain controls designed to test simple versions of strategic theories. Model 1 includes a measure of the proportion of votes won by extreme right parties. Usually very hostile to minority nationalisms, 51 extreme right party success should highlight ethnoregional issues. ­Additionally, their success may promote greater fear among minorities that drives ethnoregional party support. The model utterly fails to support this theory, suggesting instead that support for extreme right parties actually slightly reduces votes for ethnoregional party. The coefficient predicts that a 10 percent increase in votes for the extreme right cuts ethnoregional party support by 0.2 percent. Model 2 in Table 10.7 tests a simpler version of Bonnie Meguid’s theory. It includes controls for whether the major left- and right-wing parties take adversarial or accommodative positions toward ethnoregional minority autonomy and rights. Both measures are coded zero when the party takes a dismissive position or ethnoregional minority rights are not an issue. The presence of adversarial parties increases the ethnoregional party vote share, especially when the major leftwing party takes an adversarial position. When the major left-wing party adopts

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minority rules

Table 10.7  Strategic Models of Votes Won by Ethnoregional Parties Percent Votes (1) Proportion Votes for Extreme Right Parties

(2)

–1.55 (0.65) *

Adversarial Left Party

2.47*** (0.53)

Accommodative Left Party

0.43 (0.46)

Adversarial Right Party

0.83* (0.36)

Accommodative Right Party

0.29 (0.46)

Gini Coefficient

–1.72* (0.68)

–0.80^ (0.43)

Upper House Chosen by Regional Governments

–1.69^

–2.39

(0.91)

(1.98)

Upper House Chosen by Regional Governments × Decentralized

***

8.01 (1.87)

9.00*** (2.69)

Ethnic Decentralization

3.02*** (0.69)

3.92*** (0.79)

Non-Ethnic Decentralization

0.12 (0.38)

0.25 (0.48)

pEREG

0.39 *** (0.03)

0.33*** (0.03)

Simultaneously Elected Strong President × pEREG

–0.29 *** (0.06)

–0.20 * (0.08)

Ethnic Party Ban × pEREG

0.11^ (0.06)

0.05 (0.08)

Ballot-Access Requirements × pEREG

–0.07 (0.06)

–0.09 (0.08)

Lower Threshold × Percent Additional Ethnoregional Groups Best-Loser System (Mauritius)

1.53***

1.38***

(0.31)

(0.28)

5.16 (0.74)

4.75*** (0.89)

***



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Table 10.7  (continued) Percent Votes (1)

(2)

Year (1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, . . . 2012 = 23)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00^ (0.00)

Constant

0.86** (0.32)

0.36* (0.18)

Observations Panels Wald chi-squared

446

446

77

77

633.29

794.88

Notes: pEREG = percent electorally relevant ethnoregional groups. All models are crosssectional time-series generalized least squares models with clustered standard errors.***p < 0.001.**p < 0.01.*p < 0.05. ^p < 0.10.

an adversarial position toward ethnoregional minority autonomy, ethnoregional parties win an additional 2.5 percent of the vote but they gain only 0.8 percent when the major right party takes an adversarial stance. Accommodative major parties do not appear to reduce ethnoregional party support. This finding, however, may stem from the comparatively basic nature of the measures and model. 52 The adversarial position of left parties may influence ethnoregional party support more because ethnoregional autonomist parties also tend to congregate on the left of the political spectrum. Despite the success of right-wing ethnoregional parties like Catalonia’s CiU and the Ticino League, more nationalist movements, including Latin America’s indigenous parties, the Basque Country’s PNV, Scotland’s SNP, Wales’s Plaid, and Quebec’s BQ , appear on the left. Generally ­perceived as more open to minority rights than their right counterparts, major left parties are also more willing to address economic grievances. When major left parties take an adversarial position, it leaves left-wing ethnoregional minorities isolated and likely helps them drum up support to protect group rights. It also opens up political turf that might otherwise be occupied by the major left party. Strategic theories that take into account party positions hold out promise to compliment institutional theories of ethnoregional party success. 53 Electoral systems may constrain which cleavages can gain expression through the political system even as party strategy as well as institutions helps account for variations in the level of support for ethnoregional parties within these constraints across countries and time. Bonnie Meguid’s discussion of party strategy dovetails nicely with explanations for why decentralization may not independently stir up support for ethnoregional parties in national elections in the absence of ­pre-existing ethnoregional cleavages that propelled decentralization. In centralized and ­

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d­ ecentralized countries alike, non-ethnoregional parties can act strategically in way that augment or tamp down ethnoregional party strength. Moreover, parties may decentralize and sacrifice power in regional elections to consolidate power at the national level. 54

Conclusion Multivariate models provide further evidence that any link between decentralization and ethnoregional party success is limited to ethnically decentralized countries. Ethnoregional parties do not perform more strongly in non-ethnically ­decentralized countries than in centralized countries, a clear sign that decentralized institutions do not inherently cause the development of decentralized parties. Historical analysis presented in the previous chapter reveals that ­ethnoregional parties do not gain strength after decentralization in most ethnically decentralized countries. Instead, the most logical explanation for the greater success of ethnoregional parties in ethnically decentralized countries is the continuation of the same cleavages and parties that propelled the creation of decentralized institutions. Decentralization’s territorial organization can influence the extent to which decentralization tends to promote the maintenance or growth of ethnoregional parties within ethnically decentralized countries. Ethnoregional parties achieve the greatest success in countries decentralized entirely along ethnic lines as ­compared to when the dominant nation is broken up among several regions. Dividing minority ethnic groups among several regions also shows promise as a means to reduce ethnoregional party support, as does keeping the dominant nation g­ overned by the central government. The powers granted to regions through decentralization further shape its impact. In general, ethnoregional parties fare better in countries that grant ­regions additional power over the central government. In particular, bicameralism can aid ethnoregional parties in lower house elections when regions ­possess the power to select members of the upper house. On the other hand, ethnoregional parties receive no benefit from regional autonomy that offers regions greater ­control over internal regional governance but does not expand their ­influence at the center. The attempt to incorporate economic theories into models of votes won by ethnoregional parties was less successful. Ethnoregional parties gain no extra votes in countries with either wealthy or poor ethnically distinct regions. Countries with high levels of income and human development do not show additional ­support for ethnoregional parties, as predicted by post-material theories. Inequality does not enhance ethnoregional party support. If anything, the reverse is true.



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In contrast, multivariate models provide support for strategic theories. The presence of adversarial major parties stimulates more votes for ethnoregional parties, even if strong extreme right parties do not have the same effect. Adversarial left-wing parties have an especially strong impact, probably because they are often more competitive with ethnoregional parties.

11

Conclusion

Electoral rules shape the nature of ethnic and regional cleavages and ­ethnoregional party success. But decentralization does not have the same consistent effect. Rather than systematically influencing the share of votes and seats won by ethno­ regional parties, decentralization often is a product of these same ethnic forces. This chapter examines key implications of these findings, especially those related to the prevention and mitigation of ethnic conflict. In that vein, I focus particularly on the representation of ethnic minority groups and their incorporation into government in a broader sense.

Structuring the Ethnoregional Party Success Analysis of ethnoregional party success suggests that institutional designers can aid their efforts but also impose limits on their power. Ethnoregional parties fare best when the electoral system provides them with genuine opportunities to win seats. Voters prove reluctant to give their votes to parties that lack the potential to win them representation. Strategic elites reinforce this dynamic, as they are less willing to invest in parties that cannot serve as vehicles to gain elected office. Instead, the electoral system gives them strong incentives to make their political careers within national parties. Electoral systems have often been structured to achieve political ends. ­Uruguay’s two major parties colluded to switch from a plurality to a majoritarian system for presidential elections to thwart the victory of a rising left-wing party candidate.1 Sweden invented the modified Sainte-Laguë system with its seemingly odd first divisor of 1.4 as a solution to the very political problem of how to advance the interests of the Agrarians without helping the Communists.2 France switched from majoritarian to proportional elections for National Assembly elections to aid the governing Socialists who were expected to lose the upcoming elections. The country changed back to a majoritarian system to undercut the extreme-right National Front. 3

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C o n c l u s i o n

329

Writers of electoral rules have hardly been ignorant of their potential impact on ethnic and regional minorities. Countries have often altered their thresholds or constituency boundaries to advance or to hinder minority representation. Poland and Germany exempt minorities from thresholds applied to ­non-minority parties. The United States draws its state and national legislative districts to make it possible for African-American and Latino voters to elect their preferred ­candidates. New Zealand’s unique system of dual constituencies and electoral rolls accomplishes the same goal. Constituency boundaries can also be drawn with an eye toward minority representation in countries with proportional ­representation systems. Denmark drew its South Schleswig constituency to allow its German minority to win legislative seats. Finland and Italy reserve seats for small regions—Åland in Finland and the Aosta Valley in Italy—to assure that ethnic minorities in these regions gain a voice at the national level. Many Pacific Island and Caribbean countries overrepresent smaller islands in their legislatures. Mauritius adopted its best-loser system as part of an effort to dampen ethnic minority concerns about their marginalization in an independent parliamentary democracy. Institutional designers can use this knowledge to either help or stymie ­ethnoregional parties. The broader impact of ethnoregional parties on the political system and democratic stability is admittedly not always clear. Ethnoregional party representation may increase stability in democratic countries by providing groups with representation at the national level. The very success of such parties may, however, exacerbate divisions, particularly if such parties are systematically relegated to the opposition. Perpetual opposition may advance their efforts to portray themselves as advocates for a victimized minority but undermine the legitimacy of the political system. The scope for regulation via the electoral system is not limitless. In particular, parties supported by regionally concentrated minorities can win ­representation under most majoritarian and proportional electoral systems alike. Even bans on ethnic parties have not shown much promise at limiting ethnoregional ­parties in free democracies. Ballot-access laws that mandate the demonstration of support through signature or vote requirements prove more effective, possibly because they provide a straightforward mechanism to enforce their exclusion. While ethnic party bans can be problematic to enforce due to difficulties over the definition of ethnic parties, evasion by the ban’s targets, and fears that bans are anti-democratic, ballot-access rules provide enforceable means to exclude ethnoregional parties that may attract less attention due to their arcane, bureaucratic form. Countries may also try to include or to exclude ethnoregional parties through legal thresholds. In sum, institutional designers possess a number of options in their toolkit to structure competition and to mold ethnoregional party electoral prospects.

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minority rules

Even if the interaction of ethnic geography with electoral rules changes their impact from country to country, they nonetheless provide options to achieve the desired goal. Since ethnic divisions can provide among the strongest challenges to ­democratic stability, it is important to keep the impact of electoral rules on ethnoregional parties and cleavages in mind when crafting them.

Decentralization and Ethnic Conflict Decentralization as a mechanism for reducing ethnic conflict has been fiercely debated among both scholars and practitioners. The adoption of decentralized institutions has been viewed as having the potential to undercut ethnic conflict by providing a means through which regional minorities can exercise power and satisfy demands at the regional level. Sharing power appeases ethnoregional demands that might otherwise escalate into violent ethnic conflict. In countries where ethnic conflict has already emerged, decentralization may provide a means to end it. Not all scholars have been as sanguine about decentralization as either a ­preventive or palliative measure for ethnic conflict. Some fear that decentralization heightens ethnic divisions by enshrining them in government institutions. Rather than undercutting the forces promoting ethnoregional divisions, decentralization augments them by giving their proponents additional power and ammunition to fight for their cause. Instead of appeasing ethnoregional minorities, the grant of power at the regional level places resources in the hands of divisive forces. Despite the ability to address at least some demands at the regional level, ethnoregional parties will have a strong interest in maintaining a sense of victimization and consequently highlight or invent new grievances to build support. In effect, decentralization assures the perpetuation of parties that are fundamentally opposed to the integrity of the state by providing them with a resource base. Other scholars have argued that decentralization may have the unintended effect of freezing ethnic conflicts. Solutions that institutionalize ethnic divisions in the name of promoting reconciliation between different groups may ironically assure that the political power of these divisions last longer. For example, the complex multilayered decentralized structures put into place in Bosnia as part of the Dayton Agreement to end that violent conflict assure that ethnicity remains central to Bosnian politics.4 Through the creation of ethnic fiefdoms, the settlement privileges politicians who maintain adversarial relationships with other ethnic groups and makes bridge building difficult as proponents of reconciliation face constant threat from opponents within their group. Even leaders who would move beyond ethnicity find it difficult when positions of power are allocated on an ethnic basis.

C o n c l u s i o n

331

Dawn Brancati suggests a specific mechanism through which d­ ecentralization undercuts efforts at solving the very problem that it was meant to solve. The creation of regional governments promotes ethnoregional parties that have little stake in the country as a whole but see much benefit in highlighting ethno­ regional divisions to attract support. In effect, the aid given to ethnoregional parties by decentralization stimulates ethnic conflict, thus undercutting any ameliorative impact of decentralization through its appeasement of regional minorities. 5 While the jury may still be out on the question of whether decentralization can successfully prevent or abate ethnic conflicts, the results presented here indicate strongly that countries should not shy away from decentralized institutions out of fear that they will indirectly propel ethnic conflict forward via ­ethnoregional parties. Instead, cross-national analysis of elections over the past two decades in democratic countries around the globe suggests that ­ethnoregional parties do not systematically benefit from decentralization. Careful historical analysis reveals that ethnoregional parties are often stronger in decentralized countries precisely because of their key role in the creation of decentralized institutions. Quantitative case studies of Spain and Italy, which decentralized gradually after democratization, also show that decentralization does not consistently result in more or less successful ethnoregional parties. The prospect of decentralization may incentivize ethnoregional party creation and support just as much as the creation of decentralized regional governments. Even in the absence of decentralized institutions, ethnoregional parties can form to agitate for their creation. Nonetheless, Dawn Brancati is on the right track when she suggests that the election of national upper houses by regional legislatures may spur greater ­ethnoregional party success. Granting regions more influence over the central government, rather than autonomy within regions, may aid ethnoregional parties, though the effects are limited to ethnically decentralized countries. Policymakers who wish to dampen ethnic divisions and avoid prospective ethnic conflicts without encouraging greater ethnoregional party growth at the national level would be wise to hesitate before giving regions additional control over the center. Such links along with ethnoterritorial decentralization may help entrench ethnic divisions by giving them greater opportunity to operate at the national level and thus undermine attempts to break out of the ethnic mold as feared by Richard Pildes. 6 In sum, while this study does not bring new evidence to bear on the question of whether decentralization directly exacerbates or assuages ethnic conflict, it refutes the notion that decentralization necessarily propels ethnic conflict forward indirectly via ethnoregional parties. Moreover, any positive impact of the construction of decentralized institutions on ethnoregional parties occurs only within ethnically decentralized countries and can be sharply curtailed, even eliminated, through attention to their design.

332

minority rules

Assuaging Ethnic Conflict and Assuring Minority Inclusion This study’s conclusions provide additional clues in the search for tools to assuage ethnic tensions to prevent the emergence of ethnic conflict. They also provide the jumping off point for related investigations. Beyond the electoral rules explored here, preference voting may ameliorate interethnic tensions by forcing politics in a more cooperative direction and encouraging constituency-oriented representation. More broadly, the study of ethnoregional parties is only the beginning of understanding the meaningful representation of ethnic minorities, including their incorporation into government.

Preference Voting Though this work examines many electoral rules and institutions, it has been relatively silent on the impact of preference voting—electoral systems that either require voters to rank candidates or give voters the opportunity to aid specific candidates even if they may vote for only one party. Ranking Candidates

The alternative vote utilized in Australia and the single-transferable vote (STV) employed by Ireland and Malta require voters to rank candidates in their order of preference. Common to both systems is that votes not used to elect a candidate may end up being transferred to their next ranked preference. Nauruan voters must also rank candidates. Unusually, all candidates ranked by voters gain votes but the number of votes depends upon the ranking. Scholars have speculated that ranked preference electoral systems, like the alternative vote and STV, may undercut ethnic conflict by tamping down the adversarial nature of elections. Candidates seek second preferences from voters whose first choice is another candidate in case first preferences alone do not decide the election and avoid strong attacks out of fear of alienating supporters of these candidates. Benjamin Reilly in his examination of extremely ethnically fractionalized elections in Papua New Guinea found that the alternative vote ameliorated ethnic tensions that often slid into interethnic violence.7 STV may further undercut the partisan nature of elections as candidates of the same party are in competition with each other as much as with candidates from other parties. As a result, candidates try to gain a personal following to garner a higher ranking than other candidates from the same party. In Ireland, one of the two countries to use STV to elect its parliament, successful politicians pay strong attention to constituency-­centered concerns and sometimes orient their focus to one area within the constituency to win greater support.

C o n c l u s i o n

333

Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral systems can have the same impact even if voters cannot express full lists of preferences. Although voters can cast a vote for only a single candidate despite the election of multiple ­legislators for each constituency, that vote is analogous to a preference for a ­particular c­ andidate within a political party. Studies of politics in the three East Asian countries that have used SNTV—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—all found that it ­encouraged candidate-centered, retail politics in which ­candidates often cultivate a specific geographic area within the constituency. 8 In Taiwan, however, parties tried to undercut this spur to intraparty competition by directing supporters to vote for particular candidates based on their identity card numbers or where they live, though the latter strategy hardly undercuts ­constituency-centered politics.9 None of the countries that use the alternative vote, STV, or SNTV electoral systems have strong ethnic parties. The candidate-centered nature of campaigns, which encourages all candidates to pay attention to regional and constituency concerns, may make the political atmosphere less hospitable to them. However, the absence of such parties may be due to ethnic homogeneity in countries like Japan. Similarly, Ireland’s Protestant minority is too small and too dispersed to elect members of parliament (MPs) on a Protestant ticket. More telling, perhaps, is the absence of strong ethnoregional parties in places like Taiwan that have salient ethno-linguistic cleavages. Not all evidence suggests that these systems prevent ethnoregional party ­formation. Northern Ireland’s party system remains largely communal though it uses STV to elect its regional parliament. Preferences tend to flow overwhelmingly to candidates from parties within confessional groups. The system may nonetheless undercut polarization as the more moderate unionist and nationalist parties benefit from preferences that come to them from more extreme parties. Parties often have strong regional bases in South Korea, suggesting that SNTV may not be a barrier to regional party formation in an ethnically homogenous society. Candidate Preferences

More broadly, preference voting includes systems that mandate or allow voters to cast ballots for specific candidates as well as parties. In majoritarian systems, open block voting systems permit voters to cast a single vote for as many candidates as there are positions to fill. Voters can cast all their votes from ­candidates from the same party or distribute their votes among candidates of different ­parties. In proportional systems, panachage permits voters to cast as many votes as there are candidates and to split them among candidates from different parties. Utilized in Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, panachage allows voters to d­ etermine not just which parties win seats but the order of party lists and thus which candidates fill any seats won.

334

minority rules

In other proportional and mixed systems, voters may not express preferences outside of their party choice but often still can cast a preference for one or ­several candidates within that party. The impact of preferences varies considerably. ­Several countries have rules that make it difficult to alter the predetermined party list despite permitting voters to express preferences. However, two countries— Brazil and Finland—leave it completely to the voters to determine the order in which candidates of each party are eligible to occupy seats. Still other countries make it relatively easy for voters to alter the predetermined order even if the ­decision is not left entirely in the hands of voters. Ethnoregional parties fare poorly in most countries with either panachage or that give complete power to the electorate to order lists. As in countries with SNTV, the search for voter support may press successful candidates to provide strong constituency and regional representation and weaken parties. If all representatives work to present themselves as effective constituency or regional ­representatives, ethnoregional parties may have difficulty gaining traction. The evidence that candidate preferences dampen ethnic parties is not wholly convincing. Some countries with preference voting, like Finland, possess successful ethnoregional parties. The lack of ethnoregional parties in others may reflect the absence of ethnoregional minorities or spurious correlation. Among the three countries with panachage, two—Liechtenstein and Luxembourg—are small and have few indigenous ethnic minorities. The third, Switzerland, has political institutions that foster consociationalism despite linguistic divisions. In some countries with preference votes, the absence of ethnoregional parties may be attributed to barriers posed by other electoral rules. Brazil and Peru, for example, make it extremely difficult for regional parties to gain access to the ballot. Nevertheless, preference voting merits continued investigation because it ­harnesses existing political forces to assuage ethnic tensions. Rather than suppressing ethnic and regional political forces or appealing to the better natures of candidates against self-interest, ranking candidates may encourage moderation out of the strategic necessity to appeal to voters from different parties and backgrounds. Candidate preferences of all types appear to spur candidates to cultivate constituencies in a manner that can make it harder for regional parties to compete. They also force intraparty competition that may undermine group and party solidarity. If the presence of ethnoregional parties is viewed as a threat to stable democracies, then preference voting may prove a potent tool to undercut them.

Incorporation into Government Protest Is Not Enough, Rufus Browning, David Tabb, and Dale Marshall’s seminal work on African-American and Latino political power in 10 northern California cities, develops a hierarchy of minority inclusion in government. In their view, though representation is obviously preferable to complete exclusion, inclusion

C o n c l u s i o n

335

in the dominant governing coalition represents more meaningful participation and lends itself to incorporation in the government. Incorporation is superior to representation because minority representatives possess the opportunity to make decisions as well as speak out on behalf of their constituents.10 The concept of incorporation can easily be translated from American municipalities to national legislatures. Especially in parliamentary systems, being part of the government majority is crucial to moving beyond voice to influence and power. Northern Ireland demonstrates vividly why the permanent exclusion of ­ethnoregional minorities from government can promote ethnic conflict. The confessional party system led to the exclusion of Catholic Nationalists as Protestant Unionists held a perpetual majority in Northern Ireland’s parliament. Such exclusion and rampant discrimination eventually resulted in protest and then the ­v iolence of “the Troubles.”11 Serious study of ethnic conflict avoidance and resolution will need to examine not just factors that enable or impede ethnoregional party electoral success but their inclusion in government. Constant inclusion is not necessarily required for legitimacy across ethnic and regional communities as long as one can envision today’s opposition joining tomorrow’s government. Permanent exclusion, however, can delegitimize government institutions, as the minority never participates in decision-making so its views are not taken into account to any great extent. Northern Ireland demonstrates not just the problem but one potential solution. The Belfast Agreement, which slowly brought an end to this violent conflict, mandates the inclusion of both Unionist and Nationalist parties in the province’s parliament and executive.12 Northern Ireland was not the first to adopt forced consociationalism as a solution to governance in a polarized political system. The Belgian Constitution mandates that Dutch and French speakers hold equal numbers of cabinet seats leaving aside the prime minister.13 Switzerland has taken a somewhat similar approach though its results are grounded not in law but in ­tradition—forming a government based in the German majority would not be illegal but unthinkable. This multilingual Alpine country has a plural executive with seven members and a rotating presidency that makes it easier to include ­Francophone and Italian members, and the government is supported by an ­oversized, diverse coalition.14 Consociationalism is not the only route to inclusion. As chapter 8 explains, many ethnoregional parties have participated in government coalitions or provided support from outside the coalition. For example, neither major Indian political party can win a majority easily on its own, so both depend upon regional alliances.15 Spain’s electoral system allows each of its major parties to win majorities on occasion, but both often fall short and require support from regional parties. The inclusion of ethnoregional parties in government may depend upon many factors. Ethnoregional parties may become more desirable coalition partners as their share of seats rises. Nevertheless, the probability of ethnoregional party

336

minority rules

inclusion could decline as they win more seats if the majority feels threatened and majority-group parties find it politically impossible to form coalitions with them. Similarly, ethnoregional party inclusion in government may become less likely as extreme-right party strength grows. Radical right parties often take hostile stances to ethnic minorities, so their success may discourage ethnoregional party inclusion.16 Similarly, if the government contains radical right parties, it seems less likely to include ethnoregional parties. The ideology of ethnoregional parties toward non-ethnic or non-regional issues could shape the ease with which they form coalition with national ­parties. In Finland, the centrist positions of the Swedish People’s Party have made them a natural coalition partner in many governments. However, in Slovakia, ethnic Hungarian parties have only worked with one side of major political divide among predominantly ethnic Slovak parties. Of course, the strength of ethnic or regional demands could facilitate or hinder the inclusion of ethnoregional ­parties in national coalitions. National parties may be unwilling to pay the price demanded by ethnoregional parties for their support. In short, while this study hopefully moves forward the study of the question of under what conditions ethnoregional parties flourish, more focus is needed on when they are incorporated into government coalitions. Ethnoregional party success may advance minority representation but simultaneously derail minority incorporation if ethnoregional parties win mandates but are consistently excluded from power. Representation without incorporation is not a recipe for government legitimacy among the minority or for stability of the state over the long term. As Northern Ireland illustrates, the perpetual exclusion of ethnoregional parties weakens state legitimacy to the extent that it depends on the idea that a legislative minority may someday become the majority. Permanent political exclusion underlines majority and minority differences rather than ameliorates them.

Minority Representation This study has concentrated on the representation of ethnic and regional ­m inorities via ethnoregional parties. However, this focus is not intended to minimize the potential for ethnic or regional minority representation or influence within national parties. Indeed, participation in national parties may facilitate minority incorporation as national parties usually have a larger potential support base that makes it easier to achieve electoral victories and power. Moreover, national parties may prove a more viable and acceptable vehicle for minority inclusion precisely because national parties fear that they will pay a political price within the majority group for allying with ethnoregional parties. This problem is most prone to occur in countries most at risk for ethnic conflict, as tensions between the majority and the minority group can render ethnoregional minority parties unacceptable as coalition partners. Interethnic tensions may also drive

C o n c l u s i o n

337

ethnic minority parties to increase their demands, making their acceptance into ­government coalitions more difficult, to prevent being outflanked by more strident competitors. As countries descend into ethnic conflict, their incorporation into government, which would help legitimate it for ethnoregional minorities, may ironically undercut it for the majority—exactly the sort of zero-sum perspective that makes ethnic conflicts intractable. Difficulties related to the ethnic identification of legislators make the task of assessing ethnic minority inclusion in national parties much more difficult. The names of legislators are often insufficiently reliable ethnic markers because assimilation and changes in ethnic identification over time can lead to people possessing names associated with a different ethnic group. In Belgium, the historical francization of many Flemings resulted in many Francophones with Dutch surnames, such as former Walloon Regional Minister-President Jean-Claude Van Cauwenberghe. Similarly, the assimilation of many Francophone families into a more assertively Dutch Flanders has led to Dutch politicians with French names, such as former Belgian Prime Minister and Flemish Minister-President Yves Leterme. This phenomenon is not limited to Belgium; Daniel Johnson Sr. became Quebec’s premier as leader of the Union Nationale while his son, also named Daniel, accomplished the same feat as leader of the Quebec Liberals. Another son, Pierre-Marc Johnson, served as leader of the Parti Québécois. Politicians can also make classification more difficult through intentional, politically advantageous obfuscation or mixture of ethnic identities. Americans have long been familiar with these efforts by savvy politicians. New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia took it to new heights with his ability to legitimately claim a panoply of religious—Catholic, Espiscopalian, and Jewish—and ethnic—Italian, Hungarian, and Jewish—identities. His expansive linguistic skills further allowed him to make the most of any possible link to New York’s many ethnic groups. Opponents of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau sometimes tried to use his mixed English and French heritage against him, but Trudeau skillfully turned the attacks to his own devastating advantage.17 Paul Martin’s linguistically ambiguous name—as quintessentially French as English—along with his ability to speak fluently both of Canada’s official languages similarly aided his political efforts. Claiming multiple identities is more common than one might think. In Spain, for example, feeling Catalan and Spanish are not mutually exclusive. If identities are fungible for the electorate, surely the same is true for politicians. And these examples leave aside cases in which candidates of one ethnic origin may choose to publicly present themselves as another. In Belgium, Flemish and Walloon politicians are expected to present themselves publicly in the language of their region even if they speak another language at home. In the Belgian parliament, deputies always ask questions according to the linguistic affiliation of their party with ministers replying in the same language.18

338

minority rules

Nonetheless, one can still attempt to classify representatives by ethnic origin based on their public presentation as part of an effort to deepen understanding of minority representation. It makes sense to focus on public instead of private identities as only public identities can form the basis of political appeals. Classification of legislators makes it possible to examine differences in party affiliation by ethnicity and the extent to which ethnic minorities are members of parties that participate in governing coalitions and hold important positions in government. Israel, New Zealand, and the United States highlight the potential for variation in representation and inclusion across parties and countries. No ­A frican-American representatives belong to ethnoregional parties, while most Israeli-Arab ­members of the Knesset are affiliated with Arab parties. New ­Zealand Maōri gained entry to the House entirely through national parties until the Maōri Party’s party b­ reakthrough in 2005. Across these three countries, the share of minority ­legislators who would have needed to change parties to have the same ­d istribution as majority legislators in 2010 varies substantially. Thirty-three ­percent of Maōri MPs would have needed to switch, lower than the 45 percent in the United States and the 73 percent in Israel. The higher number for Israel mirrors the political gulf between the Jewish majority and Arab minority while the figure for the United States reflects that African Americans win overwhelmingly as Democrats. In New Zealand, Maōri have entered the House ­d isproportionately as members of the Labour Party but Maōri MPs have also won on other party lists, so the figure is lower. Majority versus minority voting behavior can be examined in a similar manner. The same forces that explain ethnoregional party ­success may shape minority representation. But one should not neglect to consider alternative potential explanations for the level of minority representation as different factors may weigh more or less heavily. This work demonstrates the value of a reinvigorated institutional approach focused on electoral systems and rules to explain the expression of ethnic cleavages and emergence of ethnoregional parties. While by no means the exclusive explanation—institutions alone cannot explain variations within an unchanged institutional setup—electoral institutions provide critical constraints on ­ethno­regional parties and politicians. Moreover, decentralization remains a viable, potential solution to ethnic conflicts as it does less to propel forward ethno­regional parties and cleavages than previously thought, particularly when focused on autonomy within the region rather than power over the center. Along with electoral rules, it merits further consideration as a valuable tool in the effort to create sustainable and peaceful democratic polities. The knowledge to prevent and to stop ethnic conflicts still eludes scholars. This work attempts to improve understanding of how institutions shape ethnic and regional politics. Hopefully, it represents a step forward toward the goal of designing political structures for ethnically fractured societies that at least do no harm and even some good.

Appendix I:  Percentage Votes and Seats for Ethnoregional Parties, 1990–2012 All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Andorra

339

Andorra

Lauredian Union

a

2.4

a

7.1

6

2

Independent Group for Sant Julià

a

0.0

a

0.0

6

1

Union of the People of Ordino

a

1.2

a

7.1

6

1

Independents of Ordino

a

Canillo-Massana Grouping

a

2.4

Total

a

6.0

a a

1 14.3

6

1

6

For all countries with mixed electoral systems, the appendix reports the percentage of votes based on those cast for list seats but the percentage of seats based on all seats. As indicated, the table excludes some elections for selected other countries. a In Andorra, regional parties don’t compete for national list seats, only for parish block seats.

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Antigua and Barbuda

340

Antigua and Barbuda

Elections Participated

Barbuda People’s Movement

1.2

5.9

53.4

100.0

1.2

5.9

53.4

100.0

4

4

Barbuda People’s Movement for Change

0.2

0.0

12.3

0.0

1.0

0.0

49.1

0.0

4

1

Total

1.4

5.9

65.7

100.0

Buenos Airean Unity

0.2

0.1

0.5

0.4

1.6

0.8

4.1

2.9

8

1

Federal Movement to Recreate Growth Alliance

0.2

0.0

0.6

0.0

1.6

0.0

4.4

0.0

8

1

Federalist Action for Buenos Aires Alliance

0.3

0.3

1.0

1.1

2.8

2.3

7.6

8.6

8

1

4

Argentina (1990–2005) Buenos Aires

Neighbors Confederation Alliance

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.8

0.0

2.0

0.0

8

1

Popular Bueonsairean Front Alliance

0.5

0.5

1.3

1.8

3.8

3.8

10.6

14.3

8

1

Catamarcan Unity

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.0

0.0

8

2

New Hope of Catamarca Front Alliance

0.0

0.0

1.8

0.0

0.1

0.0

14.3

0.0

8

1

Provincial Liberal Option Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.2

0.0

8

1

United for Catamarca Front Alliance

0.0

0.0

1.8

0.0

0.1

0.0

7.1

0.0

8

2

Chaco

Chacan Action

0.3

0.2

11.5

7.3

0.4

0.3

18.4

11.7

8

5

Chubut

Chubutan Action

0.1

0.0

8.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

8.3

0.0

8

8

Chubut Current Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.0

8

1

Chubut Popular Movement

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

8

1

Catamarca

341

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Córdoba

342

Corrientes

Elections Participated

Provincial Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.0

0.0

8

1

Change Córdoba

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.2

0.0

8

1

Córdoba in Action

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.7

0.0

8

1

Córdoban Popular Movement

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.1

0.0

8

1

The People First— Neighborly Union of Córdoba Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.3

0.0

3.3

0.0

8

1

Together for Córdoba Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.0

1.9

0.0

8

1

Union for Córdoba Alliance

0.4

0.4

4.7

5.6

3.1

3.1

37.8

44.4

8

1

Autonomous Liberal PactPopular Democratic

0.1

0.2

5.4

6.3

1.1

1.5

43.3

50.0

8

1

Autonomous Liberal Pact—Progressive Democrat—Christian Democrat

0.1

0.2

5.8

8.3

1.1

1.6

46.6

66.7

8

1

343

Distrito Federal

Civic and Social Front of Corrientes

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

0.3

0.0

11.3

0.0

8

1

Corrientan Action

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

8

3

Corrientan Front

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

8

1

Corrientes Project Front Alliance

0.0

0.1

1.8

3.1

0.2

0.4

7.2

12.5

8

2

Liberal-Autonomist Pact—Progressive Democratic—Union of the Democratic Center Alliance

0.1

0.1

2.4

4.2

0.4

0.8

19.1

33.3

8

1

Liberal-Autonomist Pact—Progressive Democratic Alliance

0.2

0.3

7.7

9.4

0.7

1.2

30.8

37.5

8

2

Popular Corrientan Unity Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

8

1

United for Corrientes Front Alliance

0.0

0.0

2.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

15.7

0.0

8

1

Force of Buenos Aires City Alliance

0.2

0.2

1.7

2.1

1.5

1.5

13.4

16.7

8

1

Party of the City

0.2

0.1

1.4

1.0

0.4

0.3

3.7

2.8

8

3

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

Entre Ríos 344

Formosa

Elections Participated

Union to Recreate Buenos Aires Alliance

0.1

0.1

1.2

1.0

1.1

0.8

9.8

8.3

8

1

Provincial Union

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

2.3

0.0

8

2

Social Movement of Entre Ríos

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

7.9

0.0

8

1

Authentic Formosan

0.0

0.0

2.3

0.0

0.2

0.0

18.6

0.0

8

1

Federal Pact

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

8.4

0.0

8

1

Formosan Action— Formosan Force for Integration

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.0

8

1

Integrating Force of Formosa

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

8

1

Native Action

0.0

0.0

1.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

10.4

0.0

8

1

Provincial Civic Action

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

8

1

Jujuy

345

Civic Renewal Movement

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

0.1

0.0

6.6

0.0

8

1

For a New Jujuy

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.1

0.0

7.3

0.0

8

1

Jujuyan Popular Movement

0.1

0.3

8.7

12.5

0.2

0.6

17.4

25.0

8

4

Movement for Jujuyan Political Autonomy

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.2

0.0

8

1

Union for Jujuy Alliance

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

8.9

0.0

8

1

Pampean Federalist Movement

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

8

1

Pampean Front

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

8

1

La Rioja

Defense of the Province of Rioja

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.9

0.0

8

1

Mendoza

Democratic of Mendoza

0.2

0.2

3.7

5.0

1.3

1.6

29.7

40.0

8

1

Together for Mendoza

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

8

1

Federal Option

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.1

0.0

7.0

0.0

8

1

La Pampa

Neuquén

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

346

Río Negro

Salta

Elections Participated

Front of Neuquenian Participation

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

4.5

0.0

8

1

Movement for the Unity of the Neuquenians

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.0

0.0

8

1

Neuqenian Popular Movement

0.4

1.1

39.0

56.3

0.4

1.1

39.0

56.3

8

8

Front for Río Negro

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.9

0.0

8

1

Patagonian Popular Movement

0.0

0.0

3.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

8.1

0.0

8

3

Provincial of Río Negro

0.0

0.0

3.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

5.7

0.0

8

5

Regional Movement of the People

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

4.9

0.0

8

1

Renewal of Salta

0.6

0.8

24.4

28.1

0.8

1.0

32.5

37.5

8

6

Saltan Alternative Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

8

1

San Luis

Santa Cruz

347

Saltan Popular Movement

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

8

1

Alliance of Sanluisan Victory

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

0.0

8

1

Sanluisan Force Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.7

0.0

8

1

Front of Integration and Defense of Santa Cruz

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

8

1

Move for Santa Cruz

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.9

0.0

8

1

Riogallegan Neighbor’s Movement for Santa Cruz

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.9

0.0

8

1

Riogallegan Neighborly Movement

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.6

0.0

8

1

Santacruzian Federal Front Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.7

0.0

8

1

Santacruzian Federal Movement

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

8.1

0.0

8

1

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

Santiago del Estero 348

Tierra del Fuego

Tucumán

Australia

Australia

Elections Participated

Santacruzian Popular Movement

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

11.0

0.0

8

1

Santiagan Crusade Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.0

3.5

0.0

8

1

Viable Santiago

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7.6

0.0

8

1

Front of Fuegan Action

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.3

0.0

8

1

Fuegan Federal

0.0

0.0

2.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

7.6

0.0

8

3

Fuegan Popular Movement

0.0

0.5

20.8

25.0

0.0

0.5

20.8

25.0

8

8

Laborers of Tucumán

0.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

4.7

0.0

8

2

Tucumanan Alliance for Change

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

2.3

0.0

8

1

Australia’s Indigenous Peoples Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

8

2

Tasmania First Party

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

8

2

Total

0.0

0.0

8

349

Austria

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Austria

Total table

0.0

0.0

7

Austria 1 (1990)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Austria 2 (1994–)

Total

0.0

0.0

6

Bahamas

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Bahamas

Total

0.0

0.0

Barbados

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Barbados

Total

0.0

0.0

Socialist Party

12.2

15.1

34.3

40.4

12.2

15.1

34.3

40.4

6

6

Reformist Movement

10.3

12.8

25.0

28.7

10.3

12.8

25.0

28.7

6

6

Francophone Democratic Front

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.0

1.5

1.4

0.9

0.0

6

1

Humanist Democratic Center

6.4

6.9

17.9

18.3

6.4

6.9

17.9

18.3

6

6

Ecologists

4.9

4.9

12.4

10.9

4.9

4.9

12.4

10.9

6

6

Communist Party

0.2

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.6

0.0

6

5

National Front

1.5

0.6

4.0

1.4

1.5

0.6

4.0

1.4

6

6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

5

0

0

5 0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

0

5

Belgium (1995–2010) French or Walloon

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

350

National Front + (FN +)

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.6

6

1

New Belgian Front

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.5

0.0

6

3

Rally Wallonia-France

0.2

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.7

0.0

1.4

0.0

6

2

Agir

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.8

0.0

6

3

Walloons (W+)

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.6

0.1

6

4

“France” Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

6

2

Walloon Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

1

Walloon Rally

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Federal Christian Democrats

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.9

0.0

6

2

National Force

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

6

1

351

Brussels

Nation Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

1

Vélorution

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

People’s Party

0.2

0.1

0.5

0.0

1.3

0.7

3.1

2.0

6

1

Wallonia First (Wallonie D’Abord)

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.6

0.0

1.7

0.0

6

1

Left Front (Front des gauches)

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.8

0.0

6

1

Pensioners Party (Parti Pensionné PP)

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.0

6

1

Equality (Egalite)

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.8

0.0

6

1

MSplus

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

MP Education

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

N

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Pro Bruxsel

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.0

0.0

6

1

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Party of Belgian GermanSpeakers

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

2

Muslim

Young Muslims Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Citizenship and Prosperity Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

352

German

Belgium

Total table

Belgium 1 (1991)

Total

37.9

41.0

98.2

100.0

1

Belgium 2 (1995–1999)

Total

36.4

39.3

96.9

100.0

2

Belgium 3 (2003–)

Total

37.1

41.3

97.7

100.0

3

Belize

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Belize

Total

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5 5

0

Botswana

353

Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM)

3.6

0.4

0.0

0.0

3.6

0.4

0.0

0.0

4

4

Botswana People’s Party (BPP)

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

4

2

Botswana

Total table

4.4

0.4

4

Botswana 1 (1994)

Total

4.6

0.0

1

Botswana 2 (1999–)

Total

4.4

0.6

2

Brazil

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Brazil

Total

0.0

0.0

Turks (and Roma)

Movement for Rights and Freedoms Coalition

8.7

9.8

Bulgaria

Total table

8.7

Bulgaria 1 (1990)

Total

6.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

0

6

Bulgaria 0.0

0.0

8.7

9.8

0.0

0.0

7

9.8

8.7

9.8

7

5.8

6.0

5.8

1

7

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Bulgaria 2 (1991–)

Elections Participated

Total

11.0

12.6

11.0

12.6

10.5

13.8

10.5

13.8

0.0

0.0

6

Quebec Bloc

10.5

13.8

Canada

Total

10.5

13.8

Cape Verde

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Cape Verde

Total

0.0

0.0

Southern Regions IX, X, XI

Party of the South

0.1

0.2

0.8

1.7

0.3

0.4

2.1

4.2

5

2

Southern Regions IX, X, XI

Regional Action PartyIndependent Regional Force

0.1

0.0

1.9

0.0

0.7

0.0

9.5

0.0

5

1

Canada 354

39.9 0.0

56.0 0.0

39.9

56.0

7

7

7 0.0

0.0

5

0

5

Chile

Northern Regions I, II, III

National Alliance of IndependentsIndependent Regional Force

0.1

0.2

0.8

3.3

0.5

0.8

3.8

16.7

5

1

Regionalist Party of Independents

0.8

0.5

0.6

0.0

4.0

2.5

2.9

0.0

5

1

355

Chile

Total

1.1

0.8

5.5

3.8

Costa Rica

Limon Authentic Party

0.2

0.0

2.9

0.0

0.3

0.0

4.9

0.0

5

3

(1990–2006) Cartagines Agricultural Union

0.7

0.7

6.4

6.7

0.7

0.7

6.4

6.7

5

5

Agricultural Force of Cartagines

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.9

0.0

5

3

Autentico Turrialbeño Cartagines

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

5

1

Alajuelan Democratic Action

0.4

0.0

1.9

0.0

0.6

0.0

3.2

0.0

5

3

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.6

0.0

2.0

0.0

5

1

Independent Guanacaste

0.1

0.0

1.8

0.0

0.2

0.0

3.0

0.0

5

3

Heredian Authentic Party

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.2

0.0

2.1

0.0

5

1

Costa Rica

Total

1.6

0.7

Cyprus

No minority parties

0.0

0.0

Cyprus

Total

0.0

0.0

356

Alajuelan Solidarity

5 0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

0

5

Czech Republic Roma

Romany Civic Initiative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

2

Moravians

Moravian Democratic Party

2.5

2.6

6.2

6.7

2.9

3.0

7.2

7.8

7

6

Helax—Ostrava is having fun

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

Czech Republic

Total table

2.5

2.6

7

Czech Republic 1 (1990–1998)

Total

16.8

18.0

4

Czech Republic Total 2 (2002–)

0.3

0.0

2

1

Denmark 357

Arhus

Arhus Constituency

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Minority

Minority Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Denmark

Total

0.1

0.0

Dominica

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Dominica

Total

0.0

0.0

Dominican Republic

Independent Movement of Santiago Rodriguez

0.0

0.0

Dominican Republic

Total table

0.0

0.0

6

Dominican Republic 1 (1990–1994)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

7 0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.8

0.0

0.1

0.0

10.7

0.0

5

0

5 6

1

continued

Appendix I: (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

358

Dominican Republic 2 (1998)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Dominican Republic 3 (2002–)

Total

0.0

0.0

3.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

10.7

0.0

3

El Salvador

No minority party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

8

El Salvador

Total table

0.0

0.0

8

El Salvador 1 (1991–2003)

Total

0.0

0.0

5

El Salvador 2 (2006–)

Total

0.0

0.0

3

Constitution Party

2.5

2.0

0

Estonia Russians

3.8

3.0

6

4

Estonia

Russian Party in Estonia

0.5

0.0

1.1

0.0

6

3

Total

3.1

2.0

Swedish People’s Party

4.9

5.0

10.9

11.4

4.9

5.0

10.9

11.4

6

6

Coalition of Åland (For Åland in the Diet)

0.3

0.4

80.2

83.3

0.4

0.5

96.3

100.0

6

5

Åland (Bourgeois) Alliance

0.1

0.1

17.4

16.7

0.2

0.3

52.1

100.0

6

2

Åland Social Democrats

0.0

0.0

2.4

0.0

0.1

0.0

14.4

0.0

6

1

Total

5.3

5.5

Federalist Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

Alsace First

0.1

0.0

2.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3.0

0.0

3

2

Alsace-Lorraine National Forum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

6

Finland Swedish

359

Finland

6

France (1997–2007)

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

360

Union of the Alsatian People (RPS)

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

3

3

Alsatian Democratic Movement

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

3

1

Independent Alsatian regionalist

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Party of Muslims of France

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

2

Basque National Party/ Basque Solidarity (RPS)

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

3

2

Nationalist’s Union

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.9

0.0

3

1

Unity

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

361

Basque Country Yes

0.0

0.0

2.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

6.7

0.0

3

1

Independent Basque regionalist

0.0

0.0

1.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.4

0.0

3

1

Breton Democratic Union/Breton Liberty (RPS)

0.1

0.0

1.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.2

0.0

3

3

Regionalist Movement of Brittany

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Breton Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Regionalist

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Catalan Bloc/Catalan Republican Left (RPS)

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

3

1

Democratic Convergence of Catalonia

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

3

1

Catalan Republican Left

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

3

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections Elections Participated Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

362

Party for Catalonia

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

3

1

Catalan Unity

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

3

1

Autonomists

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

3

1

Independent Catalan regionalist

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

A Party of Corsica

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

3

1

Insemi part L’Avvena

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.6

0.0

3

1

Manca Naziunale

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

3

1

Corsican People’s Union

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.6

0.0

3

1

363

Union for a Political Solution

0.0

0.0

3.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

9.9

0.0

3

1

Nationalist

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.8

0.0

3

1

Regionalist

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

3

1

Occitan Party (RPS)

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

3

Sovereignty, Ecology, Rurality

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

Party of the Occitan Nation

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

independent regionalist

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

2

Alpes-Côte d’Azur Regionalist Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Pied-Noir Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Savoy Region Movement/ Savoy League

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

3

2

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

364

France

Elections Participated

For the Respect of Rights Acquired for Savoy

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3

1

Savoy Rally

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

3

1

Independent Savoy

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

3

1

Total

0.3

0.0

3

Germany Danish

South Schleswig Voters’ Union

Turkish

Democratic Party of Germany

0.0

0.0

Bavarian

Christian Social Union

7.3

8.9

50.2

54.6

0.0

0.0

7.3

8.9

50.2

54.6

6

1

6

6

Bavaria Party

0.1

0.0

Total table

7.4

8.9

Germany 1 (1990)

7.2

Germany 2 (1994–)

7.5

Germany

0.5

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

6

7.7

52.4

59.3

1

9.1

41.7

43.7

5

9.0

8.1

6

0.0 Ghana (1996–2012)

365

Northern

People’s National Convention

2.2

1.0

Ghana

Total

2.2

1.0

Greece

Muslim Lists

0.2

0.1

Greece

Total table

0.2

0.1

Greece 1 (1990)

Total

0.7

0.7

Greece 2 (1993–2004)

Total

0.1

0.0

Greece 3 (2007–)

Total

0.0

0.0

Grenada

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Grenada

Total

0.0

0.0

2.2

1.0

9.0

8.1

5

5

5 9.6

5.6

0.6

0.3

28.7

16.7

9

2

9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

0

5

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Hungary

Elections Participated

366

Hungarian Roma Organizations Forum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

2

Democratic Roma Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Hungarian Roma Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

National Minority Forum

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

Hungarian Gypsy Democratic Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Gypsy Solidarity Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

