Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development: Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order [1st ed.] 9789811524776, 9789811524783

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AFRICA’S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM EMERGING COUNTRIES

Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order Edited by Inocent Moyo · Christopher Changwe Nshimbi · Jussi P. Laine

Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries Series Editor Ajay Dubey African Studies Association of India (ASA India) Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

The 21st century has been characterized by a global rush to engage African countries. Unlike in the past, globalization has given African countries options to select and diversify their engagements. Though traditional powers are still trying to reinforce their links, African countries have generally found it more empowering to reduce their traditional dependence and develop more equitable relations with counties of the South, especially with emerging economies. Different regions and countries of the world find different opportunities and challenges in their attempts to engage the African region. Similarly, African countries, along with the African Union and other regional organizations, find different advantages in diversifying their traditional dependence. However, the new engagements have neither replaced the traditional engagement of Africa, nor are they wholly unproblematic from African perspectives. In this context, it is essential to understand and analyse emerging Africa’s global engagements. To that end, this series will cover important countries and regions, including traditional powers, that engage African countries, the African Union and African regional organisations. The book series will also address global and regional issues that exclusively affect African countries. Books in the series can be either monographs or edited works. Expected Content: The series will focus on the following aspects, among others: • In its current global engagement, is Africa still a “helpless” player? Who dictates the terms of Africa’s new engagement, and how it impacts various African countries? • In the current competition between traditional powers and emerging economies to engage Africa, is Africa’s global engagement merely undergoing a geographical shift, or is it moving toward increasingly equitable international relations? How traditional powers have re-­ strategised themselves to retain their influence on Africa and how Africa is responding to them? How is Africa involved in the issues of global governance and how it negotiates and navigates its positions on issues of global concerns? More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15417

Inocent Moyo Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Jussi P. Laine Editors

Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order

Editors Inocent Moyo Department of Geography and Environmental Studies University of Zululand KwaDlangezwa, South Africa Jussi P. Laine Karelian Institute University of Eastern Finland Kuopio, Finland

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn)/Department of Political Sciences University of Pretoria Hatfield, South Africa

Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries ISBN 978-981-15-2477-6    ISBN 978-981-15-2478-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover design: eStudio Calamar Cover illustration: boommaval, shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To all classes of migrants who have suffered from or perished in the raging intra-Africa and Africa–European Union migration conundrums and contestations and who continue to. The hope for a shared humanity still lingers.

Foreword

The issue of intra-African migration and EU-Africa migration are topics that continue to elicit mixed reactions and, in some cases, misplaced policy responses. The need to separate facts from fiction, and more importantly, crafting policies that situate migration at the heart of global and regional developmental efforts, remain critical tasks that scholars, politicians and policymakers cannot afford to ignore. This is the reason why this book is a timely addition to the body of knowledge in this field. The book weaves together not only the different currents underlining migratory patterns within and outside the continent but also the variables that should shape policy approaches. While the different authors that have contributed to this edited book approach the question of migration from multidimensional, multidisciplinary perspectives, one thread that runs through their ideas is the imperative of reframing the existing problematic narrative. They have presented readers with a critical, informative guide to understanding that migration can no longer be seen from a “single story” lens. This point is of utmost importance particularly against the background of increasing antagonistic response of European countries to African migrants, incidents of xenophobic attacks in some African countries, and the inability of African Union (AU) member states to commit to an implementation approach that is sustainable. In addition, the EU-African dialogue on migration often exists within a dialogue-of-the-deaf milieu, with both parties speaking past and around each other. While the EU views migration from Africa through a securocratic/hard border lens, Africa advocates a broader, developmental perspective on tackling this issue. vii

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FOREWORD

This book rightly locates the debate on migration within the intersections of a changing global order, regional integration efforts in Africa, and varying national dynamics. Emerging from this scholarly discourse is the imperative of adopting nuanced and context-specific solutions. Arriving at such a juncture requires a broader conceptualisation of migration as both an enabler of economic development and an important condition of humanity. The latter is essentially the reason why compassion and respect for humanity should always lie at the heart of designing and implementing policies on migration. As the late literary icon Chinua Achebe pointedly warned, “when we are comfortable and inattentive, we run the risk of committing grave injustices absentmindedly”. As discussed in the book, the effective governance and management of intra-African and EU-Africa migration have to be multisectoral. A bottom-up approach that encompasses civil society participation, an objective understanding of push-and-­pull factors, meaningful and respectful EU-African partnership, transformational national leadership in Africa, and genuine Afrocentric policy response to migration issues are necessary ingredients for addressing this problem. This pivotal book comes at a critical phase of African integration. The AU is currently engaged in efforts aimed at transforming its institutions and processes and has adopted protocols on free trade and free movement of persons. While the former has already been ratified, the latter has received negligible interest from member states. The book’s scholarly focus on migration matters provides an essential spectrum and guide for policymakers, researchers, and politicians to further their intellectual engagement on this subject. I have no doubt that this book will stimulate interest and new ideas that will enhance the grasp of the articulation and implementation of policy instruments on a phenomenon that is as old as humanity itself. Pretoria, South Africa 31 October 2019

Babatunde Fagbayibo

Acknowledgements

This volume would not have been possible without the generous support of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) of the European Commission (EC) under the Jean Monnet Activities within the Erasmus + Programme (Project Number 587767EPP-1-2017-ZA-­­ EPPJMO-PROJECT). The collaborative work that resulted in this volume came out of a project co-led by Chris Nshimbi and Inocent Moyo at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), Universities of Pretoria and Zululand, respectively, in South Africa, Jussi P. Laine at the University of Eastern Finland and Tabani Ndlovu at Nottingham Trent University. The team of editors express our gratitude to all participants in the workshop and conference on the EU-Africa migration conundrum in a changing global order hosted by the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), at the University of Pretoria from 3 to 4 September 2018. Their intense engagement and rigorous contribution in the debates are greatly appreciated as the account for the success of the project. Our thanks also go to Kirsty Agnew Nepomuceno, Project Coordinator, and the logistics team at GovInn, for the hard work in making the workshop and conference successful. Likewise, we appreciate the immense contributions by the dedicated team of reviewers who critically reviewed this work and were always ready to meet our never-ending requests. Notwithstanding,

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

reasonable effort has been made to contact copyright holders before publication, and in the event that there have been oversights in this regard, the editors and publishers apologise and are ready to correct them, if the need arises. 31 October 2019

Inocent Moyo Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Jussi P. Laine

Contents

Part I Migration Conundrums in Regions and Development in a Changing Global Order   1 1 Migration and Transformation: Africa-­Europe Migration Conundrums in a Changing Global Order  3 Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, and Jussi P. Laine Introduction   3 Migration, Regions and Development in Africa   7 Africa-Europe Relations in the Age of Increased Migration and Globalisation   8 Migration Contestations and Transformation  10 Migration and Misrepresented Views and Actors in Conventional Migration Discourses  11 References  13 2 Migration, Regional Integration and the Development Conundrum: Reflections on Policy, Identity and Shared Humanity 17 Samuel O. Oloruntoba Introduction  17 The Crisis of Global Migration  20 Migration and Regional Integration in Africa  23 xi

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Contents

Reframing the Discourses on Migration and Regional Integration  27 Resolving Identity Crisis Through Decoloniality  29 Conclusion  31 References  31 3 Migration and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Opportunities 37 Ernest Toochi Aniche Introduction  37 Conceptualizing Migration and Sustainable Development  39 Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding the Nexus Between Migration and Sustainable Development  42 Challenges and Opportunities of Migration and Sustainable Development  47 Concluding Remarks  57 References  57

Part II Migration Conundrums: Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order  63 4 The EU’s Approach to African Migration During Crisis: Reinforcement and Changes 65 Anna Knoll Introduction  65 One Crisis: Many Facets  66 Actors, Interests, and Policy Narratives in the EU: Influencing EU-Wide Response  73 Intensified Engagement with African Countries on Migration  80 The Way Forward in the EU  86 References  87

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5 Reframing African Migration to Europe: An Alternative Narrative 93 Jussi P. Laine Introduction  93 Information Is Power  96 The Bigger Picture  98 Africa-Europe Relations Beyond Migration? 106 Conclusion 110 References 112 6 Intercontinental Citizenship: Europe-based Congolese Migrants and Their Influence on Homeland Governance During 2011 DRC Electoral Crisis117 Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka Introduction 117 Intercontinental Citizenship and Democratic Governance: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations 118 Intercontinental Citizenship 119 Democratic Governance 122 Understanding Intercontinental Migrant Citizenship Through the Lens of Political Transnationalism 127 Some Determinant Factors of Migrant’s Intercontinental Citizenship 130 Methodological Considerations 132 The 2011 Elections and Its Discontents in DRC: Homeland Context of Congolese People Exodus 133 European Democratic Governance Context: A Political Opportunity Structure for the Europe-­based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship 138 Europe-based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship in the Quest for Democratic Governance in the DRC 140 Assessing the Influence of Europe-based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship in Demand for Democratic Governance in DRC 148 Conclusion 151 References 152

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Part III Migration Conundrums Down Under: Intra-Africa Relations, Regional Integration and Development 163 7 Life in the Fringes: Informality, African Migrants’ Perception of the Border and Attitudes Towards Migrating to Europe165 Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Introduction 165 Of Gold and All That Glitters: Brief Conceptual and Methodological Takes on Migration and Borders 170 Of Crossroads and Ancient Paths: Migrants’ Contextual Environmental Background and Influence on Perceptions of Borders and Migration 173 Of Perceptions and Attitudes: Orientations Towards Global Socioeconomic and Political Realities 179 Of Irreconcilable Views and Interpretations: Concluding Remarks 183 References 185 8 Migration and the Locality: Community Peacebuilding as a Deterrent to Collective Violence in South Africa193 Mpangi Kwenge Introduction 193 The Research Component 198 The Intervention 201 The Alexandra Case Study 203 The Mamelodi Case Study 205 Conclusion 209 References 210 9 African Informal Migrant Traders in Johannesburg: Experiences on the Ground and Implications on Human Mobility in the SADC213 Inocent Moyo Introduction 213 Conceptualisation 214 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 216

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Views on the Ground 217 Reflections on Migrants’ Experiences 218 Conclusion 220 References 222 10 African Migrants’ Aspirations and Citizens’ Anxieties in Johannesburg, South Africa: Concerning Migration Management227 Christal Spel Introduction 227 Historical Context of Migration 228 Migration Management 233 South African Citizens’ Anxieties in the Face of African Migrants 235 African Migrants’ Aspirations 239 Migration Management, South African Citizens and African Migrants in South Africa 243 Conclusion 247 References 248 11 Artisanal Miners, Migration and Remittances in Southern Africa257 Esther Makhetha Introduction 257 Research Context: Migration and Lesotho’s Changing Rural Economy 260 Migration and Remittances Since Independence 261 Zama-zama Migrants: Migration and Remittances 262 Remittances 265 Conclusion 266 References 268

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Part IV Conclusion: Migration, Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order 271 12 Beyond the Present: Migration Governance for Regions and Inclusive Development273 Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, Inocent Moyo, and Jussi P. Laine Introduction 273 Regions and Development 275 Africa-Europe Relations 276 Intra-Africa Relations 277 References 279 Index281

Notes on Contributors

Ernest  Toochi  Aniche holds BSc, MSc and PhD degrees of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN), with a bias to international relations. His areas of research interest include African integration, comparative regionalism, migration studies, borderland studies, peace and conflict studies, security and strategic studies, international environmental politics, oil politics, energy politics, theories of international relations and international political economy. He has authored three books, co-authored two books, co-edited a book and contributed chapters in books and articles in scholarly journals. He is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Federal University Otuoke (FUO), Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He is also the acting head, Department of Political Science, Hezekiah University, Umudi, Imo State, Nigeria. Anna Knoll  is the head of the Migration Programme at ECDPM. She has seven  years’ policy research experience (research design and implementation) in international policy activities engaging on development, aid, migration and conflict and security issues. With an academic background in philosophy and economics (BA) and in international political economy (MSc), her current research and publications focus on the interaction between migration, displacement and development processes, the external and development dimension of the EU’s migration and asylum policies, migration in European development policies as well as African narratives, policies and processes on migration. xvii

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mpangi Kwenge  is working for Freedom House. She holds a master’s in international conflict analysis from the University of Kent. She has held appointments at the Dag Hammarskjold Institute for Peace Studies at the Copperbelt University in Zambia as a special research fellow and the Swiss ethnic power relations project funded by the Swiss Programme for Research on Global Issues for Development (R4D). Her research includes work on ethnic power relations in Zambia and xenophobia and constraints towards social cohesion in South Africa. Jussi P. Laine  is an associate professor of multidisciplinary border studies at the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland and holds the title of Docent of Human Geography from the University of Oulu, Finland. He is the president of the Association for Borderlands Studies and also serves in the Steering Committee of the International Geographical Union’s Commission on Political Geography. By his background, he is a human geographer, yet in his approach to borders he combines influences also from international relations and geopolitics, political sociology, history, anthropology as well as psychology. Within border studies, he seeks to explore the multi-scalar production of borders and bring a critical perspective on the relationship between state, territory, citizenship and identity construction. Most recently, his works focused on border mobility and tourism, the ethics of borders and bordering, bottom-up construction of borders and border making, as well as on ontological security have been published. Esther  Makhetha  is a postdoctoral fellow at the Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South Africa (UNISA). She holds the following qualifications: a baccalaureus degree in consumer science (University of Pretoria, South Africa), an MSc Research, Agricultural and Food Economics (University of Reading, United Kingdom), and a PhD (University of Pretoria, South Africa). Her research interests include mining: artisanal and small-scale mining, commercial mining, gender, land needs and land use. Inocent  Moyo  is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Zululand, South Africa. Inocent is a human geographer with a deep interest in the interface between people and the environment, particularly the broader fields of political geography, political economy, political ecology, migration, regional development, globalization and transnationalism, borders

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and borderlands and urban geography, among others. He has published and delivered international presentations on these topics. Inocent is the founding chair of the International Geographical Union Commission on African Studies (IGUCAS). Christopher Changwe Nshimbi  is Director and Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation (DST/NRF) Research Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria. He researches migration, borders, regional integration, the informal economy, social cohesion and water resource management. Besides teaching and supervising postgraduate research at the University of Pretoria, Chris also participates and sits on regional and international technical working groups on trade, labour and migration as well as water. His opinion pieces are occasionally published on THE CONVERSATION Africa, OpenDemocracy and other media outlets. Samuel O. Oloruntoba  is an associate professor and the coordinator of the research cluster on innovation and developmental regionalism at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, and a visiting professor at the Institute of African Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada. He obtained his PhD in political science with specialisation in international political economy of trade from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He was previously a visiting scholar at the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and a fellow of Brown International Advanced Research Institute, Brown University, Rhode Island, USA.  His research interests include regional integration and development in Africa, resource governance, global governance of trade and finance, democracy and development. He has presented papers in more than forty local and international conferences, and over forty of his scientific articles have been published in journals and book chapters both locally and abroad. He is the author, editor and co-editor of six books, including Regionalism and Integration in Africa: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Euro-Nigerian relations (Palgrave 2016), Africa and Its Diaspora: Histories, Identities and Economy (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on African Politics, Governance and Development, co-edited with Toyin Falola (Palgrave Macmillan 2018), State and Development in Post-independent Africa (with Vusi Gumede (eds)). Working with other research team members, he has concluded two

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funded research works: Migration and Regional Integration in Africa: ECOWAS and SADC in Comparative Perspectives, as well as Illicit Financial Flows in the Mining Sector of Four Southern African Countries. He has served as guest lecturer in conferences and seminars in different countries in Africa, Europe and USA. He also serves as external examiner on MA and PhD theses to Universities of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Kwazulu-­Natal and Zululand. Oloruntoba was the recipient of Wangari Maathai Award for Innovative Research Leadership at the Africa Conference, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, USA, in March 2016. In 2017, he became a rated researcher by the National Research Foundation of South Africa. Christal  Spel  is an NRF postdoctoral fellow at the SARChi Chair for Social Policy, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. She holds a PhD in social and public policy from the University of Helsinki, Finland, and an MSc in development and international cooperation from the University of Jyvaskyla, Finland. She has held visiting appointments at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Netherlands; Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands; and the African Center for Migration and Society, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Her research includes work on African migrant well-being in Africa and informal sector development in Nigeria. Leon  Mwamba  Tshimpaka  is a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, South Africa. He completed his master’s of arts in development studies from the University of South Africa in 2014. He is teaching the Introduction to Development Studies, Development Problems and Institutions, Community Development and Programs and Projects as tools of Development. In addition, he is an external examiner for the same courses since 2011.

Abbreviations

ACC ACMS ACP ACPMD AEC AfCFTA AGOA ANC ASM AU BBC CBL CDP CEAS CEN-SAD CENI CLSD COMESA CSO CSVR DAC DHA DRC EAC ECI ECOWAS

Alexandra Chamber of Commerce African Centre for Migration and Society The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States African Common Position on Migration and Development African Economic Community African Continental Free Trade Area African Growth and Opportunity Act African National Congress Artisanal and Small-scale Mining African Union British Broadcasting Corporation Central Bank of Lesotho Compulsory Deferred Pay Common European Asylum System The Community of Sahel-Saharan States Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante Community-Level Social Dynamics Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Civil Society Organization Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation Department of Arts and Culture Department of Home Affairs Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community European Citizens’ Initiative Economic Community of Central African States

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Abbreviations

EIU EMU EU FDI FTA HRW ICT IFP IGAD IIAG JAES LAWA LNDB LUTCHA M23 MARS MCR MPFA MPI NEM NGOs OAU ODA OSCE PBTs RDC RDP RECs RFI SACU SADC SADCC SALW SAPS SDGs TEBA UMA UN UNDP UNHCR USA WHO

Economist Intelligence Unit Economic and Monetary Union European Union Foreign Direct Investments Free Trade Areas Human Rights Watch Information and Communication Technology Inkatha Freedom Party Intergovernmental Authority for Development IIbrahim Index of African Governance Joint Africa-EU Strategy Latin American Workers Association Lesotho National Development Bank Lutte pour le Changement Movement of the 23 May Migration and Remittances Survey Mamelodi Concerned Residents Migration Policy Framework for Africa Migration Policy Institute New Economics of Migration Non-Governmental Organisations Organisation of African Unity Official Development Assistance Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Peace-Building Teams République Démocratique du Congo Reconstruction and Development Programme Regional Economic Communities Radio France Internationale Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference Small Arms and Light Weapons South African Police Services Sustainable Development Goals The Employment Bureau of Africa Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe United Nations United Nations Development Programmes United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Stated of America World Health Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Conceptual and theoretical framework. (Source: Author, adapted from Lima (2010), Morlino and Carli (2014) and Diamond and Morlino (2005)) Number of total DRC migrants in Europe (in thousands). (Source: Author, adapted from the United Nations Trends in International Migrant Stock (2015))

119 149

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List of Tables

Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Selected targeted project sites Social cohesion survey sites

197 199

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PART I

Migration Conundrums in Regions and Development in a Changing Global Order

CHAPTER 1

Migration and Transformation: Africa-­ Europe Migration Conundrums in a Changing Global Order Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, and Jussi P. Laine

Introduction The various processes of globalisation, together with the related increase in migration flows, have created growing concerns about the rights of people who are either temporarily or permanently absent from their home country. The number of international migrants globally has reached an

I. Moyo (*) Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa C. C. Nshimbi Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn)/Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Hatfield, South Africa J. P. Laine Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, Kuopio, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_1

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estimated 272 million in 2019, an increase of 51 million since 2010 and 99 million since 2000 (UN 2019). What has been even more noteworthy is that the number of refugees has been on the rise worldwide. Both globally and in Europe as well as in Africa, most migration is intra-continental. The consolidation and expansion of the European Union (EU) regime of free movement facilitated the increased mobility within the region (Santacreu et al. 2009). Europe has always been a popular destination for migrants; recently, however, new waves of immigration have occurred, the most discernible of which has been the great number of refugee and asylum seeker arrivals from North and Central Africa, Middle East and beyond. Within the African continent migration is very significant in terms of the number of people who migrate due to political, economic, social and other factors (Adepoju 2010; McAuliffe and Kitimbo 2018). For example, between 2015 and 2017, the number of Africans migrating within the continent increased from 16 million to around 19 million, but those migrating out of Africa increased from 16 million to 17 million (McAuliffe and Kitimbo 2018). In addition to their benefits, these migration flows have also evidently generated negative responses from their actual or potential host countries (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Mawadza and Crush 2010; Solimano 2010; Stewart and Mulvey 2014) in terms of negative backlash against migrants, manifesting itself in xenophobic attacks against immigrants in migrant-receiving countries within the continent, such as South Africa (Mawadza and Crush 2010). Increased migration continues to assault and undermine the fixity of nativist and territorialised belonging (Gupta and Ferguson 2008), the idea that people are from a particular bordered place (Laine 2018a), which by extension underlined the ever more apparent need to rethink the “possibilities of belonging” (Papastergiadis 2000, 80). The other actual or potential implication of migration includes its developmental aspects, in terms of the transactions and connections that it could generate (Moyo 2017). Our attempt to broaden the framing of migration from a challenge or a problem to a possibility and a resource does not lead us to ignore the potentially negative impacts—be they political, economic or social, among others (Milanovic 2016)—on both the sending and receiving countries or regions migration may have. Much of the recent discussion on migration has, however, been narrowly focused with an apparent overemphasis on its negative impacts—whether actual or perceived, at the expense of its positive or developmental impacts. Such a lopsided perception of migration obscures rather than illuminating the complex phenomenon under scrutiny and its

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various ramifications. In an attempt to contribute to more holistic and balanced debate on migration, this book is premised on the understanding that migration is “an integral part of the global transformation process, rather than a problem to be solved” (International Migration Institute 2006, 9). We put forward that efforts should be focused on the more efficient management and governance of migration as well as channelling its various dimensions towards a developmental trajectory, rather than simply attempting to stop migration or wish it away. In order to achieve this, more evidence-based and easily accessible information on the drivers, motivations and root causes, but also the complex interplay of these determining factors, is needed. There is a need to go beyond the mere push-and-pull factors and the assumption of linear causality, to the recognition that migrant decision-making process tends to involve calculation of various factors at the same time and have very different impact on different people. People have always migrated and will continue to do so. Borders, however, are nothing but an end-of-pipe solution to a much broader phenomenon and will not make the purported problem go away because they are themselves a fundamental part of that problem (Laine 2018a). Past efforts to curb migration in various parts of the world have had limited success. Limiting the movement of people may decrease documented migration, but it tends to increase undocumented flows. Walls, whether on paper or on the ground, may seem effective, but seldom are; once a wall is erected, people will soon try to cross it (Laine 2018a). Migrants also tend to find alternative ways of migrating and finding their way to intended destinations, despite efforts to prevent them from migrating (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016a, b). The consistent drive towards ever stricter border and migration policies not just in Europe, but throughout the entire Global North, has not emerged on its own or purely as a creation of politicians, but reflects the thinking of their electorates. It is thus necessary to look deeper into the various bordering practices, which—in the context of the strength of anti-­ immigrant movements across Europe—have conveyed an image of immigrants, before anything else, as a threat. Such rhetoric has not only overshadowed the proven benefits of migration, but it has also been cut out for deteriorating support of welcome and for ignoring the harsh reality and humanitarian drama which millions of refugees have to live through every day. The resultant unwelcoming sentiment is indicative of the deficiency of historical self-understanding, which has catalysed a hollowing-­ out of the very values upon which the idea of Europe has generally been constructed (Laine 2018a, 293). Migration is also a very complex

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phenomenon; it means different things to different people, countries and regions. As a result, reaching a consensus or resolving the perceived problem becomes difficult. Some view migration as a security issue, and this occludes its economic or developmental benefits or its humanitarian implications. Others may focus only on the latter, ignoring the fears—no matter how ungrounded—others may attach to migration. To this can be added others who demonstrate emotional and ideological responses to migration, all of which amplify the migration conundrum, with which this book grapples. Evidently, these debates range from the actual and perceived international and cross-border security threats that migration is said to bring, to the negative perception of migrants and the notion of migration in the host countries or societies leading to, among others, the securitisation and hardening of borders, to the developmental potential of migrants and migration arising from, inter alia, cross-border development and cooperation. For one, the EU and African Union (AU), respectively, seem to hold different perceptions and interpretations of the migration conundrum— whether, for example, migration (re)presents international or cross-border security threats or that it positively contributes to development. In Europe, questions concerning migrants and borders seem to reflect the greatest challenges that contemporary European societies face. The birth rates have been in decline while life expectancies have increased. As the population has been ageing, the functionality of the labour markets and pension systems has become challenged (Mitze et al. 2017). As a result of the need for labour and the increased mobility, migration has emerged as a key theme and policy instrument for the EU. The need for migrant labour has, however, been overshadowed by the more protectionist and security-­ oriented rhetoric surrounding migration in the wake of the recent so-­ called refugee crisis. Worries about its consequences for society, welfare institutions and labour markets have influenced not only public opinion, but also political action, causing temporary closings of borders, cultural divides, and even expressions of racism and xenophobic nationalism (Laine 2019). The sudden influx of refugees turned into a political crisis, giving rise to populist parties and right-wing ideology (Laine 2018a, b), and conflated with economic, educational and welfare migration, as well as internal EU labour mobility, it has even sparked notions of the end of the entire EU. The resultant prevalent rhetoric on migration concerns, problem or threat largely outperforms the scientific evidence that European countries

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will simply not manage without migrants. If anything, studies have shown that immigration provides economic opportunities and that Europe could achieve a fair and effective allocation of migrants that would preserve European principles and unity (Blau and Mackie 2017; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016). The European attempts to “secure” or “protect” borders have undoubtedly failed, largely because migration is often seen as a border security issue—as something that needs to be combatted (Laine 2018a). In this view borders tend to be depicted as protective, yet vulnerable walls safeguarding the inside from a perceived threat from outside. This variance in perception and approach towards a phenomenon that not only characterises the globalised world in the twenty-first century, but is also accelerated by elements of globalisation, and, thereby, promises to define the world for many years further into the century, warrants proper investigation. The outcome of the investigation should then help both sides, whose relationship has a long history, to appreciate each other’s views as well as work out mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions to the challenges that migration presents.

Migration, Regions and Development in Africa The AU seeks to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 through the 1991 Abuja Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991). The strategy for attaining the AEC is through regional economic communities (RECs) as building blocks. Eight such RECs constitute these pillars for moving Africa towards the AEC. The progress that each REC makes in its integration project impacts the AU’s continental integration agenda. Migration, and, particularly, free movement of economically active persons across a region’s borders, is an important productive factor essential to regional integration. Moreover, the AU’s New Partnership for Development (NEPAD) cites the migration-­ development nexus as a sectoral priority in NEPAD’s Human Resources Development Initiative. The AU realises that migration contributes to development and defines its approach to the issues through two key policy frameworks. The first, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), addresses nine key migration issues: labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, and interstate cooperation and partnerships (African Union (AU) 2006a).

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The second, the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD) raises eleven priority policy issues and recommendations for national, continental and international action. These include Migration and Development, Human resource and the brain drain, Labour migration, Remittances, African Diaspora, Migration and Peace, Security and Stability, Migration and Human Rights, Migration and Gender, Children and Youth, Elderly and Regional Initiatives (African Union (AU) 2006b). These and other instruments of the AU and African RECs ultimately target the establishment of the AEC predicated on RECs. As a result, the debates on intra-Africa migration are an important point of scholarly conversation, which this book takes up so as to show how the continent measures up to the ideals of AU the AEC. This is precisely because while African countries are engaged in the drive towards RECs and the AEC, there is a corresponding movement by some states to securitise their borders, which is antithetical to the ideals under consideration. In addition, undocumented migration and informal cross-border movements of economically active people at the grassroots have received scanty attention and recognition from policymakers and scholars alike. This is despite the ubiquity of the phenomenon across Africa. Least of all, the (potential) role and place of people engaged in such movements in economic, social and political well-being in Africa and the RECs remain unexplored. This is also an issue which is discussed in this book (see Chaps. 9 and 11). Overall, the issues around intra-Africa migration demonstrate a conundrum—despite the stated policies at continental, regional and country levels, the effective and collective management of migration is never settled. Consequently, the task of forming RECs in Africa (before even considering relations with other regions such as Europe) in which migration binds and positively transform, and thus contribute to the development of rather than dividing the continent in this age of increased migration and globalisation, is one of the main themes with which this book engages.

Africa-Europe Relations in the Age of Increased Migration and Globalisation Africa-Europe migration relations and governance have undergone a significant shift, especially since the so-called 2015 migration crisis (Chap. 4), and this has led to cooperation regimes and programmes which emphasise more the restrictions of migration from Africa to Europe (Chaps. 4, 5 and

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7). In contrast to the ultimate EU aim of eliminating borders within its internal area, several governments of the EU member states have closed their borders to refugees and reintroduced border checks in an attempt to restrict the incoming or transiting movement of people. Such reactions can be seen as illustrative of how states continue to function in the postmodern era of post-national policies and non-territorial flows and to suggest a regression into state-centric thinking and the weakening of the EU’s integrationist momentum and solidarity (Laine 2018a). The apparent lack of faith in the European social model challenges the idea of open borders, and, as Betts implies, states’ commitment to asylum has become increasingly conditional (Betts 2015). The situation is not, however, as new as it is often claimed to be. As Huysmans (2000, 77) noted already two decades ago, migration had become a meta-issue in the political spectacle in Europe, and discourses reifying immigrants as a dangerous challenge to societal stability play a prominent role in it. Ever since then, migration has become increasingly securitised by integrating it into an internal security framework, whereby the more welcoming sentiments have become effectively suppressed (Cuttitta 2017; Gill 2018; Laine 2018b; McCall 2015). Furthermore, increased securitisation aimed at combatting the perceived threat has created a logic that has generated several counterproductive dynamics (Laine 2018a), including making, on the one hand, the migrant journeys from “outside” more dangerous and, on the other, those “inside” feel more threatened and insecure. The hardening and securitisation of borders against migrants from Africa demonstrates the contradictions of globalisation and, indeed, a changing world order. So pronounced is the insincerity in dealing with the issue of migration that the hardening and securitisation of the EU borders have been likened to construction of the EU as a gated community (McCall 2015; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). This is most evident (on the basis of the deployment of border securitisation paraphernalia between Africa and Europe) at Ceuta and Melilla, which are Spanish towns which share a border with the North African country of Morocco. In this, one can clearly see the extent to which migration impacts on Africa-European relations in terms of the lengths to which the EU can go so as to keep out migrants from Africa among other regions. Further, the insincerity on the part of the EU is demonstrated in the securitisation and hardening of the EU borders while simultaneously using humanitarian language to reduce the rights of migrants or arbitrarily arrest or intercept them on the Mediterranean Sea or send them back to their countries, all of which is

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tantamount to the “boderization” of the Mediterranean Sea (Moreno-­ Moreno-­Lax 2018, 120). In this respect, migration challenges Africa-­ Europe relations. Against this backdrop, the common and widespread view that migration is a security issue needs to be challenged and/or debunked (Chap. 5). Pursuant to this, the starting point around meaningful and positive Africa-­ Europe relations is a counter perspective, which offers a balanced picture, which would urge people to reconsider the attitudes they hold—and this book is a modest attempt in this direction. This counter-narrative should be based on and consider the interests of both Africa and Europe (Chaps. 4 and 5) and provides a balanced perspective on both the challenges related to and opportunities provided by the ever-increasing migration flows. We investigate several issues, ranging from conundrums relating to migration within Africa, but also its bearing on regional and continental integration, to migration between Europe and Africa, and the significance of this in terms of relations between the two continents. By these means, we seek to bring into conversation migration issues relating to the management of migration for development, social cohesion and regional integration. We particularly focus on migration issues related to the management of migration as a threat and phenomenon that must be curbed.

Migration Contestations and Transformation While there is increased migration within Europe, as well as within the African continent, there is a contention around the volume of migration from the latter to the former. That people migrate from Africa to Europe is a fact, but what is fanciful or fictitious is the numbers and volumes of migrants making such movements (Essa 2018; Nshimbi 2017; Nshimbi and Moyo 2016a). In addition to this, the major problem is that these numbers of people who migrate to Europe are misrepresented in a manner which ignores that Africans migrate more within Africa than they do to other regions such as Europe (Essa 2018; Nshimbi 2017). Given that only about 5.6% of refugees in Africa actually migrate out of Africa and the rest stay within the continent, the discourse that there is a deluge of African migrants and refugees who are overwhelming Europe is a myth (Essa 2018; Nshimbi 2017). The important point to emphasise in this

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respect is that, while migration is more significant within Africa it still connects Africa to other parts of the world, such as Europe. Given that the issue of migration is challenging intra-Africa relationships in addition to Africa’s relationships with other regions of the world, such as Europe, it is imperative to examine intra-Africa relations vis-à-vis migration, besides evaluating EU-Africa relations in a global order characterised by unprecedented fluxes of men, women and children within and between the two continents. In particular, Africa is characterised by extensive interactions across its artificial and contiguous borders and borderlands, just as there are notable flows of migration from Africa to Europe. Several questions arise, such as inter alia: How should these fluxes be managed to promote socio-economic transformation and development in Africa? What lessons can be gleaned from the experiences of the EU? This should be viewed within the context that the changing global order is characterised by, among others, moves towards regionalism and regional integration. Hence, Chaps. 2, 8 and 10 delve deeper into these themes by analysing xenophobia and issues of social protection of and social policy around migrants, development and integration. This debate is also amplified in Chap. 3, which discusses and debates the links between migration and sustainable development, suggesting that migration both necessitates and confronts relationships. Concerning the issue of necessitating relationships, Chap. 6 demonstrates that the migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who are based in Europe have established strong connections with their homeland in the fight against corruption, authoritarianism and influence of local political dynamics back home.

Migration and Misrepresented Views and Actors in Conventional Migration Discourses To respond to the question of managing migration for development and socio-economic transformation, some chapters (see e.g. Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 7) in this volume juxtapose discourses on migration with mis- and underrepresented themes and phenomena in academic literature as well as in the political and public debates whenever they engage with the broader themes of migration and development. Chapter 7, for example, introduces and interrogates the phenomenon of cross-border informality by exposing the nuances that underpin this economic sector such as how informal cross-­ border actors view the international or nation-state border, and what

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insights this can throw on the development of migration policies (taking into account regional and continental integration) in response to, and especially, informal cross-border migration—whether it is within or between Africa and Europe. Similarly, Chap. 9 goes on to introduce and examine African informal cross-border migrants in Johannesburg within the logic and context of regional and continental integration. Following on Chaps. 9 and 10 continue with the examination of African migrants’ aspirations, along with host country citizens’ anxieties within the city of Johannesburg, but in relation to remittances-related issues. Similarly, Chap. 11 also examines the dynamics and nature of informal or artisanal miners in the Southern African region and argues that this informal activity plays an important role in the flow of remittances and, by extension, impacts on development in the receiving region. For which cause, this brings to the fore the issue of migration management and especially informal cross-border economic activities in Africa in general and specifically the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Continentally, perhaps efforts to integrate Africa through the regional economic communities (RECs) should then be informed by lessons drawn from across Africa and RECs like SADC as well as the integration experience of the EU—particularly the Schengen Area—in moving from free movement of labour (only) to EU citizenship (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013), as enshrined in Article 20 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In the final analysis, the chapters in this book bring in different perspectives to the analysis of migration within the broader context of relations within and between Africa and Europe. The analysis goes beyond merely demonstrating the development potential of migration and the contribution of actors involved therein. Also, the book adopts a different epistemological and ontological slant from approaches generally adopted in books of a similar nature, by asserting that migrants and migration are as important factors as others in development agendas. Thus, effectively managing migration within Africa, across its RECs, and between Africa and Europe, and harnessing it to achieve inclusive development, is an important subject of analysis in the book. And beyond examining intra-Africa migration, this book also investigates Africa-Europe relations vis-à-vis migration.

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References Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). 1991. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/243/. Accessed 19 Mar 2017. Adepoju, A. 2010. Rethinking the dynamics of migration within and from Africa. In International migration, within to and from Africa in a globalized world, ed. A. Adepoju, 9–45. Accra: Network of Migration Research on Africa. African Union (AU). 2006a. The migration policy framework for Africa. Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, Banju, 25–29 June 2006. ———. 2006b. African common position on migration and development. Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, Banjul, 25–29 June 2006. Betts, A. 2015. The normative terrain of the global refugee regime. Ethics & International Affairs 29 (4): 363–375. Blau, F.D., and C.  Mackie, eds. 2017. The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Cuttitta, P. 2017. Delocalization, humanitarianism, and human rights: The mediterranean border between exclusion and inclusion. Antipode 50 (2): 783–803. Davidov, E., and B. Meuleman. 2012. Explaining attitudes towards immigration policies in European countries: The role of human values. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38 (5): 757–775. Essa, A. 2018. The myth of mass African migration to Europe. https://www.iol. co.za/news/opinion/the-myth-of-mass-african-migration-toeurope-15950438. Accessed 30 Nov 2018. Gill, N. 2018. The suppression of welcome. Fennia  – International Journal of Geography 196 (1): 88–98. Gupta, A., and J. Ferguson. 2008. Beyond culture: Space, identity and the politics of difference. In The cultural geography reader, ed. T.S. Oakes and P.L. Price, 60–67. London/New York: Routledge. Huysmans, J. 2000. The European Union and the securitization of migration. Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (5): 751–777. International Migration Institute. 2006. Towards a new agenda for international migration research. Oxford: James Martin 21st Century School. University of Oxford. Kahanec, M., and K.F.  Zimmermann, eds. 2016. Labor migration, EU enlargement, and the great recession. Berlin: Springer. Laine, J. 2018a. The ethics of bordering: A critical reading of the refugee ‘crisis.’ In How to deal with refugees? Europe as a continent of dreams, ed. G. Besier and K. Stoklosa, 278–301. Berlin: LIT Verlag. ———. 2018b. Conditional welcome and the ambivalent self – commentary to Gill. Fennia 196 (2): 230–235. ———. 2019. Tabloid media and the dubious terrain of migration reporting. Ethical Space 16 (1): 34–40.

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Mawadza, A., and J. Crush. 2010. Metaphors of migration: Zimbabwean migrants in the south African media. In Zimbabwe’s exodus: crisis, migration, survival, ed. J.  Crush and D.  Tevera, 363–376. Cape Town/Ottawa: Southern African Migration Programme. McAuliffe, M., and A. Kitimbo. 2018. African migration: What the numbers really tell us. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2018/06/heres-the-truth-about-african-migration/ McCall, C. 2015. State borders in Europe. In Introduction to border studies, ed. S. V. Sevastianov, J. P. Laine, and A. Kireev, 180–197. Vladivostok: Dalnauka. Milanovic, B. 2016. Migration’s economic positives and negatives. Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/migrations-economic-positives-and-negatives. Accessed 24 Oct 2019. Mitze, T., T. Dall Schmidt, D. Rauhut, and A. Kangasharju. 2017. Ageing shocks and short-run regional labour market dynamics in a spatial panel VAR approach. Applied Economics 50 (8): 870–890. Moreno-Moreno-Lax, V. 2018. The EU humanitarian border and the securitization of human rights: The “rescue-through-interdiction/rescue-without protection” paradigm. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (1): 119–140. Moyo, I. 2017. African immigrant traders in inner city Johannesburg: Deconstructing the threatening “other”. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Nshimbi, C.C. 2017. Harnessing diverse migrant and remittance flows for development. In Rural Africa in motion. Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara, ed. S. Mercandalli and B. Losch, 26–27. Rome: FAO/CIRAD. Nshimbi, C.C., and L. Fioramonti 2013. A region without borders? Policy frameworks for regional labour migration towards South Africa. MiWORC report N°1. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand. Nshimbi, C.C., and I. Moyo. 2016a. Visible and invisible bordering practices: The EU-African migration conundrum and spatial mobility of borders. World Journal of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development 13 (4): 300–314. ———. 2016b. Human trafficking legislation in the SADC region: An overview. Journal of Trafficking Organized Crime and Security 2 (2): 157–170. Papastergiadis, N. 2000. The turbulence of migration: Globalization, deterritorialization and hybridity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Santacreu, O., E. Baldoni, and M.C. Albert. 2009. Deciding to move: Migration projects in an integrating Europe. In Pioneers of European integration, ed. E. Recchi and A. Favell, 52–71. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Solimano, A. 2010. International migration in the age of crisis and globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stewart, E., and G. Mulvey. 2014. Seeking safety beyond refuge: The impact of immigration and citizenship policy upon refugees in the UK. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (7): 1023–1039.

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UN. 2019. The number of international migrants reaches 272 million, continuing an upward trend in all world regions. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/ development/desa/en/news/population/inter national-migrantstock-2019.html van Houtum, H., and R. Pijpers. 2007. The european union as a gated community: the twofaced border and immigration regime of the EU. Antipode 39 (2): 291–309.

CHAPTER 2

Migration, Regional Integration and the Development Conundrum: Reflections on Policy, Identity and Shared Humanity Samuel O. Oloruntoba

Introduction Migration, broadly conceptualised as the movement of people from one place to another, has become a permanent feature and constitutes a major point of discourse in the contemporary times (King 2012). Migration has been part of human history from time immemorial as people have moved from one part of the world to another either voluntarily or forced by natural disasters, wars, conflicts or slavery. The globalisation processes that resulted from the post–Second World War liberal international order have fostered new waves of migration as skilled and unskilled people have been forced to move from one region to another in search of better opportunities (King 2012). At the global level, migration has become a

S. O. Oloruntoba (*) Institute of African Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_2

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highly emotive issue, which has led to the return of nationalism, populism and identity politics in both the right and left of the political ideological divides (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Solimano 2010; Stewart and Mulvey 2014). Faced by dwindling lifestyles and economic insecurity, the middle class in many developed countries have blamed foreign workers, whom they accused of accepting lower wages, for their plights. As a continent that operates on the fringes of global capitalism, Africa is facing undue pressures on the economies from neoliberal globalisation, through deindustrialisation, financialisation and the attendant job losses. To escape the deleterious effects of harsh economic conditions, both skilled and unskilled Africans have moved through regular and irregular routes to places that they consider provide better opportunities for better livelihood (Essa 2018; Nshimbi and Moyo 2016). From the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of professionals in various fields have migrated to North America, Europe, other African countries and, to a less extent, Asia. Several thousands more have undertaken perilous journeys through the Sahara desert and Mediterranean Sea as they struggle to get to Europe. Despite the regional integration agenda of the African Union and the discourses on free movement of people, cases of xenophobia or Afrophobia have occurred over and over in Africa (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2006). Contrary to the generally held norms of promotion of democracy, rule of law and human rights that the European Union has championed in Africa, the regional organisation has not been able to prevail on some of its members to treat migrants and refugees as humans deserving dignity and protection. In contradistinction to these principles and norms, the EU has developed Neighbourhood Policies with North African countries, which have, contrary to their projected aims, led to the securitisation of borders and worked towards keeping African migrants in Africa (Moreno-Lax 2018). Given the above scenarios and the resultant development conundrums, questions arise on the status of shared humanity in our contemporary times. This chapter examines the crisis of global migration in the context of the development conundrum, regional integration in Africa and shared humanity. Taking a historical approach, it is argued in this chapter that whereas it might be politically correct for developed countries to keep Africans away from their borders, at least for the time being, it will be counterproductive for African countries to follow this populist approach, which is anchored on neo-­ nationalism or even nativism. The economic history of Africa clearly shows that several empires were built in different parts of the continent when

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citizens were free to move from one part of the continent to the other, without being restricted by borders (Zeleza 1993). Similarly, as Nkrumah (1963) argues, consideration for geostrategic interest necessitates the imperative of crafting a Pan-African identity and developing a common strategy in mediating and negotiating relations with other parts of the world. The new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is focused on the structural transformation of African economies (ECA 2017; Oloruntoba and Tsowou 2019). However, it remains to be seen how the question of migration will be addressed under this agreement. Although the dominant feature of the neoliberal international order has been that other factors of production such as capital, technology and investors move freely across borders, the peripheral position of Africa in the global circuit of capital, the disparities in availability of skills require a different approach to managing migration. Both labour and capital are part of the factors of production. The preference for capital over labour in terms of ease of movement is one of the challenges of contemporary modernity. The profit motif that underlined it, the degradation of the value of humans as a critical agency of development and the protection of class interest of members of the Transnational Capitalist Class are other features of capitalism (Robinson 2010, 2004; Stiglitz 2012, 2010). Scholars have argued that the global capitalist order rooted in Eurocentric modernity is informed by the paradigm of war, greed and exploitation (Marx and Engels 1986; Rodney 1981). This paradigm was given expression through various inhuman practices like slavery trade, colonialism and neocolonialism. Although various forms of class division existed in precolonial Africa, it was the triple forces of trans-Atlantic slave trade, global imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism that worsened social relations and undermined the paradigm of peace and communalism that were the defining features of African societies in precolonial times. Thus, it becomes incumbent on Africa to follow a different approach in resolving the current crisis of migration and development conundrum. Why has migration become such an emotive issue in the development discourse? What are the causal links between migration and development in Africa, in particular? What are the existing frameworks for migration and regional integration in Africa? How can Africa foreground humanism and Pan-­African identity in managing the current challenges of migration within the overall framework of an integrated continent? After this introduction, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section “The Crisis of Global Migration” examines the crisis of migration

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and the forces that have made it such an emotive issue over the past few years. Section “Migration and Regional Integration in Africa” analyses the challenges of migration and regional integration in Africa as well as the African Union’s framework for mainstreaming migration into its various development agendas. The European Union’s approach to migration and how this shapes the responses and programmes of the African Union are also discussed in this section. In section “Reframing the Discourses on Migration and Regional Integration”, a case is made for a different approach for addressing the crisis of migration and xenophobia through the reconstruction of humanism and a pan-African identity. This reconstruction of humanism diverts from the current preoccupation with the commoditisation of life, in which, following the logic of neoliberalism, capital and businesses have more leverage in moving around the continent without hiccup than labour. Section “Resolving Identity Crisis through Decoloniality” concludes with recommendations.

The Crisis of Global Migration Discourses on migration have occupied major attention in the development and intellectual community in the past one decade. These discourses have varied from the link between the migration crisis and the global labour market (Castles 2011) to the deliberate conflation of refugees with economic migrants (Crawley and Skleparis 2018) to and the confusion around structure and agency in migration theory (Bakewell 2010). There have also been attempts to locate migration within the ongoing debates on the commoditisation of life under the neoliberal capitalist economic system. Mavelli (2018) shows how the state has followed the logic of the market to commodify access to citizenship to high-net-worth individuals. From New Zealand to Britain, United States of America, Malta and various other developed countries, deliberate policies are being put in place to attract rich people to come and become citizens. Similarly, faced by declining population growth, various countries are putting in place schemes and programmes to attract people with specialised skills in various disciplines. Thus, the cacophony of political noises over migration is geared towards keeping the poor and vulnerable people in their countries of birth. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, protectionist policies are on the rise and there are many who feel disadvantaged by the open international system. Migrants from regions of less economic development are considered as others, who must be kept away from competing for jobs,

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and in the case of South Africa, for women. The rhetoric of building border walls that is emanating from populist and neo-nationalist leaders like Donald Trump of United States of America, Brexit by Nigel Fagel and Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom and Herman Mashaba in South Africa is especially targeted towards immigrants that they consider as burden. The economic globalisation processes and the war on terror have contributed to the conditions that are forcing people out of their countries to seek for greener pastures and safe havens in the West. Africa and much of central America, regions that constitute the highest source of irregular migration, have been negatively affected by the politics of the Cold War, on the one hand, and the imposition of the structural adjustment programmes by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund over the past half of a century, on the other (Reno 1998; Schmidt 2013). In trying to gain geostrategic advantage, the West and East used these countries to fight proxy wars. Dictators like Mobutu Sese seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), the apartheid regime in South Africa, and leaders of UNITA in Angola were propped up and supported in their reign of terror and subversion of citizens’ rights. In these processes, democratic governance with accountability became a rarity. Just as the dust of the Cold War was settling, the international financial institutions imposed structural adjustment programmes on these countries as a way of addressing their socio-economic problems. Lacking in home-grown strategy and crafted without adequate consultation with either the people or their governments, the structural adjustment programmes failed dismally. As poverty and inequality continue to grow, unemployment among youths and desperation to survive have driven many of them to undertake perilous journeys through the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, where they expect to make a better living. The Middle East also has its share of the global migration crisis. There are domestic and external factors that fuelled the crisis. At the domestic level, the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2009 created massive instability in various countries in the subregion, which continues till today. Protests against sit tight leaders in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, among others, led to regime change and protracted conflicts. At the external level, there has been a lot of military activities in the Middle East post–September 11, 2001. This has led to the emergence of counter forces like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also known as Islamic State of Irag and the Levant (ISIL), with far-reaching consequences for peace in the subregion. Many of the migrants who try to reach Europe are refugees who are fleeing from these crises. The Arab

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Spring that started in 2009 also brought in its wake various socio-economic and political crises that accentuated the crisis of global migration in relation to Africa, in particular (David 2008). The deleterious effects of neoliberal globalisation are not limited to Africa. The displacement of manufacturing and industrialisation and the replacement of these with financialisation have created disruption in the ways in which economies are organised in advanced countries. As industries migrate to regions of low labour economies, getting satisfactory jobs remains difficult for many middle and lower classes in advanced countries. Besides, wages of workers have become suppressed in these countries more than at any time in the post-1945 era. While pay and incentives of top business executives have grown in leaps and bounds, wages of workers have increased much below the rise in inflation and interest rates (Oloruntoba 2016). The power of labour unions has also been whittled down since the Reagan-Thatcher alliance of the 1980s. Faced with the dilemma of a reduced welfare and an absent state, the middle class has become disillusioned about what the future holds for them. In the process, conservative and populist politicians seize the narrative to blame migrants for the woes of the fearful segments of the population (Oloruntoba 2018b). Despite the indisputable contributions of migrant workers to the economies of their host countries (see Haan 2000), politicians have created political rhetoric of fears, using languages such as flooding, swamping, taking over and so on to describe an imaginary invasion of migrants into the advanced countries of Europe and the United States of America. Thus, the crisis of migration assumes a paradoxical dimension which can be traced to neoliberal globalisation and the resurgence of empire building. On the first score, the forces of the market and the underlying logic of trade agreements that developing countries sign with the developed countries have created conditions that deepen poverty in the former. Also, the imposed liberal form of democracy, with little or no room for citizens to constructively participate in politics, has led to the emergence of a ruling elite that is neither developmental nor capable of addressing the challenges of underdevelopment in the sending countries. Similarly, the vulnerable and the excluded people, both among the middle and lower classes in developed countries, have become concerned about how the changing economic structure will affect their future. The resurgence of empire and realism has further provided motivation for more military spending than what obtains in social sectors in a country like the United States of

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America. The contradictions of the crisis of global migration are visible in the crisis of ageing workforce in developed countries, the design of various programmes to attract highly skilled migrants from Africa, the corporatisation of citizenship by the state and the criminalisation of low-skilled migrants and refugees from developing countries (Mavelli 2018). It remains to be seen how the various populist policies such as building of walls or the threat of it, arresting and keeping desperate migrants in custodies, separating children from their parents as well as massive deportations will end the current crisis. It also remains to be seen how the countries that are perpetuating these exclusionary policies will turn back to advocate the rule of law, protection of human rights and other such platitudes in the sending countries.

