Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in Türkiye (Turkey) 9786050715972

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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND VOTING ¨ ˙ BEHAVIOR IN TURK IYE

˘ Edip Asaf BEKAROGLU Associate Professor, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Political Science and International Relations ˙ Department, Istanbul, T¨urkiye

Published by Istanbul University Press Istanbul University Central Campus IUPress Office, 34452 Beyazıt/Fatih Istanbul - T¨urkiye

www.iupress.istanbul.edu.tr Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye Edip Asaf Bekaro˘glu E-ISBN: 000-000-00-0000-0 DOI: 10.26650/B/SS30.2024.007 Istanbul University Publication No: 0000 Faculty Publication No: 0000 Published Online in Month, 20XX It is recommended that a reference to the DOI is included when citing this work. This work is published online under the terms of Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

This work is copyrighted. Except for the Creative Commons version published online, the legal exceptions and the terms of the applicable license agreements shall be taken into account. This book was published as part of the Istanbul University Press’ 100th Anniversary of the Republic book project.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER 1 Elections and Political Life From the First Constitutional Monarchy to the End of the One-Party Regime 15 1.1 The Idea and Attempts of Representation from 1876 to 1920 . . . . . . . . . 16 1.2 Elections and Political Parties from 1920 to 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 CHAPTER 2 Elections From 1946 to 1957: Majoritarian Electoral System and Its Results 22 2.1 Transition to Multi-Party Life and 1946 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.2 Early Period of Free and Fair Elections: Embracing or not Embracing Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3 Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior in the 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 CHAPTER 3 Elections From 1961 to 1977: Experiencing Different Versions of the Proportional System 3.1 1960s: Changing Electoral Systems and the AP’s Unpreventable Rise . . . . 3.2 1970s: Proportional System without Thresholds and Increasing Polarization . 3.3 Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 1961 to 1977 . . . . . . . . .

34 37 41 42

CHAPTER 4 Elections From 1983 to 1999: Fragmentation and Volatility in the Proportional System With 10 Percent Threshold 4.1 1980s: Unrealized Desire for a Two-Party System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 1990s: Increasing Fragmentation and Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 1983 to 1999 . . . . . . . . .

48 50 53 57

CHAPTER 5 Elections Since 2002: From a Dominant Party System to Increasing Fragmentation 5.1 Elections from 2002 to 2015: Rise of a Dominant Party System . . . . . . . . 5.2 The 2018 and 2023 Elections: Rising Polarization and Fragmentation . . . . 5.3 Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 2002 to 2023 . . . . . . . . .

61 65 67 72

REFERENCES

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APPENDIX 1

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APPENDIX 2

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ABSTRACT This book aims to scrutinize the influence of electoral systems, an institutional factor, on political life and voter behavior. The institutionalist approach to analyzing voter behavior directs its focus towards the effects of institutions and regulations that govern political participation, either encouraging or discouraging voting and nudging both voters and parties to act strategically. T¨urkiye offers a convenient case for analyzing the relationship between electoral systems and voter behavior due to its ability to provide internal comparisons. Since the initiation of multiparty elections in 1946, T¨urkiye has employed various versions of both majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems. Nevertheless, T¨urkiye’s parliamentary and electoral legacy can be traced back to 1876, marking the commencement of the First Constitutional Monarchy (Mes¸rutiyet) in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, this book first evaluates political life and elections spanning from 1876 to 1946. After that the book makes an intensive analysis of electoral systems and voter behavior for the whole multi-party elections starting from the 1946. It also offers a comprehensive examination of electoral systems adopted in T¨urkiye since 1946 and the subsequent modifications. Overall, this study concludes that the electoral system based on proportional representation incentivizes both political elites to establish new parties and voters to support smaller parties. Yet, it also finds that the intended impact of high electoral thresholds, designed to hinder third parties within T¨urkiye’s proportional representation system, did not materialize as expected during certain periods. Also, certain regulations enacted by parliamentary majorities against the opposition have not consistently yielded anticipated results.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Among the various factors contributing to the so-called incumbency advantage, one significant element is the incumbents’ capacity to modify electoral rules and electoral districts. Consequently, political parties in power often seek to manipulate electoral rules in their favor. As a student of political science with a focus on Turkish politics, I have closely monitored the changes in electoral rules implemented by the Turkish government since 2017. It has been intriguing to witness the impact of these modifications on voter behavior and the broader political landscape. When I decided to embark on a study on this subject, I realized the absence of a comprehensive compilation of electoral system regulations in T¨urkiye dating back to 1946. Therefore, this book has emerged from both a theoretical concern about the impact of electoral systems on voter behavior and a desire to establish a comprehensive archive of electoral system regulations in T¨urkiye. It is my hope that this work will serve as a valuable resource for fellow researchers and scholars exploring these critical issues. I would like to express my profound appreciation to all those who have played a significant role in the creation of this book. First and foremost, I owe my gratitude to my dear colleagues, ¨ G¨ulsen Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu and Ozhan Demirkol, whose invaluable insights and contributions were instrumental in shaping this work. Our previous collaborative efforts provided the ¨ foundational framework for this book. Furthermore, Ozhan generously shared the formulaic templates with me for calculating indicators related to the party system and electoral system. I am also indebted to my students who have participated in the Political Parties and Electoral System class. The notes I prepared for them, and their feedback and engagement with the subject matter greatly facilitated the writing process of this book. My sincere appreciation goes to the editors at Istanbul University Press, especially Dr. Ahmet K¨oro˘glu, and the two anonymous referees who offered constructive comments in the review process. During the final stages of crafting this book, I received the somber news of the passing of ¨ Professor Ergun Ozbudun. During my PhD study at Bilkent University, I had the privilege of knowing and learning from him. He has been a source of inspiration for me and many young academics with his remarkable personality and pioneering works on Turkish political life, electoral systems, and political parties. I offer my eternal gratitude to him, and may he rest in peace. Edip Asaf Bekaro˘glu

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Introduction

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INTRODUCTION In every election, media pundits share their insights on voter preferences. They often make confident predictions about election outcomes. Nevertheless, there is no single formula to elucidate voter behavior in any given election within a specific country, let alone a universally applicable model of voter behavior. If such a model existed, opinion polls would always be accurate, media pundits would not continuously adjust their views, and political parties would not feel the need to press all the buttons simultaneously during election campaigns. Unfortunately, just as the rhetoric of the “will of the people” is a hollow romanticism, the models claiming to predict voter behavior are little more than caricatures. Both politicians and experts would probably wish there was a magic formula for predicting the voter behavior. However, humans are very complex creatures and therefore there is no simple formula for voting behavior. Modern political science has indeed developed more advanced models than the simplistic portrayals of voter behavior seen in the media. Yet, as is the case in nearly every field of the social sciences, a consensus on this issue remains elusive. This is due to the remarkable diversity among voters. Some are driven by emotions, while others make rational decisions. Some are heavily influenced by their family backgrounds, while others have emancipated themselves from those influences. For some, cultural identity holds paramount importance, while economic circumstances take precedence for others. There are ideological voters, but pragmatic voters are also quite numerous. Some are staunchly committed to their choices, while others remain undecided. Some view voting as a civic duty, while others abstain from voting altogether, and so on. The range of voter characteristics is vast and multifaceted. The aim of this book is not to propose a miraculous formula for explaining voter behavior in T¨urkiye. Instead, this study seeks to examine the influence of electoral systems, an institutional factor, on political life and voter behavior. Electoral systems represent one of the most significant institutional foundations that affect voter behavior. However, the relationship between electoral systems which serve as mechanisms translating votes into representation, and voter behavior is frequently overlooked. Most studies on voter behavior primarily focus on ideologies, party identities, or demographic characteristics. In contrast, this study aims to explore the impact of electoral systems on voter behavior, a subject that has often been neglected. Electoral systems not only directly influence how voters cast their ballots but also indirectly affect voter behavior by shaping the strategies of political parties and competing candidates. In summary, this study strives to enhance our comprehension of voter behavior from an institutional perspective. Nevertheless, before proceeding, the next section will provide a concise introduction to the primary theoretical approaches to voter behavior and delve into the key arguments of the institutionalist approach.

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Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

1. Theories Explaining Voter Behavior and the Institutionalist Approach Understanding why voters support certain parties or candidates is one of the most examined aspects of political science. Before the widespread use of public opinion polls in the 1950s, the explanation for voter behavior was relatively straightforward: citizens voted for parties and candidates aligned with their ideological inclinations. This explanation stemmed from the presumption in classical democratic theory that citizens were interested in and responsive to public issues and were both aware and consistent in their political preferences. However, the belief that political life in democratic nations hinged on the choices of aware and responsive citizens began to erode in the United States from the 1940s onward, following a series of studies employing public opinion survey techniques (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954, Campbell et al. 1960). According to this theoretical perspective, known as the sociological approach, voters cast their votes without having a clear understanding of the policy preferences of the options they faced. In particular, early studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954) argued that people’s social identities, demographic characteristics, and pre-existing inclinations were the most influential factors affecting voter behavior. However, a significant issue with these early studies is that while social identities and tendencies are unlikely to change in the short term, voter preferences fluctuate considerably from one election to the next (Hutching and Jefferson, 2018, p. 22). An effort to address this challenge was undertaken in The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960), published in 1960. This study, one of the early examples of the social-psychological approach, delved into the analysis of voters by focusing on their personal attitudes and party affiliations rather than their social identities. In this context, partisanship is defined as a psychological affinity with a political party, rather than simply the party an individual voted for in the previous election. In other words, according to this approach, it is possible to predict voting behavior by examining voters’ attitudes toward parties, candidates, and various policies. Moreover, the accuracy of predictions about these attitudes can be significantly improved by considering the depth of an individual’s partisanship. In short, according to the social-psychological approach, by evaluating a voter’s partisanship and its intensity, one can anticipate how a citizen will vote and understand their policy preferences. For instance, it is feasible to predict that a voter who feels closely aligned with Party X will vote for Party X’s candidate in the presidential election and will adopt Party X’s president’s policy preferences in direct proportion to their level of partisanship. To achieve this, survey techniques that assess party affiliation and partisanship at the individual level have been widely adopted since the publication of The American Voter study. The primary critique of the social-psychological approach is that the causality of the relationship between policy preferences and party affiliation can also operate in the reverse direction. In other words, it can be argued that voters choose certain parties and candidates

Introduction

3

because they hold specific political tendencies and policy preferences. However, proponents of the social-psychological approach contend that public opinion polls demonstrate that voters display limited interest and knowledge about political issues, are not particularly attuned to public problems, and exhibit inconsistency in their policy preferences. Therefore, they argue that party affiliations, which are established during childhood, significantly shape voting behavior. Essentially, according to this approach, party affiliation is a product of socialization during the pre-adulthood years, primarily influenced by the attitudes inherited from one’s family. In simpler terms, voters’ party affiliations typically align with those of their parents. While these affiliations may shift under the influence of the social environment in the post-childhood phase, they generally endure. However, the social-psychological approach also acknowledges that the party loyalty of young individuals is less steadfast, whereas older individuals tend to demonstrate stronger party loyalty. On the other hand, while party loyalties tend to be stable overall, they can undergo changes during major crises that impact everyone’s lives, such as the Great Depression. While partisanship and social identities continue to be the most influential factors in explaining voter behavior, certain political scientists, such as Arrow (1951) and Downs (1957), argue that voters, particularly those positioned ideologically near the center, base their votes on short-term factors that can sway election outcomes. At the core of this model, known as the rational actor approach, lies the assumption that individuals’ political behavior, much like their economic behavior, is guided by what is most advantageous for them. Essentially, individuals are considered rational beings who assess the available options and choose the one that maximizes their benefits. Similar to the social-psychological approach, the objective of the rational actor approach is to predict the voter’s voting preference. This implies that by observing a voter’s behavior under specific conditions, it is expected that voters in similar circumstances will exhibit similar behavior, while those in different circumstances will show varying behavior concerning the benefits and costs of the new situation. However, because voters’ utility calculations can vary, predictions based on this approach are not as precise as those rooted in social identities or party affiliations. Here, utility is not only considered in terms of individual material interests but also in terms of post-material values or the common good of the social group to which one belongs. Hence, according to proponents of the rational actor approach in explaining voter behavior, voting serves as a means to an end. In other words, voting is an instrumental behavior, an investment made to achieve the desired outcome (Aldrich, 1993, p. 248). In this context, the rational actor approach draws inspiration from economics to explain voter behavior. Those who analyze voter behavior using this framework align their concept of democracy with Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) minimalist definition. According to Schumpeter, democracy is characterized by the free competition between parties or candidates for the

4

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

free votes of the electorate. Schumpeter, an economist himself, draws a parallel between democratic politics and the free market. In the free market, companies compete to attract consumers and generate profits by offering goods and services, much like how in democratic politics, parties and candidates seek to persuade voters through various promises to secure their votes. Therefore, according to the Schumpeterian approach, parties, candidates, and voters are all regarded as rational actors with free will. The seminal works adapting the rational actor approach to voter behavior are Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). According to Arrow, in multiparty elections, parties and candidates who manage to persuade voters positioned near the center are more likely to win elections. This is because voters frequently vote strategically, taking into account not only their preference for a candidate but also their desire to prevent another candidate from winning. In such scenarios, candidates and parties tend to moderate their ideological positions, with the aim of becoming the second-best choice for a larger number of voters rather than the first choice for a smaller group of voters. Arrow’s theory models this situation based on “Condorcet’s paradox” and can be illustrated as follows (McLean, 2018, p. 208): Voter A prefers Candidate X over Candidate Y and Candidate Y over Candidate Z. Voter B prefers Candidate Y over Z and Z over X. Voter C prefers Candidate Z over X and X over Y. In this scenario, if Candidate Z is expected to be the likely winner and Voter A strongly opposes Z as the winner, A might vote for Candidate Y instead of Candidate X, even though X is their first preference. This strategic vote for Candidate Y by A could lead to Y winning the election. Consequently, even with clear data on party affiliation, strategic considerations can impede the precise prediction of election outcomes (Dowding, 2018, p. 32). In this context, the most rational electoral strategy for parties is to focus on persuading the center (average) voter. According to Downs (1957), another pioneer of the rational actor approach, voters are rational individuals who shape their preferences by evaluating the promises and past performance of parties and candidates. They aim to maximize their utility based on their personal needs. Downs’ theory is rooted in the “Hotelling model,” which explains why businesses in the same sector prefer adjacent locations (Dowding, 2018, p. 32). In this context, competition for the most convenient location for customers leads businesses to converge on the same location. Applying the Hotelling model to political competition, Dowding argues that parties vying to win elections need to position themselves at the ideological point where most voters are located. Parties situated at other ideological points will secure fewer votes. Therefore, parties aspiring to gain power will position themselves closer to the center of the ideological spectrum, as most voters tend to be nearer to center-right and center-left ideologies rather than far right and left. Naturally, as the average voter’s ideological position changes, parties will adapt their positions accordingly. However, while the predictability of this approach is higher

Introduction

5

in two-party systems like the US or UK, it becomes more complex in multi-party systems. In countries with multi-party systems, such as T¨urkiye or Germany, making long-term or specific point forecasts is challenging. In certain scenarios, there may be prevailing concerns that resonate with a majority of voters. For example, issues like high crime rates demanding reduction, economic crises requiring resolution, or a surge in the number of migrants needing management could be common sensitivities among the average voter. On such matters, parties and candidates are likely to make similar commitments, such as reducing crime rates, ensuring economic stability, or controlling migration. When parties and candidates share similar stances on these issues, voters are expected to gravitate toward those they trust. Two dynamics often come into play in such situations. First, voters assess the past performance of candidates and parties in light of their expectations for the future and make their decision based on this evaluation. Candidates who are well-known to the public have a better chance when this dynamic significantly influences voter behavior. However, if parties and candidates present very similar rhetoric and promises, voter turnout is likely to decrease (Dowding, 2018, p. 34). The second dynamic, in cases where parties and candidates hold similar positions, involves parties attempting to engage voters by employing exaggerated ideological discourse. Some voters, influenced by this tactic, may perceive the candidate in question as aligned with their views and, thus, favor them. In any case, it is assumed that the voter will adjust their stance by considering the available options; in other words, they act as rational actors. From this perspective, the rational actor approach emphasizes that the influence of campaigning on voting behavior surpasses that of other approaches. While the social-psychological and rational actor approaches emphasize different dynamics, they both share a common focus on examining the individual as the unit of analysis. The social-psychological approach explains voter behavior by considering the influence of the social environment in which individuals are socialized. However, in public opinion polls, all these effects are ultimately assessed based on the individual’s expression. On the other hand, the rational actor approach is entirely agent-centered. In this sense, within the classical dichotomy of agent and structure present in the social sciences, this approach strongly supports the role of the agent. It assumes that people’s behavior is the result of their own reasoning and preferences. In contrast, the institutionalist approach considers the impact of institutional arrangements, which are exogenous factors, on the formation of voter behavior. The institutionalist approach to analyzing voter behavior directs its attention toward the effects of institutions and regulations that govern political participation. These institutions can either encourage or discourage voting and influence both voters and parties to act strategically. It is crucial to consider these effects since the rules that govern participants in the political sphere, such as parties, candidates, and voters, are established by these political institutions.

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Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

Furthermore, political parties, which are political institutions themselves, influence each other’s behavior and that of the electorate. As articulated by Boix (1999, p. 609), “electoral rules are formal institutions that encourage the strategic behavior of both elites and voters.” According to Maurice Duverger (1954), who developed the most well-known theory on the impact of electoral systems on political life, there are two main mechanisms at work: mechanical and psychological. The mechanical effect is a tangible effect of electoral systems that limit the representation of parties other than the two major parties. Conversely, the psychological effect comes into play as voters, perceiving the difficulty in the representation of minor parties, tend to opt for one of the two major parties, typically the lesser of two evils, instead of their own ideal preferences (Duverger, 1954, p. 215). In the psychological effect, the primary motivation of voters is to avoid wasting their votes. As Blais and Carty (1991, p. 80) put it, “the psychological factor affects the vote, the mechanical factor affects the seats.” Consequently, electoral rules, often shaped under the control of major parties, function to reduce the number of effective parties in the system. Of the two effects highlighted by Duverger, the mechanical effect is readily observable by comparing the parties’ vote percentages with the actual number of seats they secure in parliament. On the other hand, the psychological effect, which holds more relevance in this book, is not as straightforward to observe and analyze. Additionally, the psychological effect is a mechanism that impacts not only voters but also parties and political elites. This is because parties, aiming to anticipate the psychological effect on voters, strategize accordingly. According to Blais and Carty (1991, p. 82), the psychological effects of electoral systems can be clearly observed in three areas: (1) the actual number of parties participating in the race is lower than the total number of registered parties, (2) the proportion of third-party votes is lower in majoritarian systems compared to proportional systems, and (3) party system fragmentation is higher in proportional systems than in majoritarian systems. In their analysis, Blais and Carty (1991, p. 89) find that both political elites and voters consider the mechanical effects of electoral systems, which subsequently have psychological effects. Moreover, in majoritarian systems, elites show less inclination to form new parties, and voters are less inclined to vote for third parties. Additionally, electoral systems wield influence over voter behavior and political dynamics through two other mechanisms. The first mechanism involves the creation of opportunity spaces for actors by institutions, and the second revolves around the provision of information (Peters, 2018, p. 42). The more open the opportunity spaces and rules for political participation provided by institutions, the higher the level of political participation. Similarly, the more informed citizens are about political processes and issues, the more inclined they become towards political engagement and participation. Democracies, fundamentally built on the principles of participation and accountability, are expected to possess institutions that foster

Introduction

7

and promote participation. However, these institutions can vary in design across different countries. In some nations, citizens are actively encouraged to partake in political processes, from voting to active engagement in politics. Conversely, in other regions, both formal and informal institutions may deter overall citizen participation or specific groups from engaging. Institutions can be perceived at various levels, ranging from the macro level—such as the system of government established by the constitution—to the space available for civil society. For instance, the presidential system, affording the electorate a direct role in shaping both the legislature and the executive, encourages voter turnout. Particularly, presidential candidates can utilize their strong personalities or charisma to motivate citizens about the significance of their vote. Another reason for voters to perceive their vote as valuable is the relative strength of representative institutions. In this regard, a robust and majoritarian parliament can also foster a sense of encouragement among voters to actively engage in politics. Furthermore, concerning the second mechanism, knowledge about candidates and policies plays a pivotal role in encouraging political participation. When voters are required to invest additional effort to educate themselves about the available options, voter turnout tends to decrease as fewer citizens are willing to exert this effort. This underscores the significance of political parties and campaigning. Regulations governing a party’s ability to disseminate their messages through the media or rules regarding the period leading up to the end of a campaign can influence the effort voters put into gathering information. For instance, live televised debates between candidates, a tradition in countries like the U.S., the U.K., or Germany, significantly contribute to voter information. In T¨urkiye, practices such as permitting political parties to set up campaign tents and distribute campaign materials in city centers serve to facilitate voters’ access to information. Moreover, electoral laws and systems rank among the most critical institutions impacting voter behavior, influencing both opportunity spaces and information mechanisms. Electoral laws directly shape the number of parties and the spectrum of ideologies. These effects can profoundly impact voter behavior. Firstly, electoral systems that enable a higher number of parties and candidates to compete are likely to boost voter turnout as they offer citizens more options in terms of ideologies or priorities. Electoral systems based on proportional representation, known to increase the diversity of representation, demonstrate higher turnout rates compared to majoritarian systems (Ladner and Milner, 1999). Proportional representation systems elevate voter turnout not only by augmenting the number of parties but also by allowing small and medium-sized parties to secure parliamentary seats. This is because voters perceive that their vote holds significance and that they are adequately represented in parliament. On the flip side, the proliferation of parties and candidates imposes a cost on the electorate, making it more challenging to stay informed about the available choices. This becomes

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Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

especially pertinent if the party system is unstable, characterized by frequent entries and exits of new parties, making it difficult for voters to stay informed about the options. Consequently, this may deter some voters from participating in the electoral process. Additionally, the complexity of the electoral system poses another challenge. For instance, preferential or transferable voting systems grant more power to the voter but demand a greater understanding of the candidates. In such cases, citizens, beyond the informed and attentive voters, may opt to educate themselves about the candidates but opt to avoid the complexity by refraining from going to the polls. Some other dynamics related to electoral systems may also affect voter behavior. For instance, in single-candidate plurality systems, voters are often more motivated to vote when there is a close race between candidates. This phenomenon is notably evident in local elections in T¨urkiye. For example, during the 2004 local elections in Istanbul, Kadir Topbas¸, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party, Ak Parti) candidate, secured a comfortable win with 45.3 percent of the vote, while his closest rival, Sefa Sirmen from Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the Republican People’s Party, CHP), received 28.9 percent of the vote. Voter turnout for these elections was 65.7 percent. However, in the 2019 elections, where there was a much more competitive race between the CHP and Ak Parti candidates, voter turnout surged to 83.8 percent in the annulled elections on March 31 and further to 84.5 percent in the repeat elections on June 23. In essence, in closely contested races, voters are more inclined to cast their ballots as they believe their vote could sway the election results. Another critical factor is electoral thresholds. Electoral thresholds impact both voter turnout and increase voters’ tendency to vote strategically (Peters, 2018, p. 49). High electoral thresholds elevate the disproportionality of electoral outcomes, rendering votes for parties that fail to cross the threshold as wasted. Consequently, some voters may choose not to vote or opt for larger parties to avoid wasting their votes (Boix, 1999). Conversely, voters of larger parties, free from the concern of crossing the threshold, might vote for other parties they favor to ensure their entry into parliament and prevent them from falling below the threshold. This voter behavior, known in Turkish political context as ”borrowed” or ”entrusted” votes, was notably observed in the 2015 elections. During the June 7 elections, it was widely acknowledged that 13.1 percent of the votes received by Halkların Demokratik Partisi (the Peoples’ Democratic Party, HDP) were ”entrusted” votes from the CHP. The motivation behind this phenomenon was the expectation that the HDP’s entry into parliament would reduce the number of Ak Parti deputies (Bora, 2015). In conclusion, the institutional arrangements within a country can exert a significant influence on voter behavior. They can shape the options available to voters, influence the perception of the value of a vote, ease or complicate access to information about available choices, and enable strategic voting. These dynamics underline the vital role of electoral