367

Hungarian Gypsy Social Democratic Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Regional Democratic Youth AllianceDemocratic Youth Alliance of Félegyháza

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Somogy County Christian Coalition

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

Association for Somogy

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

6

2

Hungary

Total

0.1

0.0

Iceland

No minority party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

0

Iceland

Total

0.0

0.0

6

Iceland 1 (1991–1999)

0.0

0.0

3

Iceland 2 (2003–)

0.0

0.0

3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats India (1991–2004) 368

Andhra Pradesh

Majlis-E-Ittehadul Musalmeen

0.1

0.2

1.1

1.9

0.1

0.2

1.1

1.9

5

5

Telugu Desam Party

3.1

2.8

34.0

35.7

3.1

2.8

34.0

35.7

5

5

Telangana Rashtra Samithi

0.1

0.2

1.4

2.4

0.6

0.9

6.8

11.9

5

1

Arunachal

Arunachal Congress

0.0

0.1

17.8

20.0

0.0

0.1

29.7

33.3

5

3

Assam

Asom Gan Parishad

0.5

0.3

17.9

11.4

0.5

0.3

17.9

11.4

5

5

Autonomous State Demand Committee

0.0

0.1

1.2

4.3

0.1

0.2

1.9

7.1

5

3

United Minorities Front, Assam

0.0

0.0

2.1

1.4

0.0

0.0

2.1

1.4

5

5

Bihar

Lok Jan Shakti Party

0.1

0.1

1.6

2.0

0.7

0.7

8.2

10.0

5

1

Rashtriya Janata Dal

1.6

1.8

17.1

19.9

2.7

2.9

28.5

33.1

5

3

Samata Party

0.8

1.4

6.1

5.9

1.3

2.3

10.2

9.9

5

3

Maharastrawadi Gomantak Party

0.0

0.0

12.4

10.0

0.0

0.0

15.5

12.5

5

4

United Goans Democratic Party

0.0

0.0

9.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

12.2

0.0

5

4

Gujarat

Janata Dal (Gujarat)

0.1

0.0

2.6

0.8

0.5

0.2

13.1

3.8

5

1

Haryana

Haryana Vikas Party

0.2

0.2

8.2

10.0

0.2

0.2

8.2

10.0

5

5

Haryana/Indian Lok Dal

0.3

0.2

15.4

18.0

0.5

0.3

25.7

30.0

5

3

Himachal Pradesh

Himachal Vikas Congress

0.0

0.0

2.5

5.0

0.0

0.1

6.2

12.5

5

2

Jammu and Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir National Conference

0.1

0.4

17.5

30.0

0.2

0.7

29.1

50.0

5

3

Goa

369

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

370

Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party

0.0

0.0

2.4

3.3

0.1

0.2

11.9

16.7

5

1

Jharkhand

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

0.4

0.5

5.6

8.4

0.4

0.5

5.6

8.4

5

5

Karnataka

Karnataka Congress Party

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.7

0.2

0.2

3.1

3.6

5

1

Lok Shakti

0.1

0.1

2.3

2.1

0.7

0.6

11.5

10.7

5

1

Congress (Socialist)

0.1

0.0

0.6

1.0

0.4

0.2

2.8

5.0

5

1

Kerala Congress

0.1

0.2

4.0

5.0

0.1

0.2

4.0

5.0

5

5

Muslim League Kerala State Committee

0.2

0.3

5.0

9.0

0.2

0.3

5.0

9.0

5

5

Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.2

1.5

2.5

5

1

Kerala

Madhya Pradesh

Maharashtra

371

Indian Union Muslim League

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

4

Nationalist Congress Party

0.8

0.6

8.0

6.3

2.0

1.6

19.9

15.6

5

2

Peasants’ and Workers’ Party of India

0.1

0.1

1.1

0.8

0.1

0.1

1.1

0.8

5

5

Republican Party of India

0.2

0.2

2.3

2.1

0.2

0.2

2.3

2.1

5

5

Shiv Sena

1.5

1.9

16.6

21.7

1.5

1.9

16.6

21.7

5

5

Federal Party of Manipur

0.0

0.0

2.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.9

0.0

5

2

Manipur People’s Party

0.0

0.1

13.2

10.0

0.0

0.1

13.2

10.0

5

5

Manipur State Congress Party

0.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

0.1

0.2

24.9

50.0

5

1

Mizoram

Mizo National Front

0.0

0.0

24.8

20.0

0.0

0.1

41.4

33.3

5

3

Nagaland

Nagaland People’s Council

0.0

0.0

10.5

20.0

0.1

0.2

52.7

100.0

5

1

Manipur

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

372

Nagaland People’s Front

0.0

0.0

14.6

20.0

0.2

0.2

73.1

100.0

5

1

Odisha

Biju Janata Dal

0.7

1.1

18.1

28.6

1.2

1.8

30.2

47.6

5

3

Punjab Sikh

Shiromani Akali Dal

0.6

1.0

24.9

40.0

0.6

1.0

24.9

40.0

5

5

Rajasthan

All India Indira Congress (Tiwari)

0.3

0.2

1.1

1.6

0.8

0.5

2.8

4.0

5

2

Sikkim

Sikkim Democratic Front

0.0

0.1

52.1

80.0

0.0

0.2

65.1

100.0

5

4

Sikkim Sangram Parishad

0.0

0.0

31.6

20.0

0.0

0.0

39.6

25.0

5

4

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

1.6

1.5

21.5

20.0

1.6

1.5

21.5

20.0

5

5

Tamil Nadu

373

Uttar Pradesh

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

1.8

1.9

23.2

25.6

1.8

1.9

23.2

25.6

5

5

MGR Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.5

0.1

0.1

1.3

1.3

5

2

Marumalarchi DMK

0.3

0.4

4.5

5.6

0.4

0.5

5.6

7.1

5

4

Pattali Makkal Kachi

0.5

0.6

5.6

7.2

0.5

0.6

5.6

7.2

5

5

Tamil Maanila Congress

0.8

0.8

10.9

11.8

1.4

1.4

18.1

19.7

5

3

Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress

0.0

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.2

0.4

1.5

2.4

5

1

Bahujan Samaj Party

4.0

1.9

19.4

10.6

4.0

1.9

19.4

10.6

5

5

National Loktantrik Party

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.4

0.4

5

3

Rashtriya Lok Dal

0.2

0.2

1.4

1.2

0.5

0.5

3.5

3.1

5

2

Samajwadi Janata Party

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.5

5

5

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Samajwadi Party

3.3

3.6

20.1

23.3

4.1

4.6

25.1

29.2

5

4

All India Trinamool Congress

1.4

0.6

14.3

7.6

2.4

1.0

23.8

12.7

5

3

Forward Bloc

0.4

0.5

3.5

6.2

0.4

0.5

3.5

6.2

5

5

Paschim Banga Rayja Muslim League

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Revolutionary Socialist Party

0.5

0.7

4.5

8.6

0.5

0.7

4.5

8.6

5

5

Muslim

All India Minorities Front

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

India

Total

27.7

27.6

Ireland

South Kerry Ind. Alliance

0.1

0.0

3.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7.5

0.0

5

2

Ireland

Total

0.1

0.0

West Bengal 374

5

Israel Arab

375

United Arab List

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

6

5

Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

2.5

2.4

3.0

2.8

6

5

National Democratic Alliance

1.1

1.1

2.2

2.2

6

3

Sons of the Village

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Progressive List for Peace

0.2

0.0

0.9

0.0

6

1

Progressive Coalition

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

6

1

Arab Federation for Progress and Change

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

New Arab Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

1

Democratic Action Organization (Daam)

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6

3

National Unity Party

0.1

0.0

0.7

0.0

6

1

Arab National Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

376

Israel

Total table

6.2

5.8

6

Israel 1 (1992–2003)

Total

7.2

6.7

4

Israel 2 (2006–)

Total

8.7

8.8

2

Valdotanian Union

0.1

0.1

36.3

0.1

0.1

43.6

6

5

Autonomy Liberty Democracy

0.0

0.0

7.2

0.0

0.2

43.4

6

1

South Tyrol People’s Party

0.5

0.4

38.6

0.4

0.4

38.6

6

6

Union for South Tyrol

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.1

0.0

9.6

6

2

The Free Thinkers

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

2.7

6

2

Northern Italy Northern League

5.9

7.6

10.9

5.9

7.6

10.9

6

6

Italy Aosta Valley

Bolzano/ Südtirol German

Piedmont

Lombardy

377

Piedmont Alpine League

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.0

2.2

6

1

League for the Piedmont

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.5

6

1

Free Piedmont

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.4

6

1

League for Autonomy, Lombard Alliance

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.9

6

3

Free European Lombard League

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.5

6

1

Southern League of Italy

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

6

1

Autonomous Lombard Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.5

6

2

League for Autonomy Veneto

6

Northeast Project

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.2

0.0

2.7

6

1

North-East Union

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.2

0.0

2.0

6

1

Venetian Autonomy League

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.3

0.1

1.6

6

2

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

378

Venetian Regional Autonomy Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

6

1

Venetian Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

6

1

League of the Venetian Front

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.1

0.0

2.6

6

2

Three Venices Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

6

1

Venetian Republic League

6

1

Venetian Agreement

6

1

6

1

Friuli-Venezia Autonomous Free North Giulia

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.6

379

EmiliaRomagna

Emilia Romagna-League Padania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

6

1

Tuscany

Tuscan Autonomy Movement

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.3

6

2

Marche

Marche League

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.8

6

1

For the Marche

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.6

6

1

Lazio

Lazio League

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

6

1

Molise

Revival of the South

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

1.6

6

1

6

1

Southern Italy Movement for Autonomy, Alliance for the South Campania

Southern Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.5

6

1

South League

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

2

Apulia

Southern Action League

0.1

0.1

1.4

0.1

0.1

2.0

6

4

Calabria

Southern Movement

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.8

6

1

For the South

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.5

6

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Sicily

Elections Participated

380

Sicilian Democracy

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.3

6

1

We Sicilian

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.7

6

3

Sardinian Nation

0.0

0.0

1.7

0.0

0.0

1.7

6

6

Sardinian Action Party

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.1

0.0

1.9

6

2

Total

10.7

9.5

1

Italy 2 (1994– Total 2001)

8.5

11.7

3

Italy 3 (2006–) Total

7.8

8.0

2

Jamaica

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Jamaica

Total table

0.0

0.0

Japan

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Sardinia Italy 1 (1992)

0.0

0.0

5

0

5 0.0

0.0

8

0

Japan

Total table

0.0

0.0

8

Japan 1 (1990–1993)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

Japan 2 (1996–)

Total

0.0

0.0

6

For Human Rights in United Latvia

3.9

4.3

6.8

7.5

7

4

National (Popular) Harmony Party

4.5

5.0

10.6

11.7

7

3

Latvian Socialist Party

0.8

0.7

5.6

5.0

7

1

Equality (Equal Rights Movement)

0.8

1.0

5.8

7.0

7

1

Russian Party

0.4

0.0

1.0

0.0

7

3

Latgale Light (or Life of Latgale)

0.2

0.0

1.6

0.0

7

1

Harmony Centre

10.0

11.0

23.2

25.7

7

3

Total table

20.7

22.0

7

Latvia 1 (1993) Total

19.0

20.0

1

Latvia 2 (1995–)

21.0

22.3

6

Latvia Russians

381

Latvia

Total

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

382

Lesotho

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Lesotho

Total table

0.0

0.0

5

Lesotho 1 (1993)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Lesotho 2 (1998)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Lesotho 3 (2002)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Lesotho 4 (2007–)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

Liechtenstein No minority party

0.0

0.0

Liechtenstein

Total

0.0

0.0

Minority

Alliance of Lithuania’s Ethnic Minorities

0.4

0.0

2.6

0.0

6

1

Poles

Electoral Alliance of Lithuanian Poles

3.6

2.6

3.6

2.6

6

6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

6

0

0

6

Lithuania

383

(Lithuanian) Polish People’s Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Russians

Lithuanian Russian Union

0.4

0.0

0.9

0.0

6

3

Lithuania

Total table

4.5

2.6

6

Lithuania 1 (1992)

Total

2.1

2.8

1

Lithuania 2 (1996–)

Total

5.0

2.6

5

Luxembourg

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Luxembourg

Total

0.0

0.0

Malta

Gozitan Party

0.0

0.0

Malta

Total

0.0

0.0

Rodriguan People’s Organization

1.4

2.6

0.0

0.0

4

0

4 0.0

0.0

5

1

5

Mauritius Rodrigues

1.4

2.6

5

5

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

384

Rodriguan People’s Grouping

0.2

0.0

1.0

0.0

5

1

Rodriguan Movement

1.0

2.3

1.0

2.3

5

5

Rallying of the Responsible Rodriguans

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Progressive Front of the Rodriguan People

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

Rodrigues Mauritian Workers Solidarity Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Creole

385

Muslim

Democratic Workers Rodriguan Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Democratic Union of Rodrigues

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Green Party

0.1

0.0

0.7

0.0

5

1

Gaëtan Duval Party

1.3

0.3

6.3

1.5

5

1

Authentic Mauritian Movement

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Xavier Duval Mauritian Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Mauritian Solidarity Front, formerly Party of God (Hizbullah)

1.6

0.6

1.6

0.6

5

5

Muslim People’s Front

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

5

2

Muslim Action Committee

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Tamil 386

Hindu

Mauritius

Elections Participated

Tamil Brotherhood of Mauritius

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Tamil Council

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

2

Mauritian Militant Socialist Movement

0.3

0.0

1.5

0.0

5

1

Mauritian Democratic Movement

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

3

Hindu Ekta Andolan Dul

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Independent Forward Bloc

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Total

6.3

5.9

5

387

Rodrigues

2.7

5.0

Mauritius (island)

3.6

0.9

Monaco

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Monaco

Total table

0.0

0.0

4

Monaco 1 (1993–1998)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

Monaco 2 (2003–)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

Mongolia

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Mongolia

Total table

0.0

0.0

3

Mongolia 1 (1992)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Mongolia 2 (1996–)

Total

0.0

0.0

2

Damara

United Democratic Front

2.9

3.1

2.9

3.1

4

4

Afrikaaner

Monitor Action Group

0.7

1.0

0.7

1.0

4

4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4

3

0

0

Namibia

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

388

Herero

Nama

Elections Participated

Republican Party

0.7

0.7

1.4

1.4

4

2

National Unity Democratic Organization

1.8

1.7

3.7

3.5

4

2

South West African National Union

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.5

4

3

South West African National Union-Workers Revolutionary Party

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

4

1

Namibia Democratic Movement for Change

0.2

0.0

0.4

0.0

4

2

389

Democratic Coalition of Namibia

0.3

0.3

0.6

0.7

4

2

Democratic Party of Namiba

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

4

1

Kavango

All People’s Party

0.3

0.4

1.3

1.4

4

1

Southeast Regional

Federal Convention of Namibia

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

4

2

Namibia

Total

7.6

7.7

Free Indies Party

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

3

Progressive Integration Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

List Potmas (Muslim Democrats)

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Solid Multicultural Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Total

0.1

0.0

4

Netherlands

Netherlands

7

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats New Zealand Maōri

0.7

1.2

2.0

3.3

8

3

Mana

0.1

0.1

1.1

0.8

8

1

Mana Maōri Motuhake

0.1

0.0

0.6

0.0

8

1

Mana Maōri Movement

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

4

Mauri Pacific

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

1

Te Tawharau

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

8

1

Immigrants

Ethnic Minority Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

8

1

South Island

South Island Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

8

2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

8

1

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

8

1

390

Maōri Party

Asian and Asia Pacific United Party Pacific Islander NZ Pacific Party

New Zealand

Total table

391

1.2

1.3

8

New Zealand 1 Total (1990–1993)

0.4

0.0

2

New Zealand 2 Total (1996–)

1.4

1.5

5

Norway

Coast Party

0.6

0.2

0.8

0.3

5

4

Interpolitical Coast and District Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Østfold List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Oslo List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Hedmark List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Oppland List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Vestfold Hospital Preservation List

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Sørland List Aust-Agder

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Sørland List

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Hordaland List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Nordland List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

392

Troms List

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Sami People’s Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

Norway

Total table

0.7

0.2

5

Norway 1 (1993–2001)

Total

1.2

0.6

3

Norway 2 (2005–)

Total

0.5

0.0

2

Panama

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Panama

Total

0.0

0.0

Peru

Andean Renaissance

0.3

0.1

1.0

0.4

6

2

Incan Independent Movement

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

1

0.0

0.0

4

0

4

393

Loreto Regionalist Movement

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

6

1

Tacna Front

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

6

1

Peru

Total table

0.5

0.1

6

Peru 1 (1990)

Total

0.8

0.0

1

Peru 2 (1995– Total 2000)

0.1

0.0

2

Peru 3 (2001)

Total

1.4

0.8

1

Peru 4 (2006–) Total

0.4

0.0

1

Poland

Sum of Various German Minority

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.6

7

7

German Minority

0.3

0.4

0.6

0.7

7

4

German Minority Unity and the Future

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

German Minority of Opole Silesia

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.5

7

2

Germans of Katowice Province

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.1

7

2

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

394

Socio-Cultural Association, Germans of Czestochowa

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

2

German Minority of Olsztyn

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

2

German Workers Commonwealth: ‘Unity and Future’

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Socio-Cultural Association of Germans of Elblag

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

395

NMGS—German Minority of Upper Silesia

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Wyborców “Mniejszości Niemieckiej Śląska”

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Silesian Autonomy Movement

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.2

7

2

Belorussian Election Committee

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Belorussian Union in the Polish Republic

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7

1

Podhalan Union

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.2

7

1

Election Bloc of Minorities

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

7

1

Regional Electoral Forum

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Orthodox Slav Minority

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

396

Poland

Total table

0.7

0.7

7

Poland 1 (1991)

Total

2.2

2.2

1

Poland 2 (1993–1997)

Total

0.9

0.6

2

Poland 3 (2001–)

Total

0.3

0.3

3

Democratic Party of the Atlantic

0.1

0.0

Total

0.0

0.0

Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania

6.5

6.8

Portugal

Portugal

0.1

0.0

7

5

7

Romania 16.9

17.4

6.5

6.8

16.9

17.4

7

7

397

Independent Hungarian Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Hungarian Free Democratic Party of Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

2

Szekler Youth Forum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania

0.1

0.0

0.6

0.0

7

1

Social Democratic Roma Party in Romania

0.3

0.2

0.6

0.3

7

4

Democratic Union of the Roma

0.2

0.0

0.4

0.1

7

3

United Democratic Party of the Roma Woodworkers and Fiddlers in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7

1

Party of the Gypsies of Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

2

0.3

0.0

2.1

0.0

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats All Elections

Elections Participated

398

Democratic Christian Party of the Roma of Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Free Democratic Union of Roma in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

General Union of Roma in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7

1

Community of the Roma Ethnicity in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Union of the Roma, Constanta

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

399

Christian Centre of the Roma in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Alliance for Roma Unity

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

7

1

Pro-Europe Roma Party

0.1

0.1

0.5

0.3

7

2

Union of Armenians in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

Democratic Turkish Union in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

7

6

Democratic Muslim Turkish Union

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

7

2

Turkish Community of Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Ethnic Turk Association

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Union of Poles in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

7

7

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

400

Union of the Poles in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

7

1

Cultural Union of Poles in Romania Association

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Association of Macedonian (Slavs) in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

7

4

Cultural Association of Macedonians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

401

Democratic Union of Turkish Muslim Tatars in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

7

6

Union of Ukrainians in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

Democratic Union of Ukrainians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

2

General Union of the Associations of the Hutul Ethnicity

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

2

Cultural Union of Ruthenians in Romania

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.3

7

4

Hellenic Union in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

Hellenic Union of Romania—Prahova Hellenic Community

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

402

Hellenic Community Iasi

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Hellenic Union ELPIS Constanta

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

7

7

Italian Association in Romania

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.3

7

3

Italian Community of Romania

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

7

4

Federation of Italians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

403

Community of Italians from Galati

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Community of Italians from Pitesti

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Italian Community— Prahova County

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Federation of Italians in Romania—Italian Community Ovidius Constanta

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

League of Italian Communities in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

1

Union of Serbians in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

Community of Lippovan Russians in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats All Elections

Elections Participated

404

League of Association of Albanians in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

7

4

The Cultural Union of Albanians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

7

2

Democratic Unions of Slovaks and Czechs in Romania

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

7

7

Union of the Czechs in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Bulgarian Union in the Banat

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

7

7

405

Bratstvo Community of Bulgarians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

7

3

Bulgarian Cultural Association of Romania

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

7

2

Union of “Pavlicheni” Bulgarians in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Union of Croats in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

7

6

Democratic Union of Croats in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

2

Democratic League of the Croats in Romania

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

1

Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.4

7

4

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

406

Romania

Total table

9.2

11.3

7

Romania 1 (1990)

Total

8.6

10.1

1

Romania 2 (1992–1996)

Total

9.4

11.7

2

Romania 3 (2000–2004)

Total

9.5

12.5

2

Romania 4 (2008–)

Total

9.1

10.4

2

Samoa

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Samoa

Total

0.0

0.0

San Marino

No minority party

0.0

0.0

San Marino

Total

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

0

5 0.0

0.0

6 6

0

São Tomé and No minority party Príncipe

0.0

0.0

São Tomé and Total Príncipe

0.0

0.0

Party of the Hungarian Coalition

8.4

8.3

8.4

8.3

8

8

Hungarian Civic Party

0.3

0.0

2.3

0.0

8

1

Hungarian Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

1

Most-Híd (Bridge)

1.9

2.3

7.5

9.0

8

2

Eastern (Prešov and Košice)

Our Region

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

1

Roma

Romany Civic Initiative

0.2

0.0

0.5

0.0

8

3

Party of Roma Union in Slovakia

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

2

0.0

0.0

6

0

6

Slovakia Hungarians

407

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

408

SPI—Party of Labour and Security

0.1

0.0

1.0

0.0

8

1

Political Movement of the Roma in Slovakia

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

8

1

Romanies

0.1

0.0

0.7

0.0

8

1

Movement for SelfGoverning DemocracySociety for Moravia and Silesia

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

8

1

11.1

10.6

8

9.4

9.3

1

Slovakia

Total table

Slovakia 1 (1990)

Total

409

Slovakia 2 (1992–1994)

Total

11.1

10.3

2

Slovakia 3 (1998–)

Total

11.4

10.9

5

Slovenia

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Slovenia

Total table

0.0

0.0

Slovenia 1 (1992–1996)

Total

0.0

0.0

Slovenia 2 (2000–)

Total

0.0

0.0

Zulu

Inkatha Freedom Party

7.7

7.7

Afrikaners

Freedom Front Plus

1.2

Afrikaner Unity Movement

0.0

0.0

6

0

6

South Africa 39.3

7.7

7.7

1.3

1.2

0.1

0.1

National Action

0.0

Federal Alliance Indians

4

4

1.3

4

4

0.3

0.3

4

1

0.0

0.1

0.0

4

1

0.1

0.1

0.5

0.5

4

1

Minority Front

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

4

4

Muslims

Africa Muslim Party

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

4

1

Al Jama-ah

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

4

1

1.2

39.3

1.2

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

410

Luso

Luso-South African Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4

1

Qwa Qwa/ South Sotho

Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

4

1

Whites/NonBlacks

Democratic Alliance

10.1

10.1

10.1

10.1

4

4

Whites/NonBlacks

New National Party

7.2

7.3

9.7

9.8

4

3

North West Province/ Bophuthatswana

United Christian Democratic Party

0.5

0.5

0.7

0.7

4

3

Transkei/ Eastern Cape

United Democratic Movement

1.6

1.7

2.2

2.3

4

3

South Africa

Total

28.9

29.0

33.1

32.7

4

Spain (1990–2008) Aragón

Asturias 411

Basque Country

Aragonese Party

0.2

0.1

6.9

1.5

0.3

0.1

8.6

1.9

5

4

Aragonese Junta

0.2

0.1

7.0

3.1

0.2

0.1

7.0

3.1

5

5

Aragonese Initiative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

United Citizens of Aragon

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Asturian Renewal Union

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.0

2.1

0.0

5

1

Asturian Party

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

5

4

Bloc of the Asturian Left

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Andecha Astur

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

4

Asturian Left

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

United

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Asturian Democratic Convergence

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Aralar

0.1

0.0

1.2

0.0

0.1

0.0

2.9

0.0

5

2

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

412

Navarre

Catalonia

Elections Participated

Basque Nationalist Party

1.4

1.7

28.2

31.9

1.4

1.7

28.2

31.9

5

5

Basque Solidarity

0.4

0.2

7.3

4.2

0.4

0.2

7.3

4.2

5

5

Basque Civil Initiative

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

5

1

Unity

0.3

0.2

5.4

4.2

0.8

0.6

13.4

10.5

5

2

Alavan Unity

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.4

0.0

5

1

Convergence of Navarran Democrats

0.0

0.0

2.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.3

0.0

5

3

Nafarroa Bai

0.1

0.1

7.3

8.0

0.2

0.3

18.3

20.0

5

2

Catalan Republican Left

1.2

0.8

7.8

6.0

1.2

0.8

7.8

6.0

5

5

Catalan Republican Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

413

Galicia

Convergence and Union

4.0

3.9

26.5

29.2

4.0

3.9

26.5

29.2

5

5

Catalan State

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Independent Citizens Platform of Catalonia

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Party for Catalonia

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

We Are

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Galician Nationalist Bloc

0.9

0.5

12.5

7.4

0.9

0.5

12.5

7.4

5

5

Galician People’s Front

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

3

Galician Coalition

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Galician Democracy

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Galician Nationalist Convergence

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

5

1

Galician Alternative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Canary Islands Canarian Coalition

Elections Participated

414

0.9

1.0

24.4

23.8

0.9

1.0

24.4

23.8

5

5

Party of Independents from Lazarote

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.2

0.0

5

1

Canarian Nationalist Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

5

1

Canarian People’s Alternative

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

5

1

People’s Front for Canarian Independence

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

5

1

Grand Canary Party

0.0

0.1

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.3

1.9

0.0

5

1

Grand Canary Insular Group

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Tenerife Assembly

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

415

Andalusia

United Progressives of the Canaries

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Alternative for Grand Canary

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

New Canary-Canarian Center

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

0.2

0.0

3.8

0.0

5

1

Canarian Nationalist Alternative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

People’s Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Movement for the Unity of the Canarian People

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Independent Progressive Citizens Union of the Canaries

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Andalusian Party

0.6

0.1

3.2

0.3

0.6

0.1

3.2

0.3

5

5

Socialist Party of Andalusia

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.5

0.0

5

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

416

Andalusian Assembly

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Andalusia Nation

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Andalusian Party of Progress

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.0

1.1

0.0

5

1

Voice for the Andalusian People

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

Left Assembly-Initiative for Andalusia

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Andalusian SocialDemocratic Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Party of Almería

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Cantabrian

417

Castile and León

Cantabrian Regionalist Party

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

5.7

0.0

5

1

Union for the Progress of Cantabria

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.0

0.1

0.0

8.2

0.0

5

1

Cantabrian Nationalist Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Cantabrian Nationalist Council

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

5

2

Leon People’s Union

0.1

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.0

0.0

5

5

Regional Party of León Country

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

5

Inter-Zamorano Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Zamora United

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Salmantino People’s Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Initiative for the Development of Soria

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

418

Ind. Cands, Party of Castile and León

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

2

Regional Union of Castile and León

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

4

Commoners’ Land

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

People of El Bierzo

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Merindades Initiative of Castile

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Alliance for Burgos

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Burgos Citizens Initiative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Citizens Grouping

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Common Ground— Castilian Nationalist Party

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

4

Regional Party of CastileLa Mancha

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Guadalajara Regional Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

5

Castillian Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

Independents for Cuenca

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

La Rioja

Rioja Party

0.0

0.0

2.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.0

5

4

Valencia

Valencian Nationalist Left

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Valencian Union

0.2

0.1

2.1

1.3

0.4

0.2

3.5

2.1

5

3

Valencia Nationalist Bloc, Green Left

0.2

0.0

1.6

0.0

0.2

0.0

1.6

0.0

5

5

The Greens of Alicante Country

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Castile-La Mancha

419

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

420

Alicante Democratic Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

2

Catalan State

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Independent Social Democrats of the Valencian Community

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Valencian Coalition

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Valencian Nationalist Option

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

For the Valencian Republic

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Identity Kingdom of Valencia Balearic Islands Majorcan Union Nationalist Union of Majorca

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

0.0

0.0

1.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.1

0.0

5

4

0.1

0.0

5.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

6.3

0.0

5

4

0.3

0.0

0.5

0.0

5

3

Catalan Republican Left

421

Spanish Balearic Alternative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Balearic Radical Alternative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Balearic Alliance

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Balearic People’s Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Balearic Revival Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Centrist Union of Menorca

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Unity for the Islands

0.0

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

5.4

0.0

5

1

Catalan State

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

422

Ceuta

Melilla Madrid

Elections Participated

Islanders of the Balearic Islands

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Workers Coalition for Democracy

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Socialist Party of the People of Ceuta

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

8.0

0.0

5

2

Initiative for Ceuta

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Local Bloc of Melilla

0.0

0.0

5.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

24.8

0.0

5

1

Nationalist Party of Melilla

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

5

1

Madrid Independent Regional party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

3

Extremadura

United Extremadura

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

León People’s Union

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Regional Party of León Country

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

423

Union for Leganes

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

United Extremadura

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

5

4

Independent Socialists of Extremadura

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

2

Extremaduran Regionalist Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

5

1

Extremaduran Coalition

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

5

2

11.2

8.9

Spain

Total

5

St. Kitts and Nevis

Concerned Citizens Movement

9.5

18.2

53.9

66.7

9.5

18.2

53.9

66.7

5

5

Nevis Reformation Party

8.2

9.1

46.1

33.3

8.2

9.1

46.1

33.3

5

5

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats All Elections

St. Kitts and Nevis

Total

St. Lucia

Elections Participated

424

17.7

27.3

5

No minority party

0.0

0.0

St. Lucia

Total

0.0

0.0

St. Vincent

No minority party

0.0

0.0

St. Vincent

Total

0.0

0.0

General Liberation and Development Party

0.7

0.0

1.2

0.0

5

3

A-Combination

2.4

4.7

6.1

11.8

5

2

Party for the Development of Suriname

0.6

0.0

2.8

0.0

5

1

0.0

0.0

5

0

5 0.0

0.0

5

0

5

Suriname

2.0

1.6

5.0

3.9

5

2

Basic Party for Renewal and Democracy

0.6

0.0

3.2

0.0

5

1

Renewed Progressive Party

0.5

0.0

2.5

0.0

5

1

Suriname Progressive People’s Party

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

5

1

Democratic Alternative ’91

1.2

0.8

6.1

3.9

5

1

New Choice

0.5

0.0

2.4

0.0

5

1

Democrats of the 21st Century

0.3

0.0

1.3

0.0

5

1

New Suriname

0.3

0.0

1.6

0.0

5

1

NU

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

5

1

Progressive Political Party

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

5

1

Suriname

Total

9.3

7.0

Sweden

Norrland Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

3

Norrland Coalition Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

425

Pendawa Lima

5

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

426

Sweden

Elections Participated

Immigrants Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

3

Norbotten Party

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

3

Norbotten Care Party (Norrbottens Sjukvårdsparti)

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Gottlands Party/Gotland’s Future

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

6

2

Sjöbo Party

0.1

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.2

0.0

1.8

0.0

6

3

Skåne Party

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

6

5

Scanian Federalists

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Total

0.1

0.0

Jura Alliance

0.1

0.1

6

Switzerland French

8.8

0.6

0.2

0.3

26.4

1.7

6

2

427

Romande List

0.0

0.0

5.3

0.0

0.3

0.0

31.5

0.0

6

1

Geneva Citizens Movement

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.0

2.5

0.0

6

1

Les Rauraques (RAU, Young Jura Separatists)

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Romande Citizens Movement

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

German

Free State of Lower Small Basel

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Italian

MontagnaViva

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Italian Switzerland

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6

1

Ticino League

1.1

0.6

13.8

14.6

1.1

0.6

13.8

14.6

6

6

Total

1.3

0.7

Chinese Taiwan Aborigine Democratic Party

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

7

3

Hakka Party

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.0

7

1

Taiwan

Total table

0.0

0.0

7

Taiwan 1

Total (1992–1995)

0.0

0.0

2

Switzerland

6

Taiwan Aborigines

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) All Elections

Elections Participated

Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

428

Taiwan 2

Total (1998–2004)

0.0

0.0

3

Taiwan 3

Total (2008–)

0.2

0.0

2

Scottish National Party

1.8

0.8

21.1

10.2

2.2

1.0

26.3

12.7

5

4

Scottish Socialist Party

0.1

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

1.4

0.0

5

4

Scottish Green Party

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.6

0.0

5

2

Free Scotland

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Scottish Freedom

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Party of Wales

0.6

0.6

11.4

9.1

0.7

0.7

14.2

11.4

5

4

Forward Wales

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

5

1

Blaenau Gwent People’s Voice

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

5

1

United Kingdom Scottish

Welsh

Cornish

Sons of Cornwall

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.7

0.0

5

3

Irish Catholic

Social Democratic and Labour Party

0.5

0.5

20.5

18.2

0.7

0.6

25.6

22.8

5

4

Sinn Fein (We Ourselves)

0.5

0.5

19.5

17.9

0.6

0.6

24.4

22.4

5

4

Irish Freedom Movement

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

0.7

0.8

25.4

30.1

0.8

1.0

31.7

37.7

5

4

Democratic Unionist Party

0.6

0.8

21.6

30.3

0.7

1.0

27.0

37.9

5

4

UK Unionist Party

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.1

1.7

0.0

5

2

Progressive Unionist Party

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

5

2

Ulster Populist Unionist Party

0.0

0.0

0.5

1.2

0.1

0.2

2.5

5.9

5

1

Traditional Unionist Voice

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.0

0.1

0.0

3.9

0.0

5

1

0.2

0.0

6.1

1.1

0.2

0.0

7.6

1.4

5

4

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

5

2

Irish Protestant Ulster Unionist Party

429

Northern Irish Alliance Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition

continued

Appendix I:  (continued) Number Number National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional of Total of Elections Elections Participated Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats All Elections

Elections Participated

430

England

Lincolnshire Independent Forum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

Asian

Asian League

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5

1

United Kingdom

Total

4.9

4.0

Scotland

1.9

0.8

22.5

10.2

Wales

0.6

0.6

11.5

9.1

Northern Ireland

2.5

2.7

95.6

98.9

Cornwall

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

Alaskan Independence

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

5

United States Alaska

0.0

0.0

4.2

0.0

12

2

431

Connecticut

A Connecticut Party

0.0

0.0

2.5

0.0

0.2

0.0

10.1

0.0

12

3

Vermont

Liberty Union

0.0

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.2

0.0

12

11

Vermont Progressive

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

12

1

Wyoming

Wyoming Country

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

12

1

United States

Total

0.0

0.0

Uruguay

No minority party

0.0

0.0

Uruguay

Total table

0.0

0.0

4

Uruguay 1 (1994)

Total

0.0

0.0

1

Uruguay 2 (1999–)

Total

0.0

0.0

3

12 0.0

0.0

3

0

432 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  Ethnic and Regional Parties, 1990–2012 Country

Minority or Region

Party

Andorra

Sant Julià

Lauredian Union Independent Group for Sant Julià Union of the People of Ordino Independents of Ordino Canillo-Massana Grouping

Ordino

Antigua and Barbuda Argentina (1990–2005)

Canillo and La Massana Barbuda Buenos Aires

Federal District Catamarca

Chaco Chubut

Córdoba

Corrientes

Barbuda People’s Movement Barbuda People’s Movement for Change Buenos Airean Unity Federal Movement to Recreate Growth Alliance Federalist Action for Buenos Aires Alliance Neighbors Confederation Alliance Popular Bueonsairean Front Alliance Force of Buenos Aires City Alliance Party of the City Union to Recreate Buenos Aires Alliance Catamarcan Unity New Hope of Catamarca Front Alliance Provincial Liberal Option Alliance United for Catamarca Front Alliance Chacan Action Chubutan Action Chubutan Current Alliance Chubutan Popular Movement Provincial Alliance Change Córdoba Córdoba in Action Córdoban Popular Movement The People First—Neighborly Union of Córdoba Alliance Together for Córdoba Alliance Union for Córdoba Alliance Autonomous Liberal Pact-Popular Democratic Autonomous Liberal Pact-Progressive DemocratChristian Democrat



appendix

433

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Entre Ríos Formosa

Jujuy

Mendoza Neuquén

La Pampa La Rioja

Party Civic and Social Front of Corrientes Corrientan Action Corrientan Front Corrientes Project Front Alliance Liberal-Autonomist Pact-Progressive Democratic-Union of the Democratic Center Alliance Liberal-Autonomist Pact-Progressive Democratic Alliance Popular Corrientan Unity Alliance United for Corrientes Front Alliance Provincial Union Social Movement of Entre Rios Authentic Formosan Federal Pact Formosan Action—Formosan Force for Integration Integrating Force of Formosa Native Action Provincial Civic Action Civic Renewal Movement For a New Jujuy Jujuyan Popular Movement Movement for Jujuyan Political Autonomy Union for Jujuy Alliance Democratic of Mendoza Together for Mendoza Federal Option Front of Neuqenian Participation Movement for the Unity of the Neuquenians Neuqenian Popular Movement Pampean Federalist Movement Pampean Front Defense of the Province of Rioja continued

434 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Party

Río Negro

Front for Río Negro Patagonian Popular Movement Provincial of Río Negro Regional Movement of the People Renewal of Salta Saltan Alternative Alliance Saltan Popular Movement Alliance of Sanluisan Victory Sanluisan Force Alliance Front of Integration and Defense of Santa Cruz Move for Santa Cruz Riogallegan Neighbor’s Movement for Santa Cruz Riogallegan Neighborly Movement Santacruzian Federal Front Alliance Santacruzian Federal Movement Santacruzian Popular Movement Santiagan Crusade Alliance Viable Santiago Front of Fuegan Action Fuegan Federal Fuegan Popular Movement Laborers of Tucumán Tucumanan Alliance for Change

Salta

San Luis Santa Cruz

Santiago del Estero Tierra del Fuego Tucumán Australia

Austria Bahamas Barbados Belgium

Minor Indigenous and Tasmanian None None None Francophone

Socialist Party Reformist Movement Francophone Democratic Front Humanist Democratic Center Ecologists National Front New Belgian Front



appendix

435

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Belize Botswana

None Northern Minorities Kalanga None Turks (and Roma) Quebec None extreme South and North Limón

Brazil Bulgaria Canada Cape Verde Chile

Costa Rica (1990–2006)

Cartago Alajuela

Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Dominica Dominican Republic El Salvador Estonia

Guanacaste Heredia None Moravians Minor Århus and minority None Santiago Rodríguez None Russians

Finland

Swedish Åland

France (1997–2007)

Alsace

Party

Botswana Alliance Movement Botswana People’s Party Movement for Rights and Freedoms Coalition Quebec Bloc Party of the South

Limón Authentic Party Cartagines Agricultural Union Alajuelan Democratic Action Alajuelan Solidarity Independent Guanacaste Heredian Authentic Party Moravian Democratic Party

Independent Movement of Santiago Rodríguez

Constitution Party Russian Party in Estonia Swedish People’s Party Coalition of Åland (For Åland in the Diet) Åland Bourgeois Alliance Åland Social Democrats Alsace First continued

436 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Party

Basque

Basque National Party/Basque Solidarity (RPS) Nationalist’s Union Basque Country Yes independent Basque regionalist Breton Democratic Union/Breton Liberty (RPS) Party for Catalonia Insemi part L’Avvena Manca Naziunale Corsican People’s Union Union for a Political Solution Savoy Region Movement/Savoy League Nationalist Regionalist

Breton Catalan Corsica

Germany Ghana

Greece Grenada Hungary Iceland India (1990– 2004)

Savoy Nationalist or regionalist label Bavaria Northern (Upper East, Upper West, Northern) None None Minor Roma and Somogy None Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam

Bihar

Christian Social Union People’s National Convention

Majlis-E-Ittehadul Musalmeen Telugu Desam Party Telangana Rashtra Samithi Arunachal Congress Asom Gan Parishad Autonomous State Demand Committee United Minorities Front, Assam Lok Jan Shakti Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Samata Party



appendix

437

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Party

Goa

Maharastrawadi Gomantak Party United Goans Democratic Party Janata Dal (Gujarat) Haryana Vikas Party Haryana/Indian Lok Dal Himachal Vikas Congress

Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu and’ Kashmir Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala

Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra

Manipur

Mizoram Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu

Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Karnataka Congress Party Lok Shakti Congress (Socialist) Kerala Congress Muslim League Kerala State Committee Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress Nationalist Congress Party Peasants’ and Workers’ Party of India Republican Party of India Shiv Sena Federal Party of Manipur Manipur People’s Party Manipur State Congress Party Mizo National Front Nagaland People’s Council Nagaland People’s Front Biju Janata Dal Shiromani Akali Dal All India Indira Congress (Tiwari) Sikkim Democratic Front Sikkim Sangram Parishad All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam MGR Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam continued

438 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Uttar Pradesh

West Bengal

Ireland Israel

None Arab

Italy

Aosta Valley Bolzano/ Südtirol Northern Italy Piedmont Veneto

Molise Southern Italy Apulia Sardinia Jamaica Japan Latvia

None None Russians

Party Marumalarchi DMK Pattali Makkal Kachi Tamil Maanila Congress Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress Bahujan Samaj Party Rashtriya Lok Dal Samajwadi Party All India Trinamool Congress Forward Bloc Revolutionary Socialist Party United Arab List Democratic Front for Peace and Equality National Democratic Alliance Valdotanian Union Autonomy Liberty Democracy South Tyrol People’s Party Union for South Tyrol The Free Thinkers Northern League Piedmont Alpine League Northeast Project North-East Union Venetian Autonomy League League of the Venetian Front Revival of the South Movement for Autonomy, Alliance for the South Southern Action League Sardinian Nation Sardinian Action Party

For Human Rights in United Latvia



appendix

439

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Party National (Popular) Harmony Party Latvian Socialist Party Equality (Equal Rights Movement) Russian Party Latgale Light (or Life of Latgale) Harmony Centre

Lesotho Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mauritius

None None Minority Poles None None Rodrigues

Creole Muslim

Monaco Mongolia Namibia

Netherlands New Zealand Norway

Panama Peru

Hindu None None Damara Afrikaaner Herero Kavango Namibia Minor immigrant Maori Minor regional and Sami None Indigenous

Alliance of Lithuania’s Ethnic Minorities Electoral Alliance of Lithuanian Poles

Rodriguan People’s Organization Rodriguan People’s Grouping Rodriguan Movement Gaëtan Duval Party Mauritian Solidarity Front, formerly Party of God (Hizbullah) Mauritian Militant Socialist Movement

United Democratic Front Monitor Action Group Republican Party National Unity Democratic Organization All People’s Party Total

Maori Party

Andean Renaissance continued

440 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Poland

Minor, mainly German and Silesian Minor regional Hungarian None None None

Portugal Romania Samoa San Marino São Tomé and Príncipe Slovakia

Slovenia South Africa

Spain (1990–2008)

Hungarians

Roma None Zulu Afrikaners Whites/ Non-Blacks Transkei/ Eastern Cape Aragón Asturias Basque Country

Navarre Catalonia Galicia

Party

Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania

Party of the Hungarian Coalition Hungarian Civic Party Most-Híd (Bridge) SPI—Party of Labour and Security Inkatha Freedom Party Freedom Front Plus Democratic Alliance New National Party United Democratic Movement Aragonese Party Aragonese Junta Asturian Renewal Union Asturian Party Aralar (Basque Mountain Range) Basque Nationalist Party Basque Solidarity Unity Alavan Unity Convergence of Navarran Democrats Nafarroa Bai Catalan Republican Left Convergence and Union Galician Nationalist Bloc



appendix

441

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Minority or Region

Party

Canary Islands

Canarian Coalition Party of Independents from Lazarote Grand Canary Party New Canary-Canarian Center Andalusian Party Cantabrian Regionalist Party Union for the Progress of Cantabria León People’s Union

Andalusia Cantabria Castile and León Rioja Valencia Balearic Islands

St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname

Ceuta Melilla Nevis None None

Maroon Indonesian

Hindu

Sweden Switzerland

Rioja Party Valencian Union Valencia Nationalist Bloc, Green Left Majorcan Union Nationalist Union of Majorca Unity for the Islands Socialist Party of the People of Ceuta Local Bloc of Melilla Concerned Citizens Movement Nevis Reformation Party

Creole Sjöbo Jura Geneva

General Liberation and Development Party A-Combination Pendawa Lima Party for the Development of Suriname Democrats of the 21st Century Basic Party for Renewal and Democracy Renewed Progressive Party New Choice Democratic Alternative ‘91 Sjöbo Party Jura Alliance Romande List Geneva Citizens Movement continued

442 a

ppendix

Appendix II:  (continued) Country

Taiwan United Kingdom

Minority or Region

Party

Ticino Minor Aboriginal Scotland

Ticino League

Wales Cornwall Northern Ireland

Uruguay United States

None Alaska Connecticut

Scottish National Party Scottish Socialist Party Party of Wales Sons of Cornwall Social Democratic and Labour Party Sinn Fein (We Ourselves) Ulster Unionist Party Democratic Unionist Party UK Unionist Party Progressive Unionist Party Ulster Populist Unionist Party Traditional Unionist Voice Alaskan Independence Party A Connecticut Party

Note: This Appendix includes only parties that won seats or averaged more than 1% of the vote in the country or their regional base in elections in which they participated from 1990 through 2012 unless otherwise noted.

NOTES

Chapter 1 1. Jonathan Steinberg, Why Switzerland? 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) is one notable exception. 2. Kenneth McRae’s series constitutes one major effort to explore these questions; Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983); Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986); Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual S­ ocieties: Finland (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1997). 3. The ballot is actually even more complicated as the Socialists, like many Swiss parties, ran multiple lists linked together in an apparentment or cartel. In Fribourg in 2007, the Socialists ran lists labeled as the Fribourg Young Socialists (Jeunesse socialiste fribourgeoise/­ Jungsozialistinnen Freiburg) in both the French and German parts of the Canton. In the past, they have also had separate lists for male and female candidates. 4. Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 379–90; Matthias Basedau and Alexander Stroh, “Ethnicity and Party Systems in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa” (German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper No. 100, May 2009); Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes, “Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party? The Structural and Attitudinal Basis of Partisan Identification in 12 African Nations” (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series RWP03–009, February 2003); William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (November 1997): 1203–50; Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 1 (February 1999): 83–116; Dani Rodrik, “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses,” Journal of Economic Growth 4, no. 4 (December 1999): 385–412. 5. Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert H. Bates, ­“Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Africa” in State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, eds. Donald Rothschild and Victor ­Olorunsola (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); James Scarritt and Shaheen Mozaffar, “The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of

443

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note s to page s 6 –9

­ emocratic  Competition in Contemporary Africa,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5 D (Spring 1999): 82–117; Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner., “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 494–510. 6. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. 7. Atlas Narodov Mira (Moscow: Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute at the Department  of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the Soviet Union, 1989). 8. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (June 2003): 155–94; James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (June 2003): 195–222; Philip G. Roeder, “Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985,” http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm, 2001; Scarritt and ­Mozaffar, “The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups”; Daniel N.  Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (October 2004): 849–63; Donald Morrison, Robert Mitchell, and John Paden, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook, 2nd ed. (New York: Paragon House, 1989). 9. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” 853–9. 10. Nauro F. Campos and Vitaliy S. Kuzeyev, “On the Dynamics of Ethnic Fractionalization” (Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 2822, Bonn, Germany, June 2007). 11. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Invention: A New Principle for Institutional Design in Ethnically Divided Democracies” in Designing Democratic Government: Making Institutions Work, eds. Margaret Levi, James Johnson, Jack Knight, and Susan Stokes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), 89–114. 12. Daniel N. Posner, “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and ­Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 529–45. 13. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. 14. Maurice Duverger, “L’influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique” in L’influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique, ed. Maurice Duverger (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1950); Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 144–5; William H. Riker, “Duverger’s Law Revisited” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: ­A gathon Press, 1986), 19–42; Maurice Duverger, “Duverger’s Law: Forty Years Later” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 69–84; David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A  ­Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 162–5; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of ­Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 165; Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and ­Political Behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42–7; Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of ­Parties,” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (January 1997): 149–50; Matthew Søberg Shugart, “Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 25–55; Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169. 15. Katz, Democracy and Elections; Farrell, Electoral Systems; Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, “Introduction to Electoral Systems” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. ­M ichael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3–23; Cox, Making Votes Count, 214–9.