Migration and Regional Integration in Africa Africa, like any other part of the world, has been a site of migration from time immemorial. The push-and-pull factors of migration have propelled people to move from one part of the continent to another (Adepoju 2003, 1988; Afolayan 1988). In precolonial Africa, push factors of migration included seeking for business and economic opportunities from one region to another. In the specific case of West Africa, Adepoju (2003) has shown how various groups within the subregion moved around in search of business opportunities. For instance, the Yoruba people of Southwest Nigeria are found in countries like Ghana, Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. Ochonu (2015) also shows how the Wangari business people moved around within the West African subregion. Ghanaians are also found in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa. In East Africa, Kenyans, Tanzanians, Ugandans as well as Rwandans have lived in different parts of the subregion before the bifurcation carried out by the imperialists at the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885. The freedom that Africans had to move around without the inhibition of borders contributed to huge trade volumes that flowed between and among the various nations. As Zeleza (2003) argues in his Economic History of Africa, the free flow of people contributed to the building of great empires that existed on the continent before their destruction by slave trade and colonialism. The twin evil of slave trade and colonialism constituted the initial factors that forced Africans out of their natural habitats. As slave traders hunted for Africans, various chiefs and heads of communities joined in this ignoble trade, thus leading to incessant conflicts and wars among erstwhile peaceful

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communities. On its own part, colonialism introduced a wage economy that forced Africans from the villages to urban areas in search of jobs (Ake 1981). The nature of political independence that Africans got from the colonialists was a negotiated one. This negotiation was based on a guarantee of the continued control of the economies and, to a large extent, the politics of the newly independent countries by the erstwhile colonial masters. Thus, despite the protestation to the contrary by few informed early post-­ independent leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, maority of the leaders agreed to keep the colonial borders intact (Ki-Zerbo 2005; Mbembe 2019). The retention of these borders have created what Nyamnjoh (2006) refers to as insiders and outsiders. In his analysis of how privileged people have used territorial privileges to label, oppress and exclude others, the author provides empirical analysis of xenophobia in countries such as Botswana and South Africa. Despite their peripheral location in the global capitalist order, political elites in these countries see themselves as better than the others, whom they consider to be interlopers and irritants, depriving them of the space to enjoy the fruit of freedom. The irony of independence and the contradictions of Pan-Africanism are that these elites have maintained or, in some instances, deepened the colonial/apartheid policies of exclusion of the others, now widely referred to as foreign nationals (see Mbembe 2019; Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2014). As Mbembe (2019) argues, whereas the apartheid regime kept the black population in townships and underdeveloped areas through the enforcement of pass laws, the post-independent state in South Africa has borrowed a leaf and labels many Africans from other parts of the continent as criminals that need to be deported. Although regional integration and Pan-Africanism continue to be part of the language of politics in countries where xenophobia has become a recurring experience, the logic and philosophy of such rhetoric are not different from the consideration of the neoliberal capitalism, which is access to market and possibly raw materials from the home countries of foreign nationals, carelessly tagged as criminals. This contradiction in the language of unity and politics of otherness explains the concern that South African companies operate as sub-imperial organisations in other African countries (see Samson 2009 for a debate on this issue). While South Africa is the most recent face of xenophobia against other African nationals, this problem is not limited to the country or even Southern Africa subregion as a whole. Prah (2006, 2010) shows that acts

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of Afrophobia have occurred in various parts of Africa at one time or the other. These include the deportation of Nigerians from Ghana in 1968, the repeat of the same by Nigeria against Ghana in 1981, Kenya against Ugandans, Ivory Coast against Ghana, Gabon against other Africans and a host of others. Apart from the economic factor, which is also the main reason advanced for such attacks, Prah (2010) identifies cultural differences and feeling of superiority of some nationals over the others, which culminate in looking down on migrants and, in certain instances, engagement in criminal activities by some nationals. While this argument holds a lot of merit, I have argued elsewhere (Oloruntoba 2018a) that beyond the consideration of economic or cultural factors is the crisis of identity that continues to plague the psychology of Africans. This argument is premised on the ways in which Africans welcome people from developed parts the world, such as North America and Western Europe, but at the same time killing and labelling as criminals their own (people from other African countries). Are we to say that there are no criminals among people from the West and the East that are daily thronging the cities and villages of Africa in search of markets, investments and raw materials? The ease with which these categories of people enter and exit from the borders that are made so tight for other Africans further underscores the argument that the crisis of identity is underpinned by self-hate, self-denigration and inherent dislike for people who look like one but who must be made to assume a lesser position of privilege than the inhabitants of the artificially contrived borders (Ki-Zerbo 2005). Resolving the crisis of identity is fundamental to the success of any regional integration that the African Union could have designed for the continent. From the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 through the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 1981, Abuja Treaty of 1991, the New Partnership for African Development of 2001 to the Agenda 2063 adopted in 2015, African leaders have understood the importance of fostering unity to the socio-economic development and the geostrategic importance of the continent (Nkrumah 1963). What is lacking is the capacity to correctly design and define the forms and manner of the integration. This lack of capacity is further worsened by the absence of political will to implement agreed treaties and protocols on regional integration. The majority of the political elites on the continent are caught in the web of politics of nationalism and the rhetoric of Pan-­Africanism (Ndlvou-Gatsheni 2013). Furthermore, Adedeji (2012) argues that neocolonial powers such as France have continually worked surreptiously to undermine the

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integration efforts on the continent through divide and rule by exerting pressures on their former colonies. This point was supported by Bach (2007), who argues that France has always been suspicious of the leading role of Nigeria in West Africa, where majority of its erstwhile colonies are located. Given the challenges above, the various programmes and agenda of regional integration put in place by the African Union have not led to the realisation of a fully integrated continent with a strong capacity to decide her own affairs in the comity of nations. Until recently, when the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was ratified, various deadlines for achieving regional integration have been missed. From various accounts, especially from government agencies and multilateral institutions such as the African Union (AU), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as well as some analysts, the AfCFTA represents the single most important step towards regional integration and structural transformation of African economy (ECA 2017). Despite the optimism, concerns exist on how the continental agreement will work, especially when the issue of migration is put into contextual analysis. For instance, the African Union has established Protocol on Movement of People under the Single Passport regime. However, less than 20 per cent of the countries on the continent have adopted this protocol. The relatively better off economies have expressed fears that adoption of a single passport could lead to influx of Africans from regions of low economic development to their countries. The recent xenophobic attacks against some foreign African nationals in South Africa, the continued border problems between the Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighbours and the closure of Nigeria’s border with Benin Republic are early warnings and signals of challenges that lie ahead in the implementation of the continental trade agreement as well as other parts of the regional integration agenda, such as the African Economic Community. The limited success of the African Union in ensuring that its member countries implement existing protocols on free movement of persons can be linked to the influence of the European Union over the African Union Commission. Scholars have argued that the regional integration project in Africa is largely modelled after the European Union (see Draper 2013; Gibb 2009). However, this perspective has been recently queried by Fioramonti and Mattheis (2015), who ask if indeed the African Union is following the European Union approach to regional integration. Despite any reservation to the contrary, the agreement that exists between the EU and the AU on managing migration from Africa shows that the AU lacks

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independence in decision-making on this issue. Rather than addressing the supply-side issues in forms of trade and investment agreements as well as tacit support for dictators and corrupt leaders that created the conditions that are making many young Africans to flee the continent, the EU has adopted a two-track approach of EU Neighbourhood Policy of helping to keep migrants from other parts of Africa away from their borders. The agreement between the AU and the EU runs counter to the spirit of Lisbon AU-EU Strategic Sommit, which recognises the imperative of allowing the AU and its member countries to exercise their sovereignty on issues of governance and development. This point is worth highlighting because of the leverage that the EU has on the AU as the major donor. In other words, it will seem that consideration for national interests and commoditisation cum exchange occupy higher priority than that of mutual partnership and shared humanity, which the EU has touted in relations with Africa in recent times. As argued by Oloruntoba (2018a), the EU cannot claim to be promoting human rights and the rule of law in Africa through its various interventions while at the same time breaking international conventions on the protection of vulnerable people, who are seeking better economic opportunities. While it is understandable that the imperative of national politics, underscored by consideration for votes, has shaped the responses of the EU to the migration flows from Africa, the change in nomenclature from refugees to economic migrants notwithstanding, the EU has a duty of care to protect and care for the desperate people fleeing wars and hardship. Similarly, the AU is expected to foreground consideration for the humanity of the migrants and Pan-African identity before making arrangements with the EU to maintain detention centres at the border of North African countries.

Reframing the Discourses on Migration and Regional Integration The ongoing crisis of migration, which manifests in increasing migration flows from developing or least developed countries to advanced countries and the turn to nationalism and populism at the global level, requires new reflections on policy, identity and shared humanity. At the policy level, it bears restating that migration should be managed in ways that lead to pareto optimality between host and sending countries. Consideration for

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shared humanity poses another question regarding the ongoing neoliberal basis of attracting the best-skilled and financially endowed people from developing to developed or other developing parts of the world. In Nigeria, for example, there are low-skilled people from different parts of the West African subregion that ply their trade without much molestation. For example, there are tailors and cloth merchants from Senegal and Guinea, who sell guinea brocade and Senegalese clothes in major markets and on the streets of major cities in the country. People from the east of the continent, for example from Somalia, have also successfully built spaza shops and provide access to cheap household items to people in the townships in different parts of South Africa. People in the informal sector have contributed significantly to economic activities in many countries in Africa. In a study led by Oloruntoba, Gumede and Serges-Kamga in Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe on the link between migration and regional integration in the informal sector, it was found out that while the people in the informal sector derive a lot of benefits from working across borders, they face harassments, intimidations and extortion from security agents both within their host countries and from border officials (see Gumede et al. 2019). In countries such as Ghana and South Africa, political leaders have complained that foreign nationals from other African countries are operating in spaces and in sectors that are supposed to be occupied by indigenes. In the wake of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in September 2019, the country’s minister of small business, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, in an interview with 702 Radio, was quoted as saying that the government is planning to regulate the retail sectors in terms of who should be allowed to operate there. In her words as reported in the Businesstech of September 26, 2019, “if you look at the retail sector, when we all grew up our spaza shops were run by ourselves, by our neighbours, we took over shops from our mothers. If you (look) now, then that is not the demographic of who is running our spaza shops”. The minister alluded to similar laws in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, which regulate who can operate in which sectors. Indeed, Nigeria promulgated the Indigenisation Decree in 1972 to allow Nigerians to participate in the commanding heights of the economy as well as in consumer non-durable goods production. However, as Ogbuagu (1982) argues, this policy was informed by consideration for nationalism borne out of pressures from local business people and interest groups. Also, the targets of exclusion from the commanding heights of the economy were not Africans from other countries; rather, these were Lebanese, Indians

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and Europeans. Indeed, these groups of people were not completely excluded. Rather, they were mandated to concentrate in the intermediate and capital-intensive goods (Ogbuagu 1982). The fact that Nigeria introduced the indigenisation decree or policy did not instantly change the economic condition of the country; neither did it lead to substantial creation of employment for the teeming youth of the country. Recently, Ghana has raised alarm that Nigerian businessmen are taking over the sectors that are supposed to be occupied by Ghanaians. This led to the promulgation of laws that made it compulsory for wholly foreign-­ owned businesses in the country to meet a capital requirement of USD 500,000 (Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 2018). The furore generated by this law led to the intervention of the government of Nigeria before Ghana could soft pedal on enforcing the large capital requirement, which is beyond the reach of many small business owners from Nigeria and other West African countries that are interested in establishing business in that country. Paradoxically, as Africans continue to fight themselves over the issue of right of establishment, there are Chinese who operate in small business sectors, especially in the area of artisanal mining, without any form of molestation either from the state or from the people. What the above points to is the crisis of identity, which continues to define African relations with one another, to which I now turn.

Resolving Identity Crisis Through Decoloniality Decoloniality provides an entry point to resolving the crisis of identity that have continued to plaque Africans for centuries. Although Africans, like any other groups of people, are made up of various tribes and tongues, they share similar experiences of oppression and subjugation, which should have motivated them to work together for a common solution to their challenges. However, centuries of oppression and dehumanisation has wrought terrible damage to the psychological composition of an average African, especially in relations to one another. Distrust, mistrust, competition, envy and jealousy have served to motivate self-hate and self-­ denigration. Worse, the form of education that many received has created a condition of arrogance in ignorance, in which even though people lack a knowledge of who they are, they are comfortable in their ignorance. In his book on decolonising the mind, the novelist Ngũgı ̃ wa Thiong’o highlights the deleterious effects of externally constructed received knowledges on the minds of Africans (Wathio’go 1986). Decolonial scholars have

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argued that although official colonialism might have ended, there continues to be coloniality of being, power and knowledge (Ndlvou-Gatsheni 2013, 2018). Of these three, coloniality of being is most relevant to the analysis of the crisis of identity. The being of an African is bifurcated in ways that undermine the true meaning of his or her personality. Both the educated and uneducated Africans are conflicted in trying to find proof of relevance, assert power over others of his or her kind and see kith and kin as the others. As mentioned above, the crisis of economic globalisation has worsened and undermine the sense of collectivisation and community that previously defined Africans. Decoloniality of mind could help Africans see that the differences that are so amplified due to the separation the externally designed borders have created in their minds are merely imagined. In the case of Africa, the colonialists divided the continent among themselves so that they can divide and rule the conquered territories. Regardless of the dependent and beggarly nature of most of these states, the political elites have mastered the art of using the borders and claims of territorial sovereignty to ensure that they have access to and control resources through the control of political institutions. Although the political elites live in affluence, they blame African foreign nationals for the economic challenges of their citizens. While sameness may not be achieved, decolonisation of discourses on migration and regional integration could help Africa settle the issue of identity. First, this theoretical approach will help Africans understand that in the global hierarchy of power, the continent and her people occupy the lowest rung of the ladder. This marginal position should spur cooperation, unity and a common sense of purpose, which Nkrumah advocated for in his book Unite or Perish (Nkrumah 1963). Second, given the marginal position of all African countries, including the ones that appear to be economically better than others today, they operate at the mercy of global capital and the owners, who are free to withdraw their investments at the least sign of danger. Resolving the question of identity in the migration discourse will also help provoke new thinking about the possibility of reciprocal treatment in the event of any unforeseen economic or political crisis in seemingly stable economies of today. The way out of this conundrum is the construction of African citizenship who are conscious, critical and liberated in their thoughts (Oloruntoba 2018a).

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Conclusion This chapter has examined the ongoing global crisis of migration within the context of Africa. It traces the origins of the crisis in its diverse manifestations and links it with the rise of populism in advanced countries of the world and, to some extent, in developing countries. A case was made for new thinking on African identity and our shared humanity. In this connection, we argue that if other parts of the world shut out Africans, who are trying to make ends meet through migration to developed countries, African countries cannot afford to follow such inhuman steps. This is because apart from the conflict that this portends to the paradigm of peace for which the cultural values of Africans have disposed them for centuries, the peripheral location of the continent in the unequal international division of labour does not give room for the ongoing politics of exclusion and otherness. Thus, it becomes necessary for political, private sector and civil society organisations to work in concert to develop an education system that can help decolonise the minds of Africans. The core of the new knowledge should be centred around self-knowing and learning about our shared experiences in the competitive global system. Policies on migration should ensure the deconstruction of mental and physical borders that keep Africans apart. As Mbembe (2019) argues, a future Africa without the constraints of the current artificial borders anchored on removal of colonial-­era policies of exclusion should be prioritised and fully pursued. The reality of interconnectedness of Africans, their shared experiences and the renewed wave of identity politics in advanced countries make Mbembe’s recommendation imperative. Civil society organisations with a balanced understanding of the importance of unity to the socio-economic transformation and development of Africa should make this a major agenda for advocacy at national, regional and continental levels. Pan-­ Africanism provided the rallying point for the struggle against colonial rule and its eventual dismantling. It holds great potential for helping to resolve the crisis of migration in Africa today.

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Migrants-Livelihoods-and-Rights-The-Relevance-of-Migration-inDevelopment-Policies.pdf. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. King, R. 2012. Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer. Willy Brandt series of working papers in international migration and ethnic relations 3/12 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260096281_ Theories_and_Typologies_of_Migration_An_Over view_and_A_Primer. Accessed 6 Oct 2019. Ki-Zerbo, J. 2005. African intellectuals, nationalism and Pan Africanism: A testimony. In African intellectuals: Rethinking politics, language, gender and development, ed. T. Mkandawire. Dakar/London: CODESRIA/Zed Books. Mavelli, L. 2018. Citizenship for Sale and the neoliberal political economy of belonging. International Studies Quarterly 62: 482–493. Marx, K. and F. Engels. 1986. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Mbembe, A. 2019. Blacks From Elsewhere and the Right of Abode, the Ruth First Memorial Lecture 2019, at the Wits Theatre on 3 October Moreno-Lax, V. 2018. The EU humanitarian border and the securitization of human rights: The “rescue-through-interdiction/rescue-without protection” paradigm. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (1): 119–140. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2018. Towards epistemic freedom. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 40 (1): 1–45. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2013. Coloniality of power in postcolonial Africa: Myths of decolonisation. Dakar: CODESRIA. Neocosmos, M. 2008. From ‘foreign natives’ to ‘native foreigners’: Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics. Dakar: CODESRIA. Nkrumah, K. 1963. Africa must unite. London: Panaf Books. Nshimbi, C.C., and L.  Fioramonti. 2014. The will to integrate: South Africa’s responses to regional migration from the SADC region. African Development Review 26 (S1): 52–63. Nshimbi, C.C., and I. Moyo. 2016. Visible and invisible bordering practices: The EU-African migration conundrum and spatial mobility of borders, world journal of science. Technology and Sustainable Development 13 (4): 300–314. Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2006. Insiders and outsiders – citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary southern Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Ochonu, M. 2015. The Wangara Trading Network in precolonial West Africa: An early example of Africans investing in Africa. In Africans investing in Africa, eds. M. Pearson, W. Boer, and T. McNamee, 9–27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ogbuagu, C. 1982. The Nigerian indigenization policy: Nationalism or pragmatism? African Affairs 82 (327): 241–266.

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Oloruntoba, S.O. 2016. Democratization and Poverty in Nigeria: Exploring the Link between Politics and Poverty in Middle Income Countries. In Poverty & Inequality in Middle Income Countries: Policy Achievements, Political Obstacles, J. May, G. Wright and E. Breathen. eds., 123–142. London and New York: Zed Books/CROP, University of Bergen, Norway. ———. 2018a. Crisis of identity and xenophobia in Africa: The imperative of a Pan-African thought liberation. In The political economy of xenophobia in Africa, ed. A. Adeoye, 9–22. New York: Springer. ———. 2018b. Globalisation and the rise of populism, Lecture delivered at the town and gown meeting organised by the Department of Political Science, Covenant University, Otta, Nigeria, February 5. Oloruntoba, S.O., and K.  Tsowou. 2019. Afro-continental free trade areas and industrialisation in Africa: Exploring afro-Canadian partnership for economic development. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 25: 237–240. Prah, K. 2006. The Africa nation. Cape Town: CASS. ———. 2010. Soundings, studies on African transformation, CASAS book series, no, 79. Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Study of African Society. Reno, W. 1998. Warlord politics and African states. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Robinson, W. 2004. A theory of globalization capitalism: production, class, and state in a transnational world. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. ———. 2010. Global Capitalism Theory and the Emergence of Transnational Elites, Working Paper No. 2010/02, Finland: World Institute for Development Economics and Research, United Nations University. Rodney, W. 1981. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications. Samson, M. 2009. Sub-imperial South Africa? Reframing the debate. Review of African Political Economy 36 (119): 93–103. Schmidt, E. 2013. Foreign intervention in Africa: from the cold war to the war on terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Solimano, A. 2010. International migration in the age of crisis and globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stewart, E., and G. Mulvey. 2014. Seeking safety beyond refuge: The impact of immigration and citizenship policy upon refugees in the UK. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (7): 1023–1039. Stiglitz, J. 2010. Freefall: America, free markets, and the sinking of the world economy. New York: W.W Norton Company. ———. 2012. The prize of inequality: How today’s divided society endangers our future. New York: W.W Norton Company.

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CHAPTER 3

Migration and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Opportunities Ernest Toochi Aniche

Introduction Due to rapid rise in international migration, particularly irregular migration, migration has been dominating the national, regional, and global scholarly discourse in recent years. It was estimated that around 173 million people were international migrants in 2000 (Tulloch et al. 2017). In 2013, an estimated 232 million people were living outside their country of birth or citizenship for more than one year, whereas over 243 million people (3 percent of the global population) lived outside their country of origin in 2015 (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2017b; IOM 2015). Europe and Asia host the most international migrants, recording 76 million and 75 million, respectively, with southern Europe and Gulf States recording the highest in 2015 (O’Neil et al. 2017). The total number of migrants rose from 258 million (approximately 3.4 per cent of the global population) in 2017 to

E. T. Aniche (*) Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke (FUO), Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_3

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271.6 million (approximately 3.5 per cent of the world’s population) in 20191 (UNCTAD 2018; IOM 2020). A global total of 164 million migrant workers constituted 59.2 percent of the above international migrant stock in 2017 (ILO 2018). Bear in mind, these figures only relate to documented migrants and excludes multitudes of undocumented ones. Given its significance to development, migration has long been on the development agendas of international and local agencies. Migration has spanned the domestic and foreign policy agendas of many countries due to domestic and external pressures. In the early years of the debates on the migration and development nexus, the general objective was to maximize development benefits of international migration and minimize its negative impacts so as to foster development in poorer countries of origin (Skeldon 2008). The “comprehensive approach” as envisaged in the Amsterdam Treaty aims at tackling the “root causes” of migration using development and other external relations instruments (Higazi 2005). As such, government policies were targeted at reducing the total number of migrants through tackling the root causes (UNESCO and MOST 2017). Martin and Taylor (1996) drew attention to the non-linearity of the relationship between migration and development, according to which development leads to increased emigration in the short to medium term. Paradoxically, Skeldon (2008) showed that more developed societies tend to be more mobile, challenging the assumption that development might reduce emigration. Although migrant remittances tend to reduce poverty, they do not necessarily or automatically trigger development (UNESCO and MOST 2017). This underscores the complex relationships between migration and development. Most studies on international migration and economic development have focused on migration-sustainable development nexus, rendering the relationship indispensable to intellectual and policy engagement. Notwithstanding this, few of these recent studies have interrogated the reciprocal relationship between migration and sustainable development. Thus, this reciprocal relationship between voluntary international migration and sustainable development remains understudied. Rising poverty levels and extreme inequality have put sustainable development into the mainstream of academic conversation, triggering national, regional, and global concerns. Consequently, United Nations 1

 Statistics as at mid-2019.

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(UN) initiated the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty in all its forms everywhere (UN 2015). Yet Suliman (2017) argued that the inclusion of migration in the SDGs cannot serve as the basis for the resolution of the contemporary migration crisis. Newland (2017) noted that the SDGs provide little guidance on how migration issues should be addressed despite the undue emphasis on trafficking. Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to examine the reciprocal relationship between voluntary international migration and sustainable development as well as identify the challenges and opportunities inherent in this reciprocal relationship, and how they enhance and impede the realization of SDGs. Following this introduction, the first section conceptualizes and classifies migration and sustainable development. It is followed by a section that discusses theoretical perspectives for explaining the migration-­development nexus. The subsequent section identifies and discusses the relationships, challenges, and opportunities of migration and sustainable development. The final section discusses the findings and suggests recommendations for policy options. The chapter is essentially a descriptive, qualitative, and desktop study, and relies solely on secondary data of documentary method.

Conceptualizing Migration and Sustainable Development Human migration is the movement of people from one place to another. It can be classified variously as internal migration and international migration, voluntary migration and involuntary/forced migration, economic and sociopolitical, documented/regular and undocumented/irregular migration. The bases for these classifications include nature, factors, causes, or purpose of migration. It is pertinent to state at this juncture that migration is complex because some of the above criteria or bases of classifying it are interrelated and interwoven, and therefore, it is difficult to classify it. However, the focus of this chapter is on international migration, specifically on voluntary international migration. International migration is the movement of people across borders to reside permanently or temporarily in a country other than their country of birth or citizenship (Adepoju 2006). Migration is either voluntary, that is, when people decide on their own volition when and how to move and where to settle, or involuntary, a situation where people are forced by

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circumstances such as natural disasters, depletion of resources, political persecution, armed conflicts, and so on, to settle elsewhere. Both voluntary and involuntary migrations can occur either internally or internationally (Agyei and Clottey 2007). On the basis of causes or purpose of migration, the voluntary migration refers to migrants who leave their respective residence and settle somewhere else in search of economic opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, education. Voluntary migrants are those with agency or choice. The forced migration refers to migration caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, and threat and/or fear that force people to flee their place of residence in search for security and safety. Forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their personal security and to protect themselves from an imminent threat to their physical well-being (Rwamatwara 2005). Forced migrants are those without agency or choice. Regular migration is a documented migration that takes place within the legal frameworks of origin, transit, and destination countries. It is also known as documented migration because it involves trans-border migration with any or all of these relevant or required travel documents like international passport, visa (exit and entry), vaccine certifications, and documentation. Regular migration can be circular. Circular migration refers to regular and repeated movement (in- and out-migration) between the origin and host countries (GIZ and CIMD 2013). But irregular migration is an undocumented migration that takes place outside the regulatory frameworks of origin, transit, and destination countries (IOM 2013). It is also called undocumented migration because it entails cross-border movement without any or all of these relevant or prerequisite travel documents. Irregular migration is difficult to quantify because it is not documented and thus it is often estimated based on deportation/repatriation and arrest records in the receiving countries (UNCTAD 2018). Globally, the magnitude of irregular migration is estimated at 10–15 percent of international migration flows (IOM 2010). On the other hand, Brundtland Report of 1987 defines sustainable development as “development that meets the need of the present (generation) without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Aniche 2009, p. 311). Sustainable development thus refers to a consistent improvement in the human quality of life or welfare for present and future generations. It strikes a balance between the present

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generation and future generation. Sustainable development is simply development that lasts or endures. Any development that is ephemeral lack basic moorings of sustainability. Sustainable development, therefore, should be seen as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. It should be a means to the ultimate end of improving on a sustainable basis the living standards of human beings. Similarly, it has been noted that wherever extreme poverty is a problem, there is a tendency for the poor to sacrifice long-term benefits (i.e. sustainability) to shortterm needs to survive (Aniche 2009). Sustainable development is thus sacrificed at the altar of the immediate needs for survival. In a nutshell, the primary objective of sustainable development is to reduce the poverty of the world’s poor through providing lasting and secure livelihoods that minimize resource depletion, environmental degradation, cultural disruption, and social instability (Aniche 2009). This approach to development therefore sees the world as one ecosystem and advocates that the economic process should include ecological and environmental issues as an essential component of development. This is because resource overuse and depletion are causative factors for natural disasters such as flooding, erosion, drought, desertification, volcanic eruptions, earthquake, tsunami, acid rain, heat radiation, global warming, climate change, which can negatively impact on sustainable development and induce migration. Therefore, the SDGs include 17 goals, as enumerated here: Goal 1 of ending poverty in all its forms everywhere. Goal 2 of ending hunger through achieving food security, improving nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture. Goal 3 of ensuring healthy lives and promoting the well-being for all. Goal 4 of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. Goal 5 of achieving gender equality through empowering all women and girls. Goal 6 of ensuring availability of clean water for all through sustainable management of water and sanitation. Goal 7 of ensuring access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy for all through alternative sources of modern energy. Goal 8 of promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all through sustainable development. Goal 9 of building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and fostering innovation. Goal 10 of reducing extreme inequality within and among countries. Goal 11 of making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, and secure. Goal 12 of ensuring sustainable consumption and viable

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production patterns. Goal 13 of taking urgent action to combat climate change. Goal 14 of conserving and managing the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development. Goal 15 of protecting, restoring, and promoting sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, managing forests sustainably, combating desertification, and halting and reversing land degradation and halting biodiversity loss. Goal 16 of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Goal 17 of strengthening the means of implementation and revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (Fukuda-Parr 2018; IOM 2017; UN 2015). All these goals and their targets are either directly/explicitly or indirectly/implicitly related to international migration. But the SDGs that most directly refer to migration or most explicitly reflect migration-­ development nexus is Goal 8, on economic growth and decent work which emphasizes the economic value of migrant labor. The next is target 10.7, which is intended to promote and facilitate documented migration through the implementation of well-managed migration policies, and target 10c, which is targeted at achieving a reduction in the transaction costs of remittances (Dalby et al. 2019; Fukuda-Parr 2019; UNCTAD 2018).

Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding the Nexus Between Migration and Sustainable Development International migration theories are classified in many ways. Sasikumar (2014) classified international migration theories into two, namely, migration initiation and migration perpetuation theories. Migration initiation theories include neoclassical, new economics of migration (NEM), dual labor market, and world systems theories, while migration perpetuation theories comprise migration network, migration systems, cumulative causation, and institutional theories (O’Reilly 2015). Migration initiation theories offer most insight into the factors triggering initial voluntary migration as well as providing the best explanation for forced displacement. They are, however, inadequate in explaining the persistence of voluntary migration despite changes in economic conditions or legislation in receiving countries. Migration perpetuation theories are thus very adequate

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in explaining the persistence of voluntary migration and why it occurs from some areas and not others (Boswell 2002). But the more dominant classification is the one associated with level of analysis such as systemic, macro, meso and micro migration theories (Boswell 2002). One good example of systemic theories or international migration systems perspectives is world systems theory. Macro migration theories consist of neoclassical migration and dual labor market theories. Meso theories include migration network theory, migration systems theory, and cumulative causation theory. Micro theories comprise human capital theory, NEM model, and institutional theory (Massey et al. 1993). Systemic theories such as world systems theory of international migration as anchored on the works of Wallerstein (1974) essentially linked the origins of international migration to the structure of the world market or global economic system that has developed and expanded since the sixteenth century (Sassen 1988). It argued that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist societies created a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad. Migration is therefore seen as a natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist development (Massey 1989). The theory is a historical-structural approach to migration which links the drivers of migration to structural transformation in global markets, conceiving migration as a function of globalization, regionalization, and emerging productive patterns (Silver 2003). However, it denies that people really have unrestricted freedom in making migration decisions. It rather sees migrants in more deterministic forms as people forced into movement as a result of broader structural processes (de Haas 2008). Thus, the structural framework has been criticized as being too deterministic and descriptive (UNCTAD 2018). Macro theories of international migration, such as neoclassical migration theory, emphasize the structural and objective conditions which act as push-and-pull factors for migration. Neoclassical migration theory is the earliest and foremost international migration theory developed originally to explain labor migration in the process of economic development (Harris and Todaro 1970). The push factors include economic conditions such as unemployment and low wages relative to those in the country of destination. Pull factors include migration legislation and the labor market situation in receiving countries. But the theories are unable to explain why so much migration occurs from relatively few places. However, due to its

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analytical rigor and its ability to propose a set of testable hypotheses, the theory is a useful tool for analyzing not only the causes but also the effects of migration. Thus, neoclassical migration theory still occupies a prominent position in current academic and policy-related research (Boswell 2002). But dual labor market theory argued that international migration results from the intrinsic labor demands of modern industrial societies. One of the foremost proponents of this theoretical perspective, Piore (1979) argued that international migration is caused by a permanent demand for immigrant labor that is inherent in the economic structure of developed countries. Just like world systems theory, dual labor market theory associates migration with systemic economic changes but departs by explaining migration dynamics from the demand side of labor rather than from the supply side (Massey et al. 1993). Therefore, the theory offers an adequate explanation for the concurrence of persistent labor demand for foreign nationals alongside structural unemployment in destination countries. But it factors out origin countries and overemphasizes official recruitment processes. It is also unable to explain disparity in immigration rates in countries with similar economic structures (Arango 2000). Meso theories reject the focus on push and pull factors, instead locating migration flows within a complex system of networks between states and within states. Migration is thus assumed to occur within a migration system of a group of countries linked by economic, political, and cultural ties as well as migration flows. Thus the conditions generating movement are understood as dynamic linkages between origins and destinations, rather than as a set of objective indicators. Networks once formed can substantially influence the direction and volume of migration flows, providing resources that help people move like information, contacts, and economic and social supports. The resources that flow through networks make moving a more attractive and feasible option for other members of a network which can generate chain migration. Generally, meso theories are analytically very useful and helpful in explaining the choice of destination for both voluntary migration and forced displacement. But they are less relevant for explaining forced displacement (Boswell 2002). Specifically, network theory of migration does not consider the factors which trigger migration but rather looks at what prolongs migration (Massey et al. 1993). In other words, the theory sees networks as the most important factor self-perpetuating migration (Arango 2000). Migrant networks which often develop into organizational frameworks explain why

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migration continues even when wage disparities or recruitment policies cease to exist. This is because the existence of migrant networks is likely to shape the decisions of migrants when they choose their destinations (Dustmann and Glitz 2005). The network theory also explains the reasons why migration trajectories are not equally distributed across countries (Faist 2000). Closely related to network theory is migration systems theory pioneered by Magobunje (1970). As rooted in geography, its main postulation is that migration changes the social, cultural, economic, and institutional contexts at both the sending and receiving ends (de Haas 2009). Migration systems theory emphasizes that migration reorganizes the entire societal framework of the social spaces, both at the destination and at the origin states (de Haas 2007). It also assumes that migratory trends occur in response to prior existence of an interface between sending and receiving states (Castles and Miller 2009). The theory thus sees a culture of migration as the most important factor perpetuating migration (Arango 2000). But while migration network and migration systems theories can explain why migration perpetuates, they provide little explanatory value or analytical utility for understanding migration-undermining mechanisms and the weakening of migration systems in the long run (de Haas 2011). Also, related to migration network and migration systems theories is the theory of cumulative causation which states that migration sustains and perpetuates itself by creating more migration (Massey 1990). Already scholars like Tilly and Brown (1967) had emphasized the importance of kin and friendship networks in shaping and sustaining internal as well as international migration. These interpersonal ties connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination (Lomnitz 1977). A good example of migration networks which helps to sustain and perpetuate migration is ethnic economies, enclaves, and niches (Thieme 2006). Micro theories, drawing from rational choice theory, focus on the factors influencing individual decisions to migrate based on cost-benefit analysis. A good example of micro theories is the human capital theory by Sjaadstad (1962), which enriches the neoclassical framework by factoring the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual as an essential determinant of migration at the micro-level. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) tried to demonstrate the likelihood of migration decreasing with age and increasing with education level. At the center of such analyses is a rational individual who migrates with the aim of maximizing his or her gains. By relying on microeconomic model of individual choice, human

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capital theory analyzes how potential migrants calculate the various costs and benefits of migrating (Borjas 2008). Another of the micro migration theories known as new economics of migration model arose to challenge the assumptions of other micro theories of international migration (particularly the human capital theory) that migration decisions are made by isolated individual actors. NEM rather argued that these migration decisions are made by larger units of related people (like families or households) in which people act collectively not only to maximize expected income but also to minimize risks (Stark 1991). Unlike individuals, households can use international migration to diversify risk by relying on migrant remittances for support (Massey et al. 1993). Thus, remittances play an important and integral part in the NEM research as they are directly in sync with the concept of household interconnectedness and the risk diversification while analytically linking the empirical study of the causes and effects of migration (Taylor 1999). While being able to analyze the causes and consequences of migration, the NEM has been criticized for its sending-side bias and for its limited applicability due to difficulties in separating the effects of market imperfections and risks from other income and employment variables. Generally, the theory has not received much scholarly attention and following. Essentially a social choice account, it has also been critiqued for downplaying dynamics within households and being too futuristic (Faist 2000). Institutional theory argued that once international migration has begun, private institutions and voluntary organizations arise to satisfy the demand created by an imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into developed countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer. This imbalance creates a lucrative economic niche for entrepreneurs and institutions interested in promoting international movement for profit. As this black market in migration creates conditions conducive for exploitation and victimization, voluntary humanitarian organizations also arise in developed countries to enforce the rights and improve the treatment of legal and undocumented migrants. Institutional theory is predicated on two logically interwoven hypotheses. The first assumption is that as organizations develop to promote and sustain international migration, the international flow of migrants becomes more institutionalized and autonomous of the factors that initiated it. The second proposition is that states have difficulty controlling migration flows once they have begun because the process of institutionalization is difficult to regulate (Massey et al. 1993).

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Given the complexity and dynamism of international migration as well as differential levels of development and variations in phases of migration cycle of countries, migration and development nexus cannot be adequately explained by any of these theories alone. This chapter thus adopts a synthetic theoretical approach, as suggested by Massey (1999).

Challenges and Opportunities of Migration and Sustainable Development In some destination countries, official development assistance (ODA) has been used as one of the far-reaching approaches to discourage migration. Yet this has not always been effective because there is no strong empirical evidence that ODA can change migratory patterns. The sectoral distribution of ODA to origin countries does not significantly vary from its distribution in other countries. Thus, its tendency to reduce migration is likely to be constrained. Donors could potentially make greater impact by leveraging ODA to shape migration for the mutual benefit of both origin and destination countries (Clemens and Postel 2018). ODA could be a vital instrument for long-term migration management if channeled into stimulating structural transformation in Africa. Given that the need for employment is a key driver of migration, targeting ODA and investments towards the most potentially productive sectors to raise quality standards and productivity and promoting rural non-agrarian economic development may produce results that could generate the best return in terms of employment and investment opportunities in origin and destination countries (UNCTAD 2018). The implications of this for understanding challenges and opportunities cannot be overemphasized. Challenges of Migration and Sustainable Development It is often said that “one man’s meat is another’s poison” or “one’s gain is another’s loss,” and vice versa. Therefore, the tendency of migration to bring about sustainable development for both the sending and receiving states can be confronted by numerous challenges such as rise in undocumented migration and human trafficking/smuggling; conflict and insecurity; increase in poverty and inequality; capital flight; divestment; brain drain; job loss, xenophobic tendencies and anti-immigrant policies; remittance recipient dependent; lack of social protection; inflationary and

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deflationary tendencies; overconsumption and underinvestment; and excessive pressure on domestic economy and infrastructures. Borders if not properly securitized and policed can lead to rise in undocumented migration, human smuggling, and human/child trafficking. The increase in irregular migration tends to impede sustainable development in both countries of origin and destination. This is because irregular migrants cannot be easily tracked and documented for purpose of collecting accurate demographic data/statistics required for planning and achieving sustainable development. As a corollary to the above, irregular migration tends to induce and escalate conflict and insecurity. The migration-conflict nexus shows that irregular migration can lead to serious security challenges in transit and destination countries. Irregular migration has resulted in proliferation of smuggling, internet fraud, money laundering, illicit trade, cross-border crimes, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and human/child trafficking by transnational syndicates. Thus, insecurity, terrorism, insurgency, insurrection, militancy, smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, trans-border crimes, and other illicit activities have been associated with undocumented migration. It has been noted that terrorists often leverage on the movement of undocumented migrants to migrate untracked, unnoticed, and unsuspected. This is because whenever people move illegally, terrorists move with them.2 Development cannot be sustained in an environment of insecurity. The tendency of migration to reduce poverty and bridge inequality gap in the host countries may be undermined by the fact that irregular migration is numerically dominated by low-skilled labor (mainly women) who often work in the informal sector with low-paid irregular wages. This is coupled with high recruitment costs. Thus, millions of low-skilled migrant workers are vulnerable to recruitment malpractices such as exorbitant recruitment costs (Ratha et al. 2018). Even the few highly skilled undocumented migrants work in the lowly paid informal economy because they have no work permit and other relevant papers. This makes it extremely difficult for migrants to sustain themselves in host countries, not to talk of saving enough to send remittances to their countries of origin (GIZ & CIMD 2013). Also, high costs and risks of both documented and undocumented migration can lead to higher inequality because the poorest  See Aniche, E.T., Moyo, I. & Nshimbi, C.C. “The Ungoverned Spaces of West African Borders: Understanding the Nexus between Irregular Migration and Insecurity”. Submitted for consideration for publication. 2

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of the origin countries may not be able to afford it (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2017b). More importantly, these undocumented workers in the informal sector lack social protection, and thus, are exposed to all forms of forced labor, denial of labor rights, and exploitation with harsh working conditions devoid of occupational health and safety, and social-insurance schemes in the event of disabilities caused by occupational hazard or accident (Hagen-­ Zanker et al. 2017a). Consequently, O’Neil, Fleury, and Foresti (2017) noted that undocumented female migrants are likely to suffer more from gender inequality, violence against women, sexual molestation/assault, discrimination, exploitation, lack of access to social protection, disempowerment, harmful traditional or cultural practices, and so on. With reduction in costs of sending cash remittance, increasing interest rate, and weakening currencies and rising inflation in the origin countries, migration can lead to a sustainable capital outflow from the host countries to sending states through remittances and repatriation of profits (GIZ and CIMD 2013). But this can weaken the local currencies of host countries, leading to inflation, which can in turn impact negatively on the origin countries in the long run by reducing financial remittances. Wide gap between official exchange rate and black market rate in the origin states can encourage informal remittances, thereby circumventing tax deductions leading to loss of government revenues. Conversely, higher interest rate in the destination countries and other economic considerations tend to reduce financial remittances for investments to origin countries. Some non-economic reasons that can discourage remittances for investments and asset acquisition to countries of origin of migrants include lack of trusted recipients or intermediaries, lack of interest to return, weak family ties, financial fraud, political corruption, crisis, and instability (Crush 2019). Also, high costs of financial remittances can encourage informal remittances, ultimately leading to loss of government revenues due to tax evasions. For example, it costs 8.9 percent to send $200 to Africa on the average, which is almost double the cost of sending money to South Asia, against a global average of 7.3 percent. Thus, the costs of cash remittances to Africa is considered the highest in the world. Even the global average percentage of sending financial remittances as stated earlier is significantly higher than the target in the SDGs of less than 3 percent. In other words, global remittance costs continue to be over the SDG target of 3 percent. But reducing global remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030 is one of SDGs, which is target 10.7 (OECD, IOM & UNHCR 2019; UNCTAD 2018).

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By charging an average fee of 11 percent in the first quarter of 2019, banks were the most expensive remittance channels, followed by post offices, which charged over 7 percent within the same period. Regrettably and unfortunately too, the high costs of money transfers reduce the benefits of migration (Ratha et al. 2019). As noted above, this is counteracted by informal remittances. To be sure, informal cash remittances refer to sending cash through travelling friends and family members, bus and truck drivers, or networks of brokers. Aside from cash remittances, informal economic or in-kind remittances generally involve sending goods home to families through informal channels to avoid high charges of formal trade channels (UNCTAD 2018). Similarly, the high migrant return, capital flight, and profit repatriation can lead to significant divestment in the receiving states. Other forms of migrant remittances such as social, cultural, religious, and political remittances can be negative to sending states if they lead to social disorganization and disorder, identity crisis, religious violence, and political crisis, anomie, and anarchy (UNCTAD 2018). In other words, some of the challenges of these non-economic migrant remittances to sustainable development in origin countries include social disorientation, lack of social cohesion, clash of civilization, culture conflict, religious intolerance, political disunity, and instability. International migration can lead to brain drain in the countries of origin due to skilled labor shortage. To be sure, brain drain is the loss of needed human resources resulting in reduction of the highly skilled labor force (UNESCO and MOST 2017). For instance, migration-related shortages of human resources in the health sector like medical doctors, nurses, and other health workers can negatively affect in health-care delivery (Tulloch et  al. 2017). Also, the inability of highly skilled undocumented migrant workers to obtain work permit can lead to deskilling if they are not able to work where they can use their skills. Even the documented migrant workers can be deskilled in a situation where they are denied the opportunity to work where they can make effective use of their skills. Deskilling of the highly skilled documented migrant workers can as well occur when their professional qualifications are not recognized due to the regulatory policies of host countries preventing them to find jobs commensurate with their skill levels (UNCTAD 2018). This becomes a “brain waste” both for the countries of origin and destination (Hagen-­ Zanker et al. 2017b).

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Migration can result in job losses, shrinking employment opportunities, mass unemployment, xenophobic tendencies, and anti-immigrant policies in the host countries. During the period of job losses, dwindling employment opportunities, mass unemployment, and economic recession most governments of host states resort to anti-immigrant policies of mass expulsion or repatriation of migrants (especially irregular migrants) as a short-term solution. The period of job losses, declining employment opportunities, mass unemployment, and economic depression can also trigger xenophobic tendencies and attacks on migrants by citizens of receiving states. Irregular migration can result in excessive pressures on domestic economy and infrastructures, especially during the period of economic recession in the host countries. For example, large inflow of migration, especially the undocumented migration, can have negative impacts on the educational infrastructures for the host countries. This affects migrant children in host countries more because they often suffer disadvantages in accessing quality education. This may lead to overcrowding in schools and falling education quality. This can impede Goal 4 of the SDGs of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all, which can have indirect negative impacts on the goal of reducing poverty and inequality (Nicoiai et al. 2017). Diaspora financial remittances can impact negatively on the economies of origin states, which may lead to continuous decline in economic growth if the recipients become remittance-dependent and less productive. The resultant decline in production can lead to a continuous decline in economic growth. Also, due to infrastructural deficits in most origin states, remittances tend to be largely channeled to consumption rather than investment, leading to demand-pull inflation. On the other hand, the reverse negative impact of migrant financial remittances is the tendency for the high inflow of foreign currency to strengthen the local currencies of the origin countries, thereby impeding the competitiveness of its industry with its foreign counterparts due to the higher prices of its exports (GIZ and CIMD 2013). Opportunities and Benefits of Migration and Sustainable Development Despite the numerous challenges, the propensity for migration to beget sustainable development is underscored by various opportunities and

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benefits, which include deepening regional and global integration; boosting international trade and tourism; boosting foreign investment; braingain return and brain circulation; technology transfer; bridging manpower gap; capital inflow and migrant remittances; job creation; and poverty alleviation, inequality reduction; and global prosperity. International migration can help in deepening regional and global integration. Migration is a veritable instrument for regionalization and globalization. This is because one of the primary objectives and strategies of regional and global integration is free movement of persons, goods, and services, or liberalization of trade, capital, and investment. This aspiration of shifting from visa-free to borderless world will be very instrumental in achieving SDG 16 of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. The overall goal of attaining unrestricted migration by regional and global integration is also in tandem with poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth and development. As a corollary to the above, by deepening regional and global integration, international migration can boost international trade and tourism. By boosting trade and investment flows, diaspora communities can become harbingers of economic growth and development. Where migrants serve as intermediaries for trade relations and investments as well as exchange of information and resources, international migration can become an avenue for building transnational social networks of interactions and transactions that can connect family members, friends, and colleagues in the origin and host countries (GIZ and CIMD 2013). Thus, increasing movement of persons and goods tend to boost global trade (Nshimbi and Moyo 2017). In line with the above, international migration can boost foreign investment, capital inflow, and sustainable industrialization through migrant investment for host countries and diaspora remittances for countries of origin. For example, it has been noted that aggregate estimates of international migrant remittance flows indicate that cash remittances are greater than ODA, and also more stable than foreign direct investment (FDI), and are thus an important and reliable source of external finance for Africa and other Third World countries (UNCTAD 2018). Diaspora fund can become a viable alternative source of external borrowing for countries of origin. Diaspora communities can be encouraged to invest on bonds floated by their countries of origin. This can facilitate increased job creation and employment opportunities, especially when migrants are

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encouraged to increase their investments in local infrastructures and support for entrepreneurial projects in countries of origin (UNESCO and MOST 2017). Other benefits of migration for sustainable development are brain-gain return and brain circulation. But for a country to benefit from brain-gain return, the conditions that ab initio necessitated migration must improve politically, economically, and socially. Also, for a country to benefit from brain circulation her internal conditions must be attractive enough to attract skilled migrants. For example, the returning migrants can use skills acquired abroad to strengthen the domestic educational and health systems. Migrants in education sector often donate books and other educational facilities to their alma mater. Also, migrant health workers usually donate drugs, free medical care, and other health/medical equipment to health centers and hospitals at home, especially during the period of outbreaks of disease. Given that education and health are implicit and explicit in all the 17 Goals, migrants’ contributions can uplift education and health (Tulloch et al. 2017). More specifically, the inputs of migrants are vital in enabling origin countries achieve SDG 3 of ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages and SDG 4 of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. As a corollary to the above, international migration can facilitate closing of manpower gap or bridging of capacity gap through brain circulation. Migrants can fill labor shortages and employment gaps in countries of destination, thereby contributing to increased productivity and achievement of Goals 1, 8 and 9 (UNCTAD 2018). As a result of high inflation, weak local currency, high interest rate, high returns on investment, and other economic and non-economic reasons, capital and cash inflows from migrant remittances are on increase in many origin countries. For instance, official remittance flows have increased rapidly since 2000, amounting to 51 percent of private capital flows to Africa in 2016, up from 42 percent in 2010. Cash inflows to Africa through diaspora remittances increased from $38.4 billion on average in 2005–2007 to $64.9 billion in 2014–2016, accounting for 2.8 percent of GDP and 14.8 percent of total exports in 2014–2016. But it has been demonstrated that cash remittances are likely to be underestimated, as migrants may decide to send money through informal channels to avoid paying high transaction costs. Therefore, the amounts of such informal remittances are nearly impossible to estimate without accurate, comprehensive,

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comparable, and representative surveys of households and migrants (UNCTAD 2018). It was estimated that informal remittances account for more than one-quarter of all the remittances transferred to developing countries (GIZ & CIMD 2013). It has been noted that as compared to other financial flows, remittance volumes to developing countries are large and have risen steadily over the past three decades from $126 billion in 1990 to $528 billion in 2018 (OECD, IOM & UNHCR 2019). A more recent report by Ratha et al. (2019) showed that remittances to low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) reached a record high in 2018 from $343 billion (11.4 percent) in 2010 to $528 billion (10.8 percent) in 2018, while the global remittance inflows rose from $469 billion (8.5 percent) in 2010 to $689 billion (10.3 percent) in 2018. They also stated that remittance flows increased in all six regions, notably in Europe and Central Asia (20 percent), South Asia (14 percent), and sub-Saharan Africa (10 percent), about $46 billion in 2018. They further noted that remittances are a major source of foreign exchange earnings in many LMICs, and continue to be more than three times the size of official development assistance (ODA), while $462 billion remittances to LMICs (excluding China) were significantly larger than $344 billion FDI flows in 2018. Migrant remittances have thus become the largest source of foreign exchange earnings and external financing in LMICs. However, both formal and informal economic remittances can be mobilized to improve rural infrastructures and community development. It can also lead to economic growth in the countries of origin. Weak domestic currency also encourages migrant remittances. Other forms of remittances such as social, political, and cultural remittances like ideas (on Western model of democratization and liberalization), norms, values, beliefs, lifestyles, attitudes, social capital, know-how, and skills can be intangible but positive to origin countries. Legislating diaspora votes can increase migrants’ political participation and raise their confidence and patriotism to increase their philanthropy, economic remittances, accumulation of assets, and investment at home. It can increase their interest to return and join partisan politics, thus enabling them to transfer their norms, values, social capital, and ideas of Western-style democratization and liberalization (UNESCO and MOST 2017). This can also improve their communication with local communities. Already diaspora communities and associations are deeply involved in the political activism at home.

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Technology and skills transfer through brain-gain return. Diaspora contributions to sustainable development include tourism, technology transfer, knowledge transfer, philanthropy, community projects, heritage trade and investment. International migration can also foster innovation through social remittances like norm transfers, skills or knowledge transfers, return migration, and brain gain, which has implications for individual and family well-being, and poverty reduction in the long run (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2017b). International migrants in both sending and receiving countries can make good use of their social networks to harness the tremendous potential of information and communication technology (ICT) in transferring social remittances. International migration can be more effective at reducing poverty than other development programs for both origin and host countries. In the case of origin countries, poverty reduction is achieved through migrant remittances. Migration can be an important tool or instrument for poverty reduction for sending states through increasing access to basic human needs and services such as food, shelter, water, education, health, thereby improving human development indices. In other words, remittances can help accomplish, by 2030, Goal 3, which is meant to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages, as well as other goals like Goals 1 and 4. The migrant remittances increased the incomes, savings, spending, assets, consumptions, and investments of the families and close relatives of the migrants, thereby improving their socio-economic conditions. This can help in realizing SDG 12 of ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns. Migrant remittances can serve as an informal insurance mechanism helping households cope with economic shocks and preventing them from falling deeper into poverty. This can help sending states achieve 2030 SDGs target 1.5, which calls for greater resilience and insurance for individuals and families. Diaspora remittances when invested in the real sector can create employment opportunities necessary for poverty alleviation. In all, remittances can enable the origin countries achieve target 1.4, which calls for greater and equal access to economic resources, financial services, and basic services (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2017b). The increased revenues and foreign exchange earnings derived from taxes on diaspora remittances can lead to economic growth and balance of payment, which can impact positively on poverty reduction. This can facilitate Goal 8 of promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. The improved revenues can also enable the government to increase public spending by

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providing essential basic human needs and social services such as water, food, shelter, education, health care (Tulloch et al. 2017). This can help the sending states realize Goal 4 of the 2030 SDGs of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. The government can as well channel the increased revenues into provision of infrastructures (like roads, bridges, rails, etc.) which can have multiplier effects on the economy in terms of FDI inflow, job creation, unemployment reduction, higher wages, and so on. This can enable the countries of origin achieve Goal 8 of promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment, and decent work for all. By reducing poverty, migrant remittances can as well reduce child labor. Through increasing access to education and health by migrant families and relatives at home, remittances can reduce poverty and bridge the inequality gap. Diaspora remittances can help origin countries attain target 1a, which calls for better and smarter mobilization of resources for development (Hagen-­ Zanker et al. 2017b). For the host countries on the other hand, international migration can revitalize depopulated schools and increase growth and help tackle poverty because of its positive economic effects through increased production, new demand and supply of goods and services, and labor-market specialization (Nicoiai et al. 2017). This can help host countries in realizing SDG 12 of ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns. Migrants can also add value to the economies of host countries through their diverse skills, resourcefulness, creativity, and innovation. This can enable receiving states realize Goal 9 of building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and fostering innovation. Therefore, international migration tends to bring about reduction in extreme and global inequalities, and facilitate global prosperity. The point being made is that by reducing poverty and extreme inequalities, international migration can enhance achievement of 2030 SDGs of eradicating extreme poverty for all people everywhere, particularly targets 1.1 and 1.2, which call for an end to poverty around the world, and Goal 10 of reducing inequality within and among countries (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2017b).

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Concluding Remarks So far, I have tried to demonstrate the intricate and complex links between migration and sustainable development as well as identifying the challenges and opportunities inherent in this reciprocal relationship through synthetic theoretical perspectives. In other words, I have been able to establish in the course of this chapter that there is a reciprocal relationship between migration and sustainable development. Therefore, the nexus between migration and sustainable development is not a one-way traffic; rather, it is a two-way traffic. Thus, while migration affects sustainable development, conversely, sustainable development influences migration. The point being made is that while documented migration tends to beget sustainable development, undocumented voluntary international migration tends to endanger it. Conversely, while sustainable development is likely to increase documented migration, lack of it tends to increase undocumented migration. For a country to leverage upon these aforementioned opportunities to overcome the above-mentioned challenges, she must improve her internal conditions politically, economically, and socially. Migration, particularly documented migration, can be a win-win for both origin and host countries. Therefore, an effective global policy on migration that can discourage or reduce undocumented voluntary international migration and encourage documented migration is a harbinger for sustainable development which can enhance global prosperity, peace, and security. The emphasis of the global migration policy should be on harmonization and coordination of migration policies of different countries and various regions so as to engender a visa-free world and ultimately a borderless global community.

References Adepoju, A. 2006. Placing international migration in the context of the 3D’s: Demography, development and democracy. International Migration 44 (4): 3–13. Agyei, J., and E.  Clottey. 2007. Operationalizing ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People among the member states: Issues of convergence, divergence and prospects for sub-regional integration. London: Ghana African Migrations Workshop Paper & Oxford International Migration Institute. Aniche, E. 2009. A modern introduction to Political Science. Onitsha: Desvic Publishers.