Introduction

9

systems and laws, which go beyond just organizing elections—they significantly impact the fundamental process of democratic participation and citizen engagement. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for analyzing and fostering a robust democratic environment. 2. Turkish Case T¨urkiye provides a convenient case for analyzing the relationship between electoral systems and voter behavior due to its capacity to offer internal comparisons. Since the initiation of multiparty elections in 1946, T¨urkiye has employed various versions of both majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems. In the initial phase of multiparty elections, spanning from 1946 until the military coup in 1960, the bloc voting system, a rudimentary form of the majoritarian electoral system, was employed. Subsequently, in the era commencing in 1961, the proportional representation electoral system was introduced as a response to the excessive majoritarianism and disproportionate outcomes of the bloc voting system. Since then, multiparty elections in T¨urkiye have been conducted under the proportional representation. Nonetheless, different iterations of proportional representation have been experimented with, ultimately culminating in a proportional representation system utilizing the d’Hondt calculation, along with a 10 percent national threshold. In recent amendments, this system was extended to electoral alliances, commencing with the 2018 elections, and later the national electoral threshold was lowered to 7 percent, effective from the 2023 elections. Table 1 outlines all the electoral systems employed in T¨urkiye’s general elections. As elucidated in the subsequent sections, a notable aspect of the alterations in T¨urkiye’s electoral system is that the involvement of military regimes and the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi, AYM) significantly shaped these decisions, often rivaling or surpassing the influence of ruling party interests. To provide a preliminary understanding of the relationship between electoral systems and voter behavior, it is beneficial to analyze the evolution of six key variables during T¨urkiye’s multiparty history. These variables encompass the total size of the two largest parties in terms of vote share (2PV) and parliamentary seats (2PS), the total vote share of fringe/radical/antisystem parties, voter volatility, and the number of parties actively participating in the political arena. By examining how electoral systems influence these variables, we can gain insights into the voting preferences of centrist voters and how these preferences translate into parliamentary representation. 1. Total Size of the Two Largest Parties: a. 2PV (Total Vote Share of the Two Largest Parties): Indicates the combined vote share of the top two parties, reflecting the voting preferences of centrist voters in a specific electoral system. b. 2PS (Ratio of Total Parliamentary Seats of the Two Largest Parties): Demonstrates

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Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye Table 1: Electoral systems implemented in T¨urkiye, 1946-2023 Election Electoral System Year 1946 1950 1954 1957

Multi-candidate/fixed list majority system (bloc vote)

1961

National Assembly→ Proportional representation system (constituency threshold, d’Hondt calculation) Senate→ Multi-candidate majority system (bloc vote)

1965

National Assembly→ Proportional representation (National remainder calculation) Senate→ Proportional representation (National remainder calculation)

1969 1973 1977

Proportional representation (no threshold, d’Hondt calculation)

1983

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with country and constituency thresholds)

1987

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with country and constituency thresholds and quota candidates)

1991

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with country and constituency thresholds and quota candidates/preferential list)

1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 2015

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with 10 percent country threshold)

2018

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with 10 percent country threshold and electoral alliance)

2023

Proportional representation (d’Hondt calculation with 7 percent country threshold and electoral alliance)

the parliamentary representation of the two dominant parties relative to the overall parliamentary composition, illustrating how centrist voter preferences translate into seats. 2. Total Vote Share of Fringe/Radical/Anti-system Parties: Reflects the collective vote share of smaller parties or those outside the mainstream, shedding light on the influence and appeal of these alternative parties. 3. Voter Volatility: Provides an insight into the stability or fluctuation of voters’ choices across elections, showcasing the degree of consistency or change in voter behavior. 4. Number of Effective Parties in Political Life: a. ENEP (Effective Number of Electoral Parties): Represents the diversity and competitiveness of parties based on their vote share in elections. b. ENPP (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties): Reflects the number of parties adequately represented in parliament, depicting the effectiveness of party representation beyond mere electoral presence. Analyzing the trends and shifts in these variables across different electoral systems in T¨urkiye’s multiparty history will allow us to discern the impact of electoral systems on voter behavior and the broader political landscape. In Figure 1, which illustrates the general trends in these variables since 1950, several significant trends are evident. First of all, the combined vote share of the two largest parties

Introduction

11

has shown a consistent decline since the introduction of the proportional representation system in the 1961 general elections. This decline continued until 2002 when a reversal in this trend occurred. This shift was primarily driven by the Ak Parti and the CHP consolidating as the main choices for center-right and center-left voters, particularly the Ak Parti, which consistently secured votes in the 40-50 percent range. However, the implementation of alliance practices in the electoral system starting in 2018 instigated a renewed decline in the total votes garnered by the two major parties. A parallel pattern can be observed in the ratio of the total parliamentary seats held by the two largest parties. However, since the 1969 general elections, a notable disparity emerged between the vote share and the total parliamentary seats share of the two largest parties. This disparity widened, especially with the influence of country and environmental thresholds implemented post-1980. Since 2015, there has been a gradual narrowing of this gap.

Figure 1: Characteristics of Voter Behavior and Party System in T¨urkiye, 1950-2023 (ENEP: Effective number of electoral parties, ENPP: Effective number of parliamentary parties, 2PV: Total vote share of the largest two parties, 2PS: Total seat share of the largest two parties)

Additionally, the total vote share of far-right or radical parties, including Turkish nationalist, Islamist, and Kurdish nationalist parties, witnessed a significant increase in the post-1980 period. Voter volatility, indicating the shifts of voters from one party to another, experienced a rise until 2002. However, starting from 2007, party votes began to consolidate. This decline in voter volatility after 2007 can be attributed to the escalating polarization within T¨urkiye, a topic that will be further discussed in subsequent sections. The period of high voter volatility until 2002 was largely influenced by military coups and party closures. The peak in voter volatility in 2002 was a result of a substantial realignment in voter behavior. Furthermore, the number of parties preferred by voters increased between 1961 and 2002, particularly in the 1990s. This trend, however, reversed between 2007 and 2015, and eventually began to rise

12

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

again after 2018 with the advent of alliance practices. Notably, the number of effective parties in parliament is consistently lower than the number of effective parties in elections due to the high threshold within the electoral system. Certainly, these observed trends cannot be solely attributed to the electoral systems. Various factors such as social, economic, cultural, and political dynamics play integral roles in shaping voter behavior and party systems. Even with the same electoral system in place, changes in societal attitudes, economic conditions, leadership, and geopolitical influences can lead to distinct trends over time. For instance, the same electoral system was used between 1995 and 2015, yet different trends were observed in terms of voter behavior and party system. However, as highlighted earlier and as will be further explored in subsequent sections, alterations in electoral systems have undeniably wielded substantial influence over voter behavior, election results, and the overall political landscape. Electoral systems can serve as crucial levers that influence the way votes are translated into seats, encourage strategic voting, shape party strategies, and affect the representation of various ideologies within the political arena. Understanding the interplay between electoral systems and the broader socio-political context is essential to comprehending the dynamics of voter behavior and the evolving party systems. 3. Layout of the Book This book delves into the electoral systems employed since the inception of multi-party politics in T¨urkiye in 1946. It meticulously scrutinizes electoral behavior, resulting election outcomes, and, when pertinent, assesses election campaigns. Nevertheless, T¨urkiye’s parliamentary and electoral legacy can be traced back to 1876, marking the commencement of Mes¸rutiyet (Constitutional Monarchy) in the Ottoman Empire. Especially from 1908 onwards, even amidst wartime and single-party rule, regular elections have been conducted, forming parliaments through a two-stage electoral system. Given that the roots of the factions paving the way for multi-party politics were laid during these periods, the first chapter of this book will assess the political life and elections spanning from 1876 to 1946. Multi-party elections in T¨urkiye since 1946 are usually analyzed in three or four distinct periods. Undoubtedly, the influence of military interventions in altering electoral systems has significantly impacted Turkish political dynamics. Therefore, when delving into elections and electoral systems in T¨urkiye, it is prudent to divide the analysis into periods before and after the military coups of 1960 and 1980. The period after 2002 will be treated as a distinct era as it commenced with a significant realignment and was marked by the dominance of a single political party, namely the Ak Parti. In this case, the second chapter of the book looks at the inaugural experiences of multi-party elections in Turkish political history, spanning from 1946 and concluding with the 1960 military coup. Preceding the 1946 elections, which did not meet the criteria of free and fair elections, the electoral format shifted from a two-stage to a one-stage

Introduction

13

voting system. This transition saw the adoption of a majoritarian electoral system known as bloc voting. Throughout the 1950s, Demokrat Parti (the Democratic Party, DP) governments implemented a series of modifications to this electoral system, disadvantaging the opposition. Consequently, they easily secured a parliamentary majority in all three elections held during this period. The third chapter of this book examines the period from 1961, marked by the adoption of the electoral system founded on proportional representation, up to the 1980 military coup. It delves into the profound effects that alterations in the electoral system had on political life during this vivid era. This period holds particular significance within the scope of this book, given the dynamic electoral developments. Specifically, three distinct versions of the proportional representation electoral system were utilized: the d’Hondt calculation with an electoral district threshold, the national remainder calculation, and ultimately, the d’Hondt calculation without a threshold. The book also scrutinizes the revisions made to the electoral system by both CHP and Adalet Partisi (the Justice Party, AP) governments in the 1960s, shedding light on their intriguing effects on the political landscape. The fourth chapter of this book examines the period from the 1983 elections, marked by the adoption of both the 10 percent national threshold and the constituency threshold, through the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the constituency threshold in 1995, up to the 1999 elections. Remarkably, during this period, the thresholds failed to deter the formation of a fragmented party system, an increase in the number of effective parties, and the rise of unstable governing coalitions. The fifth chapter delves into the last period, spanning from the 2002 elections, which is characterized by a significant realignment of voter preferences, to the 2023 elections. This period can be further divided into two sub-periods. A pivotal referendum in 2017 facilitated a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government, while a concurrent amendment to the electoral law introduced a system allowing for the formation of formal electoral alliances. During the elections between 2002 and 2017, in the wake of these transformative changes, the Ak Parti clinched parliamentary majorities and established single-party governments in every election, except for the June 7, 2015 general election,1 which necessitated a re-run due to its failure in government formation. In the 2018 and 2023 elections, although the Ak Parti itself could not secure a parliamentary majority, strategic electoral alliances ensured it retained its parliamentary majority against opposition efforts and the victories of Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, the Ak Parti’s presidential candidate. Finally, in the conclusion, the book offers a comprehensive summary and evaluation of the analyses presented throughout its chapters, providing a cohesive understanding of the intricate relationship between electoral systems and voter behavior in the context of Turkish political history. 1 For

a detailed analysis of June 7, 2015 elections, see Bekaroglu (2015).

14

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

Overall, this book not only analyzes electoral systems and voter behavior from an institutionalist perspective but also offers a comprehensive examination of electoral systems adopted in T¨urkiye since 1946 and the subsequent modifications. Thus, the book furnishes crucial reference material for those engaged in the study of electoral systems and associated subjects within the Turkish context. Appendix 1 further enriches this resource by presenting a comprehensive list of all legal regulations concerning electoral systems in T¨urkiye. For readers less acquainted with the electoral systems, Appendix 2 provides a succinct introduction to the electoral systems employed in T¨urkiye, aiding in a deeper understanding of the book’s content.

CHAPTER 1 Elections and Political Life From the First Constitutional Monarchy to the End of the One-Party Regime

16

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

1.1. The Idea and Attempts of Representation from 1876 to 1920 The Republic of T¨urkiye has maintained a multi-party system since 1946 and held free and fair elections from 1950 onwards. However, the roots of parliamentary elections in the region trace back to the late Ottoman era. As the Ottoman Empire struggled to keep pace with the rapid modernization sweeping across Europe, it faced the need to reform various facets, including the military, bureaucracy, and education system. Moreover, the Ottoman rulers had to respond to the growing influence of representative and electoral ideas.2 Consequently, the First Constitutional Monarchy period commenced with the enactment of the Kanun-i Esasi (the Constitution), the inaugural attempt at establishing constitutional monarchy, on December 23, 1876. This early People’s Assembly, formed through the 1877 elections, is significant for our study due to its role in introducing electoral practices into Turkish political life. Despite the assembly’s brief existence and its suspension by Abd¨ulhamit II in 1878, as noted by Kemal Karpat (2002: 75), the 1877 Assembly stands as ”a turning point in the social and intellectual history of the Ottoman Empire”. Ultimately, this assembly can be seen as a political amalgamation and embodiment of a century of economic, social, and intellectual transformation. Based on the fact that no permanent political parties were formed due to its short lifespan, one should not fall into the misconception that the 1877 parliament was devoid of political factions. Even in this parliament, it is possible to see reflections of the center-periphery division, as formulated by S¸erif Mardin (1973). According to Mardin, there were two main groups in the Ottoman Empire largely separated from each other in terms of their relationships with the state and wider society. Askeriye, consisting of the Sultan, the army, and the bureaucrats, is termed the ”center” by Mardin, while the reaya, who were obliged to pay taxes and provide soldiers to the center, corresponded to the ”periphery”. Put simply, the relationship between the center and the periphery resembled that between rulers and the ruled. It is possible to read Ottoman political life from the eighteenth century as a story of tension between the center, on one hand, and the ayan and es¸raf (notables)3 , on the other hand, who began to act relatively autonomously from the center and became the most influential ¨ components of the periphery with these characteristics (Ozbudun, 2011a, pp. 14-15). In the parliament of 1877, many ayans and notables were represented, thus transferring the ¨ center-periphery divide to the political arena (Ozbudun, 2011a, p. 16). As previously noted, the brevity of this initial parliamentary endeavor prevented the transformation of the center-periphery division into formal political parties. Nevertheless, during the era of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, which commenced in 1908, it becomes 2 Since the reforms in the Ottoman Empire are not the subject of this book, the details of this period will not be discussed here. For detailed analyses of this subject, see A˘gır (2022), Berkes (1964), Tunaya (2004), Ortaylı (2019) 3 The Ayans were landlords who had the privilege of utilizing government-owned lands. Es¸raf means the prominent people of a region.

From the First Constitutional Monarchy to the End of the One-Party Regime

17

evident that the precursors of the post-1946 political parties primarily began to take shape around the center-periphery dynamics, and that these parties exhibited substantial variations in their approaches to the issue of how to govern the Empire (Tunaya, 2015). There is no doubt ˙ that the most influential actor in the period of the Second Constitutional Monarchy was Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Union and Progress Committee, ˙ITC). The product of a split within the center, the ˙ITC was founded in 1895 by a group of bureaucrats and soldiers known as the Young Turks4 who opposed the ”istibdad” (despotic) regime of Abd¨ulhamid II. The officers’ uprising in 1908, aimed at revolutionarily overthrowing Abd¨ulhamid II’s regime, resulted in his compelled reinstatement of the constitution (Kanun-i Esasi). Furthermore, the constitutional amendments of 1909 augmented the authority of the Meclis-i Mebusan (the Assembly of Deputies) in relation to the Sultan, rendering it imperative to form a party and secure representation in parliament. Consequently, within the five-year ˙ span between the 1908 elections and the establishment of the single-party regime by the ITC following the Bab-ı Ali Raid in 1913, the Ottomans witnessed the inception of multi-party politics. During this period, while the ˙ITC represented the center and enacted policies to further centralize state power, the Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası (the Ottoman Liberty Party, OAF), formed by proponents of decentralization within the ˙ITC, purported to represent peripheral groups such as notables, communities, ethnic and religious minorities, and the like. Despite its failure in the 1908 elections, the OAF was disbanded following the March 31 incident. ˙ Subsequently, in 1911, the H¨urriyet ve Itilaf Fırkası (the Freedom and Accord Party, H˙IF) took up the mantle of voicing the periphery’s demands. However, in the 1912 elections, ˙ which were held on an uneven playing field dominated by the ITC, the H˙IF could only secure ˙ six seats. This initial experience of multi-party politics and the political tenure of the HIF ˙ reached its conclusion with the Bab-ı Ali Raid on the ITC in 1913. Following this, elections were conducted in 1914 under the single-party rule of the ˙ITC and in 1919 and 1920 under the specter of the First World War and the occupation of Istanbul. 1.2. Elections and Political Parties from 1920 to 1946 The elections of 1920 marked the onset of a new era. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that this new era also retains elements of continuity, as the two tendencies that had been present in political life since the First Constitutional Monarchy continue to compete in different forms. The commencement of this new epoch, however, is distinctly denoted by the transformation of the parliament’s name from Meclis-i Mebusan to B¨uy¨uk Millet Meclisi (the Grand National Assembly, BMM). This nomenclature shift unequivocally signified the shift from a multinational monarchical empire to a national republic. On the other hand, in this parliament without parties, there emerged two factions during the National Struggle. The first of these factions 4 The Young Turks had previously founded a secret society in 1889 under the name Ittihad-i ˙ Osmanlı (Union of the ˙ Ottomans), which was renamed Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Union and Progress Movement) in 1895.

18

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

was the M¨udafa-i Hukuk (Defense of Rights) group, also known as the ”First Group”. The First Group, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, continued the modernizing and centralist ideology ˙ of the ITC. After a while, a faction formed in parliament in reaction to the radical modernizing stance of the M¨udafa-i Hukuk Group, and from 1922 onwards, opposed it under the banner ¨ of the ”Second Group” (Ozbudun, 2011a, p. 19). Similar to their counterparts in the Second Constitutional Monarchy period, the OAF and HIF, the representatives of the Second Group maintained a conservative stance on social and cultural matters, alongside a relatively liberal and decentralized stance on administrative issues. Therefore, it can be said that the Second Group purported to represent the periphery in the aforementioned center-periphery divide. However, akin to the OAF and the HIF, the Second Group’s tenure was short-lived. In the 1923 elections, the members of the Second Group were completely purged from parliament, while the First Group coalesced into a party—the Republican People’s Party—establishing a single-party regime that would endure until 1946 (or, more realistically, until 1950). During the single-party period, there were two attempts to create space for an opposition party in political life before 1946. The first was Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Progressive Republican Party, TCF), established in 1924 as a sort of continuation of the disbanded Second Group. This group advocated for more gradual change and liberal policies against Mustafa Kemal’s radical revolutions. It was during this period that a clear division among the leaders of the War of Independence emerged, setting the stage for the first multiparty experiment of the Republic (Yurtsever Ates¸, 1994, p. 105). The TCF, founded under the leadership of significant figures from the War of Independence like Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Adnan Adıvar, was dissolved in 1925 in connection with the Sheikh Sait Rebellion before it could participate in any elections, including the 1924 by¨ elections (Ozbudun, 2011b, p. 78). To grasp the political context of this period, it is helpful to examine the fundamental principles of the 1924 Tes¸kilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu (Constitution). While the 1924 Constitution broadly acknowledges and verbally guarantees rights and freedoms, it lacks the principle of the separation of powers, concentrating all legislative, executive, and judicial powers within the Grand National Assembly. In this regard, as highlighted by Karpat (1996, p. 125), this constitution ”theoretically granted all rights and freedoms to the individual but deprived him of the means to realize these rights and freedoms (...), rendering the constitutional provisions on human rights and freedoms practically meaningless”. Indeed, this approach can be traced back to as early as 1920. On April 24, 1920, Mustafa Kemal, in his speech to the BMM, suggested that the legislative and executive powers should be vested in the Parliament, and that the President of the Parliament should also act as the head of the government. Although these proposals were accepted, it’s essential to emphasize that there were heated debates in the parliament. For instance, Ali S¸u¨ kr¨u Bey, the deputy from Trabzon who would later be assassinated in 1923, opposed these proposals and instead advocated for the separation of powers and the cabinet system (Yurtsever Ates¸, 1994, p. 36). Ahmet

From the First Constitutional Monarchy to the End of the One-Party Regime

19

A˘gao˘glu, a prominent politician and intellectual of the National Struggle period and the early years of the republic, described the political atmosphere of the 1920s in the following way: The era of the First Parliament is an era of parliamentary dictatorship that is almost impossible to find another example in history. There is no decision that it cannot make on both the state and the citizens. All the work done is in its name. The Parliament exercised control and oversight over these matters as it saw fit, providing direction and, at times, not hesitating to engage in contradictions and excesses under the sway of day-to-day events. (cited in Yurtsever Ates¸, 1994, p. 36)

The 1921 Constitution, the predecessor of the 1924 Constitution, also adopted the principle of the fusion of powers as in Mustafa Kemal’s proposal quoted above. This principle is explicitly stated in Article 2 of the Constitution, which reads, ”The executive and legislative powers shall be manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and true representative of the nation.”5 In fact, during the ongoing war, Mustafa Kemal assumed all three powers - Commander-in-Chief, President of the Grand National Assembly, and President of the Republic. This consolidation of power, as mentioned by A˘gao˘glu, showcased an exceptional level of centralization. Concurrently, within the BMM, the second group persisted in its vigorous opposition to this, despite their internal differences. According to Selahaddin Bey, a significant figure within the Second Group, as cited by Yurtsever Ates¸ (1994, p. 42), this opposition was elucidated as follows: ”The group was established with the objective of averting all forms of personal tyranny and substituting personal rule with legal governance. The Group advocates for parliamentary dictatorship but is against personal autocracy.” As evident from this quote, it becomes apparent that the opposition group in the Assembly opposed not the expression of national sovereignty within the parliament, but the concentration of personal power epitomized by Mustafa Kemal. However, as highlighted earlier, no member of the Second Group was elected in the 1923 elections, and the environment of pluralistic ¨ discourse in the Assembly’s first term was eradicated (Ozbudun, 2011b, p. 78). Subsequently, in the period following the 1923 elections, these purges escalated, solidifying the single-party regime. Key actions included intensifying pressure on the opposition through the Takrir-i S¨ukˆun (Maintenance of Order) Law no. 589 enacted on March 4, 1925, the dissolution of the opposition party reconstituted with the TCF in 1925 in relation to the Sheikh Sait Rebellion and, based on this law, the execution or tarnishing of the reputation of several prominent opposition figures were linked to the Izmir assassination. Additionally, over 600 ˙ death sentences were issued by Istiklal Mahkemeleri (the Independence Courts) between 1925 ¨ and 1927 (Ozbudun, 2011b, p. 79). The second attempt to create space for an opposition party during the one-party era was 5 For the full text of the 1921 Tes¸kilat-i Esasi, see: https://www.anayasa.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/onceki-anayasalar/1921anayasasi/

20

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Free Republican Party, SCF), established under the initiative and oversight of the regime itself. As the Great Depression of 1929 exacerbated the economic situation and reactions against the political changes of the single-party regime grew, Atat¨urk decided to establish an opposition party that could address the rising discontent (Karpat, ¨ 1996, p. 73). According to Ozbudun (2011b, p. 95), the primary motivation was to seek legitimacy. When Atat¨urk asked his close friend Fethi (Okyar) Bey to found the party, he expressed his unease with the situation, stating, ”Today’s perception of us is more or less that of a dictatorship. (...) We are perceived as dictators both at home and abroad.” He emphasized the necessity to present a more positive image to both domestic and international public opinion. With these motivations, the SCF was established on August 12, 1930, under the presidency of Fethi Bey. Even though the regime designed this party and permitted the party to criticize the government solely on economic matters, the SCF was portrayed to the public as a genuine opposition party. Interestingly, it gained traction with the public, and opposition groups started to rally around the party swiftly. However, the SCF was dissolved on November 17, 1930, with a petition submitted by Fethi Bey himself, even before participating in a general election. Therefore, it was not possible to see how the public interest reflected in representation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that certain incidents suggested the SCF initiative could easily escalate beyond control. For instance, approximately a month after the party’s formation, Fethi Bey was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd of 30-40 thousand people in Izmir, where slogans against the CHF were chanted during his speeches (Karpat, 1996, p. 73). Another example is that in the 1930 local elections, despite immense pressure and manipulation by the regime, the SCF won around ¨ 30 municipalities, including Samsun (Ozbudun, 2011b, p. 96). Within the parliament, there were intense debates between Fethi Bey and CHF deputies, and Fethi Bey was accused of having signed the Armistice of Montrose, of nurturing personal ambitions against Mustafa Kemal, and the SCF of becoming a shield for reactionaries (Karpat, 1996, p. 74). Influenced by these accusations, Mustafa Kemal retracted the neutrality promise he had given to Fethi Bey, and publicly supported the CHF. Under these circumstances, the Free Party dissolved itself only three months after its establishment. The single-party regime, despite its increasing rigidity after the dissolution of the SCF, continued to organize regular elections in the years 1931, 1935, 1939, and 1943. Deputies were elected through a two-staged electoral system, just like the elections held before. The period from 1931 to 1943, however, lacks significant relevance to this book’s focus on electoral systems and voter behavior. Earlier elections were briefly discussed, as they represented a limited pluralism phase, albeit under restricted conditions. This limited pluralism can be viewed as a precursor to the post-1946 multiparty era. These events during the single-party era illuminate the delicate balance between consolidating power within the government while

From the First Constitutional Monarchy to the End of the One-Party Regime

21

attempting to accommodate political dissent. The early Republican era represents a unique period of parliamentary dictatorship in history, where nearly absolute powers over the state and its citizens were concentrated within the BMM. The interplay between centralization and the introduction of opposition forces set the stage for future developments in Turkish political history, offering valuable insights into the dynamics of power, governance, and democratic processes. The subsequent chapters of the book delves into a more comprehensive analysis of elections, electoral systems, and voter behavior from 1946 onward.