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16. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945–90 (New York: Oxford University Press 1994), 24–5; Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 143–70. 17. Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (February 1994): 122. 18. William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws,” Comparative Political ­Studies 39, no. 6 (August 2006): 679–708. 19. Shaheen Mozaffar, “Electoral Systems and Their Political Effects in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis,” Representation 14, nos. 3–4 (Autumn 1997): 148–56. 20. Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, “A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties” in New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Towards ­E xplanation, eds. Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 129–46. 21. Giovanni Sartori, “The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 58–9; Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of ­Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 93–5. 22. John Gerring, “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems,” Party Politics 11, no. 1 (2005): 79–107. 23. Matthijs Bogaards, “Crafting Competitive Party Systems: Electoral Laws and the ­Opposition in Africa,” Democratization 7, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 163–90. 24. Lieven De Winter, “Conclusion: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral, Office and Policy Success of Ethnoregionalist Parties” in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, eds. Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan (London: Routledge, 1998), 220. However, Wilfried Sweden cites evidence from De Winter that ethnoregional parties find it harder to establish themselves under proportional representation compared to majoritarian systems; ­W ilfried  Sweden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and ­Thematic Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151–2. 25. Dawn Brancati, “The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties,” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (2007): 135–59; Dawn Brancati, Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 205–16. None of the coefficients on variables controlling for majority/plurality electoral systems or mixed electoral systems achieves statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level in the models presented in the BJPS article. However, in Peace by Design, models of the share of votes and seats gained by regional parties at both the national and constituency levels show that they perform less strongly in countries with mixed systems (p < 0.05 in national-level models, p < 0.01 in constituency-level models). National-level models reveal no similar statistically significant (p < 0.10) relationship for majority/plurality systems, but constituency-level models indicate that regional parties win more votes and seats in national elections in countries with majority/plurality systems (p < 0.01). 26. “ . . . proportional systems do not encourage support for regionalist parties. Our data show that regionalist parties gain more votes in plurality systems than in majoritarian ones.” Juan Montabes Pereira, Carmen Ortega Villodres, and Enrique G. Pérez Nieto, “Electoral Systems and Electoral Success of Regionalist Parties in Western Europe” (Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh, 28 March–3 April 2003). 27. Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties: A CrossNational Analysis,” International Political Science Review 6, no. 4 (October 1985), 516. 28. “Le débat reste toutefois ouvert car la question de la proportionnelle renvoie tout à la fois au decoupage en circonscriptions et à celle de la magnitude. Ces deux elements peuvent

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influer considérablement sur la représentation parlementaire de partis régionalistes.” (“The debate remains open because the issue of proportionality returns simultaneously to that of boundary delimitation and magnitude. These two elements can influence considerably the parliamentary representation of regional parties.”) Pascal Delwit, “Petites patries, petits partis? Les partis régionalistes en Europe” in Les partis régionalistes en Europe: Des acteurs en développement?, ed. Pascal Delwit (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de ­Bruxelles, 2005), 14. 29. Pippa Norris finds that majoritarian electoral systems and higher thresholds in proportional systems did little to discourage support for radical right parties. Elizabeth Carter uncovers no relationship between electoral systems and votes won by extreme-right parties in Western Europe. Herbert Kitschelt similarly warns against overemphasizing the importance of electoral rules to the success of “left-libertarian” parties. Terri Givens ­a rrives at the opposite conclusion as she finds that electoral rules shape strategic behavior that influences the share of votes won by radical right parties. Studies by Robert Jackman and Karin Volpert as well as Matt Golder also find that extreme-right parties win more votes in countries with higher district magnitudes and lower thresholds. Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 105–26; Elizabeth Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? (New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), 146–62; Herbert Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 25; Terri E. Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–4, 101–32, 144–9; Robert W.  Jackman and Karin Volpert, “Conditions Favouring Parties of the extreme right in Western Europe,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 4 (October 1996): 501–21; Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 (May 2003): 432–66. 30. Brancati, Peace by Design, 6; Daniel Elazar, Explaining Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 34–5. 31. Elazar, Explaining Federalism, 54–8. The United Kingdom constitutes the major exception as it has an unwritten constitution. Elazar eschews the term “decentralization” in favor of “federal” because he views decentralization as a nonconstitutionally mandated diffusion of power that can be eliminated at the discretion of the central authority. The decentralized label is applied more narrowly here to include only to countries that protect regional governments from removal of their authority without their consent. 32. Brancati, “The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design. 33. De Winter, “Conclusion,” 220. 34. Pradeep Chhibber and Geetha Murali, “Duvergerian Dynamics in the Indian States: ­Federalism and the Number of Parties in the State Assembly Elections,” Party Politics 12, no. 1 (2006): 5–34. 35. Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 161–79. 36. Jóhanna Kristín Birnir and Donna Lee Van Cott, “Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures,” Latin American ­R esearch Review 42, no. 1 (February 2007): 99–125. 37. Imke Harbers, “Decentralization and the Development of Nationalized Party Systems in New Democracies: Evidence from Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 5 (2010): 606–27; Richard Lalander, “Decentralization and the Party System in Venezuela,” Ibero Americana 33, no. 1 (2003): 97–121; Jeffrey J. Ryan, “Decentralization and Democratic Instability,” Public Administration Review 64, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 81–91; Ernesto Calvo and Marcelo Escolar, Crisis política, realinemientos partidarios y ­reforma electoral (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2005).



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38. Gerring, “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems,” 87–95. 39. Levi and Hechter, “A Rational Choice Approach”; Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 139–58. 40. Seth Jolly, “Economics, Institutions and Culture Explaining Regionalist Party Success in Europe” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 22–24 April 2010). 41. Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” 516. 42. Daniele Caramani, The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press 2004). 43. Anika Becher and Matthias Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa” (German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper No. 66, January 2008); Matthias Basedau, Matthijs Bogaards, Christof Hartmann, and Peter Niesen, “Ethnic Party Bans in Africa: A Research Agenda,” German Law Journal 8, no. 6 (2007); Matthijs Bogaards, “Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Ethnicity in Africa” in Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in ­Sub-Saharan Africa, eds. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler ­(Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 179. 44. Venelin I. Ganev, “History, Politics, and the Constitution: Ethnic Conflict and Constitutional Adjudication in Postcommunist Bulgaria,” Slavic Review 63, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 66–89. 45. Brancati, “The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties,” 149–54; Brancati, Peace by Design, 200–20. 46. Donna Lee Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” Latin American Politics and Society 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 1–39; Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, ­“Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?: The Effects of Formation Costs on New Party Foundation in Latin America,” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 3–27; Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press 2005), 163–75; Raúl L. Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 10–1, 112–4. 47. András Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary (Budapest: Central European ­University Press 1999), 117–32; Kenneth Benoit, “Hungary: Holding Back the Tiers” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 231–52. 48. Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 163–8. 49. Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” 504–6, 513–6. 50. Brancati, Peace by Design, 204; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties,” 149–74; Mark P. Jones, “Presidential Election Laws and M ­ ultipartism in Latin America,” Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 1 (March 1994): 41–57; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System” in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 394–439; Birnir and Van Cott, “Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity,” 114–5; Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 130–4; Cox, Making Votes Count, 169, 209–10. 51. David Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (New York: ­Cambridge University Press, 2003), 79–107; David Samuels, “Concurrent Elections, ­Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil,” Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (October 2000): 1–20. 52. Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” 516–17.

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53. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 54. James D. Fearon and Pieter van Houten, “The Politicization of Cultural and Economic ­Difference: A Return to the Theory of Regional Autonomy Movements” (Paper presented at the Fifth Meeting of the Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes, Stanford University, May 10–11, 2002); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, “Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Framework of Analysis” in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, eds. Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan (New York: Routledge, 1998), 17–27; Filippo Tronconi, “Ethnic Identity and Party Competition: An Analysis of the Electoral Performance of Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe,” World Political Science Review 2, no. 2 (2006): 137–62. However, Tronconi also finds that support for ethnoregional parties declines as the proportion of national income produced in the region rises. 55. Peter Alexis Gourevitch, “The Reemergence of ‘Peripheral Nationalisms’: Some Comparative Speculations on the Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 21(1979): 303–22; Jolly, “Economics, Institutions and Culture,” 22–3. 56. Donald L. Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April 1981): 165–95. 57. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 58. Chandra, Why Do Ethnic Parties Succeed? 59. Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” 514. 60. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Collins, 1957). 61. Bonnie M. Meguid, Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bonnie M. Meguid, “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 347–59. 62. James M. Glaser, Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 63. Givens, Voting Radical Right, 87–149. 64. Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); David Lublin, “Quality, Not Quantity: Strategic Politicians in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952–1990,” Journal of Politics 56, no. 1 (February 1994): 228–41. 65. Ordeshook and Shvetsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties”; Mozaffar, “Electoral Systems and Their Political Effects”; De Winter, “Conclusion,”; Sweden, Federalism and Regionalism; Pereira et al., “Electoral Systems and Electoral Success”; Delwit, “Petites patries, petits partis?”; Chhibber and Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems; Jolly, “Economics, Institutions and Culture”; Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America; Birnir, “Stabilizing Party Systems”; Mainwaring and Shugart, “Conclusion”; Hechter, Internal Colonialism; Meguid, Party Competition ­between Unequals. Norris, Electoral Engineering, and Brancati, Peace by Design, constitute two major exceptions as both studies have numerous cases from different regions of the globe. 66. Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy”; Basedau et al., “Ethnic Party Bans in Africa.” But these studies are also quite valuable because of ethnic conflicts in partly free countries. 67. Freedom in the World 2003 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 68. A lack of information prevented the classification of Beninese parties as ethnoregional or not ethnoregional. Mali was excluded due to its recent civil war and coup. Taiwan is ­excluded not because of the long-term dispute over its status but due to difficulties in defining the share of electorally relevant ethnic groups, as explained in chapter 4.



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69. Matt Golder, “Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2000,” Electoral Studies 24(2005): 103–21. 70. “Electoral System (Chamber 1),” ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, International IDEA. http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?question=ES005. 71. Michael Gallegher and Paul Mitchell, eds., The Politics of Electoral Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems; Rae 1967; Rein ­Taagapera, “Nationwide Inclusion and Exclusion Thresholds,” Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (1998): 405–17. 72. Louis Massicotte and André Blais, “Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey,” Electoral Studies 18(1999): 341–66; Golder, “Democratic Electoral Systems.” 73. More information on the Greek electoral system can be found in chapter 4 and more on the Panamanian system is located in chapter 7. 74. Daniel Bochsler, Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Daniel Bochsler, “It Is Not How Many Votes You Get, but Also Where You Get Them: Territorial Determinants and Institutional Hurdles for the Success of Ethnic Minority Parties in Post-Communist Societies,” Acta Politica 46, no. 3 (2011): 217–38. 75. Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures”; Basedau and Stroh, “Ethnicity and Party Systems”; Dawn Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties,” British Journal of Political Science 36(2006): 135–159; Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy; Gerring 1997; Mozaffar et al., “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages”; Norris and Mattes, “Does Ethnicity Determine Support”; Ordeshook and ­Shvetsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” 76. Bochsler, Territory and Electoral Rules; Bochsler, “It Is Not How Many Votes You Get”; Mozaffar et al., “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages,” 379–90. 77. Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures”; Mozaffar et al., “Electoral ­Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages”; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” 78. Bochsler, Territory and Electoral Rules; Bochsler, “It Is Not How Many Votes You Get.” 79. Brancati, “The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design. 80. Tronconi 2005, 137–8.

Chapter 2 1. Katz, Democracy and Elections, 144–5; Riker, “Duverger’s Law Revisited,” 19–42; ­Duverger, “Duverger’s Law: Forty Years Later”; Farrell, Electoral Systems, 162–5; Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 165; Norris, Electoral Engineering, 42–7; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties,” 149–50. 2. “Le système electoral tend au dualisme des candidats à l’intérieur de chaque circonsciption.” Duverger “L’influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique,” 16; italics in original. 3. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 20–21; Farrell, Electoral Systems, 26; ­A nthony Heath, Siana Glouharova, and Oliver Heath, “India: Two Party Contests within a ­Multiparty System” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 145–54; Norris, Electoral Engineering, 44; Andrew Reynolds, “Elections in Southern Africa: The Case for Proportionality, A  Rebuttal” in Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, eds. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998), 72. 4. Norris, Electoral Engineering, 212. 5. Dawn Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties,” British Journal of Political Science 36(2006): 15–19. 6. Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties,” 163–5.

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7. Gerring, “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems,” 94–5; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties,” 122. 8. Robert G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the ­Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies (New York: Cambridge ­University Press, 2012), 180–207. 9. Joel D. Barkan, “Rethinking the Applicability of Proportional Representation for Africa” in Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, eds. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998), 57–70. 10. Reynolds, “Elections in Southern Africa,” 73–7; Shaheen Mozaffar, “Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa: A Twenty-Eight State Comparison” in Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, eds. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998), 81–98; Shaheen Mozaffar, “Electoral Systems and their Political Effects in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis,” Representation 34, nos. 3–4 (Autumn 1997): 153. 11. Lesotho and New Zealand have both shifted from SMP to mixed-member plurality systems since 1990. Malta and Ireland are the only two countries that use a single-transferable vote. Cyprus switched to a proportional system after initially utilizing the block vote. 12. Some American states require a runoff election for the US House if no congressional ­candidate achieves a majority or fails to pass a required threshold below a majority. 13. Prince Edward Island held a plebiscite in 2006 on whether to shift from SMP to a ­m ixed-member proportional electoral system. The Islanders rejected the idea with only 36 ­percent voting in favor. 14. Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie, Danny Dorling, and David Rossiter, From Votes to Seats: The Operation of the UK Electoral System since 1945 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001). 15. Of course, majoritarian electoral systems do not always produce majority governments in either Canada or the United Kingdom. Canada experienced three consecutive minority governments prior to the Conservative victory in 2011 while the Conservatives formed the United Kingdom’s first coalition government since the end of World War II in 2010. 16. Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 7th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2009); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd ed., (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). 17. David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); 39–54; David Lublin, ­“The  Election of African Americans and Latinos to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972–1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 1997): 269–83; David Lublin, Thomas L. Brunell, Bernard Grofman, and Lisa Handley, “Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived Its Usefulness: In a Word ‘No,’” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (November 2009): 525–53. 18. Frank R. Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after 1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), a pivotal case on racial redistricting, the US Supreme Court ruled that North ­Carolina had to dismantle existing multimember state legislative districts to pave the way for the creation of new single-member black-majority districts to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act. 19. The presence of independent or minor-party candidates plays a role in determining the share of support needed to win a seat. Only major-party candidates sought election in the four races in which greater than majority support was needed to gain election. In contrast, independent or minor-party candidates ran in four of the five races in which less than ­majority support was required to win. 20. In the second round, each party ran as many candidates as there were seats left to fill. The candidates from each party who won the most votes in the first round but failed to win ­election gained second round places.



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21. But see Pierre Serré, Deux poids, deux measures, L’impact du vote des non-francophones au Québec (Montreal: VLB éditeur, 2002); Pierre Serré, “La souveraineté interdite. Avec un mode de scrutin proportionnel adéquat, le Québec aurait pu devenir indépendant dès le début des années soixante-dix,” Bulletin d’histoire politique 7, no. 2 (Spring 1999). 22. The provincial and federal Liberal parties, officially labeled in English as the Liberal Party of Canada and the Liberal Party of Quebec, are separate entities, though both are anti-separatist parties. 23. Federalist parties sometimes attract the votes of nationalists, and vice versa, as their vote is not directly on the question of Quebec independence. 24. India is a federal country with both states and union territories. For the sake of brevity, I refer to both as states. 25. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. 26. “The Nationalists’ Dark Victory,” The Economist, 19 December 2002. 27. Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India 1952–2004 (New Delhi: Manak, 2006). Despite its status as India’s only Muslim state, Kashmir is excluded from the discussion of Muslim parties because its politics have not been sufficiently democratic despite recent improvements. Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Arch Puddington, ed., Freedom in the World 2010: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010). Aside from Kashmir, Muslims form an overwhelming ­majority in the union territory of Lakshadweep, a string of islands off India’s west coast that elects just one Lok Sabha member. 28. The BSP’s push to expand beyond UP in 2009 paid dividends in the sense that it earned 41 percent of its votes outside of UP but it still won 20 of its 21 seats in UP. 29. Shiv Sena contested constituencies in 14 states or union territories but won 98 percent of its votes and all of its seats in Maharashtra. 30. Daniel N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of ­Political Science 48, no. 4 (October 2004), 849–63. Posner refers to ethnic rather than ­ethnoregional groups and politically rather than electorally. 31. New Zealand developed a successful ethnoregional party, the Māori Party, only after it switched from a majoritarian to proportional electoral system. See chapter 5. 32. Some Northern Irish parties nonetheless possess links to British parties. 33. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert H. Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of ­Politics in Africa” in State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, eds. Donald ­R othschild and Victor Olorunsola (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); James Scarritt and Shaheen Mozaffar, “The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary Africa,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5 (Spring 1999): 82–117; Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, ­“Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 494–510. 34. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. 35. Niraya Gopal Jayal, Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 36. Robert D. King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 37. Alistair McMillan, Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Reservation in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). India also reserves two parliamentary seats for Anglo Indians. 38. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. 39. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa”; Posner, “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference.”

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40. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” 41. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. 42. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. 43. A. K. Verma, “Uttar Pradesh: From Exclusionary to Inclusive Politics” in Electoral Politics in Indian States, eds. Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri, and Yogendra Yadav (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 292–301. 44. Alexander C. Diener, One Homeland or Two? The Nationalization and Transnationalization of Mongolia’s Kazakhs (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 124, 175. 45. Successful Māori parties did not form in New Zealand until the introduction of proportional representation. 46. Philip G. Roeder, “Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985,” http://weber.ucsd.edu\~proeder\elf.htm, 16 February 2001. 47. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003): 155–94. Data available from Roman Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/­ faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls. 48. James D. Fearon, “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of ­Economic Growth 8 (June 2003): 195–222; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (March 2003): 75–90; Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.”. Data are available from James Fearon, “Replication Data,” http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/ publicdata.html. 49. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/­ publications/the-world-factbook. 50. Brancati, Peace by Design, 6–7; Daniel J. Elazar, Federal Systems of the World, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1994), xv. 51. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel, “Operationalizing Regional ­Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950–2006,” Regional and Federal Studies 18, no. 2–3 (2008): 123–42. The United Kingdom and Spain are the two additional ­countries ­captured by Regional Authority Index scores; South Africa is the only federal country that does not have a region rating 15.0 or higher on this scale. 52. Several Caribbean countries—the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. ­V incent and the Grenadines—do not delimit within subnational units and are treated as single regions, as is Monaco. 53. “Surprisingly Brave,” The Economist, 18 September 1997; “Blowing in the Wind,” The Economist, 2 April 1998. 54. Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design.

Chapter 3 1. Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design, 213–20. Brancati’s country, rather than constituency, models suggest that the electoral system has no effect. 2. William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws,” Comparative Political ­Studies 39, no. 6 (August 2006): 679–708; Jorge P. Gordin, “The Electoral Fate of ­Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe: A Boolean Test of Extant Explanations,” Scandinavian Political Studies 24, no. 2 (2001): 149–70. 3. Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies,” Democratization 13, no. 5 (December 2006): 811–27. 4. Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 28–32; Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America”; Birnir and Van Cott, “Party System ­Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity”; Birnir, “Stabilizing Party



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S­ ystems and Excluding Segments of Society?”; Roberta Rice and Donna Lee Van Cott, “The Emergence and Performance of Indigenous Peoples’ Parties in South America: A Subnational Statistical Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 6 (August 2006): 709–32. 5. Ordeshook and Shvestsova, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties,” 122; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties.” 6. Gordin, “The Electoral Fate of Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe.” 7. One can also calculate the Imperiali quota by dividing by the number of seats plus two but this system was only used in Italy in 1992 among all of the countries included in this study. The Droop quota is the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota rounded to the nearest whole number higher than the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota. Droop has the advantage over HagenbachBischoff in that it precludes the rare outcome of needing to distribute more seats than exist. In practice, the two produce the same outcome, and the difference is ignored here. 8. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 23, 95–8; Michael Gallagher and Paul ­M itchell, eds., The Politics of Electoral Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 587–9. 9. Estonia uses a modified version of the d’Hondt system with divisors being the d’Hondt series raised to the power of 0.9, so the series of divisors is 1, 2 0.9, 30.9, 4 0.9, and so on. 10. Gallagher and Mitchell, The Politics of Electoral Systems, 584–6; Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 21–5, 95–8; Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair ­R epresentation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 11. Austria is the only country included in the data set with three levels of allocation among countries utilizing a proportional electoral system. 12. In Germany, until recently, parties could gain extra seats if the number of constituency seats won in a Land exceed the total number of seats that it merited based on the second vote. In that event, the party got to keep the extra seats—called overhang seats (überhangmandate)—and the size of the Bundestag expanded; Giovanni Capoccia, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws: The German System at Fifty,” West European Politics 25, no. 3 (July 2002): 199. In New Zealand, parties can similarly gain overhang seats if they win more mandates in constituencies than deserved based on the party vote. So far, only the Māori Party has won overhang seats in New Zealand; see the discussion in chapter 5. 13. Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño and John C. Lane, “Malta: STV in a Two-Party System” in Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single-Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution, eds. Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 178–204; Michael Marsh, “Candidate Centered But Party Wrapped: Campaigning in Ireland under STV” in Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single-Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution, eds. Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 114–30. 14. Votes would have to be scattered extremely widely for such a party to have a shot at a seat in a three-seat constituency. 15. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 13. Lijphart defined an electoral system as new if a country altered its electoral formula or any of the following changed by 20 percent or more: district magnitude at the decisive tier, legal threshold, or assembly size. 16. Some of these countries used nonproportional systems or the decisive level was below the national level for part of the period between 1990 and 2012, including Bulgaria, Italy, ­L esotho, New Zealand, and Peru. 17. Taagapera, “Nationwide Inclusion and Exclusion Thresholds.” 18. Michael Gallegher and Paul Mitchell explain: “A party that wins, say, 4.9 per cent of the vote in one fourteen-seat constituency is unlikely to win a seat. . . . But if a party were to win 4.9 per cent of the votes nationwide in a country with 560 seats and forty fourteen-seat constituencies, we would be amazed if it were to fail to win any seats. Only if it won

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precisely 4.9 per cent in every constituency would there be any risk of this fate befalling it.”  Gallegher and Mitchell, The Politics of Electoral Systems, 608–9; Rein Taagapera, ­“Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold,” Electoral Studies 17, no. 4 (1998): 393–404; Rein ­Taagapera, “Nationwide Threshold of Representation,” Electoral Studies 21(2002): 383–401. 19. Cyprus also had an 8 percent threshold at the time of the 1991 elections, though it subsequently reduced it to 1.8 percent. 20. Ignacio Lago Peñas and Santiago Lago Peñas, “El Sistema Electoral Español: Una Cuantificación de sus Efectos «Mecánico» y «Psicológico»,” Revista de Estudios Políticos 107 (January–March 2000): 229–31. 21. Moser and Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context, 74–5. 22. Belgium formerly used a version of apparentement in which parties may link not with other parties but with lists presented by the same party in selected other constituencies. It was last permitted in 2012 but only among the three constituencies that together comprised the Province of Brabant before its scission: Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, Leuven, and Nivelles (Walloon Brabant). Switzerland allows not just apparentement but sous-apparentement, or cartels within the larger cartel. This makes it easier for parties to run multiple lists, often comprised of candidates of a single gender, members of the party’s youth wing, or people from different linguistic groups, in addition to forming links with other parties where ­advantageous. 23. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 10–11; Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 29–32. 24. The Dominican Republic had no ethnoregional parties under its first or second electoral systems and only an unsuccessful regional party centered on Santiago Rodríguez in its third. Portugal’s sole regional party, the Democratic Party of the Atlantic, claimed to represent the Azores and Madeira but won more of its tiny vote share outside of these island regions. Very small regional parties emerged in peripheral counties of Sweden, primarily in Skåne but also in Gotland and Norrbotten. Minuscule immigrant parties won a few votes in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands but have made no real political impact. 25. In Chile, the Party of the South won one seat as part of the right-wing Union for Chile ­coalition in 1997 and the Regional Action Party, a northern regional party, won a seat in 2005 as part of a coalition of two regional parties that merged into the Regionalist Party of the Independents, which won three seats in 2009. In Costa Rica, various regional parties won single seats in Alajuela in 1998, Cartago in 1990 and 1994, Limón in 1994, and San José in 2006 and 2010. The Coast Party won one seat in Norway’s Nordland County in 1997 and 2001. Peru’s indigenous and regional parties never gained much traction but the Andean Renaissance Party picked up one seat in 2001. Independent Muslim lists in Greece’s Rhodope and Xanthi prefectures in Thrace gained two seats in the 1990 elections but lost them after Greece reverted to a less proportional electoral system with a legal ­national threshold of 3 percent—a requirement impossible for Muslim lists to meet; see chapter 7. Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Regions, Minorities and European Integration: A Case Study on Muslims in Western Thrace, Greece,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 1 (2007): 105; Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Regions, ­M inorities and European Policies: A State of the Art Report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece),” Project Report for EUROREG (2005), 11. 26. Argentina has a plethora of changing parties and alliances, so even experts can have trouble sorting out national from provincial parties. Parties were deemed regional here if they ran in only one province, though two additional prominent regional parties—the Bloquista Party in San Juan and Republican Force in Tucumán—were also included despite not meeting this requirement. Calvo and Escolar, La nueva política de partidos en la ­Argentina; Marcelo Leiras, Todos los caballos del rey: La integración de los partidos politicos y el ­gobierno democrático de la Argentina, 1995–2003 (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007); Marcelo Leiras, “Parties, Provinces and Electoral Coordination: A Study on the ­Determinants of



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Party and Party System Aggregation in Argentina, 1983–2005” (Ph.D. ­d issertation, ­University of Notre Dame, 2006); Ernesto Cabrera, “Multiparty Politics in Argentina? Electoral Rules and Changing Patterns,” Electoral Studies 15, no. 4 (1996): 477–95. 27. The chart counts only non-Flemish parties as Flemings or Dutch speakers constitute the majority group in Belgium. 28. The share of seats won by ethnoregional parties in Romania exceeds the share of votes in part because Romania guarantees one seat to ethnic minority parties that win a minimal number of votes. Quite a few parties enter the Chamber of Deputies under this provision, as chapter 5 explains. 29. Ivan Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria” in The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, ed. Jonathan P. Stein (New York: EastWest Institute, 2000), 251–2. 30. Census 2001: Primary Tables South Africa Census 1996 and 2001 Compared (Pretoria: ­Statistics South Africa, 2004), 11. 31. Eric S. McLaughlin, “Beyond the Racial Census: The Political Salience of Ethnolinguistic Cleavages in South Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 4 (April 2007): 435–56. 32. J. F. Maho, Few People, Many Tongues: The Languages of Namibia (Windhoek, Namibia: Gamsberg MacMillan, 1998), 156–60; Martin Pütz, “Official Monolingualism in Africa: A Sociolinguistic Assessment of Linguistic and Cultural Pluralism in Namibia” in Martin Pütz, ed., Discrimination through Language in Africa?: Perspectives on the Namibian Experience (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 158–62. The term “Coloured” has had a somewhat looser definition in Namibia than in South Africa, including the Rehoboth Baster community in addition to a variety of other mixed-race people. “Coloured” is no longer in official use in Namibia. 33. Petya Nitzova, “Bulgaria: Minorities, Democratization, and National Sentiments,” Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (1997): 733; Ali Eminov, “The Turks in Bulgaria: Post-1989 Developments,” Nationalities Papers 27, no. 1 (1999): 40. Ilchev reports that increases in support from the MRF from 1990 to 1991 came primarily from Bulgarian-speaking Muslims but also says that over 90 percent of MRF support comes from ethnic Turks with support from Bulgarian speakers limited primarily to the Western Rhodopes; see Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 251–2. 34. Eminov, “The Turks in Bulgaria,” 44–51; Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 252. 35. Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, “Regions, Minorities and European Policies,” 4, 7–8, 10–12, 20, 22–4. 36. Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, “Població segons coneixement del català. Recomptes. Població de 2 anys i més. Catalunya. Any 2001,” http://www.idescat.cat/territ/BasicTerr? TC=5&V0=3&V1=3&V3=876&V4=17&ALLINFO=TRUE&PARENT=1&CTX=B. 37. Corts Valencianes, Estatut d’Autonomia de la Comunitat Valenciana (València: Corts Valencianes, 2006), Article 6, ; Govern de les Illes Balears, Estatut d’autonomia de les Illes Balears (Palma: Govern de les Illes Balears, 2007), Preamble and Article 4, http://www.caib. es/webcaib/govern_illes/estatut_autonomia/doc/Estatut_Autonomia.pdf. The first two sections of Article 6 of the Valencian Statute state: “1. La llengua pròpia de la Comunitat Valenciana és el valencià. 2. L’idioma valencià és l’oficial a la Comunitat Valenciana, igual que ho és el castellan, que és l’idioma official de l’Estat. Tots tenen dret a conéixer-los i a usar-los i a rebre l’ensenyament del, i en, idioma valencià.” A portion of the Preamble to the Balearic statute reads: “La llengua catalana, pròpia de les Illes Balears, i la nostra cultura i tradicions són uns elements identificadors de la nostra societat i, en conseqüència, són ­elements vertebradors de la nostra identitat.” Section 1 of Article 4, titled “La llengua pròpia” states: “1. La llengua catalana, pròpia de les Illes Balears, tindrà, juntament amb la castellana, el caràcter d’idioma oficial.”

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38. If one includes Basque speakers in Navarre, a province and autonomous community claimed by Basque nationalists in opposition to the views most Navarrese, the national share of Basques rises 1 percent. 39. Piet Hemminga, “Regional Language and Political Opportunities: The Case of the Frisian Language,” in Multilingual Cities and Language Policies, eds. Kjell Herberts and Joseph G.  Turi (Vaasa-Vasa, Finland: Åbo Akademi University, Social Science Research Unit, 1999), 297–312. 40. Gerhard Seibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe (Leiden: Koninkijke Brill, 2006), 43, 57; Gerhard Seibert, “São Tomé e Príncipe” in A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, eds. Patrick Chabal et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 291. Santomean Creole, called fôrro or lunga santomé, is mutually intelligible with its counterpart on Príncipe, not with Angolar. 41. Seibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins, 433. 42. Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. 43. Birnir, “Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” 4, 9–12; Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 141. But see Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 112–4, who argues that institutional explanations can provide “only a partial explanation” for the weakness of Peruvian indigenous parties. 44. Recensement federal de la population 2000: Le paysage linguistique en Suisse (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Swiss Federal Statistics Office, April 2005), 9. 45. John R. G. Jenkins, Jura Separatism in Switzerland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, 185–212; Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, 89–98; Alain Pichard, La Question jurassienne: Avant et après la naissance du 23e canton Suisse (Lausanne, Switzerland: Presses polytechniques et ­u niversitaires romandes, 2004); Claude Hauser, L’Aventure du Jura: Cultures, politiques, identité régionale au XXe siècle (Lausanne, Switzerland: Éditions Antipodes et Sociétés d’Histoire de la Suisse romande, 2004); Alain Charpilloz, Le Jura irlandisé (Vevey, ­Switzerland: ­Editions Bertil Galland, 1976); Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to ­Conflict in Multicultural Societies, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 25–7, 65–8. 46. In elections for the Bern parliament, parties have divided into separatist and antiseparatist camps with two of major Swiss parties split into two parts—each proffering with their own electoral lists—based on their view of the future status of the Bernese Jura. The S­ ocialists have divided into the anti-separatist Socialist Party of the Bernese Jura (PSJB) and the separatist Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA). The Radicals have split into the anti-separatist Radical Party of the Bernese Jura (PRJB) and the separatist Jurassian Liberal Party (PLJ). The PLJ runs on a joint list with the undivided pro-separatist Christian Democrats (PDC). The Democratic Union of the Center (UDC) offers a single pro-Bern list. The Greens and Evangelical People’s Party (PEV) remain neutral while the Federal Democratic Union (UDF) opposes separatism. Separatist lists have garnered between 22 and 30 percent of the vote in elections for the cantonal parliament held in Bern since the creation of Canton Jura. Résultats de elections au Grand Conseil et au Conseil-exécutif bernois du 14 avril 2002 (Berne, Switzerland: Chancellerie d’Etat du canton de Berne, 2002); ­R ésultats de elections au Grand Conseil et au Conseil-exécutif bernois du 29 avril 1990 (Berne, Switzerland: Chancellerie d’Etat du canton de Berne, 1990); Chancellerie d’Etat du canton de Berne, “Elections cantonales du 9 avril 2006: Résultat Grand Conseil” (Berne, Switzerland: Chancellerie d’Etat du canton de Berne, 2006), http://www.wahlarchiv.sites. be.ch/elections06/wahlenabstimmungen-wahlen06.html. 47. Pichard, La Question jurassienne; McRae, Conflict an Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, 185–212; Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, 89–98; Jenkins, Jura Separatism in Switzerland; Carol L. Schmid, Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 10–11.



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48. Steinberg, Why Switzerland? 49. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 602–12, makes a similar point regarding Nigeria. 50. Bernhard Altermatt, La politique du bilinguisme dans le canton de Fribourg/Freiburg (1945– 2000): Entrée innovation et improvisation (Fribourg, Switzerland: Université de Fribourg, 2003); Claudine Brohy, “Bilingual Cities in Switzerland” in Multilingual Cities and ­Language Policies, eds. Kjell Herberts and Joseph G. Turi (Vaasa-Vasa, Finland: Åbo ­A kademi University, Social Science Research Unit, 1999), 29–54; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland, 105–111, 213–27; Miquel Caminal, El federalism pluralista: Del federalismo nacional al federalismo plurinacional (Barcelona: Paidós, 2002), 106–9. 51. Clive H. Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 63. 52. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, 130–32. 53. Linder, Swiss Democracy, 84–137; Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland, 143– 53; Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, 98–113. 54. See the equivalent section of chapter 2 for a description and sources for the various ­measures of fractionalization the percentage of minorities. 55. Brancati, Peace by Design, 65–89. 56. Birnir and Van Cott, “Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures,” 99–125; Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 25–7; Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South ­A merica,” 11–12. 57. Brancati, Peace by Design, 204; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties,” 149–74; Jones, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker Than Others?, 41–57; Shugart and Carey, Presidents and ­A ssemblies; Mainwaring and Shugart, “Conclusion”; Birnir and Van Cott, “Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American ­L egislatures”, 114–15; Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 130–34; Cox, ­“Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties,” 169. 58. Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil, 79–107; Samuels, “Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results,” 1–20.

Chapter 4 1. Massicotte and Blais, “Mixed Electoral Systems.” 2. Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, “Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 9 (November 2002): 1027–53; Federico Ferrara, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences (New York: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Erik S. Herron and Misa Nishikawa, “Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems,” Electoral Studies 20(2001): 63–86. But see Moser and Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context, 44–69, for a contradictory point of view. 3. Cox and Schoppa, “Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems”; Ferrara et al., Mixed Electoral Systems; Herron and Nishikawa, “Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems.” 4. Richard J. Crampton, “The Bulgarian Elections of 1990,” Representation 29, no. 108 (1990): 33–5. 5. Sondra Z. Koff and Stephen P. Koff, Italy: From the First to the Second Republic (New York: Routledge, 2000), 63–77; James L. Newell, Parties and Democracy in Italy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000), 45–67, 89–134. 6. Moser and Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context, 63.

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7. The system had no impact on regional parties in the Aosta Valley as it continued to elect its sole deputy by SMP. 8. Wonbin Cho, “The General Election in South Korea, April 2004,” Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 525–30. 9. Jung Bock Lee, “The Political Process in Korea” in Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction, eds. Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 143–7; Peter Moriss, “Electoral Politics in South Korea,” Electoral Studies 15, no. 4 (November 1996): 550–2. 10. Woojin Moon, “Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests,” Party Politics 11, no. 5 (2005): 579–99. 11. The membership of the Legislative Yuan increased from 161 in 1992 to 164 in 1995 to 225 in 1998. The share elected by SNTV was 125 in 1992, 128 in 1995, and 176 in 1998, 2001, and 2004. 12. A few constituencies had only one member—five in 1992 and 1995 and four in 1998, 2001, and 2004. Chen Chun-fu, “The Legislative Election in Taiwan, December 2004,” Electoral Studies 25, no. 4 (2006): 821–2; Christian Schafferer, “The 2001 National and Local ­Elections in Taiwan,” Taiwan Papers 4 (2002): 3; Christian Schafferer, “The Legislative Yuan Election, Taiwan 2001,” Electoral Studies 22, no. 3 (2003): 533–4; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics” in How Asia Votes, eds. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and David Newman (New York: Chatham House, 2002), 35–6; Andrew J. Nathan, “The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System,” Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (April 1993): 425–8. 13. Excluding the two Aboriginal constituencies, there were 27 territorial constituencies in 1992 and 1995 and 29 in 1998, 2001, and 2004. The mean magnitude of the territorial constituencies was 4.4 in 1992, 4.5 in 1995, and 5.8 in 1998, 2001, and 2004. John ­Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Manipulating the Electoral System under the SNTV: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan” in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single ­Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 65–84; see also Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, “Seat ­Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan,” Comparative Politics 26, no. 3 (January 1994): 221–36; Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 39–54. 14. The total number of seats also dropped to 113—just under one-half the size of the previous legislature. 15. Alexander C. Tan, “The 2008 Taiwan Elections: Forward to the Past?” Electoral Studies 28 (2009): 492–517. 16. The Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies are cited in John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and ­African Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2005): 14. 17. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Taiwan,” https://www.cia.gov/­ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html. The Taiwan Census does not gather data on ethnicity except for Aborigines. 18. Tan, “The 2008 Taiwan Elections: Forward to the Past?,” 505. 19. The proportional representation seats are first allocated to parties in relation to the number of multiples of full Hare quotas with any remaining seats distributed by the d’Hondt method. 20. Massicotte and Blais, “Mixed Electoral Systems,” 347–9. 21. Eduardo Valdés Escoffery, “Evolución de los Sistemas Electorales Aplicados a la Elección de Legisladores en la República de Panamá,” Asamblea Legislativa Asociacion Española de Letrados Parlamentarious: I Curso Internacional de Derecho Parlamentario, Panamá,



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22–26 July 2002; Tribunal Electoral, República de Panamá, “Elecciones 2004: ¿Cómo votar en las elecciones generales del 2 de mayo del 2004?.” http://www.tribunal-electoral. gob.pa/html/index.php?id=888 (viewed 29 April 2014) “Código Electoral, República de Panamá,” Gaceta Oficial 23, no. 437 (13  ­December 1997): 91–2 (see Articles 281–2); ­Tribunal Electoral, República de Panamá, ­“Información y Reglamentación de las Elecciones Generales del 2 mayo de 1999,” 22–3, 54–7, from Decreto 60 de 23 de noviembre 1998, “Por el cual se reglamentan las Elecciones Generales del 2 de mayo de 1999.” 22. Carlos Guevara Mann, “Forsaken Virtue: An Analysis of the Political Behavior of ­Panamanian Legislators, 1984–1999” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2001); Carlos Guevara Mann, “Calidad de la representación política y tamaño de las ­circunscripciones electorales: una comparación de las asambleas panameñas de 1945 y 1999,” Revista de Ciencia Política 24, no. 2 (2004): 94–115. 23. In 1999, small parties fared just as well in SMDs and even more poorly in multimember districts. In 2009, the top three parties won 100 percent of multimember district mandates with 87 percent of the vote and gained 65 percent of SMDs with 71 percent. Tribunal ­Electoral, República de Panamá, “Administración—Elecciones 1999: Votos obtenidos por ­legisladores proclamados por circuito: Elecciones populares del 2 de mayo de 1999,” http://w w w.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/html/fileadmin/user_upload/Elecciones/­ elecciones_1999/Cuadro_10_-_Legislador_Electo.pdf (viewed 29 April 2014); Matthew M. Singer, “Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Panama, May 2004,” Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 531–7; Tribunal Electoral, República de Panamá, “Administración— Elecciones 2009,” http://www.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/html/index.php?id=71. 24. Guevara Mann, ”Forsaken Virtue,” 2001. 25. Arend Lijphart, Rafael Lopez Pintor, and Yasunori Sone, “The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 154–69; Cox and Niou, “Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan.” 26. Steven R. Reed and John M. Bolland, “The Fragmentation Effect of SNTV in Japan” in  ­Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull ­ Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 211–26. 27. Jean-Marie Bouissou, “Organizing One’s Support Base under SNTV: The Case of Japanese Koenkai” in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 87–120. 28. Arend Lijphart, “SNTV and STV Compared: Their Political Consequences in Japan, Ireland, and Malta” in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, SungChull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 289–99. 29. Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeo N. Fukai, “Campaigning for the Japanese Diet” in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 121–52. 30. Manuel Alcántara Sáez and Ismael Crespo Martínez, Partidos politicos y procesos electorales en Uruguay (1971–1990) (Madrid, Spain: Fundación Centro Español de Estudios de América Latin, 1992), 21–9; Jeffrey Cason, “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and

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Party Adaption in Uruguay,” Latin American Politics and Society 44, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 89–109. 31. Alcántara Sáez and Crespo Martínez, Partidos politicos y procesos electorales en Uruguay (1971–1990), 8–16, 25–9; Scott Morgenstern, “Organized Factions and Disorganized ­Parties: Electoral Incentives in Uruguay,” Party Politics 7, no. 2 (2001): 235–56; Phillip B. Taylor, “The Electoral System in Uruguay,” Journal of Politics 17, no. 1 (February 1955): 19–42; Cason, “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaption in Uruguay,” 94–7; Jeffrey Cason, “Electoral Reform and Stability in Uruguay” in Electoral Systems and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 154–67. 32. Mads H. Qvortrup, “Uruguay’s Constitutional Referendum 8 December 1996,” Electoral Studies 16, no. 4 (December 1997): 549–54; Henry Finch, “The Uruguayan Election of 1994,” Electoral Studies 14, no. 2 (June 1995): 232–6; Cason, “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaption in Uruguay,” 97–8; Cason, “Electoral Reform and ­Stability in Uruguay,” 158–65. The decision to change the system proved prescient as the Broad Front candidate, Montevideo Mayor Tabaré Vásquez, won a plurality with 40 ­percent of the vote but lost the runoff as supporters of the third-place National candidate coalesced behind the Colorado candidate. Robert Espíndola, “No Change in Uruguay: The 1999 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections,” Electoral Studies 20, no. 4 (2001): 649–57; Cason, “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaption in Uruguay,” 98–100. The new system did not prevent Vásquez from winning a first-round victory with 52 percent in 2004. David Altman and Rossana Castiglioni, “The 2004 ­Uruguayan Elections: A Political Earthquake Foretold,” Electoral Studies 25, no. 1 (2006): 147–54. 33. Parties with more than 3 percent of the vote were also guaranteed to receive at least 70 ­percent of the seats corresponding to their share of the valid vote multiplied by 300, though other seats were taken away from small parties before large parties to accomplish this ­outcome. Aikaterini Kalorigou and John Panaretos, “Analysis and Comparison of Greek Parliamentary Electoral Systems of the Period 1974–1999” (Paper presented at the SESS-TIES International Conference on Environment and Statistics in the Earth and Space Sciences, Athens, Greece, August 1999). 34. Stephanos Stavros, “Citizenship and the Protection of Minorities” in Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan disintegration?, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (New York: Manchester University Press 1996), 119; Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Regions, Minorities and European Integration: A Case Study in Muslims in Western Thrace, Greece,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 7, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 101. 35. Coalitions needed to win 10 percent of the vote to receive any seats, higher than the 4 ­percent threshold for single parties. If a coalition passed the threshold, individual parties within the coalition could gain seats as long as they won 2 percent of the vote or were the largest party with less than 2 percent. 36. Alternatively, one could calculate a combined single value for the size of the electorally relevant ethnoregional groups by weighting according to the share of seats elected by each method. Though the use of an overall single measure clouds the theorized impact of by conflating two the expectations generated by two clashing electoral systems, this estimate for pEREG still performs far better than existing measures when subject to the same tests presented in Table 4.3 for the measure of pEREG outlined in the text. 37. Cox and Schoppa, “Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems”; Ferrara et al., Mixed Electoral Systems; Herron and Nishikawa, “Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems.” 38. Moser and Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context, 50–61. 39. Moser and Scheiner, Electoral Systems and Political Context, 62–3.



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40. Kenneth Benoit, “Hungary: Holding Back the Tiers” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchel (New York: Oxford University Press 2005); see also Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary. 41. Official data on the Hakka in Taiwan are not collected; the estimates here are from reports by a local observer. Data for Mainlanders is from the 1990 Census; Taiwan’s census no longer gathers this information, though it still reports information on the Aboriginal ­population. 42. In the bivariate model at the regional level, not reported in the table, pEREG has a statistically significant coefficient of 0.17. 43. The central problem with multivariate models is that each additional independent variable controls for a single country. For example, Italy is the only decentralized country, and Panama is the only ni-ni country with a simultaneously elected strong president.