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Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, and E. Taylor. 1993. Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. Population and Development Review 19 (3): 431–466. Newland, K. 2017. The global compact for migration: How does development fit in? In Towards a global compact for migration: A development perspective, Issue 1. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Nicoiai, S., J.  Wales, and E.  Aiazzi. 2017. Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 59–74. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing Papers. Nshimbi, C.C., and I. Moyo, eds. 2017. Migration, cross-border trade and development in Africa: Exploring the role of non-state actors in the SADC region. London: Palgrave Macmillan. O’Neil, T., A. Fleury, and M. Foresti. 2017. Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 45–58. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing Papers. O’Reilly, K. 2015. Migration theories: A critical overview. In Routledge handbook of immigration and refugee studies, ed. A.  Triandafyllidou, 25–33. Oxford: Routledge. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2019. International and Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report to the G20. Paris: OECD, IOM & UNHCR. Piore, M. 1979. Birds of passage: Migrant labor and industrial societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ratha, D., et al. 2018. Migration and remittances: Recent developments and outlook. Washington, DC: World Bank Group Migration and Development Brief 30. ———. 2019. Migration and remittances: Recent developments and outlook. Washington, DC: World Bank Group Migration and Development Brief 31. Rwamatwara, E. 2005. Forced migration in Africa: A challenge to development. Stichproben: Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien Nr.8/2005, 5. Jg. Sasikumar, S.K. 2014. Maximizing the developmental outcomes of international labor migration and remittances: The South Asian-Gulf experience. Labor and Development 21 (2): 30–57. Sassen, S. 1988. The mobility of labor and capital: A study in international investment and labor flow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Silver, B. 2003. Forces of labor: Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sjaadstad, L. 1962. The costs and returns of human migration. Journal of Political Economy 70: 80–93. Skeldon, R. 2008. International migration as a tool in development policy: A passing phase? Population and Development Review 34 (1): 1–18.

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Stark, O. 1991. The migration of labor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Suliman, S. 2017. Migration and development after 2015. Globalizations 14: 415–431. Taylor, E. 1999. The new economics of labor migration and the role of remittances in the migration process. International Migration 37 (1): 63–88. Thieme, S. 2006. Social networks and migration: Far West Nepalese labor migrants in Delhi. Münster: LIT Verlag. Tilly, C., and H. Brown. 1967. On uprooting, kinship, and auspices of migration. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 8 (2): 139–164. Tulloch, O., F. Machingura, and C. Melamed. 2017. Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 75–86. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing Papers. United Nations. 2015. Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York: UN A/RES/70/1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2018. Migration for structural transformation. In UN Economic Development in Africa Report (UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2018). New York/Geneva: UNCTAD. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization & Management of Social Transformations. 2017. Migration as a development challenge: Analysis of root causes and policy implications. In UNESCO/MOST/ REPORTS/2017/1. Brussel: UNESCO/MOST. Wallerstein, I. 1974. The modern world system, capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the Sixteenth Century. New  York: Academic Press.

PART II

Migration Conundrums: Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order

CHAPTER 4

The EU’s Approach to African Migration During Crisis: Reinforcement and Changes Anna Knoll

Introduction During the past five years, high numbers of refugees and irregular migrants have come to Europe from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In 2015 alone, over 1 million irregular migrants and refugees arrived in Europe. While European societies showed solidarity and support, the situation of uncontrolled migrant arrivals of 2015 and 2016 has led to a crisis within the European Union (EU), making migration one of the most contentious and divisive issues discussed at high political level. Besides attempts to create a more systematic, coordinated and harmonized response inside the EU, the EU turned to find solutions outside its territory. This resulted in increased engagement with partners and calls for stronger externalization of EU migration governance. As a consequence, taking action against smuggling and trafficking and reducing irregular migration has been a predominant feature in the EU’s relations with African countries and bodies.

A. Knoll (*) ECDPM, Maastricht, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_4

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This chapter explores the implications of the 2015 so-called migration crisis on EU development policy and practice toward African countries in the context of addressing irregular migration and displacement. It will do so by examining how the nature of the crisis has been defined in the policy discourse and how the various migration narratives and interest constellations have shaped strategic policy approaches to migration and development in the EU and its member states toward Africa. By adopting a multilevel governance lens, the chapter will investigate how the EU has developed a more interest-driven approach and how this has translated into practice in the political context of African partner countries. It will explore a number of challenges and opportunities this has raised for the EU’s external migration agenda as well as for the notion of long-term partnership between Europe and Africa.

One Crisis: Many Facets Emergencies or other social crises are to a considerable extent in the eyes of the beholder. At a higher political level, it is not necessarily “the events on the ground, but their public perception and interpretation that determine their potential impact on political office-holders and public policy” (Boin et  al. 2009: 81). How large-scale and sudden migration situations are understood, framed and made sense of therefore has a strong bearing on policy responses (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018). Crises are usually perceived as constituting threats to existing sets of values, systems and structures (Boin et  al. 2005). They require not only rapid action but also persuasive communication by government leaders with a view to managing public uncertainty (Hart and Tindall 2009). Crisis moments can become political battlegrounds, not only about the nature of the crisis itself but also about its severity, its causes, the responsibility for its occurrences or escalation and its policy implications (Hart and Tindall 2009). A number of severe crisis elements exist in the migration and refugee situation of the past years, globally and within the Euro-Mediterranean space—not least in relation to the many migrants’ lives lost. A particular crisis narrative has developed in the EU over time. While the European Commission (EC) described the 2013 Lampedusa incident1 as a ‘tragic 1  In October 2013 at least 130 African migrants (mainly from Eritrea and Somalia) died near the Italian island of Lampedusa after their boat sank due to capsizing after a fire broke out.

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event’, the term European ‘refugee and migration crisis’ gained prominence in policy circles against the background of increasing numbers of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean during 2015 (EC 2013b, 2015b; European Council 2015).2 The emerging definition and understanding of the nature of the crisis subsequently defined the scope for political action, policy options and the migration governance pursued by the EU (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018). Determining the Nature of the Crisis: A Crisis About Numbers? Over time, the dominant interpretation of the nature of the ‘migration crisis’ in EU politics has been linked to two sets of numbers: the high number of irregular migrants entering the EU and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the low number of return of those with no legitimacy to stay in European countries (Collette and Le Coz 2018).3 These two aspects became the epitome of European governments’ incapacity to control who enters the EU zone and to establish orderly migration systems. This fundamentally threatened not only the political survival of European leaders,4 but also the European project itself, including its achievements and stability. For instance, the temporary reintroduction of border controls within Europe, which threatened the unique achievement of free movement within the EU Schengen zone,5 was interpreted as an ‘existential challenge for the EU’ (Tusk 2016). 2  The European Commission note on the Task Force Mediterranean referred in 2013 to the crisis only in the context of Syria, yet noting that some operational crisis frameworks of the EU should be utilised to prevent the tragic events to turn into a crisis (see EC 2013b). After further tragedies with migrants drowning at sea, an emergency European Summit took place in April 2015, which referred to the situation as a crisis. The term migrant and refugee crisis appears in EC and EU Council documents increasingly as of 2015. See, for example, EC (2015b) and European Council (2015). 3  From 2104 to 2016, the EU response underwent various phases where interpretation of the nature and scale of the crisis changed. Prior to 2015, the EU’s key focus was to reduce the loss of lives in the central Mediterranean responding to a sense of urgency which had emerged due to the humanitarian situation at sea. For an overview over different phases, see Collette and Le Coz (2018). 4  Migration influenced politics across Europe. The career of German chancellor Angela Merkel took a hit following a humane and open response to large inflows seen as threat to electoral successes of her party. In a number of European countries, far-right parties gained influence. 5  The Schengen area comprises 26 European states, which have agreed to abolish passport and other types of border control at their mutual borders and is named after the Schengen Agreement of 1985.

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The media played a central role in producing and upholding this particular crisis narrative, covering refugee and migrant issues by focusing on numbers over other issues (Berry et al. 2015; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017),6 often referring to “large quantities and elemental forces” (Greussing and Boomgarden 2017), thereby fueling public anxiety about immigration and asylum. The situation also provided an opportunity for more populist and right-leaning parties to challenge governments in their responses to the situation. European leaders were thus under pressure to show their ability to effectively control the situation and establish a sense of order and ‘normalcy’.7 With the crisis being framed as one of numbers, the identified solution was to significantly reduce irregular migrants and step up returns together with external partners. Through this, EU leaders hoped to restore trust in European politics and safeguard unity. This predominant crisis understanding is visible in many of the EU’s policy documents under the European Agenda for Migration, and specifically in the 2016 Migration Partnership Framework and its subsequent progress reports (Castillejo 2017). In these, operational progress and success are presented to a large extent in relation to the reduction of numbers of irregular migrants across routes to Europe and measured in partner countries’ efforts to prevent irregular flows, halt smuggling activities and cooperate on returns. That the EU views the crisis as one of irregular migrant numbers is also visible in the fact that the EC declared the crisis to be over based on a reduction of the number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. At the beginning of 2019 it stated: “Europe is no longer in crisis mode. The number of arrivals is the lowest it has been in five years (150,000  in 2018). This is the result of joint EU efforts on all fronts” (EC 2019a). Crisis narratives form part of contestation processes, and also in Europe perceptions of the crisis varied across actors and communities. Interestingly, while numbers of irregular migrants actually had decreased already in 2016 and 2017, the crisis momentum was upheld, suggesting that there are other features that merit attention. At least two sets of alternative interpretations about the situation the EU is passing through have been highlighted. While these are not necessarily mutually exclusive to the 6  It has to be noted that there have been significant regional differences in the coverage of the crisis across the EU and framings used by media changed over time. 7  Next to the high numbers it was the sudden increase and their unexpected and chaotic nature.

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framing of the crisis as one of numbers, they give different meaning to and highlight distinct aspects of its nature. The first alternative framing challenges the European nature of the crisis and points to the global reality of displacement and migration flows, with developing countries taking a large share of responsibility for refugee protection. Low- and middle-income states host by far larger numbers of refugees than wealthier states (Martin et al. 2018). African Union (AU) officials in this context have pointed out that “if there is a crisis at all – the crisis is within Africa, not in Europe” (Chutel 2019). This reality also challenges the narrower Eurocentric and interest-driven responses that emerged from the crisis. Another interpretation highlights alternative causes of the crisis, viewing it much more as one about European policy and governance as well as about trust that citizens put into governments’ ability to respond rather than the numbers per se (Betts 2019).8 This concerns several subsets of governance challenges in Europe: First, there has been a crisis of information and foresight (Parkes 2017).9 Though awareness about rising migration pressures existed at various levels, and indicators pointed to an escalation, information was scattered. The absence of trusted, strong, and consolidated information and data systems with clear links to analysis and political decision-making “contributed to both disputes over the nature of the emergency and delays in developing a concerted response” (Collette and Le Coz 2018: 25). Second, experts have observed a crisis of preparedness and response. At various fronts, the EU aimed to pull its weight, but actors initially struggled to respond to the crisis. Underlying this challenge have been inadequate institutions and mechanisms, including coordination mechanisms and knowledge exchange (Collette 2019; Collette and Le Coz 2018). Third, and more fundamentally, while the sense of urgency led to a strengthening of coordination and to some extent EU joint external action, further explored below, a logic of renationalization hampered the development of more robust European migration governance systems to date (Lehne 2018). The observed lack of solidarity within Europe— characteristic especially of the discussions concerning the reform of the Common European Asylum System—revealed deep and complex 8  Betts, for example, has argued that “the “refugee crisis” has never been a crisis of numbers, it’s a crisis of politics, a crisis of trust, as well.” 9  This increasingly includes a challenge about dissection of factual information from false news, introduced by actors to politically or otherwise gain from disinformation.

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divisions between EU member states about the migration issue. These political struggles to find common ground suggest a far more existential crisis for the EU and its unity, in a context where interests, values and ideas, on migration increasingly diverge. Fourth, observers noted a crisis of leadership, in which “European leaders have […] favored a short-term approach” (Vimont 2016) and in which certain politicians or political groups deliberately distort information for short-term gains. Beyond numbers of irregular migrants, it is a combination of these more fundamental crises that underlies the lack of progress in joint and effective long-term responses. United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, summarizes these alternative crises interpretations when asking: Has there ever been one [n.b. referring to a European migration crisis]? […] [F]rankly, […] refugees, displaced people, about 70 million worldwide, 85% to 90% are […]in poor or middle-income countries. So that’s where the crisis is. Now, of course, we have seen people arriving in Europe – at some stage – in large numbers. That was critical and it was not handled well. That made the crisis more acute and it has then been politicised, which made it irreversibly acute. (Grandi 2019)

Although the EU—with the significant reduction in irregular immigrants—has left the ‘crisis of numbers’ moment, it is still concerned about future migration pressures. The crisis interpretation has shifted and is understood more as a structural ‘new normal’ (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018), in which policymakers ‘brace for impact’ of potential future migrant flows—especially from Africa. This new framing signals urgency to address migration and influences policy and institutional responses as part of the EU’s envisaged partnership with Africa in the foreseeable future. This is visible not only in political messaging of the European Commission (EC),10 but also, for instance, in negotiations of the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), in which the financial ability to respond to migration plays a key role (Knoll and Veron 2019).

10  At the same time as signalling the end of the ‘migration crisis’ in Europe, the Commission highlights that “a steady rise in migratory pressure and the risk of instability beyond the EU’s borders will keep migration at the head of the challenges facing the EU.”

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Determining Policy Responses: Contestation of Migration Narratives How policy makers perceive the nature of the crisis does alone not yet determine the policy responses they chose. The predominant framing of the situation as a crisis coalesced with more general narratives and beliefs about migration. These, together with the institutional constellation of interests, determined and defined policy implications as well as tools used by the EU in its external action and relations toward African countries (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). While evidence about migration dynamics has entered European policymaking in a number of ways (Collette 2019; Parkes 2017), policymakers are constrained by domestic and European politics, which follow certain perceptions and narratives. Knowledge and facts about migration dynamics thus do not always play a strong role in guiding policy responses (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018; Knoll and de Weijer 2016).11 Four narratives about migration can be identified in the EU’s formal declarations, action plans, and informal communications on migration since the 2015 ‘crisis’.12 In a multi-governance system, such as the EU, these co-exist in parallel and often mix in the pursued policy agendas— however with differing relative emphasis. While these narratives are presented as simplifications of complex phenomena and dilemmas policymakers face, their core messages have significantly influenced policymaking (Knoll and de Weijer 2016).13 The remainder of this section will briefly present these four policy frames before turning to how they were championed by actors and influenced responses. The first narrative views migration as a threat to national security and welfare. It considers the inflow of migrants—and in particular its irregular nature—as bringing security risks and economic costs for parts of the host population (e.g. through increased competition in labor markets), ultimately posing threats to sociocultural stability and social cohesion. Together with the predominant crisis framing of numbers of irregular 11  Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, “Changing the path”, point out that while policymakers are “able to articulate understandings of migration that are consistent with research evidence, […] they tend to internalize within their own sense-making the constraints as they see them imposed by domestic politics in the member states” (p. 147). For a more detailed assessment of how these policy framings relate to available evidence, see Knoll and de Weijer, “Understanding Perspectives”. 12  To varying degrees these narratives are also found in EU policies and external strategies on migration prior to 2015, such as the Global Approach on Migration and Development. 13  The following four narratives draw on Knoll and de Weijer (2016).

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migrants, this narrative leads to an objective to reduce the flows. While it focuses mostly on irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, in countries like Hungary it seems to apply to migration more generally (Deutsche Welle 2019). In terms of responses, this framing leads to strategies of containment, such as fighting irregular migration and migrant smuggling, improving border management, and strengthening surveillance as well as expanding cooperation with third countries on these matters as well as on return and readmission. Whether such responses of ‘securing’ or ‘protecting borders’ are effective is contested in the literature (Andersson 2016). The second narrative views migration as a symptom of poverty, conflict, and weak governance whereby migration is caused by poverty, inequality, conflict, and instability, as well as wage and opportunity gaps between poorer and wealthier countries. The main policy implication is to reduce such causes or migration drivers. This strategy has become known by the term of addressing root causes of particular unwanted forms of migration, most prominently applied to EU development cooperation and financing. While taking a more benign and developmental shape, it corresponds to the aim of reducing numbers. However, it is based on problematic assumptions about both the connection between development and migration dynamics as well as whether EU’s development assistance and investment are effective tools to address their interaction (Knoll and Sherriff 2017; Knoll and de Weijer 2016). The third narrative considers migration as opportunity for livelihoods and long-term development. This framing counters the first narrative of migration as a threat and can be found in global international frameworks such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the UN Global Compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration, to which the EU has signed up.14 It is based on an understanding that migration is a source for development and resilience and that increased (labor) mobility drives growth and development. This implies that migration needs to be well-­ governed and facilitated and negative aspects reduced. Accordingly, related strategies rest on mechanisms to enhance possibilities for legal migration, both regionally and internationally, for instance, through regional economic integration.15 This narrative can connect with the ‘crisis of 14  Not all EU governments support the Global Compact, yet the EU Commission and the EU as a whole has had influence in shaping the text of the compact. 15  Reducing the cost of remittances, visa facilitation, and integration agendas equally often form strategies under this narrative.

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numbers’ understanding based on an assumption that an increase in regular migration pathways may partially reduce irregular migration. The fourth narrative concerns migration as a humanitarian and protection issue. This perspective highlights that migrants can be highly vulnerable and have protection needs and rights enshrined in international law. The main policy objective is adequate and rights-based protection of migrants, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Policy actions include humanitarian assistance providing essentials for refugees and IDPs, migration diplomacy toward enhancing livelihood and rights of IDPs and refugees, rescue missions for migrants trapped in perilous situations, and other measures to enhance protection. There may be an element of EU self-interest in that such strategies are hoped to reduce the incentives or needs for onward movement toward Europe.

Actors, Interests, and Policy Narratives in the EU: Influencing EU-Wide Response Crises of this kind can be understood in terms of framing contests, as battles between the various actors that seek to contain or exploit crisis-­ induced opportunity space for their preferred policy. They can lead to non-incremental changes in policies, which are in usual times stabilized by path dependence and inheritance (Hay 2002). Policy contestations on how to address migration externally took place at multiple levels: (i) between EU member states, (ii) between the EU member states at the level of the Council and the EC, and (ii) between different directorate generals (DG) of the EC. Rather than a complete change in external policy direction concerning migration, EU leaders and policymakers pursued ‘a more of the same approach,’ yet applying considerably more force and energy. Level of the Council Whereas before the crisis, the EC dealt with migration in its development cooperation and external action at a more technical level, new actors now sought to influence the agenda. EU member states became increasingly interested in influencing European responses to migration, given the high salience of the topic at highest political levels in their capitals. The EU Council became central in taking decisions on the external migration

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dimension. Many European member states pursued a two-pronged strategy—on the one hand, they aimed to influence the EC agenda in order to create leverage and utilize resources toward a ‘migration reduction’ objective with third countries, and on the other hand, they continued bilateral approaches (Collette and Le Coz 2018: 29)16 toward this end. Overall, EU member states’ positions were dominated to a large extent by the agendas of their interior ministries, which are in the lead on migration matters and view it more strongly as part of an internal and security frame following the first narrative. But it was not only EU member states’ politics influenced by populism but also a new way of decision-making in the EU Council. The fact that consensus had to be found among all EU member states often meant that EU Council Conclusions often reverted to a lowest common denominator (Rasche 2018), characterized by an externalization and harsher and more forceful language in policy documents on migration and toward partner countries. Collectively, EU member states thus aimed to align the use of EU tools, such as development cooperation, dialogue, and funding, to serve the EU’s objectives of reducing irregular migration and stepping up returns. This is visible not only in the pledge in the 2016 Bratislava road map to “never allow return to uncontrolled flows” and “further bring down the number of irregular migrants” but also, for instance, in the EU negotiation mandate of the post-Cotonou agreement,17 which was initially blocked by Hungary on the grounds of too positive language on migration. The Bratislava agenda explicitly notes EU member states’ aims to broaden consensus on long-term migration policy locking the EU into more restrictive policy (Pascouau 2018). While consensus emerged to link development cooperation much more closely to achieve migration objectives, opinions on how to establish genuine partnerships diverged, especially on the question to what extent EU aid should be used conditionally in the area of migration (Knoll and Sherriff 2017). Some EU member states were frustrated about the hurdles for mobilizing sufficient EU financing for external action related to internal migration objectives, given that DG DEVCO and DG NEAR as external relation 16  National actions by EU member states can also be seen against the background of perceptions that the EU Commission did not show awareness of the gravity of the situation until the second half of 2015, “compelling Member States to develop their national and regional responses”. 17  The post-Cotonou agreement refers to the, at the time of writing, ongoing negotiation of the successor of the 2020 Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.

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DGs have considerably more available funding for external action than DG HOME, yet are bound by the specific regulations for their funds including Official Development Aid (ODA) commitments (Knoll and Veron 2019). In general, EU member states could more easily agree on joint external agenda than on internal solidarity sharing. Level of the European Commission Overall, the influence of the EU Council increased, yet also at the level of the EC different policy narratives exist and are contested in relation to the role of EU development policy addressing migration externally. Traditionally, the EC services (International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), Migration and Home Affairs (HOME), European External Action Service (EEAS), European  Civil  Protection  And  Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR)) share different philosophies and priorities with regard to migration in partner countries. Before the crisis this had inhibited coordination on aspects of external migration policy, with each pursuing their work in silos (Collette and Le Coz 2018: 28). Policy coordination within the Commission improved enormously during the crisis (Knoll and Sherriff 2017),18 contributing to learning across policy domains and helping to bridge various approaches (Knoll and Sherriff 2017; Parkes 2017).19 But such cross-fertilization also led to compromises. At the level of the EC, DG HOME has had a strong coordinating role in the Commission’s overall response to the migration situation. Its internal concern for security and less chaotic arrivals were transposed to the external dimension resulting in alignment of several tools in the EU’s effort to respond to the situation in an integrated and comprehensive way. Not only was DG HOME in the lead of coordinating but also helped shape broader policy lines (Carrera et  al. 2013; Collette and Le Coz 2018).20 The general policy line emerging from the EU Council

 EU Commission services systematically met at different levels several times per week.  Interview EU Official, 2016. 20  DG HOME officials, for example, drafted the ten-point plan in 2015—a precursor for the later EU Agenda for Migration (see Collette and Le Coz 2018). DG  HOME already moved into the external dimension  before through taking a lead in preparing and negotiating dialogues with third countries and associating relevant other DGs (such as EEAS or DG DEVCO). See Carrera et al. (2013). 18 19

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supported DG HOME’s stronger security–driven approach and migration narrative. Yet in some crucial respects—as further explored below—it constrained the EC to act comprehensively. The role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was initially low-key beyond the Common Security and Defense mission in the Mediterranean. While it was the EU Council that was in the lead on the 2015 Valletta Summit,21 the EEAS got more strongly involved in establishing the coordination of EU member states’ approaches toward third countries in the context of high-level dialogues and under the 2016 Migration Partnership Framework, further detailed below. Also, here the approach followed a need to reduce numbers of arrivals through making use of EU combined foreign policy (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). The fact that EU member states take a more proactive role in these partnerships under the EU umbrella was welcome and accepted—especially in countries where EU member states had better relations. With the crisis gaining in salience, coordination was placed under the responsibility of the Commission Secretariat General. It played a role as neutral arbitrator of disputes between competing DGs, while at the same time retaining “strong political backing and communication with the office of the Commission President [and] [...] sufficient authority to push through decisions” (Collette and Le Coz 2018). The closer working relationship between DGs also led to a common language and understanding each other’s concerns and objectives.22 For the EC it became more difficult to diverge from the European Council’s position. Not only is the president of the EC a member of the European Council, but it was also under pressure to show its added value on this defining issue for Europe’s future. A Change in EU International Development Cooperation on Migration Overall, this constellation of actors and their interests contributed to the adoption of more targeted and security-focused approaches on migration in EU relations with African countries (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018). 21  This was a Summit chaired by European Council President Donald Tusk bringing together EU and African Heads of States and Governments as well as ECOWAS, AU and UN representatives. 22  Interview with EU Official, 2019.

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The EU Migration Partnership Framework, introduced in 2016, and drafted at the highest level in the EC,23 embodied this approach. It aims to utilize a range of available EU instruments to pressure third countries to act on reducing irregular migration and better cooperate return and readmission. While not necessarily presenting a full departure from the EU’s previous approach to partner countries on migration (Andersson 2014, 2016),24 tailor-made and coordinated engagement strategies of partners were meant to be more effective and were pursued with more force and financing. As part of the Migration Partnership Framework and following the aim to establish more coherence between EU activities in priority countries, EU development policy toward African priority countries underwent changes. Development cooperation has been put under the general tenets of the political agenda and adopted a new role of contributing to a reduction of flows and to higher return rates. Before 2014, with migration not taking center stage, the development-led external dimension of migration led by DG DEVCO centered on maximizing the development aspects of migration while minimizing negative effects (EC 2013c). EU development projects—at least in their policy strategies—aimed to depart more strongly from the migration realities and topics of partner countries and included aspects such as regional migration, South-South migration, remittances, a link to climate. While development projects on smuggling, trafficking, and border governance existed prior (Andrade et  al. 2015), there was little notion of ‘addressing the root causes’ of migration with a view of reducing irregular migration to the EU in EU development policy writ large before 2015.25 In 2013, the EC noted that development assistance measures should not be subordinated to migration policy priorities (EC 2013a). The 2015 version of its Policy Coherence for Development report turned this relationship around, asserting that “Home Affairs issues  Interview with EU Official, 2019.  DG  NEAR, through the European Neighbourhood Policy and Instrument (ENI), had supported for years projects to strengthen border management capacities, and fight irregular migration and trafficking. Andersson (2014, 2016) has shown that the EU has started to adopt strategies to fight irregular migration in Africa since the introduction of the Schengen agreement in the mid-1990s. See Andersson (2014). 25  The notion of addressing ‘root causes’ of migration through development cooperation is, however, not new to the EU and has periodically entered political discussions, e.g. during the large refugee inflow in the 1990s. Yet, the 2011 GAMM does not make any mention of a role for EU international cooperation to address ‘root causes’. 23 24

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need to be embedded in the EU’s overall external relations, including development cooperation” (EC 2015a). This push toward using EU development support to promote national interests in the area of migration has to be understood as part of a more general trend in EU member states to highlight donor-related outcomes as part of ‘mutual benefits’ departing from the view of ODA as a poverty reduction and development promotion tool for partner countries (Keijzer and Lundsgaarde 2017). As a direct response to the crisis collective, EU aid rose in volume up to 2015, which to a large extent was due to increased humanitarian spending for the Syria refugee crisis both in Europe and abroad. This positive aid trend discontinued in 2017, however, with fewer refugees arriving. The political situation has nudged development cooperation in the migration area primarily closer to a focus on refugees and displacement, addressing smuggling and border governance as well as return and reintegration, next to the broad notion of addressing ‘root causes’ of migration (Knoll and Sherriff 2017). Conditionality elements in the use of development cooperation are part of this trend,26 including with sub-Saharan African countries. The more coordinated approach integrating the EU’s internal and external agenda means that more actors are now involved in making decisions on the use of EU development spending in the context of migration.27 In the case of Ethiopia, some EU member states suggested to halt cooperation;28 Concord reported migration-related conditionality attached to direct budget support in Niger (Concord 2018); and projects in the pipeline were held back until progress in the migration dialogue was achieved in the case of Côte d’Ivoire.29 The jury may still be out whether the stronger influence of internal concerns on EU development cooperation has been a positive development for the EC’s Development DG. Interviewed EU officials noted that DG DEVCO has become stronger, moving from a more technical to a political DG with more influence in defending its principles and generating respect for its objectives and contributions (Orbie and Delputte 2019).30 Other analysts, however, view this development as rendering DG 26  The Migration Partnership Framework does not limit this conditionality element to development finance, but this also includes the use of, for instance, visa facilitation. 27  Interview with EU Officials, 2018 and 2019. 28  Interview with EU Official, 2019. 29  Interview with EU Official, 2019. 30  Interview with EU Official, 2019. See Orbie and Delputte (2019).

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DEVCO and a European Development Commissioner insignificant in broader geopolitical and interest-driven cooperation. Constraints on a Comprehensive Agenda While DG HOME became more influential on the external dimension of migration in the EU under the endorsed Migration Partnership Framework, it also faced constraints on pursuing its envisaged agenda fully. Following a comprehensive approach, it encouraged EU member states to also incorporate legal labor mobility possibilities through pilot schemes with African countries in order to (i) create more leverage, given that African partners have a strong interest in increased migration possibilities (Koch et  al. 2018),31 (ii) as a way to counter irregular migration (EC 2019c), and (iii) to connect the migration issue to the increasing demographic pressure within Europe due to aging societies. Given the predominant policy narrative in the Council and the EU member states, there has however to date been little interest by EU member states and beyond a few pilot schemes little notable progress has been achieved. Moreover, those few countries that have interest may engage bilaterally and not through EU channels so to keep privileged relations with specific third countries (EC 2019c). While most EU external policy tools were aligned to the reduction of irregular migration, the wider EU migration system and bilateral migration relations of EU member states with African countries have thus not been under scrutiny. This is especially interesting against the background of “irregular migration from Africa to Europe [having] […] increased sharply over the last 10 years, [while] legal migration opportunities for African citizens […] to the EU for purposes of work have almost disappeared” (MEDAM 2018). The EU’s lack of progress on coordinating a stronger legal migration agenda through EU member state commitments and actions at the EU level, means that by default the EU’s agenda remains defined by a more narrow agenda in partnerships with third countries. In summary, while on the one hand, the EU pursued a strong ‘more of the same approach,’ for the EU’s development cooperation it propelled a more structural change toward African countries, which is likely to

31  For a number of governments accepting EU development finance from the EU in exchange for cooperation on migration may not be well perceived by citizens, who demand increased legal migration pathways.

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continue during the coming years (Lehne 2018).32 All narratives presented before played a role in EU external action during the past years to varying degrees. More energy has been put on activities emerging out of the first narrative viewing migration as a threat. The second on addressing ‘root causes’ is partly seen as a means to achieve a reduction in irregular migration and hence support solutions to the first narrative. The fourth narrative justified an increased spending on humanitarian funding. Although the third narrative on migration as a positive factor for development is present in individual member states and in some EU policy documents, it only plays a subordinated role in EU actions toward partner countries in Africa. If it does, the focus rather is on intra-African migration.

Intensified Engagement with African Countries on Migration The above dynamics have led to a new intensity in relations between the European Union and African countries on migration control. The EU underpinned its push for strengthened cooperation on fighting irregular migration and stepping up returns with tailor-made incentive packages offered bilaterally to transit and origin countries. While presented as ‘win-­ win’ and comprehensive partnerships, European interests are at the core (Kihato 2018). The EU’s internal political contestation and a security-led approach have also led to narrower margins of maneuver when engaging in partnerships. This has limited the EU’s flexibility to accommodate partners’ expectations: Once a strategy had been found vis-à-vis African partners, there was little space to diverge from it (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018).33 Accordingly, the agreements reached in Valletta in 2015 and the Migration Compacts with African countries have struggled to follow a balanced or comprehensive agenda in their implementation. The majority of efforts have taken place in the area of security, migration management, and  See road to Sibiu speech, and Lehne (2018).  Remark at an internal conference organized by ECDPM and one EU member state , given by an EU member state official, 2017. Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2018) quote one EU interviewee: “[F]oreign ministries are very often seen as the ones who have to sell the policies to third countries. And that is also what we have here [in the Commission]. Many ideas that come out of certain home oriented interior working groups are simply not feasible with our partner countries. […] My view on migration is very much determined by that we have to have something to sell. There has to be something in for both sides.” (p. 156) 32 33

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addressing root causes of migration (Genetzke 2017). Progress on regular migration reforms, resettlement, and visa are more ambiguous (Concord Europe 2018).34 However, this does not mean that the bilateral migration agreements do not correspond to several objectives held by African partner countries. Internal politics within African countries on migration are often as contested as they are in European countries—with different interest groups seeking political influence. Overall, if generalizations are possible, political interests in Africa are strong concerning legal migration opportunities and visa facilitation to the EU as well as reducing remittance costs or supporting diaspora. Increasing cooperation with European countries on readmission and return in exchange for development finance bears political risks for governments. In Mali, it has led to erosion of trust of civil society vis-­ à-­vis their government (BBC 2018) and, in the past, has led to backlash from citizens and diaspora (Trauner and Deimel 2013). Yet, migrant smuggling and irregular migration have become domestic concerns in a number of African countries as well, corresponding with EU interests. For example, in Ghana the Nigerian community is concerned about increasing stereotyping of migrants (Ghanaweb 2019), and North African countries, such as Morocco and Algeria, have engaged in harsh crackdowns on irregular migrants (Alami 2018; Kihato 2018; O’Mahony 2018).35 Cooperation with police and provision of equipment for better border governance with the aim of stopping irregular migration are thus often an area where joint interests between the EU and African counterparts can be found (Concord Europea 2018).36 Overlap in interests also exists, for example, with regard to awareness raising and information campaigns or increased support for reintegration measures, as is the case for Ethiopia (Council of the EU 2016). The risk of such engagement is, however, that national and local dynamics and the politicization of migration control (i.e. which groups 34  This is exemplified in the cases of the Migration Compacts with Ethiopia or Niger. See Concord Europe (2018). 35  See Alami (2018) and O’Mahony (2018), “Algeria dumps thousands of migrants in the Sahara amid EU-funded crackdown”; other examples, where governments have become more restrictive regarding immigration in recent years include South Africa, Botswana, and Angola (Kihato 2018). 36  This can, however, also have negative impact on foreign relations. Since Niger has stepped up cooperation with the EU on irregular migration, it has received complaints from neighboring countries regarding the push-backs of their own citizens. See Concord Europe (2018).

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gain from EU cooperation, which groups may lose) can pose challenges for power dynamics and stability in already fragile settings. Research in a number of African countries has shown that the EU’s interests seem to trigger and reinforce dynamics that on the one hand risk eroding migrants’ rights and on the other import solutions that are not sufficiently conflict-­ sensitive or embedded in the local political economy, and hence have limited ability to transform the conflict or migration situation on the ground (Peters et  al. 2018). Mismatches between the EU’s wish to strengthen sustainable and effective governance structures in partner countries in the long term and the cooperation with groups that help with the reduction of irregular migration in the short term remain unresolved. The EU’s engagement in Libya (Micaleff and Reitano 2017) and its support to the Portail Officiel des Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) and the police in Mali have been examples where the EU contribution to building stability is complex and has been questioned (Bøås et al. 2018; Ba and Bøås 2017; Cuny 2018).37 Kihato (2018) further notes that agendas limiting movement in African spaces “are likely to outpace efforts to facilitate sub-­ regional movement”, given the large amounts of financial inputs dedicated to it. In this way, with the ‘complicity of African leaders’ (Kihato 2018), there is an importing of EU narratives also on African migration management strategies. The stronger interest-driven cooperation on migration also led to a partial informalization of EU cooperation with partner countries in Africa and beyond. This not only concerns the choice of EC and EEAS tools, such as the more flexible and crisis-driven EU Trust Fund for Africa, but also influenced the mode of engagement on return under the EU Partnership Framework. The EU and its member states have an interest to not spoil their partners’ ability to enforce migration governance–related interests. For those elements that receive little popularity in African domestic political affairs, such as return and readmission, more informal and less transparent arrangements have been sought, which seems to make it easier for partner governments to cooperate (Adam et  al. 2019). Examples of more informal and non-binding agreements include those with Guinea in 2017, and Ethiopia, the Gambia, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2018 (Slagter 2019). 37  While the EU is not responsible for human rights abuses or political clashes in these countries, it has little possibilities to monitor and ensure that its support is not utilised to fuel conflict; see Boas et al. (2018) and Cuny (2018).

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Views on the EU’s Approach from Africa Despite the notion of genuine partnerships in many policy documents and speeches, the EU’s approach toward Africa and the language of positive and negative incentives did not lend itself easily to a relationship in which concerns of each party receive a balanced weight. Given the overly strong emphasis on EU interests and vision through the use of leverages and incentives, the partnership approach has not been perceived as a true cooperative framework. Analysts have noted that a “built-in contradiction” (Vimont 2016) and the lack of more fine-tuned diplomacy “made Europe start out on the wrong footing, as it gave the impression of a repeat of past experiences with Africa” (Vimont 2016: p. 5). West African leaders have, for example, been frustrated by the overly dominant focus on irregular migration instead of intra-regional orderly migration in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They also criticize the unilateral decisions of the EU to transfer funding from the Regional Programme to the EU Trust Fund for Africa, in whose management they were less involved (IRAM 2018). Distant from meeting partnership principles, African countries were in a number of cases not involved in setting objectives and identifying means of action when it came to the EU’s proposals or use of tools (Tardis 2018). However, at the same time the EU’s strong push for diplomatic and operational cooperation on migration issues has led to increased engagement and ownership from the African side. Interviewees pointed out that African actors today engage much more strongly on migration, formulating and defending their interests on migration governance.38 While accepting EU support in the area of migration, it is increasingly “their way, which is useful for ownership.”39 The African Union has also become more forceful in defending migration-related interests and has stressed the predominance of its own migration policy frameworks for Africa. Some perceived the EU’s push for bilateral deals as a ‘divide and conquer’ tactic—especially because there was little clarity how bilateral deals would relate to and fit with regional and continental migration frameworks.40 The African Union Commission, for example, actively intervened to stop  Interview with AU and EU officials, 2018 and 2019. As one EU official put it: “We do work more with the AU than in the past – It is better if you have ownership also from the African side, which we do see increasingly. Five or six years ago it was much more the EU imposing our views on migration. Now you have African actors that engage more strongly.” 39  Interview with EU official, 2019. 40  Conversation with AU member state Official, 2017. 38

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the EU’s advances with selected countries to explore the idea of disembarkation platforms. While aspirations to take common African positions on migration and vis-à-vis Europe and to rebalance the current bilateral focus are stronger, resistance still exists from countries that stand to gain from closer EU cooperation (Castillejo 2017). African states have learned to exploit the fact that the EU needs their help for their own particular and varied domestic or international interests (Koch et  al. 2018). Despite increasing engagement of African states, financially the EU drives the common set agenda, such as the Valletta Action Plan.41 Successful Partnerships? From the outset it has been unclear how success of the Partnership Framework and its various components would be measured or tracked— and even more what success would constitute (Collette and Ahad 2017). According to the EU’s own progress reports, key achievements concern primarily a contribution to the short-term reduction of irregular migration flows to the EU via the Mediterranean. Given that this has been one of the prime aims and concerns for EU policy, the EC rates its approach toward Africa as a success. Yet, the leverage the EU intended to achieve through pooling its external action tools has not been satisfying. Especially in the area of return, efforts have not translated into the envisaged increase in return numbers of migrants without authority to stay in the EU. For the EC, the problem lies in missed opportunities to pull all leverages, especially in the area of visa and legal migration beyond development cooperation. Repeatedly, the EC has pointed out that without a balanced approach to migration, leverage and sufficient incentives cannot be achieved vis-à-vis partner countries (EC 2017).42 A considerable part of the available positive incentives lies at the level of EU member states’ competence and thus outside the reach of EU-level possibilities. The leverage available to the EC, however, concentrates strongly in the area of development finance constituting limited 41  The planning document submitted to the Senior Officials Meeting following up on Valletta in February 2017 reveals that African states have not financed national or regional initiatives emerging from the Valletta agenda. 42  EU Commission, “Progress Report European Agenda”, 2019. In addition, the fourth progress report of the EU Migration Partnership Framework points out that “overcoming resistances in the field of returns and readmission will require a more coordinated and wider use of the levers offered by all relevant EU policies to achieve results” (p. 14) (see EC 2017).

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means in broader migration partnerships. As the Chief of Mission at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Niger has pointed out: “Compared to the level of funding generated by [the informal smuggling] economy, plans proposed via foreign aid through trust funds and multilateral and bilateral cooperation look like pocket money for these communities” (Loprete 2016). In the EU’s own assessments of partner countries, legal migration opportunities featured high on the list of their interests. In agreements and commitments with African partners, the EU seems to have once again overpromised on the aspects of legal migration opportunities given the unpopularity of additional migration opportunities in most EU countries.43 Only very few pilot labor mobility schemes have been put in place to date44 as part of the Valletta Action Plan, most of which are innovative but small-scale and not more than testing grounds. They are unlikely to reduce migrants’ incentives for irregular migration but may incentivize partner governments’ cooperation on migration management. For those EU member states that have provided opportunities or are reforming migration laws and opportunities, there is little coordination at the EU level. While enabling a more forceful approach toward partner countries, the general predominant migration narrative prevalent in EU member states has thus also in a crucial aspect constrained DG HOME in pursuing a balanced approach and its credibility with African partners externally. African policymakers, such as in Ghana and Senegal, have expressed disappointment in what has been achieved with the EU so far in terms of unskilled and skilled labor migration (Adam et al. 2019). In the area of development cooperation, the closer alignment with migration interests seems to have pushed the EU further away from initial aims to support positive aspects of mobility and injecting development thinking into the EU’s migration policies in line with global commitments, such as the SDGs. From this angle, little success toward progress on the EU’s commitments to policy coherence for global sustainable development has been made. As the EU’s external evaluation on Policy Coherence for Development points out, “the need to balance political priorities has limited the extent of development considerations” in the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

 This may not be surprising as legal migration opportunities have been part of the GAMM or the support promised to Arab Spring countries in the past decades without tangible follow-through. 44  As of March 2019, only three were launched, while two more were in preparation. 43

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The Way Forward in the EU The above-described contestation of different narratives of the crisis and their translation into policy actions “has obscured a deeper analysis of and pragmatic response to Africa’s migration and Europe’s ageing population” (Kihato 2018). EU member states have, in the past few years, strongly aligned development spending with migration interests in the context of internal political pressure. The focus on migration governance in Africa through its development cooperation and in broader external action will also continue in the future. The external dimension of migration plays a central role in EU budget discussions taking place for the EU’s next MFF. Rather than adopting a more balanced mix of the migration narratives presented in this chapter, migration conditionality and a further push to pursue migration interests with EU development policy loom large over the future of EU-Africa policy. Still, migration narratives co-exist and different policy actors at the European level share different ideas, which will continue to influence discussions in parallel. Development actors are still finding their place in this new reality and are engaging in generating evidence and knowledge on their added value on influencing migration and contributing to the EU’s policy priorities in this area. The short-term gains in reducing irregular flows, largely through bilateral agreements with external countries, have obscured the fact that internal reforms on the EU’s systems to manage asylum and migration have lagged behind. Analysts point out that the EU remains “woefully unprepared for another refugee crisis” (Lehne 2018). At the same time, it remains unclear whether the focus on numbers and the crisis-led approach have been a useful strategy to counter polarized societies or whether it in fact led to further division and strengthening of populist parties on the right. As concerns partnerships with African countries, a more balanced and long-term cooperation with African organizations in support of a comprehensive African migration agenda could be envisaged, given that the continent experiences large intra-African movements, yet is relatively restrictive when it comes to migration opportunities. This will need to be part of any approach that puts listening and trust building at its core in an effort to bridge and reconcile different migration interests and narratives between the EU and African counterparts.

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Boin, Arjen, and Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. 2005. The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carrera, Sergio, Joanna Parkin, and Leon den Hertog. 2013. EU Migration policy after the Arab Spring: The pitfalls of home affairs diplomacy. Policy paper no. 74, February 26. Paris: Notre Europe Jacques Delors Institute. Castillejo, Claire. 2017. The EU Migration partnership framework – Time for a rethink?, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik discussion paper 28/2017. https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_28.2017.pdf Chutel, Linsey. 2019. At least 80% of African migrants never leave the continent, but the focus is on Europe. Quartz Africa, February 15. https://qz.com/ africa/1550885/at-least-80-of-african-migrants-never-leave-the-continentbut-the-focus-is-on-europe/ Collette, Elizabeth. 2019. Understanding the role of evidence in EU policy development: A case study of the ‘Migration crisis. In Bridging the gaps – Linking research to public debates and policy-making on Migration and integration, ed. Martin Ruhs, Kristof Tamas, and Joakim Palme, 169–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collette, Elizabeth, and Aliyyah Ahad. 2017. EU Migration partnerships: A work in progress. Migration Policy Institute, December. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/eu-migration-partnerships-work-progress Collette, Elizabeth, and Camille Le Coz. 2018. After the storm: Learning from the EU response to the Migration crisis. MPI Europe report, June. https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/research/after-storm-eu-response-migration-crisis Concord Europe. 2018. Partnership or conditionality? – Monitoring the Migration compacts and EU trust fund for Africa. Brussels: Concord Europe. https:// concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CONCORD_ EUTrustFundReport_2018_online.pdf Council of the European Union. 2016. Joint Commission-EEAS non-paper on enhancing cooperation on migration, mobility and readmission with Ethiopia, 7205/16, March 17. http://statewatch.org/news/2016/mar/eu-com-eeasreadmission-ethiopia-7205-16.pdf Cuny, Elise. The EU’s new migration partnership with Mali: Shifting towards a risky security-migration development nexus. College of Europe EU diplomacy paper 1/2018. https://emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/ diplomacy-paper_.pdf Deutsche Welle. 2019. Hungary gives tax breaks to boost population, stop immigration. DW News, February 10. https://www.dw.com/en/ hungary-gives-tax-breaks-to-boost-population-stop-immigration/a-47449980 European Commission. 2013a. EU 2013 report on policy coherence for development. SWD (2013) 456 final, October 31, 2013. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pcd-report-2013_en.pdf

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———. 2013b. Communication from the commission on the work of the task force Mediterranean. COM(2013) 869 final. December 4, 2013. Brussels, European Commission. ———. 2013c. Maximising the Development Impact of Migration. EU contribution for the UN high-level dialogue and next steps towards broadening the development-­migration nexus. COM(2013) 292 final. https://ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-maximising-the-developmentimpact-of-migration_en_11.pdf ———. 2015a. Policy coherence for development  – 2015 EU report. SWD(2015) 159 final, August 3, 2015. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec. europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pcd-report-2015_en.pdf ———. 2015b. Refugee crisis: European Commission takes decisive action. EU Press Release, September 9. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm ———. 2015c. Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European agenda on Migration. September 23. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm ———. 2017. Fourth Progress report on the partnership framework with third countries under the European agenda on Migration. COM(2017), 350 Final. June 13. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th_progress_report_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_european_agenda_on_ migration.pdf ———. 2019a. Facts matter: Debunking myths about migration. European Commission Press Release, March. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190306_managing-migration-factsheet-debunking-myths-aboutmigration_en.pdf European Council. 2015. Council conclusions on measures to handle the refugee and migration crisis. EU Council Press Release, November 9. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/09/ jha-council-conclusions-on-measures-to-handle-refugee-and-migration-crisis/ Geddes, Andrew, and Leila Hadj-Abdou. 2018. Changing the path? EU migration governance after the ‘Arab spring’. Mediterranean Politics 23(1): 142–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1358904 Genetzke, Ralph. 2017. State of the implementation of the Valletta action plan. Presentation given at the ACP-EU JPA political affairs committee, Brussels, March 24. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/acp/dv/ppp_ralphgenetzke/ppp_ralphgenetzkeen.pdf Georgiou, Myria, and Rafal Zaborowski. Media coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’: A cross-European perspective. Council of Europe Report DG1(2017) 03. https:// rm.coe.int/1680706b00

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GhanaWeb. 2019. Nigerian community in Ghana cautions against stereotyping its nationals. GhanaWeb General News, May 6. https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Nigerian-community-in-Ghana-cautionsagainst-stereotyping-its-nationals-744022 Grandi, Filippo. 2019. Is Europe still facing a migration crisis? Euronews, January 29. Interviewed by Andrew Neil. https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/25/ is-europe-still-facing-a-migration-crisis-unhcr-chief-filippo-grandi-withandrew-neil-uncu Greussing, Esther, and Hajo Boomgarden. 2017. Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(11): 1749–1774. https://doi.org/10.108 0/1369183X.2017.1282813. Hart, Paul’t, and Karen Tindall, eds. 2009. Framing the global economic downturn: Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions. ANU Press. http://www. jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hf3m Hay, C. 2002. Political analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. IRAM. 2018. External Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the West Africa Region (2008–2016) Final Report, Volume I - Main Report. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/eval-ue-afofinal-report-nov-2018_en.pdf (accessed 18 March 2019). Keijzer, Niels, and Erik Lundsgaarde. When unintended effects become intended: Implications of ‘mutual benefit’ discourses for development studies and evaluation practice. Working paper no. 2017/7. Special working paper series on ‘unintended effects of international cooperation’. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kihato, Caroline 2018. EU migration ‘crisis’ and African complicity in migration management. SAIIA occasional paper 228. October 4. https://saiia.org. za/research/eu-migration-crisis-and-african-complicity-in-migrationmanagement/ Knoll, Anna, and Frauke de Weijer. 2016. Understanding African and European perspectives on migration – Towards a better partnership for regional migration governance. Discussion paper no 203. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. November. https://ecdpm.org/publications/understanding-african-european-perspectives-migration Knoll, Anna, and Andrew Sherriff. 2017. Making waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on official development assistance spending and practices in Europe. Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (Expert Group for Aid Studies), January. https://eba.se/en/rapporter/making-wavesimplications-of-the-irregular-migration-and-refugee-situation-on-officialdevelopment-assistance-spending-and-practices-in-europe-2/5239 Knoll, Anna, and Pauline Veron. 2019. Migration and the next EU long-term budget: Key choices for external action. In Investing in Europe’s global role: The

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negotiations for the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027, ed. A. Sherriff. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. https:// ecdpm.org/publications/migration-next-eu-long-term-budget-key-choicesexternal-action/. Koch, Anne, Annette Weber, and Isabelle Werenfels (eds.). 2018. Profiteers of migration? Authoritarian states in Africa and European migration management. SWP research paper 4, July . Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Lehne, Stefan. 2018. The EU remains unprepared for the next Migration crisis. Carnegie Europe Article, April 3. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/ eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-pub-75965 Micallef, Mark and Reitano, Tuesday. 2017. The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game. ISS, North Africa Report 2, December 2017. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf Martin, Susan, Rochelle Davis, Grace Benton, and Zoya Waliany. 2018. International responsibility-sharing for refugees. World Bank KNOMAD working paper, 32, March. Washington: World Bank. https://www.knomad.org/ sites/default/files/2018-03/KNOMAD WP_International ResponsbilitySharing for Refugees.pdf MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration). 2018. 2018 MEDAM assessment report on Asylum and Migration policies in Europe. Kiel: IfW. https:// www.ceps.eu/system/files/MEDAM-assessment-report_2018.pdf O’Mahony, Jennifer. 2018. Algeria dumps thousands of migrants in the Sahara amid EU-funded crackdown. The Telegraph. June 25. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/ algeria-dumps-thousands-migrants-sahara-amid-eu-funded-crackdown/ Orbie, Jan, and Sarah Delputte. 2019. Let’s abolish EU Commissioner for Development. EU Observer Opinion article, May 9. . https://euobserver.com/ opinion/144841 Parkes, Roderick. 2017. Nobody move! Myths of the EU migration crisis. Chaillot paper no 143, December. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Pascouau, Yves. 2018. The European council and the drift of power. European Migration Law.eu Points of View, November 28. http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/en/articles/points-of-view/the-european-council-and-the-driftof-power.html Peters, Ingo, Enver Ferhatovic, Rabea Heinemann, Susan Berger, and Sofia Marie Sturm. 2018. The European Union’s crisis response in the extended neighbourhood: Comparing the EU’s output effectiveness in the case of Iraq, Mali and Afghanistan. Brussels EUNPACK working paper. http://www.eunpack. eu/sites/default/files/publications/WP%207%20Comparative%20for%20 7.1._final%20version%2010.03.18.pdf

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CHAPTER 5

Reframing African Migration to Europe: An Alternative Narrative Jussi P. Laine

Introduction The witnessed increase in number of asylum seekers’ arrivals to Europe has undeniably provoked a mounting interest, but also concerns, about migration and its broader societal impacts. The complexity of the situation in itself has created a demand for simplified explanations. Offers of easy answers to the many open questions have seldom been enough to thoroughly comprehend the witnessed course of events. While the peaks in migration flows witnessed in the EU in 2015 and 2016 were undeniably remarkable, their framing as “crisis” or even as an exceptional situation— requiring exceptional measures—can however be questioned. In the broad debate that followed, rational assessments have been overshadowed by emotional outbursts and narrow standpoints. Irregular migration to Europe has become a field where estimations often prevail over researched actualities, and hearsay and myths govern over concrete evidence.

J. P. Laine (*) Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, Kuopio, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_5

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According to these depictions, immigration is out of control and threatening the resilience of the European societies, its fragile national economies and—perhaps most audibly—its security. According to the regular surveys and opinion polls, immigration and terrorism remain the two top concerns expressed by European Union (EU) citizens. Too often, the two get automatically connected. The witnessed anxieties seemingly fuelled by immigration have become entwined with deep and profound insecurities inflicted by originally completely unconnected societal changes, the influence of which has been the strongest on those already in precarious positions within society. This has evidently made the balancing of one’s own rights, benefits and preferences of association against the responsibilities towards others confusing and difficult (Laine 2018a: 231). Surely, the arrival of more than one million asylum seekers and migrants to Europe in 2015 alone can be seen as tipping point in how migration is generally viewed, but rather than assessing it as an unforeseen occurrence of its own, it might be necessary to adopt a more holistic approach in terms of both time and scope. Sparked off by the 2015 events, the salience of migration as a political and social concern intensified rapidly, and the topic has since then been framed almost as a matter of life and death, determining the fate of the European Union but also challenging the fundamental corner stones of the European idea and civilization. However, the debate can be seen to have had less to do with migration in itself, but rather it has been much more telling about the broader societal and ontological insecurities many European countries have been facing. This chapter puts forth that the increased number of new migrant arrivals to Europe, but even more importantly the fast pace with which the events occurred, did bring about a crisis, yet is was not a refugee one, as the event became widely referred to. The peaks in migration flows exposed serious flaws in the EU’s asylum system and that the commitment to an asylum has become increasingly conditional. Europe, together with much of the Global North, is working on a number of initiatives to attract more highly skilled migrants, at the same time as it has taken increased measures to keep the unwanted out. The EU and a number of its individual member states have opted for closing their borders and tightened their migration polices, some even succumbing to the knee-jerk reaction to build physical walls, undermining in so doing the moral, legal, philosophical, as well as economic accounts of limiting movement. Much of both the political and broader public debate have become to depict immigrant flows as an

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invasion, something we need to seek to contain, control and combat (for detailed examples, see Laine 2018a, b, 2019), whereby borders have become to play a strong—at least rhetorical and psychological—role as a defence against all kinds of “ills” affecting the body of “national” societies. Consequently, migration has become predominantly addressed through the security nexus and borders to represent protective, yet vulnerable, barriers from the perceived looming threat from the other side. The present crisis has given increasing prominence to the debate about borders, their functions and significance. The once prevalent rhetoric of a borderless world has given way to more realistic notions strengthened by the re-emergence of state-centric thinking, weakening in so doing EU’s integrationist momentum and the idea of open borders. Worries about its consequences for society, welfare institutions and labour markets have influenced not only public opinion but also political action, causing temporary closings of borders, cultural divides and even expressions of racism and xenophobic nationalism. The sudden influx of refugees turned into a political crisis, giving rise to populist parties and right-wing ideology (Laine 2018b), becoming conflated also with economic, educational and welfare migration, as well as internal EU labour mobility, sparking even notions of the end of the entire EU (Zimmermann 2017). The resultant prevalent rhetoric on migration of concerns, problem or threat largely outperforms the scientific evidence that European countries will simply not manage without migrants (Myrskylä and Pyykkönen 2015). If anything, studies have shown that immigration provides economic opportunities and that Europe could achieve a fair and effective allocation of migrants that would preserve European principles and unity (Blau and Mackie 2017; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016). Migration from Africa, Ardittis (2017) notes, continues to be fundamentally misconstrued and misrepresented, in relation to both its core dynamics and the implications it is asserted to have for European economies and societies. Fuelled by sensationalist media images and narratives as well as alarmist and opportunistic right-wing politicians seeking to capitalise on the purported immigrant invasion (Laine 2018b), Africa has become portrayed as a “continent on the move” (Flahaux and de Haas 2016: 1). Characteristic of the debate has been the depiction of millions of migrants, assumed to consist predominantly as those of irregular kind, looming behind the gates of Europe just waiting for the first opportunity to cross over. As Flahaux and de Haas (2016: 1) explain, the main suppositions underlying such a vision tend to be that African migration is excessive and

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increasing, mainly directed towards Europe, and driven by poverty and violence. It is for this reason that serious efforts must be taken to deflate and rectify the unrelenting deceptive and inaccurate narratives surrounding migration, and to gain more nuanced understanding of not just the root causes and motivating factors behind the migrant flows but also their inherent interlinkages and the impact of broader social and economic forces that shape migrant decision-making.