CHAPTER 2 Elections From 1946 to 1957: Majoritarian Electoral System and Its Results

Elections From 1946 to 1957

23

The first period of the multi-party politics in the Republic of T¨urkiye began with the unfree and unfair elections of 1946 and concluded with the military coup of 1960. This era was heavily shaped by two crucial factors, one operating at the systemic level and the other at the level of individual political actors. At the systemic level, the pivotal factor was the electoral system employed. Referred to as the multi-candidate (list-style) bloc voting system, this electoral scheme organized each city as a constituency, where parties nominated candidates equal to the number of available parliamentary seats in that district, and the party garnering the most votes in a constituency secured all the available seats. Consequently, even a slight margin in votes for a political party led to the acquisition of all parliamentary positions in that district, leaving opposing parties with no representation. The multi-candidate bloc voting system stands as one of the least utilized majoritarian electoral methods globally due to its tendency to yield highly disproportionate outcomes concerning the distribution of seats in comparison to the vote share. Examining the parliamentary arithmetic resulting from this system in T¨urkiye between 1946 and 1960 highlights the evident disproportionality. In the 1950 elections, the Democratic Party secured 415 parliamentary seats with 52.6 percent of the votes, while the Republican People’s Party obtained merely 69 parliamentary seats with 39.4 percent of the votes. Comparable imbalances persisted in the 1954 and 1957 elections. Regrettably, T¨urkiye’s inaugural multi-party venture commenced with this egregiously unjust electoral system, and as detailed below, the political repercussions were severe. Table 2: Relevant parties and election results, 1946-1957 Party

1946

1950

1954

1957

Vote share (%)

Number Vote Number of of seats share (%) seats

Vote Number of share (%) seats

Vote Number of share (%) seats

CHP

85,4

395

39,6

69

35,1

31

41,4

178

DP

13,1

64

55,2

416

58,4

503

48,6

424

MP / CMP

-

-

4,6

1

5,3

5

6,5

4

Undoubtedly, the focal agent-level element during this period was the DP. Established by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat K¨opr¨ul¨u, and Refik Koraltan, who defected from the CHP following a declaration famously known as the “D¨ortl¨u Takrir” (Declaration of Four), the DP, akin to preceding peripheral parties, held liberal views on political and administrative matters while adopting a conservative stance on social issues (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 70-71). Leveraging the bloc voting system, the DP secured an overwhelming majority in parliament during the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections. Capitalizing on the structure of the 1924 Constitution,

24

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

which lacked checks and balances on government authority, the DP exhibited increasingly authoritarian inclinations. This escalating political tension culminated in a military coup on May 27, 1960. Another pivotal agent-level component during this era was the CHP, which facilitated a smooth transition to multi-party politics and accepted the election outcomes despite its loss. The CHP assumed the role of the principal opposition party during this phase, consistently obtaining between 35 and 41 percent of the vote. Millet Partisi (the Nation Party, MP), later re-formed as Cumhuriyetc¸i Millet Partisi (the Republican Nation Party, CMP), and H¨urriyet Partisi (the Freedom Party, HP), established by opposition deputies who had departed from the DP, garnered limited votes, with the exception of the CMP’s victory at the Kırs¸ehir. Consequently, this initial stage of Turkish democracy bore the hallmarks of a two-party system. However, considering the DP’s consecutive triumphs in three elections and its ability to form a government independently, it could also be categorized as a dominant party system. 2.1. Transition to Multi-Party Life and 1946 Elections During transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, it is common practice to adopt a new constitution and laws regulating multi-party elections. However, T¨urkiye transitioned from a single-party regime to multi-party democracy with the 1924 Constitution altering the fundamental political institutions and rules. The only significant change regarding the procedure of the 1946 elections was the transformation of the elections from two-stage to one-stage with Law No. 4918 of June 5, 1946 on the Election of Members of Parliament, which paved the way for voters to directly elect their representatives through their own votes instead of through the electoral college (Olgun, 2011, p. 22). In this sense, the democratization ¨ of T¨urkiye is an intriguing case. In fact, Ozbudun (2011b, p. 117) states that the fact that Turkish democratization took place entirely through the decision of the single-party regime and without any changes in the constitutional structure is ”unique” compared to other democratization experiences. However, during the transition to democracy with the will of the regime, the CHP possessed the authority to enact legal and constitutional modifications as it deemed fit. The probable reason why CHP leaders did not pursue such alterations was their belief that the existing system would predominantly operate in their favor. As mentioned earlier, the prevailing electoral system in T¨urkiye during the transition to a multi-party system was the multi-candidate majority system, also known as bloc voting. Just prior to the 1946 elections, significant debates emerged regarding both the electoral system and the timing of the elections. The DP and other opposition parties advocated for proportional representation-based electoral system instead of the majority rule. However, the CHP chose to retain the existing system. The June 5, 1946 Law on Parliamentary Elections, as previously mentioned, brought a notable reform by stipulating that the elections would occur on a single day with a single stage, but it upheld the plurality system with multiple candidates. In this context, Kasım G¨ulek, a prominent figure in the CHP, delivered the following statements

Elections From 1946 to 1957

25

during his speech at T¨urkiye B¨uy¨uk Millet Meclisi (the Grand National Assembly of T¨urkiye, TBMM): The opposition party raised the issue of proportional representation. Why is this necessary? Why should we vote for impersonal parties and not for the representatives we know? Why should we not use a system that has been used for so long and successfully in the civilized countries of the world? When it is necessary, they say, ”Democratic countries do this and that, let us do the same. It is the same here. The goal we are pursuing here is to ensure the free manifestation of the nation’s will (TBMM, TD, D.VIII, C.1, July 1946, p. 23, quoted in Balcı, 2018, p. 696).

Although there was opposition to the CHP’s preference to continue with a majoritarian electoral system, the more controversial issue at the time was the fact that the 1946 elections were conducted with methods that violated some of the most basic principles of free and fair elections.6 Three aspects, in particular, were highly concerning. Firstly, the 1946 elections employed an open ballot system, diminishing the principle of free choice and subjecting voters to undue pressure. Essentially, votes were cast publicly in the presence of state officials, deviating from the norm of marking ballots in privacy within a secluded booth. This method clearly violated the principle of free voting by exerting influence on the voters’ will. Secondly, there was a lack of transparent vote counting, and the widespread belief that the elections were free from electoral fraud was not realized. On the contrary, ballot counts were conducted in secrecy. Lastly, the 1946 elections were administered not by an autonomous and impartial institution, but by the one-party administration itself. Besides these concrete methods that impeded free and fair elections, numerous subtle and overt means were also employed to create an environment where opposition parties and candidates could not compete on an equal footing with the ruling party. Therefore, it is evident that the 1946 elections, despite being the first multi-party elections in T¨urkiye, were not truly democratic. An illustrative example of bias in favor of the CHP was the timing of the elections. Originally scheduled for 1947, the elections were moved to July 21, 1946, through the decision of the TBMM on June 10, 1946. Referring to these elections as a ”raid election” due to their hurried nature, the DP leaders chose to participate despite only being able to organize in thirty-four out of sixty-three provinces, and despite all the adverse conditions mentioned earlier (Olgun, 2011, p. 21). The DP nominated only 273 candidates out of 465 6 According to Larry Diamond (2002), the criteria for free elections are (1) low legal barriers to entering the political arena, (2) genuine freedom for candidates and supporters of different political parties to campaign, and (3) no pressure on voters’ choices. Of course, for campaigning to be free, the country must also guarantee freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association under the law. The criteria for fair elections are that (1) they are conducted by an impartial authority, (2) there are effective and satisfactory safeguards against electoral fraud, (3) the security forces and courts treat candidates and parties impartially, and (4) competing parties have access to the media (especially state television and radio), (5) electoral rules and electoral districts are not systematically biased against the opposition, (6) independent observers are allowed to monitor elections, (7) the principle of secret ballots and open counting is applied, and (8) the resolution of election-related disputes is guaranteed through transparent and impartial procedures.

26

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

deputies but managed to win 65 deputies in these elections, while the CHP easily secured the majority in the parliament with 390 deputies. After the elections, while the DP leaders continued their opposition, claiming that the elections were not procedurally free and fair and that the multi-candidate majoritarian electoral system created artificial majorities in parliament, some important changes also took place in the CHP. In mid-1947, as the tensions between the government and the opposition increased, the then President ˙Ismet ˙In¨on¨u intervened in a neutral way with a letter known as the “12 Temmuz Beyannamesi” (Declaration of July 12). Emphasizing that no political party is privileged in a multi-party system and that the sine qua non of democratic politics is that ˙ on¨u stated that the basic rules of the system should be as parties and citizens feel “safe,” In¨ follows: “The opposition will live in security and be confident that the government does not intend to destroy it. The government will be confident that the opposition is only thinking about its legal rights. The great mass of citizens, on the other hand, will be able to think with a clear conscience about the possibility of the government being in the hands of one party or the other” (quoted in Kili, 1976, p. 98). This understanding also characterized the 7th Congress of the CHP in 1947, where the party decided to adapt to the multi-party system. At the Congress, the conservative wing led by Recep Peker was purged by ˙In¨on¨u, paving the way for the 1950 elections with S¸emsettin G¨unaltay’s government, which was dominated by reformers (Bekaro˘glu, 2015, p. 111). 2.2. Early Period of Free and Fair Elections: Embracing or not Embracing Democracy One of the most important results of the atmosphere dominated by ˙In¨on¨u and the reformers within the CHP was undoubtedly the electoral law that was revised before the 1950 general elections. In fact, when S¸emsettin G¨unaltay’s government was formed, one of the first issues addressed was the revision of the electoral law. The government, which made various preparations for the electoral law for a year, put the draft law on the agenda of the TBMM in early 1950. The bill was first discussed in the Mixed Commission, which consisted of CHP, DP and MP members of the Constitution, Interior and Justice Commissions. While the MP members of the commission advocated the adoption of the proportional electoral system, the DP members did not take a clear stance on this issue. Rather, DP deputies emphasized that the elections should be free and fair regardless of the system adopted. Consequently, the CHP and the DP reached a consensus on implementing the first-past-the-post system. Within the committee’s deliberations, there were proposals to narrow down the electoral districts if a majority-based system were to be employed. However, these suggestions were not embraced, and it was decided that each city would serve as an electoral district (Uyar, 2017, pp. 14-16). The legislation, as thus formulated, was ratified by the Parliament on February 16, 1950, under the name ”Law on the Election of Deputies,” designated as number 5545.

Elections From 1946 to 1957

27

The following speech of the then Prime Minister (PM) G¨unaltay regarding the choice of the electoral system after the law was passed is noteworthy (quoted in Uyar, 2017, p. 17): We see and hear every day what bad results proportional representation produces in some countries. In such countries, governments cannot last a week. However, today’s conditions and the world situation require permanent governments based on strong parties. Therefore, we do not favor proportional representation. In fact, proportional representation is against the spirit of the Turkish nation. As a disciplined nation, the Turkish nation wants to discuss issues with each other. But it never wants any interference, and hates anarchy. The result of the proportional system is anarchy.

It is very likely that the CHP leaders expected this electoral system would produce a strong government formed by their party. Nonetheless, in the 1950 elections, the CHP faced a substantial setback, receiving only 39 percent of the votes, which translated into a mere 14 percent of the parliamentary seats. In addition to the significant imbalance created by the electoral system, the Democratic Party’s victory in these elections was facilitated by the Law on the Election of Deputies. This law, passed by the moderate faction of the CHP prior to the elections, helped guarantee that the elections took place in a free and fair environment. In fact, the first article of the electoral law stipulates that “deputies shall be elected by universal, secret and equal suffrage according to the majority system,” thus establishing the principle of secret voting. The law also established Y¨uksek Sec¸im Kurulu (the Supreme Election Board, YSK) as an independent and autonomous institution to conduct elections. With an independent body stepping in to conduct elections, it was decided that local election boards would not include administrative chiefs, civil servants, soldiers, and members of parliament; political parties and independents were allowed to have observers at polling stations; parties that could nominate candidates from at least five provinces were allowed to use radio; and ballots were protected in civil peace courts and could not be transferred without the request of parliament or the YSK (Olgun, 2011, p. 24). Undoubtedly, these were indicators not only that the anti-democratic practices of the 1946 elections had been largely eliminated, but also that the one-party regime ˙ on¨u was determined to make the transition to democracy. led by In¨ Although the election results caused great disappointment, and led to various debates ˙ on¨u supported the accepwithin the the CHP, including the nullification of the elections, In¨ tance of the election results and ensured that this most critical turning point in T¨urkiye’s democratization passed smoothly. In fact, the CHP conducted an election campaign that was in line with the nature of the new era. With its election manifesto entitled “Takdir Milletimizindir” (Our Nation’s Choice), the CHP promised to draft a democratic constitution without the six arrows of the CHP, to abandon the statist economic principle to a large extent and to open up the space for private and foreign capital, and to make many promises especially to the peasants and small farmers. It is obvious that the CHP expected that these changes in the discourse would receive a significant response from the public. Nevertheless, after the

28

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

election results, some prominent figures of the CHP preferred easy explanations referring to the ingratitude and manipulable ignorance of the people or suggested to hold new elections. ˙ on¨u alluded to the virtue of digesting democracy before the elections On the other hand, In¨ and said, “If we lose, I will say you have seen, this honor is mine” and after the elections he stated, “This result is our domestic policy’s fault, our foreign policy’s fault. The masses are not to blame.” He criticized the elitist attitude of some CHP members and in a letter to his son Erdal ˙In¨on¨u, studying abroad at the time, he wrote: “Why did we lose? There are a thousand reasons. But the most important one is the desire for change.” Overall, his analysis of the 1950 elections was cold-blooded (G¨ung¨or, 2010, pp. 201-205). Although the CHP had difficulty digesting the election results, it accepted them and successfully handed over power to the opposition. On the other hand, there was a widespread opinion within the CHP circles that the people had voted in the 1950 elections “in a great uproar,” that they did not think that the government could change while voting, and that in the next election the voters would vote with reason and that common sense would prevail (Kili, 1976, p. 119). However, in the elections held on May 2, 1954, the CHP’s share of the vote dropped from 39.9 percent to 34.8 percent and the number of deputies from 69 to 31. The failure of the expectation that “the electorate would turn back from its mistake” led to a greater trauma in the CHP, which found expression in demands such as not participating in the next local elections or withdrawing from the parliament at the 11th Congress convened on June 26, 1954. Although such demands were ˙ on¨u tried to influence the delegates by threatening to resign widely voiced at the congress, In¨ from the party chairmanship if such a decision was taken and ensured that the CHP remained within the democratic process at this critical juncture. In the following period, the fruits of this decision can be observed as the voters’ interest in the CHP increased. This increased interest was driven by various factors including economic difficulties, the turmoil resulting from the events of September 6-7, 1955, and reactions to the growing government pressure on the press, universities, and opposition parties by the DP administration (Bekaro˘glu, 2015, p. 112). After the DP increased its votes from 53.3 to 56.6 percent in the 1954 elections and its representation in parliament from 83.8 to 93 percent, it can be said that the DP government ¨ became more authoritarian and intolerant of the opposition (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 93). It is possible to see the reflections of this in a number of legal regulations directly related to elections. Undoubtedly, one of the most striking of them was lowering Kırs¸ehir from a city to a district of Nevs¸ehir with Law No. 6429 published in the Official Gazette on July 7, 1954.7 Kırs¸ehir was an outlier in the 1954 general elections as the CMP won all the five parliamentary seats with 43.5 percent of the votes. During the debates in the TBMM, the then 7 The

regulation can be found at https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/8748.pdf

Elections From 1946 to 1957

29

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in response to the criticism that Kırs¸ehir was punished for political purposes, stated that there were no political intentions. Yet, he also stated that even if there were such intentions, it would not be absurd because the fact that all the deputies in Kırs¸ehir were won by “a party that did not receive more than 3 percent of the votes in both elections in any province of T¨urkiye.” This, according to Menderes, “shows an anomaly in terms of the social and political fabric of this province” (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 28).8 After the 1954 general elections, the electoral law was also amended. According to the amendment numbered 6428, adopted by the TBMM on June 30 and published in the Official Gazette on July 7, 1954, civil servants and those working in state-owned economic enterprises were required to resign six months in advance in order to become parliamentary candidates, and those who applied to run from one party and were not nominated could not run from another party or independently. In addition, while Article 45, which allowed political parties to propagandize on the radio, was abolished, it was stated that radio speeches by government officials about their actions and duties would not be considered election propaganda. Thus, the opposition was prevented from using state radio, the most effective mass communication tool of the time, while the government was given the right to engage in unlimited propaganda (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 30). Amid escalating political tensions between the ruling party and the opposition, the DP majority in the TBMM decided to call for early elections on September 11, 1957, bringing the election date forward to October 27, 1957 instead of 1958. In a noteworthy turn of events, the DP, which had previously criticized the CHP government for early elections in 1946, now employed the same practice upon assuming power, opting to hold elections in a mere 46 days. One of the key factors motivating this decision was the CHP’s attempt to form an alliance with other opposition parties for the upcoming elections. Significantly, representatives from the HP and the CMP participated in the 13th congress of the CHP on September 9, 1957, indicating the success of the CHP’s pursuit. The DP, on the other hand, aimed to conduct the next elections before this alliance could solidify (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 31). Additionally, the DP was not content with this and introduced significant changes to the electoral process with Law No. 7053, which was enacted on September 11, 1957, the same day the decision for early elections was made, in an effort to level the electoral playing field against the opposition. Following this modification, parties were mandated to contest elections with their own candidate lists, and individuals who was a member of one party were barred from running on another party’s list. The second part of this amendment was widely referred to as the ”K¨opr¨ul¨u article.” It was evident that this change was specifically implemented to thwart Mehmed Fuad K¨opr¨ul¨u, one of the founders of the DP, from becoming a parliamentary candidate from another party (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 32). Indeed, K¨opr¨ul¨u’s departure from the DP on July 5 and his transition 8 For a detailed analysis of this and other instances of gerrymendering attempts in Turkish multi-party life, see Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu (2021).