Chapter 5 1. For additional information, see David Lublin and Matthew Wright, “Engineering ­Inclusion: Assessing the Effects of Pro-Minority Representation Policies,” Electoral ­Studies 32, no. 4 (December 2013): 746–55. 2. The level of Māori under representation dropped after 1867 as the Māori population share declined, though the disparity later grew as the number of European seats increased and the Māori population share rose. 3. Susan A. Banducci, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, “Minority Representation, ­Empowerment, and Participation,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 2 (May 2004): 536; Ann ­Sullivan, “Maori Politics and Government Policies” in New Zealand Politics in Transition, ed. Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 367. 4. Banducci et al., “Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation,” 536; ­Sullivan, “Maori Politics and Government Policies,” 367–8. 5. Lublin, The Paradox of Representation. The problems related to the packing of minority voters stood out in sharper relief in New Zealand as all four of the Māori districts were homogenously Māori whereas majority–minority districts in the United States contain a white minority. On the other hand, support for Labour in Māori constituencies in the last several elections held under SMP was lower than support for the Democrats among ­A frican Americans. Support for Labour ranged from 65 to 78 percent in Māori electorates in the four elections held from 1981 through 1990 and dropped to just 51 percent in the last SMP election in 1993. In contrast, African-American support for the Democrats in congressional elections regularly exceeds 85 percent. 6. Banducci et al., “Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation,” 536, 541. One Māori seat was won by New Zealand First in 1993, which then swept all of the Māori electorates in the first MMP election in 1996; Ann Sullivan and Jack Vowles, ­“Realignment?:  Maori and the 1996 Election” in Voters’ Victory?: New Zealand’s First Election Under ­Proportion Representation, eds. Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and ­Jeffrey Karp (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), 171. Labour ­regained all of the Māori electorate seats in 1999 and 2002 but split them with the Māori Party in 2005 and 2008 and with the Māori and Mana parties in 2011. 7. Sullivan and Vowles, “Realignment?,” 172–5. Mana Motuhake joined the multiparty ­A lliance in the 1993 elections; Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare, and Raymond Miller, Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press 1995), 44. 8. Labour won 41 seats on 48.3 percent of the vote while National gained the remaining 39 seats on 44.2 percent of the vote in 1957. In none of the other 16 general elections held from 1943 through 1990 did Labour win with a majority of less than five seats. Elections

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New Zealand, “General elections 1890–1993—Seats Won by Party,” http://www.­ elections.org.nz/events/past-events/general-elections-1890-1993 (visited 29 April 2014). 9. The number of Māori electorates depends on a formula designed to make sure that the South Island, which tends to lose population relative to the rest of New Zealand, retains 16 electorates. A quota is calculated by dividing the number of people on the general roll on the South Island by 16. The number of Māori electorates equals the number of Māori voters divided by the quota and rounded to the nearest whole number. Elections New Zealand, “How Electorates are Calculated,” http://www.elections.org.nz/voting-system/electorates/how-electorates-are-calculated (viewed 29 April 2014). 10. The number of seats in the House increased from 99 to 120 with the adoption of the MMP. The number of Māori electorates did not change in 2005, 2008, or 2011. Elections New Zealand, “Māori Electoral Option 2013—Final Results,” http://www.elections.org.nz/ events/maori-electoral-option-2013/results (viewed 29 April 2014). 11. Māori-based Mana Motuhake joined the Green, New Labour, Democratic, and Liberal parties in the Alliance in 1991. In 1993, one Mana Motuhake member was elected under the Alliance banner. Two Mana Motuhake members won as Alliance candidates in 1996 and 1999. No Alliance candidates won in 2002 and Mana Motuhake dissolved in 2005. Vowles et al., Towards Consensus?, 44. 12. Māori composed 14.1 percent of the total population, higher than in the voting-age ­population because children form a higher share of the Māori population. “2001 Census of ­Population and Dwellings: Population Structure and Internal Migration,” (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand), Tables 3 and 3a. The share claiming Māori descent is 2.1 percent higher than the share claiming Māori ethnicity; see “2001 Census of Population and Dwellings: Māori” (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand), Table 1. 13. Andrew Geddis, “The General Election in New Zealand, September 2005,” Electoral Studies 25 (2006): 811–2. 14. Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp, and Raymond Miller, eds., Voters’ Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government ­(Auckland:  Auckland University Press, 2004), 201. The 1996 and 1999 New Zealand ­Election Studies revealed that 30 percent and 36 percent, respectively, of registered Māori and 12 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of registered Europeans did not vote. Māori ­composed 9 percent of the electorate in both years; Jack Vowles, “A New Post-MMP Party System?” in Voters’ Victory? New Zealand’s First Election under Proportion Representation, eds. Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp (Auckland: ­Auckland  University Press, 1998), 36; Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Jeffrey Karp, Susan ­Banducci, ­R aymond Miller, and Ann Sullivan, eds., Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election and the Fate of MMP (Auckland: Auckland ­University Press, 2001), 227. 15. Geddis, “The General Election in New Zealand, September 2005,” 811–2. 16. Elections New Zealand, “Statistics (2005 General Election),” Tables 4.2, 4.4, and 5.1, http://2005.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2005/e9/html/statistics.html (viewed 29 April 2014).; “Statistics (2008 General Election),” Tables 4.2, 4.4, and 5.1, http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2008/e9/html/statistics.html (viewed 6 July 2013); Elections New Zealand, “Statistics (2011 General Election),” Tables  4.2, 4.4, and 5.1, http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2011/e9/ html/statistics.html (viewed 6 July 2013). 17. ICL, “Cyprus Constitution,” http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/cy00000_.html (viewed 15 December 2008); see section 2, Articles 2 and 62,. The island was divided into the same six block vote multimember constituencies for purposes of electing representatives from both communities but voters cast ballots only for their community representatives. ­Panayiotis Zaphiris and Nicos Nicolaou, “Parliamentary Elections: Historical Background and ­Results,” http://www.kypros.org/Elections/news.html (viewed 15 December 2008); Stavros Panteli,



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A History of Cyprus: From Foreign Domination to Troubled ­Independence  (London: East-West Publications, 2000), 289–91. 18. ICL, “Cyprus Constitution,” Part 5, Articles 86–111. 19. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot government declared the independence of the Turkish ­R epublic of Northern Cyprus but has largely failed to win international recognition. The Greek Cypriot government views the northern portion of the island as illegally occupied and itself as the sole legitimate government. 20. Cyprus shifted from the block vote to PR in 1981. Zaphiris and Nicolaou, “Parliamentary Elections.” 21. Republic of Cyprus House of Representatives, “Election, Composition, and Dissolution of the House of Representatives,” http://www.parliament.cy/easyconsole.cfm/id/143 (viewed 29 April 2014). 22. “Population by Ethnic Affiliation, Slovenia, Census 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2002,” Census of Population, Households and Housing, 2002 (Ljubljana: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2002). 23. The remaining 88 members of the National Assembly are elected by a two-tier system of PR  with the national allocation by the d’Hondt method being decisive. Since the 2000 election, parties must meet a threshold of 4 percent of the national vote to participate in the national seat allocation. In 1992 and 1996, parties needed to win a total of three seats at the district level or national level or in some combination of the two to participate in the ­national seat allocation—the equivalent of a threshold of 3.37 percent. Jurij Toplak, “The Parliamentary Election in Slovenia, October 2004,” Electoral Studies 25, no. 4 (December 2006): 825–31; Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 295. 24. Choosing to rank only one or some of the candidates in a Borda count election is similar to bullet voting in a block vote election (i.e., casting fewer than the total number of votes ­a llowed in a multimember district). 25. James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State in the New Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 136–7. According to the 2002 Census, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs form 1.98 percent, 1.81 percent, and 1.10 percent, ­respectively, of Slovenia’s population. “Population by Ethnic Affiliation, Slovenia, Census 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2002.” 26. Igor Mekina, “Slovenia and Minorities: Some Are More Equal Than the Others,” AIM (­A lternativna Informativna Mrežna/Alternative Information Network), 30 March 2001, http://w w w.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200103/10330-002-trae-lju.htm (viewed 25 May 2008); Borut Mekina, “Slovenia: National Minorities as State Secrets,” Transitions Online, December 21, 2004. 27. Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, “Population and Housing Census: 2000 Statistical Tables,” Tables 1 (Number of Households, Population and Average Size of the Household by City/County in ­Taiwan-Fukien Area) and 56 (Number of Indigenous Population by City/County in ­Taiwan-Fukien Area), http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=8465&ctNode=1629; Hsieh, “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan,” 14. Hsieh also cites the Census in Chinese: Census 2000, “The Population of Aborigines in the Taiwan Area,” http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Attachment/53114475571.pdf. 28. Plains and Mountain Aborigines are sometimes referred to as Lowland and Highland ­A borigines. 29. Data are compiled by author from Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU), “The Elections for Public Offices in the Republic of China (Taiwan),” http:// vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp (viewed 6 July 2008). 30. Chen, “The Legislative Election in Taiwan, December 2004,” 822; Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” 40.

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31. Ching-hsin Yu, “The Evolving Party System in Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and African ­Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2005): 105–12; Yun-han Chu and Larry Diamond, “Taiwan’s 1998 Elections: Implications for Democratic Consolidation,” Asian Survey 39, no. 5 (September–October 1999): 812–8. 32. 2006 Taiwan Yearbook (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2006), 26–9; Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, “Population and Housing Census: 2000 Statistical Tables,” Table 56 (Number of ­I ndigenous Population by City/County in Taiwan-Fukien Area), http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct .asp?xItem=8465&ctNode=1629; 33. Yu, “The Evolving Party System in Taiwan,” 115–7. 34. Hsieh, “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “How Far Can Taiwan Go?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 107–8; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “East Asian Culture and Democratic Transition, with Special Reference to the Case of Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 35, no. 1 (2000): 39–40; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Salient Issues in ­Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” Electoral Studies 15, no. 2 (1996): 219–35; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Issue Voting in the Republic of China on Taiwan’s 1992 Legislative Yuan Election,” International Political Science Review 17, no. 1 (January 2006): 13–27; Chi Huang, “Dimensions of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and National Identity in Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2005): 51–70. But also see Yu, “The Evolving Party System in Taiwan,” 112–8; Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,” Asian Survey 44, no. 4 (July–August 2004): 483; Hungmao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, “Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan,” China ­Journal 37 (January 1997): 16–9; John F. Copper, “Taiwan: Democracy’s Gone Awry?,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 34 (2003): 153. 35. Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, “Introduction: Political Culture, Representation and Electoral Systems in the Pacific Islands,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (November 2005): 261; Asofou So’o and Jon Fraenkel, “The Role of Ballot Chiefs (Matai Pälota) and Political Parties in Sämoa’s Shift to Universal Suffrage,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (November 2005): 333–61, esp. 336; Asofou So’o, “Samoa” in Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Vol. 2, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz, and Christof Harmann (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 780–4, esp. 782–3; Dag Anckar and Carsten Anckar, “Electoral Systems in Pacific and Other Small Islands” in Handbook of Global Political Policy, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), 332. 36. Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archive, “Samoa,” http://psephos.adam-carr.net/. 37. New laws have attempted to circumscribe the ability of MPs to change party or to form a new faction, encouraging the trend toward greater party organization. Jon Fraenkel, ­“Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws” (Discussion Paper 8, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2005); So’o, “Samoa,” 781–2; So’o and Fraenkel, “The Role of Ballot Chiefs (Matai Pälota) and Political Parties in Sämoa’s Shift to Universal Suffrage,” 354–5; Fraenkel and Grofman, “Introduction,” 271–2. 38. “Tusigaigoa O Tagata Ma Fale 2006 (Preliminary Population Count 2006),” (Apia: Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance, Government of Samoa 2006). 39. Samar Bosu Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India: An Experience of Incompatibility” in Challenging Politics: Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Political Parties and Elections, ed. Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2001), 98–102; Alistair McMillan, Standing at the Margins (New  York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2; Niraja Gopal Jayal, Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions (New York: Palgrave ­MacMillan, 2006), 58–62.



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40. Alistair McMillan, “Delimitation in India” in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, eds. Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 75–6; Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 102; McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 197–8; Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 95; Jayal, Representing India, 62. 41. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 182–9; Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 113. 42. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 187–8; “Delimitation Commission of India.” 43. Section 9(c) of the Delimitation Act of 2002 reads: “Constituencies in which seats are ­reserved for the Scheduled Castes shall be distributed in different parts of the State and located, as far as practicable, in those areas where the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large”; see The Gazette of India, 4 June 2002; McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 190–200; McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 79; Mohammed Sanjeer Alam, “Intra-State Parity and Selection of Reserved Seats,” Seminar 586 (June 2008), http:// www.india-seminar.com/2008/586/586_mohd_sanjeer_alam.htm. 44. G.  N. Gawaguru, Party Politics in Reserved Constituencies (Ph.D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, 1985); McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 197; McMillan, ­“Delimitation in India,” 79; Alistair McMillan, “Delimitation, Democracy, and End of Constitutional Freeze,” Economic and Political Weekly, 8 April 2000, 1273; Alam, “IntraState Parity and Selection of Reserved Seats.” 45. Some have proposed reserving constituencies for Muslims to address their underrepre­ sentation. Alam, “Intra-State Parity and Selection of Reserved Seats”; Hilal Ahmed, ­“Debating Muslim political representation,” Seminar 586 (June 2008), http://www.indiaseminar.com/2008/586/586_hilal_ahmed.htm; Report on Social, Economic, and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India (New Delhi: Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Cabinet Secretariat, 2006): 189–214, 269–70. 46. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 200–1; Myron Weiner, “India’s Minorities: Who Are They? What Do They Want?” in State and Politics in India, ed. Partha Chatterjee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 474. 47. Section 9(d) of the Delimitation Act of 2002 states that “constituencies in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Tribes shall, as far as practicable, be located in areas where the proportion of their population to the total is the largest”; see The Gazette of India, 4 June 2002; McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 199–200; Alam, “Intra-State Parity and ­Selection of Reserved Seats.” 48. Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 113; Weiner, “India’s ­M inorities,” 471–4. 49. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 200–2. 50. McMillan, “Delimitation, Democracy, and End of Constitutional Freeze,” 1271–2; ­McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 182; McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 78–9; Alistair McMillan, “Constitution 91st Amendment Bill: A Constitutional Fraud?” Economic and Political Weekly, 14 April 2001, 1171; Alam, “Intra-State Parity and Selection of Reserved Seats”; K. C. Sivaramakrishnan, “A Fear of Change,” Seminar 586 (June 2008), http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/586/586_k_c_sivaramakrishnan.htm. 51. Constitutional amendments and presidential decrees also prohibited the Electoral Commission from revising boundaries in six states: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Manipur, and Nagaland. 52. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 189; McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 76, 83–5; ­McMillan, “Constitution 91st Amendment Bill,” 1171; Sivaramakrishnan, “A Fear of Change.” 53. In the South, Andhra Pradesh loses two seats compared to three for Kerala and six for Tamil Nadu. In the Hindi Belt, Haryana gains one seat compared to two for Madhya

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Pradesh, three for Bihar, four for Rajasthan, and seven for Uttar Pradesh. Maharashtra would also gain three seats while Odisha (Orissa) would lose two. Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Meghalaya, Manipur, and Nagaland would each lose a single seat under a proportionate apportionment based on the 2001 Census. McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 82–91; McMillan, “Constitution 91st Amendment Bill,” 1172. 54. McMillan, Standing at the Margins, 186–9; McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 83–6, 90; McMillan, “Delimitation, Democracy, and End of Constitutional Freeze,” 1274. 55. McMillan, “Delimitation in India,” 90; McMillan, “Delimitation, Democracy, and End of Constitutional Freeze,” 1274–5. The BSP aspires to be a national party and is classified as such by the Electoral Commission but is counted as an ethnoregional party here because it only has meaningful success in Uttar Pradesh. In 2004, though it contested seats in 25 states or union territories, it won all of its seats and two-thirds of its votes in Uttar Pradesh. While the BSP won 25 percent of the vote in Uttar Pradesh, it received less than 5 percent of the vote in 22 other states that it contested. The BSP managed to win 7 percent in Uttaranchal, formerly part of Uttar Pradesh, and 8 percent in Punjab. The SP similarly aspires to greater status and contested constituencies in 23 states or union territories. However, it won 85 percent of its votes and all but one of its seats in 2004 in Uttar Pradesh. Uttaranchal, where the SP won 8 percent of the vote, was the only other state in which the party won a seat or exceeded 3 percent of the vote. In 2004, RJD won 96 percent of its votes and 22 of its 24 seats in Bihar. RJD won most of the rest of its votes and its other two seats in Jharkhand, formerly part of Bihar, though it contested seats in four other states. While RJD earned 31  percent of the vote in Bihar and 4 percent in Jharkhand, it did not gain more than 0.3 ­percent in any other state. 56. Article 331 states: “Notwithstanding anything in article 81, the President may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community is not adequately represented in the House of the People, nominate not more than two members of that community to the House of the People.” Article 333 states: “Notwithstanding anything in article 170, the Governor of a State may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community needs representation in the Legislative Assembly of the State and is not adequately represented therein, nominate one member of that community to the Assembly.” Constitution of India, Articles 331, 333. 57. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “Directory of Parliaments and Legislatures,” http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/Mem/Directory/ (viewed 29 April 2014); “Legislative Bodies in India,” http://legislativebodiesinindia.nic.in/ (viewed 22 December 2008); “Andhra Pradesh Legislature: Legislative Assembly Overview,” http://www.aplegislature.org/overview (viewed 29 April 2014); Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, “List of ­Members,” http://www.assembly.tn.gov.in/disp_all.asp (viewed 22 December 2008); Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, “The State Legislature: Origin and Evolution,” http:// www.assembly.tn.gov.in/history/history.htm (viewed 22 December 2008); Anglo Indian Association, “Anglo Indian M.L.A.’s of Bihar,” http://bit.ly/1nDxlOx (viewed 29 April 2014); Karnataka Legislature, “Origin and Growth of the Karnataka Legislature,” http:// kla.kar.nic.in/legislature.htm (viewed 22 December 2008); S. Rajendran, “Nomination of Anglo-Indian MLA Will Have to Wait,” The Hindu, 30 May 2008, http://www.­ thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/nomination-of-angloindianmla-will-have-to-wait/article1267423.ece; B.  S. Satish Kumar, “Fullinfaw Is AngloIndian MLA,” The Hindu, 6 June 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/06/stories/ 2008060659620400.htm; “Nominated,” The Hindu, 17 June 2006, http://www.hindu. com/2006/06/17/­ stories/2006061714570400.htm; “Kerala Legislative Assembly,” http://w w w.­h eadlinesindia.com/constituencies/kerala-legislative-assembly.html (viewed 22 December 2008); “Anglo-Indian MLA nominated,” The Hindu, 12 April 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/12/stories/2007041209330300.htm; “Second Congress List for Chhattisgarh,” The Hindu, 3 November 2008, http://www.hindu. com/2008/11/03/­stories/2008110356541200.htm; Chhattisgarh Legislative Assembly,



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“Frequently Asked Questions,” http://cgvidhansabha.gov.in/english/englishindex.htm (viewed 22 December 2008); Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, “Uttar Pradesh Legislature: A Historical Sketch,” http://uplegassembly.nic.in/UPLL.HTML (viewed 22 ­December 2008); ­“Delimitation Benefits Madhya Pradesh Tribal Leaders Most,” http:// news.oneindia.in/2008/10/21/delimitation-benefits-tribals-in-mp-1224572688.html (viewed 29 April 2014). 58. Raobeia Ken Sigrah and Stacey M. King, Te Rii ni Banaba (Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2001), 17–20, 239–64; Howard Van Trease, “The 1991 Election in Kiribati,” Journal of Pacific History 27, no. 3 (1992): 66. Kiribati is not included in analyses involving parties in this volume as existing parties are very loose, ­u norganized formations and independents have been the largest group in parliament until the most recent election; see Van Trease, “The 1991 Election in Kiribati,” 67. 59. The Constitution of Kiribati, Sections 53, 117; see Parliament of Kiribati, “Constitution of Kiribati,” http://www.parliament.gov.ki/content/constitution (viewed 29 April 2014); Van Trease, “The 1991 Election in Kiribati,” 66; Norman Meller, “Ethnic and Racial ­Cleavages in Pacific Island Constitutions,” Journal of Pacific History 32, no. 2 (December 1997): 205; Natan Brechtefeld, “The Electoral System” in Atoll Politics: The Republic of Kiribati, ed. Howard Van Trease (Christchurch, New Zealand: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1993), 42; Howard Van Trease, “From Colony to Independence” in Atoll Politics: The Republic of Kiribati, ed. Howard Van Trease (Christchurch, New Zealand: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1993), 3–22. 60. The Constitution of Kiribati, Sections 53–5, 117. Kiribati citizens choose the elected ­members using a two-round system. Kiribati is divided into 24 constituencies with ­between one and three MPs. Voters have as many votes as there are seats but may not cast more than one vote per candidate. Candidates who receive a majority in the first round are elected. If all the seats are not filled, the second round includes two candidates more than  the seats ­remaining. In the second round, the top candidates win election even if they do not receive a majority. In addition to the nominated and elected MPs, the attorney general is an ex o­ fficio MP. Van Trease, “The 1991 Election in Kiribati,” 66; Fraenkel, ­“Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws,” 3; Brechtefeld, “The Electoral System,” 44; Barrie Macdonald, “Elections in Kiribati,” Political Science 35, no. 1 (July 1983): 58–70. 61. The Constitution of Kiribati, Section 118, subsection (4). 62. The next most overrepresented constituency—Onotoa—has 32 percent of the ideal ­population per MP. Van Trease, “The 1991 Election in Kiribati,” 66; Howard Van Trease, “The General Election” in Atoll Politics: The Republic of Kiribati, ed. Howard Van Trease (Christchurch, New Zealand: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1993), 77–80; Brechtefeld, “The Electoral System,” 43. Giving one or more seats to the outer islands and limiting the seats awarded to the two constituencies on South Tarawa benefits all of the outer islands greatly. At the time of the 2011 election, South Tarawa contained 49 percent of Kiribati’s population but elected just 14 percent of the elected members of the Maneaba. The underrepresentation of these two constituencies has only grown in recent years as more MPs have been allotted to other constituencies even as people continue to move from the outer islands to Tarawa. Data compiled by author based on “Kiribati: Gilbert Group,” http://www.citypopulation.de/Kiribati.html (viewed 6 July 2013); Jon Fraenkel, “Kiribati Legislative Needs Assessment,” UNDP Mission, August 2008. 63. Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Kiribati: Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election ­R esults,” http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2169_arc.htm (viewed 24 July 2008). 64. A. J. Christopher, “Ethnicity, Community and the Census in Mauritius, 1830–1990,” Geographical Journal 158, no. 1 (March 1992): 57–64; Larry W. Bowman, Mauritius:

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­ emocracy and Development in the Indian Ocean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), D 44–55; A. R. Mannick, Mauritius: The Development of a Plural Society (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1979), 59–76; Adele Smith Simmons, Modern Mauritius: The Politics of Decolonization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 10–51; ­ ­ W illiam F. S. Miles, “The Mauritius Enigma,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 2 (1999): 91; William F. S. Miles, “The Politics of Language Equilibrium in a Multilingual Society,” Comparative Politics 32, no. 2 (January 2000): 216–7; Shaheen Mozaffar, “Negotiating Independence in ­Mauritius,” International Negotiation 10 (2005): 269–71; Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrance Carroll, “Accommodating Ethnic Diversity in a Modernizing Democratic State: Theory and ­Practice in the Case of Mauritius,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 1 (­January 2000): 122, 127; Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrance Carroll, “State and Ethnicity in Botswana and Mauritius: A Democratic Route to Development?,” Journal of ­Development Studies 33, no. 4 (April 1997): 480–2; Henry Srebnik, “Can an EthnicallyBased Civil Society ­Succeed? The Case of Mauritius,” Journal of Contemprary African Studies 18, no. 1 (2000): 9–10; Oddvar Hollup, “Islamnic Revivalism and Political Opposition among Minority Muslims in Mauritius,” Ethnology 35, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 285–300. 65. The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, Section 75; Republic of Mauritius, “Rodrigues Regional Assembly,” http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/rra_portal/rraas­ ­ sembly/index.htm (viewed 24 October 2009); see election results at Republic of Mauritius,  “Election Commissioner’s Office,” http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/eco/ ­ (viewed 3 July 2008). 66. The original boundary delimitation intentionally created 10 rural constituencies dominated by Hindus and 10 urban constituencies with relatively high non-Hindu populations. Constituency boundaries have not been altered since, though the constitution provides for new delimitation in line with population changes. Raj Mathur, “Parliamentary Representation of Minority Communities: The Mauritian Experience,” Africa Today 44, no. 1 (1997): 62–3; Ajay Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1997), 175–6, 178–80; Denis K. Kadima and Roukaya Kasenally, “The Formation, Collapse and Revival of Political Party Coalitions in Mauritius,” Journal of African Elections 4, no. 1 (2005): 139; The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, Section 39. 67. The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, Section 39 and First Schedule, Section 1, subsection 1. At the time of the 2005 elections, Rodrigues had 10 percent fewer registered voters per MP than the average constituency. However, the average constituency differed by 15 percent from the ideal, so Rodrigues was not outside the norm. Two constituencies in Port Louis had at least 40 percent fewer electors than the ideal, while two other constituencies outside the capital had at least 30 percent more. 68. Henry Srebrnik, “‘Full of Sound and Fury’: Three Decades of Parliamentary Politics in Mauritius,” Journal of Southern African Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2002): 278; Kadima and Kasenally, “The Formation, Collapse and Revival of Political Party Coalitions in ­Mauritius,” Journal of African Elections 4, no. 1 (2005): 150; The Constitution of the ­R epublic of Mauritius, First Schedule, Section 1. 69. Independent candidates are ineligible to receive best-loser seats. 70. Mathur, “Parliamentary Representation of Minority Communities,” 63–70; Hansraj Mathur, Parliament in Mauritius (Rose-Hill, Mauritius: Editions de L’Océan Indien, 1991), 59–66; Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius, 177–8; The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, First Schedule, Section 5. 71. An alliance won 57 of the 60 constituency seats on Mauritius. All three losing candidates  were Hindus but its first best-loser seat was designated for a Muslim. Mathur, ­Parliament in Mauritius, 67–8; Mathur, “Parliamentary Representation of Minority ­Communities,” 71–4. 72. Ari Nave, “The Institutionalisation of Communalism: The Best-Loser System in ­Mauritius” in Consolidating the Rainbow: Independent Mauritius, 1968–1998, ed. Marina Carter (Port Louis, Mauritius: Centre for Research on Indian Ocean ­Societies,  1998),



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19–26; Mathur, “Parliamentary Representation of Minority ­ Communities,” 68–9; ­Mozaffar, “Negotiating Independence in Mauritius,” 282; Deborah Bräutigam, “Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in ­Mauritius,”  Comparative ­Politics 33, no. 1 (October 1997): 52–3. Kadima and Kasenally, “The Formation, Collapse and Revival of Political Party Coalitions in Mauritius,” 142–5, argue that ethnicity ­remains a key feature in Mauritian voting behavior. See also Bowman, ­Mauritius; Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius; Miles, “The Mauritius Enigma”; Mannick, Mauritius; and Srebnik, “Can an Ethnically-Based Civil Society Succeed? 73. Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 228; Grzegorz Janusz, “The Status of National Minorities in Poland” in International Obligations and ­National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, ed. Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006), 487; James G. Kellas, Nationalist Politics in Europe: The Constitutional and Electoral Dimensions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 119. 74. Sarah Birch, Frances Millard, Marina Popescu, and Kieran Williams, Embodying ­Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post Communist Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 38–45; Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, “Idealism versus Realism in Institutional Choice: Explaining Electoral Reform in Poland,” West European Politics 24, no. 3 (July 2001): 78–84. For more on battles over electoral system reform in Poland, see Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden, “Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System, 1989–2001,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 2 (May 2004): 396–427; Marek M. Kaminski and Monika A. Nalepa, “Poland: Learning to Manipulate Electoral Rules” in Handbook of Electoral System Choice, ed. Josep M. Colomer (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 369–81. 75. The district level seats were awarded utilizing the largest remainder system with a Hare quota while the national-level seats were allocated using the modified Sainte-Laguë ­formula to all parties eligible to receive them. “Law on Sejm Elections, 3 July 1991,” http:// www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/legislationAll.asp?country=poland&legislation=pl91 (viewed 26 May 2008); Frances Millard, “The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991,” Soviet Studies 44, no. 5 (1992): 839–40, 846–7; Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 228; Olga Shvetsova, “A Survey of PostCommunist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” Electoral Studies 18 (1999): 401, 403; Bryon ­Moraski and Gerhard Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe,” Journal of Politics 61, no. 1 ­(February 1999): 155; Kimmo Kuusela, “The Founding Electoral Systems in Eastern Europe, 1989–91” in Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (New York: Routledge, 1994): 132–5. Kuusela (p. 134) reports that minority parties had to meet less stringent signature ­requirements to present a national list. 76. “The Act of 28th May, 1993: On Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland,” http:// www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/legislationAll.asp?country=poland&legislation=pl93 (viewed 27 May 2008); Carlos Flores Juberías, “Post-Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities: A Dilemma in Five Paradigms” in The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, ed. Jonathan P. Stein (New York: EastWest Institute, 2000), 42–3; Chan, “Idealism versus Realism in Institutional Choice,” 76–7; Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, “Poland at the Crossroads: The 1993 General Election,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 1 (1995): 130; Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 228–9; Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” 401, 403; János Simon, “Electoral Systems and Democracy in Central Europe, 1990–1994,” International Political Science Review 18, no. 4 (1997): 368; Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe,” 155. Poland also switched to the d’Hondt formula to allocate seats at both the district and

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n­ ational levels—less favorable to small parties than previous formulae; see David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 71–8; ­Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 23; Gallagher and Mitchell, “Introduction to Electoral Systems,” 584–9. 77. Czestochowa and Opole retained 8 and 10 seats, respectively, in 1993 and 1997. Katowice kept its 17 seats in 1993 though it dropped to 16 in 1997. Gliwice had 13 seats in 1991 but 14 in 1993 and 1997. “Poland: Constituency Data,” http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=Poland&opt=con (viewed 26 May 2008). Some sources, however, appear to attribute the sharp decline in the German representation to electoral system changes, obliquely in Tomasz Kamusella and Terry Sullivan, “The Germans of Upper Silesia: The Struggle for Recognition” in Ethnicity and Democratization in the New Europe, ed. Karl Cordell (New York: Routledge, 1999), 178; and more specifically in ­Juberías, “Post-Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities,” 42–3. Juberías states: “Article 91.3 waives the general requirement that lists be presented in 26 districts in order to field a national list of candidates, instead requiring that national minority organizations to present lists in only 5 districts throughout the country. However, the law does not exempt such parties from the general requirement of including in the national list only citizens previously registered as candidates in district lists, which is tantamount to requiring that they present as many as 69 candidates throughout the country and thus campaign in many more districts than any ethnic minority in Poland could possibly cover. As a result, no ethnic minority group was able to present a national list for the September 1993 elections.” Juberías further contrasts the number of minority MPs elected in 1993 unfavorably with the number elected in 1991; Juberías, “Post-Communist Electoral Systems and ­National Minorities, 61n47. But Chan, “Poland at the Crossroads,” 130, notes that both the German and Belorussian minority parties collected enough signatures to register their parties in seven constituencies apiece, and it remains unclear why they could not run their district candidates on a national list. Regardless, the votes received by both parties were too few to win national constituency seats. 78. “The Act of 12 April 2001 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland,” http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/­legislationAll. asp?country=poland&legislation=pl2001 (viewed 28 May 2008); Birch et al., ­Embodying Democracy, 41–5; Benoit and Hayden, “Institutional Change and Persistence,” 404, 419–22. In 2001, the formula utilized to allocate the seats within districts shifted from d’Hondt  to modified Sainte-Laguë. The number of mandates in Opole grew from 10 in 1997 to 13 in 2001. 79. The drop in the number of votes for nonethnic parties that failed to meet the legal threshold also made it more difficult for ethnic parties to win seats. Parties must win a percentage of the vote that is closer to the exclusion threshold as the share of wasted votes declines. 80. Karl Cordell and Karl Martin Born, “The German Minority in Upper Silesia: Electoral Success and Organization Patterns,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 47; Jakub Karpinski, “In the New Europe, Poland Is Better as a Partner Than an Enemy,” Transitions 2, no. 3 (1996): 13. 81. Tomasz Kamusella, “Asserting Minority Rights in Poland,” Transitions 2, no. 3 (1996): 17; Karl Cordell, “Poland’s German Minority” in German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging, ed. Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 90; Karl Cordell, “Politics and Society in Upper Silesia Today: The German Minority Since 1945,” Nationalities Papers 24, no. 2 (1996): 279–82; Michael Fleming, “The New Minority Rights Regime in Poland: The Experience of the German, Belarussian and Jewish Minorities since 1989,” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 4 (2002): 539. 82. As for the German lists, changes in district magnitude cannot, for the most part, account for the decline of these ethnoregional parties. In many cases, district magnitude remained unchanged. Even when the district magnitude shifted disadvantageously, these parties were often below the exclusion threshold even for a single seat in 1991. The large numbers



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of parties that failed to win any seats, substantially decreasing the votes required for a seat, aided their 1991 victories. The Movement for Silesian Autonomy’s losses cannot be attributed to changes in district magnitude as Gliwice gained a seat and Katowice remained ­u nchanged. Similarly, Poznan retained the same number of seats in 1991 and 1993, leaving the Wielkopolska list unaffected. The Zielona Gora-Leszno district with 11 MPs was ­d ivided into separate Zielona Gora and Leszno districts but the Wielkopolska regional list’s showing of 3.2 percent was less than one-half the exclusion threshold of 8.3 percent for even the combined district. The Nowy Sacz district where the Podhalan Union won a seat in 1991 had seven seats in both 1991 and 1993. 83. Small regional formations in Wroclaw and in Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg ran but did not win seats in 1991. See Janusz, “The Status of National Minorities in Poland,” 486–9 and Fleming, “The New Minority Rights Regime in Poland,” for reviews of minority rights and ­political success in Poland. 84. “Population by Ethnicity,” 2001 Population and Housing Census (Vilnius: Statistics ­Lithuania 2001). Other minorities were comparatively small with Belarussians and ­U krainians forming the next largest minorities at 1.2 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively. The share of Poles and Russians has declined from 7.0 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively, since 1989; Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania ­(Statistics Lithuania), “Population by Ethnicity and Municipality,” 2011 Population and Housing Census (Vilnius: Statistics Lithuania 2011). For more on the status of minorities  in Lithuania, see Vesna Popovski, National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in ­Lithuania, 1988–93 (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Natalija Kasatkina, Giedrius Kadziauskas, and Kristina Sliavaite, “Ethnic Minorities and Public Policy: The Case of Lithuania” in International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, ed. Sia ­Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006), 347–96; V.  Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sediatis, Lithuania: The Rebel Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 211–8; Alfred Erich Senn, “Lithuania and the ­Lithuanians” in The ­Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith (New York: Longman, 1996), 178–80; Alfred Erich Senn, “Lithuania’s First Two Years of ­Independence,” Journal of Baltic Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 81–7; Thomas Lane, “Lithuania: Stepping ­Westward” in The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, eds. David J. Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs, and Thomas Lane (New York: Routledge, 2002), 138–40, 149–59; Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolutions: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 158–213; Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 117–24; Ole Nørgaard, The Baltic States after Independence (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1996), 169–77, 183–8. 85. Terry D. Clark and Nerijus Prekevičius, “The Effect of Changes to the Electoral Law in Premier-Presidential Systems: The Lithuanian Case” in Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2000, ed. Algimantas Jankauskas (Vilnius, Lithuania: Institute of International ­R elations and Political Science, Vilnius University, 2001), 127; Mindaugas Jurkynas, “The 2004 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Lithuania,” Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 772; Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 212; Kjetil Duvold and Mindaugas Jurkynas, “Lithuania” in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd ed., eds. Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. Aarebrot (Northamption, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 174; Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” 401, 404. 86. Lithuania used the two-round system in SMDs with the top two candidates advancing to a runoff no candidate wins a majority in the first round. In 2000, Lithuania eliminated the second round and switched to SMP but reverted to the two-round system after this election. In the single national constituency Lithuania applies the largest remainder system of PR with a Hare quota. Kasatkina et al., “Ethnic Minorities and Public Policy,” 363–4; J. Fitzmaurice, “Parliamentary Elections in Lithuania, October 2000,” Electoral Studies

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22 (2003): 162; Lane, “Lithuania,” 133–4; Juberías,“Post-Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities,” 43–4; Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” 401; Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe,” 154–60; Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 212; A. Krupavicius, “The Lithuanian Parliamentary Elections of 1996,” Electoral Studies 16, no. 4 (1997): 544–5; Jurkynas, “The 2004 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Lithuania,” 772; Terry D. Clark, “The 1996 Elections to the Lithuanian Seimas and Their Aftermath,” Journal of Baltic Studies 29, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 146; Saulius Girnius, “The Parliamentary Elections in Lithuania,” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 48 (1992): 6–7; Duvold and Jurkynas, “Lithuania,” 174. 87. Electoral Action received just under 2 percent of the vote in 2000 and would not have ­received seats even under the old, preferential threshold. 88. All population and ethnicity data are from the 2001 Census. Even more ethnic Poles live in Vilnius city municipality but are just 19 percent of the population. “Population by Some Ethnicities by County and Municipality,” 2001 Population and Housing Census (Vilnius: Statistics Lithuania 2001); “Number of population by county, city (town) and municipality,” 2001 Population and Housing Census (Vilnius: Statistics Lithuania 2001); Duvold and Jurkynas, “Lithuania,” 148–9; Popovski, National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–93, 109–11. 89. The three constituencies are 55 (Širvintų–Vilniaus), 56 (Vilniaus–Šalčininkų), and 57 (Vilniaus–Trakų); 55 and 56 are wholly within Vilnius or Šalčininki but around one-third of the voters in 57 live in Trakų. Election Action for Lithuania’s Poles won just constituency 55 in 1996; it won 55 and 56 in 1992, 2000, and 2004, and all three in 2008 and 2012. In 1996, Electoral Action’s candidate carried 56 by a majority in the first round but the ­results were invalidated due to insufficient turnout. Krupavicius, “The Lithuanian Parliamentary Elections of 1996,” 547; Juberías, “Post-Communist Electoral Systems and ­National Minorities,” 44. These successes occurred despite some, albeit mixed, evidence of anti-Polish gerrymandering; see Lane, “Lithuania,” 152–3; Lieven, The Baltic Revolutions, 169; Alan Sikk and Daniel Bochsler, “Impact of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Party Nationalisation in the Baltic States” (Paper Proposal for Workshop “The Nationalisation of Party Systems in Central and Eastern Europe” at the 2008 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Department of Political Science, University of Rennes, France, 2008), http://www. bochsler.eu/publi/sikk_bochsler_baltics-ecpr08.pdf. 90. Visaginas is linked with Zarasai; drawing it into a constituency with neighboring Ignalina instead would only have reduced further the share of ethnic Russians. Department of ­Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (Statistics Lithuania), “Population by Some Ethnicities by County and Municipality”; Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (Statistics Lithuania), “Number of Population by County, City (Town) and Municipality”; Duvold and Jurkynas, “Lithuania,” 148–9; ­Popovski, National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–93, 81–3. 91. Giovanni Capoccia, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws: The German System at Fifty,” West European Politics 25, no. 3 (July 2002): 199. 92. In 1949, parties needed to receive 5 percent of the vote in any federal state. In 1953, parties had to win only a single constituency seat as an alternative to the 5 percent threshold. In 1990, the 5 percent threshold was applied separately in the länder comprising the former West Germany and East Germany; Peter James, The German Electoral System (London: Ashgate Publishing 2003), 19, 53–4; Susan E. Scarrow, “Germany: The Mixed-Member System as a Political Compromise” in Mixed-Member Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, eds. Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg (New York: Oxford University Press 2001), 57; Thomas Saalfield, “Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed-Member Proportional System” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press 2005), 210–2; Capoccia, “The Political Consequences



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of Electoral Laws,” 173–91; Marcus Kreuzer, “Germany: Partisan Engineering of Personalized Proportional Representation” in Handbook of Electoral System Choice, ed. Josep M. Colomer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 223, 230–3. 93. The Left also won three east Berlin constituencies. 94. “Deutschland seit 1945, Bundestagwahlen, Land Zweistimmen: Bayern,” http://www. wahlen-in-deutschland.de/buBayern.htm (viewed 8 July 2013). 95. In 1949, the Bavaria Party received 4.2 percent of the national vote but 21 percent of the Bavarian vote and qualified for list seats under the then-existing rules. If it had retained its vote share and again won 10 constituencies, the Bavaria Party would have qualified again for seats under the new rules in place in 1953. However, it won only 9.2 percent of the ­Bavarian vote—1.7 percent of the national vote—and no constituency seats and was eliminated from the Bundestag. 96. In 1953, the CDU did not run a candidate in one district won by the Center Party that qualified it to receive list seats under the standard in place in 1953. See Capoccia, “The  ­Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,” 181, 190–1, on the political impact of ­a lliances. 97. Capoccia, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,” 174. The exemption does not help other minority groups, including immigrant minorities; Barbara Donovan, “‘Minority’ Representation in Germany,” German Politics 16, no. 4 (December 2007): 455–80. 98. The SSW won 0.16 percent of valid party votes or 0.17 percent of the party votes given to parties entitled to receive seats, but parties required 0.21 percent of the vote to win a seat. 99. Louis Massicotte, “To Create or to Copy? Electoral Systems in the German Länder,” German Politics 12, no. 1 (April 2003): 3–4, 15–6. The bulk of Landtag members were elected by SMP in SMDs. The remaining mandates were distributed to parties with more than 5 percent of the vote by the d’Hondt system of PR based on the total of votes cast for a party’s defeated candidates combined with the surplus votes of its victorious candidates. The Landtag election results demonstrated the tendency toward disproportionate outcomes. The SPD won 61 percent of seats with 44 percent of votes in 1947, and the party that came in second in votes came in third in seats in 1950. 100. The SSW won 8.6 percent of seats with 9.3 percent of votes in 1947 and 5.8 percent of seats for 5.5 percent of votes in 1950. 101. Massicotte, “To Create or to Copy?,” 5–12. Schleswig-Holstein continues to use the d’Hondt system of PR to determine the overall seat allocation. 102. Parties can also gain the right to participate in the distribution of list seats through victory in a single constituency seat. Massicotte, “To Create or to Copy?,” 14–5, 22; Jørgen Kühl, “The National Minorities in the Danish-German Border Region: The Case of the German in Sønderjylland/Denmark and the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein/Germany” (Unpublished Paper, 2003); Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, “No Representation without ­R ecognition: The Right to Political Participation of (National) Minorities,” European ­I ntegration 25, no. 3 (September 2003): 232. 103. The SSW agreed to back a SPD–Green coalition from outside the government in 2005 but the coalition failed to win support from the Landtag, so a CDU–SPD coalition formed i nstead. Klaus-Jürgen Nagel, “Elections in Schleswig-Holstein: Hot Emotions in ­ ­Germany’s Cool North,” Regional and Federal Studies 16, no. 1 (March 2006): 109–15. 104. Saxony does not appear to provide the same benefit to Sorb parties. However, one source suggests that Saxony has included similar protections for the Sorbs in its electoral law as Brandenburg; Stefan Oeter and Alastair Walker, “The Case of the Federal Republic of ­Germany” in International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, ed. Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: The Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006), 253–4. 105. The Wendish People’s Party was founded in 2005 but did not participate in any Landtag elections. Serbska Ludowa Strona, “SLS: Serbska Ludowa Strona,” http://www.­ wendische-volkspartei.de/ (viewed 8 August 2008).

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1 06. “A Sorb Story,” The Economist, 26 June 2008. 107. Andrew Reynolds, “Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (May 2005): 301. 108. The top-up seats are distributed within three defined regions, but the national allocation is determinative. The d’Hondt formula was used from 1920 to distribute constituency seats until the modified Ste.-Laguë replaced it in 1953. The switch was harmful to small parties like the Schleswig Party because it made it more difficult to gain the first constituency seat. The Schleswig Party would have won a constituency seat in South Jutland County in 1964 if the d’Hondt method had been used instead of the modified Ste.-Laguë. Jørgen Elklit and Anne Birte Pade, Parliamentary Elections and Election Administration in Denmark ­(Copenhagen: Ministry of the Interior, 1996), 7–19; Jørgen Elklit, “The Politics of Electoral System Development and Change: The Danish Case” in The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 2002), 18, 40–3; Jørgen Elklit, “Simpler Than Its Reputation: The Electoral System in Denmark since 1920,” Electoral Studies 12, no. 1 (1993): 41–57; Folketingsvalget den 22. september 1964, Elections to the Folketing September 22, 1964 (Copenhagen: Danmarks statistik, 1965), 44–5. 109. Greenland and the Faeroe Islands also each elect two members of the Folketing by the d’Hondt highest average method. As is customary, they are excluded from tabulations of Danish election results. Jørgen Elklit, “Denmark: Simplicity Embedded in Complexity (or  Is It the Other Way Round)?” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael ­Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 459–60. 110. The party won 0.45 percent of the national vote in September 1953 but just 0.23 percent in September 1971. 111. Jørgen Kühl and Karen Margrethe Pedersen, “The German Minority in Denmark” in ­I nternational Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, ed. Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006), 56–61; Folketingsvalget den 22. september 1953, Elections to the Folketing ­September 22, 1953 (Copenhagen: Danmarks statistik, 1954), 33, 89, 99; Folketingsvalget den 15. november 1960, Elections to the Folketing November 15, 1960 (Copenhagen: Danmarks statistik, 1961), 11, 20, 22, 27, 30; Folketingsvalget den 22. september 1964, 13, 30–1, 38–9, 44–5; Folketingsvalget den 23. januar 1968, Elections to the Folketing ­January  23, 1968 (Copenhagen: Danmarks statistik, 1968), 20, 41, 43, 50–1, 56–7; ­Folketingsvalget den 21. september 1971, Elections to the Folketing September 21, 1971 (Copenhagen: Danmarks statistik, 1972), 34, 57, 60–1, 66–7. 112. Kenneth E. Miller, “The Danish Electoral System,” Parliamentary Affairs 18, no. 1 (1964): 79; Jørgen Elklit also clarified this point in a personal communication by e-mail, 12 August 2008; Jørgen Elklit, “The Best of Both Worlds? The Danish Electoral System 1915–20 in a Comparative Perspective,” Electoral Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1992): 196. 113. Folketingsvalget den 22. september 1953, 33, 89, 99. 114. Miller, “The Danish Electoral System,” 79; Jørgen Elklit, “The Best of Both Worlds? The Danish Electoral System 1915–20 in a Comparative Perspective,” Electoral Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1992), 196. 115. Kühl and Pedersen, “The German Minority in Denmark,” 58–61. 116. “The German Minority in Denmark,” http://www.nordschleswig.dk/uploads/ INFO2007-English(2).pdf (viewed 12 August 2008); Kühl and Pedersen, “The German Minority in Denmark,” 59. 117. Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 248; Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” 401, 403; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 90, 90–3; John T. Ishiyama, “Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 101. The number of mandates before the allocation of minority party seats is 328. All seats are initially distributed among 41 constituencies—the 40 judets and the capital city



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of B ­ ucharest. Parties and coalitions that pass the threshold receive as many seats within each judet as they have full multiples of a Hare quota. Any votes and seats remaining are pooled at the national level and distributed utilizing the d’Hondt highest-average system of PR; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 90–106. Significant modifications were made in 2008 as judets were divided into SMDs. Parties must gain 50 percent of the SMD vote to win a seat or the votes are counted toward the party total with the system otherwise working the same as in previous elections. Parties cannot keep their SMD seats unless they meet the thresholds, which remain the same except that parties may now also qualify by winning six chamber districts outright. The changes make it possible for a majority coalition to a win a disproportionate share of mandates, as occurred in 2012. Seán Hanley, “Romania’s Election Law: Everything You Always Wanted to Know. .  .  .  ,” 16 March 2008, http://­ drseansdiary.blogspot.com/2008/03/romanias-election-law-everything-you.html (viewed 25 June 2008); Seán Hanley, “Romanian Electoral Reform: Bitter Rruit?,” 18 April 2008, http://drseansdiary.blogspot.com/2008/04/will-romanian-electoral-reform-bear. html, (viewed 25 June 2008). 118. Simon, “Electoral Systems and Democracy in Central Europe, 1990–1994,” 366; ­Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990–1998,” 401, 403; Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 249; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 90. 119. Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 249; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 94; Constitution of Romania, http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/ database/legislationAll.asp?country=romania&legislation=ro91const (viewed 3 July 2008). “Law on the Election of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate,” http://www2. essex.ac.uk/elect/database/legislationAll.asp?country=romania&legislation=ro92. See Article 59 in the constitution, and Article 4 in the election law; Kuusela, “The Founding Electoral Systems in Eastern Europe, 1989–1991,” 139–42. 120. Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 260; Michael Shafir, “The Political Party as National Holding Company: The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania” in The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-­ Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, ed. Jonathan P. Stein (New York: EastWest Institute, 2000), 103; Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 65–86, 112–3. 121. Institutul National de Statistica, “Recensământ 2002”; “Europe’s Roma: Bottom of the Heap,” The Economist 387, 21–27 June 2008, 36. 122. Roma parties would have fared even better if the thresholds had simply been eliminated for minority parties, as they would have won at least two seats through the normal distribution process in each election held since 1992. Instead, the Roma party received the single seat allocated under the pro-minority provision. Moreover, the provision allows only one seat per minority, so the second-place minority party cannot receive a seat. In 1996, the Roma Union ran almost as well as the Roma Party but obtained no seats. If they had simply been exempted from the threshold, each Roma party would have earned two seats for a total of four. Excluding Roma parties, only the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania (FDGR) would have won a single seat if the thresholds had been lifted but the share of votes needed for a seat had not been reduced. 123. Institutul National de Statistica, “Recensământ 2002.” 124. Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, “Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Italian Parliament,” http://electionresources.org/it/ (viewed 4 June 2009). 125. Reduced thresholds might also have an impact by making it easier for groups already above the threshold to gain seats. In, Lithuania, ethnic Poles form under 7 percent of the population and found it possible to meet the 2 percent threshold in place in 1992 but much more difficult to surpass the 5 percent threshold. 126. The positive coefficients in the country-level model might alternatively reflect that none of the variables truly captures the diverse kaleidoscope of ethnic groups Mauritius and its

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no t e s to pag e s 178 –18 0 propensity to generate ethnoregional parties. The percentage of electorally relevant ethnic groups classifies only Rodriguans but not any other groups as politically relevant. However, regional-level model not shown here suggest that this is not a good explanation, as the coefficient on a separate control variable for the island of Mauritius fails to achieve statistical significance.