Information Is Power In order to better understand why migration has become a security issue, it is necessary to first understand not only the changed nature of the concept of security but also the role of borders in the entire migration conundrum not merely as sites of control but as frames for social and political agenda-setting. The core assumption herein is that security is socially embedded; it is as much an everyday phenomenon as it is a geopolitical one. As Limnéll (2009) points out, the idea of security is constructed in relation to the threats perceived and given that all threat perceptions, even if claimed to be real, are products of estimates and interpretations, they cannot be defined in terms of objective reality. The threat perceptions that are presented in public are often deliberately constructed in specific ways, whereby the content of the perceived threat becomes politically determined. The everyday production of security underlines the notion that states are no longer the only political subjects that produce security (Fierke 2007); rather, it is necessary to acknowledge the interlinked nature of state-centred, militarily defined security and human security (James 2014) as well as that of domestic and international (intermestic) security challenges and their consequences for policy recommendations (Duke 2013; Szabo 2015). Given that human security can only flourish in supportive socio-political and economic environments, security threats can come to emerge through perceptions of and reactions to everyday life. In contrast to more traditional, state-centred understandings of security, the reactions to immigration witnessed throughout Europe suggest more ontological understanding to security to be at stake. While such understandings may have more to do with perceptions and emotions than they have with any rational and evidence-­based assessments, this does not make these concerns any less meaningful or impactful.

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The perceptual aspects of security draw attention to the links between security and information. The manipulability of public sentiment has become heightened during the current era of alternative facts, false news and one-sided or misleading information. The commercial media often serve as conveyors of negative information, focusing on conflict, violence and playing to basic fears (Wolfsfeld 2004). Beyond the frame of the individual subject, meaning of information is intrinsically social—stemming from a shared system of rules, representations, values and beliefs. Information is also social, as Mingers and Standing (2018) explain, because the social and organizational world shapes the information that may be available and the effects that it may have. Information—regardless of its objectivity—reduces uncertainty, whereby many have been prone to accept simplified explanations, despite their inadequacies, to make sense of the complex phenomena with which they have come face to face. As a result, security has become increasingly about the production, consumption and interpretation of information. This is to say that the feeling of security has less to do with statistical data or objective facts, but much more about ways of presenting, framing and narrating specific issues, which may embody very different ideas, ideologies and interests. Information does not simply exist, but is produced in the political, media and public debates. They simplify complex information, making common, even if more mundane, understandings of security possible. While simplification has its benefits, it also has its disadvantages. Simplification may lead to either generalizations or overly narrow representations or taking matters out of their original context. The damage caused by deceptive (mis-)information gets further augmented when such information is used to sustain a particular framing of a certain group of people or a phenomenon in a way that deliberately distorts some aspects of reality, yet produces nonetheless a seemingly coherent and credible picture. Such framings can be understood as socio-political imaginaries that may convey misleading or one-sided narratives. They reflect the role of beliefs, values and emotions in the interpretation of political reality (Gregory 1994; Howie and Lewis 2014; Milkoreit 2017), forming in so doing the fundamental frame within which information is consumed and orient our action by reducing complexity selectively (Jessop 2012). To link these ideas with the actual topic at hand, the perspective of ontological security is in order. The concept highlights the role of identity and the stability of ideas, values and interests as well as points of common reference that are seen create and nurture a sense of group belonging

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(Giddens 1991; Rumelili 2015). It shifts the focus of analysis from the traditional, often state-centric, security paradigm to a person’s elemental sense of safety, secure self, as well as of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be (Kinnvall 2004: 746). In this sense, security denotes the ability of people to “go on” with their lives without succumbing to paralysing anxieties and insecurities about the nature of existence (Browning 2016) in the turbulent and unpredictable environment of the contemporary era. Following Mitzen (2006), ontological level security dilemmas, such as one many felt at the sudden surge of refugees, may actually reinforce the sense of being and identity by fostering cognitive-­ affective resistance to identity change and a reluctance to part with available certainties and assumptions because of their potential disruption to continuity. The salience of the concept is substantiated by attempts to achieve “epistemic coherence in times of uncertainty” (Natorski 2015: 650) and maintain forms of behaviour that favour continuity (Chernobrov 2016). Rumelili (2015) exemplifies this by accentuating the threat potential of perceived negative difference between peoples, cultures and states, which form the basis of the common threat scenarios that have proliferated in Europe following the witnessed migration pressures in which immigrants are seen to challenge the very foundations of European civilisation and its ways of life. It is largely for these reasons that migration has become securitised, that is, framed both politically and socially as a threat. It is particularly salient insofar as threat is framed in ways that emphasise national and cultural identities and “otherness” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017).

The Bigger Picture The much-circulated and oft-repeated media representations of migrants as anonymous refugees crammed into boats or wandering on highways in uncontrollably large masses surging towards “us” are certainly powerful in themselves, yet fall short in capturing the full scope of the event. For the largest part, media coverage has given the misleading impression of a linear, uninterrupted large-scale movement of people heading towards Europe, often represented through maps or other graphics with thick arrows from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe—reminiscent of the traditional war maps with arrows denoting troop movement. The widely shared images of desperate refugees trying to sneak into the European Union over, under or through various fences have only

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reconfirmed the perception that the situation is out of control and that order needs to be restored at “our” borders (Laine 2018b). While the media plays a vital role in focusing the world’s attention on the event of importance, providing people with relevant information in a timely manner and pressuring both decision-makers and the public to react, the story that is told is seldom objective. The media framing, covering a topic from a particular angle or perspective over others, is an inherently ideological act—whether consciously or not. It has significant consequences for how people make meaning of events (Gamson and Modigliani 1989), whereby the media holds the power to set agendas and tone (Berry et  al. 2016; Zhou and Moy 2007), and also in defining an event as a “crisis”. The already critical role of the media was augmented further not only by the scale on migrant flows particularly in the latter half of 2015, but even more so by the pace with which the events unfolded. Not only the general public but policy and decision-makers as well had to depend largely on the available quickly produced media information in the absence of more time-­ consuming thorough research and comprehensive analyses (Laine 2018b). A particularly common framing throughout Europe was to depict the rising number of refugees trying to reach Europe’s frontiers as something “unprecedented”, as a perpetual and increasing emergency that, by definition, can only be addressed through the adoption of exceptional measures. So created “state of exception”, Agamben (2015) has rightly stressed, creates circumstances whereby the legal order is no longer valid and the customary rules and norms may be deviated from. The emergency frame presenting the migration situation as an unprecedented crisis on Europe’s borders has led to demands for more policing, enhanced border security and stricter migration control. These policies have however done little to impede “illegal” migration, but rather made it riskier by pushing migration to more dangerous routes. The investments have also created counterproductive dynamics, such as increasingly lucrative markets for the smuggling industry capitalising on human misery. Prioritising border security and surveillance has also further fostered an image of our homelands being overrun with foreign, if not criminal, elements that the EU must repel at any means necessary—creating in so doing even more support for further border security and policing. By now, it is clear that the European attempts to “secure” or “protect” its borders have undoubtedly failed. Accordingly, the EU has received a fair deal of criticism—if not accusations—for either not doing enough to

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help those in need or doing too much in trying to protect its borders (e.g. Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2019; Bueno Lacy and van Houtum 2017; Davitti 2019; Gill 2018). While a vast majority of the critical observations made have been both justified and necessary, at times the faceless EU has become an easy target and made the scapegoat at the expense of the more profound drivers of the suppression of welcome. This is to draw attention to the fact that “the EU” does not exist in a vacuum or operate detachedly from the member states or the people. The European Commission, the driving force within the EU’s institutional system and representing the common interest, is a politically independent institution that proposes legislation, policies and programmes of action. It is also responsible for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament, the voice of the people and the Council (of ministers), and the voice of the member states. The European Council, comprising of the Heads of State or Government of all the EU member states, the highest-level policy-making body in the EU, defines the overall political direction and priorities of the Union, it does not, nevertheless, exercise any legislative functions. While it is the European Commission that initiates procedures and proposes new laws, it is the European Parliament and Council that adopt them. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by EU citizens to represent their interests and the Council consists of government ministers, that is elected officials, from all the EU member states. Hence, rather than simply blaming the mere policies, it is necessary to dig deeper. Perception drives policy; that is, policy-making on immigration and asylum-seeking is to a significant extent motivated by prevailing public attitudes. The important question thus is, to what extent has the public had an accurate understanding of the “crisis”: the number and type of migrants who have arrived in Europe as well as the reasons, circumstances and motivations of their journeys? Rather than depicting any alleged official perspective in opposition to that of the people, it seems more accurate to state that the reactions and responses to the witnessed situation have been torn at best. It is this ensuing mounting polarization within the seemingly coherent European space and people, rather than the influence of immigration per se, that are putting Europe’s democracies, social model, cohesion as well as values and the very idea to the test (Laine 2018a: 231). Over-emphasising the novelty and unprecedented nature of contemporary forms of migration, augmented by poor understanding of history, have deceptively discounted a more nuanced understanding of the context

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within which the current migration flows take place. The twenty-first century has been justifiably framed as the century of the migrant (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2020). The statistics are clear, the last decade alone has marked the highest number of migrants in recorded history (Nail 2015), now globally reaching already an estimated 272 million (UN 2019). While the global population has been growing rapidly as well, which explains a part of this, the growth in number of migrants has recently, particularly since 2010, outpaced the growth rate of the world’s population. Scores of people are on the move, constrained by environmental, economic and political instability, but also broader changes—from global tourism to undocumented labour—which have, as Nail (2015) suggests, made us all migrants. Still, another way of looking at the situation would be underlined that the international migrants make up approximately 3.5 per cent of the entire global population. In other words, a vast majority of people continue to live in the country in which they were born. Be it as it may, migration remains poorly understood. Migration is a complex and a highly stratified phenomenon and its various patterns vary substantially across regions and countries, and flows have changed considerably over time. Not all migrants are alike either. Treating migrants as a one coherent category is thus doomed to obscure much more than illuminate the already complex situation we are facing. There is a fierce competition among the EU states for attracting highly skilled migrants from the right places at the same time as major investments are made to keep the unwanted from the wrong places out. Indeed, as Bauman (e.g. Bauman 1996) has extensively theorised, our mobility is increasingly dependent on who we are, how much money do we have in our pockets, and where we are perceived to belong to. Not everyone is free to work, live or even visit where one wants. According to the UN (2019) statistics, as many as 70.8 million people globally have been forced from their homes; among them are approximately 25.9 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. What is particularly noteworthy is that the percentage of total migrants who are non-status or undocumented has been increasing, which poses a severe challenge to their political representation. There are already nearly three million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights, such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement (UN 2019; UNHCR 2018). While, regionally, Europe hosts the largest number of international migrants, 85 per cent of refugees are hosted by developing countries, and nearly four out of every five

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refugees lived in countries neighbouring their countries of origin (UNHCR 2018). While it has been predominantly the migration from a region to another, more specifically from developing countries to developed countries, which has been accompanied by growing resentment, most international migrants tend to move between countries located within the same region. Flows of migrants between countries especially in the African region have thus become an increasingly prominent feature of the contemporary global migration system. This is to say that while the stock of African migrants in the world has increased rapidly, many remained within the continent. For example, a majority of international migrants in sub-­ Saharan Africa (89 per cent) originate from the same region (UN 2019). While it is a fact that emigration from Africa has escalated considerably over the past decade in absolute terms, it is important to keep in mind that the proportion of emigrants relative to Africa’s total population is still one of the lowest in the whole world (Ardittis 2017). Notwithstanding the increased migrant flows, when the purported “crisis” is considered, a brief look at the history of migration reveals that there is little unprecedented in the current situation. People have always migrated and moved around, and will also continue to do so. In Africa, migration has historically played a fundamental role in shaping the continent—and also the rest of the world. It may well be that it was within and from Africa, where the human species began spreading on the planet in the first place (Rossi 2018). Africa has been the source of the largest forced migrations in history. Within Africa, traditional forms of trade across complementary ecological zones and the seasonality of production spurred free migrations of traders and workers (Ibid.). These patterns were distrusted by European colonialism, the economic rationale which directed migrant flows more towards cities. The rise of development as a rationale for African societies channelled people’s mobility in various ways through national and international policies, but also through unfolding projects of self-development by travelling to places where they hoped to find better opportunities (Ibid.). As the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) underlines, migration is a fundamental component of structural transformation in many African countries, and for many households, migration forms a strategy to improve their livelihood, minimise their risks and diversify their income sources (FAO 2017). However, a vast majority of the news—or event studies for that matter—have not been about the developments within Africa, but excessively about African migrants heading to Europe. In many of the presented

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standpoints, the apparent fact that Europe too has been at the crossroads of various migrant flows since ancient times has been disregarded. It was largely thanks to its central position within global migration systems— including its mercantilist and colonial expansions—through which its states become established and shaped in the first place. Immigration to Europe also has a long history, whereby many European nations already have substantial immigrant populations. Likewise, persistent political conflicts, increased demographic pressures and mounting poverty levels in Europe’s adjacent regions in Africa and the Middle East (de Lima et al. 2016: 12), as well as the increasing number and magnitude of natural disasters resulting from climate change, will keep on feeding migratory flows also in the future. However, it is important to keep in mind that the levels of regular migration from Africa to Europe have far exceeded numbers of irregular arrivals, aside from the couple of rather brief peaks. While there is no denying that the events of 2015–2016 got many by surprise, mass movements of comparative scale have certainly been seen before. For example, the Yugoslav wars also led to sudden flows of up to a million individuals, and the inter-war Europe was hit by numerous refugee crises involving even higher numbers of people fleeing their homes and seeking refuge. While the recent immigration may have put the resilience of Europe’s societies to the test, having been already weakened by other overlapping societal changes, the situation was, Cloet (2016) notes, quite similar during the inter-war era, when Europe—even more than now— had to also cope with many other problems comparable to those of today: financial and economic turmoil, concerns about budget deficits, and multiple persistent conflicts at the fringes of the continent. Both then and now, politicians have been forced to grapple with questions over the employment, education and integration of newcomers—and national governments showed great reluctance to welcome newcomers and spend additional money on refugee settlement. Hostility among the public and media was there as well (Ibid.) The various migration crises have never been only about migration. Migrants have, however, often been the convenient scapegoats for all the things that are not working properly or are simply too difficult to tackle. It is important to be borne in mind that the resilience and response capacity of the European societies had already been weakened before the so-­ called migrant crisis by quite severe social and economic crises and Europeans’ trust and faith in the EU was at an all-time low. The very idea of a coherent Europe without borders was challenged by many already

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before the event of 2015 and 2016, which certainly fanned the flames and fuelled protectionism, nationalism, right-wing populism and xenophobia. The birth rates have been in decline throughout Europe, whereby the European population is ageing fast, which presents social, economic and cultural challenges to public welfare and pension systems and societies. Economic inequality has risen together with the elaboration and adoption of market-oriented policies, especially in sectors such as education and health. As a result, divergences in both quality and accessibility of social services have amplified, and the entire democratic structure has become questioned. The longstanding employment structures and workplace cultures are being disrupted by rapid and far-reaching technological innovation and digital transformation. Also, sustained development of the European economy is becoming more vulnerable to challenges and to weaknesses in the globalisation process. In short, the daily life of many has become more fragile and unpredictable. The feelings of not being equal, or having been excluded or left behind, can cause fear, frustration, resentment, even anger. As Kierkegaard (1844/1944) once maintained, fear becomes anxiety if it does not have an outlet. “Strangers”, they who are not like us, provide such an outlet—and for the sake of ontological security, rationality of the utilised argumentation may be consciously pushed aside. That is, the scapegoating and othering of migrants become a strategy to fight against paralysing anxieties in search of societal or identitary stability. Another typical portrayal of the situation is to associate immigration with the high cost of refugee services and integration and suggest that immigrants take the jobs and benefits of native population. Calculations tend to be one-sided and oriented towards the short term, discounting the long-term contribution of migrants to the economy. Also, in terms of the broader cultural and social impact of migration, only the alleged negatives tend to get mentioned. While the cultural and social impact is difficult to define and may depend greatly on whose perspective is concerned, the economic aspects are easier to measure. The study by Bove and Elia (2017) suggests that immigration-fuelled diversity is good for economic growth as a richer pool of expertise and experiences can create organisational synergies, leading to better outcomes for all. Notwithstanding that heterogeneous environments may produce coordination problems, increase transaction costs and create distrust and irreconcilable divisions (Alesina and la Ferrara 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997; Esteban and Ray 2011; Gören 2014), different societal norms, customs and ethics can nourish

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innovation and the diffusion of new ideas, and lead to the production of a greater variety of goods and services (Ager and Brückner 2013; Ottaviano and Peri 2006). From this perspective, immigrants represent human resources, particularly appropriate for innovation (Bodvarsson and van den Berg 2013). The recent studies by the European Commission (2015a) and the IMF (Aiyar et  al. 2016) indicated that the fears of cost of immigration are ungrounded (see also de Lima et al. 2016). They show that refugee and overall migrant flows have a relatively limited fiscal impact, even in the short term, and in the medium term the costs could be effortlessly outweighed by the benefits of integration. According to the IMF estimates, the fiscal costs are 0.1 per cent of European GDP per year, while the growth impact is likely to be greater (particularly for the countries recording higher inflows), but also states that this will be dependent on the migrant access and integration in the labour market, migrant age structure, as well as the skills and qualifications that they possess (Aiyar et al. 2016). Costs of non-integration, in contrast, are high and often paid by the weakest (de Lima et al. 2016: 10). Also FAO (2019) acknowledges that while the challenges and opportunities of migration are highly dependent on country context, in general migration can be an engine of economic growth and innovation, and it can greatly contribute to sustainable development and the reduction of inequalities both within and between countries. Given the apparent ageing problem Europe faces, this may not even be a matter of choice. The presented evidence is compelling: a number of European states will simply not manage without migrants, but rather needs to attract a substantially more of them (Myrskylä and Pyykkönen 2015). As the previous studies have suggested, Europe could boost its competitiveness and growth potential by better use of migrants as human capital, and secure, in the long run, its weight as a global player (de Lima et al. 2016: 11). When the common argument that immigrants would be stealing jobs from the native-born workers is concerned, little evidence can be found to that effect. Neither public opinion nor evidence-based research supports the claim made repeatedly by some politicians and the media. Rather, evidence-­based research shows that the impact of immigrants—of all skill levels—to native employment is in the short term insignificant and in the long term immigration actually increases employment (Constant 2014). This is not to say that migrants would not be taking any jobs. Of course they do, and finding a job is generally supported and preferred too—if the

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alternative is to live on the social welfare, assistance and income support. It has been shown that the often-heralded job and wage losses of native born are actually rather insignificant, and where they do occur they are predominantly concentrated on the low-skilled (de Lima et al. 2016: 11). Instead, migrants should be viewed as valuable recourses as they can help ease widespread skills shortages and the related mismatches within the EU, compensating for persistently inadequate levels of intra EU-mobility (Ibid.). Migrants choose locations with available jobs and fill labour shortages, rarely substitute directly for native workers (Constant 2014). Furthermore, immigration also creates more jobs—also for the native-­ born population. They create new jobs by increasing production, engaging in self-employment, and easing upward job mobility for native workers (Ibid.).

Africa-Europe Relations Beyond Migration? The last years showed considerable debates about migration from Africa to Europe, yet the perspectives have often been particularly lopsided. Certainly, the relations between Europe and Africa have their unmistakable historical burden, which should be disregarded. However, the conflictual premise does not provide the most fertile ground for mutually beneficial collaborative agenda. The argument put forth here is not that the history should be belittled or that it would have lost its meaning, but rather that Africa-Europe relations need to change with the times in order for the opportunities to be grasped. While work remains to be done on both sides, an important beginning would be for the EU to rethink its attitude to and perception on Africa. While there is an apparent need to move beyond mere post-colonial frames towards more balanced relations, there are, as Haastrup (2013, 2017) maintains, different priorities on each side, and a persistent hierarchy of scale, wealth and power which need be brought out into the open when the future relations are discussed. The need to rethink Africa extends also beyond the political frame. For many Europeans Africa remains “often seen as a continent of mass migration and displacement caused by poverty, violent conflict and environmental stress” even if such perceptions tend to be “based on stereotypes rather than theoretically informed empirical research” (Flahaux and de Haas 2016: 1). Surely, there is no denying that Africa would not continue to face major socio-economic challenges. The traditional parochial imaginary of misery

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has however been allowed to dominate the debate far too long and continues to shape the general European perception of Africa, including among policy-makers. As Bilal (2016) puts it, “[t]he story goes that Europe must help, if not save Africa, by sending troops into troubled places… and spend billions in development assistance.” Because of its outdated paternalistic approach, together with the failure to recognise the diversity of situations between African countries, Europe has missed good opportunities to benefit from Africa’s economic boom and to capitalise on its strengths (Ibid.). The rhetorical efforts to this effect have already been made. Cooperation at a continental level is guided by a strategic partnership, which is heralded to be—as such documents usually are—based on shared values and common interests. The partnership, guided by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) that was adopted in 2007, forms the formal political channel through which the EU and the African continent work together and defines the very nature of this cooperative relationship. The officially announced objective of the partnership is to “bring Africa and Europe closer together through strengthening economic cooperation and promoting sustainable development, with both continents co-existing in peace, security, democracy, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity” (European Commission 2019). The main intention set out in JAES is the “intention to move beyond a donor/recipient relationship towards long-­ term cooperation on jointly identified mutual and complementary interests” (Ibid.). More matter-of-factly, the goals of the strategy are to move beyond development cooperation to issues of joint political concern; that is, to “move beyond purely African matters towards effectively addressing global challenges such as migration, climate change, peace and security”, but also to support Africa’s own aspirations to inspire continental and trans-regional responses to these key challenges and to work towards a people-centred partnership, ensuring better participation of African and European citizens (European Parliament 2019). In terms of the legal basis, the relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa are governed by the Cotonou Agreement, adopted in 2000 to replace the 1975 Lomé Convention. The agreement provides the overarching framework and basis for relations between the EU and 78 countries in the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which also include political, economic and development dimensions. Despite these political frameworks, many EU member states continue to prefer and maintain their own bilateral relations with the African states

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over the more unified EU approach. While the reason for this may vary, the post-colonial ties certainly play a decisive role here, an explanation can also be sought from the lack of comparable partner on the African side. The African states have been pursuing political and economic integration at a continental level. Indeed, greater African integration has long been a cherished but elusive goal, with only limited results on the ground (Olu-­ Adeyemi and Ayodele 2007). Since the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and even more so since the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002, determined efforts have been made to build continental institutions and establish ambitious policies and initiatives. In developing the relationship between the two Unions, rather than between individual states from one continent to another, a question of whether the EU should be taken as a model for AU has surfaced frequently in various debates. The position put forward herein is that while there may indeed be lessons to be learned from the EU experience, both in terms of best practices and mistakes made, the African setting—particularly the historical circumstances—are evidently very different from that of Europe. This makes the mere transplanting of a functioning model—as questionable as that definition in itself may be—from one setting to another less straightforward. Rather than a model, Haastrup (2013) argues, the EU is best placed to serve as a mentor to the AU, guiding it in its efforts to foster regional integration in Africa, fulfilling in so doing its overarching external relations commitments to local ownership and deepened further integration in Africa. In trying to explain and better understand the present-day state of borders and integrative processes in Africa, it is vital to take into consideration both the current re- and de-bordering processes, which bring to light “the dialectical and inextricable links of geography and history” (Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013: 25). Perhaps the most obvious limitation for using EU as a model stems from the fact that the African borders have evolved through an entirely different process than what was the case in Europe. When talking about African borders, it is of course vital to look at the continent’s history of colonisation (Minghi 1963), yet as Okumu (2014) and Ahmad (2014) have noted, borders existed in Africa also before colonisation. The very crux of many border problems relates to the fact that the borders drawn by the colonial powers did not only change the function of these borders, but also that the new arbitrary lines did not coincide with the existing socio-cultural spaces and socio-political structures. As Engelbert, Tarango and Carter (2002: 1095) explain, “the

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concept of territorial delimitation of political control was ... culturally alien ... and this makes colonially imposed boundaries ‘alien’ to Africa”. Having gained independence, African states had to make a decisive choice: either to inaugurate an extensive and indubitably complicated re-­ bordering process or to accept and maintain the imperfect borders drawn by the colonial powers (Minghi 1963: 420). Through the intergovernmental structure of the OAU (1963–1999), the African states chose to sustain the existing political structures over any re-bordering process, as the latter were feared “to open a Pandora’s Box of irredentism and secessionist claims” (Jacquin-Berdal 2002: iii). Its successor, the African Union, moved the focus more towards achieving greater unity and solidarity between African countries and their people, promoting African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples and encouraging international cooperation. However, the widely differing stages of development within the continent, internal divisions and poor communications and interlinkages within the continent, inter alia, remain as major obstacles for pan-Africanist unity. The proclaimed aim to move away from excessive bilateralism is hindered by the common reading that the comprehensive continent-to-­ continent arrangements do not add much value to the status-quo, and may even downgrade the current relations with the EU. As an example, as De Groof et al. (2019) explicate, the North African states are seeking to “move south”, towards deeper political and economic continental integration, while at the same time they continue “looking north” with an aim to maintain and secure their relations with the EU. Heedlessly of this double pursuit they have shown little enthusiasm for developing a comprehensive continent-to-continent approach under the auspices of the AU. Despite recent reassurances from the AU that their privileged relationship with the EU would remain intact, the North African states have displayed practically no interest in working towards or even being associated with a renewed agreement between the ACP countries and the EU (Ibid.). Challenges remain on the EU side as well. Despite the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s (in Fox 2018) assurances that “co-operation with Africa goes far beyond migration”, and is now “a partnership between equals”, the relations have remained focused on migration—and its securitisation. For a number of years now, the European Commission’s repeated mantra has been that the established new investment vehicles for the African market—that is, the European External Investment Fund that seeks to boost the capacities of financing and Africa

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Trust Fund that aims for quicker capacity of reaction—will tackle the root causes of poverty and migration (European Commission 2015b). In contrast to the aims of the current joint strategy to move beyond migration, in practice the EU seems to only have prioritised migration [control] further by conditioning future aid and financial investment on African countries doing far more to control their borders and pushing migration [policy] to the core of the EU’s new partnership with Africa (Fox 2018), which is evidently one of the key reasons why the current negotiations on how to further augment the EU-African collocative frame have largely stagnated. Challenges aside, Africa and Europe are and will remain neighbours, sharing not just the common neighbourhood at and around the Mediterranean, but also both the history and future. While Europe is struggling with low growth, ageing population and brain drain, among other things, Africa has experienced sustained high economic growth over the past decade. Africa is likely to become even a far more significant continental partner this century (Gillespie 2018). The mere numbers are telling. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is set to double over the next 30 years, whereby it would account for more than half of global population growth between now and 2050. The population of the entire African continent could double by 2100, meaning that one in three of the world’s people would live there (UN Population Division 2019).

Conclusion Migration is a highly diversified phenomenon, but often represented simplistically. The prevalent security-oriented approach evident in much of the political and media debates in Europe has failed to provide a nuanced enough picture of the migration flows in order for its costs and benefits to be pit against one another in a balanced way. The resultant widespread rhetoric on the migration problem largely outperforms the scientific evidence that European countries will simply not manage without migrants. It conveys a negative image of immigrants as a threat to our land, culture, identity, values and conventional ways of life. The body of Europe has become portrayed as being under a full attack by the invasive outsiders looking at the fringes of Europe waiting for the opportunity to enter. The accentuation of perceived difference between peoples, cultures and states tends to increase further and become more polarised during instances of broader socio-economic stress and geopolitical instability. The so-called

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refugee crisis cannot thus be assessed as a phenomenon of its own, but rather with an understanding that it hit Europe at a time when its resilience, response capacity and preparedness to manage yet another crisis had already been severely weakened. In this context, migrants became used as convenient scapegoats for all things wrong, as yet another burden to be endured and paid for. The brief discussion presented herein aims to advocate for a need to rethink the EU-African relations and particularly the role migration plays in this entire conundrum. While there is an evident need to move beyond migration as the dominant factor determining the relations and work towards more multisectoral collaboration on an equal footing in order for the potential to be tapped in a mutually beneficial manner, there is no denying that migration remains a matter of great concern which cannot be ignored. Work, however, remains to be done in reframing migration for its potential to be seen and changing the attitudes in order for these to be capitalised on. Mere policies aside, the EU—claiming to represent a force for good in this world—must broaden its perspective and see, while the promotion of peace and the freedom, security and the well-being of its citizens has been assigned high moral value, this cannot be achieved by isolating itself from the—what are too often portrayed as—problems of others. Our moral obligation towards others stems not only from a mere humanitarian principle but rests also upon the realities of today’s interconnected world; we are no longer simply part of isolated—be they national or more broadly European—communities, but by virtue of our transnational interactions in today’s networked world, developments even in distant areas tend to come with manifold bearings, and as Benhabib (2004) argues, when other people suffer, we are complicit in that suffering. Migration, in any form, does not simply occur, but it needs to be understood as a corollary of much more complex and broad common challenges, ranging from geopolitical instability and demographic developments to the repercussions of climate change and the whole spectrum of socio-economic issues. While it is certainly an advancement that the EU policy rhetoric has moved from retrospective account to addressing the root causes that drive people to leave home, the actual underlying European narrative on Africa has changed little. The root causes are more complex than poverty, conflict and crises, weak institutions and corrupt leaders, and research has shown that the conditions and events which may spur migration in one context may have no effect in another (Fratzke and Salant 2018: 4). It is seldom mentioned that the root causes also include

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the dark history of the forced migration of million enslaved Africans, the profound impact of decades of colonial rule over the African interior which led to the current border demarcations, as well as inequalities and unequal distribution of resources. That is, Europe is not external to the reasons why people flee their homes—and this realisation needs to be kept in mind when the future relations are being contemplated.

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CHAPTER 6

Intercontinental Citizenship: Europe-based Congolese Migrants and Their Influence on Homeland Governance During 2011 DRC Electoral Crisis Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka

Introduction The formation of public and representative social and civic organizations by migrants beyond the nation-state and continental boundaries has received surprisingly little critical attention from political elites, policy makers and scholars. Desktop review reveals that technological revolution has triggered transnational social relations, subsequently linked migrants to their respective homeland. Spatial expansion of social networks from below facilitates the reproduction of migration, business practices, cultural beliefs and political agency. In the case of Europe-based Congolese migrants, first, the established democratic principles in receiving European countries have triggered political participation of Congolese migrants to

L. M. Tshimpaka (*) Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_6

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exercise their citizenship in various forms beyond their African continent. Second, given the colonial umbilical tie to European former colonial metropolitans, Europe is deemed by Congolese elites to be an epicentre of decision-making for Congolese foreign policy. Through an extensive literature review, this study looks at intercontinental citizenship which resonates with migrants who want to extend human rights as part of democratic principles of political and social equality beyond nation-state boundaries (Fox 2005). In order to investigate the influence of the intercontinental citizenship of the Europe-based Congolese, this chapter links key concepts namely citizenship and democratic citizenship through the notion of political transnationalism as a core theoretical frame of the study, briefly describes the methods around how the study was conducted, shows a link to the intercontinental citizenship exercised by Europe-based Congolese migrants, elaborates on a key array of transnational political activities undertaken by Europe-based Congolese migrants and lastly attempts to draw out implications of this investigation for more effective intercontinental citizenship and democratic governance in the migrants’ countries of origin.

Intercontinental Citizenship and Democratic Governance: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations Figure 6.1 below highlights the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study which is formulated through a linkage between two concepts, intercontinental citizenship and democratic governance. These two concepts together show how the promotion of political participation of ordinary citizens, as one of the principles of democracy, either within or beyond nation-state boundaries, occurs. Box A1 denotes the sending site characterised by democratic deficit G1 as a context of exit of migrants towards the receiving site in Box A2 under a democratic governance G2 as context of integration. The shrinking of civic spaces in sending site pushes out citizens from their homeland A1 in search for new terrains of participation in receiving site A2 beyond the continent which became at the later stage a new avenue of political mobilisation to influence regime change in the country of origin through diverse transnational social fields, like intercontinental citizenship.

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A1. SENDING SITE Context of Exit. G1. Democratic deficit

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX (Shrinking civic space) -Passive participation

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A2. RECEIVING SITE F1. Influence?

Context of Integration. G2. Demo. governance

Transnational political activities

-Active participation (Open civic space)

F1. Influence

B1. Ordinary citizens (Local citizenship)

Migration

B2. Migrants (Intercontinental citizenship)

Political Transnationalism

Fig. 6.1  Conceptual and theoretical framework. (Source: Author, adapted from Lima (2010), Morlino and Carli (2014) and Diamond and Morlino (2005))

In this regard, political transnationalism constitutes a suitable theoretical framework in order to understand the influence of intercontinental political activities of migrants exerted on the ruling regimes of their country of origin.

Intercontinental Citizenship In this contemporary era, the notion of citizenship is no longer confined to one interpretation which often reduces it to a simple status of membership in a particular geographic and self-governing political community (Bauböck 2006). This implies that, citizenship was usually defined as a form of membership status in a political and geographic community. Conversely, literature demonstrates how the concept of citizenship has become multifaceted with a variegated character as being at once modern, diasporic, aboriginal, sexual, cosmopolitan, ecological, cultural and radical (Heater 2013; Isin et al. 1999; Kivisto and Faist 2007). To some scholars, citizenship entails legal status and belonging, whereas to others it is equated to the right to participate in the political decision-making processes and willingness to become involved in public life (Bauböck 2003; Kivisto and Faist 2007; Lima 2010). For example, Johnston (2008)

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regards citizenship as collective responsibilities to a social and ecological commons. Given its focus on transnational political practices of migrants, this study conceptualises citizenship as not only legal status and belonging but merely social and political engagement of ordinary citizens in public affairs. There are different dimensions in the conceptualisation of citizenship. Bloemraad (2000) distinguishes four dimensions of citizenship that cut across each other, reinforcing or undermining its boundaries and content. These include, (i) legal status, (ii) rights, (iii) political and other forms of participation in society and (iv) a sense of belonging (Bloemraad et  al. 2008; Bosniak 2000). As for Bauböck (2006: 16), he clusters these dimensions of citizenship in three: “(i) as political and legal status; (ii) legal rights and duties attached to this status, and; (iii) individual practices, dispositions and identities attributed to, or expected from those who hold the status”. Thus, this study utilises the third dimension of citizenship emphasised by Bloemraad (2000) and Bauböck (2006) which conceptualises it as political participation in a form of individual practices, dispositions and identities attributed to those who hold the status of citizenship. The above third dimension resonates with the objectives of the study which emphasise the transnational political activities undertaken by individual migrants and Europe-based Congolese. The latter are identified as such based on their legal status and/or belonging to both their sending and receiving sites, in this case the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and European territory. Revolution of information technology, nowadays, has been proved to be a pivotal driver of infinite communication between immigrants and their home society. The modern internet galaxy has triggered expansion of migrants’ activities beyond state borders. This implies, citizenship can not only be exercised within nation-border but beyond by transnational communities or collective identities (Besserer 2004; Fox 2005). It is an era of internet political participation (Polat 2005; Vissers and Stolle 2013). On that note, there is need to rethink the relevance of a single nation-state notion of citizenship. The transnational citizenship can be exercised by different actors including transnational civil society, migrants and diaspora. In this regard, the study is merely focused on Europe-based Congolese migrants as transnational migrants. Borrowing from Smith’s reading, the study also emphasises merit of independence and the duties of migrants to actively participate in the community more than simply engagement in political life (Smith 2001). Against this backdrop, the

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study conceptualises intercontinental citizenship as political participation exercised by migrants and refugees beyond nation-state located in different continents with impact on their respective homeland through various social fields that they create (Bauböck 2003; Lima 2010). From time to time, intercontinental citizenship is often equated to transnational citizenship (Fitzgerald 2004). The latter is defined as “participation in more than one national political community through three distinct paths, namely parallel, simultaneous and integrated”(Fox 2005: 188). Citizenship exercised by migrants beyond nation-state borders engenders transnational citizenship which is viewed in this study as intercontinental citizenship. Although intercontinental and transnational can be used interchangeably, this study prefers to stick to intercontinental citizenship. The latter finds explanation in political transnationalism theory (Bauböck 2003; Bauböck and Faist 2010) in order to show how political activities of migrants are undertaken between two interlinked continents, Africa and Europe, under study. This implies, the study explicitly views intercontinental citizenship as trans-continent participatory political practices undertaken by migrants which consequently have political implications on the nature of their respective homeland governance (Bloemraad et  al. 2008). It is a cohort of cross-border activities undertaken by migrants mobilised within self-created spaces in receiving countries in order to either help or prompt political transformation in their respective homeland political regime (Dobson and McGlynn 2013; Pitkänen et al. 2012). Kivisto and Faist (2007) underline that there are number of factors that shape citizenship; these include changes in the nation-state itself, shift from welfare capitalism to neoliberalism, changes in the citizenry itself as a result of the individualistic tendencies of modern societies and effects of globalisation. Without overlooking other factors, histogenic accounts of different countries reveal several push and pull factors of migrants based on political grounds. Among them, there is a quest for a democratic governance, as an alternative to state-centred governance or authoritarian regime, promoting responsive institutions and inclusive participation of ordinary citizens in political decision-making processes that affect their lives on a daily basis.

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Democratic Governance Emanated from Greek kybernan meaning to pilot, steer or direct, the concept of governance remains contested with different actors exerting different types and levels of influence (Schneider and Hyner 2006). To some, governance indicates the complexity of decision-making processes in contemporary political, social and economic affairs. Whilst to others, the idea of governance assumes a fragmentation and diffusion of power as no single government nowadays can simply govern alone due to economic, social and cultural dynamics (Bartolini 2011; GovInn 2019). More than that, governance is conceptualised as a structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy (Bartolini 2011; Börzel 2010; Jessop 2011; Kjaær 2004; Pierre and Peters 2000; Risse 2012). Levi-Faur (2012) corroborates the above in the following: As a structure, governance indicates “the architecture of formal and informal institutions; as a process it means “the dynamics and steering functions involved in lengthy neverending processes of policy-making”; as a mechanism governance entails “institutional procedures of decision-making, of compliance and of control”; lastly, as a strategy it signifies the actors’ efforts to govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and preferences. (Levi-Faur 2012: 8–9)

This study navigates between the above four conceptions of governance as they help to capture the complexities of political dynamics around the management of state affairs in the DRC which by ricochet triggered citizenship of Congolese migrants based in Europe. In this context, governance is conceptualised as the economic, political and administrative exercise to run affairs of a country on a daily basis. Governance encompasses the institutions, mechanisms and processes through which ordinary citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (Mo Ibrahim 2016). In this perspective, governance turns out to be a general concept that is core to political, economic, spatial and social order research broadly (Héritier and Rhodes 2011; Levi-Faur 2012). The author agrees that governance is not about simply goals achievement but processes. It is the system of principles and related rules of implementation a society is using to manage itself. A governance system is made up of institutions, processes and social conventions that together determine how power is exercised, how important

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decisions affecting society are made and the place accorded to various interests in such decisions. The World Bank (1992) and Corkery et  al. (1995) respectively perceive governance as a manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for transformation. It is equated to “practices of governing” (Bevir 2011:1) and the “exercise of authority, public” (Heinrich 2011:256). For Streeten (2007), governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. This implies, governance involves interaction of different institutions such as state, market and civil society in the management of affairs that cover all spheres of society in a manner that promotes human rights. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, together with informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests (Streeten 2007). Against this backdrop, governance can be either citizen-centred or state-centred (Levi-Faur 2012). On the one hand, governance can be state-centred whereby the state is considered to be the most important and core actor in politics and policy. This implies, the state is the undisputed locus of power and control. Thus, governance is perceived as “processes in which the state plays a leading role, making priorities and defining objectives” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 12). More than that, neorealists believe that nation-state should be at the centre of community building to avoid any intensified differences and conflicts that may arise between states, if overlooked (Cini 2003; Söderbaum 2004). This being said, there is a manipulation of citizens through deprivation of their rights to have ownership of established decision-making processes for the benefit of elitist class (Arnstein 1969; Levi-Faur 2012). State-led decisions have sidelined many citizens who are supposed to drive and own political decisions that affect their lives on a daily basis (Gilpin 2004). Consequently, governance is resulting into low quality of implemented political regimes whereby patrimonialism and clientelism are perceived to be salient drivers of state machinery at the expense of ordinary citizens. In most cases, epistemic communities are treated as beneficiaries, and not as active agents and owners of political projects. Meanwhile, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the authority of government should, normatively, be based on the will of the people (Smith 2008). On the other hand, governance is citizen-centred when it is exercised in a way that it allows citizens to be active agents by fully participating in the decision-making processes. It is the hollowing out of the state (Jessop

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2011; Peters 1994; Rhodes 1994) by the fact that the state-centred governance has been criticised to be an embodiment of state hegemony that reinforces a top-down form of governance driven by state-led institutions in decision-making processes. A general thought of an independent state that manages a society in a top-down manner through laws, rules and comprehensive procedures has lost its power and is being substituted by new thoughts that promote a decentring of governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). In doing so, the state becomes a collection of inter-organizational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate (Levi-Faur 2012; Rhodes 1997). Unlike hierarchical or state-centred governance, citizen-centred governance cannot develop without citizens’ direct involvement for their own interests. This implies, active participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes of the nation becomes a fundamental of governance which is centred on citizens. Here, participation is possibly less about choice than voice. It is about developing mechanisms and approaches that encourage voices to be sounded and ensure that those voices will be heard and receive a response in regions-building processes (Cornwall and Coelho 2004; Gaventa 2006). Gaventa and McGee (2013) underscore that genuine citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states and inclusive and cohesive societies, like the community of Europe-­ based Congolese migrants. The concept of participation is related to rights of citizenship and to democratic governance (Dahl 1998; Pateman 1970; Samuel 2002). Through transnational citizenship, migrants have a role to ensure promotion of democratic principles such as transparency, accountability, rule of law and pursuit of public good, in their country of origin. Human rights, accountable public institutions, freedom and democracy, and rule of law become core fundamentals of governance, which subsequently feature a democratic governance (Dahl 1998; Smith 2008). More than that, Corkery et al. (1995) distinguish three more appealing features of governance: notably, the form of country political regime, the process by which the authority is exercised in the management of public good and the capacity of the government to discharge its core functions. The author is interested in two elements among the three stressed by Corkery et  al. (1995). Firstly, the understanding of the DRC political regime is of paramount importance by the fact that it helps the author to describe the type

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of governance implemented in DRC, the country of origin of Congolese migrants in Europe. Secondly, a relapse to authoritarian practices by Congolese elites could constitute one of the key pushing factors of Congolese migrants towards Europe. These also justify the motives guiding the orientation of their political activities in Europe towards their country of origin, the DRC. While some studies on democracy are at the nation-state level, this study looks at migrants’ contribution to democratisation processes of nation-state by using self-organised strategies beyond state and continental borders. The study stresses the importance of understanding democratisation of governance as the construction of citizenship beyond one continent. Democracy constitutes the archetype of a contested concept as its means different things to different people irrespective of how many countries openly claim to be democratic. Generally speaking, nation-states have only become democratic over long periods of time and struggle. Also, even the most advanced democracies have room for improvement in achieving true democratic ideas (Smith 2008). It is one thing to follow the procedures of democracy, but it is another thing to achieve the full impact of democracy on the well-being of people (Doorenspleet 2015). This study is inspired by the minimalist definition of democracy as Dahl (1971) points it out that a regime should be considered democratic if it has at least the following: (i) universal male and female suffrage; (ii) free, competitive, periodic and fair elections; (iii) more than one political party; (iv) different and alternative sources of information (Morlino 1998; Morlino and Carli 2014). This definition fits well in this study on the influence of migrants’ intercontinental citizenship on homeland governance for number of reasons like, election procedurals and the ways they affect citizens’ human rights. For the sake of this study, the minimalist definition helps the author to capture the complexities of a political transitional period when a ruling regime in the DRC may have already embarked on democratisation processes or not through elections in some respects, but continues to remain authoritarian in others in terms of the quality of elections and human rights (Morlino 2011; Morlino and Carli 2014). This implies, the study corroborates Morlino’s definition of democracy as a stable institutional structure that realises the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms (Morlino 2011). Since the 1990s, the African continent embarked into democratisation processes of their overall national system of governance. This adherence,

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by African states, to democratic values and principles was translated into continental and regional instruments ratified by government representatives and Head of States, which pledge to promotion of and commitment to democracy. The 2002 AU Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the revised 2015 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, to name a few, indicate the commitment of African states to democratic governance. For example, Article 4 of the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance stipulates that: AU member states commit to, among other things, promoting adherence to the universal values and principles of democracy; regular free and fair elections to institutionalize the legitimate authority of representative government and democratic change of governments; democratic culture and practice and inculcating political pluralism and tolerance; and the establishment of necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability in the management of public affairs. (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2007, Article 4, p. 4)

The central element of the above Article 4 of the African Charter is the commitment of the African states to acknowledge the consent of people who are governed to be the sole source of legitimacy of the established governments seconded by other principles such as majority rule, basic freedoms and civil liberties, political participation, government accountability and competitive elections that are regular, free and inclusive. However, the above African instruments on democracy have suffered their genuine implementation in most part of African states, like in the DRC during its 2011 general elections. We should bear in mind that, a good democracy is thus first and foremost a broadly legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens (Diamond 1999; Morlino and Carli 2014). However, the established political regime in some African states was reportedly criticised by African general citizenry to not likely yield a stable institutional structure that realises the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms (Morlino and Carli 2014). The above proves that there is a need to link both procedures and effects of democracy rather than viewing democracy as the exclusive domain of the state, with its procedures,

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institutions and political elites, while ignoring people’s views (Alvarez et al. 1996; Doorenspleet 2015). Against this backdrop, this study posits that democratic governance is a variety of procedures through which people attain agreement on and applies regulations, human rights, laws, policies and social structures—in pursuit of justice, welfare and environmental protection. Institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, executive branch, political parties, private sector and a range of civil societies, all carry out these policies and laws. On that note, how societies are organised becomes a mantra of democratic governance in order to ensure equality in terms of opportunities and equity in relation to social and economic justice for all ordinary people (Cheema 2005:1). In other words, democratic governance is a system of government where institutions function according to democratic processes and norms, both internally and in their interaction with other institutions (Doorenspleet 2015). As indicated above, the adopted democratic principles in this study include political pluralism, institutional accountability and responsiveness, an active civil society, human rights, the rule of law and democratic elections (Diamond 2005; Morlino and Carli 2014; OSCE1 2019). This study is more interested in political participation, both formal and informal, of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes that concern their lives on a daily basis. Borrowing from the UNDP’s readings, democratic governance places human rights at the centre of governance practice. The author is interested in inclusive democracy that emphasizes the quality of representation through active participation and voice of all ordinary citizens in democratic life beyond elections and majority rule principles (UNDP2 2009).

Understanding Intercontinental Migrant Citizenship Through the Lens of Political Transnationalism The study uses political transnationalism as a core theoretical frame and lens through which to investigate political participation of the Europe-­ based Congolese migrants beyond nation-state borders that enables them to keep ties with and influence their homeland governance. According to Faist (2010), and Bauböck and Faist (2010), transnationalism has served 1 2

 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP).

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as prominent research lenses through which to view the aftermath of international migration and the shifting of state borders across populations. At the same time, transnationalism is viewed by scholars of migration studies as theoretical framework and analytical tool to understand international migration. It is merely focused on migrants’ networks and activities that involve them in politics oriented towards their country of origin (Bauböck 2003). Transnationalism helps the author to focus on intercontinental citizenship—a set of activities that extend across the continent through which migrants become involved in the domestic politics of their respective home countries. Drawing from Ostergaard’s definition, transnational political practices include “various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country” (Bauböck 2003: 701). Thus, the objective of this section does not entail to delve too much into different interpretations attached to the concept “transnationalism”, as other scholars, like Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton (1994), Portes (2001), Lewellen (2002), Zirh (2005), Faist (2010), Bauböck and Faist (2010), have already done it. Instead, it focuses on transnationalism as a lens enabling the researcher to understand intercontinental citizenship, exercised by Europe-based Congolese migrants,3 which constitutes cross-border activities undertaken by migrants beyond nation-state borders in order to influence or keep tie with their homeland (Basch et al. 1994; Bauböck and Faist 2010). Such links are currently facilitated by innovation of the information technology communication (ITC) (Vertovec 2009). ITC has changed the relationship between people and places by making more accessible and affordable transportation and communication (Lima 2010). In the past, the concept of transnationalism was used to refer to official international bodies, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. Then, since the 1960s, transnationalism has been used to understand every type of interactions and institutions beyond nationally bounded phenomena and international relations (Lewellen 2002; Zirh 2005). There are various interpretations accorded to the 3  Europe-based Congolese migrants entail both intercontinental migrants and refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo who sojourn within European spaces. As for intercontinental migration, it is a movement of people from one continent into another continent regardless of pushing and pulling factors. Europe-based Congolese migrants are a consummate example.

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notion of transnationalism as theoretical framework of the transnational migration studies. Firstly, transnationalism is viewed as a product of world capitalism which allows us to scrutinise the economic dynamics shaping the transnational migration streams and to place the migrants’ responses to these dynamics and their survival strategies, cultural practices and identities within the worldwide historical context of differential power and inequality (Bauböck 2003; Faist 2010). In this regard, the world is currently bound together by a global capitalist system whereby transnational practices are triggered by the economic dislocations in different continents (Bauböck and Faist 2010). Secondly, transnationalism is viewed as cultural flow or social relations beyond borders (Njoya 2009; Perullo 2008). It is equated to cultural transnationalism whereby culture is also on the move together with influx of migrants in receiving countries. This cultural transnationalism can be in the form of music, food, to name a few. The spread of the Congolese Kwassa-kwassa and Ndombolo dances beyond Congolese borders constitutes a consummate example of cultural transnationalism (Dance 2011; Perullo 2008). Thirdly, transnationalism is deemed as a site of political engagement (Bauböck 2003). Migrants discover in receiving countries opportunities of open civic spaces as new avenues of political engagement, compared to their sending countries where involvement in political activity is very limited and restricted to a few. The third approach leads to the last one which considers transnationalism as everyday practices such as political participation (Bauböck and Faist 2010). The two last approaches, which present transnationalism as political participation and site of political engagement, have interested the author. The reasons being that, they resonate with the objectives of this chapter and help to understand the exercise of citizenship by Europe-based Congolese migrants in quest for an installation of constitutional order in their country of origin. Emphasis is put on quality of governance in relation to participation of ordinary citizens in the decision-­making processes in both sending and receiving sites of migrants. European territory is considered to be a suitable enabling environment for exercise of Congolese migrants’ citizenship and daily practices in the form of political participation undertaken by migrants which have influence on their homeland governance system (Bauböck 2003). In addition to various approaches to transnationalism, there are factors that drive it and give impetus to modern-days’ migrants to keep ties with their country of origin.