30

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

to the HP had certainly stirred considerable excitement within the opposition. In short, these changes were intended to hinder the formation of electoral alliances and the development of synergy within the opposition. During this period, the CHP entered the 1957 elections with a prominent election manifesto, featuring the phrase ”we will save the main rights and renew the elections in May 1958 at the latest,” and with a strong belief in coming to power (Kili, 1976, p. 126). In their election campaign, the CHP aimed to secure the votes of urban middle-class voters by using slogans such as ”No more partisan administration,” ”Establishing the rule of law,” ”Independent court, assurance of judges,” ”Impartial radio,” ”Right to strike for civil servants,” and ”Proportional representation in elections.” They also drew attention to the problems faced by the rural population with slogans like ”Unfortunately, we pull the tractor with oxen” (slogans ˙ ¸en, 2013, p. 122). On the other hand, the DP’s campaign for as cited in Duman and Ipeks these elections centered on comparisons between the period before 1950 and their own time in power. DP used slogans like ”1950 we were a backward state, 1957 we became an advanced world nation,” ”Mountains became roads, wastelands became vineyards,” and ”Do not forget those who stole votes, those who forged mazbata, those who beat you” (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 33). Although there was a substantial increase in CHP’s vote share as a result of these fervent campaigns in the 1957 elections, it remained the main opposition party in the parliament with 40.6 percent of the votes, while the DP secured 47.3 percent. Although the CHP was ˙ on¨u managed to view disappointed at not coming to power despite the increased support, In¨ the situation from a broader perspective, asserting that Turkish democracy had matured. In a ˙ ˙ on¨u stated, ”We speech delivered on October 18, 1958, one year after these elections, Ismet In¨ have established the democratic regime as the final reform of the great reform era. This cause will persist, it will triumph. The Turkish nation will know how to safeguard this new way of life against all encroachments” (Kili, 1976, p. 130). 2.3. Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior in the 1950s During the 1950s, a pivotal period in T¨urkiye’s multi-party political landscape, the two primary players were the DP, representing the center-right, and the CHP, representing the center-left. In Mardin’s terms, one might also describe the DP as representing the periphery and the CHP as the center. However, when we examine the electoral performance of the DP and CHP in the 1950s from a regional perspective, it becomes clear that neither ideological nor center-periphery representation offers meaningful insights. To begin with, both parties were highly nationalized during the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections. The nationalization index, which assesses whether a party’s votes in various regions are evenly distributed, revealed that the DP had a nationalization rate of 0.951, while the CHP’s rate was 0.932 (Demirkol and Bekaro˘glu, 2021, p. 35). Considering that the CHP had become a party confined to the western and southern coasts of T¨urkiye by the 2000s, this nationalization score in the 1950s

Elections From 1946 to 1957

31

is remarkable. A straightforward center-periphery analysis would have predicted the CHP to perform better in more developed and urbanized regions during the 1950s, while the DP to garner more votes in less developed rural areas with strong traditional ties. However, what is observed is that there was not a significant regional concentration of votes for either party in the 1950s elections. Even more intriguingly, a closer examination of the regional performance differences of these parties reveals that the CHP, representing the center of the social divide in T¨urkiye, received higher votes than the DP in certain less developed electoral districts. This phenomenon is explained by Wuthrich (2015, p. 129) as the result of both parties’ ability to mobilize various peripheral groups. In fact, the CHP secured more votes than the DP in some provinces in eastern Anatolia and the Mediterranean region, where it maintained patronage relationships from the one-party era, while the DP was ahead in relatively more developed areas (Bekaro˘glu and Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu, 2021, p. 9). In summary, it can be concluded that there is a notable negative correlation between the CHP’s vote share in electoral districts and the level of regional development. Conversely, in districts where the CHP’s patronage networks lacked strength, the DP sought to make an impact by fostering personal relationships and making promises to the voters. According to certain analyses, voters in regions with access to daily newspapers or transportation to urban centers, in other words, areas with relatively high integration with the outside world compared to local life, were more inclined to vote for the DP. On the other hand, voters in more isolated regions were more likely to cast their ballots for the CHP (Kudat, 1975). Furthermore, particularly in underdeveloped regions, local divisions and rivalries among influential individuals or families at the grassroots level played a more significant role in shaping voter behavior than overarching ideological or identity-based divisions across the nation (Wuthrich, 2015, p. 132). This dynamic had evolved over the course of the 1950s. As ¨ Ozbudun (1976, p. 49) contends, in less developed eastern regions, local elites could easily mobilize their support base. In relatively modernized areas, there were opportunities for the DP to employ different campaign strategies. In such regions, the DP developed effective approaches to engage with voters through merchants, notables, or individuals from various professional groups. In fact, eight of the eleven provinces that the DP failed to win in the 1950 elections were located in underdeveloped regions of eastern and southeastern Anatolia.9 In the 1954 elections, the CHP won only four provinces, three of which were situated in eastern Anatolia. Although the gap in votes between the two parties notably diminished in the 1957 elections, the DP still maintained its dominance in the Aegean and Marmara provinces (Bekaro˘glu and Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu, 2021, p. 10). 9 For the distribution of 1950 election results by electoral www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel secimler.secim cevreleri?p secim yili=1950

districts,

see

32

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye Table 3: Party and electoral system indicators in parliamentary elections, 1950-1960 Election year

Electoral System

2PV (%)

2PS (%)

Disproporti onality

ENEP

ENPP

Vote share of antisystem parties

Parliament ary fragmentat ion

Voter volatility

1950

Bloc vote

94,8

99,6

28,1

2,16

1,33

%4,6

0,25

n/a

1954

Bloc vote

93,5

98,7

32,32

2,14

1,15

%5,3

0,13

4,5

1957

Bloc vote

90

98,7

17,7

2,42

1,76

%6,5

0,43

11

2PV: Total vote share of the two largest parties, 2PS: Total seat share of the two largest parties in the parliament, ENEP: Effective number of electoral parties, ENPP: Effective number of parliamentary parties

During the 1950s elections, there were no significant fluctuations in citizens’ voting preferences, and stable trends in voter behavior were observed, as described above. Table 3 illustrates that voter volatility remained at a low level. Voter volatility was not calculated for the 1950 election because the previous election was not considered free and fair, making any difference in voting tendencies statistically insignificant. In the 1954 elections, the calculated voter volatility of 4.5 points was the lowest in the history of multi-party elections in T¨urkiye. In other words, those who had voted for the DP in 1950 largely maintained their support, and there was minimal shifting of votes to the CHP or alternative right-wing parties. In the 1957 general elections, the volatility level increased from 4.5 to 11, though this was still relatively low compared to other periods in Turkish democracy as will be discussed in upcoming chapters. In 1957, the CHP increased its vote share to 41.4 percent and reduced its gap with the DP to 7 points. However, as indicated in Table 3, the level of disproportionality remained high, even though it had slightly decreased from 1950 to 1957. As mentioned earlier, the primary reason for this situation was the electoral system based on multi-candidate first-past-the-post system (bloc voting). In the 1950s, this electoral system has led to the most disproportionate levels between the parties’ vote share and their parliamentary representation in the history of Turkish democracy. To summarize, the 1950s witnessed a political landscape characterized by high degrees of disproportionality, with the two largest parties, the DP and the CHP, dominating both in terms of vote share (2PV) and parliamentary seats (2PS), as depicted in Table 3. While the presence of anti-system parties was relatively limited during this decade, there was a slight increase in the vote share of such parties, indicating a growing dissenting voice within the electorate. By 1957, though the DP and the CHP remained major players in Turkish politics, some changes were noticeable, including a modest rise in party diversity and increased voter volatility. Such shifts across the years highlight the dynamic nature of political competition, foreshadowing potential challenges and opportunities for electoral reform and the representa-

Elections From 1946 to 1957

33

tion of diverse political voices. These developments would have a substantial impact on the political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3 Elections From 1961 to 1977: Experiencing Different Versions of the Proportional System

Elections From 1961 to 1977

35

T¨urkiye’s fledgling democracy and the unrestrained DP rule in the 1950s eventually gave way to a military coup on May 27, 1960. Subsequently, T¨urkiye was under military dictatorship for 17 months. Following the coup, the Constituent Assembly, established under military oversight, completely changed the legal and constitutional framework that had allowed unrestrained executive power in the 1950s. The 1924 Constitution, which lacked provisions for the separation of powers and the checks and balances inherent in a one-party regime, was replaced by the 1961 Constitution. This new constitution established a bicameral parliament consisting of a National Assembly and a Republican Senate. It also introduced checks and balances mechanisms such as Anayasa Mahkemesi (the Constitutional Court, AYM) and Milli G¨uvenlik Kurulu (the National Security Council, MGK). The 1961 Constitution was ratified by 61.7 percent of the people in a referendum on July 9, 1961.10 Following the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the civilian and military bureaucracies besides political actors began to exert increasing influence on political life. As this influence became more deeply ingrained in subsequent periods, T¨urkiye transitioned into a form of democracy referred to as a ”tutelary ¨ democracy” (Ozbudun, 2011, p. 131). In addition to the 1961 Constitution, a comprehensive change was made to the electoral system through the introduction of Milletvekili Sec¸im Kanunu (the Election of Deputies Law) on May 25, 1961, numbered 306.11 For elections to the National Assembly, the majoritarian system was replaced with a form of proportional representation featuring a constituency threshold and d’Hondt calculation. In contrast, for the Senate elections, the listed majority system (bloc vote) was retained. In the National Assembly elections, the constituency threshold was determined by dividing the number of valid votes by the number of deputies in the district, and the number of deputies allocated to parties surpassing this threshold was determined using the d’Hondt method. During this period, electoral districts were established based on the provincial boundaries. Law No. 306 also introduced the preferential list system. Under this system, voters could express their preferences within the parliamentary lists of political parties, allowing them to change the order of candidates on those lists. In essence, the objectives behind the 1961 Constitution and Law No. 306 on the Election of Deputies were twofold: firstly, to enhance representation in the National Assembly by enabling smaller parties to secure more seats through the proportional system, and secondly, to balance the popular will with the more elite segment of the TBMM, the Senate, and the civilian and military bureaucracies. As will be shown in detail below, in the 1960s and 1970s, various versions of the proportional system were experimented with. It is evident that proportional representation systems, which offered advantages to small and medium-sized parties, had the ultimate effect of in10 For

a detailed study analyzing referendums in T¨urkiye, see Osmanbas¸o˘glu and Bekaro˘glu (2019). the full text of the law, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc044/ kanunmbkc044/kanunmbkc04400306.pdf

11 For

36

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

creasing the number of effective parties in T¨urkiye. This facilitated the entry of ideological parties from the extreme right and left into the parliament and contributed to heightened political polarization (see Table 5 for a more comprehensive overview of these measures). An examination of political parties during this period reveals a significant diversification, particularly on the right-wing spectrum. After the 1960 military coup, there were three right-wing parties competing for the political legacy of the dissolved DP. The first was the conservative Cumhuriyetc¸i K¨oyl¨u Millet Partisi (the Republican Peasant Nation Party, CKMP), formed in 1958 by the merger of the Millet Partisi (the Nation Party, MP), founded in 1948 by conservative members who had left the DP, and T¨urkiye K¨oyl¨u Partisi (the Peasant Party of T¨urkiye, TKP), which had also founded by a group that broke away from the DP in 1952. The second party was Yeni T¨urkiye Partisi (the New T¨urkiye Party, YTP), founded by those who opposed the H¨urriyet Party’s merger with the CHP. The last and most prominent party was Adalet Partisi (the Justice Party, AP), which had a large proportion of DP members in its local organizations. The party took its name from its mission to bring justice to the banned DP members and could be classified as a center-right party. With a similar party program to its predecessor, the AP emerged as the primary heir of the DP and the chief representative of the center-right, demonstrating success in the 1961, 1965, and 1969 general elections. On the right side of the political spectrum, new and noteworthy political parties also emerged in the late 1960s. These parties were distinct from those aiming to carry on the DP’s legacy and instead belonged to the category of extreme right-wing parties, establishing a lasting tradition in T¨urkiye’s political landscape. The nationalists, under the leadership of Alparslan T¨urkes¸, who assumed the party leadership of the CKMP in 1965, renamed the party as Milliyetc¸i Hareket Partisi (the Nationalist Movement Party, MHP) in 1969 and oriented it more towards far-right. In 1970, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of Milli G¨or¨us¸ Hareketi (the National Vision Movement, MGH) founded Milli Nizam Partisi (the National Nizam Party, MNP), which was shut down due to alleged violations of secularism and replaced by Milli Selamet Partisi (the National Salvation Party, MSP) in 1972. The MSP, which followed an Islamist agenda, along with the nationalist MHP, compelled the AP to adopt more right-wing policies (Sayarı, 1978, p. 50). Finally, in 1970, a group of AP deputies who rebelled against the party’s leader S¨uleyman Demirel founded Demokratik Parti (the Democratic Party, DkP), a right-wing party that positioned itself slightly further to the right of the AP (Bozbeyli, 1976, p. 190). On the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, not only the CHP underwent various transformations but also several new left-wing parties emerged. The most prominent of these ˙¸c¸i Partisi (the Turkish Workers’ Party, T˙IP), which embraced a socialist-left was T¨urkiye Is ideology. In the 1965 elections, the T˙IP secured 14 parliamentary seats with 3 percent of the vote, thanks to the national remainder calculation. However, its success was not sustained due

Elections From 1961 to 1977

37

Table 4: Relevant parties and election results, 1961-1977 Party

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

CHP

36,7

173

28,7

134

27,4

143

33,3

185

41,4

213

AP

34,8

158

52,9

240

46,6

256

29,8

149

36,9

189

CKMPMHP

14,0

54

2,2

11

3,0

1

3,4

3

6,4

16

YTP

13,8

65

3,7

19

2,2

6

-

-

-

-

TİP

-

-

3,0

14

2,7

2

-

-

0,1

-

GP-CGP

-

-

-

-

6,6

15

5,3

13

1,9

3

MSP

-

-

-

-

-

-

11,8

48

8,6

24

DkP

-

-

-

-

-

-

11,9

45

1,8

1

to changes in the electoral system. Nonetheless, the T˙IP had a significant ideological impact, ¨ leading the CHP to gradually adopt a social democratic party line (Ozbudun, 1981, p. 231). These ideological changes within the CHP led to internal divisions. The CHP’s participation in the 1965 elections under the slogan “Ortanın Solu” (Left of Center) heightened tensions within the party. A dissenting faction, which believed that this shift in rhetoric aimed to distance the party from its Kemalist foundations, founded G¨uven Partisi (the Trust Party, GP) in 1967 (Akar and D¨undar, 2008, p. 124). In the 1969 elections, the CHP abandoned the ”left of center” slogan, and yet faced a new internal conflict over its stance regarding the March 12, 1971 memorandum issued by the Turkish Armed Forces and the subsequent technocrat governments. The faction led by B¨ulent Ecevit, who argued for the separation of the military from the party, assumed leadership in the CHP. This marked the completion of the CHP’s transition to the ideological tendency known as ”left of center.” CHP members who opposed this transition first established Cumhuriyetc¸i Parti (the Republican Party, CP) and later merged it with the GP. This merger resulted in the formation of Cumhuriyetc¸i G¨uven Partisi (the Republican Trust Party, CGP) in 1973. 3.1. 1960s: Changing Electoral Systems and the AP’s Unpreventable Rise In the 1960s, T¨urkiye adopted a completely different electoral system compared to the previous period. This new system, which implemented a form of proportional representation

38

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

with a constituency threshold and d’Hondt calculation, was established by Law No. 306 on the Election of Deputies passed on May 25, 1961 as outlined above. The 1961 National Assembly elections, conducted under this new system, yielded 173 seats for the CHP with 36.7 percent of the vote and 158 seats for the AP, which inherited a significant part of the DP’s legacy, with 34.8 percent of the vote. The 1961 general elections are noteworthy for having the lowest level of representation disproportionality in the history of Turkish democracy. However, as expected, the disproportionality remained much higher in the elections for the Senate, which ¨ used a bloc vote system (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 94). The AP secured 47.3 percent of the senatorial seats with 34.5 percent of the votes while the CHP won 24 percent of the seats in Senate with 36.1 percent of the votes. Following the 1961 elections, where the CHP failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly, the first coalition governments in the history of the Republic were established. First, a coalition was formed between the CHP and the AP for six months, and then a cooperation took place with the participation of the CHP and smaller parties, the YTP and the CKMP, in the National Assembly (Ba˘gce, 2015, p. 40). Although the CHP had initially experienced an upward electoral performance in 1957, the last election before the coup, and emerged from the first post-coup election as the party with the highest number of votes, its electoral support decreased in the subsequent elections in 1965 and 1969. A significant factor contributing to this decline in electoral support was the perception that the CHP had a favorable attitude towards the May 27 coup and was seen as having some level of integration with the coup ˙ ˙In¨on¨u’s characterization of the coup as a ”legitimate revolutionary leaders fueled by Ismet movement” (Kili, 1976, pp. 136-138). Despite ˙Ismet ˙In¨on¨u’s efforts to positively influence the democratic transition in the 1940s and 1950s, such a perception of integration appeared to discomfort the electorate. Consequently, even though the CHP received the highest number of votes in the 1961 elections, it’s evident that the 36.7 percent of votes garnered in 1961 marked a decline from the 41.4 percent obtained in the 1957 elections. As the CHP struggled to establish a stable government between 1961 and 1965, its declining electoral trend persisted throughout the 1960s, resulting in 28.7 percent in the 1965 elections and 27.4 percent in 1969. To counter the decline in electoral support and to prevent the rise of the AP, the parliamentary majority composed of the CHP, YTP, and CKMP, just like the DP governments in the 1950s, agreed on a new electoral system in the lead-up to the 1965 elections. Through Law No. 533 passed on February 13, 1965, a new proportional representation system was implemented not only for National Assembly elections but also for the Republican Senate elections. Most importantly, it was decided that the calculation of parliamentary seats would be based on the national remainder method.12 The national remainder calculation was anticipated to maximize fairness in representation by minimizing disproportionality and was 12 For

the national remainder calculation, see Appendix 2.

Elections From 1961 to 1977

39

expected to favor small parties while putting large parties (at this context, the AP) at a disadvantage. However, an analysis of the 1965 election results reveals that the first expectation of favoring smaller parties was met, but the second expectation was not realized. Small parties, as anticipated, benefited from the national remainder calculation, with the CKMP securing 11 deputies with 2.2 percent of the votes and the T˙IP winning all 14 deputies with 3 percent vote share. Conversely, the AP, which gained the majority of votes with 52.9 percent in the 1965 elections, managed to form a single-party government by securing 53.3 percent of the ¨ parliamentary seats, frustrating the expectations of the CHP, YTP, and CKMP (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 94). In the 1965 elections, the CHP made efforts to clarify its position within the political spectrum. This need arose because its primary rival, the AP, had distinctly defined itself in terms of free market economy and right-wing politics. Meanwhile, the socialist-leftist ˙ found resonance, particularly among university youth and urban classes discourse of the TIP (Turan, 2004, p. 309). To address this need, the CHP introduced the concept of ”left of center,” which was justified by referencing ”devletc¸ilik” (statism), one of the party’s six foundational principles, and the idea of a social state, one of the principles enshrined in the constitution. Nonetheless, in the 1965 elections, the CHP struggled to draw in voters during an intense campaign period where it was unable to formulate a response that could effectively counter the ”Ortanın solu, Moskova yolu” (left of center, Moscow way) propaganda promoted by the AP (Bekaro˘glu, 2015, p. 118). As a result, the CHP’s vote share dropped to 28.7 percent. Two additional factors contributed to the CHP’s failure to attract voters. The first of these factors relates to the persuasiveness of the CHP’s new position. The party still grappled with credibility and reliability issues tied to its leadership, cadre, and rhetoric, causing voters to be confused by the messages emanating from the party. The second factor is structural in nature. Residents in shantytown neighborhoods believed that the traditional values they had brought with them from their rural origins were still vibrant, which inclined them towards the AP (Z¨urcher, 2005, p. 368). Consequently, the urban poor, who could have been a potential voting bloc for the CHP’s new leftist discourse, favored the AP over the CHP in this election. After the 1965 elections, the AP, which secured a parliamentary majority and established a single-party government, implemented significant changes to the electoral law that were deemed favorable to its interests. Through Law No. 1036 of March 23, 1968, which was approved by the AP legislative majority, the national remainder system was replaced with the d’Hondt system with a constituency threshold for both the National Assembly and the Republican Senate. This change, particularly the introduction of the constituency threshold, tilted the electoral playing field against small parties and in favor of the AP. However, the AYM challenged this amendment, and in its decision no. 1968/13, the Court declared that the amendment related to the threshold was unconstitutional. In its rationale for this decision, the

40

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

AYM pointed out that the electoral district threshold could “result in representatives elected by a minority of voters taking over the administration of the country by gaining a majority in the Assembly.” It also noted that it might “put psychological pressure on voters from the very beginning” because of a concern that their votes would not be represented for being redistributed to other parties. Consequently, the AYM concluded that the constituency threshold regulation in Law No. 1036 violated constitutional principles related to the democratic rule of law, free elections, and the role of political parties as essential components of democratic political life (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 117). ¨ According to Ozbudun (2016, p. 95), the decision of the AYM raises several concerns. First of all, the 1961 Constitution did not explicitly specify a particular electoral system, but the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution had already chosen the d’Hondt system with a threshold for electoral districts. Indeed, it is interesting to observe the relatively short time frame (seven years) within which the AYM decided to challenge the electoral system preferred by the Constituent Assembly. This highlights the evolving nature of the Turkish political landscape during that period, where political dynamics and power struggles were at play. Such events can provide valuable insights into the complexities of Turkish politics during that era and the role of institutions like the Constitutional Court in shaping the ¨ country’s electoral systems and political structure. The second point raised by Ozbudun is that the selection of an electoral system falls within the legitimate discretion of the parliament, unless the constitution explicitly dictates a specific electoral system. In other words, in the absence of a clear constitutional provision on the electoral system, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy for the judiciary to impose its will over that of the legislative. Furthermore, it is a realistic expectation that no electoral system can ensure that every single vote is represented equally, and it cannot be asserted that the sole method for ¨ democratic elections is a purely proportional system. In essence, according to Ozbudun (2016, p. 95), with this decision, the AYM “invalidated a legal regulation that was well within the legitimate authority of the legislature, deeming it an ’artificial interference’ with the natural course of elections.” As contentious as this decision may be, it set a precedent, and in the subsequent general elections held until the 1980 coup d’´etat, T¨urkiye had to use the d’Hondt calculation without a threshold. This example underscores that in the political system established by the 1961 Constitution, both civilian and military bureaucracy wielded considerable influence over the elected parliament and government. Despite the Constitutional Court’s ruling to invalidate the electoral district threshold, it becomes evident that the AP successfully achieved its objectives by eliminating the national remainder system and reverting to the d’Hondt method, a calculation method known to be advantageous to larger political parties. In 1969 general elections, although the AP’s vote share declined from 52.9 percent to 46.6 percent its parliamentary representation expanded

Elections From 1961 to 1977

41

from 240 to 256 seats. A parallel scenario unfolded for the CHP, as its electoral support waned while its parliamentary seats grew from 134 to 143. Conversely, the parties that had ˙ reaped the benefits of the national remainder system in the 1965 elections, namely the IP and the CKMP/MHP, lost almost all their parliamentary seats in the 1969 elections. Even though the ˙IP’s vote share decreased by a marginal 0.2 percentage points, it secured a mere two parliamentary seats. In contrast, the MHP, despite its vote share slightly increased from 2.2 to 3 percent, could only win one parliamentary seat. Succinctly, the parliamentary seats hitherto allocated by the national remainder system to smaller parties in the 1965 elections became divided between the AP and the CHP in the 1969 elections. In this regard, it is tenable to argue that the two-party system that characterized the 1950s persisted through the 1960s. 3.2. 1970s: Proportional System without Thresholds and Increasing Polarization 1973 and 1977 elections were conducted without the presence of an electoral threshold. Notably, during the 1970s, no substantive modifications were introduced to the electoral system. This period saw the emergence of extreme right-wing parties and a heightened polarization within the realm of political life. On one hand, radical leftist parties failed to establish a notable presence throughout the 1970s due to the mainstreaming of anticommunist political discourse in T¨urkiye during the Cold War. Consequently, the CHP became the exclusive choice for left-leaning voters. On the other hand, the right-wing vote was fragmented among the AP, the MSP, and the MHP. This fragmentation within the right-wing led to a decline in the AP’s electoral support, while the CHP secured the highest number of votes in both the 1973 and 1977 elections. Nonetheless, the CHP did not attain a parliamentary majority that would enable it to form a government on its own. As a consequence, the 1970s are remembered as a particularly turbulent decade in Turkish political history. In fact, from the military memorandum of 1971 to the coup of 1980, the country witnessed the formation of ten different governments, none of which enjoyed the status of a single-party majority government. In fact, only five of these governments were formed as coalitions with parliamentary majorities. The remainder were either minority governments or technocratic administrations established under military auspices between 1971 and 1974 (Gunter 1989, p. 64). In the 1973 elections, the CHP secured 185 out of the 450 parliamentary seats with 33.3 percent of the vote, subsequently forging a coalition government with the far-right MSP, holding 48 parliamentary seats. This government took office on January 26, 1974, but its tenure was short-lived, lasting a mere ten months. Subsequently, a neutral minority government was established, which also had a brief existence of only four months. Eventually, a coalition government, referred to as Milliyetc¸i Cephe H¨uk¨umeti (the Nationalist Front Government, MC H¨uk¨umeti) emerged as a cooperation of the AP, the MSP, the CGP, and the MHP in March 31, 1975. Under the leadership of S¨uleyman Demirel, this coalition government ruled