Chapter 6 1. Racial redistricting also occurs in boundary delimitation for local and state legislatures. 2. According to Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, jurisdictions are covered if: “(1) The jurisdiction maintained a test or device as a precondition for registering or voting as of November 1, 1964, and (2) less than 50 percent of the voting-age population was ­registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or less than 50 percent of the voting-age population voted in the November 1964 presidential election.” Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality ­(Cambridge  University Press, 1992), 16–7. These tests captured Alabama, Georgia, ­L ouisiana, ­M ississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and portions of North Carolina. Later versions of the Voting Rights Act updated the criteria so that additional portions of the United States became covered jurisdictions, including, Alaska, Arizona, and Texas as well as selected counties or towns within California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and South Dakota. In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court invalidated the ­c urrent coverage formula. 3. Judicial rulings have strongly influenced the evolution of boundary delimitation in the United States. 4. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Grofman et al., Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting ­Equality. 5. Racial redistricting supporters argued that partisan rather than racial gerrymandering often explained erose district boundaries. 6. 509 US 630 (1993). 7. David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 70. 8. Party unity in congressional voting has increased substantially in recent years but most African-American and Latino representatives fall well within the mainstream of their ­parties. 9. Lublin, The Paradox of Representation. 10. Two comarcas have subprovincial status. Created in 1996, Kuna de Madugandi in Panamá  province had a population of 3,305 in 2000. Panama established Kuna de Wargandí in Darién province in 2000; it had a population of 1,133. “Panama,” http://www.­ citypopulation.de/Panama.html (viewed 16 June 2008). 11. Bernal Damián Castillo Díaz, “La participación política de los pueblos indígenas en Panamá” in Estudios sobre participación política indígena (San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 2007), 116–9; Margarito Ruiz Hernández and Aracely Burguete Cal y Mayor, “Indigenous Peoples without Political Parties: The ­Dilemma of Indigenous Representation in Latin America” in Challenging Politics: Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Political Parties and Elections, ed. Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2001), 53–6; Eva ­ T. Thorne, “Ethnic and Racial Political Organization in Latin America” in Social Inclusion and Economic Development in Latin America, eds. Mayra Buvinić and Jacqueline Mazza with Ruthanne Deutsch (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 321–3. Emberá is sometimes also referred to as ­Emberá-Wounaan.



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12. The Comarca of Kuna Yala was referenced by its former name of the Comarca of San Blas in this version of the Constitution; it was renamed by Law 99 of 23 December 1998; Diaz, “La participación política de los pueblos indígenas en Panamá,” 116–7; Mann “Calidad de la representación política y tamaño de las circunscripciones electorales,” 102–3; Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Panama: Constitution with Reforms through 1994,” http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Panama/panama1994.html (viewed 16 June 2008). 13. The constitution indicated that each electoral district should receive one deputy for each 30,000 inhabitants and one more if the remainder is at least 10,000. Article 141, section 5 of the Panamanian Constitution as reformed through 1994 read: “Cada Circuito Electoral tendrá un máximo de cuarenta mil habitante y un mínimo de veinte mil habitantes, pero la Ley podrá crear Circuitos Electorales que excedan el máximo o reduzcan el mínimo anteriores, para tomar en cuenta las divisiones políticas actuales, la proximidad territorial, la concentración de la población indígena, los lazos de vecindad, las vías de comunicación y los factores históricos y culturales, como criterios básicos para el agrupamiento de la ­población en Circuitos Electorales.” (“Each electoral circuit will have a maximum of fortythousand inhabitants and a minimum of twenty-thousand inhabitants, but the Law will allow the creation of electoral districts that exceed the maximum or reduce the minimum in order to take into account current political divisions, territorial proximity, indigenous population concentration, neighborhood ties, communication routes, and historical and cultural factors.”) The constitution also required that each district within a province be a separate electoral district if its population exceeded 40,000 except that Panama City had to be divided into four multimember districts. Mann, “Calidad de la representación política y tamaño de las circunscripciones electorales,” 103; Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Panama: Constitution with Reforms through 1994,” http://pdba. georgetown.edu/; Matthew M. Singer, “Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Panama, May 2004,” Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 532. 14. Tribunal Electoral, República de Panamá, “Circuitos Electorales para el 1999: Cuadro 1: Conformación Geográfica de los Circuitos Electorales, Elecciones 1999,” http://www.­ tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/html/fileadmin/user_upload/Elecciones/circuitos/geografica. xls (viewed 29 April 2014). 15. Tribunal Electoral de Panamá, “Cuadro de circunscripciones electorales y los puestos de elección popular con miras a las elecciones generales de 2 de mayo de 2004,” http://www. tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/html/index.php?id=886 (viewed 29 April 2014). 16. Asamblea Legislativa, “Acto Legislativo No. 1 (De 27 de Julio de 2004),” Gaceta Oficial, 11 August 2004, 12.” 17. The change was from “la concentración de la población indígena” to “la concentración de la población.” Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Panama: Constitution with reforms through 1994,” Article 141, Section 5; “Asamblea Legislativa, Acto Legislativo No. 1 (De 27 de Julio de 2004),” 12. Diaz, “La participación política de los pueblos indígenas en Panamá,” 133. 18. Data are unavailable on indigenous representation after the 2009 election. Bureau of ­Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, “Panama: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 1999,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ ­ hrrpt/1999/396.htm, 23 February 2000 (viewed 17 June 2008); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, “Panama: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2000,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/818.htm, 23 February 2001 (viewed 17 June 2008); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, “Panama: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2005,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61736.htm, 8 March 2006 (viewed 17  June 2008); Castillo Diaz, “La participación política de los pueblos indígenas en Panamá,” 130.

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19. Dominica has appointed members called senators who sit with the elected MPs in the House of Assembly. Of the nine senators, five are appointed on the advice of the prime minister and four on the advice of the leader of the opposition. The speaker is also a member of the House and elected at the first meeting of the House after a general election. Provisions may also be made for the election of senators. The Commonwealth of Dominica ­Constitution Order 1978, sections 34, 36. 20. The Commonwealth of Dominica Constitution Order 1978, schedule 2. The full text of schedule 2 reads: “All constituencies shall contain as nearly equal numbers of inhabitants as appears to the Constituency Boundaries Commission to be reasonably practicable but the Commission may depart from this principle to such extent as it considers expedient to take account of the following factors, that is to say: a. the density of population, and in particular the need to ensure the adequate representation of sparsely populated rural areas; b. the means of communication; c. geographical features, and d. the boundaries of administrative areas.” 21. Non-Kalinagos may move to the Territory, formerly called the Carib Territory, only by ­invitation. The Kalinago Territory has its own chief and elected council. Salybia has roughly one-third fewer voters than average but this deviation is not outside the norm; the mean deviation is around the same size. Salybia is often a marginal constituency; its MP won by less than 5 percent in 1990, 1995, and 2005. Dominica Academy of Arts and Sciences, “The Caribs of Dominica: The Carib Territory in Brief,” http://www.da-academy. org/kalinago_inbrief.html (viewed 29 June 2008); US Department of State, “Dominica: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2005,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2005/61724.htm (viewed 27 June 2008); “Dominica’s General Election 2005 ­Coverage,” http://www.newsdominica.com/election/index.cfm (viewed 29 June 2008); “Dominica Elections,” http://www.dominicaelections.com/ (viewed 13 July 2007); “Dominica: Parliamentary Elections, 1951–2000,” http://www.thedominican.net/­ articles/electiontwo.htm (viewed 29 June 2008). 22. Ashton Graneau succeeded his brother as MP and Minister for Carib Affairs in 2009. “Ashton Graneau Wins Salybia,” http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/ news/politics/graneau-wins-salybia/ (viewed 15 July 2013); “Ministry of Carib Affairs,” http://caribaffairs.gov.dm/ (viewed 15 July 2013); US Department of State, “Dominica: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2005;” Dominica Academy of Arts and ­Sciences, “The Caribs of Dominica: Brief Introductions,” http://www.da-academy.org/ kalinago_intro.html (viewed 29 June 2008). 23. The Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 retained these changes, as did the Boundary Commissions Act 1992. Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie, Danny Dorling, and David Rossiter, From Votes to Seats: The Operation of the UK Electoral System since 1945 (New York: ­Manchester University Press, 2001), 52–67; D. J. Rossiter, R. J. Johnston, and C. J. Pattie, The Boundary Commissions: Redrawing the UK’s Map of Parliamentary Constituencies (New  York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 76–132; David H. McKay and Samuel C. ­Patterson, Comparative Politics 4, no. 1 (October 1971): 61. 24. Section 86, subsection (4), Scotland Act 1998; see the UK Statute Law Database, “Scotland Act 1998,” http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=2044365 (viewed 30 May 2008); Oonagh Gay and Chris Sear, “Scottish Seats in the Commons and Number of Seats in the Scottish Parliament” (Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library Standard Note, 30 May 2003), 5; see http://www.parliament.uk/ commons/lib/­research/notes/snpc-01159.pdf. “The Parliamentary Boundary Commissions,” (Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library Standard Note, 21 August 2003), 1; see http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc01158.pdf. 25. Scotland would have needed to lose four more MPs to equalize the average electors per constituency.



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26. The Western Isles constituency now goes by its Gaelic name of Na h-Eileanan an Iar. Robert Waller and Byron Criddle, The Almanac of British Politics, 8th ed. (New York: ­R outledge, 2007), 685. 27. Section 86, subsection (3), Scotland Act 1998; section 3A, schedule 2: Rules for Redistribution of Seats, Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 (as amended); see the UK Statute Law Database, “Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 (c. 56): Schedules,” http://www. statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Primary&PageNumber=36&NavFrom=2 &parentActiveTextDocId=214988&ActiveTextDocId=215020&filesize=314 (viewed 30 May 2008); Gay and Sear, “Scottish Seats in the Commons and Number of Seats in the Scottish Parliament,” 5; “The Parliamentary Boundary Commissions,” 1–2. 28. Waller and Criddle, The Almanac of British Politics, 254, 794. 29. England’s only persistent regional party in national elections is Mebyon Kernow—Sons of Cornwall. While it has elected a few local councilors, it has never won more than 2 percent of the Cornish vote in a UK general election or come close to winning a parliamentary seat. Simon Henig and Lewis Baston, The Political Map of Britain (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2002), 50. 30. Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone, 1996); Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern ­Ireland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Dick Leonard and Roger Mortimore, Elections in Britain: A Voter’s Guide, 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 70–1. 31. Leonard and Mortimore, Elections in Britain, 64–5; Gerry Hassan and Peter Lynch, The Almanac of Scottish Politics (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2001); Beti Jones, Etholiadau’r Ganrif—Welsh Elections (Ceredigion, Wales: Y Lolfa Cyf., 1999); Tim Austin and Tim Hames, eds., The Times Guide to the House of Commons, June 2001 (London: Times Books, 2001), 296. 32. Waller and Criddle, The Almanac of British Politics (8th ed.), 54. However, the SNP gained two new seats in the 2005 general election—seats that they held in 2010—leaving their parliamentary caucus one stronger than in the previous parliament. 33. The description of Meirionnydd Nant Conwy from an earlier edition of The Almanac of British Politics is revealing: “In the USA ‘ethnic minority’ districts are created by law (the Voting Rights Act) to provide guaranteed representation for black and Hispanics. The nearest thing to this in Britain is the Welsh-speaking seat of Meironnydd Nant Conwy. In 1983 the Boundary Commission originally proposed uniting Merioneth with much of the Tory-held English-speaking Conway on the north coast. This caused a storm of protest, not least because it would have eliminated one of the two seats that Plaid Cymru then held. After an inquiry, the Commission decided to expand Merioneth only slightly. . . . The seat has an electorate of just 32,000, making it the smallest in Wales and less than half the ­average-size seat for the United Kingdom. This over-representation is justified not by reference to language or party of course, but by the mountainous and difficult terrain. .  .  . The upshot, though, is a guaranteed seat for Plaid Cymru.” Robert Waller and Byron Criddle, The ­A lmanac of British Politics, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 1996), 571–2. 34. “However, the latest Welsh Boundary Commission has felt that so small an electorate is no longer defensible, and has ordered that it should be increased by adding the Dwyfor ­d istrict, formerly in Caenarfon constituency, to the ancient county of Meirionydd. This will produce a rock-solid seat for Plaid Cymru by merging the most Welsh-speaking areas of the two former seats—but in so doing, it may well reduce their representation in North Wales by confining it to this seat. Instead of an effective gerrymander in favor of the ­Nationalists, we will have what the Americans call a ‘packed gerrymander’ against them, in which from their point of view too much of their support is concentrated in one place.” Waller and Criddle, The Almanac of British Politics (8th ed.), 661. 35. Ontario received 15 new seats, compared to 6 for British Columbia and 4 for Alberta.

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36. Quebec’s population-based seat entitlement was 72. It received 3 additional seats for a total of 75 due to the grandfather clause. The seats received by other provinces, however, would have reduced Quebec’s share of the House below that in the population. The representation rule’s award of an additional three seats to Quebec prevented that outcome. 37. Quebec formed 25 percent of the population in 1991 and 24 percent in 2001, but it received just 20 percent and 26 percent of seats awarded through the senatorial or grandfather clauses clauses in the redistributions. 38. Chapter 5 examines Kiribati and Mauritius as both countries utilize additional protections for minorities. 39. Section 1 of schedule 2, “Rules for Delimitation of Constituencies,” Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis Constitutional Order of 1983; see Political Database of the Americas, “Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983 Constitution,” http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ Constitutions/Kitts/kitts83.html (viewed 28 May 2008); Douglas Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean” in Living at the Borderlines: Issues in Caribbean Sovereignty and Development, eds. Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Don D. Marshall (Miami, FL: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 401–4. 40. “St Kitts and Nevis,” http://www.citypopulation.de/StKittsNevis.html (viewed 28 May 2008). The St. Kitts and Nevis Demography Digest 2002 is cited as the original data source. 41. Nevis receives exactly one-third of elected MPs as long as their number is divisible by three. Raising the total number of elected MPs to 13 would maximize Nevis’s representation as St. Kitts would have still have just eight but Nevis would obtain five or 38 percent of all MPs—11 percent higher than now and two seats more than its entitlement based on population. The share of representation received by Nevis is always higher when the number of MPs is not divisible by three due to the need to round up in favor of Nevis to comply with the constitution but rounding never produces as much advantage for Nevis as when there are 13 MPs.   In addition to the 11 elected representatives, the National Assembly has three senators appointed by the governor-general, two on the advice of prime minister and one on the advice of the leader of the opposition. Although they have different titles and are appointed, the National Assembly is a unicameral legislature. There is no ­requirement or tradition that any of the senators come from Nevis. After the 2004 elections, the Concerned Citizens Movement led the opposition and appointed a Nevisian senator. The speaker and the attorney general are elected by the National Assembly and become members, if not already, for the duration of their service. Ann L. Griffiths, “St. Kitts and Nevis” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: ­McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 284; Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis Constitutional Order of 1983, sections 26, 30. 42. Nevis also possesses an unusual institutional advantage as the constitution enshrines the  right to secede. Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis Constitutional Order of 1983, ­section 113. 43. Clifford E. Griffin, “Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the Caribbean: Failure of Mediation in the St. Kitts and Nevis Conflict” in Governance, Conflict Analysis, and Conflict Resolution, eds. Cedric H. Grant and R. Mark Kirton (Miami, FL: Ian Randle Publishers, 2007), 82–5; Simon Jones-Hendrickson, “Which Way Forward: ­Constitutional Issues and Reform in the Twin-Island Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis” in Living at the Borderlines: Issues in Caribbean Sovereignty and Development, eds. Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Don D. Marshall (Miami, FL: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 441–56. 44. “Antigua and Barbuda,” http://www.citypopulation.de/Antigua.html (viewed 12 July 2008). 45. Statistics Mauritius, “Resident Population and Resident Population in Private Households by Geographical District Single Year of Age and Sex,” http://statsmauritius.gov.mu/­ English/Documents/Demogra/district.htm (viewed 29 April 2014); “Mauritius,” http:// www.citypopulation.de/Mauritius.html (viewed 12 July 2008).



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46. The constitution also requires that 2 of the 17 senators hail from Barbuda. The ­governor-general appoints one Barbudan senator on the advice of the prime minister and another on the advice of the Barbuda Council. The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, section 28; Dag Anckar, “Noncontiguity and Political Architecture: The Parliaments of Small Island States,” Political Geography 15, no. 8 (1996): 704. 47. The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, sections 36, 62–5; Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean,” 402. 48. Antigua and Barbuda Electoral Commission Office, “Breakdown Results of 2009 General Elections,” http://www.antiguaelections.com/electionday/2009/default.htm (viewed 16  July 2013); Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern ­Caribbean,” 402–3. 49. The powerful Bird family controlled the ALP with Prime Minister V. C. Bird succeeded by his son, Lester, in 1994. The Birds used their monopoly on patronage and authoritarian measures to perpetuate their control. The ALP won every general election in Antigua and Barbuda from 1951 through 1994 with the exception of the 1971 election. Jan Rogoziński, A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib to the Present (New York: Penguin, 1999), 349–53; Robert Coram, Caribbean Time Bomb: The United States’ Complicity in the Corruption of Antigua (New York: William Morrow, 1993); Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson, “The Caribbean: Democracy Adrift?” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 4 (October 2005): 166; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” http://www.­ ­ freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (viewed 29 April 2014); Freedom in the World, multiple volumes. 50. Antigua and Barbuda Electoral Commission Office, “Antigua and Barbuda General Elections” http://www.antiguaelections.com/ (viewed 12 July 2008). The Progressive Labour Movement merged into the United Progressive Party in 1992. 51. “St Vincent and the Grenadines,” http://www.citypopulation.de/StVincent.html (viewed 13 July 2008). 52. The governor general also appoints four senators on the advice of the prime minister and two on the advice of the leader of the opposition. 53. The Saint Vincent Constitution Order 1979, section 33, subsection (2); Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean,” 402. 54. The Grenadines contained approximately 8 percent of the country’s population; possession of 1 of 13 seats gave the island chain close to 8 percent of MPs. Increasing the number of Grenadines seats to 2 of 15 upped its share to a little over 13 percent and above its ­population-based entitlement. Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean,” 402–4. 55. Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, “Election Results Summary 2010,” http:// www.election.gov.vc/election/views2010/index.php (viewed 30 April 2014); Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, “Election Results 2005 http://www.election.gov. vc/election/views2005/summary_2005.php (viewed 30 April 2014; Government of St.  Vincent and the Grenadines, “Election Results 2001,” http://www.election.gov.vc/ election/views2001/summary_2001.php (viewed 30 April 2014); General Secretariat ­Organization of American States, “Electoral Observation St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2001 General Elections” (Washington, DC: General Secretariat Organization of ­A merican States, 2001). 56. The ULP was formed through a merger of the St. Vincent Labour Party and the Movement for National Unity after the 1994 elections. 57. Midgett, “Democracy and Electoral Reform in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean,” 404–7. 58. The FSM is not included in analyses involving parties in this volume due to their absence; see Jon Fraenkel, “Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws,” State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper 2005/8 (Canberra: Australian National University 2005), 7.

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59. Though Chuuk is home to 50 percent of the approximately 107,000 FSM residents, it has just six or 43 percent of senators. Pohnpei is underrepresented to a lesser degree as it has 32 percent of the population but four or 29 percent of senators. In contrast, Kosrae benefits from the arrangement as it has just 7 percent of the population but two or 14 ­percent of senators. Yap is also overrepresented, though to a lesser degree, with 11 percent of the ­population but two or 14 percent of senators. Despite being underrepresented, Chuuk’s dominance remains a major issue. “Micronesia,” http://www.citypopulation.de/­ Micronesia.html (viewed 20 July 2008); Federated States of Micronesia Division of ­Statistics, “Census 2000: General Tables,” http://www.spc.int/prism/country/fm/stats/ Census%20&%20Surveys/2000/Summary.htm (viewed 30 April 2014); Alexander Somoza, “Federated States of Micronesia,” Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Vol. 2 South East Asia, East Asia, and the South Pacific eds. Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann (New York: Oxford University Press 2001), 637; Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet, eds., Political Handbook of the World 2008 (­Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 867. 60. The creation of a higher tier of top-up seats can also limit and even eliminate the impact of malapportionment on the partisan composition of a legislature. 61. Although the share of MPs within each party caucus will shift in favor of the areas with disproportionate shares of seats, the overall partisan composition of the legislature will not change much, though shifts in district magnitude can alter the results even if voting ­behavior is the same across constituencies. 62. Article 45, Constitution of Brazil; Complementary Law No. 78 of 30 December 1993. ­Despite the constitutional provision mandating reapportionment in the year before each election, no change has been occurred since 1990. Jairo M. Nicolau, “Brazil: Democratizing with Majority Runoff” in Handbook of Electoral System Choice, ed. Josep M. Colomer (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 123–4; David Samuels, “Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25, no. 3 (August 2000): 483; Jairo Marconi Nicolau, “As Distorções na Representação dos Estados na Câmara dos Deputados Brasileira,” Dados 40, no. 3 (1997). 63. All gains and losses due to malapportionment discussed in this and following paragraphs in this section are based on estimates of the difference between the actual apportionment and a fair apportionment using the Sainte-Laguë method. Michel L. Balinski and H.  Peyton  Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 71–8. 64. Richard Snyder and David J. Samuels, “Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,” in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 131–72. 65. Åland had sought to join Sweden after the Russian Empire’s collapse at the end of World War I, which led to Finland’s independence. 66. Finland apportions MPs proportionally among constituencies before each election in strict accordance with the constituency’s total population. 67. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland, 235–40; Hannu Nurmi and Lasse Nurmi, “The Parliamentary Election in Finland, March 2007,” Electoral Studies 26 (2007): 797–8. 68. These three regions are also defined as the homelands of Spain’s three “historic nationalities.” Ignacio Lago Peñas, “Identidades Duales y Abstención Diferencial en las Comunidades Autónomas: Los Casos de Cataluña, Galicia, y País Vasco,” Dereito 9, no. 2 (2000): 84; Christopher J. Ross, Contemporary Spain: A Handbook, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 90–1, 96–111, 287–90, 295–300; Daniele Conversei, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997); John Gibbons, Spanish Politics Today (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 15; Luis Moreno, La federalización de España: Poder politico y territorio (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1997), 107–9.



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69. Igancio Lago Peñas, El vote estratégico en las elecciones generales en España (1977–2000): Efectos y mecanismos causales en la explicación del comportamiento electoral (Madrid, Spain: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2005), 137–61; Ignacio Lago Peñas, “Sobrerrepresentación de las Zonas Rurales y Vote Conservador en el Sistema Electoral Español,” Dereito 8, no. 1 (1999): 81–101; Ignacio Lago and José Ramón Montero, “Más votos y menos escaños: el impacto del sistema electoral en las elecciones autonómicas catalanas de 2003,” Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 105 (2004): 12–3; Lago Peñas and Lago Peñas, “El Sistema Electoral Español,” 225–50; Ismael Crespo and Fátima García, “El Sistema Electoral Español” in Política y Gobierno en España, 2nd ed., eds. Manuel Alcántara and Antonia Martínez (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2001), 310–31; José M. Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics (New York: Routledge, 2004), 79–84, 108–9; Gibbons, Spanish Politics Today, 59–61; Jonathan Hopkin, “Spain: Proportional Representation with Majoritarian Outcomes” in The Politics of Electoral ­Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 375–85; Josep M. Colomer, “Spain: From Civil War to Proportional Representation” in Handbook of Electoral System Choice, ed. Josep M. Colomer (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 262–3. The relatively large number of mandates in low magnitude ­constituencies has spurred voters to cast ballots for one of the two major parties, especially outside regions with nationalist parties, as most other parties are unlikely to win seats; see Lago Peñas, El vote estratégico en las elecciones generales en España (1977–2000), for a ­detailed examination of strategic voting in Spanish elections. The United Left, a coalition including the Spanish Communist Party, is undermined by malapportionment because large urban constituencies in which the party performs relatively well receive fewer seats. The mainstream right has benefited both from the large number of small constituencies and malapportionment. The People’s Party performs well in small constituencies and gets an extra large bonus in terms of seats relative to votes. Applying the same methodology described below in the text to measure the impact of malapportionment reveals that the People’s Party has gained an average of 4.3 seats due to malapportionment in the six elections held between 1993 and 2012. 70. Spain apportions these mandates by the largest remainder system with a Hare quota. Lago Peñas, El vote estratégico en las elecciones generales en España (1977–2000), 131–6; Lago Peñas, “Sobrerrepresentación de las Zonas Rurales y Vote Conservador en el Sistema ­Electoral Español,” 83–90; Ross, Contemporary Spain, 28–9; Crespo and García, “El Sistema Electoral Español,” 310; Gibbons, Spanish Politics Today, 59–60; Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, 80–1; Hopkin, “Spain,” 378–9; Colomer, “Spain,” 262. 71. Valencia would have gained three seats. Alicante, Málaga, and Sevilla would have gained two seats. Cáceres, A Coruña, Murcia, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and Bizkaia would have each gained one seat. The Sainte-Laguë system was used for all simulated apportionments discussed here as it produces a result less biased toward large or small provinces than the largest remainder system with a Hare quota utilized by Spain; Balinski and Young, Fair Representation. 72. Malapportionment cost A Coruña a seat that would have gone to the Galician Nationalist Bloc. 73. The distinctions between nationalist and non-nationalist parties are not always crystal clear. Local branches or affiliates of national parties, like the Catalan Socialists, often favor greater autonomy for their region and act independently of the national party. Moreover, nationalist parties sometimes ally with non-nationalist parties against other nationalist parties. Nonetheless, the conventional distinction made in Spain between parties with and without links to national parties is used here to identify regional parties. 74. Catalonia apportioned seats among the provinces before the 1980 elections based on the 1976 Census with Barcelona given one seat per 50,000 inhabitants up to a maximum of 85 seats and the other three provinces allotted one seat per 40,000 inhabitants with a minimum of 6 seats. Catalonia has not reapportioned seats among the provinces since; Ignacio

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Lago Peñas, “Cleavages and Thresholds: The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in the Spanish Autonomous Communities, 1980–2000,” Electoral Studies 23 (2004): 31; ­Ignacio Lago Peñas, “Cleavages y umbrales: las consecuencias políticas de los sistemas electorales autonómicos, 1980–2000,” Revista Española de Ciencia Política 7 (October 2002): 141; Lago and Montero, “Más votos y menos escaños,” 14–6. 75. Lago and Montero, “Más votos y menos escaños,” 27. 76. Lago and Montero, “Más votos y menos escaños,” 12; Crespo and García, “El Sistema ­ Electoral Español,” 333; Pascal Delwit, “Les parties regionalists, des acteurs politico-­ électoraux en essor?: Performances électorales et participations gouvernementales” in Les parties regionalists en Europe. Des acteurs en développement?, ed. Pascal Delwit (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005), 58. Lago and Montero, “Más votos y menos escaños,” 31–4, note that CiU benefited not just from malapportionment but from doing well in low magnitude districts that generally give the winner a higher bonus of seats for votes than high magnitude districts. 77. Lago Peñas, “Cleavages y umbrales, 141; Ignacio Lago Peñas, “La Coordinación Electoral del Nacionalismo Gallego,” Revista Internacional de Sociología 39 (September–December 2004): 31. The Basque parliament had 60 seats in 1980, also equally divided among the three provinces. 78. The Basque names of the provinces appear first with the Castillian names in parentheses. 79. Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, 136. 80. Gibbons, Spanish Politics Today, 22–5, 53–4; Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, 147– 50; José Luis Barbería and Patxo Unzueta, Cómo hemos llegado a esto: La crisis vasca (Madrid: Taurus, 2003), 248–52; Delwit, “Les parties regionalists, des acteurs politicoélectoraux en essor?,” 61–2; Tom Lansford, ed., Political Handbook of the World 2013 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013), 1350–1. 81. The Galician names for the provinces appear first with the Castillian names in parentheses if they differ. Only 71 members were elected to the Galician parliament in 1981 and 1985, 22 in A Coruña, 19 in Pontevedra, and 15 apiece in Lugo and Ourense. 82. Ignacio Lago Peñas, “La Coordinación Electoral del Nacionalismo Gallego,” 35–61; ­Ignacio Lago and Ramón Máiz, “Le nationalisme galicien: Opportunités, mobilisation politique et coordination électorale,” Pôle Sud 20 (May 2004): 25–46; Gibbons, Spanish Politics Today, 54; Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, 151; Delwit, “Les parties ­regionalists, des acteurs politico-électoraux en essor?” 66–7.

Chapter 7 1. Brancati, Peace by Design, 202–3. 2. Henry E. Brady, Michael C. Herron, Walter R. Mebane Jr., Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Kenneth W.  Shotts, and Jonathan N. Wand, “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode,” PS: ­Political Science and Politics 34, no. 1 (March 2001): 59–69. 3. Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?,” 19–22. 4. The same article requires that each party’s program have a “national character.” Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Article 55, sections 3 and 4; Kevin S. Fridy, “The ­Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana’s Fourth Republic,” African Affairs 106, no. 423 (200): 284. 5. The Political Parties Law reinforces the constitutional ban: “No political party shall be formed (a) on ethnic, gender, religious, regional, professional or other sectional divisions; or (b) which uses words, slogans or symbols which could arouse ethnic, gender, religious, regional, professional or other sectional divisions.” Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Article 55, section 7(c); Political Parties Law, Republic of Ghana, Act 574 (2000), section 9(e).



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6. Political Parties Law, Republic of Ghana, Act 574 (2000), section 3. 7. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Article 55, section 7; Political Parties Law, Republic of Ghana, Act 574 (2000), section 9. 8. Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?”; Joshua B. Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 2004), 217–9; Paul Nugent, “Ethnicity as an Explanatory Factor in the Ghana 2000 Elections,” African Issues 29, nos. 1–2 (2001): 2–7; Joseph R. A. Ayee, “The December 1996 General Elections in Ghana,” Electoral Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1997): 420–24; Felix K.  G. Anebo, “Voting Pattern and Electoral Alliances in Ghana’s 1996 ­Elections,” African Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (1997): 41–2; Fridy, “The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks”; Paul Nugent, “Living in the Past: Urban, Rural and Ethnic Themes in the 1992 and 1996 Elections in Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 2 (1999); Staffan I. Lindberg and Minion K. C. Morrison, “Exploring Voter Alignments in Africa: Core and Swing Voters in Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 568; Paul Nugent, “Winners, Losers and Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Election,” African Affairs 100 (2001): 405–28; ­Mahamudu Bawumia, “Understanding the Rural-Urban Voting Patterns in the 1992 ­Ghanaian Presidential Election: A Closer Look at the Distributional Impact of Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Programme,” Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 (1998): 67–8; Richard Asante, “The Politics of Managing Ethnic Cleavages, Inequalities, Nation Building and Democratisation in Ghana” (New School for Social Research, Transregional Center for Democratic Studies, Working Paper, 2004); Richard Jeffries, “The Ghanaian Elections of 1996: Towards the Consolidation of Democracy?” African Affairs 97 (1998): 203; E. Gyimah-Boadi, “A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 2 (April 2001): 108; Steven J. Taylor, “Disputed Electoral Results in Ghana and the United States,” Journal of Global Awareness 5, no. 2 (Autumn 2004): 54–64; E.  Gyimah-Boadi, “Another Step Forward for Ghana” in Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, 2nd ed., eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2010), 137–51; Anja Osei, “La connexion entre les partis et les électeurs en Afrique: Le cas ghanéen,” Politique africaine 104 (December 2006): 38–59. 9. Nugent, “Ethnicity as an Explanatory Factor in the Ghana 2000 Elections,” 3; Asante, “The Politics of Managing Ethnic Cleavages, Inequalities, Nation Building and Democratisation in Ghana”; Osei, “La connexion entre les partis et les électeurs en Afrique.” 10. Both parties fail to win a portion of the vote even in their “home” region. Support for the regional champion in presidential elections is strongest in Volta. One reason the NDC does so well in Volta is that non-Ewes also support the party. Non-Akan settlers in Ashanti often support the NDC, so Ashanti votes less homogeneously for the NPP. When I visited Kumasi in 2008, local residents confirmed that settler areas are more likely to vote NDC but also pointed out that support for the NPP among Asante is not uniform. The two ­parties gain an even lower share of the vote in their strongest regions in parliamentary ­contests, though single-member plurality assures that they dominate their base in terms of seats. Partisan loyalties override candidate ethnicity; Mills always fared extremely well among Ewe in Volta despite being Akan. Staffan Lindberg and Minion K.C. Morrison, “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana,” Political ­Science Quarterly 123, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 95–122; Wilhelmina J. Donkoh. “Knust, Kumasi” (Paper presented at the Garden City Golden Tulip Hotel, Kumasi, 1 October 2008); Nugent, “Ethnicity as an Explanatory Factor in the Ghana 2000 Elections,” 7; Anebo, “Voting Pattern and Electoral Alliances in Ghana’s 1996 Elections,” 42. 11. “At one level, it continued to insist that it was the only legitimate Nkrumahist party, standing in direct succession to the PNP whose electoral mandate remained incomplete. In ­private, however, senior PNC figures conceded that theirs was effectively a party of the north.” Nugent, “Living in the Past,” 295–6; Nugent, “Ethnicity as an Explanatory Factor in the Ghana 2000 Elections,” 4; Jeffries, “The Ghanaian Elections of 1996,” 192;

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­ awumia, “Understanding the Rural-Urban Voting Patterns in the 1992 Ghanaian B ­Presidential Election,” 68; Asante, “The Politics of Managing Ethnic Cleavages, Inequalities, Nation Building and Democratisation in Ghana”; Osei, “La connexion entre les partis et les électeurs en Afrique.” 12. The PNC presidential candidate’s share of the vote in the three northern regions was 21.3 percent in 1992, 9.7 percent in 1996, 13.0 percent in 2000, 7.8 percent in 2004, 3.4 percent in 2008, and 1.0 percent in 2012. In the rest of Ghana, it was 3.4 percent in 1992, 1.7 percent in 1996, 0.6 percent in 2000, 0.9 percent in 2004, 0.4 percent in 2008, and 0.01 percent in 2012. 13. National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, (Sofia: National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria), http://www.parliament. bg/?page=const&lng=en (visited 6 February 2009); Eminov, “The Turks in Bulgaria,” 36; Ganev, “History, Politics, and the Constitution,” 71; Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 250; Rumyana Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to ­Democracy: Minority Rights and Constitutionalism,” University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 1993 (1993): 41–2. 14. Article 3, section 2 (1) and (3) in “Political Parties Act,” http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/ database/legislationAll.asp?country=bulgaria&legislation=bg9098lpp (visited 6 February 2009); Ganev, “History, Politics, and the Constitution,” 70; Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 250; Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to ­Democracy,” 35. 15. The MRF has aspired to represent a variety of Bulgarian minorities, including Roma, but it has not succeeded in attracting support beyond its base in the Turkish and Muslim communities. Ivan Ilchev reports that the only substantial non-Turkish support came from Bulgarian-speaking Muslims in the Western Rhodopes; Ilchev, “Emigration and the ­Politics of Identity,” 250–52, 265n1. 16. Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 253; Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy,” 48–9. 17. One theory, “widely shared consensus among Bulgarian political analysts,” is that the BSP, the renamed Communist Party, wanted the MRF registered for its own reasons, perhaps to split the opposition or because the BSP thought it could control the MRF. As Communists still controlled the government apparatus, registration would not have been difficult for the BSP to arrange. The BSP, however, launched proceedings to ban the MRF during the following year. Ganev, “History, Politics, and the Constitution,” 70; Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 249–50; Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy,” 35. 18. Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy,” 35. 19. The decision broke down on party lines. The four justices appointed by UDF President Zhelyu Zhelev voted to uphold the MRF’s constitutionality. Three of the four justices elected by the BSP-controlled parliament voted to ban the MRF; the other justice was ill and did not participate. The four justices elected by the Supreme Court split with one ­justice—the Constitutional Court’s chair—voting against the ban and three voting for it. Eminov, “The Turks in Bulgaria,” 37; Ganev, “History, Politics, and the Constitution,” 72, 86–9; Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity,” 252; Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy,” 42, 45–6. 20. Article 3 requires all political parties to have as objectives “the safeguard of national unity,” “the safeguard of territorial integrity,” and “the safeguard of the secular character of the State.” Article 12 states that parties must “safeguard cohesion and national unity.” Article 5 contains a more lengthy prohibition of ethnoregional parties: “Political parties must, in their programs and in their activities, prohibit intolerance, regionalism, ethnocentrism, fanaticism, racism, xenophobia, and/or recourse to violence in all forms. No political party can justify its creation and its action upon a base and/or upon objectives including: ­sectarianism and nepotism; membership exclusive to a single faith, philosophy, linguistic group, or region; gender, ethnicity, or professional status; membership in a development



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association or a non-governmental organization.” Republique du Benin, Loi No. 2001–21: portant Charte des partis politiques, Articles 3, 5, 12. 21. “The number of founding members of a party cannot be less than ten (10) per Department.” Republique du Benin, Loi No. 2001–21: portant Charte des partis politiques, Article 15. 22. Kouassi A. Degboe, Elections et Réalités Sociologiques au Bénin (Cotonou, Bénin: Intermonde Editions, 1995); N. Bako-Arifari, “Démocratie et logiques du terroir au Bénin,” Politique africaine 59(1995): 7–24; Roger Gbégnonvi, “Les legislatives de mars 1995,” Politique africaine 59 (1995): 67; Lucy Creevey, Paul Ngomo, and Richard Vengroff, “Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions,” Party Politics 11, no. 4 (2005): 472–8. Nicolas van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientilism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2 (2003): 314; Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (October 1993): 28, 31; Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin,” World Politics 55 (April 2003): 404; Thad Dunning and Lauren Harrison, “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 21–39. However, Bierschenk argues that Beninese parties are not ethnic parties but regional clientelistic networks; see Thomas Bierschenk, “The Local Appropriation of Democracy: An Analysis of Municipal Elections in Parakou, Republic of Benin, 2002–03,” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 4 (2006): 547–8, 552–4; Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and ­Democracy through Party Regulation?” 23. The National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act, 1997, Government Gazette 42, no. 49 (21 July 1997): 528–9; The National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act, 2001, Government Gazette 46, no. 11 (1 February 2001): 102–8. 24. Massa Coulibaly and Amadou Diarra, “Democratie et Legitimation du Marche: Rapport d’Enquete Afrobarometre au Mali, Decembre 2002” (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 35, 2004). 25. The Constitution requires that political parties “respect the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, national unity, and the secularity of the State.” The Charter of Political Parties states: “No party may constitute or organize itself on an ethnic, religious, linguistic, regionalist, sexist, or professional basis.” The charter further enjoins parties to promote “the spirit of solidarity, tolerance and dialogue” and the duty to “the national community.” Article 36, Loi No. 05–047, 18 August 2005, Charte des Partis ­Politiques. 26. Other language groups have regions of strength but none predominate in a region like the Tuareg. Native Bambara speakers form majorities in Bamako, Sikasso, and Ségou and a plurality in Koulikoro, but Bambara average just 55 percent across these four provinces. Speakers of Sonrhaï form majorities of less than 60 percent in Gao and Timbouctou, as do the Dogon in Mopti. In Kayes, Sonriké speakers hold a plurality of around one-third but there are also many speakers of Malinké and Khassonké. Coulibaly and Diarra, ­“Democratie et Legitimation du Marche”; Richard Vengroff, “The Impact of the Electoral System on the Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Case of Mali,” Electoral Studies 13, no. 1 (1994): 36. 27. Dunning and Harrison, “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting,” 21–39. 28. Dunning and Harrison, “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting,” 24; Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?” 29. Oshiwambo, the name of the language, is preferred in Namibia to Ovambo to refer to the people, though both are widely understood, and Ovambo is used in the English-language literature. Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 2005), 230; James Suzman, Minorities in ­Independent Namibia (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2002), 6. 30. Basedau et al. “Ethnic Party Bans in Africa,” 628; Bogaards, “Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Ethnicity in Africa,” 179.

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31. Graham Hopwood, Guide to Namibian Politics, 2008 Edition (Klein Windhoek, Namibia: Namibia Institute for Democracy, 2008), 65–73, 84–5; Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 224; Suzman, Minorities in Independent Namibia, 15. 32. Confirmed by a number of sources during my visit to Namibia in October 2008. However, Cliffe and Parkhurst resist application of the ethnic label to SWAPO or Namibian politics; see Lionel Cliffe and Donna Parkhurst, “The 1989 Elections and the Decolonization of Namibia” in Voting for Democracy: Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa, eds. John Daniel, Roger Southall and Morris Szeftel (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate 1999), 72–8; Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 211, 231–2; Suzman, Minorities in Independent Namibia, 9, 15–16. 33. Cliffe and Parkhurst, “The 1989 Elections and the Decolonization of Namibia,” 71–3; Hopwood, Guide to Namibian Politics, 2008 Edition, 71; Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 224, 231; Suzman, Minorities in Independent Namibia, 4, 15–16. 34. Hopwood, Guide to Namibian Politics, 2008 Edition, 58–63, 74–5, 83–91. The ethnic orientation of the parties seemed understood during my visit to the country. For example, Damara speakers who were not particularly interested in politics described the UDF as “our party.” The race of the sole Republican Party and Monitor Action Group MPs reinforces the alignment of these parties. 35. Christof Hartmann and Jörg Kemmerzell, “Understanding Variations in Party Bans in Africa,” Democratization 17 (2010): 642–65; Anika Moroff, “Party Bans in Africa: An Empirical Overview,” Democratization 17 (2010): 618–41. 36. Article 51, section 4, Constitution of Portugal (2005); André Freire, “Minority Representation in Portuguese Democracy,” Portuguese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 196; David Goldey, “Elections and the Consolidation of Portuguese Democracy: 1974– 1983,” Electoral Studies 2, no. 3 (December 1983): 231; J. R. Lewis and A. M. Williams, “Regional Autonomy and the European Communities: The View from Portugal’s Atlantic Islands,” Regional Politics and Policy 4, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 67–70, 75–8; Jesús del Río Luelmo and Alan Williams, “Regionalism in Iberia” in Regionalism in the European Union, ed. Peter Wagstaff (Portland, OR: Intellect Books, 1999), 167–87. 37. Santomean, Príncipean, and Angolar are all Portuguese creoles. Santomean and Príncipean are mutually intelligible but Angolar is not. Gerhard Seibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 43. 38. Massicotte and Blais, “Mixed Electoral Systems.” 39. The SMD elections for 176 seats occur in two rounds. Candidates need a majority to win in the first round. Otherwise, all candidates with more than 15 percent but no fewer than the top three candidates advance to the second round. All candidates advance if turnout falls below 50 percent. Candidates often withdraw from the second round as part of strategic alliances between parties. Hungary’s 19 counties and capital city serve as constituencies for the allocation of regional list seats. Seats are distributed within regions to parties that surpass the 5 percent national legal threshold utilizing the largest remainder system of PR with a Droop quota but no regional seats are awarded for a remainder less than twothirds of the quota. Any of the 176 regional seats left unallocated are added to the 58 ­national list seats. These seats are awarded to all parties passing the 5 percent threshold using the d’Hondt highest average method of PR based on the surplus votes from the two lower tiers—that is, the combined total of votes cast in first round in SMDs for losing candidates and votes cast for a regional list that did not help a party win a seat. If a party wins a regional list seat for less than a full quota (i.e., a remainder seat), the number of votes needed to complete the quota is subtracted from that party’s national surplus. The legal threshold for list seats was 4 percent in 1990. Körösényi, Government and Politics in ­Hungary, 117–32; Benoit, “Hungary,” 231–52; Matthew J. Gabel, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in the 1990 Hungarian Elections,” Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 205–14; Kenneth Benoit, “Evaluating Hungary’s Mixed-Member



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­ lectoral System” (Paper presented at the Mixed Electoral Systems Conference, Newport E Beach, CA, December 11–13, 1995); Barnabas Racz and Istvan Kukorelli, “The ­‘Second-Generation’ Post-Communist Elections in Hungary in 1994,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 2 (1995): 251–79; Shvetsova, “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions,” 400, 407–8; Simon, “Electoral Systems and Democracy in Central Europe, 1990–1994,” 369–70; Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe,” 154, 157; Birch et al., Embodying ­Democracy, 60–61. 40. Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, 119–20, 128–9; Benoit, “Hungary,” 238–9, 242–4. 41. In 2006, even a party gaining every single valid vote would not have won enough votes to pass the threshold in 14 counties and a party would have needed over 94 percent of valid votes in three others. In Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, a party would have met the threshold with 75 percent of all valid regional list votes. Only in Budapest and the surrounding county of Pest could a regional party have won enough votes to pass the threshold with less than one-half of the valid vote. Calculated from official results; National Election Office Hungary, “2006 Parliamentary Elections,” http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2006/main_ en.html (viewed 19 February 2009); Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, 119–20, 128–9; Benoit, “Hungary,” 238–9. 42. According to the 2001 Census, Roma comprised 2 percent of the population. Many sources suggest that Roma are severely undercounted with estimates of the actual share of Roma as closer to 5 percent though others place it even higher. László Karsai, “The Radical Right in Hungary” in The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P.  Ramet (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press), 137; Paul Robert ­M agocsi, Historical Atlas of Central Europe, Rev. and exp. ed. (Seattle: University of ­Washington Press 2002), 147–8. 43. Zoltan Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization in the Postcommunist Context: Albanians in Macedonia and East European Roma” in Ethnic Politics after Communism, eds. Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 78–107; Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics (New York: ­Cambridge University Press, 2002), 202–40. 44. Constitution of Brazil, Article 17. The constitution was adopted on 5 October 1988, but has been amended many times since. 45. Article 7, Section 1, Lei dos Partidos Políticos, Lei No. 9096 de Setembro de 1995 (Federative Republic of Brazil); Tribunal Superior Eleitoral: Brazil, “Código Eleitoral Anotado e Legislacão Complementar,” Volume 1, 7a edicão, http://www.tse.gov.br/servicos_online/ catalogo_publicacoes/pdf/codigo_eleitoral/codigo_eleitoral2006_vol1.pdf (viewed 4 March 2009). Article 7, section 1 reads: “Só é admitido o registro do estatuto de partido político que tenha caráter nacional, considerando-se como tal aquele que comprove o apoiamento de eleitores correspondente a, pelo menos, meio por cento dos votos dados na última eleição geral para a Câmara dos Deputados, não computados os votos em branco e os nulos, distribuídos por um terço, ou mais, dos Estados, com um mínimo de um décimo por cento do eleitorado que haja votado em cada um deles.” 46. Timothy J. Power, “Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil: Politics as a Permanent Constitutional Convention” in Democratic Brazil: Actors Institutions and Processes, eds. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 29–30. 47. Seats are allocated to parties or coalitions of parties by the d’Hondt highest average method. 48. Nicolau, “Brazil,” 123; Nicolau, “The Open-List Electoral System in Brazil,” Dados 3 (2007). 49. Scott Mainwaring, “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 1 (October 1991): 22–6; Scott P. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

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1999), 248–50; Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 41–3; Nicolau, “Brazil,” 123–7; Power, “Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil,” 25–8; Nicolau, “The Open-List Electoral System in Brazil.” This article is a translation of Jairo Nicolau, “O sistema eleitoral de lista aberta no Brasil,” Dados 49, no. 4 (2006). 50. Candidato nato means birthright candidate in Portuguese; Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 254–5; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil, 42; Mainwaring, “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems,” 24–5. 51. Mainwaring, “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems,” 28; Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 254–5. But Samuels, “Concurrent ­Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil,” reports that many incumbent deputies lose bids for reelection and many prefer to seek other ­offices. 52. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil; Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 251; Nicolau, “The Open-List Electoral System in Brazil.” 53. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil; Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 268–9; Alfred P. Montero, “Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization and the New Brazilian Federalism” in Democratic Brazil: Actors ­Institutions and Processes, eds. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power (Pittsburgh, PA: ­University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 64–5; Samuels, “Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil,” 2. 54. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 155–6; Power, “Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil,” 28–30; Samuels, “Concurrent Elections, ­Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil,” 2; David J. Samuels, “The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil,” Journal of Politics 62, no. 1 (February 2000): 240–53. 55. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 268–71. 56. It also banned the use of regional or religious symbols by political parties. Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde (1992), Articles 125–6. Article 126 prohibited parties of “a local or regional ambit” and required parties to respect “the national independence and unity” and “territorial integrity.” Article 125 barred parties from adopting symbols “which, directly or indirectly, are identified with any part of the national territory, the church, ­religion, or religious creed, or . . . which are similar to or can be confused with national or regional symbols.” 57. Constituição da República de Cabo Verde (1999), Lei Constitucional No. 1/V/99 of 23 November, Article 56, sections 3–6. “3. Os partidos políticos não podem adoptar denominações que, directa ou indirectamente, se identifiquem com qualquer parcela do território nacional ou com igreja, religião ou confissão religiosa ou que possam evocar nome de pessoa ou de instituição. 4. Os partidos políticos não podem, ainda, adoptar emblemas, símbolos e siglas que sejam iguais ou confundíveis com os símbolos nacionais ou municipais. 5. É proibida a constituição de partidos que: Tenham âmbito regional ou local ou se proponham objectivos programáticos do mesmo âmbito; Se proponham utilizar meios subversivos ou violentos na prossecução dos seus fins; Tenham força armada ou natureza para-militar. 6. Os partidos políticos devem respeitar a independência, a unidade nacional, a integridade territorial do país, o regime democrático, o pluri-partidarismo, os direitos, as liberdades e as garantias fundamentais da pessoa humana.” 58. Section 3, Articles 7, 12 “Lei No. 102/V/99,” Boletín Oficial da República de Cabo Verde Series 1: 12 (19 April 1999), 360–68. “É proibida a constituição de partidos políticos de âmbito regional ou local e de partidos que fomentem o regionalismo, o racismo ou a discriminação ou se pro ponham empregar meios subversivos ou violentos na prossecução dos seus fins ou que tenha natureza paramilitar.” 59. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) led the liberation struggle prior to independence in 1975. The PAICV split from the PAIGC after a 1980



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coup in Guinea-Bissau but remained the same party. Peter Meyns, “Cape Verde: An ­A frican Exception,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 154, 162; Bruce Baker, “Cape Verde: The Most Democratic Nation in Africa?” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 4 (2006): 494. 60. Meyns, “Cape Verde,” 159; Baker, “Cape Verde,” 504, 507; Becher and Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?” 61. Richard A. Lobban Jr., Cape Verde: Crioulo Colony to Independent Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 53–7. 62. Meyns, “Cape Verde,” 161. 63. “Asked to self-identify with a sub-national group, nearly a majority could not; i.e. they refuse to identify themselves as anything other than Capeverdean.” B. Ames, L. Renno, and F. Rodrigues, “Democracy, Market Reform, and Social Peace in Cape Verde” (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 25, The Institute for Democracy in South Africa with the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana and Michigan State University, Cape Town, South Africa, 2003), quoted in Baker, “Cape Verde,” 504. 64. The 72 National Assembly MPs seats are allocated within 20 constituencies with seats by the d’Hondt highest average method. Every constituency is guaranteed a minimum of two seats. Cape Verde reserves three constituencies of two seats apiece for the Diasporas in Africa, the Americas, and the rest of the world. While the Diaspora’s population is larger than that of Cape Verde, only a small fraction participates in elections. Diaspora voters nonetheless played a pivotal role in the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections. In both cases, Diaspora voters provided the winning margin for Pedro Pires of the PAICV over Carlos Veiga of the MpD who carried the vote in the islands. The Diaspora seats have not shifted the balance of power in the National Assembly, though they have tilted increasingly to the PAICV. Baker, “Cape Verde,” 495–7, 507–8. 65. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 2, 5–6, 33; Birnir “Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” 11–12, 17, 20; Birnir and Van Cott, “Disunity in Diversity,” 113. Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 174–5; Hernández and Cal y Mayor, “Indigenous Peoples without Political Parties,” 38–9. 66. Birnir, “Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” 11–12, 17–18; Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 14; Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America, 163, 173–5; Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 112–13. 67. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 13, 19, 34–5fn3. Peru utilized the provinces as districts in 1990 though the legislature had 180 seats at the time. In 1995 and 2000, Peru allocated all of the seats in the reduced 120-member legislature in a single national district. In 2001 and 2006, the provinces were once again used on electoral constituencies. 68. The indigenous population of Peru is concentrated in the 11 provinces of Amazonas, ­Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huánuco, Junín, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Pasco, San Martín, and Ucayali. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones in Resolution No. 057–2001-JNE; Legislación Electoral del Perú (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, República del Perú 2001), 230–31. 69. Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 113; Carlos Blancas Bustamante, “La Ley de Partidos Politicos, Análisis jurídico,” Elecciones 5(2005): 105–23. 70. Peru has also consistently utilized the d’Hondt highest average system of PR to allocate seats, a system that tends to favor large parties. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 12–13. 71. Birnir, “Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” 4, 8–12. 72. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” 14; Birnir, ­“Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” 17, 21. 73. Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 113.