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Some Determinant Factors of Migrant’s Intercontinental Citizenship To keep ties with their homeland, migrants create social fields while engaging in transnational activities beyond nation-borders with an aim to lobby for either democratic change or development. Lima (2010: 4) views these social fields as “the product of series of interconnected and overlapping economic, political, and socio-cultural activities that reach beyond and cross nation-state borders”. Among these transnational social fields, both formal and self-organised, also referred to as informal, transnational political activities have interested the author as they resonate with the overarching objective of this chapter. They range from a retained membership in homebased political parties to transfer or dissemination of political ideas, norms, writing a blog, political internet, or lobbying local people for political change (Lima 2010). It is paramount to understand that intercontinental citizenship of migrants does not happen in a vacuum. Lima (2010) posits that there are contexts of exit and modes of integration of migrants which can foster or discourage transnational activities. On one side, migrants from countries suffering political turmoil tend to form political associations to influence their countries of origin, like the case of Congolese migrants. On the other side, political regime in the receiving setting may determine the fate of migrants’ transnationalism. It can decide the inclusion or exclusion, and citizenship or by allowing or prohibiting various forms of political mobilisation within their borders (Guarnizo et al. 2003). For instance, Congolese migrants based in European territory took advantage of established democratic fundamental integrity principles and values, such as freedom of assembly and speech, to freely exercise their citizenship across nation-state borders. In the same vein, Guarnizo et al. (2003) list some factors as acculturation preferences that can foster transnational activities with ties to homeland. Firstly, grievances by migrants due to discrimination and lack of recognition encountered in receiving countries push them to turn towards their country of origin (Portes 2001). Secondly, embeddedness in social networks in the host country fosters political trust and rises symbolic and material resources which then drive political involvement in the countries of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003). Thirdly, the feeling of belongingness in the receiving country gives confidence to further develop connections in their country of origin (Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Vertovec 2009). Lastly,

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collective identification fosters political and social movement participation, like the case of Congolese living in the European territory (Stürmer and Simon 2004). Additionally, transnationalism depends on transnational political involvement and transnational political behaviour (Al-Ali et  al. 2001; Green et  al. 2014). The former entails transnational motivations that foster the abilities and willingness to engage in, and dedication to, political and socio-economic activities in homeland. As for transnational political behaviour, it consists in the electoral participation by being a member of a political party or financial contributor, and non-electoral participation as a member of civil society or sponsors of any civic associations (Bloch 2008; Faist 2008; Green et al. 2014; Guarnizo et al. 2003). This study is interested in non-electoral participation of Congolese migrants based in Europe. More than that, commitment to transnational activities promotes solidarity and collaboration within migrant communities in receiving countries, and subsequently participation in migrant networks or associations (Green et al. 2014). These above factors are used as baselines for the analysis of the transnational political strategies employed by Europe-based Congolese in order to engage and influence ruling regime in their country of origin. Sometimes, as Bauböck (2003: 708) alludes, “city administrations in the receiving state may become engaged in political campaigns against authoritarian regimes from where their immigrant communities originate”. However, when condoning transnational political activities, which is deemed to be an impediment to national interests from the view of homeland ruling regime, the receiving state might be obliged to act on migrants against its own protective rules in favour of the sending political regime. For example, in 2012, the South African government deported 81 Congolese combatants to Lubumbashi due to their recurring protests undertaken in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town against President Zuma for being the first to congratulate President Kabila despite the tainted 2011 presidential elections (Inaka 2017). There was a similar case in Belgium whereby Congolese migrants were deported back home by Belgian authorities for being hostile to President Joseph Kabila after the controversial 2011 election results. In this vein, the author is aware of the theory of immigrant assimilation which ties the involvement of migrants in homeland political affairs to the length of their stay in the receiving country, which does not fit with the objectives of the study, as championed by Guamizo, Portes and Haller (2003). At the same time, the study borrows some elements of social

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network theory to complement the political transnationalism theory in order to explain the extent to which the Europe-based Congolese migrants undertake transnational political activities to influence their homeland governance through building networks among themselves (Guamizo et al. 2003; Inaka 2017).

Methodological Considerations The study relied on secondary data from published and non-published relevant sources like books, academic journal articles, reports from electoral institutions and observer missions, newspaper articles, audio-visual materials, electronic sources and online scientific materials as well as internet-­based social media such as Twitter, Facebook, Blog and YouTube. Firstly, the author reviewed political transnationalism as a core theoretical framework that enabled the author to grasp the undertaken transnational political activities beyond nation-state borders by Europe-based Congolese migrants with an aim to influence homeland governance to abandon its authoritarian rule. In this study, transnationalism is not a unidirectional approach or centred on destination countries. Secondly, the author conceptualised the study on the participation of migrants in quest for homeland regime change in order to situate it in the current debates on transnationalism and democratic governance. As indicated above, the author borrowed both minimalist approach to democracy and quality of democracy according to Diamond and Morlino (2005), Morlino (2011), and Morlino and Carli’s readings (2014). These scholars emphasise participation, in its formal and informal forms, as one of the eight dimension/qualities of democracy. Data from Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG 2013) and the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2016) were used to show the level of democratic governance in both sending and receiving territories of Congolese migrants. In this vein, the author made use of migration data from the United Nations Migrant Stocks (2015), UNHCR Global Trends (2016) and the Migration Policy Institute (2018) in order to establish a link between the influx of Congolese migrants in European territory and the 2011 post-electoral crisis in the DRC. The study is mainly focused on transnational political activities of Europe-­ based Congolese migrants undertaken from 2011 to 2016 in European territory with an aim to influence homeland governance. During this five-­ year period of the last presidential term, Congo experienced political

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unrest fuelled by the critiqued 2011 elections followed by ruling authoritarian strategies to cling on power beyond constitutional mandate.

The 2011 Elections and Its Discontents in DRC: Homeland Context of Congolese People Exodus To begin with, the former Belgium’s colony, DRC has an estimated population of 80 million which makes it the fourth most populous country in Africa. With its 2.345 million square kilometres, apart from being the second largest African country after Algeria, DRC is as vast as the whole of Western Europe (World Bank 2019). Even so, elections have been a nightmare for the DRC. On 28 November 2011, Congolese people went out in numbers for the second time in history, since their country’s independence from Belgium in 1960, to vote their President and 550 Parliamentarians during the presidential and legislative democratic elections (Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b; Reid 2013; Rigaud in Afrikarabia 2011). The incumbent President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader veteran Etienne Tshisekedi were the two main presidential candidates among the 11 contenders (CENI 2012; Reid 2013). Unfortunately, these claimed democratic elections in the DRC were marred by a plethora of political unrests due to much criticised massive fraud and elections rigging. Subsequently, these presidential and legislative elections in the DRC were widely condemned as illegitimate by ordinary citizens and a whole array of observers (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014; Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b, International Crisis Group 2015; Reid 2013; Shepherd 2014). For example, the Carter Center and the European Union Electoral Missions, through their respective reports and statements, joined the Catholic Cardinal Laurent Monsengo Pasinya to put into question the credibility and legitimacy of the 2011 presidential election results. These elections were criticised by the above electoral observing missions based on a number of factors, notably a whole disorganized electoral process and myriad of violent incidents during the voting process, and also the counting process was criticised to be absolutely not transparent (BBC Africa News November 2011a; Carter Center 2011a, b; International Crisis Group, May 2012; Reid 2013). More electoral observers confirmed that they were not allowed to access the compilation centres controlled by electoral personnel of electoral commission, the CENI.  Opposition

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strongholds, like Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and other major cities, experienced a lot of massive violent incidents due to contestation of majority of population accusing Kabila’s regime of manipulating the vote in favour of the incumbent outgoing President Kabila (Carter Center 2012; International Crisis Group, May 2012). For instance, in Mbuji-Mayi City where 97% of the population reportedly voted for opposition veteran Dr Etienne Tshisekedi. People declared that “we are really disappointed. We voted for Tshisekedi, now we are told it’s Kabila. That’s why we are angry”, lamented a local woman (Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b). According to BBC Africa News December 2011b reporter, Mr Hubert., I quote: The number of polling stations where the results were discarded by the electoral commission because of electoral violence or logistical problems was consistently higher in areas where the opposition vote was high. For example, nearly one in five polling stations in Kinshasa was not included in the election result, compared to less than 1% in Katanga. Two-thirds of Kinshasa voters chose [Dr] Tshisekedi, while 90% of those in Katanga voted for Mr Kabila. [Surprisingly], in Mr Kabila’s home village of Manono, more voters cast their ballots than were registered on the list, resulting in a turnout rate of 100.14%. (Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b)

On 9 December 2011, President Joseph Kabila was declared the winner of elections firstly by the President of CENI, Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, then later confirmed by the then Constitutional Court (CENI 2012; Reid 2013). Out of a total of 18.14 million ballots cast, Joseph Kabila was reportedly announced to have gained a majority with 8,880,944 votes or 48.9% of the votes cast against 32% for veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi (Reid 2013; The Guardian, December 2011). The concomitantly held legislative elections for the 500 members of parliament at the National Assembly were also criticised as deeply flawed. These controversial results announcement sparked violent protests and massive contestation throughout the post-conflict fragile state. The Vice-Premier Minister and Foreign Minister of former colonial power Belgium, Didier Reynders, and the above-mentioned mission observers fuelled the tension by accusing the then Constitutional Court of not having conducted a thorough examination on the poll results before confirming Mr Joseph Kabila as a winner with 48.9% of the votes (Trefon in BBC Africa News, December 2011c). The myriad of statements questioning the credibility of election results from different electoral observers’ mission especially from Carter

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Center, the European Commission and Mr Didier Reynders have given hope to Congolese people to seek for asylum in these two respective continents (Carter Center 2011b). Dr Etienne Tshisekedi, immediately disputed the result and subsequently declared himself President, in these words on the French media, RFI: I consider these results a real provocation of the Congolese people. As a consequence, I consider myself, from today, the elected president of the Democratic Republic of Congo. (RFI December 2011; The Guardian December 2011)

Against this backdrop, DRC’s major cities and particularly Kinshasa then braced itself for mass uprisings. But the doomsday scenario did not unfold as Joseph Kabila managed to quell it by deploying police and army in the major cities including in opposition strongholds, like Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa. DRC’s demonstrators did not want to be martyrs like those of the Arab Spring era. Also, the fear of winding up in The Hague at the International Criminal Court (ICC), from both opposition and ruling regime, has deflated the balloon of civil war in major cities of Congo (BBC Africa News 2011c, Trefon in BBC Africa News December 2011d). Astonishingly, apart from the Carter Center, both regional and International observers respectively released their statements asserting that “although the electoral process was marred by irregularities and disorganisation, but the vote should not be annulled” (The Guardian December 2011). To western governments and multinationals, Joseph Kabila represented a sense of continuity despite electoral irregularities, but opponent veteran Dr Tshisekedi was portrayed to be stubborn and unpredictable with regard to western interests in Congo (Trefon in BBC Africa News, December 2011d). Consequently, Dr Tshisekedi was brought under home siege and opposition became suffocated as Tshisekedi’s lieutenants were corrupted by ruling coalition to legitimising Kabila’s by serving in parliament despite their revocation from the party for disobedience (BBC Africa News 2011c, Crisis Group, May 2012). As the stalemate dragged on due to ambiguous position of western governments on 2011 elections, Congolese people continued to pay the price. At least 24 people were documented by the Human Rights Watch to be killed and dozens detained by security forces in 2011 election-related violence so far (HRW December 2011). Radio Okapi, a UN-sponsored station, put the death toll at six for the city of Kinshasa alone (Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b). According to Hubert in BBC Africa News December

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2011b, the UN reported that Congolese security forces were criticised of

carrying out serious human right abuses and the Congolese government was accused of condoning civil war and violent conflicts in the eastern part of Congo. The emergence of M23 rebel military group in April 2012 constituted a consummate example of many proliferated foreign and domestic armed militias taking advantage of the lack of rule of law in the eastern part of Congo following the electoral crisis (Aljazeera November 2013; BBC Africa News 2015; Reid 2013). Following 2011 election results, Congolese elites were criticised of marginalising and oppressing any critical voice which undermines the acquired democratic principles (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014; International Crisis group 2015). Consequently, the opposition figures were fragmented and weakened. This is evidenced by the freedom of speech 2013 index which ranked the DRC 142nd out of 179 countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). At the same time, consolidation of political power became a political mantra of elitist ambition to achieve at any cost. The overall quality of judiciary became marred by deficiencies (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014; Trefon 2013). Congolese people lost hope in the government elites as they witnessed a deterioration of a fragile democracy, under construction, through recurring human rights abuse, extrajudicial executions, civil wars and rapes, internal forced displacement of civilians, shrinking of civic space, social injustice, unresponsive government, to name a few (Hubert in BBC Africa News December 2011b, Trefon 2013). The Ibrahim Index of African Governance from the 2011 to 2013 reports altogether ranked the DRC the 47th out of 52 African countries with an average of 34.1% of overall governance scored and 32.6% of deteriorated participation and human rights (IIAG 2013). Additionally, the Democracy Index (EIU 2016) reveals that between 2011 and 2016 DRC was still under an authoritarian regime with a score below 2 on a scale of 10. We should bear in mind that the Economic Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index measures the state of democracy by rating electoral processes and pluralism, the state of civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation and political culture in more than 160 countries worldwide (Willige 2017). It shows that the 2011 elections did not allow political transformation and governance reform in a fragile country recovering from recurring civil wars in the 1990s. In contrast, it was an era of political survival strategies whereby politics of identity prevailed over ideas.

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These discrepancies in governance performance were qualified to be syndromes of an autocratic regime or authoritarian presidential political regime in the aftermath of 2006 and 2011 elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014; International Crisis Group 2015). After the controversial elections, it was evident that the ruling party, the People Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), was reinforcing its grip on most of the public institutions by appointing the Premier Minister within the ruling party, the PPRD, despite the presence of party’s allies like it was a case during the 2006 elections (International Crisis Group, May 2012). The majority of citizens including civil society organisations were reportedly disempowered by the ruling regime which cracked down any form of civic action and engagement in the decision-making processes (Trefon to BBC Africa News December 2011d). The post-2011 elections era was criticised by many for inaugurating an era of illegitimate and undemocratic institutions in a fragile state. Governance deficit was deemed to pave a way to a political uncertainty creating a protracted social and economic slump. These corroborate with what Lucas (2006) and Adepoju (2004) point out to be the main drivers of migration out of Africa, namely demographic pressure, economic difficulties, ethno-political conflicts and ecological deterioration. The 2011 post-electoral crisis has, consequently, exacerbated the existing migration intentions in desperate Congolese to Europe and USA, whose hope of democratic change faded away due to alleged fraudulent re-­ election of President Joseph Kabila. On that note, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI 2018) reveals that a trend of positive decisions and recognition rates of asylum seekers from the DRC in the EU/EFTA increased from 875 cases in 2011 to 1410 cases in 2012 and 1775 cases in 2013. These figures constitute a tangible evidence of influx of Congolese asylum seekers in Europe in the aftermath of 2011 elections. According to the UN Human Development Index (2015), despite its 80 million hectares of arable land and over 1100 minerals and precious metals, DRC is still ranged 176 out of 187 countries as the poorest countries in the World due to a number of factors including lack of active participation of its population in the decision-making processes (World Bank 2019).

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European Democratic Governance Context: A Political Opportunity Structure for the Europe-­based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship Over recent years, European territory has not been only a destination of citizens of its former colonies, but also transnational public sphere for migrants’ citizenship. However, colonial links are no longer only determinants of destination pattern of African immigration to Europe where other factors such as easy access, language advantage, existing migrant networks, socio-economic opportunities, to name a few, are not to be overlooked (Al-Ali et  al. 2001; Hatton 2005). Thus, apart from USA and Canada, Europe constitutes one of the major destinations of sub-Saharan citizens to migrate (Lucas 2006). For example, in the 1970s, Congo was the main sub-Saharan migrant sending country to Belgium with 5244 the then Zairian migrants (Demart 2013a; Kagné and Martiniello 2001). Following the ICT revolution nowadays, these intercontinental migrants, like the Europe-based Congolese migrants, both residents and newest, have become to somewhat new political actors beyond nation-state borders with an aim to engage their country of origin. Alba and Victor (1997) posit that national context and ideological perspective are drivers of migrant integration within country of destination in which they intend to exercise citizenship thereafter. National context of each respective European country and its democratic ideology have all inaugurated a new public sphere for migrants’ citizenship. In this regard, studies have pointed out that European Union adheres to human rights and democratic values and principles which are universally promoted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (EU 2012). For instance, apart from the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of the European Union’s 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy shows how committed are all European countries to the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy (Borońska-Hryniewiecka and Monaghan 2017). According to this EU’s Action Plan: the European countries are committed to promote freedom of religion or belief and to fight discrimination in all its forms such as on grounds of race, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation and advocating for the rights of children, persons belonging to minorities, indigenous people, refugees, migrants and persons with disabilities. (EU 2012:1)

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The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) complements the list of democratic frameworks aimed at increasing direct democracy in Europe. Introduced in 2007 by the Lisbon Treaty, the ECI enables direct participation of EU citizens in the decision-making processes of EU policies. It allows one million EU citizens to prompt policy solutions (Borońska-­ Hryniewiecka and Monaghan 2017; García 2013; Monaghan 2012). There is a linkage between citizens and policy makers (Morlino and Carli 2014; Roberts 2010). Although bringing decision-making closer to ordinary citizens, the ECI was criticised to favour only participation of civil society organisations than direct involvement of individual citizens (Monaghan 2012). These corroborate what Smith (2008) contends that even the most advanced democracies have room for improvement in achieving true democratic ideas. There is a general view among scholars of political transnationalism that “democratic states are obliged to grant foreign residents the same civil, political and cultural liberties as are enjoyed by native citizens” (Bauböck 2003: 711). However, these liberties granted to migrants always suffer practical and normative limits in receiving countries for fear of subverting institutions with imported home-land socio-­ political unrest (Bauböck 2003). Democracy Index 2016, by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), confirms that from 2011 to 2016 Europe oscillated between flawed democracy and full democracy with Norway’s score of 8.7 on a scale of 0 to 10 as a global top scorer (EIU 2016). Thus, the study does not intend to unpack other scholars’ critics on the ECI.  Despite these critics, the European countries, through the above instruments of democratisation, enable individuals to live independent lives and to take part as active citizens in all spheres of modern, rapidly changing societies. In addition to the above, the 2016 double reforms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) foster a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy. The reform of CEAS, including other migrant instruments, has made the EU a more competitive and attractive ground for migrants’ settlement. Being discontent due to governance deficit back home in DRC, the Europe-based Congolese migrants took advantage of the institutionalised freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and association, both online and offline, as beacon of democracy in Europe. The latter enables the former to be active citizens in democratic societies beyond their continental borders in order to influence their homeland governance. Europe-based Congolese migrants are not the first to exercise intercontinental citizenship in Europe. For instance, apart from the plethora of African migrant

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associations in Europe, like the Senegalese Mouride organisations among others, there are Franco-Maghrebi associations of Maghrebi migrants, SOS Racisme driven by African students in Paris. The SOS Racisme was founded in the 1980s by the Paris-based North African students in order to fight racism in France (Gibb in Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; Riccio and Uberti 2013). To add, there are Latin Americans exercising their citizenship to influence policies in the United Kingdom within the Latin Front, formed by middle-class Columbian women, and the Latin American Workers Association (LAWA), founded by four Latino trade unionists (Lagnado 2004; Martiniello 2005; Macilwaine 2005; Però in ReedDanahay 2008; Vertovec 2006). However, the above examples emphasise the collective efforts of migrants to improve their conditions in their respective host countries. Little attention was given to transnational political activities of Europe-based migrants with an aim to influence change of ruling regime in their country of origin. The current study distinguishes itself from other through emphasis on the citizenship exercised with an aim to influence homeland ruling regime. These Europe-based Congolese migrants develop different strategies, by engaging in various civic activities, in order to both raise international awareness about the Congolese’s political instability and influence homeland governance through enhancing civic-mindedness for homeland citizenship in the DRC.

Europe-based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship in the Quest for Democratic Governance in the DRC This section investigates political participation of Europe-based Congolese migrants. A particular attention is made on both non-institutional and illegal political participation, including political mobilisation practices among themselves aimed at influencing change in ruling regime of their homeland. Some of these multidirectional political practices were carried out in the context of horizontal pattern of communication and exchange, voluntary hierarchical organisations and sometimes in ad hoc social movements, or on individual basis as freelance opinion manipulator and engaged journalist (Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; Tillie 2004). In order to put pressure on their homeland government in Kinshasa to abandon the relapse to the authoritarian regime, the Europe-based Congolese migrants exercised intercontinental citizenship through

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different kinds of developed strategies in European territories. The latter involves strategies such as the Ingeta Movements, online campaign against the ruling regime, Mutakalization phenomenon, public protest and demonstrations in Europe followed by prohibition of Congolese artists from performing in Europe. As indicated above, this intercontinental citizenship was prompted by the aftermath of tainted 2011 general elections, among other political crises, in the DRC. Thus, Europe-based Congolese migrants employed the above strategies as counterforce mechanisms to express their discontentment vis-à-vis the ruling regime and influenced citizen participation in Congolese political landscape. Creation of Ingeta Movements A colloquial concept Ingeta derives from the Congolese Kikongo vernacular meaning “resistance”. These Ingeta movements are sort of semi-­ structured social movements which unite men and women who identify themselves as combattant, resistant and Patriote. These entail, fighters, resisters and patriots, respectively. To some observers, it is a fighting spirit or arena of citizenship. But to others, they are cartel of criminals without ideological foundation but mere avenues of evidence justifying their asylum demands in Europe by improvising themselves into enemies of the Congolese state. They are fighting the established political regime in DRC, which they all criticise to be authoritarian and patrimonialist (Afrikarabia 2018; BBC Africa New December 2011; Inaka 2017). Resisters reject all forms of alienation on Congolese people and the DRC at large, perpetrated by what they portray to be usurpation, illegal and illegitimate political power (Mulongo 2018; TV5Monde 2017). As for patriots, they profoundly love their country for which they are ready to die. Combatants are at the forefront of resistance for a free, sovereign, united and undivided Congo (Inaka 2017). They form part of a pressure group formed in the UK in the early 2000s and currently dispersed around the world. The Ingeta movements claim that Congolese have been subjected to a political invasion through an established impostor- and predator-­ruling regime at the service of the multinationals with the sole objective to plunder Congolese natural resources (Mulongo 2018). Subsequently, Congolese people both in diaspora and homeland should oppose and not recognise the established ruling regime that they critic to be illegitimate and illegal. Similarly, people should not buy into opposition parties’ stratagems which are deemed to be goalkeeper-wheel of the

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existing oppressing status quo by legitimising and maintaining the ruling regime (Mulongo 2018). The Ingeta movements include the Front Civil de Resistance Populaire,4 Résistant combattant congolais (RCK),5 APARECO (Alliance of Patriots for the Refoundation of the Congo), Tolingi congo,6 Toponi Congo,7 Bana Congo,8 Bakolo Congo,9 Jeunesse Code, Objectif Congo,10 to name a few. Interestingly, these Ingeta movements work collectively with other similar social movements from other African countries such as Collectif-Congo-Brazza11 and Collectif Sauvons le Congo,12 both from Congo-Brazzaville (TV5Monde 2017). These collective actions of intercontinental citizenship networks were confirmed, in French, by the Collectif Sauvons le Congo’s Coordinator, I quote: Nous sommes un même peuple, nous avons les mêmes problèmes. Nous y arriverons en agissant ensemble et non pas chacun de notre côté. (TV5Monde 2017)13

Given the activism of the patriots, resisters and combatants, these Ingeta movements have considered themselves to be the ultimate hope for political change in the DRC through their exercised intercontinental citizenship. They organise awareness campaign to conscientise both national and international communities on political crisis in DRC. Protests, sit-ins, internet politics, online campaigns and opinion manipulation are part of the most used tools by these Ingeta movements. Among these drivers of Ingeta movements, some have already gained European citizenship while others are still permanent residents or refugees, but continue to have ties with their homeland, DRC.

 Civil Front for Popular Resistance, in French.  Congolese Resister Fighters, in French. 6  We love Congo, in Lingala. 7  We choose Congo, in Lingala. 8  Children of Congo, in Lingala. 9  The Owner of Congo, in Lingala. 10  Congo Objective, in French. 11  Collective-Congo-Brazzaville, in French. 12  Let us save Congo, in French. 13  We are one people and we share common problems. Together we shall win but not in isolation, in French. 4 5

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Online Campaign Against the Homeland Ruling Regime Currently information technology has been one of the determinants of political transformation not only in developed world but also in the developing world. It is the internet politics and world of cyberspaces whereby both elites and ordinary citizens have turned into netizens (Chadwick and Howard 2009; Jordan 1999). Cyberspaces undermine the hierarchies, injustices and inequalities caused by power struggle of offline politics (Jordan 1999). It has been evidenced that the boom of internet and mobile phone revolution have both enabled migrants, especially in the diaspora like Europe, to make powerful demands for development and democracy (Chadwick and Howard 2009; Fanta et al. 2013). For example, the ICT has made possible the Europe-based Congolese migrants through transnational social movements to launch several online anti-­ ruling regime campaigns in various forms. These include the most used social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebooks, WhatsApp and Twitter. Through these online platforms, different tailored videos are sent out to general public or targeted audiences showing how discontent social movements of Europe-based Congolese undertake various advocacy activities or exercised citizenship as part of denouncing malpractices of homeland governance system. These online campaigns constitute one of the key strategies that swiftly spread the message across the world, including homeland, on one click of the mouse. Congolese patriots, resisters and fighters in both European and Congolese territories have become Youtubers using online YouTube TV stations to exercise their online citizenship. These include, les Amis de Wetshi, Tele Tshangu1, Congo-Synthese, Congo-France TV, AparecoTV, Congo Mikili, Bana-Mikili TV, Liloba ya Opposition TV, Code 243, Micro de Pasteur BoBo (MPB) TV, 5 sur 5 TV, among others (Mulongo 2018). These online virtual TV stations may be either mobile or fixed and at the same time indoor or outdoor stations. The “Kabila degage”14 campaign was one of the greatest online campaigns initiated by Europe-based Congolese migrants thereafter adopted by local social movements, like LUCHA15 (Habari RDC 2017; TeleObs 2011). Internet connection comes at the centre of operationalisation of these YouTube TV stations. Shutting down of the internet has become a political stratagem of Congolese elites to quell a widespread of information that  Kabila, leave or clear the presidential way, in French.  Lutte pour le Changement, “struggle for change”.

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can fuel political tensions. A single camera or mobile phone with a microphone is part of useful tools to disseminate all transnational political activities of ingeta movements and other engaged Congolese. Online campaigns against the ruling regime constitute the most significant arena of citizenship exercise for the Europe-based Congolese migrant. Through these YouTube stations, migrant’s political activities with ties to DRC such as demonstrations, protests, sit-ins, workshops, seminars, interviews or political talk-shows are all either shown live or rebroadcasted worldwide. In addition to the YouTube channels, there are online radio stations, blogs and websites as other tools of information sharing between Europe-based Congolese migrants and their local fellow citizens on the ground. Radio stations include, Radio Bendele, Balia Ngando, Eveil Patriotic, Kimpwanza, Bonsomi, Tshiondo, Likembe, Lisolo, Raki, SBN and Réveil-FM International (Mulongo 2018). There are more than 50 websites as online arena of citizenship of Congolese migrants (Kimbalanga 2012). These include the Ingeta.com, Congomikili.com, lecongolais.cd, banamikili.skyrock.com, Debout congolais,16 Kabila doit Partir,17 Congo independant, Congo tribune, Apareco.org, Congo horizon, Le Fouineur de la RDC, to name a few (Kimbalanga 2012). These cyberspaces on Congolese political outlook draw respectively thousands of subscribers and followers from the DRC and Congolese diaspora who are keen to follow the homebased news pertaining to political situation on a daily basis. Europe-based Congolese Youtubers have turned into opinion makers and key figures considered by homeland political elites as threats and western puppets for their regime change and at the same time deemed as igniters of diplomatic tensions between the receiving and sending countries. Mutakalization Phenomenon Mutakalization is a Congolese colloquial concept from Frangala, a mix of French and Lingala languages, meaning a way of brutally stripping naked someone in order to humiliate him or her in the public following social media publicity of his or her nudity (Inaka 2017). Mutakalization is a violent strategy which cannot be tolerated by any society in Europe and beyond. But the Europe-based Congolese migrants legitimise their mutakalization actions by Article 64.1 of the Congolese constitution  Wake up Congolese, in French.  Kabila must go, in French.

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which stipulates that “all Congolese have the duty to oppose any individual or group of individuals who seize power by force or who exercise it in violation of the provisions of this Constitution” (DRC-Constitution 2006:17). Europe-based Congolese migrants frequently use this mutakalization tactic to brutally attack Congolese government elites and their allies visiting Europe on either private or official visits. The ultimate goal of these practices is to influence homeland political regime to be more concerned about the need of ordinary citizens. Mutakalization strategy prompted fear in Congolese government elites and their family members during their short stay in Europe for either official or private reasons. The latter were forced to be alert all the time and hire bodyguards during their stay in Europe. Illustratively, although in private visit on 31 December 2011  in France, Mr Leon Kengo, the then President of the Congolese Senate, was bloodily attacked by a group of Europe-based Congolese migrants. He was reproached by his attackers for collaborating with Joseph Kabila as his alternative opposition to radical opposition (Jeune Afrique 2012). In April 2015, five Europe-based Congolese combatants reportedly stormed the Embassy of Congo in Paris to spray Ketchup sauce tomato on the Ambassador in remembrance of the martyred Congolese people by the homeland ruling regime which they criticised to be authoritarian (TV5Monde 2017). The Jeune Afrique magazine has documented a few of cases of mutakalization attempts by Congolese migrants. These include, the Senator Mr She Okitundu in London, October 2006; Mr Vital Kamerhe in Montreal, the former ally of Kabila and then opposition leader, May 2011; the Army General, Mr Didier Etumba, in Paris, June 2011; the then President of the CENI, Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda in Cap Martin, November 2011. The famous homeland artist musicians such as Mr Koffi Olomide, Mr Werrason, Fally Ipupa, among others, reportedly escaped so many attempts of mutakalization on European soil (Jeune Afrique 2012; Mulongo 2018). Public Protests and Demonstrations on European Soil Europe-based Congolese migrants took advantage of the political opportunity structure in Europe, like the freedom of speech, rights to association and assembly, among others, to denounce persistent authoritarian rules and policies in their homeland, DRC (Bodeux and Demart 2013; Demart 2013b). Inspired by the Arab Spring, Congolese migrants use public protests and demonstrations in the streets of European cities, like

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Geneva, Paris, Brussels, and London, in order to demand for homeland political transformation. In addition, these public protests and demonstrations are aimed at exerting pressure on international community whose actions are perceived by Congolese citizens to conspire with a group of Congolese political elites to plunder natural resources (Garbin and Godin 2013). Frequently, these public demonstrations take place at the European Parliament in Brussels, United Nations Human rights commission and World Trade Organisation in Geneva and International Criminal Court in the Netherlands (Bodeux and Demart 2013; Reuters 2011). Public protests and demonstrations are fuelled by homeland political turmoil occurrence, official visits of Congolese political elites on European soil, to name a few. For instance, political unrests following the tainted results of the 2011 presidential elections (Carter Center 2011a, b; HRW December 2011; Reid 2013), the 19th, 20th and 21st January and 15th September 2015 respectively killing of the peaceful protesters in Kinshasa City (BBC News 2015; HRW 2015; Polet 2016), recurring civil wars in the Eastern part of the DRC, among other causes (HRW December 2011) have all triggered public protests and demonstrations of Europe-based Congolese migrants in Brussels, Geneva and Paris. Europe-based Congolese migrants took to the streets of Paris and Brussels respectively for peaceful demonstrations against the recurring mass killing of innocent civilians in Beni (Afrikarabia 2016; Bodeux and Demart 2013). For example, on 8 December 2011, a group of 100 Congolese students arranged to meet before the European Parliament in Brussels to submit a memorandum asking Europe to play an active role in the DRC (Demart 2013b). Next day, on Friday night, 9 December 2011 in Brussels, Belgian police made arrest of 200 Congolese migrants after violent demonstrations against the court ruling on the re-­election of the incumbent President Joseph Kabila in DRC.  Europe-based Congolese migrants overturned rubbish bins, threw Molotov cocktails at police cars, smashed shop windows and bus shelters following the tension with the Brussels police (Reuters 2011). The demonstrators called on President Joseph Kabila to step down at the end of his constitutional second term. They carried placards labelled: “Kabila must go”, “Kabila stepdown” and “Don’t touch the constitution” (Bensimon 2015; Bodeux and Demart 2013; Mulongo 2018). These Congolese migrants’ demonstrations had double motives such as awareness campaign for European Union to put more pressure on homeland political regime and at the same time, to show solidarity to their fellow local Congolese back home and to trigger their awakening. More often,

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Europe-based Congolese migrants remain vigilant and mobilised for protests or peaceful demonstrations in case of any official visits of Congolese dignitaries in the European countries. Prohibition of Homeland Artists from Performing in Europe The war on Congolese homebased artists in Europe started when most of them were hired by the Congolese ruling party to campaign for incumbent President Joseph Kabila during 2006 and 2011 elections (Radio Okapi 2012). Given the persuasion ability of the music, Congolese artists were reproached for misusing their singing talents by advancing the political ideology of the authoritarian regime and manipulating local citizens (Ansari 2018; Teitelbaum 2017). Literature demonstrates how music encapsulates and promotes political attitudes and positions (Bleiker 2005a, b; Manuel 2017). These Congolese homebased artists used to perform in major European cities such as Paris, Brussels, Dublin and London. Due to their campaign deal with the ruling regime, artists such as Werrason, J-B Mpiana, Fally Ipupa, Koffi Olomidé, Felix Wazekwa, and Ferre Gola have respectively witnessed their concerts interrupted by projectile throwing and fights in Paris and Brussels by Europe-based Congolese migrants (Radio Okapi 2012). In Europe, the victims were accused by Europe-­ based Congolese migrants to be agents of a Congolese elite club working to side-track diaspora from participating in the political landscape through music and dance (Bazzara 2017). In his word, Teddy Minar, Congolese migrant rapper and activist, confirmed: On ne va pas faire la fête pendant que la mère patrie est en train de souffrir. Les artistes se maintiennent dans un silence assourdissant face aux violences.18

This implies to these Congolese migrants that Congolese music was turned into opium of the people than avenue of cultural promotion instead. The strategy has prompted more awareness to ordinary citizens back home in the DRC to consider Congolese diaspora’s political transnationalism contesting any alliances between artists and government elites. But the Congolese music industry has another view on this activists’

18  “We cannot celebrate here while the nation is sick. Artists have shockingly turned a blind eye on violences in Congo” (Bazzara 2017).

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prohibition strategy. For instance, one executive music producer, David Monsoh, regrettably comments in French that, I quote: les combattants se trompent de cible et délégitiment leurs actions militantes. Ils font un amalgame entre politique et musique. Ils sont devenus les ennemis de la musique. Les vrais combattants sont sur le terrain, à lutter politiquement contre le pouvoir19

This situation has negatively impacted the incomes of these Congolese artists who mostly relied on overseas performance. Mr Koffi Olomide complained in French as follows, I quote: Je conçois qu’on soit opposant ou qu’on ne soit pas d’accord avec ce qui se passe dans son pays, mais ce que font nos compatriotes à l’étranger est vraiment pénible. C’est vraiment déplorable, il y a un manque à gagner énorme pour les musiciens. Heureusement que les méninges aidant, on se sort d’affaire autant que faire se peut20

Consequently, most of Congolese artists were forced to perform domestically and some neighbouring African countries. However, these domestic and continental performances were criticised by homeland artists for not yielding more profits compared to European tours.

Assessing the Influence of Europe-based Congolese Migrants’ Citizenship in Demand for Democratic Governance in DRC This section analyses the influence of the citizenship exercised by Europe-­ based Congolese migrants in demand for democratic governance in their homeland. Here, the study shows how Congolese migrants in Europe used different transnational political strategies in order to demand for democratic governance during crisis in DRC.  Transnationalism was 19  The fighters are mistaken for the target and delegitimise their militant actions. They make an amalgam between politics and music. They became the enemies of music. The real fighters are on the ground, to fight politically against power (Bazzara 2017). 20  “I understand that one is opposed or does not agree with what is happening in his country, but what our compatriots do abroad is really painful. It is really deplorable, there is a huge loss for the musicians. Fortunately, the meninges help, we get out of the situation as much as possible” (Kam 2013).

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needed as a theoretical study frame in order to understand how the citizenship of the Europe-based Congolese migrants influence domestic political arena (Bauböck 2003; Lima 2010). Boomerang pattern influence enabled the author to analyse the linkages between and target of transnational political activities to change domestic state behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). To begin with, the 2015 United Nations Trends in International Migrant Stock by destination and origin proves that for two decades elections alone were not able to help the DRC to stop exodus of its citizens to Europe but exacerbated it instead. Figure 6.2 shows how the Congolese migrant trend increases in these more than two decades. For instance, for the last ten years marking the two elections, 2001 and 2011, in the DRC the number of Congolese migrants in Europe increased from 109,823 in 2005 to 161,583 in 2015 despite the two consecutive elections of 2006 and 2011. In symbiosis with the political opportunity structure in Europe, factors such as transnational political involvement, transnational political behaviour, collective identification and sense of belongingness have respectively motivated Europe-based Congolese migrants to exercise their citizenship. It was found that homeland political partisanship and Congolese collective identification constituted transnational motivations that foster Congolese migrants’ abilities and willingness to engage in, and dedication to, political activities with ties to their homeland.

Number of total Congolese migrants in Europe (in Thousand) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

161.583 141.296 109.893 85.886 70.564 55.531

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Fig. 6.2  Number of total DRC migrants in Europe (in thousands). (Source: Author, adapted from the United Nations Trends in International Migrant Stock (2015))

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Through boomerang pattern, there are evidences demonstrating an array of transnational political activities of Europe-based Congolese migrants which exert an influence for a relapse to constitutional rule back home in DRC. Boomerang effect of the internet politics has facilitated the influence of these Europe-based Congolese continental citizenship on homeland soil (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). Firstly, the Ingeta movements, protests and demonstrations on European territory have sparked the emergence of local citizenship on the ground. From 2012, DRC has witnessed an emergence of social movements inspired from the Europe-based Ingeta movements, Senegalese Y’en a marre and Burkina Balai citoyen (Boisselet 2017). These include, the Lucha, Filimbi, Objectif 2016, Congolais Debout, among others. Besides internet politics’ influence, there was an interaction between the actors of these local social movements and Europe-based Ingeta movements. For instance, a Lucha activist was invited in Europe by Congolese migrants to talk about political crisis in DRC in conferences and European media like TV5Monde news (TV5Monde 2018). Lucha has a section in Paris in order to mobilise Europe-based Congolese migrants (Boisselet 2017). These Ingeta movements have fostered local activists to defy homeland political intimidation and risk their lives by protesting in closed civic spaces demanding for democratic governance. The relapse to constitutional rule by the Congolese Senate after the three-day protest in January 2015 in Kinshasa and Goma cities and internet shutdown all constitute a consummate example of Europe-based Congolese migrants citizenship’s influence on homeland ruling regime (BBC News 2015; HRW 2015; Polet 2016). Secondly, the online campaign against homeland ruling regime did not only trigger the emergence of new local political netizens but also created a link with existing YouTuber activists on the ground. For example, Tele Tshangu 1, a Europe-based YouTube virtual TV station, has another corresponding local station for sharing and disseminating all topical information on the ground. Tokomi Wapi magazine, one of the local online magazines, played a key role in political awareness campaign during 2011 post-electoral crisis and against delayed 2016 elections. Tokomi Wapi magazine interacts with some Europe-based Congolese migrants’ networks and online media on political situation. Sometimes, it was also invited by the same associations to debate on Congolese political unrest (ADtvRDC 2017a, b). On the ground, protest songs, like “Zongiza ye na Rwanda”,21  Send him back to Rwanda, in Lingala language.

21

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sung during protests by Europe-based Congolese migrants were replicated during local citizenship in DRC. More than that, Kabila degage22 online campaign was adopted by the Lucha in Goma City whereby walls on public area were all painted on this wording to send out a message to the ruling regime (Abega 2017; Bensimon 2015). Lastly, as for Mutakalization phenomenon and prohibition of Congolese artists to perform in Europe, they have prompted fear in Congolese political elites and homeland artists respectively. Politicians became very cautious about circumventing constitutional rule. Homeland artists are no longer singing for politicians. At the same time, Congolese elites blacklisted some Europe-based Congolese migrants who were deemed to be more vocal in these organised attacks. In a nutshell, transnational political activities of Europe-based Congolese migrants have sparked local citizenship and international community awareness which respectively exert more pressure on Congolese elites to relapse to constitutional rules.

Conclusion To sum up, this study dealt with the transnational political practices undertaken by Europe-based Congolese migrants to influence their domestic political arenas. Investigating influence of intercontinental citizenship of Europe-based Congolese migrants helps identify social fields that assist its achievements and intended outcomes to enact participation in homeland politics. Different factors such as transnational political involvement, transnational political behaviour, collective identification and sense of belongingness have motivated Europe-based Congolese migrants to develop transnational social fields. Such social fields include transnational political activities epitomised by the creation of Ingeta movements, online campaigns against the ruling regime, mutakalization of homeland elites and allies visiting Europe, prohibition of homeland artists from performing in Europe, public protests and demonstrations in Europe. The study argued that the relapse to authoritarian rule in country of origin caused migrants to create new arena of political participation in receiving country to influence the restoration of constitutional order in their homeland. Under the impulse of the boomerang pattern of internet politics symbiosed with European political opportunity structure, it was found that Europe-based Congolese migrants’ citizenship sparked local citizens into action and forced the authorities back home to abandon authoritarian tactics.  Ibid ref. note 15.

22

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PART III

Migration Conundrums Down Under: Intra-Africa Relations, Regional Integration and Development

CHAPTER 7

Life in the Fringes: Informality, African Migrants’ Perception of the Border and Attitudes Towards Migrating to Europe Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction From about 2011, well into 2019, news and narratives of international migration continued to be dominated by accounts of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from developing and least developed countries undertaking perilous journeys to Europe. A major route these people use, on which mainstream media reports focus, is the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the CNN (2019) Special International Online Edition on migration carries several reports on would-be migrants from over 20 countries risking lives and journeying through deserts and mountains to the North African coast of Libya. Their intentions are to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. Similarly, Al Jazeera’s (2019) webpage dedicated to Refugee Crisis News carries several reports among which is one that points to over 1000 deaths occurring in the Mediterranean Sea in 2019, marking the

C. C. Nshimbi (*) Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn)/Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Hatfield, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_7

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sixth year in a row such deaths have been recorded in a single year. Originating from countries such as Eritrea, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Senegal in Africa and Syria in the Middle East (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016a, b), the commonest factor cited in reports on the people attempting to cross the Mediterranean is the desire to escape poverty and violence back home and gain a better life in Europe (Flahaux and De Haas 2016; Gebrewold 2007). The Mediterranean Sea has itself been called various things, to reflect not only the magnitude of people attempting to cross it but also, and most of all, the fatalities of those who cannot make it to their destination, Europe. Added to reports by media such as CNN and Al Jazeera are views presented by politicians and other groups on the migration crisis, especially in Europe. These views are diverse. On one side are humanitarians who assist the migrants (Reidy 2019) and therefore defend the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. Others are restrictive, even proposing to curb migration and contain it from the point of origin. The latter tend to be nationalistic, using national security, safety and protection of culture and European civilisation, among others, as reasons to preserve their societies (Miller and Chtouris 2017; Thorleifsson 2017). To this can be added governments and organisations that, by their actions, overtly suggest migration should be stopped. The European Union (EU) has, in this respect, even drawn policy frameworks and directives that make those who would assist undocumented migrants liable to prosecution in its respective member states (Reidy 2019). Besides entering into an agreement with Libya in 2017 to prevent migrants from leaving its coast for Europe, Italy would later, in 2018, also appoint right-wing anti-immigrant Lega Nord party leader, Matteo Salvini, as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister who would ban rescue ships carrying migrants from entering the country’s waters (AFP 2019; Jenkins 2019; The Local 2019). On their part, academicians too provide equally diverse analyses of the phenomenon (Adepoju 2003, 2008a, b; Crush 2013; Masanjala 2006; Truong 2006). Of interest here, however, are analyses that push the argument that Africans are flocking to Europe to escape poverty back home, in search of a better life. In response to that line of argument, European countries and the collective, the EU, deploy policies, processes and programmes that aim to develop the migrants’ origin, in order to curb migration from the source (Pina-Delgado 2013). Other actions relate to and grow out of the failed state narrative, in which it is argued that some migrant-sending

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countries fail to fulfil their primary responsibilities of providing security and services to citizens and thus pose a threat to international security, as they are a source of instability and terrorists, among other things (Boege et al. 2008; Jones 2008). The solution to all this is to curb migration from the source and reinforce the border with such countries. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has thus been deployed, among other agencies, projects, programmes, policy, legal and legislative instruments and strategies, to execute the EU’s response of sealing its external borders against unwanted migrants and asylum seekers. Of particular interest in this regard is the way in which Frontex (ab)uses accepted discourse to carry out its activities to enforce what some may consider draconian border laws (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016a, b). Frontex does this by deploying three discursive strategies including security, technocracy and humanitarianism in its communication and then uses the humanitarian discourse to depict migrants as victims. In so doing, it exploits and transposes the concept humanitarianism from its ordinary use into a different context of and as a means to effect border control (Horsti 2012). Frontex thus simultaneously portrays itself as rescuer of migrants, promoter of basic rights and defender of the citizens of Europe against threats presented by migrants and so, positions itself in discourses that represent the convergence of humanitarianism and security in Europe’s border governance (Perkowski 2018). The bottom line thus drawn is that, the migrants in question represent a threat to EU citizens, and must be warded off the shores of Europe and contained in their spaces of origin. By developing their country or community of origin, for example, it is argued that their chances of attempting the journey to Europe are minimised (de Haas 2005). Some, of course, argue that development or the so-called smart solution of curbing migration by increasing development aid to sending countries will not stop migration (de Haas 2007). And as this chapter demonstrates, notwithstanding the regulations and restriction of migration through border control or management and the promotion of development in sending countries, migrants have this agency, based on inner feelings that are partly influenced by perception, that works to direct their movement. Debunking Cooked-Up Narratives: Argument and Methods This chapter focuses on Africans and argues that assertions that poverty compels them are too simplistic an explanation of their reported unabated

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attempts to enter Europe. The chapter regards informality and borders as better explanatory factors of the (attempted) migration to Europe that authorities and border agencies there seem to be failing to curb. The narratives used in this chapter are drawn from a continental project called Migration Platform on “African Voices from the Ground”, which gathered data through systematic research methods from four countries representing four African regions: Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, Mali in the Sahel region, Senegal in West Africa, and South Africa in Southern Africa.1 The information was gathered from citizens and civil society organizations, besides government officials and professionals that worked on migration issues in selected communities of these countries. The research deployed a qualitative study design with a social constructivist methodological approach. This was used to obtain in-depth information on issues related to migration and borders, and gave the researcher the opportunity to understand the migrants’ feelings and perspectives. It was important to understand emotions, meanings, experiential realities and existential circumstances of the people concerned and who made up the target population. This approach employed semi-structured interviews to collect the data. The chapter also used intra-method (within the qualitative design) triangulation of sources and tools of data collection and analyses. Thus, a semi-structured interview questionnaire, unstructured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted; the latter two being with a select few respondents to solicit a deeper narrative of their experiences of migration. Interview respondents were sampled based on the non-probability sampling theory. Specifically, they were selected through the snowballing technique. This allowed the selection of respondents with whom it would ordinarily be difficult to secure interviews. The data obtained was sufficiently and thematically analysed in order to yield the relevant information that responded to the motivations for undertaking the study. The data collection exercise was conducted from June to September 2017 and the information gathered focused on migration related issues and dynamics. Most respondents ranged from 21 years to 54 years in age and were male. Females made up a small portion of the total sample. The age and gender distribution of respondents in the sample should not be surprising, because economically active and mobile people generally fall in 1   Project details available on the project webpage: http://ipss-addis.org/research/ research_projects/migration_dialogue_platform_based_on_-african_vo.php, Accessed 12 November 2019.

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that range and labour markets involving the kind of people interviewed tend to be gendered (Birchall 2016). Care should, nevertheless, be taken not to overgeneralise these dynamics, as they are contextual, being contingent on micro and macro political, economic, social and cultural processes and developments (Birchall 2016). Relevant to this chapter was the data on motives for migration among members of the sampled communities. Out of the 751 people included in the sample from these countries, this chapter only relies on a few of the 327 who made the category of potential migrants, to derive some ways in which perceptions based on internal feelings such as desire as well as external drivers manifest as forces in the process of migration. Through the narratives, it was possible to explore the respondents’ expressions of desire and gain insight into the multitude of factors that make their migration possible. Upon conducting the data collection in these countries, it however became clear that respondents hailed from the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti), Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, among other countries, too. That respondents from other countries were found in the countries in which data was collected is consistent with observations and arguments in the literature as well as in media reports and pronouncements by politicians and some civil society organizations (CSOs). The sampled countries are not only destination but also transit countries for migrants from neighbouring countries and surrounding regions attempting to migrate to the EU, Australia, New Zealand and North America (Ellis and Segatti 2011). Respondents too, corroborated this observation. A male Zimbabwean migrant interviewed in South Africa, for example, disclosed, I wish to further my studies abroad because I have tried to apply for a bursary at local Universities with no success. I then decided to try a University in Europe and they responded, I am busy processing my papers [documents] now. It will be a great experience since I will be studying and doing part-time jobs, it’s really great. (African Voices from the Ground interview, Johannesburg)

From this response, it can also be derived that the Zimbabwean migrant’s desire to study in South Africa was hampered. However, this did not stop him from redirecting the pursuit of his academic desire. And more importantly, this was livened by prospects of the great experience he would draw from not only studying but also working part-time in Europe.

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In a later section, the chapter engages further and attempts to make sense of interview data to reveal the ways in which perceptions impact on and interact with desire that translates into mobility and the sustenance of that mobility.

Of Gold and All That Glitters: Brief Conceptual and Methodological Takes on Migration and Borders The discussion of migration between Africa and Europe in this chapter is based on a simple model that is founded on two concepts: perceptions and borders besides, of course, the migrant acting upon the two concepts. The first concept, perceptions, relates to the way in which the African migrant views the border that separates their own country from other African countries, and that between Europe and Africa. The second concept, border, relates to the line of separation between two nation-states and also between Africa’s frontier states and Europe. Perceptions come into play thus: The question is first asked, how does the African migrant view the nation-state border and their ultimate destination, Europe? To this, the response is given that, in the first instance, to the African migrant or in their mind, the border as conceptualised in this chapter does not exist. Therefore, the migrants’ movements across Africa’s nation-state borders, as far as they are concerned, should be unrestricted. This is because they do not perceive the border that separates their countries to be real. This view influences the migrant’s understanding of the strength or level of restriction in the European border, or the border between Africa and Europe. And because in their view the border that separates their countries in Africa is non-existent, that view minimises the understanding that Europe’s “Fortress” border is strong. Therefore, as far as the African migrant is concerned, Europe’s border does not constitute a major hurdle. To them, the major challenge would be gathering the resources needed to make the first step towards their final destination unimpeded by the borders between their country and the destination. Yet, even this mobilising of resources may be relatively easy, as it is sometimes a communal venture that includes entire communities raising the resources to send the migrant abroad. In the second instance, a factor which augments the migrant’s motivation to move and, from their view, also minimises the restrictiveness of the border

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is the way in which they perceive life on the other side of the border or frontier—which is life in Europe. Because the desired end on the other side holds a stronger attraction, this contributes to minimising the hurdle or the way in which the border is viewed by the migrant. Therefore, perception comes into play here again, in the sense that the final destination is so strongly attractive and desirable that the factors (i.e., borders) that lie between the current location of the migrant and the desired end are minimised. The second concept in the model deployed in this chapter is the border. The border in international relations or in the literature on borders is understood to be a line of separation between two nation-states, signalling territorial jurisdiction between the states and the authority of either state over specified territory (Benhabib 2005; Goodhart and Lastra 2010; Johnson et  al. 2011; Paasi 2012). But this could be extended further, particularly with regard to the ultimate border that lies between Africa and Europe. And we might classify this as a frontier, being some form of an unexplored area that the migrant would venture to conquer in order to reach their desired perceived end (Brown 2001; Prescott and Triggs 2008). Because of the way in which they understand the African border, its non-existence, the migrant minimises the frontier between Africa and Europe too. This is a perception that is informed by orientation. Whether that frontier is restrictive or not, is not the issue here. The point (as far as concerns the African migrant) is based on bounded rationality and understanding of borders, which is informed by their locality or local understanding, that the frontier is conquerable. The only obstacle again, therefore, would be amassing the necessary resources back home, in order to embark on the journey, to move through and across these imagined spaces or lines of separation, and reach their perceived nirvana, which has a stronger attraction—an attraction strong enough to overcome any obstacle or restrictions that may be represented by the border or anything else that stands between them and their perceived promise in Europe. Images of Europe and migrants who have successfully made it to the continent, too, feed into the migrants’ perceptions. The images are, first, facilitated and enhanced by information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly through social media and platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and YouTube. Migrants have easier access to these media than the mainstream media such as CNN, which are traditionally beamed via television, because they use

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smartphones to access the social media. Further, the use of media generally goes with preference and choice; and the assumption regarding such use is that the migrants opt to use the platforms mentioned to meet their information needs, and not the mainstream media where (negative) images of migration that show drowning and dying migrants are reported. Second, those who have already entered paint a rosy picture of a nirvana Europe. And this too is conveyed through social media. Here, potential migrants back home see that their compatriots who left for Europe are “making it big and living the life” there. They thus aspire to the same life(style). This second assertion is backed up by the fact that, although the debate in migration discourse is inconclusive on the integrative effects of social media on migrants (Diker 2019), studies of Syrians seeking asylum who had obtained refugee status in Europe show that the Syrians used social media as bases on which they decided whether to migrate and the places where they would settle (Dekker et al. 2018). These people accessed information from social media through smartphones before and during the migration process. Importantly, according to Dekker et  al. (2018), the migrants preferred the information they found on social media that originated from people in their social networks, because they found it more trustworthy. And the information told of personal experiences. Through such means, not only does Europe present itself as the “city lights”—that life which is an attraction in some migration literature on/in rural-urban migration (Mazumdar 1987). That literature, however, falls short of the attempt made in this chapter, to go beyond the depiction of the attraction of the city as an explanatory pull factor of migration. Instead, this chapter probes deeper into the inner feelings and emotions of the migrant which are influenced by what they see, as factors that drive them to migrate and sustain that migration. Whether an illusion or not, the “city lights” and life displayed on social media about Europe represents the glittering gold that creates and strengthens the desire and resolve within the prospective migrant to defy all odds, including borders, to attain the dream.