42

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

the country until the 1977 elections. The latter half of the 1970s in Turkish political life was characterized by economic challenges catalyzed by the 1974 oil crisis and social tensions exacerbated by the Cold War environment. The culmination of these tensions was witnessed in Taksim Square during the May 1 demonstrations of 1977, where tragically, 33 civilians were killed. Amidst mounting unrest, it was decided jointly by deputies of the AP and the CHP to hold elections on June 5, 1977, which were originally scheduled for October. In the 1977 general elections, the CHP increased its vote share to 41.4 percent, yet it secured only 213 out of 450 parliamentary seats, leaving it short of the majority needed to independently form a government. The AP also increased its votes from 29.8 to 36.9 percent, earning 189 parliamentary seats. Notably, the DkP’s voter base, which had garnered 11.9 percent of the votes in the prior elections with the support of Celal Bayar, diminished significantly, with a substantial portion of these votes shifting to the AP in the 1977 elections. Examining the extreme right-wing spectrum, on the other hand, it is discernible that the MSP experienced a decline of 3.6 percentage points, reaching 8.6 percent of the vote, while the MHP observed a 3-percentage-point increase, attaining 6.4 percent of the vote. In a political atmosphere characterized by heightened ideological polarization along the right-left spectrum, it appears that far-right voters penalized the MSP for its pragmatic coalition with the left-wing CHP. These outcomes indicate a reversion to a two-party system in T¨urkiye. The number of effective parties, which had risen to 3.32 in the 1973 elections, dwindled to 2.42 in the 1977 elections. While the total vote share of the two largest parties had stood at 74.2 percent in the previous elections, it surged to 89.3 percent in 1977. However, the capacity of either of the two major parties to independently form a government, a defining characteristic of two-party systems, did not materialize in these elections. The attempt by CHP leader Ecevit to establish a minority government, which received presidential approval, endured only for a month as it failed to secure a vote of confidence from the TBMM. Following this, on July 21, 1977, the 2nd MC Government, led by Demirel, was formed with the backing of the MSP and the MHP. However, this government was dissolved on January 5, 1978, after Ecevit enticed 11 AP deputies to his side with the promise of ministerial posts, thereby causing the government to lose the vote of confidence. In the period spanning this date until the 1980 coup, Ecevit first formed a coalition government, and subsequently, Demirel established a minority government. Consequently, the 1970s, marked by social and economic turbulence exacerbated by unstable governments and political deadlock, culminated in a military coup on September 12, 1980. 3.3. Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 1961 to 1977 Each of the post-1961 proportional electoral systems, while not to the same extent as the national remainder calculation, ultimately fostered the emergence of small and medium-sized ¨ political parties when compared to majoritarian electoral systems. Ozbudun and Tachau

Elections From 1961 to 1977

43

(1975) contend that a substantial segment of the electorate, which can be characterized as ”peripheral,” did not align with the successor parties of the DP but rather gravitated towards the newly established extreme right and radical left parties. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the geographic distribution of votes obtained by nationalist and Islamist parties did not exhibit a clear regional pattern (C ¸ arko˘glu and Avcı, 2002, p. 119). Conversely, the distribution of votes garnered by the DP’s successor parties and the CHP in the 1961 elections mirrored that of the 1950s to a large extent. The regional performances of the AP, securing 34.8 percent of the votes, and the YTP, receiving 13.7 percent of the votes, overlapped with the votes received by the DP in the 1950s. In essence, it can be asserted that the local dynamics and affiliations that had guided voters to specific parties in the 1950s persisted to a significant extent in 1961. The heirs of the DP, particularly the AP, continued to amass slightly more votes than the CHP in the more developed regions during the 1961 elections. Commencing from the 1965 elections, a shift in electoral geography brought about new trends. Within this context, the 1965 elections can be characterized as “transitional elections,” during which the right-left political axis gained prominence in political campaigns and electoral conduct (Wuthrich, 2015, p. 123). In previous elections, with the exception of the limited influence of the MP/CMP/CKMP led by Osman B¨ol¨ukbas¸ı, a unique political leader, political dynamics were predominantly molded by centrist parties. However, following the advent of a pluralistic environment under the relatively liberal provisions of the 1961 Constitution, nationalist, Islamist, and radical leftist parties made their entry into the parliament after the 1965 elections, becoming influential players in Turkish political life. In addition to these ideological divisions, the 1965 elections marked the inception of the fragmentation of the Turkish political party system. This phenomenon of fragmentation, characterized by the division of the right and left political factions and their representation in the parliament through distinct parties, became an intrinsic aspect of the Turkish party system from 1965 to 2002. In the 1965 elections, the number of parties holding representation in the parliament expanded to six, and this number remained constant until 2002, with the sole exception of the 1983 elections, which were conducted under the purview of a military regime (Bekaro˘glu and Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu, 2021, p. 11).

Ideological polarization and party fragmentation have left a lasting imprint on T¨urkiye’s electoral landscape since the 1965 elections. First of all, there has been a transformation in the electoral base of the CHP. The CHP’s electoral support increased in more developed regions, while its vote share in less developed areas, where it had traditionally garnered substantial ¨ support, declined (Ozbudun, 2013, p. 44). This trend persisted throughout the 1970s, and under the charismatic leadership of B¨ulent Ecevit, the CHP secured the highest number of votes in both the 1973 and 1977 elections. Subsequently, the positive correlation between CHP

44

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye Table 5: Party and electoral system indicators in parliamentary elections, 1961-1977 Disproportionality

ENEP

ENPP

Vote share of antisystem parties

Parliamentary fragmentation

Voter volatility

71,50 73,6

2,04

3,40

3,26

%14

0,69

56,8

Proportional representatio n (national remainder calculation)

81,60 83,1

2,34

2,70

2,62

%11,5

0,62

29,8

1969

Proportional representatio n (d'Hondt calculation, no threshold)

74

88,7

9,03

3,29

2,34

%11,7

0,57

12,6

1973

Proportional representatio n (d'Hondt calculation, no threshold)

63,10 74,2

6,83

4,30

3,32

%16,9

0,70

30,1

1977

Proportional representatio n (d'Hondt calculation, no threshold)

78,30 89,3

6,58

3,12

2,47

%15,5

0,60

18,3

Election year

Electoral System

2PV (%)

1961

Proportional representatio n (d'Hondt calculation, constituency threshold)

1965

2PS (%)

2PV: Total vote share of the two largest parties, 2PS: Total seat share of the two largest parties in the parliament, ENEP: Effective number of electoral parties, ENPP: Effective number of parliamentary parties

vote share and socio-economic development indicators such as urbanization, industrialization, and education levels in electoral districts continued. One of the pivotal factors underpinning this correlation in the 1970s was Ecevit’s positioning of the CHP’s ideology as left-ofcenter and the formulation of appealing policy propositions for the lower socioeconomic strata, thereby making the CHP a preferred choice for the votes of “gecekondu” (shantytown) residents in major urban centers. Following the 1965 elections, another noteworthy trend in the electoral geography was the emergence of nationalist and Islamist far-right parties as the favored option for a substantial segment of voters who had previously supported center-right parties in rural areas, particularly in Central Anatolia (C ¸ arko˘glu and Avcı, 2002, p. 124). This transformation not only solidified the divide within the right-wing political spectrum but also introduced regionalization as a fourth dimension into T¨urkiye’s electoral geography, ¨ alongside what Ozbudun (2000, 2013) referred to as the “three maladies” of Turkish politics: polarization, fragmentation, and volatility.

Elections From 1961 to 1977

45

Amidst the escalating fragmentation within right-wing parties and a mounting call for social justice among the urban poor, the CHP, by shifting its political discourse away from statism and presenting voters with social democratic policy alternatives, clinched electoral victories during the 1970s. Since the 1969 elections, there have been significant transformations in the regional distribution of the CHP’s electoral support. The CHP’s sway in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, stemming from patronage networks inherited from the single-party era, has markedly receded. In contrast, T¨urkiye’s industrial hubs and well-developed cities, notably in the Marmara region, have solidified as CHP strongholds (Bekaro˘glu and Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu, 2021, p. 12). To comprehend this significant transformation in electoral geography, it is crucial to delve into the demographic shifts that occurred in T¨urkiye during the 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, it is essential to underscore that the proportion of the urban population within the total population surged from 18.5 percent in 1950 to 38.2 percent in 1970, further escalating to 43.8 percent in 1980. T¨urkiye’s total population doubled from 20.9 million in 1950 to 44.7 million in 1980, while the urban population witnessed a sixfold augmentation, surging from 3.8 million to 19.3 million. As observed in other developing nations, this rapid urbanization embodies two significant facets. First, urbanization manifests unevenly across geographical areas, with pronounced concentration in major cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Second, the newcomers to urban areas predominantly establish unauthorized and unregulated settlements and livelihoods. The percentage of the population dwelling in shantytowns, an outcome of this form of settlement, was merely 4.7 percent of the urban population in 1955, ascending to 16.4 percent in 1960 and 23.6 percent in 1970. Istanbul and Ankara faced an even more acute situation. By the end of the 1970s, 65 percent of Ankara’s population and 45 percent of Istanbul’s population were residing in shantytowns (Erman, 2012). Considering that the paramount concern of this new breed of urban voters was survival, it comes as no surprise that they exhibited a pragmatic approach in their voting behavior. Hence, it is evident that the dominant parties of that era, the AP and the CHP, veered towards making promises directly linked to the essential needs of these individuals, rather than relying on ideological discourses to win over the urban poor (Wuthrich, 2015, p. 162). Voter behavior in response to these promises was notably volatile. While the urban poor predominantly voted for the AP in the 1969 elections, they shifted their allegiance to the CHP in the 1973 and 1977 elections, particularly in Ankara, ˙Istanbul, and ˙Izmir, where CHP support significantly exceeded the national average. For instance, in the 1973 elections, while the CHP’s national vote share was 33.3 percent, its vote in ˙Istanbul stood at 48.9 percent. Similarly, in 1977, the CHP’s vote in ˙Istanbul reached 58.2 percent, as opposed to the national average of 41.4 ¨ percent. In a broader context, as highlighted by Ozbudun and Tachau (1975), it becomes apparent that from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, the CHP experienced an upsurge in

46

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

support nationwide, particularly in the Marmara, Mediterranean, and southeastern regions. The absence of a rival party that could appeal to left-leaning voters played a pivotal role in this phenomenon, while the AP began to shed some of its support among the urban poor and voters in less developed regions to far-right parties, commencing a downward trajectory. In conclusion, it is beneficial to offer a comprehensive assessment of the electoral systems employed in the elections spanning from 1961 to 1977 and their impact on voter behavior and the political landscape. Throughout this period, various iterations of proportional representation-based electoral systems were utilized. The elections were conducted using the d’Hondt system with a constituency threshold in 1961, the national remainder system in 1965, and the d’Hondt system without a threshold in the subsequent three elections. As anticipated with proportional electoral systems in general, the degree of disproportionality in the elections held in the 1960s and 1970s was relatively low when compared to other periods in Turkish political history. As elucidated in Table 5, although the disproportionality levels were exceedingly low at 2.04 and 2.34 in 1961 and 1965, respectively, they saw a modest increase to 9.03 in 1969, 6.83 in 1973, and 6.58 in 1977. It is worth noting that these figures remained considerably lower than those witnessed in the 1950s. Overall, the indicators in Table 5 reveal dynamic shifts in the political landscape from 1961 to 1977. In 1961, a constituency threshold in the d’Hondt proportional representation system yielded high values for the total vote share of the two largest parties (2PV) and total seat share (2PS), underscoring the dominance of these parties. The relatively low level of disproportionality indicated a more equitable seat distribution. Subsequent elections witnessed shifts in these trends. The use of different calculation methods and the removal of the threshold in 1969 led to increased disproportionality. While anti-system party vote shares fluctuated, voter volatility experienced significant variations. These trends emphasize the sensitivity of electoral outcomes to changes in the electoral system, showcasing the multifaceted dynamics of political competition and representation during this period. While polarization, fragmentation and vote share of anti-system parties increase in this period, it appears that government instabilities were not simply an outcome of proportional representation. Indeed, in 1965 and 1969, the AP managed to secure parliamentary majorities, enabling the formation of single-party governments. In the other elections, even in the absence of such a majority, the party with the highest vote share was able to form a coalition government by engaging a smaller party. In other words, these elections, conducted under proportional representation systems emphasizing equitable representation, did not lead to government instability. Therefore, it is plausible to interpret that the challenges faced in forming governments at times were not primarily due to fragmentation brought about by the electoral system, but rather stemmed from the absence of a culture of compromise among political parties in parliament or the ideological polarization exacerbated by the Cold War

Elections From 1961 to 1977

47

environment (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 120). Nonetheless, the inability to establish stable governments in parliament, particularly in the late 1970s, along with the ensuing political instability marked by street violence, ultimately culminated in a military coup on September 12, 1980.

CHAPTER 4 Elections From 1983 to 1999: Fragmentation and Volatility in the Proportional System With 10 Percent Threshold

Elections From 1983 to 1999

49

The architects of the September 12 coup identified politicians as a primary catalyst for the political turmoil of the 1970s. Consequently, all political parties existing before September 12 were disbanded, and their leaders were prohibited from participating in politics. Beginning in 1982, the military regime initiated some measures towards liberalization, permitting the establishment of new political parties in 1983, provided they had no affiliations with the previously banned parties, and allowing for multi-party elections in the same year. However, only three political parties were granted authorization to participate in the 1983 general elections. Of these three parties, Halkc¸ı Parti (the People’s Party, HP) and Milliyetc¸i Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, MDP) were composed of retired military personnel and civilians who had no ties to the proscribed political parties. The HP was intended to represent the center-left, while the MDP was positioned to capture the center-right vote. The third party was Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), led by civilians, which, akin to the MDP, sought to appeal the center-right electorate. Established in 1983 under the leadership ¨ of Turgut Ozal, ANAP secured the backing of conservative and nationalist voters with roots predating 1970, and to the surprise of the military regime, emerged as the triumphant party in the 1983 elections. ANAP governed the country with single-party governments until the 1991 elections, and during the 1990s, it played a pivotal role in the political landscape until 2002 as one of the two prominent parties representing the center-right. Table 6: Relevant parties and election results, 1983-1999 Party

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

Vote share (%)

Seats

HP-SHPCHP

30,5

117

24,8

99

20,8

88

10,7

49

8,7

-

DSP

-

-

8,5

-

10,8

7

14,6

76

22,2

136

ANAP

45,1

211

36,3

292

24,0

115

19,6

132

13,2

132

MDP

23,3

71

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

DYP

-

-

19,1

59

27

178

19,2

135

12

85

RP-FP

-

-

7,2

-

16,9

62

21,4

158

15,4

111

MHP

-

-

2,9

-

-

-

8,2

-

18,0

129

HEP / HADEP

-

-

-

-

-

-

4,2

-

4,7

-

50

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

On the other hand, following the transition to democracy, parties seen as successors to the banned parties began to re-emerge under new names. Do˘gru Yol Partisi (the True Path Party, DYP), which positioned itself as the heir to the proscribed AP, was established in 1983 and, alongside ANAP, became another prominent representative of the center-right until 2002. The HP, representing the center-left in the 1983 elections, merged with Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi (the Social Democracy Party, SODEP), subsequently altering its name to Sosyal Demokrat Halkc¸ı Parti (the Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP) in 1985. In 1992, the CHP was reconstituted following the removal of obstacles that had hindered the formation of the pre1980 parties. After the SHP merged with the re-established CHP in 1995, the CHP solidified its position as one of the primary center-left parties of the era. The other significant contender in this domain was B¨ulent Ecevit’s Demokratik Sol Parti (the Democratic Left Party, DSP), who had been the charismatic leader of the CHP prior to the coup. Ecevit opted not to return to the CHP but instead charted its own course by establishing another party. In this context, leading up to the 2002 elections, the SHP-CHP and the DSP vied for the center-left vote, while the DYP and ANAP competed for the center-right vote. This representation of centrist politics by two major parties marked a new development in Turkish political history. It underscored the continued expansion of party system fragmentation throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Looking beyond the center-right and center-left, it is possible to observe both the continuation of pre-1980 political movements and the emergence of new entrants. The MSP, one of the anti-system parties from the pre-1980 period, was reborn as Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party, RP). However, in 1998, the RP was dissolved by the AYM due to its anti-secular stance and was succeeded by Fazilet Partisi (the Virtue Party, FP). Milliyetc¸i C ¸ alıs¸ma Partisi (the Nationalist Working Party, MC ¸ P), which followed in the footsteps of the MHP, merged with the re-established MHP in 1992. This period also witnessed the founding of Kurdish political parties, which would assume significant roles in Turkish politics from the 1990s onward. The first of these parties was Halkın Emek Partisi (the People’s Labor Party, HEP), established by Kurdish nationalists who had left the SHP in 1990. Following the dissolution of the HEP, Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (the People’s Democracy Party, HADEP) emerged in 1993 to represent the Kurdish political movement throughout the 1990s. 4.1. 1980s: Unrealized Desire for a Two-Party System The 1982 Constitution, similar to the 1961 Constitution, did not prescribe a specific electoral system but rather outlined the fundamental principles governing free and fair elections. Article 67 of the constitution stipulated that “elections and referendums shall be held under the administration and supervision of the courts on the basis of free, equal, secret, one-tier, universal suffrage, and open counting and casting.”13 The responsibility of formulating an electoral law was delegated to the Constituent Assembly established by the military regime. 13 For

the original text of the 1982 Constitution as published in the Official Gazette dated October 20, 1982, see https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17844.pdf.

Elections From 1983 to 1999

51

In the report submitted by the Consultative Assembly, the civilian branch of the Constituent Assembly, clarifying the electoral law it had developed, it is evident that it attributed the political crises and the frailty of governments during the 1970s to the electoral system: “As is known and experienced, the period leading up to September 12 was marked by a series of unstable coalition governments and the unfortunate events that unfolded during the formation and sustenance of these coalitions. Consequently, there was a consensus that the new electoral system to be introduced should, above all, prioritize stability to the greatest extent possible, and rules were sought to achieve this objective. (. . . ) A comparison was made between the majoritarian system and the proportional representation system, with the d’Hondt method of proportional representation ultimately being chosen. However, in order to prevent the representation of minor parties in the legislature, the establishment of a threshold was deemed necessary. After extensive research, a nationwide threshold of 10 percent was adopted. On the other hand, at the provincial level, it was deemed fair that parties failing to surpass the number of votes derived from dividing the total valid votes by the number of deputies to be elected (electoral district threshold) should not participate in the seat allocation process.” (cited in Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 123).

The system devised with these intentions was enshrined in the Electoral Law of June 10, 1983, designated as Law No. 2839. It featured the d’Hondt method of proportional representation and included both a 10 percent national threshold and a constituency threshold. Notably, the decision to set the national threshold at 10 percent, the most stringent globally, was defended by Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup who assumed the presidency in 1982, with the following justifications: ”After extensive deliberations, it was decided to set the threshold at 10 percent. In my view, the greater the number of parties in parliament, the more likely coalition governments become. If we examine the United States and the United Kingdom, we observe the existence of two major parties, with other parties having limited or no representation, resulting in infrequent changes of government between elections and reduced instances of political crises. I earnestly desire that we could have two dominant parties similar to those countries, and that the transfer of power would occur between these two major parties. ¨ (cited in Ozbudun, 2016, p. 96).