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74. Some also speak dialects of these langauges. Though referenced as pejorative, Pomak is still  widely used in much of the scholarly literature instead of Bulgarian Muslims or ­Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. Although used here, the substitution of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims is somewhat problematic due to conflicts in Greece over their ethnic and linguistic identity as well as increased assimilation. Mario Apostolov, “The Pomaks: A Religious ­M inority in the Balkans,” Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (December 1996): 727–42. 75. The share of Slavic speakers declined greatly in Greek Macedonia following expulsions and population exchanges between Bulgaria and Greece at the end of World War I and the ­resettlement of substantial Greek populations in the area following the population ­exchanges between Greece and Turkey. Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, ­“Regions, Minorities and European Policies: A State of the Art Report on the Turkish ­Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)” (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Project report [D1 and D2] prepared for the EUROREG project funded by the ­European Commission Research DG, Key Action Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base, 2003). 76. Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008). 77. Similarly, Bulgarians label Slavic-speakers in Macedonia as Bulgarians. In the past, they have also been claimed as Serbs, though Macedonian gained recognition as a separate language and people within Tito’s Yugoslavia. 78. Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, “Regions, Minorities and European Policies,” 105–6; Kalogirou and Panaretos, “Analysis and Comparison of Greek Parliamentary Electoral Systems of the Period 1974–1999.” 79. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, “2001 Population and Housing Census,” http:// portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=3214 (viewed 30 April 2014). 80. Rose and Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 151–65; Eben Friedman, “Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and Macedonia,” Ethnopolitics 4, no. 4 (November 2005): 382–5, 389–90; Shvetsova, “A Survey of PostCommunist Electoral Institutions,” 401–3; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 75–9; Peter A. Toma and Dušan Kováč, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover ­I nstitution Press, 2001), 258–74, 301. 81. Friedman, “Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and ­Macedonia,” 383–4; Birch et al., Embodying Democracy, 75–9; Toma and Kováč, Slovakia, 337–45. 82. Roma comprise just 1.7 percent of the population according to the 2001 Census but, as in Hungary, true numbers are likely considerably higher. Friedman, “Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and Macedonia,” 382. 83. Friedman, “Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and ­Macedonia,” 384–5, 391–2; Barany, The East European Gypsies, 202–40. The Romani Civic ­I nitiative ran independently in 1992, 1994, and 2002. In 1998, it worked with Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar, probably the most ­a nti-Romani elected leader in the region. The Romani Civic Initiative leader would have won a seat in the National Council except that he died due to a car accident shortly before the election; see Barany, The East European Gypsies, 214–15, 228, 237–8. 84. Van Cott, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America,” Birnir, “Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?,” but see Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. 85. If one substitutes unweighted controls for ethnic party ban or ballot-access requirements, ethnic party bans have a statistically significant impact on votes won by ethnoregional ­parties in both country and regional-level models without fixed effects but not with fixed effects. The coefficients on the ballot access requirements control are not statistically different from zero in any of the models.



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86. The coefficient and standard error indicate that ballot access requirements may actually nudge up the vote share won by ethnoregional parties (p < 0.10), but the substantive effect is small. 87. Neither ethnic party bans nor ballot access requirements have a statistically significant negative impact if one adds controls for Namibia and Peru. The tentative nature of the impact of both rules might stem from the many countries with no electorally relevant ­ethnoregional groups or ethnoregional parties in addition to the lack of any real effect, though the regional-level models support the latter conclusion. 88. But see David Lublin and Matthew Wright, “Don’t Start the Party: Assessing the Electoral Effect of Legal Provisions Impeding Ethnoregional Parties,” Election Law Journal 13, no. 2 (June 2014), 277–87.

Chapter 8 1. Brancati, Peace by Design, 6–7; Elazar, Exploring Federalism, xv. 2. Hooghe et al., “Operationalizing Regional Authority.” 3. Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design. 4. Calvo and Escolar, Crisis política, realinemientos partidarios y reforma electoral; Chhibber and Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems, 161–79; Chhibber and Murali, “Duvergerian Dynamics in the Indian States”; De Winter, “Conclusion,” 220; Gerring “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems,” 87–95; Harbers, “Decentralization and the Development of Nationalized Party Systems in New Democracies: Evidence from Latin America”; Lalander, “Decentralization and the Party System in Venezuela”; Ryan, “Decentralization and Democratic Instability.” However, others argue that decentralization has little impact or even reduces ethnoregional party support. Caramani The Nationalization of Politics; Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,”, 516; Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 139–58; Jolly, “Economics, Institutions and Culture Explaining Regionalist Party Success in Europe”; Levi and Hechter, “A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties.” 5. Lori Thorlakson, “Federalism and the European Party System,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 3 (2005): 468–87; Lori Thorlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” Party Politics 15, no. 2 (2009): 157–77. 6. Brancati, Peace by Design, 90–121. 7. Maya Chadda, “Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India” in Ethnonationalism in India, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 385; Robert D. King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 110–17. 8. Odisha was called Orissa in English until 2011. The All Indian Ganatantra Parishad participated briefly in a coalition state government with the Indian National Congress from 1959 to 1961 but remained in opposition for most of its existence prior to merging into the multistate Swatantra Party in 1962. Swatantra governed Odisha in coalition with a new regional party, the Orissa Jana Congress (Orissa People’s Congress), from 1967 until 1971. After the 1971 elections, Swatantra formed a new government in coalition with Utkal Congress, another new regional party, which lasted just one year. 9. Orissa Legislative Assembly, “Brief History of the Orissa Legislative Assembly Since 1937,” http://ws.ori.nic.in/ola/brief.htm (viewed 1 September 2010). 10. Sanjib Baruah, “Confronting Constructionism: Ending the Naga War” in Ethnonationalism in India, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 239–62; M.  Sajjad Hassan, “Secessionism in Northeast India: Identity Wars or Crises of Legitimacy?” in Ethnonationalism in India, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 291–315; Archana Upadhyay, India’s Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009). Regional parties have also

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often governed internationally disputed and strife-ridden Jammu and Kashmir. However, its elections do not meet Freedom House’s standards for free and democratic elections. Bose, Kashmir; Sumantra Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century” in Ethnonationalism in India, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 200–36. 11. Carved out of southern Bihar in 2000, Jharkhand’s assembly has lacked stable majorities since its creation. 12. Punjab Assembly, “Chief Ministers,” http://punjabassembly.nic.in/members/showcm.asp (viewed 2 September 2010). 13. Brancati, Peace by Design, 204; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties”; Jones, “Presidential Election Laws and Multipartism in Latin America”; Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; Mainwaring and Shugart, “Conclusion”; Birnir and Van Cott, “Disunity in Diversity: Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures,” 114–15. 14. Some parties make a conscious choice not to append the name of the region to emphasize their opposition to greater regional independence. 15. Most vividly, the SVP could not expel one of its federal councilors without the consent of its Graubünden section. When the Graubünden SVP refused to do so, the national SVP expelled the entire section to accomplish the original goal. 16. The Radicals merged with the Liberals in 2009, resulting in the adoption of new names. 17. Thorlakson, “Federalism and the European Party System”; Thorlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations.” 18. Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Africa”; Kanchan Chandra, ed., Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Nelson Kasfir, “Explaining Ethnic Political Participation,” World Politics 31 (April): 365–88; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991); Orlando Patterson, “Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, eds. Nathan Glazar and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 305–49; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa; Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976). 19. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. 20. The California state senate provides an exception to the rule. 21. Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius, 157. 22. The Bloc Québécois led the opposition for a single parliament after the 1993 elections. 23. David Lublin, “Dispersing Authority or Deepening Divisions? Decentralization and Ethnoregional Party Success,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (October 2012): 1079–93. 24. William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977); Elazar, Exploring Federalism; Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); A. S. Narang, Ethnic Identities and Federalism (Shimla, India: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995); Graham Smith, ed., Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (New York: Longman, 1995); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136–75; Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 258–68; Will Kymlicka, “Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secessionism?” in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New



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York: Routledge Press, 1998), 111–50; James Manor, “Making Federalism Work,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (July 1998): 21–35; Ted Robert Gurr, People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Hechter, Containing Nationalism; Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000); Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Nancy Gina Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 96–110; Caminal, El federalism pluralista; Ian S. Lustick, Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson, “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 209–29; Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff, eds., Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, ed., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Brancati, Peace by Design. 25. Richard H. Pildes, “Ethnic identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic Perspective” in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?, ed. Sujit Choudhry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 197. 26. The alliance ruptured in 2008 and the People’s Party competed in Navarre’s 2011 autonomous community elections but the People’s Party and the Navarrese People’s Union (UPN) formed a joint list for the 2011 congressional elections. 27. Brancati, Peace by Design, 116–17. 28. Lago Peñas, “Sobrerrepresentación de las Zonas Rurales y Vote Conservador en el Sistema Electoral Español”; Lago Peñas and Lago Peñas, “El Sistema Electoral Español.” 29. Koff and Koff, Italy, 34–77; James L. Newell, Parties and Democracy in Italy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2000; Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Italian Politics (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 39–62). 30. Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, “The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), 131–50; Percy Allum and Ilvo Diamanti, “The Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), 151–69. 31. The statistical results change little if one codes the decentralization variable based on the timing of a region’s first election instead of the promulgation of regional statutes by the national government. 32. Henry E. Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse,” World Politics 56 (January 2004): 165–93. 33. Valerie Bunce, “Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia,” Politics and Society 27 (June 1999): 233. 34. Lisbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel, “Operationalizing Regional Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950–2006,” Regional and Federal Studies 18, no. 2–3 (2008): 123–42. 35. Her detailed case study of Czechoslovakia indicates that the impact may be especially powerful in countries where decentralized units select a relatively large share of upper house legislators. Brancati, Peace by Design, 65–89. 36. Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 210–12; Jonathan Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom: The Quebec Sovereignty Movement and Its Implications for Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 48–54; Robert Bothwell, Canada and Quebec: One Country, Two Histories, rev. ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 223–5; Christopher Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997). 37. St. Kitts and Nevis has appointed representatives called senators but they sit in the unicameral National Assembly with the elected members.

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Chapter 9 1. John Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism (London: Hurst, 1996), 145–69; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 156–73; Xavier Mabille, Histoire politique de la Belgique: Facteurs et acteurs de changement, 4th ed. (Brussels: CRISP, 2000), 337–40, 349–61, 386–93, 409–14; Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Maynen, Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000), 251–9; André Lecours, “Solving the Belgian Paradox: Political-­ Institutional Fragmentation, National Identity and Nationalist/Regionalist Politics,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 29, nos. 1–2 (2002): 139–51; Xavier Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale (Brussels: CRISP, 2003), 125–9, 180–91, 244–8, 257–61; André Leton and André Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 84–97, 126–41, 262–74, 345–8; Jean-Claude Scholsem, “La nouvelle Belgique fédérale” in Où va la Belgique? Les soubresauts d’une petite démocratie européenne, eds. Marco Martiniello and Marc Swyngedouw (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1998), 31–43; Belgian Constitution (October 2007), Articles 1–5, 115–40. 2. Among the 40 directly elected senators, the Flemish Community elects 25, and the Francophone and Germanophone Communities together elect 15. The Flemish and Francophone Community Parliaments each select 10 senators from among their membership, while the Germanophone Community selects one. Finally, these 61 senators choose the remaining 6 Flemish and 4 Francophone senators, though their partisan composition must reflect that of the direct election results. The current Belgian government proposes to shrink the size of the Senate and eliminate all directly elected senators. 3. Belgian Constitution (October 2007), Articles 54, 67, 99. Pascal Delwit and Jean-Benoît Pilet, “Fédéralisme, institutions et vie politique: Stabilité, instabilité et retour” in L’État de la Belgique: 1989–2004, quinze années à la charnière du siècle, eds. Marie-Thérèse Coenen, Serge Govaert and Jean Heinen (Brussels: Éditions De Boeck Université, 2004), 48–51. 4. Leton and Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique, 55–66; Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, 35–42; Witte et al., Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards, 174–82; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 30–32, 110–12; Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium, 44–5; Lecours, Solving the Belgian Paradox,” 143. 5. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 113–14, 285–321; Witte et al., Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards, 130, 239–250; Mabille, Histoire politique de la Belgique, 329–32; Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, 117–22; Leton and Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique, 73–83; Jean-Benoit Pilet, Changer pour gagner? Les réformes des lois electorales en Belgique (Brussels, Belgium: Editions de la Université de Bruxelles 2007), 31–5. 6. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 114–16; Witte et al., Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards, 250; Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, 122–3; Leton and Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique, 87–8. 7. Pascal Delwit, Composition, decomposition et recomposition du paysage politique en Belgique (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2003), 51–66; André Lecours, “Political Institutions, Elites, and Territorial Identity Formation in Belgium,” National Identities 3, no. 1 (2001): 60–3; Leton and Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique, 97–117, 275–9; Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale,107–12; Marc Swyngedouw, “Les rapports de force politiques en Belgique” in Où va la Belgique? Les soubresauts d’une petite démocratie européenne, eds. Marco Martiniello and Marc Swyngedouw (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1998), 45–58; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 138–48; Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium, 170–221; Paul Wynants, “Les partis politiques” in L’État de la Belgique: 1989–2004, quinze années à la charnière du siècle, eds. Marie-Thérèse Coenen, Serge Govaert and Jean Heinen (Brussels: Éditions De Boeck Université, 2004), 109–14; Régis Dandoy and Nicolas De Decker, “Peut-on encore parles de «partis frères»



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en Belgique?” in L’absence de partis nationaux: menace ou opportunité?, eds. Jean-Benoit Pilet, Jean-Michel De Waele, and Serge Jaumain (Brussels, Belgium: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009), 19–35; Jean-Benoit Pilet, “Changer la logique du système électoral belge? De la création d’arènes électorales séparées à la circonscription fédérale” in L’absence de partis nationaux: menace ou opportunité?, eds. Jean-Benoit Pilet, Jean-Michel De Waele, and Serge Jaumain (Brussels, Belgium: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009), 38–52. 8. Swyngedouw, “Les rapports de force politiques en Belgique,” 45–58; Delwit and Pilet, “Fédéralisme, institutions et vie politique,” 43–4; Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium, 121–44; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 156–73; Witte et al., Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards, 251–9; Évelyne Lentzen, “Le processus de federalization” in Où va la Belgique?: Les soubresauts d’une petite démocratie européenne, eds. Marco Martiniello and Marc Swyngedouw (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1998), 31–43; Mabille, La Belgique depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, 125–9, 183–91, 244–8, 257–61; Leton and Miroir, Les conflits communautaires en Belgique, 84–96, 126–41; Delwit, Composition, decomposition et recomposition du paysage politique en Belgique, 61–2. 9. Scholsem, “La nouvelle Belgique fédérale,” 108–10. 10. Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) was formerly called Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok). 11. Rogoziński, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 321–3, 353; Griffiths, “St. Kitts and Nevis,” 282–3; Keith C. Simmonds, “Political and Economic Factors Influencing the St. KittsNevis Polity: An Historical Perspective,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (1987): 281–3; JonesHendrickson,­“Which Way Forward,” 442–5; Douglas Midgett, “Pepper and Bones: The Secessionist Impulse on Nevis,” New West Indian Guide 78, nos. 1–2 (2004): 45–53. 12. Midgett, “Pepper and Bones,” 49–62; Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Tennyson S.D. Joseph, General Elections and Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992–2005 (Miami: Ian Randle Publishers 2006), 75–8; Griffiths, “St. Kitts and Nevis,” 287; Griffin, “Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the Caribbean,” 82–3; Ralph R. Premdas, “Self-Determination and Decentralization in the Caribbean: Tobago and Nevis,” http:// www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/sk&n/conference/papers/RRPremdas.html (viewed 12 August 2009). 13. The Labour Party objected strenuously to these provisions and withdrew from independence talks before their conclusion. Midgett, “Pepper and Bones,” 55–7; Griffin, “Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the Caribbean,” 83; Jones-Hendrickson, “Which Way Forward,” 445, 450–52. 14. The referendum followed a period of instability and the return of Labour to power. In 1993, the PAM and Labour split the Kittitian seats evenly despite Labour’s decisive 57 percent of votes. The CCM held the balance of power and refused to form a coalition with either party, leading to early elections in 1995. Labour won all but one of the Kittitian seats and formed a majority government. Midget, “Pepper and Bones,” 57–62; Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, General Elections and Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992–2005 75–8; Jones-Hendrickson, “Which Way Forward,” 446–7; Ralph R. Premdas, “Identity and Secession in Nevis” in Identity, Ethnicity and Culture in the Caribbean, ed. Ralph R. Premdas (St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: University of the West Indies, 1998), 447–83. 15. Office for National Statistics, Key population and vital statistics: Local and health authority areas, Population and vital statistics by area of usual residence in the United Kingdom, 2001 Series VS 28: PP1 24 (London: Office for National Statistics, 2001), 8. 16. The Ulster Unionist Party and the Conservatives formed an electoral alliance in Northern Ireland in 2010 known as the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists–New Force, which won no seats. 17. The Good Friday Agreement contains a number of additional provisions and intergovernmental bodies designed to promote communal comity. 18. “The National Party of Scotland (NPS) was formed in 1928 with the goal of independence, yet it eventually came to advocate autonomy; a more right-wing party supporting

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autonomy emerged, the Scotland Party. A contingent of the more radical NPS members, including many seeking outright independence, were expelled, and the NPS and the Scottish Party then merged to form the Scottish National Party in 1934.” Janet Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and the Meanings of Statehood in a Supranational Context (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 44–5. 19. Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe, 54. 20. This referendum contained no 40 percent requirement to pass. Though turnout was just over 60 percent of the electorate, 44 percent of the electorate cast ballots in favor of the assembly though only 38 percent voted in favor of the provision regarding taxation. 21. Though an Act of the British Parliament, the Constitution Act was negotiated by Canadians and passed at their request. 22. “Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Focus on Inuit in Nunavut,” 2006 Census of Population, StatsUpdate (Statistics Canada and Nunavut Bureau of Statistics 2008), http://bit. ly/1i3c6hr (viewed 1 May 2014); “Mother Tongue and Language Spoken Most Often at Home, 2006 Census of Population, StatsUpdate (Statistics Canada and Nunavut Bureau of Statistics 2007), http://bit.ly/1mj75tq (viewed 1 May 2014). 23. Candidates competed under a variety of party names during this era, and this characterization refers more to the rough coalitions associated with each party in Canadian history rather than to specific party names. Members elected in Canada West under the rubrics of Grit, Clear Grit, Reform, and Reformer are included here under the umbrella of the Reform Party label. Members elected in Canada West as Conservatives, Liberals, Liberal-­ Conservatives are linked together as Conservatives. Members elected under the Bleu, Conservative, Independent Liberal, or Liberal Conservative labels in Canada East are similarly grouped here as Conservatives. 24. Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal; Louis Massicotte, “Les partis politiques nationaux au Canada” in L’absence de partis nationaux: Menace ou opportunité?, eds. Jean Benoît Pilet, Jean-Michel De Waele, and Serge Jaumain (Brussels: Éditions de Université de Bruxelles, 2009), 53–74; Donald V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987); P. G. Cornell, “The Alignment of Political Groups in the United Provinces of Canada, 1854–1864” in Upper Canadian Politics in the 1850s, eds. Ramsay Cook, Craig Brown, and Carl Berger (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 64–88. 25. It performed most strongly in 1984 in Manitoba, where it won 7 percent of the vote, and in 1988 in New Brunswick, where it gained 4 percent. 26. Massicotte, “Les partis politiques nationaux au Canada.” Reform attempted an earlier alliance prior to the 2000 election but a Progressive Conservative rump refused to join the new Canadian Alliance. While the Canadian Alliance performed more strongly than  Reform, the national dynamic did not change as it was viewed as an augmented Reform Party. Nonetheless, the Alliance was an important step toward Conservative ­reunification. 27. Janis van der Westhuizen, “South Africa” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 309–23; Nico Steytler, “Republic of South Africa” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, eds. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 312–46; Wilmot G. James and Daria Caliguire, “The New South Africa: Renewing Civil Society” in Democratization in Africa, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 83–93; Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, eds., Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Andrew Reynolds, Election ’99: South Africa From Mandela to Mbeki (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Stephen Rule, Electoral Territoriality in Southern Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 215–57; Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 237–76.



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28. André Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2007), 25–36; Juan Díez Medrano, Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 21–35. 29. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 2007, 41–50. 30. Daniele Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation (Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1997), 38–42, 75–7; Julio Gil Pecharromán, La Segunda Republica (Madrid: Historia 16, 1999), 82–9. 31. Eliseo Aja, “Nation, Nationalities, and Regions” in Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. John Loughlin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 230; Gil Pecharromán, La Segunda Republica, 89–92. 32. Miguel M. Cuadrado, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en España (1868–1931) (Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, SA, 1969), 630–37, 667–73, 696–706, 714–23, 734–46, 755–9, 778, 882–997. 33. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 66–8; Díez Medrano, Divided Nations, 69–106; Albert Balcells, Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 67–82, 94–105; Gil Pecharromán, La Segunda Republica, 38–42, 143–8, 175–9; Javier Tusell Gómez, Las Elecciones del Frente Popular en España (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, SA, 1971), 107–119, 128–69, 264–341; José Luis de la Granja Sainz, Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco: Estatutos de autonomía, partidos y elecciones, Historia de Acción Nacionalista Vasca: 1930–1936 (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, SA, 1986). 34. The results are equally unsupportive if one examines autonomous community elections. 35. Anna Laura Lepschy, Giulio Lepschy and Miram Voghera, “Linguistic Variety in Italy” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), 69–80. 36. According to the Ethnologue classification system, Sardinian is a Southern Romance language while standard Italian, as well as Italian, Friulian, Ladin and the many local Italian languages spoken throughout the peninsula are Italo-Western Romance languages. Herta Maurer-Lausegger, “The Diversity of Languages in the Alpine-Adriatic Region I: Linguistic Minorities and Enclaves in Northern Italy,” TfS: Tidsskrift for Sprogforskning 2, no. 1 (2004): 5–23; Carlo Ruzza, “Language and Nationalism in Italy: Language as a Weak Marker of Identity” in Language and Nationalism in Europe, eds. Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 168–82; David H. Kaplan, “Political Accommodation and Functional Interaction along the Northern Italian Borderlands,” Geografiska Annaler 83, no. 3 (2001): 131–9; Rudolf Lill, “The Historical Evolution of the Italian Frontier Regions,” West European Politics 5, no. 4 (1982): 109–122; Lepschy et al., “Linguistic Variety in Italy,” 72–3. 37. But see Martin Clark who argues that “Sardinia in 1948 became an ‘autonomous’ region against the wishes of most of its elderly political class, and in the virtually total absence of any ‘nationalist’ agitation or concern over ‘sardità.’” Martin Clark, “Sardinia: Cheese and Modernization” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), 69–80. Ernest Weibel, La creation des regions autonomes à statut special en Italie (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1971); Anna Bull, “Regionalism in Italy” in Regionalism in the European Union, ed. Peter Wagstaff (Portland, OR: Intellect Books, 1971), 140–57; David Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), 110–11; Beniamino Caravita, “Italy: Toward a Federal State?: Recent Constitutional Developments in Italy” (Unpublished paper, 2004), http://www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/caravita.pdf (viewed 3 January 2010); Sondra Z. Koff and Stephen P. Koff, Italy: From the First to the Second Republic (New York: Routledge, 2000), 182–91; Kaplan, “Political Accommodation and Functional Interaction along the Northern Italian Borderlands,” 134; Lill, “The Historical Evolution of the Italian Frontier Regions,” 110–11.

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38. Anny Schweigkofler, “South Tyrol: Rethinking Ethnolinguistic Vitality” in German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging, ed. Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 63–72; Stefan Wolff, “Complex Autonomy Arrangements in Western Europe” in Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution, eds. Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (New York: Routledge, 2005), 124, 129–34; Kaplan, “Political Accommodation and Functional Interaction along the Northern Italian Borderlands,” 134–5; Lill, “The Historical Evolution of the Italian Frontier Regions,” 110–11. 39. Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, and Robert D. Putnam, “Italy—Territorial Politics in the Post-War Years: The Case of Regional Reform,” West European Politics 10, no. 4 (1987): 88–107; Koff and Koff, Italy, 192–6; Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State, 109–29; Caravita, “Italy Toward a Federal State?” 40. Jyotirindra Dasgupta, “India’s Federal Design and Multicultural National Construction” in The Success of India’s Democracy, ed. Atul Kohli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 52–4, 59–63; King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, 98–118; Akhtar Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” Publius 33, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 84–5. 41. Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 83–98; Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 169–74; Vasuki Nesiah, “Federalism and Diversity in India” in Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, ed. Yash Ghai (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 55–9; Mahendra P. Singh and Douglas V. Verney, “Challenges to India’s Centralized Parliamentary Federalism,” Publius 33, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 4–6. 42. The city of Chandigarh was turned into a new union territory and serves as their shared capital. 43. Rajat Ganguly, “Democracy and Ethnic Conflict” in The State of India’s Democracy, eds. Sumit Ganguly, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 50; Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, 171–3; King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, 120–1; Nesiah, “Federalism and Diversity in India,” 61–2; Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 90; Pritam Singh, Federalism, Nationalism and Development: India and the Punjab Economy (New York: Routledge, 2008), 28–32; Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 276–400. 44. Singh, Federalism, Nationalism and Development, 32–3; Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, 343–50. 45. Sajal Nag, “The Contest for the Marginal Space: Parties and Politics in Small Indian States” in Political Parties and Party Systems, eds. Ajay K. Mehra, D. D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 336–65; King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, 121; Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 88–9; Samir K. Das, “India. Democracy, Nation, and the Spirals of Insecurity: State Response to Ethnic Separatism in India’s Northeast” in Fixing Fractured Nations: The Challenge of Ethnic Separatism in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Robert G. Wirsing and Ehsan Ahrari (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 116–39. 46. According to the 2001 Census, Scheduled Tribes make up just over one-third of Manipur’s population. No one tribe exceeds 25 percent of the Scheduled Tribe population but 13 tribes form more than 1 percent. 47. Two tribal peoples, the Khasi and the Garo, comprise 91 percent of Scheduled Tribes in Meghalaya and four-fifths of all Scheduled Tribe members identify as Christians according to the 2001 Census. 48. By 2001, Scheduled Tribes constituted a little less than one-third of Tripura’s population with the eponymous Tripura making up 55 percent of Scheduled Tribe members and the remainder split up among many smaller groups. 49. King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, 121; Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 120–23; Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence,



note s to page s 288 –290

501

201–5; Ganguly, “Democracy and Ethnic Conflict,” 50–2; Hassan, “Secessionism in Northeast India,” 291–315; “Mizoram: Data Highlights: The Scheduled Tribes,” Census of India 2001 (Office of the Registrar General, Government of India 2001), http:// censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_mizoram.pdf (viewed 1 May 2014); “Arunachal Pradesh: Data Highlights: The Scheduled Tribes,” Census of India 2001 (Office of the Registrar General, Government of India 2001), http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_ Published/SCST/dh_st_arunachal.pdf (viewed 1 May 2014). 50. Two other Portuguese enclaves, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, remain union territories. The former French colony of Puducherry also remains a union territory, though it possesses its own legislature as does Delhi, the National Capital Territory. 51. Stuart Corbridge, “The Ideology of Tribal Economy and Society: Politics in Jharkhand, c.1950–1980” in Jharkhand: Environment, Development, Ethnicity, eds. Stuart Corbridge, Sarah Jewitt, and Sanjay Kumar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 17–55; Stuart Corbridge, Sarah Jewitt, and Sanjay Kumar, “Introduction: Jharkhand in Prospect and Retrospect” in Jharkhand: Environment, Development, Ethnicity, Stuart Corbridge, Sarah Jewitt, and Sanjay Kumar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1–16; Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 89, 94–7; Stuart Corbridge, “The Continuing Struggle for India’s Jharkhand: Democracy, Decentralisation and the Politics of Names and Numbers,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40, no. 3 (2002): 55–71; R. D. Munda and S. Bosu Mullick, The Jharkhand Movement: Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle for Autonomy in India (Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs and Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action, 2003). 52. Sajal Basu, “Ethno-Regionalism and Tribal Development: Problems and Challenges in Jharkhand” in Tribal Development in India: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Govinda Chandra Roth (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 133–52; Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 123–8. 53. Corbridge, “The Continuing Struggle for India’s Jharkhand,” 55–71; Sanjay Kumar, “Creation of New States: Rationale and Implications,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 36 (7–13 September 2002): 3705–9; Census of India, “Tables on Individual Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)”; Corbridge et al., “Introduction,” 1–9; Chadda, “Integration through Internal Reorganization,” 393–5. 54. But see Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 94–7 who reports on demands for a separate Chhattisgarh as early as the 1950s. 55. “Creation of New States: Rationale and Implications,” 3707. 56. Kumar, “Creation of New States: Rationale and Implications,” 3707–8; Majeed, “The Changing Politics of States’ Reorganization,” 94–7; Chadda, “Integration through Internal Reorganization,” 394–5. 57. Pradeep K. Chhibber and John R, Petrocik, “Social Cleavages, Elections, and Indian Party System” in Parties and Party Politics in India, ed. Zoya Hasan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 56–75; E. Sridharan, “The Fragmentation of the Indian Party System, 1952–1999” in Parties and Party Politics in India, ed. Zoya Hasan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 475–503; Balveer Arora, “The Political Parties and the Party System: The Emergence of New Coalitions” in Parties and Party Politics in India, ed. Zoya Hasan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 504–32; Pradeep Kumar, “The National Parties and the Regional Allies: A Study in the Socio-Political Dynamics” in Political Parties and Party Systems, eds. Ajay K. Mehra, D.D. Khanna, and Gert W. Kueck (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 288–305. 58. Kumar, “Creation of New States: Rationale and Implications,” 3708; Mullick, “Indigenous Peoples and Electoral Politics in India,” 123–8; Corbridge, “The Continuing Struggle for India’s Jharkhand,” 57–8; Election Commission of India, “Statistical Reports of Lok Sabha Elections,” http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx (viewed 1 May 2014).

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Increasingly, Janata Dal (United) also looks like a Bihar regional party as its support outside of this state has declined. 59. Kumar, “Creation of New States: Rationale and Implications,” 3707–8; Election Commission of India, “Statistical Reports of Lok Sabha Elections.”

Chapter 10 1. Roland Sturm, “Austria” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 46–7. 2. Cheryl Saunders, “Australia” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 32–44; Cheryl Saunders, “Commonwealth of Australia” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, eds. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 12–26. 3. Rudolf Hubek, “Germany” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 150–51; Jutta Kramer, “Federal Republic of Germany” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, eds. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 1. 4. Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, originally published in 1966). 5. The Polish vote remained relatively stable across the entire period, averaging 3.6 percent. Starting in 1874, Alsace-Lorraine’s participation in elections increased the ethnoregional party vote share as many of its voters cast ballots for regional representatives. Danish representatives won entry to the Reichstag from North Schleswig. In both Alsace-Lorraine and North Schleswig, the ethnoregional party vote share declined in the elections held before World War I. Lithuanian parties started contesting elections in 1898 though they never won any seats. 6. The German-Hanoverian Party’s vote share fell gradually from around 2 percent to less than 1 percent over the life of the German Empire. 7. The share of the vote won by regional parties shot up in 1920 when the Bavarian branch of the Center Party broke away to contest elections as the Bavarian People’s Party and won 4.5 percent of the national vote, equivalent to 28.9 percent in Bavaria. The party’s vote share declined gently to 24.2 percent by the last free elections in 1933. The Bavarian Peasants League gained around 1 percent of the national vote but ceased to be a regional party when it joined in the formation of the German Peasants Party in 1927. 8. The Württemberg party won over one-sixth of that region’s vote in the two elections held in 1924 as well as the sole 1928 election. 9. The new party still performs more strongly in eastern Germany but gains a more significant share of the vote in western Germany than won by the PDS. 10. The CSU won an average of 57.5 percent of the Bavarian vote in the five elections preceding reunification; it received 51.7 percent in the five post-unification elections. 11. Thomas Stauffer, Nicole Töpperwien, and Urs Thalmann-Torres, “Switzerland” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 343–4; Nicolas Schmitt, “Swiss Confederation” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, eds. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 350–58. 12. Jenkins, Jura Separatism in Switzerland; Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, 89–98; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, 185–212. 13. This government was the first in Argentina’s fractious history that could genuinely claim to possess effective authority throughout the country, though regular armed challenges continued. 14. Viviana Patroni, “Argentina” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 17–26; Edward L. Gibson and Tulia



note s to page s 298 –302

503

G. Falleti, “Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the Origins of Argentine Federalism” in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 226–54; Antonio M. Hernandez, “Republic of Argentina” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, eds. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 8–36. 15. Mark P. Jones, “Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress” in Legislative Politics in Latin America, eds. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 147–84; Mark P. Jones, Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi, “Amateur Legislators—Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System,” American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3 (July 2002): 656–69. 16. Argentina’s numerous parties render the organization of election results extremely difficult. While results are available for all years, I have them organized and included here only for these years. 17. Peter G. Snow and Luigi Manzetti, Political Forces in Argentina, 3rd ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 72. 18. Miguel de Luca, Mark P. Jones, and María Inés Tula, “Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes?: Candidate Nomination in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 4 (May 2002): 416–9. 19. Valeriani Mendes Ferreira Costa, “Brazil” in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 91–5. 20. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983). 21. J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South 1880–1910 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1974); David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 22. Statistics Finland, “Language according to Age and Gender by Region 1990–2007,” http:// pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/databasetree_en.asp (viewed 12 December 2008); 5.5 percent of the population of the entire country spoke Swedish in 2007. 23. Kristian Myntti and Pirkko Nuolijärvi, “The Case of Finland” in International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, ed. Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006), 187–9; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland, 322–30; Henry Milner, “The Status of Finland’s Swedish National Minority: Exemplary—But for Whom?” in The Fate of the Nation State, ed. Michel Seymour (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 319–20. 24. Statistics Finland, “Language according to Age and Gender by Region 1990–2007.” 25. Myntti and Nuolijärvi, “The Case of Finland,” 182–7; McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland, 219–30; Milner, “The Status of Finland’s Swedish National Minority,” 315–19. 26. Fernando Domínguez García, “Autonomy Experiences in Europe—A Comparative Approach: Portugal, Spain and Italy” in Two Systems, Three Legal Orders: Perspectives of Evolution, eds. J.C. Oliveira and P. Cardinal (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009), 418. 27. But see José Guilherme Reis Leite, “The Azores in the Portuguese Republic” in The New Portugal: Democracy and Europe, ed. Richard Herr (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1992), 62–70; and Christina Teixeira, “Roots of Discontent: Azorean Sub-Nationalism and Autonomy,” Podium 3, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 47–56. They argue that the Azores is culturally unique and autonomy reflects aspirations heightened by neglect by the metropole. Also see Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 176; he points out that Azoreans believed autonomy would help make sure that their interests would no longer be ignored during negotiations with the United States over its military base. Others have

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noted the comparatively low levels of prosperity and development of the islands and linked it to neglect by the mother country; see Tom Gallagher, “Portugal’s Atlantic Territories: The Separatist Challenge,” World Today 35 (September 1979): 353. However, Gallagher attributes the rise of separatism not to economic distress but to opposition among local elites, supported by the general population, to the extreme left-wing government. Today, Madeira is among the wealthier regions, though the Azores remains below average; Freire, “Minority Representation in Portuguese Democracy,” 200. 28. The same article in the constitution that defines Portugal as a “unitary” state also enshrines the Azores and Madeira’s autonomous status and requires that the state “respect the autonomous island system of self-government.” A separate article defines as a “fundamental task of the state” to show “particular regard to the ultraperipheral nature of the Azores and Madeira archipelagos” in its promotion of “harmonious development” throughout Portugal. Title VII on “Autonomous Regions” includes 10 articles on the operation and powers of the autonomous regions. Reforms expanded their areas of competence and removed the central government’s ability to veto constitutional legislation adopted by the autonomous assemblies. Articles 9, 225–34, Constitution of Portugal (2005); Domínguez García, “Autonomy Experiences in Europe,” 418, 427; Gallagher, “Portugal’s Atlantic Territories,” 353–9; Lawrence S. Graham, “Center-Periphery Relations” in Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy, eds. Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1990), 24; Robert Harvey, Portugal: Birth of a Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 75; Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, 176; Lewis and Williams, “Regional Autonomy and the European Communities,” 68, 77–8; 29. Álvaro Xosé López Mira, “Portugal: The resistance to change in the state model,” Regional and Federal Studies 9, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 98–105; Walter C. Opello Jr., Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 80–96; Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy; Harvey, Portugal. 30. Lewis and Williams, “Regional Autonomy and the European Communities,” 68, 75–9; John Loughlin, “Portugal: The Difficulties of Regionalization” in Subnational Democracy in the European Union, ed. John Loughlin (Oxford University Press, 2001), 255–70. 31. Gallagher, “Portugal’s Atlantic Territories,” 357. 32. Goldey, “Elections and the Consolidation of Portuguese Democracy,” 1983, 231. 33. Coding Finland and Portugal alternatively as ethnically decentralized or centralized had no meaningful impact on the coefficients on the decentralization variables in the multivariate models. 34. Brancati, “The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties”; Brancati, Peace by Design; De Winter, “Conclusion”; Chhibber and Murali, “Duvergerian Dynamics in the Indian States”; Chhibber and Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems; Birnir and Van Cott, “Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures”; Gerring, “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems.” 35. Brancati, “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties,” 5–6; Brancati, Peace by Design, 57–8, 117–18, 150–51. 36. Hale, “Divided We Stand.” 37. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 602–22. 38. Bunce, “Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment.” 39. Hooghe et al., “Operationalizing Regional Authority.” 40. The coefficient in Model 4 is statistically significant at p < 0.10 but its substantive import remains very low, as the maximum possible shift in self-rule from zero to 15 would raise the vote share won by ethnoregional parties by 0.15 percent. 41. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Amorim Neto and Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties”; Farrell, Electoral Systems. 42. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization. 43. Chandra, Why Do Ethnic Parties Succeed?; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.



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44. Among the countries examined here, the Human Development Index ranges from 0.410 to 0.961. 45. Replacing the natural logarithm of Purchasing Power Parity with just Purchasing Power Parity results in a statistically significant (p < 0.01) negative coefficient of small magnitude with little substantive impact. 46. Hechter, Internal Colonialism. 47. Gourevitch, “The Reemergence of ‘Peripheral Nationalisms’”; Jolly, “Economics, Institutions and Culture Explaining Regionalist Party Success in Europe.” 48. Fearon and van Houten, “The Politicization of Cultural and Economic Difference”; MüllerRommel, “Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe”; Tronconi, “Ethnic Identity and Party Competition.” 49. Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism,” 165–95. 50. Meguid, “Competition between Unequals”; Meguid, Party Competition between Unequals. 51. Extreme right ethnoregional parties exist, such as the Ticino League in Switzerland and the Northern League in Italy, but are not especially common. 52. Bonnie Meguid’s more sophisticated models take into account not only whether the two major mainstream parties take accommodative, adversarial, or dismissive positions but also the relative strength of their positions. This becomes relevant when the two parties take opposed positions, as in the UK example in the text. 53. Meguid, Party Competition between Unequals, 75. “Electoral rules emerge as a strong and statistically significant predictor of ethnoterritorial party vote.” “If Model V reveals the weak explanatory power of the nonstrategic variables, with the notable exception of electoral rules, Model VI indicates the strong role of mainstream party actors in the electoral success and failure of regionalist parties.” 54. Bonnie M. Meguid, “Institutional Change as Strategy: The Role of Decentralization in Party Competition” (Paper presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2008).

Chapter 11 1. Cason, “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaption in Uruguay”; Cason, “Electoral Reform and Stability in Uruguay.” 2. Jørgen Elklit, “What Was the Problem If a First Divisor of 1.4 Was the Solution?” in Elites, Parties and Democracy: Festschrift for Professor Mogens N. Pedersen, eds. Erik Beukel, Kurt Klaudi Klausen, and Poul Erik Mouritzen (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1999), 75–101. 3. Norris, Radical Right, 107. 4. Pildes, “Ethnic identity and Democratic Institutions,” 197; Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press 2002). 5. Bracanti, Peace by Design. 6. Pildes, “Ethnic identity and Democratic Institutions.” 7. Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Benjamin Reilly, “Dealing with Divided Societies” in Electoral Systems and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 27–41; Donald L. Horowitz, “A Primer for Decision Makers” in Electoral Systems and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3–15. 8. Bouissou, “Organizing One’s Support Base under SNTV”; Fukui and Fukai, “Campaigning for the Japanese Diet”; Reed and Bolland, “The Fragmentation Effect of SNTV in Japan”; Cox and Niou, “Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System.”.

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9. I-Chou Liu, “Campaigning in an SNTV System: The Case of the Kuomintang in Taiwan” in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, eds. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 181– 208; Yun-han Chu, “The Legacy of One-Party Hegemony in Taiwan” in Political Parties and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 273; Jih-wen Lin, “The Politics of Reform in Japan and Taiwan” in Electoral Systems and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 196–209. 10. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 11. Ian Budge and Cornelius O’Leary, “Permanent Supremacy and Perpetual Opposition; The Parliament in Northern Ireland, 1921–72” in Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National Development, ed. Albert F. Eldrige (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), 166–200; Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1996); Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 12. Brendan O’Leary, “The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process” in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), 293–356; Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 13. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 161–2, 194–9; Kris Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 50, 140–46. 14. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, 130–32; Linder, Swiss Democracy, 22–5. 15. Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy.” 16. However, some ethnoregional parties are also extreme-right parties, such as the Ticino League in Switzerland, the National Front in Belgium, and Shiv Sena in India. 17. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “Speech at the Paul Sauvé Arena, Montreal, Quebec, May 14, 1980,” (viewed 24 December 2010). “I was told that no more than two days ago Mr. Lévesque was saying that part of my name was Elliott and, since Elliott was an English name, it was perfectly understandable that I was for the NO side, because, really, you see, I was not as much of a Quebecer as those who are going to vote YES. . . . Of course my name is Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Yes, Elliott was my mother’s name. It was the name borne by the Elliotts who came to Canada more than two hundred years ago. It is the name of the Elliotts who, more than one hundred years ago, settled in Saint-Gabriel de Brandon, where you can still see their graves in the cemetery. That is what the Elliotts are. My name is a Québec name, but my name is a Canadian name also, and that’s the story of my name.” 18. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, 173–84, found that the general practice in the 1970s was for parliamentarians to speak in their own language. The situation had evolved to the point that cabinet ministers were expected to be bilingual and reply to a question in the tongue of the MP who posed it by the time I visited in 2006. Ministers must have sufficient command of Dutch and French as no deputy from Flanders will ask a question in French or accept an answer in that language even if the deputy speaks French better than the minister does Dutch.