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Of Crossroads and Ancient Paths: Migrants’ Contextual Environmental Background and Influence on Perceptions of Borders and Migration The migrants’ orientation plays a significant role in their perception of nation-state borders and mobility. In general, people intending to migrate cite the lack of finances to pay for the journey as the most, if not only limitation on their migration to Europe (interview responses—Migration Platform on “African Voices from the Ground”). The border is the least obstacle on their intended migration to Europe. It is the least concern on their minds. These attitudes were predominant  among the  responses in the data obtained in the Migration Platform on “African Voices from the Ground” (hereafter, African Voices) project. For the majority of respondents who intended to migrate, the border, which is reflected in whether they had the requisite documents to enter Europe or not, never was uttered or came up in the responses to interview questions, until probed by interviewers. Even then, this was the least concern to them. As far as they were concerned, avenues existed through which they would encounter the border without significant challenges. How could this reality disclosed by majority of interview respondents be explained? Africa’s history provides one among several ways in which to explain this. Without delving much and deep into that history, the pre-colonial constitution of African society seems to have a lasting impact on the way in which Africans perceive borders. Then, the social constructs that separated nations of people were not so much the distinct physical lines in the way that borders are known today in the fashion of Westphalia. That territorial model of nation-states served specific purposes for Europe. In relation to Africa, however, that model has always been alien to the continent’s socio-­ political reality because territory and the markings thereof in the Westphalian state fashion do not authentically define the typical original relations between the peoples of different nations on the continent. The borders then were loose and fluid. Writing about those African borders, Herbst (1989, p. 680) argues that they were in no way real demarcations that separated different categories of people but were fluid and difficult to draw. Citing Allott (1974, p.  117), Herbst (1989, p.  680) goes on to argue that,

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in the precolonial period, ‘the ruler’s territory [was] defined by the limits of what his subjects [were] occupying at any given time. The static definable boundaries so necessary to orderly acquisition by the European powers would thus [have been] absent.’

So, fast forward to the colonial and post-colonial period, the social constructs that are today’s borders actually crossed these pre-colonial communities. Even then, the ability of the borders to disrupt life in such areas was limited, given the strength and resilience of the links/connections of the people in those territorial demarcated areas (Nshimbi 2017). Africans in these spaces are accustomed to crisscrossing them without significant consciousness of the existence of the borders in the minds. Thus, the history or contextual environmental background of Africans influences them and the way in which they perceive and approach borders, migration and their desired final destination—Europe. Both of these factors also influence the African migrants’ orientation and attitudes towards the socioeconomic and political realities of a globalising world. But, of course, the colonial episode and its effects in Africa and on Africans cannot be overlooked. The visible and obvious evidence of this is the creation of states, marked out by the boundaries which the colonisers drew. These states have generally remained the way colonisers left them. In fact, at independence, the first leaders of newly independent African states jointly resolved (in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) to maintain and respect the borders created by colonisers (Herbst 1989). It is these borders that define African statehood today. Despite some disputes over some of these lines between a handful of African countries, those borders are essential for establishing stable states on the continent. In their efforts to achieve this, starting from the time they obtained independence and resolved to maintain the colonial borders, respective African states engaged in state-building projects through which they created national consciousness within the territories defined by those borders. Thus, in spite of the argument and evidence given in this chapter that the border is insignificant in the mind of the African, the Africans do have a sense of nationhood or national identity, place, belonging and citizenship, and so on. This is based on the work of state leaders to rally the different peoples marked into the spaces defined by the lines of demarcation left by the colonisers. The outcomes and consequences of the post-colonial state created by colonially marked boundaries, including projects at the national level by respective African governments to (re)integrate the continent, or

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processes at the micro level, both positive and negative such as xenophobia between people who may essentially share historical backgrounds, are beyond the scope of this chapter. The point to underscore, insofar as concerns the argument of this chapter is that, with the advent of colonialism, borders reconfigured the African continent and its peoples, with long-­ lasting impacts. Simultaneously, the borders somewhat failed to completely erase the links that define(d) sociocultural, economic and political relations between some groups of people who had inhabited the areas that were so demarcated long before colonialism. Migration Is a Colonial Construct Moreover, the African people even in pre-colonial times tended to be relatively permanent (or stable) in terms of abode. Belgian historian and anthropologist, Jan Vansina (1992, p. 26), aptly makes this point in arguing that, “Despite appearances, the notion that Africans were forever on the move is a baseless stereotype.” The only exceptions were groups such as the Masai and Bedouins, who were and continue to be nomadic (Asiwaju 1993; Coast 2002; Hüsken and Klute 2010; Titeca 2009). The economic and sociocultural lives and practices of nomadic African groups such as these remain fluid and defy nation-state borders to date. As for the other African groups, colonial administrations actually turned them into migrants. This happened by virtue of the policies established by those administrations. A case in point is the hut tax. Colonial administrations imposed this on locals as a means of generating revenue for the colonial governments. Not only so, colonisers especially in the late nineteenth century realised that they could only realise profits from their ventures through African labour because the goods they traded in were huge in quantity (e.g., ivory tusks) and difficult to move in rough terrain that had no roads and was too infested with tsetse fly to permit the use of draught animals (Caldwell 1985). The challenge facing the colonisers was that majority of Africans were subsistence farmers at the time who, according to Caldwell (1985), had few needs and considered regular employment with colonisers smacked of slavery. In response, Europeans would not bear seeing large profits slip away and, according to Caldwell (ibid, p.  201), resorted to primitively and brutally forcing Africans to work for them by imposing hut and individual taxes on the Africans. The Africans, therefore, inevitably migrated to locations where the Europeans provided the work.

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So, most of the people that were subjected to and forced to observe such policies were peasants without occupations that would generate the incomes from which to pay those taxes. Inevitably, the African peasants had to migrate for work in the urban and commercial centres established by those administrations as well as in the foreign enterprises that represented colonisers’ interests (back home). Caldwell puts the development and expansion of this system (in later years of colonial rule) to involve long-distance migration rather succinctly. More significantly, from the 1890s West Africa…labour migrations began to move great distances looking for paid employment. At first they were impelled by the need to pay taxes, but later the desire to purchase goods and to go to distant places became stronger. (Caldwell 1985, p. 205)

Caldwell (1985, p. 205) argues that this migration was initially all seasonal. But eventually, it significantly became longer-term, so that about 200,000 Africans migrated to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Nigeria annually from the savanna just before 1930. In all this is seen also a new form of economy (to the indigenous Africans) in which Africans were forced to migrate from their usual habitats, to go join and provide labour in areas that were set up by colonisers. In short, migration was not only a colonial construct but Africans were groomed into being migrants in search of money and, later, a lifestyle previously unknown to them. Numerous studies have indeed also been conducted that examine the so-called dual economy in the context of modernisation theory and the broader discipline of development economics. In the work of Harris and Todaro (1970), for example, the foregoing speaks to people or labour migrating from rural agrarian production forms to urban, formalised forms. This is because, as Harris and Todaro demonstrated, the coexisting industrial urban and traditional rural sectors were characterised by widespread unemployment which saw people engage in labour movement between the sectors. And the point to still underscore, in relation to the argument of the chapter, is that these migratory processes were initiated by and a creation of colonial administrations. Though this theme and details of Harris and Todaro’s study go beyond the scope of this chapter, the theme reveals the formal-informal dichotomy of labour and production. The average African would be considered to be operating in the informal, before they were “forced” to migrate in order to provide labour and also produce in the urban sector or economic spheres created by the

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colonisers. Some studies conducted then, even branded the other economic form, in which the indigenous African operated, backward. Writing in the 1930s and 1960s, for example, Furnival (1939) and Geertz (1963) argued that the informal sector was traditional, backward and insignificant in comparison to the formal economy. They presented the view that economies in developing countries were dual in nature, comprising the informal economy, which was unrelated to and excluded from the formal. The origins of this dualist view of the economy, however, can be attributed to Arthur Lewis (1967). Lewis distinguishes between the industrial sector found in urban centres and the “subsistence” sector in the countryside. The relevant point in Lewis’ model to this chapter is that he proposed that the informal sector provided an unlimited source of labour for the formal sector, implying migration of rural-based workers from rural to urban areas. This points to the suggestion in this chapter that the migration of Africans (for work in urban areas) was the coloniser’s creation. The same can be argued with respect to Harris and Todaro’s argument. Later studies of African informality destigmatised it from the view posited by the likes of Furnival and Geertz, acknowledging that the informal economy and activities had value in that it provided sources of income and livelihoods for people operating in that space (Hart 1973; ILO 1972). Still, the point to make here is that colonialism had a role to play in orienting the African into a life of migration. In a manner of saying, today, in the face of globalisation, the African ventures beyond the borders of their nation-state, in search of the means to “pay the hut tax”. And they will defy the same borders that colonisers constructed to separate territories over which they (the colonisers) claimed control. Borders Are Colonial Constructs Substantial literature exists on the imperial origins of borders in Africa, and the fact that they are colonial constructs. This chapter does not, therefore, rehash and dwell much on that. It only briefly refers to what some of that literature postures and the relationship to the present theme of the way in which Africans perceive borders and migrating to Europe. The point to emphasise is that, the scramble for and demarcation of Africa had political, economic and psychological repercussions. This chapter focuses on the inner feelings, thoughts, beliefs and motivations regarding migration spurred by perceptions that relate to the socio-psychological repercussions of Africa’s partitioning and colonial rule.

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The literature on the partitioning of Africa also alludes to the fact that the demarcation of borders was arbitrary and without any consideration for concerned communities or the African states or kingdoms that existed at the time. In this respect, Asiwaju (1985) argues that although the partitioning had significant implications for Africa’s subsequent history, the whole exercise was a European affair where Africa was neither represented nor its concerns treated as important in relation to the basic political, strategic and economic interests of the European powers engaged in negotiating the partition. This notwithstanding, the way in which Africans on the ground perceived those partitions did not significantly alter. Their lives and social relations continued across the dividing lines as had happened before the lines were drawn. Actually, Asiwaju’s citation of the Alaketu of Ketu (King of Ketu)2 rams the point home regarding the way in which Africans then perceived the borders. Asiwaju (1985, p.9) cites the Alaketu of Ketu’s response to an informal interview regarding the borders British and French colonisers had drawn between Benin and Nigeria, saying, “we regard the boundary as separating the English and the French, not the Yoruba.” The king’s response points to the fluidity across the arbitrarily drawn nation-state borders. Even after the lines were drawn, Africans who straddled them continued to migrate, intermarry and intermingle across those lines (Burke 1964). Africans simply did not observe the territorial distinctions that the lines represented. The relevant point to this chapter from the Ketu king’s response, however, is that not only could and did partitioned Africans move freely across the colonially demarcated borders, but that in the minds of the Africans and as far as they were concerned, the Westphalian state form of borders which Europeans had demarcated were for the Europeans, and not Africans. This perception continues to hold in the minds of most Africans who inhabit borderlands today. And this chapter argues that, that perception influences and extends (beyond views of African borders) to the African migrant’s view of the border between Africa and Europe.

2

 Ketu is the ancient Yoruba city of Dahomey (now Benin).

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Of Perceptions and Attitudes: Orientations Towards Global Socioeconomic and Political Realities Liberalists and proponents of globalisation argue that the globalising world offers abundant opportunities including, increased flow of labour, capital, goods and services, which lead to, among others things, technological change and economic growth that benefit entire national economies. They argue that the poor in regions such as Africa can exploit globalisation as a positive economic and social force to inter alia implement structural reforms, reduce poverty, promote prosperity and increase the formation of skills for development (Bhagwati 2004). Some scholars, of course, express concerns over the effects of globalisation, and recommend approaching it with caution (Rodrik 1997; Stiglitz 2002, 2018). Rodrik (1997), for example, warns that if not properly addressed, tensions between globalisation and social cohesion could trigger adverse mass responses against (international) trade. However, the pros and cons or arguments for or against globalisation are not the primary concern of this chapter. Rather, in relation to Africans migrating to Europe and the way in which they perceive borders, interest is in the fact that liberal economic theory inherently propagates international free movement of people, along with capital, goods and services. This is based on basic liberties which liberalism advocates where every individual is free to, among other things, move, associate, own property and worship, and so on. In this regard, liberalism as promoted in the EU stipulates the removal of obstacles to free movement of factors including capital, people or labour, goods and services. In other words, the EU is, actually, essentially pro-open borders. The liberal reasoning that the cross-­ border movement of goods or trade is welfare enhancing and benefits countries in the global economy equally applies to the movement of labour. Or, the movement of labour to places where it adds value and demand for that labour exists is beneficial to the global political economy. However, Europe in reality generally seems opposed to opening its borders to some migrants from Africa (de Haas 2008; Dünnwald 2011). It prefers to control immigration (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). But irregular African migrants seem to get the basic liberal argument that promotes free movement, and capitalise on it. This is besides their historical orientation and grooming to migrating in search of the economic means to pay the hut tax, discussed in the “Migration is a colonial construct” section of this chapter. Moreover, added to the nirvana image

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of Europe, there seems to be some belief among them that Europeans will do all they can to keep Europe safe, while “they [the Europeans] destroy [countries in] Africa.” This is a view that was expressed by a Nigerian respondent (African Voices), who went on to say that the migrants “understand that Europe will never destroy European countries. So, it’s better to go and live in that Europe to be safe, instead of being here in Africa, which they are destroying.” The respondent’s view was that the EU was engaged in overt and covert activities, in Africa, that amounted to the destruction of African countries and people. As an example, he cited European combat operations in Libya, Mali and the Sahel region. That respondent’s views seem to resonate with some academic literature on the impact of some EU policies on African countries. Although the EU is arguably uniquely altruistic in its approach to Africa (Olsen 2015), it  treats  the continent’s needs as secondary. The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), its hurtful impacts on many African farmers and the suggestion that some of its consequences compel Africans to resort to migrating to Europe is illustrative here. Through CAP, the EU heavily subsidises European farmers, leading to over-production. The excess produce is dumped on African countries, making it difficult for farmers there to live off agriculture, as African markets are distorted, farmers undercut and their productive capacities reduced (Borrell and Hubbard 2000; Jooma 2005; Livingstone 2018; Masip et  al. 2013; Ward 2017). The African farmers are thus pushed out of economic activities that sustain livelihoods, and end up in circumstances that compel them to migrate—to Europe (Nshimbi 2018). Of course, contrary views exist regarding the impacts of CAP on developing countries, such as Flint’s (2008), who argues that CAP leads to high domestic prices in Europe. This, according to him, benefits developing countries that enjoy preferential access to EU markets, as they can export more. Still, Flint’s argument does not seem to influence the perceptions, inner feelings and narratives of majority of respondents in the African Voices project, whose narratives corroborated the argument made in this chapter that migrants’ perceptions influence their inner feelings, provoking in them the desire and motivation to migrate. Respondents in Southern Africa, for instance, indicated that the “economies in most European countries were relatively stable, unlike the situation here in South Africa, where economic instability is high” (African Voices, Durban, South Africa), which made them want to migrate to Europe because of the perceived economic stability as well as “lower rates of unemployment”.

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In general, and within the ambit of existing theories of migration, some respondents disclosed that the factors driving them to migrate included poverty, violence, war and conflict in their countries of origin. Therefore, as one would expect, some respondents cited the poor conditions of their countries and political instability and conflict as factors that forced them to migrate. For example, a respondent from the Horn of Africa said, People are being killed by political leaders and supporters only because they support another party. It is tough, to be in poverty and when you support a party you think will bring change, you are persecuted for that. (Interview, African Voices, Eastern African respondent, Johannesburg)

Similar to responses such as the one above were those provided by some respondents who said they migrated involuntarily. In their case, however, it is because they were escaping crime and violence. Some specifically cited gender violence including the type that is perpetrated against people whose gender orientations were “not culturally acceptable” (African Voices). For example, a migrant was quoted saying, In my country homosexuality is despised by the community and it carries a jail sentence. To avoid this, the migrant had no choice except to migrate to countries which could accommodate and accept his gender orientation. (African Voices, Eastern African respondent in Johannesburg)

Insofar as concerns the argument in this chapter, however, the respondent cited in the response above actually perceived Europe as somewhat representing a kind of society that would tolerate them. A Europe of liberal ideals and one that respected human and individual rights and freedoms. At a deeper level, though, the response given by that informant speaks to the migrant’s longing for acceptance. And they, therefore, saw this desire being fulfilled in the society projected as liberal in ideology and practice. More positively, while the literature and migration theories show that migration brings benefits to sending communities through, for instance, remittance-induced development (Cohen 2005; Dinbabo and Carciotto 2015; Moyo and Nicolau 2016), a deeper consideration of some responses in the African Voices project gave insights beyond the arguments presented in that literature, and spoke directly to the argument

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of this chapter. A lucid example was the response of an interviewee who greatly desired to migrate to Europe said, I would like to go to United Kingdom because I was motivated by one lady from my neighbourhood, who went there and now she is living pretty good. (African Voices, Zimbabwean respondent in Johannesburg)

The migrant in this case had “made it big” in the UK. And most of their “living pretty good” was on display on her page of the social media platform, Facebook, for all people back home to see. But beyond merely communicating to relatives and friends back home that she was well, that communication presented images that interacted with our respondent’s aspirations and desires for a similar life. Thus, the desire to migrate is fed by perception in this era of ICTs and social media, in particular. Potential migrants see the accomplishments of their peers in Europe on social media and, therefore, as Kandel and Massey (2002) argue, initiate aspirations to migrate. The would-be migrant thus responds—within—to the stories and images they see of their peers who migrated. Beyond the argument that people leave Africa because of unemployment and in contrast with perceptions that job opportunities exist in Europe, respondents seemed to attach a qualitative dimension to the issue of job prospects in Europe. Some respondents who had full-time jobs in Africa, for example, believed that they would earn better incomes if they went overseas, to countries they referred to as “greener pastures”. An employed respondent thus stated, I am employed but do you know that someone in Australia who’s doing the same job with me earns three times as I am earning here and work less hours than I do here? What I am earning here is what that person in Australia is paying his maid. (African Voices, Eastern African respondent in Johannesburg)

The perception of quality jobs overseas extended to the acquisition of education too, especially for younger migrants. The interview response in the “Debunking cooked-up narratives” section of this chapter reported on an informant whose desire for education was quashed in South Africa, prompting her to reroute her migration trajectory, from Zimbabwe to South Africa to, now, include Europe. Driven by the desire to pursue higher education overseas in the hope of securing a job and earn a good income, another respondent revealed,

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I can imagine myself coming back home with a qualification obtained from…[overseas] …obviously people will respect me. I will be treated like a genius who knows everything. (African Voice, Durban)

This informant’s response dispels the populist narrative, especially in mainstream  media and among right-wing nationalists, that Africans are flocking to Europe in droves, threatening European national security and its moral, social and cultural fibre (Bennhold et al. 2019; Bremmer 2018; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Rydgren 2008; Trilling 2019; Yılmaz 2012). The informant not only desired quality education, but to return home, in glory, upon attaining that education. He saw quality education in Europe that was not only attainable, but also able to transform his future to the point of gaining respect and praise, when he returned home. The perception of the education acquired in Europe worked in conjunction with a prospective bright future created by that education. This generated a desire, in the informant, to migrate and acquire the education. The desire, fuelled by the perception, provides the impetus for migrating and sustains the migration until the informant achieves his goal. This is, at least partly, also evident in the respondent whose plan to acquire education in South Africa failed. But the desire to obtain education from abroad, coupled with prospects of working in Europe while pursuing that education, redirected the respondent’s sojourn to a different country where they would satisfy that desire. Other migrants wished to gain international exposure in their specific areas of study. This is because they perceived developed countries to be more advanced in and providers of subjects in technological fields and, therefore, suitable destinations for self-improvement and development. Again, perception fuels desire within the individual migrant, which spurs and sustains migration.

Of Irreconcilable Views and Interpretations: Concluding Remarks This chapter sought to demonstrate the importance of perceptions and that the inner feelings which are influenced by perceptions work in individuals in such a way that they influence or drive them to migrate. Specifically, it considered the ways in which informality and borders as perceived by Africans provide meaningful concepts through which to understand the type of migration to Europe that state authorities and border agencies there seem to be failing to curb.

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Africa is generally considered a continent most affected by forced displacement and migration caused by poverty, war and conflict, violence and environmental stress (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). The impression is despite research that emphasises that official migration data on the continent significantly understates the actual international movement of people, because the data is not frequently and consistently collected and is inaccurate (Jerven 2013; Shimeles 2010). But the narrative of mass migration of Africans to Europe is not informed by the mainstream media (e.g., CNN and BBC) alone, as shown in the introduction of this chapter. It is, actually, the basic assumption in migration management regimes for governing migration and borders, which developed countries practice. Migration management regimes assume that migration from developing countries results from forced movement and the rational behaviour of migrants. What informs those management regimes is the assumption of rational choice attributed to migrants in some theories of migration (see, e.g., Richmond 1988). The argument goes that migrants examine alternative destinations before moving, in terms of what benefits each of those destinations offer, and will choose the most optimal from the examined possibilities. That is to say, the migrants’ decision to move, according to the theories of migration that assume rationality, is possibly made after duly considering all relevant information, which is rationally calculated for the migrant to maximise material and symbolic rewards (Richmond 1988). This reasoning eventually leads to, first, adopting “migration management” as an effective approach to dealing with international migration and, second, the kind of narratives projected in mainstream media about migrants from developing countries flooding Europe. Little wonder that in 2015 Europe said it experienced a so-called migration crisis, because over a million refugees and asylum seekers landed on the continent (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016a, b). Without parroting the fact that Uganda, a developing country, hosted about 1.4 million refugees around the same time (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2017), the populist political debates due to the said crisis in countries such as the UK that led to Brexit cannot be overlooked. Europe as a whole was swept into populist and nationalist angst, with calls in far-right circles to tighten borders. At the global stage too, the United Nations (UN) itself held a Summit for Refugees in 2016, and established a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (International Organization for Migration 2019).

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This chapter, however, has attempted to demonstrate that there is more to factors that explain migration than that it is based on rational economic decisions and flight from war, violence and poverty. Migration is complex. Besides attempting to demonstrate the influence of historical orientation and how it shapes the perception of borders and migration among Africans, the chapter has also used migrant narratives to help explore perception. This is because migrants recount their movements from intentions inspired by their perception of migration and its outcomes. This, the chapter has attempted to show, evolves into desire to realise their dreams that generated and sustained the migration. Many influences internal to the individual and some triggered by external drivers, as the “Of perceptions and attitudes” section of this chapter has attempted to show, instigate migration. Based on the evidence from respondent narratives presented in that section, the chapter contributed to the conceptualisation of motives behind migration that goes beyond economic rationality. For, though not explicitly stated alongside the evidence, migration also occurs in the context of social relations (mostly over ICTs) and imaginations informed through those relations, as the narratives provided by interview respondents in this chapter suggest. A careful appreciation of perceptions, and the desire to migrate resulting from those perceptions, shows that they actually factor in initiating migration. And once initiated, they propel and sustain migration towards its conclusion or end. The Zimbabwean migrant denied education in South Africa speaks volumes to this. Thus, stepping aside from or letting go of economic rationality in the explanation of migration promotes a broader approach that factors in and highlights the role that perceptions and desire play in understanding migration, especially from Africa to Europe. On their part, the border between African countries and those that constitute “Fortress Europe” are diminished in the mind of the African mind on account of the migrant’s orientation coupled with the desire borne out of what they see in their destination, which is what they want to get.

References Adepoju, A. 2003. Migration in West Africa. Development 46 (3): 37–41. https:// doi.org/10.1177/10116370030463006. ———. 2008a. Migration and social policy in sub-Saharan Africa. In Social policy and migration in developing countries. Geneva: UNRISD (UN Research Institute for Social Development), IOM, Institute for Futures Studies.

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Coast, E. 2002. Maasai socioeconomic conditions: A cross-border comparison. Human Ecology 30 (1): 79–105. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014567029853. Cohen, J.H. 2005. Remittance outcomes and migration: Theoretical contests, real opportunities. Studies in Comparative International Development 40 (1): 88–112. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02686290. Crush, J. 2013. Linking food security, migration and development. International Migration 51 (5): 61–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12097. de Haas, H. 2005. International migration, remittances and development: Myths and facts. Third World Quarterly 26 (8): 1269–1284. https://doi. org/10.1080/01436590500336757. ———. 2007. Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration. Development and Change 38 (5): 819–841. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00435.x. ———. 2008. The myth of invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. Third World Quarterly 29(7, globalisation and migration: New issues, new politics?): 1305–1322. Dekker, R., G. Engbersen, J. Klaver, and H. Vonk (2018). Smart refugees: How Syrian asylum migrants use social media information in migration decision-­ making. Social Media + Society 4(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2056305118764439. Diker, E. (2019). Social media and migration. Retrieved from http://ps-europe. org/social-media-and-migration/ Dinbabo, M.F., and S. Carciotto. 2015. International migration in sub-Saharan Africa: A call for a global research agenda. African Human Mobility Review 1 (2): 154–177. Dünnwald, S. 2011. On migration and security: Europe managing migration from sub-Saharan Africa. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 22 (2011): 103–128. Ellis, S., and A. Segatti. 2011. The role of skilled labor. In Contemporary migration to South Africa: A regional development issue, ed. A. Segatti and L.B. Landau, 67–79. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /The World Bank. Flahaux, M.-L., and H. De Haas. 2016. African migration: Trends, patterns, drivers. Comparative Migration Studies 4 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/ s40878-015-0015-6. Flint, A. 2008. Trade, poverty and the environment: The EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific Bloc. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Furnivall, J.S. 1939. Netherlands India: A study of plural economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gebrewold, B., ed. 2007. Africa and fortress Europe: Threats and opportunities. Aldershot: Ashgate. Geertz, C. 1963. Peddlers and princes: Social change and economic modernization in two Indonesian towns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Goodhart, C.A.E., and R.M.  Lastra. 2010. Border Problems. Journal of International Economic Law 13 (3): 705–718. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jiel/jgq042. Harris, J.R., and M.P.  Todaro. 1970. Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector analysis. The American Economic Review 60 (1): 126–142. Herbst, J. 1989. The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa. International Organization 43 (4): 673–692. Horsti, K. 2012. Humanitarian discourse legitimating migration control: FRONTEX public communication. In Migrations: Interdisciplinary perspectives, ed. M. Messer, R. Schroeder, and R. Wodak, 297–308. Vienna: Springer. Hüsken, T., and G. Klute. 2010. Emerging forms of power in two African borderlands a theoretical and empirical research outline. Journal of Borderlands Studies 25 (2): 107–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2010.9695765. International Organization for Migration. 2019. The global compact for migration. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration Jenkins, M. 2019. Salvini bans new migrant rescue boat from entering Italian waters. Euro News, August 1. Retrieved from https://www.euronews. com/2019/08/01/salvini-bans-new-migrant-rescue-boat-from-enteringitalian-waters Jerven, M. 2013. Poor numbers: How we are misled by African development statistics and what to do about it. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Johnson, C., R. Jones, A. Paasi, L. Amoore, A. Mountz, M. Salter, and C. Rumford. 2011. Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography 30 (2): 61–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.002. Jones, B.G. 2008. The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the ‘failed state’ ideology. Review of International Political Economy 15 (2): 180–205. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290701869688. Jooma, M.B. 2005. Southern Africa assessment: Food security and HIV/ AIDS. African Security Review 14 (1): 59–66. https://doi.org/10.108 0/10246029.2005.9627336. Kandel, W., and D.S. Massey. 2002. The culture of Mexican migration: A theoretical and empirical analysis. Social Forces 80 (3): 981–1004. https://doi. org/10.1353/sof.2002.0009. Lavenex, S., and R. Kunz. 2008. The migration–development Nexus in EU external relations. Journal of European Integration 30 (3): 439–457. https://doi. org/10.1080/07036330802142152. Lewis, W.A. 1967. Unemployment in developing countries. The World Today 23 (1): 13–22. Livingstone, E. 2018. How EU milk is sinking Africa’s farmers. POLITICO, August 4. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/ eus-milk-scramble-for-africa/

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CHAPTER 8

Migration and the Locality: Community Peacebuilding as a Deterrent to Collective Violence in South Africa Mpangi Kwenge

Introduction According to the World Health Organization (WHO), collective violence may be defined as: “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives” (World report on violence and health 2002:215). In the South African context, outbreaks of collective violence are experienced where governance systems have failed the residents of a particular locality. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) posits that the violent disruption of the dominant symbolic order constitutes a popular or subaltern symbolic order with its own morality, and its own rationales, which explain and sanction the use of violence. Violence is understood as a language, a message, a way of calling out to higher authorities about the state of things

M. Kwenge (*) Freedom House, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_8

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in their town but its violence makes it a warning at the same time. For example, a respondent in Voortrekker recalled: “Then people said, ‘The premier undermines us. He’ll see by the smoke we’re calling him’” (CSVR 2011:27). This comment suggests that collective violence is a means of forcing the powerful to acknowledge the dignity and legitimacy of the powerless and hear their collective demands. As a result, public protest action and, in the more recent years, xenophobia have become synonymous with collective violence. While community protests usually arise as a result of frustration targeted at government for lack of adequate service delivery, more often than not these protests divert from their initial aim and take aim at the unsuspecting foreign nationals resident in  local communities, who are seemingly thriving in these communities despite prevailing economic and social conditions. For example, in September 1998, two Senegalese and a Mozambican man were thrown out of a moving train in Johannesburg by local individuals after attending a rally at which foreign migrants were blamed for the high levels of unemployment, crime and poor service delivery. In September 2008, after a service delivery protest by local residents in Delmas (Mpumalanga province), 41 shops owned and staffed by foreign nationals were attacked and looted resulting in one death and two serious injuries (Misago, Landau and Monson, Towards Tolerance, Law and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals in South Africa 2009). After the much publicized 2008 xenophobic attacks and in the recent years, social cohesion has become an important construct in the South African society (Palmary 2015). In 2012, the South African Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) hosted a social cohesion summit and published a National Strategy on Social Cohesion and Nation-Building. They defined social cohesion “as the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression among individuals and communities” (DAC 2015:32). In terms of this definition, a community or society is cohesive to the extent that the inequalities, exclusions and disparities based on ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age, disability or any other distinctions which engender divisions, distrust and conflict are reduced and/or eliminated in a planned and sustained manner. The strategy aimed to reduce conflict based on ethnicity, nationality and other divisions through the building of networks and partnerships that promote diversity and the spirit of togetherness in each society (DAC 2015). However, the department failed to prescribe how the strategy should be implemented. As a result,

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the concept of social cohesion has gained significant traction at policy level—within the national space, but remains a mirage at local community level. Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world.1 In Southern Africa prior to 2016, the organization carried out several activities to increase judicial independence, develop greater respect for the rule of law and enable civil society to be more effective advocates for human rights. While there was significant progress made to achieve the above, the organization also witnessed an increasing rise in xenophobic violence that led to a much needed shift in project implementation. Violence in South Africa against foreigners forms part of a protracted and perpetual cycle of violence. The structural violence effected by the apartheid state through repression and legislated inequality in the distribution of resources, wealth and opportunity created a climate whereby all forms of social existence— including housing, education, employment, wages and service delivery— were politicized in post-apartheid South Africa. Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon to South Africa; the idea that the country and the country’s resources are being inundated by foreign nationals has been brewing for 25  years. Xenophobic attitudes are widespread and entrenched in South Africa and not the preserve of a small (criminal) minority (Crush 2008). Government and local law enforcement have been complicit in these attacks by either fueling anti-foreigner sentiment or turning a blind eye to incidences of xenophobic violence (Landau, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Landau and Freemantle 2010; Landau et al. 2013; Crush and Ramachandran 2014). However, 2008 was notably the year in which the world was introduced to the extremity of citizen hostility toward foreign nationals. In May 2008 an outbreak of xenophobic violence swept across the country for two weeks and left more than 60 people dead, dozens raped, close to 700 wounded and over 100, 000 people displaced (Landau 2011). Senior government officials described the events as unprecedented, and an unforeseen, strange phenomenon that justified the slow police response. Everyone seemed to be shocked and soon theories of an inexplicable third force emerged. In March 2015 while addressing community members during a moral regeneration event in KwaZulu-Natal, King Goodwill Zwelithini accused the government of failing to protect locals from the so-called influx of foreign nationals. The 1

 https://freedomhouse.org/about-us

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King is recorded as having said “most government leaders do not want to speak out on this matter because they are scared of losing votes. As the king of the Zulu nation, I cannot tolerate a situation where we are being led by leaders with no views whatsoever. We are requesting those who come from outside to please go back to their countries” (Ndou 2015). This speech triggered a new wave of xenophobic violence across KwaZuluNatal province which left scores of people injured and several properties destroyed. In this sense, there is a link between migration and xenophobic violence in South Africa. Migration to South Africa increased after 1994, as a result of the dawn of democracy and this has led to increased debates about the number of foreigners in South Africa. Many foreign migrants come to South Africa either fleeing conflict in their home countries or seeking better economic opportunities. Xenophobic violence in South Africa tends to target more black foreign nationals rather than those from Western/European countries. It could be that this targeted xenophobic profiling is part of the divisive legacy left behind by the apartheid government which deliberately divided people along racial and geographic lines and placed blacks at the lowest end of the economic spectrum. In postapartheid South Africa this previously disadvantaged grouping of people that were once forced to live together are now forced to compete for the scarce resources left at their disposal (Harris 2004). Often when foreign migrants arrive, they do so with little in their possession and tend to settle in high density, predominantly black townships that put them in direct competition with the poor for limited resources and service delivery (Valji 2003). In addition to this, politicians and local media have reinforced a rhetoric of irregular migration that demonizes and criminalizes the foreign migrant and as a result the average South African is unable to differentiate between illegal and legal immigrants (Landau 2005, 2008). It was in response to this increase in xenophobic violence that Freedom House embarked on an 18-month project to mitigate xenophobic violence in 2016. It did so, on the premise that if community actors and conflicting groups could work together on issues of mutual interest, then they would learn how to cooperate and strengthen non-violent community-­ developed and community-led solutions to community problems. This is because the activities that they would engage in would help them increase knowledge, confidence and enable them to find common ground which would in turn reduce their overall prejudice against outsiders and their sense of vulnerability. Some of the central underlying assumptions behind the project were that:

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• Violence and conflict in South Africa over the past five years have been driven by poverty, inequality, poor service delivery and the slow pace of government reform. • Protests over poor service delivery often sparked violent protests that extended into violence against foreigners. • Informal settlements were at the forefront of service delivery protests as residents demanded better housing and basic services. • Well-designed community-based approaches could help communities identify and articulate their true grievances and be less susceptible to scapegoating or incitement by politicians and other outsiders. • Preventing violence in “hotspot” areas where there were significant pockets of migrants living or migrant-owned businesses and have been locations of violence in previous violent events could help stop the spread of violence to other communities. Further solutions, which are not part of these assumptions will be contained in the conclusion section at the end of this chapter. Freedom House identified 16 heterogeneous, culturally diverse “at risk” communities that had a relatively extended history of violence including but not restricted to xenophobia. The project undertook a lengthy process of research to identify drivers of violence and to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and dynamics of xenophobic violence in the 16 communities. We conducted comparative qualitative conflict assessments in each of the 16 communities (Table 8.1 below) and a unique extensive, parallel quantitative Community-Level Social Dynamics (CLSD) survey of 4000 residents living in and adjacent to 10 of the 16 targeted sites. Table 8.1  Selected targeted project sites Gauteng

Eastern Cape

Western Cape

North West

Alexandra

Makana

Khayelitsha

Makause

Motherwell

Joe Slovo/ Dunoon De Doorns

Madibeng Makhado Isipingo and surrounds Musina KwaMashu/ Umlazi

Orange Farm Diepsloot Mamelodi Source: Author (2019)

Masiphumelele

Limpopo

KZN

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The Research Component As representative, quantitative studies of collective violence (xenophobic or otherwise) remain rare in the South African context; the CLSD survey was designed to understand the individual and community-level factors contributing to (a lack of) social cohesion, as well as factors relating to individual participation in protests and forms of collective violence like looting. While the case studies depended mainly on key informant interviews and documentary evidence, the survey aimed to understand the experiences and perceptions of a representative sample of residents. A minimum of 400 surveys were administered in each of the ten sites, based on a protocol which ensured random selection, gender representation and a purposive sample of spaza2 shopkeepers who were seen as a critical group because of the dominance of foreign nationals in these shops. The survey (survey sites are shown in Table 8.2) provided a complex set of variables against which to test various hypotheses on social cohesion such as what causes social cohesion challenges. It situated collective violence in the popular culture of protests in South Africa, correlating protest action with the propensity to loot, and examined the relationship between material conditions and other factors including attitudinal, social participation and institutional trust variables in explaining individual choices to protest and loot. Additionally, in each site, conflict assessment interviews were simultaneously conducted with indigenous local residents, community leaders, government representatives, community-based organizations and foreign nationals. The research process involved data collection through unstructured interviews, with broad themes. In this regard, the study used in-­ depth, open-ended questions that evolved as the research project proceeded. The interviews were relatively unstructured to allow the respondents to express what was important to them in relation to causes and consequences of anti-outsider violence and allowed the research team to explore inconsistencies and surprises that emerged from the research. The population of the study consisted of local South African residents, foreign nationals and officials and representatives of different organizations operating in selected areas. Interviews were requested with a wide range of key informants including local government officials, non-­ governmental organizations (NGOs), community leaders, South African 2

 Local kiosks.

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Table 8.2  Social cohesion survey sites Province

Area

Wards

Phase 1 Gauteng

Diepsloot

Ward 95 Ward 113 (Diepsloot West 1 S3) Southern site Northern site Ward 2, 5, 7, 10 Ward 18: Ikwezi Park Ward 87 Ward 26: Marikana north, west, east (Wonderkop-Madibeng) Ward 33: Nkaneng- Rustenburg Breede Valley Ward 2, 3, 4 Makhado/Makhangele/Waterval B Ward 1,2, 5, 15, 16 Ward 36: Primrose Ward 93: The westernmost corner of Ekhuhuleni Ward 40: City of Tshwane Ward 15: Eastern part Ward 57: Nelson Mandela Bay (western part)

KwaZulu-­ Natal Eastern Cape Western Cape

Durban South

North West

Marikana & Nkaneng

Western Cape

De Doorns

Limpopo

Elim

Gauteng

Makuase

Gauteng

Mamelodi East

Eastern Cape

Motherwell

Grahamstown Khayelitsha

Source: Freedom House/Social Surveys Africa

Police Service (SAPS) and national and local civil society groups involved in leading response teams. Individual interviews were also conducted with affected non-nationals and South African residents in the selected target areas. Focus group discussions (involving existing groups such as youth clubs, burial societies, women clubs, stokvels, etc.) also formed part of the data collection strategy. Key informants were identified and selected in advance. For community-­ based interviews (for both South African citizens and non-nationals still living in communities), snowball and convenience sampling techniques were used. In all instances, participation was entirely voluntary. At each site, 25–40 interviews (including focus group discussions) were conducted. Data was not collected from children under the age of 18. The research identified key issues of concern and obstacles to social cohesion. It further pointed to socio-economic deprivation; the existence of stark inequalities within specific communities where more often than not the visible relative deprivation provoked grievance to the point of

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protests action. The perceived influx of foreign new labor and establishment of informal business spaces by foreign nationals was seen to bring unfair competition for limited local job markets and trading opportunities. These sentiments have permeated to the local grassroots level and ingrained themselves there. However, while perceptions of accelerating in-migration may have heightened tensions and anxieties in some communities, population dynamics do not provide an acceptable explanation for why foreigners are the target of violence in local communities (Misago 2011). Poor service delivery was a cross-cutting precursor for collective violence in each site. Most communities researched lacked the analytical capacity to assess whether service disruptions were as a result of mismanagement of allocated funds (corruption), inept local government structures or basic affordability and resource constraints. Police services clearly impact the propensity for violence in a number of ways. Perceptions of alignment with certain political, economic or even criminal interests undermined the credibility of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Community members pointed to several instances where police were complicit in criminal activity such as turning a blind eye to known migrant drug kingpins: “Ah, we don’t know anymore. The police see them where they buy their drugs. I can go as far as saying that even the police can do nothing about it.”3 This statement by a respondent intimated community sentiment that police are unable to apprehend criminal elements within the community even when they are in plain sight. In cases of collective violence where the community takes the law into their own hands, the police arrive after the violence or attacks have occurred and evacuate or take victims to police stations and places of safety. Evacuation has become the standard procedure for the police in dealing with violent attacks on foreign nationals in the area. One respondent reported that: “the police were called, but they come when it is all over because they have to come to write a statement.” When asked how attacks cease one respondent said: “It stopped because the shops no longer had anything.”4 More often than not, however, it seems that breakdowns in the relationship between police and community occur around simple and long term issues of service efficiency and performance. This obviously links to communities’ propensity to endorse or resist the use of coercive violence by non-state actors (vigilante groups, taxi associations, 3 4

 Interview with local resident, Mamelodi Social Cohesion Profile, 20 April 2016.  Interview with local resident, Mamelodi Social Cohesion Profile, 20 April 2016.

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etc.)—both in protection of and against the community. Low levels of social integration of foreign nationals were also identified (that can be attributed to both foreign and local attitudes where locals exclude foreigners from meaningful community engagement and foreigners exclude themselves by socially distancing themselves from host communities in an attempt to achieve economic and physical self-preservation). The perception that foreigners are the root cause of socio-economic ills such as unemployment, crime and substance abuse was prevalent across all targeted sites. Necosmos (2008) posits that xenophobia must be understood as a result of political ideologies and consciousness—in brief, political subjectivities—which have been allowed to arise in post-apartheid South Africa, as a result of a politics of fear prevalent in both state and society. This politics of fear has at least three major components: a state discourse of xenophobia, a discourse of South African exceptionalism and a conception of citizenship founded exclusively on indigeneity Necosmos (2008). Statements by the press and government officials have reinforced the belief that there is “a massive influx of illegal migrants” flooding the country in search of work and better living conditions, thus posing a threat to the livelihoods and sustenance of local South Africans (Nyamnjoh 2006).

The Intervention To address some of these precursors, Freedom House subsequently adopted a peacebuilding approach that was committed to addressing both the causes and consequences of collective violence by strengthening the capacity of communities to manage conflict in non-violent ways and letting collaborative work for peace yield changes in attitude rather than us focusing on changing attitudes first which in itself promised to be a tall order. All peacebuilding team members were residents of the targeted hotspots and came from existing legitimate community structures. Nearly all interviewed community members recognized Peace Building Teams (PBTs) as a relevant structure, and the fact that they are from the community made them trustworthy. We recruited 15–25 community residents per community from existing community structures to form community peacebuilding teams. In each community we sought to recruit people who were already activists or belonged to community groups advocating for some form of transformative change. This provided key leverage for acceptance and recognition. Community members and youth considered the peacebuilders to be non-political and neutral, which was crucial given the

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lack of trust in local authorities, the police and community leadership in highly politicized hotspots. Once these teams were formed, technical training workshops that taught peacebuilders basic social analysis skills, conflict resolution methodology and community stakeholder mapping that allowed peacebuilders to establish entry points to engaging key community actors and leaders in promoting peaceful conflict mitigation and resolution was conducted. The peacebuilding teams were perceived as agents of change because of their determination to work for the good of the community and their efforts in promoting community capacity to mitigate violence using peaceful means. Through grassroots conflict analysis and mediation training, we began to better understand the complex dynamics in which those living in difficult and often personally violent circumstances were caught up in collective violence against ‘the other’. It became apparent that social ills and social cohesion were two opposite ends of the same spectrum and could not be explicitly separated and would thus have to be dealt with in tandem. The second critical assumption our project made based on existing research was that service delivery, or lack thereof, was a contributing trigger of outbreaks of xenophobic violence. Our selected communities were no exception; during our first round of research, residents pointed to poor service delivery and high levels of unemployment that made it easier/ conducive for individuals and groups to mobilize violent protest that would attract government’s attention. But more often than not government would only listen or respond if a few foreign nationals were harmed. Freedom House in partnership with Afesis-Corplan developed a service delivery toolkit that trained peacebuilders on how to track local government progress on service delivery implementation, as well as responsiveness to needed reforms identified by citizens and civil society. The results were profound and exceeded our expectations. Peacebuilders across the country began documenting issues of service delivery and in sites like Limpopo managed to garner the attention of national government with their documentation of poor sanitation and lack of access to water. We found that these voluntary team members drawn from local communities and their civic organizations themselves required better knowledge, skills and improved attitudes—and that our interventions were necessary at that level in order to trigger change within each of the communities. In the project, hostel residents (that were feared by the outside communities), people that belonged to conflicting political parties in politically tense townships, members of traditional houses and few willing

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foreign nationals that were driven toward peacebuilding in their local settings were worked with. We created a common place where concerned community members could convert issues, grievances and social dynamics into achievable conflict mitigation wins by developing community action plans. The project identified a gap where civil society, government and local leadership structures attempted to reduce violence and deal with the consequences thereafter by rapidly establishing multi stakeholder forums that could quickly rally and assemble the much needed humanitarian responses after violence had occurred. The real challenge lay in spotting the upsurge of anger and identifying the symptoms of the conflict before it occurred. Our preventive approach aimed to inoculate communities well in advance, by building relations with key community stakeholders that would enable a more targeted rapid response. At the end of the project we had well over 400 peacebuilders across the country that could establish the root causes of conflict well in advance and intervene when necessary.

The Alexandra Case Study Alexandra is one of the oldest, most densely populated, and diverse townships in South Africa. Originally established during the apartheid era as large, single-sex hostels/dormitories to house black migrant workers, hostels in Alexandra have become a key source of community grievance and suspected illicit activity. Owing to its close proximity to urban and industrial centers near Johannesburg, Alexandra is home to both South African local tribes and Africa foreign nationals. The hostels are governed by Indunas,5 and largely supportive of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Freedom House located its project around the Madala hostel (one of the largest hostels in Alexandra, infamous for its assumed links to guns, crime and hired hitmen used in local taxi or business disputes) and surrounding settlements. Foreign nationals in Alexandra were generally ill perceived by the majority of local respondents. A Social Cohesion profile of the site pinpointed a number of grievances between locals and foreigners, including perceptions that foreigners steal jobs from local residents as they are willing to work illegally for lower pay; are generally better educated and skilled and are therefore preferred by employers; fail to pay tax and sell 5

 Traditional leaders.

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counterfeit goods; remit most of their profits to their home countries and fail to support the local economy; carry deadly diseases, such as Ebola, that threaten to cause major health crises in the community; and bribe corrupt city officials to get preferential access to publicly funded Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing. Hence, There are some people, especially older folks, who will tell you that since these people came we have lots of illnesses these days. That’s what they  are fighting about, that we have lots of illnesses since they arrived. So diseases are another reason. And I could believe some of it a little bit. Like this thing with Ebola. We are now scared what if it gets here? These people get in easy at the border gate. So you get scared, what if they come with it this side? It’s from Africa close to them there.6

The Alexandra Peacebuilding team began their operational mandate in Alexandra with a door-to-door survey of 100 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses to investigate rumors that only foreign nationals lived in RDP houses at the expense of locals. The team found that the majority of houses were owned by local residents who preferred to rent the properties to unsuspecting foreign nationals who are usually unaware of the laws governing RDP housing occupation and are willing to pay exorbitant rental prices. Rent-seeking has and continues to serve as a driver of violence in Alexandra. As a result, “while there are elements of criminal opportunism or direct material incentives through looting and appropriation of property, the main purpose [of violence] is to eliminate business competition” (Misago et al. 2016: 22). Several residents pointed to incidences where unemployed young men, known for substance abuse were employed by local businessmen to get rid of the competition (often foreign owned shops) by looting or vandalism. This was further exacerbated by the undercurrents of political rivalry closely related to taxi violence dating back to the 1980s with a body count of over 100 deaths. Freedom House research found that taxi associations were for the most part divided along the middle, with one group supporting the African National Congress (ANC) and the other supporting IFP. For many locals, the nature of these political decisions and tensions was also to blame, for creating hostility toward foreign nationals. Many stated that the IFP and 6  Interview with a male South African respondent; Alexandra Social Cohesion Profile, 5 May 2016.

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hostel dwellers were usually behind the violence against foreigners in Alexandra. The Alexandra peacebuilding team engaged with the leadership of the Madala hostel and recruited the Induna and his deputy as members of the peacebuilding team and convinced them to let them host peacebuilding team events in the hostel. This strategy worked well as they were able to shift attention from the scapegoating of foreign nationals to the expansion of their community action plan on housing to raise awareness on the derelict (following decades of neglect), overcrowded hostel buildings. The peacebuilding team campaigned for the refurbishment of the hostel and the provision of better sanitary and service conditions. For the first time people were not afraid to venture into the hostel which was previously considered a no-go area for outsiders and a hot bed for crime, substance abuse and gun violence. The Induna was recognized as a fellow resident of the township in comparison to previous years where he was regarded as the “Godfather” of crime. As a result, the process of opening up the hostel led to a shift in the levels of fear between residents and non-residents of the hostel and created a social space for new cohesion. In addition, the Alexandra peacebuilding team was also able to broker peace between the rival taxi associations. The team not only served as a mediator between the two rival associations but also organized a “peace march,” attended by close to 1000 people, to hand a memorandum to the Gauteng Premier to seek their support in facilitating the peace accord. The Alexandra peacebuilding team observed and signed as witnesses a peace agreement that continues to be displayed at the Alexandra Chamber of Commerce (ACC).

The Mamelodi Case Study Mamelodi Township was established by the apartheid government planning in 1953 as an urban housing scheme, designed exclusively for occupation by black African residents to provide a cheap labor force for industries in Pretoria and the wider Gauteng region. Mamelodi is now one of the largest townships in the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. According to the Statistics SA (2011) it is home to 334,577 residents across 110,703 households. The census paints a relatively positive picture of the township, the low matriculation levels notwithstanding. It depicts a home ownership rate of 40.5 percent with 36 percent of the population having access to piped water and 69 percent of the population having access to regular electricity. In addition to this, 75.6 percent of the

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population receives at least one weekly refuse removal from the municipality. Thus according to the census, in terms of service delivery Mamelodi seems to be doing better than other townships with lower indicators such as Alexandra and Diepsloot. However, research conducted by Freedom House and the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) found contradicting information. The majority of Mamelodi residents face significant socio-economic challenges ranging from unemployment, poverty, poor service delivery, violence and crime. Such hardships are a serious obstacle to social cohesion as they heighten tensions and often exacerbate negative perceptions and attitudes toward non-nationals. Interview respondents revealed that they believe most informal settlements are occupied by foreign nationals and local residents widely believed that residents in these settlements had established illegal connections to the local power grid and effectively “steal” electricity, which in turn results in higher electricity prices for local residents who have to subsidize what foreigners are stealing. However, our research found that foreign migrants compose only 2 percent of the total Mamelodi population with the bulk of the population comprising of locals from various South African provinces. The notion that there are a large number of migrants in the township may stem from the diverse national composition of migrants in Mamelodi. The majority of migrants in Mamelodi are from: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, Mamelodi has also been home to waves of repeated communal and xenophobic violence; most notably in 2008, 2014, 2015 and 2017. This violence has tended to be focused against foreign nationals and often concentrated in Mamelodi East, the area targeted under the Freedom House Project. According to the research, community members often engage in these violent protests to express dissatisfaction with the level of service delivery and perceived shortcomings in the leadership of the Ward Councilor and Ward Committee. A main frustration and driver of past violence has been the perception of local residents that government has and continues to fail to deliver an adequate level of basic services. Some residents explained past violent protests as expressions of these frustrations rather than overt expressions of hatred toward foreigners themselves, although local residents did also express strong frustrations toward foreigners as indicated below. Locals generally believed that government had failed to control the influx of illegal migration into South Africa; and that non-nationals were taking away

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jobs from local residents as they were generally better educated and willing to work for lower wages. Locals generally perceived foreign nationals as a threat to their lives and livelihoods. According to local residents, foreign nationals steal jobs and business opportunities by offering cheap labor and low prices for basic commodities; steal local women through marriages of convenience for documentation; contribute to crime; are a burden on scarce basic services; do not pay tax and are responsible for resource outflows of money which undermine the local economy and negatively affect the country/local resource base (Misago 2016a, b). People from outside come with ideas and are educated and when they get here they want to be a qualified thing and have a permanent permit to stay in South Africa. So, I agree that it is them that are getting hired more than us.7

There is also a frustration that non-nationals are generally assumed to only be interested in making money to send back to support their families in their home countries, and made little effort to work toward the betterment of their communities or to facilitate knowledge- or skill-transfers to local South Africans. Interviews with community members and municipal officials also pointed to a low level of community trust in the South African Police Service, who were generally regarded as non-responsive and corrupt. Police officials were repeatedly accused by both locals and foreign nationals of rarely taking steps to prevent violence and being slow and hesitant to respond when violence took place. Interviewees further explained that community members turned to vigilantism as a way of working around the formal justice mechanisms in order to address their issues. Foreign nationals, in particular, were identified as being particularly mistrusting of police. This mistrust in turn led community members to turn to informal structures of authority such as traditional leaders or local residents’ associations. “Such informal structures of authority are also associated with vigilantism. Such leanings may not promote law and order but does help further leaders’ political and economic interests. Community members feel neglected by the government and have little confidence in opposition parties. Not only does this undermine faith in the police and other institutions, but it creates incentives for performative attacks on outsiders” (Misago 2016a, b:29). These perceptions in turn led to a state of limited 7

 Interview with local resident, Mamelodi Social Cohesion Profile, 22 April 2016.