Evren’s desire materialized in an electoral system featuring a dual threshold that favored major parties and penalized smaller ones. Under Law No. 2839, a further provision favored larger parties. Unlike previous periods where each city constituted an electoral district, this law reduced the larger districts to a maximum of seven parliamentary seats. In proportional representation systems, the reduction of electoral districts tends to increase disproportionality, thereby working against the interest of smaller parties. This law faced extensive criticism for undermining the fairness of representation, but it it remained immune from constitutional challenge before the Constitutional Court (AYM) as it fell within the category of laws deemed ”not subject to constitutional contradiction” under the provisions of the provisional Article

52

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

15 of the 1982 Constitution. In the 1983 elections conducted under this law, another measure aligned with Evren’s wishes was implemented, allowing only three parties to participate. Upon analyzing the results of the 1983 elections, it became clear that one party representing the center-right and another representing the center-left took center stage in parliament, aligning with the expectations of both Evren and the architects of the electoral law. Nevertheless, in contrast to the expected outcome, it was the ANAP, rather than the anticipated MDP, which represented the center-right, that managed to capture 211 out of 400 parliamentary seats with 45.1 percent of the vote share, establishing a single-party government—a development that had not been foreseen by the military junta. After the ban on political parties was lifted through a 1987 referendum, the parliament opted to hold the subsequent general elections earlier, on November 29, 1987. During this period, the ANAP, akin to the governments of the 1950s and 1960s, did not shy away from meddling in electoral systems for its favor. The ANAP majority in parliament, therefore, introduced several significant changes to the electoral law in 1986, just prior to the 1987 elections. The first of these amendments was the introduction of the quota candidacy regulation, outlined in Law No. 3270 dated April 15, 1986. Under this modification, parties were obliged to nominate “one quota candidate in each of the electoral districts that would elect 5, 6, and 7 deputies,” and the “quota candidate of the political party that received the highest number of valid votes in the electoral district ” would secure the parliamentary seat “regardless of whether the candidate surpassed the constituency threshold.” Additionally, this law also raised the electoral district threshold by stipulating that the calculation to determine the threshold in electoral districts where quota candidates were nominated would be based on one less than the total number of deputies (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 127). In this manner, Law No. 3270 further reinforced the inherent bias of the electoral system in favor of major parties. After all, ANAP, being the largest party, holds an advantage over other parties in obtaining both quota candidacies and parliamentary seats that might have been allocated to parties failing to surpass their respective constituency thresholds. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) introduced a new electoral adjustment through Law No. 3361 on May 17, 1987. This amendment increased the number of deputies from 400 to 450 and established the voting age at 21. Shortly thereafter, another change in electoral regulations followed. This change pertained to the size of electoral districts and the election of quota candidates. Law No. 3377, enacted on May 23, 1987, further streamlined the electoral districts, reducing the maximum number of parliamentary seats in a district from seven to six. Furthermore, the districts in which quota candidates were to be nominated were specifically identified as those that would yield 4, 5, and 6 parliamentary seats. This modification resulted in an increase in the number of candidates elected through a first-past-the-post system and further solidified the advantage of major political parties. Also,

Elections From 1983 to 1999

53

immediately before the 1987 elections, two minor modifications were introduced to clarify Article 34 of Law No. 2839. First, Law No. 3403 on September 10, 1987, elevated the electoral threshold to 20 percent, with the rule that “in electoral districts that will produce six deputies, the division (to determine the electoral threshold) shall be made by one less.” Subsequently, Law No. 3404, enacted on October 17, 1987, was implemented to address confusion arising from the YSK’s interpretation of quota candidacies. This law introduced the provision that “in constituencies where quota candidates are nominated, the division process (to determine the constituency threshold) and the distribution of deputies will be conducted with one less than the number of deputies these constituencies will yield” (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 129). Interestingly, the AYM, which had deemed the electoral district threshold unconstitutional in 1968, did not find the 1986 and 1987 amendments unconstitutional in its decisions numbered 1987/11 and 1987/27. The AYM justified these decisions on the grounds that the Constitution did not explicitly specify the electoral system, leaving the choice to the legislature, and that a ¨ decision on the electoral system fell outside the Court’s conformity review (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 97). It is evident that the 1987 elections, which took place after the AYM’s decision not to intervene in the amendments to the electoral law, yielded results in line with the expectations of the ANAP. While ANAP’s share of the vote declined from 45.1 percent to 36.3 percent, its representation in parliament increased from 52.7 percent to 65 percent. Apart from ANAP, only two other parties entered the TBMM: the SHP, the successor to the CHP, received 24.7 percent of the vote and 99 deputies, and S¨uleyman Demirel’s new party, the DYP, secured 19.1 percent of the vote and 59 deputies. The remaining parties were hindered by the double threshold and could not win any representation in the TBMM. In short, 1987 elections were characterized by the manufactured parliamentary majority of ANAP and the 19.8 percent of votes that went unrepresented. When analyzing the level of disproportionality, it becomes evident that the 22.3 percent disproportionality in the 1987 elections was a near return to the rates seen under the bloc vote majoritarian system in the 1950s (Yılmaz, 2020, p. 355). 4.2. 1990s: Increasing Fragmentation and Volatility The first general election after 1987 was originally scheduled for November 1992. However, with the enactment of Law No. 3757 on August 24, 1991, it was decided to move the election to October 20, 1991. This same law also introduced several amendments to the Electoral Code, with one of the notable changes designed to benefit smaller political parties. Specifically, it stipulated that in the 19th parliamentary elections, the constituency threshold mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 34 of Parliamentary Election Law No. 2839 would be set at 25 percent in electoral districts that would elect two or three deputies, and at 20 percent in electoral districts that would elect five deputies (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 132). The primary motivation behind this adjustment, which offered a slight advantage to smaller

54

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

parties, was most likely to counterbalance the increasing popularity of the DYP and the SHP by improving the prospects of smaller political parties that could potentially attract some of the voters who would otherwise support ANAP’s larger competitors. Another noteworthy change introduced by this law was the inclusion of the option for voters to cast preferential votes for party lists. Interestingly, the preferential voting system did not function effectively despite its inclusion in the original text of Law No. 2839. This provision clarified how preferential voting would be conducted: “if the number of valid preferences received by any candidate on the list exceeds 15 percent of all the valid votes received by the political party in that constituency, those to be elected as deputies from that party shall be determined in order, starting with the candidate who received the highest number of preferences” (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 132). Therefore, in the period beginning in 1983, voters had the opportunity to cast preferential votes for the first time during the 1991 elections. The likely motivation of the ANAP government in implementing this change was that the preferential voting might work to the disadvantage of its political adversaries by potentially boosting their intra-party competition and disrupting party discipline,. During the 1991 elections held under these regulations, certain parties that were likely to be affected by the 10 percent national threshold sought to overcome the challenging nature of the electoral system by forming electoral alliances. In this context, the RP, the MC ¸ P, and Islahatc¸ı Demokrasi Partisi (the Reformist Democracy Party, IDP) established an electoral alliance, while the HEP candidates participated in the elections on the SHP lists. This marked the onset of a new era where the number of influential parties in parliament increased. Furthermore, ANAP, which had lost its grip on power in the 1991 elections with 24 percent of the vote, and the DYP, which had emerged victorious with 27 percent of the vote, failed to secure a parliamentary majority to govern independently. As a result, T¨urkiye entered a period of coalition governments. The fragmented party structure in the TBMM and coalition governments persisted throughout the 1990s until the 2002 elections. There were two other very important changes concerning the electoral system in the 1990s. The first, undoubtedly, was the constitutional amendment introduced by Law No. 4121 on July 23, 1995. This amendment broadened the discretionary authority of the Constitutional Court in relation to the electoral system. It added a paragraph to Article 67 of the Constitution, stating that “the electoral law shall be regulated in a way that balances the principles of fair ¨ representation and stability in governance” (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 97). Additionally, this law lowered the voting age to 18. Following this constitutional amendment, the Turkish Grand National Assembly decided on October 27, 1995 to hold early elections on December 24, 1995. On the same day, Law No. 4125 introduced several crucial changes regarding the conduct of elections. This law increased the number of deputies from 450 to 550 and allowed Turkish citizens living abroad to participate in the electoral process. Furthermore, Article

Elections From 1983 to 1999

55

21 of Law No. 4125 eliminated quota candidacies and preferential voting, while Article 17 specified that 100 of the 550 deputies would be elected from “national electoral district” through a d’Hondt calculation with a national threshold of 10 percent (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 134). In other words, these 100 deputies, referred to as “T¨urkiye deputies,” would be allocated to parties based on the proportion of votes exceeding the 10 percent national threshold, rather than any other criteria. Law No. 4125 also restructured the electoral districts by designating each city as a single electoral district, effectively reverting to the pre-1980 framework. However, cities with more than 18 deputies were further divided into two or three districts. Under this arrangement, cities with between 19 and 35 deputies were divided into two electoral districts, while those with 36 or more deputies were divided into three electoral districts. Furthermore, Article 16 of Law 4125 addressed the electoral district threshold. According to this amendment, the electoral district threshold was calculated by dividing it by the number of deputies in the respective region, with a consistent ratio of 25 percent maintained in provinces with 2 or 3 deputies (Y¨uzbas¸ıo˘glu, 1996, p. 135). Undoubtedly, the expansion of electoral districts and the reduction of the constituency threshold benefit small and medium-sized political parties while minimizing disproportionality. Still, it is reasonable to infer that these adjustments were made with the expectation that smaller parties would garner votes that might otherwise have gone to the rival parties. Nevertheless, some of these extensive amendments were invalidated by the Constitutional Court before they could be put into practice. Due to a legal challenge about the Law No. 4125, the AYM invalidated the sections of this law related to the “national parliamentary constituency” and the “electoral constituency threshold” in its Decision No. 1995/59. The AYM’s reasoning for invalidating the national parliamentary constituency was based on the argument that deputies are “tied to their respective regions” and are elected “solely through the votes they receive from their region.” The Court asserted that Article 75 of the Constitution ¨ is not conducive to “classifying and designating deputies differently” (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 98). On the other hand, the AYM’s interpretation of electoral district threshold was as follows: “Introducing a new threshold for each electoral district is inconsistent with the principle of ‘fairness in representation’ when a national threshold is already in place for parliamentary elections, as established to uphold the ‘principle of stability in governance’ aimed for by the Constitution. Furthermore, the d’Hondt system, a form of proportional ¨ representation, inherently includes its own threshold” (Ozbudun, 2016, p. 98). According ¨ to Ozbudun, both of the AYM’s justifications are unfounded. This is because Article 75 of the Constitution, which states that deputies “represent the entire nation and not the region from which they were elected or those who elected them,” actually aligns with the “T¨urkiye ¨ deputy” regulation. Furthermore, Ozbudun contends that the regulation in question does not

56

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

differentiate between deputies; instead, it grants equal status to all deputies, regardless of ¨ their method of election. According to Ozbudun, the Constitutional Court’s decision, which upheld the national threshold as constitutional and deemed the electoral district threshold ¨ as unconstitutional, is perplexing (Ozbudun, 2016, pp. 98-99). Nevertheless, in the end of the day, the AYM’s decision was conclusive, cementing T¨urkiye’s electoral system as a proportional representation system with a 10 percent national threshold and the d’Hondt calculation method. This system remained in effect with only minor adjustments until 2018 when the national electoral threshold was reduced to 7 percent and the ability to form official electoral alliances was introduced, as will be discussed in the next chapter. When analyzing the impact of the electoral systems in the 1990s, a notable rise in the number of political parties in parliament is evident, with both the center-right and centerleft factions being represented by two parties each. Simultaneously, there was a reduction in the level of disproportionality, particularly after the 1995 elections when the electoral district threshold was eliminated. This reduction brought the disproportionality closer to the levels observed in elections between 1969 and 1977 when the d’Hondt system was employed without any threshold. Hence, the 10 percent national threshold in the electoral system did not achieve its anticipated purpose during this period. Indeed, parties like the RP and the MHP, often considered extreme right-wing or anti-system parties, not only exceeded the 10 percent threshold, guaranteeing their presence in parliament, but also achieved significant electoral success. The RP received the highest number of votes in 1995, while the MHP secured the second-highest number of votes in 1999. The surge of these parties might be attributed to the weariness of the electorate with the coalition governments formed between the center-right DYP and the center-left SHP after the 1991 elections. Voters turned to alternative political actors beyond the traditional center-right and center-left choices. The 1990s were characterized by the existence of unstable coalition governments. The fragmentation of the party system, particularly the emergence of multiple parties representing center-right and left ideologies and the intensification of competition among them, seem to have had a more pronounced impact on this instability than the electoral system itself. Furthermore, the increase in the vote share of extreme right-wing parties reflects an escalation in polarization, which is a critical factor contributing to governmental instability. In addition to the political factors contributing to the instability during this period, which are linked to the electoral and party systems, it is essential to acknowledge the role of T¨urk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (the Turkish Armed Forces, TSK) in political intervention through Milli G¨uvenlik Konseyi (the National Security Council, MGK). Following the 1995 elections, due to concerns about the Islamist ideology of the RP, which received the plurality of the votes, the responsibility for forming a government was entrusted not to RP leader Necmettin Erbakan but to ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz. However, the formation of a stable government proved to

Elections From 1983 to 1999

57

be elusive. Erbakan was subsequently tasked with forming a government on June 28, 1996, resulting in the establishment of a government with the DYP, known as Refah-Yol. However, this government’s tenure came to an end on June 18, 1997, due to the unfolding “post-modern coup” process, which commenced with the MGK meeting on February 28, 1997. Following the fall of the government, it was expected that DYP leader Tansu C ¸ iller would be entrusted with forming a new government. However, then-President S¨uleyman Demirel assigned this responsibility to Yılmaz. Subsequently, a fragile minority government, influenced by the TSK, governed T¨urkiye until the 1999 elections. Following the 1999 elections, with the repercussions of February 28 still looming, the 57th government, one of the most stable in Turkish political history, was formed. This government brought together ideologically disparate parties, including the center-left DSP, the far-right MHP, and the center-right ANAP, and it governed T¨urkiye from May 28, 1999, until the 2002 elections. During this period, there was a rapid enactment of European Union harmonization laws. However, in the wake of a significant financial crisis, early elections were called in 2002. The outcome of the 2002 elections marked the near disappearance of the center-right and center-left parties that had dominated the political landscape in the 1990s, resulting in the highest voter volatility of 56.8 percent in the multi-party era. In this regard, 2002 was unquestionably a “critical realignment” election. 4.3. Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 1983 to 1999 In comparison to the military regime established after the 1960 coup, the regime resulting from the 1980 coup lasted longer and undertook more ambitious efforts to influence the political landscape following the transition to multiparty elections. Key actions within the scope of this book include the prohibition of all pre-1980 parties and their leaders, the appointment of coup leader Kenan Evren as the president from 1982 to 1989, the expansion of the president’s and the MGK’s powers, the allowance of only three parties to participate in the 1983 elections, two of which were established by the military regime, and the introduction of a national electoral threshold set at 10 percent. The 1983 elections, in particular, were conducted under ¨ stringent oversight and were therefore described as “semi-competitive elections” (Ozbudun, 2013, p. 1). The party that secured victory in 1983 general elections, ANAP, employed a straightforward and service-oriented communication style in its campaigns, as opposed to relying on abstract ideological messages. This approach is emblematic of what Cizre (2002, p. 84) characterized as a highly pragmatic form of ”political entrepreneurship.” Given the highly polarized political discourse and the volatile economic and political conditions in the ¨ pre-1980 era, the electorate also gravitated towards Ozal’s party, appreciating his economic expertise and technocratic approach. In the 1983 elections, ANAP’s votes did not display any significant regional pattern and were rather evenly distributed throughout the country. On the other hand, the MDP, which

58

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

aimed to capture right-wing votes, found success in only a few constituencies in southeastern Anatolia. It can be argued that the state of emergency imposed after the coup and the relationships established by the military administration with local tribal groups (as¸iret)14 had an impact in this context. During the same elections, the HP, which aimed to attract leftist votes, outperformed the MDP. While it primarily gained the upper hand in regions located in eastern, southeastern, western Anatolia, and the central Black Sea region, an analysis of its overall vote share reveals a nationalization level of 0.917. This nationalization level was ¨ slightly lower than ANAP’s, which stood at 0.932 points (Ozhan and Bekaro˘glu, 2021, p.36). Table 7: Party and electoral system indicators in parliamentary elections, 1983-1999 Election year

Electoral System

2PV (%)

2PS (%)

Disproportionality

ENEP

ENPP

Vote share of antisystem parties

Parliamentary fragmentation

Voter volatility

1983

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, constituency and national thresholds)

75,60

82,2

6,83

2,85

2,52

0

0,60

n/a

1987

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, constituency and national thresholds, quota candidate)

61,10

86,9

22,30

4,11

2,05

10,9

0,51

38,5

1991

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, constituency and national thresholds, quota candidate, preferential list)

51

65,1

11,33

4,67

3,58

17,3

0,72

20,3

1995

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

41

52,7

9,78

6,16

4,40

35,4

0,77

22,5

1999

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

40,20

48,2

9,45

6,78

4,87

41,9

0,79

22,3

14 As¸iret

is used to describe large family groups of the tribe type, usually in the southeastern regions of T¨urkiye. According to Ert¨urk (2015), tribes have different relationships with the state. While some have problematic relations with the central authority, others may cooperate in the context of mutual interests.

Elections From 1983 to 1999

59

Similar geographic patterns persisted in the 1987 elections, with a few exceptions. For instance, Isparta, the hometown of S¨uleyman Demirel, predominantly voted for the DYP, while in Diyarbakır and Tunceli, where Kurdish voters were concentrated, the SHP emerged as the top choice. In regions where the HP had garnered more votes in the previous elections, the SHP took the lead. Subsequent to the 1987 elections, and especially following the 1991 elections, where banned leaders re-entered the political arena and Kurdish political parties emerged, ANAP embarked on a new phase marked by a decline in votes. Additionally, this period witnessed substantial increases in party fragmentation, polarization within the party system, and heightened voter volatility. Also, one of the primary features of this new era was a decline in the level of nationalization of the parties and the persistence of specific regional trends. Notably, a substantial number of Kurdish citizens shifted their support away from various political parties toward those representing Kurdish politics. The electorate in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, which had previously exhibited a high level of voter volatility, began consistently supporting parties that were the successors of the HEP since the mid-1990s.15 This trend remained unchanged despite the successive closure of these parties. Even during the major realignment of the Turkish party system in the 2002 elections, voter volatility in the southeastern regions was 10 points lower than the national Turkish average (S¸ekercio˘glu and Arıkan, 2008, p. 225). Another noteworthy trend that defined the electoral landscape of the 1990s is the attraction of voters in Central Anatolia to Islamist and Turkish nationalist parties. On the other hand, the RP, representing an Islamist inclination, began to draw support from lower-income voters in major cities in more developed regions, particularly in Ankara and Istanbul. These voters had previously aligned with the CHP in the political contests of the 1970s. As Secor (2001, p. 546) points out, this shift can be explained by “new geographies created by rural-urban migration and shifting class orientations.” In summary, the era characterized by the right-left ideological spectrum, during which center-right and center-left parties did not display clear geographical distinctions in their electoral performance, came to an end. Since the mid-1990s, an electoral geography driven by anti-system and far-right parties has emerged. As C ¸ arko˘glu argued (2002, p. 33), by the end of the 1990s, the formation of approximately three regions with distinguishable voter tendencies had been solidified. Voters in the less socioeconomically developed eastern and southeastern regions leaned toward supporting Kurdish political parties and small anti-system parties. Meanwhile, regions along the Black Sea, Aegean, and Mediterranean coasts tended to back center-right and center-left parties. Voters in Central Anatolian regions, which fell outside of these areas, tended to favor far-right parties. Overall, as can be seen in Table 7, T¨urkiye’s electoral geography and electoral behavior witnessed some transformative changes. The inclusion of quota candidates and preferential 15 In

Bekaro˘glu and Osmanbas¸o˘glu’s (2021, p. 6) study, which analyzes this situation through the case of Van, it is clearly seen that the high volatility of the Kurdish electorate continued until the early 1990s, but then stabilized.

60

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

lists in 1987, and later the relaxation of thresholds were pivotal in altering electoral dynamics. Among these, perhaps the most important one was the burgeoning influence of anti-system parties that underscored evolving voter preferences. Also, the increasing parliamentary fragmentation and voter volatility signify the emergence of a more multifarious and fluid political environment, partially an outcome of changing electoral rules.

CHAPTER 5 Elections Since 2002: From a Dominant Party System to Increasing Fragmentation

62

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

The 2002 general elections marked a significant realignment in voter behavior and the party system in T¨urkiye, as noted by various scholars (e.g., Tosun, 2003; Akarca and Bas¸levent, 2011; Tezc¨ur, 2012). Votes for the ANAP and DYP, representing the center-right in the 1980s and 90s, saw a sharp decline, falling below the 10 percent national threshold in 2002 and resulting in the loss of all their parliamentary seats. Similarly, the DSP, one of the two parties representing the center-left during that period and leading the coalition government with the highest votes in the 1999 elections, suffered a significant loss of support, with its vote share dropping from 22.2 percent to 1.2 percent. This transformation marked the ascent of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party, AK Parti), established by the ”reformist” faction that had broken away from Fazilet Partisi (the Virtue Party, FP), the successor of the RP. The AK Parti became the primary choice for voters who had previously supported center-right and Islamist parties, ultimately securing power and winning all elections held since 2002. In the post-2002 era, the CHP, another center-left party, and the MHP, representing the nationalist tendency on the far right, continued to be significant political players. Furthermore, parties associated with the Kurdish political movement, which had been active in elections since the 1990s, assumed a crucial role in the post-2002 period. Initially, the Kurdish political movement participated in the 2002 elections as Demokratik Halk Partisi (the Democratic People’s Party, DEHAP). However, due to their parties being closed by the AYM, they adopted various names in subsequent elections, such as Demokratik Toplum Partisi (the Democratic Society Party, DTP), Barıs¸ ve Demokrasi Partisi (the Peace and Democracy Party, BDP), Halkların Demokratik Partisi (the Peoples’ Democracy Party, HDP), and Yes¸il Sol Parti (the Green Left, YSP). In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the Kurdish political movement chose to participate with independent candidates as a strategy to overcome the 10 percent national electoral threshold. However, in the June 7, 2015 elections, they ran under the banner of the HDP and achieved a historic 13.12 percent of the vote, securing 80 parliamentary seats. Subsequent elections saw Kurdish political parties successfully surpassing the national threshold and maintaining their presence in parliament. The post-2002 elections can be divided into two distinct periods, with a significant shift occurring after the 2017 referendum that introduced a change in T¨urkiye’s system of government, transitioning from a parliamentary system to a presidential system (Kaya Osmanbas¸o˘glu and Bekaro˘glu, 2019, p. 105). Subsequently, an amendment to the Parliamentary Election Law on March 13, 2018, made it possible for parties to form official alliances for elections. Therefore, since the 2018 elections, conducted under these new regulations, different dynamics have come into play compared to previous elections. One key change is that, starting in 2018, parliamentary election campaigns of the political parties have been overshadowed by the presidential campaign, following the approval of the 2017 referendum to hold presidential and parliamentary elections concurrently. This represents a significant shift, as parties are now

Elections Since 2002

63

compelled to align with a specific presidential candidate. Also, it has relatively diminished the importance of parliamentary elections, given the severed link between the votes parties receive and the formation of the government. Conversely, the 2018 regulation allowed parties to participate in elections through formal alliances, partially mitigating the impact of the 10 percent national electoral threshold that traditionally disadvantaged small parties. This change provided a boost to small parties by offering them the opportunity to enter parliament through alliances with larger parties. The subsequent reduction of the national electoral threshold to 7 percent in 2022 further enhanced the influence of this factor. Table 8: Relevant parties and election results, 2002-2023 Party

2002

2007

2011

2015 (7 June)

2015 (1 November)

2018

2023

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Vote

Seats

Ak Parti

34,3

363

46,6

341

49,8

327

40,9

258

49,5

317

42,6

295

35,6

268

CHP

19,4

178

20,9

112

26,0

135

24,9

132

25,3

134

22,7

146

25,6

169

MHP

8,4

-

14,3

71

13,0

53

16,3

80

11,9

40

11,1

49

10,7

50

İYİP

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

10,0

43

9,7

43

DEHAPDTPBDPHDP-YSP

6,2

-

*

21

*

35

13,1

80

10,8

59

11,7

67

8,8

61

YRP

2,8

5

ZP

2,2

-

TİP

1,8

4

* In the 2007 and 2011 general elections, the party ran with independent candidates to overcome the national electoral threshold.