IN DEX

Åland Agreement, 301 Alaska (United States), 48, 430, 442 Alavan Unity (political party in Spain), 195, 197, 412 Alberta (Canada): establishment of, 279; indigenous population in, 187; malapportionment and, 181, 184, 187–188; regional parties in, 228, 280 Alberta Wildrose Party (Canada), 228 Alesina, Albert, 63, 109, 138 Alliance of Lithuanian National Minorities (political party), 160–161, 382 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK): coalition government experience of, 240; electoral apportionment’s impact on, 153; electoral performance of, 236–237, 372; Tamil Nadu base of, 44–45, 53, 153, 230, 236 All India Forward Bloc (political party), 241 All India Indira Congress (political party), 240 All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (Indian political party), 44, 241, 368 All India Trinamool Congress (political party), 237, 241, 374 All People’s Party (Namibia), 208 Alsace-Lorraine (France), 296, 359, 435, 502n5 Alsatians (minority group in imperial Germany), 294–295 alternative vote (AV) systems: in Australia, 31, 37, 46, 234, 266, 332; defining features of, 31; ethnoregional parties and, 30, 36–37, 46, 49 Amaiur (Basque political party), 194 Amapá (Brazil), 98 Amazonas (Brazil), 98 Ami (Taiwanese aboriginal group), 148 Amorim Neto, Octavio, 30, 68 Ancash (Peru), 102–103

Åbenrå (Denmark), 166–167 A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition (Lithuania), 159, 161 Abruzzi (Italy), 257–259 Acadie-Bathurst (Canada), 185 A Coruña (political party in Spain), 198 Acre (Brazil), 98 Acts of Union (United Kingdom), 275 Adivasis (indigenous people of India), 50 African Americans: in Alabama, 35, 41; Democratic Party and, 179, 300; as majority in some constituencies, 54, 58; as political candidates, 36, 179–180, 338; political underrepresentation and disenfranchisement of, 35, 37, 41, 300; racial redistricting and, 177–179, 198–200, 329 African National Congress (ANC, South Africa), 87, 282 African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), 212, 490–491n59 Afrikaaners: as minority group in Namibia, 83, 95, 101, 387–388, 439; as minority group in South Africa, 96, 282 Afrikaner Freedom Front (South Africa political party), 282, 409 Agrarian Party (Sweden), 328 Akali Dal (AD, political party in India), 287 Akan (ethnic group in Ghana), 204–205, 218 Akhil Bharatiya Loktantrik Congress (political party in India), 241, 373 Alabama (United States), 35, 41, 233 Alajuela (Costa Rica), 81, 435 Åland (Finland): decentralization and, 10, 94, 246, 300–302; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 88, 227, 301, 359, 435; reserved parliamentary seat for, 192, 201, 329; Swedes in, 3–4, 88, 99, 192, 300–301

507

508 i

ndex

Andalucía (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 194, 196, 228, 251, 253, 255, 415–416, 441; regional autonomy in, 251, 253, 255, 283–284 Andalusian Party (Spain), 194, 196, 415 Andaman and Nicobar Islands (India), 151 Andhra Pradesh (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; establishment of, 286; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 43–44, 46, 153, 229, 237, 368, 436; Muslims in, 44; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 46; Telugu ethnic group in, 43, 53, 153, 286, 368 Andorra: constituency magnitudes in, 115; ethnoregional parties in, 339, 432; ni-ni electoral system in, 115, 123–124, 133; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Angolar (minority group in São Tomé and Príncipe), 96, 103, 106, 208–209 Anguilla, 274 Antigua and Barbuda: decentralization in, 62; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–61, 199; ethnoregional parties in, 46, 49, 59, 190, 340, 432; malapportionment to protect Barbuda’s representation in, 188–189, 199, 201, 264–265, 481n46; nationwide parties in, 189–190; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 46, 189; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264 Antigua Labour Party (ALP), 189–190, 481n49 Aosta Valley (Italy): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 101, 116–117, 169, 285; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 87, 169–170, 256–260, 286, 376, 438; regional autonomy in, 228–229, 250, 259–260, 285–286; reserved parliamentary seats for, 329; single-member plurality elections in, 132, 169, 256, 269 apparentement, 79, 454n22 Appenzell (Switzerland), 297 apportionment. See also malapportionment: boundary delimitation and, 176–177; definition of, 176; ethnoregional parties and, 25, 165, 201, 221; majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems and, 176 Apulia (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 257–259, 379, 438; regional autonomy in, 259 Apurímac (Peru), 102–103 Araba (Spain), 104, 195, 284 Aragón (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 194, 228, 251, 253–255, 411, 440;

malapportionment’s impact in, 194; regional autonomy in, 251, 253–255, 283 Aragonese Junta (Spanish political party), 194, 411 Aragonese Party (Spanish political party), 194, 411 Aralar (Spanish political party), 195, 197, 411 Arequipa (Peru), 102–103 Arfon (United Kingdom), 184 Argentina: boundary delimitation in, 177; caudillo rule in, 297; constituency magnitudes in, 74, 97; constitution in, 297; decentralization in, 11, 24, 93, 112, 247, 263, 266, 270, 297–298, 307; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 93, 97; ethnoregional parties in, 80–81, 86, 112, 270, 298–299, 340–348, 432–434, 454n26; Federal Pact of 1831 in, 297; malapportionment in, 191; proportional electoral system in, 70, 74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 97; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 266, 268–270 Arizona (United States), 31, 37–39 Articles of Confederation (United States), 299 Arunachal Congress (Indian political party), 238 Arunachal Pradesh (India): ethnoregional parties in, 46, 238; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Castes and Tribes in, 50, 150, 287 Asante (ethnic group in Ghana), 204–205 Ashanti Region (Ghana), 204 Asom Gana Parishad (Assam People’s Council, Indian political party): coalition government experience of, 240; electoral performance of, 230, 237; ideology of, 43; regional base of, 53, 230 Assam (India): emigration from, 287; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58–60; ethnoregional parties in, 43, 46, 53, 59–60, 230, 237, 368, 436; partition of original state of, 287; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Association for Somogy (political party in Hungary), 210, 367 Asturias (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251, 253–255, 411, 440; regional autonomy in, 251, 253–255 Atayal (Taiwanese aboriginal group), 148 Australia: aboriginal population in, 36, 61, 293; alternative vote (AV) system in, 31, 37, 46, 234, 266, 332; decentralization in, 23–24, 67, 247, 263, 266, 293, 307; ethnoregional



index

parties in, 36–37, 46, 293, 348, 434; majoritarian electoral system in, 19, 31; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 31; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 266, 269 Austria: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 311, 349, 434; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 97; decentralization in, 93, 232, 263, 265, 267, 293, 311; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 93, 97, 293; Nazi era in, 293; proportional electoral system in, 73, 76, 453n11; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 97; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–265, 267–269 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 293 Autonomist Party (Argentina), 298 Autonomy, Liberty, Democracy coalition (Italy), 169–170 Ayacucho (Peru), 102–103 Azores (Portugal): ethnoregional parties in, 84, 208, 217, 302; regional autonomy in, 95, 300–303, 503n27, 504n28; U.S. military base in, 302, 503n27

Bahamas: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 349, 434; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 46; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP, India): casteoriented policies of, 44, 52; coalition government experience of, 242; electoral apportionment’s impact on, 153; electoral performance of, 44, 238, 373, 466n55; Uttar Pradesh base of, 52, 230, 238, 466n55 Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi (political party in India), 241–242 Balearic Islands (Spain): Catalan language and, 91; ethnoregional parties in, 85, 228, 251, 253, 255, 421–422, 441; regional autonomy in, 251, 253, 255, 283 ballot-access requirements: ethnoregional parties and, 11–12, 22–23, 25, 107, 203, 207, 209, 212–213, 215–221, 306, 308, 312, 315, 319, 321, 324, 329; reasons for adopting, 203 Banabans (minority group in Kiribati), 142, 153, 171, 199 Bangladesh, 43, 287 Banská Bystrica (Slovakia), 85 Barbados: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 349, 434; electorally relevant

509

ethnoregional groups in, 61; singlemember plurality (SMP) elections, 46; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Barbuda (island in Antigua and Barbuda): ethnoregional parties in, 49, 190, 340, 432; malapportionment to protect representation in, 188–189, 199, 201, 264–265, 481n46; regional legislature in, 189 Barbudans (minority group in Antigua and Barbuda), 58, 60–61, 199 Barbuda People’s Movement (political party), 190 Barbuda People’s Movement for Change (political party), 190 Barcelona (Spain), 78, 193, 195 Barkan, Joel, 30 Basic Law, (West Germany) 294 Basilicata (Italy), 257–259 Basque Country (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 87, 194–197, 201, 228, 232, 235, 237, 244–245, 251, 253–255, 283–284, 325, 411–412, 436, 440; linguistic politics in, 284; malapportionment’s impact on, 193–197, 199, 201; regional autonomy in, 250–251, 253–255, 283–284 Basque Left (political party in Spain), 195–196 Basque Nationalist Party (PNV): coalition government experience of, 228, 242; electoral performance of, 235, 237, 284, 412; left-wing ideology of, 325; malapportionment’s impact on, 194–196, 201; support for minority governments by, 245 Basque Solidarity (political party): electoral performance of, 412; malapportionment’s impact on, 194–196 Bavaria (Germany): cultural profile of, 296; ethnoregional parties in, 5, 82, 86, 159, 162, 229, 238, 243–244, 294–296, 311, 364–365, 436, 473n95; representation in upper chamber of national legislature for, 262 Bavarian Peasants League (political party in Germany), 294, 296 Bavarian People’s Party, 294 Bavaria Party, 162, 295, 365, 473n95 Bayan Olgii (Mongolia), 58–59, 61 Belfast Agreement, 335 Belgium: apparentement in, 79, 454n22; constituency magnitudes in, 75, 97–98; constitution in, 272–274; decentralization in, 6, 93, 112, 227, 246–247, 263, 267, 270–274, 291, 310–313; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 93,

510 i

ndex

Belgium (continued) 97–98, 106, 244, 268, 272–274, 335, 337; ethnoregional parties in, 81, 87, 112, 240, 270, 273, 291, 310, 312, 349–352, 434; lack of ethnic conflict in, 1; linguistic divisions and politics in, 2, 6, 89, 91, 244, 272–274, 335, 337, 506n18; nationwide parties in, 227, 273; proportional electoral system in, 70, 75; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 79, 97–98; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–265, 267–270, 310, 496n2 Belize: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 352, 435; Creoles in, 58–59, 61; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61; single-member plurality (SMP) elections, 46; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Belize District (Belize), 58–59 Benin: ethnoregional parties in, 215–216; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 206, 215–216, 486n20; proportional electoral system in, 70; threshold to governmental participation in, 216; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Benoit, Kenneth, 12, 135 Berlin (Germany), 159 Berlusconi, Silvio, 132, 169, 244 Bern (Switzerland), 105, 107–108, 296–297, 456n46 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, India): casteoriented policies of, 44; electoral performance of, 289–290; Gujarat province and, 43; Hindu nationalism and, 43, 50, 289; national profile and coalition formations of, 42, 244, 289, 335; regional parties and, 60, 230, 335; role in creation of new territories by, 288 Bialystok (Poland), 158 bicameralism, 261, 304–306, 326 Bihar (India): ethnoregional parties in, 46, 238, 290, 369, 436, 466n55; partition of original state of, 50, 288, 290; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150, 288 Biju Janata Dal (Biju People’s Party): Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and, 230; coalition government experience of, 241; electoral performance of, 238–239, 372; Odisha base of, 230, 238 Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín: on decentralization in Latin America, 10–11, 112; on indigenous parties in Latin America, 212–213; on majoritarian versus proportional representation electoral systems, 68; on party registration laws in Latin America, 12

Bizkaia (Spain), 104, 195, 283–284 Blair, Tony, 66 block vote systems. See also under specific countries: defining characteristics of, 31; ethnoregional parties and, 30, 36–38, 47–49; hypothetical example of, 38–39 Bloc Québécois (BQ ): electoral performance of, 40, 55–57, 235, 238, 245, 281, 354; establishment of, 281; French language and, 3, 40; left-wing ideology of, 325; majoritarian electoral system’s impact on, 40–42, 66; separatist agenda of, 40, 55, 281 Bocas del Toro (Panama), 118 Bochsler, Daniel, 19, 21 Bodaland Peoples Front (political party in India), 242 Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (India), 59 Bodos (minority group in India), 58–59 Bogaards, Matthijs, 9 Bolivia, 106, 218 Bolzano (Italy). See also South Tyrol (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 169, 256, 376, 438; German speakers in, 285–286 Bombay Reorganization Act (India), 286 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 296 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1, 246, 330 Botswana: electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61; ethnoregional parties in, 46, 59, 353, 435; single-member plurality (SMP) elections and, 46; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Bouches-des-Rhône (France), 32 boundary delimitation. See also malapportionment: definition of, 176; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups and, 176–177; ethnic cleavages and, 7–8; ethnic or racial redistricting and, 143, 156, 171, 177–181, 198; ethnoregional parties and, 10, 22, 25, 53–54, 176, 177, 201, 221; majoritarian electoral systems and, 176–178; proportional electoral systems and, 176–177, 329; single-member districts and, 176; Voting Rights Act (United States) and, 178–179 Bov (Denmark), 167 Brabant (Belgium), 81, 273 Brancati, Dawn: on decentralization and ethnic conflict, 10, 225; on decentralization and ethnoregional parties, 66, 247, 265, 331; on electoral systems’ impact on ethnoregional parties, 29–30, 68; on ethnoregional parties and party registration laws, 12; on models of support



index

for ethnoregional parties, 9; on upper chambers of legislatures, 66, 262, 304, 331 Brandenburg (Germany), 159, 164 Brazil: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 353, 435; apparentement in, 79; ballot access requirements in, 203; boundary delimitation in, 177; candidato nato rule in, 211; constituency magnitudes in, 75, 98; constitution in, 210; decentralization in, 24, 93, 247, 263, 266, 299; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 93, 98; establishment of Estado Novo (1937) in, 299; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 215–216; gubernatorial elections in, 12, 112; malapportionment in, 191, 211; open party lists in, 71, 210–211, 217, 334; party registration laws in, 203, 209–210, 217, 299, 334, 489n45; patronage and pork barrel politics in, 211; Political Parties Law in, 210; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 75, 79, 210–211; single-member plurality elections in, 266; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 79, 98, 210, 216–217; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 266, 269 Bridge Party (Slovakia), 215 British Columbia (Canada): establishment of, 279; indigenous population in, 187; malapportionment and, 181, 184, 187–188; national parties in, 280; regional parties in, 228, 235, 281 British Columbia Liberal Party, 228, 235, 281 Broad Front (Uruguay), 130 Browning, Rufus, 334–335 Brussels (Belgium), 272–273, 351 Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde region (Belgium), 97–98 Brussels Liberals (Belgian political party), 273 Buenos Aires (Argentina): Argentine unification and, 297–298; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 97; ethnoregional parties in, 80, 340–341, 432; revolt (1880) in, 298 Bulgaria: closed party lists in, 71; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 98, 115; constitution in, 205–206; ethnoregional parties in, 81, 88–90, 124, 215–216, 240, 242–243, 353–354, 435, 486n15; ethnoregional party bans in, 203–26, 215–216, 486n17, 486n19; Political Parties Act in, 205–206; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 73, 76, 115, 122, 133; Romani speakers in, 90; single-member district elections in, 115, 122, 133; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 78, 98, 115, 216; Turkish minority

511

in, 81, 88–90, 93, 98, 115, 122, 124, 133, 205, 216; unicameral national legislature in, 263; “wasted votes” in, 78 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 206, 243, 486n17 Bunce, Valerie, 261, 311 Bunun (Taiwanese minority group), 148 Burgenland (Austria), 97, 293 Bush, George W., 203

Caenarfon (United Kingdom), 184 Calabria (Italy), 257–259, 379 Campania (Italy), 257–259, 379 Campos, Nauro, 7 Canada. See also specific provinces: boundary delimitation in, 177, 185; Constitution Act (1867) in, 279, 291; decentralization in, 10, 24, 64, 67, 235, 249, 263, 265, 267, 270–271, 281, 291, 311; Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act in, 185; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 3, 40–41, 54–55, 58–59, 61, 337; ethnoregional parties in, 3–4, 10, 24, 36, 39–41, 46, 49, 52, 54–57, 59, 66, 227–228, 235, 238, 245, 249, 262, 270–271, 280–282, 291, 325, 337, 354, 435; Fair Representation Act in, 184–185; importance of regional boundaries in, 54–55, 57; indigenous population in, 36, 181, 185–188, 199–200; lack of ethnic conflict in, 1; majoritarian electoral system in, 30, 32–34, 36–37, 52; malapportionment’s impact in, 181, 184–188, 480n36; municipal consolidation in, 166; nationwide parties in, 32–34, 41–42, 55–57, 235, 280–281; non-Québécois Francophones in, 54–55, 57; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 40, 46; upper chamber of the national legislature in, 262–263, 265, 267–268, 270 Canarian Coalition (political party in Spain’s Canary Islands): coalition government experience of, 228, 242; electoral performance of, 414; malapportionment’s impact on, 194; support for minority governments by, 245 Canary Islands (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 87, 194, 228, 244–245, 251–255, 414–415, 441; malapportionment’s impact on, 194; regional autonomy in, 251–255 candidate preference voting, 334 Cantabria (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 228, 251–253, 255, 417, 441; regional autonomy in, 251–253, 255

512 i

ndex

Cape Colony (South Africa), 282 Cape Verde: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 354, 435; ballot access requirements in, 203; constituency magnitudes in, 73–74, 79, 217; constitution in, 211; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 211, 215–216, 490n56; malapportionment in, 191; party registration laws in, 203, 209, 211–212, 215–216, 490nn56–58; political parties in, 212; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73–74, 491n64; relative ethnic homogeneity in, 212, 217; reserved parliamentary seats in, 491n64; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 79, 216–217; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Caprivians (minority group in Namibia), 101, 106, 204 Caprivi Liberation Front (Namibia), 208 Caramani, Danielle, 11 Caribs (minority group in Dominica), 58, 61, 181, 199 Carinthia (Austria), 97, 293 Carlists (political faction in nineteenth-century Spain), 283 Cartago (Costa Rica), 81, 435 Carter, Elisabeth, 12, 446n29 Casamance (Senegal), 15 Castile and León (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251–255, 417–419, 441; regional autonomy and, 251–255 Castile-La Mancha (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251–253, 255, 419; regional autonomy in, 251–253, 255 Catalan Republican Left (ERC): coalition governments and, 228; electoral performance of, 235, 237, 284, 412; malapportionment’s impact on, 193–196 Catalan Socialists (PSC), 5, 195, 229, 232 Catalan Solidarity for Independence (political party in Spain), 196 Catalonia (Spain): Catalan language and, 91, 96, 284; ethnoregional parties in, 5, 85, 87, 193–196, 228, 232, 235–237, 244–245, 251–255, 283–284, 325, 412–413, 436, 440; malapportionment’s impact on, 193–196, 199, 201, 483–484n74; parliament in, 195, 283; rebellion (1640) in, 283; regional autonomy in, 250–255, 283–284 Catalans: as minority group in Italy, 101; as minority group in Spain, 104 Catamarca (Argentina), 80, 341, 432 Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain (Belgium), 273 Caué (São Tomé and Príncipe), 103

Cavan (Ireland), 177 Center Democratic Party (Denmark), 165 Center Party (Germany), 162 Ceuta (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251–256, 422, 441; regional autonomy in, 250–256; single-member plurality elections in, 193 Chacan Action (Argentine political party), 298, 341 Chaco (Argentina), 80, 86, 341, 432 Chandigarh (India), 151 Chandra, Kanchan: on ethnic cleavages and constituency boundaries, 7, 51; on individuals’ multiple identities, 6, 18, 50, 233; on patronage systems in poor societies, 13 Charest, Jean, 282 Charles I (emperor of Austria-Hungary), 293 Chewas (ethnic group in Malawi and Zambia), 7 Chhattisgarh (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; establishment of, 50, 288, 290; lack of ethnoregional parties in, 290; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150, 288 Chhibber, Pradeep, 10 Chiapas (Mexico), 15 Chile: Amerindians in, 93, 98, 106; apparentement in, 79; constituency magnitudes in, 73–74, 79, 98; ethnoregional parties in, 81, 86, 354–355, 435, 454n25; proportional electoral system in, 17, 70, 73–74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 79, 98; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Chinese Taiwan Aborigine Democratic Party, 146–147, 427 Christian Democratic Party (Belgium), 273 Christian Democratic Party (Italy), 229 Christian Democratic Union (CDU, Germany): Christian Social Union and, 5, 82, 86, 159, 162, 229, 238, 243–244, 295–296, 311; electoral performance of, 238–239, 295; governing coalitions and, 162 Christian Social Union (CSU, Germany): Bavaria and, 5, 82, 86, 159, 162, 229, 238, 243–244, 295–296; Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and, 5, 86, 243–244, 295–296, 311; coalition government experience of, 240; electoral performance of, 238–239, 364 Chubut (Argentina), 80, 97, 341–342, 432 Chuuk (Micronesia), 191, 482n59 Citizens Party (Spain), 196 Clark, William Roberts, 9, 68 Colorado Party (Uruguay), 130



index

Commewijne (Suriname), 105 Commitment Coalition (Spain), 194 communal lists: electorally relevant ethnoregional groups and, 22, 201, 221; ethnoregional parties and, 25, 141; reasons for establishing, 141 Communist Party (Sweden), 328 Communist Party of the Basque Lands (Spain), 195, 197–198 Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM, Saint Kitts and Nevis political party), 189, 275, 423, 497n14 Concord of Lithuania (political party), 160 Confederation of Regions (Canadian political party), 280 Congress Party. See Indian National Congress (INC) Conservative and Unionist Party (Northern Ireland), 276 Conservative Party (Canada), 55–57, 245, 279–281, 450n15 Conservative Party (United Kingdom), 33–34, 277–278, 323, 450n15 constituency boundaries. See boundary delimitation constituency magnitudes. See also under specific countries: apportionment and, 176; ethnoregional parties and, 9, 21, 68–69, 72–73, 92, 113; thresholds to governmental participation and, 79, 88 Constitution Act (Canada), 279 Convergence and Union (CiU, Spanish political party): coalition government experience of, 228, 242; electoral performance of, 235, 237, 325; malapportionment’s impact on, 193–196; right-wing ideology of, 325; support for minority governments by, 245 Córdoba (Argentina), 80, 342, 432 Cornwall (United Kingdom), 48, 429–430, 442 Coronie (Suriname), 104 Corrientes (Argentina): ethnoregional parties in, 80, 86, 298–299, 342–343, 432–433 Costa Rica: Black Creole minority group in, 93, 99; closed party lists in, 71; constituency magnitudes in, 74, 99; decentralization in, 11; ethnoregional parties in, 81–82, 86, 355–356, 435, 454n25; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 99; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Cox, Gary, 30, 68 Creoles (minority group in Costa Rica), 93, 99 Creoles (minority group in Mauritius), 3, 53, 154, 171, 385, 439 Cusco (Peru), 102–103

513

Cyprus: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 356, 435; communal list voting in, 142, 145; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 75, 77; constitution in, 145; ethnic divisions and conflict in, 1, 6, 15–16, 45, 142, 145, 170–172; ethnoregional parties and, 170; Greek Cypriot government in, 16, 145; political stability in, 15–16; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 75, 77, 141, 450n11; reserved parliamentary seats in, 141, 145, 171; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 77, 171; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Czech Republic: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 75, 99; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 86–87, 112, 356–357, 435; Moravians in, 87, 93, 99, 112, 356, 435; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73, 75; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 78, 99; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263; “wasted votes” in, 78 Czestochowa (Poland), 157, 394

Dadra and Nagar Haveli (India), 46, 151 Daman and Diu (India), 58, 151 Damara (minority group in Namibia), 83, 87, 90, 95, 101, 208, 387, 439 Danish minority in Germany, 94, 99–100, 156, 162, 164, 171–172, 294–296, 502n5 Darién (Panama), 118, 180, 198 Dayton Agreement, 330 decentralization. See also under specific countries: definition of, 10, 225; ethnic conflict and, 1–2, 10, 225–226, 232, 234, 246–248, 330–331, 338; ethnic decentralization and, 226, 247, 249, 260–261, 271–292, 300, 304–305, 307–312, 317–318, 324; ethnoregional parties and, 2, 5, 10–11, 18, 23–26, 54, 64–67, 110–112, 225–226, 231–233, 235–236, 245–250, 253–254, 257–261, 265, 270–272, 274, 277–278, 280–286, 288–292, 295–297, 300–304, 307, 310–311, 313–314, 317, 325–326, 328; multivariate models regarding the impact of, 226, 249, 270, 291–292, 303, 305–309, 311–312, 315–317, 326; nationwide parties and, 232; non-ethnic decentralization and, 226, 249, 260, 271, 292–305, 307–309, 311–312, 318, 324; proportional electoral systems and, 69, 303; reduction of political participation costs and, 231; self-rule and, 261–262, 314–315, 317, 338; shared rule and, 261– 262, 314–315, 317, 331, 338; territorial organization of, 311–314, 326

514 i

ndex

Declaration of Independence (United States), 299 Decretos de Nueva Planta (Spain, 1700), 283 Delhi (India), 151 Delimitation Act (India, 2002), 149 Delwit, Pascal, 10 Democratic Alliance (South Africa): electoral performance of, 410; Western Cape and, 228, 238; white leadership of, 87 Democratic Party (United States): African Americans and, 179, 300; Latinos and, 179; regional variation in, 14, 233, 300; two-party system and, 36–37, 39 Democratic Party of the Atlantic (Portugal), 302, 396, 454n24 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Taiwan), 126, 146–148 Democratic Union of Hungarians (political party in Romania), 169, 243 Denmark: apportionment in, 165–166, 329; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77; ethnic redistricting in, 171, 199–200; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 86, 156, 164–168, 357, 435; German minority in, 156, 164–165, 170–172, 199–200, 329; immigrant parties in, 91; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 77, 164, 474n108; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 156, 164–165, 171; unicameral national legislature in, 263 devolution. See decentralization de Winter, Lieven, 9 Distrito Federal (Argentina), 80, 343–344, 432 Dominica: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 357, 435; constituency magnitude in, 478n20; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61, 199; ethnic redistricting in, 177–178, 181, 198–200; single-member plurality (SMP) elections, 46, 181; unicameral national legislature in, 263, 478n19 Dominican Republic: constituency magnitudes in, 74, 79; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 86, 357–358, 435, 454n24; proportional electoral system in, 70, 93; threshold to government participation in, 74, 79; upper chamber of legislature in, 263 Domowina League of the Lusatian Sorbs (German political party), 164 Dosanjh, Ulijal, 281–282 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progress Federation; DMK): coalition government experience of, 241; electoral performance of, 236–237, 373; Tamil Nadu and, 230, 236–237, 373 Druze (minority group in Israel), 90

Dublin (Ireland), 177 Dundee (Scotland), 36 Duval County (Florida), 203 Duverger, Maurice, 8–9, 29, 114 Dwyfor Merionnydd (United Kingdom), 184

East Germany, 294–295 Economic Reconstruction Association (German political party), 295 Ecuador, 106, 218 Elazar, Daniel, 10, 446n31 Electoral Action for Lithuania’s Poles (political party), 122–123, 158, 160, 382, 472n89 electorally relevant ethnoregional groups (EREG): boundary delimitation and, 176–177; community list voting and, 22, 201, 221; ethnoregional parties and, 19, 111–113, 175, 312–313, 315, 317–322, 324, 329, 336; geographic concentration and, 19–22, 39, 41–42, 53, 57–60, 64–67, 69, 92, 96, 248, 261, 329; impact of measures designed to limit ethnoregional parties and, 218–220; linguistic politics and, 90–91; mainstream national parties’ representation of, 336–338; measures of fragmentation among, 60–64, 92–96, 106, 109–110, 132–134, 137–138, 216; multiple crosscutting identities among, 49–51, 89; Posner on, 7, 45; reserved parliamentary seats and, 22, 201, 221; ways of defining, 19, 22, 25, 49, 51, 57, 60, 69, 79–80, 88–92, 106, 110, 114, 132–138, 317 El Salvador: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 358, 435; constituency magnitudes in, 74; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 93; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Emberá (Panama), 118, 180 Emilia-Romagna (Italy), 83, 257–259 England: ethnoregional parties in, 48, 430, 442, 479n29; malapportionment’s impact on, 181–184, 200; regional autonomy arrangements in, 275, 278; religion’s impact on politics in, 49 Entre Ríos (Argentina), 80, 298, 344, 433 Equality Party (Canada), 57 Estonia: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 75, 99; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 87, 358–359, 435; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 75; Russian minority in, 82, 87, 91–92, 94, 99, 358–359, 435; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 99; unicameral national legislature in, 263



index

ethnic cleavages: ethnic conflict and, 1, 26, 247; identification of, 5–7, 89; institutions’ ability to shape salience of, 19, 30, 42, 45, 51–52, 68, 113, 234, 271, 310, 325–326, 328; political boundaries and, 7–8 ethnic decentralization. See under decentralization ethnicity, definition of, 2 ethnic parties. See ethnoregional parties ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), 30, 45, 63–64, 109–110, 138 ethnoregional parties. See also specific parties: alternative vote (AV) and, 30, 36–37, 46, 49; apportionment and, 25, 165, 201, 221 (See also malapportionment); ballot-access requirements and, 11–12, 22–23, 25, 107, 203, 207, 209, 212–213, 215–221, 306, 308, 312, 315, 319, 321, 324, 329; bans against, 11, 22–23, 25, 202–208, 211, 216, 219–221, 305, 308, 312, 315, 318, 321, 324, 329; bicameralism’s impact on, 261, 304–306, 326; bivariate models of electoral performance of, 62–64, 109–110, 138; block vote and, 30, 36–38, 47–49; boundary delimitation and, 10, 22, 25, 53–54, 176, 177, 201, 221; communal lists and, 25, 141; constituency magnitudes’ impact on, 9, 21, 68–69, 72–73, 92, 113; decentralization and, 2, 5, 10–11, 18, 23–26, 54, 64–67, 110–112, 225–226, 231–233, 235–236, 245–250, 253–254, 257–261, 265, 270–272, 274, 277–278, 280–286, 288–292, 295–297, 300–304, 307, 310–311, 313–314, 317, 325–326, 328; decentralized structures and labels for, 5, 232–233; economic factors’ impact on, 12–13, 292, 320–324, 326; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups (EREG) and, 19, 111–113, 175, 312–313, 315, 317–322, 324, 329, 336; electoral rules designed to limit, 202–221; ethnic conflict and, 331, 338; ethnic parties versus regional parties and, 2–4; geographic concentration and, 41–42, 45; incorporation into government of, 239–245, 328, 332, 334–337; left-wing versus right-wing ideology among, 325; majoritarian electoral systems and, 8–9, 19–21, 29–30, 32–42, 45–49, 52, 60–68, 79, 110, 303, 317–320; majoritarian incentives’ impact on, 130; malapportionment’s impact on, 22, 191–194, 198, 200–201; means of identifying and classifying, 4–6, 17; multivariate models of electoral performance of, 18, 26, 64–67, 110–113,

515

172–175, 218–220, 226, 305–324; national elections and, 234–239; national ethnic majorities and, 2–3; nationwide parties and, 14, 33, 92, 323–325; ni-ni electoral systems and, 114, 117, 121–122, 124, 128, 135, 138, 317–320; party registration laws and, 12–13, 22–23, 69, 107, 203, 209–213, 217, 329, 334; plurality elections and, 9–10, 30, 32, 40; political strategy explanations regarding, 13–14, 323–327; preference voting and, 332–334; presidential elections and, 112–113; presidential versus parliamentary systems and, 12; proportional electoral systems and, 8–10, 17, 21, 30, 66, 68–69, 71–72, 78–113, 303, 317–320; race and, 89; reserved seats and, 25, 141, 170; singlemember plurality (SMP) elections and, 9, 11–12, 37, 46–49; single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems and, 129, 136; thresholds to governmental participation and, 21–22, 25, 68, 72, 92, 113, 156–159, 162, 165–166, 169–175, 201, 203, 209–210, 213–216, 219, 221, 312, 316–317, 319, 321, 324, 329; upper houses of national legislatures and, 10, 23, 25, 66, 262, 270, 292, 304–305, 308, 310–311, 321, 324, 326, 331 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque terrorist organization), 195, 198 Euskal Herria Bildu (political party in Spain), 195, 197 Euskal Herritarrok (Basque political party), 195–196 Ewe (minority group in Ghana), 58–59, 204 Extremadura (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251–256, 423; regional autonomy in, 251–256, 283

Fair Representation Act (Canada), 184–185 Fante (minority group in Ghana), 205 Fearon, Phillip, 63–64, 109, 138 federalism. See decentralization Fiji, 142, 153 Finland: Autonomy Acts (1951 and 1991) in, 301; constituency magnitudes in, 75, 99; decentralization in, 10, 94, 201, 246, 263, 265, 268, 300–302; ethnoregional parties in, 4, 82, 88, 192, 201, 227, 240, 242, 301, 334, 336, 359, 435; Guarantee Act in, 301; Language Act in, 301; malapportionment in, 192, 201; open party lists in, 334; proportional electoral system in, 70, 75, 199, 201; reserved parliamentary seats in, 329; Sami ethnic minority in, 99; Swedes in,

516 i

ndex

Finland (continued) 3–4, 82, 88–89, 94, 99, 192, 199, 201, 300–302, 359, 435; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 99, 192, 201; unicameral national legislature in, 263, 265, 268 Finnmark (Norway), 83, 102 Flanders (Belgium), 242, 272–274, 337 Flemings (ethnic group in Belgium), 2, 272–273, 337 Flemish Interest (VB, Belgian political party), 274 Flemish Liberals (Belgian political party), 273 Flemish People’s Union (VU, Belgian political party), 273–274 Florida (United States), 179, 203 Formosa (Argentina), 80, 344, 433 Forward Bloc (Indian political party), 238, 374 France: Canada and, 279; ethnoregional parties in, 46, 328, 359–364, 435–436; majoritarian electoral system in, 30–32, 328; Muslims in, 61; religion’s impact on politics in, 49; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 31, 46; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264 Franco, Francisco, 24, 250, 284 Franco-Mauritians (minority group in Mauritius), 53, 154 Francophone Democratic Front (FDF, political party in Belgium), 273–274, 434 Franco-Provençal (minority population in Italy), 87, 94, 101, 137, 285 Freedom House, 15 Free Thinkers (Italian political party), 169, 376 Free-Thinking Democratic Party (Switzerland), 232–233 Free University of Brussels (Belgium), 273 Fribourg (Switzerland), 5, 105, 296–297 Friesland (Netherlands), 106 Frisian National Party (Netherlands), 106 Frisians: as minority group in Germany, 162, 164; as minority group in the Netherlands, 95, 102, 106 Friulians (linguistic minority in Italy), 94, 101, 106, 116, 133, 137, 285, 499n36 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Italy): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 116–117, 285; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 106, 257–259, 378; regional autonomy in, 106, 228–229, 250, 259, 285 Fuegan Popular Movement (Argentina), 299 Future Yes (political party in Spain), 194

Galaich, Glen, 19 Galicia (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 87, 94, 194, 197–198, 201, 228, 232, 235–237,

244–245, 251–253, 255–256, 283–284, 413, 440; linguistic politics in, 284; malapportionment’s impact on, 193–194, 197–199, 201; regional autonomy in, 250–253, 255–256, 283 Galician Coalition (political party in Spain), 197, 413 Galician Left (political party in Spain), 197 Galician Nationalist Bloc (political party in Spain): coalition government experience of, 242; electoral performance of, 235, 237, 413; malapportionment’s impact on, 194, 197–198, 201 Galician Party (Spain), 197 Galician Socialists (Spain), 197, 232 Garifuna (minority group in Belize), 58, 61 Gawaguru, G.N., 151 Geneva Citizens Movement (Swiss political party), 108 German-Hanoverian Party, 294–295, 502n6 German People’s Union (political party), 78 Germans: as minority population in Denmark, 156, 164–165, 170–172, 199–200, 329; as minority population in Poland, 88, 95, 103, 156–158, 171, 393–395, 470–471n82, 470n77 Germany. See also specific regions: Cold War partition of, 294–295; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 75, 99–100; decentralization in, 5, 24, 94, 112, 248, 263, 267, 270, 293–296, 307, 311; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 94, 99–100, 156, 162, 164, 170–172, 294–296, 502n5; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 86, 112, 159, 163–164, 229, 238–240, 243–244, 270, 294–296, 311, 364–365, 436, 473n95, 502nn4–10; immigrant parties in, 91; mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts in, 71, 164; Nazi era in, 293–295; Neo-Nazi parties in, 78; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 75, 453n12; reunification of, 295; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 78, 99–100, 156, 159, 162, 164, 171, 329, 472n92; upper chamber of national legislature in, 262–264, 267, 269–270; Weimar Republic era in, 293–296 Gerring, John, 9, 11, 30 Ghana: constitution in, 204; decentralization in, 64; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61, 204, 216–218; ethnoregional basis for parties in, 46, 49, 204–25, 215–218, 365, 436, 485n10; ethnoregional party bans in, 203–24, 215–216, 218, 484n5; majoritarian electoral system in, 19, 216; nationwide



index

parties in, 59; party registration laws in, 204, 215–218; Political Parties Law in, 204, 484n5; single-member plurality (SMP) elections and, 46; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Gipuzkoa (Spain), 104, 195 Givens, Terri, 14, 446n29 Glaser, James, 14 Gliwice (Poland), 157–158 Goa (India): ethnoregional parties in, 46, 369, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150; statehood of, 288 Golder, Matt, 9, 68 Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland), 227, 276–277 Gordin, Jorge, 68 Gourevitch, Peter, 13, 320, 322 Graneau, Kelly, 181 Gråsten (Denmark), 167 Graubünden (Switzerland), 105, 297 Greece: constituency magnitudes in, 76, 100, 115, 131; ethnoregional parties in, 25, 82, 86, 89, 130–131, 213–214, 216, 365, 436, 454n25; majoritarian incentives in, 129–131, 133; proportional electoral system in, 17, 76; Roma in, 90, 214; singlemember plurality (SMP) elections in, 131; Slavophone Greeks in, 94, 100, 115, 131, 133, 214, 492n75; thresholds to governmental participation in, 25, 76, 100, 115, 131, 137, 213–214, 216, 218, 460n33; Turks and other Muslims in, 82, 89–90, 94, 100, 115, 133, 214, 218, 492n74; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Grenada: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 365, 436; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 61; singlemember plurality (SMP) elections, 46; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Guanacaste (Costa Rica), 82, 356, 435 Gujarat (India): anti-Muslim riots (2002) and, 43; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in, 43; establishment of, 286; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 46, 240, 369, 437;Gujarati language in, 50; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150

Hainaut (Belgium), 81 Hakka (minority group in Taiwan), 119–120, 126–127, 134, 136, 148 Hale, Henry, 260–261, 311, 313

517

Harbers, Imke, 11 Harderslev (Denmark), 166, 168 Harmel, Robert, 9–13 Haryana (India): establishment of, 50, 286; ethnoregional parties in, 44, 46, 230, 237, 241, 369, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Haryana/Indian Lok Dal (political party), 241 Haryana Lok Samiti (HLS), 287 Haryana Vikas Party (India), 230, 237, 241 Hechter, Michael, 9, 11, 13, 320 Helsinki (Finland), 4, 82, 99, 301 Heredia (Costa Rica), 82, 435 Herero (minority group in Namibia), 83, 87, 90, 95, 101, 208, 388, 439 Herri Batasuna (Basque political party), 195–196 Himachal Pradesh (India), 47, 50, 150, 286, 369, 437 Himachal Vikas Congress (political party in India), 241 Hizbullah (political party in Mauritius), 155, 385 Højer (Denmark), 168 Hooghe, Lisbet, 261, 314 Horowitz, Donald, 13, 311, 313, 322 House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts (United Kingdom), 182 Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, 126, 148 Huancavelica (Peru), 102–103 Huanuco (Peru), 102–103 Humanist Democratic Center (political party in Belgium), 240 Human Rights Protection Party (Samoa), 149 Hungarian Civic Party (Slovakia), 215 Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK, Slovakia), 215, 240, 243, 407 Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (political party), 240, 396 Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania (Romania), 169 Hungarians: as minority group in Austria, 293; as minority group in Romania, 95, 103, 169, 171, 243; as minority group in Slovakia, 96, 104, 213–215, 243, 336, 407, 440; as minority group in Slovenia, 96, 104, 145–146, 171 Hungary: constituency magnitudes in, 115; ethnoregional parties in, 12, 210, 216–217, 366–367, 436; ni-ni electoral system in, 12, 115, 121, 133, 136, 209, 488n39; party registration laws in, 209, 215–217; Roma minority in, 115, 133, 135, 210, 217, 489n42, 492n82; thresholds to governmental participation in, 115, 135,

518 i

ndex

Hungary (continued) 209–210, 216–217, 488n39, 489n41; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Hyderabad (India), 44, 60

Iceland: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 367, 436; constituency magnitudes in, 73–75; malapportionment in, 191–192; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73–75; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74–75; unicameral national legislature in, 263 India. See also specific states and regions: Bombay Reorganization Act in, 286; caste-based parties in, 44, 52, 369, 371, 373; constituency magnitudes in, 234; constitution in, 149, 152; Dalit (“untouchable” caste) in, 44, 141, 149; decentralization in, 10, 24, 64, 67, 249, 263, 267, 270–271, 286–291, 310; Electoral Commission in, 149, 151–152, 172, 288; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58–61, 64; ethnoregional parties in, 3, 6, 10, 17, 24, 42–47, 49, 52–53, 59–60, 89, 152–153, 172, 229–230, 236–242, 244–245, 249, 270, 287–291, 310, 368–374, 436–438, 493n8; language as a basis for political divisions in, 50, 52, 286–287; majoritarian electoral system in, 30, 42, 52; multiple crosscutting forms of identity in, 50–51, 89; Muslims and Muslim parties in, 43– 44, 50, 52, 151, 237, 240–241, 368, 370; nationwide parties in, 42, 60, 335; Other Backward Classes in, 52; Pakistan and, 43, 286; reapportionment and constituency boundaries in, 152–153; regional insurgencies in, 15, 43; reserved parliamentary seats in, 6, 50, 141–142, 149–153, 171–172; Sachar Commission in, 151; Scheduled Castes in, 6, 50, 141–142, 149–153, 171–172; Scheduled Tribes in, 6, 50, 141–142, 149–153, 171–172, 287–288; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 42, 46–47, 149, 234; States Reorganization Act (1956) in, 50, 229, 286; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264, 267, 269–270, 310; Vidhan Sabhas (lower legislative houses) in, 149–151 Indian National Congress (INC): caste-oriented policies of, 44; decentralization and, 286; electoral decline of, 24, 229–230, 289–291; Muslim supporters of, 50; national profile and coalition formations of, 42, 244–

245, 289–290, 335; regional parties and, 60, 335, 370–371; reserved parliamentary seats and, 151; secularism and, 50 Indian National Lok Dal (political party), 230 Indian Union Muslim League (political party), 43, 240, 244 Indo-Fijians (minority group in Fiji), 142 Indo-Mauritians (majority group in Mauritius), 53, 154–155 Inglehart, Ronald, 13 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, South Africa): electoral performance of, 238–239, 409; KwaZulu-Natal base of, 87, 228; Zulus and, 90, 228, 282 Inukitut (language of minority group in Canada), 58–59 Ireland: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 374, 438; boundary delimitation in, 177; constituency magnitudes in, 74, 79; partition of, 34, 276; proportional electoral system in, 72, 74; Protestant minority in, 333; single-transferable vote system in, 72, 332, 450n11; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 79; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Israel: apparentement in, 79; closed party lists in, 71; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 79, 100; ethnic conflict in, 6; ethnoregional parties in, 82, 88–89, 245, 338, 375–376, 438; Hebrew language in, 49; immigrant parties in, 91; Israeli Arabs in, 6, 82, 88–90, 94, 100, 245, 338, 375; linguistic politics in, 90; party proliferation in, 129; proportional electoral system in, 17, 70–71, 73, 77, 129; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 79, 100; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Istria (Slovenia), 145 Italy. See also specific regions: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 100–101, 116–117; decentralization in, 24, 26, 94, 106, 112, 228–229, 250, 256–260, 263, 266, 270–271, 285–286, 291, 331; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 94, 100–101, 106, 116, 133, 137, 171, 256–257, 285; ethnic redistricting in, 171; ethnoregional parties in, 24, 26, 82–83, 86–87, 106, 112, 124, 128, 130, 132, 137, 156, 169–170, 228–229, 238–239, 242, 244, 256–260, 270–271, 286, 291, 331, 376–380, 438; linguistic politics in, 137, 285; majoritarian incentives in, 129–130, 132–133, 137, 266, 269; mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts in, 117, 124, 135; proportional electoral system in, 73, 76, 116, 121, 124, 133, 137, 169, 266;



index reserved parliamentary seats in, 329; single-member district elections in, 116–117, 121, 124, 128, 132–133, 266, 269; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 100–101, 116–117, 124, 132, 156, 169, 171; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 266, 269–270

Jacobson, Gary, 14, 36 Jamaica: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 380, 438; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 61; single-member plurality elections in, 47; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263; withdrawal from West Indies Federation by, 274 Jammu and Kashmir (India): ethnoregional parties in, 47, 242, 369–370, 437; Muslim majority in, 52; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (political party), 242, 369 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party, 242, 370 Janata Dal Party (India), 240 Japan: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 380–381, 438; constituency magnitudes in, 117; ethnic homogeneity in, 333; ni-ni electoral system in, 117, 123–124, 133; Ryukyuan minority in, 117, 123–124, 129, 133, 136; single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in, 117, 128–129, 133, 136, 333; thresholds to governmental participation in, 117, 136; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Jeolla (South Korea), 125 Jharkhand (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; establishment of, 50, 288, 290; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 50, 230, 238, 241, 288, 290, 370, 437, 466n55; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150, 288 Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Jharkhand Liberation Front, political party in India), 50; coalition government experience of, 230, 241; electoral performance of, 238, 290, 370; pressure for decentralization from, 288 Jharkhand Party (India), 288, 290 Johnson, Daniel Jr., 337 Johnson, Daniel Sr., 337 Johnson, Pierre-Marc, 337 Jolly, Seth, 11 Jujuy (Argentina): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 97; ethnoregional parties in, 80, 86, 299, 345, 433

519

Jujuy Popular Movement (political party in Argentina), 299, 345 Junín (Peru), 102–103 Jura (Switzerland), 107–108, 297, 426, 441 Jurassian Alliance, 107

Kalanga (region and minority group in Botswana), 46, 58, 61, 435 Kalinago (minority group in Dominica), 181, 198–199 Kalinago Territory (Dominica), 181, 198 Kaohsiung (Taiwan), 127, 136 Karnataka (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58, 370; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 241, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Karnataka Congress Party (India), 241 Kashmir (India), insurgency in, 15, 43. See also Jammu and Kashmir (India) Katowice (Poland), 157–158, 393 Kaunas (Lithuania), 159 Kaunda, Kenneth, 8 Kavango (minority group in Namibia), 95, 101, 208, 389, 439 Kazakhs (minority group in Mongolia), 58–59, 61 Kazakhstan, 59 Kenya, 52 Kerala (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 237, 240, 370, 437; Muslims in, 43–44; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Kerala Congress (political party in India), 237, 240, 370 Kernell, Samuel, 14 Kim Dae Jung, 125 Kiribati: Banaban minority group in, 142, 153, 171, 199; Electoral Commission in, 153; malapportionment to protect minority representation in, 188, 199, 201, 467n62; reserved parliamentary seats in, 142, 153, 171; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Klaipėda (Lithuania), 159 Kollman, Ken, 10 Körösényi, András, 12 Košice (Slovakia), 85, 407 Kosrae (Micronesia), 191, 199, 201, 482n59 Kuna Yala (Panama), 118, 180, 198 Kuomintang (political party in Taiwan), 126–127, 146–148

520 i

ndex

Kurdzehali (Bulgaria), 115 Kurzeme (Latvia), 101 Kuzeyev, Vitaliy, 7 Kven (minority group in Norway), 95, 102 KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa), 85, 87, 228, 238

Labour Party (New Zealand), 143–144, 338 Labour Party (Saint Kitts and Nevis), 244, 274–275, 497nn13–14 Labour Party (United Kingdom), 33–34, 231, 275–278, 323 Labrador (Canada), 184, 186, 188 Ladin (minority group in Italy), 94, 100, 116–117, 124, 133, 137, 169, 285, 499n36 La Guardia, Fiorello, 337 Lago Peñas, Ignacio, 79 Lago Peñas, Santiago, 79 Lakshadweep (India), 52, 58, 151 La Pampa (Argentina), 80, 345, 433 Lapland (Finland), 99 La Rioja (Argentina), 80, 345, 433 La Rioja (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 228, 251–253, 255–256, 419, 441; regional autonomy in, 251–253, 255–256 Latgale (Latvia), 101, 381 Latinos in the United States: as constituency majorities in some districts, 58; racial redistricting and, 177–179, 198–200, 329 Latvia: constituency magnitudes in, 75–76, 101; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 87, 381, 438–439; proportional electoral system in, 70, 75–76; Russian minority in, 83, 87, 91–92, 94, 101, 381, 438; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75–76, 101; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Lazio (Italy), 257, 379 Leeward Islands Federation, 274 The Left (German electoral coalition), 159, 295 Leopold III (king of Belgium), 272 Lesotho: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 382, 439; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 117; ethnic homogeneity in, 207, 217; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 206–207, 215–216; mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts in, 216, 440n11, 450n11; ni-ni electoral system in, 123, 125; proportional electoral system in, 73, 77, 117, 133; single-member plurality elections in, 47, 117, 133, 216; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 216; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Lesotho Congress for Democracy (political party), 123 Leterme, Yves, 337 Levi, Margaret, 9, 11