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interaction between nationals and non-nationals as identified in the Community-Level Social Dynamics (CLSD) Survey and Social Cohesion Profiles. Some of the reasons given for limited social interactions included fear, mutual mistrust, language and cultural barriers (Misago 2017:22). Foreigners are often blamed for dealing drugs to youth, whose idleness and drug use are in turn blamed turning to violence and crime. This distrust led to the appointment of informal authority structures such as the local residents’ associations. However, rather than providing security, these informal structures of authority were also associated with vigilantism and soliciting protection fees from foreign nationals. The newly formed associations did not often promote law and order but rather served to advance the economic and political interests of various political actors. Community members felt neglected by the government and in most of the communities profiled, residents believe the government only pays attention when they loot, burn property and in some cases kill immigrants. It was further established that local politics and politicians are also significant mobilizers and drivers of conflict. “Community leaders used violence as a tool to claim or consolidate the power and authority needed to further their political and economic interests” (Misago 2017:22). Ultimately violence was used to further political and economic interests by different actors. In Mamelodi for example, local politics drives violence against outsiders when local political players and other influential groups such as local business owners promote and instigate such violence to claim or consolidate their power; to attract relevant (municipal, provincial or national government) authorities’ attention to otherwise neglected local socio-economic grievances; or get rid of the business competition the presence of foreign nationals represents. In February 2017 the Mamelodi Concerned Residents (MCR) circulated a memo calling for a march against foreigners on 24 February 2017. The memo accused foreigners of taking jobs away from South Africans, and alleged they had no legitimate reasons for being in South Africa. The memo created a series of ripple effects that were felt across the country and led to threats against foreigners in places as far as De Doorns, Motherwell, Isipingo and KwaMashu. In each site our peacebuilding teams intervened through community dialogues and rights awareness campaigns that educated community residents on the rights entitled to migrants under the South African constitution. In Mamelodi we took pre-­ emptive action and held a series of meetings with members of the Mamelodi Concerned Residents (MCR), with the aim to better understand their

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demands and to identify possible measures to mitigate an outbreak of xenophobic attacks against foreigners. At the onset of our engagements, members of the MCR were adamant that they did not wish to meet with international organizations representing the interests of foreigners and were tired of being ignored by government. The MCR indicated that the purpose of their march was to present their grievances to the Department of Home Affairs, Department of Labor and the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality’s Police Department whom they felt had neglected their duties to the residents of Mamelodi West. It became evidently clear that although the memo was directed toward foreigners, the issues of the MCR were directly related to poor service delivery, lack of visible policing and law enforcement in Mamelodi West. We recognized the community was disgruntled and had every right to protest peacefully; our engagements with the group were successful in reformulating the tone of the march as well as getting the leaders of the MCR to publicly denounce violence against foreigners. On 24 February, the day of the march, 60 peacebuilders from Alexandra, Makause, Mamelodi, Marikana and Orange Farm joined the concerned residents of Mamelodi as peace marshals and marched with the group to assist with crowd control and to ensure a peaceful protest march. The march was largely peaceful from Marabastad to the Department of Home Affairs contrary to various media and Civil Society Organization (CSO) reports on the day. This incidence exemplifies the role of peacebuilders and their interventions in each of our targeted sites. Subsequently after the march, members of the MCR were recruited to form an additional peacebuilding team and were provided with the same social analysis and service delivery training we had given to pre-existing peacebuilding teams to ensure a long term effectiveness of the intervention carried out.

Conclusion The project undertaken by Freedom House made the assumption—that improved service delivery would ameliorate the pressures which lead to collective violence. Service delivery is a contested term in and of itself, and service delivery protests—as a descriptor of collective community protest—even more contested. However, it made sense for us to consider what one might call vertical trust—measured either directly or through the lens of perceptions of corruption or integrity. This is the trust which allows the police to do their duty with community support and

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encouragement, or the local government to introduce and implement policies without resistance, to build infrastructure which is protected by citizens rather than vandalized, or to collect fees and taxes. The establishment of peacebuilding teams and training of these teams on alternative ways to advocate for service delivery as opposed to protests created a space during the project, where communities could engage with local authorities on issues of concern. This project revealed that a multi-pronged intervention could indeed reduce incidences of collective violence in hotspot communities, as local communities are willing to welcome non-partisan, multi stakeholder peacebuilding teams willing to use a range of tools to reduce triggers for violence and promote peaceful problem solving. However, establishing a dedicated community peacebuilding team will take a minimum of at least six months and will require a facilitator/coordinator with local knowledge of the community and a footprint within the community. One needs to break down the negative perceptions and attitudes of locals against non-­ nationals and to rid non-nationals of their well-founded fears of integrating in local communities where they settle. In every site there was evidence of limited interactions between non-nationals and locals. Any social interactions that existed were transactional in nature. Once these obstacles are overcome, collective efficacy can be promoted on issues of mutual interest. It also emphasized that the concept of community peacebuilding is not farfetched; however, teams need to be built on what exists in communities, and should aim to be an amalgamation of existing local organizations. However, the peacebuilding role should not be imposed on organizations created for other purposes. It is important to ensure that both locals and foreigners are represented on the peacebuilding teams to lay the foundation for understanding and tolerance in diverse communities.

References Crush, Jonathan. 2008. The perfect storm: The realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project. Crush, J., and S. Ramachandran. 2014. Xenophobic violence in South Africa: Denialism, minimalism and realism. Southern Africa Migration Project and International Migration Research Centre: Cape Town, South Africa. Migration Policies Series No 66. CSVR. 2011. The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa. Johannesburg: CSVR.

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DAC. 2015. National action plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Draft Policy. Johannesburg: Department of Arts and Culture. Harris, B. 2004. Arranging Prejudice: Exploring Hate Crime in post-apartheid South Africa. Race and Citizenship in Transition Series. Krug, Etienne G., Linda L. Dahlberg, and James A. Mercy. 2002. World report on violence and health. Geneva: World Health Organisation. Landau, Loren. 2005. Immigration and the state of exception: Security and sovereignty in east and southern Africa. Millennium Journal of international studies 34: 325–348. ———. 2008. Attacks on foreigners in South Africa: More than just xenophobia. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 30 (2, November). https://www.questia. com/librar y/jour nal/1G1-193140716/attacks-on-for eigners-insouth-africa-more-than-just ———. 2009. Living within and beyond Johannesburg: Exclusion, religion and emerging forms of being. African Studies 68 (2): 197–214. ———. 2010. Discrimination and development? Migration, urbanisation and sustainable livelihoods in South Africa’s forbidden cities. Surviving on the move: Migration, poverty and development in Southern Africa, by J Crush and Frayne, B. 66–79. Cape Town: IDASA and Development Bank of Southern Africa. ———. 2011. In Exorcising the demons within: Xenophobia, violence and statecraft in contemporary South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. ———. 2012. Focus should be on integration. Opinion, Johannesburg: The Star, May 24, 2012: 14. Landau, Loren, A. Segatti, and J.P. Misago. 2013. Planning and participation in cities that move: Identifying obstacles to municipal mobility management. Public Administration and Development 33: 113–124. Landau, Loren, and I. Freemantle. 2010. Tactical cosmopolitanism and idioms of belonging: Insertion and self-exclusion in Johannesburg. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (3): 375–390. Misago, Jean-Pierre. 2011. Disorder in a changing society. In Exorcising the demons within: Xenophobia, violence and statecraft in contemporary South Africa, 89–108. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. ———. 2016a. Alexandra social cohesion profile. Community profile. Johannesburg: Freedom House. ———. 2016b. Mamelodi social cohesion profile. Community profile. Johannesburg: Freedom House. ———. 2017. Social cohesion synthesis report. Johannesburg: Freedom House. Misago, Jean-Pierre, Loren Landau, and Tamlyn Monson. 2009. Towards tolerance, law and dignity: Addressing violence against foreign nationals in South Africa.. Research. Johannesburg: IOM International Organization for Migration.

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Misago, Jean-Pierre, et  al. 2016. Social cohesion community briefs [Mamelodi, Alexandra, Marikana, Diepsloot, Orange farm, Elim, Musina, Makause, KwaMashu, Isipingo]. Johannesburg: Social Cohesion Profiles commissioned by Freedom House. Ndou, Clive. 2015. The citizen. March 23. https://citizen.co.za/news/southafrica/349347/foreigners-must-go-home-king-zwelithini/. Accessed 21 Aug 2019. Necosmos, Michael. 2008. The politics of fear and the fear of politics: Reflections on xenophobic violence in South Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies 43: 586–594. Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2006. Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa. Dakar/London: CODESRIA/Zed Books. Palmary, Ingrid. 2015. Reflections on social cohesion in contemporary South Africa, 62. Published by CSVR. Valji, Nahla. 2003. Creating the nation: The rise of violent xenophobia in the New South Africa. Unpublished Master’s Thesis. York University, Johannesburg. https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/riseofviolent.pdf

CHAPTER 9

African Informal Migrant Traders in Johannesburg: Experiences on the Ground and Implications on Human Mobility in the SADC Inocent Moyo

Introduction African informal migrant traders refer to people who travel across national borders for the purposes of buying and selling a range of commodities, including processed and unprocessed goods (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012; Moyo 2017; SME 2006). They play an important developmental role in terms of, among others, alleviating poverty (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012; Moyo 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi 2017; Nshimbi 2017, 2018). In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, they contribute 30–40% of intra-SADC trade with an estimated value of $17.6 billion (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012). Given their demonstrated role in terms of being a source of livelihood (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012; Moyo 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi 2017; Nshimbi 2017, 2018), among other I. Moyo (*) Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_9

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developmental impacts, that they have on families and communities, the issue of how they are managed or governed not only in their cross-border operations but also within the countries in which they operate becomes an important point of conversation and thus provides a site on which this chapter is located. Focusing specifically on African informal migrant traders in Johannesburg, South Africa, this chapter discusses how these actors are governed and the implications of this on the goal of free human mobility in the SADC and by connection, the African continent. This is important to mention, because the African informal migrant traders who were interviewed in Johannesburg came from nearly all regions in Africa such as the Afar Horn, East, Central, West and Southern Africa. This qualitative study took place between 2011 and 2015 and involved in-depth interview with traders from countries such as Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Hence, the following question can be asked: What do the experiences of the African informal cross-border traders in Johannesburg suggest about the goal of human mobility and regional and continental integration? To respond to this question, the chapter is organised as follows. This introduction is followed by a conceptualisation of the chapter. There is then a discussion of the experiences of the traders in light of the stated goals of regional and continental integration, and finally a conclusion is provided, in which it is asserted that, the goal of human mobility will be difficult to attain, if policies continue to fail to respond to the circumstances of people on the ‘ground’.

Conceptualisation In 1991, the African Union (AU), signed the Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) or Abuja Treaty whose goal is the establishment of a continental economic community by 2028 (Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991). The Abuja Treaty as outlined in Article 4 commits to “the gradual removal among Member states of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment” (Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991:11). The AEC should be built on Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which would provide building blocks. There are eight such RECs, which include: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),

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Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). The Abuja Treaty shows that the establishment of the AEC should take thirty-four years (34) divided into six successive phases, which are, first, strengthening those RECs in existence and in the case of regions in which these do not exist set them up, over a period of five years (Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991). The second stage entails the removal of trade restrictions within the RECs in a period of not more than eight years and in the third stage, there is the establishment of Free Trade Areas (FTA) within RECs, in a period of not more than ten years. Fourth is the formation of a Customs Union over a period of not more than two years and this involves the “coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems” within RECs (Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991:14). The fifth stage involved the formation of a continental Common Market over a period of four years. The sixth and final stage, should include the “free movement of people, goods, capital and services … and the rights of residence and establishment” (Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991:14). Concerning the issue of migration and continental integration, the African Union (AU) has developed two policies, which are, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD). The MPFA, can be generally taken to provide a framework to Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in dealing with migration. This is because, the 2006 MPFA addressed nine thematic migration issues such as labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, and inter-state cooperation and partnerships (African Union 2006a). But, in 2016, the AU evaluated the MPFA, leading to the revision of the MPFA so as to respond to the complexity of migration vis-à-vis regional and continental integration in Africa. The results of the revision were the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2027), which identified eight key pillars, which should guide AU member states and RECs. These are: migration governance, labour migration and education; diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration, forced displacement and internal

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migration; and migration and trade (African Union 2006a). Likewise, the ACPMD was adopted in 2006 with the objective of adopting a common position on migration and its implications on development (African Union 2006b). In this context, the ACPMD identifies eleven priority policy issues. These include migration and development, human resources and the brain drain, remittances, trade, migration and peace, security and stability, migration and human rights, gender, regional initiatives and access to social services. As a result, the ACPMD has made recommendations with implications on national, continental and international levels on issues of migration. It is in this context, that it is the possible to comment on what individual countries and RECs in Africa do to manage or govern migrating people such as African informal cross-border traders. Since the SADC is one of the RECS, in the plan towards the establishment of the AEC, comment on it is necessary.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) The origins of SADC can be traced to the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). In particular, the Frontline Sates (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) aimed to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa and thus contribute towards the fight against apartheid (Nshimbi and Moyo 2017). However, in 1992, SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a result of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992). The SADC is currently constituted of sixteen member states, which are: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The objectives of SADC include strengthening and consolidating the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of Southern Africa as well as progressively eliminating obstacles to the free movement of labour, capital, goods and services and of people between member states (Declaration and Treaty of SADC 1992, Article 5). To achieve the goal of free human mobility, the SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons was developed (Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2005). But, given that only six

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out of the sixteen member states have ratified it means that there is no protocol on the free movement of people in the SADC (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016; Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013; Nshimbi, et  al. 2017). This means that the respective laws of SADC member state are responsible for governing migration (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013, 2014; Nshimbi et al. 2017). In this context and given that African informal migrant traders were operating from Johannesburg, there is need to briefly consider the South African immigration laws. Concerning this, it needs emphasis that these did fundamentally change after 2002, when the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) as amended by Immigration Act of 2004 (Act 19 of 2004) came into effect (Crush et al. 2006; Peberdy 1998, 2009; Peberdy and Crush 1998). This means that up to 2002, the racist apartheid immigration policies, such as the Aliens Control Act, 1991 [No.96 of 1991], were still in force (Crush et  al. 2006; Peberdy 2009; Peberdy and Crush 1998). However, even after 2002, the removal of racist immigration policies was also restrictive to the extent that the policies were selective on the basis that migrants considered to be beneficial to South Africa were preferred (Peberdy 2009). This can be clearly seen in, for example, Immigration Act of 2007 [Act 3 of 2007], Immigration Amendment Bill of 2010 [Amendment Bill of 2010], Immigration Amendment Act of 2011 [Act 13 of 2011], Immigration Regulations (2014) and White Paper on International Migration (2017). From this, it can be seen that traders such as those discussed in this chapter can be easily left out in immigration law, policy and practice. I will return to this point in the following sections.

Views on the Ground Interview data with African migrant traders suggests that they faced several hurdles, ranging from challenges at the South African ports of entry such as Beitbridge to actual harassment by municipal and police officials on the streets of Johannesburg inner city, for example (Moyo 2017; Nshimbi and Moyo 2018; Moyo et al. 2016, 2018). The main issue for the traders was that they could not get trading permits or visas which in turn restricted their cross-­border movement. This resulted in some of them resorting to illegally crossing the border to South Africa for the simple purpose of buying and selling goods. For this reason, the traders felt they were ‘not wanted’ in South Africa because it is almost impossible for them to acquire business permits from the Department of Home

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Affairs (DHA) (Nshimbi and Moyo 2018). Other issues of concern related to harassment at the border by immigration officials. This also extended to the places where they operated, such as the streets of Johannesburg inner city. On these streets, there were reports that the traders suffered harassment by officers from the South African Police Service (SAPS) and, especially, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), who subjected migrant traders in Johannesburg to various levels of discrimination, hostility and xenophobia (Nshimbi and Moyo 2018). Further, there were reports that some ordinary South African citizens also demonstrated xenophobic tendencies by either insulting and telling the traders to go back to their countries or looting their goods (Moyo, et al. 2016, 2018). Differently stated, the migration by African informal migrant traders from many different countries in Africa to South Africa was faced with several challenges such that this translated to constrained human mobility and by extension their economic activities. The following section provides an expanded discussion of this issue.

Reflections on Migrants’ Experiences It was emphasised that the AU is moving towards the formation of an AEC set for 2018. What is even instructive in this respect is that on 21 March 2018, the first phase of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was signed (African Continental Free Trade Area 2018; Signé 2018). This AfCFTA is a precursor to the AEC as discussed in the preceding sections. The assumption is that, in the development towards the AEC, there should be free movement of capital, goods and people, among other resources. Similarly, SADC was formed to integrate and promote the development of member states and achieve, among others, “complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes” and “strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the [SADC] region” (SADC Declaration and Treaty 1992, Article 5. 1). But, these pronouncements at the level of both the Abuja Treaty and the Declaration and Treaty of SADC assist in identifying the problems in the current intra-Africa migration practices, which are characterised by restricted movement of people as a result of draconian and/or restrictive immigration policies such that people, like traders, who are the subject of this chapter suffer from restricted movement, which amounts to exclusion or even marginalisation.

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Starting at the level of SADC, we notice that, there is no regional migration management policy, except Actions Plans, such as the 2013–2015 Labour Migration Action Plan, 2016–2019 Labour Migration Action Plan (Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2016). This implicates on free human mobility to the extent that individual countries have to manage migration and this explains why individual states fail to echo the ideals of the region, because they are by nature formulated to address national interests and not that of the region. A case in point is that, theoretically, the South African immigration law and policy welcomes and embraces all migrants from, among others, the SADC region. But, experiences on the ground, based on the traders under discussion, however, paint a different picture, in which migrant traders face difficulties in acquiring business and trading permits. The traders thus felt that the South African government, represented by Department of Home Affairs (DHA), was less supportive of them and their economic activities (Nshimbi and Moyo 2018). Further, migrant traders felt that, they were more targeted than other groups of migrants, because of the raids which were organised by both the SAPS and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD). In a region and continent, which is working towards integration, could this be taken to indicate exclusion? Is there anything better that can be done? This answer is in the affirmative, precisely because in a region like the SADC and indeed the AU which aims to reduce or eliminate barriers to the free movement of people, policies which work against this ideal are exclusive. For this reason, the fact that traders who are the focus of this analysis, seem to suggest that they suffer actual and symbolic forms of exclusion and this negatively reflects on cohesion in Johannesburg and regional integration is problematic. This raises questions on how best to manage the case of African informal cross-border traders, towards inclusive development, on the basis of which, we could have a viable SADC region that will articulate to the ideals of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992). It is posited that, what is standing in the way of this free human mobility and ultimately integration has a lot to do with the governance of migration. This governance may have to do with both the state and the local actors. At the level of the state, immigration laws tend to be inward looking, the result of which are restrictive and selective immigration policies (Moyo 2016, 2017, 2018).

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Conclusion The evidence presented in this chapter, which captures the experiences of the traders suggest that the border is a huge hurdle which they must continuously negotiate and cross. The border in this case refers to both the physical line at the margin of the South African state, which is manifest at the Beitbridge border, for example, as well as symbolic practices and discourses beyond the physical border, but in the interior of the nation state (Coleman 2007; Cons and Sanyal 2013; Johnson et al. 2011; Laine 2015; Paasi 2012) of South Africa, which also have a bordering effect, with the result that human mobility is limited. Cases in point relate to the harassment that the traders suffered at the border as well as in Johannesburg, such as Johannesburg inner city streets. Interview data shows that, on these streets, the traders were insulted and told to go back to their countries of origin and in some cases their goods were taken without payment by some South African citizens/customers (Moyo et al. 2016, 2018). To this can be added the alleged harassment and victimisation by members of the SAPS and JMPD. Given the demonstrated efficacy of informal crossborder traders, such as those under discussion, in terms of importing and exporting different types of goods and services as well as capital, which can be regarded as integrating African countries from below (Moyo 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi 2017; Nshimbi 2015; Nshimbi and Moyo 2017, 2018) and that these actors have restricted mobility across African borders is a serious indictment on how migration in governed in Africa in general and within RECs and individual countries specifically. It can be posited that one of the reasons around the lack of proper governance or management of migration around actors like the informal cross-border traders may have more to do with Eurocentric policies that are not informed by the existential circumstances on the ground in African countries. This is because both the continental and regional integration schemes in Africa appear to follow neoclassical integration theory, which presupposes that integration should occur through formal institutions, such as the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), as a result of the removal of trade restrictions, followed by the formation of a Customs Union. In the third stage, integrating countries form a Common Market and the fourth and final stage involves the setting up of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in which supranational institutions govern policies in the integrated countries (Balassa 1961).

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As a result of these formulations, people like these traders are not included in this process of cross-border migration and by extension, regional and continental integration. Concerning continental integration, the signing of the AfCFTA in March 2018, which pronounced relatively less on the informal actors, like those under discussion, illustrates the exclusivist nature of these policies, which in turn have a bearing on their mobility. This, because, policies which impact on human mobility have a bearing on borders in that, formal actors are assumed to be the ones who have the right of cross-border movement on the strength of their inclusion in integration policies both at regional and continental level. If this is the case, it means that African informal cross-border traders may continue to be marginalised and because of this may have to use unofficial border crossing or continue to suffer harassment and criminalisation. This, because, if they have difficulty in securing permits, it means their operations are not protected by law and this creates a site for victimisation and even xenophobia, which then has implications on social cohesion and integration at the social level. In this sense, the lack of a comprehensive migration governance strategy at the level of RECs in Africa, such as the SADC, challenges relationships, by creating a space for the construction of informal cross-border traders as informal actors and by extension criminal elements deserving annihilation. In this context, it is then possible to argue that, if African countries and different RECs come up with regional migration governance policies, there will be a limited site for the existence of undocumented migrants. In this sense, cross-border migration will be accepted as the norm, in which there may be limited xenophobic attacks. Such that a common and Pan-African identity and integration may be built around effectively and properly managing migration in Africa. And this suggestion therefore calls for innovative ways of managing informal cross-border traders for inclusive development and regional integration in the SADC and Africa. I would suggest that, the first step should involve the recognition of informal actors in policy and law. This recognition will remove the binary between the so called formal and informal actors, where the former are assumed to be the ones who should enjoy cross-border migration and the later languish in the zone of marginalisation and exclusion. It is noteworthy, that in some of RECs in Africa, informal cross-border traders are receiving recognition and acceptance as important elements in the intra-­ Africa migration dynamics and relations. One example, which can be used

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is that of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which is made up of nineteen countries, which are Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1994). In this REC, the concept of a Simplified Trade Region (STR) has been implemented. The STR involves simplified paperwork, customs documents and procedures, such that traders can transport goods with a value of up to $1000 (Soprano 2014). It also includes a certificate of origin and a common list of products. Another is the East African Community (EAC), which is composed of member states which are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda (Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community 1999). In this, there has been the setting up of one stop border posts (OSBP). For example, in February 2018, Kenya and Uganda launched an OSBP at Busia (Musyoki 2018). The significant issue about this OSBP is that it has infrastructure to deal with informal cross-border traders as well thus demonstrating the overdue and indeed welcome recognition and acceptance of informal actors in the intra-Africa migration discourses and practices. This is a welcome departure from the obsession with Eurocentric models, such as the neoclassical frameworks, which informs intra-Africa migration practices, RECs and the African continental integration project.

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Moyo, I., T. Gumbo, and M.D. Nicolau. 2018. African migrant traders’ experiences in Johannesburg Inner City: Towards the migrant calculated risk and adaptation framework. South African Review of Sociology 49 (1): 53–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/21528586.2018.1496030. Musyoki, J. 2018. One-stop border posts have strengthened cross-border trade. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/One-stop-border-postsstrengthen-cross-border-trade/434750-4334054-1jkc7vz/index.html. Accessed 9 Dec 2018. Nshimbi, C.C. 2015. Networks of cross-border non-state actors: The role of social capital in regional integration. Journal of Borderlands Studies 30 (4): 537–560. ———. 2017. Life in the fringes: Economic and sociocultural practices in the Zambia–Malawi–Mozambique borderlands in comparative perspective. Journal of Borderlands Studies 32 (2): 1–24. ———. 2018. Rethinking Regional Integration for Development and Eradication of Poverty in Africa: The Missing Link. In: Oloruntoba S., Falola T. (Eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development, 645–660. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Nshimbi, C.C., and L. Fioramonti. 2013. A region without borders? Policy frameworks for regional labour migration towards South Africa. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand. ———. 2014. The will to integrate: South Africa’s responses to regional migration from the SADC region. African Development Review 26 (S1): 52–63. Nshimbi, C.C., and I. Moyo. 2017. History, trends and dynamics of cross border movements and trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. In Migration, cross-border trade and development in Africa: Exploring the role of non-state actors in the SADC region, Series: Palgrave Studies of Sustainable Business in Africa, ed. C.C.  Nshimbi and I.  Moyo, 1–14. London: Palgrave. ———. 2018. Informal immigrant traders in Johannesburg: The scorned cornerstone in the southern African development community integration project. In Africa now! Emerging issues and alternative perspectives, ed. A. Adeniran and L. Ikuteyijo, 387–413. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nshimbi, C.C., I.  Moyo, and T.  Gumbo. 2017. Between neoliberal orthodoxy and securitisation: Prospects and challenges for a borderless southern African community. In Crisis, identity, and migration in postcolonial Southern Africa, ed. H.H. Magidimisha, N.E. Khalema, T. Chirimabmowa, and T. Chimedza, 167–186. London: Springer. Paasi, A. 2012. Border studies reanimated: Going beyond the territorial-relational divide. Environment and Planning 44: 2303–2309. Peberdy, S. 1998. Obscuring history: Contemporary patterns of regional migration to South Africa. In South Africa in southern Africa: Reconfiguring the region, ed. D. Simon, 187–205. Oxford: James Currey.

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———. 2009. Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa’s immigration policies 1910–2008. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Peberdy, S., and J. Crush. 1998. Rooted in racism: The origins of the aliens control act. In Beyond control: Immigration and human rights in a democratic South Africa, Southern African migration project, ed. J.  Crush, 18–36. Cape Town: IDASA. Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2002. Immigration act no 13. Pretoria: Government Printers. ———. 2007. Immigration amendment act no 3. Government Gazette, Vol. 554, No. 34561. Cape Town. ———. 2010. Immigration amendment bill. Pretoria: Government Printers. ———. 2011. Immigration amendment act. Government Gazette, Vol. 505, No. 30095. Cape Town. ———. 2014. Immigration regulations. Government regulations Gazette, Vol. 587, No. 37679. Pretoria. Signé, L. 2018. Africa’s big new free trade agreement, explained. https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/29/the-countdown-to-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-starts-now/? noredirect=on&utm_term=.fc0d2a75ebe8. Accessed 26 Nov 2018. SME. 2006. Cross border African shoppers and traders in South Africa: Findings from an SBP survey. SME Alert. http://sbp.org.za/uploads/media/SME_ Alert_Cross_Border_Shopping_final_8-12-06.pdf. Accessed on 28 May 2018. Soprano, C. 2014. A step toward formalization: The charter for cross border ­traders. http://www.worldbank.org/trade/step-toward-formalization-charter-cross-bord. Accessed 28 May 2018. Southern African Development Community (SADC). 2005. Draft protocol on the acilitation of Movement of Persons. http://www.sadc.int/documentspublications/protocols/. Accessed 23 Dec 2016. ———. 2016. Draft labour migration action plan 2016–2019. https://www.iom. int/sites/.../sadc-labour-migration-action-plan-for-2016-2019.docx. Accessed 10 Dec 2018. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community. 1999. www.eala. org/.../the-treaty-for-the-establishment-of-the-east-africa-community-1999-. Accessed 12 Oct 2018. Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 1994. https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3113. Accessed 9 Dec 2018. White Paper for International Migration for South Africa. 2017. http://www.dha. gov.za/WhitePaperonInternationalMigration-.pdf /. Accessed Mar 2018.

CHAPTER 10

African Migrants’ Aspirations and Citizens’ Anxieties in Johannesburg, South Africa: Concerning Migration Management Christal Spel

Introduction South Africa is a country with high immigration from African countries. According to the South Africa’s census report (2011), over 75% of international migrants living in South Africa are from the African continent. StatsSA (2016) community survey reports that eight out of the top ten migrant sending countries are African. Most of the immigrants are often active in entrepreneurship, including the lower end of the entrepreneurial table as survival and micro entrepreneurs. Faced with such high migration, the government has come to be known for its anti-immigrant politics and xenophobic rhetoric that often target vulnerable African migrants1 that are active in the informal sector where they engage in survival or micro 1  For this chapter I use vulnerable African migrants to refer to the migrants that are active in survival and micro-businesses in the informal economy of South Africa.

C. Spel (*) Post-Doctoral Research Fellow: DST/NRF SARChI Chair in Social Policy, College of Graduate Studies, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_10

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businesses (Vigneswaran et al. 2010). The administration of immigration has also been criticized for its contradictory and inconsistent approach that is more in resonance with South Africa’s apartheid history (Amit 2010; Landau and Segatti 2011; Vigneswaran 2011). In the ensuing stringent immigration context, empirical examinations of citizens’ relationship with the migrants are often belaboured with the apathy attached to xenophobia and other experiences of discrimination and hostility towards the migrants (Klotz 2012; Landau 2011; Steinberg 2008; Worby et al. 2008). Notwithstanding, few authors (see e.g. Glaser 2008; Pillay 2013) have examined the relationship between African migrants and South African citizens outside the xenophobia lens. This chapter examines migrant aspirations and citizens’ anxieties alongside of South Africa’s vision of migration management. Migration management is identified in this chapter as the theoretical platform where the vision of the future is played out by the state, its citizens and the migrants. In Foucauldian terms, that relationship can be understood as constituting the ‘art of government’ from two perspectives: first, as “target[ing] the access, stay and employment of foreign populations and to place non-­citizens/foreign workers under state order, surveillance and control” (Geiger 2013). Secondly, migration management reflects the political commitment to protect and plan for societal, and hence, narrowly, citizens’ wellbeing (Geiger 2013). Consequently, several governments have developed multiple ways outside the traditional border control to influence migration patterns, flow and migrant stock (Castillejo 2017; Geiger and Pecoud 2010). From here, this chapter is divided into five sections. Section two presents the historical context of migration to South Africa and the methodology of the study. The third section is a conceptual discussion on migration management. The fourth section then discusses citizens’ anxiety in the South African socioeconomic context. This is followed by a fifth section that relies on narrative data to discuss vulnerable African migrants’ aspirations. The sixth section synthesizes the discussion in the chapter using findings from document analysis and narrative texts. The final and seventh section is the concluding section.

Historical Context of Migration Crucial to an understanding of contemporary South African immigration context are its historical struggles for inclusion and exclusion and the creation of South African citizenship (O’Meara 1996). South African

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immigration history is understood as complex and heavily politicized, and its nationalism fragmented because of racism, divisions and class struggles (Klotz 2013; Marks and Trapido 1979; Peberdy 2009; Posel 1991). The migration history is connected to the availability of labour in farms and mines. As early as 1840s men from the Southern African region such as the Tsonga, Mozambicans and Pedis have engaged in seasonal migration to work in farms ((Delius 1983; Turrell 1987). The discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1870s increased the demand for labour and facilitated a more established migrant labour system, although this migration was circular, as the migrants were discouraged and prohibited from permanent residency (van der Horst 1971). As the cities grew and the nation moved from agrarian to industrial, social and economic problems increased, and the state responded with racially partial laws and regulations that favoured the whites (Brown and Neku 2005; Patel 1992). The apartheid state understood the socioeconomic problems in urban areas as problems of control of the black population. In 1896, laws were promulgated to curb the presence of blacks in cities, and the economic privileges available in urban centres were then linked to the state’s racial conception of national identities (Klotz 2013; Posel 1991). Hence, the apartheid control of movement to urban centres emphasized the nation as fundamentally urban, and white citizens as rightful residents with access to employment. This notion impliedly mirrors some citizens’ anti-migrant perception. This is because migrants in urban centres are seen as encroaching on citizens’ socioeconomic space and responsible for socioeconomic problems (Landau 2011). Neocosmos (2006, 25) argues that “both from the perspective of the state and from that of the people, it is the migratory phenomenon which has provided the most important context for the development of democratic conceptions of citizenship in the region [South Africa]”. In that context, the conception of migration invokes contestation and strengthening of perceptions of citizenship that easily draw on the active participation of ordinary people (Neocosmos 2006). Thus, the history of migration in South Africa highlights active citizenship like the contemporary contestations with African migrants’ presence in South Africa. Post-apartheid migration management in South Africa is observed by researchers to be polarized. On the one hand, it is commonly framed with the discourse of xenophobia, especially targeting African migrants (Landau 2011; Landau and Segatti 2011; Mngxitama 2008; Peberdy 2009; Worby et  al. 2008). On the other, the post-apartheid state is signatory to

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international and regional regulations that promote fair, rights-based and free mobility, including all international treaties on refugees and asylum seekers. Nonetheless, there is a wide gap between the discourses of the state and its practices (Segatti 2011). The state’s approach to African migration has been described as stringent and tactical with political rhetoric that criminalizes vulnerable migrants (Klotz 2013; Landau 2010; Landau and Segatti 2011; Nieftagodien 2012). Another important component of South African immigration context is the administration of immigration control. The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is responsible for the practicalities of immigration management in South Africa. The agency has been the target of severe criticisms from migrants, NGOs that work for the rights of migrants and academics that study migration in South Africa. Such criticisms have targeted the infrastructure as grossly inadequate in the face of migrants needs, and the management as riddled with malpractice, misconduct and inadequacies (Andersson 2006; Landau and Segatti 2011; Vigneswaran 2011; Vigneswaran et al. 2010). However, some of the malpractices have been understood as an informal show of support to the government’s immigration antagonism, hence they represent the enduring extension of state hegemonic power (Vigneswaran et al. (2010). Such informal practices that are expressed as discriminatory, aggressive and sometimes violent relationships between the police and the African migrants are active in the informal sector (Vigneswaran 2011). That spills over to citizen-migrant relationship, as citizens are rarely held responsible by the police for violent acts against migrants supporting what Misago (2011, 96) themed “endemic culture of impunity” in many of the attacks against migrants. This citizen-migrant landscape prompted multiple studies focused on citizen-migrant relationship (Abdi 2011; Amisi and Ballard 2005; Everatt 2011). Some researchers (see e.g. Gelb 2008; Pillay 2008) argue that the hostility towards African migrants by South African nationals in South Africa is related to the promise and expectation of economic freedom through political inclusions. Hence, foreign migrants are perceived to be draining the national resources reserved for citizens, echoing the apartheid logic for the restriction of its black population from urban centres (Reddy 2012). Therefore, for citizens, immigration control in post-apartheid South Africa rightly touches on issues of economic freedom, availability and sufficiency of public services, and reaffirmation of a privilege identity.

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The post-apartheid violence against migrants in South Africa is not recent but has been traced to far back as 1996 when there was mass revolt against the issuance of visas to immigrants with the arguments that “foreigners steal local jobs” (Monson and Arian 2011). In the year 2000 Mozambican migrants were attacked in Alexandra, in 2007 immigrant bus drivers were violently attacked by South African bus drivers over passengers, in 2017 houses belonging to African foreigners were looted and burnt in Pretoria West and Johannesburg, and in 2018, violence against African migrants erupted in Soweto, Johannesburg (Crush et  al. 2017; Crush and Ramachandran 2015; Khumalo 2018). The incidences of such violent attacks against migrants have been numerous as reported by several authors (Worby et  al. 2008). Rolf Maruping (2008) argues that poor South Africans are jealous and resentful of migrants that are thriving, and this motivates violent hostility towards the migrants. John Steinberg (2008, 1) calls attention to South Africans’ perception of the economy “as a finite lump around which people feed via their access to patrons”. Therefore, successful migrants are perceived to be reducing the quantity of the resources that should be available for citizens. More so, as the migrants exist outside the privilege relationship of citizenship with the state, any success achieved is understood as unmerited. Steinberg (ibid) linked this misconception to the distributive role of the apartheid state towards ‘privileged’ white citizens. Daryl Glaser (Glaser 2008) argues that South Africans’ perceived hostile relationship with migrants should be understood as “patterns of pressure, opportunity, incentive and lived experience”. In the struggle to access scarce resources in cities, migrants become competitors that are tactically positioned to prevail successfully in the competition. John Sharp (2008) calls attention to the complexities in the identified hostility between South Africans and migrants. He reminds us that “South Africans from far-flung parts of the country” were also victims of xenophobic violence as their right to the city and citizenship were challenged by hostile citizens. This resonates with Francis Nyamnjoh’s (2006) notion of the construction of foreign others as outsiders based on the political definition of insiders. Also, relevant, Neocosmos (2006, 16) calls attention to the notion of nationalism as “access to economic resources” where access is indigenized by state policies in active exclusion of foreigners. His arguments illuminate the political relationship between the state and the society, and it presents citizen-migrant hostility from a discursive perspective that centralizes the politics of citizenship. Hence, xenophobia assumes

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the form of ideological contestations of statism and statal postulation. He argues that the volatile and vexed relationship between South Africans and migrants “must be understood and can only coherently be understood as a result of politics where the state is seen as the sole definer of citizenship and where, given the absence of prescriptive politics among the people, passivity prevails” (Neocosmos 2006, 133). Data for this chapter is extracted from my two-stage doctoral research conducted in Johannesburg, South Africa, between July to October 2013, and December 2014. I utilize narrative data and document analysis for the study. The narrative approach has an advantage of displaying the human experience (Riessman 2008). Thus, the approach is appropriate for examining vulnerable African migrant experiences, desires and motivation in South Africa. The narrative data was gathered from ten African migrants living in Yeoville and Hillbrow. The areas were selected as the site of fieldwork because they are locally known as popular spot for foreign African migrants. The process of identifying research participants involved the researcher making a purchase to strike a conversation after several visits before introducing the research and soliciting participation. Setting time for narrative interviews was a challenge as it involved multiple cancellation and rescheduling, and weeks from the first day of contact. Interview sessions were recorded and transcribed. Participants in the study were from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Benin Republic and Malawi. The model by Lieblich et al. (1998) was used to analyse transcribed narrative texts. Categorical content analytical approach was used in the analysis as the participants arguably share similar experiences. In addition, secondary data from document analysis provided supplementary data that strengthen, link and highlight the arguments of the chapter. Document analysis can be utilized to generate data for the examination of the social and political context as a supplementary source or to triangulate findings from other sources of data (Bowen 2009; Corbin and Strauss 2008). Bowen (2009) notes that document analysis is “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents… [I]t entails a first-­ pass document review, in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identified” (27, 32). Document analysis mainly focused on South African Department of Home Affairs’ (DHA) and the Consortium of Refugees and Migrants in South Africa’s (CoRMSA) annual reports. The latter is a consortium of organizations and individuals that are active in the field of migrant protection and wellbeing. Its objectives are to advocate for rights-based immigration policies that comply

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with the rule of international and national laws and to promote best immigration practices in South Africa. DHA’s and CoRMSA’s annual reports are easily accessible public documents providing information on the activities, challenges and achievements related to the immigration goals of the South African government and experiences of migrants in South Africa. In document analysis, quality and not quantity is paramount (Bowen 2009).

Migration Management The arguments for the potentiality of migration are challenged by the political strategies and tools that continuously seek to tame and control it, for instance through political definition of desired and undesired migrants (Aas and Bosworth 2013; Lamont et  al. 2015; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). That political need to tame human migration is codified under the concept of migration management, which was first operationalized for the international community by Ghosh’s (2000) three-pillar model. Ghosh’s three-pillar model approach to migration management sought to harmonize the migration policies and interests across states, produce a global framework to govern migration from harmonized policies and interests, and incorporate and organize the work of all other parties interested in the migration phenomenon. Ghosh’s proposal introduced a deeper and broader engagement with the actors (government and non-government) and activities that interact with and intervene on migration. Such a comprehensive approach to international mobility premised with a key objective to “turn migration into a more orderly, predictable and manageable process, and to make it beneficial for all the stakeholders involved” (Geiger and Pecoud 2010). A decade after Bimal Ghosh’s report, Geiger and Pecoud (2010, 1) argued that migration management is a catch phrase that is used by actors to “conceptualize and justify their increasing interventions in the migration field”. For instance, several services and practices are offered as part of migration management, such as counter-trafficking, foreign aid and national security. These approaches call attention to how migration management is evolving to interlink the agents of migration management, the migrants and their society in defining migration and the accompanying intervention mechanisms (Geiger and Pecoud 2010, 2013).Therefore, it is not only about making migration a “more orderly predictable and manageable process”. Rather it is also about making individuals as migrants “more orderly, predictable and manageable” (Geiger and Pecoud 2010,

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1) in their desire or action to migrate—with the constant objective of making migration beneficial for all the stakeholders. Thus, it goes beyond targeting the migrant to the individual and the country of origin as a form of socializing individuals and sensitizing—pressurizing—sending societies to reproduce only the ‘perfect migrant’. That is a migrant that is wanted by the receiving country and is committed to observing the rules of admittance. It is important to note the connection between the political panic about migration flow and the increasing span and comprehensiveness of migration management. That connection locates the increasing comprehensiveness of migration management not on the wellbeing of the migrants but on the political gains of the state actors and on the political economy of migration management to non-state actors (Smith 2013; Williams 2010). The need to support broad-based migration management does not deviate from the rationality that is inherent in the statal paternalistic watch over its citizens—it is not about the migrants, but ‘about citizens’. For example, several authors (Collett and Ahad 2017; Lehne 2017) have criticized EU initiatives for migration management in Africa, with arguments that “many African actors [perceive the Migration Policy Framework (MPF)] as imposing EU interests and undermining African unity and continental ambitions” (Castillejo 2017, 33). It is thus arguable whether the turn to more comprehensive method of migration management has proven to be more effective in stemming the flow of unwanted migration. The strongest paradox of the extensive approach to migration management is that while efforts are targeted at the ‘root causes’ of migration “there is no evidence that these types of development investments will actually reduce migration” (Castillejo 2017, 18). Such centrally located disjunction at the core of one of the logics of migration management challenges not the efficacy of the specific means of attempt to curtail migration, rather it confronts the ideology behind the “systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors that [seeks to] facilitate and condition mobility” (Xiang and Lindquist 2014, 124). Indeed, on the one hand, there is the common notion that poverty and macroeconomic insecurities drives emigration to the point of high-risk irregular migration. On the other, there is the argument that “emigration is likely to increase as a country’s economy growth, as more people have the financial resources and the information they need to make the journey” (Cummings et  al. 2015, 3). That indicates the variability of migration management, but also the indeterminateness of migrant actions.

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Unlike the disconnected and weak correlation between migration management goals and the actions of (informal) migrants, citizens’ political decisions and social anxiety continue to be connected to migration management. From the citizens’ perspective, the ultimate political purpose of migration management as “the preservation of the status and welfare of citizens” (Geiger 2013, 19) makes immigration issues important to their everyday life. Therefore, even though the increasing comprehensiveness of migration management does not address the “root causes” (Castillejo 2017, 18) of emigration, and specifically, unregulated emigration, it does have an impact on citizens’ anxiety over their individual and societal wellbeing (Suren Pillay 2013). Therefore, just as managing migration implies the discipline of the present and future choices of people in the sending countries, it also reinforces the socialization of the individual as citizens in the Foucauldian sense of subject-making. That is, the notion of self-­ making and subject-making by the power relations that condition actions through schemes of coercion, discipline, and the distribution and restrictions to rights and resources (Dean 2010; Foucault 1991; Rose 1999). In this sense, one can question whether the comprehensive methods of migration management have concretely improved the wellbeing of citizens.

South African Citizens’ Anxieties in the Face of African Migrants The notion and dispensation of care to vulnerable groups in the society forms an integral part of the conception of the relationship between the state and citizenship. Thus, the political conception and dispensation of care to meet the economic anxieties of citizens are relevant (Clarke et al. 2007b; Clarke 2005; Procacci 2009) in South Africa. The historicity of social policy in South Africa strongly links the idea of a welfare state to its processes of nation building—inclusion and exclusion. Also, social policies remain one of the political instruments affirmed as crucial to ameliorating poverty and correcting some of the wrongs of apartheid (Brown and Neku 2005). That elevates the discourse of substantive care to the socioeconomic platform where citizens and migrants often interact. During apartheid, the privilege of white citizenship and racialized democratic rights also conceptualized and concretized a social welfare system that prioritized whites under the rule of the National Party (Leubolt 2014). This ties

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the historical construction of citizenship to the post-apartheid expectations from citizenship rights, even before the contemporary political promises and rhetoric for development and wellbeing for all. As early as 1657 the distribution of welfare resources to white settlers during periods of vulnerability was institutionalized under the Dutch Reformed Church and excluded the indigenous population (Brown and Neku 2005). As the society shifted from agrarian to industrial, new vulnerable groups such as the urban white poor prompted the planning of a national welfare outreach for whites only (Patel 1992). Policies for development and social support targeting whites went on to empower whites from 1946–1994 (Brown and Neku 2005; Lund 1992; Mamphiswana and Noyoo 2000). Historical socioeconomic anxieties of black South Africans are linked to active policies of exclusion of blacks and inclusion of whites such as the Pass Laws that regulated access to and residency in cities and the policy of different development in social welfare services (Brown and Neku 2005). The social emphasis was not on border crossing but on the processes of identity and hierarchization in terms of access to resources. That reinforces the citizen/inclusion-access to resources nexus that forms the political foundation of nationalism in the tradition of Marshall (1950), and in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. However, the experiences of poverty and vulnerability by the ordinary South African indicate a rupture in this taken-for-granted nexus in two important ways: first in the fabric of inclusion as a political process, and second inclusion as an economic process. In their discussion of Border as Method, Sandro Mezzadra and Neilson Brett (2013, 62) calls attention to the “changing shape of inclusion”, emphasizing Celia Lury’s (2009, 80) argument that “there is an excess of inclusion over belonging” in relations of multiplicity. Mezzadra and Neilson’s (2012, 62) highlights of “subjectivities that are neither fully insiders nor fully outsiders” can be used to describe vulnerable South African citizens. Those citizens although part of the inclusive community as South Africans, yet, remain outsiders by virtue of limited or no access to public goods. Hence, one may be a South African but can be excluded from access to quality education by financial constraint, low grades or locality, amongst others. Similarly, a South African may have access to urban centres as one of the inclusive benefits of post-apartheid politics, but may still be an outsider as a homeless, landless, unemployed individual. Indeed, there are multiple internal borders within the practical context of inclusion that makes a nonesense of the citizen-access to resources nexus.

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Existing in the tensions of ‘be-longing’ and ‘in-betweenness’(Baas 2013; Manjikian 2010), the lived experience of the ordinary South African mirrors those of the poor African migrants seeking social and economic space in South Africa. The notion of social exclusion becomes relevant in framing poor South Africans anxieties. Social exclusion retains its relevance as a lens to highlight the perceived and apparent gap between the everyday life of poor South Africans and the substantive benefits of citizenship rights, especially in the post-apartheid context (Atkinson 1998; Devicienti and Poggi 2011). Social exclusion emphasizes disparity in economic outcomes, and the intrinsic and extrinsic values that can be socially and politically converted to improvement in wellbeing. Critically relevant also are the structural barriers and hurdles to economic growth. In the context of the history of apartheid as highlighted above, and the promises of and expectations from post-apartheid democratic transformations, the ordinary South Africa exists in confounding paradox of being ‘in’ but ‘out’. South Africa has one of the highest inequalities (economic and space maximization inclusive) in the world linked to its apartheid history and racial inequality (Cole 2015; Leubolt 2014; Orthofer 2016; Visagie 2013). The World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) Report (2018) described the country’s transition from the racially skewed opportunities, resource distributions and spatial economy of apartheid as incomplete. Inequality in the South African context emphasizes poverty and vulnerability amongst the black South Africans. Lamont and Molnár’s (2002) conception of symbolic boundaries, and the notion of consumer culture, has relevance in understanding inequality beyond the frame of economic lack. Consumer culture emphasizes the version of life politics in which “identities are constructed through the signifying practices of consumption choice” (Clarke et al. 2007a, 11). By the lack of capacity (economic) to exercise choice in consumption, the poor black South African experiences multiple forms of exclusion, in this case, such as identity-as-a-­ privileged-citizen—an identity that was won by the defeat of apartheid. The inability to consume that which the citizen identifies as symbolic of belonging/citizenship, such as decent accommodation, employment, secured income and access to quality healthcare, creates anxieties. Symbolic boundaries frames consumption choices as “everyday social production and organization of ‘differences’ and ‘similiarities’” (Duemmler 2015, 308) along the dividing line of dignified/unworthy, belonging/excluded, citizens/others. In the context of apartheid/post-apartheid, ordinary

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South Africans are continuously being ‘otherized’ by the lack of capacity to participate in the signifying practices of consumption choice of inclusive and privileged citizens. The citizens who live with poverty at varying levels exist in confounding political contradictions and socioeconomic anxieties. Hage (2003, 3) argues that failure to distribute socioeconomic hope in the society “generates worrying citizens and a paranoid nationalism”. The failure of post-­ apartheid governments in addressing poverty and inequality amongst the formerly disenfranchised citizens has severally been cited as implicit in the hostilities and violence targeting African migrants (Crush and Ramachandran 2015; Klaaren 2011; Landau 2011). Nyamnjoh (2006, 1) had argued that the South African context of increasing socioeconomic anxieties will only “bring an even greater obsession with citizenship and belonging”. For black citizens, the challenges being faced by the post-­ apartheid government in delivering economic benefits has created what Landau (2011, 3) describes as “a politically entitled but materially deprived citizenry”. Frantz Fanon (2001, 40) reflecting on post-colonial violence declared “ the colonized man is an envious man” to emphasize the propensity for animosity between the post-colonial subject and outsiders in a context of unfulfilled needs. Unfortunately, South Africans’ socioeconomic vulnerabilities are unfolding on a global platform that is politically advocating for market-­ driven approach to economic reforms and less government presence in service provision (Gathii 2011) ranging from market-driven land reforms (Bernstein 2003; Lahiff 2007) to private education and health subsidies (Chisholm 2011; Fonn et  al. 2007). In that context, there is shrinking social provisions, and migration issues assumes huge proportion of relevance in so much as it concerns the distribution of and access to national resources either directly or impliedly. Thus, migration management, its failure or success in managing the flow of migrants can have impact on the anxieties of the black South Africans. The presence of economically successful migrants will tend to emphasize the ‘otherness’ of poor and vulnerable South Africans as it relates to the practices of consumption. Poor and vulnerable migrants will only remind the poor South Africans of the open contradictions of the inclusivity of post-apartheid promise. Although they are privileged citizens, their socioeconomic reality still places them as ‘none members’ in the parlance of apartheid.