Indeed, i the post-2017 period, there has been a noticeable surge in the number of political parties participating in T¨urkiye’s political landscape, especially in terms of representation ˙ Parti (the Good Party, ˙IY˙IP) stands out within parliament. Notably, the emergence of Iyi among these political parties. The formation of ˙IY˙IP did not arise from the opportunities created by alliance regulation but rather resulted from a split within the MHP after the 2015 elections. The MHP’s support for the ruling AK Parti following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and their collaboration in the constitutional amendments during the 2017 referendum led to an irreparable rupture between the opposition group and the MHP leadership. As a

64

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

result, the ˙IY˙IP was established in 2017, led by Meral Aks¸ener, after she and her opposition ˙ IP, ˙ numerous new and wing were expelled from the MHP. Since 2017, in addition to the IY existing smaller parties have gained traction in the political arena, primarily driven by the new dynamics resulting from the alliance regulation. Some of these parties have historical roots and represent specific ideologies or movements. Examples include Saadet Partisi (the ˙¸c¸i Partisi (the Felicity Party, SP), a continuation of the National View parties; T¨urkiye Is Workers’ Party of T¨urkiye, T˙IP), founded in 2017 with the aim of representing socialist-leftist ideology; B¨uy¨uk Birlik Partisi (the Great Unity Party, BBP), established in 1993 under the leadership of charismatic politician Muhsin Yazıcıo˘glu, who defected from the MHP; Vatan Partisi (the Fatherland Party, VP), founded in 2015 by Do˘gu Perinc¸ek, an influential leader within the left; and H¨ur Dava Partisi Partisi (the Free Cause Party, H¨uda Par), representing an Islamist Kurdish movement. In the post-2017 era, alongside the mentioned parties, some influential smaller parties ıcıoğ by popular politicians who had departed from larger political parties. Notable were formed ğ

examples include Memleket Partisi (the Hometown Party, MP), established in 2021 by Muharrem ˙Ince, who left the CHP; Gelecek Partisi (the Future Party, GP), launched in 2019 under the leadership of Ahmet Davuto˘glu, the former prime minister and chairperson who had İ

parted ways with the Ak Parti; and Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi (the Democracyğ and Progress ılı Party, DEVA), founded in 2020 under the guidance of Ali Babacan, the former minister of the

economy who also departed from the Ak Parti. Furthermore, Yeniden Refah Partisi (the New Welfare Party, YRP), established in 2018 by Fatih Erbakan, son of Necmettin Erbakan, and ğ ¨ ¨ Zafer Partisi (the Victory Party, ZP), founded in 2021 by Umit Ozda˘ g, who departed from the İYİ

˙IY˙IP, also had a significant impact on the political landscape. As further explained below, all of these parties significantly influenced the election results, especially in the 2023 elections, depending on whether they chose to engage in electoral alliances or refrain from doing so. Table 9: Number of parties participating in elections and represented in the parliament, 2011-2023 Election year

Number of parties participating in elections

Number of parties represented in the parliament

2011

15

4

7 June

20

4

1 November

16

4

2018

8

9

2023

24

14

2015

As indicated in Table 9, the number of parties participating in elections ranged between 15 and 20 in 2011 and 2015, while the number of parties entering parliament remained constant at 4. However, since 2018, there has been an increase in the number of parties participating in

İ

ı

Elections Since 2002

65

elections and those entering parliament, with this trend becoming particularly pronounced in the 2023 elections. The 2018 elections, originally scheduled for November 3, 2019 but held on April 20, 2018, as a sort of snap election at the request of the MHP, witnessed a decrease in the number of parties participating in the elections. However, despite the opposition parties not being fully prepared for the March 16 amendment to the electoral law that allowed for alliances, they took advantage of this alliance opportunity, leading to an increase in the number ˙ of parties entering parliament. In the 2018 elections, Cumhur Ittifakı (the People’s Alliance, ˙ C˙I), consisting of the Ak Parti, MHP, and BBP, and Millet Ittifakı (the Nation’s Alliance, M˙I), ˙ IP, ˙ SP, and DP, were the major players. Additionally, the HDP, the comprising the CHP, IY VP, and the H¨uda Par ran in 2018 elections without participating an alliance. On the other ˙ IP ˙ hand, the BBP joined with Ak Parti lists included some candidates from the BBP, the IY lists opened some space for the DP candidates, and the T˙IP candidates were included in the HDP lists. While the SP ran with its own lists, some of its candidates featured on the CHP lists, with two of them winning parliamentary seats. Subsequently, deputies who had initially entered parliament through other parties’ lists resigned and rejoined their respective parties. Consequently, the TBMM consisted of 9 parties: the Ak Parti, CHP, HDP, ˙IY˙I, MHP, Saadet, T˙IP, BBP, and DP in 2018. In the 2023 elections, there was an increase in both the number of alliances and the number of parties involved. Five electoral alliances were formed, and the emblems of 24 parties appeared on the ballot. Some of the alliance parties did not run with their own party lists but rather with the lists of the larger parties in the alliance. This means that the actual number of parties participating in the elections was more than 24. The CI˙ and the M˙I, established in the 2018 elections, expanded their alliances in the 2023 elections. The C˙I included the YRP, while H¨uda Par and DSP participated in the elections on Ak Parti lists, even though they were not officially part of the alliance. The DEVA and the GP, on the other hand, joined the M˙I. These two parties and the the SP candidates ran on the CHP lists. Additionally, ¨ url¨uk Ittifakı ˙ Emek ve Ozg¨ (the Labor and Freedom Alliance), founded by the YSP and T˙IP, ˙ Ata Ittifakı (the Ancesral Alliance), known for their anti-immigrant rhetoric, and Sosyalist G¨uc¸ Birli˘gi (the Socialist Power Union) formed by radical leftist parties, also participated in the 2023 elections. 5.1. Elections from 2002 to 2015: Rise of a Dominant Party System The regulations concerning the functioning of the electoral system in the 2000s began with a constitutional amendment. The Law No. 4709, which was enacted on October 3, 2001, marked a significant development in Turkish constitutional history by bringing about extensive amendments, modifying thirty-three articles of the 1982 Constitution. These changes were heavily influenced by the drive to align Turkish laws with European Union standards. One of these constitutional amendments added a clause to Article 67 of the Constitution, specifically

66

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

addressing how elections would be conducted in T¨urkiye. This new clause stated, “The amendments made to the electoral laws shall not be applied in the elections to be held within one year from the date of their entry into force.” The primary objective of this addition was to curtail the common practice of political parties with a parliamentary majority manipulating the electoral system shortly before elections to their advantage. Such manipulations had been prevalent up to that point as described in previous chapters. This regulatory measure was aimed at limiting such manipulations to a certain extent. After the 2001 constitutional amendment, the Ak Parti secured a parliamentary majority in the TBMM in the 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections, allowing it to form governments without the need for coalition partners. Remarkably, despite enjoying a parliamentary majority, the Ak Parti made limited alterations to the electoral system until 2018, primarily due to the existing system favoring the party. In fact, from 2002 to 2015 (with the exception of the June 7, 2015 elections), the Ak Parti was able to secure safe majorities in the TBMM even though it did not win a majority of the votes. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Ak Parti implemented some significant secondary amendments to the parliamentary election law between 2002 and 2018. One notable change concerned the voting age. The voting age for parliamentary elections was initially reduced from 30 to 25 by Law No. 5552 in 2006, and then further lowered to 18 through constitutional amendments approved in the 2017 referendum. As a result, both the voting age and the electoral age in T¨urkiye were set at 18 years old. The second significant change relates to making it easier for Turkish citizens residing abroad to vote in general elections. The Law No. 5749, enacted on March 13, 2008, introduced amendments to the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registration. These amendments established the Overseas District Election Board under the Ankara Provincial Election Board, leading to an increase in the number of ballot boxes in foreign countries. This allowed voters living abroad to cast their votes at embassies and designated polling stations instead of having to travel to customs gates to vote. This change had a significant impact, with voters living abroad increasingly participating in elections, especially since the 2015 parliamentary elections. In the 2014 presidential elections, the participation rate for overseas voters was 8.4 percent. This rate significantly increased to 40 percent in the November 1, 2015 elections and further to 44.6 percent in the 2017 referendum. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, out of 3,044,837 registered overseas voters, 1,525,279 cast their ballots, constituting approximately 3 percent of the total votes cast in T¨urkiye. Another important alteration was made regarding the frequency of parliamentary elections. Initially, the term of office for deputies was reduced from five to four years with Law No. 5922 on October 22, 2009, by the decision of the Ak Parti parliamentary majority. However, with the 2017 referendum, the term of office for deputies was restored to five years, determining that TBMM elections would be held every five years once again.

Elections Since 2002

67

An analysis of election outcomes during the period between 2002 and November 1, 2015, reveals a consistent trend. In all elections held during this period, except for the June 7, 2015 election, which was repeated due to the failure to form a government, the Ak Parti secured the majority to autonomously form a government in the TBMM. As a result, the 2002-2018 era in Turkish political life can be characterized as a “dominant party system” (C ¸ arko˘glu, 2011, p. 45). During this time, the number of effective parties decreased, and the Ak Parti was complemented in parliament by the center-left CHP, the far-right MHP, and a party representing the Kurdish political movement. This period also aligns with the conceptualization of “moderate pluralism” by Sartori (1976), as it portrays a scenario where limited number of parties on the right and left side of the spectrum primarily compete for votes in the centre. 5.2. The 2018 and 2023 Elections: Rising Polarization and Fragmentation The 2018 elections open a new era in T¨urkiye’s multi-party electoral history. Undoubtedly, the most important dynamic of this new era is the presidential system adopted in the 2017 referendum. As mentioned above, the fact that the presidential and parliamentary elections were held on the same day and that the government formation process became independent of the votes received by the parties had a significant impact on the results of the 2018 and 2013 elections. Additionally, while not directly related to the electoral system, the 2017 constitutional amendments included two crucial provisions pertinent to parliamentary elections. Firstly, the number of seats in the TBMM was increased from 550 to 600. Secondly, a provision regarding the renewal of elections was introduced, providing a mechanism to resolve potential significant deadlocks between the legislature and the executive in T¨urkiye’s transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system. In this unique structure, unlike traditional presidential systems where early elections are uncommon, both the president and the parliament hold the authority to initiate elections if faced with substantial impasses (Alkan, 2018, pp. 108-109). After the 2017 amendments, Article 116 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The Grand National Assembly of T¨urkiye may decide to renew the elections with a three-fifths majority of its total number of members. In this case, the general election of the Grand National Assembly of T¨urkiye and the presidential election shall be held together. If the President decides to renew the elections, the general election of the Grand National Assembly of T¨urkiye and the presidential election shall be held together. If the Parliament decides to renew the elections in the second term of the President, the President may run for another term.” While in the parliamentary system, a vote of no confidence in the government or a decision to hold early elections can be taken by a simple majority, T¨urkiye’s presidential system makes it more difficult for the parliament to do so by increasing the number of members to three-fifths. Prior to 2017, in T¨urkiye’s parliamentary system, there was no specific provision in the Constitution

68

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

or in the internal rules of the Parliament to decide on early elections, which was done in the Parliament according to the procedure set out in Article 96 of the Constitution. According to this article, Parliament convenes with “at least one third of the total number of its members” and decides ”by an absolute majority of those present at the meeting,” but the quorum cannot be “less than one quarter of one more than one quarter of the total number of its members.” Until 2018, such secondary revisions concerning the electoral system did not have a significant impact on the outcomes of the elections. Nevertheless, just before the 2018 elections, there were a number of comprehensive amendments to the Parliamentary Election Law, introduced through Law No. 7102 on March 13, 2018, significantly impacted the electoral system in T¨urkiye. This legislation, known as the “Law on Alliances,” established a legal framework for political parties to engage in electoral alliances, a departure from the previous de facto alliances where parties typically nominated parliamentary candidates from the largest party’s list in the alliance. A fundamental change brought about by this law was allowing parties within an alliance to participate in the elections with their own lists (Article 12/A). Moreover, if the total votes garnered by the alliance exceeded the 10 percent national threshold, the parties within the alliance were not required to individually surpass the threshold (Article 33). These modifications altered the dynamics of electoral competition by enabling political parties to join forces strategically while maintaining their distinct identities. With this new regulation, the ballots were changed and a space for the alliance and the political parties in the alliance was added to the ballot papers (Art. 26-b, additional paragraph). Thus, voters were given the opportunity to vote for an alliance in addition to voting for a political party. This of course makes the calculation of the conversion of votes into representation somewhat more complex. Accordingly, the votes printed in the alliance box on the ballots are counted as “alliance votes,” and the total alliance votes are calculated by taking the sum of the individual party votes and the alliance votes. In order to calculate the valid votes of a party in the alliance, the share from the alliance votes is added to the number of votes received by the political party in that electoral district. To calculate this share, first the number of votes obtained by each political party in the alliance is divided by the total votes garnered by all the parties within that alliance. The resulting coefficient is then multiplied by the total alliance votes (Art. 29, additional two sentences). This yields the share attributed to each party within the alliance based on their individual performance relative to the total votes of the alliance. In the end, this calculation method determines how the seats are allocated among parties within the electoral alliance. Overall, a two-stage d’Hondt calculation is used to distribute the number of representatives among the parties. In the first stage, the parliamentary seats in a constituency are distributed among alliances and non-alliance parties. In the second stage, the seats won by alliances are allocated to the parties within the alliance in proportion to their votes. This naturally works in favor of the smaller

Elections Since 2002

69

parties in the alliance. These parties not only avoid the national threshold, but also increase their votes after the distribution of alliance votes. In turn, the alliance regulation essentially encouraged strategic electoral alliances, influencing voter behavior and party strategies. The alliance regulation, established by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 13, 2018, and officially published in the Official Gazette on March 16, marked its debut during the June 24, 2018 elections. Per the Constitution, this regulation was not initially meant to be implemented within a year of its adoption. However, its validity in elections just three months later is attributed to a provisional article within the constitutional amendments package from the 2017 referendum. Temporary Article 21/H of this package stipulates that the provisions of Article 67 of the Constitution would not be applicable to the first general parliamentary election and the presidential election. Consequently, the amendments introduced by Law No. 7102 were in effect for the June 24 elections, leading to the formation of alliances both within the ruling party and the opposition, embracing the opportunity for such collaborations. In the end, The CI˙ was forged between the ruling Ak Parti and the supporting MHP, whereas the M˙I comprises the opposition CHP, ˙IY˙IP, and the SP. The governing bloc in T¨urkiye orchestrated the electoral alliance system expecting it to disadvantage the opposition, similar to prior electoral law adjustments in Turkish political history. Additionally, the elections were rescheduled from November 3, 2019, to June 24, 2018, furthering the Ak Parti and the MHP’s intent to impede the participation of ˙IY˙IP and to complicate opposition alliance formations (S¨ozen, 2019, p. 297). Not stopping at this, the state of emergency, enforced after the July 15 coup attempt, was prolonged for an additional three months from April 19, 2018, encompassing the June 24 elections. This decision, supported by the parliamentary majority of Ak Parti and MHP in the TBMM, was made during the April 18, 2018 session and published in the subsequent issue of the Official Gazette.16 In summary, the 2018 elections were conducted amid a state of emergency, moved forward from November 2019 to June 2018 with the intention of catching the opposition unprepared. This was followed by an amendment to the electoral law that was anticipated to work in favor of the ruling coalition and against the opposition parties. Nevertheless, against all odds, this system allowed M˙I parties to secure a greater parliamentary presence than they would have if they had run independently. Due to the implementation of this novel system, the CHP, the predominant party within the M˙I, managed to secure 15 parliamentary seats in cities such as Elazı˘g, Yozgat, S¸anlıurfa, K¨utahya, Karaman, and Osmaniye, where it had previously faced challenges in establishing political representation. This accomplishment can be attributed to the support of its allies, ˙ IP ˙ and the SP, whose additional votes were instrumental in achieving this electoral the IY success (C ¸ olak, 2020, p. 736). On the other hand, the clear beneficiary of the alliance 16 For

the publication of the Official Gazette, see https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/04/20180418M1.htm

70

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

system was undeniably the ˙IY˙IP. Leveraging the alliance system, the ˙IY˙IP, garnering 9.96 percent of the nationwide votes, circumvented the 10 percent national threshold, earning 43 parliamentary seats. Concerning the smaller member of alliance, the SP did not manage to get any deputies from its own lists, yet two of the candidates nominated from the CHP lists in order to guarantee its representation in the TBMM were able to become deputies. Consequently, the total votes received by the political parties represented in the TBMM in the 2018 elections amounted to 99.31 percent, depicting a remarkably fair representation (Yılmaz, 2020). Examining the disproportionality scores (see Table 10), it’s evident that the second lowest level of disproportionality since 1969 was achieved in multi-party life. In this regard, it is plausible to state that the alliance system has positively impacted Turkish political life in terms of increasing fairness in representation and decreasing disproportionality. Yet, prior to the 2023 elections, another adjustment to the electoral system was made by the parliamentary majority of the Ak Parti and the MHP alliance. This modification involved substantial alterations to the regulations governing alliances within the Parliamentary Election Law, and it was implemented through Law No. 7393. The law was officially enacted on March 31, 2022, and published in the Official Gazette on April 6, 2022.17 According to these amendments, from now on the total votes of an alliance will not affect the number of parliamentary seats of the parties within the alliance. In the 2018 version of Article 34 of the law, it stated, “The number of MPs to be obtained in an electoral distric by independent candidates, political parties exceeding the threshold set out in Article 33 and alliances exceeding that threshold is calculated as follows” (emphasis added by the author). However, in the amended version, the phrase ”alliances” in this sentence was changed to ”parties forming the alliance”. In addition, the section describing the d’Hondt calculation in the third paragraph of the same article reads in 2018 as follows: “The names of the political parties, alliances and independent candidates who participated in the elections shall be written one below the other and the number of valid votes they received shall be written next to them. The number of votes received by political parties and alliances shall be divided first by one, then by two, then by three .... until the number of deputies to be elected in that district is reached. The shares obtained and the votes received by independent candidates shall be ranked from largest to smallest without discrimination. The deputies shall be allocated to the political parties, alliances and independent candidates having these shares according to the order of magnitude of the numbers in the order of the number of deputies to be elected from the constituency” (emphasis added by the author). With the amendments made in 2022, the words ”alliances” in this paragraph were removed from the text. Consequently, parliamentary seat distribution in a constituency will now be based on the vote shares of individual parties, not the total votes of the alliance. The intention behind these changes, driven by the ruling bloc, 17 For

the publication of the Official Gazette, see https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2022/04/20220406-1.htm

Elections Since 2002

71

is to avoid situations where parties like the CHP or other opposition parties gain additional parliamentary seats by leveraging the sum of alliance votes, as occurred in 2018. The primary advantage of joining an alliance, particularly for smaller parties, now lies in overcoming the national election threshold if the alliance’s total votes surpass the threshold. In practice, these amendments impose a choice on parties within an alliance. They must decide between being on the ballot with their own emblems and lists or participating in the elections without their legal entity, but within the lists of another party. This regulation adds a considerable complexity to forming alliances compared to the 2018 elections. Indeed, in the 2023 elections, smaller parties were compelled to choose between being part of the alliance with their legal entities and lists, resulting in fewer parliamentary seats, or nominating candidates from another party’s list to secure more parliamentary seats. Conversely, major parties had to negotiate to allocate quotas from their lists to smaller parties whose potential vote contributions were uncertain. For example, the YRP and the BBP of the C˙I participated in the elections with their respective legal entities and lists. While the YRP was able to get 2.8 percent of the votes and 5 parliamentary seats, the BBP received 0.9 percent of the votes and ˙ the candidates could not get any parliamentary seats, including the party’s leader. In the MI, of the SP, DEVA, GP and DP were included in the CHP lists and won 10, 15, 10 and 3 parliamentary seats respectively. Another significant alteration introduced by the Law No. 7393 was about the national electoral threshold. This amendment lowered the threshold to 7 percent in T¨urkiye. This is a significant shift for a country that had upheld the highest national election threshold globally, which had been fixed at 10 percent since the 1983 elections. The ruling party framed this reduction as a democratic reform enhancing Turkish democracy.18 However, pragmatically, the primary motivation seems to be to ensure that the MHP, participating in the elections with its own lists within the C˙I, would not encounter a threshold challenge. Another possible motivation could be to incentivize opposition parties to engage in the elections by either forming new alliances among themselves or participating individually, thus impeding the formation of a substantial opposition bloc. At the conclusion of the elections, the C˙I achieved a parliamentary majority and their presidential candidate, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, secured victory with 52.2 percent of the votes, albeit in the second round. In other words, the Ak Parti and the MHP achieved their goals. ˙ comprising the Ak Parti, MHP, and YRP, Regarding parliamentary seat distribution, the CI, garnered 318 out of 600 seats. This number increased to 323 with the addition of 4 deputies from the H¨uda Par and 1 deputy from the DSP, who entered parliament through the Ak Parti’s ˙ on the other hand, secured a total of 212 seats, while the Labor and lists. The opposition MI, 18 For

the statement, see https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/ak-parti-genel-baskanvekili-numan-kurtulmus-cnnturkte-gundemi-degerlendirdi

72

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

Freedom Alliance obtained 65 seats.19 As a natural consequence of the alliance system, there was a notable rise in the number of parties represented in parliament. The SP and the GP deputies merged under SP’s umbrella, forming a parliamentary group with a total of 20 seats. The DEVA, DP, H¨uda Par, and the DSP continued in parliament as independent parties, not aligning with any specific group. Even though they were part of alliances, the YRP and the T˙IP, participating in the elections with their own lists and winning 5 and 4 seats, respectively, opted to enter parliament with their own party identities. As in the 2018 elections, it can be observed that the votes cast by citizens in 2023 were largely represented in the parliament, but this rate decreased from 99.3 percent to 94.74 percent. Notably, among the unrepresented votes, the ZP (2.23 percent), known for ˙ IP, ˙ the BBP (0.97 percent), its anti-immigrant stance and founded after splitting from the IY which despite being part of the C˙I, ran independently and did not secure a parliamentary seat, ˙ and the MP (0.92 percent), established after a split from the CHP, led by Muharrem Ince, who is also a presidential candidate, were prominent. Nevertheless, in the context of Turkish political life in general, it should be emphasized that the 2023 elections resulted in a high level of representation. 5.3. Electoral Geography and Voter Behavior from 2002 to 2023 Since 2002, distinct regional patterns have been evident in T¨urkiye’s election result maps. Typically, these maps use orange to depict the Ak Parti, red for the CHP, and purple for the Kurdish political parties. When analyzing which party leads in specific electoral regions, it is evident that these colors are concentrated in particular areas. Red tends to dominate the coastal areas in the western regions of T¨urkiye, while purple is the predominant color in southeastern Anatolia. The remaining larger geographical area is predominantly colored orange.20 As mentioned above, the persistent three-color pattern on electoral maps from 2002 ¨ until the 2023 elections adds a new dimension, regionalization, to what Ozbudun (2000, 2011a) identified as the “three maladies” of Turkish politics: polarization, fragmentation, and volatility. While these maps provide a visual representation of party influence across regions, comprehending the intricate structure of voter behavior and establishing causal explanations requires a more nuanced analysis. Considering the ideological orientations and prominent identities of the parties, a broad observation can be made. Voters in the western coastal areas seem influenced by secular lifestyle sensitivities, those in the southeastern Anatolian region prioritize their Kurdish identity, and voters in other regions tend to be guided by conservative and nationalist inclinations. However, delving deeper into the understanding of these regional tendencies requires a 19 For 20 For

the distribution of seats in the parliament, see https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sandalyedagilimi an example of a map of T¨urkiye showing the results of the 2018 elections, see https://secim2018.ntv.com.tr/

Elections Since 2002

73

more comprehensive examination. Does the socio-economic development of regions influence voting patterns, or do these patterns depend on culturally distinct identities unique to each region? Is this regionalization phenomenon exclusive to the 2000s, or does it mirror historical trends within Turkish political history? While attempting to address these questions, it’s crucial to acknowledge the diversity of voters and the multitude of factors that influence their voting behavior, ranging from early-life socialization to economic circumstances, as outlined in the Introduction. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that these factors can vary from one voter to another. Nevertheless, the undeniable presence of three significant trends in T¨urkiye’s electoral tendencies since 2002, delineated geographically, remains a foundational element of the country’s political landscape.