Liberal Democratic Party (United Kingdom), 32–33, 42 Liberal Party (Argentina), 298 Liberal Party (Canada), 32–34, 36, 40, 55–57, 227–228, 280–281 Liechtenstein: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 382, 439; constituency magnitudes in, 75; malapportionment in, 191; panachage vote system in, 72, 333; proportional electoral system in, 70, 72, 75; thresholds to governmental participation, 75, 78; unicameral legislature in, 263 Liège (Belgium), 81, 98 Leuven/Louvain (Belgium), 273 Liguria (Italy), 83, 257–259 Lijphart, Arend, 9, 73, 108 Likud Party (Israel), 245 Lima (Peru), 102–103 Limón (Costa Rica), 81, 99, 435 Lindberg, Staffan, 205 Lithuania: constituency magnitudes in, 117–118; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 117–118, 122–123, 134, 158–159, 171; ethnoregional parties in, 122–124, 128, 156, 158, 160–161, 382–383, 439, 472n89; ni-ni electoral system in, 117–118, 122, 128, 134, 158; singlemember districts in, 128, 134, 158, 471n86; threshold to governmental participation in, 117–118, 122, 124, 156, 158, 170–171, 213; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Løgumkloster (Denmark), 168 Lok Jan Shakti Party (India), 242 Lok Shakti (political party in India), 241, 370, 437 Lombard League (Italy), 257 Lombardy (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 229, 257–259, 377; regional autonomy in, 259 Loreto (Peru), 84, 102–103, 393 Louvain/Leuven (Belgium), 273 Lozi (minority group in Namibia), 95, 101 Lugo and Ourense (Spain), 198 Lundtoft (Denmark), 167 Lushai (minority group in India), 58 Luxembourg: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 383, 439; boundary delimitation in, 177; constituency magnitudes in, 75; malapportionment in, 192; panachage vote system in, 72, 333–334; proportional electoral system in, 70, 72, 75; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75; unicameral national legislature in, 263



index

Macedonia region (Greece), 100, 131, 214 Madeira (Portugal): ethnoregional parties in, 84, 208, 217, 302; regional autonomy and, 95, 300–303, 504n28 Madhya Pradesh (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional parties in, 44, 47, 240, 370, 437; partition of original state of, 50, 288; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress Party (India), 240, 370 Madrid (Spain): constituency magnitudes in, 78; ethnoregional parties in, 85, 253, 422–423; malapportionment’s impact on, 193; regional autonomy in, 253 Madrid, Raúl, 12, 213 Maharashtra (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; establishment of, 286; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 3, 45, 47, 53, 230, 237, 289, 371, 437; Marathi language in, 50; nationalism in, 45; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (India), 240 Mainlanders (majority group in Taiwan), 119–120, 126–127, 134, 136 majoritarian electoral systems. See also under specific countries: boundary delimitation in, 176–178; “Duverger’s Law” and, 8–9, 29; ethnic or racial redistricting in, 156; ethnoregional parties and, 8–9, 19–21, 29–30, 32–42, 45–49, 52, 60–68, 79, 110, 303, 317–320; open block voting in, 333; stable governing majorities and, 33–34; types of, 30–32; winner-take-all nature of, 29, 39, 54 malapportionment. See also under specific countries: ethnoregional parties and, 22, 191–194, 198, 200–201; for peripheral regions and constituencies, 181–188, 198–200, 211; proportional electoral systems and, 191–198, 201; for smaller islands in archipelago states, 188–191, 198–199, 201, 329 Malawi, 7 Malayalam (minority group in India), 58 Mali: electorally significant ethnoregional groups in, 207, 216–217, 487n26; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 207, 215–217, 487n25; “joking kinship” tradition in, 207, 217; linguistic fragmentation in, 207; unicameral national legislature in, 263 Malta: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 383, 439; constituency magnitudes in, 74; proportional electoral system in, 72, 74;

521

single-transferable vote system in, 72, 332, 450n11; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Mana Motuhake Party (New Zealand), 143, 390 Mana Party (New Zealand), 145, 390 Manipur (India): establishment of, 287; ethnic conflict in, 230; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 230, 238, 241, 371, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Castes in, 150; Scheduled Tribes in, 50, 150, 500n46 Manipur People’s Party (India), 238 Manipur State Congress Party (India), 241 Manitoba (Canada): establishment of, 279; indigenous population in, 186; malapportionment and, 184, 186; regional parties in, 280 Māori Party (New Zealand): coalition government experience of, 240; community list voting and, 22, 36, 144–145; electoral performance of, 48, 88, 142, 144–145, 172, 338, 390; support for minority governments by, 245 Māori Representation Act of 1867 (New Zealand), 142 Marathis (minority group in India), 3 Marche (Italy), 83, 257–259, 379 Marks, Gary, 261, 314 Marowijne (Suriname), 105 Marshall, Dale, 334–335 Marshall Islands, 263 Martin, Paul, 337 Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (political party in India), 241 Maryland (United States), 31, 38 Massicotte, Louis, 163 Mato Grosso (Brazil), 98 Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazil), 98 Mauritius. See also Rodrigues (Mauritius): “best-loser” electoral system in, 25, 141, 154–155, 171–173, 175, 199, 201, 219, 312, 316, 319, 322, 324, 329; block voting system in, 47–48, 154, 234; constitutional protections for Rodrigues and, 188; decentralization in, 62, 189; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 3, 53, 58–59, 61, 64, 154–155, 171, 199, 201, 383–386, 475–476n126; ethnoregional parties in, 47–49, 53, 59, 155, 172–173, 175, 201, 227, 240, 243, 312, 316, 319, 322, 324, 383–387, 439; nationwide parties and, 49; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 31; unicameral national legislature in, 263, 269 Mayans (minority group in Belize), 58, 61

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McMillan, Alistair, 151–152 Meänkieli (minority group in Sweden), 96, 105 Mečiar, Vladimir, 215, 218, 492n83 Meech Lake Accord (Canada), 281 Meghalaya (India), 47, 50, 150, 287, 500n47 Meguid, Bonnie, 14, 323, 325, 505nn52–53 Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (United Kingdom), 184, 479n33 Melilla (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 251–256, 422, 441; regional autonomy in, 250–256; single-member plurality elections in, 193 Mendoza (Argentina), 80, 345, 433 Mexico, 15 Micronesia: constitutional protections for smaller islands’ representation in, 188, 191, 199, 201, 482n59; single-member plurality elections in, 191; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Mills, John Atta, 205 Minas Gerais (Brazil), 211 Minnan (Taiwanese minority group), 126, 148 Minnesota (United States), 233 Miramichi (Canada), 185 Mitre, Bartolomé, 298 mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts, 121. See also under specific countries Mizo National Front (political party in India), 230, 371 Mizoram (India): establishment of, 287–288; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 230, 371, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Castes in, 150; Scheduled Tribes in, 50, 150, 287 Mole-Dagbon (minority group in Ghana), 58 Molise (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 257–259, 379, 438; regional autonomy in, 259 Monaco: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 387, 439; block vote system in, 39, 48, 118, 127; constituency magnitudes in, 118; ni-ni electoral system in, 118, 125, 127, 134; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Monaghan (Ireland), 177 Mongolia: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 387, 439; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 58–59, 61; majoritarian electoral system in, 30–31, 48; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Montabes Pereira, Juan, 9 Monitor Action Group (Namibia political party), 208 Montreal (Canada), 41, 57, 166, 185 Moravia (Czech Republic), 82, 99

Moravians (minority group in Czech Republic), 87, 93, 99, 112, 356, 435 Morrison, Minion, 205 Moser, Robert, 30, 79, 121, 135 Most-Híd (political party in Slovakia), 240 Movement for Autonomies (political party in Italy): coalition government experience of, 242, 244; electoral performance of, 132, 229, 258, 379; Italian electoral law’s impact on, 132 Movement for Democracy (MPD, Cape Verde), 212 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, Bulgaria): Bulgaria’s effort to ban, 88, 486n19; coalition government experience of, 206, 240, 243; electoral performance of, 88, 122, 205–206, 353; Turkish support base for, 90, 122, 205, 243, 486n15 Mozaffar, Shaheen, 9, 19, 30 Murali, Geetha, 10 Murcia (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 251–256; regional autonomy in, 251–256, 283 Muslim League (India), pre-partition era and, 43 Muslim League Kerala State Committee (political party in India), 43, 237, 370 Nagaland (India): establishment of, 287; ethnic conflict in, 230; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 230, 242, 371–372, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 50, 150, 287

Nagaland Peoples Front (political party), 242, 372 Nama (minority group in Namibia), 83, 87, 90, 95, 101, 388–389 Namibia: apartheid era in, 207–208; closed party lists in, 71; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 79, 101; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 95, 101, 106, 204, 208, 216, 387–389; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 87, 89, 208, 215–216, 387–389, 439; ethnoregional party bans in, 203–24, 208, 215–216, 221, 493n87; linguistic politics in, 90; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 73, 77; South Africa and, 207–208; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 79, 101, 216; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264 Namur (Belgium), 81 Natal (South Africa), 282 National and Democratic Union (Monaco), 39 National Autonomist Party (Argentina), 298



index

National Democratic Alliance (India), 244 National Democratic Congress (NDC, political party in Ghana), 59, 204–205, 485n10 National Democratic Party of Germany, 78 National Front (political party in Belgium), 349–350 National Front (political party in France), 32, 328 Nationalist Congress Party (India), 230, 241 Nationalists (Northern Ireland), 34, 335 National Movement Simeon II (political party in Bulgaria), 243 National Party (New Zealand), 143, 245 National Party (South Africa), 87, 90, 228, 238, 282 National Party (Uruguay), 130 National Party of Scotland (NPS), 497– 498n18 National People’s Party (NPP, Ghana), 204–25, 217, 485n10 National Unity Democratic Organization (political party in Namibia), 208, 439 Nauru, 264, 332 Navarre (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 194, 228, 251–256, 440; malapportionment’s impact in, 194; regional autonomy in, 251–256, 283–284; right-wing parties in, 284 Navarre People’s Union (political party in Spain), 253 Nazi Party (Germany), 293–295 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 50 The Netherlands: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 79, 102; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 86, 106, 389, 439; Frisian minority in, 95, 102, 106; immigrant parties in, 91; open party lists in, 71; party proliferation in, 129; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73, 77, 129; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77–79, 102; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264 Neuquén (Argentina): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 97; ethnoregional parties in, 80, 86, 298, 345–346, 433 Neuquén People’s Movement (political party in Argentina), 298 Nevis (island in Saint Kitts and Nevis): constitutional protections for representation from, 188–189, 199, 201, 275, 480n41; ethnoregional parties in, 48, 189, 227, 242, 244, 275, 291, 423–424, 441; nationwide parties in, 49, 274; political parties in, 189, 201; regional legislature in, 189, 274–275; separate subnational identity in, 3, 58, 61

523

Nevis Reformation Party (NRP), 189, 242, 244, 275, 423 New Brunswick (Canada), 58, 184–185 New Democracy (political party in Greece), 131 New Democratic Party (Canada), 41, 55–57, 280 New Democratic Party (NDP, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), 190, 201 New Flemish Alliance (NVA, Belgian political party), 274 Newfoundland (Canada), 184, 186, 188, 279 New Party (Argentina), 298 New Party (Taiwan), 127, 147 New Zealand: community list voting in, 22, 36, 142, 144–145, 171, 329; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 75, 102; ethnic redistricting in, 171, 198–200; Māori minority group in, 58–59, 61, 95, 102, 142–145, 171–172, 338, 461n5; Māori Party in, 4, 22, 36, 48, 83, 88, 144–145, 170, 172, 240, 245, 338, 390–391, 439, FILL; mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts in, 36, 71, 142–145, 172, 200, 450n11; nationwide parties in, 143, 338; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 75, 141, 453n12; reserved parliamentary seats in, 141–144, 171–172, 200; single-member plurality elections in, 48, 142–144, 172; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 102, 144; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Ngöbe-Buglé (Panama), 118, 180 Nickerie (Suriname), 105 Nicolau, Jairo, 210 Nieto, Enrique Pérez, 9 Nigeria, 311 ni l’un ni l’autre, 114 ni-ni electoral systems. See also under specific countries: constituency tiers and, 135; defining electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 132–137; deformed proportionality and, 114; ethnoregional parties and, 114, 117, 121–122, 124, 128, 135, 138, 317–320; list tiers and, 135; majoritarian incentives and, 129–132; mixed-member proportional (MMP) districts, 114, 121–125; parallel systems and, 121–125, 132, 135; single-member districts and, 121–122; single-member plurality (SMP) elections and, 114; single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems and, 128–129; single-vote mixed systems and, 125–128, 135 Nitra (Slovakia), 85 non-ethnic decentralization. See under decentralization

524 i

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Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (Taiwan), 147–148 Norbotten (Sweden), 105, 426 Nordland (Norway), 83, 391 Norris, Pippa, 29, 446n29 North East Kalanga (Botswana), 61 Northern Ireland: Belfast Agreement in, 335; ethnoregional parties and, 34, 200, 227, 276, 291, 314, 335–336, 429–430, 442; ethnoreligious divisions and conflict in, 34, 49, 276, 335; Good Friday Agreement and, 227, 276–277; Irish partition and, 34, 276; malapportionment’s impact on, 181–183, 199–200; nationwide parties in, 49; parliament in, 67, 276–277, 335; regional autonomy arrangements in, 275– 278, 291, 314; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 34, 276; singletransferable vote (STV) elections in, 234, 277, 333 Northern League (Italy): coalition government experience of, 242, 244; electoral performance of, 87, 124, 132, 229, 258, 286, 376; language policies of, 137 North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 162 Northwest Territories (Canada), 185–186, 279 Norway: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 102; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 95, 102, 106; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 86, 391–392, 439, 454n25; malapportionment in, 192; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 76; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 102; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Nova Scotia (Canada), 184, 279–280 Nowy Sacz (Poland), 158 Nunavut (Canada): establishment of, 279; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58–59, 185–186, 188; reserved parliamentary seat for, 200

Odia (minority group in India), 58 Odisha (India): ethnoregional parties in, 47, 229–230, 238, 372, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Okinawa (Japan), 117, 124, 129, 136 Olive Tree (Italian electoral coalition), 244 Olomouc (Czech Republic), 99 Ontario (Canada): Constitution Act (1867) and, 279; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; indigenous population in, 186; malapportionment and, 181, 184, 186, 188; municipal consolidation in, 166; regional parties in, 280

Opole (Poland), 84, 103, 157–158, 393 Orange Free State (South Africa), 282 Ordeshook, Peter, 9, 30 Orissa (India). See Odisha (India) Orkney (Scotland), 182 Oshiwambo (majority group in Namibia), 90, 207–208 Ottawa (Canada), 166

Paiwan (Taiwanese aboriginal group), 148 Pakistan, 43–44, 50, 286 Palau, 263 Palm Beach County (Floria), 203 panachage vote systems, 72, 333–334 Panama: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 392, 439; constituency magnitudes in, 118, 127–128, 477n13; constitution in, 180; ethnic redistricting in, 177–178, 180–181, 198–200; indigenous population in, 128, 134, 180–181, 198–200; multimember districts in, 127–128, 136; ni-ni electoral system in, 17, 118, 121, 127–128, 134, 136; preference voting in, 128; single-member districts in, 127–128, 180; threshold to governmental participation in, 118; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (political party in Greece), 131 Papua New Guinea, 332 Paramaribo (Suriname), 104–105 parliamentary systems, 12, 188, 231, 335 Parti Bleu (Canada), 279–280 Parti Québécois (PQ , Canada): electoral performance of, 40–41, 227, 238; French language and, 40, 54–55, 281; majoritarian electoral system’s impact on, 40–42; provincial-level focus of, 235, 281; regional autonomy agenda of, 40, 54, 281 Parti Rouge (Canada), 279–280 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, Germany), 159, 162, 229, 295 party registration laws. See under ethnoregional parties Patrons of Industry (Canadian political party), 280 Pattali Makkal Katchi (political party in India), 43, 241, 373 People First Party (Taiwan), 147–148 People’s Action Movement (PAM, political party in Saint Kitts and Nevis), 275, 497n14 People’s National Convention (PNC, political party in Ghana), 205, 485n11, 486n12 People’s National Movement (political party in Saint Kitts and Nevis), 244



index

People’s Party (Spain), 245, 253, 483n69 Peru: apportionment in, 212–213, 218, 491n67; ballot-access requirements in, 107, 221, 493n87; constituency magnitudes in, 73–74, 77, 102–103, 213; ethnoregional parties in, 84, 86, 212–213, 215, 217–218, 392–393, 439, 454n25; party registration laws in, 107, 209, 212–213, 215–218, 334; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73–74, 77; Quechua minority in, 95, 102–103, 106–107, 216, 218, 491n68; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 77, 102–103, 212–213, 216; unicameral national legislature in, 264 Peterson, Hector, 90 Piedmont (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 229, 257–259, 377, 438; regional autonomy in, 259 Piedmont League (Italy), 257 Pildes, Richard, 247, 331 Plaid Cymru (Welsh political party): boundary delimitation’s impact on, 177; electoral performance of, 34–35, 42, 48, 184, 227, 235–237, 278, 291, 428, 430; left-wing ideology of, 325; majoritarian electoral system’s impact on, 35; malapportionment’s impact on, 184, 200; regional autonomy politics and, 323 plurality elections: alternative vote (AV) systems and, 31; ethnoregional parties and, 9–10, 30, 32, 40; legislative majorities and, 34, 36–37, 39 Podhalan Union (political party in Poland), 158, 395 Pohnpei (Micronesia), 191, 482n59 Poland: constituency magnitudes in, 75–76, 103; ethnoregional parties in, 84, 88, 156–158, 393–396, 440, 470–471n82; German minority in, 88, 95, 103, 156–158, 171, 393–395, 470–471n82, 470n77; party registration laws in, 470n77; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 75–76, 156; Silesian minority in, 95, 158; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75–76, 78, 103, 156–157, 171, 329; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263; “wasted votes” in, 78 Poles: as minority in Germany, 294–296, 502n5; as minority in Lithuania, 117, 122–124, 134, 158, 171, 383 Polish People’s Party (Lithuania), 160–161, 383 Pontevedra (Spain), 198 Popular Unity Candidates (Spain), 196 Portugal: boundary delimitation in, 177; Carnation Revolution (1974) in, 301; constituency magnitudes in, 75;

525

constitution in, 208, 302; decentralization in, 95, 264–265, 268, 300–303, 503n27, 504n28; democratic transition in, 300, 302; ethnoregional parties in, 84, 86, 208, 216, 302, 396, 440, 454n24; ethnoregional party ban in, 208, 215–216; proportional electoral system in, 70, 75; relative ethnic homogeneity in, 208, 217; thresholds to governmental participation in, 75, 216; unicameral national legislature in, 264–265, 268–269 Posner, Daniel: on flexibility of identities, 18, 233–234; on institutions’ ability to shape salience of ethnic cleavages, 51–52; on measuring ethnic heterogeneity, 7, 51; on politically relevant ethnoregional groups, 7, 45, 63, 109, 138 Postojna (Slovenia), 104 Poznan (Poland), 158 preference voting, 332–334. See also alternative vote (AV) systems; single non-transferable (SNTV) vote systems; single-transferable vote (STV) systems Prekmurje (Slovenia), 145 presidential systems, 12, 231 Prince Edward Island (Canada), 32–33, 184, 279, 450n13 Progressive Conservative Party (Canada), 32, 41–42, 55–56, 228, 280 Progressive Labour Movement (political party in Antigua and Barbuda), 189 proportional electoral systems. See also under specific countries: boundary delimitation in, 176–177, 329; closed party lists and, 71; constituency magnitudes and, 68, 73, 176, 234; decentralization and, 69, 303; d’Hondt quotas and, 70, 267; ethnic conflict and, 68; ethnoregional parties and, 8–10, 17, 21, 30, 66, 68–69, 71–72, 78–113, 303, 317–320; formula-based forms of, 69–70; governing majorities and, 34; Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas and, 70, 71; Hare quotas and, 70, 104, 126; highest quotient systems and, 70–71; largest remainder systems and, 70–71; means of categorizing, 17; panachage vote systems, 72, 114, 333–334; preference-based forms of, 69–70; Sainte-Laguë quotas and, 70, 164, 328; single-transferable vote and, 72, 146, 177, 234, 268, 332; strong presidents and, 111–113; tier-based forms of, 69, 71; types of, 69–72; “wasted votes” and, 78–79 Protest Is Not Enough (Browning, Tabb, and Marshall), 334–335 Prussia, 293–296 Ptuj (Slovenia), 104

526 i

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Public Against Violence (Slovakian electoral coalition), 215 Puducherry (India), 47, 58, 150 Punjab (India): ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 44, 47, 230, 238, 372, 437; partition of original state of, 50, 286–287;Punjabi ethnic group in, 50, 58, 286–287; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150; Sikhs in, 50, 52, 230, 286 Punjab Reorganization Act (1966), 286 Puno (Peru), 102–103

Quebec (Canada): British rule in, 279; Constitution Act (1867) in, 279; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 3, 40–41, 46, 54–57, 227–228, 235, 238, 245, 262, 280–281, 291, 325, 337, 354, 435; French language and, 3, 40–41, 54–55, 58, 61; indigenous population in, 186; malapportionment’s impact on, 184–186, 200, 480n36; municipal consolidation in, 166; nationwide parties’ in, 40–41, 55–56, 280; nonFrancophones in, 41, 57, 185 Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ ), 227–228, 235, 281, 337 Quechua (minority group in Peru), 95, 102–103, 106–107 Rabi Island (Fiji), 153 Radical Party (Argentina), 299 Radical Party (Switzerland), 232–233 Rae, Douglas, 9 Raîche v. Canada, 185 Rajasthan (India), 47, 150, 372, 437 Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD, India): Bihar partition and, 288; coalition government experience of, 241; electoral apportionment’s impact on, 153; electoral performance of, 238, 290, 466n55; establishment of, 230 Rashtriya Lok Dal (political party in India), 241, 373 Rawlings, Jerry, 204 Razgrad (Bulgaria), 115 reapportionment. See apportionment redistricting. See boundary delimitation Reform Movement (Belgium), 240 Reform Party (Canada), 55–56, 279–281 Regional Authority Index (RAI), 64, 225, 314 Regionalist League (Spain), 283–284

regional parties. See ethnoregional parties Region South Denmark, 165, 167–168 Reilly, Benjamin, 68, 332 Representation Act (Canada), 184 Republican Party (Germany), 78 Republican Party (Namibia), 208, 388 Republican Party (United States): regional variation in, 233, 300;two-party system and, 36–37, 39 Republican Party of India, 242, 371 reserved parliamentary seats. See also under specific countries: electorally relevant ethnoregional groups and, 22, 201, 221; ethnoregional parties and, 25, 141, 170;reasons for establishing, 141 Revolutionary Socialist Party (India), 238, 241, 374 Rex (Belgian political party during World War II), 273 Reynolds, Andrew, 30 Rhodope (Greece), 90, 100, 131, 214, 454n25 Rice, Roberta, 68 Riga (Latvia), 101 Rio de Janiero (Brazil), 211 Río Negro (Argentina), 80, 346, 434 Robertson, John, 9–13 Rødekro (Denmark), 167 Rodriguan Movement (political party in Mauritus), 240, 243, 384 Rodriguan People’s Organization (political party in Mauritus), 240, 243, 383 Rodrigues (Mauritus): “best-loser” electoral system in, 155, 173, 175, 199, 201, 219–220, 312, 316, 319; Creoles in, 3–4, 53, 154; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 173, 175, 201, 227, 240, 243, 312, 316, 319, 383–385, 387, 439; mixed-member proportional electoral system in, 234; nationwide parties in, 49;regional assembly in, 53, 62, 154, 189, 234 Roeder, Philip, 63, 109–110, 138 Roma: as minority group in Czech Republic, 356; as minority group in Germany, 94, 99–100, 162; as minority group in Greece, 90, 214–215; as minority group in Hungary, 114, 133, 135, 210, 217, 366–367, 436, 489n42, 492n82; as minority group in Romania, 169, 171, 397–399, 475n122; as minority group in Slovakia, 215, 407–408, 440 Romande List (Swiss political party), 107–108, 427 Romania: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76–77, 103; ethnoregional parties in, 84,



index

87, 156, 166, 169, 240, 242–243, 396–406, 440, 475n122; Hungarian minority in, 95, 103, 169, 171, 243; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 76–77, 474–475n117; Roma minority in, 169, 171; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76–77, 103, 156, 166, 169, 171; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Romani Civic Initiative (political party in Slovakia), 215, 492n83 Romansh (minority language in Switzerland), 96, 105, 285, 297 Roraima (Brazil), 98 Russians: as minority group in Estonia, 82, 87, 91–92, 94, 99, 358–359, 435; as minority group in Latvia, 83, 87, 91–92, 94, 101, 381, 438; as minority in Lithuania, 118, 122–123, 134, 158–159, 171, 383 Ryukyuan (minority group in Japan), 117, 123–124, 129, 133, 136

Sachar Commission (India), 151 Saint Kitts and Nevis: constitutional protections for Nevis’ representation in, 188–189, 199, 201, 275, 480n41; decentralization in, 67, 189, 263, 265, 268, 270–271, 275, 291; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 3, 58–59, 61, 199, 201; ethnoregional parties in, 48–49, 59, 189, 227, 242, 244, 270, 275, 291, 423–424, 441, 497n14; nationwide parties in, 49, 274–275; singlemember plurality elections in, 48; unicameral national legislature in, 263, 265, 268–270 Saint Lucia: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 424, 441; ethnoregional minorities in, 61; single-member plurality elections in, 48; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 424, 441; ethnoregional minorities in, 61, 199; malapportionment to protect minority representation in, 188, 190, 199, 201, 481n55; national legislature in, 264; political parties in, 190, 201; singlemember plurality elections in, 48; singlemember plurality (SMP) elections in, 190 Šalčininkai (Lithuania), 117–118, 158 Salmond, Alex, 66 Salta (Argentina), 80, 86, 97, 298, 346–347, 434 Salta Renewal Party (Argentina), 298 Salybia (Dominica), 181 Samajwadi Party (Socialist Party, India): coalition government experience of, 241;

527

electoral apportionment’s impact on, 153; electoral performance of, 238, 374, 466n55; Uttar Pradesh and, 230, 238, 466n55 Samata Party (India), 241, 369, 436 Sami (minority group in Noway and Sweden), 95–96, 99, 102, 105–106, 392, 439 Samoa: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 406, 440; block vote system in, 31, 48, 148–149; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 62, 171; Individual Voters constituency in, 148–149; national legislature in, 263; political parties in, 149; reserved parliamentary seats in, 142, 148–149, 170–171; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 31 Samogitian Party (Lithuania), 160–161 Samuels, David, 12, 112, 191 San José (Costa Rica), 81 San Juan (Argentina), 80, 299 San Juan’s Bloquista Party (Argentina), 299 San Luis (Argentina), 80, 347, 434 San Marino: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 406, 440; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 119; majoritarian incentives in, 132; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73, 77, 119; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 119; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264 Santa Cruz (Argentina), 80, 347–348, 434 Santa Fe (Argentina), 80 Santiago del Estero (Argentina), 80, 348, 434 Santiago Rodriguez (Dominican Republic), 82, 435, 454n24 São Paulo (Brazil), 191, 211 São Tome and Príncipe: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 407, 440; Angolar minority in, 96, 103, 106, 208–209, 216; constituency magnitude in, 74, 103; ethnoregional party bans in, 203, 208, 215–216; linguistic politics in, 106; proportional electoral system in, 70, 74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 103, 216; unicameral national legislature in, 264; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264 Saramacca (Suriname), 105 Sardinia (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 106, 229, 257–260, 286, 380, 438; regional autonomy in, 228, 250, 259–260, 285–286 Sardinian Action Party (Italy), 229, 380 Sartori, Giovanni, 9 Saskatchewan (Canada): establishment of, 279; indigenous population in, 186–187; malapportionment’s impact on, 184, 186–187; regional party in, 228, 235

528 i

ndex

Saskatchewan Party (Canada), 228 Savai’i (Samoa), 149 Saxony (Germany), 164, 473n104 Scarritt, James, 19 Schakel, Arjan, 261, 314 Scheduled Castes (India): geographic concentrations of, 150–152; reserved parliamentary seats for, 6, 50, 141–142, 149–153, 171–172; size of, 151–152 Scheduled Tribes (India): geographic concentrations of, 50, 150, 152, 287–288; reserved parliamentary seats for, 6, 50, 141–142, 149–153, 171–172; size of, 152 Scheiner, Ethan, 30, 79, 121, 135 Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), 159, 162–164 Schleswig Party (Denmark), 164–168, 474n108 Schweizerische Volkspartei (name of Swiss People’s Party in German-speaking cantons), 5, 232 Scotland: economic development levels in, 13; ethnoregional parties in, 34–36, 42, 48, 66, 184, 227, 231, 235–237, 277–278, 291, 323, 325, 428, 430, 442, 497–498n18; malapportionment’s impact on, 181–184, 199–200; mixed-member proportional elections in, 234; nationwide parties in, 49, 277–278; parliament in, 66–67, 278; regional autonomy arrangements in, 275–278, 291, 323; Scotland Act (1978), 277; Scotland Act (1998) and, 182, 200; Scottish Gaelic speakers in, 62, 181, 276 Scottish National Party (SNP): electoral performance of, 34–36, 42, 48, 184, 227, 235–237, 277–278, 291, 428, 430; establishment of, 277; Labour Party and, 231; left-wing ideology of, 325; majoritarian electoral system’s impact on, 35; malapportionment’s impact on, 184, 200; regional autonomy politics and, 323 Seibert, Gerhard, 106 self-rule. See under decentralization Senegal, 15 Seven Years’ War, 279 shared rule. See under decentralization Shaw v. Reno, 179 Shetland (Scotland), 182 Shiromani Akali Dal (political party in India), 230, 238, 241, 372 Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji, Indian political party): Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and, 230, 289; coalition government experience of, 241, 244; electoral performance of, 230, 237, 371; Hindu party identity of, 3, 45, 289; Maharashtra base of, 45, 53, 230, 237 Shumen (Bulgaria), 115 Shvetsova, Olga, 9, 30

Sicily (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 229, 257–260, 286, 380; regional autonomy and, 228–229, 250, 260, 285–286 Sikhs (minority group in India): ethnoregional parties and, 230; political parties representing, 287, 372; in Punjab, 50, 52, 230, 286 Sikkim (India): establishment of, 287; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 49, 230, 238, 240–241, 372, 437; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Castes in, 150; Scheduled Tribes in, 50, 150 Sikkim Democratic Front (political party in India), 230, 238, 241, 372 Sikkim Sangram Parishad (political party in India), 240, 372 Silesian Autonomy Movement (Poland), 158 Silesians (minority group in Poland), 95 Silistra (Bulgaria), 115 single-member plurality (SMP) elections. See also under specific countries: apportionment and, 176; defining features of, 31, 77; “Duverger’s Law” and, 29; ethnoregional parties and, 9, 11–12, 37, 46–49; party registration laws and, 12; plurality victories and, 36; runoff elections and, 32 single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems, 129, 333. See also under specific countries single-transferable vote (STV) systems, 332–333. See also under specific countries Sino-Mauritians (minority group in Mauritius), 53, 154, 171 Sipaliwini (Suriname), 105 Slovakia: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76–77, 104; decentralization in, 232; ethnoregional parties in, 25, 84–85, 87, 213–216, 218, 232, 240, 242–243, 336, 407–409, 440, 492n83; Hungarian minority in, 96, 104, 213–216, 218, 243, 336, 407, 440; proportional electoral system in, 70, 73, 76–77; thresholds to governmental participation in, 25, 76–78, 104, 213–216, 218; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264; “wasted votes” in, 78 Slovenes: as minority group in Austria, 93, 97, 293; as minority group in Italy, 94, 100, 116–117, 133, 137, 257, 285 Slovenia: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 86, 409, 440; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 104; electorally relevant minority groups in, 96, 104, 142, 145–146, 171; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 76; reserved parliamentary seats in, 142, 145–146, 170; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 104, 463n23; upper



index

chamber of national legislature in, 263–264 Snyder, Richard, 191 Social Credit (Canadian political party), 280–281 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP, Northern Ireland), 276, 429 Social Democratic Party (Romania), 243 Social Democratic Party (SPD, Germany), 159, 295 Socialist Party (Belgium), 273, 349 Socialist Party (France), 328 Socialist Party (Hungary), 210 Socialist Party (Spain, PSOE): Basque Country and, 232; Catalan Socialists (PSC) and, 5, 195, 228, 232; Galician Socialists and, 197, 232; national election of 2008 and, 254 Socialist Party (Switzerland), 5 Socialists Reform Movement (political party in Belgium), 240 Sønderborg (Denmark), 167–168 Sorbs (minority group in Germany), 94, 99–100, 162, 164, 171, 473n104 South Africa: apartheid era in, 90, 282; constituency magnitudes in, 73, 77, 79, 104; decentralization in, 24, 96, 112, 263, 267, 270–271, 282, 291, 310; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 87, 89–90, 104; establishment of, 282; ethnoregional parties in, 24, 85, 87, 89, 112, 228, 238–239, 270, 282, 291, 310, 409–410, 440; linguistic politics in, 89– 90; Namibia and, 207–208; nationwide parties in, 87; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 77; thresholds to governmental participation in, 77, 79, 104; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–264, 267, 269–270, 310 South Jutland County (Denmark), 165, 167–168 South Korea: constituency magnitude in, 119; ni-ni electoral system in, 119, 125, 134; political parties in, 333; single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system in, 128, 333; threshold to governmental participation in, 119; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264 South Moravia (Czech Republic), 99 South Schleswig (Denmark), 329, 364 South Schleswig Voters Association (SSW, Germany), 162–164, 364, 473n100, 473n103 South Tyrol (Italy): electorally significant ethnic groups in, 101, 256, 285; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 87, 124, 132, 169, 229, 238–239, 242, 256, 376, 438; regional autonomy in, 259

529

South Tyrol People’s Party (SVP, Italy): coalition government experience of, 242; electoral performance of, 124, 132, 229, 238–239, 256, 376; Italian electoral law’s impact on, 132, 169 South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) Party (Namibia), 87, 90, 208 Soviet Union, 91 Spain. See also specific regions: boundary delimitation in, 177; civil war (1930s) in, 283–284; closed party lists in, 71; Congress of Deputies in, 193; constituency magnitudes in, 74, 104, 483n69; constitution in, 284; decentralization in, 5, 24, 26, 96, 112, 228, 232, 235, 246–247, 250–254, 263, 267, 270–271, 283–284, 291, 310, 331; democratic transition in, 284; economic inequality in, 322; ethnoregional parties in, 24, 26, 85–87, 112, 193–198, 201, 228, 232, 235–237, 242, 244–245, 251–256, 270–271, 283–284, 291, 310, 325, 331, 335, 411–423, 440–441; First Republic era in, 283; linguistic politics in, 91, 284; malapportionment in, 192–198, 199, 201, 269; multiple crosscutting forms of identity in, 337; proportional electoral system in, 70–71, 74, 193, 201; Reconquista in, 283; Second Republic era in, 283–284; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 78, 104, 254; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263–265, 267, 269–270, 310; War of Spanish Succession and, 283; “wasted ballots” in, 79 Steinberg, Jonathan, 108 Südtirol (Italy). See South Tyrol (Italy) Suriname: constituency magnitudes in, 74, 104–105; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 86, 96, 104–105; ethnoregional minority parties in, 86–88, 424–425, 441; proportional electoral system in, 70, 74; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 104–105; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264 Swabhimani Paksha (political party in India), 242 Sweden: constituency magnitudes in, 73, 76, 105; decentralization in, 232; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 96, 105; ethnoregional parties in, 86, 232, 425–426, 441, 454n24; Finland and, 246, 301; proportional electoral system in, 71, 73, 76, 328; thresholds to governmental participation in, 76, 105; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264

530 i

ndex

Swedish minority in Finland, 3–4, 82, 88–89, 94, 99, 192, 199, 201, 300–302, 359, 435 Swedish People’s Party (Finland): coalition government experience of, 240, 242, 301, 336; electoral performance of, 88, 301, 359; geographic bases of support for, 192; malapportionment’s impact on, 201 Swiss People’s Party, 5, 232 Switzerland: apparentement in, 79; constituency magnitudes in, 74, 105; decentralization in, 5, 96, 107–108, 247, 263, 266, 296–297, 307, 311–313; electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 96, 105–108, 261, 296–297, 426–427; ethnoregional parties in, 86, 88, 106–108, 232–233, 238–239, 297, 312–313, 325, 426–427, 441–442, 456n46; Executive Council in, 108, 335; laws regarding linguistic minorities in, 108; linguistic divisions in, 296–297, 313, 335; national party system in, 6; panachage vote system in, 71–72, 333–334; proportional electoral system in, 70–72, 74; religious divisions in, 297; Swiss Confederation as the origins of, 296; thresholds to governmental participation in, 74, 79, 105; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 266, 269

Taagapera, Rein, 77 Tabb, David, 334–335 Tacna (Peru), 84 Tacna Front (Peruvian political party), 393 Taipei (Taiwan), 127, 136 Taiwan: Aboriginal groups in, 119–120, 126–127, 134, 136, 142, 146–148, 171, 199–200, 427; China and, 126; constituency magnitudes in, 119–120; ethnic redistricting in, 171, 198–200; ethnoregional parties in, 146–147, 333, 427–428, 442; ni-ni electoral system in, 125–127, 134; reserved parliamentary seats in, 142, 146–147, 170–171, 200; single-member plurality (SMP) elections in, 126–127; single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in, 119–120, 126, 128, 136, 333; threshold to governmental participation in, 119–120, 127, 136; upper chamber of national legislature in, 264 Taiwan Solidarity Union (political party), 147–148 Tamil Maanila Congress (political party in India), 240, 373 Tamil Nadu (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 43–45, 47, 53, 153, 230, 236–238,

372–373, 437–438; proposal to divide, 43; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Tarawa (Kiribati), 201, 467n62 Targovishte (Bulgaria), 115 Tasmania (Australia), 46, 234, 293, 348 Telangana (India), 58–60, 242, 368 Telegana Rashtra Samithi (political party in India), 59–60, 242, 368 Telugu Desam Party (India): Andhra Pradesh base of, 43, 53, 153, 286, 368; coalition government experience of, 241; electoral apportionment’s impact on, 153; electoral performance of, 229, 237, 368; ideology of, 43 Thamizhaga Rajiv Congress (India), 241 Thornburg v. Gingles, 178 thresholds to governmental participation. See also under specific countries: apparentement and, 79, 454n22; constituency-level dynamic of, 77–78, 92; effective thresholds and, 73–77; ethnoregional parties and, 21–22, 25, 68, 72, 92, 113, 156–159, 162, 165–166, 169–175, 201, 203, 209–210, 213–216, 219, 221, 312, 316–317, 319, 321, 324, 329; exclusion thresholds and, 73–77, 96–106; legal thresholds and, 9, 17, 68–69, 72–79, 113, 121, 132, 137, 156–157, 169, 329; means of reducing, 22, 25, 68–69, 79, 170–172, 175, 201, 221; multivariate models of the impact of, 172–175; ni-ni electoral systems and, 114; raised thresholds for ethnoregional parties and, 213–216; reductions for ethnoregional parties and, 156–159, 162, 165–166, 169–175, 316, 319, 321, 324, 329; single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems and, 129, 136 Ticino League (Switzerland): electoral performance of, 86, 88, 107, 238–239, 297, 313, 325, 427; extreme right ideology of, 4, 88, 106–107, 325 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina), 81, 86, 299, 348, 434 Tillich, Stanislaw, 164 Tinglev (Denmark), 166–167 Tønder (Denmark), 165–166 Transvaal (South Africa), 282 Transylvania (Romania), 84, 169 Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 100, 116–117, 285; ethnoregional parties in, 229, 256–260, 286; regional autonomy in, 228–229, 250, 259–260, 285–286 Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party (Italy), 229



index

Trento (Italy): electorally relevant ethnoregional groups in, 100, 285–286; ethnoregional parties in, 83, 229, 256; regional autonomy in, 285 Trieste (Italy), 100, 257 Tripura (India), 50, 58, 150, 287, 500n48 Trnava (Slovakia), 85 Troms (Norway), 83, 102, 392 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 337, 506n17 Tuareg (minority group in Mali), 207, 217 Tucumán (Argentina), 81, 86, 298, 348, 434 Tucumán’s Republican Force (Argentine political party), 298 Tumbukas (ethnic group in Malawi and Zambia), 7 Tuscany (Italy), 83, 257–259, 379 Tuvalu, 264

Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Porderone (Italy), 100–101 Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland), 34, 276, 335, 429, 497n16 Umbria (Italy), 257–259 Union démocratique du centre (name of Swiss People’s Party in French-speaking cantons), 5, 232 Unione Democratica di Centro (name of Swiss People’s Party in Italian-speaking regions), 232 Union for South Tyrol (Italian political party), 169, 376 Unionists (Northern Ireland), 34, 335 Union Nationale (political party in Canada), 337 Union of Democratic Forces (UDF, political party in Bulgaria), 206 Union of Russians (political party in Lithuania), 159–161 United Christian Democratic Party (South Africa), 410 United Democratic Front (UDF, political party in Namibia), 208 United Democratic Party (UDP, political party in Namibia), 208 United Kingdom. See also England; Northern Ireland; Scotland; Wales: boundary delimitation and, 177; decentralization in, 10, 13, 66–67, 227, 235–236, 246–249, 263, 265, 268, 270–271, 275–278, 291, 311, 314, 323; economic development levels in, 13; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58–59, 62; ethnoregional parties in, 10, 34–35, 39, 42, 48–49, 52, 59, 66, 182, 184, 227, 235–237, 248–249, 270, 276–278, 291, 323, 325, 428–430, 442; majoritarian electoral

531

system in, 19, 30–37, 42, 48, 52; malapportionment in, 181–184, 479nn 33–34; nationwide parties in, 32–34, 41–42, 49, 323; religion’s impact on politics in, 49; single-member plurality elections in, 48, 234; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263, 265, 268, 270 United Labour Party (ULP, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), 190, 201 United Left (Spain), 254, 483n69 United Nevis Movement (UNM, political party), 275 United Progressive Alliance (India), 244 United States: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 10, 36–37, 48, 54, 200, 232, 300, 338, 430–431; African Americans in, 35–37, 41, 54, 58, 60, 62, 177–179, 198–200, 300, 329, 338; apportionment in, 176; ballot access requirements in, 203; boundary delimitation in, 177; constituency magnitudes in, 234; constitution in, 299–300; decentralization in, 10, 23–24, 67, 108, 232, 247, 263, 266, 299–300; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58–59, 62, 178–179; Latinos in, 58, 60, 177–179, 199–200, 329; majoritarian electoral system in, 36–37; racial redistricting in, 143, 177–179, 329, 461n5; single-member plurality elections in, 234, 266; two-party system in, 29, 36–37; upper chamber of national legislature in, 262–263, 266, 269 Upolu (Samoa), 149 upper chambers of national legislatures: Brancati on, 66, 262, 304, 331; decentralized countries and, 265–270; impact on ethnoregional parties’ success and, 10, 23, 25, 66, 262, 270, 292, 304–305, 308, 310–311, 321, 324, 326, 331; regional legislatures’ election of, 10, 23, 25, 262–264, 267, 292, 304–305, 308, 310–311, 321, 324, 326, 331 Uruguay: absence of ethnoregional parties in, 431, 442; constituency magnitude in, 120; ethnic homogeneity in, 130, 136; legislative elections in, 130; majoritarian incentives in, 129–130; ni-ni electoral system in, 120, 134, 136, 328; presidential elections in, 129–130, 134, 136; threshold to governmental participation in, 120, 129; upper chamber of national legislature in, 263 Uttarakhand (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; establishment of, 288, 290; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 290; reserved parliamentary seats in, 151, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 151

532 i

ndex

Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD, political party in India), 290 Uttar Pradesh (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional parties in, 44, 47, 52, 230, 238, 373–374, 438, 466n55; partition of original state of, 288; reserved parliamentary seats in, 150; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 150 Uusimaa (Finland), 82, 99

Vaasa (Finland), 82, 99 Valais (Switzerland), 105, 296–297 Valdotain (minority group in Italy), 116–117, 133 Valdotanian Union (political party in Italy), 170, 228–229, 376 Valencia (Spain): ethnoregional parties in, 85, 194, 228, 251–253, 255–256, 419–421, 441; linguistic politics in, 91; malapportionment’s impact on, 194; regional autonomy in, 251–253, 255–256, 283 Valencian Union (political party), 194, 419 Van Cauwenberghe, Jean-Claude, 337 Van Cott, Donna Lee: on decentralization in Latin America, 10–11, 112; on indigenous parties in Latin America, 212–213; on majoritarian versus proportional representation electoral systems, 68; on party registration rules in Latin America, 12 Varsinais-Suomi (Finland), 82, 99 Vaud (Switzerland), 297 Venetian League (Italy), 257 Veneto (Italy): ethnoregional parties in, 83, 229, 257–259, 377–378, 438; regional autonomy in, 259 Venezuela, 11 Vermont (United States), 48, 233 Verviers (Belgium), 97–98 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (political party in India), 242 Vidzeme (Latvia), 101 Villodres, Carmen Ortega, 9 Vilnius (Lithuania), 117–118, 123, 158–159 Visaginas (Lithuania), 159 Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Belgian party during World War II), 273 Voeren (Belgium), 273 Volta Region (Ghana), 59, 204, 485n10 Voting Rights Act (United States), 35, 178–179, 476n2 Vysočina (Czech Republic), 99

Wales: economic development levels in, 13; ethnoregional party in, 34–35, 42, 48, 177, 184, 200, 227, 235–237, 278, 291, 323, 325, 428, 430, 442; malapportionment’s impact on, 181–184, 479nn33–34 mixed-member proportional elections in, 234; nationwide parties in, 49; regional autonomy arrangements in, 275–276, 278, 291, 323; Welsh Assembly and, 66– 67, 182, 235, 278 Wallonia (Belgium), 272–273, 349–352 Walloon Liberals (Belgian political party), 273 Walloon Rally (RW, Belgian political party), 273–274, 350 Walloons (ethnic group in Belgium), 97–98, 272–274, 337, 350 Wanica (Suriname), 105 War of Spanish Succession, 283 “wasted votes,” 78–79 West Bengal (India): Anglo-Indian MPs in, 153; ethnoregional minorities as constituency majorities in, 58; ethnoregional parties in, 47, 237–238, 374, 438; reserved parliamentary seats in, 151, 153; Scheduled Tribes and Castes in, 151 Western Cape (South Africa), 85, 228, 238, 282 Western Isles (Scotland), 182 West Germany, 294–295 West Indies Federation, 274 West Virginia (United States), 31 Wielkopolska (political party in Poland), 158 winner-take-all systems. See under majoritarian electoral systems Württemberg Farmers and Wine Garden League (political party in Germany), 295 Xanthi (Greece), 90, 100, 131, 214, 454n25 Yadav, Laloo Prasad, 230 Yap (Micronesia), 191, 199, 201, 482n59 The Yukon (Canada), 185–186, 228, 235 Yukon Party, 228, 235 Zambia, 7–8, 52, 233–234 Zemgale (Latvia), 101 Zielona Gora-Leszno (Poland), 158 Zimbabwe, 142 Zlín (Czech Republic), 99 Zulus (ethnic group in South Africa), 87, 89–90, 96, 104, 282, 440