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African Migrants’ Aspirations The study of aspirations is traditionally located in the discipline of social psychology, but the relevance of the concept to migration has been highlighted by several contemporary researchers (Carling et al. 2013; Carling and Collins 2018; Carling and Schewel 2018; Czaika and Vothknecht 2014). From its social psychological background, the study of aspirations dates back decades ago to include the works of Kurt Lewin (1939), Richard Stephenson (1957), Archibald Haller and Miller (1963), Hyman Rodman (1963), amongst others. In that context, aspiration is used to refer to “ego’s own orientation to a goal” and it is represented along levels of “cognitive orientational aspect of goal-directed behaviour” (Haller 1968, 484). In the contemporary study of migration and the application of the concept, aspiration has been used to indicate migrants’ “attention to thoughts and feelings that precede migration outcomes” (Carling and Schewel 2018, 947). Such thoughts and desires have been examined in the migration literature as hope, desires, wishes and intentions (Alpes 2013, 2014; Collins 2018; Coulter 2013; Czaika and Vothknecht 2014). The relevance of the conception of aspiration revealed itself in the narratives of the migrants, and it retained its relevance as the migrants navigate their constraining context. Thus, the emphasis moved from “thoughts and feelings that precede migration outcomes” to include thoughts and feelings that sustains and stimulate resilience in the face of hostility. The study, in line with other studies (Landau 2011; Morreira 2010; Reddy 2012), highlights a harsh socioeconomic context characterized by incidences of violence, discriminations, and exclusions. Nevertheless, the migrants presented their everyday activities as multiple steps towards achieving their plans for a very successful future. So, on one note, the migrants are victims, severely vulnerable from the social and political hostility; on the other, they are individuals with grand visions of the future. For instance, one of the interviewees who migrated to South Africa in 2006 and subsequently applied for asylum reported in harsh details experiences of violence, humiliation and discrimination targeted at African migrants in his local vicinity of Hillbrow, Johannesburg. In his story he spoke of being part of a crowd that watched an African migrant bleed to death by the side of the road after a fight. He sadly reminisces that nobody could help that unfortunate migrant, not even the police were willing to provide first aid for over 45 minutes, until he slumped and died. The interviewee sombrely spoke about insecurity of migrants’ lives, socioeconomic

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hardship, vulnerability and risks. At the end of his narration I was expecting that for him the future, indeed the near future, will be conceived to be geographically far from South Africa. Yet, this interviewee spoke about perceived opportunities in the hostile context and expressed confidence that economic success is quite possible in the face of the experienced challenges. To this migrant, his aspiration is expressed as a yearning for material success; in his conception, remaining in South Africa becomes one of the routes to achieving that success, and his aspiration is related to his religious faith, not immigration rules. Another interviewee resigned from his job in a government ministry in his home country and migrated to South Africa to pursue his dream of grand success through entrepreneurial engagements. From his perspective, the possibility of achieving his aspirations and meeting his socioeconomic expectations for the future was in the unknown opportunities that could be explored in South Africa, and not in the security of his employment in the home country. He left his country with a vague vision of the entrepreneurial pathway to achieving his aspirations, and without an established network in South Africa. On arrival in South Africa in 2005, he used the money (100 rands) with him to purchase belts and socks and started trading at the bus and taxi stations, slowly accumulating his profit. He engaged in several trading activities and eventually opened a street-side ethnic restaurant, which was where I met him and solicited his participation in the study. He reported that the social and economic contexts for African migrants in South Africa have been deteriorating since he migrated. When I asked him about his aspiration in relation to the deteriorating socioeconomic context, he responded by informing me about some of the hardships he has endured and the socioeconomic problem of youth unemployment in South Africa. Nevertheless, he was confident in his narrative that he will achieve the grand success of his aspiration in South Africa. Important to note in this story is that his aspiration preceded his migration, but also, the notion of employment as socioeconomic security did not accommodate the capacity to pursue his grand vision. From his perspective, the context of uncertainty in South Africa appeared to hold broader potentials and capacity for him to explore his desires. In the migration-aspiration discourse, migration is conceptualized as an aspiration in its own right. The interviewees’ cases liken to the notion that the aspiration to emigrate is influenced by economic factors (Mains 2011; van Dalen et al. 2005). However, the emigration from a secured employment to a context of uncertainty and risk highlights the disjunction at the

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core of migration management that seeks to condition the international mobility behaviour of people (Castillejo 2017). It also highlights the complexity of what constitutes the aspiration of the migrant. In that vein, the interviewee’s aspiration can be framed in the notion of Hannah Arendt’s (1998[1958]) potency of action, which stressed the human capacity to begin, to do the unexpected, and indicates the relevance of individuality in action. It echoes Carling and Schewel’s (2018, 954) argument that “migration can be valued- and yearned for – in its own right… [And that] approaches to migration aspirations must also recognise the pull of adventure experience and independence”. In addition, the social psychology literature emphasizes the interaction of the environment with the individual aspirations. That is, the individual makes sense of the “matrix of opportunities and constraints” (Sherwood 1989, 61) available in the society. That role of the environment can thus be linked to survey findings that 60% of would-be African migrants are unsatisfied with local public services (AfDB 2015) and emphasizes the availability of infrastructures that facilitates entrepreneurial drives and engagements in the destination country, such as South Africa. That calls attention to the classic push-pull model of migration that emphasizes destination utility, preferences for locations, access and the conversion of utility to personal satisfaction. When I asked this interviewee about his thoughts on the process from his home country to his present location and future aspiration, he responded that he will persevere until death. He went on to explain, that he is saving towards starting a company in his home country, and that soon he should be able to start implementing that plan. Another interviewee echoed similar desire for a grand success, but with a focus on a global platform. From his narrative he experienced economic success for years in his home country trading in mobile phones but suffered a misfortune and lost his goods to robbers. He then migrated to South Africa in 2012, where I met him selling bananas and peanut by the street of Yeoville in 2013. He reported that as a successful businessman in his home country, his dream had been to own a big household electronic importation business. Knowing how far he is from that dream as a street trader in South Africa, I asked him about that dream. He explained himself solemnly, voice low and trembling, emphasizing that he is convinced that he will achieve his aspiration to be a successful businessman. He explained further that he is saving towards his plans to move to another country, where he hopes to work and continue trading to save enough

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money. Eventually, he expects to save enough and travel to Japan, where he could search for work and save enough money to start buying and selling electronics again. His aspiration sounded unrealistic from the position of a street trader, but his life story started from selling goods along the highway to motorist as a child and teenager. His previous success in growing a mobile phone trading business was one of his sources of inspiration in the possibility to achieve his aspiration. When I returned for follow-up fieldwork in December 2014, I was informed by his friend that he has migrated to Brazil. It is not just about the migration. To my interviewees it is their desires, intentions and the connection and interaction between them and the social environment. From this perspective, their location is only as important as who they are, and the aspiration that they are chasing (Carling and Schewel 2018). Ultimately, their aspiration could flexibly move across and between borders, or it may locate itself within the host society; the role of the geography in this case is seen as navigatory even as it is valued. Thus, the centrality of entrepreneurial pursuit to the migrants’ aspirations in South Africa raises the puzzle whether the interviewees would have embraced entrepreneurship as the means to their visions if they were able to secure formal employment in South Africa. From the narratives, all the interviewees started their lives in South Africa by searching for full-time and contractual employment. But they had negative experiences even when they managed to secure some forms of employment. They diversified their income-making activities and were engaged in numerous service provisions such as house painting or roof repairs for extra income. Their narratives indicate that their experiences as jobseekers in South Africa compelled them to turn to entrepreneurial activities even though their aspiration remained the same. So, to my interviewees, the goal or aspiration was the fulcrum of their activities and not the means, such as selecting a profession. In this sense, entrepreneurship becomes accidental in their conception of the future, but central in the South African context of high unemployment. Previous studies (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2017, 7) have emphasized the motivating effect of hardship to entrepreneurial engagements by highlighting how “traumatic experiences of individuals … lead them to become entrepreneurs”. Thus, unsuccessful jobseekers can be motivated by their experience to take up entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, understanding the migrants’ activities as focused on building their future incorporates the room for deliberation, and planning, into the suggestions of chance

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indicated in their entrepreneurial choice. However, that also calls attention to the capacity to revise and review their actions, highlighting the possibility that entrepreneurship will be a means rather than an end to some of the migrants. The implications from that suggest the critical relevance of business support to encourage and sustain migrants’ participation in entrepreneurship. It also implies the possibility of delusion, or what Czaika and Vothknect (2014, 3) call “a hedonic treadmill”, and Appadurai (2004) refers to as aspiration trap. In each case, there is a dislocating gap between the migrants’ aspirations and entrepreneurial outcomes. Quite important to the interviewees’ stories is the uniqueness of each aspiration story, but, also the centrality of purposeful effort to achieve better life. That effort to achieve their aspiration can be understood as a state of in-­ betweenness—between the home country, host country and the global. Their aspiration is not so much about integrating to the host nation for success or permanency, rather it is about the agency to take calculated economic risk and investment in the form of an adventure with imaginaries of success. Thus, the aspiration as an imagination and adventure retains its power to motivate even in the face of hostility and constraints. In other words, the uninvited but resident migrants remain above the confines of migration control if they can avoid detection and deportation through informal tactics.

Migration Management, South African Citizens and African Migrants in South Africa From the dais of migration management, depending on whose perspective, the poor African migrant or the black South African, South Africa’s future may hold hope for grand success or anxiety about socioeconomic security. As the South African government doubles down on immigration as one of the critical means to manage its economic uncertainty, and the international community and NGOs amplify their voices for migrants’ rights issues, hope and anxiety are simultaneously reproduced. South Africa’s vision for its society through immigration is framed in the global language of national development and security prerogatives. Following that approach, the country’s Immigration Regulation Act of 2014 placed emphasis on critical skills and favours the highly educated and high-level professionals. Geographical preference also targets the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) excluding itself. Investment cut-off for business

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people was placed at five million rands—that is, a 100% increase from the previous immigration regulation, indicating a preference for successful business people. Although such ambitious criteria in selecting its immigrants are not unique in a global context, it does not reflect the country’s immigration experience. For instance, the majority of the migrants in South Africa are from within the African region, with low-medium skill level, even as the country also attracts high-skilled professionals such as doctors from African countries. Annual reports from the DHA revealed that 1283 permanent residence permits, and 141,555 temporary permits were issued to migrants in 2012; Africans made up 54.4% of the temporary permits and 53.2% of the permanent permits. Zimbabweans and Nigerians made the largest percentage of the total migrants. By setting the bar very high for accepting entrepreneurs, the government indicated its unwillingness to work with majority of its migrant population. Narratives from my interviewees indicate that the first challenge they had to deal with in South Africa was avoiding deportation. Thus, knowing that they could not meet the requirements for formal residence permits, they opted for asylum seeker status, as an available alternative to illegal status. That gives them extra time and the platform to hope for a positive and humane response to their desire to remain in South Africa. All but one of the interviewees chose to apply for asylum as the only legal way to remain in South Africa, even though their experiences were different. An interviewee recounted how she tried to renew her visitors’ visa before it expired but she was unsuccessful. She then went to the DHA to ask about how she can remain legally in the country but had to leave because the officials were harsh, and she became scared that she will be deported. With hindsight, she considered that approach of seeking the legal means of remaining in the country as naïve and faulty. After a year of living in the country with the expired permit, she paid a DHA official to erase her personal information from the system. Obliterating the old information on her presence in South Africa gave her the opportunity to apply for asylum as a new entrant. The migrants’ aspiration suggests that their exclusion from the vision of migration to South Africa does not obliterate their desire to pursue grand visions in South Africa. Rather, it spurs them to seek alternative means to achieve their aspirations in the situation where the difficulties cannot be negotiated or ignored. However, although aspirations in that vein emphasize the agency of the migrants, yet there is an interplay of the migrants’ agency and structural constraints (Carling and

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Schewel 2018) that reproduces the outcome of ability to remain in South Africa. For the DHA, the immigration vision of the South African government creates extreme bureaucratic challenges. For example, given the stringent approach to immigration control in South Africa, clarity in the legal definition of what constitutes illegality in immigration choices of migrants becomes critical in identifying potential deportees. However, CoRMSA (2008) calls attention to ambiguities in the definition of the ‘illegal’ foreigner in South Africa, which results in the arrest and detention of refugees and asylum seekers that are waiting to submit applications or whose applications are being processed. Expectedly, a combination of ambiguous definitions and immigration preferences that cannot be met by a large number of the migrant population, will contribute to overburdening the migration management system. This can be seen from the DHA’s annual reports on the huge amount of asylum applications and deportation. For example, the DHA’s annual report for 2007/2008 indicated that 207,206 people applied for asylum permits; in 2009 (DHA 2009/2010) 364,638 asylum applications were received; in 2011–2012 (DHA 2011/2012) the figure was 81,708, and in 2016, 35,377 new asylum seekers were registered. Deportation numbers are also sky high with 54,169 persons deported during 2014–2015 financial year (DHA 2014/2015). With such high volume of applications, the DHA is often going through processes of transforming and improving its reception systems both to improve the experiences of the migrant clients and to meet the goals of South African immigration stipulations. For example, in 2008 a wide range of processes were initiated to improve the processing time for asylum applications, by 2009 the DHA reported success in accomplishing the goal of the turnaround process, and by 2010, their report indicated partial success. However, CoRMSA’s (2009) annual report, while acknowledging some of the successes of the turnaround strategy, noted that new challenges were created by the system dedicated to rapid processing of applications. A review of CoRMSA’s reports shows that the pressure from DHA set targets on number of applications, placed staff under duress as they struggled to meet daily targets. For instance, CoRMSA reported that Refugee Status Determination Officers (RSDOs) were left with less than an hour to “conduct an interview and write a decision”. Pressured to meet the set targets, in several cases researchers saw RSDOs fail to make individual decisions but “simply cut and paste from previously written documents” (ibid., 2009: 86).

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To the asylum seekers, the decisions on asylum application took a subjective and random turn, that inadvertently gives hope for a redress in appeals. In a similar note, when the DHA decided to ease the overburdened deportation centres by engaging private providers for supplementary services, it was lauded as a milestone accomplishment (DHA 2008–2009). However, CoRMSA’s report (2011) warned that the private providers are usurping the role of immigration officials as they assumed the responsibility to determine migrant cases that could be brought to immigration officials. The migrants are thus compelled to register their complaints with private providers that are without professional training on immigration issues. Such challenges create tactical opportunities for migrants, trigger active advocacy for migrants’ rights and become a fetid ground for corrupt practices to thrive. In that context, immigration remains a highly politicized, but also a rights activism domain that brings migrant issues to the forefront. The visibility of the migrant is seen by citizens as “visual symbols of the government’s inadequacy” (Misago 2011) in immigration control. For the citizens, a context of active advocacy for migrants’ rights and the perceived weakness of the government to get rid of the presence of the migrants generate anxieties that are related to socioeconomic insecurity. The migrants’ aspirations are not necessarily dispelled by that context, as they engage their adverse context for opportunities, even as they recognize the constraint in their context. As one of the interviewees argued, the challenges and hardships that are experienced in the host country do not come as a surprise because the migrant recognizes that she/he is outside the support found in the home country. The aspiration of my interviewees highlights their commitment to working for their future desires. This shift in emphasis from the Now to the Future is at the crux of the interviewees’ narratives of their aspirations. Their contemplation of the future thus couches the sting from their experience of adversity and hardship and allows engagement with their present conditions. Thus, the constraint created by South African migration management system does not obscure their ability to see opportunities. Indeed, “[t]oday people see you walking; tomorrow they can see you driving a car, probably a very expensive car” is a powerful visual summary of the essence of my interviewees’ hopes, tactics and aspiration. This aspiration creates a corridor for the agents of migration management to explore more flexible immigration options for broader categories of migrants.

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Conclusion The recent (28 July 2018) overhaul of South Africa’s immigration regulations in the released white paper on migration is reportedly developed to focus on Africa and move away from its apartheid past. However, the strategic changes elaborated in the document followed the militarized and securitization perspective that criminalizes economic migration of the poor and unskilled/ semi-skilled. What is missing is a broader conceptualization of migration management that is framed by the notion of development of people and places in mutually beneficial ways. There is the pathway where migration management will target regional development and bilateral agreements with labourers/entrepreneurs of sending countries to facilitate safe and mutually beneficial migration to South Africa. That approach to immigration management will focus on the human development of the actual migrant stock, the majority of whom come from the sub-region and other African states. Although the question of whether migration management can stop ‘unwanted’ migration is often answered in the negative, yet, creatively extending the practices of migration management beyond border control can be understood without the cynicism and problematization of state intentions. There is the room to explore how to achieve more positive results in migrants’ and host countries’ experiences of the migration process. If the vision is to build a cohesive society, it could be argued that focusing on sub/regional development and utilizing the African migrant stock as part of the human resources for societal development hold a promise. In the main time, the conflict between South Africa’s vision of migration management and the migrants’ aspiration will continue to ferment uneasiness and anxieties for the citizens. There are no winners or losers, only a long-drawn conflict without an end. Finally, using the migration management concept, attention is called not only to the intentions of the state but also to its macro-economic capacity. Turning the focus from the drafting of regulations and policies that exclude certain categories of African migrants to building entrepreneurial capacity and development cooperation with other African states will require a strong state. However, although the political and economic landscape has improved since the 1980s, the African state is still afflicted by multiple challenges that continue to constrain and capture its political and economic institutions (Fosu 2017). In particular, the South African state is embroiled in challenges that is inherited from its apartheid history

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and state capture and is constrained by weak administration, institutions and ideological innovation (Soma Pillay 2004; Matlosa 2017; Mkhabela 2017). Likewise, several of the African migrant sending countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and Nigeria are also dysfunctional in terms of citizens’ welfare, functional institutions and developed infrastructures (Meirotti and Masterson 2018). The official responses from such sending countries so far have not impacted the dominant securitization and criminalization rhetoric of migration management in South Africa. To develop and pursue a migration management regime that is suited for the African context will require a people-oriented leadership with an evolved pan-Africanist ideology from both sending and receiving countries.

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CHAPTER 11

Artisanal Miners, Migration and Remittances in Southern Africa Esther Makhetha

Introduction Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) generally involves ‘labour-­ intensive, low-tech mineral exploration and processing activities’ (Cuvelier 2017: 205). ASM has grown into a critical source of livelihood for millions of people across the African continent (Cuvelier 2017). In the abandoned and disused mines in South Africa, artisanal mining (locally known as zama-zama) has witnessed a dramatic expansion since the collapse of the regional mining complex in the late 1990s (Ledwaba and Mutemeri 2018; Makhetha 2017). The majority of the people working in these closed and abandoned mines are from neighbouring countries, notably Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Like elsewhere, migrant mine labour has remained a predominantly male affair both in the commercial mining industry and in the artisanal mining sector in South Africa (Cuvelier 2017; Ledwaba and Mutemeri 2017; Thornton 2014). This does not dispute the fact that where mining is taking place there are a lot of people, especially

E. Makhetha (*) Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_11

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women and children. These people often get involved in informal trading in these forms: street trading, cleaning and sorting minerals, as well as sex work (Cuvelier 2017). Just like male miners, some women also dig for minerals in open surface pits and underground (Benya 2016; Lahiri-Dutt and Macintyre 2016; Makhetha and Mnguni 2018) in both the commercial and artisanal mining industries. In the case of South Africa, women dig for minerals underground in the commercial mines (see Benya 2016). Over the years, mobility patterns of miners from Lesotho to South Africa have become much more complex. During the colonial and postcolonial era, migrant mine workers were recruited directly from their home countries via organised recruitment channels, notably through The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). There were other forms of organised movements as well from Lesotho to South African mines (Crush et al. 2010; Mhone 2001). These formal processes required miners to have documentation (passport) to cross the border into South Africa. Today artisanal miners organise themselves in Lesotho or mining areas in South Africa to occupy the abandoned and disused mines in South Africa, and in most cases they are undocumented. The different ways through which they unofficially cross the border to South Africa are discussed in the following sections. Once they gain access to the mining site, they regularly move from one mine to another; this usually depends on, among others, the ease of access or entry into the mine, friendship or relationship networks, or teams from Lesotho. Sometimes the presence of security officials on a mining site means they are constantly on the move to sites where they have networks that would allow them to get into the mine. Following the collapse of the regional mining complex, many migrants flocked to the abandoned and disused commercial mines to improve their livelihoods (Ledwaba and Mutemeri 2018; Munakamwe 2016). However, little has been written in the academic literature about the movement of Basotho artisanal miners to the abandoned and disused commercial mines in South Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, Jønsson and Bryceson (2014) argue that Tanzanian gold miners are similarly motivated by a quest for riches in an otherwise depressed agrarian landscape. Over the past three decades, the rush to mining sites for ‘left over’ gold has proliferated, often leading to massive influxes of people. Despite this knowledge on remittances from South African mines, little research has been conducted on the mobility of artisanal miners from Lesotho to South Africa and how they transfer their remittances from South Africa into Lesotho. Research by Crush et al. (2010) and CBL (2005) focused on the miners working in

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the commercial mining sector, not on the artisanal miners. To bridge this gap, this chapter explores how artisanal miners cross the border between Lesotho and South Africa, and the channels artisanal miners use to remit funds to Lesotho, since most of the artisanal miners are undocumented and have no access to the banks and formal financial institutions. In this way, the chapter examines Basotho artisanal miners’ mobility to abandoned and disused commercial mines in South Africa. It explores the context in which migration involving men from Lesotho occurs, which raises questions about crossing the border into South Africa and mobility from mine to mine within South Africa. The chapter further analyses the methods miners use to enter the abandoned and disused mines and the networks they negotiate to access entry into these mines. The chapter is organised as follows; 1. research context: migration and Lesotho’s changing rural economy, 2. migration and remittances since independence, 3. zama-zama migrants: migration and remittances, and 4. conclusion. Excluding the introduction: the research context, which gives the economic background of Lesotho. This is followed by a description of the historical patterns of labour migration flowing from Lesotho into South Africa, and organised means of remitting funds to Lesotho. A section that follows presents an ethnography on Basotho artisanal miners, migration, and remittances. This section shows how miners negotiate access to South Africa (sometimes without official papers), as well as into the abandoned and disused mines. The section further documents the causes of the movement of miners from mine to mine while already working in South Africa. Lastly, the section shows how these miners remit their funds or finances to Lesotho via informal channels, and conclusions are offered at the end. Methodologically, a review of literature on migration, artisanal mining, and remittances between Lesotho and South Africa was conducted. The chapter also draws on the researcher’s study of artisanal diamond mining in the highlands of Lesotho and Basotho men’s involvement in mining in South Africa’s abandoned and disused commercial mines. Data collection involved unstructured and semi-structured interviews with artisanal miners. The interview questions focused on, among other things, cross-­border migration/mobility of Basotho men to South Africa, recruitment, and remittances. The interview questions also included the questions on the causes of mobility of miners within South Africa and how they remit funds to Lesotho. The informants were interviewed between May 2013 and January 2014, August, October, and December 2018 as well as January

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2019. Moreover, these interviews were conducted in Sesotho, informants’ native language. For the purpose of this chapter, the author will focus only on artisanal miners working in South African mines, not those in the highlands of Lesotho.

Research Context: Migration and Lesotho’s Changing Rural Economy Lesotho is a unique country, which is completely enclosed by its neighbour South Africa. It got independence from the British in 1966. The country has been dependent wholly on its neighbour since independence (Coplan 1994; Ferguson 1990, 2006; Mafeje 1978). The population of Lesotho is estimated to be 2 million, of which 80 per cent are living in rural areas on farming, migrant labour (remittances), and informal economy (Braun 2011; Epprecht 2000; Ferguson 1990; Makhetha 2017; Maliehe 2016). Livestock production in Lesotho is categorised into two, one for men and the other for women. Women are normally involved in piggery and chicken rearing. Men, on the other hand, are involved in producing livestock such as cattle, goats, and sheep (Ferguson 1990). Lesotho is also dependent on foreign aid from donor countries and international development organisations, as well as revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). It is also a beneficiary of foreign direct investment, especially the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was introduced by President Barak Obama, the former president of the United States of America (Shakya 2011). Lesotho has been using the dual economy model which consists of subsistence farming and the remittances from South African mines. Subsistence farming is basically done in rural areas, and remittances from South African mines are still the main form of livelihood for Basotho even though the number of Basotho men working in the South African mines has declined. (Braun 2011; Crush et al. 2005, 2010). With retrenchments in the South African commercial mines, Basotho men occupy the abandoned and disused mines. Women, on the other hand, are increasingly migrating to South Africa to work as domestic labourers. Meanwhile, others move to textile factories in Maputsoe, Maseru, and Mafeteng in Lesotho (Bezuidenhout and Jeppesen 2011; Braun 2011; Makhetha 2017). This demonstrates a new pattern of migration, which has shifted from the male-dominated one to the feminised contemporary migration.

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Migration and Remittances Since Independence The majority of households in rural Lesotho depended on remittances at the peak of the mining sector in South Africa for their living (Crush et al. 2010; Wallman 1972). And households that did not have remittances were in a vulnerable state (Crush et al. 2010). From the 1990s, the southern African mining industry retrenched many foreign workers and employment opportunities closed up. As a result, there was a shift in migration patterns; women became more mobile within the country and in South Africa in pursuit of economic survival. They migrate to the lowlands, Maputsoe, Maseru, and Mafeteng to work in the textile factories (Bezuidenhout and Jeppesen 2011; Crush et  al. 2010; Trillo-Figueroa 2009). This shows how women have become more mobile and crossborder migration of Basotho women to South Africa. In the past, single young Basotho men used to work in the mines in South Africa (Crush et al. 2010). They supported their households with remittances. At the moment things are different. Based on the study conducted in 2010 by Crush, Dodson, Gay, Green, and Leduka, over 84 per cent of Basotho men working in the mines are married and household heads (Crush et al. 2010). These married aged 40 and above. This shift demonstrates the impact of retrenchment and closures of some mines, and this leads to less job creation (Crush et al. 2010). Crush et al.’s (2010) research is a nationwide study. In their study, they chose the informants by asking them a series of questions. The regional sample was 4700 households, and Lesotho sample size was 1023 households, consisting of 899 men and 177 women (Crush et al. 2010). The study showed a decreased number of the Basotho men joining and working in the mining sector in South Africa; however, the funds they remit to Lesotho have rather increased due to the increase in their wages (Crush et al. 2010). With the increased wages, Basotho men were supporting their family members in Lesotho, and some also supported secret lovers in South Africa. Some ended up leaving their households in Lesotho for secret lovers in South Africa (Crush et al. 2010; Maliehe 2016). This resulted in a decrease in the remittances to Lesotho, and for the households without mine workers, it became even more difficult (Crush et al. 2010; Maliehe 2016). The Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) (2005) found different results from conducting the same study done by Crush et al. (2010). The CBL findings showed that the decreased number of Basotho men working in

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South African mines affected the remittances. For instance, in 1991 about R120 million of remittances was sent to Lesotho, and in 2005 the remittances decreased to R400,000.00 (Central Bank of Lesotho 2005). Hence, the findings of the study by Crush et al. (2010) are disputed by the Central Bank of Lesotho (2005). The remittances to Lesotho were sent through the compulsory deferred pay (CDP) system, TEBA, the post office, and banks. In the contemporary Lesotho, funds are sent to Lesotho in an informal way (Crush et al. 2010). This is the reduced numbers of Basotho men working in the South African mines, and those who are working in the abandoned gold mines as well as those without travel documents. With the informal transfer of remittances to Lesotho, Lesotho government and the CBL do not know the exact amount of money that is remitted to the country. The remittances are often the main form of livelihood in Lesotho (Crush et al. 2010; Mususa 2014; Wallman 1972).

Zama-zama Migrants: Migration and Remittances Southern Africa has a long and rich history of population mobility. In fact, for centuries, there have been waves of temporary migration to the commercial mines and for seasonal agricultural work in South Africa (Mhone 2001). This constituted an important element in the livelihood strategies of people in the region. During the precolonial and early postcolonial periods, there existed a series of well-organised and highly mobile states, such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, and Swaziland (Andersson 2006; Ledwaba and Mutemeri 2017; Matsumoto 2014; Plath et al. 1987; Townsend 1997). Miners were recruited from these countries prior to migrating to the commercial mines in South Africa. At the time, the South African economy relied on the mobility of the workforce from these countries to the mines and other industries, including agriculture (Mhone 2001). In recent times, Basotho miners organise themselves within Lesotho and in South Africa prior to migrating to the abandoned and disused mines. Their decision to move to these mines is normally a livelihood improvement choice, which is always based on the limited information obtained from other Basotho artisanal miners who are already working in the abandoned and disused mines. This pattern resonates with that of Tanzanian artisanal miners, whose decision to move to a mining site is also a livelihood choice that is based on restricted information (Jønsson and Bryceson 2014). Subsequent decisions to move have the

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benefit of miners’ greater knowledge about mining as well as heightened awareness of how much they do not know about the next site. The decision to migrate for gold mining engenders multiple uncertainties in terms of livelihood failure, family separation, accidents, physical attack, disease, and destitution. Miners must be willing to endure these risks in their quest for striking gold (Jønsson and Bryceson 2014). The difference, however, between Tanzanian and Basotho miners is that Tanzanian miners move from one mine to another within the same country and without the challenges of crossing the border into a foreign country. The mines they occupy are usually new mines, commonly referred to as a ‘gold rush’, whereas Basotho artisanal miners move from one country to another in order to access multiple mining sites, which are abandoned and disused commercial mining sites. They normally face challenges when crossing the border into South Africa, especially the undocumented miners. They access the country through several routes, which include negotiating with officials at the border and middlemen (between them and officials), crossing the Mohokare river, or being smuggled through the border in disguise. Mr Mahlomola (30  years), a migrant artisanal miner, described how he crossed the border to South Africa with an expired passport: When I crossed the border between Maputsoe and Ficksburg, I was accompanied by two men whom I meet in Maputsoe. They are always there close to the Lesotho customs to ask people if they need assistance without a passport or an expired one. I told them that my passport had expired, and I didn’t have money. They wanted me to pay them M1150.00, and I told them that I only had M100.00. They accepted. They told me to follow them from Lesotho to South Africa. In Lesotho, we passed without showing the documents to the officials. When we got to South Africa, one of them took the money, went into one of the doors, and I waited outside with another one. After something like 30 minutes, he came and took my bags and we followed him to the other side. From there I thanked them and got into a taxi to Johannesburg. I did not show my expired passport to any one at the border.

Upon arriving at the mining site, Basotho miners normally interact with other miners and learn how to mine. Some of the miners have never worked in a mine before, neither in the unlicensed artisanal diamond 1

 Maloti is Lesotho currency. Maloti is plural, Loti singular. It is equal to South African rand.

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mining sites in the highlands of Lesotho, nor in commercial diamond mining sites in Lesotho, nor in the commercial mines in South Africa. This category of miners acquires mining skills through hands-on experience and informal transfer of knowledge by working with older and more skilled artisanal miners (see Makhetha 2017; Nhlengetwa and Hein 2015; Thornton 2014). They use rudimentary tools and the mining method can be described as ‘labour intensive’ (Hinton et  al. 2003; Thabane 2003; Thornton 2014). This is also a common practice in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ghana, where artisanal miners use rudimentary tools. Most miners stated that they prefer to work in groups underground and often form partnership bonds with gold dealers outside the mine. The groups of miners working in partnerships in underground pits often range from three to four members or even more. These forms of collective digging involve teams working along national and friendship lines, as well as teams from Lesotho, that is, Basotho or teams such as terene and matlama [seakhi] (see Makhetha forthcoming) from Lesotho. These teams also assist new miners by letting them work under their shadow for some time until they feel that they are ready to work on their own. Experienced miners often give the newly recruited miners the choice to remain or leave their teams after they gained the necessary mining skills. In both cases, collective digging is organised around Basotho artisanal miners, or Basotho traditional music teams (terene, seakhi/matlama). Moreover, some Basotho artisanal miners are flexible and often team up with other miners from other countries, including Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, and South Africans. Nhlengetwa and Hein (2015) asserted that artisanal miners have defined roles in a value chain and tend to maintain their position in their networks. Their defined roles are sometimes based along ethnic groups. In some cases, the artisanal miners are groups of brothers, or even whole families, women and children included (Thornton 2014). Thornton (2014) reiterates that artisanal miners work in groups ranging from 5 to 15 men and argues that more than 15 normally leads to internal conflict. Some of the Basotho artisanal miners prefer to stay underground for a long period. They get food from those who sell underground, and they claim that food is extremely expensive underground. In some cases, they get food from men working in the commercial mines. They have social networks with commercial mine workers and interact with them, but at the same time they often state that commercial mine workers are far from them under ground. Mr Moremi (36 years), a migrant Mosotho artisanal miner, had the following to say during an interview about the prices of

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food: ‘tinned food like fish [pilchard], corned meat [normally called beef], beans; their price ranges from ZAR 100.00 to ZAR 200.00 per item’. After arriving and settling at a mining site for a while, miners regularly move from one mine to another. The decision of Basotho artisanal miners to move from one abandoned and disused mining site to another is often based on the working conditions, easy access to the pit, building and improving their mining career, social networking, as well as the desire to join their favourite team from Lesotho. Even the heavy presence of security officials does not dissuade them from moving to new mining sites where they have networks that would allow them to get access into the mine. The same is true for artisanal miners elsewhere in Africa. In Tanzania, for instance, Jønsson and Bryceson (2014) observed that miners’ decisions to move was driven by opportunities embedded in the collegial networks necessary for building a mining career, namely, new site information, pit access, and loan support. Significantly, the sources of information that necessitate their decision to move on were from fellow miners instead of relatives and friends (Jønsson and Bryceson 2014), which is very similar to the case of Basotho artisanal miners. Mr Mosese (40  years), a migrant Mosotho artisanal miner, described how and why he moved from the first mining site in Free State to Gauteng Province: After staying underground for more than a year in the Free State, I went to Lesotho to visit my family. When I came back from Lesotho, there was the new security company at the entrance of the mine. I did not know them, and I stayed for a year outside the mine trying to negotiate access to the mine. After a year, I moved to Gauteng, where I moved into a mine in Roodepoort, which is wet underground and it is not easy to stay for a long period. There were a lot of Basotho men, who already had connections with access to the mine.

Remittances The transfer of remittances by Basotho miners working in the commercial mines was managed by formal institutions such as the compulsory deferred pay (CDP) system, TEBA, the post office, and banks; however, recent information indicates that the vast majority of cash remittances flow through informal channels (usually carried by hand) (Crush et al. 2010). In fact, Basotho artisanal miners working in the abandoned and disused mines in South Africa send remittances to Lesotho mostly through

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informal channels. These informal channels range from fellow mine workers to taxi drivers commuting between Lesotho and South Africa. Most of the miners are undocumented and have no access to the banks and formal financial institutions; hence they depend on social networks and trust to remit their finances. Even those with legal documents indicated that they were afraid of depositing large sums of money into banks; this was to avoid being investigated by the bank, asked to justify the sources of the huge sums of money, and reported to the police. Makina (2012) supports that the majority of migrants with financial access still prefer to utilise informal transfer mechanisms. The same goes for Basotho artisanal miners in South Africa and elsewhere. The individuals whom the artisanal miners entrust to convey money to Lesotho are people that are well known by the miner because they come from the same district or the miner knows the chief of that particular person. In the case of a taxi driver, it therefore means that the miner knows him very well and had travelled with that taxi for a considerable period to develop a level of familiarity and trust. This is a form of reciprocity and it is not standard like banks or formal institutions. Mr Morake (35 years), a migrant Mosotho artisanal miner, described below how he sends money to Lesotho: I always ask a person that I know to transfer money to Lesotho to my mother. When I give my mother ZAR 50,000.00, this person I give him ZAR 3000.00, as a way of thanking him. I always make sure that I know his district, and local chief. In case things go wrong, I know where to report him.

Conclusion The main lesson from this chapter is that cross-border labour migration (including Basotho men leaving their homeland to work in the commercial mines in South Africa) has for many decades been a common phenomenon for foreign mine workers in southern Africa. However, following the closure of some of the commercial gold mines, many Basotho men and foreign nationals from southern Africa have been working in abandoned and disused mines. Some of the Basotho miners are undocumented, and most often, the border between Lesotho and South Africa is invisible to them as they negotiate access to enter South Africa with expired documents or without documents at all. The mobility of Basotho artisanal miners from Lesotho is motivated by the desire to improve their livelihoods, be it upon arrival at the first commercial mining site or at the abandoned

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and disused mine in South Africa. The decision to move from the first mining site to the second and beyond is based on the working conditions, pit access, and the desire to further their careers, and in most cases this kind of mobility is well-thought-out. The miners often face a dilemma of moving from a known and familiar mining area to a new one, which they know nothing about other than there might be more minerals there (Jønsson and Bryceson 2014). Basotho artisanal miners working in the abandoned and disused mines in South Africa send remittances to Lesotho. These miners send money mostly through informal channels. These informal channels range from fellow mine workers to taxi drivers commuting between Lesotho and South Africa. Most of the miners are undocumented and have no access to the banks and formal financial institutions, and hence they depend on social networks and trust to remit their finances. They do not deposit money in formal financial institutions, even those with proper documents (passports), because of the fear of justifying the sources of the huge sums, in case they are reported to the police. Nevertheless, artisanal miners often face challenges when going back to Lesotho after a lengthy period in South Africa. Some get arrested for working in the abandoned and disused mines and travelling without documents or expired documents in a foreign country. In most cases, miners are aware of these challenges, and yet chose to leave Lesotho and venture into an unknown territory due to the high rate of unemployment back home. The dangers often associated with an unknown territory include leaving families back in Lesotho and working in the dangerous and unsafe mines without proper equipment and professional training other than the hands-on practical training offered by experienced artisanal miners. The issue of undocumented migration between Lesotho and South Africa thus illuminates the absence of a regional migration management regime in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region countries. As the cases of the Basotho artisanal miners show, the border between the two countries was invisible to them, suggesting the need for countries in the region to seriously move in the direction of developing free movement within the SADC. In any case, even if the states fail to do so, the people on the ground are already doing this. In which case there is need for states in the region and other parts of Africa to craft migration policies which are people-centred. It is not enough that some of the immigration officials turned a blind eye to undocumented cross-border migration between Lesotho and South Africa. Likewise, it promotes crime when

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some immigration officials accepted bribes from Basotho artisanal miners so that they could cross the border from or to South Africa. There is a need for clear policies which promote free human mobility so as to reduce or eliminate dangerous forms of undocumented cross-border migration like human smuggling. Similarly, there is a need for migration policies to be sensitive to informal cross-border livelihood strategies, like the case of zama-zama, so that the full developmental potential of these could be enhanced. This is important to emphasise given the move towards regional integration in the SADC, which should necessarily promote regional development and the progress of all countries (and people/actors like the informal miners, who are the subject of this contribution) in the region.

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PART IV

Conclusion: Migration, Africa-Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order

CHAPTER 12

Beyond the Present: Migration Governance for Regions and Inclusive Development Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, Inocent Moyo, and Jussi P. Laine

Introduction At the beginning of this book, we were faced with a migration conundrum and the way in which it plays out in Africa-Europe relations as well as in intra-Africa relations. A general perception and, in fact, a particular narrative exist in the media, in academic literature and in many a political discourse that migrants and migration pose security threats. Countries that are economically better off particularly raise this alarm that migrants from their less well-off neighbours and further afield bring problems into their C. C. Nshimbi Centre for the Study of Governance Innnovation (GovInn)/Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Hatfield, South Africa I. Moyo (*) Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa J. P. Laine Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, Kuopio, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 I. Moyo et al. (eds.), Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2478-3_12

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territories. Problems cited range from diminishing the ability of recipient national governments to provide social services to their own citizens to threats on the physical security of citizens to threats to law and the potential disruption of order to threats on national security (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008, 2010; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). In short, migration from regions such as Africa is unwanted and raises concerns in places such as the EU about crime and the national security of the region and its member states (Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas 2013:530). The 11 September 2001 attacks on the US helped reinforce this view, based on the argument that immigration control had failed and thus contributed to the attacks (Faist 2002). Yet, historical continuities suggest that migration is a potent force that can also positively transform societies. In Africa, migration is thus an important instrument for development, providing essential mechanisms and strategies for survival for migrant-sending countries/communities and the migrants themselves. Recognising this, the African Union (AU) crafted a policy and formulated a position on migration to guide member states in ways they can employ migration for development (African Union 2006a, b). The latter view, and the policy and position adopted by the AU, raises prospects of recognising that migration is an important factor among the many that define global processes in the world and that it is also an essential contributor to development. With such a view, holding migration responsible for disorder and insecurity diminishes, as the prospects it offers to both receiving and sending countries come to the fore. For example, the financial remittances migrants make to their countries of origin are touted for not only contributing to the macro-economic development of those countries but transforming migrants’ sending communities and their families too (Jemaneh 2016; Kleist 2018; Maphosa 2005, 2007, 2009; Moyo and Nicolau 2016; Sander and Maimbo 2005; Tevera and Chikanda 2009). But this, and, of course, the apparent contradictions, confusion, challenges and, yes, the positive experiences and outcomes of migration elucidated in this book, makes it clear that addressing the challenges associated with migration and seeking the best out of it clear the conundrum which it appears to be. Certainly, Africa-Europe migration points to the need to move beyond ill-informed populist narratives of African migrants flooding Europe. It points to the need to imagine a future in which the migration conundrum the two regions are experiencing is jointly handled to promote development and well-being on both sides of the Mediterranean,

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and not its “boderization” (Moreno-Lax 2018:120), so as to keep out migrants from Africa. As a result, this chapter attempts to point in that direction as it briefly recollects and attempts to show how the contributions in this book have delivered on the promise made at the beginning. That more migration occurs within Africa than towards destinations outside of the continent is well documented and articulated (Nshimbi 2017). However, a contradictory narrative persists which suggests that Europe is under threat of being inundated with migrants attempting to escape poverty, war and conflict in Africa (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016). This view in and of itself creates tension between the parties. But even within Africa, between member states of the same regional economic communities (RECs) as well as the AU, tensions exist due to attempts by some countries to curb migration into their territories from other African countries. Thus, intra-Africa migration, and particularly the form characterised by cross-border informality, is discouraged and restricted in/by some African countries. Correspondingly, migration stirs a xenophobic backlash in such countries, which places migrants from within Africa in a limbo. This calls for proactive and robust mechanisms at national level and at the level of the RECs to ensure migration is handled in line with the prescriptions and guidance laid down by the AU, as some contributions to this volume suggest (e.g. Chaps. 2, 3 and 9). Indeed, the analyses of migration in this volume point to the need for effective migration governance, which should lead to functional regions in which inclusive development is promoted. Going further, therefore, this volume suggests three broad implications of the migration conundrum on Europe-Africa as well as intra-Africa relations and inclusive development. In the following sections, we briefly consider these implications.

Regions and Development In Chap. 2, Oloruntoba examines the causative factors and dimensions of the global migration crisis and concludes that history shows that countries that seem to be comfortable at a given stage in time are not guaranteed to be in such a position in the future. In Chap. 3, Aniche argues that a reciprocal relationship exists between migration and sustainable development and concludes that while documented migration tends to beget sustainable development, undocumented migration tends to endanger it. The relationship between migration and sustainable development can thus be summarised as follows: documented migration generally leads to

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sustainable development and undocumented migration negatively impacts on or undermines sustainable development. This is the context within which we invoke the notion of migration and sustainable development, in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which target ending poverty in all its forms everywhere (UN 2015). The fact that undocumented migration militates against the achievement of sustainable development as encapsulated in SDGs should be taken as a clarion call for an effective management of migration so that there is a win-win situation for both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. This calls for Europe and Africa to determine a comprehensive and effective global migration policy which fosters documented migration leading to sustainable development and not the securitisation of borders which engenders undocumented migration, which in turn endangers sustainable development.

Africa-Europe Relations Knoll and Laine, in Chaps. 4 and 5, respectively, bring in the EU dimension to the Europe-Africa migration conundrum. Knoll explores the implications of the 2015 so-called migration crisis on EU development policy and practice towards African countries. She examines how various migration narratives and interest constellations shape the EU and its member states’ strategic policy approaches to migration and development as well as their impact on EU development cooperation and spending in Africa. One of her conclusions is that the short-term gains the EU has seen in reducing irregular migration flows obscure the fact that the EU’s internal reforms on its system for managing asylum and migration lag behind. Laine takes a slightly different approach by examining underlying attitudes and prevailing narratives of African migration to Europe. With this, he argues that Europe’s attempts to “secure” or “protect” borders have failed because migration is often seen as a border security issue that needs combatting. Tshimpaka and Nshimbi too, in Chaps. 6 and 7, respectively, discuss migration with a take on the Europe-Africa dimension, but from the perspective of Africans intending to migrate and migrating to Europe and those already in Europe. Tshimpaka, for instance, argues that besides remittances, migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country which geographically stretches from Southern to Central and Eastern Africa, exercise intercontinental citizenship in order to help reinstate democratic governance in the DRC. He concludes that

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this practice also ignites local citizens back home, in the DRC, into action and forces the authorities there to abandon authoritarian tactics. Nshimbi takes a different spin by primarily focusing on would-be migrants in Africa whose sights are, ultimately, on Europe. Notwithstanding the popular narrative that Africans are desperately attempting to escape poverty (and, perhaps, war and conflict too) for better life in Europe, he argues that “poverty” as an explanation of the purported unabated attempts by the migrants to go to Europe is too simplistic. Instead, he argues, informality and borders provide meaningful concepts through which the type of migration that European authorities and border agencies seem to be failing to curb should be explained. He concludes that history and the way in which Africans fundamentally perceive and approach borders influence the African migrants’ orientation and attitudes towards the socio-economic and political realities of a globalising world.

Intra-Africa Relations Moyo, in Chap. 9, picks the thread of informality in migration and focuses his investigation on migrant traders—those informal actors who cross borders in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and beyond, for the purpose of buying and selling goods—operating in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa. He argues that the fact that these actors are constructed as informal suggests that they are placed on the margins of the socio-economic space. In making his concluding remarks, Moyo suggests the adoption of innovative ways of managing migrant traders for inclusive development and regional integration. Spel maintains the focus on South Africa–based migrants from other African countries, in Chap. 10, by examining their aspirations and the anxieties of South African citizens through a conceptual analysis of migration management and a narrative analysis of empirical data from the migrants living in the city of Johannesburg. She goes on to argue for an inclusive vision of the future that broadens the spatial framing of vulnerability and well-being. Still on actors engaged in migration and operating in the informal sector, Makhetha, in Chap. 11, focuses on artisanal miners from Lesotho working in abandoned and closed gold mines in South Africa. They, thus, examine the cross-border mobility practices of Basotho men working informally in abandoned and closed mines in Johannesburg and, further, explore not only how these artisanal miners negotiate access to South Africa without travel documents or with expired passports but also how they remit funds

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to Lesotho, since most of them are undocumented and lack access to banks and formal financial institutions. That migration, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 2001  in the US, has been a contentious issue and source of tension between sending and receiving countries is undisputable. The contentions and tensions are also evident at both the macro and micro levels—between continents as well as between states, and between individuals in and communities within a migrant-receiving country too, hence the rise of anti-­ immigrant populism in Europe and the escalation of xenophobic violence against foreign African nationals in some African countries. As if to complete, sober up and balance the contributions to this volume on the conundrum which migration presents itself to be, Kwenge, in Chap. 8, discusses the case of a real-life and empirical project that Freedom House South Africa, an independent watchdog organisation that works on expanding freedom and democracy globally (Freedom House 2019), conducted in 2016. The project sought to mitigate xenophobic violence in South Africa and, thus, set out to establish whether a planned multi-­ pronged intervention in a democratic state could prevent costly outbreaks of collective violence that undermined livelihoods and put democracy at risk. In her brief overview of the project, Kwenge reports that community actors and conflicting groups had to learn to cooperate and produce collective solutions to community problems. A critical outcome of the project was the reduction in prejudice against outsiders and their sense of vulnerability. The relatively positive outcomes which have been achieved by Freedom House South Africa in terms of forging positive relations between South African nationals and foreign nationals in cities like Johannesburg and Pretoria are symbolic of the approaches which need to be adopted in managing intra-Africa migration relations as well as Europe-Africa migration relations. In intra-Africa migration relations, this should involve resolving the crisis of identity in which Africans are self-hating, as manifested by killing migrants from other African countries in frequent and virulent xenophobic outbursts. In both intra-Africa and Europe-Africa migration relations, the common issue around which such relations can be built is the realisation that all people have what Oloruntoba (Chap. 2) refers to as a shared humanity. This shared humanity should motivate Europe and Africa to confront migration issues based on symmetrical power relations and not on the misguided view that Africans are flooding Europe and need to be stopped or at least boderised.

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References African Union (AU). 2006a. The migration policy framework for Africa. Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, Banjul, The Gambia, 25–29 June 2006. ———. 2006b. African common position on migration and development. Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, Banjul, The Gambia, 25–29 June 2006. Faist, T. 2002. “Extension du domaine de la lutte”: International migration and security before and after September 11th 2001. International Migration Review 36 (1): 7–14. Ferrer-Gallardo, X. 2008. The Spanish-Moroccan border complex: Processes of geopolitical, functional and symbolic rebordering. Political Geography 27: 301–321. ———. 2010. Territorial (dis)continuity dynamics between Ceuta and Morocco: Conflictual fortification vis-à-vis co-operative interaction at the EU border in Africa. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 102 (1): 24–38. Ferrer-Gallardo, X., and A.  Albet-Mas. 2013. EU-Limboscapes: Ceuta and the proliferation of migrant detention spaces across the European Union. European Urban and Regional Studies 23 (3): 527–530. Freedom House. 2019. About us. https://freedomhouse.org/about-us. Accessed 20 Oct 2019. Jemaneh, Y. (2016). Ethiopia: Engaging the diaspora in nation building. The Ethiopian Herald. https://allafrica.com/stories/201601051009.html. Accessed 18 January 2019. Kleist, N. 2018. Somali diaspora groups in Sweden – Engagement in development and relief work in the Horn of Africa. Delmi Report. https://delmi.se›upl›files. Maphosa, F. 2005. The impact of remittances from Zimbabweans working in South Africa on rural livelihoods in the southern districts of Zimbabwe. Forced migration working paper series # 14, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand. ———. 2007. Remittances and development: The impact of migration to South Africa on rural livelihoods in southern Zimbabwe. Development Southern Africa 24 (1): 123–136. ———. 2009. Rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe: Impact of remittances from South Africa, Monograph Series. Dakar: CODESRIA. Moreno‐Lax, V.2018. The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitization of Human Rights: The ‘Rescue‐Through‐Interdiction/Rescue‐Without‐ Protection’ Paradigm. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (1): 119–140 Moyo, I., and M.D. Nicolau. 2016. Remittances and development: Zimbabwean migrant teachers in South Africa and their impact on their Zimbabwean families. African Population Studies 30 (2): 2506–2519.

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Nshimbi, C.C. 2017. Harnessing diverse migrant and remittance flows for development. In Rural Africa in motion. Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara, ed. S. Mercandalli and B. Losch, 26–27. Rome: FAO and CIRAD. Nshimbi, C.C., and I. Moyo. 2016. Visible and invisible bordering practices: The EU-African migration conundrum and spatial mobility of borders. World Journal of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development 13 (4): 300–314. Papadopoulos, D., and V.S. Tsianos. 2013. After citizenship: Autonomy of migration, organisational ontology and mobile commons. Citizenship Studies 17 (2): 178–196. Sander, C., and S.M. Maimbo. 2005. Migrant remittances in Africa – A regional perspective. In Remittances–development impact and future prospects, ed. S.M. Maimbo and D. Ratha, 54–77. Washington, DC: World Bank. Tevera, D., and A. Chikanda. (2009). Migrant remittances and household survival in Zimbabwe. Migration policy brief no 51, Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town: IDASA. United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New  York: UN A/RES/70/1. https://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E. Accessed 22 Oct 2019.

Index1

A Abandoned and disused commercial mines, 258, 259 Africa, vii, viii, 4, 7–12, 18–28, 30, 31, 49, 52–54, 65, 66, 69, 70, 77n24, 79–84, 86, 95, 102, 103, 106–111, 137, 166, 168–171, 173, 174, 177–180, 182, 184, 185, 203, 204, 214–216, 220, 221, 275 African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD), 8, 215, 216 African Economic Community (AEC), 7, 8, 26, 214–216, 218 African informal migrants, 213–222 African Union (AU), vii, viii, 6–8, 18, 20, 25–27, 69, 76n21, 83, 83n38, 108, 109, 126, 214–216, 218, 219, 274, 275 Amsterdam Treaty, 38

Anxieties, 12, 68, 94, 98, 104, 200, 227–248, 277 Apartheid, 21, 24, 195, 196, 203, 206, 216, 217, 228–231, 235–238, 247 Artisanal miners, 12, 257–268, 277 Aspiration, 12, 52, 84, 107, 182, 227–248, 277 B Basotho artisanal miners, 258, 259, 262–268 Basotho miners, 262, 263, 265, 266 Brain drain, 47, 50, 110 Brain gain, 52, 53, 55 C Capital flight, 47, 50 Child trafficking, 48

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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Community, 9, 30, 54, 55, 57, 81, 119–121, 123, 124, 146, 151, 167, 181, 193–211, 227, 233, 236, 243, 278 Conflict, 17, 21, 23, 31, 40, 47, 48, 50, 72, 82, 82n37, 97, 103, 106, 111, 123, 136, 137, 181, 184, 194, 196–198, 201–203, 208, 247, 264, 275, 277 Corruption, 11, 49, 200, 210 Cross-border migration, 12, 221, 259, 261, 267, 268 D Deportation, 23, 25, 40, 243–246 Development, vii, viii, 6–8, 10–12, 17–31, 38–57, 66, 69, 72–75, 77–81, 77n25, 78n26, 79n31, 84–86, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109, 111, 130, 143, 167, 169, 176, 179, 181, 183, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221, 234, 236, 243, 247, 274–277 Diaspora remittances, 52, 53, 55, 56 Documented migration, 5, 40, 42, 57, 275, 276 E Economic migration, 247 Entrepreneurship, 227, 242, 243 Environmental degradation, 41 Europe, 3–12, 18, 37, 65, 93, 117–152, 165–185 European Union (EU), vii, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18, 20, 26, 27, 65–86, 74n17, 93–95, 98–101, 103,

106–111, 133, 135, 137–139, 146, 166, 167, 169, 179, 180, 234, 274, 276 F Forced migration, 39, 40, 102, 112 Foreign migrants, 194, 196, 206, 230 Free Trade Areas (FTA), 215, 220 G Global migration, 18, 20–23, 57, 102, 103, 275, 276 Global partnership, 42 Global trade, 52 H Human rights, 7, 18, 23, 27, 40, 82n37, 118, 123–125, 127, 136, 138, 146, 195, 215 Human smuggling, 47, 48, 268 Human trafficking, 47, 48 I Inequality, 21, 38, 41, 47–49, 51, 52, 56, 72, 105, 112, 129, 143, 194, 195, 197, 200, 237, 238 Informal cross border trade, 214, 216, 219–221 Informal remittances, 49, 50, 54 Infrastructures, 41, 48, 51, 53, 54, 56, 210, 222, 230, 241, 248 Insecurity, 18, 47, 48, 94, 98, 234, 239, 246, 274 International migration, 37–40, 42–47, 50, 52, 53, 55–57, 128, 165, 184

 INDEX 

Investment, 25, 27, 30, 47, 49, 51–55, 72, 99, 101, 109, 110, 234, 243, 260 Involuntary migration, 40 Irregular migration, 7, 21, 37, 39, 40, 48, 51, 65, 66, 72–74, 77, 77n24, 79–85, 81n36, 93, 196, 215, 234, 276 L Labor market, 6, 20, 42–44, 71, 95, 105, 169 M Migration, vii, 3, 17, 37, 65, 93, 117, 165, 193–211, 215, 227, 257–268, 273 Migration management, 12, 47, 80, 82, 85, 184, 219, 228, 229, 233–235, 238, 241, 243–248, 267, 277 Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), 7, 215 Mobility, 4, 6, 72, 79, 85, 95, 101, 102, 106, 170, 173, 214, 216, 218–221, 230, 233, 234, 241, 258, 259, 262, 266–268, 277 P Peacebuilding, 193–211 Population, 6, 20, 22, 24, 37, 43, 71, 86, 101–104, 106, 110, 128, 133, 134, 137, 168, 199, 200, 206, 228–230, 236, 244, 245, 260 Poverty, 21, 22, 38, 39, 41, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 72, 78, 96, 103, 106, 110, 111, 166, 167, 179, 181, 184, 185, 197, 206, 213, 234–238, 275–277

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Protest, 21, 131, 134, 141, 142, 144–147, 150, 151, 194, 197, 198, 200, 202, 207, 209, 210 R Refugee, 4–6, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 23, 27, 40, 65–69, 67n2, 73, 77n25, 78, 86, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101–105, 111, 121, 128, 128n3, 138, 142, 165, 172, 184, 230, 245 Regional Economic Communities (REC), 7, 8, 12, 214–216, 220–222, 275 Regional mining complex, 257, 258 Regular migration, 40, 72, 73, 81, 103, 184 Remittances, 12, 38, 42, 46–56, 72n15, 77, 81, 181, 257–268, 274, 276 Repatriation, 40, 49–51 S Service delivery, 194–197, 200, 202, 206, 207, 209, 210 Social cohesion, 10, 50, 71, 179, 194, 195, 197–200, 200n3, 201n4, 202, 204, 204n6, 206, 207n7, 221 Social exclusion, 237 Social inclusion, 194 Social remittances, 55 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 12, 126, 213–222, 267, 268, 277 Sustainable development, 11, 37–57, 85, 105, 107, 275, 276 U Undocumented migration, 8, 40, 47–49, 51, 57, 267, 275, 276

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United Nations (UN), 3, 38, 39, 42, 70, 72, 76n21, 101, 102, 110, 135–137, 184, 276 V Violence, 49, 50, 96, 97, 134, 135, 147, 147n18, 166, 181, 184, 185, 193–211, 231, 238, 239, 278 Voluntary migration, 39, 40, 42–44

Vulnerabilities, 197, 236–238, 240, 277, 278 X Xenophobia, 11, 18, 20, 24, 104, 175, 194, 195, 197, 201, 218, 221, 228, 229, 231 Z Zama-zama, 257, 262–265, 268