Table 10: Party and electoral system indicators in parliamentary elections, 2002-2023 Election year

Electoral System

2PV (%)

2PS (%)

Disproportionality

ENEP

ENPP

Vote share of antisystem parties

Parliamentary fragmentation

Voter volatility

2002

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

53,7

98,4

26,98

5,43

1,85

27,0

0,46

56,8

2007

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

67,50

82,4

11,91

3,47

2,25

21,3

0,56

24,8

2011

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

75,80

84,0

7,48

2,96

2,34

16,5

0,57

12,1

2015 (7 June)

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

65,80

70,9

4,91

3,65

3,13

32,6

0,68

18,3

2015 (1

Proportional

74,80

82,0

6,69

2,99

2,45

24,1

0,59

10,0

November) representation (d'Hondt

calculation, 10 percent national threshold)

2018

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 10 percent national threshold with electoral alliance)

65,20

73,5

5,71

3,72

3,07

24,7

0,67

12,0

2023

Proportional representation (d'Hondt calculation, 7 percent national threshold with electoral alliance)

61

72,8

7,52

4,54

3,32

27,93

0,70

12,9

A closer examination of the election results during this period reveals that the Ak Parti

74

Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

typically secured the position of the second-largest party in constituencies where it did not emerge as the first. For instance, in the 2007 elections in Izmir, a stronghold of the CHP, where extensive demonstrations known as “Republic Rallies” against the Ak Parti were organized just before the elections, and secular concerns were at the forefront,21 the CHP received 35.5 percent of the votes while the Ak Parti became the second-largest party with 30.5 percent of vote share. In the 2011 elections in the same city, the CHP increased its vote share to 43.8 percent, and the Ak Parti’s share also rose to 36.8 percent. Likewise, in Diyarbakır, a crucial stronghold of the Kurdish political movement, independent candidates garnered 47 percent of the votes in the 2007 elections, while the Ak Parti secured 41 percent of the votes. In the 2011 elections, the total vote share of the independent candidates increased significantly to 61.7 percent, whereas the Ak Parti’s votes remained at 32.1 percent, which was still considerably higher than the 2.3 percent obtained by the third party, the CHP. It is noteworthy that while the Ak Parti exhibited notable electoral performance in nearly every electoral region, the CHP had minimal presence, especially in the eastern and southeastern regions. Conversely, candidates and parties representing the Kurdish political movement lost their electoral potential outside the southeast, except in major cities to which Kurds migrated. The regionalization of Kurdish political parties can be seen as anticipated, as their political demands and agenda are centered around Kurdish identity. However, a significant revelation is the transformation of the CHP, originally perceived as a nationalized party until the 1990s, into a regional party in the 2000s (Tosun et al., 2021). When examining the nationalization score of the CHP, it becomes evident that prior to 1980, the CHP had a nationalization level of 0.9, comparable to other mainstream parties. However, beginning in the early 1990s, the CHP’s nationalization score started declining, approaching 0.8 after 2002, aligning with the nationalization level of extreme right-wing parties (Demirkol and Bekaro˘glu, 2021, p. 37). In short, it can be said that the regionalization trend that had been in the making since the 1990s began to crystallize after 2002. Apart from this, the long-standing pattern of voter behavior in Turkish political life has largely continued in a similar manner. As C ¸ arko˘glu and Kalaycıo˘glu (2007) point out, the right-wing/conservative tendency in the Turkish electorate has been strongly manifested since the beginning of multiparty life. Especially since 1983, ¨ the sum of center-right and far-right votes has usually been around 60-65 percent (Ozbudun, 2006). After 2002, the Ak Parti became the main recipient of these right-wing votes, either by absorbing large and small right-wing parties other than the MHP or by attracting the voters of these parties. In the 2018 elections, this hegemonic dominance of the right was consolidated with the formation of the CI˙ by the Ak Parti and the MHP (S¨ozen, 2019, p. 295). In the 2018 and 2023 elections, in which the Ak Parti and the MHP campaigned with a security-oriented 21 For

a detailed analysis of the period in question, see Bekaroglu (2015).

Elections Since 2002

75

“politics of survival” (beka siyaseti) narrative, prioritizing issues related to security over concerns about rights, freedoms, and economic matters, the total votes of the CI˙ were 53.7 percent and 50.1 percent, while the votes of the alliance’s presidential candidate, Erdo˘gan, ˙ ˙IP’s votes of approximately 10 were 52.6 percent and 52.2 percent, respectively. If the IY percent and the votes of other small right-wing parties are added, the total right-wing vote increases to 60-65 percent. Hence, it is plausable to argue that it was the right strategy for the Ak Parti and the C˙I adopted the right strategy by engaging in politics aligned with this right-wing tendency, which represents the majority of the voters. Looking at the party and electoral system indicators in this period, it is possible to see that the post-2017 period reveals a shift in dynamics. Notably, as illustrated in Table 10, the values of 2PV and 2PS that were increasing until the 2015 elections (June 7 is again an exception) tend to decrease in 2018 and especially in the 2023 elections. Conversely, the total votes for anti-system parties habe been on the rise. Nevertheless, an interesting and seemingly contradictory situation in Table 10 is worth noting. In contrast to the trends mentioned above, the number of effective parties and parliamentary fragmentation is lower than expected. This can be attributed to the parties participating in the electoral alliances without using their own banner in the elections, instead nominating candidates from the lists of other parties. Although the MPs of these parties typically return to their own parties after the elections and these parties continue to operate in parliament with their own identity, this nuanced situation is often overlooked because the calculations of the number of effective parties and the fragmentation indices are based on the parties participating in the elections. As previouss¸y shown in Table 9, the number of parties represented in the TBMM remained at 4 in 2011 and 2015, increased to 9 in 2018, and further rose to 14 in 2023. Although some of these parties (the DP, the DSP, or the H¨uda Par) have very few MPs, it is evident that both the number of relevant parties in parliament and fragmentation are actually higher than what Table 10 suggests. Indeed, the introduction of the alliance regulation in the electoral system has had significant and anticipated effects. This underscores the notion that alterations in the electoral system have substantial impacts on voter behavior and the overall political landscape, affirming the core assertion of the institutionalist approach. It is apparent that electoral reforms and modifications can fundamentally shape how parties behave, how alliances are formed, how votes are cast, and subsequently influence the representation and contestation within the political arena.

CONCLUSION Electoral systems are codified in laws, which are established through a simple majority in parliament and can be modified or reformed through the same legislative process. Political elites are keenly aware that electoral rules can have a profound impact on the psychology of the electorate, shaping their voting behavior. Consequently, they craft these laws with these expectations in mind. These laws are strategically designed to influence the distribution of electoral gains, tilting the electoral playing field in favor of major parties at the expense of smaller ones. Turkish political life is no exception to this well-established pattern. Throughout its multi-party electoral history, governments with parliamentary majorities have not hesitated to manipulate the electoral system to their advantage and to the detriment of the opposition. This study delves into T¨urkiye’s multi-party elections with the underlying assumption that amendments to electoral rules play a significant role in influencing voter behavior and shaping the political landscape. Through this analysis, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the impacts of electoral systems and related revisions on voter behavior and the overall political dynamics. To begin with, the electoral system based on proportional representation incentivizes both political elites to establish new parties and voters to support third parties. It is evident that the number of influential parties in elections and parliament has notably risen since 1961 when the electoral system based on proportional representation was adopted in T¨urkiye. In particular, a rising trend in the number of significant parties became apparent during certain specific elections: in 1965, when the national remainder calculation that maximizes proportional representation’s fairness was introduced; in 1969, 1973, and 1977, when no electoral threshold was imposed; and in 2018 and 2023 elections, when formal electoral alliances became possible. During these periods, the vote share and seat share of the two major parties generally decreased, leading voters to lean towards third parties given the enhanced probability of parliamentary representation for parties aligning with their beliefs, identities, and priorities. The second major conclusion of this study is that the intended impact of high electoral thresholds, which were meant to obstruct the success of third parties within T¨urkiye’s proportional representation system, did not unfold as anticipated during specific periods. In the 1990s, despite the presence of both a high national threshold and a constituency threshold, the number of effective parties was notably higher compared to the 1970s, when there was no threshold, and the post-2002 period, when only a national threshold existed. Two dynamics other than the electoral system appear to have played a role in this phenomenon. Firstly, dur-

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ing the 1990s, the center-right and center-left were each represented by two political parties, and they were able to surpass the 10 percent national threshold by effectively sharing the votes. The return of charismatic political leaders who had previously been banned due to the military coup played a significant role in fostering this diversification, particularly from 1987 onward. Secondly, thanks to the emergence of identity politics in the 1990s, the combined votes for Kurdish nationalist, Turkish nationalist, and particularly Islamist parties surged to much higher levels compared to other periods. Consequently, even though the threshold mechanism existed in a dual form until 1995 and then as a high national threshold of 10 percent, it failed to fulfill its intended purpose of curbing the influence of third parties during this period. On one hand, it is evident that the proportional system had the effect of encouraging pre-1980 leaders to establish new parties after their bans removed. With charismatic leaders like Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit at the helm, these parties managed to surpass the 10 percent threshold. On the other hand, the impact of high electoral thresholds in discouraging voters from supporting small parties was overshadowed by the influence of identity politics. In other words, identity politics superseded strategic voting dynamics to a considerable extent in the 1990s. The third noteworthy finding is that electoral rules or modifications to electoral rules do not consistently yield the anticipated results for their architects. For instance, the adjustments made by the DP in the 1950s, the ANAP in the 1980s, and the Ak Parti and MHP alliance in 2023 enabled these parties to maintain or even increase their parliamentary seats, despite a decrease in their vote shares. Nonetheless, the alterations initiated under the leadership of the CHP in the early 1960s did not produce the expected outcomes. Specifically, in the 1965 elections, despite the efforts of the CHP-led parliamentary majority to promote small parties and thus divide the center-right votes that the AP was vying for, they were unsuccessful in dissuading the electorate from choosing the AP as the sole political successor to the DP. Consequently, the AP secured 52.9 percent of the vote, the highest ever achieved by a political party in T¨urkiye’s electoral history, establishing itself as the governing party. Another notable example is the alliance arrangements introduced into the electoral system in 2018, which unexpectedly benefited the opposition by leading to stronger parliamentary representation for the M˙I. Therefore, political engineering may not always translate effectively into practical outcomes. Opposition parties can frustrate the calculations and turn the tide in their favor with the strategies they develop. In other words, electoral institutions and rules set a certain framework for political parties and candidates, trying to push the fate of the election in certain directions and in favor of certain actors. But they are not decisive. It is not always possible to manipulate a strong current or voter tendency by tinkering with the rules. Finally, irrespective of the electoral system, it is evident that the collective votes for rightwing parties have consistently exceeded those of left-wing parties in T¨urkiye’s multiparty

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elections since 1950. The combination of center-right and far-right parties has, on average, ¨ received 60-65 percent of the total votes. As Ozbudun (2011a, p. 68) notes, despite the high levels of voter volatility in T¨urkiye, the relatively low degree of volatility between the right and left ideological blocs is a distinctive characteristic of Turkish political life. However, it is also important to emphasize that this does not suggest a consistent alignment of right-wing parties as a unified bloc. T¨urkiye’s multi-party history is replete with examples of certain right-wing and left-wing parties forming alliances against a dominant right-wing or left-wing party or establishing government coalitions. These alliances are at times linked to centerperiphery conflicts. An illustrative example of this is the alliance between the right-wing parties YTP and CKMP with the CHP in the early 1960s. In this case, the YTP, established by Menderes’ opponents within the DP, the CKMP, which endorsed the 1960 coup, and the CHP, a party purpotedly representing the state elites at that time, all embodied the center in the center-periphery division. On the other hand, the AP, the successor to the DP, stood on the opposite side as the party supported by peripheral dynamics. Nevertheless, alliances between right and left parties were at times driven by pragmatic motives. The government coalition formed by the CHP and the MSP after the 1973 elections or the alliance between the CHP and the right-wing parties in the 2023 elections are instances of such pragmatic alliances. In any case, the electoral systems influence the manner in which such alliances or collaborations can be established. For example, the 10 percent national threshold or electoral alliance rules are likely to encourage some parties to join forces. On the other hand, the electoral systems based on proportional representation without thresholds can compel parties to pragmatically form coalition governments because a party’s chances of securing a majority in parliament are relatively low in such systems. In a nutshell, the relationship between electoral systems and political dynamics in T¨urkiye’s multi-party elections unveils an intriguing blend of strategic maneuvering, voter behavior, and occasionally expected yet at times unforeseen outcomes resulting from changes in electoral rules. Essencially, the Turkish electoral landscape serves as a testament to the intricate relationship between electoral systems and political outcomes. Electoral rules can indeed establish the foundation and wield significant influence, but the actors on that stage, driven by a wide range of dynamic forces, have the potential to alter the trajectory of events. This study underscores the significance of comprehending these nuances in order to gain a deeper understanding of T¨urkiye’s democratic processes and the role that electoral systems play within them.

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APPENDIX 1: Laws on Parliamentary Elections, Amendments to These Laws and Regulations on the Conduct of Elections –

June 5, 1946, Law No. 4918 on Parliamentary Elections

Converting elections from two-stage to single-stage popular elections. –

February 16, 1950, Law No. 5545 on the Election of Members of Parliament

Arrangements for free and fair elections. –

July 7, 1954, Law No. 6429

Kırs¸ehir city was lowered to a district under Nevs¸ehir. –

July 7, 1954, Amendments made by Law No. 6428

Civil servants and employees of state economic enterprises must resign 6 months in advance in order to become a candidate for parliamentary candidacy; those who apply for candidacy from one party and are not nominated as a candidate cannot become a candidate from another party or an independent candidate; abolition of Article 45, which allowed political parties to make propaganda on the radio; the decision that radio speeches by government officials about their actions and duties will not be considered election propaganda. –

September 11, 1957, Amendments made by Law No. 7053

Requiring parties to enter the elections with their own lists; prohibiting a candidate who is a member of one party from running on another party’s list. –

May 25, 1961, Law No. 306 on the Election of Deputies

Transition to a version of proportional representation with d’Hondt calculation and a constituency threshold for the elections to the National Assembly, while the bloc vote system was continued for the elections to the Senate. –

February 13, 1965, Amendments made by Law No. 533

Adoption of the proportional representation system with a national remainder calculation both in the elections to the National Assembly and the Senate. –

March 23, 1968, Amendments made by Law No. 1036

Abandoning the national remainder system and returning to the d’Hondt calculation with a constituency threshold for both the National Assembly and the Senate. –

Constitutional Court Decision No. 1968/13

Annulment of the provision on threshold as unconstitutional. –

June 10, 1983, Law No. 2839 on Parliamentary Elections

Adoption of the d’Hondt calculation version of proportional representation with both a 10

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percent country threshold and a constituency threshold. –

April 15, 1986, Amendments made by Law No. 3270

Arrangement of quota candidacy in favor of the largest party and raising the electoral district threshold. –

May 17, 1987, Amendments made by Law No. 3361

Increasing the number of MPs from 400 to 450 and setting the voting age at 21. –

May 23, 1987, Amendments made by Law No. 3377

Reduction of electoral districts from seven to six parliamentary seats and increase in the number of electoral districts to nominate quota candidates. –

September 10, 1987, Amendments made by Law No. 3403

Increasing the constituency threshold to 20 percent in electoral districts with six deputies. –

October 17, 1987, Amendments made by Law No. 3404

Clarifying the calculation of quota candidates. –

August 24, 1991, Amendments made by Law No. 3757

Lowering the electoral district threshold in small electoral districts. –

July 23, 1995, Amendments made by Law No. 4121

Ammending the Article 67 of the Constitution by adding the following sentence: ”Electoral laws shall be regulated in such a way as to reconcile the principles of justice in representation and stability in governance.” Also, lovering the voting age to 18. –

October 27, 1995, Amendments made by Law No. 4125

Increasing the number of MPs from 450 to 550; making arrangements for the Turkish citizens living abroad to vote; abolishing the quota candidacy and preferential voting procedure; determining 100 of the 550 MPs from ”country electoral districts” by d’Hondt calculation with a 10 percent national threshold. –

Constitutional Court Decision No. 1995/59

Cancellation of the country electoral district and constituency threshold regulations. –

October 3, 2001, Amendments made by Law No. 4709

Amending Article 67 of the Constitution by adding the following sentence: ”Amendments to the electoral laws shall not apply to elections to be held within one year from the date of

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entry into force.” –

October 19, 2006, Amendments made by Law No. 5552

Lowering the parliamentary election age from 30 to 25. –

March 13, 2008, Amendments made by Law No. 5749

Establishing an Overseas District Electoral Board under the Ankara Provincial Electoral Board and paving the way for voters living abroad to vote at embassies and polling stations to be established at certain points in addition to customs gates. –

October 22, 2009, Amendments made by Law No. 5922

Reducing the term of office of MPs from five to four years. –

- 2017 referendum

Transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system; increasing the number of deputies from 550 to 600; lowering the age for parliamentary election from 25 to 18; increasing the term of office of deputies from four to five years (In addition, with the provisional Article 21/H added to the Constitution, it was decided that the regulation in Article 67 of the Constitution that the amendments made to the election law could not be implemented within one year would not apply to the first general election after the 2017 Referendum.). –

March 13, 2018, Amendments made by the Law No. 7102

Creating a legal basis for political parties to make electoral alliances. –

April 06, 2022, Amendment made by the Law No. 7393

Reducing the national electoral threshold from 10 percent to 7 percent; making some changes in the alliance regulation by removing the total votes of the alliance from the calculation of the number of deputies and introducing the obligation of the parties participating in the elections to enter the elections with their own lists.

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¨ APPENDIX 2: Electoral systems implemented in Turkiye 1. Multi-candidate (party list) bloc voting Among majoritarian systems, the most rarely used is the multi-candidate bloc voting system. Unlike other first-past-the-post systems, this system has large electoral districts in which more than one representative is elected. In other words, parties nominate candidates equal to the available seats in a district, and the party with the plurality of the votes in that district wins all the seats. In this case, the party that receives more votes, even by a very small margin, wins all the parliamentary seats, while the other party wins none. As might be expected, the multi-candidate bloc voting system leads to highly disproportionate results. For example, suppose there are 10 parliamentary seats in a district and three parties are competing. These parties get 35 percent, 34 percent, and 31 percent of the votes respectively. In this case, the party with 35 percent of the votes will win all 10 parliamentary seats, while the others will lose all of them. Simply, this is an extreme version of the “winner-take-all” sytem. 2. Electoral systems based on proportional representation Proportional systems can be divided into two groups: fixed list and preferential list. In the fixed list method, the lists are completely under the control of the parties. In other words, each party determines the number of MPs to be elected in a district, ranks them, and presents them to the voters. The voters only vote for the parties. In the end, the number of parliamentary seats won by the party in proportion to the number of votes it received is the number of candidates from its list who are elected as parliamentary deputies. This is the electoral system currently used in T¨urkiye. In the preferential list system, parties have less control over the lists. There are two different versions. In the first one, the parties make the list, but the voters are given the opportunity to choose the order of the list. In other words, the voter votes for the party, but also makes a preference ranking in the party’s list. In this version, even though the voter is given the opportunity to make a ranking, the parties still control who gets on the list. This system was used in T¨urkiye in the 1991 elections. In the other version of the preferential list, candidates who are or are not members of parties compete against each other. This method is called Single Transferable Vote (STV), where the voter makes a preference ranking on a ballot consisting of party candidates or independent candidates. It is called ”single transferable vote” because the voter’s primary vote is the first vote, and the others are substitutes or alternates. In this system, voters can also vote for candidates from different parties when ranking their preferences. In other words, voters vote directly for candidates, not for parties. Logically, this is similar to the singlecandidate preferential voting system. However, because the districts are large rather than single-member districts, it is a form of proportional representation. The term ”transferable” in the name of the system refers to the fact that if a candidate receives more votes than the

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electoral quota, the remaining votes are transferred to second preferences. This process of transferring the remaining votes to the next candidate continues until all parliamentary seats in the constituency are elected. The goal is to minimize the number of unrepresented votes. The larger the constituency, the smaller the problem of unrepresented votes. Despite these advantages, it is not widely used because it is a complex system. The Republic of Ireland’s general election and the Australian Senate election are notable among the elections in which the single transferable vote system has been used. 3. Methods of calculation in proportional representation In systems based on proportional representation, once it has been decided how the parliamentary lists will be drawn up and how the voters will vote, the most important issue is to decide the minimum number of votes required to be elected from a parliamentary district. For all types of lists, fixed or preferential, the number of votes needed to be elected must first be calculated. There are several ways to do this. Depending on the type of calculation, these methods can be divided into two groups: maximum average and maximum remainder formulas. In transferable vote systems, the number of votes needed to be elected in a region is usually calculated using the maximum balance method. This calculation is made by dividing the number of voters by the number of representatives or by one more than the number of representatives. The former is called Hare and the latter is called Droop. For example, if 4 MPs are to be elected in a constituency, a candidate must receive at least a quarter of the total votes according to the Hare calculation and at least a fifth according to the Droop calculation in order to be elected. The Droop method may be considered more favorable in terms of fairness of representation, since it allows a candidate to be elected with fewer votes. However, in some cases, the Hare calculation may increase the likelihood of small/medium parties winning the last seat in parliament. A version of the Droop calculation is the so-called National Remainder System in T¨urkiye. The goal of this system is to minimize the problem of unrepresented votes as much as possible. This calculation method, which was used in the 1965 elections in T¨urkiye, was not used again because it favored small parties and allowed radical or anti-system parties to enter parliament. In the national remainder system, the number of voters in a constituency is divided by the number of deputies, as in Hare, and a number of seats is calculated. Then the number of votes for each party is calculated based on that number of seats. These correspond to the number of seats each party won in the region. Usually, the number of MPs from that region is higher. When the total number of MPs from the region is subtracted from the total number of MPs from the parties as a result of the calculation, the remaining number of MPs from that region is determined and put into a pool. The votes of each party from the same region that are not enough to elect a representative are set aside as the party’s remaining votes.

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Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in T¨urkiye

Finally, the sum of the increased votes from all constituencies is divided by the increased number of parliamentary seats. Thus, a nationwide popular vote is calculated, and the number of that popular vote in each party’s remaining votes is calculated, and the parties win as many additional parliamentary seats as that number. These additional parliamentary seats are distributed to the provinces with missing parliamentary seats to determine who will be elected as a member of parliament. Although the national remainder system, which produces the most proportional results among electoral systems, maximizes fairness in representation, it is considered to lead to instability in government and is not preferred because it gives representation to radical parties. It is also complicated to calculate. The most common methods for determining the electoral vote are the d’Hondt and Sainte-Lagu¨e methods, which are versions of the highest average calculation. In the d’Hondt method, the votes received by the parties in a constituency are divided sequentially from 1 to the number of MPs in that constituency. The parties with the highest results in these divisions win that number of parliamentary seats. In the Sainte-Lagu¨e calculation, the divisors are not ordinal numbers, but either odd numbers or numbers that increase by half. Of these methods, Sainte-Lagu¨e allows for more representation of small parties. However, d’Hondt is the more common of the two calculations and has been the preferred calculation in T¨urkiye since the introduction of the proportional representation electoral system. The d’Hondt calculation can be explained with a simple example. Let’s assume that 4 parties are competing in a region where 5 representatives are to be elected. The table below shows the votes they received and how the calculation is done. Looking at the highest results, Party A and Party B each win 2 seats and Party C wins 1 seat. If there was also an independent candidate in this district, the minimum number of votes he/she would need to get to be elected as an MP would have to be higher than the lowest number marked in the table (in this case 5500). Table 11: An example for d’Hondt calculation Party

Number of votes

/1

/2

/3

/4

/5

Number of deputies elected

Party A

16000

16000

8000

5333

4000

3200

2

Party B

11000

11000

5500

3666

2750

2200

2

Party C

6000

6000

3000

2000

1500

1200

1

Party D

2500

2500

1250

833

625

500

0

Total

35500

35500

17750

11833

8875

7100

5